However it is to be described, feeling angry is not much like feeling elated. Whether these feelings are constituents of emotions or sometimes accompaniments, certain feelings seem relevant to particular emotions, whereas certain other feelings seem irrelevant to the same emotions and, sometimes, irrelevant to any emotion whatsoever.

The appropriate description of these features is one issue. A prior issue, the one to be discussed here, concerns the basis or bases of specification for such noticed differences in the identity of feelings. In the following, I consider possible bases, defend one, and fend off objections to the solution proposed. I shall begin with some assumptions.

A relatively safe assumption is that specifiable cognitive states, including evaluations, are constituents of each and every emotion. For example, whereas anger involves judgments that the object of anger has frustrated one’s aims or insulted one in some fashion, elation does not, but rather involves judgments about the exceptional way things have gone, are going, or are expected to go. Since neither the above mentioned judgments nor more intricate complexes of them are thought sufficient for emotions, an assumption only somewhat riskier is that there must be components of emotion additional

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to these cognitive ones. Whether the additional components are feelings, desires, physiological changes, or some combination thereof remains sufficiently controversial to bar further assumption if we are to consider our question in the least question-begging fashion possible.

Some general observations about feelings are also in order. Feelings, though always attractive as a constituent of emotion, run into a host of problems which has deterred consideration of them as more than a sometime or frequent accompaniment of emotion. Serious discussion of feelings is made difficult because feelings, whatever their precise nature and role, occupy a particular private part of our psychic life: comparison and contrast is not easy; the lack of subtlety found in the language of feelings is not surprising. Since these difficulties are inherent in the subject matter, we can never enjoy the sort of sophistication in discrimination or comparison concerning feelings which we enjoy with, say, the cognitive components of emotion.

These difficulties, then, bear on the precision attainable concerning the basis for, and specification of, the feelings relevant to emotion, suggesting that it must remain general and in outline. Such generality, however, should not be misconstrued, taken to show that consideration of feelings is misguided, inappropriate, or to be avoided. Rather, it indicates the sort of precision the subject matter admits of, and thereby sets the bounds of reasonable expectations.

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3 That feelings are attractive as a constituent of emotion is born out by their frequent role in analyses of emotion prior to this century. Our present century has found such serious problems with that placement that talk of feelings has become something of an embarrassment. But for certain notable exceptions, discussions tend to be dismissive of a place and significance for feelings.
Now to our question. Our ability to identify certain feelings, to cite them as relevant or irrelevant to an emotion or emotions, requires that said feelings are specifiable and appropriate. But in what sense and upon what basis?

One possible specification of feelings is in terms of the emotion itself. The feelings relevant to particular emotions are those of that emotion: the feelings relevant to elation are those of elation; the feelings relevant to anger are those of anger, etc. Feelings that are not of elation are not relevant to that emotion; feelings that are not of any emotion are feelings which are not relevant to emotion. The basis of specification and relevancy of certain feelings is the emotion the feelings are feelings of. One is able to determine feelings to be of a certain sort on the basis of knowledge of the emotion, and knowledge that said emotion has certain feelings associated with it.

Although as a characterization this may contain some truth, it does not provide an adequate basis to specify the feelings involved in particular emotions, or to exclude feelings as relevant to particular emotions or any emotions whatever. Quite aside from the vagaries of identification by emotion, specifying feelings by emotion is helpful only if feelings are something incidental to and not strictly a part of emotion. Now, this role for feelings may prove true. But, since identification by emotion simply begs the question against certain theories of emotion and feeling (i.e., theories of emotion and feelings in which feelings stand as an independent component), we must look to see whether a more neutral basis for specification is possible. If one is, then a prominent role for feelings in and out of emotion becomes plausible; if one is not, then doubts about any prominent role for feelings must surely be strengthened.

A promising line of inquiry involves sifting through the various senses of 'feeling' distinguishing perceptual, exploratory, propensitory, localized sensation, mock, propositional, etc., senses of the term and isolating a sense or senses relevant to the emotion. William Alston finds a sense, the general condition, which covers four further

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4 I shall use the ‘relevant to’ and ‘associated with’ language in a way which is uncommitted as to whether the identify of the feelings “relevant to” an emotion presupposes or requires that emotion in a important way.

