A Genealogy of Contemporary Indianness:
A Foucauldian Analysis of Identity and Society in Anti-Colonization Politics

By

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the discursive construction of Indigenous identity under the conditions of colonization on Turtle Island. I investigate how the colonial discourse on Indianness discursively produced Indigenous subjectivity in the logics of race and culture. Using Michel Foucault’s genealogical method, I present a history of contemporary Indianness that saw the transformation of Indigenous communities and nations into Western colonial forms. I argue that, since the early encounters between European cultures and Indigenous nations, colonial impulses to consolidate territory and wealth in the ‘New World’ undertook the project of “othering” Indigenous peoples. From the days of the sixteenth century and lasting to this day, very technical details and knowledge about Indianness were discursively produced. This emergent discourse cast identity in a new form, expressing Indianness along cultural and racial dimensions, giving discursive life and political purchase to the colonial discourse on Indianness. Relying on the theory of Antonio Gramsci and the work of Edward Said, I analyze how the colonial discourse obtained cultural hegemony in Indian Country in the mid-twentieth century.

Following the moment of colonial cultural hegemony, I examine how the colonial discourse shaped debates and discussions internal to Indian Country. In this analysis, I investigate the discursive construction of types of Indians, as well as questions of where the racial and cultural boundaries between the colonizer and the colonized would lie. As I show, the discursive imaginings of real, authentic Indianness along racial and cultural lines were introduced in some Indigenous communities to produce divisions and distinctions within Indian subjectivity. I use Foucault’s theoretical understanding of the link between discourse and power to explain how in some cases Indian Country has transformed into a
disciplinary society. I discuss Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. I apply this theoretical concept to the racial organization of First Nations and other Indigenous communities, examining Indian Band membership codes to underscore the spread of biopolitics in Indian Country. This analysis is complemented by an inquiry into the proliferation of disciplinary institutions and practices in some communities of Indian Country. I demonstrate how Indigenous people were drawn into networks of power to normalize and produce authentic Indianness in accordance with the discursive tenets of traditionalism.
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Introduction

One of the more popular currents running through the postcolonial canon suggests that decolonization does not end with severing the colonial relationship and terminating the domination of colonizer over the colonized. By this view, the recognition of indigenous political autonomy and relations founded on non-domination and non-interference is only part of the liberatory calculus. Indeed, it is argued that full indigenous decolonization entails shedding colonial residue from all aspects of indigenous existence. Indigenous society in the pre-colonial era, many postcolonial intellectuals argue, is the model of liberation from the colonizer and also the condition for indigenous self-determination. It is reasoned that, but for European settlement and the eventual establishment of the oppressive and destructive colonial order, contemporary life of indigenous peoples would closely resemble the halcyon days of their pre-contact ancestors. Emancipation by way of decolonization, put very simply, entails the reconstruction or resuscitation of traditional indigenous society—a project that is fully discharged by the reconstruction of both the untainted indigenous race of peoples and its traditional culture. “Many Aboriginal activists and intellectuals,” observes Joyce Green, “have claimed that cultural traditions provide the formula for healthy indigenous communities today. For some,” Green goes on to add, “these arguments have included racialized notions of how “the people,” or the relevant community, will be determined” (Green, 2004: 19). Put another way, this version of decolonization calls for the restoration of “traditional” indigenous societies, comprised of “traditional” indigenous individuals who, as a collective, constitute separate indigenous nations and discrete races. This, after all, is one of the more popular images of indigenous existence before the time of colonization.
This strand of thought is a product of a relatively nascent tradition in moral philosophy, emerging from the ethical critique of the normative foundations that justified colonization. In the seminal postcolonial essay *Discourse on Colonialism*, Aimé Césaire points out that colonization and colonial society “is unable to justify itself either before the bar of “reason” or before the bar of “conscience”” (Césaire, 1972: 31). More recently, James Anaya, a notable indigenous legal scholar and the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, puts it: “Colonization was rendered illegitimate in part by reference to the processes leading to colonial rule, processes that today clearly represent impermissible territorial expansion of governmental authority. The world community now holds in contempt the imposition of government structures upon people, regardless of their social or political makeup” (Anaya, 2004: 106-106). Thus, for some postcolonial theorists and proponents of Indigenous decolonization, the solution is quite simple: reverse the colonial processes and the effects that they have rendered since colonization, thereby returning indigenous peoples to their pre-colonial, “traditional” state of existence (see *inter alia* Alfred 1999, 2005; Corntassel 2008, 2012; Dickson-Gilmore 1992; Fanon 1963; Long 1990; Memmi 1965). Given the illegitimacy of colonization and its processes, remedial decolonization prescriptions appear as morally coherent. Indeed, the normative prescription that has emerged in some strands of postcolonial thought that maintain that the return to “traditional society” is the panacea appears to be beyond reproach.

**Problematizing the Politics of Anti-Colonization Resistance**

On its face, the predominant undercurrent of decolonization—the proposition to return to traditional society—holds significant theoretical appeal. The basic premise of this
strategy makes sense and is logically consistent in its political calculus: once having determined the relative moral deficiencies of colonization and the ensuing western form of society that displaced the previous Indigenous society, then it follows that the immediate superior alternative form of social organization is the very one replaced by colonization. In his popular treatise, *Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom*, Taiaiake Alfred is unequivocal on this point: “On a theoretical level, the enemy of our struggle is the noxious mix of monotheistic religiosity, liberal political theory, neoliberal capitalist economics and their supportive theories of racial superiority, and the false assumption of Euroamerican cultural superiority” (Alfred, 2005: 103). For Alfred—and many contemporaries—the solution to colonization is a return to traditional Indigenous society: “We will self-consciously recreate our cultural practices and reform our political identities by drawing on tradition in a thoughtful process of reconstruction and a committed reorganization of our lives in a personal and collective sense” (Alfred, 2005: 35). Put another way, decolonization entails resistance by stepping out of and back from western, colonial modernity.

The emergence in recent decades of anti-colonial, liberation theory by prominent Indigenous thinkers—like Taiaiake Alfred—undertakes a critical analysis of what is, perhaps, the most urgent response to the violence of colonialism. As with other contemporaries, Alfred engages the pressing moral imperative identified by Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*: “Because it is a systematized negation of the other, a frenzied determination to deny the other any attribute of humanity, colonialism forces the colonized to constantly ask the question: “Who am I in reality?”” (Fanon, 1963: 182). There is a significant place in anticolonial resistance to participate in the colonizer’s legal
institutions—to challenge the colonizer’s laws and policies—as is the pursuit of many Indigenous scholars and activists. Alfred is well-aware, however, that this mode of resistance is insufficient to bring about Indigenous decolonization:

The experience of resurgence and regeneration in Onkwehonwe communities thus far proves that change cannot be made from within the colonial structure. Institutions and ideas that are the creation of the colonial relationship are not capable of ensuring our survival; this has been amply proven as well by the absolute failure of institutional and legalistic strategies to protect our lands and our rights (Alfred, 2005: 24).

The hard work of decolonization will not be achieved by participating in the colonizer’s institutions, but rather by cultivating a “liberated post-imperial vision” of Indigenous existence and striving to create that world (Alfred, 2005: 27). In this sense, Alfred’s thought of the past twenty years has been a significant development in decolonization philosophy that takes up the vitally important task of exploring and answering the colonized’s moral dilemma: “Who am I in reality?”

Indigenous people are acutely aware of how the colonizer and colonial society has constructed them and their reality in both law and social representations. Indigenous people in colonial settings—whether in North America or elsewhere—are ensnared in a Manichaean dichotomy that divides the colonizer from the colonized along racial and cultural lines, dehumanizing Indigenous people in racial and cultural taxonomies. But as Fanon points out, the colonized will not remain passive and will react accordingly: “The colonized know all that and roar with laughter every time they hear themselves called an
animal by the other. For they know they are not animals. And at the very moment when they discover their humanity, they begin to sharpen their weapons to secure its victory” (Fanon, 1963: 8). Indeed, Indigenous philosophers have sought to reawaken their subjugated and colonized compatriots to their humanity, to resist the reality that has been violently imposed on them by the colonizer. Thus, the Indigenous response makes sense and is a rational course of action to defend themselves along the very lines that they are dehumanized and marked out for elimination: racial and cultural othering.

But while Fanon advocated for violent revolution to counter the colonizer, other Indigenous thinkers have proposed anti-violent resurgence and instead promote positive affirmation of Indigenous society. According to Alfred, this strategy of resistance entails discipline. As Alfred explains:

The Onkwehonwe movement requires discipline. By discipline I mean the development of a resurgent power and culture of resistance that channels our angry and potentially deadly and self-destructive energies into a positive force for change. This strength lies in Onkwehonwe communities and people being decultured and disabused of the colonial mentalities and various colonial myths and recultured to support the resurgence of action against state manipulation of their identity (Alfred, 2005: 59)

Indigenous anticolonial resistance, in order to avoid violent conflict with the colonizer, must undertake a disciplined program for rejuvenating Indigenous society and identity. As a matter of decolonization strategy, indigenous people must reject “state manipulation of their identity,” and, instead, undertake a disciplined approach to regeneration.
Indian identity in Canada has been a matter of state legislation and constitutional interpretation since the mid-nineteenth century. In 1850, the legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada enacted the first legislative definition of Indians with *An Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians of Lower Canada*. Conceivably, this legislation instituted the legal creation of ‘Aboriginality’ (Pfefferle, 2007). This legislation based Indian identity on kinship. It included individuals with Indian blood and those who were related to such individuals. The *Indian Act*, later introduced by the Canadian government in 1876, adopted the definition of Indians from the 1850 law. Amended numerous times since its inception, the act defines and determines the legal standing of an individual claiming to be or determined by the government to be an Indian. Since its enactment, the *Indian Act* has controlled who could be legally recognized by the federal government as an Indian, and also stipulated what benefits were to be conferred to those with this status.

For many Indians, the *Indian Act* confers a strong sense of Indian identity. Given the long-standing entrenchment of the act and its provisions, many Indians and Aboriginal communities have adjusted to the legislation over time and have adapted their institutions to become congruent with its governance features. Witness the adverse reaction of Indians across the country to the Trudeau/Chrétien White Paper on Indian policy: in 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and then Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chrétien, proposed the abolition of the *Indian Act*. Despite recognizing that the legislation was racist and assimilatory in its intent, Indians all over Canada, particularly ‘Status Indians,’ strongly opposed the elimination of any distinct status for Indians in Canada. In 1970, the Indian Chiefs of Alberta (ICA)—which included the Red Power luminary Harold Cardinal—drafted
a response to the federal government’s 1969 “White Paper,” which had proposed the elimination of the *Indian Act*. The “Red Paper,” as it was to be colloquially known, stridently repudiated the Canadian government’s plan to abolish the *Indian Act* on a number of grounds, including the purported elimination of Indian identity and difference. The Indian Chiefs stated: “We reject this policy. We say that the recognition of Indian status is essential for justice. Retaining the legal status of Indians is necessary if Indians are to be treated justly” (ICA, 2011: 192). The Chiefs went on to add that, “The legal definition of registered Indian must remain. If one of our registered brothers chooses, he may renounce his Indian status, become “enfranchised,” receive his share of the funds of the tribe, and seek admission to ordinary Canadian society. But most Indians prefer to remain Indians” (ICA, 2011: 193). For Indigenous people, the *Indian Act* has become both symbolic and practical affirmation of their distinction from all other peoples.

Yet who could claim Indian status, and who could not, has been a contentious issue since the enactment of the *Indian Act* and its precursor of 1850. This is true not only from the view of the law, but also among Indians themselves as the legislation produced two classes of Indians: status and non-status Indians. Over the years, the legislation has been amended and in a number of cases, the amendments have altered the definition of an Indian. For example, the initial definition in 1850 had a broad interpretation, deeming any person “to be aboriginal by birth or blood, any person reputed to belong to a particular band or body of Indians; and any persons who married an Indian or was adopted by Indians” to be legally recognized by the government as an Indian (INAC, 1991). Later, in 1876, an amendment to the act would emphasize male lineage, removing status from an Indian woman who married a non-Indian, but also assigning status to any woman who
married an Indian man. This discrimination against Indigenous women would continue for longer than 100 years when only the first steps to remove this damaging, sexist control would be addressed.

It took the famous Bill C-31 amendment in 1985 to restore lost status to some First Nations women that ‘married out’ of their Indian status, and the children of such women, to remedy some of the gendered discrimination in the Indian Act. These particular conditions have induced the growth of a large body of literature, studying how the Indian Act and other legislation have ‘regulated’ Native identity, in the words of Bonita Lawrence (Lawrence 2003, 2004, and 2010). In this area, a number of scholars have focused their research on how the Indian Act has regulated the identity of Indian women. In separate studies, Caroline Dick and Joyce Green have studied the impact on the identity of Indian women who reacquired status and rights under Bill C-31 (Dick 2006, 2009, and 2011; Green, 1997; see also Kuokkanen, 2015). In both studies, the authors examine the situation of Indian women who reacquired status rights under the 1985 Indian Act amendment and how their situation played out in the case of Sawridge Band v. Canada. For her part, Dick examines the court’s adjudication process from the position of these women, a position that “occupies a middle ground between the Band’s claim for autonomy and the state’s reinstatement efforts” (Dick, 2006: 105). Green, on the other hand, interrogates the problem of contemporary citizenship and membership in Indigenous society for Indian women who have had Indian status restored (Green, 1997). Each of these studies has located Indian women at the intersection of gender and race. Each has considered how Indian women of reacquired rights and status have had implications for Aboriginal rights and decolonization.
At the same time, a number of legal cases have been launched to challenge the ‘residual discrimination’ against First Nations women that remains in the Indian Act.¹ Most notable is the McIvor v. Canada case where the British Columbia Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that there is still discrimination in the Indian Act that is based on sex and matrilineal descent. Although the 1985 amendment to the legislation, Bill C-31, ensured that future generations of women would not lose Indian status through marriage to a non-Indian, the change to the law did not apply retroactively to women who had lost status prior to the legal revision. Moreover, the children of women who had lost status, before the new statutory provisions introduced in 1985, would also lose any entitlement to Indian status.

In the 2007 decision, the court found that the law continued to infringe the right to equality of women, as well as their children, who lost status as a result of ‘marrying-out.’ On appeal in 2009, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court; the Government of Canada decided that it would not appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. As a result of the McIvor decision, many women and their children previously regarded as non-status Indians are now eligible to identify as status Indians.

In recent years, some scholars have turned their attention to how the Indian Act ‘hides’ conceptions of blood quantum. Some of this research has looked at how the second-

¹ In 2011, the Canadian Parliament passed the Gender Equity in Indian Registration Act in response to British Columbia decision in McIvor v. Canada (Registrar of Indian and Northern Affairs) to further eliminate gender discrimination that remained after the passage of Bill C-31 (1985 amendment to the Indian Act). In 2017, the Canadian Parliament passed Bill S-3, An Act to amend the Indian Act in response to the Superior Court of Quebec decision in Descheneaux c. Canada (Procureur général). Bill S-3 widened the scope of eligibility for Indian status by addressing four areas: “unknown/unstated parentage; omitted minor children (children who lost status when their mother married a non-status man); the cousins issue (differential treatment among first cousins whose status depends on the sex of their grandparent) and the siblings issue (females born out of wedlock between 1951 - 1985 who were denied status)” (NWAC, 2018). Despite these amendments, and Bill S-3 that ensued from the 2017 Superior Court of Quebec decision, the Crown has not eliminated all gendered discrimination against women (and their descendants). Bill S-3 includes the 1951 cut-off. This cut-off did not restore Indian status to women who had “married-out” prior to 1951 and their children.
generation cut-off restriction outlined in Bill C-31 creates ‘lesser’ Indians by denying status beyond a certain threshold of blood quantum. This rule stipulates that two successive generations without an Indian parent in the ancestral lineage will terminate Indian status for such descendants. This amendment to the Indian Act divides Indians into the categories 6(1) and 6(2) (which reflect the sections of the act), where the offspring of a 6(1) Indian and a non-Indian parent are entitled to Indian status, while the child of a 6(2) Indian with a non-Indian parent cannot receive this status. In Pamela Palmater’s recent study, she argues that, although there is no specific provision in the act that provides for a blood quantum determination, this stipulation amounts to no less than discrimination on the basis of mixed-bloodedness (Palmater, 2009 and 2011). As Palmater points out,

> While the Indian Act does not use the term “blood quantum” in the registration provisions, through its reliance on specific degrees of birth descent, Canada has, in effect, incorporated a type of blood quantum by birth descent for status Indians born after April 17, 1985, when Bill C-31 amended the Indian Act. In other words, one generation of marrying out equals 50 per cent of notional Indian blood quantum, two generations equals 25 per cent, and so on (Palmater, 2011: 29).

Those Indians with lesser Indian blood, in effect, are lesser Indians, and are viewed in Canadian law as individuals with marginal connection to their Indigenous identity. As the Cree legal scholar, Douglas Sanderson, explains, “[t]his is informally called the “two generation rule”, and while it does not explicitly use terminology like “blood quantum”, the implicit effect is to categorize First Nation people as a race whose purity requires blood lineage that is traceable to the fetishistic ideal of a pure” Indian” (Sanderson, 2014: 538).
Similarly, Bonita Lawrence in her book, *Real Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood*, addresses this same issue, but with a focus on mixed-blooded Indianness in an urban setting and on how the *Indian Act* has manufactured this particular identity. As Lawrence notes:

[i]n Canada federal legislation [the *Indian Act*] has shaped who among Native people even considers themselves to be mixed-blood and who does not ... [and] simply being urban—which itself is shaped no less by identity legislation [the *Indian Act*] than any other aspect of urban mixed-blood reality—is a site of deep divisions over who is a “real” Indian and who is not (Lawrence, 2004: 15).

As such, “Indian status” as a legislated designation by the colonial Crown has put not only the notion of “blood quantum” into circulation in some Indigenous circles, but the question of what this legal status entails in urban (and non-reserve) spaces.

In addition to recognition by the colonial state as a “status Indian,” the legal label of “Indian” held considerable intangible representations of identity and Indigenous culture. In her legal battles with the Crown for Indian status and removal of gendered discrimination in the state definition of the Indian, Sharon McIvor has argued the instrumentality of Indian status to the maintenance of Indigenous culture. Based on the testimony of McIvor and the resulting court decisions, Mary Eberts has observed that “the concept of Indian has come to exist as a cultural identity alongside traditional concepts, and is imbued with significance extending far beyond entitlement to programs” (Eberts, 2010: 30 – 31). In the decision
from *McIvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, Justice Ross recounted McIvor’s deposition on the cultural impact of exclusion from Indian status:

> It has been my experience that the exclusion of First Nations women pursuant to previous versions of the *Indian Act* had a negative impact on the cultural flourishing of Aboriginal communities which, for purposes of passing on Indian languages and culture heritage, require the participation in their communities of women and their offspring who possess the knowledge of Indian languages and culture (Sharon McIvor quoted in *McIvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada*, 2007 BCSC 827, para. 139).

In other words, the *Indian Act*’s definition of the Indian excluded Indigenous people, which served to alienate them from their Indigenous culture.

Given the long-standing entrenchment of the *Indian Act* and its numerous provisions concerning identity, many Indians and Aboriginal communities in Canada had wholly adjusted to the colonial discourse on Indianness, internalizing features of colonial legislation such as the racial definition of Indian. Ovide Mercredi, who had served as the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations through most of the 1990s, and Mary Ellen Turpel, an Aboriginal legal scholar, lawyer and judge, took the occasion in their 1993 book, *In the Rapids: Navigating the Future of First Nations*, to reflect on the *Indian Act* and the imposition of settler boundaries between colonizer and colonized. Mercredi and Turpel observed what most Indians of the day recognized, noting that, “We sometimes buy into *Indian Act* definitions and categories in our own assessments of people and politics. This is...
part of the legacy of colonialism” (Mercredi and Turpel, 1993: 89). Indeed, for many Aboriginal peoples, the *Indian Act*, its definition of Indianness and control over aspects that informed Indianness, had achieved a sort of totalizing status among Indians. As Bonita Lawrence argued, the *Indian Act’s* leverage over Indian identity had assumed a sense of “naturalness” over time. Lawrence remarked that:

The *Indian Act* in Canada, in this respect, is much more than a body of laws that for over a century have controlled every aspect of Indian life. As a regulatory regime, the *Indian Act* provides ways of understanding Indian identity, organizing a conceptual framework that has shaped contemporary Native life in ways that are now so familiar as to almost seem “natural” (Lawrence, 2003: 3).

The *Indian Act*—so pervasive in the social consciousness of Indian Country—was not the only colonial force shaping Indian identity. Indeed, the *Indian Act* was coupled with constitutional provisions around Indianness and the interpretation thereof by colonial institutions. Pursuant to section 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, the Government of Canada asserted exclusive authority over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”

The *Indian Act* is not the only source of legal identity of Indigenous people developed by the colonial state. In 1982, Aboriginal peoples were recognized as a distinct people through the repatriation of Canada’s Constitution, but this momentous event introduced new questions around Indianness and how the colonial state would eventually address it. Section 35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982* defines the “aboriginal peoples of Canada” to include “the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada” and it also recognized
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. Because these rights were not spelled out specifically, the courts—and not Aboriginal peoples themselves—were charged with the task of working out what these rights entail, and thus what amounts to “Aboriginality” and indigenous difference (Christie, 2003: 483; see also Macklem, 2001). As Caroline Dick argued, the judicial foray into identity politics continued the tradition of assertion by the Canadian state of its control over Aboriginal identity: “The judicial project of defining Aboriginality continues a long history of naming that has intruded into the lives of Aboriginal peoples and profoundly affected their self-understanding” (Dick, 2009: 973). What is more, the rulings by the courts had the effect of “freezing” the understanding of Aboriginal culture, and thus determining with a great deal of certitude what constitutes Indianness for all time (Borrows, 1997; Murphy, 2001). As Dimitrios Panagos pointed out, “the judiciary becomes a keeper (of sorts) of Aboriginal identity for future generations of Aboriginal nations” (Panagos, 2007: 607). Like the Indian Act, then, the Constitutional affirmation of the distinct status of Aboriginal peoples in Canada informed a great deal of understanding of Indianness and Indigenous identity; and, like the Indian Act, it was imposed by the colonial state.

The formal institutions of the colonial state—legislated Indigenous identity—was not a benign act. Rather, crystallizing Indigenous legal difference in law was, and remains to this day, part and parcel of colonial control over the lives of Indigenous peoples. State actions that rested on dividing the colonizer from the colonized were delineated by way of legal definition, but it was at the nexus of colonial coercion and Indian identity where the various forms of oppression, exploitation, subjugation, and often violence was manifest. Nowhere, perhaps, was the vision of state coercion more vividly expressed by a colonial
authority than when Canada’s Parliament was debating a Bill to amend the *Indian Act* in 1920. Duncan Campbell Scott, a senior public servant that held the position of Deputy Superintendent of the Department of Indian Affairs, spoke to a Parliamentary Committee in the spring of 1920 about the proposed *Indian Act* amendment:

I want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a matter of fact, that this country ought to continuously protect a class of people who are able to stand alone. That is my whole point. Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department and that is the whole object of this Bill (Duncan Campbell Scott, quoted in Titley, 1986: 50).

Setting aside the proposed amendments—which were particularly violent in the 1920 amendment—the words underscore the colonial imperative to eliminate Indigenous people, and the state’s use of law and authority was deeply implicated by: first, defining the Indian; and, second, eradicating the Indian.

Having defined the colonized, the colonial state aggressively—and inhumanely—undertook a program of physical and economic violence in the pursuit of eradicating Indians. Colonial oppression extended far back, long before the colonizer sought to fix Indigenous identity in law. However, once formalized by state legislation, the colonizer legitimized its authority to carry out heinous acts of violence on anyone that was branded with the status of Indian. As Joyce Green points out, “[c]olonial activity in Canada (and elsewhere) was motivated by the search for wealth for mercantile and capitalist investors
and their political sponsors” (Green, 2003b: 54). The colonizer saw Indians as economic burdens to advancing these visions of settler society. Speaking in the House of Commons on April 26, 1882, Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald described the policy of Indigenous starvation:

> It is true that Indians so long as they are fed will not work. I have reason to believe that the agents as a whole, and I am sure it is the case with the Commissioner, are doing all they can, by refusing food until the Indians are on the verge of starvation (quoted in Official Debates of the House of Commons, 1882: 1186).

Many other examples of violent colonialism abound: Indian Residential Schools with their attendant horrors of abuse and death of Indigenous children forcibly taken from their parents; dispossession and forced relocation to remote and unfamiliar locations in dangerous, often inhabitable environments; and, especially, material and economic deprivation. All of this was authorized by the colonizer. Consider the words of Hector Langevin, one of the architects of the Indian Residential School system:

> We do not propose to expend large sums of money to give [the Indians] food from the first day of the year to the last. We must give them enough to keep them alive; but the Indians must, under the regulations that have been sanctioned by Parliament, go to their reservations and cultivate their land. They must provide partially for their wants. And therefore, if, by accident, an Indian should starve, it is not the fault of the Government nor the wish of the Government (Langevin, quoted in Shewell, 2004: 41).
Taken together, the words of Duncan Campbell Scott and Hector Langevin, make it clear that the colonial project of eliminating Indians was an economic consideration: the state did not want Indian existence to persist, but while it did, the state did not want to provide the necessaries of life because of financial calculations.

Although the views of early colonial architects, such as Macdonald, Langevin, and Scott, appear somewhat dated, the very same logics of colonialism continue to this day. As the Indigenous criminologist, Lisa Monchalin, notes of the *Indian Act* today and the authority the colonizer maintains by way of this legislation:

> [t]his federal act still regulates “Indians” in Canada, and, consequently, First Nation communities fall under federal jurisdiction. The result is that the federal government allocates less to First Nations communities for things such as water, housing, and education than do the provincial, territorial, and municipal governments responsible for funding these things in non-First Nation communities (Monchalin, 2016: 75).

A vast bureaucratic complex, legitimated and supported by acts of Parliament, continues to administer Indigenous poverty and economic marginalization.

Indeed, the economic conditions of First Nations are largely contrived through colonial mechanisms that regulate financial flows all on the basis of the legal identity of the Indian. The deliberate strategy of economic coercion by the colonial Crown has continued to exert considerable pressure on First Nations to this day. The colonial conscription of Indigenous lands—and the legacy of forced settlement on small, inadequate reserves—has been a “major factor in Native economic and cultural decline” (Kendall, 2001: 47). At the
same time, federal obligations have also failed to alleviate the significant poverty in First Nations. In the mid-1990s, the federal government instituted a 2% cap on funding increases to Indigenous expenditures—which have always been grossly insufficient (Palmater, 2011: 122). First Nations, already under immense financial pressure to meet even the most basic human needs of its membership, are often forced to make substantial sacrifices in the delivery of programs and services. To be sure, in the face of this colonially-imposed impoverishment and economic scarcity, First Nations must make difficult decisions such as limiting the size of their membership in order to provide for a smaller number of individuals with the meagre finances set and controlled by the colonizer.

The impetus of the economics of colonization have not changed, though the mode of deliberate impoverishment and contrived economic duress of First Nations has assumed new forms. In December of 2017, the federal government announced that it would establish a “New Fiscal Relationship” with First Nations which proposed to entail “a new Fiscal Policy Framework to address funding sufficiency and identify priority funding areas” (Canada, 2017). On the surface, this new relationship may stir hope in First Nations that have lived under deliberate colonial desitution for centuries. But the ‘new relationship’ still models what political scientist Daniel Elazar has termed “coercive federalism,” which ensues when the top-level government maintains policy-making dominance and can exercise its fiscal powers unilaterally (Kincaid, 2012). As I’ve written elsewhere, “[n]owhere does coercive federalism flourish more than when federal pre-emptory policy dominance is paired with funding relations. And this is exactly the sort of arrangement envisioned as the federal government moves to both eliminate [the Department of Indigenous Services Canada] and develop a “New Fiscal Relationship” framework with First
Nations, Métis, and Inuit” (Coburn, 2018). The economic relationship is still one of colonial domination.

When viewed with this historical backdrop, the moral foundations of decolonization appear to be above suspicion. But, there are a number of theoretical considerations that cast doubt on the viability of the Indigenous liberatory strategy of breaking away from the oppression and dominating hold maintained by the colonial society. The two-part strategy of 1) recreating traditional Indigenous identities and 2) reconstruction of traditional Indigenous societies ensues from a particular analysis of the political relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Indeed, the political analysis used by anti-colonization theorists and other proponents of decolonization rests on a tradition of thinking that views power as something possessed, exerted with intention, and deployed in the interest of the political actor holding power. This formulation is evident in much anti-colonization theory, according to which the dominant society exercises power over Indigenous peoples, affecting the latter in such a way that is contrary to their interest. This is especially true in the analysis that begins from assumptions of discrete political units—the colonial power of the state and Indigenous nations—in struggle and strife over matters of territorial sovereignty and government over political subjects. As Steven Lukes points out, this understanding of power is conceptualized with a specific application to shape the interests of the recipient or target of power, it is a view of power “according to which A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (Lukes, 2005: 30; see also Lukes, 1986). However, this classical mode of political analysis—based on a particularly limited understanding of power and society—elides significant political
phenomena at work that would otherwise put the political calculus of decolonization theory into question.

The contemporary politics of anti-colonization of the last 50 years and still underway in Indian Country\(^2\) challenge the adequacy of conventional analysis to illustrate a complete picture of the political. The objectives of decolonization—briefly described by Taiaiake Alfred above—emerge, in large part, from a politics that is insufficiently conceptualized in long-held and applied political theory. “As we enter the twenty-first century,” Nikolas Rose has observed, “many of the conventional ways of analyzing politics and power seem obsolescent” (Rose, 1999: 1). Indeed, Rose points out that “we are seeing a proliferation of forms of politics and of types of contestation which cannot be calibrated in terms of the dichotomies of traditional political thought” (Rose, 1999: 2). The politics of anti-colonization that I examine in this dissertation turn on political phenomena that elude adequate articulation within classical theoretical appreciations of politics and power. In this study, I avail myself of Michel Foucault’s expansive political and philosophical inquiries to draw many of these weaknesses into the light of wider anti-colonization discussions. In

\(^2\) Throughout this study, I employ the terms Indian, Aboriginal, Native, Indianness, indigenous, and Aboriginality rather interchangeably (for an excellent discussion on identity labels and indigenous peoples in North America, see Yellow Bird, 1999). Scholars of indigenous studies will recognize that the terms “Indian Country” and “Indians” are deployed in various studies with no or little technical definition; moreover, studies on indigenous matters are often conducted without providing much in the way of empirical description or analysis of the scope of such terms. In this study, I exclude both Métis and Inuit from the term “Indian.” At the same time, therefore, the geographical homelands, such as Métis settlements in Alberta, the Red River Métis homeland in Manitoba, and all of Inuit Nunangat—although both groups are duly recognized as Indigenous peoples. This exclusion is done for a number of reasons but suffice to say they are excluded mainly for the reason that neither group is easily compared with the numerous First Nations that have developed band membership codes. And, both groups are subject to very distinct debates about authenticity that are not altogether commensurate with the debate occurring in the corners of Indian Country that are analyzed in this study (see Andersen, 2014 and Gaudry, 2013). Furthermore, the period under examination in this study—referenced here as “today”—is constrained to the mid- to late-1960s up to the early 2010s. The time period is discussed in the chapters that follow, particularly chapter one.
what follows, I analyze two political variables at the heart of anti-colonization politics—identity and society—using Foucault’s theoretical treatment of power. I suggest here that the conditions necessary for the type of society and the identities that lie at the core of these liberatory projects and dreams are unstable—even, perhaps, altogether unrealizable—given the current direction of both theory and praxis in anti-/de-colonization.

**Overview of Thesis and Chapter Outline**

This study is organized into six chapters. In the next chapter, I examine the discursive history of contemporary Indianness. This chapter applies Foucault's genealogical method of historical analysis to explore the emergence of the discourse on Indianness. Here, I explore the shifts and transformations in the narratives and politics around Indigenous identity. I show that, since the early encounters between European cultures and Indigenous nations, colonial impulses to consolidate territory and wealth in the 'New World' undertook the project of “othering” Indigenous peoples. From those early days of the sixteenth century and lasting to this day, very technical details and knowledge about Indianness were discursively produced. This emergent knowledge cast identity in a new form, expressing Indianness along cultural and racial dimensions, giving discursive life and political purchase to the colonial discourse on Indianness. Furthermore, relying upon the theory of Antonio Gramsci and the work of Edward Said, I analyze how the colonial discourse obtained cultural hegemony in Indian Country in the mid-twentieth century. I argue that the hegemonic status of the colonial discourse—buttressed by the positional superiority of the colonial cultural form and the colonial “will-to-truth”—came to
predominate Indigenous social consciousness and colonize the world view of Indigenous peoples and nations.

The analysis in chapter two picks up from the investigation of colonial cultural hegemony in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I examine how the hegemonic colonial discourse shaped debates and discussions internal to Indian Country. In this analysis, I investigate the discursive construction of types of Indians, as well as questions of where the racial and cultural boundaries between the colonizer and the colonized would lie. As I show in this chapter, the discursive imaginings of real, authentic Indianness along racial and cultural lines introduced finer divisions and distinctions within Indian subjectivity. I draw out these discursive subjectivities through a close reading of works by a number of Indigenous anti-colonization theorists. From this chapter forward, I refer to the hegemonic discourse on Indianness—once taken up and given political purchase in Indian Country—as the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness.

In the subsequent two chapters, I use Foucault’s theoretical understanding of the link between discourse and power to explain how, in some cases, Indian Country has transformed into a disciplinary society. Chapter three builds on the foundation set by the previous two chapters, focusing on the racial dimension of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse. I introduce and discuss Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. I apply this theoretical concept to the racial organization of First Nations and other Indigenous communities. This chapter examines Indian Band membership codes to underscore the spread of biopolitics in some Indigenous communities in Indian Country. Before concluding this chapter, I undertake a quantitative analysis of biopolitics in First Nations by way of a composite index that I call the Racial Index.
The investigation in chapter four emerges from the precepts of the cultural dimension of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse and connects them with Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power. This chapter traces the proliferation of disciplinary institutions in Indian Country and examines how some Indigenous communities were drawn into networks of power to normalize and produce authentic Indianness in accordance with the discursive tenets of traditionalism. To demonstrate this, I examine some of the programmatic literature that has emerged in recent decades concerned with authenticity and subjectivity; these programs consist of “self-help” books and “how to” manuals, and other writings that provide guidance on achieving real Indianness. Furthermore, I examine how Indian Band membership codes in some cases served as disciplinary programmes for the production of “traditional Indians.” As with the inquiry into biopolitics in the previous chapter, I have developed a quantitative instrument—the Traditionalism Index—for the empirical analysis of the extent to which traditionalism has been taken up in Indian Country.

The final chapter of this study, the conclusion, draws together the arguments made in the previous chapters and provides a broad overview of the claims that I have made throughout the dissertation. At this point, I summarize how these claims lend themselves to the overarching and ironic argument that efforts at decolonization are effectively transforming some Indigenous communities into distinctly modern, western forms of society, moving away from the broader goal of decolonization and towards disciplinary societies.
Situating this Project

The impetus for this work has emerged from my own experience as an Anishinaabe—an Algonquin from Pikwàkanagàn—and contemporary anticolonial resistance traditions—both intellectual and praxis. My family, my community, and my nation share a history as colonized peoples, a connection that extends to other Indigenous families, communities, and nations. But a fractious politics lies behind the seemingly unified exterior of these connections. From the outside looking in, being Anishinaabe is relatively straightforward with a simple calculus of identity. But as almost any Anishinaabe—or any Indigenous person—knows, there are a number of cleavages that have carved up our understanding of ourselves. Most Indigenous folks will point to the Indian Act and its various statuses of Indianness as the source of division. The origin of this damage lies with the colonizer, its totalizing politics, as well as other colonial legal incursions into Indigenous identity. This much is readily identifiable amongst most Indigenous people; there are less obvious colonial intrusions, however.

Colonialism is cunning and its skillful deceit is such that some Indigenous peoples are themselves reproducing colonial conditions under the cover of “freedom” or “decolonization.” Colonialism continues to reorganize and constrain our families, communities, and nations without resorting to many of the hallmark coercive practices—forced relocation and Indian Residential Schools, for instance—that mark the colonial legacy. In many ways, our Indigeneity—how we understand ourselves as Indigenous peoples with Indigenous identities—continues to be shaped, confined, and inhibited through subtler, neocolonial designs. Given the scarcity of economic resources, there is considerable colonial pressure upon Indigenous communities to recreate the longstanding
colonial divisions based on ideas of race and what we think our “authentically” pre-contact cultures entail. Like some other Indigenous nations, we Anishinaabe internally divide ourselves, sometimes as methodically and as shrewdly as the colonizer, perhaps even more so. We now have gradations of Indianness, various degrees and shades along spectrums of Indianness. We can be more or less Indian, depending on measures of race and markers of culture, going by various monikers like the “apple,” the “city Indian,” the “wannabe,” and the “half-breed.” We have dissected our families, communities, and nations in near perfect colonial practice. We have done this through our own passive consent. We have acquiesced to colonial cultural constructions of our societies—and how we constitute ourselves—while believing that we are exercising political autonomy. Put more plainly, some Indigenous peoples are colonizing themselves.

Many Indigenous individuals have harboured suspicions about our role in our own self-colonization. Our personal experiences have seen us in different social circles where the identity of another is thrown into flux based on questions of race and cultural competencies. The invectives based on these assessments—“apples,” “wannabes,” etc.—are heard in every kind of social setting, lobbed at others to shore up exclusionary impulses. At the same time, many Indigenous individuals have a sense that their own comportment is similarly under some sort of scrutiny, that their demeanor and style is assessed against certain social expectations. Often, our sense of external judgement is less a suspicion we have and, rather, more the result of being in receipt of explicit criticism (frequently one or more of the familiar racial and cultural epithets). We experience this in our families, our communities, and our nations. For some of us, from these experiences, we sense that we are engaged in something very colonial. Our intuition tells us that we are not wrong to feel
that we are somehow deeply implicated in our own colonization. These instincts have prompted me to explore how we have come to develop these exclusionary and behavioural impulses based on colonial logics of race and culture.

The inquiry undertaken here is inspired by contemporary anticolonial thought. In recent time, prominent figures in this intellectual tradition have problematized the long held decolonization strategies centred on matters of Indigenous identity, especially the deployment of race and culture in these strategies. In her dissertation, Pamela Palmater (Mi’kmaw) examines the use of colonial conceptions of race:

I hope that I will be able to explain how the historical injustices forced upon my people by colonial and modern governments have caused a sickness of sorts within my community and others. I want to emphasize how out-dated, racist, colonial policies evolved and have become part of the mindset of many Aboriginal peoples, to our own detriment (Palmater, 2009: 1).

In her monograph, *Beyond Blood: Rethinking Indigenous Identity*, Palmater describes the use of colonial measures of race, such as blood quantum, as “the worst kind of sickness” (Palmater, 2011: 14). Others, such as Bonita Lawrence (Mi’kmaw), have also challenged the significance of race in the Indigenous social conscious, particularly “Real” Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood (2004), as well as Damien Lee (Ojibwe) in his recent dissertation, “Because our law is our law”: Considering Anishinaabe Citizenship Orders through Adoption Narratives at Fort William First Nation (2017).
The practices, representations, and ‘policing’ of what is often considered “authentic” or “traditional” culture in Indigenous social circles and formal institutions has also been questioned by anticolonial thinkers. Joyce Green (Ktunaxa/Métis) has thoughtfully interrogated the presumed authority of ‘tradition’ in anticolonial resistance. As Green points out, “[m]any Aboriginal activists and intellectuals have claimed that cultural traditions provide the formula for healthy indigenous communities today,” noting that “[t]radition becomes the social prescription for national or cultural rejuvenation” (Green, 2003a: 1). The drawback to this strategy leads to fundamentalism, a set of strict political exclusions, often violating inherent human rights. Pamela Palmater provides a parallel critique of the “traditionalist” rejuvenation strategy, noting that “[r]igid applications of traditional criteria can have the same effects as the status provisions of the Indian Act, except that traditional criteria would be more subjectively applied” (Palmater, 2011: 188).

