OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES: COMPARING EAST AND WEST

by

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Abstract

The present study examined 413 Euro-Canadians and 480 Chinese over four studies on their preferences for offensive and defensive strategies. Past research has demonstrated that East Asians think more non-linearly and are more prevention focused, whereas North Americans think more linearly and are more promotion focused. Based on these cultural differences, I predicted that East Asians would prefer defensive strategies more than North Americans would, whereas North Americans would prefer offensive strategies more than East Asians would. I also hypothesized that the effect of culture on preferences for strategies would be mediated by regulatory focus, and that Chinese would endorse more non-linear beliefs about offense and defense, whereas Canadians would endorse more linear beliefs about them. However, across various scenarios/domains - sports and martial arts (Study 1a), marketing and negotiation (Study 1b and 1c), Chinese were found to prefer offensive strategies more than Canadians did, whereas Canadians preferred defensive strategies more than Chinese did. These cultural differences in their self-reported preferences were not reflected in the strategic moves they made in the behavioural game played in Study 2. In addition, promotion focus did not mediate the relationship between culture and preference for offense, and prevention focus did not mediate the relationship between culture and preference for defense. Nonetheless, Canadians were more likely to endorse linear beliefs more than Chinese did, whereas Chinese were more likely to endorsed non-linear beliefs about offense and defense more than Canadians did. (237 words)
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Li-Jun Ji for her wisdom and guidance, and to my wife, Suhui Yap for being my muse and pillar of support. My gratitude also extends to my committee members, Dr. Jill Jacobson and Dr. Leandre Fabrigar, for their thoughtful feedback and suggestions, as well as the research assistants who dedicated time and effort for this project.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This research project explored if Chinese and Canadians differ in their preferences for offensive and defensive strategies. Based on cultural differences in regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), I predicted that Chinese would emphasize defense and defensive strategies more than Canadians, whereas Canadians would emphasize offense and offensive strategies more than Chinese. This is because Chinese who are more prevention focused than Canadians may prefer to adopt more defensive strategies, whereas Canadians who are more promotion focused than Chinese may prefer to adopt more offensive strategies. In addition, based on cultural differences in dialectical thinking (Peng & Nisbett, 1999) Chinese would hold more nonlinear beliefs (e.g., defense begets success and/or offense begets failure) about these strategies than Canadians, and Canadians would hold more linear beliefs (e.g., offense begets success and/or defense begets failure) than Chinese.

1.1 Definition of Strategies

Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) explained strategy as, “[a] pattern of decisions in the acquisition, retention, and utilization of information that serves to meet certain objectives (i.e., to insure certain forms of outcome and to insure against certain others)” (p. 54). Thus, an offensive strategy can be defined as a pattern of decisions that
serves to actively pursue gains or insure certain desirable outcomes, whereas a defensive strategy can be defined as a pattern of decisions that serves to reduce the risk of loss or insure against certain undesirable outcomes. According to Johnston (2005), one who endorses offensive strategies tends to adopt more active state behaviors in international politics (e.g., engaging an opposing country first), whereas another who endorses defensive strategies tends to adopt more passive state behaviors in international politics (e.g., focusing on fortifying one’s defenses).

Similarly, at the organizational level, a company that advocates offensive corporate strategy tends to eagerly pursue changes for their own company (i.e., actively acquiring other firms to fuel growth), whereas a company that advocates defensive corporate strategy tends to vigilantly protect oneself from the competitors in the industry (i.e., conservatively minimizing losses). Strategic cultural differences can also exist at the individual level. Morris and colleagues (1998) found differences in how people from different cultures managed conflict, whereby Chinese managers preferred to adopt a more avoidant oriented management style due to their high value on conformity and American managers preferred to adopt a more approach oriented management style due to their high value on personal achievement. Therefore, this study aimed to explore potential cultural differences in people’s preferences for, or endorsements of, offensive and defensive strategies across various contexts.
1.2 Dialecticism and Decision-Making

A myriad of research studies has established that culture shapes thinking styles – East Asians (including Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans) tend to think more holistically and reason more dialectically, whereas European North Americans (including Americans and Canadians) tend to think more analytically and reason less dialectically (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). In particular, holistic thinkers attend more broadly to the interrelations among all objects and are more likely to consider the whole context, whereas analytic thinkers attend more to the focal objects and are more likely to disregard context (Iishi, Reyes, Kitayama, 2003; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Witkin & Berry, 1975). Likewise, Asians and North Americans tend to have different cognitive tendencies in reasoning with contradictions and inconsistencies (Ma-Kellams, & Blascovich, 2012; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Peng and Nisbett (1999) showed that Asians, who are more likely to engage in dialectical reasoning, are more tolerant of apparent contradictions and are more likely to accept inconsistencies. In contrast, North Americans, who are more likely to engage in formal and logical reasoning, are less tolerant of contradictions and are more likely to prefer a single stand.

Such cultural variations in cognitive styles and reasoning can shape our judgment and decision-making processes. For example, compared to Westerners, East Asians tend to consider more information as relevant when making decisions or attributions about certain behaviors (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003; Li, Masuda, & Russell, 2014; Liang, Kale, & Cherian, 2014). In addition, when presented with apparent contradicting
propositions, North Americans were more likely to differentiate them and chose one over the other, whereas Chinese people were more likely to consider each proposition and reach a compromise between them by finding a middle way (Chen, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Recent studies also showed that consumers from the East experienced less cognitive discomfort with contradictory product information and, thus, had higher purchase intention for those products than consumers from the West (Aggarwal, Kim, & Cha, 2013; DeMotta, Chao & Kramer, 2015; Ko, Seo & Jung, 2015).

As culture can guide the information we attend to and how we process that information, it can also influence our preferences for various problem-solving strategies, depending on the importance of the decision (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1995). Because Chinese, who are more holistic and dialectical, can tolerate (and maybe appreciate) both sides of a seemingly contradiction, they may be more likely to acknowledge contributions of both offense and defense in determining the outcome of a competition equally. On the other hand, North Americans, who are more analytic and less dialectical, may tend to focus on the most salient and focal aspect in a competition, such as preferentially acknowledging offense more than defense in determining the outcome of a competition because offense is often considered as the key to success (Biswas-Diener, 2010).

1.3 Regulatory Focus

People in different cultures not only differ in thinking and reasoning styles, but they can also differ in their regulatory focus – promotion versus prevention focus (Halvorson & Higgins, 2013; Higgins, 1997). Regulatory focus refers to motivation that
drives people’s approach and avoidance strategies (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998). That is, people with different regulatory focus (i.e. promotion focus vs. prevention focus) will tend to be motivated to have different strategic inclinations. Particularly, chronically promotion-focused individuals tend to have the strategic inclination to make progress and pursue growth because they are more focused on goals as advancements and accomplishments (i.e., approaching gains). On the other hand, chronically prevention-focused individuals tend to have the strategic inclination to take precautions and avoid unnecessary risks because they are more focused on goals as responsibilities and safety (i.e., avoiding non-losses). These approach and avoidance strategic inclinations can be seen as analogous to offensive and defensive strategies in some ways. For instance, both approach and offensive strategies seem to have in common an element of actively initiating advances to make good things happen, whereas avoidance and defensive strategies seem to have in common the act of passively staying away to prevent bad things from happening.

Research has shown that East Asians tend to be more prevention focused – motivated to meet their responsibilities and to stay safe, whereas Westerners tend to be more promotion focused – motivated to advance and achieve gains (Halvorson & Higgins, 2013; Higgins, 1997; Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005). Thus, East Asians may be more likely to have the strategic inclination to be conservative and not take unnecessary chances because with a prevention focus, one will tend to be more vigilant to ensure non-losses (Tanner & Swets, 1954; Trope & Liberman, 1996). Westerners, on the
other hand, may be more likely to have the strategic inclination to take the offensive stance and to take chances because with a promotion focus, one will tend to be more eager to attain gains (Tanner & Swets, 1954; Trope & Liberman, 1996). Due to their cultural differences in prevention (loss avoidance) and promotion (improvement gains) focus, when dealing with competitions and conflicts, East Asians may tend to prefer defense or defensive strategies more than offense or offensive strategies than North Americans, whereas North Americans may tend to prefer offense or offensive strategies more than defense or defensive strategies than East Asians.

1.4 Present Research

Although offensive and defensive strategies have been investigated in the context of marketing (e.g., Bridges, & Freytag, 2009; Erikson, 1993; Hauser, & Shugan, 2008) and politics (e.g., Levy, 1984; Waltz, 1993), no cross-cultural research has investigated the cognitive underpinnings of these strategies. In this research, I explored cultural differences (due to regulatory focus) in people’s preferences for offensive versus defensive strategies, and how dialecticism may contribute to the cultural differences in endorsing linear and non-linear beliefs about strategies. To address these questions, I used hypothetical scenarios with clear offensive and defensive strategies or roles across various situations in Study 1 and a board game in Study 2 to provide behavioral evidence as additional support for my hypotheses. In Study 1a, I chose soccer and martial arts because in soccer there are clear offensive and defensive roles, and in martial arts there are clear offensive strikes and defensive blocks/dodges. In Study 1b and 1c, I chose
offensive and defensive strategy styles adopted by people or companies in more practical strategic situations like marketing and negotiation domains. In Study 2, I chose a simple but novel board game called Alkkagi, which participants could make either offensive or defensive shots to win. Based on cultural differences in dialectic thinking and regulatory focus, I made the following predictions:

**H1:** Chinese would emphasize defense and defensive strategies more than Canadians, whereas Canadians would emphasize offense and offensive strategies more than Chinese. These differences would be reflected in their preference for strategy styles across various scenarios, their behaviors in a game, and their attributions of success and failure outcomes to these strategies. More specifically:

**H1a:** Canadians would prefer an offense role/strategy more than Chinese would, whereas Chinese prefer a defense role/strategy more than Canadians would.

**H1b:** Canadians would be more likely to attribute success/failure to offensive strategies than Chinese would, whereas Chinese would be more likely to attribute success/failure to defensive strategies than Canadians would.

**H2:** The cultural differences in people’s preferences for offensive and defensive strategies or roles would be mediated by their regulatory focus; specifically, culture affects one’s preference for offensive strategies/roles indirectly through promotion focus, and culture affects one’s preference for defensive strategies/roles indirectly through prevention focus.

**H3:** Based on cultural differences in dialecticism, Canadians are more likely than
Chinese to hold linear beliefs about offense and defense (e.g., offense and defense are viewed as independent from each other), whereas Chinese are more likely than Canadians to hold non-linear beliefs about offense and defense (e.g., offense and defense are dependent on each other, and good offense comes from good defense).

Chapter 2

Study One A

The following three studies (a, b, and c) assessed participants’ preferences for offense and defense in three different domains – soccer, martial arts, and business. In Study 1a, Euro-Canadians and Chinese participants were presented with hypothetical soccer and martial arts scenarios. In Study 1b, they read hypothetical marketing scenarios. In Study 1c, they read hypothetical business and negotiation scenarios. For all three studies, I predicted that Euro-Canadians would be more likely than Chinese to endorse offensive strategies, whereas Chinese participants would be more likely than Canadians to endorse defensive strategies.

Participants

Ninety-eight Euro-Canadian undergraduate students (82 women, 16 men) from Queen’s University and 100 Chinese undergraduate students (50 women, 50 men) from Peking University participated in this study for cash or small gifts. I used a participant-based stop-rule, ceasing data collection after 100 participants per culture (mixed design)
were collected. No data were analyzed prior to this stop-rule. Euro-Canadian participants ranged in age from 18 to 23 years ($M = 18.87, SD = 1.22$), and Chinese participants ranged in age from 16 to 28 years ($M = 19.54, SD = 1.99$).

**Procedures**

**Consent.** When participants arrived at the lab, they were provided with a letter of information and a consent form. I began the experiment after participants signed the consent forms.

