HOW WIDE THE WE?

A Study of Canadian Multiculturalism and American Cosmopolitanism

by

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy

in conformity with the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

September, 2008

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Abstract

This paper looks at liberal multiculturalism through the lens of its cosmopolitan critics. In particular I examine the arguments of four theorists who issue a variety challenges to the concept of state-sanctioned minority rights. The first two of these theorists, K. Anthony Appiah and David Hollinger, offer cosmopolitan challenges to multiculturalist views on identity (Appiah) and historical critiques of the effects of racial and ethnic political claims-making (Hollinger). My analysis attempts to show how these views are indicative of distinctly a American emphasis on race and immigration which inhibits them from a better appreciation of the Canadian experience with national minorities, one of liberal multiculturalism's main concerns. The third theorist, Patchen Markell, presents a theory of incomplete individual agency the acknowledgment of which he argues is necessary for an adequate political theory yet remains unappreciated by proponents of recognition. I attempt to show that while his concept is useful, it is simply misplaced to the arguments he wishes to criticize. The fourth theorist whose work I examine is Seyla Benhabib. She presents a more substantial account of what cosmopolitan minority claims might look like, relying on a postnational view of world affairs which eschews the state-centric approach of liberal multiculturalism. I largely reject her criticisms, but I argue that this postnational vision is one that could have implications for liberal multiculturalism. I finally offer a modest account of what these implications might be and where the terrain of this multiculturalist-cosmopolitan debate may be headed.
Acknowledgments

I must extend most gracious thanks to Professor Will Kymlicka, Queen's University, and the Foundation for Educational Exchange between Canada and the United States of America for making this research and my time in Kingston, Ontario possible. I also must thank Professors Jill Frank, Nathalie Kaufman, Jan Love, and Peter Sederberg and the Office of Fellowships and Scholar Programs' Novella Beskid at the University of South Carolina for their encouragement and attentive guidance. Further thanks to Professor Kymlicka for providing invaluable direction and feedback for this paper. This experience has been a great honor.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

There is a story about the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment that probably oversimplifies its inheritors into two camps, but since greater thinkers than me seem fond of telling it, I see no great harm in alluding to it here.¹ This story is of the evolution of the brand of rational idealism developed by Kant and taken up by Locke and Mill into the contemporary liberal pluralism of our day espoused by such luminaries as Rawls, Dworkin, and much of the Anglo-American establishment. It is also the story of the strand of thought beginning with Herder and taken up by Hegel, which has become the point of departure for contemporary communitarians like Taylor and Sandel. To be sure, these divergent views attempt to interpret the nature of common values like freedom and justice, and as such they often overlap with one another, trading ideas and arguments in the process. Many attempts have been made to accommodate aspects of both views within a single theory as Will Kymlicka has done with his theory of multicultural citizenship and as Anthony Appiah has attempted with his cosmopolitan "ethics of identity."² Still, there are disagreements which largely center around the nature of the value of autonomy, or self-authorship. The communitarians invariably point to the idea of self-discovery; that we can look to our community and to our selves and discover an "authentic" identity. Liberals charge that this is too constrictive a concept of the self; that while we can look to cultural cues and inwardly to ourselves for indication as to what sort of life to lead, we also have the choice to keep those aspects we want and change those we do not. Add to this those theorists who

¹ Goodin, Robert, "Communities of Enlightenment" (1998) 28 British Journal of Political Science 3, pp. 531-558
attempt to forge a middle path, and one can find much grist on which to chew. I will begin by looking at how some of these arguments and counterarguments have developed. These developments are interesting, because much of the liberal establishment now leans more and more forcefully towards a cosmopolitan viewpoint, while many communitarian theorists have adopted a multiculturalist-pluralist perspective. Furthermore, although most liberal cosmopolitans make a pointed effort to distinguish themselves from their enlightenment era predecessors - especially in terms of their cultural sensitivities - and multiculturalists, similarly, now speak of the need to break free of oppressive social categories, these two camps remain modern ciphers for this on-going tension in social thought.

What's more, while this tension has held fairly constant since the rise of the modern nation-state, nation-states have undergone seismic shifts since their initial rise. Changes are now being wrought which may fundamentally alter the socio-political order that has held sway since the Treaty of Westphalia. Ulrich Beck labels these times in which we live the "Second Age of Modernity." He describes these times as marked by weakening state actors attempting to grapple with the transnational deregulation which now poses external limits to their sovereignty and the challenges of "territoriality, collectivity, and frontier" which now create internal limits. One of the goals of this paper will be to show how these changes have not skewed the arena of debate in favor of either the cosmopolitan or the multiculturalist but have actually made them mutually codependent, coextensive, and reinforcing. My point of departure for this project will be various criticisms of Will

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Kymlicka's attempt to outline a liberal theory of multiculturalism. While I believe it correctly captures the ways minorities justifiably make claims on the state, I also see that it is at least partially open to criticisms that it relies on too much of a state-centric approach, one which tends toward a treatment of culture as too easily individuated vis-à-vis the state. So much of the debate up until now has primarily focused on concepts of culture and identity, with cosmopolitans arguing these are fluid, unbounded and constructive, multiculturalists allegedly arguing they are more essentialist, territorially specific and authentic. This, however, is largely much ado about nothing, as I will attempt to show. Where the real debate lies is in specific minority claims, when and if they are justified, as determined by whom, and for what reasons. One such reason is Kymlicka's distinction of what he calls a national minority, a distinction often misunderstood or overlooked by American cosmopolitans, who tend to concentrate on immigrant and racial diversity rather than historical minority enclaves. I will look at how a better understanding of this distinction might resolve some of the tension between the two camps. Furthermore, I will address whether the nation-state is the most appropriate arbiter for these claims.

In order to do this I will examine the arguments of some of the foremost writers on these issues and use their arguments and criticisms of multiculturalism as a lens through which a more cosmopolitan form of multiculturalism might come into focus. I begin with a look at the works of K. Anthony Appiah and David Hollinger. These are two American cosmopolitan theorists who offer two uniquely American viewpoints on multiculturalism, Appiah concentrating on cosmopolitan identity and Hollinger on political claims. I will attempt to show that the challenges these theorists offer against liberal multiculturalism are
insubstantial and based on misunderstandings stemming from their uniquely American lens. This American perspective tends to over-extrapolate from the American racial and immigrant experience in ways that do not adequately reflect the cultural dynamics of other countries such as Canada (or even the United States, for that matter). Thus, I turn to two other theorists, Patchen Markell and Seyla Benhabib, who put forward more unconventional views. While I do not believe they successfully challenge the ideas of liberal multiculturalism, they do offer important critiques of the limits of liberal nationalism which point towards a potential future revision of multiculturalism. My goal here is thus twofold. I will first show how and why many of today's foremost cosmopolitans get multiculturalism wrong. I will then attempt to show why and where cosmopolitan insights might be useful to multiculturalism in forwarding a liberal theory of cultural justice that accommodates emergent political actors and their claims.
Chapter 2: Appiah's Cosmopolitan Patriotism

So first I have chosen Appiah as an intellectual sparring partner and the ideas of Kymlicka as my pugilist, but why? For one they both share in attempts at bridging the Kantian-Herderian divide I alluded to above. The reason I begin with Appiah though is because he represents a very typically (and self-avowedly) American view of enlightened cosmopolitanism, a view that is quite en vogue at the moment. He calls this a "rooted cosmopolitanism," and it is one which allows him to claim the possibility of a "cosmopolitan patriotism." This view has features I find attractive. It attempts to combine liberal nationalism with a cosmopolitan ethic in a somewhat symmetrical way as Kymlicka's combination of liberal nationalism with a pluralist ethic. I examine it here, because the full range of liberal sentiment, from cosmopolitan to multiculturalist, are needed to complete the picture of an ideal modern politics. However, because it rests on two key misunderstandings, the first being a concern with a commodified view of culture and the second being a concern with cultural purity, it ultimately needs to be informed by multiculturalism. Furthermore I believe it shows the limitations of focusing on a theory of identity without much regard to actual political claims-making, which I will contrast with Hollinger.

Appiah writes in a number of places about the need for identity to be seen not as a discovered substrate nor as a fully self-realized, existential choice.\(^4\) In contrast to Charles


Taylor's concept of identity as dialogically constituted authenticity, Appiah argues that our autonomy allows us to see collective identities as various "scripts" from which we can use to choose the sorts of lives we want to lead and narrate our own personal identities. This is critical to his version of cosmopolitanism, because it places identity squarely on the side of individuals, who then use the cultural milieu around them to create a unique, personal identity. On this cosmopolitan view, the milieus in which we find ourselves are becoming more and more uniformly diverse. To be born to a middle class white family in South Carolina may present one with a similar number of scripts from which to choose as a second generation Mexican-American born in Chicago or an African-American from Cleveland. As this diversity becomes more and more the norm, the scripts become more and more loosely defined and redefined. Thus Appiah believes that culture, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality - all these things should be respected, but he rejects the notion that they should be propped up or supported by the state, concluding most poignantly that "Between the politics of recognition and the politics of compulsion there is no bright line." The main argument, however, from Appiah's concept of identity, which carries into his discussions of cosmopolitanism, is that culture, even when it takes the form of what we might call a nation, is morally arbitrary. It matters because it matters to people, to individuals. Unlike Nussbaum, who wishes to argue that the boundaries of the nation-state are morally irrelevant and hold us back from embracing people who we should think of as concitoyens, Appiah instead argues that a plurality of states is necessary to ensure the sort of diverse milieus cosmopolitans cherish. According to him, states may have come into being in

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6 Ibid p. 160
7 Ibid p. 163
various haphazard ways, but now they ostensibly embody a consensus on questions of
color right and wrong and organize our lives through morally justified means of coercion.
Thus distinctions between citizens have "intrinsically" moral meaning and are not arbitrary.
The state, then, should promote a cosmopolitanism that remains patriotic by granting its
citizens the ability to associate across borders and cultures, working for the betterment of
all mankind. This is a vision that he believes will allow for solidarity within and between a
plurality of states.

