AN

APPEAL

TO THE

PEOPLE, &c.
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PEOPLE:
CONTAINING,
The Genuine and Entire Letter of
Admiral Byng to the Secr. of the Ad—y:
OBSERVATIONS on those Parts of it
which were omitted by the Writers of the Gazette:
AND
What might be the REASONS for such
OMISSIONS.

—Nec lex eff æquior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua. OVID.

PART the First.

LONDON:
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1756.
AN

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IN all States of whatever Plan the Constitution may be formed, general Prejudices are extremely apt to take too strong Possession of the Hearts of Men, but in none are the People so open to the Influence of that Impulse as in Governments, where, from the Nature of the Establishment, they make a Part of the legislative Power.

From this Cause at present in this Kingdom, constituted on a Plan of Liberty, it is probable, that as well as anciently in Athens and Rome, popular Condemnation and Applause are more particularly visible in the Actions of all Ranks of Men, than in monarchic or despotic States: Hence it is, that those who become the favourite Objects of this People, are for the most B Part
Part preserved inviolate from the Malevolence of the M—rs, and those who become Objects of their Resentment or Contempt, are abandoned to the full Force of m—l Attacks. No Man can be safely punished, or safely permitted to escape Punishment, when the Nation is in great Ferment, contrary to the general Opinion of his Deserts, however well inclined the M—rs may be to save or destroy.

This Consent or Disapprobation of the Public, frequently proves to be the just Counterpoise which weighs against the ministerial Inclinations, when unreasonably intended to reward or punish those who become the Objects of the national Consideration, and a necessary Sanction to all their Proceedings of a public Nature; for these Reasons, whenever, by m—l Measures long misconducted, some minister Event becomes the Consequence of their Administration; those in the Cabinet who have little Honesty and less Understanding to direct a Nation either in Peace or War, to appoint proper Means for attacking their Enemies, and protecting their own Country by Land or Sea; in short, those who are unequal to every Duty of a M—r, are still cunning enough to think it indispensible necessary, to throw the whole Blame and Disgrace of the ill Success, on the visible Object who presided in the Scene of Action, to fascinate the Understandings of the Multitude by delusive and partial Representations,
tions, and sculk from their Indignation behind the Resentment, which their Adherents and Abettors have craftily raised against the Commander in the Day of Battle.

To quote Instances of this Kind, would be to mention almost all the past Facts in History, in which Military Affairs have proved unsuccessful, from the Iniquity, Negligence, or Incapacity, of the M—rs, and the Chief in Command has been called to public Justification: and indeed as the Dependents of M—rs must be more numerous than those of a suspected Commander, and as the Love of Money and their own Interest is more particularly prevalent, in such Men, than the Love of Honesty of Truth, and of their Country, it has too generally happened, that by means of m—Faction, the innocent Commanders have been condemned by the People, and the guilty Administration not attended to or acquitted. It has been remarked, that the Tribunal of the People has generally pronounced righteous Sentences, when all the Circumstances of the Affair have been brought before it; and even where the Decisions have been either defective or unjust, that it has been chiefly owing to partial and unfair Representations of the Subject; for these Reasons, it necessarily becomes the Interest of all Ministers, who intend to transfer the Guilt of an Action from themselves to the Commanders in any unfortunate undertaking, to conceal
conceal and misrepresent every Circumstance, which can possibly offer any favourable Idea, for the Justification and Defence of those who have unhappily miscarried in their Endeavours, under their wrong Directions and ill-concerted Measures, and to define them the public Sacrifice and Atonement for their Inability or Iniquity.

To effect this, and their own Preservation, Ten Thousand idle and groundless Reports, which may tend to countenance and support that Part of the Affair only which they think necessary to be offered to the Public, are daily spread by their Emissaries; hence it arises, that from partial Views of the whole Circumstances, from limited Considerations of the Subject, Things appear to be just, which are the rankest Injustice, the Guiltless die, and the Guilty escape from condign Punishment.

This has frequently been the Consequence of Craft in M—orrs, and many an innocent Man has suffered from this cruel Cunning of Men in Power; by these Arts the Passions of the People, greatly incensed and knavishly seduced, have been misled to condemn Men as Destroyers of the Crown and Nation's Honour, who are only made to appear in that Light, by the Wickedness and Wiles of those very M—s who ruined the public Welfare, and betrayed the Glory of the Sovereign; it is during this Tumult in the Minds
Minds of Men, too turbulent at first to be appeased by, or listen to, the Voice of Reason, that M——rs have taken Occasion to sacrifice a Commander in Chief, to appease the Wrath of the People and save themselves.

This having been already the Event in numberless Instances, must naturally prevail again, and be attempted, whenever an inquisitive, weak, or inattentive M——r entertains the Design of screening himself from Punishment, by the Death of another Man less criminal; without this Precaution, the first Impetuosity in the Multitude subsiding, and more Truth being let in upon the Subject and their Minds, that which was condemned under a partial View, becomes approved of under a general one, the M——r receives that Fate which he had allotted for the Commander, and Justice takes Place where Heaven always designed it should, on the nefarious.

It may perhaps by this Time be suspected, that all this Preface is advanced to prepare a Justification of the late Behaviour of Admiral B——g, and that I, his Advocate, am endeavouring to screen him from the public Resentment. Nothing is less true; my Intent is only to lay the whole Affair candidly before you, assuring you at the same Time, that no Man can be more irritated against his Conduct than I was in the beginning, till what I am going to offer to your
your Opinions became the prevailing Power over mine.

I am fully convinced that the People of this Country have the Love of Justice so strongly implanted in their Boshoms, that nothing can efface or over-rule it by direct and open Force; but I know also, that by Concealment of Truth and Misrepresentation of Circumstances, the Minds of Multitudes, as well as of the wisest Individuals, may be warped from Equity, and induced to determine diametrically opposite to right Reason, however ardently they seek the Truth.

Indeed, I freely own my Sentiments are much altered, by being indulged with authentic Evidence of Admiral B—g's Behaviour in the Mediterranean; and appealing to you as Judges of his Guilt or Innocence, I dare believe, when what I have to say is laid before you, even in granting the most unfavourable Opinions you can entertain of him to be just, you will allow that he has been most unjustifiably dealt with by those who sent him on the Expedition.

Between perfect Innocence and perfect Guilt there are innumerable Degrees in the Scale of Offence; and as no Man can say he is without Fault, so none can be pronounced all Guiltiness; the Nature of Crimes differs as much in Degrees as those who commit them; and the Nature of Justice is such, that unless it be truly adapted to the
the Degree of Offence, it becomes Injustice; and that which is the due Punishment for one Crime is converted to Cruelty, when inflicted for the Commission of a less; though it be just to condemn the Murderer to Death, is it not too severe to deprive those of Life, who steal Bread to satisfy the Calls of Nature in the Moment of perishing by Hunger?

In Cases of Disloyalty, the Officers who are most active in recruiting Troops against their King, and bravest in the Day of Battle, are always considered as less culpable in the Breach of their Allegiance and Duty, than the Creators of the Rebellion, though they never appear in Arms; the most obvious Objects of Resentment are frequently the least guilty of all who are concerned.

In like Manner, when M——rs have heretofore been determined to fell the Interest of their K——g and Country, those whom they employed to execute their Purposes, however guilty, have been considered as less criminal, whilst their Leaders, like Satan, first tempted to sin, continue tempting others to their own and the Nation’s Ruin; not that I say this to intimate that this Kingdom has been sold on a late Occasion, much less that Mr B——g is conscious of the Sale. I know he is not; but to show only that in such aggravating Incidences even, there must be Men more notoriously guilty than the
the most obvious Offender, and that it therefore becomes necessary to point out who they are, that the foremost in Offence may be first in Punishment, and not by removing the subordinate, preserve the chief Contrivers, to perpetrate more Mischief to their Country's Ruin.

To fix the Degree of every Crime in the Scale of Offence, becomes then as much an Act of Justice, as to protect the Innocent or condemn the Guilty; and to lay the Case of Mr B—g fairly before you, must appear a laudable Attempt in the Eyes of all humane and just Men, because every Englishman has a Right to a fair Plea and candid Judgment; and without being acquainted with all the Circumstances, no Decision can be made but what must be partial and defective. If it shall appear then, at the End of this Enquiry, that Misrepresentation, Calumny, Concealment of Truth, and Tales of Falshood, propagated and committed by those who pursue Mr B—g, and their Confederates, have induced you to pronounce those severe Censures which have been passed against him, when Things come to be placed in their true Light, and the Mist of Craft removed from your Eyes; when, if it be apparent that your Judgment has been misled by erroneous and partial Representations, shall not then the Love of Justice move ye to reverse those Decrees which ye have already made, and the Love of Truth prompt you to renounce the Errors of your
your former Decision, with the same Zeal with which you embraced it, you will then think it as much the Duty of an English Subject, and of a Man, to remit your Resentment against Mr B—g, as it will be to direct it on the great promoters of your Ruin and Dis grace.

Without manifesting this Candour, Men obstinately confess, that they prefer following an Error once adopted, to renouncing it for a Truth which may have been long hidden from their Perceptions, by the most malignant Artifices of the most pernicious Men: This Reflection, I hope, shall never be imputed to the Behaviour of Englishmen.

In this View and to this Intent I stand forth; not as the Friend or Advocate of Mr B—g, but as the Friend and Advocate of Justice, my King, and Country; to make apparent to all Eyes, how the first has been violated, and the latter abused and ruined; to explain how it becomes your Duty, though the Crime of Mr B—g be ever so enormous, to provide that it be fairly examined, and the Ad—impartially treated; to show you in what Manner those Evidences, which favour the Justification of him, have been cruelly with-held from the public Eye, basely misrepresented, and others added to insinuate their coming from his Hands; and in his Place permit me to speak to the Hearts and Understandings of all Englishmen, C uncorrupted
uncorrupted and uninfluenced by m——l Bribes, Places, and Pensions. Let me suppose that any one indifferent Man amongst you had been employed in a military Action of Consequence, and had written to either of the others an Account of his Behaviour, and of the Transaction on which not only his Honour but his very Life depended, is there a Man amongst you who would have concealed or misrepresented any Part of this Account, with Design to accomplish the Writer's Undoing? I am convinced you would not have committed such Baseness. What then is the just Due of such Men, if such there are, who have dared to commit an Action of that Nature, not improbably, duping their R—l Master to this iniquitous Intent, without his Knowledge of the real Circumstances, and making you, the honest Subjects of this Realm, Abettors of all this horrid Injustice? What then must be the State of that Man's Bosom, who may have seen his own Letter stripped of every Part which can make most effectually in his Favour, imperfectly given to the public Examination, and the People enraged against his Conduct by this partial Representation of his own Account, concealing the most material Circumstances which determined him to behave as he did.

