MODERN THEORIES OF EMOTION*

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Modern theories of emotion include judgments, desires, physiological changes, feelings, and behavior as possible constituents of emotion. By exploring the plausible place(s) for each, we can test the legitimacy of their placement, as well as the success of various depictions of emotion.

JUDGMENTS

When theorists speak of a role for judgments in the analysis of emotion, ‘judgments’ tends to cover various cognitive-intentional states, including evaluations, beliefs, suppositions, thoughts, suspicions, and so forth. To use the vernacular, it is a “robust” sense of ‘judgment.’ Judgments so understood have certain features which help to depict emotion.¹ For example, judgments seem to account for the object directedness of emotion. This seems especially clear when the object is framed propositionally, e.g. fear that the bear will eat you. In order for this fear to exist, the belief or suspicion . . . that the bear will or may attempt to eat you must be had; otherwise the placement of that particular object of fear seems unexplained and inexplicable. Equally, in order for a nonpropositional object to be in place, a belief or suspicion . . . about the object seems vital. For example, to fear the bear you must believe in or suspect the existence, and perhaps presence, of the bear. To be without such thoughts about the bear would seem to render impossible the fear being directed towards it.

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In addition to accounting for the object directedness of emotions, certain contextual judgments seem necessary for the plausible attribution of emotion. To describe you as afraid of a bear requires not only an object of fear, but also that you view the object as in some way dangerous. Otherwise, you may have bodily upset, feelings, desires, even behavior—these, though noteworthy in themselves, do not seem sufficient to account for the matter being one of fear. Similarly, persons correctly described as angry seem so only if that at which they are angry is viewed as having frustrated their aims or slighted them in some fashion. Otherwise, we have bodily upset, feelings, etc. but, it seems, no emotion. Again, if you are embarrassed or ashamed, what you are embarrassed or ashamed about must be viewed in some sense as negative or detracting. Were that not the case, then it would make no sense to ascribe either emotion to you.\(^2\)

Not only are contextual judgments necessary for the plausible attribution of emotion, but also differences among emotions seem accounted for (at least in part) by differences of evaluation. Why a certain state is described as fear rather than excitement, anger, or shame is plausibly explained by differences in the evaluations constitutive of those emotions. Fear views its object as dangerous to one; excitement, as a significant challenge; anger, as insulting one; shame, as a grievous wrong for which one shares some responsibility. Naturally, the complexity in judgment is considerably more detailed than mentioned. Proponents of judgments work to articulate the judgments involved in a detailed way.

Considerations such as these, as well as an apparent lack of explanatory power of other possible components, have moved some to a purely judgmental depiction of emotion, one in which specifiable sets of judgments are necessary and sufficient for emotion.\(^3\) Judgments, however, are not sufficient. The most powerful, direct, and prominent proof of this is that one seems able to make all the judgments in question yet not thereby be moved to a particular emotional state or any emotional state. For example, one can see, believe in, and take seriously the
danger of a present situation (the cognitions relevant to fear) but not thereby be moved to fear. Judgments can be made dispassionately as well as passionately.⁴

If not sufficient, are judgments necessary? The considerations advanced to make plausible the judgmental view do suggest their necessity. The intelligibility of something as a particular emotion, the account of an object of emotion, the differences between various emotion states, seem unexplained and inexplicable if judgments are not constitutive of emotion. Thus the necessity of judgments to emotion seems correct.

This conclusion is generally admitted, but it can be (and has been) argued that certain occurrences of emotion and perhaps even certain emotion types do not require judgments. Consider some plausible examples of emotion without judgment. First, the sudden flashing of the oil light whilst driving a car evokes fear, but, in the situation there is no opportunity to make the requisite judgments of danger. Second, a sudden, loud noise may evoke emotion, but in the moment, not judgments. Third, depression seems an emotion which can come and go without requiring any change in the subject’s judgments.⁵

In order for such examples to convince us that judgments are not necessary, one would have to account for the object directedness of emotion, and the work done by contextual judgments without appeal to judgments. Now it is not absurd to suppose that the object directedness might be handled wholly by the perception of the object of emotion—especially in the first two proposed counterexamples. The concern then becomes the contextual judgments. Is there anything that suggests they are superfluous? Is there anything that suggests they are necessary?

The first proposed counterexample rests on the limited time available to judge the situation. In the sudden evocation of fear in response to the flashing of the oil light there seems insufficient time to make the requisite judgments. Hence judgments cannot be necessary. Yet the speed of the reaction is no proof of the absence of judgment: there is no reason to suppose judgments cannot be formed as
rapidly as the reaction. Relatedly, in advocating the necessity of evaluation, one need not hold that the evaluation is thought through or pondered; it may simply be an occurrence of a disposition to judge in a certain fashion, one which has been set off by the situation. The rejoinder that we are unaware of any such judgments as part of the emotional experience isn’t convincing since we are often unaware of our judgments: they are often known to us by inference rather than immediately, e.g. my judgment that my computer is working well. Thus there is nothing in the first counterexample that indicates that the contextual judgments cannot be present.