Up to this point there is not much that would actually distinguish Appiah and the
multiculturalism of which he issues criticism. Appiah admits himself that his arguments
mirror closely that of the model of liberal multiculturalism, before backing off an
endorsement for reasons not very clear, but which allude to the primacy of individual
choice. He says, "...the cosmopolitan's high appraisal of variety flows from the human
choices it enables, but variety is not something we value no matter what ... some kinds of
cultural variety constrain more than they enable."\textsuperscript{9} Again, equating recognition of
minority groups to an imperialism of identity does not capture the multiculturalist ideal he
wishes to criticize, and ultimately, this common (and commonly American)
misunderstanding precludes any sort of new ground being broken between the
cosmopolitan vision he eloquently describes and the multicultural reality he does not seem
to fully appreciate. Where Appiah considers multiculturalists as "commodifying" cultures,
Kymlicka argues quite forcefully and quite correctly for the idea that culture acts as one of
Rawls' primary goods - goods such as rights and liberties to which any rational person

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid. p. 634
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
would want. Kymlicka argues that because culture provides a "context of choice" it too should be counted amongst these and likewise steps should be taken to make sure that, where justifiable and within reason, people have access not only to a culture, but to their culture.\textsuperscript{11} One argument Appiah takes issue with is how Kymlicka describes the process of identity formation in terms of "societal cultures." This is a concept which describes the type of culture of which nations are made. Comprised of a language, territory, symbols, and other civic goods they provide their members with a full range of opportunities from which they may author their own individual lives. This concept stems from his argument for the basic value of culture, and it posits that because people have a right to their national, societal culture, they should only pay the costs of integrating into a new societal culture if that integration is voluntary. Thus, national minorities like the Québécois in Canada, the Catalan in Spain, the Corsicans in France, and the like have special claims to the cultural and self-government rights not shared by immigrants.

Appiah wishes to deny that this is a justified response. He does this by portraying, incorrectly I will argue, Kymlicka's treatment of culture as something akin to a commodity, as a "resource."\textsuperscript{12} To be sure, Kymlicka does wish to add culture to Rawls' list of primary goods, and he also makes arguments to the effect that public institutions should make efforts to recognize and support minority cultures, but nowhere can I find him making arguments against something as bizarre as "the unequal distribution of culture."\textsuperscript{13} Appiah misses the point by arguing against Kymlicka on this front. Using an example of a lone immigrant moving into a foreign country, he attacks Kymlicka's theory as incoherent,

\begin{footnotesize}
11 Kymlicka (1995) p. 84  
13 Ibid. p. 124
\end{footnotesize}
because a lone immigrant would have greater need for cultural support than a long-standing minority but would be less justified in being granted such support. He wants to show how access to one's culture can neither be granted nor denied by a government, and, borrowing from Tomasi, he argues that culture is "like form: you can't not have it."\(^{14}\)

First of all Kymlicka is not interested in portraying culture as some sort of quantifiable commodity. When Kymlicka speaks of the value of culture it is not in practicing certain customs or eating certain foods, it is in having access to a "context of choice."\(^{15}\) This "context of choice" can be provided by the majority culture, which normally enjoys the power of the state apparatus, but it can also be provided by long standing, national minorities, which more and more are demanding a share of this power. In order to ensure they are not forced to give up one for the other, which would be an unjustifiable burden and could quite possibly leave them with much fewer choices and opportunities, these minorities claim an equal right to access and preserve their culture. This access, be it through language rights, immigration controls, or a say in public school curriculums, are not at all like Tomasi's air, they do have specific forms which can be granted or denied. Kymlicka's point is simply that when it is denied, cultures often decay. The example Appiah uses of the lone immigrant overlooks the way Kymlicka's theory is less a theory about how identity is formed (certainly not through the accumulation of culture as a commodity) and more about the way different types of minorities make claims upon the state.

On Kymlicka's theory the case of the lone immigrant is not troubling at all. Instead

\(^{14}\) Ibid.  
\(^{15}\) Kymlicka (1995) p. 83; Indeed, he has been criticized by others for just this. See Jeff Spinner-Halev's *The Boundaries of Citizenship* (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1995) at p. 96
of asking ourselves what is required so that all people everywhere can enjoy equal access to their culture (in fact, even before debating the normative role of culture or identity in autonomous choice), we should first look at real world claims-making. To what do immigrants generally make claims vis-à-vis the state? Kymlicka believes that they justifiably make claims not to recreate the culture of their homelands in new locales, but instead they claim the respect necessary for (and policies to facilitate) their integration into the new societal culture in which they now find themselves.16 Nowhere does Kymlicka argue for a commodified view of culture to which we are all equally entitled. Instead he argues that we all carry with us certain cultural cues, and that we each help define and shape the cultures to which we belong. The proper role of a liberal government, then, is to fairly adjudicate and implement policies aimed at broadening the shared cultural horizons of all citizens, while respecting the differentiated claims these citizens voice as members of various cultural groups.

Appiah seems to believe that because minorities often make claims to respect as members of specific cultural groups - perhaps the only way to make claims to cultural rights - that this in turn leaves them vulnerable to liberty-infringing enforcement of cultural purity. "Between the politics of recognition and the politics of compulsion there is no bright line," he says as quoted above. This is primarily an objection to Taylor, but it surfaces again in his treatment of Kymlicka. Here he seems to tack away from his "culture as a resource" rhetoric to object to the view of culture as context of choice. This is actually more to the point, yet still mistaken. He makes the argument that granting cultural rights to minorities represents a "preservationist ethic" among political theorists whose main goal is

16 Kymlicka (1995) p. 38
to equate cultural and physical survival. "Assimilation is figured as annihilation," he says. After noting Kymlicka's insistence that cultures naturally change as a result of their members' choices, he takes issue with his distinction between endogenous (justified) change and exogenous (unjustified) change. He believes if we can make this distinction then we are no longer speaking of cultural community, but a community of descent, "something conceptually congruent to race," in his opinion.18

This line of attack again confuses Kymlicka's project, because Kymlicka is, again, not interested in preserving any specific cultural particularities (and again, he has been criticized for this). Instead he is simply interested in giving minority cultures their own fair chance at survival. It is not an argument for preservation, it is an argument for fairness. Appiah simply does not seem to fully appreciate this when he writes things like "From the point of view ethical individualism ... Might it not be better if Hutu and Tutsi all became Rwandans or Burundians?"19 Kymlicka's theory is not dedicated to preserving ethnic categories for ethnic categories' sake. From the point of view of ethical individualism one might imagine a great many things being different than they actually are, but instead we live in a world of cultural conflict. The situation between the Tutsis and the Hutus is if anything an example of the need, not for a better understanding of ethical individualism, but for a deeper respect of the claims to group-differentiated rights. If Hutus and Tutsis are to become Rwandans they will need assurances from the majority government that they will be treated fairly. The granting of such assurances, such group-differentiated rights, is what Kymlicka believes is necessary to mitigate the effects of cultural conflict, not new

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17 Appiah (2004) p. 130
18 Ibid. p. 136
19 Ibid. p. 131
ideas on identity formation, not new theories on cultural particularity or hybridization, nor the relative value of diversity.
Chapter 3: Hollinger's Post-ethnic Cosmopolitanism

Ultimately this sort of American cosmopolitanism (and concomitant challenges to Canadian-style multiculturalism) is presented in a more suitable manner by David Hollinger, who has his own criticisms of Kymlicka, but whose criticisms are also amenable to reconciliation. This is because he begins not with a theory of identity or a theory of cosmopolitan culture in mind, but instead shows an interest in the particular, real-world minority claims-making which are often the site of conflict and which Appiah largely overlooks. What I wish to show in this section is how Hollinger's interpretation of those claims - that they arose in response to specific racial categories which we should aim not to perpetuate - is basically correct, but that the story he wishes to tell should not be translated at it is into his critique of liberal multiculturalism. Hollinger, an historian by training, quite naturally begins by looking at the American ethno-racial pentagon. This was a policy he describes as a little-known government directive originally used to gather census data aimed at enforcing the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act.20 Right away his emphasis is thus in trying to pry apart the racial and cultural categories that have so marked the American political landscape. He does this by arguing that the pentagon shows the conflict between impulses aimed at protecting historically disadvantaged groups and celebrating current cultural variety.21 The ethnoracial pentagon thus is an artifact that was properly used to protect people from their ascribed identities (like being Black), but should not be permitted to serve as a platform for the hardening of voluntary, cultural identities

21 Ibid. p. 49
(like being Catholic). Through this spectrum he analyzes the multicultural debates, which he believes mark an ongoing movement of "species to ethnos," which is a development that could be served by heeding his own "postethic" perspective. He commences this line of discourse with an attempt at defining cosmopolitanism in contrast to other orientations influenced by multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism he distinguishes from universalism as, "defined by an additional element not essential to universalism itself: recognition, acceptance, and eager exploration of diversity."²² He then goes on to distinguish cosmopolitanism from pluralism - a distinction he characterizes as even more important - by stating that "While cosmopolitanism is willing to put the future of every culture at risk through the sympathetic but critical scrutiny of other cultures, pluralism is more concerned to protect and perpetuate particular, existing cultures."²³ A postethic, cosmopolitan perspective is what he believes is necessary to sort out the "diversification of diversity" brought on by the success of multiculturalism, and in so doing he believes we will be able to answer the fateful question, "How wide the circle of the 'we'?”²⁴

In so doing he makes arguments (in his Postethnic America and elsewhere) that offer a direct rebuke of the type of multiculturalist and minority rights policies advocated by Will Kymlicka. For instance, he directly trains fire on Kymlicka's focus on national minorities as being worrisome due to their potential for repression, particularly of the minorities that inevitably exist within their own boundaries.²⁵ He then goes on to criticize Kymlicka's example of Quebec as displaying a type of cosmopolitanism by asking, "What,

²² Ibid. p. 83
²³ Ibid. p. 85
²⁴ Ibid. p. 68
other than linguistic particularism, makes Quebec here a national minority in Canada any
more than New Jersey or Colorado are a national minority within the United States of
America? These represent the two horns of what I will call "Hollinger's Dilemma":
either there are national minorities of fairly homogeneous particularity, of which he is
doubtful and which he implies would require some form of repression to maintain; or there
are cosmopolitan national minorities like Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia which are only
superficially different from the national majority and thus do not merit the sort of
protections for which Kymlicka argues in the first place. But this discounts much too
deeply the importance of "linguistic particularity" just as it glosses over the substantial
historical differences between national minorities and majorities. It is fairly audacious by
any fair account to compare the difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada to New
Jersey or Colorado and the rest of the US. Why is there such a disconnect?