What profligate and abandoned Hearts must such Men possess, who, by Omissions of whole Paragraphs of a Commander's own Letter,
ter, and Additions of others, can lessen the Force of his Justification in an Affair of Life and Death, change the Account of his Proceedings, and almost efface the whole Meaning of the Letter, to make his own Words condemn him to the Multitude, by speaking half what they express, and extorting, by this new Way of putting Letters to the Torture, so contradictory to the Spirit of the English Laws, a Meaning so different from what they truly import, a Confession of Guilt which is not to be found in the whole uncastrated Original. If this appear to be a true Representation, you will not withhold a just Revenge on this Occasion; and that it is, I dare to make appear from such Proofs, that even the greatest Enemy against Mr B—g shall be obliged to confess his Conviction of the Truth of what shall be said; and that, however guilty he may appear to be, in Comparison with his Oppressors, he is as innocent as the Person who treads on a Worm compared with Cain who slew his Brother, or he who burns his own Hovel, to him that set Fire to the shattered Ruins of Lisbon amidst the Calamities of the Earthquake.

In Truth, and before the Eyes of Heaven, if what I shall offer to your Consideration appears to be Fact, How are such barbarous Proceedings reconcilable with Humanity, or essentially different from a Forgery? to add what can undo a Man, or erase what can preserve him,
how do they vary in the Nature and Consequence of the Design? And to aggravate the Heinousness of the Offence, it is not like the despicable Intent of defrauding a Man of his Money, but like that of depriving him of his Life; it cannot be an Attempt to rob, though it may be to murder.

Is it not a Crime equal to that of Forgery, when men, by leaving out the most material Circumstances of a Man's Defence, lessen the Force, or change the Import of the whole, rendering him to the People the detestd Object of their Indignation and Desire of Punishment? Is it not by such cruel Means that he may become unjustly condemned? Added to this, if it shall appear that this Iniquity is purposely committed to screen themselves from their just Rewards, what is it but an execrable Endeavour to take away the Life of a less guilty, perhaps innocent, Man, to save their own destructive Heads from condign Punishment.

Any Attempt of this Nature appears the most inhuman of all Kinds of corrupted Evidence I have hitherto known, omitting the Parts which justify, and retaining those which seem to condemn. Is it not a Subornation of Witness? Is it not obliging the very person to give Testimony contrary to the Truth of the Fact, and repugnant to his own Preservation?
If this should appear to be the Case with Respect to the Man whose Conduct I am going to lay before you; if M—rs shall be found to have dealt with him in this inhuman Manner, I doubt not but the Tide of Resentment, which has so long and so violently ran against him, will be turned in his Favour, and set as strongly against those that may be discovered to have thus cruelly meditated his Ruin to preserve themselves.

This Attempt of faithfully placing before your Eyes the real State of an injured Fellow-Subject, will I hope be forgiven; injured he must appear to be, however Guilty, because no Man's Guilt can justify the concealing or altering the Nature of his Evidence, or representing him to his Countrymen more criminal than he is, with Design to see him over-borne by the Torrent of Popular Prejudice.

In my Endeavours to do this, I shall only lay before you the genuine Letter which was sent to the S—y of the A——y by Admiral B—g, dated on board the Ramillies off Minorca, May the 25th, 1756, in it's entire State, unmangled by the Writers of the Gazette; endeavour to investigate the true Motives which induced the publishing of it in this imperfect State, on June the 26th, and impartially ex-
plain the Mischief it was probably designed to do Mr B—g.

This I presume is justifiable in the Eyes of Heaven and Earth, to develop and characterize the Designs of Men in such Proceedings against the A—l, and to examine if Self-Preservation, attempted by Cruelty and Injustice, might not have been the chief Motives to this inhuman Conduct.

All I request, is a calm and dispassionate Examination of the whole Affair, and what there is to be said upon it; and then, though Prejudices of all Kinds are difficultly erased, more especially those which are received against the imagined Enemies of their Country. I entertain not the least Suspicion, but to prove the Person against whom this Tempest of Injuries has been let loose, who has been drawn, hanged, and burnt in every Part of the Town, is the least Guilty of all concerned in the Conduct of the Affair in the Mediterranean, the least meriting such opprobrious Treatment, and the most worthy your Protection; and that all those injurious Proceedings will be found to have taken Birth from conscious Guilt, the Fear of your Resentment, and public Justice, and to withhold your Eyes from discerning the just Objects of your Indignation: By this, I mean not to soothe your Hearts to disproportioned Mercy; all I desire is, that you may be alike
alike just in your Decisions to every Man proved a Delinquent; let not the great, when proved Offenders, screen themselves by the Sacrifice of the less criminal; distinguish their Offences and the Degrees of them, deliver your Opinions freely of the Punishment which is due to each, for without your Approbation, they will not presume to condemn him unmeriting it; and if you are still deluded to believe amiss by partial and unjust Representations, will they not screen themselves and complete his Destruction however Innocent?

All I mean by what has been already urged, is to appeal to your Tribunal, in Justice to you who have been so flagrantly abused by deceitful Representations, and made Accomplices in Abetting the wicked Purposes of bad Men, in Justice to my own Convictions, and the Sensations of a humane Heart, which has been deeply touched with Resentment of this Barbarity towards Mr Byng; in Justice to, and Compassion for one, who by injurious and unmerited Ill-Use from their Hands, has been rendered so obnoxious to the Public, that scarce a Man dares openly appear to be his Friend.

Permit me now, to lay the true Copy of the Letter as it left the Hands of Admiral Byng, before you, uncurtailed or altered.

A Ge-
A Genuine Copy of Admiral Byng's Letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

The Parts printed in Italics and Comma's, mark the Parts omitted in the GAZETTE.

Ramillies, off Minorca,
25 May, 1756.

S I R,

I HAVE the Pleasure to desire you will acquaint their Lordships, that having failed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 19th, having been joined by His Majesty's Ship Phœnix, off Majorca, two Days before, "by whom I had confirmed the Intelligence I received at Gibraltar, of the Strength of the French Fleet, and of their being off Mahon. His Majesty's Colours were still flying at the Castle of St Philip's, and I could perceive several Bomb Batteries playing upon it from different Parts; French Colours we saw flying on the West Part of St Philip's. I dispatched the Phœnix, Chesterfield, and Dolphin a Head, to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, and Captain Hervey, to endeavour to land a Letter for General Blakeny, to let him know the Fleet was here to his Assistance, though every one was of Opinion, we could be of no use to him, as by all Accounts, no Place was secured
secured for covering a Landing, could we have spared any People. The Phænix was also to make the private Signal between Captain Harvey and Captain Scrape, as this latter would undoubtedly come off, if it were practicable, having kept the Dolphin's Barge with him; but the Enemy's Fleet appearing to the South-East, and the Wind at the same Time coming strong off the Land, obliged me to call those Ships in, before they could get quite so near the Entrance of the Harbour, as to make certain what Batteries or Guns might be placed to prevent our having any Communication with the Castle." Falling little Wind, it was Five before I could form my Line, or distinguish any of the Enemy's Motions, and not at all to judge of their Force more than by their Numbers, which were Seventeen, and Thirteen appeared large. They at first fled towards us in a regular Line, and tacked about Seven, which I judged was to endeavour to gain the Wind of us in the Night; so that being late, I tacked, in order to keep the Weather-Gage of them, as well as to make sure of the Land Wind, in the Morning, being very hazy and not above five Leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards the Enemy at Eleven; and at Day-light had no sight of them. But two Tartans with the French private Signal being close in with the Rear of our Fleet, I sent the Princess Louisa to chase one, and made the Signal for the Rear-Admiral, who was nearest the other, to send D Ships.
Ships to chace her; the Princess Louisa, Defiance, and Captain, became at a great Distance, but the Defiance took her's, which had two Captains, two Lieutenants, and One Hundred and Two private Soldiers, who were sent out the Day before with Six Hundred Men on board Tartans to reinforce the French Fleet, on our then appearing off the Place. The Phoenix, on Captain Hervey's offer, prepared to serve as a Fire-Ship, but without damaging her as a Frigate, 'till the Signal was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her Decks, every thing else being prepared, as the Time and Place allowed of. The Enemy now began to appear from the Mast-head; I called in the Cruizers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the Enemy, and formed the Line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to Leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured to weather me: They were Twelve large Ships of the Line, and five Frigates. As soon as I judged the Rear of our Fleet to be the Length of their Van, we tacked all together, and immediately made the Signal for the Ships that led, to lead large, and for the Deptford to quit the Line, that ours might become equal in Number with theirs. At Two I made the Signal to engage, as I found it was the surest Method of ordering every Ship to close down on the one that fell to their Lot. And here I must express my great Satisfaction at the very gallant Manner in which the Rear-Admiral set the Van the Example, by instantly
instantly bearing down on the Ships he was to engage with his second, and who occasioned one of the French Ships to begin the Engagement, which they did, by raking ours as they went down; I bore down on the Ship that lay opposite me, and began to engage him, after having received the Fire for some Time in going down. The Intrepid, "unfortunately" (in the very beginning had his Fore-top-mast shot away, and as that hung on his Fore-sail and backed it, he had no Command of his Ship, his Fore-tack and all his Braces being cut at the same Time, so that he drove on the next Ship to him, and obliged that, and the Ships a-head of me to throw all aback; this obliged me to do so also for some Minutes to avoid their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our Adversary out of the Line, who put before the Wind, and had several Shot fired at him from his own Admiral. This not only caused the Enemy’s Center to be unattacked, but left the Rear-Admiral’s Division rather uncovered for some little Time. I sent and called to the Ships a-head of me to make Sail on, and go down on the Enemy, and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Deptford to supply the Intrepid’s Place. I found the Enemy edged away constantly, and as they went three Feet to our one, they would never permit our closing with them, but took the Advantage of destroying our Rigging; for though I closed the Rear-Admiral fast, I found I could not
not again close the Enemy, whose Van were fairly drove from their Line; but their Admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this Time 'twas past Six, and the Enemies Van and ours were at too great a Distance to engage; I perceived some of their Ships stretching to the Northward, and I imagined they were going to form a new Line; I made the Signal for the headmost Ships to tack, and those that led before with Larboard Tacks, to lead with the Starboard, that I might by the first, keep (if possible) the Wind of the Enemy, and by the second, be between the Rear-Admiral's Division and the Enemy, as his had suffered most, as also to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in a very bad Condition, and whose loss would very greatly give the Ballance against us, if they had attacked us the next Morning as I expected. I brought to about Eight that Night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our Ships as fast as possible, and continued so all Night. The next Morning we saw nothing of the Enemy, though we were still lying to; Mahon was N. N. W. about ten or eleven Leagues. I sent Cruisers out to look for the Intrepid and Chesterfield, who joined me the next Day; and having, from a State and Condition of the Squadron brought me in, found that the Captain, Intrepid, and Defiance, (which latter has lost her Captain) were much damaged in their Masts, "so that they were endangered of not being able to secure their Masts properly at"
Sea; and also, that the Squadron in general were very sickly, many killed and wounded, and no where to put a Third of their Number, if I made an Hospital even of the Forty Gun Ship, which was not easy at Sea.” I thought it proper in this Situation, to call a Council of War before I went again to look for the Enemy. I desired the Attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their Opinions upon the present Situation of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make sure of protecting the latter, since it was found impracticable to either succour or relieve the former with the Force we had; for though we may justly claim the Victory, yet we are much inferior to the Weight of their Ships, though the Numbers are equal, and they have the Advantage of sending to Minorca their wounded, and getting Reinforcements of Seamen from their Transports, and Soldiers from their Camp; all which, undoubtedly has been done in this Time that we have been laying to to refit, and often in Sight of Minorca; and their Ships have more than once appeared in a Line from our Mast-heads. I send their Lordships the Resolution of the Council of War,” in which there was not the least Contention or Doubt arose. “I hope indeed we shall find Stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and if I have any Reinforcement, will not lose a Moment’s Time to seek the Enemy again, and once
more give them Battle, though they have a great Advantage in being clean Ships, that go three Feet to our one, and therefore have the Choice how they will engage us, or if they will at all, and will never let us close them, as their sole View is the disabling our Ships, in which they have but too well succeeded, though we obliged them to bear up." I do not send their Lordships the Particulars of our Losses and Damages by this, as it would take me much Time, and that I am willing none should be lost in letting them know an Event of such Consequence. "I cannot help urging their Lordships for a Reinforcement, if none are yet failed, on their Knowledge of the Enemy's Strength in these Seas, and which, by very good Intelligence, will in a few Days be strengthened by four more large Ships from Toulon, almost ready to sail, if not now failed to join these." I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene by way of Barcelona, and am making the best of my way to cover Gibraltar; from which Place I propose sending their Lordships a more particular Account.

