The United Nations and Sport for Development and Peace: A Critical History

By

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Abstract
This dissertation offers a critical history of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm by exploring the United Nations’ use of sport in the development context. It questions the dominant, ideal vision of Sport for Development and Peace in which sport is understood to offer an innovative and pragmatic approach to development and to act as a vehicle for the promotion of health, education, peace-building, economic growth, and infrastructural development. Within a framework of the “history of the present” and drawing upon a post-structural discourse analysis and archival research I trace the use of sport from colonial and imperial endeavours, through to post-World War II reconstruction, to the contemporary moment, so as to make visible the political and contested nature of implementing sport in the development context. Arguing that the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm is not a novel venture, that it extends a (neo)colonial governmental apparatus, and that it reinscribes neoliberal rationalities, I seek to explore how Sport for Development and Peace policies conceal and reproduce broader global power relations.
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**List of Abbreviations**

CSR ............... Social Corporate Responsibility  
ILO ............... International Labour Organization  
IOC ............... International Olympic Committee  
IYSPE ............. International Year for Sport and Physical Education  
MDG ............... Millennium Development Goal  
NGO ............... Non-Governmental Organization  
SDP ............... Sport for development and peace  
SDPIWG .......... Sport for development and Peace International Working Group  
SME ............... Sport mega-event  
UN ............... United Nations  
UNAIDS .......... Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS  
UNDP ............. United Nations Development Programme  
UNEP ............. United Nations Environment Programme  
UNESCO .......... United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
UNHCR .......... United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNICEF .......... United Nations Children’s Fund  
UNODC .......... United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
UNOSDP .......... United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace  
UNRRA .......... United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration  
UNV ............... United Nations Volunteers  
WHO ............... World Health Organization
Chapter 1 – Introduction

On April 6th 2015, the United Nations celebrated the second annual International Day of Sport for Development and Peace, an initiative designed to “highlight the potential of sport to advance human rights, eliminate barriers, and promote global solidarity” (United Nations, 2015). This event is meant to draw particular attention to development efforts pursuant to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – a series of eight development objectives unanimously adopted by all 189 UN member states in 2000 and to be achieved by 2015. Presented as the keystone for development policies in the new millennium, the MDGs have made sport integral to the development apparatus, and official UN documents released to mark the April 6 event highlighted the direct contribution of sport to attempts to achieve all eight goals. Looking back upon a development landscape that continues to be marked by uneven development fifteen years after the inauguration of the MDGs, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a veiled acknowledgement of the failure to meet many of the MDGs. Nonetheless he called upon the world to help bolster an “emerging new United Nations sustainability agenda.” Ban hailed “the immense power of sport to make the world a better, more tolerant place for all,” and “encouraged all sportsmen and women to throw their energy into advocating the new sustainable development agenda currently being crafted by the United Nations Member States” (United Nations, 2015). Ban also thanked the United Nations Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace, Wilfried Lemke, for his efforts in promoting SDP, and commended athletes who use their “fame and influence and to bring about social change”. Further, the Secretary General expressed his gratitude to the United Nations Special Envoy on Youth Refugees and Sport and former
President of the International Olympic Committee, Jacque Rogge, for his work in using sport to help refugees and internally displaced people (United Nations, 2015).

I flag this meeting as particularly symbolic of the confluence of four factors that have come to form the Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) paradigm: the use of sport in meeting the MDGs; the institutionalization of SDP in international development through the creation of the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace and the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace; the employment of celebrity athletes as UN Goodwill Ambassadors for SDP to raise awareness of sport’s utility in addressing systemic underdevelopment; and the mobilization of sport’s commercial avenues in pursuit of development objectives.¹ This latter trend is particularly evident in the close relationship between the IOC and the UN, where the IOC holds observer status at the UN, allowing it to inform development policy, and promote the Olympic Games as a means to and marker of development in the global South. Through these four movements, the role of sport in the development paradigm has become as commonsensical and innocuous as the term development itself.

Despite the ubiquity of the term, development as we understand it today has existed in popular lexicons and consciousness for only six decades. The “dawn of the development era” is popularly traced to January 20th, 1949, when, in the fourth point of his inauguration speech, U.S. President Harry Truman called for a new worldview where the global South

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¹ Throughout the dissertation, I distinguish between “Sport for Development and Peace” as a constellation of organizations, institutional practices and policies, and “sport for development” as a more diffuse or informal use of sporting activities in a development context.
would follow in the footsteps of the U.S., down a path of industrialization, and into modernity.² Truman stated:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old Imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. (quoted in Esteva, 1992, p. 6)

Truman’s speech helped shift the framing of the countries of the global South from colonial appendages to autonomous yet “underdeveloped” nations that required the aid of the North. Prior to Truman’s inauguration speech, “development” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was tied to a political ethos of colonial domination in which economization and colonization were synonymous (Esteva, 1992). What Truman had succeeded in doing in his speech was “free the economic sphere from the negative connotations it had accumulated for two centuries, delinking development from colonialism” (Esteva, 1992, p.17). This discourse of development is now ubiquitous and self-evident.

Although more than sixty years have passed since Truman announced his vision of development, the global landscape remains marked by inequality, poverty, and instability. In the discursive shift to development, the term has come to be synonymous with quantifiable measures and markers manifest in terms of financial aid and economic growth.

² I use the terminology of “global South” and “global North” in place of what has conventionally been called the First and Third Worlds. While this is an attempt to mitigate the problematic connotations of First World versus Third World, the terms are not without contention. First, they are geographically misleading as evidenced, for example, by Australia’s geographical location in the global South, but economic and political position in the global North. Second, as with most generalizations, the dichotomy of global North and global South is homogenizing and proposes a neat global division of the “haves” and “have-nots”, as opposed to a more nuanced and accurate understanding of development as diffuse: there are pockets of development and underdevelopment within any given country, regardless of their position in the global North/South. Despite such limitations, the terms global North and global South are useful in conventionalizing the relations between these two parts of the globe, and in highlighting ongoing historical patterns of (neo)colonialism between the two regions (O’Brien and Williams, 2007).
The belief in development as something that can be quantifiably measured was particularly pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s, when neoliberal policies of the “Washington Consensus” – a banner term for development policies at this time – espoused the virtues of privatization, deregulation, and market fundamentalism for development in the global South (see Williamson, 1990). Towards the end of the 1990s, when it was recognized that these policies largely failed to produce the kind of development they had been imagined to enable, the UN sought to capitalize on the turn of the millennium to proffer a new social, holistic approach to development. Arguably, the most noteworthy changes in this new approach was a movement away from the policies of the Washington Consensus, towards an approach that centralized social measures of development – a shift effectively encapsulated within the adoption of the aforementioned MDGs.

In this dissertation I seek to map the history of sport for development and peace from the “dawn of development” to the current historical moment where sport is cast as an as innovative, multilateral, and pragmatic approach to global development. That the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and IOC, have all actively endorsed sport as a tool of development is emblematic of both the positionality of sport as a central site of political-economic and social meaning in society, and the ostensibly new, more social and egalitarian approaches to development of the 2000s. Despite the fanfare with which SDP has been met, the effects of sport in the development context are not fully known or theorized. Although sport is widely believed to enable personal, social, political and economic development, it can be equally divisive and damaging. The detrimental qualities of sport can be particularly pronounced in the development context, where sport holds a legacy of advancing (neo)colonial and neoliberal policies in the global South through the
use of public funds for private means (Andreff, 2008; Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004), increasing social stratification and deepening economic inequalities within nations (Broudehoux, 2007), and the reproduction of global inequity along racialized lines (Darnell, 2007). As I endeavour to show in this dissertation, the ahistoricism of the SDP paradigm presents sport for development as a positive rupture in the timeline of development; yet I argue that it remains tied to modernist ideals of both colonial and late capitalism and statistical measures of “healthy” economies and “healthy” populations. Supposing that SDP marks one primary future of development, I seek to explore not only where it is leading us to (through its symbolic and material effects on the development landscape) but also what it is supposedly moving us away from. By taking a historical approach to my work and constructing a genealogy of sport for development and peace, I seek to evaluate the extent to which SDP marks a break from traditional development policy, and the extent to which repackages (neo)colonial development tropes.

Rationale and Research Questions

Sport for Development and Peace is a bourgeoning field of study within the sociology of sport and beyond. My interest in this area of study was first piqued years ago as a first-year master’s student researching the political economic underpinnings of a corporate Sport for Development and Peace program, the National Basketball Association’s Basketball Without Borders. In that year, at the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport (NASSS) Conference, there were few, if any, sessions on the matter. Two years later, at the same conference, a colleague and I organized a session on SDP, one of only two or three at the time. Since that time, SDP-related sessions have been amongst the most numerous and well attended sessions: for instance, at the most recent NASSS conference in
Portland, Oregon in November 2014, no fewer than eighteen papers were presented on
sport for development. Part of the rationale for my master’s thesis was the relative dearth
of research in the field. Clearly, over the last four years, this is much less the case.

Despite the growing body of critical work on SDP, there remains much work to be
done, and many research gaps to be filled. As Douglas Hartmann and Christina Kwauk
(2011) note, not a great deal has been done to “conceptualize, organize, and structure the
whole sport and development field” (p. 285). In broad strokes, the existing body of
literature makes assumptions about the role of global governance institutions like the UN,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, or World Bank in the promotion of SDP, and relies on
a priori assumptions about the history of development and the emergence of SDP. We have
little understanding of the mechanisms by which sport would foster development, and
much of the “evidence” produced by international governing bodies rests on “best
practices.”

My work advances the critique of Sport for Development and Peace in new
directions by critically analyzing its historical roots and questioning why SDP has gained
such traction at this particular moment in time. Moreover, this project challenges the
theoretical and political foundations of the use of sport as a tool for development. As of yet,
there has been little research conducted through a historical lens to map the links between
sport and international development, nor an engagement with how these processes
articulate with the broader context of development policy at a global governance level. My
work addresses this paucity of literature and offers an analysis of discourses about sport
and development. In this regard, I challenge the production of truth claims regarding the
developed/developing dichotomy, notions of modernity, and how racialized and
(neo)colonial signifiers are ascribed to bodies in the global South through sport and development.

I direct my analysis at the United Nations because it has been at the vanguard of Sport for Development and Peace since the early 2000s. As the most prominent agency of international governance, the United Nations holds tremendous influence in shaping the development landscape. Over the last fifteen years, the UN has gone to great lengths to legitimize the use of sport in the development paradigm, as illustrated by the creation of the position of United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace, the formation of the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, the naming of 2005 as the International Year of Sport and Physical Education, the publication of no less than 18 documents related to SDP, and, most significantly, the inclusion of sport in the MDGs, the UN’s keystone policy since 2000 (see United Nations Office on Sport for Development, n.d.). The position of the United Nations in the international community and the ardour with which they have promoted SDP in development policy thus makes the organization an ideal subject for this dissertation.

The over-arching theoretical question that drives my analysis concerns the operation of sport for development and peace as a technology of power. I am interested in the extent to which sport-based indicators of health and progress (e.g.,) impact epistemes of governmentality in developing nations. With this in mind, the following research questions guide the dissertation:

- How has UN policy regarding SDP emerged and changed historically?
- How has the call for more social and holistic approaches to development informed or enabled the emergence of SDP? What other discourses, institutions, and actors have informed the UN’s production of SDP?
• How does UN policy inform the practice of mobilizing sport in the development paradigm?
• How has the SDP paradigm shifted the understanding of what development looks like, who will do the developing and who will be developed?

**Methodology**

This project sits at the intersection of cultural studies, sport sociology and sport history. Methodologically, it is most indebted to the practice of radical contextualization (Grossberg, 1996) associated with cultural studies and the Foucauldian notion of writing “histories of the present.” Cultural studies is an appropriate framework for this project: its privileging of multi-faceted methodologies and perspectives enables the kind of radical contextualization necessary for the interrogation of Sport for Development and Peace. In making these claims, I follow the insights of scholars in the sociology of sport such as David Andrews and Michael Giardina (2008) who contend that cultural studies is an effective position from which to challenge the popular belief of sport as an apolitical entity, so as to understand it as a practice negotiated within the complexities and specificities of social relations. In their work on SDP, scholars such as Simon Darnell (2010a) and Lyndsay Hayhurst (2009, 2013; see also Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011) take a likeminded approach, arguing that work interrogating sport for development must do so through a lens that privileges social and historical relations, particularly global political economy, foreign policy, and socio-political hierarchies. As Darnell (2010a) writes “the sport for development and peace movement provides sport scholars an opportunity to “do cultural studies” … attuned to the power relations and political structures that shape, and are shaped by, the terrain of sport for development and peace” (p. 57). Moreover, as Samantha
King (2005) contends, the analysis of a sporting text does not constitute cultural studies unless it is “considered in terms of its competitive, reinforcing, and determining relations with other objects and forces” (p. 23). In this dissertation I thus seek to explore the terrains that shape and are shaped by SDP by engaging with the broader forces of globalization, international development, and neoliberal capitalism that are given form in the history of the present. Necessarily then, my work considers, from multiple theoretical and methodological positions, the historical underpinnings of the current geo-political climate that has enabled the emergence of sport for development.

Taking seriously cultural studies’ call for interdisciplinary work that privileges multiple and competing histories, and the interrelation of theory and method, my methodological approach draws from Foucauldian historiography and post-colonial methodologies. The history of the present is a term popularized by Michel Foucault in the mid-1970s, first appearing in the opening chapter of Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977a). Foucault used the term to critique the troubles of the present by engaging with their histories – a concern that later takes form in his concept of genealogy (Garland, 2014). While the history of the present is less of a unified approach or interdisciplinary field, and as Mitchell Dean (1994) argues, more of a “trans-disciplinary, critical, contestatory, erudite, intellectual activity” (p. 11), the term has been taken up by interdisciplinary scholars working from post-structural and post-colonial traditions, including Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009), Craig Calhoun (2003), Mitchell Dean (1994), Frederick Cooper (1994), and Larry Griffin (1995). With Dean’s (1994) caveats in mind, a definition of the history of the present is necessarily loose: it may be characterized by the use of historical resources to reflect upon the contingencies, interconnections, and potentialities of the diverse trajectories of
contested histories, so as to prevent linear and “anachronistic understandings of the present as a necessary outcome of a necessarily continuous past” (Dean, 1994, p.21; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Examples of this type of work includes Dipesh Charkabarty’s (2009) postcolonial analysis of the history of climate change, Joan Wallach Scott’s (2012) work on how the history of the concepts of emancipation and equality shape contemporary understandings of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Elizabeth Weed’s (2012) essay on how new forms of “reparative reading” as proposed by Eve Sedgwick rely on familiar criticisms of the practice of critique.

Taking up post-structuralist critiques of knowledge production, the history of the present offers methodological tools to social scientists seeking anti-essentialist, counter-hegemonic, and trans-disciplinary approaches to theory, research, and scholarship. As such, the history of the present is a useful and necessary endeavour for this project in that it brings to the forefront multiple, complex, and contextual histories that locate relationships of power in historical narratives and historiography. For example, a multi-perspectival approach is necessary in challenging the historicism of Eurocentric, teleological narratives that plague much of the popular and political understandings of development, and the role of sport therein. The history of the present is particularly useful in deconstructing historical epochs neatly divided within temporal, spatial, and epistemological ruptures (e.g. colonialism and post-colonialism; “traditional” societies and “developed” ones) and meta-narratives of historical progress (e.g. the linear progressions of nations from pre-modern to modern). The history of the present is thus useful in departing from trans-historical generalizations of sociological meta-theories – be it of modernization, colonialism or development – to an approach that seeks to qualify, oppose, or even undermine these
approaches as a natural unfolding of history. Ultimately, a history of the present framework is productive for my pursuit of a more nuanced, complex, and contested understanding of the SDP Paradigm and the truth claims made around sport in the development paradigm.

**The truth about truth: Foucault’s genealogical method.** In this dissertation I am not concerned with whether or not development is happening, but rather with how it is purported to happen, and what sort of epistemologies and power structures underpin the term. In other words, I am interested in how an assemblage of practices, knowledges, stakeholders, and symbols give shape to discourses of development. As such, my work necessarily relies upon Michel Foucault, and draws upon his methodological insights that extend from the history of the present. Foucault problematized versions of history that conceptualized power as fixed, and challenged the linear trajectory of historical forms of truth and knowledge (Dean, 1994). Foucault’s approaches to method – archaeology, genealogy, and what some have called the “problematizations” that marked his later work – are united by his view of history as a practice; a practice that is inextricably linked to the present. “No matter how much historical writing is about dimensions or aspects of the past, and refers to events, irruptions, discourse, and social practices that can be given a particular time-space,” writes Dean (1994) of Foucault’s methods, “it is in fact an activity that is irrevocably linked to its current uses” (p. 14).

To adequately explain Foucault’s genealogical method, it is first necessary to discuss the “archaeologies” that characterised his early work. In his archaeological texts, Foucault sought to explain the categorizations of inclusion and exclusion through which knowledge is shaped and governed. His focus was on systems and rules of thought rather than the
consciousness of the individual subject who was at the center of traditional historiography (Flynn, 2005). The purpose of archaeologies was not to discover some ultimate truth or origin in the past, nor a unified historical arc to the present, but rather to seek out the “archive” of “systems that establish statements as events and as things” (Flynn, 2005, p. 29). Taking the archive as the primary site of analysis involves a rethinking of themes and conventional understandings of historiography. In this way, conditions of existence are not necessarily discovered in documents (as artifacts), but as discourses that produce knowledge practices to be interpreted. Discourse is thus central to the archive. As Foucault explains, “my object is not language but the archive, that is to say the accumulated existence of discourse” (cited in Flynn, 2005, p. 29). For Foucault, discourses set the conditions of existence for knowledge and social practices that manifest in applications of norms, exclusions, and means of control by defining and delineating realms of truth. In this sense, archaeology is a counter-history and social critique to progressivist, linear understandings of history (Flynn, 2005).

Following his archaeological works, Foucault sought a renewed approach to reveal the heterogeneity and multiplicity of histories and the ways in which power operates on a social level through what he termed a genealogical method. Although Foucault does not explicitly outline a methodology to genealogy, he discusses his approach in some length in his commentary on the notion of origin. In the exploration of origins Foucault speaks for the need of “descent” – as in archaeology – that uncovers the subtle, singular marks of history to unravel categories of resemblance so as to make visible difference, counter-hegemony, and the multiplicity of beginnings and events (Foucault, 1984). Descent is key to the methodology of genealogy by applying the effects of discourse to lived experience and
the body. As Foucault (1984) writes “the body maintains, in life as in death, through its
strengths or weaknesses, the sanction of every truth and error, as it sustains in an inverse
manner, the origin – descent” (p. 83). It is in this focus on the body that Foucault’s
genealogies of discipline (Discipline and Punish) and sexuality (History of Sexuality) explain
how systems of control become normalized (Flynn, 2005).

Foucault does not seek out origins so as to locate absolute truths, or to uncover the
culmination of some historical (teleological) development, but rather to explore moments
of emergence of particular discursive formations. In this regard, genealogies seek to explain
how the emergence of systems of subjugation and forms of domination lead to, and are
product of, different histories (Foucault, 1984). The focus on emergence allows for an
interrogation of history-making and historiography by taking into account not only
documents, but also discursive practices and modalities of power so as to deconstruct what
appears natural. As Foucault (1984) argues, the success of history and the writing of
history belong to those who are capable of seizing systems of rules and norms, to disguise
liberty and sovereignty and subvert the means of domination. Foucault (1984) elaborates,
“the role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and
metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or the ascetic life; as they stand
for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on a
stage of historical process” (p.87). Genealogy attempts to displace “common sense” notions
of evolutionary progress by recording discourses outside of any teleological understanding
of history and trouble the fetishized search for origins (Foucault, 1984). The genealogist
takes as their focus an event, not necessarily as a point of convergence in history, but as a
relationship of power, to uncover the falsities of truth.
Foucault does not conceptualize power as something that can be held or taken away, but rather as a relationship of control: power underwrites all of Foucault’s genealogies. In this sense, the purpose of genealogy is to investigate relations of power through history to uncover their meanings, and their means of control on the body and on the populace – what Foucault terms biopower (Flynn, 2005). Thus, genealogies explore “technologies of power” – forms of surveillance, categorizations, normalizations, statistics – that shape knowledge and truth today. In his genealogy of discipline and punishment, for instance, Foucault notes that punishment has other purposes than setting an example: technologies of power move punishment directed upon the body (e.g., corporal punishment) to indirect forms of punishment that shape identities and ways of conduct through forms of surveillances and discursive practices (e.g. categorizations of the criminal, or the insane, or the sexual deviant) (Foucault, 1984; Flynn, 2005). Genealogies take as their essences not historical questions of what, or what happened, but rather how knowledge, truth, and understanding of a particular field are transformed. In his genealogy of madness, for instance Foucault did not ask what in a given period is regarded as sanity or insanity, as ill or normal behaviour, but how these divisions operated (Foucault, 1991). Whereas archaeologies sought to uncover distinctions of true and false in the archive, genealogy’s focus is not on documents, institutions, theories, or ideologies, but practices and conduct that are made acceptable at a given moment. As Foucault (1991) writes, “it is a question of analyzing a “regime of practices”, practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken granted meet and interconnect” (p. 75, emphasis original). The schemas of the prison, hospital, or asylum are not facts that can be rediscovered only through the historian’s retrospection, but are
explicit and reasoned programmes and institutions set to control and normalize through normalizing categories of good/bad, healthy/ill, sane/insane (Foucault, 1991).

While the history of the present operates as a methodological framework that is aligned with poststructuralism, and borrows substantially from Foucault’s oeuvre, the applications of this methodological approach to my analysis of SDP requires engagement with postcolonial studies. Postcolonial theory and methodology articulate with the framework of the history of the present in centering ongoing legacies of colonialism, imperialism and Eurocentric workings of power on a global stage (Stoler & Bond, 2006; Seigel, 2005). Postcolonial theory thus seeks to reclaim the politics of knowledge production and critiques of empire to afford a voice to the global South (Stoler & Bond, 2006). As Prakash (1994) writes, “the aim of such a strategy is not to unmask dominant discourses but to explore their fault lines in order to provide different accounts, to describe histories revealed in the cracks of the colonial archaeology of knowledge” (p. 1483).

A key component of this project seeks to explore how the discourse of SDP constructs a grid of intelligibility regarding subjectivities in both the global North and South. The history of the present that I construct regarding the emergence of Sport for Development and Peace thus necessarily draws on post-colonial methodology and theory (for further elaboration see Chapter Two). In the Sport for Development and Peace context, Lyndsay Hayhurst (2009) argues that development policy controls and affects the lives of the individuals it targets, so as to “make subjects through productive power, whereby the social relations and processes of power are constituted through frameworks of knowledge and discursive practices” (p. 2109). In this way, a postcolonial framework offers my work insurance that themes of power, global inequalities, and identities are understood through
intersecting positionalities of race, class, culture, and resistance. Following Hayhurst (2009, p. 212), my work will draw on critiques of SDP from the sociology of sport, Foucauldian understandings of power, and a postcolonial approach to policy discourse to pose questions concerning policy as “sites of enunciation” of power.

**Sites of enunciation: Discourse analysis.** In this dissertation I put the methodologies outlined above into practice by undertaking a critical discourse and textual analysis of UN documents related to sport for development. For Foucault, discourse sets the conditions of existence for knowledge and social practices that manifest in applications of norms, control, and exclusion, by defining realms of truth. In this way, development itself is understood as a discourse that constructs certain truths that claim to represent reality, enacts social relations, establishes identities, and entrenches relationships of power within organizations, institutions, and social practices (Fairclough, 1992). Approaching development as discourse is crucial for this project not only because it brings to light how knowledge and truth are shaped through power, but, as Arturo Escobar (1995) argues, a discourse analysis allows the “researcher” to stand “detached from the development discourse, bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze the theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated” (p. 21).

This project considers the historical underpinnings of sport for development in policy and practice from a diversity of perspectives that have shaped, and are shaped through the discourses of modernity, progress, and sport as a social good. Discourse analysis is a fitting method for this project, since it makes visible the sites of enunciations and silences that comprise contemporary understandings of SDP as economically,
politically, and socially productive for development in the global South. To situate the emergence of SDP within the broader development paradigm I conducted primary research at the United Nations archives in New York City and at the International Centre for Olympic Studies at Western University in London, Ontario. These archives provided access to numerous UN documents related to sport and development, including: resolutions, voting records, charters, and speeches from the General Assembly; documents from other UN organizations, including the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, the UN High Commission for Refugees, the UN Children’s Education fund; and files pertaining to the UN’s relationship with the International Olympic Committee (See Appendix A for an overview of my archival research plan and a brief overview of documents available in the archives).

I have also utilized information on sport and development available online so as to evaluate how the discourse of development is produced in the public realm. The analysis of documents made available on the UN’s website is not merely driven by convenience and accessibility. As I have argued elsewhere (see Millington & Darnell, 2014), the Internet is a productive analytical site to better understand the production of knowledge and discourse in popular culture (for examples, see Harlow, 2011; Hrynyshyn, 2008; Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Wilson, 2006, 2007; Wilson & Hayhurst, 2009; Wright, 2011). While the Internet offers a variety of methodological tools for researchers, it is not immune to power structures; the Internet reflects and reproduces global political economy and contributes to development inequalities (see Payne, 2005; Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). As Simon Darnell and I argue, “the development politics contested online are intimately connected to the “offline” world, where policies and philosophies of neo-liberal globalization remain
hegemonic (despite resistance) and, in turn, shape local experiences and struggles” (Millington & Darnell, 2014, p. 193). In other words, although resistance can and does take place in the online world, with the Internet offering an important means to counter processes of capitalism, it is also a site for the maintenance and perpetuation of global capitalism (see Millington & Darnell, 2014; Wilson, 2007) – as evidenced in the proliferation of corporations turning to the Internet to market their products and social responsibility endeavours.

In the sport for development world, online communications have become a key arena for the marketing of SDP endeavours, both carving out space within and perpetuating neoliberal environments that promote competition for resources, awareness, and recognition amongst development actors (Hayhurst, Wilson, & Frisby, 2010). The Internet, then, is a powerful site of knowledge creation and dissemination regarding not only the epistemology of development, but also the role of sport in the development context. Organizations like Right to Play, the UN, or the IOC have taken to the Internet as a means of promoting a particular vision of development, and their own role, as well as the role of sport therein. As Darnell and I have argued, following Lyndsay Hayhurst, Brian Wilson, and Wendy Frisby (2010), the knowledge production enabled via the Internet has the capacity to enable social and political inequalities since “NGO’s and development programs from the global North often perpetuate a professional hegemony by “cyber-linking” with other Northern-based NGOs but less often to NGOs from the global South. Patterns of global inequality in the offline world are therefore reflected online through the fact that access to, and consumption of, online communication is unevenly distributed around the globe” (Millington & Darnell, 2014, p. 193).
Towards a genealogy of Sport for Development and Peace

In this dissertation I conduct a genealogy of Sport for Development and Peace so as to challenge a priori and “common sense” understandings of the utility of sport in the development context. My aim is to explore how discourses and practices of development are produce and concealed within policy and how they dictate ways of knowing and acting through development goals. My work considers the biopolitics undergirding SDP by focusing on the hidden truths that maintain power structures, and how policies set by global organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, and INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND are practiced through forms of governmentality that produce and maintain structures of power between the developed and underdeveloped worlds (Darnell, 2010b; Li, 2007).

As we shall see, the history of sport in colonialism and imperialism informs the contemporary moment where, through discourses of development, sport is mobilized as a means to shape conduct. The purpose of this project is not merely to enumerate the ways in which SDP reinscribes hegemonic relations, but rather to offer a critique of sport for development that makes the emergence of the Sport for Development paradigm strange – that is, to trouble accounts of a natural unfolding of history that has necessitated the emergence of sport as a “common sense” or “post-political” approach to development (see Žižek, 1999). Power within sport and SDP is mobilized in a productive fashion through the ability to motivate more so than oppress, and gains traction through the discursively intelligible values of sport and play as socially beneficial and culturally normative. The ability of sport to target transformative bodily changes, moreover, make it a particularly potent way to “make life” and “defend society from poverty and corporeal mismanagement”
(Darnell, 2010b, p. 399). I am interested in the ways in which development indicators, such as the achievement of the MDGs, serve as forms of surveillance, placing “developing” polities under the observations and subjectivization of the UN and various development actors. Serving as a panoptic, I uncover how “development” acts as a panoptic to render certain “truths” knowable, and shapes conduct by delineating and limiting specific means and spaces of development. In this way, this dissertation seeks to explore how the ostensibly more holistic and social development landscape of the 2000s is marked by increasingly quantified objectives that extend forms of measurement and surveillance further into the realm of “the everyday” through the conduit of sport (Hayhurst, 2009; Li, 2007).

The dissertation proceeds in seven chapters and is divided into two parts. In the first part, I set the historical and theoretical context for the dissertation. Chapter Two offers a literature review of three areas of study: the history and theory of development, the vision of Sport for Development and Peace from a stakeholder perspective, and critical literature on SDP. Chapter Three develops the theoretical framework for this dissertation by drawing upon Marxist, postcolonial, and poststructural insights in order to trouble the emergence of SDP. The second part of the dissertation presents the bulk of my empirical work. Chapter Four traces the long and complex history of sport and imperialism, from colonialism and notions of muscular Christianity, through post-colonial and independence movements, to the contemporary moment of Sport for Development and Peace. In Chapter Five I complicate the narrative of SDP as a novel approach to development by introducing primary research from the United Nations that demonstrates sport’s longstanding history in “development” work. In Chapter Six, I present an analysis of the incorporation of sport
into development policies, namely the MDGs, to explore the ways in which these two paradigms – that is, the MDGs and SDP – extend governmental apparatuses of control. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I draw these findings together, providing “answers” of sorts for my research questions, and outline the intended contributions of my work.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

Until recently, the development paradigm has been composed of three sectors popularly referred to as the “three pillars” of development. The first and most longstanding is “direct bilateral aid” between designated government agencies in the global North and their counterparts in the global South. This form of aid has conventionally focused on loans, technical advice, and material aid with the aim of establishing “modern” governments with efficient departments, national banks, and public utilities (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009, p. 912). The second pillar stands in the form of multilateral development aid. From the outset of the “development era” (i.e. post-1949), donor countries have distributed a portion of their development aid through multilateral international institutions like the United Nations. These institutions have come to be seen as authoritative experts in development, tending to focus on macro-economic and social policies. The third pillar is most often associated with non-governmental organizations and is comprised mostly of Northern organizations that finance infrastructure in local communities (e.g., wells, schools, health services), support social movements in the global South (e.g., farmer’s associations, women’s movements, and unions), or raise awareness of underdevelopment for audiences in the global North (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009).

Within the climate of development in the new millennium and the mounting criticism of traditional development practices, a fourth pillar of development has emerged to focus on matters of culture and social capital. Concomitantly, non-specialist development organizations in the private sphere and civil society – including corporations and non-development government sectors – have taken a prominent place in the development landscape. As underdevelopment persists, and as governments continue to roll back levels
of aid in a context of neoliberalism, development organizations, including the UN, have increasingly looked to partner with these non-specialist organizations. Sport has been seen to be a natural outlet for this fourth pillar for its ostensible ability to engender social change, while capturing the imagination and popular interest of organizations in both the public and private spheres (Levermore & Beacom, 2009). Further, sport for development organizations and programmes have been particularly attractive in garnering support from corporate entities seeking to capitalize on the visibility and popularity of the SDP paradigm. To this end, the UN now lists 614 governmental, non-governmental, and corporate groups engaged with some form of SDP program (see International Platform on Sport and Development, n.d.)

While there has been a proliferation of academic work on SDP in response to its emergent popularity, there is a noticeable lack of work that places sport within this broader development context. Flagging this absence is not merely a question of how the work is conducted, but also where: As Simon Darnell and David Black (2011) argue, it is significant that most of the academic attention paid to SDP has been located within sport studies, rather than development studies. This not to say that the work produced in the sociology and history of sport is not valuable, but rather to point to vestigial positions within parts of academia that see sport as at best an indulgence and at worst a distraction from the need for more pressing matters of global social justice (Holden, 2008). This literature review then, and the dissertation more broadly, seeks to place SDP in a broader development context, to put sport sociology and history in conversation with development studies, and to articulate the value of sport studies in promoting matters of global social justice. The aim of this review is not merely to recount the history of mainstream development practices
and theories, but rather to construct a backstory for the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm so as to add complexity and nuance to what is often an apolitical and ahistorical rendering of SDP.

The chapter unfolds as follows: First, I present an overview of development literature and theory so as to better situate sport within international development studies and to lay the foundation for critiques of the SDP paradigm to come. Second, to better understand how sport for development purportedly works, I review the literature produced by stakeholders in the field, primarily the United Nations, and the International Olympic Committee. Third, I provide a review of the critical literature on sport for development that opens with a discussion of the generalized critique of sport for development, before delving into a thematic review on four fronts – policy, race, gender, and corporate capitalism. My aim in this review is to address the gaps in the sport for development research where these bodies of literature often stand as isolated from one another. Ultimately, this literature review goes to lengths to meet the overall goals of the dissertation, which seeks to challenge the apolitical and ahistorical narrative of SDP.

**Literature One – Development theory: Regimes of representation**

The history of development is complex and contentious. Many popular and academic texts situate the genesis of “development” within US President Truman’s 1949 inauguration speech, an occasion that marked a shift in socio-political rationalities of international governance. While such a timeline is productive for centralizing the changing geo-political context of a post-war world, it also risks (re)inscribing Western-centric narratives of teleological progress. Rationalities of development are longstanding and continually (re)negotiated: Truman’s speech is but one rupture in a series of perpetual cultural and
political reinventions. From the production-based export-oriented economies of the colonial era, to the Marshall Plan for the economic rejuvenation of post-World War II Europe, through to the current era of aid, development has taken varied forms, yet the underpinning ethos of securing Northern hegemony has remained constant (Biccum, 2010; Darnell, 2012a).

That development has been mobilized in a plethora of political-economic pursuits by an even broader array of actors – be it imperialists, foreign governments, or international governmental institutions – is a testament to both the draw of progress narratives, and the encompassing nature of the term “development”. As Douglas Hartmann and Christina Kwauk (2011) argue, “the multiplicity and ambiguity around conceptions of development presents one of the most important initial challenges for understanding and theorizing the sport and development field” (p. 268). Indeed, the multiple, amorphous, impalpable nature of development allows the term to stand in for anything and nothing at all: depending on the context, development can refer to the philosophical (such as the progress of human kind), the practical (social engineering of developing nations), or the individual (personal progress). Yet, development also has also come to hold a broader set of political meanings, particularly in discourses of human rights that engender popular understandings of development as “helping the world's poor”, and economic growth models that often get wrapped in neoliberal, or even neo-colonial methods of rule (Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011). These discourses, combined with the vagueness of the term, have, in the sport for development context, perpetuated the a priori and best practices approach that have become hallmarks of the SDP paradigm. Given these contentions, it is my intention here to
review the development literature not to enumerate the historical ruptures and tangents of development, but to explore its theoretical underpinnings and alternatives.

**Modernity, dependency theory and world systems theory.** Within the post-World War II context development has been popularly framed within a discourse of humanitarian aid that obscures underlying hegemonic power structures. Many critical scholars have argued that Truman’s 1949 speech did not call development into being, but rather reframed a vast and heterogeneous group of nations into a homogeneous, narrow and select group that required the intervention of the global North (Esteva, 1992). Truman’s speech was informed by modernization theory – the palimpsest upon which development ideology continues to be written – that championed a universal path upon which all countries progressed. Modernization theory posits that underdeveloped areas are merely behind on the path to modernity, and their development can be catalyzed through capitalist investment. Economic and social historians of the time, however, began to challenge Truman’s visions: perhaps the most notable responses to modernity theory were “dependency theory” popularly associated with Andre Gunder Frank and “world systems theory” developed by Emmanuel Wallerstein.

Dependency theory rejected the modernist view of development, arguing instead that underdeveloped countries were not merely primitive versions of developed ones, but rather distinct and heterogeneous nations that are exploited as sources of natural resources, cheap labour, and markets for the global North. Frank (1972), uses the terms “core” and “periphery” to describe the systematic way in which (neo)colonial powers (the core) undermine underdeveloped nations (the periphery). In this view, underdevelopment
does not result from a lack of development as modernization theory would posit, but rather as a necessary effect of capitalism: development in the core requires underdevelopment in the periphery. For Frank (1972), the path to “development” lies in de-linking from this system and transitioning to a “self-reliant socialism internally, or some undefined international socialist cooperation” (p. 28).

World-systems theory, developed by Emmanuel Wallerstein in the early 1970s, also sought to challenge modernization theory. In Wallerstein’s view, patterns of commerce and communication have produced a global political, economic, and social order that does not operate on equal ground. Wallerstein (2004) argues that the world is comprised of three interdependent sectors whose positions in the global capitalist economy have been determined through colonial histories and economic wealth: the “core” (comprised of Northwest Europe, North America, and Japan), the “semi-periphery” (including Eastern Europe, North Africa and parts of Asia), and the “periphery” (most of Africa, parts of Asia, and the Indian subcontinent) (Darby, 2001, p. 234). World-systems theory highlights how the spread of a capitalist ideology, and ultimately globalization, has failed to integrate underdeveloped nations into the international economic order in a way that would encourage development, as many of the nations in the semi-periphery and periphery remain export-oriented and dependent on the global North. Attempts at international development have exacerbated the inequities between the global North and South and resulted in systematic underdevelopment: The result is the “development of underdevelopment” in which the economic structure of the global South is not an earlier stage in the “transition” to industrialization as transnational financial institutions claim, but rather the result of being involved in the world-economy as a peripheral, raw material-
producing area. Essentially, underdevelopment is seen as a product of a global capitalism that is dependent on production and consumption classes and in which nations of the global South become primarily export economies (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 64).

Early efforts to critique the language of development, alongside its problematic economic implications, emerged from scholars such as anthropologist Dell Hymes, who in 1969 urged scholars to critique the way “Third World” societies were framed in public policy and social science debates. Hymes was critical of scholars who challenged colonial systems of exploitation, yet did not afford the same attention to development. “The common coin has been ‘developed’ versus ‘underdeveloped,’ or ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional,’” Hymes wrote, “I submit that these are equivalents to the ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’ of a preceding era, still a polar evolutionary model, combined often enough with the notion of a center of diffusion to less fortunate peoples” (Hymes, 1969, p. 28).

In the following decades, many scholars took up Hymes’ call and began to challenge economic models that prioritized capitalist growth over local social, cultural, and ecological factors (Everett, 1997). Concomitantly, post-structural and postcolonial scholars, often influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, began to focus less on political economic definitions of development and more on understanding of development as a discourse. These approaches have included Arturo Escobar’s (1995) and Geoff Wood’s (1985) work on how terminology in development used by multi-national institutions legitimate development interventions, Wolfgang Sachs’ (1992) approach to development as a “mental structure,” and James Ferguson’s (1994) work that frames development as a knowledge apparatus in his ethnography of the World Bank’s development work in Lesotho.
Working within conceptualizations of development as discourse, Gilbert Rist and Arturo Escobar offer insights into the contrapuntal epistemologies of development. First, Rist (2002, p. 13) defines development as:

...a set of practices, that sometimes appear to conflict with one another, which require – for the reproduction of society – the general transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective demand.

Fittingly for the complexities of development, this definition requires some unpacking. By the “reproduction of society” Rist is alluding to the hegemony of the global economic order that seeks to expand the area within its grasp. The “transformation and destruction of the natural environment and social relations” refers to the processes of industrialization, urbanization, commodification and privatization of natural resources, and the changing of social relations (e.g., wage-labour) that have become the calling cards of development goals and measures. Finally the reference “to increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared to effective demand” highlights the centrality of productivity and progress as the crux of development.

Rist’s definition is useful in drawing out the global capitalist and teleological narratives of development: through industrialization and the accumulation of capital, nations can progress from pre-modern to modern societies within a capitalist enterprise. This is an accurate representation of the political economic underpinnings of development, while also pointing to how conventional political economic framings also risks obfuscating alternative histories and epistemologies of development, and the power relations that sustain underdevelopment. While capitalist growth remains hegemonic within the development paradigm, Majid Rahnema points to the problematic nature of such a reduction. Rhanema (1991, p.45) writes,
The word "poverty" is, no doubt, a key word of our times, extensively used and abused by everyone. Huge amounts of money are spent in the name of the poor. Thousands of books and expert advice continue to offer solutions to their problems... all the definitions given to [development] are woven around the concept of 'lack' or 'deficiency.' This notion reflects only the basic relativity of the concept. What is necessary and to whom? And who is qualified to define all that?

To confront these hegemonic understandings of development Arturo Escobar foregrounds the knowledge-power apparatus that upholds the term. In this Foucauldian sense, development is a discourse that does not reflect, but rather constructs reality. In doing so, it engenders hegemonic knowledge of the “First” and “Third” worlds, while closing down alternative ways of thinking (Escobar, 1995). Understanding development as a discourse makes visible the constellation of concepts, peoples, objects and strategies that become knowable and nameable under the banner of development. Discursive practices and relationships – between institutions, socioeconomic processes, forms of knowledge, and technologies – come to form the development apparatus and establish the sets of rules and positions therein. The discourse of development defines “who can speak, from what points of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed for this or that problem, theory, or object to emerge and be named, analyzed, and eventually transformed into a policy or a plan” (Escobar, 1995, p. 40).

Escobar makes a distinction between development as discourse and development as ideology in a Marxist sense. In concert with Rist’s definition, Escobar argues that the discourse of development is an ideological configuration produced by “those in power” to hide their capitalist motivations and intentions, but also a discursive amalgam of practices that are the product of longstanding power relations in which the “West” continues to exercise its dominance in the world system (Escobar, 1995). In this way, the discourse of development deploys a “regime of representation” (Everett, 1997) over the Third world,
defining and delineating development subjects – the “backwards” other, the “malnourished,” the “illiterate,” “small farmers,” and “landless peasants” – and spaces of intervention – poverty, insufficient technology and capital, rapid population growth, idle economic practices (Escobar, 1995). These discourses then actively construct the dichotomies of development: the knower and the known, the developed and the underdeveloped, the modern and the pre-modern.

