SURVEILLANCE STUDIES AND THE SURVEILLED SUBJECT

by

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Abstract

Surveillance studies has been somewhat inattentive to the perspective of the surveilled subject. It is the functioning of the surveillance apparatus, not the relatively inconsequential subject, which has tended to frame the focus of surveillance inquiries; leaving understandings of surveilled subjects’ experiences relatively limited. This research addresses this gap in the literature, exploring ways in which surveillance studies might understand the surveilled subject with greater consistency. Participants (N=47) shared their encounters with and perceptions of surveillance in a specific (Pearson International Airport) and general (everyday life) context through semi-structured interviews. The findings suggest that surveilled subjects’ encounters can be understood with some consistency – characterized by consistent criteria across subjects and contexts, and through a consistent theoretical framework across subjects in a specific context. However, consistency should not be confused with uniformity; encounters with surveillance must also be recognized for the extent to which they are nuanced and situated. For example, as this study also highlights, participants’ perceptions of encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport were differentially distributed in relation to identity characteristics (particularly minority status).
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Surveillance studies has been somewhat inattentive to the perspective of the surveilled subject. This has been attributed to the tendency in surveillance studies to reduce the experience of the surveilled subject “to one of oppression, coercion, ambivalence or ignorance” (Ball, 2009, p.640). Conceptualized as such, it is the functioning of the surveillance apparatus, not the relatively inconsequential subject, which frames the focus of surveillance inquiries; leaving understandings of surveilled subjects’ experiences relatively limited. Indeed, as demonstrated throughout its premier journal, Surveillance & Society, central research topics in surveillance studies include: theoretical applications of the work of high profile scholars (e.g., Foucault), theoretical and technical evaluations of surveillance equipment (e.g., CCTV), and a good deal of debate over the concept of privacy. Comparatively little work has explored the experience of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject (though there are exceptions, e.g., Dawson, 2006; Di Domenico & Ball, 2011; McCahill & Finn, 2014). My dissertation contributes to this gap in the literature, continuing to expand understandings of the surveilled subject in surveillance studies.

More precisely, I set out to explore ways in which surveillance studies might understand the surveilled subject with greater consistency, and, consequently, found that three themes of focus emerged in this research. The first theme centres on identifying theoretical consistency; in particular, considering a theoretical framework through which the attitudes and behaviours of surveilled subjects might be consistently understood across persons and contexts. The second theme emphasizes consistency in the operationalization of concepts; specifically, drawing attention to subject-centred understandings of surveillance and consistencies in these understandings across persons and contexts. Finally, despite stressing the ways in which
surveilled subjects’ experiences can be understood with consistency, I am also keen to remain attentive to the nuances of surveillance encounters; as such, the third theme involves acknowledging the differences between surveilled subjects’ encounters in a specific context.

To help situate this knowledge development, I elected to focus on surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance in a specific context (at Pearson International Airport), but also to explore perceptions of surveillance in a more general sense (in everyday life). As I previously mentioned, the subjective experience of surveillance is an underdeveloped area of surveillance studies in general and, as such, a focus on the surveilled subjects’ perspective in any context in which persons feel surveilled would have added to the literature, but, I opted to focus on Pearson International Airport for three key reasons. First, border crossing sites in general and airports in particular have become locations in which it is common knowledge that travellers will be heavily surveilled. Therefore, this context is one in which the surveilled subject is acutely aware of the surveillance encounter. Second, individual experiences with border crossing procedures and outcomes have been reported to vary widely depending on the intersection of one’s identity characteristics in Canada (particularly racial and religious statuses; see Helleiner, 2012; ICLMG, 2010; Pratt & Thompson, 2008). As such, this context can be anticipated to be one in which surveilled subjects bearing different identity matrices may describe very different encounters with surveillance, offering insight on the nuances associated with surveilled subjects’ experiences. Finally, the selection of Toronto’s Pearson International Airport in particular is ideal as the biggest and busiest airport in Canada (Toronto Pearson, 2016).

Working with this general introduction to the topic of my research, I now describe its specific direction in greater detail while providing an overview of the organization of the remainder of the dissertation. Following a review of key literature useful to positioning the
research, I comment on the significance of the current study at the end of Chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the research methodology, participants, and materials. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are presented as combined results and discussion chapters, respectively focusing on the themes mentioned above. Specifically, Chapter 3 presents and discusses results demonstrating participants’ attention to procedural justice concerns during encounters with surveillance at Pearson, arguing that relational models of procedural justice offer a theoretical framework through which the attitudes and behaviours of surveilled subjects can be consistently understood across persons in this context as well as other similar contexts (i.e., at a minimum, in other surveillance encounters that involve direct interactions between surveillance agents and subjects). Chapter 4 presents and discusses results that pertain to the definition and measurement of surveillance from a subject-centred orientation (offering a comparison between surveillance encountered at Pearson and surveillance encountered in everyday life), arguing that uncovering the constructs that underlie surveilled subjects’ understandings of surveillance across contexts is not only important to acknowledging the perspective of the surveilled subject, but is also a critical first step towards the development of measures that would encourage greater coherence between investigations into the subjective experience of surveillance in surveillance studies. Chapter 5 dedicates attention to the nuanced and situated quality of surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson by comparing participants’ narratives based on self-identified identity matrices (specifically skin colour and sex). This chapter presents and discusses results that pertain to participants’ perceptions of identity (in particular: normativity, fragmentation and self-presentation), arguing that surveilled subjects’ encounters at Pearson serve as an exemplar of how identity can correspond to relative (dis)advantage when surveillance is conducted for social sorting purposes. Finally, Chapter 6 offers a conclusion; providing a
summary of central findings and key implications as well as acknowledging limitations and proposing future research directions.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The Subject Experience of Surveillance: Looking for Consistency

Although surveillance encounters show immense variability, they are also bound by consistencies. Gary Marx has the most longstanding record of contribution to this position. Marx (1998) proposed factors that might consistently affect evaluations of the appropriateness of surveillance based on privacy concerns. In particular, he maintains that the means and context of data collection, as well as the use of the data, are central pillars of privacy concerns across varied surveillance contexts. In a similar vein, Marx (2002) proposed a set of classification criteria indicative of both the change and continuity between what he terms “new” and “old” surveillance. Several other scholars have also contributed to this hunt for consistencies. For example, Ball (2003) highlighted four key “dimensions” of surveillance (representation, meaning, manipulation and intermediation) in an effort to broaden traditional conceptualizations of surveillance (in the spirit promoted by Lyon, 2001; 2002). As well, recognizing the value of such contributions, Monahan, Phillips & Murakami-Wood (2010) called for further research exploring the consistencies that define surveillance, while stressing the importance of not becoming ignorant to the reality that context will affect the application and relative importance of those consistencies. Efforts to recognize the consistent aspects of surveillance promote better understandings of surveillance encounters, particularly their effects on surveilled subjects.

Although surveillance has long been purported to wield significant consequences for individuals, surveillance studies has only minimally engaged with consistent theoretical understandings of the subjective experience of surveillance (Ball, 2009; McCahill & Finn, 2014). At the same time, scholars in the field have made substantial theoretical contributions to macro-level sociological understandings of surveillance, including, but not limited to, conceptualizing:
the relationship between privacy and surveillance (Rule, 1973); surveillant identification, categorization and identity (Jenkins, 1994); the accumulation of disadvantage (Gandy, 1996); the assemblage, as opposed to the panoptic, metaphor (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000); the ethics of surveillance, particularly social sorting, (Lyon, 2001; 2002), and the ubiquity of surveillance (Andrejevic, 2007). While some research has explored the micro-level of analysis by offering descriptions of surveillance experiences (e.g., Dawson, 2006; Finn, 2011; Nippert-Eng, 2010), very little work has attempted to employ a specific theoretical lens to understand surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance consistently across persons or contexts, largely excluding the subject experience from theoretical analyses, though notable exceptions to this trend have been produced by Ball (2009) and McCahill and Finn (2014).

McCahill and Finn (2014) explore the experience of surveillance in the context of crime control from the perspective of varied social groups (e.g., police officers, offenders, protestors) by drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu. More specifically, they argue that the possession of various traditional forms of “capital” influences response strategies adopted by surveilled subjects, and introduce the concept of “surveillance capital” to describe “how surveillance subjects utilize the everyday forms of tacit knowledge and cultural know-how that is acquired through first-hand experience of power relations to challenge the very same power relations” (p.4). In their work, McCahill and Finn demonstrate the presence and utilization of surveillance capital through an analysis of the ways in which their varied participants contest surveillance associated with crime-control in a variety of contexts. Their contribution offers important insight into our understanding of how diverse social actors differentially engage with surveillance at the point of encounter, but, their emphasis is on the subject’s utilization of various forms of capital to actively negotiate the surveillance encounter, with little discussion of the actual administration
of surveillance. Procedural aspects of surveillance encounters are noted in their work (e.g., the authors briefly comment on the influence of technological mediation and also acknowledge surveilled subjects’ attention to relational concerns during encounters), but better understanding surveilled subjects’ experiences and responses by focusing on the process of surveillance is not the goal of their contribution. Alternatively, Ball’s (2009) concept of exposure is much more attentive to the influence of procedure in theorizing the experience of the surveilled subject.

**Exposure.** Although Ball’s (2009) work formally introduced surveillance studies to the concept of exposure as a means of framing the subjective experience of surveillance consistently, her work on resistance (Ball & Wilson, 2000; Ball, 2005) can also be interpreted as early forays into this same genre. Reaction strategies ranging from acceptance to resistance inherently follow encounters with surveillance, and reactions can only be understood consistently across persons and contexts by identifying explanatory theoretical models. Attention to the *processes* at work in surveillance encounters is particularly important in this regard (Ball & Margulis, 2011). Ball’s (2009) work was her first explicit discussion of developing the concept of exposure as a means of understanding the subject’s experience of surveillance consistently, which Ball and Di Domenico (2011) further informed through empirical research. Ball (2009) describes exposure as the individual’s conscious sense of vulnerability, danger and visibility, and maintains that perceptions of exposure are a means by which individuals evaluate encounters with surveillance. As an indicator of the ongoing struggle between imposed identification and ontological security in various settings, vulnerability is a particularly important component of exposure (Di Domenico & Ball, 2011). Di Domenico and Ball (2011) demonstrate the applied value of exposure in an analysis of “Bed and Breakfast” (B&B) operators’ perceptions of encounters with secret inspectors. They found that B&B operators’ negotiated feelings of
exposure associated with welcoming patrons into their homes, but, that descriptions of
encounters with secret inspectors, were characterized by perceptions of vulnerability, and, as
such, concluded that the concept of exposure offered some explanatory power in relation to
participants’ experiences. Furthermore, Ball, Di Domenico and Nunan (forthcoming) also
developed the concept of exposure by highlighting its utility as a means to better understand the
surveilled subject’s experience in not only “traditional” but also “new” forms of surveillance,
such as big data collection.

Specifically, the notion of “proximity” (which was incorporated into Di Domenico and
Ball’s (2011) understanding of exposure) is expanded upon by Ball, Di Domenico and Nunan
(forthcoming) to demonstrate that exposure helps explain the subjective experience of
surveillance even in surveillance encounters that are characterized by low “inter-relationality.”
Ball, Di Domenico and Nunan acknowledge that encounters with surveillance are frequently
experienced at a distance. Inter-relationality is low when surveillance procedures are relatively
distal, especially when surveillant relations are characterized by intermediaries and when an
intimate sense of being observed is absent (e.g., algorithmic surveillance, license plate
recognition technology); and, when inter-relationality is low, the initial concept of exposure
could be criticized as irrelevant (if approached with the assumption that relatively direct
encounters with agents or technologies of surveillance are needed to induce perceptions of
exposure). Ball, Di Domenico and Nunan incorporate the notion of proximity (defined as “an
embedded sense of nearness, a shared presence which is detected, perceived, and incorporated by
the subject in their lifeworld” p.11) into the concept of exposure to account for the effects of
more omnipresent but less disruptive encounters with surveillance. This expanded theoretical
understanding of exposure prompts us to consider how relatively mundane and even
inconspicuous surveillance experiences still prompt tangible effects via the embedding of new normativities into the lives of surveilled subjects through socio-technical practices that render surveillant relations proximal.

Collectively, these theoretical and empirical contributions developing the concept of exposure advance micro-level understandings of the surveilled subject. Ball’s contributions draw attention to the surveilled subject’s positioning in the surveillance encounter and consider how the process of surveillance affects surveilled subjects’ perceptions of and reactions to surveillance; in particular, arguing that surveillance procedures differentially “expose” surveilled subjects and, thereby, produce varied reactions. Beginning with Ball’s (2009) work (but expanded upon through Di Domenico & Ball (2011) and Ball, Di Domenico & Nunan’s (forthcoming) contributions) the construct of exposure can be interpreted as comprised of a number of process-oriented concerns, including: accountability (i.e., activity visibility), vulnerability (i.e., body interior, spatial/temporal privacy), awareness (i.e., relative invasiveness, preparedness, deception/covertness, procedural/outcome transparency), voice (i.e., data representation, interpretation and sharing), pleasure (i.e., voyeurism), power dynamics (i.e., process control, autonomy, consent/voluntariness), and proximity (i.e., inter-relationality, lived normativities) in surveillance procedures. However, understandings of how these concerns affect surveilled subjects’ perceptions of and reactions to the application of surveillance collectively through the construct of exposure are in their infancy. An alternative process-oriented model that is particularly suitable for surveillance encounters that involve “high” inter-relationality – which is more limited than exposure’s applicability, but also offers a well-developed literature base in terms of hypothesizing and understanding surveilled subjects’ evaluations of and reactions to the
procedural application of surveillance – is found in the procedural justice literature; a body of work that has remained largely outside of the scope of surveillance studies thus far.

Procedural justice. Experiences with surveillance often involve relationships of authority and subordination; a dynamic which is also quite central to the concept of procedural justice. As such, literature exploring procedural justice effects offers a means of evaluating and interpreting the surveilled subjects’ experiences with consistency across some contexts (in particular, those which involve direct interactions between agents and targets of surveillance). Perceptions of the extent to which an outcome is evaluated as fair and satisfying are heavily dependent on the procedure used to determine the outcome. This fact is demonstrated through a wealth of psychological literature exploring the relationships between processes and outcomes (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1989). A particularly cogent body of procedural justice literature to this research project is that situated in the legal context, which is concerned with evaluations of the application of law; specifically, the extent to which a procedure, as opposed to an outcome, is perceived as fair and satisfactory (emphasizing the subjective interpretations that serve to define perceptions of justice; Tyler, 1989). Procedural justice stands in contrast to distributive justice, which emphasizes outcome-oriented concerns over those which are process-oriented. However, acknowledgment of the importance of procedural justice concerns was born out of research focusing on distributive justice.

Thibaut and Walker (1975) sought to explain effects that were counterintuitive to distributive justice concerns; specifically, that outcomes considered objectively unfavourable to a decision recipient could still be subjectively evaluated positively by that recipient. This finding defies basic expectations of how outcomes should be evaluated; unfavourable outcomes are expected to be evaluated negatively. Thibaut and Walker concluded that the explanation for this
effect was grounded in the process used to determine the outcome, maintaining that instrumental motivations prompt decision recipients to consider the procedural justice concern of process control when evaluating an outcome (1975, 1978). Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) research was the first to systematically investigate procedural justice effects in legal contexts and found “voice” (the input a participant is permitted throughout a decision-making procedure) to be a highly influential variable. Working on the assumption that voice would only be valued on the basis of instrumental motivations (i.e., enhanced voice serves as a means to a more favourable end), it was concluded that voice was a measure of process control (Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Houlden et al., 1978).

Thibaut and Walker’s control model of procedural justice maintained that people are concerned with the procedure used to reach a decision because they desire to wield some control over that decision. In other words, people value procedural justice for instrumental reasons. Since the discovery that the procedural aspects of decision making matter, voice has been found to affect procedural justice judgments consistently: When people are permitted voice in a decision-making procedure, they judge the procedure and its outcome to be more satisfactory and fair (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997). Research has repeatedly demonstrated that voice (as a procedural component of decision-making) serves to enhance the overall favourability ratings of outcomes; even when the outcome of a decision is objectively the same, ratings of fairness and satisfaction with that outcome will be lower when the procedural opportunity for voice is lacking. However, the control model has since been overshadowed by an alternative approach to procedural justice effects that emphasizes relational, or non-instrumental, concerns (i.e., the extent to which procedures convey status recognition, trust and neutrality; Blader & Tyler, 2003). These relational models argue that voice impacts an individual’s sense of
social value and perceived respect (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992), and contend that voice is valued because the opportunity to offer input in a decision-making procedure implies that the participant is a valued member of the group overseeing the procedure (i.e., they are asked to provide input because they have an important contribution to offer; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997).

Relational interpretations of procedural justice provide an explanation for a consistent finding that the control model cannot explain: Even when individuals know that the voice that they are permitted during a procedure will have no effect on the outcome reached, ratings of fairness and satisfaction associated with the outcome are still greater when an opportunity for voice is incorporated into the procedure. In fact, even post-decision opportunities for voice lead to higher fairness evaluations than no voice (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990). This finding refutes the instrumental basis of procedural justice effects posited by the control model and necessitates an explanation grounded in non-instrumental, or relational, concerns. Relational explanations of procedural justice still highlight the importance of voice, but not on the basis of instrumental value. Instead, relational models posit that opportunities for voice in a decision-making procedure are indicative of a participant’s social status, particularly the extent to which the participant is considered to be a valued and respected person by the administering authority(ies) (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Group membership (in particular, perceptions of in- or out-group status) is important to these models. Voice was found to not work as an isolated determinant of procedural justice perceptions, but as one indicator amongst several process-oriented concerns that affect the extent to which a procedure, as well as its outcome, are determined to be fair and satisfactory (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997; Platow et al., 2013). Although multiple relational models have now been
developed to explain procedural justice effects (i.e., the Relational Model of Authority, Lind & Tyler, 1992; the Group Engagement Model, Tyler & Blader, 2000), these iterations all maintain the same core tenets outlined in the first model developed, the Group Value Model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), which still serves as the dominant relational explanation in the procedural justice literature.

The group value model. The Group Value Model (GVM) offers a nuanced understanding of the mechanisms that shape procedural justice perceptions grounded in relational concerns. Lind and Tyler (1988) proposed that the extent to which a procedure appeals to central relational concerns dictates evaluations of fairness and satisfaction with not only the procedure, but its outcomes as well. In particular, three relational concerns were identified: (1) neutral and consistent treatment; (2) trust in administrator benevolence; and, (3) interactions demonstrative of respect and dignity. Further, although not articulated as one of the fundamental components of procedural justice perceptions in the original iteration of the GVM, voice has been assessed in many evaluations of the model as a factor that serves to enhance perceptions of neutral, trustworthy and respectful treatment (e.g., Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Tyler & Murphy, 2011).

An underlying assumption of the GVM is that group membership is of significant importance to individuals, particularly the distinction between in- and out-group statuses. Lind and Tyler (1988) maintained that attention to procedural justice concerns symbolically demonstrates a decision recipient’s status as an in-group member in relation to the procedure’s administrative authorities. Tests of this hypothesis have demonstrated that procedural justice
concerns do affect perceptions of group membership, as well as group-oriented feelings, such as pride and respect (Smith et al., 1998; Tyler & Smith, 1997; Tyler, Degoeuy & Smith, 1996). As such, the assumption that relational motivations drive perceptions of procedures and, in turn, outcomes has been established and, in fact, has a longstanding history of empirical validation (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Fagan, 2004). Therefore, the GVM has proved to be a reliable explanation of procedural justice effects, and has revealed attitudinal and behavioural effects associated with variations in procedural justice perceptions.

Procedural justice perceptions have repeatedly been found to influence perceptions of procedural outcomes and administering authorities in ways that produce important effects on behaviour. In particular, attention to procedural justice concerns has been found to enhance evaluations of outcome acceptance and satisfaction (Mazerolle et al., 2012; Mossholder, Bennet & Martin, 1998; Tyler & Degoeuy, 1995), increases acceptance of and commitment to outcomes (Gibson, 1989; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997; Tyler & Degoeuy, 1995), as well as heightening perceptions of legitimacy, not only of a specific outcome, but also in relation to the administering authority more generally (Bradford, Murphy & Jackson, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Legitimacy is a particularly important outcome in the context of legal settings that also seems highly relevant to surveillance encounters. The perceived legitimacy of authorities (or institutions) prompts an attitude of compliance with the future instructions of those authorities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In addition, legitimacy engenders voluntary and cooperative behaviours, even to unpopular decisions (Gibson, 1989; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Degoeuy, 1995). Furthermore, even single interactions have been found to produce these results (Tyler, Degoeuy & Smith, 1996). These findings prompted a vast and growing body of literature exploring the practical value of procedural justice theory in relation to
policing. This specific subset of the wider body of procedural justice literature helps demonstrate
the utility of procedural justice to understanding surveilled subjects’ interactions with surveillant
authorities more generally.

Inquiries into the relevance of procedural justice research to policing began by extending
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) interest in the fairness of decision-making experiences to the
fairness of authorities (Tyler, 1988). This broadened the scope of topics to which procedural
justice was applicable. Procedural justice seemed particularly well suited to explaining
evaluations of both police and policing (henceforth dually encompassed in the term “police”)
given that enhancements in objective performance indicators (instrumental concerns) have not
been accompanied by increases in positive public perceptions, suggesting that non-instrumental
concerns may affect public evaluations of police (Tyler, 2003). In fact, four procedural aspects of
citizens’ evaluations of police have been repeatedly identified in the literature: voice, respect,
trustworthiness, and neutrality (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Murphy, 2011). In
particular, the causal relationship predicted is that perceptions of legitimacy – “a property of an
authority or institution that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be
defered to and obeyed” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p.514) – are enhanced by police treatment and
decision-making attentive to these procedural concerns (Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; Mazerolle
et al., 2012; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In turn, perceptions of legitimacy have been hypothesized to
encourage attitudes and behaviours that are compliant and co-operative with police (Reisig et al.,
2007; Tyler, 2003). Additionally, the concept of identity (which has long-standing ties to
relational models of procedural justice, but tends to be rather subtly articulated through
discussions of in- and out-group statuses) also features in some of the policing-oriented
procedural justice literature through suggestions that procedural treatment may serve as a proxy
indicator of identity classification and status that may bond individuals to administering authorities through presumptions of similarity, enhancing perceptions of legitimacy and behavioural compliance (Bradford, 2014; Bradford, Murphy & Jackson, 2014). Ultimately, the causal chain of events advocated throughout all of this literature is grounded in the assumption that perceptions of legitimacy compel deference to authorities and institutions for not only instrumental, but also relational reasons (Weber, 1968 as cited in Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). These components form the foundation of most research exploring and testing the relevance of procedural justice to policing.

Based on the aforementioned starting points, a substantial number of studies employing a variety of research methods have demonstrated that evaluations of the fairness of procedures used by legal authorities affects perceptions of and reactions to those authorities and their decisions (e.g., Tyler, 1988; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Murphy, Mazerolle & Bennett, 2014). Specifically, a causal relationship has been demonstrated between perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy which has been argued to foster a variety of outcomes that are desirable for both the subjects and administrators of surveillance encounters, including: outcome satisfaction and acceptance (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002), trust, as well as compliant and cooperative behaviours (Mazerolle et al., 2012; Murphy, Hinds & Fleming, 2008; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In addition, perceptions of the fairness of procedural treatment has been found to affect identity (strengthening solidarity), which also increases reported legitimacy and cooperation (Bradford, 2014; Bradford, Murphy & Jackson, 2014). Indeed, a very well supported claim in the literature is that evaluations of legal authorities are based much more on perceptions of treatment and procedure (relational concerns) than indicators of performance (instrumental concerns; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 1990). Furthermore, this finding
holds true for not only abstainers, but offenders as well (Papachristos et al., 2009). These findings suggest a reliable and consistent means by which the surveilled subjects’ perceptions of and reactions to some surveillance procedures and authorities could be understood (which I will discuss further momentarily), however, it is important to acknowledge that contrary findings have also been reported.

For instance, Skogan (2006) found that evaluations of satisfaction with the police do not affect perceptions of legitimacy symmetrically: While unsatisfactory treatment significantly decreased perceptions of legitimacy, satisfactory treatment did not significantly increase perceptions of legitimacy. Yet, the overwhelming majority of research findings support the conclusion that attention to procedural justice concerns produces a variety of favourable outcomes, including enhanced perceptions of legitimacy (see Mazerolle et al., 2013 for a comprehensive meta-analysis). Even a robust test of these relationships (an experimental field trial conducted at police administered drinking and driving check points) revealed that procedurally fair treatment directly increased citizens’ perceptions of trust and confidence in the police with regards to the specific encounter (and that trust, in turn, predicted cooperative and obedient behaviours), as well as enhancing positive evaluations of police more generally (Mazerolle et al., 2012a; Murphy, Mazerolle & Bennett, 2014). Importantly, research also suggests that these findings are relatively consistent across various demographic characteristics (Murphy, Mazerolle & Bennett, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and in national contexts other than the United States, where much of the existing research has been based, such as Australia (e.g., Hinds & Murphy, 2007) and England (e.g., Bradford, 2014).

**Surveillance studies, the surveilled subject, and procedural justice.**

Relational models of procedural justice (beginning with the Group Value Model
but morphing through several variations) maintain that treatment by an authority in a decision-making procedure is indicative of a participant’s social status, particularly the extent to which the participant is considered to be a valued and respected person by the administering authority(ies) (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Attention to process-oriented concerns (namely: respect, trustworthiness and neutrality) are central to these models. While not all encounters with surveillance consist of the situational aspects that have been traditionally found to induce attention to procedural justice concerns, some do. Many surveillance encounters involve a direct (or relatively direct) interaction with some form of decision-making authority that results in an outcome of varied possible favourability (similar in ways to public interactions with police, which act as an authority that sometimes performs surveillant tasks). When these foundations are present, I believe that surveilled subjects will evaluate their experience, its outcome, and the authority administering that outcome, at least in part, on the basis of procedural justice concerns. The feasibility of this contention is bolstered by research exploring procedural justice effects in the context of policing. Although police have always been framed in procedural justice research simply as decision-making authorities, working from the reference point of surveillance studies, police are agents of surveillance with decision-making authority. As such, while the procedural justice literature in general provides a framework for better understanding the perceptions and behaviours of surveilled subjects in specific contexts, the subset of literature focusing on police interactions provides particularly useful insight given its
emphasis on participant concerns and evaluations associated with surveillant authorities. However, despite the emphasis in surveillance studies on authorities as agents of surveillance and the proven history of procedural justice as an explanation for perceptions of interactions with authorities, procedural justice has received very minimal attention in the field of surveillance studies.

Interactions with surveillance have been linked to procedural justice concerns in the fields of organizational studies as well as occupational psychology in research focusing on the effects of employee monitoring (e.g., Alge, 2001; Alge & Hansen, 2013; Kidwell & Bennett, 1994), which has produced some measures of workplace surveillance (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Stanton, 2000); but, Ball’s (2001, 2002, 2010) contributions, tangentially positioned between organizational and surveillance studies, actually acquainted surveillance studies with procedural justice. Ball (2001; 2002) introduced surveillance studies to the concepts of distributive and procedural justice concerns in her exploration of the ethics of computer based performance monitoring of employees in a UK call centre. It is worth noting that the purpose of both of these pieces was to stress the effects of epistemological positions on data analysis interpretations, arguing for fine-grained analyses that contextually locate surveilled subjects; in which, procedural justice concerns were discussed as relevant, but did not form the centrepiece of the research. Likewise, Ball’s (2010) overview of workplace surveillance acknowledges the presence of procedural justice in literature focusing on employee monitoring but, again, does not forward a strong emphasis on procedural justice. In addition, Ball also briefly mentions procedural justice elsewhere in surveillance studies themed contributions; specifically, in an editorial urging further explorations into the experiences of surveilled subjects (2003), and as a concept related to perceptions of privacy (Ball, Daniel & Stride, 2012).
Although surveillance studies is currently lacking research that has predominantly featured procedural justice, Ball’s contributions highlight the relevance of procedural justice to surveillance studies by considering the relationship between surveilled subjects’ perceptions of procedures and outcomes. Thus, her work suggests the value of further applications of procedural justice to inquiries pertinent to surveillance studies, such as attempts to integrate findings from the procedural justice literature more broadly into understandings of surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance practices, personnel and technologies. More specifically, procedural justice may offer a means to consistently theorize the surveilled subject in particular contexts; allowing both the mechanisms at work in surveillance procedures to be better understood from the perspective of the surveilled subject as well as the surveilled subjects’ perceptions and behaviours to be reliably explained. However, by maintaining that encounters with surveillance can be assessed and theorized with consistency I do not mean to suggest that surveilled subjects’ experiences are uniform. Illustrating the differences in experiences that can exist between surveilled subjects (particularly groups of surveilled subjects determined based on identity characteristics) is best suited to locating the surveillance encounter in a specific context. As such, I turn to an overview of literature relevant to understanding the nuances of surveilled subjects’ experiences with surveillance in a more specific context: Canadian border crossings.

**Nuances in the Subject Experience of Surveillance at Border Crossings: From Individual to Social Problems**

Kruger, Mulder and Korenic (2004) maintain that the relatively inviting Canadian immigration policies of the last several decades established Canada as an immigrant-friendly nation. The concept of the Canadian mosaic – a nation simultaneously supportive of native cultural retention and Canadian cultural integration – fostered a multicultural Canadian identity.
However, following the events of 9/11, particular groups of foreign nationals were increasingly associated with terrorism and national security threats in Canada through media and government discourse (Adelman, 2002; Kruger, Mulder & Korenic, 2004; Lyon, 2006). The contemporary assemblage casts immigrants and visible minorities from a variety of cultural origins with a monolithic negative image that prescribes more scrutinizing surveillance grounded, at least partially, in the identifying characteristics of race and religious orientation. In particular, persons identified as Arab and/or Muslim have been repeatedly reported to be the target of disproportionately stringent surveillance at Canadian borders (Helleiner, 2012; ICLMG, 2010; Pratt & Thompson, 2008).

A consequence of increased attention on particular groups of immigrants and visible minorities shifts the focus of border surveillance from problematic individuals to groups deemed problematic. As such, the influence of surveillance is not only felt at the individual level through isolated experiences, but can also result in systematic effects for persons categorically grouped together, acting as a form of social sorting. Lyon (2004) describes surveillance conducted for social sorting purposes as the processing of personal data by agencies to influence, direct, and manipulate behaviour in daily life (e.g., travel, credit approval, benefit receipt, etc.). Lyon (2001) argues that because the basis for this form of surveillance is largely utilitarian (i.e., presumed more helpful than harmful and working in the majority’s interest), practices of social sorting have been increasingly employed. Operationalized as such, surveillance can be a means of profiling individuals and groups in a way that affects life chances and choices with regard to access to and distribution of services and opportunities (Bowker & Star, 1999; Lyon, 2006). This orientation highlights a fundamental concern of surveillance systems: the ability, if not tendency, to discriminate and enforce differential treatment on the basis of identity categories rather than
assessing individuals on their personal merits. Furthermore, terrorist suspects in particular are often presumed by the general public to be members of minority groups (Lyon, 2007a; 2007b), increasing the likelihood that surveillance systems intended to detect terrorists at Canadian borders will create the greatest barriers for already marginalized members of society (e.g., racial minorities).

The notion of identity is particularly important here and will be broached in greater breadth in Chapter 5 to help situate the research data discussed, however, I also wish to make two key points about identity here that provide a useful basis from which to introduce the concept of cumulative disadvantage and the analytical framework of intersectionality; which are the central foci of this portion of the literature review. First, even perceptions that identity characteristics (e.g., race, sex, religious orientation, etc.) affect the processes that take place during encounters with surveillance at Canadian borders may come to affect individual and group perceptions of identity, such as perceived or factual relative (dis)advantage based on categorical classifications. These perceptions may encourage a hierarchical understanding (or structural positioning) of identity in which some identity characteristics and combinations of identity characteristics are preferred over others (Bashi, 1998; Omi & Winant, 1994). This position can be associated with the assertion that alongside conceptualizations of individual identity, collective identities (including “national” identities representing the normative citizen that are derived from state histories that emphasize unity grounded in common language, culture, religion, etc.) simultaneously exist and foster discomfort associated with persons of dissimilar origins (Taylor, 1998). The normative identity is presumed loyal to the state’s aims and objectives, while identities that are not congruent with that of the status quo pose a potential threat, fostering a hierarchical understanding of Canadian identity that may be reproduced
through encounters with surveillance in a variety of contexts including at Canadian border crossings.

Second, social sorting processes may have significant consequences for an individual’s perception of their own identity in an “identity making” (and, in turn, behaviour shaping) process. Specifically, in the process of sorting out individuals whose identity characteristics fail to approximate normative preferences of the surveillance practice, targeted individuals may come to feel labelled through an overreliance on one aspect of their identity (e.g., race or religious orientation); a phenomenon known as identity fragmentation (Lugones, 1994; Ong, 2005; Toren, 2014). This simplification of what constitutes a “belonging” or normative identity encourages understandings of identity in terms of “singular affiliations” (Sen, 2006) and fails to take into consideration the richness and multiplicity of identity (Sen, 2007), particularly for those individuals already clearly marginalized as “other” in comparison to the norm. The reality of fragmented identities highlights an important sociological implication of surveillance systems: The ability to emphasize difference and reinforce inequality through social sorting in a way that maintains and strengthens social divisions (Lyon, 2001b; 2004).

**Social sorting and cumulative disadvantage.** Although these experiences may seem personal and isolated to the individuals affected by them, they may be representative of a broader social problem associated with cumulative disadvantage. Merton (1988) identified the impact that cumulative advantage has on professional status, suggesting that persons with high levels of initial advantage were more readily able to capitalize on and accumulate additional advantages because of life circumstances such as education and income. Other scholars have also identified statuses of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious orientation and socio-economic status (as well as other identity characteristics) as important to this process (see Verloo, 2006).
By the same token, cumulative disadvantage can result from categorizations and life circumstances that accumulate and interact to disadvantage an individual’s life chances.

Particularly relevant to my use of the concept of cumulative disadvantage is Gandy’s (2010) argument that cumulative disadvantage is sometimes an unintended consequence of surveillance. Gandy suggests that surveillance conducted for the purposes of social sorting tends to discriminate against certain groups of persons systematically, negatively influencing life chances and choices in ways that are patterned. While this reality may be difficult to recognize from relative positions of privilege, the existence of identification schemes is bound to produce hierarchies of advantage. The process of social sorting relies on identification as a means of allocating goods and opportunities and, more generally, the identification of persons for the purpose of categorization has been recognized to be of particular significance for those persons who are negatively categorized (Jenkins, 2000). Furthermore, Gandy (2010) argues that surveillance systems sometimes inadvertently support goals and objectives that are inherently biased. For example, Helleiner (2012) argues that “whiteness” is predominant in the Canadian border crossing narrative and has come to be embedded within surveillance practices at the border. Assuming that meaning is relational and tends to be understood through juxtapositions, whiteness comes to be considered as a preferred identity quality at the expense of non-whiteness. In the context of surveillance, Gandy (2010) argues that embedded preferences are strengthened and enabled by a tendency towards focusing the systematic objectives of surveillance on the endless task of the identification and management of known and unknown risks (a feature that characterizes surveillance at most international borders). The result of this focus is a greater opportunity for systematic biases (e.g., racial profiling).
Helleiner's (2010) interviews draw out the reality that border crossing experiences appear to be patterned around the identity characteristics of race, class, gender and country of origin, suggesting that categorical preferences are embedded within surveillance at the Canadian border. For example, Helleiner maintains that “smart” border control and surveillance reinforces and expands discriminatory practices associated with racial profiling, despite official policies and rhetoric that disavow the practice. In fact, evidence suggests that surveillance at Canadian borders is at least informally directed at individuals who fail to approximate the identity characteristic of whiteness, but is particularly directed at those individuals who embody the identity characteristic of brownness (see Helleiner, 2012; ICLMG, 2010; Pratt & Thompson, 2008). The reality that these systems and practices may be informal and possibly even unintended does not diminish the effects that they have. The concept of cumulative disadvantage helps draw attention to the fact that many relatively mundane interactions (e.g., bias in the education system, failure to be approved for loans, impositions on mobility, and so on, as well as added scrutiny during encounters with surveillance at borders) compound to affect individuals, as well as groups of individuals deemed categorically similar, negatively. Cumulative disadvantage questions the extent to which existing structures of categorization (heavily dependent on identity characteristics) are influential in determining experiences as well as overall life opportunities, and, thereby, is extremely useful to understanding the nuances embedded in surveilled subjects’ experiences in many settings including at borders.

**Cumulative disadvantage and intersectionality.** The concept of cumulative disadvantage is closely linked with “intersectionality,” a framework that was initially used to better understand and describe the experiences of racialized women (Collins, 1998; Crenshaw, 1991). In this context, intersectionality was a means to address feminist scholarship that served
to homogenize the experiences of all women (reliant on the white, middle-class woman as the base point) by arguing that the combination of two disenfranchised identity characteristics (i.e., sex: woman and race: black) culminated in unique experiences that were not adequately acknowledged in the existing feminist literature at the time. Since its introduction, intersectionality has come to be conceptually defined as the intersection of identity and subordination, expanding beyond assessing the combined effects of race and sex in isolation from other identity characteristics (Davis, 2008). Dynamics of intersectionality now prompt researchers to consider how a range of identity characteristics (including, but not limited to, sex, race, age, sexual orientation, religious orientation, disability, etc.) intersect to shape personal identity and subsequent experiences (Davis, 2008; Hancock, 2007). Ultimately, intersectional focused research considers how multiple categories of difference simultaneously influence the lived realities of individuals (and groups), prompting varied forms of stratification. However, critics have attacked intersectionality as a “theoretical orientation” and have also questioned the scope of the concept (e.g., the boundaries used to distinguish particular identity characteristics or the ability to accurately evaluate the weighted value of particular identity characteristics within a broader identity matrix; see Davis, 2000). Yet, as a framework, intersectionality is a very useful tool for articulating how encounters with surveillance can simultaneously be understood with consistency but also recognized as producing nuanced effects on individuals and groups, as well as linking neatly to surveillance studies concepts such as social sorting and cumulative disadvantage.

The intersection of multiple subordinated identity characteristics results in the greater potential that certain persons will be systematically disadvantaged. Thus, intersectionality and cumulative disadvantage share an interesting theoretical connection with regards to
understandings of identity that is particularly important in the context of surveillance studies. In the process of surveillance, it is the surveillant other who is responsible for the identification and imposition of categorizations on to those who are surveilled (Ball, Di Domenico & Nunan, forthcoming), encouraging understandings of identity based on homogenizing categories. Intersectionality and cumulative disadvantage draw attention to the disempowerment that can result from evaluating individual experiences only on the basis of one identifying characteristic at a time, such as race or sex. Multiple categories of difference serve to simultaneously shape our experiences, collective ideology, and cultural practices (Davis, 2008). Likewise, recognizing accurate patterns of power and subordination, particularly the ways in which accumulations of disadvantage are incurred longitudinally, necessitates an awareness of the compounding effects of combinations of identity characteristics. In the case of experiences with surveillance during border crossings, the extent to which individuals and groups accumulate disadvantage in this regard is likely dependent on a combination of characteristics used to establish identity by surveillers; however, because belongingness in Canada is often tied to whiteness (Handa, 1997; Peake & Ray, 2001; Salter, 2013), skin colour may be a particularly influential identity characteristic in this context.

Finn (2011) maintains that perceptions of discriminatory experiences with surveillance serve to enunciate its racializing effects. The implications of this extend beyond the actual interpersonal and physical interactions with surveillance. Apart from prompting tangibly different subjective interpretations of surveillance (such as comparative understandings of experiences and reaction strategies), broader social effects can also be anticipated. For instance, the embedded preference of whiteness encourages the “racialized structure of citizenship” (Razack, 2010, p, 89). Coupling the aforementioned notion of national normative identity with
these perceptions of differential treatment on the basis of identity characteristics may serve to establish a relatively stable hierarchy of identity characteristics and matrices through patterned experiences that structurally position identity matrices relative to one another. In particular, a racialized structure of citizenship suggests how identity might come to be hierarchically organized (with normative identity characteristics associated with the national status quo positioned as superior and other identity characteristics or combinations constituting gradations of relative disadvantage).

Intersections of identity characteristics certainly have the potential to create disempowerment, however, the resultant subordination is not necessarily an intentional product but, instead, a consequence of multiple levels of vulnerability (Crenshaw, 1991). As such, it is critical to acknowledge this vulnerability – in this case, acknowledging how experiences with surveillance during Canadian border crossings appear to be patterned around identity characteristics – because ignoring difference means that situations will not only be misconstrued at a theoretical level, but also that tension and hardship will be exacerbated for the individuals concerned at a practical level. Engaging with intersectionality is particularly well-suited to addressing these concerns because it can be used to meaningfully represent the distinct experiences of participants within a sample as well as connecting these experiences to broader social trends and patterns – permitting an isolated empirical study to transition to the realm of middle-range theorizing (i.e., to provide a useful generalization of some larger phenomenon beyond the particular field work). Although the theoretical linkages established in this section (i.e., those between social sorting, cumulative disadvantage and intersectionality) lend themselves well to the macro-level effects of particular surveillance practices, they also serve as
a useful framework to better understand the subject’s experience of surveillance in this particular context.

**Significance of the Present Study**

This project relied on qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews to contribute to understandings of the subjective experience of surveillance. In particular, I endeavoured to explore ways in which surveilled subjects’ experiences might be understood consistently across persons and contexts, while also remaining attentive to nuances associated with the subjective experience of surveillance. The work contributes to a small, but highly important vein of scholarship that is dedicated to better understanding surveillance by exploring it from the perspective of the surveilled subject (Ball, 2009; Gilliom, 2006; McCahill & Finn, 2014). In doing so, this research enhances understandings of the surveilled subject in surveillance studies in three important ways.

First, a means of theorizing the subject’s experience of surveillance consistently across persons and some contexts is discussed. Specifically, the relevance of relational models of procedural justice to better understand surveilled subjects’ experiences is considered by exploring attentions to procedural concerns in participants’ narratives of their encounters with surveillance in a specific context (Pearson International Airport), with the findings also extrapolated to other contexts that involve a direct interaction with an agent of surveillance. This assertion of generalizability is supported by the consistency of procedural justice phenomenon across many contexts (Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2005; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Mazerolle et al., 2013). The procedural justice literature highlights the importance of the process of surveillance alongside, or even apart from, its outcomes in terms of understanding the surveilled subject’s experience. This attention to exploring the process of surveillance from the perspective of the
surveilled subject underscores the need for subject-centred understandings of surveillance; allowing for surveillance to be engaged with as it is perceived by the surveilled, not necessarily as it is conceptualized by operators. As such, second, consistent criteria used by participants to define and evaluate surveillance in a specific context (Pearson International Airport) and more general sense (everyday life) are identified; offering the foundations for subject-centred operationalizations of surveillance that are applicable across contexts. However, all this emphasis on the consistencies important to better understanding the surveilled subject’s experience might imply inattention to the nuances of surveilled subjects’ encounters, particularly how intersections of identity are associated with different experiences. Therefore, and third, to acknowledge this reality, participants’ narratives of their encounters with surveillance in a specific context (Pearson International Airport) were also explored through an analysis guided by a subset of participants’ identity matrices: sex and minority status; which revealed important insights into nuances of subjects’ experiences with surveillance in this context.

Ultimately, this investigation works from a detailed empirical position to fill out and complement the work of others that has highlighted the subjective experience of surveillance. While the study was largely exploratory in nature – focused on better understanding the surveilled subject’s experience, and paying particular attention to the ways in which surveillance might be understood consistently across contexts – I developed a series of research questions to guide my work. Drawing from the literature reviewed above, the following research questions are relatively focused descriptions of the three themes that came to dominate my dissertation, and respectively serve as broad introductions to the results / discussion chapters to follow.

Research questions.
1) Are surveilled subjects attentive to any procedural justice concerns during encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport? If so, which concerns and how so?

2) Do surveilled subjects use consistent criteria to characterize the presence, good attributes, and bad attributes of surveillance across varied contexts? If so, what consistent criteria? If so, how do these criteria relate to criteria identified elsewhere in the surveillance studies literature?

3) Does exploring surveilled subjects’ descriptions of encounters with surveillance in a specific context (Pearson International Airport) with attention to identity characteristics/identity intersections (i.e., race and sex) reveal any dominant themes or suggest that experiences are patterned? If so, in what ways?
Chapter 3: Methodology

Semi-structured interviews were employed to explore participants’ encounters with and perceptions of surveillance in a specific (Pearson International Airport) and general (everyday life) context, the data from which was analyzed qualitatively. The interviews also incorporated questionnaire segments that collected data for the purpose of quantitative analysis, but this data was ultimately not analyzed. Although developing these questionnaire materials was a fruitful exercise, I have realized I was misguided in thinking that they would augment my understanding of participants’ experiences given my sample size. Although I was anticipating a sample size that would be too small to run any inferential analyses that would produce meaningful results, I had initially conceptualized that the use of quantitative measures would be another means by which I could come to better understand and describe participants’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson. However, I ultimately found that the qualitative data was much more informative given the sample size and purposes of my research. As such, while I acknowledge that participants completed questionnaire items as an aspect of this research, the results that follow focus only on the interview data.

Qualitative analysis helps facilitate the comprehension of multifaceted historical, contextual, and political influences on the lived experience of humans, both as individuals and groups (Chase, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). As such, I felt that qualitative methodology was ideal given my interest in providing surveilled subjects with the opportunity to relate in-depth descriptions of their experiences with and perceptions of surveillance in varied contexts. The focus group method was also considered as a data collection strategy. Focus groups serve as an alternative to the individual interview which seeks to level hierarchy in the research process by reducing perceptions of researcher authority and fostering
collaborative knowledge construction (Halcomb et al., 2007; Kamberelis & Drimitriadis, 2008). However, commonly cited criticisms of focus group research (such as participant confidentiality, group dynamics, group management, and researcher dependency; Halcomb et al., 2007; Morgan & Spanish, 1984; Smithson, 2000) led me to select interviews as preferable for this research to encourage rich and informative data that highlighted the voice of individual respondents and allowed them to speak for themselves. Further, I opted for a semi-structured approach to allow for the flexibility to probe into areas of emergent significance during interviews. This approach not only exposed me to more informed narratives, but also allowed me to better understand how participants conceptualize, experience and make meaning out of their encounters with surveillance in varied settings. In addition, encouraging participants to speak freely and engage in discussions even if the content was not directly related to the standard interview guide enabled me to develop better rapport with participants while also granting participants the opportunity to express any feelings or experiences that they wanted to share with someone.