What’s more, uncritically adopting “traditionalist” criteria, as a fundamentalist politics, “freezes traditions and creates an archetypal “Indian” standard that few could hope to meet;” the “reliance on strict traditional criteria,” Palmater continues, “can fragment a community” (Palmater, 2011: 188). Indeed, Indigenous people are accustomed to both formal and informal ‘gatekeepers’ of identity that draw boundaries for social exclusion based on whether or not one is sufficiently “traditional.”

The point of my study is not to further entrench internal divisions within Indigenous families, communities, and nations. Rather, I wish to add to the intellectual tradition of the theorists above—and those not named here—that are exposing internalized colonization underway within Indigenous nations and social groups. Consider the conclusion of Glen Coulthard’s (Dene) intensely theoretical investigation, *Red Skin, White Masks*, and the
implications to nearly half a century of anticolonial politics and resistance: “the liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous self-determination in Canada that began to consolidate itself after the demise of the 1969 White Paper has not only failed, but now serves to reproduce the very forms of colonial power which our original demands for recognition sought to transcend” (Coulthard, 2014: 23-24). Coulthard is cognizant that the conclusion drawn from his examination will be uncomfortable for those that have uncritically adhered this long-standing anticolonial politics. “This argument will undoubtedly be controversial to many Indigenous scholars and Aboriginal organization leaders insofar as it suggests that much of our efforts over the last four decades to attain settler-state recognition of our rights to land and self-government have in fact encouraged the opposite—the continued dispossession of our homelands and the ongoing usurpation of our self-determining authority” (Coulthard, 2014: 23-24). Nevertheless, these theoretical investigations serve a decolonization purpose. Indeed, I share Palmater’s inclination—and that of others committed to effective anticolonial praxis—to engage in the line of inquiry pursued in my study: “I believe that it is only through acknowledgement of our problems and a willingness to change that our communities can heal and move forward” (Palmater, 2009: 1).

Palmater’s words hold a great deal of significance and urgency for my nation, the Algonquin Nation. Colonialism has inflicted deep and wide wounds and continues to cut through the fabric and flesh of the Anishinaabe communities that comprise the Algonquin nation and its territory. Today, after millenia of our existence, the Algonquin nation is staring down colonial dispossession of our national territory by way of the Ontario modern treaty negotiations. The modern treaty has produced a number of divisions that are carving
the Algonquin nation into fragments in terms of territory. But at the same time, considerable debate is ongoing around who is Algonquin and who, then, has the right to extinguish or modify our territorial title.\(^3\) Cleavages have been drawn around conceptions of identity and Indianness to exclude Algonquins from participating in critical discussions around the integrity of the Algonquin nation’s territory. These deliberations have been informed, to a large extent, by a discourse that deploys themes of race and tradition that circulate throughout many First Nations. The Anishinaabe—and the Algonquins more specifically—are not immune to this discourse.

To that end, I have chosen a rich theoretical body of work—developed primarily by Michel Foucault and augmented by Foucauldian scholars—to similarly draw out, to make more readily visible, the ways that some Indigenous peoples are reproducing the conditions of our colonization in our families, communities, and nations. I am not alone in my interest in Foucault and his theory of power as a mode and method of analysis. The Mississauga Nishnabeg scholar and philosopher, Leanne Betasamosake Simpson has remarked: “I think we need to do some collective thinking and analyzing about how the politics of biopower seep into resurgence movements, because without this awareness, we are destined to replicate the things we don’t want to replicate” (Simpson, n.d.). Indeed, Anishinaabe must be aware of how other modes of power, not just those found in statist or state-centric analyses, have colonized our societies. For instance, as Simpson points out

\(^3\) It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the ongoing politics of Algonquin identity as well as the Ontario modern treaty. There are a number of recent sources that have discussed some of these matters. See, for instance, Bonita Lawrence’s 2012 book *Fractured Homeland: Federal Recognition and Algonquin Identity in Ontario*; Shiri Pasternak’s *Grounded Authority: the Algonquins of Barriere Lake against the State* (2017); and, specifically Regina Hartwick’s *Am I Omàmiwinini Enough? Understanding the Implications of Colonial Discourse and Political Policy in the Kichi Sibi* (2012).
elsewhere, “I don’t accept the narrow, singular interpretations of our knowledge systems that lead to “tradition” steeped in dogma, exclusion, erasure, and violence, and I am not willing to replicate that in the beautiful Indigenous worlds we will create in the present and in the future” (Simpson, 2017: 130). To be sure, leaving other forms of colonization unchecked can result in undesirable outcomes, as my examination of communities later in this thesis, such as the extreme outliers of Kahnawá:ke and Sawridge, which have undergone considerable internal turmoil because of matters of identity (see chapters 4 and 5). By employing Foucault in the analysis of this neocolonialism, I attempt to bring to the surface a discourse that has eluded detection in some spaces of Anishinaabe political and social organization, that has been taken for granted.

So, while the work in this thesis may be of interest on purely academic grounds or personal preference, the project here is of importance to internal discussions within the Algonquin nation specifically, and possibly to other Anishinaabeg—Nipissing, Mississauga, Ojibwe, Oj-Cree, Saulteaux, and Potawatomi—more broadly. Other Indigenous nations may take issue with the analysis here—as Euro-centric, for instance—and even other Indigenous scholars may take exception with the theory, methodology, and data; but, as Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith has made salient in her seminal work, Decolonizing Methodologies, “Decolonization, however, does not mean and has not meant a total rejection of all theory or research or Western knowledge. Rather, it is about centring our concerns and world views and then coming to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes” (Smith, 2006: 39). The support for using Western theory for critical analysis of contemporary society is echoed by Simpson and Anishinaabe Elder Edna Manitowabi: “Western theory, whether based in postcolonial,
critical, or even liberatory strains of thought, has been exceptional at diagnosing, revealing, and even interrogating colonialism” (Simpson and Manitowabi, 2013: 279). I cannot speak to how other Anishinaabeg will receive this work, and I will not pretend to speak on behalf of other Indigenous peoples and nations. Just as Val Napoleon has remarked on pan-Indigenous prescriptions on citizenship and self-determination, “[e]ach aboriginal nation will have to conduct its own analysis of these concepts according to its culture, history, and present circumstance” (Napoleon, 2005: 38). The analysis and results of this study may be of some utility to discussions that other Indigenous nations are having, but that is something for them to determine. Those other Indigenous nations and peoples will likely resist colonial power and discourse in other ways. At the same time that we—as Algonquin—respect the autonomy of other Indigenous nations to exercise self-determination and how they constitute themselves as communities. Generally, this is not an immobile process or static politics; the politics around Indigenous identity is constantly shifting and fluctuates by Indigenous nation in varying and diverse ways. This is the situation for several Indigenous communities that I examine in this thesis, communities like Kahnawá:ke, Sawridge, and even my own.

Before closing on any discussion of my own positionality as a preface to this study, it behooves me to betray Michel Foucault’s historiographical methodology—his archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power—and disclose some of my own political disposition and persuasions. Foucault approached his historical studies such as the history of sexuality, the history of punishment, the history of madness with notable “neutrality” and a palpable avoidance of moral relativism. That is, Foucault conducted his studies without “becoming involved in arguments about whether what they [the discourse analyses] say is true, or
even whether their statements make sense,” as Dreyfus and Rabinow observe (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: xxiv). Similarly, as both Nancy Fraser and Nancy Hartsock have critiqued of his method, Foucault’s historical investigations omitted his personal views and any normative judgments of the subject matter that he studied (see Fraser, 1989; and, Hartsock, 1990). As with Foucault’s own approach, I have attempted to provide a contemporary history of Indianness without inserting my own personal perspective. Rather, I have proceeded with a history—not the sole history—of the genealogy of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness that is not laden with value judgements or other normative qualifications. Nevertheless, and despite my conscious attempt to leave out my express personal views, the work here is open to the normative interpretations by the reader, whether the audience an Indigenous scholar or otherwise.

However, I will say at the outset of this study that I do maintain and harbour certain moral views and interpretations of the phenomena in question—race and what is often referred to as “traditionalism”—that are not apparent from a reading of my work here. I will say, very briefly since it is not the focus of this study, that I am sympathetic to ethical philosophies that counterpose Indigenous traditionalism to western political philosophies. I have written elsewhere, with Devin Zane Shaw, that Indigenous liberatory aspirations cannot be realized within a philosophical tradition that underwrites colonialism and various modes of subjugation that Indigenous people continue to endure (Shaw and Coburn, 2017). On the other hand, I reject appeals to racialization of Indigenous people and any politics that reduces Indigenous nations to mere races. Yet, because I do not provide any moral pronouncements or interpretations on these matters throughout this study, it is possible that the audience may misinterpret my own position.
A Genealogy of Contemporary Indianness:

Towards the History of Colonial Cultural Hegemony

In his 1995 study of the anticolonial politics in his Mohawk community of Kahnawá:ke, *Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors*, Taiaiake Alfred broadly remarks that “[t]he process of identity formation within Indian communities has, at least since contact with European cultures, had two key elements: culture and race” (Alfred, 1995: 173). In conventional scholarly fashion, Alfred makes this statement and supports his claim by drawing on evidence from historian Hazel Hertzberg’s 1971 “landmark study,” *The Search for an American Indian Identity: Modern Pan-Indian Movements*, and ethnohistorian James Clifton’s 1989 work, *Being and Becoming Indian: Biographical Studies of North American Frontiers* (Alfred, 1995: 173). Read one way, as an exercise in academic inquiry and social analysis, the passage above and the works cited confirm the self-evident substance of the statement, namely that two features—race and culture—comprise the essence of Indigenous identity. In this sense, Indian identity is “taken-for-granted, assumed to be ‘given’, or natural within contemporary social existence” (Hook, 2005: 7; see also Legg, 2005).

But read another way, Alfred’s discussion and analysis of Indianness is illustrative of a broader political phenomenon at work. Indeed, the confluence of the statement, the substance, and the marshaling of intellectual authority to support the claim, suggest that: 1) Indian identity is discursively represented as “race” and “culture;” 2) that the representation of Indianness is historically contingent; it has a discontinuous and unstable history, shifting “at least since contact with European cultures;” 3) that Indianness is a
process, one that entails “becoming” Indian, per Clifton, and an object to be discovered by way of a “search” for Indianness, per Hertzberg; and, 4) Indian identity is overdetermined at the nexus of several technical knowledges and disciplines—ethnography, history, and lexicography, to name just a few. These observations motivate the analysis that follows in this particular chapter and underwrite an argument that informs each chapter that follows.

The analysis pursued in this chapter applies Foucault’s theoretical understanding of discourse, examining colonial projects of “Othering” Indigenous peoples in a manner employed by Edward Said in his seminal *Orientalism*. Here—and throughout the following chapters—I broadly argue that, co-extensive with the wider project of settler domination, a colonial discourse of race and culture emerged to fix the colonized Indian as the inferior “Other.” As Robert Young has remarked of Said’s *Orientalism*, colonization involves “epistemic as well as physical violence,” that “colonialism operate[s] not only as a form of military rule but also simultaneously as a discourse of domination” (Young, 2016: 383; italics original). More narrowly, I argue here that the colonizing discourse on Indianness constructed Indigenous identity in the colonial epistemology—in terms of “race” and “culture”—and, further, that the hegemonic character of the colonial discourse came not only to represent the world to the colonizer, but also to the colonized. In short, the colonial discourse of Indianness quite literally colonized the discursive world for both settler and Indigenous in logics of race and culture.

This chapter is organized into two parts. In Part I, I sketch a brief history of Indianness. This section traces the emergence of the racial and cultural vocabularies that discursively constructed and constrained the predominant colonial understanding of Indianness. To draw out and highlight the underlying colonial interests at work in the
discourse on Indianness I close out the section with a close reading of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1939 reference case that was charged with making a determination of the racial identity of the ‘Eskimo.’ In Part II, I continue the genealogy of the colonial discourse on Indianness. This section, however, is concerned with tracing the moment of cultural hegemony of the discourse in Indian Country. I show that, in the last half of the twentieth century beginning in the 1960s, the colonial conception of the world—the racial and cultural configurations in the colonial order of things—migrated into the social imaginary and consciousness in some corners of Indian Country.

Part I

In the examination pursued in this chapter, I sketch a Foucauldian “history of Indianness,” or a genealogy of the colonial discourse on Indianness. In doing so, I want to trace a brief discursive history of how Indigenous peoples came to understand themselves in the configuration identified by Alfred at the outset of this chapter as a racial and cultural calculus of identity. That is, I investigate the colonial maneuvers that took Indigenous identity as a target for colonization, producing an edifice of knowledge around Indianness, organizing the colonial “regime of truth” about the colonizer and colonized “Other.” The method and approach here follows Edward Said’s line of inquiry in his work, Orientalism: “My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (Said, 1978: 3). The investigation in this chapter, approaches Indianness in a similar light, as a colonial
discourse that produced “Indians” and the “truth” of their Indianness as a mode of cultural colonization by settler society.

**Genealogy**

The following chapters make use of the genealogical method, first suggested by Friedrich Nietzsche and later developed and used by Michel Foucault. The genealogical method stands in contrast to historical accounts of events, to the linear historiography employed in most expositions of political phenomena, particularly on indigenous issues. Genealogy is not a method for examining why events unfold as they do, how certain phenomena can be explained as a sequence of rational behaviour when we ask “why?” Rather, genealogy is a method to uncover the “how,” particularly how phenomena are imbued with meaning and under what conditions this occurs. The investigation here, specifically, explores the discursive and non-discursive shifts around Indianness, how Indianness became a locus of social organization in some corners of Indian Country, and how some Indigenous communities—since the Red Power movement—transformed into a disciplinary society. In this section, I provide an overview of Foucault’s methodological approach to genealogy.

While much method-driven historical studies focus on locating the origin of a particular phenomenon, the genealogical method attempts to discover and expose the conditions that give rise to a specific phenomenon. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche observed that, “There are no moral phenomena at all, only moral interpretations of phenomena” (2008: apothegm 108). To understand the morality of certain phenomena, we need to investigate how meaning inheres within such phenomena, not why it does so. To
understand the how, rather than focusing on the why, Nietzsche proposed the genealogical method. As Nietzsche states in *On the Genealogy of Morals*:

> It is my purpose here to bring to light, not what this ideal has *done*, but simply what it *means*; what it indicates; what lies behind it, beneath it, in it; of what it is the provisional, indistinct expression, overlaid with question marks and misunderstandings. ... What is the meaning of the power of this ideal, the monstrous nature of its *power*? (Nietzsche, 1989: 3.23; italics original)

Genealogy is an investigative method distinct from historical accounts in that it is concerned with “what we tend to feel is without history,” according to Foucault (1971: 139). Indeed, the problem for genealogy is to answer not the question of where our values and morality originated, but rather under what conditions did humans devise these value judgments, “and what value do they themselves possess?” (Nietzsche, 1989: Preface 3; italics original). To that end, I examine Indianness using the genealogical method, to expose the “singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality,” that is, the conditions that imbue Indianness with its contemporary morality and understanding (Foucault, 1971: 139).

From this standpoint, there is no overarching teleology to phenomena such as Indianness. Historians have made it their task to piece together the events and institutions that shape both our lives and experiences in order to uncover a deeper meaning. As Foucault observes: “Historians, like philosophers and literary historians, have been accustomed to a history which takes in only the summits, the great events” (Foucault, 1980:
Accordingly, historical accounts of phenomena attempt to construct grand narratives that link events together in a seamless fashion. For Foucault, the conditions of the present are not reducible to a coherent drive towards progress, the meaning of which could be found in some deep, underlying significance. Unlike historical studies, genealogy does not pursue the development of a consistent narrative of unbroken advancement. Instead, genealogy “seeks out discontinuities where others found continuous development” and looks for ruptures in the surface of events, the details, and shifts that have occurred (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 106). It is superficial practices and the accidents of the past, rather than some primary origin or unchanging truth that is the focus of genealogy.

On the surface, this description may seem ambiguous. However, Foucault employed the genealogical method with a great deal of success in such works as *Discipline and Punish* (1975) and *The History of Sexuality* (1978). Moreover, Foucault provided an explanation and theoretical elaboration of this approach in his 1971 essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In this essay, Foucault tells us that a genealogy “will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning” (Foucault, 1971: 144). Famously, for Foucault, details and accidents emerge in discourses, regimes of truth, at the nexus of power and knowledge, rather than in the purposeful systems of law and sovereignty. What genealogy does, Foucault tells us, “is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects” (Foucault, 1980: 85). Genealogy, then, brings to the surface what Foucault calls ‘subjugated knowledges,’ those
knowledges that have been relegated to the lowest levels of the hierarchy of truth, to challenge the validity of discourses and regimes of truth.

Genealogy was Foucault’s advancement of his archaeological method. In his earlier works, such as The Birth of the Clinic (1963) and Madness and Civilization (1965), Foucault investigated how specific discourses and knowledge were given meaning in particular eras that were characterized by a certain episteme. In Madness and Civilization, for example, Foucault analyzed how the discourse of reason and insanity took on noticeably different social meaning over several centuries. As Foucault asks in his more methodological elaboration, The Archaeology of Knowledge, “how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (1969: 30). He goes on to note that this method is distinct from the history of thought insofar as the analyst must look for the intention of the speaking subject: “what we try to examine is the incision that it makes, that irreducible – and very often tiny – emergence” (Foucault, 1969: 31). What we look for, in short, are the contingencies of history that governed how only certain discursive formations were articulated while others were not.

As I mentioned above, genealogy was Foucault’s advancement of the archaeological method to explain discursive transitions across historical periods. It has been debated amongst scholars as to whether or not Foucault’s work after “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), marked a distinct shift away from, or even outright rejection of, the archaeological method for investigation. As Colin Gordon, points out, “It is sometimes supposed that Foucault’s subsequent thematisation of power tacitly jettisons as obsolete the ambitious methodological edifice of the Archaeology. In fact the features of the [archaeological method] form the essential ground for the further concepts Foucault was to
introduce” (Gordon, 1980: 244). Although there are some theoretical issues with Foucault’s archaeology that are problematic, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) discuss in significant detail, Foucault’s genealogy would incorporate the useful parts of archaeology. Whereas genealogy is concerned with that which conditions, limits and institutionalizes discursive formations, there is still the need to treat discourse as an object requiring analysis. “Archaeology still isolates and indicates the arbitrariness of the hermeneutic horizon of meaning. It shows that what seems like the continuous development of a meaning is crossed by discontinuous discursive formations” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 106). Although Foucault’s archaeology is concerned primarily with discourse, linguistic expression, and how we perceive the world, the categories of archaeological analysis (objects, concepts, modes of authority, and, lines of strategic action) are instead applied to practices that produce material effects (Gutting, 2005: 45). In order to analyze discourse and its effects, while considering the relationship between power and knowledge, Foucault subordinates archaeology to genealogy.

For both Foucault and Nietzsche, to focus on the juridical sources of power is to ignore the chance occurrences of social life and how society organizes itself. Instead, a genealogical analysis focuses on how specific knowledge or truth is produced and then disseminated in society through discourses. Such an analysis is meant to demonstrate how a system of thought is a result of the accidental turns of history, not its rationally inevitable results (Gutting, 2010). Like conventional historiography, genealogy is concerned with understanding the consequences of the past. A Foucauldian genealogical analysis, however, turns its attention to how meaning has been discursively constructed, that is, how meaning, through the production of knowledges and truth, manufactures understandings of our
selves. The production of knowledge and meaning, then, is not a ‘rediscovery’ of sorts, linking together the occurrences of the past to make sense of the present. The chief objective of genealogy “is not to understand the past in its own terms or for its own sake, but to understand and evaluate the present, particularly with a view to discrediting unjustified claims of authority” (Gutting, 2005: 50). Indeed, the genealogist looks for how power operates beneath phenomena and through discourse and how power and knowledge are exercised with intent. As Foucault states, “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (Foucault, 1971: 154). That is, knowledge and discourse are devised with a strategy for dividing, one of the primary concerns of a genealogy and crucial to the analysis of discourse.

**Foucault, Discourse, and Power**

According to Foucault, power is revealed in the knowledge, or truths, transmitted and circulated in society through discourses. As Foucault tells us, “in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse” (Foucault, 1980: 93). Understood as Foucault had conceived of it in his book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), discourse is a system of signs, beliefs, attitudes, perspectives, practices, customs, ideas, and so forth. Discourses emerge out of the power relations amongst individuals and groups and circulate power and its effects throughout society through the dissemination of knowledge and truth-claims.
In fact, power produces knowledge and vice versa. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault asserts that, “[w]e should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another” (1975: 27). Indeed, power and knowledge are bound together in discourse, and it is discourse that is the vehicle for both the transmission and production of power (Foucault, 1978: 100-101). Because power and knowledge are conceptually indistinguishable from one another, Foucault referred to the two phenomena as one, coining the term “power/knowledge,” as distinct from “power/law” or “power/sovereignty.” It is in discourse that we find the “truths” of our societies and cultures, and ourselves. Indeed, when we accept a discourse as truth, power inserts itself into our lives to shape our understanding of ourselves.

According to Foucault, discourses emerge out of the body of technical knowledge produced by “experts” and “professionals.” Producing large bodies of knowledge on a particular phenomenon of study and inquiry, the “experts” of the field (i.e., doctors and scientists) are viewed as occupying positions of authority, as those who can legitimately “speak the truth” about a phenomenon. “The true statements will be circulated throughout society, reproduced in books; they will appear in school curricula and they will be commented on, described and evaluated by others in books and articles. These statements will underpin what is taken to be “common-sense knowledge” within a society. Those statements which are classified as false will not be reproduced” (Mills, 2003: 74). In his work on the history of madness, for example, Foucault’s study of this idea demonstrated how medical professionals organized a whole system of knowledge concerning insanity and reason. In *Madness and Civilization* (1965), Foucault shows how insanity incited the
birth of a strict, clinical knowledge on this phenomenon and how it was formulated in medical terms, at an evidentiary standard thought to be morally unassailable. That is to say, what the experts said about madness and the insane was regarded as truth.

Discourse achieves the status of truth not only through the claims to authority by “experts” but also through the strategies that are integrated into the knowledge produced by such professionals. According to Foucault, there is no knowledge that is created without intent. With regards to the idea of criminality, for example, Foucault remarked in *Discipline and Punish* that, “It is true that it is society that defines, in terms of its own interests, what must be regarded as crime: it is not therefore natural” (Foucault, 1975: 104). Thus, knowledge is not objective, and “facts” are not established in any sort of neutral fashion. Indeed, discourse attains its purchase through its economic advantages and political utility (Foucault, 1980: 100–101). Knowledge, then, is a mechanism of power in the service of particular interests of individuals and groups. To meet a set of desired ends, or defined outcomes, knowledge is mediated and manipulated to appear as “truth” or “fact.”

**Genealogy: Delimitations**

Having provided a sketch of genealogy and the use of this method to analyze discourse, I want to address the theoretical limitations of this line of investigation. Although described as a historical approach—a “history of the present” as Foucault describes it in *Discipline and Punish*—genealogy is “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events” (Foucault, 1980: 117). The Foucauldian genealogical history analyses the emergence of
discourse in the lead-up to the present, rather than typical historiography that constructs narratives around events. But, on this distinction, a number of concerns have been raised about the application of genealogy and its “historical” results.

Scholars of applied historiography and other historical methodology have expressed some misgivings with Foucault’s genealogical method as a technique for adequate historical research. As Robert Young points out, a “common objection from historians is that colonial discourse analysis typically examines a restricted number of largely literary texts but then proceeds to make large historical generalizations based on them” (Young, 2016: 389). Edward Said is cognizant of this critical viewpoint, a charge that could be levelled against his investigations, as well as others writing in this tradition. In Orientalism, Said remarks: “It should be said at once that even with the generous number of books and authors that I examine, there is a much larger number that I simply leave out. My argument, however, depends neither upon an exhaustive catalogue of texts dealing with the Orient nor upon a clearly delimited set of texts, authors, and ideas that together make up the Orientalist canon” (Said, 1978: 4). Indeed, Said later remarks that, “[i]t has seemed to me foolish to attempt an encyclopedic narrative history of Orientalism, first of all because if my guiding principle was to be “the European idea of the Orient” there would be virtually no limit to the material I would have had to deal with” (Said, 178: 16). The emergence of discursive formations over the passage of history is more important to the purposes of genealogy than traditional historical events. As Robert Young observes, “colonial discourse analyses are analyses of representations rather than investigations that seek to deliver facts or appraise evidence as such” (Young, 2016: 391; emphasis original).
The genealogy that I develop here is, thus, liable to the same criticism from historians and its cognate disciplines that rely upon conventional historiography. That is, the history of the colonial discourse on Indianness that I sketch draws from a limited archive of texts and authors. However, the genealogical work that I undertake here suffers from the same issue identified by Said in Orientalism: “There still remained the problem of cutting down a very fat archive to manageable dimensions, and more important, outlining something in the nature of an intellectual order within that group of texts without at the same time following a mindlessly chronological order” (Said, 1978: 16). Thus, I avail myself of a narrow selection of texts, aware that the point is the discursive formations that the statements represent, rather than a historical narrative of grand events.

**Colonial Discourse on Indianness: Racial and Cultural “Othering”**

The pretense of colonialism’s authority rested not only on the military might of the west and European settlers, but also, as Edward Said and others observe, on its “positional superiority” in the colonial order of things (Said, 1978: 7, italics original). Complemented by the exertion of imperial military power, the entire project of colonialism is located in regular practices that reaffirm the colonial view of the world as the sole and legitimate form of the “truth” (Tuhiwai Smith, 2006: 59-65). Central to colonialism is the recurrent “Indian problem,” the distinction between the colonial and the colonized “Other.” Since contact, colonials have puzzled over what, exactly, the Indian entailed and how the Indian figured into early theories and visions of western colonialism fulfilled. These colonial incursions into the ‘New World’ incited what Foucault would describe as a “veritable discursive explosion” around and apropos Indianness (Foucault, 1978: 17). Indeed, from the earliest contact between Indigenous and colonial, we can not only trace the emergence
of the "Indian" in colonial discourse, but also the affirmation of colonial positional superiority in settler-Indigenous relations.

By all accounts, colonial impulses for Othering the Indigenous inhabitants ‘discovered’ in the ‘New World’ began with travel literature. In what would eventually be settled as Canada, the early French explorer Samuel Champlain closely documented not only the territory, but also the Indigenous peoples that his mission encountered. Entitled *Des Sauvages*, Champlain’s first book from 1603—a thorough record of the exploratory survey carried out as a mandate from France’s King Henri IV—meticulously detailed the observations of the life and culture of several Indigenous nations. From Champlain’s view, the savage was a barbarian, dishonest, wicked, a vindictive people, pagan-worshipping—all qualities that he connected to a lack of “civilization” (Heidenreich and Ritch, 2010: 234). As with much of the remainder of *Des Sauvages*—with chapters devoted to geographical study—the accounts of the savage inhabitants were written always with the prospects for colonization in mind. Indeed, contemplating the suitability of the ‘New World’ for European colonization required not just a technical knowledge of the territory—the land and water, and their various formations—but also a technical knowledge of the indigenous savage, a barrier to reproducing European civilization in the colonies. As Champlain remarked in his report to the King of France with regards to the threat of the ‘uncivilized savage’: “They are by no means so savage but that in time and through intercourse with a civilized nation, they may be refined” (quoted in Heidenreich and Ritch, 2010: 234).

Further accounts from early encounters with the indigenous peoples adopted the representations found in the travel literature and other documentation produced through European exploration. Religious authorities that undertook many of the first Christianizing
missions in the new European colonies saw Indigenous peoples in a similarly negative light, but took a significantly greater step toward “moralizing” the savages than the earlier accounts by explorers. The Jesuits in New France, for instance, developed numerous descriptions of the moral worth of Indigenous peoples. Throughout the *Jesuit Relations*—an extensive documentary system of Jesuit observations of life amongst “les sauvages” and spanning over 40 years—variously describe the Indigenous people as “barren souls, as the thorns and weeds of an untended garden, and as the “rocks and stones” of the parched wilderness of biblical tradition” (quoted in Blackburn, 2000: 46). At the same time, English Protestant missionaries constructed images of the native population that were indistinguishable from their Catholic counterparts (Higham, 2000). And, like the Jesuits, the Protestants undertook a rigorous documentary work-ethnic when it came to the indigenous people, producing “copious writings and lectures” on the Indian Other (Higham, 2000: 2).

While the rhetoric of savagery and barbarism lingered in representations of the Indian, European theories of race entered to consolidate the distinction between the civilized white colonial, and the backwards, dark-skinned indigenous heathen. Cultural historians point out that “[e]ighteenth-century thought turned to the physical characteristics of the Indian” (Smedley and Smedley, 2011: 165; see also Takaki, 1979). Encounters with the Indian prompted settler society to reconsider the distinction between themselves and the savage. Reflection on English-Irish relations, whom the English also considered “savages,” convinced colonial society that the English-Indian difference was one of discrete kinds, rather than gradations of savagery which had been contrived in terms of cultural criteria (Takaki, 1992: 895). Colonial theorizing of the colonial divide conceived the difference of kind as one of “nature,” which was acquired as a matter of “descent,” an
immutable characteristic that was naturally inherited. As Takaki notes of colonial relations in New England, the racial taxonomy supported settler hierarchy and Christian appeals to authority, borrowing heavily on the physiological difference between white, English settlers and the Indigenous peoples: “Indian savagery was racialized: Indians came to be condemned as a demonic race, their dark complexions signifying an indelible and inherent evil” (Takaki, 1992: 912).

The colonial discourse on Indianness eventually coalesced around conceptions of race and culture. Colonial models of distinction appealed to ideas of hereditary determinism to construct hierarchies that placed white Europeans at the apex, and the colonized Indian far below. And, despite shifts in theorizing around race and culture, the history of the colonial discourse on Indianness continued to build on the early edifice of knowledge of the Indian and his or her Indianness. The early documentary apparatus—consisting largely of work undertaken by explorers and religious authorities—multiplied in the centuries since European-Indigenous contact and initial colonial settlement. Since that time, Indianness has rapidly expanded and organized into what Edward Said has described of Orientalism: “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978: 3). Put in Foucauldian terms, the colonial discourse on Indianness was established as a “regime of truth.”

A great deal of what underwrites the colonial regime of truth—the colonial discourse on Indigenous peoples and their identities—has been developed in historical and anthropological studies, as well as ethnographic accounts. Employing ideas about ethnicity
and race, these studies are, for the most part, responsible for the dominant image of the Indian in mainstream discussions about Aboriginal identity. Early studies introduced and support many of the familiar stereotypes of Indians as uncivilized and lazy—stereotypes that continue to broadly characterize Indigenous peoples to this day. As Bruce Trigger, one of Canada’s preeminent anthropologists once remarked, “Anthropologists and historians must share part of the blame for a general lack of understanding of the role played by native people in Canada’s history and developing ethnic mosaic” (Trigger, 1985: 5). These academic disciplines developed an intellectual archive of the characteristics of the Indigenous population, producing the factual grounds for Indigenous difference and identity, only from a non-Indigenous perspective. As John Borrows, a prominent Indigenous legal scholar, has remarked, “An Indian is a creation of the European imagination ... There were no Indians in Canada prior to European arrival” (Borrows, 2008: 10).

The classification and codification of difference, the documentation of results from non-Indigenous research and studies, have certainly determined how we think of and how we recognize Indianness and Indian identity. Just as in the relationship between the Orient and the dominant Occident, anthropology and history became the vehicle for dealing with the manufactured inferiority of Indigenous peoples. Take, for example, the text \textit{The Indians of Canada} by the celebrated anthropologist Diamond Jenness. Published in 1932 and reprinted numerous times thereafter, the book has attained a lofty reputation and an unmatched influence in its discipline (Cummins, 2004; Preston, 2009; Steckley, 2008). As Peter Kulchyski observes:
The Indians of Canada acts as a kind of strategy of containment: forcing Native cultures into specific, culturally coded categories that serve to objectify them; surveying Native cultures from the perspective of an instrumental rationality that classifies and dissects from the outside; subjecting Native cultures to an imperial, all-knowing gaze that consolidates itself with every explanation it offers and every trace of culture it captures (Kulchyski, 1993: 31).

Academic fields, especially anthropology, have constructed Indigenous nations, peoples, and cultures in Eurocentric perspectives, a colonial viewpoint that adjudicated the moral worth of all other societies and their peoples always from the position of a self-assigned superiority.

An entire edifice of colonial authority is built upon the disciplines that order and legitimate knowledge. For Vine Deloria Jr., there was no greater offender to the true characterization of Indigenous peoples than Western academic disciplines—particularly anthropology—which had organized sophisticated understandings of Indians and their cultures. In his Indian Manifesto, Deloria Jr. lamented, “Indians have been cursed above all other people in history. Indians have anthropologists” (Deloria Jr., 1969: 78). Anthropology, and its cognate disciplines, was viewed as the authoritative system of cultural and social knowledge, legitimating the dominant colonial understandings of Indianness. In many situations, anthropology underwrote the “truth” of Indianness. This was particularly true when Indigenous peoples and groups challenged colonial activities and Crown legislation in court where the colonial discourse on Indianness, legitimated by anthropologists and ethnographers, was absolute. For its part, the Crown could always rely
on “Her Majesty’s Loyal Anthropologist” to provide the court with the valid evidence needed to arrive at a decision (Culhane, 1992).

Nowhere is this deeply entwined, co-extensive discursive relationship more obvious than the triumphs of colonial discourse played out in the case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. In Delgamuukw, where the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en Nation argued for Aboriginal title to lands not extinguished through treaty with the state, Chief Justice McEachern of the Supreme Court of British Columbia did not recognize the accounts provided by Hereditary Chiefs and Elders from the First Nations. In his ruling, Chief Justice McEachern dismissed the Gitskan adaawk and the Wet’suwet’en kungax forms of oral history (Cruikshank, 1992: 34). In his Reasons for Judgment, Chief Justice McEachern stated: “I am unable to accept adaawk, kungax and oral traditions as reliable bases for detailed history” (McEachern, 1991: 201). McEachern, in his 1991 ruling, carried on the tradition of accepting white settler, anthropological discourse over Indian history.4

The image of the backwards, savage, uncivilized Indian that has appeared in most accounts of Indianness since the arrival of the European newcomers has been among the most forceful of references for Indigenous identity. This was true not only for the non-Aboriginal population but also, and perhaps most painfully, for Indigenous peoples themselves. The racist gaze of inferiority would go on to become internalized by Indians; a

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4 In contrast to the initial Delgamuukw ruling by the Supreme Court of B.C. (1991), the plaintiff’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (1997) resulted in a decision affording some measure of recognition of Indian accounts of themselves, their identities, and history. Indigenous accounts gained some ground on anthropology in terms of legitimacy when on appeal, Chief Justice Lamer noted that adjudication processes involving Indigenous people must be adapted “so that the aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and traditions and on their relationship with the land, are given due weight by the courts. In practical terms, this requires the courts to come to terms with the oral histories of aboriginal societies, which, for many aboriginal nations, are the only record of their past” (CJ Lamer, 1997: para. 84).
phenomenon explained by Frantz Fanon in his works *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963). Consider the popular image of the ‘squaw’, the pejorative used quite commonly to refer to Aboriginal women who are viewed as lazy, drunk and sexually promiscuous. These images have served not only to justify their sexual exploitation, but they have also “deeply affected Native women’s self-esteem” (Little, 2005: 39), and, as Janice Acoose points out, “[s]uch images continue to imprison us [Indigenous women] in racist and sexist stereotypes” (Acoose, 1992: 5; see also Anderson, 2000; and, Vowel, 2016). For many Indigenous peoples, these views on Indianness and Indian identity are the cause of great psychic agony. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson relates, “[w]e grew up believing the stereotypes and believing that if we existed outside of the domestic sphere, outside of heteropatriarchal, monogamous Christian marriage, we embodied the dirty, stupid, useless, promiscuous, and irresponsible assumptions built into the word squaw” (Simpson, 2017: 95). As Iris Marion Young surmises, “the dominant culture’s stereotyped and inferiorized images of the group must be internalized by group members at least to the extent that they are forced to react to behavior of others influenced by those images” (Young, 1990: 59). Although individuals may not consciously behave in conformity to outside images, they must still come to grips with the fact that they have been marked as different by those outside of their own group.

**Colonial Formations: Racializing the “Eskimo” as Indian**

In 1938, some 70 years after the Parliament of Canada passed the *Rupert’s Land Act, 1868*, which transferred control and authority over Rupert’s Land to the Dominion of Canada, a “controversy”—as it was described—emerged to threaten the colonial divide between settler and Indian. Despite the significant passage of time when the Dominion of
Canada acquired Rupert’s Land and the legislated powers for the governance over the territory, colonial authorities had not come to grips with the existence of those whom Samuel Champlain since his ‘discovery’ of their existence in 1625, had called “sauvages esquimaux.” But, in the mid-1930s, the federal and provincial authorities diverged in their view as to whether or not the “sauvages esquimaux” were racially and culturally Indian. To adjudicate the matter, the federal Minister of Justice referred the matter for judicial review by way of authority under the Supreme Court Act as a reference case. Indeed, as Chief Justice Duff remarked in his reasons for decision in Reference as to whether “Indians” includes in s. 91 (24) of the B.N.A. Act includes Eskimo inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, [1939] S.C.R. 104:

The reference with which we are concerned arises out of a controversy between the Dominion and the province of Quebec touching the question whether the Eskimo inhabitants of that province are “Indians” within the contemplation of head no. 24 of section 91 of the British North America Act which is in these words, “Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians”; and under the reference we are to pronounce upon that question (Duff C.J., [1939] S.C.R. 104, p. 105)

The reference case is interesting for the legal distinctions between settler and Indian, but it also underscores the reach, ambit, and prominence of the colonial discourse of racial and cultural Indianness. Indeed, the statutory dispute notwithstanding, the question at issue highlights colonial anxieties and tensions as well as the operation of what had, by the mid-twentieth century, become a vast assemblage of knowledge—Said’s “corporate institution”—that created not only the Indian, but also colonial society.
Whether or not the “sauvages esquimaux” were Indians hinged on an assessment of their racial constitution. Although cultural features had long figured into discursive accounts and distinctions between European and Indigenous societies, by the time of the ‘Eskimo’ reference case, this distinction was conflated with a racial logic. To be sure, in their lengthy reasons for decision, the justices of the Supreme Court make no mention of either culture or the often deployed rhetorical substitute, “civilization.” Representations of the Indian, and thus differentiation from settler society, was cast in the language of ‘race.’ Justice Crocket, writing for the Court, availed himself of several dictionaries to define the “Indian”:

the 1934 edition of Webster’s International Dictionary, “Indian” is defined as follows:—

Indian. 5. A member of the aboriginal American race; an American, or Red, Indian; an Amerindian

...

It is true that in the New English (Oxford) Dictionary, volume 5, under the heading “Indian” appears the following:—

A.***

2. Belonging or relating to the race of original inhabitants of America and the West Indies.

B.***
2. A member of any of the aboriginal races of America or the West Indies; an American Indian. (Crocket J., [1939] S.C.R. 104, p. 121)

Even when the justices characterized the ‘Eskimo’ as ‘savages,’ as they repeated throughout the decision, or when they turned their consideration to cultural components, such as language, cultural activities, such as fishing and sealing, and the mode of housing and dress, the court was consistent in its view that the Indian was a separate race from white colonials. Indeed, throughout the decision, each justice of the court was consistent in reference to the “Indian race,” and unequivocating in the distinction of the “Indian race” from Canadian society.

