Abstract

By virtue of their presence, observers alter what they are observing. Yet, the international soldiers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) did much more than observe events. From August 1949 until the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in November 1956, the Western military officers assigned to UNTSO were compelled to take seriously the task of supervising the Arab-Israeli armistice, despite the unwillingness of all parties to accept an actual peace settlement. To the extent that a particular peacekeeping mission was successful – i.e., that peace was “kept” – what actually happened on the ground is usually considered far less important than broader politics. However, as efforts to forge a peace settlement failed one after another, UNTSO operations themselves became the most important mechanism for regional stability, particularly by providing a means by which otherwise implacable enemies could communicate with each other, thus helping to moderate the conflict.

This communication played out against the backdrop of the dangerous early days of the Cold War, the crumbling of Western empires, and the emergence of the non-aligned movement. Analyses of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), the committees created to oversee the separate General Armistice Agreements signed between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, particularly those during the 1954 to 1956 tenure as UNTSO chief of staff of Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns, best evaluate both UNTSO effectiveness and Arab-Israeli interaction.
Acknowledgements

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The United Nations Archives was the most important repository that I visited. Thanks to Monika Tkacova and the always helpful and well-trained staff of that shamefully underused archive, it was always a pleasure to work there.

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The errors that remain are my own.
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Note on Terms and Transliteration

Transliteration, the transfer of words from one alphabet to another – in this case from the Arabic and Hebrew alphabets to the Latin alphabet – remains an inexact practice. While no express transliteration format has been adhered to in this study, every effort has been made to ensure uniformity and avoid confusion. To that end, diacritical marks, which guide pronunciation, have been excluded. Likewise, Hebrew prefixes have been combined into the English wording; for example, rendering the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* rather than *ha Aretz*.

Military ranks, including those of the Israel Defence Force and the French Army, have been rendered in their British staff system equivalents; thus, lieutenant-colonel rather than *sgan aluf* and major rather than *chef de bataillon*.

The Israeli practice of Hebraizing, changing “diaspora” surnames to “Israeli” ones, as in Aryeh Shalev (né Friedlander) explains occasional discrepancies in the narrative.

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Armistice Demarcation Line</td>
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<td>BDA</td>
<td>Belgian Diplomatic Archives</td>
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<td>BNA</td>
<td>British National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFPI</td>
<td>Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Demarcation Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIMAC</td>
<td>Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Israeli Foreign Ministry</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>British Foreign Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
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<td>GAA</td>
<td>General Armistice Agreement</td>
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<td>GAS</td>
<td>General Assembly Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSO</td>
<td>General Staff Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>HJKIMAC</td>
<td>Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>i/c</td>
<td>In Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICSC</td>
<td>International Commission of Supervision and Control in Indochina</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDFA</td>
<td>Israel Defence Force Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILMAC</td>
<td>Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Israel State Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISMAC</td>
<td>Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCA</td>
<td>Local Commanders’ Agreement</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mixed Armistice Commission</td>
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<td>MEDO</td>
<td>Middle East Defence Organization</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>N.D.</td>
<td>No Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>Swedish Military Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNA</td>
<td>United Nations Archives</td>
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<td>UNCCP</td>
<td>United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer</td>
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<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan</td>
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<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In the midst of a series of violent incidents in Jerusalem over several days in early April 1954, a man wandered from Israeli territory into the no man’s land tenuously separating the Israelis and the Jordanians. He was dressed in civilian clothes and carried a bundle under his arms. The Jordanian soldiers stationed along the Old City walls gunned him down without hesitation: they later alleged that he was carrying a bomb that he planned to detonate in the midst of the Old City’s crowded markets. The peacekeepers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) patiently heard Israel’s denials of Jordan’s claims and, although Israel was officially refusing to cooperate with UNTSO at the time, decided to recover the body themselves in order to avoid further killing. After consultations with the Israelis and the Jordanians, two peacekeepers, one from each side of the armistice line, approached the body simultaneously. Careful examination of the bundle revealed that it contained nothing more than a coat.\footnote{1} Much of the work carried out by UNTSO came down to situations like this, one of thousands of deaths that occurred during the period between the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War and the 1956 Suez War. Did the UNTSO peacekeepers make any difference to this level of virtually uninterrupted violence?

This study answers that question through analyzing the two functions carried out by UNTSO between August 1949 and the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in November 1956. Not only did the peacekeepers attempt to uphold the
original mandate granted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council – that of supervising the General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) – but they also developed an additional role, that of facilitating communication between Israel and its neighbours, a function in which UNTSO proved far more effective than any other person or organization. While the local belligerents often refused to cooperate in the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) established by each of the Armistice Agreements, the only consistent way that Israel talked with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria from 1949 to 1956 was through UNTSO channels. While the parties postured and constantly used UNTSO for their own purposes, the peacekeepers attempted to improve the situation. The armed UNEF buffer formation, heavily influenced by UNTSO experience, eventually brought wider calm, but still no peace, to the region.

The principal elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict first became present during the 1949 to 1956 period. These included frontier violence, open deceit, aggressive posturing, complex prisoner exchanges, and lack of direct communication. While the solutions to these problems may be no more apparent now than they were in the 1950s, the experiences of the past illustrate the importance of a mediatory body that facilitates communication between the Arab states and Israel. Such a body is of enduring value to keeping the peace and to establishing the circumstances that will help make a permanent settlement possible. As this narrative repeatedly emphasizes, reducing and managing tension on the ground is the necessary precursor to lasting Middle East peace.

The UN, the principal actor that attempted to reduce and manage Middle East tension in the immediate post-Second World War period, was also hindered by conflict
and distrust. It was not supposed to have been this way. In 1945, the victorious Allied powers established the UN to ensure a common front against future threats to international peace and security. That effort immediately collapsed into bickering and recrimination, with the United States and the Soviet Union pitted against one another in the global ideological struggle soon to be called the Cold War. This context deeply influenced both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the UNTSO peacekeeping effort.

Peacekeeping developed out of the Cold War impasse that paralyzed the most important body of the UN, the Security Council. All five permanent members of the Council – Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States – held a veto power over the resolutions drafted by the body. The veto power meant that many of the most idealistic stipulations of the UN Charter, such as the formation of an international military force to keep the peace, remained moribund as long as unanimous agreement could not be reached. Of course, threats to the myriad national interests of the Security Council members remained. Therefore, the UN needed to respond to these problems in a manner that avoided direct confrontation between the superpowers.

As a result of a temporary Soviet boycott of the Security Council, the Korean conflict of 1950-53 witnessed armed UN intervention against the North Korean invasion of South Korea. While the West seized a unique opportunity to take action against the expansion of international Communism, because both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons, operations of this sort would not always be an option. Attempts to find another preference predated the Korean hostilities, as the UN had
previously led civilian fact-finding operations to Palestine and the Balkans and brokered a 1949 truce in the war between The Netherlands and Indonesia.

The civilian staff of these early operations soon gave way to military personnel trained to serve for extended periods in hostile environments and to report on military activities. Peacekeeping, defined here as actions carried out by a non-aggressive multinational military element placed between or among belligerents, thus arose out of the early Cold War. Peacekeeping was not specifically enshrined in the UN Charter, and the phrase itself entered the vernacular only after the later establishment of UNEF. Nevertheless, before the 1956 foundation of that mission, unarmed soldiers serving with UNTSO, the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir, and the International Commission of Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Indochina tried to keep the peace in troubled areas. All of these peacekeeping operations came in response to inter-state conflicts following the independence of former colonies from European rule. By historical precedence, they define “classical” peacekeeping.2

The United States pioneered these initial peacekeeping efforts, assisted by the other Western powers. The Americans viewed international unrest as inimical to their national interests, especially capitalist trade. As a result, before 1956 even the soldiers of colonial states like Belgium and France made acceptable peacekeepers. Effective Soviet opposition to this Western monopoly on peacekeeping did not develop until 1954.

UN Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, an American awarded the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements, strongly influenced the
establishment of the earliest peacekeeping methods. The later experiences of UNTSO officers, especially Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns, as well as the work of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, enhanced Bunche’s blueprint. More importantly, even when not providing the bulk of the peacekeeping forces, the United States supplied the UN with the majority of the financial and logistical support needed to carry out peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers did not blindly follow American policies as a result; instead, they worked diligently to foster peaceful conditions, thus nurturing the behaviour that best assisted Western goals. As a result, the first peacekeepers were not intended to be impartial; for example, UNTSO peacekeepers investigated and judged which party, or parties, had violated the Armistice Agreements.

By 1955, with the Soviet hold on their own recently conquered satellites solidified and publicly declared through the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, the Cold War expanding into every corner of the world, and the Soviet Union more active at the UN, the United States began a gradual withdrawal from direct peacekeeping involvement. Not coincidentally, middle power peacekeeping participation expanded significantly during the same period. The so-called middle powers, developed nations with smaller populations than the great powers but well-trained military personnel and experienced international diplomats, used peacekeeping to play their most vital role in Western Cold War policy. Peacekeeping soon came to be dominated by smaller North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, such as Canada, Denmark, and Norway, that were acceptable not only to the Security Council, but to the disputants. Although UNTSO and
other early peacekeeping efforts did not immediately lead to permanent peaceful settlements, they did help prevent superpower and nuclear conflict which, in the context of the dangerous early days of the Cold War, stands as a major achievement.

These Western goals supported UNTSO, the most important “classical” peacekeeping operation. Traditionally, the strategies proposed at the New York headquarters of the UN, in the Security Council, and in ministries throughout the capitals of the great powers have been viewed as the ideal ways for scholars to critically assess peace operations. These examinations commonly describe UNTSO in less than flattering terms. Even the staunchest defenders of the UN, including former Under-Secretary Brian Urquhart, defined UNTSO as “pitifully inadequate.” Israeli commentators typically have been harsher, in one contemporary case dismissing the MACs as “useless instruments.”

Assertions that UNTSO failed its responsibility to resolve the Arab-Israeli impasse are misplaced. While the UN espoused peace, censuring the peacekeepers for failing to maintain it both removes responsibility from the parties themselves and ignores the context of events. The world body was a conglomeration of member states divided by the Cold War, not an international government. Certainly the UN “institutionalized the stalemate,” but the Arab-Israeli conflict resembled other regional conflagrations in both American and Soviet eyes; since it could not immediately be resolved, it needed to be contained in order to prevent greater calamities. From 1949, and certainly once the Cold War heated up in the Middle East with the Czechoslovakia-Egypt arms-for-cotton deal six years later, UNTSO was principally an instrument of the Western policy to deter
superpower conflict. The intransigence of the parties themselves made the quest for a peace settlement secondary to simply containing the fighting.

The Middle Eastern states and their interactions with the peacekeepers are thus vital to understanding how UNTSO fared. Looking at UNTSO operations reveals the motivations and actions of the parties, and allows assumptions about their positions on peace and relations with their neighbours to be tested. A fuller examination of the circumstances under which UNTSO laboured, especially the integration of day-to-day peacekeeping operations with peace settlement efforts and wider Cold War strategies, reveals conclusions very different from the existing historiography. To test those conclusions, we must begin with the first Arab-Israeli war.

The 1948-49 War completely changed the Middle East. The new state of Israel was created and the state of Palestine disappeared, partitioned between Egypt, Israel, and Jordan after vicious fighting. The events of the war, including the Armistice Agreements that created UNTSO at the “end” of the conflict, provided the foundation for much of the subsequent enmity between Israel and its neighbours.

Britain had been granted control of Palestine after the First World War. During Britain’s tenure, tension between native Arab Palestinians and hundreds of thousands of Jews entering the country – motivated both by Zionism and the anti-Semitic actions of European governments such as Adolf Hitler’s Germany – often flared into open fighting, notably during the Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939. After the Second World War, the UN sought to help establish a mutually acceptable compromise in the face of continuing Arab-Zionist tension, but the Palestinian Arabs rejected the result, the 1947 partition
Britain, badly battered by the war, lost patience with the process and withdrew from Palestine in May 1948. This withdrawal led to Israel’s unilateral declaration of independence, which precipitated open war with the Palestinian Arab population, all four neighbouring nations, and three other regional states. The Security Council, aided by the fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States immediately recognized Israel, promptly ordered a truce, which lasted four weeks.

The Security Council then established a Truce Commission, composed of civilian observers drawn from Belgium, France, and the United States. This organization was soon superseded by military observers from the same three countries, operating as UNTSO. These quick maneuvers allowed the West to keep the Soviets and their allies from becoming directly involved, although Swedish assistance was gratefully accepted. The UN also played an active role in bringing the parties together peacefully, particularly after the 17 September 1948 assassination of the original mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. The 16 November Security Council resolution threatened Chapter VII military intervention in ordering an armistice to “facilitate the transition from the present truce to the permanent peace.” The combination of this tacit threat and the military success of Israel prompted the signing of the Armistice Agreements in 1949.

The agreements concluded the first Arab-Israeli War and secured Israel’s independence. With the assistance of UN mediators Ralph Bunche and Henri Vigier, four separate pacts were signed between Israel on the one hand and its neighbors Egypt (24 February 1949), Lebanon (23 March 1949), Jordan (3 April 1949), and Syria (20 July 1949) on the other. The other major state participant in the conflict, Iraq, and those
Arab League members who provided token forces, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, neither met with the Israelis nor signed truce agreements. As a result of these accords, Israel controlled over 75 per cent of mandatory Palestine, commonly referred to as Israel’s pre-1967 frontiers, a much larger area than the partition plan had granted the new state.

The Arab states considered the armistice talks to be purely military discussions. All of the Armistice Agreements recognized this, with each declaring that the accord had been “dictated exclusively by military considerations,” and noting that they did not prejudice final territorial claims.\(^{14}\) The Arab negotiating parties consisted solely of military officers and, to Israel’s frustration, the sides did not always meet face-to-face during the negotiations, often transmitting statements through UN officials. Furthermore, the governments of the Arab states did not consider the accords to have granted official recognition to Israel. Instead, they deemed them temporary cessations of hostilities, and continued to carry out belligerent acts not expressly covered therein, including an economic boycott of Israel and blockading the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. They also pledged to present a common front against Israel, believing that their opponent had benefited from fighting against independent adversaries.\(^ {15}\)

The changes brought about or recognized by the Armistice Agreements, especially population movements and frontier alterations, account for many of the problems encountered by the peacekeepers in the following years. The UN accepted deliberately vague agreements in order to foster compromise and to provide inducements toward permanent peace. The agreements also produced armistice lines, provisional boundaries which military forces and civilians were forbidden to cross. The first, the
green line, delineated the new frontiers that did not correspond with pre-war international boundaries. This covered all of the armistice lines save that between Israel and Lebanon, and parts of the Egypt-Israel and Israel-Syria frontiers. The creation of the state of Israel and the territorial expansion of Egypt and Jordan also destroyed what had been Palestine. As a result, during the 1948 fighting, 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes, becoming refugees in neighbouring territories, especially the Jordanian-controlled West Bank and the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip.

By signing the first accord, Egypt established the precedent of not recognizing Israel and not prejudicing Arab territorial claims: the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement stated three times that the accord did not constitute a political settlement. Egypt also spearheaded the effort to boycott Israeli products. To that end, Egypt banned Israel-bound shipping from the Suez Canal, the largest avenue of waterborne commerce in the world.

Egypt also retained control of a thin coastal area of Palestine known as the Gaza Strip. While Egyptian rhetoric trumpeted the need to return Palestine to its perceived rightful owners, a more selfish reality predominated: further territorial aggrandizement. Egypt continued its quest to gain control of the Negev, the desert – and nearly deserted – south of Israel, a goal designed to simultaneously weaken Israel and physically reconnect the divided Arab world. Israel refused to part with any segment of the desert, placing the dispute over the region at “the core of the conflict.”

The Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement also created the El Auja Demilitarized Zone (DZ). El Auja represented the geographic middle of the three road networks cutting through the Negev/Sinai desert. The other two, centred on Rafah and Eilat, lay in the
hands of Egypt and Israel, respectively. The strategic worth of this central route – Egypt invaded Palestine via El Auja in 1948 – was obvious. The failure of the two sides to reach agreement over the area led to the UN-sponsored compromise of a DZ.

The second state to conclude an armistice with Israel, Lebanon, welcomed compromise. The small Lebanese military initiated little offensive action against Israel during the war, contenting itself with a passive naval blockade in the Mediterranean. The Israel-Lebanon relationship even included cooperation, as the Israelis withdrew from villages occupied up to the Litani River, ensuring that the armistice line conformed to the pre-war international border. While this evidence suggests that the two sides may have welcomed direct peace talks, none occurred. Lebanon predicated its own survival on angering neither Israel nor Syria, its powerful neighbours. As a result, a status quo of quiet cooperation with Israel coexisted with a lack of official recognition.

The greatest territorial shift occasioned by the Armistice Agreements involved the nebulous Israel-Jordan frontier. At the signing of the Armistice Agreement between the two states, the Jordanian military, the Arab Legion, occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem and the Old City. The frontier stretched north to south for over 600 kilometres and divided communities from wells, fields, cemeteries, and places of worship, as well as featuring numerous indefensible salients. The Jordanians also held Latrun, a village dominating the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, while the Israelis retained rights to most of Mount Scopus, the strategic key to Jerusalem, in an enclave beyond the Jordanian line. Under normal diplomatic circumstances, these anomalies would have been corrected, but with the continued animosity between the two
sides, the frontier simply represented the positions where the two armies had faced one another at the end of the 1948 fighting.

While neither side held pronounced military advantages as a result of the location of the armistice line, Jordanian forces controlled much of the high ground. The West Bank also provided Jordan with a defensive buffer zone, and from its most westerly points Jordanian vehicles were an unopposed drive of a few minutes from the Mediterranean coast. Like the Egyptian government, the Jordanian government also coveted the Negev, a position that fostered much of the disagreement that developed between all three states. For its part, Israel welcomed any correction of the West Bank frontier, particularly a land corridor to Mount Scopus and access to Jewish religious sites in Jordanian Jerusalem. Most importantly, Hashemite control of the Old City and its Christian and Muslim holy sites legitimized that monarchical family’s bid to revive its leadership role in the Arab world.

That bid benefited from the support of a great power and Security Council member. The 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Defence Treaty bound Britain to come to the aid of Jordan if attacked, gave Britain airbases on Jordanian soil, provided British officers for the Arab Legion, and granted Jordan a £10 million annual subsidy. The Arabic-speaking British general John Bagot Glubb, who retained his Ottoman honorific of Pasha, commanded the Jordanian military, and the British government paid the annual subsidy directly to Glubb himself. Glubb regularly corresponded with the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and British officers held all senior command positions and made every decision concerning training, equipping, and expanding the Jordanian military.
This support had grave longer-term consequences for Britain but, in the short term, it nurtured Jordan in its most vulnerable years. The British influence in Jordan rankled Israel, since the British had harshly suppressed Jewish military activity and limited Jewish immigration before their withdrawal from Palestine and, more importantly, Israel had no great power ally of its own.

Syria, the state most reluctant to meet with Israeli representatives, signed the last of the Armistice Agreements under the dictatorship of Colonel Husni Zaim. Zaim needed the armistice in order to bring his troops home and consolidate control over the country.\textsuperscript{22} To better correspond with the pre-war international frontier, the Syrians partially withdrew from territory captured in pre-war Palestine, creating three contentious DZs around Lake Tiberias. The Syrians retained the Golan Heights that dominated the frontier, while Israel held the high ground overlooking Lake Tiberias from the west, the lake and its adjoining rivers constituting a continual source of contention, as Israel and Syria possessed very little water and Jordan and Lebanon, also riparian states, had competing claims of their own as well.

Outwardly, the Syrian government prided itself on presenting the most extreme anti-Israel policy of the Arab states. Just two weeks after signing the armistice, the military assassinated Zaim, who had been engaged in secret peace negotiations with the Israelis, and toppled his government in a coup. To the surprise of many observers, the Syrians did not immediately repudiate the Armistice Agreement, although the new regime promptly withdrew the peace feelers that Zaim had extended.\textsuperscript{23}
The Security Council renewed UNTSO in order to aid the implementation of these Armistice Agreements by the parties and to uphold the 11 August 1949 ceasefire order. Under command of a chief of staff directly appointed by the secretary-general, UNTSO peacekeepers explored complaints brought by the parties and independently reported breaches of the armistice. The MACs created by each of the accords consisted of equal numbers of the parties’ representatives, plus the UNTSO chairman, who cast the deciding vote in investigations of alleged violations. The usual term used to describe the members of UNTSO is military observers, but peacekeepers are far more apt, since UNTSO sought to keep the peace, not only observe events. Indeed, the MACs were the only place where Arabs and Israelis overtly met, and a rare forum where the peacekeepers retained consistent influence. While as many as 572 UN observers served in Palestine throughout 1948, between the signing of the Armistice Agreements and the outbreak of the 1956 War, UNTSO never exceeded 65 peacekeepers, and included only 21 officers until 1953.

Headquartered at the former British government house, itself located on neutral internationalized ground in Jerusalem, UNTSO concentrated its peacekeepers along the various frontiers. The peacekeepers maintained a headquarters for each MAC near the respective armistice lines and operated liaison offices in Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Gaza City. All of the chairmen and senior peacekeepers held commissions, while American, Belgian, and French other ranks and multinational UN Field Service employees provided drivers, radio operators, and headquarters security. To avoid
confusion with the forces of the parties, the unarmed peacekeepers travelled in white jeeps wearing national uniform with a UN armband.

The four MACs differed greatly from one another, fostering diverse peacekeeping situations under the umbrella of a single operation. The Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission was normally sedate and presented the fewest problems; by contrast, violence overshadowed the others. For instance, Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission disputes centred on water, including struggles over control of the Jordan River tributaries and Lake Tiberias. Contentions in the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission concerned the divided city of Jerusalem, the enclaves that each side held in the other’s territory, and Arab infiltration and Israeli reprisals across the West Bank armistice line. Disputes in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission focused on the El Auja DZ, the status of the Negev, and Egyptian sponsorship of often murderous cross-border raiding parties.

This work follows a chronological format, tracing the development of UNTSO and the conflict that it attempted to contain. The framework integrates ground-level details with peace settlement and extra-regional Cold War issues. The changes at the top of UNTSO, namely in the tenures of the three chiefs of staff who served between 1949 and 1956, delineate the majority of the chapter breaks.

The next chapter provides a historiographical review. The narrative recommences with chapter three, which analyzes events during the service of the first chief of staff, American Brigadier-General William Riley. Under the watch of Riley, the signatories to
the Armistice Agreements initially cooperated both with each other and with UNTSO. The parties soon diverged, however, threatening the armistice regime with the problems left unresolved by the vague accords. At the same time, the failure of every peace settlement effort forced UNTSO into a more active role in fostering stability. These larger failures came accompanied by new problems on the ground, notably increased infiltration of Palestinians from the Jordanian West Bank into Israel and Israeli criticism of the peacekeepers. The worsening tension led to the resignation of an exhausted Riley in April 1953.

Two months later, Danish Major-General Vagn Bennike replaced the American general. The change of command prompted the inauguration of new policies by both UNTSO and the parties. These shifting policies produced the same deadlock and violence as before. During the tenure of Bennike, opinions of UNTSO further hardened. The Arab states came to support Bennike, whom they considered fair, in large part because the majority of the decisions taken by the peacekeepers – usually related to Israeli military reprisals against Jordanian infiltration – went against Israel during his time in charge. The Israelis simultaneously worked to undermine Bennike and many of his subordinates, resulting in his replacement after only fourteen tumultuous months on the job.

The tension between Israel and UNTSO under Bennike coincided with the open spread of the Cold War to the Middle East. The West took drastic action in response. The Americans and French began to withdraw from the most prominent UNTSO roles and the middle powers stepped forward to provide peacekeepers of their own. The assumption of
the chief of staff’s position by Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns in September 1954 marked the organized beginning of this new middle power-based peacekeeping policy.

Chapters 5-7 analyze Burns’ assigned role as a peacekeeper and his assumed role as the senior diplomat charged with keeping Arabs and Israelis talking to each other. These chapters, which analyze the violent period from 1954 to 1956, constitute the core of the study. The Israelis disliked many of Burns’ actions and, thanks in large measure to Western Cold War policies in the Middle East, the relationship between UNTSO and Israel was all but destroyed during his time in command. The Arab states, Egypt in particular, also resented Burns at times, but this had more to do with wider Arab-Israeli tension than his diplomacy. UNTSO thus survived despite a complete lack of support from Egypt and Israel, who undermined the peacekeepers in order to better impose their policies. Indeed, persistent violence between the two states disabled the MACs, forced UNTSO into a virtually powerless position, and culminated with open war in October 1956.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

A slip appended to the beginning of one of the many files in the United Nations Archives (UNA) neatly summarizes the challenge facing the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) researcher: “At one time we started preparing a full study of the Palestine incidents. The task proved one for Hercules and pressure of other work soon swept it aside.” “However,” the erstwhile archivist went on to write, “the material we did dig up might at some future date, and perhaps in another connection, save someone else work.”¹ The scope of the 1949 to 1956 incidents is certainly daunting. Nevertheless, this dissertation uses a ground-up methodology – as opposed to the usual top-down format – and a focus on the United Nations (UN) records to explore new perspectives on longstanding debates surrounding the effectiveness of regional peacekeeping, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the early Cold War.

Much has been written about the Middle East in this formative period, but little of this writing has focused on the role of UNTSO and its peacekeepers. As a result, it is necessary to concentrate on the sources most relevant to peacekeeping. The archival record, particularly the UNA and the many official UN documents, is much richer than most researchers seem to realize.² Repositories outside of Britain, Israel, and the United States should not be overlooked either, especially since sources as diverse as the Belgian Diplomatic Archives (BDA), Library and Archives Canada (LAC), and the Swedish Military Archives, provide context vital to a fuller understanding of UNTSO and its operations.
Only by examining events at the level of the peacekeepers can hypotheses about UNTSO operations and the nature of early Cold War peacekeeping be truly tested. A review of the secondary literature reveals why. For example, studies by former State Department mandarin Nathan Pelcovits and historian Neil Caplan convincingly argue for the important role of Anglo-American diplomacy in attempts to broker an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, most notably through the 1955 Egypt-Israel effort code-named Operation Alpha. These works have relatively little to say about the actions of peacekeepers, often the potential instruments of that diplomacy on the ground, as well as the persons with the prime vantage points on why these peace settlement efforts failed. Not surprisingly, the reality of Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) proceedings and UNTSO actions often differed from the intentions of American State Department or British Foreign Office edicts. Much of the literature does not reflect this.

The default position in writing on the Middle East in this period means uses American, British, and Israeli primary sources, buttressed by secondary studies produced by authors from those same countries. This scholarship is being steadily revised. Since the 1970s, and especially in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East War and the subsequent Arab oil embargo against the West, academics have devoted more attention to the history of the region. The 1990s marked a watershed of published accounts concerning the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War and the reverberations of that event. The opening of long-sealed archives and developments such as the Oslo Accords, the Israel-Jordan peace agreement, the second Palestinian intifada, and the emergence of post-Zionism all contributed to this wellspring. Yet these secondary works tend to be
expressly concerned with the 1948-49 and 1956 Wars themselves, not the interval between them. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and all that has followed have similarly kept Middle Eastern studies focused on those events, while the recent fortieth anniversary of the 1967 War shifted attention to that conflict. Furthermore, with rare exceptions, the field, long dominated by Israeli authors, is broadly split between revisionist “new historians” and “old,” often avowedly Zionist, proponents. The role of the peacekeepers has not received much attention in this charged atmosphere. In essence, as Neil Caplan – whose Futile Diplomacy series represents the comprehensive historical primer on the search for Middle East peace – has asserted, peacekeeping has been insufficiently examined for the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

With these issues in mind, interested readers should first consult the peacekeeping surveys. While none pays particularly close attention to UNTSO, these works provide the context necessary for understanding what motivated the UN, as well as the regional states themselves. Distinguished authors in this field, including Sydney Bailey and David Wainhouse, enhance the introduction given in the official UN review of peacekeeping, The Blue Helmets, while Rosalyn Higgins’ compendia of primary documents are vital for any study. Nonetheless, pre-1956 peacekeeping operations lack the overt great power rivalry that surrounded the later Cyprus mission, the violence of the Congo operations, or the abject failures of the 1990s, resulting in comparatively little detailed secondary source material. As the major Western powers, which have since returned to a direct role in peacekeeping and peacemaking, were actively involved in the practice in its earliest
years, a new look at this period is valuable to understanding both peacekeeping history and post-Cold War operations.

In addition to the peacekeeping literature, a much greater number of works concentrate on the broader Arab-Israeli peace process, including Earl Berger’s work on Arab-Israeli relations in the 1950s, Farouk Ali Sankari’s fine dissertation, and Fred Khouri’s body of scholarship. Only a single mention is made of UNTSO in Saadia Touval’s respected study *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, a symptom of the UNTSO focus on peacekeeping rather than mediating a peace settlement. Many monographs, including Israeli diplomat Michael Comay’s *U.N. Peacekeeping in the Israel-Arab Conflict, 1948-1975: An Israel Critique*, accuse the UN and its peacekeepers of favouring the Arab states and abetting their opposition to a peace settlement with Israel. The perspectives of outside powers, especially the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, are also useful for enriching the picture at the UN, including Cold War concerns – for there was always more than one conflict going on – and the outside pressures placed on the Middle Eastern states.

Works that concentrate on the MACs themselves naturally provide the most information about the roles played by the peacekeepers. MAC-focused studies include Nissim Bar-Yaacov’s *The Israel-Syrian Armistice*, which has been supplanted by Aryeh Shalev’s *The Israel-Syrian Armistice Regime*. Bar-Yaacov’s work resembles David Brook’s *Preface to Peace* in that both are concerned with issues of international law, a burgeoning subfield in both Middle Eastern and peacekeeping studies. Raphael Israeli’s *Jerusalem Divided* provides an error-filled introduction to the many problems
encountered by the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, from the one-sided viewpoint of a 1960-65 Israeli veteran of that same committee. Research on the 1955-56 events must also consult the work of Mordechai Bar-On, the bureau chief to the then-Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Force (IDF), Moshe Dayan.12

Historical studies are also vital. Benny Morris’ sweeping *Israel’s Border Wars* documents the 1949-56 infiltration and reprisal activities, although it has been critically reviewed for its lack of interest in the perspectives of the Arab states.13 David Tal’s *Tfisat haBitahon haShotef shel Yisrael, 1949-1956: Mekoroteha veHitpathutah (Israel’s Day-to-Day Security Conception: Its Origin and Development)* is another important work. The book not only details many of the incidents that involved UNTSO in the 1949 to 1956 period, but also argues that, until September 1955 and the Egyptian arms-for-cotton deal with the Warsaw Pact, Israel was focused on day-to-day security rather than fighting the second round of the Arab-Israeli conflict.14 However, this work details many pre-1955 instances where Israel sought to alter the status quo established by the Armistice Agreements, including repeated attempts to force the Arab states to accept direct talks – themselves designed to promote a peace settlement on Israeli terms. In addition, studies by Motti Golani, Michael Oren, and Elie Podeh, some of which are only available in Hebrew, are all examples of excellent scholarship, and they provide especially strong analyses of the period just before the breakout of the 1956 War.15 Nathan Pelcovits’ *The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1960* stands out for its attention to the period and subject under study. Despite its title, however, this work
is committed to examining American and British diplomatic attempts to supersede peacekeeping with an actual peace settlement. It contains little information about UNTSO, while over half of the narrative concerns the aftermath of the Suez crisis. Further information about secondary sources and subject matter may be gleaned from review essays.¹⁶

Any study dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict risks becoming bogged down in a discussion of the major historiographical and political debates surrounding the origins of Israel, the Palestinian refugee question, and the assignment of blame for any number of acts. Focusing on UN records and accounts partly offsets this, for at least here there are attempts to balance examinations of all perceptions and motivations. One UN first-person account, Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns’ *Between Arab and Israeli*, is the finest representation of this approach. The culmination of his experiences as UNTSO chief of staff, the book is a carefully written report on the peacekeeping situation from 1954 to 1959. While other reminiscences produced by UNTSO officers avowedly decry Israeli actions, Burns’ work is a nuanced first-person account of the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁷

The voice of the peacekeeper, or at least that of the peacekeeper below the level of chief of staff, is absent from this literature. While only one UNTSO officer who did not serve as chief of staff, American Naval Commander Elmo Hutchison, penned a book, this lacuna is explained by the following excerpt from a scholarly review. In his review of James Eayrs’ *Indochina: Roots of Complicity*, political scientist William Dobell complimented the book for its lack of operational detail, since “this would have meant military rather than political assessments, commission histories written from the
perspective of middle-rank officers. The reader would have been dragged through half the hamlets of Indochina, an endurance from which we have been mercifully spared.”

This contention, common in both Arab-Israeli conflict research and peacekeeping studies, presumes military assessments to be irrelevant, ignoring their unique potential to illuminate wider events. The records of the highest-ranking peacekeepers, Israeli politicians, and great power leaders and diplomats dominate the published reminiscences. This study, by contrast, gives a voice to the peacekeeper. The proceedings of MAC meetings and UNTSO reports add detail unavailable in the published sources, and the two are often very different from each other. Significantly, since the contribution of Israel’s neighbours is partly recorded in these records, they also allow analysis of the positions of the Arab states.

The lack of material on Arab perspectives is a major problem, however. Scholarly writing in the Arab states is often much more one-sided than anything produced in Israel, the United States, or elsewhere. The cold peace between Egypt and Israel and the fact that, at the time of writing, Lebanon and Syria officially remained in a state of war with Israel, are hardly conducive to scholarship or memoirs that could provide even an approximation of the “truth” of 1949 to 1956 events. As a result, much of the literature related to the Arab states has actually been written by Israelis. This should come as no surprise considering the number of Arab speakers in that country – Ehud Yaari and Uriel Dann are both well known Israeli “Arabists” – but this situation has obvious drawbacks as well. Jordanian sources offset this phenomenon somewhat, for a number of anglophones who worked in Jordan during the period of British alliance published
memoirs, including General John Bagot Glubb, the longtime Arab Legion Chief of Staff, and Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Young, the former commanding officer of the 9th Regiment of the Arab Legion. King Hussein of Jordan authored an English language autobiography, and the relatively open peace between Israel and Jordan has even led to some scholarly exchanges between the two states. Nevertheless, the sources dealing with the Arab states that are most accessible to the anglophone reader are secondary monographs examining the political role played by regional militaries.

These factors combine with the scope of the relevant archival holdings to make secondary research material less central to work on UNTSO than it is to other topics. The most important of the archival repositories are the UNA, the Israel State Archives (ISA), the Israel Defence Force Archives (IDFA), and LAC. Documents located here include UNTSO correspondence and reports and the pivotal MAC and Israeli liaison officer records. E.L.M. Burns’ papers, held at LAC, include his diary, correspondence unavailable elsewhere, and drafts of *Between Arab and Israeli*. Newspapers from throughout the Middle East have also been combined with media of record such as *The New York Times* to provide further insight into contemporary thinking. As government organs, Egyptian and Jordanian newspapers are especially useful for analyzing the attitudes and goals of the their states, while the Israeli English language newspaper *The Jerusalem Post* served as the mouthpiece for government policy in the anglophone world.

The UNA remains the most important source of UNTSO material. The finding aid for the UNTSO S-0375 political affairs series runs to 158 pages, with entries
corresponding to hundreds of boxes and thousands of files. The weekly summaries found in S-0373 are ideal for getting started. Following the 2002 declassification of certain files in S-0156 and S-0163, virtually the entire 1949 to 1956 UNTSO record is open to the public, not to mention the holdings covering the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine, the United Nations Emergency Force, and other regional peacekeeping missions.24 The various MAC meetings, correspondence, and reports, while periodically supporting the adage that the amount of debate on a certain subject is directly disproportionate to its level of importance, are amazing sources of information. Attempting to put everything together is a trying task, for often-contradictory allegations concerning events are notoriously difficult to verify. Single complaints made to the MACs often described multiple violations of the Armistice Agreements, both sides published higher numbers of enemy casualties and lower numbers of their own, off-the-record discussions regularly occurred during MAC meetings, and the huge numbers of complaints and the small size of UNTSO meant many incidents were never investigated at all.

The ground-up research approach also necessitates careful investigation into the activities of the parties themselves. The ISA and IDFA provide the necessary insight into Israeli actions, although many files held by those archives remain classified.25 The ISA-published series Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel collects important excerpts from these repositories but, at the time of writing, the series had yet to cover the year 1955, while the first volume covering 1956 was released only in August 2008. Some original documents are in English or French, and the ISA has published English language
companion volumes to each release, but researchers should be aware that these records are mainly in Hebrew and that the English excerpts are summaries, rather than direct translations of the originals.26 There is significant overlap between documents held by the UNA, IDFA, and ISA, but any researcher interested in events involving Israel should explore each of these collections. The ISA also holds unique files related to Israel’s exploration of how individual UNTSO peacekeepers felt about a variety of topics, most notably Israel and the Israelis themselves.

It is unfortunate that the close attention paid to the role of one state cannot be similarly examined for the others, but it is extremely difficult to obtain Arab primary sources. The UN records provide some of this through correspondence with Arab officials, but it is still significantly less than the amount of Western and Israeli information available. While the Jordanian National Archives in Amman are open to researchers, a series of bombings against government buildings in the 1960s destroyed many of the relevant Jordanian defence establishment files.27 Moreover, primary sources from Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria do not approach the level of material from Jordan, thanks in large measure to the records surrounding British support for Jordan available at the British National Archives. Other documents captured by Israel during the numerous regional wars have not been made available to the public.28 Overall, the administrations involved are either oblivious to the utility of permitting access to archival material in the historiographic and often actual battleground that is the Middle East, or fearful of the consequences.
Western states, especially the United States, have fewer such concerns. The American government-published *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* is another indispensable primary source. This document series is especially detailed on what it euphemistically calls the Arab-Israeli “dispute,” excerpting the most important files held by the United States National Archives. The archival documents contained therein become progressively more relevant as UNTSO assumes additional responsibilities in the wake of the repeated failures to secure an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.29

The sheer volume of available material means that new work on the 1949 to 1956 period is expected to exhaust the known archives while also breaking new ground. This expectation makes it especially surprising that so much material has been passed over. The UNA is woefully underused as, for example, the otherwise thorough *Israel’s Border Wars* is based mainly on Israeli and British records, barely touching upon what is available in Manhattan. With many peacekeepers hailing from middle power nations, the records of repositories in those countries themselves are also important. For example, the BDA records situate the pivotal 1949 to 1953 role played by Belgium, when the country was the lone middle power supplying UNTSO peacekeepers, in the wider context of Belgian foreign policy. The French Archives, normally passed over by anglophone historians content with focusing on records in London and Washington, actually add little to the UNTSO story, but they will greatly interest researchers of great power politics, the Tripartite Declaration, and the Suez crisis. Smaller archives in Norway and Sweden help highlight the significant peacekeeping contributions and, in the case of Norwegian Major Einar Odd Hjellemo, the significant peacekeeping controversies of those states. There is
much material on UNTSO and related subjects in these archives, and other works should benefit from these resources.

