Teaching history:
A discussion of contemporary challenges

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ABSTRACT
The authors argue that intellectual shifts and related ideological debates have set new pedagogical demands on history teachers and new programmatic demands on faculties of education. In an attempt to relate the relevance of generating historical thinking (motivating the students to think like historians) to transformative education, the authors outline an history inquiry model based on Dewey’s educational theory. In this model, content knowledge and mastery of the subject matter is as critical as an understanding of teaching and learning history. The paper addresses the challenges set by a dominant relativist self-referential slant, the teaching of history in a multicultural class, and the tendency, in particular in social studies classes, to fall into presentism.

Key words: teaching and learning history; historical inquiry model; relativism and history teaching

RÉSUMÉ
Les auteurs soutiennent que les changements dans le domaine de la pensée et les débats idéologiques qui s’en suivent ont imposé de nouvelles exigences pédagogiques aux enseignants d’histoire et de nouvelles contraintes aux facultés d’éducation en matière de programmation. Pour tenter d’établir un rapport approprié entre l’importance de susciter la pensée historique (c’est-à-dire, de motiver les étudiants à penser à la manière des historiens) et l’éducation tranformatrice, les auteurs exposent les grandes lignes d’un modèle d’enquête historique basé sur la théorie de l’éducation de Dewey. Selon ce modèle, la connaissance du contenu et la maîtrise de la matière sont aussi critiques qu’une compréhension de l’enseignement et de l’apprentissage de l’histoire. Le papier aborde les défis posés par un point de vue relativiste dominant ainsi que ceux posés par l’enseignement de l’histoire dans une classe multiculturelle et la tendance, particulièrement dans une classe de sciences humaines, à tomber dans le présentisme.

Mots clefs: l’histoire de l’enseignement et de l’apprentissage; un modèle d’enquête historique; le relativisme et l’enseignement de l’histoire

RESUMEN
Los autores sostienen que los cambios intelectuales y los debates ideológicos que los acompañaron generaron nuevas demandas pedagógicas a los profesores de historia y nuevas demandas programáticas a las facultades de educación. En un intento por relacionar la relevancia de generar pensamiento histórico (en otras palabras, motivar los estudiantes a pensar como lo hacen los historiadores) a una educación transformadora, los autores delinean un modelo inquisitivo para la enseñanza de la historia, basado en la teoría educativa de Dewey.
En este modelo, el dominio de la materia es crítico así como el entendimiento de la enseñanza y el aprendizaje de la historia. El artículo se refiere también a los desafíos presentados por una tendencia relativista dominante que llega a la escuela, por el carácter multicultural de la clase de historia, y por la facilidad para caer en el presentismo.

**Descripciones:** enseñanza y aprendizaje de la historia; modelo inquisitivo; relativismo y la enseñanza de la historia

**Introduction**

Throughout the broad middle years of the twentieth century, history was viewed by many Canadians outside Quebec, whose exposure to the discipline had been restricted to school history at the primary and secondary levels, as primarily a narrative of past events peppered factually with significant names and dates. In the curricula and texts that fostered the development of this conception of history, the narrative theme usually focused on the building of the Canadian nation both geographically and politically. Studying history on this view was largely concerned with students’ committing the main plot lines of the national saga and its most important names and dates to memory. Successful teaching and learning of history on this model usually meant that a critical mass of the pertinent plot lines, names, and dates could be readily recalled by learners well into middle age and beyond. It aimed at generating a common memory and a civic narrative that served a conservative notion of citizenship.¹ The well publicized 1968 Hodgetts’ *What Culture? What Heritage? A Study of Civic Education in Canada*, offered a devastating critique of Canadian history as taught in the schools.² Hodgetts pointed out an overemphasis on constitutional and political developments and a disregard for the social and political problems of the time. Moreover his analysis showed that the tremendous difference in the way French and English history were taught in Quebec and in English Canada did not help to generate an understanding of Canada as a whole.³ Hodgetts assessed history teaching in relation to its contribution to citizenship education. Indeed, history and citizenship are not easily separable in the context of the Canadian polity where, as Osborne has observed, the debate on what history should be taught and what is involved in teaching it effectively is not so much about education as it is about the state of Canada.⁴