Kymlicka gives an example that is telling of the basic disagreement between his
camp and the cosmopolitans. This is when he extrapolates from Rawls' discussion on how
emigration does not make political authority voluntary. Here he argues that because the
cultural bonds and ties that are the parameters for a liberal theory of justice do not coincide
with political boundaries, "...a francophone leaving Quebec City for Toronto, or a Puerto
Rican leaving San Juan for Chicago, would be breaking those ties, even though she is
remaining within the same country." Now here is where the cosmopolitan will tend to
take issue. They wish to argue that this view is the wrong picture of the world today.
When a Puerto Rican moves from San Juan to Chicago, when a Québécois moves from

26 Ibid p. 234
27 Kymlicka (1995) p. 87
Quebec City to Toronto, they are not leaving their culture in the same way as is implied by the quote above. Cosmopolitans point out that in today's world (and probably even more so in tomorrow's) citizenship is, for better or worse, becoming untethered from territory as global economic forces reorganize humanity in ever-changing ways - Filipino maids in Vancouver, Indian roughnecks in Kuwait - while political institutions remain largely unchanged. Saskia Sassen argues that this environment points to the rise of "economic citizens," which are the multinational corporations and global economic firms, who in the new opening between territory and citizenship, have built up enough power to make states accountable to them. 28 Because of this reality, she argues that today's immigrants to global cities find themselves in a creative space that provides the possibility of membership at once localized and transnational. 29 This sort of cosmopolitan view, and others like it, point to a declining state system. Here, the nation-state loses relevance as citizens and migrants interact in embedded layers of belonging, nationality, and identity. The choice, then, that Kymlicka presents, between "increased mobility and an expanded domain within which people are free and equal individuals" and "decreased mobility but a greater assurance that people can continue to be free and equal members of their own national culture" is a false one, according to the cosmopolitans. 30 

For them, this choice does not adequately reflect the facts on the ground. First of all they argue this is simply not a choice people are faced with. Immigration is simply a fact of life for most immigrants and their communities. In order to support their families they create rich diasporic communities where they are able to retain many elements of their

29 Ibid. and see also Falk, Richard, "Towards a Just World Peace" in Mendlovitz and Walker, eds., Towards a Just World Peace: Perspectives from Social Movements (Boston, Butterworth, 1987)
own national cultures. But this is not all, for as we learn from Simmel, the fact of diversity changes both migrants and the cities which receive them. The cosmopolitan project is that this interaction can be harnessed to produce a new kind of politics, instead of it resulting in alienation or indifference. From this the vision is a fundamentally creative identity rooted not to space or place, but to time. The question then becomes, if we buy this picture of the world, what from multiculturalism remains relevant. Kymlicka's arguments attempt to navigate a middle course between cosmopolitan, individual universalism and communitarian, group particularism. Most of the cosmopolitans would find a lot to take away from his position, but ultimately they are apt to reject it, because it is a fundamentally state-centric approach. For them the value of culture is similar to the value of oxygen, and claims on it are like claims for food: self-validating. States on this reading can no more promote culture than they can take it away, for instead they are beholden to the forces of globalization, which dictate that their citizens will go where their skills are most suited, and speak whatever language necessary. Kymlicka expresses distaste for this comparison to the market; losing culture is not, as he says, akin to losing one's job, but the cosmopolitan will say in response that this is not the analogy being drawn. They will say that the new world citizens of today and tomorrow never lose their culture, they simply take their culture with them and express it in whichever language or languages they can. And yet multiculturalism, particularly in response to national minorities remains valid. No matter the image of the world, there is a justifiable duty on

33 Appiah (2004), quoting Tomasi on p. 124 and in reference to Taylor on p. 133
34 Kymlicka (1995) p. 84
the part of the national majority to respect the claims of national minorities such as Puerto Ricans or Québécois, because they would incur high and unjustifiable costs if forced to change cultures and assimilate into the societal culture of the majority. Whether or not they face such costs out of an assimilative national policy or out of the vicissitudes of global economic forces, national minorities have a right to a fair chance at maintaining their cultures and immigrants have a right to fair terms of integration through cultural recognition.
Chapter 4: Towards An Effective Cosmopolitan Analysis of Multiculturalism

It seems clear that the basic disagreement lies in the fact that what David Hollinger offers is a vision of minority claims-making specifically rooted in the American *racial* and *immigrant* experiences, while Kymlicka offers one specifically rooted in the claims of the Canadian *national minority* experience. Although they both have strong ideas on both immigrant and national minority multiculturalisms that developed in the 1980s and 90s, these are nonetheless their main frames of reference. Fortuitously, these share significant space which it seems neither has fully explored. Perhaps an anecdote might help to illustrate this idea. As an undergraduate I spent a term in Dakar, Senegal. My host family there was a cosmopolitan theorist's dream. "Maman" as I still call her, was born in Cape Verde and moved to Senegal as a young woman and married a Senegalese man. She travels extensively, visiting friends and relatives in such far flung places as Japan, Romania, France, and the United States. She speaks French, Wolof, Portuguese, and a little English. Her children are well-educated, several of them now living abroad. One of Maman's daughters, Rosie, offers an interesting case for the arguments under consideration here. After living and working, raising a family in Dakar, she is now moving to Montréal for a job she was able to secure in the business sector there. Is she proof positive that the salient distinction between Kymlicka and the cosmopolitans is the political unit where cosmopolitanism takes place? Or is she proof that the political unit is becoming less and less salient as identity and culture, become, like the people who bear them, more portable and more individually defined? Or is her case indicative of something else?
Kymlicka's arguments in the end boil down to exactly that which the cosmopolitans most overlook: language. Rosie's story shows that while cosmopolitanism is open to multi-lingual expression and hybridization, lives are most often led in one language at a time. It may be true that English is becoming an Esperanto of our day, but the reality is that even in global cities such as New York, Hong Kong, and Paris, the operating language is the language of the nation. This is why Kymlicka argues that language and traditions constitute the "shared vocabulary" of a societal culture, access to which is a necessary "precondition of making intelligent judgments about how to lead our lives."35 But if Kymlicka and the cosmopolitans can agree that when Rosie moves to Montreal, she is helping to redefine what constitutes the "traditions" aspect of the shared societal vocabulary, then societal culture now is simply distilled to a common language. Rosie, by her presence, contributes to the fact of diversity in Quebec. This fact will hybridize the identity of both her and her family members and the larger societal identity of Quebec as a whole. These new identities will be narrated and negotiated through their shared language. Cosmopolitans overlook this last point at their own peril. Language is necessary both for identity formation and for full, equal participation within a certain political community. It is needed (among other things) so that the "alterity" described by Sennett does not give way to a "regime of differences that are non-interactive," a state of affairs where "difference produces indifference" and "crowds become mono-functional."36 This is where the cosmopolitan and the liberal nationalist should be able to agree. Political boundaries are becoming less relevant as identity is marked not by place but by series of places. Culture

35 Ibid. p. 83
thus becomes more markedly individualized as authored by its bearers over the course of
their lifetimes. Those customs and practices which help further the life plans of individuals
are guarded as other aspects of their culture are left behind or "forgotten." In any event,
all of these acts will almost certainly be done in the language of one's mother tongue.

Thus Kymlicka is right to insist on language rights for national minorities, but
cosmopolitans are also justified in pointing out that as the world integrates economically it
may be the case that fewer and fewer societal cultures will be able to provide the full range
of opportunities necessary to warrant their institutionalized, systematic maintenance. This
must be one of the reasons the language of government, business, and education in Senegal
is French and not Wolof years after their independence from France. Of course, historically
France has exerted influence over West Africa as a colonial power, and perhaps equitable
amounts of international aid and development would allow Wolof to fully take over French
as the societal language. In many regards, it already has. But the choice to remain
Francophone belies the choice to have a national language open to both the internal
diversity of Senegal (with 10 languages spoken in addition to French and Wolof) and of
building opportunities for its citizens that extend across much of Africa and further to
places like France and Quebec. Maman and her children like Rosie would not be creating
the globalized environment cosmopolitans cherish if it were not for these choices.

One of my goals is to show that cosmopolitan ideas can have currency with
Kymlicka's theory, but not for the reasons they put forth. This is because they overlook the
importance and primacy of language. If one couches a cosmopolitan ideal of identity
within Kymlicka's liberal multiculturalism, there are implications which have not yet been

properly accounted. For when we fully respect the significance of language, Kymlicka's arguments imply a more cosmopolitan outlook than he allows. In order to preserve the rights of national minorities to their own societal cultures, indeed to preserve societal cultures as meaningful pathways to a full range of human life, the majority nation has an incentive to build relationships and pursue policies which encourage their national minority's language abroad. As we have seen with the example of Rosie, Canada is the beneficiary of immigration, but in order to preserve in Quebec what I have identified as the only real distinction worthy of preservation, the French language, it benefits all the more so from immigrants from francophone countries like Senegal. This is a fairly explicit example of multicultural minority rights and cosmopolitan human rights reinforcing one another. Kymlicka's theory of liberal multiculturalism is thus quite compatible with not only a domestic cosmopolitanism but also an international one. In fact, the more traditional cosmopolitan insights help show how it might actually be seen as ever more reliant on these international ties. On the other hand, the rooted cosmopolitan insights can show how this is no necessary impediment to solidarity or cultural crisis. They show how to begin the "ambiguous adventure" of mediating between two cultures and making the best of both one's own which Cheikh Hamidou Kane describes.38 Thus a linguistic cosmopolitanism comes into focus. This cosmopolitanism has many characteristics similar to those of the transnational risk communities of Ulrich Beck in that it socializes the risk of losing a justifiably preserved language across international boundaries.39 There is also a substantial amount of resources currently dedicated to these ends by an array of international

organizations, such as La Francophonie, The Organization of Ibero-American States, The British Council, UNESCO, and others.