Just as the anonymous UNA note writer informed us, there is ample material on this subject for many projects in a variety of fields. This work aims to encourage others to explore this fascinating subject.
Permanent peace did not follow in the wake of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements. Instead, the winner of the war attempted to solidify its gains while the defeated readied for a second round of fighting. From August 1949, the United Nations (UN) proffered its good offices to effect mediation, and its military officers to report on events. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) helped to keep the peace as best it could during the often-violent events that preceded the October 1956 outbreak of open warfare. An examination of the intervening years, the only period when the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) functioned in even a limited way, best analyzes both Middle Eastern peacekeeping during the early Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In doing its work, UNTSO and its Western sponsors struggled to calm local tension, discourage the influx of armaments, and keep out Soviet influence. Israel sought at the same time to gain regional legitimacy and foster the secure environment needed to ensure the Jewish immigration that would stimulate population growth and prosperity. Following Egypt’s lead, the Arab states worked to prevent Israel from realizing those goals through economic boycott and civilian infiltration, while simultaneously harbouring their own contradictory territorial ambitions and debating the fate of the restless and voiceless Palestinian refugees.1
As the first attempts at moving from armistice to peace stalled, UNTSO and the MACs assumed greater importance. Peace settlement bodies, especially the civilian United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), tried to bring together the parties to the Armistice Agreements to help resolve central issues such as the Palestinian refugee crisis, the status of Jerusalem, and the economic blockade of Israel by the Arab states. These issues lay beyond the purview of the MACs, but the lack of high-level progress – with Israel refusing to make territorial concessions and the Arab states refusing to make recognition concessions – demonstrated the difficulties inherent in the efforts to help fashion a Middle East peace.²

Peacekeeping remained much less glamorous than forging a peace settlement. The states that accepted this work were the same ones that had originally contributed soldiers to the defunct Palestine Truce Commission: Belgium, France, and the United States. The three countries each provided seven peacekeepers to support the first UNTSO chief of staff, American Brigadier-General William Riley. A charismatic and battle-hardened veteran, Riley came out of retirement to serve with the Truce Commission in 1948. Born in Minneapolis in 1897, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in order to fight in the First World War. Riley then distinguished himself in the Second World War, serving as assistant chief of staff, plans, to Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, Third Fleet commander in the Pacific. He briefly assumed command of the Third Marine Division after the surrender of Japan, but the unit was disbanded shortly thereafter. He then served as the director of recruiting for the Marines from March 1946 until his initial retirement.³
As the size of UNTSO suggests, the chief of staff had little to work with. The discrepancy between the peacekeeping goal and the means of attaining that goal stemmed from the fact that the UN conceived of the mission as temporary support for wider peace efforts in which international military officers would play no direct role. The speed with which the Armistice Agreements were concluded further suggested that peace treaties would soon be signed and that UNTSO would not be required for very long. In contrast, the original incarnation of UNTSO under the civilian mediator, in existence until the passage of the 11 August 1949 Security Council resolution, numbered 288 officers and other ranks as late as December 1948. Riley, then commanding those troops, proposed that any post-armistice peace observation mission consist of no less than 167 soldiers, noting that “This organization is predicated upon the assumption that there is a complete and effective Armistice in Palestine, and that Observers have complete freedom of movement to cross the lines at any point in time.” With only 21 peacekeepers in August 1949, most of whom had come out of retirement or were serving as reservists, the UN was clearly supremely optimistic about both the general situation and its own abilities.

The grunt work of peacekeeping grew out of Western ties to the region, especially Cold War strategic concerns, which played no small part in an American general being appointed chief of staff. Belgium similarly viewed its contribution as a mediatory one, since it had a small military and no past or present territorial ambitions in the Middle East. Naturally, the largest European colonial powers, Britain and France, were already heavily involved in the Middle East. While the former French mandates of Lebanon and Syria had gained their independence during the Second World War, Paris
provided significant aid to Beirut and Damascus. This influence could be seen in the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) and the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC), whose official proceedings were conducted in French. Britain controlled the Persian Gulf emirates and the Jordanian military, retained influence in Iraq, and guarded the Suez Canal with 80,000 soldiers, the only significant concentration of Western troops in the region. The United States slowly challenged the dominance of these traditional regional powers, while the other superpower, the Soviet Union, remained aloof. The massive casualties suffered by the Soviets in the Second World War, the process of integrating the conquered Eastern European states, and flashpoints such as Berlin and Korea far outweighed Moscow’s Middle Eastern concerns during Riley’s tenure.

These preoccupations allowed the UN to form UNTSO without Communist interference. Although the Soviets resented the Western monopoly on the mission, they did not veto its establishment. For his part, Norwegian UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, eager to ensure American support for UNTSO and the UN in general, regularly denounced the Communists and praised Riley. With UN forces fighting the Communists in the Korean War from June 1950, it was hardly surprising that this partiality became further entrenched.

On the ground, the composition of UNTSO mattered much less than the workings of the MAC system. The Armistice Agreements precluded any resort to force and any crossing of the armistice lines, but when incidents like crossings occurred, any of the parties could lodge complaints with the MACs and, following investigation by UNTSO
peacekeepers, MAC chairmen voted with one of the parties to produce theoretically binding resolutions. This did not resolve problems – true resolution being the purview of the political sphere – but it did pass judgment, forcing the peacekeepers to take a partial stance. In recognition of the centrality of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC), a special committee for hearing appeals also existed there. If a party remained unsatisfied following all of these stages, they could convene a conference under UN auspices. Direct recourse to the Security Council itself also existed. The MACs themselves, as merely administrative bodies, needed the support of the parties, equal members in each commission, to ensure that they functioned as intended. In 1949, this system seemed satisfactory, especially if UNTSO remained secondary to the peace settlement process.

A separate peacekeeping responsibility, the 11 August 1949 Security Council ceasefire order, supplemented these quasi-judicial functions. Maintenance of the overall truce was largely carried out through the operation of the MACs themselves, but this order became more critical as time passed. While direct peace negotiations normally follow an armistice, and the preamble to each Armistice Agreement noted the desire of all parties to “facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine,” the Arab-Israeli conflict did not conform to this standard. The scope of UNTSO powers remained resulting contentious throughout.

Initially, even UN officials confused UNTSO functions with those of the civilian UNCCP. This resulted in efforts to place UNTSO under UNCCP control. These suggestions were based on the optimistic belief that the Conciliation Commission would
achieve political results, which it did not, even in its earliest attempts. Riley lamented these calls in a March 1950 letter to UN headquarters, declaring, “I have battled long and hard these past many months to make a success of the United Nations’ efforts in this area. I cannot continue to work this way much longer.” He went on to ask to be released from his position, just eight months into the job. Since he remained at the helm for another three years, this reply merely revealed the growing pains and general frustrations of the mission. The parties provided many more of these.

Despite the failure to conclude a peace settlement, a cooperative environment prevailed following the signing of the Armistice Agreements. In fact, covert diplomatic contacts and agreements between Israel and its neighbours characterized the armistice regime. This seemingly contradictory reality highlights an important theme of the period between the 1948-49 and 1956 Wars, mainly the parties’ tendency to cooperate on certain issues of mutual concern, especially if there was no chance that this collusion would become public knowledge in the Arab states involved. The ILMAC best exemplified this cooperation, with UNTSO never permanently posting more than two peacekeepers to that commission. Similarly, the Israelis and Jordanians worked together, carrying out small territorial exchanges and exploring peace in secret meetings. In 1949-50, joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols watched over the Gaza frontier, the two parties combined to delineate sections of the armistice line with a trench, and a small exchange of desert territory on 22 February 1950 marked the only official adjustment ever made to any of the Armistice Agreements.
Throughout this period, the Western powers actively supported UNTSO efforts, while simultaneously encouraging further cooperation between the parties. This meant limiting both Arab and Israeli recourse to other options. To that end, on 25 May 1950, Britain, France, and the United States issued the Tripartite Declaration. The three nations, the largest regional arms suppliers, suspended unilateral weapons shipments to the parties and agreed to limit future sales to carefully scrutinized requests for defensive deliveries.\textsuperscript{15} The declaration reiterated the core regional message of Western diplomacy, a message already encapsulated by support for UNTSO: do not resort to force.

Not everyone welcomed the message. With interest in frontier exchanges and other coordinated measures waning within months of the armistice regime’s establishment, MAC meetings increasingly focused on matters such as animals that had crossed the armistice lines and thefts, issues which friendly states would have handled with police cooperation rather than the assistance of international military officers. The lack of progress toward a peace agreement emphasized this but, at the same time, the partiality mechanism inherent in MAC voting strained cooperation. Even if the UNTSO chairman of a MAC voted to support a resolution proposed by one of the parties during a meeting, no mechanism existed to sanction the guilty, reward the vindicated, or assuage the victimized. As a result, the parties often used the forum provided by a MAC meeting to attempt to convince the peacekeepers of the rightness of their general cause rather than to clarify the specifics of the investigation at hand, itself often months old. As a result, the parties began to advance their national interests outside the realm of the MACs, trying the system created to help them manage their differences.
Ultimately, Israel did not want to have MAC relationships at all. Instead of using UNTSO to help work out small problems with its neighbours, Israel wished to sign peace treaties with them on its terms. On the other hand, the Arab states used the MACs to address minor problems without requiring official recognition of Israel, much less normalization of relations or peace treaties. This difference of opinion, a product of fierce antagonism, produced the first cracks in the armistice.

With peace out of the question in the near future, three main issues threatened the armistice regime during Riley’s tenure: open fighting over the Demilitarized Zones (DZs) along the Israel-Syria frontier, the infiltration of Palestinians into Israel from the Jordanian-occupied West Bank, and the Egyptian closure of the Suez Canal to Israel-bound shipping.

The compromise DZs drawn up by the Israel-Syria armistice left the question of full control of strategic high ground rich in agricultural land and water resources to future peace talks. When no talks were forthcoming, disagreement over the zone surrounding Lake Hula led to fighting which cost significant casualties and paralyzed the ISMAC, in spite of efforts by UNTSO and the Security Council to resolve the issue. Under the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement, UNTSO, assisted by locally recruited Jewish police in majority Jewish areas and locally recruited Arab police in majority Arab areas, administered the contentious areas. The reality on the ground did not reflect this, the agreement having been circumvented from the beginning. Israel instead asserted that it held sovereignty over the three DZs abutting the frontier. The Syrians disputed this, and
since the DZs represented the parts of Palestine that Syria had seized during the 1948 fighting, admission of their loss would discredit the junta in Damascus.

The Lake Hula DZ prompted the initial conflict. A private firm with close ties to the Israeli government, the Palestine Land Development Company, was draining the Lake Hula marshes, continuing a project initiated by a pre-state Zionist organization. The stated justification for the project – helping to return “normal civilian life” through the improvement of local farmland – coincided with the wider Israeli effort to assert sovereignty in the area. The Syrians claimed that the drainage of the marshes granted Israel a military advantage, in violation of Article II, 2 of the Armistice Agreement.

Having experienced three coups over a nine month period, the emboldened Syrian government of Colonel Adib Shishakli challenged the Israelis, an act certain to unite the country behind its new military ruler. On 15 March 1951, Syrian soldiers dressed in civilian clothing sniped at tractors working the Lake Hula drainage sight. No one was fooled by the Syrian effort to disguise the action as a spontaneous outburst of local discontent, but the move hastened UNTSO efforts to calm the situation by temporarily halting the Israeli project, exactly as Syria desired. Riley suggested that the Israeli tractors leave the disputed area, but the Israelis ignored the request. According to the account of Israeli historian Aryeh Shalev, who was present at the site as a major with the Israel Defence Force (IDF) that day, only the sabotaging of a tractor fuel line by an unnamed peacekeeper – hardly the act of an observer – halted the work and calmed the situation.
UNTSO quickly ascertained that no military advantage would be gleaned from the drainage project, but the peacekeepers also asserted that the Israelis could not work on Arab-owned land without permission or purchase. Neither was forthcoming. Since Zionist organizations had bought most of the land surrounding Lake Hula in the 1930s, the Israelis could have completed the drainage work without infringing on Arab-owned property, but they sought to establish a precedent.

In the wake of this episode, both sides continued their maneuvers in the DZs and through communications passed on by the peacekeepers. UNTSO was especially hard-pressed to confront the problem, since the questions of sovereignty and possible territorial adjustments raised by the conflict were problems for politicians, not peacekeepers. Consequently, UNTSO actions were not limited to mere observation, but to active efforts to arrange the compromise that would have to precede any actual talks. When Israel and Syria failed to reach such a compromise, the two states fought to partition the DZs. The Israelis first forcibly expelled to Syria many of the Arabs living in the disputed areas, razing their houses to prevent the population from returning. Then, in early April, the Syrian military ambushed and killed seven Israeli police travelling on the road to al-Hamma. The Israelis responded with an air strike that killed two Syrian civilians and, in response to that retaliation, the Syrians occupied a hill along the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias. The Israeli attacks to recover the territory resulted in the deaths of 40 of their soldiers in intense clashes with regular Syrian forces, which suffered minimal losses but were compelled to withdraw.
The Israeli casualties produced a period of calm, which shifted the conflict from the military to the diplomatic arena. Here the Israelis held the advantage. In the original request to Riley, Israel asked for a ruling on the Syrian complaint, but the chief of staff returned with additional judgments, exacerbating the already dangerous situation. Most importantly, the Israelis asserted that Article V of the Armistice Agreement granted the chief of staff, and the chief of staff alone, control over civilian activities in the DZ. The entire episode highlights the overall tendencies of the two sides. The Israelis wanted the peacekeepers out of the way so that they could dictate their terms in direct negotiations, while the Syrians needed the peacekeepers in order to help sell their own fiercely anti-Israel population on any compromise that they might have to make. Befitting the representatives of the nation-state for the Jewish people, who had suffered centuries of anti-Semitism and only recently forced off the yoke of British rule and repelled the invasions of their neighbours, the Israeli government resented any action which it deemed an infringement of sovereignty. For their part, Syria and the other Arab states could not believe that the UN, the same organization that had drafted the partition plan in the face of total Arab opposition and that had threatened Chapter VII military intervention to implement a ceasefire in 1948, could not convince Israel to make basic concessions on a drainage project.

UNTSO disappointed Syria, but Israeli frustration with the failure of the peacekeepers to grant them a free hand had more serious consequences, namely Israeli withdrawal from the ISMAC. The Israelis announced that they had “lost faith” in the two officers who led the effort to keep the peace after Riley required surgery in the United
States, French ISMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Bossavy and the acting chief of staff, Belgian Colonel Bennett de Ridder. Upon his return, Riley transferred de Ridder, a decorated veteran of the Second World War Belgian resistance, back to the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJKIMAC). UNTSO urged the Israelis to reconsider, claiming that withdrawal from the ISMAC was incompatible with an honest desire for peace. The Security Council echoed this position with its 18 May 1951 resolution, which denounced the actions of both Israel and Syria, but reserved its harshest criticism for the failure of the parties to cooperate with UNTSO. Meanwhile, the Syrians believed that they had made gains, including limiting the Hula project to Jewish-owned land, but internal problems and a lack of wider Arab support ensured a desire not to be continually embroiled with Israel. This combination of Israeli hard-headedness and Syrian consolidation meant that regular ISMAC meetings ceased in May 1951.

Israeli and Syrian representatives soon resumed informal talks, often without the peacekeepers’ presence or awareness. Discussions took place in Arabic, rather than the French used in ISMAC meetings, and concerned subjects of mutual interest, including anti-malaria measures, fishing rights, water usage, and the Israeli wish to establish telephone communication with Syria. The meetings also sought to legitimize the partition of the DZs, the real obstacle to peaceful relations. The Syrians desired a new armistice line that would grant them control over half of Lake Tiberias and partition the zones on the basis of land ownership. The Israelis refused to accept this, insisting on retaining control over the entire lake and settling and cultivating Arab-owned land in
order to create “facts on the ground.”

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion cajoled Syria through the international media, reminding *The New York Times* that “Damascus is no farther from Galilee than Galilee is from Damascus.” Nevertheless, the Israelis sent Yosef Tekoah – the Foreign Ministry director for armistice affairs – Major-General Moshe Dayan, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaul Ramati, and Major Aryeh Friedlander (who later Hebraized his surname to Shalev) to talks with Colonel Ghassan Jdid, the senior Syrian ISMAC delegate. The Israelis wanted peace negotiations and dispatched senior officers and civilian officials to push for same; the Syrians met them with the same military officer they had routinely spoken with before the fighting began, thus indicating exactly how each side viewed the talks. The new ISMAC chairman, American Colonel Sam Taxis, and the UNTSO political officer Henri Vigier, assisted at key junctures as well, but to little effect.

The Syrians opposed the publication of any evidence of the meetings, and Israeli and UNTSO respect of this prerequisite made some cooperation possible. At other times cooperation could not be avoided, as when a Syrian ship was forced into Haifa harbour by storm in January 1952. As a result, on 19 January, Syria signed a Distressed Vessel Agreement with Israel. The agreement called for either side to release merchant vessels that had been forced into the other’s waters by a storm, mechanical failure, or other reasons beyond the control of the crew. Despite its well-cultivated hardline reputation, Syria demonstrated pragmatism in signing this accord; in order to help protect maritime commerce, Syria acknowledged, again unofficially, the existence of Israel. The central
disputes remained unresolved, however, only reinforcing why the ongoing attempts to forge a peace settlement had proven unsuccessful.

Between the 1948-49 and 1956 Wars, infiltration into Israel by Arabs from the neighbouring states undermined the armistice regime. All of the accords forbade any crossing of the armistice lines, but this proved easier to pronounce than to enforce, and infiltrators passed between Gaza/Sinai and the West Bank through the Negev desert, crossed over in the Jerusalem and Latrun areas, and moved into the Galilee from Lebanon. These infiltrators, invariably displaced Palestinians, sought to return to their former lands, harvest crops, smuggle goods, or carry out other activities deemed illegal by the accords. Israel did everything in its power to discourage this infiltration, since so much depended on maintaining the Jewish demographic advantage created by the dispersion of the Palestinians during and after the 1948 fighting. Also, newcomers to Israel, themselves mainly Jewish refugees from the Arab states, had since settled many of the areas vacated by the Palestinians. These circumstances led to numerous violent clashes.

Infiltrators moved from Israel to the Arab states as well, since Israeli Arab citizens also smuggled goods and had relatives beyond the lines. In order to prevent these practices and to keep watch over a perceived fifth column, Israel moved most of its remaining ethnic Arab settlements at least ten kilometres behind the armistice lines and away from major transportation and communication infrastructure. The Israeli government also placed virtually every Arab village under military administration and instituted the practice of issuing all citizens with identity cards recording their ethnicity.\textsuperscript{34}
Jewish Israelis rarely infiltrated into the Arab states, but the unmarked armistice lines could be crossed by accident. Some also risked their lives on hiking excursions to Petra, a stunning ancient Nabataean city in southern Jordan, and other sites in the neighbouring countries. Israeli military training practices irked the Arab states as well, especially routine IDF live fire exercises close to, and sometimes beyond, the armistice lines, and the activities of Israeli intelligence and reconnaissance units.35

Like Israel, most of the Arab states worked to prevent infiltration. This position was exemplified by the collaboration between Israel and Lebanon. Since the Israel-Lebanon armistice line corresponded with the pre-war frontier, the two countries had a recognized boundary. By a 1951 ILMAC agreement, the states marked this line with whitewashed stones, iron posts, and multilingual notices.36 The parties also did their part by carrying out joint investigations of all MAC complaints and establishing secret telephone connections.37 Meanwhile, the tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees admitted into Lebanon dreamed of returning home, and many of Lebanon’s confessional factions – the Maronite Christians, the Druze, the Shia Muslims, and the Sunni Muslims – resented the influx. Internal struggles resulted in Lebanon denying the Palestinians basic rights, herding them into refugee camps away from the frontier, and leaving the United Nations Relief and Work Agency to care for them. Population movements from Lebanon to the Galilee, the one region of Israel that retained its pre-war Arab majority, still occurred. These movements entailed visits to friends or attempts to return to ancestral land. Continued cooperation between the parties reduced the chances of clashes, uniting the Israelis and the Lebanese in the common aim of reducing criminal acts such
as hashish smuggling. Lebanon’s internal policies, none of which clashed with Israel’s own, greatly contributed to keeping the frontier quiet.

A rare disruption of this quiet occurred when a Turkish ship bound for Israel sought refuge from a storm in Tripoli harbour. Local merchants bought the shipment of beans, causing the Israeli police to steal a prize herd of Lebanese sheep in response. Fuad Ammoun, director-general of Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, later confessed to Riley, “Lebanon had to keep in step with the Arab League’s policy concerning the embargo on the sale of goods to Israel.” To avoid future problems, the two countries signed a Distressed Vessel Agreement on 20 February 1952; Beirut again demonstrated a willingness to conclude agreements with Israel on the condition that another Arab state did so first. All signs suggested that the Lebanese government wanted normal relations with Israel, but the state had to weigh this desire against the risk of civil strife and the wrath of more powerful members of the Arab League.

Like Lebanon, Egypt and Syria worked to prevent infiltration, despite the 300,000 Palestinians, mainly refugees, in the Gaza Strip. Although the Egyptian authorities initially posted no regular military forces to the area, police and other government servants controlled the lives of Gazans, refusing to allow any movement into Egypt, and insisting for propaganda purposes that the puppet Gaza leadership formed a Palestinian government-in-exile. Correspondingly, the sparsely inhabited and mountainous terrain along the Israel-Syria frontier limited infiltration. The fierce 1951 fighting in the DZs further discouraged civilians from entering the area, especially after the Israelis expelled many of the local Arab inhabitants. The Syrian military and its feared deuxième bureau...
internal security service also curtailed unauthorized forays, in line with the military regime’s desire to control the population. This at least signalled that any infiltration from Syria likely came with the approval of Damascus.

While Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria worked to curtail infiltration for various reasons, Jordan, thanks in large measure to its majority Palestinian population, maintained a different policy. In April 1949, with the ink barely dry on the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, prominent Palestinian-Jordanian leader Azmi Nashashibi declared that the Arabs would never abide by it. In keeping with this spirit, mixed Israeli-Jordanian patrols, set up in divided Jerusalem during 1950, collapsed less than one month after implementation. In April 1950, Jordan annexed the West Bank, the Palestinian territory captured in the 1948 fighting. This incorporation, which only Britain recognized, also granted citizenship to the Palestinian population. The Jordanians had little choice but to do so, since the inhabitants of the new territory outnumbered the conquerors. While West Bank Palestinians, especially those who had not been made refugees in the fighting, may have been better off than their brethren in Gaza, the East Bank Jordanian elite retained firm control of political life and the Bedouin, trusted allies of the monarchy, dominated the ranks of the Arab Legion, Jordan’s British-officered army. Nashashibi, who went on to serve as senior Jordanian HJKIMAC delegate, and other Palestinian leaders adjusted to this new reality, but many Palestinian-Jordanians did not. In fact, the loyalty of the new citizens remained in doubt, particularly following the 20 July 1951 assassination of King Abdallah by a Palestinian Jerusalemite. Both former Lebanese Prime Minister Riyadh al-Sulh, assassinated in Amman four days earlier, and the
Jordanian monarch were murdered because of persistent rumours that they favoured peace with Israel.\textsuperscript{45}

The murder of the king, and the confused interregnum under first his son Talal and then, after Talal had been declared mentally unfit to rule in August 1952, Talal’s teenage son Hussein, ended the covert Israel-Jordan talks. Rightist Israelis welcomed this collapse. Their interpretation of Jewish eschatology linked the coming of the messiah to Israeli control of both banks of the Jordan River, which had also been included in the original Palestine mandate. The internal dissent and Israeli pressures came coupled with negative public opinion in the other Arab states, where most viewed Jordan as an artificial construct doomed to collapse – a collapse from which they could benefit. Iraq, governed by another branch of the Hashemite family, sought paramount influence, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria further conspired to weaken Jordan for their own respective gain.\textsuperscript{46} These efforts only eroded inter-Arab cooperation.

The same intrigues ensured that some degree of cooperation with Israel had to be maintained. If Jordan acted shrewdly enough, the country might even be able to play the disparate threats off against one another. The limitations of the HJKIMAC as a method for assisting this had long been revealed, as Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb, the experienced British commander of the Arab Legion, acknowledged. In a letter to Riley, Glubb laid out the basic problem, “Even if the M.A.C. does ascertain the truth, it can only make a decision blaming one side. As I have already said, a decision blaming Israel or Jordan for stealing a mule or shooting a man three months ago, is purely academic. A hundred animals have been stolen since then and fifty more people have been shot.”\textsuperscript{47}
This was nothing less than a plea for UNTSO to act as peacekeepers rather than observers. With the long and winding West Bank frontier factoring in many incidents, the interests of the Jordanian government, Israel, and UNTSO coalesced against infiltration and its tendency to heighten tension.

To that end, the two parties to the Armistice Agreement signed extra-parliamentary accords, beginning with the 7 June 1951 agreement to allow Christian monks at the wine-producing Latrun monastery to harvest their vineyards in no man’s land.48 This was followed by an “Agreement on Extraordinary Measures to Curb Infiltration,” itself superceded by the “Agreement to Reduce and Solve Incidents along the Demarcation Line.”49 The state-controlled Jordanian media explained how infiltration hurt the country.50 Ahmed Bey Tuqan, a civilian soap factory owner more interested in improving export prospects than in fighting, became the senior Jordanian HJKIMAC delegate. The number of official complaints submitted to the MAC fell precipitously, as face-to-face meetings between local commanders, brief and to-the-point, with a peacekeeper present only to take general notes, obtained results. The Jordanians also welcomed police meetings since, unlike the Israelis, they considered civilian crossings of the line a criminal matter.51 UNTSO welcomed all of these moves, for the Jordanians had an infuriating habit of referring every potential decision back to Amman for instructions, further slowing HJKIMAC procedure and trying the Israelis’ always limited patience. For all the hopes of Israel and the UN, however, cooperation between local commanders did not restore the peace talks.
In spite of this step forward, according to official Israel Police statistics, 8,000 Jordanian infiltrators entered Israel in 1952. The Israelis alleged that the part-time Jordanian National Guard, composed of Palestinians, assisted infiltrators, a difficult claim to verify and one that Jordan denied. Certainly, Jordan’s Palestinians did not always welcome the monarchy’s attempts to improve relations with Israel; the Israelis felt they had a solution to these differences of opinion. For instance, after local Palestinians physically prevented Jordanian government surveyors from working near the West Bank frontier village of Qalqilya in late 1951, the Israelis became involved. “We must now make the maximum trouble along the border, particularly in the vicinity of wells used by the Arabs from the other side,” stated a report from Israel’s HJKIMAC delegation to IDF headquarters, “so as to bring pressure on the Arabs to demarcate the line and to come to a settlement on the question of the wells.” Perhaps force would succeed where cooperation had failed.

Throughout this mutual maneuvering, most infiltration remained peaceful. The real problems stemmed from the armed interlopers who attacked Israelis. Israeli frontier settlements gradually became fortified strongpoints in response, with armed guards, wiring, lighting, minefields, and booby traps. Captured infiltrators were expelled as quickly as possible or sentenced to long terms of manual labour in Israeli prisons. The Israelis also passed intelligence information, including the names of known infiltrators and their ringleaders, to Jordan via UNTSO, in the usually vain hope that the Jordanians would act on the information. Jordan also announced general steps to counter unauthorized crossings. The infiltrators still came.
Early 1952 saw one of the initial cases of what soon became a brutal pattern. First, men from the West Bank crossed into Israeli Jerusalem and raped a Jewish woman. On the night of 6-7 January, Israeli vigilantes retaliated against the village of Beit Jala, outside Bethlehem, the supposed home of the perpetrators. In addition to destroying houses and killing one woman and her four children, the attackers left menacing Arabic messages promising more of the same if infiltration persisted. These events demonstrated that not all Palestinian infiltrators were peaceful and that not all Israelis preferred restraint. Unfortunately for all concerned, the numbers of both these groups only grew.

Throughout this violence, the very effectiveness of UNTSO brought it into conflict with the parties, especially Israel. In June 1952, the peacekeepers caught Israeli police attempting to transport a suspicious object in a barrel bound for Mount Scopus, the demilitarized Israeli enclave surrounded by Jordanian East Jerusalem. The Israelis responded by forcibly limiting the peacekeepers’ freedom of movement and preventing them from opening the mysterious barrel. On 20 June, this extended to an armed takeover of the HJKIMAC house at the Mandlebaum Gate, the only official crossing point in the divided city. The peacekeepers suddenly found IDF soldiers guarding the barrel, and they could not get in or out of the MAC house without an unwanted Israeli military escort. UNTSO could not open the barrel without special tools, but before they could be procured, Riley ruled that the barrel should be returned to Israel unopened, which hardly endeared him to the Jordanians. UNTSO then moved all of its Jerusalem operations to
Government House, located in no-man’s land, in order to hinder future bullying tactics, if not Israeli weapons smuggling.\textsuperscript{60}

The HJKIMAC soldiered on in spite of these not inconsiderable hindrances. Meetings between local commanders still produced improvements for frontier dwellers, but Israel regularly used both these meetings and the HJKIMAC proceedings to demand that the Jordanian military do more against infiltration. The first step to doing this, in both Israeli and UNTSO opinion, was to mark the armistice line. The Jordanians opposed this. No matter how often UNTSO reminded the Jordanians that the marking of the line would not prejudice any final territorial settlement, the state refused to act.\textsuperscript{61} The Jordanians also combined an unwillingness to risk civil strife – for how would the Palestinian majority respond to the move – with an inability to guard the entire length of the frontier. Glubb further feared that deploying troops along the armistice line would place the Arab Legion, composed of only two infantry brigades, at the mercy of the more powerful IDF.\textsuperscript{62}

Under these pressures, local cooperation soon collapsed, the Israelis withdrawing from the “Agreement to Reduce and Solve Incidents along the Demarcation Line,” now described as a Local Commanders’ Agreement (LCA), in January 1953. On 4 January, three unarmed IDF soldiers and their civilian driving instructor crossed the line near Latrun, apparently in error. Jordan initially denied holding the three soldiers and then sought to try them as infiltrators, even though the LCA, renewed just days earlier, decreed that members of the security forces who accidentally crossed were to be returned following questioning.\textsuperscript{63} De Ridder negotiated the return of the Israelis in February, but
the incident demonstrated that local meetings had glossed over wider problems between the two parties, leading to Israel’s abrupt withdrawal from official cooperation. Jordan, which had sought to give the Israelis some of what they had been receiving, consulted Britain for assistance under the Anglo-Jordanian Defence Treaty. Until 1956, UNTSO struggled to recreate the modest success of local meetings in all MACs. Israel opposed this position, opting instead to withhold cooperation from the Arab states and the peacekeepers in order to bring Jordan to the peace table instead of the local police post.

In the first three years of the armistice regime, incidents mainly occurred along the Israel-Syria and Israel-Jordan frontiers. Israel could point to a surprisingly consistent degree of cooperation with Egypt, the largest Arab state. Even the Arab League effort to boycott Israeli products, run from its Cairo headquarters, had little effect at first, as the Israelis simply routed trade via Cyprus. Before long, differences reemerged on the ground. As in the Israel-Syria conflict, a DZ was behind the trouble. The Israelis initially respected the limited forces stipulation in the El Auja zone, the disputed central road axis along the shared frontier, but maintained that the area came under their sovereignty. The Egyptians disagreed, and appeals to the EIMAC special committee, itself soon rendered inoperable due to the lack of cooperation between the parties, failed to resolve the impasse. UNTSO involvement notwithstanding, Israeli actions had drastic consequences for the traditional inhabitants, the Azazme Bedouin. The nomads had not been living in El Auja when the Armistice Agreement had been signed in February 1949, and resented the changed post-war situation. Furthermore, the strictures of the Armistice Agreement, especially the attempt to prevent frontier crossings, threatened their way of life. Using the
justification that the Bedouin had been absent at the creation, the Israelis expelled the 7,000 Azazme, being careful to disperse them to the Egyptian Sinai and not to the Israeli Negev.\textsuperscript{66} To guard against any Azazme return, the Israelis established settlements in the DZ.\textsuperscript{67} Egypt protested the moves, since the Azazme strengthened their competing claim to El Auja.

The Egyptians meanwhile maintained the ban on Israel-bound shipping in the Suez Canal, seizing vessels suspected of trading with Israel and blacklisting ships and companies that had ever called at Israeli ports.\textsuperscript{68} Egypt insisted that the Armistice Agreement did not preclude these actions, and no mention was made of the subject in the accord.\textsuperscript{69} Israel maintained that any belligerent act ran contrary to the UN Charter, which even non-UN members like Jordan accepted when they signed the Armistice Agreements.\textsuperscript{70} With the EIMAC prevented from exploring the issue because it was not mentioned in the Armistice Agreement, the Israeli complaint went to the Security Council. The Council backed the Israeli position, and the resolution of 1 September 1951 condemned the Egyptian practices and demanded their immediate cessation.\textsuperscript{71} As a result, Egypt limited the blockade to shipments of arms, immigrants, and oil, but in essence ignored the ruling.

Israel responded by withdrawing from the EIMAC, just as they had previously walked out of the ISMAC. This action was part of an organized strategy designed to force the Egyptians to make blockade concessions. As the head of the Israeli MAC delegations, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaul Ramati, wrote in October 1951, “It would doubtless be beneficial to us in the long run to bring the Egyptian MAC to the same deadlock as is
now existing on the Syrian MAC, and to maintain the latter. We can only lose by attending these 2 MACs, and by continuing to cooperate fully on the HJK and Lebanese MACs, where we may still derive some benefit, we would show that our aim was not the disruption of all the MACs.”72 The persistence of frontier incidents forced the representatives of Egypt and Israel to continue meeting, however. Since both parties maintained their posturing, emergency meetings replaced formal ones. The former soon convened more often than the latter had.

The Security Council position on the Suez Canal aside, Egypt, the nominal leader of the Arab countries, remained comparatively quiet vis-à-vis Israel during Riley’s tenure as UNTSO chief of staff. Internal instability and the tense relationship with Britain explained this. Tension with Britain surrounded the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which permitted the stationing of British soldiers on both banks of the Suez Canal. Egypt, desperate to assert the independence required of the leading Arab nation, sought to revise the treaty and secure the departure of the foreign troops. This position created friction with the West, with the British and Americans particularly concerned with keeping their oil lifeline operating in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.73 Egypt, unmoved by this concern, responded to the British dithering with a guerrilla campaign designed to forcibly oust the perceived interlopers. The worst clash of this campaign, near the British base at Ismailia in January 1952, cost the Egyptians 50 dead. Mobs in Cairo took their anger over this incident out on Westerners on 26 January, burning numerous buildings and murdering ten foreigners in the Egyptian capital. Concurrently, influential segments of the Egyptian officer corps believed that they had not really been defeated in the field,
but that their lavish and corrupt civilian leaders, especially King Farouk, had betrayed them by failing to provide the military with modern weapons and training, thereby ensuring Israeli victory.\textsuperscript{74} This mindset fostered the Free Officers coup of 23 July 1952, which deposed the king and brought to power a junta headed by the Revolutionary Command Council under Major-General Mohammed Naguib. A protracted behind-the-scenes power struggle soon began, which kept Egypt firmly focused on domestic issues.

The new government embarked on a series of ambitious reforms, including public works construction, anti-poverty programmes, and the establishment of the Cairo radio station Voice of the Arabs, which disseminated revolutionary rhetoric throughout the region.\textsuperscript{75} Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion welcomed the coup, hoping for the emergence of a more pragmatic Egyptian leadership in a 17 August 1952 speech in Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, as well as peace talks.\textsuperscript{76} In August, the two countries reconvened regular EIMAC meetings at which the new senior Egyptian delegate, Lieutenant-Colonel Salah Gohar, also the War Ministry’s director of Palestine affairs, pledged cooperation.\textsuperscript{77} However, the changes in Cairo did not lead to any relaxation of the Suez Canal blockade. Moreover, the revolutionary show trials condemned the Egyptian monarchists for their greatest crime: the loss of Palestine.\textsuperscript{78}

UNTSO peacekeepers played only a background role in many of these dramas, but all of their consequences deeply informed the steadily deteriorating armistice regime. This situation exhausted the peacekeepers. Riley resigned on 23 April 1953, although he agreed to stay on until a successor could be found. He admitted to \textit{The New York Times},
“the time has come for me to get back to the States and take a rest. This type of job is not easy on the nerves.” His final report to the Security Council expressed his annoyance:

This machinery itself did not (repeat not) function properly, since delegates tended to act as lawyers defending a case in court and Chairman consequently appeared as the judge who had to decide between conflicting conclusions, each party moving that the other be condemned for breaking General Armistice Agreement. In such circumstances, machinery of Mixed Armistice Commission becomes inadequate. It is effective only when both parties are ready to use it to settle their difficulties, when they willingly co-operate in an investigation with assistance of Chairman and United Nations observers and when, in absence of agreed decision, they accept a majority decision, as provided in General Armistice Agreement.

This represented an accurate, sobering appraisal. But the outstanding problems, notably the vagueness of the Armistice Agreements themselves and the failure to begin peace negotiations, were not UNTSO problems.

By the time of Riley’s final report, a pattern had set in. The beginnings of this pattern were problems not obviously dealt with in the Armistice Agreements. The Arab states sought to discuss problems, usually rural disputes over property or livestock near the armistice lines, but only in the MACs and without recourse to publicity or peace talks. This resistance to peace talks prompted Israel to withdraw from three of the four MACs at various times. In response, the Arab states disregarded Security Council resolutions and sparked serious frontier incidents, anything to keep UNTSO involved. None of the parties showed any desire to change their positions, with the peacekeepers stuck in the middle.

In spite of the calm prevailing on the Israel-Lebanon frontier, differences between the parties prevented UNTSO from carrying out its assigned role. From 1949 to 1953, the Arab states garnered successes in their actions against Israel, with the Syrian military
inflicting heavy casualties on the IDF in the fighting around Lake Tiberias, the Egyptians maintaining the Suez Canal blockade in spite of a Security Council resolution condemning it, and Palestinian-Jordanians infiltrating into Israel at a steady pace. As a result, from 1951 onward Israel changed its tactics; paying little heed to UN intercession while simultaneously seeking to force their neighbours to accept their state by other means. Internal Israeli correspondence supports this contention, describing the MACs as “useless instruments” and asserting that “Israel derives no benefit from their operation.” After all, the MACs had to fail in order for the Israeli policy to succeed. Once the Israelis had come to this conclusion, largely at the urging of senior officers like Ramati and his successor as general staff officer for the MAC delegations Lieutenant-Colonel Haim Gaon, it was impossible for Israel to retreat. After the Israelis asserted that they would, for example, not talk to the Syrians unless it was about peace, anything less represented a concession on their part. The Arab states did not want to talk peace and the Israelis refused to withdraw from their hard-line position.

Israel could take some solace in signing the Distressed Vessel Agreements with all three maritime neighbours – Egypt and Israel signed one in July 1953 – as well as the separate accords with Lebanon. This demonstrated that tension and cooperation coexisted with the conflict, but these accords did not represent major shifts toward a settlement, instead dealing with issues neglected by the Armistice Agreements and well beneath the level of peace talks. The short and often unhappy life of the Israel-Jordan LCAs also demonstrated that some accords, seemingly necessary precursors to peace, imposed
unwanted constraints on Israel. As a result, initial Israeli support for the MACs and for agreements like the ones with Jordan disappeared.