Data analysis involved a series of steps that included analyzing participants’ narratives to look for shared features in terms of both specific content and general themes. Following the “Listening Guide” model of reflexive engagement with participants’ narratives (advocated by Doucet & Mauhner, 2008), I completed multiple reviews of the data collected, with each successive review exploring the data from a unique perspective. Four full reviews were ultimately conducted. First, in the process of transcribing the interviews, a holistic review of

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1 Indicators of content analysis are evident in this research through my use of tables that attempt to quantify the use of various terms and concepts. However, I would describe this contribution as largely the result of thematic analysis based on my focus on describing and interpreting participants’ narratives in terms of both semantic and latent themes (which were products of both pre-existing theoretical frameworks as well as information emergent within the data) to better understand and articulate surveilled subjects’ perceptions and experiences (see, Braun and Clarke, (2006), Floersch et al., (2010), and Vaimoradi et al., (2015) for examples of work that helped inform my understanding and practice of thematic analysis, particularly its relationship and compatibility with standard content and narrative analyses).
each individual narrative was conducted. I treated this first review as an early stage of content analysis, overviewing the abundant textual data produced during each interview. Although I had some areas of focus in mind when undertaking this project, research grounded in fledgling areas of study (such as the subject’s experience of surveillance) is best suited to a grounded theory approach to data coding and analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Stanton & Weiss, 2000). As such, many of my coding categories and subcategories emerged during this initial review. Having identified and recorded these thematic codes, a next step was the exploration of their categorical depth and recurrent frequency (Stanton & Weiss, 2000). I imported the data into a qualitative analysis software program (Nvivo) before beginning the second major review of the data. My second review also involved a comprehensive read of the transcripts, in which I read each narrative in its entirety, but also coded the data according to the dominant themes identified in the first review. Upon finishing this review, data relevant to my coding framework was compiled and pulled from the entirety of participants’ narratives. However, in this reading I noticed specific questions that tended to be particularly rich sources of data relevant to my coding framework. As such, my third review involved a more focused reading of the transcripts, arranged by question. Reviewing participants’ responses in this way along with the already coded data allowed me to refine my coding; incorporating data that had been initially overlooked as well as recoding data to recognize a broader range of sub-codes. Finally, my fourth review worked with the existing coded data (including information auto-coded by interview questions as well as purposefully coded from across participants’ narratives) to explore differences associated with sex and minority status attributes. Ultimately, I believe this strategy of successive reviews helped me to better understand and communicate the realities conveyed by participants.
Carefully considering methods as well as describing steps in the research process is a practice that helps bolster the credibility of a researcher’s work, enhancing perceptions that the conclusions reached are both valid and reliable. As much as they can be, methods are tools to better know the world – means by which to represent the world as it is – however, it is also important to acknowledge the influence of methods on knowledge produced. Methods are shaped by the social world and, thus, reflect the concerns of their creators (Harraway, 1991; Pinch & Bijker, 1984), but, as practices of organizing the social world, methods also serve to constitute reality (Law, Savage & Ruppert, 2011; Law & Urry, 2004). As such, methods are useful and necessary tools for research, but they are embedded with consequences; they impact the reality we see, the data we produce, and our interpretation of that data. For example, in my dissertation work, the utilization of an interview method and subsequent content analysis of participants’ narratives adds layers of complexity to first-hand knowledge that impact my ability as a researcher to fully know or represent a participant’s first-hand experience; in particular, in terms of how communication between persons shapes information produced and interpreted. Attention to epistemological concerns such as these is not intended to undermine the contributions of researchers, but to simply help us position the scope and boundaries of our contributions in relation to the methods employed.

Participants

Participants (N=47) were recruited through community organizations and participating academic institutions (see Appendix A for a full list of organizations contacted). Participation was contingent on meeting three self-identified criteria: (1) being a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, (2) having travelled through Pearson International Airport at least once in the last three years, and (3) self-identifying as “white” or “brown” (with a Middle Eastern or
South Asian heritage) in the interest of exploring variations in perceptions of encounters with surveillance on the basis of skin colour. Outside of meeting these criteria, no participants were excluded on the basis of sex, age, religion or any other characteristic. Although criteria (1) and (2) are quite straightforward, I wish to provide some additional comments on my selection of the terms used in criteria (3) before offering further description of the sample.

The post-9/11 emphasis on “brownness” as an identity characteristic that warrants additional scrutiny, coupled with recent international incidents that have added addition fuel to such fears, as well as a variety of anecdotal evidence suggesting that Canadian border crossing experiences are stratified, in part, by skin colour, prompted my attention to skin colour when exploring surveilled subjects’ experiences in this research. In particular, I elected to focus on two groups for the purpose of comparison: one group consists of visible minorities who self-identify with a “brown” skin colour, and the other group consists of non-visible minorities who self-identify with a “white” skin colour.

I chose to focus on self-identified skin colour as opposed to a more rigid criteria for participation on the basis of Finn’s (2011, p. 413), position that, in a post 9/11 socio-political environment, persons of South Asian and Middle Eastern heritage have come to be primarily identified by their “brownness.” Finn, along with other scholars such as Zaidi, Couture and Maticka-Tyndale (2012), identify specific countries of origin that constitute the South Asian label (i.e., Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Bhutan). The Middle Eastern label has been applied more fluidly. For example, while Tessler (2002) includes Palestine, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef (2000) cite the “Arab league [...] as well as Pakistan, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and the Islamic Public of Iran” as Middle Eastern countries (p. 3). I elected to use the criteria of self-identification with a “brown” skin colour to
further explore the shared experiences of persons with this identity characteristic in common, however, I also argue that one of the primary components of “brownness” as it relates to surveillance (and border crossings in particular) is its “otherness,” especially when juxtaposed to “whiteness” (see Helleiner, 2012). This phenomenon is also captured by Patel's (2012) operationalization of “brown bodies” in the context of surveillance as “all those of Middle Eastern appearance, or of South Asian or Arabic heritage and of the Muslim faith...who are marked out as members of a ‘suspect community’” (p. 216). It is based on these foundations, that I justify the terms used in criteria (3) and the comparison groups I selected.

Data from all 47 of these participants are presented in the results that follow in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The sample included 25 participants who self-identified as male and 22 as female, 24 participants who self-identified as white and 23 as brown, and had a mean age of 30.74 ($SD = 11.25$) years with a range of 18 to 60 years (see Appendix F to reference each participant’s sex, minority status and age).

**Procedure and Materials**

Participant recruitment relied on convenience and snowball sampling. The use of these sampling techniques is endorsed by the concept of theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967); in which, the goal of sampling is not to attain a random sample that provides the entire population with an equal opportunity of participation but, instead, is to increase the likelihood that cases of interest are present in the data (Becker, 1998; Denzin, 1983; Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003). The aforementioned organizations (see Appendix A) were contacted and provided with a recruitment letter (see Appendix B). Contacts were encouraged to share the recruitment letter broadly in the hopes of acquiring additional participants through snowball recruitment. As an incentive, the recruitment informed participants that a draw for a $100 gift card would be held
once data collection was complete. The recruitment letter provided interested persons with contact information for the primary investigator (myself). Once contacted by a prospective participant, I confirmed their eligibility for participation and, if eligible, arranged to meet with participants in a mutually agreed upon and neutral location to complete the interview. Upon arrival at the location, participants were given two copies of a letter of information and informed consent form outlining the interview process as well as the purpose of the study (see Appendix C). Participants were encouraged to keep one copy but required to sign and return the other as proof of consent. Upon returning the signed form, I initiated the interview phase of the meeting. Upon completing the interview portion of the study participants were thanked for their time and provided with a thank you letter (see Appendix E) containing the contact information of the primary investigator and her supervisor. Participants were encouraged to contact these sources if they had any concerns or questions at a later time.

Interviews were approximately 60 to 90 minutes in length, consisting of traditional interview question and answer periods as well as two brief questionnaire segments. During the interview guide (see Appendix D) participants were asked to relay their experiences with surveillance at Pearson International Airport as well as in everyday life; emphasizing understandings of surveillance (e.g., definitions in theory and practice, positive and negative attributes), perceptions of surveillance processes (e.g., awareness of procedures and technologies, attention to treatment-oriented concerns), and outcomes of surveillance procedures (e.g., comparative evaluations of treatment, response strategies). Interview questions were developed to be open-ended, allowing the interviewer to develop a greater understanding of the context of the experiences and the meanings of those experiences as constructed by the participant. As a result, although the sample is small given the qualitative nature of the research,
I was able to uncover rich and informative data that advances our understandings of surveilled subjects’ perspectives and experiences in surveillance studies, the substance of which is explored in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4: The Surveilled Subject and Procedural Justice Concerns

This results and discussion chapter presents and discusses results of my research demonstrating participants’ attention to procedural justice concerns during encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport. It starts with an overview of participants’ references to relational procedural concerns broken down by the three primary constructs that form perceptions of procedural justice: respect, neutrality and trust. While references to these treatment-oriented concerns tends to emphasize perceptions of disrespect, bias and a lack of trust, not all participants felt this way; positive or indifferent framings were also evident and similarly indicate participants’ attention to procedural justice concerns in this context. These different, but equally supportive framings are presented in the alternative positions section. Following the presentation of these results, I offer a more nuanced breakdown of participants’ perceptions, distinguishing between themes of focus on the basis of minority status for the concern of neutrality (the most commonly referenced relational concern). In addition, I dedicate two sections to concepts related to the construct of procedural justice (power and group membership), which are not directly assessed through items in traditional measures of procedural justice but are central to relational models. While some discussion is embedded in the presentation of these results, a detailed discussion section concludes the chapter.

Before moving to the results I must clarify that the point of this research is not to assess the surveillance policies, practices or personnel at Pearson International Airport through an evaluation of participants’ narratives. Although such an assessment may be highly desirable, my research is not capable of making claims in that regard based on the sample size or the methods employed. Instead, this research offers an empirical inquiry into surveilled subjects’ attention to procedural concerns during encounters with surveillance (that adhere to particular qualities) by
using Pearson as a case study. In short, my intention is to demonstrate the utility of procedural justice as a theoretical framework through which the attitudes and behaviours of surveilled subjects can be consistently understood in particular (but not singular) surveillance contexts.

**Procedural Justice Concerns**

Based on findings that relational procedural justice concerns are pertinent in many contexts, I felt confident that interactions with agents of surveillance who act as decision-making authorities may very well be bound to these same procedural concerns. As it turns out, participants’ narratives of their experiences with surveillance during border crossings at Pearson provided strong evidence for this view. While almost all participants emphasized the imperative value and absolute necessity of surveillant technologies and agents at this site, many also called the process into question. The following two quotes provide excellent general examples of participants’ concerns over the application of surveillance at Pearson:

“I just want to state that...the authorities doing surveillance...in some situations is a requirement...but how they do surveillance, I think they need to do their homework a little bit.” – Participant 20

“So, it [surveillance] definitely has its place and I’m not sure how it can be... It can be improved just by treating people a little bit nicer or being a little less obvious of who you’re targeting or profiling because I’m sure it doesn’t feel good for those people. So, I think there’s ways they can improve it that make it feel better for people.” – Participant 10

These quotes, in combination, are demonstrative of core relational procedural justice concerns in that: (1) they exhibit participant recognition of the differences between processes and outcomes in relation to surveillance, and (2) they imply attention to treatment-oriented concerns when encountering surveillance. While these quotes serve as good representations of participant references to procedural justice in a general sense, the nuanced character of relational procedural justice concerns was articulated much more explicitly by a number of participants (see Table 1).
Table 1: References to Procedural Justice Concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(13 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(16 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(36 sources)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The considerable number of references to one or more of these central aspects of relational models of procedural justice suggests that, at least in the context of Pearson, surveilled subjects are sensitive to the extent to which surveillant procedures/authorities are attentive to relational concerns. Presented below are quotes that more specifically illustrate participants’ attention to the core relational procedural concerns of respect, trust and neutrality.

**Respect.** In the earliest iterations of relational models of procedural justice “respect” was referred to as “standing.” Perceptions of respect are bound to evaluations of the extent to which treatment approximates appropriate status recognition, as demonstrated through interpersonal interactions that are perceived as polite, dignifying and considerate of personal rights (Tyler, 1989; 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Ultimately, disrespectful treatment conveys to the individual that they are a person of low status within the group in question, and can also imply the social standing of groups in relation to one another (Tyler, 1989). In this subsection, I present concerns that participants associated with encounters with surveillance at Pearson that demonstrate attention to respect, specifically through the indicators of: politeness, deservingness and voice.

Perceptions of respect, as well as the ability to convey respect, can be a nuanced process; perceived on the basis of indirect indicators (such as deservingness and opportunities for voice), but also communicated via much more direct means, such as tone or inflection in a dialogue, which are generally encompassed under “politeness” in the procedural justice literature (Tyler & Lind, 1992). The general importance of tone as an indicator used by participants to evaluate their encounter is evidenced by references to exchanges with agents of surveillance at Pearson. In
particular, participants who described the manner in which they were addressed tended to characterize it negatively, using terms such as “rude,” “abrupt” and “disrespectful” to relate their experiences. However, despite being referenced, politeness was also dismissed as a highly valued indicator of respectful treatment in this context through attributions to situational variables. For example:

“Sometimes the way they keep asking questions or probing, their tone can be, like, disrespectful, but I don’t think…sometimes I just brush it off as their job or that specific person.” – Participant 14

“Just people sometimes can be rude. I don’t know if they’re rude to everybody, but I see that they’re being rude. I don’t think it’s only towards me.” – Participant 47

While most participants who drew attention to politeness discussed it in terms of the way in which they were personally spoken to, some participants mentioned seeing other travellers being spoken to in a tone that they described as disrespectful. Participant 6 provides a good illustration of this sentiment embedded in the narrative of an example:

“I know the last time I travelled that we were going through and there was a group of people standing in the lineup in front of me and their skin colour was brown and there was probably six or seven of them and they were all standing together and they were speaking a different language and there was that line at the metal detector area and me and my partner were called to go past them. It seemed like the tone of her voice was really friendly when she called us over and then, the group of other people, they asked: “Oh, should we come too?” And the way she said “No.” to them was just like, almost rude...I don’t know...it didn’t seem as friendly. And, we almost felt like we shouldn’t go, because we were like butting...but we did. So I feel like that is an example of it, like, clearly these other people were ahead of us in line, so why wouldn’t they go through before us?” – Participant 6

As a white participant, Participant 6’s story helps illustrate not only that travellers do draw direct comparisons between their experiences and the experiences they witness others engaged in, but also, in this instance, an awareness of the privilege of whiteness in which skin colour as an identity characteristic was attributed to variations in respectful treatment. Furthermore, the final sentence in Participant 6’s quote speaks loosely to a highly influential indicator of relational
understandings of procedural justice as demonstrated through respect: perceptions of deservingness.

Perceptions of respect, as they relate to fairness, are founded in part in the relative accord between judgments of treatment received and treatment deserved (Heuer et al., 1999). These evaluations are not founded in static or absolute measures, but are based on fluctuating perceptions of appropriate treatment. Despite the subjective nature of the concept of deservingness, these evaluations have important implications for procedural fairness judgments and can be communicated through simple gestures (Heuer et al., 1999). For example, Participant 35 noted an instance in which a polite gesture is responded to with appropriate reciprocity and indicated its immediate effects:

“I smile and they smile back and I feel relieved.” – Participant 35

However, participant narratives that spoke to this aspect of respect more frequently characterized their treatment with surveillance personnel at Pearson as failing to satisfyingly approximate that which they thought they deserved. Participant 32’s quote indicates attention to deservingness, but highlights it as a noticeably absent quality of encounters with agents of surveillance at Pearson:

“The actual...attitudes of the personnel conducting the surveillance searches. I’d say...I would generalize it...but at times they can be very rude and their authority can go to their head. It’s not welcoming. It’s more like you’re entering a prison where you’re constantly being watched. They don’t care if you’re not a threat, they’re treating everyone the same.” – Participant 32

While the last sentence in this quote might arguably be used to help demonstrate that blanketed, as opposed to targeted, surveillance efforts can be perceived as bias free, any attempt to do so would be grounded in the assumption that negative encounters with surveillance serve as an appropriate baseline of evaluation. In other words, attention to respect as demonstrated through
treatment warranted (or deserved) on the basis of previous behaviours is assumed to be disregarded during surveillance encounters in this context because the high priority placed on protection necessitates scrutiny of all travellers, whether they deserve it or not. However, despite Participant 32’s characterization of deservingness, suggesting that respectful treatment is lacking, he describes it as uniformly lacking. Other participants describe perceptions of unwarranted scrutiny as being more segmented. For instance:

“It feels as though the greater good of the many is done at the cost of the few and if you’re one of the few it’s very negative and you don’t appreciate the value to the greater good because you’re that means. While I can intellectually sit back and say I sort of get it and see the value, I still have to physically go through it.” – Participant 11

Participant 11 is expressing dissatisfaction with treatment that he sees as unjustified, but his speculation that a utilitarian philosophy (i.e., “the greater good of the many is done at the cost of the few”) underlies surveillance practices at Pearson also draws attention to feelings of marginalization. Exclusion from active participation in a decision-making procedure is evaluated through perceptions of voice in the procedural justice literature. Recall that “voice” refers to the opportunity to provide input during a procedure (Thibaut & Walker, 1978), and relational explanations of procedural justice effects characterize voice as important in that it serves as an indicator for the participant that the authority administering the procedure regards them respectfully (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990). While the aforementioned quote hints at the importance of this aspect of respectful treatment, other participants addressed voice much more directly.

Negative characterizations of voice tended to be discussed in one of two ways. In some cases, participants described specific situations or general perceptions which could be categorized as “no voice;” the participant simply did not believe that they had the opportunity to provide input during the procedure. For example:
“When I first started going across, even though all my paperwork was good and everything it was an automatic that once you talked to the agent you were going to secondary and they’d sit you there and hold you there until like 10/15 minutes before your plane’s leaving and meanwhile they’ve been doing nothing. It’s not like there’s a whole pile of people, they just leave you sit. And you can’t go bother anybody, like, you’re not allowed to go talk to anybody. And when it’s 10 minutes before it’s time to go, they ask you some simple questions and then they expect you to run to whatever gate you have to go to.” – Participant 1

Participant 1 used this general scenario to illustrate the details of a number of specific instances in which he was brought to a separate area after passing through the security check for secondary screening. As evidenced in the quote, a central recollection of these experiences was his inability to inquire about the process or influence it in anyway. Similar sentiments were expressed through more general descriptions of encounters with agents of surveillance at Pearson. For example:

“I feel like they have all the control. If they don’t want me to pass through than I won’t pass through, and if they want to be rude to you they can be rude to you, and I can’t say anything, because I want to go on my trip.” – Participant 39

However, participants also described specific situations or general recollections of perceptions which could be categorized as “voice without influence;” where the participant makes an effort to provide input during the procedure, but does not feel that the input is appreciated or impactful. Participant 28 speaks to this characterization of voice in the general sense, associating poor communication with poor relational treatment:

“I expect that I’m going to be made to feel nervous…and a lot of that has to do with them not communicating very well. Right away I feel like they’re not recognizing me as a person.” – Participant 28

However, Participant 20 provides a specific example of voice without influence:

“When I was coming back one time, the guy beside me was having difficulty understanding what he was being asked because he didn’t speak English well and so I translated it for him and both customs guards just looked at each other and they put something on my declaration card. Both me and that guy had to go to a different area that says “Newcomers to Canada.” So, I walk back out and say I’m not a newcomer to
Canada, and the guy was just so extremely rude and said we had to go back in there. So I went back out again and said listen I’m born and raised here and he was extremely rude and I told him he couldn’t talk to me like that, but we had to go back in and got asked all these questions about my wife and son – who was born overseas – and asked me a bunch of questions I don’t recall the answers for and she was very insistent that I should have known the answers.” – Participant 20

This story serves to demonstrate the silencing of voice at multiple levels. First, the decision made by the initial agent of surveillance to send Participant 20 to secondary screening (which was assumed by the participant to be associated with his attempt to assist a fellow traveller), sent a strong message about the “inappropriateness” of his behaviour; particularly the extent to which he had overstepped the bounds of the role expected of him in this encounter. Second, and perhaps the clearest example of voice without impact, Participant 20 describes being ignored when he tries to explain that he has been sent to a screening area that does not align with his Canadian citizenship status. Finally, when given the opportunity to provide answers to requested questions, Participant 20 felt that his responses were deemed insufficient (warranting additional scrutiny). In total, Participant 20’s description of the encounter conveys strong feelings of being disrespected during the surveillance process.

In summary, the concept of respect (as informed by a relational understanding of procedural justice) was embedded in 13 participants’ narratives. As demonstrated through the quotes presented, at times, participants directly referenced the term “respect;” however, respect was frequently implicated as a noteworthy aspect of encounters with surveillance at Pearson through indirect indicators as well, specifically: politeness, deservingness and voice.

**Trust.** Relational procedural justice models have always incorporated “trust;” understood as the extent to which the decision-making authority is perceived as trustworthy. This aspect of procedural justice concerns involves evaluating the perceived intentions of the administering authority, specifically, the extent to which the authority is perceived as reasonable (Tyler, 1989;
Perceptions of trust are based on evaluations of the benevolence of the authority’s treatment (Tyler & Lind, 1992), and are particularly influential on perceptions of legitimacy because the inference of a benevolent disposition fosters the belief that an authority can be trusted in the long term (Hough et al., 2010; Tyler, 1994). In this subsection, I present concerns that participants associated with encounters with surveillance at Pearson that demonstrate attention to trust, specifically: benevolence, transparency and legitimacy.

Faith in the benevolence of a decision-making authority is a longstanding key component of trust as a relational procedural justice concern. Benevolence evaluations are associated with perceptions of the authority’s intentions and the apparent effort dedicated to fair treatment (Tyler, 1989; 1994). These evaluations are grounded in the extent to which the outcome reached seems reasonable. However, decision-makers are often in a position which imbues them with the power to use discretion, necessitating evaluations of reasonableness to be determined in large part on the consistency of the procedure used to determine the outcome as opposed to the outcome itself. As such, the transparency of the procedure employed has also been discussed as an aspect of relational procedural justice concerns (Jonathan-Zamir, Mastrofski & Moyal, 2013; Schafer, 2013; Tyler, 2004).

Most participants who indicated a lack of trust in the surveillance policies and practices in place at Pearson did so through references to limited transparency. An exception to this general tendency is found in Participant 12’s direct mention of trust:

2 It is important to note that the operationalization of ‘trustworthiness’ employed in this research is drawn from the literature dedicated to relational models of procedural justice (a well-developed body of literature that first began operationalizing this understanding of trust in the late 1980s). However, alternative bodies of literature (in particular, risk analysis, public administration, crime control and occupational psychology) all engage with the concept of trust through a somewhat different understanding that incorporates four sub-scales (integrity, benevolence, competence and procedural justice) (K. Ball, personal communication, May 10, 2016). It is worth considering these different understandings of trust in relation to each other in future research.
“The part of human interaction makes me feel uncomfortable for sure because I have always felt that I am putting on a show for this person who is questioning me. I’m more attuned to my accent. I have to sound very Canadian. I have to look very Canadian. My story has to be very short and to the point. That part of the interaction makes me feel quite uncomfortable and I don’t feel very trusting of the officer at that time.” – Participant 12

Although I feel the general message of this quote speaks more to Participant 12’s awareness of her presentation of self and perceptions of othering in this context, she still indicates very clearly that trust is a concern at the forefront of her mind during interactions with agents of surveillance in this setting. Other participants described similar feelings of unease or discontentment associated with the (assumed) unbridled power of agents of surveillance at Pearson. For instance:

“The sense of being observed I don’t mind too much. The knowledge that I could be observed in ways that I don’t expect and that I think there’s insufficient control over, that bothers me a little more; but, not so much that I’m going to do much about it. I don’t think there’s enough balance in oversight there.” – Participant 24

“…if they had someone they had to answer to for making bad calls, right, than that would be better. If they had some kind of structure like that.” – Participant 1

The fundamental issue underlying statements such as these seems to be one of transparency. Participants often assumed that there was little to no system of oversight in place for agents of surveillance at Pearson – that decisions are made relatively autonomously and with little supervision – and, while one would hope that is not the case, the Canadian Border Services Agency is secretive about the specific policies and practices used to secure the border. National security serves as the primary justification for this opaqueness and, however legitimate that justification may be, travellers notice the lack of transparency and associate it with a procedure that cannot be evaluated and is therefore untrustworthy. Participant 47 provides two very insightful comments in this regard:

“I often miss my flight and that usually doesn’t happen to people. I have to go to an office that most people don’t have to go to. If they were being transparent...but they don’t. You don’t know how they’re basing their decisions.” – Participant 47
“I don’t think it [surveillance practices at Pearson] helps me in any way, but for the community it makes it more secure. However, I think if there was more transparency to it than I think it would make the community more secure. So, I don’t know if it’s really positive. There’s security and stability, but those are just labels.” – Participant 47

Participant 47’s first quote is highly exemplary of the point I made in the preceding paragraph: that transparency is a dimension of trust that surveilled subjects are concerned with in surveillance encounters. Furthermore, in the second quote, he goes on to suggest that security and stability (prime objectives of surveillance in the context of border crossings) would be enhanced by greater transparency. Ultimately, Participant 47’s second quote offers evidence that surveilled subjects’ evaluations of surveillance procedures and outcomes are linked to relational concerns; specifically, trust in the administering surveillance authority as demonstrated through transparency (which would then need to reveal benevolence). Although this characterization of trust is representative of the way most participants who brought up trust related concerns engaged with the concept, trust can also be interpreted in a different way.

Traditionally, trust has been defined in the procedural justice literature in terms of the participant’s perception of the trustworthiness of the authority; however, it is also worth considering whether there is a dimension of trust relevant to procedural justice concerns in which the participant demonstrates attention to the extent to which they perceive the authority as trusting them. In explaining her thoughts on obtaining and beginning to use a Canadian passport after travelling with a passport issued by India previously, Participant 23 clearly explicates this second understanding of trust:

“Well, I mean, and maybe one point we didn’t touch on at all was...I wasn’t always a Canadian citizen, I used to travel on an Indian passport, but that has bigger impacts for immigration than security. The interesting part being that when I had that passport I was travelling a lot for work and there would be a big group travelling and I would always get additional questions and be held up. Interestingly enough, it wasn’t as pronounced when I got the Canadian passport. But I was the exact same person, no different markers but the
Canadian passport. Does that make me a more trustworthy person? So, your identity, in the sense of citizenship, plays a huge role in border crossings. My crossings are not as seamless as yours [referencing the white female interviewer], but they’re better [than they used to be] and the individual behind the passport has not changed, just the passport.” – Participant 23

Participant 23 engages with the concept of trust to describe how she does not feel that the surveillant authority trusts her. Moreover, while no other participants integrated such a direct discussion of this understanding of trust into their narratives, I think it is more subtly implied by many participants. This characterization of trust has not yet been considered in the procedural justice literature, but finds some other support in McCahill and Finn’s (2014) assertion that social bonds may be undermined through the use of invasive surveillance practices, potentially impacting normative compliance. Concluding that such an understanding of trust exists based on the evidence available would be an overstatement, but the topic does warrant further investigation and may be a unique quality of procedural justice concerns in the context of surveillance; or, more specifically, in some surveillance contexts.

Returning to the more traditional characterization of trust, some participants’ narratives directly linked mistrust of the motivations, policies and practices of surveillers to perceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy is “a property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p.514). The lack of transparency associated with surveillance encounters at Pearson was linked to the concept of legitimacy by some participants. For instance:

“I have often felt that every...thing I say and answer I give – and this is obviously just a perception – is overly analyzed to the point where I’m constantly questioned. So, I’d give an answer, and what I think is a matter of fact answer is questioned, when I think there’s no logical basis for the question. Which then leads me down a path that makes me wonder about the answers I’m giving, because it all seems like a very superficial experience, which makes me question why I’m even answering them.” – Participant 11
As well, in describing and reflecting on legitimacy in a different but related narrative (the meanings and functions of surveillance in everyday life), some participants implied that their encounters with surveillance at Pearson were justifiable in the process of expressing concern over the legitimacy of applications of surveillance in their everyday life. For example:

“Not good. More so than at the border, because it’s like why the hell do you care what I’m doing on the internet? It doesn’t feel as much for personal safety as much as it is for snooping and keeping track of you. Just applications that don’t seem alright.” – Participant 15

Although these quotes are both grounded in descriptions of surveillance in everyday life (a topic that will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4), both quotes also reference border surveillance as a point of comparison and demonstrate attention to legitimacy as a property of evaluations of encounters with surveillance.

In summary, 16 participants’ narratives demonstrated attention to the procedural justice concern of trust. Similar to the concept of respect, at times, participants directly referenced the term “trust;” however, trust based concerns were also embedded in participants’ narratives as an important aspect of encounters with surveillance at Pearson through indirect indicators, in particular: benevolence, transparency and legitimacy.

**Neutrality.** The most frequently referenced relational procedural justice concern was neutrality. “Neutrality,” which broadly refers to the “even-handedness” of a procedure, is the final original factor comprising relational models of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; 1994). This procedural justice concern is based on the extent to which treatment by an administering authority is perceived as unbiased, objective and administered with equality (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In this subsection, I present concerns that participants associated with encounters with surveillance at Pearson that demonstrate attention to neutrality, specifically: bias and targeting.
“I think how it should be is just the overall security of the country but how I feel it is, is that it has some bias about how you look like, what country you’re from, where you work, what you do, how long you’ve been here. I think there are two separate things: how I think it should be and how it is.” – Participant 36

Participant 36’s comment is representative of many participants’ sentiments on neutrality, but also clearly distinguishes between the two ways in which participants tended to discuss the concept: in terms of expectations and experiences. Furthermore, participants who discussed neutrality were not at all ambiguous in regards to their expectations. Consistent and equal exposure to surveillance across travellers was expected by participants. This indicator of neutral treatment was communicated by many participants, but Participant 3 provides a particularly clear and concise statement on the matter:

“I expect to be treated like everybody else that walks through that airport. I don’t expect special treatment, and I don’t expect to be watched intensely by anyone.” – Participant 3

However, many participants relayed concerns over the extent to which the application of surveillance at Pearson is neutral, citing bias as a central indicator of mistreatment.

Determinations of bias are based on perceptions of procedural inconsistencies (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). While some participants did relate firsthand experiences with biased treatment, a number of participants mentioned bias in more general terms by referring to how bias might be experienced by others, differentially applied through hypothetical examples, or attributed on the basis of various characteristics. For instance, participants who chose to discuss biased treatment, but did not have personal experiences to relate, often did so by considering the experiences of others:

“I guess it’s more the...and it’s really not firsthand experience...I know that there is profiling that happens in these...policing type of places and they probably use statistics to determine who or what types of people to be watching. While...I understand it, but it’s not fair to the individual so I think if it was not quite as obvious...I think the interactions could be more positive. So, bias....” – Participant 10
“I think that maybe it can be biased depending on what people are wearing or how they look. I guess that’s what the security guards have been told to do. Even though these things haven’t happened to me, when I do see it happen it never looks to me like it’s the stereotypical Canadian being pulled aside to get searched.” – Participant 8

Similarly, participants speculated on how the application of surveillance might vary by adding hypothetical components to their own experiences and considering the implications. For example:

“Yeah, I feel like if I were to have gone through with my head covered I would expect them to be much more strict. I think that because there’s so many stereotypes regarding people who have their head covered and those stereotypes were developed by the media. There’s a lot of negativity.” – Participant 34

“I’ve never encountered...but I do feel that sometimes they judge people on how they look. They would ask more questions. For instance, a Middle-Eastern woman wearing a burqa, completely covered, maybe they might check a bit more; ask a bit more questions.” – Participant 43

An additional marker of participant attention to bias is found in references to the assumed targets of biased treatment. Although a wide variety of identity characteristics were discussed in relation to neutrality concerns (i.e., race, ethnicity, accent, religious garb, criminal record, sex and age), country of origin was repeatedly emphasized by participants as an attribute believed to be of particular significance to the distribution of treatment. For example:

“I think it’s [surveillance targeting] primarily due to my country of origin.” – Participant 47

“I always feel like there are stereotypes about me because I’m from Iran. I’m sure there is something in place because I don’t think of the officers as very...like, free minds...I always feel like there is some sort of racism there and that bothers me. I have that fear.” – Participant 35

Furthermore, while bias in all of the aforementioned quotes was discussed as a potentiality, other participants related personal experiences that supported these assumptions. However, before moving on to those results, I must draw the reader’s attention to an important point: the extent to which participants actually experienced biased treatment is not, and cannot be, determined from
this research. Participants’ experiences were not controlled or measured systematically and, as a result, determinations of what constitutes biased treatment are entirely at the discretion of the participant. In other words, I am not making claims about the actual presence or severity of biased treatment experienced during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Instead, I argue that bias is a relevant aspect of encounters with surveillance in this context that participants were attentive to, as demonstrated by the experiences they relate.

Particular identity characteristics, when grouped together, were often implied to be the source for biased treatment – equating to more invasive surveillance encounters. In particular, country of origin/heritage (coupled with skin colour and assumed religion) were described by some participants as a likely contributor to the biased treatment that they personally experienced. For instance, both Participant 40 and 7 suggest that despite being Canadian citizens, the fact that they were born outside of Canada (specifically in Middle Eastern countries) contributes to lengthier encounters with agents of surveillance at Pearson. For instance:

“I come from a Lebanese background and get that stereotype of the Middle East and...not terrorist, but basically that you have to watch out for that person. A lot of personal experiences. They question us more than other people. So, we have to go through lengthy processes...like, if I’m with someone wearing something religious or cultural, we’re more likely to be questioned by people.” – Participant 40

“Well specifically for when they see my place of birth. When I’m travelling with a group of friends I can tell when they go up to be questioned about where they’re going and what they’re doing they always just have one or two simple questions and that’s it. But then, and this doesn’t happen all the time, it’s happened to me twice, when I have gone up right after one of my friends, going for the exact same reason, live in the same area, they look at my passport and all of a sudden there are maybe five or six questions: “Where exactly are you staying? Who do you know there?” And, in my mind I’m wondering why are you asking me this but not my best friend who just passed right before me? But, of course I know, I think I know, why.” – Participant 7

Experiences of this nature may foster feelings of difference and exclusion (perceptions of which will be discussed in greater detail in the “Group membership” subsection below), a possibility
which is exemplified by Participant 11’s summarization of how such surveillance encounters make him feel:

“You almost feel...all of a sudden you become a secondary citizen if you want to put it that way, and the way I’m treated [at the border] is categorically different than the way I’m treated anywhere else.” – Participant 11

Although the overwhelming majority of participants describing biased encounters with surveillance at Pearson cited identity characteristics such as skin colour, country of origin and religious affiliation as the assumed rationales underlying the bias, one participant described experiencing biased treatment based on a very different identifying characteristic: a criminal record. Participant 1 provides a unique narrative framed by the challenges that his (pardoned) criminal record creates when crossing the border at Pearson to enter the United States specifically:

“Now, if you’ve already proven to the right officials that you’re not a threat any longer than I believe that that’s where they stereotype because they know that I did this, but that ‘x’ amount of time has passed and the government has issued papers that say it’s forgiven, then, I should just go through like anyone else who fits all the proper characteristics.” – Participant 1

While founded in a unique circumstance, Participant 1’s quote draws attention to the importance of neutrality as a procedural justice concern in a way that is relatable to the previously presented experiences. Specifically, the aforementioned quotes describe feelings of being identified as worthy of differential treatment on the basis of an identifying characteristic (which they believe to be irrelevant to the surveillance they should be subjected to), culminating in the perception that the procedure is biased. While the point of this section is simply to demonstrate the relevance of procedural justice concerns (and, thereby, procedural justice theory and findings) to surveilled subjects in this particular context, it is also worth pausing to note the perceived realities of biased treatment at Pearson.
Many participants expressed concern over bias in surveillance policies and practices at Pearson from their subjective position as “outsiders” to the procedures in place. This statement is not intended to undermine the importance of subjective perceptions, but simply to acknowledge that the objective presence of bias in the application of surveillance at Pearson cannot be determined based on the data available. However, Participant 21, who is employed as an administrator of surveillance at Pearson shared some interesting information on the actual use of “stereotypes” in determining which travellers to assess more closely as they pass through the airport, noting:

“It’s entirely on that. People don’t like to believe that there’s a...that in this environment racism exists, but racism is a negative term, however, there is a way that these agencies use to segregate people for searches and it’s based on research, it’s based on current events, it’s based on statistics, and so, because of that, it does happen.” – Participant 21

Participant 21’s comment suggests that the shared perceptions of bias held by some participants (associated with country of origin, skin colour and religious affiliation) may very well be grounded in the objective reality that persons bearing particular attributes associated with these identity characteristics (specifically, Middle Eastern, brown skin tone and Muslim) are objectively subjected to more surveillance at Pearson. However, I cannot stress enough that perceptions of bias alone are sufficient to trigger low procedural justice evaluations. In other words, even unbiased procedures that are perceived as biased will be evaluated negatively and, therefore, must be adjusted or even abandoned to better communicate attention to neutrality.

As has been demonstrated by participants’ comments, perceptions of procedural consistency help to express neutrality by serving as an indicator of systematic bias, however, evaluations of bias are also based on the extent to which a procedure’s administrator is believed to incorporate their personal biases into the decision-making process (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Put differently, and in the context of this research: for surveillance encounters to be evaluated as
unbiased, agents of surveillance are expected to make decisions on the basis of objective facts rather than personal opinions. Again, procedural justice concerns were found to be important to participants through their expressed anxieties over the possibility that surveillance agents might rely on their personal biases in drawing conclusions. For example:

“Well, the only part where I feel different is feeling like there is some prejudice and bias in terms of the people conducting surveillance. The most direct one is certainly the visual minority aspect...I think it really just is a point at which the human factor comes in to determine what is a threat and what isn’t a threat. There’s no extended interaction at the border for people to focus on much else, so I know it matters.” – Participant 3

“No human being is unbiased. Because of the media I think there is an emphasis on people who are of Arab or Middle Eastern origin. I don’t blame surveillance people, however, I don’t think it’s the right way of doing it.” – Participant 47

In combination, references to procedural consistency and surveillance agent discretion as indicators of bias draw attention to the centrality of neutrality concerns during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. However, a related but distinct emphasis on “targeting” also highlighted participants’ attention to perceptions of neutrality.

Feelings of being “targeted” or “singled-out” during a decision-making procedure may be another unique characteristic of procedural justice concerns in the context of surveillance encounters. This concept is not drawn out of the procedural justice literature, however, I do see it as related to bias and, therefore, neutrality. What participants prefer in their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, in terms of neutrality, is to not feel individually targeted. For instance, many participants expressed sentiments similar to Participant 27:

“Knowing that there’s surveillance outside but knowing that they’re not just targeting a specific person, it’s a variety of people, it’s not targeted. I think the blanketed surveillance is better than a targeted surveillance in general.” – Participant 27

As a perception associated with neutrality, awareness of targeting tended to be recognized as an indicator of biased procedures. (However, I do not wish to imply that blanket (or mass)
surveillance is necessarily preferable to targeted surveillance in such contexts; for example, appropriate targeted surveillance that focuses on credibly identified potential suspects (as opposed to groups of persons based on demographic characteristics) has been described as substantially more effective at intercepting terrorist threats; Lyon, 2014; Lyon, 2015). Perceptions of targeting did not require firsthand experience. For instance, Participant 18 expressed a distinct consciousness of bias prompting perceptions of being targeted through his skepticism of the “randomness” of purportedly random additional surveillance screenings at Pearson:

“I think they try to have us believe that it’s all fair and they look at us all equally, for example, when you go through the section where you get your x-rays, everyone’s going through the same thing at the same time, but some people get pulled aside for what they call random inspections, but, in my opinion, it’s not random inspection. So, no, I don’t think mine is. I think somebody that is a different race will have a different expectation going into the airport than I would.” – Participant 18

Ultimately, perceptions of demographic targeting (whether personally experienced or assumed to be experienced by others), were discussed as an unfavourable aspect of the surveillance encounter at Pearson. Not only because of the implied presence of procedural bias (suggesting a violation of legal rights), but also on practical grounds. Specifically, participants questioned the functional utility of surveillance that targets subjects on the basis of very general identity characteristics. For instance:

“It would more be the unfair use of surveillance on certain people. If you’re only monitoring a certain type of people based on colour, race, what they’re wearing, etc. than that doesn’t make sense because the whole point is for the safety of everyone and you should be monitoring everyone who is going through your border, not just certain people.” – Participant 13

In summary, 36 participants’ narratives were attentive to the procedural justice concern of neutrality during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. The neutrality of encounters with surveillance in this context was questioned by many participants, with particular emphasis placed
on country of origin, skin colour, race, accent and religious garb as identifiers that were assumed to affect surveillance exposure. As an aside, sex and age were also mentioned by a number of participants as identity characteristics impacting the application of surveillance at Pearson, however, these factors were generally described as identity attributes which were likely to be particularly salient when combined with the aforementioned characteristics. Neutrality based concerns were an important component of participants’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson, as demonstrated through references to bias and targeting.

Positive Characterizations of Procedural Concerns

The data presented thus far has emphasized participants’ negative characterizations of relational procedural justice concerns; highlighting perceptions of disrespect, skepticism over trustworthiness, and a lack of neutrality associated with the surveillance procedure and/or agents of surveillance at Pearson. However, some participants described their encounters with surveillance at Pearson much more positively. This section is dedicated to providing an overview of participants’ expressions of satisfaction with the application of surveillance at Pearson as represented through the same central procedural justice concerns of respect, trust and neutrality.

Positive characterizations of respect were again noted directly (through usage of the term “respect”) as well as indirectly. Recall that indirect indicators of respect are based on evaluations of the extent to which treatment is demonstrative of politeness, deservingness and opportunities for voice. Participant 6 provides an excellent example of how even simple acts of politeness have broad reaching implications for perceptions of procedural justice:

“I remember when I was trying to take out my laptop and camera and stuff and I had pretty much spilt my purse and one of the guys who was supposed to be doing the metal detector stuff actually came over and helped me pick up my stuff and that...I felt it was really decent, you know. They’re supposed to be in work mode and be really cold and almost untouchable and I felt like he was just a human in that moment and came and helped me out. I just find that for the most part even if you leave something in your
pocket or forget to take something off that you should have taken off, the way that they talk to me about it, they don’t assume that I had it for a bad reason. They reassure me that they don’t think anything negative about me. That makes me appreciate their customer service and their opinion of me.” – Participant 6

Participant 6’s description of her experience demonstrates the importance of respect as a component of procedural justice evaluations from a positive characterization. Furthermore, her comment also speaks to the value of relational procedural justice models. Participant 6’s reference to how she used the treatment she received as an indicator of “their opinion of me” suggests that she is, at least in part, concerned with how she is treated on the basis of relational concerns. In other words, the respect conveyed through treatment is used as a pseudo measure of group membership and standing (Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler, Degoe & Smith, 1996). However, turning back to the core indicators of respect, participants also touched on the aspect of deservingness.

Not all participants felt that they were over scrutinized during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Some participants described their surveillance exposure as appropriate. For instance:

“People don’t watch me overly. They might look at me, but I get perceived pretty respectfully.” – Participant 45

In general, participants who did not have expressly negative experiences to convey tended to refer to their encounters with surveillance at Pearson with an air of indifference; as is the case in this statement. This finding is complementary to various other works that have demonstrated or discussed surveilled subjects’ perceptions of indifference or ambivalence to surveillance (Ball, 2009; Bostrom, Kjellstrom & Bjorklund, 2013; Di Domenico & Ball, 2011). However, Participant 45’s comment helps illustrate that even when surveillance encounters are regarded with relative indifference, procedural justice concerns still factor into that determination; in this
case, respect as demonstrated through the perception of warranted surveillance (i.e., deservingness).

Positive characterizations of voice as an aspect of respect were surrounded by a similar muted quality. For instance, Participant 31 referenced his awareness of voice during encounters with surveillance at Pearson through comparison to his experiences at other airports:

“I have felt more negativity at other airports. That thing I was saying about authority and the ability to abuse it, I’ve felt that. They didn’t want to hear what I had to say, it was just: ‘Listen, this is how it’s done. Do we have a problem?’” – Participant 31

Alternatively, Participant 13 engages with perceptions of voice more directly in relation to her experience with surveillance at Pearson:

“It [the encounter with surveillance at Pearson] was fine. I felt like I was being dealt with in a pleasant manner. It was more like a conversation than scrutinizing me.” – Participant 13

In both of these examples the participants express a preference for surveillance experiences that are perceived as conversational – which seems akin to a preference for voice. Voice is a key indicator of respect that, in turn, enhances procedural justice judgments of fairness and satisfaction (Bradford, 2011; Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; MacCoun, 2005); a finding that is also implied in this research through participants’ characterizations of their experiences with surveillance at Pearson as relatively positive or negative when associated with respectively greater or lesser perceptions of voice.

The procedural justice concern of trust was found to have the fewest positive characterizations in participants’ narratives; however, participants discussed positive characterizations of trust very consistently. Remember that participants referenced negative characterizations of trust indirectly through evaluations of the extent to which treatment was perceived as benevolent and transparent, and that the concept of legitimacy (an outcome
evaluation based largely on the procedural justice concern of trust; Hough, Jackson & Bradford, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Degoe, 1995) was also mentioned. Positive characterizations of trust also emphasized benevolence (faith in the good intentions of the procedure and agents of surveillance at Pearson). For instance:

“I don’t have anything to hide, and really I don’t see how it hurts to have that information if it’s used in the right way.” – Participant 26

However, some participants offered much more comprehensive accounts of their trust concerns, indicating perceptions of transparency and legitimacy as well. For example:

“I’m pretty comfortable with what they’re doing. I know what they’re doing and whenever they are asking me questions I’m fairly tolerant that it’s a person with a job to do. I think as long as they’re reasonable and have the right kind of professional politeness than it’s all good.” – Participant 24

“I know the process behind it so I have a biased approach to it. I understand why it’s there and why we need it there. Most people don’t understand the extent of it, they don’t understand why it’s there – why we need the process – and they feel that this is being misused rather than used in a positive way.” – Participant 21

Participants 24 and 21 both emphasize their acceptance of surveillance procedures and agents of surveillance at Pearson on the basis of procedural justice concerns. They exemplify the realization of procedural trust through their statements that the surveillance policies and practices in place at Pearson are necessary and valid. Both participants also indicate perceptions of transparency. Furthermore, Participant 21 considers the importance of transparency by speculating that persons with limited understandings of the procedures and practices in place at Pearson might assume that the surveillance is misused. However, it is worth noting that both of these participants (as well as two other participants who expressed similar sentiments) are all relative “insiders” to the surveillance industry. (Participant 21 is in a managerial position associated with surveillance at Pearson, Participant 24 is a police officer, and the other two participants are employed for security purposes at government service sites.) Their regular
engagement as agents of surveillance may bolster their perceptions of transparency, and thereby trust, associated with surveillance at Pearson. Regardless, positive characterizations of trust, similar to negative characterizations, were again founded in treatment-oriented concerns.

Neutralities, as indicated through the extent to which procedures demonstrate bias and targeting, was commonly questioned by participants; however, some participants’ narratives expressed more positive characterizations of neutrality. Recall that I categorized perceptions of bias in two ways; in terms of evaluations of procedural consistency (indicating systematic bias) or evaluations of administrator application (indicating personal bias), and that feelings of being singled out (targeted) seemed to serve as an additional gauge of neutrality.

Participants who described an absence of bias in surveillance practices at Pearson frequently did so through statements similar to that made by Participant 13:

“I felt I was treated just like everyone else. It was a surprise, but a pleasant surprise…I thought it was fair because I wasn’t…I didn’t take any longer than anyone else, so it seemed smooth. I would say fair. I guess normal based on what everyone else was going through.” – Participant 13

Participants often engaged with the concept of neutrality positively through evaluative statements such as: “I was treated just like everybody else.” Statements of this variety do not distinguish between neutrality as attributable to procedural consistency or administrator application specifically (likely because both would be necessary to produce an unbiased experience), however, some participants directly spoke to how their concerns over administrator bias had been, or could be, addressed. For example:

“When the technology wasn’t up and running it felt like there was more profiling. Now that the technology is there, everyone is going through the same thing, same instrument. It’s the same process.” – Participant 25

“I’ve been to other airports where it’s a machine that you push a button on and it determines if you get searched or not and at that point I have no problem with it because it’s not a person determining if you get searched or not, and at that point I didn’t feel any
sort of individual, like, security threat. It was just kind of very random and it makes the potential of catching somebody random.” – Participant 3

Participant 3 seems to echo Participant 25’s preference for greater technological administrations of surveillance. Both participants speak to the assumption that technology is unbiased and can therefore assist in making the process of surveillance unbiased.

Finally, positive characterizations of neutrality were also evident in participants’ narratives through statements indicating an absence of perceptions of targeting. For example:

“I normally go out of the cab right into Pearson and from that moment I feel like you’re just another person in an airport under video surveillance unless something stands out, which I don’t think it does...The amount of time it takes me to go through, it seems pretty on par with the other people I’m going through with. And also I guess it comes back to just being another number, there’s nothing that I think identifies me differently than anyone else, I feel I get asked the same questions everyone else gets asked.” – Participant 31

“You do hear about things like people getting picked out from a crowd based on their appearance but I don’t feel like I have been singled out based on my appearance.” – Participant 16

Similar to participants who described perceptions of unwarranted targeting during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, participants relating acceptable applications of surveillance also identified a preference for blanket, as opposed to targeted, surveillance. Participant 16 goes on to suggest that this demonstration of neutrality has a direct attitudinal effect (“peace of mind”), which is equatable to the more technical procedural justice term of “satisfaction.” Ultimately, these more positive recollections of encounters with surveillance at Pearson provide additional evidence that relational concerns are important to the surveilled subject’s interpretation of their experience in this context.