The Supreme Court’s determination of ‘Eskimo’ racial identity brought the “corporate institution” of Indianness—the entire apparatus of knowledge cultivated by the colonial discourse on Indianness—into sharp relief. Centuries of the colonial archive on Indianness was brought to bear the colonial management of racial division and categorization. As Constance Backhouse describes it, the parties to the case, both the federal and Quebec governments “produced voluminous exhibit books, filled with extracts from the notes of geographers, explorers, anthropologists, cartographers, historians, missionaries, compilers of dictionaries, and government papers” (Backhouse, 1999: 37).

Indeed, as Justice Crocket wrote in the closing paragraph:

After considering the reports of missionaries, explorers, agents, cartographers and geographers, included in the cases submitted on behalf of the Dominion and province of Quebec, I do not believe anything further may be usefully added. The weight of opinion favours the construction which I
have indicated is the proper one of head 24 of section 91 of the British North America Act but the deciding factor, in my view, is the manner in which the subject was considered in Canada and in England at or about the date of the passing of the Act. (Crocket J., [1939] S.C.R. 104, p. 124)

In concurrence with the other justices, Justice Crocket closed the decision of the Court: “The question referred was answered in the affirmative” (Crocket J., [1939] S.C.R. 104, p. 124). That is, the “sauvages Esquimaux” were to fall into the homogeneous Other, the “Indian race.”

The Supreme Court ‘Eskimo’ reference case draws together a number of threads that are less evident when the decision is read solely as a work of western jurisprudence. I would like to pause for a moment to indicate two threads. First, it is clear that the racialization of the “sauvages esquimaux” as the colonized Other was always an exercise of colonial positional superiority: the determination of racial identity was prompted by authorities of the Crown and adjudicated by officers of the colonial court. Then, what is not apparent from the decision is the flagrant one-sidedness of the interests at issue, despite the glaring omission of Inuit themselves. Constance Backhouse underscores this point, remarking that in “reference cases, the Supreme Court is specifically authorized to direct that all ‘interested parties’ be heard, and it can appoint counsel to represent interests otherwise unrepresented.” Backhouse goes on to point out that, “In this pivotal proceeding, no one seems to have thought that representatives of the Inuit or First Nations communities constituted ‘interested parties’” (Backhouse, 1999: 35).\(^5\) It may be true that

\(^5\) The 1939 Supreme Court decision in *Re Eskimo* stands in sharp contrast to the 2016 Supreme Court of Canada decision in *Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development)*, 2016 SCC 12, with respect to
no one thought to have Indigenous representatives present to make submissions on their own behalf and in their own interest. At the time, however, the omission, absence, and often deliberate erasure of Indigenous peoples from settler society was *de rigeur* for colonialism. As Sunera Thobani has observed, “[t]he suppression of Native peoples, and of their socio-political orders, remains the necessary condition of Canadian sovereignty” (Thobani, 2009: 39).

The colonial milieu of the first half of the twentieth century is, perhaps, more telling of the eventual outcome of the ‘Eskimo’ reference case. Concomitant with colonial concerns about the changes and potential threats posed by immigrants to Canadian national identity, colonial anxieties around the “Indian problem” were also amplifying. Indeed, as Richard Day points out, the racial and cultural constitution of Canada—“the problem of Canadian diversity,” as Day observed—occupied a prominent place on colonial registers (Day, 2000: 164). “Why the sudden resurgence of interest in the Indians?” asks Day, who locates the official bureaucratic surge in anxiety in 1946 with the creation of the special joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons charged with examining the operations of the Indian Act and Indian Affairs in Canada (Day, 2000: 169). As he explains, “official interest in the ‘Indian problem’ had picked up in 1946” because colonial expectations that the Indian would have either died off, or was noticeably dying off, had not materialized and the Indian population was thriving: the “size of the ‘Indian problem,’ which was taken to be proportional to the size of the unassimilated Indian population, was therefore seen as

the participation of the interested Indigenous parties. Both matters put the question to the Supreme Court to rule as to whether or not Inuit (Eskimo) in the former, and Métis with non-status Indians in the latter, are “Indians” within the meaning of s.91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*. In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Unlike the 1939 matter, Indigenous people—Métis in particular—were directly involved (see *inter alia* Macdougall, 2016; Teillet, 2016; and, Vowel and Leroux, 2016).
increasing at an alarming rate” (Day, 2000: 169). Put another way, colonial exigencies—nationalist impulses and anxieties around threats to the settler way of life—were put before Indigenous interests.

Part II

I have briefly sketched a cursory genealogy of the colonial discourse on Indianness, how Indigenous identity was discursively constructed in the logics of race of culture. In this section, I extend my analysis of the Foucauldian genealogy of this discourse to the Indigenous social domain. That is, I trace a discursive history of the racial and cultural discourse that sees these colonial configurations of Indianness reproduced in certain corners of Indian Country. As with Edward Said in Orientalism, my analysis rests on the insights developed by Antonio Gramsci. Using Foucault’s theory of discourse and power/knowledge, Said argues that the historical conditions and the discourse on the Orient emerged in what Gramsci identified as cultural hegemony. Simply put, the combination of the historical positional superiority of the West and the discourse of Orientalism—as a whole system of knowledge about the Orient—was adopted and taken up by the very objects of Orientalism, the ‘Orientals.’ As Said puts it, “[k]nowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world” (Said, 1978: 40; italics original).

In what follows, I argue that the genealogy of the colonial discourse on Indianness similarly emerges as culturally hegemonic in Indian Country. The racial and cultural logics of Indianness—as an identity of the Indian and as imagery of Indian Country—emigrate into the social imaginary and consciousness of the Indian. I locate the moment of this
cultural hegemony in the nascent social transformation of Indian Country of the 1960s. Indeed, it is out of the shifting colonial relations between colonizer and colonized that a historically contingent politics comes into view. The anticolonial Indigenous resistance movement that emerged in the last half of the twentieth century—known largely as the Red Power movement—engages in a politics centred on the discursive formation of Indianness. Indeed, “it was not until the tumultuous political climate of Red Power activism in the 1960s and 70s,” Glen Coulthard points out, that “the contemporary Indigenous self-determination movement coalesced, “launching into a determined [defense] of a unique cultural heritage and identity”” (Coulthard, 2014: 4-5). It was out of the struggle about and around Indianness that the racial and cultural discourse on Indianness migrated into the general sensibilities of the Indigenous social consciousness. In other words, anticolonial Red Power politics marked the moment of colonial cultural hegemony of the discourse on Indianness.

**Discourse and Colonial Cultural Hegemony**

The racial and cultural coordinates of colonial representations of Indianness were not contained solely to settler society. Although it is true that the discourse and the Foucauldian-esque dispositif around Indianness was a colonial enterprise, the material effects of the discursive formation of Indianness were eventually manifested in the social consciousness of Indians themselves. That is, the colonial construction of Indianness in a logic of race and culture—the colonial discourse on Indianness—acquired cultural hegemony throughout both settler society and Indian Country. In *Orientalism*, Edward Said observed the same political phenomena in the relations between the Occident and the Orient:
In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as *hegemony*, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism [its] durability and [its] strength (Said, 1978: 7).

For Said, the discourse of Orientalism was an epistemological mode of colonization that subjugated both the Orient and the Oriental in a hegemonic discourse. This hegemony, according to Said, obtained by way of the West's positional superiority over the Orient. And, it is important to point out that, as Said correctly indicates, the relationship is one where a cultural form *predominates*, which is quite apart from outright domination which may entail physical coercion and violence.

Said says little else on Gramsci in *Orientalism*, nor does he provide an exposition of Gramsci’s theory, but his convergence of Gramsci and Foucault is instructive for postcolonial studies and analysis of cultural predomination and domination. In a very Foucauldian sense, Said speaks to the dominating impulses of colonial discourses. “As a cultural apparatus,” Said notes, “Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge” (Said, 1978: 204). For students and scholars of Foucault, the turn of phrase “will-to-truth, and knowledge” will be familiar. For Foucault, the will-to-truth is “imposed on the knowing subject, and [is] in some sense prior to all experience, a certain position, a certain gaze and a certain function” (Foucault, 1981: 55). That is, the subject of a discourse comes to see itself, reference itself, and ultimately understand itself within the
assumed ‘truth’ of the discourse. Bill Ashcroft and Pal Ahluwalia provide insight to this will-to-truth in a colonial setting.

Colonial discourse is a system of statements that can be made about colonies and colonial peoples, about colonising powers and about the relationship between these two. It is the system of knowledge and belief about the world within which acts of colonization take place. Although it is generated within the society and culture of the colonisers, it becomes that discourse within which the colonised may also come to see themselves (Ashcroft and Ahluwalia, 2002: 62).

Indeed, the colonized may come to identify with the colonial discursive representations of themselves. For Said, this outcome obtains under the colonial cultural hegemony.

Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony explains how the world view of certain social groups acquires considerable political purchase, social license, and cultural acceptance in other groups. This is particularly germane in the analysis of groups that share little in common and, quite frequently, are disposed to significantly divergent interests. This political configuration is at the heart of Said’s application of cultural hegemony when he explains how the discourse of Orientalism came to configure the world view of not only the West but, more importantly, the world view of the Orient and the Oriental. Gramsci provides a general description of cultural hegemony in the Prison Notebooks.

The social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action,
but occasionally and in flashes—when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’ (Gramsci, 2005: 327).

For Gramsci, these conceptions of the world are produced discursively. As the cultural historian T.J. Jackson Lears points out, “Gramsci anticipated Michel Foucault’s emphasis on the role of “discursive practice” in reinforcing domination. Gramsci realized that “every language contains the elements of a conception of the world;” Jackson goes on to note that, “[t]he available vocabulary helps mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, discourages the clarification of social alternatives, and makes it difficult for the dispossessed to locate the source of their unease, let alone remedy it” (Jackson, 1985: 569-570).

Indeed, cultural hegemony obtains through the positional superiority of the discourse produced, a moment of “cultural leadership” by the dominant social group. Cultural leadership entails the mobilization of resources that form the dispositif, the apparatus of knowledge or, in Said’s terminology, the “corporate institution.” It is, in other words, the circulation of discourse—and its attendant institutions—that shore up the will-to-truth, to shape and otherwise colonize the conceptions of the world of others. In colonialism, the subalteran groups—the colonized Indigenous groups—are subordinated to the positional superiority of the colonial “corporate institution”—the controlled mass production and circulation of cultural representations in mass media and other cultural
forms. Lacking political autonomy—for reasons of historical contingency and struggle—the subaltern groups acquiesce to the expressions and activities of colonial interests (Howson and Smith, 2008).

**Colonialism and the Rise of the Red Power Movement**

It is impossible to understand the conditions under which social and cultural transformation occurred in Indian Country during the middle of the twentieth century without at least a cursory awareness of the colonial legacy of Indigenous and settler relations. European colonial powers have been compelled, since contact, by imperial ambitions to seize the land of the Indigenous nations and to claim it for economic exploitation and development, as well as settlement by European newcomers. Domination and totalization of all aspects of Indian life would become the reality for Indigenous peoples for the next hundred years. “For much of the post-Confederation century reaching from 1867 to 1967, Native peoples were routinely constrained, the purpose being to make them appendages to white power” (Palmer, 2009: 371). Through the imposition of juridico-power, exercised from above by the British sovereign, and subsequently the Canadian and American states, Indigenous nations and societies had become constrained insofar as the actions of individual Aboriginal persons were governed through legal prohibitions and other coercive measures by the sovereign and colonial authorities such as “sporadic and small-scale massacres, forced removals, negligent disease spread, prohibitions of cultural practices such as the potlatch, welfare-state child removals, the sterilization of Aboriginal women and the ecological devastation of indigenous territories” (Woolford and Benvenuto, 2015: 374). Cultural practices, such as the Potlatch and Ghost Dance, which held socio-religious significance in Indian Country, were outlawed. At the behest of Christian
missionaries, the activities involved in the Potlatch were banned outright by the Canadian state through a statutory amendment to the *Indian Act* in the 1880s and strictly enforced under the authorities conferred by *British North American Act, 1867*.

The totalizing effects of sovereign domination over Indian populations have been widely documented. Stephen Cornell has described the degree of domination by white settler society through the Canadian and American states, describing these results in his study, *The Return of the Native*. Here, Cornell notes:

> Allotment, the prohibition of certain ceremonies, the forced dismantling of indigenous authority structures, and other policies of the period in many cases precipitated political collapse. Collective decision-making processes atrophied as meaningful decisions were taken out of Indian hands, while much of the substance of decision making under conditions of freedom—hunt organization, camp moves, interband and intertribal relations—was no longer relevant. The institutional substance of tribal life was dissolving under the impact of imposed sociocultural change (Cornell, 1988: 80).

It is clear then that the social and political conditions of Indigenous peoples were far from ideal to resist power, in both the classical juridical formulation as well as Foucault's more modern understanding of how power functions. In the first case, physical conditions and the imposition of coercion impeded Indigenous peoples from withstanding the brute force of British (later Canadian and American) powers of the state apparatus. However, in the latter situation, the conditions proved to block the development of significant relations of power. Aboriginal peoples were not free to resist the circulation of the colonial discourses that objectified and dehumanized them. Indigenous epistemes and systems of knowledge,
of life and of themselves, were dismantled coercively as Indigenous children were forcibly
drawn from their homes and communities and promptly enrolled in Indian Residential
Schools. According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), over
150,000 Indigenous children attended Indian residential schools where they were subject
to inhumane treatment with the ultimate goal of eliminating Indigenous peoples in a
process “which can best be described as “cultural genocide”” (TRC, 2015: 1). Additional
analysis from the TRC found that over 3,200 Indigenous children died while attending
Indian residential schools (TRC, 2015: 92).

But these conditions were about to change as the colonial project of coercive
assimilation was officially abandoned by the Canadian state in 1946, marking a policy shift
towards Indigenous integration into settler society (Ormiston, 2002: 5). Once eased—once
the coercive effects of sovereign power were transformed into alternative state-directed
methods of forced assimilation—the Indigenous population began to organize politically to
challenge white society and the Canadian and American states. Under the banner of Red
Power, Indigenous peoples instituted a fight for freedom: “freedom from injustice and
bondage, freedom from patronization and oppression, freedom from what the white man
cannot and will not solve” (Josephy, 1971: 14). Under colonialism, treaties had become
abrogated; rights, civil, human and Aboriginal, had been ignored, and lands had been
confiscated, to name only a few consequences of European domination. Activism—
ocasionally through confrontational action but more frequently through non-violent

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6 As Alice Ormiston (2002) notes, the shift towards “integration” came as coercion—as the physical exertion
of force—was observed by policymakers as “counter-productive” to eliminating Indigenous difference and
their burden on the Crown. Nevertheless, while the formal policy of Indian assimilation was officially
abandoned, numerous efforts by the Crown since then indicate that the state continues to deploy blunt
assimilative instruments with the force of coercion (for example, the “60s Scoop”).
resistance—came to characterize Red Power as Indigenous peoples had regained a certain degree of liberty. These modes of anticolonial resistance are recognized as the more common hallmarks of Red Power politics; the Red Power movement entailed more than just material politics, however.

1960s: Social Transformation in Indian Country

The mid-twentieth century marked the emergence of the new discourse on Indianness that proliferated throughout Indian Country in the following decades. The 1960s saw what has been variously described as an Indian “revival,” “rebirth,” “renaissance,” and a “rediscovery” (Nagel, 1996; Cardinal, 1977; Clifton, 1989; Palmer, 2009). For some observers of Indigenous politics, an approximate beginning of the social change in Indian Country can be traced back to 1969, “a critical year, a marker for events that those who are unaware of the tenacity of indigenous knowledge consider a Native cultural and political renaissance” (Valaskakis, 2005: 4).

Although the new sensibilities of Indians were coming to the fore during this era, it was not altogether a deliberate force concocted by Indians themselves. Rather, as I argue here, the conditions under which the new discourse on Indianness took hold came about fortuitously. The external conditions of outright colonial domination and totalization of Indigenous were beginning to be transformed, as was the case for many minority groups at the time. Red Power, to be sure, came to prominence alongside other liberatory movements—such as Black Power, second wave Feminism in the Women’s Rights movement, the Gay Liberation Movement—during the 1960s. But while these latter groups, generally speaking, were concerned with racial, gender, and sexual equality within the
dominant social and legal frameworks, the politics of Red Power was focused more on an exclusivity of Indians, differing from the civil rights focus of these groups, although there were some parallels in Black Power and separatist feminism. To be sure, all groups were struggling to assert a positive image and presence in white society, but the politics of Red Power coalesced around a profound discursive shift in the conception of Indian identity. As James Frideres argues, Indigenous politics is not conventional identity politics, understood as the political expression of a formerly silenced group. Rather, “Aboriginal identity today is about: (1) reclaiming suppressed culture and forging new identities; and (2) projecting an Aboriginal identity into the mainstream society” (Frideres, 2008: 335).

As a result of the nascent integration policy adopted by the state in the mid-twentieth century, Indigenous peoples began to resist many of the coercive, colonial bonds that had dictated almost every aspect of their lives, though by no means were they to entirely escape colonialism and the conditions it imposed. In terms of identity, however, Indians had found that they were somewhat liberated to articulate their own sense of Indianness. As Stephen Cornell has remarked, “In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Indian world has been changing. This much is hardly new; it has been changing all along, and often quickly. What is new is that for the first time in a long while it is Indians who have been making those changes happen” (Cornell, 1988: 8). In the classical liberal sense of power, it is true that Indians have acquired greater powers vis-à-vis the state, but in a Foucauldian sense, it is also true that the changes occurring in Indian society have not been solely in the state-Aboriginal, sovereign-subject relationship. Rather, I argue that there have been changes in the discourses of Indian culture.
Identity and Red Power Politics

While it is true that the politics of the Red Power movement were a very material politics—the struggle to attain measures of Indigenous ownership and sovereignty over particular territories, the acknowledgement of treaty obligations by the Crown in Canada and the Executive in the United States—the politics of this era also turned on something new for Indigenous people. The Red Power movement that emerged in the 1960s also entailed more modern political considerations, particularly those of identity. As one scholar of Indigenous politics has observed, “Red Power activism was the progenitor of an American Indian ethnic rebirth” (Nagel, 1996: 113). Perhaps for the first time, the organization of Indigenous politics hinged on objects of notional significance rather than material value. During the height of the Red Power movement, one Native writer reflected on this: “worse than the physical poverty, terrible as that is, is the complete denial of the Indians’ most precious asset—their self-identity as Indians” (Fidler, 1970: 7).

Typifying the new concern of Indianness at the time—the heightened apprehension of the political significance of identity in colonial relations—are the words of Doug Cuthand. As editor of The Native People, a monthly periodical produced by and for Indians, Cuthand wrote in January 1970:

What lies ahead in the ‘70s? I feel that we the Native People of Canada have embarked upon the most exciting decade in our history. Throughout the ‘60s there have been ripples and undercurrents. The last six months of the ‘60s provided a preview of the ‘70s. The 70’s will see greater organization and awareness among Native People. Native organizations will become powerful
and “Indian Power” will be the order of the day. We are a young race in age
groups and an old race in history. The ‘70s will see the two come together.
Youth is seeking an identity. Indian youth will disregard the pressure to
intergrate [sic] and seek an identity as Indians. The searching out of an
identity and the revising of the culture will have a profound effect on the
native people and their image. When a person or race of people is proud and
strong the social problems which faced them in the past when they were
unorganized tend to disappear—social problems will be replaced by pride
and self-reliance (Cuthand, 1970: 5).

As this editorial demonstrates, Indian identity was becoming prominent in Indigenous
politics and the urgency to master Indianness, through discourse, was becoming
increasingly apparent in the Indigenous anti-colonial project.

The epistemic shift—the idea of identity and a politics ordered around its ethical
value—took hold for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada at this time.
Writing on racial formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1990s, Michael Omi
and Howard Winant remarked that,

Social movements create collective identity by offering their adherents a
different view of themselves and their world; that is from the worldview and
self-concepts offered by the established social order. They do this by the
process of rearticulation, which produces new subjectivity by making use of
information and knowledge already present in the subject’s mind. They take
elements and themes of his/her culture and traditions and infuse them with new meaning (Omi and Winant, 1994: 99)

Indeed, the epistemic turn to identity as a locus of political resistance was not far from the surface of Indian resistance activism during the 1960s and thereafter. As the sociologist Joseph Tilda Rhea points out, “Red Power was concerned primarily with the recovery and assertion of an affirmative racial identity” (Rhea, 1997: 10). Not only was race a critical consideration of Red Power politics, but so too were ideas of culture. Rhea continues, noting that it was particularly traditional Indian culture that was at the center of the Red Power articulation of Indianness. “Reaching for a new sense of the past, they [Indians] developed an active antagonism toward the mainstream representation of their history” (Rhea, 1997: 15). Indian resistance during the Red Power era was a politics of recognition and, more broadly, a politics of difference.

Indigenous people were beginning to become conscious of how identity fit into a politics of liberation, particularly how it is produced and, perhaps more importantly, who articulates identity. Conceptually, this politics maintains that identity is developed in dialogical reasoning such that the understanding of ourselves is mediated through the perception others hold of us. As Charles Taylor explains, “our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm” (Taylor, 1994: 25; emphasis original). In this sense, then, the production and circulation of degrading and humiliating images—a distinctive feature of the colonial discourse on Indianness—amounted to maltreatment,
and the misrecognition by the colonizer, whether intentional or not, was viewed as tantamount to oppression.

Misrecognition of what Indians were beginning to interpret and express as authentic Indianness stemmed not only from academic disciplines and other technical domains, but also from the folk taxonomies that underwrote much of the general settler attitudes towards Indians. Once Indigenous peoples had ceased to be viewed with any sense of political or economic benefit in the colonial relationship, attitudes of cultural superiority and racial eminence entered the social consciousness of white settler society, introducing a lexicon of hostile and malignant terminology into the sensibilities of both the colonizer and colonized. “For a long time many, many Indians accepted the white man’s evaluation of them as a race and as individuals. So often were they told openly and brutally that they were no good, that they were nothing, that they came to accept this negative image,” Harold Cardinal bemoaned in the early days of the Red Power movement (Cardinal, 1969: 23).

Broader than the Red Power politics of recognition was the focus of Indigenous identity at the core of a politics of difference. The politics of difference—a form of identity politics—is distinct from a politics of recognition in that it is a critical politics. As Iris Marion Young points out, “the assertion of a positive sense of group difference provides a standpoint from which to criticize prevailing institutions and norms” (Young, 1990: 167). Not only were Aboriginal peoples concerned with the respect presumably owed to their own conception of Indianness, but they were also critical of the difference manufactured by white settler society, particularly the racial and cultural forms. During the transformations that took place in Indian Country during the 1960s and thereafter, Aboriginal people
countered the racism and ideas of cultural supremacy propagated by white society. One observer of the Red Power politics commented that, “Native people were drawn together in their attempt to demonstrate that they’d no longer respond to discriminatory treatment with downcast gaze and frightened silence” (Burke, 1976: 105).

Indigenous peoples were particularly critical of the differences instituted by white society in the form of race. The predominant view of Aboriginal peoples held by white society was that they were a race of individuals at a lower level of social development. For white society, this view could be deployed for beneficial purposes. One Indigenous scholar explains that, “[t]he idea of dividing people according to a single racial identity was the invention of Europeans, who socially constructed race to exclude and subordinate people who were not white and to privilege those who were” (Yellow Bird, 1999: 3). Indians were racialized as the inferior “Other” and this classification justified the separation of Aboriginal peoples from white society, oftentimes forcefully, by the state and its authorities. Above all, however, were the folk stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples that had been propagated throughout white Canadian and American society. Racist ideas—what the Native scholar Elizabeth Cook-Lynn calls ‘Anti-Indianism’—were widespread. The express purpose of Anti-Indianism, according to Cook-Lynn, has “been to socially isolate, to expunge or expel, to fear and menace, to defame and repulse indigenous people” (Cook-Lynn, 2001: 4). The objectives of Anti-Indianism were, as it is well known, quite successful under colonialism. Indians were excluded from white society; they were feared by white settlers; and, their identity was impugned.

In the course of the politics of recognition and difference, Indigenous peoples organized under a collective Indian identity. Based on the shared difference from the
dominant colonial society, Indigenous peoples of varied cultural backgrounds grouped together under the broad political identity of pan-Indian solidarity. At the time, Harold Cardinal wrote that Indian unity was a “dream long held by Indian leaders” in the resistance to colonial forces (Cardinal, 1969: 14). Cardinal continues, “When our people begin to call themselves Indians instead of Crees or Saulteaux or Mohawks, when intertribal cooperation no longer allows the government to threaten our individual treaties, then we will have the strength of unity, the power to help make some of our other dreams come true” (Cardinal, 1969: 14). A product of the anticolonial resistance politics, the emerging unified Indian identity was something very new to Indigenous peoples and nations, however. To be sure, the idea of a single identity was a novel concept for Indians: “Historically, Aboriginal people in Canada neither called themselves by a single label nor understood themselves as a national collectivity” (Frideres, 2008: 320).

Drawn from disparate national and cultural backgrounds—such as Algonquin, Haida, Ojibway, and so forth—a Pan-Indian unity emerged, asserting a composite identity based on the homogenizing colonial discourse on Indianness. After centuries of the colonial discourse predominating settler-Indigenous relations, discrete Indigenous nations and cultures were discursively mingled into one racial and cultural identity—the Indian. Indeed, the predominating nature of the colonial discourse on Indianness served to harden the settler-Indian distinction within the Indigenous social imaginary. Indigenous anticolonial resistance during the Red Power movement consolidated the colonial binary: “There is a solidarity, which sometimes goes under the name of ‘pan-Indianism’, which crosses the cultural and legal boundaries asserted by Aboriginal peoples,” writes Peter Kulchyski (Kulchyski, 1995: n.p.). Indeed, features that were decidedly common amongst
Indigenous nations and societies, but at the same time non-Western and non-white, were combined and integrated into a collective Indian identity. A synthesis of contrasting cultural artifacts from dissimilar Indian societies soon became signifiers of what was Indian. “There were and are Hopi, Navajo, Miwok, but the term Indian merges these identities into a singular identity,” notes one Native judge and scholar (Lomayesva, 1999: 63). The Pan-Indian identity emerged out of the amalgamation of cultural practices that drew their origins back from seemingly unrelated Indigenous cultures. Religious rituals, such as the sweat-lodge rituals, social ceremonies and celebrations, like Pow-Wows, took on a universal signification as unquestionably Indian, overlooking the fact that many of these specific cultural features were unique to different Indian cultural societies (Patterson, 1971).

Inherent to the politics of recognition and difference of the Red Power movement—intrinsic to the assertion of a positive Indigenous identity in the broader social fabric of Canadian society—was an emergent re-interpretation of Indian morality. It was during the social transformation of the mid-twentieth century, emerging in the early 1960s, that new moral prejudices of Indianness were discursively produced. Nowhere was this emergent moral re-valuation of Indianness more evident than in the rise and spread of “Native Pride.” As one scholar has remarked, the “First Nations renaissance to recapture what has been lost over the years, in so far as Aboriginal pride and integrity are concerned, gained particular momentum in the 1960s” (Friesen, 1997: 228). The Red Power movement introduced new moral themes, through the politics of recognition and difference, saturating Indianness with a sense of moral superiority. The “rebirth” and “renaissance” of Indianness in the 1960s entailed ideas of Indian ethnic and racial pride, “redefining “red”,

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“native”, and “tribal”, as valued statuses imbued with moral and spiritual significance” (Nagel, 1996: 140). Red Power, in fact, ushered in a surge of pride amongst Aboriginal people. The new generation of Indians embodied the heightened sense of pride and transmitted this throughout Indian Country. “Young Indians are proud of their heritage and are learning more about it,” Harold Cardinal observed, going on to say that, “more and more Indians are suddenly standing straighter, walking with a firmer step and finding a new pride in being Indian” (Cardinal, 1969: 24). This new sensibility—of taking pride in what was previously humiliating and a source of psychic shame—came to be ubiquitous throughout Indian Country in the decades following on the years of Red Power.

It was out of the particular politics of the Red Power movement that the contemporary nature and truth of Indian morality was developed. At the outset of the movement, the paternalistic and monolgically formed Aboriginal identity that had been so prominent in the social consciousness of Indian Country was beginning to be challenged by the new generation of Indians. As one Native individual asserts,

Part of Native Pride is teaching the children who they are, and that our culture has value. We have to teach them to reject the image of Indians that was invented in Hollywood. People get their idea of what Indians are like from books and movies, especially those ‘Westerns’ where the cowboys are the good guys and the Indians are the bad guys. Well, they need to get with the times. That’s not the way it is—and it never was (Hill Hearth, 2008: 175).
Native Pride would, then, be a politics of recognition but a politics concerned with identifying Indigenous peoples as inherently ‘good’ rather than that of the debasing view held, and spread throughout settler society.

The strategy of reinscribing a favourable moral understanding on the widely held negative views of Indians, so widespread throughout both mainstream society and Indian Country, turned on Indigenous resistance to the colonial discourse on Indianness. “What indigenous leaders describe as “reclaiming identity” often amounts to reasserting a historic ethnic pride and sense of self-worth in the face of intensified threats to indigenous cultures” (Wearne, 1996: 16). This much was, politically speaking, a strategic response to the harsh colonial endeavours of settler society and its demeaning valuation of Indians. Vine Deloria Jr. explained the new moral interpretation, stating that, “Once having left the wild animal status, Indians will not revert to their old position on the totem pole” (Deloria Jr., 1969: 195). That is to say, having been cast to the bottom of the social, racial and cultural hierarchy, Native people would take their rightful place at the top, upsetting the colonial prejudices of settler discourse.

Taking pride, however, was only one tactic of the strategy of moralizing Indianness. The newfound “love for” and “pride in” all things “traditionally” Indian, was complemented by a moral criticism of white values (Frideres, 2008: 326). As prominent Red Power advocates recalled several years later, the social transformation of the 1960s not only spread pro-Indian and Native pride sentiments throughout Indian Country, but the movement had also rapidly become anti-white (Deloria Jr. and Lytle, 1984: 253). The critical politics of the Red Power movement had placed Indians in a position of moral judgment of white values and ethics. The vilification of white culture is especially
pronounced in Vine Deloria Jr.’s seminal *Indian Manifesto* published in 1969, wherein he states most succinctly: “White culture destroys other culture because of its abstractness. As a destroyer of culture it is not a culture but a cancer. In order to keep the country from complete divisiveness, separatism must be accepted as a means to achieve equality of personality for both groups and individuals” (Deloria Jr., 1969: 188; emphasis original).

**Racial Reasoning in Indian Country**

In addition to these ideas of cultural difference, the cultural hegemony of the colonial discourse on Indianness “naturalized” racial distinctions within the Indigenous social consciousness. Indeed, by the last half of the twentieth century, Indigenous anticolonial resistance organized around the theme of race. In response to cultural crisis, Indians constituted themselves, and their distinction from the Other, in racial terms. This theme, a central tenet produced, maintained, and propagated in the discourse of the colonizer, had influenced the social sensibilities of Indians themselves. Although new to the self-understanding of Indians—despite the long history of colonial tactics of racialization by the colonizer—the logics of race obtained cultural hegemony throughout many sectors of Indian Country. Of course, some critics did denounce racialization as a product of white, European colonial dominance. Denouncing colonial racism and white, European racial supremacy was a prominent theme in Red Power anticolonial rhetoric. The wider moral revaluation of Indianness prompted moral condemnation of racial logics underwriting the cover of colonialism’s authority and dominance: Indianness could claim some measure of moral superiority over white European society as Indian Country had been unfamiliar with ideas of race and its strategic value for oppression of other races. As one Indigenous scholar writes, “[t]he idea of dividing people according to a single racial identity was the
invention of Europeans, who socially constructed race to exclude and subordinate peoples who were not white and to privilege those who were” (Yellow Bird, 1999: 3). For Indigenous peoples, then, race was a new concept, something developed in an alien culture. But themes of race, and the distinctions that could be based on ideas of race, were recognized to hold strategic value in the constitution of Indianness, and thus the success of anticolonial resistance.

Indeed, while Indigenous individuals and groups were keen to contest the moral validity of racial distinctions imposed by the Canadian and American societies, it did not inhibit them from taking up ideas of race themselves. Until notions of exclusion based on medico-biological criteria had become a practice instituted by European settlers, Indians were unfamiliar with this form of identity. As one scholar submits, it is commonly assumed that to be Indian is necessarily to identify as a particular race, namely as a member of the red race, and that this has always been true: “Indians may share this perception today, but race has not always been a determining factor in the formation of Indian nations or tribal communities” (Valaskakis, 2005: 218). This is not to argue, however, that Indians did not make any distinctions between the in-group members whom they readily recognized as Indians and any newcomer or outsider. Prior to any exposure to racialization and racism, through social interaction with European society, Indians had markedly incommensurate criteria for difference. To be certain, “[b]efore contact, indigenous people identified themselves as distinct from other indigenous people and constructed their identities in this way” (Weaver, 2001: 242). Difference, in fact, did exist among Native individuals and communities, and this was easily delineated for Natives; only notions of race did not fit into such calculations.
For Indigenous peoples, social differences did not rest on anything conceptually similar to race prior to the appearance of the colonial discourse on Indianness. The most prominent marker of difference for North America’s Indigenous societies and nations entailed cultural considerations. James Clifton makes this point quite clear, stating that,

Originally, no native North American society subscribed to the idea of a biological determination of identity or behaviour. Indeed, the most common identity question asked of strangers was not, “What nation do you belong to?” or “Of what race are you?” Instead, when confronting unknown people, they typically asked, “What language do you speak?” They were disinterested in skin color, the standard Euro-American sign of racial identity (Clifton, 1989: 11).

In addition, one may add to Clifton’s observation of the prominence of language difference as an emblem of identity other non-racial factors, which include residence, family and kinship relations, and religion (Tsosie, 2005: 88). Thus, cultural distinctions typified group differences rather than contemporary notions of race that were introduced by Euro-descended settlers.

By the time of the Red Power social transformation of Indian Country, much of colonialism’s intellectual traditions that had formulated ideas of race and racism—the technical knowledge stemming from European biological and medical sciences—had seemingly become “naturalized.” The hegemonic status of the colonial discourse on race had achieved what Gramsci would describe as “common sense.” So naturalized by the predomination of the colonial discourse on Indianness, race and racial distinction was
accepted in much of Indian Country as uncontroversial, as the “truth” of Indianness. The
naturalness of this ‘truth,’ that Indigenous peoples were a separate race, was expressed in
sentiments of primordialism, the notion that certain individuals are associated by virtue of
their strong links to a group that evolved independently from all other groups. From this
primordial understanding of group affinity and belonging, an inherent separateness is
claimed to be natural in both origin and significance. On this seemingly natural racial
difference, Vine Deloria Jr. has surmised that,

There is no basic antagonism between black and red, or even between red
and white. Conflicts are created when Indians feel they are being defined out
of existence by the other groups. Historically, each group has its own road to
travel. All roads lead to personal and group affirmation. But the obstacles
faced by each group are different and call for different solutions and

techniques (Deloria Jr., 1969: 193).

Thus, the emergent racial sensibilities of the new discourse rested on the notion of
primordial connection and that group boundaries could be circumscribed based on what
was believed to be a natural teleology for each race.

It was not always the case that each race had “its own road to travel,” however. In
fact, it is not altogether clear that notions of race played any role at all in social
configurations before the transformation of Indian Country during the Red Power
movement. The negligible consideration placed on the race of an individual to be
introduced and accepted into Native societies in earlier times is evident in the observations
of some Indigenous insiders. Ward Churchill, who is not Indigenous but one of the most
prominent and recognized activists and academics of anticolonial politics in the last century, reflected on the seemingly indifference to racial mixing and greater attention placed on cultural integrity that earlier, pre-Red Power Indigenous nations and societies considered when accepting a new member to Indian Country: “There is little if any indication, moreover, that most indigenous societies viewed this admixture as untoward or peculiar, much less threatening, in and of itself (this is opposed to their often bitter resistance to the cultural, political, and material encroachment of Euro-American “civilization”)” (Churchill, 1999: 43). The threat to Indian Country ensued from those individuals and groups determined to undermine, if not outright annihilate, Indian cultural societies. Indeed, even those who could claim substantial Indian blood, even Indian “purity,” could be viewed as cultural threats to Indian Country. As Churchill notes elsewhere, “many Native people ‘untainted’ by any hint of admixture with whites or blacks conducted themselves with all the fidelity of Vidkun Quisling. Such matters were well understood in traditional societies, which is precisely why they never considered blood quantum to be a useful factor in determining citizenship or cultural identity” (Churchill, 2003: 208).

Prior to the cultural hegemony of the colonial discourse on Indianness, Indigenous peoples displayed little, if any, hostility towards individuals and groups based on physical appearances. One need only look at the cultural integration and assimilation practices of past Indigenous societies in their dealings with the alien and unfamiliar outsider. Consider the tribal adoption of strangers, for example. Early anthropological studies of Indian

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7 Vidkun Quisling was a Norwegian politician noted for being a traitor, collaborating with the Nazis during German occupation of Norway during World War II.
cultures in Canada demonstrate that the cultural practice of adopting strangers into Indian tribes was widespread among most Native cultural communities (Boldt and Long, 1986: 153). The conditions of coexistence among differing Indian tribes and nations had made assimilation of tribal outsiders a conventional tradition. Irrespective of physical differences, Indigenous individuals would often intermarry between tribes, integrating cultural practices and customs from the foreign member's natal community, producing tribally hybrid societies (Valaskakis, 2005: 218). Identifying individuals from foreign Indian nations was not, then, a matter of racial distinction, or of racializing the Indigenous Others, but a cultural consideration. Moreover, as the apparent indifference to intermixing and subsequent miscegenation implied, there existed no animosity toward the offspring produced from the mixed conjugal relationship between Indians of different tribal origin.

Although the custom of assimilating and adapting to distinct cultural forms was carried out in Indian Country long before the appearance of the new, white arrivals from Europe, it remained in practice for some time after British and French colonial settlement had become a permanent fixture. Indigenous adoption conventions designed to culturally assimilate outsiders, to make them one of their own, appeared to apply seamlessly to the white newcomer: “it required no major readjustment to adopt Whites, as in the past Indians had been adopted. So thoroughly were adoptees integrated into the complex social structure of the Indian society that even Whites who had originally gone unwillingly as captives of the Indians often refused to be ransomed” (Farb, 1978: 250). Although Indigenous societies could differentiate among the various shades of skin pigment, non-Natives to be adopted and incorporated in Aboriginal communities were not racialized as such. However, like Indians from foreign tribes and nations, a thematic of blood was
present in symbolic imagery and allegorical rhetoric. James Smith, a white European captive of the Kahnawá:ke Mohawks during the eighteenth century, detailed the customary adoption ritual in his diary. Through the ceremony, Smith was told that, “every drop of White blood was washed out of your veins; you are taken into the Caughnewago nation, and initiated into a warlike tribe” (quoted in Alfred, 1995: 49). Similar in spirit to the mixing between Indians of different tribal origins, then, difference was primarily a cultural consideration when introducing and assimilating non-indigenous peoples into Native societies.

With the cultural hegemony of the colonial discourse of racial Indigeneity, many of the customary and traditional practices of adopting non-Native strangers into Indigenous societies, as well as cultural intermingling, have given way to the racialization of the non-Native Other. In the past, social-mixing, intercultural marriage, and miscegenation between Indigenous people and white settlers was uncontroversial as ideas of race were virtually non-existent within the social sensibilities of Indian Country. Indeed, early colonial alliances established between European settlers and local Indian societies were often consummated through the marriage of European men and Native women (Lawrence, 2003: 8). Today, however, such racial mixing is far less welcome and is often met with some degree of acrimony by Indians themselves. As Harold Cardinal observes, “Many [Indians] married across the colour line. Now social pressure swings the other way with Indians, and is against marrying into white society” (Cardinal, 1969: 24). It is such a transformation of Indigenous attitudes toward racial mixing that is instructive of the
cultural hegemony of “racial reasoning” inherent to the colonial discourse on Indianness (West, 1994).  