These critical perspectives on development as discourse have found covalence with the political agenda of postcolonial theory to offer counter- and anti-development approaches under the umbrella of post-development. Many postcolonial scholars contend that the discourse of development is so pervasive that it proliferates the epistemology and ontology of development itself: development projects initiated by governments, NGOs, corporations and the like actively maintain the status quo and hegemonic power. In this way, underdeveloped countries are not the product of an interrupted teleology, nor pockets of underdevelopment yet to be reached, but are rather the product of an ongoing cultural and economic imperialism (Everett, 1997; Kiely, 1999). From this perspective, development has failed to eradicate poverty because it does not offer a challenge to the ideological and material conditions upon which global inequality is built. Escobar (1995) argues that the discourse and strategy of development has produced its opposite: “massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression, the debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure of forty years of development” (p. 4). In a similar vein to Escobar, Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2000) sees development as imperialistic for imposing Western views on the global South that are culturally homogenizing, environmentally
detrimental, and ultimately not proven to work. For his part, Edward Said (1993) argues imperialism locates the “source of the world’s significant action and life in the West, whose representatives seem at liberty to visit their fantasies and philanthropies upon a mind-deadened Third World” (p. xviii). Global governance has privileged those in the West where western culture is projected upon the periphery and is ever-present through administration, investment, and the expansion of development. Ultimately, as Gustavo Esteva (1987) rather bluntly asserts, “you must be either very dumb or very rich if you fail to notice that development stinks” (p. 135).

These varied approaches to and understandings of development are significant not only for their critiques but also for their timelessness. The insights they offer are unfortunately just as pressing today as they were at their outset. As Frans Schuurman (2009a) contends, critical theory within development studies has increasingly been sidelined in academic and popular thought. Schuurman (2009a) argues that the apolitical framing of development has been particularly pronounced since the 1990s when the growing “hegemony of depoliticized, post-Cold War globalization discourse and depoliticization of the development debate in general” took hold (p. 834). Scholars like Schuurman see contemporary development strategies, including the MDGs, as the products of depoliticization where instead of culminating in development’s denouement, the MDGs “have been used to discipline development research towards neoliberal globalization discourses, further away from critical theory; a manoeuvre that Foucault could have labelled academic governmentality” (Schuurman, 2009b, p. 835). Sport has played a key role in the process that Schuurman describes: the apolitical and ostensibly universal understanding of sport as socially productive has masked the neoliberal and hegemonic
tendencies of the sport for development and peace paradigm as well as the ongoing relationship of sport to (neo)colonialism.

**Literature Two – Sport for development stakeholders**

The argument I present in this dissertation is not one that denies the potential of sport to do good, or pursues a lack-of-evidence narrative (important as that is), but is instead designed to question the histories and epistemologies that underpin commonsense and apolitical understandings of sport in the development context. SDP stakeholders – those who have an interest in promoting sport’s development potential – often perpetuate these commonsense narratives. I derive my definition of SDP stakeholders from the United Nations’ “Maglingen Call to Action 2005,” which identifies ten stakeholders in the field: sport organizations, athletes, multilateral organizations, bilateral development agencies, governments across all sectors, armed forces/international peacekeeping missions, NGOs, private sector/sport industry, research institutions, and the media (United Nations, 2008). Much of the literature produced by stakeholders makes inferences to the novelty of sport as a tool of development, and the importance of the SDP paradigm. Two timelines are often referred to in the stakeholder literature – published by the United Nations and the International Platform on Sport for Development and Peace respectively – both of which point to the 2001 appointment of Adolf Ogi to the newly created position of Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace as the genesis of the SDP paradigm (see International Platform on Sport and Development, n.d.; United Nations, 2005). Given sport’s longstanding ties to colonialism and the perceived need for a renewed and novel approach to development, such ahistoricism is problematic but not unexpected. Indeed, the praise for the capacity of sport to contribute to “development” is so ubiquitous
that it overwhelms critical engagement. This fanfare is perhaps best captured by then-UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan: “People in every nation love sport. Its values - fitness, fair play, teamwork, and the pursuit of excellence - are universal. At its best, it brings people together, no matter what their origin, background, religious beliefs or economic status” (United Nations, 2005, p. 7). This vision of sport as a panacea for population ill-health, social division, lack of education, low self-efficacy, crime, and even poverty encapsulates contemporary popular thought and public policy regarding SDP and development more broadly.

From the outset, SDP was intimately tied to the MDGs as part of a refocused and recommitted approach to development by the UN and its member nations. The earliest official UN report pertaining to sport and development, “Sport for development and peace: Towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals,” published in 2003, readily foregrounds this relationship. The report is the product of the Inter-Agency Task Force – a group convened by Anan and comprised of the International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Volunteers (UNV), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) – which was asked to established an inventory of existing sport for development programs. As the “first attempt by the UN to draw together sport for development initiatives in a coordinated and comprehensive manner” the task force identified 120 sport for development initiatives, half of which were already run or
supported by UN agencies. The report outlined three primary objectives for the SDP paradigm: address social issues, such as underprivileged children, education, gender equality and refugees; promote health, including HIV/AIDS prevention, drug prevention, immunization, and health for people living with disabilities; and provide economic stimulus through poverty alleviation, local economic development, job creation, and environmental protection. The report concludes by making six recommendations (United Nations, 2003):

1. Sport should be better integrated into the development agenda.
2. Sport should be incorporated as a useful tool in programmes for development and peace.
3. Sport-based initiatives should be included in the country programmes of UN agencies, where appropriate and according to locally assessed needs.
4. Programmes promoting sport for development and peace need greater attention and resources by governments and the UN system.
5. Communications-based activities using sport should focus on well-targeted advocacy and social mobilization, particularly at the national and local levels.
6. The implementation of programmes that use sport for development and peace should occur through partnerships.

A year later, UNICEF published their own report on the value of sport, recreation and play in the development context, echoing the ‘findings’ of the special Task Force and offering a list of recommendations for achieving the MDGs through sport with examples from many developing countries (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2004). UNICEF also began to (re)construct the backstory to SDP, citing Article 1 of the 1978 International Charter of Physical Education and sport that states “the practice of physical education and sport is a fundamental right for all,” and the resolution adopted at the 1993 United Nations General Assembly in support of the “Olympic Ideal” that called for the cessation of hostilities to
provide athletes safe passage to the Games. This resolution was also significant in laying some groundwork for the close relationship between the IOC and the UN as well as the links between development and sport mega-events, further articulated in UNICEF’s call for global events such as the FIFA World Cup to promote sport and development (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2004).

The following year, the UN proclaimed 2005 as the International Year of Sport and Physical Education to again emphasize the role of sport as a tool of achieving the MDGs and related development aims (United Nations, 2005). The report on the International Year published by the UN for the first time made note of the divisive and detrimental potential of sport as well as the “ad hoc” way in which sport has been used by the UN, making reference to the institutional cooperation between the IOC and ILO dating back to 1922, the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of Children, the 1978 UNESCO International Charter on Physical Education and Sport, and the 1990 convention on the Rights of the Child that recognized the right of the child to rest and leisure. While it is significant that this history is recognized, the use of sport in the development context is not nearly as novel as the UN makes it seem (see Chapter Five). The International Year for Sport and Physical Education was also marked by the 2nd Magglingen Conference on Sport in Development that inaugurated the aforementioned “Magglingen Call to Action” that would frame many of the objectives and stakeholders for the SDP paradigm.

Throughout the rest of the decade the UN continued to promote sport as a simple, low-cost, and effective means of achieving development goals – although the evidence used to support these claims is circumstantial at best – with publication titles ranging from “Sport for development and peace in action,” to “Harnessing the power of sport for
development and peace” to “Achieving the objectives of the United Nations through sport” (see for examples United Nations, 2008; Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, n.d.). The 2006 report from the Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group entitled “From practice to policy” is indicative of much of this literature. Formed in 2004, the Working Group is an inter-governmental policy initiative with the aim of integrating sport for development and peace policy recommendations into the national and international development strategies of national governments with the goal of “harnessing the potential” of sport to contribute to achieving development objectives, specifically the MDGs. The 2006 report reasserts the oft-repeated benefits of sport – health promotion, gender equality, social integration, peace building, and economic development to name a few – before outlining the role of NGOs, elite sport, and national governments in promoting sport for development (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2006).

**Not just about the boys.** Increasingly, the UN has focused on the role of sport in promoting gender equality and female empowerment. Three documents in particular outline the UN’s position on the contribution of sport to global gender equality. First, the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (2007) “Coaching boys into men: A violence prevention guide for [soccer] coaches” focuses on a series of teachable moments regarding the effects of sport including harmful language surrounding gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and disability, and unacceptable behavior including abuse and physical and sexual violence.
A second report published by the UN in the same year entitled “Women 2000 and beyond: Women, gender equality and sport” extols the benefits of physical activity and sport for girls and women. Beginning with a quote from Susan B. Anthony, “bicycling has done more to emancipate women than any one thing in the world,” the report outlines the ways in which sport can address gender inequalities and discrimination while contributing to the MDGs. The UN argues that sport can be empowering for girls through the skills and values it engenders such as “teamwork, negotiations, leadership, communication and respect for others.” Further, the report posits that sport can help overcome social barriers for women by developing a “sense of identity” and access to new opportunities so as to allow “them to become more engaged in school and community life” and “enjoy freedom of expression and movement” (United Nations, 2007). As examples, the UN cites the “Afghan Women’s Network”, a group of 97 NGOs working to empower Afghan women by breaking the restriction on movement of women through sport, and the work of the Mathare Youth Sport Association in Kenya that challenges violence against women by focusing on men’s resistance to challenging gender specific boundaries, particularly in the male-dominated world of sport (United Nations, 2007).

A third and more recent report, “Empowering girls and women through physical education and sport” from United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2012) elaborates further on many of these themes. The report notes that girls make up the majority of out-of-school children, that adult women form a significant proportion of “illiterates worldwide,” and the strong relationship between poverty and gender inequality in education persists. The report also identifies numerous initiatives seeking to tackle these
issues as well as barriers to women’s participation in sport and physical activity as outlined (see Table 1).

Table 1: The pursuit of gender equity in physical education and sport in six countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Religious and cultural practices that encourage or forbid female participation, hence little to no female participation in sport or physical activity</td>
<td>Compilation of data on female performance and physical activity. Dissemination of findings at conferences in the region</td>
<td>Relaxation of clothing rules in basketball to permit girls to participate fully clothed in accordance with religious belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Religious and cultural practices that discourage or forbid female participation, hence little to no female participation in sport or physical activity</td>
<td>Activism by members of the Qatar Women’s Sports Committee</td>
<td>Relaxation of clothing requirements in a range of sports Participation in the Asian Games hosted by Qatar in 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>Not specified (but see Judo, 2008)</td>
<td>Activism by members of the Women’s Sports Foundation of the Philippines, in particular, use of legal instruments. Targeting schools to increase participation by girls. Ensuring appropriate facilities are available, female teachers and coaches in place. Compiling and disseminating data about the health benefits of physical activity for females. Implementing inclusive and anti-harassment policies. Providing public and media recognition for the contributions of women.</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Not specified (but see Ye and Cha, 2008)</td>
<td>Women and Sport Group worked with Singapore Sports Council and various NGOs to develop collaborative partnerships to generate the following actions: • sportsplay days camps for children ages 6-14, • a bowling league and bowling instruction for girls and women; • support dragon boat rowing activities, culminating in the first international dragon boat world championship in October 2000; • a set of aerobic exercises known as kebayarobos for female students in the madrasas; • “Be an Active Woman” campaign 2005; • Leadership workshops for women sport administrators and athletes.</td>
<td>Women’s participation in weekly physical activity increased from 38% to 42%. The government officially added a women’s department to the High Participation Group of the Singapore Sports Commission. 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>The rate of participation in physical activity for females in Taiwan is lower than for females in the United States and other industrialized nations. Thirty-eight percent of females in Taiwan are sedentary, 33% engage in at least 150 minutes of moderate-intensity physical activity per week, and 24% in at least 60 minutes of vigorous activity. People of working age, housewives, and unemployed people have the lowest rates of participation in physical activity.</td>
<td>Compilation of data on the epidemiology of physical activity of women and girls in Taiwan. Advocacy of a Title IX-like law (landmark legislation that bans sex discrimination in schools, whether it be in academics or athletics). Hosted the 2006 International Conference on Physical Activity and Physical Fitness Promotion Strategy for Women and Girls.</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2012, pp. 6–7)
**The IOC stakes it claim.** The UN has also actively promoted the contribution to be made by sport organizations and (mega-)sport events to development. The relationship sown between the IOC and the UN in the early 1990s was cultivated in the mid-aughts. During this decade, the IOC sought to present itself as a vanguard for SDP though its position within the UN. For instance, in a 2007 publication entitled “Teaching Values: An Olympic Educational Toolkit”, the IOC articulated the role of sport in promoting global peace and tolerance and through the values of “Olympism.” “The goal of Olympism” the document reads “is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity...in the five continents” (International Olympic Committee, 2007).

The First International Forum on Sport, hosted by the IOC in 2009, further positioned the IOC as a development agency. In his opening address, IOC president Jacques Rogge articulated this ambition quite clearly: “today there is no longer any doubt that the IOC and the sports movement have a social responsibility – namely to enable the largest number of people to have access to the practice of sport, and to make this a key element of sustainable social and human well-being for individuals and society” (International Olympic Committee, 2009, p. 5). Somewhat paradoxically given these comments, Rogge went on to recognize that sport could not solve all the socio-economic problems of the world, but that the IOC would work closely with the UN to use sport to promote peace, development, education, and health, globally.

Other reports published by the IOC perpetuate these developmental logics in a similarly circular manner. For example, in the report published from the second International Forum on Sport for Peace and Development in 2011, Rogge made clear the
unquestioned position of sport in the development context, stating that, “thanks to the UN, sport has found its rightful place in the global agenda for peace and development and it is officially recognized that sport can be an invaluable tool for education, gender equality, integration, health, and more generally, for the good [sic]” (United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, 2011, p. 2). The UN Special Advisor on Sport for Development and Peace restated many of Rogge’s comments in his own statement – making reference, for example, to the ability of sport to “build bridges,” “break down barriers,” and “bring people together” – illustrating the circularity and ambiguity with which the case for implementing sport in development is made (United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, 2011, p. 3; see also International Olympic Committee, 2011).

One final avenue worthy of discussion in this literature review of SDP stakeholders pertains to the positioning of sport-mega events, particularly the Olympics, as a catalyst to development. The IOC and UN both promote the development potential of the games; for example, prior to the 2010 Games in Beijing, China, the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace argued that the event would promote harmony and reconciliation around the world, and offer a platform for attaining specific development and peace objectives, including the MDGs (United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, 2009). The IOC was also quick to point to the positive effects of the Games, citing the 400 million children in 400,00 Chinese schools who were exposed to Olympic Values, the 100,000 Chinese chefs who received food cleanliness classes, the putting in place of a new disease prevention and control system, and various cultural, sport and educational exchanges between countries as evidence of development.
**Sport management and sport for development models.** Outside of these NGO and corporate stakeholders, the field of sport management has offered some insight into how sport for development programs should be implemented. Beginning with the premise that sport as a catalyst to social change is widely established, much of the sport management literature on Sport for Development and Peace is focused on establishing models, assessing content, and monitoring and evaluating outcomes so as to delineate the “best practices” for SDP programmes. Although recently much of the literature in the field has taken critiques of SDP into account, noting that sport is not a panacea to underdevelopment, from a sport management perspective, the central research questions continue to center on how sport can be implemented in the development paradigm so as to contribute to economic development, social inclusion, health promotion, gender equality and peacebuilding. Research in the field has focused on how SDP programs impact the lives of participants (Sherry, 2010; Sherry & Strybosch, 2012; Welty Peachey, Lyras, Borland, & Cohen, 2013) and other stakeholders such as volunteers (Peachey et al, 2015), as well the themes of “empowerment” (Sherry, Schulenkorf, & Chalip, 2015), women’s rights (Meier & Saavedra, 2009; Sawrikar & Muir, 2010; Siefken, Schofield, & Schulenkorf, 2014), skills development (Kay & Bradbury, 2009), pro social behaviour (Davis Smith, Ellis, & Howlett, 2002; Eley & Kirk, 2002), developing social capital, particularly amongst homeless populations (Cohen, Welty Peachey, 2015; Welty Peachey, Borland, Loprices, & Cohen, 2015), community capacity building (Edwards, 2015), and the cultivation of “safe space” for these initiatives (Spaaij & Schulenjorf, 2014).

Scholars in sport management have also sought to create models or frameworks of SDP to outline how sport can best be implemented in the development context. Two such
models that have garnered attention in the field are Nico Schelenkorf’s (2012) “Sport-for-Development” (S4D) framework, and Alex Lyra’s (2009, 2012a) “sport for development theory” (SFDT). The S4D framework offers a guide for the “strategic investigation of sport and event projects and their contribution to understanding and measure direct social impacts and sustainable outcomes for (disparate) communities” through a “holistic yet flexible management tool” (Schulenkorf, 2012, p. 10). Similarly, SFDT offers a model to “increase understanding of the processes and conditions involved in sport for development programs” (Marshall & Barry, 2015, p. 109). The model espouses that researchers should focus on the context and outcomes of the mechanisms of social change in sport for development programs, so as to enable “replication for similar projects and to develop theoretical foundations for sport interventions” (Marshall & Barry, 2015, p. 110; see also Lyra, 2009; 2012a). The SFDT model includes five main components – impacts assessment, organizational, sport, educational, and cultural enrichment – that act as “building blocks to enhance the understanding of identifying appropriate content, processes, and outcomes for programme development and assessment” (Marshall & Barry, 2015, p. 111; see also Hancock et al., 2013; Lyra, 2012a; Lyra & Welty Peachey, 2011). The SFDT model serves as a platform for theory building based on an interdisciplinary theoretical foundation drawn from organizational theory, and psychology which provided evidence and recommendations about the “context and the conditions under which sport programs can leverage positive social change” (Lyra & Welty Peachey, 2011, p. 312). While the sport management field offers functionalist insights into the role of sport in development, the potential benefits of SDP outlined in the literature have been challenged
by critical scholars in the sociology of sport, who argue that the divisive components of the SDP paradigm outweigh the propensity of sport to do good in the development context.

**Literature Three – Critiques from the Sociology of Sport**

The ostensibly universal draw of sport, in combination with the rigor with which the UN has promoted sport for development has enabled the establishment of “common sense” narratives regarding the efficacy and ethicality of the SDP paradigm. This is particularly true for North American audiences where sport rests on consecrated ground; as a result, many of the deleterious effects of sport are absent from these narratives. These silences have made for a fertile ground in which scholars in the sociology of sport have begun to dig and uncover the racialized (see Darnell, 2007, 2010b, 2014; Fusco, 2005), gendered (see Hayhurst, 2011, 2013), and hegemonic political economic structures (see Darnell, 2010a; Hayhurst, Wilson, & Frisby, 2010; Levermore, 2010, 2011) that underpin SDP. The critiques of SDP from scholars in the field are not a wholesale condemnation, but rather a move to (re)politicize sport for development. In tracing the emergence of SDP as an idealist response to post-Cold War global politics that emphasized entrepreneurship and the mass mobilization to “make poverty history,” Bruce Kidd (2008, p. 378) has referred to the SDP paradigm as a “timely, progressive impulse” and “one of the most encouraging trends in the last few years.” Echoing this cautious optimism, David Black (2010) argues that the imperative of making a difference in the lives of poor and marginalized people is both an admirable and inevitable component of SDP. Yet it is in the currency of potential good that SDP trades, obfuscating the detrimental effects of the paradigm. While framed as a new and novel approach to development that has had the opportunity to learn from “some of the
dangers and missteps that have befallen more ‘mainstream’ development practitioners’

SDP has suffered from a lack of critical and theoretically-informed reflection (Black, 2010, p. 122; see also Darnell & Black, 2011; Levermore & Beacom, 2009).

SDP scholars have attempted to map the field so as to examine the broader long-term benefits and challenges of participation in sport and physical activity in the development context (Coalter, 2010; Darnell, 2007, 2010ab; Giulianotti, 2004; Guest, 2009; Kidd, 2008; Levermore, 2008). Scholars such as Fred Coalter (2010) and Bruce Kidd (2008) see three broad formations of sport for development: the development of sporting practices that typically include the provision of basic sports coaching, equipment and infrastructure; humanitarian assistance in which fund-raising in sports is used to provide forms of aid, frequently for children and internally displaced populations; and the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm that covers an array of organizations and projects that tend to be more concerned with individual and community development.

For their part, Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) further elaborate on two different “ideal” sport for development types that appear in the field: a dominant vision in which sport maintains and reproduces the established status quo of social relations, and a more radical interventionist approach in which sport is intended to contribute to transformative social change. The majority of SDP endeavours fall under the dominant approach, where sport is believed to be an effective tool of development for its promotion of life skills, social knowledge, and values that articulate with neoliberal ideologies of individualism, competition, and free enterprise (Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011; see also Darnell, 2010a, Kay & Bradbury, 2009; Levermore, 2008; Rose, 1999). Although many SDP proponents, particularly the UN, assert that sport-based development initiatives are mutually beneficial...
for marginalized individuals and society *writ large*, in reality the aims of these initiatives are to re-socialize individuals so as to maintain hegemonic power relations and social structures (Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011). In this vein Bruce Kidd (2008) argues that many SDP initiatives are top-down and transient endeavours that do little to engage the majority of people who have little opportunity to participate in sports, and risk imposing the values of the “First World” middle class on the disadvantaged of the global South in an assimilative manner.

The disconnect between the vision promoted in the stakeholder literature and the critical rejoinders from scholars in the sociology of sport is a product of what Fred Coalter (2010) argues are the idealist mythopoeisms of SDP. Like all things mythopoeic, elements of truth are at play, but these truths become distorted and repeatable so as to evoke vague and generalized images regarding sport and development. In this way, the mythos of sport perpetuates its inherent proclivity for social good, when in reality SDP is better understood as an “empty form” that is “like any other tool, technology, or social practice whose meaning, use, and impact is dependent on the ways in which it is employed on how and to what ends it is used” (Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011, p. 289; see also Coakley, 2002; Hartmann, 2003; MacAlloon, 1995). With this notion of sport as an empty form in mind, it is productive to explore four overlapping trends in the SDP literature within the sociology of sport: work that deconstructs development discourse at a policy level; work that explores the racial politics of SDP; the comparatively limited amount of research on gender and SDP; and work that uncovers the capitalist tendencies of the paradigm.

*Problematizing policy and practice.* The social policies that form and inform Sport for Development and Peace have largely escaped critical analysis. This omission is
significant given the breadth of organizations promoting sport for development, the lofty goals of the SDP sector, and the growing tendency to mobilize sport as a response to the supposed ills of global civil society ranging from obesity and mental illness to youth crime and low education levels (Giulianotti, 2011a; see also Kaldor, 2003). In one of the few analyses of SDP policy, Lyndsay Hayhurst (2009) argues that policies serve to both produce and conceal practices of development. She argues that the increasingly quantifiable targets and measures of development aimed at addressing inequalities in social welfare conceal interventionist and neoliberal tendencies of the SDP sector and unequal global North-South power dynamics. In this way, the praise and success stories in the aforementioned SDP documents give a false impression of the effectiveness of SDP and of harmonious relations between global North institutions such as UN agencies, NGOs, and corporations, and “recipients” in the global South. The effect of perpetuating these narratives in policy is to buoy panacean narratives of SDP and the ostensible need for more objective measures and monitoring (Hayhurst, 2009).

Another exception to the lack of critical approaches to SDP policy is the report on Sport for Development and Peace from the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Physical Education and Health headed by Bruce Kidd and commissioned by the Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group. In reviewing five commonly held beliefs about the benefits of sport in the development context – child development and education, achieving health objectives, gender equity, inclusion and well-being of people with disabilities, and peace building – the University of Toronto commission urges a tempered and ultimately critical approach to SDP. Taking each theme in turn, first, the commission argues that while there is a great deal of evidence regarding the benefits of
sport participation for children and youth, “few conclusions have been drawn regarding the mechanism by which sport positively facilitates, or contributes to, child and youth development” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007b, p.16). Second, in regards to the ability for sport and physical activity to achieve health objectives, the commission confirms that given clean air, proper nutrition, and moderate levels of exercise, there is a positive relationship between physical health and sport. Yet the authors temper these claims by noting that “the evident benefits appear to be an indirect outcome of the context and social interaction that is possible in sport rather than a direct outcome of participating in sport” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007b, p. 4). Third, SDP stakeholders often cite sport’s ability to empower women and make strides towards gender equality; yet, the evidence to suggest changing gender roles are “observed outcomes of these programs, rather than empirical findings” and may be undermined by the fact that SDP programs are usually run for and by men (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007b, p. 105). Similarly, the authors caution that for the fourth theme, sport as a means to foster inclusion, health and wellbeing of people with disabilities, women with disabilities hold a double burden where 93% of women with a disability do not participate in sport or physical exercise (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007b). Finally, they argue that the ability of sport to promote peace is contested given that sport has also historically been implicated in conflict (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007b).

The cautious and critical tones with which the University of Toronto Commission evaluated SDP, however, do not preclude recognition of some progressive aspects of SDP
and the successes of some programs in the field. The Mathare Youth Sport Association (MYSA) and Physically Active Youth (PAY), both in Namibia, have demonstrated tangible differences for youth in terms of personal development, gender stereotypes (particularly through MYSA “Letting Girls Play” program, see Willis 2000), and education; and Football 4 Peace, established by John Sugden, a Professor of Sociology of Sport at the University of Brighton, has seen some success in bringing together and reducing some conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel (see Sugden, 2006). Yet, ultimately, the commission argues that much of the research carried out by the UN, SDP programs, or other organizations, is done under the assumption of the positive benefits results from sport, resulting in *a priori* arguments that are frequently taken up uncritically, and repeated in other literatures. The authors urge for caution to be taken in order not to essentialize sport and the role it the plays in society, and they argue “it would be preferable to think of sport as a plurality of forms that have different results in different contexts” (p.165)

The report from the University of Toronto reflects Hayhurst’s (2009) conclusions that SDP policies are unclear, circuitous, and underpinned by political rationales that promote “development assimilation” rather than partnership, and an increasingly neoliberal mandate. Such policies ignore lived experiences and relationship between power and global capital within the development paradigm. Hayhurst (2009), echoing Henry et al (2007,) argues that by approaching “policy as discourse” rather than “discourse as policy” allows for an exploration of SDP policies as “sites of enunciation” for power dynamics and identity politics that privilege the questioning of the agents of knowledge, their social location, who is speaking and for whom they speak, and who is being empowered and marginalized within a development discourse that is often, if not always, racialized.


**Racial intelligibility and institutionalized whiteness.** In his extensive work on race and sport for development, Simon Darnell argues that much of the SDP industry relies upon and reproduces a racialized grid of intelligibility regarding who is in need of developing (the global South) and who will do the developing (the global North). In his work on Right to Play, Darnell (2007) explores how the discourse of development reconstructs hegemonic development dichotomies of the empowered and disempowered, the vocal and the silent, the knowers and the known. Darnell argues that organizations like Right to Play frame development agents as benevolent for delivering aid to an ostensibly grateful Other, while underlying histories of colonialism and imperialist exploits remain silent and silenced. In this way, Darnell argues that SDP programs operate from a position of whiteness understood “not as a fact of white bodies, but as a racial characteristic that assumes and presumes a normative social position through the discursive intersection of gender, class, sexuality, domesticity, respectability and superiority, and that allows for the intelligibility of racialized bodies” (Darnell, 2007, p. 564; see also 2010b, 2014; Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011). “The commitment to global justice and equality that characterizes the progressive nature of the development mandate” writes Darnell (2007), “is complicated by a professional hegemony based on racialized and spatialized notions of superiority” (p. 562). The institutionalization of SDP thus serves not only to reproduce racialized power dynamics, but hides them under the banality of social good of sport, and the goodwill of the programs and practitioners.

In a similar vein to Darnell, Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) argue that the histories of inequality and colonialism that have created the current geopolitical order are often left out of development narratives, sanctifying global North interventionism, and implicitly
constructing racialized stereotypes of the global North and global South. The contentions drawn out by scholars in the sociology of sport that SDP operates from a position of whiteness are supported by the work of sport historians who have explicated the ways in which the racialized power dynamics of development hold roots in colonialism. For instance, historians such as Dean Allen (2011), J. A. Mangan (2006), and Rosalind O’Hanlon (1999) note how in the colonial expansion of the nineteenth century, notions of white European superiority provided a justification for colonialism. Informed by the “muscular Christianity” movement in Britain which sought to instil values of good social standing personified in gentlemanliness and athleticism among young men of the colonial classes, in response to a perceived decline in masculinity in the Empire (see Chapter Four), sport was soon mobilized in the colonial context to bring civility and religion – coded through a racial ideology of whiteness – to the colonies (Mangan, 2006). Indeed a great deal of the sport history literature from scholars such as Markku Hokkanen, J. A. Mangan, Joe Sang, and John Bale point to the central role sport was thought to play in progressing “barbarous” nations and peoples along the teleological path to modernity and civilization (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006). This “civilizing” process was centered on proper ways of acting – in terms of manners and etiquette – as well as on notions of athleticism, where a lack of coordination was connected to a perceived backwardness and animalism (Bale, 2002; Bale & Sang, 1996; Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006).

Taking up this work, Gerald Gems (2006) has called attention to the fact that the interplay between racial ideologies and sport were not confined to European colonialism, but also played out in the Americas. Sport was central in U.S. colonial expansion, playing a particularly pronounced role in staking claims to land and culture; for instance, in the
continental United States, hunting for sport was a means to claim ownership over the land and its resources from Aboriginal groups, while in Hawai‘i missionaries took popular Hawaiian games and replaced them with “proper” sports such as baseball as a means to introduce Anglo-Saxon “ethics” (Gems, 2006). In South America and South East Asia, sport was similarly used as a means of imperialism. As Gems (2006) reveals, American missionaries continued many of the well-established colonial practices of the British. White Anglo-Saxon Protestant groups used education, sport, and a variety of popular media such as newspapers, photography, and film to denigrate the colonial subject (Gems, 2006). In this regard, sport and physical education played a dual role: both infusing proper values and ways of acting to compete in a modern industrialized world and reifying racial hierarchies and the inferiority of non-white bodies in “Western” games (Gems, 2006).

While sport was used as a means of imperialism, other scholars have highlighted the ways in which sport was mobilized in anti-colonial and independence movements. This is particularly true of cricket in the British West Indies where the colonial game was turned against the colonizer and reappropriated as a symbol of nationalist independence (Allen, 2011; Holden, 2008; MacLean, 2009, 2010; Neumann, 2006). As Birgit Neumann (2006) reminds us, cricket was not merely a passive vehicle that reproduced imperial ideology, but rather constituted both the sutures and fissures of the colonial bond. In the late 1920s, cricket was a political pitch onto which Black West Indian cricketers such as Learie Constantine and public figures such as CLR James began to challenge colonial rule and make demands for political rule in the public sphere (Stoddart, 2006). Baseball was similarly used in colonial struggle, where the sport was implemented as a means of
imperialism and adopted in ways that promote anti-colonial and nationalist sentiment (Gems, 2006; Kelly, 2006).

**And what about gender?** Comparatively, there is a dearth of research focused on gender dynamics, and the intersection of race and gender, in sport for development programs. This is in part a reflection of the lack of initiatives focused on women and girls in sport for development, a curious omission given the rather prominent position gender plays in justifying the need for SDP programs in the first place – gender is named directly in at least three of the eight MDGs (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a). Women and girl-centric sport for development programs have begun to emerge, driven in part by the “Girl Effect” movement: a campaign initiated by Nike in 2005 that casts adolescent girls as the catalysts for social and economic change to their families, communities and countries (Hayhurst, 2011, p. 7). While the Girl Effect holds profound implications for promoting gender equality, challenging gender norms, and improving women’s overall health, these potentialities are complicated and undermined by the neoliberal logics they conceal. This is particularly true of the corporate capitalist tilt to the movement and for the prevalence of hegemonic masculinity that favours male “privilege and power” in the realm of sport (Hayhurst, 2011, 2013). While Nike posits that women-focused SDP initiatives “can unleash the world’s greatest untapped solution to poverty,” Hayhurst (2011, p. 7) argues that the Girl Effect movement is problematic for placing the onus on girls to change their behaviours, actions, and attitudes in order to achieve gender equality, while ignoring the need to enlist men and boys in this endeavour (see also Hayhurst, 2013). “Though useful in drawing attention to the failure of the development community in addressing the marginalization of girls” Hayhurst (2011) argues, “the Girl
Effect mantra and other development regimes that builds on its premise tend to recycle former discourse of colonial paternalism as “Third World girl” empowerment narratives that construct girls in the Two-Thirds World as requiring the benevolence of their counterparts in the global North in order to be saved” (p. 534).

**Socially responsible for whom?** The modernist progress narratives of development and the sport-as-social-good imperative converge within sport for development to shape perceptions of SDP as benevolent and philanthropic. The popularity of the SDP paradigm within the contemporary political economic context, moreover, has drawn the attention of transnational corporations seeking an outlet for seemingly mandatory “social responsibility” endeavours. In her work on the pink ribbon campaign for breast cancer, Samantha King (2006) discusses the emergence of cause-related marketing as a significant evolution in neoliberal capitalist ideology. While corporations presenting themselves as more than a commercial entity is certainly nothing new, what is new about these corporate social responsibility (CSR) endeavours is that capitalist consumption is increasingly mobilized as a response to – rather than contributor to – social ills in domestic and international markets. In these CSR campaigns, a portion of funds raised through consumerism is redeployed through charitable outlets. King (2006) argues that this growing trend is part and parcel of neoliberal ideology where the ideal “citizen as consumer” is rebranded as the “citizen as volunteer” in which “strategies of government designed to replace the passive, dependent citizen of the welfare state with the active consumer-citizen of neoliberalism have frequently placed, often with great public fanfare, volunteer-development programs at their core” (p. 73). This trend is perhaps most readily visible in U2 lead-singer Bono’s “(RED)” campaign in which a portion of sales from
Corporate sponsors including American Express, Gap, Converse, Motorola, and Armani are directed toward the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in developing polities of the global South. This “brand aid” as Richey and Ponte (2008) call it, utilizes popular fashion, technologies, commodities, and celebrities to create a world in which the West can consume as much as they want without depriving those in other parts of the world – a “win-win” approach to solving poverty and disease.

Unsurprisingly, corporations are increasingly looking to sport for development as an outlet for their CSR endeavours. Nike, for example, has both sponsored and created their own programs related to SDP, including the aforementioned “Girl Effect” as well as their “Better World” and “Let me Play” campaigns, all of which promote the capacity of sport to promote peace, economic development, and education in developing nations. While SDP programs are seemingly a natural pursuit for a sporting company like Nike, in that they allow for brand promotion while ostensibly promoting social justice, these types of initiatives are also attractive for their ability to deflect anti-corporate sentiments and campaigns. In Nike’s case, CSR campaigns can be seen as a response to the company’s history of exploitative production techniques in the global South (Giulianotti, 2011b). Indeed, many corporations involved in CSR do little to hide the boost the programs give their marketing departments. The National Basketball Association, for instance, does not camouflage the dual-benefit of promoting goodwill and profit at play. Their annual “Basketball Without Borders” program is hosted in developing nations across four continents where “young people from diverse cultural, national and economic backgrounds on four separate continents to learn through the sport of basketball” (National Basketball Association 2006). With the support of NBA celebrity athletes and the league’s corporate
sponsors such as Nike and McDonald's, the program incorporates basketball instruction and programs on matters such as HIV/AIDS prevention, education, and health while both promoting their product, and actively scouting future players for the league (see Millington, 2015).

Despite the potential conflict of interest in promoting social justice while prioritizing profitability, the UN's partnerships with various corporations have made great strides in legitimizing CSR within the sport for development sector. Some corporations have worked closely with NGOs to finance sport for development organizations while others, like Nike and Reebok have taken a more prominent role, contributing to UNHCR SDP projects and delivering large volumes of sport equipment to developing communities (Giulianotti, 2011b)(for a list of SDP CSR initiatives, see Levermore, 2010, p. 225). Although there has been little research on the way sport is increasingly used to deploy CSR, it is safe to say that this phenomenon has gained uncritical acceptance that may further exacerbate asymmetrical power relations between the global North and South (Levermore, 2010, 2011; see also Hayhurst, Millington & Darnell, 2015).

Although not a corporation per se, the International Olympic Committee occupies a gray area between capitalist enterprise and non-governmental agency (Boykoff, 2014). Its corporate sponsors and the revenue-generating character of the Olympic Games make it relevant to this literature review. Indeed, over the past decade the IOC has sought to establish itself as an agent of international development, both through the Olympic Games where it espouses the structural and economic development benefits of the event for developing polities, and through the creation of their own SDP program, Olympism in Action (International Olympic Committee, 2009). Yet, where the IOC articulates its social
responsibility ambitions most clearly is through the Olympic Games, where the event has been recast as a catalyst to economic and social development and a stage upon which the IOC can display its social responsibility, while pursuing its capitalist interests.

Recently, developing nations have bid for and won the rights to host sport mega-events: the “successes” of the 2008 Olympic Games in China, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India, and the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics in Brazil are emblematic of a trend where large scale sport events are increasingly part of international development strategy. Roche (2000) writes that mega-events are “large scale (including commercial and sporting) events [that] have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance...[and are] important elements in “official” versions of public culture” (p. 1). That mega-events are being promoted as a means to and marker of development by the international community is a significant move in the history of development, as these events have historically been reserved for “high income” nations of the global North and are deeply entwined with global capitalist power dynamics (D. Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Bolsmann & Brewster, 2009; Cornelissen & Swart, 2006; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Roche, 2000; Swart & Bob, 2004; Tomlinson, 1996, 2008; Zolov, 2004).

The increasingly “common sense” understanding that sport mega-events can be mobilized to meet the development aims proffered by the IOC and its corporate partners has been met with growing concern from activists and academics, who point to the gap between predicted and actual impacts of these events on host nations (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). While mega-events ostensibly offer host nations an influx of capital and tourism, and infrastructural development (e.g., highway, housing and sport stadia
construction), scholars and activists have challenged these assurances for their ephemerality and propensity to further economic and social marginalization. As Zhang and Silk (2006) argue in their analysis of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, sport mega-events “routinely manifest in polarized labour markets, extreme economic disparities, racially differentiated housing, population distribution, schooling, and welfare provision”, that ultimately create “segregated or divided cities that offer a carefully contoured image of affluence that belies structural inequalities” (p. 439).

It is important to note that these effects are not unique to the Beijing Games, but are endemic to sport mega-events in general. In her work on the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, Scarlett Cornelissen (2011) argues that while mega-events can contribute to economic growth and infrastructure, they can also facilitate everything from “providing incentives to evict or remove the homeless; to expanding the illicit sex industry, possibly making vulnerable groups (children, in particular) more vulnerable; to entailing various encroachments on civil rights” (p. 508). The spatial and ideological restructuring produced by these events exacerbates inequalities through the diversion of public funds for private means (see Andreff, 2006; Broudehoux, 2007; Krohe, 2009; Lenskyj, 2000, 2008). Harvey (2005) uses the term “accumulation by dispossession,” to signify the accumulation of monetary and physical capital through the “privatization of land, natural resources, forestry, water, air; the conversion of various forms of property into private property; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; and monetization and taxation of land” (p. 145). In this way, sport mega-events such as the Olympics require and perpetuate neoliberal manoeuvring that privileges capitalist accumulation at the cost of social welfare (see Broudehoux, 2007;
Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Horne & Whannel, 2012; Lenskyj, 2000; Tomlinson, 1996, 2008). Scholars have also cautioned that developing nations in the global South are in a much weaker position to serve as hosts of mega-events, and are particularly vulnerable to the divisive effects of the social and economic hierarchies and segregation through spatial logics of privatization the events tend to solidify (Curi, Knijnik, & Mascarenhas, 2011; Gaffney, 2010).

In considering the complicated and diverse motivations for hosting sport mega-events, David Black and Janis Van Der Westhuizen (2006) utilize Bourdieu’s concept of “the social” to explore how the complexities of capital, power, and identity become intertwined in their production. They argue that when bidding for such events, host nations, cities, and peoples expect to gain social capital (in terms of image construction and global reputation) that can be converted to economic capital through tourism, and global investment. With access to a global audience through television, hosting an SME may be advantageous to economically and politically peripheral nations, and controlling their own image-making (both domestically and globally) can be particularly attractive to local elites (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). As Black and Van Der Westhuizen (2004) note, “the pursuit and sponsorship of major games has become an increasingly popular strategy of governments, corporations, and other “boosters” world-wide, who habitually argue that major developmental, political, and sociocultural benefits will flow from them, easily justifying the costs and risks involved” (p. 1195). The opportunity to project a carefully cultivated image can be particularly appealing in the development context, where many “developing” countries (e.g. China, South Africa, India, Brazil) have pursued sport mega-events to signal their entrance to modernity (Darnell & Black, 2011), or as a chance for authoritarian or
weak democratic regimes to demonstrate their “acceptability” to the international community – a case exemplified in China and South Africa’s respective bids for the 2008 Olympic Games and 2010 FIFA World Cup (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004).

In this regard, SMEs have become powerful claims-making entities for developing nations, in that they are viewed as inherently “modern” cultural events, embodying ideals and principles connected with “Western civilization” including rationalism, progress, capitalist industrialism, and humanism (Roche, 2000, p. 9). Alan Tomlinson (1996) argues that the study of mega-events offers a revealing basis for comprehending the complex characteristics of claims to belonging in modernity. This is particularly evident in the cultural displays of modernity created by “developing” nations in their bids for sport mega-events including the 1968 Olympics in Mexico, the 2008 Olympics in China, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. The IOC, moreover, has made the links between the Olympic Games, international development, and modernity quite clear through their partnership with the United Nations Development Program and have actively reached out to nations in South America, Africa and Asia who have used the Games as a sign of independence.

The draw of sport mega-events is thus the promise of a position within capitalist modernity as states demonstrate their transition from “traditional” to “developed” (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Roche, 2000). Yet hosting a mega-event is deeply imbued with hegemonic power relations that are detrimental to broad swathes of a host nation’s population. Despite their putative benefits, the Olympics and the World Cup often result in the consolidation of wealth in the hands of local and transnational elites, the social exclusion of marginalized populations, and ultimately require the public to bear the social
and financial cost of the events through the diversion of public funds for private means that often result in cuts to social services (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). As John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter (2006) argue, “sport mega-events are a significant part of the experience of modernity, but they cannot be seen as a panacea for social and economic problems” (p. 15). In this way, sports mega-events continue to be connected to, and positioned as evidence of, broad-based development policies for southern nations (D. Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Cornelissen, 2009; Darnell, 2012b; Swart & Bob, 2004) and constitute a key component of domestic and international development strategies (Nauright, 2004, p. 1325).