If minority rights are correctly seen as complementing universal human rights as Kymlicka wishes us to acknowledge, he must concede - and does, for that matter - that cosmopolitan values can operate within minorities as well. The value of culture is that it provides us with the options from which we choose what type of life is best for us. The fact that this usually occurs for individuals in one primary visage linguistique means that it is justifiable for the state to respect the language rights of its minorities who have been incorporated into the state through conquest or confederation. Unlike immigrants, we cannot view these minorities as choosing to forgo their cultural rights, and so to rectify this relationship vis à vis the state we should be willing to grant them self-government and language rights. However in an ever more globalized world, national minorities cannot only rely on their state as the sole arbiter of ethnocultural justice. In order to successfully preserve their societal cultures, albeit more cosmopolitan ones, they must build relationships across boundaries but within a common language - indeed it may be unjustifiable for them not to. These relationships, in turn, are the potential raw materials for a new politics, a cosmopolitan politics based on ethnocultural justice.
Chapter 5: Markell's "Acknowledgment"

Whereas Appiah and Hollinger can be seen as the voices of multiculturalism's liberal, American criticisms, Patchen Markell voices a series of continental, almost existentialist criticisms of multicultural theory based largely on close readings of Hegel and Arendt. He is another critic of the politics of recognition and lumps in Kymlicka and Taylor with his arguments for a new concept of identity respect. He is not a self-described cosmopolitan in the mold of an Appiah, although his arguments must certainly have a resonance with those wishing to curb the spread of group-differentiated rights. Markell brings a remarkably fresh voice and novel approach to the debate. Unlike Appiah and Hollinger he does not approach multiculturalism with critiques based on a theory of identity or historical claims from the American experience with immigration and race. Instead he focuses on a theory of political agency that weaves together strands of Arendt with Hegel's dialectic of recognition into what he calls a "politics of acknowledgment."40 This construct is no more successful at countering liberal multiculturalism than Appiah's cosmopolitan patriotism or Hollinger's "postethnic perspective," but like them it involves raising valid questions of multiculturalism yet concluding by incorrectly anticipating the responses to these questions. I will show that he is ultimately misguided for various reasons both similar to these others and unique to his own approach, but that his attempt raises certain valid sentiments which both cosmopolitans and multiculturalists should take to heart.

Markell offers, primarily, a critique of the philosophical underpinnings of the idea

of recognition, and as such focuses his aim squarely at Taylor but also Kymlicka, whose ideas on minority rights are largely based on this concept. For Markell the philosophy of recognition politics is "at odds with itself."\textsuperscript{41} This is because we can never, even by Taylor's lights, be perfectly recognized or act in such a way that perfectly recognizes another, and so to pursue a politics of recognition is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of human existence, action, and identity formation. In making these claims he makes use of the distinction I raised at the outset of this paper between the genealogies of liberalism and communitarianism, and he uses this genealogy to criticize the origins of Taylor's politics of recognition which draws significantly from Herder and Hegel. He faults both these philosophers and Taylor for valiantly attempting theories of authentic identity which might account for the contingent nature of human identity, action, etc. only to on the final measure betray this intention for arguments which actually enshrine the illusion of sovereign agency. He then leverages these criticisms into an assault on Kymlicka's work which he believes offers an untenable middle path between liberalism and communitarianism.

To begin with, he argues Herder presents us with two senses of the term recognition: the "cognitive" and the "constructive."\textsuperscript{42} This is important, because from these two senses we are supposed to gain appreciation for the "blind spots" in Herder's, Taylor's, and ultimately Kymlicka's arguments on the importance of culture. The cognitive sense, he argues, describes the way in which we come to know things in their authenticity, which he contrasts with the constructive sense in which we each have a role in creating the languages
and cultures we engage with and redefine over time. Markell's point is that Taylor's appropriation of this distinction is ill-advised, for Taylor uses it to show how classic liberalism must correct its own view of sovereign, disengaged choice, while ignoring that his own proposal for engaged choice based on authentic identity (echoing Herder's view on rightness of language and pluralism of Völker) simply reaches for sovereign agency along a different route. Just as Herder reached for a future providential unity out of the diverse, plurality of European peoples, Taylor offers us a similar palliative for overcoming misrecognition of the diverse minorities he describes. Markell aims to show that this tactic is infected with the same covert aspiration to sovereignty as Herder, because it views each cultural group as authentically distinct and capable of proper respect and recognition.

Markell argues:

But this egalitarian future, in which formerly neglected, suppressed, and undervalued identities are all properly and publicly recognized, is still a reflection - however transfigured - of Taylor's premodern scene of unproblematic recognition, just as Herder's anticipated unity-in-multiplicity of Völker reprises, but does not precisely repeat, the harmony of Eden.

Markell goes to great lengths through close readings of both Hegel's Phenomenology and Sophocles' Antigone to show how recognition is ultimately as imperfectly contingent and incomplete as the rest of our human existence, and this is the basis for his main arguments against Taylor and Kymlicka. His paradigmatic illustration of this idea, which he uses to prod those two theorists, is the emancipation of the German

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. p. 56
Jews in the 19th century. He argues that this case shows an attempt by the state to not only recognize and preserve Jewish difference but to also assert their equal dignity and that this policy carried with it significant costs to German Jews. Among these costs he cites are "the creation of unjust relations of inequality, asymmetrical dependence, and exploitation among people, groups, and institutions."\textsuperscript{45} In other words, not a misunderstanding of Jewish identity. The state's role then is key to Markell, because it can serve to either illuminate or obfuscate these costs and thus should not be seen as an (implausibly) independent arbiter - an "always-already-sovereign institution" as he calls it - or an instrument, à la Marx, used to merely depoliticize certain identities and power relationships only to have their manifestations conserved within civil society.\textsuperscript{46} And here is where he locates his main criticisms of Taylor and Kymlicka's multiculturalist project.

Before I move on to these it is important to preface them by first pointing out several problems which shade Markell's arguments. The first of these is that Markell's criticisms of Taylor, as described above, and Kymlicka, which I will delve into below, are patently incongruent with these theorist's claims. Markell's "politics of acknowledgment" occurs at a meta-level of existential reflection that is asymmetrical to the political arguments of Taylor and Kymlicka, which are aimed much more thoroughly at praxis than at an ontological framework. For instance, Markell's insistence that the politics of recognition involves a fundamentally flawed attempt towards sovereign agency misses the point. Taylor (and Kymlicka for that matter) may or may not have the correct view of agency, but surely their arguments are not primarily focused on the need for the state to

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. p. 150
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
perfectly recognize every citizen or every cultural group within its borders. Their arguments are largely aimed at addressing just the sorts of inequalities, asymmetrical dependences, and exploitations to which Markell refers. This is not done by perfectly recognizing every citizen or cultural group but by attempting to assure that a congruent form of imperfect recognition offered by the state to the majority population is also offered to its minorities. This requires differentiating between imperfections of recognition, which are unavoidable; and asymmetries of recognition, which can and should be addressed.47

Compare what Markell attributes to Taylor as betraying his theory's actual aspirations to sovereignty: "that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident," which in itself doesn't seem to betray much ontological commitment, to what Taylor says elsewhere.48 For instance, Taylor does argue for the presumption of the possibility of a fusion of horizons, but contrary to Markell's assertions, this for him is not tantamount to perfect recognition nor is it simply a hermeneutic exercise. Using Quebec and the Meech Lake Accord as an example he argues that while the rest of Canada seized on its acceptance of collective goals, the Québécois saw giving the Charter precedence the imposition of a procedural liberalism which was foreign. This obviously is not describing a situation of perfect recognition or even of attempted perfect recognition. Instead it describes a real world compromise, one which established a form of equal respect "hospitable" to difference which allows for group-differentiated rights as a method of achieving this value. Far from

47 Thanks to Kymlicka for pointing this out to me.
between cultures - it shows how unplanned such "fusions of horizons" come into being and how tenuously they are maintained. Markell's flaw is in arguing that the Prussian recognition of the Jews was the sort of recognition advocated by Taylor. Clearly Taylor's arguments are meant not to separate recognition into two categories of "equal dignity" and "difference" but combine these categories and create political mechanisms that accommodate both values simultaneously. As Taylor himself says, "A society with strong collective goals can be liberal ... provided it is also capable of respecting diversity ... and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights." It is clear from Markell's discussion that this was not the case with Prussia; it is not clear from Markell's discussion where exactly Taylor contradicts himself or where Markell's insights would guide us or even if they would deviate from Taylor's proposals.

If Markell's Prussian example is supposed to show how attempts at recognition can be at once coercively assimilative and seek to preserve categories of differentiated, second-class citizenship, what alternative would he endorse? This is the point of Markell's discussion of Hegel, where he argues we should gather that "what justice demands is less the recognition of people as who they really are than the acknowledgment of our own condition." What if Markell is right to assert that perhaps Taylor's project does endorse, albeit ambiguously, a sort of ultimate sovereign mastery whereby cultures might gain recognition in the eyes of the state only at the expense of dominating the very people from whom they seek emancipation? But where does this take us, politically? A democratic state will always offer recognition of some sort to its citizenry. Where Taylor may be

49 Taylor p. 59
50 Markell (2003) p. 121
ambiguous in showing how his arguments are aimed primarily at compensating for unequal distribution of recognition (as equal respect for justifiable differences), Kymlicka is quite frank; and yet Markell finds many problems with Kymlicka's defense of multiculturalism as well.

Markell's first problem with Kymlicka's theory is that it uses an "amalgamation of the liberal language of property and possessive individualism [with] the communitarian language of encumbrance" which is too flimsy on which to stand and which is unable to do the work he needs. On this view we have a right to a culture, because it provides the context of our choices and makes them meaningful; we have a right to our culture, because of the costs associated with giving up our culture and the constitutive role culture plays in identity. Markell believes that this points us back in the direction of his reading of Herder and Taylor, and relates our autonomy back to an authentic culture which we discover instead of actively define. Furthermore, he is not satisfied with what he takes Kymlicka's hedge against this criticism to be: that there is a distinction to be made between the "character" of a culture at any one time, which he argues can justifiably change, and the fact of its existence through time, which should be protected. Markell points out a possible dilemma with this view, which I shall call "Markell's Dilemma." It goes something like this: either cultures have an authentic character which determine our range of choices and identities and which is problematic for a liberal sense of agency, or cultures merely exist through time and change according to our individual choices, in which case it's unclear why they deserve protections. This is a similar argument - if perhaps of a

51 Ibid. p. 158-159
more ontological variant - to what I called "Hollinger's Dilemma" above, and I believe it suffers from the same sort of misunderstandings. This is because he, like Hollinger, downplays the very important role of linguistic particularity, and the ways in which linguistic particularity becomes for Kymlicka the very essence of what is at stake and what, in addition to the derivative institutions it enables, is justifiably preserved.