All of the parties also vilified UNTSO from time to time, but Israel reserved special opprobrium for the peacekeepers who, in official Israeli opinion, were not doing their jobs correctly. The parties also heaped special praise on those they favoured. For Israel, these included the first chief of staff, who would be missed over the coming years. On his departure, the Israeli government gave Riley “exquisite” first century Roman glasswork as a gift (he reciprocated with fine cigars). 82 Riley, twice promoted for his efforts in the region, also earned many plaudits in Shalev’s work, a verdict that carries extra weight given the fact that the two officers often worked at cross purposes. 83 Rather than supporting Zionism, Riley appears to have lacked the willpower to resist concentrated Israeli pressure, such as when he accepted the Israeli position on normal civilian life in the Israel-Syria DZs, or when he returned the suspicious barrel, unopened, to Israel. The American general was often understandably frustrated by the lack of progress on the ground: thus, when he was not ruminating aloud about resigning, he left much of the actual peacekeeping work to his subordinates, in particular de Ridder and the international members of the HJKIMAC. Riley was a staff officer, whose actions, in the short term, often contributed to curbing the ongoing violence. Not surprisingly, Israeli support was mirrored by Arab opposition. The Jordanians, in particular, did not want a “pro-Israel” American at the helm of the armistice machinery. 84

The peacekeepers had other problems below the command level. With only three countries providing seven officers each for UNTSO, there was a pressing need for
expansion. The quality of the peacekeepers was questioned as well, and not just by the Israelis. An American diplomat reported that the senior Egyptian EIMAC delegate confided to him that most of the peacekeepers were “time-servers, completely ineffectual, and perhaps even venal.” The “perhaps” was unnecessary. The peacekeepers mainly lived on the Arab sides of the frontiers, where housing and amenities were cheaper than in Israel. They were among the very few people who could legally cross the armistice lines, and some did not resist the temptation to smuggle valuables or flaunt local currency laws.

Another major problem was communication with the parties. The ILMAC and ISMAC used French, the EIMAC and HJKIMAC English. The peacekeepers tended to be fluent in either of these, in the Europeans’ case usually both, but most Arab and Israeli members of the MACs had not mastered those languages. Nor did the peacekeepers understand Arabic or Hebrew. The records of MAC meetings provide ample testimony to the often unintentionally comical results, while the events say even more about the overall problem.

In spite of such drawbacks and the best efforts of the UNCCP to bring about a peace settlement, by May of 1953, UNTSO had assumed the primary role in UN Middle Eastern efforts. The UNCCP barely survived, which pleased the British Foreign Office, since it “put an end to the sorry spectacle of eminent diplomats touting hopelessly from one side to the other without making any progress.” The desire to continue facilitating contact between the parties while keeping the Soviets out of the region meant that the UNTSO peacekeepers took over the touting role. This shift reflected the lack of progress
towards a peace settlement, itself a byproduct of the animosity on the ground. While UNTSO tried to keep the peace, the mission did not fare as well as its supporters, especially the West’s permanent Security Council members, had hoped for. As a small operation created during the optimistic period immediately following the signing of the Armistice Agreements, UNTSO should have been expected to run into trouble if the “transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine” stalled. With the parties now barely talking – and when they were talking it was with help from UNTSO – the peacekeepers needed to go beyond their limited mandate. Moreover, the constant changes in government in all of the Arab states save Lebanon, itself hardly the epitome of stability, were the result of assassinations and coup d’état. This issue, along with aggressive Israeli policies, continued Syrian animosity, the Egyptian blockade, and Jordanian infiltration, ensured the perpetuation of serious difficulties for UNTSO and the parties following the departure of Riley.
Chapter 4
Shifting Policies, Same Results
June 1953-August 1954

With the resignation of Lieutenant-General William Riley in April 1953, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) seized the opportunity to broaden its membership. While an able American, Belgian, or French officer could have assumed the position of chief of staff, Denmark, a charter signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and a regular contributor to the cadre of peacekeepers serving in Kashmir with the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), volunteered a senior engineer, Major-General Vagn Bennike. A saboteur in the Danish resistance during the Second World War, Bennike had served as a commander of resistance operations on the Jutland peninsula, where he and his comrades disrupted German communications with occupied Norway. In 1946, Bennike had been appointed general inspector of the Danish Engineering Corps, a post he held until his retirement in early 1953. Bennike quickly grew restless with civilian life, however, and requested that his government send him to Kashmir. With his transfer to UNMOGIP pending, the UNTSO chief of staff position became available and Copenhagen recommended Bennike. The United Nations (UN) accepted. Bennike was first briefly appointed chairman of the practically moribund Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC), giving him a chance to become familiar with troubles on the ground before assuming command from a weary Riley on 17
June 1953. Just over one year later, events would force UNTSO to broaden its membership still further, including replacing its chief of staff.

Bennike was not the only Scandinavian to assume a major UN post in 1953. Just two months before the UNTSO change of command, Sweden’s foreign minister, Dag Hammarskjöld, replaced Trygve Lie of Norway as secretary-general. Lie, outspoken in his belief that the Soviet Union posed a threat to international peace, had succumbed to Communist pressure against him and resigned. As a representative of a non-aligned nation that enjoyed good relations with the Eastern bloc, Hammarskjöld was elected by the General Assembly in his stead. The erudite Swede would have a profound influence on Middle East peacekeeping.

It took time before the parties to the Armistice Agreements came to an opinion on the new chief of staff and secretary-general, but Israel had already made up its mind about Major-General Bennett de Ridder. De Ridder had risen steadily through the ranks while serving as the senior Belgian member of UNTSO, chairman of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJKIMAC), and occasional acting chief of staff. His seniority had prompted many clashes with Riley and, though he may have assumed he would replace the American, his own actions forestalled such promotion.

The Israelis had not always considered de Ridder a problem, and had taken a keen interest in the ill-will between him and Riley. De Ridder first seriously clashed with the Israelis during the January 1953 Latrun driving school incident. When the HJKIMAC convened an emergency meeting to discuss the incident, de Ridder prevented the senior
Israeli delegate, Major Nutov, from making a statement on the grounds that the action was not on the agenda of the meeting. Nutov was forced to submit, in writing, his statement announcing Israel’s withdrawal from the HJKIMAC. This precipitated an organized Israeli campaign to remove him. For his part, de Ridder’s attitude towards Israel had worsened as the UNTSO mission continued. Initially full of praise for Israel, de Ridder changed his views as a result of the behaviour of Israeli officers on the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC), especially their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaul Ramati. For instance, after a December 1951 meeting to discuss the armistice line in the Qalqilya area ended in an angry standoff, de Ridder reported that “Ramati’s attitude was shameful towards the Jordan Delegation, and also towards me. I admired [senior Jordanian delegate Ahmed Bey] Tuqan’s patience and self-restraint.” Such partiality came with serving as a MAC chairman and, in this instance, it was not at all to Israel’s liking.

Once the Israelis withdrew from the HJKIMAC in January 1953, they believed that any return would be a concession on their part, unless de Ridder was dismissed. Criticism of the Belgian intensified with the Israeli efforts to secure the return of the driving school soldiers held by Jordan. De Ridder negotiated their release, but refused to pass on Israel’s threats, arguing, “I was convinced that the Jordanian authorities would refrain from acting under duress and that the best way to obtain the release of your citizens was by talking to them.” The Israelis then asserted that de Ridder had stricken their commentary from HJKIMAC records, carried out “illegal” UNTSO investigations without their approval, mused about the activities of Israeli extremists, and failed to
convene an emergency MAC meeting only because Israelis and not Jordanians had been murdered. Under the HJKIMAC rules of procedure, which de Ridder had drafted in tandem with the other MAC members in 1949, the chairman alone decided if an emergency meeting would be called, and de Ridder considered doing so to be counterproductive in the tense atmosphere of early April. This placed the Israeli complaint in a long queue that could only be shortened if that country returned to the HJKIMAC. The stalemate caused Ramati’s successor as head of Israel’s MAC delegations, Lieutenant-Colonel Haim Gaon, to ask that UNTSO keep de Ridder out of Israeli territory. This greatly reduced de Ridder’s peacekeeping effectiveness, resulting in his August 1953 transfer to Kashmir, where he became acting chief military observer to an UNMOGIP mission also floundering in the face of intransigent parties. Both de Ridder’s difficulties and his eventual fate demonstrated Israel’s forceful policy of treating the peacekeepers as meddlesome obstacles to direct talks between the parties.

With de Ridder in Kashmir and Bennike in Jerusalem, the Israelis returned to the HJKIMAC, and to the same problems that had existed previously. Infiltration remained the most pressing of these for, while the Israeli public subsisted on rationing and black marketeering and the government feared the very real prospect of insolvency, Israel still offered better economic options for Palestinians than the squalid refugee camps in the Arab states. As a result, the flood of Palestinians into Israel from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continued unabated.

In late March 1953, a list of proposals presented through UNTSO by Israel to Jordan enumerated those actions Israel believed Jordan should carry out, including
marking the armistice line, moving Palestinian refugee camps away from the frontier, and collectively punishing infiltrators’ villages. These proposals were an ultimatum: if Jordan was unwilling to accept them, Israel would act unilaterally. The Jordanians resented this demand. As their senior HJKIMAC delegate, Azmi Nashashibi, explained to UNTSO:

the frequent Israeli attempts to obstruct investigations by procedural methods, her insistence (voiced as long ago as 1921, and still maintained today) that Arabs can be made good neighbours by violence alone, and her repeated denunciations of arrangements to solve frontier difficulties quickly, on a police level, and without publicity, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Israel has a case to establish, and is determined to establish it, if necessary in the teeth of the facts. 

Before these positions clashed, the arrival of Bennike convinced Gaon and Nashashibi to give a Local Commanders’ Agreement (LCA) another try. On 8 June 1953, the two sides sat down together again. As weekly local police meetings resumed, mutual familiarity with each other sped investigations of frontier crossings and thefts. Israeli photographers even captured images of Arabs and Israelis talking to one another. But not all was rosy. The Israelis laid telephone wire as far as the armistice line, but the Jordanians never hooked it up on their side, while in some areas infiltrators stole it right out of the ground. The seemingly endless cycle of thefts, provocations, and killings continued. As a result, the Israeli cabinet decided to act through the only means it believed still available: military action. First, Israel created a paramilitary border defence force. Second, since the Israel Defence Force (IDF) could only retaliate against actual infiltrators in extremely rare cases, the military collectively punished frontier villages through reprisals or, in official Israeli parlance, raids, retaliations, or “counter-measures.”
The formation of the paramilitary Border Police represented a tacit admission by Israel that the regular police could not cope with the infiltration problem. While IDF units had been stationed on frontier duty in the past, the new Border Police assumed many of these quotidian responsibilities in July 1953. Unlike the poorly-armed regular police, these jeep-borne forces moved quickly on or off road, and were equipped with mortars, machine guns, and small arms to repel infiltrators and engage in localized combat.

Concurrently, the IDF attacked West Bank frontier communities in order to deter continued crossings of the armistice line and, in the words of contemporary analyst Elizabeth Monroe, “to keep up the pecker of the frontier settler.” The Israeli government feigned ignorance of these raids, and official spokespeople always cited Jordanian provocations to justify the attacks, universally painted as the only recourse available to the long-suffering population. After the first small reprisals had failed, the IDF developed a specialized formation virtually handpicked by Major Ariel Sharon, a daring intelligence officer. His Unit 101 became the primary instrument of the new Israeli anti-infiltration policy.

The Israeli reprisal policy posed many risks for Jordan. The first entailed the danger that the Israelis would attempt to hold ground occupied in their attacks. The assaults also weakened Jordan’s ability to control internal dissent and fend off the machinations of neighbours such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia eager to expand at its expense. Jordan might even be forced to officially acknowledge the existence of Israel and talk peace. This collision of all these divergent policies led to mass killings on both sides of the armistice line, which UNTSO failed to prevent.
The cycle of mass killings began on the night of 14-15 October, when Unit 101 carried out its first large-scale raid into the West Bank, an assault on the village of Qibya, a haven for smugglers and infiltrators. The scale of the IDF reprisal far exceeded the size of those Jordanian infiltrations that had provoked it. Sharon’s forces killed 69 people, mainly women and children who died when explosive charges demolished the houses in which they had sheltered. The Jordanian National Guard and the Arab Legion both failed to confront the attackers, who returned to Israel without loss. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced that border settlers, pushed over the brink by violent Jordanian incursions, especially the murder of an Israeli mother and her two children in Yahud on 12 October, had carried out the assault.

The ensuing UNTSO investigation, headed by American Naval Commander Elmo Hutchison, turned up conflicting evidence, including the attackers’ use of equipment in IDF service such as 81 millimetre mortars, Bangalore torpedoes, and incendiary bombs. Reflecting the seriousness of the situation, Bennike personally presented this evidence to the Security Council on 27 October. Less than a month later, a strident resolution co-sponsored by the three Western powers condemned both the attack and the role of the IDF in it.21

International condemnation aside, the Israeli military, led by Unit 101, markedly improved the effectiveness of the reprisals, and official admission of the military role was soon forthcoming. Jordan, whose prime minister had already met with Bennike amidst the rubble of “martyred Qibya village,” responded to the attack by moving artillery, armoured cars, and two of the three Arab Legion infantry brigades to the West Bank.
Since Jordanian Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb still needed to focus on defending the East Bank, British troops moved into areas vacated by the Legion. Qibya failed to activate the Anglo-Jordanian Defence Treaty, since the British unilaterally decided that the agreement only encompassed the territory within Jordan’s 1948 frontiers, but the Israeli reprisal had prompted the insertion of regular Jordanian units near the armistice line, with British reinforcements close at hand. It had also done little to dissuade infiltrators, as the Israelis own records demonstrate.23

Bennike’s forthright testimony to the Security Council led to death threats and an Israeli government campaign to discredit him.24 Israel insisted that, for his own safety, the chief of staff provide one hour’s notice of any visit to the country. The threats prompted the UN to purchase a “protective uniform” for Bennike from the United States Marine Corps.25 The Danish officer resented these measures, believing they were designed to constrain his freedom of movement rather than protect him. UNTSO needed to actively calm the situation, a difficult task with the chief of staff the target of assassins. Nevertheless, the Security Council ordered Bennike to draft reports, due in February 1954, on improving UNTSO and local compliance with the Armistice Agreements. Another pressing problem remained the small size of the mission, with just nineteen peacekeepers, only five of whom served on the HJKIMAC.26

The Western members of the Security Council, especially Britain, which was eager to assist Jordan, insisted that UNTSO receive reinforcements, and between January and July 1954, UNTSO accepted more men from its original contributors and welcomed new peacekeepers from such Western middle powers as Canada, Denmark, New Zealand,
and Sweden. This increased the size of UNTSO to 41 officers by the beginning of August, and allowed for the creation of reserves that could be quickly dispatched to trouble spots.

As UNTSO expanded, Israel struggled to extricate itself from the bleak situation created by Qibya. Buttressed by the fact that the Security Council had censured Jordan for the many crossings of the armistice line, the Israelis invoked Article XII of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement in order to formally meet and discuss mutual difficulties.

Article XII, 3 of the Israel-Jordan accord stated:

> after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to convocate a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

Although Hammarskjöld supported the conference, the Jordanians prized the HJKIMAC, which allowed Amman to communicate with Israel while avoiding direct talks and any mechanism that might grant Israel additional leverage. The secretary-general never announced the dates and location of the conference, realizing that it would be pointless to do so without Jordanian cooperation, and it never convened. The failed effort further demonstrated Jordan’s disrespect of its Armistice Agreement with Israel and strengthened inter-Arab defiance.

UNTSO continued trying to renew cooperation on the ground, and reconvened local commanders’ meetings in December. The peacekeepers also proved useful in other ways. In January 1954, a British aircraft en route from Nicosia to Teheran made a
forced landing in Baghdad. Iraqi authorities imprisoned the three Israeli nationals on the plane and, with Israel and Iraq still formally in a state of war, UNTSO helped obtain their release.\textsuperscript{34}

Meanwhile, attempts to allocate scarce riparian resources among states that did not recognize one another guaranteed additional problems. In May 1953, the final covert high-level meeting between Israel and Syria on sharing the water of Lake Tiberias and its tributaries ended without progress. With control of the lake at stake, both sides again advanced their positions militarily. The Syrians first redirected the water from the disputed, but nominally shared, springs on the Doufeila farm. Instead of immediately launching a military counter-move, the Israelis noted the precedent and devised their own, more grandiose, plans.\textsuperscript{35} This resulted in the Taghba project, a scheme to divert the Jordan River to serve the growing needs of Israel’s central cities and the Negev settlements. The ISMAC chairman, American Colonel Roy Tillotson, voiced no objections to the plan and work commenced on 2 September. When the Syrians again alleged that the project granted Israel a military advantage, Tillotson changed his mind and Bennike concurred, putting the Taghba operation in violation of the Armistice Agreement.\textsuperscript{36}

When the Israelis protested, the Americans stepped in to mediate the disagreement, a sure sign of the centrality of water to the conflict. To impress upon Israel the seriousness of the issue, American President Dwight Eisenhower halted economic aid to Israel until the diversion work stopped.\textsuperscript{37} The UN then appointed two international hydrologists to study the Taghba project. UNTSO did not play a direct role in this
examination, further evidence that the Western superpower viewed the water problem as too big for the peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{38} Eric Johnston, Eisenhower’s special mediator appointed to help find a solution to the dispute, made some progress in multi-party talks, but the Arab states stubbornly maintained their refusal to enter into any agreement with Israel preferring, in the cases of Jordan and Syria, to cooperate with one another. Syria also found great power support for this position.

On 22 January 1954, following sixteen meetings on the subject, the Soviet Union vetoed the Security Council resolution on the Jordan River project, which would have allowed Israel to begin the Taghba work. Damascus had not suddenly embraced Communism, nor did the Soviets wish to champion Syrian nationalism, but they realized the mutual benefits of cooperation. The Soviet Union had formerly backed Israel, immediately recognizing the country’s independence, supplying arms during the 1948-49 War, supporting the admission of Israel to the UN, and generally looking favourably upon the socialist state and its Eastern European leadership.\textsuperscript{39} In 1950, once Israel verbally supported the UN military action against North Korea, the Soviets backed away, even temporarily breaking off diplomatic relations in the wake of the “doctors’ plot,” a Stalinist anti-Semitic canard. Following the Israeli announcement on the Korean War, the Soviets regularly abstained from Security Council decisions dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the procedural renewal of the UNTSO mandate.\textsuperscript{40} The Soviet Union continued to support the peacekeepers, recognizing the benefit of maintaining an international mechanism that the Arab states considered necessary for dealing with Israel.
At the same time, the Soviet veto devalued the overarching forum for managing the wider conflict – the Security Council itself – further entrenching the deadlock.

Backed by this Soviet support, the Syrians escalated tensions on Lake Tiberias. They aggressively asserted their claim to a ten-metre strip of land on the northeastern shore of the lake, where Syrian nationals habitually fished and watered their cattle. Israel rejected Syrian attempts at compromise over the issue, since the ten-metre strip was wholly within Israeli territory. Syria likewise rejected Israel’s compromise offer to officially allow foreign fishing in the lake, since the permits required to do so would be issued by Israel. Since acceptance of these permits would amount to recognition of their neighbour, the Syrians tried to create their own facts on the ground instead.

The illegal Syrian fishing fleet in Lake Tiberias, protected by shore batteries and a ring of military outposts, mushroomed. Although the demilitarization of the lake did not permit naval craft, the Israelis responded to this with police boats, modified landing ships protected by armour plating and armed with 57 millimetre cannon. The Syrian outposts along the shore fired on these boats as soon as they appeared, especially when they ventured to within a few hundred metres of the northeastern shore. Following an eleven hour emergency ISMAC meeting on 15 March, calm was restored. The UNTSO presence and the innovative Israeli response had caused the Syrians to back down.

The peacekeepers helped preserve that calm. The Syrians asked UNTSO to place peacekeepers aboard the Israeli vessels, but Israel refused, again citing infringement of sovereignty. UNTSO remained vigilant regardless, as when Tillotson noticed two Israeli police boats cruising within 150 metres of the disputed shore in mid-April, despite the
absence of fishing boats in the area. As Belgian ISMAC Chairman Colonel Marcel van Horen wrote to both sides afterwards, “I consider my duty not only to supervise the execution of the provisions of the G.A.A. but also to advise both parties when a situation such as the one described above could provoke serious incidents.” Israeli tactics, the Syrian internal intrigues that had led to the overthrow of President Adib Shishakli in February, and vigilant peacekeepers operating in spite of the fact that the ISMAC met only in unofficial or emergency circumstances, kept the frontier relatively quiet.

On 1 March, the UN released Bennike’s report on the state of the Armistice Agreements. The chief of staff decried the tendency of all parties to inflate the number of their complaints, which he likened to “psychological warfare.” More importantly, thanks to the work of the Jordanian authorities and the Israeli Border Police, the number of infiltrators had fallen. Might Qibya have brought an end to infiltration after all? That question was answered within a few days. On 17 March, eleven passengers on a bus travelling from Eilat to Beersheva were murdered, the worst atrocity perpetrated against Israelis since the beginning of the armistice regime. The investigation of the attack also sparked the most serious clash between UNTSO and Israel and led to the eventual replacement of Bennike.

Maale Akrabim, the site of the attack, was so desolate that its name translates into English as “scorpion’s ascent.” Located 27 kilometres from the Israel-Jordan armistice line, in the midst of salt marshes and unforgiving desert, Maale Akrabim had no permanent residents. At 11:45 that March morning, as the bus struggled up the steep incline, attackers opened fire from the surrounding hilltops. The first shots killed the
driver and disabled the vehicle, whereupon two men entered the bus and sprayed the occupants with sub-machine gun fire. While some theft occurred, murder, not robbery, was the motive. The entire attack lasted less than ten minutes.46

UNTSO rushed to the scene to begin an investigation. By the afternoon of the attack, a peacekeeper was at Maale Akrabim. Swedish Captain Gerhard Svedlund, a newcomer to the mission, could not have been better suited to the task. Unlike every other member of UNTSO, he spoke fluent Arabic and rudimentary Hebrew, allowing him to interview the survivors without interpreters.47 The Israelis, accompanied by Svedlund, began searching for the attackers the next morning, but even expert Bedouin trackers and dog teams lost the trail in the stifling heat and barren landscape.48

The investigation quickly turned to the testimony of the five survivors, two of them children, and each of whom had feigned death to survive the vicious attack. All identified the attackers as Arabic-speakers, but none could be certain of their origin or provide descriptions. The eldest survivor, IDF Sergeant Hakoon Morris, was in charge of the three armed soldiers travelling as escorts inside the bus, none of whom had their weapons loaded or at the ready when the attack began. Morris did not see the faces of the attackers while playing dead on the floor of the vehicle, but told Svedlund that he knew they were Arabs by “the smell of those who entered the bus.” Another survivor, 20-year-old IDF Private Esther Levi, an Egyptian immigrant fluent in Arabic who had been shot in the chest, noted that all she heard the attackers say was “yalla, yalla,” Arabic for “hurry up.” Jordan, mindful of its international reputation and its campaign for admission
to the UN, offered Bedouin trackers of its own, through UNTSO, to assist the search. The Israelis accepted and joint tracking took place on 20 March, again without success.49

On the same day, the official Israeli complaint to the HJKIMAC alleged that the attack had been carried out by a “well-organized and highly trained Jordanian unit.” At an emergency meeting on the subject convened on 22 March, the Israeli delegates passed the names of three Jordanians supposedly involved in the attack to the chairman, Hutchison, but refused to share this information with the Jordanian MAC members. The Israeli resolution condemning Jordan for the attack came to a vote after heated debate. Hutchison ruled on the version presented and, while suggesting modifications, could not present his own draft resolution. With the hastily-conducted investigation having failed to turn up conclusive evidence of Jordanian complicity, Hutchison abstained from the vote, meaning that the Israeli resolution failed to pass.50 In response, Israel walked out of the HJKIMAC and immediately began campaigning for Hutchison’s removal. The Security Council, always supportive of UNTSO findings, did not become involved.

In contrast, the enraged Israelis believed that the Security Council could not dictate the UNTSO position fast enough after the Qibya attack. New prime minister Moshe Sharett, widely perceived as more moderate than Ben-Gurion, chided the peacekeepers in a rousing speech to the Knesset, asserting, “To leave undecided, on this occasion, the question of guilt is to proclaim complete moral bankruptcy of the entire machinery for the implementation of the Armistice Agreements under their supervision.”51 When it became known that Bennike seemed to believe, or at least did not discount, that Jewish Israeli extremists had carried out the Maale Akrabim attack, death
threats against the chief of staff became even more commonplace. UN peacekeepers have likely never been as hated as Bennike and Hutchison were in Israel immediately after Maale Akrabim.

As in the aftermath of the Qibya attack, Maale Akrabim highlighted UNTSO weaknesses. After Israel had stormed out of the HJKIMAC, UN headquarters opted to release MAC proceedings and resolutions in the United States in order to counter Israel’s one-sided public statements. The chief of staff again requested more peacekeepers, suggesting that “some of the observers might be obtained from the NATO Command,” a natural instinct for a Danish officer.

For two weeks after the attack, the Jordanians and the peacekeepers travelled to the regular local commanders’ meeting points, but the Israelis did not. Israel also returned UNTSO mail, but only after opening it. Then, on the night of 28-29 March, Unit 101 attacked the West Bank village of Nahalin. The reprisal killed nine, wounded nineteen, and destroyed the community’s mosque and many of its houses. The reprisal demonstrated Israel’s military prowess and may have satisfied some Israelis, but it also increased both the chance of direct clashes between regular forces – the majority of the casualties at Nahalin – and Jordanian reprisals against the reprisal.

Prominent Israelis worried about the consequences of these actions outside the country, even as they decried infiltration. Arthur Lourie, a senior foreign ministry official who had served as Israel’s deputy representative to the UN, accurately summarized the quandary facing his country: “the problem arises from the fact that the long train of assaults and robberies from across the border, involving a murder here and a murder
there, while a cumulative creating an intolerable situation for us, does not in the individual case have sufficient news value to receive special or often any mention at all in the press abroad.” Abba Eban, the Israeli ambassador to both Washington and the UN, even sought to sue The New York Times unless the newspaper retracted a report that the officer commanding Israel’s MAC delegations, Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Shalev, had threatened Hutchison after the Maale Akrabim emergency meeting. The outside world mainly knew of the Qibya attack and Israel’s angry reaction to Maale Akrabim, neither of which put the state in the most favourable light.

The Israeli reprisals caused more trouble for what remained of the UNTSO-Israel relationship. Israel refused to allow the peacekeepers to carry out an investigation on its side of the line near Latrun on 19 April, reminding UNTSO that Israel had withdrawn from the HJKIMAC. On 9 May at Khirbet Illin, Israeli forces shot at a white UN jeep displaying a white flag, aimed loaded rifles at Hutchison and Svedlund, and tried to induce the two peacekeepers to reveal Arab Legion positions. While retreating back to the Jordanian side of the line after that experience, Hutchison and Svedlund narrowly avoided being killed when a lengthy firefight, complete with mortar and artillery shelling, broke out around them. Next, after three IDF soldiers were killed raiding the West Bank village of Husan on 19 June, UNTSO tried to avoid another incident by retrieving the bodies. While informing Israelis from the adjacent community of Mevo Beitar about the operation, Svedlund and Canadian Captain Leslie Barden watched as a man brandishing a loaded rifle ran at them, only to be forcibly restrained by his comrades. The Israeli attacks became even more intense after the Jordanians captured an IDF
sergeant wounded in yet another cross-border raid. The peacekeepers visited the man and kept Israel informed of his condition, while the IDF carried out additional forays to capture Jordanian police and soldiers in order to carry out an exchange.\textsuperscript{61} For all its efforts, UNTSO was powerless to stop the cycle of violence.

The HJKIMAC officially continued to meet, and the peacekeepers, still working under Hutchison, conducted investigations. While every emergency meeting convened during the Israeli boycott passed resolutions against Israeli actions, the newly-smug Jordanians expressed disappointment at the thoroughness of the peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{62} They also continued to search for the perpetrators of the Maale Akrabim attack. Jordanian intelligence, suddenly much more helpful than usual to UNTSO, identified a Sinai Bedouin gang, the Black Hand, as the culprits.\textsuperscript{63} Further investigation in Egypt, coupled with a strong desire to rehabilitate his own reputation, caused Hutchison to support this claim, but the identity of the murderers has never been conclusively proven.

Throughout this tense period, the embattled Bennike criticized both Israel and Jordan in his reports, describing how “The populations are being submitted to a steady stream of hatred propaganda to provide a convenient external outlet for fundamental internal difficulties.”\textsuperscript{64} Framing UNTSO as the scapegoat for all troubles formed the key component of this policy. Even the influential Lebanese media joined the criticism, distracting its listeners and readers from the fact that the Lebanese military often cooperated with Israel. The press and radio trumpeted the mobilization of the Lebanese Army along the frontier in aid of its Jordanian brothers, but Bennike matter-of-factly informed New York, “As to the allegedly recalled reservists they are quietly sipping arak
and Turkish coffee in the market places of their native villages.” In both Israel and the Arab states, bluster against the enemy distracted the population from other problems.

While UN headquarters and the Security Council continued to publicly profess complete support for Bennike, in June Hammarskjöld informed the Dane that the UN had decided on a new policy of one-year rotations for chiefs of staff. Bennike replied that he was prepared to leave, so long as it did not look like he was being forced out by Israeli pressure. He also insisted on staying long enough to brief his successor, something Riley had failed to do the previous year.

In their desperation to revive the status quo shattered by Maale Akrabim, the Jordanians sparked an incident in the most sensitive possible arena, Jerusalem. Both Israel and Jordan normally practised restraint in the city, although shootings in late April increased tensions and there was no consensus on the future of Jerusalem. There were regular flashpoints, as most of the world failed to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and Jordan refused to allow Jews to visit the religious sites of the Old City, including the Western Wall, which they were permitted to do under Article VIII of the Armistice Agreement. Besides spurning another part of that accord, the Jordanians also used Jewish tombstones from the Mount of Olives to pave sections of the Old City and stabled animals in the historic synagogues of the Jewish Quarter, now empty of Jews. These actions had not seized the attention of the world, but violence in the city holy to three religions quickly did so. Since the two sides refused to meet to resolve their issues, the worsening situation required UNTSO mediation.
The area surrounding the Old City was the tensest part of Jerusalem. Jordanian troops guarded the Old City walls, which overlooked the Israeli section of the city and a contentious no-man’s land. Israeli troops garrisoned buildings just outside the walls, including the Hospice Nôtre Dame de France and the Church of the Dormition, placing the opposing soldiers mere metres from one another. When firing broke out across those walls on 30 June, the peacekeepers faced more challenges than usual, especially as the Israelis sought to deny UNTSO freedom of movement. The parties had always issued travel visas, checked identity papers, designated movement routes, and limited where peacekeepers could go, with whom, and for how long, but with the heightened tensions, Israel applied even stricter movement controls. On the day the firing started, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan informed UNTSO that “UN Observers have been sent on duty not in accordance with the GAA and unaccompanied by Israeli officers assigned to the MAC. The sending of UN Observers under these conditions can only cause unpleasantness between them and Israeli units in the field, a situation which, I believe, should be avoided.”

UNTSO responded with a press release by their new information officer, a position created in the wake of the intense Israeli criticism of the Maale Akrabim investigation. The release explained that the peacekeepers’ freedom of movement derived from the Security Council ceasefire order of 11 August 1949 and noted coyly that “the status and scope of duties of observers may not be fully understood by public opinion in Israel and by some Israeli authorities.”

The peacekeepers knew where to go for real help: the three Western members of the Security Council. The American government had already presented both Jordan and
Israel with a terse aide-mémoire supporting UNTSO, known as the 11 Points. In July, the powers again backed UNTSO to the fullest, while Hammarskjöld informed Bennike that his reports would henceforth be shared with Britain, France, and the United States. After scores of casualties on both sides, a special appeal by these three powers brought about a shaky ceasefire on 2 July.

Events during the Jerusalem violence further demonstrated the value of UNTSO. On 1 July, Major Aryeh Doron, an IDF officer formerly with the HJKIMAC, approached the peacekeepers working in Israeli Jerusalem, informing them that an Israeli woman had been wounded in a house near the Old City walls. Danish Lieutenant-Colonel Georg Norgaard and Barden quickly agreed to help. Shooting continued along the road to the woman’s home, and the car transporting the two men was hit by rifle rounds en route. Despite the close calls, the peacekeepers successfully transported the wounded woman to safety without taking additional casualties. Doron returned the next day, this time asking Norgaard to recover another Israeli, a wounded soldier trapped near Mount Zion. When informed that it would take approximately 40 minutes to establish a ceasefire in the area, the Israeli major angrily announced, “If that’s all the help we can expect from UN Officers, I shall do it myself.” This outburst spurred the peacekeepers to action. They established a ceasefire, found the corpse – the soldier had in fact been killed many hours before – and carried the body hundreds of metres to waiting IDF jeeps. Despite this invaluable assistance, the Israelis were uncooperative when UNTSO investigators sought to determine who had started the shooting, refusing to make their troops available. Once
interviews finally began, Norgaard noted that “all their testimonies were practically identical and given without one moment’s hesitation as if it had been memorized.”  

The usual propaganda struggle ensued. Lebanon, sitting as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, played out its real role in the Arab League: tabling complaints. The submission by Lebanese representative Charles Malik emphasized the danger posed to Christian holy places from the 81 millimetre mortar shells that Israel had fired into the Old City. Similarly, Israeli intelligence intercepted a cable sent by Hammarskjöld urging UNTSO to avoid a repeat of what happened in March. The statement read, “I consider it obvious that no resolution condemning either side possible unless firmly and conclusively supported fullest evidence.” The Israeli media presented these instructions as proof of UN support for the Arab states, for it naturally knew that Jordan had started the incident: according to the Tel Aviv daily Yediot Ahronoth, the peacekeepers whiled away their days ignoring incidents, playing bridge, and lobbying to increase their pay. In its own direct complaint to the Security Council, Israel criticized UNTSO for its perceived failure, claiming that “The fact that the painstaking investigation carried out by the United Nations observers failed to lead to the eventual identification and censure of the guilty party is liable to undermine the moral authority of the United Nations and serve as encouragement for further aggressive violence.”  

Despite the poisoned discourse, on 19 July, after abortive Israeli attempts to convince the Jordanians to meet without UNTSO, Israel told the peacekeepers that it would return to the HJKIMAC, on condition that Hutchison did not. The peacekeeping teams that had been patrolling both sides of Jerusalem since 16 July recognized that they
remained unwelcome, and the Israeli media continued to lambaste the international officers, but a reduction in tension had been realized.

Throughout, the Arab states behaved in much the same way as Israel, refusing to accept the reality of Israel’s existence and only cynically supporting the peacekeepers when circumstances verified the Jordanian or Syrian versions of events. The Jordanians, for instance, prized Hutchison, “who was known to be scrupulously impartial.” Other Arab commentators realized UNTSO needed improvement, as when Egyptian Colonel Mahmoud Riad, an officer respected even by the Israelis, lamented Bennike’s “lack of initiative and forcefulness.” Instead of wallowing in self-recrimination or criticizing the parties, the peacekeepers launched an “offensive” of their own. The total number of UNTSO officers had now ballooned to 41, supported by a staff of 67. In July, the United States provided UNTSO with a C-47 aircraft and crew, finally giving the peacekeepers independent access to air travel and re-supply. Most importantly, the information officer gave UNTSO what it most desperately needed: a means to answer the fabrications of the regional media by publicizing its version of events. The tracking dogs, helicopters, and Arabic translators also requested by Bennike at this time were not approved. The half measures improved the peacekeeping mission in the near future; additional improvements awaited the next crisis. Bennike and his officers still relied mainly on each other to keep the peace, and a more active and better reinforced effort could not be as easily bullied or ignored.

The most pressing problems faced by UNTSO under Bennike, as under Riley before him, came from events along the Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria frontiers. The new
Egyptian leadership, still preoccupied with diplomatic initiatives designed to secure the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal, carefully avoided serious conflict with Israel, which nevertheless continued its campaign to assert full control over the El Auja Demilitarized Zone (DZ). When the Azazme and other Bedouin tribes returned to the disputed region in 1953, Israeli air and ground forces attacked any who did not hold national identification cards. The IDF also moved loyal Bedouin into the region, while burning down the huts and shooting the camels of the Egyptian tribes. UNTSO took action whenever possible. Peacekeepers noticed Israelis preparing ambushes above the Birein well on 15 and 18 September 1953, but could do little other than loiter conspicuously in the hopes of disrupting their work.82

Infiltration from the Gaza Strip into Israel also continued. Theft was the motivation, particularly the theft of irrigation pipe, which enriched Palestinian refugees and hurt Israeli settlements. The IDF launched attacks to end these thefts, including Unit 101’s 28 August 1953 reprisal against the Bureij refugee camp, located two kilometres inside Gaza and administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which killed 20 and wounded 62.83 Egypt passed anti-infiltration measures, but the village mukhtars and local Palestinians ignored them. Moreover, as an UNTSO report noted, the refugees served an important purpose for Egypt. “Egypt is doing little to help them except to let them exist in the Gaza Strip,” wrote the chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC), American Colonel T.M. Hinkle, “it is possible that many could be absorbed into Egypt, but if they are kept in a refugee status, living on UNRWA and under horrible conditions, they can always be used by Egypt as a
symbol to hold up to the world to point to the Egyptian objection to the occupation of Palestine by the Jewish people.”84 By 1954, exchanges of fire between regular army units had become common.85

Much of this tension could be traced to Israeli apprehension at the internal transformation of Egypt. In April 1954, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, a revolutionary ringleader serving as interior minister, removed President Mohammed Naguib and seized power for himself. Three months later, Britain and Egypt secretly initialed an agreement to withdraw the British troops from the Suez Canal.86 While negotiations continued on secondary issues, the Egyptian blockade was expanded to encompass the Gulf of Aqaba, the only outlet for the developing southern Israeli port city of Eilat. This prompted Israel to renew its challenge of Egyptian actions in the Security Council, which faced the Soviet veto a second time.87 Egypt also linked a July series of amateurish terrorist attacks against American and British-owned property in Cairo and Alexandria to Israel, but outsiders could not immediately verify these claims. Egypt and Israel cooperated less with each day, and there seemed to be little that UNTSO could do about it.

Bennike’s tenure corresponded with fourteen very difficult months, a period which showed him to be both inconsistent under fire and, ultimately, ineffective. UNTSO survived his tenure, carrying out much needed reforms that benefited Bennike’s successor and the parties to the armistice regime. At the same time, UNTSO acquiesced in many of the concessions demanded by Israel, including the dismissals of de Ridder and Bennike himself. The peacekeepers had to do something to return Israel to the fold and to begin to improve the peacekeeping machinery and, as those improvements took effect, UNTSO
demonstrated its worth and countered the disinformation campaigns of the Israeli media. It certainly helped that the reinforcements included officers as talented as Norgaard and Svedlund. Bennike had been the first to draft weekly summaries and to provide regular cables directly to the secretary-general, routines that mirrored the scope of UNTSO difficulties. Other reforms, such as Bennike’s suggestion that the parties vote on the MAC chairman’s resolution rather than presenting their own, could not surmount opposition from the Armistice Agreement signatories, who preferred a weak UNTSO unless the peacekeepers could be totally won over to their side. Moreover, the struggle for water and the Soviet decision to support the Arab states with its Security Council veto caused the Western powers to realize that UNTSO alone could not keep the peace. While Britain, France, the United States, and Hammarskjöld all maintained their public support for the peacekeepers, the Israeli desire to have Bennike replaced dovetailed with the West’s urge to appoint a stronger chief of staff.