I am,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

Hon. John Cleveland, Esq;

P. S. I must
P. S. I must desire you, will acquaint their Lordships, that I have appointed Captain Harvey to the Command of the Defiance, in the room of Captain Andrews slain in the Action.

I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out, whilst I was closing my Letter."

Before I proceed to examine what may have been the probable Reasons for omitting the above Paragraphs printed in Italics and Comma's, permit me to lay before you, authentic Lists of the Fleets which engaged in the Mediterranean under the Commands of Admiral Byng and Monsieur La Galissonniere, as they were in Number of Ships, Number of Men, Number of Cannon, and Weight of Metal; and from a fair Comparison in these Particulars, shew you on which Side, and to what Degree the Advantage lay.
The Honourable Admiral Byng’s Squadron, when he engaged Monsieur De La Gallifsonniere’s off Cape Mola, 20 May, 1756.

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<td>5875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deptford</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesterfield</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolphin</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>932</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6885</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Monsieur
Monsieur De La Gallissonniere's Squadron, when he landed the Troops at Minorca 18 April, and at the Engagement with Admiral Byng's Squadron off Cape Mola, 20 May, 1756.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships Names</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Weight of Metal on the Lower Deck.</th>
<th>Number of Seamen</th>
<th>Total Men on board each Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lb.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foudroyant</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Couronne</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Guerrier</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Temeraire</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Redoutable</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Hippopotame</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Fier</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Triton</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Lion</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Contant</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Sage</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'Orphée</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>828</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6800</strong></td>
<td><strong>8350</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Juno</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Roze</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
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<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Gracieuse</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Topaze</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Nymphe</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>982</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8050</strong></td>
<td><strong>9600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the first Place, the Number of Ships was equal on each Side; from this then no Advantage was to be drawn by one Party above another. As the Frigates on either Side did not engage, notwithstanding the French exceeded the English greatly in Number of Men and Weight of Metal, I shall not attempt to derive from that Circumstance any Argument of the Superiority of the French Fleet to that of the English, but consider those Ships which were drawn up in Line of Battle, only remarking the Weakness of that Objection to the Conduct of the Admiral, in leaving the Deptford out of the Line; when the same Thing was done by Monsieur La Gallifsonniere in not taking the Junon into his Line; the first being of Forty-eight Guns, and the latter of Forty-six.

The Number of Ships being equal, the next Consideration is the Number of Guns; and in this Article, according to this List, which was received from a Person the best enabled to give a just Account, and the least to be suspected of doing the contrary, the French Fleet exceeded the English by Fifty Cannon, the Number of the first being Eight Hundred Twenty-eight, and of the second Seven Hundred Seventy-eight, which gives a Majority of Fifty on the Side of the French; but as it may be objected, that, according to other Lists printed by Authority, the Hippopotame and Fier are given as Fifty Gun Ships
Ships only, we will suppose that to be the right; and then the Number of French Cannon exceeds the English by Twenty-two Guns only.

The next Article which comes under Consideration is the Weight of Metal; and in this Place it seems necessary to remark, that it is the usual Custom to denominate the Weight of Metal by the Guns which are on the whole Decks only; hence it happens, tho' three Sizes are only mentioned in the Lift of the Ramillies, and two in that of the Foudroyant, that there were ten of the Number on board the Ramillies on the Quarter Deck and Forecastle, which carried six Pounds only, and on board the Foudroyant Twenty-four, which placed in the same Parts mentioned in the Ramillies, carried only Shot of Twelve Pounds.

The Foudroyant and Ramillies then may be thus considered with Respect to the Cannon which each carried.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foudroyant</th>
<th>Ramillies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>Weight of Shot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 of 52 Pounds</td>
<td>26 of 32 Pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>2268 lb. each Charge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deducting
Deducting then the lesser from the greater Number, the Weight of the Shot fired by the Foudroyant in a Discharge of all the Cannon, exceeds that of the Ramillies by Five Hundred Seventy-two Pounds, almost a third of the whole Quantity. The Number of Men on board the English Ship, was Seven Hundred and Thirty; on board the French, Nine Hundred and Fifty; which gives a Majority of Two Hundred and Twenty Men to the French Ship. Now, on a Medium, we may allow Eight Men to a Gun on board the Foudroyant, as her Metal is heavier, and Six to a Gun on board the Ramillies; this will make Six Hundred Seventy-two at the great Guns, and Two Hundred and Seventy-eight at the small Arms, on board the French Ship; and Five Hundred and Forty at the great Guns, and One Hundred and Ninety at the small Arms, on board the Ramillies, which gives a Majority of Eighty-eight small Arms Men to the Foudroyant, almost a third superior to the Ramillies. In this Account we have computed, the Officers and others employed in various Duties, amongst the small Arms; and as each Ship has probably an equal Number engaged in these Services, whatever is allowed, being allowed alike on board each Ship, it leaves the same Proportion amongst the small Arms Men; this then effects nothing on the Validity of the Reasoning.
Let me then imagine them all engaged on board each Ship, the Foudroyant discharging from the small Arms, two hundred and seventy-eight Balls, and the Ramillies one hundred and ninety, the French Ship's Fire in this Respect exceeds the English by eighty-eight Ball in each generally Volley; let me suppose also, that a Number of Cannon equal to the whole Sum in each Ship, be discharged in a Minute, which seems no improbable Supposition, since Cannon are fired twelve Times in a Minute in Land-Service; the Excess of Weight of Metal in the Foudroyant, compared with that fired by the Ramillies in one Hour, will be thirty-four thousand three hundred and twenty Pounds, a most amazing Superiority. If we allow at the same Time, four Discharges of the Small-Arms in each Minute, then the Number of small Shot fired from the Foudroyant, more than from the Ramillies in one Hour, will be twenty-one Thousand one Hundred and Twenty, which increases the Chance of the Men being killed on the upper Decks on board the English Ship equal to that Number. The Advantage drawn from the small Arms, is then exactly in Proportion to the Number in which one Ship exceeds another, and the Advantage of the heavier Shot discharged from the Cannon, is as the Diameter of each exceeds the other; let me suppose a thirty-two Pound Ball to be ten Inches in Diameter, such a Shot can pass between two Objects eleven
eleven Inches distant from each other, and touch neither of them; whereas, allowing a Ball of fifty-two Pounds, to be twelve Inches diameter, and to pass in the same Direction with the former, this last Ball may destroy, but must inevitably wound both Objects: Again, if you suppose a Ball of ten Inches diameter, to pass within half an Inch of any single Object, that of twelve passing in the same Line by the increased Diameter, must destroy or injure it: In like Manner as the Diameter in Shot increases, the Holes which are made in the Sides will be increased also; thus two Men may be killed by the biggest Ball, and not touched by the lesser; two Ropes cut by the biggest, and not touched by the lesser; and Mafts and Yards carried away by the increased Diameter of the heavy Ball, which will be untouched or less affected by the lighter; besides this, Holes between Wind and Water, which are made by heavy Balls, being proportioned to the Diameter also, the Danger of sinking is increased, as the Water which flows through the great Aperture, is more than that through the lesser; every Broadside then fired from the Foudroyant, carries a Probability of doing more Mischief than that from the Ramillies, as the Diameters of all the Balls taken together, fired from the French Ship, exceeds that of the English; and for this Reason it is in a great Measure, that the Mafts, Yards, and Rigging, are more damaged on board English Ships in Battle than on board French.
Hence in every View, except Number of Cannon, which are only six small Guns of six Pounds, the Foudroyant is superior to the Ramillies, almost as three to two; in this Manner of computing the Superiority, which appears to me to be just, if for three to two in Force, we put three to two in Ships, which amounts to the same Thing, on which Side ought a prudent Man to expect the Victory.

