Civilizing Madness:
Sadomasochism, Imperialism and the Formation of German National Identity, 1880-1914

by
Kathryn Ilyta Heintzman

A thesis submitted to the School of Kinesiology and Health Studies in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
June, 2010

Copyright © Kathryn Ilyta Heintzman, 2010
Abstract

In Ann Stoler’s (1995) erudite critique of the absence of race in Foucault’s *History of Sexuality Volume 1*, she asks if any of the figures of sexual regulation Foucault takes up could have “exist[ed] as objects of knowledge and discourse in the nineteenth century without a racially erotic counterpoint, without reference to the libidinal energies of the savage, the primitive, the colonized?” (pp. 6-7). Recognizing that the regulation of sexuality was often enforced through psychiatric mechanisms, one might also add that discourses of wellness and illness, the normal and the pathological, were also discursively framed in relation to the colonial other. This paper explores how medicalizing discourses of s/m in nineteenth century sexology were mutually constituted with Germany’s coeval imperial expansion and regulation of national identity. I take up the conditions of possibility for the formation of sadism and masochism within psychiatric discourse, such as Germany’s national unification in 1871, Germany’s colonial expansion in East and Southwest Africa from 1884 to 1919, and the exogenous criticisms of Germany’s colonial policy. Such circumstances provided impetus for Germany to define savagery and civility through the regulation of sexual practices within Germany’s national borders. Though s/m is presently most often tied to discourses of imperialism, through shared tropes such as master-slave relationships, flogging, bondage, and collars, I hope to complicate such perspectives by examining the relationships of imperialism and nationalism to psychiatric perspectives on s/m. By conducting a close reading of psychiatric, sexological, and psychoanalytic descriptions of sadism and masochism throughout Germany’s imperialist expansionist era, I argue that the pathologization of s/m was as much about the regulation of Germany’s racial identity as it was about the regulation of sexuality.
Acknowledgments

Two weeks ago I knew what these acknowledgments would say. In some ways I have been writing them long before my thesis—writing in the sense of writing in one’s head, without the contact between fingertips and keyboards. I have been thinking of those people who have shaped and supported me throughout the process of reading, researching, and writing, and imagining about how I might best express gratitude toward them. I had hoped to offer an ethos here on gratitude. In the wake of the police violence in response to the G20 protests this past weekend, I am having a hard time remembering much of what my academic work meant to me before it. However, in all of my grief I am reminded of how much there is to be grateful for.

To my thesis committee: Dr. Samantha King, I am very much changed for having been your student. I couldn’t have imagined a more supportive and encouraging supervisor. Dr. Mary Louise Adams I cannot thank you enough for consistently pushing me to work harder and perform better. Dr. Elaine Power for warmth, support, honesty, and for so much comfort with the messiness of my work. All three of you have had such a huge part in shaping me as an academic over the past four-five years. Dr. Cathie Krull, thank you for challenging me in the classroom and outside of it. And thank you Dr. Spencer Moore for chairing. Thank you Dr. Ishita Pande for your helpful comments, questions, and advice during the proposal stage of this thesis. And, Dr. Dina Georgis, though you were no longer here at Queen’s during my MA research, I feel as though an undergraduate of taking as many of your courses as I possible very much shaped this project.

So many people have made this work possible by challenging and supporting me as both and activist and academic. Morgan Vanek, thank you for setting the bar so high and for
your fierce compassion. Laura Goodman and Jenna Rose for sharing so much wisdom with me. Lauren McNicol for the incredible amount of energy you bring to every interaction. William Bridel for so much inspiration, and all of the confidence you have in me. Thank you Marty “Rusty” Clark for the smiles, hugs, nachos, and late night conversations. Rob Millington for the sense of humour. Sarah McTavish for the ice cream and GRE prep. Jim Seale, thank you for banjo covers and pizza crust. Carolyn Prouse for being the kind of nerd I can run up to with glee when I find a source discussing Fanon and biopower. Kym Nacita, Christina Clare, Barb Besharat, Auden Neuman and Phoenix for shared outrage, activism, energy, and support. Lara Szabo Greisman for bicycle rides and pumping iron. Niq Gryphon for years of friendship and being a sounding board. Aruna Srivastava for the life advice. Benjamin Tollestrup for sweet potato pie and WWE. Al Walsh for wry wit. Natalie Jacox for late night candy runs. Heather Gainforth for alacrity. Rosemary Nolan for teaching me grade eight math all over again. Jordan Bruce for nearly a decade of a stolid ear. Jenny Wilson for the role modeling of humble brilliance. Kyla Zanardi for train ride conversations. Chelsea Elliott for the inspiration. Andrea Phillipson for activism and pop culture references. Jonathan Latkowcer for being the best of all wheelmen. Carol Murphy for keeping my head on straight. Carol De Rose for unrelenting support. Stuart Heintzman for understanding.

Many of my friends and professors have edited parts or the whole of this thesis and deserve special, and reiterated thanks: Dr. Samantha King, Dr. Mary Louise Adams, Carol De Rose, and Laura Goodman. Despite all of their hard work to polish my syntax and hold in the reins of my less than linear thought patterns, all mistakes are of course my own.

Thank you to the Ontario Graduate Scholarship for funding the second year of this research project.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .........................................................................................................................ii

Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................iii

Prologue .......................................................................................................................vii

Chapter One: Introduction ..........................................................................................1
   The Problem with Origin Stories: Research Questions in Flux ............................1
   Finding a Reason: Rationale .................................................................................4
   Finding a Way: Methods .......................................................................................12
   Theoretical Assemblages: Or, Why I Do Not Call My Work Intersectional ....18
   Chapter Summaries ..............................................................................................31

Chapter Two: Literature Review ..............................................................................27
   Conditions of Possibility: German Nineteenth Century Imperialisms and National
   Identity .................................................................................................................27
   Imperial Psychiatry in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries .....................42

Chapter Three: Introduction to Primary Sources .....................................................57
   Nomenclature, Namesakes, and Nosology: Sexologists in Context ...................57
   Richard von Krafft-Ebing: *Psychopathia Sexualis With Especial Reference to the
   Antipathic Sexual Instinct* (1903/1965) ..............................................................58
   Albert von Schrenck-Notzing: *Therapeutic Suggestion in Psychopathia Sexualis with
   Special Reference to Contrary Sexual Instinct* (1892/1895) ..........................65
   Clinical Sexual Case Histories* (1897/1933) ..................................................68
   Albert Eulenburg: *Sadism and Masochism: A Look at Sadistic Love and Masochism
   (1902/1984) .........................................................................................................72
   Sigmund Freud: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (1905/2001) ........74
   Synthesis ...............................................................................................................77

Chapter Four: Discussion – Going Civilized ...............................................................79
   Theoretical Frameworks .......................................................................................79
   Civilizing the Perversions of Civilized Perverts .................................................86
   Degeneracy, Hereditary Taint, and Atavism .......................................................93
   The Elephant in the Room: Who Names, Whose Other? ...................................98
   Conclusion ..........................................................................................................104

Chapter Five: Discussion – A Biopower of Love ......................................................107
   Theoretical Frameworks .....................................................................................107
   Thinking of the Children: Reproductive Futurism and the Coital Imperative ....116
   Of Protection and Property: Narratives of Subjugation ...................................121
   Conclusion ..........................................................................................................127
Chapter Six: Conclusion – “Remember me” .......................................................... 129

End Notes .................................................................................................................. 134

References .................................................................................................................. 135
Prologue

Isaac Julien, a director most recognized for his docu-drama *Looking for Langston* (1988) and feature length film *Young Soul Rebels* (1991), released a short and little discussed film called *The Attendant* in 1992. *The Attendant* was funded by the artistic series *Time-Code*, which offered directors the opportunity to put together short films without dialogue (Julien, 1994). Though the film is far outside of the period of my research, I will be using themes and imagery from the film to set up conversations around historicity, identity, imperialism, gaze, fantasy, and artifact that are integral to the focus of my thesis: German nosological categorization of s/m, race, and national identity from 1880 to 1914. Where there exists a paucity of scholarship speaking to the relationships between s/m, imperialism and race, Julien’s (1992) film has caught the attention of a number of academics—myself included—as a starting point for these dialogues (Freeman, 2008; hooks, 1996; Julien, 1994; Orgeron, 2000).

*The Attendant* tells the story of a black museum attendant who superimposes a homoerotic s/m fantasy upon an abolitionist’s painting of transatlantic slavery. Any attempt to summarize the film’s plot, however, would neglect that the diegesis consciously prevents the audience from grasping a stable, coherent, or linear narrative. Instead, my description will focus upon the mechanisms Julien uses to trouble the narrative and dwell upon ambiguity.

The introductory image of the film is F. A. Biard’s *Scenes on the Coast of Africa*, a slavery abolitionist painting from 1840, which depicts African slaves being branded and whipped. The painting exists against a black background, dislocated from a wall to hang on and lacking a frame to contain it. Judith Butler (2009) argues that when something exceeds its frame, the viewer’s sense of reality is troubled: “What happens when a frame breaks with
itself is that a taken-for-granted reality is called into question, exposing the orchestrating

designs of the authority who sought to control the frame” (p. 12). For Julien (1992), the
removal of the frame deprives the image of location, context, and explanation, and robs it of
an authoritative narrative. The second shot is the title of the film, which fades into itself from
outside to in, creating an effect that marks the beginning of the film as “THE END.”

THE
ATTENDANT

THE
ATTENDANT

THE
ATTENDANT

These first two images foreshadow the disruption of space and time that will take place
throughout the film. The following shot continues this trend, taking the audience from an
establishing shot outside of the museum, to one inside of it: a room that is filled with
reflective surfaces. It is unclear if the museum’s paintings have been replaced by mirrors, or
if the shine of the glass frames causes the visitors’ images to be reflected in the art they gaze
upon; either way, the museum is intimately entangled with questions of how a viewer filters
that which they gaze upon. The framing of an image changes what is seen.

Julien (1992) uses tight angle close-ups to disturb coherency around space and time.
Early in the film Julien cuts from a shot in the museum to a contextually disruptive, tight shot
of hands wearing black leather gloves. The camera then returns immediately to the interior of
the museum, leading viewers to assume the gloved hands are inside the museum. Julien does
not return to the gloves until minutes later. In the next image featuring the gloves, a man is
walking into the museum holding them, rather than wearing them, but in the following shot
the visitor is wearing the gloves as he hands a bag to the attendant. Immediately the audience
questions the coherency of what they are watching. Only at the film’s end, when the camera returns to the first shot of hands wearing the gloves, now zoomed out, is the spatial positioning of the gloves made clear and the viewer sees that they are situated in a concert hall and not the museum. What the audience sees happening inside of the museum does not align with what the viewer saw taking place just outside of it. And the concert hall itself is never confidently established as a “real” space; rather it is a point of doubt for the audience, one that is clearly part of the attendant’s fantasies, but that could also be a physical space he occupies as well. Within the confines of the museum Julien questions the history that its walls can offer, and with that troubles the artifacts and performances that are put on display. As the gloves disrupt space and time, they also collapse inside and outside, viewers cannot trust what they see or be certain where they are looking.

Roland Barthes (1976) discusses sadism within the context of the Marquis de Sade’s writings (not to be confused with psychiatric discussions of sadism) as reliant on the regimented borders of inside and outside. Offering a critique of moralistic commentators who assume a realist perspective on de Sade’s work, Barthes notes, “enclosure permits the system, i.e. the imagination” (p. 17). Like Barthes, Julien (1992) sees intellectual potential in exploring systems of confinement and plays with the museum as a fortress of imperial power by passing in and out of it. It is precisely while the attendant is in the confines of the museum that he can transform the landscape, that he can imagine himself outside of it. Viewers are invited to fill in the narrative’s blanks, trying to sort images into fantasy and reality—categories Julien conflates elegantly. Visual disruptions, such as the scenes with the gloves, repeatedly provide viewers with new information that cannot be linearly synthesized into a coherent pattern with the previous images. While watching, the viewer must write over the
history of the previous image to reconcile it with the next one. Was the visitor really holding the gloves in the last shot? Was he always wearing them? History is transformed to legitimize a prior, hasty, interpretation. The narrative is a process of re-imagination, striving in opposition to coherency.

Despite the absence of dialogue, Julien (1992) uses a diegetically-situated soundtrack to manipulate audience perceptions of temporality. The camera compulsively returns to the attendant examining visitors’ bags. Museum visitors—many of whom are white—come to see history, the black attendant is paid to examine artifacts of the present that could pose a threat to the preservation of that history. Over one such scene the voice of the attendant is heard singing *Dido’s Lament* from the opera *Dido and Æneas*. The layering of music over the close of one scene, propelling the audience into the following camera shot where the music is diegetically situated, is a common cinematic technique. However, given the verse sung by the attendant, it is hard to ignore how such a device fits into a wider project of troubling temporality. The attendant in a concert hall, now clad in a back suit sings:

> When I am laid, am laid in earth,
> May my wrongs create
> No trouble, no trouble in thy breast;
> Remember me, remember me, but oh, forget my fate.
> Remember me, remember me, but oh, forget my fate.

Such a verse conjures up leitmotifs of memory, loss, trauma, and historicity. It is unclear if the camera has taken the viewer through space, memory, or imagination to reach the concert hall. As the message to “remember me” is taken outside of the museum into the following scene, the museum is also removed from the particular nostalgia for imperial conquest and
the Orientalist fascination with the imperial artifact. The attendant cannot make his request to be a part of our memories, a part of our histories from within the confines of the museum walls. Who gets to look is then entangled with discourses of historic memory: Whose stories are told? Who tells these stories? Who has access to such histories? As the displacement of the images of the gloves troubles the viewers’ faith in the images before them, so the verse asks viewers to remember dislocated fragments, which the text refuses to fully resolve.

A pocket watch reading 6 o’clock marks the close of the museum and the camera returns to the museum lobby where a man in the background is facing a painting/mirror that reflects his image. He covers his face, backing away from the picture frame. What is it that he cannot bear to see? The audience is refused the painting, but instead offered the recoiling visitor’s reflection, his body repelled pushes further away, but he does not turn his head. The theme of painful and repulsive imagery is further explored after the visitors leave the museum and the attendant walks past his own sexual fantasy without turning his head to watch it. Elizabeth Freeman (2008) describes this scene as the film’s tableau vivant. The attendant transforms Scenes from the Coast of Africa into scenes of s/m imagery, where actors stand in the same positioning of the pictorial representation of slaves and slave traders, only now they are clad in leather chest harnesses. This moment corroborates Franz Fanon’s (1959/1965) statement, “the way people clothe themselves . . . constitutes the most distinctive form of a society’s uniqueness, that is to say the one that is the most immediately perceptible” (p. 35). To change the clothes of the scene is to change the context and its meaning, but viewers are asked to recognize that the meaning of the second scene—leather s/m—must be interpreted through the context of the former. By changing the apparel, Julien transforms a scene of racialized oppression and subjugation to one of homoeroticism, not to
mark s/m as oppressive, but to, as Devin Orgeron (2000) puts it, *re-member*. He borrows “re-member” from Toni Morrison’s novel *Beloved*, which he describes as a “linguistic play” that more actively inserts the remembering subject into the histories they recount (p. 40).

*Scenes on the Coast of Africa*, now transformed into *tableaux vivants* of men in leather s/m attire, has been divided into two separate frames focusing on different parts of the original painting. Though the frames hang on the museum walls containing the transformed *tableaux vivants* within them, the attendant does not look at them. His fantasies make up the bulk of the screen through the first *tableau vivant* still hanging in a frame of the museum wall, however, that audience watches without the participation of the attendant—by refusing to turn his head toward his fantasies he does not condone the visual curiosity of outsiders. The camera penetrates the paintings, taking viewers into the *tableaux vivants*, once penetrated no longer distanced by the frame of the museum’s hanging. To remove the viewer from the interiority of the attendant’s s/m fantasy the film cuts away to an extreme close-up of a white stone sculpture’s eye, with a human eye superimposed over it that dissolves away. The stone-white-dead-eye is the only gaze the viewer may identify with. Watching and fantasizing are marked as very different processes of engaging with history. The stone-eye is not invested in the images it consumes, but the attendant is clearly invested in his fantasies. So the position of the gazing is relegated to the domain of colonial artifact as well, a remnant of a haunting past embedded in the structure of the museum and historic memory.

Although Julien is at pains to disrupt the fantasy-reality binary and to deny clarity and causality, he does not view narratives about s/m and slavery as freely and unproblematically distributed. That is, *The Attendant* insists on a connection between the symbolisms of imperialism and s/m, disjointed as that connection may be. Another way to read the
attendant’s interracial gay s/m fantasy is as a reflection of Julien’s own position, and as representative of the wider canon of Julien’s work that seeks to create visibility for black gay men within black British cultural studies. After all, Julien’s (1994) essay responding to his own film is titled, “Confessions of a Snow Queen.” One can also read the fantasy as a response to the debates on s/m widely taken up by feminists who figured the dominant discourses of s/m within heteronormative power imbalances between men and women, or lesbian s/m feminisms, which argued that the removal of men from the equation took s/m out of the context of patriarchy. Julien reminds his viewers that gender is not the sole power imbalance that s/m may operate through or eroticize. Not only does he disavow that the removal of the penis is a means of subverting patriarchy, but he also problematizes such lines of argument that repudiate and ignore his sexuality. Furthermore, he makes this claim from a position that does not inherently decry s/m for playing with such power imbalances.

The content of Julien’s narrative, however, is not nearly as important to my project as his insistence that the story is perforated. In my tracing a history of s/m and late nineteenth and early twentieth century psychiatry, Julien’s work offers much food for thought. By situating his story within a museum and a concert hall, he asks his viewers to disrupt fantasy and reality. The creative production of art and the creative production of history are not so dissimilar, though their audiences and reception may differ. This similarly reminds viewers that attempts to record and trace histories are matters of interpretation, are in and of themselves fantasies. It also speaks to the cathetic investment the viewer has in their own fantasies, be they in the attendant’s sexual fantasies of s/m, or in historical fantasies and memories. The Attendant argues that telling history is the telling of a story; history, in other words, is a narrative.
Like Julien’s (1992) work, the terms “sadism” and “masochism” come to straddle a place between fantasy and reality. German sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing took the names of authors of fiction, the Marquis de Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, to coin his diagnostic neologisms. In the process, Krafft-Ebing attempted to read truth from fantasy, and pathology from desire. Therefore, it seems fitting when analyzing the psychiatric and psychoanalytic descriptions of s/m to trouble the relationship of author and subject. Hence the impetus to situate my work in relation to Julien's film and to further problematize the positions of subject and object, spectator and spectated, scientist and artist, and doctor and deviant.
Chapter One: Introduction

The Problem with Origin Stories: Research Questions in Flux

The first time that I remember listening to someone consciously putting race and s/m in conversation with one another was in March 2008 at the University of Toronto’s *Fetish: Working out the Kinks* conference. The opening speaker, Mehr Khan (2008), presented a paper exploring Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s use of fetish imagery in anti-racist and anti-colonialist art. Her insightful paper, one of very few pieces of academic writing that addresses a relationship between kink and race, was followed by a presentation by Toronto kink author and photographer, Lord Morpheus (2008), titled, “From the Arts to Society and Back Again: A Study of the Influence of Kink on the Arts and Society.” An audience member met Morpheus’s attempt at innocuously inserting into his presentation Édouard Manet’s painting, *Olympia* (1863), as the first example of kink in art, with opprobrium. Manet’s painting features a naked white woman with a ribbon around her neck and a band around her right wrist, looking at the audience. Behind and beside her is a black servant holding a bouquet of flowers. The audience member specifically rebuked the absurdity of Morpheus speaking to the subtle bondage of the collar around Olympia’s neck and the band around her wrist, but making no mention of the black woman serving her in the same painting.

Sander Gilman (1985) argues that throughout the development of Manet’s art the black woman disappears, just as she seems to be erased in the consciousness of Morpheus (2008) looking at *Olympia*. Morpheus had used several images throughout his presentation, only three of which represented persons of colour. The audience member continued to interrogate Morpheus’s colourblind incorporation of some persons of colour, such as in the
Manet painting, and his inclusion of images that emphasized racist stereotypes. Two questions drove the question period that followed: Where was race located in Morpheus’s argument? And, what is the value of imprudent inclusion? The only defense Morpheus could muster was in regard to *Olympia*. He argued that because she was the “first” representation of kink in “art” she must be included, and because the black woman who stands beside her holding flowers was not attired in commensurate fetish collars and bands, she warranted no mention in such a presentation. Morpheus was resolute: the bondage of racialized oppression did not belong in a conversation about bondage in s/m.

*Fetish: Working out the Kinks* brought up a number of critiques that have influenced and informed my project. I initially conceptualized this thesis as a diachronic analysis of psychiatric descriptions of s/m. I kept Khan’s (2008) and Morpheus’s (2008) presentations in mind: the former for the integration of kink and anti-racism and the latter for its colour-blindness. But this was just one moment and I am reminded of Avery Gordon’s (1997) recursive iteration in the description of coming to her own graduate research—“but then I got distracted” (p. 32). In March 2009 I happened across a call for papers soliciting work that addressed s/m and race, citing only three academic texts as having taken up such a project. When I picked up Anne McClintock’s (1995) *Imperial Leather*, the first work listed, I had only hoped that it might help me avoid oversights similar to those made by Morpheus. I opened McClintock’s book considering it to be pleasure reading that only peripherally touched upon my research—a text that would make me think harder and differently, but not work that would be used for its content. *But then I got distracted.*

Reading McClintock (1995) has drastically affected how I engage with the history of s/m. Using Michel Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization* (1988), McClintock marks
imperialism as a condition of possibility for the formation of s/m sex and play. She writes, “it is no accident that the historical subculture of S/M emerged [italics added] in Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century with the emergence of imperialism,” (p. 142). McClintock’s astute and insightful work, however, seems similarly preoccupied with firsts. She does not define what the emergent s/m subculture looked like, and how it might look different from s/m prior to the eighteenth century. Drawing from Julien’s (1992) situating of the imperial artifact in present settings and his collapse of transatlantic slavery and s/m, I am becoming increasingly comfortable with anachronism and decreasingly concerned with firsts and linearity. I do not assert that the emergence of the terms “sadism” and “masochism,” mark the emergence of s/m sexuality, or even the emergence of the pathologization and criminalization of what most would presently recognize as s/m sexuality. Rather, I think the emergence of nosological descriptions of s/m, first medicalized as their own categories by sexologist Krafft-Ebing, reveals something about the ongoing entanglement of German national identity, civility, and imperialism in the late nineteenth century.

Butler (1993) argues, “the effort to describe theoretically the origins of fantasy is always also a fantasy of origin” (p. 267). I started this project as a genealogy of s/m, but that is not the project I am now offering. Over the course of researching and writing I have continued to wrestle with the relationship between past and present and with the fictions of beginnings. So when I try to tell you how this project started, I feel hyper conscious of the fantastical nature of such a narrative. This project is about German national identity. This project is about s/m and race. It is about the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is about the chimerical paradigms of savagery and civility. It is about psychiatry, sexology, and psychoanalysis. But like so many other historic projects it is also about the present and about
what may come. As Cathy Caruth (1996) would put it, my work is about memories. As Gordon (1997) would put it, my work is about ghosts.

Taking a great deal of inspiration from Gordon (1997) and Caruth (1996), I seek to interrogate the silences born out of medicalized constructions of s/m: What were psychiatrists, sexologists, and psychoanalysts trying to record as they mapped the nosological descriptions of sexual perversion? What ghosts haunt these pages? How do such hauntings manifest through metaphor that seeks to obscure their presence, or refuse that presence altogether? My research starts from the theoretical position, shared with psychoanalysis and diaspora studies, that histories and memories are inextricable from the experiences encountered after those moments (Caruth, 1996; Cho, 2008; Gordon, 1997; Marriott, 2007; Matsuoka & Sorenson, 2001). Gordon argues that scholarship speaking to exclusions and invisibilities is in the business of chasing ghosts, chasing after their materiality, their remnants. May Opitz (1986/1992) ties this to German national identity, insisting that “ideologies about “black” and “white”” will not be surmounted until Germany reconciles with its imperial past (p. 19). Taking these cautions seriously, this thesis seeks to address the entangled relationship between psychiatry’s inchoate pathologization of s/m and Germany’s imperial history. It focuses on the histories and fantasies of individuals collected and synthesized by psychiatrists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century German metropole and on the ways in which these diagnostic processes defined and policed whiteness, civility, love, reproduction, and national identity.

**Finding a Reason: Rationale**

What I found after a preliminary examination of nosological literature from the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was either silence around the issue of race, or
complicated moments of presence through absence. Where race was mentioned, it was often facilitated by the use of racializing language, such as primitive and atavistic, overarching narratives of the sexual difference between the civilized and the primitive, and subjects of case studies who describe their own experiences of eroticized slavery through narratives of racialized slavery.

Though I opened the previous section of this chapter with a critique of Morpheus (2008), our work shares some common ground. My project, like his, is not actually all that interested in the practices of s/m itself, since the play and motivations are as individual as the practitioners. Rather we both examine representation, though admittedly from quite different perspectives. I explore the regulation of bodies and the discourse of whiteness through racist dichotomies of appropriate sexual behaviour—civilized whiteness and savage blackness—in nineteenth century German psychiatric descriptions of s/m. Such regulation reveals through its disavowal the inextricability of the narratives of racialized master-slave relationships in the colonies and sexualized master-slave relationships in the metropole. As the audience of Working Out the Kinks pointed out, Olympia’s unnamed servant is clearly there, it is the eye of the beholder that disavows her presence and relevance. I am interested in how similar disavowals took place within the inchoate psychiatric discourses of s/m.

Sadism and masochism “categorically” entered psychiatric language through Krafft-Ebing’s writing. The precise date of his first publishing the terms is contested. Most scholars date sadism’s and masochism’s neologisms with the first edition of his Psychopathia Sexualis, 1886 (Eulenburg, 1902/1984; Marshall & Kennedy, 2003; Taylor, 1997; Weinberg, Williams & Moser, 1984). Wolfgang Berner, Peter Berger, and Andreas Hill (2003) rebut this position, saying that sadism and masochism, as terms, were not present in the first
edition, although the “lust-murder” case studies later used in Krafft-Ebing’s exploration of s/m were. Ivan Crozier (2004) claims sadism and masochism did not appear until the fifth edition, 1890, a date that John Noyes (1997) corroborates in his work on masochism. Harry Oosterhuis (2000) agrees with Crozier (2004), but clarifies that previous texts had active and passive flagellation as descriptive labels and that certain fetishes were relabeled as masochism in subsequent editions. Alison Moore (2009b) argues that the terms were first placed in a periodical predating Psychopathia Sexualis in 1882.

It is not the inception of the linguistics of sadism and masochism that interests me here, however. Although the naming of sadism and masochism falls under Butler’s (1997) examination of the trauma of being named by another preceding the will of the named, the productive aspects of that naming, such as agency and identity, are traced from the context informing its use and not through the precise moment the word is created. In tracing Germany’s pre-imperialist history, it is clear that though the stakes of debating the role of imperialist expansion certainly would have changed between 1882-1890, the competing discourses remained similar. And, as the namesakes of sadism and masochism, de Sade and Sacher-Masoch, make so apparent, what is presently described as s/m was practiced long before there was language for it. Though Morpheus (2008) believes Olympia to be the first representation of s/m in art, representations of eroticized intense physical sensation long predate the nineteenth century (Döpp, 2003).

It is thematic and linguistic repetitions, as well as hermeneutics that I will explore throughout the following chapters. Paul Ricoeur (1974) reminds me, “Symbol and interpretation thus become correlative concepts; there is interpretation wherever there is multiple meaning, and it is in interpretation that the plurality of meanings is made manifest”
Rather than seeking to uncover something tangible and new, desperately hoping my gaze will find uncharted territory and artifact, clinging to the Orientalist fascination with “discovery,” I am interested in providing a reading of the denial of race and imperialism within the psychiatric descriptions of s/m, definitions that regulate metaphors of imperialism being eroticized in the bedroom. This work is interpretive, rather than positivist. The denial of race in these texts follows what Page DuBois (2003) has referred to as the “mutually constitutive” dynamics of “invisibility and ubiquity” (p. 6).

Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1903) *Psychopathia Sexualis* came at a historical moment that inherited much scientific and psychiatric racism, which would persist for arguably the next century (Engstrom, 2003; Gunthrie, 1998; Weikart, 2004). Historians of psychiatry have well documented psychiatric racism, which abounded in the studies of physiognomy, brain size, and pigmentation measurements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Gunthrie, 1998; Thomson, 1999). Furthermore, Patricia Collins’s (2005), Saidiya Hartman’s (1997), and Fanon’s (1952/1967) works on the racist constructions of black sexuality as deviant, highlight how prominent sexualized racism has been throughout imperial expansionist projects. I find myself compelled to ask why psychiatry was so quiet about not only race, but especially blackness and those parts of East Africa and Southwest Africa that Germany was colonizing, in its conversations about a “perversion” that shares so many symbols and metaphors with imperialism. Those questions feel all the more germane given that the sexual categories of s/m were debated and defined by German psychiatrists, sexologists, and psychoanalysts during shifts in German national identity, and Germany’s anachronistic imperialist expansions. I question how much of the inchoate discourse of s/m avoided direct mention of race, while simultaneously racializing its subjects—how the language of
racialized slavery, that is, plays out within those texts that advocate for the manumission of willing sexual slaves. To claim that overt scientific racism was absent from psychiatric discourse, especially when compared to that of phrenology, for example, is not to advocate for compensation of “the ‘structured absences’ of [race and racism in the psychiatric/psychoanalytic] paradigms [of s/m];” rather, my aim is to take up Isaac Julien and Kobena Mercer’s (1996) call, “to identify the relations of power/knowledge that determine which cultural issues are intellectually prioritized in the first place” (p. 196).

I take Audre Lorde’s (1988) call for feminists to “subject everything in our lives to scrutiny” (p. 13) to heart. Though she and I ultimately diverge in our conclusions about the psychic and social results of practicing s/m, when she calls for feminists to think critically about their sexuality and how it operates within existing power structures she is asking an important question. In doing a historic analysis of the presences and absences of racialized narratives within the pathologization of s/m as it pertains to the formation of a German national identity, I hope to participate in the growing critical scholarship on race and sexualities. The consequences of the old adage to not know history, is to risk repeated it is given momentum by Caruth’s (1996) understanding of traumatic repetition. In this case, the repetition is one of omission. There remains very little in the way of critical explorations of the relationship between s/m, imperialism, and race nearly 125 years after its first definitional descriptions; silence begets silence.

Despite the proliferation of scholarship in the last decade that addresses race and sexuality (Aarden, 2008; Aldrich, 2002; Altman, 2001; Arnfred, 2005; Arondekar, 2009; Barnard, 2003; Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2007; Bose & Bhattacharta, 2007; Briggs, 2003; Cantú, 2009; Carter, 2007; Cheek, 2003; Collins, 2005; duBois, 2003; Dunning, 2009; Ferguson,
2004; Frühstück, 2007; Ghosh, 2001; Gopinath, 2005; Hawley, 2001; Horswell, 2006; Johnson & Henderson, 2005; Karayanni, 2004; Kempadoo, 2004; Massad, 2007; McWhorter, 2009; Nagel, 2002; Patton and Sanchez-Eppler, 2000; Povinelli, 2006; Prasso, 2006; Puar, 2007; Rodriguez, 2003; Stockton, 2006; Stoler, 2002; Somerville, 2000; Thomas, 2007; Voss, 2008; Wallace, 2003; Wright & Schuhmann, 2008), when it comes to s/m, academia has not met Mercer’s (1994) call to conceptualize “the structured absence of race in contemporary cultural debates on eroticism, censorship and the power of images” (p. 172). Queer theory has only started to make space for s/m within its conceptualization of nonheteronormative sexuality (Hart, 1998; McRuer, 2006; Sedgwick, 1993; Sullivan, 2003; Thanem & Wallenberg, 2010). While there exists increasing scholarship that seeks to decriminalize, demedicalize, and destigmatize consensual, adult sexual activity including s/m, such scholarship is rarely historically driven. Moreover, such work tends to place its argument within a normalizing framework, rather than one that problematizes the inchoate discursive constructions of s/m as a pathology (Kleinplatz & Moser, 2007; Pa, 2002; Weinberg, Williams, & Moser, 1984).

Scholars McClintock (1995; 2004) and Marcus Wood (2002), pornographer Morty Diamond (2008), and director Julien (1992) are among the few exceptions to such silences. Each touch on some aspect of the relationship between imperialism and sexuality by drawing attention to s/m’s incorporation of symbols such as dominance and submission, masters and slaves, whips and chains, and what is called “race play” in kink communities. Other scholars, such as Lynda Hart (1998) have focused on the performative and theatric aspect of s/m. For scholars like Hart and Penelope Engelbretch (1997) s/m’s critical reappropriation of symbols of power imbalances are not necessarily reproductions of such power imbalances. Rather
they have the potential to disrupt hierarchies of domination and submission, subverting the repressive paradigms of master/slave narratives. Noyes (1997) is the only scholar who seeks to address European identity in the early works on masochism, however, he draws most specifically on the works of fiction rather than psychiatric texts. The only psychiatric work included in his chapter belong to Freud’s work, post-World War I. Noyes’s work draws no parallels to the contemporaneous German imperialism, nor the German identities of the majority of sexologists describing s/m in the late nineteenth century.

In the case of my work, I will be exploring how the case studies define and describe s/m within a medicalizing narrative. I come to this project asking how anxieties about race and imperialism are represented in the early constructions of s/m as pathological categories in Germany, questioning “the mode of representation of otherness, which depends crucially on how the “West” is deployed within these discourses” (Bhabha, 1996, p. 89). That sadism and masochism linguistically entered a discursive framework as pathological categories, etymologically leaves the constructs entangled with psychiatry. “The power of categories,” Ann Stoler (2002) reminds us, “rests in their capacity to impose the realities they ostensibly only describe” (p. 8). Moore (2009b) wants historians to think through the problematics of using a neologism as a departing reference point in histories of sexuality. She is right to point out that both the actions of s/m as well as the metaphorical adoption of de Sade’s moniker to describe brutality predate Krafft-Ebing. However, Moore’s critique of writing histories of sexuality is complicated by scholars who do their work on histories of sexuality through histories of psychiatry. I agree with Moore that the words themselves have little to teach about s/m practice and its history; rather the tensions in nosological description of s/m might
offer insight into the histories that produced them and the knowledges they come to produce, not only about s/m, but also about German national identity.

Anti-psychiatry, philosophy of medicine, and sociology of medicine scholars have long understood that there is a relationship between that which is considered to be different from an imagined norm and that which is conceptualized as sickness (Bullough & Bullough, 1977; Canguilhem, 1966/1989; Carter, 2007; Foucault, 1961/1988; Gilman, 1985; Huffer, 2010; Tiefer, 2004). Similarly the question of the nosological category is inextricable from the question of race once one takes into account Stoler’s (1995) claim that both normal and perverse European sexualities are figured against “the libidinal energies of the savage, the primitive, the colonized” who become “the reference points of difference” (pp. 6-7).

While claims that s/m play is inherently sexist (Griffin, 1982) have been rebutted with fervent criticism from practitioners and scholars (Califa, 1994; Hart, 1998; McClintock, 1995; McClintock, 2004), the assertions that s/m is racist for drawing upon tropes of slavery and the Holocaust (Miriam, 1993; Reti, 1993; Star, 1982) have been met with relative silence (Freeman, 2008). With this project I hope to complicate conversations about racism and s/m. I am not seeking to explicate the etiology, rationale, psyche, and consequences of the actions of s/m practitioners as psychiatry and anti-s/m feminists have often attempted to do. Rather, I will examine how racism has long been a part of the narratives of s/m, not necessarily in the form of sexual identities or performances but through the conceptualization of what makes a pathological sadist and what a pathological masochist. I take a Foucaultian approach to power that examines how a specific context fosters the impetus and possibility of the creation of such categories, rather than redistributing labels of oppressor and oppressed (Foucault, 1976/1990). The stakes of this project are to disrupt the surface analysis of the incorporation
of issues of power and struggle into s/m as an inherently racist sexuality, and instead ask questions about how the larger systemic structure, in this case psychiatry and psychoanalysis, shapes the discourse of race and s/m, ultimately perpetuating silence.

**Finding a way: Methods**

Coming to the methods section is daunting, given my lack of disciplinary training. My undergraduate studies filled with epidemiology and statistics courses have not prepared me for this moment. Instead I take my methodological cues from feeling my way into what research is both comfortable and what kinds of questions and modes of interpretation I have valued as a reader. What I will be doing with this project is similar to what scholars have sometimes called methodical promiscuity (Prinz, 2008; Wills-Chun, 2007). This means that both my subject of study and my mode of analysis will “get around.” Following historians of psychiatry and medicine this project takes psychiatric and psychoanalytic publications as primary sources to be critiqued, rather than as secondary sources used to interpret. In so doing, I aim to disrupt hierarchies of knowledges that privilege empiricism and positivism from a top-down, researcher-to-researched, model.

My primary sources are five German and Austrian psychiatric and psychoanalytic texts that have since been translated into English, and that discuss the eroticism, perversion, or sexual characteristics of “sadism,” “masochism,” “sadomasochism,” and “algolagny” between 1880 and 1914: Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) *Psychopathia Sexualis With Especial Reference to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct*, Albert von Schrenck-Notzing’s (1892/1895) *Therapeutic Suggestion in Psychopathia Sexualis with Special Reference to Contrary Sexual Instinct*, Albert Moll’s (1897/1933) *Libido Sexualis: Studies in the Psychosexual Laws of Love Verified by Clinical Sexual Case Histories*, Albert Eulenburg’s (1902/1984) *Sadism and
Masochism: A Look at Sadistic Love and Masochism, and Sigmund Freud’s (1905/2001) Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. I have chosen 1880 as it predates all of the dates in the debates about Krafft-Ebing’s first included discussions of s/m. Furthermore, though 1884 marks what many scholars point to as a critical moment in Germany’s building of empire through occupation of African land, the possibility of German expansion was discussed immediately post-unification, and increasingly so up until 1884 (Townsend, 1921). The end of Germany’s imperial period is also debated, with authors marking it between 1914 and 1921 depending upon whether or not they are discussing East Africa or Southwest Africa, and if the author considers the beginning of World War I, the end of World War I, or the Treaty of Versailles as the end of German imperial occupation. Still, I have closed my periodization of the project at 1914, as the effects of World War I upon German national identity are outside the scope of this project.

Taking Edward Said's (1979) Orientalism as a methodological cue, I acknowledge that it is neither necessary nor possible for a scholar to compile a “complete” archive. Dominique LaCapra (1985) marks the attempt to make the archive into “a literal substitute for the “reality” of the past” as fetishistic—and I might add, attuned to the stigma attached to kink, fetishistic in a disruptive, rather than erotic, manifestation (p. 92). LaCapra challenges the historian’s desire “to discover some “unjustly neglected” fact, figure, or phenomenon” that will disrupt the previous interpretations of that history (p. 20). He argues that it is not the one coveted artifact that makes for good scholarship. If we accept history as discursively contested, incoherent, and fragmented then the collective individual artifacts can never make whole.
I collected the texts by searching psychiatric and psychoanalytic journals and books for the mentioned nosological categories: sadism, masochism, sadomasochism, and algolagnia. The search was expanded by using the bibliographies of retrieved texts to fill in gaps that emerge in the primary search. There are a few contemporary publications that take up nineteenth and twentieth century constructions of s/m nosology, and they too have been examined for their primary sources (Crozier, 2004; Moore, 2009b; Noyes, 1997). My five primary sources are limited to those texts that were translated into English and reflect what is physically accessible to me. I take such a limitation in stride acknowledging that the aims of my project are not to unveil some positivistic truth about what “was” and what “is” that can only be made visible through the systematic examination of every relevant detail. Instead the project hopes to illuminate the inheritance of silence around the entanglement of German imperialism and s/m. Taking my cue from diaspora and critical race theories, one could also call this an exploration of the ghosts of imperialism that continue to haunt narratives of s/m today, either tucked away in the scholarship that seeks to repress their presence or crying out loud in lament like Julien’s (1992) attendant.

At its core this project is concerned with German history and semantics. I am taking to heart the historic conditions of possibility for the regulation of s/m play and ritual within Europe, and especially Germany. This means that while conducting my close reading of the texts I examine the relationship between s/m, pathologization, and the historical significance and impact of slavery and imperialism. Many of the incipient primary texts discussing s/m from psychiatric, psychoanalytic, and sexological—as opposed to juridical—perspectives come from Germany and Austria in the 1880s to 1900s. This period overlaps with Germany’s imperialist occupation of East Africa and Southwest Africa, 1884-1919 (Deutsch, 2006;
Townsend, 1921; Zantop, 1997). After unification in 1871, Germany’s national identity was in flux, a crisis of identity that continued to be contested throughout the period of German colonial expansion (Schmidt, 2008; Townsend, 1921). The expansionist project fuelled controversy within Germany and Europe as to the German character (Mackenzie, 1974; Schmidt, 2008; Townsend, 1921). Germany’s “civilized” status was under threat for the “barbaric” participation in imperialism and slave economies, an observation that ought to be put into conversation with the desire to regulate consensual master-slave sexualities within the metropole.

I have no place to speak to the intentions of the psychiatrists, sexologists, and psychoanalysts whose work is critiqued in the following chapters. Rather I am interested in the situation of psychiatric description within a wider context of nationalism. Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose (2006) describe the empire’s influence over the metropole as “undoubtedly uneven,” remarking that even though the majority of citizens within, in their case, the British metropole “were probably neither ‘gung-ho’ nor avid anti-imperialists … their everyday lives were infused with an imperial presence” (p. 2). Here I seek to examine that imperial presence within the German nosology of s/m: What do civilization and savagery mean within the colony and the metropole? Whose bodies require paternalistic protection? What bodies ought to be reproducing to build a nation? What bodies are remembered? To such an end, this work is more exploratory than argumentative. It does not seek to fuse my five primary sources into a coherent and singular narrative of German psychiatry’s understanding of s/m. Rather, my hope is to complicate conversations around s/m, race, and medicalization. I seek to create a dialogue where theorists of s/m might complicate how they see the role of Germany’s
imperialism in shaping categories that have become meaningful sexual identities for many people.

Queer theory emphasizes the productive aspects of language in categorical groupings that may facilitate identity construction (Butler, 1997; Foucault, 1976/1990). The emergence of a neologism—such as homosexual or sadist—is implicated in the process of knowledge production, the naming of the category facilitates a new and specific way of describing a population. Stanley Rosen (1987) touches on this point when he claims that knowledge is not purely descriptive but rather that “knowledge is making” (p.8). However, drawing on semiotics, knowledge production might also be understood as knowledge recycling. In the creation of any new nosological category the author of the term relies on linguistic symbols to make their creation comprehensible. Analogy, case study, and metaphor are used in such nosological descriptions to make the meaning of the neologism comprehensible. In the following chapters I trace themes, repetitions, and absences within the psychiatric texts to formulate my conclusions about how psychiatrists incorporated or neglected the relationship between sexualized slavery, racialized slavery, German imperialism, and the German metropole. This will require reading the psychiatric publications as contextualized by their historical position. The language, themes, and values used and omitted in the descriptions of s/m facilitate my investigation of the explicit assumptions within these texts but also the implicit prejudices that undergird them.

Given the entanglement of race, sexuality, gender, sex, imperialism, racism, s/m, slavery, psychiatry, heterosexism, pathologization, and sexism, I will be working very closely with a number of subjects that require care and consideration. I come from a kink positive perspective and I do not assume that because there are relationships between s/m and
the masters, slaves, whips, and chains of racialized slavery that this means that s/m is inherently racist. Masters, slaves, whips, and chains are notably symbols of a multiplicity of systematically oppressive structures beyond white supremacist hegemony, including domesticity and the psychiatric institutions themselves. I am uncomfortable with the need to articulate a distinction between what I have been referring to as “racialized slavery,” to describe the enslavement of persons of colour that was legally supported by European imperialism, and “eroticized slavery,” which will refer to consensual slavery taking place in a s/m context. This linguistic decision troubles me, since, as Hartman (1997), bell hooks (1981), Collins (2005), and Fanon (1952/1967) have aptly noted, what I am calling “racialized slavery” has been persistently sexualized throughout settler colonialism, transatlantic slavery, and imperialism. However, my project makes such distinctions based upon dominant discourses constructed within the psychiatric texts, and not from a position that seeks to reify “racialized slavery” and “eroticized slavery” as aggregate categories. This project is about inserting a conversation about race into the regulation of “eroticized slavery” where it is often ignored. Steven Feierman (1995) offered much more than a truism, writing that because of its polysemic qualities, “the word slavery is dangerous” (p. 368).

The subject of racism is at the core of my thesis on s/m and German national identity. As a result I am prompted to heed Hartman’s (1997) caution regarding the reproduction of narratives of suffering with the “casualness” that too many previous authors have used in their accounts of racialized slavery and imperialism. Hartman’s project is one of recognizing the roles of the performative, the phantasmatic, and the erotic in antebellum southern USA. She fears that work on slavery too often reiterates the suffering of subjects in a way that fails to “[incite] indignation;” instead, “too often [such descriptions] immure us to a pain by virtue
of their familiarity . . . and especially because they reinforce the spectacular character of black suffering” (p. 3). Methodologically this requires care to be taken with my subjects of study and recognition that while I am writing about psychiatry I am also writing about histories that are filled with sustained cultural memory of inequity, injustice, and suffering.

**Theoretical Assemblages: Or, Why I Do Not Call my Work Intersectional**

There is no single theoretical framework facilitating my exploration of racialized discourse in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century psychoanalytic and psychiatric literature. I am equally interested in the imbrications of postcolonial, queer, psychoanalytic, critical race, and Foucaultian theory that make my project possible, as I am with the primary texts that facilitate my hermeneutic reading of race and s/m. Rather than divide theoretical frameworks into sections based upon categories of theory, such as “Foucaultian,” “postcolonial,” and “psychoanalytic,” I will weave theory together and draw upon its already mutually constituted states in my introductions to my two discussion chapters, “Going Civilized” and “A Biopower of Love.” But first, I will clarify the impetus to treat theory in such a manner.

Feminist and critical race scholars such as hooks (1981) and Collins (1999) call for intersectional scholarship addressing race, class, and gender as related and concomitant forms of oppression. The ‘race, class, and gender’ triad is touted in dozens of publications (Blum, 2008; Byrne, 2006; Chowdhry & Nair, 2002; Davis, 1981; Delle, Mrozowski & Paynter 2000; Dennis, 2005; Dines & Humez, 1994; Ebo, 1998; Grusky & Szelenyi, 2006; hooks, 1996; Hubbard, 1997; Janiewski, 1992; Karim, 2008; Magubane, 2004; McCall, 2001; Mullings, 1996; Naples, 1997; Palmer & Sangster, 2008; Pascale, 2007; Ramey & Pugh, 2007; Roschelle, 1997; Smith, 1999; Strolovitch, 2007; Weis, 1988). Despite the
popularity of the intersectional triad, there has been increasing acknowledgement of how limited “race, class, and gender” and sites of analysis really are; to this end scholars note the absence of sexuality, ability, nationality, citizenship status, religion, and expand the list to “every variable of identity imaginable” (Puar, 2007, p. 206). Scholars have attempted to evince the relationship between race, class, and gender by using imagery and metaphor such as overlapping circles, concentric circles, roads, and matrices (Collins, 1999; Crenshaw, 1994; Dhamoon, 2009). Comparisons to arithmetic have been incorporated to attempt explanations of a multiplicity of oppressions, such as Mary Deegan and Nancy Brook’s (1988) use of the phrase double handicap to describe the experiences of women with disabilities, and Kirsten Peterson and Anna Rutherford’s (1986) use of double colonialism to describe the experiences of colonized women of colour. Elizabeth Povinelli (2006) refers to this trend in intersectional scholarship as a “grammar of concatenation,” where two identity categories “are added to nomialized social phenomena (so we get race and sexuality)” (p. 11). She also problematizes what she calls “transformative” discourses of intersectionality, which treat “an aspect of social life . . . as transformed by” the experience of being gendered and racialized (p. 11). Such mathematics and imagery offer visual representations of how identity could be understood and how scholars proposing such models hope that their followers will come to conceptualize intersectionality. It should be of no surprise that the models become increasingly complex, from a few overlapping circles to what Collins (1999) describes as a matrix of domination.

While I am enticed by the imagery that matrices of domination produce, it almost seems to be undone by the language of intersectionality, which ultimately comes back to multiple lines crossing over one another. Such language marks a terrain of experience that
has an isolated point at the intersection of analysis—a physical space or body where multiple marginalizations have “intersected”—rather than looking at the figure of the whole.

Following from my discomfort with the intersectional model, though not the spirit of intersectional research, I adopt Jasbir Puar’s (2007) description of an assemblage to talk of the relationship between identities within my research. Puar critiques intersectionality’s attachment to identity categories. She argues “intersectionality privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning, while assemblage underscores feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information” (p. 215). Puar appeals to conflicting and paradoxical visual and tactile representations of the assemblage: “fusing, viscosity, bouncing” (p. 211). She consciously refuses her reader a stable image of what makes up a network of understanding subjectivities. Critiquing the compartmentalization of intersectionality in which one becomes the sum of one’s parts—race, class, gender—Puar cannot figure identities in ways that can be easily grabbed onto, described, or depicted. While the matrix conjures a chaotic web of interrelated space, the assemblage mocks the idea that a representational model is even possible.

Ultimately, Puar’s (2007) critique of intersectionality comes down to priorities. She is wary of the epistemological investigation of identity politics, as demonstrated by the ever-expanding list of identity categories now attached to race, class, and gender. Such an intersectional analysis makes two assumptions that are problematic for Puar: the first is that it is possible to name such identities, and secondly the idea that identities are even knowable. In the case of my work there is another problem. It seems at best self-defeating to go about the critique of the invention of identity categories—sadist, masochist, sadomasochist—while relying on other identity categories—queerness and race—to make my point. The work that
must come out of Puar’s criticisms is not as simple as acknowledging that race and sexuality are social constructions, but must, in my case, investigate the desperate attempt of psychiatry and imperialism to emphatically declare what is knowable and what can be known. It is also to call into question what the endeavour to know one’s other has cost us in terms of affect, tactility, and the ontology of s/m.

Though I agree with the bulk of Puar’s (2007) criticisms, I feel hesitant about some of the dichotomies she sets up in her distinctions between intersectionality and assemblage, most notably her claim that intersectional scholarship—to its detriment—privileges epistemological and representational analysis, whereas work on assemblage—to its benefit—privileges the interrogation of ontology and information. Ontology and epistemology ought not be so easily separated from one another. Queer theory’s genealogical approach to epistemological investigations (Foucault, 1976/1990; Sedgwick, 1990) ultimately troubles the ontologies that continue to haunt contemporary dominant discourses. This is not to say that one cannot trouble an ontological assumption without an epistemological investigation, but that Puar fails to explain why epistemology should be written off altogether. Foucault (2008) makes it quite clear that his genealogical projects are always about ontology:

The point of all these investigations concerning madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, and what I am talking about now [governmentality], is to show how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus of knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately submits it to the division between true and false. (19)

To study how one has come to acquire knowledge, epistemology, is inseparable from a critique of the taken-for-granted knowledge produced from the epistemological process.
Said (1979) understood this when he took up a Foucaultian method of discourse analysis arguing that there is no Orient, rather that it has only been imagined into being; it is a fantasy, not a thing. The work of queer theorists on representation (Edelman, 2004; Foucault, 1976/1990; Prosser, 1998; Sedgwick, 1990) frequently serves the end of revealing tacit ontological assumptions: things that we all know, without knowing that we know them. This is most obvious in the case of Lee Edelman’s (2004) work on reproductive futurism. Edelman uses psychoanalysis and queer theory and texts such as *Children of Men* and *A Christmas Carol* to demonstrate that children are figured as the future, and concomitantly, that the queered figure who refuses to reproduce is positioned in direct opposition to this future. What is taken as self-evident knowledge is challenged through an epistemological investigation of those discourses that (re)produce that knowledge. Thus while I agree with Puar that ultimately it is ontology that ought to be investigated, epistemological investigations into representational texts remain useful precisely for that purpose.

As Puar (2007) makes the case against an intersectional model of identity politics of race, class, and gender, so I am making the case that an intersectional approach to theoretical frameworks is similarly problematic if we imagine it as a listing of bulleted, segregated categories. Though some theoretical frameworks lend themselves more intuitively to one another such as feminism to queer theory, and some theoretical positions have more historical tension between them, such as queer and critical race theory (Barnard, 2003; Collins, 2005; Johnson & Henderson, 2005), for the purposes of this project it is my contention that queer, psychoanalytic, critical race, postcolonial, and Foucaultian theory are better integrated under a construct of assemblage than intersectionality. It is not my hope to build up a theoretical model out of separate pieces of theory that now form a new and
knowable being. Rather I am interested in using such theoretical frameworks in their already entangled and mutually constituted forms. Theories that slide into one another while bouncing off walls and dripping down the sides. Theory that is understood as porous and malleable.

Take for example the incorporation of queer theory and critical race theory. Such intersectional work was born out of critiques of critical race theory for its heterosexism in the best of cases and homophobia in its worst (Collins, 2005; Johnson & Henderson, 2005) and out of critiques of queer theory’s white supremacist value structure (Barnard, 2003; Johnson & Henderson, 2005). Yet, despite the burgeoning and prolific scholarship that has come out in the past decade addressing sexuality and race in conversation with one another, much of this scholarship stops at seeking to describe, explain, or examine the experiences of one’s sexuality as affected by their racialization, or the experiences of one’s racialization as affected by their sexuality—stories that tell a great deal more about the limitations of queer theory and critical race theory for having previously considered them untellable or unimaginable, than they do about the groups they describe. The theoretical positions of queer theory and critical race theory continue to avoid one another. This is aptly demonstrated in the dearth of scholarship that incorporates ideas of biopolitics, eugenics, and reprosexuality. All this is to say, it is not a matter of mounting one theoretical framework on the back of another, nor is to mash them together in some sort of theoretical casserole. Instead it is to acknowledge that in many respects such theoretical positions are already similarly invested.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter Two: Literature Review. The literature review starts with a history of the relationship between imperialism and German national identity. Germany’s comparatively
late expansion into Africa was deemed anachronistic within the metropole and also to other nations that had built their empire on colonies. I investigate Germany’s failed expansionist projects prior to unification and couple this with an examination of how narratives of race, racism, and imperialism were taken up within German consciousness in responses to expansionist projects post-unification. I also briefly discuss how Germany’s post-unification expansionist projects were critiqued by other European nations. The second half of the literature review is dedicated to imperial psychiatry. Using Foucault’s (1961/1988) work on madness in the French metropole, I contrast existing literature on imperial psychiatry in different African colonies including Zimbabwe and South Africa. I seek to explore the difference in standards of care between European psychiatry and psychiatry conducted by Europeans in the colonies as well as psychiatric ambivalence to persons of colour and colonized bodies.

