IN SEARCH OF MINERVA’S OWL

Canada’s Army

and

Staff Education (1946-1995)

by

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ABSTRACT

The intellectual history of the Canadian Army from 1946 to 1995 can be traced through the curriculum utilized by the Canadian Army Staff College and the Canadian Forces College to educate the Canadian Army staff officer in conducting warfare within theatres of war. This body of knowledge was analogous to what today comprises the operational level of war. It is a structured vision of conducting conflict that was reaffirmed and sustained by institutional memory created in the crucible of the Second World War and traces its antecedents to the military operations of the Napoleonic Age. These ideas were preserved almost unchanged throughout the Cold War until the introduction of operational art in the late 1980s, as a result of United States influence. The ability of the Canadian Army to maintain this professional knowledge, as a coherent, unchanging whole throughout a period buffeted by social and political change indicates the separateness of the military profession within Canada. This arose from the absence of consistent and durable political guidance during the immediate post war era. As a result the use of the Canadian military as an instrument of national power became disjointed. By default, the unifying factor in Canadian defence activities was maintaining relevance within alliances, particularly in supporting the Pax Americana. This influence can be discerned by applying theories of knowledge transmission and change to the Cold War curriculum used to educate Canadian Army staff officers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is the result of years of research and thought into the nature of intellectual change within the Canadian military, particularly the Army. It is the product of many conversations and debates, as well as examinations of historical and contemporary records. The number of people who have assisted me throughout this journey is innumerable and I will undoubtedly miss many individuals in these brief acknowledgements and if any feel slighted by omission please accept my apologies in advance.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Importance of Professional Military Education

*It is the man who is afraid of the enemy’s General Staff who is a coward: the man who is afraid of his own is merely an old soldier.*

“The Duke of Gallodoro” by Menen

– Quoted in *Canadian Army Staff College Course 1953 “Students Guide to Staff Duties Series”*

If one wishes to understand a nation’s interpretation of war and other conflict one must understand the professional education of that nation’s military. A firm grasp of the professional education of the military is vital because this learning shapes the activities of a nation’s military through providing paradigms to interpret war and other conflict. The composition and provenance of such education plays an important role in the formation of specialized military competencies that permit the profession of arms to perform its primary function - the structured use of violence on behalf of the state. Canada’s military, particularly its Army, has adopted three discernible paradigms in its professional military education. These have been derived from national and international influences and experiences beginning in the nineteenth century. The creation and manifestation of these differing ideas –British, then Canadian and, more recently, American - in Canadian Army staff education are the focus of this thesis.

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Central to any examination of professional military education is an understanding of the knowledge that comprises the core competencies specific to the profession of arms. These proficiencies are included in the curriculums of advanced professional military education. This material pertains to interpreting war and other types of conflict, as well as comprehending the linkages of these military activities to the state. In a related fashion it is necessary to grasp the manner in which military activities are arranged throughout the breadth and depth of these forces to achieve overarching goals. Also, of great importance is the role of the military as part of a multi-disciplinary national effort that would include other activities, such as diplomacy, informational and economic initiatives.³

To appreciate fully the importance of this neglected topic one must examine some broader considerations or perspectives pertaining to use of the profession of arms in the application of military force. For most countries the use of such force is normally a choice of last resort. The decision to use that option, at least hypothetically, is made in a deliberate and measured fashion as an *in extremis* national response when politics and diplomacy have failed. In the words of the military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz from almost two centuries past, “...war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”⁴ The more commonly used paraphrasing of this idea is that war is an “extension of politics by other means.” But Clausewitz continued with the important notion that: “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”⁵

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⁵ Ibid.
These ideas reflect a rational connection between policy and military activities that is generally accepted by countries like Canada, in theory, if not always in practice. In this process it is important to understand the roles played by senior military commanders and their staffs, as well as the professional culture and intellectual influences that have shaped the manner in which Canada’s military organizes war on behalf of its nation. Education is the manner in which these competencies are passed.

Central to any understanding of a professional military is an awareness of the role of the staff officer in devising solutions to military problems on behalf of a nation. Staffs have existed since ancient times and assist senior commanders in carrying out national direction. In its most rudimentary form the staff can consist of personal assistants to a commander, however, in modern times staffs have become large and highly specialized organizations. The staff forms the intellectual core of any military organization. Staffs have continually evolved since the Napoleonic Wars, when nations mobilized in order to meet the threat imposed on Europe by the armies of post-revolutionary France. Since that time the scope and complexity of conflict has expanded. Staffs have developed to deal with all aspects of military activities from operations to administration. In essence, staff officers prepare armed forces for what they have to do. The Mathematician Gerald J. Whitrow wrote “The primary function of mental activity is to face the future and anticipate the event which is to happen.”

In this way staff officers look ahead, attempt to foresee what is to come and organize their services for the roles that they will be assigned by government. In this fashion

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6 While from a Canadian perspective the clarity of the relationship between policy and military strategy has not always been well defined the need for policy to guide military activities has been part of the legacy of the Canadian civil-military relationship. Ph.D candidate, Major-General Daniel Gosselin (who, at the time of writing, occupies the position of Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy) has discovered in the course of his research a continuous record of this understanding. Major-General Daniel Gosselin, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations, National Direction and Strategic Command,” a presentation given to the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 11 July 2009.

they remove the burden of minutia from military commanders in order to allow those leaders to guide and manage their forces. The British Army staff manual from 1912 exhorted staff officers to act in concert with the wishes of their commander and:

...be unsparing in their endeavours to help the troops by every possible means in carrying out their difficult task; foreseeing and providing for obstacles and dangers that may arise; making clear what is required without ambiguity or possibility of misunderstanding; and ever careful to attend to the comfort of those under their General’s command before attending to their own.

This directive also made sure that staff officers understood that they had no de jure power outside that vested in them by the person in charge, theirs was an intellectual role:

Staff officers, as such, have no authority over the troops or services and departments, and though they are responsible for the issue of orders, it is essential that they should remember that every order given by them is given by the authority and on the responsibility of the authorized commander.

In order to become a member of a military staff, officers must demonstrate that they are proficient in their métier. They must also successfully complete rigorous programmes of studies that provide them with specific intellectual competencies. The institutions that offer these courses of study are called “staff colleges.”

It would be inaccurate to conceptualize staff colleges merely as military technical institutions. Rather, staff colleges are holistic in their curriculum and reinforce the professional aspects of the profession of arms; empiricism, administration and specialized knowledge. Staff colleges also provide students the opportunity to form relationships with other military practitioners, both instructors and students. The professional relationships created in this fashion also include

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9 United Kingdom, War Office, Staff Manual War Provisional 1912 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1912), 7.
10 Ibid.
11 See Kahn, “Note.”
alliance and coalition partners who send instructors and students to each other’s institutions. This transnational\textsuperscript{12} community has bonds that facilitate the transmission of professional knowledge between connected militaries and in extreme cases sometimes has influence on armed forces greater than national authorities. The introductory chapters of this dissertation establish the relationships thus forged by the staff college experience in much greater detail.

Despite these demanding requirements and responsibilities, the staff officer in popular culture is a much maligned member of the military profession. The enduring image of the staff is one of bumbling, uncaring or even dangerous individuals who are an impediment to fighting personnel. In the aftermath of the First World War, this representation of military leaders and their staffs as insulated and out of touch from the realities of horrific violence took firm root in the public consciousness through popular literature like Charles Yale Harrison’s \textit{Generals Die in Bed}.\textsuperscript{13} Even professional works, like Major-General J.F.C. Fuller’s \textit{Generalship Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command} perpetuated this depiction of the staff officer as negligent, uncaring or both.\textsuperscript{14} This poem written by a Canadian Army officer and veteran of the Korean War, Captain Brian F. Simons, in the early 1950s summarizes this perspective:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{PORTRAIT OF A STAFF OFFICER}

What species stands before us bold,  
With codfish eyes, furtive and cold,  
Past middle life, wrinkled and lean,  
Polite in contact but cool, serene.

Damnably composed, a concrete post,  
Lacking in charm, a friendless ghost,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} “Transnational” is used in the sense of operating between or outside national borders.  
Minus his bowels, a human stone,
No sense of humour, passionless, unknown.

What species stands before us tell,
We hear that he winds up in hell,
Just spare him from undue abuse
And hope he doesn’t reproduce.\textsuperscript{15}

Unfortunately, these commonly held sentiments of disdain ignore the
importance of staff officers as intellectual custodians, who act as protectors and
creators of knowledge associated with the profession of arms. Additionally, staff
officers provide a critical role in the orderly conduct of military activities. They not
only create directives in response to superior direction, but more importantly provide
rigor to the orders, instructions and plans that are prepared prior to and during
operations. Ideas flow from commanders, but are provided substance and form by
their staffs who then disseminate these concepts in the form of orders and instructions.
Given the central and vital role they fulfil, the importance of staff officers and the
educational system that produces them has been highlighted to the Canadian military
time and time again during war and peace.

The need for professional military education is especially pronounced in the
Army, which to a greater extent than the other services, traditionally relies on the
understanding and application of a common body of knowledge, or in modern terms,
doctrine, to conduct effective military operations.\textsuperscript{16} It can be argued that this is due to
the difficulty of the physical environment in which land forces operate. Armies fight
in exceedingly complex surroundings, navies in less complicated settings and air

\textsuperscript{15} Canada, CASC, \textit{Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College} 2, no. 3 (1963-1965): 32 and 153.

\textsuperscript{16} For discussion of Canadian military culture see Allan English, \textit{Understanding Canadian Military Culture} (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2004).
forces in the most straightforward milieu. Common understanding allows practitioners to view military problems from a shared perspective despite any complicating factors that might occur. In many ways this is analogous to the corporate body of knowledge required by other specialized professions, like law and medicine.

This shared knowledge imbues concepts contained in warfare theories, which are developed from the experience of history, to provide a body of professional literature. This material creates amongst practitioners a collective understanding of how a specific military or its components are intended to operate in a chaotic world. In the twentieth century some of this material has been formally codified and referred to as “doctrine,” which will be explored later in this thesis. Staff colleges and the education they provide are crucial to creating, implementing, refining and preserving this aspect of specialized professional knowledge. The importance of the Army staff education system has been particularly pronounced in Canada since the Second World War when the need for Army staff officers was dire and the institutional capability to produce competent practitioners was decidedly lacking. This requirement has not decreased since 1945 as most military operations pursued by Canada since then have been primarily land-based.

This requirement for Army staff education might lead one to assume that the professional knowledge created through repeated use of the Canadian military in the violent conflicts of the past century would be mostly national in origin. On the contrary, an examination of the body of knowledge taught to Canadian Army officers throughout recent history demonstrates that its provenance is not always Canadian.


but has been determined by other sources. The intellectual development of Canada’s Army, within the larger context of the Canadian military, has mostly rested within the arms, or army, of an empire, be it British or of the United States. Scrutinizing the education of the Canadian Army staff officer provides evidence of transnational influences on the profession of arms in Canada particularly during the tensions of the Cold War.

In order to understand the preparation of army staff officers since the Second World War and its significance to Canada it is necessary to study army staff education, its intellectual provenance and form from modern to post modern times. The Canadian army staff college system was created at the end of the modern era, during the Second World War. That conflagration drew attention to the need for a reliable system to educate Canadian army officers in the competencies of advanced military arts and sciences, especially those required to organize large scale conflict and to connect it to national direction. Tracing the evolution of this professional knowledge and its instruction, as part of the staff college curriculum, will show that there were numerous outside influences on the military profession in Canada. These external pressures and their effects demonstrate continual military interdependence between Canada and other nations that continues in the post modern age.

Prior to the Second World War, a limited number of Canadian officers had attended Imperial staff colleges and larger numbers had taken truncated forms of staff

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19 Canada’s Army is a generic expression not coupled to a specific point in time.

20 These chronological periods are derived from the scholarship of military sociologists Charles Moskos, John Williams and David Segal who proposed that the twentieth century can be divided into three stages which describe the professional evolution of western militaries. First, the modern era (1900-1945) is an example of the role of the citizen soldier and levee en masse. According to Moskos et al., the late modern phase (1945-1990) includes the continuation of mass armies and the ongoing professionalization of their officer corps in the context of the Cold War. Last, the post modern age (since 1990) represents a lessening of the separation between military and society during the post-Cold War era. Charles C. Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,” in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15.
education in Canada. In 1940 the shortage of vacancies on British courses prompted the Canadian Army to create a short wartime course to educate officers in the knowledge needed to function as staff and leaders in an expanding military organization. The first iteration was conducted in England, with the remainder of these courses being conducted in Canada, at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). During the same period some officers attended British and other courses. After the war the Canadian Army Staff College (CASC) was established at Fort Frontenac in Kingston, Ontario and continues to this day as the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC). The CASC and its successor attempted to ensure that junior and mid-level officers were educated in the competencies required to command and administer army organizations, in war and peace. Prominent Canadian military historian John English has affirmed that this army staff college was of vital importance to the maintenance of the army’s military expertise.

In 1966 the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto was established as an amalgamated Canadian staff education institution. The creation of the CFC was precursor to the unification the Canadian military in 1968 from distinct services to a single entity, the Canadian Forces (CF). As a result, the new CFC took on custodianship of the professional education of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), as well as became responsible for the education and training of future staff officers of the CF. For Canadian Army officers, specifically, this meant that the CFC took ownership of CF

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22 In his monograph Lament For An Army, John English states, “Like the British Staff College, after which it was modelled, the CASC was the nursery of the General Staff and the single most important educational institution in the army.” English, Lament For An Army, 6.
curriculum pertaining to large scale military activities, including the organization of military operations in pursuit of national goals during conflict. This new institution was founded on the grounds of the former Royal Canadian Air Force Staff College, in Toronto, and the curriculum records and miscellaneous papers for CFC from its inception onwards are housed in the College archives. While other allied learning institutions existed, it was these colleges, the CASC/CLFCSC and the CFC, which provided the bulk of Canadian army staff officers the education to deal with both the dilemmas of military employment and organizing warfare in the late modern age.

In addition to these institutions, the National Defence College (NDC) was established at Fort Frontenac in 1948. It was an organization analogous to the British Imperial Defence College, created in 1927 to study the high level interface between national objectives and military policy.\textsuperscript{24} The curriculum of the NDC was more wide ranging then that the other Canadian senior officer education institutions and focussed on not only the military, but also on the social, political, industrial, economic, and diplomatic aspects of national defence.\textsuperscript{25} This college was closed in 1994 due to fiscal constraints.\textsuperscript{26} However, not long after the closure of the NDC, two shorter courses were instituted at the CFC to replace the longer single course. The Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) commenced in 1998 and the National Security Studies Course (NSSC) was started in 1999. In 2006 these latter courses were renamed the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) and the National Strategic Studies Program (NSSP). Like the NDC that they replaced, these courses aspired to teach not only the military, but also the non-military aspects of defence. At the time of writing,

\textsuperscript{24} For information concerning the formation of the Imperial Defence College see Brevet-Major A.R. Godwin-Austin, \textit{The Staff and the Staff College}, with a forward by General Sir George F. Milne (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1927), 285-86.
\textsuperscript{25} English, \textit{Lament For An Army}, 82.
\textsuperscript{26} Canada, DND, \textit{Canadian Officership In The 21st Century Detail Analysis And Strategy For Implementation (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance For The Canadian Forces Officer Corps And The Officer Professional Development System} (March 2001), BN 2/15.
these programmes have been superseded by the National Security Program (NSP), amalgamating the AMSP and NSSP into one course of study, which commenced in September 2008. While highly interesting in their own right, study of the NDC and its successors are not within the scope of this work. This exclusion has been made because only very limited numbers of officers attended NDC, AMSC/AMSP and NSSC/NSSP, with the bulk of staff education for army officers taking place earlier in their careers. Also there was some doubt regarding the effectiveness of the original NDC in fulfilling its mandate. For both of these reasons, albeit primarily the former, little mention will be made of NDC, AMSC/AMSP and NSSC/NSSP.

The learning environment of the staff colleges was shaped by the instructors. They tended to be senior officers who had commanded military organizations in their respective specialties, and they were assigned a small group or “syndicate” of students to mentor. Most instruction was conducted through instructor-guided discussion in order to allow the participants to share experiences and understanding in order to educate themselves. Other instruction consisted of lectures, field problems using the local countryside to provide realism to tactical questions and “war games,” with students acting in the capacity of commanders and staffs to solve military problems. The fraternal relationships formed during the staff college experience were based on scholarship and knowledge. This atmosphere of collegiality hearkens back to the learning fraternities established by Prussia in the early nineteenth century and,

28 English, Lament For An Army, 48-49; and Macdonald, 134-141.
through the study of curriculum changes, can be seen to have extended itself far beyond the limited geographical area of individual colleges.\textsuperscript{29}

In this sense, as professional learning institutions with instructors and students from allied militaries staff colleges have assisted in the establishment and solidifying of transnational links between these allies and Canada’s Army. Consequently, examining the pedagogy associated with Canadian Army staff education permits one to discern the intellectual influences produced by these relationships over time. Utilising social theories concerning the transmission of knowledge to interpret the evolution of learning will enable delineation of these relationships. Although, theories of epistemic communities are derived from research pertaining to knowledge transmission in scientific communities, those professional groups, amongst others, are analogous to the military in terms of having a distinct body of knowledge and separate organization.

This study of the education of the Canadian Army staff officer focuses on two specific aspects of knowledge transmission, communities of practice and thought collectives. These models, described below, are used to describe the relationships between individual military practitioners and the allied militaries that are the subject matter of this thesis. Also these models can be used to interpret the nature of the changes that took place within the Canadian Army staff curriculum, particularly the intellectual shifts produced as a result of the Second World War and Cold War.

Sociologist Diane Forestell, in “Communities of Practice: Thinking and Acting within the Territory,” has argued that ideas of communities of practice should be applied to the Canadian military. She also has put forward the idea that formal CF professional education ignores the social dimension of knowledge. Forestell draws

upon the works of other social scientists who have specialized in organized learning to substantiate her thoughts. Furthermore, she defines communities of practice as groups of persons who are connected by the shared pursuit of knowledge or expertise in a certain area. These collections of individuals are not bound by organizational hierarchy but should be viewed as networks of people with a shared interest or passion. A community of practice is normally self-organizing along these lines of commonality.\textsuperscript{30} One can discern the existence of these communities of practice in the materials pertaining to the various Canadian staff colleges and the relationships established between the Canadian Army and allied militaries.

In a related fashion, Ludwik Fleck, a Polish doctor who examined the philosophy, sociology and history of science, advocated the concept of thought collectives, which he defined as those who were participants in a definable and collective structure of thought generated by an esoteric circle of authorities, or experts. This group communicates knowledge with other practitioners and interested parties to solicit feedback on their views. Knowledge passes from the inner to outer circles and back again so this cycle is strengthened and collectivized. Fleck believed that this complex open system of exchange can at times create a weakening of existing systems of beliefs and encourage new discoveries and ideas.\textsuperscript{31} This process is analogous to that which transpires in staff colleges, but also provides another perspective concerning the exchange of knowledge between the Canadian and other staff education institutions.

\textsuperscript{30} Diane Forestell, “Communities of Practice: Thinking and Acting within the Territory,” (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Contract Research Report, 2003), 1-5; and 24.

Fleck suggested that all participants in thought collectives have shared ownership of experience and theories, and, therefore, changes in knowledge, are most likely during periods of confusion when dissonance exposes differences between competing belief systems and eventually produces new thought styles in an effort to address perceived inconsistencies. The programmes of the Canadian staff colleges provide opportunities for this aspect of knowledge development and change. It must be noted that the absence of structured and progressive evolutionary change within the scrutinized bodies of knowledge can be indicative of the, at times, overwhelming influence of thought collectives formed by allied military practitioners in the United Kingdom or United States. This point is affirmed emphatically within the research conducted for this thesis.

In a similar manner to Forestell and Fleck, theorist Thomas Kuhn emphasized the relationships within and between professional groups as being necessary to the creation and migration of knowledge. He utilized the concept of the paradigm to include communities of scientific practitioners who share common beliefs, as well as to describe the shared belief, or theory. His thoughts concerning paradigm shifts describe the process by which practitioners change the paradigms that provide their mental frameworks. Kuhn proposed that over time anomalies gradually appear, which cannot be explained by the existent paradigm through “normal” science and these incongruities prompt new research and eventual reconstruction of the field in a manner predicated upon a need to account for the previously unexplainable irregularity. Kuhn believed that paradigms are necessary to focus research and that the true sign of a mature science is a continuous transformation from one paradigm to

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another through successive paradigm shifts produced by scientific revolutions.\textsuperscript{34} He also believed that as the new paradigms, or schools of thought, gain credence and attract practitioners the older paradigms and communities of practitioners disappear. Specialized journals, the activities of groups of practitioners and demands for specialized curriculum are associated with the implementation of new paradigms.\textsuperscript{35}

Other philosophers of knowledge, like Karin Knorr-Cetina with her studies on the intellectual aspects of science, argue that the cognitive operations of that discipline are constructive rather than descriptive and understanding is built rather than discovered.\textsuperscript{36} In the paradigm shifts evidenced through the Canadian staff college curricula at the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War, the hallmarks of progressive, constructive accumulation and formulation of knowledge are absent. Thus, questioning these missing underpinnings of the construction of professional knowledge within Canadian staff college curriculums confirms the existence and role of other influential groups of practice, thought collectives or professional bodies in the intellectual development of the Canadian Army. The chapters of this dissertation are organized to provide an orderly framework for the exploration of these ideas.

While the focus of this research is the latter portion of the twentieth century it is necessary to look at army staff education throughout the modern period, from the establishment of Canada in 1867 to the end of the Second World War in 1945, in order to provide context to later discussion. Following that will be an investigation of the education of the army staff officer from 1946 to 1995 with the implementation of the last knowledge shift within the CF. Such an examination also demonstrates that the influence of empire on the intellectual development of the Canadian Army has

\textsuperscript{34} Kuhn uses the idea of a scientific revolution to describe the processes and effects of a paradigm shift. Ibid, 12-15 and 89-90.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 18-19.
been pervasive and consistent through its inception until post modern times. As a result the dissertation is divided into two chronological parts separated by the end of the Second World War. This division mirrors the pre-Second World War influence of the United Kingdom and post war influence of the United States.

Chapter 2, “Mars and Minerva,” looks at the primary material pertaining to professional military education. The records and writings that exist provide a good foundation for analysis and study of Canadian Army staff education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As well, they provide a variety of perspectives that together forms a comprehensive discourse on the intellectual provenance of army staff education in Canada.

In Chapter 3, “Supporting the Pax Britannica: Canadian Army Staff Education Prior to the Second World War (1867-1938),” the connection between the United Kingdom and the formation of Canadian staff education will be brought out through an examination of the thought collectives created by these communities of practice. It will become evident through an examination of this period that the British Army created the substance and structure of Canadian Army professional knowledge through staff education in the years before the Second World War. Canada’s participation in the Imperial staff colleges located in Britain and India and the professional affiliations created from these experiences guaranteed that Canada’s Army was firmly enmeshed within the arms of the Empire. As well, the influence of the British system of professional military education on Canada’s Army becomes apparent when one looks at the development of domestic professional military education in Canada during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Shared military practices or paradigms obtained from these allied and national institutions enabled Canadian staff officers to interact seamlessly with their British counterparts.
during Imperial wars. This chapter will also discuss the staff college system, from its Prussian origins to its British implementation, and examine in detail the role it played in assimilating the Canadian Army into its larger Imperial counterpart.

Although the education provided at the British staff colleges in those pre-war years initially gave structure to the wartime staff training created in 1940 this British influence did not continue to wield the same authority over staff education throughout the Second World War. Indeed, the form and content of the wartime courses changed over time to reflect the needs and experiences of an expanding Canadian Army, as well as a developing relationship with the American military. There is a discernible shift in the communities of practice and thought collectives from a British to Canadian emphasis. Chapter 4, “Creating the ‘Brain’ of an Army: Canadian Army Staff Education During the Second World War (1939-1945),” examines the development of the CASC curriculum in the late modern age as a result of these national and extra-national influences. The Second World War provides the demarcation between the Imperial perspective of the pre-war period and the creation of a distinctly Canadian paradigm of education.

Chapter 5, “Separate and Distinct: Canadian Military Developments of the Cold War (1945-1990),” leads the second portion of this dissertation; the examination of the post Second World War period. This chapter scrutinizes the transnational linkages of the late modern age between the Canadian Army and its American counterpart. The international events of these years provide a context for understanding of the circumstances by which Canada’s armed forces developed strong military relationships with the nation’s major ally, sometimes acting independently of government direction, but in concert with its own military interests. These interests were determined in some ways by the transnational groups of practice and thought
collectives that had been formed during the Cold War. Also, this section provides context to the post Second World War portion of this dissertation showing the continued influence of an empire, albeit that of the *Pax Americana*, on Canada’s Army.

Following this is Chapter 6, “A Canadian Vision of Professional Military Education: Establishing the Army Staff College (1946-1958).” This chapter gives an assessment of the immediate post-war CASC curriculum and demonstrates that this material was a body of knowledge that had Imperial provenance, but was shaped by the Canadian Army experience of the Second World War and with American overtones. This curriculum was affected by a number of external pressures, similar to those faced by allied armed forces. These included the threat of nuclear war, the need to maintain a large professional army, the need to have the support of alliances, the requirement for military leaders to be managers and technicians, coupled with an ambivalent public attitude towards the Canadian military. The influence of both the United Kingdom and the United States is visible within the curriculum and consequently the intellectual formation of the Canadian Army. However, the professional military education paradigm that was formed was primarily Canadian and culminated in the establishment of the two-year Canadian Army staff course starting in 1959.

Chapter 7, “Paths Found and Lost: Canadian Army Staff Education (1959-1973),” details the decline of Canadian army staff education and loss of the Canadian paradigm. This professional learning had been rooted in the Canadian Army experiences of the Second World War. It had continued the legacy of its pre-war connections with the British Army but also accommodated its Cold War partners,

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37 Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military,” 15.
predominantly the United States Army. This chapter looks at the growth of the CASC staff course to meet the increasing requirements of the Canadian Army and its later diminution as a result of the integration of the Canadian services and professional military education.

Chapter 8, “New Beginnings: Inter-service Staff Education at the Canadian Forces College (1974-1986),” examines the creation of the CFC. This beginning occurred as a result of unification and effectively transferred the mandate to educate army staff officers in higher level military activities from the CASC/CLFCSC to the new institution. The curricula at the CFC at first mirrored those of the RCAF, but then adopted an American flavour, which in turn had an impact throughout the separate services via the education provided to the Canadian students. The joining of the separate services’ staff education created a professional activity that did not meet the needs of Canada’s land forces or address the lessons learned from the Second World War onwards.

Chapter 9, “Following Another Paradigm Shift: The Canadian Forces College and the Operational Level of War (1987-1995),” details the influence of the Canadian association with the United States military that was particularly pronounced in the land environment studies and eventually culminated in the most significant paradigm shift of the late and post modern age in Canadian military thought - the adoption of the operational level of war. The operational level of war is a conceptual realm that exists between the politics of strategy and the violence of tactics. It has two main components, campaign planning and operational art. The former is the process of translating strategic objectives in a manner that can be understood and utilized at the tactical level, while the latter is a far more complicated skill and refers to the creative
aspects of arranging engagements, battles and campaigns to achieve national ends.\textsuperscript{38}

The operational level of war is an extremely important professional idea as it formalizes the connection between strategy and tactics, in theory, if not in practice, ensuring the link between military activities and national direction. These concepts and their American provenance will be explored within this chapter, as well as the details of the communities of practice and thought collectives that had formed to produce this paradigm shift. The CFC implementation of this doctrinal construct demonstrates many of the indications espoused by the epistemological theorists and consequently demonstrates the influence of the \textit{Pax Americana} within the Canadian military.

Finally, Chapter 10, “Conclusion: In the Arms of Empire,” provides a \textit{dénouement} to this research. This section recapitulates and synthesizes the results of this dissertation. It notes that a holistic examination of Canadian Army staff education and a detailed dissection of the one true paradigm shift of the late and post modern period has provided hitherto undocumented insights into the attribution and formation of the body of professional knowledge utilized by the CF.

These chapters demonstrate that it is possible to discern the external exigencies that influenced the development of military professional knowledge in Canada in the late modern age by examining the materials associated with staff education. Using ideas articulated by Forestell \textit{et al.} one can observe the formation and transmission of knowledge, as well as changes in the paradigms accepted by informal and formal groupings of transnational military practitioners. Understanding these associations enables an understanding of the transnational influence of other nations on the Canadian military.

\textsuperscript{38} Comprehensive discussion concerning the levels of war is contained in the various chapters of Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Lawrence Hickey, eds., \textit{The Operational Art – Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts} (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005).
The intellectual dimensions of a military profession are an outgrowth of its particular culture and history. This dimension is expressed through curricula which are taught in staff colleges. Logically, these elements should exist as a coherent body of knowledge and over time demonstrate a progressive, relative evolution. However, an examination of army staff education in Canada belies this supposition through the manner in which various educational approaches that were adopted. The paradigm shifts that were produced over time demonstrate that the intellectual history of the profession of arms in Canada has sometimes been shaped more by the demands of maintaining relevancy to major allies than by self regulation and awareness. A thorough study of these topics demonstrates that the professional education, and competencies, of the officers of the Canadian Army have often been extra national and in the arms of an empire. In the final analysis, without a comprehensive account of the development of professional thought in Canada’s Army through staff education, there will continue to be a void in Canadian military historiography. This dissertation addresses that space.
Chapter 2

Mars and Minerva

There is... no thorough and detailed study on the emergence of and relationship between the classics of strategy, or indeed on the historical development of formal or abstract military thought, or on the history of strategic thought and its relations with historiography. These are not easy subjects but they are very important ones. Yet one lacks penetrating studies or syntheses of these problems.

- Walter Kaegi (1980)

These comments by American historian Walter Kaegi remain relevant and apply to Canada as well as the United States. A comprehensive study of the intellectual development of the Canadian Army is long overdue. Although, from a Canadian perspective a great deal of research and analysis has been already been done on various facets of this topic, no holistic study had been yet produced. This thesis builds on existent research and the primary source materials associated with staff education to create a study of the higher level specialized military knowledge used by the Canadian Army and its successor the Canadian Land Forces.

Chapter 1 laid out how the body of professional military knowledge passed on by staff colleges to Canadian officers was utilized to orchestrate military activities on behalf of Canada. Through the research conducted into this topic it was discerned that there were significant links between Canada and allied militaries throughout the twentieth century which, in turn, influenced the content and structure of the professional military education of Canada’s Army. First, was the connection between the Canadian and British Armies prior to the end of the Second World War and, second, was that involving Canada’s Army and the United States military, principally

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its Army during the Cold War and beyond. Between these two was a brief period produced as a result of the Second World War in which a Canadian viewpoint dominated. However, due to Cold War alliances and Canadian military restructuring this national perspective was eventually subsumed by that of the United States.

In order to provide a larger background for any study of the Canadian Army in the twentieth century a number of general surveys relevant to Canadian military history, in addition to a number of specialized works focused on various topics, were used. First in the former category was Canadian historian Desmond Morton’s, *A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo.* Morton’s work offers a reference that is commonly used in Canadian military studies and research. It provides a dependable source concerning Canada’s military history. Along with Morton’s study are the works of James Eayrs. His *In Defence of Canada* series offers a comprehensive examination of the Canadian military in the twentieth century. Also, Jack Granatstein’s numerous works concerning Canada’s Army give an overview of that institution and its commanders. George Stanley’s somewhat dated, but still extremely useful, summary history of Canada’s Army, *Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People,* was also extensively utilized to provide

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context to this research. A number of focused accounts provide depth to particular periods of this history. For example, the works of Colonel Charles Stacey detailing Canadian Army involvement in the Second World War gives a well-rounded perspective on the Canadian Army from 1939 to 1945, and along with Major Rick Walker’s “Poles Apart: Civil-Military Relations in Pursuit of a Canadian National Army,” figure prominently amongst the histories of this time. Additionally, the Department of National Defence has sponsored studies to explore various facets of Canada’s military history, including aspects of its professional development. J.D. Sheffield’s, “How Even Was the Learning Curve? Reflections on the British and Dominion Armies on the Western Front, 1916-1918,” as well as P. Brennan and T. Leppard’s, “How the Lessons Were Learned: Senior Commanders and the Moulding of the Canadian Corps after the Somme,” both contained in Yves Tremblay’s *Canadian Military Since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000*, provide perspectives on the professionalization of Canada’s Army in the First World War. Furthermore, various military branch and regimental histories also present other specific details not readily available in the broader works, while assorted autobiographies and biographies give the background of individuals who were prominent throughout the period researched. These more

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specialized works indicate the hidden importance of army staffs that existed at the time.

While there has been study of military education in Canada there has been little examination of the curricula of the relevant staff colleges in order to understand outside influences on Canadian military thought. Building on existent research in this area will permit a fuller understanding of the dimensions of this significant topic. Canadian military historian Steven Harris, in *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939*, has examined aspects of Canada’s military education and training and provides the foundation and background for research after this period. Harris looks at education and training in terms of what he deems the attributes of a profession - expertise, corporateness and responsibility. He concludes that the violence of the First World War was responsible for prompting the professionalization of the army. He notes that maintaining the professional ethos inculcated on the battlefields of Europe became a challenge because of the public antipathy towards the military that resulted from the horrific waste of the First World War. There was little public interest in establishing a professional education system for military officers and as a result the British staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta during the early part of the twentieth century laid the intellectual foundation of the Canadian Army. Participation in these courses also perpetuated traditions of officer learning that were fraternal and transnational in character. Harris’ work provides an exploration of the British perspective adopted by Canadian Army staff officers prior to the Second World War and supports ideas of communities of practice and thought collectives. His

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later essay “A Canadian Way of War: 1919 to 1939,” in *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, provides further discussion of these British influences.⁹

Along with Harris, there are other Canadian academic works on professional military education, many in the form of edited volumes and articles. A notable collection of this genre is Yves Tremblay et al., *L’éducation et les militaires canadiens*. The chapters in this book are focused on the academic education of entry level officers, the training of the general military population and, importantly, the professional education of senior officers.¹⁰ Other Canadian research into professionalism and professional education has been conducted by historians, Allan English and Randy Wakelam.¹¹ The staff colleges are also the subject of a number of master’s dissertations, notably John A. Macdonald, “In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899 to 1945,” and M.V. Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945.”¹² These unpublished academic studies examine the development of professional education institutions in a chronological fashion and describe the institutional history of the Canadian Army staff and its education. They lay the basis for further study into the development of

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professional knowledge within the various curricula, its links to communities of practitioners and the background to paradigm shifts.

Research into the area of staff education has also been undertaken in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Historian Brian Bonds’, *The Victorian Army and the Staff College*, has examined the influence of the Camberley staff college in transforming the British Army from an early nineteenth century institution to a small professional force that acquitted itself superbly at the beginning of the First World War. The 1927 publication by A.R. Godwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, is a treasure trove of detail on the functioning of Camberley in its early years. Both histories provide an indication of the relevance of education to knowledge migration within the profession of arms. Additionally, Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Young’s, *The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958*, provides an exceptional overview of the Camberley experience. An excellent general study of the history of the staff is Brigadier James Hittle’s, *The Military Staff: It’s History and Development*. As well, the early history of staff education and its Prussian provenance is documented in Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805*. White provides great insights into the establishment of the professional communities of practice that eventually became a characteristic of the staff college experience.

There are also notable studies of American professional military education. In a small field, Judith Hicks Stiehm’s, *United States Army War College: Military*
Education in a Democracy, stands out.\textsuperscript{18} It comprehensively explores the manner in which professional military education supports the democratic objectives of a nation-state. Additionally, while military studies teacher, Keith Bickel’s, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940,\textsuperscript{19} is not a study of military education \textit{per se}, it examines the United States Marine Corps as a learning organization and documents the outside influences on the formation of the now important Small Wars Manual.\textsuperscript{20} It provided perspectives that were useful in delving into the factors shaping the staff education of Canada’s Army.

Connected to the developments in United States military education detailed by Stiehm and Bickel is the Canadian adoption of the operational level of war between 1987 and 1995. It is necessary to scrutinize this paradigm shift to understand the transnational influence of the United States Army on its Canadian counterpart. Additionally, the acceptance of this idea into the body of professional knowledge embraced by the Canadian military provides great insights into knowledge migration through professional education. Furthermore, the operational level of war is an extremely important military professional concept because, as noted in Chapter 1, it represents the link between strategy and tactics – it provides for a line of continuity between military activities and national direction.

The concepts formalized in the operational level of war had been part of the core professional knowledge of the Canadian Army prior to it being given an American form and provenance in the late twentieth century. William (Bill)

McAndrew has outlined Canadian Army involvement with operational art during the Second World War in his “Operational Art and the Canadian Army’s Way of War” and “Operational Art and the Northwest European Theatre of War.” McAndrew demonstrates that the form of operational art practised by Canadians in the Second World War was fragmentary at best, because military campaigns lacked the coherency required to satisfy the requirements of strategy. It did not reflect the paradigm that was eventually adopted from American sources. Other Canadian historians who have formed similar conclusions concerning the Canadian usage of operational art are Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris the editors of Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders. On the other hand, Terry Copp, in Guy Simonds and the Art of Command, argues that Simonds utilized operational thought in a coherent fashion, similar to the American model, during his campaigns in Europe in the last years of the war. The context provided by McAndrew, Horn, Harris, and Copp assist with understanding the formation of a uniquely Canadian perspective in post war staff education and the shift from a British to Canadian paradigm.

While these histories make available the viewpoint of particular individuals or events to provide a perspective on the military commander as practitioner of operational art, John English in a number of studies, like “The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War,” Failure in High Command: The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, Lament For An Army: The Decline of Military Professionalism, takes a more wide ranging approach and delves into many issues.

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22 Lieutenant Colonel Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds. Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001).
23 Terry Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007).
concerning Canada’s Army, including education, during and after the Second World War. He does not address the operational level of war as a separate facet of professional military thought, except in the broadest sense, but instead presents overviews of the development of operational art and its interaction with various armed forces. Still, this work provides excellent Canadian background for these complex ideas. Within the Canadian community of military historians the subject matter of operational level constructs as part of the greater body of ideas has been recognized as an area that requires further research. It is only with such study that conceptual explanatory models relevant to the conduct of the Canadian military operations can be uncovered. Canadian military historian, Allan English and others have published a great deal of work on contemporary operational thought in recent years. These writings provide some perspective on various facets of this conceptual model in the late and post modern periods.

Within the context of the foregoing research some recent writings of Canadian military historiography highlight the necessity of forming a comprehensive record


pertaining to operational thought in Canada. Ron Haycock and Serge Bernier, in
*Teaching Military History: Clio and Mars in Canada*, a primer of military graduate
studies in Canada, are strident in their contention that research on operational art is a
rich potential field of study for Canadian historians. They write that without historical
exploration into this topic that there are great challenges in the balancing of current
operational research with history.\(^{27}\) Haycock and Bernier argue that lacking strong
historical underpinnings one cannot comprehend the evolution of current ideas
pertaining to the conduct of war. Initiatives such as those which have been sponsored
by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Defence Research and Development
Canada, and the Canadian Forces College, studying “Leadership, Command and the
Operational Art” have assisted in addressing Haycock and Bernier’s observation of
the need for further exploration into this area. This research is structured to “create a
Canadian approach to leadership and command as they apply to the operational art in
the CF with a view to translating it into a framework for professional development.”\(^{28}\)
Research which discusses the state of contemporary operational thought in Canada,
like maritime historian, Richard Gimblett’s “The Canadian Way of War: Experience
and Principles,” greatly contribute in providing more Canadian materials pertaining to
this area of study.\(^{29}\)

Also assisting with building a Canadian perspective regarding the
development and adoption of operational level knowledge as part of the military

\(^{27}\) Ronald Haycock and Serge Bernier, *Teaching Military History: Clio and Mars in Canada*
(Athabasca, Alberta: Athabasca University, 1995), 33; for further discussion on professional military
education see Ronald G. Haycock, “The Labors of Athena and the Muses: Historical and
Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education,” in Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson,
and see also Ronald Haycock, “Getting here from there”: Trauma and transformation in Canadian

\(^{28}\) Canada, Department of National Defence, “INITIATIVE for the STUDY of LEADERSHIP,
COMMAND, and the OPERATIONAL ART,” (May 2003), no page.

\(^{29}\) Richard Gimblett, “The Canadian Way of War: Experiences and Principles.” (Dalhousie: Dalhousie
University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Seapower Conference, 8 June 2002, revised November
2002).
profession are a myriad of studies from other nations. Historians who have documented the operational level of war in the Soviet Union and the United States provide much of the backdrop to the extant Canadian accounts of operational thought and practice. Indeed in some cases they shape Canadian historical studies. Sean Maloney’s, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” relies upon prominent United States historian Russell Weigley’s, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, to provide comparable themes which he then weaves into his account of Canadian military strategy and operational plans.\(^30\) Weigley argued that the United States at the time of the American Revolution was a weak nation state that relied on perseverance in conflict to wear out their opponents - a strategy of attrition. Over time, as the industrial and military capacity of the United States increased, America developed an approach to conflict that relied on the complete destruction of adversaries, or annihilation. This technique of annihilation was first evidenced during the United States Civil War.\(^31\) Maloney contends that Canada, like the United States, lacked a national strategy and, in a similar vein to Weigley, constructs a historical account of Canadian warfare predicated on a deficiency of strategy, resulting in operational actions being based on historically accepted ways of conducting war. Although Weigley has created an admirable theoretical model it is uniquely American and should only be applied outside that nation with great care.

This example serves to illustrate the influence of American works in the study of the operational level of war and the continuing need to build on Canadian research to date in order to address this discrepancy. However, in the meantime these allied


materials assist with developing a greater understanding of Canadian ideas in this area. One valuable study is American military historian Richard Swain’s *Army Command in Europe: During the Time of Peace Operations: Tasks Confronting USAREUR Commanders, 1994-2000*, which, unlike most accounts of the application of operational methodologies, focuses on operations other than major wars. He examines both operational and tactical perspectives of the same events, during North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peace operations in the former Yugoslavia, to attempt to account for differences in viewpoints and actions at the varying levels of war. He concludes that a very high degree of awareness across all levels of war is necessary during these types of operations. Another of Swain’s works, his Gulf War history, “Lucky War” *Third Army in Desert Storm* and American military theorist Robert Scales’, *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* are excellent studies of operational thinking prior to and during that conflict. Both Scales and Swain give a descriptive historical account of the planning and conduct of Operation Desert Storm by the United States Army in an effort to examine the events of the war to reinforce and improve American operational doctrine.

Underlying these works is a comprehensive body of materials studying the legacy of operations and operational thinking in the United States. James J. Schneider of the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas provides the theoretical and historical grounding for more recent accounts of operational thought with his “Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational

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Art” and “Theoretical Paper No. 4: Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the
Emergence of Operational Art.” 34 “Theoretical Paper No. 3” is an explanatory primer
of operational thought written for American students, while “Theoretical Paper No. 4”
determines that operational art emerged during the United States Civil War and
describes its form. Schneider’s works provide not only interpretations of operational
art within the American context, but also a sense of its provenance. Swain has also
addressed similar questions regarding the development of operational thought in the
United States Army with “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the US Army.” 35
In this article he views the current importance placed on understanding operational art
as part of the post Vietnam intellectual renaissance of the United States Army.

This intellectual revitalization has been well researched in the United States.
Studies like that of researcher, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, as
well as popular books, such as Colonel (Retired) David H. Hackworth and Julie
Sherman, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior, provide context for this
change. 36 Others, such as the much reprinted monograph, On Strategy: The Vietnam
War in Context, by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., detail the lack of discernible
professional military strategic and operational thought that was evidenced throughout
the period. 37

34 James J. Schneider, “Theoretical Paper No.3: The Theory of Operational Art,” (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1988); and James J. Schneider,
“Theoretical Paper No.4: Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational
35 Richard M. Swain, “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the US Army,” (Fort Leavenworth,
36 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986; reprint, 1988); and Colonel David H. Hackworth, United States Army Retired,
and Julie Sherman, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior, with an introduction by Ward
37 United States, Department of the Army, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry, On
Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, April 1981).
In the United States there is much debate and discussion as to the meaning, forms and transmission of operational art and its associated implementation within the military profession. This discourse is mostly centred on the manner in which policy is interpreted and enacted by military forces. With the exception of James Schneider and a few other researchers, this plethora of work is focussed on the moment from which the operational level of war was formally introduced into the United States military with emergent doctrine of the 1970s. A more wide-ranging historical view of operational thought is that recorded by researchers who have studied Russian operational constructs. The works of Russian theorists of the operational level of war, such as Svechin, Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky are being translated, as are Russian commentaries of the meaning and implementation of these conceptualists’ ideas. For example, Soviet historian Victor Kuzyakov’s, Marxism-Leninism On War and Army, is an illuminating history of military/ideological thought and its practical implementation from the birth of the Red Army until the 1960s. Kuzyakov has produced a book that details the use of the military as an instrument of ideology and attempts to show that the creation of such an army was a break with the past and required new methods of conducting war. Likewise, of great interest to military researchers are Western historians’ studies of Russian operational thought. These accounts examine a period of almost a hundred years. James Schneider’s, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State, shows that while new ideology permitted the development of new aspects of

operational thought it created a military state that ultimately caused the economic
destruction of the nation. In this case operational thought had a negative strategic
impact. American researcher Richard W. Harrison’s, *The Russian Way of War:*
Operational Art, 1904-1940, details the development of military theory in the pre- and
post-revolutionary Russian Army to produce an operational doctrine that eventually
was employed during the Second World War. Historian Sally W. Stoecker’s
published Ph. D dissertation, *Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the*
Politics of Military Innovation, details the life and theories of Tukhachevsky and how
they contributed to the emergence of the operational thought that made the Red Army
an extremely powerful force during and after the Second World War. University of
Texas professor Roger R. Reese’s, *Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the*
Red Army, 1925-1941, provides a window on the rapid expansion of the Red Army as
a result of industrialization and collectivization. The growth of the Red Army
prompted the creation of an operational doctrine that made best use of its increased
size. All these histories are thought provoking and without equivalents in the
historiography of western studies of the operational level of war and the larger body
of professional knowledge. Their perspectives on the historical development of
operational art in the Soviet Union illustrate the history, theory and the creation of
military doctrine. These international studies assist with contextualizing Canadian
perspectives pertaining to this subject area.

In order to look at the outward manifestations of change in staff education one must also scrutinize the professional Canadian Army publications of the twentieth century. These are the Canadian Army Training Memorandum (CATM), Canadian Army Journal (CAJ) and Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ). First, the CATM (1942-1947) was designed to address the issues that plagued a greatly expanded Canadian Army and it provided a systematic method of capturing lessons as they were identified and rapidly disseminating them, as well as general information, throughout the force. The original CAJ (1947-1965) succeeded the CATM and was later reinstated in 1998 as the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin (ADTB). A few years after institution of the ADTB the title was changed to the CAJ to commemorate not only the sixtieth anniversary of the D-Day campaign, but also to acknowledge post modern processes of change, through the reinstitution of a professional journal that was meant to inform a general audience:

The name change from The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin to The Canadian Army Journal reflects not just a nod to the past but also a look to the future. As the Canadian Land Forces undergo a process of transformation in order to make them more responsive and relevant in a significantly changed and continually changing world, so too must the Army’s professional journal transform. The name change was a deliberate decision in order to inspire and reflect the intellectual demands and expectations made upon the profession of arms.  

The new CAJ was to serve a similar purpose to that of the original CAJ, which had succeeded the CATM.

Finally, CDQ (1923-1939, 1971-1997) provided a forum for the exchange of opinions on specialized professional issues of concern to all services. The successor to CDQ was the Canadian Military Journal (CMJ), which commenced publication in 2000. Unlike CDQ, CMJ was meant for not only the professional military

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community, but also to engage academics, as well as the public in defence issues. Together these journals form a comprehensive package that speaks to army intellectual development during the period being studied and the formation of communities of practice and associated thought collectives.

At the same time, any indication of change discerned in the professional journals is confirmed by the curriculum files of the staff colleges and their general papers. These not only give an indication of the nature of the changes that took place, but also those who were involved in the processes. Primary sources are, in the case of the CASC/CLFCSC, stored at the Directorate of Heritage and History (DHH) in Ottawa as the CLFCSC Fonds, 1946-1986 and the CLFCSC Library Fonds, 1943-1979. This documentation provides lists of staff and students who had been involved with the staff education at the RMC and CASC/CLFCSC from the Second World War to the late 1970s. These collections proved very useful in examining the communities of practice formed through attendance at the CASC/CLFCSC. Also, in this regard, the CASC/CLFCSC journal, the Snowy Owl, provided great assistance with student articles, biographical information and course lists from 1952 to 1973. Additionally, DHH has a large number of miscellaneous files pertaining to staff education in Canada during the modern age and the assorted materials at the Library and Archives of Canada (LAC) complements these dossiers. Information related to the history of the CFC and to a limited extent its predecessor the RCAF Staff College, can be found

46 Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Directorate of Heritage and History (DHH) Archives, Canadian Land Forces Command (CLFCSC) Fonds 80/71 (henceforth CLFCSC Fonds); and Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Library, Miscellaneous documentation pertaining students and instructors from 1946-1972 (henceforth CASC/CLFCSC Course Documentation).
47 Canada, Canadian Army Staff College (CASC). Annual Review Canadian Army Staff College (1952-1953); Canada, CASC. Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College (1954-1966); and see also Canada, CLFCSC. Snowy Owl: Journal of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (1968-1973).
48 Canada, Library and Archives of Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 24, Canadian Military Records.
at the current day CFC. These files include curricula, records of meetings concerning the activities of the staff college held at CFC and higher headquarters, on top of general documentation pertaining to curriculum development and change. Through these documents it is possible to discern those involved in the formation of educational material and in conjunction with the staff directories delineate the communities of practice and their interactions in some detail.⁴⁹

Other archival materials that provide perspectives on the formation of Canadian staff education during the twentieth century originate from the United Kingdom and the United States. The India Office files of the British Public Record Office provide discussion of the Camberley and Quetta staff college courses in the years prior to the Second World War and the content of the curricula, which in turn impacted on the Canadian wartime staff courses and, subsequently, the CASC.⁵⁰ It also provides a framework for understanding the evolutionary nature of the paradigm shift from British to Canadian perspectives in the years after the war. For American influences in the late and post modern eras the archives of the United States Army, located at the Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), over and above those of the United States Army Command and General Staff College situated at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) give a great deal of information pertaining


⁵⁰ United Kingdom, Public Records Office, India Office files, “Military Department Records.” Files L/MIL/7/3197 and L/MIL/7/3203.
to the nature of intellectual change within the United States Army’s education and training systems in the twentieth century.

There are a number of Canadian educational reviews that delineate the different facets of professional military education, as well as some secondary literature. Of note, in this group is the official report “A Program For Professional Military Education For The Canadian Defence Force - A Report By The Working Group 19 March 1965,” which looks at the integration of Canadian staff education and the influential *Report of the Officer Development Board*, or *Rowley Report*, from 1969. The *Rowley Report* provided analysis and recommendations pertaining to professional education which endure today. These proposals were of great assistance in this research when identifying institutional concerns pertaining to professional military education in Canada.51


51 Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), “A Program For Professional Military Education For The Canadian Defence Force - A Report By The Working Group 19 March 1965”; Canada, DND, *Report of the Officer Development Board*, 3 Vols. Ottawa: 1969. Also referred to as the *Rowley Report*. The Chair of the study was Major-General Roger Rowley; (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 19 March 1965); Canada, DND, *Final Report of the Officer Development Review Board*, vol. 1, also referred to as the “Morton Report.” The Chair of the study was Dr. Desmond Morton; Canada. DND, “Out Service Training for Officers,” (Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel), National Defence Headquarters, March 1985), also referred to as the “Kitchen Report.” The Chair of the study was Major-General C. G. (George) Kitchen; Canada, DND, “Senior Officer Professional Development” (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, Officer Professional Development Council, 30 April 1986), also referred to as the “Lightburn Study.” The author was Colonel David Lightburn; and see also Richard Evraire, “General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces” (MPA thesis, Queen’s University, 1988). Evraire was serving at that time as a Canadian general officer. This work was later circulated within the Canadian Forces and referred to as the *Evraire Report*. 40
perceptions on professional facets that affect knowledge formation in military education.⁵²

From this broad survey one can perceive that the state of historical study of military education and the professional knowledge it contains, like recent ideas concerning the operational level of war, is varied. Nevertheless the most obvious deduction is that while there has been a great deal of valuable research few studies exist concerning either topic in Canada. It is also apparent that investigation of the history of Canadian Army staff officer education and the influences upon it would address an empty niche in the current body of historical work concerning the Canadian military and the underpinnings of its professional knowledge. This literature review also confirms that, for most countries, there is a great deal of study concerning armies and conceptual models for organizing land warfare. Thus, studying Canadian Army staff education and scrutinizing the paradigm shifts of the twentieth century, notably that of the Cold War, provides insights into the attribution and formation of the body of professional knowledge utilized by the Canadian military in its pursuit of national interests.

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Chapter 3

Supporting the *Pax Britannica*: Canadian Army Staff Education
Prior to the Second World War (1867-1938)

I hear from you with great pleasure that arrangements have been made with the Imperial authorities to admit a certain number of Canadian officers, yearly, to the Staff College.

DUNDONALD
Major General Commanding Canadian Militia

- Annual Report, Department of Militia and Defence, for the year ended December 31, 1903

Professional education for the Canadian Army in the modern era was shaped in form and content by the British Army. Canadian attendance at Staff Colleges, at first in Britain and later in India, ensured that until the Second World War Canada’s Army retained its Imperial ties and dependency. The professional knowledge provided to selected Canadian officers made certain that the staff officers of the Canadian Militia functioned as adjuncts to those of the Empire. This evolution can be discerned through examining the origins and progression of professional military education in Canada during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from its Prussian roots to British implementation, and its role in integrating the Canadian military into a larger Imperial Army.

The notion of the modern military staff officer has its origins in the late seventeenth century with the professionalization of European armies, although rudimentary staffs are recognizable in ancient historical accounts, as far back as the

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2 During this period both full-time and part-time components of the Canadian Army were referred to collectively as the “Militia.” The former component was known as the “Permanent Active Militia” or “Permanent Force,” while the latter group, today called the Reserve, was the “Non-Permanent Active Militia.” Email from Dr Steve Harris, Chief Historian, DHH, National Defence Headquarters to Author, Monday, October 22, 2007 9:33 AM.
armies of the Egyptian pharaohs. One could argue that as long as organized militaries have been present some form of staff function must have co-existed in order to ensure that the projection of military force was not hindered by such issues as a lack of supplies or transportation. However, it was not until after the Thirty Years’ War, with the rise of standing armies, that impetus was provided to the formalization of military staffs and corresponding professional education.

Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, is credited with setting in motion events that eventually culminated in the establishment of the renowned German General Staff. As a result of his experiences during the conflicts of the late eighteenth century and in particular the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) he emphasized the need for educated officers who, as part of the military, could see to the needs of the state. In 1765 he established the Academie des Nobles, which later developed into the Kriegsakademie, or War Academy. In correspondence describing the need for such a developmental institution Frederick wrote:

As regards the private soldier, it will be precisely the same as before the war. But as regards the officer, the case is one of greatest anxiety to me. With the object of making officers attentive to their duties, and giving them the power of reasoning for themselves, I have them now instructed in the art of war, and they are taught to form their own judgement on everything they do. You will, of course, see...that this method will not succeed with everybody, but that at the same time we will eventually get from the whole body, certain men who will not only in course of time be generals by virtue of their rank, but what is more, possess the necessary qualifications.

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4 For detailed discussion concerning the role of states in the establishment of national armies see Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 472-80.


6 Frederick the Great quoted in Hittle, The Military Staff, 58.
In the late eighteenth century Napoleonic warfare harnessed the social changes of the post-revolutionary French state to generate mass armies and provided the impetus for the development of staffs and staff education. The sheer size of these forces necessitated that they be organized into sub-groups, known as *corps* and *divisions*, capable of independent operations, but centrally coordinated with the ability to come together, when conditions were propitious, in order to fight. Israeli military researcher, Martin Van Creveld, argues that staffs came into being in order to permit Napoleon to establish effective command over these multitudes. In 1796 Marshal Alexandre Berthier, the former Chief of Staff of the French Army of the Alps, wrote *Document sur le Service de l’Etat Major Général à l’Armée des Alpes*, in which he laid out the organisation and duties of an army staff. He put forward that there should be four staff elements under the direction of a chief of staff. The first section dealt with legal matters, military organization, prisoners of war, and deserters, while the second section dealt with keeping the official journal, armament, artillery, engineers, sustainment, medical, police, and the command of the headquarters. Next, the third section included reconnaissance, operational plans, communications, postal services, as well as employment of the guide company. Last, the fourth section had the responsibility for the establishment and organization of the headquarters, including its policing.\(^7\)

These groups, managed by subordinate adjutant generals, were responsible for those aspects of an army that enabled it to function. From this embryonic structure and responsibilities evolved the detailed staff framework of modern times.\(^8\) In order to

\(^7\) Hittle, *The Military Staff*, 96-97.

\(^8\) Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1985), 58-62, and 69. Figure 2-1 taken from information contained in note 27 pages 291-92; for detailed discussion of French innovations concerning the organisation of armies and the creation of a military staff see Hittle, *The Military Staff*, 93-114.
provide context for any discussion Appendices A and B lay out military ranks and organizations.

While the influence of Napoleonic France is undeniable, it is the Prussian, or later German, philosophical tradition that permeates western staff education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even though the origins of the staff college system in Canada lie directly with the British military there is a thread of continuity between Scharnhorst’s reforms and Canadian staff education. Noted Canadian military historian C.P. Stacey wrote retrospectively in 1973 of these connections:

The origins of the military staff can be traced far back; but like many other aspects of modern military organization it first took definite form during the Napoleonic Wars. It was then the Prussian General Staff, which was to provide a model for many armies came into existence under the influence of Gerhard Scharnhorst.  

This Prussian perspective originated, as indicated by Stacey, through the endeavours of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who provided the foundation of modern staff education. He was a well known military scholar who had observed his victorious French opponents during the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) and as a result published a number of articles that proposed changes to the manner in which a state conducted war. Scharnhorst’s proposals included better military education and the establishment of a permanent general staff. His ideas were disregarded in his state of Hanover and, accordingly, in 1801, he accepted an offer to join Prussian service. 

In Berlin, von Scharnhorst initially found a reserved reception to his ideas, but, despite this, he and a number of others founded the Militarische Gesellschaft, a society to discuss military affairs, with von Scharnhorst as director. This group

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rapidly became recognized as an intellectual focal point for the Prussian Army and promoted the concept of Bildung, or the creation of a community that supported a lifelong process of learning through guided discussion and interaction, with seniors mentoring those who were junior. Bildung, with its ideas of group learning, philosophizing and knowledge transmission also fits neatly into the modern theoretical perspectives of Forestell, Fleck and Kuhn.

During 1801 von Scharnhorst was assigned to the Berlin Institute of Young Officers as superintendent and mandated by Frederick William II to examine the practices of this institution. The Berlin Institute was one of six Inspectionsschulen, or Military District Schools, created at larger garrisons by Frederick the Great in 1779 to teach military sciences. Throughout von Scharnhorst’s period with the academy his thoughts on military education coalesced and were refined through discussion, practice and writing. His ideas were based on the need for officers to achieve the balance of training and education demanded by Bildung. This could be accomplished through an intensive professional curriculum that included study of military history and the classical theorists of war that would develop intelligence, reason and judgement.\(^\text{12}\) Nineteenth century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz was to later describe Von Scharnhorst as reflective of the pedagogy he utilized:

> Far from being a pendant, he placed little value in the raw substance of knowledge, and paid attention only to the intellectual and spiritual values that can develop from it; nor was anyone more practical and active. This showed unmistakably in his judgement and selection of men for important assignments; native intelligence, common sense, even the crude child of nature counted for more with him than any amount of learning that had not yet proved its aptitude or usefulness.\(^\text{13}\)

A great deal of impetus was provided to von Scharnhorst’s efforts by Napoleon’s seemingly never ending stream of victories. Military historian Robert

\(^{12}\) Ibid, 33-34.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, 29-33, 39, 49-50, and 87-93. Quote from page 92.
Epstein argues that the resounding defeat of Prussian forces at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 validated the French system of warfare. The decentralised structure of corps and divisions, as well as concomitant ability to command and administer these dispersed formations provided a robustness and mobility that the antiquated Prussian armies could not match. Consequently, they lost the battles and disintegrated under the subsequent French advance which culminated in the capture of Berlin.\footnote{Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War*, with a foreword by Russell F. Weigley (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994), 29-31; and for further information concerning Napoleon’s campaigns see David G. Chandler, *The Campaigns of Napoleon* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966).}

In the midst of the succession of defeats that resulted in Prussian surrender during 1807 a number of members of the *Militarische Gesellschaft*, including Scharnhorst, who had been mobilized for active duty, nonetheless managed to distinguish themselves. Accordingly, in 1808, Frederick William III permitted Scharnhorst and others to put into place laws that resulted in the militarization of Prussia and its transformation into a nation-in-arms. A reform of military education was part of these changes. Military District Schools became merit based and were designed to provide a comprehensive professional education for all aspects of military activities, both field and garrison. The graduates became the general staff officers and adjutants who provided the centralized command and control for Prussia’s rejuvenated and re-organized army. This was the army that was essential to the defeat of Napoleon in 1813 and again, finally, in 1815.\footnote{White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, 128-37 and 169-76; and see also Epstein, *Napoleon’s Last Victory*, 179.}

The British military did not experience the same process of professional reorganization and rejuvenation until later in the nineteenth century. They, like many of their continental neighbours, also had an established staff system prior to the Napoleonic Wars. Its structure reached back in origin to Cromwell’s New Model
Army and a military academy with junior and senior divisions had been established in 1799 at High Wycombe, near London. During the Napoleonic period that staff system had become further developed under the supervision of the Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington. However, the knowledge so painfully gained in the tempest of conflict languished for almost four decades until the debacle of the Crimean War (1853-1856). Little effort was made to maintain a relevant or rigorous professional curriculum at High Wycombe; therefore, the staff education provided there paled in comparison to its Prussian counterpart. By the end of the Crimean conflict deficiencies of staff planning were manifested through poor performance of the Army and forcibly demonstrated to the British military, and more importantly the public, its unpreparedness for the exigencies of modern warfare.

The resulting changes, known as the Cardwell reforms, re-invigorated British Army staff education. A senior staff college for the instruction of military subjects was established at Camberley and the first course commenced in 1858. It operated until 1997, educating officers of both the British Army and their allies. It and the other service colleges were subsequently replaced by the Joint Services Command and Staff College, at the site of the former Royal Air Force Staff College in Bracknell, Berkshire.

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16 For discussion of structural evolution of the British staff system throughout this period see Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 112.3H1.009 (D63), “British Staff Appointments. Paper on origins of British Staff Appointments, terminology of appointments and comparison of these appointments,” (Prep by Mr. J.M. Hitsman and Mrs. A. Sorby – Feb 64).


18 So named because of changes initiated between 1868 and 1874 by Edward Cardwell (1813-1836), then the Secretary State for War, in an effort to address deficiencies in the British Army. Byron Farwell, *Queen Victoria’s Little Wars* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 184-85.

19 Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 103-10.

20 Email from Colonel (Retired) Eric MacArthur, Canadian Forces to Author (Friday, May 9, 2008 10:19 AM). In 1997 Colonel MacArthur was the first Canadian Army exchange instructor assigned to the newly formed Joint Services Command and Staff College; and in 2000 this College was relocated to purpose built education facilities at Shrivenham, near Oxford. See King’s College London, “The
Though the senior course at Camberley was originally created in the late 1850s to address perceived military needs it did not at first receive whole-hearted support from the officers of the British Army. An article published on 16 January 1867 in *The Times* suggested that the reforms that had taken place at the Staff College still did not provide the expected results. It went on to explain that although changes had been made to the education being provided by Camberley successful graduates were not rewarded for mastering the intricacies of staff work through the education. It was evident to British Army officers that a Camberley education provided no assistance to advancement within the military profession, which had a commensurate negative impact on the numbers of potential applicants. In a following series of letters throughout that month and into February these sentiments were supported by others. The adverse publicity, in conjunction with a lack of suitable staff college candidates later that year - only 23 officers had written the entrance exams the following November to apply for the 15 available Camberley vacancies - made apparent to authorities that vigorous action was needed. A Royal Commission was created in 1868 to examine military education, with emphasis on the operations of the staff college. The underlying purpose of this inquiry was to ensure that Camberley attracted the best officers and provided a relevant military education to those students.\(^{21}\)

The subsequent report from this investigation prompted the British Army to establish guidelines for the selection of commandants, instructors and students. Commandants were appointed by the Director-General Military Education, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and War Office, on the basis of “special qualifications for the post, particularly as regards practical experience in staff work on

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\(^{21}\) Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 142-55.
active service” and members of the staff were to be chosen or removed by the Commandant because “whoever was responsible for the College should be entrusted with the selection of his subordinates.”