**Addressing the gaps**

In reviewing three broad literatures related to Sport for Development and Peace – development literature and theory, stakeholder literature, and critical rejoinders from the sociology and history of sport – my aim has been to provide some context for the emergence of SDP, while also situating my research within the broader academic literature. Given that SDP has emerged through the “fourth pillar” of development – itself an ostensible response to a stagnant development landscape – this review of literature has necessarily included both historical and contemporary works related to sport and development. In light of this review, it is clear that there exist two significant gaps in the literature. The first pertains to the history of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm: the majority of the work in the field has focused on more contemporary critiques of the field, or on historical analyses of the role of sport in colonialist enterprises. The second gap is apparent in the limited amount of work that places the sociology of sport and development studies in conversation with one another. My dissertation takes steps towards
addressing these two gaps, so as to draw critical attention to the longstanding use of sport in development work and challenge the Western-centric and teleological logics that underpin the policy and practice of Sport for Development and Peace.
Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I seek to develop a critical analytical framework with which to interrogate and expose the assumptions and underlying power dynamics of sport and development at the heart of this project. Part of the broader aim of this dissertation is to put scholarly work on Sport for Development and Peace in conversation with scholarly work on development. This chapter is thus organized with a view to mapping some of the key scholarly perspectives through which development has been analyzed. In the tradition of post-structuralism and “contextual cultural studies,” I place Marxist and postcolonial theories of development and modernity in conversation with one another to develop a synthesized analytical framework for my study. Bradley Millington (2011, p. 13) argues,

In recent years, “contextual cultural studies” has emerged as a viable and highly instructive framework for those carrying out qualitative research. From a theoretical perspective, scholars taking this approach have found a fecund, if sometimes uncomfortable, alliance between Gramscian/Marxist and poststructuralist conceptions. In this sense, researchers and writers have mobilized a “unity-in-difference”, meaning devotion to constructive eclecticism in the selection and organization of guiding theories.

Undertaking such a unity-in-difference approach to my work will allow for the exploration of cultural phenomena as products of broader social, historical, and political economic conditions and to acknowledge the interrelationships and divergences between different approaches to critical inquiry.

While I am careful not to reify epistemological boundaries between these theoretical approaches, and recognize the overlaps between post-structuralism, Marxism, and postcolonialism, I contend that naming these three distinct theoretical traditions is an important and necessary endeavour. These approaches vary in the emphasis they place on the particular modes of power – be they discursive, economic, cultural – that shape
development. Explicating and then synthesizing these differences allows for a nuanced critique of the epistemological and ontological roots of modernity itself. It also allows me to expose how narratives of becoming modern (re)produce hegemonic patterns of global governance and entrench dichotomizations of the modern and the traditional, the developed and the underdeveloped. By drawing on these three theoretical traditions, it is my hope that a deeper understanding of the relationship between SDP, development, postcolonialism, and modernity will emerge.

I begin with a discussion of the relationship of modernity to development in order to set the context for the remainder of the chapter. In the next two sections, I outline Marxist and post-colonial analytical insights so as to develop a theoretical toolkit for my work. Ultimately, I incorporate these insights into a broadly post-structuralist epistemology to make the idea of modernity strange, to deconstruct its teleology, and to question its progressivist inflections.

**Of development and modernity: Or, Have we ever been modern?**

Though readily referenced in both development policy and popular thought (even if not named as such), “modernity” remains an imprecise and ambiguous concept. Partly a question of philosophy and epistemology, partly one of politics, modernity has become a catchall that is defined not by what is, but rather what it is not – traditional, anachronistic, irrational. The centrality of modernity in a variety of modes of thought, or what Foucault (1980) terms “regimes of truth”, is long standing. The social and political cache of modernity stems from Enlightenment thinking in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe that promoted the values of individual liberty, democracy, rational thought, and secularization (Giddens, 1991). As the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1784)
argued, the central paradigm of the Enlightenment was to emancipate free thought from a self-imposed immaturity and irrationality. Kant, like other philosophers, saw the Enlightenment as a gradual but inevitable process that could be achieved not through force but through a revolution of the mind.

Frederick Cooper (2005) identifies four perspectives on modernity that run through dominant conceptions of the term. First, modernity is understood to be teleological in that it presents a claim to a singular, monolithic state to which all nations progress. Second, modernity is imperial in that it situates a grouping of social, ideological, and political phenomena within a Western historical origin. Third, modernity is presented as residing in the global North, but attainable for developing polities. Fourth, and finally, modernity, is plural, multiple and alternative (Cooper, 2005, pp. 13-14). Given these multiplicities of meanings, modernity is a powerful claims-making concept. The dichotomy inherent in the term – the modern finds its antithesis in the traditional – is manifest in hegemonic understandings of the global South, the global North’s “Other.” Discourses of salvation, liberalism, and market economics have justified the intervention of the global North in the global South from colonialism through to the era of development. Modernity, or the absence thereof, informed the ideological basis of the colonial era: The exploitation of resources (both natural and human) was sanctioned as “traditional” societies were thought unable to make rational use of them and their economic potential thus left to waste without the intervention of the global North.

The shift from colonial to development ideology was a discursive turn that reframed the intervention of the global North from one of exploitation to one of partnership. In his critique of development, Vinay Gidwani (2008) offers insight into the modernist
underpinning of development on three fronts. First, development comprises a staged process of change over time and space marked by the progress of “Third” world nations from colonial appendages to developed nations. Second, development is progressive in that it indicates an advancement of culture from a primitive nature measured through industrialization and transnational capitalism. Third, development involves a deepening of rationality and individual choice, where all things are mobilized in pursuit of productivity, as illustrated, for example, in rendering idle resources into commodities. Thus, through notions of progress, profit, and productivity, modernity has become the discourse upon which development trades: the developmental apparatus ostensibly enables the global North to assist the transition of former colonies from export-based economies to industrial capitalism, marking a new era of progress and productivity. Modernity represents a claim to a singular, continuing (colonial) project “whose historical origins lie in the West ... condemned as itself an imperial construct, a global imposition of specifically Western social, economic, and political forms that tames and sterilizes the rich diversity of human experience and the sustaining power of diverse forms of community” (Cooper, 2005, p. 113; see also Mitchell, 2000). Modernity, thus, is not the natural unfolding of history, but rather a political project. The idea of modernity, with roots in the Enlightenment and defined by a rupture from the past, provides a framework for the theoretical debates that I seek to navigate in this chapter.

Discourses of development come to name spaces and people as developed or undeveloped, modern or traditional through narratives of progress and modernity. In this way, post-structural critiques highlight the contradictory positioning of modernity as a condition or a representation (Ferguson, 2005). Modernity as a condition encompasses the
teleological view written into the exercise of development-as-progress. Modernity as a representation entails a way of thinking about the world through discourses of temporal transformation while “bringing out the simultaneity of global unevenness, in which ‘tradition’ is produced by telling a story of how some people became ‘modern’” (Cooper, 2005, p.114). In this way, modernity is not an inevitability, but a model held before colonized people, marking the global North’s right to rule: “something to which the colonized should aspire but never quite deserve” (Cooper, 2005, p. 115). Discourses of modernity thus become powerful claims-making concepts in which the global South is condemned to the role of “catching up” and through which various forms of intervention are justified.

For centuries “catching up” has been defined as capitalist growth: the argument goes that capitalist development in Europe via industrialization could be extended to the colonies to provide an outlet for surplus capital, while bringing modernity to the backward other (cf. Fridland & Boden, 1994; Mitchell, 2000). In the development context these themes are recast within discourses of partnership (see Baaz, 2005) and integration into a global capitalist economy. Thus capitalism has long been seen as not only the catalyst to modernity but as the engine of history, a narrative that homogenizes, or excludes, histories outside of this space and time (Cooper, 2005). In opposition, many scholars (see Appadurai & Breckenridge, 1995; Berman, 2010; Comaroff, 2002) argue that modernity, though a powerful conceptual tool, does not inherently or incontrovertibly subsume all within a Eurocentrism. Modernity, instead, is multiple: it has “no priori telos or content. It is colourless, odourless, and tasteless…it is an ideological formation; an unstable, often
inchoate one, to be sure, but an ideological formation nonetheless” (Comaroff, 2002, cited in Cooper, 2005, p.129).

With these caveats and counter-points in mind, I find centralizing capitalism in modernity necessary for my theoretical framework, as it shapes much of the dominant discourse and representative politics that surround development. In this instance representations do not refer to a preoccupation with image-making over reality (indeed “images” and “realities” are co-constitutive), but rather to “forms of social practice that set up in the social architecture and lived experience of the world what seems an absolute distinction between image (or meaning, or structure) and reality, and thus a distinctive imagination of the real” (Mitchell, 2000, p. 17). Framing development and modernity as discursive, as representations rather than conditions, allows for a multi-perspectival theoretical approach that finds a common ground upon which the global forces of capitalism can be put in conversation with anti- and postcolonial – that is, non-homogenizing – histories and politics.

Although capitalism is certainly a key component of modernity, caution must be taken to not frame it as the quintessential element. Indeed it is necessary to recognize the complexity and contextuality of capitalism and modernity, particularly as it relates to colonialism and identity politics. On this point, Timothy Mitchell (2000) argues that Marxism places dispersed multiplicities of “social and political development into a singular linear history of capital...there is no analysis of social organization, the system of discipline, or the techniques of production that characterize the colony” (p.11). While considerations of capitalist modes of production are important, modernity cannot be reduced to a singular unitary process of capitalist development or European imperialism, but rather can be seen
as the result of multiple, competing, and divergent processes. The danger in reducing modernity to a singular process or mode of representation is to set Western history as a benchmark rather than to see how global relations construct(ed) the global North and South in the same process, “as modernity and backwardness incarnate” (Cooper, 2005, p.136). On the other end of the spectrum, it is equally important to not position colonialism as the linchpin of modernity, for such a construction may in fact reproduce the same homogenizing approaches that postcolonial theory seeks to challenge: colonialism was, and is, mobilized and experienced in diverse and disparate ways depending on the context. As Frederick Cooper (2005) notes, “although colonization was of the era in which it occurred, to identify the villain as modernity is to avoid rather than foster debate over the political and ethical issues that matter most” (p.120).

In this way, it is necessary to question both the location and temporality of modernity, so as to disrupt Eurocentric and essentialist discourses of modernity and becoming modern (Mitchell, 2000). Modernity theory presents a particular view of geography in which the global North sits at a center to which all other nations are peripheral. Similarly, framing modernity as progressive stages of development appropriates all other histories that exist outside of this singularity, outside of capitalism (Mitchell, 2000). While discourses of modernity tend to homogenize world histories into the modern/traditional dichotomy, it is not necessarily a culturally homogenizing force. Mitchell (2000) notes “a distinctive feature of modernity is contemporaneity...the modern occurs in a homogenous temporality that gives rise to a new experience of simultaneity, in which people living unconnected lives can feel themselves joined by occupying the same homogenous temporal moment” (Mitchell,
Modernity is thus the process of interconnectedness, where global forces of culture, ideology, politics, and economics, interact on a global stage.

Yet modernity is not merely a process, not a product of global hierarchy and historical time, but an invention of discourse: a set of promises (independence, cultural and political autonomy) that have not come to fruition, yet remain important (Ferguson, 2005). Once modernity is removed from narratives of progress, questions of global hierarchies and power relations are no longer tempered by “promises of the not yet” (Ferguson, 2005, p.174). Indeed, the promise of modernity has yet to come to fruition because, as Bruno Latour (1993) reminds us, we have never been modern. To be modern requires a distinction from the ancient, a distinction that is unobtainable, for the impossibility of a rupture between the (false) dichotomy of modern and traditional, developed and undeveloped. The discourse of modernity has thus played an important role in the framing of space and time, but holds little analytical purchase in its subsumption of all. In moving forward, it is necessary to consider a nuanced approach to theory that considers both capitalist processes as well as an anti- or post-colonial politics, whose effects are, as always, representative and material in one and the same.

**Marx, modernity, and the globalization of class politics**

Marxist theory is often labelled as reductionist. This tag however, is partly formed from a disregard for – or at least a misunderstanding of – concerns for discursive, as well as material, dimensions of power in Marxism. Indeed, Marxist theory is a useful component to my theoretical approach in that it allows for a critique of the hegemony of global capitalism within the development paradigm. As Arif Dirlik (2007) argues, Marxist theories challenge “narrative modes of production in which postcolonial history appears as a transition (or
aborted transition) to capitalism” (p. 336). From a Marxist perspective, the central divide
between “traditional” societies and “modern” ones is capitalism and control of the
globalized means of production. The impetus for underdevelopment that created this
divide between the (traditional) global South and (modern) global North, is the inherently
exploitative relationship between those who control the means of production and labour.
Marxist critiques of modernity center on the position that exploitation of the global South
by the global North is not exclusive to the time and space of colonialism, but rather remains
a prevalent component of the world economy today. The perpetual need for capitalism to
find profitable terrain to produce surplus product and reinvest surplus value has shaped,
and continues to shape, the geo-political landscape (Harvey, 2008).

Yet barriers to capitalist expansion continually present themselves and must be
overcome, often through exploitative measures such as creating new means of production,
discovering new resources for extraction, or finding new markets by expanding foreign
trade (Harvey, 2008). Barriers to capital accumulation and absorption typically emerge in
one of three forms, or some combination thereof, and must be overcome. First, scarce
labour with high wages has to be disciplined – through technologically induced
unemployment or an assault on organized working-class power, for example – or new
labour forces must be found. Second, new means of production must be discovered,
particularly in regards to natural resources, and the opening of new terrain for raw-
material extraction, and new technologies, innovations, and markets for trade, need to be
found. Third, low profit rates require the circumvention of regulations, competition, and
monopolies to find outlets for capitalist export (Harvey, 2003, 2008).
All of these barriers and their “solutions” via industrialization – i.e. the rational use of resources and/or global trade – are particularly salient for their ties to modernity. While the principles of capitalist expansion are mobilized in pursuit of development, their exploitative consequences not only result in, but also require, the maintenance of under- or uneven-development. Marxist critiques of modernity thus see the divide between modern and traditional not as the result of some historical teleology in which the global South is behind the global North, but rather that it is under it – under exploitative capitalist practices that force non-capitalist territories to be open to trade and forms of investment that use cheap labour and dispossessive forces of accumulation such as the “creative destruction” of land, or the gentrification of low-income areas (Harvey, 2003, 2008).

To adequately encapsulate how these political economic manoeuvrings intersect with and (re)produce modernity requires a further exploration of one of the central tenets of Marxism: primitive accumulation. According to Rosa Luxemburg (2003) capital accumulation has a dual character that must be understood in tandem: an economic process in which surplus value is produced in the factory, mine, agriculturally, or through transactions between capitalists and labourers; and a relational process between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production that are played-out on an international stage through colonialism, international loans, and war. From a Marxist perspective it is in this second aspect of the dual character that the divide between the modern and traditional is (re)produced. Marx argued that capitalism must have something “outside itself” – an “Other” to exploit – to be stabilized. This concept is referred to as capitalism’s dialectical (inside-outside) method. Capitalist accumulation occurs in this inside-outside dialectic through primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation describes the process by which the
original accumulation of wealth (surplus product) is reinvested for capitalist gain (surplus value). Primitive accumulation implicates a wide range of processes that include: commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of occupants; privatization of property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets; the monetization of exchange; and taxation, especially land (Harvey, 2003, p. 145).

Marx’s dialectical method is useful for understanding the dichotomy of modern and traditional because it reveals how interactions between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of labour and society, do not, and in many ways cannot, produce a harmonious state. Capitalist expansion, rather, deepens social inequality – a trend that David Harvey (2003) notes has pervaded, and helped strengthen, neoliberalism over the last thirty years. As Harvey (2003) argues, in the current epoch, “the new American Bourgeois imperialism appears as nothing more than the revisiting of the old, though in a different place and time” (p. 182). Harvey, further developing Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation, argues that capitalism perpetuates the divide between the global North and South through an ongoing process of accumulation by dispossession. Harvey argues that some mechanisms of primitive accumulation play an even stronger role in global capitalism, particularly in development policy. He provides the examples of the displacement of poor populations in Mexico, India, and Brazil; the privatization of common property resources such as water through structural adjustment programs; the emphasis on intellectual property rights in World Trade Organization negotiations through trade-related aspects on international property agreement (TRIPs); the escalating depletion of the global environmental
commons; and the commodification of cultural forms (Harvey, 2003). Importantly, Harvey notes that capitalist accumulation through these means can be internally driven as in the case of China, externally imposed as in neo-colonial development, or through some combination of both (Harvey, 2003).

Although Harvey argues that accumulation by dispossession has maintained and (re)produced the divide between the modern and the traditional through systematic underdevelopment, it is important to note that this uneven-development is not exclusive to the periphery. Indeed, accumulation by dispossession – promoted through neoliberal policies – has created pockets of underdevelopment in both the global North and South. This is evident in urban areas throughout the world, where restructuring through repeated bouts of “creative destruction” and gentrification has come at the expense of the poor and working classes (Harvey, 2008; cf., Klein, 2008). Accumulation of land and the dispossession of its inhabitants is evident for instance: in the United States, where gentrification of poor neighbourhoods forced people further to the margins of society; in China where a million people of low socio-economic status have recently be displaced from Beijing; in India where six million slum dwellers are under threat in Mumbai; and, in Brazil where millions of people living in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas face displacement for the upcoming Olympic Games (Harvey, 2003; Klein, 2008). As Harvey (2003) writes: “urbanization has played a crucial role in the absorption of capital surpluses, at ever increasing geographical scales, but at the price of burgeoning processes of creative destruction that have dispossessed the masses of any right to the city whatsoever” (p. 37).

Arif Dirlik (2007), drawing on Marxist and post-colonial theory, argues that to understand the condition of modernity requires a focus on how class politics have been
globalized. Globalized flows in capitalism have reshaped power dynamics, uprooting its locality (the factory, or the nation state) to play out on a global scale. The changing nature of class politics is demonstrated in the increasing visibility of a transnational capitalist class unified by their participation in “a common organization of the political economy, a common education, and common lifestyles that...distance them from their immediate environment” and the globalization of the working class where migrant tradespeople and migrant workers on the other end of the spectrum take part in a common culture (Dirlik, 2007, p. 93). A global focus on class relations complicates conceptions of modernity by shifting the focus from nation states – where nations are positioned on a teleological scale and where one nation, or region dominates another – to more complicated interactions between delocalized flows of capital. In this regard, Marxist scholars like Dirlik, Harvey, and Arjun Appadurai argue that through capitalist-driven globalization, modernity, as it stands today is marked by a temporal contemporaneity: Global flows (the movement of people, technology, finances, information, and ideas) have broken down previous conceptions of nations in various stages of modernity to challenge the zero-sum relationship between tradition and modern that is endemic to modernization discourse (Dirlik, 2007). As Dirlik shows, the modern/traditional divide cannot be reduced to the dichotomy of the global North/South but rather is a product of global uneven-development contributing to the presence of the “First” world in the Third and the “Third” world in the First (Dirlik, 2007, p. 96). It is not just that spaces in both the global North and global South are being left out of the global economy (and subsequently modernity) but also entire groups of people across national boundaries – those outside of the transnational capitalist class. Whereas other
theoretical paradigms hold modernity as a state of existence, Marxist perspectives attribute imperialist capitalism as the agent of modernity.

A Marxist perspective is useful for critiquing the teleology of modernity because it highlights how hegemonic power relations position some as modern and others as traditional within the geo-political order. Within this lens “becoming modern” and performing modernity are marked by the transition from agrarian, “backward” societies to industrial, rational ones. This process does not occur naturally, but rather is the product of capital flows, that often require the maintenance of underdevelopment throughout the world.

While Marxist theory is useful in complicating notions of modernity by decentralizing the dichotomy of global North and South and centralizing the dispossessive and exploitative forces of development, it is not without its limitations. In affording such weight to accumulation by dispossession, class struggle, and control of the means of production, Marxist perspectives are often accused of avoiding questions of identity beyond class and the intersection of culture with market imperatives (Dirlik, 2007). Social movements based around identity politics emerged in the 1970s to politicize matters of marginalization and disenfranchisement of women and racial minorities, both in the Americas and Europe, and globally in post-colonial movements of the time. As Dirlik (2007) notes, the shift in attention to questions of cultural identity in postcolonial and post-structural discourse has been “both a moment in and a beneficiary of a more general reorientation in Marxist thinking toward a recognition of at least the partial autonomy of the cultural from the economic or the political spheres of life” (p. 107). This focus on culture has largely been taken up by postcolonial scholars who, by disassociating the question of culture and
identity from the structure of capitalism, have moved the focus to the encounter between colonizer and colonized, and the foregrounding of colonialism rather than capitalism as the primary agent of modernity (Dirlik, 2007). Informed by this shift, postcolonial studies focuses on affording a history outside of capitalism to the formerly colonized, and a rethinking of the developmental divide between the traditional and the modern.

Postcolonialism, underdevelopment, and the staging of modernity

Dirlik (1997) defines the postcolonial as a tripartite description of a) conditions in formerly colonial societies; b) a global condition after the period of colonialism resulting in the creation of the “Third” world; and c) a discourse that is informed by the epistemological orientations that are products of those conditions (p. 332). Postcolonial theorists challenge ahistorical, homogenizing, and Eurocentrist constructions in academic and popular thought. Dirlik (1997) argues that where once the “Third” world was defined by its position in the capitalist worldview, postcolonialism has reclaimed the identity of the “Third” world to focus on its discursive position. Although postcolonial work sees the importance of the economy in the (re)production of hegemonic power relations, it offers a break from staunch Marxism by challenging a “narrative of modes of production in which postcolonial history appears as a transition (or an aborted transition) to capitalism” (p. 336).

Rather, the post-colony is viewed within postcolonial theory as a discursive formation of capitalist thought. The construction of the “underdeveloped Other” in the (post)colony was a product of what Arturo Escobar (1995) refers to as the “discovery” of mass poverty in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the post-World War II era. Firmly entrenched in Cold War ideology, and central to the rebuilding of Europe, decolonizing and newly independent nations of the global South were recast within a language of capitalism and international
trade. The marketization of the global South under the banner of development was a significant shift: during colonialism poverty was of little concern, and in some ways was actively promoted – in the maintenance of cash crops for example. Based in an ahistorical modernism, colonial narratives perpetuated a belief that “natives” could not make use of complex capitalistic processes (Escobar, 1995), effectively erasing from the pre-history of colonialism any sort of technological or intellectual sophistication (Prakash, 1999).

The problem of poverty in the global South (as “discovered” in the post-World War II, Cold War era) thus marked an epistemological shift where the underdevelopment of colonialism was reframed within discourses of poverty that could be rectified through development. In effect, global capitalism created the idea of global poverty. As Escobar (1995) notes, two-thirds of the world’s people were transformed into poor subjects requiring intervention when the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development defined poor countries as those with an annual per capita income below $100 in 1948 (p. 24). The transformation of the formerly colonized into the poor in need of assistance has had profound consequences. As Escobar (1995) argues the “modernization of poverty signified not only the rupture of vernacular relations but also the setting in place of new mechanism of control” (p. 22). In the same way that modern technology aided governance of the colony, new means of control are applied through development by transforming societies of the global South through the social problem of poverty. Here the concern is less with the means of production – although it is certainly still a concern – and more with discursive power structures.

These discursive means of control – what Foucault terms technologies of power – manifest in governmental apparatuses where the “poor” became objects of knowledge and
management whose lives could be intervened in through a myriad of “social” problems – education, health, hygiene, morality, employment (Escobar, 1995). Discourses of social problems that could be cured through “development” were steeped in modernity: by defining poverty within standards of wealth and localizing it within former colonies, the hierarchy between global North and South, modern and traditional was solidified. The cycle of poverty in former colonies could only be broken through an influx of capital, thus justifying the intervention of the global North “experts” with the knowledge to intervene in the lives of the “illiterate”, “underdeveloped”, “malnourished” Other (Gidwani, 2008).

In this light, postcolonial critiques assert that modernity is not a stage but rather a staging that creates a divide through the underdevelopment of colonial economies (Gidwani, 2008). Such understandings are based in classic capitalist economic theory and modernist tropes of progress: value cannot be left unproductive, it must be put to rational use to generate surplus value. The notion of value and its intersection with modernity is readily articulated in the example of waste in relation to land. Waste – areas of barren, uninhabited, or uncultivated land – is the specter that haunts value; value is the linchpin to political economy and moral conduct (Gidwani, 2008, p. 19). Ideas of waste and productivity are thus integral to notions of morality, rationality, and modernity as dictated by the “natural rights” liberalism of John Locke and the political economy liberalism of Adam Smith. As Gidwani (2008) notes, both of these theorists “defended the virtues of individual labour, the sanctity of property... and the natural rights of individuals” that “not only established the inseparability (and patriarchy) of freedom and property but also sanctioned how property was to be used” (p. 25). These principles would contribute significantly to colonial governmentality where colonial societies were positioned as
labour- and export-oriented so that land would not lay idle, but be improved upon and help progress colonized nations and peoples towards modernity.

The “rational” use of land in the colonies required intervention and the implementation of “modern” technology. Drawing on Heidegger, Prakash (1999) argues that the essence of modern technology utilized in the colony was not technology itself, but rather a form of revealing that occurs as technology “sets upon” nature to yield energy, and to render colonial economies as standing reserves for colonial empires. In the colonial context “technology not only encloses nature but also gathers human beings in the ordering and challenging of all beings as resources...[it] renders all natural, human, and technical forces into resources always available and completely manipulable” (Prakash, 1999, p. 159). In the nineteenth century British India of which Prakash (1999) writes, and indeed in most European colonies, this setting upon nature occurred at the level of the state that oversaw the establishment of modern networks of irrigation, railways, telegraphs, mines, and manufacturing (Prakash, 1999). These sectors were all mobilized to solidify governance by rendering colonies more manageable, knowable, and profitable to colonial powers.

The “setting upon nature” of technology not only involved industrial advancements, but also the expansion of science and technology into the realm of the social. Technology, through measures such as statistics, became a means of racialized and spatialized (in terms of “knowing” the colony and its boundaries) knowledge production. Management of the social is executed through the power of government – what Foucault terms governmentality. Although Foucault’s work has been criticized by postcolonial scholars for his neglect of imperial conditions and relations between colonizer and colonized (Gidwani,
2008), his theoretical constructs remain prevalent in the field. For Foucault, power operates at both an individual and societal level (what he termed biopower) to control and shape members of a society through the art of government. Foucault argues that government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.” (Foucault, 1977b, p. 100). Central to governmentality is the integration of the economy into political practice, and the derivation of knowledge from technologies – statistics such as the ratio of birth to death, and reproduction rates, for example (Foucault, 2003). In the colonial context, governmentality not only defined and produced knowledge of the global South within a lens of modernity, but also systematically reaffirmed such narratives through paternalistic and exploitative policies. Governmental power in the colony was thus concerned with disabling non-modern forms of life to make way for modern implementations (Gidwani, 2008, p. 8).

The ideas of modernity and governance, encapsulated within liberalism (i.e., rationality, productive labour, free thought), also sowed the seeds for the shift to anti-colonial nationalism and development. Gidwani (2008) writes, “it is under the lengthening shadow of development, that liberalism oversees the birth of a new modality of power in the colonies, government” (p. 13). Gidwani (2008) argues that the defining problematic of colonialism – that which colonialism cannot think without – is within the contradiction between commitment to the rights of the individual, and the realities of authoritarianism. It is the modernist ideal of liberalism that justified colonialism and later nationalism and development through modernist tropes of progress (Gidwani, 2008, p. 12).
In many colonial nations, the problematic of liberalism was paradoxical. On the one hand the contradiction between human rights and colonial rule presented a strong argument for nationalist independence, on the other, modernist and development discourses were (and in many ways remain) ingrained in colonial societies that the capture of state power was equated with the achievement of nationhood (Prakash, 1999). In colonial India, for example, the escalation of political demands through criticism of the economy resulted in rescripting the rationality of alien rule (the modern state) as the logic of the nation (Prakash, 1999). Thus, as Prakash argues, “the governmentalization of the colonial state set the background for the cultural imagination of the modern nations,” defining the nation within the realm of production, trade, and industry (p.179). This contradiction is central to postcolonial perspectives: modernity, via colonialism and development, constructs a grid of intelligibility regarding the global South, its peoples, and its position within the global economy and social hierarchy. Through nationalism, the hegemony of these discursive and geo-political constructions become visible. Nationalism, with its colonial roots, requires the expulsion of the colonizer, yet, the discourse of poverty and development requires the incorporation of the global North through the development apparatus and international trade.

Postcolonial studies have also spurred the more interdisciplinary work of subaltern studies, which emerged from an intervention in South Asian historiography of the 1970s, and the Indian independence movement (Prakash, 1994). The term “subaltern” draws upon Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony and subordination in terms of class, caste, gender, race, language, and culture (Prakash, 1994). Subaltern studies seek to recover the lives of people excluded in Eurocentric narratives by calling into question the narratives.
themselves, their sources, theoretical frameworks, and the positional subjectivity of historians. These histories are recovered through a history of the present approach that challenges the essentialism of Europe’s progress towards development through capitalist growth, industrialization, and privatization that mark Europe’s modernity in contrast to the failed development of Africa, Asia or in South America (Dean, 1994; Cooper, 1994). The recovery of the subaltern is undertaken through a genealogical approach in which subjectivities are located as the product of power relations in history and discourse.

Drawing on Foucault, Ranajit Guha (1982) distinguishes between three types of discourses that construct a grid of intelligibility regarding subjectivities in the global North and South: the immediate accounts produced by officials (primary discourse) that are later processed in another time and narrative by colonial official reports and memoirs (secondary discourse), which in turn is incorporated and redistributed by historians removed from the event (tertiary discourse). Discourse is also central to subaltern studies as scholars critique this form of hegemonic narrative of history to “locate the subaltern’s radical heterogeneity in discourses, woven into the fabric of dominant structures and manifesting itself in the very operation of power” (Prakash, 1994, p. 1482).

Thus, postcolonial and subaltern positions critique notions of “achieving” modernity as a teleological stage through which all nations pass. Postcolonial scholars point to how colonialism, development, and nationalism are entrenched in discursive constructions of modernity that leave people – the intersections of class, gender, race, and nationality – out of development theory and practice (Gidwani, 2008). Critiques of modernity from this position center on how discourse operates as a force of normalization and homogenization, and how teleological constructs of personal/national progress have both material and
symbolic consequences. Modernity is not a stage in history, but rather a staging that is product of colonial underdevelopment.

In prioritizing multiple, competing truths and lived experience, both post-structuralist and post-colonial schools of thought have spurred a movement towards alternative modernities. Alternative modernities present an opportunity to explain global relations outside of the hegemony of teleology and global North-South relations. Some post-colonial theorists, including Dirlik (2007) and Prakash (1999), argue that the idea of a colonial modernity overcomes the binary of the modern and the traditional that distinguishes between the global North and its periphery. Colonial modernity emphasizes the interrelatedness of the colonial and the modern by affirming the contemporaneity and inextricability of the two concepts. In this way, the colonized, rather than being left out of history, or subsumed by the singular history of capitalism, acquire agency through a colonial modernity that identifies the modern in the colonial and the colonial in the modern. Colonial modernity is thus marked “not by inequalities in power structurally but also by inequalities in the “hybridization” of those who inhabited the contact zones of [colonialism]” (Dirlik, 2007, p. 115). In other words, colonial modernity accounts for the uneven effects of modernity as well as the persistence of colonial spaces in the post-colonial. Dirlik (2007) stresses that global capitalism and production are key to this process: Through forces of globalization, producer and consumer classes have been deterritorialized resulting in an “economic colonization” that moves the uneveness and inequality of colonialism from the nation-state to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a global elite (p. 118).
A weakness with colonial modernity is that in attempting to deconstruct the teleology and hegemony of modernity, the concept may entrench and reify that which it attempts to challenge (Mitchell, 2000). For Cooper (2005), the idea of colonial modernity does not afford agency to marginalized populations, but rather represents the globalization of colonial governmentality. Cooper (2005) argues that such formulations mistake colonial modernity for the perpetuation of colonialism in the “modern” era. My own inclination is to favour Dirlik’s conception of global modernity to colonial modernity. Dirlik (2007) argues that the concept of global modernity is intended to capture the present reality that is “not merely a more developed version of the past but breaks with it in the proliferation of claims on modernity” (p.89). While colonialism is certainly a part of, and informed by modernity, the concept of global modernity attempts to move away from conceptions of the modern based in European and North American histories. In this view, the struggle against colonization has been replaced by conflicts over modernity. Dirlik (2007) argues that the irony of claims to difference in modernity theory, or even in colonial modernity, is that they “presuppose a commonality where assumptions of progress and development are concerned with a fetishization of development for which the sole model is capitalist development” (p.91).

While I side with Dirlik’s assertion that colonial modernity may homogenize colonial encounters and reaffirm the hegemonic position of the global North in relation to the global South, it is unclear how far the idea of a global modernity can go in disrupting these claims. As Cooper (2005) argues, it is not clear why these alternative modernities should be called modernity at all. If modernity is the history of colonialism and development, the interactions between the global North and global South, and a description of cultural and
capital flows, then it has little analytical purchase in its subsumption of all. Thus, rather than develop a more detailed or encompassing alternative modernity, it is useful to consider alternatives to modernity. As Cooper (2005) argues, “shoehorning a political discourse into modernity, antimodern, or postmodern discourses, or into ‘their’ modernity or ‘ours’ is more distorting than revealing” (p.115). Such a critique removes modernity from its “intellectual pedestal” to reassert a focus on the highly contextual nature of histories and their manifestations in the present.

**Beyond Modernity: Towards a synthesized analytical framework**

My goal in this dissertation is not simply to delineate how sport for development is tied to discourses of modernity, but rather to politicize and historicize Sport for Development and Peace. To do so, it is necessary to challenge the intransigence of the modernist undergirding of SDP in two ways: by exposing the teleological roots of development; and by highlighting the effects of modernist discourses on how we think about and “do” development. In moving towards a synthesized theoretical framework, this chapter has drawn from Marxist, postcolonial, and post-structural theories. In order to address more directly how these three positions work together, it is useful to consider the work of Arjun Appadurai who himself draws on Marxist, postcolonial, and post-structuralist theories. In his oft-referenced essay “Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy” Appadurai (1996) suggests disposing of meta-theories of modernity and globalization, and thinking instead in terms of “overlapping, disjunctive landscapes whose center and perspective shift according to the different kinds of cultural, financial, and political forces one considers” (cited in Mitchell, 2000, p. 7). Appadurai (1996), drawing on Jean Baudrillard (1994) and Benedict Anderson (1991), argues that we live in an era of
imagined communities that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe. Within these imagined communities money, commerce, and migration have created durable international bonds that have set the basis for globalized relations. Power, rather than located with an elite, is diffuse, decentralized and contextual.

Thus, rather than subscribe to a meta-theory of development or modernity that conceptualizes power working in one particular and fundamental way, I seek to draw upon a theoretical and analytical toolkit in the tradition of post-structuralism that borrows from Marxist and post-colonial theory. Given the complexities of the ongoing history of international development, and the historical nature of this project, it is vital to be able to draw upon a range of theoretical constructs so as to illuminate the political economic, postcolonial, and racialized underpinnings of the SDP paradigm. Post-structuralism is an effective framework to consolidate this theoretical toolkit, for its ability to navigate some of the tensions between these theoretical approaches. For instance, although Marxist theory is often labeled as reductionist, particularly for its privileging of a stable and monolithic class ideology, Stuart Hall argues that the post-structural “interruption” in cultural theories of ideology offers important insight into the salience of discourse as a medium of social power (Hall, 1992; Stoddart, 2007). Thus rather than seeing power as possessive, as purely a tool of domination and subordination, or as a means of instilling false consciousness, I take up a Foucauldian understanding of power as a collection of non-centralized and relational forces (Foucault, 1977b; Ramazanoglu, 1993), as a means to grasp how language does not merely reflect social experiences, but constitutes social subjects and the realms in which they exist (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p. 474).
In the post-structural interruptions that Hall describes, a discursive understanding of power offers a bridge to, rather than break from, Marx’s conceptualizations of domination and control. Indeed, a distinctive feature of “post-Marxism” is a displacement of the concept of ideology by that of discourse, not in such a way that removes the focus on class relations, but rather in a manner that complicates charges of reductionism and economism (Purvis & Hunt, 1993). In his canonical work Marxism without Guarantees, Stuart Hall (1996) seeks to mitigate the tensions between Marxist and post-structural analysis through the concept of “articulation.” By articulation Hall is referring to the “processes of connecting disparate elements in a temporary unity under certain conditions, texts, policies, practices and the like: It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, or absolute and essential for all times; rather it is a linkage whose connections of existence or emergences need to be located in the contingencies of circumstance” (du Gay et al., 1997, p. 3). In seeking to account for how certain ideas take hold in popular consciousness and come to dominant social thinking, Hall foregrounds the multiplicity and contextuality of truth claims. Through discourse, Hall argues, people form mental frameworks (or ideologies in Marx’s terminology) that shape the languages, concepts, categories, and systems of representation which different classes and social groups “deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall, 1996, p. 29). Thus discourse plays an important role in stabilizing forms of power and domination that reconcile people to their social group and/or class.

A post-structuralist approach to theory is also useful in navigating how power structures are maintained. Post-Marxist scholars like Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe (1985) echo Antonio Gramsci in arguing that ideological power does not work as a
monolithic system, but rather through hegemony that solidifies the discursive connections
of subject positions within the social realm. Gramsci uses the concept of hegemony to
illustrate how the state and civil society produce and maintain consent to the class
hierarchies of capitalist societies (Stoddart, 2007, p. 193; see also Hall, 1992, 1996).
“Whereas ideology connotes closure and a unidirectional flow of power,” writes Mark
Stoddard (2007), “hegemony emphasizes the inherent conflict involved in constructing
networks of power through knowledge” (p. 193). In locating the operation of power within
the cultural realm of society, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony shares a kinship with
Foucault’s understanding of power as both are rooted in the distinction between coercion
and consent. Whereas coercion works through the capacity for violence, hegemonic power
works to convince individuals and social classes to subscribe to social values and norms
(Stoddart, 2007) – it operates through voluntarism and participation, so that, in Foucault’s
parlance, people will “do as they aught.”

The concept of hegemony is a useful concept for this project as it offers more
analytical purchase to understand “dominant” discourse. Hegemony appears as the
“common sense” notions that guide everyday understandings of the world: “It is a view of
the world that is ‘inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed’ and which tends to
reproduce a sort of social homeostasis, or ‘moral and political passivity’” (Gramsci, 1971, p.
333 cited in Stoddart, 2007, p. 201). Hegemonic power is produced and reproduced through
ongoing social action, always historically contingent and unfinished and as such, is never a
unified monolithic system of control.

The historically contested nature of hegemony, in conjunction with its focus on
discursive forms of power and control, also offer an important bridge into post-colonial
theories. Postcolonial scholars, including Frantz Fanon, took up similar themes to Gramsci’s, focusing on how colonial power is maintained across time and space. From a postcolonial perspective, the ongoing struggle over colonialism is not just a struggle over forms of economic or political domination, but also over a cultural hegemony. Struggle is not simply class-based, but occurs in the socio-cultural sphere (for example, through the media, schools, family, and sport) to produce colonial and development subjects and subjectivities.

In the forthcoming chapters I seek to merge the strengths of post-structural, Marxist, and postcolonial positions to form a synthesized theoretical framework for this dissertation. Each of these perspectives deconstructs the seemingly ineffable teleology of modernity, to show its discursive and ideological underpinnings. From a Marxist perspective, modernity is the manifestation of a dual character: capitalism must have an “Other” outside itself to reinvest surplus value. Often this dialectic manifests through exploitative accumulation by dispossession where war, colonialism, development, and other measures have contributed to the massive social inequality. Postcolonial critiques point to the struggles between the global North and global South that do not manifest solely in the economy, but have tangible effects on the lives of peoples in these locations. As such, it is imperative to conceptualize and centralize histories outside of the teleology of capitalism. Post-structuralist critiques seek to further deconstruct the teleology and hierarchical nature of modernity to disrupt its discursive effects within, and outside of, colonialism and development. With these facets forming the basis of an analytical framework, it is possible to move beyond the hegemony of modernity by prioritizing the
discursive manifestations of global power dynamics so as to challenge “common sense” understandings of sport in the development context.
Chapter 4 – The Ball, the Bullet and the Bible: Historicizing Sport in Colonialism and Development

Winds of the World, give answer! They are whimpering to and fro –
And what should they know of England who only England know? –
The poor little street-bred people that vapour and fume and brag,
They are lifting their heads in the stillness to yelp at the English Flag!

- *The English Flag*, Rudyard Kipling, 1891

What do they know of cricket who only cricket know?

- *Beyond a Boundary*, C.L.R. James, 1969

In the opening stanza to *The English Flag*, written shortly after he returned from India in 1891, Rudyard Kipling lamented the downfall of the British Empire, particularly in the hearts and minds of the people of England. An effort to stir nationalist sentiments and harkening to a time of England’s eminent international standing, Kipling’s imperialist nostalgia casts contempt upon the nation’s complacency and neglect of the armed forces and the resultant demise of the Empire (Dobree, 1967). The poem pleaded for “street-people of England to remember that their great empire had been won at a price” and called upon the English to “go forth and do their bit” so as to secure the continued expansion of British imperialism (Allen, 2007, p. 317).

Born in the Bombay Presidency of British India in 1865, Kipling – best known for *The Jungle Book, Kim*, and many short stories – was amongst the foremost writers of his time. His 1907 Nobel Prize for literature speaks to his popularity and influence. In the period since his death, however, Kipling and his work have come to be seen as testaments to unabashed British imperialism and colonial ideology. In an essay first published in *Horizon*, George Orwell (1942) describes Kipling as a prophet of colonialism depicting him as a “jingo imperialist,” “morally insensitive,” and “aesthetically disgusting.” Similarly, in
Culture and Imperialism Edward Said make clear his contempt for Kim, for Kipling’s depiction of colonialism in India as inevitable, necessary, and just. Of the novel, Said (1993, p. 145-146) writes:

The conflict between Kim’s colonial service and loyalty to his Indian companions is unresolved not because Kipling could not face it, but because for Kipling there is no conflict... There might have been conflict had Kipling considered India as unhappily subservient to imperialism, we can have no doubt, but he did not: for him it was India’s best destiny to be ruled by England. By an equal and opposite reductiveness, if one reads Kipling not simply as an “imperialist minister” (which he was not) but as someone who read Frantz Fanon, met Gandhi, absorbed their lessons, and remained stubbornly unconvinced by them, one seriously distorts his context, which he refines, elaborates, and illuminates.