5 Hereafter, identification by emotion.

6 Alston [op. cit.; and “Feelings,” Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1979):3-34] and Gilbert Ryle [“Feelings,” Philosophical Quarterly, 1, 3 (1951): 193-205] have developed this line of thought most usefully. Hereafter, I shall refer to this as the sifting method.
senses, one of which seems helpful in picking out the sorts of feelings most plausibly involved in the emotions.\(^7\) Such delimitation by elimination, though unattractive inasmuch as it does not so much characterize as distinguish the relevant feelings, does help narrow down the feelings relevant to emotion.\(^8\)

One way to augment the account would be to allow that any feeling from this narrowed grouping is relevant to any emotion, so long as it is conjoined with, associated with, etc., the appropriate cognitions.\(^9\) Emotions are, at least, cognitive complexes, ones which may have feelings involved or associated with them; particular emotions are distinct from one another in terms of differences in cognition; particular kinds of emotion have no distinct feelings associated with them other than that they are among the group of feelings deemed relevant to emotion. Any further differences of feeling among emotions would be wholly accidental.

Certainly some will feel that this is as far as one can push the matter. But it has not solved our problem about feelings. For even if we are relatively happy that the feelings relevant to emotion had been or could be separated off in the sifting fashion, still one must specify the feelings that are relevant to particular emotions, say, feeling angry versus feeling elated. Eliminating sorts of feeling as relevant to emotion does not itself provide a basis for differentiating among those feelings which are relevant to emotion. Nor does conjunct identification further the matter. Quite the contrary: conjunct identification has not taken seriously the thought that different feelings associated with

\[^7\] According to Alston, under general conditions we have (a) emotional, (b) mood, (c) general bodily conditions, and (d) behavioral tendencies. I suggest that one difference between the feelings associated with behavioral tendencies and those of emotion is the former’s prima facie link with behavior and the latter’s absence of such a link. A difference between feelings of general bodily conditions and the feelings relevant to emotions is that the former are not intentional, whereas distinctively emotional feelings are intentional. Perhaps one can draw the same contrast between mood feelings and emotional feelings. The nonintentionality of mood feelings, however, is more controversial. One may have to make room for both emotional and mood feelings as feelings relevant to emotion.

\[^8\] I do not mean to suggest that the last word on this project has been written, only that the project does seem to be identifying a sense of 'feeling' which allows us to distinguish the feelings particularly relevant to the emotions.

\[^9\] Hereafter, conjunct identification.
certain emotions are recognizably different and appropriate to certain emotions, much less does it provide a basis for this. As we have seen, however, some basis is needed.\textsuperscript{10} A better way to augment the sifting method would be to suggest that of the group of feelings deemed relevant to emotion (as determined by the sifting method), the feelings relevant to particular emotions are the ones standardly caused by or typically conjoined with the independently specifiable cognitions constitutive of particular emotions.\textsuperscript{11} As a basis this would allow us to say that, since being elated standardly feels in one way and being angry in a quite different way, then, should a feeling like that of elation arise, we can identify it as such—even if it should arise in a context normally associated with a different or no emotion. The feeling remains one of elation. For it is the sort of feeling that is standardly caused by elation.

This explanation is a significant improvement because it does provide a basis for discrimination among the feelings relevant to emotion, including some and excluding others as relevant to particular emotions. It thereby provides a basis for the opening observation that feeling angry is not much like feeling elated.

As it stands, however, there is something of a problem. For speaking of feelings “standardly” caused or “typically” conjoined seems to have some statistical, empirical content.\textsuperscript{12} What, then, if people should “standardly” come to feel as they do when elated, but in the context of evaluations relevant to anger, and vice versa? Should we allow that, due to possible changes in the regularities of the universe, angry feelings would come to be those previously known as feelings of elation, and vice versa?

Followers of Hume would be prepared to accept this consequence. According to Hume, pride is a pleasant passion, whereas hatred is a painful one. There is no reason for this; it is how we find the world. Presumably, if we were to find the world otherwise, painful feelings could be feelings of pride, while pleasant feelings could be feelings of hatred.