**Imaginative Geography: The Birth of the ‘Rez’**

One of the more striking effects of the hegemonic discourse on Indianness was the spatial reorganization of Indigenous territory and national boundaries. Colonialism, again, was much more than military might and physical violence exerted in the name of territorial acquisition in the name of the European Crowns. The cunning of colonialism, in this respect, is evident in its hegemonic influence to consolidate territory for the enjoyment and disposal of settler society at the expense of Indigenous nations through the tacit consent of the colonized. It is true that colonial history is beset with numerous instances of forced relocation and territorial dispossession by way of coercive means. But even in spite of this history, Indian reserves—the diminutive tracts of land left over after colonial dispossession—acquired a certain significance in the popular imaginary of both colonizer and colonized.

Colonial otherness, in other words, was not only a matter of racial and cultural distinctions, but also contrived through the imaginings of spatial demarcation. The reduction of ancient territorial boundaries of Indigenous nations into the ‘Rez’—a contemporary colloquialism for Indian reserves amongst Indigenous populations—underscores what Edward Said explained as the imaginative geography of Orientalism. Imaginative geography, according to Said, is the “universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is “ours” and an unfamiliar space beyond “ours” which is

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8 Cornel West explains that “racial reasoning” is a framework that consists of the triumvirate of: 1) racial authenticity; 2) closed-ranks mentality; and, 3) cultural conservatism (see West, 1994: 35-49).
“theirs” is a way of making geographical distinction that can be entirely arbitrary” (Said, 1978: 54; italics original). From the position of the colonized, the ‘Rez’ is entirely arbitrary, a spatial design and geographical configuration constructed by the colonizer, the meagre remnants of once expansive nations. Nevertheless, “space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us” (Said, 1978: 55). For many Indigenous people under the conditions of colonization, the ‘Rez’ has been conceptualized as a familiar space, beyond which is the realm of the oppressor.

Spatial distinctions were not new to Indigenous nations as they had long made determinations of identity along territorial divisions. However, spatial distinctions based upon the colonial construction of Indian reserves were, by the closing decades of the twentieth century, embraced in many places of Indian Country. Indeed, the cultural difference between life on Indian reserves and that of urban white settlements had come to figure into the differentiations of hegemonic colonial discourse on Indianness. Although Indian reserves were initially implemented as part of the colonial project—as a coercive means for settler conscription of title to land and natural resources—the significance of this relatively recent institution gained a different moral standing in the eyes of many Indigenous peoples. The physical borders, implemented under the colonial dominance of white, Euro-descended society, afforded Indians with a spatial demarcation that could construct a psychic division, as well as physical, between Indians and all others, particularly white settlers. Gail Guthrie Valaskakis, a Native studies scholar, makes this point clear when she says quite succinctly, “[i]mages of reservations as heritage or home are intertwined in the conversations, interactions, and practices in which Native people
represent and recognize Indianness” (Valaskakis, 2005: 245). But this particular representation of reserves is new for Indians and ignores the fact that reserves were a colonial institution; that is, reserves were a historical outcome, rather than some naturally occurring signifier of the ‘truth’ of Indianness.

With the emergence of Red Power activism during the 1960s, the reserve assumed the status among many Indigenous people as a site for anticolonial liberatory resistance. One observer of Aboriginal politics has remarked that, “[t]he main area for such resistance has been the indigenous community or reservation. Although often centres of poverty and all the other social problems associated with forced relocation, such communities, originally a symbol of abuse and control, have been subverted to become at least potential centres of ethnic pride and culture” (Wearne, 1996: 95). Indeed, from the outset of the social transformation that Indian Country underwent during the Red Power era, the reserve took on a strategic value for anticolonial resistance as the colonial discourse on Indianness continued to predominate in Indigenous societies. While it was true that the reserve was a non-discursive entity that could act as jurisdictional stronghold against the Canadian and American states, the moral value of a space where Indianness could be governed, not by settler society but rather by Indians themselves, held significant strategic utility. As a discursive strategy, then, the significance of the reserve and other Native communities was to be transformed and deployed in the anticolonial resistance politics. Indian Country was as much a virtual, signified space as it was a tangible, physical location.

With the advent of colonial cultural hegemony, Indian reserves had come to represent spatial difference between the white and red “races,” not just in the eyes of white, settler society, but also from the perspective of Indigenous peoples themselves.
When Indigenous peoples ceased being viewed with any sense of economic or political benefit by the European settlers, they had been forcibly removed from their natal communities in the mid-nineteenth century. These were, in many cases, the Indigenous settlements of the First Nations, many of which had existed largely undisturbed and fixed in distinct geographic locations that had stood since “time immemorial.” With the expansion of white settlements and the emerging European discourses of racial superiority and the assumed pre-eminence of European civilization, Indigenous peoples had been relocated to small tracts of land, removed from “civilized” white society. As Stephen Cornell describes, “[o]n reservations wholly or largely occupied by a single tribe, bands that had once been territorially discrete often were forced to settle side by side or together on the same spot. Villages were moved and consolidated; ...their [Indians] lands ceded to or taken by Whites, [they] found themselves concentrated within sharply circumscribed areas” (Cornell, 1988: 81).

In the early days of the Indian Reserve system, the colonial control of Indigenous settlement movement was a matter of strict, coercive enforcement by colonial state. Largely a feature of the Indigenous colonization in the Prairies, the colonial administrators of the Crown’s Department of Indian Affairs instituted the “Pass System” to restrict the lives of Indigenous peoples to the small, remote parcels of reserve land. In 1885, the Assistant Indian Commissioner, Hayter Reed, recommended to Indian Commissioner Edgar Dewdney about instituting the “Pass System.” With the support of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, Reed reported that:

I am adopting the system of keeping the Indians on their respective Reserves and not allowing any [to] leave them without passes—I know this is hardly
supportable by any legal enactment but we must do many things which can only be supported by common sense and by what may be for the general good. I get the police to send out daily and send any Indians without passes back to their reserves (quoted in the TRC, 2015: 127).

Although the Crown authorities knew that this system violated the treaty rights of Indigenous people, passes were still issued until the 1930s (Purich, 1986: 132; see also Barron, 1988). It was in the mid-twentieth century that the colonial authorities had begun to moderate these strict segregationist policies. In light of these changes, Indigenous peoples had found greater mobility privileges and could travel off the reserve.

Despite these newly granted liberties to leave the reserve, albeit under restrictive conditions, Aboriginal peoples had come to recognize the reserve as home. An article in the May 1966 edition of the Indian Record describes the sense of confidence and stability that the reserve had come to represent for Indians: “The reserve provides security. There the Indian is not ostracized” (IR, 1966: 4). Indeed, outside the reserve, white society subjected Indigenous people to racist attitudes and beliefs of white, racial superiority. Harold Cardinal was familiar with the racial objectification experienced by Indians outside the reserve, explaining that, “there are towns and cities in Canada, in every province of Canada, where an Indian dares not forget his identity as an Indian. There are towns and cities in Canada where a Canadian Indian simply dares not go” (Cardinal, 1969: 18).

Although a colonial effect, the reserve had come to represent the division between Indigenous and settler society and this significance could be deployed in discourse to consolidate racial homogeneity on reserves and act as a bulwark against the encroachment of non-Indigenous culture. As one Native scholar asserts, “while reservation borders exist
as vestiges of forced removal, colonialist domination, and whitestream greed, they are also understood as marking the defensive perimeters between cultural integrity and wholesale appropriation. They are the dividing line between “us” and “them” (Grande, 2004; 110). Indeed, the cities and urban centres that had become settled by white Europeans were just that, white and non-Native, at least from the perspective of many Indigenous people. For Indigenous peoples, racial and cultural homogeneity could be consolidated within the boundaries of the reserve. In cultivating authentic Indian bodies, tactics of exclusion could be deployed in the management of the cultural crisis, envisioned as potential bulwarks against the racial and cultural encroachment of non-Indian individuals and cultures. In this sense, if the reserve was not Indian enough in both the racial and cultural dimensions, the significance of the borders, the “dividing line between “us” and “them,,”” could be deployed in the service of keeping all things non-Indian out of Indian Country, particularly non-Indian individuals.

**Conclusion**

Colonialism’s deceit—and its ongoing existence—has always been underwritten by two mutually dependent antecedents: first, that the distinction between colonizer and colonized is naturally marked by racial and cultural difference, and second, the colonizer is, by this natural distinction, inherently superior to the colonized. Indeed, the categories of racial and cultural identity were deployed in colonial attempts to shore up an assumed claim to superiority over the Indigenous inhabitants of the ‘New World.’ It is clear from the earliest encounters between European travelers in the territories of Indigenous nations that imperial ambitions to secure access to the resources and wealth of the newly ‘discovered’ lands that the potency of military force and physical coercion alone was
insufficient. Over the span of several centuries, colonial superiority was epistemologically constructed and the colonial discourse on Indianness propagated. What is striking is the hegemonic status that the colonial discourse eventually obtained in the last half of twentieth century.

I have argued above that a whole dispositif, a Saidian “corporate institution,” emerged out of the colonial impulse to “other” the Indian—to fix the identity of the colonized Indian in an apparatus of knowledge. The genealogy of the ensuing discourse, helped along by the positional superiority of the colonizer, eventually obtained cultural hegemony in the late 1960s. Not only were Indigenous peoples the object of the burgeoning colonial discourse, but many had come to see themselves as subjects of the same discourse. By the 1960s, the politics of anticolonial resistance turned on ideas of identity, where the locus of liberatory struggle emerged in a politics of recognition. The racial and cultural configurations of the Indian—propagated by the colonial discourse on Indianness—had migrated into the social consciousness of Indian Country. The cultural hegemony of the colonial epistemology on Indianness—the racial, cultural, and spatial coordinates of Indianness had come to predominate—was taken up as the “truth” of Indianness in some corners of Indian Country. In the following chapter, I examine the debates and discussions around Indianness that emerged in Indian Country in the last half of the twentieth century, how the colonial cultural hegemony on Indianness introduced new political tensions around racial, cultural, and spatial internal difference and shaped exclusionary tendencies in some parts of Indian Country.
We “Other Indians”:
The Discursive Limits of Indianness and Ambiguous Indian Identities

Some three decades after the Red Power movement emerged in the late 1960s, an article—that went largely unnoticed among much of settler society and to a lesser extent its intended Aboriginal readership—addressed itself to the “Indian problem,” as Indians of the time saw it. In 1999, *Windspeaker* magazine, which described itself as “Canada’s National Aboriginal source for news, issues and culture,” published a brief essay by the well-known Ojibwe playwright and author, Drew Hayden Taylor, entitled “How Native is Native if you’re Native?” The title of Taylor’s essay is suggestive that one’s Indian identity—one’s Nativeness—is uncertain even if, as Taylor indicates, “you’re Native.” And what’s more, the question of “how Native?” implies that there is a spectrum of Nativeness, where one could be more or less Native. In the space of slightly more than a thousand words, Taylor manages to address—if only ostensibly—some of the more prominent anxieties and preoccupations that shaped the contours of contemporary Indian identity and subjectivity at the close of the twentieth century. Indeed, the peculiarity that a widely recognized Native, Drew Hayden Taylor, would pose such a question is mollified by the debates and discursive practices that were at the time, and continue to be today, constitutive of Indianness. Though a brief exposition, Taylor’s article speaks to the fractious politics of the day, a politics that was deeply immersed in a discursive struggle over and around Indianness. On that account, Taylor’s problematization of Nativeness in the title of his essay is apt: the once seemingly fixed category of the Native was no longer secure, even for Native peoples themselves.
Indianness—both the claim to Indian identity and the practices of Indian culture—had, by the end of the 20th century, become central to resisting colonization. In the decades that followed the earnest demands by the Red Power movement for respect and recognition of Native identity, an outwardly unified resistance to colonial discourse began to display internal fissures and tensions. If, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, answers to the questions “who is Indian?” and “what is Indianness?” appeared self-evident and assured, it was largely confined to non-Native outsiders who could defer to the convenience of the Indian Act, which provided a neat and clear distinction of the boundaries of Indianness and Indian identity. Internal debates and discussions within Aboriginal social circles, however, demonstrated that the answers to these questions were far from established and gave way to a substantially more fractious struggle over the question of Indianness. As Taylor observes, “[w]ithin the growing and diverse Native community, there seems to be an ongoing ideological battle raging, one that seems to have reversed itself from what was practiced decades ago” (Taylor, 1999). Indeed, what was once obviously Native to Natives—a static, somewhat universal understanding—had been thrown into flux. In the decades following the cultural hegemony of the colonial discourse on Indianness, Indian identity increasingly became a site of discursive contestation in much of Indian Country.

In this chapter, I explore the discursive imaginings of Indianness that have been put into circulation in Indian Country since the colonial discourse on Indianness obtained hegemonic predominance. The Red Power movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s elevated concern around the question of Indianness within Indigenous quarters. I argue here that a more specific appreciation of what constituted authentic Indianness moved into
the social consciousness of Indian Country. Strategies of decolonization—though attentive to a wide range of colonial imperatives—invested Indianness with substantial liberatory promise. Decolonization in the minds of some Indigenous individuals meant the return of lands to indigenous nations, yet it also advanced the idea of authentic Indianness as a viable and lasting mode of existence among Indians. But, as Drew Hayden Taylor points out in his essay, the apparently inert and orthodox quality that branded the pan-Indian form of decades past had become unsettled and contested within Indian Country.

In what follows below, I examine how the discursive struggles emerged, evoking a multiplicity of competing and sometimes complementary discourses on Indianness. Here, in this chapter, I explore the making of Indian categories, those “other Indians” who put the construction of Indianness as a monolithic project of decolonization into question, how the cultural hegemony of the colonial discourse on Indianness, underwritten by the colonial logics of race and culture, was taken up by some Indigenous communities in what I call the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness. I examine how the generalized sensibilities of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse into more generalized sensibilities in Indian Country was challenged by classes of Indians who blurred the demarcation between Indian and Other. To do this, I survey the debates and discussions that emerged among a number of notable Indigenous authors writing in the anticolonial resistance tradition.9

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9 Many Indigenous philosophers, particularly Indigenous women, have developed a rich scholarship on Indigenous traditionalism. The analysis in this chapter, and the genealogy of disciplinary power that I develop later, omits this work since the philosophical works are more akin to Foucault’s notion of ethics as a practice of freedom. Much of this canon speaks to traditionalism as an ethical mode of Indigenous existence, and does not provide the same programmatic and technical prescriptions of how a person much conduct themselves in order to be “traditional.” Some examples from Indigenous philosophers and scholars are: Devon Mihesuah’s *Indigenous American Women: Decolonization, Empowerment, Activism* (2003); Patricia Monture-Angus’ *Thunder in My Sould: A Mohawk Woman Speaks* (1995); Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond’s “Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian State for First Nations Women” (1997); and Leanne Betasamosake
Indianness, Authenticity & Decolonization

As the question of Indianness moved to the fore of Aboriginal political engagement during the Red Power movement of the 1960s, a new discourse around Indian identity emerged in some parts of Indian Country. In the last chapter I showed how Indianness was constructed in colonial discourses on race and culture and that, by the last half of the twentieth century, the colonial discourse obtained cultural hegemony. Since the early days of the Red Power movement, when the moment of cultural hegemony was propagating the colonial discourse was first emerging, Indianness—and its logics of race and culture—have become a significant preoccupation in numerous social circles.

The identity politics of the Red Power social movement began in earnest in the late 1960s, merely demanding recognition and respect for Indianness from white settler society, and propagating sensibilities around “Native Pride” in Indian Country. However, this project of decolonization, that cultivated basic Manichaean sensibilities that set Indian against Other, was far less stable and assured than the neat dichotomy of colonizer versus colonized that was suggested in liberatory rhetoric. As the politics of Indigenous society advanced and transformed in the 1970s through to the present day, a more fractious voice emerged within Indian Country around Indianness and Indian identity. While the Red Power movement transformed into broad anti-colonization efforts, the perspectives of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse took on greater significance throughout Indian Country. Ideas of race and culture, as well as gender and spatial considerations, were variously invoked in debates and discussions about indigenous anti-colonization efforts, especially in

Simpson’s As We have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical Resistance (2017) and Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back (2011).
visions that imagined the (re)construction of “decolonized” Native communities. At issue were questions around the social limits of Indianness and what threats—either real or imagined—put Indianness in danger.

Foucault’s ideas of discourse, knowledge and truth are instructive in the analysis of the making of Indianness in the post-Red Power era. Indianness and the Indian/Other distinction that underwrote anti-colonization initiatives appeared self-evident—as “always, already”—in much of the prescriptive language that accompanied efforts to resist colonization, but it was the emergence of a specific knowledge about race and culture that made Indianness. It was through the Foucauldian “regime of truth” that ideas of race and culture were both normalized and naturalized as constitutive of Indianness. As Foucault explains,

> Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1980: 131)

This insight is particularly germane to the “truth claims” around Indianness that emerged in the resistance to colonization in the late twentieth century. Thus, as Taiaiake Alfred proclaimed in 1999, “We must cut through white society’s myths and begin to act on our own truths” (Alfred, 1999: 84), the “truths” and “knowledge” produced by white society around Indianness were stigmatized as fallacy only to be replaced by indigenous “truths.”
Indeed, Indianness was becoming an object of the “truth” for many Indians by the late 1970s and onwards. In 1999, at the same time as he was writing about indigenous peoples’ “truths,” Taiaiake Alfred announced that the determination of Indianness was the rightful province of Indians themselves, rather than colonial society that had long put into operation its own discourses: “The time has come for people who are from someplace Indian to take back the discourse on Indians” (Alfred, 1999: 143). Jeff Corntassel, a contemporary and colleague of Alfred’s, similarly declared that, “[t]he question of “who is indigenous?” is best answered by indigenous communities themselves” (Corntassel, 2003: 75). But this intervention of decolonization activists had, by the close of the twentieth century, been organized around a specific intellectual tradition that gave rise to its own set of experts and authorities. As Drew Hayden Taylor pointed out that same year in his essay, “there’s a vast number of “experts” existing in this world eager to tell you what defines a Native and would be more than happy to tell you whether you fit into that category” (Taylor, 1999).

The discursive production of Indianness by Indians in the decades following the Red Power social movement was an anti-colonial instinct and vocation to establish an authentic Indian “regime of truth.” The “regime of truth” around Indianness elaborated upon the more specific problematization of Indian leadership that grew out of the Red Power movement. The “New Indians” of the Red Power era sought to expunge the “sell-outs” from within the ranks of Indian leadership by appealing to race and traditional culture, but by the late 1970s and thereafter, a more generalized sensibility coalesced, extending to broader considerations of “authenticity” and Indian identity in some regions of Indian Country. Native Pride had installed new sensibilities within the younger generation of
Indians who were coming of age in the post-Red Power era. These “New Indians” sought to regenerate and restore Indian identity to what they viewed as its rightful form and reject colonial discourses. As one of the more prominent luminaries of the post-Red Power political cadre described it, anti-colonization was a battle to “win control of the right to answer the question, “Who is an Indian?”” (Alfred, 2000a).

Indigenous people have made significant strides towards reconstructing their identities as autonomous individual, collective, and social beings.

Although much remains to be done, the threat of cultural assimilation to the North American mainstream is no longer overwhelming, because substantial pride has been restored in the idea of being Native (Alfred, 1999: 2).

Alfred’s acknowledgement in 1999 that pride had been restored to Indianness was but one facet of the discursive shifts that the Racial-Traditionalist discourse took. Despite the moral re-armament, which had been initiated years earlier by his Red Power predecessors, Alfred called for a broader anti-colonization strategy—one that rejected all colonially imposed identities on Indians.

By the closing decades of the twentieth century, a growing indigenous intelligentsia—a loose assemblage of politically conscious Aboriginal academics and activists—began to take aim at the colonial laws that had shaped the landscape of Indianness for over a century. Themes of self-government and self-determination filled a great deal of the language around decolonization and resistance. Writing in 2005, Glen Coulthard observed that over the previous 30 years—extending back to 1975—“the self-determination efforts and objectives of Indigenous peoples in Canada have increasingly
been cast in the language of “recognition”” (Coulthard, 2007: 437; see also Ladner and Dick, 2008). Central to the claims of self-determination, particularly the demands for recognition of difference between Indian and Other, was the acknowledgement that First Nations and other Aboriginal groups could autonomously develop their own identities, free from the coercion of the state or other outside institutions (Green, 2007; see also Ivison, 2003). Self-determination, Joyce Green argued, necessarily involved acts of “self-definition” (Green, 2003a: 8). “Native Indian leaders,” it was observed, “are seeking to achieve this goal by increasing self-determination over their own lives and destinies through control over those institutions that regulate their lives most directly” (Boldt, 1981: 504), alluding to the colonial state and its control and imposition of Indian identity. Taiaiake Alfred lamented the incursion of the state into the realm of indigenous self-determination, noting that, “[t]he most fundamental right of a people is the one that empowers them to determine their own identity. Yet in Canada it is the state that determines who is considered indigenous under the law” (Alfred, 1999: 71). Intensifying since the late 1970s, Indian Act identities and the constitutional complements that filled in many other legal gaps, were increasingly subject to challenge by a new indigenous resistance.

Many Aboriginal people had come to believe that the state’s control over Indian identity would prove to be a mechanism to eliminate Indianness, particularly the cultural distinction, and not to furnish indigenous culture with security or protection, as Canadian politicians had long maintained. Carrie Bourassa and Ian Peach have commented as much, noting that, “[s]tate-imposed definitions of identity and the attitudes they have fostered towards who really “counts” as Aboriginal are tools of colonization” (Bourassa and Peach, 2009: 1). Bonita Lawrence similarly observed that the “legislation was openly aimed at the
elimination of Indigenous peoples as a legal and social fact” (Lawrence, 2010: 516). Indeed, as a tool of colonization designed to eliminate both the legal and social existence of Indian identity, the state controlled nearly all aspects of Aboriginal society and individual Indian life, aspects that constituted the cultural and social backdrop to Indianness. Writing in a report for the National Centre for First Nations Governance in 2008, Ken Coates, a historian of Aboriginal policy, provided some insight on the effects that the Indian Act had on indigenous peoples and their identities:

It is difficult to categorize and describe the social and cultural consequences of this wide-ranging government intervention. Dependency, cultural loss, dispiritedness, and a profound sense of disengagement from the national political system are all logical outgrowths from a system that provided little room for individualism, collective action or a positive Indigenous agenda (Coates, 2008: 4-5).

Not only did the Indian Act seem to be a colonial instrument for the destruction of indigenous cultures and nations, but it was argued by some—including Taiaiake Alfred and Pamela Palmater— that this particular legislation quite poorly mapped the boundaries and frontiers between “real” Indianness and Others. Taiaiake Alfred openly expressed concern that state definitions of Indian and Aboriginal were over-inclusive. In a somewhat light-hearted manner, Alfred noted in one of his popular writings that, “[i]n Canada, we seem to let anyone and their dog call themselves Aboriginal and give whomever full consideration as one of us!” (Alfred, 2000b). More seriously, however, “[t]he trend in Indian communities themselves,” Alfred wrote in one of his academic tomes, “is toward exclusivity” (Alfred, 1995: 175). For Alfred, the unease with broad inclusivity was particularly pronounced with
respect to authentic indigenous culture. Alfred argued that Canadian state definitions of Indian were “based on a notion of Indian status and membership that demands no community consent, no participation in the culture, no knowledge of language or history” (Alfred, 2000a). Indian status, for many, was a legal category that was silent on the cultural component of Indianness; culture, in contrast, was central to Indianness.

Diverging from this view, Pam Palmater—and other Indigenous women that have raised issues around exclusion, such as Sharon McIvor, Jeannette Corbière Lavell and Sandra Lovelace Nicholas—have called attention to what is, in their view, an underinclusive statutory definition of the Indian (Palmater, 2011). Writing before recent statutory amendments, Palmater pointed out that the Indian Act, 1985 (as it was amended by Bill C-31) was alienating for “rightful members”—individuals who should otherwise be recognized by their ancestral First Nation but for the Canadian state’s control over the legal identity (Palmater, 2011: 53). Other Indigenous scholars, however, advocated for a return to a community-focused approach to determining membership, one based on indigenous cultures and traditions: “one should seek alternatives that would serve to decolonize that state by returning to Aboriginal communities their authority to define community membership according to their own traditions and rules that are seen to be legitimate by the community members themselves” (Peach and Bourassa, 2009: 3).

But in rejecting colonial diktat, the reconstitution of Indianness in the last decades of the twentieth century served to fracture the seemingly unified voice of indigenous resistance against the legal and constitutional discourse promulgated by the settler state. Informal authorities and experts—mostly from indigenous ancestry themselves—took on significant influence throughout some of the Indian social body, developing divergent
views on Indianness. The emerging indigenous intelligentsia, which included prominent activists, academics and leaders in Aboriginal political organizations, sought out a new answer to the question, “who is Indian?” One feature of the emergent discourse was challenging settler discourse with a definitive boundary between Indian and Other rooted in an authentically indigenous understanding. But this is where any accord amongst Indians faltered. What it means to be Indian—especially “authentically” Indian—erupted into a fierce debate that only intensifies with the increasing knowledge about Indianness that was continuously cultivated by the emergent “Indian experts” and “Indian technicians.” In foregoing the neat colonial division and definition of the Indian Act, the state-imposed distinction between settler and Indian, the discursive preoccupations of Indians at the end of the twentieth century ushered an unstable—oftentimes shifting—conception of Indianness.

**Culture and the “Apple”**

Although there was near consensus amongst the emerging indigenous intellectuals on the limiting and dominating effects of colonial policies that defined and delimited Aboriginal identity, the debates that emerged in the Post-Red Power era gave rise to new questions about the borders and parameters of Indianness that Indians themselves would draw. Rejecting colonial prescriptions of Indianness, found in Canada’s Indian Act and in various American legal decisions and state statutes, the “word warriors” and “Indian technicians” who promoted a “made-in-Indian Country” definition of Indianness were preoccupied with the regeneration and rejuvenation of an “authentic” Indian identity, a version of Indianness that held significant liberatory potential for meaningful decolonization. However, the construction of a newly decolonized division between Indian
and Other was far from straightforward as the seemingly well-ordered distinction held. Indeed, not all of those who stood on the dominated side of the colonized-colonizer divide found themselves included amongst the Indians with whom they had always identified. Indeed, the debates that emerged since the 1970s demonstrated the protean nature of “Indianness.”

The debates over the composition and limits of Indianness were heavily focused on problems of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the basis for which would entail the construction of new boundaries of Indianness. These inclusionary and exclusionary compulsions were particularly salient in the discursive treatment of race and culture, as well as the space—both physical and notional—that Indianness would occupy. In fact, in drawing such a boundary, Indian Country ran up against the issue of cultural and racial hybridity that had come to characterize much of Aboriginal social life in the late twentieth-century. As the Aboriginal scholar Chris Andersen noted as recently as 2008, “biological, cultural and linguistic “mixedness” constitute a social fact for all Aboriginal people” (Andersen, 2008: 353). This fact called into question the neat division between Indian and the colonial Other that the anti-colonization imperative had sought to reform and served to amplify the debates over who could be counted as authentically and really Indian. “Among the most vexing issues afflicting Native North America at the dawn of the twenty-first century,” wrote Ward Churchill, “are questions of who does or does not hold a legitimate right to say he or she is American Indian, and by what criteria—whose definition—this may or may not be true” (Churchill, 1999: 39).

Rejecting colonial definitions of Indianness did not assuage the fears and anxieties that many Aboriginal peoples continued to harbour from the early days of the Red Power
era. Debates around cultural membership had begun in earnest during the late-1960s and into the 1970s, and were intensified throughout the 1980s and onwards. Many social activists, indigenous intellectuals, and other recognized authorities in Indian Country, couched the anti-colonial imperative of indigenous cultural survival in terms of “tradition,” setting this particular conception against the colonial “modern” culture. Commenting on this in the early 1990s, Vine Deloria Jr. recognized that “[t]he recent Indian activist movement has attempted to recoup the lost ground and return to the culture, outlook, and values of the old days” (Deloria Jr., 1992: 236). Prominent texts by members of this cadre of “word warriors” expressed the critical need to return to what was held out to be traditional Aboriginal society. “At the core of the crisis facing our nations is the fact that we are being led away from our traditional ideals by the people with the authority to control our lives,” wrote Taiaiake Alfred in his 1999 indigenous manifesto, *Peace, Power, Righteousness* (Alfred, 1999: xv). Alfred explained the urgency, “[b]y ignoring traditional teachings, Native people risk losing what they most need to survive as indigenous people, and move closer to the cultural vortex of the other, foreign, collectivity” (Alfred, 1999: 5). It was the very rhetoric that juxtaposed a decolonized “traditional” indigenous society with the imagery of a cultural vortex that underwrote fears of assimilation and a collective sensibility that any alternative culture would further colonial goals of eliminating Indianness. At the same time, however, expressions of cultural dangers informed discursive reactions to individuals that—by most accounts and evaluations—found themselves in such a “cultural vortex.”

Not all members of the indigenous intelligentsia had adopted the sharp contrast between traditional Aboriginal culture and that of the “other, foreign, collectivity;” still,
many indigenous writers and prominent figures in the anti-colonization movement considered assimilated Indians as a problem to the survival of indigenous society. George E. “Tink” Tinker, a professor of American Indian Cultures, wrote, “[t]here is something wrong in a situation where someone claims a vague attachment to one community, yet practices a ceremonial life of another community as a way of living out one’s Indianness” (Tinker, 2001: 59). This perspective, which was reminiscent of the Red Power rejection of “Brown bureaucrats” and “Uncle Tomahawks”—who were regarded by many in the ‘new’ Indian leadership of the time as “cultural traitors” and assimilated Indians—evoked the question around the dangers of including Indians who had little or no loyalty or no apparent filiation with what some saw as authentic Indian culture. For Tinker, the problem of counting such individuals—those whom Tinker saw as racially “white” in spite of their Indian racial pedigree—as Indians would corrupt traditional Indian culture:

Do Indian communities have any obligation to receive these long-lost relatives, now void of any bit of cultural competency, back into our midst? ... After several generations of their being White, how will we suddenly teach them a whole new set of habitual responses to the world? Unfortunately, culture—that is, habitual patterns of behavior—is very difficult to change. What happens invariably and ironically is that these “Whites,” who see becoming Indian as a source of personal salvation for themselves, actually introduce the insidious and wicked virus of individualism and ego, the cornerstones of the culture of their rearing, in the Indian context. Thus, wanting to learn Indian culture, they end up
introducing White culture into Indian culture as a viral contamination (Tinker, 2004: 51-52).

These propositions about individuals who sat on the divide between Indian culture—particularly the highly-touted “traditional” variants, however expressed and espoused—and white, western, colonial culture introduced into the new discourse another figure which eventually gained significant traction in more general circles of Indian Country.

Arguments around cultural “contamination” proffered by Aboriginal intellectuals resonated with some in the anti-colonization movement, and found a home in nearly all corners of Indian Country. Suggestions that some particular Indians, though racially secure in their physical appearance and biological heritage, could potentially threaten the existence of Aboriginal society by their mere presence, drifted into the consciousness and everyday colloquial discussions of Indians. "Apples," as these figures came to be known, threatened to obscure the boundaries between the Indian Country that some anti-colonial Indians sought to establish, and the communities and spaces of the colonial Other. "An "apple,"

"as one indigenous legal scholar explained, "is a term used by many to describe one who is “red outside and white inside.” It means that the one called an apple is not truly and
[sic] Indian, because they don’t think or act like an Indian, even though they appear Indian. The apple has deviated too much from the archetype" (Lomayesva, 1999: 65). This “archetype” varied by Aboriginal community, yet the jargon around the “apple” remained relatively consistent across indigenous differences where the term had gained a derisive connotation (Kulchyski, 1995). The usage of the designation was deployed in both formal and more casual discussions about authentic Indianness, adopted idiomatically and without much controversy by some Natives Studies scholars as well as some of the
Indigenous population. As one Native commenter related: “A lot of my family and friends say that there are Natives,” continuing to stress the distinction, “and then there are what they call apples, people who are red on the outside but white on the inside” (Fitzgerald, 2007: 166).

Set apart as a distinct category, the “apple” had been targeted for suspicion by “real” Indians. Brock Pitawanakwat was explicit about this anxiety, noting that among indigenous peoples, “Many of us fear being accused of what the Plains Cree refer to as moniyakaso; that is, “acting or behaving as a white person”” (Pitawanakwat, 2006: 32). The “apple” was portrayed in much of the literature as the figure who not only abandoned his or her Native culture, but wilfully participated in the attrition and outright destruction of their ancestral indigenous society. The “apple” epitomized colonialism incarnate, what Taiaiake Alfred described as “Aboriginalism.” As Alfred sets out, “Aboriginalism” is a “perversity,” an “identity of assimilation, in which Onkwehonwe are manipulated by colonial myths into a submissive position and are told that by emulating white people they can gain acceptance and possibly even fulfillment within mainstream society” (Alfred, 2005: 23). The existence of the “apple” served as a cautionary reminder to remain vigilant against the cunning of colonialism. As Alfred went on to add, “Onkwehonwe who accept the label and identity of an aboriginal are bound up in a logic that is becoming increasingly evident, even to them, as one of outright assimilation—the abandonment of any meaningful notion of being indigenous” (Alfred, 2005: 23-24).
Language and Identity

Discussions and debates around cultural membership and the criteria for acceptance often encompassed more specific talk about the importance of indigenous language to the cultural revival of Indianness. Thus, Verna St. Denis remarked that, “[I]anguage as an important sign of one’s cultural authenticity continues to pose a challenge for many Aboriginal people. Although there have been many calls for Aboriginal language maintenance and reclamation, Aboriginal languages are continually dying” (St. Denis, 2007: 1077). In March of 2008, the Assembly of First Nations—the national Canadian organization that represents First Nations peoples—conducted a two-day focus group on Aboriginal identity and membership issues. This focus group was comprised of “First Nations technicians from across the country representing on and off-reserve interests, including, youth, Elders and women representation” (AFN, 2008a: 3). The final report highlighted the substantial concern harboured by Aboriginal people around language and its connection to Indian identity: “Participants considered the loss of language to be a component in loss of identity, robbing First Nations of their ability to self-identify; an ability which reflected their inherent capacity to distinguish themselves as a nation from others” (AFN, 2008b: 7).

While language may have been treated as a distinct component from culture in the more philosophical and theoretical works that originated in the post-Red Power years, in popular writings, language worked itself into the cultural index of Indianness that could demarcate genuine Indianness from Otherness. As Taiaiake Alfred remarked, “Native languages embody indigenous peoples’ identity and are the most important element in their culture” (Alfred, 1999: 136; emphasis added). Others similarly observed that, “Aboriginal
people maintain it is impossible to separate language and identity. Language is perceived as the quintessence of a culture” (Asante, 2005: 16). The significance of language in drawing the boundary between Indian and non-Indian was seen mostly in symbolic and rhetorical calls for decolonization. It was recognized that, after centuries of coerced assimilation, very few Indians actually spoke their ancestral languages. As Alfred wrote several years later, “the vast majority of Onkwehonwe do not speak their ancestral languages” (Alfred, 2005: 245); nonetheless, Alfred added, “our survival as [indigenous] peoples is dependent upon the survival and revitalization of indigenous languages” (Alfred, 2005: 247). For the fortunate few who did speak their Native language, however, this was a boon to their cultural credentials as legitimate Indians.

In practice, whether or not one could speak their Native language figured into calculations of Indianness in often-varied ways, intensifying when the situation called for evaluations of linguistic competency as an indicator for acceptance as Indian. Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle pointed out that authentically “traditional” Indians could be readily distinguished by their ability to speak their indigenous language; in their words, fluency in a Native language was “evidence of real Indianness” (Deloria Jr. and Lytle, 1984: 233). Indeed, some questioned the generational divide and linguistic cleavage between the older generation of Native language speakers and the younger indigenous generation:

Too many Aboriginal youth today prefer to speak one of the nation’s official languages. These youth daily subject themselves to all manners of media influence, the bulk of which are transmitted in either English or French. Despite this trend, many Native youth believe themselves to be full members of their respective First Nation society. They insist that they
are Aboriginals, but they differ slightly in thought and practice from their parents and grandparents (Friesen and Friesen, 2005: 149).

This complaint, that the indigenous youth of the most recent generation did not speak much of their ancestral language, moderated the hard-line view that only “real” Indians spoke their Native tongue. Be that as it may, fluency in one’s indigenous language was a considerable brand to exhibit in defence of one’s claim to authentic Indianness.

**Racial Mixing**

By the end of the twentieth-century, racial sensibilities had nearly saturated the ongoing debates and contestations around Indian identity and membership in Aboriginal communities. After decades of intermarriage and other interracial unions between Indian and settler, the emergent discourse on Indianness had seized upon the problem of the vast number of descendants of such relationships. This was particularly amplified when, in response to several court cases in the 1970s brought by Jeannette Corbière Lavell, Yvonne Bedard, and Sandra Lovelace on the ground of gender discrimination, the Government of Canada reversed some “marrying-out provisions” in the Indian Act that had prohibited many women from First Nation membership. As a result, some women who had married-out could now return to their natal communities, along with their mixed-race children. This gendered discrimination prevailed while Indian men could retain their status in “mixed-race” unions, but also pass status to their non-Indigenous spouse and the children produced of this “mixed” union.

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10 Mary Eberts has remarked that, “[a]lthough it had been rare for a white woman to marry an Indian man, by the 1960s the practice had become common enough to be cause for concern to Indian women” (Eberts, 2014: 151).
Going by any number of permutations to the racial-mixing trope—“mixed-blood,” “mixed-race,” “half-breed,” half-blood,” and so on—the progeny of multiple racial heritages presented an additional threat to the making of a rejuvenated and authentic Indian community. Indeed, the presence of “mixed-blood” Indians threatened the precision of the anti-colonial descriptions of racial membership in Indian Country, blurring the sharp boundary that marked the discrete categories of Indian and Other. Here, evaluations of Indianness relied heavily on biological markers of race in order to cultivate the vision of an “authentic” and “real” Indian community. This was principally the case among those who viewed their membership in Indian Country as racially secure. In a passage for *How Native is Native if You’re Native?* Drew Hayden Taylor alluded to this phenomenon, noting the sharp reversal of attitudes within Indian social quarters in recent times:

> When I was growing up, I remember that the more "Native" you looked, i.e. dark skinned with prominent Aboriginal features, the lower you were on the social totem pole (no cultural appropriation of West Coast symbolism intended). White was in and Native people (and no doubt many other ethnic people) tried to look it, dress it and act it. Those that didn’t were often made fun of. Being dark was no lark. In the Caucasian world, people whose family history included a drop or two of Native blood bent over backwards to keep the scandal a secret. The skeletons in those closets would thrill anthropologists and museums the world over. These days, it’s

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11 It is important to note the gendered discrimination of the colonial administration of Indigenous membership that, prior to the 1985 Bill C-31 amendment to the *Indian Act*, men with Indian status could “marry-out” and retain their status, as well as pass status onto their non-Indigenous spouse and the children produced of this “mixed” union.
a completely different ball game. Native is in. The darker you are, the more you are embraced and the more Indian you are thought to be. The lighter your skin, the more difficult it sometimes is to be accepted by your Aboriginal peers (and the non-Native world). White is no longer right (Taylor, 1999).

Indeed, racial sensibilities had shifted within some Indigenous communities in the late twentieth-century, welcoming biological measurements and physical appearance as indices of Indianness.