**Soccer Scenario.** First, participants’ preference for soccer roles were measured by providing a short scenario about soccer (see Appendix A), and asking them to rate the extent to which they would like to play the role of an attacker, a defender, and a midfielder (by imaging themselves as competent soccer players). Thus, participants with an offensive preference may like to play as the attacker, participants with a defensive preference may like to play as the defender, and participants with neither (or both) may like to play as the midfielder. Then, participants rated the extent to which they thought a soccer team’s offense and defense contributed to a win or a loss in a game. Thus, participants who believed in a linear relationship between strategy and outcome may tend to think offense (defense) contributed more to a win (loss) than loss (win), whereas participants who believed in a non-linear relationship between strategy and outcome may tend to think defense (offense) contributed more to a loss (win) than win (loss).

**Martial Arts Scenario.** Second, participants’ preference for roles in martial arts were measured by providing a short scenario about martial arts (see Appendix A) and
asking them to rate the extent they would like to learn a predominantly offensive and
defensive martial arts. Thus, participants with an offensive preference may like to learn a
predominantly offensive martial art, while participants with a defensive preference may
like to learn a predominantly defensive martial art. As above, participants also rated the
extent to which they thought a martial artist’s offense and defense contributed to a win or
loss in a bout.

**General Statements about Strategies.** Third, I assessed participants’ general
linear/non-linear beliefs about offensive and defensive strategies by asking them to
respond to four general statements (see Appendix A).

**Regulatory Focus Questionnaire.** Finally, I assessed participants’ regulatory
focus by administering an 18-item regulatory focus scale by Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda
(2002) (see Appendix A).

**Debriefing.** Participants were debriefed at the end of the questionnaire before
concluding the experiment.

**Measures**

**Preference for Soccer Roles.** This measure consisted of a single item for each
role (attacker, defender, midfielder). Participants indicated their preference for the
respective soccer roles by reporting how much they would like to play each role on a 1 to
7 scale, where 1 represented *Not at all*, and 7 represented *Very much*). Across the three
roles, participants’ preferences did not significantly correlated with each other (see Table 1 below).

Table 1

*Correlations among Preference for Soccer Roles*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Attacker</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Defender</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Midfielder</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Strategy and Outcome for Soccer.** This measure consisted of four-items that assessed how much participants thought a soccer team’s offense and defense contributed to a win or a loss in a game. For each item, participants recorded their responses on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented *Not at all*, and 7 represented *Very much*. Across all items, participants’ ratings were positively correlated with one another (see Table 2 below).

Table 2

*Correlations among Strategy and Outcome for Soccer*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Extent offense contribute to a win</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Extent defense contribute to a win</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extent offense contribute to a loss</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Extent defense contribute to a loss  .23**  .32**  .36**  –

**p < .01 (2-tailed)

**Preference for Martial Arts.** This measure consisted of a single item for learning each martial art type (offensive type, defensive type). Participants reported their preference for each martial arts’ type by rating how much they would want to learn them on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented *Not at all*, and 7 represented *Very much*. Participants’ preference for both martial arts’ types were not significantly correlated with each other, \( r(198) = -.09, p = .23 \).

**Strategy and Outcome for Martial Arts.** This measure consisted of four-items that assessed how much participants thought a martial artist’s offense and defense contributed to a win or a loss in a bout. For each item, participants recorded their responses on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented *Not at all*, and 7 represented *Very much*. Across all items, the four items were positively correlated with one another (see Table 3 below).

Table 3

*Correlations among Strategy and Outcome for Martial Arts*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Extent offense contribute to a win</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Extent defense contribute to a win</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extent offense contribute to a loss</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Extent defense contribute to a loss   **.43**   **.49**   **.43**   –

**p < .01 (2-tailed)**

**General Statements about Strategies.** This measure consisted of four general statements that assessed participants’ general linear/non-linear beliefs about offensive and defensive strategies. The four statements were:

I. **Nonlinear:**

   Statement 1: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to attack others first

   Statement 3: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to defend oneself first

II. **Linear:**

   Statement 2: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to not attack others

   Statement 4: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to not worry too much about defending oneself first

For each item, participants recorded their responses on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented *Not at all*, and 7 represented *Very much*. Please see table 4 below for the correlations of participants’ ratings across all four statements.
Table 4

Correlations among General Statements about Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Defend is to attack(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Defend is to not attack(^b)</td>
<td>-.48**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attack is to defend(^a)</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attack is to not defend(^b)</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)p < .01 (2-tailed)

\(^a\) refers to the general statements with non-linear beliefs about strategies. \(^b\) refers to the general statements with linear beliefs about strategies.

**Regulatory Focus Questionnaire.** This measure consisted of 18-items that assessed participants’ regulatory focus (nine items measure promotion focus and nine items measure prevention focus). For each item, participants recorded their responses on a 1 to 9 scale, where 1 represented *Not at all true about me*, and 9 represented *Very much true about me*. A prevention focus score was computed for each participant by averaging their scores on items 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15, while a promotion focus score was computed for each of them by averaging their scores on items, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17 and 18. Higher scores indicated higher levels of the respective regulatory focus. The
reliability for both prevention and promotion measures were high, \( \alpha = .83, \) and \( .84, \) respectively.

**Results**

**Soccer Scenario**

In retrospect, I decided to drop the analysis of the midfielders because the interpretation of the midfielders was unclear as midfielders could act both offensively and defensively. Thus, I performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 (Roles: Attacker vs. Defender) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on participants’ preferences for playing these roles, with culture as a between subject variable and roles as a within subject variable. There was a significant main effect of roles, \( F(1, 196) = 5.34, p = .02, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .03. \) In general, participants preferred playing the role of the attacker (\( M = 4.98, SD = 1.69 \)) more than the role of the defender (\( M = 4.57, SD = 1.71 \)). There was also a main effect of culture, \( F(1, 196) = 4.13, p = .04, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .02. \) In general, Chinese (\( M = 4.94, SE = .11 \)) gave higher preference scores across both roles than Canadians did (\( M = 4.61, SE = .11 \)). However, there was no significant interaction between roles and culture, \( F(1, 196) = .59, p = .44. \) Although the interaction was not significant, a simple effect analysis for preference for playing the attacker role was marginally significant, \( F(1, 196) = 3.81, p = .052, 95\% \) CI [-.94, .00]. More specifically, Chinese participants (\( M = 5.21, SD = 1.65 \)) preferred to play the attacker role more than Canadians (\( M = 4.74, SD = 1.71 \)) did. No cultural difference was found in people’s
preference for playing the defender role, $F(1, 196) = .62, p = .43, (M_{Chinese} = 4.66, SD_{Chinese} = 1.61, and M_{Canadians} = 4.47, SD_{Canadians} = 1.80)$.

The first prediction (specifically 1a) was that Chinese would emphasize defensive roles more than Canadians, whereas Canadians would emphasize offensive roles more than Chinese. However, this was not supported as I found that Chinese participants preferred playing the attacker role more than Canadians did, and there were no cultural differences for playing the defender role.

**Strategy and Outcomes for Soccer**

This analysis examined the contributions of offensive and defensive roles to success or failure outcomes in soccer matches across both cultures. As the items 1 and 3 that measured the extent to which a soccer team’s offense contributed to its winning or losing were highly correlated with one another (see Table 2), I decided to average them to obtain an aggregate for the contribution of offense to success and failure outcomes. Likewise, I averaged items 2 and 4 to obtain an aggregate for the contribution of defense to success and failure outcomes since both items that assessed the extent to which a soccer team’s defense contributed to its winning or losing were highly correlated with each other. Next, I performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subject) by 2 (Strategy Contribution: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on the extent to which participants attributed a soccer team’s outcome to its offense or defense. There was a significant main effect of strategy contribution, $F(1, 196) = 29.4, p < .001, \eta^2 = .13$. In general, participants were more likely to attribute the outcome of a
soccer game (success and failure) to a team’s defense than offense ($M_{\text{Defense}} = 5.79$, $SE_{\text{Defense}} = .07$, and $M_{\text{Offense}} = 5.42$, $SE_{\text{Offense}} = .08$). However, the main effect of culture was not significant, $F(1, 196) = 4.65, p = .10$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$, as well as the interaction between culture and strategy, $F(1, 196) = .45, p = .50$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. Although the interaction was not significant, a simple effects analysis between culture for attributing outcomes to a team’s defense was marginally significant, $F(1, 196) = 3.32, p = .07$, 95% CI [-.02, .55]. More specifically, Canadians ($M = 5.92, SD = .96$) attributed the outcome of a game to a team’s defense more than Chinese ($M = 5.67, SD = 1.07$) did. No cultural difference was found for attributing outcomes to a team’s offense, $F(1, 196) = 1.21, p = .27$, ($M_{\text{Canadians}} = 5.50, SD_{\text{Canadians}} = 1.03$; and $M_{\text{Chinese}} = 5.33, SD_{\text{Chinese}} = 1.14$). Once again, this did not support prediction 1b that Canadians were more likely than Chinese to attribute outcomes to a team’s offense, and Chinese were more likely than Canadians to attribute outcomes to a team’s defense.

**Martial Arts Scenario**

Similarly, I performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Type of Martial art: Offensive vs. Defensive; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on participants’ preferences for learning a predominantly offensive and defensive martial art. The culture main effect was not significant, $F(1, 196) = .29, p = .59$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$. In general, participants preferred to learn a defensive martial art ($M = 5.31, SD = 1.43$) more than an offensive martial art ($M = 4.99, SD = 1.59$), $F(1, 196) =$
4.44, \( p = .04 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .02 \). The martial art type main effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect between culture and the type of martial art, \( F(1, 196) = 7.57, p = .006 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .04 \). Simple effect analyses showed that Chinese (\( M = 5.24, SD = 1.56 \)) preferred to learn an offensive martial art more than Canadians did (\( M = 4.74, SD = 1.58 \)), \( F(1, 196) = 5.13, p = .025 \), 95% CI [-.95, -.07], whereas Canadians (\( M = 5.49, SD = 1.30 \)) preferred to learn a defensive martial art more than Chinese did (\( M = 5.14, SD = 1.53 \)), \( F(1, 196) = 3.01, p = .08 \), 95% CI [-.05, .75]. This was, once again, contrary to my first prediction, which stated that Canadians, as compared to Chinese, would prefer to learn a more offensive martial art, and Chinese, as compared to Canadians, would prefer to learn a more defensive martial art.

**Strategy and Outcomes for Martial Arts**

Similar to the soccer scenario, this analysis examined the contributions of offensive and defensive strategies to success or failure outcomes in martial art bouts across both cultures. Again, as all four items were highly correlated with one another (see Table 3), I decided to combine items 1 and 3 to examine the contribution of offense to success and failure outcomes, and items 2 and 4 to examine the contribution of defense to success and failure outcomes. Then, I performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subject) by 2 (Strategy Contribution: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on the extent to which participants attributed outcomes of a martial art bout to the martial artists’ offensive or defensive strategy style. There was a significant main effect of strategy contribution, \( F(1, 196) = 41.3, p < .001 \), partial \( \eta^2 = \)
.18. Particularly, participants were more likely to attribute outcomes of a martial art bout to a defensive martial art strategy ($M = 5.81, SE = .07$) than an offense martial art strategy, ($M = 5.37, SE = .07$). There was also a significant main effect of culture, $F(1, 196) = 3.91, p = .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, in which Chinese participants ($M = 5.72, SE = .09$) had higher attribution scores than Canadians in general ($M = 5.47, SE = .09$). The interaction effect between culture and strategy contribution was not significant, $F(1, 196) = .01, p = .92$, partial $\eta^2 = .00$. Relating back to my prediction, these results, once again, did not support my hypothesis that Canadians were more likely than Chinese to attribute outcomes to a martial artist’s offensive strategy style, whereas Chinese were more likely than Canadians to attribute outcomes to a martial art’s defensive strategy style.