Not only is there nothing that indicates that the contextual judgments cannot be present, but also there is reason to suppose that they must be present. After all, it makes no sense to call my reaction to the flash of my car’s oil light fear unless it is supposed that I interpret the flashing as a sign of something seriously wrong with my car’s engine. My fear is not of the flashing, but of what that flashing signifies. With the danger of a damaged engine as the object of my emotion, and the flashing of the light the indication of said danger, a sophisticated complex of judgments is thereby assumed. If, however, no place is made for these judgments, then my reaction to the light would no longer seem to be fear, but an odd physical response—like a sudden chill sweeping over one. This reaction, however, is not a counterexample. Thus it seems that the contextual judgments remain necessary.

The second proposed counterexample, the instantaneous reaction to a loud noise, should be dealt with in a similar way; that is, there is opportunity for the judgments to be in place, and the intelligibility of the situation as one of a particular emotion requires the supposition that certain judgments are so placed. If the second example is alleged to differ in nature from the first, it will be because the reaction to the noise is taken to be a sudden start upon hearing the noise rather than a matter of fear. But if that is what is alleged, the objection simply collapses.
There is no more reason to include a simple reflex to noise as an emotional reaction than there was the sudden chilling.\textsuperscript{6}

Unlike the proposed counterexamples just considered, accounting for the object directedness of emotion by perception seems most unlikely in the case of depression, our third proposed counterexample. For in depression the object is not usually a perceptual object, e.g. depressed about work, a death, and so on. Moreover, the response that unless the judgments are in place, the phenomena cannot be understood as the emotion of depression is apt here also. Consider that one may feel in a particular way and be in a particular bodily condition without being in an emotional state—the aftereffects of drugs, a hard night’s drinking, etc. Before the reaction can be thought of as an emotional reaction of depression, an object of depression and something negative about said object must be supposed. If not, then the state under investigation is not the emotion depression, but simply a felt condition of the body.

Part of the apparent power of the third example is that \textit{ex hypothesi}, the judgments do not change while the emotion comes and goes. But notice that this only affects the question of judgments’ sufficiency, not their necessity. Hence it offers no challenge to the necessity of certain judgments. Our proposed counterexamples offer no reason to doubt—indeed every reason to suppose—the necessity of certain judgments.

Judgments are necessary but not sufficient for emotion. ‘Where the necessity arises because of the object of the emotion, the judgments in question are those needed to specify that object. Otherwise, the necessity seems to be for certain contextual, evaluative judgments, as was argued concerning anger, fear, and shame. Our question becomes: What else is needed and with judgment that proves sufficient for emotion?
DESIRES

Desires are commonly associated with emotions. The ranges of intensity characteristic of emotion may be explained by the intensity of desires. Similarly, the motivational force of emotion is readily explained if desire is a part of emotion. Perhaps desires are necessary and make up for the insufficiency of judgments in the analysis of emotion.

Some restrictions on the desires which are to be relevant to emotion and to particular emotions seem needed: hunger and thirst are improbable candidates for constituents of emotion; the desire for revenge is an improbable candidate for a constituent of compassion. A theory that includes judgment and desire seems able to delimit the desires to be constituents by relating them to relevant evaluative judgments. For example, fear seems to involve evaluations of something as dangerous to oneself or those close to one. The desire relevant to fear would seem to be one for safety—whether that take the form of wanting to flee, to freeze, or to overcome the danger. That something is deemed dangerous, and that ceteris paribus dangerous things are to be avoided, explains why having judged a thing to be dangerous one would wish to avert it.

The relationship between desire and judgment can be maintained at both the type level and the token level. Thus not only do judgments of danger and the consideration that danger is to be avoided explain fear’s desire for safety, but also the present judgment of danger explains the present desire for safety, and only then is fear present.

Desire’s relationship to judgment needs to be specified further. It may be deemed cause of, consequent upon, or co-present with judgment. But whatever the details of particular versions of this theory, desire is not necessary for emotion.