Yet this is not all Markell wishes to challenge in Kymlicka's work, for after making this now-familiar "ontological" critique of Kymlicka's theory, he then attempts to use this as a springboard on to a more thoroughly political critique, similar to what we saw with his assessment of Taylor. He says that the tensions running through Kymlicka's theory are symptomatic of liberal thought writ large, yet he implies that Kymlicka's method of negotiating these tensions creates potential costs, costs which are inevitably paid by the very groups Kymlicka's theory is aimed at helping.54 This critique paints Kymlicka's theory as some form of political snake oil, capable of neatly absolving the liberal nation-state of its past sins of assimilation or other maltreatment, while at the same time allaying fears of the potential for social discord and "swamping" diversity by packaging cultural claims into stable, manageable "acceptable expressions."55 This represents for Markell the same aspiration to sovereignty via recognition from which Taylor's theory suffered, although it should be pointed out that Kymlicka never uses the vocabulary of recognition. Still, in Markell's eyes Kymlicka endorses a fantastic aspiration to sovereignty which belies potential costs such as "obscuring or perpetuating existing patterns of subordination" or creating new ones by making recognized groups dependent and vulnerable on the

54 Ibid. p. 166
55 Ibid. p. 167,170
majority.\textsuperscript{56} This is evident in his discussion of the French headscarf affair, where he characterizes Kymlicka as wrongly interjecting himself into a role as the girls' spokesman, allaying the fears of traditional liberals by assuming that wearing the headscarf was a straightforward demand for a cultural right, one that will allow them to fully integrate into society. This is supposed to show an attempt towards sovereign mastery, because as Markell says:

Here ... as long as those demands are phrased properly - that is, as long as they are phrased in ways that restore the liberal agent's sense of sovereign agency, assuring him that his concerns are misplaced - an exchange of recognition can occur.\textsuperscript{57}

There are several things wrong with this characterization, however. The first is that Markell seems to be trying to have it both ways. Earlier he characterized Kymlicka's theory as too stifling, as not adequately protecting the free choices within minorities. Now he is criticizing Kymlicka for whitewashing immigrant and minority voices until they are only those which are capable of recognition and accommodation by the liberal state. To be fair, Markell, by doing this, wishes to make the point that Kymlicka unsuccessfully oscillates between two views of culture, one in which we belong to a certain culture and the other in which a certain culture belongs to us. It is just not fair, however, on Markell's part, to overlook the main distinctions coming out of Kymlicka's work and thus fail to counter or contradict them in any meaningful way. Kymlicka's characterization of \textit{l'affaire foulard} rests on two key distinctions, the first being the distinction between self-government rights

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p. 173
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p. 169-170, 172
for national minorities and polyethnic rights for immigrants, and the second being a
distinction between the external protections, which these rights offer, and the internal
restrictions which they do not and are what many liberals legitimately fear. These
distinctions are important, because they aid in precisely what Kymlicka's project attempts
to do, which is to draw a unifying line around these two views of culture and in so doing
show just what sorts of cultural claims are justifiably included with this unified view of
culture and which are justifiably kept outside the boundaries of liberal society.
Furthermore to characterize Kymlicka and his audience as pretenders to "administrators of
culture," is not only inaccurate, but it can be shown how Kymlicka's actual stance is indeed
consistent with Markell's main message.

Let us look at what the French headscarf affair actually entails from the Kymlickian
perspective. Young girls of primarily North African descent fail to take off their head
garments in various places in France, violating policy and sparking a rather contentious
political debate ranging from the nature of French secularism to the ideals of modern
feminism to the role of public education and many points in between. The government
convenes a panel and ultimately issues a new policy banning overtly religious
paraphernalia in schools - not only headscarves, but also yarmulkes, large crosses, etc.
After a few protests and student suspensions the furore largely dies down and these students
accept the ruling. From a Kymlickian perspective this scenario does in fact amount to a
case of the state seeking an impossible sovereignty over culture. It does leave the groups

59 Markell uses this terminology on p. 170.
60 See LaBorde, Célia, "Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9/3: 351-377, I also noticed several occasions while I worked at the Lycée Camargue in Nîmes from 2004-2005 where girls would wear more modern-looking hair wraps which seemed to past muster and served as a compromise.
seeking such exemptions more vulnerable vis-à-vis the state. Markell and Kymlicka agree on this much. Where they supposedly disagree is that Markell believes that this is the case no matter what, that the state will never be able to fully "perfectly" recognize the claims made on it by citizens, that either the state dictates the dress code and fails to recognize certain cultural commitments or the state protects religious dress at the expense of enforcing difference. Kymlicka is right to think that this truly pessimistic, but what's more, he does not fully disagree. He has no reason to challenge this point, except to point out that even if this is the case the state still has certain obligations to justice. He aims to show that the state apparatus \textit{inevitably} serves as a sovereign instrument for the administration of culture, and that justice requires us not to make it perfectly cognizant, but equally \textit{imperfectly} cognizant in service of not just the majority, but minority groups as well. Thus Kymlicka was correct in his portrait of the girls as seeking inclusion - they were not refusing to go to school - and in his arguments that the French ban on headscarves needlessly sought to eliminate difference instead of incorporating it. Precisely by endorsing a public sphere open to this sort of cultural contestation, Kymlicka is allowing for the very uncertainty advocated by Markell. Simply because Kymlicka advocates liberal policies with regards to this uncertainty is neither regressive nor oppressive. It is vigilantly progressive. It aims to create "fair terms of integration" while making sure these terms remain unexploited or pushed to illiberal extremes.\textsuperscript{61}

Markell's main argument, that we must have a deeper recognition of our finitude and unachievable sovereign mastery is thus well-received, but simply not applicable to Taylor or Kymlicka, who would have us distinguish between such a form of inescapable

misrecognition and the form against which they argue involving institutional asymmetries of recognition. The reason I raise Markell's objections however is not to simply offer a fuller explanation of multicultural principles, but to fold them into what I think are more pertinent critiques emanating from the cosmopolitan project. I said at the outset that Markell is not an avowed cosmopolitan, but I do believe his views would resonate with the type of cosmopolitans who seem to see multiculturalism as some aging sea wall which the irresistible forces of globalization and cultural hybridity will eventually wash away. I have attempted to show through an examination of this view that multiculturalism is the very opposite. Instead of being some out-dated bulwark against the forces of modernity, multiculturalism has risen precisely to manage these forces, to "tame" them,\(^\text{62}\) and having proven its worth, it will continue to serve these ends even as the focus of its insights play out more and more frequently on a transformed world stage. If one thing should be taken away from Markell's work however (and to be sure, there is a wealth to be gained from his account), it must be this notion of locating our politics in the realm of uncertainty.\(^\text{63}\) It seems clear to me that multicultural, liberal democracy does this better than conventional forms, but it is unclear whether it does it well enough to remain viable in the sea of world economic and social forces without some form of intentional transnational coordination. And while it seems contradictory to the very idea of Markell's "acknowledgment" to tender a prescription for change (if we are acknowledging the inherent impossibility of sovereign actions, would this not be futile?), we can see the prospect of cosmopolitanism in his suggestion of a "multiplication and diffusion of sites around which struggles for

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\(^{63}\) Markel (2003) p. 188
recognition are carried out."64 This is yet another point Kymlicka advocates time and again,65 yet to see what the full cosmopolitan effects of this suggestion are on multiculturalism I will turn elsewhere.

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64 Ibid.
65 Kymlicka (1995) and (2001)
Chapter 6: Benhabib's *Claims of Culture*

At this point it should be clear and reiterated that neither Kymlicka nor Taylor harbor ideals which run counter to the cosmopolitan project. Kymlicka puts this sentiment quite clearly in stating, "We are citizens of a nation, but also citizens of the world, and sometimes the interests of others can - indeed should - take precedence over our national interests." Kymlicka for one argues for the need to look beyond the sovereign state to answer questions arising not only out of minority rights claims but to tackle issues like the environment, like terrorism which are associated with an ever more globalized world. In fact, Taylor as well trumpets the virtues of looking beyond borders for a consensus on questions of human and minority rights. This is all to say that there is already substantial evidence of cosmopolitan ideals within multiculturalism. Now that I have responded to arguments attempting to enumerate the ways in which they are theoretically incompatible. I will now look at how arguments over their supposed *substantial* incompatibility. I will thus examine attempts to show how the nation-state is no longer the salient locus of claims of recognition or minority rights and how theorists such as Kymlicka and Taylor might themselves account for claims in such a new and changing paradigm. Seyla Benhabib is one of the authors at the forefront of this inquiry into the changing role of the state. She, like Markell, has a more continental orientation in her approach to the theory of multiculturalism and its relationship to cosmopolitanism, but unlike Markell she takes on more substantive analyses of real-world political claims making, which sets her up to more

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effectively challenge Kymlicka and Taylor. This she does, and while I disagree with much in her reading of Kymlicka, I find her conclusions nonetheless important to the aspirations of my own project which is, again, to show the mutually reinforcing nature and interdependence of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism and to show that multi-nation states like Canada actually embody this ideal.

Benhabib's arguments are interesting, because in many ways they closely mirror (or perhaps are mirrored by) Markell's, except that Benhabib moves further to actually perceive real-world alternative claims-making schemes. First however, she adds her voice to the chorus of writers who take issue with multiculturalist view of culture. She begins with Taylor's theory of identity and criticizes his model of "webs of interlocution," which he uses to explain identity formation and thus privilege the recognition of certain linguistic communities.69 Benhabib agrees that identity is formed in a linguistic and cultural community, but she disagrees that this provides an argument about "which webs of interlocution should be normatively privileged, and under which circumstances and by whom."70 She then criticizes Kymlicka for the ways he goes about answering just these sorts of questions. For instance, she takes umbrage with his description of societal cultures, those which on his account justify preservation. This is interesting, because societal culture is obviously resonant with Taylor's idea of "webs of interlocution," which Benhabib does not criticize in and of itself, "But there are no such "societal cultures,"" exclaims Benhabib.71 Apparently ignoring the intentional clarifications Kymlicka offers when defining societal cultures as distinct from racial or descent groups and marked by