Like Bennike, Hutchison technically completed his tour rather than being dismissed, although the Israeli smear campaign ended his effectiveness as a peacekeeper. His plight showcased not only Israel’s changed opinion of the peacekeepers, but also the peacekeepers’ altered view of Israel. For his part, Hutchison, ignorant of the conflict when he arrived, hardened into an outspoken public advocate for change in America’s “pro-Israel” foreign policy, as did Bennike and other officers, all of whom came from Western states where Israel enjoyed public support. The Israeli campaign against him played a major role in this decision, but his bitter and hastily-published recollections, *Violent Truce*, traced the shift to a long series of Israeli actions that flaunted the
Armistice Agreements and abused the peacekeepers. To Israel, these were necessary responses to the threats posed to its sovereignty by Palestinian infiltrators, highway ambushers, and Syrian fishermen. Israeli leaders believed that UNTSO enabled Jordan to avoid direct talks, but the Jordanians, as the reprisals and the Article XII effort aptly demonstrated, simply did not want to have them. The peacekeepers also proved useful to the Israelis in certain circumstances, notably by curbing the outbreaks of violence in Jerusalem. Since Israel returned to the HJKIMAC in September 1954, it gained little from the walkout other than temporarily discrediting the peacekeepers and forcing some personnel changes. The Israeli tactics also emboldened extremists on all sides and further damaged relations with Jordan: the day that the two states would sit down together to discuss peace did not come any sooner as a result of the reprisals at Qibya and Nahalin. More to the point, while infiltration waned in the immediate aftermath of reprisals, the Israeli attacks incited greater hatred and encouraged both more violent infiltration and actual (rather than illusory) inter-Arab solidarity.

In addition to the numerous incidents between Israel and Jordan, Israel-Syria meetings had ended, and no amount of outside effort could get Damascus to resume talking following the Soviet veto of the Security Council resolution on the Taghba project. This also kept Lebanon from discussing peace with Israel, although the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission remained quiet. Egypt remained fixated on the negotiations with Britain, and cold toward Israel and any possibility of peace talks. Most of the disagreements derived from the parties’ continued refusal to change core attitudes, an intransigence that forced the peacekeepers to adapt to a worsening situation.
CHAPTER 5

The Arrival of General Burns

September-December 1954

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) became more vital to the easing of tensions on the ground in the midst of the Israel-Jordan and Egypt-Israel strife that dominated the final four months of 1954. Its increased importance stemmed from the American and British realization that the parties to the Armistice Agreements could only be coerced into a peace settlement, a goal complementary to the their desire to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East.¹ UNTSO, the representative of the international community on the ground, helped to ensure the relaxation of frontier tension required to support Anglo-American diplomacy. To that end, the Western powers molded UNTSO to fit their needs. The Americans, eager to preserve an honest broker role with all sides of the conflict, slowly withdrew from positions of overt peacekeeping leadership. The Western superpower did not wish to risk losing the Arab and Muslim world as it had “lost” China in 1949. To fend off this potential development and to better foster regional calm, the West and the United Nations (UN) secretary-general needed an active UNTSO led by a respected chief of staff and supported by well-trained officers from middle power nations.

UNTSO also needed to make a clear break from the events of the previous year, when the peacekeepers were too often part of the problem rather than part of the solution. As a result, the American and French UNTSO contingents gradually shrunk, to be
replaced by officers from such middle powers as Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden. These states had no colonial ties to the Middle East and, aside from prominent Swedish individuals who had led peace efforts during the 1948 fighting, they had little previous involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Canadian, Danish, and New Zealand decisions to contribute officers to UNTSO provide instructive examples of how the middle powers became involved in Middle East peacekeeping. Canada already supplied peacekeepers to the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and to the newly-formed International Commission of Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Indochina, and was approached by the UN to support UNTSO precisely for that reason. Despite a sizeable Jewish and a smaller domestic Arab population, few commercial ties existed between Canada and the Middle Eastern states: Canada opened its first regional embassy, in Tel Aviv, only in 1953.² On the other hand, while New Zealand had sent tens of thousands of troops to the Middle East during both world wars, Denmark had essentially no involvement with the region until the arrival of Major-General Vagn Bennike.³ In short, middle power peacekeepers joined UNTSO at the urging of larger Western states. The Security Council members attempting to limit Soviet intrigue in the region, especially Britain and the United States – France was increasingly focused on colonial entanglements in Indochina and North Africa – needed a solid replacement for Bennike. As UNTSO had been led first by a staff officer and then an engineer, perhaps someone with experience in both of these positions would enjoy more success.
Canadian Major-General Eedson Louis Millard (E.L.M.) Burns assumed command of the mission on 2 September 1954. Burns, a 31-year veteran of the Canadian Army, possessed extensive combat and command experience, but his career had not been spotless. Born in Montreal in 1897 and commissioned in the engineers at the age of 18, he was twice wounded in action during the First World War. Between inter-war staff college courses, Burns co-authored a novel and numerous journal articles, mainly on military topics. The intellectual general appeared uniquely placed to excel in high command during the Second World War, but in August 1941 he was dismissed from his position on the Canadian General Staff for revealing classified information in a randomly intercepted letter to his mistress. After narrowly avoiding court martial, Burns redeemed himself, rising to command the 5th Canadian Armoured Division and then I Canadian Corps in the Italian campaign. Despite many battlefield successes, Burns was sacked in October 1944, after just seven months as corps commander, largely because his subordinates could no longer work with him. One, the eloquently vulgar General Chris Vokes, dismissively stated of Burns, “I believe one can’t command sitting on one’s ass in the rear.” While no one could deny his abilities, Burns was also a humourless and distant leader who utterly failed to inspire his troops. After serving out the remainder of the war as a rear-area staff officer, Burns retired from the military and joined the civil service, reaching the position of deputy minister for Veterans’ Affairs. While he may have lost the respect of some of his military comrades, he had many political friends, foremost among them Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, who tempted Burns back into uniform to take up the challenge of serving as UNTSO chief of
An active member of the UN Association of Canada, Burns possessed familiarity with both the international organization and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was determined to succeed in his new post, but would a general who had failed in operational command be fit for the trying position of senior Arab-Israeli peacekeeper?

The Western powers must have asked themselves this same question, but Burns did not take the job purely to serve as a Western operative. He swore the international oath of allegiance, as had his predecessors, and neither his government nor the great powers instructed him independently of Security Council directives. The West required a judicious officer, not a puppet, to help rehabilitate UNTSO and to keep some semblance of Arab-Israeli peace. The most experienced of those Western peacekeepers did not disappear with Burns’ arrival either. At the end of September, the nine American UNTSO officers still formed the largest national contingent of the 45 peacekeepers on the ground. Moreover, throughout Burns’ tenure, his two most trusted colleagues were United States Marine Corps Colonel Richard Hommel, who served as the assistant chief of staff, and French Major (chef de bataillon) François Giacomaggi, the chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC).

Burns’ challenges began with his arrival in the region. On the night of 1-2 September, an Israeli battalion attacked the West Bank village of Beit Liqya, near Latrun, in another reprisal designed to win release of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) prisoner in Jordanian hands. One section of the attackers descended on the village, while others mined the roads and set ambushes. An Arab Legion car coming to the aid of the village struck the mines and the IDF seized three prisoners. By the time UNTSO had contacted
Israel to arrange a ceasefire, the attackers had already returned home. Israel, still boycotting the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJKIMAC), refused to allow an UNTSO investigation on its side of the frontier, but the peacekeepers were fully occupied defusing the mines and a booby trap charge found inside the wrecked Arab Legion vehicle. Burns authored the report on the incident dispatched to the Security Council, even though the attack occurred on the morning he officially assumed command of UNTSO. Under the circumstances, the report contained a surprising number of far-reaching suggestions, including a request for Israel to return to the HJKIMAC, a recommendation that Israel stop conducting live-fire exercises along the armistice line, an appeal to Jordan to do more to combat infiltration, and an exhortation that “only well-trained and disciplined military or police personnel be employed in the first line of the defensive organizations of both parties, particularly in sensitive areas like the Jerusalem area.” Burns spent much of the next two years attempting to meet the goals set out in his first report to the Security Council.

Burns’ arrival tempered the anti-UNTSO feeling prevalent in Israel, where reservations about the Canadian officer nevertheless remained. Through “top secret” sources, the Israelis knew a Canadian would be selected to replace Bennike by late July, circumstances that prompted Foreign Ministry Director-General Walter Eytan to write, “I think we have a rather poor experience with the Scandinavians. Bernadotte, Lundstrom, Paul Mohn, Bennike – these are the neutral types of what Leo Kohn likes to call the ‘pseudo-objective’ kind, after the pattern of former British High Commissioners of Palestine. I don’t know how much better Canadians are.” Burns’ close connections to
the British military and his uniform, virtually identical to a British one aside from the “Canada” shoulder flash, further reminded many Israelis of the mandate period, never a welcome association. The friendly relationship that quickly developed between Burns and Arab Legion Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb – the two had attended the same staff colleges, albeit at different times – also worried the Israeli government. His decision to take Arabic lessons in the West Bank, under the assumption that he could always communicate in English or French with Israelis, but not with Arab representatives, contributed to these concerned mutterings. Others disliked his adopted habit of peppering his sentences with expressions such as insh’Allah, Arabic for “God willing.” Despite these concerns, as a goodwill gesture to the newcomer, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan released the five captured Jordanian police and soldiers, including the three men seized at Beit Liqya, on 4 September.

The Arab states also welcomed Burns, without hiding their appreciation for his predecessor. Before returning home to Denmark in September, Bennike accepted the Jordanian Star First Grade and the Syrian Distinguished Merit Medal, signalling the Arab states’ approval of the outgoing chief of staff. These actions prompted the UN to pass new regulations against the acceptance of decorations by international civil servants, another UNTSO improvement fostered by Bennike. At the same time, the Jordanians did not hesitate to try to convince Burns that Israeli reprisals threatened central control of the restless Palestinian population and produced frontier violence. More positively, tactful diplomatic pressure from Burns induced the Jordanians to release the imprisoned Israeli sergeant, who was returned home, through UNTSO, on 29 October.
Burns quickly grasped the importance of a robust peacekeeping organization capable of confronting Arab and Israeli propaganda while producing some of its own carefully-managed public statements. When UNTSO information officer Hamilton Fisher passed away in early September, Burns contacted New York for a replacement, stating: “Immediate reaction is required, as unless the authoritative UNTSO version of events is given, false or distorted news gets into the press and is difficult to correct later.”21 This thinking had come too late to redeem Commander Elmo Hutchison. Another American, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Brewster, replaced Hutchison as HJKIMAC chairman on 15 November, after the latter had returned home. An UNTSO press release emphasized that Hutchison “is relinquishing the post on the expiration of his term of office.” 22

These UNTSO actions prompted Israel to return to the HJKIMAC, just as the UN desired. In early October, Burns sent letters to Israel and Jordan suggesting that future Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) resolutions be voted on in parts, as in the Security Council.23 While the parties ignored this suggestion, Burns’ own actions continually supported the sentiment behind it. Jordan and Israel resumed regular HJKIMAC meetings on 20 October, with both sides welcoming Burns and Brewster. In his opening remarks Burns described himself as “a rather hopeful person by nature.” The senior Jordanian delegate, Dr. Hasem Nuseibeh, then took the floor, using the opportunity for conciliation to offer obsequious praise for the absent Hutchison, described as Brewster’s “illustrious predecessor.” Naturally, the Israeli delegation took offence to this and to the doctor’s criticism of IDF reprisals. Burns quickly curbed the excesses of both delegations, stating: “we are here as a group to try and establish facts, but it should not be, in my view, a place
where the rightness or the wrongness of the policies and the moral consequences of them by both sides are to be debated.” These were calming words but, with the bulk of the meeting devoted to heated off-the-record discussions, it was clear that both sides had learned nothing from the fighting that predated the arrival of Burns.

Problems also persisted in Jerusalem. Although none of the outstanding issues were as serious as the firefights that attracted international attention in July, they disrupted the already strained relationship between Israel and UNTSO. The main sticking point remained freedom of movement for peacekeepers in Israeli Jerusalem. The peacekeepers experienced movement restrictions throughout September, thanks in large part to the sensationalism of the Israeli media. On 14 September, the English-language Jerusalem Post published an acerbic article headlined “UN Observers Begin Unlawful Patrols.” The IDF set up six posts garrisoned by armed military police in order to prevent the peacekeepers from moving on their side of the Jerusalem line without the accompaniment of Israeli liaison officers. By framing events in this way, Israel made it appear that the peacekeepers opposed a standard practice, rather than the other way around. Burns responded on 26 September by holding a press conference that laid out the UNTSO position once again. He reiterated that if Israel wished to revise the 11 August 1949 ceasefire order, it would have to do so through diplomacy in New York, not by obstructing the work of the peacekeepers on the ground. As he told the press, “if UN military observers are not free to move at all unless accompanied by an officer of the party concerned, and then only go where he says they may go, it is probable that the
outside world will conclude that the party has something to conceal, and those who are not its well wishers will say that it has aggressive intentions.”

The Israeli reaction was swift and uncompromising. Their soldiers usually only needed to be firmly polite to prevent the peacekeepers from moving about but, on 30 September, aimed bursts of rifle fire convinced Brewster and Belgian Warrant Officer Hubert Lombet to immediately halt their white jeep at a Jerusalem checkpoint. Dayan regretted the incident in replying to a letter from Burns, but something had to change. Based on vivid reports from his Jerusalem peacekeepers, especially those of the Swedish captain and Semitic linguist Gerhard Svedlund, Burns informed the secretary-general that “Children are openly calling the Observers spies, throwing stones and making threatening gestures.” In the first week of November, the IDF increased the number of Jerusalem checkpoints faced by the peacekeepers from six to ten and began harassing UN personnel while they were off-duty and wearing civilian clothes.

Burns maintained that the establishment of fixed posts and regular UNTSO patrols on both sides of divided Jerusalem would be beneficial for all concerned. Unlike in the past, when their small numbers and geographic dispersion forced the peacekeepers to respond to incidents after the fact, if at all, fixed posts and patrols would place the international officers near regular trouble spots. The idea was to discourage the outbreaks of shooting, rock throwing, and infiltration that plagued the city. The Israelis categorically rejected the idea, which they considered an affront to their sovereignty as well as a threatening expansion of UNTSO powers.
UNTSO compromised, agreeing in December to inform the Israeli HJKIMAC delegation in advance of any patrols, while Israel accepted that fixed patrols could be beneficial during tense periods. Burns claimed that the peacekeepers had lost nothing with this agreement, especially since UNTSO relied on the goodwill of the parties to function. The peacekeepers also lacked the numbers to indefinitely support fixed patrols, while Jordan allowed UNTSO to observe the Jerusalem no-man’s land from atop the Old City walls. The Israelis still benefited from the proximity of the peacekeepers, immediately dropping the checkpoints and calling for international witnesses whenever the Jordanians began throwing rocks or opening small arms fire into the New City. Still, the issue of fixed patrols guaranteed acrimonious debate between Israel and UNTSO. UNTSO remained an easy target of Israeli criticism: even though the failure to reach an Israel-Jordan peace agreement rested with the two states, the peacekeepers did not seem to be helping. Israel regularly decried the peacekeepers’ failure to prevent Jordanian attacks, while simultaneously limiting UNTSO activities on its side of the line. The Israelis believed that the peacekeepers should remain in their neighbours’ territory to prevent assaults without hindering Israeli actions. Throughout, the peacekeepers successfully struggled to maintain a presence wherever they might most effectively carry out their duties.

These debates did not deter other efforts to promote cooperation between the parties. The actions of Israel and Jordan had sabotaged both the peace talks and multiple Local Commanders’ Agreements (LCAs) covering the entire frontier, leaving UNTSO
with no choice but to further compartmentalize the peacekeeping effort. To that end, Burns proposed a Jerusalem-area LCA.

Despite continuing tension in the divided city, both sides welcomed this proposal although, predictably, for different reasons. Jordan wanted an LCA to resume the flood of Christian pilgrims to East Jerusalem, one of Jordan’s few sources of external revenue. Israel welcomed a relaxation of tension in order to extract political concessions from Amman. When all was arranged for the LCA signing ceremony on 15 November, the Israeli representatives abruptly refused to sign the accord. Dayan asserted that Burns should not sign the LCA – as his predecessors had earlier signed LCAs and Distressed Vessel Agreements – since it was an agreement between two states. Jordan, fearing that a signature under these circumstances would amount to recognition of Israel, refused to give in to British pressure and sign without Burns acting as a witness. Glubb appealed directly to Burns, emphasizing that Jordan now wanted UNTSO to provide not only a signature, but a peacekeeping presence at all LCA meetings, further complicating what remained of the negotiations. Israel felt that Burns wished to push the accord forward in order to symbolize progress that did not actually exist on the ground, and the IDF confidently expected the LCA provisions to be respected by both sides without a piece of paper. This turned out to be a prescient assertion, but Israel would not settle for a peace arrangement rather than a peace agreement, even if Jordan were interested. Thus, Israel and Jordan remained deadlocked for the usual reasons, despite the peacekeepers’ efforts.

In the final four months of 1954, the fallout from the bungled Israeli sabotage operation in July, the official conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez Canal
troops, and violent infiltration from Gaza disturbed the customarily somewhat relaxed Egypt-Israel situation. By the end of the year, the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict had definitively shifted from Jerusalem to the desert frontier that bisected the Negev and the Sinai.

The reasons for this shift did not rest exclusively with the governments involved. The Muslim Brotherhood, an extremist Islamic movement, wished to undermine the secular leaders of Egypt, themselves distracted by backroom power struggles. Gaza-based Muslim Brotherhood infiltrators routinely attacked Israeli frontier settlements, especially collective farming communities populated by Jewish immigrants from the Arab states. The violent raids and the fear they promoted led to the deterioration and abandonment of Negev settlements, while the success of their actions demonstrated the Cairo government’s comparative laxity towards Israel. At the same time, Egypt, devoted to final negotiations to secure the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal, had temporarily halted rhetoric against Israel: the Egyptians did not wish to offer the British – altering their global troop deployments in light of nuclear developments – any excuse to avoid signing the agreement. Because the Muslim Brotherhood activities threatened this goal, the Egyptian authorities, as an anti-infiltration measure, forbade civilians from moving in the vicinity of the Gaza-Israel armistice line between 5 pm and 6 am. Most importantly, the desire of the Egyptian government to be seen in the Arab world as the principal opponent of Israel fostered the official decision to harness rather than dissuade infiltration.
In order to do so, Egypt needed a firm hand at the top. Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser realized this, and his legitimacy received a major boost with the long-awaited 19 October conclusion of the agreement for the withdrawal of the British Suez Canal troops, to be completed by June 1956. The Muslim Brotherhood then tried to assassinate Nasser on 26 October, but the failed attempt only accelerated the harsh crackdown on the extremists.41

Meanwhile, Israel wanted the British to stay. While Israel had no sympathy for the former mandatory power, it viewed the continued presence of the Canal troops as a limit on Egyptian action and a way to prevent modern arms from falling into the hands of the junta or the Brotherhood.42 These fears had prompted shadowy elements within Israeli intelligence to activate previously-organized cells of Egyptian Jewish saboteurs to carry out attacks against Western interests, making it appear that the Egyptians could not be trusted to uphold their end of the Anglo-Egyptian bargain. The cells’ attacks accomplished little other than cosmetic damage to some American and British-owned property in Cairo and Alexandria. July saw the arrest of ten members of the ring, including an IDF intelligence officer, by the Egyptian authorities. The actions had no effect on the Anglo-Egyptian talks.43 While the initial incidents occurred during Bennike’s term as UNTSO chief of staff, Burns dealt with their destructive fallout.

The Israeli attempt to destabilize Egypt produced support for Nasser just as he moved to modernize the military and focus attention on Israel following the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. The Israeli actions also provided impetus for the spread of the
Egyptian brand of pan-Arab nationalism, which threatened both Israel and pro-Western Arab states such as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.

In seeking to arrest the Egyptian efforts to obtain regional ascendancy and to divert attention from the failed sabotage operation (termed esek haBish, Hebrew for “the rotten business”), Israel sought to embarrass Egypt internationally by revealing Cairo’s flagrant disregard for the 1951 Security Council resolution on freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. On 30 September, the Bat Galim, an Israeli-flagged and crewed merchant vessel, sailed into the waterway carrying an innocuous cargo of tinned meat, hides, and plywood. The vessel, which had entered the canal in good working order and thus was not covered by the Egypt-Israel Distressed Vessel Agreement, was promptly impounded and its ten crewmembers imprisoned. Previous Israeli tests of the Egyptian blockade had been limited to European-flagged vessels – normally granted passage – but the Bat Galim demonstrated that Israeli-flagged vessels would not be permitted to traverse the canal. Clearly, only wider international mediation could solve the problem.

Egypt refused to cooperate, claiming that it had detained the ship because its crew had murdered Egyptian fishermen. The Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Salah Salem, stated as much in Cairo’s leading newspaper, Al-Ahram, the next day. Another Cairo publication, the government organ Al-Gomhorriya, termed the affair “uncivilized zionist fanaticism” and clamoured that “Egypt and the Arabs must appeal in the name of humanity and its culture to all nations of the world who will aid in wiping Israel off the face of the map because of its barbarism.” The Egyptian media routinely made statements of this kind, but its version of the Suez Canal events was a blatant fabrication,
as the UNTSO investigation promptly revealed.\textsuperscript{49} With Nasser seeking to consolidate his power, there could be no pause in Egypt’s anti-Israel rhetoric, much less its anti-Israel actions.

When Israel raised the \textit{Bat Galim} issue in the EIMAC, Egypt insisted that the large backlog of outstanding complaints be dealt with first. According to the rules of procedure, UNTSO and Israel had no choice but to relent. Israeli amendments to the rules of procedure were defeated by the filibustering of the senior Egyptian EIMAC delegate, Lieutenant-Colonel Salah Gohar.\textsuperscript{50} Burns proffered his good offices to mediate the dispute, but Egypt rejected the suggestion. After much mutual posturing, the Egyptians returned the crew of the \textit{Bat Galim} to Israel on 1 January 1955. The ship itself, which the Tel Aviv daily \textit{Maariv} depicted as part of an Egyptian Museum exhibit in a January 1955 editorial cartoon, was incorporated into the Egyptian Navy in August 1956.\textsuperscript{51} Evidently, Egypt had no plans to end the canal blockade even under duress.

The increased tension was also reflected on the frontier between the two countries. In August, an IDF private dressed in civilian clothes deserted to Egypt and revealed that all of the inhabitants of Ketziot, a recently-established \textit{kibbutz} within the El Auja Demilitarized Zone (DZ), were members of \textit{Nahal}, the IDF fighting-pioneer unit. The peacekeepers had suspected this already, for most communal settlements did not have only 18 to 20-year-old heavily armed and mainly male “farmers” as Ketziot did. This existence of what UNTSO described as a “camouflaged military camp” violated the Armistice Agreement and increased the likelihood of conflict in the ever-sensitive DZ.\textsuperscript{52} Meanwhile, Palestinians continued to infiltrate into the Negev from Gaza to steal or to
destroy infrastructure: on the night of 11 August, infiltrators sabotaged the Nir Am water pipeline supplying fifteen frontier kibbutzim. Israel responded four nights later by destroying the main Gaza water pipeline, but the infiltrators returned to damage Nir Am again on 7 September, 25 October, and 4 December.53 Egypt announced additional anti-infiltration directives in response, as Egyptian Army documents later captured by the IDF confirmed, but Israel demanded more, often via press coverage. In December, Hasin Hasan Faraj, an inmate in the Jaffa prison, informed an Israeli press conference that he had been forced by Colonel Mustafa Hafez, chief of Egyptian Army intelligence, to abandon his Gaza vegetable stand and infiltrate into Israel.54 The difficulty of spotting infiltrators like these in the desert led to the UNTSO deployment of an observation plane – Belgian and French Air Force pilots were attached to the EIMAC – to support the most important investigations.55 The Egyptians also approached UNTSO to permanently post a peacekeeper to El Auja, again trusting in the international officers even though they did little other than supply outside reports on the aftermath of Israeli reprisals.56

In the midst of the frontier trouble, Burns invited Egypt and Israel to accede to an accord resembling the still-unsigned Jerusalem-area LCA. UNTSO always tried to keep the two sides talking, but Israel wanted to do this without any peacekeepers present. When Burns suggested a MAC meeting to help resolve the festering Azazme Bedouin issue, where Israel was in violation of a Security Council resolution, Dayan deflected the move by writing to Burns that he “proposed officially to sit together with Egypt and try to find a practical solution in light of present realities. It is regretted that the Egyptian delegation chose to reject this proposal.”57 Burns understood that he might have more
luck with his simple four-point proposal: joint patrols along the armistice line, the employment of only regular forces near the line, the fencing of sensitive parts of the frontier, and local commanders’ meetings. This effort met with even less success than the aborted Jerusalem talks. Throughout the final four months of 1954, the number of complaints submitted to the EIMAC spiralled ever higher. The outbreak of open warfare between Egypt and Israel seemed imminent.

This possibility inspired an ambitious Western attempt to covertly arrange an Egypt-Israel peace agreement. The Anglo-American effort, codenamed Operation Alpha, was agreed upon in November and took concrete shape in January 1955. The two powers recognized the need for an organized push to resolve the core of the dispute, something that was well beyond the UNTSO mandate. Both the UN and France, the latter struggling to recover from ignominious military defeat in Indochina and committed to containing the Algerian revolt, were not informed of the operation. The Americans believed that they had some sway with the Israelis, while the British supposedly retained influence in Egypt, a theoretically ideal combination. Unlike previous United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine (UNCCP) efforts, the powers resolved to coerce the two intransigent states with a delicate combination of carrots and sticks that only they could provide. The effort, based on the understanding that Egypt-Israel rapprochement was the key to halting the overall conflict, needed to extract painful concessions from the Israelis, concessions designed to force Egypt to accept Israel. Success would benefit not only the parties, but also the West, which could use a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict to fully integrate the region into the Western orbit and fend off further
Soviet regional involvement. Operation Alpha would be proposed to the parties in 1955.

Strengthening UNTSO was a central component of Alpha, for the peace settlement effort required a relaxation of frontier tension in order to have any chance of success. Only the peacekeepers, in concert with the parties to the Armistice Agreements themselves, could obtain this. The prospects for peace looked bleak as 1954 turned into 1955, but Alpha held out the promise of something better. On the other hand, the old policies, including the Israeli attempt to force Jordan to sign the Jerusalem LCA without UNTSO involvement, again backfired. Not only did that move scuttle the already-agreed upon accord for the foreseeable future, but it made Jordan more cautious and ensured that the peacekeepers could not be circumvented, exactly the opposite of what Israel had wanted. Israeli officials believed that the drawbacks accruing from the presence of the peacekeepers outweighed the benefits, especially since UNTSO investigations helped produce MAC resolutions against Israel and negative international media attention. Overall, the parties’ complete inability to compromise on even the most basic issues not only kept the peacekeepers working, but also strengthened their operations, culminating in the direct involvement of the great powers in their most intimate affairs.

Considering the difficulties on the ground, this may well have represented a positive development. There were others as well. Since the incidents on Lake Tiberias in May, the Israel-Syria frontier had remained relatively quiet. The quiet was disturbed in December when Syria captured a five-man IDF espionage patrol on its side of the armistice line, an incident that would have serious repercussions in 1955. Syria also
protested the Israeli refusal to return to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, but the deadlock persisted because neither side would compromise over the sovereignty and water issues that always threatened to spark additional violent incidents.62 At least nothing serious had disturbed the smooth work of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission. By the end of the year, even the Israel-Jordan frontier, long the flashpoint of the entire conflict, had calmed down, thanks in large measure to the actions of Burns and the replacement of Hutchison with Brewster in the HJKIMAC.63 No one could have known it at the time, but there would not be another significant IDF reprisal against Jordan until September 1956. UNTSO and Israel had even managed to repair their relationship and agree on the role of the peacekeepers in Israeli Jerusalem.

After the commands of Lieutenant-General William Riley, who was often partial to Israel, and Bennike, who was usually supportive of the Arab states, UNTSO had finally found a balanced chief of staff in Burns. He certainly improved upon his chequered Second World War record, always remaining calm under pressure and taking an active role in keeping the parties talking and upholding the peace. He collected his own impressions in a Christmas Eve letter to Lester Pearson, writing that “the job really has a lot of satisfaction in it – just the trying, and the feeling that perhaps a few less people have been shot than might otherwise have been.”64 Even this limited accomplishment would be for naught if troubles worsened between Egypt and Israel.
In his diary entry for 19 January 1955, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Chief of Staff Major-General E.L.M. Burns recorded, “Makes 5 months I am in Jerusalem. So far no accomplishment, except things are rather quieter and there is less ‘tension.’” Burns would not have the chance to pen a similar entry in the future for, as the year progressed, the Arab-Israeli conflict became the Egypt-Israel conflict. The Egyptian junta, under the leadership of charismatic Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, used its growing military power and the lingering resentment of Gaza Palestinians to challenge its neighbours for regional dominance. This represented a much more serious threat to Israel, and to Middle East peace, than the infiltration incidents and frontier skirmishing with Jordan that had dominated the period from 1949 to 1954. Nothing highlighted this more than conclusion of a substantial arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in September 1955, a move that further polarized the regional Cold War divide. Israel responded with severe reprisal attacks and efforts to obtain more Western weapons and support. What could halt this seemingly inevitable slide towards war?

The Americans and British believed that, with a little help from the UNTSO peacekeepers on the ground, Operation Alpha held the answer. The Egypt-Israel peace settlement proposed by Alpha complemented the British effort to establish a pro-Western Middle East defence alliance. Waning British regional influence fostered these
combined appeals, as did the ever-increasing regional popularity of Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism. An earlier attempt to forge a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) had failed, but the British willfully exaggerated the threat of Communism and promised modern arms to states sympathetic to joining a new pact. This proposal found support from states geographically close to the Soviet Union and, on 24 February 1955, Iraq and Turkey established a military alliance, with Britain, Iran, and Pakistan acceding to the Baghdad Pact before the end of the year. Egypt viewed the alliance as a threat, since the pact contained both Britain, the former colonial power it had long struggled against, and Iraq, the principal Egyptian rival for leadership of the Arab world. The pact also threatened to supersede the pre-existing Arab League collective security measures. These had little actual relevance, but symbolized the pan-Arab ideal.³ Israel also distrusted the Baghdad Pact, fearing Arab-Western rapprochement and resenting the perceived threat to burgeoning trade with Iran and Turkey. In hoping to preserve wider influence, the Americans did not join. While American arms provided an incentive to signatories, the United States had learned from experience just how quickly honest broker relations could be soured by arms sales. Following the conclusion of an independent arms deal with Pakistan, a key nation along the “northern tier” of Soviet border states, American peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Military Observer Group, India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir were declared persona non grata by India.⁴ As a result, the United States did not wish to derail progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement through accession to any Middle East alliance.
On the ground, the year began on a positive note, with Egypt returning the crew of the *Bat Galim* to Israel on 1 January, the resumption of Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) meetings, and the start of a survey of the armistice line, in keeping with Burns’ November 1954 proposals. But Israel ceased cooperating with Egypt following the execution of two of the Egyptian Jewish saboteurs apprehended the previous year. Although Israel and the Western powers had pleaded for amnesty, Nasser’s regime could not risk leniency with Israeli operatives after brutally suppressing the homegrown opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood (six of their leaders had been hanged in December) and facing down challenges from Iraq.\(^5\) Israeli Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon resigned in the wake of the executions, which led to the return of David Ben-Gurion as defence minister and, following July elections, as prime minister.

Israeli media reports emphasized the public “shock” fostered by the executions.\(^6\) While the populace mourned, Gaza infiltrators seized confidential documents and murdered civilians in Rishon LeZion and Rehovot, communities on the southern outskirts of Tel Aviv. While Moshe Sharett had disbanded Unit 101 after he assumed the prime ministership, Major Ariel Sharon’s troops merged with existing paratroop formations and, thanks to express demands by senior officers, the reprisals themselves continued. In the official Israeli view, infiltrator depredations close to Tel Aviv, with its relative distance from the frontiers and its position as home to the defence ministry, foreign embassies, and most newspapers, demanded a harsh response. On the night of 28 February, Sharon led a reprisal which devastated Egyptian military positions in the Gaza
Strip. The Egyptian Army suffered 64 casualties, including 36 killed; the Israel Defence Force (IDF) lost 21 soldiers.\(^7\)

With this action, the most violent clash between regular forces since the signing of the Armistice Agreements, the Israelis struck directly at Nasser’s prestige. The junta recognized the threat.\(^8\) By demonstrating the weakness of the Egyptian Army, the Israelis also illustrated the helplessness of a government composed of the senior officers of that army. Nasser had to respond if he wished to retain his hold on power, a response which required a massive military build-up. Like the armies of the other Arab states, the small and unprofessional Egyptian forces had been battered in the 1948-49 War. Many of the finest Egyptian officers had likewise moved into revolutionary politics, while the bulk of the military and all of its best formations surrounded the Suez Canal, patrolled Egypt’s disputed borders with Libya and Sudan, or were devoted to stifling internal dissent. Until the 28 February attack, only one company of regular troops had been regularly posted to the Gaza Strip, with local defence the responsibility of National Guard units officered by Egyptians but composed of local Palestinians.\(^9\) As had been the case with Jordan in 1953-54, the Israeli attack goaded Egyptian regular forces into taking a more active role along the frontier, further increasing the number and seriousness of incidents.

Angry Gazans also vented their frustrations, turning on both the Egyptian authorities and United Nations (UN) representatives. Rioting broke out in Gaza City early on the morning following the Israeli attack. Crowds stormed the home of the Egyptian governor, threw stones at the EIMAC office, destroyed two UN vehicles, and burned the local United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) headquarters to the ground.
The Gazans demanded weapons and military training; the UN evacuated its civilian employees. Regular EIMAC meetings and the surveying of the armistice line, which had tentatively resumed after the execution of the two saboteurs, ceased once again. In the face of this violence, Burns publicly suggested more stringent outside measures, such as halting all arms sales to Israel for three months, to curb the violence.

On 29 March, the regular pattern repeated itself when a Security Council resolution condemned Israel for the Gaza attack. The UNTSO investigation also identified the Egyptian role in abetting the violence, but asserted that only the actions of both parties could stop it. The next day a second resolution encouraged Egypt and Israel to accept Burns’ 1954 proposals, including joint patrols and the employment of only regular forces along the armistice line, the fencing of sensitive parts of the frontier, and instituting local commanders’ meetings to reduce tension. Unfortunately for all involved, despite basic cooperation with UNTSO, the Egyptian government responded to the attack in a manner very different from its earlier restraint.

While the Gaza attack represented an Israeli attempt to punish Egypt for its failure to control infiltration, it resulted in the Egyptian development of a more violent and better organized form of the practice. Nasser personally resented the attack and, in the wake of the British withdrawal agreement and the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt was strong enough to risk confronting Israel. Egypt chose to do so by harnessing Palestinian anger. The concept of fedayeen, an Arabic title bestowed upon those who sacrifice themselves for a cause, stemmed from the Egyptian guerrilla campaign against the British Suez Canal forces. Thus, in March, once Gazans understood that Cairo now
welcomed attacks against Israel, smugglers (*mitsalilun*) began to be honoured as *fedayeen*. These were not visitors to old lands; they were marauders out to murder Israelis. Simultaneously, the Egyptians built up their forces in Sinai and the Gaza Strip in order to ensure military control and deter additional Israeli attacks. *Fedayeen* assaults were also launched from Jordan and Lebanon. This export of Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism allowed Palestinians to do the fighting and dying, and forced the other Arab states to share the consequences of reprisals. Although *fedayeen* forays did not begin in earnest until August, the Gaza attack had presaged a dangerous expansion of the conflict.

In the meantime, an international gathering announced Egypt’s new-found confidence to the world. European decolonization had fostered the growth of a new bloc of nations that rejected the dueling ideologies of the Cold War. The Bandung Conference, an April meeting of these “non-aligned” states in Indonesia, demonstrated the scope of this third force. At Bandung, Nasser gained support from the People’s Republic of China, India, Yugoslavia, and other developing countries, simultaneously repudiating both the Western and Eastern alliances. For its part, Israel had no chance of being considered by a group that espoused the position of the Arab states on the Palestine question. This non-aligned support allowed Egypt to further assert its regional and international influence.

Egyptian success at Bandung was buttressed by rare good news from the Israel-Jordan frontier, so long the centre of the conflict. The Jordanian government, mindful of its campaign for UN membership and eager to stabilize 19-year-old King Hussein on the throne, moved to contain violence. On 18 April, Israeli Colonel Haim Herzog and
Jordanian Colonel Abdul Halim al-Sakat finally agreed to the Jerusalem-area Local Commanders’ Agreement (LCA) that had been pending since November 1954. Both sides ratified their agreement by informing UNTSO that they would respect the provisions of the accord, including direct telephone contact, but they did not sign any document. Immediately afterwards, Burns formally proposed the implementation of an improved general LCA. He attached a draft accord and offered to personally chair a meeting to discuss it. The parties expressed polite interest but, after the experiences of previous wider accords – all of which had failed – nothing more. The Jerusalem agreement nevertheless succeeded in reducing incidents in the divided city and contributed, despite the ongoing friction fostered by an unmarked frontier and a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) burdened with over 2,000 outstanding complaints, to the cooperation prevailing between the regular forces along the armistice line.

Unfortunately for the peacekeepers, the formerly serene Israel-Lebanon frontier became a source of trouble in the midst of the Jerusalem success. On 11 April, the Lebanese authorities detained three Israelis who had deliberately crossed the frontier, apparently in search of adventure. UNTSO referred to the three men as “hikers,” since when apprehended they were carrying Sten guns and grenades along with camping equipment. Israel demanded their immediate release, while the media clamoured for an attack on Beirut – Haaretz reported that the men had been “kidnapped” – conveniently ignoring its own unyielding position on Arab infiltration. Israel let Lebanon know that this situation was different by sending soldiers and police across the frontier to seize Lebanese nationals and livestock. Burns informed UN headquarters of the trouble,
writing, “Tranquility has ceased on a usually quiet border. The Lebanese are anxious to deal with their 3 prisoners with leniency, but in view of public opinion, feel that they must prosecute them for crossing the border and carrying fire-arms.”

Through UNTSO channels, Lebanon informed Israel that the hikers would be well-treated and returned as soon as the furor died down, which turned out to be in August. The Israelis accepted this compromise.

Nothing so positive could be said about developments between Israel and Syria. When he became chief of staff, Burns reformed the organization of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC), appointing fellow Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.L. Castonguay as chairman. This change failed to entice either Israel or Syria to resume regular meetings. Relations had been tense since 9 December 1954, when a Syrian patrol had captured five IDF soldiers in the act of retrieving listening devices planted on a telephone pole in Syrian territory. At the 12 January ISMAC emergency meeting prompted by the incident, Castonguay supported the Israeli resolution that the prisoners be returned as soon as possible. The next day, one of the captured soldiers, Private Uri Ilan, committed suicide, leading Israel to fear that the prisoners were being tortured. UNTSO peacekeepers investigated the suicide, returned Ilan’s body to Israel, and reported that the prisoners were being well-treated, but Syria refused to implement the ISMAC ruling. This prompted Israeli calls for reprisals against Syria. These cries, much like the clamouring for revenge against Egypt after the execution of the Israeli agents and the uproar against Lebanon following the hikers incident, disregarded the fact that Israeli soldiers had infiltrated into a neighbouring state, in the Syrian case to
facilitate espionage. Syria also informed UNTSO that Israel held 35 of its nationals, including probable defectors missing since 1948, and proposed an exchange. Israel pressured the peacekeepers to obtain the release of the IDF prisoners, openly dismissing the Syrian exchange offer, while treating their own demand as a test of UNTSO effectiveness. In late February, Burns admitted to New York that he was “not in a position to give the assurance requested from me that the four Israeli prisoners would be returned ‘say within a week.’” As a result, at an ISMAC emergency meeting on 16 March, the IDF senior staff officer for all four MACs, Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Shalev, announced that Israel would no longer attend meetings with Syria. This turned out to be the final ISMAC meeting before the 1956 War, and it concluded with the two sides farther apart than ever before. This mutual alienation did not immediately lead to more violence, thanks to Israel’s focus on the Egyptian frontier and to the internal upheaval still dominating Syria.