\textsuperscript{10} In “Feelings and Emotion” [\textit{Review of Metaphysics}, XXXVII (1984): 303-320], I argue, in effect, both that many hold that the solution of conjunct identification is about as much as one can say about the role of feelings, and that that thesis is too modest. Here I suggest how a stronger relationship might be justified.

\textsuperscript{11} This seems to be Anthony Kenny’s [\textit{Action, Emotion and Will} (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963)] position on feeling and emotion. Hereafter, standard cause identification.

\textsuperscript{12} Henry Laycock brought to my attention this consequence of standard cause.
A position with such extreme consequences is not desirable. For it seems simply absurd that the feelings we ascribe to grief are so contingently connected with grief that grief feelings could conceivably come to be those which we presently ascribe to joy. Instead, let us seek an analysis in which there is not this contingency associated with the nature and role of feelings.

I believe that the standard cause solution can be modified so as to allow us to say that feeling and being angry feel in a certain way whatever the empirical regularities. One, then, is not forced to the contingent view about the nature of feelings, suggested by the Humean. To meet this challenge, however, it is necessary to distinguish an identifying and defining project.

Standard cause seems to provide a noncircular way to identify or pick out the feelings relevant to emotion and particular emotions, allowing that certain feelings are recognizable and relevant to emotions and to particular emotions. The identifying project proposals of standard cause do rely on the world being as it is. Should the world turn Heraclitean in the relevant way, yet should we wish to deny the contingency of feelings as just suggested, we may well have to develop different identifying strategies. But in order to deny that contingency of feelings, a related (though distinct) project of defining or delimiting the feelings relevant to particular emotions must be accomplished, and accomplished in a way which does not rely on the contingencies of this world, or at least not in the way the identifying method does. This type of specification, then, is central to an account of feelings which would allow them to be independently specifiable and nonreliant upon the regularities of experience. How, then is the defining project to be accomplished?

The proposal, mentioned near the outset, that the feelings relevant to emotions are defined by the emotion can be revived here, but, once again, not for those not wishing to foreclose the question of the relative independence of feeling. A different strategy remains necessary.

An assumption at the outset was that judgments constitutive of emotions are specifiable. One can describe, compare, and contrast the judgments involved in, say, anger, versus elation. One thing notable about many of the constitutive judgments is that they value the world in certain ways, e.g., anger involves judgments of insult, whereas
elation involves judgments concerning the exceptional way things are going. Furthermore, feelings seem to be valued in and of themselves. For example, painful feelings, aches, etc.—quite apart from their functional utility, etc.—are valued in a certain way, whereas various sorts of pleasant feelings are valued in quite another way. Whether or not the pain of remorse leads to amends, the pain is negatively valued.

Now, if one grants that the feelings relevant to particular emotions should cohere with the evaluations constitutive of emotions if one is to have a coherent emotion complex, then upon that basis one can justify saying things such as “this feeling is not appropriate to this sort of emotion, whereas this one is.” The reason for the lack of appropriateness is that the evaluation constitutive of the emotion and the evaluation of the feeling are out of harmony; and the evaluation constitutive of the emotion is emphasized in setting out the emotion, its feelings, and so forth. The reason for appropriateness is a harmony of feeling and the evaluation constitutive of the emotion.

Thus when one judges in a fashion appropriate to depression but exquisite feelings of pleasure are had, one does not feel depressed, nor is one depressed—whatever people standardly feel in such situations. The valuation of depression involves a grim world, whereas the feeling of pleasure mentioned has a very positive evaluation. So here there is a lack of harmony in combining a positive valuation with something that has a negative one. For depression, both ought to be negative. Similarly, an amused feeling had upon seeing someone’s undeserved pain or distress is not part of pity nor appropriate to

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13 Stronger positions about certain feelings and evaluation are taken. For example, the pleasure taken in something is essentially the same as the evaluation of that thing. Such a position would tend to support, but is not necessary to, the project undertaken here. See Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967), p. 65.