For Kipling then, in spite of his familiarity with the work of anti-colonialist figures, there were no alternatives to a British imperialist worldview: Indian resistance to British rule is reduced to madness, to the irrational in the face of the rational British Empire. Kipling’s work thus not only reflects British colonial ideology of the time, but actively produces it, or, in the instance of The English Flag, attempts to recapture it.

If Kipling’s work represents the height of British imperial sentiment, C.L.R. James’ Beyond a Boundary carries equal counterweight as a work of anti-colonialism. Whereas Kipling’s cry of “what should they know of England who only England know!” tries to rally sentiment of what was – an imperialist nostalgia for the British Empire – James’ call of “what do they know of cricket who only cricket know?” offers a way forward, a way of appropriating the tools of imperialism. Beyond a Boundary, a canonical postcolonial text, and one of the first in the sociology of sport, explores colonial and anti-colonial tensions as manifest through cricket. For centuries, sport has played a central part in propagating British culture and legitimizing British power throughout the Empire. Sports such as cricket have operated as vessels of Britishness by fostering notions of “civility” in “native”
populations, and concomitantly by maintaining the spirit, loyalty, and values of soldiers and missionaries in the colonies (Maclean, 2010). As Richard Giulianotti and Gary Armstrong (2011) note, sport is intimately tied to empire building: “the British Empire was in part an enormous sports complex, driven institutionally by the military and the church; thus, ‘sport travelled the world with the bullet and the bible’” (p. 382). Cricket bore out many of the racialized and classed antagonisms of the colonies, where British values were introduced, developed, and embodied, yet also resisted and rejected. “The field of competitive sport,” Ben Carrington (2013) writes of Beyond a Boundary, “became a modality for promoting West Indian self-hood, black pride, and ultimately national independence” (p. 381). Colonial resistance was manifest on the cricket pitch, where beating the colonizers at their own game had profound implications for the political environment in the Caribbean. As an autobiography of sorts, Beyond a Boundary thus connects the personal to the political, demonstrating the dualism of James’ experience with British cultural imperialism while sowing the seeds of resistance in and through sport.

It is difficult to overstate the significance of Beyond a Boundary as a representation of the politics and history of West Indies cricket and colonialism from an anti-colonial perspective. The book challenges teleological and modernist tropes of colonialism and development and, as such, plays a central role in this chapter. Although there is a rich and diverse body of literature under the banner of sport history, this work often finds itself on the margins of the larger cannon of historical work, particularly that related to the colonial context. Herein lies a significant contribution of CLR James in navigating two pitfalls related to histories of sport and histories of colonialism: First, sport and physical culture are often overlooked in historical accounts, cast to a corner of insignificance and often left
unrecorded; Second, James’s position as a colonial subject allows for insights into the thoughts, feelings, and epistemologies from a perspective other than that of the colonizer – a perspective all too often silenced (Maclean, 2010).

In this chapter I seek to explore how the history of sport in shaping good muscular men in the colonial context informs the contemporary biopolitical apparatuses of power within the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm. In other words, using a conceptual framework of the history of the present, I seek to explore how sport’s imperial history informs the contemporary sport for development paradigm, without delineating a linear history nor reifying neat, epistemic ruptures between colonialism, postcolonialism and development. While there exists a rich body of work on sport and imperialism (see Galily & Sheard, 2002; Hirko, 2008; Houlihan, 1994; Klein, 1991; Stoddard, 2006 for examples) at times this literature is divorced from postcolonial politics and thus allows a casual slippage into cultural homogenization that obfuscates agency in the face of a monolithic and indomitable cultural imperialism. Through this chapter I seek to challenge such slippages by employing an anti-essentialist approach that disrupts notions of sport as solely a transformative force of humanitarianism and social good as the UN posits. I recognize the difficulty of this task, particularly as this chapter proceeds in recounting a history from antiquity to the contemporary moment; yet, I find John Kelly’s (2006) work on decolonization helpful in navigating this course. In examining the history of muscular Christianity – personified in good social standing, gentlemanliness, and Christian chivalry – Kelly argues that origins are not essences and essences are not origins. Indeed, my work here adds to the genealogy of SDP not by uncovering the origin or essence of the movement within ideologies and histories of modernity and liberalism, but rather by exploring how
the body in SDP is shaped by apparatuses of power that reflect and reproduce a governmental rationality: “By examining muscular Christianity and its legacies” writes Kelly (2006), “…we can add to the genealogy of contemporary politics in surprising ways, and unsettle our sense of contemporary institutions” (p. 823), institutions that include the United Nations, as I ultimately endeavour to show.

My aims in this chapter are thus threefold. First, to complicate the Eurocentric history under which the SDP paradigm operates, I explore the use of sport as a means of imperialism in shaping and moulding the body within a British, Victorian ethic. Second, to elucidate the ways in which sport has long shaped the body to meet the ends of dominant political and ideological regimes, I place the history of sport and imperialism in conversation with post-colonial studies and anti-colonial resistance through the work of C.L.R. James. Third, to challenge the teleology of development, I trouble normative understandings of development, freedom, and sovereignty so as to make visible the role of the UN in promoting nationalism in the “first decade” of development. Ultimately I wish to ask why it matters that the history of sport as a tool of imperialism has been lost in sport for development history and how this erasure informs the present through contemporary efforts to shape the bodies within development mentalities.

**Sport and colonialism: Muscular Christianity and the shaping of healthy bodies and “healthy” Empires**

The SDP paradigm presents the transformative power of sport as a novel contribution to development; yet the notion that sport can produce healthy, “disciplined”, and economically productive citizens is longstanding. For centuries various forms of physical education has been a means to shape and mould the body to political and
ideological contexts both physically and symbolically. In antiquity, eminent scholars reflected on the capacity of sport to produce “good men”: in Plato’s Republic, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the importance of gymnastic training for guardians of the city, and compare the similarities between an athlete and a soldier; in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses sport as an avenue for people to ensure self-worth in the absence of war, writing, “a courageous action in war is pleasant, it is concealed in the same way that the pleasure of honour and victory felt by a boxer endures to obtain that honour” (cited in Giulanotti and Armstrong, 2011, p. 380). The casual parallels drawn here between athlete and soldier, between sport and war, are not unique to the philosophers of antiquity. In the Roman Empire, for instance, the muscular mesomorphic male body of gods, soldiers and athletes signified the strength of the Empire (Park, 2007a,b).

Enlightenment sensibilities of eighteenth century Europe brought about a new vision of corporeality that disrupted the status of the muscular athlete/soldier, privileging brain over brawn, manifest in the gendered “rational man” and “man of feeling” who embodied Enlightenment values of free-thought and reason (Park, 2007a; Schiebinger, 1989). Though this thinking man temporarily disrupted the narrative of muscular men of good standing, rising global geopolitical tensions of the nineteenth century engendered fears that an intellectual and feminized manhood had compromised the strength and vitality of nation-states, particularly, as we have seen, within Kipling’s Great Britain. A crisis of masculinity, an oft-repeated trope, catalyzed the return of an idealized masculinity that drew upon emergent interests in physiology, psychology, and medical ideals that merged within athletics to produce rational and muscular men. As Roberta Park (2007a), drawing on Michele Cohen (1996) writes, the “ideal of manliness, which emphasized politeness,
conversation and a proper outward demeanour in the company of women,” cultivated in Enlightenment thought, “was being eclipsed by a masculine ideal of martial and chivalrous virtues that was emerging in English public schools” (p. 1604). That this new masculinity was developing in the public school system of the British Empire is significant, and indelibly connected to what Bruce Haley (1968) has called the “meteoric rise of athleticism” through British school system during the mid-nineteenth century. The virtues of good physical standing, a respect for authority, and civility instilled through physical education would reinvigorate and strengthen the nation and the empire.

The rise of athleticism and physical education was not only significant for fostering a new found physicality, but also for its envelopment within new scientific interests in health and the body. In Great Britain sport was thought to offer important insights into the health of a whole person, both body and mind (Park, 2007a). In his work on the body and Victorian culture, Bruce Haley (1978) argues that above religion or politics, health came to embody the Victorian ideal, articulated through the modernist notion that men (and occasionally women) had the capacity to improve themselves physically and mentally. Haley (1978) writes, “to a nation preoccupied with health, the athlete was the new hero and the human form divine” (p. 207-208). Similar ideals regarding health and the sciences were also flourishing in North America (Park, 2007a). Underpinned by panics that the “wasted body” would destroy the fabric of middle-class America, the athlete would come to embody new ideals of achievement and success. As Park (2007b, p. 1562) argues,

The athlete’s body also united all that modern biology had separated into systems, tissues, cells and the like. His achievements – over himself and over an opponent – were demonstrable proof that man was not unduly fragile and that the social order would not necessarily come apart. Through their own actions such men could make an impression on the world and, perhaps, even control parts of it. Such were the new men of character!
The quest for knowledge of the body – imbued with empiricist and modernist rationalities – extended beyond the health of the individual to the health of the nation *writ large*. In this way sport operated as a biopolitical apparatus, enacting a normalizing and regulatory force on the individual and population, so as to conform the actions of both to dominant ways of knowing (Foucault, 2003).

Heavily influenced by the emergence of evolutionary biology as a field of study after the publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, health and healthy bodies became a focus of sanitary reform and public health endeavours in the late nineteenth century (Park, 1990). Evolutionary biology allowed for casual linkages to a variety of social theories. Most notable amongst these theories was social Darwinism which – in conjunction with changing demographics in both Britain and North America and the growth in institutions of higher learning – spurred ideas of Anglo-Saxon superiority and concerns about matters of evolution and racial decline (Parks, 1990).

If the biological health and racial purity of the nation were called into question, sport and athletics were seen as the solutions. Competitive athletics rapidly expanded around the turn of the nineteenth century as “physical training” drew the attention not only of scientists, but anthropologists, educators, physicians and social reformers concerned with the state of social order (Park, 1989; 1990). In 1890, physician and third-generation missionary, Luther Halsey Gulick declared physical education to be a new profession of profound importance, arguing that “few scientific fields [offer] opportunities for the study of problems of greater value to the human race” (Park, 1989, p. 2, emphasis added). Similarly, in writing of the American Association for the Advancement of Physical Education, founded in 1885, Abel Livermore argued that the “strength and prosperity of
every nation lies primarily in its physical stamina”, and therefore that Americans must “learn to practice the laws and rules of Life, Health, Development, and Longevity” (cited in Park, 1995, p. 275). Later, in addressing the Boston Society for Medical Improvement in 1894, Dr. W.M. Conant, instructor in anatomy at Harvard Medical School, argued that sports – particularly gymnastics, baseball, football, rowing, tennis, track, and cricket – were effective means of promoting two central aspects of health and proper habits of action: proper hygiene (i.e., bodily health) and proper education (i.e., character building). Likeminded ideas were reflected in Charles William Elliot’s annual Harvard President’s report in 1893, declaring his belief that American intercollegiate athletics was key to the physical and moral development of young men, and in Yale football coach Walter Camp’s assertion that sports develop “strength, swiftness, courage, steadiness of nerve...resourcefulness, self-knowledge, self-reliance...the ability to work with others...[and] readiness to subordinate selfish impulses, personal desires, and individual credit to a common end” (cited in Park, 2007b, p. 1640).

These values promoted through sport in the United States articulate with those promoted in the British public school system, which sought to develop boys who would “become both proper Christian gentlemen and future custodians of empire” (Park, 2007b, p. 1640). Thus in the minds of the medical and educational establishment, sport emerged as a means to foster personal health and physiology: notions that were readily extended beyond the individual to the betterment of the social, psychological and moral development of the nation (Park, 1989; 1995). Indeed, it was a short step from physical education as pedagogy for new knowledge about the body, to sport as the training ground for a muscular manhood befitting the Empire.
**Sport and imperialism in the empire.** On both sides of the Atlantic, physical education was seen as an avenue for two goals central to the empire: the training of good Victorian soldiers and a means to instil enlightened cultural values within the nation and abroad (Park, 2007b). As I have shown, sport was valued for developing fitness and character, its ability to develop physical and moral courage, manhood, discipline and the power of will is what made it an apt tool for the training of soldiers. Throughout the nineteenth century, physical education transformed colleges “into theaters of organized physical combat” (Park, 2007b, p. 1641). In the wake of the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Civil War in the United States (1861-1865), physical education and sport came to define through men of action (Park, 2007b). A sporting “cult of manliness” that combined physical courage, strength, endurance, sportsmanship and patriotism became a pervasive feature of middle class British and American society that would prove useful in empire building (see for example Allen, 2011; Mangan & Walvin, 1987; McDevitt, 2004; Park 2007b).

The new codes of imperial manliness developed in public schools, were expanded in romanticized visions of the soldier, the hunter, the pioneer, and the athlete in the colonial frontier (D. Allen, 2011; O’Hanlon, 1999). In the United States, for example, shortly independence in 1776, trappers and traders ventured further into what was once Indigenous land as part of the colonial expansion of the nation. For the combined purpose of economic activity and recreational hunting, these settlers decimated the bison population: The result was devastating to the nomadic Plains Indians, further contributing to the genocide perpetrated against them (Gems, 2006). Hunting for sport was not the only means by which colonizers staked their claim over indigenous lands and populations. When American missionaries arrived in Hawai’i in 1820, native customs were seen as inhibiting
to social and industrial advancement. In response, missionaries banned gambling and popular Hawaiian sports such as surfing, boxing, canoe racing, and the “erotic” hula dances, and introduced residential boarding schools to indoctrinate local children with Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture, including the sport of baseball – a tactic that was also replicated with indigenous populations on the mainland. By 1890 colonialists had appropriated 75 percent of the island, converting its land to plantations, and used baseball as a form of social control for the workforce (Gems, 2006).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the continued growth of the British Empire brought with it an expansion of the British missionary movement. Indeed, historians have argued that the nineteenth century was a period in world history characterized by European imperialism, where superior maritime, military, and industrial technology enabled Europe to impose itself on much of the world (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006; Mangan, 2006; Neill & Chadwick, 1986). During the same era, middle class Victorian advocates of Muscular Christianity and the “rational recreation” movement in Britain began to “export” values of rationality, industry, respectability and meritocracy through sport (Donnelly, 2011). Sport was seen as an effective avenue of social control, particularly in quelling popular recreational activities such as drinking, gambling and “rough pursuits,” at home and abroad (Donnelly, 2011, p. 66). As John Nauright (1997) argues, in the British Empire at large, sport played a key role in both warfare and empire building. Hunting, horse racing and cricket were all part of the colonial bourgeois backdrop (Nauright, 1997) where the ideals of being a “good sport” and showing “good form” were “instilled through games as boys and came to be seen as required for all phases of life from warfare to gambling to cricket to parliamentary politics” (Allen, 2011, p. 76).
That colonial expansion and missionary fervour emerged in concert was no coincidence: The qualities of what Mangan (2006) calls “missionary muscularity,” – Victorian ideals personified in good social standing, gentlemanliness, and Christian chivalry – drew upper-class members of society into missionary work, and provided a justification for the broadening of empire. As Patrick Scott (1970) contends, these men were “a striking testimony to the power of the uplifted Christ to draw to himself, not the weak, the emotional, the illiterate only, but all that is noblest in strength and finest in culture,” (p. 139) whose “hold on the religious public came essentially from their gentlemanly sporting credentials” (p. 134). Near the end of the century, more than 10,000 missionaries had been sent overseas at the cost of two million pounds annually, a sum equal to the entire annual cost of British civil service salaries. Empire and Christian mission had become “inextricably linked” (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006, p. 1258).

This link between mission and empire was articulated in parliamentary debates on imperial ambition. In his work on middle-classness, colonialism and sport, John Hughson (2009) outlines how in 1886, future British Prime Minister Archibald Primrose joined the Liberal Party debate on the matter of imperial expansion, arguing against “wild, hot imperialism” in favour of “sane imperialism” that could be morally defensible in maintaining the Empire through a larger patriotism and civilizing missions. In contrast to France and Germany, which tended to directly impose customs and values upon their territories, Britain relied on the “velvet glove” of cultural imperialism (Hughson, 2009).³

³ Similar debates took place in U.S. congress and amongst the general populous. Anti-imperialists saw colonialism as an affront to the democratic and egalitarian principles upon which the nation was founded. President McKinley, however, aligned with the alternative, siding with Indiana Congressman Albert Beveridge, who argued: “We will not repudiate our duty in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustees under God of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not howling out regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens, but with gratitude for a task worthy of our
While religion played a central role in this approach, sport was thought to bind the empire together by creating a cultural bond between colonizing and colonized peoples. Cricket came to play a particularly significant role in this regard, symbolizing the essence of patriarchal Victorian society within Britain and its colonies (D. Allen, 2011; Hughson, 2009) and epitomizing a “set of consolidatory moral imperatives that both exemplified and explained imperial ambition and achievement” (Mangan, 1992, p. 2). As scholars such as Dean Allen (2011), and Brian Stoddart and Keith Sandiford (1998) note, its difficult to overestimate the importance of cricket in Victorian life: it symbolized English nationalism and cultural superiority in the civilizing missions of England abroad. Exporting cricket across the world, from India to South Africa, had transformed the sport from a “simple, pastoral game into a powerful and symbolic force representing all that was deemed by the ruling classes to be worthy in the Anglo-Saxon male” (Allen, 2011, p. 63). In these colonies, missionary teachers held a common belief in sport as a technology of power to meet imperial and moral persuasions, shaping and conforming colonial subjects in a Victorian mould. Yet, as J. A. Mangan and Kausik Bandyopadhyay (2004) note, to suggest that sport was administered as an explicit tool of imperialism is reductionist – rather, the more implicit ideological constructs of the “social good” of sport was a key driving force. In other words, European missionaries, military men and civil administrators did not propagate modern sports simply as a convenient form of social control: Rather other motives such as “the desire to improve the health, to encourage the fortitude and to diminish the religious animosities of the native population” (Mangan & Bandyopadhyay, 2004, p. 406) were at play, a fact that demonstrates the intransigent belief in the “power of sport”. In this way

strength, and thanksgiving to Almighty God that he has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world” (Gems, 2006, p. 6).
sport operated as a means of governmental control. The bodies and behaviours of the colonized were regulated so as to shape the “conduct of the conduct” and engender knowledge about a population that allowed for the identification of sites of intervention, and ultimately the reproduction of docile, productive subjects (Foucault, 2003).

Sport thus became a primary means with which British missionaries and soldiers would impart Victorian values of gentlemanliness and civility not only to expand the reach and influence of the empire, but also to modernize the colonized Other. As Mangan and Bandyopadhyay (2004, p. 407) note,

Soldiers and schoolteachers were the John the Baptists of the faith of football and the hundred other recreational devices of the Victorian British: soldiers, school teachers and priests and railway workers and minors and factory managers took them across the world in a few short decades, and when they had finished their work the world would never be the same again.

That sport was thought to improve the health, fortitude, and morality of colonial subjects elucidates modernist tropes in colonial ideology on two fronts: through the framing of the colonizer as possessor of superior knowledge and physical aptitude to bestow upon the colonized, and through the configuration of the “Other” as backward and in need of benevolent intervention of the colonizer.

In their work on European missionaries in colonial outposts, Markku Hokkanen and J. A. Mangan (2006) explore the connections between muscular Christianity and civilizing missions, where sport was used as a means to progress “barbarous” nations and peoples along a teleological path to modernity and civilization. They argue that the second half of the nineteenth century presented a marked shift in the approach from colonizing “Africa” to “regenerating” the civility, commerce, and religiosity of the colonies. On the one hand, this new approached owed a great deal to broader social changes including the anti-slavery
movement and, on the other hand, to the aforementioned impact of Darwinism on natural science, social theory, medicine and theology (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006). Thus, European attitudes towards most non-Europeans were given a new “scientific” basis for old teleological ideals of progression from savagery to civilization (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006, p. 1261).

Religion, or the lack thereof, was understood as the reason for, and solution to, incivility in Africa: the absence of Christianity had forsaken the continent to backwardness, animalism, and immorality. Though racial hierarchies were firmly entrenched, the moral degeneration of the colonies could be salvaged through the intervention of missionaries and the development of Christian morals in both body and mind. Vitality, activity and growth would become the key words of regeneration. Idleness led to a regression of body, mind, and morality, which sport, via a muscular missionary Christianity, was thought able to cure (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006). Religion would develop morality and civility in the mind of the colonial Other, yet to truly regenerate and modernize the colonies required the development of physically healthy, productive, and athletic male bodies. It was common for colonists to exoticize and admire the “athletic frames and well developed muscles [which] tell of great strength” (Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006, p. 1263) of African men, yet to also criticize their coordination, speed or control, connecting these to a perceived backwardness, animalism, and illness that required evangelism to produce healthy bodies (Bale, 2002; Bale & Sang, 1996; Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006). This ideology is evident in Reverend Duff MacDonald’s writing on his time as a missionary to Malawi from 1878 to 1891. In Africana, or the Heart of Heathen Africa, published in 1882, he writes of “Protestant pragmatism and the indigenous response to alien games”: 
In finding suitable amusements for our pupils we had at first considerable difficulty. Owing to the heat of the climate, the native children are not so fond of active games as English children are. After a time they began to enjoy swings and football, but the favourite game was ‘cricket’. We were glad that they showed a special fondness for this game, as it proved a pleasant means of conveying instruction. The calculation of the ‘runs’ gave them exercise in arithmetic (as we threw aside the Yao notation in favour of the English), and when any one was appointed umpire, he learned to form an opinion for himself and abide by it. Some sturdy bowler would often be heard calling out ‘Pray sir!’ He meant ‘Play sir!’ ... The native technical terms used in this game were amusing. A ball rolled along the ground was termed a ‘rat’, while a ball that was overpitched was called a ‘bird’ (chijuni). (Quoted in Hokkanen & Mangan, 2006, p. 1266)

In juxtaposing the rational, knowledgeable, and superior missionary with the ignorant, naive and backward colonial subject, MacDonald’s words provide insight into Victorian colonial ideology. These constructions are evident not only in the positioning of cricket – the ultimate vessel of British culture – as beneficial for instruction on exercise and arithmetic, but also as a means to “develop” the bodies and minds of the children with an implicit focus on obedience to rules and normative standards. Further, in framing Malawi as exotic and desolate in comparison to Britain, and Malawian children as naïve, helpless, lazy unaware of proper terminology, and in need of the intervention of the benevolent missionary to learn how to properly pitch cricket balls, MacDonald extends analogies of proper ways of acting into other facets of life. That Malawians could have their own values, culture, and indeed sports, was a fact either not entertained, or to be overcome and erased through imperialist measures.

Using sport as a means to develop the colonial subject, in both body and mind, was not unique to Malawi or Africa generally, but rather was a common thread throughout the Empire. Echoing the writing of MacDonald, the missionary T.L. Pennel, wrote of the role of sport in challenging indigenous culture by aiding in the transition from the culturally
traditional sports of tent-pegging and wrestling, to the missionary games of cricket and football (Mangan, 2006). In Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier, Pennel writes,

> The old order changes and gives place to the new. The simpler native games are gradually giving place to the superior attractions of cricket and football, and the tournaments – between schools of the provinces are doing much...to develop among these frontier people a fascination for these sports which have done so much to make England what she is. (quoted in Mangan, 2006, p. 783)

Pennel not only conveys the superiority of Western sport and the benefit of Victorian cultural values to the colonies, but also the inevitability of these cultural changes and the role of the colonizer in advancing the teleology of modernity through the natural order of the old giving way to the new.

While cricket functioned as a primary vehicle for British imperialism, it was the quintessential sport of baseball that had the greatest influence for foreign interests in US colonies. American expatriates, teachers, military personnel, and missionaries helped spread baseball throughout Asia, but especially in the Philippines, China and Japan (Gems, 2006). The Philippines was perhaps most impacted by baseball during this era. Like other colonizers, American soldiers seeking to recreate their home conditions imparted their religion and culture by dispensing bibles and baseballs when they arrived in Manila around the turn of the twentieth century. True to passive representations of the colonial other, the commander of U.S. forces in Manila, General Franklin Bell, stated “baseball had done more to civilize Filipinos than anything else” (Gems, 2006, p. 10).

**Beyond imperialism: Post-colonial politics and resistance through sport**

As noted above, in this chapter I challenge essentialist and hegemonic narratives of modernity by placing sport sociology and history in conversation with development and postcolonial studies. From the preceding it is clear that there is a great deal of literature
pertaining to the imperial and colonial history of sport. However, there is comparatively little said about the role of sport as a tool of anti/post-colonial agency. This is partly a product of sport being left on the sidelines of historical work, and partly a reflection of historiographic Eurocentric trappings. Indeed, the focus of much of what is written here is on what sport and physical education has meant for the colonizer and the health of the Empire – the role of sport in engendering masculine muscular missionaries that would expand the Empire territorially and culturally. This type of historical work – including what I have presented here – often marginalizes, speaks for, and constructs a passive other, with little space for agency or resistance.

I began this chapter with two questions – “What should they know of England who only England know?”; “What do they know of cricket who only cricket know?” – so as to complicate the role of sport in perpetuating cultural and physical imperialism on the one hand, while fostering resistance and heterogeneity on the other. Indeed, when approached as an anti-colonial text, Beyond a Boundary demonstrates how imperialist ideologies were instilled in the colonies via the church and the teachings of the Bible, the education system, which focused on the canons of Western civilization such as Shakespeare and classic nineteenth century novels like Vanity Fair; and sport, where the gentlemanly values of Victorian ideology were imparted. James brings new meaning to these tensions throughout Beyond a Boundary, perhaps no more profoundly than in the passage continued from the opening quote of this chapter:

What do they know of cricket who only cricket know? West Indians crowding to tests bring with them the whole past history and future hopes of the islands. English people, for example, have conceptions of themselves breathed from birth. Drake and mighty Nelson, Shakespeare, Waterloo, the Charge of the Light Brigade, the few who did so much for so many, the success of parliamentary democracy, those and such as those constitute a national tradition. Underdeveloped countries have to go back
centuries to rebuild one. We of the West Indies have none at all, none that we know of. To such people the three W’s, Ram and Val wrecking English batting, help to fill a huge gap in their consciousness and in their needs. In one of the sheds on the Port of Spain wharf is a painted sign: 365 Garfield Sobers. If the old Maple-Shannon-Queen’s Park type of rivalry was now insignificant, a nationalist jealousy had taken its place. (James, 1969, p. 233)

Here, James points to the cultural imperialism of British literature, history, and cricket in serving to erase the pre-colonial history of the Caribbean and its people. Yet, paradoxically, these forms of imperialism also made cultural erasures all the more visible, spurring a sense of nationalism within the very grounds of colonial structures, both symbolic and physical, such as the Queen’s Park Oval established in 1896 by the Queen’s Park Cricket Club in what is now Trinidad and Tobago. As James’ biographer Paul Buhle notes, this education, both formal and informal, engendered within James a critical perspective that illuminated the fallacy of Western superiority and colonial inferiority (cited in MacLean, 2010, p. 113).

In this section, I elaborate on the role of sport in de-colonization and anti-colonization, by placing CLR James’ text in conversation with sport history and post-colonial studies. The point here is not to construct what Birla (2002) calls continuous-seeming and continuous-seaming histories – that is, I do not seek to write a foundationalist history that narrates a universal world history of subjects and (post)coloniality through the experience of CLR James. Rather, I seek to challenge the continuity between subjectivity and agency and complicate a linear account of the transition from colonialism to resistance to nationalist independence, by drawing on James to show the heterogeneity and complexity of these endeavours. As Ritu Birla (2002) writes, ”the problematizing of the intending subject informs a critique of history as a discourse of identity production, cultural authenticity, and collective consciousness, that is, a critique of history as transferential
relation to ‘past experience’” (p.177). Ultimately, I follow Gayarti Chakravorty Spivak in attempting to harness an interdisciplinary approach in which literary readings and historical analysis are placed in supplementary relation.

In the construction of the Other of Europe in intellectual thought, Spivak (1988) argues that great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could invest emotion. The clearest example of this form of epistemic violence, Spivak elaborates, is in the project that constitutes the colonial subject as Other, and thus erases a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate. The complexity and heterogeneity of the Foucauldian triumvirate of power, truth, and knowledge are so prevalent that a straightforward narrative is counterproductive – and yet, Spivak argues it is the job of academics to disclose the discourse of the Other. While CLR James’ *Beyond a Boundary* is useful in this regard, the politics of representation need to be addressed. In the post-colonial theatre, Spivak (1988) argues, two senses of representation run together: Representation as “speaking for,” as in politics, and representation as a portrayal or image, as in art or philosophy (p. 70). These two constructions are related but discontinuous – the challenge is to not represent, in the sense of speaking for, the oppressed group, nor to represent a universal experience or consciousness, nor is it to describe the way things really were, or to privilege a narrative form of history of imperialism. Rather, the task is to offer one account of history, a narrative of colonial history and historiography from the perspective of a discontinuous chain of colonial histories, to “traffic in radical practice of differences” (Spivak, 1988, p. 74).

CLR James’s insight into (post)colonial history in the West Indies and the role of cricket is but one example of this type of work. James work highlights how, like bodily
cultural practices in other contexts, cricket was not an unquestioned vessel of imperialism: it was neither an unchallenged means to impose colonial culture, nor solely a site of subaltern cultural resistance (MacLean, 2009). As Malcolm MacLean (2009) argues, cricket is “best read through the lens of great and little traditions: of localized reinscription, innovation, and distinctive, even unique practice within a broader coherent and ontological system” (p. 538). Indeed, James illustrates the tension between his exposure to an alien culture through his education in the British school system on the one hand, and his West Indian identity on the other. This formal education involved not only the study of “high culture”, but also lessons on how to be a subject befitting of the Empire. “I began to study Latin and French, then Greek, and much else,” notes James (1969, p. 24), “But particularly we learnt, I learnt and obeyed and taught as code, the English public-school code. Britain and her colonies and the colonial peoples. What do the British people know of what they have done there? Precious little. The colonial peoples, particularly West Indians, scarcely know themselves as yet. It has taken me a long time to begin to understand” (James, 1969, p. 24). Here, James begins to unpack the epistemologies and ontologies of both the colonizer and the colonized in a context in which local culture was made to be foreign and backwards. British missionaries and teachers, indeed the whole colonial endeavour, comes to know itself in opposition to the Other, and yet Europe as an Other itself is simultaneously constructed – that is to say, cultural imperialism can never be wholly fulfilled.

If formal education in British public schools operated as a disciplinary apparatus in which cultural values and codes of the Empire were instilled, the cricket pitch offered an avenue to shape a concomitant corporeality. Indeed, as noted above, sport was seen as an
effective avenue to shape both the body and mind of the backward Other, instilling Victorian values and bodily practices. James (1969, p. 24) writes,

Before very long I acquired a discipline for which the only name is Puritan. I never cheated, I never appealed for a decision unless I thought the batsman was out, I never argued with the umpire. I never jeered at a defeated opponent, I never had a friend a vote or a place which by any stretch of imagination that could be seen as belonging to an enemy or to a stranger. My defeats and disappointments I took as stoically as I could. If I caught myself complaining or making excuses I pulled up. If afterward I remembered doing it I took an inward decision to try not to do it again. From the eight years of school life this code became the moral framework of my existence. It has never left me, I learnt it as a boy, I have obeyed it as a man and now I can no longer laugh at it.

For James, the values instilled through sport – the ideals of respecting authority, the premise that those in power “know better”, to remain silent and stoic in the face of injustice, perceived or otherwise – are long lasting. Here, cultural imperialism is enacted not only through the teachings of British high culture, but also in its purported replacement of the (low) culture of the colonized, framed as savage, barbarous, emotional in the face of a British stoicism. The conflict between these two selves – between a British and West Indian identity – does not result in the subsumption of one over the other, but rather a dual rejection of the alien colonizer and an ostensibly primitive, ancestral and backward culture of the colonized Other (Chatterjee, 1993). In Beyond a Boundary, James explicates how the culture of the Caribbean was made to seem foreign or alien in comparison to the imposition of an equally alien British culture. The “ancestral” cultures of the colonies were an inhibition to modernity; this backwardness could only be righted through British imperialism.

James writes of the fervour with which he consumed the works of this alien culture, perhaps most ardently in his fascination with William Makepeace Thackeray’s 1847 novel Vanity Fair: A Novel without a Hero, which depicts nineteenth century Britain. James’
infatuation with the book is significant for at least two reasons. First, it reveals a fascination with the everydayness of British culture and life to which, at least to some degree, James and his compatriots were meant to strive: A refuge into which he withdrew, demonstrating both the foreignness of the culture, and the depth to which it struck at his core. Second, although he does not name it as such, Vanity Fair is a satire of British culture in the nineteenth century, depicting the vanity, hypocrisy, and greed of the British Empire and the British East India Company. This is significant in that it points to the second rejection brewing within James himself – a rejection of the imposition of this flawed alien culture. Of this second rejection James (1969, p. 18) writes;

Me and my clippings and magazines on W.G. Grace, Victor Trumper and Ranjitsinjhi, and my Vanity Fair and my puritanical view of the world. I look back at the little eccentric and would like to have listened to him, nod affirmatively and pat him on the shoulder. A British intellectual long before I was ten, already an alien in my own environment among my own people, even my own family. Somehow from around me I had selected and fastened on to the things that made a whole. As will soon appear, to that little boy I owe a debt of gratitude.

The theme of alienation (or the “alien”) emerges here as well. The foreignness James felt in his own environment is demonstrative of the dual, contradictory rejection of both his own culture from a young age, and the emergent rejection of the foreign British culture – a rejection that would manifest as anti-colonial sentiment. Sport, particularly cricket, played a significant role in perpetuating and entrenching British imperialism in the colony. Yet, it was also a significant site for this rejection, for resistance. The flagging of WG Grace, an English cricketer from 1865 to 1908 considered by many to be the greatest cricketer of all time, and Victor Trumper, an Australian cricketer known as the most stylish and versatile batsman in the “Golden Age of cricket,” from 1890 to the outbreak of World War I, demonstrate the penetration and cultural impact of foreign cricket in the West Indies. Yet,
the mention of Ranjitsinhji is perhaps more significant. Ranjitsinhi, born in British India in 1872, rose to prominence in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to be recognized as one of the greatest batsmen of all time, and then went on to play for the English cricket team. Although as a Cambridge educated scholar, and as the ruler of the Nawanagar State, he was representative of the Indian elite, his successes offered insight into colonial resistance. Indeed, sport would come to play a significant role in anti-colonialism, where the tool that once served as a primary vehicle for cultural imperialism and colonial rule, would come to play a significant role in undermining the authority and ostensible supremacy of British imperialism and cultural values.

Here, a postcolonial analysis re-centers the ways in which the colonized or subaltern reacted to, understood, and resisted imperialism (including sport) in both emancipatory and liberatory ways. In the *Location of Culture* Homi Bhabha (1994) argues that in the colonizing process, the colonized are often interpreted as passive or even appreciative for the intervention of the colonizers (as was the case in the history of sport and imperialism highlighted above). The colonizer has often seen the culture of the colonized to be archaic, barbaric, backwards, and unchanging – all of which are barriers to the Enlightenment project of modernity. Such ideological constructs not only justified imperialist intervention but also worked to remove and deny the agency of the colonized. This denial of agency operates upon the assumption that when the colonized Other does (perhaps inevitably) “play the colonial game” – be it in the British school system, or by taking up cricket – it is seen as a placid acceptance of colonial rule (Maclean, 2010). Yet, in centering (post)colonial agency, Bhabha (1994) argues that participation was not a passive acceptance of
colonialism, but rather a type a resistance to colonial rule, through what he terms ironic mimicry and sly civility.

In this regard, understandings of cultural imperialism move beyond the straightforwardness of cultural homogenization or hybridization, to form more complicated political relationships between what are at times seemingly oppositional forces. The idea of parody complicates the colonizer's understanding of what the colonized were doing, and reverses the fascination with the colonized (Bhabha, 1994; MacLean, 2010). Ironic mimesis and sly civility operate in tandem, forming a power dynamic where each sees a distorted version of self and the Other. For the colonizer, the mimetic are seen as “good natives” eager to take up Western culture and submit to the benevolence of their colonial rule. Yet, even these good natives are forever cast to the realm of mimesis, “almost the same, but not quite”, or “almost the same but not white”, always striving, but never quite English (MacLean, 2010, p. 106; Bhabha, 1994). The colonized mimetic is seen as ironic in the eyes of the colonizer, for it is always partial, always a deformed version of the colonizer. On the other side of the colonial coin, Bhabha argues that for the colonized, this isn’t a matter of mimesis, but rather of sly civility: a subtle form of parody rather than an imitation, an intentional distortion of the colonizer’s rules and practices. The effect of sly civility is to subvert and destabilize the power/knowledge relation of colonialism – “alterity under the guise of mimesis” (Maclean, 2010, p. 107).

For James and his peers sport offered a means of challenging, of undoing these imperialist constructions. While his formal education was marked by a Victorian ethic, cricket offered a way of rejection and resistance: a means of propagating Bhabha’s ironic mimicry and sly civility. Throughout Beyond a Boundary, James highlights his successes as a
student in the British education system and mastery of Western canonical texts. By all accounts, he was a well-respected student. Yet, seeds of resistance are also planted throughout the book, as he recounts both submitting and not submitting to the moral Victorian discipline and English temperament to which he was exposed. Another passage points to defiance:

But at the same time, almost entirely by my own efforts, I mastered thoroughly the principles of cricket and of English literature, attained a mastery over my own character which would have done credit to my mother and Aunt Judith if only they could have understood it...I look back at that little boy with amazement, and, as I have said, with a gratitude that grows everyday. But for his unshakeable defiance of the world around him, and his determination to stick to his own ideas, nothing could have saved me from winning a scholarship, becoming an Honourable Member of the Legislative council, and ruining my whole life. (James, 1969, p. 24)

His successes in the British education system, both in mind and body (that is, the mastery of his own character) would likely convince his educators (Oxford and Cambridge men) of his mimicry of British cultural values – a mimetic that could only be partial, for he, like his Mother and Aunt, could never truly embody these ways of knowing. Yet, from a young age, a resistance to these teachings was present within James, culminating in his anti-colonial politic. Cricket, would play a similar role in this regard. Of colonial resistance and cricket, James writes:

But as soon as we stepped on to the cricket or football field, more particularly the cricket field, all was changed...Yet rapidly we learned to obey the umpire's decisions without question, however irrational it was. We learned to play with the team, which meant subordinating your personal inclinations, and even interests, to the good of the whole. We kept a stiff upper lip in that we did not complain about ill-fortune. We did not denounce failures, but 'Well tried' or 'Hard luck' came easily to our lips. We were generous to opponents and congratulated them on victories, even when we knew they did not deserve it. We lived in two worlds. Inside the classrooms the heterogeneous jumble of Trinidad was battered and jostled and shaken down into some sort of order. On the playing field we did what ought to be. (James, 1969, p. 26)
James depiction of his “physical education” on the cricket pitch paints a decidedly more complicated picture with regards to colonial resistance. The game taught him the values of Victorian muscular Christianity (that is, a respect for the rules, authority, your opponent and an overall gentlemanly code of conduct); in these ways, Cricket, the ultimate vessel for British cultural imperialism, can be read as a site of ironic mimicry where the culture and behaviours of the colonizer are contrapuntally irrational. Yet, this passage also highlights the contradictions of colonial life in terms of both race, and the school system, and it echo’s Bhabha’s notion of sly civility, where a pride in the sport, and in the successes of the West Indies, served as a rally point for nationalism.

In the West Indies, cricket carved out a distinct political space for postcolonial cultural nationalism by subverting colonial rule (MacLean, 2009). The politicized nature of cricket intensified in the decolonization era of the latter half of the twentieth century as the successes of West Indian cricketers challenged notions of imperialist supremacy. In this period, the tension between subaltern leaders who sought to increase their influence and power and colonial elites who sought to retain control was born out on the cricket pitch: For decades prior, struggles over colonial and national representations were fought over the exclusion of blacks from West Indies representative teams during English tours, a fight that culminated in the appointment of Frank Worrall as captain of the West Indies team in the 1960s (MacLean, 2009). The success of West Indies’ teams during this era challenged colonial constructions of inferiority within the sport and beyond the boundary of the pitch. Simmering nationalist sentiment on the cricket pitch boiled over into social and political spheres of which labour disturbances and political agitation in Barbados, Trinidad, Saint Lucia, Jamaica are examples (Holden, 2008; MacLean, 2009). The sly civility engendered on
the cricket pitch, thus, not only offers a resistance to colonial rule, but a way of defining an anti-colonial nationalism in juxtaposition to the colonizer.

What I have intended to do in this section is neither to present the origins nor the essences of anti-colonialism, decolonization, or nationalism. Rather I have endeavoured to complicate Eurocentric and homogenizing narratives of sport and (post)colonialism within a broader genealogical framework. This work is also useful in constructing a history of the present, where the legacy of sport in shaping the body in both imperial and anti-colonial endeavours, informs contemporary politics and institutions as they relate to the present moment of sport for development. It is productive here to call attention to John Kelly’s (2006) argument on decolonization as “not primarily an exit from something, exit from the European empire, but also and more importantly as entry into something, entry into a new global system of sovereignty by nation-state, with much more specific institutional delimitation of many things” (p. 827). Indeed these notions of sovereignty inform the history of the present and the “institutional sovereignty” of organizations such as the United Nations that have been formed in the postcolonial era. I am particularly interested in how the nation-state gets established as the authoritative unit of sovereignty for liberal democracy, how sport spurred these nationalist sentiments, and the role that the UN has played in legitimizing sovereignty through the nation state. My aim in the following section is thus to begin to frame the role of the United Nations in this ongoing history of the present and to heed Hayhurst and Darnell’s (2011) call to re-imagine development, and particularly sport for development, as related to an ongoing struggle for decolonization.
Liberation, emancipation, and the trouble with the nation-state

Just as it is reductionist to see sport simply as a force of imperialism, it is equally problematic to hold sport as purely a force of anti-imperialism. While sport has certainly inspired nationalist sentiment, the casual, linear narrative from imperialism to resistance to nationalist sovereignty allows for a conflation between nationalism and sovereignty. Indeed, the genealogy of the nation-state rests within Enlightenment rationalities and imperial history – as Chatterjee (1986) argues, even national liberation is a Western-derived project. A study of the nation-state is pertinent here to disrupt the history of the present, where national independence appears as an inevitable stage of world-history. John Kelly and Martha Kaplan, drawing on Benedict Anderson (1991), argue that the legacy of the “new nation” reproduces unexamined evolutionism, a vague sense of the necessity of nation-states, and the peripheralization of colonial political dynamics: ultimately, it enables a rerun of modernization theory (Kelly & Kaplan, 2001, p.421).