**General Beliefs about Strategies**

Recall that each of the four statements were designed to be grouped into one of two categories:

I. Nonlinear:

Statement 1: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to attack others first

Statement 3: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to defend oneself first

II. Linear:
Statement 2: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to not attack others.

Statement 4: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to not worry too much about defending oneself first.

Although the two non-linear belief statements were significantly positively correlated, $r = .18$, the two linear belief statements were not, $r = .01$. Moreover, the linear belief statements did not negatively correlate with the non-linear belief statements (see table 4). Thus, I decided not to aggregate the scores on the respective statements, and performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 4 (Statements: 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their ratings.

There was a significant main effect of statements, $F(3, 194) = 25.9, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .29$, and a significant main effect of culture, $F(1, 196) = 35.6, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .16$. In addition, there was a significant interaction between culture and their endorsements of the four statements, $F(3, 194) = 7.48, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .10$. More specifically, simple effects analyses revealed that participants from the two cultures differed in their endorsements of all statements except for Statement 2 (for Statements 1, 3, and 4, $Fs(1, 196) > 11.5, ps \leq .001$; for Statement 2, $F(1, 196) = 1.77, p = .19$).

Specifically, Canadians were more likely than Chinese to endorse linear beliefs of strategies (statement 4), while Chinese were more likely than Canadians to endorse non-linear beliefs of strategies (statements 1 and 3). Table 5 contains the respective means and standard deviations for each of the statements. I predicted that Canadians as
compared to Chinese would be more likely to hold linear beliefs about strategies, whereas Chinese as compared to Canadians would be more likely to hold nonlinear beliefs about strategies (Hypothesis 3), and it was partially supported.

Table 5

*Means and Standard Deviations on General Beliefs about Offense/Defense*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Statement 1 (nonlinear)</th>
<th>Statement 2 (linear)</th>
<th>Statement 3 (nonlinear)</th>
<th>Statement 4 (linear)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadians</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regulatory Focus**

To examine the effect of culture on participant’s regulatory focus, I conducted a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Regulatory Focus: Prevention vs. Promotion; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their regulatory focus questionnaire scores. There was a significant main effect of culture, $F(1, 196) = 4.58, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, whereby Canadians ($M = 6.54, SE = .10$) had higher regulatory focus scores than Chinese participants ($M = 6.24, SE = .10$). There was also a significant main effect of regulatory focus, $F(1, 196) = 90.5, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .32$, in which participants were generally more promotion ($M = 6.94, SD = 1.17$) than prevention focused ($M = 5.84, SD = 1.42$). Most importantly, there was a significant interaction
between culture and regulatory focus, \( F(1, 196) = 7.74, p = .006 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .04 \). As expected, simple effect analyses revealed that Canadians were more promotion \( (M = 7.26, SD = 1.06) \) focused than Chinese \( (M = 6.63, SD = 1.20) \), \( F(1, 196) = 15.1, p < .001 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .07 \), 95% CI [ .31, .94 ]. However, participants from both cultures \( (M_{\text{Canadians}} = 5.83, SD_{\text{Canadians}} = 1.51, \) and \( M_{\text{Chinese}} = 5.84, SD_{\text{Chinese}} = 1.33) \) did not differ in their prevention focus scores, \( F(1, 196) = .01, p = .915 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .00 \), 95% CI [ -.42, .38 ]. The results here partially replicated previous findings that Canadians were found to be more promotion focused than Chinese, however, Chinese were not found to be more prevention focused than Canadians.

**Indirect Effects Analysis**

To test for the indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for offense or defense through their regulatory focus, I conducted a simple mediation analysis using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS. Since culture was a categorical variable, I dummy-coded Chinese as 0 and Caucasian as 1. Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference to learn a predominantly offensive martial arts through promotion regulatory focus, \( b = .12 \), was above zero [ .01, .30 ], indicating a significant indirect effect. This indirect effect is likely a suppression because the nature of the direct and indirect effect reversed in relationship (see Figure 1 below). Also, after controlling for participants’ promotion regulatory focus, the direct effect of culture on participants’
preference to learn an offensive martial art became more significant, $b = -0.62$, $t(196) = -2.72$, $p = .007$. The indirect effect is relatively small, $k^2 = .04$, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09]. There was, however, no significant indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for playing an attacker role in a soccer match through participants’ promotion regulatory focus, $b = .03$. The 95% bias-corrected CIs [-0.11, 0.18] based on 10,000 bootstrap samples included zero.

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 1.* Model of culture (Chinese = 0, Caucasian = 1) as predictor of preference for learning a predominantly offensive martial arts, suppressed by promotion regulatory focus.

In addition, the indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for learning a predominantly defensive martial art and for playing a defender role in a soccer match through their prevention regulatory focus was not significant, $bs = -0.006$ and $-0.002$, respectively. The respective 95% bias-corrected CIs [-0.11, 0.10] and [-0.07, 0.04] based on 10,000 bootstrap samples included zero. This is not surprising because there were no cultural differences between Canadians’ and Chinese’s’ prevention focused scores.
Relating back to the predictions, it seems that regulatory focus did not mediate the relationship between culture and preference for strategy styles. In fact, 1 out of the 4 indirect effects analysis showed that regulatory focus could be a suppressor instead. However, this conclusion might be spurious as suppression effects can also be obtained due to pure chance (MacKinnon, Krull, Lockwood, 2000).

**Gender**

Out of the 100 Chinese participants, 50 were men and 50 were women. However, among the Canadian participants, 16 were males and 82 were females. One could argue that Canadian participants preferred defensive strategies while Chinese participants preferred offensive strategies was because there were more females in the Canadian sample and there were more males in the Chinese sample. In order to address gender as a potential confound, I did some additional analyses.

**Soccer Roles**

First, I conducted a 2 (Gender: Men vs. Women; between subjects) by 2 (Roles: Attacker vs. Defender; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their preferences for soccer roles among the Chinese participants only because the distribution of male and female participants for Canadian participants was too different for any meaningful analyses. Only the main effect of roles was significant, $F(1, 98) = 5.11, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$, in which participants generally preferred playing the attacker role ($M = 5.21, SD = 1.65$) more than the defender role ($M = 4.66, SD = 1.61$). The main effect of gender was not
significant, $F(1, 98) = .36, p = .55$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$ ($M_{Men} = 5.00, SD_{Men} = 1.76$, and $M_{Women} = 4.87, SD_{Women} = 1.49$). The interaction effect between roles and gender was not significant too, $F(1, 98) = .75, p = .39$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$. This meant that gender did not influence Chinese participants’ preference for playing an attacker or a defender in a soccer match. Unfortunately, this cannot be concluded for the Canadian participants.

Next, I also examined the effect of culture on women participants’ preference for playing the attacker or defender in a soccer match. I did a 2 (Culture: Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Roles: Attacker vs. Defender; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their preferences for soccer roles. The main effect of culture, roles, and interaction between culture and role were all not significant, $F(1, 130) = 1.49, p = .23$, $F(1, 130) = 1.09, p = .30$, and $F(1, 130) = .20, p = .66$ respectively. This meant that there were no cultural differences between women’s preferences for playing the attacker or defender soccer roles, although there was a trend for Chinese women to play as the attacker ($M = 5.14, SD = 1.76$) more than Canadian women did ($M = 4.68, SD = 1.71$), and a slight preference for Canadian women to play as the defender ($M = 4.70, SD = 1.49$) more than Chinese women did ($M = 4.54, SD = 1.77$).

**Martial Arts**

I repeated the analysis for the martial art scenario, and conducted a 2 (Gender: Men vs. Women; between subjects) by 2 (Martial Arts Type: Offensive vs. Defensive; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their preferences for martial arts among the Chinese participants. The main effect of gender, and the main effect of roles were not significant,
The interaction between gender and roles was not significant as well, $F(1, 98) = .21$, $p = .65$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$. Consistent with the soccer scenario, gender did not influence Chinese participants’ preference for playing an attacker or a defender in a soccer match.

Next, I analyzed women participants, and did a 2 (Culture: Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Martial Arts Type: Offensive vs. Defensive; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their preferences for types of martial art. The main effect of culture was not significant, $F(1, 130) = 2.52$, $p = .11$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$. The main effect of martial art type was, however, significant, $F(1, 130) = 9.45$, $p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. In general, women participants from both cultures preferred defensive martial arts ($M = 5.34$, $SE = .14$) to offensive martial arts ($M = 4.95$, $SE = .12$). In addition, the interaction effect between culture and roles was significant, $F(1, 130) = 7.97$, $p = .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. Specifically, Chinese women ($M = 5.36$, $SD = 1.65$) as compared to Canadian women ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.77$) were more likely to prefer an offensive martial arts to a defensive one, $F(1, 130) = 8.95$, $p = .003$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, 95% CI [.28, 1.34]. These results provided partial evidence that gender might not a potential confound for participants’ preference for offense or defense in the martial arts scenario. In fact, the cultural difference between women participants was consistent with the findings in study 1a.
Summary

To summarize, for both soccer and martial art scenarios, Chinese participants preferred to play the attacker role and learn a predominantly offensive martial art more than Canadians did. Although there was no cultural difference between Chinese and Canadians for playing the defender role, Canadians preferred to learn a predominantly defensive martial art more than Chinese did. In addition, for the soccer scenario, Canadians were more likely than Chinese to attribute outcomes to a team’s defense, whereas there was no difference between the two cultures for attributing outcomes to a team’s offense. However, for the martial art scenario, participants from both cultures did not differ in their attributions of outcomes to offensive or defensive strategies. Lastly, the significant indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for learning a predominantly offensive martial art through their promotion regulatory focus indicated a suppression effect. However, promotion focus did not suppress the effect of culture on preferences for playing an offender role in a soccer match. Neither did prevention focus suppress the effect of culture on preferences for playing a defender role or learning a predominantly defensive martial art.
Chapter 3

Study One B

Participants

Sixty-nine Euro-Canadian undergraduate students (57 women, 12 men) from Queen’s University and 99 Chinese undergraduate students (78 women, 21 men) from Huazhong Normal University participated in a questionnaire study for cash or small gifts. I used a time-based stop-rule, ceasing data collection after 4 weeks of data collection. No data were analyzed prior to this stop-rule. Euro-Canadian participants ranged in age from 18 to 26 ($M = 19.45, SD = 1.28$), and Chinese participants ranged in age from 17 to 28 ($M = 19.19, SD = 2.45$).

Procedures

Consent

When participants arrived at the lab, they were provided with a letter of information and a consent form. I began the experiment after participants signed the consent forms.

Marketing Scenario Strategies

First, participants first read a general description of an offensive and a defensive marketing strategy (see Appendix B):

Offensive and defensive marketing strategies have distinct benefits, depending on the status of your business and how successful you are in your local market. An
offensive marketing strategy seeks to attack the market by targeting their competition. A defensive marketing strategy is reactive to the competition or focuses on improving your own products without concerns for others.

This was to ensure that participants understood the basic concept of what offensive and defensive marketing strategies were before attempting to answer various marketing questions (see Appendix B). Then, participants read the following marketing scenario:

Imagine that you are running a business of your own. Recently, you realize to your dismay that there are much cheaper, and better options from another manufacturers that were becoming the preferred choices of the local market. You need a business plan to help take you out of this difficult situation (see Appendix B).

After reading the scenarios, participants’ preferences for marketing strategies were measured by presenting them with 4 possible strategies and asking them to rate the extent to which they would like to adopt each strategy (by imaging themselves as competent employees in their company) on a 7-point scale, where 1 represented *I will definitely not adopt*, and 7 represented *I will definitely adopt*. With the intention of strategies 1 and 4 being more reactive (i.e., defensive in nature according to the definition given to participants), and strategies 2 and 3 being more proactive (i.e., offensive in nature), the four strategies were:
1. Highlighting the effectiveness of your company’s products in the wake of your competitor’s claims of product inferiority.