14 Hereafter, evaluational specification. This attempt has a certain kinship with attempts, such as Franz Brentano’s [Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint, D.B. Terrell, trans. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971)], to find basic positive and negative emotions from which all others are to be explained. Both projects help us see that more Humean views about feelings, such as the following by Bedford and Solomon, are just too strong: “It may be said that an emotion is unjustified when a feeling is inappropriate or unfitting to a situation. But I find this unintelligible. Feelings do not have a character that makes this realistically possible” (Bedford, op. cit., p. 21); “But I do know that it does not even make sense to say that one feels angry if one is not angry” [Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” Review of Metaphysics, XXVI 1 (1973): 24].
the emotion. For the evaluation we give of the amused feeling and the evaluation of an undeserved pain are at odds.\textsuperscript{15}

The contrariness of evaluation need not be this extreme in order to exclude certain feelings as relevant to particular emotions or to certain sorts. For example, it might be that a feeling is too intense in comparison with the valuation of the judgment. If one supposes that the evaluational difference between fear and terror has to do with the extremities of danger, then to judge something somewhat dangerous, yet to feel incredibly distraught and overwhelmed by it, betrays a certain inappropriateness or lack of harmony such that one is puzzled about just what to make of the person’s emotional state. It is not clearly a case of terror or fear; it has affinities with each, but the state remains confused. More relevantly, the feelings are not those of a normal, ordinary fear, but those of terror. Feeling that distraught is to feel terror, not to feel fear.\textsuperscript{16}

Notice that evaluational specification does not require the presence of the emotions, say, anger, to determine the presence of the feelings, angry feelings. Nor does it require the presence of the evaluations necessary to the emotion. Rather, to be able to determine that a present feeling is or is not an angry feeling presupposes familiarity with anger and its valuation at some level, but not thereby the presence of the anger or the relevant evaluation.

The way evaluational specification provides a basis for the specification of the felt component can be more complex than indicated so far. Consider the pain of love, or delight had in anger when taking vengeance. How are these to be explained? On the surface of it, love seems to involve a rather positive evaluation and thereby should involve corresponding feelings, whereas anger involves a negative evaluation and thereby should require painful feelings. Indeed, these explanations are appropriate as far as they go.

\textsuperscript{15} The example is C.D. Broad’s [“Emotion and Sentiment,” in Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp. 283-301]. Broad speaks of fitting and appropriate emotions, but leaves the notions unanalyzed. Here I offer a part of that analysis.

\textsuperscript{16} An example which frequently causes us much trouble and which parallels the fear/terror contrast in a rather interesting way is the contrast between being fond of or liking someone and the associated feelings, versus being deeply in love with a person and the associated feelings—though here the difference may not be so much that of intensity, but of the depth and durability of the feelings.
One way to deal with this apparent incongruity of feeling would be to maintain, say, that the pain sometimes associated with love is had at love’s frustration or loss, not as part of the love itself. Similarly, the pleasure associated with anger is a pleasure of taking vengeance as a result of anger, not as part of anger itself. Thus, love remains a certain sort of pleasure; anger, a certain sort of pain. The apparent incongruity of feeling is explained away as a feeling which, strictly speaking, is not a part of the emotion—though related to the emotion in specifiable ways.

One difficulty with this response is that, unless one is prepared to maintain that the person having incongruous feelings necessarily is in a mixed feeling state, it suggests that those enjoying vengeance are no longer angry and those pained in love are no longer in love. A claim of a mixed state or the postulation of discontinuance of emotion, however, do not suffice as interpretations of all the relevant experiences. Love, at times, is sheer pain.

A better solution would be to admit that love involves specifiable sorts of evaluations that would require certain pleasant feelings, but add that, when the aims of the evaluation are frustrated or lost, that frustration or loss is itself valued, which, in turn, explains the appropriate place of being pained while in love. Thus, we say that, other things being equal, love is a pleasure, but that, when it is frustrated or lost, because of the meaning of that frustration or loss, frustrated love (and unrequited love) is painful or involves pain. Thus, if someone tries to say that feelings of love are feelings of pain and misery, even sweet misery—even if it is true that this is the plight of most of us most of the time—we can explain why such claims are misleading. Similarly, we say that, other things being equal, anger is distressing and feels so, but that, when the desire for revenge is entertained, set upon, accomplished, it can be most pleasant. Thus, the experience of anger while taking revenge or even contemplating it can end up being rather different from the experience of anger when that revenge is not occurring, anticipated, or possible. Angry feelings, according to this view, can differ. Even so, we can see why it would be highly misleading to say, without further ado, that said feelings are rather pleasant.

