UNFELT FEELINGS IN PAIN AND EMOTION

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In this paper I defend the view that feelings are necessary to and a constituent of emotion against a prominent objection.¹ The objection has various formulations but William Lyons puts it well when he says:

For example, it runs counter to the data that one can easily gather, that people can be in an emotional state and not be subjectively aware of it. For the following seems to be an uncontroversial case of emotions: O’Reilly is so taken up by the discussion at the curriculum meeting that he does not realise that he is becoming very angry with Macdonald who is suggesting that the central texts in the first year course should consist only of the writings of the Existentialists. It is only later on, when Macdonald curtly remarks to O’Reilly that there was no need to get so heated, and he overhears MacFee wonder why he got so angry, that O’Reilly realizes that he must have become very angry during the meeting. Yet, on Descartes’ account, the above case is impossible, for to have an emotion is ipso facto to be aware of it, because for him an emotion is a feeling and one cannot have unfelt feelings. Feelings are subjective states in which one experiences (is aware of) whatever is the content of the feeling, say, a throb.²

¹ This paper is held in copyright by the author and the Southern Journal of Philosophy. I would like to thank the latter for the opportunity to reprint this work here.
In section one of this paper, I lay out what I take to be powerful in Lyons’ argument. In section two, I turn to a case easier to get one’s bearings with, pain, and argue that to do justice to the phenomena some sense of an unfelt feeling must be supposed. Section three considers and rejects an alternate response: that we speak exclusively of the same type of pain, never the numerically same pain. With the apparent necessity of an unfelt feeling established, section four draws and defends certain distinctions that make plain the sense of unfelt feeling required. This should remove the paradoxical air about that notion. In section five, I anticipate and respond to objections concerning the usefulness of these distinctions. With the place of an unfelt feeling secure, in section six I show that and how Lyons’ objection does not prevent feeling from being necessary to emotion, and a variety of ways O’Reilly can be angry, feel angry, but be unaware of such feelings. With this I remove one hurdle to an analysis of emotion that makes feeling a prominent feature.

I

Consider the objection. Lyons’ conclusion is not that feelings must be totally irrelevant to emotion. Rather, his argument is meant to show that feelings are not necessary to or constitutive of emotion, a strong claim given that Lyons is speaking of occurrent emotion. ³

The obvious response, that it is a problem of identification, that O’Reilly felt it all right but just did not recognize it as a feeling of anger, is not adequate here. For O’Reilly’s problem is not that he is unable to identify certain feelings as feelings of anger, say, through ignorance, but that he is unaware of any feelings. Here is the problem: 1) presently O’Reilly is angry; 2) he is not aware of any feelings; 3) we are always aware of our feelings. Thus feelings cannot be necessary to or a constituent of emotion.

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It is generally accepted that unfelt feeling is a contradiction. Since there is much emotional experience in which no feelings are felt, we ought to dismiss analyses of emotion that make feelings necessary to or a constituent of emotion.

II

To see whether an unfelt feeling is indeed contradictory, I turn to a similar problem in the analysis of pain.

We often speak of pain’s presence, while not noted. For example, I have a headache, but because I get involved in some music, I no longer notice my headache. Later on, I notice it again; indeed, I may wake up with the headache the next day. We are willing to allow that someone has numerically the same headache over a long time span. At times it is forgotten; at times it blisters. But if it is not felt throughout, and if there are “gaps,” why do we speak of the same numerical pain? Is the feeling unfelt here?

In *Attention* A.R. White attempts to account for the identity of the pain in terms of dispositions and stabs. If one had a headache for a given time span, that means that throughout that time span one was disposed to have certain stabs—which, in fact, one often did experience.

A dispositional analysis, however, does not seem to cover all the cases it must. R. Trigg notes that a headache had for a long span of time is often a diffuse, dull pain, and not, as White has it, a series of stabs. A series of stabbing pains could never do justice to an ache: aches do not stab. Further, Trigg observes that each member of a series is numerically distinct from the other members. As such, they alone could not account for the same numerical pain.

Trigg’s remarks pose problems for a dispositional analysis of the numerically same pain. Some of these could be remedied by specifying different kinds of occurrences as also relevant. Still, I think that Trigg is right to hold that
dispositional analyses will not explain the numerically same pain. We can see why by exploring some earlier examples.