Beginning in the 1970s intellectual shifts toward history itself, compounded by the postmodern turn of the 1980s and 1990s in university humanities departments, began to have an influence on the teaching of history and on teacher preparation.⁵ The remnants of the conventional nation-building narrative structure of Canadian history curricula came to be eclipsed by various forms of social history. This paradigmatic shift together with the rise of multiculturalism in the 1970s, as a core component of the contemporary Canadian identity, and later, in the 1990s the drive to economic globalization led to changes in what and whose history was taught. It also led to the appropriation of history education curricula for the exploration and often acceptance of present sociocultural realities.⁶ Non-Canadian history mostly disappeared from the curriculum. Once more, history education appeared linked to the citizenship and identity formation debate.
In reaction to the revisionism, conceptual displacements, and discursiveness of the new views of history and the massively diverse historical accounts these views produced, more conventionally minded historians strongly urged a return to history education as a source of cohesiveness and criticized the newer explorations of “multiple pasts” as fostering a dangerous form of political fragmentation. Chief among the critics’ complaints was the assertion that Canadian citizens knew very little about their own history and that the question of precisely “what” history to teach therefore needed fundamental reexamination. What history and whose history acquired a regressive ahistorical tone in this approach.

The best known critique came in the form of a polemical essay, *Who Killed Canadian History* by Jack Granastein, who asserted that the history that was taught in schools was not history but a politically correct celebration that did not lead to an united and informed citizenship. He was not alone. Michael Bliss, concerned with national unity, strongly questioned excessive specialization in historical studies, poor communication among historians, and lack of a national historical synthesis. The implications for teacher preparation and curriculum development, although not addressed by Bliss, were blatanly obvious. Furthermore, the notion of citizenship, within the context of historical study, became central to the debate in various ways—with the curricular notion of “national history” advanced by critics as a benchmark for the success of history programs in Canadian schools. For people anxious to promote a distinctly Canadian identity with respect to the United States and globalization, the issue of curricular content, fueled by surveys sponsored by a number of foundations, gained prominence.

This paper will first introduce a profile of the history teacher within the context of an historical inquiry model inspired by Dewey’s educational theory. The starting point is the already well examined sui generis character of teaching and learning history, its problems and strategies, a basic finding established by Seixas, Martineau, Laville, and Osborne. We rely on Dewey’s educational theory to relate the relevance of generating historical thinking (motivating the students to think like historians) to the transformative character of education. Moreover it will argue that an approach to history curricula that stresses the sources of contemporary social currents at the expense of considering the deeper strata of historical explanation can easily result in an undesirable form of presentism. Key elements of a positive conception of history education will be sketched, which, while mindful of the genuine problems identified by some postmodern theorists, still promotes a central role for such notions as “truth” and “objectivity.” If the recent turn to relativism represents an unnecessary development, however, so too does the older, more traditional approach (and its contemporary revivals) unnecessarily distort the nature of genuine historical inquiry. By failing to deal adequately with the conceptual problems attendant upon conventional notions of truth and objectivity and by stressing a single narrative line in history curricula, the traditional approach likewise implies a flawed conception of history. Having learned history in such a way, it is not surprising why many people who came later to recognize the ways in which perceptions and accounts of events may differ significantly from one another—who came to understand the inevitable ways interpretive frameworks
provide distinctive and sometimes divergent narrative and ideological contours to past events—also came to view history as a highly problematic subject matter incapable of supporting securely grounded accounts of the past. Ironically here perhaps, the excesses of the new may be traced, in part, to the lapses of the old.