70 Ibid. The emphasis is hers.
71 Ibid. p. 60
internal diversity. Benhabib charges Kymlicka with a view of societal culture that is "holistic, monochronic, and idealistic in that it confuses social structure with social signification," adding "... at any point in time there are competing collective narratives that range across institution and form the dialogue of cultures". So this is similar to the same sort of cultural essentialist critique leveled by the theorists discussed above. Benhabib here seems to offer not a different view of identity but of the importance of particular cultural manifestations to individual identity and agency, the first prong of Kymlicka's project. She then attacks the nature of Kymlicka's distinction between immigrant and ethnic minorities and national minorities, stating that "The distinction then between multinations and ethnocultural groups is not static but dynamic, and it alone cannot suffice for us to differentiate between the recognition claims and aspirations of distinct human groupings." So we have an argument against Kymlicka's view of the importance of a particular culture - reminiscent of the "culture as air" critique we heard from Appiah, and we have an argument against the differentiation of minorities between national and immigrant minorities similar to what I termed Hollinger's and Markell's Dilemmas above. I will not rehash how these sorts of arguments get Kymlicka wrong and actually do not present much in the way of contradiction. Suffice it to say that her particular take on these arguments is just as dubious and lacking as theirs, and I think it is clear that her alternatives range from the vague: "the acknowledgment of the fluidity of group boundaries," "the reflexive reconstitution of group identities," "dynamic constructions of identity," "the politics of complex cultural dialogue," which are all completely compatible with Kymlicka and  

73 Benhabib (2002) p. 60-61  
74 Ibid. p. 64
Taylor's views; to the (naively) concrete: universalizing entitlement programs and making census data less uniform, which seem to discount the very reasons why such programs were set up and why minorities still wish to claim them today.75

I do not wish to dwell on these weaknesses of Benhabib's view, because I feel that they are misunderstandings which on further examination can be resolved and which ultimately lead her to conclusions the vast majority of which I do not see as offering much of a departure from Taylor's and Kymlicka's proposals. Where she does offer important insights though, and why I have chosen to examine her critiques here, is not in her arguments that Canadian multiculturalism has some sort of fundamental incompatibility with cosmopolitanism, but in her insights into what problems the two ideals pose for each other, and the lessons they must teach each other to remain viable as political projects. In this regard I feel she has much to offer. For instance in her discourse on modern citizenship in the Europe Union she touches on a number of important insights, including the tension between human rights and self-determination and the corresponding political claims to open borders and traditional civic-republicanism.76 Here she argues that these tensions arise out of the changing role of the modern nation-state and that all too often political philosophers (among whom she includes Kymlicka) have taken an overly state-centric and static view of the ongoing evolution of the "social practice of citizenship."77

What is of interest in this argument is that most foreigners in European states are granted some form of temporary or permanent social rights, however they are mostly denied political rights, and what her thesis tenders is the idea that cosmopolitan, international

75 Ibid. p. 64, 70, 74-76
76 Ibid. p. 151-154
77 Ibid. p. 160-161
integration has created the discursive space (at least in Europe) to possibly by-pass the nation and secure political rights on both a local and at a regional, transnational level, and on her view this would be a progressive development, because it would mark the further disaggregation of citizenship away from the nation-state and thus also of the ethnos away from the demos.  

There are many reasons to believe, as I take Benhabib to believe, that the locus of the metropolis is uniquely suited to answer the call of many of these questions. Not only because the city has traditionally been at the forefront of democratic developments since the time of the Mediterranean city-states, but because they are now at the front-lines of the globalizing processes of monetary and migrant flows. While the integration of the former may be rather seamless, that of the latter is often much more of a conscious negotiation, and it happens primarily at the local level. As such municipalities are gaining expertise in both global markets, transnational political institutions, and local resettlement and integration. As French sociologist Cynthia Ghorrà-Gobin succinctly puts it, “The metropolis as a political actor permits, on the one hand, to regulate the costs linked to the instrumentalization of the metropolitan entity by transnational flows and, on the other hand, to anchor territorially notions of civic culture and citizenship all while authorizing the affirmation of an identity.” Furthermore as Saskia Sassen points out on her reading of Weber's *The City*, contemporary cities exhibit the same qualities of the medieval cities he

analyzed, qualities that were integral in their role in becoming strategic sites for the
development of entirely new forms of political constructions and social interactions.81 This
is because current realities of globalization (of markets, of communication, of immigration)
are producing similar factors of “dislocations and destabilizations” to the traditional order.
This is leading to a “re-scaling” of the political-economic system and a “partial
unbundling” of the nation as the prime locus for a range of social processes.82

The metropolis, in this sense, is a laboratory for future developments, both inter-
and infra-national, in human socio-political interaction and organization. Thus Benhabib's
argument for local and transnational citizenship is aligned with the argument of Sassen in
that “current conditions in global cities are creating not only new structurations of power
but also operational and rhetorical openings for new types of political actors which may
have been submerged, invisible, or without voice.”83 Perhaps surprisingly though,
Benhabib and Kymlicka are closer in their views in these regards than meets the eye. Both
agree that some form of metropolitan citizenship, even if it is not necessarily all they are
due, could be passed to immigrants and both agree that liberal citizenship lies
fundamentally apart from the ethnonational.84 The difference between Kymlicka and
Benhabib lies in how they see their commitments to these principles panning out in the real
world. Kymlicka believes that these are essentially occurring and contained between
nation-state actors, while Benhabib sees transnational governance and solidarities leeching
power from traditional state-centered actors. She believes that disaggregation of

81 Sassen (2005) p. 90; also see Sassen's The Global City: London, New York, Tokyo (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1991)
82 Ibid. 92
83 Sassen (2005) p. 91
84 Kymlicka, Another Cosmopolitanism, p. 139, Benhabib p. 172
citizenship rights from the nation can and should be achieved while he believes that the
nation is indispensable in securing the sorts of cosmopolitan solidarities she seeks.
Whereas Benhabib argues that current developments in international law and the European
Union are examples of the "transcendence" of liberal nationhood, Kymlicka argues that it is
instead the "taming" of the liberal nation-state.85 Benhabib charges this view as "conflating
nationality and peoplehood," and she distinguishes between a "voluntarist" and
"substantialist" reading of nationality.86 The former, she says, leads us to what she calls
"the paradox of democratic legitimacy," whereby "the people" are those franchised with the
ability of discriminating between aliens and citizens; while the latter is the traditional
"community of fate" and is pre-political.87 She sees the weakening of the state system as
an opportunity for fruitful change and offers a concept that draws on the city as a locus for
changes in citizenship which are effectively post-ethnic and post-national.88 Kymlicka, on
the other hand, takes a more modest approach to the story Benhabib and others wish to tell
of the depreciating significance of the nation-state. He accuses Benhabib of too little
emphasis on the enduring power of the nation-state.89 He sees the nation-state - as Arendt
and others have argued - as the primary guarantor of rights and recognition, and he sees
claims against the state as arising from people seeking inclusion in full citizenship, not
exclusion or differentiated citizenship.90 What's most interesting about this interplay is how
it so aptly captures what is at stake for both of their theories. Kymlicka needs the nation-

85 Kymlicka, Another Cosmopolitanism, p. 130
86 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, p. 167
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid p. 174; For clarification on the difference between post-national (meaning more at supra-national)
and de-national (meaning more of a redefining of the national) see Sassen's “The Need to Distinguish
Denationalized and Postnational,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7: 575-584
89 Kymlicka, Another Cosmopolitanism, p. 141
90 Ibid.
state or some sovereign entity like it to have an important role in order to secure the minority rights he believes are rightly justified. Benhabib needs her discursive space model to take the place of the nation-state in order to downplay the minority rights claims which might hamper the transnational, hybrid solidarities buttressing her ideas on identity and political community.

It seems clear to me that these views are both, yet only partially, correct. They are both overly optimistic in their own ways - Benhabib in believing that cosmopolitan solidarities can successfully protect individual rights, Kymlicka in thinking of the nation-state as the *sine qua non* of political and cultural rights. In Benhabib's case there is good reason to believe that the national sovereignties of the EU are still more salient than she gives credit and will take longer than expected to give way. In Kymlicka's case there is good reason to believe that minorities may make claims as something other than conationals. In fact his own descriptions of multination-states would confirm this. If differentiated rights are not only claimed but justified in these cases, then why would immigrants in the European Union find it troubling if they could, for instance, maintain dual citizenship with the EU and their sending country and obtain local citizenship from their host country? Differentiated rights might be to their advantage in a world of diasporic, hybrid identities, and thus, particularly in the integrating EU experiment, it seems a stretch to insist on the primacy of the nation. In fact though, both Kymlicka and Benhabib offer correctives to the ills of liberal nationalism that simply work through different mechanisms: Kymlicka's through the multination state of which Canada is exemplary, Benhabib's through the integrative "discursive space" model of which she
claims the EU is exemplary. Kymlicka's model seeks to make the state more liberal by incorporating multicultural policies, some of which place a good deal of importance on international institutions to adjudicate claims of minority rights. Benhabib's model seeks to transcend the liberal state by arguing for a cosmopolitan solidarity capable of liberalizing not only the nation-state but also the social ramifications of the current global economy. Kymlicka's is the admittedly proven success story, while Benhabib's seems more in tune with future developments. By and large, however, they are arguing for the same things: the liberalization of the nation-state, the multiplication of sites of recognition, and responsive, democratic public institutions at all levels of government. To protect minority rights within a state it may be important to look outside the state's borders and coordinate the preservation of things like languages. Likewise, to protect international institutions and develop a more cosmopolitan world system it may be important that these be built on strong (multicultural) patriotic allegiances.
Chapter 7: The Next Frontier in the Multiculturalism Debates

Kymlicka outlines a brief sketch of the trajectory of the debate surrounding multiculturalism as consisting of three primary developments. The first of these he describes is the liberalism-communitarian debate I have touched on here. This is the debate going back in many ways to Kant and Herder between those who argue that ethnocultural minorities have a right to maintain their authentic ways of life without the interference of the liberal majority and its values and those who argue that enhancing individual autonomy is the only means by which communal rights should be advocated. The second development then is the attempt to overcome this dichotomy. Kymlicka describes this phase as one reflecting the desires of most minority groups to rights which fall within a liberal framework, not one that questions the importance of individual autonomy but instead asks "if groups are indeed liberal, why do their members need rights?" So formulating an acceptable answer to this question and an account of which rights were and were not justified became the point of departure for Kymlicka and several others, but according to Kymlicka this was also not enough. He then goes on to describe the third state in this trajectory as consisting in asking not what counts as acceptable departures from a norm of liberal neutrality, but in what ways the idea of liberal neutrality is patently false, and in what ways does a "nation-building model" of governance (the promotion of a national language, holidays, etc.) systematically disadvantage minorities. Arriving at an account of these ideas and the justifiable minority rights that flow from them has thus

92 Ibid. p. 30
93 Ibid. p. 37

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occupied the major focus of Kymlicka's and Taylor's efforts.