Chapter Three: Introduction to Primary Sources. Chapter Three places the definitions of s/m coined by the five German sexologists within a wider context of each author’s life work, as well as the individual text itself. The majority of those German authors who wrote of s/m during Germany’s expansionist project include their definitions within larger works that discuss broader treatises upon perversion outside of s/m. By placing the definitions within a larger context of the text, as well as within the authors’ life works, it is my hope to draw attention to the momentum that was fostered by Krafft-Ebing’s initial pathologization of s/m. There are many diagnostic categories invented that did not catch the attention or interest of other scholars. That s/m was not only taken up by Schrenck-Notzing, Moll, Eulenburg, and Freud, but were also redefined, debated, and treated speaks to ripple effects of diagnosis within psychiatric and lay communities.
Chapter Four: Discussion One – Going Civilized. The first section of my discussion takes up how sexologists figured their definitions of s/m within wider claims about civilization, morality, sexuality, perversion, and savagery. This is taken up through discussions of what civilized, or normal, sexuality was imagined to look like within the German metropole. This is then contrasted against the role of neurasthenia as a concomitant diagnosis ascribed to many s/m patients. Here I also explore the role of terms such as “degeneracy,” “atavism,” and “primitive” within the nosological descriptions of s/m. Such language is utilized to mark the s/m practitioner within a narrative of failed whiteness. Despite psychiatry’s persistent marking of the s/m practitioner within a narrative of sexuality that has deviated from normal and moral civilized sexuality, the authors refuse to acknowledge the role of imperialism within these conversations. The final section addresses one of Krafft-Ebing’s cases studies, 57, who represents patient agency within medicalizing structures. In detailed discussions of masochistic fantasies which draw on an American abolitionist novel, 57 speaks to the connection between imperialism and s/m.

Chapter Five: Discussion Two – A Biopower of Love. The second half of my discussion focuses on how whiteness, sexuality, and reproduction are regulated through the nosological descriptions and case studies of s/m. It seeks to locate how individual sexuality is placed within a wider narrative about the necessity of reproduction for the health and survival of the nation state. However, it also dwells upon the way that sexuality is infused with affect by such definitions, arguing that the regulation of sexuality is also about the regulation of how love manifests within sexual relationships. European sexuality is deemed civilized, and therefore distinct from animal or savage sexuality, because it is about more than “just” reproduction. It is about hope and a future. Lastly, I focus upon narratives of philanthropy
within the nosological descriptions. Who is it that these descriptions hope to save? This is then contrasted against metaphors of despotic and tyrannical love between s/m practitioners, marking their perversion as aligned with an imagined and othered violent nation state, different from the assumed civilized nation state of Germany.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

Conditions of Possibility: German Nineteenth Century Imperialisms and National Identity

Having just achieved unification in 1871, Germany’s national identity was in persistent flux nearing the close of the nineteenth century (Townsend, 1921). Despite centuries of Teutonic pride predating unification, the newly formed nation had the histories of empires, such as the French and British, to live up to. Despite the political and economic shifts within many European countries, which were seeking to abolish slavery and alter if not completely cease their approaches to settler colonialism, such nations had laid a groundwork that defined what it meant to become an empire through conquest and imperialism. Germany’s expansionist project is often periodized between 1884-1919 (Deutsch, 2006; Freidrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001; Mackenzie, 1974; Sunseri, 1993; Townsend, 1930; Walther, 2002), depending on whether the authors are focusing on East Africa, Southwest Africa, Togo, or Cameroon and whether they mark the close of expansion into Africa with the beginning or close of World War I, or by the Treaty of Versailles’s reallocation of land.

In what follows I outline discourses of race and imperialism that facilitated and challenged the German expansionist projects of the late nineteenth century, including Germany’s previous failed colonialist projects. Mary Townsend (1921) notes that German statesman, Otto von Bismark, prior to Germany’s decision to expand, declared: “No country should engage upon colonial activity, unless a strong public opinion supports it” (Townsend, 1921, p. 20). This is not to say that the mere existence of Germany’s imperialist expansion evinces the support of its citizens, but rather to think about how Germany’s decision to
expand into East Africa and Southwest Africa was enmeshed in national discourses already taking place amongst German citizens, including its psychiatric professionals. Not every author working on s/m whom I will discuss in chapters three, four, and five is of German nationality, nor do I assume that those Austrian and German sexologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts were consciously attempting to participate in the formation of Germany’s national identity. Rather, I want to lay the groundwork to think about how those discourses that affected the decision for Germany’s expansion, may have affected other areas of the metropole, and European discourses of sexuality in general. I want to recognize, that is, that knowledge is not produced in a vacuum. To this end, I offer an adumbrated history of German imperialism so that the formation of sadism, masochism, sadomasochism, and algolagny as psychiatric categories can be read through historic tensions of a newly unified nation’s anachronistic expansionist policy, Teutonic pride, and the Black Legend.

**Austria: Germans abroad.** Beyond the contiguous nations sharing German as the primary language, Austria has a long history of political, economic, and migratory interdependence with Germany (Barbour, 2002; Katsenstein, 1976). David Blackbourn (2003) asks rhetorically in regard to German history post-unification, “If Germany was defined in terms of language, culture or even race, how could it end at the borders of Bismarck? Should it not include Germans in Austria … and the African colonies?” (p. xvii). He then adds that given the dynamics of imperialism and migration in nineteenth century Germany, a history of Germany requires “some consideration of ‘Germany abroad’” (p. xvii). Stephen Barbour (2002) demonstrates this sense of cultural affiliation between Germany and Austria, noting that unlike other German-speaking countries, the German language was profoundly tied to national identity in both Austria and Germany. Peter
Katsenstein’s (1976) examination of the asymmetrical relationship between Germany and Austria points to Austria’s financial dependence on Germany nearing the end of the nineteenth century. Regarding migration, though Katsenstein observes a decrease from 31 percent Germans among Austria’s foreigners in 1869 to 22 percent in 1910, it nonetheless demonstrates a strong cultural affiliation between nations. Furthermore, Katsenstein also observes that in the late nineteenth century and pre-World War I twentieth century, the Austrian newspapers allocated between two and three times the attention to Germany than Germany did to Austria. Lastly, Oosterhuis (2000) argues that by the dawn of the twentieth century, Germany and Austria had become the center for medicalized research upon sexuality, replacing France. None of this is to say that Austria’s national identity can be collapsed into Germany’s, a claim comparably problematic to one asserting that Germany or Austria as individual nations had coherent and singular national identities of their own. Rather it is to acknowledge the geopolitical proximity of the potential pluralities, investments, and stakes of German and Austrian identities and that it may be useful to keep them in conversation with one another.

**Histories of German imperialism.** Compared to other metropolitan states engaging in imperial expansion, such as Britain, France, and settler colonies such as Canada and Australia, there is a paucity of English publications on Germany’s imperial history. Though there is considerably more scholarship done on Germany’s imperialist expansion written in German that is not translated to English, even with the German and English scholarship combined, the volume of scholarship is incomparable to the amount produced on Britain and France’s imperialist expansions and occupations (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001; Zantop, 1997). Scholars working in this still nascent area offer a number of explanations as
to why Germany’s late nineteenth century imperialism may have received such disinterest: the comparably short periodization of Germany’s colonial expansion; the small geographic target of imperialism; the unimpressive financial benefit to the German metropole; the absence of colonized subjects within Germany speaking out against the history of colonialism [see Campt, 2004 and Opitz, 1992 for exceptions]; and Germany’s centrality in other areas of history, such as the Holocaust, taken as an intellectual priority (Blackshite-Belay, 1992; Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001; Zantop, 1997). I might add that the limited availability of translations of German scholarship discussing imperialism hinders German-illiterate scholars from participating in the production of this scholarship. The dearth of scholarship on German imperialism is both the result and cause of what Catherine Hall (2002) calls “amnesia about empire” (p. 5). Opitz (1992) beckons us to recall Germany’s imperial history and recognize what the repression of such histories can do to a national consciousness. This literature review is in many ways an attempt to conjure up these memories of imperialism, ultimately with the goal of examining how they have infused the categories of s/m with tensions of race and nationalism.

Failed expansion and conquest before unification. The Teutonic Knights are often referred to as the earliest German-speaking colonists (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). As early as the fifteenth century the Teutonic Knights, and thousands of other Germans, aligned with Spanish and Portuguese travelers, venturing into the “New World” in the name of scientific expedition, and transporting African slaves with them in their travels to South America (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). Townsend (1921) notes that the history of the Teutonic Knights’s conquests of the Baltic lands and travels eastward “added the impulse of romance” to discourses of late German imperialism (p. 23). However, Zantop
(1997) suggests that this romanticism was mired in antinomy, caught between a romantic longing for expansion, and a reflective sense of superiority in not having participated in what was increasingly described in the late nineteenth century as the violence of slavery.

Gilman (1982) marks the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a pinnacle moment in Germany’s constructions of citizenship. In his book, *Blackness Without Blacks*—a title emphasizing that Germany gleaned much of its discursive ideals of blackness from nationally exogenous sources—he describes a “mythic structure of blackness [that] permeated even the image of the Black under German colonialism in the nineteenth century” (p. xi). Such a statement evinces Stuart Hall’s (1996) argument that histories of colonialism are not purely histories of those lands colonized, but also that colonization “was always inscribed deeply within [the imperial metropolis]” (p. 246). Germany’s metropole was not only inscribed with its own imperialism, but also with the travel literature, anthropology, and art from other European expansionist projects. Zantop (1997) and Gilman argue the representation of blackness in art and literature was, for many German’s, their sole source of knowledge about blackness. Gilman describes many of the representations of blackness in Germany—defined through fantasies of otherness and savagery—as anxiogenic, whereas Zantop beckons her readers to “dwell on the tension[s] between desire and fear, attraction and repulsion, incitement and interdiction which [are] operative in the imagination of would-be-colonizers” (p. 5).

While Zantop (1997) demonstrates this romantic investment and disavowal of imperialism in German literature, it is also apparent in German philosophy. There is much aesthetic philosophy and anthropology which espoused that the physiognomy of persons of colour, especially black Africans, were signs of inferiority, degeneracy, and were often
touted as justifications for imperialism and slavery (Gilman, 1975; Opitz, 1992). Eighteenth century Dutch philosopher Cornelius de Pauw argues that the European was the “natural man” and “natural colonizer” of what de Pauw described as the disordered and sexually deviant savage; similar arguments are not hard to come by (Zantop, 1997, p. 49). Immanuel Kant first introduced the term “Race,” rooted in the in English descriptions of the animal kingdom, into German discourses of the human in the late eighteenth century (Zantop, 1997, p. 68). Taking a monogenist approach, Kant believed that that all “races”—defined by skin-colour—had come from the same origin, but through the effects of geographic and climatic conditions, had become inferior to the original Saxon stock (Zantop, 1997). In the same time period the German word “Kultur” was synonymous with “civilization” (Young, 1995a, p. 37). The Kulturvolk had a “natural” right as the stronger to conquer the weaker Naturvolk (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001, p. 22). However, there was also a resistant German philosophy that contradicted such claims. Johann Herder in the late eighteenth century argued that the white skin of Europeans came to signify the destruction of imperialist exploitation (Gilman, 1975). By the mid-nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer, German philosopher and supporter of the abolition of slavery, argued that whiteness might instead be perceived as the signifier of degeneracy (Gilman, 1982). This is not to divide German historians, philosophers, and scientists into groups of racists and non-racists, since within the body of each of these scholars’ works exist contradictions. Rather it is to represent that Germany and its citizens, like those of other nations, struggled with competing narratives of civilizing imperialist missions as either violently destructive or salubriously productive (Zantop, 1997).
Historians and literary critics of imperialism have long looked to literature to access metropolitan fantasies of the colony (Apter, 1999; Faery, 1999; Sigel, 2002; Wallace, 2003). Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox, and Zantop (2001) trace such a history in Germany, positing the attachment of racialized master-slave narrative to the burgeoning master fantasies of domesticity, which crept into metaphors of imperialisms through discourses of the “marriage” of cultures. Drawing on the narratives of naturalized sexed and gendered hierarchies of the home, the colony became the idealized home for a growing empire (Zantop, 1997). German writers took up these narratives in the form of romantic—if not titillating—love stories, where German heroes entered foreign landscape and using their natural strength were able to create productivity, where there had previously been dysfunction (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). By the mid-nineteenth century the fictionalized, happy, colonial home gave way to new narratives called “Columbus dramas,” where “a visionary heroic male figure “discovers,” explores, and takes possession of virgin territories” (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001, p. 22).

The small-scale colonial endeavours between the heyday of the Teutonic Knights and the late nineteenth century were described by Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox, and Zantop (2001) as keeping “the “colonial ideal” alive” for Germany (p. 9). German-speaking explorers and colonists started to initiate contact with persons of colour in Africa and in non-German European metropoles in the seventeenth century (Gilman, 1975). Between 1750 and the 1850s there was an increase in voyages to Africa, Australia, China, New Zealand, and South America in the name of scientific discovery (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). Furthermore, as the population grew, German settlers started to emigrate to South and North America (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). Zantop (1997) argues that it was
precisely the absence of a coherent, nationalistic imperialist history that fostered the fantasies of German expansion. She critiques Said’s (1979) argument that the paucity of German colonies in the eighteenth century made the German fantasy of colonialism more abstract, arguing rather that it was the missed adventure of new land, savage villains, and exotic damsels that abounded in the travelogues of so many other imperialist nations that offered Germany the sense of longing and entitlement to the colonist experience. Yet, Germany also had its own share of “colonial guilt” after the enslavement and annihilation of indigenous populations, in places such as Venezuela, which the Welsers, a sixteenth century German banking family sought to colonize (Zantop, 1997). Zantop takes up priest Bartolomé de las Casas’s discourse of the “Black Legend,” outlining the innate viciousness of the Germans and their aptitude for cruelty. What is more interesting to Zantop about German historians’ discussions of the Black Legend is how it participated in what Slavoj Žižek (2008) has referred to as “changing the subject” (p. 11). She argues that despite Germans having been “incomparably more cruel than all the other conquistadors,” the “Black Legend” was most often taken up by Germans to describe the Spanish cruelty. Instead, Germany substitutes stories of colonial failure for fantasies of triumph:

The frustrations, self-doubts, and moral qualms – over having come too late and having done too little, and over Germans’ complicity in colonial atrocities – were repressed in favor of a positive, affirmative, upbeat fantasy, which ended in an emphatic “no”: no, Germany had not come too late – there was still territory to be had: no, Germans were not incompetent colonizers – on the contrary: their proverbial courage, industry, and organizational talent predestined them for that vocation; and no, Germans had no share in colonial guilt – their innocence in fact legitimized their
claim to be given another chance. In other words, the “subtext” of failure was concerted into, and contained by, an ultimately triumphalist fantasy. (Zantop, 1997, p. 29).

Remnants of the Germanic sense of superiority, not only over the racialized other, but also over the European, can be found just prior to unification in the work of anatomist Carl Vogt who considered German Saxons to be a pure, Teutonic, race in and of themselves, disavowing Anglo-Saxons as mongrels (Young, 1995a).

**Unification.** Townsend (1921) marks unification in 1871 as a moment that not only reconfigured the geographic boundaries of Germany, but one that “also reconstructed the national mind” (p. 13). To return to Bismarck’s caution against colonial expansion without the support of the nation, between unification and 1884, Germany repeatedly turned down expansionist opportunities (Townsend, 1921). Just as Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox, and Zantop (2001) refer to the mid-nineteenth century fictionalized fantasies of imperialism as “anachronistic” (p. 22), so discourses of nineteenth century scholarship agreed (Townsend, 1921). Townsend (1921) quotes August Lammers as having referred, in 1871, to the impending possibility of German colonialism as “a sad political anachronism” and “that colonies should be considered chimerical” (p. 20). Lammers’s statement as translated by Townsend (1921) does not appear to draw specific references to the political shifts since the British Slavery Abolition Act nearly forty years prior, or the Emancipation Proclamation in the United States less than a decade old. However, with emancipation and slavery abolition happening in the British metropole, as well as British colonies in India (Sigel, 2002), transformations of political relationships between colonized subjects and colonizers must have affected the scope of colonial possibilities, marking many colonial practices, slavery
included, as an anachronism. Still, Ladelle McWhorter (2009) points out that the abolitionist movement in Britain was met with a great deal of resistance, which often drew its forces from anthropological and biological “knowledges” of the savage. Despite, Lammers’s charges of anachronism, in 1875 Vice-Admiral Livonius fervently advocated that as a newly unified state, Germany immediately commence an imperialist project (Townsend, 1921). However, Livonius’s proposal was immediately rejected, and blocked from publication as Bismarck was uncertain how other nations would respond (Townsend, 1921). Townsend’s history leaves room to imagine a multiplicity of concerns Bismarck may have had about how German imperialism might be perceived. Still, with the contextualizing shifts in what imperialism and slavery meant for empire and metropole, compounded with Germany’s tensions of the Black Legend, it is not unreasonable to deduce that the fear of German civility coming under scrutiny for expanding into Africa could have influenced Bismarck’s decision to stifle such a proposal.

In Townsend’s (1921) detailed history of the period of unification to 1884, she carefully outlines the steps taken to facilitate German imperialism. Among these included the oscillation of Germany’s financial security post-unification and the increased trade between Germany and British colonies in Samoan Islands (Townsend, 1921). As tensions grew in the Samoan colony, Germany formed a joint protectorate with Britain. This provided an opportunity for colonial enthusiasts within Germany to lobby the government to establish Germany as a colonizing empire by taking control of East Africa. In describing the expansionist propaganda, Townsend notes that between 1880 and 1882 forty books were published describing the benefits of German colonialism, drawing upon the possibility of economic growth, and fomenting nationalism that verged upon jingoism. The narratives that
Germany drew upon advocating for imperialism are exactly those one would expect to see following the pattern of justification that other empires had made use of. Townsend quips, “While it may be an English characteristic to construct a policy to fit the facts, it is indeed a distinct habit of the Germans to formulate, at the very outset, an abstract theory as a guide to practice” (p. 22). Many historians of race and imperialism have commented that the racialized and racist discourses used to justify imperialism are long predated by colonial and imperialist projects (McWhorter, 2009). McWhorter (2009) and Foucault (2003b) alike, remind us that the idea of race as an immutable category is a relatively modern invention. So it might not be that Germany thought out its justifications for imperialism more thoroughly than the British empire, but rather because Germany entered into its imperialistic project so late, it was able to borrow from well established discourses of racism, as well as biological and cultural inferiority to justify itself, in ways that became after thoughts for previous imperialistic projects. This does not mean that Germany had a monolithic perception of race, but rather that the conversation of imperialism after the emergence of scientific racism, debates of monogenic and polygenic origins, and other racialized discourses must take such historic developments into consideration. Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, one of Germany’s most loquacious academic imperialism enthusiasts, argued passionately that the German nation ought to bring Kultur to Africa, and with it the potential for progress (Townsend, 1921). In Matthew Fitzpatrick’s (2008) examination of Germany’s popular culture, nationalism, and imperialism prior to 1884, he notes that in popular weekly periodical, Die Gartenlaube, Germans frequently read about the benefits of colonialism to the problematically depicted lazy and uncivilized Africans. After 1880 Ernst von Weber took up writing for Die Gartenlaube advocating that Germany would find new vitality by entering an African
colonized landscape, but also advocated that through imperialism Germans would be assisting their “African brothers” in their struggle for freedom (Fitzpatrick, 2008, p. 192). Discourses of inferiority were combated with discourses of monogenic brotherhood and philanthropy. The possibility of expansion and settler colonialism represented the possibility of heroism, adventure, and conquest. Germany would not just be a nation, but an empire that controlled land outside of Europe. Imperialism would demonstrate Germany’s philanthropy; protectorates could be so readily framed as a benefit to the nation colonized, rather than as exploitative paternalism. Despite the rebuttals to such arguments and public censure against imperialism, which troubled such nationalistic rhetoric, Bismark gave his pro-colonial speech on June 26, 1884, leading to the establishment of Germany as a colonial empire.

**Imperialism post-unification and critiques of Germany** Though I do not wish to spend too much time on how imperialism manifested within the German colonies, it is useful to take up a few examples that would come to disrupt the conflation of imperialism, civility, and nationalistic pride within Germany. With the increasing emancipation and abolition of slavery within America and Britain, the majority of colonies within Africa were undermining, or altogether doing away with slavery (Sunseri, 1993). Instead of following suit, Germany anachronistically made its colonial economic policy reliant upon the preservation of slavery (Sunseri, 1993). Thaddeus Sunseri (1993) estimates that there were “several hundred thousand slaves in German East Africa” prior to World War I, making up approximately 10 percent of the population (p. 490).

Carl Peters and General Lothar von Trotha are often evoked as examples of Germany’s more deleterious settlers (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001; Opitz, 1992; Walther, 2002; Zantop, 1997). Carol Blackshire-Belay (1992) captures the euphemism of
“settler” colonialism eloquently, writing: “Germans did not “settle” in Africa. Germans “occupied,” “dominated,” and “exploited” African countries” (p. 244). Peters, a founding member of the Society for German Colonization (1884) and the German East African Society (1885), claimed enormous quantities of land eliciting much confrontation from East Africans (Freidrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001; Opitz, 1992). Opitz (1992) quotes Peters:

The negro is the born slave, who needs his despot as the opium smoker needs his pipe, and he lacks any noble characteristics. He is prone to lying and stealing, is disloyal, and deceitful …

… I have tried to make an impression on the Massai with forest fires, firecrackers, even with a coincidental eclipse of the sun on 12/23, but I found that the only thing that made an impression on those wild sons of the steppes were bullets of the repeater and double-barrel rifles and by persistently using them against their own bodies, at that. (p. 26)

In 1896 Peters was removed from office for having murdered his African mistress and her lover (Freidrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). Peters’s removal from East Africa did not, however, quell the tensions of land and livelihood. Between 1905 and 1907 East Africa witnessed the Maji Maji revolt, one of many uprisings against the German occupier (Freidrichsmeyer, Lennoz & Zantop, 2001). The Maji Maji revolt is estimated to have claimed the lives of between 75,000 and 100,000 Africans (Freidrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). The revolt and imperial response were of great embarrassment to Germany, and led to the replacement of governor Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen for his emphasis on militarization (Schmidt, 2008).
As in other imperial histories, many of the Africans colonized by Germany rebelled collectively against the colonial rule, and others found ways of individually subverting occupation. Sunseri (1993) captures this phenomena noting that slaves frequently used holes in the slave ransoming policies of German colonies to become free. The Nama had been opposing occupation in Namibia and the expropriation of their land through guerilla warfare throughout the 1890s (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001; Walther, 2002). Another community of Africans in Namibia, the Herero, joined in the Nama’s struggles against imperialism (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001). It is estimated that 35 to 50 percent of Nama were murdered and 75 to 80 percent of the Herero were exterminated in response to these revolts (Walther, 2002). Though historians debate whether the attack on the Herero and Nama can be framed as “genocidal,” General von Trotha’s 1904 extermination speech speaks for itself:

The Herero nation must leave the country. If it will not do so, I shall compel it by force. Inside German territory every Herero tribesman, armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. No woman and children will be allowed in the territory; they will be driven back to their people or fired on. These are the last words to the Herero nation from me, the great general of the mighty German emperor (SWAPO, 1981, p. 13, in Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001, p. 13).

Trotha’s infamy resulted in his repatriation back to Germany in 1905 (Friedrichsmeyer, Lennox & Zantop, 2001).

In the face of such resistance Germany failed at convincing its citizens and other Europeans that their presence was well received in Africa. International criticism of German conduct in the colonies can be found as early as 1888 (Mackenzie, 1974). Early criticisms
focused on Germany’s paternalistic policy that attempted to force the Samoans into subservience through arson and expropriating land (Mackenzie, 1974). By 1889, The New Zealand Herald deemed Germans to be “unfit for colonial extension” because of “rough, unreasoning, and arrogant treatment” of colonized people (in Mackenzie, 1974, p. 168). In 1892 Robert Louis Stevenson took up Germany’s occupation of Samoa as the subject of his novel, A Footnote in History, which featured the German character as the central problem of colonial tension and violence in Samoa (Mackenzie, 1974). His novel concluded with a plea for Germans to discover “moderation and understanding” in their dealings with the Samoans (Mackenzie, 1974, p. 171). As might be expected, the most vitriolic critique of Germany’s imperialism came in response to Trotha and accused Germans of “incompetence and savagery” (Mackenzie, 1974, p. 174). Amidst accusations of savagery, cruelty, and genocide, Germany also repatriated several German colonialists for homosexuality within the African colonies (Schmidt, 2008; Walther, 2008). Repatriation was not merely about the need to prosecute homosexual offenders under the German Criminal Code, which outlawed sexual contact between men, but was also attached to a fear of how the German empire would be perceived if German colonists were caught gaily fornicating (Schmidt, 2008; Walther, 2008). Such anxiety was as much about the fear of losing face before colonized Africans, as it was about a desire among many Germans to have Germany live up to the imperial conquest of previous empires (Walther, 2008).

What ought to be taken from all of this history is the ubiquity of tensions between civility and savagery in German national identity at the end of the nineteenth century. Colonialism was supposed to present the opportunity for Germany to put its name beside European empires such as France and Britain. If whiteness means never feeling like a
stranger, as Hall (2002) suggests, how might we understand German whiteness to have felt threatened by such a clear persona non grata status within their African colonies? How did Germany comprehend its national infancy when met with censure for its outdated and often racially inscribed “barbaric” and “primitive” behaviour in Africa? How was that shame of savagery paralleled with discourses of perverse and deviant sexuality? Just as Germany came to understand itself as a nation, and sought to represent itself as a civilized, advanced, and tacitly white nation, other European countries marked German people in primitive language such as savage and barbaric, thus connoting blackness. When examining the passionate disavowal of sexualized, white, master-slave relationships though s/m in the following chapters, this fragility of national identity is quintessential. The investment in regulating sexuality within Germany’s national borders, and within the colonies as well, cannot be removed from the historic proximity to this crisis of identity.

**Imperial Psychiatry in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries**

Foucault (1961/1988) opens *Madness and Civilization* with a quote from Dostoyevsky. “It is not by confining one’s neighbor that one is convinced of one’s own sanity” (p. ix). Foucault goes on to tie madness to what he will later call ‘governmentality,’ by asking that we understand neighbours in confinement in relation to the state and how those citizens relate within national borders. The issues of state, citizenship, and civility are paramount to the following pages and to my wider discussion of s/m in Germany’s national identity. While scholars have critiqued the absence of race in Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* (Gilroy, 2000; Stoler, 1995), considerably less attention is paid to the absence of race in Foucault’s work on medicine and psychiatry (1961/1988, 1963/1973, 2003a). Stoler’s (1995) often-quoted critique of Foucault’s work on sexuality, asks if any of the figures of Victorian
sexuality: the masturbating child, the hysteric woman, the homosexual, or Malthusian couple could have existed “as objects of knowledge and discourse in the nineteenth century without a racially erotic counterpoint” (p. 7). Lynne Huffer (2010) challenges queer theory’s investment in *History of Sexuality* and asks that scholars return to madness, remembering that the homosexual, masturbating child, and hysteric woman were pathologized and medicalized. So as studies of sexuality take up the assemblages of madness, desire, and the state, one might ask the same question that Stoler does about the key figures in Foucault’s work on psychiatry.

Scholars working in the history of imperial psychiatry have been more forgiving of Foucault’s omissions than postcolonial feminist theorists. Instead, historians of imperial psychiatry have followed in Said’s (1979) footsteps, taking what is good and useful from Foucault, and applying it to postcolonial, anticolonial, and subaltern histories of psychiatry, leaving any implicit critique of Foucault’s Eurocentrism separate from critiques of the value of certain theoretical positions, such as discourses of power. The overwhelming majority of these historians focus on French and British colonies in India and African countries, especially South Africa, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, but with works also geographically situated in North Africa and East Africa. These texts focus on the architectural make up of institutions, the imperial clash between local medicine and metropolitan medicine, the experiences of colonizers—as workers and as patients—in the asylums, the experiences of those colonized within the asylum, and the necessary minutiae of historic writing: the names, and dates, and times of asylum creation, policy, and shifts.