MAC problems not withstanding, by April there remained the very real prospect of a war between Egypt and Israel. Such a war might easily expand into a regional, or even international, conflagration. As a result, the next moves made by UNTSO would be the most crucial since its establishment in 1949: challenges that ensured another shift in peacekeeping activity. Instead of guiding MAC investigations into frontier incidents, Burns and his senior officers began to mediate negotiations of international importance, mainly because both sides trusted no one else to do so. This relatively smooth transition further demonstrated the value of UNTSO, even as the MACs themselves crumbled into obsolescence.
Western diplomacy required the peacekeepers to play a more prominent role. While Britain and the United States did not inform UNTSO of Operation Alpha, the peacekeepers needed to foster progress on the ground for the peace effort to have any chance of success. They made their first protracted pitch of Alpha in April. Egypt responded with counter-proposals against the Baghdad Pact. As the British Embassy in Cairo informed the Foreign Office, Nasser “could not be expected to take any concrete steps in the matter unless and until the present inter-Arab dissensions had died down.” If Egypt accepted Alpha beforehand, “he would merely be accused of having let Egypt fall into a Western plot to keep the Arab states weak and strengthen Israel.” A pleased Foreign Office reported back on the next step, stating “it is essential that there should be a reduction in the dangerous tension on the Gaza frontier.”

In seeking to reduce that tension, UNTSO requested a separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces and asked for renewed public commitments to respect all of the provisions of the Armistice Agreements. Burns’ plan to stabilize the armistice line was still based on joint foot patrols by regular troops, marking of the frontier, and the conclusion of an LCA. These suggestions remained unacceptable to the parties, although Egypt allowed the peacekeepers to establish fixed posts on its side of the line. The parties’ inability to agree to a wider compromise led UNTSO to insist on a 500 metre mutual pullback from the frontier. The peacekeepers especially tried to persuade the Israelis to cease what they termed “provocative” patrols, which paralleled – and often crossed – the armistice line, guaranteeing an Egyptian response. Israel rejected this proposal, and the proposal for joint patrols, on the grounds of infringement of sovereignty.
Despite the Israeli stance, UNTSO supported the position that tension could only be eliminated by addressing the larger issues behind frontier incidents in direct negotiations. Burns offered to host talks between the two sides on the neutral ground of UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem, but Egypt demurred. After strong American representations urging both sides to work with UNTSO, the Egyptians agreed to talks along the Gaza line, appointing as their representative Colonel Salah Gohar, the former senior Egyptian EIMAC delegate and the War Ministry director of Palestine affairs. UNTSO had pleaded with Egypt to appoint someone, anyone, else, noting, “A conference with him as representative would be refused or would be bound to fail if it ever took place.” Israel wished to meet with Mahmoud Riad, then serving as the Egyptian ambassador to Syria, but the American ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade, explained Egypt’s objection, claiming that Israel wanted the talks to fail in order to justify still higher-level direct contacts. Despite intense pressure from the UN and the Western powers, Egypt declined to send anyone but Gohar to the talks, thus ensuring that the negotiations took the form of an extended emergency EIMAC meeting.

The talks, which began on 28 June, played the part to perfection. UNTSO consultations had already revealed the fault lines, with Egypt unwilling to inform Israel of infiltrator punishments, accept any marking of the frontier, or allow telephone contact. Gohar similarly insisted that the parties forego any LCA, instead preferring a vague “Agreement to Maintain Security along the Demarcation Line.” Semantics aside, in ponderous, tense meetings held in a sun-beaten iron hut at remote Kilo 95, Gohar rejected all of the stipulations necessary for cooperation. Burns drafted the agenda; Gohar
rejected it. Burns made seven separate changes to the agenda; Gohar rejected each in turn. In Burns’ reckoning, the excuses offered to stunt progress amounted to contrived fears that, with direct Egypt-Israel telephone contact, “Some simple Egyptian sergeant would be seduced into gossiping by some honey-voiced Israeli girl soldier.” Whatever the case, Egypt would not accept direct telephone communication with Israel. The Israelis played their usual part as well. Since they desired only direct talks, the Israeli representatives objected to the UNTSO compromise that peacekeepers would attend future meetings only at the request of either party. As Yosef Tekoah, the Israeli Foreign Ministry director for armistice affairs, noted during the 8 August meeting, “UNTSO seems to be not an organ which would assist the two Parties, but which seems to symbolize, I would say, the continued policy of non-cooperation between the two sides.” Burns rejected the positions of both Egypt and Israel, proclaiming the UNTSO desire to help the parties keep the peace with the aid of an LCA: “The whole purpose of this arrangement is to provide additional means for maintaining security when it is not adequately covered in the original agreement of the MAC. It involves quick action, not after things have happened and after long argumentation of who is to blame, but to prevent incidents instead of placing blame after.”

Egypt, resentful of Burns’ central role in convening the talks and actually trying to make them work, chose the opportunity to launch a campaign against the “pro-Israel” UNTSO chief of staff. Burns was familiar with the efforts undertaken against his predecessors, Generals Bennike and Riley, and conceded that the Egyptian maneuver was part of the job. Kennett Love, chief Middle East correspondent for The New York Times,
publicized the Egyptian claims, asserting that Burns would soon be replaced by retired American General and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley.\textsuperscript{47} For his part, Burns informed the American consul-general in Jerusalem that he would not mind if it leaked out that Gohar was obstructing the talks. Just one week after the initial newspaper report, the Egyptians reversed course and publicly praised the work of Burns.\textsuperscript{48}

As Gohar’s actions indicated, the Egyptian representative had only sat down with the Israelis in an attempt to relieve IDF pressure on the junta. Once this realization became clear, the talks became another opportunity to score propaganda points, especially if Gohar could force the Israelis to quit the talks first, or vice-versa, thus supposedly demonstrating that the other side opposed peace. The differences of opinion between the two sides on all but this central issue ensured a poisonous, drawn-out process of no benefit to anyone. Indeed, the Kilo 95 talks were a microcosm of the concurrent covert Anglo-American effort that sought to convince Egypt and Israel to accept the Operation Alpha peace proposal.

As the talks floundered, Israeli voters went to the polls. The 27 July election saw David Ben-Gurion returned as prime minister, while right-wing parties Herut and the National Religious Front gained seats. Complicated coalition talks took almost four months to complete, but the early November result was a government much more committed than its predecessor to aggressively ensuring Israel’s security.

Even the incremental progress made in the Kilo 95 talks was soon sabotaged. The Israelis continued patrolling up to the frontier and also began marking the armistice line
one metre east of the surveyed boundary, despite Egyptian objections. UNTSO informed
the Egyptians of the survey activities, but Egyptian officers refused to receive the
messages in-person, allowing them to feign ignorance of the notifications when their
soldiers fired on the Israelis. On 8 August, the Israelis, accompanied by peacekeepers
acting as witnesses to the survey work, came under fire from an Egyptian outpost.
UNTSO thus learned that the offended fortification was situated within the El Auja
Demilitarized Zone (DZ), in violation of the Armistice Agreement. In response, the
Egyptians threatened the EIMAC chairman, Major François Giacomaggi, that he would
be held responsible for “the consequences of the continuation of this marking and the
results that may occur.” Since Egypt refused to recognize its eastern neighbour,
UNTSO could not make sense of the opposition to Israeli preparations to erect a physical
barrier on their side of the line. After the same outpost fired on another Israeli patrol later
in the month, Israeli soldiers overran the position, killing five Egyptians and capturing 25
others. The resulting mutual recriminations prompted Egypt to withdraw from the Kilo
95 talks on 24 August.

In the immediate aftermath, Burns arrived in Cairo to try to entice the Egyptian
government into high-level talks with Israel. As Burns noted in his report to Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld – the chief of staff’s cables now went directly to him –
“Gohar reacted violently against the proposal and apparently his views prevailed.” Burns
believed that Gohar opposed anyone else’s involvement in talks with the Israelis, as that
would interfere with his privileged position as director of Palestine affairs. Burns’
actions were now measured attempts to assert dwindling UNTSO influence, but even he
could not persuade the parties to revise their core positions. He would be granted many more opportunities to try.

One week after the collapse of the Kilo 95 talks, Egyptian *fedayeen* launched murderous forays into Israel. In the prevailing mood of hopelessness created by these attacks on civilians, often deep within Israeli territory – one *fedayeen* unit penetrated within 18 kilometres of Tel Aviv – IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan tendered his resignation. Ben-Gurion rejected the action, and the Israeli government again responded with military reprisals. On the night of 31 August, just hours after another series of brazen *fedayeen* assaults, the IDF struck the Gaza refugee camp of Khan Younis, a centre of *fedayeen* training. The attackers killed 72 Egyptian soldiers, against the loss of one Israeli paratrooper.

On the day of the attack, the IDF prevented six UNTSO peacekeepers and three other UN personnel in Beersheva from leaving that city. Despite Israeli explanations, the maneuver prevented the peacekeepers from reporting the reprisal. International condemnation following the attacks on Qibya, Nahalin, and Gaza had convinced the Israelis to control outside information about reprisal attacks. The Israelis were also fed up with UNTSO. The Egyptians had made it clear during the Kilo 95 talks that they continued to welcome the peacekeepers, and Israel seized on this fact as evidence that UNTSO remained an obstacle to direct talks. Over the years, Israel had made repeated attempts to curb the operations of the peacekeepers, but the final months of 1955 marked a concerted effort that crippled the already-floundering EIMAC, a policy aided by Egypt’s own actions.
UNTSO sought to halt the cycle of violence in spite of these conditions. Burns, who termed the *fedayeen* attacks a “war crime,” similarly denounced the reprisal against Khan Younis and urged both sides to retreat from the brink of war.\(^57\) Cairo Radio and the Egyptian newspapers boasted of the achievements of the *fedayeen* before any other media coverage appeared, a “coincidence” that invalidated official claims that the government knew nothing of the attacks. Ibrahim Tenawi, the military correspondent for Cairo’s *Al-Ahram*, provided dispatches from *fedayeen* designed to assuage the Egyptian desire for revenge. *Al-Akhbar* did the same: “Blessed good greetings from the depths of Palestine and not from its outskirts,” wrote Gaza *feday* Abed al-Rahman Habib in the 5 September issue, “I call on God to accompany me in order to serve my nation, and to become one of her martyrs and to save Gamal Abdel Nasser for Egypt.”\(^58\) In the prevailing mood, Egypt rejected a British request for a conciliatory statement, asserting that public opinion would never condone it. Nasser further emphasized that the *fedayeen* represented Egypt’s only means of retaliation against Israel.\(^59\) On 8 September, the Security Council, unable to condemn the *fedayeen* attacks in the face of a Soviet veto, ordered a ceasefire.\(^60\) This failed to renew the talks, setting off yet another of Burns’ futile diplomatic road shows.

The Israelis chose a military solution to this stalemate. On the night of 20-21 September, the IDF occupied the El Auja DZ, including the EIMAC headquarters. Swedish Captain Gerhard Svedlund, the peacekeeper on duty that night – and an officer regularly at the sharp end of the conflict because of his wealth of investigative experience and fluency in Arabic – was awoken by a section of Israeli soldiers who ordered him to remain in his room. Disobeying the instruction, Svedlund sought out the unarmed
Egyptian soldiers bunking in the camp, but the Israelis prevented him from learning their whereabouts. Svedlund’s presence at El Auja ensured a first-hand UN perspective on the incident, a rarity by this stage in the conflict, as all now recognized the dangers inherent in allowing the peacekeepers to investigate, much less witness, attacks. True to form, his report revealed that the senior Israeli EIMAC delegate, Lieutenant-Colonel Yaakov Nursella, had personally led the attack, although the IDF refused to grant UNTSO interviews with the soldiers involved. Burns immediately began the tedious process of negotiating an end to the occupation, but the Israelis had again made their point: military action achieved results, UNTSO did not. While Israel would tolerate an UNTSO presence along the frontier until the outbreak of the 1956 War, in large part because of the peacekeepers’ unique ability to communicate with both sides, the Israeli military occupation of the DZ established by the first Armistice Agreement and of EIMAC headquarters spoke volumes about its opinion of UNTSO. More immediately troubling for the peacekeepers, however, was the wounding of the senior Egyptian officer during the attack. While the soldier happened to be a mere second lieutenant, experience had taught UNTSO that “every time an Egyptian officer was wounded or killed during an incident, there was some kind of retaliation afterwards.”

The result was the first serious attack on Israel from across the Lebanese frontier. On 22 September, four fedayeen firing Bren guns and throwing grenades from pre-sited ambush positions waylaid a Tzafat-bound bus outside Meron. Three passengers were killed and nine wounded. ISMAC peacekeepers rushed to the scene to begin the investigation and assist the two officers serving with the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice
Commission (ILMAC). The attack came just days after the Israeli and Lebanese authorities had released a joint statement that they would “search for and liquidate all terrorist organizations within their territories which might plan and undertake hostile acts against the other party.” The Lebanese cooperated with the investigation, allowing Israeli trackers to follow the trail of the attackers to the frontier village of Maroun al-Ras. While the Israelis recognized the prints of three of the men from previous infiltration investigations, the attackers evaded capture. Nevertheless, the murders threatened IDF reprisals against the one neighbouring state with which Israel enjoyed virtually normal relations. In response, the Lebanese government continued to cooperate with the efficient mixed ILMAC investigations while creating a ten kilometre security zone along the frontier. In the interests of an “anti-smuggling” effort, whole villages were moved behind the line and no unauthorized crossings were permitted. The Lebanese Army also dispatched a senior officer to meet with the Israelis and formulate joint action against the fedayeen. The thorough work of UNTSO and the committed response of the Lebanese government ended attacks from that country and foiled the Egyptian effort to export the conflict.

Modest success on the Lebanese frontier did nothing for the deadlock in the desert. The Israelis justified their El Auja occupation by claiming that two wrongs made a right: they had captured the DZ in order to remove the Egyptian outposts. They also protested the fact that Egypt did not uphold parts of the Armistice Agreement, notably Articles VII, 3 and VIII, 3, dealing with the amount and type of regular forces permitted in the western DZ. Moreover, with Egypt in violation of a Security Council resolution on
freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal that the great powers would not enforce, Israel believed that the country had no choice but to act alone – and especially without hindrances like UNTSO.66 In a meeting with Ambassador Byroade, Nasser denounced this policy: “He stated Israel must finally come to learn that these tactics would not work and that he was not going to agree to any position that did in fact, or even gave appearance, of shoving UNTSO aside.”67 The UN could hardly agree with Israeli logic, either, especially with both sides proudly violating the Armistice Agreement and ignoring the Security Council. As Hammarskjöld later wrote to Burns, “Cannot have strictest application of the armistice agreement west of frontier with consolidation and legal recognition of Israeli position east of the frontier.”68

This became a moot point on 27 September, when Nasser publicly announced the conclusion of a massive arms-for-cotton deal with Czechoslovakia. The recently-concluded Warsaw Pact, a military alliance of Soviet satellites established in response to NATO, made it clear who the real supplier was, in spite of Egypt’s “non-aligned” status. The deal included T-54 tanks, heavy artillery, jet fighters, bombers, and submarines: in short, the military technology that signified modernity and promised battlefield prowess.69 The Egyptians then concluded a military alliance with Syria – soon joined by Saudi Arabia and Yemen – forming a powerful counterweight to the Baghdad Pact. While Egypt had always considered itself the leader of both the Arab states and the struggle against Israel, these military advances confirmed that position.

The West, so long devoted to keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East, reacted petulantly to the arms deal. Certainly, there could be no greater evidence of the failure of
Operation Alpha than this: the efforts to keep the Soviet Union out had in fact brought the Soviet Union in. The USSR used its Czechoslovak proxy to end the Western arms monopoly in one fell swoop, with the West granting them the opportunity through the 1950 Tripartite Agreement and its failure to supply Egypt with weapons while advocating a peace settlement. But Britain and the United States had armed Iraq and other members of the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact, and the Egyptians had only approached the Soviets after repeated rejections by those same two powers.

Egypt required time to absorb its bounty of unfamiliar weaponry, regardless of the hundreds of Warsaw Pact advisors included with the deal. In the meantime, the Egyptians explained that the weapons represented a means to help modernize the state, to counter Iraqi military growth, and to deter Israeli attacks. In an interview with *The New York Times*, Nasser alleged that Egypt needed to be stronger even to negotiate on equal terms with Israel, arguing that “I cannot defend Egypt with schools and hospitals and factories, and what will be the use of them if they are destroyed?” This did not sway the Israelis, who viewed the arms deal as their most pressing existential threat, the opening move in a planned war of annihilation. The Israelis especially feared attacks against their urban centres by the new Ilyushin bombers, whose operational altitude exceeded that of their fighter and anti-aircraft defences. Based on these fears, the Israelis believed that they had no choice but to save themselves by striking Egypt before it could fully absorb the Czechoslovak arms. Ben-Gurion personally announced this policy, encouraging donations of valuables to support Israel in its time of trial and publicly threatening Egypt with war if the Straits of Tiran were not opened to Israeli shipping. The West likewise
stepped up its regional aid in response to the Czechoslovak deal, but to Iran and Iraq, not to Israel; UNTSO was left to contain the complications of the great powers’ Middle Eastern machinations.77

Not surprisingly, after the arms deal, Israel rarely bothered with formal EIMAC procedures such as lodging complaints or requesting investigations. UNTSO relations with Egypt were equally troubled, with Burns blaming much of this on Gohar, still ensconced as the director of Palestine affairs.78 While the ILMAC functioned smoothly even after the Meron murders, the constant frontier clashes between regular forces and the parties’ refusals even to acknowledge the ISMAC rendered the larger MAC system of little consequence, their progress hindered by massive backlogs of complaints, a near-total lack of cooperation from the parties, and political deadlock. Even as the peacekeepers’ responsibilities exceeded their capabilities, they tried to solve these daunting problems.

The peacekeepers first surveyed the Egypt-Israel armistice line themselves. This effort, overseen by Major Le Moine, a French topographical expert, occurred without serious incident, but this was just another survey, not a marking of the line.79 Israel still claimed that the survey represented an infringement on its sovereignty, while Egypt repeated demands for an Israeli withdrawal from the DZ and carried out more fedayeen attacks, prompting Israeli reprisals.80 Belgian Captain de Ghellinck and a Field Service radio officer learned this firsthand during a 16 October patrol, when an Egyptian outpost raked their white UN vehicles flying white flags with sustained small-arms fire. With their vehicles disabled, the two men went to ground and remained motionless until dark,
after which they hiked nine kilometres back to El Auja and reported the incident. The Egyptians had urgently requested an UNTSO investigation into the alleged presence of Israeli soldiers in the area. As a livid Burns informed Hammarskjöld, “This is a most flagrant example of lack of coordination between Egyptian delegation to EIMAC and commanders of Egypt troops in the area and general lack of control over troops. Unless this situation is corrected it will become impossible for EIMAC to operate.”

Burns sought extra assistance from New York to help temper the overall situation, which he felt was certain to lead to open war without drastic improvements on the ground. With the Egypt-Israel frontier extremely tense, Burns worked his contingent, which at the end of June 1955 consisted of only 36 officers, to the fullest, rotating peacekeepers between the various MACs to allow for wide experience and only very occasional rest. While the chief of staff considered requesting additional peacekeepers at this time, his administrative priority was the establishment of a rapid reinforcement group capable of bringing in ten new officers on 24-hours notice. This did not represent a drastic increase, but UN member states proffered little support, probably as a result of the dire situation. Burns further advised that Israel be counselled to avoid reprisals until the secretary-general could remonstrate against the fedayeen: “I feel strongest representations should be made to Egypt to put an immediate stop to all such activity which she can in any way control and also cease glorification of the exploits of these terrorists in press and radio.”

Following further consultations with Burns and representatives of the three Western powers, the Security Council released Hammarskjöld’s own proposals for
overcoming the deadlock.\textsuperscript{84} They contained few new ideas, the UN hoping that the personal involvement of the secretary-general, fresh from his success meditating the release of fifteen American airmen imprisoned in the People’s Republic of China, would compel the intransigent parties to compromise.\textsuperscript{85} This was a bold step for the UN, but there was little else that the international organization had not yet tried and, more than anything else, the initiative revealed the depth of the Middle Eastern morass. Hammarskjöld stepped in, emphasizing at each pace that he was acting to support Burns.\textsuperscript{86} The proposals themselves called for all military personnel, fortifications, and mines to be removed from the El Auja DZ and – again – for the erection of a barrier along the Egypt-Israel frontier.\textsuperscript{87} The parties replied with the usual objections and launched propaganda efforts blaming the other for the situation.

The renewed high-level diplomatic efforts necessitated by Hammarskjöld’s proposals took the peacekeepers back into uncharted political territory. The toll was beginning to show. Evelyn Shuckburgh, the British Foreign Office under-secretary for Middle Eastern affairs and one of the principal architects of Alpha, noted in early November that Burns was “looking much aged and very grim.”\textsuperscript{88} Burns nonetheless dutifully shuttled to the regional capitals in search of some assistance from the parties. On 9 November, the chief of staff even urged Ben-Gurion to help solve the Palestinian refugee crisis, which he viewed as the real primary obstacle to détente, even though “it was not my business to negotiate peace.”\textsuperscript{89} As Burns’ drastic maneuver demonstrated, the failure of Operation Alpha had forced UNTSO into a peacemaking role which, thanks to the parties, promised to be little more successful than its peacekeeping one.
Obviously, only drastic innovation could bring calm to the Egypt-Israel frontier. Herein lay the genesis for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which emerged after the total breakdown along the same frontier in 1956. The Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, proposed, at November meetings with Nasser, raising an international buffer force to be placed along the frontier between Egypt and Israel. Burns and another Canadian officer, the UNTSO permanent liaison in Cairo, Lieutenant-Colonel David Ely, contributed key ideas at the talks. This should not have been surprising, since UNTSO possessed the most experience with the issue and had placed peacekeepers in fixed positions on the Egyptian side of the line from April until Egypt ordered their removal five months later. Burns also met with Byroade, and the two discussed “having a neutral military force in the El Auja and nearby areas to ensure tranquility.” Both Egypt and Israel rejected the international buffer force suggestion, as did the British.

On the ground, Egypt and Israel continued to constrain the peacekeepers by limiting their freedom of movement and by violating the Armistice Agreement – Israel through its maintenance of an infantry battalion and fortifications in the DZ, and Egypt by prohibiting UNTSO from operating on its side of the armistice line. Rather than struggling to make progress on the ground, Burns again travelled to Cairo to try to convince Egypt to resume direct talks with Israel. The Israelis provided instructions for Burns, with Tekoah – the Foreign Ministry had assumed full control of the MAC delegations from the IDF in June – reminding Burns that since Israel had accepted the secretary-general’s proposals “in principle,” while Egypt had only informed the UN of its
conditional acceptance, “public clarification of the real situation would be useful in efforts to bring about a modification of Egypt’s discouraging attitude; and pronouncements glossing over the facts would only add to confusion.” Unsolicited advice notwithstanding, the Egyptian attitude was indeed discouraging, as Giacomaggi learned from his meeting with Egyptian Chief of Staff Abdel Hakim Amer. Burns dispatched Giacomaggi to urge the Egyptian Army to cease sponsoring fedayeen attacks from the West Bank; Amer responded with thinly-veiled threats, informing the EIMAC chairman that “You must understand that we can send not one or two, but more than forty of such groups, and are not, consequently, interested in such uncontrolled and quite ineffective sabotage.” On 24 November, an UNTSO press communiqué announced that neither party had accepted Hammarskjöld’s proposals.

In the face of these implacable attitudes, the violence worsened. Throughout October and November, using the captured El Auja road junction as a jumping-off point, Israel launched elaborate and effective attacks against Egyptian military positions in Sinai. The attackers also began seizing large numbers of prisoners, including 29 at Kuntilla and 55 at al-Sabha, in addition to the 81 Egyptian soldiers killed in the latter attack alone. In seeking to spark war with Egypt, Israel also temporarily held the ground captured in these attacks. The Egyptian and Syrian media countered with claims that their combined forces had killed 250 Israeli soldiers. UNTSO immediately verified that these were imaginary victories; indeed, the battles described had never taken place. Nevertheless, an IDF raid into Syria on 22 October, the first since the December 1954 incident, resulted in the capture of five Syrian soldiers. The raid upped the
brinkmanship in the prisoner stakes: Israel refused to allow UNTSO to visit the captured soldiers until Syria released its four Israeli captives.  

Additional problems had also festered between Israel and Syria. Burns had attempted to resolve these, without success. For instance, UNTSO had again broached a formal division of the DZs, Syria’s main demand. But, as during the last round of two-party talks in 1953, both sides preferred jockeying for greater control on the ground to compromise, especially after the capture of the Israeli espionage team in Syrian territory. Burns also commissioned a new report on the Jordan River diversion project. The Canadian backed the findings, which repudiated the 1954 ruling that the project granted Israel military advantage. Burns still did not want the work to resume, as it represented a threat to the quiet along the frontier. At the same time, the Syrians frustrated special American mediator Eric Johnston by refusing to involve Israel in any water-sharing agreement “even,” as Burns later recorded, “if the Arab states would thereby achieve greater benefits.” While the parties ceased talking to one another after the final ISMAC emergency meeting in March, the frontier settled into a deceptive calm, broken by the October raid, which itself had been prompted by the conclusion of the military alliance between Egypt and Syria.

Less than two months later, on 11 December – a Sunday and thus the chief of staff’s weekly day off – Ben-Gurion invited Burns to a meeting. Their wide-ranging talk was designed to gauge Burns’ opinion of the consequences of another Israeli reprisal attack. The Canadian later described the prime minister as uncharacteristically apprehensive in his discussion of Syrian developments. Burns did not say anything that
persuaded Ben-Gurion to change course, as an attack against Syria went ahead hours later.\textsuperscript{105}

In its first stage, the attackers approached the northeastern shore of Lake Tiberias, prodding the Syrians into opening fire. With the justification for action having been established, 600 Israeli soldiers, supported by artillery, mortars, and half-tracks, disembarked and rapidly overwhelmed the confused Syrian outposts. The attackers systematically eradicated all of the Syrian shore positions, killing 56 Syrian soldiers and civilians, wounding nine, and capturing 32 prisoners. The IDF lost six killed.\textsuperscript{106}

The UNTSO investigators who arrived on the scene the next day found that two Syrian soldiers had been killed by bayonet, while “All the dead had suffered severe multiple wounds,” testaments to the ferocity of the fighting. American Captain Ralph Turner went further, calling the action a “treacherous and monstrous attack” and a “massacre,” demonstrating that UNTSO peacekeepers also made emotional judgments.\textsuperscript{107}

Desperate to prevent a further escalation of violence, Burns again enlisted the aid of the secretary-general for a comprehensive ceasefire attempt. Although there had been no fedayeen attacks from Syria and the frontier had remained quiet for most of the year, Israel explained that their operation had been necessary to end Syrian illegal fishing. Castonguay’s report to Burns stated that, aside from the staged provocation, the Israelis had submitted no complaints of any kind to the ISMAC since 1 November, and none concerning fishing since 28 September.\textsuperscript{108} Nor did the Israeli newspapers, often platforms for the government’s security position, show any concern about fishing until after the attack.\textsuperscript{109} The Lake Tiberias fishing season began only in late November, but there is no
doubt that the attack was actually designed to test the Egypt-Syria alliance and to force the release of the four Israeli soldiers being held by Syria.

When the Egyptians did not come to the aid of their ally and the Security Council harshly condemned the attack, Israel backed down. Neither party requested an ISMAC emergency meeting, inaction that essentially signalled the end of the commission. The ISMAC may not have enjoyed much success during its short existence but, as the Israeli military operation made clear, other options did not represent an improvement. In Burns’ report to the secretary-general on the attack, he explained that after the last regular ISMAC meeting in 1951, “It has been replaced with more or less success by informal conversations and also unfortunately, when an incident occurs, by unilateral statements the object or result of which is to inflame public opinion.” If this did not change, Burns argued, war on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts would be the result.110

Israel kept up a rearguard action to justify the attack, an effort centred on publicizing captured Syrian standing orders to fire on Israeli police boats – but not on fishing vessels – if they came within 250 metres of the northeastern shore. UNTSO verified the accuracy of these reports, investigations which also revealed that, thanks to past UNTSO errors, Syria incorrectly believed that Israel had agreed to keep police boats that distance from the shore.111 The whole incident revealed the willful deception that all were capable of, as well as the danger of miscommunication, a problem inherent in any “relationship” that was not on speaking terms. Nonetheless, the Syrian reaction, including “spontaneous” Damascus demonstrations by young men demanding to be allowed to defend the frontier, and the harshness of the Soviet condemnation of Israel – the
amendments to the draft Security Council resolution proposed by the Soviet Union demanded that Israel pay indemnities to Syria, and that Israel be threatened with Chapter VII military intervention to deter future attacks – allowed the West to moderate its criticism of the assault.112

The Lake Tiberias attack affected arms sales to both countries. Syria reacted with the signing of its own Warsaw Pact arms deal, and Israel eventually benefited with more outside weapons as well. Moshe Sharett was especially incensed at the operation, since the Israeli foreign minister was then in the United States pleading for the Americans to meet their “moral obligation” to supply weapons to a supposedly defenceless Israel.113 Not only did the Americans decline to help, they pushed Israel to approach Canada, Italy, and other middle powers instead.114 Attacking Syria, a former French mandate, also threatened relations with Paris, Israel’s only large-scale weapons supplier. The French, who resented their exclusion from the Baghdad Pact and other Anglo-American maneuvers, began delivering weapons to Israel in November, just two months after the announcement of the Czechoslovak arms deal with Egypt.115 While these deliveries were temporarily suspended after the Tiberias attack, that operation actually strengthened the relationship between the two countries. The French military was particularly impressed with the operational successes of the Israeli reprisals, and longed to emulate them in Algeria. Franco-Israeli cooperation was based upon the doctrine of the enemy of an enemy being a friend; thus, in exchange for arms, including Mystère fighter-bombers capable of confronting the Egyptian Ilyushins, the Israelis supplied intelligence on Egyptian support for the Algerian Front de Libération nationale.116 The Tiberias attack
also gave Israel a large number of Syrian prisoners to exchange for their four men held in Syria, a swap that occurred in March 1956.

While the Lake Tiberias attack received the bulk of UNTSO attention throughout December, Jordan was simultaneously torn apart by its people’s opposition to the Baghdad Pact. During the latter half of the year, Britain and Turkey had tried to negotiate Jordanian accession to the military alliance. The Egyptians, eager to prevent any Arab states from entering the Iraqi sphere of influence, organized some of the Jordanian dissent, but Nasser’s precedent of removing the British and obtaining modern weapons inspired Jordanians to rise up in defiance of the monarchy’s desire to join the pact: the West could hardly have created a more perfect cause to rally Egyptian pan-Arabism. Riots paralyzed Jordanian centres, and the cluster of Western consulates and residents in Jerusalem, including many UNTSO peacekeepers and their families, made the area a regular target for the mobs of young men roaming the streets. Burns had mud hurled at his UN car during the disturbances, another experience he dismissed as part of his job, but the authorities eventually contained the unrest. While the tension failed to spread across the Israel-Jordan frontier, Jordan declined to join the Baghdad Pact. The country was divided, with even young Arab Legion officers actively supporting the recruitment of fedayeen and conspiring to oust the British. The West and its allies were in retreat across the Middle East.

Operation Alpha technically outlasted these events, but this fleeting survival proved to be of little consequence. As the fighting between Egypt and Israel grew worse in the last months of 1955, British and American representatives revealed elements of the
secret proposals. United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles hinted publicly on 26 August that “If agreement can be reached on these basic problems of refugees, fear, and boundaries, it should prove possible to find solutions for others.” This was eminently logical but, as the work of UNTSO demonstrated, no agreement was pending on these “basic problems.” British Prime Minister Anthony Eden likewise raised the tired spectre of a revival of the partition plan in his November speech at Guildhall. Egypt never relented in its desire for Israeli territorial concessions in exchange for peace, and Alpha supported the Egyptian claim for a land corridor across the Negev. Israel opposed this, just as it had opposed all previous proposals involving territorial concessions. With war against Egypt likely at any time, Israel could not be persuaded to change its mind, even with the prospect of receiving the Gaza Strip and a security guarantee from the United States in return. Because neither Egypt nor Israel desired the peace offered by Alpha, the effort had come to naught by the end of 1955, joining all of the other peace proposals that had preceded it.

Each of the threats to peace that arose in 1955 – the Baghdad Pact, the fedayeen, the Israeli reprisals, the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia, the collapse of the ISMAC and EIMAC, and the failure of Operation Alpha – had been set in motion by a complex series of events. The most important of these was the fact that the West operated upon the understanding that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to Middle East peace, even though the Middle Eastern states aptly played that role themselves. The Israeli attack on Gaza was central to the year’s dénouement, but the great powers, despite their backing of UNTSO, ensured that its consequences could not be contained. Although
Egypt would likely have opted to confront Israel regardless of the Gaza operation (as the regime’s rhetoric strongly suggested it would), the Israeli reprisal ensured that the junta would do so sooner rather than later. Even if the Gaza attack was not the main reason for the aggressive Egyptian actions throughout the year, it established a handy symbolic justification: Nasser and his fellow military revolutionaries could not risk failing to confront such a salient threat to their newly-consolidated power. This Egyptian policy prompted a defiant Israeli response. While the West vainly concentrated on trying to coerce both sides into a peace settlement, the Soviet Union took advantage of the opportunity to arm Egypt and to establish regional influence.

In October, when the IDF attacked Egyptian bases in the Sinai, the *fedayeen* attacks immediately stopped. This demonstrated that Egypt possessed the ability to halt violent infiltration when the junta so desired, and showed that Israeli reprisals could fulfill their stated purpose under certain circumstances. But any relaxation in tension was only temporary. Egypt was busy expanding the *fedayeen* and training its military on Warsaw Pact weapons, while Israel desperately tried to match those arms with French support. The Middle East had taken sides in the Cold War, with the signatories to the Armistice Agreements now beholden through arms shipments to the competing great powers. The West shoulders most of the blame for this situation, but it should be borne in mind that Egypt’s steep asking-price for supporting the West was the partitioning and renunciation of Israel. The British, desperate to retain the remnants of colonial influence, were tempted; the Americans refused. Israel would never have allowed it. The French, thanks to the Algerian War more deeply involved in the region than the two other
Western powers, opted to back the side enjoying military success against a common enemy. All three of the major Western powers could hardly have been more supportive of the efforts of UNTSO yet, thanks to their actions in abetting the prevailing atmosphere of belligerence and gross deception, it hardly mattered. Indeed, the overall failures of Anglo-American diplomacy far outpaced those of UNTSO, and they led most directly to the events of 1956.

Ironically, it was the sheer recklessness of Egypt and Israel that prevented the outbreak of war in 1955. Both states went to the very brink, and arrived separately at the same conclusion: that war would be better waged at another, more opportune, time. The evident willingness of both sides to go to war in the future marked the most serious UNTSO setback.

The fact that the EIMAC and ISMAC were finished at the end of another tumultuous year further supports this contention. Both Egypt and Israel soon resumed submitting complaints to the former but, with the parties in contravention of the Armistice Agreement, neither requested investigations of these complaints. The most important MAC was reduced to a propaganda forum allowing each side to proclaim the duly-tabulated depredations of the other to receptive domestic audiences.

While two of the MACs were all but buried, the parties’ other options also produced few dividends. Direct talks had failed completely. What Israel really wanted were high-level talks without any outside observers and, aside from a few clandestine meetings of little consequence, these did not occur. The Arab states, with the notable and very quiet exception of Lebanon, would not accept this. Moreover, the direct talks
attempted in 1955 not only ended in failure – the Kilo 95 meetings even began in failure – but also precipitated spasms of frontier violence worse than any that had come before. Unlike the official Israeli perception, and regardless of supposed Egyptian support for the peacekeepers (Egypt’s decision to cease cooperating with the peacekeepers while issuing public statements that all was well actually contributed to the severity of the frontier violence), UNTSO was not an obstacle to direct talks. UNTSO remained the only mechanism that allowed Israel to retain a modicum of contact with the Arab states. Time and again, UNTSO kept the lines of communication open and helped prevent incidents and reduce tension, even in the darkest moments of a very bad year.

There were some successes. While the fighting briefly threatened to envelop Lebanon, the ILMAC and the parties demonstrated how the armistice regime was supposed to work. Lebanon ensured that after the terrible precedent of Meron, no additional fedayeen attacks would come from its soil. Israel likewise refrained from conducting the usual reprisals, either following the hikers incident or the Meron murders, recognizing that Lebanon wished to live in peace, even if its own internal fissures and minority position within the Arab League blocked a formal settlement. UNTSO peacekeepers, especially Burns, had also proven themselves worthy diplomats, carrying out unexpected and unwelcome additional responsibilities with extraordinary patience and tact.

As had happened many times before, the violence on the ground overtook the peace settlement efforts. The parties’ alternatives to Operation Alpha were not their own peace proposals, but more violence. While the Anglo-American peace plan faltered, the
peacekeeping mission that Nathan Pelcovits described as the “least unacceptable option for all concerned” again adapted to the troubled circumstances and continued its work. The year 1955 was very bad for Middle East peacekeeping, but valuable lessons were still learned. UNTSO peacekeepers and their chief of staff, with a great deal of assistance from Hammarskjöld and Pearson, had learned that the only way to prevent Egypt and Israel from fighting was to create a buffer between their military forces. While the two states prevented this plan from being put into place in the fall of 1955, events demonstrated that the later establishment of UNEF was the culmination of bitterly-earned first-hand experience.
CHAPTER 7

Keeping the Peace

January-November 1956

In the late afternoon of 29 October 1956, Israeli paratroopers dropped from the sky above the Sinai peninsula. In due course, additional units surged across the armistice line into Egypt, beginning the Second Arab-Israeli War. The United Nations (UN) rose to the challenge presented by this conflict. Despite the central failure of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the larger response of the UN demonstrated the intrinsic value of peacekeeping. Only one week after the commencement of hostilities, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was established as an armed buffer between Egypt and Israel, finally ushering in a sustained period of regional calm. The success of UNEF stemmed from what UNTSO had learned: Egyptian and Israeli forces needed to be physically separated in order for the two states to consider peace. This separation was not easy to accomplish. Until the war began, the parties to the Armistice Agreements prevented UNTSO from helping to keep the peace because they were committed to breaking it. Both the Arab states and Israel secured outside arms from the great powers, refused to cooperate in the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), and stymied the peace efforts of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. UNTSO secured reinforcements for itself, but the influence of the peacekeepers declined until they were reduced to the role of onlookers and the failure of Egypt and Israel to seize the many opportunities to make peace led to more fighting.
Unlike the peacekeepers, outside powers wishing to help forge a peace settlement were reduced to onlookers long before October 1956, even as they issued fresh proposals and dispatched new mediators to the region. The aftermath of the devastating December 1955 Israeli attack on Syria provided for a universal period of much-needed reflection. The United States seized the opportunity to renew its regional peace efforts. Unlike the now-abandoned Operation Alpha, this attempt, code-named Gamma, was launched under the personal supervision of President Dwight Eisenhower. The American peace emissary, Robert Anderson, possessed no diplomatic credentials aside from his close friendship with the president. He did not make substantial progress.¹ Pending the establishment of UNEF, Anderson’s failed mission marked the end of serious Arab-Israeli peace settlement efforts, leaving the UNTSO peacekeepers as the only consistent option for mediating the conflict.