While concentrating upon music, I would probably not report my headache if asked about it. But if requested to attend carefully, I might discover that it was still there. Being absorbed in the music, I failed to notice my headache, at first. Now were some version of a dispositional analysis right, then every time this experiment is successfully performed, a stab occurs at that moment. The fortuitousness that must be supposed here is not credible. Similarly, consider athletes injured during a game. While on the sidelines they might notice the pain if questioned about it; otherwise their attention maybe so absorbed in the game that they just do not notice the pain. As before, the thought that the stabs just happen to occur when the athletes are asked to attend carefully to their injury or occur in response to the question will not do. A dispositional-occurrence explanation will not suffice here.

Significantly, these examples suggest that something is continuing throughout—something we sometimes notice, something we sometimes do not notice, something that allows us to speak of the same pain.

Trigg accounts for speaking of the numerically same pain by speaking of absorption in something else. One was so absorbed in the music, the game, or whatever, that one was distracted from the pain. This is the start of an explanation and is appropriate to these particular examples. It, however, is less adept to deal with other cases. Recall our earlier example in which someone fell asleep and woke up the next day with the same headache. The continuation of the same headache is not plausibly explained in terms of absorption or distraction: here it is a loss of attention if anything. This qualification is significant inasmuch as Trigg thinks that we would feel the same sensation but for being distracted. Yet not only can it be a matter of having been distracted, but also a matter of not having given
something our attention or losing attention. So, the matter is somewhat more intricate than Trigg suggests.

Moreover, Trigg’s account remains incomplete until he provides an analysis of the continuation of the pain during absorption, distraction and inattention, i.e. the stages during which the same pain or headache is not noticed but is thought to continue. For what is the gap like? Is it some sort of cessation of the pain, a failure to notice a continuing pain, or what?

From Trigg’s and our own criticisms of White we can see that speaking of the cessation of the pain will not help one analyze the same numerical pain (though it would allow one to account for the same type of pain). Not surprisingly, then, Trigg speaks of the continuity of the pain. But in his specification of the continuity I think that Trigg’s analysis fails him. Trigg says:

I could say that I would have felt it but for my absorption, and this gives us ground for thinking of some kind of continuity. It is however (i) a logical continuity, rather than that of (ii) some shadowy pain which is ‘there’ in some way, but just happens not to be felt.7

This analysis of the continuity does not help us: ‘logical’ does no work here. For what does it mean but to say that you felt the pain, that there was a temporal gap, that you felt pain once more, and that we say that it was the same numerical pain? But we want an explanation of the continuity of the same numerical pain. Claiming that the continuity was “logical” is not an explanation.

Furthermore, the absence of any means with which to ascertain whether there is indeed logical continuity during the period in which the pain is said to continue logically underscores the unhelpfulness of Trigg’s proposals. For example, of a given case was the numerically same pain there all along, unnoticed, or did it go away only to return later? How is the latter even possible? Again, how do we analyze “logical continuity” versus “diverted attention?” These problems
are especially acute given Trigg’s assurance—which we have seen to be unjustified—that you would have felt it had you not been distracted. Most importantly, what is the difference between a logically continuing headache and a headache that goes away only to be replaced by another qualitatively similar headache? That is, how do we distinguish whether the case is one of the same numerical pain or one of the same type of pain? Trigg’s talk of “logical continuity” is without resources to deal with these questions adequately.

Far too many questions remain unanswered and unanswerable in speaking of (i) “logical continuity.” The attempt to account for the same numerical pain by insisting that in no sense (ii) the feeling of pain persists unfelt fails. For though Trigg and White seem keen to dispel the myth of such feelings, they offer no viable alternative. Furthermore, there do not seem to be options available other than a return to some sense of a persisting but unfelt feeling.

This consequence, however, should be neither surprising nor unwelcome. For our study of the phenomena of pain in the case of a headache and an athlete’s injury suggested a need to return to a persisting but unfelt feeling.

III

Instead of appealing to an unfelt feeling, some may suggest that we should simply abandon our concern for the same numerical pain and instead claim that when we speak of the same pain in the above contexts we are always speaking of the same type of pain.

Doubtless there are many cases in which the continuity of the pain is a continuity of type, not number. Nonetheless it would be mistaken to stipulate that none of the continuities are identities in number. Hence we must provide an analysts such that it remains possible to speak of the numerically same pain.