I have struggled with how to structure this particular section of the literature review more than the former. Critiques of the language of colonialism, postcolonialism, and
imperialism warn against the pitfalls of not only collapsing different colonized nations into a single category of experience, but also of collapsing individuals within the colonized state into a dichotomy of colonizer and colonized (Loomba, 2005; McClintock, 1992; Prakash, 1994; Said, 1979; Shohat, 1992; Stoler, 2002). However, I have decided to discuss imperial psychiatry divided thematically rather than in the form of isolated institutions for a number of reasons. The first has to do with the intentions of this section. This history is taken up to demonstrate how scholars have been working to deconstruct how, in the colonies, ideas of “otherness” leading to the institutionalization and pathologization of madness were racially defined. These examples are used to explicate the entanglement of images of the primitive with images of madness. However, this section is not intended to give a detailed historiography of imperial psychiatry in any given nation. Several publications already exist on the subject (see Deacon, 1999; Deacon, 2001; Ernst, 1991; Ernst, 1996; Ernst, 2007; Fanon, 1952/1967; Gilman, 1985; Jackson, 2005; Keller, 2007; McCulloch, 1995; Mills, 2000; Sadowsky, 1999; Sen, 2005; Swartz, 1995; Swartz, 2005; Vaughan, 1983; Vaughan, 2007). Furthermore, it is not my intention to bind nineteenth century imperialist psychiatry to Germany’s colonial occupations. Much of the scholarship upon imperial psychiatry is periodized well after World War I. Instead, I hope to demonstrate the connections between imperialist expansionist projects and psychiatry, linking the apocryphal discourses of philanthropically ‘saving’ the savage natives from themselves and similar philanthropic narratives of saving the degenerate perverted and insane deviant from themselves. To this end I will explore Foucault’s concept of (un)reason and the talking patient, his analysis of the Great Confinement, the conflation of prisons and asylums in imperial projects, and the question of agency as each of these themes emerge in the history of imperialist psychiatry.
Where appropriate this history will be put into conversation with work on the history of psychiatry in the European context.

**The (un)reason of the talking patient.** Psychiatry, Foucault argues, is a “monologue of reason about madness” (1961/1988, p. xi). A monologue in a dyadic scene, such as that between analyst and patient, is contingent upon the silence of the other. Huffer (2010) argues that under psychiatric practice, “madness and the psyche have no real content and, therefore, have nothing to say” (p. 149). This silence comes to symbolize, for Foucault, the tensions of pre-psychoanalytic treatment for the mad. The mad person only exists as a point of observation and classification, and therefore dialogue is impossible (Foucault, 1961/1988). Foucault struggled with the failed potential of psychoanalysis to subvert such a silencing (1961/1988, 2003a). There seems to be a longing in Foucault’s work to read Freud as subverting, rather than participating, within the discourses of regulating sexuality. Foucault (1961/1988) argues in *Madness and Civilization* that psychoanalysis failed to listen to the patient who speaks, and instead only “preserved the old asylum structure” through “doubl[ing] the absolute observation of the watcher with the endless monologue of the person watched” (p. 251). Foucault (1976/1990) later acknowledges that psychiatry works concomitantly with jurisprudence as a “social practice, which took the exasperated but coherent form of a state-directed racism, furnished this technology of sex with a formidable power and far-reaching consequences” (p. 119). Though he concludes in *History of Sexuality Volume One* that Freud is part of a normalizing discourse, he also claims that from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century psychoanalysis troubled the hereditary and degeneracy theory that had fueled so much psychiatry before it. Huffer, however, asks readers to acknowledge that in spite of the potential for psychoanalysis to have restructured...
the relationship between doctor and patient, psychoanalysis failed to change the normalizing narratives of psychiatry.

Though Freud may have moved away from genetic causes of madness, Foucault does not offer Freud or psychoanalysis absolution for their part in normalizing discourses of sexuality and behaviour. Feminist and anti-colonialist scholars (Fanon, 1952/1967; Seshadri-Crooks, 1994; Walton, 2001) have since pointed out that despite the psychoanalytic shift from an emphasis on degeneracy, psychoanalytic discourse is situated in assumptions of whiteness in both analyst and patient. Their sentiment is aptly captured by the title of Robert Gutherie’s (2003) monograph on the history of psychiatric racism, Even the Rat was White. Other scholars (Saunders, 1988; Thomson, 1999) have attempted to minimalize the effects of scientific racism in historical context. They argue that scientific racism may have experienced little attention outside of those working to promote it. Such an interpretation ignores how scientific racism was as much a product of a racist culture as it was a vehicle for its production; they are mutually constitutive. Drawing upon a genealogical approach to the history of racism, McWhorter (2009) claims “where morphological race was concerned, scientific theory followed and attempted to explain, justify, and refine practice; it did not precipitate it” (p. 73). Furthermore, Harriet Deacon (2001) avers one does not need scientific racism to practice medicine and psychiatry filtered through racist belief structures. What I want to think through in the scholarship on imperial psychiatry is the different treatment of European and African, or European and Indian, patients. Not just in imperial psychiatry’s racist allocation of treatment and funds, but in the justifications used for psychiatric care.

**Differences in standards of care and practice.** Megan Vaughan (1983) and Jock McCulloch (1995) both observe that Europeans who experienced any contact with African
colonies, fancied themselves to be “experts on African psychology” (Vaughan, 1983, p. 226). Such expertise was not only a consequence of nineteenth century assumptions that Africans were simple minded, childlike, and psychically uninteresting (Gilman, 1985; Jackson, 2005; Marks, 2007; Swartz, 1995; Vaughan, 1983); it also had productive effects throughout occupation. In spite of such claims to expertise, Jonathan Sadowsky (1999) notes that psychiatrists were absent from the asylums for the overwhelming majority of Nigeria’s colonial occupation. Similarly, the Zomba Lunatic Asylum in Nyasaland Protectorate, present day Malawi, was first established in 1910, but it was not until 1955 that a psychiatrist was appointed to the facilities (Vaughan, 1983). In the light of such evidence, McCulloch argues that very few psychiatrists worked with Africans in Africa in the 1920s and 1930s, quipping that colonies the size of Kenya could be expected to have only one psychiatric professional, more likely available to the settlers than those colonized.

McCulloch (1995) also explores the role of the short-lived sub-field of psychiatry and anthropology: ethnopsychiatry. He describes tensions around ethnopsychiatry in a way that might be easily compared to Foucault’s antinomy on psychoanalysis. McCulloch argues that whereas the ‘old’ scientific racism tried to locate the presumed inferiority of black Africans in the body through physiognomy and brain measurements, ethnopsychiatry offered the opportunity to acknowledge cultural context and individual personalities in African cases of madness. However, much like psychoanalysis, despite ethnopsychiatry offering tools to move from the regulation of the body to conversation with a subject, no dialogue could be had, and instead ethnopsychiatry recursively returned to the notion of African “imperfectability” (McCulloch, 1995, p. 5). Sally Swartz (1995) echoes this sentiment writing that in British colonial institutions “no attempt was made” to understand the unique
features of madness in colonial South Africa and, like ethnopsychiatry, the bulk of psychiatry relied on the prejudices of “racially discriminate colonizing consciousness” to explain etiologies of madness (pp. 401, 402). The hindsight provided by Fanon (1959/1965, 1961/1963) tells us that imperial psychiatry is not simply psychiatry in an imperial context, but psychiatry defined and practiced as part and parcel of practice of imperialism.

**The Great Confinement.** In what Foucault (1961/1988) calls the Great Confinement, the mad, prisoners, and other unruly subjects, were incarcerated, often through the juridical system. Confinement, of prisoners and mad persons was about labour and had little to do with treating illness (Foucault, 1961/1988). Shula Marks’s (2007) demonstrates the exploitation of mental patients as a source of labour in South African imperial asylums noting that black patients were transferred from one asylum to another in cases where asylums serving white, paying patients were short on labour. Foucault characterized the Great Confinement as a period where prisoners and mad people are institutionalized together in seventeenth century Europe. However, by the nineteenth century Foucault argues that psychiatry became indignant at the thought of locking the prisoner and mad person together. And yet, despite such trends spreading through Europe over a century ago, historians of imperial psychiatry have numerous examples of mad people incarcerated within the twentieth century prison system. Jackson (2005) argues that the establishment of Pretoria Asylum in nineteenth century Southern Rhodesia represents the “growing settler colonial consciousness” that housing mad amongst prisoners might be inadequate (p. 33). Nevertheless, the problem of locking the mad away in prisons persisted in Southern Rhodesia into the twentieth century (Jackson, 2005). In such circumstances, the problematizing of the incarceration of mad persons amongst prisoners was not couched in the Eurocentric
philanthropy of being better able to aid the ill in an asylum. Dr. Andrew Fleming argued for the removal of lunatics from the prisons, on the following grounds: “They [lunatics] occupy the cells to such an extent as to cause crowding of the other prisoners, and they, as well as delirium tremens cases, disturb prisoners and warders, largely increasing the work of the latter” (Jackson, 2005, p. 38). Vaughan (1983) observed a similar report from 1926 in reference to the Zomba Lunatic Asylum of Malawi. An insane prisoner had convinced the other prisoners that he had received orders that they stop working. Hence we see the “forced labor camp” of the asylum that was so common in seventeenth century psychiatry, operating within the penal asylums of twentieth century colonies (Foucault, 1961/1988, p. 59). The Zomba Asylum was first established in 1910 as a part of the Central Prison, and remained under the juridical system until 1951 (Vaughan, 1983). In the 1940s the commissioner of prisons in Nairobi was denied a request for “observation cells” to accommodate mad prisoners, so the majority of patients remained confined alongside the prison population (McCulloch, 1995, p. 24). Sadowsky (1999) describes early-twentieth century Nigerian asylums and prisons as “functionally equivalent” (p. 29). However, he notes that administrators distinguished between the two, so that the violent insane were kept separate from other prisoners. Whereas insanity in Europe took many forms, encompassing the moron, the melancholic, and the masturbator, the African mad person was only relevant as potentially violent and a threat to others. And whereas the 1838 reform of the French prisons held that the mad ought to be kept separate from the prisoners for the protection of the insane, twentieth century imperial prisons saw the insane as a burden to their system (Keller, 2007).
It is not my intent to argue that European colonial psychiatrists were “engaged in a large-scale project of direct social control,” as Vaughan (2007) warns against in reading the Great Confinement into colonial psychiatry, rather it is to dwell upon the similarities to the Great Confinement in order to critique the kinds of assumptions imperial psychiatry embodied (p. 2). It is significant that after over a hundred years of reform in Europe, regarding patient treatment and care, the colonies drew upon antedated and anachronistic institutional policy.

**Consuming the patient and medical gaze.** The process of consuming the psychiatric and medical patient through the psychiatrist’s and doctor’s senses—sight, touch, sound—is central to Foucault’s (1961/1988, 1963/1973) work on the regulation, categorization, and diagnosis of pathology. In *Birth of the Clinic* (1963/1973) he stresses that the gaze is a passive experience that seeks not only to absorb that which has caught its sight, but also to master it. This obsession with gaze can be found in mid-nineteenth century German asylums (Sammet, 2007). Kai Sammet (2007) describes in detail how for an asylum to serve its patients wellbeing, every aspect of the institution must be dedicated to moving a patient into convalescence and wellness; it was to be a “wohlgeordnete Anstalt (well-ordered asylum)” (p. 286). Supervision was a central aspect to the design, meaning that there always needed to be someone watching over the patients, accommodated through hidden holes in the wall and permanent lighting (Sammet, 2007). In the case of European response to somatic illness, the patient could not be trusted and instead the body if looked at properly, if appropriately mapped, would reveal all its secrets to the doctor (Foucault, 1973). The gaze of madness, for Foucault (1961/1988), was one of “spectacle” (p. 69). In *Psychiatric Power* (2003a) Foucault clarifies that Bentham’s panopticon was not just a model for a prison, but was also
transferable to the hospital, the school, and the asylum. “Permanent visibility” was entrenched in the understanding of the psychiatric cure (Foucault, 2003a, p. 102). Yet, throughout the history of medicine, medical invasion of the body forms what Foucault (1963/1973) coins as the “sight/touch/hearing trinity,” a “plurisensorial structure” (p. 202). The “speaking eye” is now “a complex organization with a view to a spatial assignation of the invisible” (Foucault, 1963/1973, p. 202). Psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel (1999) argues that to look at someone is to devour them. Critical race theory on visual culture has taken up this claim asking what it means to eat one’s other (Arondekar, 2009; hooks, 1992; Marriott, 1996). In reading histories of imperial psychiatry we might ask: What bodies were consumed? What senses were used to consume certain bodies? And, how was that consumption filtered through the cultural framework of the analyst or psychiatrist? Swartz (2005) reframes Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) perhaps most famous question, as “can the clinical subject speak?” (p. 399) within the context of South African’s colonial asylums as well as present subaltern psychiatry. Swartz (1995, 2005), Sadowsky (1999), and Vaughan (2007) each acknowledge that in tracing the history of imperial psychiatry, scholars indubitably learn more about the psychiatrists who did the recording of—or who failed to do the recording of—case histories, than about the patients themselves. Taking the negligible interest imperial asylums had in therapeutic methods, such as therapy, students of imperial psychiatry might rather glean knowledge as to how the psyche of Africans was consumed and dismissed. The colonized lunatic had neither the romantic appeal of the European discourses of freedom in madness, nor did they offer the European subject knowledge about colonialism or the African’s psyche.
The silencing of patients within the imperial asylum is a lasting injury of colonial medicine. Swartz (2005) takes up the examples of two women, Gertie and Annie, who were institutionalized for infanticide. She comments that nowhere in Gertie’ and Annie’s medical records is there any indication that they were ever asked why they killed their children: “Were they asked? If they were, why were their responses not recorded?” (p. 512). Despite the persistent substitution in psychiatry of the “primitive” and the “savage” for the harms imagined to follow the degeneration of the white race, psychiatrists were not expected to know much about those ‘savages’ contrasted as the civilized citizen’s other. Some historians of imperial psychiatry, in efforts to align themselves with the patients’ struggles, have sought to access medical histories where patients were given the opportunity to speak. Jackson (2005) is one such example. She reminds her readers of Foucault’s emphasis upon reason and unreason in the discourses of madness, noting that in imperial Zimbabwe—one of the few examples where indigenous people had access to a psychiatrist—the first step of the psychiatric interview was to determine if the patient understood reality. When a patient, Winnie, was asked why she was in the asylum, she gave the following answers:

“I am at Enhlanyeni, but my grandfather is not here.”

“I am at baas’s house” [baas translates to master]

“I followed my grandfather and my brother-in-law because the grandfather had no gramophone and wanted some beer.”

“I came to see the head nurse.” (Jackson, 2005, pp. 20-21).

As late as 1966 these answers did not satisfy her psychiatrist. Jackson tells us that the right answer would have been “because she is mad” (p. 21). There can be no way out of the asylum if the only way to prove connection to reality is to admit madness. Beyond the logical
problems of such a paradox, we must return to Foucault (1961/1988) to see that this process of patient interview is about bringing the mad patient to speak reason in the terms of the psychiatrist. In cases such as Winnie’s, Annie’s, and Gertie’s, this power imbalance is aggrandized by the psychiatrist also participating as a colonizer. Thus, Jackson counters the idea that the mad have no reason with, “But what about their reasons?” (p. 2).

There are two common critiques amongst historians of psychiatry about the kind of historiography of imperial psychiatry that I have offered you. I will attempt to amend my representation to account for the first; the second I will rebut. The history as I have presented it has very much been one of imperial policy and practice, and not one that, as Butler (2004) might put it, has done justice to those whose land was occupied. Keller (2007) summarizes this failure in many of the histories of imperialism, writing “a focus on the colonies as a crucible for innovation and experimentation includes a troubling dimension: reading the colonies as a laboratory perpetuates the conceptualization of overseas territories as a space devoid of indigenous human agency” (p. 8). Many authors have noted there was minimalist and poor record keeping when it came to the case histories of many Africans within the imperial asylums, making it difficult to find record of such agency in action. However, exceptions do exist. Jackson (2005) titles her book, Surfacing Up, which she describes as “the interactions between different forms of consciousness and agency resulting in one person being perceived as a problem by another” (p. 11). She goes on to explain that she is focusing her research on African patients in Ingutsheni and those processes that lead to their construction as disruptive to “the colonial order of things” (p. 11). Her work, and that of several scholars like her, pieces together histories of Africans negotiating imperial psychiatry by means that also disavowed, challenged, and subverted the colonial order. In another
example of exceptions to the erasure of agency of texts on imperial psychiatry, Swartz (1995) tells the stories of Antonie M, Margariet M, and James S who each found ways within the institutional settings of South Africa to avoid labour under the euphemism of therapy. James S’s story is particularly poignant. When interrogated as to why he refused to work, James S responded it was because he was “not a bloody fool” (Swartz, 1995, p. 413). Swartz points out that James has both rejected his status as foolish, in the sense that he ought to be institutionalized, but also in the sense that because he is institutionalized, he is also gullible and can be tricked into unpaid labour. Jackson argues many Zimbabweans were able to seek the guidance of local healers, such as nanga, for diagnosis, cures, and therapy, and rather made use of colonial medicine when it suited their interests, such as for access to tranquilizers. These are just a few examples intended to demonstrate that imperialism cannot be reduced to narratives of a powerful colonizer acting upon the passive, colonized subject. Rather the colonized found ways of subverting regulating and normalizing institutions, such as the asylum, and challenging the colonial and medical positions of authority.

This brings me to the second criticism of such a historic rendering. In a review of McCulloch’s (1995) book Colonial Psychiatry and ‘the African Mind’ Anthony Appiah argues, “Anyone who wants to add the colonial mental hospital to the long bill of indictment against colonialism … would do well to ask how these people would have been treated by their own societies; and should ponder, too, the fate of the mentally-ill in post-colonial Africa” (Appiah, 1995, pp. 16-17, in Sadowsky, 1999, p. 39). The discourse of the primitive who could serve to benefit from the technologies of Eurocentric medicine continue to abound through development “aid,” structural adjustment programs, and other western/northern initiatives. Resistance to acknowledging what Fanon (1959/1965) was so apt to point out,
that the processes of imperialism are antithetical to health, persist. There are many historians of psychiatry who consider their role within an academic sphere as one which brings objective information about psychiatry to the forefront, without imbuing it with political or anti-oppressive agendas. Claims such as, “one should be careful not to evaluate past psychiatric ideas and practices according to contemporary scientific and moral standards” are not hard to come by (Oosterhuis, 2000, p.56). However, Fanon’s (1959/1965) work also problematizes the possibility of objective renditions of colonial psychiatry, and adding this reading to his work in *Black Skin White Masks* (1952/1967), one might also read his critique into the history of sexuality. Rather than attacking the hubris of evening imagining the possibility of objectivity in science, as Donna Haraway (1988) does, through the metaphor of the “god trick,” Fanon emphasizes the limits of objectivity in the case of injury, “Scientific objectivity was barred to me, for the alienated, the neurotic, was my brother, my sister, my father” (p. 225). The critique of imperial psychiatry is not about invoking paradigms of the nefarious colonizer and the innocent colonized. Rather, this research is situated in a history of abuses, injuries, and struggles that emerged from the premise of supposedly objectively reasoned pursuits of knowledge, land, and bodies. Acknowledging imperial psychiatry as a regulatory mechanism that participated within a wider colonial project is a politicized position, and one that I argue—siding with Fanon—is useful. Such histories reveal double standards and contradictions within the philanthropic rhetoric of colonies and psychiatrists, who wished only to save the degenerate from themselves.

**German Imperialism Against Imperial Psychiatry**

Germany’s history of imperialism prior to unification oscillated between narratives that disavowed failed expansionist projects and sought to point to other nations in cases
where the imperialism superceded what were contemporaneously understood as acceptable levels of violence. Post-unification and the decision to expand into East Africa and Southwest Africa, Germany was met with a great deal of internal and external debate as to the role of imperialism and slave economies in the building of empire. In finding justifications for imperialism German leaders drew upon readily available discourses from previous expansionist projects, such as a philanthropic rhetoric of saving the savage from themselves, or by arguing for racial superiority and dominance. The tension between legitimizing the regulation of bodies through narratives of superiority and philanthropy are quite similar to those evoked in the discursive shifts of how mad persons were treated within the French metropole as described by Foucault (1961/1988). However, what the history of imperial psychiatry reveals is that while France and various parts of Europe may have been restructuring the treatment of the white European patient within the metropole through similar conversations of philanthropy and protection, the colonized subjects who were placed into imperial asylums were met with a very different fate. Though psychiatry, sexology, and psychoanalysis often drew references to the savage psyche as a point of contrast within their work, historiographies of imperial psychiatry reveals that there was little engagement with colonized patients that would have been offered as empirical evidence to support the claims of psychiatrists within the metropole. The mission to save the Africans from themselves and one another is mired in comparable justifications to the mission to save European mad persons from themselves.
Chapter Three: Introduction to Primary Sources

Nomenclature, Namesakes, and Nosology: Sexologists in Context

What follows is a brief biography of each of the five German and Austrian sexologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts who clinically addressed sadism, masochism, algolagnia, and sadomasochism between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Each section provides a brief description of the sexologist’s medical qualifications and how their work was received. It should be noted, however, that not all histories are created equal. There are many more available secondary and biographical sources about the writings of Krafft-Ebing and Freud, for example, than about Schrenck-Notzing, Moll, and Eulenburg. The purpose of these sections is to demonstrate that the scholarship that each of these authors produced on s/m is but a mere moment within lifelong careers in psychiatry and medicine. This ought not diminish the significance of the impact of each of their conclusions about s/m. As the descriptions unfold, the influences from one scholar to the next become transparent. Though not always a friendly, inviting, and forgiving group, an academic community of sexologists did exist within Germany and Austria and came together intellectually, if not in physical space, to describe what each understood, in their terms, to be perversions.

The second half of each section offers a broader description of the purposes of each individual text, as well as outlining how each thinker contributed to discussions that medicalized s/m, setting up the background and context of the texts to be examined in chapters four, five, and six. In some ways this chapter is apologetic. This thesis started out about s/m, but with the shift to the study of imperialism there is little within the final chapters about the descriptions of s/m in and of themselves. Rather it is in this chapter that I outline what each author contributes to the study of s/m, in part so that this information does not go
unrecorded, but more relevantly because the following chapters’ examinations of racialization, civility, eugenics, reprosexuality, biopower, love, and grievability must be read within the context of these authors’ nosological categorizations and the wider context of each publication. The authors’ contextualizations are taken up in chronological order of their publications, with one exception. The available translation of Krafft-Ebing’s *Psychopathia Sexualis* is of the 1903 posthumous edition, rather than any of his previous editions between it and 1886. However, despite the translated edition marking *Psychopathia Sexualis* as the penultimate in chronological creation, I have decided to cover his text first, based upon the impact of the first edition in 1886. Though the content certainly changed between the first and last editions of *Psychopathia Sexualis* (Crozier, 2004; Moore, 2009b; Oosterhuis, 2000), the sexological texts taken up in this chapter are so directly engaged with Krafft-Ebing’s work, that it would not make sense to deny its foundational position in the discussions of pathologizing s/m.


Krafft-Ebing was born in Mannheim, Germany, on August 14, 1840 (Klaf, 1965). His cosmopolitan career started early as he attended his elementary education in both Germany and Switzerland (Klaf, 1965). By Krafft-Ebing’s early adulthood his parents had moved from Mannheim to Heidelberg, Germany (Klaf, 1965). Here, his maternal grandfather, an attorney who frequently undertook cases involving sexual perversion, took to educating Krafft-Ebing (Klaf, 1965). Krafft-Ebing soon commenced his studies of medicine, which were interrupted by repeated attacks of typhus, forcing him to take breaks throughout his schooling (Klaf, 1965). Krafft-Ebing’s interest in psychopathology led him to volunteer at Illenau Asylum in
Achern, Germany, where he commenced his psychiatric training (Klaf, 1965). Eric Engstrom (2003) describes Illenau as one of three psychiatric hospitals in Germany that had a reputation as a “standard-bear[er] in clinical instruction” (p. 47). Krafft-Ebing soon selected “Mental Delirium” as his dissertation topic, completing his doctorate in 1863 (Oosterhuis, 2000). He then traveled to Berlin to garner further experience and training from 1864-1869; this was a period in German history where psychiatry had very little career status (Klaf, 1965; Oosterhuis, 2000). Franklin Klaf (1965) describes Krafft-Ebing as “the best trained neuropsychiatrist on the continent” by 1870 when he accepted his professorship at Strasbourg, France just on the border of Germany. Throughout his career he was “showered” with honours and recognition within Germany and across Europe (Blain, 1965, p. ix). In the 1880s Krafft-Ebing resigned from Strasbourg and moved to Austria, forming the Sanatorium Marigrum until he was offered the highest academic position at the University of Vienna in 1889, teaching while also taking over their clinic (Klaf, 1965; Makari, 1997). His position at the University of Vienna afforded him so much respect that a reviewer of *Psychopathia Sexualis* comments, “The critic is deterred from speaking as strongly about it as he might otherwise be disposed to do by respect for the great university in which the author holds, or until recently held, a chair” (“Sexual Psychology,” 1902).

The compendium *Psychopathia Sexualis* was first published in 1886, but was revised and republished up until a posthumous twelfth edition in 1903, and is by far the most recognized of his published works (Moore, 2009a). Though Daniel Blain (1965) posits that several of Krafft-Ebing’s other publications—such as *Textbook of Psychiatry* (1886)—were equally important within their time, *Psychopathia Sexualis* has an enduring quality in its appeal, with translations as late as 1998 lauding its continued psychiatric merit (LoPiccolo,
1998/2010). *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1903/1965) had a profound influence on both directing and structuring studies of psychosexual pathology, but its broad readership and wide response indicates that it also held influence in the lives of lay people. Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) thanks Krafft-Ebing in his introduction for being “constantly by my side as a guide in these questions; and if in some points the results of my studies do not accord with those of my highly-honored teacher, my indebtedness is thus increased, since in the cases of his book I found the way indicated which has been followed in this work” (p. xi). While other German psychiatrists such as Eulenburg (1902/1984) and Moll (1897/1933) critique Krafft-Ebing throughout their work, they nonetheless draw on his conclusions about s/m in order to formulate their own. Freud (in Blain, 1965) also remarked on how Krafft-Ebing provided him with many case studies that would confirm Freud’s own work. Within the later editions of the *Psychopathia Sexualis*, as well as Moll’s and Schrenck-Notzing’s work, several cases are published with patients either seeking help from these psychiatrists because of reading *Psychopathia Sexualis* or writing letters to Krafft-Ebing directly challenging his position with their experiences of s/m.

Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) work is often contrasted with Freud’s (1905/2001), with authors noting that Krafft-Ebing’s research was biologically and physiologically focused, as opposed to Freud’s, which was more psychically driven (Blain, 1965; Oosterhuis, 2000). However, by its final edition *Psychopathia Sexualis* comes to negotiate psychic investment and childhood experience with biological determinism. This is not done seamlessly throughout the text, but rather marks the bricolage of ideas and case studies changing over the sixteen years between first and final editions. In some moments Krafft-Ebing seems mired in physiological etiology for psychosexual pathology:
It is justifiable to presume that there is a definite region of the cortex (cerebra centre), which gives rise to sexual feelings, ideas and impulses, and is the place of origin of the psycho-somatic processes which we designate as sexual life, sexual instinct, and sexual desire. This centre is susceptible to both central and peripheral stimuli.”

(Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 19)

However, in other moments Krafft-Ebing marks biology as only one factor, relying on ethics participating in the decision making process, “Constitution, and especially organic influences, have a marked effect upon the instinctive impulses; education and cultivation of self-control counteract the opposing influences” (p. 26). However, as is seen within his case studies, unlike Freud to follow after him, Krafft-Ebing rarely investigates the symbolic nature, or even content of his patients’ fantasies.

For Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) normal sexuality is not only focused upon the act of heterosexual coitus, but also comprises dynamics of emotion, not necessarily of love, but of release and comfort. Krafft-Ebing carefully distinguished between a perverse action and a perverse person within his descriptions of pathology and case studies. Though perverse actions may be considered vices, the entirety of the person, personality and motive included, must be investigated before diagnosing someone’s perversion (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). However, despite the occasional ambiguity between perversion and perversity, Krafft-Ebing is clear that he understands “normal” sexuality as coitus completed through detumescence, “and the psychical and sexual excitement gives place to a comfortable feeling of lassitude” (p. 27). The masculinist connotations of such a definition of “normal” sexuality is rife throughout his descriptions of s/m, perspectives which Eulenburg (1902/1985) would come to critique.
Sadism and masochism are both brought under the category of paraesthenia for Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965), which is defined as “perversion of the sexual instinct, i.e., excitability of the sexual functions to inadequate stimuli” (p. 34). Though he gives more time to the case studies of sadism than he does to masochism, he justifies the nomenclature in response to masochism’s namesake, a French writer most famous for his publication, *Venus in Furs*, that tells the story of a male submissive and a female dominant, Sacher-Masoch,

I feel justified in calling this sexual anomaly “Masochism,” because the author *Sacher-Masoch* frequently made this perversion, which up to his time was quite unknown to the scientific world as such, the substratum of his writings. I followed thereby the scientific formation of the term “Daltonism,” from *Dalton*, the discoverer of colour-blindness. (p. 87).

However, this is not an analogous situation. For this to be comparable, Krafft-Ebing would have used his own name as the clinician, like his example, Dalton. Gilles Deleuze (1991) claims that such an act marks Krafft-Ebing as having given Sacher-Masoch “credit for having redefined a clinical entity,” defined not only between eroticism and pain, but eroticism and humiliation and subjugation (p. 16). However, Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) treatment of Sacher-Masoch is scathing, describing the author as “afflicted with this anomaly,” and ultimately arguing that for a man of evident literary talent, his perversion has prevented him from fully realizing his potential as a writer (p. 87). Sacher-Masoch’s recording of his own fantasies for the erotic consumption of his reader is disavowed in Krafft-Ebing’s own collection of other persons’ fantasies in the name of medicalization. Through the naming of the author of fiction, rather than using his own moniker, Krafft-Ebing was able to mark the perversion outside of himself, taking the credit for the discovery,
without attaching his name to a single pathology. Still, Deleuze may be right to acknowledge that Krafft-Ebing’s approach to research dispenses with a great many of the stereotypes of empiricist and modernist knowledge production. Krafft-Ebing draws on personal case studies with his own patients to be sure, but also from other physicians, literature, history, and the personal narratives and letters of lay persons, some of whom combat his claims. Some of his case studies are written in Krafft-Ebing’s voice, the voices of other clinicians, but some of the patients write from the first person themselves. Before calling it “masochism” Krafft-Ebing referred to “passive flagellation” and before “sadism,” he used categories active flagellation and lust-murder, the later term he continued to use to describe specific cases of sadism (Moore, 2009b). Krafft-Ebing trades the thorough engagement with Sacher-Masoch’s life for terse insults directed at sadism’s namesake, the Marquis de Sade, as a “monster” for his “combination of lust and cruelty” (p. 69). He continues to mark sadists as monstrous throughout his text.

Sadism for Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) is the “association of lust and cruelty” (p. 34). It may manifest itself only in fantasy, be acted out with a partner or with a sex worker, it may act as a stimulant to initiate intercourse, or rather it may be an end in and of itself. Though it can be occasionally found in women—he offers only two case studies—he claims it is most often found in men. As Krafft-Ebing goes on to describe the process of taking delight in another’s pain, he refutes the possibility that the term sadism may be used to describe “all the remarkable and surprising acts of cruelty that occur, and to assume sadism as the motive underlying all the horrors recorded in history or found in certain psychological manifestations among the peoples of the present time” (p. 84). He argues that though sadism may occasionally play a role in such circumstances, its rarity as a perversion rules out the
possibility of it explaining all historical atrocity. However, here his argument becomes circular, “sadism” is a rare condition because he has confined the parameters of the definition to not include historical atrocities, and then argues that historical atrocities cannot be considered sadistic because it is too rare of a condition to be as common as historical violence. Thus he locates sadism as an individual perversion, one that people have as individuals, but not as a condition effecting entire groups, who may repeatedly find themselves in the position of inflicting cruelty through systems of governmentality, militarization, and imperialism. It is the “sexual element,” which marks the inclination toward cruelty as sadistic, and therefore as pathological.

Masochism for Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) is referred to as the “counterpart” and “opposite” of sadism (p. 35; p. 86); “the parallel” he remarks, “is perfect” (p. 140). Masochism is diagnosed when the patient’s sexual feelings and thoughts are “controlled by the idea of being completely and unconditionally subject to the will of a person of the opposite sex; of being treated by this person as by a master, humiliated and abused” (p. 86). His definition, as are his case studies of masochism and sadism, is notably hetero-centric. Like sadism, masochism may manifest in fantasy only, or may be acted out with a partner as an end in and of itself, or as a means of facilitating coitus. He notes that though sadism may escalate to lust murder, and a masochist may fantasize about dismemberment or even death, self-preservation hinders most masochists from pursuing such extremes. Though within the case studies sadism and masochism are often both associated with degeneration and neurasthenia, within the descriptions, masochism is more often marked through degeneracy and femininity, whereas sadism is marked through growth and escalation.
Albert von Schrenck-Notzing: *Therapeutic Suggestion in Psychopathia Sexualis with Special Reference to Contrary Sexual Instinct* (1892/1895)

Schrenck-Notzing was born in Oldenburg, Germany in 1862 (Makari, 1997). He studied medicine in Munich, graduating in 1888 (Makari, 1997). *Therapeutic Suggestion* (1892/1895) is one book in a series that was published throughout the 1880s-1890s that methodically described and recorded case studies and treatment following from the categorizations of Krafft-Ebing’s *Psychopathia Sexualis* (Makari, 1997). Where mention of the possibility of a cure or treatment was sparsely scattered in the case studies of *Psychopathia Sexualis* (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965), *Therapeutic Suggestion* advocates from its introduction that hypnosis can be used as a treatment for its described perversions and includes details, not only of patient histories, but also progresses and failures of treatment. Schrenck-Notzing, along with Moll, campaigned for the criminalization of hypnosis performed by non-medical professionals throughout the 1880s-1890s, marking their work within an area of expertise, outside of the access of lay people and certainly not to be put on stage for show (Wolffram, 2009b). In 1896, Schrenck-Notzing made the “first expert witness testimony in Munich, Germany,” linking his work with perversion to the judicial system (Walker & Shapiro, 2003, p. 4). However, by the early twentieth century Schrenck-Notzing started to participate in stage performances of hypnotism, eliciting censure from the psychiatric communities that had fought with him against such performances and alienating him from Moll as a colleague (Wolffram, 2009b). Schrenck-Notzing’s success with hypnosis as a treatment for perversion, originally proposed by Krafft-Ebing, led him to conclude that Krafft-Ebing had overemphasized the physiological determinants of perversion, for if hypnosis were to work, then biological determinism failed to adequately explain the actions
(Makari, 1997). Schrenck-Notzing writes, “Natural disposition alone cannot explain why one becomes a lover of shoe-nails, another of ladies’ eyes” (p. 154). Though Schrenck-Notzing admits the possibility of hereditary predisposition, he advocates that childhood chance experiences were the more likely sources of fetishism and perversion. That perversion was not necessarily hereditary and therefore biologically determined meant two things for Schrenck-Notzing’s research. The first is that such perversion may be cured. The second is that perversions can change over time, either escalating or devolving. George Makari (1997) notes that by the 1890s, eight authors were adopting in part or whole Schrenck-Notzing’s understandings of the psychical dynamic of sexual perversion.

Whether discussing Makari’s (1997) work specifically, making passing mention of Schrenk-Notzing in broader histories of sexology (Crozier, 2004; Moore, 2009b), or the work of those contemporaneous and compatriot sexologists engaging with Schrenck-Notzing’s work in the early twentieth century (Eulenburg, 1902/1984; Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965), sexological research seeking to use Schrenck-Notzing as a resource tends to omit any reference to his work as a parapsychiatrist. Schrenck-Notzing outside of his sexological research also argued that there were “unknown forces within the human organism” that could explain “spirit manifestations;” this position earned him the nickname, “Geisterbaron,” translated as “Ghost-Baron” (Wolffram, 2009a, p. 151). Heather Wolffram (2009a) argues that the parapsychology lab that Schrenck-Notzing built became symbolic of an early twentieth century “paradox at the heart of aspiring science” (p. 151): the uncomfortable space between calls for academic rigour, objectivity, and the repeatability of results coupled with “both conscious and unconscious fraud” (p. 152). This tension could only be exacerbated.
through parapsychology’s failure to receive recognition, let alone praise from scientific communities (Wollfram, 2009a).

Within *Therapeutic Suggestion* Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) is specifically interested in what he refers to, borrowing from Karl Heinrich’s gay rights terminology, as uranism. This is the “contrary sexual instinct” referenced in Schrenck-Notzing’s title, and also found in Moll’s (1897/1933) writing. *Therapeutic Suggestions* as a whole seeks to advocate for hypnotherapy as a means of curing uranism and other perversions. Whereas Krafft-Ebing’s *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1903/1965) might be best understood as an encyclopedia of perversion, complete with a collection of case studies, *Therapeutic Suggestion* is driven with treatment and remedy as its focus. Schrenck-Notzing follows from Krafft-Ebing’s understanding of “paræthesia” nearly verbatim as rooted in “inadequate stimuli” (p. 117). However, where Krafft-Ebing reserved his scathing critiques for particular case studies of perversion, Schrenck-Notzing uses such forceful language against perverts as a group: “Every expression of sexual desire which does not correspond with the purpose of nature—procreation—is perverse” (p. 117). Schrenck-Notzing’s moralizing prose continues throughout the text wherein he advocates for “moral insanity” as an appropriate diagnosis (p. 156). In such cases, patients will have a “moral weakness,” meaning that they will not recognize nor understand that their actions are immoral and criminal (p. 156). He uses this to explain why “urnings” might not understand “their sexual instinct … as abnormal” (p. 156).

Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) rejects Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) nomenclature of *sadism* and *masochism*, arguing that it is not in line with scientific practice and that even were the individual diagnoses more appropriately titled, “it seems essential to form a word the composition of which shall indicate the nature of these sexual anomalies” (p. 121). He
offers the terms *algolagnia* and *algolagny* in their stead, drawing on Greek etymological 
origin to justify his decisions, a strategy Mary Marcel (2005) points out was common among 
other sexologists and psychiatrists attempting to bolster their readership. “Algo” refers to 
“pain;” Schrenck-Notzing clarifies that he means medicalized pain “as in analgesia, 
cephalalgia, and neuralgia” (p. 121). “Lagneia” comes from the Greek origin for lust, but was 
used by Hippocrates and Aristotle to specifically describe “semen emissions” (p. 121). 
Schrenck-Notzing’s clarification elucidates the connection between psychic attraction of lust 
with physiological response of ejaculation. Following from Krafft-Ebing’s earlier distinction 
between active and passive flagellation, Schrenck-Notzing advocates that medical 
professionals can use the term “active algolagnia” to replace sadism and “passive algolagnia” 
to replace masochism. These definitions reveal that Schrenck-Notzing conceptualizes this 
“perversion” as being about the association of pain and lust, similar yet distinct from Krafft-
Ebing’s association between cruelty and lust. Schrenck-Notzing marks flagellation as the 
most common means of satisfying passive algolagnia, however, he acknowledges that 
“symbolic” subjugation may take place (p. 122).

**Albert Moll: Libido Sexualis: Studies in the Psychosexual Laws of Love Verified by**

**Clinical Sexual Case Histories (1897/1933)**

Moll was born in Lissa, Prussia May 4, 1862 (Shelley & Teloh, 1977). He received 
his M.D. in Berlin in 1885, but had previously studied in Breslau, Frieburg, and Jena (Shelley 
& Teloh, 1977). His early research interests and training focused upon anatomy and 
pathology, which he would eventually integrate into his career focusing on contrary sexual 
instinct, and childhood sexuality (Amidon, 2008). After receiving his medical license Moll 
traveled to Paris and studied there with researchers focusing upon hypnosis (Shelley &
Teloh, 1977). By 1887 Moll returned to Berlin and began working in neurology (Shelley & Teloh, 1977). Moll quickly became well-respected as a psychiatrist in Germany for his work on sexology, parapsychology, and hypnosis (Pranghofer, 2009; Shelley & Teloh, 1977; Wolffram, 2009b). Crozier (1999) goes so far as to name Moll as the most important sexologist after Krafft-Ebing and before Freud. Moll’s sexological case studies were republished by both Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) and Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) and, like both of them, Moll (1897/1933) quotes patients within his own text who have sought him out because of how they have been affected by his work. Moll’s first book, on the subject of hypnotism, was published in 1889 (Shelley & Teloh, 1977). By 1891 he published the “first major medical monograph” on “homosexuality” (Amidon, 2008, p. 66).

Engaging with medical ethics, Moll also advocated for the informed consent of patients and developed a positivist and legally based “contract theory of the patient-doctor relationship” (Vollmann & Winau, 1996, ¶. 5). In 1902 Moll published a handbook on medical ethics advocating for doctor-patient confidentiality, even in cases where the patient had committed a crime (Maehle, 2003). This passion for “objectivity” is found in his later work with the *International Society for Sex Research*, formed in Berlin in 1926, where Moll advocated for neutral sexology that avoided practical activism (Haeberle, 1981). Erwin Haeberle (1981) marks this objectivity as a veiled homophobia in line with Moll’s public censure of Magnus Hirshfeld, whose own work on s/m is outside of the periodization of this project. However, Vern Bullough (1994) posits that Moll did not get along with many of the sexologists of his generation, also citing disagreements with Freud.

Like Schrenck-Notzing, Moll was among the pioneers in attempting to bring parapsychology into the mainstream psychiatry of Germany. Moll presented one of the first
papers within the German psychiatric community on the topic of parapsychiatric methods in 1887 (Wolffram, 2009b). However, by the dawn of the twentieth century skepticism took hold and Moll launched an investigation seeking to discover why someone might believe in the occult (Wolffram, 2009b). Moll believed that hypnosis allowed psychiatrists the possibility of accessing the unconscious in ways that had previously been foreclosed (Wolffram, 2009b). He believed that hypnotism could render a person completely without will, and feared that persons could be hypnotized without their consent (Andriopoulos, 2008). Under Nazi Germany’s rule in 1938 Moll, like all Jewish physicians, lost his license to practice medicine (Haeberle, 1981). Moll died September 23, 1939 in Berlin (Shelley & Teloh, 1977).

In *Libido Sexualis* (1897/1933) Moll draws on a number of sources to construct his discussion of sexuality including the founding figures of psychology Wilhelm Wundt, Charles Darwin, Krafft-Ebing, Schrenck-Notzing, Eulenburg, and Freud. This text draws parallels between humans and animals, utilizing animal case studies to challenge beliefs about humans, which is part and parcel with his biologically driven understanding of sexuality. He follows from Krafft-Ebing (1903/1963) in positing that there is a special centre of the sex instinct, and that a specific part of the brain and certain cells are responsible for sexuality.

Moll (1897/1933) offers far less engagement with the nomenclature and nosological descriptions of sadism and masochism than Krafft-Ebing and Schrenck-Notzing; rather he works through case studies, expanding on Schrenck-Notzing’s project to increase the recognition of sadism and masochism outside of heterosexual pairings. However, he argues that even when the male sadist is attracted toward male victims, that those victims are
consistently children, thus linking sadism and inversion with pedophilia. Marking women and children and inferior to adult men, Moll (1897/1933) goes on to point out that the heterosexual sadist has much in common with the former, in that they both choose weaker and inferior partners. Drawing on biological determinism he writes,

> Stimulation in certain parts of the skin cause voluptuous sensations and are reflected onto the sex organs. They who are sexually excited through flagellation, are probably excited for this reason. We seem to be dealing here with peripheral stimuli, which, like the peripheral stimulations excited in $l$ and carried over to the genital centres $l$ through the nerve paths $e$, are also carried over to these centres. (Moll, 1897/1933, p. 126)

The italicized letters in his explanation refer back to Krafft-Ebing’s diagram of the brain centre’s sexual instinct. Interestingly, he follows this claim arguing, “Such cases would thus have nothing to do with the to be considered phenomena of masochism” (p. 126). Therefore if the masochist’s arousal can be explained by universal physiology, it cannot be diagnosed as pathological. Despite this foundation of sensation in biological mechanisms, Moll critiques the idea of a “sexual instinct” altogether. He rejects the term *sexual instinct*, following Darwin’s understanding that an instinct is something that is not conscious. Though Moll admits that there is much about human sexuality that is unconscious for the subject, he ultimately argues that most humans have too much invested in sexuality to claim that they act on impulse rather than judgment; his examples include the production of children for the sake of old age security, and selling sex for money.
Albert Eulenburg: *Sadism and Masochism: A Look at Sadistic Love and Masochism* (1902/1984)

Eulenburg’s career brought him to many different sectors of the medical and psychiatric communities of Germany. In 1867 Eulenburg worked as an assistant at Charité, a medical school in Berlin (Killen, 2006). Following his graduation he went on to become a professor at Greifswald University for nine years (Schulz, 2003). At other points in his career Eulenburg was employed as a public health officer in Berlin (Taylor, 1992). In 1878, before going on to study sexology and hypnotism, Eulenburg introduced the term “psychic trauma,” thus predating Freud (Hart, 1990). Upon quitting his professorship he opened a polyclinic for private practice in Berlin 1885 (Killen, 2006). His first publication about sexuality was in 1895 (Bullough, 1994). However, Eulenburg did not publish extensively on the issue until his *Real Encyclopädie für Medizin* was criticized in 1901 for its failure to address sexuality (Bullough, 1994). Bullough (1994) attributes Eulenburg’s subsequent publications on sexuality as a reactive attempt to demonstrate that he had always had the knowledge about sexuality and medicine. His career continued on this path, and alongside Magnus Hirsfeld and Iwan Bloch, Eulenburg founded the Medical Society of Sexual Science and Eugenics (Amidon, 2008). His colleague Bloch (1933/2003) described Eulenburg as being “rightly regarded as the path breaker in the field of scientific investigation of the different forms of “psycho- or neuropathia sexualis”” (p. 13). Attesting to the impact of Eulenburg’s scholarship Dean (2000) argues that Eulenburg was one of the most widely read doctors by specialists in France, with specific reference to *Sadism and Masochism* (1902/1984).

In *Sadism and Masochism* (1902/1984) Eulenburg follows Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) bricolage approach to sexology, bringing together medical and criminal case
studies, detailed responses to the works and lives of de Sade and Sacher-Masoch, and cultural artifacts to make his claims about s/m and pathology; it is also the only German monograph on the subject produced during the imperialist expansion 1884-1914. Eulenburg returns to Krafft-Ebing’s broader claims about s/m, noting that in the work of de Sade, and therefore under the category of sadism, there is much more than the eroticization of pain. Whereas Krafft-Ebing, Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895), and Moll (1897/1933) noted in their case studies the existence of sadists who experienced anxiety at the thought of causing real injury to their partners, Eulenburg was the first to remind readers that characters within de Sade’s writing delighted at their partner’s experiences of pleasure in response to the infliction of pain, humiliation, and degradation. Eulenburg also expresses great frustration with the masculinist and heterosexist focuses of Krafft-Ebing’s subjects. Rather, Eulenburg would have readers recognize that sadism and masochism are neither mutually exclusive categories, nor can they be denied in women. To this end, Eulenburg devotes an entire chapter to sadism in women. He echoes Schrenck-Notzing’ and Moll’s claims that sadism and masochism are not discrete categories, writing “‘Sadism’ and ‘masochism’ are therefore mutually exclusive opposites in theory only; in truth they are closely related aberrations which, like so many apparent antitheses, are to be found joined near each other in the same individual” (p. 16).

Despite his disagreements with Krafft-Ebing, Eulenburg does agree on a few points, including Krafft-Ebing’s assertion that sadism may only describe acts of cruelty that are motivated by lust, consciously or unconsciously.

Like Moll (1897/1933), Eulenburg (1902/1984) clings to a narrative of objectivity in his research, and reiterates throughout the text that while his work borders on the debates of morality, he cannot stake a claim in those debates. Continuing to follow in Moll’s footsteps,
and contradicting Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965), Eulenburg also advocates that regardless of the biological or acquired nature of the perversion, humans are autonomous subjects responsible for their actions; he rejects the idea of a spiritual or moral disease. Though Moll hints at this, with his arguments about the physiological response of nerve endings to flagellation, Eulenburg makes his opinion explicit, stating that though masochism is a desire for physical sensation, the sadist derives psychic pleasure. Eulenburg is the only source to attach a bibliography; it is thematically subdivided so that persons can find materials on de Sade, Sacher-Masoch, flagellation, and corporal punishment.

**Sigmund Freud: Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex (1905/2001)**

One need not look hard to find biographical information on Freud. The reverberations of the profound influence of his work can be seen in countless secondary sources, which outline how physics courses (Greenberg, 1994), his knowledge of philosophy and Greek mythology (Makari, 1997; Marcel, 2005), his whiteness (Sesahdri-Crooks, 1994), a broken heart (Reidel-Schrewe, 1994), the rise of Nazi Germany (Caruth, 1996), and childhood and home life (Gilman, 1993) came to affect what he wrote, how he wrote, and when he wrote it. There is also an abundance of scholarship on Freud’s theoretical positions in relation to his Jewish identity, which is outside of the scope of this contextualization (Boyarin, 1998; Caruth, 1996; Decker, 1991; Gilman, 1993; Lesser, 1999; Said, 2003). However, I want to briefly touch on Said’s (2003) observation that Freud did express complicated relationships to his Jewish identity, sometimes disavowing religion altogether and later in life, upon being accepted to the Hebrew University, discussing attachment to ideas of a Jewish homeland. The deluge of scholarship on Freud’s life attests to importance of his work, compounded with the prolific volume of material he produced over his lifetime.
Freud was the eldest son of his family, born May 6, 1856 (Gilman, 1993). At the University of Vienna Freud studied biology, while also maintaining a passionate interest in physics, between 1873 and 1882 under professors who adopted Darwinian understandings of inheritance (Gilman, 1993; Greenberg, 1994). Gilman (1993) notes that at the time Freud was attending university in Vienna, anti-Semitic violence was a “common” and “daily occurrence” (p. 45). Freud went on to study hypnotism in Paris at the Salpêtrière and in a smaller town, Nancy (Andriopoulos, 2008). Freud, along with Josef Breuer first propounded psychoanalytic investigations into the psyche as a cure for mental anguish in 1893 (Freud, 1905/2001). Though Krafft-Ebing is said to have had little faith in psychoanalysis, he spoke on Freud’s behalf, resulting in Freud’s professorship at the University of Vienna (Klaf, 1965). It was in Studies on Hysteria (1895) that Freud first published his own treatise on the unconscious mind (Makari, 1997). Makari (1997) describes Freud’s early understanding of the unconscious as falling in line with Kantian philosophy. However, by 1905 Freud, while maintaining the unknowability of the unconscious, sought to describe it in detail (Makari, 1997). In many ways despite himself, Freud’s work disrupted the objectivity narrative that so many of his sexological predecessors clung (Seshadri-Crooks, 1998). After writing Three Contributions (1905/2001), Freud went on to publish two essays specifically devoted to the subject of masochism outside of this periodization, the first, in 1919, titled ‘A Child is Being Beaten’ and the second, in 1924, ‘The Economic Problem of Masochism.’ Despite critiques of Eurocentrism, misogyny, and heterosexism, Freud’s work was taken up by his contemporary analysts, many of whom were members of those groups marginalized by his scholarship (Gilman, 1993; Said, 2003; Seshadri-Crooks, 1994; Walton, 2001). In 1923 Freud was diagnosed with a cancerous tumor; between diagnosis and 1938 he underwent
thirty-seven medical procedures (Gilman, 1993). During this time Freud avoided most public appearances and went under the care of his daughter, Anna (Gilman, 1993). The Nazi government censured sexological research, with Freud being specifically targeted (Amidon, 2008). Caruth (1996) quotes Freud from 1938 after leaving Vienna for London, “In the certainty of German prosecution … I left, with many friends, the city which from my early childhood, through seventy-eight years, had been a home to me” (p. 21). The following year, Freud died in London.

The *Three Contributions* (1905/2001) of Freud’s text refer to sexual aberrations, infantile sexuality, and the transformation of puberty. It is within the first section that Freud outlines his understanding of fetishism, perversion, and sadomasochism. Here Freud argues that though the sexually abnormal may be psychically normal in all other respects, the psychically abnormal will often be sexually abnormal as well. In the former cases, sexuality is marked as “their weak point” (p. 14). Greatly expanding Eulenburg’s (1902/1984) claims about pleasure in masochism and sadism, Freud outlines the pleasures associated with a great number of actions outside of coitus. For Freud, perversions are either “anatomical transgressions of the bodily regions destined for sexual union” or “a lingering at the intermediary relations to the sexual object which should normally be rapidly passed on the way to the definite sexual aim” (p. 15). Like Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965), Freud acknowledges that perverse actions may—and, given the breadth and the scope of perverse actions including kissing, will—take place in “the normal sexual life” (p. 14). Rather Freud imagines that it is quite rare for an individual to find themselves exclusively directed toward the genitals of the sexual object, and that perversion stems from an “overestimation of the sexual object” (p. 15). That overestimation takes the form of the subject generalizing the attraction
to an entire body rather than just the reproductive organs. This is also where Freud first describes fetishism as a case of substitution, where a patient wholly replaces the sexual subject with an object, forming an erotic association. Whereas the eroticism from the genitals to the whole body is an acceptable generalization of the sexual instinct, the complete substitution of the genitals for an object is deemed an “unfit substitution” (p. 17). He defines “instinct” not within the Darwinian language of Moll (1897/1933), but rather as a concept “marking the limits between the psychic and the physical” (p. 30). In his second section on infantile sexuality Freud also argues that children have sadistic impulses.

Freud (1905/2001) opens his conversation on s/m by fleshing out the distinction between Schrenck-Notzing’s emphasis on pleasure in pain and Krafft-Ebing’s broader discussion of the pleasures of humiliation and submission. Like his predecessors, Freud argues that sadism is an exaggeration, an excess of the masculine sexual instinct already extant. He argues that sadism is closer to the normal sexual aim than masochism. However, Freud was intrigued by his finding that sadism and masochism are often found within the same subject. Within the masochist’s psyche Freud expects to find exaggerations of passive factors of sexual development, such as the castration complex and conscience. What is unique to Freud about sadism and masochism is that as perversions, in lesser degrees, “their bases belong to the common traits of the sexual life” (p. 22).

Synthesis

Though it is evident that Krafft-Ebing, Schrenck-Notzing, Moll, Eulenburg, and Freud had several points of contention between them as they sought to define, describe, and diagnose s/m, their work is also a testament to an academic dedication to treating what they perceived to be distressing perversions. Their work builds upon one another’s scholarship.
while simultaneously struggling against what they perceive as weaknesses in each other’s arguments. Each author attempts to bring something new to their understanding of s/m and perversion, either through the addition of case studies to the conversation, and wider emphasis on treatment, or through a newly formed synthesis of the presented information altering the diagnosis as a whole. To understand how race and imperialism found itself within these authors’ texts, it is first important to understand what the author created as a text in and of itself.
Chapter Four: Discussion One – Going Civilized

Theoretical Frameworks

This chapter’s title, “Going Civilized”, is a play on Marianna Torgovnick’s (1990) monograph, *Gone Primitive*, which critiques the heteroglossia found in modernist and postmodernist fantasies of the primitive. Her introductory chapter, titled “Going Primitive,” switches tenses from the monograph’s title and her final chapter “Gone Primitive.” In her epilogue she explains this distinction: “We have no need to “go primitive” because we have already “gone primitive’” (p. 246). Despite modern and postmodern recursive visitations to archetypal primitive bodies and pasts, her sandwiching of “going primitive” between a title page and final chapter that relegate the action to the past tense, denotes the impossibility of “going primitive” within the present tense. The primitive is marked as an other to modernity and postmodernity, but an other that continues to elicit curiosity and fascination, an other that is persistently re-membered and revisited (Torgovnick, 1990). This quest to find “beginnings” in the primitive is a project undone from the start because it is defined by where the subject has ended up (Torgovnick, 1990). Thus the history of the primitive, as it is recorded by the ethnographer, fails to represent the subject of study (Torgovnick, 1990). Rather such studies often became histories of the self—the ethnographer and civilization—whereas the stories of the subject, labeled as “primitive,” are written over. Attempts at “going primitive” convey a great deal more about a self-consciousness of civility and the invention of the primitive/civilized binary than about those supposedly represented by the exogenous category: “primitive.” The label “primitive” marks “civilization” within modernist narratives of progress. However, the primitive/civilized binary is also hyperconscious of the sense that civilization is incomplete, a tension captured in the tendency to describe civilization’s
citizens as “civilized” rather than “civil.” Civil would denote their position in the present tense, would mark an aim as having been fully accomplished. Rather “civilized” denotes the transformation, the impermanence of civility. The elusive quest to “go primitive” is a path toward making sense of “civilization.”