Occurrences of certain emotions require no desires. Whereas fearing a bear suggests some aversion to the present danger and a concern for safety, not all
cases of fear similarly involve desire. While on a roller coaster, though full of fear, someone may or may not desire to escape to safety; while watching a horror movie someone may entertain no thoughts or desires whatsoever about their safety. Yet each is afraid. Analogous points can be made regarding pity, embarrassment, guilt, hatred, anger, etc. Even if such emotions typically involve desire, the stripping away of desire (in fact or in thought) is not the destruction of the emotion.\(^7\)

Moreover, certain emotion types seem unconnected with desire. To be moved by music or to swell with pride does not seem to involve desire. Of course, those enjoying music may desire to hear more. But they need not: someone may be so wrapped up in the moment that such desires are not present at all or, if present, not necessary to or part of the emotional state. Indeed, the presence of such desires could be inimical to the enjoyment of diverting the person from his or her present ecstasy. Similarly, a proud person may have certain desires; often, one wishes others to know of one’s fine accomplishments. But here too one need not so wish. Moreover, the plausible place for desire seems independent of the emotional reaction. It is a certain boastfulness along with our pride that has us telling of our accomplishments. The absence of said boastfulness and/or the desire for others to know is perfectly compatible with the presence of pride. So, the claim that desires are necessary to either of these emotions is weak. Similar considerations apply to joy, elation, awe, shame, glee, taking contentment, or satisfaction, etc.

Furthermore, certain emotions have no particular desires associated with them. For example, someone in love may desire sex, to be with the beloved, to hear the beloved speak, etc. But no one of these desires seems necessary to love. Nor is there an informative general description of desire of which these are all species.\(^8\) The rejoinder that all are species of love’s desire is no help here because it is circular.
That certain emotions have no particular desire associated with them, that certain occurrences and species of emotion are without and do not require desire(s) shows us that the claim that the genus emotion requires desire(s) is mistaken.

Even though desires are not necessary, it may be that a relevant judgment-desire complex is sufficient for emotion. I suggest that this too is unlikely—unlikely for reasons similar to those advanced against the sufficiency of judgments, namely the relevant judgment-desire complex can be in place without the emotion. Consider the complex relevant to fear, an object of concern and an evaluation of it as dangerous to oneself or those close to one either causally connected to or conjoined with a desire for safety. Yet a person described as cautious or prudent would seem to evaluate something as dangerous, be desirous of safety, but could remain untouched by fear. The cautious or prudent need not fear, not even a very cool fear. Nonetheless, to describe them as cautious or prudent (where we do not mean a pathological condition) involves the proposed constituents of fear. It seems that someone can judge the world as do the fearful, want what the fearful want, but not be afraid. Likewise, anger is said to require a judgment of insult and a desire for revenge. Here too it would seem that someone, e.g. a ruthless killer, could have what is thought sufficient for emotion, but be passionless. Similar considerations obtain regarding the judgment-desire complexes relevant to joy, love, shame, etc. The judgment-desire complex, howsoever arranged, does not seem to be sufficient for emotion. Such complexes can be as passionless as can the relevant judgments.

One rejoinder to these criticisms is that they work only via a simplistic sketch of the desires and judgments deemed sufficient for fear, anger, etc. The suspicion is that matters will be different when the appropriate complexity of the judgments, desires and their interrelationship is filled in. The lack of fully articulated depictions of the judgment-desire complexes here and in the literature makes this claim hard to assess; certainly, its plausibility waits upon proponents of
desire offering a precise and detailed picture of the complexes relevant to various emotions that will make a difference. Yet in thinking over what has been or might be offered I cannot see anything that does or would diminish the force of the objections offered.

It appears that desire is neither necessary to emotion, nor sufficient—even though combined with necessary judgment. That said, that certain species of the genus emotion are properly analyzed as judgment-desire complexes, or that certain species of emotion require desire remains possible, and shall be taken up later.

BEHAVIOR

The strongest role for behavior is that emotions are particular, distinct behavior patterns. Because the implausibility of behaviorist analyses has been offered in the literature, and because we already have reason to give judgment a place, we can take it that this position is untenable. A more modest proposal is that the conjunction or causal relationship between judgment and behavior is emotion. Behavior is necessary to emotion and when combined with the relevant judgment(s) is sufficient for emotion. This proposal parallels the previous model—though the role proposed for “necessary behavior” must differ from the role proposed for “necessary desire.” For whereas the desire(s) appropriate to most emotions seem relatively specific to those emotions, there is no behavior particularly apt for each emotion or able to help distinguish one emotion from another. Just too many different things can be done in, say, love or anger—and too much overlapping of behavior amongst emotions is possible. Yet not just any behavior will count. Torturing one’s beloved does not manifest love; twiddling one’s thumbs doesn’t mark a difference between fear and anger.