The reasons for this are stronger than an appeal to linguistic practices and pedestrian conceptions of pain—though these are not without their weight. Certain examples are most naturally interpreted as numerical identity. The injured athlete (discussed above) is one; there are others. Due to head injuries some have headaches that continue throughout their lives. By distracting themselves the ache won’t always be noticed, but the ache does seem to remain ever present and return as the effort lapses. Similarly, in certain cases of arthritic pain and Ménière’s disease the pain or ringing is constant. With luck or effort the pain or ringing temporarily can become transparent, unnoticed. Even though there are certain gaps with each of these cases, it looks very much like the pain, the aching or the ringing remains numerically the same.

Of course, one could insist on a type explanation even here. But that does seem contrary to the cases and would have many of the peculiarities we saw when testing White’s proposals regarding the athlete’s injury. Certainly, we should try to provide an account of numerical identity. And this, as we have seen, we must do by returning to the suggestion in ii), the feeling persists unfelt.

IV

To do justice to this suggestion, we need to distinguish four levels: 1) experiencing or feeling something, 2) attending to our experience or feeling, 3) taking note of what we are feeling, and 4) judging, knowing or believing that we are feeling such and so.8 Level one is an experiential realm one is subject to prior to any attempt to interpret, distinguish or be aware of. It is the stream of which we may be conscious, the feelings which may be “felt.” Level two is an attempt to be aware of and distinguish amongst the various happenings at level one. One may or may not be successful, or be more or less successful. Success, however minimal, moves one to the third level of noticing or noting. While level three most often represents success at level two due to our efforts to discern at level one, it need
not. For one’s attention may be drawn to something and note taken of that something due to that thing’s predominance in one’s psychic environment (e.g. a stabbing pain versus scrutinizing to discover how an old injury feels). Level four is the cognitive appreciation of level three. Typically it is in place when level three is in place. The feeling we note we also know or believe to be present. But there is no necessity here. For example, an infant might experience, attend to and notice its pain or fear, but not know believe or even judge that it was pain or fear. Interestingly, the infant’s parents may know that it is pain or fear that the infant feels. Later in its development the child too will be in a position to know that it is pain or fear which it experiences, attends to and notices.

Using these distinctions, let us try to give a better analysis of the same numerical pain. Consider the headache had while listening to music or the injury had during an athletic contest. With Trigg we would say that the pain continued though the person was distracted. But instead of speaking of the logical continuity of the pain, our analysis is the following. One experiences or feels the pain (level one), but because one is distracted by the music (insufficiency at level two) one does not notice what was felt (failure at level three). Thus one is in pain without notice or knowledge of the pain (failure at level three yielding failure at level four). Here if questioned, one would at first say that one does not feel it, though on paying attention (effort at level two) observe that one does feel it (notice of what is occurring at level one and thereby position to know of the pain is gained). At the impetus of questioning one moves from simply experiencing to attending to. With the former one was not in a position to notice the pain and so answered one way; with the latter one moves to a position from which one can notice and know of the pain, and, in this case, does.

A similar explanation can be offered in the case of waking up the next day with the same headache—a case which Trigg’s commitment to “feeling but for distraction” prevents him from even beginning to explain.
By admitting that the pain continues and by employing the above distinctions, not only can we account for a pain being numerically the same, but also we are able to answer the questions the logical continuity analysis could not. That a pain (or feeling) is present though not noticed during the gap can receive confirmation through questioning, and sometimes through behavior, e.g. the limp of the athlete, the tendency to treat one’s head with care, avoid bright lights, etc. That one really does feel it, and that it did not just go away only to have another appear can be tested by (constant) questioning. Thus we can establish that the feeling continued (numerically the same pain) rather than that there was a gap between two similar feelings (the same type of pain). Does the pain (level one) “just happen” not to be noted? No. Sometimes through absorption, sometimes through distraction, sometimes through in attention to feeling or insufficient attention to feeling, one does not take note. Thus we explain how it is that a pain can be felt, but not noticed. Why call the pain the same? Because it was felt throughout (level one). Did the pain go away and come back again, or was it shadowy? No. It was present throughout (prereflective consciousness), felt but not noted (reflective consciousness).  