At the same time principles were laid out concerning applicable entrance examinations, selection of appropriate candidates and provision of suitable post-staff college employment for Camberley graduates. It has been suggested that this direction along with other orders and instructions arising from the Royal Commission provided elements of a Staff College *Magna Charta.*

In conjunction with these initiatives, the 1890 publication of Spenser Wilkinson’s *The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff* was also extremely influential. It advocated for the concepts surrounding the education, organisation and institution of the German staff and spread these ideas amongst high ranking officers of the British Army. Wilkinson noted in the Preface the authority and importance of the German General Staff and the deficiency of the same in a British context by citing the 1887 testimony of a highly placed officer, Major-General Henry Brackenbury, to a “Select Committee...appointed to examine into the Army and Navy Estimates.” Brackenbury is recorded as having compared the British and German methods of army management by describing the German General Staff as:

...the keystone of the whole system of German military organization...the cause of the efficiency of the German army...acting as the powerful brain of the military body, to the designs of which brain the whole body is made to work...I cannot but feel that to the want of any such great central thinking department is due that want of economy and efficiency which to a certain extent exists in our army.

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22 Ibid, 158; and quote from “Special Army Circular – November 11, 1870,” 162.
23 “General Order 41, dated April 14, 1870, issued May 1” quoted in Ibid, 158-61 and see also page 163.
Wilkinson analysed not only all aspects of the German General Staff pertaining to the 1866 campaign against Austria, but also put forward its general philosophy, formation, utilization, and education. Wilkinson examined in detail the three major facets of the German paradigm: the role of the General Staff in the management of a military campaign, the functions of a General Staff as part of a larger military organization, and the composition and schooling of a General Staff.\footnote{Ibid, 41-46.}

At the time of publication, *The Brain of an Army* met with an unfriendly reception. The prestigious *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* described the work as “interesting” but “uncomplimentary” to those not part of the German General Staff.\footnote{“Notices of Books: *The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff.* By Spenser Wilkinson,” *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* 34 (1890): 564.} Nonetheless, in hindsight, Wilkinson identified the key issues involving the German General Staff and presented them in such a manner that they could be grasped by those who needed to understand them. Today, Wilkinson is credited with providing impetus to British Army development of cohesive and coherent models for staffs and associated staff education.\footnote{Hittle, *The Military Staff*, 153-54.} This German influence is further borne out by military publications translated into English for use in education and training prior to the First World War.\footnote{An example of this migration of knowledge is a translated German instruction on teaching tactics and organising field training to staff officers and others, *Oberst Und Abteilungschef IM Grossen Generalstabe* von Moser, *The Preparation and Conduct of Tactical Rides and Tours on the Ground*, trans. General Staff, War Office (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1911).}

Concurrently, the formalization of the British Army General Staff took place on 12 September 1906 as part of the Haldane reforms with the issuance of Army Order 233.\footnote{For a discussion of these reforms refer to Sir Frederick Maurice, *Haldane: 1856-1915* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1937), 177-234; see also E.S. Haldane, “Haldane, Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane of Cloan (1856-1928),” in J.R.H. Weaver, ed, *The Dictionary of National Biography: 1922-1930* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 382-83.} The guidance contained in this Order provided for a cadre of General Staff officers who would be educated to serve with various military organisations and
also established the general structure of the staff. Most importantly this direction recognized staff officers as custodians of the necessary knowledge that constituted the profession of arms, as well as advisors to commanders at all levels. It enjoined various staffs to:

... advise on the strategical distribution of the Army, to supervise the education of officers and the training of the Army for war, to study military schemes, to collect and collate military intelligence, to direct general policy in Army matters, and to secure continuity of action in the direction of that policy.

... assist the officers on whose staffs they are serving, in promoting military efficiency, especially in regard to the education of officers and the training of the troops, and to aid them in carrying out the policy prescribed by Army Headquarters.  

The early reforms of the Staff College at Camberley, as well as the creation of the British General Staff, while significant in their own right as examples of institutional change, came to mirror the principles espoused by Scharnhorst in the aftermath of the decisive Prussian victories in what are commonly known as the Wars of German unification - the capture of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark (1864), the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). Intellectual historian, Azar Gat describes the “German Military School,” that arose out this period of conflict, as characterised by nationalism and military strategy linked to overwhelming victory. These features were actualized by mass armies sustained and equipped through industrialisation. Britain amongst other great powers looked towards a victorious Germany as not only epitomizing ideas of effective warfare, but also staff structures and methods of professional education.  

One could argue that the qualities of the German School, patriotism above all, the use of military force to achieve success and the idea of decisive victory continues to imbue western military

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31 Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 243-44.
thinking today. Looking back, it also seems that this school of thought was exported to former colonies and possessions of the great powers and manifests itself in other parts of the world today. Wilkinson’s publication, the debate that surrounded it, as well as the eventual adoption of German staff organization and practices can be seen as indicative of the paradigm shift that took place during this time within the Imperial Army. This German paradigm provided the foundations of today’s staffs and their education.

While these adjustments were taking place in Britain, the Militia, as the Canadian Army was then known, was changing in response to the exigencies of the *Pax Britannica*. For Canada this meant being capable of providing elements that could be subsumed into Imperial forces engaged in colonial wars. Given the lack of an immediate threat and an ongoing economic recession, military commitments received scant attention and few resources. In 1887 the authorized strength of the Permanent Force was established as 1000 men but, even for a small country, this organization was sorely lacking in many aspects. Of an effective strength of 886 men in 1890, 345 were discharged, 152 deserted, 128 were pronounced guilty of various military offences by courts-martial, and eight died. Additionally, less than half of that Permanent Force had two years or more military experience and given that the full-time soldiery was at such a low level of preparedness it would not be realistic to expect much from the Non-Permanent Active Militia of the period. The description provided by military authors Gwynne Dyer and Tina Viljoen in *The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the Empire 1760-1939* depicts the Non-Permanent Active Militia as primarily a social and political organization, not an effective military force:

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Canadian governments assuming that war with the United States was unlikely and war with any other military threat inconceivable therefore felt justified in allowing the militia to degenerate into little more than a fancy-dress party, and in rejecting occasional British blandishments to take part in the incessant colonial wars of the empire.  

Canada did not have the professional framework of a developed military and even the Royal Military College, founded at Kingston, Ontario in 1876, did not supply the bulk of its graduates to the Permanent Force. In *Canada’s RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* historian Richard Arthur Preston wrote that of the 195 graduates of the College between its inception and 1894 “for every one who was in either the Canadian Permanent Force or the public service of Canada, there were two in the imperial service and two more employed privately on various kinds of engineering projects in Canada.”

Also, Canada’s Army was a force designed and used to supply internal security. The Riel Rebellion of 1885 and the policing activities of the Yukon Gold Rush in 1898 typified the military activities of the pre-Boer War period. As a result, existent low level doctrine and training mirrored that of the British Army with its rigid adherence to discipline and drills, and little thought was given to higher military education or producing Canadian senior commanders.

However, throughout the 1890s a series of enthusiastic British General Officers Commanding the Canadian Militia implemented reforms pertaining to organisation, administration and training that greatly improved the efficacy of the

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34 The average drill strength of the Non-Permanent Active Militia from 1876-1896 was 18,871 men and it must be noted that of this figure there were four officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, buglers and bandsmen for every nine privates. This seems to indicate an inefficient organization at best. Gwynne Dyer and Tina Viljoen, *The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the Empire 1760-1939* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, Inc., 1990), 146-48; Quote from page 148.
Permanent Force and to a much lesser extent the Non-Permanent Active Militia. All this was in an effort to improve these colonial forces and strengthen their possible contribution to Imperial forces.

In 1899 the Boer Republics of South Africa, Transvaal and the Orange Free State, declared war on the British Empire. At the onset of war the Canadian government offered to contribute an infantry battalion of 1000 officers and men. The recruits for this expeditionary force came from across the Dominion and the structure of this force was based on the existing Permanent Force. On 30 October 1899 the 1061 men of the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion sailed from Quebec City to join British Forces in South Africa. The Canadians arrived in November and until early February spent many hours occupied with drill to achieve an acceptable level of training and fitness, as well as combat boredom.

For the Canadians, minor raids and combats with a few larger scale set-piece battles, notably the Battle of Paardeberg on 27 February 1900, characterized the campaigns of the Boer War. Of the eight companies of the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion that had sailed for South Africa, six companies refused to extend their

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38 Warrant Officer Ross A. Appleton, “The Battle of Paardeberg (South African War).” Unpublished paper, 1999 (Petawawa, ON: 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment), 1-2. This work, written using sources held by the regimental archives of The Royal Canadian Regiment, was released prior to the hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Paardeberg (27 February 1900) as part of the regimental commemoration; and see also Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899-1902 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 49-64.
39 Dyer and Viljoen, The Defence of Canada, 163-64; and see also Miller, Painting the Map Red, 73-74; foreshadowing the First World War, the lessons of the Boer War pertained to the increased lethality of modern firepower, the resultant superiority of the defence and the requirement for mobility over extended regions of conflict. These lessons were not institutionalized by the British and Canadian Armies because the Boer War was perceived as a anomaly with little relation to future warfare, particularly in Europe; and for an account that encapsulates these events and is based on contemporaneous dispatches see Marquis, T. G. Canada’s Sons on Kopje and Veldt, with a forward by George Munro Grant, Principal Queen’s University (Toronto, Guelph and Brantford: The Canada’s Sons Publishing Co., 1900).
40 The Canadians learned patrolling, outpost duty, fire and movement from British-trained officers. It was also felt necessary to impose and enforce at all times a stringent form of military discipline. Appleton, “The Battle of Paardeberg,” 3-4; and see also Miller, Painting the Map Red, 81-82.
service past the end of their contract in September 1900 and returned to Canada. However, other Canadian contingents continued to arrive and fought until the War’s end.\textsuperscript{41}

From a national perspective, Canadian participation in the Boer War marked the first dispatch of troops to an overseas conflict and the development of a Canadian identity. But in so doing, the military became more tied to Britain. Serving under British commanders and utilizing their methods during the Boer War assisted in binding the fledgling Canadian Militia to the British Army and creating a community of practitioners that utilized British ideas. No Canadian commanders had the opportunity to develop higher command experience during that conflict and thus there was little systemic or national impetus for the development of higher systems of Canadian military education. Despite this general lack of institutional professionalization there were some individual initiatives to address this issue, mainly by senior British officers. These efforts were not altruistic but had the goal of strengthening Canadian military in order that it could be a solid component of an Imperial army.

For example, prior to the commencement of the Boer War, a British officer, Major-General Edward Thomas Henry Hutton,\textsuperscript{42} General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, directed the establishment of a staff course at the Royal Military College (RMC). Hutton reasoned that colonial militias could add to the military strength of the British Empire and he recognized that a serious deficiency in Canada

\textsuperscript{41} Dyer and Viljoen, \textit{The Defence of Canada}, 170; and see also Miller, \textit{Painting the Map Red}, 277-88 and 414-23.

\textsuperscript{42} Influenced by the Cardwell reformers Lieutenant-General Sir E.T.H Hutton, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.L., K.R.R.C.: Commandant in New South Wales, 1893-1896; General Officer Commanding (GOC) Canadian Militia, 1898-1900; GOC Australia, 1901-1904; and 21st Division 1914-1915 was an adaptive British officer. For example, he was “an advocate of mounted infantry, commanded mounted troops other than cavalry in South Africa” at a time when this type of change was not welcomed by the conventional military establishment. His implementation of staff education in Canada should be seen in this light. See Preston, \textit{Canada’s RMC}, 167.
was the lack of educated senior staff officers. Accordingly, the first Militia staff course for non-permanent officers of the Canadian Militia was conducted at the RMC, in Kingston, Ontario during 1899. In the years that followed until the end of the Second World War the RMC evolved from a “cadet school” to a “cadet school and staff college.” Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the impetus to Hutton’s initiative was an effort to ensure the military strength of the Empire by addressing a colonial deficiency.

After the Boer War the Canadian Militia returned to its pre-war state. The priority for defence was internal security, as the prevailing feeling was that there was little threat of outside attack. The Militia’s employment during this period reflects these priorities. This included sending detachments to quell labour difficulties at: Sydney Mines, Nova Scotia in 1905; Winnipeg, Manitoba and Kingston, Buckingham, and Hamilton, Ontario in 1906; and, again, Sydney Mines in 1909. Between 1902 and 1904 the Department of Militia and Defence was reorganized under Major General Douglas Dundonald, Earl of Dundonald in a further effort to ensure an alignment of Dominion and Imperial forces. There was a general departmental restructuring of stores and engineering branches from civil to military control and an intelligence branch was formed. Modern administrative practices, such as a Central Registry to provide effective personnel management and record keeping,
replaced numerous separate registries. The Militia acquired training areas and ranges.
As well, new drill books were procured for infantry and cavalry. Prime Minister Sir
Robert Borden’s government legislated changes to the laws governing Canada’s
defence. Amendments to the Militia Pension Act and the 1904 Militia Bill improved
the Permanent Forces or as they had become known, the Permanent Active Militia.\textsuperscript{49}
Some of this reform was directly attributable to Borden and Dundonald, while some
was in response to British reorganization stemming from lessons learned during the
South African conflict.\textsuperscript{50}

On top of these changes, in 1902 the first Canadian officer, Major Daniel Isaac
Vernon Eaton, Royal Canadian Field Artillery, attended the British Army Staff
College at Camberley.\textsuperscript{51} Eaton was a highly proficient officer who had distinguished
himself in South Africa and epitomized the professional officer of the period. He was
personally selected by Lord Frederick Roberts,\textsuperscript{52} who was then commanding the
combined Imperial and colonial forces in that conflict, to attend the Staff College.
Regrettably, Eaton died in France during the First World War. He was killed the
evening prior to the attack at Vimy Ridge, while commanding the 3rd Divisional
Artillery of the Canadian Corps, the fighting component of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF). Historian Glenn Wright eloquently notes in the
\textit{Dictionary of Canadian Biography}: “With opportunities for training and for active
service, Eaton carved out a promising career for himself as an experienced artillery

\textsuperscript{49} Stanley, \textit{Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954}, 297.
\textsuperscript{50} John A. English, \textit{Lament For An Army: The Decline of Military Professionalism}, Contemporary
Affairs Number 3 (Concord, ON: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 11; Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File
733.013(D3), “Notes on History of Militia Staff Course,” Appendix B, “Extracts from \textit{Annual Reports
of the Department},” no page; and see also Richard A. Preston, \textit{Canada and “Imperial Defense”: A
study of the origins of the British Commonwealth’s defense organization, 1867-1919} (Toronto:
\textsuperscript{51} Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 733.013(D3), “Notes on History of Militia Staff Course,”1.
\textsuperscript{52} For more information concerning Lord Roberts see Stanley McKeown Brown, \textit{With the Royal
Canadians} (Toronto: The Publishers’ Syndicate, Limited, 1900); and see also Miller, \textit{Painting the Map
Red}. 

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officer of the first rank, only to lose his life on the eve of Canada’s greatest military achievement of the Great War.” In effect, Eaton epitomized the type of Canadian officer that was considered suitable for staff education. By the beginning of the First World War there were three to four officers with similar potential selected to attend Camberley each year.

Along with the education of officers, between 1902 and 1911 several Imperial or, as they were commonly known Colonial, Conferences were held with a view to cement military cooperation between Britain and the Dominions. At the 1907 Conference a resolution was passed proposing a central staff of the Imperial General Staff to coordinate with, and advise, dominion forces through local sections of the Imperial General Staff that would be established in the dominions. Canadian historian George Stanley argued that these Imperial Defence Conferences resulted in a commitment to standardization amongst British and Dominion forces that suborned those forces’ distinctly national characteristics to those of the Empire. He wrote that these agreements:

…meant the Canadian soldier would lose to some extent, not only his distinctive character, but the means of developing those types of warfare for which he was especially suited by climate and geography. Winter training, cold weather equipment, mountain fighting, forest warfare, all of these could and should have been the special possession of the Canadian militiaman as they had been in the days of the Ancien Regime. They were all ignored, for the policy of standardization had one aim, that of making the Canadian militiaman into a replica of the British Territorial Tommy in arms, training, equipment, and habits of thought.

55 Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954, 302-3.
56 Ibid, 304; for detail on the employment of the Canadian contingent during the Boer War see Miller, Painting the Map Red.
By establishing a community of practitioners that had Imperial foundations the
professional knowledge and practices of the Canadian military would be
firmly entrenched in that of their Imperial counterparts.

Additionally, continued attendance at Camberley from 1903 onwards by
officers of the Permanent Force further ensured that replication of the British system
occurred throughout the Canadian Militia. Undoubtedly, the transnational linkages
formed over time with amongst Canadian and British officers, as well as the
professional knowledge imparted through Camberley likely assisted with ensuring a
distinctly British cast to Canadian military activities. Nonetheless, these courses did
not produce a large reservoir of fully qualified staff officers. The Militia List of spring
1914 indicates only eight serving officers were staff college graduates and another
four were in the process of completing their education. 57 Part of the difficulty in
obtaining consistent numbers of candidates lay in the challenging Staff College
entrance and graduation exams, although the RMC had taken on the task of preparing
Camberley candidates for the entrance tests. 58 Somewhat alleviating this shortage of
educated officers was that, after a brief hiatus due to the Boer War, from 1902
onwards the RMC had resumed the militia staff course. The object of this staff
training was to educate officers of the Non-Permanent Active Militia in essential
administrative and general staff duties. This course was modelled on elements of the
existing British staff course at Camberley and taught by British officers, thus ensuring
an imperial legacy. 59 At the commencement of the First World War there were 124

57 Stacey, “The Staff Officer,” 46.
58 “Extracts from The Organization and Development of The Canadian Militia,” quoted in Canada,
DND, DHH Archives, File 733.013(D3), “Notes on History of Militia Staff Course,” Appendix C,
“Extracts from The Organization and Development of The Canadian Militia,” and “The Staff Colleges,
Camberley and Quetta,” 1-3.
59 Ibid, 1.
graduates of these courses which provided a basic level of professional skills, but not the more comprehensive education of the senior staff college at Camberley.60

The Camberley course was designed to rehearse students in realistic operations involving a small professional force. As part of this education, these officers carried out, through practical exercises, the staff duties that they would be called upon to fulfil in the event of an imperial conflict. In other words, the course attempted to reflect the military activities that an Imperial staff officer might have to address in varied capacities all through the years prior to the First World War. The address of the Commandant of Camberley, Colonel W. R. Robertson, to the Class of 1911, captures the spirit of that education and the prevailing military ethos. Robertson was the first Camberley graduate to return to command the Staff College.61 He said:

So far as one can judge from the present state of the world, you may any day find yourselves taking part in a war than which there has been no greater for the last hundred years or so, and it may be upon you to whom I am now speaking that to a great extent will depend how we emerge from that war...

Finally, remember that when the day for fighting comes, the qualifications demanded of you, whether on the Staff or in command, will include, in addition to a good theoretical knowledge of your professional duties, the possession of a quick eye, a good digestion, an untiring activity, a determination to close with the enemy, and a firm resolution not to take counsel of your fears.62

Unlike the situation in Britain, there is little evidence that a great deal of original thought was expended on professional issues by Canada’s Militia. It seems as if it was accepted that perspectives on military matters would be supplied verbatim by Britain because the small size of the Canadian military precluded much contemplation being given to those issues. Furthermore, the Militia was primarily an instrument of internal security, providing support to the civil authorities; therefore, there was no

60 English, Lament For An Army, 12-13; and see also Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 733.013(D3), “Notes on History of Militia Staff Course,”Appendix C, “Extracts from The Organization and Development of The Canadian Militia,” 1.
61 Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 255
apparent need to focus on advanced levels of professional thinking with the concomitant implication that there was no requirement for more vacancies on higher command and staff education. Indeed, it was only in 1913 that the first opportunity for the bulk of the Militia to receive a few weeks collective training in summer camps. It was a case of “too little, too late” and regrettably, the net effect of this neglect was apparent from the beginning of the First World War:

On observing the disembarkation of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in Britain in October 1914, the future British military reformer J.F.C. Fuller caustically remarked that Canadian soldiers would be good enough after six months training if the “officers could be shot.”

The recruitment of Canada’s overseas land force commitment to the First World War, the CEF, was characterized by confusion and amateurishness. Meticulously planned mobilization strategies, prepared during times of peace, were disregarded in the enthusiasm of the moment and the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, improvised a new mobilization scheme. He overlooked the existing units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia as the structure for creating the CEF and formed the volunteers who came forward into numbered battalions bearing no relation to the forces then in existence. From the resultant chaos eventually emerged the operational component of the CEF, the Canadian Corps, which matured into the shock force of the empire.

Military historian John English has postulated that:

Much of the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Corps sprang from the skill of its high-quality British staff officers, three of whom rose to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). In a highly positional war that left little room for strategic maneuver, tactical innovation through meticulous staff work was critical.

63 Dyer and Viljoen, The Defence of Canada, 200.
64 English, Lament For An Army, 14.
65 Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954, 310-13.
English believes the success of the Corps was predicated on thorough planning, training and preparations. This passion for extremely detailed staff work is mentioned in documentation of the period:

A glance at the piles of written papers on the chief’s [divisional Chief of Staff] desk helps one to realise something of the immense preparations for even one [2000 man] raid. The general idea is first obtained, and is worked out on paper to the minutest details. Every battery, every company, every man is given his exact orders. Each gun section has its written directions telling when it is to fire, and what it is to fire. Each platoon commander knows where he is to be, how he is to move, and where each of his men is to go. Provision is made for everything…

For weeks aerial observers, sky photographers, O-pip [Observation Post] officers, scouts in No Man’s Land, have worked for this, accumulating facts, studying the enemy lines. The staffs had to think not only what our men can do, but what the enemy may do in reply…

The capture of Vimy Ridge on 9 April 1916 demonstrated growing Canadian prowess in the skills and thought necessary for the brutal battles of the First World War. For the first time the four divisions of the Canadian Corps planned, coordinated, practised and completed a successful major operation. Today, this engagement is popularly trumpeted as having marked the coming of age of the nation.

Vimy Ridge was not the only operational triumph of the Canadian Corps during the First World War. The period from August to November 1918 marked the transition of the nature of the conflict from an attrition-based, static defensive genre to a war of movement and offensive manoeuvre. The Canadian participants recognized

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68 McKenzie provides a detailed account of the battle, phase by phase. However, to provide a *grosso modo* idea of the meticulous planning conducted for the attack it is worth repeating his description from page 72, “The coming advance was divided into four stages. Four imaginary lines were drawn: Black, red, blue, and brown. The first attacking parties were to go through to the Black line, following their barrage…Then a second party were to go through the first and attack the Red line, a third through the second for the Blue, and so on to the final assault on the Brown line. Every step was exactly timed.” The battle was completed as rehearsed with each objective being attained before commencement of the next stage. Ibid, 72-86.
69 According to Stanley, Field Marshal Smuts commented that Currie possessed, “…a high sense of the practical, a firm grasp of detail and a real capacity for administration. He could recognize ability in others and was not afraid to attract to his staff talented, even eccentric officers, whose ideas he could translate into reality.” Stanley, *Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954*, 312.
the fundamental nature of this change by the summer of 1918. An excerpt from that time describes this shift in warfare:

We still used trenches, and it would be a mistake to talk of trenches as obsolete. Fresh trenches had been dug along our new lines. But the trench was no longer the dominating feature of the situation. War was to become what soldiers had long hoped for – open war, where armies fought and moved and cavalry came into play again, where the initiative of the individual soldier obtained full opportunity and generalship could show itself in other ways than the building up of cumbersome defences.\(^{70}\)

The Canadian staff officers and commanders of the CEF had learned from their British mentors and over the course of the First World War had become skilled enough to occupy the key positions of this Canadian force.\(^{71}\) Stanley described, better than many, what followed:

It is almost national tradition in Canada that active participation in a war should be followed by a rapid decline in the efficiency of the defence forces. Many of those who had fought in France during the First World War were anxious to forget the horrors and the hardships of war; others believed that the organization of an international society the League of Nations, had rendered the maintenance of defence forces unnecessary.\(^{72}\)

In the race to resume the normalcy of peace the lessons learned at such horrific cost by the CEF were never captured formally. In particular the overwhelming victories of the last months of 1918 were overshadowed by the memories of the gory struggles of the preceding years. There was a rush to forget. English makes the pithy

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\(^{70}\) Ibid, 201.


\(^{72}\) Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954, 326.
comment that, “It was left to the German General Staff to study the lessons of the Battle of Amiens and the hundred days that followed.”

This was borne out by what transpired with Canada in the period immediately after the Great War. In 1919 the Otter Committee was convened under the guidance of the elderly Major-General William Otter, who had commanded the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion during the Boer War. This commission was instituted to determine the structure of the post-First World War Army, perhaps using the units of the CEF as a structure. Instead it accomplished little other than a return to the pre-war status quo, when the Canadian Militia was primarily a social institution. The role of the Militia, once again, became internal security, with elements promptly dispatched to Manitoba in order to suppress the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919. This pattern of aid to the civil authorities was repeated at Quebec City in 1921, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia in 1922-1923, Oshawa and St-Catherine’s, Ontario in 1932 and Stratford, Ontario in 1933. During this post-war period British doctrine and staff education continued to be utilized as the Canadian model. The prevailing view was that if a conflict occurred the Canadian military would fight alongside British forces and thus required interoperability.

Further contributing to this erosion of the expertise learned at great expense just a few years previously was the emphasis on non-military domestic activities. From 1929 to 1936, at the height of the Great Depression, in addition to the

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73 English, Lament For An Army, 19-20.
76 Dyer and Viljoen, The Defence of Canada, 322.
previously mentioned security activities, there was heavy Militia involvement with the administration of relief camps. Furthermore, an emphasis on northern communications and aerial mapping also distracted an over tasked military from professional education and related issues.⁷⁸

Although the Permanent Force was immersed in an overwhelming number of military tasks, including the requirement to train the Non-Permanent Active Militia, some officers continued to be spared from these duties to attend Camberley, as well as, from 1926, the affiliated Staff College at Quetta, India.⁷⁹ The first Canadian officer to attend this institution was Captain J. K. Lawson who seems to have been an officer of similar characteristics to the first Canadian to attend Camberley. He had served with distinction from the beginning of the First World War as a line and staff officer of the Canadian Corps. By 1941 Lawson was a Brigadier and the Canadian commander in Hong Kong during the Japanese siege, where he was killed.⁸⁰

If there was one noteworthy Canadian initiative during these inter-war years it was the establishment in 1923 of the professional journal, *Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ)*. The existence of this journal demonstrated a desire to establish discourse on defence issues.⁸¹ The Chief of the General Staff, Major-General J.H. MacBrien, a 1914 graduate of Camberley, had noted the need for a service publication in Canada that would attempt, “to reflect military thought, examine critically the direction of military development, and study in some degree the trend of world

⁷⁹ Stanley, *Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954*, 328; and see also Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 251-54.
movements” and CDQ grew from that need.82 One example of the intellectual engagement it engendered was a lively dialogue, which took place between Lieutenant-Colonel E.L.M. Burns (later a Lieutenant-General) and Captain G.G. Simonds (later a General and Chief of Staff of the Canadian Army) in 1939 as to the correct balance of tanks and infantry in a division as to achieve flexibility and interoperability.83 Both were staff college graduates, Simonds from Camberley in 1937 and Burns from Quetta in 1928.84 In retrospect, the Canadian Defence Quarterly was an especially significant journal with regards to professional knowledge as its creation acknowledged that there might be a distinctive “school of military thought” in Canada that was separate from its Imperial counterpart.85 However, this prediction was not fulfilled until after the Second World War with the emergence of a distinctly Canadian paradigm in staff education as a result of the experiences of the Canadian Army during that conflict. The creation of this Canadian perspective in the post war years is explored in Chapter 6. Regardless, it is evident that in the late 1930s CDQ assisted in creating and maintaining discourse within the professional community of the Canadian military.

Opportunities for Canadian army officers to attend imperial staff colleges continued to be restricted between the wars. Vacancies were limited to three per year.

82 “Editorial,” Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ) 10, no. 2 (January 1933), 135; and see also, Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 530.03 (D1), “Folder listing personnel who have attended Staff Courses, gradings obtained, files applicable to Courses, received from DMT, Aug 1962,” “Canadian Officers – Camberley,” no document number, no page.
83 “Lieutenant-General Granville Simonds, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (born 1903), graduated RMC, 1925; RCA; associate professor of artillery and instructor in tactics, RMC, 1938; GOC 2nd Canadian Corps, 1944-5; CGS, 1951-5.” Preston, Canada’s RMC, 299; see Lieutenant-Colonel E.L.M. Burns, “A Division That Can Attack,” CDQ 15, no. 3 (April 1938), 282-98; Captain G.G. Simonds, “An Army that can Attack - a Division that can Defend,” CDQ 15, no. 4 (July 1938) 413-17; and see also Major Jamie W. Hammond, “The Pen Before the Sword: Thinking About ’Mechanization’ Between The Wars” Canadian Military Journal 1, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 100-101.
84 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 530.03 (D1), “Folder listing personnel who have attended Staff Courses, gradings obtained, files applicable to Courses, received from DMT, Aug 1962,” “Canadian Officers – Camberley” and “Canadian Officers – Quetta,” no document number, no page.
at Camberley and one per year at Quetta. While the British Ministry of Defence had established the Imperial Defence College in 1927 it was a college meant to study the strategic issues of conflict, including inter-service cooperation and the military relationship to government. There was provision that officers from the Dominion forces could attend and some Canadians did, with thirteen graduating prior to the Second World War. This institution was meant to complement a robust staff college education that was the cornerstone of professional development, as well as further a common understanding of Imperial strategy. One could not normally attend the Imperial Defence College until one graduated from the Staff College. Many Canadian officers, however, were not interested in either Staff College or the Imperial Defence College, as they had other pursuits to occupy their time and there was debate on the value of this higher professional education. The Staff Colleges were a considerable investment of time, being two-year courses combined with rigorous selection that included the five-month preparatory course at RMC and successful completion of comprehensive examinations. An idea of the challenges surrounding attendance at the Staff College can be discerned in the 1926 Canadian Militia regulations concerning the criteria for selection and the formal preliminary work associated with the entrance examinations. These requirements are reproduced at Appendix C and laid out in detail the responsibility of supervising officers to ensure that the best candidates are nominated, as well as the processes involved, from confidential reports to assessments of performance in staff positions. Also emphasized is the previously mentioned requirement for all staff college candidates to have

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87 For discussion of the Imperial Defence College mandate and its evolution see Sturton Mathwin Davis, “Development and Characteristics of National Defence Colleges – As a World Phenomenon” (PhD thesis, Queen’s University, 1979), 152-90.
88 Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, 285-85; and see also Granatstein, The Generals, 17.
89 Granatstein, The Generals, 14-17.
completed the staff college preparatory course in an acceptable fashion and passed the requisite entrance examinations.  

Nevertheless, more than half the Permanent Force officers who rose to general rank during the Second World War attended Camberley or Quetta. Until 1938, for a small number of Permanent Force officers, there was the two-year course. At that point the Camberley and Quetta Staff College programmes of studies were reorganized and divided into separate one-year junior and senior courses. In addition, there were staff courses held at the RMC during the inter-war years. From 1922 onwards there was a Militia Staff Course for the Non-Permanent Active Militia and, later, from 1935 an Advanced Militia Staff Course. Both these options were greatly abbreviated when compared to the British model, but they were sufficient to produce a large number of partially qualified staff officers in the Non-Permanent Active Militia prior to the Second World War. However, some debated the value of even this limited professional education. In the October 1938 issue of CDQ Major M. Barry Watson, of the Canadian Officers Training Corps, wrote an article entitled “The Advanced Militia Staff Course: From the Viewpoint of a N.P.A.M. Officer.” Watson suggested in this piece of writing that he thought the Advanced Course did not accomplish the objectives that it set for itself, primarily due to its short length and he implied that this situation also existed to a lesser extent with the other Non-Permanent Active Militia Staff Course. Regardless of such criticism, by 1939 the Militia Staff Course had produced 400 graduates and the Advanced Militia Staff Course had

91 Granatstein, The Generals, 16-17.
94 Major M. Barry Watson, “The Advanced Militia Staff Course: From the Viewpoint of a N.P.A.M. Officer,” CDQ 11, no. 1 (October 1938), 68.
graduated 29 officers. In addition to the 45 Permanent Force officers who had graduated from Camberley and Quetta throughout this inter-war period, those graduates still serving in the army provided some degree of staff capability.\textsuperscript{95} Moreover, one could hypothesize that the thought collectives formed by these graduates and their Imperial colleagues assisted to firmly establish British interpretative paradigms within the various staffs of the Non-Permanent Active Militia and the Permanent Force.

Even so, Canada’s Army as a whole was woefully unprepared for the Second World War. In 1938 the Permanent Force had held its first regimental-level exercise since the end of the First World War. Indeed, it was the first time many officers who had enrolled after 1918 had seen 1000 soldiers on parade.\textsuperscript{96} This training deficiency was evident throughout the manoeuvres. The regimental history of The Royal Canadian Regiment notes:

We were sadly lacking in field experience as a battalion…We had become hopelessly bureaucratic and it was deemed impossible for a battalion to perform even the simplest operation without issuing a four-page written order to at least forty addresses. As an Adjutant I recall the tension created by my desire to have everything brief and verbal and my Commanding Officer’s determination to commit everything to writing.\textsuperscript{97}

It is evident that during the interwar years the Canadian Militia was under-funded, under-equipped and undermanned, as well as being focused on tasks other than fighting. On a solely physical level it was not ready for the challenges of the impending conflict.\textsuperscript{98} However, of equal importance was the lack of intellectual preparedness of Canada’s Militia. In general, neither commanders nor staffs had the

\textsuperscript{95} English goes on to say that the militia staff course graduates were qualified to do little more than garrison duties and actually added little value to the formation staffs of the Canadian Army during the Second World War. English, \textit{Failure in High Command}, 98.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid, 20.

\textsuperscript{97} Stevens, \textit{The Royal Canadian Regiment}, 11.

\textsuperscript{98} For shortfalls in professionalism of the Canadian Army during the Second World War see English, \textit{Lament For An Army}, 20 and 25-45.
opportunity to refine or develop professional expertise and, consequently, the body of knowledge necessary for higher level military operations had not been generally preserved to be inculcated in new generations of officers.99

In the final analysis, Canadian Army professional education in the period prior to the Second World War was shaped by the British Empire. Attendance at Imperial staff colleges ensured that the “brain” of the Canadian Militia, its staff officers, retained a distinctly English cast and allegiance. This occurred through the communities of practice, thought collectives and paradigms formed and maintained by this professional military education. Many of the limited number of graduates attained high rank during their careers. However, the general reliance on the Pax Britannica in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not only imparted a distinctly British perspective to Canadian officers, but also ensured that Canada’s Army was woefully unprepared for the Second World War. In an effort to remain relevant to the Empire and address domestic needs from its inception onwards the Militia, with the exception of the First World War, was generally insufficiently resourced, equipped and lacked personnel. It was evident that the costly knowledge gained in the Great War concerning the demand for educated and experienced staff officers in order to conduct complex military activities was discarded in the post war reduction of forces. Importantly, this decrease was accompanied by a return to the “arms of the Empire” for intellectual guidance regarding the conduct of complex military operations. The Canadian perspectives and ideas that had emerged from the military operations of the First World War, were overshadowed by the professional knowledge provided by the British Army. Consequently, the Canadian Army did not develop the capacity to educate its own staff officers during the inter-war years, as the

paradigms used to interpret war were those provided to a limited number of officers by the Imperial staff colleges. The cost of this unpreparedness would only become apparent with the outbreak of the Second World War.
Chapter 4
Creating the “Brain” of an Army:
Canadian Army Staff Education During the Second World War (1939-1945)

Of all the traditions Canada has inherited in the military field none, is more persistent than public neglect and indifference to national defence, until face to face with an emergency, well expressed by Rudyard Kipling’s lines on ‘Tommy Atkins’ – ‘It’s Tommy this and Tommy that and kick him out the brute; but it’s thank-you very much Mr. Atkins when the guns begin to shoot.’ And as a corollary when an emergency does come, the general public believes that the citizen recruited from the street can be turned into an effective fighting man at the wave of a wand. The public mind seems incapable of grasping the fact that military business is a highly skilled profession.1

- Lieutenant-General G.G. (Guy) Simonds (1972)

Simonds’ words, published as part of Hector Massey’s edited volume, *The Canadian Military: A Profile*, reflect his Second World War experiences as a Canadian Army officer, senior commander and key architect of wartime staff education for deployed Canadian Army officers in Great Britain. On 31 March 1939 the Permanent Force consisted of 4169 personnel, of whom 446 were officers, and the Non-Permanent Active Militia was 51,400, of whom 6373 were officers.2 Neither the Permanent Force nor the Non-Permanent Active Militia were organized into coherent field formations within a field army structure. After Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 the Canadian Government followed the Mother country’s entry into this conflict and declared war on 10 September. The 1st Canadian Division arrived in Britain that December. Major-General A.G.L. (Andrew) McNaughton, a veteran of the First World War, was at its head. Mobilization of military forces, unlike that which took place in 1914, integrated existing units of the Permanent Force and the

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Non-Permanent Active Militia. By 1942 the “Canadian Army,” that term having replaced “Militia” in the autumn of 1940, had in total 177,000 personnel and the portion of the army in England was divided into five divisions, three of infantry and two of armour. These forces were organized as the First Canadian Army and commanded by a newly promoted Lieutenant-General McNaughton. Near the end of the war the Canadian Army was 251,000 strong with its fighting arm in Europe comprised of an Army headquarters, two corps headquarters, three infantry divisions, two armour divisions, two independent armour brigades, and ancillary units. This sudden organizational growth was not without its challenges on a number of levels, but most importantly in the provision of and adequate supply of educated and experienced senior army officers who were prepared to lead and manage the greatly expanded elements now at their disposal. The construction of Canadian Army staff education in the post-war era, and the shift from a British to a Canadian paradigm, had its roots in its development within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

The general neglect of the inter-war period, and lack of introspective thought on the military profession, had an adverse influence on the Canadian Army in the

4 The Canadian Army first saw action at the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942, which involved two brigades supported by naval and air elements conducting a raid of the town of Dieppe. It was not successful, but captured lessons for the future invasion of France. The next significant military activity commenced in July 1943, with the commencement of the Italian Campaign. This force eventually grew to Corps size (1st Canadian Corps) and took part in the Liri Valley offensive that resulted in the capture of Rome and the breaching of the Gothic line that led to the capture of Rimini and Ravenna by Autumn 1944. In early 1945, the bulk of the 1st Canadian Corps moved to North West Europe and was commanded by General H.D. Crerar during the next eleven months of fighting. The remainder of the Canadian Army participated in the Normandy campaign and breakout; the Falaise Gap; Scheldt Estuary; the crossing of the Rhine; and North West Germany until the war ended on 5 May 1945. Stacey, “The Development of the Canadian Army: Part IV: The Modern Army, 1919-1952,” 15-20; for personnel figures in 1942 and 1944 see Colonel C.P Stacey, OBE, The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948), 48; and for information on the development of the First Canadian Army see John R. Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army: Formation Organization, Staff Technique and Administration, Revised ed. (Kingston, ON: The Regimental Historian, 1998).
early years of the war. Senior commanders, at the commencement of conflict, were for the most part officers who had served in the First World War. Many who failed to grasp evolving concepts of airpower and mechanization or lacked insufficient understanding of command at formation level were replaced before 1943. In numerous cases their successors were those who had been pre-war Non-Permanent Active Militia officers and possessed sufficient flexibility and acumen to adapt to the realities of modern war. In 1942 Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery assessed formation commanders from the Canadian Corps as lacking in “the stage management of battle operations, and in the technique of battle fighting generally” and he went on to state that the deficiencies of brigade commanders could not be rectified “unless the Division Commanders are themselves competent to train their subordinates, and are themselves conversant with the handling of a Division.” In the same vein Montgomery also said that the training of division commanders had failed to progress at the same rate as that of lower levels. This general lack of familiarity with higher level command was evidenced by McNaughton’s difficulties during Exercise Spartan, a Corps-level field training exercise held in Britain during March 1943. His inability to manage an army corps was apparent to all. He returned to Canada, a few months later, ostensibly due to health reasons. Canadian Army officer Captain John Rickard provides a description of McNaughton that, perhaps, could portray many Canadian senior commanders at the commencement of the Second World War:

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5 For discussion of issues pertaining to the interwar period, as well as the wartime impact, see Captain John N. Rickard, “A Case Study in Professional Development: McNaughton’s Preparation for High Command During the Second World War,” Canadian Army Journal 9, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 52-57.
7 Quoted in Granatstein, The Generals, 31.
8 Ibid.
He was a man of great conviction and was convinced that a citizen army backed up by sufficient technology would be sufficient to win the next war. Yet for all his intellectual brilliance he allowed himself to be blinded to the fact that the swift organizational changes of the inter-war years would not permit a citizen army the necessary time to figure out the battlefield of the next war. McNaughton, though clothed in the garb of a professional military man, was in fact an amateur commander...  

To all intents and purposes there was a paucity of professional intellectual formation during the interwar years that resulted in the loss of a group of senior leaders who should have become proficient in their vocation.  

Greatly accelerated wartime staff training at Camberley attempted to remedy the lack of qualified staff officers in Commonwealth armies in order to provide the “brain” of this rapidly expanding force. Starting in September 1939 the Staff College conducted 17-week junior staff courses for 100 students at a time. Due to the overwhelming demand for staff education by the British and other armies the Canadian Army received only a small portion of the vacancies on these courses. Of the 100 who attended the first war staff course approximately 10 of those vacancies were allocated to allied armies. Canada received five of these openings. McNaughton recognized that the limited opportunities to educate Canadian staff officers at Camberley would not begin to address the critical staff deficiencies within the Canadian contingent. As well, it was obvious that the British would have little future capacity to spare so the situation would remain unaltered. Moreover, McNaughton believed that the British staff officers currently serving with the Canadian forces would soon be withdrawn to fill openings in British headquarters and

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10 Rickard, “A Case Study in Professional Development,” 64.  
11 English, Lament For An Army, 37.  
Consequently, in late 1940, he sought and obtained permission to create a Canadian staff course. In certain ways this and other developments mirrored the genesis of the First World War Canadian Corps as “a self-contained Canadian formation capable of a large degree of independent action…”

The Canadians established their own three-month Junior War Staff Course in Britain, in the fall of 1940, which was later relocated to the RMC for subsequent serials. Of the 59 who completed the first course only 36 received the staff qualification, seven obtained conditional passes and 16 failed. A lessening of the rigorous pre-war standards ensured a higher level of success during the second and subsequent courses. This course was later renamed the Canadian War Staff Course and subsequently divided into junior (garrison staff) and intermediate (formation staff).

However, the foundations of this wartime shortage of staff officers had been laid prior to 1939 and had far greater implications than one might suppose. For example, John English believes the dearth of qualified staff officers in the inter-war period had an adverse effect on the Canadian Army’s performance during the Second World War. Competent staff officers permit an army to train for war during peace – they provide the intellectual depth needed by military forces, or its “brain.” Once war commences there is rarely time to train field staff officers and remedy deficiencies in

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13 For the background of the Canadian Corps see Canada, DND, DHH Archives, “Report No. 10: Visit to Headquarters, Canadian Corps, Interview with General McNaughton, Present state of the Corps and plans for its development,” Canadian Military Headquarters Reports (18 Feb 41), 8.
education and experience. Command and staff problems that tend to support this hypothesis were evidenced by the Canadian Army throughout the conflict. For example, some troubles demonstrated during the Italian campaign at Liri Valley in 1944 included inflexible artillery fire plans, insufficient time allocated to the reconnaissance of enemy objectives prior to attacks, poorly organized road movement leading to traffic congestion and senior commanders unused to exercising effective command. The Royal Canadian Regiment, which participated in this campaign, recorded the following observation in their regimental history:

The conduct of this battle by the Canadian Corps confirmed General Alexander’s [Commander 15th Army Group, comprised of American and British armies] belief ... that in view of its performance in the Liri battle he could not accept the responsibility of placing British or other allied divisions under Canadian command in subsequent operations. Many senior officers deemed this a slur on the quality of the Canadian soldier. It was nothing of the sort; it merely recognized the axiom the larger the formation the greater its problems of management. General Leese [Commander British 8th Army, which included the Canadians] suggested the Corps be broken up or a new commander appointed.

Prominent British commander General Bernard Montgomery was also aware of these deficiencies within his subordinate Canadian formations and attempted to compensate for them throughout the war. In order to maximize the efficiency of inexperienced and minimally trained staff officers he directed that battle plans be kept simple and that they ensure the largest amount of preparations possible prior to military activities. In keeping with these limitations Montgomery did not expect his subordinates to implement any imaginative or bold actions while conducting operations.

18 Ibid, 101-2.
This insufficiency of staff skills continually impacted in a negative fashion on the performance of the Canadian Army throughout the Second World War. Operational manoeuvre was slow and cautious, normally oriented on definable terrain features, instead of being focused on a difficult opponent. The breakout battles at the Falaise Gap, following the 1944 seaborne invasion of Normandy, demonstrated the difficulties the Canadians had in reacting to pre-empt smaller German forces. Subsequently, the Germans took advantage of the Canadian lack of flexibility and withdrew many of their forces before the encirclement could be closed at Falaise. Historian Bill McAndrew argues that amongst the reasons for failure in Northwest Europe during this period were unwieldy staff procedures which restricted the ability to request and effectively use close air support, formation commanders inexperienced in the use of combined arms and command and staff methods that made formation manoeuvre contingent upon the ranges of the supporting artillery, thus limiting any initiative of the tactical commanders. McAndrew indicates that this inflexibility resulted in “Selection and maintenance of the plan, not the aim, being the guiding principle…” Years later retrospective observations were attributed to Simonds, who regarded the plethora of orders and instructions issued by the Canadian staffs as demonstrating unfamiliarity with the business of war. This observation does bear out McAndrews conclusions, but at the same time it must be noted that herculean efforts were made to remedy the shortfalls of suitably qualified staff officers who could assist senior leaders in exercising the functions of higher command. By the end of the war

Canada’s Army had addressed many of these challenges, in no small part due to the greatly expanded wartime staff education.

However, in hindsight, it is not surprising that in 1939 the Camberley Staff College was unable to fill the requirements for a rapidly growing British Army let alone Dominion forces. Even ceasing the two-year courses at Camberley and Quetta and replacing them by abbreviated and expanded wartime courses was insufficient to meet the demand for staff officers. Consequently, few vacancies could be allocated to officers other than those of the British Army. The inability of the British Army to meet Canadian training and education needs was evidenced in December 1939 instructions from the Canadian Overseas Military Headquarters to McNaughton. The “2nd Junior War Staff Course” 11 January – 20 April 1940 and the “3rd Junior War Staff Course” 16 May – 24 August 1940 respectively allocated only five and seven openings to Canadians and, as described by English, the attrition rate of Canadian students was high. To explain these failures to Canadian authorities the Commandant and staff at Camberley noted that the Junior Staff College course included the material needed to educate officers to hold key operational staff positions up to General Staff Officer (GSO) II and Canadian officers were unable to master the material due to a “lack of military experience.” In the system of staff appointments used at that time the lowest grade general staff officer was a GSO III, normally holding the rank of captain, who assisted more senior appointments. The usual GSO II was one rank higher and customarily a major in charge of a portion of a staff or supporting a more senior ranked staff officer. At the highest level was a GSO I, typically a lieutenant-colonel, but could be of higher military rank depending on the

Learning the knowledge required of a GSO III would permit Canadian Army officers to function in important staff positions at the Brigade, while understanding the functions of the next higher level of organization, the division.

The first Canadian junior war staff course was conducted in the United Kingdom. The reasons for this were manifold and Stacey recorded those put forward by McNaughton. First, there were many experienced officers available in the United Kingdom as instructors and lecturers. Second, the time it would take to send officers from the United Kingdom to Canada would be excessive. Third, there were senior staff officers and commanders of divisions and corps who could participate, as available, in lectures and discussions. Fourth, the course could access British officers with recent combat experience who could present their hard won knowledge. Fifth, the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom could support the course with demonstrations and other tasks as required by the curriculum. Sixth, the British Staff College was close and that proximity would assist to ensure that the course was conducted with the same rigour as the British course. Despite the rational for initially locating the course in the United Kingdom it was also acknowledged that this staff training would eventually move to the permanently established infrastructure in Canada.²⁸

Simonds, in late 1940 a Lieutenant-Colonel after having been rapidly promoted during wartime expansion, was re-assigned by McNaughton from command of the First Regiment Canadian Horse Artillery, to be the Commandant of the Canadian Junior War Staff Course conducted from January to April 1941. He

constructed a staff course that replicated the core knowledge that he had learned at the British staff college in 1936. This included each type of major military operation that would be conducted by a division both defensive and offensive. However, it must be emphasized that this wartime staff education focused on tactical outcomes, the business of fighting. It provided extremely condensed lessons determined by the requirements of the ongoing conflict. Lacking was the second year curriculum of Camberley, the studies pertaining to the security of the Empire and aspects of Imperial power. Ideas of military strategy with its connections to national objectives were not addressed, as they had been in the senior programme of 1938. Within the course outline, or syllabus, “Strategy” was a subject, along with “Imperial Defence” and “Imperial and Foreign Affairs.” As an example of the learning activities linked to these areas, papers required from the students on that first senior staff college course included an analysis of “British Imperial Strategy,” with concomitant discussions of the requirements of imperial defence and foreign affairs. Instruction also included an examination of the major campaigns of the First World War, like that of Amiens (1918), which was a major turning point in that conflict. Additionally, unlike the pre-war Camberley course, more time was spent on basic staff procedures, understandably so given the experience level of the students. The core curriculum of the first course reflected this approach and consisted of the topics necessary to function as a staff officer at a Brigade or Division headquarters. Topics like the production of messages, instructions and orders to convey information pertaining to military operations,

administration and logistical support, the functioning of general and specialized units during the different operations of war, combined operations, called “joint” today, with other services, organizing road movement of military forces, and comparison of British and German tactics, were taught during the 14 weeks of this pilot course. Simonds directed that, unlike the pre-war Camberley programme, which had many specialized précis, or compilations of specific material to explore all aspects of a topic, standard military manuals would be used. John English hypothesizes that these courses could only be considered military education in the superficial sense of the phrase and they were more concerned with imparting standardized procedures than “considering the conduct of operations objectively.” However, despite that one could presume that these courses provided the foundation for the establishment of a Canadian Army “thought collective,” a group of professionals sharing ideas, derived from common interpretive paradigms.

Like the pre-war staff education the educational methodology of these wartime courses was the same. Every element of learning was connected to an assessment either written or practical. The first half of the course was spent mostly in the classroom and receiving practical demonstrations in the intricacies of inter-arms cooperation by various military units and formations, while the second half was consumed with both map and ground exercises.

In a fashion similar to Scharnhorst’s concepts of Bildung and the pedagogical approach at Camberley, Simonds described syndicate work as being the preferred

31 English, Failure in High Command, 100.
educational technique. He suggested that it would assist the participants “... to gain, by discussion with others, knowledge of his profession, which he has not been able to acquire from books or his own experience.” Simonds also observed that aside from causing individuals to work as a team in order to achieve an objective, that every staff was essentially a syndicate of one form or another. This explicit discussion of the relationships during learning, while sparse, encapsulates the tenor of the staff college experience. The mentoring relationship between the syndicate instructors, or “directing staff,” perpetuated notions of Bildung by choosing trainers who were expert in their respective areas and capable of providing an appropriate learning relationship. To establish this professional and educational relationship there were nine directing staff, six of whom were Canadian and three of whom were British.

The details of the pedagogy employed were succinctly captured by Stacey during his visit to the Canadian Junior War Staff Course. This educational style was fundamentally derived from the Kriegsakademie, given British provenance at Camberley and perpetuated through the Canadian system, many aspects of which continue unchanged today:

The students work in syndicates, each of which is under an officer of the directing staff. The syndicates are ‘re-shuffled’ every month, one consequence being that at the end of the course three independent opinions will be available upon each student. The basic method of instruction is discussion designed to make the student think of himself. A discussion sheet upon a certain topic is issued, often containing controversial propositions. It is discussed by the individual syndicates, and then a ‘central discussion’ [plenary] follows. Not much reliance is placed on lectures as such; but lecturers have been brought ‘from outside’ for the special purpose of discussing recent events from the standpoint of actual participants...
Stacey also recorded that each student had three written papers to submit. The first was on a current military topic, the second was a historical case study which pertained to contemporary warfare and the third focussed on staff procedures. Marking was based on the existent Camberley system and was determined by the assessment of the directing staff to whom the student had been exposed and was divided into letter grades ranging from A to F, with each having specific meaning, which changed as the war progressed and the courses evolved. These are laid out at Appendix D and it is noticeable that grading becomes less demanding as the war progresses. During Courses 1-3 there is provision in the grading system for passing students, but not recommending them for employment as a staff officer – a D grade. However, in Course 4 onwards successful completion of the course, at whatever level of achievement, resulted in employment as a staff officer.

It was also recognized that the then existing curriculum of the junior war staff courses, derived from the Camberley staff college, required officers with 10 to 15 years of experience in order to grasp all facets of the material being taught and to acquire the knowledge associated with being employed as a GSO II. In order to maximize the learning of these less experienced students the Directorate of Military Training, in Ottawa, recommended that the staff course should be expanded from three to four months and expectations lowered. The course should aim at producing officers competent to function at the GSO III level. Simonds held similar views regarding the professional abilities of his students, as well as the learning outcomes that they were able to achieve. He observed to Stacey that these officers lacked

36 Ibid, 5.
37 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 530.03 (D1), “Folder listing personnel who have attended Staff Courses, gradings obtained, files applicable to Courses, received from DMT, Aug 1962,” “Grading - Canadian War Staff Courses,” no document, no page.
38 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 112.352109 (D181), Directorate of Staff Duties, “Visits of Army Officials – Dec. 40/Jun 42,” “Appendix D.”
employment experience with their units, or “regimental experience.” Consequently, their solutions to the problems assigned within the curriculum “just fall short of being practical.”

Simonds’ concerns regarding the level of expertise attained by the graduates of this first wartime course were articulated in his informal address to these officers prior to the formal graduation ceremonies. He felt it necessary to remind the graduates of an obligation to be motivated learners and to pursue self-improvement. He also exhorted them to avoid using the model exercises studied for the course when designing pre-combat training that needed to address other situations. These statements took into account the high rate of non-completion of the course and were indicative of Simonds’ unease regarding the products of this wartime staff education. Stacey, then a Major and historical officer with the Canadian Military Headquarters, was on hand to record these remarks:

In conclusion, the commandant [Lieutenant-Colonel Simonds] said something of the reactions of the students to the course. He had already complained that their comments showed too great a belief in spoon-feeding. He reminded them that the course had only scratched the surface; there was still a great deal to learn. Incidentally, he advised them to burn most of the papers which they had left over from the course, and not to attempt to use the exercises over again. A new exercise, worked out to suit different circumstances, would always be more valuable to the troops involved.

Simonds also confided to Stacey that he was in the process of preparing a confidential report noting that the “standard of tactical training” amongst the students was not to the level expected from a qualified staff officer.

However, Stacey also captured other aspects of the staff college experience in the formal graduation remarks. Colonel M.B. Dowse, the GSO I, or Chief Instructor,

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41 Ibid, 6.
at Camberley addressed the graduating officers and stressed the close ties between the
British staff college and the Canadian Junior War Staff Course noting that Camberley
would continue to provide curriculum materials to the War Staff Course after it
moved to the RMC at Kingston. The unspoken message was that this would assure
that Canadian Army officers even in the exigencies of wartime would obtain their
intellectual formation from their British allies. Additionally, Brigadier G.R. Turner,
the Brigadier of the General Staff (Canadian), or GSO I equivalent of the Canadian
Corps, spoke concerning the value of the social networks that had been established
during the three months of instruction. Turner noted that the personal bonds
established within courses such as the Junior War Staff Course have “…greatly
facilitated understanding and liaison.” 42

Turner was alluding to the transnational connections within the profession of
arms that were created by the staff college experience, or communities of practice.
McNaughton expressed this clearly and unambiguously in 1940:

Our staff officers are products of Camberley in England, of Quetta in India
and of the Imperial Defence College in London, the great post-graduate
military colleges of the British Empire which Canada and the other Dominions
have, for many decades, combined with the United Kingdom to support.
Through them we have a uniformity in tactical doctrine,...an asset which is of
priceless value when it comes to operations in the field.

Through them, too, we have, even before we take the field, a wide range of
personal friends throughout the Staffs of the British Army, Corps and
Divisions, and it is no unusual experience for Canadian staff officers to go
into a British Headquarters and find that between them they know everyone
present...our relations with the British Expeditionary Force [are] in marked
and pleasant contrast when we came over practically as strangers. 43

In many ways these “personal” bonds defined the relationship of staff college students
to each other and to the instructors. Through shared experiences of education, the

42 Ibid, 5-6. Quote from page 6
43 Emphasis added. Quoted in Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-
1945,” 110.
fraternity established by the spirit of Bildung, they came to see themselves as part of a larger group of military practitioners who shared the profession of arms.

When the course was moved from Britain to the RMC at Kingston the concerns articulated by Simonds and others had resulted in the Junior War Staff Course of four months duration and designed to qualify officers to fill GSO III positions rather than the more demanding GSO II role. The curriculum remained a version of that provided by Camberley, albeit further truncated than earlier war staff courses and continued to be focused by the exigencies of the current conflict. The primary area of study concerned the organization and employment of various army elements that constituted divisions or parts thereof in all types of military operations. Higher level formations were only touched upon insofar as these even larger organizations supported a division. Supporting studies included such items as general staff duties, intelligence, administration, foreign armies, road, rail and overseas movements, current military affairs, case studies, visits to training centres, formations and units, combined operations, and, finally, the preparation of training.44

The course seems to have changed little until 1943 when it was divided into the Canadian War Staff Course (Intermediate Wing – four months) and the Canadian War Staff Course (Junior Wing – three months). The first was designed to prepare staff officers for wartime army formations utilizing instructors who had recent overseas experience and the second was meant to train officers for staff positions in non-combat environments.45 Along with that functional partition, the qualities required by the students became clearly defined during the same period by a Canadian Army engaged in conflict. If one compares the pre-war requirements for the selection of

44 Canada, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 8 (CATM) (1941), 26.
45 Canada, Library and Archives of Canada (LAC), Record Group 24, Box 9841, File 2/Reports/1, Documents 28-30, “Secret - Report of Visits to Special Trg Ests, 4 Oct 43,” 3; and see also Canada, Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFSC), “SC 1325-2027 (Comdt) 4500-1 (Comdt), Army Staff and Related Courses, 13 Feb 81,” 1.
candidates contained at Appendix C with that those laid out within Appendix E it is discernible that wartime exigencies had affected not only the curriculum, but forced the Army to maximize the pool of potential students by unambiguously putting forward minimum prerequisites for staff education that were much lower than those prior to the conflict. The 1926 regulations list a complex competitive system of professional assessment, including evaluation by superiors, examinations and a preparatory course eventually leading to successful completion a staff course that was related to career employment and progression. However, the wartime courses simply sought officers considered knowledgeable in their fields, cognizant of other military organizations and able to work in a staff capacity for a greatly expanded Canadian Army. Those who performed well would advance in rank.

Despite an unavoidable lessening of interwar staff college entrance standards, the war staff course requirements evolved over the course of the conflict. The instructions from 1942 and 1943 are notable in that they unambiguously provide increasingly greater detail as to the exact conditions necessary for acceptable staff course candidates. While still less exigent than those of pre-war staff courses, these later war staff courses articulated requirements that took in the wartime experience. It seems that as the war progressed that the understanding of the role of the staff officer became more clearly delineated and then was institutionalized by the Canadian Army. For instance, while the 1941 criteria ask for a “good regimental officer” with an “aptitude for staff work” and a “good knowledge of organization and tactics” of his

46 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 733.013(D3), “Notes on History of Militia Staff Course, Staff Colleges & Staff Trg in Cda prepared in D Hist by WO I RG Fowler, May 57,” Appendix C, “The Staff Colleges, Camberley and Quetta,” 3; Canada, Canadian Army, “War Courses – RMC,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 8 (November 1941), 13 and 26-28; Canada, Canadian Army, “Nomination of Candidates for Courses at Central Schools,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 19 (October 1942), 68; and see also Canada, Canadian Army, “Joining Instructions for Candidates Attending Royal Military College War Courses,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum Number 25 (April 1943), 31-32.
own specialty in conjunction with a “broad knowledge” of others, subsequent courses are very specific. The 1942 and 1943 criteria discuss age, medical fitness, recommending authorities, levels of knowledge and practical experience necessary, and personal attributes. Also, they give guidance to the officer providing the recommendation with regards to the type of experiences they might provide their candidate to prepare him for the course.47

Throughout this period learning and communication amongst military practitioners, as well as educational and training institutions, was neither confined to the Canadian Army nor staff colleges of the British Empire. In mid-1944 the United States Army Command and General Staff School48 initiated the sharing of course materials with allied staff colleges through the British Army Staff in Washington. It was suggested by the American commandant that they should exchange complete sets of instructional materials every nine months, or after about two courses, and the response was positive. Interestingly, it is evident that the Commander of the British Army Staff in Washington viewed the RMC as part of the Imperial staff college system, as the offer to the Commandant of the RMC came directly from him, not the Canadian liaison staff in the United States. It is also evident from the correspondence that there was an informal and formal network of instructors and students who discussed curriculum and other developments amongst themselves in a non-hierarchical fashion and great value existed in the establishment and maintenance of a community of learning practitioners that would extend beyond commonwealth

47 Canada, Canadian Army, “War Courses – RMC,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 8 (November 1941), 13 and 26-28; Canada, Canadian Army, “Nomination of Candidates for Courses at Central Schools,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 19 (October 1942), 68; and see also Canada, Canadian Army, “Joining Instructions for Candidates Attending Royal Military College War Courses,” Canadian Army Training Memorandum Number 25 (April 1943), 31-32.
48 Today the United States Army Command and General Staff School is known as the United States Army Command and General Staff College. It is still located at Fort Leavenworth, KS.
This enthusiasm is evident in correspondence that took place in 1944 between the RMC and the United States Army Command and General Staff School:

...the British Army Staff, Washington, has written to RMC suggesting that an exchange of subject matter issued to the students at Command and General Staff School and the Canadian War Staff Course (Intermediate Wing) be made.

I feel that a great deal of mutual benefit would result from this scheme, and I am most anxious to do so. A complete set of the precis issued to our students is, therefore, being prepared to be forwarded to you...

I am looking forward to receiving your precis here and feel that they will be most useful to us in our work...  

In the same letter the RMC also offered to send the Americans school solutions to the précis problems, but this was declined by the United States Army Command and General Staff School, “If your questionnaires and exercises on the phases of war are similar to those sent to us by Camberley...” Since there was no record of further correspondence on this topic it strongly suggests that the Canadian War Staff Courses continued to utilize British materials and mirror aspects of their progenitor. At the same time, although the curriculum remained wedded to Camberley, the transnational nature of staff Canadian staff education changed during the war years. By late 1944 Canada was also sending students not only to commonwealth staff colleges, but also three per course at the United States Army

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49 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 171.009 (D209) “Corresp and requests for info re special war courses (incl CJSC’s) at RMC – Sep 41/Mar 46,” Document 55, Letter from the Commandant, The Royal Military College of Canada to the Commander British Army Staff, Washington, D.C. dated 4 July, 1944 and Document 56 enclosed Letter from the Commander British Army Staff, Washington, D.C to Commandants Camberley, Quetta and Haifa Staff Colleges dated 4 July, 1944, no page.

50 Ibid, Document 59, Letter from the Acting Commandant the Royal Military College of Canada to the Commandant the United States Command and General Staff School dated 17 Jul 44, no page.