The most plausible version of the theory seems to employ judgments to distinguish amongst emotion types, to put certain limitations on the behavior
relevant to particular emotions, and to connect judgments to behavior either causally or temporally.⁹

Behavior, however, is not necessary. Consider the earlier example of being moved by music. One may sway and move to music, or be disposed to do so. However, these are remarks about some people when moved by music rather than what it is to be moved by music. To be moved by music does not require that one behave or be disposed to behave in any fashion. One may simply be captivated and touched by music. Similarly, awe, sorrow, shame, pity, and pride do not seem to require behavior, or even a disposition to it. Moreover, even where behavior is typical, it is still not required. You can fall in love, become angry, feel grief or joy and do nothing. A failure to act may or may not reside in restraint on your part or the situation. For you may simply not behave in any relevant way or show emotion, or not on this occasion, or not in these circumstances, etc. Indeed, for mild emotional reactions not behaving would seem to be the norm rather than the exception. Further, where behavior is to be explained by desire, and if desire is not necessary, as has been argued above, the necessity of behavior is most implausible. Yet if one weakens the position alleging that it is the behavior that flows out of the desire when the desire is relevant and sufficiently strong, one again admits numerous cases in which desire and behavior are not necessary to emotion.

Throughout, the absence of behavior (the actual and/or imaginative stripping away of behavior) need not be seen as the destruction of the emotion. This is because behavior or disposition to behave is not necessary.

Neither is behavior sufficient when conjoined with the relevant judgments. To return to earlier examples, evaluating something as dangerous and seeking safety, the behavior and evaluation deemed relevant to fear, can be an act of caution, rather than one of fear. Similarly, the ruthless murderer may wreak vengeance, but not be angry: a question of money or desert not emotion. Equally,
realizing that one is responsible for certain wrongs and attempts to right them (the evaluation and behavior thought relevant to shame) can be a matter of shame, or an act done from a sense of justice. Taking in, valuing and dancing to music need not be a matter of enjoyment.

As was noted of theories which include desire, one reaction to these arguments may be that they depend upon the simplicity of the sketch, rather than a failure of judgment-behavior complexes to characterize emotion. Once more, the absence of fully articulated depictions of the relevant complexes here and in the literature makes this objection hard to assess. As before, it is up to the proponents of the theory to offer a detailed picture that will make a difference. But here again, I cannot see that matters of detail do or will alter these conclusions.

It seems that behavior is not necessary to emotion the genus, nor sufficient when combined with the relevant judgmental content. As before, it remains possible that a subset of emotions is properly analyzed as judgment-behavior complexes, or that a subset requires behavior. We shall return to this suggestion also.

PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGE

The view that physiological changes are relevant to emotion does not mean that any physiological change is relevant to the genus emotion. Like emotion itself, the changes need to be temporary, not permanent ones. In addition, the changes are of a relevant nervous system, in all probability the autonomic nervous system.\(^\text{10}\) While it is possible that there is a match between particular emotions and specific sets of relevant physiological changes, it seems that physiological changes do not differ or differ significantly between various types of emotion.\(^\text{11}\)

Physiological changes when appropriately qualified are taken to be necessary for emotion; when combined causally with a relevant evaluation, or,
perhaps, conjoined as sets, the complex is taken to be sufficient for emotion. The conceptual links are found between emotion and physiological changes, rather than between a specific emotion and a specific subset of the relevant physiological changes. Thus distinguishing amongst emotion types is done in terms of the judgments, as it was with judgmental analyses.

The view is thought promising on the basis of considerations such as the following. Schachter and Singer found that subjects physiologically excited by the surreptitious ingestion of adrenalin label their state in terms of cognitions suggested by the situations they were placed in. In particular, subjects reported anger and euphoria. Further, they found that the reports of emotion do not occur if the subjects are told of the true cause, the adrenalin ingestion. Again, they propose that subjects inhibited from having any noticeable physiological changes will not report emotion when placed in situations which would lead them to judge in a way relevant to emotion. Further, and in general, should we not notice our own physiological changes, we do not report emotion. Concerning others, the presence and intensity of emotion is judged, at least in part, on the basis of observed physiological changes.

Considerations such as these show something, but not the conclusion drawn. That we, in part, determine the presence or intensity of emotion in others on the basis of observed physiological changes shows that we take physiological changes to be indications of emotion’s presence. This is a point about how we know about emotion, not thereby a point about emotion’s constituents—as color changes on litmus paper is a way we know of a substance’s acidity but not thereby a component of that acidity. Similarly, the experiments of Schachter and Singer, and the observations about when we report our emotion reveal what we use to judge emotion present, but not thereby what is judged to be present, i.e. what emotion is.
Further, the determination of the presence or absence of emotion is based upon noticing or failing to notice physiological changes. This raises the issue whether what is significant to emotion is 1) the noticing, 2) the noticed, 3) both. Lyons takes the answer to be the noticed, the physiological changes.

… it seems inconceivable to be in an emotional state and not to have undergone unusual bodily changes of some sort. To be in love . . . but never to be in any unusually agitated or excited physiological state, or never to be in any unusually calm or serene physiological state seems inconceivable. (Emotion, pp. 124—125, my emphasis)

Yet the evidence offered has not forced this conclusion. Nor is the conclusion obvious. Consider A. Kenny’s view of the matter, one quite compatible with the evidence presented.