Behavior, absorption, distraction, insufficient attention, inattention, in addition to the problems that emerge from the doctrine of logically continuing pains—all these provide good reason not to deny that athletes and sufferers of headaches are in pain because they are not noticing the pain.

This solution is superior to the logical continuing proposal. For what this solution is is not mysterious. Indeed with it we are able to answer the questions the others could not, and able to account for the earlier suggestion that there was something (the pain) continuing which allowed us to speak of the same pain. The apparent paradox of an unfelt feeling is dispelled in the case of feelings that are not noted.
Moreover, these proposals harmonize with pedestrian conceptions. Consider what Leo Tolstoy writes about the death of Ivan Ilyich. Ivan was wracked with pain; he attempts to screen off the thought of his death, which is pursuing him.

But then his wife would say, when he was moving something himself: ‘Do let the servants do it, you’ll hurt yourself again,’ and immediately *It* peeped through the screen; he caught a glimpse of *It*. It just peeped through, and still he hoped it would disappear but involuntarily he would watch for the pain in his side—there it was, the same as before, aching, aching all the time, and now he can forget it no longer, and *It* is staring at him behind the flowers.¹²

Ivan’s pain had *ached* all the time, not just continued logically. He had managed not to take note of it, but he could ignore it no longer.

V

The framework just set forth allows for an explanation of the same numerical pain, one in which a pain or feeling continues unfelt and one that makes sense of much that competing accounts failed to make sense of. Our goal is to show that that a feeling is unnoticed in an occurrent emotion state is not itself proof that the feeling is not felt. The method will be to apply this framework to the case of emotion, in particular O’Reilly’s anger. But before we do so, we should consider potential problems with the framework itself.

First, it may be suggested that though the distinctions advanced do form a coherent framework for analyzing the cases, the framework is needlessly florid. For level one, in which feeling serves as the psychic object which may or may not be noted, is unnecessary. Instead the object of attendance and notice is physical damage. If so, level one becomes redundant, the body is neatly tied into the
account, feeling is unambiguously noting, and thereby there is no non-contradictory sense of an unfelt feeling. Lyons’ conclusions become unavoidable.

There are difficulties with this proposal. Although level one may be eliminated, this simplifying is had at too great a cost: it makes impossible what we wanted to explain. For we were trying to make sense of the continuity of psychic conditions (e.g. headaches and pains) over time periods in which there were gaps. But if feeling is noting, then not noting is not feeling, and, concerning the relevant cases, is the disappearance of the same psychic state. Thus one must abandon the idea that the pain or headache continues: what continues is physical damage. Yet it was the continuity of the headache or pain we wanted to explain.

This inability to account for our speaking of the same psychic state, and failure to do justice to the apparent continued presence of the feeling might be shrugged off because of needed conceptual reformation in the problematic area of “folk psychology.” But that won’t do. On the analysis offered above, there is no problem with folk psychology calling for reformation. Nor is there any need to retreat to a prescriptive metaphysics by the denial of continuity of mental states and by the denial of a psychic object as an object of notice (cf. sections!! and III). Standard conceptions work well here, are true to experience, and are available to descriptive metaphysics. The solution advanced in the previous section remains preferable.

Second, instead of trying to replace level one with physiological happenings, one might suggest that feelings at level one are contingently identical with certain physiological happenings. The thought would be that an identity such as

feeling (level one) = certain physiological happenings

brings these two together in a useful way.
This may be quite accurate. It does not, however, take away from the distinctions argued for above. For even if we accept this suggestion, the original problem remains as would the various attempts to account for the same pain and the superiority of the proposal adopted here. For feeling (level one) has not been eliminated. And in the cases considered it is the ache one notices, that is the object of one’s attention, not the physiological change. If anything is different on this suggestion, it is our surety that feelings (level one) are present. For now we have a further avenue for corroborating their presence, namely the presence of the physiological changes these feelings are contingently identical with.

I conclude that the distinctions feeling, attending to, noticing, and knowing are the best means to analyze the persistence of numerically the same pain. What is particularly important to us is that these distinctions allow for a sense of an unfelt feeling, namely an unnoted feeling.¹³

VI

In general, what are the ways in which we can explain persons becoming so embroiled in a meeting that they fail to realize that they are angry?