Liaison was established and maintained with many staff colleges, the long standing institutions of Camberley, Quetta, and Leavenworth, as well as institutions at Cabarlah in Australia, and Haifa in British Palestine. As well, the instructional cadre became more international and inter-service. In 1945 the Canadian War Staff Courses had on staff an officer from the United States Army Command and General Staff School, three officers from the British Army, one officer from the Australian Army and even one officer from the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Moreover by 1945 it seems as if the curriculum of the Canadian war staff courses was incorporating sources other than those of strictly British origin. There is evidence of discussion about the use of American manuals pertaining to employment of military forces. Additionally, the growing importance of the American forces was mirrored in repeated requests by elements of the Canadian Army for copies of American précis. This included the Directorate of Military Training, which had oversight of all education and training in the Army. Moreover, of increasing relevance was the importance of the Canadian war experience. There were repeated requests for information from the Canadian War Staff courses for details of recent Canadian military operations and employment. This ability to gather and teach relevant

52 Ibid
54 Ibid.
lessons from the Canadian Army experience was a far cry from the problems regarding the design and delivery of curriculum faced by the first courses. The early wartime staff courses were noted by the Commandant of the RMC as having suffered from a “...lack of [instructor] experience and prepared material applicable to Canada.” This emphasis on the creation of Canadian curricula seems to also be evidence of an ongoing paradigm shift from a British to Canadian perspective.

In addition to the exchange of curriculum materials there were also visitors to the RMC from many allied staff education institutions. In 1945 these guests included notables like:


From this list, one can see the linkages established between permanent and wartime military education institutions. In combination with the cross assignment of instructional staff from various armies and schools such visits assisted in the furtherance of transnational bonds.

By the end of the Second World War the two wartime staff courses were solidly ensconced at the RMC. The Canadian War Staff Course (Intermediate Wing), was called “A Wing” and the Canadian War Staff Course (Junior Wing), was named “B Wing.” Both courses continued to produce GSO III level graduates, in the former instance for field headquarters and in the latter case for static headquarters. “A Wing”

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57 “Staff Courses at the R.M.C.”, “Review: Log of H.M.S. Stone Frigate” (1946): 78.
was graduating about a 100 students per course, while “B Wing” produced about 40 graduates.  

The last Canadian War Staff Course ended on 22 March 1946. Altogether, 19 wartime staff courses had been conducted and a detailed list is contained in Appendix F. Of these, 12 were Intermediate and the remainder were Junior courses. Over the course of the conflict the Intermediate courses had lasted three to four months, while the Junior courses were two to three months in duration. In the aftermath of the war the Intermediate Course was eventually extended to eight months and the Junior Course back to four months. Ultimately, about 1400 Canadian Army officers were the recipients of wartime staff education.

However, from the beginning of the Second World War, one facet of the staff college experience did not change and, in fact, became more developed throughout the war in response to the demands of coalition and joint warfare and the personal relationships that it engendered. In this manner Scharnhorst’s concepts of Bildung that had been actualized through syndicate instruction firstly, by the Kriegsakademie, and later Camberley, were perpetuated in the Canadian model of military education. What is more, these bonds extended not just throughout the Canadian and British armies, but came to include those of other allies, especially the United States. In effect, a transnational community of practice coalesced as a result of the sharing of information and expertise necessary for the education of staff officers during the Second World War. While Canadian military education owed its intellectual provenance to the British Empire, during the war it came to incorporate its own operational experience, in addition to those of other close allies. Although, the

58 Ibid, 77; and see also Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945,” 135.
59 CLFCSC, “SC 1325-2027 (Comdt) 4500-1 (Comdt), Army Staff and Related Courses, 13 Feb 81,” 1.
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, comprised of the heads of the various services, briefly raised the idea of jointly conducted staff training at the end of the war, that scheme was deferred. In the meantime it was decided that each Service would deal with its own staff training. Canadian Army staff education thereby became tailored to the requirements of the wartime force and in that process laid the foundation for a Canadian Army vision of professional military education in the years that immediately followed.

The Canadian Army had expanded rapidly at the beginning of the Second World War and experienced problems that took away from its operational performance. After the fact, it was evident that the general neglect of staff education during the inter-war period, and concomitant lack of introspective thought on the military profession, had an adverse influence on the Canadian Army during the war. At great cost the Canadian Army had come to understand the need to develop and maintain its own staff education and create its own “brain.” As a result, the foundations of professional staff education for Canadian Army shifted from a primarily British to Canadian paradigm. This national perspective was to endure for the next two decades, until the educational reorganization precipitated by the unification of the Canadian military.

Chapter 5

Separate and Distinct:
Canadian Military Developments of the Cold War (1945-1990)

*It is from the outside world that the storms threaten. Two states of unparalleled power face each other in an uneasy “peace.” Two ways of life, which is not too much to call religions, clash in mutual denunciations. State and religion in each case coincide. The atomic bomb hangs over humanity like Damocles’ sword. The Canadian people show no disposition to deviate from the pattern of their behaviour on previous occasions, so that if the uneasy peace were to break down into war, they would be found “at America’s side” just as on previous occasions they were found at Britain’s.*

– A.R.M. Lower (1949)

*The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century is to be replaced in the later twentieth century by a Pax Americana.*

– Escott Reid (1947)

In order to examine the professional education of Canadian Army officers in the post-war period and to understand the increasing American influence in this education, it is essential to place this activity within the larger context of military, national and international affairs. This time was characterised by extreme violence, and by international tension and nuclear standoff, with the omnipresent threat of global annihilation. Although the cessation of hostilities in 1945 had concluded a worldwide struggle against fascism, it also marked the end of an uneasy wartime alliance of two other differing ideologies, those of communism and capitalism. In his 1949 Preface to the 4th edition of his seminal work *Colony to Nation: A History of Canada* eminent Canadian historian Arthur Lower accurately captured the bipolar...

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world of the late modern era outlining the tensions that were its *raison d’être*.\(^3\)

Additionally, others like Canadian diplomat Escott Reid noted that, in this new world order, the American Republic and affiliated nations had supplanted Britain and the Empire as the harbingers of the west. It seemed reasonable to most that Canada’s relationship to the ascendant United States would be marked by a shifting of allegiances and a severance of the last ties that bound the nation to Britain. Given Canada’s struggle for recognition of her wartime contribution, it was believed by the Canadian government that this association with the United States and other major nations would reflect Canada’s status as a nation state in the post war global community, not co-equal perhaps, but as a country with a degree of influence. Lester Pearson, then the Minister-Counsellor of the Canadian legation in Washington, expressed these nascent desires in May 1944, observing that Canada’s participation amongst the allied powers was recognized as vital for successful prosecution of the global conflict, but amongst the “Big Four,” the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, Canada was not considered an equal. Accordingly, Pearson believed that Canada fell into the category of an “in-between state,” a country with power and responsibility, but unable to control or direct the war. Some Canadian officials were concerned that the great powers were not acknowledging Canada’s efforts towards winning the war because they excluded her from the decision-making bodies of the wartime alliance. Initial attempts to be included in these forums were rebuffed by the major allies on the grounds that making an exception for Canada would mean that other smaller countries would wish to participate. Inclusiveness would make the process of policy and strategy formation too complex and time consuming. Despite these obstacles, views, such as those of Pearson, eventually

resulted in the formulation and recognition of the “functional” principle of representation. Pearson advocated that in areas where smaller nations had expertise or interests they should be considered in the same light as major powers. In other words, relevance or “salience” within the alliance permitted representation in wartime councils. This was an enduring lesson to Canadian statesmen and senior military commanders.  

In 1945 Ottawa embraced the term “middle power” to describe Canada’s status as a smaller nation that had earned the right to participate in and influence international affairs. Pearson gave this idea form by suggesting that “our strength and resources as a middle power” should permit Canada to partake of some of the “rights and privileges” within the realm of international politics that the larger nations had abrogated unto themselves. This philosophy was first utilized in an effort to ensure that the leaders of the victorious allies did not dominate the proposed United Nations (UN). Canada sought greater recognition for smaller countries in the post war world and advocated a role for middle powers in the maintenance of international peace.  

By the cessation of the Second World War it was evident that Canada’s acceptance as a middle power lay in its ability to establish salience (or relevance) on the international stage by participating in constructive international action through multilateral organizations. Membership in alliances, particularly the North Atlantic

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5 This Canadian idea of achieving relevance, or salience, within alliances has been explored at length in Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest* (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 2006).

Treaty Organization (NATO) and NORAD,\textsuperscript{7} and to a lesser extent the UN, as well as the necessity of constructing relevancy within these alliances \textit{de facto} determined how Canada would use its military to demonstrate commitment as a member of the western aligned states. The broad strokes of immediate post war foreign policy maintained wartime alliances, but early in the Cold War emphasis moved from multilateral to bilateral arrangements for defence. However, in the absence of coherent and durable political guidance to the Canadian military it became separate from the government. During succeeding decades, the use of Canada’s armed forces as an instrument of national power was cautious, fragmented and disjointed with a corresponding deleterious effect on the conduct of military operations.\textsuperscript{8} Exacerbating this situation was the isolation of the profession of arms in Canada. The seclusion of the military profession had its origins in the formation of the Canadian services. This isolation was reinforced after the Second World War and continued through the following decades. In effect the Canadian military was distinct from Canadian society.\textsuperscript{9} As a result of all this, the Canadian services had developed a tradition of seeking strategic guidance from its military alliances rather than from its own political leaders. The unifying factor in Canadian defence activities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was support of a \textit{Pax Britannia}, which was replaced by the \textit{Pax Americana}. The employment of Canadian military forces since the Second World War reflects this movement from British to American spheres.

\textsuperscript{7} In 1981, the “A” in NORAD changed from “Air” to “Aerospace” in recognition of the growing importance of space to continental defence.


\textsuperscript{9} David Bercuson argues that this lack of connection to Canadian society had disastrous consequences for Canada’s army in the 1990s. See David Bercuson, \textit{Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia} (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996).
Although governments throughout recorded history have used the military to further the aims of their respective nations, contemporary views of political and military have been shaped by the European experience of interstate warfare.\textsuperscript{10} As a result of the Napoleonic wars the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz formalized western views of this connection between national objectives and military activities: “…war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means.”\textsuperscript{11} Clausewitz proposed that the nature of war was determined by the interplay between government, the people, and the military. Key to this relationship is the link between national policy and the use of military forces. The latter, according to Clausewitz, should be subsumed by the exigencies of the former. Clausewitz also strove for broad explanatory concepts of war and viewed the connection between policy and the violence of war as being modified by various gradients of strategy and tactics. The contemporary construct of the operational level of war was incorporated in these gradients and not separately identified by western military thought until the late modern period.\textsuperscript{12} As will be discussed in a later chapter, during the twentieth century this linkage developed, from primarily United States Army influence, into a hierarchical arrangement that included military strategy, operations and tactics. This sequencing permitted an orderly and methodical transformation of strategic objectives to attainable and measurable tactical

\textsuperscript{10} Amongst the first documented instances of the connection between policy and war are in events documented by the historian Thucydides during the Peloponnesian War (434-404 B.C.). In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides wrote that a representative of Athens, explained to the Melians the necessity of the Athenians destroying Melos, their city state, to ensure the security of Athens: “No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power… so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection,…” Thucydides, \textit{History of the Peloponnesian War} [document on-line]; available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm; internet, accessed 12 April 2004, Book V, Chapter XVII.


goals. In this construct heads of state and their principal advisors normally formulate overarching strategy. Strategy is the level of policy at which a country or a group of countries chooses national or alliance security objectives. Grand strategy concerns the goals of an alliance while national strategy refers to that of an individual nation. Military strategy is the application of the military power of a nation through force or threat of force to achieve the goals of grand or national strategy. Operations involve the creation and implementation of military campaigns to achieve strategic ends. Tactics are the detailed techniques and procedures that military units and formations use to achieve victory in battles and engagements. This hierarchical arrangement is the practical expression of the military as “an instrument of policy.”

Interestingly, Canada had and still has no formal systemic process to formulate strategy, such as that contained within the American National Security Act of 1947. In theory, this American legislation ensures that security objectives are methodically linked to national policy and eventually transformed into military actions that support policy goals. It also ensures there are mandated periodic reviews and assessments of the effectiveness of United States National security strategies. The legislation was designed to capitalize on the lessons of political-military coordination learned during the Second World War and it makes certain that the authority for policy making is vested in the civilian departments of government, particularly the State Department. On the other hand, it must be observed that the war in Iraq has caused an evolution in the realm of American policy formulation with a greater degree of input from the

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13 Howard Coombs, “Perspectives on Operational Thought,” in Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Lawrence Hickey, eds., The Operational Art – Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), 75-95.
14 Clausewitz, On War, 88.
Department of Defense. These changes are currently causing much debate in the United States concerning the role of the military in creating national policy.  

From the perspective of Great Britain and affiliated commonwealth nations the Second World War did not provide the same impetus to devise an American type of legislative and hierarchical theoretical approach in linking military activities to national objectives. It was recognized that there were gradients of actions from the political level through the conduct of military operations. Also that state policy governed the decision to conduct war and its overall goals, which in turn determined military strategy, grand tactics and minor tactics. However, it was recognized that this relationship was not simply one way or always clear, but was sometimes characterized by constantly shifting direction and discourse. Interestingly, this post Second World War perspective may be somewhat akin to that which seems to be presently occurring in the United States.

In any case, after the Second World War, Canada maintained a Cabinet Defence Committee that now and again initiated defence reviews to provide oversight on the Canadian military. This process, however, did not result in an encompassing methodical approach, like that of the United States, to formulating lasting and durable defence plans in keeping with foreign policy. Instead Canada evolved an informal

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approach to the employment of military forces that was determined by factors other than a coherent body of national policy.

During the initial decades of the Cold War, the heads of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) formed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and provided all military advice regarding defence policy to the Minister of National Defence and the Cabinet Defence Committee. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee acted in the capacity of the government representative to NATO and NORAD and had immense influence in Canada’s relationship with her allies. In the absence of a centralized and coordinated strategic policy mechanism, Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, the Adjutant-General of the Army, testified in 1961 to the Special Committee on Defence that the Chairman “became the real arbitrator on defence policy tendered to government,” with the ability to influence defence and consequently foreign policy. The authority of the Cabinet Defence Committee had dwindled by the mid-1950s to matters of administration, budgets, manning and logistics. In light of these circumstances the “tacticization” of strategy come to pass, or more simply put, “the tail was wagging the dog” – National Defence rather than the Cabinet was creating policy.

Compounding this weak link between national objectives and defence policy was a form of militarism produced by the isolation of the military profession in Canada. Alfred Vagts, in A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession suggested that the armies of western democracies are:

…maintained in a military way and a militaristic way. The distinction is fundamental and fateful. The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is with the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It is limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential

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qualities. Militarism, on the other hand presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and wars yet transcending true military purposes...Rejecting the scientific character of the military way, militarism displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief.  

Vagts argued that modern armies were not constantly at war like those of ancient times and subsequently were more liable to forget that their purpose was war and that militaries exist to perpetuate the state. “Becoming narcissistic, they dream that they exist for themselves alone. An army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic…” In many ways, Vagts’ ideas of militarism delineated the expression of Canadian military professionalism in the wake of the Second World War. In the absence of a clear articulation of pertinent policy objectives for military activities by the Canadian government, the profession of arms in Canada established its own vision of military relevance within alliances during the modern era.

However, this pattern was not entirely a post war phenomenon and there were clear indications of militarism by the Canadian Army prior to the end of the Second World War. As a result of the negative experiences concerning conscription during both world wars, the Canadian Government decided not to exercise that option, although it possessed powers of general conscription from 1942 onwards. However, by 1944 the numbers of voluntary enlistments in the Army were sharply reduced from previous years. Casualty estimates in October 1944 projected a deficiency of almost 4,000 trained soldiers, an assessment that created great consternation among Canadian military authorities. In the face of Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s refusal to resort to conscription and cause “serious controversy,” the Minister of National Defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston, resigned on 1 November and was subsequently replaced the next day by General A.G. L. McNaughton (who was brought back from retirement).

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This turmoil between the political and military leadership over conscription resulted in, “One of the most violent and bitter public controversies in Canadian political history…” As a result of this emotive debate the Government felt it had no choice but to authorize conscription on 22 November.  

Major R.J. Walker, in *Poles Apart: Civil-Military Relations in Pursuit of a Canadian National Army* writes that this debate signified a “crisis” of two parts between the Canadian Government and the Canadian Army. First, was the resignation of Brigadier R.A. Macfarlane, Officer Commanding District No. 10 (Winnipeg) a day earlier, on 21 November, in protest over the Government’s negative stance on conscription. Macfarlane stated that “99 percent of the officers in Canada favoured conscription, and that he resigned because he could not conscientiously do his job as a soldier under the existing system of raising reinforcements.” The resignation of a senior serving officer in wartime sent a clear and significant message of protest to the Canadian government.

The second part of the crisis, was that during the morning of 22 November, Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, Chief of the General Staff, and the principal generals, who comprised the Army Council, met with McNaughton after submitting a memorandum stating that the “Voluntary system of recruiting through army channels cannot meet the immediate problem.” This document, in combination with the unrecorded dialogue from that meeting, left participants with the understanding that more resignations would be the next step if the Minister and the Government remained unwavering in their refusal to enact conscription. In the face of this intransigence and the threat of mass resignation, conscription was passed by

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Parliament creating a great deal of national discord.\textsuperscript{25} There were demonstrations in Montreal and Quebec. Support for and against conscription polarized English and French Canada. Luckily for the King government the need for reinforcements diminished as offensive operations in Northwest Europe and Italy slowed during Winter 1944/1945. The Canadian Army retrenched until Spring 1945, when the conflict in Europe ended and the crisis was avoided.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless, in a fashion similar to the militarism described by Alfred Vagts, the Canadian Army had created its own goals and arranged its activities in order to meet them.\textsuperscript{27} The Army had ignored the principle that “the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its expression through the institutions established by it – whether in determination of the policies or in the interpretation of the constitution – can be legitimate.”\textsuperscript{28}

This Canadian expression of militarism did not arise only from the crucible of combat, but had its origins within the Canadian military profession prior to the Second World War. Stephen Harris, in \textit{Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939}, writes that a number of factors, especially geographical seclusion, a small population and reliance on Great Britain, had the effect of preventing the creation of a national military profession. This lack of strong identity and connection to the nation is evident in pre-war editions of \textit{Canadian Defence Quarterly} that had a distinctly Imperial focus. Harris also suggests that this trend to emulate the most significant ally was continued by military affiliation with

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Morton Desmond Morton, \textit{A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 220-22.
the United States in the post war era. This later affiliation brought with it compliance to American ideals and norms in a fashion that mirrored the relationship with the British military of the previous epoch.

Consequently, the focus of the post-Second World War Canadian military was the production of navy, army and air forces that would be interoperable with those of the United States. Strategic thinking was predicated on ideas originating from the United States and within American-led alliances and coalitions. The profession of arms in Canada, while ostensibly acting as an instrument of the state was separate from the nation and distinct from the society. While theorists like Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* suggest that the most effective military forces are those motivated by ideals of professional competence rather than political or ideological aims they are careful to indicate that the soldier must be subordinate to the interests of national policy. In the Canadian context, the military profession was not only subordinated to the interests of alliance, but defined itself during the Cold War in the context of transnational military agreements. Accordingly, the expression of this military alignment was at times without regard to Canadian foreign policy or related objectives.

The groundwork of Canadian national strategy during the Cold War was provided in a 1947 address at the University of Toronto by future prime minister Louis St Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs. St. Laurent’s speech

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30 While questions regarding the impact of the move from British to American orbit on the military profession in Canada have yet to be fully explored facets of this connection have been recognized and examined since the 1970s. Richard A. Preston, “Review: Toward a Defence Policy and Military Doctrine for Canada,” *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 1 (November 1977): 129.
31 Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bentley, *Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005), 95.
33 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 8-10; and Downey, *Management in the Armed Forces*, 5.
placed Canada firmly in the same camp as the Western allies and outlined how relevance would be achieved within that alliance. First, he proposed that Canadian foreign policy would exist as a unifying influence within the country; it could do this best by reflecting the values and ideals of Canadian society: “The role of this country in world affairs will prosper only as we maintain this principle, for a disunited Canada will be a powerless one.” Second, Canada should support political liberty, thus “a threat to the liberty of Western Europe, where our political ideas were nurtured, was a threat to our way of life.” Third, Canadian foreign policy should support the rule of law and St Laurent suggested that a lesson could be learned from “the hideous example of the fascist states of the evil that befalls a nation when the government sets itself above the law.” This was an allusion to and warning about the state of affairs within the Soviet Union. Fourth, foreign policy should be based on “some conception of human values.” These values emphasized the rights of the individual and were not to be determined by considerations of material wealth. St Laurent expressed the sentiment that Canada should “protect and nurture” these standards of behaviour. Last, arising from the desire to enact policy that was in keeping with the previous principle, Canada had an imperative to take on external responsibilities because the “security for this country lies in the development of a structure of international organizations.” Unlike the devastated countries of Europe, Canada was intact and should act in concert with a number of like-minded nations, such as those in the British Commonwealth, the United States and France. The speech stressed the value of Canada’s numerous treaties and agreements, and it attempted to steer clear of encouraging French Canadian criticisms of too close a relationship with Great Britain. Canada would avoid regionalism but acknowledged that it enjoyed a close connection with the United States; however, he observed that “The relationship between a great
and powerful neighbour and its smaller neighbour is at best far from simple.” St. Laurent also stressed proportionality in Canada’s policies because Canada was “a secondary power” and would cooperate in “constructive international action,” but he could not and would not advocate activities that only larger countries could bear. St Laurent believed that “There is little point in a country of our stature recommending international action, if those who must carry the major burden of whatever action is taken are not in sympathy.”

He further predicted that Canada would act internationally in concert with allies and partners, which became the prelude to Canadian military involvement with NATO and NORAD. In conjunction with the principle of achieving relevance and an absence of a systemic connection between the formulation and implementation of grand strategy and Canadian military strategy, this tendency to act within alliances and coalitions created the conditions for an incoherent and disjointed approach to the planning and conduct of military operations. The idea of Canadian services aligning themselves with their principal ally in the absence of authoritative national direction came to characterize the “Canadian Way” during the Cold War.

At the end of the Second World War, the Canadian military had a great deal to offer its allies. It possessed the third largest navy, fourth largest air force and one of the bigger armies amongst the allies – wartime enlistments had numbered 106,522 for the RCN; 730,625 for the Army and 249,624 for the RCAF – in total 1,086,771 or roughly 9.65 per cent of the pre-war population. It was a formidable organization.

Canada did not immediately rush to reduce her forces and initially assumed


commitments abroad in the form of collective defence. The government committed 25,000 servicemen and 11 RCAF squadrons for the occupation of post war Germany. A booming economy, however, prompted most Canadians to clamour for demobilization and a return to normalcy. Domestic pressure and collective action by overseas servicemen caused Canada to bring back its occupation troops in the spring of 1946. Given popular sentiment, plans of the three services for expanded post war forces met with an unenthusiastic response from the government. The navy requested a manning strength of 20,000 to create a task force with two aircraft carriers and four cruisers. The army proposed force levels of 55,788 regulars and 155,396 reserves and a “training force” of 48,500, who were to be drafted into compulsory service. The RCAF recommended 30,000 on active service, 15,000 in auxiliary squadrons, and 50,000 in the reserve. These propositions were sharply reduced by the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King to a level that was deemed necessary for current and future commitments. The RCN proposal was lessened by half, to about 9% of its wartime strength, the army was permitted 25,000 regulars or 3% of wartime enlistment and the RCAF was allowed 16,000 on active service or 6% of wartime numbers for a total of 51,000 in the Canadian forces – 5% of Second World War figures. Furthermore, any ideas of conscription to maintain military Manning levels were flatly rejected.

Notwithstanding these sharp cuts, prominent Canadian military historian C.P. Stacey wrote retrospectively in 1952 that much had changed from the post war

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36 Auxiliary squadrons were intended to directly supplement the active squadrons of the RCAF in times of war and peace, while the general reserve did not include these flying squadrons and were viewed principally as a wartime resource with some utility for peacetime augmentation. Beretion Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston, and William G.P. Rawling, The Crucible of War 1939-1945: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Volume III (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 13; and Brigadier General Paul A. Haynes (Retired) “Future of the Naval, Air and Land Reserves,” address to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, January 1997 [presentation on-line] available at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/hayes.htm; internet, accessed 16 May 2006.

situation of 1919: “A people who traditionally had been very unwilling to do much in the way of military preparation in time of peace had clearly learned a great deal from the hard experience of two World Wars.”

The reduced military establishments of 1946 did not remain fixed but began to rise again in 1947-1948 in the face of international tension, to meet the demands of alliances, until a peacetime high of 100,000 in three services was reached in 1952.

As indicated by St Laurent in his 1947 speech Canada would fulfil her commitments to NATO and continental defence, but interestingly these obligations did not then include the UN.

The formation of the UN in 1945 had been met with high expectations, but the effectiveness of the international body was soon doubted. In September 1946 Louis St. Laurent characterized the UN as “impotent” and not a venue through which Canada could make an appropriate contribution to international security. The UN was viewed, by some, as ineffective as long as the Soviets had a veto in the Security Council. Sir Brian Urquhart, a British diplomat who later served as the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, was present during the creation of the UN, and he stated:

The Charter had been based on the concept of an extension of the wartime alliance into peacetime. The “United” in UN came from the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and referred to nations united in war, not in peace. The permanent members of the Security Council with the power of veto were the leaders of a victorious wartime alliance, and the Charter assumed, with a stunning lack of political realism, that they would stay united in supervising, and if necessary, enforcing, world peace.

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40 Quoted in Bothwell, The Big Chill, 14.
Canadian External Affairs officials believed Western nation states should provide a united front but not attempt to make changes to the Charter that would cause the Soviets to withdraw from the UN and isolate themselves. In Canadian eyes the Cold War threatened middle power states and the UN provided a venue for dialogue regarding potential causes of friction and a way to avoid outright conflict between major powers.

Failure to achieve consensus in the UN Security Council led to an assessment of alternative forms of collective security by the United States and her allies, including Canada. The “Truman Doctrine” of March 1947 committed the United States to provide assistance to any country attempting to maintain its sovereignty and self-governance when menaced by totalitarian aggression. Reflecting notions of “containment,” advocated by George Kennan, an analyst with the State Department, this American policy was designed to discourage the Soviet Union from attempting to establish communism worldwide: “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies.” The philosophy of containment was also advocated by officials of Canada’s External Affairs. Escott Reid believed that an overwhelming preponderance of force, instead of a more pacifistic approach, was the most appropriate deterrent to the Soviet challenge. For Canada, with its

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44 Ibid, 33-34.
middle power capabilities, this meant that the requisite military, economic and public
diplomacy would be augmented through Canada’s participation in alliances.46

Containment assisted in the creation of an Atlantic community led by the
United States. Soviet–American antagonism became the pivotal feature of post war
international relations. As a result of this burgeoning friction, informal discussions
commenced between American, British and Canadian officials in the fall of 1947
regarding a mutual security assistance agreement.47

The February 1948 Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade
later that year created further consultation regarding mutual deterrence and defence
amongst former wartime allies. These discussions led to the signing of a military
mutual assistance treaty amongst the North Atlantic nations on 4 April 1949. The
original signatories were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain and the United States. The
military aspects of NATO quickly developed when in June 1950, as a result of the
onset of the Korean War, the signatories decided to create a standing military force to
dissuade and counter Soviet aggression. By 1951, as a result of these NATO
commitments, Canadian military forces were stationed in Europe.48

The Canadian military had no difficulty accepting American guidance at this
time because agreements formed during the Second World War had already

46 Escott Read cites prominent American Sovietologist George Kennan’s ideas of containment as the
most appropriate manner of dealing with Soviet expansionist tendencies, as well as providing thoughts
on the role of the United States as a leader in western efforts to limit the Soviet Union’s global
aspirations. Escott Reid, Head, Second Political Division, “United States and Soviet Union: A Study of
the Possibility of War and Some Implications for Canadian Policy,” Top Secret Draft Memorandum,
Ottawa, 30 August 1947 in Hillmer and Page, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 377-79; and
Escott Reid, Head, Second Political Division, “Developments in the UN during the Next Year,” Secret
Memorandum to the High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, 29 October 1947, in Ibid, 683.
47 Hilliker and Barry, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 33.
48 About 10,000 were based in West Germany and France. In the early years Canada’s NATO
commitment was an infantry brigade group of 6670, an air division of 12 squadrons (up to 300
aircraft), approximately 40 warships, and reinforcements in time of war. Dean L. Oliver, Dispatches,
Issue 9: Canada and NATO [paper on-line]: available from
supplanted longstanding relationships between the military forces of Canada and those of Britain.\textsuperscript{49} In matters of mutual defence the Ogdensburg Agreement of 17 August 1940 had resulted in the creation of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), while the Hyde Park Declaration signed in April 1941 had strengthened Canada’s military-industrial reliance on the United States.\textsuperscript{50} The PJBD continued after the Second World War and a subsidiary group, the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), began integrating continental defences in 1946. From 1948 to 1950 Canadian politicians lobbied for increased reciprocal defence procurement arrangements with the United States and a Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee was established in April 1948.\textsuperscript{51} Indicating the growing acceptance of American support in matters of defence, the PJBD initiated a bilateral agreement on 12 February 1947 that committed the Canadian military to use American equipment, weapons and modes of operation.\textsuperscript{52} All together, these accords had made Canada and her military comfortable with looking to the United States for guidance and assistance in matters of mutual defence, just as they had looked to Britain prior to the Second World War.\textsuperscript{53}

In conjunction with the environment of the Cold War and a desire to establish and act

\textsuperscript{49} Prior to the Second World War some have argued that continentalism already overshadowed the traditional ties to Empire. Liberal Member of Parliament S.W. Jacobs at a speech on immigration policy, during July 1927 said that in matters of international policy: “We [Canada] follow blindly what you [the United States] do. We ape your laws and customs. Our government makes the mistake of thinking what is good for 110,000,000 people is good for 9,000,000. You take snuff in Washington today and we do the sneezing tomorrow. You are suffering from high blood pressure and we are suffering from anaemia, but our government thinks we ought to be given the same medicine.” “Declarations Ottawa Apes Washington,” from \textit{The Montreal Gazette} 9 July 1927, Sutherland Brown Papers, Queen’s University Archives, Box 9, File 216.


\textsuperscript{52} Morton, \textit{A Military History of Canada}, 230.

\textsuperscript{53} “The old age of imperial defence was over: in 1948 a satisfied Foulkes returned from London to announce its death: the British he reported, ‘are taking a much broader and more realistic view of defence matters.’ The imperial capital was Washington.” Ibid, 229.
within alliances, NATO became a natural extension of these previously brokered American-Canadian agreements. Nonetheless the dangers of such an arrangement to Canada soon became apparent: in the absence of formulated national security strategy, Canadian participation in NATO became *de facto* foreign policy.

Canadian involvement in the Korean War also followed a similar pattern of maintaining alliances. While not directly concerning NATO, the conflict was viewed by the United States as an expansion of communism and American forces were immediately ordered to the support of South Korea. The United States called upon the other members of the UN Security Council to assist. By early July the Security Council had passed resolutions that offered help to South Korea and empowered the United States as force commander. In an effort to avoid becoming enmeshed in a Korean morass St Laurent attempted to escape committing the Canadian military, particularly ground forces. Eventually, under pressure from the UN and American allies, Canada despatched three destroyers to the Korean coast. The commitment of the RCN provided an immediate military response in order to appease demands for Canadian reaction and gave the government a period of grace in which to formulate a

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54 Escott Reid suggested that such a defence cooperation agreement would facilitate the continuance of present defensive arrangements with the United States. Escott Reid, Head, Second Political Division, Letter to Hume Wrong, Ambassador in the United States, Ottawa, 27 October 1947, in Hillmer and Page, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, 680.

55 It has been proposed that to have a convergence of defence and foreign policy in small to middle states, clear and consistent direction is required from government. If this does not transpire foreign policy may become predicated on defence. However, even when policy makers attempt to align foreign and defence policy a mismatch of resources may cause military divergence in order to maintain what they view as freedom of action. This seems to have reflected the Canadian experience of the NATO years. D. Stairs, “The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Hector J. Massey, ed., *The Canadian Military: A Profile* (Canada: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 88-90. The alliance was originally viewed as more than merely a defensive arrangement between member states, in that it should: “encourage cooperative efforts between any or all of them to promote the general welfare through collaboration in the cultural, economic and social fields.” Washington to Ottawa, December 24, 1948, telegram WA-3237, Department of External Affairs file 283(s) in Hilliker and Barry, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs*, 76-77. Quote from page 77.


57 Due to efforts to serve with her American counterpart the RCN “by the time of the Korean War, was perhaps the only navy in the world capable of working effectively and easily alongside the USN.” Marc Milner, *Canada’s Navy: The First Century* (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 169.
decision as to any further role. Soon after the departure of the Canadian vessels, the Secretary General of the UN, Trygvie Lie, formally requested more combat forces from Canada, particularly ground forces. Almost simultaneously a similar American request was received and provoked an embarrassing situation, as the Canadian government neither had troops to send nor was it prepared to make a decision. To compound the dilemma the Secretary-General’s appeal had been released to the press and needed an answer. In response, the Government announced the commitment of a RCAF transport squadron to the Korean conflict. All the same, debate continued regarding the contribution of army units; public opinion and international pressure finally prompted the establishment of the Canadian Army Special Force with the intent that it would serve as Canada’s expeditionary force in Korea. In a note dated 25 September 1950 the service of this brigade size formation was formally offered to the Secretary-General of the UN. A pragmatic comment on the debate over the creation of this expeditionary force was offered by Escott Reid: “...it was a pity we did not act sooner and send fewer men. My motto in this sort of thing is ‘Get there fastest, with the fewest.’ We would have got more credit with the United States for sending a battalion almost immediately than sending a big brigade group after a considerable delay.”

The St Laurent cabinet demonstrated solidarity with the Americans throughout the Korean War. In January 1951, with China’s entry into the war, the cabinet backed an American resolution condemning China as an aggressor nation. Canada’s support

59 The public American request to commit Canadian ground forces put the Government in a difficult position because it created expectations – both international and domestic – that Canada would send soldiers. Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 71.
61 Quoted in Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, 86-87.
to the United States maintained “allied unity” and kept the United States involved with the machinery of UN decision-making. Later Pearson raised a question that indicated the potential difficulty of continually following the United States in these matters: “If Washington ‘went it alone,’ where would Ottawa go?” It was necessary to remain relevant.63

Months earlier, in May 1951, Canada had deployed into the theatre of war the Special Service Force, or as it became designated the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, under command of Brigadier J.M. (Rocky) Rockingham, a former brigade commander from the Second World War. This brigade became part of the 1st Commonwealth Division and took part in operations until the armistice in July 1953. Unlike the Second World War, ground forces were replaced over time by fresh troops—the principle of rotation for those serving in Korea being that none would remain deployed longer than one year. Subsequently, by war’s end over 25,000 Canadians had been under UN command in Korea and Japan and 312 had died in the “service of peace.”64

The process by which Canada’s military was committed to the Korean conflict was cautious and it demonstrated a singular lack of political vision; however, it provided the means to act with alliances, such as the UN and NATO, and thereby maintain relevance. Unlike the First and Second World Wars, Canada did not establish the primacy of national command in the employment of her Korean forces. The Canadian Forces Act, passed on 8 September 1950, permitted the government to utilize military forces to answer the needs of collective security. Through an Order-in-Council, the formal offer of Canadian troops was made to the UN Secretary General

64 Stanley, *Canada’s Soldiers 1604-1954*, 374-75; and, personnel figures were taken from John Melady, *Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1983), 178.
on 25 September and contained no explicit national restrictions. Subsequently, the Commander in Chief of UN forces felt no need to consult Canada or other governments with similar arrangements regarding the usage of assigned military forces. The strategic implications of having Canadians serve under unified UN command were highlighted in May 1952 by the employment of elements of the Canadian Army Special Force to quell prisoner of war riots on the island of Koje-Do, without the approval of the Canadian government. Missing military strategic objectives linked to national policy, the Canadian commanders in Korea had no reluctance in accepting an assignment with “political implications.”

This lack of clearly formulated grand or national strategy was accompanied by waning public interest concerning this foreign war. In A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea, Canadian historian William Johnston suggests that: “Canada’s involvement in the Korean War was simply the nation’s contribution to an international standoff that one only read about in the newspaper.” The vital interests of the country vis-à-vis the Korean conflict were not identified by policy objectives, instead they mirrored a political desire for salience. The process by which the

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65 Prime Minister St. Laurent indicated to the House that the passage of the CFA would permit the government to act in cabinet to deploy Canadian troops to Korea in order to restore the peace. Because no opposition to the new Act manifested itself, the Cabinet felt empowered to authorize the use of the Special Force in Korea. Canada, “Report No. 62.” 30-31.
66 On 7 July 1950 the UN Security Council passed a resolution that called on all contributing members to place their forces under a unified UN command and asked the United States to choose its Commanding General. Effectively the conflict in Korea was to be directed by the Americans. Brent Byron Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea: 1950-1953 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2002), 6; and, Koje-Do is located off the south coast of Korea, in the vicinity of Pusan. By the end of 1951 there were about 130,000 Koreans and 20,000 Chinese in confinement at the encampment. Resistance to the American military authorities had commenced in February 1952 and climaxed in May when the prisoners seized the Camp Commandant. B Company, 1st Battalion The Royal Canadian Regiment was sent there soon after that incident. Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 191-92.
67 Lieutenant General Simonds, Chief of Staff of the Canadian Army, viewed the order as acceptable from a military standpoint but was reluctant to support it as it had “political implications.” Government officials, including Pearson mirrored this concern. However, Canadian commanders in Korea had no similar reservations and without clear military-political direction, actions will sometimes occur in the field that may create policy rather than vice versa. Ibid, 192-96. Quote from page 194.
Canadian government committed its military to the conflict set an enduring pattern of prolonged and indecisive force deployments. Through this process, it became apparent that Canada had entered the conflict in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion. Politicians focused on the Soviet threat in Europe had not formulated clear policy goals for Canadian participation in the Korean War.\(^6^9\) Subsequently, military commitments were incremental and reflected Canadian notions of relevancy and the expectations of close allies, specifically the United States.\(^7^0\) From a governmental perspective, a positive aspect of this method was that in the absence of clearly defined policy goals a graduated commitment provided more time to formulate an appropriate response to an international crisis. Unfortunately, with the lack of clearly defined national objectives the employment of Canadian military forces in Korea was governed by the wishes of UN headquarters, or more so its American commanders, than Canadian interests. This reinforced military-to-military linkages, particularly between the Canadian and United States armies.

Following this, the end of the Korean War marked an increased western apprehension over Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. The Canadian relationship with the United States became increasingly defined through the bipolar world of the Cold War and as a result Canada expanded its defence establishment to meet this new threat with NATO solidifying as part of Canada’s self image as a staunch ally.\(^7^1\) Participation in the alliance became a means unto an end and this impacted greatly on the style and content of Canadian diplomacy. One result was that relations with the


\(^7^1\) Bothwell, 39-41.
United States after 1952 were dominated by defence issues.\textsuperscript{72} Another consequence was that NATO, and the United States, became the sources of most of Canada’s military and political intelligence.\textsuperscript{73} The provision of this intelligence solely to the Canadian military diminished the ability of other departments, particularly External Affairs, to operate without the support of National Defence. One instance of the negative consequences of this arrangement occurred in 1955, when Prime Minister St. Laurent and Secretary of State Pearson asked the Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, to facilitate interdepartmental cooperation between External Affairs and National Defence concerning the development of foreign policy. Regrettably, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, ignored these requests; he believed that the provision of intelligence would cease if External Affairs was permitted to share in the information obtained from the Pentagon, particularly on matters pertaining to United States national security and nuclear strategy.\textsuperscript{74} Foulkes bluntly stated that:

\begin{quote}
Divulging nuclear information given to him in confidence by his friends at the Pentagon would be contrary to the McMahan Act, and that he had no intention of letting External Affairs ‘eggheads’ jeopardize his relationship with Admiral Radford, his counterpart in Washington. To put it in a nutshell, there was going to be no joint study: Is that understood?\textsuperscript{75}
\end{quote}

This failure to comply with Canadian political direction in matters of defence did not concern the military. Almost two decades later, Air Marshal M.M. Hendrick, former Air Officer Commanding RCAF Air Defence Command opined: “It was not our business to worry about politics [policy]; we left that to our Minister, and to our

\textsuperscript{72} Hilliker and Barry, \textit{Canada’s Department of External Affairs}, 107.
\textsuperscript{73} D. Stairs, “The Military as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy,” 112-13.
\textsuperscript{74} George Ignatieff, “NATO, nuclear weapons and Canada’s Interests,” \textit{International Perspectives} 7, no. 6 (November/December 1978): 7.
\textsuperscript{75} Quoted in Walker, \textit{Poles Apart}, 165; and, enacted on 01 August 1946 the McMahan Act established the Atomic Energy Commission. In an attempt to maintain the American monopoly on Atomic weaponry this legislation did not permit the sharing of atomic information between the United States and other nations, even the closest of allies. John W. Young, \textit{The Longman Companion To Cold War and Detente 1941-91}(London and New York: Longman, 1993), 275-76.
civilian heads.” In other words, military affairs were best left to the judgement of military professionals who would resist altering what they believed the correct course for Canadian defence matters.

In the meantime, within the context of a military that had created its own vision of relevance determined by alliances, individual services had charted their own paths and by the early 1960s were preparing to fight different kinds of wars. These ideas were guided for the most part by their relationships with American sister services. The navy was focused on anti-submarine warfare of the type essential for convoy escorts, while the army visualized a lengthy confrontation with time to mobilize reserves and obtain necessary equipment in a manner similar to the Second World War. The air force visualized the next conflict in terms of a nuclear war of extremely limited duration. This divergence confirmed the inadequacy of inter-service coordination at the strategic level and the strength of parochial interests within the three services. But more importantly it, in part, explains why changes to Canadian concepts concerning the conduct of war were determined by the influence of alliances. The manifestation of this fact, particularly for the Canadian Army, will be explored in successive chapters.

For the RCN the immediate post war period produced the need to plan for a potential conflict in Europe. Some scholars debate the extent of the pressures on the RCN to become interoperable with the United States Navy (USN); however, there is no doubt that customs and traditions adopted from the RN were subsumed by the imperatives of cooperation within alliances and coalitions. As a result of the inaugural May 1946 meeting of the Military Cooperation Committee, the primary

77 Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces (Toronto: McClelland and & Stewart Inc., 1990), 33-34.
78 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 158-95.
threat to North America was acknowledged to be long-range bomber aircraft and missile-launching submarines. Consequently, the RCN developed a force structure catering to convoy escort; existing vessels were converted to configurations that emphasized anti-submarine warfare, anti-aircraft armament and technologies. New ships were purpose built for these duties and the resultant St Laurent class of ships was produced during the 1950s. In a similar fashion, the maritime air squadrons of the RCN and RCAF took on an anti-submarine role commencing in 1947-1948.

According to Canadian naval historian Roger Sarty, “In short, the balanced, surface warfare task force envisioned in 1943-1946 and earlier had become an updated version of the American escort carrier-destroyer hunting groups that had so effectively despatched U-boats in the Canadian zone and elsewhere.”

The task of the NATO land forces was to impose an effective delay on Soviet aggressors with forward deployed formations in order to provide NATO time to send reinforcements to the theatre of operations and defeat this enemy. Canada’s 27 Brigade, later 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG), was responsible, as a member of I (British) Corps, to defend within an assigned sector on the Rhine.

Overtly Canada was still focused on maintaining interoperability with the British Army, but this changed. An examination of articles in the Canadian Army Journal from the late 1950s onward indicate that its articles migrated from a prevalence of British sources to ones of American origin. By the 1960s the majority of republished Canadian Army Journal articles were from American, not British, military journals.


This shift of focus was reflected in the creation of army doctrine that was an uneasy mixture of American and British sources.

Doctrine is a vital part of professional knowledge. At its most fundamental level it represents the common understanding that is generated by standardized methods of practice. Doctrine is a distillation of history, theory and accepted techniques. It is not prescriptive, but can be likened to a sheet of music that all players may read and interpret, using their own instrumental method. It should be a reflection of the way a country desires to employ military forces. According to Canadian military historian Paul Johnston, the danger of adopting other national doctrines is that a discontinuity between written doctrine and practice will occur resulting in “doctrinal dissonance.” In other words, operations are carried out in a manner commensurate with our military culture, not our published doctrine. “There may or may not be nationally determined ways in warfare, but specific military organizations certainly have specific organizational cultures, in much the sense that business theory describes corporate cultures.”

In the midst of Canadian doctrinal confusion, NATO operational plans for forward defence in a nuclear environment shaped military methods and strategy by forcing the formulation of defensive plans based on holding terrain, regardless of losses, until reinforcements could arrive. As a result of these influences, the focal point of the Canadian Army became forward defence of the alliance. There was little political direction to encourage introspective examination of this focus; without overarching defence and foreign policy, these operational plans became defence and foreign policy. Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau recognized this state of affairs in a speech to the Alberta Liberal Association in April 1969:

In the situation we had reached NATO had in reality determined all of our defence policy...And our defence policy had determined all of our foreign policy...we had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO. And this is a false perspective...to have a military alliance determine your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy which determines your military policy.  

While Trudeau couched this declaration in general terms, it had been apparent to the Liberals twenty years earlier (not long after the formation of NATO in 1949) that it was an organization dominated by American influence and Canadian military planners were formulating plans “in the nature of an exercise in military thinking, rather than a realistic appraisal of what should and could be done.”

RCAF participation in NORAD demonstrated similar tendencies. NORAD developed from the MCC-sponsored Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan of 5 June 1946 that, in turn, had evolved almost unchanged from bilateral wartime arrangements. This operational plan directed the air forces of both countries to a common air defence system, as well as to provide air intercept capabilities for the protection of critical areas. The agreement signed in 1957 by, the then newly elected, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his Minister of National Defence, Major-General George Pearkes, enmeshed the Canadian military in a highly centralized continental defence system that permitted NORAD to order forces into action without Canadian government approval. As historian Desmond Morton observed, “If politicians such as Robert Borden and Mackenzie King had struggled

84 Walker, Poles Apart, 153-55. Quote from page 155
for Canada’s right to control its destiny, Diefenbaker had unwittingly signed away his country’s control of when it would declare war.”

At the same time as NORAD was formed, questions regarding the most appropriate form of defence against the nuclear threat caused a great deal of public and political debate in Canada. There was enormous pressure from the United States to adopt interceptor aircraft, or better yet missile systems, which could be deployed in remote locations across the continent and equipped with nuclear armaments to assure the effective protection of North American airspace. Soviet tests of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and the launch of Sputnik caused Diefenbaker, in 1959, to yield to American demands, cancel the development of the Canadian designed Avro Arrow interceptor and agree to the purchase and deployment of the Bormarc ground-to-air nuclear armed missile in Canada. Both decisions engendered much controversy; however, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 overshadowed the debate and caused public opinion to support the acquisition of nuclear arms under joint control with the United States. In 1963 recently elected Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, formalized this arrangement with American President John Kennedy.

Interestingly, given that the acrimony surrounding the cancellation of the Avro Arrow contributed to the fall the Diefenbaker administration, details of these nuclear weapons were secret. The services concealed them from all non-military personnel. Even Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer observed in 1964 that:

The explosive power of the atomic bombs assigned to the RCAF’s No. 1 Air Division was…[a] closely guarded secret the military was reluctant to reveal to anyone – especially a politician…It was only when I demanded, point blank, to see the figures, that I was told the bombs were capable of yields ranging from a few kilotons to something in excess of two megatons. I could

now understand the air force’s desire to avoid the kind of public relations ‘explosion’ that would have been inevitable had this information become public.\textsuperscript{88}

Once again the Canadian military demonstrated its particular brand of militarism.

Loyalty to bilateral military arrangements continued with the deployment to sea of the RCN and placement of the RCAF on a high degree of alert during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Both of these significant events occurred without the prior approval of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. They resulted from the failure of the Canadian Government to understand the organization of the Canadian military and its bilateral defence responsibilities. Essentially, while Diefenbaker wavered in his decision to put the Canadian armed forces on alert, the military leadership, in the words of Canadian political scientists Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel, “sought to honour alliance obligations and to defend their country at a moment of great peril.”\textsuperscript{89} Clearly, the Cuban Missile Crisis proved that the Canadian government – or at least its Tory Prime Minister – did not understand the \textit{Pax Americana} continental defence arrangements in the same way as its armed forces.

These military activities along with the Canadian Army’s rigid adherence to an American-designed vision of the nuclear battlefield, reinforced political concerns about civilian control of the military.\textsuperscript{90} The apprehensions of Hellyer and others were supported by the Royal Commission on Government Organisation (Glassco Report) in

\textsuperscript{88} The explosive power of nuclear weapons is measured in amounts similar to tons of dynamite, thus a device with a yield of two megatons has the equivalent explosive power of two million tons of dynamite. Along with the effects of the blast there would be lethal amounts of radioactivity. Hellyer, \textit{Damn the Torpedoes}, 75.
\textsuperscript{89} Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel, “Foreword” to Peter T. Haydon, \textit{The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered} (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), xii.
\textsuperscript{90} Walker, \textit{Poles Apart}, 165.
1963, which outlined doubts about the degree of civilian control exercised over the Canadian military.\textsuperscript{91} Unification of Canada’s armed forces, in part, was an attempt to re-establish effective coordination and control within and in regards to the separate services.\textsuperscript{92}

Hellyer’s attempts to unify the differing branches of the Canadian military were perceived by those involved to have had varying degrees of success; however, the Cold War rapport established between the Canadian and American forces continued unchanged throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as did the relationship between the Canada and her armed services. Internal discussion of this issue was limited and largely confined to military professional educational institutions as exercises in critical thought or in response to single issue papers directed by military authorities.\textsuperscript{93}

One such professional paper from the 1970s, which falls within the former category, stated that the use of conventional military power appeared to have no place in current society.\textsuperscript{94} The authors, Lieutenant-Colonel J.J. Barrett, Captain (Navy) M.A. Martin, Colonel W.G. Paisley, and Colonel M.L.A. Weisman, elaborated on the idea that, within a climate of “permissiveness,” referred to in the paper as “the Age of Aquarius,” the military was viewed as an oppressor; furthermore, the paper cited the negative impact of the American experience in Vietnam and a fear in Canada of a military takeover of government. Other factors cited as making western militaries extraneous, included nuclear weapons, the lack of public support for defence spending...


\textsuperscript{92} Hellyer, \textit{Damn the Torpedoes}, 33-38.

\textsuperscript{93} For example see Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 82/189, Chief of Personnel, “First Working Draft – Mar 71 Report of a Study on the Military Profession in Canada.”

\textsuperscript{94} This paper was found loose in the CFC Archives, but its provenance and intended file is unknown. In any case it must have been of interest to the College at some point in order to be designated for the archives. Lieutenant-Colonel J.J. Barrett, Captain (Navy) M.A. Martin, Colonel W.G. Paisley, and Colonel M.L.A. Weisman, “A Canadian Defence Policy,” unpublished paper, 1974(?).
and, most importantly, the failure of armed forces to explain their role in international relations. The paper went on to suggest a number of specific factors that exacerbated this situation in Canada. These were the lack of a military tradition, a reliance on the United States for defence, and the remoteness of Canada from areas of conflict in the world. In the paper’s conclusion, the authors proposed that, in order to address current problems arising from the marginalisation of the Canadian Armed Forces, the military needed a distinct role that could be clearly understood by its “civilian political masters” and it also needed a unified strategy for material acquisitions. 95 Another paper originating from the Canadian Forces Staff School in 1977 expressed similar ideas concerning the lack of connection of the Canadian Armed Forces with Canadian society. The author, Captain P.C. Paterson, concluded with the sentiment that, “Our future is in our own hands and the key to our future is professional development to strengthen the corporateness of the officer corps and to improve our social responsibility to better fulfil the roles seen as meaningful today.” 96 The ideas articulated within these papers seem to show that some members of the military viewed their relationship with Canadian society as a reconcilable meeting of two solitudes.

In retrospect Canada’s participation in UN missions seems to give lie to the assertion that the activities of the Canadian military were not linked to the desires of Canadian society. However, peacekeeping continued to reinforce the status quo by enabling relevance within NATO and NORAD through furthering the interests of affiliated western states. UN operations permitted Canada to be a committed member of the western alliance and “an international arbiter with sufficient freedom to act

96 Captain P.C. Paterson, “The Emergence of a New Professionalism in the Canadian Forces,” in Canada, Canadian Forces College, Canadian Forces Staff School 2-77: Perspectives (Toronto: Canadian Forces Staff School, 1977), 70.
In a 1965 report on peacekeeping, then-Lieutenant J.L. Granatstein wrote:

Canadian isolationism is dead, and its resurrection seems most unlikely. The shrinking of the world has given new responsibilities to every nation, but very few are willing to pick up the burden. If peace is maintained and a nuclear holocaust averted, the credit may well go to those nations that took steps to prevent wars. Canadians can take justifiable pride in the role they have played.\(^{98}\)

Nevertheless, a letter from Louis St Laurent to Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, captures the reserved Canadian reception to peacekeeping:

There was little enthusiasm in meeting this request [to contribute to the Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan December 1948]. The matter was referred to the Cabinet by Hon. Brooke Claxton, and in his words the Cabinet was ‘allergic’ to the proposal, wondering why Canada had been asked and who else had accepted... The decision as to whether or not Canada should participate was left up to the Prime Minister and the S.S.E.A. [Secretary of State for External Affairs]... There can be no doubt that Mr. Pearson carried the day. He even offered to have External Affairs pay the costs for two of the four officers requested.\(^{99}\)

Despite this pessimism Canada’s formalized military contributions to the UN commenced in 1949 and since then Canada has contributed to almost all UN missions. Notwithstanding that initial hesitation, peacekeeping was soon embraced as a means of maintaining Canada’s status as a middle power with strong bilateral ties to the United States. For example, the airlift of the Canadian contingent during the 1960 Congo operation was not possible without American support. Additionally, the United States provided financial aid and public political support throughout that operation. Furthermore, Canadian involvement in UN peacekeeping in Cyprus was not entirely altruistic but was entered into as a member of NATO to prevent conflict between two alliance members, Greece and Turkey. Likewise, as an anti-communist western

\(^{97}\) Norman Hillmer, “Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1989): 57.

\(^{98}\) “Report No. 4: Canada and Peace-keeping Operations” (Canadian Forces Headquarters, 22 October 1965), 25.

nation, Canada was chosen in 1954 to serve on the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam until 1973, when it was dissolved as a result of the Peace Agreement. The three nations of the ICSC represented the major blocs: Poland (the East), Canada (the West) and India as the neutral arbitrator. Peacekeeping may seem to have little direct connection with Canadian-United States defence activities; nevertheless, sometimes considerable pressure was exerted on Canada by the United States to undertake certain missions as part of the Canada-United States defence partnership. One example of such a mission, after the end of the ICSC, was Canada’s continued service in Vietnam between 1973-1974 as part of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), created to monitor the newly implemented peace. It could be argued that another instance of this relationship could be the Canadian contribution to the United States led peace efforts in the Sinai – the Multinational Force and Observers. This mission was established in the 1980s after the end of the UN mandate in that region and Canada has participated in this United States sponsored deployment since that time. Consequently, there can be little doubt that participation in peacekeeping provided a degree of forward security within the context of the alliances of the western Pax Americana.

This desire to support the Pax Americana and the absence of a strong overarching policy permitted the three Canadian services to become focused on their own particular and unconnected geostrategic commitments. All three services

\textsuperscript{100} James Earyrs argues that Canada committed to mutually exclusive roles in Indochina by the acceptance of the ICSC mission. One role was that of supervisor of the Geneva Accords while the other was as protector of American interests in the region. In Defence of Canada, vol. V, Indochina: Roots of Complicity (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
\textsuperscript{101} Hillmer, “Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise,” 55-57.
developed close affiliations with corresponding American military forces. By the early 1960s through to the end of the Cold War, the three Canadian services viewed military strategy through the prism of their support to the *Pax Americana* and the form that took through NATO, NORAD and the UN. Without coherent and enduring national and grand strategy to provide focus for military efforts, Canadian defence policy became even more fragmented and diffuse, confirming and continuing a Cold War legacy of operations conducted in neither a logical nor orderly manner.\(^{103}\)

Reinforcing this separation of national policy and military activity was the isolation of the military profession in Canada. The profession of arms in Canada during the Cold War lacked solid roots and reflected the alliances of the Second World War through behaviours that were characteristic of militarism. Canadian military professionals of the period defined themselves and their vocation through bilateral commonalities within military alliances.\(^{104}\)

A number of trends can be discerned within this bilateral and disjointed approach to defence in Canada during the latter half of the twentieth century. First, national policy was at times predicated on alliance policy and the desire to achieve salience; the linking of strategic ends, operational ways and tactical ends was not always a smooth progression but usually a disjointed series of discrete measures. Second, as evidenced by the Korean War, the employment of NATO forces in Europe and the formation of NORAD, Canada committed tactical forces as a result of the imperatives of alliances and sometimes had little understanding or input into how these forces would be employed. Third, military power was rarely used in a coherent

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or decisive manner derived from necessity, but rather was determined by the needs of political authorities. Without a national security strategy, force deployments were sometimes prolonged and incremental to create time for politicians to formulate an appropriate response to demands of alliance partners. Fourth, because of the geographical isolation of North America, the vital interests of Canada were not normally at risk and the need for military forces made a limited impression on the nation as a whole. Without its widespread involvement in supporting conflict Canadian society displayed little concern regarding the employment of the military or its nature. This lack of interest and oversight allowed the military profession latitude to develop and express behaviours characteristic of militarism. Fifth, peacekeeping, such as participation in NATO and NORAD, can be taken as a form of Forward Security. Last, but not least, the tension between the Canadian military officers supporting bilateral military arrangements with the United States and Canadian politicians indicate the detrimental effects from the lack of a rational and structured national security strategy. This tension also indicated the divergence between Canada society and its armed forces in regards to defence policy and views on the nature of the profession of arms in Canada.  

Together these trends form a comprehensive dialogue describing a military that was separate and distinct from the nation which formed it; to some degree these trends explain the related increase in American influence in professional military education during period after the Second World War.

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Chapter 6

A Canadian Vision of Professional Military Education: Establishing the Army Staff College (1946-1958)

For the first time in history, Canada in this war had her own staff college. Previously, all Canadian staff officers were trained at Camberley, the British staff college. In establishing our own college at Kingston, and training our own officers there, we marked up one of our great, if unpublicized, successes in this war. The staff work of the Canadian army, when it went into action, was regarded as excellent by all Allied commanders. The Canadian staff college is something which Canada must retain.¹

- Winnipeg Free Press January 12, 1946

The end of the Second World War heralded many changes in Canada’s military. One such change was the preservation and reaffirmation of Canadian Army staff education. The foundations of this programme, laid in war, were to be retained and developed during peace. In comparison to the indifference towards professional military education after the First World War this initiative represented a notable shift in military policy. According to the 1947 edition of the RMC Review the implementation of Canadian Army staff education resulted in the creation of “…a Staff College of truly national flavour…”² No more would Canada’s Army depend on other countries to be the sole source of staff education. The Canadian Army Staff College would ensure that the lack of staff officers experienced just a few years previously would not reoccur. Between 1946 and 1958 the CASC implemented a model of professional staff education that was primarily Canadian in nature but later on, commencing with the two-year staff course in 1959, became increasing oriented in

¹ United States, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group (RG) 59, State Department Files, Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), Box 10, “File correspondence of PJBD, January to December 1946,” “Canada’s Staff College,” Winnipeg Free Press (January 12, 1946), no page.
perspective towards the United States Army. The beginnings of this later paradigm shift will be discussed in the following chapter.

The post-war years were opportune for the creation of an army staff college. In 1952 Stacey wrote retrospectively that in the immediate post-war period the Canadian population had demonstrated a great deal of general support of its Army. He went on to suggest that the reason for this stemmed from the nature of the Canadian Army’s involvement in the Second World War. Stacey observed that the RCN and the RCAF had been to a certain extent indistinguishable from their British counterparts with whom they had fought, while the Army had retained its separate identity. From this he noted that “many of the public saw in it [the Canadian Army] the embodiment of the national spirit.” Stacey also suggested that a key difference in levels of support for the post-war army between the First and Second World Wars was “that the people of Canada had now decided that peace would not be secure without organized forces to protect it.” In any case, the continuation of Army staff education after the end of the war heralded something new, a CASC created and refined by the exigencies of war to meet the needs of that service. Its purpose was the same as that of the initial war staff course and pre-war staff colleges, “…to train officers for second grade [GSO II] appointments in field and static formations.” Furthermore, it was hoped that the course, initially conducted on an annual basis and having a ten month duration, would eventually rival the stature attained by the longer established staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta. While the ten month criterion reflected the duration of other staff colleges, the Canadian course would eventually become almost two years in length between 1959 and 1965 and then was reduced back to ten months until 1973,

4 Canada, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Routine Orders (CARO) vol 13, nos 6303-6646, “6630 – The Canadian Staff College,” no page.
5 Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” 53.
when staff education was restructured as a result of the unification of the Canadian services into a single military force. These changes are examined in subsequent chapters. All in all, over this 27 year period there were a total of 23 courses - 20 of almost one year length and 3 of nearly two years duration. Appendix G includes a list of all Canadian Army staff courses conducted from 1946 to 1973.6

Despite these initial hopes for a national army staff college, army staff education after the Second World War did not keep its original focus. Although retaining its British origins and reflecting the experience of Canada’s army during the Second World War the learning provided by the Canadian Army eventually came to reflect American military practices. These outside ideas can be discerned within the curriculum from the first courses onwards as a result of the elements discussed in the last chapter - wartime alliances, the desire to create a common awareness of the perceived Soviet threat and emerging atomic, chemical and biological weapons, as well as Canada’s involvement in NATO. A new paradigm of professional military education had emerged. The Winnipeg Free Press article of 1946 cited at the beginning of this chapter proved prescient:

But if the Canadian staff college is to serve this country to the best advantage, it is essential that it be brought into harmony with Canada’s new role in world affairs. It must, in short, establish the closest possible liaison with American staff college[s] so that there may be an exchange of instructors and ideas across the border.

The unknown author went on to conclude with:

There is no practical alternative to a closer relation between the Canadian and American military and staff colleges. There will be those who will see in this development a drift away from the Commonwealth and into the United States. There is no ground for such a fear. Our connection with the British Army will be retained and strengthened. But the experience of this war has demonstrated beyond all doubt that we must take full advantage of all the lessons which the American Army has learned in this war. This can only be done by the

6 Canada, Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC), “SC 1325-2027 (Comdt) 4500-1 (Comdt), Army Staff and Related Courses, 13 Feb 81,” 1; and see also same document, “Annex A - Course Dates.”
establishment of the closest possible liaison between the Canadian and American armies.\(^7\)

One can also discern in the earliest curriculum another facet of professional military education in Canada that aided in the eventual creation of a group of practitioners who sought conceptual guidance from other sources. That aspect was caused by the absence of education in Canadian civil-military relationships or how governmental policy was systemically transformed into military activities. Without an understanding of the processes necessary to formulate relevant and cogent military strategy, derived from national direction, Canadian-specific ideas and practices pertaining to this conceptual area were lacking. It could be argued that an effect of this shortcoming was the continuation of Canadian reliance on allies to provide perspectives on military strategy. However, this deficiency was not initially readily apparent and the new course commenced as soon as practicable after hostilities ended.