I do not by this Manner of computing each Force, propose to reduce the different Degrees in Strength of each Ship to a Mathematical and demonstrative Exactness, but only to show nearly, how much the Superiority of the French Ship was greater than that of the English; as to the Size of the Ships, the Foudroyant is the largest.

It may be objected, probably, that the Charge and Discharge of a Cannon, instead of taking up one Minute, may take up five or perhaps ten, and each Man at the small Arms employ a like Time to charge and fire his Fuelle; even then this will create no Difference, the same Time being allowed alike to each Ship, the Superiority of Powers on board the Foudroyant to those on board the Ramillies will be still preserved the same; and the sole Alteration arising from this is, that by less firings, the Superiority
periority is not so often exerted, and the Pro-
portion of four to three still remain.

In this Manner of comparing the different
Strengths of the two Fleets, I have pitched upon
the two Ships which were the nearest a Match
for each other, and here the odds were as four
to three. Between the Couronne and Culloden, it
is still greater, and when you descend lower,
and compare the seventy-four and sixty-four
Gun French Ships, against the sixty-eight, sixty-
six, sixty-four, and sixty Gun Ships of England,
it is three to two; so that the Proportion of
four to three, is a very inferior Allowance for
the Superiority of the French Fleet over the
English as they met in the Mediterranean.

Hence it evidently appears, that if this third
Part of Superiority was taken from the twelve
French Ships, leaving each an equal to the En-
glish, there would remain a sufficient Force to
equip four Ships more, then the Number
would be sixteen French Ships to twelve En-
glish, a Superiority not to be attacked by a
prudent Man, scarce at any Time, and in this
particularly wrong, as we shall show in the fol-
lowing Pages.

The inexpressible Ignorance of those who
appointed and prepared this Fleet for this Ex-
pedition, if the succouring Minorca was the
Design of it, must appear absurd beyond all
Expression,
Expression, not to give it a worse Appellation.

Having in this Manner endeavoured to ascertain the Superiority of the French to the English Squadron, let me now assign the Reasons for the French Cannon being so much heavier than the English. First, the Pounds of France being heavier than those of England, a Shot which they call a thirty-six Pounder, is almost equal to a forty-two Pound Shot English; and in the above Lifts, the Weights are reduced to the English Standard; another Reason was, that to increase the Force on board each Ship at Toulon, Cannon were put much heavier than usual on board Ships of such Rates, to make them as much superior as possible to the English in the Day of Battle, apprehending no Danger from this increased Weight, as the Navigation was short, in Summer Seas, and smooth Water. And that it may not appear extraordinary, that Ships should carry Cannon of twenty-four Pounds on the Upper-Deck; the Invincible in our Service, taken from the French, carries such Guns at present.

The Lifts of each Fleet were placed in the Beginning, to give a just Idea of the Strength of them, and to place the whole in a clearer View, which may be said in the following Sheets, where we shall mention that given to the Public in the Gazette, with Mr
Mr Byug's Letter, to show how fallaciously it was inferred to insinuate it's coming from his Hands.

Having transcribed the Letter, given the Lifts of the Fleet and their different Force, let me now enquire what may be the Nature of the Paragraphs omitted in the Gazette, and from thence attempt, if it is not possible to deduce the true Reasons for the Omissions of them.

The first Article omitted, refers to a Letter sent from Gibraltar by the Admiral, on his Arrival at that Place in his Voyage to Minorca, and addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty. This Letter contains an Account of the Number of the French Fleet which escorted the Embarkation from Toulon; the landing of fifteen thousand Men at Minorca, from about a hundred and sixty or two hundred Transports, a concern for the Admiral's not being sent time enough to prevent this Descent, which he imagines he could have effected, had he been sent sooner; Reasons for the Difficulty of relieving the Place unless a sufficient Number of Soldiers could be sent to dislodge the French, considering the immense Quantity of Stores, Ammunition, and Provisions of all Kinds which they brought with them, adding, immediately "I am determined to sail up to Minorca with the Squadron, "where I shall be a better Judge of the Situation
"tion of Affairs there, and will give General "Blakeney all the Assistance he shall require." He then expresses his Opinion, that of the Chief Engineers at Gibraltar, who had served at St Philips, and of the other Officers of the Artillery, who were acquainted with the Situation of the Harbour, of what might be the Success of his going to it's Relief, and his and their Reasons for those Opinions. He then mentions an enclosed List of the Strength of the French Ships at Toulon, and a Copy of a Letter of Intelligence to General Blakeney, giving an Account of the Equipment on that Occasion; and thence infers an Apprehension of the French attacking Gibraltar, adding, that if Mabon could not be relieved, that he should look upon securing Gibraltar as his next Object.

He then goes on to express his great Concern, in finding at Gibraltar, few or no Stores in the Magazines to supply the Squadron; and that the careening Wharf, Sore-houses, Pits, &c. were entirely decayed; with the great difficulty of getting them repaired, as no Artificers were at that Place, and no Carpenters could be spared from the Fleet which was proceeding to Minorca; he then mentions his having appointed a proper Person to transact every Thing towards preparing what was necessary, with all possible Speed, adding something relating to the Council of War held by General Fowke, and the Result of it.
This Letter was never given to the Public, for Reasons too evident to be named; yet this is the Letter from which those wise Heads inferred that the Admiral would not Fight; which in the Opinion of every honest Man, will convey Ideas very different from founding the Presumption of branding him with Cowardice; and which, though without Design, affords very just Reasons to blame the Conduct of the great Head of the A—y.

This Letter, if the Publick have any desire to see, accompanied with some others, may probably be laid before them.

Is not then the omitting the first Article of the Letter in the Gazette, designed to prevent all Knowledge or Enquiry about the different Force of the two Fleets, to keep your belief of Superiority on the English side, and delude you to conclude from the Equality of the Number, that Mr Byng was extremely delinquent in not vanquishing the French Squadron.

The next Article seems omitted with intent to suggest, that the Admiral’s Squadron was never in Sight of Port-Mahon, and that he avoided meeting the French Fleet, or proceeding directly to Mr Blakeney’s Assistance; whereas by the Objects which he saw, and indeed it will be proved by undeniable Evidence, that after
after getting round the small Island, called the Laire of Mahon, at Ten in the Morning he was within a League of the Port; but on seeing the Enemy's Fleet, he thought it more immediately his Duty to bear away at Eleven, to meet them. This obliged him to recall, with Reason, the three Frigates which he had sent a-head of the Fleet to reconnoitre the Harbour's Mouth, to land a Letter for the Commander of the Garrison, to acquaint him the Fleet was arrived to his Assistance, and to know in what Manner it could be of the most effectual Service.

This Behaviour will now I imagine, appear to be suggested by the utmost Prudence, all that could have been attempted in the Space of an Hour, and the most advantageous Step which could have been taken on that Occasion: It proves that the Admiral depended not on the hear-say Evidence which he had received, even from the best Authorities at Gibraltar, nor on the united Opinion of every Officer at that Place: But that he was determined to be certified of the true State of the Harbour and Citadel from General Blakeney himself, as he knew that Captain Scrope, who, together with all the Soldiers and Marines of Mr Edgecomb's Ships, and one hundred Seamen, had been left to reinforce the Garrison, would come off in his Barge, and bring him a just Relation of every Circumstance necessary to be known; and though he adds the Opinions
Opinion of all the Sea and Land Officers, that
they could render no Service to the Garrison,
as no Place was covered for the landing of any
Men, could they have spared any.' In this he
only gave his Opinion, agreeable to that of all the
other Officers. This Opinion had no Influence
on his Conduct, and was only meant to signify
what might have been the Event, supposing
the French Fleet had not appeared at that Time.

So far then neither Knowledge of his Profes-
sion, Prudence in conducting the Expedition,
or Duty to his King and Country, appear to be
deficient in him.

His Letter to Mr Blakeney, sent by Mr Her-
vey, though never delivered, for Reasons imme-
diately to follow, will evince this Truth, and
the Public may be satisfied by seeing it also if
they please.

The first Care of the Admiral, after coming
in Sight of the Port, was to know the true State
of the Harbour and Garrison, to encourage the
General and the Soldiers, by acquainting him
that he was arrived to his Succour, and desiring
to know how it might most effectually be put
in Execution.

Are not now the Reasons which induced
the publishing this Letter, mangled in that
Manner, sufficiently convincing? Was it not
from
from a Perfwasion, that those Passages would convey to your Understandings the most undeniable Proofs of Knowledge, Prudence, Conduct, and Duty, in the Commander of the Fleet, the Man whom they seem too determined to destroy? Did not they know that those Words would create a Suspicion, that an Admiral, so provident in every other Respect, could not be guilty of what they chose to lay to his Charge? And the last Words, _Could we have spared any People_; Do not these plainly pronounce Negligence, Ignorance, Inability, or something worse, in Men whose Duty it is to preside and direct in the equipping a Fleet? Does it not naturally create this Question, Why a Fleet, sent with Intent to relieve _St Philip's_, and assist the Garrison against a Siege from a very powerful Enemy, was unsupplied with Troops for that Purpose? This would probably have condemned the Equippers of the Fleet, and exculpated the Admiral. This was a too dangerous Hint to be trusted with the Public; they felt in their own Hearts that this Neglect or Design could not be imputed to him as a Crime; he neither fitted out the Fleet or planned the Expedition; they also knew that it must fall on them in your Opinion, and therefore it was necessary to be concealed from your View.