The history teacher

Any discussion around the teaching of history needs to refer to conceptions of education and pedagogical practices, and to the understanding of the role of the teacher. Formal education is a value-laden political process that takes place in the classroom, a contested site that displays competing discourses, unique experiences, silences, resistance, and compliance. Historically we know that the intersection of the official discourse—as expressed in policies, programmes of studies, and statements—with lived experiences of teachers and students produced unintended outcomes. The understanding of the school and the classroom as cultural sites that embody conflicting values leads naturally to the need for teachers to have an ethically defensible vision of education when selecting strategies and organizing their classroom. This vision of education is unavoidably normative, although the relation between education and ethics is often obscured by the use of empirical (sometimes pseudo-empirical) language in educational policy documents. Not only must the conscientious history teacher have such a defensible foundational view. A teacher of history needs to have an understanding of history as a discipline, its critical areas of controversy, and the various explanatory paradigms with which historians work. Perhaps the best way to integrate the foundational, pedagogical, and historiographical skills needed for educationally effective history teaching would be, following Dewey—but placing his principles in relation to current pedagogical dilemmas pertaining to constructivism in its various versions—to develop an historical inquiry model that would engage the class in a substantive manner. Here the primary goal would be to engage students in a process that reorganizes and reconstructs experience within the framework of historical explanation. In this process, meaning would be added to experience, which in turn would increase the educational possibilities of directing the student’s course of subsequent experience. While the student attempts to understand the meaning and significance of past events through the ongoing process of historical inquiry, the history teacher monitors the activities of students with a view to meeting the needs that emerge from their inquiries-in-progress and in turn furthering those inquiries. Teaching history, on such an inquiry model, demands not only a body of information about the past but also a body of knowledge about the past; moreover it requires proficiency in the skills of developing, evaluating, and critiquing that knowledge and how historical knowledge may be used productively in the classroom in pursuit of legitimate educational objectives. The teacher may encounter particular challenges set by the tension between participation in history disciplinary practices and students constructing their own understanding of history. Furthermore, the teacher monitors classroom activities, having as a point of reference that certain ideas are considered more “truthful” than others. There are then limits on the students’ construction of
their own ideas although it is important to motivate the students to situate the newly acquired knowledge in their own universe. The managing/pedagogical skills of the teacher to encourage collaborative work and manage different kinds of discourses become extremely important. Obviously, the view expounded by critics such as Granatstein that history was diluted because of a child centered education—originally rooted in Dewey’s philosophy and in progressive education—is not pertinent at all. An important point here is that any discussion of models of teaching and learning history—and there are a number of interesting ones—should pay particular attention to teacher preparation in faculties or colleges of education.

An important point here is that any discussion of models of teaching and learning history—and there are a number of interesting ones—should pay particular attention to teacher preparation in faculties or colleges of education. In fact, there should not be a separation between content and pedagogy. However, teacher candidates who will (or could) teach history often bring to teacher preparation programs a limited background in the subject matter even as they may comply with the necessary credit hours requested for admission. This is in part related to the wide range of courses offered by departments of history—a reflection of the variety of research produced in the last thirty years and the absence of a definition among education faculties of what the appropriate background should be. The problem is also beyond the reach of the faculties. A summary from the Registrar’s Office at the Faculty of the Education at Queen’s University, for instance, shows that 32% of the teacher candidates in the Intermediate/Senior program in 2001–2002 would be allowed to teach history in Ontario—even if they did not have history as a major or a minor. This is not unique to Queen’s. The U.S. Department of Education Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reported in 1997 that 55% of all history teachers in American schools had neither a major nor a minor in history.

The emphasis on stressing the process of general thinking skills in history classrooms may effectively displace genuine historical content, if these history-specific inquiry-elements are insufficiently engaged. Stressing such generic thinking skills absent from the complex contexts within which historical problems emerge, while suitable for economic or workplace purposes in that they may readily be represented as “employability skills”, can actually have undesirable and politically disempowering consequences. Training in generic thinking skills can effectively inhibit agency and encourage the development of a citizenry deprived of the bases on which to question their reality.

**Challenges**

One of the challenges educationists encounter in all areas of concern in history education is the presence of a relativist slant that goes well beyond a necessary and healthy skepticism respecting the most ambitious metaphysical and epistemological claims of ultimate demonstrability for notions like causality and truth. Certainly contemporary work in the philosophy of science—in its problematization of observation, explicit causal connection, and universal meaning—has made older,
conventional views of these concepts untenable. But to acknowledge the fragility of such conventional conceptions in no way leads necessarily to the relativist position so prevalent among postmodern commentators on historical explanation that in its most vulgar versions situates truth as completely relative to the position of the historian.²⁴ The attitude that some students have toward the position of the history teacher may be summarized, in a phrase used by Chris Lorenz when reflecting on truth and objectivity in history, “You got your history, I got mine.” ²⁵ It has become a persistent theme in class discussions of history education that the historian is fatally prejudiced and can only provide her version of reality. Or that history or histories as constructions inevitably have fictional elements due mainly to the gap between language and reality.²⁶ The point here, as Lorenz has said, is that “constructing” is not identical to “fictionalizing,” but is in fact a legitimate and necessary cognitive activity. How may one deal with this challenge? First, it may be argued that history educators’ notion of integrating in the teaching model the process of historical interpretation based on relevant evidence, exposing various perspectives, and identifying the explanations and legitimate grounds for those perspectives, is a secure but not infallible basis for claims of explicit historical connection. Second, by explaining or exemplifying what historians actually do and how they do it, we can certainly argue, following Appleby, that “truths about the past are possible, even if they are not absolute, and hence are worth struggling for.” ²⁷ This is an approach sustained by history education researchers although using different approaches to teaching and learning history.