The first post-war army staff course was conducted, like its wartime predecessors, at the RMC. In 1947, the CASC moved to Fort Frontenac, also located in Kingston. This move was a result of the planned re-opening of the RMC in September 1948 as a military college, whose purpose was the education of officer aspirants. Today Fort Frontenac continues to be the home of army staff education in Canada.\(^8\)

One can surmise that Fort Frontenac was a suitable site for the relocation of the CASC due to its proximity to the RMC and available infrastructure. On top of that, the site possessed a rich military history which provided a fitting setting for professional military education. Originally established as a fortification in 1675 by Louis de Baude, *Conte de Frontenac* and Governor of New France, Fort Frontenac

\(^7\) PBJD, box 10, file correspondence of PJBD, January to December 1946, “Canada’s Staff College,” *Winnipeg Free Press* (January 12, 1946), no page.

was a key military location for the French until about 1760, when, with the capitulation of New France, it was abandoned. Following this, the fortification was not occupied by the British until 1783 when in the wake of the American Revolution Kingston became an area of Loyalist resettlement. Moreover, it became a location of strategic value because it provided a base from which British forces could exert a degree of control over the interior waterways of the region. In a time when the major transportation arteries of North America were its great lakes and principal rivers Kingston came to play a prominent part in any and all disagreements between the United States and Great Britain. Throughout the nineteenth century Fort Frontenac was built up to accommodate various military garrisons. After Confederation the British government, recognizing that more cordial relations existed with the United States than in past years, began diminishing its military presence in North America and by 1871 had given Fort Frontenac over to the Dominion government. A unit of the Permanent Force was stationed in that location until 1939 when it was dispatched to war. In the years that followed Fort Frontenac was utilized as a personnel depot until occupied by the CASC in 1947.9

From its post-war inception the British heritage of the CASC was evident and seemed to have continued from the pre-Second World War years as a matter of course. For example, both the College crest and its journal were adapted from its British counterpart. In 1868 Camberley had adopted the Owl “resting on crossed swords and surmounted by a crown, together with the motto ‘Tam Marte Quam Minerva’” as its emblem. The Owl was selected because it was the favourite bird of Minerva, who, according to Roman mythology, was goddess of war and wisdom, while the motto, which has been said to have Prussian antecedents, lends itself to

various translations. The most popular version of this dictum is “With understanding and with force of arms” or, alternately, “Practical as well as theoretical soldiering here.”¹⁰ In 1946 permission was obtained by the CASC to utilize the Camberley badge with a band across the base containing the word “CANADA.”¹¹

In a comparable fashion, the Canadian annual staff college journal, from the third edition in 1954 onwards, was changed from the Annual Review to the Snowy Owl, because as the editor explained “The Snowy Owl is a distinctly Canadian bird, and therefore as the name of the Canadian Army Staff College Year Book it makes a fitting brother for Wellington’s OWL [Defence Services Staff College, at Wellington, located in southern India] and Camberley’s OWL PIE.”¹² In this manner the CASC publication was made obviously similar to that of the two longer established British staff college journals reinforcing the notion that this Canadian staff college was their equal in all respects. Also worth noting was that from its earliest inception at Camberley the purpose of the annual journal had been gradually enlarged from being a record of the year’s events to a means of connecting with former students and instructors in order to maintain the bonds produced by the “the staff college experience.” Similarly, the professional links forged amongst Canadian and other military practitioners through the experience of attending the CASC and the wartime staff courses were reaffirmed and supported by the existence of the Snowy Owl.

Furthermore, Canadian senior and general officers actively reinforced this aspect of bildung, including the necessity and value of establishing and sustaining these ties.

¹⁰ Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Young, ed., The Story of the Staff College 1858–1958 (Camberley: Staff College, 1958), 40; and the slogan chosen in 1795 by the military school of Frederick the Great located at Neue Friedrichstrasse, Berlin was Martis et Minervae Alumnis. Brevet-Major A.R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, with a forward by General Sir George F. Milne (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1927), 143.
¹¹ In 1977 the original Horned Owl was replaced by a Canadian Snowy Owl. See Canada, DND, CLFSCC, “Fort Frontenac Yesterday and Today,” 8-10.
¹² Major A.G.M. Maitland, “Editor’s Page,” Canada, Canadian Army Staff College (CASC), Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College 1, no. 3 (1954): 15; and Young, ed., The Story of the Staff College 1858–1958, 41.
This relationship was best described by Simonds, then a Lieutenant-General and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) for the Canadian Army, when he made this observation in the 1952 Annual Review:

In my view the Staff College provides one of the most important experiences in the life of a professional officer and not the least important aspect of this experience is the widening of friendships and associations. This is a most valuable thing and is of great assistance afterwards in the course of their duties in command or on the staff. A Staff College magazine of this sort serves a link to keep us all in touch, not only with present activities of the Staff College itself, but with former students and members of the directing staff.  

The traditions of international fraternal learning within the profession of arms fostered by Camberley had established themselves in Kingston and the Snowy Owl manifested this heritage. Of note is that the students who were staff of the Snowy Owl were volunteers – nevertheless, it seems as if the importance of this journal was recognized by those who were undertaking the full-time studies of the staff course. Colonel (Retired) George Oehring, a member of the staff for the last edition in 1972-1973, reminisced about the significance of this publication for the students:

As I recall, one of the DS had the Snowy Owl as a responsibility, in our case LCol [Lieutenant-Colonel] Guy Lessard [later a Major-General]. He called for volunteers to do all the work. John Marteinson [eventually a Lieutenant-Colonel, historian and editor of CDQ/CMJ] was our volunteer because he had a passion for the stuff, and certainly a talent - witness his later accomplishments. Had there been no volunteers, or had he who did so have no talent for the job, I don’t know what would have happened - probably an ‘appointment’. But as you know, courses like these are always ‘volunteer-rich’ environments, hence, I wouldn’t think there was ever a problem getting the right number of volunteers...There was very much the feeing [sic] that we were upholding a tradition and leaving something for posterity, albeit unselfconsciously light-hearted in most ways.

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In addition to the items mentioned by Oehring students also contributed articles. These fell into three general categories: (1) articles on topics that were of interest to individual students; (2) articles solicited by the editorial staff and pertaining to a specific topic; (3) course papers that were exceptional. In all cases the proposed item had to be approved by both the student editor and the supervising DS.\(^\text{15}\)

Also of importance in furthering professional connections was that the Army staff course maintained an international, and inter-service, flavour. In 1946-1947 there were three staff from the British Army and one from the United States, as well as a RCAF officer. These numbers varied over time as noted in Table 6-1.\(^\text{16}\) However, it is evident from the first that there was a strong American interest and involvement in the CASC. The United States military provided the greatest proportion of foreign instructors in the years that followed the creation of the CASC, 48 between 1946 and 1973. Given that the Americans provided over two times as many instructors as the British, who sent 20 throughout the same years, the influence that American instructors had with the Canadian curriculum was significant and likely manifested itself in changes reflecting shifts in American staff education. Some of these alterations are discussed in the next chapter.

\(^{15}\) Email from Colonel (Retired) George Oehring, Canadian Forces to Author, Thursday, May 28, 2009 1:34 PM.

\(^{16}\) The figures at Table 6-1 include arrivals and departures during that academic year(s), as well as all teaching staff, not just those assigned as Directing Staff (DS). Throughout this entire period the course varied from approximately one to two years in duration. See CLFCSC Library, Miscellaneous documentation pertaining students and instructors from 1946-1972 (henceforth \textit{CASC/CLFCSC Course Documentation}); see also Canada, CLFCSC, \textit{Snowy Owl: Journal of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College} (1972-1973), 109-124.
### Table 6-1 – CASC/CLFSCC Instructors 1946-1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Canadian Army</th>
<th>Canadian Air Force</th>
<th>Canadian Forces (Post-Unification)</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>Australian</th>
<th>Total Instructional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1947</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1961</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-1963</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1967-1968</td>
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<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1968-1969</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>1970-1971</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1971-1972</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>1972-1973</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Ibid.
Large numbers of foreign officers also took part in the course as students over the years. These visitors were called “guest officers.” This term sometimes, but not always, also seems to have been used to encompass members of the RCN and RCAF who attended the CASC. Table 6-2 provides the proportions of the various courses that were from other countries. These officers came from most continents: Asia, Africa, North America, Europe, and Australia. They all reflected Canada’s alliances and are listed by year from 1946 to 1973 at Appendix H.¹⁸ This group included not only the partners of the Second World War and later NATO, but also foreign officers from decolonizing regions of the world. From the 1950s onwards Canada’s Department of External Affairs viewed military assistance to developing nations as a way to foster and maintain diplomatic ties. While the Department of National

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Canadian Students</th>
<th>Guest Students (including Foreign Students)</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1947</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
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</table>

¹⁸ CASC/CLFCSC Course Documentation; see also Canada, CLFCSC, Snowy Owl (1972-1973), 109-124.
¹⁹ CASC/CLFCSC Course Documentation; see also Canada, CLFCSC, Snowy Owl (1972-1973), 109-124.
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<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defence was initially reluctant to participate in these initiatives, due to the demands of educating its own officers, as well as those of close allies, by the 1960s External Affairs had prevailed and National Defence agreed to accepting personnel from Commonwealth countries, for all types of training. Into the bargain National Defence also agreed to send military assistance abroad to give professional education and training support to the militaries of these post-colonial nations. Despite that, in the wake of unification and more pressing defence priorities, by 1973 the bulk of the formal Canadian military assistance programme had been gradually phased out, although foreign officers continued to attend the CLFCSC in the years that followed.  

Many of the staff and students eventually went on to high rank during their careers. This was in keeping with the original criteria devised for Camberley

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concerning selection of commandants, instructors and students, as laid out in Chapter 3. It also had the effect of reinforcing the existence of an influential transnational community of practice, which is discussed in later Chapters. Commandants and instructors were chosen based on experience and ability, while students were selected in a similar fashion and with a view to their future employment.\(^{21}\) For example, in the Canadian context of the modern era this meant that instructors, who were known as directing staff or normally more simply as “DS,” were successful senior officers, in the prime of their careers, who had the potential to become higher commanders or, as expressed in 1961:

\[\ldots\text{no Lt Col over 42 years of age should be posted as a DS to the CASC. The preferred age should be between 36 and 42. The selection should be limited to Lt Cols who have commanded battalions and who have given clear indication that they have the potential to become senior commanders.}\]^{22}

One can discern that after the Second World War these general guidelines were followed within Canadian Army staff education – only officers of the highest qualifications were selected. For example, the first Commandant of the CASC in 1946 was a distinguished officer, Brigadier (later Major-General) J.D.B. (James) Smith. During the Second World War Smith was the General Officer Commanding 4th and 5th Armoured Brigades and 1st Infantry Brigade, as well as the GSO I of 5th Armoured Division and the Brigadier General Staff (BGS) I Canadian Corps. Smith was made Commandant of the RMC in the last part of the war and was responsible for the conduct of the War Staff Courses during 1945-1946. He later went on to become the military secretary to the Cabinet Defence Committee, the Canadian military representative to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),

\[^{21}\text{Godwin-Austen, }\text{*The Staff and the Staff College*, 142-55.}\]
\[^{22}\text{Canada, DND, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” Document 73, Dir Inf HQ 3310-81/1 (D Inf) dated 2 Oct 61 to DMT, “Report on 1959-61 Canadian Army Staff Course,” 2.}\]
Commandant NDC, and Adjutant-General. His senior member of the directing staff was Colonel (later Major-General) R.P. Rothschild, who had been a staff officer in the 5th Armoured Division during its formation in 1941. Most of the other directing staff also went on to higher rank as depicted in Table 6-3:

Table 6-3 – Rank upon Retirement 1946 CASC DS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canadian Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier-General) R.T. Bennett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier-General) A.G. Chubb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Colonel) J.L. LaPointe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier-General) L.E. Kenyon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Paradis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Major-General) G.H. Spencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Colonel) E.S. Tate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Major-General) N.G. Wilson-Smith</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RCAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wing Commander F.W. Hillock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) J.A. Grant-Peterkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.R. Freeland, British Army (no record)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel (later Colonel) T.G.V. Stephenson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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25 Letter from Lieutenant-General (Retired) Bill Milroy to Deputy Commandant CLFCSC dated 27 April 1994, no page.
In conjunction with high standards for the staff college faculty, stringent regulations pertaining to screening of candidates and entry examinations were put into effect for student selection as soon as practicable after the war. These exacting procedures represented a return to the pre-war processes used to screen Canadian officers for attendance at Camberley and Quetta that were discussed in Chapter 3 and were a continuation of the original guidelines instituted in the nineteenth century. In fact, Canadian historian Yves Tremblay described these policies as re-commencing from the beginning of the post-war courses:

La sélection des premières cohortes d’étudiant du Collège de l’Armée ne s’est pas faite sans difficultés. A la fin de la guerre, l’Armée pouvait se permettre d’être exigeante, car nombre de jeunes volontaires de 1939-1945 désiraient poursuivre une carrière militaire. Pour être admis, les candidats devaient réussir six examens de qualification en six jours, des examens portant sur leurs connaissances générales et sur les principaux aspects du métier militaire : histoire militaire, politique nationale et internationale, organisation et emploi des armes (tactique), administration, loi militaire et organisation générale de l’armée en temps de paix.26

There were numerous candidates who desired staff education because the Army was in the process of being reduced from its wartime strength to a peacetime force of 25,000 and it was recognized by those officers remaining that this type of professional experience would be necessary for those who wished to continue and be successful in their military careers. Although detailed statistics concerning this pool of applicants have proven difficult to come by, the rapid downsizing of the post-war Canadian Army suggests that there were more officers who wished to stay in the post-war Army than positions for them to occupy. Due to this rapid force reduction

competition for these staff college positions would likely have been fierce. Of all those who expressed an aspiration to complete the first course, which commenced in June 1946, 56 Canadians were chosen at the outset by National Defence Headquarters. In May 1946 the Canadian Army had its various regional military districts institute courses meant to ready these prospective candidates for their upcoming staff college education. This initial work was designed to provide these students with an understanding of the specific organization of infantry and armour divisions. Those officers who were not based in Canada and could not return in time to participate in this groundwork with one of the military districts attended a pre-course conducted at the CASC in early June, just prior to the start of the staff course. Also attending that pre-course with Canadian Army officers were two RCAF officers and two American Army officers, who were also scheduled for the ten month staff course. However, even with the measures taken to screen suitable candidates and preparatory courses, not all Canadian Army students were successful at the CASC and four candidates were forced to withdraw early in the course. Subsequently, a number of measures were put in place by the Canadian Army to ensure that only the best of those available and desirous of becoming staff college graduates would be chosen. First, in addition to the initial recommendation and selection students would complete a preparatory course of greatly expanded scope based on study papers prepared at the CASC. Second, this work would culminate in an entrance examination whose

outcome would form a significant part in selection for the following course. This proposal was implemented in one form or another after the initial course.

A press release from the Headquarters of the Eastern Ontario Region at Kingston on 27 January 1947 confirmed that stringent preparations had been implemented for those who wished to gain entry onto the peacetime staff course. At least 156 hours of private study and an organized five week preparatory course of 225 hours from 3 February to 10 March were necessary to ready officers for the compulsory entrance exams of the 1947 course. This first series of six tests included: the organization and administration of military forces in both peace and war, tactics up to the brigade level, military law, the military geography of Canada, Canadian and military history. A description of the information required for each examination is contained at Appendix J. The military history portion of the examinations focused on the campaigns of the American Civil War, specifically: “The military situation of the period 1864-1865, starting with [General Ulysses S.]Grant’s assumption of command and ending with the surrender at Appomattox.” This period of American military history describes a series of battles and operations leading to a decisive military victory, in many ways akin to the last years of the Second World War. Weigley suggests in his seminal The American Way of War that the generalship of Generals Grant and his subordinate, William T. Sherman, during this time exemplified a strategy of annihilation and terror. The former technique, used by Grant, was oriented towards the destruction of an opponent’s military forces and
removed the means of waging war, while the latter stratagem, utilized by Sherman, was aimed at breaking the will of the opposing population by subjecting them to the deprivations and horrors of war. Weigley put forward that in tandem the two stratagems lent themselves to attaining what had seemed to have become the object of this great struggle - “the total submission of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{32} As a result of the horrific losses endured during the American Civil War, it had an indelible impact on that nation’s psyche, as well as the development of its military forces. Consequently, while at one level this case study can be looked at as a review of relevant military history in order to gain a better appreciation of the employment of land forces in the attainment of military ends, at another level it could be viewed as part of a pattern designed to produce a greater understanding of the United States, its Army and American military methods.\textsuperscript{33} At any rate, the initial selection of this campaign was indicative of the underlying perspective from which the Canadian Army viewed the use of military power; in an overwhelming and determined fashion. This “way of war” was the legacy of the Second World War and endured in the decades that followed. At the same time studies at Camberley focused on the campaigns of the recent war, particularly the European battles.\textsuperscript{34}

Understanding the requirements imposed by these examinations is crucial to gaining a sense for who composed the Canadian military student population of the CASC and the material which was thought necessary for army officers of this period to be exposed to prior to commencing Staff College. These officers were highly rated


\textsuperscript{33} After two years of service with the United States Army between 2000-2002 at their Command and General Staff College, which is still located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, it was apparent that the American Civil War has mythic status within the customs and traditions of that force and is still imbued in various aspects of the curriculum of their Staff College. For example, all foreign officers, including Canadians, who attended the Staff College were required to take a mandatory course concerning that conflict and participate in a battlefield tour, or “staff ride,” at Gettysburg, which was the scene of horrific fighting over 1-3 July 1863.

\textsuperscript{34} Captain G.J. Martin, “The Staff College - Camberley,” \textit{CAJ} 17, no. 2 (1963), 36.
by their superiors and had the acumen necessary to absorb and demonstrate the
synthesis of the materials pertaining to their part of the profession of arms. In general,
the content and form of these CASC pre-course tests did evolve over the years, but the
broad subject areas remained more or less consistent, with some being amalgamated
into others. Specific CASC entrance examinations ended in 1959, but were replaced
by promotion examinations that tested what were deemed to be the seven subject
areas essential for military professionals: military law, staff procedures and military
writing, organization and administration of military forces, military history, current
affairs, tactical operations, and operational administration. These requirements were
described in these extracts from the 1965 version of the Canadian Army’s How to
Qualify for Promotion and Staff Courses:

**MILITARY LAW**
19. **Aim**
To ensure that the officer is familiar with, and capable of interpreting and applying, the
various orders and instructions containing in QR [Queen’s Regulations](Army).

**STAFF DUTIES AND MILITARY WRITING**
22. **Aim**
To train officers in the use of military abbreviations, symbols, forms and methods of military
staff work, and to develop skill in self-expression.

**ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION**
26. **Aim**
To ensure that officers know the organization of the Canadian Army, responsibilities and
procedures for its administration, that they are able to deal with typical unit administrative
problems, and that they have a knowledge of the doctrine, principles and procedures of
national survival necessary to carry out tasks related to [national] survival operations.

**MILITARY HISTORY**
35. **Aim**
To give the officer a sound knowledge and understanding of accepted military principles from
the study of past military campaigns.

**CURRENT AFFAIRS**
42. **Aim**
To develop the candidate’s factual knowledge of important world events and his ability to
analyse, interpret, and present reasoned judgements on matters of national and international
concern, with special reference to the political, economic and military aspects.

**OPERATIONS (TACTICAL)**
47. **Aim**
To impart a knowledge of the techniques used in the tactical employment of sub-units, units
and formations in war, and to gain practice in the use of techniques in solving typical
battlefield problems.
OPERATIONS (ADMINISTRATION)

55. Aim

To ensure that officers know the administrative techniques of sub-units, units and formations in war, and to gain practice in the use of these techniques in solving typical battlefield problems.35

Until unification of the three services brought wide-ranging changes to the staff education system, army officers who wished to attend the Staff College needed to successfully complete these promotion exams as part of staff college selection. In addition to attaining passing grades in two sets of tests, the first group from Lieutenant to Captain, and later, the second set, from Captain to Major, the potential candidates had to be consistently recommended as suitable for staff employment in their annual evaluations and, finally, be selected by the Canadian Forces Headquarters.36

That is not to say that the maintenance of such elevated criteria took place without individual and institutional challenges. A number of Canadian Army officers who were in Korea during 1952 with 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade sought to have the CASC entrance exam waived and be permitted to attend the CASC without completing that prerequisite. This submission was denied by Director General Army Personnel, Brigadier M.L. Brennan, who noted that it had not been supported by the Commander 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Brigadier (later Major-General) M.P. (Pat) Bogert, who thought these professional requirements should be maintained with few exceptions37:

Concerning the question of officers writing pre-staff examinations in the Far Eastern theatre, the present Comd 25 Cdn Inf Bde feels that officers in that

35 Canada, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Manual of Training (CAMT) 2-85 – How to Qualify for Promotion and Staff Courses (Revised 1965): Officers – Canadian Army (Regular) (Ottawa: Army Headquarters, 1965), 101-109.


37 Bogert, who from April 1954 to February 1958 was Commandant of the CASC, stated that all officers, less those actively engaged in combat operations, should adhere to these selection requirements. Canada, DND, DHH, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” BDF DGAP 4-1-1 to DGMT, “Question of Recommendations For Officers to Attend Staff College Without Writing Entrance Examinations,” (9 Jul 1952), 1; Stevens, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 322; and Canada, CLFCSC, Snowy Owl (1972-1973), 109.
theatre can, in fact, write the examinations in Korea providing adequate help in the form of study papers is sent to the theatre in good time, and providing also that the examination papers arrive on time.\textsuperscript{38} Brennan added later in this correspondence:

Brig Bogert [Comd 25 Cdn Inf Bde] points out that it is his view that no duty other than active operations should be permitted to prevent a recommended candidate from writing the Staff College Entrance Examinations. I interpret this to apply in Canada, Korea or Germany.\textsuperscript{39}

These principles were also eventually applied to those serving in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{40} Also of note is that Bogert was a wartime graduate of Camberley. His feelings on the value of staff education were likely formed by his experiences regarding the importance of staff education during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{41}

Aside from the impediments posed by physical location and access to appropriate materials, a significant number of the officers selected were unable to master the subject matter and successfully complete these examinations. Over a seven year period between 1949 and 1959, for which data is available, 1509 Canadian officers wrote these tests and 410 qualified giving a success rate of about 27%. Table 6-4 provides statistics for some of the post-war examinations. Of note is that these results were less than half in percentage terms of the pre-war testing results for admittance to Camberley and Quetta.\textsuperscript{42} In 1935 a total of 336 British officers wrote

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{38} Canada, DND, DHH, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” BDF DGAP 4-1-1 to DGMT, “Question of Recommendations For Officers to Attend Staff College Without Writing Entrance Examinations,” (9 Jul 1952), 1.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{41} Young, ed., The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958, 31.
\textsuperscript{42} Canada, DND, DHH Archives, FN 60, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Canadian Army Staff College Examining Board on the Work of Candidates for the Entrance Qualifying Examination 1949 (Fort Frontenac, Kingston: CASC), 40; Canada, DND, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Army Headquarters Examining Board on the Work of Candidates for the Canadian Army Staff College Entrance Examinations 1953 (Ottawa: Army Headquarters), 32; Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 82/768, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Army Headquarters Board on the Work of Candidates Who Wrote the Canadian Army Staff College Entrance Examinations 1954 (Ottawa: Army Headquarters), 39; Canada, DND, DHH Archives, FN 60, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Army Headquarters Board on the Work of Candidates for the Canadian Army Staff College Entrance Examination 1955 (Ottawa: Army Headquarters), 47; and also Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 81/249, Canadian Army,
\end{footnotes}
the staff college examination and 191 qualified, thus having a success rate of 57%.

However, more telling was that in addition to the British officers who wrote the exam that year 14 Dominion candidates also attempted them and none passed. The post-war qualification figures were higher and provided sufficient candidates for the CASC, but were still low in comparison to the numbers of potential candidates who had originally written the selection exams. Consequently, in 1959 the Canadian Army Operational Research establishment was commissioned by the Army Headquarters to complete a study regarding the Staff College entrance exams and their high failure rates.

The review of these 1957-1959 Staff College tests was not complete before they were replaced by the Captain to Major promotion examinations. With the abolition of these separate entry tests success rates became much greater. Planning figures for estimated staff college attendance in 1960 projected a success rate of 80% for the promotion exams. These numbers were based on 57 officers writing to provide about 45 qualified for promotion and are congruent with the totals of officers qualified over the years contained in Table 6-4.


Table 6-4 – CASC Entrance Examination Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
<th>Number Qualified</th>
<th>Percentage Qualified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the implementation of promotion examinations as criteria for CASC, the material that was tested had not substantially changed from the original CASC pre-course exams. The knowledge that had formerly resided within the CASC examinations was now divided between two sets of promotion exams, Lieutenant to Captain and Captain to Major, with each set further divided into Part 1 and Part 2 qualifications. The former was common to all corps, or specialties, comprising general competencies expected from army officers while the latter was subdivided into 2A and 2B testing. 2A tests were common for all officers and were a practical

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47 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, FN 60, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Canadian Army Staff College Examining Board on the Work of Candidates for the Entrance Qualifying Examination 1949, 40; Canada, DND, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Army Headquarters Examining Board on the Work of Candidates for the Canadian Army Staff College Entrance Examinations 1953, 32; Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 82/768, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Army Headquarters Board on the Work of Candidates Who Wrote the Canadian Army Staff College Entrance Examinations 1954, 39; Canada, DND, DHH Archives, FN 60, Canadian Army, Remarks of the Army Headquarters Board on the Work of Candidates for the Canadian Army Staff College Entrance Examination 1955, 47; and also Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 81/249, Canadian Army, “Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment Working Paper No 59/3,” 2.
demonstration in front of an examination board of military acumen pertaining to tactics and 2B tests were a similar type of exam, but did not address the general requirements of warfare and were tailored to military speciality. For example, for a supply officer a 2B exam might include questions pertaining to resupply of military forces engaged in conflict, rather than broader questions that might be in a 2A test related to the overall employment of army formations and units. This arrangement recognized that each military speciality had its own unique requirements and catered to that unique knowledge requirement.  

The difference in success rates noted in Table 6-4 might be attributable to the structure and purpose of these examinations over time. For example, the impetus to take the previously-instituted CASC entrance exams had been based on an individual nomination by higher authority to attend the College. These prospective CASC students were initially chosen on criteria derived from: age, in that they could not have passed their 34th birthday during the year that they would commence the course; medical fitness; having at least a minimum of six years commissioned service, although in the immediate post-war period exceptions could be made for those who had served in the Second World War; at least six months of staff experience; and also be recommended by the respective Commanding Officer and a regional Command Review Board. The candidate then attended a preparatory course and wrote all examinations afterwards. Successful completion of the entrance tests did not necessarily mean that the prospective student would go to the CASC, but that the candidate’s name could be forwarded to Army authorities for final decision regarding attendance at the Staff College. Only the top-rated officers of those available were

48 Canada, Canadian Army, CAMT 2-85, 201-203.
selected.\textsuperscript{49} While similar standards and processes took place before an officer could attempt promotion exams, a key difference was the main purpose of these examinations, i.e., to prepare an officer for higher responsibilities, rather than ensure broad threshold knowledge in preparation for the CASC. As such, for the individuals who undertook the tests there was likely more impetus to pass the promotion exams due to their direct connection to the next promotion and an increase in professional status (and pay). It would have been understood that for promotion up to and including the rank of major these exams needed to be successfully completed. One could contrast this with the CASC entrance examinations which did not have the same transactional immediacy as the promotion exams, but paid professional dividends in the longer term.

The higher success rate for those undertaking promotion examinations can also likely be attributed to the manner in which these tests were tailored to individual specialties and staged over the course of an officer’s career. Promotion exams seemed to provide verification and refinement of the experience and knowledge gained throughout an individual’s military employment and were integral to professional progression.\textsuperscript{50} Compare this situation to that of Staff College candidates who may or may not have had a great deal of experience when nominated for the CASC and completed the entrance exams consecutively during a single testing period, rather than over a much larger period. The low success rate might be simply attributable to the large amount of knowledge that it was necessary to master for successful completion of the CASC exams, with the situation being further complicated by the varying levels of experience possessed by the prospective Staff College candidates. Despite the

\textsuperscript{49} Canada, Canadian Army, CARO, vol 13, nos 6303/6646, “Appendix ‘A’ to Routine Order No. 6630 – Canadian Staff College Entrance Qualifications, Nomination and Selection of Candidates,” (17 June 1946), 10-11.

\textsuperscript{50} Canada, Canadian Army, CAMT 2-85, 101-109 and 201-205.
higher success rates of promotion exams the then newly instituted promotion tests were not easy in their own right.  

These examinations were only a start. Even with such high entry standards, evaluation during the course was rigorous with the final grade attained by the students linked to achievement of the coveted staff college graduation symbol and post-nominal “psc.” This three letter symbol, representing “passed staff course,” was the military staff qualification awarded by the CASC and had been in use by the British Army since 1864. It represented (and still represents) the culmination of arduous study, as well as a public confirmation of professional competence. However, not all officers who graduated the staff college as psc had the same levels of ability. Table 6-5 shows the distribution of grades from 1959 to 1973 with the majority of most students attaining “C” or below – this system of grading had been adapted from the war staff courses. The letters used changed over the years, nonetheless, in general an “A” indicated outstanding ability, ready for GSO II or higher positions, accelerated promotion and eventually high rank; a “B” showed superior qualities, prepared for GSO II and some higher positions, may eventually be a staff college instructor; a “C” indicated average ability and for most the readiness to fill a GSO II assignment; a C- or E indicated a pass with difficulty and requires supervision in a staff position; and a

51 Years after their cancellation Major-General (Retired) Walter Holmes, a Canadian Army officer during this period, reminisced that while a young officer he remembered his seniors still talking “about how challenging and difficult they [promotion exams] were.” Email from Major-General (Retired) Walter Holmes to Author, Tuesday May 27, 2008 7:51 AM.


53 See untitled attachment to Canada, CLFSC. SC 5720-4 (Cmdt) “Memorandum – Course Grades 1959-1986” (10 Nov 86), no page.
“F” represented failure to demonstrate the qualities necessary to perform as a staff officer.\(^{54}\)

Table 6-5 – CASC/CLFCSC Course Mark Distribution\(^{55}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Total Graded</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C+</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D  (see Note)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-1961</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: This table alludes to “D” as a mark vice “C-” or “E” - however, in the source document the use of the letter “D” likely represents an amalgamation of those who received either grade.)


\(^{55}\) See attachment to Canada, CLFCSC, SC 5720-4 (Cmdt)“Memorandum – Course Grades 1959-1986” (10 Nov 86), no page.
The award of an equivalent to “C-” to “E” sometimes resulted in employment limitations and a delay in achieving the CASC qualification:

3. Students who lack certain experience or qualities which can be gained or developed by a short period of further experience may be awarded a “provisional pass”, and the following procedure followed:

(a) The officer will be placed in an appointment designed to give him the experience needed or the opportunity to develop the qualities which are lacking.

(b) On completion of one year’s service in the appointment referred to in (a) above, will be reported on by his GOC [General Officer Commanding] or Commander not below the rank of Brigadier, as to his suitability or otherwise for the award of “psc”. The standard confidential report form will be used and the Rating Officer and Reviewing Officer’s remarks will be directed specifically to the question of eligibility of the officer for the award of “psc”.

Army Headquarters expected that some army specialists, specifically, medical officers of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps would attend the course. This would provide them broader professional experience and make their medical expertise available to the staff and students of the CASC. Despite that, as a result of the stringent professional standards required to successfully graduate, Canadian Army Headquarters acknowledged that Medical Officers would likely not have the necessary military experience or general familiarity of issues outside their area of knowledge to successfully attain the criterion demanded by the course, but the benefits of their attendance outweighed this potential disadvantage. In any case, only those who completed all educational requirements and successfully demonstrated the ability to be employed as generalist staff officers outside the Medical Corps would be granted the staff college qualification psc.


57 Ibid.
The types of knowledge that were taught at the CASC were generally divided into three categories and together seemed to be structured to develop the broad cognitive competencies required to solve complex military dilemmas. Firstly, “Basic Study” was composed of knowledge core to the army and designed to provide a solid understanding of military organizations, tactics, administration and staff procedures. Secondly, “Applied Study,” developed the ability to reason through military problems in a logical fashion to reach a conclusion and express that deduction verbally and/or in writing. Finally, “Complementary Study” enlarged the student’s familiarity with general military and international affairs in order to provide a broader professional perspective. All instruction included mixtures of these three types of knowledge with the focus of the course on applied and complementary studies. The stated reason for this emphasis was that the assessment of these types of competencies supported the “development of the qualities of a staff officer” and, consequently, “it is on them that the assessment of a student’s potentiality is based.” The time spent on basic studies was limited due to the assumption that the students had attained the requisite levels in that particular area of work prior to arrival at the staff college.58 This was a reasonable assumption given the nature of the pre-entry examinations.

In any case the results of these types of efforts were evident. The graduating class of 1946-1947 contained 53 Canadian students, in addition to 11 foreign students. Of the 53 Canadian graduates there were eventually three Lieutenant-Generals, two Major-Generals; nine Colonels; 24 Lieutenant-Colonels and four Majors, while the 11 foreign students in due course included: four Brigadiers and three Lieutenant-

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58 The first layout of the course structure for students contained in the curriculum papers is in Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 17, Folio 49, Vol 1, “Canadian Army Staff College 1951 Course 15 January 1951 – 23 November 1951,” “Outline Block Syllabus,” 1.
Colonels (United Kingdom); one Brigadier-General and one Colonel (United States); and one Brigadier of the General Staff (India).59

One might think that the CASC was merely a continuation of the pre-war professional education offered by Camberley because of a comparable one-year duration and curriculum flow. However, while there were similarities between the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Kingston, the courses were not the same. For example, the 1938 British Staff College course had divided its major subject areas into areas later used by the CASC curriculum: staff procedures (or staff duties); intelligence; use of specialist arms; tactics; national and international affairs (as they pertained to the Empire); air operations; foreign armies; Imperial strategy; combined operations; naval operations; and, military history (particularly the lessons of the First World War). Additionally, in a corresponding fashion to Camberley, the post-war CASC used exercises, tours of military establishments and visits to places of military or general interest to support its curriculum.60 Nevertheless, the Canadian Army had built on the Canadian pre-war legacy of Imperial staff education to provide a distinctly Canadian vision of professional education through the CASC, as well as incorporated its recent wartime experiences.

The form of post-Second World War Canadian military education had been debated amongst the Canadian Chiefs of Staff during November 1945, just after the end of the war. Canada’s wartime experience had demonstrated some lack of interoperability among the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF. This shortcoming was attributed to the development of a “single-service” focus. The inter-service deliberations revolved around the need for jointly conducted versus single service

59 Letter from Lieutenant-General (Retired) Bill Milroy to Deputy Commandant CLFCSC dated 27 April 1994.
60 United Kingdom, Public Records Office, War Office files,“Staff College 1938 Senior Division Years Work in 2. Volumes – Vol 1: File No. 1 to 20,” “Senior Division 1938,” no document number, no page.
education, and it was eventually decided that the services would continue to provide staff education for junior and intermediate officers, while at some point the need for staff education at the senior officer level would be examined.\(^{61}\) This issue was later addressed with the establishment of the NDC three years later. However, from this discussion it is evident that the Chiefs of Staff of the respective services recognized that post-war professional military education needed to contain the knowledge gained during the war. This understanding of the need to include those lessons, in turn impacted on the content of the curriculum of the CASC.

Because of this acknowledgement, the Canadian staff course, while roughly approximate to its British antecedents, reflected the wartime experience of the Canadian Army. It included field administration, administration in Canada, aid to civilian authorities, ceremonial duties, civil affairs and military government, military law, movement of military forces, public relations, aspects of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and RCAF, in addition to related aspects of airpower, Royal Navy (RN) and American amphibious forces, characteristics of all branches of land forces, staff duties, combined operations, chemical warfare, winter warfare, current affairs, Canadian history, tactics in all types of operations and environments, as well as detailed study of the United States Army.\(^{62}\)

The curriculum emphasized Canadian wartime operations, particularly those of Northwest Europe. Many of the first exercises designed by the CASC staff to support the College curriculum were derived from that recent conflict and supporting


\(^{62}\) Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 1, Folio 1, Vol 1, “Canadian Army Staff College 1946-1947 Course 17 June 1946 – 14 June 1947 General Table of Contents,” 1-15.
readings were replete with Canadian wartime examples. One can discern that a great
deal of thought was expended to integrate the most significant aspects of the national
military experience into the course. For example, the 1946 CASC captured the
lessons from the Canadian crossing of the Rhine through a practical planning exercise
using a scenario, or setting, based on traversing a local waterway, the Cataraqui River.
Known as “Operation Exodus” this exercise mirrored some of the considerations that
occurred prior to the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945. It also stressed the need
for continuity of military operations with one flowing to the next over time towards a
particular objective, as well as the uncertainty of conflict because unforeseen military
engagements could not be scheduled, but planning would have to cater to their
occurrence:

Op[eration] EXODUS is not a single op but more of a campaign. It concerns
the breakout of 1 Cdn Corps which is a build-up from formation from the
Second Army brhd [bridgehead] to seize a toe-hold over the R[iver]
CATARAQUI. There will be battles before the corps objective is reached but
exactly where they will be fought cannot be pre-determined and therefore
cannot be pre-planned. There is one exception however – the crossing of the R
CATARAQUI and this will undoubtedly be a maj[or] battle, so that long
before D Day the corps staff will have planned this op in outline.

Along with the evolution of the curriculum, the instructional methodology that
was used for the CASC was as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. It had developed greatly
from its eighteenth century roots and was comprised of personal study,
demonstrations, lectures, and exercises, syndicate discussions, as well as exercises
based on military problems, visits and tours. All material included in the initial

63 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 2, Folio 5, Vol 5, “Combined Operations,”
“Canadian Army Staff College Tactics I-I - May 1946,” 1; and for information on the Rhine crossing
see Colonel C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol III, The
Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960),
527-63.
64 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 2, Folio 5, Vol 5, “Combined Operations,”
“Canadian Staff College Tactics I – 6 Corps Briefing Operation Exodus Lecture Demonstration -
August 1946,” 1.
65 For an overview of British methodology from the nineteenth century onwards see also Brian Bond,
The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London, Eyre Methuen Ltd, 1972); Godwin-
course was divided into four terms, known as “tutorials,” with breaks for leave and individual study. These four tutorials comprised 46 weeks of the entire course and of this period only 1100 hours were allocated to formal instruction, about 25 hours per week. It was expected that students would require at least that much and more in order to master the material they were studying. Of the prescribed curriculum about 25% was dedicated to implementation of military tactics, the largest part of this taking place outside the classroom, applying the solutions for notional problems to real terrain. This type of practical learning activity was known as a “TEWT” or Tactical Exercise Without Troops. Learning to design TEWTs and organize collective and individual training for the troops that would eventually be their responsibility as staff officers and commanders took another 14% of the allocated time, while the subjects involved with military administration used 12% of the course. Other topics that received “considerable emphasis” within the schedule were staff procedures, the understanding of various military capabilities and organizations, operations in cold weather, and, as previously indicated, the United States Army.  

In keeping with the cooperative military activities of the Second World War the naval and air power parts of the curriculum included material on the RN and RAF, as well as the RCN and RCAF. This is understandable given the nature of their wartime relationship as military partners with the Canadian Army. Moreover, there was an emphasis on combined, or inter-service, operations that had grown out of the wartime experience of amphibious landings. A laudatory article in the 1947 edition

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Austen, The Staff and the Staff College; and see also Young, ed., The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958.

66 Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” 50-51.

67 The modern use of the term “combined” refers to two or more military services or agencies of the different nations working together to achieve common purpose, while the term “joint” pertains to two or more military services or agencies of the same nation taking cooperative action to achieve the same objectives. The usage of this post-war period is derived from the activities of the Second World War and applies to both situations - two or more military services or agencies of the same or different nations working together to achieve common purpose.
of the RMC Review entitled “Combined Operations at the Canadian Staff College at R.M.C.” announced that, due to Britain’s experience in coordinating the efforts of her navy, army and, recently, air force before the first course of the Canadian Army Staff College had commenced, arrangements were made to have an instructional team from the School of Combined Operations at Devonshire, England visit Canada in order to “...conduct the study of combined operations for the benefit of the Canadian Army’s future staff officers.” The invitation resulted in a team of RN, Royal Marine, British Army and RAF instructors arriving in February 1947 and providing three weeks of instruction, or 90 hours, on “the mysteries and technicalities of planning, mounting and conducting an assault landing.” In later years these cooperative studies included joint training with the RCAF Staff College at Toronto, the Canadian Joint Air School (later Canadian Joint Air Training Centre) at Rivers, Manitoba and the United States Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia.

In addition to the links to the alliances and operations of the Second World War, many of the elements of the course structure and teaching were similar to the British Staff College experience. All formal instruction occurred during a six hour day with personal studies being completed outside that time. The students were grouped in “syndicates” with an instructor who was an appointed “DS.” The number of tutorial periods varied from course to course over time. At the end of a tutorial, or term, the syndicates would be dissolved and reorganized, with new DS. In this fashion all instructors and students would become acquainted with each other.

69 Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” 52.
70 See CLFCSC Fonds.
This syndicate system perpetuated notions of *bildung* and was considered “the cornerstone of the system of instruction employed at the Staff College.” In syndicate teaching could take place inside or out of doors, it could be divided into smaller groupings or combined into larger ones, it could also involve discussion or exercise. Regardless of the subject or method of instruction, the syndicate system assigned the responsibility of teaching a particular group to a single DS. This permitted an awareness of student progression and the ability to assess in detail, provided the capability to share experiences between students and DS, and assisted in the development of techniques of effective communications, as well as the development of interpersonal and small group organisational skills. The presence of foreign students gave another, non-Canadian, perspective to discussion.\(^{72}\)

DS could use a number of teaching methods and these would vary in accordance with personality, the experience and background of the assigned students, the subject being taught, and the teaching environment. Discussions, in seminar format, could be chaired by DS or an assigned student. These exchanges were normally based on impromptu or assigned questions that pertained to the study materials. In any case DS were enjoined by the Staff College to master the subjects being taught, have an intimate knowledge of their students in order to assist with their education, and be positive in their attitude and teaching methodology in order to create a sound learning environment.\(^{73}\)

While there was still overt British influence within the first iteration of the CASC curriculum it must be highlighted that the instructional package on the United States Army was considerable. It contained all necessary knowledge for a Canadian officer to function in a United States Army staff position. At the same time there was

\(^{72}\) Ibid.

\(^{73}\) Ibid, 401-403.
no corresponding curriculum designed for the British Army. This emphasis would likely assist with creating a closer professional identification between American and Canadian Army officers, while at the same time not supporting the traditional military relationships of the pre-war period.

This is not to suggest that the CASC had completely oriented itself towards the United States, or was still holding fiercely to its Imperial connections. What emerges from study of the CASC courses from 1946-1958 is a hitherto unrecognized interpretation of a uniquely Canadian institution focused on serving the professional needs of its Army by utilizing many sources for its curriculum. One can distinguish early influences, as well as those of the Second World War, within the curriculum and pedagogy utilized, but in the end the interpretation, organization and teaching of this information occurred from a Canadian perspective. After the first year of the CASC one of the instructors, Lieutenant-Colonel R.T. Bennett wrote of changes to curriculum that would permit graduates to function efficiently during peace as well as war:

From experience gained in the first course, numerous changes in the form and content of the instruction were made. The object of the course, in addition to training officers for war-time second grade staff appointments in all branches of the staff, was broadened to include instruction that would impart to the students as much general knowledge as possible of value to them and to the Army in peace-time. This was a definite forward step in the annals of military staff colleges, as previously instruction had been directed solely toward wartime aspects.74

Furthermore, in the same article Bennett concluded:

However, much still remains to be done. The basic concept of a staff course is to teach a student a sound and practical approach to any problem, enable him to appreciate its essentials and arrive at an effective solution. This is being achieved but the methods of doing so still require alterations. Such alterations undoubtedly will continue as the stature of the College grows. Thus, students of the future can look forward with anticipation to a course based on a system

which has been not only well organized but also of sufficient flexibility to adapt itself to new requirements as necessity dictates.  

Bennett, was correct. In the years immediately following the commencement of the CASC there was a great deal of correspondence between the College and Canadian Army Directorate of Military Training (DMT), regarding the curriculum and outside lecturers. Foreign officers, instructors from other staff colleges and military schools, as well as civilian and military guest lecturers visited the CASC.  

There also were connections and affiliations made with outside agencies, like the Canadian Institute of Foreign Affairs. At the same time instructors from the staff college attended outside conferences and participated in professional development seminars elsewhere. One such experience was a 1947 visit by most CASC instructors to the United States Army Command and General Staff College for an abbreviated course on American instructional techniques.  

Given this exposure to outside ideas modification to the curriculum was not only produced by staff, but by visitors, of all types, who made suggestions and provided comments regarding the CASC and its course content. This exchange ensured that the Canadian Army remembered the lessons of the recent past. For example, in 1948 Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, Vice Adjutant-General Army Headquarters, and a graduate of Quetta, corresponded with Colonel W. Clement Dick, Director CASC concerning a presentation he had been invited to provide entitled “An Introduction to the Study of the Principles of War.” Macklin noted that his presentation could only provide an overview of what he viewed as a “vast subject” and that it had originally been a much longer presentation. He emphasized that his approach to the lecture was designed to encourage introspective thought rather than

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75 Ibid.
76 See Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 179.009 (D3), “Corresp, instrs, copies of lectures, etc by visiting lecturers at Cdn Army Staff College, d/Sep 47/ Dec 49,” (6 vols).
rote memorization in the students, as the latter produced officers who were not proficient in the practice of their profession:

However, I feel the main object of this lecture is not to be dogmatic about this business but to make people think for themselves...You and your staff can be as dogmatic as you like but I hope you won’t be like the Methodist fundamentalists who argue that if its in the Bible it is so and if it isn’t it isn’t so. If you get that way you will turn out a brand of wooden-minded students who will be about as proficient as those who follow Culbertson’s Blue Book are at bridge. They always return their partner’s suit and play second hand low and they win a few rubbers against the masters.78

Marginal notes on the letter indicated that these sentiments were addressed to the extent possible within the amount of time available for this topic.79

Another letter from Macklin a few months later pertained to the activities of the 21st Army Group during the Second World War. The First Canadian Army had belonged to this larger formation throughout the campaign in Northwest Europe. This correspondence provided an extract from its administrative history to ensure that lessons concerning the need for detailed planning of administrative support for military operations were not lost. The letter and excerpt observed that all too often the quality of the staff officers needed for these supporting functions and the requisite professional knowledge were not sufficiently emphasized because it was a difficult subject to master and it was not as popular with officers as the tactical aspects of military activities. Marginal notes indicate the director believed that this particular item was addressed during the 1948 course.80 This correspondence to the Senior Staff of the CASC provides an idea of the wide variety of interactions that influenced the

78 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 179.009 (D3), “Corresp, instrs, copies of lectures, etc by visiting lecturers at Cdn Army Staff College, d/Sep 47/ Dec 49 (Vol 1 of 6),” Folio 51, Letter from Vice Adjutant-General (Brigadier WHS Macklin, CBE ) to Colonel W. Clement Dick, Director Canadian Army Staff College dated 19 Jan 48, 1.
79 Ibid.
80 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 179.009 (D3), “Corresp, instrs, copies of lectures, etc by visiting lecturers at Cdn Army Staff College, d/Sep 47/ Dec 49 (Vol 3 of 6),” Folio 110, Letter from Brig Macklin to Col W.C. Dick, OBE, Director, Canadian Army Staff College dated 7 May 48, 1 and attachment; and see also Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol III, The Victory Campaign.
curriculum, as well as a greater understanding of the professional debate surrounding complex issues that were being taught.

There are also indications that the staff attempted to keep the curriculum abreast of wider national and international affairs. A representative of McGill University and Quebec author of note, the Honourable Wilfrid Bovey,81 was invited to the CASC in 1948 to lecture on Quebec, because, as described in the letter of invitation, most of the students possessed a limited knowledge of that province and had only just become cognizant of what has been called “The French Canadian Problem.”82 The importance of providing the right speaker, an authority for the topic at hand, was implicit throughout this Staff College correspondence. For example, with the coalescing of the Soviet threat and western response the Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) directed his staff to advise the CASC that he would defer an invitation to give the closing address regarding “the implications of the Atlantic Pact and Western Union,” as he believed that the CGS should do it, adding that if the CGS was unable to do it then the VCGS would. 83 Implicit in this demurrer was the idea

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81 “Educationist and writer Wilfrid Bovey was born in Montréal, the son of Henry Taylor Bovey (see Section I: University Teaching and Research). He earned his B.A. from McGill in 1903 and his LL.B. from Cambridge in 1906, and practiced as a lawyer in Québec from 1907 to 1923, save for the War years, when he served with the Black Watch. He was McGill’s first director of Extramural Relations and Extension from 1923 to 1948, and served in a number of other positions connected with adult education, particularly as chairman of the Canadian Legion Educational Services (1939-1946) and president of the Canadian Handicrafts Guild (1930-1936). Bovey was a member of the Quebec Legislative Council from 1942 to 1948, and a governor of the C.B.C. [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation] from 1938 to 1951. He was a prolific author, particularly on the subject of French Canada.” McGill University, “Politics and Government” [Document On-Line], available at http://archives.mcgill.ca/resources/guide/vol2_3/gen07.htm#BOVEY,WILFRID; internet, accessed 06 September 2008, no page.

82 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 179.009 (D3), “Corresp, instrs, copies of lectures, etc by visiting lecturers at Cdn Army Staff College, d/Sep 47/ Dec 49 (Vol 2 of 6),” Folio 113, Letter SC 5-1-1 from Lt-Col CM Paradis GSO 1, Canadian Army Staff College to the Hon Wilfrid Bovey, OBE McGill University dated 18 Mar 48, 1.

83 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 179.009 (D3), “Corresp, instrs, copies of lectures, etc by visiting lecturers at Cdn Army Staff College, d/Sep 47/ Dec 49 (Vol 5 of 6),” Folio 61, Letter from Colonel R.W. Moncel, Deputy Chief of General Staff, Department of National Defence (Army) to Colonel W.C. Dick, OBE, Director Canadian Army Staff College dated April 28, 1949, 1.
that military strategy should be presented by the highest level of command wherever possible likely due to its connections to governmental affairs.

Institutionally, the CASC recognized this requirement by separating the invited lecturers into two categories, those supporting professional and scheduled curriculum topics and those experts who were invited, like Wilfrid Bovey, to present on topics that provided a larger world view. This was all part of giving a professional educational experience that was relevant and useful. Consequently, for professional lectures only military officers of very senior rank were desired. The rationale for providing the highest quality lecturers, and commensurate educational experience, was quite straightforward and clearly articulated as CASC policy: “As so few vacancies are available at the Defence Colleges and Joint Service Staff College, this is the last opportunity most students will be given to obtain this type of education.”

For lectures that were non-syllabus related, but selected and designed to supplement the curriculum, their purpose was to elevate the students’ thinking above their current experiential base of knowledge in order to provide the opportunity to conceptualize holistically:

*During the year’s course as far as the student is concerned the war is still going on and he is continually struggling in a low level rut. The greatest opportunity to get him out of this is by obtaining prominent men who are leaders in their fields to lecture on other than military subjects or in certain military lectures to keep them at a level higher than is taught here.*

Prior to the institution of the first two-year course in 1959, this broadening of the Staff College curriculum evolved in response to the geo-strategic influences of the Cold War. Granatstein described those influences in this fashion:

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84 This seemed to pertain to lectures involving presenters from various staffs in particular as the quote notes goes on to indicate, “Therefore Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels are not wanted to lecture here but at least the heads of branches and up.” Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 179.009 (D3), “Corresp, instrs, copies of lectures, etc by visiting lecturers at Cdn Army Staff College, d/Sep 47/ Dec 49 (Vol 5 of 6),” Folio 50 and 50a Memorandum SC 1-1-2 “Visiting Lecturers” from the GSO2 to the Director of the Canadian Army Staff College dated 27 Apr 49, 1.

85 Emphasis added. Ibid.
The USSR changed matters. The coming of the Cold War, the USSR’s development of the A-bomb, and the Korean War meant expansion. Before long the army had a brigade group in Korea, a brigade group in NATO, new equipment, money - and the nation’s first ever professional peacetime army. To my mind, the period from the early 1950s to the early 1960s was the heyday of Canadian military professionalism outside of wartime. *Canada worked with its Allies and learned from them*; there was the money to get good equipment, and the government support to make the army the best it could be.  

As a result studies were added to the curriculum concerning the Soviet Army, aspects of future warfare, and NATO, as well as material on atomic, biological and chemical warfare. These subjects evolved over time. In 1950 lessons on the organization, operations and administration of the Soviet Army were created in order to give students general knowledge of this entity. As the Cold War progressed these lessons would take up a larger part of the curriculum, and the Soviet military would provide the model for opposing forces in Staff College military problems. By 1951 the future warfare instructional series was created in order to increase the knowledge of students concerning “strategical,” or what we know today as strategic, issues, and the effects of these developments on military structures, operations and administration. Many of the presentations that were included in this subject area had been part of the visiting lecture series or had been raised within the presentations on the United States military. While Chemical Warfare had received its own lecture series a year previously, likely due to a perception of Soviet capabilities, the strategic and tactical

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88 The term strategic vice “strategical” will be used throughout this work.

use of atomic weapons was buried within the Future Warfare Series. 90 Discussion on this topic explored the objectives that could be attacked with atomic weapons such as centres of government; population concentrations; sources of electrical power; transportation hubs; industrial facilities; and ports, communications hubs and submarine bases. 91 However, in conjunction with this relatively straightforward military perspective some thorny dilemmas were posed to the students. For instance, the students were asked to consider the ethics of using atomic weapons: “Moral issue. (Will it have any effect on whether we use the atom bomb first? Remember the wave of horror around the world after Nagasaki and Hiroshima.).” Also, another difficult question of this nature was “Would we use it against say Paris, Rome or in the Ruhr if these areas were occupied by the USSR? To do so might create a hatred of the North American countries which would last for centuries.” 92 Such queries made the students examine the broader context of military problems.

Through the consideration of all aspects of modern warfare and the discourse concerning the geo-political setting of hostilities in Western Europe the Staff College curriculum, after the establishment of NATO, emphasized a need for collective international action in the event of hostilities against a Soviet opponent. This was reinforced by placing syndicate and course discussion in terms of problems that could confront Canada and NATO like the necessity of staging a counter offensive to “Russian aggression in Western Europe through the Black Sea and Caspian Sea areas.” The points considered were wide-ranging, not only military in nature, but also

92 Ibid, 2.
aspects of foreign policy that pertained to the Alliance. Some of these reflections in
the realm of grand strategy included the need for pre-conflict involvement with
Turkey and the establishment of peacetime diplomatic contact with the countries of
the Middle East.93 Other discussion focused on considering which countries would be
of strategic significance in the context of a European invasion by Soviet forces and
why this would be so. Furthermore, in a manner which presaged NATO deployment
exercises to Europe throughout the Cold War, the students also had to examine the
locations to which military forces could be despatched to assist threatened forces.94
The practical exercises of the course emphasized scenarios that supported these types
of Alliance contingencies, particularly in the context of cooperation with United
States forces. Fictional Canadian and American armies were united to fight aggressive
Soviet opponents during map exercises. These exercises used local areas where the
students could visit the regions involved in order to view the terrain and confirm their
military plans. One example from 1951 was Exercise Keystone. It involved a
combined force of three United States armies and a Canadian army fighting an
intransigent Soviet-like enemy advancing from Toronto eastwards towards Montreal.
These types of pedagogical activities continued into the mid-1990s in a comparable
manner.95

Related to Canada’s involvement in NATO and the perceived need to operate
with other military forces, particularly the Americans, one can also distinguish
elements of the curriculum that reflected the growing influence of the American
military. Discussion of equipment interoperability with the United States military

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93 Ibid, 3-4.
94 Ibid, 4-5.
95 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 20, Folio 55, Vol 7, “Canadian Army Staff
College 1951 Course 15 January 1951 – 23 November 1951, “Canadian Army Staff College Operations
War Series Brief – Part II - DS Only,” 1-3; and, the author was a student at CLFCSC during 1995 and
participated in such types of exercises.
acknowledged that while the Canadian Army had closely followed British models for doctrine and organization it must now be ready and capable of integrating with American forces in order to use the same equipment. This discussion of the necessity for increased interoperability with the United States Army articulated a desire to retain current Canadian military organizations and brought out not the only positive aspects of such cooperation, but also the need to pay particular attention to the potential weaknesses of such arrangements, for instance:

(i) The discrepancy between Canadian Army and US Army logistical requirements will demand special attention.

(ii) Dependence upon US Army equipment developed to meet US Army concepts will conflict with organization based on British requirements.

(iii) The need to produce training literature, equipment tables, etc, will be an “overhead” which the Canadian Army has avoided in the past.\textsuperscript{96}

The last statement is the most telling and presaged the American influence on the Canadian Army during decades to come. In a similar fashion to the pre-war reliance on British professional perspectives to provide the Canadian military with grounding in the profession of arms, the use of American-related materials became prevalent in the years after the Second World War.

Throughout all of this period one notable absence in the curriculum seems to be the lack of a connection between strategy and military activities. Military historian Ron Haycock records that the lack of strategic education in Canada was recognized by Foulkes when the NDC was established in 1948:

...when press reports suggested that the new Canadian “National Defence College” would be similar to the British Imperial Defence College and to the U.S. National War College, Lieutenant General Foulkes, the chief of the General Staff (CGS) and chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee pointed out that he did not want the new college to obviate the necessity of continuing

to send Canadian officers to the other two countries’ strategic schools. This qualification to remain dependent on allies to get higher strategic development – perhaps a sign of what may be labeled the “colonial cringe” hinted at an uncertain future for the NDC. It also meant that Canada did not have a high-level military forum that potentially could create a unique national strategy or produce general officers able to operate in the difficult world of advising politicians.\footnote{97} 

This educational shortcoming was clearly identified in 1969 by the Report of the Officer Development Board, a study of officer development in the then newly unified Canadian Forces. Also known as the Rowley Report, this document was, and still is, an influential holistic description of Canadian military professional education that describes the needs of the profession of arms in Canada. Its findings were, and continue to be, utilized in the design of officer development experiences within the Canadian Forces.\footnote{98} 

The Rowley Report noted that this missing link from strategy to tactical action arose from the collective experience of the Second World War: 

In spite of their fine record in battle, our officers were given little more opportunity to become masters in strategy or in the planning and conduct of theatre \[of war\] and high operations during The \[sic\] Second World War than they were in the first. Larger forces were deployed, higher commands were held, notably that of Commander-in-Chief North Atlantic and an army commander in North-west Europe, but these were still subordinated to strategic decisions taken outside of Canadian control.\footnote{99} 

Continuing on, the Rowley Report ventured that this lack of strategic understanding by Canadian officers was in part due to the fact that unlike Great Britain and the United States, Canada did not have a pre-war system for strategy formulation. As a 

\footnote{98} See Canada, Department of National Defence, Report of the Officer Development Board, 3 vols (Ottawa: 1969), also referred to as the Rowley Report, the Chair of the study was Major-General Roger Rowley. 
\footnote{99} Ibid, 13.
result the Canadian military provided personnel and resources to operations that were “planned, organized and commanded from elsewhere.”

Supporting this notion is the fact that the CASC curriculum was focused almost exclusively on battlefield activities, rather than the translation of policy of objectives to military strategies. While the term “campaign” was used, it denoted something that would take place two to three months from initiation to conclusion rather than the much longer duration implied by the same expression today. The planning taught at the CASC was divided into three types bounded by temporal limitations, from initiation to execution. These were “Immediate” – two to four days, “Near Future” – two weeks to two months and “Far Future” – two to three months.

These definitions were illustrated by the example of the various types of planning which took place concurrently during the seizure of Caen in 1944, which demonstrated ideas of “top down” planning from the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction to the Joint Planning Staff then to a commander for planning in conjunction with subordinate headquarters. However, this was a mechanistic process based on very specific military objectives, not strategic art. Even when much larger scale major operations were considered within the curriculum they were divided into military considerations with the higher implications being paid little detailed attention.

It is evident from the post-war CASC curriculum that the machinations of strategy formulation, as noted in Chapter 5, were discussed, but not explored. In keeping with the later findings of the Rowley Report, the discussion of strategy was at

100 Ibid.
101 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 3, Folio 9, Vol 9, “Tactics, part I: Advance and Encounter; Fighting in Built-up Areas; River Crossing; Defence,” “Canadian Staff College Introduction to the Tactics Series - August 1946,” 1; and “Canadian Army Staff College Tactics I-I - May 1946,” 1.
102 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Box 3, Folio 9, Vol 9, “Tactics, part I: Advance and Encounter; Fighting in Built-up Areas; River Crossing; Defence,” “Canadian Army Staff College Tactics I-I - May 1946,” 1-3.
first focused on the mechanisms used in Great Britain, before proceeding briefly to
the Canadian example.\textsuperscript{103} In keeping with the post-war Canadian experience it can be
argued that this was so because when direction was not supplied through an alliance,
domestic linkages between military activities and national policy were \textit{ad hoc} at
best.\textsuperscript{104}

Over time even these vague notions of strategic thought were subsumed in
material that reaffirmed the lessons of the Second World War and was solidly
entrenched in the concerns of the Cold War, as well as the demands serving within
larger alliance and American formations. The previously scant attention that had been
paid to ideas of strategy formulation was replaced by exercises that focused on the
attainment of immediate military objectives provided by allied army formation
commanders against a Soviet-like enemy. By 1952 the CASC curriculum confirmed
the practice of Canadian military professionals in following the military lead of allies
and focused exclusively on the demands of the anticipated immediate multi-national
military response to the threat at hand. The Korean War had solidified ideas of allied
military cooperation against a seemingly hegemonic opponent.\textsuperscript{105} Indeed, officers
were enjoined to understand that:

Each officer should appreciate the importance of knowing Soviet Army
organization, equipment and tactics, particularly from divisional level down.
It should also be appreciated that simply knowing these things is not enough.
The Soviet Army must be compared with our own so that its relative strengths
and weaknesses clearly emerge. The Soviet Army’s reactions will not be the
same as our own. It is for this reason that the personal characteristics,

\textsuperscript{103} Canada, DND, DHH Archives, \textit{CLFCSC Fonds}, Box 6, Folio 17, Vol 3, “Amphibious Operations
(British), Amphibious Operations (United States); Planning; Navy;” “Canadian Army Staff College
\textsuperscript{104} See Chapter 4 of Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Loomis, “A Conceptual Study for Canadian Security in
\textsuperscript{105} See various exercise papers in Canada, DND, DHH Archives, \textit{CLFCSC Fonds}, Boxes 22-26, Folios
59 - 69, Vols 1-10, “1952 Course.”
background and training of the Soviet soldier and officer should be familiar to each officer.\textsuperscript{106}

At the same time course considerations for atomic, biological and chemical weaponry largely followed ideas promulgated by the United States military. This curriculum remained virtually unchanged until the major revision of the programme in 1959.

From all of this it is evident that the new paradigm of staff education shaped by the Second World War and taught at the CASC represented the distillation of hard-won professional lessons in large-scale military operations that were organised and conducted by Canadians as part of an independent national army. It had high entrance standards, was taught in a rigorous and demanding fashion by extremely qualified military practitioners. As part of this process instructors and students formed and sustained a network of military professionals, a community of practice, who were inter-service and multi-national in nature. Many in this select group went on to high rank and remained connected through common experience and institutional mechanisms, like the CASC journal, the \textit{Snowy Owl}.

The CASC provided a post-war staff college curriculum that acknowledged its British provenance and was initially independent of outside influences. Despite that, the influx of ideas from various sources shows that the curriculum was not produced in a closed system. While the British intellectual tradition persisted within the curriculum it is evident from an examination of this breadth of material that in 1946 Canada’s Army had designed a staff course that catered to its wartime experiences. But over time the outside influences of transnational professionals, as well as the threats and the corresponding NATO agreement that had been formed by the anxieties of a bi-polar world, gradually had an impact and the curriculum evolved, in a similar

manner to that described in Chapter 1 by Karin Knorr-Cetina, to reflect these pressures. By 1958 the staff course curriculum came to have a vision of future conflict that contained the Canadian Army experience of the Second World War and was seemingly oriented towards cooperation with the United States Army in a conflict against the Soviet Union in Europe. This idea of military cooperation, as well as the acceptance of professional knowledge verbatim from an American ally, became more solidly entrenched with the implementation of the two-year Canadian Army Staff Course curriculum in 1959.
Chapter 7
Paths Found and Lost:
Canadian Army Staff Education (1959-1973)

The golden age was brief, however, and from the Diefenbaker period onward, the slide downhill was inexorable. There were constant cuts in budget, aging equipment turned obsolescent and then obsolete, good officers left for other lines of work—and increasingly social experimentation became the driving force of military policy. For four decades, the army fought a rearguard action against these things - and it lost.¹

- J.L. Granatstein (1999)

This brief, but cogent, observation on the general state of affairs in the Canadian military from the late 1950s onwards summarizes the turbulence outlined in Chapter 5 and provides a background to the concomitant decline of Army staff education. Originally based on a Canadian experience of land warfare during the Second World War, professional learning retained vestiges of its pre-war connections to the British Army; it however, was refined to accommodate the demands and influences of the Cold War and alliances, particularly that with the United States Army. This chapter will explore the expansion of the Canadian Army Staff College course from one to two years in 1959 to meet the evolving needs of the Canadian Army and its subsequent reduction in length back to one year. The shortening was a result of integration with the RCAF staff course to create unified staff education for the amalgamated Canadian Forces. This merger of separate service staff education resulted in a compromise that did not address the professional needs of the Canadian Army or incorporate the lessons that had been recently learned and re-learned in the

most arduous of settings, the arena of conflict. Unification of the CF created a decline in the quality of professional military education for the Canadian Army staff officer.

