http://hdl.handle.net/1974/806 Thu, 23 May 2013 01:42:48 GMT 2013-05-23T01:42:48Z http://hdl.handle.net/1974/8033 Title: Human Rights, Legitimacy, and Global Justice: Deconstructing the Liberal Theory of International Relations Authors: Szende, JENNIFER Abstract: This dissertation examines liberal statist and liberal cosmopolitan attempts to explain global justice. It argues that liberal statists misidentify their own commitments regarding human rights, and that once these implications are drawn out, many statist and cosmopolitan theories of global justice converge on several of their central positions. Although statists and cosmopolitans differ in their methodologies, emphasis, epistemic commitments, and some logical commitments of their respective positions, I argue that they are nonetheless committed to many of the same positions about practices in the sphere of global justice. They share elements of a logical structure, based in liberal domestic principles, which commits them to similar practical implications. Their convergence is most visible in an examination of their human rights commitments. They nonetheless differ in their analytic priorities, and hence in the ease with which they arrive at many of their insights and conclusions. In particular, despite Rawls’s denial of the desirability or feasibility of cosmopolitanism, he shares many practical commitments with cosmopolitans such as Tesón, Beitz, Buchanan, Tan and Caney. Their shared liberal egalitarian premises arising from liberal domestic theory result in convergence on what they take to be the central questions of global justice, and moreover on their answers to these central questions. Liberal theories on both sides of the cosmopolitan and statist divide endorse a practical approach to human rights that links human rights compliance with such practical global justice privileges as non-intervention, humanitarian aid, treaty relations, and even tolerance. And this convergence entails a more united liberal account of global justice than theorists on either side of the statist and cosmopolitan divide have been willing to admit. Description: Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-05-21 14:40:51.218 Wed, 22 May 2013 04:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1974/8033 2013-05-22T04:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7696 Title: Culture, Community and the Multicultural Individual Authors: Molos, DIMITRIOS Abstract: Every theory of liberal multiculturalism is premised on some account of the nature of culture, cultural difference and social reality, or what I call “the conditions of multiculturality”. In this dissertation, I offer a revised account of the conditions and challenge of multiculturality. Beginning with the widely accepted idea that individuals depend on both culture and community as social preconditions for choice, freedom and autonomy, and informing this idea with collectivist and individualist lessons from Tyler Burge’s famous externalist thought-experiment, my analysis shows that social contexts are multicultural when they are characterized by a plurality of social communities offering distinct sets of cultural norms, and individuals are multicultural to the extent that they are capable of using cultural norms from various social communities. The depth, pervasiveness, and complexity of multiculturality raises important normative questions about fair and just terms for protecting and promoting social communities under conditions of internal and external cultural contestation, and these questions are not only restricted to cases involving internal minorities. As a theory of cultural justice, liberal multiculturalism must respond to the challenge of multiculturality generated by cultural difference per se, but it cannot do so adequately in all cases armed with only the traditional tools of toleration, freedom of association and exit, fundamental rights and freedoms, and internal political autonomy. My analysis demonstrates that, upon the revised conception of multiculturality, liberal theories of tolerationism, egalitarianism and nationalism leave significant cultural remainders, or unaccounted for cultural interests. What is needed is a different liberal multiculturalism, which respects the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms, is committed to the equal and just treatment of individuals, tolerates voluntary cultural groups and practices in the social sphere, recognizes an individual right to culture, and provides some measure of state assistance to individuals seeking to protect and promote their cultural communities in the private sphere. This is a recipe for liberal cultural justice, and for a defensible liberal multiculturalism without nationalism. Description: Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-12-14 19:00:46.433 Tue, 18 Dec 2012 05:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7696 2012-12-18T05:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7583 Title: Bodies, Deviancy, and Socio-Political Change: Judith Butler on Intelligibility Authors: Orr, CELESTE Abstract: In this thesis I contribute to arguments showing how the human body is much more than a vessel that enables us to experience the world through our senses. Our sense of embodiment and our embodied performances give meaning to and shape the world in which we live. I argue that our bodies are crucial to socio-political change and subverting discriminatory cultural assumptions and ideologies. Deviant performances can cause us to be less than intelligible individuals. That is, according to Judith Butler, we become less than intelligible when we do not perform in such a way that meets certain cultural expectations. Dominant expectations are typically implicitly understood to be common-sense values. Unfortunately, many of our implicit values have embedded unjust prejudices that directly affect our thinking and behaviour. These discriminatory implicit values are couched in “the background.” Alexis Shotwell’s expansion of what John R. Searle terms “the background” is particularly useful to understand the political nature of implicitly held beliefs. These discriminatory assumptions couched in the background systematically oppress us. However, the prejudices of the background can be exposed through repeatedly performing our bodies in certain ways. Additionally, our performances can enable us to pool our intellectual resources together and live out the socio-political change we desire. In doing so, performances and identities that were once considered unintelligible can become intelligible and can alter cultural climates. Description: Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-09 13:54:49.323 Tue, 09 Oct 2012 04:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7583 2012-10-09T04:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7580 Title: The Principle of Procreative Beneficence is Eugenic, but so what? Authors: Hotke, ANDREW Abstract: In response to the possibilities for selection created by reproductive technologies like IVF and Prenatal screening, Julian Savulescu has argued that parents have a moral obligation to employ selective technology in order to have the best child that they can possibly have. This idea, which Savulescu has called the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, appears reminiscent of historical eugenics. However, Savulescu has argued that this principle is not eugenic. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to think that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is eugenic. Specifically, I argue that this principle shares five common features with historical eugenics which justify the conclusion that it is eugenic. However, while I argue that this principle is eugenic, I argue that it is not morally problematic for that reason because the shared features of historical eugenics and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, which justify the claim that the principle is eugenic, are not morally problematic. Description: Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-08 22:23:59.333 Tue, 09 Oct 2012 04:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7580 2012-10-09T04:00:00Z