In early February, Britain and the United States requested UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.L.M. Burns’ assessment of how many additional peacekeepers he needed.² Burns responded by requesting the largest increase to date – 20 new peacekeepers to augment the 40 then serving with the mission. The events of the previous year had demonstrated to Burns that separating the Egyptians and the Israelis offered the only hope for peacekeeping, and he had already drafted a report on the need for UNTSO to help do so: “If a demilitarized zone watched by U.N. observers cannot be established on both sides of a demarcation line,” Burns wrote, “there should be no opposition to a country proposing that its side of the line should be watched by means of U.N. patrols or
observation posts.” In the face of Israel’s insistence that UNTSO could not be enlarged without its permission, the Security Council approved the requested increase.4

Events in Jordan further emphasized the need for more peacekeepers. While the Jordanian monarchy supported the British-inspired Baghdad Pact, the Jordanian people did not. Through December 1955 and January 1956, more than 200 Jordanians were killed in violent public protests against the alliance. The opposition forced King Hussein to dissolve Parliament and decline to join the pact. Only martial law and total press censorship restored calm to the fractured country.5 Buoyed by their success, the opposition then demanded repeal of the unpopular Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and removal of British officers from the Arab Legion. Egyptian radio propagandists – the rampaging rioters had managed to steer clear of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian embassies during the disturbances – seized the opportunity to remind listeners of Egypt’s recent diplomatic triumph over the British and of the limited Arab Legion responses to Israeli reprisal attacks. To protect his precarious position, Hussein dismissed Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb, granting him only hours to leave the country he had served since 1930, and ten of his British colleagues on 1 March.6 The young king’s decision, described by British Under-Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs Evelyn Shuckburgh as a “monstrous piece of ingratitude,” effectively ended the British effort to provide a regional counterweight to the pan-Arab nationalism of Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser.7

Amidst Egyptian propaganda and Jordanian turmoil, Israel established a special defence fund and dispatched civilian work teams to fortify frontier settlements.8 The
prominent personal involvement of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Israel Defence Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan in the campaign – propaganda photos showed Ben-Gurion, stripped to the waist, helping to erect barbed wire fencing – provided further evidence of Israel’s determination to meet the threats of its neighbours.

Support for war was fuelled by the regional arms race, itself motivated by Egypt and Israel’s mutual fear of attack. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s November 1955 proposals had failed to ease this tension. Both Egypt and Israel “unconditionally” accepted the proposals, without actually implementing them. The 1950 Tripartite Declaration issued by Britain, France, and the United States had proven equally useless, although the Israeli government made repeated attempts to convince the West that the influx of Czechoslovak arms into Egypt obligated those powers to provide equivalent weapons to Israel. In response, at a January summit, Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden reaffirmed the declaration. Breaking ranks with its allies, France met the armament needs of Israel: by July, the French had delivered 82 Mystère fighter-bombers, 120 AMX tanks, and 40 Super Sherman tanks. Moreover, even as the Warsaw Pact dispatched advisors to Egypt and Syria, the Soviets warned against the presence of foreign troops in the Middle East without Security Council approval. The regional stakes had never been higher: was war, perhaps even a cataclysmic nuclear war between the superpowers, inevitable?

Throughout these developments, UNTSO and the UN leadership, labouring in ignorance of the American and British peace settlement efforts and theoretically “above” the Cold War, persisted in attempting to relieve tension between Israel and the Arab
states. The goals of the UN remained more modest than those of the great powers: obtaining a general ceasefire and separating Egyptian and Israeli forces along the armistice line. In order to achieve these goals, the Security Council granted Hammarskjöld an unprecedented personal mediatory role. The New York Times lauded this initiative, noting that Hammarskjöld “is not the cold and impassive character that the organizers of the United Nations may have contemplated.” The mission was risky. If the secretary-general failed in his last-ditch effort, as he had when Egypt and Israel circumvented his November 1955 proposals, war might well result.

On 4 April, the Security Council authorized the secretary-general to travel to the Middle East and survey compliance with the Armistice Agreements. Any anticipation fostered by the visit was shattered before Hammarskjöld arrived: on the same night that the resolution was passed, the IDF launched an artillery strike on Gaza City. The attack, a salvo of 120 millimetre shells fired into the centre of the city market, killed 58 and wounded over 100 civilians.

Burns tried, and failed, to halt the Egyptian reprisal. Fedayeen marauders, dispatched after Nasser had pledged to abide by the Armistice Agreement in a meeting with Hammarskjöld, murdered four children in a synagogue. From Cairo, the Voice of the Arabs radio programme pledged more of the same, threatening to unleash 50,000 fedayeen against Israel. The Israelis reacted more selectively than usual. Rather than retaliating against a military installation or settlement, the Israeli intelligence service assassinated the Egyptian Army officers believed to have been behind the fedayeen attacks. In July, both Colonel Mustafa Hafez, the Gaza director of the Egyptian
Intelligence Corps, and Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmoud Salah al-Din Mustafa, the military attaché in Amman, were assassinated by bombs hidden in books: the bomb that killed Mustafa was disguised as an UNTSO parcel.16

Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy nonetheless resulted in the signatories to the Armistice Agreements reiterating their complete support for the accords. They also accepted a separate ceasefire brokered by the secretary-general on 18 April. None of the states involved wished to start a war while Hammarskjöld was in the region, but the secretary-general could not remain in the Middle East indefinitely, and statements and actions remained different things. Reaffirming the Armistice Agreements also meant not moving beyond them. The success of Hammarskjöld thus provided a smokescreen for everyone involved. Egypt and the other Arab states still refused to recognize Israel, Israel still remained unwilling to accept this lack of recognition, and the UN remained essentially powerless to do anything more than it already had.

With no hope of resolving that impasse, the visit of the secretary-general facilitated UNTSO reinforcement consultations with Burns. Hammarskjöld was firm on one point: “Big power people should, to all possible extent, be avoided.”17 The UN instead relied upon middle power nations to supply the new peacekeepers. As the executive assistant to the secretary-general stated, the UN “will approach Canada, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and Australia.”18 Reinforcements were drawn from these states, as well as from The Netherlands. Most were immediately posted to the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) in order to increase the ability of UNTSO to act as a buffer along the Gaza armistice line.19 After years of gradual changes in the
composition of UNTSO, middle power officers now dominated the ranks. By June, American Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Richard Hommel, the Chairman of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJKIMAC), Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Brewster, and the French Chairman of the EIMAC, Major François Giacomaggi, had all left the mission or would soon depart.²⁰

The reinforcement states created problems of their own, especially Norway, which nominated lieutenant-colonels instead of the junior officers that Burns required. UN Headquarters feared that Norway would withdraw its four officers and refuse to dispatch other peacekeepers if Burns declined to accept the senior reinforcements. Compromise allowed the peacekeepers to focus on their operations with the help of two Norwegian lieutenant-colonels and two majors.²¹ Israeli monitoring of UN code traffic then sparked another reinforcement controversy, the rumour that Poland would supply peacekeepers to UNTSO. This rumour began when the Israelis circulated the news that a Dutch radio technician, a naturalized Pole named Popkowski, would be joining the mission.²² Despite Israeli and Western misgivings and the Warsaw Pact arms then flowing into Egypt and Syria, no Communist states supplied UNTSO reinforcements. Most importantly, as Burns wrote when reinforcements were first discussed in February, wherever they came from, “a large increase of Observers will be of no use unless the Parties cooperate.”²³

Hammarskjöld submitted his report on the lack of cooperation by the parties to the Security Council on 9 May. The Council responded by passing another resolution urging all of those involved to keep trying.²⁴ The resolution also ordered the parties to
respect the peacekeepers’ freedom of movement (despite intense lobbying by Burns, it stopped short of reissuing the 11 August 1949 ceasefire order), but Egypt and Israel continued to justify restrictions on the grounds of sovereign rights.\textsuperscript{25} Burns nevertheless set to work on implementing the wishes of the Security Council. In Burns’ opinion, UNTSO needed to do six things: finally mark the Egypt-Israel armistice line; further separate Egyptian and Israeli forces; extend the arrangement permitting fixed posts on both sides of the Gaza line; establish fixed posts on both sides of the Israel-Syria line along with a UN patrol boat on Lake Tiberias; conclude another Israel-Jordan Local Commanders’ Agreement (LCA); and revive EIMAC and Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) meetings.\textsuperscript{26}

From this point on, most work by UNTSO and the secretary-general involved attempting to convince Israel of the benefits of supporting the UN. In an emotional April letter to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Hammarskjöld declared, “I have made myself a personal hostage for your will,” before imploring, “I am working with you: please, Moshe, work with me.”\textsuperscript{27} Hammarskjöld also argued that the UN was an independent party to the armistice regime, a position Israel flatly rejected.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, Israel responded to the UN efforts by unilaterally dividing the Armistice Agreements, determining that Egypt’s failure to uphold Article I of the accord released Israel from compliance, pending Egyptian respect of that article. In the words of Sharett’s replacement as Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meyerson:

We have repeatedly declared that the Government of Israel views the provisions of the Armistice Agreements as an integral entity. Israel is prepared to abide fully by the Armistice Agreement. It cannot, however, acquiesce in a situation in which Arab States parties to the Agreements persist in their non-compliance with
fundamental clauses of the Armistice, while Israel is called upon to abide by certain provisions chosen by the other Parties because of their particular benefit to them.\textsuperscript{29}

The UN could not accept Israel acting as the ultimate judge of the armistice regime, but the international organization could not do much about it either.\textsuperscript{30} This standoff signified the irrelevance of the MACs. The Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) still functioned smoothly, but Israel and its other three neighbours no longer cooperated.

The EIMAC remained in abeyance because Israel would not allow the commission to hold meetings at its El Auja headquarters, occupied by the IDF since September 1955, and Egypt refused to meet elsewhere.\textsuperscript{31} Rather than shunting UNTSO aside, this situation encouraged the peacekeepers to further action. As Burns declared in his 17 July report to the Security Council, “The fact that the complaints are no longer considered in the MAC greatly increases the responsibility of the UNTSO Chief of Staff and his representative, the Chairman of the MAC, for observing the maintenance of the cease-fire by the two parties.”\textsuperscript{32} Even while Israel informed the peacekeepers that it considered any UNTSO presence in El Auja “altogether superfluous,” international officers garrisoned seven fixed posts along both sides of the Gaza armistice line.\textsuperscript{33} These reduced incidents, with Burns noting that “outbreaks of firing between Egyptian positions and Israeli patrols seldom occur near where the Observers are in position.”\textsuperscript{34}

The posts also allowed the peacekeepers to affix blame for incidents. In February, UNTSO verified that in three of that month’s cases the Israelis had started the shooting, while the Egyptians had done so in eight.\textsuperscript{35} The fact that both sides were still shooting
increased the potential for a more serious incident.36 There was likewise no satisfactory conclusion to the armistice line marking saga. With the aid of the fixed posts, the line had been partly delineated by barrels, but the strategic central area of the frontier remained unmarked. As in 1955, with the help of UNTSO, the parties concluded various marking agreements and arrangements then broke them before any actual work began.37 Moreover, since the Czechoslovak arms deal, Egyptian forces had consolidated in the Sinai, with Burns estimating in March that two infantry divisions and an armoured brigade were based in the al-Arish-Abu Aweisilia area. Although allowing complete freedom of movement to the peacekeepers was the only way that both sides could be certain that the other was not violating the Armistice Agreement, the parties preferred their own recourse to compromise.38

The Israel-Syria relationship was not as overtly troubled as that between Egypt and Israel, but initiating an ISMAC meeting proved as difficult as coordinating an EIMAC one.39 To help ease tension between the two ill-disposed neighbours, UNTSO requested fixed posts around Lake Tiberias and a patrol boat on the water. Since incidents always occurred in the same strategic locations, Canadian ISMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.L. Castonguay believed that fixed posts would serve as an effective “deterrent.”40 Syria permitted the peacekeepers to establish posts on its side of the line, but Israeli resistance to any perceived infringement of sovereignty – as well as any potential recognition of Syrian rights in the Demilitarized Zones (DZs) abutting the frontier – ensured that none would be constructed elsewhere.41 UNTSO efforts to have Israel dismantle “illegal” fortifications in the DZs proved equally fruitless.42 The frontier
remained calm, Castonguay reporting in May that, despite a few isolated incidents the peacekeepers under his command would likely have little to do until the autumn fishing season. The Syrians having been cowed by the December 1955 destruction of their lakeshore positions, and with Israeli attention focused elsewhere, no serious clashes took place between the two neighbours in 1956.

In fact, Hammarskjöld’s ceasefire held everywhere except along the Israel-Jordan frontier. New Jordanian Army Chief of Staff Major-General Ali Abu Nuwar and his colleagues were responsible for this anomaly, as they issued bombastic public statements, aided fedayeen attacks, and reneged on prior agreements, including the Jerusalem LCA. By the middle of the year, that agreement had been reduced to an “arrangement” with no hope of a wider deal, the Jordanians refusing even to continue direct telephone contact with their Israeli counterparts. Jordan alleged that Israel continued to expel Arabs across the frontier into Jordan; Israel insisted that the Jordanian accusation could only be tested in direct talks.

Lack of cooperation having destroyed the MACs, in April, the secretary-general directly intervened once again. Hammarskjöld proposed that Israel withdraw from El Auja in exchange for freedom of shipping through the Suez Canal. Egypt had tightened its blockade on European-flagged vessels carrying Israeli cargo, but Israel refused to consider the proposal, since it did not believe the UN had any real influence in Cairo. Ben-Gurion’s effort to explain this position to Hammarskjöld established a tenuous connection, the Swede and the Israeli Prime Minister maintaining a revealing personal correspondence from April onward. This direct communication occurred at the same time
that the armistice states significantly reduced their dealings with UNTSO, further
evidence of the peacekeepers’ waning effectiveness. Hammarskjöld’s letters to Ben-
Gurion railed against Israeli policies in a tone that he never adopted publicly. The
secretary-general also supported UNTSO, writing, “In my view sound political logic
should lead to the conclusion that, if you blame us for the inability of the UN organs to
assist, you should not, on the other hand, stall on such cooperation as would increase our
possibilities to be of help,” and, in one of his last letters, “I consider an effective UNTSO
operation helpful in an approach to the big problems.” In response, Ben-Gurion adroitly
explained Israel’s right to self-defence. The two statesmen, mutually frustrated by the
other’s failure to see reason, ended the correspondence in September. It was a stalemate
worthy of the more important deadlock on the ground.

In the midst of Hammarskjöld’s diplomacy, the conflict shifted back to the Israel-
Jordan frontier. Egyptian actions influenced this, but King Hussein’s fateful decision to
dismiss General Glubb was the principal action behind the change. From March, with
Glubb and his British colleagues out of the way, the Jordanians began doing what the
Israelis had always alleged they did: actively supporting violent infiltration. Israel
responded with reprisals.

Dealing with Jordanian infiltration into Israel should have been the UNTSO
specialty, but the peacekeepers floundered. In the worst example, a July gaffe by Burns
nearly precipitated war between Israel and Jordan. The two states had already reduced
Burns to little more than a messenger travelling from capital to capital: after a talk with
Ben-Gurion, Meyerson, and Dayan, Burns met a few days later with King Hussein and
General Nuwar in Amman. As he informed New York, “Stressed to them that a
dangerous frame of mind seemed to exist on the other side. Hence need to exercise
strictest control to prevent firing across the D.L. and other incidents contrary to observer
ceasefire. Otherwise Israelis might resort again to retaliation as Ben Gurion had warned
me.” Specifically, the prime minister had alluded to an Israeli plan to forcibly create a
land corridor to Mount Scopus unless the Jordanians finally accepted Article VIII of the
Armistice Agreement. Following receipt of the Israeli threat, which Burns hoped would
also serve his own desire to reduce frontier tension, the Jordanians mobilized their forces;
the IDF responded in kind. Burns defused the situation, but he had also done much to
inflame it in the first place. Israeli anger with the UN was further stoked by the
publication of former HJKIMAC Chairman Elmo Hutchison’s critical tell-all Violent
Truce, especially as the international organization declined to append a disclaimer in the
book.

The depth of tension between Israel and UNTSO was further revealed by the ugly
disagreement surrounding Major Einar Odd Hjellemo, one of the Norwegian
reinforcements. The disagreement began when the Israeli police confiscated Hjellemo’s
UN white card at the Syrian frontier on 11 July, preventing him from crossing any of the
armistice lines. The Israeli Foreign Office then publicly labelled Hjellemo an “anti-
Semit.” The Norwegian, a decorated Second World War resistance fighter, believed that
the Israeli actions were motivated by his past tour of the Middle East. In 1948, when he
was a reserve army officer and an Oslo police inspector, Hjellemo had been seconded to
the UN operation in Palestine. His investigative work identified Israeli government
agents for a break-and-enter in a UN building in Haifa. When Hjellemo departed on leave in August 1950, Israeli customs officials, alleging illegal currency trading and the possession of “anti-Semitic literature,” confiscated his travellers’ cheques and the source of the offensive literature, scrapbooks of Arabic newspaper articles. 

Considering this experience, it was surprising that he volunteered again for Middle East service, but the Israelis ensured that he would not remain for long. Useless as a peacekeeper without his freedom of movement, and with his reputation tarnished, Hjellemo resigned and returned home. Unable to prevent UNTSO expansion, Israel once again demonstrated its ability to censure and remove individual peacekeepers.

Larger events soon overshadowed the plight of Hjellemo. On 26 July, Nasser – who had been approved as president in a national plebiscite immediately following the final departure of British troops from Egypt – announced the unilateral nationalization of the Suez Canal Company before a massive crowd that, according to the US Embassy in Cairo, “wildly applauded” his “emotional and excited speech.”

The British and French governments, whose nationals controlled the waterway’s operating company, turned on Egypt in response. The European powers inflated the threat posed by Nasser: in this portrayal, the Egyptian dictator had not just stolen Anglo-French property, cut Europe’s oil lifeline, invited Communism into the Middle East, and undermined Algeria and Jordan, but he was also a threat to the entire world, another “Mussolini” or “Hitler.” Historian Earl Berger’s rhetorical question revealed another vital, if unspoken, element behind the reaction: “Was it simply that millions of French and Englishmen could not bear to be bested by the Egyptians, the despised gypos of
colonial days?” The Anglo-French smear campaign salved bruised European pride, but with Britain and France unwilling to forget those colonial days, it soon led to military collusion against Egypt as well.

The United States remained publicly aloof in the immediate aftermath of Nasser’s stunning announcement, although it shared common cause with the angry response of its European allies. Recognizing that no peace settlement was forthcoming and that Egypt had sided with international Communism, the United States had already launched a new covert effort, Operation Omega, to subvert the Nasser regime through suspension of foreign aid – including the decision to withdraw financing promised for the construction of the Aswan High Dam – and through sabotaging the Egyptian cotton crop.

The period surrounding the nationalization of the Canal Company shifted the focus of conflict from desert military outposts to the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, where Nasser had thousands of supporters. Hammarskjöld’s ceasefire held, albeit barely, but this extremely tense period represented the nadir for UNTSO, with the peacekeepers suffering their most serious casualties, including three officers badly wounded, another officer invalided home, and a Field Service radio operator killed.

All of these casualties were suffered in sensitive areas along the front lines of the conflict. In the first incident, two days before the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, two peacekeepers, Major Marcel Breault and Major George Flint, both Canadians, were wounded when they triggered an anti-personnel mine while mediating a dispute on Mount Scopus. Although the officers had managed to halt shooting between Israeli and Jordanian forces before they were wounded, the mine strike caused Flint
severe loss of blood and extensive abdominal, skeletal, and genito-urinary injuries. Breault was also hospitalized with serious back injuries.61

The next day, two peacekeepers travelling with a Jordanian liaison near the West Bank village of Beit Surik, Swedish Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Thalin and Danish Major Arne Müller, were attacked by a mob. The attack was broken off only when Jordanian soldiers fired into the crowd.62 The unprovoked assault left Thalin, a reinforcement officer who had accepted a demotion in rank in order to join UNTSO, paralyzed.63 Burns blamed these casualties squarely on “Jordanian indiscipline.” The Jordanian Army had started the Mount Scopus shooting by occupying a disputed house and was unable to prevent the Beit Surik attack and unwilling to punish those responsible for grievously wounding Thalin.64

Four days later, on 29 July, with the peacekeepers reeling from the casualties already suffered, a Danish Field Service radio operator, Svend Rasmussen, was killed when his jeep struck a mine planted in Israel by Egyptian fedayeen.65 On 1 August, Burns learned that American Naval Commander Andrew Terrill had been hospitalized in Beirut and that he would be invalided home to receive “psychological treatment”66 (Terrill’s duties had been reduced since 28 June, when the then-chairman supported an HJKIMAC emergency resolution condemning Israel for an incident in which two Israelis were killed in their own territory.67) UNTSO had lost four of its 53 officers and a radio operator in the span of just ten days.

Losses mounted in August, for reasons other than mines and mobs. That month, the staid ILMAC was drawn into controversy when Lebanese customs officials
implicated the long-time MAC Chairman, Lieutenant-Colonel Eugène Communal of France, in a smuggling ring. UN Headquarters in New York, which wanted to avoid establishing a precedent for waiving the diplomatic immunity of a peacekeeper, worked to keep the incident quiet, but Communal nonetheless resigned his commission and returned home.68

The UNTSO chief of staff also considered leaving the mission during this difficult period. In secret correspondence with Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Burns lobbied to be appointed Canada’s ambassador to Turkey. That plan did not come to fruition, and Burns accepted another extension of his UNTSO appointment on 20 July.69 While Burns retained his post, UNTSO remained ill-prepared for the coming war.

Israel responded to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by launching attacks against Jordan. No one was more surprised at this turn of events than the Egyptians.70 The UNTSO liaison officer in Cairo, Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel David Ely, reported on one factor that worked against an immediate Israeli move against Egypt: the Egyptians had re-concentrated forces astride the Suez Canal, significantly reducing troop levels in Gaza and Sinai.71 The Jordanians simultaneously provided UNTSO with compelling evidence that incidents along the Israel-Jordan frontier were “instigated by Egyptian agents.” When presenting these findings to Hammarskjöld, Burns used the opportunity to again censure both Egypt and Jordan for refusing to inform UNTSO of infiltrator punishments. The peacekeepers could not mediate Israeli reactions to violent infiltration without this information.72 Whatever their motivation, the number
and scope of Israeli cross-border attacks made Jordan seem the likely target of an impending invasion.

The peacekeepers failed to temper this violence. Although UNTSO had expanded to its largest size since the signing of the Armistice Agreements, reaching 65 officers and other ranks by the end of September 1956, reinforcement problems continued. Retention was particularly difficult. Although UNTSO peacekeepers routinely completed tours of one year or longer, four of the five Canadian reinforcements wished to return home after just six months in theatre.\footnote{73}

The violence in September tried the patience of even the most dedicated reinforcements. On 10 September, the Jordanian Army killed 13 IDF soldiers in clashes near Hebron. The IDF reprisal attacks against the West Bank villages of Khirbet ar Rhawa and Gharandal killed 33 Jordanians, mainly police officers. On 23 September, Jordanian machine-gunners fired on an archeology conference at Kibbutz Ramat Rahel, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, killing four archeologists. Two days later, the Israelis obliterated another Jordanian police fortress in response, killing 39.\footnote{74} An acerbic editorial in \textit{The Times} aptly summarized the situation: “Obviously, the Israelis do not trust the peace machinery of the UN; they trust only the punishing effect of their arms and the terror that they can strike by taking three, four or five Arab lives for every Israeli who is killed.”\footnote{75}

Hammarskjöld struggled to keep the ceasefire alive, by whatever means necessary. As he opined in a UN press release two days after the Khirbet ar Rhawa attack, “Neither the Armistice Agreements nor the cease-fire obligations have been
repealed by any of the parties concerned, and to say that the cease-fire obligation has been annulled by the violations it has suffered, would be incorrect as well as irresponsible.”76 Wishful reasoning of this sort had long since ceased to matter on the ground.77 The UN privately recognized this, Hammarskjöld providing Burns with evacuation guidelines ahead of his press release.78

UNTSO compounded its own difficulties by accepting the Jordanian claim that the Ramat Rahel murders resulted from the actions of a single “mad” soldier.79 The UNTSO ruling on Ramat Rahel prompted Israel to withdraw from the HJKIMAC on 1 October. Unlike earlier withdrawals, this maneuver looked permanent, for it was just the latest in a series of crackdowns on UNTSO activities. In September, Ben-Gurion bluntly informed Burns that the Israeli government would soon request the complete withdrawal of the peacekeepers from the country.80 On 5 October, Israel announced that the IDF would conduct its own investigations into incidents and banned UNTSO peacekeepers from operating in Israeli territory. As Burns cabled Hammarskjöld, if the peacekeepers could not conduct investigations and the parties no longer wished to take advantage of their mediation skills, they were essentially stranded tourists.81 While the Israelis officially remained members of the EIMAC, in keeping with their new policy, the IDF appointed a young captain as its senior MAC delegate.82 The result of these policy changes could be seen on 22 October, when Israel investigated a mine strike within the El Auja DZ. As Burns wrote, “It might be equally well alleged that this incident comes at an opportune time from the Israeli viewpoint. UNTSO is of course unable to confirm or deny the event or any of its particulars.”83 Egypt, Jordan, and Syria were only a little
more cooperative. It was now official: UNTSO only saw what the parties wanted it to see.

At the same time, the Jordanians demonstrated that they had adapted to IDF tactics. The 10-11 October attack on the West Bank frontier village of Qalqilya, which destroyed another police fortress and killed over 100 Jordanians, also cost the Israeli military almost 90 casualties, the worst toll for the IDF in six years of frontier fighting. The attacking force consisted of two infantry battalions, armour, and artillery support – the air force almost entered the fray to assist with their extraction – in a clear rehearsal of a combined arms operation.84

Rather than representing the opening move in a war, because of the plans of other powers Qalqilya abruptly ended Israeli incursions into Jordan. The Qalqilya attack also prompted an Iraqi declaration that they would station troops in Jordan to defend their fellow Hashemites. The announcement allowed Iraq to appear to be supporting Jordan while Egypt remained idle when, in reality, the reaction of Israel decided the matter. Since Iraq had remained in a state of war with Israel since 1948, Israel announced that it would consider any such troop movement a casus belli.85 Burns, expecting war, persuaded Jordan to allow UNTSO peacekeepers in Hebron, Latrun, and Nablus and began UN evacuation procedures.86 The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty helped calm the situation: Israel could not risk invading its eastern neighbour without jeopardizing a possible British-supported attack on Egypt.87

This exercise in diplomacy by other means failed to force Jordan to talk directly, but the policy provided valuable operational practice. Additional operations came soon
enough. On 25 October, Jordan allied with Egypt and Syria, the three states placing their combined troops under Egyptian military command.\textsuperscript{88} The next day, the Egyptians launched a new \textit{fedayeen} campaign against Israel; the IDF called up its reserves in response.

Nonetheless, the Israeli decision to invade Egypt in October 1956 was not a rash one. Despite deliveries of French arms, the Israelis had convinced themselves that they were alone in the world, facing annihilation by Soviet weapons in Egyptian hands.\textsuperscript{89} Furthermore, Israel had exhausted more peaceful options, including MAC meetings, covert negotiations, outside mediation, and coercive Western peace proposals, before choosing to attack. Israel had simultaneously balked at making any real concessions to Egypt, especially territorial concessions in the Negev, while Egypt similarly refused any steps towards recognition of, and peaceful relations with, its neighbour. These mutually intractable positions made war the only way to conduct diplomacy, and continued Egyptian belligerency and British and French anger with Egypt allowed the Israelis to strike – and triumph – with great power support.

That great power support, pledged in the Protocols of Sèvres signed by Britain, France, and Israel on 24 October, was intended to be covert. The plan was simple: Israel, apparently because it needed no justification to make war on Egypt, would invade, alone, on 29 October. The next day, Britain and France, ostensibly fearing for the safety of the Suez Canal, would issue separate ultimatums to Egypt and Israel, demanding that they withdraw their forces from the vicinity of the canal within twelve hours. If Egypt rejected the ultimatum, as it was expected to do, then, on 31 October, Anglo-French forces would
attack and seize control of the Canal, while the Israelis forcibly opened the Straits of Tiran to their shipping.

The official Israeli justification for war declared that the fedayeen had to be stopped at their source. While hardly an irrelevant factor, the principal motivation for the invasion remained Egypt’s Czechoslovakian arms deal. Israel needed to decisively defeat the Egyptian military before the full integration of the Warsaw Pact weapons, thus either imposing peace on favourable terms or buying time to foster Jewish immigration and settlement in a more secure environment: the unique opportunity to do so with great power support could not be missed.

As far as the Arab states were concerned, these were not the ideal circumstances for war. Attritional frontier skirmishes and the exploits of the fedayeen directed Palestinian anger toward Israel and away from Arab capitals, but Egypt and its allies were unprepared for a wider conflict, especially with the advanced, battle-hardened militaries of Britain and France. Egypt nevertheless had no choice but to stand and fight a conflict viewed as a war to finally secure independence from European colonialism.

The war began as planned on the afternoon of 29 October. Israel first detained or expelled all UNTSO peacekeepers posted along the Egypt-Israel armistice line. Then, using the occupied El Auja road junction as their jumping-off point, the Israelis swept down the thinly-populated and sparsely-defended Gulf of Aqaba coast. The attackers swiftly occupied Sharm al-Sheikh and the Gulf shoreline, capturing the Gaza Strip and penetrating deep into Sinai.
As anticipated, Egypt rejected the Anglo-French appeal to withdraw from the Canal and the Europeans invaded on 31 October. British and French forces engaged Egyptian troops defending the Canal terminus at Port Said, wresting control of the area by 5 November. Collusion between the three invading states was obvious. In its wake, Jordan and Syria failed to rush to the aid of Cairo. This did not matter once the United States and the Soviet Union weighed in.

The Soviets, simultaneously distracted with crushing the Hungarian uprising, threatened to rain missiles on London, Paris, and Tel Aviv unless the invading forces immediately withdrew. The American position was not as directly threatening but, for once, the two great powers agreed in principle – a fact that sharply illustrated the danger the Arab-Israeli conflict posed to nuclear peace. The Americans broke with their closest allies because they believed the neo-colonial attack sabotaged Western interests and further entrenched Soviet influence.\(^93\) The Americans and Soviets agreed that the potentially disastrous consequences had to be contained.

The UN provided the means. As Evelyn Shuckburgh later confided to his diary, “I do not think anyone imagined that Eisenhower would actually drive the UN to take positive action at unheard-of speed against us.”\(^94\) In New York, the Americans and Soviets cooperated, convening the General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace Resolution in order to avoid the British and French vetoes in the Security Council. The Canadian UN delegation, desperate to avoid a rupture in the Western alliance, proposed an armed international peacekeeping force to replace Anglo-French troops and to act as a buffer between Egypt and Israel, exactly what Burns had sought since 1955. The
formation of this peacekeeping operation, called the United Nations Emergency Force and placed under Burns’ command, helped broker the ceasefire that ended the war on 6 November. The first contingent of what soon became over 6,000 UNEF peacekeepers arrived in Cairo just eight days later. Although Lester Pearson officially proposed the peacekeeping force – for which he would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 – UNTSO experience led directly to this deployment.

UNEF introduced calm to the Egypt-Israel frontier, creating the primary circumstance necessary for renewed peace settlement efforts. At the same time, UNTSO maintained an international presence on Israel’s other three frontiers and nurtured a core group of peacekeepers versed in the many regional problems. These contingents assisted the peace process, formed the nuclei for future peacekeeping operations, and continued to work to downplay the regional influence of the Soviet bloc. Other important peacekeeping lessons were also learned from this crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria banned Australian, French, and New Zealand peacekeepers (the Antipodeans, dependent on European trade via the Suez Canal, had cheered the Anglo-French attack) from their territory. This action, which essentially eliminated one quarter of UNTSO strength, emphasized the future necessity of impartiality for peacekeeping providers.

American-led international pressure forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza Strip in March 1957 but, with the humbling of Egypt and the quiet seizure of El Auja and the DZs abutting the Syrian frontier while all eyes were on the Suez fighting, Israel had achieved its overarching goals. The benefits were much greater than those of
the 1949 Armistice Agreements, as the war forced the international community to tacitly recognize some of Israel’s core demands, including the marking of the armistice line with Egypt on Israeli terms, a separation of the two parties’ armed forces, and the curtailment of infiltration and fedayeen attacks. Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria were likewise cowed into collective acquiescence of this new reality.

Despite suffering thousands of casualties and extensive damage to its infrastructure (including the Suez Canal, reopened only with massive UN assistance in April 1957), Egypt also emerged victorious from the war. Nasser maintained his regime, repelled the European colonialists, and gave further impetus to pan-Arab nationalism. The real losers of the war were Britain and France, who ceased to matter in the Middle East, even as arms merchants. The failure of the Tripartite Declaration, the Jordanian dismissal of Glubb, and the unilateral Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company should already have convinced the Europeans of this, but it took the war, and the American and Soviet reactions to it, to confirm the message.

The UN response must not be overlooked either as, in this crisis, for once, the international organization acted as its designers had intended. UN reaction was swift, judicious, and effective. Cooperation between the two superpowers, with the vital assistance of middle power nations such as Canada and Sweden, ensured this. If the Soviet Union and the United States had been at odds over the Middle East crisis, events almost certainly would have turned out very differently, regardless of the position of any other state. The stark difference between great power cooperation and the lack thereof was best illustrated by Hammarskjöld’s failed missions. The secretary-general’s personal
diplomacy did not substantially assist UNTSO or the regional states. While Hammarskjöld linked the issues of calm on the frontiers and a peace settlement in ways that UNTSO could not, his efforts only worsened both the already-stormy UN relationship with Israel and the chances for peace. The Israeli government was especially displeased that Israel was seemingly singled out for UN remonstration, in spite of Egyptian *fedayeen* campaigns and Jordanian-instigated violence. The most drastic Israeli tactics, the attacks on the civilian centres of their neighbours, unilateral division of the Armistice Agreements, the smear campaign against Major Hjellemo, and the proscription against UNTSO activities within Israel, all came about following the interventions of Hammarskjöld.

The role of UNTSO was characterized by the fact that peacekeepers were wounded and killed in the performance of their duties. The MACs, which had barely survived the long summer of 1955, also became less rather than more effective. With war looming by October, the peacekeepers had been reduced to observers just when they were most needed. UNTSO used its limited means to try to prevent war – bringing in reinforcements, improving the fixed posts along the Gaza armistice line, and moving additional officers to the West Bank when Israel and Jordan teetered on the verge of hostilities. UNEF greatly improved this buffer force principle; with 6,000 peacekeepers it was too large and too well-armed to be pushed around as UNTSO had so often been. However, UNTSO had discovered the importance of the buffer force principle, a fact recognized by the UN with the appointment of General Burns as the first commanding officer of UNEF. Moreover, UNTSO was only rendered truly impotent when Egypt and
Israel had halted all mediation efforts and two of the Western Security Council members decided that colluding with Israel in their own national interests outweighed any other considerations. By that point in early October, Egypt had chosen not to concede on the Suez Canal Company nationalization and Israel had decided to go to war. Without the cooperation of the parties, there was no peace left to keep. Israel may have gone to war in order to impose peace, and UNTSO and UNEF may have been established to help keep it, but only an actual settlement could have guaranteed the avoidance of conflict.
CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

The 1949 Arab-Israeli General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) did not lead to a peace settlement. Until 1956, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the peacekeeping mission assigned to help the signatories uphold those agreements, was nevertheless the most successful Western initiative in the Middle East, effectively playing the dual role of peacekeeper and mediator. While the ultimate mission of UNTSO may not have been realized, the peacekeepers too often served as scapegoats for problems that Israel and the Arab states did not resolve themselves, including the failure to achieve a peace settlement.1 Peacekeeping was never intended to solve this deadlock. Although UN diplomacy had helped halt the original Arab-Israeli fighting by 1949, the chronically understaffed and unarmed peacekeepers could not enforce the armistice. From the experience of the frontier violence that followed in the wake of the Armistice Agreements, the UN learned that peacekeeping and peacemaking needed to be separated. Thus, while UNTSO remained tertiary to high-level peace settlement efforts, the peacekeeping operation survived the collapse of international conferences, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), Operation Alpha, and diverse other initiatives. Mere survival was not enough: peacekeeping and peace settlement efforts had to complement one another in order to succeed. The parties would have to desire peace and not just pay lip service to it.

The failure to conclude a peace settlement did not mean that UNTSO was completely ineffective. Rather than enforcing the Armistice Agreements, UNTSO was
established to assist the parties’ efforts to uphold them. The agreements themselves represented the vague compromises acceptable to the belligerents of the 1948-49 War, compromises that did not withstand post-war scrutiny. As soon as the parties tried to alter the status quo established by the agreements, they clashed with the peacekeeping mission created by the same accords. In 1956, UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.L.M. Burns, an astute observer then at the centre of the conflict, explained the result: “It however seems to be useless again to put forward recommendations for practical measures for ‘buttressing’ the observance of the G.A.A., as I have been doing for about two years now, since they will be ignored, evaded or sabotaged if the Parties don’t honestly intend to observe the armistice regime as a transition towards peace, and to be ready to negotiate that peace early in 1957.” As Burns argued, if the parties so wished, they could have entered into peace agreements. They did not do so.

Because the parties did not progress to a peace settlement, and came to spurn the Armistice Agreements in the process, the peacekeepers went beyond their original mandate to help mediate the conflict. The ability to mediate directly between the sides – after August 1949, Arabs and Israelis talked openly to one another only in the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) – remained the most tangible UNTSO raison d’être. Even after the final collapse of the MACs in 1955-56, UNTSO adjusted to meet the challenge, assuming a pragmatic diplomatic role that helped to keep the lines of communication open. Numerous professional diplomats, politicians, and well-meaning civilians tried to do the same, but none were as successful as the peacekeepers. The main reason for this was that the Arab-Israeli dispute was a deeply-seated conflict. Senior
military officers could be accepted by all sides to assist with military problems. Likewise, throughout the 1949 to 1956 period, even during the worst moments of Arab-Israeli tension, UNTSO successfully mediated disputes, especially small arms exchanges and incidents involving missing persons and animals, allowing the combatants to back down without recourse to further violence. In doing so, UNTSO acted not as a neutral observer, but as an integral part of the management of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Personal diplomacy outside of the MACs, the establishment of fixed observation posts, and the eventual formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) were positive peacekeeping developments fostered by UNTSO. Another lesson gleaned from examining UNTSO operations was that a measure of cooperation persisted on every Arab-Israeli front in the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. Trouble on certain frontiers co-existed alongside compromise on others. All of the parties, no matter how intransigent on major issues, showed themselves capable of cooperating on more mundane levels, especially when assisted by UNTSO mediators.