In attempting to reclaim the concept of “truth” as a meaningful component in historical explanation along the lines suggested by Appleby, it will once again be productive to turn to John Dewey. Unlike virtually all his philosophical predecessors, Dewey did not see the fundamental purpose of inquiry as the pursuit of certainty. Dewey’s entire philosophical program is quite firmly opposed to all misguided attempts to ground knowledge claims in utterly secure epistemological bases. On Dewey’s view no question may be decided with ultimate and complete authority. As Dewey indicates so clearly in *The Quest for Certainty*:

> Any philosophy that in its quest for certainty ignores the reality of the uncertain in the ongoing processes of nature denies the conditions out of which it arises. The attempt to include all that is doubtful within the fixed grasp of that which is theoretically certain is committed to insincerity and evasion, and in consequence will have the stigmata of internal contradiction.²⁸

Dewey’s philosophical position is centered on the inevitability of uncertainty. It is decidedly set against the inevitable misrepresentations of the complexities of human experience entailed by any of the metaphysical tropes that in our time we see so relentlessly eviscerated in postmodern discourse—especially in the deconstructions of Jacques Derrida.²⁹ For Dewey truth is not to be understood in absolute or ultimate terms but rather in the more provisional sense of “warranted assertability.”
The processes of developing and assessing such warrants are an important part of all inquiry, including historical inquiry, and the skills associated with these activities are an important part of education, including history education.

On a Deweyan model the business of historical understanding becomes not a matter of passively “finding” the “facts” about past events but actively engaging historical sources and materials, developing and testing possible scenarios respecting past events, setting out the warrants in support of the provisional accounts advanced, and justifying the judgments those accounts and warrants entail. On such an inquiry model the notion of judgment is of central importance. We judge in the absence of conclusive evidentiary bases, but a judgment here—even a judgment that ultimately turns out to be mistaken—is not an arbitrary matter of subjective impression. There are processes and rules (like the jurisprudential rules of evidence) that increase the likelihood that a given judgment may be sound or unsound—even in the absence of certainty. The business of history education, therefore, needs importantly to be concerned with identifying, developing, and teaching those processes and rules involved in justifying and evaluating historical judgments.

History has a reflexive character and historical narratives define us but doing and teaching history cannot be subservient to various agendas and goals at the expense of evidence and methods. It is problematic when the teaching of history appears openly subordinated to ulterior political contemporary goals such as the definition of Canadian identity or national unity and even specific interpretations. The current history curriculum in the province of Ontario, Canada, contains guidelines that direct the teacher to use primary sources and to initiate students into the methods of historical inquiry. These guidelines may provide an important opening for a reconceptualization of the history classroom. Perhaps the most important issue that needs to be engaged directly in that process of reconceptualization is the relativism that students also bring to the class.