To present decolonization as the natural unfolding of modernity, the product of a new benevolent world order, or solely an act of free will is disingenuous on several fronts. Chatterjee (1993) argues that the core doctrine of nationalism fuses three ideals: collective self-determination of the people; the expression of national character and individuality; and the vertical division of the world into nation-states “each contributing its special genius to the common fund of humanity” (p. 8). On the surface, the idea of decolonization, particularly the discursive framing of self-determination, reflects each of these ideals and appears as a reasonable, if not predictable application of Enlightenment principles under the mantle of liberty, equality, democracy and global connectivity. Yet, as Chatterjee (1993) argues, “the very idea of a nationalism being a rational and self-conscious attempt by the
weak and poor peoples of the world to achieve autonomy and liberty is demonstrably false. Nationalism as an ideology is irrational, narrow, hateful and destructive...it is wholly a European export to the rest of the world” (p.7).

Chatterjee (1993) sees nationalism as a problem of the history of “political ideas” that takes two forms. The first is “Western” nationalism, that, having emerged in Western Europe – primarily France and Britain – set the standard of progress “about man, morals and society” (p. 1) to be followed by Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. Indeed, the early-to-mid twentieth century was fraught with political manoeuvring by Western powers, seeking to shift their spheres of influence from control to counsel throughout the global South. Western nationalism was also manifest within global governmental institutions that came into being after 1940. The United Nations, although the most prominent, was not the only global institution to emerge after World War II: The World Bank, established by the United States Treasury Department in 1944 to arrange post-war reconstruction loans, the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) initiated by the US State Department’s Division of Commercial Policy in 1943 to regulate international trade, and proposals for an International Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund both formed in Anglo-American planning sessions in 1945 (Kelly & Kaplan, 2001). The emergence of these institutions is indicative of the extent to which decolonization was a Western endeavour – a fact made all the more salient in postwar planning sessions hosted in the United States, including the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D.C., and plans to construct the UN headquarters in New York City, which were all underway at this time (Kelly & Kaplan, 2001).
The second form of nationalism outlined by Chatterjee (1993) is what he terms “Eastern Nationalism,” which is marked and measured as backward in its relation to the global standards set by “advanced” nations of the West. This type of nationalism “has appeared among peoples recently drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 1). For Chatterjee and other subaltern scholars, nationalism carries vestiges of an alien culture. Nationalism and the right to self determination – as the natural unfolding of standards of progress – have come from an alien (colonizing) culture that requires the transformation of society, not through imitation of the alien culture – for a break from colonial powers was vital, at least optically – but through a distinctive identity that was made to reflect modernity. Thus while nationalism allows for a reclamation of identity and culture, and a rejection of colonial means of oppression, it can also enable oppression and oversight by other means.

In this regard it is productive to consider the liberation-emancipation dialectic. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) argues that the ideal of emancipation genealogically rests within modernity, whereas liberation is rooted in colonial difference: The fundamental difference here is that where the teleology of emancipation ostensibly manifests in liberal democracy, liberation is articulated within the darker aspects of modernity (i.e., imperialism, colonialism, the slave trade, apartheid) where decolonization is intended to bring about a new humanity divorced from colonial modernity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). The Eurocentric history of Western nationalism is at play here as well. Ndlovu-Gatsheni traces the genealogy of emancipation to three historical events: the 1668 Glorious Revolution in England, the 1776 American Revolution, and the 1789 French Revolution. “In
these three events,” writes Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2012, p. 75) “emancipation became a motive force of bourgeois revolutions that did not fight against the edifice of modernity but for reform and class ascendancy within the same capitalist system.” Emancipation in this view is thus the teleological unfolding of modernity that, in a colonial context, entrenched the ideology that freedom had to be planned and executed by Western powers. The genealogy of liberation, on the other hand, is born out of resistance to imperialism and colonialism – Ndlovu-Gatsheni points to the Tupac Amaru uprising in Peru of 1781 and the Haitian Revolution of 1804, both of which called for a new humanity of free citizens of formerly colonized peoples. Yet, in many ways, the decolonization project became subsumed under the “tidal wave of modernity” that shifted the rhetoric from liberation to emancipation (Chatterjee, 1993). In this regard, rather than breaking colonial bonds, decolonization in the post-War era became a process of fulfilling progress and taking steps towards (global) capitalist modernity

These dialectical nationalisms center an ongoing debate as to whether the nation-state reifies Eurocentrism while erasing alternative and competing histories. In the opening to his canonical work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 6) argues that the “nation” is “an imaged political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Anderson’s work is useful in framing the invention of the nation state as just that – an invention, with distinctively Western-origins. Understanding the nation-state as imagined and as a Western-derived project, as not given but made, is helpful in placing nationalism within a Marxist tradition of revolutionary/liberation politics. While the nation-state holds roots in the Enlightenment thought – debates over constitutional thought and government, social
and political theories of “civilization” – locating the birth of the nation-state within the mid-twentieth century, allows for a more complex and nuanced interpretation of nationalism as a political and neo-colonial project. “Europe and America,” writes Chatterjee (1993, p.5)

“...have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anticolonial and postcolonial misery.” Centering this Western hegemony articulates with Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2012) assertion that as long as decolonization was framed within emancipatory terms (rather than liberation), it was destined to fail Fanon’s call for the reversal of the colonial power structures so that “the last shall be first and the first last” (Fanon, 1963).

The emancipation/liberation dialectic played out in the sporting arena as well: sport offered a means to reappropriate colonial means of imperialism via resistive and nationalist post-colonial politics. If, as Fanon argues, “the native” is condemned to a physical and figurative immobility within the colonial context, sport offers tools of anticolonial decolonization. “The first things the native learns,” writes Fanon (1963) “is to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits. This is why the dreams of the native are always of muscular prowess; his dreams are of action and of aggression. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, climbing...During the period of colonization, the native never stops achieving his freedom from nine in the evening until six in the morning” (p. 46). In this way sport is embedded in the contradictions between emancipation and liberation: where sport offers potential for liberation. Mangan and Bandyopadhyay (2004) explore some of these tensions in tracing the colonial exploits of Indian Civil Servant Peter McWilliam in 1930s Alipruduar, India – a period marked by an Indian independence movement preceding the Indian Independence Act of 1947. McWilliam was a firm advocate
of using sport to develop the health of Alipurduarians and imbue a sense of fair play, self-discipline, and other ostensibly “Western” values; yet, in the Indian independence fervour of the 1930s and 1940s, he too saw the threads of imperialist emancipation in the decolonization fabric. Of this, McWilliam (cited in Mangan & Bandyopadhyay, 2004, p. 42) writes:

Decolonization, in fact, can bear witness to a strengthening rather than a weakening of cultural associations. Thus the colonial past can be visible in the postcolonial present in various forms. Acculturation can result in the birth of a new culture which includes the elements of the past and the present. Subscription to an inflexible belief in an automatic conflict between the traditional and the modern can be naïve. Reality can be a great deal more complex.

Indeed, despite a prevailing sentiment at the time that sport could hold the Empire together by allowing for an ostensibly “friendlier” path to decolonization (see Mangan & Bandyopadhyay, 2004, p. 420), the reality is decidedly more complex. These antinomic ideas – sport as liberation and sport enabling a depoliticizing of decolonization – effectively bear out the failure to consider the meanings attached to sport by the colonized.

In the forward to Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, Homi Bhabha makes the argument that the socialist, Marxist, and liberation aspirations of Third World nationalism inherently conflict with the dominant forces of globalization – that is, the ideals of the free-market, and neoliberal technocratic elitism – that have come to define the contemporary postcolonial landscape (Bhabha, 2004, p. xi). Bhabha elaborates upon what he, and by extension Fanon, sees as a false break between colonization and ‘new’ nationalisms through decolonization:

It is, of course, one of the most significant lessons of the postcolonial experience that no nation is simply young or old, new or ancient, despite the date of its independence. ‘New’ national, international, or global emergences create an unsettling sense of transition, as if history is at a turning point; and it is in such incubational moments – Antonio Gramsci’s word for the perceived ‘newness’ of change – that we experience the palimpsestical imprints of past, present, and future in peculiarly contemporary figures of time and meaning. Fanon’s
description of the ‘crude empty fragile shell’ of emergent national histories quickens the long shadows cast by the ethnonationalist ‘switchbacks’ of our own times, the charnel houses of ethnic cleansing: Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Gujarat, Sudan. (Bhabha, 2004, p. xvi)

In calling into question the “newness” of the national, decolonization bears visible traces of colonial doctrines – the original writings of colonialism written over in the same ink. For Fanon, the global post-colonial, post-decolonization future must go beyond “narrow minded nationalism” and return to the political project of Third World Nationalism because “if nationalism is not explained, enriched, and deepened, if it does not very quickly turn into a social and political consciousness, in humanism, then it leads to a dead-end” (Fanon, 1963, p. 144, emphasis added). For Fanon, when the colonialist, embarrassed by the colonies’ claim for independence, opens the dialogue of independence, it is disingenuous: Independence becomes a curse when the colony is faced with the complete withdrawal of the colonizer, and likely economic ruin, or taking independence with the conditions of colonizers, and becoming an economically dependent country (Fanon, 1963). The colonial channels carved out thus remain intact within decolonization via the maintenance of economic avenues of resource extraction. The hegemony of colonialism shifts to make visible a new path under banners of decolonization, liberation, and ultimately “development.”

(Post)colonialism and Sport for Development and Peace

While it is impossible and unproductive to recount a universal tale of oppression and liberation, the history of sport draws attention to some of the ways bodily practices have been used in both imperialism and anti-colonialism. The preceding analysis is intended to demonstrate the complexity and non-linearity of a (post)colonial history, and
that decolonization is a contested and ongoing project. In complicating the emancipation-liberation dialectic, and nationalism-as-freedom, within a history of the present framework, we can better make sense of both the contemporary development moment and the role of institutional bodies like the United Nations therein. This is particularly true of decolonization in the post-World War II era, and the role of the United Nations in what has been a Western-centric project of legitimizing the “newness” of the nation-state as the unit of sovereignty for liberal democracy (Kelly, 2006). While not the first institution charged with uniting the global in post-war peace, the UN has been particularly active in promoting both post-colonial nationalism, and development – including through Sport for Development and Peace.

There are numerous tensions explored throughout this chapter; perhaps most notable are those captured in the liberation-emancipation dialectic, and between the seemingly contradictory role of sport in both imperialism and anti-imperialism. These tensions have an ongoing impact on the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of development, but are obfuscated in the development paradigm, where hegemonic power relations are often obscured under the guise of aid. Indeed, claims to “universal humanism, belief in northern stewardship, faith in linear and scientific progress and policies of economic imperialism” that have become the calling cards of development ideology, have been challenged and deconstructed by postcolonial and post-development scholars (Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011, p. 185).

Darnell and Hayhurst (2011) offer insights into bridging the divide between decolonization and Sport for Development and Peace, so as to navigate some of these complexities. They argue that development must be re-imagined, or all together reinscribed
as an ongoing struggle for decolonization. This is a call to question the hegemony of development so as to destabilize the cultural and economic forces that construct development as necessary, and to make visible the political economic conditions that sustain contemporary international relations (Hayhurst & Darnell, 2011; Wainwright, 2008; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000). In the next chapter, I explore further the history of sport in the development context and the role of the United Nations in promoting development through sport, in order to trouble the contemporary conjuncture in which the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm has emerged.
Chapter 5 – Deconstructing nascency: Troubling the timeline of Sport for Development and Peace

When young people participate in sports or have access to physical education, they can build up their health and self-esteem, use their talents to the fullest, learn the ideals of teamwork and tolerance, and be drawn away from the dangers of drugs and crime. That is why the United Nations is turning more and more often to the world of sport for help in our work for peace and our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

– Kofi Annan (United Nations, 2005, p. 7)

At the turn of the millennium, the United Nations had been at the forefront of development work for nearly 50 years, standing over a landscape that continues to be characterized by expanding inequality and uneven development. Although starting a decade afresh with a new development mandate is somewhat of a tradition for the UN, the new millennium brought with it a renewed momentum for dynamic and novel approaches to development. This momentum manifested perhaps most tangibly in the adoption of the MDGs and the inauguration of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm.

In July 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened an Inter-Agency Task Force to review activities involving sport within the UN system and to create an inventory of existing sport for development programs. The Inter-Agency’s 2003 report “Sport for development and peace: Towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals” was the first official UN document tied to sport for development, and it identified more than 120 development initiatives employing sport, half of which were run or supported by UN agencies. The report also promoted the ostensibly inherent ability of sport to improve health and education, enable local and national economic revitalization, protect the environment, build peace, and be a deterrent for drug use, crime, and violence. Later
institutionalized as the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace, the group made the following six recommendations (United Nations, 2003, p.vi):^4

1. Sport should be better integrated into the development agenda.
2. Sport should be incorporated as a useful tool in programmes for development and peace.
3. Sport-based initiatives should be included in the country programmes of UN agencies, where appropriate and according to locally assessed needs.
4. Programmes promoting sport for development and peace need greater attention and resources by governments and the UN.
5. Communications-based activities using sport should focus on well-targeted advocacy and social mobilization, particularly at the national and local levels.
6. Programmes that use sport for development and peace should be implemented through partnerships.

Though the 2003 document makes reference to the previously informal and ad hoc relationship between sport and development, the UN’s understanding of its own history with sport for development is limited. For instance, the three timelines referenced in much of the literature, which I have amalgamated in Table 2, suggest the nascency of SDP in development (International Platform on Sport and Development, n.d.; United Nations, n.d.a, 2005).

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^4 The task force included representatives from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP), the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).
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<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>The International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Olympic Committee (IOC) establish institutional cooperation, later reinforced through a series of partnerships between the IOC and UN system partners.</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>The UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child is adopted recognizing the right to the “full opportunity for play and recreation.”</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 48/11 is adopted, “Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal,” reviving the ancient Greek tradition of Olympic Truce. Similar resolutions have been adopted since then and are issued every two years prior to each Olympic Games, both summer and winter.</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal.</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Heads of State and Government of the European Commission focus special attention on sport during the Amsterdam treaty negotiations, during which it was stated that, &quot;the Conference emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together&quot;.</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>UN Millennium Declaration adopted; Millennium Development Goals established.</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Adolf Ogi appointed as the first Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace to enhance the network of relations between UN organisations and the sports sector. UN Inter-Agency Task Force on SDP is established.</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>First International Conference on Sport &amp; Development, Magglingen, Switzerland. The conference was the first international, high-level event on Sport &amp; Development, involving participants from sports federations, governments, UN agencies, the media, athletes, business and civil society. Publication of landmark report of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on SDP, “Sport for Development and Peace: Towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.”</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>1st UNGA Resolution “Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace” is adopted, proclaiming 2005 as the International Year for Sport and Physical Education</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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| 2005 | International Year of Sport and Physical Education (IYSPE) 2005 is proclaimed by the UNGA.  
Second Magglingen Conference on Sport & Development, Magglingen, Switzerland. |
| 2007 | European Commission publishes a White Paper on Sport stating it will promote the use of sport as a tool for development in international development policy. |
| 2008 | IOC and the UN agree on an expanded framework for action to use sport to reach the goals of the UN.  
Olympic Games in Beijing, where a large contingent of UN representatives are present and during which a vast number of initiatives are implemented by UN entities.  
Wilfried Lemke is appointed as the second Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace.  
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon establishes a trust fund on Sport for Development and Peace. |
| 2009 | First UN-IOC Forum on Sport for Development and Peace held in Lausanne, Switzerland.  
"Forum on Productive Youth Development through Sport in Africa" is held at in Nairobi, Kenya.  
Resolution 64/3 adopted by UNGA, granting observer status at the General Assembly to the IOC, allowing the IOC to take the floor and participate in consultation meetings.  
Resolution 64/5 adopted by the UNGA, “2010 International Federation of Association Football World Cup event in South Africa,” urging the international community to harness the World Cup for the development of the whole African continent. |
<p>| 2010 | First UN-IOC Forum in Lausanne, Switzerland. |
| 2011 | Second UN-IOC Forum on Sport, Peace and Development held in Geneva, Switzerland. |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Meeting of Experts in Sport &amp; Development held at the Commonwealth Secretariat to develop guidelines on Sport for Development and Peace to be used throughout the Commonwealth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Third UN-IOC Forum on Sport for Peace and Development held in New York, USA. The forum closed with a call for a United Nations International Day of Sport and Physical Activity. The 67th United Nations General Assembly proclaims that 6 April is to be observed as the &quot;International Day of Sport for Development and Peace&quot;.</td>
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The significance here rests not with the events that dot this timeline, but rather with the absences. While there are a series of events tangentially related to sport between the 1920s and 1970s – i.e., the “ad hoc” partnership of the ILO and IOC, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, and the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport – and the three events in the 1990s, there is a significant gap until the avalanche of events, resolutions, and meetings in the lead-up to and throughout the 2000s. In speaking to the novelty of sport as a tool of development, the UN anointed 2005 as the “International Year of Sport and Physical Education,” noting that prior to the 2000s, sport generally received little weight in development circles and the “rights to play, sport and physical education have often been described as forgotten rights,” sentiments that are further encapsulated in the comments from Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted above (United Nations, 2005, p. 24).

To the contrary, and given the context established in Chapter Four, I suggest in this chapter that sport has long been a part of development practice, both formally and informally. That the original UN Task Force found that more than half of the sport-related NGOs surveyed in 2001 were run or supported by UN agencies is demonstrative of the longstanding relationship of sport to development. What is significant about this lineage is
not its linearity, but rather how it informs the history of the present: Sport has readily been mobilized as a biopolitical tool to shape and mould corporeality across a diverse range of political, economic, and ideological contexts. What I set out to do here is not merely a matter of correcting the historical record; the elisions, rather, raise questions about what counts as “official” history, how ahistoricism shapes contemporary understandings of sport and development, and the extent to which SDP presents a break from conventional development approaches. My analysis of documents amassed from the UN archives shows how the organization has operated as the foremost development agency since its inception in the 1940s and has long used sport in this capacity. In challenging how sport is positioned in the development paradigm, I aim to complicate what are often a priori and panacean conceptualizations of SDP.

Setting the context: The UN’s role in nation-building and development

Before proceeding it is necessary to set the parameters in which the UN emerged as an organization of global governance. Founded in the immediate aftermath of the World War II, the United Nations has since its outset been concerned with matters of peace building and development. The post-war landscape was marked by uncertainty and changing geo-political realities. Much of Europe was left in ruin, independence movements were on the rise in former colonies, and growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union made for global political instability. Within this context, and amid an increasingly interconnected world, the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, founded the UN to give global governance a body. Olav Stokke (2009) argues that the UN as we know it today, rests upon four traditions: humanitarian relief that emerges from a concern for people in situations of violent conflict or natural
disaster; international solidarity steeped in social democracy and aimed at promoting political and economic reciprocity; a missionary tradition that foregrounded the history of Christian proselytizing efforts in the global South as a means to “develop” persons and nations; and the tradition of human rights that came to be enshrined in the UN charter. Although the UN’s primary mandate was one of post-war peace building and humanitarianism, the organization quickly became entangled in the economic reconstruction of Europe and much of the global South. As part of these reconstructive efforts, and amidst a wave of decolonization, the post-war era saw a marked shift away from colonialism, towards ostensibly more cooperative and humanitarian efforts under the banner of development.

The roots of the UN’s development mandate were thusly formed through notions of liberalism, humanitarianism, and missionary fervour that can be traced back to the Enlightenment ideals personified in muscular Christianity. The UN Charter, signed in 1945 outlined the purpose of the organization, its membership, and its subsidiary organizations, and made clear its specific role in guiding decolonization, particularly by promoting the right to self-determination for all people (United Nations, n.d.a). Chapter XI of the Charter, for example, makes explicit the UN’s role in promoting the social, economic, political and educational progress of “dependent territories” – mostly former colonies – so as to assist in promoting self-government that accounts for “the political aspirations and stages of development and advancement of each Territory” (United Nations, n.d.a). Further, Chapter XII of the Charter established the “International Trusteeship System” which, through consultation with Allied powers, addressed the supervision of dependent territories (United Nations, n.d.b). The objective of the Trusteeship System was to promote self-
determination through political, economic and social advancement under a framework of human rights, freedoms, and globalism (United Nations, n.d.b, see United Nations, n.d.c for a list of these territories).

Over time, the UN’s role in decolonization and nation building was further cemented. In 1960, the UN created the Special Committee on Decolonization to monitor the implementation of the recently adopted “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”. The declaration set forth a vision for decolonization on three fronts. First, it positioned the UN as a vanguard for independence movements, asserting the organization’s “important role...in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories”, and its opposition to “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” (United Nations, 1960). The UN forcefully asserted its authority in this regard, stating that immediate steps were to be taken in “territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom” (United Nations, 1960).

Second, decolonization was articulated squarely within the human rights tradition that drew upon the Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights made “in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” (United Nations, 1960). To this end, the resolution states that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations, 1960). As we shall see, centering decolonization within Human Rights discourses would become a hallmark of development ideology throughout the next five decades with disparate consequences for developing nations.

Third, and relatedly, the decolonization framework established by the UN situates post-World War II independence movements within modernist ideologies and progress narratives. The UN Special Committee on Decolonization framed colonialism as an impediment to the natural progression of nation states as it “prevents the development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,” stating further that “the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible” (United Nations, 1960). “In order to avoid serious crises,” the Declaration continues, “an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith” (United Nations, 1960).

These explicit goals of guiding nations along a development path were further articulated and institutionalized within the UN through the creation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1965. Self-described as an advocate for change and provider of knowledge, experience, and resources to countries so as to “help people build a better life,” the UNDP was formed to “confront poverty, give a voice to the voiceless, and to begin to reverse the growing global economic political gaps” (Murphy, 2006, p. 5). From the outset the UNDP has been more effective than its predecessor development agencies, Craig Murphy (2006) argues, because it has advocated on behalf of developing countries: “[the] UNDP had become the development programme of the developing countries, the
intergovernmental organization most trusted by governments in the developing world because it was the most responsive to them” (Murphy, 2006, p. 8). As Murphy (2006) argues, the UNDP has acted not only as an “incubator” of international development, but of states themselves. The UNDP was particularly active in the post-war wave of independence movements in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, establishing new governments, health systems, transportation and other aspects of the state (United Nations, n.d.a).

In the vision set forth by the declaration, decolonization is seen as part of the natural progression of nation states to an endpoint of “development” and the universal ideals of economic co-operation and peace to which the UN refers. These ideals, in tandem with notions of “freedom and independence” obfuscate broader power structures and global hierarchies, and ongoing systems of political and economic intervention of the global North in the global South. It is useful here to recall the liberation-emancipation dialectic. As postcolonial scholars such as Partha Chatterjee (1993) and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) remind us, the nation-state is a decidedly Western concept, and one that fails to disrupt the global North’s governmental oversight of the global South. Indeed, from the outset the UN was a decidedly global North institution; by the end of its inaugural year, the organization counted only three sub-Saharan African nations (Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa) and three Asian nations (China, the Philippines, and India) amongst its ranks (O’Sullivan, 2005).

**The 1940s: The Marshall Plan, reconstruction, and the discourse of development**

The discursive shift from colonialism to “development” in the immediate aftermath of the World War emerged partly out of the need to (re)construct capitalist outlets in war-

5 This list consists of Western Sahara, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Island, Cayman Island, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Pitcairn, and Tokelau.
torn Europe and newly independent nations. The Allied forces, under the leadership of UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt, began to shape the post-war landscape and set the stage for global governance through the United Nations. With the arrival of Allied forces in Western Europe, Roosevelt instructed General Dwight Eisenhower to assure liberated peoples that “No one will go hungry or without the means of livelihood in any territory occupied by the United Nations’ alliance, if it is humanly within our power to make the necessary supplies available to them” (cited in Murphy, 2006, p. 34). Speaking in 1940 on what would eventually be World War II’s endgame, Churchill put forth his vision for development. Churchill opined,

> We can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly clear of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our utmost to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be help up before the peoples of Europe – I say deliberately – the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring them immediate food, freedom, and peace. (cited in Murphy, 2006, p. 33)

Five months later, Roosevelt made the famous “four freedoms” speech, speaking of a post-war world founded upon freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear, everywhere in the world. Roosevelt’s speech made a significant contribution to development ideology in that it extended the idea of reconstruction beyond Europe and into the developing global South. These sentiments were put into practice in January 1942, when the “multilateral Declaration of United Nations” was adopted, outlining a goal of providing 1% of national income for the recovery of liberated areas.

In 1943, the Allies created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to carry out this order, an organization that would ultimately
serve as a predecessor to the UN itself. In working with previously existing agencies such as the British Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), the UNRRA sought to transform the economies of the “developing world” by making them self-sufficient in agriculture and industrial outputs. As Craig Murphy (2006) notes, the model of technical assistance to war-ravaged countries was “designed to minimize waste, improve the flow of goods, and otherwise uncover new efficiencies, not to make room for the instruments of war, but to better the lives of those who still suffered its effects” (p. 38).

Although not part of the “official” history, the UNRRA was active in its use of sport in pursuit of making “better the lives” of those affected by war in developing countries. For instance, as part of their work in Palestine around this time, the UNRRA, with the support of volunteers from Hadassah – the Women’s Zionist Organization of America – sought to promote the Zionist ideal through education, public health initiatives and training of nurses in Palestine. They also initiated a program to create toys and balls for both economic and recreational pursuits (see Figure 1).

The caption of this archival photograph reads: “scraps from the dress shop and odds and ends of tattered clothing are being turned into stuffed animals and balls.” This photo is...
not only significant in pointing to the use of sport and recreation in this early development work, but also the missionary tradition of some of these endeavours. The description of the document continues: “Standing in the rear is Hadassah Van Vriesland of Palestine who supervises their work. Miss Van Vriesland was born in Holland, educated at Teachers College, Columbia, New York” (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, c. 1943). The presence of teachers in these endeavours highlights the missionary tradition of sport and education continued throughout the 1940s, sport missionaries, and teachers continued to be conduits for development, progress, and modernity. Although the UNRRA was disbanded in 1948 (largely out of concern for the support given to communist-leaning countries in central Europe), its approach to development, and indeed its use of sport, would be taken up by the organizations that emerged in its wake.

In 1945, the signatories to the UN Charter committed themselves to promoting social progress and better standards of living for all, with a particular focus on former colonies and newly independent states. This pledge was operationalized through institutions established within the UN’s purview including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), a precursor to the World Bank formed in 1944, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) formed in 1945, the International Labour Organization (ILO) joining the UN in 1946, and the World Health Organization (WHO) established in 1948.

Of these organizations, it was perhaps the ILO that had the most significant impact in shaping the development framework of the decade, particularly through the Declaration of Philadelphia (DOP). The DOP, convened by the Allies under the leadership of the US and Great Britain, set out the parameters for the post-war global order, and proclaimed the
ILO's dedication to finding measures "to promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the world" (Maul, 2009, p. 389). Coming into the UN fold as the first specialized agency in 1946, the ILO focused heavily on modernizing countries labelled as “Third World”.

Following the ILO's lead, development in the 1940s was primarily focused on economic growth through technical assistance, characterized by the “Marshall Plan” that was enacted in 1946 and operational from 1948 to 1951. There is a great deal of academic literature on the effects of the Marshall Plan and attempts to economically reconstruct and revitalize Europe and Asia. Despite the breadth of this literature, the role of sport in meeting the goals of the Marshall Plan has been understudied – but there is evidence of its place in this process. For instance, as part of reconstructive efforts, the UNRRA established the Zanneion Orphanage in Piraeus, Greece in 1945. The Orphanage, originally built for 156 boys, had to double the number of beds to meet the needs of post-war Greece. The UNRRA ensured that the boys were “adequately fed and clad.” Although the Orphanage was overcrowded, a report from the time stated “life at Zanneion is paradise compared to that of the majority of homeless children in Greece” (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1945, 1946). As a result of overcrowding, “beds, books and other educational materials, and sports equipment were all in short supply.” The idea that sport and physical activity were important to the wellbeing of the children is further substantiated by photograph depicting sport and play as part of the day-to-day activities of the orphanage (See figures 2-7)
Figure 2: "These three orphan boys are lucky"

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1945)

Figure 3: “These three orphan boys are lucky” (reverse)

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1945)
Figure 4: "Boys at Zanneion Orphanage, Piraeus, Greece"

![Image]

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1946a)

Figure 5: “Boys at Zanneion Orphanage, Piraeus, Greece” (reverse)

"UNRRA/3044 Boys at the Zanneion Orphanage, Piraeus, Greece
decorate their own theatre. The Zanneion Orphanage is one of the best equipped in Greece. For the 156 boys for whom it was built there was every facility. Now its numbers are nearly doubled. Beds, books, educational and sports material are all in short supply. UNRRA imports ensure that the boys are adequately fed and clad and, stunted and overcrowded as it is, life at the Zanneion is paradise compared to that of the majority of homeless children of Greece. Photo by Mrs. V. Papaioannou. No. 5377."

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1946a)
Figure 6: “UNRRA Zanneion Orphanage” 1

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1948a)

Figure 7: “UNRRA Zanneion Orphanage” 2

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1948b)
While it is possible that sport provided a mere reprieve from the daily realities for the children, the use of sport in similar UNRRA settings in Albania and Italy suggest otherwise. That other post-war orphanages, such as the Tirana Orphanage in Albania, made use of sport equipment and playing surfaces gives insight into a more systemic use of sport as part of development in following the Marshall Plan (see figures 8 and 9). This is perhaps even more evident in the use of boxing at a similar facility in Santa Marinella, Italy, which used boxing for the “rehabilitation of children taken off the Rome streets” (see figures 10 and 11).

Figure 8: “Tirana Orphanage”

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1947a)

Figure 9: “Tirana Orphanage” (reverse)

(United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1947)
Further, in Germany in 1947, the UNRRA created sporting tournaments in refugee camps in Oldenburg that housed over 100,000 refugees. As a means to improve health and morale the UNRRA requested prizes for a sports tournament held on June 22\textsuperscript{nd} 1947 that included basketball, volleyball, volkerball (i.e. dodgeball), and ping-pong (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1947b) (see Appendix B). Here it is important to recall the links between sport and physical education: sport was seen as an apt avenue for promoting health and a respect for authority, while providing productive outlets to protect against
Juvenile delinquency. Indeed, just as developing the “proper gentlemen” in the public school system was key to the propagation of empire, sport in the post-war context could be used to reconstruct Europe. Using sport and physical education in an orphanage certainly extends a long history of shaping and moulding the body materially and symbolically within the modernist tradition of progress. This is true of sport in both the colonial and development eras where the capacity for improvement was thought to rest within a healthy body and by extension a “healthy” nation.

Around this time, sport and physical education were also increasingly incorporated in development projects outside of the Marshall Plan. The 1948-1949 UN Yearbook Annual report, for instance, outlined the need to incorporate sport and physical activity in Cameroon and Togoland, both of which were under French Administration at the time. As part of these efforts, UN officials would oversee local teachers and the implementation of education programs, including those related to sport. An archival document on the matter reads: “The head of each section directs the work of African teachers and coordinates cultural activities in the region. He is normally the director of the primary school of the administrative headquarters” and supervises the work of both government and private institutions, as well as sports, physical education, and youth movements (United Nations, 1949, p. 785).

Sport thus contributed to governmental oversight; yet it was also a means to maintain the spirit and productive of UN staff. As in the colonial era when sport was a means to train the custodians of the empire (i.e., the missionaries, teachers and soldiers) and maintain their ties to the homeland, the stewards of post-war development relied on sport in similar ways. For example, the UN Charter of The Secretariat for 1946-1947
provided a guidebook for staff members of the Secretariat (international civil servants of any UN agency) as a training program. The guidebook included a variety of sports that could be included in activities for students, as well as other “opportunities for leisure time activities to facilitate adjustment to new environments and to maintain physical fitness [that] are necessary [for] staff recruited from all over the world, many of them separated from their families” (United Nations, 1947, p. 641). Examples of these opportunities included physical and recreational activities such as “keep-fit classes,” and making available sport and recreation facilities near the headquarters.

By the end of the decade, Truman’s inauguration speech gave further legitimacy to the UN’s specialized agencies in the discursive shift to development, albeit within a modernist framework that framed the global South as impoverished and in need of intervention. The 1949 “Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance” was early evidence of the operation of these discourses: The Programme outlined a plan to send technical experts on economic development, and training of managerial personnel and technicians, to the “Third World” (Rist, 2002, p. 88; see also, Stokke, 2009). Post-colonial scholars like Arturo Escobar (1995) argue that hidden within the shift to development was a desire to consolidate US hegemony within a world capitalist system, while concomitantly stymying the spread of communism. As a result, much of the development mandate was distorted by a desire to expand global markets into new, resource rich arenas, which ultimately stratified the “First World” developed nations, with “Second World” communist nations and “Third World” poor, non-industrialized nations (Escobar, 1995). In this regard the UN, in principle and practice, catalyzed the decolonization process, yet also contributed to a postcolonial order characterized by global (global North, global South) hierarchies. “The
ideological cover for this ‘imperialism of decolonization,’” writes John Hargreaves (1996, p. 249) “was paraded by new development doctrines which envisaged industrial nations collectively guiding through the same stages of economic growth.”

The 1950s: The Cold War and economic and social tension in development

Decolonization greatly contributed to political instability in the 1950s, particularly in the context of the Cold War politics that dominated the decade. Growing “East-West” tensions played out in development policy at the UN and in practice within newly independent states. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United States and the Soviet Union had the power of veto to block the UN-decision making system. While Rist (2002) rightly points out that the UN was thus forced to focus on areas that were overtly less “political”, areas such as development, building a consensus on these fronts was no easy task. Indeed, during the 1950s, the “Third World” became an ideological battleground for communist and capitalist interests with major powers seeking to align with former colonies and contain the influence of rivals. Throughout the 1950s, the development mandate, built upon the Marshall Plan and fears of a spreading communism, continued to focus predominantly on modernist ideals of capitalist development. In contrast to the Soviet model of development, Daniel Maul (2009) argues, development policy was steeped in modernization theory, as consumer capitalism was seen as a more attractive and linear path to development (cf. Stokke, 2009).

Aided by and embedded within the discursive shift from colonialism to development, newly independent nations benefitted from the aid mandate presented by the UN, at least to an extent. The new definition of “underdeveloped” enabled through the “discovery of poverty” in the Third World (Escobar, 1995) took hold within both the global
North and South because it was seen as a way of affirming legal equality and ideals of humanitarianism (Rist, 2002). Yet, it is important to note that this shift did not ease or erase the history of colonialism. Although the UN could claim neutrality in this regard, from the perspective of newly independent states, the founding UN member nations consisted of some of the most egregious colonial powers, including Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States (O’Sullivan, 2005). Given the influence these nations held, a block of global South states took steps to greater autonomy within the UN through the Nonaligned Movement, and removed themselves from East-West conflict in the mid-1950s. Later forming the “Group of 77”, this caucus of developing nations within the General Assembly attempted to reorient international economic policy through the “new international economic order” to challenge the hegemony of Western driven capitalist development that pervaded the 1950s and 1960s (O’Sullivan, 2005; Stokke, 2009).

Informed by critiques of economic determinism in development, the UN continued to operationalize its use of sport in the development context throughout the decade as a means to promote more “social” forms of development. For instance, the 1952 UN Policy document entitled “Questions concerning non-self-governing territories and the international trusteeship system” outlines the use of sport in matters of “social development” including the “practical steps...taken to discourage gambling in the Chinese community [in Nauru] through the provision of additional amenities, including an extra free cinema show each week and increased sporting and recreational facilities” (United Nations, 1952, p.589). Similarly, the annual report from 1953 outlined the social and political development of Papua New Guinea, where,
The mission held a meeting with members of all six Native Village Councils and was greatly impressed by the enthusiasm of the people for this new development...Their Council houses were being used as centres for social and sporting activities. They were encouraging indigenous production by purchasing motor trucks and boats to carry produce to markets and by opening stores for the purchase of produce and for trade goods. They had plans for such projects as the purchase of unoccupied plantation, the establishment of saw mills and the operation of rice mills. (United Nations, 1953, p. 565)

Sport is notable in this regard, offering a productive outlet to counter such “delinquent” acts as gambling, and for the rational use of space and land drawing out implicit modernist tropes of primitivism and backwardness in the global South.

True to their directive, UNESCO was the most active agency in promoting these social development goals. In 1952, UNESCO “experimented” in the educational development of Togoland with “a school, a dispensary, a handicraft workshop, a model garden, a water supply point, and the organization of a regional fair with lectures, discussions, films and sporting events” (United Nations, 1952, p. 709). Furthermore, as part of its goal to introduce universal compulsory free education in all countries, UNESCO called for an investigation of the contribution of sport “to the improvement of professional abilities and to cultural development” (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959a, p. 470). In pursuit of universal education, UNESCO anointed 1959 as the International Year of Education and outlined their efforts in 24 developing countries (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959b).6,7

6 This is a document translated from French.
7 These countries include Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Cambodia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Romania, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukraine, USSR, and Yugoslavia.
and Sport in Tunisia, to the emphasis placed on physical education in schools. UNESCO promoted the institutionalization of physical education in a variety of countries, including Guatemala, India, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Romania, and Yugoslavia throughout this time. Two examples give particular insight into the contribution of physical education to development. In Iran, “a total of 70,000 students participated in various competitions of football, volleyball, basketball, tennis etc...the regulations for these sports were prepared through a UN guide... developed for teachers of physical education in primary school” (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959b, p. 268). In Libya “an increase in the number of hours teaching sports was decided to reinforce the importance of sports activities in public schools. Due to a growing interest in interschool tournaments and championships, these activities have been expanded across the country. A physical educational school and training center will be created next summer, to which all physical education instructors will have to undergo special training of new sports techniques” (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959b, p.306).

The construction of sport stadia and hosting of tournaments was a theme that emerged throughout the International Year of Education. For example, Saudi Arabia put in plans to build two stadia in this time, while the Dominican Republic opened the *Leonida Radames* stadium and began work for the development of a sports field in San Pedro de Macorís and various other sport facilities in schools in support of physical education. Cuba provides an interesting example of making rational use of land for the purposes of development, where land was acquired “in connection with the establishment of farmers’ cooperatives and other institutions provided for by the law on agrarian reform, building
three University campuses, those of Havana, Las Villas and Oriente, and the civic and sport athletics building plan” (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959b, p. 165). Many countries also held sport tournaments to promote physical education and health, and even international diplomacy. In 1958 for example, Morocco held a sports tournament for 26,000 young people, including 3,000 girls, with similar events occurring in Sudan and the USSR. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan “interscholastic sport tournaments and meetings were organized on a larger scale and Afghan sports teams have been sent to foreign countries such as Japan, the USSR, and the Republic of China (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959b, p.64).

There exists a biopolitical subtext to all of these manoeuvrings and endeavours: Through sport and physical education, the (healthy) body became knowable, countable, and subject to surveillance under the purview of the UN and UNESCO. The governmental apparatus of the UN tracked various forms of “progress” (social, political, economic, and personal) to be measured, and intervened upon. Notions of health are often connected to ideals of hygiene that recall perceptions of underdevelopment, primitivism, and amorality – assumptions further reflected in the remarks regarding gambling and the irrational use of land. Vestiges of these ideals are visible, for example, in the 1959 UNESCO document “Right to Learn: Report on Schools for Arab Refugees”, that outlines the education provided to the one million Palestinian Arab refugees in camps across Jordan, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and UNESCO. In these camps, sport was used for a variety of means including to raise morale, ethics, and hygiene. The section under the heading “decorum and character” (translated from French) reads,
Before we saw a class at work, the director talked of efforts to bring about an *esprit de corps* [morale]. He showed us six silver cups won in competition. ‘We have triumphed in basketball, in volleyball and *saut* [high jump]!’ There are two football [soccer] teams, whose equipment was paid for by the camp residents. In student committees of ... sport and social activities, talks are made fortnightly on cultural issues or moral practice, and from time to time student give theatrical performances. ...On the walls of the reading room, posters remind of some hygiene requirements: ‘Kill flies, they propagate typhoid, eye diseases, diarrhea’; ‘Wash your hands before meals’; ‘Be clean, comb your hair’. Each camp has it own health worker who works with the students. (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959c, p.15-16).

Further, an undercurrent of economic development also pervades these documents. In this same document, under the heading “*solutions de fortune*” (makeshift solutions), a description of the abject poverty of the refugee camps alludes to the need for the economic development of the area (and of the exoticness of the Middle East). Detailing a recent sport festival in Jordan, the document reads:

> The sun casts its burning rays on the white, powdery terrain of the Aqabat Jaber camp, at the exit of the town, where 30,000 lives and sometimes up to 40 thousand refugees reside...Often at noon, you can see boys and girls enthusiastically do gymnastic exercise on sports fields. Unfortunately, the equipment breaks because in recent years, UNRWA was not able to fund the camp. (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959c, p.35-36)

In these ways then, poverty continued to be the hindrance to modernity. While the modernization paradigm maintained a hegemonic position throughout the 1950s and 1960s, cracks began to form in its foundation during this time. Given the failures of modernization theory to produce tangible gains in development, the philosophy was attacked from the Right where neoclassical traditionalists challenged the wisdom of state intervention, and from the Left, who took issue with its economic determinism and disregard for some of the cultural, sociological, political, and psychological barriers to development (Stokke, 2009). The UN published two key documents in this time, *The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems* (United Nations, 1950),...
and *Measures for the economic development of underdeveloped countries* (United Nations, 1951) that began to offer a response to the modernization paradigm (see Jolly et al., 2004). Fuelled by development failures, the *dependencia* perspective – or dependency theory – began to emerge, particularly amongst scholars of Latin America as a reaction to the ideology of modernization, rejecting modernization theory as a means for “core” countries to exploit the resources of “peripheral” ones. Drawing on Andre Gunder Frank’s “World Systems theory,” dependency theory centralized the specificity and contextuality of underdevelopment, and the need for the global South to economically delink from the global North, themes that would be further developed in the 1960s (Stokke, 2009).