Racial taxonomies proliferated across Indian Country during the Post-Red Power era. While the racial criteria that had been used by the colonial state to define and delimit Indian identity received vocal condemnation by most activists sympathetic to anti-colonization efforts, the discursive reaction by Aboriginal people in the 1970s and onward went great distances to cultivate the new Indian/Other distinction on similarly crafted parameters. Indeed, anti-colonization, in some circles, rested on the ease by which an Indian could be visibly distinguished from members of other races; this was particularly germane with respect to white people. For Indian elites who could stake an uncontested claim to Indianness, the “mixed-blood” represented the triumph of white, settler society over Indianness: “[t]he full blood, the noble savage, carries associations of preconquest wholeness, unsullied “first-ness” … [t]he mixed blood, however, carries connotations of all that has been conquered, stolen, sullied, and extinguished in 500 years,” wrote Nancy Thalia Reynolds (Reynolds, 2009: 69). These tropes, designed to underwrite an organizing narrative around race, blood, and Indian membership, were not rare assertions cast by obscure characters in the pursuit of decolonization. In fact, some of the leading texts of the
1980s through the 2010s on indigeneity and Aboriginal identity are rife with corresponding representations of “mixed-blooded” Aboriginal individuals as subversive of “authentic” and “real” Indian identity. As the 2007 Encyclopedia of American Indian Literature entry on “Mixed-Blood” pointed out, many Native writers have recognized that “racial blending” has exacerbated the erosion of tribal identity (Brown, 2007: 233).

This fear of the erosion of Indian identity through racial mixture was widespread, though not the same in every Indian locale or Aboriginal community. Pamela Palmater, for instance, has observed that, “[o]ften, fears of assimilation are really fears about loss of blood purity, and the reaction of some Indigenous groups has been to reinstate blood quantum as a band membership criterion” (Palmater, 2011: 182). Indeed, assertions of cultural survival were often masked by desires for racially “pure” Aboriginal communities, spaces that would be home to presumably “real” Indians, the likes of whom would leave little question regarding racial group membership: “some tribal spokespersons now advocate a “racially pure” Indian people among their own tribes” (Jaimes, 1995: 140). As Taiaiake Alfred so strongly asserted at the end of the 1990s, “we believe that being Indian is in the blood” (Alfred, 1999b).

Such racial rhetoric, prevalent in some Native texts of both popular writings and academic treatises since the late-1970s, was progressively taken up in some quarters of Indian Country. The logic of the blood and biological link to the Indian racial category and the distinction between “real” Indians and that ambiguous group of “mixed bloods” who

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12 See, for example, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn’s Anti-Indianism in Modern America: A Voice from Tatekeya’s Earth (2001). Clifton Hill, a Red Power advocate, likened mixed-race Indians to the ‘sons of the evil one,’ a reference to the biblical Parable of the Tares: “Some of the half-breed and mixed-blood and educated Indians, they’ve always wanted to rob the poor, the full-blood, the country Indians. They’re just like the ‘tares in the wheat’” (quoted in Steiner, 1968: 114).
threatened the vision of a racially homogenous Indian Country, found a convenient formulation in terms of “blood quantum.” Blood quantum, a measurement introduced into North American indigenous societies by early settlers as a system for assigning group identity, rested on the “degree of blood” as a metric to ascertain one’s proximity to racial purity, “placing greater value on a “full blood” than a “quarter blood”” (Clifton, 1989: 27). But blood quantum was deployed by Indians themselves in the resistance to settler discourses and, importantly, to draw sharp, discernible and computable boundaries between Indian and Other. Such a scale, where “full bloods tended to be seen as the “really real,” the “quintessential Indians,” as the Princeton educated Cherokee professor of sociology, Eva Marie Garroutte, observed, was shored up by a rationality that was simple to explain, and just as easily adopted into the anti-colonization project of racial homogeneity in Indian Country (Garroutte, 2001: 225). Indeed, as one Aboriginal contributor to the indigenous periodical *Indian Country Today* recognized, “Blood quantum” has been code for competence, entitlement, authenticity, acceptability and a host of other attributes” (Berry, 2010).

This racial reasoning—which discursively fashioned Indianness as racially contingent—bestowed a sense of certainty around Indian membership to those deemed to be “full bloods” but, at the same time, cast a pall of suspicion over those who were viewed as racially ambiguous. “Concerns are often raised about the authenticity of the mixed-bloods. They are viewed dubiously by those who claim to be full-blood Indians” (Dhooper and Moore, 2001: 214). Indeed, there was a racial prestige associated with being “full-blood” in Indian Country, a status that was sustained by the more popular belief that one’s Indian blood quantum was a generalized measurement of one’s Indianness and of the
extent to which one had been, or was vulnerable to being, assimilated into settler society. As one study pointedly concluded, “many reservation residents have a persistent notion of a division of the reservation population into mixed bloods and full bloods. These notions carry over into tribal politics because they in turn carry associations of people being more assimilated into the dominant society or more traditional and resistant to assimilation” (Braun, 2008: 76).

Pronouncements on racial mixedness held more significance than mere distinctions between those who were presumed to be able, by dint of their racial pedigree, to successfully stave off the social and cultural influences of the dominant, white society. The “mixed-blood” and “mixed-race” trope was also charged with stereotypes of how “pure-blooded” or “full-blooded” Indians saw authentic Indianness, how visual markers of race and the phenotypical expression of the degree of one’s Indian blood determined where one stood in respect to the Indian/Other division. Despite centuries of racial mixing, there has been an emergent discourse on Indianness, since the late 1960s, that believes that Indianness is to be understood as racially homogenous. As one indigenous commentator wrote as recently as 2000, “[i]mplicit in this discussion [of authentic Indianness] are notions of racial or ethnic purity which, given the reality of intragroup contact throughout history, are virtually impossible to achieve” (Brayboy, 2000: 418). That same writer continued, noting that, “[i]f an individual does not have the right blood quantum, he/she is less likely to be considered authentic, since there is a certain physical appearance involved” (Brayboy, 2000: 419). Apart from one’s cultural and social orientation, according to this argument, being a “real” Indian necessitated a high degree of visual transparency. Racial mixing, it was reasoned, diminished the stereotypical dark skin colour that had long since
set the Indian visually apart from all others, especially white settlers. Indeed, as the renowned Native studies scholar, political writer and activist, Jack Forbes maintained, “with the mixture of bloods the “Indian disappears. He is “blanched” out, becoming “white,” or is darkened, becoming “black,” or he is placed in a “Half-breed,” non-Indian category” (Forbes, 1990: 24).

Some accounts of racial Indianness from the late-1970s and onwards were heavily invested in the physical appearance of individuals. Indianness, as some descriptions maintained, rested on the received image of the Indian as a red person: red in skin colour but with other bodily features that could easily distinguish Indian from Other (see Fitzgerald, 2007: 175 and Valaskakis, 2005: 231). Reflecting on his own First Nation, Taiaiake Alfred described the sentiments that emerged in Kahnawá:ke in the late 1970s and early 1980s around race and the physical markers of what was viewed as authentically Indian: “[m]ost members felt that “Indian” physical characteristics were ideal because they helped an individual identify himself as an Indian, and represented the difference between Indians and non-Indians” (Alfred, 1995: 170). Speaking of Indian Country more generally, Devon Mihesuah points outs that, “[t]he color of one’s hair, eyes, and skin are the barometers used to measure how “Indian” one is,” continuing to add that, absent the stereotypical racial characteristics, “[i]f an individual doesn’t “look Indian,” she is often suspect for claiming Indian identity” (Mihesuah, 1999: 27).

Indeed, racial mixing and the idea of a racially heterogeneous Indian Country, by the 1980s at least, had come to be considered by many Indigenous people as an object of fear, a threat to the internal composition of racial Indianness and a danger to the Indian/Other distinction. This concern was suggested in something of a decree by the prominent Lumbee
scholar, Dean Chavers as recently as 2009. In a chapter entitled “Fake Indians” and devoted to exposing dozens of celebrated Indians as non-Indians and without “sufficient blood,” Chavers was explicitly disdainful of individuals who claimed Indian identity based on very tenuous and distant relations, particularly those individuals whose only claim to Indianness came from a “Cherokee grandmother.” Chavers concluded the essay with a candid word of vigilance: “Beware of folk claiming their Indian ancestry too strongly. They just might be fakes” (Chavers, 2009: 51). Apprehension—amplified by the increased attention to blood quantum—was magnified when questions of an Indian’s ancestral bloodline were brought to bear on whether or not they were actually Indian. The Indian who protested too forcefully about their lineage to an indigenous ancestor might draw greater social scrutiny to their claims to Indianness. For many indigenous peoples, it had become commonplace to hear an “imposter” assert blood descent through an imaginary “Indian princess.”

Even Indigenous feminist thought was not immune to the logics of race, blood, and Indian identity. In the very early days of the 1980s, two Indigenous women, Mary Two-Axe Earley and Jenny Margetts, advocated for gender equality in the Indian Act, yet also drew upon the thematics of blood and blood quantum to underscore the boundary between the Indian and other. As the President and Vice-President of the advocacy group Indian Rights for Indian Women (IRIW), Margetts and Two-Axe Early announced that “IRIW members have come up with options to discriminatory clauses of the Indian Act. They recommend that a person with 1/4 Indian blood be registered as a status Indian and that the blood line follow either the mother or the father” (IRIW 1980: 8). The racial-reasoning extended to those may have acquired “Indian status” through marriage, as well as adopted children that
were not racially Indian. The IRIW stated that “[n]on-Indian children adopted by Indians should enjoy residency rights only, until their [sic] age of majority” and that “those non-Indian women who gained status through marriage should lose their status” (IRIW 1980: 8–9).

Racial imagery was also invoked by others within the burgeoning indigenous intelligentsia to demarcate mental, spiritual and affective states of difference between Indian and non-Indians. This was particularly evident in the Indian/White Manichean dichotomy deployed in anti-colonial rhetoric. Jeff Corntassel, a Cherokee academic, portrayed this contrast by borrowing from his Native language. “Ani-yunwiya,” Corntassel explains, “means real or principal people” which is in sharp contrast to “Yonega,” the “term for white settlers” (Corntassel, 2006: 35). Corntassel added that, “[p]erhaps as much as skin pigment, terms like white or settler describe a mindset or belief system. Clearly these are not principles for Ani-yun-wiya to emulate or mimic. How would our ancestors recognize us today? As Ani-yun-wiya or Yonega?” (Corntassel, 2006: 36). These references to whiteness, which were abundant in some streams of anti-colonial thought, worked in ways that racially coded Indianness—as the “red” race—as the morally superior division of people, especially in relation to whiteness. This was apparent not only in academic treatises, but also in Native-produced arts, which had in the same manner taken up racial metaphors and significations that pitted Indian against white. In a 1977 essay penned by the celebrated indigenous artist Buffy Sainte-Marie entitled “Victims No More,” Sainte-Marie spoke to the contrast between “whites” and Indians, stating that, “The whites carry the greed disease. It kills some of them, and most of us” (Sainte-Marie, 1977). Sainte-Marie, however, is hopeful as she writes: “[t]he white veneer of Canadamerica [sic] is
rotting of its own diseased values, but my nation of Sunskins is fruitful and young, tough and gaining experience, becoming immune to the breath of cannibals” (Sainte-Marie, 1977). These racial representations did little to mitigate racial difference; instead, they served to exacerbate the racially imbued distinction in the everyday language of Indians.

Racial sensibilities also figured into the imaginings of a decolonized Indianness. As one indigenous scholar remarked, “knowledge of specific indigenous bloodlines—ties to specific nations, bands, families, and individuals, particularly to living elders or illustrious ancestors—can serve as a catalyst for the recuperation of an integrated and successful contemporary American Indian identity” (Allen, 2002: 177-178). The rhetoric of resistance was rife with commentary on the blood/race linkage to the essences of Indianness. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, an influential authority within the indigenous scholar community and elsewhere, underscored the blood/racial connection of Indianness, asserting that “relationships based on blood have been a tenet of survival and identity in native enclaves from the beginning and continue to be” (Cook-Lynn, 2007: 145). Taiaiake Alfred stated as much in 1999 when he wrote that membership amongst and within Indianness “is a matter of blood and belonging” (Alfred, 1999: 85). Indeed, “Full-Blooded” Indianness came to define the conceptually flawless Indian, if only in idealistic visions of a regenerated community of “real” Indians. Though practically unattainable, the formation of decolonized racial categories rested on this symbolic logic that maintained that Indian blood could be separated from the blood of the Other.
Gendered Indianness

The making of decolonized categories of Indian and Other rested heavily on discursive constructions of race and culture, yet the inherent indices that were promulgated in key texts and other popular publications were not always gender-neutral. In tracing anti-colonial discourse, one finds increasing attention to and concern with the role of women as actors in racial and cultural considerations of Indianness. In fact, debates about cultural and racial mixing seemed to disproportionately hone in on the domestic relationships that women maintained, both as parents and partners. As the bearers of the future generation of Indians, women were invested with a separate set of racial and cultural codes that supported anti-colonization attempts to revitalize authentic Indian society. Many in Indian Country worried quite vocally about the qualities—both racial and cultural—that young Indians would exhibit and whether or not efforts at decolonization would be undermined by the actions and attitudes of Indian women. To be sure, women were morally charged with raising “authentically” racial and culturalized Indians, reproducing and populating an “authentic” Aboriginal milieu in Indian Country. Such sentiments, common since the 1970s, stoked anxieties about Indian women and the racial and cultural backgrounds of the male companionship who they kept, as well as the possible offspring of such relationships.

Indian women were a critical element in the anti-colonization project of regenerating Indianness. Nowhere was this all-important role more evident than in the reinforcement of racial distinction between Indian and Other. Concerns around the presence—and problem—of mixed-race individuals were traced back to the mixed-unions that had produced such progeny. But it was indigenous women, specifically, who bore the
brunt of this attention. Speaking of the community sensibilities around womanhood in Indian society, Taiaiake Alfred related the view from his own indigenous background:

In the Iroquois view, women were by nature responsible for the perpetuation of the community, in terms of both physically giving birth and preserving the culture through child-rearing and education. They were innately concerned with stability and the common weal (Alfred, 1995: 78).

More generally in respect of most indigenous cultures, however, Kim Anderson’s 2000 book, A Recognition of Being: Reconstructing Native Womanhood, reiterated this point. There, Anderson pointed out that, “[m]otherhood was an affirmation of a woman’s power and defined her central role in traditional Aboriginal societies” (Anderson, 2000: 83). Alfred later repeated this perspective of motherhood in traditional Aboriginal culture. In his 2005 treatise, Wasáse: indigenous pathways of action and freedom, Alfred described the pre-colonial and traditional gender order of things in his home community: “women’s roles were defined in accordance with their power and responsibility to maintain the culture and care for the families and to enable the men to defend the nation” (Alfred, 2005: 84). While Alfred also advocated for a wider role for women in anti-colonization undertakings, this gendered division of responsibility in the resistance to colonial forces was widespread throughout many Aboriginal communities, especially in Alfred’s own First Nation of Kahnawá:ke.

Whether or not it was truly a “traditional” custom in Indigenous societies that pre-dated colonial contact and settlement, Indian women were nonetheless saddled with the
responsibility—both morally and physically—to preserve the racial and cultural composition of Indian Country and insulate the boundary of Indianness from outside intrusion. Indeed, motherhood and child rearing in Indian Country carried connotations of a separate morality and this was especially true in Kahnawá:ke up to and including recent times. A number of postcolonial studies have investigated how the nation was secured through these gendered practices. Ann Stoler, for instance, examines how motherhood shored up European social defences against Indonesian cultural influences (Stoler, 1995; 2002). Similarly, Partha Chatterjee’s studies on nationalist resistance to British colonial presence in early 19th century India reveals how the “traditional” role of women was discursively refashioned in an attempt to “make modernity consistent with the nationalist project” (Chatterjee, 1989: 625). A parallel phenomenon has been observed in Kahnawá:ke. A set of documentaries produced in 2005 and 2008 by a Mohawk member of Kahnawá:ke reveals the depth that the discourse on racial mixing had penetrated into the more general social sensibilities. In 2005’s Mohawk Girls and 2008’s Club Native: How Thick is Your Blood? Tracey Deer documents the expectations of Mohawk women and the social and political tensions of motherhood and domestic relationships. She notes how popular belief continued to mark women as the stewards and protectors of the racial and cultural integrity of the community. One informant disclosed that social pressure had, for as long as she could remember, dissuaded women in Kahnawá:ke from seeking relations with individuals of different racial heritage, especially white men. The same informant goes on to underscore the essential role of women, acknowledging her presumed responsibility to reproduce a Native society, un tarnished by non-Native blood: “I only sought out Native guys. I was raised, you know, you only date Native guys, don’t even think about non-Native.
I didn’t even think about non-Native guys, it wasn’t an option because it’s your job to perpetuate the nation as a Mohawk woman” (Deer, 2008).

For others still, mixed-race unions induced anxieties around the security of Indian culture. As Jo-Anne Fiske and Evelyn George have observed, “[a]n underlying premise of much of the legal and social scientific literature is that women who do not reside in First Nations reserve communities and/or who marry and have children with non-First Nations partners constitute a threat to community solidarity by virtue of cultural difference” (Fiske and George, 2006: 19). This concern was particularly pronounced in some of the writing of Elizabeth Cook-Lynn who had taken exception to Indians who took up domestic relations with non-Indians. Those Indians who engaged in mixed-race relationships would, Cook-Lynn feared, invariably assimilate to the culture of their non-Indian partners (Cook-Lynn, 2007: 145). But while Cook-Lynn’s pronouncements on mixed-race coupling were general in nature and without reference to a specific gender, in practice Indian women were nevertheless held to such strictures more often than their male counterparts. The Native Women’s Association of Canada, for instance, underscored the entrenched attitudes around the expectations of womanhood and motherhood, pointing to a “male establishment” that had been instituted in Aboriginal communities which introduced and defended patriarchy as a “traditional trait” (Blaney, 2003). Indeed, as Fiske and George observed, “women who ‘marry out’ are constructed differently,” adding that whether Indian women who “marry out” of their natal communities “reside for long or short periods off the reserve, in nearby communities or more distant urban centres, they are viewed as having ‘lost’ cultural oneness with their communities” (Fiske and George, 2006: 19).
This patriarchal thinking—and its link to “traditional Aboriginal culture”—was exhibited in a number of communities since the 1970s. Indeed, those “male governments and organizations” that had become entrenched in Native societies by the colonial state in the last decades of the twentieth century and had become acutely concerned with racial and cultural survival, largely denounced Indian women who had taken up familial relations—marriage or otherwise—with non-Indian men; this was especially aggravated when the domestic union was with “white” men. Taiaiake Alfred explained that this was an indigenous initiative and that the gendered perspective was a reflection of “real tradition”:

The Indians complained. They didn’t want white men coming into the community because the women have more of a responsibility within the culture regarding the land, there’s more of a responsibility to keep within the culture. So it’s a weird mixture of what today seems like bias, sexual discrimination. It looks like men discriminating against women but at the same time it’s putting more of a real traditional emphasis on the roles of the women, saying in essence the women are more important in the culture and there’s a higher responsibility on them (Alfred quoted in Barnsley, 2000; emphasis added).

In principle, social objection of those who engaged in cultural or racial mixing was not to be filtered by gender; in practice, however, the nascent patriarchal sensibilities of anti-colonization strategies trained popular aversion on women and moderated any judgment reserved for Indian men. The Sawridge case highlights the unevenly applied standard. In Sawridge v. Canada, it was fervently maintained by three First Nations from Alberta—Sawridge, Sarcee, and Ermineskin—that it was a matter of tradition that “woman follows
man.” That is, when a woman marries a non-Indigenous outsider, then the woman must leave the band. This custom, however, did not apply to men, despite the resistance to racial-mixing. As Joyce Green observed in her studies of the communities involved in Sawridge, “invoking tradition seemed to be instrumental as a means of protecting other interest” (Green, 1997: 172). As a result, men in the communities escaped racial-mixing prohibitions, while women were subject to “involuntary exit.”

In the mid-1980s and continuing to 2017, the Sawridge Band of Alberta sought to restrict membership eligibility of women who had previously “married-out” of their Indigenous community, particularly in respect of cultural considerations. Analyzing the case, Caroline Dick noted that, of the numerous arguments proffered by the Sawridge Band against admitting these women (despite their state recognized Indian status) “is the cultural commitment of the women themselves” (Dick, 2006: 100; see also Green, 2001 & 1997). Dick goes on to point out that, “[n]otions of Aboriginal authenticity figure prominently in this argument. Having lived away (and frequently because they were required to do so) from their reserve communities since choosing to marry non-Indian men, these women are presumed to be less concerned with the welfare of their natal communities and less interested in preserving traditional Aboriginal values” (Dick, 2006: 100-101). In an interview, one of the individual plaintiffs for the Sawridge Band confirmed the anxieties around women who married out and wanted to return to their Native community. Catherine Twinn, the spouse of the chief at the time, explained that these women would introduce “conflict, stress and problems,” referring to the married out

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13 The Sawridge First Nation has mounted a number of failed legal defenses of its exclusionary membership code. The changes to the internal politics of Sawridge are discussed in greater detail in the Conclusion.
women as “strangers” (quoted in McKinley, 1997). As the story reported, “[i]n time, she [Catherine Twinn] fears, the “strangers” will “destroy the land base” of the reserves” (McKinley, 1997).14

**The Urban-Reserve Divide**

The anti-colonial imperative of self-determination and the desire of indigenous peoples to construct decolonized identities also held material implications for visions of a liberated Indianness. Part of the “traditional” aspect of the discourse on Indianness seized upon the spatial boundaries as demarcations between “authentic”—and thus decolonized—Indians and those who blurred the lines of racial and cultural distinction. Indeed, the “apple” and the mixed-blooded Indian stoked greater anxieties than the mere symbolic representations they held. Indian lands and territories, namely reservations set aside by the state, figured quite prominently in the Indian/Other calculus of determining who was Indian and who was the Other. The early notions of the reservation found in the debates of the Red Power advocates saw this space as a site for the metaphorical rearmament of “traditional” Indian culture. Yet, in the decades that followed, concerns around the racial and cultural permeability of the fixed, geographical locations of the reservation matured and intensified in parallel with anxieties around racial and cultural mixing. In other words, the desire for cultural and racial homogeneity in Indian Country required the fortification of geographical distinctions particularly from those figures who threatened to obscure the safety of such spatial divides.

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14 Recent Indigenous feminist thought has developed nuanced perspectives on “tradition” and “traditionalism.” In the Conclusion, I discuss the limitations of the narrow interpretation of tradition used in this thesis and how Indigenous feminism has challenged this view.
In the mid-1990s, Drew Hayden Taylor observed that there were popular assumptions made about Indianness that suggested a territorial consideration of “authenticity.” Taylor commented that, “there are many people who live on these reserves who feel you aren’t a proper Native person unless you are born, live and die on that little piece of land put aside by the government to contain Indians” (Taylor, 1996). Taylor would later—in a separate article—relate a personal anecdote in this respect:

Another friend of mine severely criticized another friend because she had made the decision to live in the city, while friend number one had moved back to the reserve. Friend number one felt that one could only be Native, or really be called an Aboriginal person, within the confines of those artificial borders. Even though friend number one had moved back home in his mid-thirties, having never lived on a reserve, having grown up in urban environments. I think he officially considered himself, finally, to be an Indian (Taylor, 1999).

Taylor’s firsthand yarn of the significance of the reservation to genuine Indianness was not idiosyncratic to his circle of friends. Since the Red Power era, ideas about Indianness had merged with geographical location and, in many regards, established the foundations of Indianness within the material parameters of the Indian reserve. In terms of decolonization and the rejuvenation of genuine Indianness, Taiaiake Alfred remarked that, “[r]eservations are viewed as useful for grounding their sense of Indian identity” (Alfred, 1995: 175). As one other indigenous scholar added, “while reservation borders exist as vestiges of forced removal, colonialist domination, and whitestream greed, they are also understood as
marking the defensive perimeters between cultural integrity and wholesale appropriation. They are the dividing line between “us” and “them,”” (Grande, 2004: 110). For many, however, the Indian identity that was linked to the reservation community served to exclude, rather than reinforce pre-colonial sensibilities around racial and cultural mixing.

From the perspective of some anti-colonization contemporaries, the contrast images of modern urban centres and traditional Aboriginal community illustrated the picture of an idyllic setting in the contemporary social consciousness of Indian Country, set in a time before indigenous peoples had been untroubled by colonial forces. The rural/urban division appealed to an aesthetic that valued a countryside environment that was free of the ruination and defilement that white, colonial society had wreaked upon the unspoiled, pre-contact Indian Country. In the words of one Elder, the urban centre is a “cancerous growth” (AN, 1983). This sort of representation—though by no means a reflection of the contemporary reality—sketched the possibility of a decolonized alternative of Indian Country, as rejuvenated in its geographical boundaries as the correspondingly rejuvenated Indians who would populate this utopian space.

In fact, the perceived security that the boundaries of Indian reserves furnished privileged those with unambiguous racial pedigrees and cultural heritage, effectively dividing “reserve Indians” from “urban Indians.” “[W]e can see the emergence of “new Indians”,” wrote several indigenous scholars in 1999, explaining that these “new Indians” entailed a constituency of “native people living away from reservation communities” (Josephy, Nagel and Johnson, 1999: 7). Some popular and scholarly members of the Indigenous intelligentsia—though not all by any means—were openly apprehensive of
such individuals on moral, racial, and cultural grounds. In the *Unjust Society*, Harold Cardinal described urban Indigenous leadership as alienated from the reserve base:

> The new National Indian Council never could establish a solid, representational base. The membership and the leadership of the council was constituted to a high degree by the urban and marginal Indian population.” … “The leadership came from those Indians who had moved to cities and, in many cases, were employed by the government. The reserve or rural communities were suspicious. Indian organizations which were based on the reserve communities were cautious about involvement with the National Indian Council and eventually that suspicion proved a fatal weakness (Cardinal, 1969: 110).

The urban setting, many argued, constructed a space that was set apart, both notionally and physically, for the collection and settlement of “non-rooted marginal Indians” (Alfred, 1999: 143)—“apples” and “mixed-race” Indians—aggregating these figures together as one group of individuals, individuals with some racial or cultural link to Indianness, but viewed as having forsaken their ancestry for the mainstream, dominant society.15

The problem of the urban Indian emerged as a response to past assimilatory attempts by the colonial state in efforts to effectively erase or destroy cultural Indianness.

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15 See Bonita Lawrence (2004) for an extended discussion of the urban-reserve divide and the tensions this demarcation holds in debates around Indigenous “authenticity” and decolonization: “Alfred and other theorists who adopt the notion that the only sites where Nativeness still exists are the reserves, such as Elizabeth Cook-Lynn (1998), essentially consider the Indigeneity of all nonstatus urban mixed-blooms to be terminated. ... By declaring the Nativeness of urban mixed-blooms to be terminated, these theorists simply add to the messages that urban Native people already receive from the dominant culture, that Nativeness and modernity are inherently contradictory” (Lawrence, 2004: 80 – 81).
For some, the urban Indian was a cause for concern to anti-colonization efforts, especially the “retraditionalization of Indian individuals and communities” (Josephy, Nagel and Johnson, 1999: 7), where the reservation had come to be predominantly viewed as “a place to conduct ceremonies and social events, a place to maintain cultural identity” (Lone-Knapp, 2000: 636). Given the primacy of the reservation as a locus for cultural consolidation and the center for “retraditionalization,” urban Indians came under considerable suspicion when returning to the reserve—or other Aboriginal communities—claiming an Indian identity. An Elder related that cities and urbanized centres “attract our children to that place and they come back broken; damaged and twisted human beings. They come back that way or they come back with no minds at all” (AN, 1983). The argument here rested on the assumption that Indians who had moved to the city or other centres where they comprised a racial and cultural minority, had necessarily assimilated to the worldviews of the dominant society and had therefore abandoned their Native culture.

Such sensibilities were particularly germane upon the return to Indian Country by the urban Indian. As recently as 2001, Tink Tinker openly asked: “what do we do with “thin bloods” who have for some generations lived outside of the national community and now, at this late date, want back in, for whatever reasons?” (Tinker, 2001: 67). This thinking, which highlighted the urban/reserve distinction that informed “real” Indianness (as well as drawing on the metaphor of blood), cast the claims of the urban Indian to legitimate Indianness under a pall of distrust and rejection. “Such suspicions and concerns about the motives and authenticity of urban Indians who return to the reservation are manifestations of the tension that characterize urban-reservation relations” (Nagel, 1996: 194). It is true, as Peter Kulchyski maintains, that “Urban Aboriginal peoples, in particular,
are often sensitive to the question of identity,” whereas Native people living in the rural and remote settings of the reserve “have tended to be more secure in their sense of identity” (Kulchyski, 1995). However, the concern around urban Indians was compounded by considerations of blood ancestry, as Tinker’s remark suggests.

Racial and cultural distinctions were discrete considerations of authentic Indianness, but in terms of the urban Indian, they were viewed and treated as the same by many reservation-based Indians. The urban milieu, it was held, was diametrically at odds with “traditional” Indianness, the sort of Indianness that only the reserve could sustain. Cities and settings that were largely populated by non-Indians, put the Indian at considerable risk of losing his or her cultural footings. “For many of them [urban Indians], by far the majority of their time is spent surrounded by white people” (Lawrence, 2004: xv). The result of this cultural immersion, some claimed, entailed the “disappearance into the American mainstream” of “real” Indians (Cook-Lynn, 2007: 145). Indeed, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn candidly expressed her fear of Indians entering urban conditions, particularly young students who leave for educational opportunities in the city, stating that impressionable Indians,

from Indian reservations now make up a thriving middle class, a professional class of spokespersons [for Indianness] who often try to eat, think, and work Indian but, more often than not, “sleep white,” to use the slang of reservation vernacular. This means that intermarriage between Indians and nontribal people results in the assimilation of this class of native professionals and very often eventually takes them out of the communities from which they emerged. Some [including the “white
overseers,” to use Cook-Lynn’s language], of course, believe this is a good thing. Others disagree” (Cook-Lynn, 2007: 145).

Indeed, many Indians who had invested the security of culture and race behind the lines of the reservation agreed with the sentiments expressed by Cook-Lynn. As Bonita Lawrence observed, urban Indians are “[o]ften challenged by reserve Indians for their lack of knowledge of traditions, or for the fact that their families appear to have attempted to assimilate” (Lawrence, 2004: 133).

**Ward Churchill: “Ethnic Fraud”**

The problem of mixed-race Indians and “apples” reached near fever pitch in the years 2005 to 2007 when one of the most widely recognized Indians had been exposed for the transgression of having far too little Indian blood to be styled and accepted as an Indian. In what became known in some Indian circles as “L’Affair Churchill”—a term popularized by the prominent Native rights activist, Suzan Shown Harjo—Ward Churchill, a professor of ethnic studies, prominent indigenous activist, former co-director of the American Indian Movement of Colorado, and author of numerous anti-colonial texts, had been revealed as an “ethnic fraud” (Harjo, 2005b; see also Cook-Lynn, 2007b). Until 2005, Churchill’s self-identification as an Indian had received little suspicion. After all, Churchill had been a highly outspoken and visible indigenous activist against colonialism and an enthusiastic contributor to the liberatory movement of indigenous peoples across North

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16 A number of incidents have developed around other high-profile figures with questionable claims to Indigenous racial identity and heritage. In recent times, author Joseph Boyden (see Jorge Barrera, 2016: “Author Joseph Boyden's shape-shifting Indigenous identity”) and academic Andrea Smith of the University of California, Riverside (see Scott Jaschik, 2015: “Fake Cherokee?”) have had their ancestry publicly questioned. Shania Twain's claims of Aboriginal heritage have also been the subject of public scrutiny (see Jackie Bissley, 1996: “Canadian singer's status charges ancestry debate”).
America. In this regard, Churchill had worked tirelessly in solidarity with the anti-colonial movement and had become recognized as a champion for indigenous peoples through his publications that were critical of the colonial state and settler society. Investigations into Churchill’s racial genealogy and his assertions of certain degrees of Indian blood quantum unravelled his claims to Indianness, at least his racial claims.

The popular recognition of Ward Churchill as a bona fide Indian rested with his claims to certain amounts of blood quantum. For as long as anyone could tell, Churchill had always claimed that he was 1/8th Creek Indian through his father’s lineage and 1/16th Cherokee along his mother’s ancestry (Churchill, 1992). For many, Churchill’s self-identification as an Indian, together with some infrequent statements of his blood quantum over the years, was enough to recognize Churchill as such. Yet suspicion had arisen over his assertions of fractions of blood quantum, coupled with the observation that Churchill was “Caucasian in appearance” (Harjo, 2005a). An investigative report by the Rocky Mountain News out of Denver, Colorado in 2005 delved into Churchill’s ancestral claims, examining his genealogy in great detail. In part 4 of a multi-article enquiry, it was revealed that, “an extensive genealogical search by the Rocky Mountain News identified direct forebears of Churchill and turned up no evidence of a single Indian ancestor among them” (Flynn, 2005). In response to this news, many in both the academic and native activist community began publicly denouncing Churchill as a “Pseudo-Indian” (Harjo, 2005b), as a “wannabe” and “deplorable imposter” (King, 2005) and as an “ethnic fraud” (Cook-Lynn, 2007b).

Following the revelation that Ward Churchill was not an Indian by blood quantum, the authoritative voices of renowned indigenous scholars and Native organizations, such as the American Indian Movement (AIM) Grand Governing Council, weighed in on the
controversy surrounding “L’Affair Churchill.” In 2007, the AIM “Ministry for Information” took the unusual step to issue a public communiqué regarding Churchill’s standing as an Indian. In its statement, the AIM noted that, “Churchill has fraudulently represented himself as a member of the Keetoowah Nation of Cherokee Indians of Oklahoma, which he is not. When challenged to show proof of any Indian ancestry he waves an associate membership card that at one time the Keetoowah Nation would give to anyone who would promise to help them” (AIM, 2007). Indigenous scholars—many of whom enjoyed similar prominence in the AIM—repeated the trope of “identity fraud” and fraudulent representation of Indianness. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, writing in the indigenous journal that she founded, Wicazo Sa, in an essay entitled simply, “Scandal,” echoed AIM in denouncing Churchill as a fraud, noting that, “his claim to be an American Indian is also a fraud; it is “identity theft” plain and simple and therefore a crime … He has been unmasked as a man who has desperately wanted to be an American Indian for most of his professional life, but is not” (Cook-Lynn, 2007c: 86).

Yet, in spite of his dubious blood quantum claims, there were some who were willing to overlook Churchill’s blood linkage to Indianness and instead, recognize Churchill as an Indian for his cultural connection. Among Churchill’s supporters was Russell Means who had gained international recognition as an indigenous political activist after joining the American Indian Movement at its infancy during the Red Power era of the late 1960s. In 2005, just as the scandal around Churchill’s blood quantum was coming to light, Means had provided an introduction to Churchill at the University of Colorado where he was to deliver a speech. In his introduction, Means remarked that, “Ward is my brother. Ward has followed the ways of indigenous people worldwide” (Means, 2005). But Means had more
to say to the attacks on Churchill’s blood quantum, particularly those critics who had seized upon Churchill’s tenuous racial connection to Indianness. “And I don’t care,” Means added, “about his sixteenth, or three-sixteenths [of blood quantum]—he’s what counts. And his writings are proof. I cannot convey to you the amount of pride we have in Ward Churchill, and the amount of pride he gives us, the sovereignty he gives us” (Means, 2005). Means ended his introduction, his polemic against Churchill’s detractors, by pronouncing him an Indian, drawing on blood quantum measurement of Indianness as a metaphorical device: “I want, from this day forward, every media person nationally, internationally and locally to know that we have ascertained that Ward Churchill is a full-blooded Indian leader” (Means, 2005). Resisting the racial discourse of Indianness that took blood quantum as one of its criteria, Means had instead appealed to the cultural aspects of Indianness to implore recognition of Ward Churchill as an Indian. In the years that followed “L’Affair Churchill,” Means’ plea was silenced by a near consensus that Churchill’s minimal—or non-existent—blood bond to Indianness had disqualified him as an Indian; all of this despite Churchill’s commitment to Indian cultural survival.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the discursive construction of decolonized indigenous categories and those “other” Indians who saw themselves on the colonized side of the colonial divide yet who were also subjects of the exclusionary politics that emerged in the decades following the Red Power era. The analysis that I present here privileges the generalization of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness that was only beginning to take shape in the late 1960s—following the moment of colonial cultural hegemony—but became a sophisticated knowledge about Indianness as the twentieth century came to a
close. To be certain, there were a number of discourses on Indianness that laid claim to rightfully accounting for Indianness at work in localized and specific states. In this chapter, however, I wanted to examine how ideas of race, culture, gender and space saturated discussions and debates around a decolonized ideal of Indianness and how the boundaries between Indian and Other are politically and socially conceived.

Late twentieth century depictions of Indianness, as they were developed by a flourishing cadre of informal experts—drawing indigenous scholars and Indian celebrities into its ranks—were deployed as a response to state definitions of Indianness. These authorities were preoccupied with the contours that colonial legislation, statutes and policies in both Canada and the United States had imposed upon the frontier between Indian and Other. From the 1970s and intensifying thereafter, debates about who was really Indian and what it meant to be Indian escalated. These discussions, however, drew attention to the key actors in the debates wrestled with the question of “authentic” Indianness and where the distinction between Indian and Other must lie. To do so, they appealed to racial and cultural hierarchies, as well as spatial and gender stratifications, to develop prescriptions for inclusion.

The anti-colonial imperative to organize definite Indian identities was complicated by the existence of individuals who could not be neatly separated into either Indian or the Other introduced new categories of Indianness. Racial mixing—which had occurred since contact between indigenous peoples and settlers—produced the “mixed-blood” or “mixed-race” Indian who, as some argued, threatened the certainty that stark differences in physical appearance afforded to racial distinctions. Moreover, racial mixing carried with it the suggestion that a “mixed-blood” Indian held allegiance to his or her non-Indian racial
heritage, thereby jeopardizing an already culturally and racially fragile Indianness. In a similar fashion, the “apple” emerged in discourse as an additional Indian subversive. The “apple,” whose cultural sensibilities called into question his or her cultural fidelity to Indianness, was the very figure incarnate of assimilation: racially Indian yet absorbed by the dominant, mainstream society. Moreover, language use had arisen as a new criterion by which one’s authentic status could be determined, and new suspicion was cast on those who had either grown up off reserve or moved to urban areas.

Each of these discursive significations—the “mixed-race” Indian, the urban Indian, and the “apple”—who threaten the Racial-Traditionalist criteria of Indianness were either muted or pronounced, depending upon gender and geographical considerations. It was argued that women bore the burden of reproducing authentic Indian progeny that would sustain Indianness into the future. Yet for those Indian women who took up sexual relations with non-Indian partners, the mixed-blooded offspring who were produced cast a pall on the woman’s claim to Indianness as well as that of her children. The urban Indian was similarly stigmatized as subversive. Even the racially secure “full-blood” Indian could be transformed into an “apple” by dint of his or her residency vis-à-vis the “Rez.” Reserve Indians saw the urban Indian as a fellow national out of his or her element when living in the city, far from the protection of their natal cultural milieu. The fear, it was insisted, was that the urban Indian invariably accepted the norms of settler society, develop affective ties to the dominant culture and, as Elizabeth Cook-Lynn worried, disappear into the mainstream.