The results presented in the previous two sections demonstrate that participants were attentive to procedural justice concerns regardless of whether relating positive or negative
encounters with surveillance at Pearson; providing evidence of participants’ attention to relational concerns from both frames of reference and suggesting that existing procedural justice research may offer surveillance studies helpful direction in better understanding the surveilled subject’s experience in this context, and perhaps in similar encounters that involve direct interactions with agents of surveillance. In particular, procedural justice provides a framework to better understand the causal effects of surveillance procedures on surveilled subjects’ evaluations of and reactions to surveillance and its administrators by highlighting the role of *process* and relational concerns in understanding how surveillance might be consistently evaluated and reacted to by surveilled subjects.

**Procedural Justice Concerns and Minority status**

Procedural justice effects have been found to function similarly for persons bearing a range of identity characteristics. Demographic variables have repeatedly been demonstrated to wield minimal influence on procedural justice concerns and evaluations (Feldman & Tyler, 2012; Murphy, Hinds & Fleming, 2008; Tyler, 1988); even cross-cultural comparisons indicate that there is minimal variation between groups in terms of the relational variables that constitute a fair procedure (Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997). As such, I anticipated that there would be a general attention to procedural justice concerns regardless of minority status (recall that a criteria of participation was that participants needed to self-identify as either “white” or “brown”), and the results presented thus far demonstrate that both white and brown participants were attentive to relational procedural justice concerns in their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. However, given the concerns that cultural biases are embedded in surveillance policies and procedures enacted at Canadian border crossings (see ICLMG, 2010; Helleiner, 2010; 2012), I suspected that a comparison of these groups’ references to procedural justice concerns might reveal some
noteworthy differences in perceptions of treatment (and, less conservatively, in actual variations of treatment). In presenting this comparison I focus on participants’ references to a single procedural justice concern (neutrality) to help focus the content based points of comparison. I selected neutrality because it was the most commonly referenced procedural justice concern by the greatest number of participants (see Table 1). A further inspection of these results reveals some initial interesting differences in the volume of sources and references (see Table 2).

**Table 2. References to Neutrality by Minority Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Status</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(16 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>(20 sources)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of overall references indicates that brown participants indicated attention to the concern of neutrality more often and with greater frequency than white participants. Based on the content of these references (which will be discussed momentarily), these data provide some support for Skogan’s (2006) finding that people tend to be more attentive to procedural justice concerns when mistreatment is perceived. In other words, it is not that neutrality concerns are more or less important to either group of participants, but, instead, that there may be asymmetrical experiences between white and brown participants. Moving to the actual content of these quotes, participants routinely addressed the same general topics (i.e., bias/targeting and the relative distribution of that treatment across persons as well as their attitudinal and behavioural responses) and held similar overall positions, but, minority status seemed to be associated with considerable variation in the framing of these statements as well as the nature of the experiences divulged.

To begin, both white and brown participants referenced the presence of bias in surveillance policies and practices at Pearson, but from very different perspectives. White
participants speculated on the presence of biased treatment by maintaining that their own experiences seemed relatively convenient compared to the experiences of various visible minority group members on the basis of friends’ or media accounts, as well as personal observations. For example, in responding to a question as to whether she thinks prejudice impacts her experience during border crossings at Pearson, Participant 6 maintained:

“Yeah, definitely. But I think for positive. Stereotypes such as me being a Caucasian female as well as being fairly petite…that there’s not a lot of concern of me being scary or intimidating. Also, my clothes are fairly form fitting so I don’t think I’m wearing anything that would lead people to believe…I think my clothes are just neutral or fall into the safe radar because they don’t suggest that I’m affiliated with any particular groups or anything like that.” – Participant 6

White participants often expressed similar expectations of bias; routinely acknowledging “whiteness” as an identity characteristic that diminished the extent to which they would be targeted for surveillance in this setting. For instance:

“Well I guess I’m a white male so if anything it would make my crossing easier. Just because you hear the other stereotypes of people being inhibited. So I guess mine is probably smoother.” – Participant 16

“I’m the stereotypical harmless little white girl. So, yeah, I think that they [stereotypes] do affect me, but not in the negative sense.” – Participant 41

An overview of brown participants’ references to perceptions of bias in surveillance encounters at Pearson relates the same message but from the unfortunate position of personally experiencing negative bias. Some participants relayed these experiences with relative indifference (similar to Participant 33), while others expressed stronger emotional reactions (similar to Participant 13):

“Yeah, having an ethnic name like I do pretty much guarantees that I’m going to be asked some extra questions. I think it’s based on random selection in general, but when you get a combination like Arab, engineer, ethnic name, they take some extra time for due diligence.” – Participant 33

“It’s unfair. It’s very biased. You know, no matter where a person grew up or what they wear or what they believe in doesn’t really have that much of a bearing on what they’re
going to do or not going to do. It’s unfair, it’s not a good feeling to know that people have those sort of preconceptions about you.” – Participant 13

As Participant 13 indicates, what troubles her is the perception that the surveillance procedure is not being applied fairly. It is important to note here that it is not the presence of surveillance that is being critiqued, but the manner in which it is being applied: a procedural concern. For instance, Participant 13’s statement suggests perceptions of biased treatment associated with identity characteristics that she believes are irrelevant to the encounter, and, she is not alone in this assertion. Participant 12 articulates this same position quite clearly:

“I think I would be more comfortable with being watched if we lived in a world where I didn’t think there were these biases against my culture and the group of people I belong to. That being said, because I don’t have anything to hide, I don’t know that it bothers me too much of just having constant surveillance if it was equally applied to everyone for population control.” – Participant 12

Although most participants who referenced neutrality expressed concerns that surveillance policies and practices in place at Pearson might be biased, minority status served as a relatively clear indicator of how bias was framed in relation to one’s self and influenced one’s experiences. In the same way that a lack of neutrality was described as disadvantaging visible minorities, it was assumed to advantage white travellers. Participants who referenced an awareness of this bias discussed the concern very consistently. In particular, white participants who broached the topic felt that they were potentially benefited by their skin colour. This is demonstrated above by Participant 16 and 41, but is also articulated well by Participant 10:

“I think that at borders is probably one of the very few times that I’m aware of how bias and profiling is happening in the everyday world because it doesn’t impact me but I can see it a little more clearly when I’m at the border. So, I think it’s made me more aware of the privilege that I have.” – Participant 10

Participant 10’s eloquent summary of her encounters with surveillance at Pearson (and borders more generally), paints the context as a microcosm; as a small world in which broader social
phenomenon are represented and highlighted. Again, brown participants’ narratives reinforce this same overall understanding of white privilege but, this time, through an assumptive frame of reference reliant on comparative observations. For example:

“When you go through to the second spot and they start checking your luggage, that’s when I find the questions start coming up. And, even asking my friends about the questions that they’re asked afterwards, they’ve never been asked anything even close to what I’ve been asked. That’s when I know it’s specific to me and, oddly enough, that time I was the only person of colour travelling with my friends so I was the one who was stopped and extra checked through the little spinning x-ray thing.” – Participant 3

“So, because of our ethnicity and our colour, I find that a lot of it has to do with that. If you were travelling with a white person across the border it wouldn’t be that difficult. For example, I was travelling with one of my white friends across the border and it was just me and him. I was pulled in further while he just went right through and I wondered ‘What happened there?’…I honestly feel their selection process has a lot to do with how you look, because when I get pulled in because I look ‘suspicious,’ why else would I look suspicious?” – Participant 17

A collective assessment of all of these references to bias indicates that participants’ framing of biased treatment varied based on minority status but maintained a consistent overall narrative: Visible minority travellers were perceived to be scrutinized to a greater extent than white travellers. Some participants also provided descriptions of their attitudinal responses to encounters with surveillance perceived as biased at Pearson that further illustrates variation on the basis of minority status.

Not surprisingly, brown participants related feelings of negativity, characterizing the experiences as fostering feelings of inequality and exclusion that do not simply evaporate following the encounter’s conclusion. Participant 47 provides a simple summary of these sentiments, while Participant 11 offers a more detailed reflection:

“I think it’s biased. Especially if you’re on the side that’s against, you always feel that negative.” – Participant 47

“I think any time you’re not treated as an equal citizen, it has a way of making you feel undervalued or not an equal citizen of this country. So, when you have led a respectable
life, you have no criminal history, you have some expectations on the manner in which you expect to be treated and it’s not a two way street when you start to incorporate these factors that change people’s perceptions and that’s troubling.” – Participant 11

On the other hand, white participants who described an awareness of a position of relative privilege often reported a mixed emotional response, perhaps best described as a combination of relief and guilt that communicates an attitude of indifference. For example:

“It makes me feel better than the people who I think are watched to a greater capacity...when it comes to the border guards, it’s almost like we’re on the same level in a weird sort of way. Like we both get it and just sort of trust each other and it’s just like ‘Thanks, see you later.’ But when you see these instances with other people, it certainly makes me start to question them [the surveillance agents].” – Participant 6

“I think that it [my white skin colour] helps me get across faster which is unfortunate but I’m grateful for, it’s kind of that mixed feeling...I think that sometimes it can be...I’m hesitant to say unfair. I think that sometimes they do...centre their surveillance around people...like suspicious people, that kind of thing, which are in turn deemed suspicious because of their resemblance to other people who have done bad things in the past or who are known to cause issues currently. Which...I kind of am at a little bit of a personal dilemma with. Sometimes, I think that is fair because they are looking at people who have caused issues in the past and are trying to compare to that, but at the same time a lot of those people have come from certain countries, ethnicities and backgrounds so it makes it very difficult for people who also come from those backgrounds to get through.” – Participant 41

Participant 41’s comment is particularly demonstrative of an acknowledgment of white privilege, and the attitudes of indifference that seem to accompany that acknowledgement. Despite admissions of unfair bias, advantaged parties did not express any desires to actually confront applications of surveillance lacking neutrality, and this apathy may communicate the existence of a hierarchical structuring of treatment based on skin colour (amongst other factors) that positions visible minorities as relatively low and may affect their perceptions of self (Saulnier, 2015).

However, regardless of minority status, it should be noted that very few participants described any actual scenarios or even intentions of confronting surveillance at Pearson for any reason. Many participants simply felt that surveillance is a necessary aspect of border control, and that
the experience is bound to produce some discomfort. Even brown participants who felt that applications of surveillance were biased described mixed emotional responses including indifference. For instance:

“To be honest, now, I’m indifferent to them [the perceived use of racial profiling] because they’ve become the norm, and that’s terrible to say because it’s never a good feeling, but I’ve adapted my own personal strategies to work with this norm. If I dig any deeper, or go back to before I sort of made this normal...you feel like a second class citizen...and you feel...words like this is a ‘random check’ just lose all meaning and start becoming comical.” – Participant 11

The few participants who indicated a willingness to directly confront applications of surveillance that they perceived as inappropriate were fairly evenly spread across the two attributes of minority status. For instance, Participant 24, who self identifies as white, states:

“For the general level of surveillance I’m indifferent to it. For the standard formal search and inspection stuff I’m okay with it in as much as I know what I’ve got to do. So as long as everything is within that context I’m good. If I was singled out my first reaction would probably be a bit of mistrust, because that’s not normal and I will begin to put up some kind of resistance.” – Participant 24

Participant 34, who self identifies as brown, expresses a similar sentiment:

“I think if I did have bad experiences I would be much more on guard. I would have attitude with them, like, a ‘why should I listen to you?’ kind of attitude.” – Participant 34

Ultimately, airports are widely understood as a high security area in which surveillance is permitted, and perhaps even expected, to be applied quite generously and forcefully if necessary. Borders, in general, have been described as “zones of exception;” an area where persons are intensely subjected to the law, but not so assiduously protected by the law (Agamben, 1998: Topak et al., 2015). The minimal references made by participants regarding directly confronting surveillance in this context for any reason suggests that this academic concept is also understood as a piece of common knowledge amongst most travellers (although its salience is likely affected by a traveller’s unique identity matrix). Resisting the surveillance procedure at Pearson outlined
by administering authorities is likely to make travel difficult for persons regardless of minority status because of the power differential involved between travellers and agents of surveillance.

In summary, distinguishing between participants’ statements regarding neutrality on the basis of minority status reveals two key findings. First, both white and brown participants are attentive to neutrality as a procedural concern in the same way; they highlight the same focal points and generally corroborate the others’ perceptions. However, and second, while references to neutrality suggest that participants are attentive to procedural justice concerns regardless of minority status, those same references suggest that participants’ procedural justice evaluations are not consistent across minority status: Brown participants express greater perceptions and personal experiences with bias and, subsequently, perceptions of unfairness.

**Additional Aspects of Procedural Justice Concerns**

**Power.** “[P]ower may be defined as a force underlying social exchanges in which someone has control over the behavior or outcomes of another in a dependent position” (Mossholder et al., 1998, p.533). Perceptions of unequal power enhance the emphasis that persons in the subordinate position of power place on procedural justice concerns in some settings (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986). In particular, procedural justice concerns are especially salient to subordinates in procedures that involve emotionally disconnected parties interacting in rule based social settings (aspects which are central to surveilled subjects’ encounters with agents of surveillance at Pearson). This relationship can be framed through the lenses of instrumental concerns (fair procedures are perceived as a means of achieving just outcomes) or non-instrumental concerns (fair procedures symbolically communicate relational information about oneself and one’s standing relative to the administering authority). Instrumental and non-instrumental concerns have been used in combination to explain the relationship between
distributions of power in procedures and fairness judgments (e.g., Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Mossholder et al., 1998; Tyler, 1990). Ultimately, a wealth of research suggests that perceptions of power differentials and the application of power are related to evaluations of justice (and, thereby, affective, attitudinal and behavioural responses). Participants’ references to the concept of power in relation to their encounters with surveillance at Pearson reflected this same connection. Participants were keenly aware of the power differential in place during their interactions with agents of surveillance in this setting, with 27 participants providing 39 references to the concept of power. These references indicated attention to several main themes: perceptions of power differentials, explanations for perceptions of subordination, and support for unequal power.

Most participants who referenced the concept of power expressed unease or anxiety associated with their relatively subordinate position. This is not particularly surprising; positions of dependency in a procedural interaction generally prompt the party with less power to become acutely aware of their treatment (Mossholder et al., 1998), and, in relation to encounters with surveillance at Pearson, participants tended to contextualize awareness of unequal power negatively. For instance:

“Usually when you get stuck in the ‘S’ queue, you know, the lineup. And you meet the first guy and he’s just reading a ticket but he still talks to you like you’re a subordinate, like you’re...lower than him, you know: “I told you this!” ...well pardon me...things like that.” – Participant 1

“I feel like there is a power differential there. Just in the way you pile things, or what you take off, or the way you answer a question; if it’s not to their expectations you quickly notice a difference.” – Participant 14

These participants’ quotes are representative of the sentiments of most participants who discussed power. In short, participants tended to be well aware of the fact that power distributions were unequal in their interactions with agents of surveillance at Pearson, and that
travellers were in the position of subordinate power. Furthermore, participants often implied that a particularly irritating aspect of this power differential related to authority demands for specific practices, which participants seemed to interpret more as unnecessary bureaucratic insistences of the procedure rather than functional necessities. However, beyond simply indicating an awareness of the power differential present in the situation, participants also considered various factors that shaped their perceptions of relative subordination.

Participants referenced a variety of explanations to account for their understandings of power relations in place during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson; specifically, their perceptions of low status relative to agents of surveillance in the setting. The factors broached ranged from very serious to comparatively innocuous concerns, and I have chosen to present participants’ quotes using that continuum. The relatively serious concerns associated with power differentials in this context focused on either the agents of surveillance or the procedure more generally. Comments pertaining to agents of surveillance tended to centre on fears associated with the amount of power and the capacity for discretion held by these decision-makers. Overall, the majority of participants who referenced serious negative power concerns focused on the individuals facilitating the interaction more so than the process in general in their comments. For example:

“I know that they’re in a position to make your life miserable if they think they have to or if you strike them the wrong way I guess.” – Participant 29

“That you’re scared enough to think that one person, if it was a bad day for them, could make trouble for you. I know it could only go so far if you didn’t do anything wrong, but still, it could be that whole hassle and inconvenience if somebody did that. Which, I guess if they didn’t like you or were suspicious, they could do.” – Participant 28
Further, as participant 28 implies, other participants clearly articulate that the personalities of agents of surveillance factor into concerns associated with the potential for abuses of power. For instance:

“In a way…just because you’re being watched...just a scrutinizing kind of vibe. So, to a degree, and sometimes they’re just kind of like…they just seem almost like domineering personality sort of people.” – Participant 15

While most participants who questioned the potential attitudes and actions of agents of surveillance at Pearson left their critique at the individual level, Participant 4 offers a sophisticated comment on how individual acts of mistreatment can transition to systematic problems:

“And, like I mentioned with borders, this potential for unchecked power, it creates the opportunity for structural inequalities or injustice.” – Participant 4

Participant 4’s astute statement leads me to the other genre of participants’ relatively serious concerns regarding perceptions of power relations in these encounters; those associated with the process more generally. Fewer participants directly characterized their concerns over power relations in encounters with surveillance at Pearson in this way; however, the statements drawn from those who did are complementary to aforementioned procedural justice concerns. Before I clarify this statement, allow me to present the quotes:

“I feel like I’m in the middle of a lot of people and things that observe me and have power to do what they want to me and that’s really bad. I have the rights to be here but I can’t practice them. I’m uncertain if I actually have a right here and that’s really stressful. The officers can do what they want based on their stereotypes and prejudice. I feel racism there.” – Participant 35

“My feeling at the airport is that they can do whatever at the airport. They can keep you there. Because of that I feel powerless. Back to the nationality thing, if I was born in Canada and I was at the airport I might treat them differently, but right now it’s just like no resistance at all. They’re in power and I’m not and I have to do whatever they say...I always have this fear that something might go wrong and it’s mostly because I don’t see myself entitled as coming into Canada. I have this fear that the power is not balanced and I feel like there’s nothing I can do.” – Participant 36
These statements are indicative of low evaluations of procedural justice on the basis of both relational and instrumental concerns. Participant 35 directly references an aspect of the relational concern of neutrality: bias. She suggests that the policies governing the procedures in place grant agents of surveillance too much discretion; a sentiment echoed by Participant 36. However, both participants also explicitly address a distinct awareness of a lack of process control; an instrumental concern. Both participants describe perceptions of being disenfranchised of their rights due to the power relations in place in a way that denies them process control. Participant 36 specifically illustrates this as an outcome-oriented (instrumental) concern by noting his fear “that something might go wrong;” implying that he will not be permitted to travel. However, while these comments are demonstrative of the most severe concerns raised regarding power relations in encounters with surveillance at Pearson, other participants spoke to substantially less serious concerns.

Although participants generally recognized that objective power differentials are incorporated into an interaction with an agent of surveillance at Pearson, many participants also acknowledged that subjective perceptions might affect their relative comfort with their subordinate position. In other words, some participants suggested that their anxieties over the power differential might be attributed to relatively innocuous concerns such as situational familiarity and knowledge. Some participants approached the concept of power through references to control, characterizing the relative comfort levels of travellers and agents of surveillance in this setting as products of varying levels of familiarity with the environment. For example:

“You’re nervous because you’re not in control; you’re in their domain.” – Participant 33
“It is something that they are used to and work with every day and, for me, as a passenger who only flies out of Pearson maybe once a year, you’re not used to that kind of cold and sterile security check so I guess that’s why I would feel more anxious and out of my element while they would feel more relaxed. In control; they are the ones calling the shots there.” – Participant 16

In these quotes, Participants 33 and 16 link feelings of unease to perceptions of a power differential (namely, the position of control held by the agent of surveillance), but, they characterize control rather benignly in terms of the agent’s relative comfort in the situation rather than a result of more serious concerns such as unbridled authority. Participant 17 echoes this sentiment but layers the notion of situational familiarity with that of transparency (which, recall, is used in the procedural justice literature as an indicator of trust). Specifically:

“The border officers, they know who they’re looking at and what they’re looking at, as for me, I don’t know who they’re looking at and what they’re looking at. I mean, if I was a criminal I’d be like: ‘Oh man, are they looking at me?’ But I’m squeaky clean so I’m not worried if they pull me into a room, but I’ll definitely feel different from them because, on their side, they’re the ones doing the surveillance, they know who and what they’re looking at and why they’re looking at that person, so yeah, I definitely feel differently than them.” – Participant 17

While Participant 17 couches his perception of a power differential relative to agents of surveillance in references to control and familiarity (i.e., “they know who and what they’re looking at and why they’re looking at that person”), he also suggests that his position of relatively low power is a product of his comparative ignorance in the situation (i.e., “I don’t know who they’re looking at and what they’re looking at”). Other participants also commented on an awareness of limited transparency in conjunction with references to power relations. For instance:

“I feel like...I don’t necessarily know how they’re watching and I’m always very aware of the fact that there is surveillance going on but I’m not sure about what kind...so, it makes me question you know if I say or do something that looks strange that...I would question less if I knew exactly what was going on or what they were watching for, which they do. But I think that would kind of negate some of the security aspect behind it.” – Participant 41
As Participant 41 indicates, although feelings of discomfort associated with the power differential between travellers and agents of surveillance at Pearson might be, in part, shaped by perceptions of transparency, not all participants felt that total transparency would be advantageous to one of the functions of surveillance in this context: detecting security threats. Some participants explicitly expressed the importance of maintaining power differentials between surveilled subjects and agents of surveillance in this setting. For example:

“I feel like they use power and intimidation. But, I’m aware that they’re doing their job of trying to prevent anything negative from happening in the airport and it’s so serious that it’s intimidating...” – Participant 10

“I think that’s important; that they have the power. I think that in a situation, personally, I’m not prepared to do anything wrong when crossing the border, but I think that it’s important that the ones who are supposed to stop you are the ones who feel like they’re empowered and you should have a sort of...respect for them at least so that you don’t try to step over your boundaries.” – Participant 2

These comments represent the willingness of many participants to tolerate a high degree of “power distance” between surveillance agents and subjects in encounters at Pearson. “Power distance refers to the extent to which inequality among persons in different positions of formal power is viewed as a natural (and even desirable) aspect of the social order” (Brockner et al., 2001, p.302). Many participants placed a high degree of emphasis on safety and security as key objective and subjective outcomes of surveillance policies and practices in place at Pearson (a finding that will be presented in Chapter 4), and, as Participant 10 and 2 imply, the important outcomes that agents of surveillance are responsible for helping to secure might be perceived as more easily attained through greater degrees of power distance.

In summary, a majority of participants provided some commentary on their perceptions of power relations embedded in encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Although participants did not always directly use the term “power,” they demonstrated an awareness of power relations
through descriptions of the relatively subordinate role of the traveller (e.g., limited process and outcome control) and the relative authority bestowed to the process and on the agents of surveillance (e.g., limited transparency and high discretion). Further, references to the concept of power were often framed in terms of relational procedural justice concerns. One final reference that warrants presentation here was drawn from Participant 7’s narrative. Specifically:

“I mean, they always seem to have power trips and even when they’re not just doing it to me, like not singling me out, I feel I’ve been with groups of friends and had some negative experiences but it depends on the person of course. When those situations have come up where I’ve felt different, I’ve definitely felt as if they were...not interrogating, but were suspicious of me as a person and my intentions and it causes me to assume that I’m not like them, that’s why they’re asking me these things.” – Participant 7

While Participant 7’s comment clearly serves as another example of awareness of power differentials between travellers and agents of surveillance at Pearson, it also incorporates the concept of group membership, which forms the foundation of relational understandings of procedural justice.

**Group membership.** In particular, Participant 7’s description of how interactions with agents of surveillance at Pearson cause her to feel “different” and “assume that I’m not like them” is indicative of an evaluation of group membership status. In the procedural justice literature, the concept of “group membership” refers to evaluations of personal identification with and belonging within a group of persons (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Groups to which the concept is applicable range from very small (e.g., family or friendship networks) to very large (e.g., corporations to nation-state affiliations). However, regardless of group size, the basic assumption of relational understandings of procedural justice remains constant: Group identification is psychologically rewarding to individuals and, thus, group membership is important (Lind & Tyler, 1988). This central pillar of relational understandings of procedural justice serves as the rationale for the effects of non-instrumental
aspects of treatment (i.e., respect, trust, neutrality). Specifically, attention to these relational concerns by authorities is important because they serve as indicators of group inclusion for less powerful persons (Tyler, 1989; Tyler, 1994; van Prooijen, van den Bos & Wilke, 2004). Many participants offered thoughtful commentary on how their encounters with surveillance at Pearson made them feel, which suggested attention to group membership, with 23 participants providing 43 references to the concept. Participants’ references to group membership were illustrative of one of two perceptions: inclusion or exclusion.

“People want to understand, establish, and maintain social bonds” (Tyler, 1994, p.851). This underlying assumption is embedded in all relational explanations of procedural justice effects, and is helpful in understanding the non-instrumental concerns that have been repeatedly identified as important in interactions with authorities. This assumption has been validated in many studies, and, in this study, participants’ accounts of how encounters with surveillance at Pearson made them feel also demonstrated this sentiment. Similar to previous results, although participants’ narratives indicated conflicting experiences (some described perceptions of inclusion while others described perceptions of exclusion), participants’ collective positions signify a shared attention to relational procedural justice concerns. Notably, much more detail regarding the effects of perceptions of exclusion was provided by brown participants. White participants tended to only minimally engage with the concept of group membership, usually implying an affiliation between whiteness and de facto advantages associated with dominant group inclusion. For example:

“I’m in a fairly lucky position of being in one of the most favoured groups in history. So, I don’t expect that, even in the past when I was younger and had long hair and it was at a time that I travelled a lot, I never had any problems with it. I never felt that I was singled out or anything like that.” – Participant 24
“I don’t usually have any troubles at all, but that could be the way I look. It might be stereotyped in my favour because I’m white and I don’t wear any religious clothing.” – Participant 39

(With that, I leave the quotes drawn from white participants’ narratives behind, moving on to brown participants’ quotes.) However, Participant 12 definitively provides the strongest description of the concept of group membership through the standpoint of inclusion. Specifically:

“I guess emotionally I feel secure by that expectation [that I will not be targeted by surveillance at Pearson]. A big part of me feels it’s an achievement absolutely. I think, being a person who wasn’t born in Canada, to feel that way, like, not feeling targeted or anything like that, so I feel very secure and very accomplished. I don’t know why I feel accomplished (laughs) because I’m not doing anything, but I feel that maybe as a culture I feel that maybe I’m more a part of progressive culture because I’m able to pass through those security checks because I don’t feel harassed or targeted in any way. It makes me feel included I guess as well.” – Participant 12

Participant 12’s comment speaks to the positive effects that perceptions of group inclusion have been found to produce on personal as well as group evaluations. In particular, indicators of group inclusion have been found to enhance self-evaluations, such as identity, respect and esteem (Smith et al., 1998; Tyler, 1989; 1994), as well as increasing positive evaluations associated with the group in question, such as legitimacy and pride (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, Degoe & Smith, 1996). Participant 12 directly connects her positive emotions of personal security and cultural pride with perceptions of group inclusion as conveyed through encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

While the symbolic message of inclusion is communicated through fair procedures, group exclusion is an outcome of unfair procedures (Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Brown participants more frequently described experiences and perceptions that demonstrated an awareness of group membership through the standpoint of exclusion. For example, Participant 36
describes feeling concerned that he appears different from white travellers at Pearson, noting a number of steps he takes to mitigate his potential for exclusion:

“I would say I feel the difference and for me it’s mostly...I’m very careful at the airport not to do anything which separates me from the crowd and I’m pretty sure that someone born in Canada does not have that fear, and if they do have that fear it’s not as strong as mine. I don’t want to be the guy standing out of the crowd because I feel that any question could just ruin my trip because of my nationality, because of how I look, because I’m in Canada. Because of that I’m very careful. I try to be as calm as I can. I don’t make any eye contact. I just try to get to my flight. I’m pretty sure they’re watching us and if you move around a lot something is going to happen and I try to stay with the crowd as much as possible. I see other people who are white and they don’t really care, they just do what they want, they’re having fun, they’re laughing, and I can’t do that. Whenever I’m at the airport too, I only talk in English. I want to look just like the other guys.” – Participant 36

Similar to Participant 36’s characterization of feeling “different,” participants 13 describes an affective response to feeling different from other travellers:

“If you’re the only person singled out everyone else in line can see you. It’s embarrassing and it makes you look out of place and I think that especially if you’re dressed a certain way it reinforces that stereotype. It puts thoughts in peoples’ minds especially at airports because of past events and it creates more nervousness and anxiety. It can make you feel a different way, as though people are looking at you in a different way.” – Participant 13

Perceptions of group membership are undermined by exclusionary practices (Tyler, 1994; van Prooijen, van den Bos & Wilke, 2004). Furthermore, the perception of exclusion is associated with a variety of negative affective responses (e.g., anxiety, depression, hostility; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Nezlek et al., 1997), many of which are represented in the quotes of participants who recount perceptions of exclusion (e.g., exclusion from their friends, from other travellers, or from other Canadians more generally).

In summary, approximately half of participants offered some references to the concept of group membership, though not always through the exceptionally clear language of inclusion or exclusion; participants also engaged the concept through related terms such as, ease versus difficulty or similarity versus difference. Relational explanations of procedural justice would
contend that evaluations of fairness (as determined by the aforementioned relational concerns) serve to communicate messages of group membership (specifically inclusion or exclusion) which affects travellers’ perceptions of and responses to the procedure, its outcomes, and its administering authorities, both within and beyond specific incidents (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Participants’ narratives offer support for this contention, suggesting attention to indicators of group membership, particularly perceptions of exclusion. Most importantly, given the centrality of concerns over group membership to relational models of procedural justice, participants’ references to an awareness of relative inclusion or exclusion during encounters with surveillance at Pearson lends credence to the value of using such models to better understand the subject’s experience of surveillance in this context and perhaps others. When considered in isolation, participants’ references to respect, trust and neutrality, as well as power and group membership, might seem unimpressive or unconvincing, however, when considered in their totality, nearly every participant in this study indicated at least some attention to relational procedural justice concerns in describing their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. That is no coincidence; surveilled subjects’ experiences with surveillance at Pearson are shaped, at least in part, by relational procedural justice concerns.

**Discussion: Towards a Consistent Understanding of the Surveilled Subject’s Perceptions and Reactions**

Surveillance studies will be advanced by seeking out or developing theories that are able to consistently explain and predict people’s attitudes and behaviours during encounters with surveillance. There are many factors to consider when working towards theoretically consistent explanations, and I do not intend to imply that all surveillance encounters can be understood through a single theoretical framework. For instance, surveillance takes many forms.
Surveillance can be experienced by a subject in a direct relational way during interactions with agents of surveillance (ranging from parents to police officers); on the other end of the spectrum, surveillance can be devoid of human interaction, leaving surveilled subjects to barely notice their encounter (such as algorithmic monitoring of consumption interests via online browsing). Likewise, one’s relation to surveillance may affect expectations, interactions and evaluations of surveillance. Specifically, agents of surveillance, targets of surveillance and third party observers (individuals who are not an agent or target of surveillance) may all interpret and engage with the same surveillance encounter uniquely. These are only two examples of factors requiring consideration when attempting to understand and explain the effects of surveillance on the individual. They demonstrate the malleability of the concept of surveillance contextually and indicate the importance of exploring varied theoretical explanations of peoples’ attitudes and behaviours associated with surveillance encounters; carefully considering the factors most relevant to the situation in question.

However, robust theoretical explanations will not simply be applicable to a single research project but will allow for contextually similar surveillance encounters across varied situations to be understood relatively consistently. This advances the field of surveillance studies by allowing discrete research projects to pool knowledge, establishing a theoretical explanation’s utility in a host of applied settings and allowing scholars in the field to make more credible claims about their findings to other academics, the public and practitioners. My dissertation contributes to this goal by identifying a theoretical framework that might help consistently explain the effects of surveillance (in specific contexts), and then exploring the utility of that theory in a relevant situation.
In particular, I explored the experiences of surveilled subjects – of targets of surveillance – and assessed whether procedural justice concerns (specifically relational understandings of procedural justice) are relevant to their experiences with surveillance. Given the focus on direct interactions between decision-making authorities and decision recipients in the procedural justice literature I focused this case study on a situation in which participants are acutely aware of the high extent to which they are being surveilled and which involves direct (as well as indirect) interactions with agents and technologies of surveillance: border crossings at Pearson International Airport. As such, while the findings discussed here are most representative of the experiences of these 47 participants in this particular setting, the findings also offer a bridge to consider whether relational procedural justice concerns may be relevant for surveilled subjects in other situations that involve similar contexts (i.e., high visibility and direct interactions with surveillance agents/technologies), the implications of which will now be discussed more fully.

Relational Understandings of Procedural Justice and the Surveilled Subject at Pearson

Data analysis revealed that participants were attentive to relational procedural justice concerns during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson; in particular, the core concerns of respect, trust and neutrality were all embedded in a number of participants’ narratives. For example, perceptions of respect were mentioned in relation to evaluations of the extent to which treatment by agents of surveillance at Pearson approximated appropriate status recognition. These references align with early (Tyler, 1989; 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992) as well as more recent contributions to the procedural justice literature (e.g., Bradford, Murphy & Jackson, 2014; Mazerolle et al., 2012; Mazerolle et al., 2013), by linking the concept of respect to interpersonal interactions that were perceived as polite, dignifying and considerate of personal rights. Voice was an indicator of respect that was especially emphasized by participants. As has been
repeatedly demonstrated in the procedural justice literature (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Bradford, 2011; Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990), participants characterized voice as a measure of the respect that the procedure in general and the agent of surveillance specifically bestowed on them.

Similarly, references to trust were embedded in participants’ narratives, with comments focusing on the extent to which the surveillance procedure and agents of surveillance at Pearson seemed trustworthy. As in the procedural justice literature, the concept of trust was connected to perceptions of reasonable and benevolent treatment (Tyler, 1989; 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Participants were attentive to whether they found the procedure and its administering authorities to be trustworthy, and often questioned this important aspect of fairness on the basis of limited transparency. As has been noted in the procedural justice literature, decision-makers are often granted their authority on the basis of specialized knowledge and experience that decision-recipients acknowledge they do not possess; as such, the appropriateness of authorities’ decisions are partly founded on trust (Tyler, 1994; 2004). As a result, procedural consistency is often a means by which the reasonableness of an outcome is evaluated, rather than an assessment of the outcome itself. However, evaluations of procedural consistency are dependent on procedural transparency. A variety of participants emphasized their inability to trust the surveillance policies and practices in place at Pearson on the basis of limited procedural transparency. Procedures and authorities that yield low perceptions of trust have consistently been found to be associated with low perceptions of legitimacy; causally speaking, inattention to relational procedural justice concerns, particularly trust, decreases perceptions of legitimacy (Murphy, 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). In line with these findings, participants’ narratives often intertwined references to transparency and legitimacy through comments that also suggested a positive correlation between the two concepts.
Finally, many participants referenced the concept of neutrality. Participants’ statements demonstrated compatibility with longstanding relational understandings of procedural justice effects (Antrobus et al., 2015; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Sargeant et al., 2014), by linking the concept of neutrality to interpersonal interactions that were perceived as unbiased, objective and administered with equality. An indicator of neutrality that was particularly emphasized by participants was perceptions of bias. Procedural justice research has traditionally found concerns over bias to be attributed to either general procedural inconsistencies or the application of personal bias by decision-makers (Murphy, Sargeant & Cherney, 2015; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Again, participants’ engagement with this aspect of procedural justice was largely consistent with the literature, although, many participants also incorporated perceptions of “targeting” as an additional concept that seemed related to perceptions of bias and the concern of neutrality when describing their encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

The results suggest that participants are attentive to the treatment-oriented concerns that constitute relational models of procedural justice; not only by providing references to the concepts of respect, trust and neutrality directly, but also by collectively mentioning all of the indirect indicators of these concepts identified in the procedural justice literature. Therefore, the evidence indicates that, in this context, surveilled subjects are attentive to relational procedural justice concerns; treatment-oriented concerns were embedded in participants’ descriptions of their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Furthermore, the results also provide empirical support for the relevance of relational models of procedural justice as a means by which to consistently understand the variety of experiences of surveilled subjects (both positive and negative). The results sections pertaining to positive characterizations of procedural concerns as well as minority status variations are highly useful in this regard. The material in these sections
demonstrates that even when participants characterized their experiences with surveillance at Pearson very differently (ranging from positive to negative), they engaged with procedural justice concerns consistently. In other words, regardless of whether participants relate their encounters with surveillance at Pearson as positive or negative, they still frame these experiences through references to relational procedural justice concerns. For example, when participants characterized their encounters with surveillance at Pearson as satisfactory, they often did so through references to treatment that was respectful, trustworthy and/or neutral. Therefore, importantly, when participants indicated attention to relational concerns in this setting, the experiences they related varied but their concerns remained consistent.

Similarly, the comparison of white and brown participants’ different but complementary statements on neutrality endorses this same finding, demonstrating attention to the relational procedural justice concern of neutrality across the sample but with varied experiences apparent between groups (white and brown participants). Although approaching the topic from different frames of reference, collectively, participants’ comments were highly supportive of each other. Recall that when references to neutrality were separated on the basis of minority status, it became clear that brown participants reported greater perceptions of bias and targeting than white participants. While the primary strength of this research is its ability to demonstrate participants’ attention to relational procedural justice concerns in encounters with surveillance, as an aside, the extent to which white participants’ perceptions complemented brown participants’ experiences suggests that surveillance policies and practices at Pearson may actually suffer from a lack of neutrality. In situations such as this, surveilled subjects’ perceptions and evaluations of surveillance may come to be patterned around identity characteristics such as minority status, despite the insignificance of such factors once procedural
justice concerns are taken into account (see Hasisi and Weisburd (2011) for an experimental field study demonstrating this effect). Returning to the central argument, white participants and brown participants both drew on the concept of neutrality to help explain their very different experiences.

Collectively, the variation in participants’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson but consistency in their reliance on treatment-oriented concerns to frame these experiences indicates the value that relational models of procedural justice offer to theoretically consistent understandings of the surveilled subject. This contention is further evidenced by the fact that all of the findings are consistent with the existing procedural justice literature. Ultimately, treatment (especially attention to respect, trust and neutrality) affects evaluations of a procedure and its administering authority, as well as the procedure’s outcome (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Blader, 2003). The results indicate the relevance of procedural justice concerns in shaping attitudinal and behavioural responses to surveillance procedures, the outcomes of those procedures, and the agents of surveillance administering those procedures.

**Additional procedural justice concerns: Power and group membership.** Further corroborating the argument that understandings of procedural justice may offer insight on the attitudes and behaviours of surveilled subjects in some contexts are the results associated with power and group membership. To begin, power relations, as noted previously, are an aspect of interactions between decision-makers and decision-recipients, and, as such, are considered in the procedural justice literature (e.g., Brockner et al., 2001; Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Mossholder et al., 1998). Participants’ narratives indicated an attention to power relations during encounters with surveillance at Pearson, and references to power relations were generally founded in relational procedural justice concerns. In particular, concerns over general abuses of
power were discussed in terms of respect (rudeness), trust (questionable benevolence and limited transparency), and neutrality (systematic and individual bias); however, trust based concerns seemed particularly salient to discussions of power.

The general results on “trust” provide evidence that participants were attentive to transparency as an indicator of trustworthiness, which is connected to evaluations of legitimacy. Building off this, comments on “power” that incorporated the concept of trust help illustrate how perceptions of power relations are bound up with procedural concerns in encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Specifically, unequal power relations enhance a preference for assurances by subordinate parties that authorities’ decisions are just (Mossholder et al., 1998), and, attention to relational concerns in procedures (such as trust) has been found to enhance justice evaluations (Mazerolle et al., 2013). As such, the power differential between travellers and agents of surveillance at Pearson may be particularly unnerving to surveilled subjects when the procedure does not indicate attention to relational concerns. This is yet another example of the relevance of using procedural justice to better understand the experience of the surveilled subject. The finding is important because it suggests that participants are concerned with power relations as an aspect of encounters with agents of surveillance, in part, for relational reasons.

Likewise, the significance of relational concerns to participants in their encounters with surveillance at Pearson is bolstered by references representative of attention to the concept of group membership. As already noted, the assumption that group membership is highly valued by individuals lies at the heart of the explanatory power of relational models of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Individuals are attentive to relational concerns during interactions because they serve as indicators of one’s status of inclusion or exclusion relative to a specific group. Group membership need not be based on any formal
initiations; even distant and tenuous relationships have been found to foster perceptions of group membership (Tyler, 1989). Participants’ comments on perceptions of inclusion and exclusion based on their encounters with surveillance at Pearson exemplify the breadth of the concept of “group membership.” While some participants specifically identified feeling similar or different relative to agents of surveillance or other travellers during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, other participants engaged with the concept of group membership more generally through references to “belonging” (most commonly through perceptions of exclusion from large and loosely defined groups such as legitimate travellers or legitimate Canadian citizens). As such, participants are not working with a singular notion of what group they might be included or excluded from. However, the fundamental importance of these results is that they again highlight participants’ underlying relational concerns during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Group membership is the cornerstone of relational models of procedural justice, and participants’ awareness of the concept of group membership through references to inclusion and exclusion, coupled with their attention to core relational concerns, are strong indicators of the usefulness of using relational models of procedural justice to better understand surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance in this context, but potentially others as well.

**Relational Understandings of Procedural Justice and the Surveilled Subject in General**

As a case study, my dissertation work simply demonstrates another setting in which the relationship between evaluations of procedures, evaluations of outcomes, and subsequent affective, attitudinal and behavioural responses has been found to adhere to relational procedural justice models (Blader & Tyler, 2009; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003). However, more generally, the wealth of consistent findings regarding this relationship in the existing procedural justice literature can be used to extrapolate the results in this surveillance context to
other similar surveillance contexts. Namely, I argue that other surveillance encounters that involve direct interaction with a decision-making authority are likely to be evaluated on the basis of similar concerns. This position is born from the longstanding foundation of relational understandings of procedural justice: that people’s evaluations of their experiences are shaped, at least in part, by concerns over the interpersonal functioning of groups, particularly the connection between individuals and authorities (Tyler, 1994). As such, finding that relational concerns are important to participants in their encounters with surveillance in this setting offers an important new direction for surveillance studies research to pursue in terms of understanding, predicting and even improving surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance by dedicating greater attention to the process of surveillance (although intentions of improving the subject experience of surveillance through careful attention to procedural concerns are grounded in the assumption that the surveillance in place is necessary, proportional, etc.). Very few studies have explored if and how the procedural application of surveillance affects surveilled subjects’ attitudes and reactions, but those that have demonstrate that process matters (see Di Domenico & Ball, 2011; Hasi, Margalioth & Orgard, 2012; Hasi & Weisburd, 2011).

Finding that participants were attentive to relational procedural justice concerns in their encounters with surveillance at Pearson offers a step towards developing policy and best practices reform that could improve travellers’ encounters with surveillance in this setting but also others that are similar (i.e., which involve a direct interaction with an agent of surveillance). In particular, demonstrating the relevance of the procedural justice literature to better understanding the surveilled subject’s experience is helpful in promoting the design and administration of surveillance perceived as just and legitimate, and also critical to furthering surveillant administrators’ institutional objectives of management and governance. As such, the
research extends beyond purely academic circles, making a substantive contribution to the spread of surveillance administered with attention to justice concerns. However, this finding also offers a substantial contribution to theoretically understanding the surveilled subject’s experience as well as providing an empirical position from which to forward David Lyon’s longstanding emphasis that surveillance should be attentive to maintaining human dignity.

Historically, privacy has tended to be the focus of surveillance critiques. While privacy-oriented responses do provide a basis from which to garner public acknowledgment of the pervasiveness of surveillance in everyday life, this strategy suffers from important limitations. Fundamentally, the orientation encourages an individualistic rather than a social understanding of the problems surveillance can generate (Lyon, 2001). For example, life chances and choices are negatively affected by surveillance systems in a way that privacy-oriented critiques of surveillance are not equipped to deal with because the foundations of such a critique are grounded in human dignity concerns (Lyon, 2006). Privacy-oriented responses are largely unequipped to address social issues of how surveillance can effect fairness and equality among persons, particularly the implications of marginalization and hegemonic power maintenance. Beyond that, concerns over privacy have also been manipulated to serve as a rationale to enhance the scope of surveillance practices (Lyon, 2002). As such, some scholars have argued that critiques of contemporary surveillance practices are strengthened by adopting an ethical-orientation concerned with human dignity (notably, David Lyon and Gary Marx).

Lyon (2001) argues that the general surveillance principles that Marx (1998) forwards as key to upholding the dignity of persons – “not causing harm, fairness of treatment, meaningful choices for data subjects, and the avoidance of coercion and manipulation” (p. 177) – are highly relevant to surveillance applied for social sorting purposes. While the strength of this orientation
over a privacy orientation is in its capacity to move beyond individualistic concerns over the
effects of surveillance, this abstractness is also its primary limitation. The effects of surveillance
on human dignity are less tangible and more difficult to conceptualize and, as such, privacy-
oriented responses have reigned supreme (Lyon, 2001). However, surveillance can be critiqued
as an affront to human dignity more concretely through relational models of procedural justice
(which emphasize the effects of treatment-oriented concerns on perceptions of fairness and
satisfaction). As such, the theoretical models and measures associated with procedural justice
provide the means for empirically forwarding a critique of surveillance that has, thus far, had
difficulty moving beyond abstract conceptualization.

Furthermore, asserting that evaluations of surveillance encounters are at least partly
grounded in procedural justice concerns is not a conclusion limited to the micro level of analysis.
This linkage also allows surveillance studies scholars to more fully explore how the mechanisms
at work in surveillance procedures produce macro level effects. For example, participants
emphasized the importance of neutral treatment in surveillance procedures, and suggested that
encounters with surveillance at Pearson are hierarchically distributed, with white travellers
receiving “better” treatment in comparison to visible minority travellers in general, and brown
travellers in particular. In other words, participants related assumptions of and experiences with
bias at Pearson as negatively affecting visible minority travellers and relatively positively
affecting white travellers. Elsewhere, I presented a theoretical model concerning the outcomes of
discriminatory treatment at Canadian borders that incorporates the apathetic attitudes of white
travellers towards the current structuring of biased treatment at borders as one factor that may
courage a hierarchical structuring of citizenship (Saulnier, 2015). This argument is based, in
part, on research suggesting that white travellers were often complacent with, if not supportive
of, current racial profiling at Canadian borders (Helleiner, 2010; 2012). Complementing Helleiner’s findings, in this study I also found evidence that, despite admissions of unfair bias, advantaged parties did not express desires to actually confront applications of surveillance lacking neutrality. Relational models of procedural justice argue that biased treatment not only serves as an indicator of one’s low standing within or exclusion from powerful (in)groups, but also how similar others will be treated (Colquitt, 2004). In other words, a personal experience with mistreatment may transfer to assumptions that persons bearing similar identity characteristics will be similarly mistreated. When coupled with brown participants’ perceptions of or actual experiences with poor treatment, the apathy expressed by white participants may further communicate the existence of a structuring of treatment based on skin colour (amongst other factors) that positions visible minorities as relatively low, encouraging a hierarchical notion of citizenship that maintains the status quo.

However, relying on procedural justice to better understand experiences with surveillance may also present concerns for surveillance studies scholars. For example, contending that variations in treatment are a means by which to shape surveilled subjects’ evaluations of and encounters with surveillance raises the issue of “false consciousness.” Procedural justice scholars have long shown an awareness of the potential for perceptions of procedural fairness and satisfaction to be falsely induced through treatment that appears to be fair but is, in fact, patently unfair (Cohen, 1985; Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; MacCoun, 2005). Voice, in particular, has been identified as a factor that enhances procedural justice perceptions regardless of the actual value it offers to decision-recipients in terms of meeting instrumental (process control) or relational (respect) concerns. Ultimately, the findings associated with procedural justice do present a doubled-edged sword; they can be applied to objectively improve the fairness of
procedures, or they can be manipulated to co-opt compliance (MacCoun, 2005). The potential for abuse is addressed but unresolved in the procedural justice literature, perhaps best represented by the contention that relational models of procedural justice “do not address normative issues concerning whether people ought to defer to legal authorities and generally obey the law” (Tyler, 2003, p.285). In other words, procedural justice scholars tend to adopt the position that ill-intended applications of procedural justice findings can lead to abuses of power, however, simply because these findings could be misused does not negate the reality of their importance or positive value when employed for well-intended reasons. This is the position I am also inclined to adopt when considering the applicability of procedural justice to surveillance studies. When all façades associated with encounters with agents of surveillance are stripped away, we are left with an interaction with an authority figure responsible for making a decision, in which attention to relational concerns helps put surveilled subjects, as decision-recipients, at ease with the experience. Normative issues associated with the appropriateness of surveillance in general or particular applications in specific contexts, as well as the manipulation of treatment to induce compliance through false perceptions of procedural fairness, are beyond the scope of this inquiry. Having addressed this crucial point, I now return to the crux of this chapter.