However, this lay in the future. The CASC of the late 1950s was an intellectually vibrant institution that not only provided senior officer professional military education, but also tested and developed new ideas for the Canadian Army. This conceptual development lay mainly in the realms of an examination of possible force structures and doctrinal innovation. The CASC was tasked by the Canadian Army with examining proposed military structures and their usage in the context of modern military operations through discussion, debate and exercises. Through the guidance provided in its Annual Training Directives by the DMT at Canadian Army Headquarters, the Canadian Army used the intellectual capabilities of the CASC to develop and disseminate a vision of contemporary warfare. This was done in the course of the education provided by the Staff College to the selected senior officers who attended the programme, in a manner analogous to today’s concept of a “think-tank.” One example of this experimentation, was that, in an effort to be “forward-looking” course design included the creation of hypothetical war scenarios used as the setting for training problems. These exercises incorporated combinations of contemporary and possible future equipment as part of the problem in order to surmise their best methods of their use and potential efficacy. The results of these types of efforts were then the subject of discussion with DMT and high ranking

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officers who visited the College and, as noted the last chapter, are reflected in various correspondences with other practitioners concerning the curriculum.⁴

This academic activity also extended to the development of doctrine, which was discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 5. No formal Canadian Army tactical doctrine existed until the 1960s. As a result in the 1950s the CASC used a body of material that was known as “Canadian Army Staff College Future Doctrine.” Validated neither through war nor training this doctrine represented the knowledge and experience of the College staff who contributed to it; however, with the introduction of “official” Canadian doctrine in 1958, this provisional doctrine was superseded. Publications, such as The Infantry Brigade Group in Battle and The Corps Tactical Battle in Nuclear War, plus approved operating procedures involving tripartite agreements by American, British and Canadian representatives, eventually replaced the CASC Future Doctrine.⁵ These publications and agreements permitted a greater degree of inter-operability for Canadian Army contributions to multi-national military commitments, like those demanded by NATO, and were reflective of the times.

In the midst of this intellectual ferment, generated by the exigencies of the Cold War and its alliances, the first significant changes to the post-Second World War educational experience offered by the CASC took place. A Senior Officers Course of about two months duration was introduced in 1956 to refresh the tactical and administrative skills of those officers designated for battalion and equivalent command (see Appendix B). Unlike the Staff Course, which entailed a broader

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approach to organizing masses of personnel and resources to achieve military missions, the Senior Officers Course was designed to refresh and perfect the tactical and administrative proficiencies demanded for unit leadership. This programme was scheduled erratically over the following years and during the next decade a total of six serials were conducted; 1956-1960, 1962, and 1964. The demise of this Commanding Officer’s training seems to have coincided with the restructuring of the staff course and changes to military education produced by unification. This course was later re-introduced in the late 1990s, as a result of recommendations arising from “The Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces, 25 March 1997.” It directed the Chief of Defence Staff to: “Formalize pre-command training in all services to ensure that the knowledge of potential candidates [for the position of Commanding Officer at the unit-level (i.e. Ship, Battalion, or Squadron)] is current in such areas as military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management, employment equity and ethics.”

Another professional military education activity that was introduced to the CASC in the 1950s was the Militia Command and Staff Course (MCSC). The MCSC was a truncated version of the one-year residential Staff Course composed of distance studies and a two week residency portion. It has been conducted almost continuously in one form or another since 1956. Except for the first two years of its post-war existence, when it was held at the RMC, the programme has resided at Fort Frontenac. The MCSC was a re-institution of the pre-Second World War staff education that had

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6 Enlightened, “Reflections On: First Canadian Senior Officers Course 10 September – 2 November 1956,” Canada, Canadian Army Staff College (CASC), Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College 1, no. 5 (1956): 29.

7 Canada, Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC), “SC 1325-2027 (Comdt) 4500-1 (Comdt), Army Staff and Related Courses, 13 Feb 81,” 1.

been conducted for the Non-Permanent Active Militia. It was designed to “train and assess officers in the practical application of the theory of tactics, staff duties and administration as required for a Grade 2 staff appointment or unit command in the Militia.”

However, the most sweeping change was reserved for the one-year course – it was doubled in length as a result of perceived requirements to introduce the concepts of modern conflict demanded by the Cold War. In 1958 the Canadian Army Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Lieutenant-General Howard D. Graham sought agreement from the Minister of National Defence, Major-General (Retired) George R. Pearkes for a lengthening of the course. Pearkes, who had served through two World Wars with the Canadian Army and attended Camberley in 1919, understood the role of the staff college as a key developmental experience for officers. In his submission, Graham put forward that the amount of material required for contemporary staff education had increased since the immediate post-war period. The main additions were the subjects of nuclear warfare and weapons developments. That led to the conclusion that the CASC students needed more “...time for study and serious thought to prepare them for the many varied staff appointments they may be called upon to fill in overseas theatres at joint or combined headquarters as well as field headquarters in Canada and at headquarters involved in aid to civil authorities.” Accordingly, Graham

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9 I suspect the need for this course was generated by dwindling numbers of Second World War veteran’s to occupy these positions within the Militia, as well as a need to be able to conduct defence activities in conjunction with the regular component of the Canadian Army. “Militia Staff Course,” Canada, CASC, Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College 1, no. 7 (1958): 155; Canada, DHH Archives, File 171.009 (D296), “Training Policy – CA (R) CASC – File 3200-1 Vol. 7 from 20 Mar 57 to 08 Oct 59,” Document 17, “Annual Training Directive 1959-60,” 2; and, The current version of this course is known as the Army Operations Course (Reserve) or AOC (R).

10 Lieutenant-General Howard Graham had been a pre-Second World War NPAM officer who had stayed in the Army after that conflict. In 1935, he was a graduate of the pre-war staff training for NPAM officers, as well as instructing a similar course in 1938. Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier: The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 103-105.

proposed to extend the CASC staff course from one to two years. Because the Canadian Army was in a healthy position regarding the numbers of available staff educated officers, he recommended that the course intake of 50 remain unchanged because it was adequate for organizational needs. Graham explained that “Costs will remain approximately the same although output will, of course, be smaller.”

Not included in this memorandum were Graham’s personal opinions about the changing context of the times. He visualized that any potential conflict would involve weapons of “tremendous destructive power and intercontinental range” creating two potential scenarios for ground forces: the first involving a land war in Europe between opposing militaries; and the second based on efforts to restore order in the aftermath of a nuclear attack on Canada. A great deal of preparation by all parts of the regular Canadian Army and the Militia would be required to deal with these contingencies.

In any case, Pearkes concurred with Graham’s proposal to extend the length of the course.

While some debate about increasing the numbers of students did take place between the CASC and the Canadian Army Headquarters in the following years the increase proved problematic. The primary difficulty was the limited numbers of DS to teach the Staff Course, as well as to revise and update curriculum for succeeding courses. However, by 1962 one additional senior officer was allocated to the College as a DS and the CASC was directed to increase the output of the 1963 course.

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12 Canada, DHH Archives, File 113(D2), “CGS BDF3-3-5 Vol 3 Cdn Army Staff College. Papers relating to the operation of the Cdn Army Staff College and comments on Cdn attendance,” Memorandum HQC 3310-81/1 TD (DGMT) dated 11 Jul 58 from Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of National Defence “Canadian Army Staff College Policy,” no document number, no page.
13 Graham, Citizen and Soldier, 238-39; Quote from page 239.
14 Canada, DHH Archives, File 113(D2), “CGS BDF3-3-5 Vol 3 Cdn Army Staff College. Papers relating to the operation of the Cdn Army Staff College and comments on Cdn attendance,” Memorandum HQC 3310-81/1 TD (DGMT) dated 11 Jul 58 from Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of National Defence “Canadian Army Staff College Policy.”
15 Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” Document 31, CASC SCS 3310-71/1-6 (Asst Comdt)/SCC 3310-81/1-1 dated 1 Sep 60, “Course Load Canadian Army Staff College.”
to 90 students, including the guest students discussed in the previous chapter, in order to address the need for qualified staff officers. Additionally, there were embryonic plans to expand the infrastructure of the CASC to possibly accommodate 120 students.  

The idea of conducting this type of two-year programme had not emerged suddenly but been under examination for a number of years. Having returned to Canada after his assignment in Korea and becoming the Commandant of the CASC, Brigadier Pat Bogert (mentioned in the previous chapter) wrote in the 1957 edition of the Snowy Owl, “the major change in the course has been brought about by the introduction of nuclear warfare,” and he then went on to lay out the changes to war that this radical shift in weaponry had produced. Soon afterwards (after five years at the Staff College) a newly promoted Major-General Bogert departed for another command. He was replaced by Brigadier Roger Rowley, who as a Major-General in

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16 See Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965.” Canadian Army Headquarters BDF 1200-C10 (OCPS)/BDF 2581-1-P4/BDF 2581-1-P21 dated 27 Nov 61, “Officer Career Plans Committee” and Documents 40, 41 and 44, Army Headquarters Memorandum Director of Organization HQC 3310-81/1-1 (Org A) dated 27 Sep 60, “Staff Trained Officers,” 1-3; Canada, CLFCSC, Snowy Owl: Journal of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (1972-1973), 109-124; see also, Canada, DHH Archives, File 113(D2), “CGS BDF3-3-5 Vol 3 Cdn Army Staff College. Papers relating to the operation of the Cdn Army Staff College and comments on Cdn attendance,” Canadian Army Headquarters HQ 3310-81/1 (MT 3) dated 20 Nov 62, “Canadian Army Staff College,” 1.


18 Rowley served with the Canadian Army during the Second World War, later attending both the Camberley Staff College and the Imperial Defence College. He served in a myriad of staff positions during the post-war years, like Director of Military Operations and Plans, Director of Infantry, and Director of Military Training. In addition to being Commandant of the CASC, he occupied a number of other senior command positions such as Commander of 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, Commander of the Army Tactics and Organization Board, and Deputy Commander Operations at Mobile Command. After his work as Chairman of the Officer Development Board (Rowley Report) he was granted an Honorary Doctorate of Military Science from the RMC. Rowley retired from the Canadian Army in 1968. See “Obituary: ROWLEY, Major General (ret’d) Roger Rowley, DSO, ED, CD, GCLJ, GOMLJ,” The Canadian Guards Regimental Association [document on-line], available at http://www.canadianguards.ca/bereavement4.htm; internet, accessed 14 October 2008.
1969 would chair the professional development review that was put out as the *Rowley Report*.¹⁹

Rowley further explored the breadth of the change in the 1958 edition of the *Snowy Owl*. He described the process that had prompted the reorganization of the course as having been measured and inevitable, arising from the Cold War:

The introduction of these changes has occurred over the past few years, keeping pace with the development of ideas on future war. The result has been a gradual accumulation of new material in the curriculum, while instruction on the old conventional aspects of war remained almost unchanged.²⁰

Rowley went on to describe the course as having evolved into three primary subject areas: staff skills, non-nuclear and nuclear operations.²¹ The last topic was the greatest change and reflected the impact of the Cold War.

First, the topic of “staff skills” included producing formal analyses of military problems, or “appreciations,” the creation of formal orders and instructions pertaining to all aspects of military operations, in addition to the study of structures, equipment and capabilities. This subject would link all curriculum areas. Second, non-nuclear operations encompassed those aspects of the post-war programme of study that had remained unchanged. The largest course alterations were reserved for the study of nuclear operations. Last, in a similar fashion to conventional operations, all aspects of nuclear conflict and its associated administration were scrutinized. Of particular note within the curriculum were the identification of attendant technological and procedural changes, such as, “battlefield surveillance, target acquisition and analysis, the use of army air forces in the tactical area, the perils of electronic counter

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¹⁹ Canada, CASC, *Snowy Owl*, no. 6 (1957): 8; and also, Canada, CASC, *Snowy Owl* 1, no. 7 (1958): 9; and, for discussion of concepts of military revolution from the Middle Ages onwards see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300 – 2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; reprint 2004).
measures, the use of automatic data processing machines to assist in control of the battle; and a multitude of new and complicated techniques and processes.” These observations foreshadowed the late twentieth century ascendancy of information technology in conflict.

Rowley stressed that the move to a two-year programme was timely as there were other changes afoot in the Army. These shifts pertained to the restructuring and reassignment of roles for various military units as a result of the possibility of nuclear conflagration. In 1959, regular and militia units of the Canadian Army were reorganized in such a fashion as to be able to provide mobile support to devastated areas. From Rowley’s perspective, the changes to the CASC staff course were connected with these alterations to the Canadian Army.

In addition to the injection of material relating to nuclear war, further changes to structure and content were made to the course. Rather than tutorials, the course was now organised into three semesters over two years, with the first iteration starting in September 1959 until completion in June 1961. As an aside, the term “tutorial,” with its connotations of shared learning, later returned and is still in use. The first semester of the new program included lessons on the mechanics of a theatre of war, and the organization, roles and employment of Army organizations, in addition to staff procedures. The second semester used the knowledge gained in the previous months to address tactical problems for brigade and divisional formations in all parts of conflict and “situations short of war.” This semester also included the collective

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid, 16; and see also Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 244-45.
24 Rowley, “The New Staff Course,” 16-17; and see also Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” CASC SCC 3310-81/1-6 (DS) to Army Headquarters dated 10 Jun 58, Documents 7-11, “Canadian Army Staff College Policy,” 1.
training of larger military organizations and the provision of support to civilian authorities. The third semester focused on corps and higher formations, their military activities and the logistical support required. Additionally, the joint employment of the Canadian Army with other Canadian services and combined operations with other nations were examined. Considerations for specialized operations, like parachute, air transported and amphibious roles, and multinational military activities, like UN operations, were discussed and practised.26

There were a number of breaks for students over those three semesters: Christmas 1959, Easter 1960, Mid-Course (August 1960), Christmas 1960, and Easter 1961. While the syndicate system was kept, more time was allocated for self-study and reflection.27 Furthermore, the original aim of staff education was modified slightly from solely wartime contexts to include the idea of preparing an officer “for all branches of the staff in peace and in war.”28 Rowley believed that Canadian Army officers needed to be prepared for complex international and national security environments. Prior to the commencement of the 1959 CASC course he wrote to the Army Headquarters:

As Canadian Army formations are assigned by NATO to NORTHAG29 [Northern Army Group, Central Europe] it is essential that the student should not only understand the theatre structure and the elements which support tactical formations but also emphasis should be placed on teaching the staff functions at brigade group, division, corps and Army level. In the opinion of the College, it is essential to provide Canadian staff officers with the

29 Northern Army Group, of which the Canadian Brigade was part, was subordinate to LANDCENT [Land Forces Central Europe] (later AFCENT [Allied Forces Central Europe]) the NATO headquarters responsible for the conduct of the land battle in Germany.” See Sean M. Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade In Germany 1951-1993 (Whitby, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1997), 64.
background which will fit them for the growing number of NATO, UNEF\textsuperscript{30} [United Nations Emergency Forces] and other pact agreements. In addition the staff officer who is being trained in peacetime must have a basic knowledge of the relationship between Government and the Armed Forces and the impact of scientific development on the nature of war.\textsuperscript{31}

In 1962 the original aim of the course was amended to read, “To prepare officers for all branches of the staff and with further experience for command.”\textsuperscript{32}

Despite these changes, the CASC did not ignore the traditional concepts of organizing military forces for war in order to embrace non-violent uses of military power, even with the inclusion of UN and domestic operations.\textsuperscript{33} In fact, the CASC was still oriented towards preparing Canadian Army staff officers for the imperatives of conflict.\textsuperscript{34} But the necessity of preparing staff officers for “peacetime responsibilities” could not be overlooked; therefore, non-operational administration, as well as national and international affairs had to be taught.\textsuperscript{35} While both the USCGSC and Camberley addressed these topics in their curricula it was the explicit acknowledgement that army staff officers needed education outside the realm of warfare that made this Canadian goal different from that of other staff colleges.\textsuperscript{36}

Some of these issues entered the ongoing dialogue among Canadian military

\textsuperscript{30} Elements of the Canadian Army were dispatched to the Middle East as part of United Nations Emergency Forces in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis. Desmond Morton suggests as a result of the recognition that Canada received for her part in this mission, “The armed forces had found a new roles as peacekeepers.” Morton, \textit{A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo}, 241-42.

\textsuperscript{31} Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” CASC SCC 3310-81/1-6 (DS) to Army Headquarters dated 10 Jun 58, Documents 7-11, “Canadian Army Staff College Policy,” 2.

\textsuperscript{32} Canada, DHH Archives, File 113(D2), “CGS BDF3-3-5 Vol 3 Cdn Army Staff College. Papers relating to the operation of the Cdn Army Staff College and comments on Cdn attendance,” Canadian Army Headquarters HQ 3310-81/1 (MT 3) dated 20 Nov 62, “Canadian Army Staff College,” 1.

\textsuperscript{33} For discussion concerning concepts of “soft power” see Joseph Jockel, \textit{The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power} (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999).

\textsuperscript{34} Canada, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds 80/71 (henceforth \textit{CLFCSC Fonds}), Folio 197, “Presentation by Canadian Army Staff College to Conference on Integrated Staff Training 26 Jan 65 – The Army’s System Of Staff Training,” 2.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 4.

\textsuperscript{36} Appendix entitled “Curriculum Plan,” in United States, Department of the Army, CARL Archives, Accession No. N-13423.92, U.S. Command and General Staff College: After Action report, 3 July 1954 to 9 July 1956 (n.d) and also page I-1; and see also, Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Young, ed., \textit{The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958} (Camberley: Staff College, 1958), 9-11.
practitioners and assisted in creating CASC curriculum which reflected the concerns of the larger community of practice. For example, in 1959 Lieutenant-General S.F. Clark, noted to Major-General (later General) Jean V. Allard, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), that he believed “...in general our staff officers do not have sufficient training in the production of budgets and the management of expenditures.” Clark was concerned that staff officers did not understand Army financial process or the monetary implications of their proposals. Allard later replied to Clark that the Commandant of the CASC would examine the issue, prepare a recommendation and provide it to the Army Headquarters.

Significantly, although wide-ranging additions to the content of the course concerned military operations within the context of nuclear conflict, the fundamental interpretations of organizing war did not seem to have significantly changed from the Second World War. The new material was treated as an addition to the normal study of the conduct of war with conventional operations. Indeed it appears as if nuclear weapons were straightforwardly viewed as a powerful form of weapons technology that required specific considerations due to their destructiveness. Little consideration was given to these systems outside the sphere of military functionality. Articles in the Snowy Owl maintained the utility of conventional weaponry and attempted to show

38 Allard was later chosen as the second Chief of Defence Staff of the unified Canadian Forces, after resignation of Air Chief Marshall Frank Miller. Morton describes Allard as “A fighting soldier in Italy and Korea...” who “...treated unification as an order and an opportunity. A chronic optimist, he found virtues other officers may have overlooked; as a Canadian, he respected the fading British traditions, but unification was a unique opportunity to promote the French fact.” See Morton, A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo, 252-53.
39 Canada, DHH Archives, File 113(D2), “CGS BDF3-3-5 Vol 3 Cdn Army Staff College. Papers relating to the operation of the Cdn Army Staff College and comments on Cdn attendance,” HQ 310-81/1 TD 9068 Memorandum from the Chief of the General Staff to the Vice Chief of the General Staff dated 3 Mar 59 “Staff College Training.”
40 See note of VCGS to CGS dated 4 Mar 59 written on Ibid.
that nuclear arms simply created different problems that could be predicted and dealt with through foresight and planning. In describing the use of field artillery, a mainstay of Canadian Army operations in both World Wars, one student author, Captain S.B. Benton, suggested in 1958:

That the advent of the nuclear weapon has caused a reappraisal of the use of conventional artillery no one will deny. There are two aspects of this which must be examined. The first is the limitation on the use of nuclear weapons; the second is the change in battlefield deployment. Examination of the limitations will indicate the tasks that conventional artillery must continue to fulfill, while examination of the changes in battlefield deployment will indicate the capabilities required of conventional field artillery on the nuclear battlefield.41

The tried and true methods were to endure with some modifications.

These sentiments are mirrored by other student writings from this period.

Another article, reflecting a similar point of view was published in the 1961-1963 edition of the Snowy Owl. Captain F.J. Joyce touted helicopters as providing the superior mobility needed to be victorious on a battlefield fraught with threats, including nuclear. Entitled “The Victor Spoke – An Epilogue to the Third World War,” this piece takes the form of a conversation between a victorious General Nato and a vanquished Marshal Radonovitch in which the two adversaries examine the reasons behind the NATO victory and the Soviet defeat. This discussion suggested that the introduction of nuclear weapons and resultant dispersion of forces caused by threat of their use was overcome by NATO through the superior mobility provided by the helicopter. The article ends with a reminder of the validity of the application of past lessons: “The pendulum of warfare evolution has again swung back to mobility.

Mobility helped decide the Second World War and contributed immensely to winning The Third World War.\textsuperscript{42}

In late 1958, Graham, who after his tenure as CGS retired and became the Director of Civil Defence, provided a perspective on this pragmatism, or seeming naiveté, regarding nuclear conflagration. He suggested that while the Soviets had the ability to attack North America, the Western powers had a much larger capacity for retaliation. This ability was primarily based on the American nuclear arsenal. Consequently, as a result of these retaliatory capabilities of the United States, he concluded that the Soviet Union would not attack North America. At the same time Graham also recorded that premiers, federal ministers, provincial officials and various municipalities seemed to have little awareness of civil defence or concern regarding the threat of nuclear war. Graham observed: “In the West the public was little interested in civil defence.”\textsuperscript{43} One could assume this apparent lack of awareness by the Canadian populace was reflected in the atmosphere of simplicity and straightforwardness that surrounded questions of nuclear conflict during studies at the CASC.

In the post Second World War period warfare remained connected to traditional interpretations that would have been familiar to Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) and the Prussian-German military school.\textsuperscript{44} The various interpretations had their origins in the works of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), whose military theory underpinned instruction at Kingston, Leavenworth and Camberley. Clausewitz posited that warfare had a number of different forms, ranging from extreme violence


\textsuperscript{43} Graham, Citizen and Soldier, 243-46; Quote from page 245.

\textsuperscript{44} Helmuth von Moltke was considered the military architect of the German wars of unification in the late nineteenth century. See Book II, Chapter 2 of Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 314-381.
and destructiveness to limited conflicts. But in all cases the object of war and use of military force was to serve the policies of the state: “The political object – the original motive for the war – will thus determine the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”

In the late 1950s the CASC envisaged war taking place under three sets of conditions generated by the standoff between the East and the West: general war, limited war and situations short of war. General war would see the widespread use of nuclear weapons in an attempt to destroy an opponent’s military forces and its capacity to make war. It would likely take place between the bloc of western nations and the Soviet-aligned states. In comparison to this unrestrained strategy, limited war would be waged with restricted force for specific objectives, relying on low-level or tactical nuclear weapons aimed at clearly defined goals. Even if nuclear weapons were not applied to limited war, their ever-present threat was also a weapon. Only a limited war that did not involve nuclear arms, or the threat of their use, would have the potential of remaining a non-nuclear or conventional war. Finally, situations less than war involved the deployment of UN forces to conflict regions to prevent either limited or general war from occurring.

The shift in the Canadian staff course to include these aspects of nuclear and non-nuclear war seems to have accommodated earlier adjustments at the United States Army Command and General Staff Course (USCGSC). In justification of the new Canadian arrangements, Rowley suggested that any internal criticism could be

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countered in a similar fashion as that done by the Commandant USCGSC from 1956-1960, Major-General Lionel C. McGarr, when he rebutted American Army disapproval of like changes. At that time McGarr said, “Our chance of [professional] progress, our very hope of survival lies in moulding the minds of our leaders [the students] in the direction of progress.” According to this view, only by modifying staff college curriculum to take into account the developments created by nuclear weapons could military officers remain relevant in the changed environment of conflict.

In fact many of the curriculum changes introduced by the Americans at the USCGSC in the 1950s were mirrored by the CASC. The linkages between the curricula of these two allied staff colleges have not previously been examined by historians and are significant in the context of the intellectual influence the USCGSC had on the Canadian Army. The curriculum review at the USCGSC commenced in 1954 shortly after McGarr’s predecessor, Major-General Garrison H. Davidson, had assumed command; changes were implemented in 1958. Davidson described the need for these modifications in a very similar fashion to that later used by Bogert, in 1957, and Rowley, in 1958:

> While minor changes had been made during the post war period, 1946-54, the curriculum itself had remained quite static. It was characterized by nonatomic tactical situations -- this despite the inbeing [or existent] status of tactical atomic weapons. In 1951 some consideration was given to defense against atomic weapons. But it was not until 1954 that significant attention was devoted to this.

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48 United States, Department of the Army, Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Archives, Accession No. N-13423.92, U.S. Command and General Staff College: After Action report, 3 July 1954 to 9 July 1956 (n.d.), I-2; see Major-General Lionel C. McGarr, “USA Command & General Staff College Keeps Pace With the Future,” Military Review 37, no. 1 (April 1957): 3-13; and see also, Reichley, International Officers, 42.

Davidson explained that significant changes were required in the USCGSC course due to the sheer volume of work that these new subjects had produced:

The College at the present time, is attempting to accomplish an estimated four times as much as was accomplished here prior to World War II in a course that was even then hardly leisurely. When compared to the pre-World War II program the changes are striking. 50

One difference the new CASC programme and that of the USACGSC was the American belief that the topics of atomic, or nuclear, war would affect how the United States Army understood, organized and conducted war. 51 This was dissimilar to the curricula of the Canadian staff college, which seemed to be content to adapt old methods to the new technology in an effort to maintain accepted military practices for the new type of conflict.

The increase in instruction in atomic weaponry at the USCGSC was commensurate with an similar subsequent increase at the CASC. The difference was in how the material was split: the USCGSC divided its efforts into two areas, atomic and non-atomic, while the CASC taught atomic and non-atomic topics in addition to a third area “staff duties,” or staff processes pertaining to both types of conflict kept separate from that material. 52 Despite that dissimilarity the underlying approach of the USCGSC to curriculum design for staff education was comparable to that employed at the CASC since the Second World War; advanced concepts were linked by foundational subjects across the curriculum. At the USACGSC professional knowledge was imparted in three steps containing the various facets of atomic and non-atomic warfare. This method was staged and ensured that learning moved from

50 Ibid, V-2.
51 See McGarr, “USA Command & General Staff College Keeps Pace With the Future,” 3-13; and, during the post-Second World War period there are a number of terms used to describe ever increasing powerful weapons, such as, “atomic,” “hydrogen” and “neutron.” For more details regarding various terms associated with these weapons see John W. Young, The Longman Companion to Cold War and Detente 1941-91 (London and New York: Longman , 1993).
52 Ibid; and see also, Rowley, “The New Staff Course,” 17.
understanding the material conceptually to its correct practical usage during different military operations. The process was known initially as the “three-phase curriculum concept.” Simply put, it meant that the USACGSC staff education commenced with a “fundamental” phase, which focused on the basic military knowledge, such as structure and procedures for military staffs, the capabilities and organizations of all branches of the Army, essentials of military tactics and operations, as well as an introduction to the atomic, biological and chemical aspects of war. Then followed an initial “application” phase to utilize and refine understanding of these concepts. This education included learning the operations of various Army divisions, utilization of special operations capabilities, Corps and Army-level operations, as well as the administration and support of these forces, and the design of practical training for all these organizations. Finally, there was an “advanced application” phase. In this last phase the “students were to be completely immersed in using previous information, knowledge, and procedures in problem-solving activity.” In other words, they applied learning to date against military problems to devise appropriate solutions. This curricula design included a number of cross-cutting themes that provided a general foundational education that was taught throughout the phases which were meant to reinforce and link them. These courses spanned the entire curricula and covered higher United States Army organization, structures of other services, military forces of allied nations, command and leadership, military history, military geography, guest speakers, and student orientation (at the beginning of the entire programme).  

Interestingly, the 1958 syllabus from the British Staff College at Camberley does not demonstrate the same focus concerning atomic or nuclear warfare as the CASC or USACGSC, although aspects of that topic are addressed within six broad curriculum areas. The same types of progressive learning and integrated curriculum evidenced at the CASC and USACGSC did exist at Camberley. First, came “basic” or core subjects required for military professionals including topics like staff duties and administration. Second, there was “the study of war” or the major types of military operations and the conduct of simulated exercises to practise these skills. This series of educational activities included “Global nuclear war in Europe,” “Limited war outside Europe,” “Internal Security Operations,” and “Warfare in undeveloped countries.” Third, Camberley studies addressed design and conduct of training in order to eventually prepare individual and collective training plans for the units to which they were assigned. Fourth came miscellaneous topics - the British Commonwealth, chemical war, the French and American Armies (the former likely due to their proximity and shared history and the latter a probably a result of the post-war global bi-polar environment), military history, soldier’s morale, psychological aspects of war, special operations, and developments in weapons technology. Fifth, there were studies that were conducted in collaboration with other services and government organizations. Finally, students toured battlefields of Europe.54

From the various curricula it is evident that the changes to the CASC staff course in 1959 reflected a greater American than British influence. The strength of these connections appears within the pages of the Snowy Owl:

Since 1940, cooperation in defence matters has been one of the outstanding aspects of Canada’s relationship with the United States. Of particular interest is the fact that close ties have developed between the Staff Colleges of the two armies. Evidence of this has been seen by the present course at Fort Frontenac.

54 Young, ed., The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958, 9-11.
in the form of instructional material and exercises, exchange of Directing Staff and guest speakers.  

Despite the transnational impact of concepts of professional education originating with the United States Army, the curricula of the CASC often acknowledged a continuing Canadian Army relationship with the British Army. In accordance with NATO agreements and the experience of the First and Second World Wars, Canadian Army formations would be expected to fight in conjunction with British military forces. Consequently, the CASC developed an order of battle for Staff College exercises that had Canadian formations working with British Army formations, while at the same time being able to work within other allied forces. To that end, the students practised integration with various specialized British and American units.

The influence of American forces within this the area of allied operations continued to grow throughout the 1950s and 1960s. United States Army units gradually replaced British Army units within various exercises and the United States Marine Corps supplanted British marine forces for amphibious operations. Also, American methods of “automatic data processing” in the realms of military intelligence and administration were introduced.

At the same time, the CASC did cultivate a uniquely Canadian perspective on conflict, insofar that neither the USCGSC nor Camberley explicitly retained in their course objectives the idea of preparing an army officer for military service “...in peace

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56 Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” CASC SCC 3310-81/1-6 (DS) to Army Headquarters dated 10 Jun 58, Documents 7-11, “Canadian Army Staff College Policy,” 5 and Documents 15-20, CASC SCC 3310-81 (G1)/SCC 3310-81/1-6, “Minutes Of A Conference To Brief The VCDS On The New Canadian Army Staff College Course Commencing September 1959 (Held at the Canadian Army Staff College on 26 Sep 58),” 2-3.
57 Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, Documents 15-20, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” CASC SCC 3310-81 (G1)/SCC 3310-81/1-6,” CASC SCC 3310-81 (G1)/SCC 3310-81/1-6, “Minutes Of A Conference To Brief The VCDS On The New Canadian Army Staff College Course Commencing September 1959 (Held at the Canadian Army Staff College on 26 Sep 58),” 3 and 5.
and in war.” The United States Army Command and General Staff College expressed its aim as: “To prepare selected individuals of all components of the Army to perform those duties which they may be called upon to perform in war. The emphasis is on the art of command.” The deliberate acknowledgement that the CASC curriculum addressed those aspects of military operations that would involve officers in short of war situations demonstrated an awareness that the military was one facet of a number of forces contributing to national power. Some of the reasons can be derived from post-war military operations, explored in Chapter 5, which included Canadian involvement in multi-national UN operations.

Even though the CASC curricula was modified to accommodate the changing nature of conflict and its increased American content strengthened professional relationships with the United States Army, weakness in strategic understanding continued. Significantly, the CASC taught officers how to organize theatres of war for operations and administration, but did not address the intellectual processes or connections between the geographic ordering or physical arrangement of a large area for warfare and the military or political strategy that had to be achieved in that region. While it was explicit in the course material that staffs needed to understand the intricacies of military activities in an extended theatre of conflict, like North-West Europe during the Second World War, the relationship of these operations to higher objectives was neglected. Instead the focus of the CASC was on the conduct of war within a theatre of war to achieve immediate military objectives; longer term

59 Young, ed., The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958, 7.
60 Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” Document 28, Army Headquarters HQ 3310-81/1 TD 9016 (MT 3B) dated 29 Jan 59, “Canadian Army Staff College Course Commencing 8 Sep 59.”
objectives connected to alliance or national goals were ignored.\textsuperscript{61} This lack of connection between military activities and higher direction concerned some general officers in the Canadian Army. When the VCGS, Major-General Allard, was briefed on the new programme in September 1959 he asked “...whether studies would include examination and debate of the use of war as an instrument of national policy...” The minutes of this meeting record that the Commandant, Brigadier Rowley responded “...that this type of study would be part of the programme of reading and essay writing which would be included in the course.”\textsuperscript{62} One can surmise from this statement that the art and science of strategy formulation was not dealt with as a separate theme within the curriculum. This would mirror and, might have reinforced, the operations of the Canadian military throughout the post-war years. These military activities often conducted under the auspices of bilateral defence agreements rather than national direction.

Despite the absence of a connection between national objectives and military activities in the CASC curriculum and the possible consequences some students were reflecting on these issues. A graduate of the 1959-1961 course, Captain (later Major-General) D.G. (Dan) Loomis, articulated his vision concerning the influence of the overarching objectives of strategic direction and national non-military activities on the armed services. In a 	extit{Snowy Owl} article entitled, “Strategy, Operations and Tactics,” Loomis laid out a framework that, from his perspective, defined aspects of contemporary strategy formulation. In his model he noted that ideas of strategy and its composite parts in Canada were ill-defined and thus contributed to misunderstanding.

\textsuperscript{61} Canada, DHH Archives, \textit{CLFCSC Fonds}, Folio 197, “Presentation by Canadian Army Staff College to Conference on Integrated Staff Training 26 Jan 65 - Training Standards for Army Staff Officers,” 1.

\textsuperscript{62} Canada, DHH Archives, File 76/157, “CASC Staff College Trg Papers 1958-1965,” Documents 15-20, CASC SCC 3310-81 (G1)/SCC 3310-81/1-6, “Minutes Of A Conference To Brief The VCDS On The New Canadian Army Staff College Course Commencing September 1959 (Held at the Canadian Army Staff College on 26 Sep 58),” 2.
and confusion. This is not surprising considering the topic was not addressed in any significant fashion during his time at the CASC. Loomis argued that strategy encompassed all four facets of a nation’s power: economic, diplomatic, psychological (ability to influence individual minds), and military. He then went on to argue that tactics were the detailed application of one of these elements, such as a military engagement between opposing forces. Between tactics and strategy existed the realm of “operations,” which were complex and included large scale activities involving two or even three of the national instruments of power. Loomis separated the idea of “politics” from strategy by defining politics as comprised of those actions that were normally within the legal authority of a government and peaceful in nature; strategy, on the other hand, was government involvement in extra-national issues outside its normal jurisdiction and possibly involving force. In effect, according to Loomis, politics referred to national activities and strategy contained all international actions. Even with this partition Loomis suggested that politics also contained all four elements. But he did not include the terminology of “operations” or “tactics” because speaking of “economic operations” or “psychological tactics” would make no sense in a normally peaceful domestic environment. Loomis’s argument offered a convenient division between domestic and exterior commitments but, despite that, still demonstrated a lack of clarity regarding the exact relationship between the military and government in the formulation of military strategy in either sphere.63

The critical link between governmental direction, or policy, and military activity at any level of conflict continued to be imprecisely understood throughout the

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1960s by both junior and senior military officers. Other student articles submitted to the *Snowy Owl* provide more evidence. Major K. H. Boettger’s article “Types of Strategic and Operational Papers in Military History,” scarcely mentioned the oversight provided to military operations by national or alliance strategy, but did address guidance provided by the Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Winston Churchill, to his military commanders in the terse observation - “Eminent examples of Anglo-American documents in this field [strategy] are: Winston Churchill’s three famous ‘Papers’ of December 16, 18 and 20, 1941...” The remainder of the article then focused on the various types of historical western military guidance produced by military commanders for military forces. There was no further reference or connection to higher objectives. Many of his examples had Prussian or later German provenance, unsurprisingly as Boettger was a German student at the CASC, and, like many of the students of the period was a Second World War veteran, albeit of the *Wehrmacht*, or German Army. Boettger’s illustrations of warfare are imbued with a sense of independence from civilian control. This militarized perspective of hostilities had developed during the German wars of the late nineteenth century. After the Prussian victories of that period von Moltke had argued that, while the beginning and ending of conflict resided in the sphere of diplomacy, the conduct of warfare needed to be free from unclear political interference in order to achieve its objective in the most decisive and expeditious fashion:

Diplomacy avails itself to war to attain its ends, crucially influencing the beginning of war and its end. It does the latter by reserving to itself the privilege of raising or lowering its demands in the course of the war. In the

66 Ibid, 97.
presence of such uncertainty, strategy has no choice but to strive for the highest goal attainable with the means given.\(^{67}\)

In other words, the key to success was military action unfettered by restraints outside the confines of the military profession. It is a vision of conflict that shaped the wars of the twentieth century to violent extremes in a search for decisive victory.

However, Canada’s need to produce staff officers who could create military operations responsive to political direction did not go unremarked by the *Snowy Owl*. In 1969, an article by an American guest student, Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Drummond, proposed that the time had come to address the need to educate officers in “political-military affairs.”\(^{68}\) Drummond suggested that traditional staff college curriculums were oriented towards “...orderly and standardized procedures in the solution of command and staff problems”\(^{69}\) and that officers needed to learn to become an “...active counsellor to the political decision maker”\(^{70}\) in order to make the military an effective instrument of national power. Drummond’s writing indicates that he envisaged the need for coherent military strategy flowing from national direction, but he doubted that professional military education had kept pace.\(^{71}\)

In the following years this deficiency continued to plague the Canadian Forces. For instance, in 1972 the Department of National Defence “Report of Study on Professionalism in the Canadian Forces: In accordance with CDS Directive S12/70” reiterated the observation of the Rowley Report concerning the weaknesses in strategic thinking. This study advocated the need for education in long term military planning skills and increasing the understanding of how to meet strategic

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\(^{67}\) Quoted in Gat, *A History of Military Thought*, 340.


\(^{69}\) Ibid, 18.

\(^{70}\) Ibid, 19.

\(^{71}\) Ibid, 18-22.
requirements. While some might argue that NDC was meant to address this need, for the majority of Army officers their most significant educational experience would be the CASC (and later the CFC). Few attended NDC, by 1972 for example less than 55% of all serving general officers from the unified Canadian Forces had attended the NDC, or a foreign equivalent. In any case this percentage did not include the vast majority of senior officers who at the working level regularly dealt with, or perhaps did not deal with, these issues in various headquarters.

Chapter 5 discussed the separate and distinct nature of the military profession in Canada in the context of the events of the Cold War. The events of this period likely not only disconnected the Canadian military from the nation but some of the turmoil surrounding these occurrences may have extended into Canada’s military. Perhaps obstructing an education in the full range of professional military competencies, during the early 1970s, was a popular belief among some within the Canadian Forces that it was useful to government only as an internal security force, such as that used during the 1970 October Crisis. During this event Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the Emergency War Measures Act in response to the abduction of British trade Commissioner James Cross by a Quebec extremist separatist group, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). At that time, the Canadian military was used to support security operations in Quebec, as well as provide protection at key federal installations. It needs be remembered that almost 30 years had passed since the Second World War, and 20 years since the end of the Korean War. The Canadian

73 Bernd A. Goetze, National Security Series No. 3/76 - Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps (Kingston, ON: Centre for International Relations, 1976), 67.
military had been focused on peacekeeping missions and NATO. The *FLQ* crisis caused some to believe that the CF should concentrate on domestic security, despite Canadian involvement with the UN and NATO. Officers came to believe that the role of the military was limited and one dimensional. That same year a National Defence education policy document, the *Officer Career Development Program*, stated:

The most serious problem facing the Canadian Forces has not been addressed. This has been so because the problem is beyond the purview of the Chief of Personnel and even the Chief of Defence Staff. That problem is that many officers, probably a majority, do not see that government policies permit more than one realistic role – internal security – for the Canadian Forces. In other words, as the DPRC [Director Personnel, Recruiting and Careers] staff heard from so many officers from the general rank down, ‘We have no meaningful military or para-military role except as a police force within Canada.’ From this situation a number of evils have developed that are seriously affecting the effectiveness and viability of Canada’s military forces. Yet the seriousness of this situation is not seen by many officers to be understood at the senior levels of the military and civilian management of the Forces.\(^75\)

A year previously, in the 1971 edition of the *Snowy Owl*, the Commandant of the CLFCSC from 1969-1971, Brigadier-General D.S. MacLennan,\(^76\) had written similar sentiments in his end-course comments:

...until fairly recently, we as a group of professionals had never, I think, seriously examined ourselves to determine what we are, who we are, and how we fit into society and in what ways we can contribute to the achievement of our national goals. I daresay that most of us would have been hard put to it to articulate our professionalism to outsiders, and I make so bold as to suggest that this may be the contributing factor of the Canadian Armed Forces to engage the interest of the people whom they serve, the society of which they form an inseparable part.\(^77\)

As well as this internal debate concerning the role of the military in Canada, the lack of capability regarding strategic thought also became explicitly apparent to members of the Canadian profession of arms. A commentary decrying the inability of the CF to

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\(^75\) Canada, Department of National Defence, *Officer Career Development Program* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, July 1972), 7.
designated strategy amongst other functions was published in the Summer 1974 edition of *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. Written by Colonel J.E. Neelin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Technical Services at Air Defence Headquarters, in North Bay, Ontario and Colonel L.M. Pederson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, at the same headquarters, this piece argued that the functions of defence policy were being intertwined with that of military policy. They argued that the former should create overarching objectives for a military while the latter dealt with the means of executing this defence policy - the translation of governmental directives into military actions. Nevertheless, the amalgamation of the Canadian services into a single force had brought with it greater integration with the civilian bureaucracy of defence and in turn had decreased the capability of the Canadian Forces to create clear, military direction. As a result of the reorganization of National Defence Headquarters and appointment of civil servants in key roles that were formerly held by officers, military policy was created by civil servants who were not versed in the intricacies of the profession of arms.78 Thus, the concepts necessary for the formulation of military policy were subsumed and intertwined with governmental policies and actions, which created a military organization that was more “armed civil service” than “armed forces,” with a focus on “internal security and security” rather than “countering external threats (war).” The areas of military training and education, defence administration, equipment procurement, distribution and use, as well as “strategy and tactics” were adversely affected. The analogy was made that “it would be as well to have laymen in the College of Physicians and Surgeons.”79 Soon after publication of this article both

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78 One of the Transformation objectives of the 2005 Canadian Forces re-organization was to make National Defence Headquarters less bureaucratic and more focused on military objectives. Email from Major-General Daniel Gosselin to Author (Saturday, May 16, 2009 4:50 PM).

officers retired. One could assume their sentiments regarding the direction of the Canadian military played a role in this decision or that they wrote the article before a planned retirement.  

In 1975 General J.A. (JADEX) Dextraze, a legendary French Canadian officer who had achieved renown in the Second World War, Korea and the Congo, became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Amongst his varied employment Dextraze had also been on staff at the CASC for a brief time after his return from Korea. When asked by then Canadian officer and future military researcher, John Hasek “how the armed forces could work with a civil service being responsible for what in effect were military strategies” Dextraze replied “that when he wanted it, he had access to the very top [the Prime Minister].” However, Hasek noted that he did not pose the obvious question of “Et après vous, mon général?” Unfortunately, as Hasek observed, Dextraze was the last CDS with combat experience and he was, in Hasek’s opinion, replaced by a succession of senior military officers who were bureaucrats who did not focus on long range plans and policy. In any case, it is evident that the need for strategic understanding was lacking within Canadian defence and it was not addressed within Canadian Army staff education. In this vacuum the inter-army professional relationships of the period, particularly with those of close allies, may have provided conceptual guidance for Canadian Army, and, subsequently, land component officers of the CF.

In the realm of military ideas, the importance of the Snowy Owl as a professional journal and historical source cannot be underestimated. For instance, Paul Hellyer, the architect of the amalgamation of the Canadian services, cites the

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81 Ibid, 160-63; Quotes from page 161; and see also Major Andrew B. Godefroy, “JADEX,” CAJ 11, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 110-12.
Snowy Owl as an authoritative reference in his memoirs. Hellyer selected an article in the journal to support his contention that military practitioners were behind the concept of a unified Canadian military – and that it was not simply an abstract concept advocated by unknowing civilians:

The idea of a single service was not new, and its proponents were not all ‘armchair strategists’...It had been proposed by significant numbers of serving and retired officers of all ranks. Captain J. G. Forth, Royal Canadian Engineers, had published an excellent paper entitled “Unification – Why, How, When” in the Canadian Army Staff College Journal 1959-1961.

Hellyer’s observation concerning this piece in the Snowy Owl reaffirms that the journal is reflective of the professional thinking and debate of Canadian Army officers during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s.

In any case ideas of unification were not simply confined to the pages of the Snowy Owl. In the early 1960s discussions began over combining the three services and their professional education systems. At this time, only the Canadian Army and the RCAF had separate staff colleges. The RCN addressed its need for staff officers by sending a small number of students to the CASC and the RCAF Staff College. However, despite that, unification would create mixed staffs of naval, army and air force officers, who all needed an understanding of integrated or joint operations. Thus, a joint education system was of concern to all. Accordingly, in December 1964 the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) directed that a study be conducted “to determine the staff officer training requirements for the services with the object of

82 Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces (Toronto: McClelland and & Stewart Inc., 1990), 39.
84 Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 82/189, Memorandum from Chief of Personnel to CDS, P 4500-26 (DT) dated 16 December, 1965, “Integrated Staff Training” (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Headquarters, 11 January 1966), 1.
introducing an integrated staff course in September 1966.”

More importantly for the CASC he also directed, “As an interim measure pending the development of an integrated staff training programme, the two-year staff course at the Canadian Army Staff College would be reduced to a one-year course effective 1965.”

On 26 January 1965 the VCDS working group held a conference in Kingston to examine how this investigation would be conducted. At that time the CASC advocated strongly for a continuance of Army staff education for two years duration. In a briefing package approved by the Commandant, the College staff strongly objected to combining staff training amongst the three services. They argued that the competencies required by Canadian Army officers in nuclear and non-nuclear war needed a separate two-year Canadian Army staff course due to the breadth of material which required mastery. Arguments were clearly laid out from an army perspective as to the role of service staff education in an army officer’s professional development and the inadequacy of a joint service staff education to provide officers with all aspects of Army operations.

Furthermore, this understanding could only be achieved through detailed study of army activities in combination with other essential elements of professional knowledge that would provide context for the employment of army forces:

They must be given a thorough understanding of tactical and strategical principles, and knowledge of likely enemies, areas of operations and other influences which might bear on operations. They must be given all the knowledge which they need to prepare them for duty on any branch of the staff at the Grade 2 (or major) level and, with further experience for command.

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86 “Vice Chief of Defence Staff Meeting 16/64” quoted in Canada, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Folio 197, CASC SCC 3310-81/1-2 (G) dated 17 Jun 66 “Report on 1965-66 Staff Course,” 1.
87 Ibid, 1-2.
88 Canada, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Folio 197, “Presentation by Canadian Army Staff College to Conference on Integrated Staff Training 26 Jan 65 - The Army’s System of Staff Training,” 1-3.
89 Ibid, 2.
The CASC argued that time was already insufficient to educate Army officers in the intellectual tools needed to address the dilemmas associated with the employment of land power, replacing part of the limited time with multi-service staff education would further dissipate that essential education. Furthermore, they believed that an army staff officer proficient in his métier could easily adapt to other environments.90 Also, the CASC also produced a detailed list of professional competencies that were required by officers employed in command and staff positions and considered necessary for any army staff education – Appendix J contains this document. Despite these strongly worded arguments and substantiation, the directive to conduct interim courses of one year’s duration until the integration took effect was not amended. This was likely due to a need to move forward with integrated staff training despite any objections that the Canadian Army might have, as well as a seeming lack of recorded opposition from the RCN and RCAF to the proposed integration of staff education. Given that the proposals examined focused on maintaining the RCAF Staff College as the core of the revised staff college system one can deduce why neither might have opposition to this plan.91

Only two months later, on 19 March 1965, the VCDS Working Group produced a short report on the future of staff education for the Canadian Forces. This report marked the demise of single service staff colleges. “A Program For Professional Military Education For The Canadian Defence Force - A Report By The Working Group 19 March 1965.” For the Canadian Army the recommendations for an integrated professional military education system were made at the expense of an service staff college that had a line of continuity from Scharnhorst and the Prussian

90 Ibid, 1-3 and 5.
school to the Second World War and beyond. As was eloquently and directly put by
the CASC to those participating in the January 1965 conference:

The evolution of our system of staff training can be traced back over two
hundred years. The reasons why we do things in certain ways are not laid
down in a tidy volume of policy. Yet this is not to say that the methods are
unsound. Far from it – they have been proven by experience.92

The CASC apprehension of being subsumed by joint professional education
was confirmed in the recommendations of the Working Group. These proposals noted
that centralized direction of professional education by the unified Canadian military
was critical to any integrated system. Control of this education system extended to
revising the curriculum so that it focused less on practicalities or service specifics and
more on intellectual competencies. The RCAF Staff College was deemed the best
organization to serve as a model for a centrally run professional education system.
Unlike the CASC it had a small command and support element, and a larger
separately structured headquarters with a curriculum development staff. Also, the
Working Group hinted that the Air Force curriculum was less service-focused.
Accordingly, it was recommended that the RCAF Staff College would become “The
Forces College,” with representation from all services, and eventually control over
professional education institutions for the Navy, Army and Air Force.93 The changes
did not take place exactly as laid out in “A Program For Professional Military
Education For The Canadian Defence Force,” but this movement did eventually
assure the dissipation of focused Army staff education.

In 1966 the Canadian Forces College (CFC) was created to provide a
comprehensive Officer Development System for all Canadian services. This new
educational organization consisted of a number of educational components, but not

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92 Canada, DHH Archives, CLFSC Fonds, Folio 197, “Presentation by Canadian Army Staff College to Conference on Integrated Staff Training 26 Jan 65 - The Army’s System of Staff Training,” 3.
the CASC. The Canadian Army Staff College had already been ordered to institute an interim one-year programme, which, under the new educational construct, would eventually merge with the CFC staff course. This one-year CASC course would eventually become condensed staff courses aimed at junior Canadian Army and foreign officers of about Captain and junior Major rank and containing the necessary competencies to allow them to function in entry level staff positions. These courses will be dealt with in much greater detail later in this chapter. Higher level staff education would then take place exclusively at the CFC in Toronto. During 1965-1966 the CASC conducted its first one-year course since 1958 and continued to offer staff courses of this length until the introduction of the shorter programme in 1974. In 1967 the CASC was renamed to the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC).

In keeping with the reduced nature of the programme the aim of the 1965-1966 course was more restrictive than previous years: “To prepare officers for all branches of the staff at the Grade 2 level and, with further experience, for command.” Professional studies were confined to division and smaller sized military organizations and curriculum areas like “military-political geography” or strategic

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94 First, it included the CFC, which was the former separate headquarters of the RCAF Staff College. Second, was the Canadian Forces Staff College (CFSC), made up of the bulk of the RCAF Staff College. Third, was the Canadian Forces Staff School (CFSS), which had been previously known as the RCAF Staff School and in that role used to qualify officers for squadron command. The CFSS was later closed in 1994. Finally, there was the Canadian Forces College Extension School (CFCES). This organization was based on the RCAF extension program which had allowed graduates of the RCAF Staff School to qualify for Staff College. This latter program ended in 1974, likely due to the implementation of the Officer Career Development Program (OPDP). The OPDP eventually included Canadian Forces-wide exams intended to prepare an officer for professional experiences like senior staff programs. See Ibid, 8-9; Canada. Library and Archives of Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 24, Accession 1965 85/161, Box 1845, File 2-6145-12 Vol. 2, F 1901-4352/8 (DO) dated 3 October 1966, “Canadian Forces Organizational Order 1.8 – Canadian Forces College, Toronto,” 1; Email from Cathy Murphy, Chief Librarian, Canadian Forces College to Author (Tuesday, October 14, 2008 12:24 PM); and see also, Canada, Department of National Defence, Officer Career Development Program.
96 See Appendix G of this thesis.
studies were reduced or eliminated. Outside visits were minimized and the class day lengthened.  

The resultant one-year course was divided into four major parts – basic knowledge, staff skills, command and staff functions, as well as a category for miscellaneous topics. This last category included allocated study periods and undesignated periods that were known as the “Commandant’s Reserve,” which could be used as designated by the Commandant of the Staff College. Unlike previous courses this last category indicated how intricate the scheduling had become. In order to cover as much material as could be compressed within the one-year interim programme all potential programme time was allocated a purpose. As a result of the reduced time the one-year course focused on a lower level of military operations than the two-year course. This diminished perspective also confirmed the tactical focus of the CASC, and later CLFCSC, while in the process ensuring less understanding of the relationships between military activities and higher direction and policies.

From a professional viewpoint the scope of this material enabled the prospective staff officer to hold various positions encompassed by the course objective. Graduates were likely to be assigned to five primary types of staff appointment: 1. headquarters appointments in overseas theatres, 2. employment in multi-service or allied headquarters, 3. posting to a headquarters involved in nuclear


100 Ibid.
survival operations, 4. staff employment in operations that were short of war, for instance, support to UN and other agreements, and 5. peacetime staff appointments.\textsuperscript{101}

In the pedagogy and curriculum associated with the knowledge required for these assignments one can detect an attempt to ensure that the most relevant portions of the two-year programme were kept in place. In order to be employed in overseas headquarters positions students learned the Staff Duties, Movement and Operations of War portions of the course through practical exercises. They also completed work in the areas of conflict in specialized environments, domestic security operations and peace keeping.\textsuperscript{102}

In a related fashion, to be employed in a joint or allied headquarters, an understanding of amphibious warfare was needed, in addition to aspects of British, United States and other Canadian services. On the other hand, responsibilities for nuclear survival operations was delineated in a focused module of instruction offered on a single day at the Canadian Emergency Measures College\textsuperscript{103} (CEMC) at Arnprior, Ontario in combination with the nuclear, biological and chemical portions of the Staff Course.\textsuperscript{104} The reduction in time from the late 1950s and early 1960s for the latter topic was likely due not only to a shorter army staff course, but also the belief that the

\textsuperscript{101} Canada, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Folio 197, CASC SCC 3310-81/1-2 (G) dated 17 Jun 66 “Report on 1965-66 Staff Course,” 1.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{104} Canada, DHH Archives, CLFCSC Fonds, Folio 197, CASC SCC 3310-81/1-2 (G) dated 17 Jun 66 “Report on 1965-66 Staff Course,” 1.
*quid pro quo* of any nuclear exchange would preclude their use in a bi-polar world.\textsuperscript{105}

Current analyses of this post-war period seem to bear this observation out.\textsuperscript{106}

In addition to the nuclear aspects of the reinstituted one-year CASC course were those that pertained to employment as a staff officer in “para-military” environments such as the UN and various alliances. These facets of the curriculum addressed the staff competencies that officers would need for service during peacekeeping, internal security, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations. The teaching of peacetime staff appointments included topics such as understanding the relationship of military forces to the government, future warfare concepts and ongoing scientific research in those areas, plus current affairs at the national and international arenas.\textsuperscript{107}

This interim one-year CASC/CLFCSC staff course was originally envisaged as temporary, to be replaced by integrated staff training within a year, but that was not the case. Despite the post-unification resistance of the Canadian Land Forces to the dissipation of the Canadian Army staff education system, ongoing integration of officer education systems weakened army staff education. For instance, 1967 saw the end of Army promotion exams. This was viewed by a number of Army officers as a


\textsuperscript{106} “The nuclear revolution had greater strategic than operational or tactical war-fighting implications. It has been about deterrence and how we think about deterrence rather than war-fighting. Deterrence became nuclear weapons’ central role. Some, such as Bernard Brodie in 1946, recognized that very early on. Over time, a very high level of strategic interdependence developed among the states that possessed nuclear weapons, at least among those that possessed large quantities of them -- the U.S. and USSR were very sensitive to each other’s nuclear moves. Some argue that nuclear weapons are responsible for what historian John Lewis Gaddis called the ‘long peace’ of the Cold War. We have not seen a major power war since August 1945. Gaddis and other analysts argue that this is a direct result of the nuclear revolution. So we have seen a revolution in strategic, not merely military, affairs.” Andrew L. Ross, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics: A Strategic Perspective,” *Footnotes: The Newsletter of Foreign Policy Research Institute Wachman Center* 14, no. 5 (May 2009) [document on-line], available at http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1405.200905.ross.nuclearweaponsintlpolitics.html; internet, accessed 11 May 2009, no page.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
dilution of professional competencies. One argument from the early 1970s supporting this perspective advocated that:

The military officer is widely held to be a member of a profession. This implicitly demands that he offer service of the highest service of the highest order to society. He like the doctor or lawyer, cannot do that without continuously delving into his art, without studying it...He, like the doctor, must review constantly his professional knowledge.  

The Rowley report of 1969 noted the deleterious impact of the elimination of these tests:

As a result of this decision to terminate promotion and qualifying examinations, there has been a sharp decline in the level of tactical knowledge possessed by junior officers in the land element. Without the incentives associated with promotion or eligibility for staff training, self-study in environmental and specialty subjects has tended to be neglected since proof of having completed such studies is no longer required. In addition one of the means of assessing an officer for attendance at the command and staff course has been lost.

Indeed, some senior army officers felt so strongly about this deficiency that they produced local solutions. For example, Dan Loomis, when a Lieutenant-Colonel and Commanding Officer 1st Battalion The Royal Canadian Regiment, designed a set of professional exams that his officers were required to write while the unit was deployed to Cyprus on UN duties in 1970-1971.

108 Captain M.N. Geoffrey Hutton, “From Our Readers: On Professional Advancement Training For Junior Officers,” CDQ 3, no. 1 (Summer 1973): 57. This quote reflects the understanding of a profession that was made popular by researchers Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz during that period. Huntington and Janowitz proposed that military officers were members of a professional group due to a definable body of specialized knowledge that required mastery, a responsibility to the public interest, as well as requirements to be self-administering and self-regulating. The latter attribute is not much in vogue today due to a desire for greater public scrutiny over professions in general; however, it was accepted during this time. The removal of promotion exams challenged these accepted notions of professionalism. In any case, the vision of the military profession advocated by Huntington and Janowitz was reinforced by the Rowley Report in 1969. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), 5-7; and see also Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, Mass, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, reprint 1985), 7-18.


110 Email from Major-General (Retired) Walter Holmes to Author (Tuesday May 27, 2008 7:51 AM).
Later, in 1975 the self-study and examinations of the Officer Professional Development Program (OPDP) were initiated to address this deficiency. They were designed to be undertaken by officers at an earlier point in their careers than the target audience of the now defunct promotion exams. The objective of this professional activity was “...to broaden and deepen the junior officer’s knowledge and understanding of the military profession beyond the specific technical expertise of classification training and to contribute to the foundation of knowledge upon which further professional development will be built.”

This programme was not to be a prerequisite for promotion, or to relieve the Commanding Officer’s responsibility of mentoring and education of subordinate officers, and it was not designed to replace existing career courses. However, these exams did factor into the centralized officer career management process. Participation was mandatory and non-completion was considered to be a failure in the program and treated accordingly when an officer was evaluated against his or her peer group.

The series of six tests were numbered sequentially from OPDP-2 to OPDP-7 and encapsulated broad areas of professional knowledge that pertained to an integrated, or tri-service officer corps. They included:

- **OPDP-2 General Service Knowledge** - general knowledge of services and organizations within the CF and the Department of National Defence.

- **OPDP-3 Personal Administration** - the generic administration of CF personnel.

- **OPDP-4 Military Law** - regulations that pertained to the maintenance of good order, discipline and security of Canadian military forces, as well as how to apply these laws and policies.

- **OPDP-5 Financial Administration and Supply** - financial management and control of material resources.


112 Ibid, 1-2; and, the Author completed these exams during the 1980s and during that period they were used as prerequisites for staff training.
OPDP-6 National and International Studies - broad-spectrum Canadian defence and security studies.

OPDP-7 War and the Military Profession - military history, warfare theory and the nature of the military profession.\(^\text{113}\)

These OPDP exams were not taken seriously by Land Force officers. The 1970-1971 edition of the *Snowy Owl* provided a quiz that purported to be similar to the proposed series of examinations. It demonstrated an attitude that had not been present in discussions regarding the former CASC/Promotion testing and suggests a certain disdain of these new tri-service tests by the students who published the *Snowy Owl*. This "examination" is reproduced at Table 7-1. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this attitude may have been warranted.\(^\text{114}\)

\(^{113}\) Canada, “The Officer Professional Development System,” “Appendix 1 to Annex A – OPDP Part I – Curriculum Outline,” 1-5; and, in 2000-2001 as part of general officer educational reforms, the OPDP was transformed into the Officer Professional Military Education (OPME) and offered in the form of university courses through the RMC. “Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College and the Conduct of Army Officer Developmental Period 2,” *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 13; and see also, Canada, Chief of Military Personnel, ADM(HR-Mil) Instruction 08/06 *Officer Professional Military Education (OPME)*, 10 May 2006.

\(^{114}\) As a relatively inexperienced officer I wrote all OPDP successfully between 1986 and 1989, with preparation for most consisting of several nights reading of the study materials and in one memorable case only several hours review the evening prior. When brought up in conversation with other officers my experiences with the OPDP examinations were not uncommon.
Table 7–1 – The Staff College Examination

THE STAFF COLLEGE EXAMINATION

There is no longer any examination to sort out those who should be sent to Kingston from those who should not. It has now been revealed that the College at Toronto has decided to reintroduce the examination. We have been fortunate enough to get hold of the 1971 paper, which appears below. How do you rate your chances?

Question 1. What language is spoken by French Canadians?

Question 2. List the principles of war, or write down the first names of your children.

Question 3. What is the Pope’s religion? – (Check one only)

- Jewish
- Catholic
- Hindu
- Muslim
- Anglican

Question 4. What time is it when the big hand is on the two and the little hand is on the five?

Question 5. William Shakespeare was famous as a – (Check one only)

- bridge builder
- general
- playwright
- admiral

Question 6. Do you know the roles of the infantry? Yes No

Question 7. a. Who won World War II?

   b. Who came second?

Question 8. Spell the following – Trudeau; Sharp; Dare; Dextraze

Question 9. How many Commandments were given to Moses?

Question 10. People who live in the far north of Canada are known as –

- Easterners
- Westerners
- Southerners
- Northerners

Question 11. Have you ever heard of Bobby Orr? Yes No

Question 12. What is Newfoundland famous for? (Check the last one only)

- Money
- Intelligence
- Weather
- Stupidity

Question 13. Six Kings of England have been called George, the last one being George VI. Name the previous five.

Question 14. Which NATO country has “O Canada” as its National Anthem?

(Time Limit – three weeks)

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About the same period as the introduction of OPDP examinations the Land Forces reintroduced Army examinations in the form of Forces Mobile Command (FMC) Officers Examinations, otherwise known as FOE. They were pre-requisites for the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) and consisted of specific-to-service portions of professional knowledge. These tests were divided into a set of two exams – one concerned with tactical operations and the other dealing with the administration of tactical forces in the field. Both focused on lower level units and formations that the candidate writing them would have experienced, but not studied formally. While the experience was trying for the participants, the examinations did not require the depth of knowledge of their predecessors. They had neither the same scope, nor duration and intensity, as their predecessors. However, they did as they were designed to do, which was to address the basics of Land Forces knowledge in order to prepare potential CLFCSC candidates to a level adequate for a course that, as of 1974, had been much reduced. By the early 1990s these exams had been replaced by a single test, the Intermediate Tactics Course (Part 1), as part of a review of Land Forces officers’ general education in environmental-specific aspects of their profession.

The Commandant and key staff at the Army Staff College in the early 1960s expressed a certain degree of angst concerning the decrease of the course from two years to one. However, much greater turbulence resulted from the move to further reduce the course as of 1974 and relocate the responsibility for higher staff education.