2. Publicly stating that competitors will not undercut you and that you will match their prices.

3. Creating and promoting a new product just to exploit your competitor’s weaknesses.

4. Targeting your competitor’s shaky product safety record by emphasizing the safety of your own products.

Thus, participants with an offensive preference may be more likely to endorse strategies 2 and 3, whereas participants with a defensive preference may be more likely to endorse strategies 1 and 4. Like in Study 1a, participants also rated the extent to which they thought offensive and defensive marketing strategies could contribute to a company’s success and failure on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented Not at all, and 7 represented Very much.

**Marketing Scenario Strategies Perception**

The offensive and defensive nature of the four aforementioned marketing strategies could be perceived and interpreted differently by different individuals, especially those from different cultures (Zhong et al., 2006). To better assess participants' preference for endorsing each strategy, it was imperative to understand their perception and interpretation of the offensiveness and defensiveness of each strategy they endorsed. Therefore, at the end of the questionnaire, I asked them to indicate the extent to which
they perceived each of the four marketing strategies to be offensive or defensive in nature on a 7-point scale, where 1 represented *Not at all offensive*, and 7 represented *Very offensive*, and 1 represented *Not at all defensive*, and 7 represented *Very defensive*, respectively.

**Debrief**

Participants were debriefed at the end of the questionnaire before concluding the experiment.

**Measures**

**Preference for Strategies.** This measure assessed the extent to which participants would endorse each of the four marketing strategies. Across the four marking strategies, only strategy 4 was significantly correlated with the other 3 (see Table 6 below). More specifically, strategy 4 was positive correlated with strategy 2 and 3, and negatively correlated with strategy 1.

**Table 6**

*Correlations among Preference for Marketing Strategies (N = 169)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Highlighting the effectiveness of your company’s products in the wake of your competitor’s claims of product inferiority.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Publicly state that competitors will not undercut you and that you will match their price if they do.</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
prices.

3. Creating and promoting a new product just to exploit your competitor’s weaknesses

4. Targeting your competitor’s shaky product safety record by emphasizing the safety of your own products.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Extent offense contribute to success</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Extent defense contribute to success</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extent offense contribute to failure</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Extent defense contribute to failure</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05 (2-tailed)

**p < .01 (2-tailed)

**Strategy and Outcome for Marketing.** This measure consisted of four-items that assessed to what extent participants thought a company’s offensive and defensive marketing strategies contributed to a success or failure in a campaign. Across all four items, only items 1 and 4, and 2 and 3 were positively correlated with one another (see Table 7 below).

Table 7

Correlations among Strategy and Outcome for Marketing
Results

Interpreting Offensive and Defensive Marketing Strategies

A 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Strategy rating: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) by 4 (Marketing Type: 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4; within subjects) mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine cultural differences in people’s perception of a strategy’s offensiveness and defensiveness. The main effects of strategy rating, $F(1, 165) = 4.59, \ p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, and marketing type were significant, $F(3, 163) = 7.27, \ p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .12$. The main effect of culture was not significant, $F(1, 165) = 1.84, \ p = .18$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$. Most importantly, the three-way interaction between culture, strategy rating, and marketing type was significant, $F(3, 163) = 48.9, \ p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .47$.

I probed this three-way interaction and found that for the first marketing strategy (Highlighting the effectiveness of your company’s products in the wake of your competitor’s claims of product inferiority), although participants in general believed it to be more defensive ($M = 4.75, SE = .11$) than offensive ($M = 3.44, SE = .12$), $F(1, 167) = 50.2, \ p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .23$, this difference was greater for Canadians ($M = 2.54, SD = 1.54$ for offense ratings; $M = 5.49, SD = 1.44$ for defense ratings) than for Chinese ($M = 4.37, SD = 1.47$ for offense ratings; $M = 4.00, SD = 1.30$ for defense ratings), $F(1, 167) = 80.7, \ p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .33$.

For the second marketing strategy (Publicly state that competitors will not undercut you and that you will match their prices), overall, participants believed it to be
more offensive ($M = 4.39, SE = .14$) than defensive ($M = 3.66, SE = .13$), $F(1, 167) = 10.4, p = .001, \eta^2 = .06$. However, the simple effects analysis that follow a significant interaction between culture and strategy, $F(1, 167) = 41.8, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .20$, showed that this was only true for Canadians ($M = 5.10, SD = 1.57$ for offense ratings; $M = 2.91, SD = 1.74$ for defense ratings), 95% CI [.89, 1.96], but not for Chinese ($M = 3.64, SD = 1.82$ for offense ratings; $M = 4.44, SD = 1.52$ for defense ratings), 95% CI [1.00, 2.00].

For the third marketing strategy (Creating and promoting a new product just to exploit your competitor’s weaknesses), following a significant interaction between culture and strategy, $F(1, 167) = 67.6, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .29$, simple effects revealed that Canadians believed it to be more defensive ($M = 5.17, SD = 1.72$) than offensive ($M = 3.30, SD = 1.89$), 95% CI [-2.67, -1.65], whereas Chinese believed it to be more offensive ($M = 5.47, SD = 1.45$) than defensive ($M = 3.51, SD = 1.69$), 95% CI [-2.16, -1.11].

For the fourth marketing strategy (Targeting your competitor’s shaky product safety record by emphasizing the safety of your own products), there were no significant differences for the main effect of strategy, culture, and their interaction (main effect of strategy: $F(1, 168) = 2.41, p = .12$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$; main effect of culture: $F(1, 168) = .38, p = .54$, partial $\eta^2 = .002$; and interaction effect: $F(1, 168) = 2.60, p = .11$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$).
Endorsement of Marketing Strategies

Because the offensive and defensive nature of the four presented marketing strategies were perceived and interpreted differently by individuals from both cultures (as shown by preceding analysis), it stands to reason that the differences in the participants’ endorsement for each marketing strategy must be considered in the context of their perceptions of the strategy’s offensiveness and defensiveness. Hence, in order to appropriately interpret participants’ endorsements of an offensive or defensive marketing strategy, I first used participants’ ratings of how offensive and defensive each marketing strategy was on a 7-point scale (1: not at all offensive/defensive, 7: very offensive/defensive) to categorize each of them into a primarily offensive or defensive one for each participant. That is, for each participant, after comparing the perceived offensiveness and defensiveness ratings for each of the four marketing strategies, I grouped the marketing strategy as an offensive strategy if it had a higher offensive than defensive rating; and grouped it as a defensive strategy if it had a higher defensive than offensive rating. For strategies that had equal perceived offensiveness and defensiveness ratings, they were categorized as equally offensive and defensive (i.e., both offensive and defensive scores were similar). Hence, the four marketing strategies for every participant would be categorized differently based on their respective perceived offensive and defensive ratings.

After which, I created an index of endorsement scores for each of the category. That is, for each participant, an index for their endorsement of offensive marketing
strategies, an index for their endorsement of defensive marketing strategies, and an index
for their endorsement of marketing strategies that is perceived as equally offensive and
defensive was computed by averaging the respective endorsement scores (i.e., 1 = I will
definitely not adopt, 7 = I will definitely adopt) for strategies that were in the same
category. Thus, if the particular marketing strategy were the only strategy categorized as
an offensive marketing strategy, its actual endorsement score would be the new index
itself. However, if no strategies were grouped into a corresponding category, there would
be a missing value for the new index. Given that the number of participants who rated
any strategy as equally offensive and defensive (nCanadians = 14, and nChinese = 36) was
relatively small, and that we were only interested in participant’s preference for adopting
offensive or defensive marketing strategies, we did not include the category of strategies
that were perceived as equally offensive and defensive in the analysis.
A mixed 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Strategy:
Offensive vs. Defensive; within subjects) ANOVA was then performed on the new index
of endorsement scores to examine the effect of culture on participants’ preference for
marketing strategy styles. In general, participants did not show preference for either
offensive marketing strategy (M = 4.48, SD = 1.52), or defensive marketing strategy (M =
4.55, SD = 1.51), F(1, 146) = .55, p = .46, partial η² = .004. There was a significant main
effect of culture, F(1, 146) = 13.0, p < .001, partial η² = .08, in which Canadians tend to
give higher endorsement scores (M = 4.85, SE = .12) across both strategies than Chinese
did (M = 4.25, SE = .11). More importantly, there was significant interaction between
culture and strategy, $F(1, 146) = 9.62, p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. Specifically, Canadians preferred defensive marketing strategies ($M = 5.19, SD = 1.11$) more than Chinese did ($M = 4.04, SD = 1.59$), $F(1, 146) = 24.4, p < .001$, 95% CI [.69, 1.61], whereas there was no cultural difference for participants’ preference for offensive marketing strategies, $F(1, 146) = .09, p = .77$. Within culture comparisons also showed that Canadians preferred defensive strategies ($M = 5.19, SD = 1.11$) to offensive strategies ($M = 4.51, SD = 1.30$), $F(1, 146) = 6.59, p = .01$, 95% CI [.16, .89], whereas Chinese preferred offensive strategies ($M = 4.46, SD = 1.68$) to defensive strategies ($M = 4.04, SD = 1.59$), $F(1, 146) = 3.16, p = .05$, 95% CI [-.05, -.001]. Contrary to what I predicted in H1a, I found contrary evidences once again, that Canadians as compared to Chinese were more likely to adopt defensive strategies, Canadians were also more likely to adopt defensive strategies than offensive ones, and Chinese were more likely to adopt offensive strategies than defensive ones.

**Strategy and Success for Marketing**

According to the item correlations in Table 7, I could not combine the two statements for offense and defense, as items 1 and 3 ($r = -.04$), and 2 and 4 ($r = -.15$) were not positively correlated significantly. Thus, I did two separate analyses – first for success, and the second for failure. I first performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Strategy: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on the extent to which participants attributed a company’s success to offense or
defense marketing strategy. The main effect of strategy was not significant, \( F(1, 167) = 2.57, p = .11, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .02 \). There was a significant culture main effect, \( F(1, 167) = 7.89, p = .006, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .05 \), which was qualified by an interaction effect between culture and strategy, \( F(1, 167) = 28.3, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .15 \). Specifically, Chinese attributed a company’s success to offensive marketing strategy \( (M = 5.82, SD = 1.18) \) more than Canadians \( (M = 4.57, SD = 1.36) \) did, \( F(1, 167) = 40.1, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .19 \), 95% CI \([.86, 1.64]\), whereas there was marginal significance between the two cultures \( (M_{\text{Chinese}} = 5.24, SD_{\text{Chinese}} = 1.62, \) and \( M_{\text{Canadians}} = 5.66, SD_{\text{Canadians}} = 1.23) \) in attributing success to defensive marketing strategy, \( F(1, 167) = 3.36, p = .07, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .02 \).

**Strategy and Failure for Marketing**

Then, I performed another 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Strategy: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on the extent to which participants attributed a company’s failure to offense or defense marketing strategies. In general, participants attributed failure to offensive marketing strategies \( (M = 4.85, SE = .11) \) more than to defense marketing strategy \( (M = 3.92, SE = 12) \), \( F(1, 167) = 27.6, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .14 \). The main effect of culture was also significant, \( F(1, 167) = 57.0, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .25 \). Specifically, Chinese tend to give higher scores \( (M = 4.89, SE = .10) \) in attributions than Canadians did \( (M = 3.88, SE = .09) \). The interaction effect between culture and strategy was not significant, \( F(1, 167) = \)
1.86, \( p = .17 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .01 \). Thus, I found contrary evidence for success conditions that Canadians as compared to Chinese were more likely to attribute success to defense, and Chinese as compared to Canadians were more likely to attribute success to offense.

**Summary**

To summarize, Canadians preferred defensive marketing strategies more than Chinese did but there was no cultural difference for their preference for offensive marketing strategies. Within culture comparisons also showed that Canadians preferred defensive to offensive marketing strategies, whereas Chinese preferred offensive to defensive marketing strategies. Chinese were also more likely than Canadians to attribute a successful outcome to offensive marketing strategies, while there was no cultural difference in their attributions of a successful outcome to defensive marketing strategies.
Study 1c adopted a between subject design. This eliminated the possibility that participants could make direct comparisons across the strategies. In this study, I assessed participants’ preference for offensive and defensive strategy in a business marketing and a negotiation scenario.