In the following chapters, I continue to focus on the precepts of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse and discuss how Foucault’s ideas of biopower and disciplinary
power were deployed as solutions to the categories of Indianness that blurred the
distinction between the colonizer and the colonized. In chapter three, I examine the
regulation of race and culture in Indian Country by indigenous governments, how Band and
Tribal Councils treated the Indian population as a strategy for biopolitical resistance to
colonization. In chapter four, I discuss how the notions and norms of the Racial-
Traditionalist discourse produced “Indianized” selves and bodies in Indian Country. For
both disciplinary and regulatory power, I want to highlight how the Racial-Traditionalist
discourse has naturalized Indianness in terms of race and traditional culture and how both
the Indian population and the individual body are normalized in a society organized
through those tenets.
Biopolitics and the Construction of Racial Community in Indian Country

In 1987, a then-pregnant Cindy Sawka received a letter from her band council, the Sucker Creek First Nation, which contained an order for eviction. It was not an eviction notice requesting that Ms. Sawka vacate a band-owned house; rather, the eviction notice was a demand that she leave the First Nation’s territory. The grounds for her banishment, as the band council explained in the notice, rested with Ms. Sawka’s domestic arrangement with a non-Indian partner—a white man—and their forthcoming offspring, a child who would, inevitably, be mixed-race. As the letter explicitly stated, “this is an Indian reserve, not a Métis colony” (Crossingham, 1987). By the mid-1980s, as I demonstrate in this chapter, such administrative arguments from indigenous governance structures had become commonplace in some Indigenous communities, especially as they were under great pressures for providing housing with significantly limited financial funding from the federal government. Beginning in the 1970s and rapidly escalating from the 1980s and onwards, indigenous aspirations and instincts for decolonization and regeneration concentrated heavily on cultivating a particular racial milieu in Indian Country.

The wide use of the terms “regeneration” and “decolonization”—that were propagated by the emergent Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness—came to mean a number of things for Aboriginal peoples in the last half of the twentieth century. I argue that, for many Aboriginal authorities, these expressions were coded idioms for racial segregation. Racial boundaries were crucial to the regeneration undertaking that transformed Indian Country in the late twentieth century. Social policies developed by indigenous governments during this period instituted a whole economy of management of race, attentive to the domains that were instrumental to fulfilling racial visions of a
“decolonized” Indian Country. Indeed, Indianness, as a mass phenomenon, could be governed per se, but it was at this historical juncture that biopolitics and the mechanisms of biopower—instead of classical sovereign-power in the Foucauldian sense—were exercised by some Indigenous authorities to achieve the ends of racial decolonization and regeneration.

In this chapter, I examine how Aboriginal peoples in Indian Country—namely certain Indian reserves—constructed their own communities that were subject to a set of membership criteria underwritten by the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness. In the analysis that follows, I use Michel Foucault’s ideas of biopower to inform a critical inquiry into the anti-colonization projects that have spread in some Indigenous communities from the 1970s until today. I argue that the anti-colonial imperative of a decolonized indigenous identity, coupled with the notion of self-determination that was sustained by the Racial-Traditionalist discourse, legitimized the administration of numerous life processes by Indian authorities. Here, I show how Foucault’s notions of population and regulatory power describe and explain the exclusionary practices of formal Indian governance structures, such as Band and Tribal councils, which were invested in a politics of racial difference and intensely concerned with internal threats to Indianness.

Policies, statutes and other instruments enacted and employed by Indian band and tribal councils in the decades since the 1970s are striking for the immense interest that these structures expended in planning and securing an “authentic” Indian milieu. In what follows, I investigate how domestic arrangements—which included familial and sexual relations—as well as the spatial domain of Indian Country, raised political concerns for the
vitality of Indianness. Indeed, these sites generated noticeable anxiety around the racial composition of Indian Country. It was thus put to the governance of Indianness, not as an individualizing aspect, but rather as a mass-level problem in need of intervention. The response of some Native authorities and similar governing structures entailed biopolitical management to plan life in contemporary Indian Country, and to control the threat and circulation of certain social dangers.

**Foucault, Power and Biopolitics**

Michel Foucault, as is well known, was interested in analyzing and developing theoretical perspectives for analyzing power in its various forms. In this section, I discuss Foucault’s interests in biopolitics and the developments in the regulatory aspect of the power over life that he advanced. Biopower is perhaps the least studied and understood aspect of Foucault’s vast body of original work for a number of reasons. To begin with, Foucault’s foray into biopolitics and regulatory power was never as focused as his attention was to the other interests he held. Unlike its modern counterpart, disciplinary power, which saw its own lengthy consideration in *Discipline and Punish*, we are not privileged with any single volume devoted to a theoretical treatment of regulatory power (Collier, 2009; see also Macey, 2009). To be sure, both Rabinow and Rose describe Foucault’s lack of attention to developing biopower as a set of analytic tools for critical inquiry as merely “sketchy suggestions” (Rabinow and Rose, 2006: 197). Biopower and any theoretical consideration thereof, first appears in a somewhat truncated discussion in the last chapter of his introductory volume of *The History of Sexuality*.17 We first find the problem of the

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17 In that book, and later in interviews, Foucault variously promises to deliver a later volume committed to the problem of population, the central strategy of modern biopower and securitization. Foucault’s untimely
population as a strategy of biopower appear in the talks that were publicly delivered by
Foucault, and only published by his estate in recent years. But, while the impetus for the
lectures from this period was to address the problem of biopower and the population, it
seems that Foucault's interest shifted to other matters. Indeed, we see biopower and
population discussed only in some of the last lectures of *Society Must be Defended*
attempt is made to fully address the problem in *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978–1979), but
this project is quickly abandoned early into the lecture series for that year (Senellart, 2008:
328). Nonetheless, the lectures delivered from 1976 to 1979 at the Collège de France
provide enough foundational material to outline a general theory of biopower and its
functioning as a regulatory mechanism over life itself.

Towards the end of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault tells us that
what is at stake in questions of modern power is no longer solely the problem of law and
power over a defined territory and the rule of sovereignty over subjects therein. Rather,
modern power takes as one of its problems the question of the population and its biological
processes. Foucault recognized how certain processes of life were invested with biopower
insofar as power's imperative was no longer solely the sovereign-power privilege to “*take*
life and *let live*,” but rather to “make live and let die” (Foucault, 1978: 136; italics original).
As Rabinow and Rose point out, “the economy of contemporary biopolitics operates
according to logics of vitality, not mortality: while it has its circuits of exclusion, *letting die* is not *making die*” (Rabinow and Rose, 2006: 211; italics original). Like its modern contemporary of disciplinary-power, biopower was concerned with producing politically useful bodies. In the case of biopower, however, the target for regulatory intervention was mass or collective bodies, namely populations. Biopolitical interventions into the life processes of the individual bodies could be deployed to produce and manage a mass with certain utility, mobilized to effect certain ends. This rationality of power comes into sharp relief when we consider the terminal nature of sovereign-power from the classical age where power over life escaped at the point of death. The only hold that this classical form of power had over the subject existed up until the time the subject was put to death by the sovereign: “death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it” (Foucault, 1978: 135).

Indeed, biopower is assigned to the organization and administration of life rather than the sovereign prerogative over death (Stoler, 1995: 81). As Foucault states towards the end of volume one of *The History of Sexuality*, the technology of biopower is “to invest life through and through” (Foucault, 1978: 139).

In contrast to sovereign-power, biopower was formulated in terms of maintaining useful phenomena; life, instead, was valuable because it could be put to practical ends, inserted into strategic calculations that could maximize its potential. Life was not to be eliminated, as it was under the system of sovereign-power, but instead it was to be maintained: “Biopower therefore started to distinguish itself from “traditional” sovereign power not just because of its all-inclusive nature; it also addressed directly the “productivity” of life. It no longer concentrated on the individual and his property, through the power of law; rather it affects directly, and in a “positive” way, the biological processes
of the entire population” (Forti, 2006: 10). The “positive” mechanism of regulatory power, like disciplinary power, targets the potential of life, underwriting programmes for the management and improvement of biological phenomena. Indeed, “biopolitics designates a political economy of life aiming to administer, secure, develop and foster life” (Lemke, 2010: 429). And like disciplinary power, regulatory power aims to manage and organize life not by direct action upon the body, either the individual or society, but by ruling life “from a distance” (Legg, 2005: 139). The population, like the individual body, could be organized and mobilized in such a way as to extract “positive” effects of conduct without ever physically “touching” it, as was the manner in which sovereign-power had been exercised.

While this description resembles the “anatomo-politics” of disciplinary power, regulatory power’s concentration on life takes mass phenomena as its target. The biopolitics of regulatory power is not concerned with discrete, individual human beings, but the biological features and other variables of life that can be observed, aggregated and measured at the level of the population (Lemke, 2010: 430). As Foucault points out, the innovation of regulatory power was introduced when “Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a “people,” but with a “population,” with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables” (Foucault, 1978: 25). Individuals, not as subjectivities or defined subject positions, but rather as channels for population-specific elements, still play a role, albeit minimal in the analysis. Foucault is clear on this point, with respect to biopower and regulation, when he says: “The final objective is the population. The population is pertinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply the instrument, relay, or
condition for obtaining something at the level of the population” (Foucault, 2004a: 42).

While the individual body is born, lives, ages, then dies, it is the “massification” of these natural bodies into a collective phenomenon that is the target of regulation. That is, the mass of individuals could be regarded as a singularity in itself with characteristics that are irreducible to the individual. In short, it is human existence, not individual human beings, that is the object of biopower’s effects.

While Foucault had, for the most part, biological processes in mind when he was addressing biopower and regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics, such as birth rates and mortality, there was certainly more to biopower than these obvious phenomena. To be sure, the biopolitical management of the population was also concerned with any mass feature that could influence collective and socialized conduct (Rose and Valverde, 1998). Even the most seemingly benign occurrences or events could be counted among the objects for regulatory intervention. In his lectures after the publication of *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, Foucault points out that the technologies of security, those biopolitical interventions designed to defend society through internal mass regulation, entail not only mechanisms that have as their object the modification of biological systems, but also those that are specifically mechanisms of social control (Foucault, 2004a: 10). In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, for instance, Foucault sees the various flows of economic activity as the object for regulatory intervention. Nikolas Rose, who has taken up Foucault’s idea of biopower in his own works, has pointed out that the emergence of biopolitics has necessitated the spread of technologies into areas that include urban planning and health services (Rose, 2001: 1). What is important then, is that social elements with a behavioural influence on the conduct of populations, whether obvious or not, are to be managed by an apparatus of
administration. As Foucault has noted, regulatory biopower “will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework” (Foucault, 2004a: 20).

What linked these collective and mass phenomena back to biopolitics was the connection with the workings of knowledge about the population. Regulatory power, like discipline, operated through a “regime of truth” that was sustained by an apparatus of knowledge. “To rule properly,” Nikolas Rose writes, “it is necessary to rule in a light of knowledge of the particular and specific characteristics that are taken to be immanent to that over which is to be exercised” (Rose, 1999: 7). The reach of biopower into the facets of the population, in fact, is only rationalized through a calculative technology: “the operation of government was to be made possible by the accumulation and tabulation of facts about the domain to be governed ... government inspires and depends upon a huge labour of inscription which renders reality into a calculable form” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 283).

Biopolitical objectives can thus only be achieved through the collection and computation of a wide range of raw information extracted from society. All this is obtained by the production of various knowledge instruments, such as studies, inquiries, periodic surveys, and the like. Under a biopolitical regime, each domain of the population that is targeted for regulatory intervention must be analyzed and evaluated if it is to be effectively managed and controlled.

Foucault observed that this imperative to know the population and extract information was a new problem for government. The biopolitical response to the forces of nature quickly emerged with the birth of statistics. As Foucault noted, “[t]he mechanisms
introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures” (Foucault, 1976: 246). This observation prompts Foucault to further elaborate in his 1978 lectures at the Collège de France, entitled, Security, Territory, Population, that:

statistics, which had hitherto functioned within administrative frameworks, and so in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents. Statistics also shows that the population also involves specific, aggregate effects and that these phenomena are irreducible to those of the family: major epidemics, endemic expansions, the spiral of labor and wealth. Statistics [further] shows that, through its movements, its customs, and its activity, population has specific economic effects. Statistics enables the specific phenomena of the population to be quantified (Foucault, 2004a: 104).

Statistics, under a regime of regulatory power takes on political significance. In time, the governing framework—generally the state but also sub-state institutions—establishes a vast apparatus designed to collect greater amounts of knowledge, compiled into statistics. Through knowledge of the population and the spread of statistics, the population becomes the subject of action. To be sure, increased knowledge about the natural elements of the population became accessible, leaving the population open to increased manipulation by agents and transformative technologies (Foucault, 2004a: 71).

What appears natural, without the possibility of human control, is merely a façade that can be overcome. With the appropriate technologies, one can harness nature, work
with it, or make it work toward desired ends. In fact, biopower seeks to make nature both a scientific and political problem at once (Foucault, 1976: 245). As Dreyfus and Rabinow describe, the processes of the population were enveloped within the emerging human sciences. “What was first a study of population,” they note, “soon became political arithmetic” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 137). The “natural,” those phenomena that seemed to be grounded in domains beyond the control of humans, could be exploited to meet political ends, even if this was not immediately apparent. With the proliferation of the collection and analysis of information about society, the natural disposition of social life could be inserted into political programs. Disciplines such as statistics and demography emerged as the political knowledge that informed biopolitical programs for managing the population, making it possible to develop and design appropriate interventions of security (Legg, 2005: 140). Mechanisms of security largely entail practices of exclusion, normalization and methods of optimization (Lemke, 2010: 430). The population could therefore be improved—or possibly perfected—according to vital objectives: population specific phenomena, such as birth rates, mortality and life expectancy, can be observed, tabulated and then measured. Any sign of randomness in everyday life can then be managed. Indeed, regulatory interventions involve “having a hold on things that seem far removed from the population, but which, through calculation, analysis, and reflection, one knows can really have an effect on it” (Foucault, 2004a: 72). In this sense, then, the dangers of “natural” events and processes could conceivably be eliminated, or at least substantially reduced.

The critical objectives of biopower function in much the same way as disciplinary power acts on individuals. Like its disciplinary counterpart, regulatory power seeks to
normalize certain patterns, but at the level of the population. “The element that circulates between the two is the norm,” Foucault observed, explaining that, “[t]he norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize” (Foucault, 1976: 253). Governing a population by biopower, in fact, involves the normalization of mass-level processes, establishing averages and equilibria that constitute the “normal.” Regulatory power, Foucault explains, “is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall equilibrium” (Foucault, 1976: 249). The problem of normalization will involve establishing certain equilibria and determining how to maintain specific population level phenomena within a range of acceptability; or, as Foucault puts it, “within socially and economically acceptable limits and around an average that will be considered as optimal for a given social functioning” (Foucault, 2004a: 5). So, for instance, the problem of mortality and life expectancy might determine that a particular average age of death may or may not be satisfactory. Where it has been determined that a value for an average life expectancy falls outside the range of acceptability, biopower then demands intervention so as to return to “normal” conditions. Segments of the population, then, can present characteristics that may or may not be consistent with the “normal expectation” of the total population average. As such, the problem for normalization under regulatory power regimes entails a program or set of social incursions designed to “reduce the most unfavourable, deviant normalities in relation to the normal, general curve, to bring them in line with this normal, general curve” (Foucault, 2004a: 62).

Regulatory power is a mechanism of security designed to protect and maintain the normal by addressing the abnormal. At the same time that regulatory power is establishing
the normal parameters of the population it is also establishing abnormality. When addressing itself to questions of social phenomena, biopower “establishes an average considered optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Foucault, 2004a: 6). Regulatory power, in fact, is designed to compensate for adverse mass phenomenon and the emergence of the unacceptable at the level of the population. Regulatory mechanisms, as such, “compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field” (Foucault, 1976: 246). These normalizing mechanisms are installed to “bring the most unfavourable in line with the favourable” (Foucault, 2004a: 63). Whatever random events and occurrences produced the abnormality, the normal demands specific interventions to ensure the security of society from these deviances: “the norm provides the grounds not only for distinguishing “normal” and “abnormal” individuals and populations, but also for sanctioning intervention into both in order to ensure conformity or bring into conformity, to keep or make normal” (Taylor, 2009: 53).

The political question for biopower concerns the government of a vast and amorphous collection of individuals, and doing so by isolating the abnormal and marginal dangers to society (Brass, 2000: 317). In effect, biopower does not establish external enemies, but rather those who exist as internal dangers. Ann Stoler’s analysis of Foucault’s 1976 lectures on state racism underscores this aspect of biopower. Stoler notes that state racism is deployed as “a tactic in the internal fission of society into binary oppositions, a means of creating “biologized” internal enemies, against whom society must defend itself” (Stoler, 1995: 59; italics original). Depending upon the discursive urgency, biopower would organize tactical responses customized to address the danger. Medical discourses,
for instance, divided the ill from the healthy for the sake of social hygiene. Similarly, under the auspices of other human sciences, such as criminology, the criminal element of society could be divided from the lawful, securing society from not only crimes, but also criminal individuals. In each case, for each discourse, the vitality of the population is at stake; hence, the imperative of biopower that “society must be defended.” Such discourses, in fact, justified not one society waging war against another society, but instead provided the rationale for society to mobilize against its own members. In the sections that follow, I employ these conceptual tools of biopower, regulation and the security of society for a critical inquiry into the organization and management of Indianness—as a phenomenon—in Indian Country during the most recent decades.

**The Securitization of Indian Country**

Representations of Indian Country, which most often implied government designated Indian reserves but also other Aboriginal settlements, increasingly shifted away from antiquated colonial understandings in the closing decades of the twentieth century. More and more, as the 1970s passed into the 1980s and onto the 1990s, Aboriginal governments began to view Indian reserves less as spaces for settler domination and colonization; as time passed, the reserves were increasingly viewed as spaces for the cultivation of Indianness. Indigenous peoples had recognized that, as a minority, the critical markers of identity stood little chance of continued existence, much less proliferation, in white, mainstream settler society. Quite apart from mainstream society, Indian reserves appeared to be a permanent feature of Aboriginal life, a tract of land that was vested in the Crown, but “set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band,” as
identified in the Indian Act. Indeed, the Indian Act restricted reserve lands to the collective interest of First Nations, which included the exclusive rights to occupation and use by Indians. While the Crown exercised near complete dominance and control over how Indians used and occupied reserve lands until the late 1960s, the 1970s proved to be something of a turning point in how Indians used and occupied reserve lands. At this time, self-government agreements with the Crown, along with the piecemeal relinquishment of a number of regulatory powers to Indian bands by the government, opened up opportunities for Indians to exercise some administrative jurisdiction over the internal affairs of Indian Country. In response, some Indian governments began to implement biopolitical measures of security in some places of Indian Country, not just over the territory, but also over the population.

Territorial sovereignty, to be sure, was a critical feature of the Red Power political movement and figured quite prominently in the nationalist rhetoric of other indigenous resistance efforts. The Indian leadership that emerged in the mid-twentieth century was very much concerned with the encroachment of foreign states—which the Canadian and American states were largely regarded as—into Indian Country. The 1970 “Red Paper”—also known as “Citizens Plus”—response to the Government of Canada’s 1969 White Paper by the Indian Chiefs of Alberta, for instance, made it clear that certain territory was off limits to white society for expropriation (ICA, 2011). The Red Paper noted that, “[s]ince these lands remain as the aboriginal property of the Indians, it does not fall within the competence of any government to dispose of them in any way without the consent of the Indians” (ICA, 2011: 216). But at the same time, the initial discursive imaginings of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse were offering an alternative political use for indigenous
lands. The “Brown Paper,” a similar response by the Union of British Columbia Indians to the government's White Paper, viewed Indian reserves in a different light, pointing out that they were not just spaces of sovereign jurisdiction held by Indians, but that they also constituted the foundation for Indian identity preservation (Friesen, 1997: 232). This new perspective of territory, as spaces of Indian identity, underwrote the emerging rationale for Aboriginal governance. As one indigenous commentator observed, “while reservation borders exist as vestiges of forced removal, colonialist domination, and whitestream greed, they are also understood as marking the defensive perimeters between cultural integrity and wholesale appropriation” (Grande, 2004: 110).

The Racial-Traditionalist discourse cultivated the view amongst some Indigenous peoples that Indian reserves and other indigenous settlements were the geographic locations and bounded spaces of and for Indianness. Prior attitudes that reserves were inhospitable swathes of land, undesired by the settler society and thus designated for the indigenous peoples, shifted to a new understanding among some Indigenous people as an enclosure for the “securitization” of Indianness. This is the problem of territory that Foucault observed in Security, Territory, Population, wherein he observed:

we see the emergence of a completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out. No longer the safety (sureté) of the Prince and
his territory, but the security (sécurité) of the population and, consequently, of those who govern it (Foucault, 2004a: 65).

This is highlighted by the following point made by one scholar of Native politics: “as bad as conditions on reserves were, they were often understandably regarded by Native peoples as not only a last refuge, but as home” (Palmer, 2009: 386; italics original). That is, irrespective of the often bleak material conditions, although they were important and played a significant role in Red Power political demands, the idea that Indian reserves held substantial immaterial political importance and potential for Indianness began to influence the objectives of Aboriginal governance.

As the Racial-Traditionalist discourse circulated throughout Indian Country, it also shaped the sensibilities that informed the mode of governance that some Indian Bands and Tribal Councils assumed in the latter half of the twentieth century. Where land-locked Indian communities, and other “lands reserved for Indians,” as it is spelled out in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, left little agency for Indians to organize into political units, the 1985 amendment to the Indian Act—Bill C-31—permitted Indian bands to assume control over their membership.\(^\text{18}\) Section 10 (1) of the revised Indian Act states under the header of “Band control of membership” as follows:

\(^\text{18}\) As Furi and Wherrett explain, “Prior to 1985, automatic entitlement to band membership usually accompanied entitlement to Indian status. The 1985 amendments recognized the rights of bands to determine their own membership. As a result, persons may possess Indian status, but not be members of a band. Section 10 enables First Nations to enact their own membership or citizenship codes, according to procedures set out in the Indian Act. Bands must follow two principles: the majority of the band’s electors must consent to the band’s taking control of membership, and to the set of membership rules (which must include a review mechanism); and the membership rules cannot deprive a person of previously acquired rights to membership. Once the band controls its membership list, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada has no power to make additions or deletions, and no further responsibilities regarding the band list” (Furi and Wherrett, 2003: 5).
A band may assume control of its own membership if it establishes membership rules for itself in writing in accordance with this section and if, after the band has given appropriate notice of its intention to assume control of its own membership, a majority of the electors of the band gives its consent to the band’s control of its own membership.\(^{19}\)

While many responsibilities fell to Indian governments, the likes of which were typical of sub-state administrative bodies, there was a noticeably new approach to government adopted by many First Nations that address the problem of how Indians would now govern themselves _qua_ Indians. As Indians, the imperative of governance was the rejuvenation and management of Indianness. As Nikolas Rose explains, “\(^{19}\)[o]nce political power takes as its object the conduct of its subjects in relation to particular moral or secular standards, and takes the well-being of those subjects as its guiding principles, it is required to rationalize itself in particular ways” (Rose, 1999: 7). A striking example is found in the membership code of the Ehattesaht Tribe membership code under the section entitled, “The Ehattesaht Indian Band Council’s Philosophy of Government.” There, the philosophy states:

To strive for a better life for all Ehattesaht Members. The Chief and Council speak firstly on behalf of the Ehattesaht Children and secondly on behalf of the Ehattesaht Elders. We, the Ehattesahts, further state that the Membership Rules are the vehicle for the continuing existences of

\(^{19}\) _Indian Act_, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 at s.10 (1).
Ehattesahts as Aboriginal People and ensuring the longevity of the
Ehattesaht Communities by: Safeguarding all, what we were, what are now
and what we hope to be in the future as Ehattesahts [sic].

Of significance here is the implication that the governance over the membership in the
Ehattesaht First Nation is “the vehicle for the continuing existences” of the Ehattesaht
people. Where initial government functioning was concerned primarily with the
maintenance of territorial sovereignty, the new rationality for power’s exercise was the
problem posed by “phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population”
and its continued existence (Foucault, 2004b: 317). The opening recitals of the 2011
O’Chiese First Nation Membership Act serves as a further example:

    WHEREAS O’Chiese First Nation has the inherent right to determine our own
    membership based on our traditional cultural, values and beliefs; and

    WHEREAS the people of the O’Chiese First Nation shall ensure that only
direct bloodline descendants of our people are included as Members of the
O’Chiese First Nation;

    THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the following Membership Act is hereby
    enacted.

This transformation was a seizure of power not over land and territory, but rather a new
form of power—biopower—seizing the collective features of the "species" inhabiting a
given geographical region.
Biopower emerged as a strategic response for the rejuvenation of Indian Country when the population acquired Indianness. The politics of recognition and difference that marked the social transformation of Indian Country in the 1960s and 1970s had introduced a new and markedly heightened attention to collective features, each of which surfaced with considerable moral significance. Indeed, phenomena that are uniquely shared qualities, and irreducible to the individual, took on strategic importance in the emergence of biopower in Indian Country. Thus, a new political objective entered into the governing sensibilities of Indian Country whereby a dispositif, what Foucault variously described as a heterogeneous assemblage of administrative and knowledge structures, could be installed as a “security apparatus,” a mechanism of biopower (Foucault, 2004a; see also Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 120-122). As Foucault describes it, “the fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security, or, let’s say, it will be state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of ... processes intrinsic to the population” (Foucault, 2004a: 353). Increasingly from the 1970s and onwards, racial Indianness became an object of security in Indian governance: the processes of life were taken up in the administration of the population and regulation of race in certain Indigenous communities.

The Regulation of Indianness

The mid-1980s proved to be a turning point in the reproduction and regeneration of a racial order in Indian Country in Canada. Canadian Parliament passed a landmark in the optional delegation of authority from the federal government to Indian Bands in June 1985. What became widely known in Aboriginal political circles by its parliamentary notice paper
Bill C-31, *An Act to Amend the Indian Act* was instrumental in enhancing Band control over the internal affairs of life on Indian reserves (Furi and Wherrett, 2003: 4). “Under social pressure to grant greater self-government to Aboriginal peoples, the 1985 Indian Act was amended to include revisions that formally separated Indian status from band membership, granting bands responsibility for developing and managing their own membership, while Indian status remained in the control of the federal government” (UBC, 2009). Since coming into force, Bill C-31’s legacy of re-instating Indian status to some Indian women—which only partially removed discrimination against Indigenous women and was limited in terms of how many generations reinstated women could pass Indian status to descendants—who had lost this recognition for “marrying out” has largely overshadowed the ordering effects of other relinquished powers. Yet as important as the re-instatement of Indian status to some women and their children was, the grant of jurisdiction over membership to First Nations governments was as important to the social ordering in some parts of Indian County that ensued in the years and decades that immediately followed.

Less than two decades prior to this crucial transfer of power, Harold Cardinal expressed tremendous interest in the potential role that Indian organizations could play in the rebuilding and regeneration of Indianness. In 1969, Cardinal wrote in his seminal Red Power tome, *The Unjust Society*, that “[t]he political organization must be the core of an effort to redefine the word Indian in such a way that our people can begin to develop a positive sense of identity” (Cardinal, 1969: 164; italics original). Luminaries of the Red Power movement, such as Cardinal, saw the promise of rejuvenating Indianness through a sophisticated state-like apparatus. After all, it was the form of the modern state,
introduced, installed and exercised by settler society, which carried out the racial
integration and cultural assimilation of Indians into mainstream society. The solution was
evident, as Cardinal described the institutional apparatus and the particular functions
thereof. “These new institutions,” Cardinal stressed, “must be prepared to help Indians
develop their sense of identity. The function of such institutions will lie in the areas of
social rebuilding, psychological renewal and cultural renaissance” (Cardinal, 1969: 167). In
1985, when the federal government afforded a wide array of powers to Indian bands under
Bill C-31, Indian governments acquired a number of institutions that could engineer the
sort of “social rebuilding” that Harold Cardinal had envisioned.

Sovereignty over who was and who was not Indian was at the core of anti-
colonization efforts; “the crux of the problem,” Pamela Palmater observed, was “Canada’s
jurisdiction over the individual and community identities of Indigenous peoples”
(Palmater, 2011: 32). Described as a “powerful colonizing device,” a whole administrative
apparatus had been installed by the colonial state to manage Indianness through
“surveillance and intervention in communities and in the lives of individuals” (Milloy,
2008: 11). Band lists and band registries were particularly critical in this administrative
network. “As early as 1850, the colonial government in British North America began to
keep and maintain records to identify individual Indians and the bands to which they
belonged. These records helped agents of the Crown to determine which people were
eligible for treaty and interest benefits under specific treaties” (Belcourt, 2013). Over time,
records pertaining to individual Indians and bands were consolidated into a centralized
registry, maintained by the federal department responsible for Indian Affairs—which
shifted among ministries until the mid-1900s—and overseen by a designated office, led by
the Indian Registrar. Whatever these changes and refinements, the whole apparatus that included the Registrar and registry facilitated colonial intervention into Indianness through the surveillance of the population in Indian Country: “By registering births and determining the paternity of each child, band lists could be established and policed and a separation maintained between status and non-status Indians and non-Aboriginals” (Milloy, 2008: 11). For critics and indigenous authorities who viewed colonial control over Aboriginal citizenship or membership in this very light, the 1985 amendment to the Indian Act provided the administrative solution.

The Bill C-31 amendment to the Indian Act provided First Nations with the authority to control their citizenship. Bureaucratic institutions, both practices and organizations, which had long been the providence of the colonial state were transferred to the jurisdiction of Indians. Of significant importance was the new authority of Indian governments over Band lists and band registries. Indeed, the Buctouche Mic Mac Indian Band in New Brunswick—one of many First Nations that assumed control over administration of membership in 1985—left no questions regarding the jurisdiction over the Band list for its community. Section 2 of its membership code, explicitly under the heading “Administration,” stated that, “The Council of the Buctouche Mic Mac Indian Band, shall upon the commencement of administration, obtain the Band List provided by the Registrar of the Department of Indian Affairs.” Section 3 of the same code continues: “The Council of Buctouche Mic Mac Indian Band shall in accordance with Section 10(9) of the Indian Act maintain the list of persons known as the Band List formerly maintained by the Registrar of the Department of Indian Affairs.” With the acquisition and control over such an administrative apparatus, Indian Band Councils were now furnished with the same
regulatory technology of surveillance and instrument of documentation of Indianness that the colonizer once wielded.

Just as the colonial state had observed and chronicled data on the Indian population as a technology of regulatory power, now the authorities of Indian Country could “know” Indianness as a mass level phenomenon. Once adopted by Indian governments, a centralized registry of Indian membership could then be installed into a wider network of administrative control over Indianness. Indeed, Band registries and lists have become the object of scrutiny and calculation by more than one managerial body that is situated within an extensive bureaucratic apparatus.20

In fact, it is not unusual for the selection, ratification, and recording of legitimate membership to be separated into a complex of administrative bodies presiding over each of these aspects. Varily titled and recognized in band statutes as Membership Committees or Commissions, some under the moniker of Peace Maker Tribunal, these structures became integral to the apparatus of Indianness regulation in Aboriginal communities. The examples are substantial. To take one example to illustrate, consider the Sandy Bay Ojibway First Nation in Manitoba: the Sandy Bay Membership Code establishes the creation and mandate of such a regulative body, instituting the “Membership Tribunal,” “an appointed body of people from the Band members who will determine the eligibility for membership into the Band.” Once approved, a member’s name is entered into the band list, and a “file containing the Minutes of the meeting of the Tribunal” is maintained by the

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20 Many bands, in fact, have established multiple layers of management over the maintenance of individual records, inscribing these bodies in their membership codes and Band constitutions since acquiring jurisdiction in the mid-1980s. Since then, Band codes have established a number of authorities under which the management of the band registry fell.
Band’s own version of the colonial Indian Registrar, under the official title of “Membership Clerk.” The code goes on to state that, “A list of members shall be maintained by the Membership Clerk, appointed by the Chief and Council, who shall make additions and deletions according to provisions of this Code and decisions made by the Membership Tribunal within its authority as provided for by this Code.” Despite the striking similarity of bureaucratic structuring between the new Indian apparatus and the colonial model, Aboriginal governments did not carry out the policies of the Crown on the latter’s behalf, but rather as their own. Indeed, some Indian Bands instituted a modern regulatory institution as a framework to “restate” and “cultivate” a population of what many indigenous authorities saw as “real” Indianness.

The acquisition of membership jurisdiction and the establishment of regulatory institutions coincided with the preoccupations and anxieties of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness. The rhetoric around blood, culture, the mixing of each with non-Indians, which I detailed in the previous chapter, came into sharp relief when architects of the anti-colonial social order of Indian Country were fashioning the administrative mechanisms of regulation over Indianness. Perhaps nowhere were references to race, culture, and space so extensively marked out, defined, and delimited than in certain Indian membership codes and citizenship laws. The preamble to the Membership Code of the Ojibways of Onegaming—which outlines the purpose of the law—provides an example of this: “AND WHEREAS the members of the Onegaming Indian Band believe that the Indian blood line, language, culture and traditions must be preserved and enhanced.”
Membership codes targeted those classes of “lesser than Indians”—“mixed-blooded Indians,” “half-breeds,” and others who were seen as threats to authentic Indianness and anti-colonization efforts. The question of how these sub-categories of the Indian population would be dealt with by Aboriginal administrations were explicitly addressed in the Ojibway of Onegaming’s Band and Tribal Council policies and laws by privileging racial “purity.” As one indigenous commentator observed, in the immediate years following the acquisition of sovereignty over membership registries, the regeneration of Indianness on some reserves and in other Aboriginal communities has rested on purification efforts. “Bands have been in the process of “purifying” the membership lists,” we are told, “in the vain hope of trying to determine who “really belongs on a Reserve”” (McLeod, 2000: 447). “Who really belonged on a Reserve,” as it happened, was regulated through a range of biopolitical instruments.

In some Indigenous communities, race was politically treated as a biological phenomenon that could be regulated by the membership apparatus, overseen by the administrative bodies charged with the security functions—surveillance and management—instituted to produce an authentic Indian milieu. Certain communities determined membership largely by measures of an individual’s Indian “blood quantum.” As Pamela Palmater observed, the logic underwriting “blood quantum focuses exclusively on racial purity” (Palmater, 2011: 183; see also Dickason, 1982: 3; Garrouette, 2001: 230), operating under the same assumptions of the Indian Act’s second generation cut-off rule which “presumes that “real” Indigenous people are those with a deemed blood allotment of 50 per cent or more, and any with less blood quantum are somehow less Indigenous and therefore less capable of passing on their [Indigenous] identity and culture to their
children” (Palmater, 2011: 143; see also Weaver 2001: 248). As Palmater observed, anxieties around racial disappearance of Indianness came to a fore after generations of intermarriage and miscegenation between Indians and non-Indians. In response, Palmater remarked, “the reaction of some Indigenous groups has been to reinstate blood quantum as a band membership criterion ... in an effort to stave off dilution” (Palmater, 2011: 182).

Some Indigenous governments adopted the notion of blood quantum as a measure of race, some with more or less enthusiasm and earnestness. Writing in this regard, Kathleen Fitzgerald more recently posed the following, “Why does blood quantum still exist as a determination of Indianness? Whose interest does it serve?” “It appears that what began as a system of identification that works in favour of the federal government,” ... “now is being reinforced through its embrace by tribes and individuals” (Fitzgerald, 2007: 195). This was true for a number of reasons, variously proffered in arguments that worked to further entrench anti-colonization impulses for racial rejuvenation. Some scholars of indigenous politics traced the introduction of ideas of race within Indian Country to the “colonial bureaucratization of racist formulations of indigenous identity” (Green, 2009: 39). Others attributed the understanding of race as an expression of degrees of blood on a more generalized settler folk theory that captured widely held indigenous beliefs. As Bonita Lawrence remarked, “much of contemporary Native American concern about identity, with its mixed-blood/full-blood connotations, stems from attitudes and ideas fostered by the majority white culture” (Lawrence, 2003: 18). Yet despite its colonial and white culture overtones, certain Aboriginal governments did not reject blood quantum as a measurement or proxy to race.
Blood quantum was, perhaps, the most readily measurable metric of race that bureaucratic and administrative bodies could observe and manipulate. By ensuring that individual blood quanta were reported and recorded in some band registries, Indian governance could ascertain overall figures for the population with relative arithmetic ease. Additionally, such macro-calculations of individual statistics provided some sense of the performance of regulatory policies aimed at managing the general “redness” of Aboriginal communities.21

The Wausauksing First Nation in Ontario, for example, enacted blood quantum requirements that become increasingly arduous over the course of 20 years. In accordance with its membership code, a person born before April 17, 1990, had to demonstrate that he or she was of 50 percent First Nation blood; after this date, the blood quantum requirement increased to 60 percent. The code continues this upward trend, restricting citizenship in the Wausauksing First Nation to those with 75 percent First Nation blood for those born after December 31, 2010. Sections 4 and 5 of the Parry Island Citizenship Code under the header “Citizenship in the Parry Island First Nation” stipulates as follows:

4. Persons who were citizens, or were entitled to be citizens, of the Parry Island First Nation immediately before the adoption of this Code shall continue to be, or be entitled to be, citizens.

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21 In some quarters of Indian Country, Bands have begun to institute progressive or graduated blood quantum rules for membership perhaps, in part, because lower levels of Indian blood quanta, even amounts such as 50 percent for instance, still allow for some existence of racial ambiguity and evoke community concern. Many Bands and Tribal Councils have addressed these anxieties by codifying increasingly stringent blood quanta stipulations that escalate with the passing of time. Even those individuals with equal parts of Indian and non-Indian blood introduce certain social anxieties around the possibility of racial duplicity inasmuch that they might claim the privileges from both Indian and non-Indian heritages (Mawani, 2002: 50).
5. a) A person born before April 17, 1990, and who is not covered by section 4 above, is entitled to become a citizen of Parry Island First Nation if:

i) he or she can demonstrate that he or she has at least 50% First Nation blood and

ii) he or she is sponsored by a citizen of Parry Island First Nation and

iii) if the applicant is not related to a citizen of Parry Island First Nation, Council has approved the application.

b) A person born after April 17, 1990 but before December 31, 2010 is entitled to become a citizen of Parry Island First Nation if:

i) he or she can demonstrate that he or she has at least 60% First Nation blood and

ii) he or she is sponsored by a citizen of Parry Island First Nation and

iii) if the applicant is not related to a citizen of Parry Island First Nation, Council has approved the application.

c) A person born on or after December 31, 2010 is entitled to become a citizen of Parry Island First Nation if:

i) he or she can demonstrate that he or she has at least 75% First Nation blood and

ii) he or she is sponsored by a citizen of Parry Island First Nation and
iii) if the applicant is not related to a citizen of Parry Island First Nation, Council has approved the application.

Race and the Biopolitical Regulation of the Social Domain

From the late years of the 1970s and onwards, the social domains of Indianness became increasingly implicated in the regulatory management of race in Indian Country. In order to produce a viable population of Indians, Aboriginal governments focused on what Foucault had called “a whole politics of settlement (peuplement),” which included “family, marriage, education, social hierarchization” and so forth (Foucault, 1978: 149; italics original). The racial predicates of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse—which had influenced a number of Indigenous communities—transformed the antiquated and customary “governmentality” of Aboriginal governance into its contemporary, racial form. In the 1980s, the governmentality of some Indian band administrations and tribal councils had rapidly invested in the supervision and control of racial Indianness in their territories. To this end—managing the racial composition of Indian Country—families and other domestic relations took a central position in the regulation of race by certain Aboriginal governments.

Racially coded artifacts of traditional indigenous cultures sustained the logic of racial separation in Indian Country. Some indigenous authorities, particularly the class of indigenous intellectuals, drew support from Indian cultural and religious symbols for their argument that all races were naturally distinct and separate from one another. As the indigenous scholar, Gord Bruyere explained, “[i]n turning our attention to human beings, the Medicine Wheel teaches us that there are four kind of human beings, Red, Yellow, Black,
and White ... the Creator lowered those Four Races to Earth setting them off in different directions” (Bruyere, 2007: 263). In its most benign form, the interpretation of the Medicine Wheel represents one of many mythic creation stories long taught in certain indigenous cultures. Yet, in spite of its mythic roots, for some, the Medicine Wheel had come to represent both racial difference and the naturalness of racial division. In his influential book, Peace, Power, Righteousness, Taiaiake Alfred recounts such an understanding proffered by an acquaintance: “In the past, everyone knew who he or she was in relation to one another. I look at the medicine wheel and its message about the different races, and I think that somewhere our teachings probably talk about who we are as the red people in the medicine wheel” (Alfred, 1999: 10; emphasis added).