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116 Email from Colonel (Retired) Eric MacArthur, Canadian Forces to Author (Thursday, October 23, 2008 10:58 AM).
117 Richard Evraire, “General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces” (MPA thesis, Queen’s University, 1988), 51.
118 I completed these exams in 1991.
119 Email from Colonel (Retired) Eric MacArthur, Canadian Forces to Author (Thursday, October 23, 2008 10:58 AM); and, for a more complete discussion of junior land forces officer education reforms in the post-modern period see “Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College and the Conduct of Army Officer Developmental Period 2,” The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin 4, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 11-17.
to Toronto. Some objections were stated directly - the editor of the 1973, and last, edition of the *Snowy Owl*, Captain J.K. (John) Marteinson, who was mentioned in the previous chapter, bluntly expressed the feelings of the students:

I would, briefly, like to use editorial licence and postulate that with the end of psc courses at Kingston, the Snowy Owl badge should be retired. This badge, borrowed from Camberley, and used also by Australia, India and Pakistan, has come to symbolize Army staff colleges. I am sure that the Owl with its single service connotation, would be unacceptable to the Canadian Forces Staff College – indeed, they already have a badge. There can be no claim the junior staff course that will in future be conducted in Kingston is in any way the equivalent of the one or two year psc course, and that it would be inappropriate to permit the implication that the owl symbolized a junior level of staff training. The significance of the Snowy Owl should be preserved. With the end of the Canadian Army Staff College/Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, the Snowy Owl should take its proper place with the institution that it has symbolized – on the pages of Canadian military history.

Marteinson retired as a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1987 and then went on to academic pursuits.

The challenges of extracting the critical aspects of Land Forces staff education for the new programme were evidenced in the curriculum planning documents of the period. A major contribution of the 1969 *Rowley Report* had been to confirm previous work on integrated staff training and lay out the emerging professional military education hierarchy in a straightforward and understandable manner. These recommendations evolved into the key components of what became known by 1975, as the Officer Professional Development System, or OPDS, and were:

1. OPDP exams.

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120 For discussion of the changes wrought by reducing the staff course from two years to one see Canada, DHH Archives, *CLFCSC Fonds*, Folio 198, “Canadian Army Staff College Ex Staff Ride 1965 – 1965-66 Course, Fort Frontenac, Kingston,” “Welcoming Address,” 1-5; “Philosophy of Staff Training,” 1-4; “Training Standards for Army Staff Officers,” 1-2; and also, “Course Content 1965-66 Staff Course,” 1-6.


2. Canadian Forces Staff School Course (CFSSC).

3. Junior Command and Staff Course (Land) (JCSC (L)), subsequently, the Canadian Land Forces Staff Course (CLFSC), then the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff Course (CLFCSC).

4. Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course (CFCSC), now the Joint Command and Staff Programme.

5. NDC. 123

The details of the system of courses that were put in place for integrated staff officer education are described in Appendix K.

The foundation of this structure was the OPD exams that provided broad areas of knowledge linking the various parts of the OPDS, while the CFSSC was a ten week course for junior officers of all service branches that provided rudimentary staff training. Land Forces officers of the rank of captain or major then attended the CLFCSC for tactical-level service specific staff education. This course was at first, 16 and, later, 18 and then 19 weeks in duration. Selected Land Forces officers later progressed to the 45 week CFSCSC for higher level staff education. Following that course, select senior officers attended the NDC to examine the national strategic level of government and military cooperation. 124

The successor to the CASC/CLFCSC one and two-year courses, the JCSC(L), was a pale image of its predecessors. However, in fairness to the architects of the integrated staff training model, the ideas of professional education seemed to reflect the needs of a newly integrated Canadian military, the implementation proved problematic. From inception in the 1970s there were concerns by the staff at the CLFCSC regarding lack of communication between the education institutions in Toronto and Kingston, the paucity of information and direction regarding formulation

124 See Ibid. in its entirety.
of the new course, and the superficial nature of operationally-focused land forces staff training.\textsuperscript{125} In the end the instructional staff took a pragmatic approach when designing the new curriculum, one that occupied a middle ground “...between the actualities of life and the ideal situation.”\textsuperscript{126}

As a result the JCSC(L) was designed and constructed in a similar fashion to its predecessors. Students studied reference materials, attended lectures and demonstrations, and confirmed knowledge through DS- and student-led syndicate discussions and exercises. There were three tutorial periods that contained the rudiments of the necessary army staff education as described within Appendix L. First, general operations of war and basic tactics; second, the knowledge associated with the area of staff duties, including the functioning of headquarters was taught with a two day trip to a functioning combat headquarters; third, application of operational knowledge and a visit to an American installation. There were to be two courses per year, each with about fifty Canadian officers and no guest students, although guests were admitted later, likely due to a desire to continue to build the transnational communities of practitioners that were a hallmark of the staff college experience. Original plans called for five syndicates, which would be composed of a mixture of officer classifications. The composition of the syndicates and assigned DS would change each tutorial.\textsuperscript{127}

The scope of the resultant course permitted students to have an understanding of the structures, features and capacities pertaining to land forces. It gave them facility with tactics at the battle-group, or independent unit, level within a brigade context.

\textsuperscript{125} Canada, DHH Archives, \textit{CLFCSC Fonds}, Folio 354, SC 1180-4352/2 (SO Trg Coord) dated 31 Jan 72, “Minutes of DS Conference No 2/72 Held In Sicily Hall At 1100 Hrs On Tue 25 Jan 72,” 1-2; and also, SC 1180-4352/2 (SO Trg Coord) dated 05 Feb 73, “Minutes of DS Conference No 2/73 Held In Sicily Hall At 1600 Hrs On Thur 01 Feb 73,” 1-2.

\textsuperscript{126} Canada, DHH Archives, \textit{CLFCSC Fonds}, Folio 354, SC 1180-4352/2 (SO Trg Coord) dated 31 Jan 72, “Minutes of DS Conference No 2/72 Held In Sicily Hall At 1100 Hrs On Tue 25 Jan 72,” 2.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 1-2.
The staff processes of units and brigades were also taught, as were the necessary administrative and logistic procedures to support brigade group, or autonomous formation activities. Consequently, the objective of the JCSC(L) was to:

...instruct junior officers employed in land operations in the tactical employment of all components of the field forces, including tactical aviation, up to the battalion-group level, and to prepare these officers to assume junior staff appointments in any field formation headquarters.

The most accurate description of this shortened programme was likely that provided by the last Commandant of the year long course, Brigadier-General F.W. Wootton, who wrote: “In language most easily understood by the majority of former Staff College graduates the aim and scope of the JCSC(L) will be very similar to the old war course that was conducted at the Royal Military College during World War II.”

In retrospect, the CASC course had evolved over time in perspective, composition and duration in response to a changed professional world. The lessons of the Second World War, the ascendency of nuclear threats, the formation of NATO and Canada’s involvement in UN operations all produced curriculum changes. The most dramatic of these changes was the lengthening of the course from one to two years between 1959 and 1965. Another result was that the outlook of the course became increasingly American through the implementation of approaches to nuclear conflict influenced by the United States, and by Canadian Army involvement in Europe within an American-dominated NATO. Also taken into account was the need for interoperability not only with Canada’s longstanding Commonwealth friends, but also with Canada’s largest and closest ally in an increasingly tense Cold War environment.

129 Ibid, 9.
One shortcoming that continued despite the increase of staff education was a lack of understanding pertaining to the derivation of military strategy from civilian policy direction. This confusion regarding the enactment of national direction as a military option reflected larger trends and this movement was apparent in the curriculum of the CASC/CLFCSC, as well as within the pages of the *Snowy Owl*. While officers of the Canadian Army/Land Forces were well versed in the application of military force in war and also, in an uniquely Canadian fashion, peace; the connections from the “nebulous” objectives of civilian direction to the hard realities of military activities were not apparent. Their absence was noted by myriad reviews, reports and commentaries over the years.

Nevertheless, the two-year CASC course represented a high point in Canadian Army professional military education. It was designed to provide the opportunity and environment in which to study, reflect upon, assimilate, and synthesize professional knowledge, at a level arguably equivalent to graduate studies. This expert experience was drastically altered by the unification of the Canadian services into a single joint force. In the search for mechanisms that would enhance integrated visions of professionalism, Canadian Army exams were dismembered taking with them access to traditional service-specific staff knowledge and the formal course that provided those competencies. The promotion tests were cancelled and the two-year staff course became a one-year interim land forces programme with reduced professional expectations; in 1974 it was further abridged to a much shorter service adjunct to the primary integrated staff education course, which, as a result of unification, was conducted at the Canadian Forces College. The Land Forces had returned to the past. In the crucible of organizational amalgamation, Canada’s Army had adopted a form of service-specific education similar to the wartime staff training that had been
expeditiously created to meet the pressing needs of the Second World War.

Accordingly, the pursuit of integrated staff training represented for the Canadian Army, or Land Forces, the nadir of service staff education.

In the years that immediately followed the amalgamation of service specific professional military education there were further curriculum changes at the CLFCSC. These amendments attempted to increase student understanding of land forces operations in multi-service environments. Course content was expanded and lengthened to develop higher levels of command and staff competencies. These changes were an attempt to recapture the professional experience that had resulted from the previously existent longer and more detailed staff courses. All the same, these initiatives to increase the relevancy and specificity of Land Forces staff education were simply efforts to regain the once firmly established environmental vision of professional military education that had come to reside outside the direct influence of Canada’s Army. The Canadian Army paradigm of professional military education that had been expressed through the CASC was much diminished as a result of changes wrought by unification - what was once found now was lost.

131 The CLFCSC eventually attempted to produce Land Forces officers who were suitable for employment in a brigade group that was part of a higher formation, such as a division, corps, or mission-tailored task force. Canada, “The Officer Professional Development System,” “Annex C – The Canadian Land Forces Staff Course (CLFCSC),” 1-3.
Chapter 8

New Beginnings:
Inter-service Staff Education at the Canadian Forces College (1974-1986)

Professional military education is instruction aimed at developing the knowledge, judgement, breadth of understanding, and executive capacity needed by the officer in the control and direction of military forces.¹


Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces created major problems in officer development, some of which still remain unsolved today. From a military training point of view, the three distinct segments of the officer corps were less similar in fundamentals and less amenable to integration than most of its advocates realized. No doubt, this was due in large measure to the fact that each service was guided by a separate and distinct method of operation.²

- Bernd A. Goetze, Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps (1976)

The CFSC, renamed by 1975 the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College (CFCSC),³ had as a result of unification assumed the responsibility of higher level unified staff instruction for the Canadian Forces. But that was only a portion of its curriculum. In addition to joint staff education it had also acquired the responsibility to provide the core staff competencies required of the three services. At the same time the College attempted to reflect the professional adjustments which had resulted from a newly unified Canadian Forces and a changed society.

While not an impossible task the College was hindered by the adoption of the previous RCAF Staff College curriculum as the core of the inter-service programme.

² Bernd A. Goetze, National Security Series No. 3/76 - Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps (Kingston, ON: Centre for International Relations, 1976), 46.
³ The new name is used for the first time in documentation pertaining to 1975-1976. See Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1975-1976).
This body of material emphasised management techniques and executive development rather than operations. It was a 44-week program that focused on the staff techniques and processes required by senior officers, but not the imperatives of higher command pertaining to large military forces. To fulfil these latter requirements RCAF officers learned command through practice at a junior rank within highly diversified flying units. This allowed Air Force officers to command individual units effectively. Previously, Canadian Army officers had received through their staff education familiarity with the command of larger military organizations, and formal education in unit command (Appendix J). One could argue that this was due to the differing degrees of complexity between land and air combat. Ground warfare is extremely complex and commanders require education and experience to deal with its uncertainty, chaos and friction. The setting of air warfare is less complicated and air elements have a greater ability to adhere to pre-determined plans and directives. Consequently, the staff education provided to army officers at the CFSC was focused less on the needs of Canada’s Land Forces than incorporating, likely in the name of expediency, the previous RCAF curriculum.\footnote{Canada, DND, CFC Archives. \textit{Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar} (1975-1976), 48-49; for a broader analysis of the RCAF Staff College see Randall Wakelam, “The RCAF Staff College, 1943-1965: Educating for Military Effectiveness” (Ph. D Colloquium Paper Sir Wilfrid Laurier, n.d.); later translated and published as Randy J. Wakelam, “Le Collège d’état-major de l’ARC, 1943-1965: formation d’état-major et éducation libérale,” in Yves Tremblay, Roch Legault and Jean Lamarre, eds., \textit{L’éducation et les militaires canadiens} (Outremont, Québec : Athéna Editions, 2002), 167-75; detailed elements of integrated staff training are contained in Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 82/189, Chief of Personnel, “Appendix 2 To Annex A To P 4500-26 (DT) Dated 16 Dec 65,”“Integrated Staff Training” (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Headquarters, 11 January 1966), 1-3; and for a discussion of the complexity inherent within the various environments of conflict and its resulting impact on command styles see Allan English \textit{et al., Networked Operations and Transformation: Context and Canadian Contributions.} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 19-20.}

Concomitant with this amalgamation of professional education was the confusion surrounding unification of the Canadian services for the recently created Canadian Forces. Newly instituted business practices were adopted wholesale and long adhered to precepts of “command” and “leadership” were subsumed by the
philosophy of “management by objectives” instituted in the late 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{5} This change was an attempt to quantify achievement by measurable results that ignored the intangibles of warfare – morale, courage and endurance. “Management by objectives” encouraged a highly centralized and directive approach to controlling the Canadian Forces and its members through administrative selected increments, or benchmarks.\textsuperscript{6} In addition to devaluing traditional military values, “management by objectives” seemed to hinder the development of the intuitive skills in senior commanders, by restricting their ability to practise decentralized control. Moreover, while the unified services of the Canadian Forces were appeared to grow bureaucratically, NATO forces in Europe became fixated on concepts of forward defence in order to ensure that potential Soviet aggressors were held outside Alliance territories. This force posture was a return to the positional warfare of the First World War and, to a certain extent, a devaluation of the lessons of the Second, which for Canada’s Army had formed the core of the staff college experience.\textsuperscript{7} On top of this, the elimination of the Canadian Army General Staff system in 1965-1966, as part of the unification process, led to further challenges with regards to the maintenance of higher Land Force operational staff competencies, as had previously been taught at the CASC.\textsuperscript{8}

It has been argued by some Canadian researchers, most notably John English, that the Canadian government’s emphasis on peacekeeping from the 1960s was at the expense of the Canadian Army’s ability to engage in combat. English argues that it is

\textsuperscript{5} John Hasek, \textit{The Disarming of Canada} (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1987), 153.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid, 153-54.
almost impossible to maintain combat skills in a peacekeeping environment. The nature of the mission places importance on minimum force, mediation and compromise; commanders are not exercised as combat leaders. Furthermore, he suggests that operational UN procedures normally call for the referral of all incidents up the chain of command for diplomatic resolution rather than the exercise of initiative by military commanders and their troops. Thus, the nature of peacekeeping lends itself more to internal security and policing, than to fighting wars. These military environmental influences along with that of changing societal values and attitudes all created confusion regarding the nature of the profession of arms in Canada. Conspicuously, Canadian military sociologist, Major Charles A. Cotton’s 1979 study “Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada,” notes that Canadian Defence Quarterly articles from the 1970s that dealt with changing military structures and professional values were largely authored by Army officers and were not supportive of these alterations. These commentaries specifically critiqued “...both the changing orientations to military life among members of the Canadian Forces...and the need to maintain uniquely military structures and traditions in the face of a growing bureaucracy...” This uncertainty was likely one more outside

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9 The peacekeeping English discusses is the United Nations Chapter VI type missions, which result in a lightly armed force or unarmed monitors with no enforcement powers being positioned between opposing factions. Since 1995 with the advent of peace enforcement missions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Implementation Forces (IFOR) in Bosnia, these missions revolve around robust forces with the mandate and ability to use force to implement their mandate. These more recent peace enforcement missions seem to lend themselves to the use of most skills required for warfighting.

10 English, Lament For An Army, 60-61.


factor which detracted from clearly delineating and addressing the curriculum that was taught to officers at Toronto.

Despite the issues surrounding its inception, the location of the new integrated Staff College could boast proud antecedents. The lot occupied by the institution was first settled at the end of the eighteenth century by the Armour family and, as a result, the area bears the name “Armour Heights” to this day. After a number of transfers in ownership the estate was purchased by wealthy real estate investor, Frederick Burton Robins, who developed the grounds of what later became the Staff College as his family country estate and named it “Strathrobyn.” By 1915, in the midst of the First World War, a number of buildings had been completed including an opulent country house that was eventually developed into the Staff College Officers Mess. About this time Robins, who in 1923 became the Honorary Colonel of the Toronto Scottish Regiment, provided the land next to his estate as a training airfield to assist the Royal Flying Corps. This use ended with the termination of the war and it passed to commercial interests and the airfield gradually fell into disuse. Interestingly, one of the companies that used the site during this period was Bishop-Barker Aeroplanes, the venture of two highly decorated Canadian military pilots, William Avery Bishop and William George Barker.13

In 1926 Strathrobyn was sold to Mr. Albert Leroy Ellsworth the founder of the British American Oil Company. Ellsworth, renamed the estate “Glenalton,” and lived there until 1941. With the buildings and lands unoccupied, and the Second World War raging in Europe, Glenalton once again became the site of military activity, only this time, it was not used as an aerodrome, but for the location of the RCAF War Staff

College. The first course commenced in September 1943.\textsuperscript{14} In a similar fashion to the post-war establishment of the CASC, the RCAF War Staff College was renamed the RCAF Staff College in October 1945 and commenced the first peacetime programmes. Initially only six months in duration, this staff education was in 1948 extended to ten months. Concurrently, the infrastructure on the site continued to be developed. These ten-month RCAF courses continued until 1966 with the commencement of transition courses by the newly created CFC and CLFCSC.\textsuperscript{15} In 1974 the first wholly integrated ten-month Canadian Forces staff programme was conducted at that site.

Table 8-1 – CFC/CFCSC Staff 1974-1986\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Canadian Forces (Post-Unification)</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>Australian</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Total Instructional Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{14} Shields, “Canadian Forces College History Project - Canadian Forces Command and Staff College,” p. 3-6/9 to p. 4-8/30.

\textsuperscript{15} Canada, CFC, “The History of the College” (n.d.), 3-6.

\textsuperscript{16} The statistics for 1980 – 1981 are not available. These listed figures include all staff involved in command, instructional and other duties that led to direct contact with the students. While the CFCSC was considered a sub-component of the CFC in actuality the two seemed to be almost indistinguishable due to employment of the same staff to control and administer both organizations. Canada, DND, CFC, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1974-1975), 7; Canada, DND, CFC, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1980-1981), 4-5; Canada, CFC Archives. Directory Canadian Forces Command & Staff College (1975-1980 and 1981-1986); and Canada, CFC Registrar, Command and Staff Course, Course Profiles (1979-1980 and 1982-1986).
From the beginning these courses had connections that reflected Canada’s military alliances, as well as the inter-service nature of the education that was being provided. They were also conducted in a manner that was in keeping with the staff college heritage of both the Canadian Army and the RCAF. The officers who worked with the course provided a variety of functions, from that of DS to curriculum development and general staffing. From the beginning there was a great deal of involvement from Canada’s closest NATO allies; the United Kingdom and the United States. The services and nationalities of the staff are laid out in Table 8-1. Of note is that unlike the CASC/CLFCSC, civilian staff acted in administrative, library support and academic capacities.
Table 8-2 – CFCSC Students by Service 1974-1986\textsuperscript{17}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Canadian Forces</th>
<th>Canadian SEA</th>
<th>Canadian LAND</th>
<th>Canadian AIR</th>
<th>Foreign SEA</th>
<th>Foreign LAND</th>
<th>Foreign AIR</th>
<th>Foreign SERVICE</th>
<th>UNKNOWN</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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\textsuperscript{17} Some years it is not possible to discern the service affiliation of Canadian students as certain trades were and are commonly employed in all environments. The CFC Directories do not clearly lay out what environmental affiliation was linked to each Canadian student, particularly prior to the issue of environmental specific uniforms in 1986-1987 to replace the common CF service dress. At the same time the Course Profiles do provide the information regarding affiliation, but are not available for all years. Ibid.

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In a similar fashion to the CASC/CLFCSC the student population reflected Canada’s international relationships and alliances. Table 8-2 shows the composition of the course by service, while Table 8-3 shows student nationalities.

Table 8-3 – CFCSC Students by Nationality 1974-1986\(^\text{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
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<td>1974-1975</td>
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<td>136</td>
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<td>Totals (less missing years)</td>
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\(^{18}\) Ibid.
Unlike the CASC the CFC did not make the same degree of effort to maintain the professional relationships, or community of practice, that had been established during the staff course despite their importance. For example, the CASC *Snowy Owl* had provided a valuable means to maintain connections between past and present students, as well as to act as an important medium to air issues of importance to the Canadian Army; however, its CFC successor the *Review* did not perform the same function for the newly integrated CF. In order to gain a perspective on why this occurred it is necessary to examine the journals that preceded the *Review* and provided its foundations.  

The initial issue of the *R.C.A.F. Staff College Journal* launched by Air Commodore K.L.B. (Keith) Hodson, in 1956, was originally organized to accomplish the same objectives as the *Snowy Owl*. Hodson, who was a distinguished wartime RCAF fighter pilot and commander, had held positions as the Director of Studies for the RCAF Staff College, Director of Strategic Air Plans at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario, Chief Staff Officer of the RCAF Number 1 Air Division based from Metz, Germany, and Chief Staff Officer of RCAF Air Defence Command in St-Hubert, Quebec, prior to becoming the Commandant of the RCAF Staff College. He left the Staff College at the end of the 1956 academic year becoming the Chief of Organization and Management at RCAF Headquarters, and later, in 1958, the first Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) where he was promoted to the rank of Air Vice-

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19 The lack of focus on professional relationships by the CFC *Review* cannot be simply attributed to the legacy of the RCAF Staff College, as that institution had its roots in the tradition British Army staff education that formed the RAF Staff College, as well as provided the education of many senior officers of the early commonwealth air forces. Thus, ideas of the establishment and maintenance of thought collectives and communities of practice would have been a feature of RAF and RCAF staff education. See Allan D. English, “The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of RAF Strategic Bombing Policy 1922-1929” (MA thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1987); and Harris, Sir Arthur. *Bomber Offensive* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947). 23-25.
Marshal. Hodson, who was touted to become a future Air Chief Marshal and commander of the RCAF, met an untimely demise in a flying accident on 5 July 1961.\textsuperscript{20}

The establishment of the \textit{R.C.A.F. Staff College Journal} and its contents indicate an initiative by Hodson to connect the intellectual debate at the RCAF Staff College with that of a larger audience. His idea was that the \textit{Journal} would provide a forum to generate professional articles and debate on ideas that would assist in gaining an “…understanding of the complex and dangerous forces which threaten national security and of the defence measures best calculated to support the attainment of an honourable, prosperous and secure existence.”\textsuperscript{21}

Hodson left a lasting impression on the RCAF, not the least of which resulted from his time in Toronto. During the dedication of the RCAF Staff College library\textsuperscript{22} named after him it was noted:

Here he worked with officers being fitted for higher appointments in the Air Force. First as Director of Studies, and later as Commandant, he exerted an influence that defies definition. Many of our bright young officers bear the Hodson stamp – and this augers well for our Service. An all-round scholar himself, he instilled into the minds of the students the value of a liberal education comprising arts and science. He encouraged specialism in an age of specialism. But at the same time he warned of its dangers and shortcomings. He encouraged his students to broaden their knowledge so that they might place their specialities in the context of the broad human spectrum. He gave the lie to the widely held belief that military thinking is confined in a straight jacket. In the years ahead, all who knew him will make his influence felt. He left his mark on the Royal Canadian Air Force.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{22} That library still exists today serving the CFC, as well as acting as an information resource centre for the larger CF.

\textsuperscript{23} Campbell, “Address at the Opening of the Hodson Memorial Library 9 September 1962,” 3.
With Hodson’s encouragement the RCAF Staff College was trying to move towards a similar model of professional education as that of its sister service, the Canadian Army.

Regrettably, the initial goals of the Journal did not endure. By 1959 it had few subscribers and the editor noted that that in an effort to boost paid circulation there would be more articles and less “yearbook” type of entries.\(^\text{24}\) Subsequently, efforts regarding the establishment and maintenance of professional connections forged at the RCAF Staff College through its Journal fell by the wayside.\(^\text{25}\) Moreover, in 1965 publication was suspended due to declining subscriptions and the stated belief that with the rise of public debate on defence matters the raison d’être of the Journal to promote discourse concerning defence had disappeared.\(^\text{26}\) Although readers were invited to provide ideas as to the form and content of a replacement for the Journal, its successor, the Canadian Forces College Review, was not instituted until 1975 at the finish of the first truly integrated course.\(^\text{27}\)

While over the first few years the Journal was able attract and encourage writing on topics of interest to the profession of arms by a host of prominent authors, like American strategist Bernard Brodie,\(^\text{28}\) and military professionals, such RAF Air Marshal (Retired) Sir Robert Saundby,\(^\text{29}\) by the early 1960s one can discern a decline in the quality and quantity of writing. For example, an annual essay competition designed “to stimulate thought on military, and particularly air force, matters” and open to all members of the Canadian Armed

\(^{25}\) The Snowy Owl seemed to rely almost exclusively advertising to generate revenue, which allowed it to maintain its “yearbook” flavor.
\(^{26}\) One could attribute this increase in public discussion involving defence to be due to the controversy surrounding unification.
Forces, as well as government employees was unable to award the 1963 prize of $150.00. The reason for this gap was simply stated as, “No essay submitted in the 1963 Contest met the judges’ standards of suitability of topic and of composition...”

This was not only a damning indictment concerning the lack of professional writing by senior RCAF officers, but also a harsh commentary on those that were submitted. This may be in part attributable to the technical focus of air forces of this period.

The Journal’s successor, the Review, was structured to showcase a selection of staff and student papers instead of stimulating larger professional discourse. It also acted as a yearbook for the CFC staff course. An effort to create an alumni association in the first edition seems to have come to naught, as no discussion of such an organization is contained in following editions. Distribution of the Review appears to have been confined to course members and staff.

In many ways the challenges experienced by various iterations of this specialized journal reflect a decline of staff education about the time of unification and a simultaneous decrease of the importance placed on the professional associations that were produced by the staff college experience. Scrutiny of period materials show gaps in the collection of files pertaining to students and staff of the RCAF Staff College and the CFC, while those of the CASC and CLFCSC are much more complete and attempt to follow the careers of its graduates. Reconstruction of the

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33 The RCAF Staff College and other files seemed to have been destroyed in the early 1970s during renovations at the CFC. Unlike these materials the CASC files were preserved and archived. Email from Dr Steve Harris, Chief Historian, Directorate of History and Heritage National Defence Headquarters to Author (Monday, February 9, 2009 1:29 PM); The CFC Office of the Registrar does not have complete files on course members and staff covering the period from the commencement of integrated staff education but is currently attempting to compile the missing data from partial records. See Email from Commander (N) Denis Daigneault, CFC Registrar to Author (Tuesday, September 23,
social and professional networks produced by the experience of military education at the RCAF Staff College and the CFC before the 1990s is, accordingly, problematic.\textsuperscript{34}

What’s more readily available is the collection of various curricula that were instituted from 1974 onwards. A comparison with the learning that was previously imparted by the RCAF Staff College demonstrates the new course owed its provenance to its RCAF rather than the exigencies of the other services. In order to trace the evolution of the curriculum from the single service RCAF Staff College to that of the CFC it is necessary to trace its various permutations. In the 1957 \textit{R.C.A.F. Staff College Journal}, J.I. (James) Jackson, a wartime RCAF pilot and, at that time, a member of the staff college faculty,\textsuperscript{35} laid out the elements necessary for staff education of RCAF officers. He suggested that professional staff studies include major areas or “fields” of study. Each of these major study fields were further subdivided into “phases” that were composed of “units.”

Jackson envisaged two major fields of study within professional air force education. Given the specialized nature of employment within air forces the model articulated by Jackson would provide the general professional required of senior RCAF officers. First, was “staff training,” which included the knowledge needed to work as an air environment staff officer on behalf of a commander. Second, was “air warfare,” which included the knowledge and materials directly pertaining to the conduct of air operations. This body of information was critical for officers who would need to articulate orders and instructions to provide direction and for officers who would command air elements. Each of these two fields was further delineated.

\textsuperscript{34}For example, complete files on international staff are only available from 1995 onwards. Email from Ms. Rose Suppa, Office of the Registrar, CFC to Author (Monday, September 29, 2008 9:25 AM).

Staff training consisted of three phases each with a number of units; “functional skills” – general writing and oral communications, in addition to administrative and staff procedures and writing; “functional knowledge” – specific service knowledge, in addition to an understanding of national and international affairs; and, “personnel” – leadership and management, on top of manpower utilization. In the same manner air warfare was broken into phases and corresponding units; “supporting services” – including training, logistics, plus research and development; and, “operations” – general fundamentals, with further specialized units on air offensive, air defence, air transport, maritime, land/air, and amphibious procedures.\(^{36}\) This material is mirrored in RCAF Staff College Calendar for 1958–1959 and the content described by Jackson is reproduced as Appendix M.\(^{37}\)

Although, the original draft planning syllabus, or detailed outline, for the first interim integrated courses commencing in 1966 show that the existing RCAF material was used verbatim where practicable and modified as little as possible and only where necessary. This incorporation of RCAF curricula was likely in an effort to expedite the commencement of this new Canadian Forces programme. In order to address the inter-service requirements some army and navy specific materials were included in the area formerly encompassed by “Air Warfare,” now simply entitled “Warfare.”\(^{38}\) These fields were broadened from what were formerly two to become four before being subdivided into a total of 16 units of study, which are described at Appendix N. These primary fields were “Geopolitics,” “Warfare,” “Service Knowledge,” and “Military Executive Knowledge.” First, “Geopolitics” aimed at creating an understanding of Canada and its place within the global community. It included “Social Science Principles,” “National Affairs” and “International Affairs.” Second,

\(^{38}\) See RCAF, RCAF Staff College Integrated Course I Proposed Syllabus (28 March 1966).
“Warfare” looked at the professional requirements of the services and how they were utilized in order to serve Canada. The units in this field were the “Military Profession,” “Elements of Strategy,” “Military Technology,” “Contemporary Strategy,” “General War and Strategic Nuclear Forces,” “Limited War,” and “Logistics.” Third, “Service Knowledge,” examined Canadian defence policy, as well as the organization and administration of defence in Canada. This topic included “National Defence Structure,” “Major Staff Functions” and “Canadian Forces.” Finally, “Military Executive Knowledge” focused on the management of military forces in order to maximize their efficacy. This subject area was comprised of “Communications Skills” and “Leadership.”  

As a result, the interim courses from 1966 to 1974 implemented a curriculum that continued to generally reflect the ideas of the RCAF Staff College, with the service focus that had typified the RCAF influence embedded in the programme.

The first truly integrated staff education commenced in 1974. This course ostensibly rid itself of links to the RCAF tradition and the Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar for 1974-1975 described the newest curriculum in this fashion:

Since September 1966, the Canadian Forces Staff College has conducted eight interim courses which were patterned on the former RCAF Staff College Curriculum. This was acceptable in 1966 because the land environment continued to conduct a 10-month course at the CLFC&SC in Kingston, whose aim was to produce Grade 3 [III] and Grade 2 [II] staff officers for field formations in wartime. The CFSC courses could not do this, nor did the sea or air officers need land studies in the depth of those conducted at Kingston. It was always intended that a truly unified course would finally be conducted at one location for all three environments; Command and Staff Course No. 1 is that course.

However, this rather grand pronouncement was qualified with the following:

39 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar (1966-1967), no page.  
40 The original numbering conventions for grades of staff officers use Roman numerals and that convention has been maintained throughout this thesis. Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar (1974-1975), 5-7.
Because the land staff officers still require a considerable amount of field command and staff training, the Kingston college will conduct two-16 week courses annually; selected graduates will later attend the CFSC to complete their studies.\footnote{Emphasis added. Ibid.}

While the student output of the CLFCSC was doubled it provided only a portion of the education that formerly was given as a single programme. Additionally, there were fewer army officers receiving both courses than had previously received the one- or two-year CASC/CLFCSC courses. The first CFC staff course noted that a total of about 40 land officers commencing the programme, including foreign officers,\footnote{Unfortunately, the starting number of officers attending the 1974-1975 course is provided as 24 maritime, 40 land and 64 air. These totals include foreign officers. Ibid., 7} while the last one-year course of the CLFCSC graduated 53 Canadian land officers. Clearly, this was a significantly reduced output of GSO II and III army staff officers.\footnote{Canada, CLFCSC, \textit{Snowy Owl} (1972-1973), 28-47 and 115.} Concerns pertaining to a lack of qualified staff officers were articulated regularly in the decades that followed.\footnote{This reoccurring theme, as well as a continually increasing demand for qualified staff officers, resulted in the creation of a distance learning staff programme during 2008 to more than double the number of CFC graduates to fill staff positions. For various minutes pertaining to selection of students and throughput for and at the CFC see Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Papers Relating to Meetings of the Officer Professional Development Council 1980-1997 (henceforth \textit{OPDC Papers}).}

Furthermore, what was formerly a comprehensive body of professional material offered over the course of one or two years was now divided between different professional institutions and controlled and modified by different agencies. While efforts were made by the CLFCSC and the land environmental staff of the CFC to coordinate the land curriculum, the transition between the two programs was never without interruptions that increased over time.\footnote{See Ibid.; and, as of 2008 the schism between the curriculums of Staff Courses offered at Kingston and that at Toronto was pronounced. The contemporary CLFCSC offered Land Officers staff education to deal with the issues of units, while the CFC focussed exclusively on much higher levels of staff work. Thus, the knowledge required for the intervening competencies was not taught by either institution.} Related to this discontinuity was the removal of the land staff college from its role as a concept developer for doctrine and

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\begin{itemize}
\item[41] Ibid.
\item[42] Ibid., 7
\item[44] Ibid.; and, as of 2008 the schism between the curriculums of Staff Courses offered at Kingston and that at Toronto was pronounced. The contemporary CLFCSC offered Land Officers staff education to deal with the issues of units, while the CFC focussed exclusively on much higher levels of staff work. Thus, the knowledge required for the intervening competencies was not taught by either institution.
\end{itemize}
land organizations. Consequently, there was no longer a Land Forces educational institution that explored new concepts in army operations in response to direction from the general staff. This deficiency left a void in land doctrine development, but in keeping with the larger issues surrounding unification of the Canadian Forces there were no established Canadian joint policies and procedures. As a result, some Canadian single-service doctrine was available for the newly integrated CFC staff course, but the inter-service doctrine came from a variety of American and British sources, with the former predominating.\textsuperscript{46} For Land Force officers this shift in emphasis meant reductions in the comprehensive curriculum based on the heritage of the Second World War and also derived from the results of Canadian Army discourse and experimentation during the Cold War.

Some of these costs were identified by the DND in a 2007 study, \textit{Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine}. Upon reviewing the history and status of Canadian Forces doctrine, the authors concluded that until the 1990s joint doctrine was noticeable only through its absence. In hindsight, this deficiency of professional knowledge and its replacement by use of other nations’ processes and procedures resulted in number of significant weaknesses, but three in particular are noteworthy in the context of the staff education created by unification. The first, as identified by the \textit{Rowley Report}, was a deficiency of understanding pertaining to the conceptual area between the execution of operations and strategic direction. Second, there was a lack of a relationship between environmental procedures and national direction due to the absence of Canadian Forces doctrine. Finally, because of an absence of experimentation in the realms of military structures, technology and ideas, general development of professional knowledge, particularly formal procedures and

\textsuperscript{46} Canada, DND, CFC Archives, \textit{Command and Staff Course Papers 1974-1995} (henceforth \textit{CSC Papers}).
policies had lagged. Concomitantly, without the interrelationships provided by these connected areas of research and development, training, education, amongst other aspects of general military effectiveness had been diminished.\textsuperscript{47}

Another challenge to the education of Army staff officers was that the curriculum which came out of the Second World War had been taught by those who had experienced first-hand the dimensions of large scale conflict. As the experience of sustained conflict gradually diminished over time the unofficial dimensions of professional knowledge, the hard-won first-hand perspectives of veteran officers, were no longer commonly available. One can discern what must have been an erosion of professional knowledge through examining Canadian military historian Terry Copp’s treatise \textit{Guy Simonds and the Art of Command}. This study illustrates the mechanisms and processes of major land operations at the end of the Second World War from the perspective of one officer using his letters, orders, directives and instructions for the military activities he commanded throughout 1944 and 1945.\textsuperscript{48}

However, these same ideas were blurred through the dusty bits of Staff College curriculum that were presented decades after the end of the conflict. This genre of Canadian military history was not commonly available during the post-unification period. Without such perspectives, it was challenging to provide the requisite professional insights into Canadian military operations for instructors and students who had never participated in sustained conflict in theatres of war like the Pacific or, most importantly for Canada’s Army, Europe.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Canada, DND, Chief of Review Services, \textit{Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine 1258-153 (CRS)} (March 2007), iii-iv and 7-8.

\textsuperscript{48} See Terry Copp, \textit{Guy Simonds and the Art of Command} (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007).

\textsuperscript{49} The Korean War was a much smaller conflict and only involved a portion of the Regular, or active duty, Canadian Army. See William Johnston, \textit{A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
Nevertheless, the 1974-1975 Command and Staff Course at the CFC had as its aim “...to develop selected officers for senior command and staff appointments in the Canadian Forces.” It remained unchanged in the decade that followed. Following from this aim were two subsidiary objectives:

a. to develop officers to a level of professional knowledge in their own environment whereby they can fill command and staff appointments up to and including Theatre/Fleet level;

b. to develop officers to a level of professional knowledge in their own environment at which they are capable of filling key command and staff appointments in a unified force at Task Force, Command and NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters] levels.\(^{51}\)

From these it was determined that the following results were necessary for graduates:

a. have a \textit{grasp} over the complete range of activities within his own environment;

b. have a \textit{familiarity} or understanding as required with the roles and functions of other environments and classifications; and

c. have an \textit{appreciation} of international and national affairs and the extent to which they affect the military organization.\(^{52}\)

By 1985 these supporting goals and outcomes had been further refined, but were, in essence, similar to those articulated for the first course. The subsidiary objectives were now to develop officers:

a. to a level of professional knowledge in their own environment whereby they can fill command and staff appointments up to and including corps/theatre/fleet level;

b. to a level of competence in which they are capable of filling command appointments at the lieutenant-colonel rank; and

c. to a level of competence at which they are capable of filling key command and staff appointments at combined or joint Task Force, Command, and NDHQ levels, \textit{in peace and war}.\(^{53}\)

\(^{50}\) Canada, DND, CFC Archives. \textit{Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar} (1974-1975), 5; and see also, Canada, DND, CFC Archives. \textit{Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar} (1985-1986), 6.

\(^{51}\) Canada, DND, CFC Archives. \textit{Canadian Forces Staff College Command and Staff Course One Student Handbook, CSC Papers}, 3-1.

\(^{52}\) Emphasis added. Ibid.
The phrase “in peace and war” was added in 1976 to delineate the environment in which the graduates were expected to serve and hearkened back to the earlier aim of the CASC. One can only wonder at the dialogue that produced this change. Was it simply something instituted as a result of the heritage of the CASC – the Commandant of the CFC Brigadier-General J.A. (“Stobin”) St-Aubin was a graduate of the 1963-1965 course - or was it an inclusion of ideas generated by ongoing peacekeeping missions, such as those in Cyprus and the Middle East? Unfortunately, no records have come to light which illuminate the underpinnings of the change.

By the 1980s the desired learning outcomes had developed from the original three to six. Graduates were to have:

a. ability in military staff procedures;

b. understanding of the complete range of activity within his own environment of sea, land, or air operations;

c. familiarity with the roles and functions of other environments and classifications;

d. understanding of the staff functions of all environments in the joint planning process;

e. familiarity with national and international affairs, an understanding of DND procedures, and an understanding of how the environment gives rise to national strategy and defence policy; and

f. an understanding of the command and leadership process.


54 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1977-1978), 7.

55 Canada, CASC, Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College 2, no. 3 (1963-1965): 111; Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1976-1977), 1; and also Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 277.

56 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1985-1986), 7-8.
In order to make certain that the supporting objectives could be attained and the learning outcomes achieved it was necessary first, to ensure that students studied their own environments with a view to sharing the knowledge gained with colleagues from other services. Second, the different environments would have to be combined for common classes involving knowledge necessary for all groups.57 From these considerations, the structure of the first integrated course of 1974-1975 remained philosophically constant for about three decades.58 An introductory four weeks focused on general staff knowledge, communications skills and Canadian Forces organization, was followed by 16 weeks of advanced environmental specific studies. These classes were conducted separately for each environment. The remaining 24 weeks of the programme were divided into common studies, which included joint, or inter-service, operations, other militaries, aspects of national and international affairs, as well as classes aimed at cross-environmental education to expose students to the specifics of each other's service.59 Table 8-4 provides more details concerning the resulting organization and content of the CFC staff course.

For scheduling and pedagogical purposes these original divisions resulted in four “syndicate periods,” or terms, with the students assigned to groups, or syndicates, that changed with the completion of each period.60 The syndicate system had been used by Canadian staff colleges since the Second World War and it mirrored the familial learning concept put forward by Scharnhorst. As the CFC described it to students:

57 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. *Canadian Forces Staff College Command and Staff Course One Student Handbook, CSC Papers*, 3-1.
58 Major revisions to the structure of the course next occurred in 2007-2008 with the elimination of environmental terms. Email from Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Magee, Director of Curriculum, CFC to Author (Thursday, February 19, 2009 5:34 PM).
60 Ibid.
It is essentially a self study method and the onus for learning rests primarily on the student himself. Knowledge so gained is reinforced by discussions, lectures, visits, exercises, and the constant exchange of views and information with the staff and other students. The role of the DS is to supervise and guide the work of his students, but he is not necessarily an authority on all the subjects studied at the College: he is neither a teacher nor an instructor in the normal sense of the words.61

As for the CASC/CLFCSC, the composition of the syndicates changed regularly in order to provide the greatest opportunity to mix together and bring out individual expertise. During the first syndicate period (Weeks 1 to 4) an attempt was made to balance syndicates in terms of nationality, environmental background and experience. These first syndicates formed the “core” group that remained the basis of social and athletic activities.62

The second syndicate period (Weeks 5 to 20) was the environmental, or service, phase. For the period of this Sea, Land and Air studies students were assigned to separate environment-based syndicates on the basis of their background and primary military classification. This portion of the course was intended to address the specific professional needs of the three primary branches of the Canadian Forces.63

For the third syndicate period (Weeks 21 to 32) the focus was executive development; syndicates were formed in much the same manner as during the first period in order to achieve a balance of background and experience. During the fourth syndicate period (Weeks 33 to 44) executive development studies continued and students returned to their “home” syndicates. At the end of this last phase a report was rendered on each individual that included the assessments from all the previous

61 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Command and Staff Course One Student Handbook, CSC Papers, 3-8.
62 Ibid, 4-1.
63 Ibid; and, Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar (1974-1975), 7.
syndicate periods. In addition to syndicate discussions there were formal presentations, exercises and visits.

Within three years, the organization of the 1977-1978 course was further refined to five phases of study based on this curriculum. There were Introductory or Command and Staff Duties Phase (Part 1), Environmental, Joint Operations, Command and Staff Duties (Part 2), as well as National Strategic Readiness phases. These divisions remained similar with variations in labels and duration over the next three years.

| Table 8-4 – Phases and Units of Study: |
| Command and Staff Course Number 1 1974-1975 |

1. Weeks 1 to 4: Common Introductory Phase (First Syndicate Period)
   a. Organization and Functions of National Defence Headquarters
   b. Missions and Organization of Functional Commands - sub-components of the CF
   c. Communication – writing, speaking and problem solving

2. Weeks 5 to 20: Advanced Environmental Studies (Second Syndicate Period)
   a. Organization and Tactics:
      - General Review
      - US Army
      - Formations
      - Corps Troops
   b. Combat Services Support
   c. Maritime Warfare Studies:
      - Communications
      - Oceanography
      - Submarines
      - Weapons Systems
      - Maritime Aviation
      - Surface Vessels
      - Logistics
      - Foreign Navies
   d. Specialized Maritime Operations:
      - Mine Warfare
      - Amphibious Operations
   e. Miscellaneous Maritime Affairs:
      - Defensive

3. Air Warfare Operations:
   - Strategic
   - Offensive
   - Operations
   - Tactical Air

4. Sea Studies:
   - Maritime Warfare
   - Maritime Strategy
   - Maritime
   - International Law

5. Land Operations:
   - General
   - Operations
   - Administration

6. Air Support:
   - Air Transport
   - Support of Air Operations

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64 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Command and Staff Course One Student Handbook, CSC Papers, 4-1.
65 See Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar (1974-1975); and also, Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Command and Staff Course One Student Handbook, CSC Papers.
66 Ibid, 5-6; and Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Command and Staff Course One Student Handbook, CSC Papers, 4-1.
- Commercial Shipping
- Inland Waters
- Coast Guard
- Fishing Industry

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<th>- Defensive Operations</th>
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<td>- Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>- Civil Aviation</td>
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3. Weeks 21 to 32 Common Phase (Third Syndicate Period)

a. Communication
b. Leadership
c. Military Profession International Affairs
d. Canadian Social Issues
e. Canadian Economy
f. Canada’s North
g. Canadian Foreign Policy

4. Weeks 33 to 44 Common Phase (Fourth Syndicate Period)

a. War and Strategy
b. National Security Management
c. Foreign Military Forces
d. Special Operations
e. Joint and Combined Operations

few decades. Appendix O lays out this change along with the details of this iteration of the programme.

From the first course, a significant part of the curriculum was the adoption of the United States Joint Planning System (US JPS) as the predominant method of creating inter-service, or joint, plans. Its importance is underscored by its inclusion as a portion of achieving the learning outcome, “understanding of the staff functions of all environments in the joint planning process” in 1980-1981. Significantly, a few years later, by 1985-1986, due to the lack of a Canadian joint doctrine the American process had become the preferred model for Canadian joint planning. The Calendar from that year notes:

The US JPS has been chosen as a model for joint planning because it is the most highly codified, broadly diversified, and well documented system. Senior Canadian officers must be familiar with the US JPS because of North

67 Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1977-1978), 8-11; and see also Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Calendar (1985-1986), 7.
American bilateral security arrangements as well as the close historical association between the armed forces of the two nations.  

While some discussion of military planning utilizing Canadian procedures took place, these processes were connected to bureaucratic processes used by the NDHQ for creating departmental plans that excluded the employment of military force.  

This situation meant that ideas concerning operational utilization of the integrated Canadian Forces was derived mainly from the United States military, but included some other sources. This usage of United States material would have long-term consequences.

The effects utilizing United States sources can be discerned in 1977 curriculum guidance to DS. The syndicate discussion concerning the American Joint Planning Process (JPP) included a query on the relevance of learning a foreign planning procedure:

The US Joint Planning Process has been studied on four consecutive Command and Staff Courses. Each year it has been severely criticized on the grounds that it is not Canadian. Be prepared to describe a credible Canadian scenario, the command and staff organization and the planning process used in a Canadian version of EX[ERCISE] OMNES AGANT [a fictitious five day exercise at a high level American headquarters].  

The notes provided as DS guidance stress that this seminar is designed to bring students to the conclusion that given the absence of a corresponding Canadian system this American process was the desired option:

10. The point of this Requirement is that there is no Canadian equivalent to the US JPP. Because our forces operate as part of NATO or the UN and could not become involved in a unilateral major operation we do not have a planning

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process that takes us from Initiation through Concept Development to a fully documented OPLAN.

11. We do have a requirement to move forces to a theatre of operations in accordance with someone else’s concept of operations... The Canadian plans are for the strategic movement of our forces; the US OPLANS [operation plans] are for the movement and employment of our forces.

12. Students and DS may be interested to know that we are considering ways to study strategic mobility on a tri-service basis and are examining exercises from other colleges based on the NATO north flank [in Europe]. The introduction of this new series, if and when it does take place would not replace the requirement to be familiar with the US JPP.\textsuperscript{72}

This lack of impetus to plan for unilateral Canadian military activities belied the experience of the Canadian Corps of the First World War and of the Canadian Army during the Second World. It continued the weaknesses with the strategic education of senior military officers that had been identified in the 1969 Rowley Report and for the staff officer focused efforts at the lowest level of military activities, as overarching guidance would come from other than national sources. It also deemphasized subject areas that had formerly been part of Army staff education at the CASC, particularly ideas of independent, large-scale Canadian Army operations, such as those of 1944-1945 in Northwest Europe.\textsuperscript{73} While national interests were acknowledged, many ideas concerning the employment of Canadian land forces involved alliance or coalition direction.\textsuperscript{74}

On the other hand the willingness to suborn national guidance of the employment of Canadian military forces to allies allowed the ascendency of aspects


\textsuperscript{73} Canada, DND, DHH Archives, File 82/189, Chief of Personnel, “Appendix 2 To Annex A To P 4500-26 (DT) Dated 16 Dec 65,” “Integrated Staff Training” (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Headquarters, 11 January 1966), 1-3.

\textsuperscript{74} See Canada, DND, CFC Archives, “Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Land Operations – Second Edition 1977,” CSC Papers. In retrospect the Army emphasis on understanding high command may have been more idealized than real within the CASC curricula. Arguably the CASC had focused on the practical aspects of large scale tactical operations, rather than the command and staff competencies of higher levels of command.
of the RCAF curriculum that had emphasised the military or strategic studies part of
the curriculum without linking these studies to national command. The RCAF
developed as a military service that was normally controlled during conflict by other
nations or services. In an address to the CASC in 1955 Air Commodore Hodson said
that contemporary air power was comprised of a number of parts: a strategic bomber
force, tactical air forces to support the ground campaign, strategic airlift, air elements
stationed in other countries to assist allies, and maritime squadrons to help secure sea
lanes.75 These ideas came directly from the RCAF experience of the Second World
War and in order to understand the focus of the RCAF and its Staff College
curriculum one should be aware of the historical antecedents of Hodson’s points.

First, during the Second World War the RCAF had been subsumed by the
RAF to provide a key component of the RAF strategic bombing force, Bomber
Command.76 Undoubtedly, in the post war years the importance of this role was
inculcated in the RCAF. Second, the tactical air support of the RCAF to the land
campaign was well documented and emphasized by Canada’s Army. A Second
World War Canadian Army veteran, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Maurice Pope,
considered by Granatstein as “the best educated and best informed of Canadian
generals and the one with the most inquiring mind”77 commented on this topic and
added a uniquely land-centred perspective. Pope argued that the air force was integral
to modern conflict and although the Canadian Army believed the RCAF should be a
separate service, the air elements assisting ground forces needed to be under the direct

75 Air Commodore K.L.B. Hodson, “The Role of Air Power,” A presentation given to the Canadian
Army Staff College, Kingston, Ont, 18 Apr 55, 10.
76 Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston and William G.P. Rawling, “Part IV:
The Bomber War,” The Crucible of War 1939–1945: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air
77 J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in The Second World
control of the Army when engaging in these supporting operations.\textsuperscript{78} This opinion reflected, in particular, the relationship that had existed between these services during the Normandy Campaign June to August 1944 with ground elements directing supporting air elements to achieve maximum effects against their German opponents.\textsuperscript{79} This discussion represented yet another critical role in which the RCAF supported rather than led. Third, in a similar trend to elements of the RCAF employed by the RAF within Bomber Command, the pilots of the Second World War who flew in support of maritime operations were part of the RAF Coastal Command and operated under its command.\textsuperscript{80} Fourth, a similar relationship with the RAF existed for RCAF strategic airlift that was part of RAF Transport Command.\textsuperscript{81} Consequently, the RCAF experience of being controlled by other services during the Second World War led to Hodgson’s thoughts regarding the support provided by air forces to another nation through their presence. The post-war practice of stationing RCAF assets in Europe to contribute to NATO deterrence activities confirmed this idea. The Canadian air contributions to the Alliance were of great assistance in maintaining the \textit{status quo} of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, given this history, it is not surprising that the focus of the RCAF Staff College was different from that from the Canadian Army Staff College and the education of the RCAF staff officer had taken a different orientation from that of the Canadian Army Staff officer. While the stated aims of the two programmes – the objective of the RCAF Staff College was “…to prepare selected officers for staff appointments” and that of the CASC, as noted in the previous chapter, was to ready

\textsuperscript{78} Canada, DHH Archives. Biography File, Pope, Maurice A., Lt General, “Notes of Interviews with Lieutenant General Maurice Pope on 5, 27 July and 23 August 1997,” interview by Norman Hillmer, no page.
\textsuperscript{82} Morton, \textit{A Military History of Canada}, 237.
an officer “for all branches of the staff in peace and in war” there were differences in
how some elements of professional knowledge were understood, key amongst these
were the concepts of “command” and “management.” For Army officers command
- the ability to direct the activities of a unit - was inextricably linked to staff education.
This is depicted in the “Training Standards for Army Staff Officers” at Appendix J.
On the other hand concepts of command did not seem to play much of a role in RCAF
staff education as noted in the RCAF Staff College calendar at Appendix M.
Consequently one can discern the RCAF influence in the first integrated course
calendar from 1966-1967 contained at Appendix N. Ideas of command were
subsumed into management approaches seemingly more related to efficient business
practices than the chaotic environment of war. It could be that this shift was due to the
different history and, perhaps even, functions of command in the two services. One
could also argue that the RCAF approach to staff education may have generated
officers better prepared for the institutional demands of a Cold War military and
suggest that operational focus of the Canadian Army was a disadvantage in the
bureaucratic infighting of a recently amalgamated Canadian Forces.

The years after the unification of Canada’s three services were tumultuous.
Not only did they see considerable change in professional military education, but the
institution of new policies, programmes and procedures by the recently created
Canadian Forces diminished the professional practices of the previous decades. The
choice of the RCAF Staff College to provide the Canadian Forces with its integrated
staff training built on a RCAF foundation that evolved from Army staff education

83 The RCAF Staff College aim is quoted in the course outline at Appendix M. Canada, RCAF,
“Appendix A,” RCAF Staff College Calendar (1958-1959), no page. The CASC aim is quoted in “The
Editor’s Page,” Canada, CASC, Snowy Owl: Year Book of the Canadian Army Staff College 2, no. 1
(1959-1961): 4. “Command” and “Management” are both laid out in the first CFC integrated course
using the RCAF syllabus which is at Appendix N. Canada, DND, CFC Archives. Canadian Forces
Staff College Calendar (1966-1967), no page.
roots to embrace the history of the employment of RCAF during the Second World War and Cold War. While the pedagogy of the new programme was indistinguishable from that which had been used before by both the CASC and RCAF Staff Colleges, the substance depended on American and NATO doctrine to prepare Canadian officers for staff and command positions in Canada’s military. As well, the legacy of the RCAF and its vision of professional knowledge remained embedded within the unified course and were sometimes at odds with other service cultures and understandings.

Consequently, by the 1980s the Canadian Forces had a senior staff programme that seemed adequate in the context of the Cold War period, but due to an absence of joint doctrine lacked national conceptual approaches. Ideas of military operations were determined not so much by Canadian legacy, but rather by the alliances and friendships of the Cold War. This intellectual vacuum created the conditions for one of the most significant shifts in how Canadian officers, particularly Land Forces officers, would come to visualize and organize conflict. This change was the verbatim adoption of American ideas concerning the “operational level of war.”
Chapter 9

Following Another Paradigm Shift:
The Canadian Forces College and the Operational Level of War (1987-1995)

The inclusion of the operational level of war as an underpinning of professional military education has been accepted by the US Army, the German Army and the Soviet Army. It is believed that this concept also has a place in the CF and particularly, in the CFCSC [Canadian Forces Command and Staff College] curriculum.†

– Colonel E.R. (Ted) Nurse

These seemingly innocuous words written by the Director of Land Studies at the Canadian Forces College2 in 1987 heralded the only significant paradigm shift to take place in Canadian military thought since the Second World War. The operational level was a notable departure from how the CF, particularly the Army, understood and conducted war. Nurse’s statement acknowledged that the complexity of modern warfare had increased to such an extent that new ideas from other armies were overtly displacing older concepts and it was necessary that Canada follow suit, even if it meant incorporating another nation’s ideas in the CFC curriculum.3


‡ In the late 1980s the title Canadian Forces College (CFC) subsumed the name Canadian Forces Command and Staff College (CFCSC) and was used interchangeably and later exclusively to represent the former, if only on paper, separate institutions. The first indication of this shift is an amendment of the title of the Review in 1988. See Canada, DND, CFC, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Review 1987; and also Canada, DND, CFC, Canadian Forces College Review 1988; and, Additionally, Colonel Randy Wakelam, Director of Research and Symposia at the CFC, recalls that the first indication he received of this change was in 1987/1988 when as a student on the Staff Course he was corrected by the Registrar, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) John Lehmnn, for using the incorrect institutional name. Lehmann emphasized that the College was now the “Canadian Forces College” not the “Canadian Forces Command and Staff College.” See Email from Colonel Randall Wakelam, Canadian Forces to Author (Sunday, April 5, 2009 1:16 PM).

The resultant paradigm shift within the United States occurred as laid out in the theory of Thomas S. Kuhn. Its rapid acceptance and institutionalization from primarily United States, German and Soviet sources demonstrates that the Canadian military identified itself as part of a larger group of military practitioners, who shared fundamental beliefs and values. But that wider community was not as inclusive as Nurse’s proposal implied. Analysis and reflection reveals that this paradigm shift was determined by the military relationships of the Cold War. For Canada this meant that the introduction and implementation of the operational level of war was determined in large part by ideas advocated by the United States Army.

However, these thoughts could not have taken root if not approved by the Officer Professional Development Council (OPDC). This board was created as an advisory body to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) (ADM(Per)), a general officer, as a result of reforms put forward by the 1969 Rowley Report. The ADM (Per), a general officer, was one of a number of appointed assistants to the Deputy Minister of National Defence and was responsible for the career management of military personnel, to include their education. The Council provided recommendations on selected facets of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) system, such as, curriculum matters, course objectives, recommendations on the career aspects of professional development policy, integration of doctrine and organizational development. OPDC’s authority extended to matters pertaining to professional education and officer development and its membership included the Commandants of the CFC and the CLFCSC. It met at least annually, normally for

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about one day and would forward the results of these conferences to the ADM (Per) for approval and disposal.⁶

Accordingly the proposal that was forwarded by the CFC to the OPDC for its general meeting at NDHQ on 22 April 1987 was designed by Land Studies instructors to permit the Staff College a great deal of flexibility in the adoption of this new idea of the operational level of war. Also, this proposal was constructed to allow the further propagation of this concept throughout the Canadian military. CFC recommended to OPDC that:

- the concept of the operational level of war be officially recognized;
- the CFCSC be authorized to develop a CF position on the concept of war at the operation level in its curriculum; and
- the CFCSC be authorized to develop a CF position on the concept of war at the operational level in consultation with NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters], FMC [Force Mobile Command - the Army] and CLFCSC staffs.⁷

The 14-page briefing entitled “The Operational Level of War,” that accompanied this proposal identified the call for the operational level of war as arising from the changing nature of contemporary conflict. Nineteenth-century wars could be decided in the course of single battle between two armies confined to a limited geographical space; in the twentieth century this was not the case. This proposal argued that in modern times strategic victory was determined by the successful conduct of military operations over extended periods of time and

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⁷ In the documentation of the period CFC and CFCSC are used interchangeably to denote the Staff College in Toronto. This can only be attributed to the fact that the Canadian Forces College conducted only one formal course per year; the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course. Since this professional military education experience was the raison d’être of the College the two terms seemed to have become synonymous; Canada, DND, CFC Archives, OPDC Papers, 5570-1 (Comdt) dated 3 March 1987, “Officer Professional Development Council 1987 General Meeting Agenda,” B-1.
distributed over various regions. Implicit in this paradigm was the methodical orchestration of all military activities to support a national goal. However, within this document the need was defined using chiefly American sources for interpretation of key theoretical concepts and, even though some British material was cited, its quantity and import, when taken in context of the whole package, was much less.

Noteworthy was the opening sentence of that brief: “During the past four years the Army staff at the CFCSC have become increasingly aware of a new dimension in Western military thinking, that is the concept of the operational level of war.” This coincided with the publication of the 1982 version of the United States Army Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations, which clearly articulated to American officers that warfare was a “national undertaking” and “must be coordinated from the highest levels of policy making to the basic levels of execution.” It then laid out the “Levels of War” and for the first time clearly delineated the operational level of war as a separate conceptual realm rather than a portion of tactics or strategy:

**STRATEGIC**

Military strategy employs the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force. Military strategy sets the fundamental conditions for operations...

**OPERATIONAL**

The operational level of war uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns.

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9 The position paper contains a British interpretation of the Soviet perspective of the operational level from the British Staff College at Camberly, a short synopsis of the embryonic state of operational level education at Camberly, and an excerpt from a presentation given by the Commandant of Camberly to the CFCSC Army students while he was on a visit to Canada a few months previously. The remainder of the 14 page document utilizes primarily American sources and theorists, like David Glantz, Don Holder, Edward Luttwak, and Harry Summers. Ibid, 3-4 and 10-11.

10 Emphasis added. Ibid, 1.
Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified place and time with simultaneous and sequential battles…

**TACTICAL**

Tactics are the specific techniques small units use to win battles and engagements which support operational objectives…Tactics involve the movement and positioning of forces on the battlefield in relation to the enemy, the provision of fire support of forces prior to, during and following engagements with the enemy…

While these concepts were not entirely unknown, and had been utilized intuitively and, to a limited extent, doctrinally since the Napoleonic Wars, the operational level of war put forward in 1982 by *FM 100-5*, for the first time, systemically delineated the realm that existed between the politics of strategy and the violence of tactics and had various gradients ranging from the lowest level of tactics through operations to the highest level of strategy. These echelons went from individual battles, through major operations that eventually culminated in campaigns. The importance of this concept was that it formalized the conversion of strategic objectives into aims that could be understood and attained at the tactical level of military activity. It also implied the arrangement of engagements, battles and, ultimately, campaigns over time and geographical space to achieve strategic ends. Thus, the operational level of war addressed conflict as it was envisaged during the waning years of the Cold War.

These activities were linked to military objectives at each conceptual level. For instance, at the strategic level the object of war was to support and sustain national interests. This would then be translated at the operational level into major military operations that would attain the strategic goals through plans actualized by structured

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and flexible military organizations, technology and doctrine containing concepts of manoeuvre warfare. Finally, at the tactical level, the objective was to help attain operational ends through the application of force. These concepts and systemic connections are illustrated through the doctrinal perspectives contained in *FM 100-5* and outlined in Table 9-1.

Table 9-1 - Objectives of the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of War

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<th>Strategic Level</th>
<th>Operational Art Level</th>
<th>Tactical Level</th>
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<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Preserve National Interest</td>
<td>Conduct Campaigns</td>
<td>Destroy, Disrupt by Firepower &amp; Movement</td>
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<td>Deter Threat</td>
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<td>Defeat Enemy by Maneuver</td>
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<td>Continuation of Policy by Other Means</td>
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<td>Win Something</td>
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The formulation of doctrine concerning the operational level of war was prompted in the United States Army through the efforts of General William E. Depuy, Commander of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), with the publication of the 1976 version of *FM 100-5*. Despite the lack of

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14 The 1976 edition of the United States Army *FM 100-5 Operations* articulated elements of operational thought and the design of the AirLand Battle that Depuy had analysed and synthesized from German doctrine and developed in collaboration with the United States Air Force. United States, Department of the Army, Major Paul H. Herbert, *Leavenworth Paper Number 16 Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePay and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute, 1988); and the CFC paper was careful to include the influence of Soviet theoreticians and their concepts of Deep Battle, along with German influences, on the formulation of the operational level of war. “The Operational Level of War,” 3-5. While the operational level was not explicitly discussed in it, that edition represented a significant departure from previous editions of the manual by focusing on the future. It caused a great deal of intellectual ferment by attempting to describe how the American
enthusiasm in some quarters, the emphasis of the 1976 FM 100-5 on technology and
the necessity of integrating the various operational specialities of the Army into a
coherent whole, with the intention of maximizing their effect, made the United States
Army care about doctrine. The resultant debate culminated in the revised 1982
dition and an initial articulation of the operational level of war.