**Key Contentions**

Participants were attentive to relational procedural justice concerns in describing their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. I believe this finding can be extrapolated to better understand the experiences of surveilled subjects at Pearson International Airport specifically as well as in similar encounters with surveillance more broadly. The finding offers important direction for future studies exploring surveilled subjects’ affective, attitudinal and behavioural responses to encounters with surveillance. Procedural justice perceptions have been
demonstrated to produce important consequences, many of which are relevant to understanding
the effects of surveillance. Specifically, attention to procedural justice concerns shapes
satisfaction with the outcome(s) of a procedure (Mazerolle et al., 2012; Mossholder, Bennet &
Martin, 1998), outcome acceptance (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler & Degoe, 1995), and
evaluations of the legitimacy of outcomes and administrators (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler,
Degoe & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Furthermore, perceptions of legitimacy
encourage both specific and general behavioural compliance with outcomes and administrators
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Gibson, 1989; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). This body of findings,
coupled with the results presented in this chapter, suggests that attention to relational concerns in
surveillance encounters that involve a direct interaction with an agent of surveillance will
improve surveilled subjects’ perceptions of their encounters with surveillance, making for a more
pleasant surveillance encounter (assuming that the surveillance is appropriate and worth doing at
all). Furthermore, attention to procedural justice concerns offers advantages for administrators of
surveillance as well, specifically, enhancing fairness and satisfaction evaluations of the
procedure, its outcome, and its administrators. In turn, these evaluations enhance perceptions of
outcome and administrator legitimacy, which encourages more co-operative and compliant
behavioural responses. As such, the results of this initial empirical investigation suggest that both
academic understandings and practical applications of surveillance may be advanced through the
continued integration of procedural justice into the surveillance studies literature. However,
given the emphasis placed on the subject in relational models of procedural justice, this endeavor
would be simultaneously advanced by dedicating greater attention to subject-oriented
understandings of surveillance, to which we now turn.
Chapter 5: Operationalizing Surveillance from the Perspective of the Surveilled Subject

This results and discussion chapter presents and discusses results of my research that pertain to the definition and assessment of surveillance from a subject-centred orientation. It starts with an overview of the effects of surveillance as related by participants. Specifically, the first section details participants’ accounts of the assumed outcomes of surveillance in general as well as the specific affective reactions that particular encounters with surveillance produce. These affective reactions provide insight on outcomes which may be causal effects of surveillance on persons. Following this I explore participants’ definitions of surveillance and its central attributes in both a specific and general context to develop a better understanding of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject. First, I present a breakdown of participants’ definitions of surveillance in a specific context (Pearson International Airport) and compare the defining elements highlighted to participants’ definitions of surveillance more generally (in everyday life). I also explore defining elements of surveillance that participants are less consciously aware of in a subsection dedicated to descriptions of “normal” encounters with surveillance. This information sheds light on how surveilled subjects define and, thereby, recognize encounters with surveillance. However, while the mere presence of surveillance may produce some affective reactions, a wider range of affective responses are likely associated with particular qualities of surveillance; the mechanisms at work in the procedure. In the next section of the chapter I review the positive and negative attributes participants’ associated with surveillance, and highlight the attributes common to both the specific and general context (i.e., Pearson International Airport versus everyday life), in the interest of identifying criteria that comprise perceptions of surveillance acceptability across contexts. The final section briefly addresses participants’ often bi-polar affective responses to surveillance and considers
psychological reactance and cognitive dissonance in combination as explanations for these sentiments. While some discussion is embedded in the presentation of these results, a detailed discussion section concludes the chapter.

The objective of this chapter is to draw attention to the importance of subject-centred understandings of surveillance (specifically the surveilled subject’s understandings of the defining elements and central attributes of surveillance across contexts); not in opposition, but in addition to the operator-centred understandings that currently dominate the field. Surveillance can be conceptualized from varied perspectives (Bloss, 2007). Emphasizing operator-centred understandings of surveillance limits surveillance studies by overlooking the subject-centred perspective, however, this does not mean that the subject-centred understandings I highlight below supersede the works of others; instead, I believe it complements them nicely, as I demonstrate in the discussion section of this chapter. While both perspectives are necessary to a holistic academic understanding of surveillance, the perceptions of the surveilled subject are essential to developing knowledge on the experience of surveillance. In particular, identifying consistencies in surveilled subjects’ understandings of surveillance across contexts is an important first step towards developing measures useful for assessing the affective, attitudinal and behavioural effects of surveillance for surveilled subjects.

Surveillance Effects

Although exploring effects of surveillance is not the focus of this chapter, the assertions I make above are embedded with an assumption: that surveillance does produce effects (specifically, effects on the individual’s affective state, attitudes and behaviours), and while this research is incapable of demonstrating causality, it is worth acknowledging the various reactions participants’ associated with their encounters with surveillance to bolster my assumption that
surveillance encounters do produce effects. Furthermore, future research interested in charting and anticipating the effects of surveillance more generally is advanced by work developing expectations of the effects of surveillance in particular contexts. Effects of surveillance include individual level reactions, but also broader social outcomes; both of which were referenced by participants. While the remaining sections of this chapter all distinguish between and compare participants’ statements regarding surveillance in a specific context (Pearson International Airport) and surveillance more generally (in everyday life), this section does not. Instead, descriptions of assumed social outcomes and individual level responses associated with surveillance only focus on participants’ experiences at Pearson. This focus was adopted because participants provided much more detailed responses on the effects of surveillance when reflecting on this specific context. Perceptions of the effects of surveillance in everyday life tended to reiterate the effects of surveillance at Pearson, but provide no new information. This may be a product of the fact that, without predefined options, people may have a limited ability to evaluate how surveillance affects them outside of specific and well-defined encounters. This makes identifying the common as well as unique effects of surveillance across varied contexts all that more important. Furthermore, although a range of possible surveillance effects are noted across the surveillance studies literature, surveilled subjects have rarely been given the opportunity to freely identify the effects of surveillance from their perspective.

Participants provided a good deal of commentary on how surveillance made them feel (which is the type of surveillance outcome that I am most acutely interested in), however, participants also described broader social outcomes that they assumed were associated with the use of surveillance. In particular, participants stressed three interrelated assumed social outcomes of surveillance at Pearson, specifically: safety, security and protection. All of these are identified
in the surveillance studies literature as assumed social outcomes of surveillance more broadly (Ball, 2003; Lyon, 2007; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006). However, these assumed outcomes of surveillance are something that can really only be tested in perception (i.e., that, in many contexts, surveillance makes people feel more safe, secure and protected), because actually evaluating these effects beyond perception is highly difficult. Surveillance likely does impact public safety, security and protection in a tangible way, however, empirical evidence supporting the assumed positive correlation between surveillance and these outcomes is limited (Gilliom & Monahan, 2012). Although I believe it is important to acknowledge these broader social outcomes of surveillance, my methodology in this study as well as my more general research interest in the socio-psychological study of surveilled subjects, prompts me to concentrate on the affective outcomes of surveillance for individuals. In the following subsections I present results that demonstrate the variety of affective responses reported by participants, broadly categorized as indifferent, positive or negative reactions.

**Indifferent.** Although all participants expressed some form of specific positive or negative affective response to surveillance, roughly one quarter of participants also directly indicated that they reacted with indifference to applications of surveillance at Pearson. For example:

“I guess indifferent would be a good way to put it. I accept that it is something I have to do. They’re doing it for a purpose, not their own...like they’re doing it for safety reasons and nothing else.” – Participant 16

“I wouldn’t say happy. Maybe...I don’t know...it’s kind of a more negative style of indifference. Not something that you look forward to by any means.” – Participant 15

Furthermore, some participants suggested factors associated with the application of surveillance that might influence their attitudes of indifference. For instance:
“It’s hard for me to say because being who I am and looking the way that I look. I take for granted the implications of these things. I think mostly I just feel indifferent. I don’t feel overjoyed by it, but I’m not angered either.” – Participant 4

“I’d say I’m pretty indifferent because I haven’t had a really bad experience.” – Participant 8

In total, 14 participants made references to reactions of indifference as a result of encountering surveillance at Pearson, and described their feelings quite uniformly. There simply was little variety to the concept of indifference, with the exception that some participants characterized their indifference as adopting a negative slant, as represented above by Participant 15. In contrast, positive and negative affective responses adopted a much wider variety of orientations.

**Positive.**

“Doesn’t bother me at all. I have positive feelings because I want them to look for problems.” – Participant 37

Participant 37’s quote exemplifies the general tone of participants’ positive affective reactions to encounters with surveillance at Pearson; highlighting a preference for surveillance in this setting due to its regulatory functions (in particular, the ability to “look for problems”). Many participants’ comments elaborate on Participant 37’s general positive reaction by engaging the concepts of safety and security to describe the positive feelings they associated with surveillance in this setting. Although similar, safety and security are distinct concepts. **Safety** refers to a feeling of the absence of harm and danger, whereas **security** is characterized by feeling actively protected from harm and danger (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). As such, security can be constitutive of safety, but both concepts are affiliated with distinctive qualities. However, participants tended to use the terms safety and security interchangeably, so, I have disregarded the actual term employed and relied on the underlying qualities described when presenting participants’ engagement with the concepts of safety and security.
References to feelings of security associated with the use of surveillance at Pearson were characterized by two core qualities: protection from harm and distress reduction. As a process, security involves deliberate guarding from harm, which can produce feelings of protection. Participants reported an appreciation for the feelings of protection they derived from the presence of surveillance at Pearson. For instance:

“So, I think it gives travellers a sense of security to see the amount of security there, so they’re at ease when they get on the aircraft and they know that everyone here went through an extensive search, some more than others for whatever reasons, but that there was a process of search that happened before the aircraft took off.” – Participant 17

“You feel protected. You’re being watched and it’s for a good reason. No criminal attacks. Nothing can harm you in that sense. So, yeah, I feel like it’s a form of protection.” – Participant 43

Perceptions of being safeguarded from deliberate harm were not only associated with feelings of protection but also a reduction in distress associated with travel. As a means of mobility, flying is frightening for many people in general and, post 9/11, fear tied to air travel crime, particularly the commandeering of aircraft by terrorists, took on a new priority level for many travellers (Lyon, 2002). The presence of surveillance at Pearson helped quell participants’ anxieties that the commission of deliberate harm in this setting would be successful. For example:

“It makes me feel safe because they can see if there is anything weird going on and stop it before it’s on the plane.” – Participant 39

“They [surveillance procedures at Pearson] make me feel good. Less stressful; since I’ve experienced travelling so much and haven’t dealt with anything bad at Pearson it makes me feel good. It makes me feel safe. It gives me an assurance that someone will be watching me for my safety. If anything will happen at the airport they will know I’m the one being attacked, not attacking.” – Participant 43

Participants 39 and 43 both speak to the concept of security by simultaneously acknowledging feelings of protection from harm and distress reduction; in addition, they both directly address the concept of safety.
Safety was the most popular concept used to describe the affective outcomes of surveillance at Pearson. (The term “safety” alone was referenced by 40 participants a total of 193 times). However, feelings of safety are complex, and so, while participants often stated that the use of surveillance at Pearson made them feel safe, these perceptions of safety emphasized two core features: assurance through presence and being at ease. As I previously mentioned, the concepts of security and safety are interrelated in that protection from deliberate harm through security practices can bolster perceptions of safety. Feelings of safety at Pearson were often described in terms of assurances. Specifically, participants tended to equate the visibility and quantity of surveillance at Pearson with enhanced feelings of safety. For instance:

“Going through the security...the checks that are done, to me I think that’s safe because it keeps me more safe and puts my mind at ease. To me, I just look for it now, I expect it. So, I’m looking around for it to see if they’re doing their jobs because it’s about my safety.” – Participant 25

“I think it’s safety. With greater quantity we have more safety and it’s good to feel safe.”
– Participant 27

Furthermore, perceptions of safety were often coupled with feelings of being at ease in the setting. Participants often described the use of surveillance at Pearson as having a comforting effect, helping them to feel safe. For example:

“I feel comfortable about it because I think that it’s necessary. If they have less security then I feel unsafe.” – Participant 42

“It’s an essential part of the experience. I feel that it’s a comforting experience, like if something were to happen or take place we could gather information and learn more about it.” – Participant 21

In total, 36 participants described positive affective outcomes when asked how the use of surveillance at Pearson made them feel. These references tended to be grounded in the concepts of security and/or safety. Participants often described the use of surveillance at Pearson as making them feel more secure and safe, however, narrowing these broad perceptions revealed
more specific affective reactions. In particular, participants indicated that the use of surveillance at Pearson affected perceptions of protection from deliberate threats, distress over flying, assurances of safety, and feeling at ease in the environment. However, many participants also expressed negative affective responses to the use of surveillance in this same context.

**Negative.** Although participants associated the use of surveillance at Pearson with the aforementioned positive affective responses, several negative affective outcomes were also described. Specifically, participants’ comments detailing unpleasant affective responses revealed four distinct effects: feelings of privacy violations, self-consciousness, frustration or anger, and stress.

Privacy based concerns are amongst the most common reactions to surveillance, so it is hardly surprising that many participants described feelings of personal invasion and intrusion when recounting their experiences with surveillance at Pearson. Most participants who mentioned privacy implied feelings of discomfort or unease associated with perceptions of personal scrutiny. For example:

“Because I feel like I’m doing the right thing and obeying the rules, I feel like it’s a bit of an invasion of privacy, but I understand that they have to do that and there is the rules, but...” – Participant 29

“I think...that surveillance sometimes goes way out of proportion. I think people are good by nature but that there are some exceptions and when you’re trying to force everyone who’s good to be put under surveillance they will ultimately think everyone is bad. So, I think people are being more individualistic and private because of more surveillance. I would say...it is a big issue for privacy.” – Participant 47

Most participants who mentioned privacy simply stated that encounters with surveillance can prompt perceptions of intrusion – engaging with expectations of privacy in this setting as relatively fixed and unchanging. However, Participant 47’s quote indicated a somewhat different position, hinting at an awareness of the relationship between surveillance and privacy that does
not treat expectations of privacy as static. The comment is in line with Nissenbaum’s (2004) position that expectations of privacy fluctuate contextually, and importantly that the concept is fluid rather than fixed. However, returning to the central focus of this subsection, participants broadly maintained that a negative affective response associated with the application of surveillance at Pearson was perceptions of privacy invasion.

Feelings of self-consciousness were another negative response associated with encounters with surveillance at Pearson reported by participants. While a number of participants mentioned this reaction, their descriptions ranged in severity. Most participants who said they felt self-conscious as a result of surveillance described the effect as relatively minor. For instance:

“I think about it in terms of shaping my behaviour a bit but then I basically forget about it.” – Participant 12

“I just feel anxious or self-conscious... just more aware of my surroundings. And it really is only when I’m in the line, I’ve never really thought of it outside of those areas.” – Participant 14

In these descriptions, feeling self-conscious is fleeting and tied to specific moments during the surveillance encounter. However, some participants equated feelings of self-consciousness with more severe forms of judgment and bias. For example:

“It [surveillance] makes you more self-aware and the truth is that once you become more self-aware, you cannot help but become more sensitive too. So, I think my current strategies involve an accommodation that lay the...I don’t want to say blame, but relying on myself to manage my own behaviour because I’ve now got to the point that I’ve had so many experiences that I’ve become a bit jaded and so I’ve also become preoccupied with not letting my own jaded attitude become visible. That plays out every single time now.” – Participant 11

As Participant 11 articulates, more severe perceptions of self-consciousness are not isolated to particular points in the procedure but expand to the surveillance encounter more generally. In addition, the implications are more longstanding; as opposed to being a brief and relatively minor consideration, perceptions of self-consciousness seem to become much more central and
consistent to the experience. However, feeling self-conscious was not the only emotional response participants ascribed to surveillance perceived as particularly judgmental or biased, many participants also indicated feelings of frustration and anger.

Although some participants reported feeling a degree of annoyance, irritation or frustration with the surveillance policies and practices in place at Pearson, it is worth noting that feelings of anger were generally conveyed alongside experiences with surveillance perceived as prejudiced and described as unfair, which were most often relayed by brown participants. Similar to self-consciousness, participants’ descriptions of the severity of their emotional response varied. For example:

“I do feel hurt sometimes. It’s just a relative feeling of being uneasy, it’s not fair I think that I have to feel this way when my friends who are doing the exact same things I’m doing but were born here and look like they belong here don’t even get a second glance usually. So, it’s definitely a feeling of just feeling a little wronged.” – Participant 7

“It makes you angry, however, at the same time, because you fall into a stereotype if you express that anger it works against you so that anger turns into fear so now it’s like what do these people want with me rather than I know my rights, back off.” – Participant 20

Participant 7 and 20 both make it clear that their feelings are tied to perceptions of inconsistent applications of surveillance in which they feel they are disadvantaged. Complementing these descriptions, Participant 34 offers the most direct link between encounters with surveillance perceived as discriminatory and feelings of anger:

“In our last time...like...so, my dad had a problem with his birth certificate and we actually got a letter saying he was a terrorist and we were made aware that we were being watched and our family was being interviewed in Canada and in India. It was CBSA sending us letters that we weren’t cleared to fly unless we were cleared from this possible threat. So, for a while, we were getting watched and surveilled and it was affecting our travel. We didn’t get to travel until the last second though, like, in terms of getting our visa clearance. So, we were considered terrorists and it was a lot of secret service type discussions with people. I felt angry because my dad wasn’t even alive anymore. So, why are we now having to deal with this? And, I’ve never even had a problem.” – Participant 34
Participant 34’s story provides a specific example of the linkage between surveillance perceived as unfair and feelings of anger that other participants described more generally. These particularly strong affective responses were the least common negative reaction described by participants, with eight participants describing these emotions. Alternatively, the more moderate affective response of stress was the most common negative effect of surveillance at Pearson referenced by participants.

Feelings of stress were described directly as well as indirectly through a variety of related terms, including: anxiety, tension, pressure, nervousness, annoyance, embarrassment, unease, fearfulness, and uncertainty. Participants grounded their feelings of stress in two central concerns: unanticipated consequences of data collection and misinterpretations. Some participants questioned the collection and dissemination of their data through surveillance at Pearson, expressing particular concern over their lack of insight on these processes. For instance:

“I get nervous. I don’t know why. I like the idea almost more so now of going through computer scans as opposed to having someone touch me, but again, it’s this whole Big Brother thing of going through a computer and somebody can see everything that’s going on. It just feels very violating. Not in a physical sense, but more so mentally. Like, what are they doing with this information? I do get nervous and feel my hands sweat sometimes; feeling anxious, you know, just wanting it to be over.” – Participant 19

In addition, although participants generally provided much more detailed accounts of the emotional effects of surveillance when focusing on the specific context of Pearson as opposed to the more general context of surveillance in everyday life, it is noteworthy that the most prominent negative affective outcome of surveillance in everyday life reported by participants was founded in this same concern. Specifically, the uncertain outcomes associated with the sharing of their information. For example:

“Fear and stress. I’m mostly uncomfortable with it [surveillance]. I see it should be there for some things, like banks and stores, but in general I don’t feel comfortable being watched mostly because I don’t know the outcomes of any of these things. I don’t know
where they go, I don’t know what they do with it, and I don’t know what’s going to happen if they come back to you.” – Participant 36

“I feel a little bit more uncomfortable with the surveillance in our daily lives just because I don’t know what good...like, suggesting websites to me based on tracking my history over months isn’t helping me in any ways. What if I don’t want this stuff? It’s not keeping me safe.” – Participant 39

As such, participants’ awareness of their inability to fully control the collection and dissemination of their data was linked to the production of stress, however, this lack of control also seemed to manifest stress through another avenue: concerns over misinterpretation of information. Many participants indicated the stressful effects of coping with concerns that surveillance might collect inaccurate data or that accurate data might be misrepresented. For instance:

“...I’m nervous when I cross the border. I’ve never had any trouble but it does make me nervous. I guess what I’m nervous about is being falsely identified or accused of something because I have no reason to be nervous when I cross the border but I just am.” – Participant 10

“It makes me nervous. Because I’m thinking about it, I think about negative images I’ve seen associated with crossings and just because I know I’m part of that target group. Emotionally, I guess I’m a bit nervous sometimes that something might go wrong. Most of all I guess I’m just nervous that I’ll be seen as doing something wrong.” – Participant 12

In addition, participants provided indications that they not only experienced stress psychologically, but also physiologically in the form of nervous sweating, shaking and elevated heart rate. For example:

“You automatically get this increased anxiety. It’s a greater awareness. But I also feel my body change, I feel like my blood pressure goes up and I feel a little warmer.” – Participant 1

“It’s a bit scary I suppose. That’s probably the best way I would describe it. So, it would be mostly the feelings of uneasiness and relief that you made it through. I think I have had some feelings of nervous sweating or shaking.” – Participant 18
None of the bodily responses described are particularly shocking or disturbing, but participants’ accounts of experiencing common physiological indicators of stress as an affective state do lend further credence to the possibility that stress is an effect of encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

Altogether, 39 participants described negative affective outcomes when asked how the use of surveillance at Pearson made them feel. In particular, participants’ expressed feeling violations of privacy, self-consciousness, frustration or anger, and stress. However, some participants also hinted at degrees of personal conflict regarding these statements by pairing descriptions of negative affective responses with statements devaluing these feelings (e.g., “I don’t know why I feel that way”) or validating the necessity of being made to feel these ways (e.g., “I understand that they have to do that”).

**Mixed emotions.** Although I presented positive and negative affective responses to surveillance separately in the preceding two subsections, most participants described both positive and negative reactions to the application of surveillance at Pearson in their narratives. The vast majority of participants indicated at least some form of underlying inconsistency between affective reactions to surveillance and, at times, participants directly spoke to their very mixed emotional responses. For instance:

“I would have to say surveillance only affects people who have something to hide or something to worry about. If I’m doing everything by the book, there’s nothing to be scared of. Generally, I guess you might think, why me? Another feeling would be just...frustration, but it’s also kind of relief. Like, you’re relieved that it’s there. It’s a necessary evil. It makes you feel good that it’s there, but also paranoid.” – Participant 33

“I...associate feelings of frustration because you’re trying to go through security as fast as you can but at times it can be very tedious and slow, but also an understanding thing where, you know, at the end of the day we’re feeling more secure and more safe about the way we travel. So, it’s kind of a bittersweet reaction.” – Participant 32
The mixed nature of participants’ affective reactions to surveillance at Pearson is very interesting and will be considered more fully towards the end of this chapter by drawing on the concepts of psychological reactance and cognitive dissonance, but, the objective of this section of the results was to identify the variety of affective reactions that encounters with surveillance at Pearson might produce for surveilled subjects. It is not my intention to suggest that any of these affective responses occur in isolation from one another, or to attempt to evaluate the hierarchical ordering of these affective reactions relative to one another for surveilled subjects (if a hierarchy exists at all); instead, I have simply embarked on the task of recognizing core affective outcomes of surveillance for surveilled subjects in a particular context. Participant 24 provides a near perfect example of the value of developing a clearer comprehension of the effects of surveillance:

“I wonder if some level of security gets enacted with regards to me...I wonder at what point I would begin to resist. Because, I support the idea generally, but that doesn’t mean that I don’t think they can cross the line and I’m not sure what it would take for me to just shut down, but, I could see that happening at some point.” – Participant 24

Understanding reactions to surveillance such as resistance requires acknowledgment of the multifaceted affective responses surveillance produces. The results presented in this section help identify surveilled subjects’ affective reactions to surveillance at Pearson that may also be usefully extrapolated to other, contextually similar surveillance encounters. Importantly, establishing empirical evidence of the causal effects of surveillance, particularly variations in effects based on the administration of surveillance procedures (as suggested in Chapter 3), necessitates developing a knowledge base of those effects and then testing them. However, a critical step required to make such a test possible is the awareness of clear and consistent criteria used to evaluate the presence of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject.
Defining Surveillance

A typical definition of surveillance used by surveillance studies scholars is “any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” (Lyon, 2001, p.2). This broad definition is both necessary and useful for the study of a topic as diverse as surveillance; it assists in providing the field with parameters, while also inviting a wide range of scholarship. However, given the relative inattention to the perspective of the surveilled subject in surveillance studies, it should not simply be assumed that definitions such as this one necessarily represent surveillance as it is understood by surveilled subjects.

To develop a better understanding of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject, I asked participants to define surveillance in a particular context (Pearson International Airport) as well as more generally (in everyday life). In this section, I first present results outlining the core descriptors participants used when defining surveillance at Pearson and then compare and contrast these characteristics to participants’ definitions of surveillance more generally. Following this review of the central features that participants consciously recognize as constituting surveillance, I dedicate a subsection to exploring the characteristics that might be subconsciously incorporated into surveilled subjects’ definitions of surveillance by drawing on participants’ descriptions of factors that are indicative of a “normal” surveillance encounter, again comparing and contrasting responses based on context.

**Defining surveillance at Pearson International Airport.** Participants’ definitions of surveillance at Pearson focused on three general components: process, sources and outcomes. Although not every participant incorporated all three of these components into their definition, a cumulative evaluation of participants’ responses reveals the centrality of these features to their
understandings of surveillance. To begin, 40 participants directly commented on what they believe the process of surveillance entails when offering their definition. “Watching” was unequivocally the most common descriptor, however, related terms included: checking, looking, observing, keeping track, monitoring, recording information, and data collection. For example:

“As watching and observing people as they go about their business at the airport. Kind of not being obtrusive but just watching.” – Participant 10

“Just being watched. Nothing else really.” – Participant 14

As evidenced by these comments, some participants’ definitions of surveillance at Pearson engaged with the process aspect very briefly, while other participants’ descriptions indicated greater attention to the details of the process. For instance:

“Surveillance is about being watched and monitored. Not only just you physically right there but also looking at your background and where you’re going and why you’re going. Just knowing every detail about your travel, as well as checking your luggage and seeing what you’re taking with you. It’s not just about watching you in that moment but knowing everything associated with that trip.” – Participant 13

“I think...that it means that there is a constant watch on you from the time you enter to the time you leave for the purpose of being able to track back and watch something if they need to as proof.” – Participant 18

Participants 13 and 18 also provide good examples of how participants tended to describe the process of surveillance temporally. Most participants who referenced a time frame in their description of the process did not feel that surveillance could be defined in terms of a particular instant but, instead, as the entire time one was at the airport, if not longer. However, all of the quotes presented thus far regarding participants’ descriptions of the process gloss over how or by whom surveillance is enacted.

Although many participants did not explicitly state who or what was “watching” them when defining surveillance at Pearson, some participants built on descriptions of the process by mentioning sources of surveillance. In particular, 13 participants cited various technologies
and/or agents that broadly reflected on the sources of surveillance at Pearson. In most cases, these statements were very general. For example:

“Mechanical and/or human use of technology to record, and/or observe people from a position that is not normally observable.” – Participant 11

“Being observed by anybody who works for any sort of security agency; state or private.” – Participant 24

“Surveillance means to me...being watched by anything, whether it’s through a third party object like a camera or whether it’s by an actual individual.” – Participant 38

In addition, some participants also mentioned more specific agencies, including CSIS and INTERPOL. For instance:

“Surveillance means security measures and national security, national interest, control of movement or movement of people and goods. And, I think of, like, INTERPOL. I think of a large network of security forces that are trying to collect data that is relevant, not just in Canada, but to fight or combat the sort of illegal markets of various sorts.” – Participant 12

Although direct comments on the sources of surveillance were only incorporated into a minority of participants’ definitions, the general emphasis in participants’ narratives on the varied technologies and agents that facilitate surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life prompts me to believe that the who and how of applying surveillance (sources) is an important component of the definition of surveillance for surveilled subjects.

The last aspect routinely mentioned in participants’ definitions of surveillance at Pearson were outcomes. In total, 28 participants referenced outcomes of surveillance, with key descriptors including safety, security, harm prevention and general information gathering. Some participants described personal effects, however, most participants who incorporated outcomes into their definitions focused on broader social effects. For example:

“Watching people approaching around the border; their behaviour. Making sure they’re not a risk or carrying anything that might be a risk or be harmful to anyone.” – Participant 22
“I’d say...watching over people in order to ensure threats are minimized.” – Participant 32

“Means to me...safety and security stuff that are necessary for every country to have. Canada’s not as harsh but I guess it’s not the safety. It’s supposed to be fair to everyone. It’s for everyone’s safety, the better the security is, the safer everyone is in the country.” – Participant 42

As evidenced by Participants 22 and 32, when describing the outcomes of surveillance, most participants imply the presence of dangerous “others” from whom surveillance serves as a form of protection; however, Participant 42 seems to adopt a slightly different position by highlighting the importance of fairness as an outcome of surveillance. The definition offered by Participant 45 suggests a similar stance:

“Making sure that things are safe and acting according to an ethical basis. So, if someone was to act unethically, there would be surveillance of that so they couldn’t claim they didn’t do it. Surveillance is to make sure that everyone crosses the border safely and is acting ethically.” – Participant 45

Both Participants 42 and 45 emphasize in their definitions that the outcomes of surveillance should prioritize fairness for all persons. While Participant 42 speaks to this position broadly, Participant 45 specifically suggests that ensuring the fairness of surveillance outcomes also involves using surveillance as an oversight mechanism to monitor the behaviour of agents of surveillance, not only the “usual” surveilled subjects.

Finally, while most participants directly acknowledged safety as the primary outcome of surveillance at Pearson, a number of participants engaged with the concept more indirectly through comments on data retention and analysis as outcomes of surveillance. For instance:

“Surveillance would be monitoring who and what goes through the airport or the crossing and can be reviewed and viewed at any time.” – Participant 27

“I guess tracking...tracking and looking out for anything safety related and keeping a record of it for the future.” – Participant 31
These participants tended to highlight the longevity of information obtained, maintaining that the data’s life span extends far beyond the moment when it was gathered and is subject to review at a later date.

In summary, participants’ definitions of surveillance in the context of Pearson incorporated three general components: process, sources and outcomes. Participants most commonly focused on describing what the act of surveillance entails (process), emphasizing watching with the implied intention of intervention if necessary. Far fewer participants explicitly noted the sources responsible for this process, but, those who did indicated that surveillance includes both human and technological elements, and, in this context, that surveillance is conducted by large, well-recognized agencies associated with national security. Finally, the majority of participants also integrated assumed outcomes into their definitions of surveillance, underscoring personal and public safety as achieved through immediate and retrospective threat minimization. Having established the core components and specific criteria of a definition of surveillance at Pearson as understood by surveilled subjects, I now move on to consider the contextual stability of that definition.

**Contextual variations.**

“To an extent, I think surveillance at any point in time is always about someone watching your behaviour, but it doesn’t have the same purpose in every situation, so it’s not always looking for the same things. So, while surveillance has sort of the same base meaning, in different contexts it can take on different properties depending on what it’s being used for.” – Participant 5

In this subsection I explore the contextual variations that exist between surveilled subjects’ definitions of surveillance by comparing the specific instance of surveillance at Pearson with surveillance encountered in everyday life. Participant 5 perfectly summarizes what I assess here; specifically, the continuity between surveilled subjects’ definitions of surveillance in a specific
and general sense. As with their definitions of surveillance at Pearson, participants’ definitions of surveillance in everyday life also highlighted the core components of process, sources and outcomes, but with some important distinctions.

To begin, some participants defined surveillance very similarly in both contexts. Specifically, five participants directly stated that they define surveillance at Pearson and surveillance in everyday life in the same way. For example:

“I think the definition is pretty much the same for me.” – Participant 10

“I think surveillance, overall, is the process of being watched. So, whether it is at Pearson airport or at a hospital or a casino, it’s still surveillance as being watched and security. It’s basically the same.” – Participant 17

In addition, although most participants felt differently than this minority, offering definitions that suggested variations between these two contexts, the process of surveillance was defined across both very consistently. In particular, participants again emphasized watching as a central characteristic of the surveillance process. This sentiment is demonstrated above by Participants 5 and 17, but also by Participant 32:

“I would say...surveillance means again watching over citizens who may pose a risk or just watching over citizens in a Big Brother way to minimize risk in society. I think it’s different than at airports. It’s more pervasive, more encompassing, in daily life. Border security is more strict and specific. Whereas surveillance in daily life is more encompassing, it impacts different segments of society.” – Participant 32

Although the process of surveillance was recognized as remaining relatively constant in both contexts, most participants did not describe the same sources and outcomes of surveillance at Pearson in comparison to everyday life.

Similar to definitions of surveillance at Pearson, definitions of surveillance in everyday life also tended to gloss over the sources of surveillance. However, participants who commented
on how and by whom surveillance in everyday life is conducted emphasized CCTV and various government agents as the central sources. For instance:

“I think surveillance would be more about watching. I guess just kind of keeping tabs on people through I guess primarily video sources or people like the police or various social services like that. And, I think, that the surveillance there is primarily to make sure that everything runs smoothly that, in theory, everything is dealt with fairly and rules are followed. That kind of thing.” – Participant 41

“Still being watched, being tracked, being observed in any form. In my daily life I would describe surveillance as being observed by any form of authority or government rather than being observed by just random people because you are being watched by just other people all the time. So, surveillance I would associate with some sort of governing body or authority figure in my day-to-day life. But still being watched, tracked, recorded in some form.” – Participant 38

Although the specific sources of surveillance identified by participants in their definitions of surveillance at Pearson and in everyday life are not identical, there is considerable continuity in a general sense. Specifically, definitions in both contexts highlight the use of technology to assist in surveillance as well as the perception that agents of surveillance tend to be authoritarian figures, typically with ties to government agencies. A somewhat similar pattern of results was associated with participants’ descriptions of the outcomes of surveillance.

When defining surveillance in everyday life, participants again underscored the important outcome of safety, as they did when defining surveillance at Pearson. However, instead of directly incorporating the outcome of safety into definitions of surveillance in everyday life, the concept was engaged with more tangentially through references to public order. For example:

“Outside of borders I’m not as aware of surveillance. I think I may be a bit more...when I see a camera in a public place…generally, I think surveillance would be...just a general population control, a mechanism by which you’re kind of controlling people through various technologies and methods to aid crime fighting units, gather more evidence in support of ongoing litigation, traffic control. That’s basically my idea of it.” – Participant 12

“I feel like in the context of daily life, security cameras and all that stuff, they’re definitely useful. I don’t feel like they...like I’ve never complained about having a
security camera up or having a security guard stationed somewhere public. I guess I’ve never really experienced anything negative when it comes to surveillance at any spot other than the border. In the context of daily life I think surveillance is more about maintaining peace and order. Like, if something does happen, not that you’re looking for something, than you have an idea of how it happened or who was involved, but there’s no active hunting for people or targeting in on certain people.” – Participant 7

In both contexts, surveillance was described as producing the outcome of public safety, however, participants’ emphasis on this outcome was much more foregrounded when defining surveillance at Pearson in comparison to surveillance in everyday life. In addition, although protection from threats and a more general feeling of safety were described as outcomes of surveillance in both contexts, participants’ definitions of surveillance in everyday life also expanded to incorporate a wider range of outcomes; broadly encompassed as practices of data mining. For instance:

“Having your information and whereabouts looked at by different people or companies and that being used to promote things to you or give you information about something around you. That’s what I think of [surveillance] outside of borders.” – Participant 27

“I see it [surveillance] as data mining. As my cell phone, Google, social media. Like, I don’t have anything that Google doesn’t know and that’s kind of fearful.” – Participant 36

Through statements such as these, it became clear to me that most participants recognized surveillance in everyday life as ubiquitous, fostering perceptions of widespread agreement regarding the process of surveillance, but that the sources and outcomes were somewhat nebulous; difficult to define and comprehend. Perhaps as a result of this uncertainty, many participants defined surveillance in everyday life by directly comparing it to surveillance at Pearson.

Participants who offered such statements provided sources of comparison for surveillance as defined in distinct contexts. Participant 4’s description of surveillance in everyday life relative to surveillance at Pearson provides an example of one such comparative statement:
“I think there’s a difference [between surveillance at Pearson and in everyday life]. When you associate surveillance and security at airports, it’s something that’s kind of a necessity, sort of an innate part of travelling. When you’re being surveilled in more of a public space then there’s some greater questions of the legitimacy of surveillance.” – Participant 4

Although Participant 4 provides an especially direct and critical assessment of surveillance in everyday life compared to at Pearson, many other participants demonstrated similarly thoughtful attention to contextual variations in the legitimacy of surveillance through comments addressing perceptions of privacy. Some participants described surveillance in everyday life as more invasive than surveillance at Pearson. For instance:

“I guess outside of the airport it seems a lot more invasive and creepy, like thinking about terms and conditions and being watched in difference senses. So, I guess at the airport it seems a little bit more normalized, but that outside of that it’s a bit more creepy. I’d describe it as more invasive.” – Participant 14

“I wouldn’t even really think about it in my daily life. Just because the circles I travel in really don’t require surveillance. I think of it as more intrusive in my day-to-day life in comparison to a border crossing in terms of wondering why someone is watching you and why you’re being put under surveillance when you’re just carrying on and not threatening thousands of people at an airport or something.” – Participant 29

Alternatively, other participants described surveillance in everyday life as less invasive than at Pearson, emphasizing comparisons of physical presence and ubiquitous exposure. For example:

“For my daily life I think surveillance is a lot more laid back. It’s not at the high security level that the airport has. I’d say the purpose is sort of the same but the process is much more laid back.” – Participant 8

“I think you’re being surveilled way more in your daily life than at an airport but that you care less about it. You’re watched as soon as you’re in public as well as things you do online. On a home level you’re being surveilled by people you know, especially your parents. I work at a nuclear power plant, the surveillance there is way worse than at an airport. I think you become numb to it, you have to because it’s too hard to focus on everything. I think if something is out of routine you notice it.” – Participant 33

Participants were fairly evenly split on whether they felt surveillance in their everyday life was more or less invasive than surveillance at Pearson, with eight participants describing surveillance
in daily life as more invasive and seven describing it as less invasive. Despite this discrepancy in interpretations, participants falling on both sides attributed their perceptions to the heavy presence of surveillance in everyday life. In its own right, this is an interesting finding about public knowledgeableability of surveillance. However, regardless of this acknowledged presence, many participants described being less aware of surveillance in their everyday lives compared to at Pearson. For example:

“I think that there’s a significant difference between border surveillance and daily life surveillance. In the sense that...border surveillance is much more serious, whereas daily surveillance may not be considered as serious and also the fact that we might be surveilled in our daily lives and not even know it whereas, when we’re going through a border, we have a heightened sense of awareness that we are being watched. So, it’s interesting to think that for all we know we could be being watched all the time but not think twice about it.” – Participant 19

“I guess it [surveillance in everyday life] would be the same types of procedures [as surveillance at Pearson], being on camera possibly and cell phone surveillance. It doesn’t feel as ominous in a way. It’s not as apparent, more behind the scenes kind of thing. I’m sure you are being surveilled but you don’t think about it as much as your experience in an airport.” – Participant 15

As indicated by these statements, participants felt confident that surveillance is a fairly constant aspect of their everyday lives, however, the extent to which it is embedded in so many daily routines as well as its lower level of intensity relative to high security areas (such as Pearson), concurrently prompts diminished perceptions of awareness.

In summary, participants’ definitions of surveillance in the context of everyday life adopted a similar form to definitions of surveillance at Pearson, focusing on the same core components of process, sources and outcomes. In addition, participants often defined surveillance in everyday life relative to surveillance at Pearson, offering some interesting points of comparison. These comparative statements reveal that participants were fairly evenly divided on whether surveillance in everyday life was perceived as more, or less, invasive than
surveillance at Pearson, but demonstrate a stronger consensus that awareness of, or perhaps
attention to, surveillance in everyday life was lower relative to surveillance at Pearson.
Participants generally felt that the process of surveillance in everyday life was analogous to the
process of surveillance at Pearson, frequently using the term “watching” in both contexts.
Similar to definitions of surveillance at Pearson, participants also incorporated references to the
sources and outcomes of surveillance in their definitions of surveillance in everyday life, but
usually in a very general and non-specific sense. However, comments detailing the
characteristics of these components were still complementary across contexts. Specifically, when
defining surveillance in everyday life, participants’ references to sources continued to emphasize
both human and technological characteristics, and, the assumed outcome of public safety again
featured prominently. In combination, participants’ definitions of surveillance in everyday life
and at Pearson help establish the core components and specific criteria that form surveilled
subjects’ conscious recognition of surveillance in varied contexts; however, additional insights
on these understandings may also be drawn from indirect statements, such as descriptions of the
characteristics of “normal” surveillance encounters.

Recognizing “normal” surveillance. Asking participants to provide a definition of
surveillance allows for the identification of core components of surveillance to which surveilled
subjects’ are consciously aware, but, surveilled subjects’ understandings of surveillance may also
be shaped by components to which they are less consciously aware. I probed for these criteria by
asking participants to describe a “normal” surveillance encounter (at Pearson as well as in
everyday life) to further explore the components that constitute a well-rounded subject-centred
understanding of surveillance. Participant 14’s response to my inquiry indicates why my attempt
to do this might be considered foolhardy by some:
“…different types of surveillance and contexts have different expectations for normal.” – Participant 14

While I could not agree more with Participant 14’s statement, I still wondered whether there might be criteria that are consistently incorporated into surveilled subjects’ understandings of normal surveillance across varied contexts, suggesting a link to a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of surveillance, and found that there were. Participants’ descriptions of indicators of normal surveillance encounters focused on two criteria in both contexts: perceptions of procedural consistency and affective indifference.

Altogether, 28 participants described procedural consistency as an indicator of a normal encounter with surveillance either at Pearson or in everyday life. Participants were very clear on what constituted procedural consistency when encountering surveillance at Pearson, identifying a variety of specific expected protocol. For instance:

“A normal experience I would say...they are doing what you expected them to do, x-ray, metal detector, that was what I was expecting and that was what happened, so them not doing anything I wasn’t expecting I guess.” – Participant 16

“I guess...what makes an airport experience normal...getting there, doing the same baggage check in as always, expecting to go through security, different levels of security, expecting to be asked questions...” – Participant 18

Understandably, participants did not provide these same sort of specific examples when describing normal encounters with surveillance in everyday life given the considerable variety of forms and applications of surveillance that are encompassed under this label. However, an aspect of procedural consistency that was explicitly discussed in relation to surveillance in both contexts was the absence of targeting. At Pearson, for instance:

“If I’m being surveilled by a person, I know they’re not singling me out, I feel like I’m being treated the same as the person next to me.” – Participant 45

This is also true in everyday life. For example:
“Just being monitored in terms of my daily activities, not being called out or targeted for anything in particular. I do what I do daily and I may be monitored, but I’m generally not too aware of it.” – Participant 22

“Going through the same process where...just going through the same tracking process through whatever means it is. The companies may be different, but the mechanisms used are the same. A similar process across institutions and the sense that I don’t feel personally targeted.” – Participant 32

These comments are complementary to the preference expressed in the last chapter by participants for blanketied and unbiased as opposed to targeted and discriminatory surveillance.

In addition, affective responses to the presence and application of surveillance were another commonly relied upon indicator of normality in both contexts, referenced altogether by 21 participants. In particular, feelings of distress were described as representative of an abnormal encounter, while feelings of indifference were described as representative of a normal encounter.

For example, at Pearson, participants focused on affective indicators of abnormality when asked to describe a normal surveillance encounter:

“Well, because it’s similar to previous experiences. It’s the same, it’s regular. What’s not normal is when I’m delayed, challenged, threatened, when I’m made to feel uncomfortable.” – Participant 24

“It’s not normal because I have so much stress and I’m worried they stereotype me. That they look at me as a potential danger.” – Participant 35

Alternatively, when describing a normal surveillance encounter in everyday life, participants provided complementary information but from the opposite perspective, emphasizing affective indicators of normality:

“I think a normal experience...I don’t feel inconvenienced or threatened by any of the surveillance that I know is happening around me.” – Participant 10

“I’m not bothered or inconvenienced.” – Participant 28

Given the considerable emphasis placed on feelings of safety associated with surveillance by participants, I found it surprising that despite many participants’ reliance on affective responses
to help describe their understandings of a normal surveillance encounter, no participants mentioned safety or any related descriptor. However, I have reconciled this absence by recognizing the extent to which surveillance is simply understood as a form of background noise in the lives of most persons. Participant 33 provides a strong summary and anecdote regarding this conclusion:

“I think you become numb to it [surveillance]; you have to because it’s too hard to focus on everything. I think if something is out of routine you notice it...because, we don’t talk about it. It’s only when something happens. It’s just ignored and considered the norm. And, it’s like adaptation. Like, when you wake up in the morning and put your shirt on you notice it, but as the day goes on you don’t anymore. I think it’s the same thing.” – Participant 33

Surveillance is so ever-present, well embedded and seemingly innocuous in most contexts that a defining component of modern surveillance is its ability to blend into the background of our lives. As such, it is not noticeable affective reactions such as feelings of safety that characterize a normal encounter with surveillance for individuals as it relates to them personally but, rather, a considerably more muted response of indifference.

Finally, before summarizing the results of this subsection, an important consideration is worthy of note: “normal” is not a concept subject to rigid definitional consistency. All participants were asked to describe the key indicators of a normal surveillance encounter at Pearson and in everyday life, however, one participant’s normal may very well be another participant’s abnormal. Furthermore, particular groupings of participants may understand normal surveillance in similar or dissimilar ways. This was also a fact to which participants were acutely aware and brought to my attention, emphasizing expected variations in understandings of normal surveillance on the basis of skin colour, ethnicity and citizenship. For instance:

“There’s going to be people who discriminate, but I think that for myself, [surveillance] it’s not normal compared to other people, but that everyone should be treated the same way. I think my experience is normal for other white people.” – Participant 45
“When I say average, I’m talking about similarities within my own ethnic group. So I don’t think my experiences are unique to me, I think they’re unique to my ethnic group. By that, I don’t consider it normal compared to the broader public.” – Participant 11

“I think in the context of being a Canadian citizen, a normal experience would be having, like, just going through security thinking they’re there to help you, like, they’re there to protect you from a possible negative. Just going through with your bags; them not assuming you did something minor on purpose. Just getting asked the same questions you know everybody else is getting asked.” – Participant 7

However, regardless of identity intersections and differences in experiences – and, thereby, reference points for what is considered normal – participants still expressed considerable agreement on the key general indicators of normal surveillance encounters across both contexts.

In summary, despite leaving the concept of normal open to participants’ personal interpretations, across both surveillance at Pearson and in everyday life participants described normal surveillance as reliably characterized by two key indicators: procedural consistency and affective indifference. Participants recognized encounters with surveillance as normal in both contexts if they adhered to specific or general expectations of practice and appeared to employ blanketed, as opposed to targeted, procedures; demonstrating consistency from person to person, as well as experience to experience. In addition, participants often relied on affective responses to describe the normality of a surveillance encounter, with various descriptors of indifference being used as indicators of normal surveillance. These aspects of surveillance encounters did not form the focus of the core components that emerged from participants’ definitions of surveillance in either context, however, they are clearly central to participants’ understandings of normal surveillance encounters and, thereby, may serve to enhance the meaningfulness of understandings of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject.
Operationalizing Acceptability: Attributes of Surveillance

Surveillance studies scholars have shown an interest in developing a better understanding of surveilled subjects’ reactions to surveillance, maintaining, for instance, that individual responses to surveillance span a continuum from willing compliance to active resistance, and that it is worth considering how and why personal reactions fall differently on this continuum (Ball, 2005; Ball, 2009; Lyon, 2002). Surveillance, in varied forms, is an embedded aspect of many persons’ lives in Western nations – as well as elsewhere around the world – but one might speculate that it is not the mere presence of surveillance that produces effects on people, but that personal responses to surveillance are largely based on the extent to which surveillance is deemed acceptable in a given context. Below, I review the positive and negative attributes participants associated with surveillance at Pearson and in everyday life; attributes which may be important to surveilled subjects’ perceptions of the acceptability of surveillance.

Positive attributes. Participants were asked to describe the positive qualities they associated with the use of surveillance both at Pearson and in their everyday lives. Word frequency analyses revealed that particularly common concepts incorporated into participants’ responses included: safety, security, information and/or knowledge acquisition, and organization. However, a number of more specific uniquely identifiable positive attributes were also evident on further analysis. These positive attributes are presented according to context in the following order: shared, Pearson exclusive and everyday life exclusive.