There is a conceptual connection also between a feeling and its object, whereas the physiological processes studied by psychologists lack intensionality. Bodily changes may be the vehicle of an emotion, but they are not themselves emotion. (Action, Emotion and Will, p. 38, my emphasis)

What is common to both positions and what is uncontroversial is that experimental research as well as normal observations indicate that emotion and certain physiological changes are co-extensive. Thus physiological changes seem to be empirically necessary to emotion. Further, the empirical necessity and co-extension are epistemically helpful for disclosing the presence of emotion. Yet all this leaves open the conceptual connection between emotion and physiological change, whether physiological change is a useful sign of emotion or a part of the concept of emotion.

Since the empirical tie between emotion and physiological change should be granted, determining whether there is a conceptual tie in addition looks
intractable, unless one appeals to speculative considerations in which one prises (conceives of) “emotion” apart from the relevant physiological changes. Because such speculations are empirically inappropriate, they tend to be unsettling. Nonetheless they do allow us to test our conceptual commitments to the relevance of physiological changes.

Consider God. On one of the major understandings of God, God is unembodied. Yet God has something of an emotional life, being moved to anger, love, sorrow, etc. Even if these emotions are to be credited metaphorically, the metaphor has not been rendered absurd by the lack of a physiological system. Talk of God’s emotions remains intelligible. Similarly, creatures of fantasy can be imagined, either unembodied or embodied, in ways such that they too have emotions though not relevant (or any) physiological changes. The lack of the physiological system or changes, then, doesn’t bear on the conceptual constitution of emotion, though given certain assumptions, creates havoc for questions of reference, reidentification, etc. A conceptual connection between emotion and physiological change is absent. We have moved in Kenny’s direction, and done so by means not epistemological in nature.

What has been argued is that: 1) the considerations advanced to show a conceptual connection between emotion and physiological changes establish no such connection; 2) an empirical connection between emotion and physiological changes is plausible; 3) that empirical connection explains the epistemological usefulness of citing physiological change as an indication of emotion; 4) there is reason to believe that physiological change is conceptually irrelevant to emotion; 5) there is some suggestion that it is the noticing or feelings that are conceptually relevant.

Yet to be considered is (6) the possible sufficiency of physiological changes when combined with the relevant evaluations. I shall oppose this also, and in ways that lend support to positions four and five. The adequacy of such
arguments, however, can best be seen by way of contrast. Thus I postpone further questions about physiology’s role until a viable alternative is found.

FEELINGS

The central claim of feeling advocates is that feelings are necessary, not accidental, to emotion; together with the relevant evaluations they are sufficient for emotion. As with analyses that include desire and ones that include behavior, feeling and cognition can be seen as co-constituents, either causally connected or connected as sets. Again, as with the other proposed components of emotions, some restrictions upon the feelings relevant is necessary. For a diverse group is introduced by mentioning ‘feelings.’ In the literature there have been some attempts to refine the senses of ‘feeling’ and sorts of feelings as plausibly relevant to emotion. Like the anticipated role for desire, feelings are appropriate not only to the genus emotion, but also, certain feelings to certain emotions. Thus while certain feelings are not relevant to any emotion, others, though relevant to certain emotions, are not relevant to others. It is likely that there is some match up between these feelings and the physiological changes spoken of in the previous section; arguably (but not necessarily) the feelings are a form of noticing such physiological changes.

With certain intense emotions, a necessity for feelings is apparent. In a powerful story The Cat, Edgar Allen Poe describes a man who is moved to a blind rage. The narrator speaks of a fiendish malevolence thrilling every fiber of his frame. It seems clear that if one is in this blind rage, one must have some such thrills. Without them, there just is no blind rage. Equally, to boil with anger, to flare with jealousy, to burst with love, requires that something be felt. If nothing is felt, then there is no boil, no flare, no burst—no emotion. So, at some points, a necessity for feelings seems relatively uncontroversial.
Concerning such cases, however, it is the intensity of the emotions, the boil, the flare, the burst that makes clear the necessity of feelings. Is there reason to suppose that this necessity will carry through for less violent occurrences?

Let us return to the emotional life of God and do so in a way that helps us see further into the troubled issue of a role for physiological changes. Whether God’s emotion be strong or mild, how is it that we can consider God angry—even if only metaphorically so? We have seen that certain evaluations are required, as is an object of anger. But what else?

We know that God’s behavior won’t suffice and is not necessary. For a God who destroys the tower of Babel could be an unemotional just judge, not an angry one. And God, like us, could harbor the anger or simply observe, taking no action. Neither do God’s desires suffice nor are they necessary. The presence of desire is compatible with an unemotional judge. And God, like us, need not have any wishes or desires that relate to his anger. God may simply seethe. Since God is without physiology that is not necessary; nor, with cognition, would it suffice for emotion. But suppose God does not seethe, does not feel anything when said to be angry, either because God doesn’t at the moment or because God is constitutionally unable to. What sense is there now to speak of God’s anger, or an emotional life?