This movement towards a new paradigm of conducting warfare was the result
of the catastrophic effect that the Vietnam War had on the United States Army.
Critical failures in its intellectual approach, methodology and force structure have
been well documented in significant studies such as that of American researcher,
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, as well as in popular books like
that of David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman, *About Face: The Odyssey of an
American Warrior*. Moreover, the extensively studied and reprinted monograph, *On
Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, written by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.,
focused on the weakness of national strategy formulation during this period and
highlighted not only the deficiencies of its construction, but also those of
implementation. This was precisely the conceptual region that the 1982 edition of

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15 Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done*, 1-2 and 106.
16 For more detail concerning United States Army doctrinal development during this period see
Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle*, 23-50; and elaboration of the discussion concerning
the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5* read General William E. DePuy, US Army (Retired) “‘One-Up and Two-
Back,’” in United States, Department of the Army, Swain et al., *Selected Papers of General William E.
DePuy*, 295-302(originally published in *Army* 30, no. 1 (January 1980): 20-25) and also General
William E. DePuy, US Army (Retired) “FM 100-5 Revisited,” in United States, Department of the
Army, Colonel Richard M. Swain, compiler, Donald L. Gilmore and Carolyn D. Conway eds., *Selected
Papers of General William E. DePuy: First Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1
July 1973* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Command and General Staff College Combat
17 See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986; reprint, 1988); and Colonel David H. Hackworth, United States Army Retired,
and Julie Sherman, *About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior*, with an introduction by Ward
18 See United States, Department of the Army, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry, *On
Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, April 1981).
FM 100-5 addressed. However, in the final analysis, the most important impact that this tragic conflict had was on the collective psyche of the American military. The generations of officers who continued to serve in the post-Vietnam period were determined that its lessons would not be lost and they took action to revolutionize the American way of war to ensure that the military, particularly the Army, would be equipped, trained and structured to meet the challenges of the modern age.\(^\text{19}\)

As a result, the emergent ideas of the FM 100-5 series were not confined to the desks of doctrine writers, who represented a limited group of military personnel, but, engendered a new open discourse amongst those senior officers providing the writing guidance, the larger community of American military practitioners, and, surprisingly, civilian officials and academics.\(^\text{20}\) Behind this innovative discourse was General Donn A. Starry, who was the Commanding General of TRADOC between 1977 and 1981. In a move towards creating acceptance of these emerging ideas Starry took the unprecedented step of engaging government defence officials and politicians, in addition to noted scholars, like futurist Alvin Toffler.\(^\text{21}\) Toffler described his initial encounter with one of Starry’s staff officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Morelli, in War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. In a section entitled “Brute Force to Brain Force,” Morrelli explained to Toffler that a group had been put together to create the innovative military of the future and in Toffler’s words, “He told us that this team, led by his boss, a Kansas-born general named Donn A. Starry,

\(^{20}\) For further examination of this dialogue concerning the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 see United States, Department of the Army, Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), The Donn A. Starry Papers (henceforth Starry Papers), Box 33, FM 100-5 File.
\(^{21}\) While the origins of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 were connected to work that had commenced a decade earlier Starry is credited with providing the vision and guidance that led to its acceptance. Romje, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle*, 1.43 and 65-66.
had set out to reconceptualise war…”

Toffler was impressed by the vision described by Morrelli and their subsequent dialogue resulted in a myriad of articles in professional journals. Unlike the mixed reaction to the thoughts put forward in the 1976 edition of *FM 100-5*, the numerous activities that surrounded the introduction of the 1982 version made certain that the United States Army addressed the issues raised by critics of the earlier edition and ensured acceptance of the 1982 adaptation and its paradigm change. The necessity of this theoretical shift was later captured by the official historian of TRADOC, John L. Romjue, during an oral history interview with Starry in 1993 who said, “As you know, I believe doctrine should drive everything else. In this case operational level doctrine -- corps [the lowest level of army formation that has the capacity to conduct operational level activities] doctrine drove everything else.”

Canadians were not isolated from these thoughts. For instance Starry presented briefings to visiting Canadian officers at a time when he was actively promoting the emergent concepts contained in the 1982 version of *FM 100-5*. On 22 February 1982 he spoke to students of the Canadian National Defence College, who were touring McDill Air Force Base, Florida on the topic of “The Air Land Battle,” and a few days later to the CFC, at Toronto, on Joint Canadian/United States defence,

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22 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, (Boston, New York, Toronto and London: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 10; and there is a discrepancy in Toffler’s work insofar as Donald R. Morrelli was not a Lieutenant Colonel, as recorded by Toffler, but held the higher rank of Brigadier General and was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle*, 26.

23 For Toffler’s impressions of the ideas described by Morrelli see Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 10-12; for correspondence between Toffler and Starry concerning the fundamental concepts contained within *FM 100-5* see the United States, Department of the Army, AHEC, *Starry Papers*, Box 29, Documents 39 and 45; and for an indication of the discourse established in journals see the bibliography contained in Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle*, 123-25.


“REDCOM/JDA Joint Procedures.” While the latter presentation was oriented towards the fifty or more plans that were held by Readiness Command and the Joint Deployment Agency, there would have undoubtedly been discussion of military methods that would support these plans, to include the newest innovations in American Army doctrine. Starry also took the opportunity presented by visiting the CFC to re-affirm the existence of the close links that existed between the American Army and the Canadian equivalent, Mobile Command. While discussing the necessity of joint planning and implementation, Starry noted, “In fact, we practice them. The Commander of the Canadian Forces Mobile Command is coming to see me. A good friend of mine – Gen [eral] Charlie Belzile who is coming to see me next month – we are going to sit down and talk about that fine US-Canadian Defense Plan.”

Starry’s Canadian audience was receptive. It was attuned to the actions of its closest allies, and aware of the conceptual changes that were taking place. Colonel Nurse, who drafted the initial OPDC documentation pertaining to the adoption of the operational level of war in Canada, outlined the measures taken by the United States Army to institute operational doctrine and thought. He noted that the curriculum of the United States Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas had been amended to include operational ideas and problems; on top of that an additional year had been added to the course for selected students to further refine their understanding and ability to adapt and apply this doctrine to the “changing conditions of combat.” He also described the American use of centralized headquarters exercises in Europe and the United States to inculcate this new doctrine of the operational level of war in high level army formations. Nurse pointed out the related “cerebral outburst

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26 United States, Department of the Army, AHEC, Starry Papers, “The Air Land Battle” and “REDCOM/JDA Joint Procedures,” Box 37, Book 8, TAB A.
27 United States, Department of the Army, AHEC, Starry Papers, “REDCOM/JDA Joint Procedures,” Box 37, Book 8, TAB A, 14.
of thinking” that had taken place in professional journals affiliated with the United States military.²⁸

These ideas not only migrated from American military practitioners to their Canadian colleagues through lectures, like Starry’s, and periodicals, but also via military-to-military contact in exchange postings to the United States services and attendance at American professional military education institutions. For example, Nurse was a 1980 graduate of the United States Armed Forces Staff College.²⁹ This institution was founded immediately following the Second World War to educate selected officers of all services in conducting operations within theatres of war.³⁰ Nurse was undoubtedly exposed to these developing ideas during his tenure at the Armed Forces Staff College. In his 1987 briefing Nurse not only alluded to these American influences, but also provided context to the relevant issues. He argued that Canada needed to educate officers about the intricacies of the operational level of war to remain relevant within the environment of alliance and modern conflict.³¹ He concluded in his statement to the OPDC:

The size and complexity of modern warfare has evolved to the point that more than one army is deployed for battle. This has precipitated a need for understanding of a new dimension to war. The operational level separates tactics from strategy. Strategy sets objectives. The operational level establishes the campaign plan to achieve those objectives.

Our major allies are taking steps to examine and teach more of the operational level of war. We have a role to play in this dialogue and a responsibility to

²⁹ For a biography of Colonel E.R. Nurse see Canada, DND, CFC Archives, 1986-1987 Directory Canadian Forces Command & Staff College, no page.
³⁰ “...this is the only college in the school system where the basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater and major joint task force level...” United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum from the Chief of Staff United States Army, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, “Armed Forces Staff College,” 12 December 1946, JCS 962/21 [document on-line], available at http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/about/12Jun1946EisenhowerMemo.doc; internet, accessed 12 February 2007.
³¹ Canada, DND, CFC Archives, OPDC Papers, “The Operational Level of War,” 12-14.
our future commanders. The CFCSC could play a major role in the study of this issue.  

This recommendation was accepted by the OPDC with little recorded discussion or debate. The minutes note laconically that the “Council accepted the concept of an intermediate, theatre-level of war strategy, between tactics and grand strategy.” One wonders if the Council really understood the model that it had agreed to. The OPDC also directed that all proposals concerning the implementation of changes to the curriculum be forwarded to the Chairman of the OPDC, for approval prior to carrying them out.

Reaction to the Council’s decision was swift. A joint update document from the two staff colleges was put forward at a meeting held one year later at NDHQ on 20 April 1988. This short four-page document set a completely different tone than the ebullient briefing package provided to the OPDC a year previously. It noted that two facets of the previous decision had created confusion. First, in accepting the reality of the construct of the operational level of war the Council had overstepped its bounds by moving from being an educational consultative body to making a doctrinal pronouncement. Without a common operational level doctrine for all three services to permit implementation, no authority existed from the CF to use this idea. Along with that obstacle, the Army did not accept the concept of the operational level. Accordingly, it was not included as part of Canadian Army doctrine in Canadian

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33 This instance of not understanding was evidenced by the decision to direct the CFLCSC to teach this doctrinal concept at the tactical level of divisions and below, while the CFCSC would instruct at the corps and echelons above corps level. While it is possible to instruct tactical audiences on operational thought and activities, the utility of the concept is extremely limited when dealing with less than theatre-sized formations of corps, armies and army groups. It is at that plane where operational thought takes place by transforming the goals of strategy into objectives which can be implemented by tactical commanders.
34 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, OPDC Papers, “Minutes of the Eleventh General Meeting of the Officer Professional Development Council,” 6.
Forces Publication 300 - The Army. Compounding this difficulty was a number of contemporary references from the library of the CFC enclosed with this position paper. They ostensibly provided background material to the concepts discussed within this document, but they also implied that no Canadian work existed on the subject, because almost all references were taken from American professional military journals, mainly those of the United States Army.36

Second, since the 1974 the restructuring of the staff courses at the CFC and the CLFCSC had led to dissimilar levels of education and curriculum content. These differences had been ignored by the OPDC in its original direction the previous year, which had created confusion at the two Staff Colleges. Because the Commandants of the two educational institutions believed that the OPDC thought they were “doing identical work at different tactical levels” they clarified to the OPDC that the role of the CLFCSC was to teach tactical activities: “They teach tactical doctrine and staff procedures that are essential to the captains and majors who are to operate in an army staff in peace and war; they are a ‘how-to institution.’”37 Conversely, it was explained that the role of the CFC was to educate:

CFSC is more an ‘educational’ institution. There are precious few new skills taught here. We build on what CLFCSC has started. We push the students beyond the mechanical procedures into the mental process that will allow them to function as LCol [Lieutenant Colonel] and Col [Colonel] in the same army staff to which they were introduced at CLFCSC.

36 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, OPDC Papers, “OPD Council Twelfth Annual General Meeting CFC Position Paper The Operational Level of War Agenda Item I,” in “Minutes of the Twelfth General Meeting of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) Council,” 1; and see also the enclosed two page bibliography from the Canadian Forces College Library, entitled “Operational Level of War.”

As a result, while both Colleges had some overlap in their curriculum, the two staff course had entirely different purposes.  

Related to these pedagogical differences the position paper also noted that the imposition of this additional professional education requirement simply was not attainable within the current limitations of the CLFCSC course length. Compounding the challenges of teaching the operational level of war was that no NATO doctrine existed to serve as a vehicle for instructing these ideas. Accordingly, due to the differences in educational mandates, the lack of current Canadian and Alliance doctrine concerning the operational level of war, as well as the work done to date on exploring and advocating these ideas it seemed that any further development in this realm would lie within the purview of the senior Staff College.

Two recommendations fell out of this debate. Most importantly, the various doctrinal development agencies of the CF (Joint, Navy, Army, and Air Force) needed to adopt this concept and incorporate it into doctrine. Only then could the operational level of war be incorporated into the CFCSC syllabus. In addition, it was recommended that the CLFCSC should focus primarily at the tactical level of war. The necessary coordination between the two Colleges to prevent discontinuities in curriculum would be addressed by the two Commandants. Accordingly the minutes of the OPDC stated:

After a short discussion the Council accepted the Comdt CFC/Comdt CLFCSC recommendation that when the “Operational Level of War” is accepted as Canadian doctrine it will be included in the joint curriculum of CFCSC. **ITEM CLOSED**

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 2-3.
41 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, OPDC Papers, “Minutes of the Twelfth General Meeting of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) Council,” 3.
It is difficult to determine the reasons behind this apparent volte face. It may be as simple as a change of key personalities, as Colonel Nurse had moved from the CFC by the commencement of the 1987/1988 academic year. Or perhaps it was owing to straightforward practicality, in that, without an extant common Canadian doctrine concerning the operational level, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to teach the concepts in an educational setting at the CFC that included Navy, Army and Air Force students. Yet, even though the initial impetus behind the proposed change had lost momentum, the CFC continued to explore the operational level of war; on 12 July 1990, it forwarded a proposal for a major curriculum change to the Chief of Personnel Development (CPD), who was the Chairman of the OPDC.

The recommended amendments were to the Land Command and Staff Programme (LCSP), which was the environment-specific portion of the larger Command and Staff Course delivered to Canadian Army officers attending the multi-service course. This separate environmental component was mirrored within the overarching framework of the CFCSC by the other two services, through Maritime and Air studies. These distinct courses ensured that the officers of each CF component were educated in the service specific intricacies of employing sea, land and air forces. The proposed changes to the Army programme noted that “supporting” operational doctrine was being concurrently developed by the Land Forces Combat Development Committee and that a copy of the package had been sent to the CLFCSC.

42 Colonel Nurse is not listed as CFCSC staff during 1988. He was replaced by Colonel A.L. (Luc) Bujold a French Canadian infantry officer, who had spent the majority of his career in Quebec. See Canada, DND, CFC Archives, 1987-1988 Directory Canadian Forces Command & Staff College, no page.
43 See Canada, Department of National Defence, CFC Archives, Miscellaneous Documentation Pertaining to Curriculum Development (henceforth Curriculum Documents) 4955-4 (Comdt) dated 12 July 1990 “Revision to Operational Level – Land Command and Staff Programme (LCSP)”.
44 Ibid, 1.
absence of national joint doctrine, the Canadian Army had created a service doctrine that would provide guidance to the remainder of the CF.

Following this exchange, early in 1991, the new Director of Land Studies, Colonel Keith T. Eddy, after contacting his counterparts at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, recommended closer examination of American operational level developments. This proposal was likely prompted by the recent overwhelming American coalition victory in Kuwait against the Iraqi Army. This military success had utilized the latest operational doctrine – the same doctrine which was being debated and discussed in Canada.

Despite this outward support for implementation of the operational level of war at the CFC, internal correspondence, originated by the Commandant to the Director of Land Studies, indicates some doubts concerning the direction that had been taken within the Land programme. The Commandant, Brigadier General J.A.R (Ray) Desloges, was an aeronautical engineer who had served with air elements of the United States Navy from 1976-1978. He suggested that, with its emphasis on high intensity general combat, these changes to the LCSP were not in keeping with developments that seemed to be taking place in Canadian defence plans and force structures. He wrote that the curriculum must remain “…viable and credible vis-à-vis the students and the user commands [Maritime, Land, Air]…” and he was “…not

45 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, 1775-1 (DLS) dated 7 Mar 91 “Visit to Fort Leavenworth 4-5 Mar 91”, 2.
convinced that the LCSP as currently structured/intended to be will meet that criteria in two years time.”

Eddy responded that he concurred with the need for the College programmes to remain timely and pertinent, but in order to do that, it was necessary to focus beyond the norm of Canadian military operations and, amongst other things, take note of alliance shifts in doctrine and concepts. For that reason, amending the LCSP “to reflect on current CF capabilities would be doing a disservice [to the students and the CF].” There is a handwritten notation, apparently by Desloges, of “Agree” on the document opposite this last point. Consequently, by 1991-1992 the LCSP changes was set in motion and the first course to include the operational level of war as a major portion of the curriculum began in Command and Staff Course 18.

Within the LCSP there were four general areas of study all of which involved operational-level understanding. These were Force Preparation, Force Projection, Force Application, and Force Sustainment. Each topic was designed to contribute to the goal of preparing Canadian Army officers “for staff appointments at command and national headquarters, and at higher formations, with emphasis at the corps level.”

First, Force Preparation dealt with the direction and organization of forces at the higher levels of war; as well, it examined the military force structures and concerns that would affect the CF and its allies while meeting the goals of national or grand strategy. Through understanding the resources employed by the military in this

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49 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Command and Staff Course Papers (henceforth CSC Papers), “91-92 Syllabus Canadian Forces Command and Staff College Command and Staff Course 18,” 1-8.
realm of conflict, students were provided with the background necessary to conceptualize the operational level of war. This learning was accomplished by utilising a hypothetical force structure, Corps 86, which was a notional order of battle, or organization, for land forces that included a host of capabilities and resources not held by the CF.51

Force Projection was concerned with giving students an understanding of command and control of military forces at the operational level of war. It was also designed to supply a comprehension of problem solving procedures, like military estimates and operational planning process, which were necessary to unravel operational level dilemmas and issue comprehensive orders and instructions.52 This curriculum also included the chance to study deployment of large forces to a theatre of operations in response to national direction.53

Force Application, the third area of study, furnished the knowledge necessary to apply operational ideas and doctrine for a Canadian corps, based on Corps 86, to function during combat of all types, but primarily the high intensity sort envisioned in Western Europe. While the pedagogical methodology of the LCSP featured lectures and seminar discussion, this specific topic utilized practical exercises within the CFCSC, in addition to “field study exercises” in Europe and the United States to explore the functioning of allied military formations and headquarters. Through these

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51 Ibid, 17; and see Canada, DND, Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College Staff Officers’ Handbook (Kingston: Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College, May 1994); and at this time the total number of personnel in the Canadian Forces (Maritime, Land and Air) was about half that included in the Corps 86 model, an Army-based formation. See Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 276.

52 The estimate is a problem solving process that permits an individual or small group to work through a quandary by selection of the goal of the exercise or AIM, through deducing the applicable FACTORS and how they impact on the situation, eventually forming options or COURSES OPEN and then selecting the most appropriate choice to create a PLAN. The Operational Planning Process is more involved and is conducted by larger groups, likely based on headquarters staffs. It provides a mechanical process that ensures that all necessary parties are involved in the construction of a coordinated military solution and its articulation as a coherent order or directive.

latter activities it was thought that the students would “gain a better understanding of the organization, roles, and concepts for the employment of higher formations.” This portion of the LCSP was the only part that included students from the other services. Air Force students were drawn in in order to understand the role of fixed and rotary air assets on the battlefield within an Army setting. Interestingly, this desire to understand the “land/air battle” not only had historical traditions stretching back through the Canadian Army staff education system to meet the demands of the Second World War, but also more recently, with the 1976, 1982 and 1986 revisions to FM 100-5, such cooperation was necessary to understand American concepts of AirLand battle.54

Force Sustainment was created to ensure that students understood operational level systems designed to sustain the forces involved in campaigns, major operations and battles. The administrative and logistic systems presented were put in the context of a theatre of operations that involved both national and allied systems and requirements. Aspects of these topics would have also been discussed in the other parts of the series because coherent plans that ensure a continual stream of material and personnel are necessary for the success of any military activity.55

In the absence of uniquely Canadian doctrine, the LCSP took the American perspective of the operational level of war. While the operational level experiences and doctrines of other countries like Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were touched upon, the experience and doctrine of the United States was pre-eminent within the material that was taught. For instance, the key lecture of the Force Preparation series, entitled “The Operational Level of War,” and designed “to

54 Ibid.; see also FM 100-5 Operations (1976), 8-1 to 8-7; FM 100-5 Operations (1982), 7-1 to 7-25; and United States, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 5 May 1986), 9-26.
develop the student’s understanding of the operational level of war,” was taught by an American officer from the Doctrine Division of the Centre for [United States] Army Tactics, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.\textsuperscript{56}

While the first iteration of the LCSP was underway, the OPDC initiated debate with regards to instituting the conceptual model of the operational level of war within the context of advanced military education: At a meeting in 1991 discussion “focused on the subject of the ‘operational level of war’ and the extent that CF professional courses are teaching or should be teaching in this respect.”\textsuperscript{57} The recent United States success in Kuwait had highlighted the need for joint (Maritime, Land and Air) doctrine within the realm of contingency operations and these ideas were reinforced through other perspectives. In a briefing to the Council based on his experiences as a student at the British Higher Command and Staff Course and on the thoughts of senior Canadian commanders and relevant studies that had bearing on this issue of higher command, Brigadier General R.A. (Romeo) Dallaire argued, “I contend that a capability deficiency does exist in our warfighting knowledge and skills at the operational level where joint and combined operations are the order of the day.”\textsuperscript{58} Dallaire’s presentation was well received and the Council decided to hold a “brainstorming” session for its membership to examine the feasibility of developing a


Canadian equivalent to the Higher Command and Staff Course; however, this session never occurred, due to “heavy turbulence in personnel during APS [Annual Posting Season] 91 and higher priority projects such as the review of command and staff training.” In fact the latter review was much more encompassing and took in the complete Officer Professional Development System, including education and career management.59

During this period of discussion and debate, the OPDC directed that the CFC, organise and conduct a more inclusive weekend seminar for selected General and Senior officers to discuss the development of a Canadian Higher Command and Staff Course. For this activity, the Chairman of the OPDC, who was also the Chief Personnel Careers and Development (CPD - formerly CPD), acted as the convenor and sponsor; the CFC provided the necessary organization and administrative resources. 60 The seminar took place at the National Defence College in Kingston, Ontario during January 1992. It did not result in the development of a separate educational activity, but rather “the Chief of the Defence Staff [General John De Chastelain] directed the Commandant Canadian Forces Command and Staff College to consider developing a seminar to familiarize general and senior officers with the state of the art in joint and combined warfare.”61 The timing was propitious: within the same period, the Auditor General’s report noted that the CF needed to examine its

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59 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, “Higher Command and Staff Course,” undated briefing note.
60 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, OPDC Papers, “Minutes of the Fifteenth General Meeting of the Officer Professional Development (OPD) Council,” 5.
requirements for professional education with a view to understanding the “operational and managerial demands faced by senior officers” and to ensure that both career management and development reflected these requirements.62 Awareness of a potential deficiency in cognitive and practical skills amongst higher-ranking officers, together with ongoing review of the Officer Professional Development system and the direction of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) combined to ensure that the concept of the operational level of war became firmly entrenched within the professional military education system and the larger CF.

Meanwhile the CFC continued to push ahead with amendments to the sub-components of the Command and Staff Course. In addition to those changes already identified within the LCSP, the other environmental programmes, the Naval Command and Staff Programme (NCSP) and Air Command and Staff Programme (ACSP), as well as the inclusive Joint Command and Staff Programme (JCSP), were also changed to include the operational level of war. The JCSP was modified to reflect United States joint operational doctrine because Canadian material was non-existent on this topic.63

Specific changes to the JCSP included lectures on theatre-level warfare and campaign planning. These were designed to teach operational concepts and joint planning for major war. Along with this was the inclusion of specific historical studies to illustrate the concepts and buttress the learning objectives, which is a usual teaching technique in military education. The two instances of military history added
to reinforce these ideas were “Campaign Planning: A Case Study – Northwest Europe 1944/45” and “Campaign Planning and Execution: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.” The former strengthened an understanding of operational level concepts and provided a historical example of the prerequisites necessary for a large campaign by examining the activities that took place in the European Theatre during the last two years of the Second World War. At the same time, the latter case study provided an example of the successful design and execution of a contemporary major military operation by American forces.\(^64\)

Corresponding amendments were also being made within the NCSP and the ACSP. To address the maritime dimensions of operational thought new lectures and amendments to existing practical exercises were developed. The new presentations were “Naval Operational Art and Campaign Planning,” “Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence,” and “The Role of Sealift in Campaign Plans.” Two existing exercises, “Exercise Steel Drum” and “Exercise Bold Decision” were changed to include operational planning principles.\(^65\) Within the ACSP, operational activities were also addressed through classes, seminar discussion and a practical exercise. An address on “The Theatre Air Campaign” and two seminar activities “Air Warfighting Doctrine” and “Command and Control of Air Forces” were also added. An existing exercise “Theatre Plan” was amended to better align it with the capstone activity “Exercise Agile Maple,” a computer-assisted, theatre-of-war-level learning activity.\(^66\)

Following these curriculum changes, the CFC returned to the OPDC with proposals for a “General and Senior Officers’ Seminar on Joint and Combined

\(^{64}\) Ibid, 2.

\(^{65}\) Ibid, 2-3; for discussion of the role of command and control technology in the Canadian Navy see English et al., “Beware of Putting the Cart Before the Horse,” 19-42.

\(^{66}\) Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, “CFCSC Curriculum Amendments Revision to the Operational Level of War,” 3.
Operational Level Concepts.” Two options for three- or five-day colloquia were recommended and the objective for both would be “...to familiarize senior CF officers with joint and operational level warfare concepts.” While the briefing paper that was tabled did not make strong representation for either option, the recommendation, contained within a section entitled “Methodology,” stated that the five-day activity would permit greater attendee participation and understanding through practical exercises, which could not be conducted during the shorter three day option. Despite this recommendation, the three-day seminar programme was chosen, but the Chairman of the OPDC closed the discussion observing that the symposium would continue to be reviewed in order to examine resource requirements, attendance, content, and scheduling. These seminars were conducted between 1993 and 1995.

Despite the efforts being made to inculcate the operational level of war through changes to professional education and senior officer symposia, considerable challenges remained to achieving this paradigm shift. Brigadier General Desloges wrote to the CPCD a few days prior to the first seminar in January 1993 and outlined the difficulties that would be encountered in creating a general acceptance of the operational level of war. Desloges suggested that while the Army would accept such concepts as it had a long formalized process for planning activities at what could be considered the operational level, the Navy had only in recent years started to adopt such a process, and none existed within the Air Force. Desloges did note that the naval planning process had been devised at the Staff College and a similar effort was

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being made on behalf of the Air Force. He thought that these efforts were akin to the
important work being done to propagate the operational level of war and he
highlighted the CFC as a valuable agent of conceptual change: “This is another
example of the College taking the lead instead of being in a supportive role as would
normally be expected.” Furthermore, he emphasised the CF, as a whole, lacked
general operational level procedures and specific joint doctrine at the level of multi-
service military activities. In the absence of Canadian works in these areas, Desloges
wished to ensure that the CPCD understood that the Staff College had adopted
American publications to address these topics. He continued, noting that American
manuals were most suitable because they were, “after comparative evaluation against
that of other countries and NATO,...found to be the best developed, most
sophisticated, most clearly articulated, and the most proven.”

Desloges also expressed concerns about the state of Canadian military
education. He was particularly troubled about using by the upcoming seminar to adopt
the operational level of war as part of the body of professional military knowledge.
First, he argued that the pedagogical approach of discussion group alone did not
follow accepted methodology for teaching senior military commanders; as a result, it
could not create adept practitioners. While the upcoming seminar would address
theory and doctrine, it could not develop facility with these ideas. It would be
necessary to do that through practice, which, he argued, could only be obtained during
computer-assisted or field exercises. Some element of this practical application
needed to be incorporated into future seminars in order to provide a solid
comprehension of operational theory. To support this contention Desloges noted that
very few Canadian officers, and fewer recent CFCSC graduates, had “been exposed to

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70 Canada, DND, CFC Archives, *Curriculum Documents*, 4640-1 (Cmdt) dated 11 January 1993,
the concepts of campaigning as now enshrined in U.S. doctrine and being subscribed to by an increasing number of other nations, including the U.K. and Germany.” A rigorous approach to education was necessary to reaffirm the operational level model. Along with academic structure was the necessity of providing a continuous stream of articles about emergent warfare concepts and doctrinal innovation aimed at senior officers. This literature would assist with the education of the senior leadership at large.

Desloges also recommended that a more structured approach to formal military education was needed if Canada was to ensure the ability of its officers to command at the operational level of war. Again, he cited the American model as the furthest advanced. In comparison with Canada, where the single programme of the CFCSC was the only option for most, Desloges noted that the American military as provided an integrated and progressive educational experience for senior officers throughout their careers:

In addition to the Command and Staff Course, their best and brightest attend a second year, post-graduate level Advanced Military Studies Course (warfare) course immediately upon graduation from CSC. There is then the individual service War College course for Col[onel]s. Beyond that they have a number of short courses and seminars, such as the two week Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course to prepare Service Chief–selected ‘two-star flag officers for theatre-level combat leadership responsibilities.’

Desloges urged discussion at the highest military levels to address the lack of coherently programmed professional military education in Canada.

Desloges highlighted the failure of senior Canadian officers to read the classics of military studies, such as those on Napoleon and von Moltke. He observed that the “most promising,” senior officers attending the CFCSC, were amongst this group. Recommendations advocated by Desloges to address this failure of individual

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71 Ibid, 2.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
preparation ranged from developing a reading list that could serve as prerequisite reading prior to attending the CSC, to placing these enduring military texts in the context of the Officer Professional Development system, or to providing grants that would assist in defraying the costs of the recommended books.  

Notwithstanding these apparently pessimistic pronouncements, a short time later over 80 of the senior leadership from all elements of the CF attended the 1993 discussion group. The attendees included the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the three environmental commanders. The invited guests for the landmark 1993 session were from the United States, General (Retired) C.E. (Crosbie) Saint, former Commander United States Army Europe, General C.W. (Carl) Stiner, Commander Special Operations Command and noted military researcher, Dr. Jay Luvaas. Luvaas, from the United States Army War College lectured on the “Historical Development of the Operational Level of War,” which was primarily based on land force evolution of operational level concepts. General Saint examined topics such as Operational Art in the United States Army, the relationship between civilian and military strategic authorities and the development of campaign plans, and the importance of education and training. Additionally, Saint discussed his role, as the European Commander, in supporting Central Command during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Later, General Steiner lectured on the “Planning and

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74 Ibid, 3.
77 Saint replaced another American who had been scheduled to speak at the conference. Lieutenant-General (Retired) John Yeosok, former Commander of the United States’ Third Army during the Gulf War, was to have presented on the practical application of operational warfare with “Campaign Planning and Execution: Op[eration] Desert Storm.” Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum
Execution of Operation Just Cause” with special emphasis on how the 1989 intervention in Panama actually transpired as compared to the original campaign plan.

A number of others presented during this symposium. Importantly, the Canadian commanders of sea, land and air environments were present and gave their views on operational art. It was also acknowledged in the notes from the symposium that a draft was in development of a Canadian doctrine regarding the operational level of war, “compatible with those of our major allies.” All three heads of services were generally supportive of the concept of the operational level of war and the progress in implementing it to date, but their viewpoints reflected their separate environmental cultures. Navies are traditionally resistant to articulated doctrine as naval activities are viewed as the purview of the fleet-in-being and do not need to be codified. Vice-Admiral P.W. (Peter) Cairns, the Commander Maritime Command reinforced that idea, articulating what he considered the positive aspects of operational art. But, he argued that the Navy did not view “Op Art with the same gravity because the Navy has been there for the past 50 years” through large scale multinational exercises. Unlike maritime forces, armies are strong adherents to ideas of doctrine due to an organizational emphasis on establishing a common understanding of procedures and techniques for the conduct of military activities. Lieutenant-General G.M. (Gord) Reay, the Commander Land Force Command emphatically advocated education in operational art because, “to ignore it would not be true to our profession.” At the same time air forces seldom focus on creating formal doctrine but operate on the basis of choosing targets and achieving desired effects against opponents. Furthermore, due to the mechanical complexity of air operations, the service orientation is often towards the technological factors of the profession. As a result, over time they have developed

a *laissez-faire* attitude towards the formalized strictures of doctrine. Consequently, Lieutenant-General D. (Dave) Huddleston, the Commander Air Command, discussed the necessity of improving joint operations capabilities with the other two services, but with some qualifications. He focused on the inability of staff procedures to deal with large scale operations and the inadequacy of contemporary military information systems to assist decision making in wartime. He believed those arrangements were designed for peacetime. Despite these criticisms, after conducting a retrospective analysis of the 1993 symposium, Brigadier-General Desloges felt that it had made a positive impact on the senior officers that had attended:

> It would appear, based on verbal feedback, that the GSOP [General and Senior Officers’ Professional] Seminar was a success. Many of those attending the Seminar had little knowledge and experience with the Operational Level or Operational Art before the Seminar. By the conclusion, however, most appeared to have gained useful insights and had a basis to furthering their knowledge and promoting training in this area.

Regardless of the apparent achievements of the presentations, the debate continued about the appropriate methodology to institutionalize these concepts and Desloges sought direction for the conduct of future seminars. By March 1993 Rear Admiral H.T. Porter, the CPCD and current Chair of the OPDC, had signed correspondence on behalf of the CDS directing that the CFC continue with future initiatives of this type. This direction stressed that the primary body for guiding future seminars would be the OPDC. At the same time, however, Porter wrote, that while

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there was “...little doubt that current expertise and developmental capability rests within CFC, DCDS [Deputy Chief of Defence Staff] input, if not leadership is required if we are to respond to the operational (and operators) need(s).” Porter stressed that the OPDC would be “the instrument which will capture DCDS staff attention.”

Subsequent seminars were conducted in March 1994 and March 1995 and the curriculum became more formalised eventually addressing some of the concerns raised by Desloges in 1993. The 1995 Seminar, which was the last, included pre-readings of relevant literature, as well as completion of a required study exercise. Additionally, the seminar itself was of five days duration and incorporated a practical exercise designed “to reinforce officers’ understanding of the operational level of war through exposure to decision-making at the strategic and operational levels.”

In the meantime, discussion continued regarding the manner in which Canadian officers could become skilled with these operational concepts. The Army was particularly vociferous in advocating its point of view. The Deputy Commander Land Force Command, Major-General J.M.R. Goudreau, on behalf of his Commander, Lieutenant-General Reay, corresponded with others who had participated in the original seminar. He emphasised the necessity of continuing senior and general officer education beyond the formal programmes currently in place, to

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81 Within the command structure the time the DCDS was responsible for all military operations at home and abroad. Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, 4690-1 (CPD) dated 09 March 1993, “General And Senior Officers’ Professional Development (GSOPD)” 1.
prepare these professionals to serve at the operational level of war. Further education was necessary to permit senior leaders to develop the broad competencies necessary to work effectively in the context of joint and multinational environments, he argued. In particular, Goudreau noted deficiencies in four general areas, and he emphasized the requirement for CF officers to receive comprehensive and progressive military education at the higher levels of war in order to compensate for these shortcomings. The four areas were, the lack of continuous education throughout military careers, the deleterious impact of the limited experience of CFC instructors, ongoing budget challenges in the acquisition of cutting edge military technology, and, last, the negative effects of CF downsizing in Europe. 84 While this letter in itself did not directly promote any further activity it indicates the nature of the professional debate and further underscored the interest in focused higher level education recommended by Dallaire. 85 

This professional discourse was symptomatic of the ongoing paradigm shift and linked with the general acceptance and institutionalization of the operational level of war. Indeed the 1995 seminar was the last of its type, as their purpose had been achieved and a conceptual revolution had taken place. 86 During that year, joint doctrine for the operational level was promulgated and Land Force doctrine rapidly followed in 1996. 87 Both publications defined the operational level of war as “...the

84 One could argue that aspects of the first three points still apply today. Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, 4640-2027 (DComd) dated 8 July 1994, “Senior And General Officer Training At The Operational Level Of War,” 1-3.
85 For CFC comments on Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, 4640-2027 (DComd) dated 8 July 1994 “Senior And General Officer Training At The Operational Level Of War,” see Canada, DND, CFC Archives, Curriculum Documents, “Senior Officer Training,” undated briefing note.
86 “In essence it was determined that all LCol [Lieutenant-Colonel] (less 20-30) had either taken CSC [Command and Staff Course] post the intro[duction] of the operational level of war curriculum or had attended the seminar.” Email from Colonel Randall Wakelam, Canadian Forces to Author (Wednesday, January 7, 2009 4:49 PM).
87 See Joint and Combined Operations (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 1995-04-06, Ch 1 – 1995-09-05); and Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Land Force -
level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.”  

These Canadian doctrinal definitions clearly displayed their provenance from American operational thought, as they were taken verbatim from the 1995 edition of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations.  

Furthermore, the demise of the National Defence College in 1994 as a result of federal budget reductions created an impetus within the CF to address the unease regarding the lack of higher level education for senior and general officers. This concern was not only that articulated by Dallaire, Desloges, Goudreau, and Reay, but it also emerged in recommendations of a number of official reports starting in the 1969 Rowley Report through to the 1995 Report on the Officer Development Board: Part I. All these sources indicated that a revision of senior professional military education was needed to provide educational experiences that focussed on the higher level aspects of fighting wars, and on national and international studies. The gap in professional military education caused by the closure of the NDC led to the approval and establishment of the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) and the National Security Studies Course at the CFC in 1998. The curriculum of the AMSC specifically contained competencies pertaining to the operational level of war.  

Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine For The Canadian Army Volume 1 (Director of Army Doctrine, 1996-09-15).  


89 Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations (1 February 1995), GL-10 to GL-11.  


91 Ibid, 15-17.
Incongruously, there was little written from a Canadian point of view concerning this doctrinal transition. *Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ)*, the professional journal of the CF, published only two articles about the operational level of war during this entire period. In 1991, Canadian military historian Bill McAndrew wrote “Operational Art and the Northwest European Theatre of War, 1944.” This piece was derived from a presentation to the DS at the CFC. That lecture was designed to assist the instructors with a case study instituted as a result of the curriculum changes to the JCSP that same year.\(^\text{92}\) The second article was written in 1992 by the Director of Land Studies at the CFC, Colonel Eddy. Entitled the “Canadian Forces and the Operational Level of War,” it laid out not only the basics of the operational level of war, but why Canada needed to adopt it and how that progress should transpire. In effect, this article was a reprise of the arguments made by Eddy, and his predecessor, Nurse, since 1987.\(^\text{93}\)

The only other sign of intellectual discourse on these theoretical concepts and their place in the Canadian military was a compilation of essays from the Twenty-First Annual Military History Symposium held at The Royal Military College of Canada in 1995. The symposium proceedings, published as *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*, had a mostly American focus; however, one essay was noteworthy: Bill McAndrew’s “Operational Art and the Canadian Army’s Way of War.” \(^\text{94}\) In this essay, McAndrew put forward the idea that adoption of this American construct was problematic and risky. He explained that the search for answers by the United States Army during the post-Vietnam period resulted in the


adoption of the operational level of war. A similar pattern of crisis and response had not taken place in Canada and consequently:

The Canadian Forces have not experienced that vital intellectual search for first principles. Instead of stimulating an exchange of ideas on which to construct a sound intellectual base, a bureaucracy arbitrarily directed that Operational Art was to be adopted. Unfortunately, this came at a time when, elsewhere, categories were hardening and insights were being engraved in doctrinal manuals. Accepting those manuals without having experienced or really understood, the essential first phase builds on a precarious foundation...It is doubtful that a way of thinking can be changed by fiat, nor is it likely that the way an army thinks about itself can be imported. Trying to absorb foreign doctrines secondhand will be as fruitless as transplanting tropical plants in the tundra.95

Despite Eddy’s seemingly controversial proposal to adopt the operational level of war, as a result of the experiences of the American military, and McAndrew’s strongly worded caution, neither of these two pieces, nor McAndrew’s earlier CDQ article, elicited comment or prompted much public debate. One could argue that this inattention was due to a lack of introspection by Canadian military professionals; however, that argument would not be supported by activities undertaken by both Nurse, Eddy, and others, at the CFC to capture these ideas in the curriculum and promulgate the concepts to a wider audience in the CF. The explanation of this lack of professional and public discourse, therefore, likely revolves around the self–image of the profession of arms, particularly that of the Army, in Canada. Due to affiliation and interaction with the American military in the modern era, CF personnel viewed themselves as members of an transnational profession that encompassed North America. They were, in effect, a sub-group of that larger community of practice.

Thomas Kuhn emphasized the importance of the social factors to the creation and migration of knowledge. He utilized the concept of the paradigm to include communities of scientific practitioners who share common beliefs, as well as to

95William McAndrew, “Operational Art and the Canadian Army’s Way of War,” in McKercher and Hennessy, The Operational Art, 97.
describe the shared belief, or theory. His concept of paradigm shift describes the process by which the practitioners change their belief systems or paradigms. Kuhn suggested that anomalies gradually appear to challenge the extant paradigm through “normal” science thereby prompting new research and eventual reconstruction of the field in a manner predicated upon amplifying the previously unexplainable anomaly. Kuhn proposed that paradigms are necessary to focus research; and he argued that the true sign of a mature science is a continuous transformation from one paradigm to another through successive shifts produced by revolutions. He also believed that as the new paradigms, or schools of thought, gain credence and attract practitioners the older paradigms and communities of practice disappear. Specialized journals, groups of practitioners and demands for specialized curriculum are associated with the implementation of these new paradigms.

Appealing to Kuhn’s idealized model, one can discern all facets of a paradigm shift in the events surrounding the formulation and institutionalisation of the operational level of war by the United States Army. Failure in Vietnam provided the American Army with the impetus to create and adopt new doctrine in order to address perceived deficiencies in the method by which strategy was connected with military activities. The creation of this new explanatory paradigm, the operational level of war, included all constituencies and involved professional and public debate. Military professionals and academics engaged in the development of supporting doctrine and education, and they wrote books and articles on the subject. While all the hallmarks of Kuhnian theory regarding intellectual shifts are present in this process, no conscious effort was made to ensure success of the conceptual shift using this theoretical

96 Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 84-85.
97 Kuhn uses the idea of a scientific revolution to describe the processes and effects of a paradigm shift. Ibid, 12-15; and 89-90.
98 Ibid, 18-19.
approach. Rather the process was designed to create consensus and acceptance, avoiding the controversies that had followed the introduction of the earlier 1976 edition of *FM 100-5.* Surprisingly, while Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege, United States Army, a member of the team that formulated the 1982 *FM 100-5,* wrote that they did not consciously utilize Kuhn’s theories even though he “…had read Kuhn’s book as a graduate student at Harvard some years before [, they] were just advancing the art of war.” Even so, while the shift demonstrated by this change process did not deliberately mirror Kuhn’s theory, it demonstrates the validity of the model, and provides a useful tool to examine the manner in which this analytical transformation took place in the Canadian context.

In Canada, the change process underlying the adoption of the operational level of war seems to align, at least superficially, with the observations made by McAndrew in “Operational Art and the Canadian Army’s Way of War.” He suggested that the process was bureaucratically directed and that it would have no permanence because of the manner in which the OPDC, and later the CDS, mandated the adoption of this conceptual framework. Furthermore, as McAndrew suggested, unlike the United States, no great intellectual introspection, either public or professional, greeted this new idea in Canada. As a consequence, the doctrine had no firm intellectual underpinnings and this shift ought to have failed. Nevertheless, the change process succeeded in Canada: the operational level of war was adopted by the CF and continues to be studied and used in military operations today.

More understanding of this seeming anomaly can be gained from the theories of Ludwik Fleck, utilized by Kuhn in the formulation of his theory. Fleck advocated

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100 Email from Brigadier (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege, United States Army to Author (Tuesday, February 13, 2007 11:33 AM).
the concept of thought collectives, which he defined as participants in a definable and collective structure of thought generated by an esoteric circle of authorities, or experts. The group communicates knowledge within a circle of laypeople who provide feedback on these views. Knowledge passes from the inner to outer circles and back again so that this cycle is strengthened and collectivized. This complex, open system of exchange can create a weakening of existing systems of beliefs and encourage new discoveries and ideas. \(^{101}\) I believe that this process is analogous to that which transpired within what can be termed the “North American military thought collective.” One must situate the paradigm shift within the context of a single group of military professionals defined by a common purpose rather than locating it in two opposing groups separated by nationality.

The experts within the larger collective were first the doctrine writers of TRADOC, and then the practitioners or the United States Army. The collection of experts within the Canadian sub-group of the collective resided in the CFC, where they absorbed, imitated and promulgated these new ideas in the manner described by Fleck. None of the hallmarks of the paradigm shift that Kuhn would have attributed to professional discourse took place in Canada because it had already occurred in the United States; the Canadian military implicitly viewed itself as part of a single community of practice that extended across the continent and followed the paradigm shift that had taken place. \(^{102}\) This was and is evidenced by the verbatim adoption by Canadians of American examples, practices and doctrine. This interpretation explains the lack of indices of Kuhn’s model during the acceptance of the operational level of


\(^{102}\) See Diane Forestell, “Communities of Practice: Thinking and Acting within the Territory,” (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Contract Research Report, 2003), 1-5; and 24.
war in Canada. McAndrew was correct in his observations concerning the transplanting of foreign ideas: if the CF, specifically the Army, had not viewed itself as an extension of a community of practice originating in the United States, this initiative would have failed.

Both Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn emphasized the role of concurring practitioners in the spread of knowledge. Accordingly, one could be tempted to view the institution of the operational level of war in the United States and Canada as two separate, but closely related, shifts conducted by different groups of military professionals; however, the events that took place in Canada between 1987 and 1995 do not support this model. The adoption of the operational level of war by the CF was part of a single intellectual change that had originated in the United States Army and was promulgated in Canada through officers, primarily those of the Canadian Army, serving at the CFC. These officers were immersed in American concepts through professional education and their military assignments. As a result, the learning, dialogue and scant debate that this paradigm shift engendered within the CF demonstrated not only the influence of the CFC in the realm of military professional knowledge during the post unification era, but also the unquestioning acceptance of American ideas by the Canadian Army and the larger CF. More importantly it showed how quickly the leadership of the Canadian military, as likeminded professionals, were prepared to adopt a primarily American vision of organising war, one that attributed its provenance to the historical experience of the United States Army. This perspective has had a corresponding and continuing impact not only on the professional education of the Canadian military, but more importantly on the intellectual approaches utilized by its senior leaders and commanders when planning
military activities in response to national direction and, in effect, determining the
Canadian Way of War in the postmodern era.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} For further readings concerning postmodern operational thought in Canada see Allan English \textit{et al.}, \textit{eds., The Operational Art – Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts} (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005).
Chapter 10

Conclusion: In the Arms of Empire

It must be admitted, too, that the Staff has been somewhat short-changed by historians. History very properly gives credit to the fighting units for the courage and tactical skill with which they carried out the commander’s plan. The commander gets credit for the plan. The staff officer, who wrote the plan in all its compendious professional detail, and may even – tell it not in Gath¹ – have contributed to the conception of the plan, remains anonymous, the forgotten man. Nevertheless, it is a fact that if history teaches us anything it is that success in modern war is impossible unless the command of the fighting forces is supported and assisted by a thoroughly efficient staff organization.²

- C.P. Stacey (1973)

This observation by one of Canada’s preeminent military historians regarding the crucial role of the often unrecognized staff officer during conflict reinforces a need to understand the officer who provides coherence to military activities. In conjunction with this idea, the use of Canada’s military in the conflicts of the twentieth century indicates that the education of the Canadian Army or Land Forces staff officer is of particular import to national interests and deserves scrutiny. Although other services have played an enormous role in Canada’s wars and interventions only the Army has acted as a separately commanded national entity in the First and Second World Wars and has formed the basis of most contributions to alliance and coalition missions from Confederation onwards. Understanding the education of these land service staff officers provides the Canadian public an understanding of the intellectual heritage and influences that have shaped the form

¹ Gath was the location where the giant, Goliath, was born and his people, the Philistines, were enemies of the Jews. This biblical reference cautions against telling enemies a secret: “Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.” II Samuel 1:19-20. E. Cobham Brewer, “Gath,” Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (Philadelphia: Henry Altemus, 1898; reprint Bartleby.com, 2000)[reference on-line], available at www.bartleby.com/81/; internet, accessed 07 June 2008, no page.
and content of Canada’s international military involvement over the last century or more. It is a history in three parts. Prior to the Second World War this heritage was shaped by ties with Britain and after the end of that conflict formed by the Canadian experience of war and a continuation of the national staff education started in 1941. Due to unification of the Canadian Forces single service staff education was absorbed into an amalgamated vision shaped by a burgeoning Cold War relationship with the United States. This latter period is of great criticality as it directly affects how Canada’s military represents the national interest at home and abroad – today and tomorrow.

However, the antecedents of Canadian professional military education reach back about two centuries. From their inception western staff colleges have had a German philosophical tradition of familial learning, or Bildung. This pedagogy was rooted in the total wars of the Napoleonic period and was given shape in Prussia by Von Scharnhorst’s Militarische Gesellschaft. The Napoleonic Wars produced not only the teaching methodology but also the content of these Prussian educational reforms, and this change in substance was directly related to the greatly increased scope of conflict resulting from these national wars. Also, a distinctive general staff that needed to be schooled in its profession was created in order to manage the increased scale and intensity of violence of these total wars. In the decades that followed the value of these concepts was reaffirmed and further developed. Overwhelming Prussian victories during the Wars of German unification caused the armies of Western Europe to emulate this Prussian, and later Germanic, system. One result of this imitation was to create a reliance on overwhelming and decisive violence, in the pursuit of perceived policy goals. Unfortunately, the alignment of these activities with national policy has not always been clear from a military perspective.
During this same period the British public had clamoured for the reform of their Army after the problematic performance demonstrated during the Crimean War. The Cardwell reforms that arose from this renewal resulted in wide-ranging changes to the British Army and its staff college at Camberley. The German triumphs over European opponents in the latter part of the nineteenth century prompted the British Army to modify its ideas of military staff and their education to imitate the German model. These ideas were reinforced by the publication of Wilkinson’s *The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff*. Finally, at the beginning of the twentieth century the British Army General Staff was created, as a separate institution.

Meanwhile in North America, the Canadian Militia supported the Empire by being a military force that was easily assimilated in an Imperial construct. Nineteenth century reorganizations by a number of the British commanders of the Canadian Militia, guaranteed that the small Canadian permanent force was able to fulfil this supporting role and this was confirmed after Canada’s participation in the Boer War. The amalgamation of the Canadian contribution with the British forces in South Africa reaffirmed Canadian perceptions of relevancy based on being part of the Imperial contribution during wars of empire. This did not necessarily mean that Canada’s peacetime military would form capable and well structured military organizations that could deploy as a significant contribution, but quite the opposite. Peace time forces were organized to make available the minimum capabilities that could be part of colonial support to the British Army. Accordingly, after the Boer War the Canadian Militia returned to its pre-war capacity. This pattern would also be repeated in subsequent conflicts.
Despite this diminution, the same period also saw the beginning of a Canadian staff education system. At the end of the nineteenth century the first staff course had been created at the RMC. The objective of this nascent staff course was to educate Canadian officers in Imperial military procedures. This facilitated the integration of Canadian Militia into the British Army during Imperial military activities. Furthering this goal was the inclusion of a few Canadian officers into the staff colleges’ programme of studies at Camberley, and later Quetta, from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards. This schooling produced not only a commonality of professional knowledge amongst the leaders of the Canadian Militia and their British counterparts, but also ensured replication of the Imperial system throughout Canada’s military. Further ensuring this association was the inclusion of members of the British Army General Staff within the command structures of the Canadian Militia. Therefore, the Canadian outlook on military matters was British, rather than Canadian, in origin. This perspective was produced by officers trained and educated in the British model at the RMC or abroad in Camberley or Quetta and was reaffirmed by members of the Imperial General Staff assigned to Canada.

At the beginning of the First World War the hastily formed CEF learned valuable lessons from British commanders and staffs. This knowledge was quickly absorbed and by 1916 the primary combat element of the CEF, the Canadian Corps, had demonstrated itself to be an extremely capable fighting formation. This learning continued and by the end of the conflict Canada showed that it had the capability to produce a national army. In a like fashion to the demobilization of military forces at the finish of the Boer War, the CEF – Canada’s field army - was once again completely disbanded at the conclusion of the First World War.
Consequently, during the years between the First and Second World Wars the military abilities developed from 1914 to 1918 were much reduced. Canada became inwardly focused and the Militia reflected this regional outlook. British influence resumed through staff courses at the RMC and Canadian attendance at British staff colleges. Also, the content of the newly created professional journal *CDQ* reinforced Imperial perspectives. Once again the focus of the Canadian Militia was on providing contributions to Imperial forces.

In sum, Canadian Army professional education throughout the interwar period was shaped by the British Empire. Attendance at Imperial staff colleges ensured that the “brain” of the Canadian Militia, its staff officers, retained a distinctly English cast and allegiance. Many of this limited number of graduates attained high rank during their careers. However, the apathy of the inter-war years towards defence and expectation that the Great War had been the “War to end all wars” also ensured that Canada’s Army was woefully unprepared for the Second World War.\(^3\) In an effort to remain relevant to the Empire by providing force contributions to the Imperial Army and address domestic security and social needs from its inception onwards the Militia, with the exception of the First World War, was generally insufficiently equipped and lacked personnel for other than limited national activities. It was evident that the costly knowledge gained in the Great War concerning the demand for educated and experienced staff officers to conduct complex large scale military activities was forgotten during the following years.

At the commencement of the Second World War this lack of Canadian-specific professional military knowledge became painfully apparent. In combination with this was a lack of staff officers, which together resulted in commanders ill-

\(^3\) For example, this disinterest is evidenced through the lack of official Canadian military history for the interwar years. This gap is sometimes bridged, as in this work, through the use of branch, regimental or unit histories and biographies.
equipped to meet the exigencies of modern combat. The end result was a confluence of factors that coalesced in the Canadian Army to produce a method of waging conflict that was marked by over control and inflexibility. Experienced British senior commanders responsible for Canadian formations, such as Montgomery, tried to compensate for these deficiencies with varying degrees of success. Only the creation of abridged wartime staff training assisted with mitigating some of these challenges.

The genesis of wartime staff education for Canadian Army officers was prompted by the inability of the British Army to meet Canadian needs through accelerated staff training at Camberley in 1940. In view of that, the first Canadian wartime staff course was conducted in the United Kingdom with later versions taught at the RMC. From the beginning of this shortened Canadian staff education the connection to Camberley was maintained. Simonds, who created the first wartime staff course, structured this educational activity to mirror his own staff college experiences at Camberley. Additionally, close contact was continued with the British staff college for curriculum matters. As a result, this wartime staff education perpetuated the Imperial legacy.

Despite all of this, one aspect of the Second World War staff education that remained consistent and was reinforced due to the demands of the multinational and inter-service operations, ironically harkened back to Prussia. It was the emphasis on developing and maintaining professional relationships with fellow students and instructors. Scharnhorst’s ideas of Bildung were passed through the Kriegsakademie, Camberley and Quetta and perpetuated in the Canadian model of military education. The bonds that were forged included those to other Canadian and British officers, as well as allied nations, particularly the United States. This sharing of knowledge and skill created transnational connections amongst a group of international military
practitioners. In all of this one can discern that the Second World War marked a change in the focus of Canadian professional military education. Although the foundation of this activity was created by the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, during the Second World War it came to encompass the Canadian experience of conflict, as well as those of other closely allied nations. This Canadian paradigm was to permeate staff education until integration of the three services in the 1960s.

Wartime experiences also prompted a re-examination of staff education at the end of the conflict, both within the Canadian Army and centrally amongst the other two Canadian services. The net result was an affirmation of single service education. Pre-war Canadian indifference towards defence and a lack of professional military introspection had exacerbated the problems created by the rapid expansion of the Canadian Army during the Second World War and created a pervasive negative effect on large scale operations during those years of conflict. This need for continuing knowledge reinforced the requirement for the Army to maintain its own post-war staff education system separate from its major allies. This desire for separate professional education was mirrored by the Navy and RCAF. Consequently, professional staff education remained mostly service oriented, with some exceptions, until unification.

In the years following the Second World War other transnational influences affected the activities of the Canadian Army and further shaped the body of Canadian military knowledge created during that conflict. The burgeoning alliance with the United States that had been created by the necessities of war and a post-war willingness to support the *Pax Americana* set the strategic context for the Canadian services in the following decades. The RCN, Canadian Army and the RCAF became closely affiliated with their American counterparts. In an absence of policy objectives
that pertained to national security the Canadian services focused on their own visions of Canadian defence needs within the global environment. In some cases this viewpoint was formed by direct military-to-military contacts by Canadian and American services, while in other cases were created by American perspectives provided in the milieu of alliances, like NATO, through bilateral agreements, such as NORAD, and within multinational organizations, akin to the UN. The lack of consistent and lasting strategy, either national or otherwise, to provide a focal point to Canadian military efforts created a Cold War history of operations that were carried out in a fragmentary manner. Canadian defence policy became even less coherent and durable.

Aggravating the disconnection between national direction and military operations was the isolation of the Canadian military profession from larger society. The characteristics of the profession reflected transnational military relationships after the Second World War. Members of the profession of arms in Canada defined themselves through their mutual relationships with the American services.

Accordingly, there were a number of patterns in the use of the Canadian military that during emerged during the Cold War. These were:

1. National policy was sometimes determined by alliance policy and a wish to achieve saliency. As a result there was not always an unbroken line of continuity between policy decisions and military activities.

2. The Korean War, the use of Canadian contributions to NATO and the creation of NORAD demonstrated Canada’s commitment of military forces as an obligation of its alliances. This involvement occasionally took place without either a clear understanding of its ramifications or being able to provide input into how these Canadian military forces would be used.

3. Without durable and lasting national security policy, military contributions were at times drawn out and graduated in order to provide the Canadian government time to devise an appropriate reaction to the wants of allies.
4. Due to the lack of a direct threat to Canada the interest of Canadian society in the activities of its military was limited at best. This, combined with intricate nature of Cold War military partnerships, allowed the profession of arms to develop traits consistent with militarism. In this atmosphere the separation between the military profession and civilian society, or lack of reciprocal civil-military relationship, continued without abatement.

5. The friction between Canadian officers and politicians over the nature of bilateral military agreements with the United States demonstrated a continuing lack of clarity within Canadian security objectives. This antagonism was made worse by the separation of the Canadian military profession from the nation which created it.

These interrelated aspects of the utilization of the Canadian military in the last half of the twentieth century, along with the separation of the profession of arms from Canadian society, provide a complex and dynamic background to the increasing influence of the United States in the education of the Canadian Army staff officer during the Cold War.

It also must be highlighted that this use of the Canadian military and the relationship of the Canadian profession of arms to society contextualized the staff education offered by the CASC after the Second World War. While the staff course was created using the Canadian knowledge painfully gained over years of conflict, the curricula retained some of its British heritage, as well as absorbed increasing American content – reflecting the major alliances and concerns of the Cold War. The transnational influence of the United States became especially pronounced after the restructuring of professional military education brought about by unification of the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF into an integrated force. In the absence of Canadian joint professional military knowledge that of the United States – Canada’s major Cold War partner - was used.

The Canadian Army Staff College offered a demanding programme of staff studies. There were rigorous entrance requirements, highly qualified Commandants
and DS who utilized their experience to challenge the students through a professionally oriented pedagogy. One key component of the learning process was the continued formation of communities of practice by military professionals. These networks were multi-service and international, and officially encouraged and sustained for years after the completion of a specific staff course. The Snowy Owl offered one institutional mechanism to support these relationships.

One aspect of these collegial relationships was the interaction between military practitioners concerning the curriculum of the CASC, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s. Not only the interplay, but reasoning behind proposed amendments provided insights into the nature of the Canadian profession of arms. These discussions encompassed all types of national and international issues, not only those of a strictly military nature. The discourse established by this exchange of ideas assisted with maintaining a balanced perspective on military issues within a larger context. However, with the passage of time, a growing Soviet threat, the creation of NATO, and the rising importance of the United States, the augmentation of American materials is discernible within the single service curriculum of the CASC.

The impact of these outside influences was increased due to Canadian vagueness in conceptualizing military strategy. The Army staff college produced graduates who could apply the techniques and procedures of their profession to organize war, but were not prepared to connect these same military activities to the exigencies of national objectives. It seems from the curricula that these types of concepts were subsumed by the politics of alliance and the legacy of Canada’s military and political history. The formulation of strategy, connected to alliance or governmental direction, had not been a prerequisite of Canada’s participation in Imperial conflicts or the two World Wars. Consequently, these ideas were shaped by
memories of the Second World War when strategy was the result of deliberations by
the larger powers, rather than Canadian interests. This vision was apparent in the
CASC curriculum which taught military planning that encompassed only short term
activities rather than the creation of a lasting campaign that would terminate in the
attainment of alliance or national goals. This perspective reinforced a vision of
military operations unconnected from national objectives.

By the late 1950s the CASC had a curriculum of British heritage that had
evolved to reflect the Canadian experience of the Second World War. Amalgamated
within it were various ideas originating from Cold War discourse between Canadians
and allies. The course changed over time in viewpoint and makeup in reaction to
developments in the international security situation. The knowledge gained during
the Second World War, the creation of NATO and the UN all produced a Canadian
Army perspective of staff education. However, the most dramatic course change was
created by the increasing pre-eminence of nuclear and related threats. To encompass
all new material pertaining to these topics the staff course lengthened in duration from
one to two years. This two-year programme of studies lasted from 1959 until 1965.
The inclusion of a large amount of information pertaining to nuclear conflict derived
from American sources influenced the perspective provided by the curriculum. In
conjunction with these additions and Canadian involvement with NATO, there was a
concomitant increase in material pertaining to interoperability with our American
allies. While the British were not forgotten, addition of American subject matter was
significant and reflected the alliances of the Cold War.

In many respects the curriculum became oriented towards bi-lateral
cooperation with the United States military. Growing tendencies to look towards
American allies for professional guidance and knowledge seemed to become more
ingrained over succeeding years. However, uncertainties pertaining to the connection between military activities and national objectives continued and these questions were reflected in both the curriculum and the pages of the Snowy Owl. This confusion regarding the derivation of military activities from national direction was also evidenced a number of events which took place during this period. Once again, it was apparent that while officers of the Canadian Army were well versed in the use of military force it was at times without context to the larger ends that needed to be achieved.

In spite of all this, the two-year CASC course was a significant point in the professional education of the Canadian Army. It represented an unparalleled staff education experience created by the Canadian Army to meet its perceived needs. This two-year programme could be visualized as learning of the highest order with a depth of the curriculum coupled with time - time that permitted officers to absorb and reflect on the knowledge that was imparted to them; time to broaden the professional relationships that were characteristic of the staff college experience; and most importantly, time to master their profession. Regretfully, for the Canadian Army the two-year CASC course ended in the turbulence surrounding the integration of the Canadian services. The golden age of Canadian Army staff education was over.

However, the unification of the Canadian Forces did not simply result in the shortening of the Canadian Army staff course to one year, but rather dismembered the structure of service professional education altogether. Exams that were necessary for promotion and entrance to the CASC were ended and after a number of years the Army staff course was ultimately reduced to a much shortened version that contained only some of the professional knowledge that had been formerly imparted. By 1974 higher level staff education was conducted in an inter-service environment at the
CFC. The years following integration of the three military services were turbulent. Significant changes to policies, programmes and procedures, as well as staff colleges as a result of unification greatly reduced the efficacy of the professional education system established since the Second World War. Not only were there considerable change in military education, but the growing importance of peacekeeping, in combination with sharply defined NATO roles reduced the legacy of historical lessons that Canada’s Army had gained from the Second World War. Also, because almost three decades had passed since the end of that conflict, this period also marked the retirement of the last serving Second World War veterans. The memory of those professional competencies gained in war and kept alive by serving military practitioners disappeared.

The new shortened Land Forces staff courses that were conducted at the CLFCSC hearkened back to those abbreviated courses of the Second World War. In the institutional restructuring prompted by unification of the Canadian Forces, Canada’s Army had re-created a course that met the same types of requirements that shaped the wartime programmes. They provided the minimal necessary competencies for staff officers to work with brigades and divisions within a land environment and were more akin to training than education. After the decades of developing a land-specific professional development system that encompassed staff education, and particularly after the development of the two-year course, this period represents a low point in the history of Army staff education. It is a moment in time that continues to impact adversely on Canada’s Land Forces, as demonstrated by the numerous restructures of the staff courses offered by the CLFCSC. These changes attempted to capture the levels of comprehension and professional knowledge in the previous courses. Unfortunately, despite any additions or modifications to course content or
changes to scheduling, these efforts would not allow Canada’s Army to attain the educational levels that it had once accomplished during staff education. The responsibility for that now rested outside the control of the Land Forces.