Shared. Shared positive attributes are those that were mentioned as positive qualities of surveillance by participants both at Pearson and in everyday life. In particular, six shared positive attributes were clearly discernable: assistance, crime control, record keeping, safety, security and social engineering.
To begin, *assistance* refers to participants’ expectation that surveillance should be helpful to persons, not simply in terms of protection, but also more broadly; for example, in terms of providing informational and situational awareness. For instance, at Pearson, participants appreciated surveillance that they perceived as assisting travellers:

“I think it is tied into safety and watching who’s coming in not necessarily for safety but to watch who’s coming into the country for immigration and I like to think that it’s to support and not just penalize people travelling illegally.” – Participant 10

“At Canadian airports as opposed to US airports I always find they’re a little less aggressive and a little more friendly. It’s still official, it’s still thorough, but they just don’t seem so uptight about it.” – Participant 24

Although assistance was mentioned by some participants in regards to surveillance at Pearson, it was much more commonly integrated into participants’ descriptions of the positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life. For example:

“I think it’s positive in the sense that it gives you a better understanding of your surroundings. I think it serves very similar purposes, in some ways, to the surveillance that happens at borders, I think in any sense it can be utilized to promote safety and security in people’s daily lives.” – Participant 5

“I don’t think surveillance in general is a bad thing, it’s there for the general public, to assist and to help.” – Participant 17

Participants valued the assistive qualities of surveillance for both themselves and others at Pearson and in everyday life.

Similarly, another positive quality of surveillance that was acknowledged by participants in both contexts, but which was more commonly associated with surveillance in everyday life as opposed to at Pearson, was *crime control*. Surveillance was described as a tool to combat crime in both contexts, but with different points of the process emphasized. For example, participants highlighted surveillance in everyday life as a means of *responding* to crime:
“Convenience. In terms of policing, my brother’s car got stolen once and they found it really quickly through surveillance. You see, you can’t eliminate surveillance completely, it’s necessary; it’s how you’re doing it that’s the problem.” – Participant 20

“Safety again. And to know that everyone is acting ethically, like, if someone was to attack me at the school, video surveillance would prove it. People are held accountable for their actions.” – Participant 45

Alternatively, participants focused on crime prevention when describing the positive qualities of surveillance at Pearson both directly and indirectly; emphasizing the importance of crime prevention through proactive procedures but also in terms of learning from incidents and adjusting procedures to avoid similar occurrences in the future. For example:

“That it’s designed to prevent crime, to stop people from harming others, stop terrorism, stop people from transporting drugs. I think, I don’t know how often it happens to stop someone, but it definitely needs to be in place.” – Participant 22

“Definitely it is there for crime prevention as well, they’re trying to keep people safe and I totally understand and appreciate that. So the positive is that when there is a problem one would hope that all of these procedures work in favour of solving that.” – Participant 23

Despite variations in participants’ temporal referencing, crime control was clearly perceived as a positive attribute of surveillance in general.

Record keeping capacities were a third quality of surveillance that participants described as positive in both contexts, but, again, this attribute was stressed more strongly in everyday life than at Pearson. The importance of information collection and retention in both contexts was often paired with direct or implied references to crime control. At Pearson, for instance:

“I think in modern times because everything is filmed, I think that when something does happen, the fact that the film is available is important too. There’s an opportunity to have evidence.” – Participant 24

“I think the surveillance is just there for safety to stop anything from happening before it’s a threat to other people. I guess...it would be good to go back, like, if you had to go back for any reason there’s a record on file.” – Participant 39

Similar sentiments were expressed in reference to surveillance in everyday life:
“I think it [surveillance] is a good way of just keeping track of everything that is going on. I know there are instances, for example, if a crime was to happen that they have this information available and provide clues as to where that person is or what they’re doing or what they’ve done.” – Participant 13

“I guess especially because we have so many younger people using phones, like children going missing, obviously in a crime context it’s like using it to trace. For court documents you have recorded facts that can’t be disputed. I feel like it helps substantiate facts, which I think can be positive in certain investigations.” – Participant 19

However, while crime based examples were often relied on by participants to explicate the importance of record keeping as a positive attribute of surveillance, some participants commented more broadly on the value of data collection and retention in everyday life. For example:

“I think that especially when you get into data and protection of information surveillance is particularly important for, like, credit card companies and stuff like that...they know where you spend your money and how you spend your money...it just may be an easier way for consumers to control invasions of privacy that happen.” – Participant 3

“I guess if there are cameras watching and something goes missing and it records you not stealing something it’s kind of proof that you were innocent.” – Participant 16

Ultimately, participants indicated appreciation for record keeping as a positive attribute of surveillance in both contexts but for a wider variety of reasons when discussing surveillance in everyday life.

Safety was the most common positive quality of surveillance identified by participants, with over half of participants directly referencing safety as a positive attribute of surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life. When describing safety as a positive attribute of surveillance in the context of Pearson, most participants expressed a devout commitment to the importance of surveillance (similar to Participant 32’s statement below), however, some participants (such as Participant 19), were more skeptical than others:
“The main ones are just ensuring that risks are minimized. That it would be very minimal that a risk would occur. But even going through the process, at the end of the day, it’s ensuring that people are safe and not exposed to any threats. It does happen, but just going through that protocol helps to ensure safety and is a valuable asset.” – Participant 32

“A sense of safety – whether it’s real or not – and the fact that there’s this understanding or acceptance that all these measures are in place in order to prevent disasters or threats of violence or terrorism. So, whether or not this is their agenda, they’ve led us to believe this is what makes us safe.” – Participant 19

Participant 19 demonstrates critical evaluation of the concept of safety as it relates to surveillance at Pearson in a way that most participants did not. This pattern carried over to descriptions of surveillance in everyday life, in which safety was also emphasized as a positive quality. For example:

“Again, safety. Like really public places and you’re in an enclosed environment, that’s where I think surveillance is good because that’s for the betterment of everybody.” – Participant 1

“Being safe, knowing that safety is there. Knowing that you can go about your days without being worried about things happening around you. There are authorities in place to maintain safety. The majority is the safety aspect and just that if a crime occurs it will more easily be solved.” – Participant 17

In total, safety was a particularly common and consistently described positive attribute of surveillance in both contexts. This finding draws attention to the potential influence of “security theatre” (Schneier, 2003) on surveilled subjects’ evaluations of surveillance. In particular, Schneier uses the concept of security theatre to refer to practices that produce feelings of safety (often through their visible presence), but which actually do little to improve security. The emphasis participants placed on safety as a key positive attribute of surveillance is concerning when framed through the concept of security theatre because it suggests that the perception – as opposed to the tangible realization – of safety is highly influential on surveilled subjects’ evaluations of the acceptability of surveillance.
As I previously explained, safety and security are related but distinct concepts. Security (referring to proactive surveillance procedures designed to minimize intentional acts of harm), was mentioned by participants as a positive quality of surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life. When describing surveillance at Pearson, participants emphasized the importance of security measures for protecting not only individuals but also the nation. For instance:

“Security. Safety. Integrity. How it makes Canada look to visitors coming in. A more seriously authoritative figure suggests they want to protect their country to the best of their ability, so people coming in will find that Canada is a lot more strict than many countries you might go in to and I think that looks good for Canada because it suggests that their frontline security is empowered and are doing their job.” – Participant 17

“The feeling of security...and safety is something positive. I’d rather they are watching individuals that could potentially be a threat to the rest of us than not watching us at all. So that’s positive.” – Participant 18

The attention to perceptions of security and impression management demonstrated in these quotes again highlight the influence of security theatre on surveilled subjects’ interpretations of surveillance. A further interesting feature of this result is that participants more commonly described security as a positive attribute of surveillance at Pearson in comparison to everyday life. As well, although most participants who cited security when describing the positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life expressed sentiments similar to Participant 43’s statement below (implying a legitimate conviction that security is a positive attribute of surveillance), skepticism (similar to that exemplified previously by Participant 19 in regards to safety) was also conveyed by some participants, as demonstrated below by Participant 11’s comment:

“The fact that someone is watching me for my protection.” – Participant 43

“They [surveillance procedures] do serve a function, and that function is less to do with actual security and more to do with a perception of security, which I think is important for the vast majority of people.” – Participant 11

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Security was widely recognized as a positive attribute of surveillance in both contexts, but, as with safety, some participants highlighted an awareness of the distinction between assumed (security theatre) and achieved security in their descriptions.

The final positive attribute of surveillance referenced both in relation to Pearson and everyday life is what I have labelled *social engineering*. This term warrants some explanation. Participant 12 incorporated the term into her statement outlining the positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life, and, in doing so, I felt that she provided me with a concise and sophisticated descriptor that was representative of a broader range of participants’ comments. Specifically, Participant 12 responded to my query regarding the positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life by stating:

“The feeling of safety. Also, population control and advancement. Social engineering, which I think isn’t always positive but could be used for positive. And, I think of risk management. Disaster control and management.” – *Participant 12*

Participant 12’s use of the term social engineering not only speaks to shaping people’s behaviour for (potentially) positive purposes, but also reducing risks when responding to accidental or deliberate harms, and is representative of many other participants’ sentiments. In describing surveillance in everyday life, participants emphasized the positive quality of surveillance as a tool to socially engineer human behaviour to minimize deliberate threats but also respond more quickly to those that emerge. For example:

“I work in spaces that are largely public and heavily populated. The interest in safety and being able to respond quickly, I think, is a positive aspect of surveillance. There are benefits to getting assistance quickly and being able to identify where people are and I think those are all positives. I think that it is an act of deterrence even in our daily lives. I think it does offer a certain level of comfort to people and has tremendous value. Visible presence is often welcomed and as long as the balance and ratio seems appropriate, it has a largely positive effect, when that balance and ratio gets disrupted, that’s when they no longer have a positive effect; they create panic and angst.” – *Participant 11*
“I think it has a deterrent effect. I think people, because everyone now knows that they are being filmed and that serious criminal acts will have evidence, I think statistically certain kinds of crime are dropping because people know that they’re being watched. I don’t think punishment is nearly as much of a deterrent as much as that observation.” – Participant 24

In addition, references to this idea of social engineering were mentioned relatively equally in both contexts. However, in describing the positive qualities of surveillance at Pearson, participants who indicated an attention to social engineering tended to focus on its capacities as a behaviour shaping mechanism. For instance:

“Just a general sense of keeping…maybe keeping the peace…I’d say the most positive thing I can think about is people not going around with weapons and things like that.” – Participant 15

“I think the fact that everybody knows that there is security and surveillance, it keeps a high level of decorum there despite the fact that a lot of people get really upset when they travel. I think that knowledge helps keep a lid on people.” – Participant 24

Across both contexts, participants described surveillance as a means of manipulating potentially harmful outcomes, either by preemptively shaping the behaviour of persons to promote good citizenship or retroactively improving response time to accidental or deliberately harms. In either case, social engineering was recognized as a positive attribute of surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life. However, not all positive qualities identified by participants were mentioned in both contexts; some positive attributes were bound to the specific surveillance context.

Pearson International Airport. When describing the positive qualities of surveillance at Pearson, participants identified a number of attributes, most of which have already been presented because they were also discussed in relation to surveillance in everyday life. The order of the frequency with which participants commented on these attributes (from highest to lowest) is: safety, security,
modern efficiency, social engineering, record keeping, crime control and assistance. Modern efficiency is the only positive attribute identified by participants that was solely discussed in the context of Pearson, and participants who spoke to this quality emphasized the timely and technologically mediated nature of their interactions with surveillance in this context. For example:

“‘It’s very efficient. It’s a highly technological, very innovative, and I trust that it is very well managed. I think they’re using world class data and surveillance technology and training their staff with world class data and such. So, I feel very comfortable with the surveillance at Pearson compared to many other places.”’ – Participant 12

“‘Mostly I expect that it will be efficient. When I think of Pearson relative to other airports, I usually find that it’s efficient, well run.’” – Participant 24

The fact that participants did not describe modern efficiency as a positive quality of surveillance in everyday life might be attributable to the considerable variety of surveillance encompassed under this general classification. When focused on a more specific context, surveilled subjects may be more attentive to the extent to which surveillance is perceived as modern and efficient.

**Everyday life.** When describing the positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life, participants identified a wider variety of attributes that were not pertinent to their characterizations of surveillance at Pearson. The order of the frequency with which participants commented on all positive attributes of surveillance in everyday life (from highest to lowest) is: safety, social engineering, record keeping, assistance, crime control, security, tailored information, entertainment and subtlety. Of these, the final three were only mentioned when describing the positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life and none were commonly mentioned. Two participants commented on the utility of surveillance as a means to provide tailored information. Specifically:
“I think it [surveillance]...gives them an idea of consumers and how to appeal to them. So, then they can improve products or marketing.” – Participant 10

“Getting information about stuff around you. Getting tailored ads that are helpful to you.” – Participant 27

In addition, entertainment and subtlety were each mentioned by one participant as positive qualities of surveillance in everyday life. In particular:

“Sometimes it can provide entertainment. Outside of entertainment I guess it prepares you if anything bad happens. It provides us the opportunity to help someone out.” – Participant 44

“It’s not really intrusive. It’s there, but you just sort of see it and ignore it and pass by it. You come to expect it. Being not intrusive is the greatest benefit I can give it, it’s there but it’s not in your face.” – Participant 46

All three of these positive attributes have admittedly low occurrence rates, but all three are also insightful and touch on aspects of surveillance acknowledged in the surveillance studies literature (e.g., tailored information, Gandy, 1989; Lyon, 2001; Ogura, 2006; entertainment, Albrechtslund & Dubbeld, 2005; Andrejevic, 2004; Bell, 2009; and, subtlety, Fussey, 2004; Lyon, 2001; Marx, 2002). Having reviewed the positive attributes associated with surveillance at Pearson and/or in everyday life that were identified in participants’ narratives, I now turn to a review of the negative attributes.

Negative attributes. Participants were also asked to describe the negative qualities they associated with the use of surveillance both at Pearson and in their everyday lives. Word frequency analyses revealed that particularly common concepts incorporated into participants’ responses included: privacy, invasiveness and bias. However, a number of more specific uniquely identifiable negative attributes were also evident on further analysis. These negative attributes are presented according to context in the following order: shared, Pearson exclusive and everyday life exclusive.
**Shared.** Shared negative attributes are those that were mentioned as negative qualities of surveillance by participants both at Pearson and in everyday life. Six shared negative attributes were evident, specifically concerns that surveillance can be: biased, invasive, a means of inappropriate labelling, overzealous, a means of reproducing the status quo and subordinating. To begin, many participants expressed concern over the presence of bias in surveillance procedures. When describing surveillance at Pearson, biased treatment on the basis of race was either directly referenced or strongly implied by most participants who broached this topic. For example:

“Biased. Unfair, and I think you can’t get away from someone’s bias no matter what. Even if you’re in an authority position, even if you’re not you can’t eliminate all of your personal biases. So, despite the fact that we have human rights and this sense of fairness across the board that can be thrown away in an instant. You can’t stop those internal biases that just occur when you look at somebody. So despite the fact that they want us to believe that they’re being politically correct, I think that post 9/11 that’s all been thrown out the window with the expectation that what we’re doing keeps us safe and they can say: ‘Well, we’re not specifically targeting this type of person.’” – Participant 19

“Really the execution of surveillance in that setting. Just introducing stereotyping and bias in terms of deciding who to stop, who to look at, who to watch.” – Participant 3

Bias was cited with approximately the same frequency as a negative quality of surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life. In addition, racialized bias was also the central form of bias discussed when participants described the negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life. For instance:

“I think the same challenges that define border crossings transfer into everyday life. So, I think that minorities, myself included, are often a little bit more aware of being watched. In general, everyday life, it’s more about interactions. It’s not the technology itself, it’s when I’m in interactions with agents of surveillance.” – Participant 11

“I guess a negative thing about surveillance is that it’s only as good as the people operating the surveillance. So, you would hope that whoever is making that judgment
call, you hope it’s based on proper guidelines and criteria but when it comes down to it they are often using their own judgment.” – Participant 16

Interestingly, across both contexts, participants emphasized the discretionary power of agents of surveillance and, thereby, their opportunity to make decisions and take actions based on personal bias, but did not explicitly express concern over the potential for systematic bias in surveillance at Pearson or in everyday life. Participants who spoke to this quality quite unanimously described bias as a negative attribute of surveillance on the basis of fairness. Bias was a commonly referenced negative quality, cited by nearly half of participants, however, it was not the most frequently identified negative attribute.

Over half of participants described *invasiveness* as a negative quality of surveillance either at Pearson or in everyday life, making it the most frequently referenced negative attribute. Although commonly discussed in relation to both contexts, participants more often associated invasiveness with surveillance in everyday life as opposed to at Pearson. Participants expressed a greater tolerance for invasive surveillance practices in the context of Pearson, but emphasized infringements on boundaries of personal space when articulating this negative quality in this context. For example:

“I just feel like of course they’re doing surveillance on everyone and it does seem like they’re doing surveillance on people who don’t need to be part of the surveillance but I guess it’s more of a blanket surveillance that they’re doing, so you kind of feel like you’re being watched all the time, even if you shouldn’t be. I don’t know, that’s kind of like an invasion of privacy.” – Participant 16

“I guess when passing through and getting our bags and bodies examined it’s a bit...it is a bit intrusive and I feel like at one point you really don’t have any privacy at all.” – Participant 18

Alternatively, participants were much more perturbed by the invasive quality of surveillance in everyday life, referencing it nearly twice as much, and expanding the scope of practices
described as invasive. Specifically, in everyday life, participants were much more attentive to encroachments on information perceived as private, particularly that which is electronically stored, as opposed to personal space violations. For instance:

“I think it’s a little bit more invasive than it needs to be. There are times that you don’t want to be tracked and it’s not necessarily something that’s bad, but it’s just private.” – Participant 10

“What concerns me the most is at what point does it stop? They watch us at the border and I can understand that but I don’t understand tracking the websites I go to or reading my emails because at what point do you stop enjoying personal freedoms and privacy to the point where you’re just onboard with complete transparency when it comes to surveillance? When the government oversteps their bounds on where and when you’re allowed to be watched I find it intrusive.” – Participant 19

Despite variations in participants’ descriptions of the specific characteristics of invasiveness (i.e., as a violation of personal space or personal information), it was perceived as a central negative attribute of surveillance across both contexts.

The possibility of disadvantageous *labelling* was another quality of surveillance that participants recognized as negative in both contexts relatively equally, but, fairly minimally in total, with roughly one fifth of participants highlighting this attribute. I employ the term labelling here to be representative of a variety of more specific concerns tied to identity; in particular, misidentification, misrepresentation and misclassification. Participants expressed similar anxieties over labelling in both contexts. At Pearson, for instance:

“It bothers me when they look at stuff like my waiver and stuff is 35 years old and they still automatically classify you ‘here.’ Even though you’ve got all your paperwork to get you approved, they still pull you aside, and the fact that they are god.” – Participant 1

“I guess what I’m nervous about is being falsely identified or accused of something because I have no reason to be nervous when I cross the border, but I just am.” – Participant 10

Sentiments expressed in relation to surveillance in everyday life were very similar:
“It can go against people’s rights of privacy sometimes. Somebody could be mistaken for doing something wrong. It might not be fair.” – Participant 40

“Flawed representations of who you are.” – Participant 34

Ultimately, the scope of identity based concerns participants raised demonstrated attention to labelling as a negative attribute of surveillance in both contexts.

The overzealous quality that surveillance can adopt was another negative attribute identified in both contexts by a minority of participants, but, described very consistently. In particular, participants expressed concerns over the potential for both overzealous procedures and agents of surveillance at Pearson as well as in everyday life. At Pearson, for instance:

“I don’t want it; because you think you’re on the right side. Paranoia, definitely. We shouldn’t...just because something happened once...try to treat it at the root, not a surface cleanup. It shouldn’t be overkill.” – Participant 33

“Kind of just getting into your personal space, like when they’re going through your carry-on luggage. Some staff are rude. Some of the processes just seem unnecessary.” – Participant 34

With other participants expressing complementary attention to the potential for overzealous surveillance procedures and agents in everyday life:

“I think everyone thinks they’re a saint to themselves and that people who need to be surveilled are a certain type of people...so, you feel like they’re wasting time, like it’s unnecessary, like it’s overkill. One word I think I haven’t used is redundancy, and that’s tied to the overkill.” – Participant 32

“Probably the most negative experience I’ve had in day-to-day, very rare occurrences where I might have interactions with a security guard. Quite often they’re overzealous. They want to be in charge and that can lead to conflicts and I like to be kind of reason based and when things get unreasonable, I get unreasonable.” – Participant 24
Participants did not appreciate being confronted with surveillance encounters perceived as unnecessary or agents of surveillance perceived as overly ambitious; characteristics which are dually encompassed in the description of overzealousness as a negative attribute of surveillance.

The potential for surveillance to reproduce the status quo was another negative quality of surveillance described by participants which, again, was only discussed by a minority of participants but with considerable consistency. In the surveillance studies literature, this arguably unintended consequence of surveillance is often discussed through the concepts of social sorting (Lyon, 2002) and cumulative disadvantage (Gandy, 2010). Although participants did not engage with such technical language, those participants who broached the subject provided complementary empirical evidence. In relation to surveillance at Pearson, participants either directly stated or strongly implied that racial and/or cultural minorities are the primary target of surveillance policies and practices. For example:

“…I understand that there is still a larger cultural stereotype that the surveillance, the whole process, feeds into those stereotypes and maintains it. I think that if I more visibly portrayed that culture and dressed like that culture and spoke like that culture, I don’t think it would benefit me…But, the part of human interaction makes me feel uncomfortable for sure because every time I have crossed the border, I have always felt that I am putting on a show for this person who is questioning me and I’m more attuned to my accent. I have to sound very Canadian, I have to look very Canadian, my story has to be very short and to the point. That part of the interaction makes me feel quite uncomfortable and I don’t feel very trusting of the officer at that time.” – Participant 12

“The negative qualities are the use of human interaction to try and target certain groups. It disadvantages them. I don’t trust that at all. Even to the extent that we’re using certain identifiers, that people, or not even that but also computers, like this person has travelled to ‘x’ country or travel plans in the past have included such and such. That kind of stuff I’m not comfortable with.” – Participant 21

While, in describing the negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life, participants tended to offer a more tempered version of this position. For instance:
“I think it influences perceptions of minorities, and surveillance agents become a perceptual impact factor.” – Participant 11

However, a good example of the distinction between participants’ descriptions of this negative attribute between surveillance at Pearson and in everyday life is provided by Participant 12. Above, a quote drawn from Participant 12 expresses specific concerns over how surveillance at Pearson feeds into and maintains stereotypes; whereas, below, in responding to my query regarding the negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life, Participant 12 identifies the same general concern regarding the disenfranchisement of persons bearing particular identity characteristics. She does so through a prospective perspective, implying this is not currently occurring:

“I worry that, in the future, these policies that lead to the targeting of certain people at the border will lead to that same sort of targeting in daily life, in the future.” – Participant 12

The potential for surveillance to reproduce the status quo was not the most commonly recognized negative attribute of surveillance by participants in either context, but, it is a thoughtful reflection that warrants attention when considering the criteria that constitute evaluations of surveillance acceptability in varied contexts.

The last negative attribute of surveillance referenced both in relation to Pearson and everyday life was subordination. Although subordination was technically referenced by participants in both contexts, it was only mentioned as a negative quality of surveillance in everyday life by one participant, but more frequently as a negative quality of surveillance at Pearson. In addition, this single quote adopted a somewhat distinct tone from subordination as described at Pearson. Specifically, in everyday life, attention to subordination was represented through the following quote:
“Another thing would be who’s looking through your life. There’s not equality between the people doing the surveillance and those being watched.” – Participant 47

In Participant 47’s quote, the subordinate position of surveilled subjects relative to agents of surveillance in daily life is implied but not directly noted. Alternatively, subordination was frequently directly highlighted by participants in relation to surveillance at Pearson. For example:

“I feel...I guess, you feel powerless. I mean, I wouldn’t say I feel violated at all, but I can see that possibility...coming from someone who generally has nothing to hide there and isn’t trying to do anything harmful a basic amount of surveillance is expected but anything more than that can be negative.” – Participant 22

“There’s too much imbalance of power; that bothers me.” – Participant 35

Although subordination just barely met the requirement of being a shared negative attribute of surveillance, it is important to remember that while particular qualities of surveillance are more pronounced in some contexts, that does not mean that less obvious qualities are invalid. It may take particularly intuitive surveilled subjects to independently recognize various attributes of surveillance across contexts, however, that does not mean that other surveilled subjects are not attentive to the same concerns; they may simply be less consciously aware of these qualities. As with the positive attributes of surveillance identified by participants, not all negative attributes were mentioned in both contexts.

Pearson International Airport. As was the case with positive qualities, the majority of negative qualities of surveillance at Pearson identified by participants were shared with surveillance in everyday life. The order of the frequency with which participants commented on all identified negative attributes of surveillance at Pearson (from highest to lowest) is: bias, invasiveness, inconvenience, subordinating, overzealous, status quo reproducing, labelling,
health hazardous and intimidating. Of these, three attributes (inconvenience,
health hazardous and intimidating) were only discussed as negative qualities of
surveillance at Pearson, however, only one was mentioned relatively frequently.
Roughly one fifth of participants commented on the inconvenience of surveillance
at Pearson. For example:

“I think generally it’s the inconvenience of the surveillance, whether it’s going through
‘x’ number of checkpoints or having to open your bag or having to turn on your laptop,
it’s the inconvenience and general hassle of having to do everything right.” – Participant
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“Just the hassle of security, being checked, being watched. I guess having to wait, being
slowed down and having people go through your stuff.” – Participant 22

The word “hassle” was frequently incorporated into participants’ descriptions of this negative
quality. Participants indicated that the general inconvenience of surveillance could be quite
irritating in this context and, although no participants identified this as a negative attribute of
surveillance in everyday life generally, it is possible that asking surveilled subjects about the
application of a standardized surveillance procedure in more specific contexts in everyday life
(e.g. security checks upon entering various restricted environments such as schools, amusement
parks and night clubs) might demonstrate greater attention to this same concern.

In addition, surveillance was described as potentially intimidating and as a health hazard
by two separate sets of two participants. While not dismissing the functional utility of
surveillance at Pearson entirely, Participants 17 and 20 both identified intimidation as a negative
attribute that they personally associated or felt that others might associate with the high level of
surveillance in this context. Specifically:

“But because of how high it [surveillance] is with the level of security now it could also form
an opinion to some travellers about why it is so strict here. They might wonder if Canada
is a bad place to live: ‘What’s been going on here for the security to be so heavy in this
setting?’” – Participant 17
“I don’t need to go into a machine that is going to x-ray and see my body, it’s invasive and wrong. Doing a pat down I don’t like, but I can understand why they do it. But, going and looking at you as a person, especially for my wife who is a Muslim wife. The other thing is like the dogs, sniffing my bags and leaving their saliva there. It’s intimidating and that intimidation factor is what draws concern.” – Participant 20

As well, two participants questioned the potentially damaging effects of some forms of surveillance technology on physical health; in particular, the use of x-ray machines. Participants 14 and 15 both indicated concern with this practice, but also diluted the severity of their anxiety by citing convenience or acknowledging the opportunity to request alternatives. Specifically:

“Well, I guess there is like a health concern when they started using the x-ray machines and they say it’s nothing, but is it? And you end up doing it because maybe it’s more convenient.” – Participant 14

“I think that x-raying in general is not a very good health thing, but they don’t make you do it either I guess…” – Participant 15

A noteworthy point associated with this finding is that Participants 14 and 15 are the only participants that I am aware have ties to the health care industry. This fact helps draw attention to the importance of one’s personal knowledge base when attempting to identify the attributes that a surveilled subject consciously recognizes as important to their evaluations of surveillance acceptability.

Everyday life. When describing the negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life, participants indicated attention to a wider variety of attributes than those associated with surveillance at Pearson. The order of the frequency with which participants commented on all negative attributes of surveillance in everyday life (from highest to lowest) is: invasiveness, function creep, bias, labelling, overzealous, covertness, implied mistrust, status quo reproducing, subordinating and dependence. Of these, four were exclusively discussed as
negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life (function creep, coverture, implied mistrust and dependence), but only one was mentioned with considerable frequency.

Concerns associated with *function creep* were discussed by over half of participants as a negative quality of surveillance in everyday life. “Function creep” is relatively synonymous with the concept of “surveillance creep,” used to describe the ever-expanding, ever-morphing nature of modern surveillance (Marx, 1995; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006), and is regarded as one of the key characteristics of modern surveillance (Ericson & Haggerty, 2006). Embedded within this phenomenon are two processes. First, the extension of surveillance practices or technologies beyond the situations for which they were originally intended. Second, the potential for information disclosed freely and/or gathered legitimately in one context to be misappropriated in another context. Participants were hardly oblivious to these possibilities. Some participants highlighted the expanding reach of surveillance practices and technologies. For instance:

“I think any kind of security any kind of legal control that a state group has over people has to always be questioned. You have to always question whether this is in pursuit of making people more free. So, if you’re observing people for a particular reason and they exhibit other types of bad behaviour do you move in? You really need to watch how far you let that go and you need other activities in place to help counteract that.” – Participant 24

“Just the whole idea of the technology being used negatively, manipulated for a negative regardless of what it is.” – Participant 26

While other participants focused on the misappropriation of data. For example:

“When you are being watched and you are accountable for pretty much everything you do and there are people that have all kinds of information about you and the wrong people get it or they decide to use it for inappropriate reasons it could be bad, or it could just be annoying, like spam emails.” – Participant 22

“Invasion of privacy. The other thing is, again, I don’t know what they do with the data and I feel powerless if they come back and want to use that data. I don’t know what the
outcome will be. I don’t know how I can defend myself and that makes me uncomfortable.” – Participant 36

Embedded within this negative attribute are concerns over contextual relevance; specifically, the fear that data collected and retained through surveillance can come to have its meaning or purpose divorced from its original context. As Participant 22 articulates well, many participants also recognized the broad potential scope of consequences associated with this attribute, ranging from relatively minor inconveniences to serious negative effects on one’s life chances and opportunities.

In addition, participants mentioned *covertness* and *implied mistrust* as negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life with comparable rates of frequency to each other. Three participants described covert applications as a negative attribute of surveillance. For example:

“Again, I think surveillance right now is fine but again there’s kind of that Big Brother aspect where it can become too much and a lot of surveillance that is private outside of borders is more problematic because I think people deserve to know when they’re being watched and maybe even not how but should know that there is some kind of surveillance in place. That’s the biggest negative for me, that we don’t know how we’re being watched all the time in public places.” – Participant 41

“My worst one would be hidden locations. I think all of them are bad in a way. When you know that you’re being watched it’s more okay.” – Participant 47

Negative sentiment regarding covertness is not to be confused with the preference for subtle surveillance applications discussed previously. Although participants expressed an appreciation for *discrete* applications of surveillance (actually describing this as a positive attribute of surveillance in everyday life), *secretive* applications of surveillance in the same context are characterized quite differently and considered to be a negative attribute.

In a similar vein, some participants felt that a negative quality of surveillance in everyday life is the *implied mistrust* of surveilled subjects by agents of surveillance or surveillance
administrators more generally. Only two participants offered direct statements in this regard when describing the negative qualities of surveillance in everyday life. Specifically:

“Most people aren’t trying to get away with anything and it feels like you’re being criminalized for not doing anything. For most people it’s not necessary to have them be watched, most people are safe and controlled.” – Participant 15

“It can be suffocating and I feel as though I’m a really trustworthy person, I haven’t done anything to break anyone’s trust, so it’s almost like I can get defensive. Why do I have to type in my password all over the place? Why do I have to wear a card when you know I work in the building? Also, I’ve talked to people who watch the security cameras in our building and they’re not just looking for safety all the time, like, they make degrading comments, they make jokes, they share information and I feel as though sometimes it’s just too much. I don’t need to be watched all the time, it’s like an invasion of privacy.” – Participant 6

Although very few participants explicitly described what I have termed implied mistrust as a negative quality of surveillance in everyday life, my personal understanding of the importance of trust in relational terms (see Chapter 3; Lind & Tyler, 1988) prompts me to believe that careful consideration of implied mistrust as a negative attribute of surveillance is warranted.

Finally, dependence was mentioned as a negative quality of surveillance in everyday life by one participant. Specifically:

“Well, I’ll be the first to say that CCTV tells two stories. So, you can easily be put on the other side of a lawsuit or litigation that came because the camera saw something at the wrong angle. With that being said, that’s the negative side because people have this perception that because a camera caught something it has to be the truth, a lot of cameras don’t have voice recording and people don’t see that, they just see the action take place. Because people are so dependent on it they think its fool proof.” – Participant 17

Although dependence was only identified as a negative attribute by one participant, it is a particularly insightful observation which has also been broached in the surveillance studies literature in terms of “technological lock-in and failure” (Murakami-Wood et al., 2006, p.5).

While some people may exhibit a blind dependence on surveillance as described by Participant 17, other people may only need to be prompted to reflect on this attribute of surveillance in
specific applications and contexts to recognize that it is incorporated into their evaluations of surveillance.

In summary, this subsection has presented a review of the host of negative qualities that participants associated with surveillance at Pearson and/or in everyday life. Combining these with the positive qualities identified in the previous subsection provides a foundation for better understanding the various attributes of surveillance that are important to surveilled subjects as well as the relative positioning of these attributes as positive or negative. I will return to and provide a comprehensive discussion of the usefulness of this information shortly, however, before turning to the discussion, I present a final grouping of participants’ quotes relevant to the subject matter of this chapter, highlighting the often bi-polar condition of surveilled subjects’ evaluations of and reactions to surveillance.

**Considering the Complexity of Affective Reactions to Surveillance**

Before moving to a discussion of the primary objective of this chapter – developing a better knowledge base of subject-centred understandings of surveillance as well as considering useful applications of that knowledge – I want to briefly reflect on the complex and often diametrically opposed nature of the affective reactions conveyed by the majority of participants when describing surveillance, particularly surveillance at Pearson. I draw on the psychological concepts of reactance and cognitive dissonance (described below) to help explain these feelings. The statements made by Participant 7 and 32 serve as typical examples of the often bi-polar nature of participants’ descriptions of the way surveillance at Pearson makes them feel:

“Nerves. Anxiety. A general sense of unease. At the same time I definitely feel that they do increase safety. I do feel safer with the new technologies they have though I’m not exactly a fan of how they have applied it or who they choose to survey with it.” – *Participant 7*
“Frustration. Safety. Secure. Once the whole process is done: reassured. But going through the actual process itself I’d say frustration...a bit of anger. Tediouso.” – Participant 32

As demonstrated through these statements, although the utilitarian objectives and outcomes of surveillance are often appreciated, most participants still cannot help but express some degree of negativity associated with its application. These “two faces” of surveillance are well known in the surveillance studies literature (Lyon, 2002; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006). An explanation for this sentiment may lie in the theory of psychological reactance.

Psychological reactance considers how encroachments on personal freedom affect behavioural responses. The theory maintains that when a person’s freedom is threatened, reactance is experienced (Brehm, 1966). Specifically, perceived losses of freedom tend to induce reactance in the form of opposition and resistance in an attempt to re-establish freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Empirical support for psychological reactance demonstrates that: forcibly forwarded opinions and information (Worchel & Brehm, 1970) as well as its source (Miller, Lane, Deatrick, Young & Potts, 2007) are often rejected; and, perhaps most relevant, that intrusiveness has been linked to feelings of irritation (Edwards, Li & Lee, 2002). Irritation and related feelings such as frustration and annoyance were often paired with acknowledgments of the more positive aspects of surveillance, but some participants also provided a clear articulation of how surveillance, as a means of social control, prompts an attitude of defiance. For example:

“Just like a...kind of...begrudging acceptance. You know, I don’t outwardly react but inside you’re just kind of annoyed.” – Participant 15

“Swiping in and out of work. The fact that they have video cameras to watch productivity at work. Again, these are just miniaturized versions of Big Brother that I really don’t believe they have a right to do. Driving is another area. Like the photo cameras that they set up at different sites along the highway. I understand it at certain sites, but there’s no context taken into account, and that’s important because those things can change whether somebody’s really doing something wrong or not. I recognize that the border one’s a little more...I still...I totally disagree with the other ones outside of borders.” – Participant 1
So, psychological reactance helps explain why surveilled subjects are likely to feel an almost innate resistance to the application of surveillance, however, it does not provide an explanation for why surveilled subjects are, more often than not, compliant with these procedures that they often describe as objectionable; or, why different contexts might compel higher levels of acceptance, as suggested by Participant 1. Cognitive dissonance theory helps illuminate these effects.

Cognitive dissonance is used to describe the aversive state of internal inconsistency that develops when an individual’s actions and attitudes are not congruent (Egan, Santos & Bloom, 2007; Festinger, 1957). Individuals tend to try and reduce the resultant psychological discomfort by correcting the dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 1995; Stone & Cooper, 2001). In particular, the original version of the theory predicted that sufficient dissonance will encourage an individual to align their actions and attitudes. However, research has consistently demonstrated that dissonance reduction strategies are prefaced on incentives: Greater incentives prompt the individual to rely on the incentive to justify the dissonance; whereas, lesser, or absent, incentives are more likely to compel the individual to alleviate the discomfort by aligning their actions and attitudes (Harmon-Jones et al., 1995). This finding helps to explain the conflicted nature of so many participant’s descriptions of surveillance (particularly surveillance at Pearson) but simultaneous emphasis on the important function of surveillance. For instance:

“I’m trying to stay away from the word unfair, but I do know with the South Asians the Indians, they’re looked at more and it happened after 9/11, but once again I don’t want to say unfair because I respect the jobs those guys do over there. Biased.” – Participant 17

Reference to the typical pro-surveillance mantra of “necessary evil” may be interpreted as an indicator of a justification-based strategy. For example:
“I think it’s one of those necessary evils for promoting security I suppose. You can’t have it both ways. If you don’t want surveillance, well, then maybe you’re going to have security issues.” – Participant 5

“Kind of like a necessary evil in a way. Like, you can’t just have people not being surveilled and at the same time no one really likes to be watched but if it’s for the better of safety a degree of it needs to be there. I guess it’s a little bit uneasy in a way but again necessary.” – Participant 15

Surveilled subjects may perceive strong incentives to comply with surveillance policies and practices. In this case, incentives may take the form of consequences for non-compliance, particularly legal consequences, as well as the highly prized outcome of personal and public safety. Therefore, although reactance appears to be a common and understandable response to surveillance at Pearson, surveilled subjects may consider the various incentives associated with compliance as justifications for any dissonance that might arise as a result of being forced to engage with surveillance.

**Discussion: Developing and Utilizing Subject-Centred Understandings of Surveillance**

In this discussion, I compare and contrast the results presented above with material from the surveillance studies literature. A primary contribution of this chapter is highlighting subject-centred understandings of surveillance and situating this knowledge relative to existing surveillance studies literature. However, I also position this information within an argument that surveillance studies will be advanced by developing measures that can be used to consistently evaluate surveilled subjects’ perceptions of the presence, acceptability and outcomes of encounters with surveillance across similar but varied contexts. I maintain that accurately identifying and gauging the socio-psychological effects of surveillance on persons requires researchers to consistently operationalize and manipulate causal factors; therefore, understanding and anticipating the effects of surveillance necessitates knowledge of the consistent characteristics and qualities of surveillance across contexts. I argue that developing and testing
measures of those consistencies will provide surveillance studies scholars with a better understanding of the causal mechanisms at work in surveillance. Thus, this chapter lays groundwork for the development of well-informed measures in future research. In particular, future research working to develop measures of surveillance (such as perceived presence or acceptability) may find the attention dedicated to the perspective of the surveilled subject in this research valuable given the operator-centred focus of much of the existing literature. It is important that measure development does not merely reproduce taken-for-granted understandings of concepts, and, drawing on the perspective of the surveilled subject (an underrepresented perspective in the surveillance studies literature) to identify indicators of surveillance presence and acceptability as well as its socio-psychological effects before engaging in measure development is particularly important. The narratives analyzed offer unique insight on surveilled subjects’ understandings of the definitions and attributes of surveillance relative to the surveillance studies literature, and demonstrate many commonalities between the two.

The engagement that participants demonstrated with themes that are also present in the surveillance studies literature when defining surveillance as well as describing its key attributes suggests that the perspective of the surveilled subject has not been substantially mischaracterized by surveillance studies, despite not commonly being a direct topic of inquiry. These complementary positions may be partly attributable to the representation of fictional accounts of social control in popular media, which arguably simultaneously reflect and shape understandings of surveillance for both the general public and scholars. Many novels and films with a social control or surveillance emphasis (e.g., *Brave New World*, *The Truman Show*, *Minority Report*) incorporate concerns central to surveillance studies, for example: entertainment, identity, privacy, the organization of space and systems, social inclusion and exclusion, and so on. In
some cases, such as Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-four*, surveillance studies scholars acknowledge a debt to these popular works for helping to propel the field (Lyon, 1994). Further, it should not be assumed that public understandings of surveillance are simply shaped by fictional accounts, but that common public understandings are also *reflected* in these stories (Marks, 2005). However, I must return from this important tangent to the main point I wish to make at this juncture, which is: in the interest of being able to assess a variety of encounters with surveillance as consistently as possible, scholars must determine what factors are common to evaluations of surveillance, and, in turn, produce effects on individuals and groups.

Some scholars may be skeptical of efforts to operationalize and assess surveillance consistently. The utility of “centralized understandings,” “core concepts,” and “generalized statements” of surveillance for surveillance studies has been questioned (Ball & Haggerty, 2005; Ericson & Haggerty, 2006). These positions suggest that surveillance is so varied that there are limits to the usability of standardized measures. I agree with these sentiments in two ways. First, the variety of forms, practices and purposes associated with the application of surveillance does make all-encompassing measures of surveillance presence or acceptability difficult, if not impossible, to develop. Second, even when focusing on similar “types” of surveillance encounters (in terms of form, practice and purpose), a specific set of criteria for assessment are unlikely to be uniformly applicable. However, the results of this research demonstrate that there are underlying commonalities that distinguish the presence and acceptability of surveillance, from the perspective of the surveilled subject, across surveillance encounters. Despite the fact that surveillance is highly variable, as a matter of heuristic logic, surveilled subjects will look for consistencies across their experiences, and these consistencies may be assessable through measures. This hunt for consistencies has even been pursued by some surveillance studies
scholars as noted in Chapter 1 (see Marx, 1998; 2002; Ball, 2003; Monahan, Phillips & Murakami-Wood, 2010). The efforts of all of these scholars are laudable, and suggest that while singular understandings of surveillance may not be possible (or desirable), surveillance can be understood through consistent components and attributes.

This chapter of my dissertation contributes to this tradition of unifying the study of surveillance by exploring consistencies in the surveilled subject’s understanding of surveillance across contexts. In doing so, I have structured the discussion section in the following way. First, I revisit the results of the effects, definitions and acceptability attributes participants associated with surveillance at Pearson and in everyday life, framing this information within the context of existing surveillance studies literature. I then dedicate some space to discussing the specific value of the development and use of standardized measures in surveillance studies.

**Socio-psychological Effects of Surveillance**

The use of surveillance has been linked to a broad range of social outcomes in popular thought as well as in the surveillance studies literature; some good, and some bad. The rapid proliferation of surveillance in the modern era contributes to the assumption that surveillance is inherently good for society (Wang, Haines & Tucker, 2011). More specifically, commonly assumed positive social outcomes of surveillance include enhanced public safety, security and protection (Ball, 2003; Lyon, 2007; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006), all of which were mentioned by participants. However, surveillance studies scholars have also critically considered the more negative social outcomes of surveillance, including social relations characterized by domination and inhibited life chances and choices (Gandy, 2009; Lyon, 2007; Salter, 2006), none of which were mentioned by participants when they were asked to describe the effects of surveillance, but, also which we might not expect most surveilled subjects to be particularly conscious. However,
it is interesting and noteworthy that participants were considerably more attentive to the positive social outcomes of surveillance compared to those which are negative, and, it is important to acknowledge that surveillance affects individuals other than at the micro level of analysis (e.g., social ordering effects; Lyon, 2001). As I have previously mentioned, these sorts of outcomes are considerably more difficult to empirically assess and are certainly outside the scope of the current inquiry, however, ignoring them would be to miss some vital aspects of what surveillance can achieve in some contexts. Alternatively, drawing attention to the socio-psychological effects for surveilled subjects of surveillance encounters in contexts that involve direct (or relatively direct) interactions with agents or technologies of surveillance is an area of surveillance studies which this study is better equipped to address.

Investigations of the socio-psychological effects of surveillance are concerned with the way that encounters with surveillance make individuals feel. Participants described having indifferent, positive and negative emotional responses to encounters with surveillance at Pearson (and, to a lesser extent, in everyday life). In particular, perceptions of security and safety dominated positive affective reactions, while perceptions of violations of privacy, self-consciousness, frustration or anger, and stress formed the bulk of negative affective reactions. Relatively minimal work has explored the socio-psychological effects of surveillance on surveilled subjects, but what evidence does exist suggests compatibility with participants’ responses. To begin, indifference or ambivalence to surveillance by surveilled subjects has been demonstrated or discussed in various works (Ball, 2009; Bostrom, Kjellstrom & Bjorklund, 2013; Di Domenico & Ball, 2011). It was more difficult to find research in which surveilled subjects conveyed such direct positive affective responses to surveillance as participants in this study, although McCahill & Finn’s (2014) in-depth exploration of surveilled subjects’
experiences also revealed that participants often characterized surveillance encounters through positive descriptors such as “play, excitement and as identity affirming” (p.80). As well, assurances of perceived security and safety have been credited with promoting surveilled subjects’ engagement with surveillance in both empirical and theoretical contributions (although this is more often than not in the form of critical discussions) (Helleiner, 2012; Porter et al., 2011; Stoddart, 2015). On the other hand, research in which surveilled subjects described negative affective responses to surveillance was more abundant. Examples of concerns associated with privacy (Alge, 2001), self-consciousness (Dawson, 2006; Goold, 2003), frustration and anger (Finn, 2011: McCahill & Finn, 2014), and stress (Di Domenico & Ball, 2011; Rooney, 2010; Simon, 2005) all exist in the surveillance studies literature. As such, all of the socio-psychological effects of surveillance described by participants in this study have been acknowledged elsewhere as responses to surveillance, suggesting that these are potentially common affective reactions to surveillance encounters, but which require further investigation to be more fully understood.

At this point, it is important to note that the affective reactions described above are unlikely to represent the entire scope of possible socio-psychological effects of surveillance. Research that more specifically probes for a range of affective responses and explores other contexts will likely reveal additional effects that surveilled subjects are less consciously aware of or less attentive to in the contexts focused on in this research. As well, in general, accurate affective forecasting is a skill at which people have been found to be notoriously poor (Blumenthal, 2004). Remnants of this phenomenon are also evident in the surveillance studies literature. Specifically, Marx (1998) notes that people have considerable difficulty describing what they find to be wrong with surveillance other than articulating feelings of privacy invasion.
Combining such a finding with knowledge of poor affective forecasting abilities in general, suggests that surveilled subjects might be inherently ill-positioned to directly articulate how surveillance makes them feel; necessitating a variety of methods to compare, contrast and better understand the effects surveilled subjects report. It should be reiterated here that this project was not intended to be a study of the socio-psychological effects of surveillance, but participant narratives do clearly illustrate that affective reactions are tied to surveillance, thereby demonstrating the value of measure development to enhance knowledge of the causal effects of surveillance. Ultimately, an important possibility associated with understanding the effects of surveillance is being able to anticipate what sorts of surveillance encounters are more or less likely to produce which type of effects, however, doing that requires being able to consistently operationalize and assess surveillance across varied contexts from the perspective of the surveilled subject.

**Defining Surveillance from Below**

“Surveillance is historically, spatially and culturally located” (Murakami-Wood, 2009, p.179), but that does not mean that its presence is not defined by consistencies (e.g., Marx, 1998; Ball, 2002; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006). Very little work has attempted to explore the empirical consistencies of surveillance across contexts (Ball & Haggerty, 2005), and although clear operational definitions and measures do not necessarily represent “the Truth” of surveillance, they are an attempt to systematically explore and understand the effects of surveillance.