Consider the judgments that, arguably, are constitutive of emotion. Error about one’s emotional state can arise through error in regard to such judgments. For one can be mistaken about which judgments are relevant to an emotion, about the judgments one is presently making, and even ignorant of the emotion itself. Each can explain error in judging one’s own emotional state. Further, there are the explanations that revolve around our inclination to be defensive or self-deceived about emotional outbursts, especially while we are still “hot.”

Our interest in O’Reilly’s lack of self knowledge, however, must turn us towards those explanations that center on his ability or inability to notice or identify feelings present. One explanation concerns not knowing the feelings
relevant to a particular emotion. For example, though one attends to and notes certain feelings, one does not know what the emotion anger feels like (a failure at level four). So even if one takes due notice of the feeling (success at level three), one is still not in any position to identify one’s emotional state. The case may be unusual. Still, one could envisage someone reading, say, Nausea and discovering that ennui is what he had experienced for the last few months. A further explanation concerns identification. Although one notes the feeling and is not unaware of the way anger feels, one nevertheless fails to recognize the present feelings as being those of anger. The reasons for failure can be explained in numerous ways, from lapses in judging to repression. Still, as observed earlier, O’Reilly’s ignorance of present feelings is not a failure to identify what is noticed. Neither is it a failure to know what anger feels like.

Error can also arise due to failure in attending or noticing (levels two and three). O’Reilly may be mistaken about feelings of anger either through 1) insufficient attention to and thus no or insufficient notice of such feelings, or through 2) failure to attend to and notice feelings entirely. Either is sufficient to create error, as we saw regarding a headache or an athlete in pain. Moreover, the likelihood of error is compounded here because that of which we take note is relatively difficult to grasp, describe, identify or reidentify. Since such phenomena are difficult to grasp or describe at the best of times, when the matter of attention, its lack or insufficiency comes into play, the potential for error is considerable.

Quite generally, then, ignorance about one’s emotional state, where that ignorance has to do with present feelings, can be explained by 1) a failure to pay sufficient attention and thus no or insufficient notice, 2) a complete failure to attend and notice, 3) a failure to be cognizant, 4) a failure to be duly cognizant.

O’Reilly’s ignorance of feeling could result from either 1) a failure to pay sufficient attention and thus no or insufficient notice, or 2) a complete failure to
attend and notice. O'Reilly was just too engrossed in the business at hand; his attention was not upon his feelings. That he did not note or note sufficiently would explain how he could become angry and yet not be aware that he was angry and was feeling angry. That he did not realize that he was angry is no proof that he did not feel angry. As long as we are speaking of experiences or feelings of which we do not take note or due note, O’Reilly’s ignorance involves no paradoxes of inexperienced experiences or unfelt feelings.\(^{17}\)

It seems, then, that much confusion about the proper analysis of emotion and feeling arises through the failure to distinguish experiencing, attending to, noticing and knowing. An observation of Sartre’s is helpful here.\(^{18}\) Sartre notes that emotion is not primarily reflective consciousness. Thus it must be seen on analogy with, say, swimming rather than one’s reflections upon swimming. Swimming requires very little reflection; there is little noting or cognizance of what one is doing.\(^{19}\) The same holds for emotion and feeling. Because feeling or being in an emotional state is rarely a reflective activity, we should not at all be surprised that we often fail to be cognizant that we are moved to a feeling, a particular feeling, an emotion, a particular emotion. Knowing and noting are matters of reflective consciousness, whereas feeling and emotion are fundamentally matters of prereflective consciousness.

As the athlete could be in pain without noticing or knowing it, so too O’Reilly can feel angry without noticing or knowing it. Thus we answer the concern Lyons and others have about unfelt feelings and occurrent emotion states one does not know or notice one is in.\(^{20}\) One objection to feelings as a constituent of emotion is met.\(^{21}\)

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NOTES

1 A landmark statement of a wholly feeling view is given by W. James in his "What is an Emotion?" *Mind* 1884. The literature raising problems with feeling views is enormous. For a sample of the criticisms see A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963; W. Lyons, *Emotion*, Cambridge, 1980; R. Solomon, *The Passions*, Doubleday, 1977. As a result of the criticisms the views on feelings’ place in emotion include those which exclude feelings as ever being relevant, e.g. Solomon; those which hold that feelings are never necessary nor constitutive but can be related, e.g. Lyons; those which give feelings a place some of the time, e.g. Kenny. Elsewhere, I have suggested reasons for thinking that feelings are part of emotion. (See “The New View of Emotions”, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1985.) Here I am responding to reasons for thinking that feelings have no part.