Participants

One hundred and eighty-three Euro-Canadian undergraduate students (164 women, 19 men) from Queen’s University and 220 Chinese undergraduate students (106 women, 112 men) from Peking University participated in a questionnaire study for cash or small gifts. I used a time-based stop-rule, ceasing data collection after 4 weeks of data collection. No data were analyzed prior to this stop-rule. Euro-Canadian participants ranged in age from 18 to 27 ($M = 19.40, SD = 1.62$), and Chinese participants ranged in age from 17 to 33 ($M = 21.19, SD = 2.58$).

Design

Study 1c was a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 (Strategy: Offensive vs. Defensive) between-subjects design. Each participant either read about a marketing or a negotiation scenario, and was presented with either an offensive or defensive strategy depending on the condition he or she was randomly assigned to (See Appendix C).
Procedures

For participants in the marketing scenario condition, they were first instructed to imagine themselves as a business manager. They were then told that their task was to: Make plans to increase your company’s market share within the industry. Half of the participants were randomly presented with an offensive marketing strategy, and the other half of the participants were presented with a defensive marketing strategy. After which, they were asked to indicate how likely they were to endorse the presented strategy on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented Very unlikely, and 7 represented Very likely.

For the offensive strategy, participants read:

You aim to increase your company’s market share by targeting your competitors. By adopting this strategy, you intend to target your competitors’ weaknesses in their products or actively acquire other firms to fuel your company’s growth.

For the defensive strategy, participants read:

You aim to increase your company’s market share by strengthening your own company’s portfolio. By adopting this strategy, you intend to actively focus on improving your own products or creating and launching new ones.

Likewise, in the negotiation scenario condition, participants were instructed to imagine themselves as a lawyer representing a client in negotiating a settlement with the opposing counsel. Half of the participants were randomly presented with an offensive negotiation strategy, and the other half of the participants were presented with a defensive
negotiation strategy. Then, they were asked to indicate how likely they were to endorse the presented strategy on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented Very unlikely, and 7 represented Very likely.

For the offensive negotiation strategy, participants read:

You aim to begin the negotiation with a firm and unyielding offer to anchor the discussions; this involves attempting to make your point before your competitor can make his/hers.

For the defensive negotiation strategy, participants read:

You aim to let your opposing counsel make the first offer, and then counteract his/her offer; this involves attempting to make your point only after your competitor made his/hers.

Results

Marketing Scenario

I first ran a 2 (Culture: Canadians versus Chinese) by 2 (Strategy: Offensive versus Defensive) ANOVA on participants’ endorsement scores to examine the effect of culture on participants’ preference for marketing strategies. In general, participants preferred the defensive marketing strategy ($M = 5.50, SD = 1.55$) more than the offensive marketing strategy ($M = 3.76, SD = 1.55$), $F(1, 192) = 86.0, p < .001$. However, there was no main effect of culture, $F(1, 192) = .22, p = .64$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$, and there was no interaction effect between culture and marketing strategy on participants’ endorsements of strategy styles, $F(1, 192) = 2.10, p = .15$. Thus, the marketing scenario did not provide
evidence to support my prediction that Canadians are more likely than Chinese to endorse defensive strategies, whereas Chinese are more likely than Canadians to endorse offensive strategies.

Negotiation Scenario

Next, I ran another 2 (Culture: Canadians versus Chinese) by 2 (Strategy: Offensive versus Defensive) ANOVA on participants’ endorsement scores to examine if there were cultural differences in participants’ preference for a particular negotiation strategy style. Both main effects of culture, $F(1, 203) = 5.44, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$, and main effects of strategy were significant, $F(1, 203) = 33.6, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .14$. These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect between culture and strategy, $F(1, 203) = 17.4, p = .007$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$. The simple effect analyses showed that Canadians ($M = 5.60, SD = .99$) preferred the defensive negotiation strategy more than did Chinese ($M = 4.50, SD = 1.73$), $F(1, 203) = 30.9, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$, 95% CI [.50, 1.69], whereas the two groups did not differ in their endorsement for the offensive negotiation strategy ($M_{Canadians} = 3.77, SD_{Canadians} = 1.66$, and $M_{Chinese} = 3.85, SD_{Chinese} = 1.60$), $F(1, 203) = .079, p = .78$, $\eta^2 = .00$. The negotiation scenario provided contradictory results for my predictions, showing that Canadians as compared to Chinese were more likely to endorse defensive strategies.

To examine if gender was a potential confound for the significant effect of culture on participants’ preference for offensive or defensive negotiation strategies, I ran a 2 (Gender: Men vs. Women) by 2 (Strategy: Offense vs. Defense) between subjects
ANOVA among Chinese participants’ endorsement scores. Unfortunately, the distribution of male and female participants for Canadian participants was too unequal for any meaningful analyses. The interaction between gender and strategy preference was not significant among Chinese participants, $F(1, 108) = .24, p = .63, \eta^2 = .002$. Next, I ran another 2 (Culture: Canadians vs. Chinese) by 2 (Strategy: Offense vs. Defense) between subjects ANOVA among women. There was a significant interaction effect between culture and strategy preference among women participants, $F(1, 135) = 4.76, p = .03, \eta^2 = .03$. The simple effects analysis showed that Canadian women ($M = 5.57, SE = .24$) were more likely than Chinese women ($M = 4.43, SE = .30$) to endorse the defensive negotiation strategy, $F(1, 135) = 9.12, p = .003, \eta^2 = .06$. Although it would be more complete if I could perform the 2 (Gender) X 2 (Strategy) ANOVA on Canadian participants, the non-significant interaction effect between gender and strategy preference for Chinese participants provided partial evidence that gender was not a confound for the negotiation strategies.

**Summary**

In a nutshell, with a between subjects design, Canadians were more likely than Chinese to adopt defensive negotiation strategies, while both cultures did not differ in their preferences for adopting offensive negotiation strategies. Unfortunately, there was no cultural difference between Chinese and Canadians in their preferences for marketing strategies in the marketing scenario.
Chapter 5

Study Two

One of the biggest limitations in Study 1 was that the presented scenarios were hypothetical and the results were based on self-report. Study 2 aimed to address this by getting participants to play an actual board game to assess their behavioral preference for offensive or defensive strategies in tangible strategic situations. Given that Studies 1a, 1b and 1c all showed that Canadians preferred defense more than Chinese did, and Chinese sometimes preferred offense more than Canadians, I wanted to explore whether the same pattern of results would emerge in behavioral data.

Participants

Sixty-three Euro-Canadian undergraduate students (56 women, 7 men) from Queen’s University and sixty-one Chinese undergraduate students (60 women, 1 men) from Huazhong Normal University participated in this board game study for cash or small gifts. I used a time-based stop-rule, ceasing data collection after 3 weeks. No data were analyzed prior to this stop-rule. Euro-Canadian participants ranged in age from 18 to 24 ($M = 19.83, SD = 1.85$), and Chinese participants ranged in age from 18 to 23 ($M = 20.16, SD = 1.03$).
Materials and Procedures

Overview

Participants played a board game and completed a questionnaire. The whole experiment took 30 minutes, which consisted of an introductory phase, trial game phase, practice game phase, actual game phase, and a questionnaire phase.

Board Game Introductory Phase

After getting their signed consents, participants were introduced to a novel board game called Alkkagi. The board game consisted of a 15 by 15 square Go board with 5 white, and 5 black stone pieces. This game was chosen due to its simple rules and ease of learning. Participants from both cultures were not familiar with this board game, thus controlling for past experience with the game. Most importantly, unlike most games that require the player to be offensive to win (e.g., goals are needed to score in soccer matches, and attacking the opponent is required to win in war games), Alkkagi allows the player to win even by taking the defensive options (see explanation below). Participants always played with black pieces, and the experimenter with white pieces. Participants were first briefed about the rules and the aim of the Alkkagi game. They and their opponent (i.e. the experimenter) each had 5 stone pieces, which they took turns flicking. Pieces that fell off the game board could no longer be used, and the person with no more pieces left on the board lost the game. The rules were kept simple and straightforward to
ensure that all participants understood the game. In all of the sessions, none of the participants had any problems understanding the rules of the game.

**Trial Game Phase**

After participants understood the rules and the aim of the game, they played a scripted trial game with the experimenter. The purpose of the trial game was to establish two things: (a) familiarize participants with the game mechanics, and most importantly, (b) demonstrate all the most possible offensive and defensive moves in this game. Specifically, experimenters had to follow a strict protocol to illustrate all the possible moves while playing with the participants (see Appendix C). A training video was made to standardize the process of training the experimenters from both cultures. They would adhere to the protocol of the behavioral task by following the video instructions carefully. Experimenters had to perform each of the four possible moves at least once:

1. Using their white piece to *hit* their opponent’s piece (contact)
2. Moving their white piece *towards* their opponent’s piece (no contact)
3. Moving their white piece *away* from their opponent’s piece
4. Moving their white piece towards the edge of the board

The trial game ended when either player or the experimenter won.

**Practice Game Phase**

Following this, participants had two minutes to play both white and black pieces on their own (just like in International Chess practice sessions). By playing both pieces,
participants could take the perspective of their opponent’s moves and made moves while keeping in mind their opponent’s potential retaliation. This was necessary because the actual game trial consisted of five one-shot scenarios instead of a full Alkkagi game. I chose one-shot scenarios instead of allowing the participants to play the full game because I wanted to prevent players from affecting each other’s moves. For example, in a full game, players could possibly make moves that are sparked off by a tit-for-tat strategy. This may introduce unnecessary noise into the intentions of their moves or their strategic inclination to make any moves. Therefore, by using one-shot scenarios, participants would be less affected by an actual potential opponent, and could “start afresh” for each scenario. Also, for each of the moves made in each scenario, I could assess participant’s preference for offensive or defensive strategies via their intention for making that particular move since each of the one-shot scenarios is now independent from one another.

**Actual Game Phase**

After the two minutes of practice time, participants began the actual game trial – five one-shot scenarios that were counterbalanced. Participants were randomly presented with the five pre-generated scenarios, one at a time. Each of these scenarios was taken from the middle of an actual game so that all 10 pieces looked randomly arranged on the game board (see Appendix D for a sample). For each of the scenarios, participants were instructed to state their intention (e.g., I will use piece A to knock off opponent’s piece 3
or I will move piece A to the center of the board, etc.) before they made the actual shot (Appendix D). This procedure was repeated for all 5 scenarios.

**Questionnaire Phase**

After completing the first part of the experiment, participants answered a short questionnaire. First, they were asked to indicate their general beliefs regarding offense and defense across the four general belief statements (identical to Study 1a). Next, they answered an 18-item regulatory focus questionnaire (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002; see Appendix A for the same RFQ used in Study 1a). And finally, they indicated the extent to which they thought each of the four possible game moves was offensive or defensive in nature, on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented Not at all offensive, and 7 represented Very offensive, and 1 represented Not at all defensive, and 7 represented Very defensive, respectively. This was because, similar to Study 1b, the offensive and defensive nature of the four aforementioned game moves can be perceived and interpreted differently by different individuals, especially those from different cultures (Zhong et al., 2006). Therefore, it is imperative to understand participants’ perception and interpretation of the offensiveness and defensiveness of the moves they made in order to better understand their strategic inclination for making each move. These were the questions:

(i) How offensive (defensive) do you think shooting at one of your opponent’s pieces is?
(ii) How offensive (defensive) do you think moving towards one of your opponent’s pieces is?

(iii) How offensive (defensive) do you think moving away from one (or more) of your opponent’s piece(s) is?

(iv) How offensive (defensive) do you think moving one of your pieces to the edge of the board is?

Debriefing Phase

After participants completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed and dismissed.