_Let these Men, whose Duty it was to prepare this Fleet, and plan the Expedition, an_
swer me, when I ask them in the Name of you, the People of England, who have a just Right to know, by what Means and from what Manner of Reasoning it came to pass, that a Fleet so unequal to the Enemy's as this has been proved to have been, and without Troops, was sent to relieve St Philip's? Nay, even supposing a Falshood, that the Force of the Two Fleets had been equal, and even that the English had carried Troops with that Intent, Why was the Success, of such Consequence to the Nation, left to the precarious Event of an Equality in Strength, which might have been easily prevented by sending more Ships, uselessly riding at Spithead? No Man, however prejudiced, will presume to utter, that either of these Neglects or Oversights, to say no worse, are to be imputed as Crimes to Admiral Byng. Nay, permit me to assert, if the Admiral had not been induced to believe that the French Fleet could consist only of Seven Ships; and this from Men who ought to have known the contrary, he never would have undertaken the Command without a proper Force; his principal Fault was believing them to speak Truth, and his Force of Course sufficient.

And though it has been assiduously reported by the Malevolence of evil-minded Men; that he requested the Command, they will not openly assert, he fought it any otherwise, than by the general Offer of his Service to his King and Country,
Country, which becomes the Duty of every Man of his Rank and Station in Times of War.

Thus then all Things appear to be well conducted to the Time of the French Fleet's appearing in View; when on seeing the Enemy, Considerations of another Nature took Place, and it became necessary to defer the Execution of all Resolutions which he had taken since he saw Mahon, and to recall the Men of War which he had dispatched to reconnoitre the Harbour, and procure Intelligence from General Blakeney. It was now to no Purpose to know the State of the Citadel and Harbour before he had engaged the French Fleet; he had no Soldiers to land but what made Part of the Complements of his Ships, and served as Marines; and if he had been provided with them, it would have been absolutely imprudent to have landed them before the Engagement with his Enemy, and thereby render that Force less, which was already too little for the Intent it ought to have been sent upon. Landing the Troops would have rendered the Fleet unfit for Action, and obliged it to flee before the Enemy. Had the Admiral behaved in that Manner, such a preposterous Act could not have failed rendering him justly delinquent, and unequal to the Command he presided in.

He knew that if Success was the Consequence of engaging the French, that he should have it
more in his Power to relieve the Citadel, as far as landing the Troops, which served as Marines, could effect it. But he suspected also, and with Reason, that he might probably be rendered unable to keep the Seas, though he obtained the Victory, and therefore prevented from effectually succouring the Citadel.

So far all appears to have been conducted with the greatest Knowledge and Prudence, and the most partial Advocate for his Opponents can draw no reasonable Objections to his Proceedings.

This Passage of his Letter, omitted in the Gazette, cannot well proceed from Clemency to the Admiral, nor from Tenderness of not irritating the Multitude more vehemently, by giving them all the Letter, as it hath been reported with such Diligence.

I presume it will rather appear this Tenderness began from other Motives, and nearer Home; since it seems too evidently to prove, that those who planned the Expedition, prepared and appointed the Fleet, were beyond all Measure either ignorant or wicked.

Their Preciseness in omitting an individual Word is no small Argument of their Attention and Care; the miserable Epithet unfortunately, in describing the Loss of the Intrepid's Fore-Top-Mast,
Top-Mast, was omitted, left such a palliating Expression, imputing it to Chance, might alleviate the Odium, which seems by all possible Means designed to be thrown on the Admiral.

The next Omission is yet a greater Manifefation of the true Design of those Gentlemen, who like Deer, beat him from the Herd which the Hounds begin to pursue. For after having castrated all that could prove his Prudence, and vindicate his Conduct before the Engagement, they now conceal what can most effectually justify his not engaging a second Time, and not attempting to land a Reinforcement after the Battle.

With this View was not all that Part omitted, which mentions the Ships that were wounded in their Masts, and endangered of not being secured at Sea, the great Sickliness of the Squadron, the Numbers killed and wounded, no Hospital-Ships sent out to receive these unhappy brave Men, that a Forty Gun Ship converted to that Purpose would be unequal to the receiving one third of the Number, and which could not be well done at Sea; Circumstances which entirely change the Face and Reason of Things, and throw the Blame which they intend for the Admiral, on the Planners of the Expedition and Appointers of the Fleet.

G 2

Now
Now let the most strenuous Advocate for the Ad---ty, the most prejudiced Pursuer of Mr Byng, tell you why this Paragraph was omitted, without confessing that this Omission could not be made in his Favour. Will he say that Tendernets and Humanity distinguish this Action? Or will he not rather declare that the contrary is manifested beyond all Power of Denial.

It is evident from the Dates of the Time of Engagement, and of that of writing the Letter, that Four Days had passed in refitting the disabled Ships, and yet that the Mafts of Three of them could not be secured fit for a second Engagement; that if this could have been obtained, that the Ships Crews were too sickly to undertake the Fatigue of a second Combat, with not a Ship to put the sick and wounded on board during an Action, which being left on board, must have disheartened and interrupted those who were able to perform their Duty.

The Neglect of not providing Hospital Ships, as well as Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, could not proceed from any Fault, Inability, or Inattention in the Admiral. And if the Contempt of Money in the Person who must be imagined to have appointed this Fleet, was not so distinguished, and did not forbid entertaining such a Thought, would you not be inclined to think, that some sinister Intent had determined him
him to prevent Success in this Undertaking? Or that he, designed the Fleet should come too late to save Minorca and not engage; and therefore the Idea of providing Hospital-Ships, Fire-Ships, Store-Ships, and Tenders, Vessels never omitted 'till now on such Expeditions, never entered into his Imagination; for though I am willing to indulge this great Man, to prevent all Imputation of greater Crimes, with being the most ignorant of all Men who have ever sat at that Board; yet I am afraid the Indulgence of the most consummate Ignorance, will scarce preserve him from the Taxation of something more criminal, though not more fatal to your, your Sovereign's, and the Nation's Welfare.

Before what Tribunal can Admiral Byng be justly condemned, for not seeking the Enemy in this disabled Condition; not before that of the People of England, who, Lovers of strict Justice in all Things, never decide contrary to her Dictates, when the whole of any Affair is impartially laid before them, nothing concealed, nor any Thing added, to disguise the Truth.

Let me ask his Accusers, To what Purpose would this second Engagement have been attempted, with a Fleet originally so greatly inferior to the French, and now rendered much more so by the Damages received in the late Battle? A total Defeat, in all Probability, is the Answer of Reason; and if Monsieur La Galliffonniere
Gallifonniere had fought it, which providentially he did not, it is a reasonable Presumption that the whole English Squadron would have perished, or fallen a Prey to the French, since there was no Port to shelter them. Whereas, had Mr Byng been in the Mediterranean before the Arrival of the French at Minorca, a Defeat on his Side even might have saved the Island; he could have then saved his shattered Remains in Mahon, and though conquered at Sea, by Means of the Sailors and Soldiers have preserved St Philip’s, and probably the Island. Thus a Defeat of our Fleet, had it been timely sent out, would have done more Service than a Victory after St Philip’s was invested.

Those who reason otherwise than in this Manner, exclude human Prudence from amongst the Qualifications of a commanding Officer, a Talent of much more Use in the Day of Battle than tilting against Stone Walls, or engaging Yard-Arm and Yard-Arm against a superior Force; and indeed I am more afraid that Mr Byng, after every Thing has been fairly urged in his Vindication, and maturely considered, will be found rather culpable in seeking the Enemy at first, than not seeking them after the Engagement.

It has been the settled Rule of all great Generals, and of those who have written best on the Subject of Armies, and the Manner of a General’s
General’s conducting them, as may be seen in most ancient Authors, and those of more modern Date, particularly the Marquis De Feuquiere, and the Marquis De Santa Cruz, whose Words I shall quote, to consider what Advantage can result from the Action before an Engagement be resolved upon.

First then let me quote the Spaniard on this Subject, which permit me to translate.

"If nothing is more uncertain than the Success of a Battle, as I have just established it to be, this Consequence is fairly drawn from it, That no Commander should ever risque an Engagement, but when there is greater Expectations to gain by a Victory, than to lose by a Defeat."

And Feuquiere on the same Subject, lays it down in this Manner as a Maxim not to be deviated from.

"I have already said in my Maxims on the Subject of Battles, that a General never ought to attack an Enemy, or to subject himself to receive one from them, but when there is a greater Advantage to be drawn to his Prince by a Victory, than Disadvantage to be feared from a Defeat."

According
According to these Maxims of the most approved Writers on Military Affairs, Mr Byng seems not a little culpable, in first seeking the French, and justifiable only in declining the second Engagement; that the Circumstances in which he was placed before the Battle, correspond exactly with the Directions and Maxims just laid down, is utterly undeniable; First, because it was romantic to expect that he could defeat the French Fleet against such Superiority as has been already proved, it had over him; next, there was much to apprehend from a Defeat, and nothing to expect from a Victory, St Philip's being already invested and irretrievably gone, with Respect to what Mr Byng could have assisted in the Defence of it, when so great a Number of French Troops, with Artillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and every Thing necessary were landed.

When then, from the Inferiority of the English, nothing could be reasonably expected but Misfortune and Disgrace; or if by the greatest Efforts of good Fortune, Victory should declare for our Fleet, that no Advantage could be drawn from it; when the Risque of losing the whole Fleet was the Result of an unanimous Council of War; and the Nation, considering the real State of the English and French Navies, so little able to sustain a Loss of that Kind; when Gibraltar would have been left defenceless,
less, and fallen of Course to the Enemy. Could the seeking the French Admiral, by a Commander who foresaw these probable Consequences, with not only an inferior, but a shattered Fleet, and no other Ships in the Mediterranean to reinforce him, have been justified in the Judgment of Men who have studied the Nature of Military Achievements, or according to the Rules and Observations of ancient and modern Writers on this Head?