The relativist self-referential slant has particularly important pedagogical ramifications when dealing with oral histories, mostly submerged now under the heading of memories—subjective accounts of what people believed happened. The reference to self, for instance, may serve as a powerful historical source and a strong pedagogical tool. However, this reference to self along with a disconnected teaching of pluralistic histories may also advance the plausibility of those privatized, market-oriented conceptions of democracy (now legion in neoliberal discourses), that challenge the classic formulations of genuine social democracy. Furthermore, as Osborne has indicated in a recent presentation, “school history has increasingly become a collection of topics, case studies, and issues, intended not so much to illuminate the past as to explain the present.” Again, here is a key pedagogical issue. While historical conjuncture will influence our interrogation of the past and our teaching of history, school curricula, particularly when dealing with social studies, may easily lead to a presentism that neglects processes, continuity, discontinuities, and ruptures—in other words the temporal and spatial dimensions. Consideration of those processes may indeed lead to a rich connection with the present.
Pedagogically, teaching Canadian history in a multicultural classroom requires that the teacher possess the ability to question multiple perspectives, work across differences, and find a common thread in the analysis of whatever framework she chooses to use. The teacher’s familiarity with the dilemmas of the Canadian polity and the nature of Canadian nationalism may become relevant here. Difference is a fundamental feature of our public culture. The intention should not be to convert students to a particular critical position but to motivate them to think in different ways and to be curious about the various dimensions of human experience. A comprehensive picture of the Canadian past does not, however, imply a return to an exclusive nation-building narrative. What is sometimes criticized as the fragmenting focus of contemporary historical writing is often nothing more than the meaningful inclusion of those people and their perspectives who, while frequently part of historical projects, were not part of the political, social, and economic discussions that directly affected them. Unfortunately, in the understandable zeal to redress past offences, the coherent study of world history is slighted in favor of curricula that situate Canada in primarily continental terms. To compound this problem, when world historical topics do appear, as in the new Ontario curriculum guidelines, they are more often than not restricted to specific issues that are contextualized in line with the globalization ethos and its political agenda. It is then important that the teacher identify “ways of seeing” and lead students to an understanding of how these “ways of seeing” are restricted by evidence. Those “ways of seeing” could lead either to the solution of a specific historical problem or to an interpretation that tries to generate connections among events and processes.

Conclusion

Intellectual shifts in history, related ideological debates, socio-economic and political changes affecting schooling, and new curricula have created challenges and opportunities for history education. It is argued in this paper that John Dewey’s educational theory provides the conceptual tools to develop an inquiry model of history education that would engage students in analyzing sources, setting out warrants in support of accounts, and justifying judgments even in the absence of certainty. The inquiry process sketched in this paper would require an integration of foundational, pedagogical, and historiographical skills in the preparation of history teachers. It is a call to reconceptualize the history classroom and to initiate students into the methods of historical inquiry while avoiding subserviency to pressing political agendas.


Ken Osborne, *Teaching of History in Schools*.


Ken Osborne puts emphasis on the notion of historical mindedness which, in his view is broader than historical thinking that could lead to the development of narrow technical abilities. “Historical mindedness is a way of looking at the world derived from a way of looking at the past.” Ken Osborne, Review of Peter Sterns, Peter Seixas, and Sam Wineburg’s *Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History* (New York: New York University Press 2000 and of Robert Martineau’s *L’Histoire à l’École: Matière à Penser* (Partis/Montreal: L’Harmattan 1999), *The Canadian Historical Review* 82, 3 (2001), 549.


Ken Osborne introduces eight principles that, in his view, teachers should consider when selecting teaching strategies and organizing their classes. Having a clearly articulated and ethically defensible vision of education and of citizenship and of the connection between the two are two of the eight principles. In this paper, we take first one in relation to History. Ken Osborne, “Citizenship Education and Social Studies,” *Trends and Issues in Canadian Social Studies*, ed. Ian Wright (Vancouver: Pacific Educational Press, 1997), 57.

See, for example, Martin Schiralli, “Internationalizing Canadian Educational Policy Frameworks,” in *Connections and Complexities: Internationalization and Higher Education*.
Encounters / Encuentros / Rencontres


See, for example, N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: University Press 1958); and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962).


In fact Dewey defines education as follows (Education) is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.” John Dewey, Democracy and Education, 76


Jack Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History?


Ibid., 566.


29 For a discussion of Derrida’s deconstructive program, see Martin Schiralli, *Constructive Postmodernism: Toward Renewal in Cultural and Literary Studies* (Westport: Bergin and Garvey, 1999).

30 Chris Lorenz argues that “Historians' choice of a guiding perspective is usually related to their own political ideals and their 'identity politics'. This choice is possible because of the reflective character of historical identity…. This does not, of course, mean that the choice between different perspectives and narratives is free of empirical considerations, e.g. the evidence, or arbitrary, as some postmodernist suggest…It would, for example, be difficult if not impossible, to construct the modern history of the Netherlands from a federal perspective. It only means that the choice of identity-perspective is not determined by the evidence, although it is restricted by the evidence. (Here too, there is plurality because of the under-determination of historical representation by the evidence). Chris Lorenz, “‘You Got your History, I Got Mine’: Some Reflections on Truth and Objectivity in History,”