The new CFC staff education was built on the structure of the RCAF Staff College. While this choice was seemingly sound there were a number of factors which resulted in a less comprehensive staff education experience for the Land Forces officers who attended this integrated Canadian Forces institution. First, the time allocated to the programme was about one year, but instead of being service focused it provided a general multi-service education for the officers attending the course with some portions specific to environment or service. While these specialized portions in conjunction with the course offered by the CLFCSC should have provided sufficient expertise to give adequate competencies to Army staff officers, this was not the case. The challenges of coordinating curricula at two separate colleges, as well as differing levels of professional knowledge delivered to two varying groups of officers differentiated by seniority and experience mitigated against this desired professional outcome. Second, the RCAF Staff College did not have the same background as that of the CASC, thus, while the pedagogy was the same, the historical legacy of the Air Force college produced different curricula. These CFC curricula reflected the inheritance of the RCAF and its visualization of staff education. Last, the unification of the Canadian Forces produced an organization that lacked an integrated doctrine. Consequently, the CFC utilized American and NATO materials to educate Canadian Forces officers. This resulted in continued ambiguity in understanding the military connections to the direction of Canada’s government. This flaw was reinforced by curriculum arguing that Canada would only employ its military within an alliance or coalition.
As a result, by the 1980s the Canadian Forces had created a staff programme that appeared to meet the needs of Canada’s Cold War commitments, but lacked national perspectives on the use of military power. Officers who attended the CFC developed ideas concerning military operations that were not determined by Canadian military heritage, but by the alliances of the period. In the absence of introspective thought on the nature of Canada’s national and international military engagement on behalf of its nation, ideas were supplied verbatim from the transnational community of practice established within North America. The most significant paradigm shift of the Cold War, the adoption of “operational level of war,” was the result of this intellectual void. Following this American change would come to shape how Canadian officers, particularly Land Forces officers, envisaged and arranged military operations on behalf of their nation in the post modern age.

In order to comprehend the function of staff education in promoting understanding of new theories and concepts one can examine the role of the CFC in producing widespread acceptance of the operational level of war within the Canadian Forces from 1987-1995. This movement was the most significant intellectual change to take place in Canadian military thought since the shift produced by the Second World War. It represented a notable departure from how the Canadian Forces understood and conducted war up to that time.

Both Fleck and Kuhn accentuate the fashion in which knowledge is transmitted between like-minded practitioners. At first glance one might be tempted to accept the implementation of the operational level of war in Canada as the second of two paradigm shifts - the first being the American adoption of the concept. However, detailed examination of the Canadian change belies that idea. The acceptance of the operational level of war in Canada over the years from 1987 to 1995
has none of the hallmarks of a separate paradigm shift. The absence of professional discourse within Canada prior to implementation of this new approach shows that the embrace of the operational level of war by the Canadian Forces was part of a single intellectual revolution that originated in the United States Army. This transformation was followed in Canada by officers, for the most part of the Land Forces, who were staff at the CFC. These officers were familiar with American concepts through their professional education and military assignments. They created acceptance at CFC for these ideas, which then permeated to the larger Canadian Forces. Of greater importance is how the lack of a Kuhnian paradigm shift demonstrated the rapidity of Canadian senior commanders, as part of a transnational community of practice, to adopt an American perspective for organizing conflict. This vision of arranging war has had an ongoing effect on the methods used by the Canadian military in dealing with the tumultuous environment of the post modern age and has determined Canada’s approaches to the use of its forces since 1995.

Consequently, while the proceeding chapters document a history of evolving professional military education they also provide valuable perspectives on the impact of twentieth century military alliances on Canada’s Army. More importantly, it must be highlighted that the consequences of being a military ally of an empire (or superpower) are not simply limited to a particular service. They extend to encompass the larger Canadian military and also shape the activities that are conducted at the behest of Canada.

The transnational communities of practice fostered by the staff colleges examined in this research were groups that maintained their connectivity over time and acted as conduits for professional knowledge and practice across national boundaries. As explored in Chapter 9, this knowledge was often accepted by
Canadians without debate or critical review. This tendency instituted foreign military practices that became defacto Canadian, although they did not have national origins and may have not reflected the needs of Canada’s military. Also, like the examples discussed in Chapter 5, the service-to-service nature of these communities of practice promoted strong ties between military practitioners in Canada’s Army and those of the United States Army. Unfortunately, sometimes the allegiances created by these networks transcended national obligations.

In that vein, the limitations of strategic thought discernible in the staff college curricula reinforced these tendencies to derive direction from professional beliefs and associations. The goals of alliances or those that were derived by Canadian officers sufficed to provide direction for Canadian military forces. In this atmosphere the lack of clearly delineated curricula connecting Canadian military activities to overarching national policy direction, planning procedures and policies related to that professional knowledge become disconnected from strategic direction. One can also argue that, from the standpoint of militarism described by Vagts, in A History of Militarism, such curricula creates military commanders and staffs who interpret national goals from a professional, rather than state, perspective. From all of this it can be suggested that the CASC/CFC produced staff officers who were educated in the intricacies of a transnational military vocation strongly influenced by Britain and then the United States.

Study of the activities of the CFC in generating widespread consensus concerning the operational level of war provides insights into the nature of intellectual change and the role of education in providing pertinent perspectives on the changing face of war. It is evident that without the perseverance of various commandants and DS during this period of ferment those Canadian military practitioners would not have
been exposed to or adopted as quickly as they did the ideas of operational thought necessary for theatre-level warfare and interoperability with allies. Indeed, knowledge is the result of education and reflection. Yet, one can surmise that without investment in the former the latter will be rendered irrelevant in preparing military commanders and staffs to deal with the constantly shifting and multi-faceted environment of modern conflict.

Notwithstanding the manifold lessons concerning American influence imparted from examining this paradigm shift, the nature of Canada’s transnational professional military connection to the United States continues to evolve. The post modern period continuing into the twenty-first century has demonstrated comparable trends as those of the Second World War. In a fashion similar to the changes produced by conflict in the originally British body of professional knowledge that produced a Canadian vision of war and resulted in the two-year CASC programmes conducted between 1959 and 1965, the professional knowledge of the Canadian military is once again undergoing change. In order to understand the contemporary military activities that are being conducted on behalf of the country it is necessary that one examines the nature of this newest ongoing shift.

Canadian military operations in the 1990s onwards, in post-conflict regions or failed states, have created an unprecedented desire to achieve interdepartmental and interagency cooperation and coordination. Military operations must assist with creating the conditions for a durable and lasting peace in joint, multinational and multiagency environments, with numerous state and non-state actors. The military contribution to this effort is exceedingly complex. In Canada this has resulted in acknowledgement of the necessity that the Canadian Forces must establish strong connections with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the
Canadian International and Development Agency to address the modern dilemmas of post-conflict environments, such as Afghanistan. This idea has been formalized in the concept that has become commonly known as the Whole-of-Government approach.\textsuperscript{4}

This approach, involving defence, diplomacy, development and commerce has required an increased level of connectedness between agencies that often lack a common coordinating infrastructure or methodology. In the absence of shared conceptual approaches and procedures the results have at times been less than desirable. These weaknesses have become quickly apparent in environments like Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{5}

Western, including Canadian, military approaches, like that represented by the operational level of war, are originally derived from theories put forward by Clausewitz and other nineteenth century theorists. While still usable, these methods are more suited to application in an environment where the predominant form of conflict is between nation states. Therefore, these models are of limited utility in current times where one’s opponent is often distributed internationally and robustly networked and difficult to detect, delineate and neutralize. Furthermore, professional concepts derived from military theoreticians are not attractive tools for non-military partners. As a result, ideas and methods that are understandable and are acceptable to all involved must be devised and utilized to coordinate a myriad of actors and

\textsuperscript{4}For a wide range of discussion concerning Whole-of-Government types of approaches to military operations see various the sections in Allan English and Howard Coombs, eds, \textit{Effects-Based Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspectives} (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre Production Section, 2008).

activities across all elements of alliance or national power to address exceeding difficult challenges.\textsuperscript{6}

In summary, because Canada’s Army and the larger Canadian Forces are no longer dealing with the “son of Desert Storm” but rather the “stepchild of Chechnya,” any military activity must be cooperative and inclusive.\textsuperscript{7} In order to devise feasible and suitable solutions to security problems today the Canadian military is obliged to deal with complex and chaotic dilemmas in a fashion acceptable to a myriad of participants. Consequently, the Canadian Forces is migrating from a completely American vision of organizing military activities to a perspective shaped by the Canadian experience of conflict in the post modern age.\textsuperscript{8} While remaining primarily American in provenance, its Canadian usage expresses a different outlook on professional thought. The undercurrents surrounding this shifting professional knowledge are similar to those that coalesced to form the curricula of the CASC upon its inception in 1946, a time when Canada’s Army designed a new staff course that catered to its wartime experiences through education. The example provided by these military practitioners over half a century ago reverberates through the years to today. This exemplar supplies a prism through which Canadians can interpret current changes to not only the Land Forces and its staff education, but more importantly Canada’s profession of arms, their allegiances and activities in a constantly shifting global environment. Moreover, these changes not only reflect a process of organizational learning and adaptation within an extended community of practice, but also the ever constant seeking out of wisdom through knowledge - the search for Minerva’s owl.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid, 6-8.
\textsuperscript{8} Coombs and Hillier, “Planning for Success,” 12-13.
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## Appendix A

### Canadian Military Ranks

Ranks

Military organizations are hierarchical. In the following chart, the ranks customarily used in the army and militia are listed in the left-hand column. Corresponding titles for the naval and air forces are in the centre and right-hand columns.

#### Commissioned Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>Admiral</th>
<th>Air Chief Marshal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral</td>
<td>Air Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>Rear-Admiral</td>
<td>Air Vice Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier (General)</td>
<td>Commodore</td>
<td>Air Commodore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Group Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Wing Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Commander</td>
<td>Squadron Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Flight Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Sub-Lieutenant</td>
<td>Flying Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Lieutenant</td>
<td>Midshipman</td>
<td>Pilot Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Non-Commissioned Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment Sergeant-Major</th>
<th>Chief Petty Officer I</th>
<th>Warrant Officer I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company Sergeant-Major</td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer II</td>
<td>Warrant Officer II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>Petty Officer I</td>
<td>Flight Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Petty Officer</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Other Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporal</th>
<th>Leading Seaman</th>
<th>Corporal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>Able Seaman</td>
<td>Leading Aircraftsman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Ordinary Seaman</td>
<td>Aircraftsman II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Particular variants of these (e.g. Bombardier for Corporal in the artillery) will be found. Note that there is a difference between a rank (e.g. Lieutenant-General) and an appointment or position (Corps Commander).

(Hyphens have been added to the listed ranks in order to reflect current usage and are not used in the original source. See Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo*, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 313.)
Appendix B
Canadian Army Organization

Canadian Military Organization

Canadian military organizational terms have been fairly constant since 1900, although specific organizations have changed frequently and significantly. The following diagram gives a very rough guide to organizational terms in the British and Canadian armies in the two world wars.

### Formations

- **Army Group**
  - **Army**
    - **Army Corps**
      - **Division**
        - **Brigade**
          - **Battalion**
            - **Company**
              - **Platoon**

  - **Army Corps**
    - **Division**
      - **Brigade**
        - **Battalion**
          - **Company**
            - **Platoon**

(The diagram ignores artillery signals and other vital arms and services, each with its own organizational terms.)

### How Many Personnel?

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<th>Formations</th>
<th>Commanded by</th>
<th>Approximate Size</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>200,000 to 400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Lieutenant-General</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>Brigadier</td>
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### Units

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<td>Battalion/Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company/Squadron/Battery</td>
<td>Major/Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon/Troop</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>20 to 40</td>
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</table>

(Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada From Champlain to Kosovo*, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), 312.)
Appendix C
1926 Criteria for Selection to Attend the Staff Colleges, Camberley and Quetta

708. The Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta are open to a limited number of officers of the Permanent Force. Vacancies will be filled by N.D.H.Q [National Defence Headquarters] by selection amongst those officers who have passed the Entrance Examination. Particulars of this examination and of the course of study at the colleges, are contained in the Staff College Regulations, copies of which may be obtained on application to N.D.H.Q.

709. The Staff College Entrance Examination is held annually commencing on the last Tuesday in February. Applications to attend this examination will be made on A.F.C. 2112 detailed instructions for the completion of which are laid down in K.R. [King’s Regulations] (Army) Appendix XII. A candidate is personally responsible that this form is completed in time and should give ample notice through his C.O. [Commanding Officer] of his wish to compete at the examination.

The D.O.C. [District Officer Commanding] will select from the Lists referred to in para 711 below, the names of officers he recommends for this examination and submit A.F.C. 2112, in each case, so as to reach N.D.H.Q. as follows:-

(a) For candidates recommended to attend the Staff College Preparatory Course commencing at the Royal Military College the following year – By 1st October.

(b) For candidates who have previously attended the Staff College Preparatory Course – By 15th June preceding the date of this examination.

The selection of candidates for (a) and (b) above, will be made by the Chief of Staff after consideration of the recommendations of the D.Os.C.

710. An officer who has graduated at either Staff College will have the letters “p.s.c.” recorded after his name in the Militia List.

711. (a) Officers responsible for rendering the annual confidential reports upon officers serving under them will keep a list of those with not less than three years’ service who they can certify to be in every respect thoroughly good regimental officers, and whom they recommend for admission to the Staff College as likely on the staff, to render services valuable to the Militia and creditable to their regiments.

(b) The D.O.C. will annually by December first review all selected lists kept by officers under his command, and ensure that no individual officers are overlooked who have come under his command since his last review of the selected lists, ascertaining, if necessary, if the latter were on the selected list in the Districts from which they had come.
(c) A D.O.C. will take every opportunity of making himself fully acquainted with all officers under his command who are on the selected lists. He should attach them to his or to a subordinate staff on any occasion when their services can profitably be utilized and should particularly observe them during field operations. A full report by the colonel commandant or senior staff officer under whom this attachment has been carried out, will be rendered annually with confidential reports through the D.O.C. with special reference to the attached officers’ general capacity for staff employment, stating the branch of the staff to which they have been attached, and the duration of their attachment. If the D.O.C. considers that an officer on the selected list is not up to the standard required for the Staff College, he will take the necessary steps to have his name removed from that list, and make a note of the removal in the officer’s annual confidential report.

As a rule, an officer will not be permitted to compete for the Staff College unless he has previously attended the Staff College Preparatory Course and received a satisfactory report.

712. The entrance examination will be superintended by boards consisting, if possible, of three field officers [Major to Colonel]. In no case should [the president be below that rank. The boards will be assembled by the D.O.C. the District in which the examination is to be held. The examination will be strictly conducted and in accordance with the programme and detailed instructions issued.

712A. The names of successful candidates at the entrance examination and of those nominated will be published in Militia Orders in order of seniority of their regiments.

(K.R. & O. [King’s Regulations & Orders] For the C.M.[Canadian Militia], 1926)
LEGEND

1. Due to the several changes in the nomenclature of the Cdn War Staff Courses and the system of grading, the following is a guide to the qualifications received on the various courses.

2. **Nomenclature of Courses & Awards**
   (a) CJWSC – “sc” – Courses 1-3
       CWSC – “sc” – Courses 4-6
       CWSC (Intermediate Wing) – “sc” - Courses 7-10
       CWSC (A Wing) – “sc” – Courses 11-12
   (b) CWSC (Junior Wing) – “jsc” – Courses 1-5
       CWSC (B Wing) – “jsc” – Courses 6-7

3. **Gradings CWSC (A Wing)**
   (a) Courses 1-3
       A  Recommended for 2nd Grade Appointment – “sc”
       AB  (Course 1) Recommended GSO 2. Instr CWSC after a tour elsewhere – awarded “sc”
       B  Recommended for a 2nd Grade Appointment – “sc”
       C  Recommended for a 3rd Grade Appointment – “sc”
       D  Below average – 6 months att before granting “sc”
       E & F  - Failed
   (b) Courses 4-12
       A  Recommended for immediate 2nd Grade Appointment – “sc”
       Ax  Recommended GSO 2 suitable to be DS
       B  Recommended for immediate 3rd Grade Appointment – “sc”
C Recommended for a Grade 3 appointment and award on recommendation, following a period of 6 months regt or staff experience.

F Failed

4. Grading CWSC (B Wing)

The method of grading on CWSC (B Wing) is similar to the method on courses 4-12 CWSC (A Wing).

(Canada, Directorate of History and Heritage Archives. File 530.03 (D1), “Folder listing personnel who have attended Staff Courses, gradings obtained, files applicable to Courses, received from DMT, Aug 1962,” “Grading - Canadian War Staff Courses,” no document, no page.)
Appendix E
Extracted from 1941, 1942 and 1943 Criteria for Selection to Attend Canadian War Staff Courses

“War Courses – RMC” (1941)

II. JUNIOR WAR STAFF COURSE

The object of the course is to qualify officers to fill third grade staff appointments. Duration of course 4 months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Rank of Candidates</th>
<th>Requirements of Candidates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior War Staff Course</td>
<td>R.M.C.</td>
<td>Captain or Major</td>
<td>Good regimental officer with aptitude for staff work. Good knowledge of organization and tactics of own Arm together with a broad knowledge of organization and tactics of the other Arms of the Service. A.F. [Active Force] only.</td>
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</table>

(Canada, Canadian Army, *Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 8* (November 1941), 13 and 26-28)

“Nomination of Candidates for Courses at Central Schools” (1942)

3. SELECTION OF CANDIDATES

*Junior War Staff Course*

Candidates for the Junior War Staff Course will be officers between 25 and 35 years of age, at the time the course commences. In a few cases where recent experience with a field formation has provided an officer with exceptional and proven qualities, the higher age limit may be slightly exceeded.

A candidate must be medically fit. He must have at least 18 month commissioned service in the present war, including at least 6 months as an officer with a mobilized unit on Active Service. Candidates must be duly recommended for the course by the Commander (or principal staff officer or head of the service not below the rank of Colonel) under whom they are serving, and by the Commander of the District, Division or higher formation.

Candidates for this course must have a detailed knowledge of the organization, characteristics and employment of their own Arm of the service, and a general knowledge of other Arms. In addition they must be familiar with the normal problems which concern sub-unit and unit commanders.
An officer joining the Staff Course must possess the essential personal characteristics of a staff officer, that is to say:

(a) Reliability.
(b) Loyalty to his commander, his colleagues and his subordinates.
(c) Tact and pleasing personality.
(d) Ability to work hard and to work long hours.
(e) Ability to take hold of a situation and to get things done.
(f) The faculty of working with others to a common end.

The officer initiating the recommendation for a candidate for the Junior War Staff Course will give special opportunity to the nominee to improve his military knowledge and experience by such means as:

(a) Taking part in exercises and schemes either under instruction or on the directing staff.
(b) Attachment to units of all arms or to staffs of formations.
(c) Private study of the current manuals and publications.

(Canada, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Training Memorandum No. 19 (October 1942), 68)

"Joining Instructions for Candidates Attending Royal Military College War Courses" (1943)

3. SELECTION OF CANDIDATES

Canadian War Staff Course

Candidates for the Canadian War Staff Course will be officers between 22 and 35 years of age, at the time the course commences. In a few cases where recent experience with a field formation has provided an officer with exceptional and proven qualities, the higher age limit may be slightly exceeded.

A candidate must be medically fit. He must have at least 18 month commissioned service in the present war, including at least 6 months as an officer with a mobilized unit on Active Service. Candidates must be duly recommended for the course by the Commander (or principal staff officer or head of the service not below the rank of Colonel) under whom they are serving, and by the Commander of the District, Division or higher formation.

Candidates for this course must have a detailed knowledge of the organization, characteristics and employment of their own Arm of the service, and a general knowledge of other Arms. In addition they must be familiar with the normal problems which concern sub-unit and unit commanders.

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(d) Ability to work hard and to work long hours.
(e) Ability to take hold of a situation and to get things done.
(f) The faculty of working with others to a common end.

The officer initiating the recommendation for a candidate for the Canadian War Staff Course will give special opportunity to the nominee to improve his military knowledge and experience by such means as:-

(a) Taking part in exercises and schemes either under instruction or on the directing staff.
(b) Attachment to units of all arms or to staffs of formations.
(c) Private study of the current manuals and publications with a view to acquiring:
   (i) A knowledge of the outline org. Of the Inf. and Armd. Divs. And ancillary units.
   (ii) A thorough knowledge of own arm including a detailed knowledge of the characteristics of all weapons.
   (iii) A thorough knowledge of map reading and the study of ground.
   (iv) A practical working knowledge of R/T [Radio/Telephone] procedure.
   (v) Familiarity with authorized military abbreviations.
   (vi) Ability to ride a MC [motorcycle].
   (vii) A knowledge of tactical principles and their application to the major operations of war.

(Canada, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Training Memorandum Number 25 (April 1943), 31-32)
Appendix F
Chronology - Second World War Canadian War Staff Courses

Canadian Junior War Staff Course

1. January – April 1941 (Ford Manor, England)
2. July – November 1941 (Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, Canada)
3. December 1941 – April 1942

Canadian War Staff Course

4. April – August 1942
5. September 1942 – January 1943
6. February 1943 – May 1943

Canadian War Staff Course “A Wing” (Intermediate Wing)

7. June – October 1943
8. November 1943 – March 1944
9. April – July 1944
10. August – December 1944
11. January – July 1945
12. August 1945 – March 1946

Canadian War Staff Course “B Wing” (Junior Wing)

1. October – December 1943
2. January – April 1944
3. May – August 1944
4. August – November 1944
Canadian War Staff Course “B Wing” (Junior Wing) (continued)

5. December 1944 – March 1945

6. April – July 1945

7. August – November 1945

(Canada, Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, SC 1325-2027 (Comdt) 4500-1 (Comdt) “Army Staff and Related Courses,” 13 Feb 81; and also Canada, Directorate of History and Heritage Archives, File 530.03 (D1), “Folder listing personnel who have attended Staff Courses, gradings obtained, files applicable to Courses, received from DMT, Aug 1962”)

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Appendix G
Canadian Army Staff Courses/
Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff Courses 1946-1973

Canadian Army Staff Course 1946 - 1967

1. 7 June 1946 – 14 June 1947 (Royal Military College)
2. 19 January – 28 November 1948 (Fort Frontenac)
3. 19 January – 18 November 1949
4. 16 January – 24 November 1950
5. 15 January – 22 November 1951
6. 14 January – 20 November 1952
7. 12 January – 19 November 1954
8. 11 January – 19 November 1954
9. 10 January – 17 November 1955
10. 9 January – 16 November 1956
11. 14 January – 22 November 1957
12. 13 January – 18 November 1958
13. 8 September 1959 – 23 June 1961
14. 5 September 1961 – 21 June 1963
15. 16 September 1963 – 25 June 1965
16. 13 September 1965 – 29 July 1966
17. 12 September 1966 – 14 July 1967

Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff Course 1967 - 1973

18. 11 September 1967 – 12 July 1968
19. 9 September 1968 – 11 July 1969
20. 2 September 1969 – 3 July 1970
21. 8 September 1970 – 9 July 1971
22. 6 September 1971 – 7 July 1972
23. 5 September 1972 – 6 July 1973

(Canada, Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, SC 1325-2027 (Comdt) 4500-1 (Comdt) “Army Staff and Related Courses,” 13 Feb 81, Annex A, no page.)
## Appendix H
List of Foreign Officers Who Attended the Canadian Army Staff Courses/Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff Courses 1946 – 1973

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<th>Service Number</th>
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(CLFCSC Library, Miscellaneous documentation pertaining students and instructors from 1946-1972, no document number, no page.)
GENERAL STAFF BRANCH

6831----CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE----ENTRANCE QUALIFYING----6831 EXAMINATION 1947

Attached as Appendix “A” to this order is the scope of the subjects listed in paragraph 19 of Appendix “A” to RO 663O, on which candidates for the 1947 Canadian Staff College Entrance Qualifying Examination will be examined.

(HQ 74-117-15 FD 6)

APPENDIX “A” TO ROUTINE ORDER No. 6831

SCOPE OF STUDY FOR CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE QUALIFYING EXAMINATION - 1947

Organization - Peace

1. Scope  
   (a) The organization of the components of the Canadian Army in Canada.  
   (b) The functions of the services  
   (c) The division of responsibilities between Army Headquarters, Commands and Districts.  
   (d) The organization of Schools of Instruction and Training Centers.

2. Bibliography  
   Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College.

Organization – War

3. Scope  
   (a) The organization of units of the Armored, Infantry and Airborne Divisions, together with those Corps and Army Units normally associated with them, down to troop and platoon level.  
   (b) The characteristics of the arms and services in sufficient detail to be able to explain their role in the phases of war.  
   (c) The type and characteristics of the main weapons and equipments used by units in (a) above.
4. Bibliography
   Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College

**Administration**

5. Scope
   The administrative duties within a battalion or equivalent unit.

6. Bibliography
   Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College and cross-references therein to pertinent paragraphs of Canadian Army Pamphlets and publications.

**Tactics**

7. Scope
   (a) The tactical employment of the infantry battalion and supporting arms including tanks.
   (b) In general ONLY the employment of an infantry brigade

8. Bibliography
   Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College and cross-references therein to Canadian Army Pamphlets.

**Military Law**

9. Scope
   (a) A basic knowledge of Military Law and its application.
   (b) A working knowledge of the following manuals:
       Kings Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Army
       Pay and Allowance Regulations, Canadian Army, 1946
       Manual of Military Law
       Extracts from Manual of Military Law 1929

10. Bibliography
    Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College and cross-reference therein to Canadian Army Publications.

**Canadian Military Geography**

11. Scope
    General knowledge of the Defense Geography of Canada under the following headings:
    (a) General - global position of Canada
    (b) Geology and Physical Features

**Canada Military Geography** - Con. [Author’s note: page break prior in the two page original.]
(c) Climate and Weather  
(d) Biogeographical Distributions  
(e) Population  
(f) Agriculture  
(g) Mining and Industry  
(h) Commerce - External and Internal Trade  
(i) Transportation and Communications  
(j) Frontiers

12. Bibliography  
Precis prepared by Professor G.H.T. Kimble, Chairman of the Department of Geography, McGill University, and issued by the Canadian Staff College.

Current World Affairs

13. Scope  
In General:  
(a) The sequence of events and conferences (their general purpose and result) from the Atlantic Charter to San Francisco Conference.  
(b) The organization of the United Nations for dealing with the problems of the world at peace. In particular the scope and purpose of:  
   (i) Organs  
       The General Assembly  
       The Security Council  
       The Economic and Social Council  
       The Trusteeship Council  
   (ii) Organizations  
       FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) including UNRRA  
       PICAO (Provincial International Civil Aviation Organization)  
       The International Bank and the International Monetary Fund  
(c) The major points which have arisen during conferences subsequent to San Francisco such as:  
   (i) World affairs under discussion  
   (ii) Changes in the organization of the United Nations.  
(d) The background of organized labor, in particular:  
   (i) Trade Union History  
   (ii) International Labor Organization  
(e) Current trends and developments in military and industrial research in the British Empire and The United States of America.

14. Bibliography  
(a) Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College.  
(b) To be obtained locally by the students:  
   The United Nations Primer, Sigrid Arnes; Farrar and Rhinehart, Inc., Toronto  
   An Outline of Trade Union History

Canadian History

15. Scope
The history of Canada’s form of government from the development of British North America to present day.

16. Bibliography
   (a) Precis issued by the Canadian Staff College
   (b) To be obtained locally by students:
       The Canadians - Wrong, G. M.
       A History of Canada - Wittke, Carl
       Dominion of the North - Creighton, D. G.
       History of Canada for High Schools - McArthur, Duncan
       Canadian Government and Politics - Clokie, H. McD
       The development of Dominion Status - Dawson, R. M.

Military History

17. Scope
   (a) In general - The military situation of the period 1864-65 during the American Civil War, starting with Grant’s assumption of command and ending with the surrender at Appomattox.
   (b) In particular -
       (i) Grant’s Overall Strategy
       (ii) The Battle of the Wilderness
       (iii) The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
       (iv) Sherman’s Campaign against Atlanta
       (v) Early’s Raid on Washington and Aftermath
       (vi) Campaign of Franklin and Nashville

18. Bibliography
   To be obtained locally by students; starred volumes are preferred reading: -
   (a) * “American Campaigns” by Steele
       2 Volumes - US Infantry Association, Washington, DC
   (b) * Vol IV of “Battles and Leaders of the Civil War”
       The Century Co., N.Y.
   (c) * “The American Civil War 1864-65”
       Maj E. W. Sheppard - Gale & Polden Ltd., Wellington Works, Aldershot
   (d) “The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ’65”
       Humphreys - Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, N.Y.
   (e) “Campaigns of the American Civil War”
       Fieberger
   (f) “With Sherman to the Sea”
       US Infantry Association, Washington, DC

(Canada, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Routine Orders, vol 14, nos 6647-6897, “6831 – Canadian Staff College – Entrance Qualifying Examination 1947”; and also Routine Order No. 6831 – “Scope of Study for Canadian Staff College Entrance Qualifying Examination - 1947,” (12 November 1946), “Appendix ‘A,’ no page.)
Appendix J
TRAINING STANDARDS
FOR
ARMY STAFF OFFICERS

1. The current studies to determine the staff officer training requirements for the Services with the object of introducing an integrated staff course require a broad statement of the requirement to train Army officers for operational staff command positions.

DEFINITIONS
2. An “operational position” is a position on the establishment of a formation designed to be deployed in the field in direct contact with the enemy. For the purpose of this paper this includes the brigade group and division.
3. A “staff position” is one which requires the occupant to co-ordinate and direct, on behalf of the commander, the activities of two or more elements of a formation to achieve the aim or mission. The positions provided to carry out the staff duties outlined above call for the rank of major (i.e. second grade staff officer).
4. “Command” is considered here to mean command of a unit (e.g. battalion) or an independent company sized unit (e.g. engineer field squadron). Command is normally exercised by a lieutenant colonel or major.

AIM
5. To outline the standard to which Army staff officers employed in command and staff positions in a division in the field must be trained.

STANDARDS
6. To carry out his duties a staff officer must:
   a) Possess a thorough knowledge of the organization, characteristics and employment of all elements of the division or similar field formation; this includes all likely to be available to the formation.
   b) Possess an understanding of how a theater of war is organized and knowledge of how the division fits into the higher echelons of organization.
   c) Possess a thorough knowledge of the principles of war and be practiced in their application to the division and its elements under all conditions.
   d) Possess an understanding of the techniques of command and how these techniques are employed by a divisional commander and his subordinate commanders.
   e) Possess the knowledge of the methods and skills necessary to co-ordinate and direct the activities of the elements of the division to carry out the commander’s orders in all conditions of war.
   f) Possess a knowledge of how to translate a GOC’s [General Officer Commanding] direction on training into an effective training programme.
   g) Possess sufficient knowledge of the forces of friendly powers to enable him to work successfully with elements of these forces.
   h) Possess a good knowledge of the organization of likely enemy forces and their methods of operation in the field insofar as these might affect the division.
   i) Possess a good knowledge of the physical and political aspects of the various parts of the world in which Canadian forces may operate.

7. To carry out his duties a commander must:
a. Have the specialized knowledge necessary to ensure that his unit can carry out its function in action
b. Possess the knowledge of how elements of the division operate under all conditions of war to achieve the commander’s aim and the contribution his unit must make to the overall effort to enhance the chances of success of the operation.
c. Have the ability to:
   1) Consider and exploit the combat intelligence and information available to him and make correct decisions based thereon within the restrictions imposed by a higher commander and in the accordance with the principles of war.
   2) Plan the actions of sub-units to achieve a combat mission in accordance with the direction given him.
   3) Give the necessary orders to subordinates that will ensure the execution of a plan.
   4) Supervise the execution of his orders by his subordinates by personal supervision and by the use of signal communications.
   5) Change a plan of execution to meet changed conditions.
   6) Maintain the morale of a unit through an understanding of the principles of leadership and man-management.
   7) Ensure the logistic support of his unit through the application of the principles of maintenance and of supply.

CONCLUSION
8. It is considered that the curricula for any proposed integrated staff training system must meet the outlined standards set forth in this paper.

20 Jan 65

(Canada, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) Archives, CLFCSC Fonds 80/71 (CLFCSC Fonds), Folio 197, “Presentation by Canadian Army Staff College to Conference on Integrated Staff Training 26 Jan 65 - Training Standards for Army Staff Officers,” no page.)
Appendix K

Extracted from
“A new Professional Development System for Canadian Forces Officers”

The Junior Staff Course

As the first course in the system, the JSC is designed to apply to junior captains of all classifications. A limited number of foreign students are invited to attend under Military Assistance Committee sponsorship. This course is in being at Avenue Road, Toronto, on a cycle of four 10-week courses a year. Directing staff members are Canadian Forces majors, established for a teaching staff to student ratio of not more than 1:8. Ideally, all junior captains of career status should attend this course between their third and seventh year of commissioned service. However, at present, financial and manpower constraints prevent this goal from being fully met.

The aim of the JSC is* “to prepare junior officers to perform staff functions of a general nature that are appropriate to their rank and provide the foundation for their subsequent professional development”.

The 10-week curriculum covers these two broad fields and is divided into units of study with the following learning objectives:

- **Staff Duties.** “To increase the student’s understanding of the duties of staffs, the method of communication between staffs, and the mechanics of staff procedures.”

- **Communications Process.** “To improve the student’s understanding of the communication process and to develop the student’s ability to conduct research, organize material, solve problems and present solutions in written or oral form.”

- **Service Knowledge.** “To familiarize the student with the roles and organization of the Canadian Forces.”

- **Leadership / Management.** “To familiarize the student with leadership / management functions, theories, principles, and techniques related to the staff role.”

- **Professionalsism.** “To acquaint the student with the historical development of the military profession and its relation to contemporary society.”

- **Current Affairs.** “To acquaint the student with the trends and conflicts in national and international societies and their effects on the world stability.”

The Junior Command and Staff Course

The next step is the JCSC (L), for junior officers associated with land operations. The Officer Development Board recognized that, at this level, field forces require a special type of skill-oriented command and staff training for the conduct of war on land. Broadly speaking, one can compare this with the sort of training conducted by Operation Training Units for air officers and the Maritime Warfare School for naval officers. The JCSC (L) is designed to apply to all combat arms captains of the land element, a few pilots destined for field headquarters staff appointments, and a number of officers from support classifications associated with
land operations. This course will commence in February 1974 at Fort Frontenac, Kingston, on a cycle of two 16-week courses a year. Directing staff members will be Canadian Forces land element lieutenant-colonels, established for a teaching staff to student ratio of not more than 1:10. Resources will allow for virtually all our combat arms captains to attend between their third and seventh year of commissioned service, and for these officers this course lays the foundation for the subsequent, segregated land force portion of the Command and Staff Course in Toronto at the rank of major.

The aim of JCSC (L) is “to instruct junior officers in the conduct of land operations in war, and specifically to prepare the student for staff appointments in any field formation headquarters at rank of captain, to develop command ability at the rank of major, and to develop an understanding of the principles of command at the rank of lieutenant-colonel.”

The scope of the JCSC (L) will cover “the command and staff aspects of land operations throughout the scale of conflict. It will be based on a concept of operations for land forces of all arms and services working together, dependant on each other, normally undertaken with the air support and occasionally carried out with the support of sea elements. The course will be concerned with the application of this concept to the operations of a brigade group or task force forming part of a Canadian division or under operational control of an allied formation.”

The 16-week curriculum will cover the following units of study and learning objectives:

**Organization, Characteristics and Tactics**
- “To develop an understanding of the organization, characteristics and employment of the combat arms and combat support arms, including air support.”
- “To develop an understanding of the tactical employment and logistic support of a battalion/battle group within a brigade group.”
- “To familiarize the student with special military operations and situations short of war.”
- “To develop an understanding of how a Canadian brigade group or task force would operate when placed under operational control of an allied formation.”

**Operational Staff Duties**
- “To develop the student’s ability to perform operational staff duties appropriate to the levels mentioned above.”
- “To acquaint the student with the operational staff duties of selected allied nations.”

**Administration and Logistics**
- “To develop the understanding of field administration and logistics which the student requires to function at the levels mentioned above.”
- “To develop an understanding of how a Canadian brigade group or task force would be supportedlogistically when placed under operational control of an allied formation.”

**The Command and Staff Course**

This will be the second level of professional education for all except those officers associated with land operations, for whom it will be the third. For the great
majority of officers this will be their last course in the system, thus it can be regarded as the key professional course. The CBC [sic] is designed for majors of all classifications between their ninth and thirteenth years of commissioned service. Attendance will be by selection in sufficient numbers to ensure that all colonels will have had an opportunity to attend. A limited number of foreign students will be accommodated under reciprocal arrangements, which allow for some Canadian Forces officers to attend foreign staff college courses. Directing staff members will be Canadian, British, Australian and American lieutenant colonels or equivalent naval and air ranks, also under reciprocal arrangements, at an established teaching staff to student ratio of not more than 1:8. The first course will commence in September 1974 at Armour Heights, Toronto.

The aim of the CSC is “to develop selected officers for senior command and staff appointments in the Canadian Forces.” The thrust of the course will be to prepare students for appointments in at least one rank higher than major.

The 44-week program will broadly comprise military and executive development studies in approximately equal parts. During about one third of the course, students will be segregated for in-depth studies of sea, land and air warfare. This division of the student body poses no difficulties for officers of operational classifications, but some of those in support and specialist classifications will have to be arbitrary assigned to one of these three divisions according to their background or intended future employment.

The syllabus will contain the following units of study and learning objectives, though not necessarily entirely in the order shown below, nor, as far as Environmental Studies are concerned, altogether mutually exclusive:

**Introductory Studies**
- “To establish a common minimum base of knowledge of the organization, characteristics, employment and logistic support of the Canadian Forces.”

**Environmental Studies**
- “To develop an understanding in depth of military operations and situations short of war in each of the maritime, land and air environments.”
- “To develop an understanding of the administrative and logistic aspects peculiar to sea, land and air warfare.”

**Joint and Combined Operations**
- “To familiarize students with the planning and execution of joint and combined military operations and their logistic support.”

**Executive Skills**
- “To develop a further understanding of the communication process.”
- “To develop a further ability in research, in organized thinking, in problem solving, and in written and oral expression.”
- “To develop further understanding of leadership, command, and management concepts and their application.”
- “To develop a further understanding of the military profession, its historical development, and the requisite qualities of the professional officer.”
- “To familiarize students with current DND capital equipment programs, policies and problems.”
- “To develop an understanding of DND systems for planning, programming, and budgeting.”
War and Strategy
- “To familiarize students with the nature, causes and evolution of war; strategic factors; and the nature of military alliances.”

Military Technology
- “To familiarize students with the impact of scientific research and technological developments on national security, and the technological advances which will influence the development of weapons systems.”

Canadians Defense and Foreign Policy
- “To develop an understanding of the threat to national security; Canadian defence policy and its formulation; Canadian foreign policy; the objectives of Canadian diplomatic representation abroad; and the programs and objectives of Canadian external aid to developing nations.”

Canadian Political Affairs
- “To familiarize students with Canada’s federal and provincial governmental structure; the process of government, and a comparison with other systems of government; and the current problems in achieving Canadian unity and national identity.”

Canadian Economic Affairs
- “To familiarize students with Canada’s natural and industrial resources; Canada’s industrial capacity for defence and the impact of defence spending on the economy; and Canada’s economy and its growth potential.”

International Affairs
- “To familiarize students with the various factors which affect the stability of international relations; the political, economic and social problems of selected geopolitical areas; and relevance to specific international situations of the factors affecting world order.”

The National Defence College Course

This is an interdepartmental course administered and funded by the Department of National Defence, which provides for the joint education of senior military officers and civilian officials from Canadian government departments from the private sector. The British, Australian and American armed forces and diplomatic services are represented. The course has only a dozen Canadian Forces officers in the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel --- less than one third of the total course membership. Thus, while it represents the highest level in the professional development of the Canadian Forces officer, it is open to those few who show every prospect of becoming general officers. This course is in being at Fort Frontenac, Kingston.

The aim of the NDC Course is “to prepare course members for appointment to positions of higher responsibility by enabling them to study together, in the atmosphere of an advanced graduate school, those aspects of national and international affairs which determine or significantly affect Canada’s external, defence and related policies.”

This 46-week course is divided into four terms with the following objectives:

Term I, Canadian Studies, encompasses “a comprehensive examination of those factors, international and North American, that directly influence the Canadian Government.”
Term II, External Influences and Factors, provides “a broad view of the external factors which influence policy formulation in Canada, together with an assessment of the influence which Canada can exert on other nations.”

Term III, Strategic and Military Studies, reviews “the evolution of strategy, stressing recent concepts and alterations. An analysis is made of the strategies of the principle world powers and their influence on Canadian national strategy and on international relations.”

Term IV, Final Review and Study of Specific Problems, consolidates “a deeper appreciation of the considerations and principles that must be comprehended in formulating forward-looking Canadian policies, both from an idealistic viewpoint and with a recognition of specific national constraints, requirements and objectives.”

Philosophy
A glance back at the learning objectives for each unit of study in the series of staff courses below NDC will show that these are generally described by the terms “familiarity with/understanding of”, which indicates a strong emphasis on knowledge verses skill. At the JSC and CSC “ability to” is found only in the area of communications skills (research, organized thinking, problem solving, and the process of expressing these orally or in writing). At the JCSC (L), “ability to” applies only to operational staff duties associated with Canadian field forces. The main purpose of this professional development system is thus clearly revealed. It is to broaden progressively a career officer’s perception of his place in the military profession’s role in society. The system of courses is not designed to enhance his academic respectability in university circles. In the latter regard, however, and purely as a side benefit, the prospects of obtaining university recognition for attendance at these professional courses are increasingly promising. On the other hand, the CSC addresses the need for operational officers bred within a unified force of study in depth the whole spectrum of land, sea and air warfare, as appropriate to their combat classifications.

* All the quotations in this article are from official documents and directives

Appendix L  
Extracted from  
“The Officer Professional Development System”  
THE CANADIAN LAND FORCES  
STAFF COURSE (CLFSC)

GENERAL

1. The CLFSC is conducted at the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, Fort Frontenac, Kingston. Land command and staff training has been conducted in Kingston since 1941. The first post-war Canadian Army Staff Course was inaugurated in 1946. Between 1946 and 1959 the courses were of 11-12 months duration. This was followed by three two-year courses, and in 1965 the College reverted once again to a one-year course.

2. In 1975 responsibility for land command and staff training was divided between the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College for junior land staff training and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College for advanced land command and staff training. In that year the College at Kingston inaugurated the 16-week Junior Command and Staff Course (Land) while the College at Toronto commenced conducting advanced land command and staff training within the framework of its Command and Staff Course.

3. In 1975 the Junior Command and Staff Course (Land) was raised in scope and increased to 18-weeks duration. The course title was changed to the present “Canadian Land Forces Staff Course”. It is planned in 1977 to further increase the course length to approximately 19 weeks.

COURSE AIM

4. The aim of the CFLSC is to instruct officers in the conduct of land operations in war. Specifically to:

a. prepare the student to assume an SO2 staff appointment at the brigade headquarters level; and

b. develop command ability in the rank of major.

CURRICULUM

5. The CLFSC covers the command and staff aspects of land operations throughout the scale of conflict. It is based on a concept of operations carried out by land forces of all arms and services working together, dependent on each other, normally undertaken air support and occasionally carried out with the support of sea elements. The course is concerned with the application of this concept to operations of a brigade group forming part of division, corps or task.

6. A detailed curriculum outline is given in the attached appendix.
STUDENT PROFILE

7. Canadian Forces students will normally be captains, or in exceptional circumstances majors, from the following classifications:

a. ARMD,
b. ARTY,
c. INF,
d. PLT,
e. MILE,
f. CELE,
g. LORE,
h. LOG, and
i. SECUR.

8. Canadian candidates must have completed at least three years in the rank of captain, one year of which must have been served in a field or air unit. In addition candidates, except for pilots, will normally have completed either a squadron/battery/company commander’s course, or upon selection attend a classification sponsored pre-course seminar. Successful completion of CFLSC or a foreign equivalent is a prerequisite for subsequent selection for the Command and Staff Course (CSC) for Combat Arms classifications…Candidates from other classifications attending the Land Command and Staff Phrase of the CSC will normally be selected from among the graduates of CLFSC.

9. In addition, twelve foreign students attend annually under Department of External Affairs sponsorship. Prior to taking the CLFSC these students attend the CFSSC…

DIRECTING STAFF

10. The Directing Staff are lieutenant colonels with a directing staff to student ratio maintained at not more than 1:10.

OUTPUT AND TIMEINGS

11. Two courses of 60 students each are run per year. The first course normally commences in August and terminates in December. Foreign students attend the second course each calendar year.

SECURITY CLEARANCE
12. Canadian Forces students are cleared to SECRET. Foreign students must be cleared to Canadian RESTRICTED.

QUALIFICATION

13. Graduates are awarded the military qualification symbol “plfsc”.
# CLFSC CURRICULUM OUTLINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Number of Classroom Periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Combat Arms</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Combat Support</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Combat Service Support</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Operations/General</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Defensive Operations</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Offensive Operations</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>g. Other Operations which includes:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Nuclear Warfare</td>
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<td>(2) Mountain warfare</td>
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<td>(3) Northern Warfare</td>
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<td>(4) Jungle Warfare</td>
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<td>(5) Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>(6) Airborne Operations</td>
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<td>(7) Air Assault Operations</td>
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<td>h. Internal Security</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Leadership and Command</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>j. Battle Procedure</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Staff Duties</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Advanced Tactical Operations which consist of various command posts exercises and field exercises without troops</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Field Studies which include visits to Canadian, United States and NATO defence Installations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Course Administration  12

d. Sports  28

e. Commandant’s Reserve  36

THE AIM OF THE COURSE

The aim of the course is to prepare selected officers for staff appointments.

SYLLABUS

The syllabus, which is designed to attain this aim, is composed of two Fields of Study, the Staff Training Field and the Air Warfare Field. The Staff Training Field provides first the skills needed to perform the administrative and executive task, of prime importance among which is the ability to think logically, solve complex problems, and communicate ideas clearly and precisely. With this ability must go familiarity with the forms of Service papers and administrative and staff practices and procedures. The senior officer also must master certain areas knowledge. He must understand international affairs and the nation’s foreign policies. He must know the resources of the nation, the way in which the nation is governed and the relation of the Services, particularly the RCAF, to the government. He must know the function and organization of all parts of his Service. He must also know the elements of leadership and the handling of people, and the personnel policies of his Service. This knowledge will enable him to see the overall needs of the Service and the nation, and perform it efficiently.

The Air Warfare Field is designed to acquaint students with the principles of the employment of air forces so that they may contribute effectively to the direction of the Service as a military force. The Field includes training; logistics; and the research, development and production services which support the operational elements. Fundamentals of technology, intelligence, and strategic principles which govern the military situation are examined. The major emphasis in the Field is given to the operational roles of air forces, which are studied in detail.

STAFF TRAINING STUDIES

Functional Skills Phase

All – Basic Skills. The close relationship between power of expression and thinking ability is recognized in the emphasis placed on written and oral expression. Lectures are given on fundamentals of grammar and composition, and exercises to strengthen vocabulary and increase knowledge of grammar and usage are assigned throughout the term. In addition, all written work is marked for English. The study of effective speech is introduced by lectures, and each student gives a number of talks in the auditorium. Conference exercises, discussion and question periods give students additional opportunities for practicing speech.

A12 – Staff and Administrative Skills. In this unit of study various headquarters procedures and staff practices are examined. Emphasis is on the mechanics and forms of various service papers including the letter, memorandum,
staff paper, operation order, and the formal military appreciation. The theory of problem solving and the techniques of appreciation writing are introduced in a series of lectures and tutorial sessions, and exercises are assigned. From this unit students are expected not only to learn uniformity of staff methods, but to understand and master the techniques of analysis enabling them to deal swiftly and accurately with complex problems.

**Functional Knowledge Phase**

**A21 – Service Knowledge.** In this unit defence organization, including organization at government level, government policy making and financial control, and the organization and function of the RCAF, including the roles of the Commands and the structure and function of AFHQ, are studied. Lectures are given on organization of the HCH [sic] and Canadian Army and foreign defence and military agencies.

**A22 – National and World Affairs.** This unit the study of the contemporary international scene, including an examination of significant political philosophies. Emphasis is placed on the resources, government, and foreign policy of Canada, including the structure and operation of federal government. Important major powers and regions are studied in detail, and there are periodic reviews and analyses of the international scene.

**Personal Phase**

**B11 – Training.** This unit deals with the methods and equipment used in both ground and air training. Lectures describe control methods employed, standards and procedures of training, methods of assessment, quality control, and equipment and facilities. Some current RCAF problems are presented for solution. Visits are made to important training establishments.

**B12 – Research Development and Production.** This unit covers the research, development, and production needed to support modern air forces. Current problems of technological and physiological research are examined, and procedures for developing and producing new weapons, together with the government agencies involved, are studied. Visits are made to local research establishments also to the aircraft industry.

**B13 – Logistics.** This unit presents the role and organization of logistics support, including logistics planning and logistics procedures. The organization and function of logistics support, the handling of items, and the place of construction engineering are included. A visit is made to a supply depot.

**Operation Phase**

**B21 – Fundamentals.** This unit covers the technical developments, intelligence, and strategic doctrine necessary to an understanding of contemporary airpower and its future application. The strengths, capabilities and limitations of foreign forces are presented in a series of lectures. Electronics, atomic and thermo-nuclear energy, and principles of design and propulsion problems are examined in
lectures and exercises. Past and contemporary strategic thinking, including military history, principles of war, and present day strategic concepts are examined in lectures, discussion exercises, and student presentations. Visits relevant to this unit are made.

B22 – Air Offensive. This unit covers the problems and principles of modern long-range air offensive operations. Weapons, supporting requirements, force deployment, combat tactics, and doctrine are presented in lectures and exercises and examined in student seminars. A visit to a modern bomber base is made in connection with this unit.

B23 – Air Defence. Problems and principles of air defence operations are studied in this unit in both their continental and theatre dimensions. Weapons, supporting requirements, deployment, combat tactics, and doctrine are examined in lectures, student discussions, exercises, and visits. Visits are made to major air defence installations, and air defence problems are studied in co-operation with students of the USAF Air University’s Command and Staff School.

B24 – Land/Air. His unit includes problems and principles of modern land/air operations in both major and minor wars. Weapons, supporting requirements, deployment, combat tactics, and doctrine are studied in lectures and exercises. Current problems are studied in collaboration with students of the Canadian Army Staff College.

B25 – Air Transport. In this unit problems and principles of modern air transport operations are studied. The aircraft used, supporting requirements, deployment, and doctrine of air transport forces are studied in lectures and exercises. Problems of air transportability are studied in collaboration with students of the Canadian Army Staff College.

B26 – Maritime. This unit covers problems and principles of modern maritime air operations. Weapons, supporting requirements, deployment, combat tactics, and doctrine are examined in lectures, discussions, and exercises. Naval and air co-operation, carrier operations, and anti-submarine warfare are studied during a visit to maritime and naval installations.

**METHOD OF INSTRUCTION**

Instruction follows the tutorial system. Ten members of the staff direct syndicates, each of which normally consists of six students. The syndicate director works closely with each of his students on both written and oral assignments. He marks each solution carefully and explains his criticisms and corrections. Thus the students has his work fully examined and is given advice on an individual basis. This day-to-day relationship is the keynote of instruction.

The entire course is divided into four syndicate periods, and for each period both the syndicate director and the composition of the syndicate are changed. Thus, each student works with four syndicate directors, and derives benefit from working for people with different points of view. Similarly, in his different syndicate the student profits from the wide variety of views and experience of his fellow students.
Members of the staff are encouraged to spend as much time as they can with the students. The syndicate director’s purpose is to help his students, whether in written exercises, oral assignments, the choice of reading material, or the understanding of some service policy. The student is urged to speak up, to expound his views and thus develop his powers of judgment. He soon finds that the success of the course depends on the efforts and contributions of the students as much as on the syllabus itself.

The majority of lecturers are service officers who are specially qualified in their fields. In this regard the RCN, Canadian Army, RAF, and USAF have cooperated generously in providing lectures. A very important contribution to the course is also made by eminent professors from the Universities of Toronto, McGill, Queen’s, McMaster, and the Royal Military College, and by many prominent civilians from business and the professions.

**METHOD OF ASSESSMENT**

Student exercises are marked for two purposes: first, to show the student his mistakes so that he can improve his work; and, second, to record his progress. Written corrections and comments are given to the student, but numerical grades are not. The main concern of the staff is that each student should show the maximum improvement in all phases of his work during his time on the course. At the end of each syndicate period, the appropriate member of the staff submits to the Director of Studies a complete description of the student’s written and oral work, and of his personal qualities as an officer. At the end of the course, the reports for the four syndicate periods are assembled. The Commandant and members of the staff then discuss the student’s progress. If the quality of his work indicates that the student could fill satisfactorily any staff appointment commensurate with his rank and service experience, he is considered to have passed the course, and is awarded the symbol “psac”.

**CONCLUSION**

The RCAF Staff College makes no attempt to graduate experts in a particular field, nor does it expound any easy universally applicable doctrines. Rather by providing its graduates with an education of the broadest scope and by developing habits of clear thinking, it attempts to provide them with breadth of interest, openness of mind, reasoning ability, and a broad view of their Service and profession, which will enable them to master the specific tasks of any appointment and to make sound decisions in any situation.

(Canada, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), “Appendix A,” *RCAF Staff College Calendar* (1958-1959), no page)
The Staff College Curriculum

Research has indicated that the skills and knowledge required by the senior military officer can be understood as embracing four distinct but related fields. In the Staff College curriculum, these fields have been given the following names: Geopolitics, Service Knowledge, Military Executive Knowledge, and Warfare. The four main fields are further broken down into sixteen units of study. A brief outline of each of the four fields follows:

Geopolitics

The Geopolitics Field includes what is often referred to as background knowledge, and it is here understood to mean the kind of knowledge not inherently demanded for technical experience in the profession but necessary for one whose profession functions within a national and an international framework. What sort of environment knowledge does the military profession require? Armed forces exist as a national instrument; the size and usefulness of military forces depend upon the national economic strength, the national objectives of the government, the form of government, political philosophies, and even upon national attitudes stemming from a distinctive culture. A professional military officer should therefore have an understanding of the environment within which his profession functions. He will benefit by a knowledge of several of the social sciences such as economics, government, and cultural sociology which can serve as tools for him understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Canada and other nations.

This means that Geopolitics embraces three very broad areas of study: Social Science Principles, National Affairs, and International Affairs, each of which can be analyzed into component units which lend themselves to being programmed into the curriculum. As an example of this breakdown, the National Affairs Area includes two units of study: Canadian Economy, Canadian Government and Social Structure. Each of these units involves the acquisition of knowledge about some aspect of the national environment through lectures, reading, and various exercises. Similarly, International Affairs includes the economic, governmental, and cultural study of significant world regions.

Warfare

The military professional must, of course, understand the nature of his profession and of the status and responsibilities of the officer as a professional in relation to the Forces and the State. He must be familiar with the factors and principles involved in determining national and military strategy. He must know the capabilities and limitations of military men, weapons, vehicles, and equipment. He must know how to employ a variety of military forces in a variety of circumstances and must appreciate the magnitude and the complexity of logistics support for operational forces. He should be able to assess strategies and, with a knowledge of
what is possible in the scientific field, to advise on the best military force composition to support national policy. The field of Warfare is devoted to these aspects of the educational requirement.

The Warfare Field is sub-divided into seven areas: the Military Profession which deals with the role of the officer; Elements of Strategy including the nature and causes of war; Military Technology and its influence on modern warfare; Contemporary Strategy covering the major powers, alliances and UN peacekeeping; General War and strategic nuclear forces; Limited War from internal security through large-scale non-nuclear war; and Logistics which includes operational support and transportation of field forces.

**Service Knowledge**

It will be apparent that the professional military officer must have a comprehensive knowledge of the defence policy of his own country, and of the structure and operation of its defence organization. This is known as the Service Knowledge field of study. The Service Knowledge field is closely related to both the Warfare and Military Executive Knowledge fields of study, and this relationship is reflected in the design of the Staff College program.

The foregoing broad definition of the Service Knowledge field is not adequate for study purposes, and it is necessary to define the knowledge requirement of the professional military officer in more precise terms. It can be said, therefore, that the professional military officer must have a knowledge of the higher government defence structure, the major staff functions of the armed forces, the organization of the various element of the armed forces, and the roles assigned to them.

In the SC curriculum, the Service Knowledge field of study has been divided into three broad areas of study: National Defence Structure, Major Staff Functions, and Canadian Forces.

**Military Executive Knowledge**

Better management is increasingly stressed as the key to military efficiency and effectiveness. Implicit in the definition of professional education is the recognition of the professional officer as a manager whose function is to create, administer and command organizations capable of achieving predetermined results with maximum effectiveness is both peace and war. Coupled with effectiveness is of course efficiency in the use of resources of money, manpower, and material.

This association of efficiency and effectiveness with the concept of management tends to enlarge the meaning of management far beyond its connotation of efficiency and economy and establishes it as a pervasive factor throughout the organization, and one which ultimately determines everything that takes place. As a concept it thus removes management engineering and identifies it as a responsibility of both line and staff across the whole spectrum of organizational activity. Commanders, in fact, are managers whatever else they may be.
The intensification of interest in the appreciation of management concepts for improved effectiveness in all phases of military endeavor and the removal of the specialist connotation from the term “management” makes the knowledge of the processes involved in the managing very much a part of a professional education curriculum. The distinction is made here between the managing process as such and the management sciences or techniques, eg, financial control, inventory control, work study, automatic data processing. The latter properly applied have produced tremendous returns in economy and efficiency but they are, by the large, highly specialized functions assisting in the whole of management. Improved skill in these specialist activities is considered to be a training responsibility and not part of the professional education curriculum.

Management process knowledge thus contributes to the development of the officer’s managerial talent in a “generalist” rather than “specialist” sense by exposing him to a sense by exposing him to a study of the functions which are considered to make up the process of managing at all levels of organization. These functions, planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling are held by most theoreticians as well as practitioners of the art of management to constitute the process which a manager applies to achieve predetermined objectives.

The whole managerial process presupposes the development of efficient channels of communication and the associated skills of oral and written communication. Thus, in the Staff College curriculum, the teaching of Communications Skills is considered to be part of the management process and is included in the Military Executive Knowledge filed study. A sub-unit entitled Leadership completes this field of study.

(Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Canadian Forces College (CFC) Archives. Canadian Forces Staff College Calendar (1966-1967), no page.)
Appendix O

Extracted from

“The Officer Professional Development System”

THE COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE (CSC)

GENERAL

1. The CSC is conducted by the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College at Toronto on the site of the former RCAF Staff College. The College has been conducting fully integrated staff courses since 1966. The present series of command and staff courses was inaugurated in September 1974.

COURSE AIM

2. The aim of the 45-week course is to develop selected officers for senior command and staff appointments in the Canadian Forces, specifically to develop officers:
   a. To a level of professional knowledge in their own environment whereby they can fill command and staff appointments up to and including theater/fleet level; and
   b. To a level of competence at which they are capable of filling key command and staff appointments in a unified force at Task Force, Command and NDHQ levels in peace and war.

CURRICULUM

3. The curriculum has five sequential components as follows:
   a. The Command and Staff Duties Phase, Part 1 which is approximately 4 weeks in length and is taken by officers of all classifications;
   b. The three Environmental Phases of approximately 18 weeks duration. These phases are conducted concurrently. Students from the operational classifications take the phase appropriate to students from their supporting classifications are assigned according to their previous employment patterns and career interests;
   c. The Joint Operations Phase of approximately 8 weeks duration which is taken by all students;
   d. The Command and Staff Duties Phase, Part 2, which is of 1 week duration and is common to all classifications; and
   e. The National Strategic Readiness Phase of approximately 12 weeks duration, which is also common to all classifications.

4. A more detailed curriculum outline is given in the attached appendix.

STUDENT PROFILE

5. Students will normally be majors, or in exceptional circumstances, lieutenant-colonels from all classifications. Canadian students will normally have at least one performance evaluation report in the rank of major and have demonstrated a potential for colonel rank. The CLFSC or equivalent is a prerequisite for all Canadian Combat Arms students from the supporting classifications who are
selected to participate in the Land Command and Staff Phase of the CSC will normally have completed the CLFSC.

6. Approximately 23 foreign students of comparable rank and experience attend as guest students annually. Invitations are issued in accordance with a variety of reciprocal training agreements and Canadian international commitments.

7. The normal course load is 135 officers including the guest students.

DIRECTING STAFF

8. Canadian Forces and foreign members of the Directing Staff are lieutenant-colonels. The directing staff to student ratio is maintained at not more than 1:8.

TIMINGS

9. Each course commences during the first week of September and terminates in mid-July. Foreign students are required to report in mid-August for pre-course administration and briefings.

SECURITY CLEARENCES

10. All students must be cleared either to NATO SECRET, or in the case of non-NATO students, to the national equivalent thereof.

QUALIFICATION

11. Graduates are awarded the military qualification symbol “pcsc”.

CSC CURRICULUM OUTLINE

1. Command and Staff Duties Phase, Part 1,
   
a. National Strategic Readiness – Structure
   b. Command and Staff Duties – Writing, Speaking and Problem Solving

2. Environmental Phases (conducted concurrently)
   
a. Sea Command and Staff Phase
      
      (1) Maritime Strategic Studies
         
         (a) Maritime Strategy
         (b) Principles of Maritime Warfare
         (c) National Maritime Resource
      
      (2) Maritime International Law
      
      (3) Maritime Warfare Studies
         
         (a) Command, Control and Communications
(b) Oceanography
(c) Submarines
(d) Weapons Systems
(e) Maritime Aviation
(f) Surface Vessels
(g) Logistics
(h) Foreign Navies

(4) Special Maritime Operations

(a) Mine Warfare
(b) Amphibious Operations

(5) Operations

(a) Staff Duties
(b) Fleet Operations

b. Land Command and Staff Phase

(1) Organization of Land and Tactical Air Forces

(a) Organization at Divisions, Corps and Theater levels
(b) Logistics and Service Support at Divisional, Corps and Theater levels
(c) Communications at Divisional, Corps and Theater levels
(d) Land Force Air Defence
(e) Psychological Operations
(f) Rear Area Security
(g) Civil Affairs and Military Government
(h) Organization and Employment of Tactical Air Forces.

(2) Staff Duties

(a) Staff Planning
(b) Fire Planning
(c) Orders
(d) Intelligence and Staff Duties
(e) Road Movement
(f) Training

(3) Land Warfare

(a) The Nature of War
(b) The Theater Campaign Plan
(c) Conventional Operations
(d) Nuclear and Chemical Warfare
(e) Automatic Data Processing
(f) Automatic Data Processing
(g) Electronic Warfare  
(h) Allied Armies  
(i) Selected Foreign Armed forces  
(j) Canadian Land Forces Doctrine and Equipment  
Developments

(4) **Land Operations**

Selected Corps and Divisional Staff Exercises

c. **Air Command and Staff Phase**

   (1) **Air Warfare General**

   General

   (2) **Air warfare Operations**

   (a) Tactical Offensive Operations  
   (b) Aerospace Defence  
   (c) Maritime Air Operations  
   (d) Strategic Aerospace Operations

   (3) **Air Warfare Support**

   (a) Logistics Support  
   (b) Air Transport

   (4) **Air Warfare Miscellaneous**

   (a) Foreign Air Forces  
   (b) Canadian Civil Aviation

3. **Joint Operations Phase**

   a. **Cross-Environmental Familiarization**

   (1) Sea  
   (2) Land  
   (3) Air

   b. **Internal Security**

   (1) Operational Concept  
   (2) Legal Considerations

   c. **Peacekeeping**

   (1) Canadian Government Policy  
   (2) Peacekeeping Operations
(3) Peace Observation and Truce Supervision

d. **Amphibious Operations**

  (1) Command and Control
  (2) Communications
  (3) Intelligence
  (4) Supporting Arms
  (5) Logistics
  (6) Air Operations
  (7) Amphibious Assault
  (8) Trends in Amphibious Warfare
  (9) Organization of the Beach

e. **Joint Task Force Operations**

  (1) Joint Operations Planning
  (2) Joint Planning for:
      (a) Psychological Warfare
      (b) Unconventional Warfare
      (c) Civil Affairs Operations

4. **Command and Staff Duties Phase – Part 2**

  a. Leadership
  b. Innovation
  c. Bilingualism

5. **National Strategic Readiness**

  a. The Environment of National Security
  b. Geopolitical Areas of Concern for Canada
  c. Canada’s Capabilities
  d. Executive Decision-Making Techniques in Defence Management
  e. Defence Logistics
  f. Canadian Forces General Defence Readiness
  g. Field Study Exercises

(Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of Professional Education and Development, “The Officer Professional Development System” (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 22 May 1976), Annex D, 1-3, and Appendix 1 to Annex D, 1-5.)