Measures

General Beliefs about Strategies. This measure consisted of four general statements that assessed participants’ general linear/non-linear beliefs about offensive and defensive strategies. The four statements again, were:

I. Nonlinear:

Statement 1: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to attack others first

Statement 3: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to defend oneself first

II. Linear:
Statement 2: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to not attack others

Statement 4: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to not worry too much about defending oneself first

For each item, participants recorded their responses on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represented Not at all, and 7 represented Very much. Please see table 8 below for the correlations among participants’ responses across the four statements.

Table 8
Correlations among General Beliefs about Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Defend is to attack</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Defend is to not attack</td>
<td>-.77**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attack is to defend</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attack is to not defend</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.56**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05 (2-tailed)

**p < .01 (2-tailed)

Regulatory Focus Questionnaire. This same measure was used in Study 1a (please refer to Study 1a for more details). The 9-item reliability for the prevention measure was α = .89, and the 9-item promotion measure was α = .88.
Results

Intent of Participants

In order to understand participants’ preference for offensive or defensive strategies (i.e. strategic inclination) in the game, I categorized the intent of each of the moves they made into one of three categories: (a) intent to make an offensive move, (b) intent to make a defensive move, and (c) others. If their intent for the shot was to hit an opponent’s piece, move closer to an opponent’s piece, or to make a move that entails an offensive motive (such as moving into a more favorable attacking position), I categorized the shot they made as “offensive move”. If their intent for the shot was not to hit an opponent’s piece, move farther away from an opponent’s piece, or to make a move that entails a defensive motive (such as preventing the piece from falling off easily), I categorized the shot they made as “defensive move”. Lastly, if their intent for the shot did not fall into any of the two categories, was ambiguous, or had multiple goals (such as hitting an opponent’s piece and simultaneously moving in front of one’s other piece for protection), I categorized the shot as “others”. I then tallied up the total number of moves made with offensive intent, and the total number of moves made with defensive intent for each participant over the five scenarios. Since the aim of this study was to understand participant’s preference for offensive or defensive strategies, I decided to focus on moves that had their intent categorized as offensive and defensive only. Moreover, majority of the moves made by Canadians and Chinese participants were categorized as having an offensive or defensive intent; only 3.6% of them were categorized as “others”.

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Then, I conducted a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Strategic Inclination: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their intent to examine the effect of culture on participants’ preference for offensive or defensive strategies in this Alkkagi game. The main effect of strategic inclination was significant, $F(2, 121) = 704.1, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .92$. In general, participants intended to make more offensive moves ($M = 4.20, SD = 1.09$) than defensive moves ($M = .62, SD = .91$). The main effect of culture was not significant, $F(1, 122) = .23, p = .64$, and neither was the interaction between culture and strategic inclination, $F(2, 121) = .12, p = .89$.

**Perception of Offensiveness and Defensiveness of Moves**

The offensive and defensive nature of the four aforementioned moves could be perceived and interpreted differently by different individuals, especially those from different cultures (Zhong et al., 2006). I conducted a mixed 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Strategy: Offense vs. Defense; within subjects) ANOVAs on their perception and interpretation about the offensiveness or defensiveness for each of the four possible moves. This allows me to interpret each behavioral move’s offensiveness and defensiveness according to the different cultures. For Move 1 (Shooting at one of your opponent’s pieces), although both Canadians and Chinese considered it to be more offensive than defensive, $F(1, 121) = 314.6, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .72$, Canadians perceived it to be more offensive than Chinese did, $F(1, 121) = 4.72, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .04, 95\%$ CI [ .03, .71], while Chinese perceived it to be more defensive
than Canadians did, $F(1, 121) = 5.70, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$, 95% CI [-1.09, -.10] (See table 9 for the respective means and standard deviations). For Move 2 (Moving towards one of your opponent’s pieces), although both Canadians and Chinese considered it to be more offensive than defensive, $F(1, 121) = 27.4, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .19$, Canadians perceived it to be more offensive than Chinese did, $F(1, 121) = 4.58, p = .03$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$, 95% CI [.04, 1.12], while there was no cultural difference in their perceived defensiveness for this move, $F(1, 121) = .001, p = .98$, partial $\eta^2 = .00$. For Move 3 (Moving away from one (or more) of your opponent’s pieces), although both Canadians and Chinese considered it to be more defensive than offensive, $F(1, 121) = 293.5, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .71$, Chinese perceived the move as being more offensive than Canadians did, $F(1, 121) = 3.91, p = .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, 95% CI [.00, .89], whereas there was no cultural difference in their perceived defensiveness of the move, $F(1, 121) = 2.08, p = .15$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$. Lastly, for Move 4 (Moving one of your pieces to the edge of the board is), there was no significant main and interaction effects (main effect of strategy: $F(1, 121) = .73, p = .39$, partial $\eta^2 = .006$; main effect of culture: $F(1, 121) = .011, p = .92$, partial $\eta^2 = .000$; and interaction effect, $F(1, 121) = .733, p = .39$, partial $\eta^2 = .006$). As expected, there were indeed cultural differences between Canadians’ and Chinese’s perception of offensiveness and defensiveness of all of the four possible moves, except Move 4.
Means and Standard Deviations (in parenthesis) on Offensiveness Ratings between Cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Move 1</th>
<th>Move 2</th>
<th>Move 3</th>
<th>Move 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Offense</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Offense</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadians</td>
<td>6.27(^a)</td>
<td>2.87(^b)</td>
<td>5.03(^c)</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>5.90(^a)</td>
<td>3.47(^b)</td>
<td>4.45(^c)</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.87)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Means that share the same superscripts were significantly different from each other (\(p < .05\))

**Actual Moves and their Perceptions**

In addition to analyzing their intent for making the shots, I also examined the cultural differences in the actual shots each participant made. First, I categorized the actual shots each participant made into the four possible moves as mentioned above. After which, I summed up the number of moves made by each participants in each “move” category across the five scenarios. To analyze the effect of culture on the moves made by the participants, I ran four one-way (analysis of variance) ANOVAs with culture as the between subjects variable on the number of moves made in each of the four possible move category. There was no cultural difference between Chinese and
Canadians in making Moves 1 (Hitting an opponent’s piece) and 4 (Moving towards the edge of the board), $F(1, 122) = .07, p = .79$ and $F(1, 122) = 3.00, p = .09$, respectively. However, there were significant culture effects for making Moves 2 (Moving towards your opponent’s pieces) and 3 (Moving away from your opponent’s pieces), $F(1, 122) = 3.72, p = .05$, and $F(1, 122) = 12.2, p = .001$, respectively. Specifically, Chinese ($M = .90, SD = 1.30$) made more shots that moved toward their opponents than Canadians ($M = .52, SD = .84$) did, whereas Canadians ($M = .51, SD = .82$) made more shots that moved away from their opponents than Chinese ($M = .11, SD = .32$) did.

However, from the last analysis, participants (once again) have their own definition of offensive and defensive moves. Thus, I decided to analyze participants’ actual shots by considering their subjective perception of offensiveness and defensiveness of each shot they made. First, moves that were perceived as more defensive than offensive (e.g., 5 points for defensiveness and 2 points for offensiveness), more offensive than defensive (e.g., 2 points for defensiveness and 5 points for offensiveness), and equally defensive and offensive (e.g., 5 points for both defensiveness and offensiveness) were categorized as defensive move, offensive move, and moves that were equally offensive and defensive, respectively. Then, I summed up the total number of offensive, defensive, and equally offensive and defensive moves across the five one-shot scenarios for each participant. Table 10 below shows the total number of moves in each category sorted by culture.
Table 10

*Total Number of Moves in each category*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canadians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Offensive</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Defensive</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Equally offensive and defensive</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then, I performed three independent-samples *t* test on each category of moves to compare the difference in the total number of moves made in each category between the two cultures. The total number of offensive moves and defensive moves made by each culture, after considering their subjective perception of the offensiveness and defensiveness of each move they made, did not significantly differ from each other, $t(121) = 1.33, p = .19$, and $t(121) = .67, p = .51$, respectively. However, for moves that were perceived as equally offensive and defensive, there was a significant difference between the Chinese and Canadian participants, $t(121) = -2.19, p = .03$, 95% CI [-1.01, -.05]. Specifically, Chinese participants were more likely than Canadians to make moves that they perceived as equally offensive and defensive. This suggested that Chinese participants as compared to Canadians were more likely to endorse shots that exists both offensive and defensive elements.
General Beliefs about Strategies

According to the item correlations in Table 8, I could not combine the two statements for offense and defense, as items 1 and 3 ($r = .05$), and 2 and 4 ($r = .12$) were not positively correlated significantly. Thus, I ran four one-way ANOVAs to compare the cultural differences in participants’ general beliefs about offense and defense on each of the four statements (like those in Study 1). Just to recap, the statements were:

I. Nonlinear:
   
   Statement 1: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to attack others first
   
   Statement 3: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to defend oneself first

II. Linear:

   Statement 2: If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to not attack others
   
   Statement 4: If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to not worry too much about defending oneself first

Thus, I decided not to aggregate the scores on the respective statements, and performed a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 4 (Statements: 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their ratings. There was a significant main effect of statements, $F(3, 120) = 8.09, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$. The main effect of culture was not significant, $F(1, 122) = 2.62, p = .11$, partial $\eta^2 = .02$. In addition, there
was a significant interaction between culture and their endorsements of the four statements, $F(3, 120) = 16.1, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .29$. More specifically, the simple effects analyses showed that there were significant cultural differences in participants’ general beliefs about statements 1, 2, and 3, $F$s$(1, 122) = 12.2, 24.9, \text{and } 16.3; ps < .001$. Relating back to my predictions, this partially supported my prediction that Canadians were more likely to endorse linear beliefs about offense and defense (statements 1 and 3) than Chinese did, whereas Chinese were more likely to endorse nonlinear beliefs about offense and defense (statement 1) than Canadians did (in line with Study 1). There was, however, no effect of culture for linear statement 4, $F(1, 122) = .98, p = .33$. Table 11 contains the respective means and standard deviations of each of the statements.

Table 11

*Means and Standard Deviations on General Beliefs about Offense/Defense*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Statement 1 (Nonlinear)</th>
<th>Statement 2 (Linear)</th>
<th>Statement 3 (Nonlinear)</th>
<th>Statement 4 (Linear)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadians</td>
<td>M = 2.87$^a$ SD = 1.49</td>
<td>M = 4.97$^b$ SD = 1.52</td>
<td>M = 3.68$^c$ SD = 1.87</td>
<td>M = 4.21 SD = 1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>M = 3.87$^a$ SD = 1.69</td>
<td>M = 3.66$^b$ SD = 1.40</td>
<td>M = 4.90$^c$ SD = 1.47</td>
<td>M = 3.89 SD = 1.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Means that share the same superscripts are significantly different from each other ($p < .05$)
Regulatory Focus

I conducted a 2 (Culture: Euro-Canadians vs. Chinese; between subjects) by 2 (Regulatory Focus: Prevention vs. Promotion; within subjects) mixed ANOVA on their regulatory focus questionnaire scores to examine the effect of culture on participants’ regulatory focus. The culture main effect was not significant, $F(1, 122) = .008, p = .93$, partial $\eta^2 = .00$, but there was a significant main effect of regulatory focus, $F(1, 122) = 73.9, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .38$. Participants in general were more promotion ($M = 6.77, SD = 1.02$) than prevention focused ($M = 5.54, SD = 1.22$). More importantly, there was a significant interaction between culture and regulatory focus, $F(1, 122) = 9.67, p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. As expected, simple effect analyses revealed that Canadians ($M = 6.99, SD = 1.08$) were more promotion focused than Chinese ($M = 6.56, SD = .92$), $F(1, 122) = 5.68, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$, 95% CI [.07, .79], whereas Chinese were more prevention focused ($M = 5.78, SD = .99$) than Canadians ($M = 5.32, SD = 1.38$), $F(1, 122) = 4.43, p = .04$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$, 95% CI [.03, .88]. This was consistent with previous findings that Canadians as compared to Chinese were more promotion focused, whereas Chinese as compared to Canadians were more prevention focused.