### The 1960s: Sport, tourism, and peace building

The hold of modernity theory over development ideology was further challenged in the 1960s. The membership of the United Nations nearly doubled in the early part of the decade, with a majority of the new states coming from outside of Europe and North America, including 30 from Africa. That many of the 63 new countries were classified as “developing”, speaks to the continuing tide of decolonization in the 1960s, and membership in the UN as a necessary step on the path to nationhood and concomitantly to modernity (Maul, 2009; O’Sullivan, 2005). Yet, it also pushed the UN’s agenda towards finding solutions to the obvious failures of development strategies of the 1950s, particularly in regards to raising awareness of social aspects of development (Maul, 2009).

Partly a response to fears that many decolonizing nations would be drawn in by the Soviet Union, US President John F. Kennedy addressed the United Nation General assembly to launch a proposal to name the 1960s the “Development Decade.” Kennedy argued that if the United States could commit itself to put a man on the moon before the end of the
decade, it would certainly support the idea of improving the living standards of the poorest countries over the same period (Jolly et al., 2004, p. 85). Soon after the UN adopted resolution 1710 (XVI), which launched the First Development Decade that would focus on goods and agriculture, trade, health, population growth (as a threat to development), national resource development, housing, transport and communication, and human rights (Stokke, 2009).

The inauguration of the First Development Decade reflected ongoing critiques of modernization theory around this time; yet, I want to be cautious to not present this as a rupture in the development paradigm. Indeed, rather than a break from the modernization paradigm, the development policies of the 1960s were imbued with and extended modernist rationalities into other, more social realms of development. These rationalities were reflected in the six development goals for the decade (Jolly et al., 2004, pp. 88–89):

1. The development of systematic surveys on physical and human resources in underdeveloped countries for maximum mobilization of domestic resources.
2. The formulation of development plans for social as well as for economic development.
3. An improvement in the machinery of institutional administration and in production incentives for effective national planning.
4. A redirection of science and technology to attack the problems of developing countries.
5. An increase of the export earnings of underdeveloped countries through the increase of manufactured and semi-manufactured exports and the stabilization of export earnings.
6. An increased and more assured flow of capital on suitable terms to the underdeveloped countries. Social reform and economic strategy were recognized to be two sides of the same coin, “the single strategy of development”. Governments
should be increasingly concerned with planning for balanced economic and social development.

These goals set forth a path to development as defined and measured through the implementation of “science”, modern technology (primarily in the form of technical assistance), and capital investment.

**The UNDP, sport and tourism.** The United Nations Development Programme was perhaps the most significant agency to emerge out of the development mandate of the 1960s, coming into being as an umbrella organization for all of the UN’s development efforts in 1966. The UNDP’s aim was to help create institutions and infrastructure so as to transform the economic, governmental, and social structures of newly independent countries, by bringing agencies such as the FAO, ILO, UNICEF, World Food Programme, and even the INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND and World Bank under its purview (Murphy, 2006). From the outset, the UNDP operated as more than a provider of technical assistance, actively involving itself in the daily development activities through a system of “Resident Representatives” (i.e. UN employees) and offices in countries around the world.

Sport was a chief component of the UNDP’s efforts, particularly in newly independent countries. Take for instance the example of India, where the UN and UNDP had long been active in the technical assistance of the country: Shortly after India’s independence from Britain in 1947, the UN network (including the precursor agencies to the UNDP) helped to design the campuses, curricula, and staff of the major Universities of technology, and later India’s National Informatics Centre (Murphy, 2006, p. 5). In the 1960s, the UNDP turned to sport to promote economic development in the country, particularly
through the construction of sport-related tourist attractions, about which a series of correspondence between Indian and UN officials gives insight. For instance, a letter entitled “Recruitment of an Expert in Winter Sports” sent from the Resident Representative in New Delhi to the United Nations headquarters in New York City in 1964, detailed the progress of developing a ski hill (with related transportation and lifts) in Gulmarg, India, now a popular tourist destination (United Nations, 1964a) (See Appendix C). A second letter, from a UNDP Representative to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs on July 21st 1967 detailed the “untapped” tourism potential of India and sought to bring the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development into the fold for assistance in the training for hotel management and catering, assessment of the tourism potential of various areas and training of tourist officers including ski instructors United Nations Development Programme, 1967) (See Appendix C). In response, the UNDP sent three ski and hotel industry experts and commissioned a research project on potential improvements to tourism (United Nations Development Programme, 1968a) (See Appendix C).

A third letter from the UNDP Resident Representative to the UN headquarters further details the specifics for the Winter Sports Resort, the duties of the ski expert, and equipment required. “Development of Winter Sports Resorts, as part of the programme for development of tourism, the first being at Gulmarg” the letter reads, “to attract destination point charter traffic and to correct the imbalances of seasonal traffic to hill resorts. Setting up of a National Ski-Training School at Gulmarg is part of the project” (United Nations Development Programme, 1968b). The letter continues:

In our tourist planning hitherto, the emphasis has been to provide basic amenities such as accommodation, approach road etc...A stage has now been reached when we should turn our attention to the development of places which are in the nature of a holiday resort to be able to attract a large number of tourists...The latest trends in
tourist traffic to India show that the present day tourist is to some extent reducing the
period of his stay in India. There seems to be two reasons for this; first the jet planes
have made the round-the-world trip more easily possible and psychologically the
tourist who travels 600 miles an hour is in a greater hurry and wants to travel faster
within each destination area. Secondly, the lack of facilities in areas other than those
which are already popular with the foreign tourist does not encourage tourists to
prolong their stay. While we have no control over the former, development of
additional facilities and new centres of attraction such as resorts for winter sports
will help to counteract the tendency. (United Nations Development Programme,
1968b) (See Appendix C)

Allusions to modernity and modernist rationalities permeate the content of these letters.
First, the fact that a central priority of the UNDP is the development of a tourist destination
only two decades after India’s independence movement speaks to the preeminent position
of capitalist growth in the development paradigm, particularly for “new” nation states.
Second, the fact that sport was seen as an appropriate and effective means to meet these
ends speaks to the belief in the power of sport as a means to economic (as well as social)
development from the early years of the UN. Third, the letters also implicitly draw on
understandings of modernity, again speaking to making rational use of land – the
appropriation of a mountain for capitalist gain – and the concomitant growth in technology
around this time – the speed with which planes travel – giving further momentum to the
sense that India is systematically behind the economic and technical growth of modernity.
In tandem with the aforementioned work of the UN in developing the educational and
technological backbone of the country, the development of tourist attractions in India
would allow it to “catch-up” and display these developments to the rest of the world.
Fourth, and finally, in a theme that will appear and reappear throughout the decade, these
developments are to be pursued in the interest of attracting audiences, and cash flows,
from the global North.
Sport, education, and economic development. Other UN organizations were also active in their implementation of sport in the 1960s. UNESCO, as part of their educational development programs in developing countries, began to articulate the development capacity of sport and physical education more clearly during this time. Volume VII of the 1960 UNESCO International Social Science Journal addressed the social aspects of leisure, stating: “We should, for example, introduce recreation into our cultural activities and culture into our recreation, or where sport is concerned, we should reduce the emphasis on competition between individuals, placing it, instead, on general mental and physical development, social participation, emotional release, aesthetic enjoyment, etc.” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1960a, p. 582). That same year, and perhaps somewhat contradictorily, UNESCO asserted, “the social value of the activity is not important. It is what occurs to the individual as a result of participation. Sport represents the highest order of competition. The total personality of the individual is involved, his physical, emotional, mental and physical being” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1960b, p. 13).

With these tensions regarding the more “social” aspects of development in mind, economic growth continued to underpin the UNDP and UNESCO development ambitions throughout the decade, including those related to education. An article entitled “A little World of Asia’s Teachers” in the November 1960 issue of UNESCO Courier Magazine, describes the ostensibly abject and dehumanizing poverty of faceless students in an unnamed country in Asia. Echoing similar themes presented in Beyond a Boundary, here, the teachers are framed as the selfless heroes of the story:
A visit to a few ‘ordinary’ schools in the East inspires not only sympathy for the teachers, but also admiration for these poorly but neatly dress men and women...Two things about the average school strike one immediately: it is too small for its purpose and it is forbiddingly austere. It may be a straw hut built by the village council or a group of small mud houses, or more often, a ‘modern’ building of brick and cement, which means it is even less attractive with its treeless courtyard and its dusty school garden. A glance around the classroom offers a neat but bleak perspective of benches, a dais and a single window. There is nothing to relieve the bare walls; not even a map or a picture. But the teacher is not likely to be conscious of this emptiness; his own is just as austere, and even the best-furnished living-room in the neighbourhood probably has nothing but a calendar or a religious print by way of ornament. A classroom with a blackboard, a few chalks and a sponge is relatively well-off. The teacher has probably never heard of visual and audio-visual aids to teaching. If you mention these things to him, he will probably nod and smilingly tell you that they’re not yet available in that part of the world...[The students] work hard on the whole, the teacher tells you, or at any rate they are eager to learn, but after a few hours they get tired and their attention wanders. “The trouble is,” he adds, “that some of them don’t get enough to eat. They come from poor families. If only we could help feed them”.

(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1960c, p. 11)

The discursive construction of the impoverished conditions of a nameless and voiceless population articulates with “common sense” understandings of what underdevelopment looks like, and who occupies these places (poor, passive, but well-meaning teachers and students), as well as what the rational, apolitical, and necessary intervention should be. The article goes on to assert that despite these conditions, the UN has had success in promoting development, thanks in part to the use of sport as part of an array of mental and physical activities. By the middle of the decade, UNESCO had further entrenched sport as part of its aims in promoting education, inaugurating a world campaign for literacy that emphasized the participation of young people in developing countries in physical education, sports and science at the 1965 World Congress on literacy (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1966).

**Sport and peace-building.** Beyond these educational aims, peace building was also a central focus in the First Development decade, in both post-war reconstruction and in the
postcolonial world. As part of the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, sport played a role in building peace between former foes: In regards to Germany, for instance, the Chairman of the German Democratic Republic, Walter Ulbricht, argued that, as part of diplomatic relations, sport was key to promoting peace within the divided nation (United Nations, 1966). Yet the mobilization of sport for peace was not confined to mainland Europe: Cold War politics, and development frustrations, also spurred fears that continued underdevelopment in the global South would threaten post-war peace and security. The arbitrary national boundaries constructed in the aftermath of World War II often bore little relationship to the history, culture, language or economic structures of the areas, which over time, slowed progress, stymied self-determination, and engendered animosity and conflict within the global South and between the global North (O’Sullivan, 2005).

The “Congo crisis” of 1960-1964 speaks to the complexities and conflicts of decolonization, the relationship of development to colonialism, and the role of the UN therein. On July 12th, 1960, Patrice Lumumba, the first elected Prime Minister of the Congo, requested assistance from the UN, in response to the revolt of the army and the mobilization of a large number of Belgian troops to defend Belgians in the Congo. The Katanga Province of the Congo, a mineral-rich southern province dominated by Belgian mining interests, seceded from the nation, creating a crisis for Lumumba (Scarnecchia, 2011). In response, the UN deployed a multinational peacekeeping force, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC), to assist in containing the conflict. As part of peace-keeping efforts, the UNOC used sport as part of matters of technical assistance and security. In the summative evaluation of the UNOC after their withdrawal from the Congo in 1964, the organization noted “UN experts provided technical advice and guidance to the
Ministries dealing with social affairs, youth and sport and middle class community development” (United Nations, 1964b).

Post-colonial conflicts were not limited to Africa, nor were the uses of sport as a response. Following its independence, Indonesia became ensnared in a political conflict with its former colonizer, the Netherlands, over the territory of Western New Guinea. For its part, Indonesia claimed the territory as its own, while the Dutch maintained that the Western New Guinea residents were not Indonesian, and thus the territory should remain under their administration. When Indonesia landed paratroopers in Western New Guinea in 1961, the UN moved to mediate the conflict, eventually brokering the New York Agreement on October 1962 that saw the Netherlands transfer administrative authority over Western New Guinea until May 1st, 1963. As part of a programme for conflict resolution, the UN supported the Kotaburu Football Association (also referred to as the Hollandia Football Association). This support included funding for equipment for the association, a series of friendly matches to promote peace and diplomacy and the hosting of a sports tournament for youth in the region (United Nations, 1963). In initiating this programme, the UN was itself aware of the potential for such endeavours to be seen as imperialist, noting in a letter of correspondence: “Glad to hear of this development in the programme...we must be wary of taking over the leadership. We should seek out the natural leaders, train them and work with them” (United Nations, 1963) (See Appendix D). This notion of “training the trainers” would become a central theme for the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm in the decades that followed.

Postcolonial struggles manifested within the UN itself around this time as well: The Nonaligned Movement that emerged in the mid-1950s to campaign for more equitable
terms of trade and development finance schemes gained further traction with the establishment of the 1964 UN conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which ultimately led to the creation of the aforementioned Group of 77 caucus within the UN General Assembly. UNCTAD embodied the Third World view point that the dependency model promoted by the Bretton Woods system was inappropriate for the needs of developing nations, and launched a critique of international economic institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, and the World Bank (O'Sullivan, 2005).

These political tensions between the UN and nations of the global South made the matter of Apartheid in South Africa all the more pressing for the UN. In 1963, the UN created the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, later renamed the “Special Committee against Apartheid.” The UN Security Council then adopted Resolution 181 calling upon all States to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and later the supply of petroleum to South Africa. By 1965, these embargoes had failed to significantly impact the South African system: in fact, the policies of Apartheid were intensified over that period, with a stricter application with regard to entertainments, sports and other public events (United Nations, 1965). By 1968, the UN turned to sport to put pressure on the South African government: the Special Committee called for the “encouragement of anti-Apartheid movements and NGOs in their activities against Apartheid, the boycott of cultural educational, sporting and other exchanges with South Africa and the commemoration on 21 March 1969 of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa” (United Nations, 1968a). Later that year, the
International Conference on Human Rights adopted a resolution on “measures to achieve rapid and total elimination of all forms of racial discrimination in general and of the policy of Apartheid in particular” (United Nations, 1968b, p. 105). Amongst other things, the conference endorsed the decision by which the IOC banned South Africa from participating at the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games and “expressed alarm at the fact that, in spite of numerous recommendations appeals, various international federation and associations, particularly the International Lawn Tennis Association, still allowed South Africa to take part in their contests, and strongly recommended that these international sporting bodies...should exclude South Africa from their membership until the heinous policy of Apartheid was ended in that country” (United Nations 1968a, 1968, p.105).

The 1970s: Setting the stage for the SDP paradigm

In the 1970s the UN made a push to include more broad-based measures of development (including both qualitative and quantitative approaches to employment, education, health, nutrition and housing), with a particular focus on the well being of women and children in development measures. The 1970s also saw an effort towards greater autonomy for developing nations: the UN made concessions in allowing developing nations to set their own targets, yet the alliance of nonaligned countries and the Group of 77 lobbied for more profound changes. Seeking to escape the crossfire of Cold War politics, the Group of 77 launched the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 to promote their own interests, calling for greater equity and justice between nations. Through the NIEO, developing nations sought to challenge the economic models of development with reforms to the international trade system (through the lowering of tariffs on developing nations’ exports) and support for the nationalization of key industries,
and control over the price and supply of commodities and raw materials (O’Sullivan, 2005; Stokke, 2009).

Although the formalized sport for development and peace paradigm would not emerge for decades, the 1970s also saw a more clearly articulated role for sport in the development context. Throughout the decade, the UN (through UNESCO) further extended physical education programs in developing countries as part of more qualitative markers of development. Many developing countries demonstrated their support of sport for development initiatives in this time, viewing sport as a means to promote global equity. For example, in 1973, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Greece, Iran, Libyan ArabJamahiriya, Morocco, Philippines, Romanian and Uruguay sponsored a draft resolution pertaining to sport and development. The resolution states, “Convinced that physical education and sports exchanges can contribute to international efforts to promote peace, mutual understanding, co-operation and the development of friendly relations among peoples,” and recommends “that member states adopt the necessary measures to promote physical education and sports exchange programmes, particularly among young people and on the basis of equality of men and women, in order to improve the quality of life, inculcate fundamental human values and promote selfless competitions, solidarity and full respect for the integrity and dignity of all human beings” (United Nations, 1973a) (See Appendix E).

These sentiments would come to form the framework of the SDP paradigm, and were further solidified at the First International Conference of Ministers and senior officials responsible for Physical Education and Sport. The 1976 conference, hosted by UNESCO and attended by IOC president Lord Killanin, explored the present situation of physical education and sport in four realms: the education of youth, life-long education, the
promotion of physical education and sport at a national level, and international co-operation for the promotion of Physical Education and sport. True to the aforementioned desire for qualitative and quantitative approaches to development, Killanin advocated an interdisciplinary approach to physical education and sport, “since sport required intellectual qualities and had emotional, ethical, and aesthetic implications” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1976). Echoing these beliefs, the Director-General of UNESCO summarized, “sport clearly [demonstrates] the fundamental equality between people and nations, should service international understanding and prepare for life in a world at peace” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1976).

The comments of the IOC President and the Director-General of UNESCO are noteworthy in that they formally present sport as a novel response to economic and social underdevelopment – the novelty of which would be redeployed at the turn of the millennium. Here, three further notes from the archive of the conference are of interest. First, the conference highlighted the infrastructural and resource barriers to sport for development, particularly for developing countries that “are particularly sensitive to this need since they must have frequent recourse to imports” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1976). Second, caution was applied in considering the contribution of sport to development:

Although the practice of sport is indeed a powerful factor for improving the quality of life, it assumes its full value only in association with other elements. It is clearly essential to view sport and Physical Education within the framework of overall plans for economic, social and cultural development on which, in practice, they are obviously dependent. For while sport and Physical Education contribute to development, they too are subject to the same constrains that affect overall growth. (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1976)
Third, UNESCO also cautioned against the commercial capitalist tilt of sport, recommending that “national plans should be aimed at checking and eliminating the commercial tendencies which, largely fostered by professionalism in sport, hinder the wide development of sport and turning those who practice it into a type of merchandise” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1976). These last two points are poignant, given how the UN has moved away from this stance over the last three decades.

Aside from ongoing efforts to promote economic development in the global South through sport and tourism – for example, in 1972 thirteen countries received UN assistance in tourism development, including the development of sport centers (United Nations, 1973b) – other economic benefits of sport were articulated through the 1977 inauguration of the Interim Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport. The committee developed a draft status of an *International Fund for the Development of Physical Education and Sport*, intended to promote, amongst other things: social integration, the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding between nations; the provision of technical and financial collaboration in the creation and strengthening of institutions and sport facilities; and the promotion of research into the scientific, educational, physical, medical, social, economic, and infrastructural aspects of physical education and sport (United Nations Educationalalal, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1977).

Finally, the 1970s would also set the stage for another prominent feature of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm: the international development potential of sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games. Of late, the IOC has held such a prominent position in the SDP landscape that the development capacity of sport mega-events almost seems beyond reproach. As the apparent development capacity of sport became more
clearly articulated in the 1970s, the IOC also entered the sport and development fold, although in quite a different capacity than the contemporary context. Although sport mega-events, such as the Olympics, have long been a stage for the celebration of nationalism, in the 1970s claims of nationalist sentiment held a particularly salient meaning for developing countries seeking to assert their independence and statehood through membership in the UN and the IOC. The case of Southern Rhodesia is particularly illustrative of the seriousness to which these claims to nationhood were taken at the time. A 1971 letter from the German Permanent Observer to the UN protested the admittance of Southern Rhodesia to the 1972 Olympics because of its non-recognition status in the UN, and the fact that it did not have a recognized Olympic Committee (United Nations, 1971).

The IOC's role in validating nation-states, and indeed development, were further articulated at the first session of the Intergovernmental Committee for Physical Education and Sport in June of 1979, when IOC president Lord Killanin addressed the UNESCO group to announce a more open and democratic IOC. In particular, the IOC felt that Physical Education and sport had great significance as a human right, and made reference to UNESCO's International Fund for Physical Education and Sport, likening it to the Olympic Solidarity Fund of the IOC and urging coordination of the two to avoid overlap. Lord Killanin sought to further align the IOC and UN at this time by noting their shared philosophical outlooks, and the role that UNESCO could play in staging high-level competitive sport.

In setting the groundwork for a long relationship between the two organizations, Lord Killanin pledged himself to give UNESCO assistance in promoting Physical Education

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8 Though not recognized until 1980, Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, unilaterally declared independence in 1965.
and sport in lifelong education and expressed the hope that UNESCO would associate itself with the Baden-Baden Olympic Congress in 1981 (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1979). The Baden-Baden conference is significant for establishing the “Olympic ideal” that seeks to “bring down the barriers of prejudice which divide peoples from one another” under the banner of sportsmanship, fairness and impartiality. This ideal would form the basis of the Olympic Movement that would eventually solidify the IOC’s partnership with the UN, and the hosting of the Olympic Games as an accepted strategy of development (International Olympic Committee, 1981) (See Appendix F).

**The 1980s: The lost decade**

The 1980s, widely referred to as the “lost decade of development,” saw a retraction of many social and human dimensions of development, and the advancement of neoliberal development policies. The global economic crisis of the decade quickly became a development crisis when stagnant economic growth combined with rising interests rates – “stagflation” – hampered the ability of developing countries to meet debt repayment standards (Stokke, 2009). In response, the Bretton Woods organizations – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – began to institute new policies of economic restructuring in developing countries, under the banner of the “Washington Consensus.” As noted in Chapter Two, the Washington Consensus decentered the role of the state in development, and promoted three broad economic reforms: first, it liberalized trade by removing restrictions on imports, reducing and imposing a uniform rate of tariffs, and promoting free trade; second, the Bretton Woods institutions and the G7 stipulated the return of nationalized enterprises to private hands, and the closure of state enterprises that
did not turn a profit; and third, initiated the deregulation of domestic markets to establish a free market for goods, labour and finance (Jolly et al., 2004, p. 150).

True to the political climate of the decade, these economic reforms ushered in an era of neoliberalism that would come to dominant the development paradigm, and epitomize the ongoing power imbalance between the global North and South. Structural Adjustment Programs would come to dominate the next two decades of development, where aid increasingly became tied to conditions of economic reform. With few other sources of financial aid available, indebted developing nations were made to accepted macroeconomic policies of neoliberal orthodoxy, often at the cost of social and environmental development (Stokke, 2009). Under the immense wave of aid restructuring advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions and by the governments of the US and UK under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher respectively, the UN repealed many of the ideas it had been promoting over the previous two decades, particularly those focusing on social and human aspects of development. For their part, the major specialized agencies of the UN – the ILO, the WHO, UNESCO, and the FAO – each published reports pointing to the divisive consequences of neoliberal reforms. UNICEF had perhaps the greatest success in advocating against reforms and continued to work on matters of poverty and human development: two publications related to the effects of structural adjustment programs on children’s welfare *The State of the World’s Children* (an annual report first issued in 1980) and the *Impact of World Recession on Children* (Jolly & Cornia, 1984) had the strongest impact in this regard.

As part of an effort to center the human aspect of development the UN promoted the positive potential of sport for children around this time. The 1981 UN General Assembly agenda included an item entitled *Policies and Programmes Relating to Youth*, sponsored by
seventeen developing countries, that called upon member states to develop sport activities and physical education in the context of continuing education. In particular these policies sought to give priority to programs prepared in the framework of “sports for all” in order to reach all sectors of the population, especially young people (United Nations, 1981). In this regard, the 1986 Social Development Newsletter: Special Issue on Social Development in Africa, focused on the positive effect of sport on youth and the environment. The article notes:

Another environmental problem created by rapid urban growth is the lack of facilities for recreation and sports, which are important for the development of youth but have been given a low priority in government budgets and planning programmes. Instead, scarce resources are often concentrated on a few gifted individuals, who are encouraged to participate in international competitions. Some governments, however, have established youth-oriented sports departments or ministries, and many include Physical Education and sports in their teacher training curricula, although the programmes are often limited. Two areas of sport development in Africa deserve particular attention. The first is the promotion of traditional sports and games, which have often been neglected in favour of international sports. The second is the local manufacture by young people of sports equipment. (United Nations, 1986a)

In highlighting the lack of support for social programs, the reliance upon private forms of aid, and the tendency to support only high-level athletes, this passage makes clear the need for more support to social forms of development. The explicit mention of nationalism, economic growth and youth development, moreover, centers the transformative potential of sport, and its ostensible ability to meet both quantitative and qualitative development goals. The focus on youth and sport culminated in the proclamation of 1985 as the International Youth Year, where governments were “invited” to provide technical and financial support to youth centers and sport centers and to promote physical education and sports activities for young people including young girls, young people with disabilities, out of school youth, young migrants and young refugees (United Nations, 1985a).
The focus on youth and sport in this time, however, was not divorced from the broader Cold War geo-politics of the 1980s that continued to play out within and through the UN. For instance, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the UN Secretary-General discusses the XII World Festival of Youth and Students, held in Moscow in 1985, in which more than 20,000 envoys of young people from 157 countries participated. The President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, took the opportunity to appeal to participants, that they, the youth of the planet, should “wage a persistent struggle for the present and future of mankind without wars” (United Nations, 1985b). A large part of the Festival programme was dedicated to activities expressing solidarity of the youth of the world with anti-imperialist postcolonial struggle, particularly in Nicaragua, Chile, El Salvador, Namibia, Lebanon, and South Africa. These anti-imperialist expressions opposed the “[encroachment] on the freedom, independence and sovereignty of peoples and their right independently to decide their own fate, who are fighting against the remnants of colonialism, expansionism, Apartheid and other forms of racism and racial discrimination and against Fascist and dictatorial regimes” (United Nations, 1985b). These demonstrations also reflected a dissatisfaction with the neoliberal economic policies of the decade, and sought to find “ways to remove economic backwardness, to achieve genuine economic self-reliance, to end neo-colonialist exploitation, domination and oppression to find a just solution to related problems of the developing countries’ external debt and to establish a new international economic order…” (United Nations, 1985b). Importantly, sport played a significant role in delivering these messages: sport programmes at the festival were intended to provide an opportunity to learn about different national cultures, and a forum entitled “Youth and sport in
contemporary society” included discussions on the development of the personality, the democratization of sport, and cooperation in the name of peace (United Nations, 1985b).

The UN was also a venue for other imperialist and colonial condemnations, particularly in regard to Apartheid in South Africa. Continuing their efforts to place political pressure on South Africa in the 1970s, the UN declared their commitment to the elimination of Apartheid and racial discrimination at the 40th session of the General Assembly in 1985. The declaration focused on the role of sport in this regard, banning participating in sport events with South Africa, noting that,

...sport is not played between Governments; it is played between peoples. While we may condemn the actions of actions of a repressive government, we do so because of its abuse of its own people, and in the name of their human rights... Sports grounds have become the scene of political protests, and even a funeral ceremony, and have thus become in a very real sense a part of the battlefield for the liberation of South Africa. As Apartheid permeates every aspect of South African life, sport can never be prised from the iron grip of Apartheid, thus South Africa itself has ensured that sport and politics are inextricably fused. (United Nations, 1985c).

The UN also made a point to congratulate athletes who declined “on principle, vast sums of money to visit South Africa and play there”, naming in particular Viv Richards (cricket, Antigua), Larry Holmes (boxing, USA), John McEnroe (tennis, USA), Ian Botham (cricket, UK) and Mark Ella (rugby, Australia). These sentiments were further solidified in the Declaration against Apartheid sport, adopted on November 7th, 1987 that brought together governments and sports organization of Africa, national liberation movements, the UN special Committee against Apartheid, and other supportive governments and anti-Apartheid movements around the world. The 1987 declaration reiterated the role of sport in ending Apartheid, and the international boycott of competition with South Africa:

We recognize that a solemn duty devolves upon sports people and sports administrators around the world to be true to the ethics of sport and so to oppose Apartheid, not just in words but also in deeds. We are mindful of the fact that it was
the success of the sports boycott that brought about the first breaches of the Apartheid doctrine of racial separation, a success that demonstrates that the imposition of effective sanctions is the only proven means by which the international community can enable the oppressed people to secure the total destruction of Apartheid. (United Nations, 1987)

Elsewhere, sport was being used to promote peace and reconciliation, such as the organization of sporting activities between Turkey and Cyprus as a measure of good will over land disputes between the two regions (United Nations, 1988). Around the same time, Vietnam supported the adoption of the resolution to observe 1986 as the International Year of Peace by organizing a 1986 km run to promote world peace, and organized various other sport events to mark the year (United Nations, 1986b). The timing of these events are significant given that the Vietnam war had ended only eleven years prior, and 1986 marked the end of Vietnam’s third 5-year plan that launched a socialist-oriented market. Thus while sport played an active role in political posturing in the last decade of the Cold War, the ability of sport to promote more social aspects of development were hampered by the neoliberal economic policies and structural adjustments that ultimately lead to a lost decade of development.

**The 1990s: The lost rationale for aid**

The 1990s presented some of the most significant manoeuvrings in the sport for development landscape, with the aims and goals of the Sport for Development and Peace movement articulated ever more clearly within and through the UN. This momentum was catalyzed by a drastically changing political economic context that saw the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The resultant economic and political vacuum spurred action towards an increasingly connected world, and a concomitantly heightened concern for issues of globalization. While the end of the Cold War ostensibly promised a new era of
peace, the decade saw a shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts, fuelled by ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts, particularly in developing and former Soviet states (Jolly et al., 2004).

Seeking to move on from the "lost decade" of development of the 1980s, the strategy of the fourth Development Decade was to focus on human rights and human welfare; yet development "progress" remained stagnant in the quagmire of structural adjustment programs, and what Olav Stokke (2009) refers to as the lost rationale for aid. Stokke argues that during the Cold War, development assistance was an instrument in the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union: after the Cold War, though an ethical impetus remained, it was no long necessary to "buy" allies. As a result levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) declined throughout the decade, particularly from the United States, and for former Soviet nations who received support from the USSR.

In the context of decreasing levels of aid, sport for development operations took on more of a capitalist bend in the 1990s, signified, for example, in the tightening relationship between the UN and the IOC. Both organizations promoted the potential of the Olympic Games to be a force for peace and development, with various documents published in the decade that set the ground work for the emergence of the SDP Paradigm in the early 2000s.

Perhaps the single most significant event in this regard was the UN's declaration of 1994 as the "International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal." First endorsed by the Egyptian representative to the UN on behalf of the Organization of African Unity in 1993 to celebrate the centennial of the modern Olympic Games, the declaration re-introduced the Olympic Truce in which nations promised a cease-fire in any given conflict and guaranteed safe
passage for athletes while the Games were conducted. To meet these ends, the declaration stated, “the goal of the Olympic Movement is to build a peaceful and better world by educating the youth of the world through sport, practiced without discrimination of any kind, and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding, promoted by friendship, solidarity, and fair play” (Building a peaceful and better world through sport, 1993). Noting further the contribution that the Olympic Truce could make towards “advancing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN” the appeal made five recommendations to the UN (United Nations, 1993a):

1. Commends the IOC, the International Sports Federations and the national Olympic committees for their efforts to mobilize the youth of the world in the cause of peace;
2. Urges member states to observe the Olympic Truce from the seventh day before the opening and the seventh day following the closing of each of the Olympic Games, in accordance with the appeal launched by the IOC;
3. Takes notes the idea of the Olympic Truce, as dedicated in ancient Greece to the spirit of fraternity and understanding between peoples, and urges Member States to take the initiative to abide by the Truce, individually and collectively, and to pursue in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN the peaceful settlement of all international conflicts;
4. Calls upon all Member States to cooperate with the IOC in its efforts to promote the Olympic Truce;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to promote the observance of the Olympic Truce among Member States, drawing the attention of world public opinion to the

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9 Interestingly the agenda item was originally sponsored by predominantly global South/developing nations including Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zaire and Zambia and later joined by Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Eritrea, Georgia, Guatemala, Hungary, Iran, Japan, Nepal, Oman, Panama, Seychelles, UAE, and Uzbekistan.
contribution such a truce would make to the promotion of international understanding and the maintenance of peace and goodwill and to cooperate with the IOC in the realization of this objective.

In subsequent plenary meetings, various UN representatives made statements to assert the shared goals of the UN and IOC in promoting peace and development through sport. The representative from Egypt, for instance, made clear his support for the Olympic Movement in building a “better and more peaceful world by education and mobilizing the youth of the world through sport and culture,” noting the “very close link between the objectives of the United Nations and the Olympic Movement.” Similarly, the representative from Spain pointed to the long history of sport in promoting peace “since the classical age,” and to the peace and humanitarian potential of the Olympics. Finally, the US representative recalled the relation of de Coubertin’s principles for the modern Olympics and the development capacity of the Games; “De Coubertin, at an international congress in 1894, he found support when he stated: ‘Let us export our lands. That is the true free trade of the future; and the day it is introduced...the cause of peace will have received a new and strong ally ... so that together we may attempt to realize, upon a basis suitable to the conditions of our modern life, the splendid and beneficent task of reviving the Olympic Games’” (United Nations, 1993b). With the modernist rationale of sport and development in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that the resolution was adopted without a vote. With the adoption of the resolution, the UN made moves towards mobilizing the “power of sport” for social good through a series of resolutions under the banner of “Building a Peaceful and Better World Through Sport.” The draft resolution, first presented by the US representative, expressed the “unanimity of the family of peoples of this Earth in the belief that it is possible for us to
build peace through sport” (United Nations, 1994a). These views were also supported by the representatives of developing countries – including from Panama, Guinea, and Tunisia – who all highlighted the relationship of Olympism to peace and global health, listing its contributions to health, ethics, environmentalism, anti-doping, and awareness of HIV/AIDS (United Nations, 1994a).

In support of the International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal, the National Olympic Committees of more than 26 developing countries\textsuperscript{10} commemorated the International Year of Sport and the Olympic ideal through a variety of festivals, educational programs, and sporting events. Notable amongst these was the *Week of sport and the Olympic Ideal* on the theme of “Olympism for the reestablishment of peace” in Burundi; the inclusion of “Olympism” in the teaching programme of the National Institute for Youth, Physical Education and Sport in Ethiopia; the broadcast of television programmes on Olympic history and the Olympic ideal on Central Chinese Television; and a debate on “peace and development, the Olympic Ideal” at the Chinese Olympic Academy (United Nations, 1994b). The notion that the Olympic Games could promote peace and nation building were further echoed by the representative from Latvia who recounted how their admission to the UN in 1991, followed by the IOC’s decision to renew Latvia’s membership in the IOC was key to “the pursuit of our identity and self-determination.” “Sport,” the representative claimed “was an important element for the promotion of our national self-confidence and our country’s quest to re-establish its independence. The pain of improper recognition in past Olympics is still with us today” the Latvia representative continued,

\textsuperscript{10} These countries include Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Seychelles, Sudan, Tunisia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, China, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Oman, and Sri Lanka.
“...but our experience – be it living under totalitarian regime while dreaming of freedom and independence, or forming a new sense of public awareness in a free State – allows us to testify to the importance of spots and the Olympic Movement as an integral part of the life of a nation” (United Nations, 1995a). That developing and newly independent countries were leading the charge in promoting the International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal, speaks to the belief in the potential of sport to bring about significant change to development policies and practices.

Despite the positive implications of these measures, their effectiveness was called into question at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly on February 11, 1994, where the UN representative from Azerbaijan stated that in the spirit of the Olympic Ideal, the country was ready to observe a cease-fire in its conflict with Armenia (United Nations, 1994c). Yet, the Olympic Trust would ultimately prove ineffective as the armed forces of Armenia launched a large-scale attack along Azerbaijan’s front days later (United Nations, 1994c). This incident was but the first sign of unrest and dissatisfaction with the development policies of the 1990s, including those related to sport, by developing nations. At the same plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in 1995, the representative from Azerbaijan, reiterated his concern for the effectiveness of sport in development and peace-building initiatives. The Azerbaijani representative stated:

It is hard, however, to speak about either a successful and broad application of the educational potential of sport or sporting achievements in a country where the mass aspect of sport – one of its fundamental principles – has been violated as a result of aggression by the neighbouring Republic of Armenia. Instead, we are dealing with another mass – 1 million refugees, 300 000 of whom are children and adolescents. (United Nations, 1995a)

At the next Assembly, the 51st plenary meeting on November 6th 1995 regarding the resolution “Building a Peaceful and Better World through Sport and the Olympic Ideal,”
representatives from other developing nations shared similar sentiments. For example, Prince Sobandla of Swaziland, pointed to the growing concern that role of sport and the Olympics in the development paradigm was more a matter of optics than tangible development when he stated, "We, the small and developing nations, have been accused of employing the principles of peace and dialogue as a shield to protect ourselves from those whose powers both in aggression and in defence, are mightier than ours. This may be true, but we still hold to the traditional practice of solving problems by peaceful means" (UNGA 50th session, 51st plenary meeting, 1995). Similarly, Colombia, as the new Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, made clear the time-sensitive nature of promoting tangible development through sport in its address to the UNGA: “Now it is the time to as the developed countries to encourage specific programmes that will allow the developing world to integrate itself and to contribute through sports to the peace and development of the international community.” Meanwhile, although having implemented sport programs to promote peace, human rights and health, the representative from Iraq argued that the embargo imposed by the UN Security Council since 1990 had negatively impacted all aspects of life. The representative included sport in this regard, arguing that “the embargo and the lack of adequate nutrition have deprived athletes of the necessary means to realize their full athletic potential...that has led to an extremely serious deterioration in sports activities in school and universities” (United Nations, 1995b).

Over the next several plenary meetings of the UNGA many developing countries made clear their concern for the direction of development – and development through sport – taking issue in particularly with the top-down nature of its implementation. The representative from Guyana pointed to the role that super-power rivalry had in
jeopardizing their own peace and security while Kuwait highlighted their commitment to
the Olympic Ideal, yet noted the difficulty in doing so given that many of their athletes
continue to be incarcerated in Iraqi prisons. On matters of under-development, the
representative from Saint Lucia highlighted the economic and structural inequalities
related to sport for developing countries, Namibia noted the difficulty in establishing basic
sporting facilities when the highest proportion of their national budget is dedicated to
health and education, and the representative from Jamaica pointed to the ongoing
economic underdevelopment of the nation when she stated “It is a miracle, even to
Jamaicans, that, with limited financial resources, equipment and formal training, many of
our young people have risen to become world-class athletes” (United Nations, 1995b,
1995c, 1999).

In spite of the contentions from developing nations that the development potential
of sport was perhaps overstated by the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, and that
sporting initiatives could not undo well established global economic and power
inequalities, the sport for development movement continued to gain steam heading toward
the new millennium. Three archival documents capture the momentum behind sport for
development towards the end of the 1990s that would set the stage for Sport for
Development and Peace as a central component of international development policy. The
first is a speech made by the Australian representative to the UN at the 44th session and
62nd plenary meeting of the UNGA in November 1999 that captures the belief in the “power
of sport” for prompting development – particularly as it relates to children – in which he
noted his own experience as a goodwill sporting representative for the UNHCR in bringing
“hope” to child refugees on the Thailand-Cambodia border (United Nations, 1999). At the
same plenary session, Algeria, as the chair of the Organization of African Unity, made clear that despite the aforementioned dissatisfaction with sport and development by some developing nations, the African continent was in support of the Olympic movement and sport for development. The Algerian representative stated:

Africa’s interest in the Olympic Movement and its devotion to the values it carries date back to the beginning of this century, when, despite the constraints and restrictions, African athletes, under the flags of colonial Powers of that time, wrote in gold letters on the Olympic Pantheon the name of a continent which had irreversibly awoken to history. Did not Baron de Coubertin – aware as he was of the immense potential contribution of Africa to the Olympic Movement and the necessity to open up sport as a universal language and a permanent school of life to the colonized people of Africa – advocate unsuccessfully the organization in 1928 of African games at Algiers, which were not held until half a century later in 1978, bringing together the countries of the continent which were finally free. History nevertheless saw that justice was done to the African people, and after their independence, despite the often-pathetic sums available to them they have given the Olympic Movement the universality that it lacked and the breath and the momentum it needed. (United Nations, 1999)

Third, and finally, outside of the support for sport and development from nation-states, the UN itself heightened their efforts in the field particularly by implementing sport as a basic right for children, prisoners, and refugees.

**Into the twenty-first century**

After a turbulent 50 years of global governance, the UN capitalized on the turn of the Millennium to mark a new epoch of development. Centered on the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs, the 2000s brought with them the promise that tangible, holistic and “measurable” development was near at hand. Praised as a universal language and practice with an inherent ability to promote social, economic, and political advancement, sport has been presented as a novel approach to development with a human face. In this chapter I have endeavoured to show that the use of sport in aid and development paradigms is not as
“new” as the UN claims. Since its creation in 1945 the UN has mobilized sport in pursuit of various development ambitions over the decades. Indeed, sport played a central role in the Marshall Plan and post-World War Two reconstruction in the 1940s, the political posturing of the Cold War and decolonization that characterized the 1950s and 1960s, efforts to afford developing nations greater autonomy in the 1970s, the neoliberal economic policies of the Washington Consensus, as well as anti-Apartheid protests of the 1980s, and the broadening development goals and post-Washington Consensus of the 1990s and early 2000s.

If, as I contend, the use of sport as a means to and marker of development isn’t as nascent of a movement as the UN proposes, many questions remain unanswered: what are the effects and implications of this false divide in the development timeline? Rather than proffer a break from decades of stagnant development, how might the SDP paradigm extend and entrench development approaches it is ostensibly moving away from? What effects does a false shift have on shaping understandings of the knowers and the known, the empowered and the disempowered, the developed and the developing in the twenty-first century? These are questions I seek to explore in the following chapter.
Chapter 6: Governmentality and Sport for Development and Peace

To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards it inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods.

-Michel Foucault (1977b, p. 92)

The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body.

-Michel Foucault (1977a, p. 26)

In the preceding chapters I have endeavoured to show that sport has long been part of techno-political rationalities of control. As we have seen, from times of antiquity, through colonialism, to the development era, sport has been a ready avenue through which to shape and mould the body in the image of a dominant political and/or ideological ethos: In Victorian England sport was mobilized as a response to an ostensibly eroding masculinity; in the colonial context sport was seen as a way to civilize a backward and amoral “Other”; and in the post-war context sport was central in revitalizing Europe and providing a pathway to independence for former colonies. In the twenty-first century sport is mobilized in pursuit of development goals as a novel approach to a stagnant development landscape. Indeed, sport is a powerful means to meet these ends because of its ability to intervene upon and shape corporeality.