17 The solution suggested here seems implicit in Aristotle’s remarks about anger in his Rhetoric, 1378bl1-10.
In such states, the complicating factors may take over and, say, the love becomes sheer pain, or it may not take over and leave one with mixed feelings. Exactly what sort of feeling state obtains will have to do with one’s situation and one’s focus of attention.

Evaluational specification eliminates a good many feelings as relevant to particular emotions, while supporting others as feelings of various emotions, and does so in a way that does not depend on empirical regularities.

To be sure, evaluational specification offers only very general determinations of the feelings relevant to particular emotions. If my earlier thoughts about precision were correct, this is to be expected and is not itself damaging to the proposals. Still, the generality of the account may be worrisome. Let me anticipate and consider some specific objections.

One objection is that the generality of evaluational specification is evidence for the original alternatives of identification by emotion or standard cause. These, after all, were put to the side as less desirable, not proven wrong. If this objection is correct, feelings cannot be an independent constituent of emotion, but must be parasitic upon the emotion and do rely upon empirical regularities. If correct, the only means to determine that feeling angry is not much like feeling elated is to determine the presence of the emotions or the cognitions and judge what the feelings are upon that basis, or to see whether the feeling is the one that is standardly caused by the emotion or cognition.

Yet I do not think this objection works. For the alternatives for identifying feelings (identification by emotion or standard cause) are no more specific. Setting out the feelings relevant to emotion in terms of the emotion itself (identification by emotion) might have the advantage of trivial truth, but it is not very informative about which among a group of feelings is relevant. For either it simply denies the opening observation that feeling angry and feeling elated were not much alike, or it is an appeal to empirical regularities (standard cause), or it is a shorthand for the evaluational method I recommend. If it is the first, it runs contrary to experience. If it is the second, then, when the issue of changes in regularities is considered, it proves much less specific than evaluational specification. If it is a shorthand for the method suggested here, then the disagreement is verbal, not substantive. Hence, the objection to evaluational specification
by virtue of a comparative generality in identification of said feelings is lost. The alternatives are in no better, indeed worse, position.

A second objection from generality is not comparative in nature. The thought behind this objection is that, whatever the attractions of the described method, any procedure that is so general in result must be of little value. For the evaluational method seems unable to exclude feelings that typify anger as feelings of, say, fear. For the disvaluing involved in the cognitive content of each is, on the surface of it, not able to distinguish feelings of anger from feelings of fear. Yet this is absurd: some differentiation is desirable.

The conclusion that the evaluational method, as given, is not able to differentiate feelings of anger versus those of fear seems correct. Moreover, this consequence does seem somewhat absurd.

One can, of course, respond by pinning some hope to future discriminations. After all, no claim has been made that the discriminations discussed are all the relevant evaluational discriminations. Presumably more will be forthcoming; perhaps some which will make the difference concerning feelings of fear and anger. Again, one can re-affirm that the generality with which feelings relevant to emotion can be delimited might not be the disadvantage the objection implies. For exactly which feelings are and are not relevant to which emotions is rather ill-determined; whether to allow certain feelings as relevant to particular emotions is hard to say with precision. Perhaps, then, a means which allows for certain general determinations, but yet which is not terribly specific and precise, reflects not an absurdity for the method of determination, but an appreciation of the rather wide ranging possibilities open to the feelings relevant to emotions.

Although I take it that there is something to these responses, a hope for future discriminations and the recollection of the ill-determinateness of the territory still does not really dispel all our unease about feelings of fear and anger. Fortunately, a further response is available.