I see none. Whereas if God seethes or feels in some way perturbed, even mildly disturbed—even though this yields or involves neither desires, nor actions, nor, what is here impossible, physiological change—then there seems sense, once more, to the claim that God is angry. Without these feelings it does not look like we can credit emotion to God; with them we consider God moved by emotion. Here feelings seem necessary, and with cognition suffice for emotion’s presence.

One may suspect that the example is loaded in its exclusion of a possible role for physiological change: the example simply has forced a decision rather than captured anything about our emotions. The suggestion is that the concept
works differently for human emotion considered in an unprejudiced way. For though one might accept the cold, just judge argument with respect to a role for man’s desires and behavior, and though one might be resigned to an empirical necessity for physiological change, nonetheless one might maintain that matters differ where an “emoter,” in addition to making relevant judgments, also flushes in the face, trembles, has a racing heart (physiological changes and the symptoms of such changes). Would we not have sufficient reason to think emotion is present?

Lyons thinks so, as his thoughts on how we judge ourselves and others emotional suggest. But it seems to me that any surety we have of the presence of emotion arises because we take these physiological changes as signs of something else, feelings. Could we be assured that the changes occurred without feeling anything (either because one is constitutionally unable to or because one doesn’t at this point), then the surety that emotion is present evaporates. The physiological changes together with judgment are not sufficient for emotion. Whereas if we also think that the person feels in an apt way, we become convinced that emotion is present. To return to Lyons’ example, I would say that the lover who has physiological changes but no feeling is not undergoing emotion; the lover who has the apt feelings, even though (in fact or in imagination) is undergoing no appropriate physiological changes is nonetheless in love. To put the point in the manner of the previous section, it is the “noticing” not the noticed that matters; to put it in yet another way, it is the subjectivity of emotion that is vital to emotion.

The conceptual location of emotion with feelings rather than physiological changes is controversial, especially in the present milieu. Therefore, I shall press the point with a series of thought experiments, beginning with the extravagant and moving to the mundane. By so doing I hope to shore up the suggestions already advanced, and to show that the conclusions reached do not rely on an eccentric example or two.
Consider what would be required to credit computers with emotion. For reasons we have seen and as experience indicates, cognitive sets, though necessary, do not seem to determine the issue. As we have seen also, neither do behavior or desire make the difference. Suppose, then, that the latest generation of computers exhibit unusual electrical activity in some thing functionally analogous to our autonomic nervous system when making judgmental sets relevant to emotion. Although this would be puzzling, it doesn’t seem evidence to credit or even suspect emotion. Rather, the suspicion would be an electrical problem of some sort. If that suspicion proves unfounded, and if the discharge is taken to reveal more, namely emotion, then it seems that the discharge is being understood as a sign of or clue to something else—just as a clenched fist, a drawn face are signs of someone’s being upset. The electrical activity may require causal analysis, but in itself or with cognition it does not suggest a conceptual shift. In pondering whether this latest generation lead emotional lives, we would be trying to determine the possible subjectivity of these computers; in particular we would be concerned with feelings relevant to emotion. If we knew that they did have subjectivity, say in a way relevant to fear, the claim that these computers are afraid becomes plausible; if they do not, we would acknowledge the electrical activity but not say that they were afraid.

These conclusions emerge in more pedestrian settings as well. Imagine someone stricken by grief. What that means for the person is that he or she sees something as a great personal loss that is a wrenching agony for him or her. To share in the person’s grief is to be wrenched by the loss also, to sympathize with the loss involves being disturbed by the loss. It is not any physiological presence we are concerned with in order to determine grief. For we shall call this grief even if informed, much to our surprise, that no physiological changes occur. Whereas, if one’s pupils dilate as the result of some evaluation, we would not begin to suspect this as a constituent in an emotion—unless we thought the dilation betrayed a
swelling of feeling. This is not because we doubt that such dilation is of the relevant physiological system—most of us have no idea about that—but because it is what is felt, not physiology, that constitutes emotion. The same points are to be made concerning being moved by music, to anger, etc. The determination of the emotion (both epistemologically and ontologically) rests upon the presence of feelings.

Some confirmation of these conclusions may be had by an indirect argument. Consider the restrictions upon physiological changes such that only certain sorts are relevant to emotion. Why are the physiological changes relevant limited to a particular nervous system to the exclusion of physiological changes associated with stubs to the toe or bruises upon the head? The answer seems to be that we are quite clear that the pain of a bump on the head or stub to the toe are not related to emotion, while a queasy feeling or tightness in the throat can be. That is, in setting out the physiological changes appropriate to emotion, one relies on conceptual connections between emotion and feeling—otherwise one would have no reason to mark out the pertinent physiological changes. Hence the primacy of feelings conceptually.