The consistently small number of UNTSO peacekeepers brought the quality of its members, especially the individuals who served as chief of staff, into sharp focus. Constant changes in personnel reduced UNTSO effectiveness and kept the peacekeepers from developing consistent policies. The first chief of staff, General William Riley, immediately recognized the intractable nature of the conflict. As a result, the American sought to resign almost from the beginning of his appointment. His less than total commitment was evident not just in his repeated resignation requests, finally granted in April 1953, but also in his actions. Riley retreated too easily, allowing UNTSO influence
to be degraded by the parties and forcing his predecessors into long, inefficient, and ultimately vain struggles to regain a measure of that influence. His successor, Major-General Vagn Bennike of Denmark, was Riley’s opposite, refusing to compromise at all, which especially damaged the UNTSO relationship with Israel, his personal intransigence reflecting Israel’s own. Bennike’s callous decision to accept military decorations from Jordan and Syria following the conclusion of his tenure overshadowed the effective work he had done to improve the peacekeeping machinery.

Major-General Burns did much to repair UNTSO standing, but this did not much help the wider peacekeeping situation. A determined and fair chief of staff, neither his skill nor his longevity in the position – he also served as the commander of UNEF until December 1959 – prevented war. His innovations included more direct UNTSO control over the appointment and replacement of personnel, the establishment of fixed observation posts in Jerusalem, along the Gaza armistice line, and in other sensitive trouble spots, and skilled high-level diplomacy. Although it might appear that a civilian diplomat would have better filled the position of chief of staff during the 1955-56 dénouement, Burns, a former civil servant who aspired to a diplomatic career, was uniquely placed to assume the role while retaining an intimate understanding of the military matters at hand.

At its core, UNTSO was also an extension of Western Cold War policy. The peacekeepers provided the first-hand, ground-level reports needed to help the West gauge the state of the conflict without any Communist involvement. This information was not well-used by the great powers. The Security Council was divided from the beginning.
While the Western Security Council members, Britain, France, and the United States, pushed for concessions that would encourage a shift in the parties’ attitudes towards peace, no progress occurred during the 1949-53 tacit American-Soviet consensus on the Middle East. Thus, once the Soviets used their Security Council veto in support of Syria in January 1954, peace required American-Soviet, as well as Arab-Israeli, cooperation, abruptly turning the Middle East into another Cold War battleground. With the Soviet veto behind them, the Arab states had greater freedom of action and, since the Western states occasionally judged Security Council resolutions on their merits, that body continued to condemn Israeli actions. The Security Council backed UNTSO even after the Soviets penetrated the Middle East but, from that point onward, divisions between the great powers ensured that the Council would be powerless to take active measures to stop the regional violence – with the notable exception of the cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States that helped end the 1956 War. Ironically, this residual support for UNTSO co-existed with the influx of Soviet and French weapons into Egypt and Israel. Moreover, after the first regional Soviet veto, the Communist states could not be kept out of Middle East peacekeeping for long. None provided peacekeepers for UNTSO during 1949-56, but Yugoslavia promptly became the second largest contributor to UNEF. By the time of the establishment of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Cold War ensured that the Canadian and Polish contingents had to be equally represented in the ranks of the peacekeeping mission.
While the Arab states and the Soviets cleverly used each other for the mutual benefit of subverting the West and obtaining their own goals, the Soviets were not alone in their machinations. The West’s Middle Eastern policies, especially Britain’s neocolonial adventures, alienated both Egypt and Israel and nearly shattered the North Atlantic alliance. Operation Alpha and the Baghdad Pact were primarily British plans, but British regional influence had waned, a fact that London only fully comprehended after the 1956 War. While the United States did not have a regional colonial past, American support undermined Britain’s formerly dominant role, befuddled anti-colonialists in the Arab states, and alienated Israel. Failure to uphold the Tripartite Declaration because of the centrality of the Baghdad Pact and Operation Alpha led directly to the regional arms race that precipitated the Suez crisis.

The first decade of the Cold War was not an auspicious time for peace efforts. Conflicts in the Indian subcontinent, the Korean peninsula, and Indochina all “concluded” with armistice agreements rather than peace settlements. The Indo-Pakistani and Korean conflicts still simmer decades after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, more substantial progress was made toward peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 1950s than in either Korea or the subcontinent. While these conflicts have not garnered as much international scholarly attention as the Arab-Israeli conflagration, they have proven equally intractable. The 1949 to 1956 period began and ended with that rarest of Cold War circumstances, American-Soviet cooperation. This illustrated both the danger posed to the world by the Arab-Israeli conflict and, ultimately, the slim chances for a peaceful resolution.
The states of the Middle East also took their cues from the great powers. For instance, the United States and many of its allies refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, American-backed coups in Iran (there are striking parallels between the Iranian nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the later events involving the Suez Canal Company) and Guatemala, British suppression of colonial uprisings in southeast Asia, French actions in Algeria and Indochina, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary demonstrated that the Security Council members did not provide shining alternatives to the Machiavellian scheming of Egypt and the reprisals of Israel.

The original causes of Arab-Israeli enmity are lost in a thick fog of accusation and counter-accusation. But what, aside from UNTSO and the role of the great powers, prolonged the conflict? Specifically, why did the parties fail to come to a peaceful resolution between 1949 and 1956?

First, the Arab states refused to recognize Israel, refused to meet Israelis outside of the MACs, and conducted proxy war via economic blockade and propaganda. The shock of their collective defeat at Israeli hands, the desire for revenge – especially among the Palestinian refugee population – and Israel’s unwillingness to accept compromise (especially territorial compromise) were also important explanatory factors. Second, Israel could not countenance lack of recognition, which seemed to presage endless conflict. Fears of annihilation may have seemed far-fetched to some, especially in light of their regional military dominance, but Israel and the Israelis could not ignore the immediate after-effects of the Holocaust, the sometimes-violent expulsion of Jews from
the Arab states, and their neighbours’ constant incitements to their destruction. Essentially, the Arab states refused to be forced to talk peace, despite Israel’s determined, and often violent, efforts to convince them otherwise. Nor could the Arab states be persuaded to negotiate by the UNCCP or by the carrots and sticks of the Western powers. The Arab states did not want to accept Israel and Israel was unwilling to allow them this lack of acceptance. The only time that Israel had conducted direct negotiations with the Arab states was in 1949, after defeating those states in war. When their neighbours subsequently refused to recognize Israel in the 1950s, Israel learned its lesson: it would only be accepted by its neighbours through force.

Following this realization, the parties to the Armistice Agreements soon discarded the machinery established to help keep the peace, starting with the MAC system. All of the parties subverted or supported UNTSO when it suited them, but Israel was the first to reject the aid of the peacekeepers. Its reasoning was straightforward enough: the MACs allowed Arabs to meet Israelis without \textit{de jure} recognition of the Israeli state, much less a peace settlement. When Israel recognized that this situation would not change, a point obvious as early as 1951 in the case of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC), it tempered its cooperation with UNTSO, often withdrawing from it altogether, in favour of diplomacy by other means. Even when Israel withdrew its cooperation, the Arab states publicly pledged to work with UNTSO: they needed the peacekeepers to facilitate communication with a neighbour they had to deal with on some level, but refused to recognize. Neither side really wanted the Armistice Agreements to work. The
parties’ lack of cooperation embroiled the peacekeepers in endless futile bids to force the other side to capitulate. These circumstances explained the breakdown of every MAC.

The effectiveness of the MACs declined with each passing year until, by 1956 – not coincidentally the same year in which war broke out – they no longer functioned at all. The one partial exception to this rule, the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC), was less a testament to UNTSO ability or to a real desire for peace than to the side-effects of relations between two states with bigger problems than one another. Lebanon professed support for the Arab cause via careful rhetoric, the submission of Security Council complaints, and the avoidance of peace talks, but no more than that. Israel understood that Lebanon was internally divided and too weak to act on its own. Even if Beirut had honestly desired peace, the Lebanese government would not have been free to start talks with Israel until such time as Egypt and neighbouring Syria supported the idea. For supporters of peace, this was hardly an ideal situation, but Israel welcomed the respite from the seemingly unending disagreement, violence, and international censure on its other frontiers. Despite occasional tension between the states, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) never launched a single attack against Lebanon.

The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJKIMAC), often the epicentre of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, persisted because it was necessary: the long shared frontier, divided Jerusalem, and the Israeli enclave of Mount Scopus beyond the Jordanian line ensured the need for regular contact. Following the assassination of Jordan’s King Abdallah in July 1951, only UNTSO could facilitate this, despite regular violent interruption.
On the other hand, it was in Israel’s interest to have as little to do with the ISMAC as possible. Israel made every effort to weaken the commission, since its existence held out the possibility, however remote, of aiding Syrian claims to Lake Tiberias and the Demilitarized Zones (DZs) abutting their shared frontier, and of probing Israel’s own activities in the area. As a result, Israel’s 1951 ISMAC withdrawal was relaxed in times of extreme tension. Israel also proved adept at using the Arab states’ tactics of boycott and non-recognition against Syria. These Israeli refusals to compromise with Syria had the same effect as the Arab states’ refusal to recognize Israel: the Syrians resorted to other means in order to conduct diplomacy, including illegal fishing in the lake, sniping in the DZs, and the establishment of Syrian settlements and military positions in disputed areas. Unlike the other Arab states, Syria relied on regular military forces throughout. When combined with the merry-go-round of military governments in Damascus, this did much to explain why, despite the high stakes, there were relatively few clashes with Israel along the shared frontier.

The unique composition of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC) recognized the fact that the largest Arab state was always presumed to hold the key to Arab rapprochement with Israel. However, despite signing the first of the Armistice Agreements, Egypt spearheaded the economic blockade and propaganda campaigns against Israel. Until 1954, these efforts were diminished by the fact that Egypt was divided by internal problems and consumed by the desire to secure true independence by removing British forces stationed along the Suez Canal. The eventual agreement authorizing that removal corresponded with the rise to power of Gamal Abdel
Nasser, an inspirational revolutionary leader who quickly became both the symbol and, quite possibly, the means to pan-Arab unity. The EIMAC became less important as soon as Egypt began to challenge Israel directly. Despite maximum effort from UNTSO in 1955, in the wake of the Gaza attack and the depredations of the *fedayeen*, the two states refused to accept a ceasefire. In 1955-56, Egypt and Israel explored Operation Alpha and other Western peace settlement efforts because they desired modern Western weapons and support; neither side had real peace plans of its own. Egypt and Israel soon found the weapons that they wanted. Peace remained elusive.

Egypt was not out to challenge only Israel. Nasser’s overarching desire to promulgate regional power and spread his version of pan-Arab nationalism required that the other Arab states fall in line behind him. This desire motivated Egyptian-backed violent infiltration and *fedayeen* attacks in 1954-56, and served the Egyptian plan to harm not only Israel, but also the principal rivals to Egyptian supremacy in the Arab world, the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. Although Jordan staved off invasion by any of its expansionist neighbours, Amman shifted into the Egyptian orbit in order for King Hussein to retain power, a move completed with the March 1956 dismissal of the British Arab Legion Commander, Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb.

Israel’s foremost concern was its security, which it regarded as predicated on the establishment of new settlements for Jewish immigrants and reprisal attacks designed to deter infiltration from neighbouring Arab states. In the face of intransigent neighbours who recognized no other type of claim, settlements and active defence asserted Israel’s control over its territory. The construction of Kibbutz Ketzriot – actually an IDF post
posing as a civilian settlement – in the El Auja DZ and infrastructure projects in the Israel-Syria DZs were characteristic of this policy. The Arab states only came to recognize Israel *de facto* as a result of militancy of this kind. At times, the quest for security also led Israel to forcibly expel non-Jewish citizens, to demolish homes, and to attack their neighbours’ civilian centres.

To defend its settlements, Israel had to ward off infiltration from the Arab states. When it proved impossible to hermetically seal its frontiers, reprisal attacks became the principal weapon against infiltration. The first reprisal efforts failed spectacularly but, by 1953, an elite cadre was developed to carry out the attacks, after which IDF units routinely humbled any Arab resistance. This frontier fighting took a heavy toll on both Israel and its neighbours. According to the estimates cited in Benny Morris’ encyclopedic *Israel’s Border Wars*, infiltrators from the Arab states killed approximately 250 Israelis between 1949 and 1956 and wounded another 1,000, while 5,000 infiltrators were killed.\(^4\) Civilians, especially the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and other frontier dwellers, suffered the brunt of the violence. In 1955-56, IDF reprisal attacks against Egypt and Jordan helped reduce the numbers of Israeli civilian casualties, but this decrease was offset by the corresponding rise in military losses. Nevertheless, the Israeli military, leading politicians, and significant media and public opinion all supported the reprisal policy. Walter Eytan, the Director-General of the Israel Foreign Ministry, argued that “Israel’s attitude will seem disingenuous only to those who have never lived under constant guerrilla assault or cannot imagine what it is like.”\(^5\) Scholars have likewise defended the effectiveness of the reprisals, usually on the grounds that no other Israeli
policy stifled infiltration or focused the attention of the outside world on Israel’s security concerns. For instance, whenever Israel did not retaliate against infiltrators, outside powers paid no attention to infiltration; when Israel submitted complaints to the Security Council, such as proof of Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal, nothing resulted. When Israel attacked Qibya, Gaza, and the Syrian positions surrounding Lake Tiberias, the Security Council and the international press had a very different response. Reprisals at least permitted the Israelis to act, but they had serious drawbacks as well. The reprisal attacks humiliated the governments and militaries – usually one and the same – of the Arab states, increasing antipathy towards Israel while encouraging the fedayeen and other radicals. The reprisals led to sharp disagreement between Israel and the UNTSO peacekeepers, especially since armistice violations by Palestinian infiltrators were difficult to trace to a specific state, whereas Israeli violations were carried out by soldiers acting on governmental orders. Furthermore, each reprisal was followed not by lasting calm on the frontiers, but by counter-reprisals, at least until the establishment of UNEF (temporarily) broke the cycle of violence along the Egypt-Israel frontier.

Peacekeepers and UN officials did their utmost to impress their opinion of reprisals on the Israelis, arguing that reprisals worked against Israel’s long-term security as well as the quest for peace. Indeed, Israel came to distrust, and eventually to dismiss, UNTSO because the peacekeepers placed potential constraints on Israeli reprisals, while upholding the MACs and failing to encourage a peace settlement on Israel’s terms. Israeli policies squandered a great deal of goodwill in the process. All peacekeepers who served
from 1949 to 1956, including many veterans of the Second World War and decorated resistance fighters, hailed from Western states friendly to Israel. Overwhelmingly, they arrived in the region sympathetic to Israel but, thanks to aggressive posturing, shameless deceptions, and smear campaigns that removed Bennike, Commander Elmo Hutchison, Major-General Bennett de Ridder, and Major Einar Odd Hjellemo, they became receptive to Arab positions. Significantly, the poisoned views of aggrieved peacekeepers like Bennike and Hutchison, whose bitter writings adopted the same self-righteous one-sided tone favoured by Israeli hawks such as Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir, damaged the UNTSO-Israel relationship. It was left to more diplomatic outsiders like General Burns to intelligently question reflexive Israeli opposition toward the opinions of foreigners.

True Israeli security – and regional stability – could only have come with a comprehensive peace settlement. The government of Israel desired this peace, but only on its own narrowly-defined terms. Those terms included direct negotiations with the Arab states, a precondition Israel never ceased to demand, no matter how many times its neighbours refused it. “If we had to depend on the apparatus and mediation of the UN for such matters we would have failed utterly,” wrote Moshe Dayan in his memoirs. This quotation exemplifies Israeli veneration of direct negotiations, for Dayan was referencing the direct Israel-Jordan talks of 1949-50, which failed to reach a peace agreement without UN or indeed any outside involvement. Every subsequent Israeli attempt to either seduce or force the Arab states to engage in direct talks also failed.

While peace settlement proposals appeared with greater frequency following the first use of the Soviet Security Council veto on a Middle East issue, events on the ground
consistently overshadowed these often-covert initiatives. For instance, the inability to obtain a lasting ceasefire in late 1955 led directly to the collapse of Operation Alpha. Neither Israel nor the Arab states ever rejected UN mediation or Security Council resolutions outright; instead, they jockeyed for position, tacked on conditions to agreements, and defended legalistic arguments (UNTSO became adept at this as well, particularly with regard to the 11 August 1949 ceasefire order). The results were the same as outright rejection, although they usually came accompanied with bloodshed. While historian Neil Caplan’s work has argued that the Arab states may have welcomed a peace settlement imposed by the Western powers, their own actions on the ground contradicted this.\(^\text{11}\) Moreover, the Israeli position was always clear: the starting point for direct peace negotiations was the Armistice Agreements. Israel refused any concessions that went against these hard-won gains, ones the Arab states refused to even recognize. This contention supports Caplan’s assertion that the parties used the act of coming to the negotiation table as an excuse to avoid substantial compromise.\(^\text{12}\) Indeed, the first peace negotiations between an Arab state and Israel, conducted with the assistance of American mediation, began only in 1978, following additional frontier violence, terrorism, and two more Arab-Israeli wars. At the time of writing, the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreements still technically survive, forthright commentary on the lack of progress towards a truly comprehensive regional peace.

The establishment of UNEF improved upon Ralph Bunche’s peacekeeping blueprint, but UNTSO and classical peacekeeping did not disappear. UNTSO even expanded: by 1959, 119 peacekeepers were serving with the mission, significantly higher
numbers than at any point during the interval between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. While UNTSO persists to the present day, only the ILMAC survived in truly workable form beyond 1956 and none of the MACs still convene. Other peacekeeping operations benefited from UNTSO experience as well. In 1958, the next in a long line of Middle Eastern peacekeeping missions, the unarmed United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), peaked at slightly fewer than 600 personnel, supported by a fleet of six helicopters and 22 light planes that conducted over 200 reconnaissance sorties per month. Assisted by the independent landing of an American Marine Corps division in the country, UNOGIL successfully completed its operations and withdrew from Lebanon in December 1958.

But the formation of UNEF was the real, albeit qualified, UNTSO success. Instead of unarmed observers totally reliant upon the cooperation of bitter enemies, peacekeeping now encompassed armed soldiers serving in an interpositionary role, host-state consent, the neutrality of contributing states, and the impartiality of the peacekeepers themselves. During the Cold War, these principles would nobly serve the UN and warring states around the world. The chief antagonists accepted non-resolution of these disputes because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted to risk nuclear war over containable conflicts that the real adversaries proved unable to work out themselves. The egregious failures of this system since 1990 should not detract from this point – especially since making peace can prove much more difficult than keeping it, as Western military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere have convincingly demonstrated.
In the most meaningful way, however, UNEF was no different than UNTSO. Like its predecessor, UNEF survived on the whims of the parties involved. Between 1949 and 1956, Israel had regularly denounced UNTSO for failing to prevent infiltration, but then refused to allow UNEF – a force with the means to prevent incidents – onto Israeli soil. Israel maintained that even small numbers of unarmed UNTSO peacekeepers had consistently violated Israeli sovereignty; a large body of armed UN soldiers was especially unwelcome. Egypt also possessed a marked antipathy to foreign soldiers on its territory but, despite the long and bloody struggle to remove the British troops from the Suez Canal, Nasser accepted UNEF because Egypt needed the assistance of the UN in the aftermath of the 1956 War. In spite of the calming presence of UNEF, the lack of a peace settlement ensured that the peacekeepers upheld only a pause in hostilities. When Egypt ordered UNEF to leave the country in the immediate run-up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the peacekeepers departed, leaving no presence on either side of the frontier. War broke out shortly thereafter.

Israel and its Arab neighbours were unwilling to live in peace with each other from 1949 to 1956. It took a war initiated by Britain and France and the subsequent formation of a buffer peacekeeping force to establish even temporary regional calm. Without a peace settlement, however, the central disputes festered. The Middle East still awaits solutions to the same problems that existed during the 1950s, the problems of boundaries, mutual fear, and refugees. Peacekeeping may seem like a tired idea whose time has passed, but since little else has enjoyed success in the troubled region, it
deserves to play an important role in helping to find solutions, especially through facilitating Arab-Israeli communication.
Appendix A

S/1080
United Nations Security Council
Resolution 62 of 16 November 1948

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the truce in Palestine, and recalling particularly its resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Taking note that the General Assembly is continuing its consideration of the future government of Palestine in response to the request of the Security Council in its resolution 44 (1948) of 1 April 1948,

Without prejudice to the actions of the Acting Mediator regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 61 (1948) of 4 November 1948,

1. Decides that, in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine;

2. Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice, including:
(a) The delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall not move;

(b) Such withdrawal and reduction of their armed forces will ensure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine.

*Adopted at the 381st meeting*
Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement, responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an Armistice; having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948,¹ and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, in the full authority entrusted to them by their respective Governments, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

With a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the Armistice, are hereby affirmed:

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¹ For the 4 November 1948 Resolution, see UN Document S/1070.
1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties.

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces – land, sea, or air – of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term “planned” in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

Article II

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties – land, sea and air – is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article VI of this Agreement except as provided in Article III of this Agreement; and elsewhere shall not violate the international frontier; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles [4.83 kilometres] of the coastline of the other Party.
Article III

1. In pursuance of the Security Council’s resolution of 4 November 1948, and with a view to the implementation of the Security Council’s resolution of 16 November 1948, the Egyptian Military Forces in the AL FALUJA area shall be withdrawn.

2. This withdrawal shall begin on the day after that which follows the signing of this Agreement, at 0500 hours GMT, and shall be beyond the Egypt-Palestine frontier.

3. The withdrawal shall be under the supervision of the United Nations and in accordance with the Plan of Withdrawal set forth in Annex I to this Agreement.

Article IV

With specific reference to the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would not be served by the restoration of previously held military positions, changes from those now held other than as specifically provided for in this Agreement, or by the advance of the military forces of either side beyond positions held at the time this Armistice Agreement is signed.

3. It is further recognized that rights, claims or interests of a nonmilitary character in the area of Palestine covered by this Agreement may be asserted by either Party, and that these, by mutual agreement being excluded from the Armistice

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2 Not reprinted here.
negotiations, shall be, at the discretion of the Parties, the subject of later settlement. It is emphasized that it is not the purpose of this Agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen, or to weaken or nullify, in any way, any territorial, custodial or other rights, claims or interests which may be asserted by either Party in the area of Palestine or any part or locality thereof covered by this Agreement, whether such asserted rights, claims or interests derive from Security Council resolutions, including the resolution of 4 November 1948 and the Memorandum of 13 November 1948\(^3\) for its implementation, or from any other source. The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exclusively by military considerations and are valid only for the period of the Armistice.

**Article V**

1. The line described in Article VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948.

2. The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.

3. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move except as provided in Article III of this Agreement.

4. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article VI.

\(^3\) See the UN Press Release of the same date: PAL/381.
Article VI

1. In the GAZA-RAFAH area the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated in paragraph 2.B (i) of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948, namely by a line from the coast at the mouth of the Wadi Hasi in an easterly direction through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to a point 3 kilometres east of the Highway, then in a southerly direction parallel to the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway, and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier.

2. Within this line Egyptian forces shall nowhere advance beyond their present positions, and this shall include Beit Hanun and its surrounding area from which Israeli forces shall be withdrawn to north of the Armistice Demarcation Line, and any other positions within the line delineated in paragraph 1 which shall be evacuated by Israeli forces as set forth in paragraph 3.

3. Israeli outposts, each limited to platoon strength, may be maintained in this area at the following points: Deir Suneid, on the north side of the Wadi (MR 10751090); 700 SW of Sa’ad (MR 10500982); Sulphur Quarries (MR 09870924); Tall-Jamma (MR 09720887); and KH AL Ma’in (MR 09320821). The Israeli outpost maintained at the Cemetery (MR 08160723) shall be evacuated on the day after that which follows the signing of this Agreement. The Israeli outpost at Hill 79 (MR 10451017) shall be evacuated not later than four weeks following the day on which this Agreement is signed. Following the evacuation of the above outposts, new Israeli outposts may be established at MR 08360700, and at a point due east of Hill 79 east of the Armistice Demarcation Line.

4. In the BETHLEHEM-HEBRON area, wherever positions are held by Egyptian forces, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the forces of both Parties in each such locality, except that the demarcation of the Armistice Line and reciprocal arrangements for withdrawal and reduction of forces shall be undertaken in such manner as may be decided by the Parties, at such time as an Armistice
Agreement may be concluded covering military forces in that area other than those of the Parties to this Agreement [Jordanian and Iraqi forces], or sooner at the will of the Parties.

Article VII

1. It is recognized by the Parties to this Agreement that in certain sectors of the total area involved, the proximity of the forces of a third party not covered by this Agreement makes impractical the full application of all provisions of the Agreement to such sectors. For this reason alone, therefore, and pending the conclusion of an Armistice Agreement in place of the existing truce with that third party, the provisions of this Agreement relating to reciprocal reduction and withdrawal of forces shall apply only to the western front and not to the eastern front.

2. The areas comprising the western and eastern fronts shall be as defined by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, on the basis of the deployment of forces against each other and past military activity or the future possibility thereof in the area. This definition of the western and eastern fronts is set forth in Annex II\(^4\) of this Agreement.

3. In the area of the western front under Egyptian control, Egyptian defensive forces only may be maintained. All other Egyptian forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points no further east than El Arish-Abou Aoueigila.

4. In the area of the western front under Israeli control, Israeli defensive forces only, which shall be based on the settlements, may be maintained. All other Israeli forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points north of the line delineated in paragraph 2.A of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the implementation of the Resolution of the Security Council of 4 November 1948.

\(^4\) Not reprinted here.
5. The defensive forces referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be as defined in Annex III\textsuperscript{5} to this Agreement.

**Article VIII**

1. The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement and United Nations Observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this provision.

2. The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows: From a point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5) kilometres north-west of the intersection of the Rafah-El Auja road and the frontier (MR 08750468), south-east to Khashm El Mamdud (MR 09650414), thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR 10780285), thence south-west to a point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5) kilometres southeast of the intersection of the old railway tracks and the frontier (MR 09950145), thence returning north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point of origin.

3. On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila.

4. The road Taba-Qouseima-Auja shall not be employed by any military forces whatsoever for the purpose of entering Palestine.

5. The movement of armed forces of either Party to this Agreement into any part of the area defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose, or failure by either Party to respect or fulfill any of the other provisions of this Article, when confirmed

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
by the United Nations representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

Article IX

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party shall be exchanged as follows:

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall begin within ten days after the signing of this Agreement and shall be completed not later than twenty-one days following. Upon the signing of this Agreement, the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement, in consultation with the appropriate military authorities of the Parties, shall formulate a plan for the exchange of prisoners of war within the above period, defining the date and places of exchange and all other relevant details.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange.
Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

Article X

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of seven members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate three, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting. On questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations to the Armistice Conference at Rhodes or some other senior officer, whose decisions on all such questions shall be final. If no appeal against a decision of the Commission is filed within one week from the date of said decision, that decision shall be taken as final. Appeals to the Special Committee shall be presented to the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, who shall convene the Committee at the earliest possible date.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement is at issue, the Commission’s interpretation shall prevail, subject to the right of appeal as provided in paragraph 4. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.
10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Article XI

No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

Article XII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and II, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a conference of representatives
of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and II. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement entered into by the Parties on 24 January 1949.  

6. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

   IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned representatives of the Contracting Parties have signed hereafter, in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

   DONE at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the twenty-fourth of February nineteen forty-nine.

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6 See UN Document S/1225.
7 No signatures are reprinted here.
Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;

Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine solid in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be so scrupulously respected by both Parties.

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces – land, sea, or air – of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of
the other; it being understood that the use of the term “planned” in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.

Article III

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties – land, sea and air – is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article V of this Agreement;
or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles [4.83 kilometres] of the coastline of the other Party.

3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party.

Article IV

1. The line described in Article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.

2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.

3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V.

Article V

1. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the international boundary between Lebanon and Palestine.

2. In the region of the Armistice Demarcation Line the military forces of the Parties shall consist of defensive forces only as is defined in the Annex\(^8\) to this Agreement.

3. Withdrawal of forces to the Armistice Demarcation Line and their reduction to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the signing of this Agreement. In the same way the removal of

\(^8\) Not reprinted here.
mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party shall be completed within the same period.

Article VI

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows:

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall take place at Ras En Naqoura within twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full cooperation and assistance in the discharge of this function.
Article VII

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at the Frontier Post north of Metulla and at the Lebanese Frontier Post at En Naqoura, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations
Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the Preamble and Articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission’s interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.
Article VIII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such a conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate,9 of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations

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9 No signatures are reprinted here.
Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Ras En Naqoura on the twenty-third of March nineteen forty-nine, in the presence of the Personal Deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.
Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel General Armistice Agreement  
3 April 1949  
S/1302/Rev. 1

Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;

Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives of their respective Governments, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties;

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces – land, sea, or air – of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of
the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organizations;

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected;

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized;

2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.

Article III

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties – land, sea and air – is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose
whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines set forth in Articles V and VI of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party.

3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party.

Article IV

1. The lines described in Articles V and VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Lines and are delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the Resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.

2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Lines is to delineate the lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.

3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in Articles V and VI.

Article V

1. The Armistice Demarcation Lines for all sectors other than the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on the maps in annex I\(^\text{10}\) to this Agreement, and shall be defined as follows:

(a) In the sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall follow the truce lines as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

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\(^{10}\) Not reprinted here.
(b) In the Jerusalem sector, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area;

(c) In the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on map 1 and marked B in annex I to this Agreement;

(d) In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958) to the southernmost tip of Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be determined by existing military positions as surveyed in March 1949 by United Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement.

Article VI

1. It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the intention of the Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the Acting Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister of Iraq authorizing the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn.

2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on map 1 in annex I to this Agreement and marked A.

3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be established in stages as follows, pending which the existing military lines may be maintained:

   (a) In the area west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of Kfar Qasim: within five weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;
(I) In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;

(c) In all other areas of the Iraqi sector: within fifteen weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed.

4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in paragraph (c) of Article V of this Agreement and marked B on map 1 in annex I, which involves substantial deviation from the existing military lines in favour of the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, is designated to offset the modifications of the existing military lines in the Iraqi sector set forth in paragraph 3 of this article.

5. In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the Government of Israel agrees to pay to the government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty kilometres of first-class new road.

6. Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the inhabitants of such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in, their full rights of residence, property and freedom. In the event any of the inhabitants should decide to leave their villages, they shall be entitled to take with them their livestock and other movable property, and to receive without delay full compensation for the land which they have left. It shall be prohibited for Israeli forces to enter or to be stationed in such villages, in which locally recruited Arab police shall be organized and stationed for internal security purposes.

7. The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for all Iraqi forces in Palestine.

8. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement.
9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in Articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.

10. Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be established, including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this purpose, within ten days from the date on which this Agreement is signed.

11. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in Article V shall be subject to such rectification as may be agreed upon by the Parties to this Agreement, and all such rectifications shall have the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated in full in this General Agreement.

Article VII

1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this impractical, as at the southernmost tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in annex II\(^{11}\) to this Agreement. In the sector now held by Iraqi forces, calculations on the reduction of forces shall include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector.

2. Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, shall be completed within the same period.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with a view toward further reduction of such forces by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article VIII

1. A Special Committee, composed of two representatives of each Party designated by the respective Governments, shall be established for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application.

2. The Special Committee shall be organized immediately following the coming into effect of this Agreement and shall direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following, on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem.

3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it. Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may provide for the exercise of supervisory functions by the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article XI.

Article IX

Agreements reached between the Parties subsequent to the signing of this Armistice Agreement relating to such matters as further reduction of forces as contemplated in paragraph 3 of Article VII, future adjustments of the Armistice Demarcation Lines,
and plans and arrangements formulated by the Special Committee established in Article VIII, shall have the same force and effect as the provisions of this Agreement and shall be equally binding upon the Parties.

Article X

An exchange of prisoners of war having been effected by special arrangement between the Parties prior to the signing of this Agreement, no further arrangements on this matter are required except that the Mixed Armistice Commission shall undertake to re-examine whether there may be any prisoners of war belonging to either Party which were not included in the previous exchange. In the event that prisoners of war shall be found to exist, the Mixed Armistice Commission shall arrange for an early exchange of such prisoners. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to afford full co-operation to the Mixed Armistice Commission in its discharge of this responsibility.

Article XI

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of such matters as fall within the exclusive competence of the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Jerusalem and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.
3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission’s interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as
the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Article XII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in
effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the third of April one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

\[12\] No signatures are reprinted here.
Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;

Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties. The establishment of an armistice between their armed forces is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.
2. No aggressive action by the armed forces – land, sea or air – of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term “planned” in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the Resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, considerations.

Article III

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties – land, sea and air – is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military, forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in article V of this Agreement;
or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters
within three miles [4.83 kilometres] of the coastline of the other Party.

3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled
by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party or against civilians in
territory under control of that Party.

**Article IV**

1. The line described in Article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the
Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent

2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line
beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.

3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit
civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall
remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement, with application to the
Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V, subject to the provisions of
paragraph 5 of that article.

**Article V**

1. It is emphasized that the following arrangements for the Armistice
Demarcation Line between the Israeli and Syrian armed forces and for the
Demilitarized Zone are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to
ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two Parties to this Agreement.

2. In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November
1948, the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone have been
defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such
manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while providing for
the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the Demilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

3. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on the map attached to this Agreement as annex I. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow a line midway between the existing truce lines, as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for the Israeli and Syrian forces. Where the existing truce lines run along the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the boundary line.

4. The armed forces of the two Parties shall nowhere advance beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line.

5. (a) Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the Parties, shall be established as a Demilitarized Zone from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or para-military forces shall be permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the Demilitarized Zone.

(b) Any advance by the armed forces, military or para-military, of either Party into any part of the Demilitarized Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives referred to in the following sub-paragraph, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

(c) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

None of these annexes are reprinted here.
(d) The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the Demilitarized Zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this Agreement (annex II).

(e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the Demilitarized Zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of this article.

6. On each side of the Demilitarized Zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex III to this Agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex IV to this Agreement.

Article VI

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows:

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall take place at the site of the Armistice Conference within twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.
4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

Article VII

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

2. The Mixed Armistice Commission, shall maintain its headquarters at the Customs House near Jisr Banat Ya’qub and at Mahanayim, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and Articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission’s interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.
10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Article VIII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such conferences shall be obligatory upon the Parties.
4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought, on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, is signed in quintuplicate. One copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Hill 232 near Mahanayim on the twentieth of July nineteen forty-nine, in the presence of the personal deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

\[\text{14 No signatures are reprinted here.}\]
Appendix C

S/1376, II
United Nations Security Council
Resolution 73 of 11 August 1949

The Security Council,

Having noted with satisfaction the several Armistice Agreements\(^1\) concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine in pursuance of its resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948,

1. Expresses the hope that the Governments and authorities concerned, having undertaken, by means of the negotiations now being conducted by the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, to fulfill the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them

2. Finds that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security Council resolutions 50 (1948) of 29 May and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948;

3. Reaffirms, pending the final peace settlement, the order contained in its resolution 54 (1948) to the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the

\(^{1}\) See Appendix B.
Charter of the United Nations, to observe an unconditional cease-fire and, bearing in mind that the several Armistice Agreements include firm pledges against any further acts of hostility between the parties and also provide for their supervision by the parties themselves, relies upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of these Agreements;

4. Decides that all functions assigned to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine having been discharged, the Acting Mediator is relieved of any further responsibility under Security Council resolutions;

5. Notes that the Armistice Agreements provide that the execution of those Agreements shall be supervised by mixed armistice commissions whose chairman in that case shall be the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with the parties to the Agreements;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the continued service of such of the personnel of the present Truce Supervision Organization as may be required in observing and maintaining the cease-fire, and as may be necessary in assisting the parties to the Armistice Agreements in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those Agreements, with particular regard to the desires of the parties as expressed in the relevant articles of the Agreements;

7. Requests the Chief of Staff mentioned above to report to the Security Council on the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine in accordance with the terms of this resolution, and to keep the Conciliation Commission for Palestine informed of matters affecting the Commission's work under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.
Adopted at the 437th meeting by 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
Appendix D

Aide-Mémoire from the Government of the United States to the Governments of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ("The 11 Points")
19 June 1954

Aide-Mémoire

The Government of the United States of America, sharing with the Government of Israel/the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan a grave concern over the state of frontier tension in the area, has sought to devise, in concert with the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France, proposals of appropriate steps to contribute to a reduction of this tension. Pursuant to instructions received from the Department of State, the Embassy transmits to the Government of Israel/the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for its consideration the following suggestions of possible practical measures for reducing frontier incidents:

(1) The acceptance by the parties to the Armistice Agreements of their obligations to attend meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commissions, and the resumption of the operation of Local Commanders Agreements.
(2) The amendment of the rules of procedure of the Mixed Armistice Commissions to enable the Chairman to propose resolutions instead of merely rubber-stamping those of one side or the other.
(3) The appointment to the staff of the Mixed Armistice Commission of United Nations translators and politico-legal advisors.
(4) Publicity by the United Nations for Mixed Armistice Commission decisions and border conditions and the responsibility therefore.
(5) An increase in the number of United Nations Observers, who should be stationed on both sides of the border instead of mostly on the Arab side as at present.

(6) Observers to enjoy freedom of movement and investigation at all points of the border.

(7) Additional equipment for observers, such as tracking dogs, helicopters and improved radio communications.

(8) Each party to inform the Mixed Armistice Commission of the punishment of persons convicted of infiltration and other violations of the armistice.

(9) Demarcation of the border by United Nations observers (without prejudice to political rights and claims of either side), this if possible to follow frontier rectifications, and the erection of physical barriers at the most important points.

(10) A system of passes for the movement of Arabs from the Gaza strip to Jordan under United Nations supervision. (A good deal of such traffic is innocent in motive and its regularization should serve to reduce incidents.)

(11) Any other preventive measures, whether by the parties or the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

The foregoing suggestions have been presented to the Government of Israel/the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The Department of State hopes that the Government of Israel/the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, whose views and recommendations regarding possible measures are earnestly sought, will give serious consideration to these suggestions which have been formulated out of a sincere desire to see constructive and feasible steps taken to reduce border tension.
CHAPTER 1 NOTES

1 Maariv, 4 April 1954.
11 In addition to the assassination of Bernadotte, nine Truce Commission/UNTSO observers were killed and 20 wounded in 1948.
12 UN Document, S/1080, 16 November 1948, Security Council Resolution 62. This resolution is reprinted in Appendix A.
13 All of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements may be consulted in Appendix B. Analyses of these
accords may be found in Rosenne, Israel’s Armistice Agreements with the Arab States; Earl Berger, The
Covenant and the Sword: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-56 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965),
pp. 14-19; The Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements: February-July 1949: U.N. Texts and Annexes (Beirut:
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1967); Brook, Preface to Peace, pp. 16-26; Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, pp. 32-52.

14 See Appendix B.


16 See Appendix B, Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement, Article IV, 3; Article V, 2; Article XI.

17 Egypt justified this stance by reliance on Bernadotte’s report, published in UN Press Release PAL/328, 7
October 1948 and UN Document S/1070, 4 November 1948, Security Council Resolution 61. See also
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume V: The Near East,
1950, Ambassador in Egypt Jefferson Caffrey to State Department; Michael Oren, Origins of the Second

18 This phrase is taken from the title of Ilan Asiya’s study, Moked haSihsuk: haMaavak al haNegev
(Beersheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 1994).

19 Motti Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question 1948-

20 For more on the Hashemite dream, see Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism,

21 For example, see British National Archives, FO 371-98861, ET 1018/1, 1 July 1952, Arab Legion Chief
of Staff John Bagot Glubb to Foreign Office, Eastern Department. The British taxpayer paid out over £80
million to Jordan during the 1950s, a period of war reconstruction and general austerity at home. For more
on this, see Mark Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence,”
Armed Forces & Society, 4, 1 (1977), pp. 75-99; Robert Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in


36.
24 UN Document, S/1376, II, 11 August 1949, Security Council Resolution 73. This resolution is reprinted in Appendix C.