We have distinguished the empirical identifying project of standard cause from a nonempirical, evaluational defining project. So far the two have been kept quite separate. Yet the two projects can be combined. That is, we should be able to say, regarding feelings found in anger versus feelings found in fear, that the feelings relevant to each do
differ on the basis of certain empirical regularities. Thus, should a feeling like that found in fear arise, even in the context of anger, one is justifiably able to say that it is not a feeling of anger. The basis for saying so is an appeal to standard cause. Pressed on the conceptual point, whether it could be otherwise, we would have to agree with the Humean that, given some conceivable regularities in the universe, the feelings we speak of in fear could be considered feeling of anger—though at the moment they are not. What would not be possible, due to evaluational specification, is that the feelings which we presently find in anger or fear could be considered feelings of elation, or vice versa—no matter the regularities in the universe.

Thus, we use the evaluational method to provide a basis for certain discriminations in the identity of feelings, and add standard cause to base further discriminations. The refinements based on standard cause are apt to our world of experience, but do not go beyond this; the distinctions based on evaluations go beyond our experience of the world.

The bifurcating here—the notion that a basis for certain discriminations is limited to our world of experience, whereas the basis for other discriminations transcends this—may seem terribly odd. Perhaps we have avoided one absurdity by embracing another. The following thought experiment may help to dispel that suggestion.

Imagine that we were to be structured in a way which means that all painful feelings were like those we now associate with fear. Then, should we have such feelings in the context of judgments of anger, it seems rather plausible to say that we still have anger and feelings of anger. In such circumstances, feelings of fear versus feelings of anger do not differ, much like, say, joy and elation. In contrast, were we to be restructured in a way that meant that all our feelings were like those we now associate with joy, then should we have the feelings of which we are capable in the context of judgments of anger, it seems that we have a different sort of emotion, rather than anger. Certainly we do not have feelings of anger.

Using the evaluational method for certain discriminations, then augmenting it with standard cause for certain additional discriminations in given contexts seems advantageous. Our bases for specifying the feelings relevant to certain emotions becomes flexible enough to allow for certain alignments to be otherwise than we presently find
them, but firm enough to prevent any conceivable alignment calling for a change in the identity of feelings.

Hence, the second objection fails to show any disadvantage in the method recommended. What it has brought out, however, is that there is room to be made for the method of standard cause when it augments evaluational discriminations in restricted contexts. Earlier I suggested that standard cause, because of its empirical content, cannot be the whole story. We see now, what was suspected then, that it is a part of the story. It makes discriminations additional to those made by evaluational specification, but discriminations which depend upon the empirical regularities of the world, the constitution of the subjects, etc. To an extent, then, we should agree with the followers of Hume.

An objection with a similar upshot but different in approach notes that the evaluational method rests on the sifting method. Since the sifting method is a contingent methodology, it is possible that the feelings of anger—though still having to satisfy the determinations of evaluational specification—nonetheless could, in different contingencies, turn out rather differently than they presently do. As the above response suggests, however, properly understood this does not seem an unacceptable consequence.

A different objection from contingencies notes that, in the method espoused, one uses evaluations constitutive of the emotion to provide a basis for the specification of the feeling relevant to the emotion. Assumed is a necessary connection between emotion and evaluation. But perhaps this is not so. If the evaluations relevant to certain emotions are only contingently connected with particular emotions, ultimately the connections between feelings of grief and grief must be wholly contingent.

The suggestion here of a contingent connection between emotion and evaluation is peculiar, and contrary to most recent work in emotion. Thus, the objection seems to create little pressure. But even should it be the case that the connection between emotion and evaluation is contingent, that does not show that the feelings are contingent given the evaluations. Thus, even if it is a contingent matter that grief values the world in a particular way and joy in a very different way, it will not follow that the feelings relevant to grief or joy are contingent given these evaluations.

It would seem that we have bases for specifying the feelings relevant to emotion such that we can make sense of the independence of feeling suggested in my opening remarks about feeling angry and elated. In so doing, we make room for the possibility that feelings, at least some of the time, stand as nondependent constituents of emotion.¹⁸

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¹⁸ I’d like to express my appreciation to the *Journal of Philosophy* both for publishing this article and for allowing me to post it on my web page.