2 Ibid., p. 6

3 The interest throughout will be occurrence emotion states. It is these that most plausibly include feeling—though this is rejected in many analyses. (See note one.)


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., page 95, my italics and enumeration.

8 Our ordinary use of ‘experiences’, ‘feelings’ and ‘felt’ can be found at both level one and level three. My use of ‘feeling’ and ‘experiencing’ to describe level one is but one sense of these expressions. The distinctions drawn here are tailored to deal with the unfelt feeling objection. They do not exhaust the distinctions possible. (See White’s *Attention*.)

9 Because the case is one of experiencing without sufficiently attending to and consequently without noting or knowing, we cannot expect an awareness of phenomenological features to assist in determining whether the pain really is present (level one). For it is not until the level of attending to that such an awareness becomes possible. Thus the presence of level one as well as the appropriateness of my analysis must be established by different means. Offering an account of the examples, answering the questions Trigg’s analysis could not, establishing a structure in which such cases can be explained, harmonizing with pedestrian conceptions—these are such means, and the attempt of this paper.

10 The distinction between reflective and prereflective consciousness is drawn by J. P. Sartre in his *Sketch of a Theory of Emotions*. The contrast between 1) experiencing, 2) attending to, 3) noting, and 4) judging, believing, knowing . . . can be seen in the context of Sartre’s distinction, Levels one and two are forms of prereflective consciousness, while levels three and four are forms of reflective consciousness.
The sense in which one cannot have unfelt feelings, then, is one in which ‘unfelt’ and ‘feelings’ refer to the same level, whereas the sense in which one can have unfelt feelings is one in which the expressions refer to different levels. (See note eight.)


13 The analysis offered here entails that our mental life is not self-announcing. Although knowledge of it may be noninferential, there is such a thing as scrutinizing, attending to, noting, not just the world, but our mental life as well. James’ talk of a stream of consciousness provides a useful metaphor. Part of the stream is the immediate object of attention; other parts are not. That we may choose to attend or not, or to attend to one part rather than another, that our attention may be drawn to one part or another, or not at all, that we may fail to attend sufficiently makes uncertainty and error about one’s experience of pain readily explicable.

14 This explanation assumes that some emotions have a distinct range of feelings appropriate. I have argued for this position in “Feelings and Emotion,” *Review of Metaphysics*, 1984.

15 For example, concerning bodily sensations, these problems often arise, as we discover when visiting the doctor. Similar problems arise with the feelings of emotions. Try, for example, to grasp or describe exactly how your next bout of rage feels. The difficulty is not that there are no feelings present.

16 It is worth noting that each of these explanations can be used against an objection more general than the one considered in the body of this paper. That objection is that because one cannot be mistaken about what one feels at a moment, and because one can be mistaken about one’s present emotion, emotion can’t be just feeling. (See W. A “Emotion and Feeling,” *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 482.)

17 The response to the original objection could go in either of two ways. The strong claim would be that just as the same numerical pain requires the continuation of the feeling of pain, so also the same numerical emotion must have the continuation of the feeling relevant, though here unnoticed. To be useful in the case of O’Reilly this response requires both that one establish that feeling was, at some point, experienced by O’Reilly and that the continuity of feeling in emotion is necessary to the numerically same emotion. Neither point has been addressed here. (See note 20.) The weaker and more critical point is that because sense has been made of an unnoticed feeling, thereby reason to doubt that one can experience emotion and feeling yet not know or be aware of them is removed. Either way, Lyons’ objection to the conclusion that feelings are necessary to emotion is defeated.

18 Ibid.

19 To be able to swim may have required thought and training. But what is involved when learning versus what is involved when performing are rather different matters. Moreover, emotion differs here insofar as it is not a learned activity, at least not the way swimming is. Hence it has even less place for reflection.
I do not claim that continuity through unnoted feelings is the only way to account for the numerically same emotion. For example, one might suggest that the same emotion is had if a) it is a case of the same emotion type, and b) has the same object. This is plausible, though irrelevant to the purposes of this paper. For the concern here is whether Lyons’ assertion that a failure to realize that one is in an emotional state is proof that the feelings of the emotional state are not present.

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