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

1 United Nations Archives (UNA), S-0156-0003-File 5, Incidents – Statistics and Correspondence, note appended to the beginning of the file.

2 Most UN documents cited in this work may be consulted at the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine website, located at <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf>.


5 Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three, p. xviii; “The areas to be covered in the present volume deliberately relegate to the background a number of interrelated international issues that must nevertheless be taken into consideration if one aspires to a proper and comprehensive understanding of the total Arab-Israeli dispute. Each of these areas deserves careful study on its own.” United Nations peacekeeping heads this subject list.


20 Glubb repeated mentioned in his memoirs that he kept a diary, which he quotes from in his work. This diary has not been made available to the public. See John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957); Peter Young, Bedouin Command: With the Arab Legion 1953-1956 (London: William Kimber, 1956).


23 See Israel State Archives (ISA), Foreign Ministry (FM) 2440/5, 26 December 1955, Jerusalem Post reporter Moshe Levin to FM Director of Armistice Affairs Yosef Tekoah. A complete list of the archival and newspaper sources consulted for this study may be found in the Thematic Bibliography.

24 Rare files still classified at the time of writing include UNA, S-0156-0003-File 4, Incidents – Lydda Airport and File 9, Israeli Power Diversion Plan.

25 The IDFA has only widely declassified material up to 1956. The ISA holds much more open material, but potentially valuable files such as FM 2394/3, Cooperation between Foreign Ministry and Israel Defence Force on Armistice Commissions, 1949-56, remain closed to researchers. See also Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. vii.

26 State of Israel, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Volumes 4-9, May 1949-1954 (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1986-2004). Full citations may be found in the Thematic Bibliography.


28 Some of those that have been released are analyzed in Yaari, Mitsrayim vehaFedayeen.


CHAPTER 3 NOTES

2 For more information on these efforts, see Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three.
4 UNA, S-0373-0001-File 4, 30 December 1948, UNTSO Chief of Staff Brigadier-General William Riley to UN Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche.
5 Belgian Diplomatic Archives (BDA), Portefeuille 12755, liasse I, 17 September 1950, Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem Jean Nieuwenhuys to Belgian Minister of External Affairs and International Trade M. Meurice.
7 For example, UNA, S-0156-0001-File 7, 30 December 1949, Secretary-General Trygve Lie to Austin.
8 UN Document, S/1376, II, 11 August 1949, Security Council Resolution 73. This resolution is reprinted in Appendix C.
9 All of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements may be consulted in Appendix B.
10 UNA, S-0373-0001-File 2, 10 August 1949, George Barnes to Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew Cordier.
12 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 7, 14 March 1950, Riley to Cordier. See also the reply of 20 March 1950, where Cordier stated, “Individual in question [Riley] has performed most valuable service to United Nations and we consider him irreplaceable.” The chief of staff also asked his own government to release him the next year. See United States Department of State, FRUS, 1951, Volume V: The Near East and Africa.


19 UN Document, S/2049, 21 March 1951, “Report of Representative of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff to Secretary-General.”

20 Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, p. 57. The Israelis completed the Hula project in 1957.

22 This action fostered international criticism of Israel, as well as bickering between the IDF and the Foreign Ministry. See State of Israel, *DFPI, Volume 6: 1951* (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1991), pp. 215-16, Document #107, 5 April 1951, Israeli FM Director-General Walter Eytan to Israeli Permanent Representative to the UN Abba Eban and FM Counselor in Charge of Middle East and UN Political Affairs Gideon Rafael; pp. 369-71, Document #216, 11 June 1951, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett to IDF Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin; pp. 566-69, Document #343, 23 August 1951, Sharett to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.

23 Israel Defence Force Archives (IDFA), 1954-79-64, pp. 72-74, 2 September 1951, Sharett to Riley. See also IDFA, 1968-708-38, pp. 440-42.

24 UNA, S-0375-0148-File 1, N.D., “Interpretation of GAA by ISMAC.”


26 UNA, S-0373-0008-File 6, 8 April 1951, Yadin to Acting UNTSO Chief of Staff Colonel Bennett de Ridder; 19 April 1951, IDF GSO i/c MACs Lieutenant-Colonel Shaul Ramati to de Ridder. See also *FRUS, 1951*, pp. 600-601, 17 March 1951, Acheson to US Embassy in Israel; Bar-Yaacov, *The Israel-Syrian Armistice*, p. 79; Shalev, *The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime*, p. 76.


32 For example, UNA, S-0375-0148-File 1, 9 January 1952, ISMAC Chairman Colonel Sam Taxis to Riley.

33 UNA, S-0375-0148-File 1, 19 January 1952, “Israel-Syria Distressed Vessel Agreement.”


UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 12 November 1952, UNTSO Legal Officer Blaine Sloan to Riley.

UNA, S-0375-0291-File 2, N.D. [c. 1952/53], ILMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Eugène Communal, “Proposals.”


UNA, S-0375-0291-File 2, 25 February 1952, “Israel-Lebanon Distressed Vessel Agreement.” The two sides signed an improved agreement, noting that a ship would be returned “with its cargo, crew, and passengers,” one month later.


Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 10.

UNA, S-0375-0111-File 1, 31 May 1950, Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd Fredenhall to de Ridder; UNA, S-0375-0111-File 1, 20 June 1950, de Ridder to Riley.


British National Archives (BNA), FO 371-98861, ET 1018/1, 1 July 1952, Arab Legion Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb to Foreign Office (FO), Eastern Department; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, pp. 33-35.

UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 8 February 1951, Glubb to Riley.

UNA, S-0375-0077-File 6, 7 June 1951, Major V. Loriaux to de Ridder.


Falastin, 14 November 1951.

UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 8 February 1951, Glubb to Riley; UNA, S-0375-0098-File 4, 5 January 1953, Major Mathieu Ceelen to de Ridder.

ISA, FM 2429/4, 26 January 1953, IDF GSO i/c MACs Lieutenant-Colonel Haim Gaon to UNTSO Political Officer Henri Vigier. See also IDFA, 1956-636-32, pp. 213-46.

55 Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, pp. 166-67.
56 UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 8 February 1951, Glubb to Riley. See also John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 285-86; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, pp. 383-84.
58 UNA, S-0375-0103-File 4, 27 June 1952, Lieutenant-Commander Elmo Hutchison to Taxis.
59 Hutchison, Violent Truce, pp. 23-30.
61 UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 18 June 1952, “Record of Meeting between HJKIMAC Chairman Colonel Bennett L. de Ridder and Jordanian Authorities.” See also UNA, S-0375-0103-File 1, 26 September 1951, de Ridder to Riley. As de Ridder noted, “neither the Arab civilians, nor village mukhtars, nor many of the police and National Guards, nor Arab Legion personnel, have the slightest idea of the location of the demarcation line.”
63 UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 14 January 1953, Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. McAnnich to Riley. See also 8 January 1953, “Declaration made by Rav Seren Nutov.”
64 The New York Times, 1 February 1953.
67 See IDFA, 1954-79-65, pp. 219-21, 30 October 1951, Ramati to IDF General HQ.

UN Document S/2194, 13 June 1951, “Cablegram Dated 12 June 1951 from The Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization Addressed to the Secretary General, Transmitting a Report to the Security Council.”

DFPI, 1951, pp. 448-49, Document #257, 8 July 1951, Eytan to Israeli Missions Abroad.


BNA, FO 371-91368, EE 1072/21, 8 August 1951, J.C. Wardrop, “The Effect of Arab-Israeli Relations on the Defence of the Middle East;” 24 August 1951, R.J. Bowker to His Majesty’s Representatives in the Arab countries and Israel.


Oren, Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War, p. 18.


State of Israel, DFPI, Volume 8: 1953 (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1995), pp. 352-54, Document #203, 10 May 1953, Gaon to FM. See also pp. 391-92, Document #214, 14 May 1953, Israeli FM Legal Advisor Shabtai Rosenne to Eytan; Rosenne, Israel’s Armistice Agreements with the Arab States, p. 81; Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three, p. 148.
Contact was maintained even after Riley became Deputy Director of Management in the Foreign Operations Administration of the United States government, see ISA FM 2425/8, 4 December 1953, Riley to Eytan. See also IDFA, 1956-636-32, p. 458, 2 July 1953, Riley to Ben-Gurion.

Shalev, *The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime*, p. 58.


ISA, FM 2427/2, 27 October 1950, Eytan to Israeli Legal Counselor to the Permanent Mission at the UN Yaakov Robinson; 15 January 1951, Arthur Lourie to Eytan. ISA, FM 2425/8, 3 October 1951, Ramati to Reuven Daphne; 17 October 1951, Y.M. Brin to Israeli Executive Commissioner of Foreign Currency A. Winberg.


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1 United Nations Archives (UNA), S-0156-0001-File 10, 9 June 1953, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew Cordier to Israeli Alternate Representative to the UN Moshe Tov.


4 UNA, S-0163-0006-File 2, 9 January 1953, HJKIMAC Chairman Major-General Bennett de Ridder to Senior Israeli HJKIMAC Delegate Major Nutov.

5 UNA, S-0375-0103-File 1, 19 December 1951, de Ridder to UNTSO Chief of Staff Brigadier-General William Riley. See also UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 9 November 1951, de Ridder to Riley, where de Ridder lamented Ramati’s “stubbornness” and “obstructive manner,” and praised Tuqan as “a gentleman” and “very cool.” For more on Tuqan, see Robert Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 46-47.

6 Israel State Archives (ISA), FM 2429/4, 17 February 1953, de Ridder to IDF GSO i/c MACs Lieutenant-Colonel Haim Gaon.
ISA, FM 2429/4, 18 March 1953, Gaon to de Ridder; 25 March 1953, Nutov to de Ridder. See also Jerusalem Post, 28 May 1953; ISA, FM 2428/2, 12 June 1953, Michael Comay, “Telephone Conversation with Sgan Aluf Gaon on 12th June, 1953.”

UNA, S-0163-0001-File 1, 21 December 1953, Principal Director UN Legal Department Constantin Stavropoulos to Cordier; ISA, FM 2429/4, 13 April 1954, de Ridder to Nutov; 13 April 1954, Nutov to de Ridder; FM 2429/5, 25 June 1953, Nutov to de Ridder. See also Elmo Hutchison, Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955 (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956), pp. 41-42.

UNA, S-0375-0103-File 4, 30 April 1953, Gaon to Riley. See also The New York Times, 23 April 1953.


UNA, S-0375-0077-File 4, 25 May 1953, Senior Jordanian HJKIMAC Delegate Azmi Nashashibi, “How Serious is the Infiltration Problem in Fact?” See also British National Archives (BNA), FO 371-104777, ER 1091/63, March 1953, Jordanian Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb, “A Note on Refugee Vagrancy.”

UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 4 June 1953, Riley to Cordier. The agreement itself may be found in UNA, S-0375-0077-File 4.

See UNA, S-0375-0098-File 4, 9 June 1953, Commander Elmo Hutchison to de Ridder; 1 July 1953, Major G. Pinon to de Ridder.


ISA, FM 2949/4, 26 August 1953, Aryeh Eilan to Israeli Foreign Ministry (FM) Director-General Walter Eytan; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 177.


The Times, 20 October 1953; State of Israel, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel (DFPI), Volume 8: 1953 (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1995), pp. 774-76, Document #449, 19 October 1953, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s Radio Broadcast on Qibya; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, pp. 252-53 (n 121), 256 (n 134), 302.
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23 ISA, FM 2440/4, 22 November 1953, Eilan to Eytan; FM 2429/5, N.D. [c. end of December 1953], “Marauding on the Jordan Border from the date of Security Council’s Resolution on Kibya (24.11.53) up to the present.”

24 For more on the campaign against Bennike, see ISA, FM 2425/8, 26 November 1953, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett to General Manager; 2 February 1954, Israeli Minister in Italy Eliahu Sasson to Israeli FM Counselor in Charge of Middle East and UN Political Affairs Gideon Rafael. The Israelis later tried to plant stories against Bennike in Danish newspapers, with little success. See ISA, FM 2425/8, 21 May 1954, Eilan, “Report of Trip to Copenhagen.”


27 For more on the British position, see ISA, FM 2440/3, 12 November 1953, Israeli Ambassador to Britain Eliahu Elath to Sharett. See also Belgian Diplomatic Archives (BDA), Portefeuille 12755, liasee I, 18 August 1953, Belgian Consul-General in Jerusalem Count T. de Lichtervelde to Belgian Minister of External Affairs Paul van Zeeland.

28 UNA, S-0373-0001-File 4, 5 November 1953, Messinesi to Seward; UNA, S-0156-0001-File 6, 2 July 1954, “Status of Staff and Facilities.”


30 The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement may be consulted in Appendix B.

31 UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 22 December 1953, Outgoing Cable (Out) 433, New York to Jerusalem.


33 See the renewed LCA in IDFA, 1956-636-32, p. 467, 1 December 1953, “Local Commanders’ Agreement.”


42 UNA, S-0375-0244-File 7, 5 July 1954, ISMAC Chairman Colonel Marcel van Horen to Bennike.

43 See UNA, S-0375-0244-File 7, 17 January 1954, Shalev to van Horen.


47 Swedish Military Archives (SMA), Arméstaben, “FN-avdelningen,” Serial D5, Volume 1-3, Personal Register, Gerhard Gylfe Svedlund. Svedlund went on to earn a Ph.D. in Semitic Languages, as reported in the Stockholm newspaper Dagens Nyheter, 2 December 1965. My thanks to the staff of the Swedish Military Archives for bringing this article to my attention.


49 Ibid.


52 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 4, 26 March 1954, Bennike to Cordier. In this weekly summary, Bennike wrote that Israeli Bedouin, Gazans, and terrorist organizations “in either country” may have been responsible for the murders at Maale Akrabim. He did not believe that the Jordanian military had carried out the attack. See also Hutchison, Violent Truce, p. 52

53 See Haaretz, 26 March 1954; ISA, FM 2425/1, 20 April 1954, Sharett to Bennike; ISA, FM 2425/8, 23 April 1954, FM Western Europe Division to Eytan and Rafael.


See Maariv, 29 June 1954; Haaretz, 29 June 1954; Zeev Drori, “Hashpaat haSegel haTzvayi haZutar al Hahrafat haBitahon” in Golani, ed. “Hets Shahor,” pp. 130-40. Not surprisingly, the Jordanians had a different perspective on this incident, as characterized in Young, Bedouin Command, p. 80.


UNA, S-0373-0005-File 4, 14 May 1954, Bennike to Cordier.

UNA, S-0373-0005-File 4, 23 April 1954, Bennike to Cordier. See also 17 June 1954, Bennike to Cordier; Young, Bedouin Command, pp. 96, 101, 117.

UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 4 June 1954, Out 169, Hammarskjöld to Bennike; UNA, S-0168-0002-File 1, 5 June 1954, In 76, Bennike to Hammarskjöld.


UNA, S-0163-0007-File 2, 30 June 1954, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan to Bennike.


UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 6 July 1954, Cordier to Bennike; 5 August 1954, “Record of Meeting between the Secretary General and the Three Powers’ Delegations.”


UN Document, S/3264, 7 July 1954, “Lebanese Complaint.”

UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 7 July 1954, UNGVA 809, Hammarskjöld (Geneva) to Cordier; 12 July 1954, UNGVA 855, Hammarskjöld (Geneva) to Cordier.

Yediot Ahronoth, 8 July 1954. Bennike, who produced a report on the Israeli press campaign against UNTSO, saw the effort as a move by the IDF to win over the Israeli public by blaming the peacekeepers for the Arab states’ opposition to peace talks. See ISA, FM 2425/8, 21 July 1954, Rosenne to Israeli Legal
Counselor to the Permanent Mission at the UN Yaakov Robinson; UNA, S-0156-0003-File 1, 1 August 1954, Bennike to Cordier.


77 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 1, 19 July 1954, In 114, Bennike to Cordier.

78 Young, Bedouin Command, p. 74. See also Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, pp. 319, 322.


80 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 6, 2 July 1954, “Status of Staff and Facilities.”


82 UNA, S-0375-0070-File 2, 21 September 1953, EIMAC Chairman Colonel T.M. Hinkle to Senior Israeli EIMAC Delegate.


85 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 23 February 1954, Hinkle to Bennike.


88 See the forewords written by Bennike, American Lieutenant-Colonel W.T. McAnnich, and American Captain John De Barr in Hutchison, Violent Truce, pp. v-xii. See also pp. 4-6, 129-30, 142-50; Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume Three, p. 270.

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3 Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis, 1947-1957 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994), pp. 8, 32, 46. This work makes no mention of New Zealand’s contributions to UNTSO.
9 This work was performed by Belgian Warrant Officer Hubert Lombet, an explosives expert. For more on Lombet, see Belgian Diplomatic Archives (BDA), Portefeuille 12755, liassee I, 31 July 1953, Major-General Bennett de Ridder to Belgian Minister of External Affairs Paul van Zeeland.
10 Burns sent a separate letter about this issue to the Israelis, which became the subject of discussion in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. See Israel State Archives (ISA), FM 2425/9, 6 September 1954, Israeli Foreign Ministry (FM) Director for Armistice Affairs Yosef Tekoah to Israeli FM General Secretary.
12 ISA, FM 2425/8, 26 July 1954, Eytan to Israeli Minister in Canada Michael Comay.
13 John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), p. 383; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 48, 51; Granatstein, The Generals, p. 120.
14 LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entries for 27 September, 20 October, 26 October 1954.
15 For a written example, see LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 29 November 1954.

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17 LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 23 August 1954.

18 UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 9 November 1954, Outgoing Cable (Out) 310, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew Cordier to Burns; UNA, S-0168-0002-File 1, 10 November 1954, Incoming Cable (In) 214, Burns to Cordier; ISA, FM 2425/9, 13 June 1955, Hammarskjöld to the Foreign Ministries of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Bennike accepted the Jordan Star First Grade on 21 August (when he was still UNTSO chief of staff) and the Syrian Distinguished Merit Medal on 16 September.

19 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 5, 9 September 1954, Burns to Cordier. Burns reported that the senior Jordanian HJKIMAC delegate, Dr. Hasem Nuseibeh, “expressed a doubt that the Jordan Government could much longer control other elements of the population if Israel persisted in carrying out military raids against Jordan.”


21 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 6, 8 September 1954, Burns to Cordier.


23 UNA, S-0163-0007-File 2, 13 October 1954, Burns to Senior Jordanian HJKIMAC Delegate Dr. Hasem Nuseibeh.


26 UN Document, PAL/752, 27 September 1954, “Press Statement by Chief of Staff of UN Truce Supervision in Palestine.” See also UNA, S-0375-0111-File 1, 20 September 1954, Burns to IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan.

27 UNA, S-0375-0103-File 4, 30 September 1954, Burns to Dayan; 1 October 1954, Dayan to Burns.

28 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 5, 28 October 1954, Burns to Cordier. See also UNA, S-0375-0103-File 4, 19 October 1954, Major R. Bataille to HJKIMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Brewster; UNA, S-

29 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 5, 4 November 1954, Burns to Cordier.

30 ISA, FM 2425/9, 26 November 1954, Dayan to Burns; UNA, S-0375-0111-File 1, 10 December 1954, Dayan to Burns.

31 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 1, 28 September 1954, In 172, Burns to Cordier; 3 December 1954, In 244, Burns to Cordier.

32 UNA, S-0375-0111-File 1, 22 November 1954, Svedlund to Brewster.


34 UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 17 November 1954, Dayan to Burns; 18 November 1954, Burns to Arab Legion Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb.


36 UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 18 November 1954, Glubb to Burns.

37 State of Israel, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel (DFPI), Volume 9: 1954 (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2004), pp. 861-62, Document #527, 8 December 1954, Tekoah to Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett; IDFA, 1956-636-33, pp. 70-72, 9 December 1954, Shalev to Dayan, Director of IDF Intelligence Department Lieutenant-Colonel Yehoshafat Harkabi, and FM.


IDFA, 1979-1338-442, p. 303, 30 September 1954, Israel Post Telegram, Master of the *Bat Galim* to Dolphin c/o Poseidon Haifa [the shipping agent for the vessel]. All 310 pages of this IDFA file are devoted to the *Bat Galim*.


*Al-Ahram*, 29 September 1954.


UNA, S-0375-0024-File 4, 21 October 1954, EIMAC Emergency Meeting No. 33.


UNA, S-0375-0070-File 2, 16 August 1954, EIMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel C.G. Bartholdy to UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General Vagn Bennike; UNA, S-0373-0005-File 5, 19 August 1954, Bennike to Cordier; LAC, RG 31, Volume 1, “UNTSO/UNEF,” 11 October 1954, Lieutenant-Colonel David Ely to Burns; UNA, S-0168-0001-File 7, 1 November 1954, Out 304, Principal Director UN Legal Department Constantin Stavropoulos to UNTSO Legal Officer Anthony Leriche.


UNA, S-0375-0024, File 4, 3 November 1954, EIMAC Emergency Meeting No. 38.

UNA, S-0375-0070-File 2, 22 November 1954, Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Naguib to Giacomaggi.


Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume Four, p. 88.


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1 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 31, Volume 7, E.L.M. Burns diary entry, 19 January 1955.


8 Al-Ahram, 1 March 1955.


10 United Nations Archives (UNA), S-0168-0002-File 1, 1 March 1955, Incoming Cable (In) 51, UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.L.M. Burns to Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew Cordier; 1 March 1955, In 54, Burns to Cordier; 2 March 1955, In 55, Burns to Cordier; LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entries, 1 March, 4 March 1955; The Sunday Times, 6 March 1955; Yaari, Mitsrayim vehaFedayeen, pp. 17-19.

11 BNA, FO 371/115830 VR 1071/43, 24 March 1955, Telegram #255, British Delegation to the UN to Foreign Office (FO); Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 330.


14 LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 27 May 1955; BNA, FO 371/115842 VR 1072/123, 27 May 1955, Telegram #176, British Embassy, Tel Aviv to FO. In both sources, an unnamed French UNTSO peacekeeper is credited with providing this intelligence.

15 Yaari, Mitsrayim vehaFedayeen, pp. 19-20; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 91.


17 Oren, Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War, p. 71.

18 UN Document, S/3394, 18 April 1955, “Cablegram from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General Concerning Arrangements between Jordan and Israel in the Jerusalem Area.”

19 UNA, S-0163-0006-File 3, 27 April 1955, Burns to Israeli Foreign Ministry (FM) Director-General Walter Eytan.

20 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 29 April 1955, Burns to Cordier; LAC, RG 31, Volume 1, UNTSO/UNEF, Glubb Correspondence Folder, 2 July 1955, Arab Legion Chief of Staff John Bagot Glubb to Burns; Yaari, Mitsrayim vehaFedayeen, pp. 21-22.


22 Haaretz, 15 April 1955.

23 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 19 May 1955, Burns to Cordier.

24 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 4 August 1955, Burns to Cordier; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 121. Two Israeli hikers were killed inside Jordan in a separate incident later in 1955. For more on this see UNA, S-0375-0106-File 2, 2 March 1955, Burns to Glubb; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 239 (n 52).


26 UNA, S-0375-0246-File 4, 13 January 1955, ISMAC Emergency Meeting Resolution.

27 UNA, S-0375-0246-File 4, 15 December 1955, “Report by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Lake Tiberias Incident of the Night of 11-12 December 1955.”

28 Burns wrote as much in UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 27 January 1955, Burns to Cordier.


30 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 31 March 1955, UNTSO Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Richard Hommel to Cordier.

31 See UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 7 April 1955, In 125, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to Burns; 8 April 1955, Outgoing Cable (Out) 156, Burns to Hammarskjöld; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XIV: Arab-Israeli Dispute 1955

32 BNA, FO 371/115867 VR 1076/57G, 6 April 1955, Telegram #487, British Embassy, Cairo to FO; 6 April 1955, Telegram #812, FO to British Embassy, Cairo. See also 6 April 1955, Telegram #1494, FO to British Embassy, Washington; Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 254.


34 IDFA, 1956-637-56, p. 142, 19 April 1955, Burns to IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan; UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 28 April 1955, UNTSO Aide Mémoire; ISA, FM 2454/1, 5 May 1955, Burns to Eytan.

35 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 22 May 1955, Israeli Aide Mémoire.

36 LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 12 April 1955; UNA, S-0375-0056-File 2, 16 April 1955, Burns to Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett.


38 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 12 June 1955, Out 231, Burns to Hammarskjöld. See also LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 30 June 1955.


40 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 13 May 1955, Out 189, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

41 UNA, S-0375-0059-File 2, 8 July 1955, “EIMAC: Arrangement to Maintain Security along the Demarcation Line;” UNA, S-0375-0024-File 1, 13 July 1955, “Minutes of the Meeting Held on 13 July at Kilo 95.” See also the minutes for 14-15 July, 20 July, and 8 August.


43 Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, p. 81.

44 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 26 August 1955, In 336, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

45 UNA, S-0375-0024-File 1, 8 August 1955, “Minutes of a Meeting Held on Monday, 8 August, Kilo 95.”

46 UNA, S-0375-0024, File 1, 9 August 1955, “Minutes of a Meeting Held on Thursday, 9 August 1955, Kilo 95.”


UNA, S-0375-0056-File 2, 29 July 1955, Major Donald Schumacher to Sedky.

UNA, S-0375-0056-File 2, 20 August 1955, EIMAC Chairman Major François Giacomaggi to Burns.


UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 26 August 1955, In 335, Burns to Hammarskjöld. See also UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 10 June 1955, Giacomaggi to Burns.


Yaari, Mitsrayim vehaFedayeen, p. 24.


UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 8 September 1955, Burns to Cordier. See also LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 5 September 1955; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 88.

Al-Akhbar, 5 September 1955 (translated by Michael Barak); Al-Ahram, 11 September 1955. See also ISA, FM 2952/2, c. August 1956, “Fedayeen Activity Prior to Sinai Campaign.”

BNA, FO 371/115904/252 VR 1092/252, 3 September 1955, Telegram #1208, British Embassy, Cairo to FO; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 351.


62 UNA, S-0375-0070-File 8, 24 September 1955, Giacomaggi to Burns.

63 UNA, S-0375-0312-File 2, 23 September 1955, UNTSO, Press Communiqué; 24 September 1955, Major Arne Müller and Major Mathieu Ceelen to ILMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Eugène Communal.

64 UNA, S-0375-0309-File 2, 5 October 1955, Burns to Communal; 6 October 1955, Communal to Burns; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, p. 94.

65 UNA, S-0375-0070-File 2, 22 September 1955, Deputy of the FM Director-General Arthur Lourie to Burns.


68 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 5, 11 November 1955, Out 389, Hammarskjöld to Burns.


72 The New York Times, 6 October 1955. See also Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 100; Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, p. 262.


Mekoroteha veHitpathutah (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1998), pp. 242-43; Oren, Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War, p. 132; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, pp. 332-33; Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Volume Four, p. 164.


78 UNA, S-0163-0002-File 2, 19 October 1955, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

79 UNA, S-0375-0056-File 6, 4 October 1955, Giacomaggi to Burns; 9 October 1955, Captain Brian Cummings to Giacomaggi; 9 October 1955, Burns to Egyptian Director of Palestine Affairs Colonel Salah Gohar; 12 November 1955, Giacomaggi to Burns.

80 UNA, S-0375-0056-File 2, 10 October 1955, Giacomaggi to Sedky; 16 October 1955, Eytan to Burns; 19 October 1955, Gohar to Burns; UNA, S-0375-0059-File 2, 10 October 1955, Hammarskjöld to Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi.

81 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 17 October 1955, In 421, Burns to Hammarskjöld. See also UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 27 October 1955, Hommel to Cordier.


83 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 10 October 1955, In 414, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

84 Hammarskjöld’s proposals were taken virtually verbatim from UNA, S-0163-0002-File 2, November 1955, Burns, “Programme of Action to Relieve Situation in El Auja.” See also UNA, S-0168-0002-File 2, 3 November 1955, Out 374, Cordier to Hommel.


87 UNA, S-0163-0001-File 3, 3 November 1955, Memorandum, “Secretary General’s Proposals to Egypt and Israel.”

88 Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, p. 296.

89 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 104. See also UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 9 November 1955, “Notes on Conversation with Mr. Ben Gurion on 9 November 1955, at 1100 hrs;” Pelcovits, The Long Armistice, p. 92.
91 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 18 April 1955, “Question of Placing Observers in Fixed Egyptian Positions.” See also Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 136.
92 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 3, 11 November 1955, “Notes on meeting with Ambassador Byroade at the American Embassy on Friday, 11 November 1955, 11.00 am.”
94 UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, Burns to Cordier.
95 UNA, S-0373-0015-File 2, 19 June 1955, Outgoing IDF GSO i/c MACs Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Shalev to Burns; UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 4 November 1955, In 482, Hommel to Hammarskjöld; 7 November 1955, In 487, Burns to Hammarskjöld; UNA, S-0163-0002-File 2, 18 November 1955, Burns to Eytan; 21 November 1955, Tekoah to Burns.
96 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 2, 24 November 1955, Giacomaggi to Burns.
97 UNA, S-0375-0019-File 2, 24 November 1955, UNTSO Press Communiqué.
100 UNA, S-0375-0227-File 4, 23 October 1955, ISMAC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.L. Castonguay to Burns; UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 26 October 1955, In 441, UNTSO Political Officer Henri Vigier to Cordier.
101 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 3, 7 November 1955, In 488, Burns to Cordier.
104 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 113. See also Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 98.
105 LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 11 December 1955; Golani, “The Historical Place of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal,” p. 813; Shalom, David Ben-Gurion, p. 132.
106 UNA, S-0375-0246-File 4, 15 December 1955, “Report by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Lake Tiberias Incident of the Night of 11-12 December 1955.”

107 UNA, S-0375-0246-File 4, 14 December 1955, Major Donald Schumacher and Lieutenant Robert Gérard to Castonguay; 14 December 1955, Captain Ralph Turner to Castonguay.

108 UNA, S-0375-0246-File 4, 16 December 1955, Castonguay to Burns; UNA, S-0373-0005-File 6, 22 December 1955, Burns to Cordier. See also Castonguay’s general ISMAC reports for the month of November in UNA, S-0375-0225-File 5.

109 Haaretz, 12 December 1955; Maariv, 12 December 1955; ISA, FM 2440/5, 26 December 1955, Jerusalem Post reporter Moshe Levin to Tekoah.

110 UNA, S-0375-024-File, 15 December 1955, “Report by the Chief of Staff.”

111 UNA, S-0375-0246-File 4, 20 December 1955, Castonguay to Burns; 21 December 1955, Tekoah to Burns; 25 December 1955, Tekoah to Burns; 29 December 1955, Out 553, Burns to Hammarskjöld; 8 January 1956, Senior Syrian ISMAC Delegate Lieutenant-Colonel B. Kottrache to Castonguay; 10 January 1956, In D-5, Castonguay to Burns. See also ISA, FM 2440/5.


117 LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entries, 17 December, 19 December, 20 December, 29 December 1955; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 128.


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2 United Nations Archives (UNA), S-0168-0002-File 5, 8 February 1956, Outgoing (Out) Cable 67, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General Andrew Cordier to UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.L.M. Burns. 


4 UNA, S-0373-0001-File 4, 7 February 1956, UN Legal Officer Anthony Leriche to UNTSO Political Officer Henri Vigier; UNA, S-0168-0002-File 5, 10 March 1956, Incoming (In) Cable 119, Burns to


17 UNA, S-0373-0001-File 4, 21 April 1956, SECGEN 16, Hammarskjöld to Cordier.


20 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 5, 16 May 1956, Leo Malania of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General to Cordier.


23 UNA, S-0373-0001-File 4, 15 February 1956, Burns to UNTSO Administrative Officer Finn Munch-Petersen.


26 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 8, 4 June 1956, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

27 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 6, 26 April 1956, SECGEN 27, Hammarskjöld (Amman) to Hommel, for transmittal to Sharett. See also UNA, S-0168-0002-File 6, 13 April 1956, In 18, Hammarskjöld (Cairo) to Cordier; 14 April 1956, In 218, Hommel to Hammarskjöld; UNA, S-0168-0003-File 2, 8 May 1956, Hammarskjöld to Burns.


30 See UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4, 4 September 1956, Hammarskjöld to Ben-Gurion; 4 September 1956, Ben-Gurion to Hammarskjöld.


32 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4, 17 July 1956, Burns, “Implementation of the Agreements reached during the Secretary-General’s mission (April 1956) and of the Security Council’s resolution of 4 June 1956.”

33 UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4, 17 July 1956, Meyerson to Burns. See also UNA, S-0163-0002-File 1, 5 March 1956, Burns to Tekoah; 11 March 1956, Tekoah to Burns; UNA, S-0168-0003-File 4, 30 May 1956, In 363, Hommel to Burns; UNA, S-0373-0005-File 7, 7 June 1956, Burns to Cordier.

34 UNA, S-0168-0002-File 6, 10 March 1956, In 118, Burns to Hammarskjöld; UNA, S-0156-0001-File 9, 23 March 1956, Burns to Hammarskjöld.


UNA, S-0163-0002-File 2, 31 January 1956, Egyptian Director of Palestine Affairs Colonel Salah Gohar to Burns; UNA, S-0375-0056-File 3, 3 February 1956, EIMAC Chairman Colonel R.F. Bayard to Hommel; 22 May 1956, In G-95, Bayard to Burns; 20 June 1956, In G-105, Bayard to Burns; 24 June 1956, Tekoah to Burns; 5 October 1956, Bayard to Burns.

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20 March 1956, Sovok Shipping Company, Cable; p. 15, 23 March 1956, Israel Embassy, London to FM
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49 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 1, 18 August 1956, Out 437, Hammarskjöld to Burns, for transmittal to Ben-
Gurion; UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4, 12 September 1956, Hammarskjöld to Ben-Gurion. See also 26
September 1956, Hammarskjöld to Ben-Gurion.

50 See UNA, S-0168-0003-File 1, 27 August 1956, Out 451, Hammarskjöld to Burns; Urquhart,
_Hammarskjöld_, pp. 151-52. The complete Hammarskjöld-Ben-Gurion correspondence may be found in
UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4. Excerpts are also included in ISA, 2404/3 and 2448/5.

51 See Appendix B; LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entries for 28 June, 2 July, 7 July 1956; UNA, S-
0168-0003-File 4, 29-30 June 1956, In 480-482, Burns to Hammarskjöld; 3 July 1956, In 490, Burns to
Cordier; UNA, S-0156-0001-File 8, 5 July 1956, Burns to Ben-Gurion; 12 July 1956, Ben-Gurion to Burns.

52 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 4, 5 July 1956, In 497, Burns to Hammarskjöld; UNA, S-0168-0003-File 1, 12
July 1956, Out 1077/1078, Cordier to Hammarskjöld (Geneva); Burns, _Between Arab and Israeli_, pp. 155-
57.

53 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 1, 16 July 1956, Out 1096/1097, Cordier to Hammarskjöld (Geneva); ISA, FM

54 UNA, S-0373-0008-File 6, 11 July 1956, Major Einar Odd Hjellemo to Castonguay; UNA, S-0168-0003-
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55 UNA, S-0373-0008-File 6, 23 July 1956, Hjellemo’s Statement; UNA, S-0168-0003-File 2, 20 June
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56 See UNA, S-0373-0008-File 6, 30 July 1956, Hjellemo to UNTSO Legal Advisor R. Gorgem; 2 August
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58 See example of these quotations in Jacob Tsur, _Prélude à Suez: journal d’une ambassade 1953-1956_
(Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1968), pp. 321-22, 364; Shuckburgh, _Descent to Suez_, pp. 327, 341, 345; Bar-On,

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65 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 3, 29 July 1956, In 591, Burns to Cordier and UN Field Service Headquarters; 31 July 1956, In 606, Burns to Cordier.

66 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 3, 1 August 1956, In 596, Burns to Cordier.

67 LAC, RG 31, Volume 1, UNTSO/UNEF Glubb-correspondence Folder, 13 July 1956, Burns to London Information Centre Director George Ivan Smith; UNA, S-0156-0001-File 4, 17 July 1956, UNTSO, “Implementation of the Agreements.”


UNA, S-0168-0003-File 3, 27 August 1956, UNGVA 1233, Cordier (Geneva) to Hammarskjöld. See also LAC, RG 31, Volume 1, UNTSO/UNEF Pre-War Folder, 11 July 1956, C-100, Ely to Burns.

UNA, S-0168-0003-File 3, 17 August 1956, In 715, Burns to Hammarskjöld; Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, pp. 412-14. See also UNA, S-0168-0003-File 4, 12 June 1956, In 414, Hommel to Hammarskjöld; ISA, FM 2440/7, 3 September 1956, Tekoah to Burns.


For instance, see the survey of local press responses to Hammarskjöld’s initiative in UNA, S-0156-0003-File 1, 18 September 1956, Burns to Cordier.


LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 1 October 1956; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 166-67.

UNA, S-0168-0003-File 7, 3 September 1956, In 780-783, Burns to Hammarskjöld. See also ISA, FM 2428/3, 3 September 1956, Minutes of a Ben-Gurion-Burns Meeting; LAC, RG 31, Volume 7, Burns diary entry, 3 September 1956.

UNA, S-0168-0003-File 4, 5 October 1956, In 938, Burns to Hammarskjöld; 11 October 1956, In 969, Burns to Hammarskjöld; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 172.

UNA, S-0373-0015-File 2, 15 October 1956, Outgoing Senior Israeli EIMAC Delegate Lieutenant-Colonel Yaakov Nursella to Bayard. See also UNA, S-0375-0056-File 3, 5 October 1956, Bayard to Burns. Israel disbanded its EIMAC delegation on 6 November 1956.

UNA, S-0168-0003-File 7, 22 October 1956, In 1022, Burns to Hammarskjöld. See also 17 October 1956, In 997, Burns to Hammarskjöld; 22 October 1956, In 1023, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

85 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 7, 15 October 1956, In 983, Burns to Hammarskjöld.

86 UNA, S-0168-0003-File 7, 23 October 1956, In 1031, Burns to Hammarskjöld. See also LAC, RG 31, Volume 1, UNTSO/UNEF Glubb-correspondence Folder, 14 September 1956, Burns to Hammarskjöld; 19 September 1956, Hammarskjöld to Burns.

87 Dayan, *Story of My Life*, p. 292; Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 337; Dann, *King Hussein*, p. 37. Israel may have overestimated the import of the treaty, as secret British documents reveal. See BNA, FO 371/121499 VJ 1051/216, 24 October 1956, British Chiefs of Staff Committee Joint Planning Staff, “Strategic Importance of Jordan;” 25 October 1956, “Jordan.” The former described the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty as “an embarrassment” and “of little further value.”


91 Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, pp. 179-80.


94 Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 365.

95 UN Document, GAS 998 (ESS-I), 4 November 1956, General Assembly Resolution 998.

96 UNTSO observers provided the leading elements of the UN missions to Lebanon (UNOGIL, 1958), the Congo (ONUC, 1960), Yemen (UNYOM, 1963), Sinai again (UNEF II, 1973), the Golan Heights (UNDOF, 1974), Lebanon again (UNIFIL, 1977), Afghanistan/Pakistan (UNMOGAP, 1988), Iran/Iraq (UNIIMOG, 1988), and Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM, 1991).

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2 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 31, Volume 1, UNTSO/UNEF Glubb-correspondence Folder, N.D. [1956], UNTSO Chief of Staff Major-General E.L.M. Burns, “Recommendations of Chief of Staff UNTSO on Steps to be taken to restore Observance of Armistice Agreements (if asked for).”


12 Ibid., p. 2.


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