The utmost Advantage could have been but a Prolongation of the Siege, without the least Probability of raising it; because the Fleet unable to keep the Seas must have retreated to Gibraltar, the Port of Mahon being still commanded by the Enemies Batteries; from this View of Things it seems apparent, that the only wrong Step was leaving Gibraltar to give Battle to the French, and his Retreat to that Place the discreetest Act of Prudence and of a General, and in this Opinion the whole Council of War was unanimous: They did not imagine that a Commander in Chief with an inadequate Force was to engage at all Adventures, like Moor of Moor-Hall, who, with nothing at all, flew the Dragon of Wantley; indeed the Admiral was not a little surprized when he arrived at Gibraltar in going up to Minorca, and knew the Force of the Enemy, that Dispatches had not come over-land to stop him till he received farther Reinforcement; Men of Sense and Prudence,
dence, who intended the Nation's Honour and Advantage, could not have omitted so necessary a Step; for though it is barely possible that they knew not the Strength of the French Fleet before it left Toulon, and the Admiral left England; they knew it well before he arrived at Gibraltar, and had sufficient Time to have acquainted him of it, to stop his Proceeding to Minorca, to have reinforced the Fleet, and to have defeated the French before the Place was taken; this he thought necessary, and though his Orders would not permit him to tarry at Gibraltar, he could not avoid requesting a Reinforcement with all Speed to protect that Place, as he foresaw, that upon any Misfortune of great Consequence to the Fleet which he commanded, this Fortress would be open to hourly Invasions.

Had the Prudence of those who decline and prepare Fleets been equal to that of this Commander whom they seek to condemn, Minorca had been safe, the Honour of the Crown, and the Commerce of the Nation preserved, and this Gentleman the Darling, whom they wish to be the Detestation of the People.

Let those who omitted this Precaution answer you, why it was thus ignorantly or iniquitously omitted? can that be the Fault of Mr Byng; and when he expresses his Apprehensions of being inferior to the Fleet under La Gallisonniere,
niere, from the Intelligence he had received, what does it arise from, but a thorough Acquaintance with the Nature of his Profession, rendering Justice to the Arms of one Nation as well as another, from a conscious Deficiency in many Particulars, as well as in that of Weight of Metal, Number of Cannon and of Men, from a Suspicion perhaps of some delusive Proceedings in those who had seduced him to Command so inferior a Fleet, by positively asserting, that the French could not consist of more than Seven Ships, and would probably be but Five, as well as from some beginning Convictions, that it was not impossible, but that he, his brave Companions, the Honour and Interest of the King and Country, might be doomed a Sacrifice to fate the Appetite of some sinister ruling Passion.

To me it appears inexplicable, as I doubt not it will to you, whence it can arise that a good Retreat of an inferior Force from before a superior at Land, should be considered as one of the most distinguishing, difficult, and meritorious Exploits of a General; and yet, that a Retreat equally well conducted at Sea under the same Circumstances, should be deemed a disgraceful Action and worthy Punishment, more especially as the whole Council of War, Land and Sea Officers, who must from their Situation and Professions, naturally be the properest Judges of what was best to be done on such Occasions, were
were unanimous, and thought Gibraltar in Danger.

Are Commanders then at all Events to show no other Token of Generalship, but what is to be learned from Brutes? An Excess of Courage only? And are all who use the superior Attributes of the human Understanding, to be considered as Delinquents in their Duty to their King and Country? What Commander of common Sense will serve his Country under such discouraging Conditions; where, unless he fights against all Kinds of Disadvantage, he is to be stigmatised with the eternal Infamy of Cowardice; and if he does engage his Enemy, and does not succeed against this great Superiority of Force, he is to be deemed a Coward also, and given up to the Rage of the Multitude; his Letters published, and deprived of all that can vindicate him, with Additions intended to depreciate his prudent Endeavours, especially when it is known, that all private Letters which can justify the Admiral have been suppressed, or made to speak a different Sense, by interlining, before they were produced; and all those which revile and rail at his Behaviour, however absurd, have been given to the Public.

Can the Design of omitting the Paragraph which I have been just examining, take it's Origin from Tenderness in exposing the Admiral to the People's Contempt; whoever can give
give Credit to such Assertions, can never be deemed an Infidel.

Does not this Behaviour proceed from a very contrary Motive; what is it but depriving him of his just Defence, and giving him to an enraged People, by injurious Misrepresentations, Falshoods, and Concealments; is it not like lopping off a Man's Hands, and then bidding him to defend himself against his Adversary? Is it not like cutting out a Man's Tongue, and then ordering him to plead in his own Defence? Is it not even inhuman? And since, to sink the Truth, or to add a Falshood, are equally considered as Perjury in the Law; why should it be conceived otherwise in this Instance, and in those Men, if this shall be proved to be the real State of the Case, especially as the Event may prove equally fatal to the Person against whom these Things may be attempted.

The next Omission begins with the Words, of Minorca and Gibraltar, which you will observe immediately follow the Word Situation; this Omission determines the Reader to fix the Situation of the Fleet, as the Object on which the Admiral had gathered the Opinions of all the Officers; which real Condition of the Ships being concealed also, this Consideration of it's Situation, made the Sentence ridiculous, as it too evidently seems designed it should be: Whereas the Situations of Minorca and Gibraltar became reasonable
reasonable Objects of their Consideration; it appeared impracticable to relieve Mabon, and probable that Gibraltar would be attacked, and therefore the Determination of proceeding thither, was become the most prudent Decision which could have been made, the most likely to conduce to the Nation's Service, and a just Resolution of the Council of War.

As to the Victory, it signifies not much who claims it, but it was a Matter of Consequence to consider, that though two Fleets may be of equal Number, they may yet be of unequal Force, as we have already proved it happened in this Instance: and a sickly Squadron, without Means of providing for the diseased and wounded, or recruiting their Seamen and Soldiers, of which, more than a Thousand Sick, which at their return to Gibraltar, were sent to the Hospital, was a Consideration that ought greatly to influence at that Moment, especially when it was evident beyond all Contradiction, that the Enemy possessed every Advantage which the English Admiral was in want of, having a Power of procuring Recruits of Seamen from the Two Hundred Transports, and Soldiers from the Camp of the Besiegers, and which every prudent Commander must have done, and was therefore highly reasonable to be concluded, would be done, by the Admiral; Council of War, and by all who understand the Profession of Arms.

During
During the four Days which Mr Byng's Fleet was obliged to lye to to refit, 
La Gallifsonniere's Fleet was several Times seen from their Maff-head, as undoubtedly was that of Mr Byng by the French Admiral, a Circumstance as well worth omitting, perhaps, as any of the whole, because it is a dangerous Thing to permit a Question, so liable to Construction against any Mens Advantage, to come before the People of England, who, in search of Truth, might not unlikely demand, why La Gallifsonniere with such apparent Superiority did not attack the English Fleet once more, and then perhaps a satisfactory Answer might have been difficultly returned by those who chuse to conceal that Circumstance: indeed this single Circumstance, in all Men who may be unacquainted with the upright Intentions of those who planned the Expedition, may probably create a Suspicion, that the French Admiral could not have conducted Matters in this absurd Manner from Ignorance alone: nor the Planners of the Expedition have prepared a Fleet so unequal to what it ought to have been from that Cause: in what Manner, on the Principles of Reason and Knowledge in his Profession, which he is allowed to possess, can it be accounted for, that La Gallifsonniere desisted from pursuing an Advantage which he had so apparently obtained, by disabling five Ships of our Fleet, three of which could not be got fit for Service again without going into some Port. The
The next Day, and the three following, though he saw our Fleet, and might know it's Condition by a Cruiser sent for that Purpose, and probably did know it? why was the French Admiral so deficient in Duty to his King and Country, not to attempt destroying the English Fleet, by renewing the Combat on such advantageous Terms, and complete the Victory which he had partly achieved; was La Gallifsonniere a Coward too? Many are the Suggestions which are and may be formed on this Occasion; I insinuate none, but leave all Men to decide, for what Reason the French Admiral could be so complaisant to the English, unless it was by Way of Return to those of the Ad—y, who sent out a Fleet so unable to disturb him in covering the Siege of St Philips. One Thing I will assert, and produce my Reasons for saying it if required, that Admiral Byng was intirely ignorant of any Consideration which could have created this mutual Politeness, in the English Planners of the Expedition, of not disturbing the Siege of St Philips; and of not destroying the English Squadron in those of the French.

Things and Appearances being in this Situation, what could the most prudent and most courageous Man have done more than he performed? he relied on no Man's Word; Mr Byng proceeded immediately from Gibraltar to discover the Truth of Things; and having suffered from
La Gallifsonniere's Squadron was disabled from putting in Execution what he had intended before the Enemy's Fleet appeared in View.

After this last Omission, a few Words of the Letter being left to remain, the Admiral proceeds with expressing his Hopes that he should find Stores to rent the Fleet at Gibraltar, and a Resolution of not losing a Minute in seeking the Enemy again, if he had any Reinforcement, and once more giving them Battle.

You will easily discern the Reason of expressing himself by Hopes of finding Stores, if you recall, that in going up to Minorca, in his Letter from Gibraltar, he tells the Secretary of the Ad—y, that there were neither Stores nor Places in repair for refitting the Fleet. This Word was only used as a gentle Rebuke for this Neglect, and the most polite Hint, that if he should tarry at Gibraltar longer than you, the People of England, unacquainted with the Cause, should think requisite, that some palliating Report for this Delay might be spread, to prevent Murmurs against him, who was only delinquent in Appearance, owing to the Neglect of those whose Duty it is to provide Stores, and to keep careening Wharfs, Store-Houses, and Pits, in due repair. How undeservedly then was he calumniated? How industriously was the Slander of Delay spread by those Men who were only culpable in this Part, from an
Expression in his second Letter from Gibraltar, published in the Gazette; "That watering was " tedious at that Place," omitting in this also the most favourable Circumstances, as they did in the former.