Through the MDGs and the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm, the UN has been particularly active in capitalizing on the turn of the millennium as a precipice for “new” approaches to development. To recap: In September 2000, 191 countries convened under the auspices of the United Nations to agree to eight time-bound goals ranging from...
halving extreme poverty, to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education; the goals were to be met by 2015 (United Nations, n.d.d). Since 2000, the MDGs have become the framework for development policies and practices around the world (Hayhurst, 2009). As part of the goals, the G8 agreed to provide enough funds to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank to cancel $45 to $55 billion in debt from global South nations to allow resources to be redirected for health, education and poverty. In citing the significance of these goals in the new Millennium, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued:

Eradicating extreme poverty continues to be one of the main challenges of our time, and is a major concern of the international community. Ending this scourge will require the combined efforts of all, governments, civil society organizations and the private sector, in the context of a stronger and more effective global partnership for development. The Millennium Development Goals set timebound targets, by which progress in reducing income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter and exclusion – while promoting gender equality, health, education and environmental sustainability – can be measured...The Goals are ambitious but feasible and, together with the comprehensive United Nations development agenda, set the course for the world’s efforts to alleviate extreme poverty by 2015. (United Nations, n.d.d)

Positing that sport can contribute to development “in virtually any community in the world,” the UN has mobilized the use of sport in pursuit of development through the creation of the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, the naming of 2005 as the International Year for Sport and Physical Education, and the publication of multiple reports promoting the potential contributions of sport to humanitarian and development work. The most significant movement, however, has been the articulation of sport’s direct contribution to all eight MDGs, as listed in Table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Contribution of Sport</th>
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</table>
| 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger | Participants, volunteers and coaches acquire transferable life skills which increase employability  
Vulnerable individuals are connected to community service and supports through sport-based outreach programs  
Sport programs and equipment production provide jobs and skills development  
Sport can help prevent diseases that impeded people from working and impose health care costs on individuals and communities  
Sport can help reduce stigma and increase self-esteem, self-confidence and social skills  
Reduced risk of diseases that can cause or aggravate poverty by preventing people from working and/or imposing health care costs, through:  
- Increased physical activity levels  
- Sport-based public education and social mobilization campaigns in support of prevention and vaccination initiatives  
- Sport programs successful in reducing health risk behaviours |
| 2. Achieve universal primary education | School sport programs motivate children to enroll in and attend school and can help improve academic achievement  
Sport-based community education programs provide alternative education opportunities for children who cannot attend school  
Sport can help erode stigma preventing children w/ disabilities from attending school  
Increased health and physical fitness of primary school children, reducing school absenteeism through:  
- Increased physical activity  
- Sport-based health and disease prevention education for children and families |
| 3. Promote gender equality and empower women | Sport helps improve female physical and mental health and offers opportunities for social interaction and friendship  
Sport participation leads to increased self-esteem, self-confidence, and enhance sense of control over one’s body  
Girls and women access leadership opportunities and experience  
Sport can cause positive shifts in gender norms that afford girls and women greater safety and control over their lives  
Women and girls with disabilities are empowered by sport-based opportunities to acquire health information, skills, social |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Reduce child mortality</th>
<th>Sport can be used to educate and deliver health information to young mothers, resulting in healthier children.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased physical fitness improves children’s resistance to some diseases.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sport can help reduce the rate of higher-risk adolescent pregnancies.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sport-based vaccination and prevention campaigns help reduce child deaths and disability from measles, malaria and polio.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inclusive sporting programs help lower the likelihood of infanticide by promoting greater acceptance of children with disabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in child deaths and disability from measles, malaria and polio as a result of sport-based vaccination and prevention campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improve maternal health</td>
<td>Sport for health programs offer girls and women greater access to reproductive health information and services.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased fitness levels help speed and post-natal recovery.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased access to reproductive and sexual health information, discussion and services for women and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced risk of adolescent pregnancy in sport participants in some contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria, and other diseases</td>
<td>Sport programs can be used to reduce stigma and increase social and economic integration of people living with HIV and AIDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sport programs are associated with lower rates of health risk behaviour that contributes to HIV infection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programs providing HIV prevention education and empowerment can further reduce HIV infection rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sport can be used to increase measles, polio and other vaccination rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of celebrity athletes and use of mass sport events can increase reach and impact of malaria, tuberculosis and other education and prevention campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced risk of HIV infection as a result of sport programs aimed at prevention education and improving health risk behaviours.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced stigma and improved health for some people living with HIV and AIDS, contributing to their increased social and economic status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Ensure environmental sustainability

- Increased vaccination rates for measles and polio
- Increased reach and effectiveness of malaria, TB and other education and prevention campaigns

8. Develop a global partnership for development

- Sport-based public education campaigns can raise awareness of importance of environmental protection and sustainability
- Sport-based social mobilization initiatives can enhance participation in community action to improve local environment

- Sport for Development and peace efforts catalyze global partnerships and increase networking among governments, donors, NGOs and sport organizations worldwide.
- Global partnerships to leverage elite and mass sport events and high-profile athletes to promote positive health messages

(Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a)

The MDGs and the role of sport therein represent an effective avenue to explore the legacy of a forgotten history of sport in development given the prominent positions they hold in popular consciousness. As a touchstone of development discourse, the MDGs allow for a complex set of development practices and ideologies to be reduced to a few, easily digestible development goals with a clear timeline. Able to trade on the seemingly indelible maxim of sport as a force for social good – particularly in the imagination of global North audiences – sport for development readily articulates with these straightforward narratives.

In this chapter I further extend the genealogy of Sport for Development and Peace to consider what affects the forgotten – or ignored – history of sport in development has for the history of the present. To do so, I first draw on Foucault’s concept of governmentality to explore how SDP and the MDGs construct knowledge networks of development. Second, I discuss the implications for these knowledge networks on the body and their articulation through “vocabularies of cost,” such as the cost of ill-health at the level of the individual and
the political economy, two fronts on which SDP is designed to operate. Third, I argue that
the governmental apparatus of sport and the MDGs reflect and reproduce neoliberal
ideologies in which the onus for “development” is delegated to “responsible” development
subjects, before offering a critique of the manoeuvrings in the final section. Ultimately it is
my assertion that the incorporation of sport in development policy (re)produces
development subjects and subjectivities within hegemonic global power relations; yet it
does so in a matter that recasts both development “problems” and their “solutions” through
a discourses of sport and play.

**Foucault and the “developmentality” of Sport for Development and Peace**

In her analysis of SDP policies Lyndsay Hayhurst (2009) calls for work on sport for
development to mobilize a postcolonial perspective so as to re-orient questions and
concerns regarding development towards the Eurocentric standpoints couched in
development policies. Such an approach enables better understandings of how practices of
development are produce and concealed by policy (cf. Moss, 2004). In heeding this call, my
concern in this chapter rests not with the best practices for meeting the MDGs through
sport, but rather with how the discourse of sport and the MDGs constitute central
components of a governmental apparatus that renders power dynamics hidden from sight.
In the twenty-first century, “development” has come to be characterized by expanding
governmental discourse that privilege certain imagined spaces as the sites for social
transformations. Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Phillips (2010) use the term “developmentality” to
reflect the ways in which the MDGs operate as a governmental discourse – or mentality of
rule – that draws on the turn of the century to reimagine spaces and populations, and to
recast solutions to development “problems” through new objectives aimed at social
transformation. They argue that the MDGs engender a way of thinking about, and standardizing the conduct of, developing countries by outlining a set of calculations regarding social and economic life, including education, health, food security, peace, and, I contend, sport.

In this way, I argue that the MDGs enable and are enabled by technologies of global governance, or what Foucault termed “governmentality.” In his lectures at the College de France from 1977-1978 Foucault distinguished government – that is, the history of the notions, procedures, and means employed for the “government of men” in a society – from governmentality. He saw governmentality as “the way in which the conduct of a set of individuals became involved, in an increasingly pronounced way, in the exercise of sovereign power” (Foucault, 2009, p. 364). Later, in Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault expanded on this notion to explain how governmentality sought to regulate the behaviours of subjects so that “government [has to regulate the life of] its subjects, to regulate their economic activity, their production, the price at which they sell goods and the price at which they buy them and so on...” (Foucault, 2010, p. 7). Foucault argued that power operates on a societal level through what he termed biopolitics: a technology of power that uses a variety of instruments – including the ratio of births to deaths, fertility, rates of reproduction – to shape the ways of acting, and realms of possibility, for the population as a whole (Foucault, 2003). Through biopolitics, Foucault explored what he saw as the “problem of the population” and the question of how to govern. To do so he traced the historical shift in power relations from their physical manifestations (i.e., public displays of power such as executions) to more subversive forms that disguised the locus of power and sought to produce a docile, productive citizenry (Foucault, 2003).
In the shift from the rule of the sovereign whose authority was to “let live and make die”, to contemporary forms of rule, the purpose of government is not simply the act as government itself, not to rule, but to secure “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health,” to “make live and let die” (Foucault, 1977b, p. 100). For Foucault, in the shift away from sovereign power, governmentality became the means by which biopolitics is operationalized as subjects “self-optimize” through discourses of individual liberty and freedom of choice (Löwenheim, 2008). Under sovereign power, control is exercised through external threats, but in contemporary relations between and among the global North and South, power is not easily attributed to particular groups, such as nations states, or confined within particular geopolitical boundaries: rather, power is diffused throughout social relations (Darnell, 2010a).

Foucault conceived of this type of modern power as operating on a governmental level “through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly through techniques that will make it possible, without the full awareness of the people” (Foucault, 1977b, p. 100). An ensemble of institutional procedures, calculations and measures form these campaigns and techniques to allow the exercise of a seemingly innocuous, banal form of power on a target population. These technologies of power produce knowledges and ultimately shape conduct by enacting a form of political economy. Here, political economy is used in the older sense of the term to refer to the exercise of a form of surveillance and control of the economy at the level of the entire state and all members therein (Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1991, p. 92). Governmentality is thus intrinsically tied to the “conduct of conduct” where a range of technologies (e.g., statistical measures, transnational laws and policies) renders the population knowable. This knowledge then permits the identification of sites of
intervention and configuration of conduct so that people, following their own self-interest, will “do as they ought” (Ilcan & Phillips, 2010). In other words, biopower exerts a normalizing force on society by applying regulatory power on the individual and the population so as to conform the actions of both, and to render the population, as well as the individual body, knowable and thus subject to regulation (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 47).

As opposed to more direct forms of control – such as corporeal punishment – governmentality thus allows for governance from a distance, through discursive technologies of power. Whereas the authority of the sovereign to issue commands, punishments, taxes, and gifts is absolute, to govern is “to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s authority. When violence is used, it must be justified by a notion of improvement. Its purpose cannot be mere plunder or dominance” (Li, 2007, p.13). Both the colonial and development eras were/are marked by such technological apparatuses, manifest as developmental mentalities of rule. Seeking “authority for one's authority” forced a rationalization of colonialism. Armed with bullets, bibles and sporting goods, imperialists and missionaries justified colonial exploits under the auspices of bringing Christian and Enlightenment values of liberalism – the right to liberty, equality and freedom – to a backward and pre-modern “Other.” Yet liberalism also became a defining problematic of colonialism: the contradiction between commitment to the rights of the individual, and the realities of authoritarianism began to unravel the fabric of colonial rule (Gidwani, 2008).

In the development era tropes of progress and improvement remain steadfast under the guise of what Tania Li (2007) calls “the will to improve.” Colonial and postcolonial states, Li (2007) argues, share in the “institutionalized configuration of power” both
premised upon the “improvability of the “target group”” but also defined by “a boundary that clearly separates those who need to be developed from those who will do the developing” (p.15). Thus both colonial and developmental ideologies are defined by a “governmental regime” characterized by ruling powers that claim progress as a goal, a “people” whose condition must be improved, and an ideology of science with techniques to effect and measure progress (Li, 2007).

In approaching development as a power/knowledge relationship, the governmentality of development renders the world knowable in a limited and limiting range of ways so that development subjects are imagined within, and produced through, a range of neoliberal rationalities of government (Ilcan & Phillips, 2010). Such rationalities are manifest in the MDGs, where the “problems” of under/development as outlined in the goals reflect particular ways of knowing – including identifying sites of intervention and shaping the conduct of conduct – that render governmental apparatuses and power relations hidden from view (Löwenheim, 2008). Cloaked as neutral measures, the MDGs operate as a mentality of rule through systems of calculations (measures of education, food production, security, trade, health) and agencies (such as the Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Development Programme, and World Health Organization), to form a grid of “official” forms of knowledge. These official forms of knowledge are quantified through time-bound measures such as the MDGs that engage in “the language of targets, best practices, and costs,” encouraging “certain individuals, groups and places to reinvent themselves and demand the need for better tools to ‘track progress’” (Ilcan and Philips, 2010, p.849).
Sport, the MDGs and knowledge networks for development

In Victorian Britain, colonial missions, and post-World War II reconstruction, sport operated as a technology of power that shaped and defined subjectivities, ways of knowing, means of conduct, and ultimately, ways of governing. In the current context, sport is similarly mobilized to shape conduct through ostensibly more comprehensive approaches to development, that extend development objectives into the social realm. While including such things as sport, music, and communication technologies in development strategies – cellphones, for example, are now considered catalysts to development – is a visible response to critiques of strict economic models of development, such responses also extend the scope of social engineering into the realm of the “every-day” (Hayhurst, 2009; Li, 2007). For instance, a recent UNDP survey identified 165 indices of governance – including political corruption, civil liberties, gender equality, human rights, economic competitiveness, freedom of the press, political stability, environmental performance and human development – that are used to rate and rank states and evaluate their levels of aid (Löwenheim, 2008). While this rating system is certainly not new, such measures have increased exponentially over the past two decades – 83% of the indices in the UNDP were created between 1991 and 2006, and 50% between 2001 and 2006 alone (Löwenheim, 2008).

Implementing sport for development through the MDGs is but the latest expansion of mentalities of rule into a new field of measurement and surveillance. These development measures and goals construct a knowledge network for development where calculative practices shape the landscape on which development policies and subjects take shape. Measures of food security, literacy, physical fitness, and so on, allow for the (re)discovery of
groups of people in developing polities whose conduct can be subject to investigation and classification through biopolitics (Ilcan & Phillips, 2010). The body is at the center of these forms of knowledge construction and biopolitical interventions, where sets of development indicators are prescribed in and through the MDGs. For instance, sport is held to contribute to achieving the first MDG – *eradicate extreme poverty and hunger* – by reducing “stigma and increase self-esteem, self-confidence, and social skills,” and to the third goal – *improve female physical and mental health in promoting gender equality* – by enhancing a “sense of control over one’s body,” thus causing “positive shifts in gender norms that afford girls and women greater safety and control of their lives.” Similarly, in goals five – *improve maternal health* – and six – *combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases* – sport is presented as a way of “knowing” one’s own body and defining proper ways of acting: “sport for health programs offer girls and women greater access to reproductive health information and services” and “sport programs are associated with lower rates of health risk behaviour that contributes to HIV infection” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a). The UN also outlines sport’s merit for persons with disabilities, further demonstrating sport’s relationship to modernist (and neoliberal) logics of rendering the body productive. This is evidenced in goal two, *achieving universal primary education*, where “sport can help erode stigma preventing children with disabilities from attending school”; goal three, *promote gender equality*, as “women and girls with disabilities are empowered by sport-based opportunities”; and goal four, *reduce childhood mortality*, through “inclusive sporting programs [that] help lower the likelihood of infanticide by promoting greater acceptance of children with disabilities” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a).
SDP operates as a particularly salient form of biopower in the development context, in that it enunciates sites and subjects of development through its ability to motivate, rather than punish or repress, in meeting development goals. Within the MDGs the impetus for development is thus inscribed onto the body where identifying sites for better knowledge of and actions for the body ostensibly engender forms of conduct for the populace writ large that will, in turn, contribute to the overall “health” and productivity of the population and economy. The putative shift at play is that development comes from below, from the “people” themselves: a discursive movement that masks the ways in which neoliberal development measures and goals, continue to be prescribed “from above”.

**Neoliberalism and the productive body**

Sport and the MDGs imagine productive bodies not only in a physically active and healthy sense, but also in an economic sense. Promises of broader, more holistic and social definitions of development continue to be enveloped within economic indicators. As with conventional development objectives, SDP is framed within a “vocabulary of costs” such as the personal, social, and economic costs of social inequality. Through the Inter-agency Task Force on Sport and International Development, the UN posits that “well-designed sport-based initiatives are practical and cost-effective tools to achieve objectives in development and peace” and that sport can be a catalyst to economic growth in developing nations because a “physically active population is a healthier population, improving the productivity of the work-force and increasing economic output” (United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Sport and International Development, 2003, p. 3). Furthermore, the Task Force argued that the economic potential of sport can increase the Gross Domestic Product of developing countries in activities such as the “manufacture of sporting goods,
sports events, sport-related services and the media” (United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Sport and International Development, 2003, p. 3). As evidence for this claim, the Task Force states that sport activities added an extra 1.7% to the GDP of the United Kingdom (UK) in 2002 (p. 3). The relevance or applicability of statistics garnered from the UK, however, to low and middle income countries in the Global South is unclear given the quite drastically different geo-political and political economic contexts.

Unsurprisingly, the MDGs have not been sheltered from the economic reaches of the SDP paradigm. In the eighth MDG, develop a global partnership for development, for example, sport is held as a catalyst to global partnerships and increased networking among governments, donors, NGOs and sport organizations. These partnerships are formed both in policy – evidenced in the incorporation of sport into the INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers to “promote growth and reduce poverty” in countries like Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a) – as well as in practice, particularly through networking with trans-national corporations. Putting forth the notion that nations of the global South can access some of the global-sport-marketplace, the UN urges governments to engage with sport and sport based economic activities to initiate “a “virtuous circle” in which new forms of activity are generated requiring additional goods and services, creating jobs and contributing to economic development” (United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Sport and International Development, 2003, p.11). The MDGs also seek to capitalize on the economic potential of the sport-industrial complex11 by involving celebrity athletes and

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11 The term “sport-industrial complex” is used to define the movement of large amounts of money into sport and the intersection of transnational media, international sport organization, and multinational sport apparel producers for the profit of league owners, TNCs, and professional and amateur leagues (Manzenreiter, 2007).
the use of mass sporting events to increase the reach and impact of education and prevention campaigns (Sport for development and peace international working group, 2008a).

Sport’s entrenchment in patterns of global capitalism and the sport-industrial complex also shapes displays of material wealth and modernity at a national level. In fact, sport mega-events like the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, traditionally reserved for host cities in the global North, are increasingly promoted as a means to and markers of development in the global South. Indeed, over the past decade – and undoubtedly indebted to the broader position of sport in the development paradigm – developing countries in the global South are increasingly bidding for, and winning, the rights to host sport mega-events including the 2010 Commonwealth Games in India, the 2008 Olympic Games in China, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, the 2014 Olympic Games in Russia, and the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil.

The relationship of sport to modernist ideologies of productivity extends beyond the transformative effects of SDP on national economies to act on the level of the individual as well. The MDGs trade on these governmental logics of neoliberalism insofar as development is framed at an individual level: matters of social and economic underdevelopment can be addressed through the targeting of individuals – youth, mothers, people living with HIV/AIDS – who are made responsible for their welfare (Hayhurst, 2009). Take, for example, the first goal – eradicate extreme poverty and hunger – that revolves around economic indicators such as “improving life skills to increase employability”, job creation and skill development through sport programs and equipment production, and the prevention of “diseases that impede people from working and impose
health care costs on individuals and communities to lower health care costs” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a). Similarly, the sixth goal – combat HIV and AIDS, malaria, and other diseases – can ostensibly be achieved through sport by reducing stigma and increasing “social and economic integration of people living with HIV and AIDS” (Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2008a).

These notions of individualized responsibility for development run throughout the MDGs. They are particularly pronounced in the economic sphere where sport is constructed to teach discipline and the “value of effort”, and where marginalized and disenfranchised peoples are held responsible for the conditions of ill health. Take for example goal four – increase physical fitness in children to reduce child mortality rates – in which the UN argues that sport “can be used to educate and deliver health information to young mothers resulting in healthier children”, increase “physical fitness improves children’s resistance to disease”, and can reduce the rate of adolescent pregnancies. Yet, little attention is given to the structural or social issues that are at the core of high rates of disease, or gender based violence for example. Individualization pervades the MDGs where notions of increasing employability, preventing disease, motivating children to attend school, preventing gender based-violence, stemming pandemic illness, and promoting environmental sustainability are devoid of consideration for the systemic and political roots that sustain them. Often mobilized under the nebulous banner of “empowerment”, development programs and organizations set the guidelines for what constitutes development then shift the onus of responsibility onto the recipients of aid, justified through values of individualism and economic measures of progress.
Critiquing the body in motion

Economic productivity has been long tied to modernist rationalities of progress, where all things transition from pre-modern/pre-capitalist (unproductive) to modern/capitalist (productive) means. As David Scott (1999, p. 34) contends,

If modern power is concerned with disabling non-modern forms of life by dismantling their conditions then its aim in putting in place new and different conditions is above all to produce governing-effects on conduct. Modern power seeks to arrange and rearrange these conditions (conditions at once discursive and nondiscursive) so as to oblige subjects to transform themselves in a certain, that is, improving direction.

Building upon Scott’s argument through the example of land-use, Vinnay Gidwani argues that modern power sets upon what is unproductive, or what is wasteful, to render it productive Gidwani (2008, p. 25-26) writes

Land, according to the physiocrats, is the source of all wealth. Their theory of value is based on an analysis of agricultural production in which, much more than in industry, the difference between the value of labour power and value created by its use appears in its most tangible form...And so the semiotic equation of ‘waste land’ with the ‘irrational’ is quietly but irrefutably cemented. How can a rational society allow land to lie underutilized or idle?

If we take the example of land as a metonym, the notion of waste applies to labour power in the development context, where sport is a driving force in an “improving direction” so that all things must be rendered productive. While in conventional development vernacular productivity refers to putting resources “in motion” (i.e., the privatization of natural resources, making “use” of land for capitalist means such as the construction of sporting stadia), in the SDP paradigm, bodies can also not be left in rest: all forms of capital – social, physical, economic – are transformed from idle to productive within a capitalist political economic framework.

In the contemporary moment discourses of health and wellness have become imperatives in which a complex network of forces govern individuals and groups shaping
the ways in which they act. As Nikolas Rose (2007) argues, “every citizen must now become an active partner in the drive for health, accepting their responsibility for securing their own well-being. Organizations and communities are also urged to take an active role in securing the health and well being of their employees and members” (p. 6). The vague guidelines of sport in the MDGs, which propose that sport can be universally implemented to eradicate poverty, achieve primary education, promote gender equality, improve health, and ensure environmental sustainability, are all framed on an individual level. Indeed notions of individualism are further cemented in the ostensible meritocratic structures of sport – the value of effort is readily recognized and rewarded through sport – as well as in the discourses of partnerships where SDP agents and ambassadors from the global North enter the global South to expound the development capacity of sport.

These types of “partnerships” between the global North and South have become a buzzword for development in the twenty-first century. Through the guidance of the UN, development is imagined to be less about the global North imposing its will – and structural adjustments – on the global South, and more about the collective will of governments, non-governmental organizations, international governing bodies, and corporate interests to aid those in need. Implied in the discourse of partnership is a reverse of longstanding power relations, in which donor countries no longer impose their vision of development or conditionalities for aid, and global South nations now find themselves in the driving seat of development.

Despite these pronouncements, critical development and post-colonial scholars argue that the discourse of partnership disguises hegemonic structures in development. Rita Abrahamsen (2004), for example, argues that “partnerships” invoke specific
technologies of global liberal governance in which biopower operates in both voluntary and coercive ways so as to produce modern, self-disciplined citizens and states. The focus on individualism in neoliberal mentalities of governance is evident in the policies of the Bretton Woods organizations: The World Bank, for instance, posits that “the single most important theme running through the dialogue on development effectiveness is the need to put committed developing country governments and their people at the centre of their development process” (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 1455). Indeed, the centrality of individualism in development in not solely the product of vestigial sentiments of the “bootstraps model of development” in which people and nations pull themselves out from poverty, but also of a contemporary governmentality in which development is promoted through disciplinary techniques of “self-improvement.” In this way, discourses of partnerships and health promotion enable the implementation of development policies through sport while masking the “colonial continuities” of the whole endeavour. Indeed, the knowledge networks constructed in and maintained through hegemonic divides between the “knowers” and the “known” are often drawn along racialized lines (Darnell, 2010b). Sport for development and peace programs become contact zones between these two locations, where development practitioners from the global North are framed as the possessors of knowledge to be imparted upon a docile recipient in the global South (Razack, 2005).

Thus, rather than offer a way forward to ostensibly more holistic development approaches, the SDP paradigm repurposes neoliberal ideologies focused on the body. It is useful here to turn to Roger Levermore’s (2009) charge that sport for development appears “tailor made” for dominant paradigms of modernization and neoliberalism that are firmly entrenched in development ideology (p. 26). In this regard sport becomes an arena to
socialize and (re)produce productive neoliberal citizens, by “developing” underprivileged, marginalized, or deviant individuals. In “targeting marginalized young people in both domestic and international locales,” write Hartmann and Kwauk (2011), “sport-based intervention programs resemble experimental social policies aimed at governing the ‘conduct of conduct’ of ‘unskilled’ youth by equipping them with the tools for self-improvement and self-management” (p.288) (cf. Coakley, 2002, Darnell, 2010b). Indeed, the neoliberal ideologies that underpin SDP place the onus of responsibility for welfare and development on individuals, thus making it attractive to governments, as well as to global and local elites. SDP privileges the economic sphere – the building of physical infrastructure, and increasing employability through life skills training (Levermore, 2009) – while promoting neoliberal logics that ultimately come to rest on the physically active body, a body that requires perpetual self-policing and surveillance (Darnell, 2010a). Self-policing allows for governance from afar, not only through calculations of physical and economic productivity exercised by a host of governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations, and corporations, but also through responsible development subjects trained to “do as they aught.”

The neoliberal manoeuvrings endemic to the SDP paradigm are important arguments to bring to light; yet, the significance of SDP in the contemporary development landscape reaches beyond a simple repackaging of long standing colonial and development tropes. Champions of SDP point to the global popularity of sport as a tool of raising awareness to conditions of underdevelopment: for instance, the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace and Right to Play employ famous athlete “Ambassadors” who stand as testaments to the positive impact that sport can have, while drawing the
attention of global audiences to conditions in the global South. While this “call to action” is certainly nothing new – recall the depictions of impoverished and malnourished Others in consciousness raising efforts such as Live Aid organized by musician and activist Bob Geldof in the 1980s in response to the famine in Ethiopia – what is new about SDP is that images of starving children in the global South have been recast. We now see visibly happy, healthy children playing as evidence of “development”. In the late twentieth century “Live Aid” model, images of underdevelopment produced and relied upon understandings of the impoverished “Other” in need of aid, and of audiences in the global North, who were made responsible, complicit, and/or guilty for this injustice (see Figures 12-14). In the contemporary context, the frame has been refocused to images of children happily engaged in sport, so as to offer more reassuring evidence that development is happening. While the imperative to aid remains
steadfast, the focus on the body is shifted from what was – that is, decades of exploitation, neglect, apathy – to what is, or what could be – a renewed and refocused approach to development through sport. Discourses of the social good that are inherent to sport and the MDGs belie questions about the purpose of SDP programs and policies on two fronts. First, SDP and the MDGs offer reassuring evidence to global North audiences that development is happening through easily understood and digestible development goals with a clear timeline, and through matching depictions of happy, healthy children playing as evidence of the successes of these new policies (see Figure 15 for examples). Second, SDP and the MDGs align with longstanding ideologies of development that do not disrupt the larger political economic hegemonies at play. In other words, the mobilization of sport in development is explicitly not designed to bring about broad change to global or local social inequalities, but rather to resocialize individual youth into contemporary social and economic norms and structures so as to maintain privilege and the status quo (Darnell, 2014). From this view the primary, implicit function of SDP programs are to ingrain neoliberal values and “maintain power and hierarchy, cultural hegemony, and the institutionalization of poverty and privilege” (Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011, p. 291). “The hidden curriculum behind the intervention” Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) continue, “is intended to be deposited into the minds – or perhaps, in the case of sport, embodied and inscribed onto the “bodyminds” of youth by passionate volunteers, coaches, and development workers” and indeed development “subjects” themselves” (p. 8). The contribution of sport to meeting the MDGs is ostensibly about improving levels of health and productivity, and quelling various forms of violence through notions of fair play, meritocracy, and health promotion. And yet, the critique I want to offer here is that SDP and the MDGs not only do little to address
underlying systemic issues that sustain underdevelopment, but in fact engender, naturalize, and depoliticize the existing social order (see Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011; Darnell, 2010a; Li, 2007). Ultimately as Frans Schuurman (2009) argues, the MDGs are best viewed not as the culmination of 50 years of development co-operation, but as a mechanism to discipline development research towards neoliberal discourses, a manoeuvre that Foucault would label governmentality.
Problematicizing “progress”

Within a context of uneven global development, the implementation of SDP is emblematic of the movement towards social markers of development. While it may well be true that sport can promote personal development and act as an educational tool, the ways it can contribute to sustainable development on a broader scale have yet to be fully understood or theorized. Although the UN presents sport as a universally accepted and integrative social practice, it is unclear how sport can engage with and combat deeply rooted power dynamics that are ubiquitous in the development context. In this chapter I have illustrated how the integration of sport into the MDGs serves to reaffirm, rather than deconstruct, these hegemonic relations. Although the MDGs and sport for development are both often promoted as more encompassing and multilateral approaches to aid deliverance, caution needs to be employed when considering the weight of these claims. While these endeavours ostensibly represent a movement away from strict economic measures of development, and represent a renewed effort for sustainable development by the international community, the extent to which the MDGs and SDP mark a new road to development have been considerably mythologized.

Indeed, as I have attempted to show throughout this chapter, rather than a new era of development, in many ways the MDGs and SDP signal a repackaging of development tropes through a veiled neoliberalism. Under the auspices of the new millennium and a renewed focus on addressing the root causes of global underdevelopment, we have seen the perpetuation of neoliberal ideals of individualism, market imperatives, and hegemonic divisions between the global North and the global South. These divisions are spatial, ideological, and corporeal, as the global North is positioned as developed in contrast to the
underdeveloped global South, and the approach to development (through sport) framed as rational and normalized.

Given these insights, I want to suggest that sport and the MDGs hold (at least) four implications for development. First, sport for development programs actively construct knowledge of the global North and South, the people who occupy these spaces, and that of which they are capable. SDP frames development as something held by the Global North to be bestowed upon a grateful and silent Other in the global South by a benevolent development practitioner. Implicit in SDP programs is the supposed (superior) knowledge of the global North, which “knows” what is needed in the global South, and proposes that sport is a viable means to addressing global poverty, illness, and conflict (Darnell, 2007, 2010b). Here, the governmentality of SDP programs are readily identifiable: individual responsibility for (under)development, quantifiable measures of development, and the economic influence of the sport-industrial complex. Second, in shaping this particular knowledge, SDP makes visible the “active” and “healthy” – and thus “inactive” and “unhealthy” development subject. The active body is also a productive body: despite the proffering of a new era of development, SDP articulates with conventional development measures through a vocabulary of costs where people become productive components of the political economy. Third, and relatedly the active and productive development subject articulates with larger neo-liberal paradigms in development by downloading and individualizing the responsibility for development onto development subjects. As Ilcan and Philips (2010) state, “on the one hand, countries are no longer being profiled only in terms of GNP or poverty alone but in terms of a much wider reach that includes disease, equality and education. On the other hand, the standardized and limited numbers of indicators that
measure successful achievement of the Goals have squeezed out diverse and alternative ways of approaching any of these issues” (p.858).

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, I want to suggest that the ideological and epistemological underpinnings of Sport for Development and Peace extend beyond hegemonic development tropes to bring us somewhere new, and that sport offers a unique and powerful entry point into critiques of development. The discursive reframing of development subjectivities holds implications for lived experience in both the global North and South by repositioning the body as a central site of power, surveillance, and discipline. This focus on the body proffers new understandings of development subjects through images of ostensibly happy and healthy people engaging in sport, while also extending technologies that monitor, measure, and make the body knowable. In these ways, the use of sport in the MDGs serves to contribute to development governmentality by shaping the conduct of conduct through sport. Biopower operates within the sport for development context by constructing knowledge of what development is and is not. Through the monitoring and evaluation by the UN and other development actors, the construction of the global South as an area in need of a particular type of aid from the global North becomes a knowable truth. Sport governmentalities thus serve to reaffirm the discursive, intellectual, and material divide between the embodied locations of the Global North and South, classify how development can be achieved, and create subjects of development who are surveilled and monitored for “progress.”
Chapter 7: Towards a critical history of Sport for Development and Peace

The biological existence of human beings has become political in novel ways. The object, target and stake of this new ‘vital’ politics are human life itself.

-Nikolas Rose, 2001, p. 1

In this dissertation I have sought to trouble the apolitical understanding of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm and the notion that sport offers a novel response to decades of failed development. I have been committed to challenging the dominant, ideal vision of SDP in which sport is understood to shape bodies and ways of conduct that befit the values of “modern life” (see Hartmann & Kwauk 2011). A central part of this project has been to make the emergence of SDP strange: while stakeholders proclaim the paradigm as the culmination of decades of struggle over development policies to proffer a novel, holistic, and desirable response to a faltered development landscape, it is my contention that such narratives obfuscate its hegemonic and teleological underpinnings. A history of the present approach has been invaluable in foregrounding the problematic history of sport so as to challenge the “common sense” understandings of sport’s propensity to imbue social values and contribute to economic development. In utilizing this approach I have endeavoured to construct a genealogy of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm that reveals what has been hidden in the contemporary moment – namely the technologies of power-knowledges that surveil, discipline, and make the body knowable within a development apparatus (Garland, 2014).

The history of the present I offer allows for a re-evaluation of the present day by making visible the associations and lineages of sport’s imperial contexts, both colonial and developmental. Rather than search for a forgotten origin of SDP, my aim has been to
illustrate a discontinuous past that makes visible the problematic power structures of the SDP paradigm. The purpose of this genealogy has not been to identify sites and spaces in sport for development that can be ameliorated so as to outline a reparative approach to SDP. Instead, I have levied my analysis against how, rather than if, SDP purportedly works so as to explore the ways in which development discourses shape contemporary understandings of sport and/in development. The critique I offer thus seeks to move beyond enumerating the ways in which SDP repackages colonial, neo-colonial, or neo-liberal tropes, in order to question how the imperial history of sport shapes or reshapes understandings of development in the new millennium.

At the outset of this dissertation I sought to place sport sociology and history and development studies in conversation with one another; and to offer a critique of SDP through an investigation into the history of the present. My work has gone to lengths to address these gaps by offering a critique of SDP that draws on development and postcolonial studies, while situating contemporary manifestations of sport for development within the broader historical context from which they continue to be negotiated. In setting out to address these gaps, my work has been guided by questions that pertain to the operations of sport for development as a governmental apparatus. The four major research questions proposed in the introduction of this dissertation sought to explore the ways in which the SDP paradigm operates as a technology of power that shapes “common sense” understandings of what development looks like, where it operates, and upon whom it is intended to operate. Although I have offered answers to these questions, it important to note that these answers are necessarily partial, contested, and contextual. Indeed in following the post-structural approach outlined in my theory and methodology, the
research questions offered at the beginning of this dissertation look quite different from where I stand now. My research has followed diverse paths, diverging and converging in different areas as the material (or data) pointed my investigations in alternative directions. In what follows I offer answers of sorts to these research questions by first presenting a brief synopsis of my research before delving into three arguments that both address the research questions and make clear the contribution this dissertation makes to critical analyses of the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm.

Contemporary moments and contingent pasts

This dissertation entered the development paradigm in 1949 with US President Harry Truman’s inauguration speech. In this speech, Truman painted a vision of global impoverishment and underdevelopment, effectively shifting the global North’s gaze from one of colonialism to development. This discursive shift was problematic in its own time for its teleological framing of modernity as a series of stages through which all nations pass, for its erasure of histories and worldviews outside this path set by the “West”, and for its (re)positioning of the global North from imperialist steward to aid practitioner. Truman’s speech remains all the more problematic in the contemporary context: the ideals it set forth largely remain hegemonic today. Development remains understood as something that occurs in the global South and remains identifiable through narratives of poverty, instability, and backwardness. While Truman’s speech was one of multiple sites of enunciation for this vision, it remains a significant touchstone for modernist tropes that remain steadfast. Sixty years later the global landscape remains marked by ever-expanding inequality – both intra- and inter-nationally – and notions of “getting the number right” continue to be understood as the keystones to development.
Strict economic doctrines of development putatively came to a head with the demise of the “Washington Consensus” that espoused neoliberal virtues of privatization, deregulation, and market fundamentalism – often manifest in policies such as structural adjustment programmes – and the inauguration of a post-Washington consensus at the end of the 1990s. Capitalizing on the turn of the new millennium, development stakeholders, namely the Bretton Woods organizations, proffered novel and more broadly defined measures of development. The inauguration of the MDGs and the emergence of Sport for Development and Peace are perhaps the two most tangible manifestations of these policy shifts, as they ostensibly offer more social objectives and alternative voices to a stagnant development landscape. Yet, rather than presenting a rupture in the timeline of development – from decades of economic fundamentalism to novel social understandings of development – the emergence of sport for development and its implementation through the MDGs redeploy the call for more social and cultural approaches to development that continually takes on different forms in each decade of development. In this way, SDP is both new and not new in what has been a discontinuous and contested development timeline. Indeed, in many respects, the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm surreptitiously uses popular and apolitical understandings of sport and play to redeploy modernist, capitalist ideals through measures and markers of “healthy” people and “healthy” economies.

I have argued that although SDP is purportedly moving us away from strict, stagnant, and out-dated economic models of development, it is doing so by moving us toward “common sense” notions that re-center the body in the development context. Indeed the global popularity of sport, in tandem with commonly held beliefs of its apolitical
nature, have allowed the SDP paradigm to gain traction in the development paradigm, despite only circumstantial evidence to support its effectiveness as a development tool (see Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007b). That the UN lists at least 614 governmental, non-governmental, and corporate organizations utilizing sport in their development programs is evidence of this popularity. By drawing on stakeholder literature that outlines how the SDP paradigm purportedly works, and placing it in conversation with critical development literature and theory, I have sought to challenge the \textit{a priori} understanding of sport in the development context. Indeed the theoretical framework I utilized in this dissertation largely drove my analysis of SDP: In the tradition of “contextual cultural studies” (see Millington, 2011), I have employed a theoretical approach that is attuned to the complexities and antinomies of critical development studies and sport sociology. Mobilizing a “unity in difference” approach that draws on Marxist, postcolonial, and post-structural perspectives has enabled the foregrounding of the economic roots and exploitative propensity of (under)development, the contested nature of the (post)colonial and claims to modernity as a state versus a representation, and the continually (re)negotiated nature of development discourses that obfuscate hegemonic power relations between the global North and South. Undertaking such an approach has allowed me to consider the broader social, political economic, and historical imperatives that have come to position the SDP paradigm as a rational, productive, and celebrated tool of development in the twenty-first century. In what follows I synthesize the three main arguments of this dissertation.
1. Sport for Development and Peace is not novel

My first two research questions pertained to how UN policy regarding sport for development has changed historically (How has UN policy regarding SDP emerged and changed historically? How has the call for more social and holistic approaches to development informed or enabled the emergence of SDP?). The UN’s timeline on SDP makes clear the novelty of sport in the development context. The UN makes note of how sport was employed – albeit in an ad hoc manner – by the International Labour Organization in the 1920s, and in the Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1958) and the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport (1978), and yet, the UN’s own timeline on sport and development positions the new millennium as the birth of the SDP paradigm. The 2003 report “Sport for development and peace: Towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals” espouses the nascency of the movement, calling for sport to be better funded and better integrated into the development agenda by incorporated sport-based initiatives in country programmes of agencies (United Nations, 2003). Despite these claims, my archival findings demonstrate that sport has been employed in the development context in a significant capacity for much longer than this timeline suggests and in ways that make a priori understandings of sport’s inherent proclivity for social good problematic.

In the British colonial milieu, sport was understood to be an effective means of protecting the strength of the nation and expanding the reach of the empire. The dual threat of a crisis of masculinity at home, and a backwards, amoral “Other” abroad, in concert with the rise of athleticism spurred a movement towards implementing sport in the colonial context. Manifesting in what J.A. Mangan (2006) and others (Scott, 1970;
Hoakkanen & Mangan, 2006; Donnelly, 2011) refer to as missionary muscularity, sport, particularly cricket and baseball, were thought to offer a more “sane,” “velvet glove” approach to imperialism, in which a range of colonial agents – soldiers, teachers, priests – would use sport to spread Christian Victorian values throughout the empire. The anticolonial narrative delivered in CLR James’ (1969) *Beyond a Boundary* is illustrative of how sports like cricket were mobilized as a form of cultural imperialism in which the colonized subject was meant to strive for, but never fully achieve, the status of “modern,” and thus be confined to the space of the mimetic. Yet, as James and other post-colonial scholars and activists have argued, the sporting pitch acted much more as an arena for sly civility (Bhabha, 1994) that offered space for challenging colonial hierarchies and spurred nationalist independence movements.

The contemporary UN-led development context in which the SDP paradigm has emerged is informed by this imperialist history and constituted by a set of colonial continuities that make the intervention of the global North in the global South commonsensical. Established in 1945, the United Nations was founded in the midst of a surge in anti-colonial independence movements: as such, from its outset the UN has been an organization concerned with matters of decolonization and development. The UN was a central entity in the promotion of nationalism during this time, shaping axiomatic understandings of the nation-state as a crucial step on the path to modernity. Yet, as many postcolonial scholars have argued, the concept of the nation-state engenders a false equation of nationalism as liberation and a breakage from colonial power structures, when in many respects, colonial continuities remain steadfast in global North-South hierarchies.
Just as sport was utilized in the colonial context as part of the project of modernity, it was similarly mobilized in the post-war context to reposition nation-states on the path to prosperity and global modernity. It is in this context that the forgotten history of sport for development is most glaring. From the early days of the post-World War II era sport was readily deployed in a reparative capacity, not only as part of the Marshall Plan for European economic revitalization, but also in (re)focusing the attention of youth. Akin to the role of sport and athletics as an outlet for aggression and moral development for youth in the British school system, sport was used in a similar capacity throughout 1940s Europe, particularly in orphanages where “structure” was ostensibly missing. Sport was thus mobilized in this context as a means to shape proper ways of acting as part of reparative and development efforts for youth groups to shape proper ways of conduct in a post-war world.