Three core components formed participants’ definitions of surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life: process, sources and outcomes. Participants most commonly focused on describing what the act of surveillance entails (*process*) in both contexts, emphasizing
“watching” as the key characteristic of this component. Watching is also a term that is frequently employed in the surveillance studies literature, not because surveillance is actually best described by the term watching, but because “watching” is an accessible term for the more complex concepts of visibility or exposure; both of which imply a connection to the sense of sight, but that are not bound exclusively to that sense. For instance, a surveilled subject can be made to feel visible or exposed without having their body be physically watched. So, although the process of surveillance is characterized by watching, it is also much more than that (Lyon, 2002; Marx, 2002; Simon, 2005). “If we think of surveillance as just watching, we err, because surveillance is never really just watching. It’s not just vision, but supervision. It’s not just sight, but oversight” (Gilliom, 2010, p.205). Participants’ reliance on the term watching in their definitions of surveillance does not necessarily mean that they are only referring to the physical act of watching; they may be referring to a more general sense of being monitored and tracked, as indicated through the variety of supplemental terms participants drew on to describe the process of surveillance. Although watching may not be the preferred vernacular by surveillance studies scholars in defining surveillance due to its potentially misleading connotations, it is still commonly used in our lexicon, and appears to be the default choice for surveilled subjects.

Sources conducting surveillance formed the second core component of definitions of surveillance, with human and technological sources emphasized in both contexts. One might anticipate little controversy associated with this revelation given that it is also widely acknowledged in the surveillance studies literature that human agents and/or technology are the sources which enact surveillance (Haggerty, Wilson & Smith, 2011; Lyon, 2007; Marx, 1998). However, outcomes, the final core component of participants’ definitions of surveillance did not reveal such serendipity.
Although outcomes are also commonly referenced in scholars’ definitions of surveillance, the specific characteristics emphasized by participants demonstrate some discontinuity with the position of surveillance studies scholars. In particular, participants highlighted assumed outcomes of surveillance in their definitions, underscoring safety in both contexts. In contrast, definitions of surveillance employed by scholars tend to stress knowledge acquisition to better enable population management and control as the central outcomes of surveillance (Gandy, 2003; Lyon, 2002; Monahan, Phillips & Murakami-Wood, 2010). To a degree, the outcomes prioritized in participants’ and scholars’ definitions are interrelated, and, some participants indicate an awareness of the broader scope of outcomes associated with surveillance (e.g., that surveillance assists in maintaining public order and, thereby, safety). As well, when defining surveillance in the more general context of everyday life, data mining was also described by participants as an outcome of surveillance. As such, although participants described the outcomes of surveillance much more narrowly than scholars, the information available still suggests that both describe the outcomes of surveillance in ways that are more complementary than contradictory. This statement also holds true for the process and sources results. From this, I draw two important findings, but, before reviewing those, an additional result warrants consideration.

The information presented above provides valuable insight on how surveilled subjects consciously define surveillance; however, understandings of surveillance may also be grounded in expectations to which surveilled subjects are not consciously attentive. Surveillance studies scholars have already acknowledged that surveillance is both consciously and subconsciously resisted (Gilliom, 2001; Marx, 2003); it seems equally possible that subconscious core components may be incorporated into surveilled subjects’ understandings of surveillance. I
probed for this information by requesting that participants describe encounters with “normal” surveillance and found that two indicators were used to demarcate normal surveillance in both contexts: procedural consistency and affective indifference. In particular, participants recognized encounters with surveillance as normal if the procedure was considered to be consistent and the encounter did not produce a negative affective response. Although no working definitions of surveillance to which I am aware incorporate the affective indifference described by participants in this study, the emphasis on procedural consistency is found elsewhere in definitions that describe surveillance as systematic and/or structured data collection (Lyon, 2007; Murakami-Wood et al., 2006). These aspects of surveillance were important to participants and may be additional core components used by surveilled subjects to understand surveillance. Finally, it is worth noting that all of the core components described here were drawn from relatively traditional conceptualizations of surveillance. Surveillance that is less hierarchically structured such as social (Marwick, 2012) or lateral (Andrejevic, 2005) surveillance was minimally mentioned by participants in either context, suggesting that traditional conceptualizations of hierarchical surveillance may dominate the average surveilled subject’s understanding of the concept. Less traditional types of surveillance may be associated with unique core components which might be ascertained through research with a more direct focus on such encounters.

Having reviewed this last piece of information pertinent to surveilled subjects’ definitions of surveillance, I now return to the two important findings mentioned previously. First, the results reveal that participants defined surveillance consistently across a specific (Pearson International Airport) and general (everyday life) context in terms of three core components: process, sources and outcomes. Second, the specific criteria used to describe these core components was in line with a wealth of surveillance studies literature. Both of these findings
support the conclusion that surveillance is recognized by surveilled subjects in a consistent and unified way through core components across varied contexts and, therefore, the perceived presence of surveillance can be measured relatively consistently by developing question sets that properly represent these components and their particular characteristics.

There is tremendous value in demonstrating that surveilled subjects recognize and define surveillance consistently that could be realized by developing a measure of surveillance presence. For example, such a measure would help to assess surveilled subjects’ perceptions of the presence of surveillance in particular contexts and, likewise, indicate surveillance encounters that surveilled subjects do not recognize, or, at least, do not conceptualize in the same way as surveillance studies scholars. As well, a refined measure of surveillance presence could be used to help disassociate surveillance from problematic normative judgments. For instance, Monahan, Phillips & Murakami-Wood (2010) note the tendency of surveillance studies to emphasize the negative aspects of surveillance in their consideration of its empowering potentials. Identifying core components of surveillance procedures would allow the concept of surveillance to be more easily disassociated from normative understandings of the practice (e.g., surveillance is linked to invasiveness rather than care). Operationalization and measurement are key to these ambitions.

In summary, identifying the focus amongst surveilled subjects on the process, sources and outcomes of surveillance in their definitions provides surveillance studies with a better understanding of the situations in which surveilled subjects are particularly attentive to the presence of surveillance, which is a first step towards research exploring the socio-psychological effects of surveillance. However, I must reiterate that although I believe that the mere presence of (recognized) surveillance is likely to produce some affective responses, a wider range of
effects with greater variability will likely be associated with specific attributes of surveillance encounters.

**Operationalizing Acceptability Attributes from Below**

David Lyon (2002) noted over a decade ago that “[c]omparative analyses are very revealing, and are vital for surveillance studies today” (p.5); a key asset to this endeavor is a reliance across studies on standardized measures. A measure of surveillance acceptability would build on the utility of a measure of surveillance presence by providing a clearer understanding of the causal mechanism consistently at work in surveillance between applications and socio-psychological effects (which are undoubtedly associated with behaviours of considerable interest to surveillance studies scholars such as resistance). Here, I discuss the positive and negative attributes of surveillance identified by participants and argue that collectively these attributes lay a qualitative foundation for a measure of surveillance acceptability.

Assessing the effects of surveillance necessitates a more nuanced understanding of the mechanism of surveillance. This reality has been recognized by surveillance studies scholars. For example, Marx (1998) forwards a similar position in his theoretical exploration of key factors that affect perceptions of privacy and ethical conduct in surveillance encounters. I build on this tradition by conducting an empirical investigation into the positive and negative qualities of surveillance that are shared across contexts from the perspective of surveilled subjects. I maintain that the identified attributes (see Table 3) are factors consistent to surveilled subjects’ evaluations of the acceptability of surveillance across contexts and, therefore, may also influence socio-psychological effects of surveillance.

**Table 3. Shared Attributes of Surveillance at Pearson and in Everyday Life**

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<tr>
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<th>Positive</th>
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<td>Assistance</td>
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<td>Biased</td>
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164
Crime control
Record keeping
Safety
Security
Social engineering

Invasive
Labelling
Overzealous
Subordinating
Status quo reproducing

All of the above attributes were identified by multiple participants in a specific (Pearson International Airport) as well as general (everyday life) surveillance context, but all are also acknowledged in the existing literature as inherent qualities (or assumed qualities) of surveillance; bolstering the credibility of the factors listed in Table 3 as core attributes of surveillance.

Before more fully discussing the prevalence of these attributes in the literature, I would like to pause for a moment and note that all of the attributes discussed here (positive and negative) are potentialities associated with the presence of surveillance – they are core features of surveillance which surveilled subjects have demonstrated attention to in terms of categorizing surveillance as “good” or “bad.” I do not intend to suggest that every one of these attributes is actually a feature of all applications of surveillance; instead, I maintain that asking surveilled subjects about their perceptions of the presence of these attributes in contextually diverse surveillance encounters is a means of assessing the perceived acceptability of specific surveillance encounters through a general measure.

Turning first to the positive attributes of surveillance, examples of direct references to most of these attributes can be found in the surveillance studies literature while the remainder are discussed through similar, but not exact, terms. For instance, academic commentary on the incorporation of surveillance themes into popular media speaks to the attribute of social engineering indirectly by highlighting the common conception that surveillance is a tool useful in shaping public behaviour to improve society – albeit with effects generally characterized as
negative (Marks, 2006; Monahan, 2011). Likewise, acknowledgment of surveillance as assistance is embedded within research that explores surveillance as empowerment (Koskela, 2006; Monahan, Phillips & Murakami-Wood, 2010; Regan & Steeves, 2010). The remaining positive attributes are much more directly discussed in the existing literature. For example, crime control is a commonly cited rationale for public surveillance (Haggerty, Wilson & Smith, 2011; Norris, 2003; Walby, 2006). As well, surveillance as record keeping is often affiliated with the crime control attribute, as in this study, though not always; surveillance has also been recognized as a vital contributor to knowledge production in general through the act of record keeping (Simon, 2005). Finally, surveillance as security and safety are very commonly noted in the literature, often with critical undertones (Gilliom & Monahan, 2012; Lyon, 2007; Wilson & Weber, 2008), with Lyon (2003) describing 9/11 as giving these attributes heightened importance. Reviewing these findings indicates that these attributes were not only associated with surveilled subjects’ understandings of the positive qualities of surveillance both at Pearson and in everyday life, but also with the surveillance studies literature more broadly. This pattern is replicated with regards to the negative attributes identified.

Examples of direct references to some of these negative attributes are present in the surveillance studies literature, but, similar to the positive attributes discussed above, some negative attributes are strongly represented through conceptually similar terms. However, invasiveness, particularly as it pertains to the concept of privacy, is an exceptionally common negative attribute of surveillance discussed in the existing literature (Bennett, 2011; Marx, 1998; Stalder, 2002). Similarly, the potential for bias is also specifically acknowledged as a central negative attribute of surveillance by many surveillance studies scholars (Ball & Haggerty, 2005; Haggerty, Wilson & Smith, 2011), with race often emphasized, as it was by participants in this
study (Introna & Wood, 2004; Pallitro & Heyman, 2008; Wiebe, 2008). While the consistency in terminology clearly indicates that these particular attributes are situated in the literature, conceptual compatibility is evident with the other negative attributes identified. For instance, surveillance as labelling is incorporated into the literature through references to misrepresentation and misclassification (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Haggerty, Wilson & Smith, 2011). Surveillance as overzealous and as subordinating are attributes apparent in research emphasizing concepts such as power and hierarchy (boyd, 2011; Marwick, 2012; Shilton, 2010). Finally, the well-known concepts of social sorting (Lyon, 2003) and cumulative disadvantage (Gandy, 1993) both recognize the potentials of surveillance to reproduce social divisions (or, in other words, maintain the status quo). In total, the positive and negative attributes of surveillance identified as a result of this research all appear highly complementary to surveillance studies scholars’ characterizations of surveillance.

The compatibility of the findings with these sources suggests that the identified surveillance attributes are not only applicable to the contexts discussed by participants in this research, but also to a broader understanding of surveillance and, therefore, could be used as a base from which to develop a measure of surveillance acceptability that is functional across varied contexts. However, such measure development should also be attentive to advancements outside the field. Specifically, the field of occupational psychology has identified key criteria and developed measures associated with employees’ evaluations of workplace surveillance that warrant acknowledgment and provide models for developing measures that are more reflective of the knowledge base and interests of the field of surveillance studies (e.g., Higgins & Grant, 1989; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993; Stanton, 2000). Further, I also wish to stress that I suspect that perceptions of what constitutes “acceptable surveillance” will be reasonably similar across
contexts, but not contextually uniform. This position is similar to Nissenbaum’s (2004) conclusions regarding contextual integrity and expectations of privacy: I anticipate that surveillance acceptability will also vary, to some degree, according to context (e.g., location, purpose, administrator, etc.), but that a set of core attributes used to evaluate surveillance acceptability will be consistent across contexts. Searching for the connectivity between surveillance encounters, rather than the minutiae of particular encounters will provide surveillance studies with a better understanding of the mechanism of surveillance (Ball, 2003). While I explored procedural justice as a theoretical foundation by which to conceptualize this connectivity in Chapter 3, I have maintained that developing sound and consistent measures are an important methodological aspect of this process in the current chapter.

**Key Contentions**

The primary empirical contribution of this chapter draws attention to subject-centred understandings of surveillance, but I also forward the argument that consistent operationalization and measurement is needed to assess the presence, variation and effects of surveillance beyond isolated studies. This is not a new argument (see Ball, 2003; Marx, 2002), but this work is the first to propose measure development to gain a better understanding of the consistency of perceptions and evaluations of surveillance encounters across varied contexts. Measure development allows not only discrete projects exploring the same topic by the same researcher, but also completely unaffiliated researchers working on projects related to the same topic, to more easily compare and contrast their work; allowing a collaborative body of knowledge to emerge. For example, acceptability attributes identified in this research should be explored in other contexts, building on our collective understanding of the attributes which are unique to, absent from, and consistent across varied surveillance encounters. As Lyon (2002) notes “people
on the move cannot thus hope to evade surveillance” (p.3), and because surveillance should be for rather than of people (Stoddart, 2012), it is important to understand what it is about surveillance that people appreciate or find uncomfortable.

Knowledge of the mechanism of surveillance in terms of its core defining components and specific functional attributes will allow for the perceived presence and acceptability of surveillance to be accurately and consistently gauged across contexts, which is necessary to a sound understanding of the effects of surveillance. Causal relationships are at work in encounters with surveillance, however, we have a very limited understanding of those relationships (Ball, 2003; Lyon, 2002; Marx, 1998). Research such as this, which strives to recognize surveillance encounters for surveilled subjects in terms of constant independent variables is a first step towards consistently understanding and even anticipating the effects of varied applications of surveillance. Finally, this emphasis on empirical evidence accumulation and comparison is also a strategy for surveillance studies scholars to see the results of their work be more readily accepted in policy design and the practical application of surveillance (Marx, 2003). However, this is only an initial inquiry into a research topic that will require numerous studies to realize its potential.

Looking in a different direction, my emphasis thus far on searching for consistency in the surveilled subjects’ experiences with surveillance may imply a lack of appreciation for nuances associated with specific surveillance encounters. It is to this subject matter that I turn in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6: Encounters with Surveillance and Perceptions of Identity

This final results and discussion chapter presents and discusses results of my research that pertain to participants’ perceptions of identity and self-presentation during encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport. Although the results presented in this chapter are exclusively tied to surveillance in this specific context, in the discussion section I consider the implications of the findings more broadly. The ambition I set out with for my dissertation was to come to better know the experience of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject, and, while the two preceding chapters highlight means of understanding the subject experience consistently across contexts (through unifying theory and subject-centred measurement respectively), I also want to acknowledge the experience of surveillance in a context; allowing salient aspects of that experience to take centre stage. Furthermore, I wanted an opportunity to explore the intersectional experiences of surveilled subjects, addressing the nuanced and situated quality of encounters with surveillance; a task best accomplished through a context specific investigation. Guided by these research concerns, I found an emphasis in participants’ narratives of their encounters with surveillance at Pearson on themes tied to the concept of identity, in particular: normativity, fragmentation and self-presentation.

The objective of this chapter is to acknowledge the importance of exploring the nuances of surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance. Thus far in the dissertation I have emphasized the ways in which surveilled subjects’ experiences might be explored and understood with consistency in surveillance studies, however, I do not mean to suggest that the experiences of all surveilled subjects are uniform. In fact, I believe those experiences are highly situated on the basis of social order (Ball, 2001; 2002), and that a key component of the distribution of participants’ experiences with surveillance at Pearson are the ascribed qualities
associated with identity characteristics in that context, particularly the hierarchical ordering of whiteness relative to brownness. The social sciences are abundant with research exploring the influence of “whiteness” on the lived realities of persons; in which, whiteness is associated with a system of privilege (Babb, 1998; Hyde, 1995; McIntosh, 1988). A central theme that binds this diverse body of research is the problematization of the normalization of whiteness. In the Canadian context specifically, many researchers have argued that whiteness characterizes the normative Canadian body and/or identity (e.g., Handa, 1997; Peake & Ray, 2001; Salter, 2013). My use of “whiteness” draws on this same tradition of understanding, working with and building on Helleiner’s (2012) conceptualization of whiteness as an embedded preference in surveillance practices at the Canadian border. The system of privilege associated with whiteness in this context is made visible through relational comparisons. For instance, brownness as an identity characteristic that is juxtaposed to whiteness has been associated with enhanced surveillance scrutiny (see Helleiner, 2012; ICLMG, 2010; Pratt & Thompson, 2008). Bearing this framework for knowledge building in mind, I sought to better understand the nuances of surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson, particularly variations in perceptions and experiences associated with participants’ self-identification as white or brown, by exploring between group differences in participants’ narratives.

The chapter starts with an overview of participants’ perceptions of normative Canadian identity in relation to encounters with surveillance at Pearson. This first section develops an understanding of the characteristics that constitute participants’ perceptions of a “normal” Canadian, and how an individual’s ability to satisfyingly approximate the characteristics of this normative identity is perceived as affecting encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Following this, I explore participants’ references to identity fragmentation as an outcome of encounters with
surveillance perceived as discriminatory; specifically, that surveillance which is perceived as targeted on particular identity characteristics prompts the individual to perceive those characteristics as magnified and fragmented from other aspects of their identity. The final section focuses on participants’ descriptions of presentation of self during encounters with surveillance at Pearson; acknowledging heightened attention to self-presentation generally in this context, but also highlighting self-presentation as a strategy to accommodate for identity characteristics that fail to approximate normative Canadian identity. Importantly, the results in this chapter are all presented according to participants’ self-identified skin colour and sex, creating four groups for comparison: brown females, brown males, white females and white males. While some discussion is embedded in the presentation of these results, a detailed discussion section concludes the chapter.

**Perceptions of Identity in Relation to Surveillance**

Identity is a concept that is entrenched in the surveillance studies literature, in no small part due to the ability of surveillance to serve as a tool for identification and categorization; not only in a specific and focused sense (e.g., the identification of an individual through photo ID for voting purposes), but also very generally (e.g., differentiating ‘undesirable’ loafers from ‘desirable’ consumers in a shopping mall). Indeed, “surveillance makes very little sense if the people being watched cannot be identified” (Jenkins, 2012, p.163). Jenkins (2012) argues that understandings of identity are a product of processes of identification and that, while internal self-categorizations comprises an aspect of identification, in many surveillance scenarios (including encounters with surveillance at Pearson) externally imposed categorizations serve as the primary means of the identification process. As such, identification involves the classification of identity characteristics (ascribing them with particular meanings), and the subsequent
categorization of persons on the basis of these characteristics. This understanding of identification necessitates expanding the concept of identity beyond the individual to the group level. For example, while individual identity is crafted on the basis of unique combinations of personal characteristics (e.g., sex, race, socio-economic status, religious orientation), collective identities (e.g. normative national identities that represent the status quo citizen) simultaneously exist. It is critical that we are attentive to understandings of collective identities because, as aspects of surveillance procedures intended to secure the outcomes of protection and management, identification and categorization are processes that wield systematic consequences for groups of persons (Bowker & Starr, 1999; Jenkins, 2012; Lyon, 2006). As a site that is commonly recognized as being heavily preoccupied with the regulation of mobility through surveillance partly on the basis of nationality, it is perhaps not surprising that within many participants’ narratives there were descriptions of characteristics of a “normative” Canadian identity as well as inferences to the effects of one’s ability to satisfyingly approximate and be categorized as such on the surveillance scrutiny one was perceived to endure.

Many participants provided unsolicited descriptions of a normative Canadian identity in their narratives; however, all participants were also asked two questions that ultimately proved highly relevant to this same theme. Specifically, participants were asked how their experiences with surveillance at Pearson might be affected by: (1) the way that they look, and (2) stereotypes and/or prejudice. The following subsections present a variety of results that are highly indicative of a consistent understanding of the characteristics constituting normative Canadian identity amongst participants. First, an overview of statements drawn from the entirety of participants’ narratives suggests a shared understanding of the identity characteristics that constitute “normative” Canadian identity. Second, a focus on participants’ responses to the above questions
highlights perceptions of the influence of identity characteristics on encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Finally, I dedicate space to exploring participants’ perceptions of the congruence between their expectations and the realities of their encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

“Normative” Canadian identity.

“Well, it [encounters with surveillance at Pearson] depends on how much you’re blending in. If you’re the odd one out in terms of race or what you’re wearing, you’re not normal, and you’re focused on more.” – Participant 40

The concept of normativity is, without question, highly subjective; with determinations of (ab)normality resting on a host of contextual factors. However, social groups often have consistent understandings and expectations of normality when provided with defined parameters (Marwick, 2012; Trotter, 2011). In the context of normative Canadian bodies/identity, whiteness has been repeatedly identified as a central characteristic of the default standard that carries social privileges (Handa, 1997; Peake & Ray, 2001; Salter, 2013). Participant 40’s quote serves as an excellent representation of the information collectively conveyed by participants concerning the relationship between identity, normativity and surveillance encounters in a particular context; emphasizing specific identity factors and consequences associated with renderings and assessments of normality during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Although I did not directly inquire about perceptions of national identity in the interviews, the majority of participants referenced or described their (in)ability to approximate normative Canadian identity at some point in their narratives (see Table 4).

Table 4. References to Normative Canadian Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority status / sex</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White male</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(11 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White female</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(12 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown male</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(9 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown female</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(7 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>(39 sources)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although all groups of participants were represented in these references, and the sentiments conveyed by each group were supportive of each other, unique approaches to the topic were often evident between groups.

**White males.** In describing their experiences with surveillance at Pearson, participants who self-identified as white and male often acknowledged their relatively privileged status as a non-target of surveillance in this context. This position was conveyed in one of two ways: directly or indirectly. In some instances, white male participants directly mentioned identity characteristics that favourably positions persons who approximate these preferences relative to persons who do not. For example:

“The way you look, I suppose…with everything that has happened in recent history someone of different ethnic race would be targeted before a Caucasian individual who more than likely blends in…skin colour. I think if you stand out at all it will raise attention.” – Participant 18

“For myself, I think it’s pretty easy being a white male from Canada. But, things like the media’s portrayals of other cultures and things like that probably play a big role in terms of who they pay more attention to as people move through the airport. But, I think it’s a whole host of things, I think that culture and ethnicity are probably the biggest ones. And, that’s more so because it’s very visible. People make judgments about people right away, especially when it’s someone who looks different from them.” – Participant 5

However, not all participants discussed the importance of these characteristics so bluntly. The majority of white male participants employed more indirect references to the privileged status of these same characteristics through evasive language such as “average” or “normal.” For example:

“You know, it’s probably easier for an average looking Canadian citizen to go through. I just have no…I wouldn’t imagine that any one would think that I have ties to any sort of criminal foreign organization. I appear very Canadian. Not trouble or rough looking…I would imagine that my personal characteristics would make me not much of a target, being a white fairly cleanly put-together male.” – Participant 15
“I don’t think that I am a target for surveillance. I’m pretty average and don’t stand out in any one way or the other. Pretty much all my friends are what I’d consider average, nothing stands out about them, they’re all the same sort of temperament, never hear of them talking out of the ordinary that warrants surveillance. They’re white, Anglo-Saxon, male or female, living in suburbia.” – Participant 29

Although white male participants’ narratives engaged with the concept of a normative Canadian identity with varying degrees of directness, collectively these references are demonstrative of a fairly consistent understanding of key characteristics (particularly whiteness) associated with a status quo Canadian identity. A similar pattern was discernable in the narratives of white female participants.

**White female.** References to perceptions of a normative Canadian identity in the narratives of participants who self-identified as white and female demonstrated attention to similar underlying characteristics as those of white male participants, but much more frequently employed indirect language. Specifically, some white female participants directly mentioned identity characteristics and attributes in relation to constructions of social identity. For instance:

“In the context of a lot of diverse groups, being white tends to work to an advantage. It’s the society we live in, which is terrible.” – Participant 38

However, the majority of white female participants relied on the ambiguous language of “normal” and “average” to explain their experiences of being glossed over during encounters with surveillance at Pearson, in turn, equating themselves to satisfying approximations of a status quo Canadian identity. For example:

“I’m not a minority, so I’m not really looked at. I don’t have any defining qualities other than being young, I think I just look pretty normal, so I just pass through. They just do a quick check and that’s it.” – Participant 2

“Yeah, I think I go pretty much under the radar because I guess I’m an average person. I don’t think I would stand out.” – Participant 28
“I think all of that [identity characteristics] influences that [surveillance targeting at Pearson]...you read story books and you watch TV and media and my visual person and personality is always seen as that safe, no problem person. So, I think there’s a lot of that information being fed to people about the person I ‘am’.” – Participant 10

Although the comments made by Participant 2 and 28 imply the ascription of positive qualities to their identity characteristics by virtue of their described default status as non-targets of surveillance at Pearson, Participant 10 explicitly references the role of social construction in creating a shared understanding that characteristics associated with her identity are “safe.” Although Participant 10 articulates the existence of shared understandings of preferred identity characteristics particularly well in a general sense, similar considerations are echoed in references that focus on more specific attributes. For instance:

“I definitely think that because I’m a female I find that I’m treated nicely, and because I’m Caucasian. I’ve never heard of any stories in the news that are targeting Caucasians let alone females.” – Participant 6

Interestingly, white female participants were the only group that directly and repeatedly commented on the influence of sex as an identity characteristic in this setting (particularly the non-targeting of females relative to the implied targeting of males). As with Participant 6, the vast majority of participants who incorporated considerations of this aspect of their identity into their statements described being female as minimizing surveillance scrutiny at Pearson.

Furthermore, these references were also a point at which intersectional understandings of normative Canadian identity were strongly suggested. For example, while Participant 6 emphasizes the non-targeting of white females for surveillance at Pearson, Participant 38 suggests that whiteness is a primary determinant of surveillance targeting in this context but that sex may be affiliated with distributions in surveillance targeting when the preferred characteristic of whiteness is not satisfyingly approximated. Specifically:
“I always expect, just based on what friends who are visible minorities have always told me, they’re always stopped, and when I travel I’m not so...when I travel through security it’s almost...I feel it’s less likely that I’m going to be stopped because, one, I’m a Canadian citizen and, two, I’m also white. So...I know it’s a problem but I also know I’m not going to be stopped because I’m white and I don’t feel like gender plays a huge role in it, at least once you’ve put white out there, but if I was a visible minority it would probably play a role.” – Participant 38

In total, engagement with the concept of a normative Canadian identity is evident in white female participants’ narratives, although characteristic specific language is often avoided in favour of evasive references to normal or average identity. Nonetheless, whiteness as a characteristic of a status quo Canadian identity is still specifically acknowledged by some participants; highlighting the centrality of skin colour to notions of normative Canadian identity. Not surprisingly, use of terms such as normal and average falls away when turning to brown participants’ (both male and female) comments demonstrative of a shared understanding of normative Canadian identity, with the effects of one’s ability to resemble that identity emphasized.

**Brown male.** A shared understanding of normative Canadian identity was also evident in the narratives of participants who self-identified as brown and male, although they engaged with the concept uniquely from all other groups of participants; highlighting perceptions of exclusion from belonging to a status quo identity, based, at least in part, on race and skin colour. Brown male participants’ narratives were found to have the fewest overall references to the notion of a normative Canadian identity, however, the sentiments expressed were highly consistent. The relative positioning of whiteness as a preferred identity characteristic relative to brownness was a dominant message conveyed by these participants. For example:
“I think race plays into it a lot. Not necessarily sex or age per se, but race seems to be more of a factor than anything else. I guess it’s just more from a visual aspect. So...it’s easier for...like, you can easily say that somebody who is 50 years old and white male walks through like there’s no problem and then you have, you know, somebody my age [24 years old] for example, maybe not that big of a deal, but when you incorporate the race factor, what they can physically see, it becomes a little bit more of a threat to themselves especially if they don’t identify with that particular race.” – Participant 3

“The closer I can come to the Caucasian norms in dress, speech, attire, and so on the less likely I am to stand out.” – Participant 11

Although brown male participants did not cite the existence of a normative Canadian identity in such clear terms as those offered by white male and white female participants, these quotes still serve as strong indicators of the shared understanding of identity characteristics that constitute a status quo Canadian identity. “Brownness” as an identity attribute that relates to border crossings and surveillance is often characterized in terms of “otherness,” particularly when juxtaposed to “whiteness” (Helleiner, 2012), contributing to the creation of “suspect communities” identified in large part on the basis of their “brown bodies” (Patel, 2012, p.216). The articulation of characteristics that contribute to othering by participants also helps define an understanding of a status quo Canadian identity by specifying that which it is not. Participant 20 expresses the profound effects of such othering with exceptional clarity. Specifically:

“I don’t want to be treated like...I feel like at times I’m not treated like a Canadian. That’s the hardest part to be patient with. When they treat you like a criminal when you’re not a criminal is the hardest part.” – Participant 20

Participant 20’s comment highlights perceptions of exclusion from belonging to a Canadian identity. Belongingness (Helleiner, 2012; Peake & Ray, 2001; Salter, 2013) and normativity (Henry & Tator, 2009; Schick, 1998) in Canada are tied to whiteness, and experiences with discriminatory surveillance serve to enunciate racialized differences (Finn, 2011). As I have argued elsewhere, I suspect that the implications of these experiences extend beyond the actual interpersonal and physical interaction with border agents and surveillant technologies to affect
perceptions of identity-oriented belonging and normativity; based, in part, on (in)abilities to satisfyingly approximate the status quo – in this case, whiteness (Saulnier, 2015). Furthermore, brown female participants’ comments also reflected the othering of non-white persons from normative Canadian identity.

**Brown female.** References to perceptions of normative Canadian identity in the narratives of participants who self-identified as brown and female indicated attention to skin colour as an identity characteristic that is central to understandings of a status quo Canadian identity. This was conveyed, in part, through specific descriptions, but, interestingly, also through the indirect language of normativity, similar to white male and white female participants. For example:

“There is that search station they have after the metal detectors and it’s generally people who don’t look like they’re from Canada that I always see pulled aside there. Darker skin toned people, talking with an accent and wearing stuff that makes them look Muslim.” – Participant 8

“I also dress like a normal person...in terms of every normal person in Canada…but I do feel that sometimes they judge people on how they look. They would ask more questions, for instance, a Middle-Eastern woman wearing a burqa, completely covered; maybe they might check a bit more, ask her a bit more questions.” – Participant 43

Similar to brown male participants’ statements, implications of a normative Canadian identity can be inferred through references to that which does not look Canadian (e.g., darker skin tones, non-Canadian accents, non-Christian religious artefacts).

Brown female participants mentioned a wider variety of markers used to establish identity than any other group of participants, highlighting accent and clothing. A number of brown female participants stressed the importance of the effects of these markers on one’s ability to satisfyingly approximate a status quo Canadian identity and, in turn, experiences with surveillance at Pearson. For example:
“At the border, because clearly my passport says that I’m Pakistani but also that I’m a woman, I think there’s a stereotype that a Pakistani woman is going to dress and look and act a certain way, and I’m not that stereotype. I think because I’m a bit more outspoken and don’t dress in that way, people look at that and think clearly I don’t belong to a radical Muslim movement and so I’m not targeted as much.” – Participant 12

“I do not come across as, outwardly at least, because I do not fall under the...I do not present as a typical brown person. I’m a very savvy traveller, I don’t dress, sound or appear as a typical person from the Indian subcontinent. As such, I think security personnel pick up on that and say: ‘Okay, faster through.’ Again, I’m speaking Pearson. On the flip side, it does not hold true when I’m elsewhere. I’m still the same person but it doesn’t translate the same. That’s my experience. I find that I get yanked out for additional screening.” – Participant 23

An interesting theme that was present in the narratives of many brown female participants was an emphasis on self-presentations that distanced identity from skin colour while highlighting satisfying approximations of normative Canadian identity across other criteria such as accent and style of dress. A primary identity characteristic used to distinguish individuals who satisfyingly approximate the status quo from those who do not has historically been race, and individuals identified as “brown” have been deemed particularly problematic in the current moment. Identity characteristics such as race and skin colour are largely unalterable. However, the assumed benefit of diminished surveillance at Pearson when a satisfying approximation of a status quo identity is presented suggests that alterable characteristics associated with one’s identity may be a means of striving to approximate the normative standard. Importantly, the results across all four groups of participants indicate consistent characteristics associated with shared understandings of normative Canadian identity.

Specifically, across all groups of participants, normative Canadian identity was associated, first and foremost, with whiteness. However, a minority of participants also discussed dressing in a western style and speaking English (without an accent) as key secondary indicators. Although exploring collective understandings of normative Canadian identity may seem to be a
departure from the current inquiry, I feel that this information helps position participants’ responses to two specific questions in the interview guide that are presented in the following subsection. Specifically, this information helps situate participants’ responses to these questions (which both focus on how encounters with surveillance at Pearson are perceived to be shaped by identity characteristics), within the more specific focus in this chapter on the relationship between surveilled subjects’ perceptions of identity and encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

**Influence of identity on surveillance encounters at Pearson.** Participants were asked to describe: (1) the ways in which they expect that their experience will be shaped by the way that they look; and, (2) the ways in which they expect that stereotypes and/or prejudice (henceforth dually encompassed in the term stereotypes) might impact their treatment. Unlike the previous subsection, all participants provided some commentary on this relationship because each was specifically asked these questions. Although some participants indicated that they did not feel that “looks” or stereotypes influence their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, the analysis of those who did conveyed similar within group sentiments, as well as a consistent overall understanding between groups of the structure of treatment.

**White male.** Of the 12 white male respondents, 5 either indicated that they did not expect their treatment to be shaped by the way that they looked or that they did not feel that stereotypes impacted their treatment in this context. No white male participants who stated that they felt that their looks influenced their experiences with surveillance at Pearson reported perceptions of negative effects as a result. Instead, white male participants tended to emphasize an absence of negative effects as indicative of the positive effects their appearance must have on their experiences. For example:
“Just based on stories that you hear through the media or through friends, I don’t think it [my appearance] would affect me negatively because I am a white man and fairly non-threatening looking, so I think that my experience would be generally non-negative based on appearance.” – Participant 9

“I guess I’ve never really thought about it like that. I don’t think I get singled out because of my appearance. I don’t think it has a noticeable effect, so it probably means it has a positive effect; that I’m not being targeted for security checks that others might be.” – Participant 22

Participant 16 also linked feeling as though he was not negatively affected by his appearance during encounters with surveillance at Pearson to feelings of comfort. Specifically:

“I don’t feel like I have been singled out based on my appearance…and that gives me peace of mind.” – Participant 16

Some white male participants clearly articulated the privilege of “whiteness” in improving the ease of their experience (such as Participant 9), however, the specific aspects of appearance that were assumed to affect encounters with surveillance in this setting were often left unspoken. A similar strategy was adopted by white male participants when asked to describe the impact of stereotyping on their experiences.

Most white male participants who felt that stereotyping impacted their encounters with surveillance at Pearson agreed that the negative effects of stereotyping were not a problem that they expected to deal with personally but, rather, that stereotyping likely had indirect positive effects on their experiences by overlooking their threat potential. Again, generalizations tended to be favoured over the articulation of specific identity characteristics or stereotypes. Participants’ statements suggested employment of a normative conceptualization of Canadian identity and perceptions that persons failing to satisfyingly approximate that standard would be more likely to be negatively stereotyped. For instance:

“Not specifically, except kind of in the reverse way of not being overly stereotyped or prejudiced against.” – Participant 15
“Well, I guess I’m a white male so if anything it would make my crossing easier. Just because you hear the other stereotypes of people being inhibited. So, I guess mine is probably smoother.” – Participant 16

The one exception to the general sentiment held by white male participants that stereotyping did not negatively impact their encounters with surveillance at Pearson was conveyed by Participant 1. Participant 1 described perceptions of being stereotyped during encounters with surveillance in this context; however, not on the basis of a visible identity characteristic, but a very different form of identifier: a criminal record. Specifically:

“A couple times when I’ve been bothered about my waiver and they ask me what it’s for and as soon as you tell them it was drugs, right, they just…it’s an automatic, they’re sending it to secondary and they’re not using any of their discretion. It’s just like “you’re this, you’re that” and it bothers you. Like when you look at the fact that it’s like 35 years old and I’ve travelled through the States multiple, multiple, multiple times and never had any…never been in any trouble, that’s the part that bothers you. You know? I travelled over there for 15 years and nobody ever said anything and then like all of a sudden you are totally grouped into this section, being like a bad section, and I mean like, terrorism and that kind of stuff is one way you look at stuff, but just because you had something happen 30 years ago doesn’t mean that you’re a terrorist. Right?” – Participant 1

Participant 1’s description of being categorized as “bad” and worthy of additional scrutiny as well as his resultant frustration is highly reminiscent of a dominant theme associated with references to identity and surveillance encounters at Pearson found in brown (particularly male) participants’ narratives. I think it is noteworthy that the only white (male or female) participant who conveyed an experience approximating that of those much more commonly described by brown participants attributes his difficulties to the criminal record that plagues his identity.

Discriminatory surveillance practices have contributed to the equation of the identities of “brownness” and “Muslim” with criminality via the label of “terrorist” (Finn, 2011). The development of this heuristic was premised by the need to socially sort between potential threats and non-threats to national security. However, in this pursuit, discriminatory surveillance practices have sent potent messages of racialized distrust and exclusion that have tangible “race
making” effects (Huq & Miller, 2008). Participant 1’s narrative helps elucidate the criminalization of brownness at the border.

In total, just over half of white male participants’ reported perceiving that either the way that they look or stereotyping affects their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, however, those who did conveyed a very consistent understanding of those effects; maintaining that appearance expectations and stereotypes were both biased in their favour. The identity characteristics associated with those contentions were not always directly articulated (though the preferred quality of whiteness did make some appearances), however, the previously demonstrated preference amongst white participants to reference normative Canadian identity through indirect terms is suggestive of the centrality of the aforementioned status quo Canadian identity characteristics to white male participants’ understandings of their relatively positive positioning in terms of appearance and stereotypes.

**White female.** Of the 12 white female respondents, none indicated either that they did not expect their treatment to be shaped by the way that they look or that they did not feel that stereotypes impacted their treatment in this context. A small minority of white female participants stated that they did not feel that the way they look impacts their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, but the remaining majority were in strong agreement that being white and female positively impacts their experiences. For example:

“I don’t think I’m specifically targeted and I think that might come from my skin colour. Probably just because I’m a girl and a white girl. I suppose if anything age could be a factor, like, sometimes I travel by myself. I think the amount of questioning is just less.”

– Participant 14

“I think being white usually eliminates you as a primary suspect when crossing the border because it’s not the main target population at a border. Being female also gets you
overlooked because it’s not the majority to commit criminal activity. In combination, those factors make me a non-target [of surveillance].” – Participant 38

Similar to white male participants, white female participants described an absence of negative effects during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson as an indicator of the positive effects of their appearance; however, unlike white male participants, white female participants much more commonly explicitly articulated identity characteristics that were perceived as influential on these encounters. Participant 6 provides an exceptionally clear explanation of the sentiments described by the majority of white female participants; emphasizing the identity attributes of white and female as components of identity matrices that often seem to receive less scrutiny in this context. Specifically:

“I think that my characteristics…because I’m female and because I’m Caucasian…positively help the way that I’m targeted for surveillance. I think that people look at me and don’t zone in on it, they don’t see a threat, they don’t see a problem, so they don’t ask further questions. Like I said, I’ve never been brought to another level. So I definitely think it positively impacts my targeting because of the characteristics I explained.” – Participant 6

These same characteristics formed the focus of white female participants’ discussions of the impact of stereotypes on their experiences.

White female participants’ comments on the influence of stereotypes on their encounters with surveillance were highly complementary to those expressed by white male participants. In particular, no white female participants expressed concerns that stereotypes negatively impact their experiences, but, many expressed an awareness of the ways in which they might benefit from stereotypes. As with white male participants, white female participants often conveyed this perception through very general language; implying the privileged position associated with whiteness in the stereotyping of race and skin colour, but often leaving the specifics of that relationship unspoken. For instance:
“Maybe it [stereotyping] just makes me move more smoothly through. But not negative impacts. It doesn’t make it slower or anything.” – Participant 30

“I don’t think it [stereotyping] has [impacted my encounters with surveillance at Pearson]. Wait, I think it has...I think that at borders is probably one of the very few times that I’m aware of how bias and profiling is happening in the everyday world because it doesn’t impact me but I can see it a little more clearly when I’m at the border. So, I think it’s made me more aware of the privilege that I have.” – Participant 10

As with white female participants’ discussions of identity more broadly, this group again directly and repeatedly commented on sex as an identity characteristic that was perceived to have considerable influence in this setting which was attributed to stereotyping. In particular, sex was described as an identity characteristic that connotes certain behavioural expectations, with the female status being generally recognized as less of a threat than the male status. All white female participants who referenced sex in response to my query into the impacts of stereotypes on their encounters with surveillance at Pearson maintained that being female was associated with less surveillance scrutiny. For example:

“The fact that I’m female, because I’m less likely to be considered a threat. People have different perceptions of what a female is capable of doing.” – Participant 4

“Definitely being female and also race I guess. Female because there’s still a lot of stereotypes in our culture about what a girl can do and what a guy can do. So, that alone, people will automatically judge. And, race, because I’m white I’m not the minority so I think people just look past it but if I were any other race I think people would notice it and it would impact me a lot more.” – Participant 39

These results hint at the possibility that surveillance experiences vary depending on the intersection of one’s identity characteristics; suggesting that an identity matrix combining whiteness and femaleness is not a high priority target for surveillance at Pearson and, thus, is less negatively affected by the process. Drawing on participants’ collective sentiments, this may be due, in part, to the equation of whiteness with normative Canadian identity and femaleness to decreased threat potential.
In overview, most white female participants felt that either the way that they look or stereotypes affect their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, with no white female participants not reporting that at least one of these factors were believed to influence their experiences. The shared message of these comments was very consistent, with white female participants maintaining that appearance expectations and stereotypes were both biased in their favour. Furthermore, whiteness was very clearly articulated as a preferred identity characteristic (complementing white male participants’ results while enhancing their specificity), but with the additional nuance of sex incorporated; suggesting the importance of identity matrices as well as particular identity characteristics.

**Brown male.** Of the 13 brown male participants, 4 either indicated that they did not expect their treatment to be shaped by the way that they looked or that they did not feel that stereotypes impacted their treatment in this context. All brown male participants who felt that their looks influenced their experiences with surveillance at Pearson reported perceptions of negative effects. Although a small minority of brown male participants stated that they did not believe that their appearance impacts their encounters with surveillance in this context, a much more common sentiment expressed is best summed up by the word “absolutely.” For example:

“Absolutely. I think the fact that I would identify as being brown has a definitive impact on the situation. I think that the way I dress is played directly into it and it now influences the choices I make…that influences my experience greatly.” – Participant 11

“Absolutely. I’m of South Asian descent. I have a beard. I’m Muslim. And you know for a fact, well not a fact, you assume that…you’re going to be watched.” – Participant 20

The statements made by Participant 11 and 20 both suggest an awareness of the effects of particular intersections of identity. Specifically, Participant 11 suggests that skin colour and style
of dress are considered in tandem during encounters with surveillance in this context. Further, drawing from one of his previous quotes (in which he described a conscious awareness of his efforts to approximate a Caucasian style of dress to blend in, see page 178), Participant 11’s statement can be interpreted as an attempt to improve the reception of his brown skin colour by cloaking it with a western style of dress. Likewise, Participant 20’s statement suggests that the combination of his brown skin and visible indicators of Muslim religious status are recognized as potentially problematic in this context, warranting greater scrutiny. In these ways, both participants acknowledge an awareness of the muted or enhanced salience of particular identity characteristics in the context of an identity matrix. Similar sentiments are identifiable in the responses of other brown male participants. For instance, although little elaboration was offered by most brown male participants who indicated that they did not believe their experiences were shaped by their appearance, Participant 33 did; and, in doing so, provided further evidence of the perceived effects of identity intersections. Specifically:

“No. Just because I’m not your typical Arab. I fit more into the Western categorization in terms of look, dress and actions. One thing is that I talk from my own personal experiences but I’m 100% sure that if I wore the cultural clothing and religious beard I think I would be treated differently. That’s the human condition, people are always afraid of what they don’t know. So, I try to fit in here and some people might say that makes me weaker, but it also makes my life easier.” – Participant 33

Despite obvious perceptions that surveillance scrutiny in this context was at least partially attributed to particular combinations of identity characteristics, brown male participants were the group that was least likely to describe stereotyping as impacting their experiences with surveillance at Pearson.

Brown male participants seemed very hesitant to attribute their encounters with surveillance in this context to stereotyping or prejudice, although undertones of these concepts were often evident in their responses. Some brown male participants simply stated that they did
not believe these were factors that impacted their experiences. However, most described instances in which they felt that they, or people they know, were targeted for surveillance which they attributed, at least in part, to skin colour. For example:

“In some experiences I would say yes [stereotyping impacts my experience with surveillance at Pearson]. Because I have had the people searching me and question me more be predominantly white. When I get “randomly” selected and none of my white friends do, it just...whether or not I just happened to be the person who just happened to be selected I don’t know.” – Participant 3

“Personally, to myself, no. I might say I observe it in others, but not for myself. I travel with a colleague, and it started off as a joke, but he is almost always the guy that gets randomly searched. We just joke around. He’s Indian, he’s a bigger guy. Just chalk it up to the classic stereotype, more of a joke than anything.” – Participant 31

Alternatively, the concept of profiling was incorporated into several brown male participants’ responses to my query regarding stereotyping. I did not specifically incorporate the term “profiling” into my interview guide at any point and, as such, I think it is noteworthy that brown male participants were the only group to draw upon this concept with any consistency, and that the term appeared to be favoured over the use of “stereotyping” or “prejudice” in response to this particular query. For example:

“Prejudice...no. Profiling…it’s entirely on that. People don’t like to believe that there’s a...that in this environment racism exists, but racism is a negative term however there is a way that these agencies use to segregate people for searches and it’s based on research, it’s based on current events, it’s based on statistics, and so, because of that, it does happen.” – Participant 21

“I truly believe that profiling is huge.” – Participant 47

Ultimately, when responding to this question, brown male participants seemed more comfortable describing their experiences through the label of profiling rather than stereotyping or prejudice. This interesting fact within the data warrants further research but may be attributable to the desire amongst brown male participants to share their impressions of and experiences with surveillance perceived as discriminatory while avoiding highly critical or confrontational terms.
(such as stereotyping or prejudice) and, instead, opting for the more legitimized vernacular of profiling.