Although physiological activity does give us a clue, it reveals nothing and is not sufficient. Rather, it is relevant feelings that are necessary to emotion and when conjoined with the relevant evaluations that suffice for emotion. But what of the candidates excluded from the necessary and sufficient conditions?

THE OTHER ELEMENTS

Physiology’s place is empirically necessary. If we are to have emotion, we must have physiological changes of a relevant sort. For these changes allow for the biological operation of the individual; these changes are the “vehicle” for our feelings. This caused physiological activity is often revealed to us in the symptoms
of emotion, blushing, tearing, trembling, etc. All of this is epistemically valuable in judging whether emotion is present.

Behavior will occur when a desire causative of that behavior is present and when the desire is sufficiently strong to generate the behavior and when nothing overrides it. If I am sufficiently angry and desire revenge, and if I, others, or circumstances do not intervene, I wreak vengeance.

Desire is relevant in certain instances of emotion, as one is aware when one is angry and seeks to retaliate. To be relevant, the desire, as the feelings necessary, must be appropriate. The appropriateness of the desire is determined by the necessary cognition. It seems appropriate to seek safety when in danger; it seems appropriate to seek retaliation when insulted. Desire’s relevance may be strengthened in certain cases. For though desire hasn’t been held necessary for the genus emotion or certain species of emotion, it should be for other species and certain sub-species of emotion. Earlier I suggested that love might be had though no specific desire or any desire at all be present. The same, however, cannot be said for one phase of one species of love, erotic love. While in the throws of erotic love, it seems that the desire for some sort of sexual encounter must be present; otherwise we do not have erotic love. Again, the emotion envy seems to require not only the thought of someone’s having something desirable, and downcast feelings about this, but also the desire to have it or the aversion to someone else’s possession of it. This inclusion of desire does not repudiate the conclusions drawn. We do not relinquish the necessity of feelings at any level. For the mere presence of the evaluation and desire need not be felt, and such a complex, we have seen, is something yet too cool, too passion less to be considered emotion. Yet should one feel in a relevant way in regard to the person, then emotion seems present.

Like considerations seem to apply to behavior. For example, unrequited love requires certain relevant thoughts, feelings, desires and behavior— which are
not reciprocated. Hence this species of the genus emotion requires behavior.\textsuperscript{19} As with desire, we do not relinquish the necessity of feelings. Its absence is fatal for the state as one of emotion; the mere presence of the evaluation and behavior may be had without the love.

Our sketch has become more complex. Primarily it is a judgmental-feeling picture. The genus emotion, the species and subspecies of that genus, the occurrences of emotion require both judgments and feelings. Certain species, subspecies, and occurrences of emotion may have the presence of desire and/or behavior. Further, certain species (e.g. envy), subspecies (e.g. erotic Love), and occurrences of emotion require the presence of desire; still others (unrequited love) require the presence of behavior. Physiological changes are empirically necessary to emotion, and in turn account for the presence of physiological symptoms.

DISPOSITIONAL EMOTION

The disposition to anger or fear, the standing condition of anger or fear do not require feelings. For one can, say, hate (dispositionally) one’s boss or be in the standing condition of fear, yet be delighted by a friend’s success. In the midst of the delight the feelings of hatred or fear are not present.

The disposition and standing condition can be accounted for in one of two fashions. In one, the disposition is said to be in place when, for the relevant period, one is moved frequently to occurrences of the emotion in relevant situations. More plausibly, however, the disposition requires that throughout the period specified, certain judgments relevant to the occur rent emotion and relevant desires (where appropriate) continue to be held by the person said to be so disposed (though they need not be in the forefront of one’s mind); and that person tended to occurrences of the emotion in relevant situations.\textsuperscript{20}
When we say that Joe is afraid of heights, we are saying that he is the sort of person who considers heights dangerous, who will be moved to occurrent fear when faced with such heights and who is likely to avoid heights. When we say that Joe became frightened whilst climbing the mountain, we speak of Joe’s evaluation of his situation and how he feels about it.

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NOTES

1 That emotion is intentional and has an object is generally granted in modem theories, though the analysis of intentionality and emotion’s object is highly controversial. I take no stand on these latter issues here, but do assume that some notion of object is needed in the explanation of emotion.

2 A more formal way of putting these points can be had by appealing to A. Kenny’s formal/material object distinction (Action Emotion and Will, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963). Whereas the place for judgments discussed in the previous paragraph arise on account of emotion’s material object, here the concern has to do with its formal object. To frame the former only descriptive judgments seem necessary; to frame the latter, evaluative judgments are necessary.

3 The search for necessary and sufficient conditions for emotion may be vain. Whether so, and whether alternate models should be employed, is best discovered by undertaking the search for a necessary condition or conditions which suffice for emotion.