At the outset of this project I was expecting to find a great deal of debate within the UN’s records as to the propriety and practicality of implementing sport as a tool of development. Perhaps unsurprisingly given sport’s popular and apolitical standing, I uncovered little debate on the matter – at least in official records of UN meetings and assemblies. Although sport was utilized as a pulpit for contentious discussions surrounding the Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 77 in the 1950s and early 1960s, critical discussions of sport in the development context did not re-emerge until the 1990s when UN representatives for Azerbaijan, Swaziland, Colombia and Iraq voiced their concerns over the effectiveness of the Olympic Truce (although it should be noted the effectiveness of sport itself in this regard remained unquestioned). Indeed, the vast majority of UN records point to the apolitical understanding of sport within the General Assembly, where
the use of sport from the first development decade of the 1960s, to the New International Economic Order of the 1970s, through the “lost development decade” of the 1980s, and into the post-Cold War era of development in the 1990s, largely escaped critique.

This dissertation has revealed the frequency with which sport was used in a development capacity by the United Nations – from the Marshall Plan and post-World War II reconstruction in the 1940s, to the Cold War and anti-colonial politics of the 1950s and 1960s, to efforts for more social measures of development in the 1970s, through to the neoliberal economic policies of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. These findings inform the history of the present: the ahistorical presentation of SDP as a novel approach for development is problematic in that it allows for the \textit{a priori} understanding of the inherent social good of sport to proliferate. Such understandings are troublesome not only because SDP may not work in the manner it is believed to, but also because the framing of SDP as a novelty actively closes off space for critical reflection and debate. While this fetishization of the “new” isn’t itself new (it is somewhat of a tradition to reframe the development paradigm every decade or so), or unique to development, it does serve to align the SDP movement with what Slavoj Žižek (1999) terms the “post-political” where debates center on \textit{how} and not \textit{whether} sport should be employed in the development context.

Žižek uses the term post-political to describe the contemporary context in which political debate is not merely repressed so as to contain or pacify it, but “foreclosed,” so that forms of postmodern critique are rendered irrational and excessive by incorporating some form of the critique into the politic itself (Žižek, 1999, p.198). In other words, in the post-political state, the divide between formal equality and its actualizations is recognized, but
simultaneously muted, by identifying the source of the contention and proposing, superficially, a set of measures to rectify the wrong. To illustrate, Žižek (1999) uses the example of a popular protest focused on a particular demand that becomes politicized when the demand functions as a “metaphoric condensation of the global opposition against Them [sic], those in power, so that the protest is no longer just about that demand, but about the universal dimension that resonates in that particular demand” such that incorporating some form of the demand actually silences larger debate (p. 203). “For this reason,” Žižek (1999) continues, “protestors often feel somehow deceived when those in power... simply accept their demand – as if, in this way they have [deprived] them of the true aim of their protest in the very guise of accepting their demand” (p.203).

To note the post-political nature of sport for development is not to argue that those who promote and participate in SDP programmes are having the wool pulled over their eyes – that having knowledge of the problematic and contentious aspects of development is itself liberating – but rather to point to how hegemony operates. Akin to Stuart Hall’s (1986) position on Marxism without guarantees and the structuring of “common sense” ideologies, Žižek, drawing on Ernesto Laclau, argues that endeavours which seek to grasp and mirror adequately “what is” – what Marx called the “world-view” – by exposing “how features of what we (mis)perceive as ontologically positive rely on an ethicopolitical decision that sustains the prevailing hegemony” (Žižek, 1999, p. 174). In this way “common sense” notions are produced through ideological notions – e.g., sport is inherently productive for development – that are hegemonized as universal tenets or experiences. Žižek argues that these universalized ideologies are referent to, and of, empty signifiers of the “common sense” that foreclose debate: “The struggle for ideological-political
hegemony,” writes Žižek (1999), “is thus always the struggle for appropriation of the terms that are “spontaneously” experienced as “apolitical”, as transcending political boundaries” (pp. 176-177).

The novelty of sport in the development context thus trades on “common sense” notions of sport-as-socially-productive that stand-in as a universal signifier of what development looks like and how it can be “achieved”. Žižek (1999) argues that ideas like sport for development, become universal through the notion of “readability”: signifiers that enable individuals to organize their life experiences with consistent narratives become hegemonized and “readable.” Ideas becomes readable not through neutral measures, but rather through ideological struggle. Yet such struggles do not occur on equal ground or through open debate where the narrative which most adequately represents “reality” wins out, but rather through circular and self-referential sets of knowledges – “the narrative already predetermines what we shall experience as ‘reality’” (Žižek, 1999, p. 179).

It is my contention that the ostensible novelty of sport in the development context has gained traction for its readability: the idea of development as something that can be brought to the global South through sport, and images of happy children engaging in sport as evidence of development are indelibly readable to global North audiences. That Žižek uses the example of human rights to illustrate how ideological constructs become universal, is particularly cogent for my analysis of SDP. Žižek (1999) argues that from the moment they were formulated, human rights functioned as an empty signifier that could be widened from its universal form – that of white male, private owners of capital – in a way that does not merely apply the notion of human rights to new domains – women, children, racialized groups – but rather by retroactively refining the very notion of human rights (p. 180).
Matters of human rights – and by extension development – emerge as the exemplar of post-political logic that permits the “violation of State sovereignty from trade restrictions to direct military interventions, in parts of the world where global human rights are violated,” under the banner of apolitical and universal notions of “humanity” (Žižek, 1999, p. 201). Thus, through universalized notion of human rights, things like development – and indeed sport for development – become commonsensical and post-political. The effect of asserting the novelty of the SDP paradigm – in spite of decades of historical evidence suggesting the longstanding use of sport for the purposes of development – is to depoliticize SDP and foreclose any debate on the topic for its ostensible universality. Ultimately, promoting SDP as a nascent movement that proffers a more broadly defined response to decades of failed development actually closes off larger debates on the role of sport in development, and more broadly, development itself.

2. Sport for Development and Peace extends a governmental apparatus

The third research question I posed in this dissertation sought to explore how UN policies inform the practice of mobilizing sport in the development context (How does UN policy inform the practice of mobilizing sport in the development paradigm?). The explicit focus on development policy – rather than specific development programs the UN implements – was purposeful: I wished to open space to challenge a priori assumptions and the underlying focus on “best practices” that pervades much of the industry, so as to expose how policies conceal broader power dynamics (see Hayhurst, 2009; Moss, 2004). In focusing on SDP from the top-down my aim has been to turn the development gaze back on itself so as to question how SDP purportedly works. In following this framing, I contend that the SDP paradigm further extends a governmental, or to use Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Phillips'
(2010) term, a “developmental” apparatus over the global South. The productive power of sport is the implicit undercurrent to the growing popularity of SDP in contemporary development objectives: sport offers a means to surveil and shape the conduct of populations through its ability to motivate rather than oppress, by opening spaces of intervention through the culturally normative use of sport (Darnell, 2010b).

Governmentality is a useful framework to explore how SDP policies conceal hegemonic development practices and epistemologies. In distinguishing governmentality from “government”, Foucault sought to foreground how the actions of entire populations could be directed such that the populace conforms to the prevailing aims of sovereign power (Foucault, 2009). Sport has long been mobilized to shape the conduct of individuals in pursuit of dominant political or ideological paradigms from times of antiquity on – in the development context, sport is similarly utilized to regulate the life of development subjects by disciplining the body in ways that meet biopolitical aims. Both the colonial and development eras were and are marked by such technological apparatuses where discursive constructs of human rights – the rights to liberty, equality, and freedom – offered a justification for interventionist practices.

As in Victorian England where sport was positioned as the response to an eroding masculinity at home and abroad, and in the colonial context, where sport was offered as a path to civility, sport has taken on a similar ethos in the development paradigm. Indeed each of these eras have been characterized by an institutionalized configuration of power, which under the guise of a “will to improve”, allows for the intervention upon a target for whom “progress” is a goal that requires constant surveillance and measurement (Ilcan & Phillips, 2010). In the contemporary context, development operates as a power/knowledge
apparatus that identifies the “problems” of underdevelopment, and (re)defines their solutions. This is perhaps no better illustrated than in the knowledge apparatus that coalesces in the MDGs and Sport for Development and Peace. Framed as neutral measures – rates of poverty and hunger, primary education, child mortality, health and illness – the MDGs engender constrained epistemologies – of what development does and does not look like, of who “does” the developing and who “receives” it – that render international power relations hidden from sight. In quantifying official forms of knowledge through a system of calculations and time-bound goals, the MDGs articulate as a governmental discourse that reimagines spaces and populations in limiting and limited ways (Ilcan & Phillips, 2010). The 165 indices of governance tied to the MDGs are evidence of how the Goals produce knowledge about, and seek to standardize the conduct of, people in developing countries through measures and markers of social and economic life, including education, health, food security, peace, and now sport.

Sport has been a particularly effective tool in promoting and implementing development for its ability to shape the body and ways of conduct. Indeed sport has made a particularly apt tool for promoting and implementing the MDGs in the twenty-first century for its covalence with neoliberal logics – the promotion of meritocracy, individual effort, and self-improvement, for instance (Donnelly, 2011; Darnell, 2010a; Ilcan & Phillips, 2010) – while deflecting attention away from how such programs fail to challenge longstanding development practices and apparatuses. In other words, the politics and power structures of SDP largely escape critical focus for the ostensibly apolitical nature of sport, and for discursive constructions that reflect “common sense” notions of sport and play as inherently productive at the level of both the individual and the population. While on the
surface sport and the MDGs offer a movement away from strict economic measures of development to include a much wider definition of “development”, they do so within a post-political paradigm that assumes the utility and novelty of sport in the development context, while closing off diverse and alternative ways of approaching – and understanding – development (Ilcan & Phillips, 2010).

Ultimately, I contend that through development policies such as the MDGs, the SDP paradigm extends a governmental apparatus within the development context that shapes acceptable ways of conduct through forms of corporeal surveillance. In other words, sport has gained traction in the development context for its ties to productive forms of power: sport offers a ready entry point into the development context to exert a normalizing force on the body – both individual and populace – so as to make it knowable and thus subject to regulation (Markula & Pringle, 2006). In this way, SDP is hegemonic in the sense that it continues “common sense” narratives of development under another name. SDP is hegemonic, precisely because it forecloses alternative anti-colonial approaches. While in this dissertation I have not advocated for a reparative approach to SDP, I believe that framing SDP as part of developmentalities offers important points of entry into how hegemony is formed through consent. Thus the calls within SDP for social markers of development, support for women’s empowerment, or the foregrounding of “local knowledge” for instance, within SDP reinscribe colonial continuities in failing to challenge dominant, neo-liberal discourses of development “born and refined in the North” (Rahnema, 1996, p. 379; see also Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011; Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011). Rather than generative, then, SDP is a homogenizing and universalized global imagination of development that relies upon teleological vision of modernity and modern subjects.
3. Sport for Development and Peace refocuses the body in development

The fourth and final research question sought to explore how Sport for Development and Peace may shift epistemologies of development by (re)centering the body in the development paradigm (How has the SDP paradigm shifted the understanding of what development looks like, who will do the developing and who will be developed?). Recently there has been a proliferation of social responsibility endeavours that seek to raise awareness of issues ranging from environmental degradation (e.g., various “green washing” movements), to health (e.g., the pink ribbons campaign for breast cancer or the “Movember” movement for prostate cancer awareness). Similarly, there has been a concomitant growth in organizations that seek to raise awareness of conditions of poverty and underdevelopment in the global South, in both the private (e.g., the National Basketball Association’s “Basketball Without Borders” and “Let me Play” programmes) and public sphere (e.g., the multitude of non-governmental organization that employ sport in a development capacity). In my estimation, sport has been particularly productive at “raising awareness” of underdevelopment in the new millennium, for the global popularity of sport, and the increasingly “common sense” notion that sport is a human right. Indeed, when packaged through the easily digestible MDGs, SDP draws upon accepted ideologies in the imaginatives of the global North of sport’s inherent proclivity for social good to engender particularly understandings of what development looks like and how it can be operationalized.

In the 2005 “Magglingen Call to Action” the United Nations called upon ten stakeholders to commit themselves fully to the SDP so as to use the global position of sport to raise awareness of underdevelopment in the global South. Such a call to action is
certainly not new: endeavours focused on “raising awareness” of underdevelopment have long mobilized images of poverty, famine, or pandemic illness as signifiers for underdevelopment (United Nations, 2005). The depictions of impoverished and malnourished children in developing countries has been a ready trope in aid initiatives such as Live Aid in 1985 and its revival in the 2005 benefit concert Live 8, both of which were intent on eliciting emotional responses in global North audiences who were being told they have the ability to “make a difference” in the lives of others (the 1985 event broadcast images of starving and ill Ethiopian children, a scene that was recast at the 2005 event).

While Live Aid focused on raising funds from global North audiences and Live 8’s aims were directed more towards placing political pressure on G8 countries, both sought to corral the interest and compassion of global north audiences with “common sense” depictions of underdevelopment and catchy slogan like Live Aid’s “the day the music changed the world” and Live 8’s “make poverty history.” It is my contention that while the SDP paradigm trades on similar understandings of underdevelopment, it offers a (post-political) shift where rather than proffering images and discourses of abject poverty, ill-health, and despair, SDP offers more celebratory visions of development, where the novelty and popularity of sport conjures sentiments that development through sport is wanted, needed, and works. Thus while the SDP paradigm “raises awareness” of underdevelopment within a hegemonic lens, it does so by shifting the frame from the negative depictions of abject poverty and ill-health, to positive, productive images of health through the corporeality of the sporting body.

Operating within a post-political context, the celebratory twist of SDP articulates with what Jules Boykoff (2014) terms “celebration capitalism.” While Boykoff uses the term to refer to the contemporary conjunction in which the development capacity of sport mea-
events like the Olympics are promoted for their development potential, the central premise of the term applies to the Sport for Development and Peace paradigm more generally. In juxtaposition to Naomi Klein’s (2007) concept of “disaster capitalism” in which enterprising capitalists utilize the collective state of shock following disasters to institute neoliberal reforms, Boykoff (2014) refers to celebration capitalism as disaster capitalism’s “affable cousin” (p. 3). While in disaster capitalism political and corporate elites utilize the state of exception to advance policies by circumventing the governmental and no-profit sectors, in celebration capitalism the popularity of sporting events are utilized to team with – and ultimately exploit – these public entities (Boykoff, 2014).

The larger SDP paradigm mobilizes a form of “celebration capitalism” by utilizing the popularity of sport to advance neo-liberal ideologies with the aid of the governmental and non-governmental sectors. For instance, when implemented through development policies such as the MDGs, sport offers avenues for neoliberal and modernist rationalities of productivity and individualism. If the project of development is one tasked with the transition from pre-modern (unproductive) to modern (productive) states, sport has long been looked to as a mean of moving the entire body politic towards productive means: in the contemporary conjuncture, SDP substitutes depictions of idleness or malnutrition with visions of productive bodies in motion. This productivity extends beyond the realm of individual health, to the “health” of the entire political economy. In this sense, the active body not only contributes to individual health, but also fights against the economic costs of inequality: many of the MDGs refer to the ability of sport to promote life skills that increase skill development and employability, create new jobs and global partnerships, fight health
care costs, and increase the economic integration of people living with illnesses such as HIV and AIDS.

Such notions of productivity lead into a second avenue for the promotion of neoliberal ideologies – the focus on the virtues of individualism. Sport is understood to contribute to development through its propensity to teach discipline and the value of hard work. Notions of individual effort run throughout the MDGs where most goals focus on individual interventions – increasing knowledge, improving levels of health, and developing job skills – that offer little in the ways of challenging systemic inequalities. In this way, individual people are held responsible for conditions of ill health in the development paradigm, and made responsible for securing their own well-being (see Rose, 2001). The point here is not that SDP merely repackages established hegemonic development tropes (e.g., the “bootstraps” model of development), but rather that it offers something different. Sport offers a unique and productive entry point for critiques of development itself, through its repositioning of the body as the central site of power, surveillance, and discipline, allowing a range of truths to be made knowable. In this way, SDP operates as a form of biopower that constructs a knowledge apparatus through measures of health, employability, childhood and maternal mortality, and pandemic illness that obfuscates larger governmental power dynamics. Thus institutions of international governance like the UN utilize sport as a means to reframe development in the new millennium, offering new visions of what development looks like and how it can be achieved, all whilst maintaining global power dynamics and hegemonic ideologies of “progress.” As Simon Darnell (2014) argues, the SDP paradigm does not offer new avenues through which to challenge global inequality, precisely because it is explicitly not designed to do so: rather its
aims are to resocialize individual youth into social and economic structures that maintain privilege and the status quo.

It is important to note that my contention is not that targeting the body is itself a new turn in development. As I have illustrated in this dissertation the body has been a focus of disciplinary mechanisms for centuries, particularly in the colonial context of the early twentieth century where maximizing the fitness of the population and the individual by promoting practices of physical activity and proper hygiene were paramount. As Nikolas Rose (2001) argues, the focus on health in the colonial “neo-hygienist” movement sought to promote ideals of physical and moral health that “formed a kind of transactional zone between political concerns for the fitness of the nation and personal techniques for the care of self” (p. 3), which operated in concert with more broadly oriented biopolitical strategies.

In the contemporary development moment, the governmental rationale for the health of the population is no longer dictated through the “fitness of the population as an organic whole for the struggle between nations” (Rose, 2001, p. 5), but rather through economic costs of illness, and perhaps more importantly, through the imperative “will to health” that is inherently, post-politically, unquestionable. Both within and outside the development context, every citizen becomes an active partner in the drive for health, where a complex network of “forces and images, the health-related aspiration and conduct of individuals is governed “at a distance”, by shaping the ways they understand and enact their own freedom” (Rose, 2001, p. 6). In this way, the use of sport in the development context has come to dominate social thinking, to become “ideological” so as to promote new conceptions of the world that draw upon a network of pre-existing elements – the
unquestioned need for aid and the inherent social good of sport – that ultimately maintain hegemonic power relations.

**Future directions**

In this project I have attempted to bring a critical historical analysis to the contemporary moment in which sport has emerged as an accepted and celebrated tool of development. I have done so by centering the United Nations as the subject of my analysis, so as to situate sport for development within the larger development paradigm. The aim of such an approach has been to better understand where the SDP paradigm has come from, not as a search for origins, but rather to follow the ebbs and flows of the movement as a top-down project. Such an approach is useful in turning the gaze back upon the global North to shine light on the truth claims surrounding the SDP paradigm in “official” development policy.

It is my hope that this dissertation has provided fertile ground for future avenues of research. I have situated my project within research gaps that surround the history of sport in the development context, and the boundaries between sport sociology and development studies. However, there is still work to be done on these fronts. This project has predominantly focused on the role of the UN in the history of the SDP paradigm to consider how the UN has legitimized sport for development as a novel and useful tool in achieving development goals. There remains a great deal of room in exploring how the development policies and ideologies set out by the UN inform other development practices and epistemologies.

In this project I have not sought to delineate a reparative approach to development, nor to offer an evaluation of whether or not sport for development “works.” I stand by my
contentions regarding the myriad of troublesome features of the SDP paradigm – its penchant for promoting neo-liberal and modernist ideals, its framing as a rupture from longstanding development/imperialist practices, its (re)construction of hegemonic discourses of the global North and South – yet, I find myself at somewhat of a loss in reconciling the problematic aspects of sport for development, with the certainty that SDP programmes make a difference in the lives of many. While addressing such problems is certainly beyond the scope of a dissertation, I find some guidance in Simon Darnell and Lyndsay Hayhurst’s (2011) assertion that while notions of development cannot be abandoned in the face of gross inequality, the praxis of critical development work is one that confronts and de-stabilizes the cultural and economic forces that construct development struggle as necessary (see Wainwright, 2008). Thus there remains a need for work that considers how SDP can be re-imagined as a struggle for decolonization (Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011), so as to reflect counter-hegemonic approaches to and through SDP that engage directly with the political economy and relations of dominance (Darnell, 2010a). Such an approach would move beyond critiques of how mainstream development practices ignore local knowledges and practices, and the imperialist positioning of the global North as the possessor of knowledge and power and the global South as incapable, backwards, and pre-modern – although these critiques are certainly productive and necessary – to consider radical visions of development that “centers on processes of empowerment, emancipation and liberation involving the full and active participation of those previously marginalized” (Hartmann & Kwauk, 2011, 294; see also, Escobar 1995; Rahnema, 1997).

Although using a decolonizing or anti-colonial framework does not eliminate the effects of oppression, nor remove the need for self-reflection on the part of the researcher,
it does allow for a reorientation towards a radically activist approach that does not support a false separation between academic research and lived experiences in the contemporary world (Canella & Manuelityo, 2008; Darnell & Hayhurst, 2011). In this way, Darnell and Hayhurst (2011), argue that future work in the field should combine decolonizing methodologies with postcolonial and feminist international relations frameworks so that scholars can engage in more politicized, transformative and socially-revived research that "attend to the inequalities perpetuated by global politics, while also connecting with the diversity and lived experiences of those involved in, for example, gender-focused SDP programmes" (p. 188). It is necessary to ground the complexities, contingencies, and positionalities inherent to the critical study of international development as the ballast of academic research. While this study has focused primarily on development as a top-down endeavour to consider how the discourse of development as enunciated in policy shapes contemporary understandings of development, it is also imperative to seek out the effects they have on lived experience. I believe the critical study of sport for development to be an important and productive field of study in pursuit of socially transformation and social justice.

Questions regarding what to “do” about SDP and the need for decolonizing approaches to development lead to two other assertions regarding SDP and, more broadly, the idea of “development” itself. The first pertains to the “NGO-ization” of development through which the SDP paradigm flourishes. It is well established that hundreds of governmental, non-governmental, and corporate entities have taken up the UN’s call to promote sport for development. In following Peter Redfield’s (2005) line of critique regarding the humanitarian NGO Doctors Without Borders, the problem with such an
approach to aid is that NGOs operate within a climate of absent political authority that extend “norms of power in an effort to effect the government of health, but without any certainty of control as responsibility for rule is ever deferred by humanitarian organizations” (p. 330). Indeed, Doctors Without Borders was created in 1971 for the explicit purpose of circumventing national bureaucracies and international politics so as to provide expedited medical intervention in response to crisis. In the 44 years since its inception, this model of bypassing governmental authority has become the prototype for development organizations in the twenty-first century.

Thus while the NGO approach to development is problematic in that it circumvents the checks and balances of democracy and government, it is also flawed in that it is largely reactionary: the model is focused on responses to crises – be they natural disasters, conflict, pandemic illnesses, or sustained underdevelopment – that actually maintain status quo and defer actions that might support more impactful social change. The responsive approach draws upon understandings of aid as needed and inevitable, and does so in a way that removes the political nature of such a response, while also obfuscating the historical scope of the action, and indeed of the root of the matter that requires a response in the first place. The transitory nature of these initiatives provide temporary measures of success that ultimately maintain the larger undergirding structure that upholds these failures through the apparatus of crisis response (Redfield, 2005). Further, this approach to humanitarianism is predicated on the ability for some to operate without borders, while confining others to geographic spaces carved out in the legacy of imperial expansion and thus continues the lineage of neo-colonial endeavours of missionary societies (Redfield, 2005). Where the SDP paradigm differs from other humanitarian or development efforts is
that while organizations like Doctors Without Borders do not claim that their work will directly build a better social order, to end war or to create peace, and emphasis the short-term natures of their initiatives, SDP proposes to address these exact things under its apolitical guise. Ultimately, the problem with the NGO approach to aid is that it turns “states of emergency” to use Giorgio Agamben’s term (1998), into the rule: the more “successful” SDP programs are, the more this model of development becomes the norm.

The second contention is in regard to the very idea of “development”. While it is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation to advocate for a new approach to development, the concept developed by South American development theorists and critics of Buen Vivir is instructive in this regard. Buen Vivir begins with the premise that despite being declared dead several times in the past decades, the hegemonic concept of “development” persists. As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, most calls for more holistic and social measures of development throughout the decades have operated on a superficial level, and failed to challenge epistemologies and ontologies of development deeply rooted in “modern culture” (Gudynas, 2011). The movement seeks to respond to classical Western development theory, to change the development model from its growth-and extraction-orientation to something more holistic and grounded in indigenous perspectives (Escobar, 2015). Buen Vivir emerged in the early 2000s in Latin America, where it was clear that that “instrumental fixes or economic compensation to balance the negative effects of current development strategies, were inadequate, and the classical development idea had to be abandoned” (Gudynas, 2011, p. 442). Building upon Escobar’s (1992) call for “alternatives to development” – rather than “alternative developments” – Buen Vivir has been incorporated into the new constitutions of Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia.
The election of leftist governments in these countries has allowed the expression of once repressed indigenous knowledges and the emergence of alternatives to the Washington-consensus, neo-liberal market reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s (Gudynas, 2011).

*Buen Vivir* is a platform where critical views of development are shared to challenge Eurocentric knowledge and foreground decolonization as an alternative to development. The model holds central the rights of individuals – including unity, equality, dignity, freedom, social and gender equality – while also recognizing the rights of nature. As such, it rejects the modernist trappings of a linear history, and notions of rationality that posit that people and natural resources should be dominated and controlled (Gudynas, 2011).

Perhaps most importantly, *Buen Vivir* calls for a return to approaches to governance that move away from extractivist policies and towards social justice and new notions of rights that include ecological sustainability and the elimination of poverty (Escobar, 2015).

The *Buen Vivir* perspective is not a return to pre-colonial times, to a static concept, but rather one that thinks past capitalism and socialism, to explore alternatives beyond European modernity and offer new answers to post-development questions (Gugynas, 2011). *Buen Vivir* criticizes development and the very foundations of modernity at a deeper level than policy changes, to challenge the worldviews, ontologies, and representations of what constitutes “development” and “underdevelopment.” *Buen Vivir* thus challenges the global model of development, and recenters the local, not merely by applying the concept of “localization” but by taking into account inter-cultural conversations and inter-epistemic conversations that require “translation across knowledges, across cultures, across histories, across different ways of being negatively affected by globalisation, across levels of privilege.
and so forth” (Escobar, 2015). Such approaches are promising because they challenge
development – and its modernist underpinnings – at their very core. From this perspective,
Sport for Development and Peace emerges very clearly as part of the problem of hegemonic
power structures, rather than a solution to them.
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Appendix A

Archival Research Plan

I conducted primary research at the United Nations Archives and the Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York City, and the International Centre for Olympics Studies at the University of Western. The UN sources were compiled through seven avenues (the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, the United Nations Yearbook Search, the United Nations Archives and Record Management Section, the Official Document Service, as well as the UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNESCO archives), and the IOC sources through the IOC’s online databases, and the University of Western Ontario’s Olympic studies center. With the aid of archivists, I conducted a search for sport and development related materials through the aforementioned databases. Search terms included, but were not limited to: “sport”, “physical education”, “sport and development”, “sport for development”, “Olympics”, and “Olympic Truce”. These search terms were used for both Archival and online databases.

To give a sense of the resources available I have provided and inserted photos as appropriate and attached letters and other written documents as appendices. The following is a list of resources available through the UN archives:

- The United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET)
  - UNBISNET allows for a catalogue search of documents available in the UN archives.

- United Nations Yearbook Search
  - The Yearbooks are the principal reference work of the UN, providing a detailed overview of the “Organization’s concerns and activities.” Each Yearbook is fully indexed and includes all major General Assembly, Security Council and Economic and Social Council resolutions.

- The United Nations Archives and Record Management Section (ARMS)
  - The Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS) is responsible for all aspects of UN record-keeping, ranging from measures to ensure that United Nations officials create records in the course of their duties, through the
management of records in United Nations offices, to preserving and making
records of continuing value accessible as United Nations archives.

- Also, ARMS allows for access to other archival finding aids of UN predecessor
  Organizations that fit into my research time frame including the International
  Penal and Penitentiary Commission (1893-1958), the Preparatory
  Commission for United Nations (1945-1958), the International Refugee
  Organization (1947-1952). ARMS also allows for access to the archival fonds
  of UN Secretaries-General from 1946 to 2012, the UN registry from 1946-
  1983, and various UN Departments such as Political Affairs (1946-1991),
  Economic and Social Affairs (1946-1951), Political Affairs, Trusteeships, and
  Decolonization (1946-1977), General Assembly Affairs (1945-1974), Security
  Council Affairs (1948-1972), Special political affairs (1945-1974), and Special
  political questions (1973-1980). Finally, archival finding aids of UN missions
  and commissions can also be accessed through the ARMS.

• Official Document Service
  - ODS covers all types of official United Nations documentation, beginning in
    1993. ODS also provides access to the resolutions of the General Assembly,
    Security Council, Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council
    from 1946 onwards.

• United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
  - A search of the UNICEF Database available online revealed 3009 results
dating from 1996 to 2012, with the vast majority of the results coming from
2004-2012. Of the sources that were available online, many made mention of
sport’s contribution to children’s rights and development (particularly
education), including: the 1997 “State of the World’s Children” report
outlining the contribution of sport to education in rural Colombia and as a
means to empower the poor in the Philippines; the 1998 report on the
“Progress of Nations”, making note of the Palestinian Ministry of Youth and
Sport efforts to focus on the issue of child rights as they pertain to gender and
labour; and the 1999 “State of the World’s Children” report outlining
UNICEF’s cooperation with the Brazilian government in providing education
grants to the poorest families as an economic incentive to reduce the drop-
out rate, and seeking to expand sport, cultural activities and school tutoring
when child workers are in school.

• United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR)
  - A search of the UNHCR archives revealed 339 results from 1951 to 2012. The
sources that I could access online (most of which were from the mid-1990s
onwards) pertained mostly to child labour, Human Rights, and Refugee
Protection including the role of sport in the UN Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners (1995), NGO manuals on the treatment of
Refugees (such as sport in Kosovo and Kenyan refugee camps in 1999), and
sport and education.
• United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO
  o Whereas the majority of documents relating to sport in the UNICEF and UNHCR databases that I could access online were created in the last twenty years, UNESCO’s archives date back much further. A search for terms related to sport and development revealed 262 results dating from 1950-1959, 371 from 1960-1969, 647 from 1970-1979, 1096 from 1980-1989, 1723 from 1990-1999, and 1727 from 2000-2009. Many of these more historical sources related to the use of sport in refugee camps (such as Palestinian camps in Jordan, the Gaza strip, Libya, and the UAE in 1959), sport and education in South-East Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, Olympic truces, and sport stadium construction. For a brief overview of some of these sources, see Appendix D.

• International Olympic Committee (IOC)
  o A final component of my archival research involved documents available through the IOC’s archives. The IOC has numerous resources available online, including documents that pertain to Olympic Congresses, International Forums on SDP, Olympic Truce Forums, Sport and Environment world Conferences, Sport Culture and Education World Conferences, Olympic Games documents, Host City Election, IOC Commission, Executive Boards and Sessions, IOC Final Reports, Marketing and Broadcasting reports, and documents relating to their own SDP programme “Olympism in Action”.

Once compiled, the sources were organized by date and organization type (e.g. UNICEF, UNRRA, UNDP). The data was then coded according to themes that could be synthesized and analyzed within the larger context constructed throughout the thesis. These themes included: “Sport equipment/jobs”, “children and physical education”, “staff training”, “WWII reconstruction”, “decolonization”, “social/economic development”, “Apartheid”, “Olympics”, and “peace”.

Appendix B

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (1947): Recreation, Sport-Religion – Area Team

To: UNRRA Area Team 909
    Attn.: Area Welfare Officer
From: Assembly Centre 224
W.O.

Subject: Prizes for Sports-Tournaments.

We ask you to provide prizes for the winners in sport-tournaments which will start on 22nd June 1947 at Dobberteich. The programs of the sport-tournaments is as follows:

1. Basketball – one team of each nationality (for adults) (for children)
2. Volley-ball – one team of each nationality (for men-boys) (for girls)
3. "Völkerball" – one team of each nationality
4. Ping-Pong – three best players of each nationality (for adults) (for children 18 yrs.).

J. O. C.
Welfare Officer
H. Malvet
Administrator
Assembly Centre 224
UNRRA Area Team 909
1. Neither Mr. Wolowicz Stefan nor any other members of the a/m Evangelical group in camp Weserflug had ever been sentenced or put in jail in connection with the activities of this group.

YMCA/YWCA Committee
Polish Sec. School
Mühlental'sch m/Bockhorn
UNRRA Area Team 909

15 June 1947
Ref no. 90/1947

Received from the World's YMCA/YWCA Team No 6 the following articles for use in the camp:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ping-Pong balls</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water colour set</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;    &quot; brushes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing pads</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball shoes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chalk pcs</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish techn. books</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;    &quot; books diff.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &quot; Children stories</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signature: [Signature]
Date: 17.01.1947
Unit: [Unit]
To: A/C 221,

Attn: W.O.

From: Area Team 909 Oldenburg

Subject: TRANSPORT FOR RECREATION AND SPORT ACTIVITIES.

For the future all request for transport for recreation and sport activities will be submitted to 909 Area HQ. We will be informed at least one week before the transport is needed.

Please inform the respective groups in the camps under your care of this.

Rosemnie Vanmeerebeek, Welfare Officer, for E.G. Kidman, Director area team 909.

RV/IK
Appendix C

Dear Julia,

Tourism in India

You will find herewith a note on a call made by Hessim to the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation. This followed an earlier courtesy call I had paid to the Minister, Dr. Karan Singh, a young and dynamic person.

We understand this may be the first time that India is seeking assistance on a broad range of problems in the promotion of tourism.

As and when the request comes through, I believe we should give it a prompt and enthusiastic response since there is no question in our minds that the tourism potential of India is largely untapped.

You will, of course, be kept informed of progress on this side, but I am sending you this advance note in order to get from you some preliminary reactions:

a) would UN be able to respond quickly when the request comes and could we assemble an international team (including some European tourism experts)?

b) Could we count on some formula for financing a UN Tourism mission over and above the TA programme approved?

Miss Julia Henderson
Associate Commissioner
of Technical Cooperation
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations
New York
c) Are there any suggestions we should make to the Government in the coming weeks to ensure that the request is drawn up in the most suitable manner?

d) Does UNCTAD come into the picture here? Yes.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Nyer Cohen to warn him about the possibility of this request. I will suggest to him that a mission constituted under preparatory allocation looking towards the formulation of Special Fund project(s) would seem to me to be indicated.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

John McDiarmid
Resident Representative

cc: Mr. Nyer Cohen
Please refer to your letter No. 67-184, dated 20 December 1967, regarding the possible assistance to India in the field of Tourism under the United Nations Development Programme.

2. The comments made by you in paragraph 2 of your letter under reference regarding the ski instructor and an expert in hotel industry have been passed on to the Government for their consideration.

3. As intimated in our cable 49, Mr. Niels Ejler Alkjaer arrived in New Delhi on 9 January and left on 12 January. During his stopover here, he had very useful discussions with this office and with the Director General of Tourism, as a result of which there is now a better understanding of this project in the Government. On the basis of these discussions, Mr. Alkjaer has prepared the attached draft summary of recommendations, a copy of which he has left with the Director General of Tourism together with the draft of a proposed letter from the Department of Tourism to the Ministry of Finance for submission of the Government's formal request for contingency financing in this behalf. As you will note from Mr. Alkjaer's recommendations, he has suggested three experts for one month each and one expert for 12 months, in addition to a research project carried out by a scientific institute or a commercial contracting firm to be engaged by the United Nations, involving a total cost of approximately $55,000 to $60,000.

4. We have not paid Mr. Alkjaer any per diem for his stopover in New Delhi.

5. We shall write to you again as soon as we receive the Government's reaction to Mr. Alkjaer's recommendations.
Further to our letters No: E2/RG(Tourism) dated 11 June and 23 August 1968, we have now received the Government of India’s formal request for the services of a Winter Sports expert for a period of two years, preferably starting October 1968, in addition to skiing equipment of the order of $12,000.

2. As you will note from the enclosed copy of the Government’s letter of 17 September 1968, the Government have requested that the expert post in 1968 and 1969 and the entire equipment be financed out of available savings under the UN/TA Programme for 1967-68. It is understood that they will include provision for the residue of this post in their request for UN/TA Programme for 1970 at the appropriate time. As indicated to you earlier, the present 4-month provision for this post in the 1968 Regular Programme will obviously not be adequate to meet the Government’s requirements who are urgently in need of a high-level expert for at least two years. Accordingly, when we receive your confirmation of the amount of savings available under the current programme, we shall send to UNDP and to you the necessary project budget and simultaneously suggest to the Government to submit alternative proposals to utilize the 4-month provision for this post in the 1968 Regular Programme and the 6-month provision for a tourism expert in the 1969 Regular Programme. Meanwhile, I am enclosing two copies each of the project description, the job description data sheet and the list of equipment submitted by the Government so that you may initiate necessary action to procure the services of a suitable expert on an urgent basis.
Appendix D


TO: Director Department of Social Affairs and Justice.

In accordance to the tour of the Hollandia Football Association to Djakarta, under the agreement of your Department and the Indonesian Mission here in Kotabaru, I, herewith should like to give you a short history of this association growth.

1. Duration.
   The football association of Hollandia have been for 10 years.

2. Territory.
   Afdeling of Hollandia, especially the central district of Hollandia, district of Sentani, Tabati-Nimboran-Demta-Sarmi.

3. Members of the committee.
   a. First chairman : W. Inuri
   b. Second Chairman, including: competition leader and secretary. : D. Stobbe
   c. Treasure and as daily committee. : A. Prins
   d. Member : L. Ajamiseba
   e. " : A. Mandosir
   f. " : U. Olua

The headquarter of this committee is in Hollandia.

Among the committee members there are two persons who have been working very hard to develop and progress this association. They are D. Stobbe and Prins, who have been a leader of all competitions, open-tournaments, as a secretary and to take care all the equipments and materials of this association.

Both have leaded this association more than 10 years; the first chairman was selected last year, to take over the chairmanship of Mr. Abbas.

We have till to-day no one Papuan leaders to take over the supervision as the leaders before (Mr. Stobbe and Mr. Prins).
The other members of the committee are sometimes guiding and helping the association activities.

As a senior member of the committee, Mr. Stobbe will be the responsibility of the tour. He is now an officer of the UNTEA Department of Health. I have asked Mr. Stobbe to lead the tour, as a member of the Hollandia Football Association and he is the person to do that.

Since November 6, 1962, there has been established a committee for the Kotabaru Stadium, in a meeting between Dr. Sambijono from the Indonesian Mission and the committee of the Hollandia Football Association and Mr. Ajamiseba a member of our Football Association was chose as a chairman and has to make contact with the Indonesian Mission any time to discuss all about this stadium.

Other activities in accordance of our Football Association will lead by Mr. Stobbe, Mr. Prins and the other members.

W. Inuri
First Chairman of the Hollandia Football Association.

c.c.

1. Mr. Taslim, Sports representative of the Indonesian Mission.
2. Mr. Serta Tarigan, Sports and youth activities officer, Department of Social Affairs and Justice, Hollandia.
THE BUDGET OF THE KOTABARU FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION
IN ACCORDANCE THE TOUR TO DJAKARTA.

A: The Indonesian Mission/The Indonesian
Government would like to insure the
responsibilities of:
1. Plane transportation
   Biak-Djakarta-Biak = 18 x 2 x f 533.- = f 19.188.-

   f 19.188.-

B. The responsibilities of the Kotabaru
Football Association:
1. The suits of the players
   16 x 2 x f 13.50 = f 432.-
2. The over-coats(jackets for players
   and officials) @ f 15.-
   18 x 1 x f 15.- = f 270.-
3. 6 balls @ f 35.- = 6 x f 35.- = f 210.-
4. Bus transportation Kotabaru-Sentani-
   Kotabaru @ f 30.-/hour= 2 x 2 x f 30.- = f 120.-

   f 1.032.-

C. The responsibilities of the Department
of Social Affairs and Justice are as follows:
1. Plane transportation Sentani-Biak-Sentani
   = 18 x 2 x f 154.- = f 5.544.-
2. Pocket-money for the players
   @ f 5.-/day = 16 x 10 x f 5.- = f 800.-
3. Pocket-money for the officials
   @ f 15.-/day = 2 x 10 x f 15.- = f 300.-

   f 6.644.-

   Total f 26.864.-

( TWENTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR GULDENS).-
The Indonesian Mission is expecting the funds to be shared on a 50 - 50 basis by UNTEA and the Indonesian Mission, excluding the equipments and materials being taken care of by the football association.

To make clear, it could be specified as follows:

1. The funds excluded the equipments and materials
   \[ f 26.864.- - f 1.032.- = f 25.832.- \]

2. UNTEA and the Indonesian Mission in accordance to the basis on 50 - 50, would be the responsibilities of \( \frac{1}{2} \times f 25.832.- = f 12.916.- \)

(TWELVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTEEN GULDENS)
Appendix E


POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES RELATING TO YOUTH

Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Greece, Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Philippines, Romania and Uruguay: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples, which is contained in General Assembly resolution 2037 (XX) of 7 December 1965,

Bearing in mind principle IV of the Declaration, which enumerates some of the activities that should be encouraged and facilitated among young people in order to bring them together in educational, cultural and sporting activities in the spirit of the Declaration,

Noting the efforts being made by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to emphasize the role of physical education and sports in school curricula and their importance in promoting universal understanding and friendship among peoples,

Convinced that physical education and sports exchanges can contribute to international efforts to promote peace, mutual understanding, co-operation and the development of friendly relations among peoples,

1. Recommends that Member States adopt the necessary measures to promote physical education and sports exchange programmes, particularly among young people and on the basis of equality of men and women, in order to improve the quality of life, inculcate fundamental human values and promote selfless competition, solidarity and full respect for the integrity and dignity of all human beings;

2. Invites UNESCO, regional organizations and other interested
organizations and programmes within the United Nations system to intensify their efforts to promote meetings between young people through sports and physical education activities;

3. **Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a report on the activities undertaken by Member States, UNESCO, regional organizations and other interested organizations and programmes within the United Nations system in the field of physical education and sports, particularly among young people.**
Appendix F

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO THE XIITH OLYMPIC CONGRESS, BADEN-BADEN

23 September 1981

It gives me great pleasure to convey my warm greetings to the participants in the Eleventh Olympic Congress.

By encouraging a spirit of sportsmanship, fairness and impartiality, the Olympic ideal seeks to bring down the barriers of prejudice which divide peoples from one another. Based on a sense of our common humanity, without distinctions of race, colour or creed, the Olympic Movement contributes to the creation of better international understanding. In this way, it actively promotes the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

I extend my best wishes to you for a fruitful Congress and for the continued success of your important endeavours.

Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General
United Nations