In the sexological texts discussed here, civilization is not imagined as an achieved static positionality. Rather, it is something fractious and persistently under threat. Torgovnick (1990) argues that Freud journeyed through his imagination toward the primitive as a means of avoiding the larger issues at home. In what follows, my argument regarding Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965), Schrenck-Notzing’s (1892/1895), Moll’s (1897/1933), Eulenburg’s (1902/1984), and Freud’s (1905/2001) discussions of racializing s/m pathologies in the metropole is in many ways the opposite. Rather, I posit that it is Germany’s concomitant imperialist expansion into East Africa and Southwest Africa that both fosters an impetus to regulate discourses of eroticized slavery, violence, and bondage within the metropole while pointedly refusing to comment upon how such tropes—intolerable amongst Germany’s citizens—operate abroad and are perpetrated on behalf of the newly formed German nation state. That is to say, the definitions of s/m facilitate the avoidance of the complexities of Germany’s international relationships. These sexologists deny overt conversations about race within their texts, and thus also mark their critiques of masters and slaves outside of contemporaneous imperialism. That the doctors describing s/m refuse to acknowledge imperialism within their texts, however, does not mean that they successfully avoid the racialization of perversion and perverse subjects. To this end I discuss how s/m perversions are located as a problem of the civilized. I then compare and contrast this with apparently contradictory evidence: the racialization of nosological descriptions of s/m through
discourses of failed and failing whiteness. Lastly, I take up one of Krafft-Ebing’s case studies in which a masochist unabashedly marks his eroticism of slavery within a narrative of state sanctioned racialized slavery.

I take a great deal of inspiration from Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s (2003) critique of colour-blind racism as “expressions at the symbolic level of the fact of dominance” that reinforce white privilege (p. 25). His description of colour-blind narratives—discourses that minimize the existence of racism, seek to distance the speaker from the “real” racist they are critiquing, and reinforce meritocracy—demonstrate layers of nuance within the racist narratives of contemporary North America. Colour-blindness is often discussed within the context of the new racism, racism that functions within a postbellum and post Jim Crow American context (Collins, 2005). Scholarship addressing the new racism elucidates how, despite the strides made in legal policies in the United States such as the Emancipation Proclamations, the abolition of Jim Crow laws, and decriminalizing interracial marriage, many of the conditions that characterized such periods and systemic structures persist today (Bobo & Charles, 2009; Collins, 2005). Hence the title of Collins’s (2005) essay addressing the new racism, “The Past is Ever Present: Recognizing the New Racism” (p. 53).

While I whole-heartedly agree with Bonilla-Silva (2003) and Collins’s (2005) arguments that the new racism allows for the characteristics and beliefs of Jim Crowism, antebellum USA, and chattel slavery to play out in not so new ways, I am concerned with the potential for such an approach to oversimplify what would be logically relegated as the old racism. Academic discussions of the new racism risk limiting comparisons to the racism of transatlantic slavery to the most extreme, powerful, and provocative examples such as the spectacle made of Saartjie Baartman, the castration and lynching of black men, and the
existence of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (Collins, 2005). As a result, these discourses may risk ignoring that the nuances of racism they interpret within contemporary North America may also have been present in antebellum USA, the transatlantic slave trade, and for my purposes, German imperialism. I take my cue from Bonilla-Silva’s thematic breakdown of colour-blindness to access discourses of race and racism with the nosological descriptions of s/m that attempt to evade the relationship between regulating the master-slave sexual relationship in the metropole and the racialized master-slave relationships in the colonies.

I will also be borrowing from Homi Bhabha’s (1996) transfiguration of the Oedipus complex as an origin story of sexual difference to one of imagined and feared racialized otherness. In Freud’s (1963) Oedipus complex a little boy—defined as the child with the penis—becomes traumatized when he first sees female genitalia on a little girl who is defined as the child who lacks a penis. He decides that she has been castrated by the father, and thus the little boy develops an agonistic relationship to the father and develops sexual and protective feelings for his mother, who is imagined as wounded by virtue of her vagina (Freud, 1963). Ultimately the Oedipus complex is a story of Otherness (Bhabha, 1996). A boy walks through the world imagining that everyone is identical to him; when he realizes that they are not he experiences a combination of pity, fear, and desire for his newly determined “Other” (Yeğenoğlu, 1998). Bhabha (1996) finds the disavowal concomitant with castration anxiety to be a compelling metaphor for the racial fetish of imperialism that oscillates between a curiosity about racial difference and a simultaneous denial of that difference. Meyda Yeğenoğlu (1998) critiques Bhabha’s use of the Oedipal narrative to describe racial difference. She points out that castration anxiety is about the fear of lack and that Bhabha has not clarified either how persons of colour signify lack within a culture of
white supremacy, or why that particular kind of lack would provoke the phobia of racial otherness. In answer to Yeğenoğlu’s critique, I ask if the lack must be a physical one in order to translate the metaphor? Bhabha (1994) outlines his understanding of racial Otherness using Lacanian theory: “through the circulation of the signifier in its doubling and displacing, the signifier permits the sign no reciprocal, binary division of form/content, superstructure/infrastructure, self/other” (p. 75). Otherness for Bhabha (1994) “simultaneously mark[s] the possibility and impossibility of identity, presence through absence” (p. 75). In Bhabha’s (1996) transmogrification of the Oedipus complex from a narrative of sexual difference to one of racial difference, the “lack” is the impossibility of a stable racial identity, which is represented by attempts to label one’s identity in relation to an other. The lack is the emptiness of the signifiers used to convey difference. If metaphor is a comparison of two seemingly dissimilar things, then perhaps Yeğenoğlu’s critique of Bhabha’s refiguring of the Oedipus complex and the fetish is out of place and it need not be perfectly symmetrical in order to be comparable and useful. Drawing from Bhabha (1996) I argue that the combination of pity, fear, and desire of the colonized within the German metropole also plays out in the narrative that regulates whiteness and civility through the pathologization of s/m. Furthermore, such narratives are, as Bhabha (1996) proposes, about reinforcing racial difference, while simultaneously revealing something about the permeability of dichotomies such as white/black and civilized/savage.

The question of otherness, difference, and pathologization are intimately linked to the language and metaphor found within nosological descriptions and case studies of s/m from the German imperial period. Young (1995a) notes that, in reference to cultural anthropology and imperialism in the nineteenth century, “culture must apparently always operate
antithetically” (p. 53). The conquests of cultural anthropology and imperialism cannot stand alone, but rather are put in conversation about one another and their differences (Young, 1995a). Culture is persistently renegotiated; it is antithetical to stability (Young, 1995a).

Stoler (1995) makes similar assertions in her critique of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* when she argues that Victorian sexuality was categorized with the colonized and racialized subject as its counterpoint, whether explicitly or implicitly. In this section I am interested in the interconnection of pity, fear, and desire that Bhabha (1996) evoke through his comparison to the Oedipus complex. If Stoler (1995) is right, and I believe that she is, then an examination of the psychiatric literature that was intimately intertwined with the description, delimitation, and regulation of the cathexic investment in masters, slaves, whips, chains, collars, bondage, and discipline is, however consciously or unconsciously, inextricable from debates about contemporaneous imperialism. Greg Thomas (2007) revisits Stoler’s point (1995) writing that with racist narratives, “human sexuality is systemically designated for white bodies and sexual savagery for non-white ones” (p. 23). What can the pathologization of s/m by German sexologists, just as Germany has entered East Africa and Southwest Africa, elucidate about the cultural anxieties, phobias, and erotics of slavery in German consciousness? How was racialized Otherness both fetishistically dissected via the keen attention of psychiatrists hoping to define and demarcate Otherness through nosological categorization and, simultaneously, disavowed, written out of the equation altogether?

There are multiple Others at play, those that are imagined and those that are unimaginable. There is the othering of the s/m practitioner, a presumably civilized, but not civilized enough, subject who is marked as tainted in relation to the colonialized other. Of course there is also the colonial subject, othered for their assumed savagery. The process of
othering s/m practitioners as too savage for civilization demonstrates an anti-essentialist moment, challenging the racial paradigms, which perceive whiteness as equated to civility while deeming s/m as savage, and instead finds itself addressing the uncomfortable fragility of whiteness. Foucault’s (1973; 1988; 2003) work on the medical and psychiatric gaze reminds historians of psychiatry of the intimacy resultant from the relegation of the examination of a subject’s body and psyche to the realm of the ocular and auditory, both senses that are ultimately about the consumption of a subject. David Marriott (1996) summarizes Otto Fenichel’s understanding of the relationship between the ocular and consumption as follows: “the scopophilic equation – to look at = to devour – represents an attempt to preserve the equilibrium of the ego by swallowing, imitating and devouring the bad object” (p. 16). Thus both the examination of and the repetitive struggle to define the s/m practitioner is intimately connected to finding comfortable ways for civilized subjects to consume their Other: savagery made palatable and consumable through whiteness. Following from Torgovnick’s (1991) assertion that it was a western identity crisis that inspired its fascination with “primitive” subjects, one might conclude that the descriptions of s/m sexuality by sexologists are as much about the projected internalization of the savage within the s/m practitioner as they are feared within the psychiatrist.

Fenichel’s “devouring” is not just about the desire to own and control the other—as imperialism facilitates the fantasy that such things are possible—but is also about a psychic craving to reconcile differences. hooks (1992) points out that such a craving to reconcile with the other by consuming the body is about the fantasy of a world without difference. As the savage has the potential to be civilized through imperialism, so the pervert has the potential to be civilized through psychiatry. hooks uses the example of white men discussing their
desires to “fuck” (p. 23) women of different races to explain the fantasy of sameness that relies upon a narrative of difference. She explicates that these white men consider “fucking” the other as a means of accessing an experience that is expected to change them. Contact between two different subjects, has the potential to make both more similar. If we can understand the desire to know the other as a comparable means of consumption to the desire to “fuck” the other, than we must reconcile that not only was the desire to categorize the other about those bodies regulated, but that the psychiatrist was also hoping to change something about himself through that knowledge. The investment in changing the other, either through narratives of philanthropic imperialism or philanthropic psychiatry, both attempting to save the savage from themselves, both proffering the gift of civility, is concerned with the relationship between the other and the self. It relies on demarcating a difference while proffering the possibility of sameness. The racialization of s/m practitioners as primitive, as failed whiteness, represents the fragility of whiteness and concomitantly the whiteness of the psychiatrists, the whiteness of the Teutonic race. The definitions and descriptions of s/m from Germany’s imperial period offered a space for readers to regulate masters and slaves within the metropole without having to engage with their own government’s creation of master-slave relationships abroad.

**Civilizing the Perversions of Civilized Perverts**

Each of the imperial German psychiatric texts addressing s/m locates their theories of sexuality within broader conversations of civility and savagery. Whether discussing Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) work as encyclopedic, Eulenburg’s (1902/1984) as a monograph, Schrenck-Notzing’s (1892/1895) as advocating for treatment, Moll’s (1897/1933) as a stream of consciousness treatise on libido, or Freud’s (1905/2001) as a theoretical contribution to
these other texts, each functions as means of demarcating the boundaries of acceptable
sexuality and, in the cases of s/m, the texts also speak to the acceptable and intolerable
manifestations of violence. Such boundaries are laid through the authors’ discussions of the
historical progress of civilization and the pitfalls of civility as outlined through the pairing of
s/m diagnostics with neurasthenia.

Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) remarks within the first paragraph of *Psychopathia
Sexualis* that man is aligned with beast so long as he seeks exclusively to gratify his lust. It is
temperance and the quelling of “animal desire” that results in the normal sexual function that
allows man the right to claim a superior position to the animal, and allows him to claim
morality (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 1). Civilization is not only the evidence of morality in
man, but it also serves the function of self-perpetuation: civilization breeds civility and
civilized citizens (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). The sexologists rarely named the nationalities
that they considered worthy of the “civilized” label, however, there are occasional references
to the historical beginnings of civilization. Here readers find those whom the Enlightenment
often considered to be the first examples of what would become western civilization:
Egyptians, Greeks, Israelites and, of course, the Teutonic race (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965).
Moll (1897/1993) reinforces Krafft-Ebing’s inclusion of the Israelites by arguing that the
ancient Jews engaged in procreation to obey their commandment to god and therefore
demonstrated complicated and “human” sexuality beyond the bounds of the “animal”
instinct. It is the ability to reason and the versatility of the sexual instinct that represent the
“advances of civilization” (Wundt in Moll, 1897/1933, p. 20).

Civilization’s savage others are listed in abundance, however. Krafft-Ebing
(1903/1965) deems the Australasians, Polynesians, and Malays of the Philippines as savages
who are foolishly unashamed of their nudity. For Moll (1897/1933) it is “the different countries of the Orient, in Armenia, Babylonia, Carthage, Cyprus, Lydia, Palestine, and especially in Phoenicia” that are uncivilized for their failure to appreciate the virtues of chastity, innocence, and virginity (p. 256). He later adds the tyrannical nature of the Italian as a counterpoint to the virtuous love of the German. When Sacher-Masoch contends that the eroticization of slavery is especially common among the Germans and Russians, Krafft-Ebing quickly dismisses the claim citing Sacher-Masoch’s lack of evidence. Krafft-Ebing simultaneously rejects the expertise of the masochist to speak for masochists, reinforcing Krafft-Ebing’s role as expert, while defending Germany from a claim that, in Krafft-Ebing’s understanding of s/m, would align the German people with hereditary weakness, sexual deviance, and immorality. Eulenburg (1902/1984) describes France as a nation of degeneracy for their uncivilized conflation of passionate and cruel impulses. However, he does not isolate his claims to Europe, but also avers that flagellation is a common aphrodisiac among the Hindus. Eliciting a parallel between uneroticized violence and savagery, Eulenburg claims that the “orientals” are the only “nations” who do not consider it repugnant to whip a “free man” (p. 129). Therefore, the European man is assumed to have a conscious that prohibits the whipping of a free man, and since the nineteenth century European signifies a “free man,” it is also unethical to derive pleasure from his whipping. When speaking of the masochist’s sources of fantasy for submission to a woman, he lists explicitly racialized, historicized, and fictionalized archetypes: “the ever refreshed fairy tales of the man murdering Amazons, of the African Myrina, of the Bohemina Queen Drahomira, of that “black empress”, the negro Queen Zinga, of the Chinese empress Toa-Ki, etc.” (p. 146).
Though he devotes an entire chapter to the sadistic white woman, within the fantasy of the masochist, Eulenburg anticipates racialized, savage and cruel females.

Civilization and morality are further entangled through the incorporation of religion and legality into the discussions of perversion. Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) marks Christianity as the principle factor in the advance of moral progress among civilization. It is not only the moral freedom of the individual, but also penal structures and education that serve to temper instinctive or hereditary drives toward sexual excess and crime (Eulenburg, 1902/1984; Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). Sexual pathology therefore is established, diagnosed, and treated within the interests of a “community,” “modesty and morality” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965; p. 47). The opposite of civility is constructed as that which would “disgrace humanity at large, could [sadistic acts] be committed by the normal man” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 46); hence the project of these sexologists to draw attention to the exceptionality of the sadist and masochist, to demarcate his differences from the normal man, and normal German citizen. Eulenburg (1902/1984) stands out among his peers, claiming that civilization has taught men how to become all the more violent, all the more destructive, and argues that the penitent floggings of the church have inspired a great deal of perversion. Perversion manifests in sexuality through the forced sexual temperance of civilization, which breeds an association of eroticism with deprivation and the infliction of pain. Freud (1905/2001) also deviates from the civility narrative of Krafft-Ebing and Moll (1897/1933) in his description of the kiss. Drawing on his premise that everything outside of procreation is perverse, Freud emphasizes the peculiarity that among civilized nations the kiss, which is the rubbing of non-reproductive mucous membranes together, “has received … a sexual value” (p. 14). In both Freud’s and
Eulenburg’s arguments, civilization may pull one into perversion through excess, sensuality, and the exaggeration of primitive instincts.

Eulenburg’s (1902/1984) and Freud’s (1905/2001) descriptions of the pitfalls of civilization contrast with neurasthenia. Julian Carter’s (2004) work poignantly describes the relationship between a diagnosis of neurasthenia and whiteness within late nineteenth century America. In 1869, George Beard first published his descriptions of his newly discovered ailment, neurasthenia, which sought to describe “how and why the progress of civilization was making well-bred white people sick” (Carter, 2004, p. 42). Beard described neurasthenia as a nervous illness, and used broad symptoms to make up its pathological manifestations (Carter, 2004; Kaufmann, 2001). Though neurasthenia could be diagnosed in women, they were more likely to be described as hysteric; instead, neurasthenia was used as a masculine counterpart (Kaufman, 2001). Freud goes so far as to claim that what doctors call “neurasthenia” is rather just misdiagnosed psychoneurotics better described as hysteria, obsession and paranoia. Beard and his followers described neurasthenia as a disease of the civilized white man, “barbarians, and other racialized lower-class types, were not nervous because they lacked the physical, intellectual, and moral sensitivity and self-discipline that moderns involved” (Carter, 2004). The diagnosis relied on the assumption that humans had a finite amount of energy, and that if that energy were to be squandered it could result in neurasthenia (Oosterhuis, 2000). These works were quickly translated into German in 1880 (Oosterhuis, 2000). Doris Kaufman (2001) describes neurasthenia as an instant, but short-lived diagnostic success in Germany’s sexology during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Krafft-Ebing’s work played a critical role in introducing the vague diagnosis to Europe through its ubiquity in the case studies of Psychopathia Sexualis (Oosterhuis, 2000).
Many of Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) and Moll’s (1897/1993) sadistic and masochistic cases studies are concomitantly diagnosed with neurasthenia. However, despite its reoccurrence in several case studies, Krafft-Ebing did not include it within his definitional descriptions of sadism and masochism.

Cases 31 and 25 within Psychopathia Sexualis function as testaments for the moral panic that emerged out of neurasthenia’s diagnostic category, with several patients seeking treatment for neurasthenia who only later come to discuss their perversion. Case 31, who liked to drink the blood of women, came to see Krafft-Ebing for his fear of neurasthenia. Case 25, a sadist who desired to see women bleed, ceased masturbation for fear of developing neurasthenia, but was unable to fend off the ailment, developing symptoms of melancholia (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). The concepts of neurasthenia and onanism were so entangled that Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) proposed the prevalence of onanism as the explanation for the frequency of sexual perversions among “civilized races” (p. 32). Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) also marked excessive masturbation as a cause of neurasthenia in Cases 39, a man who confined his sadism to fantasies after adolescence, and 53, a masochist who fantasized about beautiful women beating him, but did not pursue them. Case 41, a sadistic male attracted to younger boys, received treatment advice focused upon: “combat[ing] the neurasthenia and pollutions” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 81). Similarly, Case 61 was offered “antineurasthenic treatment” to improve his nervous system after seeking help for masochism (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 105). Since treatment was so rarely taken up within Krafft-Ebing’s case studies of s/m, the emphasis on treating s/m sexuality by treating neurasthenia demonstrates how interconnected s/m, onanism, and neurasthenia were for Krafft-Ebing. Moll (1897/1933) addresses these interconnections in his Case XXVII, also a
sadistic man attracted to younger boys. Moll notes that he treated the patient for a long time, especially focusing upon the neurasthenia. He claims that the treatment resulted in successful heterosexual feelings for the patient. Schrenck-Notzing’s (1892/1895) Case 61 is of a masochistic male who desires to be spanked by other men. Among the “principal features of treatment” recommended by Schrenck-Notzing was “the removal of neurasthenic troubles” (p. 231). This took the form dissuading onanism, dissuading same-sex attraction and s/m fantasies, and directing the libido toward the opposite sex. To stop the neurasthenia was the only advice offered to arrest sadistic and masochistic impulses.

Thus civilization operates in a precarious position within s/m’s nosology. On one hand, for everyone but Freud (1905/2001), civilization represents the possibility of not only normal sexuality, but moral sexuality. On the other hand, an overabundance of civilization threatens to weaken the already civilized subject, rendering them vulnerable to acquiring perversion and ultimately resulting in the breakdown of their morality. What ought to be immediately striking about the nations marked as savage by Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) and Moll (1897/1933) is the absence of any African nations, let alone those being contemporaneously colonized by Germany. The political distance between Germany and the vaguely described “oriental” nations, Palestine, and Australia, render the nations nameable, while denoting layers of acceptable whiteness: Italy and France are marked as nations of inferior civility. By refusing to name Samoa, East Africa, and Southwest Africa—those populations contemporaneously colonized by Germany—or even Venezuela and other South American nations that are a part of Germany’s pre-unification imperial history, the nosological descriptions of s/m refuse to place those master-slave relationships repudiated in the German metropole, in the same breath as master-slave relationships in German colonies.
Such nosological descriptions refuse to cater themselves to a translatable commentary on wider critiques of master-slave relationships negotiated through nationality, race, and economics. They foment concern for the sexualized European master-slave, and make no mention of that European’s relationship to racialized and economic masters and slaves. However, while avoidant of these politics, descriptions of s/m are unabashed as to their desire to defend the purity of Teutonic pride and its relationship to civility. The act of naming the “other” within the German nation state marks s/m practitioners as aberrations, and therefore not representative of the wider population.

**Degeneracy, Hereditary Taint, and Atavism**

Degeneracy theory spread throughout Europe in the 1860s (McWhorter, 2009). By the turn of the twentieth century secular organizations in Germany were opened in an attempt to target social reform (Weikart, 2004). While some focused their attention on “the perceived biological decline in Germany society,” others addressed “moral decay” (Weikart, 2004, p. 68). The crisis of degeneracy within imperial Germany was a crisis of whiteness, the prospect of the decline of the Teutonic race. This fear of the failing of whiteness, coupled with the pride in the purity of the Teutonic race was not met kindly by other nation states (Young, 1995a). For example, it was not uncommon for the English to define themselves in terms of ‘hybridity’ and as a ‘mongrel-race’ in direct opposition to the racial purity narratives of a recently unified Germany (Young, 1995a).

The tension between hereditarily acquired perversion, predisposition toward perversion due to inherited degeneracy, and perversion developed from experience are ubiquitous within the nosological descriptions of s/m. For Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) degeneracy is not only a state of being, the quality of being a ‘degenerate,’ but also functions
as a default signification for perversion itself. Degeneracy is something that happens to the pervert when they become perverse: “The sublimest virtues, even the sacrifice of self, may spring from sexual life, which, however, on account of its sensual power, may easily degenerate into the lower passion and basest vice” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 1). The pleasure of sexuality puts anyone at risk of degeneracy. For Krafft-Ebing and Moll (1897/1933) degeneracy may either be inherited or acquired. Sexual acts can also degenerate, such as the civilized kiss, which might “degenerat[e] into biting” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 53). Almost the inverse is true for Freud (1905/2001). Rather, he argues the term degeneracy ought only be used in cases where the patient is not markedly different from the normal and the patient’s capacity to work and live in the world is not impaired. He goes on to argue that inverts ought not be considered degenerate and, while in some ways redeeming for the invert, claiming that they are not sufficiently different from the norm, his description also claims that because the inverts come from an “ethical culture” they can not be degenerate, marking the European by definition as not degenerate (Freud, 1905/2001, p. 4). Freud’s pervert is only redeemable through a narrative that marks persons of colour and colonized bodies as even more deviant. He concludes this section arguing that because the inverts are not found “among savages and primitive races,” inversion cannot be linked to degeneracy (pp. 4-5).

McWhorter (2009) locates Krafft-Ebing’s and Moll’s understandings of degeneracy as consistent with the general sentiments of nineteenth century European and American physicians, who were describing “degenerates” as those “whose life courses had veered off … the normal path of human development,” because of either behaviour or heredity (p. 31). Unlike the “degenerate” of “hybridity,” forced into their position by racial “intermixture”
(Young, 1995a, pp. 18-19), Krafft-Ebing’s degenerates are given a sense of choice and therefore responsibility. Taking up one of Krafft-Ebing’s case studies from an earlier edition of *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) outlines his understanding of degeneracy in s/m, contradicting Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) narrative of personal responsibility. Instead Schrenck-Notzing argues degeneracy leads to a “lessened power of resistance,” (p. 149) and heredity is located as a probable cause of weak-mindedness and moral insanity. To this end both Schrenck-Notzing and Eulenburg (1902/1984) draw parallels between feminine weakness and the mental weakness of degeneracy. Eulenburg does this through the characterization of the “hysterical-degenerative” female sadist, marking the relationship between woman’s assumed mental fragility and the weakness of the white race (p. 141). If one is not born, but rather becomes degenerate, then under the right circumstances one is responsible for their degenerative state. However, like his bricolage of cultural artifact and case studies to describe perversion, Krafft-Ebing incorporates a mélange of theories regarding racial hierarchy to make his arguments. While Krafft-Ebing clings to the idea that “sexual maturity is physiological law,” and therefore universal, he also attaches himself to narratives of geographical racism as he indicates that “southern races” have a “greater sensuality” as opposed to those in the north (p. 16).

Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) assertion that there exists a centre of the brain specifically addressing sexual instinct signifies the collapsing of physiological degeneracy with psychic degeneracy in his understanding of sadism. The sadist’s neuro-physiology associates lust with cruelty, which is described as a “psychically degenerate basis” for sexuality (p. 34). The degenerate sadist is marked throughout the case studies as less than civilized and therefore, less than human. The modesty of civilized hetero-sex is replaced by
the “monstrous” sadist in “coitus that [becomes] quite bestial and wild” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 35, p. 47). Such a monstrous and bestial quality does not merely signify the non-human animal or teratological anomaly, but is wrapped in a wider narrative where “monstrous acts of destruction of the consort’s life” are grouped among “atavistic manifestations” of sexuality (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 53). Atavistic sexuality is equated with destructive sexuality. Thus, sadism for Krafft-Ebing and Eulenburg (1902/1984) is marked outside of the bounds of humanness. To be uncivilized is to reject one’s humanity.

The degeneracy narrative allows one to relegate the characteristics of sadistic perversion, the violence, the deterrence from the path of reprosexuality and heteronormativity, and ultimately the rejection of civilized sexuality, to manifestations of the past, blips on the radar of progress. For Krafft-Ebing these are the mistakes of ancestors—animal or human—and are disavowed as a part of civilization and progress: “Sadism must, therefore, like Masochism and the antipathetic sexual instinct, be counted among the primitive anomalies of the sexual life. It is a disturbance (a deviation) in the evolution of psychosexual processes sprouting from the soil of psychical degeneration” (p. 54). He reiterates this point later averring, “Cruelty … is natural to primitive man” (p. 84).