In summary, although not all brown male participants reported perceptions that their appearance affects their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, those who did articulated a very consistent understanding of those effects; maintaining that appearance expectations negatively affect their experiences and that the intersection of brownness with identity characteristics that stand in stark contrast to indicators of normative Canadian identity (e.g., Muslim religious orientation, non-western style of dress, non-Canadian accent) are perceived to enhance the quality and/or quantity of surveillance scrutiny. Surprisingly, despite these perceptions, brown male participants seemed very reluctant to attribute their experiences to stereotyping; however, the group did draw attention to the concept of profiling (a more legitimized process that highlights one’s criminal potential on the basis of identity – especially appearance – through the use of statistics). In combination, brown male participants’ responses to these queries provide strong evidence of the importance of identity intersections on (at least perceptions of) encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

**Brown female.** Of the 10 brown female participants, none indicated either that they did not expect their treatment to be shaped by the way that they look or that they did not feel that stereotypes impacted their treatment in this context. The majority of brown female participants also felt that physical appearance plays a role in encounters with surveillance at Pearson but, unlike brown male participants, they did not prioritize skin colour in responding to this query. As with brown female participants’ characterizations of normative Canadian identity, the importance of combinations of identity characteristics were highlighted as
central to one’s ability to satisfyingly approximate a status quo Canadian identity and, in turn, affect surveillance targeting in this context. In particular, brown female participants emphasized physical indicators of cultural affiliation, such as the absence or presence of religious garb, as central to the ways in which appearance shapes encounters with surveillance at Pearson. For example:

“To be honest, I feel like maybe because I’m a female and I don’t wear a head scarf or anything very culturally identifiable...like, I’m born in Baghdad, Iraq but most people say they have no idea where I’m from usually so I feel that just by physical appearance I don’t think that I’m really targeted but when my actual place of birth becomes evident because of the passport that’s when their perceptions change.” – Participant 7

“Yes, it [the way I look] definitely does [shape my encounters with surveillance at Pearson]. I mean...I don’t physically...I don’t wear a hijab for example. Many times when I cross the border I’m exposing my body in ways that you wouldn’t identify with being Muslim, I’m wearing shorts for example. So people don’t see me as a Muslim in many ways until they see my passport and see born in Pakistan or stamps from Dubai, like, they wouldn’t really know before that point.” – Participant 12

While most brown female participants stressed their ability to better approximate a status quo Canadian identity through their appearance (specifically a western style of dress), these same sentiments were endorsed from the opposite perspective by Participant 13. Specifically:

“Definitely clothing just because I wear the hijab and I also dress fairly modestly. I wouldn’t say because of my sex. But, I do think because I’m from Afghanistan, like Afghanistan and Pakistan you can’t really tell for sure which one, but as soon as they see my name it’s also an Islamic name so...I think the combination of the way that I dress, the way that I look and my name.” – Participant 13

From both perspectives, combinations of identity characteristics were emphasized in the responses of most brown female participants as a means to describe how appearance shapes their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. However, despite demonstrating this unity of thought in regards to the effects of appearance, perceptions of the extent to which stereotypes impacted their encounters with surveillance at Pearson were much more mixed.
Although the majority of brown female participants expressed concern over the influence of stereotyping on their experiences, several participants stated that they did not feel that stereotypes impact their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. For instance:

“No. I felt I was treated just like everyone else. It was a surprise, but a pleasant surprise.” – Participant 13

“For me, I’ve had great experiences, but, I’ve seen my dad treated differently. It would kind of bother me because they would be more harsh with him. They would really interrogate him, but with me they didn’t notice anything or care.” – Participant 34

Alternatively, concern over the effects of stereotyping were mentioned by a number of brown female participants; making this the only group of participants to consistently express that stereotyping is an aspect of encounters with surveillance at Pearson that negatively impacts them. For example:

“Yes. I think it’s basically the stereotyping of all Middle Eastern people because of current events and history we get stereotyped by that. It’s a stereotype of a terrorist and it kind of grows with you and you get used to it. It’s kind of like, it’s the majority of people who are Middle Eastern. Because of the media depicting bias...they just show things without the full story. It’s mostly the media to blame for that and that’s why it’s hard for most Middle Eastern people to travel.” – Participant 40

“They look at you right...I guess everyone has a...not saying they’re being racist...they just look at you and think and maybe you’re doing something. I guess they might think you’re lying or bringing something illegal and I think they think about that in terms of the background you’re from.” – Participant 42

Although brown female participants’ narratives were a group in which the intersectional implications of identity were especially evident, their responses to my query regarding stereotypes did not specify particular identity characteristics but, rather, employed language with a more general orientation but which implied attention to identity characteristics.

In review, most brown female participants felt that either the way that they look or stereotypes affect their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, reporting that at least one of these factors influenced their experiences. With regards to appearance, brown female participants
consistently emphasized style of dress as influential; specifically, although skin colour was noted as a factor of importance, its salience was linked to physical identifiers of a Muslim religious orientation, with the wearing of religious artefacts producing greater surveillance scrutiny. In addition, while some brown female participants expressed that stereotyping did not affect their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, the majority suggested that stereotypes negatively influence their experiences in terms of general anti-Middle Eastern sentiments.

In total, the results across all four groups of participants indicate different perspectives but consistent understandings of the ways in which appearance and stereotypes impact encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Furthermore, collectively, the contrasting but complementary narratives of how normative Canadian identity is associated with encounters with surveillance at Pearson offered by white and brown participants serve as a strong illustration of Jenkins’ (2012) reminder to the surveillance studies community that processes of identification are as concerned with classifying similarity as they are with difference; one cannot exist without the other. In this context, participants’ perceived that the differentiation criteria used to expose some persons to enhanced surveillance scrutiny is based, in part, on one’s relative similarity or dissimilarity to a normative Canadian identity as determined, again in part, on particular characteristics. However, it is important to underscore that these results are based on perceptions, which are a very significant topic of study (especially in terms of better understanding subjective interpretations of encounters with surveillance) but which do not provide conclusive evidence of discriminatory surveillance practices based on appearance or stereotyping.

**Acknowledging the limitations of perceptions.** Although it is very important to explore perceptions in coming to better understand social processes, it is worth acknowledging that
perceptions are interpretive and that the actual practices underlying a social process may be perceived quite differently than its design intended. Ultimately, subjects’ perceptions are a useful tool to better understand experiences with social processes but not necessarily an accurate representation of the application of a social process. I found support for this position in participants’ responses to a query I posed regarding perceived variations between expectations of and actual experiences with surveillance at Pearson.

Participants responded to this question in one of three ways. First, a minority of participants stated that they felt their expectations and experiences were in alignment. These sorts of statements were most often framed through an implied positive overall expectation. For instance:

“No, I think my expectation is based on experience and generally it’s been okay.” – Participant 24

“I don’t think it varies. I go in expecting the same thing, not really thinking anything negative about it.” – Participant 27

Second, another minority of participants stated that they felt their expectations were usually more dramatic than their experiences warranted but with a very specific emphasis on the time it takes to move through the surveillance process at Pearson as opposed to any concerns associated with treatment or outcomes. For example:

“No significantly. I guess in the positive sense; sometimes it’s empty and you get through a lot faster.” – Participant 22

“Yes. In the sense that it’s not always busy even though I do give myself a lot of time. Sometimes you just happen to shoot through everything and you’re sitting there for two hours.” – Participant 31

Finally, the majority of participants more generally stated that they felt their experiences were often less negative than they anticipated that they would be and this sentiment was expressed similarly across participants regardless of minority status or sex. For example:
“Yeah, not very different, but, just generally I’m an anxious person. I always imagine that it will be a bigger deal than it is. So, yeah, the expectation is usually a bit more negative than the reality.” – Participant 12

“I guess you kind of get the idea that it is going to be worse than it actually is. You only hear the worst part of the stories; no one tells you how good it is. So, I expect it to be more invasive and more intrusive, but then I don’t really feel it is that way at all.” – Participant 16

“Yes. I do. I’m always thinking pessimistically. I always think that we’ll get stopped at the border; that my husband will say something stupid or that we’ll be joking about something and somebody will overhear us. I curtail what I say at the airport because I don’t know whose listening and if they might take something serious, so there’s certain things I won’t even say in an airport. But, my perception of how negative the experience is, is rarely the reality. Often times we’re sent through without any sort of questions and it’s just pretty much: ‘Go ahead.’ If anything, it’s more just boring. So, I have an expectation that I think it’s going to be really bad and then it’s like: ‘Meh, not as bad as I thought it would be.’” – Participant 19

“The experience is better than the perception usually.” – Participant 26

In summary, most participants indicated that their expectations leading up to an encounter with surveillance at Pearson tended to exaggerate the negative aspects of the process, providing some evidence that the totality of the process itself may not be as negative as it is often characterized. However, this does not mean that perceptions should simply be discounted in this context. Perceptions are still influential (Becker, 1967). In this case, regardless of whether discriminatory practices are actually embedded in encounters with surveillance at Pearson, participants’ narratives still indicated tangible outcomes on perceptions and presentations of identity, such as identity fragmentation.

**Identity Fragmentation**

Identity fragmentation refers to perceptions and processes by which a holistic understanding of identity (such as the concept of an identity matrix) is undermined and a separated conceptualization of identity in terms of pure parts (individual identity characteristics) is produced (Lugones, 1994; Ong, 2005). Negative experiences with actual or perceived
omnipresent and oppressive surveillance systems may foster identity fragmentation by accentuating difference. In part, this may be due to perceptions of exclusion from belonging to normative Canadian identity (Saulnier, 2015). While a normative identity is demarcated by accepted characteristics, individuals who believe they experience inappropriate treatment (relative to persons who better approximate a normative identity) on the basis of particular identity characteristics may come to perceive these aspects of their identity as magnified or “fragmented” (a process that involves singular components of identity coming to overshadow a more nuanced identity matrix in a particular context or more broadly; Toren, 2014). Although I did not directly inquire about perceptions of identity fragmentation in the interviews, many participants referenced or described how they perceived particular aspects of their identity to be especially pronounced during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson at some point in their narratives (see Table 5).

Table 5. References to Identity Fragmentation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Minority Status / Sex</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>(3 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(2 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown male</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(10 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown female</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>(8 sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>(23 sources)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures presented in Table 5 clearly demonstrate that references to identity fragmentation were not equally distributed across the sample. Participants who self-identified as brown (both male and female) commented on the concept considerably more often and with greater frequency than participants (both male and female) who self-identified as white. Through this pattern, references to identity fragmentation demonstrated an initial relationship to understandings of a normative Canadian identity, especially skin colour and one’s ability to approximate the
preferred quality of whiteness. This relationship was further evidenced by analyzing the nature of participants’ references to identity fragmentation across the aforementioned groups.

**White male.** The few white male participants whose narratives contained comments that were relevant to a discussion of identity fragmentation largely did not express personal experiences with this process but, rather, conveyed an awareness of this phenomenon through references to the way others might interpret discriminatory treatment. For instance:

“I’m aware that I’m lucky. I’m aware that other people are targeted and profiled and whether anybody was...especially brown people, like if you look like you’re from Pakistan or anything like that, whether you’re actually being targeted, those people are thinking about it and they need to think twice about everything. It’s always coming through that filter of ‘is this because of the way they look.’ I’m aware of how they feel in that regard.” – *Participant 24*

The one exception to this pattern in the way white male participants engaged with the concept of identity fragmentation is found in the narrative of Participant 1. As noted previously, Participant 1 described his criminal record as an aspect of his identity that negatively influences his encounters with surveillance at Pearson. In presenting this finding, I mentioned that Participant 1 was unique from other white male participants; conveying an experience more similar to that of brown male participants. I observed a similar pattern with regards to identity fragmentation; in particular, Participant 1 was the only white participant to describe personal perceptions of identity fragmentation, emphasizing the extent to which having a criminal record is highlighted as a central characteristic of his identity in this context. Specifically:

“You tell your brain that you’re not doing anything wrong but why do I still have to feel guilty about what happened 30 years ago? It’s something at work, you know, in your day to day life that you don’t have to deal with, but there it’s like here it is on a plaque.” – *Participant 1*

Despite this notable exception, white male participants’ narratives engaged with the concept of identity fragmentation very minimally, indicating that identity fragmentation is rarely
experienced by white male participants. A similar pattern was discernable in the narratives of white female participants.

**White female.** White female participants offered very few comments that were relevant to a discussion of identity fragmentation in their narratives, but Participant 10, although not providing a specific account of identity characteristics that she perceives as magnified in this context, does speak to an awareness of a relationship between context and the effects of identity characteristics; suggesting that the relative value of identity characteristics is highly contextual. In particular:

“*I think your [identity] characteristics matter, depending on where you are and what you’re doing, as far as how you get treated.*” – *Participant 10*

Although the comments made by these white female participants are relevant to a discussion of identity fragmentation in that they both acknowledge isolating and ascribing identity characteristics with weighted values in particular contexts, in total, white female participants engaged with the concept of identity fragmentation very minimally. This indicates, as with white male participants, that identity fragmentation is rarely experienced by white female participants, both of which stand in stark contrast to brown participants’ (both male and female) comments pertinent to identity fragmentation.

**Brown male.** Many brown male participants described race and/or skin colour as identity characteristics that are perceived as particularly pronounced during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, overshadowing a more nuanced identity matrix. Most brown male participants discussed these characteristics through very general language, but which implied a clear awareness of their inability to satisfyingly approximate the preferred quality of whiteness. For example:
“I don’t want to be the guy standing out of the crowd because I feel that any question could just ruin my trip because of my nationality, because of how I look, because I’m in Canada.” – Participant 36

“It depends...I think race plays into it [my encounters with surveillance at Pearson] a lot. Not necessarily sex or age per se, but race seems to be more of a factor than anything else.” – Participant 3

“Well, the [identity] characteristic would be race as far as where surveillance is concerned. But once people know who you are and your occupation they change their opinion.” – Participant 25

Although Participant 25 articulates the same general sentiments of Participants 36 and 3 regarding his awareness of the prominent positioning of his race relative to other aspects of his identity (implying identity fragmentation through the fracturing of identity into discrete components), he also downplays a link between these experiences and identity fragmentation by emphasizing the fleeting nature of moments in which such superficial identity characteristics dominate interactions. While this is a valid point in many forms of encounters, interactions with agents of surveillance at Pearson are designed to be fleeting, potentially bolstering the process of the weighting of identity characteristics and, in turn, promoting fragmented understandings of identity in that moment if not longer. Participant 11 offers a particularly strong account of this phenomenon accompanied with a description of perceptions of being isolated and separated from his family (who more satisfyingly approximate a normative Canadian identity). Specifically:

“I think the fact that I would identify as being brown has a definitive impact on the situation. I think that the way I dress is played directly into it and it now influences the choices I make, and I think the last factor is the company I’m with. That influences my experience greatly. So, I have...the vast majority of the people I travel with, even when I’m travelling with my immediate family, are Caucasian. I’ve been married twice and both my wives have been Caucasian. So, that’s been the majority of my experience and you feel very quickly like you’re being singled out and separated from your family. Which is odd because you start to see yourself as being different from your family, and I’m almost at the point right now where I go through security separate from them or at least removed from them...I have a perception that regardless...obviously I feel I have nothing to hide, yet I feel that I am someone considered worth watching. When I walk into view of surveillance, I become a lot more self-aware immediately. I don’t have
negative emotions; I once did, but you become numb to it after a while. It becomes the expectation.” – Participant 11

In the above quote, Participant 11 makes many comments that indicate his perception that a particular aspect of his identity (skin colour) features prominently during his encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Furthermore, similar sentiments were expressed by other brown male participants. For example:

“I’m of South Asian descent. I have a beard. I’m Muslim. And you know for a fact, well not a fact, you assume that you’re going to be stereotyped and you’re going to be watched.” – Participant 20

“I think...maybe because of my skin colour...but I don’t want to say just skin colour because it’s because of my cultural background. I hate blaming things on stuff like that but it’s not a coincidence that every time this happens.” – Participant 47

Recognition of the emphasis that agents of surveillance are perceived to place on identity characteristics such as cultural background, skin colour and religious orientation may enhance the surveilled subject’s own perceptions of the weighted importance of these identity characteristics, at least in the context in question, possibly promoting identity fragmentation rather than an appreciation for the complex intersection of identity characteristics that form their identity matrix. In addition, these same perceptions of identity fragmentation may be exacerbated by corroborating experiences between contexts in which surveillance is expected/tolerated and those where it is less expected/tolerated, one of which is described by Participant 11. Specifically:

“Once I’m on the plane, I feel it [surveillance] shifts from agents at the airport, law enforcement agents, to the passengers. And, I think that is created more by media and other things. People become very mindful. You feel you have to adjust to accommodate your race.” – Participant 11

Similar perceptions of “surveillant staring” in public settings (comparable to the concept of social surveillance; Marwick, 2012) are described by persons of South Asian heritage living in
the US post 9/11 as well as perceptions of being subjected to heightened suspicion in a variety of physical and online settings leading to increased perceptions of “othering” (Finn, 2011).

Experiences such as that described by Participant 11 and Finn’s (2011) participants highlight the reality that isolated aspects of one’s identity are used by surveillant others to, at least initially, evaluate the scrutiny one warrants. Brown male participants emphasized cultural background, skin colour and religious orientation as identity characteristics that are perceived as dominating their more nuanced identity matrices during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, producing a fragmented as opposed to holistic representation of one’s identity. Very similar perceptions were present in the narratives of brown female participants.

**Brown female.** Many brown female participants described cultural background, skin colour and religious orientation as identity characteristics that overshadow a more nuanced identity matrix during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. For example:

“I think my outward appearance can have negative impacts in terms of people making assumptions about me and it’s a skin colour thing… I have a negative view of it because the media is always saying that there is more surveillance on certain ethnic groups in our country, so, yeah, I guess I’m always looking over my shoulder.” – Participant 34

“I don’t think it’s a race thing generally, like, it’s not white versus black people versus brown people; it’s just brown people versus everybody and that’s not fair. I think it’s more targeted on brown people, especially when they dress a certain way or when they have a name that’s religious or cultural. I feel that is the most important thing about me when I’m there [at Pearson].” – Participant 13

Additionally, Participant 23’s quote also provides an excellent description of citizenship as another identity characteristic associated with identity fragmentation by drawing attention to her experiences pre- and post-holding a Canadian passport. Specifically:

“I wasn’t always a Canadian citizen, I use to travel on an Indian passport, but that has bigger impacts for immigration than security. The interesting part being that when I had that passport I was travelling a lot for work and there would be a big group travelling and I would always get additional questions and be held up. Interestingly enough it wasn’t as pronounced when I got the Canadian passport but I was the exact same person, no
different markers but the Canadian passport and does that make me a more trustworthy person? So, your identity, in the sense of citizenship, plays a huge role in border crossings. My crossings are not as seamless as yours [referencing the white female interviewer], but they’re better [than they used to be] and the individual behind the passport has not changed, just the passport.” – Participant 23

Brown female and male participants’ comments articulate complementary perceptions that the complexity of identity is disregarded in favour of a focus on discrete identity characteristics during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Surveillance which is focused on discrete components of an individual’s identity cause the individual to be identified by fragmented information that is not representative of the individual’s self-identity (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Lianos, 2003). Building on our knowledge of this process, some brown female participants went on to describe its effects on their perceptions of self-identity.

These powerful quotes are highly demonstrative of the reality that discriminatory surveillance which fragments identity affects perceptions of belonging in the culture of a nation. For example:

“I think there’s an unspoken perception of who is actually worth surveying and who is “randomly” selected to get surveyed, so obviously I draw a negative inference from that because I’m part of the group that would get “randomly” selected. Bias. Prejudice. I guess just invading someone’s privacy for no reason whatsoever that’s legitimate. It makes someone feel different and I think it can even stem to other more negative feelings towards Canada as a whole….it [being brought in for secondary screening] made me feel different in the sense that they’re identifying me as someone who is different; essentially saying that you’re somebody we think is different whereas I don’t feel any different than anybody else. So, it’s a weird situation to be in because you feel so wronged when you know that there’s nothing to be alarmed about. I definitely feel different that way, in that they’re putting it out there that you are different.” – Participant 7

“I guess it reminds me of the fact that there are groups within the larger population and that some of them are being watched more carefully. It reminds me that being a naturalized Canadian is not enough to show to someone that you don’t have roots or attachments to a hit-list group. It makes me go back to the community and think more about belonging to that group.” – Participant 12
“Most important I think would be my skin colour because yes there are so many different races in Canada, but I think skin colour stands out. I’m different, I’m not white, so you know I’m not really from this country.” – Participant 43

Perceptions of exclusion from the category of “legitimate Canadian” were most well pronounced in the narratives of brown female participants but were exclusively connected to participants who self-identified as brown, never emerging in the narratives of white participants (male or female). Collectively, the sentiments expressed by brown female participants not only draw attention to perceptions that holistic evaluations of identity are disregarded in favour of a focus on particular identity characteristics or combinations during encounters with surveillance at Pearson (that stand in noticeably stark contrast to the identity characteristics associated with normative Canadian identity), but also that this fragmentation of identity is linked to perceptions of difference and exclusion from the category of legitimate Canadian. A cumulative review of all four groups of participants’ narratives demonstrates that perceptions of identity fragmentation are related to minority status. Further, recognizing the role that identity fragmentation plays in encounters with surveillance at Pearson helps position understandings of participants’ manipulations of self-presentation in this context.

**Presentation of Self**

“I believe that I have, like, multiple identities. It’s all part of one, but you show yourself differently.” – Participant 47

The process of identity fragmentation tends to involve manipulations of self-presentation that downplay differences in identity characteristics between the dominant social group and oneself (Gonsalves, 2014; Pfeffer, 2014; Verni, 2009). Participant 47’s statement provides an excellent bridge between the concepts of identity fragmentation and self-presentation in this research.

There is a long tradition in sociological inquiry of recognizing the effects of social interactions on self-perceptions and self-presentations (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959), with surveillance
studies being no exception, particularly given the influence of Foucault’s work on the field. I inquired about the effect of surveillance on self-presentation directly during interviews; asking participants to describe the ways in which they consciously modify their behaviour and image when encountering surveillance at Pearson. As well, some participants independently integrated discussions of the modifications they actively make in this setting into their narratives. Conversely, a minority of participants indicated that they were not aware of making any changes to their presentation of self in this context. For example:

“When I went [to Pearson] I didn’t change the way I dress. I didn’t consciously change the way I acted. Everything was the same. I wasn’t really worried about having trouble with the surveillance.”  – Participant 13

“I don’t know if I’ve really tried to change anything; just be cooperative when interacting with the guards there.”  – Participant 22

However, most participants described taking conscious efforts to improve the ease of their experience with surveillance at Pearson. This involved an acute awareness of their self-presentation (see Table 6).

Table 6. References to Presentation of Self

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Status / Sex</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
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<td>17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>White female</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>(9 sources)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brown female</td>
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<td>(9 sources)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td><strong>(36 sources)</strong></td>
</tr>
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Surveillance understood as watching connotes a particular attention to appearance (Jenkins, 2012); an appreciation for which was demonstrated in participants’ references to manipulations of self-presentation associated with encounters with surveillance at Pearson. The figures presented in Table 6 demonstrate that references to presentation of self were fairly equally distributed across the sample (although brown male participants referenced the subject more
frequently than all other groups). However, upon closer inspection, there are considerable qualitative differences in these references between groups; particularly, between participants who self-identified as white and those who self-identified as brown. While the details of these distinctions are presented below, in general, the results suggest that manipulations of self-presentation in this context are linked to perceptions of normative Canadian identity.

**White male.** In describing their experiences with surveillance at Pearson, white male participants only discussed their presentation of self in this setting when probed to do so, but did indicate conscious awareness of manipulating the image of themselves that they present. White male participants tended to downplay their attention to self-presentation, but did describe making actual adjustments to their image and behaviours. For example:

“I don’t think I have. Maybe I sort of think about shaving a few days before I go, but that would be about it.” – *Participant 5*

“I would only say speaking mannerisms. Making sure what you say is direct and as truthful as possible and thinking beforehand what you expect them to want you to say.” – *Participant 18*

The quotes of participants 5 and 18 help to illustrate that even surveilled subjects who are ideally positioned in this context (who closely approximate a normative Canadian identity) are still consciously attentive to their presentation of self; although admittedly rather minimally, more as an after- rather than fore-thought. However, the adjustments made were still specifically linked to the surveillance encounter and indicated active efforts to minimize surveillance scrutiny. For instance:

“I’m not overly worried but I have gone in thinking you don’t want to go to the airport looking like a wreck to avoid unnecessary questioning or surveillance having the wrong idea. Even just everyone that you deal with in terms of airport staff, it’s important to be nice and polite. It makes me more conscious of how I interact with people.” – *Participant 15*
“It’s almost a feeling that you’re trying to act and look as innocent and non-threatening as possible so that you can get through without harassment.” – Participant 9

No white male participants described the manipulation of their image or behaviour as central to their encounters with surveillance at Pearson in perception or reality. However, white male participants did still acknowledge intentional image sculpting (such as interaction mannerisms acutely sensitive to politeness, and personal styling that indicates being cleanly and well-kept) with the aim of reducing surveillance scrutiny. Goffman’s (1959) assertion that even honest performers still need to assure their audience of their genuineness seems relevant to these results. Specifically, it may be that even surveilled subjects whose identity characteristics align with normative Canadian identity (and, thereby, are less likely to be targets of surveillance scrutiny) still recognize that fine-grained adjustments to self-presentation can further avoid scrutiny. A similar theme was discernable in the narratives of white female participants.

**White female.** As with white male participants, white female participants only discussed their presentation of self during encounters with surveillance at Pearson when probed to do so, but did express taking conscious efforts to adjust their self-presentation. Some white female participants associated these mindful actions with attempts to avoid additional surveillance scrutiny, much like white male participants. However, while white male participants’ comments implied that manipulations of self-presentation were intended to detract attention from oneself, several white female participants directly articulated this intention; highlighting the perceived importance of crafting an image that blends into the crowd. For example:

“So, I’m uncomfortable...with not just the security people but everyone around me...I really don’t enjoy going through some of those checkpoint so when I’m interacting I’m just trying to keep quiet, not draw attention, just directly answer their questions.” – Participant 10
“I don’t do anything that will draw attention to me. I just act normal I guess. I don’t think that there’s...like maybe I might be a little bit more nervous just because I’m trying to act normal because I don’t want to draw attention to myself.” – Participant 39

Although some white female participants did demonstrate awareness of making conscious efforts to minimize their exposure to surveillance at Pearson, they primarily focused on muting their behaviours as exemplified above by Participants 10 and 39, and did not explicitly express any substantial efforts to manipulate their presentation of self in terms of appearance. However, some did comment on modifying their style of dress to ease their travel. For example:

“Try to not wear too many clothes because you don’t want to get slowed down going through.” – Participant 2

“Absolutely. I...don’t dress formally or dress up by any means and especially when travelling because that helps to reduce any sort of stress or discomfort by being comfortable and not worrying about taking a whole bunch off in security.” – Participant 19

These references suggest that white female participants were attentive to the influence of their style of dress on their encounters with surveillance at Pearson, but, in terms of reducing the time or stress associated with any necessary disrobing during encounters with surveillance rather than influencing the subjective assessments of surveillance personnel.

White female participants indicated some attention to minor image sculpting in efforts to detract surveillance scrutiny by focusing on blending into the crowd (much like white male participants) but also highlighted style of dress as a means of minimizing time spent engaged in surveillance encounters at Pearson. However, and again very similar to white male participants, no white female participants described the manipulation of their image or behaviour as central to their encounters with surveillance at Pearson in perception or reality. These results stand in stark contrast to those of brown male and female participants.

Brown male.
“The way you behave, the manner in which you conduct yourself, you’re very mindful of any perception you might create prior to coming to the security gate. So, that’s my first sort of gauge and I think that my posed-self starts at the door. I’m very mindful of what I’m doing, how I’m looking, what I’m saying.” – Participant 11

Participant 11’s statement is highly representative of the practices and sentiments expressed by brown male participants regarding self-presentation at Pearson, illustrating enhanced awareness of surveillance in this setting and the need to present oneself in a way that is least likely to attract additional scrutiny. Most participants across all four groups expressed an active awareness of their image manipulation in this context. However, brown male participants placed greater emphasis on the importance of their presentation of self as potentially impacting their encounters with surveillance and also expressed considerably greater attention to detail. These features distinguished brown male participants’ narratives from those of white (male and female) participants. As with white participants, brown male participants described engaging tactics that were believed to detract unwanted attention by blending into the crowd. For instance:

“Specifically...I just try to do what I can do to not stand out or draw any reason to single me out. So, I go through the airport and think about what I don’t need to carry. Being more prepared. Having everything read. Anticipating what they might ask you rather than fumbling. It saves time and is more efficient and doesn’t make you stand out.” – Participant 26

However, brown male participants frequently articulated these efforts relative to their perceptions of white travellers’ experiences and behaviours. These statements highlight the extent to which brown male participants dedicate careful attention to self-presentation, but also link perceptions of more successful efforts to detract attention or “blending in” with presentations that approximate normative Canadian identity. For example:

“So let’s say a Caucasian is going through the same scrutiny as me, I would probably be a lot more patient and cooperative because if I speak like they do, I could be more likely perceived as hostile whereas they’re just practicing their rights.” – Participant 20
“I try to stay with the crowd as much as possible. I see other people who are white and they don’t really care, they just do what they want, they’re having fun, they’re laughing, and I can’t do that. Whenever I’m at the airport too, I only talk in English. I want to look just like the other guys. I always try to practice what I need to know. I make sure that I blend in. I make sure that I shave. I wear a t-shirt and jeans to blend in, to look like one of these guys.” – Participant 36

As indicated by Participant 36, although an awareness of behaviour management was often incorporated into brown male participants’ descriptions of steps taken to reduce friction during encounters with surveillance at Pearson, manipulations of self-presentation were frequently aimed at minimizing intersections of identity characteristics that fail to approximate a status quo Canadian identity. This was evident through accounts of identity management that involved manipulating appearance as well as “spinning” verbal responses. For example:

“Sometimes I have sort of a scruff or beard, which gives me sort of a darker appearance, so I might think about making myself more clean-trimmed. I think from an appearance standpoint that makes me look more like a North American individual.” – Participant 3

“Instead of saying that I’m a mechanical engineer, I’ve said before that I’m in utilities. It’s not lying, but I’m just trying to mask something that will make my experience more difficult…when you get a combination like Arab, engineer, ethnic name, they take some extra time for due diligence… I always make sure I’m clean shaven and clean cut. Almost to the point where everything is military. Just try and not draw attention to me.” – Participant 33

These same efforts at identity manipulation through self-presentation are articulated with exceptional detail by Participant 11. Specifically:

“You’re a lot more mindful of articulating every last detail properly to the point that…there’s no margin for error. There’s preparation that makes me almost mechanical. I don’t have any room for error. I’ve adjusted a lot. I almost never…I start with the way I dress. Many people put comfort first. I put forward this orderly, nice presentation because the reality is that when I look more Caucasian, with a golf shirt and such as opposed to something more comfortable, the reactions different. The closer I can come to the Caucasian norms in dress, speech, attire, and so on the less likely I am to stand out. I don’t travel a lot with people of my own ethnicity which I think is partially conscious because I just don’t want to deal with it. Carrying very minimal on to the plane and what I do is very family oriented because I think it comforts people, it makes people see you in a different light. I carry no fluids at all, not even the acceptable amounts. I limit even what is allowed on the plane because I don’t want to have to explain it. My hair will
never be dishevelled. I might not always, but have, shaved. And it’s important that I fix myself for appearing a certain way to travel, not in regards to whatever I’m doing on the other end. I never even joke about anything that could remotely be misinterpreted. So, I’m very mindful of speech. And I’m normally one to engage in a lot of talk but I won’t on a plane or in an airport. I limit my answers to a very matter of fact and don’t offer what isn’t asked. I remove any ambiguity in my choice of response because I’m trying to avoid the follow up question.” – Participant 11

Participant 11 provides a particularly in-depth description of his awareness of his image and behaviour manipulation in an effort to avoid surveillance scrutiny at Pearson, however, similar practices and sentiments are echoed throughout brown male participants’ narratives. Brown male participants’ narratives suggest that presentation of self is, at least in perception, much more central to encounters with surveillance at Pearson than the narratives of white (male or female) participants, indicating considerable attention to “image management” (Goffman, 1971). In particular, many brown male participants emphasized strategies that actively sought to approximate normative Canadian identity (such as speaking only in English, wearing western style clothes and removing potential indicators of Muslim religious status such as facial hair); implying the importance of identity intersections. As such, image sculpting tended to entail attention to a variety of identity characteristics for brown male participants, many of which were characterized in terms of the ability to approximate normative Canadian identity. Although brown male participants offered the most pronounced accounts of attention to self-presentation, brown female participants expressed some similar perceptions and practices.

Brown female. Brown female participants also described attentiveness to self-presentation at Pearson in the interest of diminishing surveillance scrutiny, placing greater emphasis on efforts taken to blend into the crowd than white (male and female) participants but less than brown male participants. Some brown female participants indicated intentionally manipulating behaviour in this setting in an effort to detract unwanted surveillance. For instance:
“Usually I have a very disarming look and I tend to be very friendly, so, I know not to be too chatty but at the same time to not look too quiet and cold and untrusting. I usually run a script in my mind before I get there.” – Participant 12

However, image management via style of dress was the most predominant theme amongst brown female participants’ references to presentation of self. White female participants also commonly cited style of dress in describing manipulating self-presentation at Pearson, but with a distinctly different quality; emphasizing comfort and ease of engagement when passing through security points that require some degree of disrobing. Alternatively, some brown female participants emphasized avoiding particular styles of dress on the basis that they attract attention. For example:

“I don’t want to stand out. I don’t wear a headscarf when I’m leaving [Canada through Pearson] but depending on where I’m going I’ll put one on once I get to the airport on the other end.” – Participant 34

“I always expect judgment. Which is, I guess, interesting...when I travel it’s imperative that I blend in. So, I do not wear ethnic clothes and I wear them in my everyday life; I have to blend in.” – Participant 23

Much like brown male participants, brown female participants’ manipulations of self-presentation emphasized efforts to minimize identity characteristics that fail to approximate a normative Canadian identity. However, brown female participants rarely specified such an underlying motivation directly, tending to favour generalizations that emphasized the need to “blend in” but not articulating into what they sought to blend. Nevertheless, contextually relevant information such as the shared understandings of normative Canadian identity presented previously as well as the cultural and religious nature of the clothing avoided strongly suggests that brown female participants’ descriptions of altering their presentations of self are, at least in part, undertaken to construct an image that more closely approximates normative Canadian
identity. This suggestion is supported by Participant 40’s response to my inquiry regarding alterations to self-presentation in this context. Specifically:

“In my case...not really, because I kind of blend in as Canadian appearance wise.” – Participant 40

Brown female participants’ references to presentation of self during encounters with surveillance at Pearson indicated attention to image sculpting in efforts to detract surveillance scrutiny but, in particular, highlighted avoiding cultural or religious styles of dress. Although generally not directly articulated, contextually relevant information suggests that this strategy might be an effort to better approximate normative Canadian identity. Most similar to brown male participants’ characterizations of self-presentation, brown female participants’ narratives suggest that presentation of self is perceived to play a central role in encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Further, a cumulative review indicates that manipulations of self-presentation are seen across all four groups of participants’ narratives but that distinct differences are evident between groups based on minority status. Jenkins’ (2012) contention that externally imposed classifications overshadow internally constructed self-identifications in many generic surveillance encounters provides some rationale as to why brown participants’ described greater attention to manipulations of self-presentation than white participants. Given that external categorization is paramount in this context, manipulations of self-presentation become a means by which brown participants can attempt to influence the identification process by better approximating a normative Canadian identity (much like Goffman’s (1963) description of interactional strategies as means of negotiating “spoiled identities” in everyday interactions); an a priori categorization for white participants.
Discussion: Surveilled Subjects’ Experiences at Pearson and the Concept of Identity

Encounters with surveillance at Pearson were found to be highly situated around identity; both in terms of the centrality of the concept of identity to surveilled subjects’ perceptions of surveillance in this context, as well as in terms of the distribution of these perceptions across surveilled subjects’ identity characteristics, particularly minority status. Specifically, references to identity characteristics (and combinations of particular characteristics) were at the core of participants’ perceptions of normative Canadian identity, identity fragmentation, and presentations of self at Pearson. Furthermore, analyzing these results with regards to participants’ identity characteristics (specifically, sex and minority status) also suggests the influence of identity characteristics on the nature and distribution of surveilled subjects’ experiences and perceptions.

Based on these results, I forward three main arguments that I explore throughout the remainder of this chapter and position relative to existing literature. First, I propose that shared understandings of normative Canadian identity are important to understanding perceptions of encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Participants’ statements indicated widespread agreement that normative Canadian identity is demarcated by particular identity characteristics and that individuals who fail to satisfactorily approximate this identity are believed to be more likely to encounter discriminatory surveillance at Pearson. Corroborating this perception is the finding that participants’ descriptions of their encounters with surveillance in this setting were often thematically divided based on minority status; suggesting that the distribution of treatment was based, at least in part, on one’s ability to satisfactorily approximate status quo Canadian identity characteristics (especially whiteness). One’s ability to satisfactorily approximate normative Canadian identity then also appears to be associated with personal perceptions and presentations.
of identity (which form my remaining arguments). Second, bearing identity characteristics that fail to approximate normative Canadian identity was associated with perceptions of identity fragmentation. Here, discrete aspects of identity are perceived as isolated and magnified from one’s more holistic identity matrix. And, third, although manipulations of self-presentation were described across all participant groups, bearing identity characteristics that fail to approximate normative Canadian identity was associated with sometimes extensive adjustments to self-presentation that often specifically sought to more satisfyingly approximate a status quo Canadian identity. I review the data presented above in relation to these contentions with a particular focus on the interrelationships between these three arguments and position the findings within relevant literature, emphasizing a surveillance studies orientation.

**Normative Canadian Identity and Surveillance**

Across all participant groups, normative Canadian identity was associated, first and foremost, with whiteness. However, dressing in a western style and speaking English (without a non-Canadian accent) were also discussed as key secondary indicators. Although this understanding of normative Canadian identity was clearly shared across participant groups, not all participant groups articulated these perceptions in the same way. White male and white female participants demonstrated the most similar approaches, both specifically identifying whiteness as a preferred characteristic but also bolstering the embeddedness of this characteristic to satisfying approximations of normative Canadian identity through a reliance on the evasive language of “normal” and “average.” Interestingly, brown female participants demonstrated a similar language tendency, although this group of participants also provided the greatest number of references to the characteristics described as secondary key indicators. Brown male participants’ narratives represented a consistent difference in articulation style from the three
other groups, emphasizing perceptions of othering on the basis of identity characteristics (particularly brownness), thereby demonstrating cohesion with the shared understanding of normative Canadian identity across groups by clearly articulating that which is abnormalized.

While these results deepen our awareness of specific identity characteristics that are equated with normative Canadian identity in this context, the data offer particularly important insights with regards to those identity characteristics that are abnormalized or “othered” during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. Border surveillance policies and practices are closely tied to nation-state authority, as is evidenced by the particular monitoring of those persons deemed potential threats to national security. The discourse surrounding “security” is largely embedded with the assumption that increased surveillance is a necessary prerequisite to greater security and/or safety (Monahan, 2006). Constructed in this way, the concept of safety becomes linked with conceptualizations of those who might violate or threaten safety. As a result, the nation-state is cast in a position of continual threat (Pratt & Thompson, 2008), and in the western world, the most significant “dangerous other” perceived as a threat to the nation-state and its citizens post 9/11 is the Muslim terrorist (Puar & Rai, 2004; Gopinath, 2005; Puar, 2005). This othering racializes perceived border and sovereignty threats, demarcating the suspect other through perceptions of “biologized race and/or essentialized ethnicity, nationality and/or religion in the context of relations and structures of subordination and/or privilege” (Garner, 2010, p.20, as cited in Helleiner, 2012). This narrative is perpetuated by surveillance that is widely perceived as discriminatory. The findings suggest that surveillance is at least perceived to be disproportionately applied on the basis of shared understandings of normative Canadian identity. This simultaneously enhances or maintains structures of white privilege as well as fostering the subordination of “brown others,” the effects of which were clearly articulated through
participants’ sentiments regarding the influence of their “looks” as well as stereotypes and prejudice on their encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

The results across all four groups of participants indicate different perspectives but consistent understandings of the ways in which appearance and stereotypes impact encounters with surveillance in this context. In particular, closer approximations to a normative Canadian identity in appearance were associated with less surveillance scrutiny. Whiteness was described as a central preferred identity characteristic, but brown participants’ (male and female) responses also suggested that satisfying approximations could be achieved through additional physical indicators such as a western style of dress. These descriptions implied the importance of identity intersections in affecting encounters with surveillance at Pearson; specifically, although skin colour was often described as being believed to have an effect, the effect was described as more salient through combinations of physical identifiers. Similarly, both white and brown female participants drew attention to their sex as an aspect of their identity that might diminish surveillance scrutiny due to stereotypes associated with the relative capabilities of women and men. As well, although not all participants felt that stereotypes influence encounters with surveillance at Pearson, amongst those who did, white participants described being advantaged and brown participants described being disadvantaged by stereotypes that highlight anti-Middle Eastern sentiments. Cumulatively, the impact of appearance and stereotypes on encounters with surveillance at Pearson were understood very consistently and in accordance with the privilege ascribed to normative Canadian identity.

These results highlight the importance of normative Canadian identity to encounters with surveillance at Pearson and complement a variety of similar reports, for example: Helleiner’s (2012) finding that in the context of Canadian border crossings, whites acknowledge a
discrepancy in treatment that places greater attention on brown persons; the ICLMG’s (2010) assertions that many instances of alleged racial profiling at the Canadian border have been reported by Muslim, South Asian and Arab persons; and, Finn’s (2011) conclusion that brown persons are subjected to heightened suspicion in a variety of physical and online settings. As such, in spite of the presumed biased free nature of the policies and practices in effect at the Canadian border, the results indicate the advantages bestowed on persons who satisfyingly approximate a normative identity during their encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

Participants’ perceptions of the influence of appearance and stereotypes suggest that identity characteristics in isolation and combination are perceived as one means by which persons are categorized and exposed to differential surveillance treatment in this setting, and the distribution of treatment described suggests that satisfying approximations of a normative Canadian identity prompt the least surveillance scrutiny and that skin colour (specifically whiteness) is central to a satisfying approximation. The result of differential treatment and the stratification of white and non-white border crossing experiences have been purported to reproduce whiteness as a global “passport of privilege” (Helleiner, 2012). Although this assertion can only be supported through perception by the results of this study, the findings indicate wide agreement amongst participants that encounters with surveillance at Pearson are characterized by the privileging of whiteness, but also that a broader range of identity characteristics are perceived as influencing this privilege.

Specifically, perceptions of surveillance scrutiny at Pearson are associated with the ability of one’s identity matrix to satisfyingly approximate constituting aspects of normative Canadian identity (such as whiteness, but also a “non-accented” English and a western style of dress and presentation – particularly the avoidance of indicators of a Muslim religious
orientation). The influence of identity intersections have also been linked to Canadian border crossing experiences more broadly, indicating that this finding is not unique to this study. For example, Helleiner’s (2012) interviews draw out the reality that border crossing experiences differ based on perceptions of race, class, gender and country of origin. Likewise, anecdotal evidence has also accumulated suggesting that surveillance systems and practices at Canadian borders are informally directed at individuals bearing particular identity characteristics that contrast with normative Canadian identity (specifically skin colour and religious orientation; see ICLMG, 2010). Ultimately, surveillance that is perceived to be distributed on the basis of one’s ability to satisfyingly approximate normative Canadian identity communicates important messages about the extent to which persons bearing particular identity characteristics “belong,” not only in particular spaces but also in the culture of a nation (Finn, 2011). Such perceptions of exclusion were evident in participants’ descriptions of their perceptions and presentations of self during encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

Perceptions and Presentations of Self: Identity Based Exclusion Empirically Observed and Theoretically Positioned

The results pertaining to perceptions of identity fragmentation and manipulation of self-presentation are both suggestive of the fact that encounters with surveillance at Pearson prompt perceptions of exclusion from the category of legitimate Canadian on the basis of identity characteristics positioned in relation to indicators of normative Canadian identity. While descriptions of status quo Canadian identity characteristics are indicative of perceptions of normalized Canadian identity, the identity fragmentation and manipulation of self-presentation results are indicative of identity characteristics that are abnormalized; identities that prompt suspicion and are worthy of additional surveillance scrutiny relative to a normative Canadian
identity. Following a brief overview of the core findings associated with perceptions and presentations of self during encounters with surveillance at Pearson, I consider the broader implications of such experiences.

Surveillance studies scholars have suggested that surveillance which is focused on discrete components of identity in any context may prompt perceptions that a fragmented, as opposed to holistic, identity serves to represent oneself in that context (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Lianos, 2003). This fragmented identity is characterized by the isolation and magnification of singular components of identity from a more nuanced identity matrix. Identity fragmentation proved to be quite important to understanding the qualitative differences between white and brown participants’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson: Brown participants reported perceptions of identity fragmentation, while white participants largely did not. Specifically, white participants (both male and female) engaged with the concept of identity fragmentation very minimally. However, some white participants indicated an awareness of the prioritizing of identity characteristics during encounters with surveillance in this context; noting perceptions of the enhanced salience of whiteness. Alternatively, brown participants’ (both male and female) narratives much more frequently described perceptions of identity fragmentation, identifying a host of characteristics that are perceived as dominating their identity matrix during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. In particular, brown participants emphasized skin colour, cultural background, religious orientation and citizenship as characteristics that are perceived as central to their identity in this context. As such, the results associated with identity fragmentation and perceptions of normative Canadian identity bear an interesting relationship.

First, fragmented identities were largely described in terms of identity characteristics that stand in opposition to those associated with normative Canadian identity and, second,
perceptions of identity fragmentation were almost entirely restricted to participants who failed to satisfyingly approximate key characteristics of a normative Canadian identity by virtue of their minority status. The findings suggest that persons who fail to approximate key characteristics associated with normative Canadian identity sometimes feel that a fragmented representation of themselves defines their encounters with surveillance at Pearson. This dynamic may exacerbate the alienating effects of surveillance by symbolizing the exclusion of those who fail to satisfyingly approximate a status quo Canadian identity, even if in practice the surveillance measures themselves do not always physically prevent individuals or groups with particular identity characteristics from moving across the border. Discriminatory surveillance practices have been argued to send potent messages of racialized distrust and exclusion (Huq & Miller, 2008). Evidence of such an effect is found in this research through the fact that perceptions of exclusion emerged in the narratives of brown participants but were entirely absent from those of white participants. Brown participants’ descriptions of identity fragmentation suggests that surveillance in this context often acts as an othering agent, the effects of which will only be magnified through the intersection of multiple subordinated identity characteristics.

Identity characteristics interact to produce unique social realities (Berger & Luckmann, 1966); as such, intersectionality is a useful framework to interpret these results further. Specifically, combinations of problematized identity characteristics are likely to produce an identity matrix that experiences greater surveillance scrutiny than identity matrices that better approximate normative Canadian identity. For example, many participants described skin colour as a key identity characteristic that defines encounters with surveillance at Pearson (with whiteness characterized as an attribute that diminished surveillance scrutiny and brownness characterized as an attribute that enhanced surveillance scrutiny), however, most of these
participants also highlighted the salience of this characteristic based on its relation to other identity characteristics perceived as key to surveillance targeting at Pearson (e.g., sex, style of dress, speech). As such, it was not surprising that many participants described active efforts to shape more malleable aspects of their identity during encounters with surveillance in this context.

Participants from all four groups acknowledged conscious efforts to alter self-presentation with the aim of reducing surveillance scrutiny; however, no white participants (male or female) described the manipulation of their image or behaviour as central to their encounters with surveillance at Pearson in perception or reality. Brown participants’ (male and female) narratives suggest that presentation of self is, at least in perception, much more central to encounters with surveillance at Pearson than white participants’ narratives. Both groups (white and brown participants) stressed the importance of sculpting self-presentation to detract attention, but brown participants uniquely emphasized strategies that actively sought to approximate normative Canadian identity. In particular, brown female participants’ references highlighted avoiding cultural or religious styles of dress, while brown male participants’ references addressed a broader range of strategies (such as speaking only in English, wearing western style clothes and removing potential indicators of Muslim religious status such as facial hair). Notably, this strategy stands in contrast to the strategy of identity affirmation (a process in which dominated individuals “accept[] and accentuat[e] the characteristics that mark them as dominated; Couzens Hoy, 2005, p.135), which McCahill & Finn (2014) observed in some surveilled subjects’ reaction strategies to surveillance in other contexts (such as protesters’ descriptions of feeling validated when targeted for additional surveillance); a contrast which is also very likely related to distributions of social privilege. In total, expressed awareness of
manipulated self-presentation across all four groups of participants indicates the active efforts undertaken by surveilled subjects to influence encounters with surveillance in this context, however, image and behaviour sculpting was qualitatively different between groups. Most significantly, brown participants’ descriptions of molded self-presentations indicated an active effort to better approximate normative Canadian identity while white participants’ descriptions did not demonstrate attention to this concern.