At the same Time, his Resolution of returning to give the Enemy Battle, could be no Argument of his Timidity; and when he adds, that the French had a great Advantage in being clean Ships, and going three Feet to one with his; What was there in this Expression, so much carped at and ridiculed, but a Phrase of all Seamen, who, to express one Ship's failing much faster than another, almost constantly use it? Was not the Reason for mentioning their failing faster, then, prudent in all Respects? It was to guard against any unwarrantable Expectations, which Men, unacquainted with naval Affairs, might entertain from a Reinforcement; because, though one Fleet is vastly superior to another, yet the inferior Fleet being better failers, may easily escape by running before the Wind, if the superior Squadron has the Wind of them; and by turning to Windward, if they have the Wind of the superior Force. And though the Admiral assigns no other Reason for this failing better than the English, but their being clean Ships, he might have justly added their being better Ships also; which reflects not a little on the Supervisors of naval Affairs, who have been inattentive to Improvements
ments at home, and only slowly copied the French in their Manner of building.

Besides this, Mr Byng concluded, from the Behaviour of Monsieur La Galliffonniere, that he would neglect no Way of conducting his Fleet with Judgment, and consequently chuse, from this Advantage of better failing, in what Manner the Combat should be carried on; and which, by preventing the coming to a close Engagement, with a View of disabling the English Ships, he had already too successfully put in Execution.

This Part then became absolutely necessary to be omitted, against a Man determined to be overwhelmed, because it takes the Fault of tarrying at Gibraltar from him, and places it on their Neglect of that Place. It shows, by his Resolution of engaging again, that he could not be justly taxed with Cowardice; it proves his Knowledge of what is to be expected from a superior Fleet, which is out-sailed by an inferior; and his Politeness, in not mentioning with Acrimony the Neglect of sending a Reinforcement sooner, and of keeping Gibraltar in Repair: Examine one Minute in how different a Manner his and your Enemies have observed a reciprocal Behaviour towards him and you.

As to the Three Feet to One, it meant no more than that the French failed faster than the English;
English; which, if they had failed only as Thirteen to Twelve, would as effectually have answered all their Purposes, and all that the Admiral intended to be conveyed by the Expression, failing faster than his Fleet.

What Truth is there then in the prevailing Report given out by his Accusers, that Tenderness for his Character, and not designing to aggravate his Faults, were the true Cause of omitting these Passages in the Gazette.

Are not these Particulars so many Justifications of Mr Byng's not renewing the Engagement against a Fleet, which had already disabled him, and which had the Power of chusing their Manner of fighting? Ought not these Considerations alone, without inferring the Consequence of ill Success, to have determined him against engaging the Enemy once more, and risking a total Defeat.

The next Paragraph which is omitted, is the urging the Ad--y to a speedy Reinforcement, if none was already sent, a Request which he had before made; at the same Time acquainting them with the increasing Strength of the Enemy at Toulon, by four large Ships; which Circumstance, though it tends not to justify the Admiral's Behaviour, gives a favourable Idea of his Zeal for Success, and a contemptible one of those, who, presiding at the Head of Affairs, had
had been totally ignorant of what was preparing at Toulon, and negligent at best of what happened to Minorca: unless you may possibly by this Time be apprehensive, that some other Motives conduced to this Behaviour in them.

The last Paragraph has but one Word omitted, which, instead of “making the best of my Way to Gibraltar,” is to cover Gibraltar; a very material Alteration; the going to cover a Place being very different from going to a Place, the one signifying an Act of Prudence, and of a Soldier; the other, in such Instances, of Flight, and of a Fugitive. Was not this Monosyllable premeditatedly left out, to prevent you from asking what Danger Gibraltar was in, and to what Part of the Letter this referred? Does it not seem to be the present Employment of the Gazette to misrepresent, and of the Writers or Directors of it, to keep the People of England as ignorant as possible of the real Situation of any Place, which may be designed to be given up to your declared Enemies, by those who are your concealed, if Men can be denominated concealed, who are thus open in pursuing a Nation's Ruin?

Every Man amongst you, who can distinguish Right from Wrong, will, I doubt not, behold this perfidious Action of omitting the Parts of a Letter, which can most effectually plead the Justification of the Writer, with all due
due Abhorrence; notwithstanding which criminal Proceeding, permit me to say, there remains something which is yet a stronger Indication of more blameable Design in those who have been guilty of the former Misbehaviour; to omit with Design to injure, is surely a criminal Proceeding; and to add, with Design to create a farther Accusation of Offence, must be yet a more heinous Crime in the Eyes of all Men of Probity.

In Continuation of this Intent to accumulate the Guilt of Mr Byng, is it not extremely probable, that the Lifts of the Two Fleets were printed at the End of his Letter in the Gazette, taking perhaps the Hint of that Design, from Part of the Postscript, in which he says, "I have just sent the Defects of the Ships, as I have got it made out whilst I was closing my Letter." Then adding what the Admiral never sent, and concealing what he did. The Defects of the Ships are very considerable, as hath been already said, five of them receiving much Damage; three of which could not, in the Opinion of the best Judges, be repaired at Sea for a second Action; the Lift of this Damage may be hereafter printed. At the same Time, under Favour of the above Sentence, Occasion was taken to add the Lifts of the Ships, a spurious one, even with Respect to our Fleet; which methinks those who inserted it ought to be better acquainted with, whatever it might be
be their Duty to know of the French; leaving out the Weight of Metal and Number of Hands on board, and putting in the Number of killed and wounded, that is, preserving all, in which a seeming Equality consisted, and castrating all, in which the French were eminently superior. Nor was this the only Variation from Truth, for some considerable Addition was made to the Number of the English Cannon, and a Dimunition of the French, with a View probably to bring the two Numbers nearer each other, and to create the Idea of Equality in the two Squadrons. I hope it is no uncharitable Suggestion to say, That this spurious and partial Lift of each Fleet, was inserted to aggravate your Resentment against the Admiral, and to gain a Belief, that the Defects of the Ships which accompanied this Letter, was no more than a Lift of the killed and wounded, an Artifice favouring of much despicable Cunning, seen through by every Man who had Sense enough to reflect, that though Mr Byng had sent the Number of his own killed and wounded, he could not well come at that of Monsieur La Gallifsonniere. Can these Lifts have been added with an honest Intent? Was it not designed to create the Idea of his being a Coward? And to strengthen, by this Addition, what they had begun to insinuate by the former Omissions.

Let me now appeal to the Hearts of Men conspicuous for the Love of Justice and Humanity
nity amongst all Nations; is it not pernicious Treatment, not only to cut out the genuine Justification of a Man's own Words, but as it were to suborn false Evidence; and add it to the Account which was transmitted by the Admiral, with a View of depreciating him in the Eyes of his Fellow-Subjects, and letting loose the popular Clamour against him.

Indeed when we review these Artifices, and reconsider the Reports which were spread among the People during the Preparations at Toulon, after their arriving at Minorca, whilst our Fleet was preparing, and after it's Departure, will there not arise certain Suspicions which Prudence would rather conceal than hint at, in any Case but that of preserving one's Country from future Misfortunes of a similar Nature, and preserving the Life of a Fellow-Subject? We shall endeavour to recollect some of them, and let those who chuse to examine them, draw that Conclusion which seems the most probable.

First, then, how came the French to form the Idea of taking St Philips, when the Fleet of England, known to be so superior, might have prevented the Embarkation; if not that, their Descent on Minorca; if that could not have been done, reinforced St Philips, beat the French Fleet, and taken the whole Embarkation Prisoners. Is the Duke of Richlieu so Military mad, that he would have undertaken
to command in an Expedition which had been preparing for five Months, known to all *Europe*, and open to be disconcerted in all the above different Manners? Would not this have rather proved him fitter for *Bedlam*, than a Command in Chief? Is not this repugnant to what *Feuquiere* and *Santa Cruz* have positively enjoined? And if the Duke would have been hardy enough to undertake it, would the *French Ministry* have permitted him? Would the Directors of our Marine Preparations, had they been in earnest to preserve *St Philips*, have sent out an inferior Squadron? Delayed it at *Spithead* during so many Months? And given the Admiral absolute Orders to expedite other Services, by not taking Men from particular Ships, nor from any Ship fit for Service, to man his own Squadron, but to wait the coming of Tenders with pressed Men from *Liverpool* and other Ports? And before the Arrival of more than two, he was obliged to fail.

**HAD** the Planners of the Expedition been truly animated with the Interest of their Country, why, during this Preparation at *Toulon*, when all *England*, and all *Europe*, was exclaiming against their Delay, did they continually give out to you, that there was no Fleet preparing at *Toulon*? That the *French* had no Sailors nor military Stores; was not this to be the palliating Speech to the People to countenance their Proceedings? Was it not to give the *Air of relieving*
St Philips only that the English Fleet set sail a few Days before the French, and before a certain Intelligence of it was given to the Public? Though the Day for leaving Toulon by the latter must, beyond all Doubt, be known by those who prevented it's Relief, in sending a Fleet from hence so inferior to the Undertaking.

When the popular Clamour now began to be very loud against this shameful Behaviour, were not ten thousand Stories invented to draw off the public Attention from the Planners of the Expedition, and to throw it on him who commanded, and who they concluded would miscarry? Was it not owing to a Design of ill Success in them that the Fleet was sent out so small, and that he was assured the French Armament could not possibly exceed seven Ships, and probably would not be more than five? Was it not constantly asserted, that no Fleet was ever so well manned, equipped, and powerful, for the Number, as this English Fleet? And that the French consisted of old Ships not fit for Service, ill-manned, and worse provided; whereas one Moment's Thought would have told them, that a Fleet, however ill-furnished with Men, when it left Toulon, must be abundantly provided with Hands from Two Hundred Transports, which after landing the Troops and Ammunition, and at Anchor, could very well spare two thirds of their Crews; as to the Ships being feeble or ill-fitted out, the Falshood
Fallhood of that Assertion is now perfectly well known. Was not this Story, of great Deficiency in the French Fleet, propagated to create a Belief in you, that *La Galissonniere* was inferior to Mr Byng; as the extolling the Strength of our Fleet, was to make the latter appear superior? To those spurious Accounts of the different Strength of the two Fleets, was it not constantly added, that Mr Byng could blow the French out of the Water? With what Intent could this be propagated, but to aggravate the Miscarriage of the Admiral, by creating an Opinion of his superior Force, and to animate your Expectations with Views of Success, the more effectually to inflame your Resentment against him, when the ill News of his not prevailing should arrive, and which they must foresee?