What this pattern renders transparent is that though Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) concern with sadism is a concern for the white sadist—and his potential victims—it is a concern that links that white body to racialized tropes of atavism, savagery, degeneracy, and the primitive. Conversely, Eulenburg (1902/1984) repudiates this whole line of reasoning, arguing Krafft-Ebing’s position merely shifts responsibility off the individual, where it ought to be placed, to “remote human forbears or even unknown fictitious ancestors of the race” (p. 45). Though mired in anti-Darwinist sentiment, Eulenburg effectively complicates Krafft-
Ebing’s syllogism: the past is to savage as the present is to civility. Instead, Eulenburg advocates for a more complicated understanding of history where he claims that the violence of the Middle Ages far outweighs that of what he would consider “ancients” (p. 47). Though his interpretations of history are based on broad sweeping generalizations, this is nonetheless an effective rupture in past/present binaries of civility and the rhetoric of progress in which so much of sexology’s values are couched.

Despite Young’s (1995a) claim that various forms of scientific racism, including phrenology and physiognomy, found themselves as “endemic” within sexology, and though Engstrom (2003) observes the clinical psychiatry in Germany’s imperial period often used hints of a patient’s physiognomy in the pursuit of a diagnosis, physiognomy and phrenology played a very small role in the diagnostic criteria of s/m. Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) was the only one of the five to keep detailed records of the cranial and pelvic measurements of his patients. Though this information was included in his last chapter, it is not integrated into his discussions of his results. Unlike Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965), who argued that heredity played a definitive role in masochistic desires and actions and may also be found as causal in the sadist, Schrenck-Notzing refuted such a “biology is destiny” narrative. Thus, positive results from cranial and pelvic measurements would have contradicted Schrenck-Notzing’s argument that perversions are acquired rather than biologically determined. Eulenburg’s (1902/1984) rejection of biological determinism also manifests in a rejection of physiognomy, coupled with a complete rejection of evolution, claiming that “evolutionary deduction and explanation” of morality is inadequate to describe masochism and sadism (p. 41). He goes on to reject scientific study of the remains of human evolutionary ancestors, refuting both the existence of such ancestors and the possibility of deriving evidence from
bones. Krafft-Ebing did not record anything as precise as measurements; however, general observations, comparable to physiognomy, can be found in *Psychopathia Sexualis*. Case 21, a lust-murderer, notes that the patient has a “cranium of more than average size, but asymmetrical,” and that the “penis [is] greatly developed” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965, p. 34). Case 67, an ideal masochist, is similarly described as having a “malformed head” and that his “penis [is] remarkably large” (p. 108). Cases such as 32, under the sub-category of sadists “Defilement of Women,” record the visible normalcy of the patient with two observations: “underdeveloped brain” and “genitals normal” (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965p. 74). Normal genitals were also remarked in other cases, such as 61, a masochist who could not love a woman who would not beat him (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). The distinction between Krafft-Ebing’s “underdeveloped brain” and Schrenck-Notzing’s cranial measurements is an important one. The underdeveloped brain is an invisible observation, one that comes from a similar logic to Krafft-Ebing’s claim that there is a cortex of the brain controlling sexuality. Here Krafft-Ebing makes clear that perversion, like brain cells hidden from view, is buried under the surfaces of his sadists and masochists. It is sub dermal, hidden behind white skin.

Although Krafft-Ebing neither draws upon physiognomic research directly, nor mentions the work of physiognomists within his text, by focusing on the penile and cranial measurements as sources of relevant knowledge within *Psychopathia Sexualis* he is drawing upon racist tropes that mark the imagined large black penis and cranial difference as signs of sexual pathology.

**The Elephant in the Room: Who Names Whose Other?**

Thus far much of the explanation of the figuring of race within the texts has attempted to expose the tacit assumptions undergirding neurasthenia as a concomitant
diagnosis, sexological understandings of the relationship between perversion and the civilization/savage divide, as well as unnamed referents of the language of degeneration and atavism. The place where the relationship between racialized slavery and s/m is made most explicit, however, is within the case studies. While the nosological descriptions of s/m draw on descriptive language such as, “pain,” “humiliation,” “subjugation,” and “violence,” they are often devoid of the content of fantasies. The descriptions of pathologies represent the synthesis of many stories into a single diagnostic category created, defined, and contested by psychiatrists, sexologists, and psychoanalysts. In contrast, the case studies imbue such descriptors with very different meanings and serve a different function: they represent the individual patient who is sometimes able to create small ruptures, speaking for themselves through the medicalizing texts. The difference between the case studies and the synthesized descriptions tells readers of the evidence presented to the doctors but deemed outside of the purview of a nosological description. This allows readers to see the difference between the aspects of the sadist and masochist that are understood to be definitive, and which are taken to be merely complementary and therefore omitted from the final definitions of s/m.

Butler (2004) discusses the difficulty of doing justice to the description of a subject one only knows through medicalizing case studies. How can she write for this case study? How can she speak about him, without having an intimate knowledge of him? Medical case studies rarely speak for themselves. Rather, they are discussed, explored, photographed, described, and diagnosed by an other, and then published so such exogenous knowledge can be disseminated and repeated. In discussing one of the few medical journals where the person as presented in the medical case study Butler is discussing is quoted directly, and therefore speaking for himself, Butler describes such an instant as “linguistic fragments of something
called a person” (p. 68). Although he could self-describe in these moments—and those descriptions should be honoured—his words are filtered through many other parties before being made available to readers (Butler, 2004). All that is available are the fractions of self-description that the case study’s doctors recorded and peer reviewed publishers decided merited a readership (Butler, 2004). Most importantly, Butler reminds readers that the very context of the interview permitting the case study to speak were those of an “intrusive observational process,” facilitated through medicalization and hierarchy (p. 69).

With Butler’s (2004) warnings in mind, I will look at Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) Case 57 to explore some of the challenges to the sexological denial of imperialism and s/m. Krafft-Ebing assigns courtesy titles and a non-serialized letter of the alphabet to the majority of his first hand case studies. Case studies from other physicians were left with whatever identifying information was present in the original text, but Case 57 is different. Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) only refers to 57 as “the author” and labels him under the subheading of “Passive Flagellation and Masochism” (p. 99; p. 93). Case 57 writes in first person to Krafft-Ebing, and therefore is marked only through his position as “I.” Fifty-seven starts his letter in a similar way to many of Krafft-Ebing’s case studies, by announcing his age—thirty-five—declaring his physical normalcy, and noting the absence of mental defect in his family. Within the first paragraph, 57 has situated his response as operating within medical diagnostic paradigms. However, by the second paragraph, 57 arrives at something Krafft-Ebing’s paraphrasing often denied: affect. Fifty-seven writes about sexual excitement and moral struggle. He also complicates the relationship between psyche and physiology, discussing his occasional erection in response to stimuli but refusing to mark the stimuli as erotic. What elicits a physiological tumescence is not necessarily psychically arousing, he
claims. Furthermore, he denies the orgasmic imperative, describing “endless pleasure” from erections that rarely resulted in ejaculation (p. 96).

Fifty-seven’s masochism is a masochism with cathetic investment in ideas of slavery. I am less interested in what 57’s fantasies tell readers about himself, or about the practice of masochism, than I am with how his story fits in with Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) project of describing masochism and how its presence disrupts the coherency of Krafft-Ebing’s narratives. Fifty-seven describes what it is about slavery that fosters excitement and arousal for him: it is the idea that a man can be owned, the fantasy of the loss of control over his body. Slavery can take a great many forms and not all of them draw on tropes of racialized borders; some are economic-based, others are based on gender, and many may operate within several of these categories simultaneously. Thus, 57 must mark his eroticization of slavery quite clearly within a discourse of race to make his fantasies clear. He starts by describing attaining erections while reading Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Uncle Tom’s Cabin is a slavery abolitionist novel, first published in a serialized form through an American newspaper in 1851 (Stowe, 1852/2003). Upon its publication as a book in 1852 the text was an immediate best seller, becoming a uniting figure within the American slavery abolitionist movement and stirring controversy among defenders of slavery who sought to refute the novel’s merits (Lowance & Westbrook, 1994). By the following year it had been translated into German (Lowance & Westbrook, 1994). Mason Lowance and Ellen Westbrook (1994) argue that Uncle Tom’s Cabin’s success was attributed to more than the story’s content; rather it came with an ethos, “embod[ying] the moral force of freedom” (p.2). Yet, freedom is not what 57 finds erotic about this text. He describes “the thought of a man being hitched
to a wagon in which another man sat with a whip, driving and whipping him” as “particularly exciting” (p. 96).

This passage of 57’s five-page description of his own fantasies and responses to Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) conclusions bears a particular historical importance. Fifty-seven’s nationality is unnamed and is not as important for my purposes as is the question of how this particular eroticism finds its way into the *Psychopathia Sexualis* during a time of profound controversy surrounding Germany’s slave economy in East Africa. Despite Krafft-Ebing’s willingness to go into the violent details of lust-murders, when he describes the masochist as a slave, there is often only a quick passing over of the term, with little dissection of what that would mean. In cases such as 50, 51, 70, 72, 80, 82, 84, and a non-serialized case study cross-published in *Psychopathia Sexualis* borrowed from Moll, the topic of slavery is passed over without comment by Krafft-Ebing. There is passing mention of being sold, borrowed, or whipped, but never a mention of cross-racial identification. All of the above listed case studies except “84” describe the desire of male masochists. None of Krafft-Ebing’s sadists express a desire to take a slave, and thus the desire to enslave is not located within Krafft-Ebing’s understanding of sadistic perversion. It is the desire to be made a slave, to transcend gendered, classed, and racialized boundaries for the sake of eroticism that he defines as perverse.

Fifty-seven writes to Krafft-Ebing and complicates the medicalized perspectives of masochism. Though 57 indicates that he is burdened by his masochism, he also actively seeks a role within the knowledge production surrounding his diagnosis. He talks of longing for a cure, but in the same breath speaks of the impossibility of such a thing, and rather draws on the belief that knowledge is power, insisting his lay contribution matters. Fifty-seven
rebuts claims that masochism is more physical than psychic, claiming mental stimulation as his erotic aim. He concurs with Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) that masochism is congenital and offers his childhood devoid of physical punishment as evidence. Lastly, he contradicts Krafft-Ebing’s argument that the male masochist is inherently feminized. He does this by reiterating his identification with the other, non-gendered, paradigms of subjugation: “To be sure, in these, the inclination to be sought and desired by the woman is dominant; but the general relation desired with her is not that in which a woman stands to a man, but that of the slave to the master, the domestic animal to its owner” (p. 99). Though 57’s text in and of itself is a testament to the effect Krafft-Ebing’s work has had on him, and he explicitly points to the way that Krafft-Ebing’s work has made him hope for convalescence from his perversion, the text also represents resistance to the expert-patient model of knowledge production. Though his sexual fantasies are described most explicitly within Uncle Tom’s Cabin’s narrative of unjustifiable and racist subjugation, 57 marks his masochism with a recalcitrant bent toward authority. Despite feeling that he is pathological, he also rejects several of Krafft-Ebing’s premises of pathologization.

Many of Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) case studies are descriptive in nature. There is sparse engagement and speculation beyond the occasional mentioning of a patient’s refusal to accept the sexual nature of their perversion. However, Krafft-Ebing was also able to control the terms of those case studies. With this case study written in the masochist’s voice, Krafft-Ebing’s refusal to comment leaves it hanging, without reflection. Krafft-Ebing neither defends himself against 57’s rebuttals nor accepts them. Krafft-Ebing is steadfast in his enduring understandings of the feminized masochist. Psychopathia Sexualis allows 57 to be heard by all who read it, but Krafft-Ebing does not appear to have changed his mind in the
face of 57’s rebuttals. The objective refusal to comment on 57’s piece, which so disrupts the flow of Krafft-Ebing’s compendium, renders it all the more anomalous. For Krafft-Ebing, 57’s narrative is evidently worthy of space within the publication, but not worthy of engagement. It allows 57’s identification with the racialized slave of an abolitionist novel to be marked as in direct opposition to Krafft-Ebing’s objective conclusions regarding the other patients. Fifty-seven is thus marked as an exception and one that, regardless of where the reader lands in the debates of Germany’s imperialist expansion, is perverse.

**Conclusion**

As these texts sought to define s/m, they also participated in wider conversations within sexology that came down to demarcating racial difference and similarity. While seeking to explain where perversion is located within a wider narrative of civility, the nosological descriptions find themselves trapped in contradiction. On the one hand these texts seek to reinforce the dichotomy that the European/German is to civilized sexuality and the Non-European/Non-German sexuality is to perversion. This is accomplished by repeatedly marking their descriptions of the European pervert with racializing language, which serves to mark the pervert as less white than the European with civilized sexuality. However, in the same breath such descriptions denote the fragility of whiteness. It symbolizes that civility cannot be so easily determined by the signifier of flesh tone. The regulation of s/m within the metropole is just as much about regulating the white citizen whose sexual desires have been considered to have “gone primitive” as it is about reinforcing heteronormativity. Hence, the mission of these descriptions: through defining, describing, and diagnosing perversion within the metropole, sexologists can be understood as
participating in a mission to civilize those German citizens whose sexuality has gone primitive.

The descriptions of s/m within the German metropole relied simultaneously on narratives of racial otherness, but also challenged the idea that race could be imagined as a fixed category. Though perversion was often marked through language that relied on stereotypes of savage and perverse sexuality outside of Europe, the definitions themselves are about regulating what is perceived as failed whiteness and failed civility. By describing Europeans diagnosed with s/m as “primitive,” “atavistic,” and “savage,” these texts also refute racial difference. The panic surrounding s/m is not only about fearing perverse sexuality within the metropole, but is also about fearing the European subject who has become a symbol for the fragility of whiteness and civility, and therefore contradicts the superiority narrative that justifies imperial expansion. Though the language of the texts is clearly othering, and uses narratives of “difference” to support its claims, such anxiety around the diagnostic criteria of s/m could also be perceived as speaking to fear provoked from sameness. It is neither violence, nor even violent sexuality that concerns these sexologists. Rather, it is white Germans eroticization of violence, subjugation, and enslavement that are reminiscent of the tropes used against persons of colour that is the problem. These texts advocate for the manumission of willing sexual slaves who are wounded by their own desires, and convalescence for those sadists who delight in the eroticized suffering of their compatriots. The s/m practitioner is othered within the metropole for having failed at normative and civilized sexuality, but is only of note because of their whiteness. The signification of racial purity through skin colour is disrupted by their
subcutaneous perversions that must be diagnosed, regulated, and cured in order to reinforce the superiority of the German race over savages abroad.
Chapter Five: Discussion Two – A Biopower of Love

Theoretical Framework

I am going to start by quoting, at length, two positions on love. The first comes from Laura Kipnis’s (2003) tongue in cheek polemic against it:

Love is, as everyone knows, a mysterious and all-controlling force, with vast power over our thoughts and life decisions. Love is boss, and a demanding one too: it demands our loyalty. We, in turn, freely comply—or as freely as the average subject in thrall to an all-powerful master, as freely as indentured servants. It’s a new form of mass conscription: meaning it’s out of the question to be summoned by love, issued your marching orders, and then decline to pledge your body and being to the cause. There’s no way of being against love precisely because we moderns are constituted as beings yearning to be filled, craving connection, bleeding to adore and be adored, because love is vital plasma and everything else in the world is just tap water. (p. 3).

The second comes from Elizabeth Povinelli (2006):

In this book, love, intimacy, and sexuality are not about desire, pleasure, or sex per se, but about things like geography, history, culpability, and obligation; the extraordinary wealth and the distribution of life and death; hope and despair; and the seemingly self-evident fact and value of freedom. So, when I speak of love and its socialities, I am referring to the processes by which the dialectic of individual freedom and social bondage is distributed geographically, how the social phenomena that contest this distribution are made commensurate with it, and how discourses that arise from this distribution circulate, are localized, and are contested. (p.10)
These two passages together draw attention to—and trouble—what I will be referring to as the micro- and macro-dynamics of eros.

Might it sound too skeptical, too heartbroken, too dismissive, to propose as Povinelli (2006) does that love and imperialism may have more forces uniting rather than separating them? Kipnis’s (2003) metaphors of the indentured servant, conscription complete with marching orders, and the empty signifier of “the cause” are not coincidental. Rather she marks love within a nationalistic rhetoric of progress quite consciously: progress denoted through militarization and economic exploitation. Yet, how might we read the “indentured servant” of Kipnis’s love against “obligation” coupled with the “self-evident fact and value of freedom” of Povinelli’s? Kipnis’s polemic tackles the microdynamics of eros. She challenges her readers to complicate how love operates upon the most quotidian individual decisions: where one leaves their pornography in the household or the decision to go home and have dinner with the partner or go out with friends. Every action, every decision, ought to consider love. Yet her final chapter centres on Bill Clinton’s infidelity, and the national response to it. By discussing the example of Clinton, Kipnis draws attention to the connection between the love that exists within the homes of the nation state and national identity, the macrodynamics of eros. Love is both private and public, and can come to define the values of the nation. The Clinton scandal is frequently taken up—in both popular media and academic texts—as a conversation about sexuality, not love (Berenstein, 2000; Ferguson, 1998; Hearn, 1999; Miller, 1999). Yet, what Kipnis elucidates is that the regulation of Clinton’s and, concomitantly, the nation state’s sexuality, is that ideals of love were inextricable from the indignant responses to infidelity. These were not just critiques of sexual dalliances, but a vehement rejection of the symbolic slight against love and matrimony.
Though, as the American president, Clinton functions as a more intuitive signifier for the nation state’s sexuality and certainly garnered more media attention than the average philanderer, he is an extreme example that evinces a subtler, yet broad phenomenon of conflating the sexuality of individuals with the sexuality of a nation, race, or culture. As Povinelli and Kipnis agree, love is about obligation. It is about responsibility. And, as Spivak, (1994) reminds us, responsibility, though couched in universalist narratives, is always partisan. Love has an agenda. A biopower of love describes two separate but related processes within the context of Germany’s pathologization of s/m: The first addresses the conflation of individual sexuality with the nation state. The second is the narrative of obligation and responsibility that creeps into imperialist narratives that mark some bodies as valuable, grievable, and worthy of “the cause,” while marking other bodies as valueless, wasted, and in the way of that very same “cause.”

Foucault (1990; 2003b) coins the term biopower to describe a European nineteenth century shift in governmentality. Whereas previously, a sovereign’s power was defined by the ability to control death—kill the citizen or borrow the citizen’s body for purposes of war—biopower is about “taking charge of life,” rather than the “threat of death” (1990, p. 143). Young (1995b) notes that among Foucault’s commentators, biopower has received comparatively little attention. This is certainly visible in the work of queer theory, and may reflect wider tensions between Foucaultian theory and critical race theory, as well as queer theory and critical race theory. As queer theory adopted Foucault, facilitating its own theoretical position through a white, North American context, it makes an unfortunate kind of sense that biopower—with all of its entanglement in discussions of war, racism, and eugenics—would have been abandoned. Queer theory is only beginning to scratch the
surface of these areas (Puar, 2008). Foucault (2000) writes of the relationship between sexuality and biopower: “Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species” (p. 146). Biopower describes new mechanisms of regulation, ones concerned with mass population control through health care and reproduction (Morton & Bygrave, 2008).

Though Foucault does not explicitly link biopower to *History of Sexuality, Volume I*’s discussion of the invention of the diagnostic category of the homosexual, Michael Warner (1993) argues for the connection between homophobia and the cultural emphasis on reproduction through his neologism, ‘reprosexuality.’ As a term, “reprosexuality,” emphasizes the naturalization and moralizing of a reproductive imperative in heteronormativity. Warner argues the belief that sexuality should lead to reproduction is attached to discourses of homophobia and heteronormativity. “Reprosexuality” describes a particular kind of homophobia; one that fears the refusal to have the kind of sex that is defined through the possibility of reproduction. Lee Edelman (2004) takes Warner’s idea further by discussing “reproductive futurism.” Edelman proposes that it is not just the possibility that one’s sexual activity can lead to a child that supports heteronormativity, but that the child acts as a figure for the future, and thus the queer subject—defined as anyone who refuses to participate in the production of that child—is figured against both the child and the future. Queerness in both cases is defined, not by on attraction, but by a resistance to heteronormativity and the reproductive imperative. Both positions locate the reproductive imperative as marginalizing to queer figures that cannot or will not contribute a child to the nation state. Herein lie the ties between reprosexuality, reproductive futurism, and biopower.
Well situated within the canon of queer theory, both Warner’s (1993) reprosexuality and Edelman’s (2004) reproductive futurism ignore race in their texts. It would complicate both of Warner’s and Edelman’s readings to acknowledge that governments and medical structures do not promote reproduction and reproductive freedoms equally to their citizens across racialized, classed, and medicalized bodies. For example, although Edelman argues that the child is figured as the future in dystopic narratives such as P. D. James’s novel *Children of Men* (2005), one might counter with the example of the nationless “African” child of Save the Children campaigns who embodies a markedly different symbolic relationship to the future. Although the “African” child of Save the Children could still stand as the signifier of that future: bright, innocent, and capable, there is also a strong discourse that discourages reproduction among the similarly positioned nationless “African” mothers. The “child” may operate as a signifier for the future, but the conversation of who should be reproducing and what kind of future is represented by that child is contingent on much more than his youth. The African child can only hope to represent an increasing Westernization of Africa, a world defined by negation, by becoming less of what it is: decreasing prevalence of HIV, fewer families in poverty, lower infant mortality rates. The American child on the other hand is the figure of hope for what is not yet known. The reproduction that facilitates his existence links him to a whole narrative of the production that will be propagated by his existence. His future, and all of our futures with him, is infinitely utopic. The child of Edelman’s future, does not need saving, but rather will save all of us. The children depicted on the cover of Edelman’s book tell his readers a great deal about the symbolic relationship between the child and the future. The bottom half of the cover features a boy and a girl standing side by side, they are both wide-eyed, white, and staring fearfully upwards. Their
skyward gaze meets the bolded title of the book hovering over their fearful faces, ominously reading *No Future*. Pairing an image of scared children looking up at the bold title hovering above them elicits a sense of discomfort as one looks at the cover of Edelman’s book. This discomfort at the thought of these futureless children is inseparable from the kind of children Edelman has chosen to depict, young, white, and affluent. “No future” does not merely signify threatening harm upon these children, but for the threat against this boy-girl pairing is also a threat to heteronormativity and the naturalized assumption that these children will grow up and reproduce more white children to take their places. A threat to the presumably heterosexual child is a threat to the future. Race complicates both Edelman’s and Warner’s positions. It does not undo their erudite contributions to queer theory, but rather adds layers. Reading race into reproductive futurism tells readers that the means and the end are intimately connected and not readily severed from one another. It reminds readers that the narrative of the future is not equally distributed across what Povinelli (2006) describes as economies of flesh.

Reproductive futurism is a historicized narrative, and Edelman’s critiques come from a twenty-first century understanding of the child. In the late nineteenth century, European children were not imagined as “innocent dependants,” but rather “ontogenic recapitulation[s] of their own savage ancestors” (McWhorter, 2009, p. 125). To watch a European child grow up was to watch that child struggle from savagery to civility (McWhorter, 2009). Thus, the question of “Who should reproduce?” is inseparable from the question of “To what end does reproduction serve?” In the case of nation-building, both questions ought not be separated from narratives of eugenics and fear of miscegenation. Carter (2007) points this out when he explains the “insistence that “sex” is potentially reproductive in its essence worked to define
whiteness” (p. 21). Though I have already discussed the problem with origin stories, taking Krafft-Ebing’s cue to look at the work of the Marquis de Sade, it becomes apparent that sadism was interpreted as both anti-reproduction (de Beauvoir, 1965) and anti-future (Barthes, 1976). By reading the work on biopower, reprosexuality, and reproductive futurism from a position that acknowledges the roles of eugenics and moral panic around miscegenation, I will interrogate the anxieties around racial purity and racial preservation that saturate the burgeoning pathologization of s/m, locating it within a wider narrative of population control.

From psychiatric discourses of the late nineteenth century to the sex wars of the late twentieth century it is clear that the issue of ‘violence’ is bound (pun intended) to definitions and regulations of s/m sexuality. Audre Lorde (1988) asks what kind of structural violence was committed through sensationalizing media reporting on the panic around lesbian s/m in the 1980s. Twenty years later, Žižek (2008) describes the prevarication that goes into marking certain acts as violent to avoid issues of systemic violence. In the nascent descriptions of s/m, the microdynamics of eros distract from the macroeconomics of German imperialism. Furthermore, the regulation of the microdynamics of eros between consenting adults within the metropole reveals something larger about the macrodynamics of eros within the conceptualization of a national sexuality. Engelbrecht (1997) points out that etymologically, violence refers to “the making of a way, a path” (¶ 10), meaning that the idea of violence is attached to change and movement. In a period of social change, the microdynamics of eros are regulated as a means of regulating macrodiscourses of violence and slavery. It is not pleasure derived from inflicting injury that is pathologized, but rather erotic pleasure, indicating that psychiatry was attempting to limit the scope of acceptable
sexuality and relationship structures within the metropole. The pervert is the anomalous and sick German citizen; whereas, the colonizers are definitionally situated outside of s/m. To such an end, pain and pleasure are figured as antithetical. Pain, vulnerability, and violence are concerning in the home of the nation and forgotten and silenced in the colonies.

Butler (2004; 2009) uses the language of precarity to help her readers think about the way value is attached to certain bodies, and ignored in other; precarity allows her readers to think about how systems are set in place to nurture certain existences, while other existences are repudiated from the start. Butler (2004) writes,

we are, from the start, even prior to individuation itself, and by virtue of our embodiment, given over to an other: this makes us vulnerable to violence, but also to another range of touch, a range that includes the eradication of our being at the one end, and the physical support for our lives, at the other. (p. 23).

This particular passage is discussing grief within the queer community, and the loss queer subjects are borne into, by virtue of discourses that may ignore us or actively encourage our extermination. She is discussing the vulnerability of both the body and the psyche that is handed over to another such as a parent or caregiver before these bodies become things one can imagine to possess or have as their own. The hand that feeds us is the hand that holds our very existence within its proverbial and literal fingers. Later, Butler (2009) comes to use the short hand of precarity and the phrase “precarious lives” to describe the vulnerability that comes with cultural interdependence, and that in many ways without person to person contact, globally one person often holds a similar possibility to nurture or eradicate. Povinelli (2006) captures a similar sentiment, writing about “the uneven distribution of flesh—the creation of life-worlds, death-worlds, and rotting worlds” to draw upon affect and intimacy in
her discussion of materiality, sexuality, and genealogy of settler colonialism (p. 8). I find it helpful to think through Butler’s understanding of vulnerability and the precarity of life within the context of her later work on nationalism. Povinelli’s quotation prompts me to ask how flesh is distributed through reprosexuality, economic (re)production, and expatriation? How might flesh play into the imaging of experiences and psyches? While Butler prompts me to ask what is the value associated with that distribution of flesh?

I want to put Butler’s work on the grievability of the queer subject (2004) in conversation with her later work on the national subject and precarious life (2009). Butler (2009) expands on the precarity of existence under a Foucaultian understanding of power, where it is not about one subject with authority, such as a parent, acting upon another without (or with less) authority, such as the child. Instead, to speak of precarity is to speak of power and interdependence between subjects; as Foucault (1978) puts it, “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (p. 92). This becomes clear when Butler (2009) notes that precarious life “implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know; a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all” (p. 14).

Butler (2009) calls for recognition that not all bodies are grieved for equally. That there are bodies that are mourned for and memorialized, and then there are bodies that are lost, erased, forgotten. The loss and injury of certain bodies are taken up as political momentum, are symbols inspiring affect. Such a loss is perhaps comparable to the transferred grief and anger that Clinton’s affair aroused within the nation. That German psychiatry was so concerned with the white consenting sexual slave’s safety, and showed so little interest in
the contemporaneous racialized slaves abroad evinces a German nationalistic discourse that suggested which bodies merited protection from themselves and others, and which bodies were to be discarded. This complicates the paternalistic discourses of imperialism and might be understood through what Žižek (2008) calls “chang[ing] the subject” (p. 11). Žižek explains, “to chastise violence outright, to condemn it as “bad,” is an ideological operation par excellence, a mystification which collaborates in rendering invisible the fundamental forms of a social violence” (p. 206). Though I am uncomfortable with the notably modernist Marxist bent to Žižek’s description—that ideology mystifies an invisible “truth”—there is much to glean from his critique that those violences that are met with public censure, which obviates discussion and censure of other violences that are in turn ignored or even lauded. I am not interested in a reversal of the paradigms or making the prosaic claim that s/m is not violence, but rather imperialism is—a notable changing of the subject itself. Rather, I would like to close by asking what the categories of s/m can teach about imperial Germany’s consciousness of grievability? How are precarious lives figured within s/m’s nascent German nosology? Who did the pathologization of s/m seek to protect?