Participants’ descriptions and explanations of their active engagement with image management during encounters with surveillance at Pearson bring to mind Goffman’s (1959) understanding of presentations of self. Goffman asserts that presentations of self are often highly manipulated in social situations. An individual’s self-presentation helps to define their role in a situation and, importantly, helps to control the behaviour of others in terms of treatment received (Goffman, 1959). Surveillance studies scholars have acknowledged the relevance of Goffman’s insights to the field, particularly in terms of surveilled subjects’ engagement with “identity work” to circumvent the surveillance gaze (e.g., Ball, 2003; Ball & Wilson, 2000; Norris & Armstrong, 1999); a practice which was also evident in participants’ narratives in this research in multiple ways. First, the references made by participants from all groups of their efforts to be particularly compliant and docile in this setting are demonstrative of identity work. Spaces in which rules of social engagement are clear and well governed tend to encourage “image management” that is highly controlled (Goffman, 1971); or, in other words, particular attention to presentation of self. Participants’ comments suggest that Pearson is a space that produces high levels of image management in general for surveilled subjects. However, second, shared understandings of normative Canadian identity also seem to have some influence on self-presentation in this context, as evidenced by the distinctions between white and brown
participants’ narratives. White participants demonstrate some attention to the ways in which their behaviours and image may attract surveillance scrutiny at Pearson but do not describe these perceptions as central to their encounters. Alternatively, failure to satisfyingly approximate a normative Canadian identity in terms of whiteness was associated with considerably greater focus on presentation of self as demonstrated in the narratives of brown participants. These attempts to avoid enhanced surveillance scrutiny by manipulating self-presentation to more satisfyingly approximate normative Canadian identity are indicative of asymmetrical power relations and a hierarchy of identity in Canadian society that manifest through discriminatory encounters with surveillance.

In the context of border crossings, discriminatory surveillance serves as a form of social power that can restrict mobility. Perceptions of racial and religious profiling, some of which results in harassment, have been cited as rationales used by some individuals for limiting cross-border travel since 9/11 (ICLMG, 2010; Helleiner, 2012; Pratt & Thompson, 2008). Although intentional limitations of cross-border travel were only noted by a few participants, awareness of and efforts to avoid discriminatory surveillance was evidenced by brown participants’ descriptions of carefully manipulating self-presentation during encounters with surveillance at Pearson. These actions are representative of what Ahmed (2000) argues is a “looking out” on the part of the surveilled subject, resulting in a performative reinscription of the boundaries of the dominant community. Participants’ varied attempts to avoid additional surveillance scrutiny are demonstrative of an identity hierarchy in Canada, in which the dominant community consists of persons bearing normative Canadian identity characteristics and relative degrees of “others” are positioned based on their abilities or efforts to satisfyingly approximate these characteristics.
Reviewing the results of this chapter in their totality demonstrates that identity
c CHARACTERISTICS are central to encounters with surveillance at Pearson; serving as a means to
differ entiate between those who warrant additional surveillance scrutiny. The results of this
research corroborate other sources which have argued that persons of Arab origin and Muslim
religious orientation are particularly vulnerable to this form of exclusion (Bahdi, 2003; ICLMG,
2010; Helleiner, 2010; 2012). As Finn (2011) demonstrates, these practices extend beyond
surveillance at border crossing sites, enabling governments and individuals to invoke safety and
security concerns to apply discriminatory surveillance practices to the “dangerous other” –
particularly the racialized other who is framed relative to dominant normative identity(ies). The
reality that these systems and practices may be informal and/or unintended does not diminish the
effect that they have on individuals. Perceptions of identity fragmentation as well as carefully
manipulated presentations of self that strive to approximate status quo Canadian identity
characteristics highlighted in this research indicates the prevalence of “othering,” at least in
perception, during encounters with surveillance at Pearson.

As such, I contend that surveillance at the border becomes a site through which
cumulative disadvantage is engaged, affecting persons with particular identity intersections
differently. Cumulative disadvantage results from categorizations and life circumstances that
accumulate and interact to disadvantage an individual's life chances (Gandy, 2010). Gandy’s
argument that cumulative disadvantage is sometimes an unintended consequence of modern
surveillance practices is particularly important to my assertions. Specifically, while surveillance
systems sometimes support goals and objectives that are inherently biased, Gandy brings to our
attention that an equally serious and often overlooked phenomenon is that surveillance conducted
for the purposes of social sorting tends to discriminate against certain individuals systematically,
negatively influencing life chances and choices. The findings suggest that unintended bias may pervade encounters with surveillance at Pearson via shared understandings of and preferences for normative Canadian identity characteristics. This sentiment is also exemplified by Helleiner’s (2012) finding that “whiteness” (a characteristic associated with normative Canadian identity in this and other research; e.g., Handa, 1997; Peake & Ray, 2001; Salter, 2013) is predominant in the Canadian border crossing narrative; specifically, that whiteness has come to be embedded in surveillance practices at the border as a preferred identity characteristic. In addition, the presence of bias in encounters with surveillance at Pearson is also supported by other findings presented in this chapter, including participants’ contentions that “brownness” warrants additional surveillance scrutiny relative to “whiteness,” and that brown participants’ manipulations of self-presentation highlight efforts to approximate whiteness in other ways such as style of dress. While potentially unintended, this bias is still impactful. Further, identity characteristics associated with these perceptions of alienation intersect with other forms of marginalization (e.g., economic, social and cultural), enhancing processes of exclusion.

I argue that experiences of cumulative disadvantage are explained well through the concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991; Davis, 2008). While identity characteristics can individually systematically disadvantage a person, the intersection of multiple subordinated identity characteristics exacerbate this reality. As participants’ narratives stressed, individual and group identities are affected by expectations associated with a host of identity characteristics, including race, ethnicity, and religion. I argue that any failure to approximate normative Canadian identity characteristics is more likely to produce encounters with discriminatory surveillance, however, persons bearing combinations of identity characteristics that exacerbate their difference from normative Canadian identity face a greater accumulation of risk of
encountering embedded bias. Further, these experiences may exacerbate social, economic and emotional alienation as outcomes that have all been associated with perceptions of discriminatory treatment on the basis of one’s identity (Adeleke, 2004; Shuval, 2000; Vertovec, 1999).

The findings suggest that perceptions of belonging to the category of legitimate Canadian are tied to whiteness, however, it is also based on one’s ability to approximate other key characteristics associated with normative Canadian identity. In the context of a national identity hierarchy, persons who more satisfyingly approximate a status quo identity are structurally positioned as more normative. Specifically, I use structural positioning here to refer to the positioning of racialized others relative to white persons in Canada. This is evidenced particularly well through brown participants’ enhanced awareness of identity characteristics that fail to approximate the norm, as well as manipulations of self-presentation that strive to approximate the norm. Omi and Winant (1994) as well as Finn (2011) point to similar phenomenons in the US to argue that structural positioning impacts individual life chances (e.g., social, economic, and geographic mobility). The implications of these effects on life chances are magnified by the reality that in a variety of contexts surveillance tends to be focused on marginalized individuals with limited alternative options (Lyon, 2007a; 2007b; Monahan, 2006). As such, surveillance at Pearson acts to re-affirm normative identity (Foucault, 1977); “maintain[ing] the normal by disciplining what has been abnormalized” (Fiske, 1998, p.72), and reinforces existing social divisions (Wacquant, 2009). Based on the totality of results presented in this chapter, I contend that participants’ descriptions of normative Canadian identity, identity fragmentation and self-presentation as they relate to encounters with surveillance at Pearson, provide evidence for the existence of a hierarchy of identity that is associated with differential
treatment in that context. In particular, those who more satisfyingly approximate normative Canadian identity experience a structural position of privilege, and those who less satisfyingly approximate these characteristics experience greater barriers, which accumulate based on combinations of abnormalized identity characteristics.

**Key Contentions**

Everyday life is increasingly saturated with surveillance, thus, understanding surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance and the effects and implications of those encounters on perceptions and presentations of identity will only become more and more relevant in highly surveilled contexts such as Pearson, as well as in surveillance societies more generally. In the context of Pearson, participants’ narratives indicated that the concept of identity was central to encounters with surveillance; in particular, perceptions of normative Canadian identity, identity fragmentation, and presentations of self were dominant themes through which the concept of identity was engaged. To address the structural components of surveillance systems that affect self-perceptions and presentations requires an understanding of how surveilled subjects experience and react to surveillance with attention to context. Although looking for the consistencies that help us better understand the surveilled subject’s experience is important to advancing surveillance studies, articulating the nuances of surveilled subjects’ experiences in particular contexts is also necessary to forwarding understandings of the situated realities of surveillance and making meaningful changes to procedures and practices when research demonstrates change is necessary. Some surveillance studies scholars have argued that better understandings of distributions of surveillance will be achieved through intersectional investigations, carefully attentive to identity characteristics such as sex and race (Ball et al., 2009; Monahan, 2008).
The evidence presented here and elsewhere (see Helleiner, 2012; ICLMG, 2010; Pratt & Thompson, 2008) suggests that exposure to and encounters with surveillance vary during Canadian border crossing experiences based on the intersection of one’s identity characteristics, especially identity matrices that substantially vary from normative Canadian identity. The extent to which experiences with surveillance at Pearson specifically differ because of the factors identified in this research is significant not only because of the high and increasing rate of cross-border mobility in Canada – the Canadian border saw over 300,000 people crossing daily in 2010 (CBC, 2011) and over 400,000 people crossing daily as of 2015 (Government of Canada, 2015) – but, also due to the changing face of the Canadian population. In particular, by 2031 Canada’s population is projected to be as much as 28% foreign born, with persons of South Asian descent expected to represent almost thirty percent of the visible minority population and persons of Arab and West Asian descent expected to triple in representation as the fastest growing minority populations in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2010), with much of this diversity expected to be found in the Greater Toronto Area, which already ranks as one of the most culturally diverse cities in the world. As such, attention to identity intersections are particularly important to understanding surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson; however, this practice is also important to surveillance studies’ investigations more broadly. Dedicating greater attention to the intersectional distributions and effects of surveillance will help us better understand surveilled subjects’ experiences, highlighting the integrity of surveillance systems in varied contexts as well as the respect these systems convey (or fail to convey) for persons based on their identity characteristics.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Summary of Central Findings and Key Implications

Through this research, I have enhanced our existing knowledge of the subjective experience of surveillance. This exploratory study relied on qualitative data drawn from semi-structured interviews and produced a wealth of interesting results; the central findings and implications of which I will briefly review in the respective order of the chapters in which they were presented. First, the findings suggest that surveilled subjects are attentive to relational procedural justice concerns during encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport. The existing surveillance studies literature only minimally engages with theoretical models that attempt to explain surveilled subjects’ experiences. This finding makes the contribution that relational models of procedural justice are a means by which surveilled subjects’ experiences can be understood consistently across persons in this context. Furthermore, the demonstrated applicability of relational models of procedural justice to understanding interpersonal interactions across a variety of contexts (Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2005; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Mazerolle et al., 2013) indicates that surveilled subjects are also very likely attentive to relational concerns during encounters with surveillance in other contexts that are bound by similar direct interactions.

My key contention here is that one way of understanding surveilled subjects’ experiences consistently across persons and some contexts is through relational models of procedural justice; and, more generally, highlighting the importance of process in shaping perceptions of and reactions to the surveillance procedure, its outcome, and its administering authorities. This orientation stresses exploring the causal effects of surveillance procedures on surveilled subjects’ perceptions, attitudes and behaviours as a means of better understanding the subjective
experience of surveillance. In doing so, surveillance studies will be better equipped to promote applications of surveillance, in necessary situations, that are arguably more fair and satisfactory from the perspective of the surveilled subject. The successful application of procedural justice theory in a variety of social contexts provides a springboard that surveillance studies scholars can utilize to help convince practitioners that the practical goals of surveillance are advanced by respectful, trustworthy and bias free surveillance procedures. As such, the continued utilization of procedural justice theory offers surveillance studies with not only the promise of better understanding the attitudes and behaviours of surveilled subjects in various contexts, but also advances applied goals. Specifically, promoting surveillance encounters that are more fair and satisfying to surveilled subjects through attention to relational concerns in the design and administration of surveillance (changes which surveillance administrators may very well be convinced to make when it is demonstrated that perceptions of legitimacy and compliance are both outcomes of surveillance encounters that receive high procedural justice evaluations). Relatedly, better understanding surveillance procedures from the perspective of the surveilled subject also necessitates recognizing subject-centred understandings of surveillance, which brings me to the second major topic of focus in my dissertation.

Second, the findings suggest that surveilled subjects use some consistent criteria to define surveillance as well as to evaluate the acceptability of surveillance (in terms of positive and negative attributes) across contexts. The existing surveillance studies literature emphasizes operator-centred understandings of surveillance, and this finding contributes subject-centred understandings of surveillance to the literature. Specifically, in both a specific (Pearson International Airport) and general (everyday life) context, the definition of surveillance was characterized by a focus on processes, sources and outcomes, with procedural consistency and
affective indifference also incorporated through expectations of “normal” surveillance encounters. In addition, six positive and six negative attributes of surveillance were identified as consistent across both the specific and general contexts explored. Furthermore, the compatibility of the identified attributes with the existing surveillance studies literature suggests that these attributes may also be applicable to a broader range of surveillance encounters.

The primary empirical contribution of these results is the description of subject-centred understandings of surveillance. I hope that the key implication of this contribution will be the more substantial inclusion of subject-centred perspectives into the surveillance studies literature from the point of defining and describing surveillance. I would argue that this is perhaps the strongest contribution of my dissertation and that the knowledge gained in this study provides a basis on which surveillance studies can continue to more strongly forward a subject-centred perspective. However, a potential implication that I forward alongside identifying these criteria is associated with my argument for the consistent operationalization and measurement of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject. Such measures will benefit surveillance studies scholars in better understanding and more easily assessing the presence, variation, and effects of surveillance across discrete research projects, helping to unify the work of surveillance studies scholars focused on this topic while simultaneously providing another avenue by which to attract the interest of practitioners looking for relatively simple assessments of their procedures. Measure development and assessment are significant undertakings that I did not set out to pursue in my dissertation research, however, the work I have produced provides a strong foundation for such a contribution, which I intend to provide through future research projects. In combination, both the first and second findings suggest that the subjective experience of surveillance can be understood with some consistency – that the surveilled subject’s
experience can be characterized by consistent criteria and through a consistent theoretical framework across persons and contexts. However, consistency should not be confused with uniformity. As this study also highlights, encounters with surveillance must also be recognized for the extent to which they are nuanced and situated (contextually as well as in relation to the subjects under surveillance), which brings me to the final major topic of focus in my dissertation.

Third, the findings suggest that surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport are highly situated around identity; both in terms of the centrality of the concept of identity to surveilled subjects’ narratives, and the distribution of perceptions in relation to identity characteristics (particularly minority status). Contextually situated explorations of the nuances of the subjective experience of surveillance are an underdeveloped area in the existing surveillance studies literature, and this finding contributes an in-depth understanding of how central the concept of identity is to surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport. Specifically, these results highlight the centrality of identity characteristics (and intersections) to surveilled subjects’ perceptions of normative Canadian identity, identity fragmentation, and presentations of self at Pearson. These results serve as an exemplar of how identity can correspond to relative (dis)advantage when surveillance is conducted for social sorting purposes and offer the most direct practical implications in terms of eliminating the discriminatory and negative qualities of surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance at Pearson that were demonstrated by the stark division in experiences between white and brown participants. Most notably, the use of mass surveillance directed at persons on the basis of immutable and broad identity characteristics such as skin colour needs to stop; these practices are widely recognized as unsuccessful, inflammatory, demeaning, and counterproductive to the social justice foundations that surveillance which is intended for the
care of persons should be striving to uphold. However, realistically, small research projects such as my own are unlikely to inspire such monumental change, but, as a revelatory empirical contribution to a growing body of literature demonstrating similar experiences, my research does have the potential to inspire further work.

Limitations and Future Directions

While this study offers interesting findings, it is important to bear in mind some limitations of the research. The specific sampling methods of convenience and snowball sampling can be critiqued for producing biased results (particularly due to the validity of the sample as a result of selection bias) and, in turn, having limited generalizability (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Kuper, Lingard & Levinson, 2008). However, these are also limitations often associated with qualitative methodology more generally (Cho & Trent, 2006; Nespor & Groenke, 2009; Pope, 2007). Developing a more nuanced understanding of surveilled subjects’ affective, attitudinal and behavioural responses to encounters with surveillance requires both qualitative and quantitative inquiries and, therefore, a central limitation of this research is that it provides only a partial picture through its reliance on qualitative methodology. Qualitative research, such as this project, is essential to assist in identifying unexpected factors as well as complex linkages between factors associated with surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance, allowing for greater awareness of the mechanisms at work in surveillance procedures and connections to theoretical explanations. Participants’ references to bias serve as a prime example of this argument. Specifically, many participants in this research indicated concern about biased treatment, but tended to discuss these concerns in an abstract sense (perceived but not experienced). Participants were very sensitive to bias, so much so that they independently discussed hypothetical situations in which they
expected they would have seen or experienced greater bias. This attention to bias, even when not personally experienced, suggests that bias is a particularly salient component of neutrality concerns in this context in a way that would have been difficult to discern without the freedom available to participants in semi-structured interviews. This example helps illustrate the ways in which the employment of qualitative methodology for this study enhanced understandings of both the scope and depth of the surveilled subject’s perspective. However, the qualitative foundations provided by this work also allow for additional knowledge to be acquired through quantitative research (in particular, experimental methods), which would have been more difficult to design without the base established through this project. The existing surveillance studies literature exploring the subjective experience of surveillance is lacking experimental methods. Experimental designs would provide a means to isolate and manipulate factors identified in this research, promoting a more nuanced understanding of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject as well as the mechanisms at work in certain types of surveillance procedures, in addition to providing evidence of the causal relationships between variables of interest (Cozby, 1977; Salkind, 2006). Experimental methods could be used to continue to build on all of the major findings associated with this research.

**Future directions: Relational models of procedural justice.** As an exploratory inquiry into the relevance of relational models of procedural justice as a means of better understanding the experience of the surveilled subject, this study has demonstrated that surveilled subjects are attentive to relational procedural justice concerns in their encounters with surveillance at Pearson International Airport; the next step is engaging in research that tests and measures these effects, and also expands their contextual applicability. Although I found that participants were attentive to relational concerns in their encounters with surveillance in this context, I am still left with
unanswered questions that are important to providing evidence of the wider applicability of such models to understanding the mechanisms at work in surveillance procedures that affect surveilled subjects’ evaluations of varied surveillance encounters relatively consistently. Specifically, I continually return to three central questions unanswerable by this research: (1) Are the findings unique to this case study or do they extend to encounters with surveillance in very similar contexts (e.g., other airports and border crossing ports in Canada as well as in other countries; (2) more generally, are the findings unique to this case study or do they extend to other encounters with surveillance (e.g., different contexts with comparable exposure in terms of inter-relationality); and (3) what is the specific nature of causal relationships at work in surveillance procedures (e.g., the effect of procedural factors on participants’ perceptions of the procedure, outcomes and administrators/sources of surveillance)?

Experimental testing is a critical next step in demonstrating the applied value of relational models of procedural justice to better understand the surveilled subject’s experience with consistency. In addition, experimental designs would also be useful in distinguishing surveillance procedures from other procedures to which procedural justice models have been found to be applicable. For example, participants were asked to provide their own definitions of surveillance in varying contexts in this research in an effort to work towards more precise definitions and measures of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject; these descriptions also help indicate aspects of surveillance procedures that are unique from other procedures studied in the procedural justice literature. For instance, participants’ attention to identification and classification in encounters with surveillance (which are also recognized core features of surveillance by surveillance studies scholars; Lyon, 2001; 2002; Marx, 2002), may set surveillance procedures apart as unique from other procedures to which relational models of
procedural justice are relevant. Acknowledging these specialized features to which surveilled subjects are attentive is important because the overall and relative importance of fairness criteria varies in different settings (Barret-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Tyler, 1989). More generally, experimental designs would be useful in determining the factors that shape perceptions of surveillance procedures as well as their relative importance; for example, assessing and comparing the effects of relational concerns central to procedural justice models (i.e., respect, trust, neutrality), in addition to procedural concerns broached in Ball’s various contributions (e.g., proximity, awareness, power dynamics), as well as instrumental concerns (e.g., outcome favourability, effectiveness). As well, experimental designs are essential to demonstrating cause and effect relationships (e.g., the effects of varied surveillance procedures on evaluations of the outcomes of those procedures). Furthermore, the ability of experimental methods to test causal relationships also allows for the comparison of contextual variations. In other words, concise explorations of the differences in expectations, encounters and evaluations of surveillance across contexts (e.g., fluctuations in the overall as well as relative influence of procedural justice concerns on evaluations of the process, its outcome and administering authorities).

Future directions: Measure development. Measure development finds foundations in the outputs of this research, but it requires many additional steps and is therefore a future direction which this research encourages as opposed to an outcome of this project. Developing standard measures would be a means by which to assess surveillance encounters from the perspective of the surveilled subject more consistently, and, in doing so, would also provide a unified foundation upon which research dedicated to the subjective experience of surveillance could build. This study lays groundwork for developing measures of the factors people use to assess the presence of surveillance in different situations, as well as measures of the criteria
people use to evaluate the acceptability of surveillance in varied situations. No standard measures (a related set of questions used to determine overall placement on an evaluative scale) are commonly used in surveillance studies, making it difficult to determine similarities or differences across research findings, but also precluding any causal conclusions. For the field to advance empirically, standardized question sets must be developed to measure key concepts describing the experience of surveilled subjects which can then be manipulated to allow affective reactions, as well as attitudinal and behavioural responses to be assessed. The findings also provide clear evidence that surveilled subjects perceive their encounters with surveillance to be associated with a number of socio-psychological effects. Future research needs to continue to explore the contextual scope of these effects (as well as yet unidentified effects) with the ambition of ultimately predicting these effects based on the characteristics of the surveillance encountered. Surveillance studies scholars have shown an interest in such knowledge development, maintaining, for instance, that individual responses to surveillance span a continuum from willing compliance to active resistance, and that it is worth considering how and why personal reactions to surveillance fall differently on this continuum (Ball, 2005; Ball, 2009; Lyon, 2002). Sound understandings of the causal effects of surveillance on persons and outcomes requires the creation of consistent forms of measurement.

This research has identified key factors used by surveilled subjects to define surveillance as well as determine its acceptability across contexts. In particular, I relied on qualitative methodology to allow participants to tell me, without restrictions, how they defined surveillance in a specific and more general context so that I could develop an understanding of the key factors surveilled subjects’ use to identify surveillance encounters. Likewise, I also encouraged participants to tell me, again without restrictions, about the positive and negative qualities of
surveillance in a specific and more general context so that I could develop an understanding of the attributes surveilled subjects use to determine the acceptability of surveillance encounters. There is certainly room for more qualitative research in this area. For example, future research should continue to explore whether the same core components described by participants in this study (i.e., processes, sources and outcomes), are also used by surveilled subjects to characterize surveillance in other contexts. In particular, qualitative research could focus on encouraging surveilled subjects to provide definitions of surveillance in other contexts, especially less traditional understandings of surveillance (e.g. social surveillance; Marwick, 2012), and compare the resultant definitions to the findings of this research. Surveillance does adopt many forms, and a more enriched understanding of that variety in surveillance studies will be encouraged by scholars exploring the consistent and distinctive ways in which surveilled subjects recognize the presence of surveillance contextually. Likewise, participants’ awareness of additional acceptability attributes identified in the surveillance studies literature (such as consent; Marx, 2002), should be explored further. However, this qualitative data should also be refined into measures of surveillance through experimental methods that are useful for quantitative analysis.

The collection of quantitative data for well operationalized concepts offers promise and has been encouraged by leading surveillance studies scholars (Marx, 2003; Murakami-Wood, 2009), and the qualitative data I offer here provides a groundwork for developing well operationalized concepts that can be quantitatively analyzed. For example, the positive and negative attributes of surveillance identified in this work lay the foundations for determining factors, assessed through groups of items, which influence surveillance acceptability across varied settings. The production of such a measure involves developing a question set, consisting of items intended to represent factors of a surveillance acceptability measure (based on the
informed starting point provided in this research), administering it to participants, and then
determining (via factor analysis) which factors form the measure, and which items best assess
those factors. Such standard measures will strengthen the coherence of the field by allowing
discrete research projects to more easily compare and contrast findings, and make meta-analyses
a future possibility.

**Future directions: Nuances of subjects’ experiences.** Finally, a variety of identity
characteristics (e.g., race, sex, age) are assumed to affect surveilled subjects’ encounters with,
and outcomes of, surveillance (Ball et al., 2009; Gandy, 2009; Lyon, 2002). My research
provides a basis from which to build a more nuanced understanding of variances in the
perspectives and experiences of surveilled subjects bearing different identity characteristics and
matrices. In general, greater numbers of participants would be helpful to understanding and
empirically demonstrating these intersectional differences with confidence, but, more
specifically, experimental designs are again useful to assessing how and why variations are
distributed across and between persons grouped as categorically similar on the basis of identity
characteristics.

Surveillance studies is increasingly recognizing the active role surveilled subjects’ play in
many surveillance processes. For example, surveilled subjects have been recognized as both
consciously and subconsciously resisting surveillance (Gilliom, 2001; Haggerty, Wilson &
Smith, 2011; Nippert-Eng, 2010). Finding that participants demonstrated active attention to
manipulations of self-presentation in an effort to minimize surveillance scrutiny is an important
empirical addition to the growing body of research indicating that surveilled subjects are not
simply passive recipients of the surveillance process, but actively engage with it in an effort to
manipulate outcomes. However, the nature of surveilled subject agency necessitates further
investigation. Surveillance studies has increasingly recognized that surveillance does not produce a blanket effect on surveilled subjects and, instead, the effects are highly nuanced and based on a variety of acquired dispositions (McCahill & Finn, 2014); but, recognizing and understanding distributions of those effects require greater empirical evidence. Research such as mine provides a knowledge base of differences that can be anticipated and then explored quantitatively in greater numbers through survey research that is less time consuming for participants. However, experimental methods again offer directions for future research to move in as well. For example, this research demonstrates ways in which participants manipulated their presentations of self when engaging with surveillance in a specific context; it is important to explore the effects of manipulations of self-presentation that are intended to satisfy a surveillant gaze. For instance, in the context of privacy, Marx (1998) suggests that our private selves, when revealed without our consent, can have harmful effects on the individual’s understanding of self. Experimental research could be used to explore the effects of a consent manipulation (i.e., consent versus no consent) by a self-presentation manipulation (i.e., congruent versus incongruent with the individual’s understanding of self), on understandings of self (e.g., identity fragmentation, ingroup belonging, etc.). Investigations such as this will help quantitatively explicate the intricate workings between variables that were brought to light because of qualitative research, as do all of the future directions I proposed.

**Final Thoughts**

In conclusion, I acknowledge that the emphasis I have placed on recognizing the consistencies in surveilled subjects’ encounters with surveillance as well as the future research directions I have proposed are only one way of enhancing understandings of the subjective experience of surveillance in surveillance studies, none of which are without their limitations. I
approach the study of surveilled subjects’ encounters from an empirically grounded orientation. I began with the assumption that encounters with security-driven surveillance are an inevitable aspect of life in the twenty-first century, and, as such, my interest is in better understanding the process of surveillance from the perspective of the surveilled subject; an area of inquiry that I advanced through this project. In particular, the findings suggest that surveilled subjects’ encounters can be understood with some consistency – characterized by consistent criteria across subjects and contexts, and through a consistent theoretical framework across subjects in a specific context. However, as noted above, consistency should not be confused with uniformity; specific encounters with surveillance must also be recognized for the extent to which they are nuanced and situated. Moving forward with these results, my ambition is to better understand the causal effects of surveillance on surveilled subjects at both the micro and macro levels. My intention is to produce research that not only enhances academic understandings of the subjective experience of surveillance, but that also promotes the development of evidence-based policy and practices that improve surveilled subjects’ encounters with justifiable and proportional surveillance. My dissertation research is representative of this overall position, has contributed knowledge that prompts further investigations in my area of interest, and is one step of many towards the realization of my intentions.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Organizations Contacted

Community

Canadian Arab Federation
Canadian Association for Equality
Canadian Institute for Diversity and Inclusion
Canadian Tamil Congress
Canadian Unitarians for Social Justice
Canadian Women’s Foundation
Daniels Centre of Learning
International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
National Association of Women and the Law
National Council of Canadian Muslims
National Council of Women of Canada
Ontario Association of Social Workers
Ontario Civil Liberties Association
Ontario Human Rights Commission
Provincial Council of Women
South Asian Bar Association

Academic (institutions were contacted generally, as well as specific student organizations)

Durham College
Queen’s University
University of Ontario Institute of Technology
Appendix B: Recruitment Letter

Have you had experiences during Canadian border crossings at Pearson International Airport in the last several years that you think people should know about?

Have you felt particularly aware of different ways in which you are watched when crossing the border?

Have you thought about surveillance in the context of border crossings and what it means to you?

If you would like to share your thoughts on these and related questions you are encouraged to participate in a research project focusing on encounters with surveillance during Canadian border crossing experiences at Pearson Airport in Toronto being conducted through Queen’s University.

The study involves interview and questionnaire components and takes approximately 45-60 minutes to complete.

All information collected will remain confidential and only be reported anonymously.

Contributions to this project will be used to better understand differences in the experience of crossing the border and how the process of crossing the border might be improved through different policies and practices.

The principal investigator for this project is Alana Saulnier, a PhD student working under the supervision of Dr. David Lyon of the Sociology Department in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Queen’s University.

If participating in this research appeals to you please contact Alana Saulnier at 12as32@queensu.ca.

Alana Saulnier and David Lyon
Department of Sociology, Surveillance Studies Centre
Queen’s University
Appendix C: Letter of Information and Informed Consent

You are invited to voluntarily participate in the project: Canadian Border Crossing Experiences. In this study, you will be asked to answer questions regarding your experiences with surveillance during Canadian border crossings in interview and questionnaire format. The interview will provide you with the opportunity to elaborate on the experiences and interpretations you relay in the questionnaire. In particular, the central topics of focus will include a description of any particularly difficult border crossing attempts, the extent to which encounters with surveillance figure into your border crossing experience, perceptions of the overall fairness and satisfaction you associate with the process of crossing the border, and response strategies to negative border crossing experiences. We expect that it will take 30-60 minutes to complete the interview and questionnaire. Upon the completion of all required interviews, all participants will be entered into a draw in which one participant will be selected to receive a $100 gift certificate to Future Shop.

There are minimal known physical, psychological, economic, or social risks associated with this study. While this project is considered relatively low risk, it is possible that some participants might become distressed when recounting their experiences. If you find yourself in this situation you may wish to contact one of the free counseling services listed in the debriefing letter. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from this study at any time without any consequences or penalties. You are not obliged to answer any questions to which you would prefer to not respond.

The interview portions of our meeting will be digitally recorded for the purpose of transcription at a later time. All information will be stored on the primary investigator’s password protected encrypted laptop. Individual responses will remain anonymous and will not be released to any one for any reason. All results reported (e.g., conference presentations, journal articles) will use pseudonyms when referring to individuals or be reported as group data (i.e., responses to questionnaire items). Alana Saulnier and Dr. David Lyon will be responsible for keeping and analyzing the anonymous data based on your responses. Also, other researchers could request to analyze these anonymous files for other valid research purposes (e.g., for meta-analyses).

This study has been reviewed and cleared by the General Research Ethics Board at Queen’s University (GREB # 6013263). The principal investigator is Alana Saulnier, a PhD student working under the supervision of Dr. David Lyon of the Sociology Department in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Queen’s University. In the event that you have any questions, concerns, or complaints, you may contact Dr. David Lyon (dlyon@queensu.ca), or the GREB Administration (chair.GREB@queensu.ca; 613-533-6000 x74025).
I have read and understood the statements above. My signature, below, indicates my free and informed consent to participate in this research as titled, that all questions have been answered to my satisfaction, that I am aware of who to contact should I have further questions, and permission to have my responses during the interview digitally recorded for the purpose of transcription.

Name (please print): ________________________________
Signature: ________________________________________
Date: __________________________
Appendix D: Interview Guide

Hello, I’m Alana.

Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this interview today about your experiences with surveillance while crossing the Canadian border at Pearson airport. As a person who is willing to share your experiences, your perspectives are invaluable to my dissertation research and I encourage you to share as detailed responses to the questions as you wish to. I also want to let you know that I will be reading from this script to ensure consistency across interviews.

In the interview I’m going to ask you questions that give you the opportunity to voice your experiences while crossing the Canadian border at Pearson and your opinion on the use of surveillance in that context. I assure you that all of the information you provide will be stored and analyzed in accordance with the General Research Ethics Board requirements at Queen’s University. Your information will remain completely confidential and data will only be published anonymously.

Before I begin the interview, I want to take a moment to remind you that your participation in today is completely voluntary. If at any point during the interview you would prefer to no longer take part in the process you are welcome to leave. Information collected from individuals who choose to withdraw is not analyzed and will be destroyed at the first opportunity. Also, if there are particular questions that you would prefer not to answer for any reason I understand. You are under no obligation to provide me with information that you would prefer not to.

Finally, may I please have your permission to tape record our interview today for the purpose of transcription at a later point? The audio recording will never be used as a means to identify you with any comments made today.

Receive or fail to receive participant permission to tape record interview.

First, I would like to ask you some questions about your history of crossing the Canadian border.

1) How many times would you estimate you travel across the Canadian border in a year?  
   a) What type of border crossing do you most frequently use (land, air or water)?  
   b) How many times would you guess you travel across the border through Pearson airport in a year?  
2) When you have to cross the border at Pearson, what do you expect the experience to be like?  
   a) What do you think those expectations are based on (e.g., media accounts, acquaintances experiences, personal experiences, other) and, how so?  
   b) How do those expectations make you feel?
c) Do you notice that your actual experience varies from your expectations? How so?

   d) Do you expect that your experience will be shaped by the way you look (for example, sex, race, etc.)?
      i) *If so:* In what ways?

3) When you have to cross the border at Pearson, in what ways do you expect to be watched or observed during the experience?
   a) Would you please walk me through when you believe the process of observation begins, how it is carried out, and when it ends.
   b) Other than preparing to have people physically watch you, in what other ways do you expect to be watched or kept track of and how?
   c) Do you feel that stereotypes and prejudice impact your treatment while crossing the border at Pearson?
      i) *If you feel that stereotypes and prejudice impact your treatment, what stereotypes and prejudices stand out to you?*
      ii) *Do you have any examples of this sort of treatment that you would like to share?*
   d) On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing not at all and 5 representing all the time), how would you rate the extent to which you are watched at the border as being based on stereotypes and prejudices associated?
   e) When you are watched while crossing the border, did this make you feel different relative to the majority of people crossing the border?
      i) *If so:* In what ways?
   f) When you are watched while crossing the border, did this make you feel different relative to the people conducting surveillance at the border (e.g., border crossing guards)?
      i) *If so:* In what ways?

4) When you have to cross the border, what sorts of surveillance do you notice before you get to the actual border?
   a) How does this surveillance affect you?

5) Have any of your border crossing experiences at Pearson been negative?
   a) *If so:* Would you describe it/them for me please?
      i) *If the participant has had multiple negative experiences:* Are there any consistent aspects to these negative experiences that stand out to you?
   b) *If so:* How, if at all, does feeling watched play into this/these negative experiences?

6) Have you ever been refused from crossing the border?
   a) *If so:* How many times?

Thank you for sharing that information with me. At this point, I’m going to stop the interview to give you some time to answer some questions on how fair you believe your border crossing experiences at Pearson have been through a questionnaire.

*Provide participants with Questionnaire Part I*

**Questionnaire Part I**
If you disregard the process of crossing the border and only focus on the outcome of whether you actually crossed the border successfully, on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly agree), please rate your agreement with the following statements.

1) I received the outcome I deserved.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

2) The outcome I received was fair.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

3) I received the outcome I deserved according to the law.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Now, turning back to the process of crossing the border, when responding to the following questions and statements please think about the ways that you think you are watched while crossing the border and how this makes you feel.

4) Do you feel that decisions about who needs to be watched at the border are made in ways that are fair?

1 2 3 4 5
Never Always

5) Overall, how fair would you say decisions and processes are about who needs to be watched at the border?

1 2 3 4 5
Not fair at all Very fair

6) How would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions about who needs to be watched at the border are handled?

1 2 3 4 5
Not fair at all Very fair

7) I have a general sense that things are handled in ways that are fair at the border.

1 2 3 4 5
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<td>8) How much of an effort do you think is made to be fair to individuals when decisions are being made about an individual’s deservingness to be watched while they attempt to cross the border?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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When responding to the following statements, think about your opinions on the overall quality of the formal procedures used to govern the border crossing process for all Canadian citizens and residents.

9) The rules dictate that decisions regarding who needs to be watched at border crossing sites are fair and unbiased.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

10) The rules and procedures regarding who needs to be watched at border crossing sites are applied consistently across people and situations.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

11) The rules ensure that decisions regarding who needs to be watched at border crossing sites are made based on facts, not personal biases and opinions.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

12) The rules and procedures regarding who needs to be watched at border crossing sites are equally fair to everyone.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

When responding to the following statements, think about your opinions on the overall quality of the behaviour of individuals responsible for enforcing the rules used to govern the border crossing process for all Canadian citizens and residents.

13) I feel confident that the decisions of authority figures at the border regarding who needs to be watched are consistent across people and situations.

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
14) I feel confident that the decisions of authority figures at the border regarding who needs to be watched are made based on facts, not their personal biases and opinions.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

15) I feel confident that the decisions of authority figures at the border regarding who needs to be watched are equally fair to everyone.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Once the participant has completed Questionnaire Part I, return to interview guide.

Thank you, now we’re going to resume the interview process. During this phase of the interview the questions I’m going to ask you will focus on your perceptions of surveillance both as a part of your Pearson border crossing experiences and in your daily life.

7) In the context of border crossings, what does the word surveillance mean to you?
   a) In this context, what sort of feelings do you associate with surveillance?

8) What words would you use to describe your encounters with surveillance while preparing to cross or actually crossing the border at Pearson?
   a) On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing very negative and 5 representing very positive), how would you rate your encounters with surveillance at Pearson?

9) What positive qualities do you associate with surveillance at the border?
   a) Drawing from your border crossing experiences, do you have any examples of these positive qualities?

10) What negative qualities do you associate with surveillance at the border?
    a) Drawing from your border crossing experiences, do you have any examples of these negative qualities?

11) Do you think that the surveillance processes in place at Pearson are necessary to ensure safety and security at this location?
    a) Are the tradeoffs you have to make regarding your personal experiences at Pearson justified because of the need to ensure safety and security at this location? How so?
    b) On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being not very important and 5 being very important) how would rate the importance of maintaining safety and security at Canadian borders?

12) Generally speaking, does surveillance mean anything different to you outside of the context of border crossings?
    a) Why or why not?
    b) What different kinds of surveillance are you aware of that you encounter in your daily life?
        i) How does encountering these various forms of surveillance make you feel?
ii) On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing very negative and 5 representing very positive), how would you rate your encounters with surveillance in the context of your daily life?

c) What positive qualities do you associate with surveillance in the context of your daily life?

d) What negative qualities do you associate with surveillance in the context of your daily life?

Now that I have a better understanding of how you interpret surveillance, I’d like to give you the opportunity to discuss how you think your experiences with surveillance compare to the experiences that other people have in similar situations.

13) In the context of border crossings at Pearson, would you describe your encounters with surveillance as pretty much the same as everybody else (“normal”)?
   a) If so: In what ways?
   b) If not: Do you think that your experience is better or worse than the average experience?
      i) In what ways?
      ii) Drawing from your border crossing experiences, do you have any examples that demonstrate these differences?
   c) On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing much worse than average and 5 representing much better than average), how would you rate your experiences with surveillance at Pearson in comparison to your perception of the “normal” experience?

14) Outside of the context of border crossings, would you describe your encounters with surveillance as pretty much the same as everybody else (“normal”)?
   a) If so: In what ways?
   b) If not: Do you think that your experience is better or worse than the average experience?
      i) In what ways?
   c) On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 representing much worse than average and 5 representing much better than average), how would you rate your experiences with surveillance in the context of your daily life in comparison to your perception of the “normal” experience?

Asking you about how your experiences with surveillance compare to the experiences that other people have may be particularly important to understanding the different reactions people have to surveillance. These next several questions focus on your strategies following your encounters with surveillance.

15) In what ways do you react to surveillance at the border?

16) How, if at all, have your experiences with surveillance during border crossings changed your attitude and reactions toward surveillance in these contexts and in your daily life?
17) How, if at all, have you tried to change your encounters with surveillance at the border by making changes to your behaviour (e.g., travelling patterns, style of dress, speaking mannerisms, luggage carried, etc.)?
   a) Do you think these changes contributed to changes in your experience?
      i) Why or why not?
   b) What, if any, other strategies have you considered as a way to change your border crossing experiences but not put into practice?

Thank you for sharing that information with me. At this point, I’m going to stop the interview to give you some time to answer some questions on your opinions on the use of surveillance at border crossing sites through a questionnaire.

*Provide participants with Questionnaire Part II*

**Questionnaire Part II**

These questions are focused on the process of crossing the border and, particularly, your opinions on the acceptability of surveillance in that context. Please indicate your support for these statements from 1 to 5 (with 1 representing strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly agree).

1) I willingly accept the current use of surveillance at the Pearson border crossing site.

   1       2       3       4       5
   Strongly Disagree                      Strongly Agree

2) In the future, I would like to see surveillance at the border continue to be applied in the same way that it is now.

   1       2       3       4       5
   Strongly Disagree                      Strongly Agree

3) I have considered going to someone to address my concerns about the current use of surveillance at the border.

   1       2       3       4       5
   Strongly Disagree                      Strongly Agree

4) The people responsible for conducting surveillance at the border could do a better job of conducting surveillance than they do now.

   1       2       3       4       5
   Strongly Disagree                      Strongly Agree

5) The way surveillance is conducted at the border serves a useful purpose.
6) The decisions made regarding the individuals who are targeted for secondary screening as a result of surveillance at the border is not influenced by bias or prejudice.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

7) The people responsible for conducting surveillance at the border can be trusted to make decisions that are good for everyone.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

8) Government policies about surveillance at border crossing sites work well.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

9) Policies about surveillance at border crossing sites are too influenced by bias and prejudice.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

10) Policies about surveillance at border crossing sites are good for everyone in our community.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Finally, please think about whether you think surveillance at Pearson is driven by stereotypes and prejudice in these last questions.

11) Do you think that you are targeted for surveillance at the border due to your race, ethnicity, sex or age?

1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Completely

12) Do you think that you are targeted for surveillance at the border due to what you actually said or did while at the border?

1 2 3 4 5
Never Always
13) I received a better or worse outcome than others targeted by surveillance while crossing the border due to my race.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

14) I was treated better or worse than others targeted by surveillance while crossing the border due to my race.

1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

Providing this demographic information is very helpful to the research because I am particularly interested in how and why people might be treated differently regarding the experiences we have been discussing.

Please record the following demographic characteristics.

Sex: ________________________________
Age: ________________________________
Ethnic origin: ________________________
Religious orientation:___________________

Once the participant has completed Questionnaire Part II, return to interview guide.

Thank you, now we’re going to begin the final phase of the interview process. During this phase the questions I’m going to ask you will focus on personal characteristics that you believe define your identity for yourself and other people.

18) There are many different “identity characteristics” (for example, race, sex, age, religious orientation, citizenship, etc,) that people use to describe themselves, which would you use to describe yourself (you may use as many as you wish)?

19) What characteristics are the most important to you?
   a) Why?

20) What characteristics do you think have the biggest impact (positive or negative) on the way that other people treat you?
   a) How so?
   b) In what ways do you think your identity characteristics influence whether you are targeted for surveillance in your daily life or at Pearson?

21) Is there anything else you would like to talk about before we end the interview? We can return back to a previous question or you can bring up anything you feel is important that I have not brought up.

Thank you very much for completing this research with me today.
Appendix E: Thank You Letter

Thank you for participating in this study!

The study that you participated in today was designed to better understand variations in experiences with surveillance during Canadian border crossings. Borders serve the important function of regulating flows of goods and people internationally; however, reports of recent border crossings suggest that the experience has become increasingly negative. One reason for this may be our enhanced awareness of surveillance encountered during border crossings. Surveillance has expanded at borders in part due to the presumed link between enhanced surveillance and enhanced security or safety. While these increases in surveillance may be problematic for many individuals, it may be the case that enhanced surveillance measures are acutely affecting particular segments of the population.

Some evaluations have shown that persons with a “Middle Eastern” appearance (characterized largely by skin tones evaluated as “brown”) and a Muslim religious orientation have particularly negative experiences during Canadian border crossings and perceive these negative experiences to be grounded in the identifying characteristics of their skin colour and decision to wear religious artifacts among other factors. Most research focuses on sharing these experiences with the particular aim of highlighting discriminatory practices. While this is of interest to us, our research explores how encounters with surveillance during Canadian border crossings specifically conveys (or fails to convey) messages of respect, neutrality and equal standing amongst travelers, and how these perceptions of treatment shape attitudes and behaviours beyond the physical experience of crossing the border.

Research on the effects of messages of respect, neutrality and equal standing (more generally known as procedural justice concerns) has demonstrated that satisfaction with outcomes, support for and commitment to decisions, perceptions of outcome legitimacy, and voluntary acceptance of outcomes are all lowered when the procedure used to reach the outcomes do not sufficiently convey procedural justice concerns. Legitimacy is a particularly important component in the context of border crossings. Perceived legitimacy of authorities (or institutions) prompts an attitude of compliance with the future instructions of those authorities. In addition, legitimacy engenders voluntary and cooperative behaviours, even to unpopular decisions. In other words, the extent to which any persons perceive their experiences with surveillance during border crossings as procedurally just is likely to wield considerable influence over evaluations of treatment during the process and, therefore, subsequent attitudes and behaviours. These effects may be particularly prominent when individuals perceive procedurally unjust treatment to be associated with profiling attributions.

It may be the case that negative encounters with surveillance during border crossings impinge on
our expectations of procedural justice, and, if that is the case, that these relatively isolated negative experiences may come to wield substantial influence over understanding of and reactions to surveillance outside of this context.

During the study, we asked you questions about the context and assumed rationale behind any particularly difficult border crossing attempts, perceptions of the overall fairness and satisfaction you associate with your border crossing attempts history, and perceptions of your attitude and response strategies to surveillance following negative border crossing experiences. We asked you these questions because we want to gauge the extent to which procedural justice concerns (i.e., perceptions of the extent to which respect, neutrality and equal standing were sufficiently conveyed during your border crossing experience) influence your evaluation of the experience. In addition, we also want to assess whether persons with high or low procedural justice evaluations of the situation(s) report differences in the way in which they defined and reacted to encounters with surveillance.

Discussing your experiences may have caused you to feel distressed. If you would like to discuss your feelings with a professional you can be contacted to one for free through the following services:

For the general public to access free mental health information:
Ontario Mental Health Helpline 24 hours a day at 1-866-531-2600

For Queen’s students to access free mental health information and counseling services:
LaSalle Building, 146 Stuart Street, second floor
Monday to Friday, 9am-4:30pm at 613-533-6000 x78264
Or by email at counseling.services@queensu.ca

If you have any additional questions, please feel free to stay and discuss them with us now or to contact Alana Saulnier (12as32@queensu.ca) or David Lyon (dlyon@queensu.ca),

Thank you again for your participation and assistance with our research!

Alana Saulnier and David Lyon
Department of Sociology, Surveillance Studies Centre
Queen’s University
Appendix F: Participant Demographics Reference

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Appendix G: Queen’s University General Research Ethics Board Approval

August 11, 2014

Ms. Alana Saulnier Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Sociology Queen’s University
Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6

GREB Ref #: GSOC-116-14; Romeo # 6013263

Title: "GSOC-116-14 Surveillance and procedural justice perceptions at the Canadian border"

Dear Ms. Saulnier: The General Research Ethics Board (GREB), by means of a delegated board review, has cleared your proposal entitled "GSOC-116-14 Surveillance and procedural justice perceptions at the Canadian border" for ethical compliance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (TCPS) and Queen’s ethics policies. In accordance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (article D.1.6) and Senate Terms of Reference (article G), your project has been cleared for one year. At the end of each year, the GREB will ask if your project has been completed and if not, what changes have occurred or will occur in the next year.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB, with a copy to your unit REB, of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period (access this form at https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/ and click Events - GREB Adverse Event Report). An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example you must report changes to the level of risk, applicant characteristics, and implementation of new procedures. To make an amendment, access the application at https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/ and click Events - GREB Amendment to Approved Study Form. These changes will automatically be sent to the Ethics Coordinator, Gail Irving, at the Office of Research Services or irvingg@queensu.ca for further review and clearance by the GREB or GREB Chair. On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

Joan Stevenson, Ph.D.

Chair
General Research Ethics Board

c: Dr. David Lyon, Faculty Supervisor
   Dr. Rob Beamish, Chair,