Indirect Effects Analysis

To test for the indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for making offensive or defensive moves in a game through their regulatory focus, I conducted a simple mediation analysis using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS. As culture
was a categorical variable, I dummy-coded Chinese as 0 and Caucasian as 1. Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for making shots with offensive intent through a promotion regulatory focus, $b = .11$, was entirely above zero [.02, .30], indicating a significant indirect effect (see Figure 2). This indirect effect was likely a suppression because the nature of the direct and indirect effect reversed in relationship (see Figure 2). However, after controlling for participants’ promotion regulatory focus, the direct effect of culture on participants’ preference to make an offensive shot remained non-significant, $b = -.07$, $t(122) = -.37$, $p = .713$. This indirect effect was also relatively small, $k^2 = .05$, 95% CI [.01, .13]. Likewise, the indirect effect of culture on participants’ preference for making shots with defensive intent through a prevention regulatory focus based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, was significant too, $b = -.06$, 95% bias-corrected CI [-.18, -.004] was below zero (see Figure 3). This indirect effect was also likely a suppression because the nature of the direct and indirect effect reversed in relationship (see Figure 3). However, after controlling for participants’ prevention regulatory focus, the direct effect of culture on participants’ preference to make a defensive shot remained non-significant, $b = .06$, $t(122) = .35$, $p = .723$. This indirect effect was also relatively small, $k^2 = .03$, 95% CI [.004, .102].
Figure 2. Model of culture (Chinese = 0, Caucasian = 1) as a predictor of preference for making shots with offensive intent (in Alkkagi game), suppressed by promotion regulatory focus.

Figure 3. Model of culture (Chinese = 0, Caucasian = 1) as a predictor of preference for making shots with defensive intent (in Alkkagi game), suppressed by prevention regulatory focus.

Summary

To summarize, for intention of the shots made, Canadians and Chinese did not differ in their preferences for making moves with offensive or defensive intent. In fact, both cultures preferred to make moves with offensive intent more than moves with defensive intent. However, from their actual behavioral moves (after considering their
subjective perception of offensiveness and defensiveness of the moves they made), Chinese as compared to Canadians were more likely to make shots that were perceived as equally offensive and defensive, whereas there were no differences between culture for moves that were perceived as offensive or defensive. In general, albeit not for all moves, Canadians were more likely to perceive moves that were considerably offensive as being more offensive than Chinese did, whereas Chinese were more likely than Canadians to perceive them as defensive. Consistent with previous findings and Study 1a, Canadians were more promotion focused and were more likely to agree with linear beliefs than Chinese did, whereas Chinese were more prevention focused and were more likely to agree with non-linear beliefs and prevention regulatory statements than Canadians did. Lastly, promotion and prevention regulatory focuses were found to suppress the relationship between culture and participants’ preference for making offensive and defensive moves, respectively. However, the non-significant direct relationship between culture and participants’ preference for making offensive or defensive moves rendered the evidences for a suppression effect less conclusive. Nonetheless, despite the weak relationship between culture and preference for a particular strategy, there was still a strong relationship between regulatory focus and strategy choices.
Chapter 6

General Discussion

In summary, across various scenarios in Study 1, instead of finding support for Hypothesis 1a, which states that Canadians would prefer offense more than Chinese would and Chinese would prefer defense more than Canadians would, I consistently found that Chinese preferred offensive strategies more than Canadians did, whereas Canadians preferred defensive strategies more than Chinese did. Additionally, in line with their preferences for defensive or offensive role/strategy, Canadians attributed outcomes (success/failure) to defensive strategy more than Chinese did. However, there was no difference between cultures in attributing outcomes to offensive strategies. This was contrary to my predictions that Canadians would be more likely than Chinese to attribute success/failure outcomes to offensive strategy, and Chinese would be more likely than Canadians to attribute success/failure outcomes to defensive strategies (Hypothesis 1b). Taken together, across the first three studies, although it was not consistent with my prediction, Canadians’ preference for defensive strategies and Chinese’s preference for offensive strategies were consistent with their attributions of successful and/or failure outcomes to the respective strategies they endorsed. However, the behavioral data in Study 2 suggested otherwise. Participants in general made more offensive than defensive moves in the game, and there were no significant cross-cultural differences between the offensive and defensive moves Canadians and Chinese made. However, Chinese participants were found to make more moves that were perceived as
equally offensive and defensive as compared to Canadians. This provided some indication that Chinese participants were more nonlinear (dialectic) in their preference for actual strategies as compared to Canadian participants (because they made more moves that have both polar opposite strategies existing in a single action).

Consistent with previous findings, Canadians were more promotion focused than Chinese, and Chinese were more prevention focused than Canadians (except in Study 1a). However, instead of mediating the effect of culture on preference for learning a martial art that was predominantly offensive (Study 1a), promotion regulatory focus was found to suppress the relationship between culture and preference for learning a predominantly offensive martial art. In addition, the effect of culture on preference for making offensive shots was also suppressed by one’s promotion focus, whereas prevention regulatory focus was found to suppress the relationship between culture and preference for making defensive shots (Study 2). However, this suppression effect (especially in Study 2) was not really conclusive because of the non-significant direct relationship between culture and participants’ preference for making offensive/defensive shots. According to MacKinnon and colleagues (2000), a significant indirect effect alone might not be enough to conclude that a suppression effect exists (it may be also possible due to chance or the 3rd variable is a total confound to the relationship), especially in the presence of a non-significant direct effect. This is because a suppressor is a factor that weakens the observed relationship by its omission, but controlling for it should render the direct effect significant. Nonetheless, Hypothesis 2 was not supported as well. Lastly, I found weak
support for Canadians to be more likely to endorse linear statements of general beliefs about offense and defense than Chinese did, whereas Chinese were more likely to endorse non-linear statements of beliefs than Canadians did (Hypothesis 3).

One of the possible reasons why the effect of culture on preference for offense and defense was not in line with my hypothesis could be due to a potential moderator. Li, Masuda, & Russell (2014) found that Hong Kong Chinese participants, who tend to be indecisive due to dialecticism, became more decisive under time pressure. Yates and colleagues (2010) also found that Chinese participants became more decisive when they were not needed to be thorough in their decisions. In a recent study, Li, Masuda and Russell (in press) found that Chinese participants currently living in China, a country undergoing much rapid developments (both economically and politically), also tended to be more decisive than Canadians. Moderators like time pressure, thoroughness and magnitude of economic change, were found to moderate the relationship between culture and indecisiveness. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that potential moderators, such as perceived societal change and/or perceived rapid developments, could moderate the relationship between culture and people’s strategic inclinations too. China is currently undergoing a lot of changes in their economy and politics (Rapoza, 2015; Miles, 2014). This flummox of changes could potentially bring about more jobs and countless opportunities for positive change. Therefore, it is possible that Chinese people, who are beginning to perceive greater societal change (where one should grab opportunities before they slip away), are becoming more proactive, and are possibly beginning to
perceive offensive strategies to be more beneficial than defensive strategies. This is because in an environment booming with economic developments, it might be important to take advantage of fortuitous opportunities to insure progress and growth in a rapidly developing environment (or not losing out). On the other hand, Canada, already a developed nation, is currently not undergoing such drastic economic and societal changes. Canadians, thus, may possibly perceive lesser societal change, and find defensive strategies to be more appealing than offensive ones because there are lesser of such fleeting opportunities for them to take advantage of in an economically stable society.

Bailenson and colleagues (2004) suggested that self-report and behavioral measures might lead to different results. Unlike participants’ self-reported preferences for a defensive strategy style (Canadians) and offensive strategy style (Chinese) across various hypothetical scenarios in Study 1, participants from both cultures did not differ in their preferences to make moves with offensive or defensive intent in the board game played in Study 2. In fact, participants from both cultures made more moves with offensive intent than moves with defensive intent. However, when we look at the actual moves participants made, Canadians as compared to Chinese made more shots that moved away from their opponents, whereas Chinese made shots that moved towards their opponents. This somehow corroborated with the results from Study 1, that is, Canadians made more shots that were defensive on face value (i.e., moved away from opponents), whereas Chinese made more shots that were offensive on face value (i.e. moved closer
towards their opponents). To better interpret participants’ preference for making offensive or defensive shots in the game, it is important to look at the moves Canadians and Chinese made together with their respective perceptions of those moves because they could be perceiving the offensiveness and defensiveness of the shots they made differently from each other. For example, although the “moving towards opponent” shot was perceived as an offensive move by both cultures, Canadians actually perceived it as being more offensive than Chinese did, whereas Chinese perceived the it as being more defensive than Canadians did. This could imply that Canadians and Chinese participants did not perceive the same moves they made as being equally “offensive” or equally “defensive”. Interestingly, this may mean that when Chinese thought about those strategies, they might think about them more dialectically (i.e., more non-linearly) than Canadians. Indeed, there was some evidence for this when the participants’ subjective perceptions of each moves’ offensiveness and defensiveness were taken into account during the analysis of their actual behavioral moves. I found that Chinese participants, as compared to Canadians, made more moves that were perceived as equally offensive and defensive. Perhaps this was because East Asians view offensiveness and defensiveness as interconnected, and can co-exist in a single strategy (i.e., theory of contradictions in dialecticism), whereas Westerners tend to make moves that were either offensive or defensive in nature. Participants’ endorsements of linear and nonlinear beliefs about offense and defense supplemented this possibility too: Canadians tend to agree (although somewhat inconsistent) with linear statements of beliefs about offense and defense more
than Chinese, whereas Chinese tend to agree with nonlinear statements of beliefs about offense and defense more than Canadians (Studies 1a and 2).

A potential issue (a possible moderator) not addressed in this study could be the representativeness of the sample. These studies had marketing and negotiation scenarios, which might be unfamiliar to the typical university student population. Thus, future studies could be conducted amongst business students, or at actual marketing companies to make sure that participants could truly appreciate the strategies that they were provided with. Likewise, the present study has been using Canadians as a proxy for Westerners (or North Americans), which might not be representative enough as a sample. It would be good to collect data from American participants in future studies so as to explore the generalizability of the effect this study is investigating.

Future studies should also examine gender as a potential moderator because usually in most cultures, masculine traits are more associated with being offensive, while feminine traits are more associated with being defensive (McDonald, Navarrete, Van Vugt, 2012). In the present study, I only have partial evidence that Chinese women and Chinese men did not differ in their preferences for offensive or defensive strategy styles. This suggested that gender did not influence Chinese’s participants’ preference for a particular strategy style. However, in order to better conclude that gender did not confound or moderate the effect of culture on preferences for offense or defense, future studies should include equal samples of men and women in both cultures. This way, we
could examine how gender could moderate the relationship between culture and preference for particular strategy style.

Also, as mentioned above, perceived drastic changes or perceived rapid developments occurring in a country might cause her citizens to be more inclined towards adopting offensive strategies to capitalize on fortuitous opportunities that come along their ways. Future studies could adopt a 2 (Regulatory focus: Prevention vs. Promotion) by 2 (Country development phase: Rapid vs. Stable) between subjects design to examine the effect of a culture’s development status and people’s regulatory focus on their strategic inclinations. For example, people in countries such as Japan (developed nation; prevention), United States (developed nation, promotion), Argentina/Spain (developing nation; promotion) and China (developing nation; prevention) could be recruited to investigate their preferences for offensive and defensive strategies across various contexts. If perceived rapid economic developments was a potential moderator for culture’s effect on their strategic preferences, participants from Argentina/Spain and China would prefer offensive strategies more than defensive strategies, whereas participants from the United States and Japan would prefer defensive strategies more than offensive strategies.

Offensive and defensive strategies may vary on multiple dimensions, such as how passive or active they can be, and how aggressive or conservative they can be. Offensive and defensive strategies have been operationalized as active and passive, respectively, in this paper. However, a defensive strategy can be active or aggressive – such as constantly
prepping for an eminent attack. Likewise, an offensive strategy can be passive or conservative – such as preempting an attack in light of an opponent’s mistakes. Future research should consider these dimensions in order to have more sensitive measures of the strategies.