**Thinking of the Children: Reproductive Futurism and the Coital Imperative**

The sadists and masochists of German sexology mark themselves as recalcitrant against producing white children for the nation state. Weiss (1986) states that post-unification and into Germany’s expansionist project “German eugenics can best be understood as a sometimes conscious, oftentimes unconscious strategy to boost national efficiency—national efficiency denoting not only economic productivity but also, in the German context, cultural hegemony” (p. 33). Eugenics in Germany’s newly unified nation was as much about the economic production that comes with new bodies as it was about
hereditary fitness, ensuring the appropriate bodies are available for a prosperous empire. German eugenics emerged out of a Darwinian paradigm (Weikart, 2004). Germany’s desire to prosper as a nation cannot be separated from its investment in the reproduction of its citizens. Returning to Krafft-Ebing’s Case 57, we see the masochist as mocking the ideals of heteronormative sexuality: “I doubt whether there are sadistically constituted women like Sacher-Masoch’s heroines. But if there were such women, and I had the fortune (!) to find one, still in a world of reality, intercourse with her would ever seem only a farce to me” (p. 97). Further collapsing the hierarchies of sensation, pleasure, and reprosexuality, 57 exclaims, and this point is italicized within Krafft-Ebing’s work, that though he is “not always potent, while with masochistic ideas, my virility is perfect” (p. 97). Thus the stimulus from erection is pleasurable without the assumed ejaculation that could facilitate a pregnancy. Despite internalizing the medicalized discourses of his masochism, 57 also mocks the limitations of heteronormative conceptions of pleasure. Similarly in case 70, Schrenck-Notzing (1892/1895) describes a patient who justifies his disdain for intercourse. Seventy says that he has found partners who enjoy his passive algolagny and that they both wish to avoid pregnancy.

In case 49, one of only two cases of female sadism recorded by Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965), the psychiatrist takes his description of the perils of sadism in women in a different direction than most of his case studies of men. Forty-nine believes that coitus is repugnant and unpleasant. However, rather than discussing the details of her sexual response or attempts at coitus, Krafft-Ebing focuses upon her failure to understand love through his lens. Though he notes that she loved her husband, her perversion is read through her refusal to conflate genital contact with an act of love. Case 61 is described as falling “violently in
love,” when his romantic interest in a woman is deemed to be exclusively masochistic. A similar story exists earlier in *Psychopathia Sexualis*, where a masochistic woman is described as thinking of love throughout her beatings and, in the process falling “into a state of bacchanalian madness” (p. 23). What Krafft-Ebing describes as “madness” is not the pleasure in beatings, similarly found in other cases without such explicit focus upon “madness,” but rather than in the ecstasy of the beatings that she would cry out “Oh love” (p. 23). Krafft-Ebing offers a whole treatise on love proclaiming that it is in close proximity to anger. Both emotions are imagined as “the most intense emotions” and “the only two forms of robust emotions” (pp. 55-56). Love, like sexuality, for Krafft-Ebing is rooted in the brain, and the intensity of such emotions may physically exhaust someone as well as “throw the psycho-motor sphere into the most intense excitement” (p. 56). Failed and repudiated reprosexuality signifies a failure to love properly, however, to find love through subjugation and pain is madness. Whereas Krafft-Ebing and Freud (1905/2001) believe that s/m can be found among heterosexual and reprosexual subjects, Schrenck-Notzing’s (1892/1895) text is dedicated to drawing parallels between “contrary sexual instinct” and other diagnoses that reject reprosexuality.

Attaching reproduction to the prosperity of German nationalism, Moll (1897/1933) explicitly links his text to fear of miscegenation and racial purity. As he abandons beliefs in the sexual instinct, and therefore places coitus within a narrative of personal responsibility, he attaches this narrative to polygenic racism, assuming that different races are different species that cannot produce fertile offspring. He repeatedly iterates that attraction does not take place between races and that interracial hetero-sex may only be explained in the colonies through the absence of available white women. This sentiment is also found in Krafft-
Ebing’s (1903/1965) commentary on the ugliness of black women. Though Eulenburg (1902/1984) troubles the westernization of beauty norms throughout his text, miscegenation also creeps in. In his listing of the masochist’s fantasies of female sadist through racialized figures, the regulation of the white German masochist’s fantasies of the “African Myrina” or “black empress” (p. 146), cannot be removed from fantasies that transcend racial and gendered hierarchies and figure upon interracial sexuality. The coital imperative dictates heterosexuality among white Germans that build up the race, and not sexuality that will, according to Moll only produce infertile offspring. Despite denying the existence of the sex instinct, Moll is quite clear that the human’s inclination toward intercourse stems from a desire to produce offspring.

Within the nosological descriptions of s/m, coitus figured as both a sign of wellness and also operated as a cure. Freud’s (1905/2001) case is the most explicit, marking all erotic pleasure outside of hetero-intercourse as perverse, but he also follows Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) writing, which created hierarchies of perversions based upon their proximity to and distance from coitus. Krafft-Ebing did this first by marking certain cases of sadism and masochism as ideal manifestations of the perversions. The ideal sadist and the ideal masochist have not yet crossed the border from fantasy to reality (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). Just as healthy sexuality is constructed as devoid of violence, so the better kind of perversion is one that has yet to be fully realized, and is therefore more likely to be recuperated. While Krafft-Ebing’s cases are primarily focused upon sadists and masochists who experience heterosexual attraction, the case studies of Schrenck-Notzing’s Therapeutic Suggestions (1892/1895) focus upon same-sex attraction, which he refers to as “contrary sexual instinct.” By focusing on s/m within a context of same-sex attraction, Schrenck-Notzing places the
diagnostic category of s/m within a wider project of reinforcing the coital imperative. He explicates the case and life history of patient 68, who is described as a male algolagnist attracted to male children. Over three weeks of hypnosis directed at curing 68 of both his inversion and algolagnia, in the last week Schrenck-Notzing describes 68’s ability to attain an erection without ejaculation as “a little progress” (p. 297). The progress thus denotes increasing steps toward the coital function. At the end of the treatment Schrenck-Notzing claims that he has cured the patient of sadistic inclinations, but this too is only a partial success: “On the other hand, the contrary sexual instinct still exists unchanged, and, in my opinion, will not be overcome until regular hetero-sexual intercourse has become possible” (p. 298). Thus the regulatory mechanisms of associating the genital nerve endings with sexual pleasure above experiences of pain, dominance, and control, are linked to the mechanisms of compulsory heterosexuality.

To this end, the pathologization of s/m marks compulsory heterosexuality and reprosexuality as antithetical to violence. Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) makes this point by drawing an explicit connection between the penetration of the lust-murderer’s knife and the failure of the sadist to attain an erection, coitus, or ejaculation. Since many of Krafft-Ebing’s cases of lust murder are either taken from other doctors, or from popular print media without ever having examined the subject, we see conjecture in claims such as “The quality of sadistic acts is defined by the relative potency of the tainted individual. … If the sadist is psychically or spinally impotent, as an equivalent of coitus, there will be noticed strangling, stabbing, flagellating (of women)” (pp. 34-35). Here Krafft-Ebing draws parallels between incommensurable acts. He deduces from those sadistic case studies who reject coitus as a mode of eroticism that lust-murderers must therefore substitute murder for coitus.
Furthermore, his reference to the “tainted individual” is a reference to moral panic surrounding the consequences of bad breeding that legitimize the eugenics movement. Thus sadism is figured in direct opposition to a burgeoning eugenics movement, contingent upon the willingness to breed for the state. The impotent sadist who cannot—or will not—engage in hetero-sex to produce new life is thus made into a symbol of death. He is, as Barthes (1976) figures de Sade, anti-future. His politics refuse to align with those of the nation state.

Of Protection and Property: Narratives of Subjugation

These texts recursively comment on the historical subjugation of women, and posit that a nation’s civility can be measured by its treatment of women. When Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) speaks of the benefits of Christianity to civilization, he also argues for the deleterious affects of Islam, drawing specific attention to the treatment of women. The Muslim woman is figured within a narrative of captivity (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). Herein, Krafft-Ebing adds another layer to the reproductuality narrative. It is not just that sex must lead to reproduction, but that this affection must be born of a loving relationship. He writes, “in the sunny balm of Christian doctrine, blossom forth her divine virtues and her qualities of housewife, companion and mother.” (p. 3). Sexuality, in the spheres of acts, is delimited by heterosex; but sexuality as a wider facet of the subject’s identity is, in contrast, all encompassing of the person. The woman’s statuses as “housewife, companion and mother” are thus also separated from the discourse of subjugation. By drawing this comparison, Krafft-Ebing aligns himself with Moll’s (1897/1993) assertion that the more primitive copulate purely for reproduction, and only in the more civilized of races is sexuality made conscious. Krafft-Ebing concludes his section on the differences between Christian and Islamic sexuality claiming, “Life is a never-ceasing duel between the animal instinct and
morality. Only will-power and a strong character can emancipate man from the meanness of his corrupt nature, and teach him how to enjoy the pure pleasures of love and pluck the noble fruits of earthly existence” (p. 3). What these European sexologists perceive as the mistreatment of women is also imaged as a representation of animal instinct, reinforcing the belief that the non-European and non-Christian are less than human. Furthermore the virtue of women is also rendered a measurement of civility. Krafft-Ebing outlines that it is Slavic, Persian, Hungarian, and Russian women who confuse violence for love. Thus layers of whiteness are divided within the European continent by national identity. The narrative of the white, civilized European woman is only available to some (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). Thus the sadistic man, the lust-murderer is not only failing in his capacity as a reprosexual, but is also failing in his commensurate roles as breadwinner, companion, and father.

Eulenburg (1902/1984) disrupts the paradigm of the “primitive man,” as more savage than the civilized. Though he describes “primitive” subjects as being “more animal-like than any animal,” he claims, with admiration, that they treat women with more care than civilized men. Though he believes that the position of women has been elevated in civil society as Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) argues, Eulenburg is more skeptical and views women’s elevated social position as mere lip service, with her subordinate position remaining the same. There is a heteroglossia in Eulenburg’s reading of gender and civility. The civilized man’s civility is called into question for his failure to treat the woman with better care. However, Eulenburg nonetheless uses his chapter on sadistic women to describe women’s savage nature. In this chapter, Eulenburg prefaces a case study from an anthropologist’s diary by saying “One knows that no one surpassed the Indian in the cruelty or torture of his victim—except the Indian women; and only white women can surpass these” (p. 144). Yet the story that follows
his claim that the white woman is the apotheosis of cruelty, is one that renders a white woman the victim of the violences of “Indian women” in New Mexico. He then quotes a description from the diary of a male eyewitness to the assault. The diary describes in detail an account of indigenous women binding, cutting, burning, and fatally stabbing a white woman, focusing their attacks on her genitals. Eulenburg deduces that the assault transpired because, despite the white woman’s resistance, she attracted too much sexual attraction from the native men, eliciting the backlash of the indigenous women. Although the story opens by decrying the violences of the white woman’s savagery, his story ultimately renders her the victim of such assaults. In a second example, this one taken from print media, he tells of two European women rivals, one of whom in jest insulted the other’s integrity. In a violent backlash the second woman hires “lackeys” to assault her “criticizer” (Eulenburg, 1902/1984, p. 142). Though Eulenburg inserts a hint of skepticism, saying that the following was never “definitely proven,” he nonetheless remarks: “as was indicated in the complaint, an unusual outrage was perpetrated by one of the lackeys—a negro” (pp. 142-143). In both cases where Eulenburg seeks to explain white, female sadism, he instead marks the perpetrator of violence on racially inscribed bodies.

Eulenburg’s (1902/1984) sadistic white women watch violence, and hire others to do their violence, but they are not imagined as the perpetrators. Conversely, in both cases, white women come out the victims of what he describes as “female sadism.” It is the European woman’s body that is imagined most vulnerable to injury from the sadist. Eulenburg’s case studies of sadistic women and Krafft-Ebing’s case studies of sadistic men lament the unnecessary injury of the European woman. The European women who perpetrate sadistic violence within these case studies are not taken up as case studies of their own, rather they
are the partners or sex workers of Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) masochistic men. Krafft-Ebing’s Case 80 is particularly poignant in this vein. A letter among 80’s belongings is written by a woman who describes her delight in watching 80 suffer, telling him that she will make him into her slave, and degrade him into agony. Yet, her writing of eroticizing his subjugation is used to speak to his masochism; he is the case study, she is merely evidence, she is stripped of her own subjectivity. These texts struggle with the feminine sadist. In Case 80 Krafft-Ebing allows her presence to creep into his work while simultaneously disavowing her. The female is repeatedly pointed to as the problem in s/m. Either she is at risk of vulnerability at the hand of the lust-murderer or through her perversion she is failing not only in her reprosexual functions, but in her positions as “housewife, companion and mother.”

While these definitions seek to limit the scope of fantasy and sensation within German relationships, so they also seek to create an interpretive separation between love and slavery. Just as it is marked as a perversion to show love to a partner through consensual and eroticized subjugation within the metropole, so there is the unnamed referent of the racialized and economically contracted slave, who is marked as outside of the bounds of love. Though Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) rarely speaks of miscegenation directly, he mentions in passing under the subject of “ideal masochism” a patient who “had love-affairs with ugly, repulsive women—negresses, dwarfs, giantesses” (p. 112). Thus, romantic affiliation across races and medicalized markers of difference and superiority is marked not only as perversion, but self-destructive perversion. Any woman’s distance from white, European standards of beauty is constructed as outside of the sexual and romantic realm of possibility for the civilized man (Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965). He thus entangles the discourses of racial and sexual purity within the German metropole, while marking the black woman’s body as undesirable and
unlovable. These texts plead for the safety and protection of those European citizens who might find themselves wounded through the sexual conduct of s/m. However, as “normal” love within the metropole is figured as antithetical to slavery, so slaves are marked outside of the bounds of protection. This is clearest in Krafft-Ebing’s (1903/1965) Case 84. Eighty-four is a masochistic woman who declares, “I have also fancied myself to be his female slave; but this does not suffice, for after all every woman can be the slave of her husband” (p. 132). Like Case 70, she is one of the few permitted to speak in first person. And also similarly to Case 70, when she does so, she actively refutes Krafft-Ebing’s premises. Where she figures the power relations of heterosex already within a paradigm of imbalance and subjugation, she also finds eroticism. As the diagnosis of s/m refuses to address racialized master-slave relationships within the colonies, it fervently argues that white bodies are unacceptable slaves. It is the white body that is exposed to violence and subjugation that these texts grieve for, and dedicate themselves to ameliorating.

Lastly, the conflation of love and cruelty by the s/m practitioner is framed within these texts as directly opposing civilization; s/m, in this configuration, is despotical and tyrannical (Eulenburg, 1902/1984; Krafft-Ebing, 1903/1965; Moll, 1897/1933). Eulenburg (1902/1984) equates the female sadist as a “despot” (p. 31). Her “slaves” “submit” their lives to her will with “the futile expectation of devotion” (p. 31). In a discussion of a male masochist, Eulenburg later describes his subject as “fallen under the curse,” rendering him “an unwilling slave of despotic female violence” (p. 92). He labels their relationship as a “gynacocracy [sic]” (p. 92). The presumed unwillingness of Eulenburg’s male masochist’s slavery to a woman reveals a number of Eulenburg’s assumptions. The paradox of what it would mean to be a willing slave is neither a new one nor a resolved one: can one make a
choice to abandon all freedom? For Eulenburg consensual slavery is written off as unintelligible, and is disavowed. This unimaginable desire is marked in a sickness that Eulenburg then takes the responsibility of describing and diagnosing to undo the harms of such subordinated white bodies. In Moll’s (1897/1902) descriptions of the virtues of German love he marks its counterpoint, Italian love, as “vivacious, impetuous, jealous and tyrannical” (p. 257). Krafft-Ebing (1903/1965) attributes a person’s attraction to masochism as a sign that they have fallen prey to “the charm afforded by the tyranny in itself” (p. 136). Though he considers most masochism to be congenital, he rhapsodizes over the seductive appeal of tyranny:

Love that willingly bears the tyranny of the loved one then becomes an immediate love of tyranny. When the idea of being tyrannized is for a long time closely associated with the lustful thought of the beloved person, the lustful emotion is finally transferred to the tyranny itself, and the transformation to perversion is completed.

This is the manner in which masochism may be acquired by cultivation. (p. 137)

To acquire masochism through experience also comes through misplaced love. Love in such cases becomes a destructive force when not appropriately applied. That this destruction comes through a metaphor of state abused power in three cases is not merely coincidental. Rather it is symptomatic of the parallel that Kipnis (2003) and Povinelli (2003) draw between the micro-dynamics of eros within the household, and the sexuality of the nation state. The metaphor reveals the stakes of regulating sexuality within the nation and it aligns “normal” sexuality with the presumed “non-tyrannical” nation state.
Conclusion

Jacqueline Rose (1998) reminds her readers that the term “state” functions both as a representation of nationality, as in the nation state, but also as a metaphor for madness, as in “to be in a state.” In the case of such nosological descriptions, it is clear that a diagnosis of perversion is in many ways an evaluation of that citizen’s relationship to the nation state.

With the burgeoning eugenics movement in Germany, it was the responsibility of its citizens to be engaging in loving heterosex, that would both produce and nurture its offspring for the growing empire. To be diagnosed with s/m is a means of indicating a failure to comply with compulsory heteronormativity and a culture of white supremacy. However, the diagnosis also comes from a place of hope. These categories are not invented merely as a means of pointing to otherness, chastising perversion for its difference, but are also dedicated to the cause of curing the pervert. These are not mad persons who are deemed disposable, to be locked in the prisons away from their potential victims. Rather they are redeemable. These texts, thus imbue the white European sadists and masochists with a potential, but not yet realized, value. Though they represent a failed or failing of whiteness, of civility, the nation still has use for them if they can only realign their sexuality with that of the nation state.

By positioning s/m as tyrannical love that is counter to Teutonic values, Germany is marked as a nation of love; a kind of love that is proven by the responsibility each of its citizens takes by continuing to build toward its prosperity starting with the home. This is the same emotional investment in its citizens that encourages these sexologists to grieve for not only the pervert, and the sadist’s potential victim, but also for the kind of future that such sexuality represents. As Germany’s imperialist expansion represents a major step in the growing empire, that empire cannot be imagined as perverse, despotic, or exploitative. So it
grieves for its perverse citizens. It attempts to foster convalescence among them, and with that is to follow a newly defined personal sexuality that through love and compliance to the reproductive imperative will foster the growth of the nation state.

The investment in curing master-slave relationships within the metropole must be read against the disinterest taken by these sexologists in the master-slave relationships Germany was in the process of creating abroad. The grief for the victim of the sadist’s lust-murder, and the grief for a sexuality that has come to represent death and destruction above the creation of life and reproduction must be read against the reverberating silence for Germany’s imperialist expansion. This expansion, represented the future of German national identity within the homestead, but would come to represent invasion, destruction, and genocide within several of the nations colonized. These texts make clear that they are not interested in critiquing slavery outside the context of eroticism, and thus the colonized bodies are marked simultaneously as unlovable by racist discourses of the black body’s aesthetic value and ungrievable for the disinterest in the way such power relations affect their lives.

This is not to advocate that it would have been useful to have pathologized the desire engaged in colonialism. Fundamentally, I don’t know that I believe a diagnostic category to group a behaviour or desire as perverse is ever useful. Rather, it is to recognize that as these categories were formed they reveal something about the priorities of the German imperial period. They reveal that individual sexuality was regulated within a larger narrative of nationalism. They reveal that while protection may be used in the justification of Germany’s imperialist expansion, these texts prioritized the protection of the German citizen and the future of Germany that citizen represented.
Chapter Six: Conclusion – “Re-member Me”

Isaac Julien’s (1992) attendant laments “re-member me,” and as viewers of his film we must attempt to reconcile with what it is that we are supposed to re-member. The attendant offers his viewers no history to be remembered, no truth to record and in that process dismantles the mechanisms of historic memory, such as the museum, and declares that the colonial artifact hung on a wall or placed in a glass case cannot serve his needs. Instead, the audience is given access only to symbols and imagery that make up a non-linear narrative, which refuses to delineate between fantasy and reality. The attendant’s call to have the assemblage of his experiences and fantasies re-membered may be contrasted with the role of s/m in German nosology. Psychiatry in some ways agreed with Julien, noting that the important issue is not whether or not the actual acts are “real,” whether fantasy transforms into practice. However, at the same time, these German sexologists made use of “fantasy” as a means of accessing and describing pathologies that just needed to be appropriated, sorted through, coded, and categorized to be made into reality. Whereas Julien argues that what is imagined as reality within the confines of the museum walls tells his viewers something about the fantasies of those who have consumed and continue to consume said artifacts. Julien understands fantasy as productive. Psychiatry on the other hand, imagined fantasy as dangerous; and by recording, describing, and pathologizing it, German sexology attempted to enervate any threat it posed. However, such a position reveals the productive aspects of fantasy that Julien represents in The Attendant and Foucault (1990) describes in History of Sexuality while discussing sexological knowledge production.

As I have argued throughout this thesis, however, the regulation of s/m sexuality within the German metropole cannot be confined to a discourse of sexual regulation. Rather,
the interest in these pathological categories must be read alongside Germany’s contemporaneous imperialist expansion into East Africa and Southwest Africa. In an attempt to build an empire out of a newly unified nation state, German did what other empires had done before it. Despite British and American economic restructurings in response to criticisms of slave economies, the conflation of empire with the conquest of new land and slavery of African bodies was still intuitive for late-nineteenth century Germany’s path to national identity.

It should be noted, however, that the endogenous and exogenous critiques of Germany’s imperialist exploits, first in Samoa and then in East Africa and Southwest Africa, the question of what it meant to have a slave and to be a slave, was a point of contention within German national consciousness. The case studies that were recorded, and the way that those recordings were synthesized by Krafft-Ebing, Schrenck-Notzing, Moll, Eulenburg, and Freud during Germany’s imperial period, offers one point for examining cognitive dissonance around the presumed entitlement of the civilized subject over the colonized subject and the increasing association between slavery and barbaric brutality. The sexological texts do not align to tell a single story of what it meant to be civilized, nor what it meant to be a pervert. Rather they struggle against one another to understand and cure the German psyche of a relationship between lust and cruelty, desire and pain, delight in subjugation.

The very premise of imperialism is based on assumptions of superiority. The colonists claim the right to take land and bodies from the colonized, Povinelli’s (2003) economies of flesh. Those colonized subjects as a counterpoint are assumed inferior, either because they need the assistance of the philanthropic colonizers who seek to bring the gift of civilization with them, or because they are imagined as being in need of regulation.
Narratives of eroticizing master-slave relationships within the metropole trouble the superior/inferior binary that legitimizes imperialism. Masochists, sadists, sadomasochists, and algolagnists within the German metropole symbolized an inferior kind of whiteness. Civil men do not take their white compatriots as slaves. Civil men have no desire to transcend racialized, classed, and gendered divisions of labour and servitude by becoming the slaves of their compatriots. In all cases the patient is deemed morally inadequate, which also undermines their civility. By creating and promulgating medicalized categories of s/m, the authors mark the eroticism of slavery as aberrant. It is separated as distinct from historical atrocities, and therefore though the erotic pursuit of slavery is perverse, the economic and racial pursuit of slavery is not.

The discourse of a failed whiteness of a few citizens is pitted against the imagined Teutonic purity of the average German citizen. If hereditary taint, atavism, and degeneracy only affect a few, then other German citizens can be understood not only to have achieved civility, but those sexologists who seek to diagnose and cure s/m can be understood as working toward civilizing the perverts of their metropole. As unification and imperialism pushed for an expanding German empire, they also fueled a growing eugenics movement in the homeland. German citizens had a responsibility to help produce the next generation of the nation state. Therefore, sexuality outside of the purview of reprosexuality found itself in opposition to building the German empire. Psychiatry participated within the eugenics movement by emphasizing the reproductive imperative, and labeling sexuality outside of reproductive futurism as dangerous, perverse, and anti-future it also regulated that sexuality in opposition to the nation state.
Civilized citizens are not only heterosexual and reproductively inclined, but they are also loving. The citizen is contrasted with the imagined distant and othered savage, and that savage sexualities are often compared with that of a beast. What marks the civilized citizen’s sexuality as different from savage or animal sexuality is denoted through a concomitant reproductive imperative that is coupled with reproductive futurism. The civilized citizen does not mate for the pure sake of biological determinism, rather choice is central to civility. One must choose to reproduce, and in this choice one’s reproduction is relegated to the loving relationship of a household. Biopower did not only seek to regulate the production of life through heterosex, but also the nurturance of that life through a family and household. The definitions of s/m strive to convince readers that even if equality is not perfectly attained in heterosex, it ought to be pursued. While refusing to comment on the relationships between Germans sent into the colonies of East Africa and Southwest Africa, nosological descriptions of s/m advocate that within the metropole, hierarchies are not sites of eroticism.

A project that seeks to discuss race and s/m has a number of potential avenues. One could ask about infusing symbols of imperialism such as master-slave relationships with eroticism. One could investigate the subversive potential of race-play within anti-racist s/m counter culture. One might also look at how cultural appropriation plays out in s/m practices such as “Japanese rope bondage.” My project on race and s/m has been very different. I have been interested in the subtext that undergirds the narratives of s/m that sexologists created when inventing their categories of perversion. I have explored how the pathologization of s/m was about much more than regulating sexuality. While these diagnostic categories do not tell their readers a great deal about what the sexologists imagined the role of the slave to be, they speak volumes through their negation. In naming the savage other as several cultures
outside of Africa they refuse to comment on Germany’s imperialist slave economies. They refuse to define what it means to own a slave, or who ought to be one. Rather they seek to build a barricade between erotic investment and slavery. And in working toward civilizing the nation, they reinforce discourses of national superiority that claim the right to hold imperial power over another.
Endnotes

i Mandy Merck (1993) argues that the visual sign of “s/m” visually depicts a disjointedness, and yet relatedness, between the categories of sadism and masochism that on the one hand are too dissimilar to be conflated, but too interrelated to be considered aggregate. She argues “the appropriately termed ‘slash’ both stands in for and cuts out” meaning (p. 237). In her polemic, Against Love, Laura Kipnis (2003) uses the word ‘against’ to symbolize what the slash represents in Merck’s understanding of “s/m.” To be against is to be opposed to, yet it is also to be beside, pressed up against. It is both severed and connected from its referent. The slash wraps sadism and masochism to one another as does the term ‘sadomasochism’, but also reminds readers that there are spaces between the two categories and identities. Following from Merck (1993), “s/m” is used throughout my thesis.

ii Though Edelman clings to a neutrality within his discussions of the figuring of the child, the majority of his example of children who will act as a symbol for the future are masculine.
References


de Beauvoir, S. (1965). Must we burn Sade? In *The Marquis de Sade: The 120 days of Sodom and other writings* (pp. 3-64). New York: Grove Press.


Dhamoon, R. (October 21, 2009). *Mapping and mainstreaming intersectionality*. Department of Political Studies Queen’s University Speaker Series.


Ernst, W. (2007). Beyond east and west. From the history of colonial medicine to a social history of medicine(s) in South Asia. *Social History of Medicine, 20*, 505-524.


Guthrie, R. V. (1998). Even the rat was white: A historical view of psychology (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.


Morpheus, L. (2008). From the arts to society and back again: A study of the influence of kink on the arts and society. In *Fetish: Working Out the Kinks*. Symposium conducted at the University of Toronto, Toronto, ON.