The Citadel of *Mahon* being attacked, it now became the common Conversation amongst the Planners of the Voyage, that the Fortification could not hold out a Week, with a Design to lessen the Surprize of it's being taken; or if it was defended any considerable Time, to give an Idea of it's being well provided; does it not therefore seem evident, from the Fleet of *England* being appointed so inferior, so long delayed after it was ready, sent so late, without a Soldier but those who acted as Marines, without an Hospital-Ship, Fire-Ship, Transports, or Tenders; that no Battle was intended to be fought, nor *St Philips* relieved? But by this delay,
delay, to give Time to Marshal Richlieu to take the Fortification, return with his Fleet, and leave Mr Byng to cruise ineffectually round Minorca; indeed the brave Irishmen disappointed the Expectations of those who had thus designed the whole Transaction, by defending the Place becoming the Duty of British Subjects, and not according to sinister Intention.

By this contemptible Cunning, a Quality often connected with Ignorance in little Minds, it seems contrived, that if General Blakeney gave up the Citadel before Mr Byng's Arrival, then he was to be exclaimed against, and charged with Cowardice; and if he held out, as the Admiral was insufficient, then that Imputation was to fall on the latter.

Was it not therefore owing to the daily Disappointment of hearing that the Citadel had surrendered, that no Fleet was sent to reinforce Mr Byng; apprehending, that with a Reinforcement he would raise the Siege, which seems so contrary to the Intent of sending him? Was it not on this Account that they did not stop him by Express at Gibraltar, to wait for more Ships of War? And at last, was not the Reinforcement sent when it could not possibly arrive 'till after the Admiral had succeeded or miscarried.

At
At length comes a Letter from Monsieur La Gallissonniere, of the English Fleet having retired before the French, when immediately a Report prevailed, that from a Letter sent by Admiral Byng from Gibraltar, it was foreseen that he would not fight; with what Intent was this added, but to confirm your Sentiments in his being a Coward, according to the Resolution which had been taken of throwing the whole Blame of the Miscarriage on him, before his own Account could come to set Matters right in the People's Opinion. After some Time a Letter from Admiral Byng arrives, printed in the Gazette, where the most material Passages in Vindication of his Conduct are cut out; why were these omitted, but to preserve the former Impressions of his having behaved like a Coward, at the same Time condemning the Resolutions of the whole Council of War unheard, a most flagrant Affront on Men of superior Birth, by one who has undeservedly started into Nobility.

It was now necessary to continue inventing more Tales to support your Resentment against Mr Byng; one Day it was given out, that he had sold out of the Stocks, forty-four thousand Pounds before he failed, which was to insinuate, that he left England with a Design never to return: The Falshood of this Report may be seen in the Stock Books. Then it was reported, that this was
was the Man who cruized before Genoa last War, and took Money to let Vessels with Provisions and Men pass to the Relief of the Town; a known Falshood, and were not the Ashes of the Dead sacred, I would tell you his Name: Was not this to hint the Idea of Venality?

Then it seems it was discovered, that a Ship with Provisions had gotten into Mahon the very Day before the Action, which Ship arrived at the Port a Month before the investing the Citadel; was not this to insinuate that he might have landed his Soldiers also?

These Rumours being grown a little cool, Ballads were made to keep up your Resentment, and the Admiral hanged and burnt in Effigy at the national Expence, by the Clerks and Officers of Public Offices, amongst whom one Mr Glover, belonging to the Victualling-Office, burning him in White-Chapel Road, was rewarded with a broken Leg by the Barking Stage-Coach.

It was now thought necessary to assert, that Mr Byng was attempting to escape in Women's Cloaths, to impart the Idea of conscious Guiltiness, which is likewise an Invention of Falshood; and yet this Idea was to be continued by fixing Iron Bars to the Windows, to prevent a Man from escaping, whom they wish to be well rid of, and
and who would not leave the Place if they would permit him.

At one Time he is represented as mad, and then as killing himself with drinking; then, that it is to be feared he may attempt Suicide. Believe me, he has not lost his Senses, as his Accusers will find, nor will he destroy himself with his own Hands; and it is your Duty to preserve his Life, for the Sake of more perfectly knowing what influenced his Pursuers to contrive and conduct the Expedition in so preposterous a Manner. Then the Author of the Evening Advertiser is engaged to keep alive the Idea of Mr Byng’s being a Coward; a proper Employment for a Man who has risen to Dignities by the infamous Practice of an Informer.

And lastly, these contemptible Artifices are followed by a Letter to Ad——l B——g, published at the Expence of his and your Enemies, and hawked through the Streets for the Sake of universal Publication. This single Circumstance, in the Minds of all Men of Sense, so inhumanly contrived to keep up the popular Prejudice against the Admiral and from themselves, amounts to an Acknowledgment of their Guilt and of his Innocence; otherwise, some one Proof of what is there charged would certainly have been brought against him. But the whole is an entire Declamation, intended to inflame your Minds, founded on no one Argument, and concludes
eludes with a *Confession*, which his Adversaries would do extremely well to learn by Heart, against that Day when public *Justice* will demand them to their *Tryals*.

*Does* not this Uniformity of Behaviour, in planning the whole Affair, prove, that Mr *Byng* was not the great culpable Person? There must be some other Source of his and your Misfortunes; otherwise the *French* must have been Madmen or Fools to have attacked *Minorca* in that Manner, and some of this Nation Madmen or Fools to attempt preserving it with so unequal a Force.

*After* all, Are not such despicable Proceedings in Men of Rank, below the Behaviour of the meanest Beggar? What an Insult on your Understandings, to conceive the absurd Idea of screening themselves from your Enquiry, and seeking Preservation, by drawing, hanging, and burning, a Man in *Effigy*, who, however culpable in this Action, must be white as Snow compared with them, whose Sins are red as Scarlet.

*From* what Origin can such Proceedings spring, but from conscientious Delinquency and Apprehension of Danger? had they believed themselves innocent, why did they conceal those material Passages in his Letter, and add a spurious and malicious *Lift* of the Two Fleets? Was it not with Design to depreciate the Commander's *Plea,*
Plea, as much as possible, before his Fellow-Subjects? Had they been conscious of performing their Duty, why was he not left to the true Recital of his Conduct? His Misbehaviour could not have affected them; the World would have been satisfied with a true Narration of the Circumstances; they had been cleared, and Mr Byng stood unprejudiced, by injurious Calumnies in your Opinion; justly condemned if delinquent, or justly discharged if innocent. Was it not their internal Guilt which prohibited them from behaving with Integrity, and I presume by this Time, as in Cases of Murder, too great Desire to conceal the Crime, has shewn you who were the Capital Offenders.

It becomes now the essential Duty of every Englishman, to divest himself of all those Prejudices which have been so artfully propagated against Mr Byng, to resent, with becoming Spirit, the insulting Design of duping you, by Misrepresentation of the Truth, to become Accomplices in pursuing, even to Death, a Man who must be unjustly treated, because hitherto his Story has never been known, and his Justification concealed.

Heaven forbid that the Integrity of Englishmen should be deceived by the Wiles of Men, who do not possess one Praise-worthy Qualification; or their Judgments perverted by crafty Representations, to become Auxiliaries in completing
pleting the Ruin of him they intend to de-
stroy. I know you have hitherto determined
equitably according to what has been laid before
you; I blame not the Decision, because it flows
from the Love of Justice and your Country.
All I request is, that you would now consider
the Case of Mr Byng with the same Zeal which
his Adversaries are pursuing him; receive the
Truth as you did the Delusion; resent the Im-
position, and see Justice done to him whom
they wish to ruin. Without your Approbation
they will not dare to make him suffer unjustly,
and with it I tremble for him, however inno-
cent he may be. Consider the Situation of that
Man, whose Death may be necessary to preserve
the Lives of others. Consider what the Disposi-
tions of Men, who have almost undone the Na-
tion, must be against a Fellow-Subject, whom
it may be convenient to destroy. If he suffer,
you will repent too late the not having listened
to the Admonitions of these Sheets. Let your
Prejudices be abated, for the Sake of Equity to
him and to yourselves; it is become an indis-
penisible Act of Justice to support him, who
has been injured, against Men who by every
Art have insinuated his being guilty. By his
Death you may save the Destroyers of your
Country. Urge then that the greatest Criminals
be first brought to Justice, and that such exist,
can need no farther or more convincing Proof,
than the Insufficiency of the English Fleet, the
long Delay in sending it, the Want of Stores
and Artificers at Gibraltar, the ordering the Marines out of Mr Byng's Squadron at Portsmouth, sending no Troops to Mahon, no Hospital-Ships, Fire-Ships, or Tenders, the sending him with foul and crazy Ships, ill manned and old, the Concealment of his Vindication, and adding to his Destruction by Ten Thousand calumniating Inventions.

Are not these the strongest Proofs of Delinquency? Do they not amount to almost a Demonstration, that the Blame lies not greatly against Mr Byng, and that what has happened, has not been repugnant to the Inclinations of his Pursuers? Did they ever design that Minorca should find Relief from the Fleets and Armies of Great-Britain?

Notwithstanding this favourable Appearance on his Side, and criminal on theirs, I ask not Mercy, but Justice to Mr Byng, his Pursuers, and your Country; all I request is a candid Tribunal, an impartial Enquiry, and an unprejudiced People, which I wish also to those who have thus inhumanly treated him. If they have all erred alike, give them up to the same condign Punishment. If their Guilt is unequal, you will not add Cruelty to Injustice, but let their Punishments be proportioned to it. If he is proved guiltless, you will preserve him. But at all Events remember, that those, in whose Hearts the horrid Compound of Cunning and Iniquity
Iniquity reside, who have brought this once flourishing Country to so ruinous a State, escape not, by the Sufferings of Mr Byng, the Rewards which are due to them. To you I appeal; be Englishmen, and I fear no Injustice to him who is thus unjustifiably pursued; him whom you have already been deceived to condemn, you will now be resolved to see treated according to the Laws, Rights, and Privileges, of a Fellow-Subject and free Briton.

FINIS.