These efforts have been successful. Both empirically and theoretically the Canadian model of multiculturalism has won over many adherents. However it seems clear we are now entering a new stage in the multiculturalism debate and as such I would like to offer a fourth development to go along with Kymlicka's three. The fourth development I would suggest is the debate I have described here between multiculturalists and cosmopolitans. Since the multicultural debates of the 1990s, cosmopolitanism has come to attract the attention of an ever growing number of scholars. While trying to arrive at a coherent and acceptable theory has been one of the main goals of this nascent (or perhaps renascent) project, many if not most cosmopolitan theorists have invariably defined their position as standing in opposition to that of multiculturalism. What I have tried to show here is that this inclination is fundamentally misguided, and that it suffers from a series of common misconceptions. One of the primary misconceptions is the notion that equates rights for minority groups with the imposition of constrictive cultural practices or narratives. This is the notion famously voiced by Appiah when he says, "If I had to choose between the world of the closet and the world of gay liberation, or the world of Uncle Tom's Cabin and the world of Black Power, I would, of course, choose the latter. But I would like not to have to choose."\footnote{Appiah, K. Anthony, "Identity, Ethnicity, Survival" in Gutmann, Amy, ed., Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition," An Essay by Charles Taylor, ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 163}

This idea is obviously anathema to the cause of cosmopolitanism, which celebrates fluid, hybrid identities and which seeks to tear down the barriers and boundaries which divide us. What I have tried to show here is that this is anathema to liberal
multiculturalism as well. With Kymlicka's distinctions between external protections as opposed to internal restrictions we may not have the "bright line" between recognition and compulsion which Appiah believes is nonexistant, but we have some pretty bold guideposts nonetheless. The other major misconceived objections to multiculturalism raised by cosmopolitans is the idea that granting group-differentiated rights to minorities is a quick path to ethnic balkanization, perhaps even secession, but at the very least will have an adverse effect on social cohesion and solidarity. This is the problem raised by Hollinger, Markell and others who see ethnic categories as dubious attempts to standardize that which cannot be standardized, to assert sovereignty over that which cannot be controlled. They assert that not only is this a futile task, but it only helps to reify what separates and divides. In other words, they argue that it's counterintuitive to strive for equality through differentiated treatment. This is the so-called "religious model" of minority rights, whereby race and culture are treated as religions by the state - none promoted, none suppressed. The problem with this is that, counterintuitive though it may be, when undifferentiated treatment fundamentally and unjustifiably disadvantages minorities, some forms of differentiated treatment is exactly what is required for them to be able to participate as full and equal citizens. This goes by many names. Sartre called it an "anti-racist racism." Ulrich Beck calls it a "self-critical racism." Americans may recognize it for better or worse as "affirmative action." Kymlicka calls these polyethnic rights.

Kymlicka himself acknowledges the sorts of future challenges I have raised in this discussion. He agrees that while the fundamental justice concerns of the original debate

96 Ibid.
97 Hollinger, "The New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way" p. 238
have been resolved there remains much debate over the justice of specific policies (like affirmative action, for instance) and the long-term effects of multiculturalism on citizenship and social cohesion. These debates are exacerbated, he astutely notes, by the extraneous political implications of illiberal minority groups and illegal immigration, the occurrence of which place great political strain on multicultural policies. I agree that these are accurate diagnoses, but my argument here is that they belie a fundamentally state-centric approach that itself may be in need of revision. The cosmopolitans I have surveyed here not only raise objections on the level of particular policies (as I have attempted to show through discussion of *l'affaire foulard*) and the level of social cohesion (as I have attempted to show through discussion of Hollinger and Markell's "dilemma"). Cosmopolitans also offer a more fundamentally revisionist conception of the role of the state itself (as I have attempted to raise through discussion of Benhabib's and others' approaches). Beyond the challenges of specific multiculturalist policies and the misunderstandings over their effects on citizenship, these more radical challenges are what I have tried to show here that Kymlicka is at least partially susceptible, and this is what I would say marks the next step in the trajectory of multiculturalism. The question at this stage then would be how does multiculturalism remain relevant and retain support when its biggest sponsor, the state, is being weakened by forces opposed to multicultural diversity - market forces of standardization, homogenization, globalization. This is an important question, and it presents two paths, the first being that stressed by both Benhabib and Kymlicka of the need for "representative public institutions at the statal, interstatal, and transstatal levels" of

98 Kymlicka, Will, "The New Debate on Minority Rights..." in p. 44
99 Ibid.
governance. Conversely, the only other option would be a laissez-faire approach, with cultural groups vying for relevance and recognition vis-à-vis an ultimately unresponsive state - in other words, a recipe for disaster. The necessity of the former option shows how multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are coextensive to a certain degree. And even though each seems to pull at the state in opposite directions, nonetheless the state still serves, by and large, as the primary conduit for the "democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics" which the two tendencies each, in their own ways, require. It is somewhat interesting to read cosmopolitan critiques of multiculturalism on the grounds of social cohesion, because if the multiculturalists have a hurdle to argue away in this regards, then the cosmopolitans' is all the higher. This is because just as the fact of diversity and the demands of justice lead us to adopt multicultural policies at the level of the nation-state, so too should they continue to serve as our guide as the traditional state system gives way to a more highly integrated transnational order. Justice should be as multicultural as it is cosmopolitan and vice versa.

I consider the quest to find the right sort of balance between the two to be just the sort of contextual, policy-oriented challenge, which Kymlicka says will mark the next step, and the right kind of step, in the debates over multiculturalism. However, the reason I believe Kymlicka is at least partially open to criticism here is because I am sympathetic to some of the implications of Benhabib's and Sassen's work. They see the answers to these challenges as relying less and less on individual, national actors and instead relying more and more on transcendent forces. For example let us look at the aforementioned affirmative action policies. This is exactly the type of specific multicultural policy toward

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100 Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, p. 169
which Kymlicka believes the debate is now shifting. In the United States affirmative action was developed to redress specific institutional racism and promote historically disadvantaged groups, namely racial minorities and women. Now however there is some debate over whether or not these policies as they are currently implemented actually serve the disadvantaged groups for which they were intended.¹⁰¹ Not only does it not appear to be helping socioeconomically disadvantaged minorities, it also over-represents immigrant minorities and their descendants. Just as we saw with Rosie and her move to Montréal, immigration, fueled by global economic forces, is changing the dynamic of many of these old multicultural questions from national issues to transnational ones. This could force the state to either rethink its immigration policies, which is doubtful, or it could lead to a re-conceptualizing of minorities within its borders, which could also prove problematic. Thus, these new issues cannot be meaningfully confronted solely at the national level. If more recent immigrants, for example, are overrepresented in certain minority achievement categories this is a development that has not only national implications but international ones. The national implications are that the policy may be flawed and old categories may need to be reworked or nuanced. The international implications are that receiving countries’ policy is impacted by that of the sending country. Should these immigration flows be stopped? Should minorities or other disadvantaged groups from the sending countries be given the same sorts of affirmative action in their attempts to immigrate? The emergence of globalized and interconnected labor and other markets may pose problems for multicultural and other domestic policies implemented by any single nation. These

changing realities affect the way minorities are perceived and their rights preserved within a country. International coordination and cooperation may be the only way to manage these challenges, and this is where I think Benhabib, Beck, and Sassen's works have some purchase.

Globalization is making cosmopolitanism a more attractive political philosophy, and giving it perhaps the discursive space it needs to grow. Its adherents see it as a way to overcome many of the evils traditionally associated with the nation-state: racism, xenophobia, lack of concern for global justice, etc. Unfortunately a side-effect of this is that they often have a knee-jerk reactions to multiculturalism, at least in its liberal, state-sanctioned form. Time and again what they fail to appreciate are not only the differences between historical minority and immigrant groups, which Kymlickian multiculturalism tries to account for in a systematic way; but they also fail to appreciate the ways in which the state is an indispensable tool in protecting the rights of minorities and ensuring their continued ability to exercise these rights as equal citizens. Just as there can be no denying the rapidly shifting terrain on which we now stand, so too should there be no illusion that a just, liberal response to these new landscapes will be able to somehow dissolve away the legitimate claims of minorities vis-à-vis the state or whatever other governing apparatus cosmopolitans envision. What seems most interesting though about this dynamic, is that multiculturalism and cosmopolitan are not only mutually reinforcing, they are mutually dependent. That is, they do not simply serve to fully liberalize each other, as I have tried to show through my discussion of various common misunderstandings here; they actually need one another, and this is what is too often lost in the disagreements between the two
sides. Cosmopolitans need multiculturalism in order to fairly integrate political communities to begin tackling the various social justice, environmental, security, and other problems which can only be fully addressed through a political process both de-national, devolving rights to individuals with less regard to nationality, and postnational, building on solidarities which move beyond the state. Multiculturalists need cosmopolitan international cooperation in order to protect and preserve minority cultures and languages in such a way that preserves viable ranges of options and life plans for its minority citizens.

This is an idea expressed by Andrew Linklater in his description of a "Post-Westphalian Society." Here he argues that the same forces of citizenship and expanding forms of recognition in themselves serve to further blur the line between citizen and alien. He draws on theorists from T.H. Marshall to Iris Marion Young to show how citizenship has evolved over the two centuries to be ever more inclusive from civil rights to political rights and onward to social rights and group-differentiated recognition. He then makes a thoroughly liberal, tripartite argument for why a Post-Westphalian, "cosmopolitan citizenship" is necessary in order to preserve the achievements of national citizenship. He argues:

First, citizens cannot rely on national democratic arrangements to give them

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102 For ways in which multiculturalism can be described as "denational" and cosmopolitanism "post-national" see Sassen, Saskia in Isin and Engin, eds., The Handbook of Citizenship Studies (London: SAGE, 2002)

103 This is why, for example, the Catalan region of Spain has consistently advocated not only more regional rights vis-à-vis Spain but has also been outspoken in its desire to be an official language of the EU. To use Sassen's vocabulary, "denationalized" recognition of cultural rights within Spain is not enough, they also need "post-national" recognition within the EU in order to remain viable and to consolidate their hard-won standing within Spain.