Although most of these results were contrary to my hypotheses, they are still important as they expand our understanding of cultural values and deepen our understanding of cultural differences in the decision making process. Especially when the effect of culture on strategic inclination is such a novel concept. More importantly, these consistent patterns of Canadians preferring defense strategies and Chinese preferring offense strategies could imply that the effect of culture on people’s strategic inclination is not as straightforward as it seems. There may be many potential moderators that need to be taken into consideration in order to better understand how culture shapes one’s strategic inclination.

Many studies have focused on self-construal (e.g., Briley, Morris, & Sionson, 2000; Choi et al., 2003) and cognitive thinking styles (e.g., Li, Masuda, & Russell, 2014; Liu & Almor, in press) on behavioral outcomes but not so much in the context of offensiveness and defensiveness (especially seen in the business, strategic culture, and international politics context). In the recent years, the use of multidisciplinary approaches in understanding human behaviors has been rather effective (e.g., Nelson et al., 2002; Krause et al., 2006). Thus, by adopting this approach, this paper hopes to better understand the nuances involved in the decision making process.
In addition, marketing is typically seen as a tool for growth, which a company can use to successfully launch a product, make inroads into a new market, or gain shares with existing products in its current market, there must be an incumbent that must defend its position. If the defender can’t hang on to what it has, it loses the foundation on which to build its own growth. While there has been much research on offensive marketing (Fornell & Wernerfelt, 1987; Erickson, 1993; Wind & Robertson, 1983), there has been little on defensive marketing. As we can see from the present study, although more research still needs to be done to clarify the relationship between culture and strategic inclinations, it is clear that there were indeed cultural differences in people’s preference for strategy styles. However, it is still unknown as to what context certain strategies may be more useful than its counterparts. Likewise, if a certain culture prefers one strategy to the other, would cultural differences cause cultural rifts and misunderstandings between two companies?
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Appendix A

Study 1a Materials

Offense Versus Defense

Soccer

In soccer games, two teams of 11 players try to get the ball into the opposing goalpost. In general, there are three categories of players – attackers ( strikers ), defenders, and midfielders.

Attackers or strikers are players who play the closest to the opposing team’s goal, and therefore are the most responsible for scoring goals.

Defenders are players who try to prevent opposing players from scoring. They do so by preventing the other team from breaching the defensive line, and by bringing balls out of their own goal area to the midfielders.

Midfielders generally are positioned in between their team’s defenders and attackers. They play the defender’s role when their team is under attack, and the attacker’s role when their team has possession of the ball.

1. Imagine that you are a competent soccer player and have joined a soccer team. How much would you want to play the role of a …
   a. Attacker
   b. Defender (1: Not at all, 7: Very much)
   c. Midfielder

2. To what extent do you think a soccer team’s offense and defense contribute to its win in a game?
   a. Offense (1: Not at all, 9: Very much)
   b. Defense

3. To what extent do you think a soccer team’s offense and defense contribute to its loss in a game?
   a. Offense (1: not at all; 7: completely?)
   b. Defense

4. How much would you like to watch a soccer game that …
a. Consists of 2 teams both with strong offense? (1: Not likely at all, 7: Very likely)
b. Consists of 2 teams both with strong defense?

Martial Arts

Different forms of martial arts are generally designed for one purpose: physically defeating opponents and defending against threats. In fact, the word 'martial' derives from the name Mars, who was the Roman god of war.

1. Imagine you want to learn a form of martial art. To what extent are you interested in learning one that is predominantly …
   a. Offensive
   b. Defensive (1: Not interested at all, 7: Very interested)

2. To what extent do you think offense and defense contribute to a win in a martial arts bout?
   a. Offense (1: Not at all, 7: Very much)
   b. Defense

3. To what extent do you think offense and defense contribute to a loss in a martial arts bout?
   a. Offense (1: Not at all, 7: Very much)
   b. Defense

4. How much would you like to watch a martial art competition between …
   a. 2 good defensive players (1: Not likely at all, 7: Very likely)
   b. 2 good offensive players

General for both scenarios:
How much do you agree with these statements? (1: Strongly disagree, 7:Strongly agree)
   a. If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to attack others first.
   b. If one wants to defend oneself, a good strategy is to not attack others.
   c. If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to defend oneself first.
   d. If one wants to attack others, a good strategy is to not worry too much about defending oneself first.
**Regulatory Focus Questionnaire** (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002)

Using the scale below, please write the appropriate number in the blank beside each item.

(1 = not at all true of me, 9 = very much true of me)

1. In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life. _________
2. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. _________
3. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. _________
4. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. _________
5. I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future. _________
6. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. _________
7. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals. _________
8. I often think about how I will achieve academic success. _________
9. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. _________
10. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. _________
11. I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains. _________
12. My major goal in school right now is to achieve my academic ambitions. _________
13. My major goal in school right now is to avoid becoming an academic failure. _________
14. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my “ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes, wishes, and aspirations. _________
15. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I “ought” to be—to fulfill my duties, responsibilities, and obligations. _________
16. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. _________
17. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. _________
18. Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failure. _________
Appendix B

Study 1b Materials

Offense versus Defense
Marketing

Offensive and defensive marketing strategies have distinct benefits, depending on the status of your business and how successful you are in your local market.

An offensive marketing strategy seeks to attack the market by targeting competitors. A defensive marketing strategy is reactive to the competition or focuses on improving your own products without concerns for others.

Imagine that you are running a business of your own. Recently, you realize to your dismay that there are much cheaper, and better options from another manufacturer that were becoming the preferred choices of the local market. You need a business plan to help take you out of this difficult situation. Below are some strategies that you can potentially adopt. To what extent would you adopt each? Please fill in the blank using the scale provided.

I will definitely not adopt \hspace{1cm} I will definitely adopt

1 \hspace{0.5cm} 2 \hspace{0.5cm} 3 \hspace{0.5cm} 4 \hspace{0.5cm} 5 \hspace{0.5cm} 6 \hspace{0.5cm} 7

( ) Highlighting the effectiveness of your company’s products in the wake of your competitor’s claims of product inferiority.

( ) Publicly stating that competitors will not undercut you and that you will match their prices.

( ) Creating and promoting a new product just to exploit your competitor’s weaknesses.
( ) Targeting your competitor’s shaky product safety record by emphasizing the safety of your own products.

To what extent do you think offensive and defensive marketing strategies contribute to a company’s success?

a. Offense (1: Not at all, 7: Completely)
b. Defense

To what extent do you think offensive and defensive marketing strategies contribute to a company’s failure?

a. Offense (1: Not at all, 7: Completely)
b. Defense

How much do you agree with each of the following statements? (1: Strongly disagree, 7: Strongly agree)

a. If one wants to adopt a defensive approach, a good strategy is to attack others first.
b. If one wants to adopt a defensive approach, a good strategy is to not attack others first.
c. If one wants to adopt an offensive approach, a good strategy is to defend oneself first.
d. If one wants to adopt an offensive approach, a good strategy is to not worry too much about defending oneself first.

Highlighting the effectiveness of your company’s products in the wake of your competitor’s claims of product inferiority.

a. To what extend do you think this strategy is offensive? (1: Not offensive at all, 7: Very offensive)
b. To what extend do you think this strategy is defensive? (1: Not defensive at all, 7: Very defensive)

Publicly stating that competitors will not undercut you and that you will match their prices.

a. To what extend do you think this strategy is offensive?
b. To what extend do you think this strategy is defensive?

Creating and promoting a new product just to exploit your competitor’s weaknesses.
a. To what extend do you think this strategy is offensive?
b. To what extend do you think this strategy is defensive?

Targeting your competitor’s shaky product safety record by emphasizing the safety of your own products.

a. To what extend do you think this strategy is offensive?
b. To what extend do you think this strategy is defensive?
Appendix C

Study 1c Materials

Offense verse Defense
Manger & Lawyer: Offense Condition

Scenario 1
Imagine you are being promoted to the business manager of the company you are working for and your first task is to make plans to increase your company’s market share within the industry.

How likely would you adopt the following strategy?
You aim to increase your company’s market share by targeting your competitors. By adopting this strategy, you intend to target your competitors’ weaknesses in their products or actively acquire other firms to fuel your company’s growth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very unlikely</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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Scenario 2
Imagine you are a lawyer representing your client in negotiating a settlement with your opposing counsel.

How likely would you adopt the following strategy?
You aim to begin the negotiation with a firm and unyielding offer to anchor the discussions; this involves attempting to make your point before your competitor can make his/hers.

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**Offense verse Defense**

**Manager & Lawyer: Defense Condition**

**Scenario 1**

Imagine you are a lawyer representing your client in negotiating a settlement with your opposing counsel.

How likely would you adopt the following strategy?
You aim to begin the negotiation with a firm and unyielding offer to anchor the discussions; this involves attempting to make your point before your competitor can make his/hers.

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<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
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**Scenario 2**

Imagine you are being promoted to the business manager of the company you are working for and your first task is to make plans to increase your company’s market share within the industry.

How likely would you adopt the following strategy?
You aim to increase your company’s market share by targeting your competitors. By adopting this strategy, you intend to target your competitors’ weaknesses in their products or actively acquire other firms to fuel your company’s growth.

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Appendix D

Study 2 Materials

Offense versus Defense

The Board Game

Script for Experimenters

Instructions to the participants when they arrived:

• “Hi! Thank you for taking time to participate in our study! Today, you will be playing a simple board game in which we are interested in what people do in this game.
• “Okay, I will first explain how this game works, and then you will have 2 minutes of practice time to get familiar with the game.
• Basically, in order to win the game, you want to only have your own pieces left on the game board. You (and your opponent) will each have 5 pieces, in which you will then take turns flicking. Once pieces fall out of the game board, those cannot be used anymore. The person with no more pieces on the board loses the game.”
• “Right now, you and I will play a trial game.”

[Play a trial game, and introduce both offensive and defensive moves to them while playing. So that they know what are the possible options available to them]

• “Okay, we done with that game, and finally you will have 2 minutes to try it out and to take the perspective of the opponent as well. Once the 2 minutes is up, we will begin with the actual task! Let me know if you have any questions too”.

“Okay, your 2 minutes are up! For the actual task, you will be presented with 5 scenarios. These scenarios are adopted from real games played throughout the world. I have taken 5 of these possible scenarios out for you to play.”

• “Most importantly, though you won’t get to see what move your opponent (Caucasian, same gender) will make after yours, your move should be as realistic as possible, taking into consideration his/her retaliation.”
• “So this is how things would work. Before you make a move, I’ll ask you what your intent is, e.g., you want to shoot off your opponent’s piece, move into a
favorable position, or move your piece into a position tougher for your opponent to get to you. Then, you will make the move.”
• “Do you have any questions? If not, let’s play!”

[Here, make sure that the pieces on the board are in accordance to the recording sheets before the participant makes each move. Sometimes, their intent might not be clear. E.g., participants may say they are going to move their piece into an empty space. That is unclear to us if it was in prep for an offensive move, or in prep for a defensive stance. You should ask s/he, “Why are you moving that piece into an empty space?”]
Sample Board Game Log Sheet  Experimenter

Scenario 1

Please write down the intention of the participant.

☐ Offense  ☐ Defense  ☐ Others  [Jot down the trajectory of the move made]

Scenario 2

Please write down the intention of the participant.

☐ Offense  ☐ Defense  ☐ Others  [Jot down the trajectory of the move made]
Scenario 3

Please write down the intention of the participant.

☐ Offense  ☐ Defense  ☐ Others  [Jot down the trajectory of the move made]

Scenario 4

Please write down the intention of the participant.

☐ Offense  ☐ Defense  ☐ Others  [Jot down the trajectory of the move made]
Scenario 5

Please write down the intention of the participant.

☐ Offense  ☐ Defense  ☐ Others  [Jot down the trajectory of the move made]