Contemporary conditions of racial mixing challenged the legitimacy of the four discrete races implied by the Medicine Wheel. The neat division between Indians—the “red people”—and the other races represented by the Medicine wheel was compromised by the fact that innumerable members of the Red race had, for centuries, mixed with members of the White, Black and Yellow races, producing offspring who did not fit into the distinct racial orders described by the wheel. As a result, mixed-race individuals became a cause for concern. This problem was the subject of an editorial published in 2003 by the notable and well-read Aboriginal periodical, Windspeaker, in an article entitled, “What Makes an Aboriginal an Aboriginal?” “This sense of toleration, or making allowances for mixed bloods, has long been an issue of severe annoyance,” wrote the Windspeaker staff writer (AMMSA, 2003: 10). As the editorial suggested, the inclusion and recognition of mixed-race as Indians was not only a source of irritation for the “bona fide” red people, but also put the racial distinction of Indianness in jeopardy.
In the minds of many “legitimately” red Indians, the solution to such racial-mixedness entailed the construction of a separate category of race, set apart from all races, particularly the red people. The *Windspeaker* feature leaned heavily on the wisdom of William Commanda, one of Canada’s pre-eminent elders and teachers of the Medicine Wheel. The editorial recounted a speech delivered by Commanda, an Algonquin from Kitigan-Zibi in Quebec. Commanda argued that the current racial ordering of the wheel inadequately addressed the current realities of mixed-race individuals. As the writer related:

Commanda made reference to what he called the fifth race, or color of man. In most First Nations cultures, it is taught that the world has four races of man-the Red, the Yellow, the Black and the White. The medicine wheel is divided into colored quarters to represent those four important citizens of the earth. But Commanda says [a] fifth race needs to be included. They are the mixed he refers to as “the Blue Race,” and they deserve a place in that circle (AMMSA, 2003: 10).

This rejection of mixed-blooded individuals from racial Indianness—the Red Race—and categorization as a race unto its own—the Blue Race—shored up governance impulses to reproduce Indian Country as a territory populated by the red people, those Indians with strong Indian bloodlines and blood quantum.

The designation of mixed-blooded individuals as a separate race was instrumental to the security of the population of Indian Country. In this regard, Foucault’s comments in the final lecture of the 1976 series, *Society Must Be Defended*, are instructive:
The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races (Foucault, 1976: 254-255).

The racial division between the red people—the Indians—from the group of mixed-race individuals who blurred the distinctions of racial boundaries informed the policy response of some Aboriginal governments. Perhaps nowhere was this biopolitical energy directed more than the relations inherent to family formation.

Anxieties around the racial integrity of the population in Indian Country—promulgated by the tenets of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse—accelerated the establishment and intervention of security mechanisms designed to “regenerate” racial Indianness, seizing the family unit to make it work in the service of betterment of the Indian race. David Theo Goldberg’s insight into government regulation of the family as a biopolitical mechanism of racial management is helpful here. He explains:

The more the racial state is implicated in fashioning the form and content of subject formation, the more it penetrates into everyday social life, and the
greater the hold of race over the social horizons of the conceivable. Consider how the racial state defines, manages, and regulates family formation: who can form a family racially, who can belong to a family, who can marry, how the offspring will be defined and designated racially and so what the life opportunities are for them (Goldberg, 2002: 115).

In Indian Country, the management of racial heterogeneity—which had resulted from centuries of coerced racial integration by the colonial state and voluntary interracial relationships by Indian and non-Indian individuals—converged on the family as the locus of production of racial Indianness. The administrative reaction of certain Indian authorities—comprised largely of chiefs and Indian councils—entailed policy interventions concerning mixed-race marriages, conjugal relationships, the progeny these relations produced, as well as matters of child adoption. In each aspect of family formation—marriage and child-rearing—some Aboriginal authorities were intent on safeguarding Indianness by defining and maintaining racial distinction.

In the the 1980s and 1990s, some Aboriginal governments instituted formal administrative measures that constrained racial reproduction to the “development of families”—some First Nations undertook this unilaterally as an assertion of sovereignty, and some did so pursuant the Bill C-31 amendment to the Indian Act in 1985 and in the years that followed. Some band councils instituted policies aimed at ensuring racial endogamy on the grounds that colonial assimilation and integration practices could be reversed in the name of indigenous racial regeneration. Taiaiake Alfred, writing for *Windspeaker*, spoke to this imperative:
Is it wrong to tell our people that they must marry an indigenous person? To demand that people take up their responsibility to become part of our culture and participate in our community? Or that membership will be determined by us based on the strength of a person's [indigenous blood] lineage within our community? We believe that in light of Canada's long-standing policies and ever-present threats to our existence, it would be wrong not to do these things (Alfred, 2000a).

Thus, in a number of Indigenous communities, statutory constraints on mixed race marriages ensued—enacted by band and tribal councils—to regulate racial homogeneity and prevent the further erosion of indigenous racial integrity. In Alfred's home community, Kahnawá:ke, the Mohawk Council established the Moratorium on Mixed Marriages in 1981 (eventually entrenched in the Kahnawá:ke Mohawk Law). Similarly, the Tsuu T'ina in Alberta enacted a ban on mixed-race marriages in its Citizenship Code, which states that, “Where a Tsuu T'ina marries a non-Indian person, the Tsuu T'ina Citizen shall lose his/her Tsuu T'ina citizenship.”

The management of racial heterogeneity in Aboriginal communities also hinged on the progeny of the domestic relationship. If, as some bands had stated, the regulation of race was necessary to preserve the existence of Indianness in their communities, it was necessary to include the future generations. It was at this point that sexual reproduction came under biopolitical control as a regulatory aversion to future mixed-blood individuals. Again, the example of the Tsuu T'ina policy is enlightening. The citizenship code declares that the spirit and intent of the statute is to “ensure the continuation of the Tsuu T'ina.” For
the Tsuu T’ina, the Indian who compromised the “continuation of the Tsuu T’ina” by producing racially inferior offspring was, according to the code, “to be dealt with by regulation.” As the code states, the citizenship of a Tsuu T’ina individual will be lost, 

[b]y the Tsuu T’ina parent of a child where the other parent is non-Indian to whom that person is married, and where the child has less than ½ Tsuu T’tina Blood Quantum, the parent shall be placed on the suspended list to be dealt with by regulation and upon the birth of a second child of less than ½ Tsuu T’ina Blood Quantum the parent shall be deleted from the Tsuu t’ina List (emphasis added).

Pursuant to the citizenship code, not only will the parent lose their right of citizenship with the Tsuu T’ina, but also the child of less than ½ Tsuu T’ina blood quantum—specific to the Tsuu T’ina, not just Indigenous blood generally—will be ineligible for citizenship in his or her indigenous community.

The security of the racial order in Indian Country also entailed progressive measures to ensure the continuation of Indianness. In some communities, the band council instituted graduated blood quantum requirements to guard against the potential of weakening bloodlines in children of the future. Although enacted on June 24, 1987, the Parry Island First Nation Citizenship Code introduced increasingly stringent blood quantum criteria for membership eligibility. At the time of enactment, mid-1987, the code permitted persons with 50% First Nation blood to become members. This allowance, however, expired on April 17, 1990. For any person born after April 17, 1990 but before December 31, 2010—more than 20 years later—the requirement increased to “at least 60% First
Nation blood;” and, a “person born on or after December 31, 2010 is entitled to become a citizen of Parry Island First Nation if ... he or she can demonstrate that he or she has at least 75% First Nation blood.” Such a condition produced a number of regulatory effects on family formation with respect to race. In the first, offspring were subjected to tighter racial stipulations for inclusion in the community, thereby securing greater racial homogeneity in the future generations of Indians. Secondly, the regulation of race implied a measure of anti-miscegenation that could be normalized over the span of several decades.

The management of family makeup extended to the matter of adoption and shines a light on the control over how the population in some Aboriginal communities would be racially constructed. Indeed, racial criteria were invoked to legitimate some children but not others. Although cross-racial adoptions had been, traditionally and customarily, a widespread practice throughout many Aboriginal communities from time immemorial, restrictions on the adoption of racially non-Indian children grew increasingly common, finding expression in band membership codes and by-laws (Lomayesva, 1999: 67). To guard against the future inclusion of racial “Others” among “real” Indians, some Aboriginal governments limited any claims that the non-Indian child might have to community resources. The Fort McPherson First Nation in the Northwest Territories, for example, expressly denied membership in this respect in its membership code: “a non-Indian child who is adopted by a member of the Band is not eligible for membership in the Band.”

Where membership entailed the right of residency in the Fort McPherson First Nations, the

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22 Anishnaabeg of Naongashiing in Ontario contains an identically-worded clause as Fort MacPherson First Nation. The Nanoose Band in British Columbia expressly prohibits membership to non-Indigenous children adopted by members of the band. “Persons not entitled to membership” include “Non-Indian children adopted by an Indian band member.”

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non-Indian child is ordered to abandon their residency in their natal community upon reaching a certain age, typically 18 years. In the case of Kahnawá:ke, an adopted, non-Indian child “is entitled to reside within the [Mohawks of Kahnawá:ke] Territory with his or her adoptive member parent or parents ... until he or she reaches his or her age of majority,” which, under section 4.1 of the *Mohawk Law of Kahnawá:ke*, “means eighteen (18) years of age;” upon reaching this age, the child will no longer be eligible “to be a non-member resident.”

Membership in Indian Country was bound tightly to certain privileges that determined who could and who could not comprise the population within Aboriginal communities. In the next section, I further examine the implication of residency rights and privileges and how they are linked to the *spatial regulation* of Indian Country. In spite of any affective ties—such as those between a non-Indian adopted child to his or her adoptive member parents—the exclusionary practices of biopolitics circumscribed the territorial boundaries of Indian Country, monitoring and controlling the comings and goings of both non-Indian and Indians alike. Although the borders separating Indian Country—often Indian reserves—and mainstream society were largely permeable to movement by anyone, who could stay and how long their stay could last became subject to the oversight of Aboriginal governments intent on constructing a racially Indian milieu. The biopolitical investment in the family, in this respect, only went as far as the racial frontier, which was to coincide with the territorial divide between Indian Country and the outside.
Race and Space in Indian Country

By the mid-1980s and thereafter, some Aboriginal governments were engaged in cultivating a racial space in Indian Country and ensuring the security of a racial milieu within their borders. As a biopolitical mechanism, Foucault had generally described—though not explicitly in terms of racial management—the problem as “a case of structuring a space” (Foucault, 2004a: 17). As Foucault noted in his lecture series, *Security, Territory, Population*, “[i]t is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient” (Foucault, 2004a: 19). After centuries of co-existence with white settlers, and in the aftermath of coerced racial integration at the direction of the colonial states, Indian Bands and Tribal Councils had become increasingly occupied with the administrative problem of racial heterogeneity in Indian Country. Band codes and other by-laws had addressed the concerns of membership and family composition—who could and who could not form families—employing racial criteria for the categorization of Indian and Others. But, many First Nations were acutely aware that the circulation of population-level phenomena—such as inflows and outflows of individuals of varied racial background—posed significant risk to the internal management of racial organization. Although sovereign in many respects over the territory of Indian Country, patterns of mobility and migration threatened the model of racial security of the population.

Indeed, Indian Country was subject to the randomness of individual mobility, exposed to the patterns of in and out migration of Indians as they chose to leave for life in mainstream settler society or return to their natal indigenous communities, however
permanently or temporarily. Anxieties over racial mixing and the dilution of blood quantum in the Indian bloodline prompted expanded biopolitical responses by some Aboriginal governments. This reaction addressed what Foucault had stated in Society Must Be Defended as “biopolitics’ last domain”: the “control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live” (Foucault, 1976: 244-245). The response of governance in some First Nations to the relations between the humans and the racially conceived milieu of Indian Country entailed a distinctly regulatory approach described by Foucault: “In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life” (Foucault, 1976: 246). As concerns around the management of race in Indian Country increased in the last decades of the twentieth century, some Aboriginal governments established security mechanisms to regulate the variability of movement of both Indians and non-Indians as they circulated in and out of Indian Country.

Racial management in Indian Country took the form of migration and residency regulations. As a method to administer a racial population, David Theo Goldberg’s analyses are instructive in this regard: “Such regulation commands not just what the racially regulated can do but where they can and cannot go … and where they can reside” (Goldberg, 2002: 110). Whether it was an informal sojourn, a temporary visit to the reserve community, or permanent stay, some bands had included administrative regulations that were tightly connected with the broader security apparatus (dispositif, in Foucault’s terminology) of Indian Country. The preamble to the Residency Law enacted by the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn, for instance, is clear in this respect. In the preamble, the
spirit and intent—indeed, the “governmentality” of the Pikwàkanagàn administration—is succinctly expressed: “it is considered necessary for the health and welfare of the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn to regulate the residence of members and other persons in Pikwàkanagàn” (emphasis added). To this end, the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn have enlarged the bureaucratic structure to oversee the management of residency.

The Pikwàkanagàn Residency Law formally established an administrative division of the larger bureaucratic system for the regulation of Indianness. Under the law, a “Registrar of Residents” was inaugurated to supervise the settlement of Pikwàkanagàn. The office of the Registrar of Residents was authorized under the enabling law to record data and information required to sufficiently monitor and direct the occupation of anyone residing or temporarily living or visiting within the Pikwàkanagàn territory. Pursuant to section 4.5 of the Residency Law:

"The Registrar of Residents shall maintain a Residents List, on which is recorded the name of each resident;

a) whether or not the person is a member of the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn;

b) The date on which the person has been granted permission to reside in Pikwàkanagàn;

c) An indication as to whether each resident is a resident for an indefinite or defined period, and

d) The length of any defined period of residence."
Data and statistics collected on these variables sustained the calculative efforts—what Goldberg has called “racial administrology”—to regulate Indianness in Pikwàkanagàn (Goldberg, 1997: 31). As he notes elsewhere, this sort of “racial administrology,” much like census enumeration, was “[a]ctivated in the shift from family, kinship, and local community as modes of social control to a focus on the abstraction of “population’’; as a “more or less comprehensive state mechanism to map population [variables],” Goldberg goes on to point out that, such a mechanism of security “has presumed race, implicitly or explicitly, as its centerpiece in demographic accounting” (Goldberg, 2002: 188–189).23 In the case of the Algonquins’ Residency Law, we see how the Registrar of Residents—an office that is accountable to the Pikwàkanagàn Chief and Band Council—could effectively manage the racial composition of the Algonquin population. Under the section 9.1 of the Residency Law, the permission of non-members (those without Algonquin blood) to reside in Pikwàkanagàn is automatically revoked “[w]hen a member advises the Registrar that their relationship to a non-member has ended.” While the provisions of the law favour racial Indianness, members of the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn—those with recognized bloodlines—are subject to eviction should their presence threaten the security of the Algonquin population.

It is a telling statement on the primacy of security of the Algonquin population within the Pikwàkanagàn territory that the inclusion of band members on the Residents List is neither automatic nor assured. Quite apart from the criteria for inclusion on the

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23 Goldberg examines how the modern, colonial state developed the census as a mechanism for “state stocktaking,” measuring a number of variables such as: “population size, shape, distribution, quality and flow of labor supply, taxation and conscription pools, political representation, voter predictability, and the necessities of population reproduction” (Goldberg, 2002: 189).
Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn Membership Register (the Algonquin “Band List”), the Residency Law authorizes the Registrar of Residents to order the eviction or removal of anyone—including official members—from the Algonquin territory if the potential resident were “compatible with the culture, society and community and welfare of the members residing in Pikwàkanagàn,” or on the basis of “such further and other criteria as are in the best interest of the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn” (ss. 6.2 c and h of the Residency Law).

Constructing a racial society and producing the desired racial composition of Indian Country was more than just a matter of regulating the residency of settlement. Securing a particular vision of an Indian racial milieu also involved the regulation of benefits and burdens within Indian Country along racial lines. By the 1980s and increasingly thereafter, some Aboriginal governments manufactured the conditions for Indian isolation and, more importantly, the avoidance of racial others. Racial segregation—though neither formally nor explicitly named as such in band and tribal council statutes—was indirectly supported through organized racial discrimination. This was particularly evident with respect to legal standing in the community, where membership or citizenship—which rested on racial distinctions—confferred a set of civil, political and economic rights and benefits. Section 5 of the 1987 Membership Code of the Territory of Akwesasne provides for the following “Rights and benefits to which members are entitled include: (a) Residency, (b) Land ownership, (c) Housing, (d) Political rights: voting, holding office, (e) Territorial education, (f) Territorial social assistance, (g) Treaty and aboriginal rights particular to the Mohawks of Akwesasne, (h) Burial rights, (i) Right to share in annuities, royalties or other revenue and capital payments paid to members.” Thus, if Indian Country was a place to put down roots for the racial Other, once granted permission by the band council as a “non-member
resident,” it was not without its drawbacks. The artifice and cunning of this racial arrangement made Indian Country much less appealing for those who held many rights in high regard.

**The Biopolitics of Life in Kahnawá:ke**

In 1991, Peter and Trudy Jacobs filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging that the Aboriginal government in their community had engaged in a range of discriminatory practices against their family. The Jacobs complaint maintained that, since 1986, the Mohawk Council of Kahnawá:ke (MCK) had systematically denied the members of the Jacobs family—including the children of Peter and Trudy—“benefits and privileges including residency, land allotment and land rights, housing, medication and dental privileges,” as the particulars of the complaint stated (CHRT, 1998: 2). The basis of the repeated and ongoing denials of benefits and privileges hinged on the Jacobs family status—namely that they were not recognized as Mohawks. Interestingly, the MCK was in agreement with many of the allegations contained in the complaint, particularly the individual and family discrimination based on race. For the MCK, what was at issue was what they saw as the external interference by a foreign judicial body adjudicating matters over which the MCK asserted sovereignty; at the Tribunal, the MCK and its witnesses maintained that, whatever the eventual outcome of the decision, whether favourable or not, the MCK would carry on with the business of regulating Indianness in their community according to its own standards. Nevertheless, the Jacobs made an appeal to the Human Rights Tribunal to intervene in the MCK’s selection for exclusion and to allow them to be
recognized and live as the Indians they had always saw and knew themselves to be, and to
do so in their home community of Kahnawá:ke.

The exclusionary impulses of the MCK were anchored by the Jacobs’ *prima facie*
illicit domestic relationship. Peter and Trudy Jacobs, and eventually the children of their
relationship, were marked for exclusion and exile from the Kahnawá:ke community as
early as 1986, the year of their marriage. Up until this time, Trudy Jacobs had been fully
accepted as a Mohawk by both members of the community of Kahnawá:ke and the MCK. At
the Tribunal, it was noted that Trudy had been raised by her Mohawk mother on the
Kahnawá:ke reserve, attended primary and secondary school in the community only to
leave for college and university in Montreal, but to return to Kahnawá:ke where she built a
house. It was not until Trudy attempted to exercise her right to vote in the community
elections of 1990 that she found out that she was no longer considered a Mohawk. As one
instance of discrimination entailed in the complaint, Trudy was denied the right to vote in
this election because the MCK had ceased to recognize her as a Mohawk. Since her marriage
to Peter in 1986, the MCK had removed Trudy from the “Mohawk List,” an administrative
registry maintained by the MCK to control membership in Kahnawá:ke. As the Tribunal
heard, “the MCK asserts that it is entitled to create its own Membership List according to
criteria that the community has accepted and that as the Jacobs family are not considered
members of the community within the scope of those criteria, they are not entitled to such
benefits and privileges” (CHRT, 1998: 6). As the MCK maintained, the selection of the
Jacobs family for exclusion from the Mohawk List, and thus the community and any
benefits and privileges associated with membership in Kahnawá:ke, was the failure to meet
the criteria established by the community. As a result, the administrative arm of the MCK omitted the names of all members of Peter and Trudy Jacobs’ family from the Mohawk List.

As with any domestic relationship in Kahnawá:ke—whether it was marriage or common-law co-habitation—the Jacobs family connections were subject to close scrutiny by the oversight authorities of the MCK. What the MCK rulers saw was an interracial union between Peter and Trudy. On her own, Trudy—though duly recognized as racially Mohawk before her marriage to Peter—was not a target for regulatory interventions by the MCK. It was only when Trudy married Peter that the emerging family became an issue. Peter, although he had been raised in Kahnawá:ke since infancy as a child adopted by Mohawk parents, was not racially Indian, possessing no Indian blood at all. Like many other First Nations, Kahnawá:ke administered racial Indianness along bloodlines, measured by blood quantum as a criterion for inclusion on the Mohawk List of members. Kahnawá:ke’s blood quantum requirement for membership had been in place since 1981. Being of no Indian blood, Peter was excluded from consideration. Further complicating the matter, Kahnawá:ke regulated domestic arrangements, tracking individuals like Peter and their relationships within the community. What made Trudy and Peter’s relationship especially illicit in the administrative eyes of the MCK—as well as the general membership of Kahnawá:ke—was their interracial union; theirs was a “mixed-marriage,” a status that was prohibited under the Mohawk Law in Kahnawá:ke and subject to regulation by the MCK.

Since the early 1980s, the MCK had instituted various measures for racial regulation in Kahnawá:ke. The family was a particularly critical objective of the regulatory mechanisms. Testimony given on behalf of the MCK at the Tribunal attested to the
widespread anxiety throughout the community that mixed-race unions threatened the model of Indianness held by the membership. The Tribunal heard that, by the early 1980s, “[t]here was concern and alarm within the community that an increasing number of non-Mohawks were residing in the community, primarily due to mixed[race]-marriage and that this threatened the culture, traditions and language of the Mohawk people” (CHRT, 1998: 28). The fear that Mohawk Indianness would be eroded by racial outsiders had prompted the MCK to establish regulatory measures designed to ensure the security of what much of the membership viewed as an authentically Mohawk milieu. To this end, the MCK issued what came to be known simply as the “Moratorium”, which was a restrictive covenant that prohibited the introduction of racially impure individuals into the Kahnawá:ke community. Issued in 1981, the Moratorium declared the following:

TO THE PEOPLE OF KAHNAWAKE:

As per Band Meeting of May 22, 1981, a moratorium has been placed on all mixed marriages (Indians marrying non-Indians, both male and female) and adopted non-Indians.

...

Because of the many concerns that have been expressed by the people of Kahnawake and the necessity of maintaining Indianism in the Kahnawake Mohawk Territory it is imperative that this moratorium be implemented until such time as the whole membership situation is clarified.

It will be difficult for this moratorium to be accepted by some of the people, but everyone must try to understand that certain steps must be taken in
Thus, as a “necessity of maintaining Indianism in the Kahnawake Mohawk Territory,” the Jacobs could not avail themselves of membership in the community, and all the benefits and privileges that such recognition entailed.

In spite of the Moratorium on mixed-marriages, the Mohawk Law which stipulated blood quantum criteria for membership, and his omission from the Mohawk List—all regulatory institutions established by the MCK to regulate “maintain Indianism”—Peter appealed to the authorities for recognition on other grounds. Peter’s arguments for recognition rested on his cultural inculcation in the Mohawk community and his own sense of Indianness. Peter identified as Mohawk. In his complaint filed with the Human Rights Commission, Peter pointed out that, although he was not “racially” Indian, Mohawk parents in Kahnawá:ke raised him since infancy. “I was legally adopted by two Indians from Kahnawake when I was a baby,” Peter stated, continuing to note that, “My biological parents were of black and jewish descents” [sic] (CHRT, 1998: 2). Moreover, by all evidence adduced at the hearing before the tribunal, either his own personal testimony or relevant material exhibits, Peter saw himself to be an Indian in every sense of his social being. At the tribunal, Peter adduced certain cultural aspects of his life in an attempt to establish his bona fides as a Mohawk. It was observed by the tribunal and entered into record that:

Peter grew up as a Mohawk of Kahnawake ... he learned the [Mohawk] language and Mohawk customs at home. As a young boy he participated in
the activities of all the Mohawk children and was treated the same as everyone else. He attended high school in Chateauguay and experienced racism as a native person. In his late teens, Peter applied to the MCK [Mohawk Council of Kahnawake] and was permitted to attend Manitou College, an all native school which taught the Mohawk language and culture.

At approximately age 12, Peter stopped going to church and began to attend one of the Longhouses at Kahnawake, the 207 Longhouse. Among other things, the Longhouse is a meeting place which is frequented by the traditionalists in the community who are intent upon promoting traditional and customary values. There he learned about the Great Law of Peace, Mohawk history, traditions and customs and he was accepted as a native person and again, treated like everyone else (CHRT, 1998: 4)

Despite his protests before the MCK and his testimony at the Tribunal, the MCK was unwilling to recognize Peter Jacobs as an Indian. Together with the denial of Peter’s Indianness, and therefore Trudy’s contravention of the mixed-marriage moratorium, the Jacobs family was subject to the “removal/evictions” directive of the Mohawk Law.

The case of *Jacobs v. Mohawk Council of Kahnawake* is less interesting for its eventual outcome than the insight into the racial regulatory regime at work in Kahnawá:ke. Indeed, in the testimony of MCK officials—including Grand Chief Norton—and in closing arguments by counsel for the MCK, the MCK was adamant that, “should this Tribunal make an adverse finding against the MCK, its Order would be ignored” (CHRT, 1998: 40). It was the position of the MCK that it alone commanded sovereign authority over issues of
membership, including the administrative decisions regarding inclusion or exclusion. Taiaiake Alfred—who would later become widely recognized in anti-colonization circles as an indigenous intellectual—testified in support of the MCK’s position on autonomous authority over internal affairs. A Mohawk from Kahnawá:ke, Alfred acknowledged that, “the intrusion of any outside authority such as this [Canadian Human Rights] Tribunal on the membership issue, would likely harden the resolve of the community to exclude rather than include the Jacobs family” (CHRT, 1998: 40). Irrespective of the final decision that was handed down by the Tribunal—which “found that the MCK has engaged and is engaging in acts of direct discrimination against Peter, Trudy and their children” (CHRT, 1998: 37)—the case highlights the regulatory administration of Indianness in Kahnawá:ke, the biopolitical extent that the authorities actively participated in constructing a Mohawk milieu, and the mechanisms deployed to achieve the stated biopolitical aims of the Mohawk authorities.

Nevertheless, in the face of the MCK’s unrelenting position, the Jacobs family did not seek out an order for monetary or financial relief, nor did they petition the Tribunal for punitive or exemplary damages that they incurred as a result of the numerous instances of discrimination. As the Tribunal noted, “they [the Jacobs] seek a remedy which will recognize that they are Mohawk and are part of the community of Kahnawá:ke. They wish to be included on the Mohawk List and be treated like all other Mohawks in the community with entitlement to all of the rights, benefits and privileges afforded to other Mohawks” (CHRT, 1998: 39). In other words, the Jacobs appealed to what they thought was an authority which held power and jurisdiction over the MCK to reverse the MCK decision and affirm the Jacobs’ Indianness.
An Empirical Examination of Biopolitics in Indian Country

In the preceding sections, I have advanced a number of qualitative claims about the spread of the biopolitics in Indian Country since the 1960s. This section is an empirical analysis of this seemingly abstract phenomenon. In the analysis here, I adopt a quantitative approach to examine the qualitative assertions developed in the discussion above. In what follows, I answer common empirical questions about three analytical measures: scope; magnitude; and, direction. As well, I address questions around limitations, about the degree of representation and generalizability that claims made here extend to the broader Indigenous population, individual persons, and First Nations communities.

In order to make deductive and empirical inferences, I have developed a quantitative instrument that I call the Racial Index. Index numbers are quantitative indicators; they are not explanatory models. Thus, the Racial Index is a summary measure of the transformation of qualities of the racial dimension that are expressed as quantities. In other words, the abstract qualities of “race” have been converted into numerical data. The qualities of race used in the calculations here are informed by the preceding discussions on biopower. As a composite measure of these qualities, the Racial Index makes use of a number of indicators that were selected based on the texts studied. Specifically, quantitative measurements of minimum blood quantum requirements for membership, as well as values of the coefficient of relatedness and consanguinity, comprise the set of indicators. A description of each indicator is as follows:

1. Blood Quantum (BQ): this indicator of race is a measurement of Indian blood “purity.” It is expressed as a fraction or percentage of Indian blood inherited from
the aggregate of all ancestors. To illustrate, an individual with a parent of full or 100% Indian blood and a parent with no or 0% Indian blood will have a blood quantum of 50%, or 0.5.

To calculate $BQ$, I ask the following: is there a minimum blood quantum requirement for membership in the First Nation? If “yes,” I ask “how much?” Values expressed as percentage are converted to fractions (e.g. 50% = 0.5).

For example, according to the Big Island Lake Cree Nation *Membership Code*, individuals must be of a minimum 50% blood quantum ($BQ = 0.50$): “any person who has 50% Indian blood or more.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer and may not total 100.

2. Descendancy ($CoR$): this indicator is measured using the Coefficient of Relatedness, a numeric expression of the degree of kinship with, or descent from, a community by measuring the minimum relatedness required to obtain membership/citizenship.

To calculate $CoR$, I ask the following: is there a descendancy/kinship requirement for membership in the First Nation? If “yes,” I ask “what is the specific
relationship?" The following coefficients are used for these relationships: (1) parent, child = 0.5; (2) grandparent, grandchild = 0.25; and, (3) great-grandparent, great-grandchild = 0.125.

For example, the Onion Lake First Nation Citizenship Law requires that “a person who has one or more grandparents who is a citizen of Onion Lake providing that person can show a substantial connection to Onion Lake” is eligible for citizenship. Accordingly, citizenship is restricted to those with a minimum coefficient of relatedness to the Onion Lake First Nation of $CoR = 0.25$.

Table 3.2 Descendancy ($CoR$) Values, Frequency and Percentage for 259 First Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer and may not total 100.

3. Consanguinity ($BQ \cdot CoR$): this measure captures the interaction between blood quantum and the coefficient of relatedness for those cases where a First Nation or Tribal Council requires Indian blood of a particular national heritage, not just mere ambiguous Indian ancestry. Calculating consanguinity is simply the product (multiplication) of the values $BQ$ and $CoR$.

For example, Carry the Kettle Band in Saskatchewan requires a minimum Indian blood quantum of 25% (or 0.25), but further requires that one parent is or was (if
deceased at the time of application) a member of the Carry the Kettle Band, the coefficient of relatedness equaling 0.5. In this example, \( BQ = 0.25 \) and \( CoR = 0.5 \). Therefore, consanguinity = \( BQ \cdot CoR = 0.25 \times 0.5 = 0.125 \).

Table 3.3 Consanguinity (\( BQ \cdot CoR \)) Values, Frequency and Percentage for 259 First Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages have been rounded to the nearest integer and may not total 100.

Using the data on each indicator, the Racial Index is computed by way of the following below. Each indicator is given equal weight; thus, the calculation is an arithmetic mean.

\[
I_{RACIAL} = \frac{1}{3} [BQ + CoR + (BQ \cdot CoR)]
\]

The values of the Racial Index are normalized to a scale with an interval of 0 to 1. At the upper limit of 1, communities and First Nations are conceptually pure in both racial and traditionalist requirements for membership/citizenship. Conversely, the lower limit of 0 indicates the complete absence of racial and traditional cultural requirements. The typical Min-Max standardization formula, immediately below, is applied to calculate the final, normalized values for the \( I_{RACIAL} \).

\[
X_{i,0\,to\,1} = \frac{X_i - X_{Min}}{X_{Max} - X_{Min}}
\]
Data and Results

Following the methodology of the index construction described in the previous section, the applied empirical analysis of the Racial Index is computed using raw data from First Nation band membership codes.24 The results presented here are delimited by the number of First Nations that have adopted their own membership codes, pursuant to authorities amended to the Indian Act in 1985 through the passage of Bill C-31 in Canada’s parliament. Not all First Nations have elected to control their membership outside of the Indian Act. While the Government of Canada recognizes only 618 First Nation bands, there are currently only 267 First Nations that have elected to control their own membership (Canada, 2017). According to the Government of Canada, as “of June 2017, 229 bands have assumed control of their own membership under section 10 of the Indian Act, while 38 control membership through self-government legislation outside of the Indian Act” (Canada, 2018). Put another way, 43% of First Nations have availed themselves of the authority to control their membership and determining eligibility criteria for individual membership.

Moreover, it is not clear how many First Nations currently use their membership codes, despite having made use of the 1985 Bill C-31 amendment to the Indian Act that allowed them to control their membership. Stewart Clatworthy’s 2005 study of First

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24 As with Clatworthy and Smith (1992), the computations here omit instances where First Nation codes allow membership to be recognized under exceptional circumstances (i.e., honorary citizenship) and those clauses that provide for alternative methods of membership (e.g., referenda voting on matters of membership) as well as conferring spousal membership (see Clatworthy and Smith, 1992b: 7).
Nations membership found that a mere 8.5% (18 of 212 First Nations that participated in the survey) were not using their membership codes at the time (Clatworthy, 2005: 9).25

Of the 267 First Nations—or 43% of all First Nation bands—only 259 individual band membership codes were collected.26 That is, 97% of the target population under study in this section have been included for analysis. The cases used in the analysis of representation in this section were selected through a convenience sampling method.27 Probability or random sampling is not possible under the current conditions for two prominent reasons: 1) many Indigenous governments—First Nations bands and tribal councils—do not make their membership/citizenship legislation available to the public; and, 2) many Indigenous governments have yet to develop their own codes and thus membership is determined by the Indian Act, as a statutory default.28

In aggregate, the total membership for the 259 First Nations included for analysis here amounts to 390,015 individuals, as of November 2018. The membership of the 259 First Nations being analyzed amounts to approximately 39% of the total registered First

25 As Clatworthy found, the reasons provided by 18 First Nations that had developed their own membership, “seven (7) reported that they were currently using the Indian Act rules (Section 6) for determining membership in their First Nations. Four (4) First Nations reported that all decisions concerning membership were being made by Chief and Council. Another four (4) First Nations reported that a moratorium was in place concerning membership. Two (2) First Nations indicated that membership was being based on family or community sponsorship. One (1) First Nation did not reveal the current basis for determining membership” (Clatworthy, 2005: 9)

26 The analysis in this section builds upon work by Clatworthy and Smith (1992) who analyzed 236 membership codes, and Clatworthy’s updated study (2005) studied 241 band membership codes.

27 “In convenience sampling, elements for the sample are selected for the convenience of the researcher. The researcher typically chooses elements that are readily available, nearby, or willing to participate” (Black, 2009: 224; italics original).

28 As Pamela Palmater notes in respect of Kirsty Gover’s 2010 study of Indigenous membership laws, “[g]enerally, data related to internal Indigenous community governance is not available to the public. In fact, here in Canada, it is very difficult to access information related to First Nations, even through Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) legislation. Her [Gover’s] persistence in acquiring these membership codes despite the difficulties speaks to her tenacity as a researcher in such a difficult and controversial area as membership” (Palmater, 2012: 138).
Nations population of 991,652 individuals reported to the Government of Canada (Canada, 2017). The population of each First Nation ranges considerably, from 42 individual Stó:lō members in the Aitchelitz First Nation located in British Columbia to 12,686 members of the Mohawks of Akwesasne.

The findings from this sample provide some insight into the developments occurring across and throughout Indian Country in recent decades. Table 3.4 below presents the Racial Index scores of all 259 First Nations included in the analysis. In the 30 years since 1987 when Indian Bands were permitted the authority to control membership, all but one band included here—Glooscap First Nation (which ratified its membership regulations in 2006) where membership is subject to referendum—have noticeably adopted the racial criteria for membership. Indeed, using the Racial score for the Indian Act—0.08—as a comparator brings the First Nations scores into sharp relief. The remaining 258 First Nations have developed racial criteria equal to, or greater than the racial conditions legislated by the Indian Act. Of that number, there were 255 First Nations that instituted racial criteria more stringent than the Indian Act. In terms of percentage, the findings here demonstrate that—once taking control of membership—the vast majority of First Nations undertook biopolitical measures to more closely manage the racial composition of Indian Country. Indeed, 99.6% of First Nations (258 out of 259) increased the biopolitical reach of the governing apparatus.

Figure 3.1 below provides an illustration of the reach of the biopolitics of race to the population. As noted above, the majority of First Nations have undertaken racial biopolitical measures. In magnitude, over 389,600 individuals included in the 390,015
membership—or 99.9% of individuals—are subject to racial criteria equal to, or greater than the *Indian Act*. A full 99.9% of Indigenous individuals included in the 259 First Nations that control their membership must meet some racial stipulations, while only 383 individuals (the remaining 0.1%) of the Glooscap First Nation are not bound by racial conditions for membership. This is evident from Figure 3.1 where the cumulative percentage line climbs steadily as it passes the 0.08 index score of the *Indian Act*, rising to 0.67 (a score that is over 8 times greater than the Indian Act racial requirements), a result received by 55 First Nations accounting for more than 66,600 individuals, or approximately 17% of the bands included in this analysis.

**Figure 3.1: Racial Index Score by Population and Cumulative Frequency**

![Graph](image)

One striking finding from these results is the trend towards more stringent racial criteria away from what is already widely recognized—and condemned—as racist, namely the blood quantum requirements of the *Indian Act*. In *Beyond Blood*, Pam Palmater is clear
on the racism inherent in the Indian Act blood quantum: "I therefore argue that the use of one-quarter blood quantum or degree of descent from a status Indian as a means of excluding Indigenous peoples from registration as Indians is either racial discrimination or an analogous ground of blood quantum/descent because it perpetuates racist stereotypes about Indigenous people based on a physical characteristic over which the affected individual has no control" (Palmater, 2011: 118). It is astonishing to see, despite the vast corpus of criticism of the legislation for its racial premises, what has been produced by First Nations in replacement of the Indian Act’s racial criteria. However, the result here—that the Indian Act scored much lower than the codes enacted by almost all First Nations that control their membership—is due largely to the “descendancy” and “consanguinity” indicators of race. When these indicators are removed, leaving the calculations solely to “blood quantum,” then we notice that: 1) the relative majority of First Nations with band membership codes are without blood quantum requirements (105 communities, or 39%); 2) followed by 79 communities (31%) that require individual blood quantum greater than this legislation; 3) 69 communities (27%) that match the Indian Act; and, 6 (2%) First Nations that stipulate a requirement of “Indian blood,” but are unclear on the exact quantum.

**Table 3.4. Racial Index 2018: Data for 259 of 618 First Nations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Nation</th>
<th>BQ</th>
<th>CoR</th>
<th>RI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abegweit</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eel River Bar First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromocto First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potlotek First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskasoni</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membertou</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: BQ = Blood Quantum; CoR = Coefficient of Relatedness; and, RI = Racial Index.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Nation</th>
<th>BQ</th>
<th>CoR</th>
<th>RI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Grassy</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lac La Croix</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainy River First Nations</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassy Narrows First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moravian of the Thames</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M'Chigeeng First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eabametoong First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasabonika Lake</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webequie</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nibinamik First Nation</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aroland</td>
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**Conclusion**

The mid-1980s marked a turning point for most Aboriginal governments in anti-colonization pursuits in Indian Country. Although a small number of band and tribal councils had independently established administrative mechanisms to secure Indianness prior to the 1985 amendments to the *Indian Act*, the passage of Bill C-31 provided the authority needed by Aboriginal governments to biopolitically regenerate and decolonize the population of Indian Country. Almost immediately, some Indian bands instituted measures to regulate the internal affairs of their territories and regenerate an “authentic” Indian milieu that was defined and constructed in racial terms. As Ktunaxa/Métis scholar Joyce Green has observed, “[s]ince the 1985 *Indian Act* revisions, bands have been able to control their membership. Where prior to 1985 the federal government implemented sexist, racist legislation determining band membership, now some bands have racist, sexist membership codes” (Green, 2001: 717). It was in the years that followed that particular life processes came under the biopolitical management of bands and other Aboriginal governments. The security of the Indian race—the prevailing governmentality of Indian bands and tribal councils—underwrote the imperative to plan for a model of decolonized life in Indian Country, take Indianness under management, and develop effective interventions to optimize the vision of a regenerated Indian population.
Broadly, anti-colonial management of Indianness—the providence of Aboriginal governments in the waning years of the twentieth century—took race as its target, yet strategically shaped the population racial contours of Indian Country by intervening into the family unit. Membership and citizenship criteria were set in line with racial distinctions; these criteria were naturalized and normalized through cultural representations, yet formalized in some governance structures such as band by-laws, membership/citizenship codes, and residency statutes. Policies that encouraged racial endogamy, discouraged miscegenation, and placed restrictions on who could live, stay, or even pay a visit in Indian Country, were deployed to manage racial heterogeneity within certain Indigenous communities. A relatively vast administrative apparatus—replete with specialized committees, offices, and officers—emerged in some bands to monitor and control the racial makeup within their particular communities. These administrative bodies were statutorily granted oversight authority, with reporting and accountability roles and responsibilities to chief and council. Marriage, common-law co-habitation, childbirth and childrearing, all fell within the ambit of the biopolitical dispositif.