104 Linklater, Andrew, The Transformation of Political Community (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1998) p. 182
much control over their individual and collective lives under conditions of complex interdependence ... Second, the vast number of international organizations which have been designed to manage a more interdependent world face democratic deficit because their decisions do not require popular consent. Third ... the sovereign state cannot claim to be the only relevant moral community as the level of transnational harm continues to rise with intensifications of interdependence.\textsuperscript{105}

So here, the force of the arguments for broadening and recognizing citizenship \textit{within} the nation has begun to open our eyes to new moral and normative claims for broadening and recognizing a new cosmopolitan citizenship \textit{without} the nation. For nearly the same reasons that we hear for recognition of minority cultures - that culture is important to individual \textit{autonomy}, that cultural recognition aids in full \textit{civic participation}, and that the dominant national culture \textit{harms} national minorities when it is forcibly and unjustifiably disseminated over their population - we are given reasons for the expansion of these notions beyond the state. Again let's go back to the case of minority languages. One could easily make the argument that national minorities within liberal and ever more interdependent states are exposed to high levels of transnational harm when, even if their country recognizes their status, they remain unrecognized by the broader community of nations. This may be due to a conflict of interest between the majority and the minority at the level of interest in transnational commitments, or it could be that the majority is too small within the potential broader political community to secure the rights at the

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. p. 192
transnational level which it had secured at the national level.\textsuperscript{106} Perhaps Catalan and other minority languages would be more adequately treated if they were recognized by the European Union as official languages, or their minority language rights enshrined in protocol? Perhaps the Kurds in Turkey could use EU entrance negotiations as a tool for their eventual recognition as a national minority? In any event what becomes clear is the need for greater cooperation and a better accounting of interests both local and foreign.

What is interesting about Linklater's argument, and which I have tried to echo is that what makes the need for a more \textit{cosmopolitan} citizenship clear are the same justifications which have been leading states toward greater acceptance and recognition of a liberal \textit{multicultural} citizenship. This is where these two theories intersect and where the next stage of development should occur.

\footnote{For example both of these could be at play with regards to Catalonia's status within the EU.}
Chapter 8: Epilogue

Cosmopolitanism is an incredibly seductive ideology to the American intellectual. Whatever will be said about America and isolationism, she has always displayed a tendency towards a distinct form of messianic liberalism. As Thomas Paine proclaims in his Rights of Man, "My country is the world, and my religion is to do good."\(^{107}\) Compare the words of that revolutionary to those of Martha Nussbaum: "We should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity a special attention and respect."\(^{108}\) History unfortunately has shown us this sort of cosmopolitan ideal is easily compromised and often corrupted out of greed and chauvinism. As for Paine he goes on to write about how a cosmopolitan world peace could secure the expansion of commerce and wealth. Nussbaum, on the other hand, must have looked on in disgust as President Bush justified a war of aggression in Iraq on humanitarian grounds, among other things. Liberation is often a guise for exploitation. And yet cosmopolitanism remains an ideal that, time and again crushed to earth, continues to rise once more. This is because it expresses a just view of humanity, a view that becomes clearer with each passing day. This is the view that fundamental human rights must at their core be divorced from locale, ethnicity, religion, and instead of requiring knowledge of a certain language in order to access them, they must be translated into all languages. This is the outcome of the postwar human rights movement. The Nuremberg Laws, the

\(^{107}\) Paine, Thomas, *The Rights of Man* (1791)
establishment and charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were all premised on the need to contain sovereign nationalism in a way that decoupled citizenship from the rights which it traditionally granted. These were milestones which argued that henceforth it will not be in virtue of one's nationality or citizenship status that rights shall be bestowed. Instead these documents made the case that rights are retained by people simply in virtue of their individual humanity. Here, however, we begin to be faced with a certain dilemma.

This dilemma stems from the idea expressed in the oft-quoted sentiments of Joseph de Maîstre, who when commenting on the rights of man enshrined in the French Constitution of 1795 said, "In my lifetime I have seen Frenchman, Italians, Russians, thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him."\(^{109}\) What he is trying to express by this is that man is not an abstract entity. Man (and woman) are always situated in communities that are characterized by their particularities - language, symbols, rituals, and histories. These particularities are important, because they shape the identities of community members and serve to color the horizons of their pursuit of the good life as they define it. Reconciling these twin notions, of universality and equality on the one hand, with particularity and the inherent favoring of some cultural practices on the other hand is a standard problem in political philosophy. Amongst liberals it often results in a call for some form of multiculturalism in domestic policy and some form of cosmopolitan pluralism in foreign policy. Here multiculturalism is a way to conciliate the project of nation-building, the reliance on the Andersonian "imagined community" in the minds of one group at the

\(^{109}\) Joseph de Maîstre, *Considerations on France* (1797)
expense of other groups, while cosmopolitan pluralism is a way of forging consensus on "universal" values through a medium of sovereign peoples, each rooted in their own particular histories, traditions, and ways of life.

The goal of this paper has been to show how these two values must be seen as mutually reinforcing and also mutually dependent. For multicultural, minority rights to be seen as forming an integral amendment to the portfolio of cosmopolitan human rights they must be justified via liberal arguments of personal autonomy and historical fairness. For cosmopolitan claims of universal equality to be taken seriously they must present a non-assimilative, non-homogenizing consensus that seeks adherents not through imperial strong-arming, but through respect and dialogue with diverse minority cultures. The prospects for such a state of affairs may not be as dim as one might imagine. Indeed it may be the only plausible way forward. American cosmopolitans, like their Canadian multiculturalist counterparts, display diverse opinions in the critiques they level against each other. I have tried here to add some clarity to what I see as some of the more recurring and pernicious misunderstanding between the two groups. These include the misunderstanding of the basic justifications for group rights (fairness and inclusion, not cultural essentialism), the misunderstanding of distinct types of minorities and why this is important (national minorities have different normative claims than immigrants or minority races), and also the misunderstanding as to the role of the nation-state as arbiter in these matters (whether or not the nation-state can remain liberal and fully protect minority rights without some forms of transnational coordination and cooperation). On the first two questions I have come down unequivocally in favor of a multiculturalist interpretation of
minority claims-making, while on the latter question I have argued that multiculturalism
may need to revise its emphasis on the nation-state, particularly if this institution is not able
to secure, in an ever more interdependent world, the very benefits for which such an
emphasis was necessary.

The two areas where most cosmopolitans, particularly American ones, continue to
hold misconceptions - minority group typology and group differentiated rights - arise
because they see multiculturalism and recognition primarily through the lens of race. This
is abundantly clear from my discussion of Appiah and Hollinger, who criticize
multiculturalists for, in their opinion, reifying racial categories and creating new ones.
Both seem to believe, for example, that the Québécois are theorized as a quasi-racial
category of people by multiculturalists, which has led to unjust political arrangements and
encouraged separatism.110 As Irene Bloemraad notes, "...critics such as Hollinger are
correct to argue that the American ethno-racial pentagon cannot be a basis of cultural
recognition..." but she also notes, "Canadian multiculturalism also suggests cultural
recognition on the basis of ethnicity rather than race."111 Thus as I have tried to show here,
when American cosmopolitans critique Canadian multiculturalism they are generally
attacking a straw man, and their preoccupation with race and the very valid need to
overcome it as an unjust categorization serves to blind them to more justifiable categories
of minorities with justifiably differentiated rights.

Extending outward from the issue of race though, disagreements also belies a focus
among cosmopolitans on an American brand of assimilative immigration. Whereas in

111 Bloemraad (2006) p. 246
Canada, with their history of accommodating the Québécois, have adopted policies which seek to reasonably accommodate incoming immigrants' cultural differences, American policy has consistently taken a more difference-blind approach closely related to law-enforcement goals and not necessarily the advancement of political participation.112 Bloemraad echoes sentiments of Bonnie Honig when she notes, "The United States, while not providing much material support for newcomers, provides some symbolic rhetoric of inclusion through its historic self-image as a nation of immigrants."113 Honig describes this sentiment as "nationalist xenophilia," which she argues actually serves to "feed and (re)produce nationalist xenophobia as its partner," when a particular type of immigrant, those which feed and replicate national myths and social customs are vaunted and celebrated while others who might serve "the nation's transformation or attenuation" are blameworthy and denigrated.114

The problem for American and other cosmopolitans which this notion poses is that immigration alone may not serve to create the new postnational societies of which they theorize. They may in fact be overly enthusiastic about these futuristic possibilities, because the nation-state may prove more resilient at incorporating diversity and immigration and using these to replicate itself. As Honig puts it, "Mere facts - the mere fact of heightened migration - cannot be counted on to do the world-building work of politics."115 Bloemraad echoes this sentiment as well. She argues that even though immigrants may be able to interact with their homelands and other places in novel,

112 Ibid. at pp. 249-250
113 Ibid. p. 244
115 Ibid. p. 5
transnational ways immigrant experiences "remain grounded in specific societies that are strongly shaped by particular government policies."\textsuperscript{116} She goes on to note that even though Canada and its export-driven economy is more economically interdependent than the United States and it generally endorses a postnational policy of attributing rights without regards to citizenship, "immigrant citizenship and participation is higher in Canada [than in the U.S.], suggesting that nation-states continue to influence the fortunes of migrants despite countervailing transnational or supranational forces."\textsuperscript{117}

Thus the discourse continues and the table is set for further debate. What is for sure is that cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism are two closely related inquiries, which at their best both wish to preserve justifiable diversity and which at their worst serve to homogenize differences to which we rightly cling. Kymlicka and Taylor offer a vision of multiculturalism at its best, and the cosmopolitans whose critiques I have analyzed here would do well to more thoroughly incorporate these views into their own projects.

Resolving these misunderstandings and presenting a defense of multiculturalism from its cosmopolitan critics has been one of my main concerns here. The other concern, albeit a much humbler one, has been to sketch out what I feel to be one avenue along which a more fully incorporated view of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism might come into focus. This nascent image of a liberal multiculturalism which in turn justifies and begs a further cosmopolitan transnationalism may seem like a contradiction to terms by both camps, but I see this interplay and the political and theoretical debates surrounding it as the next stage of inquiry. It is all the more important to clarify the terms of this debate, because while liberal

\textsuperscript{116} Bloemraad (2006) p. 248
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
values such as personal autonomy and equal respect - values which both sides do and
should share - are not really subject to change, the realities of globalization and
fragmentation are constantly recalibrating themselves and political philosophy is needed
less to resolve disputes between rival theories of identity and culture and more to develop
novel responses to the ways political claims are being made as a result or in response to
these new socio-cultural horizons and politically and economically integrated milieus.
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