4 Many versions of this argument have been advanced in the literature. I take it to be persuasive, but note that the argument might be blocked if one could assume that one was always emotional. However, even though one may insist that all consciousness has its subjective register, there seems no good reason to suppose that that subjective register must be a matter of emotion. Hence this attempt to block the criticism fails. A different tack is taken by R. Solomon, the modern architect of a judgmental analysis. In a presentation delivered at the Western meetings of the American Philosophical Association, 1985, he argued that the criticism fails to distinguish adequately mode and content of judgments. Although I do not agree that his critics have failed to appreciate the point, the line of thought is attractive for a thoroughgoing judgmentalist.

5 Throughout the examples are to be understood as ones of occurrent emotion rather than the disposition to emotion or dispositional emotion. The reason for this is methodological. Since dispositions are dispositions to occurrences, dispositions presuppose and are explained in terms of occurrences. We have to sort out occurrent emotion before we can hope to explain dispositional emotion.

6 W. Alston seems to suggest that sudden starts are emotions, but not full—blooded emotions (“Emotion and Feeling,” in P. Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967). Whereas he will allege that judgments are characteristic but not necessary for emotion and expand the cases to be considered ones of emotion, I maintain that judgments are necessary and restrict the cases to be considered ones of emotion. One reason for preferring my solution is that there seems to be no way to account for the “partial bloodedness” of such cases. Why is a sudden start partially blooded, but not the sudden chilling? Yet opening the door such that all physiological reflexes are considered emotion seems to destroy emotion as an interesting kind. Furthermore, emotions are thought to be reasonable or unreasonable. If what Alston proposes were accepted, the reasonableness, as opposed to its efficacy is inadequately explained without appeals to reason.

7 Interestingly, a contrary desire is often present in fear. Those afraid of heights are often attracted to the danger, to peer over the edge, rather than to seek safety through freezing, avoiding, etc.

8 Love’s difficulties may be explained in part because whereas there is a specifiable and informative cognitive basis for emotions such as anger and fear, e.g. insult and danger, it is much harder to discover the same for love (cf. J. C. B. Gosling “Emotion and Object,” *Philosophical Review*, 1965).

9 The basis of the restrictions upon behavior is unclear. Probably they would have to be offered in a rather ad hoc fashion when considering cases, keeping in mind the relevant evaluations and, perhaps, desires.

10 W. Lyons seems to have worked out most thoroughly and plausibly the physiological changes relevant (Emotion, Cambridge University Press, 1980). I follow his lead.

11 S. Schachter and J. Singer survey the evidence for and against distinctive physiological patterns for different emotions (cf. “Cognitive, Social, and
Physiological Determinants of Emotional State,” *Psychological Review*, 1969). While they admit that the question remains open, there seems little reason to believe that there are distinctive patterns for the particular emotions.

12 See Lyons, Chapter seven.

13 In Aquinas’ speculations about God and his emotions, the lack of a body was relevant, not per se, but because certain desires were thereby excluded. Aquinas credits God (and angels) with emotion on the basis of the presence of intellectual desire.

14 I began by speaking of feelings or noticing of physiological changes. Hereafter, I shall speak of feelings. This seems justified inasmuch as the arguments concerning God’s emotional life indicate that it is not qua physiological changes that are noticed that emotion is deemed present, but insofar as there is a certain sort of noticing or feeling. Speaking of feelings becomes preferable since it is appropriately neutral as to whether there is an object and what it is.


16 James, for example, comments that he doesn’t know whether pure spirits are condemned to cold intellectual lives, but that for us emotion without bodily feeling is inconceivable. I suggest that the inconceivability rests with feelingless, not bodiless emotions—as James’ tongue in cheek remark betrays.

17 In the case of erotic love the place of desire seems akin to a definitional move, e.g. the ‘erotic’ qualification upon love. Yet this isn’t true of envy. Hence the claim of desire’s role is substantive.

I say ‘the emotion envy’ to distinguish it from the character trait, the envious person. For an illuminating discussion of the differences between emotion and character trait with respect to pride, see G. Taylor, *Pride, Shame and Guilt*, Oxford University Press, 1985.

18 One might allege that evaluation-desire complexes are sufficient for emotion in those cases where the desire is not or cannot be something cool or unfelt, where desire is the “vehicle” for feeling. Still it is the feeling that ensures of the presence of emotion. Could one strip away the desire but not the feeling, emotion—though perhaps not the particular emotion—would be present. Could one strip away the feeling but not the desire, emotion would be present no longer.

19 Here the role for behavior is had through the qualification of “unrequited” on love. A definitional move of sorts.
The specificity of the judgments depends on the particular disposition. For example, a dispositional fear of Fred will require judgments more specific than a dispositional fear of people.

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