The experience of the Jacobs family—Peter, Trudy, and their children—calls attention to the regulatory lengths that some Indian governments went to in order to cultivate a racially robust Indian Country. The Jacobs’ story invokes the anti-colonial governmentality that constrained the parameters of family formation, as well as the spatial regulation of the Indian Country milieu. The arguments proffered by officials and authorities on Indianness in the case of Jacobs v. Mohawk Council of Kahnawake confirm the regulatory response taken by some Indian governments to the threat of racial dilution and degeneration in Aboriginal communities. At the same time, however, the rhetoric deployed
by indigenous intellectuals and Aboriginal authorities related to race, space and belonging—the logics underpinning arguments for the exile of the Jacobs from Kahnawá:ke—lend themselves to Foucault’s understanding of disciplinary power and individualization, in addition to regulatory power and “massification.” While my evidence is based on 43% of all Indian bands, it is concerning that the majority of these bands studied have reproduced the restrictions of the Indian Act and 41% have increased the restrictions. In the next chapter, I discuss how Foucault’s concept of “disciplinary power” addresses not the population but the individual body and self through the disciplinary equivalent to the “massification”—“subjectivation”—and how Indianness is internally organized by the individual and produced in accordance with the Racial-Traditionalist discourse.
Discipline and the Achievement of Indianness

In a 1991 speech given at an American university in upstate New York, the prominent Indigenous activist, Russell Means, delivered some ominous words about the prospects for Indianness. “American Indians are at a crossroads as important as any which has ever confronted them,” Means opened, continuing to warn that “The decisions taken over the next three to five years will determine whether or not Indian people have a future in North America” (Means, 1991: ii). Means, a longtime leader in the American Indian Movement, pointed to a new danger unfolding throughout Indian Country. “There is an ugly trend afoot in Indian Country today. It is the trend of the traitor and sell-out” (Means, 1991: ii). For Means—and contemporaries who promoted commensurate views—there was a discernible shift among the various threats to Indigenous peoples. Although the colonial remained a source of deep political concern, the prominence of this anxiety was—for many Indigenous activists—displaced by the nascent threat that originated by and within Indigenous people themselves. Closing his speech, Means concluded with the imperative, “our first priority, if we are to move forward to a brighter future rather than final oblivion, should be to clean up our own nest. Then we can proceed in unity to do what we must do. In other words, we must eliminate the element of traitors, sell-outs and other scum from amongst ourselves” (Means, 1991: iv).

Far from being the idiosyncrasy of an eccentric character, the narrative of Means’ speech represented a popular theme in the anti-colonization discourse. The rhetoric found in Means’ speech—and the interest around the essence of individual Indianness—was a familiar theme in the post-Red Power era. As one indigenous intellectual remarked in the early years of the Red Power movement:
It is time for some revolutionary thinking among the present-day “Indians” as to where they are culturally ... A definition of “Indian-ness” [must] be given top priority-rating in the “Indian movement” ...

We must use this definition against which to measure ourselves and adjust our life-styles accordingly—if we wish to be truly “Indian” (Traw, 1975: 36).

In doing so, a number of “subspecies” and “types” of Indian emerged from the discursive procedures that sought to construct an “ideal” mode of Indianness. These imaginings of ideal Indianness—what the likes of Means and his contemporaries developed out of a Manichaean allegory that set “real” Indians against “sell-outs” in a struggle to sustain authentic Indian existence—were coextensive with a set of practices, techniques, and institutions designed to inscribe Indianness on and within the individual.

In order to fully appreciate how this particular ideal of Indianness was normalized within some Indigenous communities, I make use of two discrete yet closely related perspectives on the construction of individual identity developed by Foucault. In The Subject and Power, Foucault explains that the undercurrent of his life’s main work has been not power as is commonly assumed, but rather the production of identity; or, in Foucault’s own words, how “human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 1983: 208; see also Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 171). Moreover, Foucault differentiates between three different “modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects”: 1) “the modes of inquiry that try to give themselves the status of science;” 2) dividing practices; and, 3) subjectivation (Foucault, 1983: 208). I explored the discourse the first mode of objection in chapter two and three, how Indianness was taken as an object of a “regime of truth,” the
Racial-Traditionalist discourse. In this chapter, I will utilize the latter two modes to analyze the discursive ideal of Indianness. As Foucault writes:

> [i]n the second part of my work, I have studied the objectivizing of the subject in what I shall call “dividing practices.”

The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the “good boys.”

Finally, I have sought to study—it is my current work—the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject. For example, I have chosen the domain of sexuality—how men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of “sexuality.” (Foucault, 1983: 208)

The conceptual association between these two modalities that I explore in this chapter lies in Foucault’s understanding of disciplinary power. I argue that, since the early days of the Red Power era in the mid- to late-1960s, some regions of Indian Country have transformed into a disciplinary society, investing each individual with a personalized Indianness that was produced and reinforced by disciplinary technologies. Indianness in the modernity of the disciplinary society is no longer a cultural given; rather, Indianness is an individual achievement.

**Discourse, Disciplinary Power, and Identity**

The knowledge inherent to the Racial-Traditionalist discourse that I have discussed at length in the previous chapters was not an objective or politically disinterested knowledge. Rather, this discourse was, and remains so to this day, a subjective knowledge,
involved in understanding the “truth” of Indianness and producing useful Indigenous bodies in traditionalism-inspired anticolonial resistance. Indeed, it is out of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse that a number of “subject positions” emerge, subjectivities that correspond to the common understanding of identity. In a Foucauldian sense, the discourse and its attendant knowledge became intimately attached to the Indian body through the modern form of disciplinary power. Thus, Indian identity is an effect of power; or more precisely, Indian identity is the effect of the interaction of the body at the nexus of power and knowledge around Indianness. This idea that Indianness is an effect of power and knowledge entails an analysis of how both power and knowledge operate as political phenomenon, and how they are comingled to produce certain subject positions.

Disciplinary power saw its first discussion by Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France in the early 1970s, but was given more familiar and refined treatment in *Discipline and Punish* shortly thereafter. In his lectures, recently published under the titles *Psychiatric Power* and *Abnormal* (delivered in 1973–1974 and 1974–1975, respectively), Foucault begins to elaborate a more contemporary understanding of power, a form of power that is distinctly modern, that has become a generalized social form. “What is power?” Foucault asks in *Psychiatric Power*, to which he responds with the following:

I would like to advance the hypothesis that something like disciplinary power exists in our society. By this I mean no more than a particular, as it were, terminal capillary form of power; a final relay, a particular modality by which political power, power in general, finally reaches the level of bodies and gets a hold on them, taking actions, behaviour, habits, and words into
account; the way in which power converges below to affect individual bodies themselves” (Foucault, 2003: 40).

As we know, the hegemonic idea of power within the political sciences was hierarchical, modeled on sovereign power, where the sovereign commands his (sic) subjects. Foucault’s new, rudimentary description of disciplinary power suggests that power functions as a network or web, but most importantly, as a network or web that acts and impinges upon the individual body.

According to Foucault, one’s identity—or subject position—is not the result of dictation from above, from the power of the sovereign or other lawmakers. Rather, his hypothesis around the production of subjectivities maintains that power is not so much a consequence of legal instruments or judicial institutions than it is one of meticulous control and operations upon the body (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 153; Gutting, 2005: 20). This latter understanding of power comes into sharp relief when we consider the popular conception of how Indian identity is produced. Although very useful in certain legal respects—such as deciding who can be recognized as an Indian under the Indian Act—and thus how certain defined rights and duties are distributed, the dominant understanding fails to account for how power operates in a modern, post-Enlightenment society. That is to say, the power of the sovereign, instituted by legislation and the constitution, can only make absolute decisions by establishing prescribed limits. In this “sovereign sense,” power determines who will and will not be legally recognized as Indian by the sovereign through the statutory provisions in the Indian Act. This appreciation of power maintains that, power is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a commodity, and which one can in consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or
partially, through a legal act or through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through cession or contract. Power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be established (Foucault, 1980: 88).

It is this very conception of power, theorized in rights and law in discourse, which Foucault encourages us to understand as limited if we are to develop a thorough understanding of how power operates specifically through identity, particularly his understanding of disciplinary power. As Foucault observed: “One remains attached to a certain image of power-law, power-sovereignty, which was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the monarchic institution. It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoretical privilege of law” (Foucault, 1978: 90). Instead, we must re-conceptualize how power works, how it operates to transform individuals outside the rules and codes enshrined in legislation. Indianness, understood accordingly, is something that must be analyzed independently of law and the sovereign right of the state, that is, independently of the *Indian Act* and the constitution of Canada.

In his earlier thoughts on this new idea, Foucault is, at some times, at pains to explain this new understanding of modern power. This generalized social form of power that Foucault seeks to explain stands in sharp contrast to the more common understanding of power that forms the basis of many political analyses. On the one hand, power has typically been conceived in terms of right and law, or what Foucault calls “sovereign power”—the power one normally associates with the right of the King, the power entrenched and exercised by political institutions. On the other hand, a discursive
conception of identity production, according to Foucault, understands that there is no natural given with some fixed essence. Instead, disciplinary power produces subjectivities, taking the individual body as its target. “In a word,” Foucault tells us, “we can say that disciplinary power, and this is no doubt its fundamental property, fabricates subjected bodies; it pins the subject-function exactly to the body. It fabricates and distributes subjected bodies; it is individualizing only in that the individual is nothing other than the subjected body” (Foucault, 2003: 55). The corollary of this is that, it is not because the state declares what Indianness entails and thus who is and who is not an Indian, rather, the Indian is produced by way of disciplinary power acting upon the body.²⁹

In order to analyze the relationship between disciplinary power and the production of Indianness, we must outline (a) how Foucault differentiates between sovereign power and disciplinary power and (b) the relationship between disciplinary power and knowledge. First, according to Foucault, disciplinary power stands in sharp contrast to sovereign power; the former is productive while the latter is repressive. As Foucault remarks, disciplinary power “seems to me to be power that is not in fact repressive but productive, repression figuring only as a lateral or secondary effect with regard to its central, creative, and productive mechanisms” (Foucault, 1999: 52). That is, sovereign power, in both its theoretical conception and in its exercise, is negative, effecting domination whereas disciplinary power is positive and productive (Shiner, 1982: 391). Nowhere, perhaps, is this difference between sovereign power and disciplinary power

²⁹ It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the already widely understood politics of Indigenous-Canadian state relations undertaking within the conventional understandings and theorizing of power and the state. See, for example, Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State by Leroy Little Bear, Menno Boldt, and J. Anthony Long.
more pronounced than in relation to the body. Indeed, the sovereign is seen to “hold” power as a commodity and exercise it at its own discretion. It can do this through direct action upon the body of the individual, imposing certain constraints on subjects of law, such as citizens (Rose and Miller, 1992: 272). Foucault illustrated this conceptual divergence of the effects of power in *Discipline and Punish*. There, infamously, Foucault opens his book with a vivid account of the tortuous punishment of Robert-François Damiens as the ritual and ceremony of the exercise of sovereign-power upon the body. In this respect, the exercise of this form of power by the sovereign can only be described as a force that physically coerces and represses a range of certain actions; at its most extreme, sovereign power can destroy its target (Rouse, 2005: 98). Foucault then goes on to show how modern society has made use of the newer form of power, that of discipline. Foucault traces the emergence of various techniques that were employed as forms of discipline, noting how prisons, armies, schools and hospitals became fertile grounds for disciplinary methods. In these settings, Foucault saw how positive effects were produced without the ritualized exercise of physical coercion. In other words, disciplinary power can produce certain behavioural ends within the individual without ever touching the body itself:

ultimately, what one is trying to restore in this technique of [disciplinary power] is not so much the juridical subject, who is caught up in the fundamental interests of the social pact, but the obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him (Foucault, 1975: 128).
Indeed, the juridical subject is the object or target of sovereign-power, whereas the modern subject is the object of this new power, disciplinary power. Moreover, while sovereign-power aims to correct behaviour through external exercises of physical coercion, disciplinary power seeks to internalize such control within the individual himself or herself. To be sure, the individual submits him or herself to the norms of prevailing discourse. When the body is found in relations of power, the self, conforming to the norms of behaviour, comportment, attitude, and habit, acts upon it. That is to say, the individual self takes his or her body and mind as the target for adjustment and correction according to the parameters of discursive norms. In doing so, the individual constitutes his or herself as a subject of discourse, the subject of power/knowledge, producing an identity (or subject position, in Foucauldian terms), consonant with the norms of discourse.

Power, according to Foucault, exists where resistance is possible. Indeed, power is “strategic games” that are in operation in relationships between people, individuals or groups (Foucault, 1988b: 18). “Strategic games concern how mechanisms of power are exercised, aiming to affect conduct” (Vad Baunsgaard and Clegg, 2012: 217). In human relations, power is always present insofar as one wishes to control the conduct of another; power, then, is exercised with design and intent, although it is not always a conscious decision of the agent (Foucault, 1988b: 11; 1978: 95). As Foucault states, “[t]he exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others” (Foucault, 1983: 219). Power has the characteristic of being capillary in nature, of reaching into the smallest details of life and directing the range of movements, gestures and attitudes of the individual (Foucault, 1975: 137, 198; 1978). In this sense, then, power produces effects in the individual that determine his or her identity.

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Indeed, Foucault's idea of power transforms the free individual into a self-disciplining, normalizing and self-regulating subject.

Foucault’s conception of how disciplinary power functions in modernity entails the activities—self-disclosure and self-understanding, for instance—that transform us, as individuals, into subjects of knowledge, and thus the foundation for our identities. Indeed, actively knowing ourselves entails “subjectivizing” ourselves, as Foucault calls it. This is what he calls a “technology of the self”: “an exercise of self upon self by which one tries to work out, to transform one’s self and to attain a certain mode of being” (Foucault, 1988b: 2). Technologies of the self, Foucault explains, are those practices “which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain sense of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection and immortality” (Foucault, 1988a: 18). Using the knowledge of discourse, we actively make use of technologies of the self, modifying ourselves to conform to the truths of society. These practices of the self, the application of power through the dissemination of knowledge, “are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group” (Foucault, 1988b: 11). We are, in short, normalizing and regulating ourselves to the dictates of culture and society. All of this is done with the belief that we are achieving an authentic self; but, as Foucault argues, we really just constitute ourselves as subjects of the disciplines of discourse.

Disciplines order and normalize the actions of everyday life through discourse. Disciplines are the “positive mechanics” that subject the individual to habits and informal rules, exercising a subtle coercion of movements, gestures and attitudes, distinct in
character from the coercion rooted in the power of state or that power authorized in legislation. As Foucault elaborates:

Disciplines are the bearers of a discourse, but this cannot be the discourse of right. The discourse of discipline has nothing in common with that of law, rule, or sovereign will. The disciplines may well be the carriers of a discourse that speaks of a rule, but this is not the juridical rule deriving from sovereignty, but a natural rule, a norm. The code they come to define is not that of law but that of normalization. Their reference is to a theoretical horizon which of necessity has nothing in common with the edifice of right.

It is human science which constitutes their domain, and clinical knowledge their jurisprudence (Foucault, 1980: 106).

Indeed, disciplines are techniques, not institutions, which colonize and invest other forms of power on the body (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 153). In these discourses, ideas of what is right and wrong, rectitude and chicanery, probity and indecency, become informal regulations to which the individual, the object of these moral and ethical injunctives, must abide. “[D]iscipline is a set of strategies, procedures and ways of behaving which are associated with certain institutional contexts and which then permeate ways of thinking and behaving in general” (Mills, 2003: 44). One’s obedience to these norms, the compliance of the individual acting on various technologies of the self, transforms the individual into a subject of a given discourse.

In a normalizing society, the subject is constituted through the deployment of both disciplinary power and the technology of punishment. Certain behaviours and attitudes are defined by disciplines along a distribution with both a positive and negative pole; in
fact, there is a “whole range of degrees of normality” (Foucault, 1975: 184). On the one hand, failing to appropriately observe the normalized codes that are conveyed through discourses, that is, failing to discipline the self to norms transmitted through discourses, calls for sanctions against the individual. “At the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism,” Foucault tells us (1975: 177). Unlike the power of the sovereign, the aim of punishment is not to crush, dismember or overpower the body, but rather “the body [is] to be trained, exercised, and supervised” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 152). Modern punishment does not devastate or destroy the body, as in medieval torture; rather, the modern technology of punishment endeavours to correct the body. One the other hand, disciplines also ensure that a system of gratification and reward is at work. In fact, disciplines are most effective when the individual believes that a certain comportment of the self or a certain inclination is in their interest. The strategy of disciplinary power, in fact, achieves its greatest efficiency when an individual both disciplines and punishes the self by its self.

Disciplinary power works by exploiting the technologies of the self, making the self conduct the punishment. For instance, an individual may feel guilt or remorse for deviating from what discourse prescribes as “normal.” Externally, transgressions can result in punitive action from independent sources for failure to comply with what knowledge and discourse tells us is conventional. Consider, for example, Sandra Lee Bartky’s study on modern patriarchal power. In her study, Bartky details how women internalize a particular conception of femininity prescribed by a discourse, what it means to be a “normal” woman, and how this discursively formulated version of femininity is inscribed both in and on the bodies of women: “the new discipline invades the body and seeks to regulate its very forces
and operations, the economy and efficiency of its movements” (Bartky, 1988: 61). As Bartky documents, women act in a very controlled manner, carefully monitoring their movements and gestures to conform to the norms of the prevailing discourse on femininity. Moreover, women are at great pains to modify their physical appearance, dressing in the “appropriate” clothing and applying other decorations to their bodies, such as jewelry and make-up. In this way, women normalize themselves to the discourse of femininity in a way that creates the impression that this behaviour is entirely voluntary; that is, there is no formal institutional structure charged with the authority to carry out the subordination of women (Bartky, 1988: 75).

Cultural Fidelities and the Normalization of the “Traditional”

In many anti-colonial writings, representations of the decolonized Indian frequently depict a person steeped in a cultural milieu that existed prior to western, settler contact. Indeed, it has been widely argued that “real” Indianness—the “authentic” Indigenous personhood that existed in a form unblemished by the assault of colonial culture—embodies this “traditional” mode. This discourse on traditionalism constructed the “traditional” as both “normal” and an “ideal type” of Indianness. According to Audra Simpson, a Mohawk academic from Kahnawá:ke, there is a position held by some Indigenous folks that she calls “self-conscious traditionalism”: “This ‘self-conscious traditionalism’, like the culture concept, cannot be thought about, or written about, enough. To be Native today is to be cultured: to possess culture, to exercise it, to proclaim it, to celebrate it. But we cannot have just any culture; it has to be “traditional” culture”
At the same time, however, the discursive techniques that render traditional Indianness intelligible as the anti-colonial norm further segment Indianness into ranks, measuring difference with respect to the norm of tradition, and arranging difference into categories or classes. As Foucault points out, this discursive practice is the first step of discipline. “The first of the great operations of discipline,” Foucault notes, “is the constitution of “tableaux vivants,” which transform the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities” (Foucault, 1975: 148; italics original). As Foucault explains, “disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate” (Foucault, 1975: 223).

Indeed, typologies and other systems of classifying emerged in numerous anti-colonial writings to reinforce “tradition” as “normal,” but also to enumerate difference on scales or along a continuum. These disciplinary exercises produce the domain of the “abnormal”: “Insofar as these disciplinary systems were normalizing, they necessarily produced, on their borders and through exclusion, residual abnormalities, illegalities, and irregularities. The tighter the disciplinary system, the more numerous the abnormalities and irregularities” (Foucault, 2003: 110). One of the earliest formulations of the Indianness-norm was articulated by one of the Red Power Movement’s most revered figures, Clyde Warrior. Warrior, a co-founder of the National Indian Youth Council, lauded

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Simpson recognizes “self-conscious traditionalism” as one form of anti-colonial resistance, but she is critical of this concept and its viability in contemporary decolonization. I address and provide more discussion of Simpson’s view, which she develops more fully in her 2014 book *Mohawk Interruptus: political life across the borders of settler states*, on this mode of traditionalism in the Conclusion (see also Sunseri, 2010: 96).
as “a legendary hero to young Indians throughout the country,” and overtly “contemptuous of white society” fashioned an early serialization of Indianness that separated individuals into types (Josephy, Nagel and Johnson, 1999: 16). Described as his “most famous statement,” Warrior published the short essay Which One Are You?: Five Types of Young Indians (1964) just as Red Power had begun to establish itself as a social movement.

Warrior’s “Five Types” are as follows:

*Type A – Slob or Hood.* This is the individual who receives his definition of self from the dominant society, and unfortunately, sees this kind in his daily relationships and associations with his own kind. ...

*Type B – Joker.* This type has defined himself that to be an Indian is a joke. An Indian does stupid, funny things. After defining himself, from cues society gave him, he proceeds to act as such. ...

*Type C – Redskin “White-Noser” or the Sell-Out.* This type has accepted and sold out to the dominant society. He has accepted that definition that anything Indian is dumb, usually filthy, and immoral, and to avoid this is to become a “Little Brown American” by associating with everything that is white. He may mingle with Indians, but only when it is to his advantage, and not a second longer than is necessary. Thus, society has created the fink of finks.

*Type D – Ultra-Pseudo-Indian.* This type is proud that he is Indian, but for some reason does not know how one acts. Therefore he takes his cues from non-Indian sources, books, shows, etc., and proceeds to act “Indian.” With
each action, which is phony, we have a person becoming unconsciously phonier and phonier. Hence, we have a proud, phony Indian.

*Type E – Angry Nationalist.* Although abstract and ideological, this type is generally closer to true Indianness than the other types, and he resents the others for being ashamed of their own kind. ... The “Angry Nationalist” wants to stop the current trend toward personality disappearance, and institute changes that will bring Indians into contemporary society as real human beings; but he views this, and other problems, with bitter abstract and ideological thinking (Warrior, 1964: 306).

The rhetoric in Warrior’s typology anticipates the language used by many Indigenous and anti-colonial authorities. The “Sell-Out,” for instance, was popularized and adopted by the likes of Russell Means, as the quotation at the outset of this chapter demonstrates. Brock Pitawanakwat similarly notes that the ““sell-out” slander has many forms that range from accusations of being an “apple” (red on the outside and white on the inside) to being called a “hang-around-the-fort Indian” (one who prefers non-native society to indigenous ways)” (Pitawanakwat, 2006: 33).

Perhaps most instructive of Warrior’s five types is his overall assessment of this multiplicity of and the construction of “normal” Indianness. As Warrior closed out his essay, he noted that “these types are just what they are, types, and not full, real human beings, or people. ... None of these types is the ideal Indian” (Warrior, 1964: 305, 307). In other words, Warrior’s five types fall outside the model of perfect Indianness, deviating from the norm. At the same time, and in the fifty years that followed the publication of Warrior’s typology, the “ideal Indian” of the anti-colonial resistance was discursively
embodied in the “traditional Indian.” John Mohawk, the celebrated indigenous activist, academic, and journalist, explains:

The idea of “tradition” arose in reaction to an attack on the Indian cultures—the idea of an anti-tradition. There was no ideology of a tradition in the preliterate society because there was no need to defend worldviews or customs which had never been challenged. When colonizer began to attack these ways, the Native people began to defend them. The Traditional Movement, then, arose in response to colonialism (Mohawk, 1983: 6).

Indeed, anti-colonial impulses served to consolidate the norm of Indianness—Warrior’s “ideal Indian”—around conceptions of the traditional. The traditional was privileged in contemporary writings, especially by Indigenous authorities. Hilary Weaver, an Ivy League educated Lakota academic, asserts that Indigenous “identity should be assessed rather than assumed. Various scales have been developed to assess indigenous people’s cultural identity along a continuum from traditional, to integrated/bicultural, to assimilated” (Weaver, 2001: 248). Similarly, in Peace, Power, Righteousness, the Indigenous scholar Taiaiake Alfred details a typology evocative of Warrior’s Five Types. Alfred’s categorization spans a spectrum; it is organized as a distribution from the traditional ideal to the deviant or deficient westernized person of Indigenous racial heritage. Alfred’s typology entails the following ranked ordering:

(1) the Traditional Nationalist represents the values, principles, and approaches of an indigenous cultural perspective that accepts no compromise with the colonial structure; (2) the Secular Nationalist represents an incomplete or unfulfilled indigenous perspective, stripped of
its spiritual element and oriented almost solely towards confronting colonial structure; (3) the Tribal Pragmatist represents an interest-based calculation, a perspective that merges indigenous and mainstream values towards the integration of Native communities within colonial structures; and (4) the Racial Minority (“of Indian descent”) represents Western values—a perspective completely separate from indigenous cultures and supportive of the colonial structures that are the sole source of Native identification (Alfred, 1999: 32).

The promotion and acclamation of the “traditional” Indian as real, authentic, and, most importantly, decolonized, figure so prominently in anti-colonial texts that the oftentimes complex classification schemes were collapsed into simple binary arrangements. As Indigenous scholar Kristina Fagan has observed, Alfred’s ranking structure is, at the base, a binary outline: “Aboriginal people [in Alfred’s works] are presented as either traditional nationalists or assimilated sellouts” (Fagan, 2004: 25). This minimal dichotomy between the traditional Indian and the assimilated counterpart was reflected in everyday views on the cultural divisions within Indian Country (St. Denis, 2004). An article published in early 1980s by the Indigenous periodical, Akwesasne Notes, highlighted this distinction, pointing out the manifestation of this categorical divide in Indian Country: “There is enormous factionalism on the Indian reservations. The communities are generally divided into two ideologically opposed camps—the progressives who represent a desire to embrace “modernity,” and the traditionalists who state a desire to preserve their culture” (AN, 1982: n.p.; emphasis added).
The Corporeality of Traditionalism

The normalization of “traditionalism” produced an entire literary edifice concerned not only with the hierarchy of Indian types, but also with the practices and procedures bound up with inscribing “traditionalism” upon the body. Texts written in the emergent anti-colonial resistance tradition were not just descriptive exercises that contrasted the traditional against the assimilated; rather, the proliferating thought was very much concerned with developing prescriptions for self-disciplined achievement. Many of the books and tracts came out of the academic study of decolonization, but less formal and equally accessible publications had also become popular. There was, in the last decades of the twentieth century to today, a proliferation of pamphlets, articles, manuals, guides, manifestos, and books produced solely for the instruction of self-normalized traditionalism. At the heart of these writings was the Indigenous body: how it was to be manipulated, moved, adorned, and maintained through both thought and action, in order to achieve traditionalism.

Instructions on traditional behaviours and comportment figure prominently in the anti-colonization literature. Popular within Indigenous resistance circles, Colonization and Decolonization: A Manual for Indigenous Liberation in the 21st Century appeared in 2006. Written by Zig-Zag, the pseudonym of Gord Hill, of the Kwakwaka’wakw nation in British Columbia, Colonization and Decolonization is a 30-page manual with organized instructions to guide the individual to a decolonized state.

Just as colonialism enters and passes through various phases, beginning first with recon missions and then the application of military force, so too does
decolonization. It would be a mistake to conceive of decolonization as a single event. Instead, it is a process that begins with individuals & small groups. The primary focus in the first phase of decolonization is the disengaging from the colonial system and re-learning one’s history, culture, etc. This phase places a heavy emphasis on rejecting European society & embracing all that is Indigenous as good & positive.

Some common steps in this phase include returning to one’s community, re-establishing family relations, re-learning culture (inc. art, language, songs, ceremonies, hunting, fishing, etc.). This not only counters the destructive effects of colonialism, but also instills in the Indigenous person a greater respect & appreciation for their own culture and way of life. In many ways it is a struggle for identity & purpose (Zig-Zag, 2006: 20)

Becoming “traditional”—authors writing in this spirit argued—rested on a return to pre-contact cultural behavior. Taking up practices that originated in Indigenous cultures before the arrival of Euro-descended settlers would thus restore the Indigenous person to his or her rightful decolonized state.

Themes found in popular media—however niche the anti-colonial movement audience—were echoed in academic works, which found wider readership beyond the academy and conventional scholarship. Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, for example, underscore the significance of behavior and thinking in the unequivocally titled Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism. Alfred and Corntassel highlight the important function of the corporeal dimension—body and mind—with regards to individual decolonization: “there are identifiable directions of movement, patterns of
thought and action that reflect a shift to an Indigenous reality form the colonized places we inhabit today in our minds and in our souls” (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005: 612). In his influential Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, Alfred reiterates the critical place of the body and mind in decolonization, linking “traditional” behavior and comportment to the promise of individual liberation and authenticity. “The process of decolonization is personal,” writes Alfred, “[a]t the more personal level, it means adopting patterns of thought and action that reject colonial premises in favour of self-conscious traditionalism” (Alfred, 1999: 80).

The crossover between academia and popular culture produced a number of hybrid publications. In 2005, Waziyatawin (née Angela Wilson), a Dakota professor at the University of Victoria’s Indigenous Governance program and Michael Yellow Bird, Director of Indigenous Tribal Studies at North Dakota State University, compiled a collection of writings on decolonization in For Indigenous Eyes Only: A Decolonization Handbook. This handbook outlines exercises to be undertaken for the individual to “decolonize” by practicing the traditional indigenous ways. “As readers work through these issues,” wrote one Indigenous reviewer, “they will see themselves as vital participants in the reclamation and retention of Native lifeways” (Pettigrew, 2011: 31). As the editors explain at the outset: “This workbook is intended as a primer to help you to think more concisely about the meanings of colonization and decolonization, to give you a language to talk about them, and to assist you in developing strategies for decolonizing your life and your world” (Waziyatawin and Yellow Bird, 2005: 1). A sequel followed this handbook in 2012 with the slightly modified title For Indigenous Minds Only: A Decolonization Handbook. Unlike the
first handbook, the second focused on the mind, providing practical instruction on how to decolonize through altering patterns of thinking.

A common theme in these writings on decolonization is the centrality of the body in the production of traditional Indianness. As the attention to distinctions between Indian and Other amplified, the specification of Indianness expanded into the corporeal domain. Ostensibly trivial aspects of the body and bodily comportment were invested with new significance becoming critical to processes of decolonization and the achievement of “authentic” Indianness. Behavior and habits involved in otherwise unremarkable details of life, such as attire, adornment, and eating, were recoded into cultural conventions in order to mark off “traditional” Indianness from not only the settler Other, but “lesser” Indians: the “apples” and the “sell-outs.” Indeed, it was through a set of disciplinary practices that the imaginings of Racial-Traditionalist discourse normalized the “traditional” form of Indianness as the ideal, decolonized type of Indian.

The Racial-Traditionalist discourse introduced aesthetic parameters, most notably how the body is to be adorned with culturally appropriate dress. A prescribed mode and style of fashion is to be closely followed if one is to be looked upon as genuinely Indian. One’s clothing, in particular, is an indication of the tradition Indian; in this way, Indianness can be, quite literally, worn on one’s sleeve (Strong and Van Winkle, 1996: 559). Certain fashion styles are associated with “real” Indianness insofar as clothing and accessories are viewed as the preserve of authentic Aboriginal culture. Irrespective of past cultural differences, a synthesis of various disparate Indian cultures has provided the basis for a pan-Indian fashion, such as buckskin garments, that is inextricably tied to identity. Harold Cardinal saw his buckskin coat as symbolic of his Indianness. When asked why he was
always seen wearing his buckskin coat with traditional bead-work, Cardinal responded by noting that “it was a symbol of Aboriginality and recognized as such by anyone who saw him” (Frideres, 2008: 326). Cardinal lamented the popularity of what he viewed to be authentic Indian dress and the impact that this had on the distinction between Aboriginal identity and the Other: “Now Indian clothing is acceptable. In fact it has become high fashion in some quarters. The only problem now is that an Indian runs the risk of being taken for a hippie if he wears his ordinary clothing” (Cardinal, 1969: 23).

Similarly, other physical features are to be manipulated in such a manner consistent with the prevailing limits of outwardly directed cues of racial and cultural identity. Take one’s hair, for example: in some of the early circles of the Red Power movement, one’s hair was a barometer for “real” Indianness. During this period, the “long-hairs” were perceived as “tribal traditionals,” those Indians who struggled with white society and also, at times, with the “short hairs,” those marginal Indians who supported “progressive” policies aimed at assimilating to western society (Valaskakis, 2005: 54). Indeed, long hair is still viewed by many Indians as authentic styling and a self-disciplining practice that is undertaken in order to meet the normalized image of the traditional Indian. Today, many indigenous individuals “either cut their long hair or grow it out, attempting to meet either the traditional or progressive image of the American Indian” (Teuton, 2009: 200). This practice is particularly significant amongst “reclaimers,” those individuals who were raised in the non-indigenous culture but who now seek to reconstruct their connection with their indigenous cultural ancestry (Fitzgerald, 2007; see also Fitzgerald, 2014: 406-407). As Kathleen Fitzgerald has observed, for “real” Indians today, “wearing long hair is a statement of their Nativeness. Many [Indian identity] reclaimers, although certainly not all,
embrace long hair as a way to embrace their Native selves and as an outward message to others as to their racial/ethnic identity” (Fitzgerald, 2007: 177).

Management of one’s diet and food consumption have emerged as disciplinary practices of selfconstitution in the achievement of “authentic” Indianness. Diets have long been recognized as specific disciplinary regimes, particularly in matters of gender subjectivity (Heyes, 2006). “Real” Indianness, today, has entered what Elspeth Probyn has described as “the intricate world of alimentary programming” (Probyn, 2000: 16). The burgeoning social concern with decolonization as a practice to achieve a “traditional”—and, thus, “real” or “authentic”—mode of Indianness has articulated corresponding social rules for dieting. “There is a movement, sometimes using the slogan “Decolonize Your Diet,” to cut back or eliminate foods that are not native to the Americas from the Indian diet. This slogan analogizes commodity and other non-native foods to colonists who have invaded the Indian diet. This is an argument from tradition alone” (Vantrease, 2013: 63). Indeed, the “Decolonize Your Diet” movement’s reliance on “tradition” was developed, in part, independently of health and nutrition considerations. As the Indigenous scholar, Devon Mihesuah, admits: “Regardless of the arguments over the intricacies of nutrition, many Native activists advocate educating ourselves about our histories in order to take a stand against colonization, and that includes studying the way our people used to eat. ... one way to decolonize is to change our eating habits” (Mihesuah, 2003: 827-828).

Today, a number of cookbooks, with “traditional” recipes that use pre-contact food sources have been published under this slogan. For instance, Luz Calvo and Catriona Rueda Esquibel, Indigenous academics in the United States, have published their *Decolonize Your Diet* (2015), a recipe book that offers discussion on decolonization. In their academic
pursuits, Calvo and Esquibel have similarly published Decolonize Your Diet: A Manifesto where they appeal for action: “We call on people of all ethnicities to connect with their elders now to recover the vital cultural knowledge we need to survive. We need to reclaim our ancestors’ wisdom. What foods did they eat? How was food prepared?” (Calve and Esquibel, 2013: 1-2). Answers to these questions are readily available for the Indigenous person who wants to decolonize and return to the traditional dietary ways of his or her ancestors. In their article entitled, Being Indigenous, Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel state:

**Decolonize your Diet**—our people must regain the self-sufficient capacity to provide our own food, clothing, shelter and medicines. Ultimately important to the struggle for freedom is the reconstitution of our own sick and weakened physical bodies and community relationships accomplished through a return to the natural sources of food and the active, hard-working, physical lives lived by our ancestors (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005: 613; italics original).

As Alfred explains elsewhere— with Glen Coulthard—the rejection of “non-traditional” foods for “traditional” edibles is “essential for indigenizing and radicalizing your mind and body.” (Alfred and Coulthard, 2006: 42). For Alfred and Coulthard, the “traditional” is “[a]nything wild and natural ... especially the good stuff like muktuk, deer tongue, oolichan grease, fiddleheads, fish head soup, moose nose, berry soups, pickerel cheeks, corn soup, beaver and muskrat tails, bear grease, and of course, caribou babies” (Alfred and Coulthard, 2006: 42).
Decolonizing the diet is closely linked to views of the traditional Indigenous economy. This is especially true with respect to traditional labour and the production of food and other land-based processes for sustenance (Simpson, 2001). “Relearning one’s culture occurs through a variety of means,” notes Zig-Zag, going on to point out that this includes learning “traditional skills such as hunting & fishing, and living on the land” (Zig-Zag, 2006: 24). To be sure, Indigenous scholar Mark Aquash reiterates this point: “First Nations culture is characterized by traditional activity such as hunting and gathering” (Aquash, 2013: 132). Decolonization, the many writings argue, point to these traditional forms of work not merely as means to provide food, but rather as cultural practices coded as “traditional” in order to distinguish authentic Indianness from assimilated and colonized modes of existence. Images of land-based people working on the land, rather than in western modern locales—urban settings such as offices or factories—are widely promoted as the quintessential preoccupation of traditional peoples (Corntassel, 2012).

**Indigenous Membership: Complete and Austere**

The discursive coding of traditionalism as the norm operated to serve technical ends for the production and management of individual Indianness across Indian Country. As Foucault remarked, the “norm’s function is not to exclude and reject. Rather, it is always linked to a positive technique of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project” (Foucault, 1999: 50). Indeed, the normative project of decolonization—the anti-colonial imperative of producing Indians in the image of traditionalism—has been taken up in what Foucault would call a system of disciplinary normalization (Foucault, 1999: 52). An entire apparatus emerged around Indianness, operationalizing disciplinary technologies and the mechanisms required to first, individualize, then normalize the “traditional” mode
of Indianness on, and within, the individual. As Foucault observed in *Discipline and Punish*, these mechanisms were deployed in “complete and austere institutions,” the sites where the individual was subjected to the disciplinary procedures. In these totalizing institutions, discipline operates by way of:

- distributing individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, extracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training their bodies, coding their continuous behavior, maintaining them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus of observation, registrations and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralized (Foucault, 1975: 231).

In Indian Country, one institution stands out as complete and austere, as an apparatus of disciplinary control designed to produce “traditional” Indians: Indigenous Band membership. Informed by the tenets of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse—with the extensive cataloguing of “traditional” aspects such as language, customs, history, and pre-contact activities and behaviours—the Band membership in some Indigenous communities was transformed and deployed as an individualizing technology for the achievement of “traditionalism.”

In the three decades since 1987 when First Nations in Canada assumed authority to control Band membership, some Indigenous communities have used membership as a disciplinary institution to produce the necessary docile bodies for the production of the “traditional.” Although these institutions—Band membership and citizenship laws—have juridical or economic origins in the sovereign form of society, their function in disciplinary modernity serves to extend disciplinary power throughout the social body to reach
individuals. Up until the mid-1980s, the Canadian state made the determination of who was and who was not Indian. The matter then was simply a pronouncement by the sovereign, a top-down exercise of power that dictated Indianness under the *Indian Act*. However, when the *Indian Act* was amended in 1985, it permitted Indian Bands to assume authority over membership if they chose. Since taking effect in 1985, Band membership in some Indigenous communities has noticeably transformed into a complex disciplinary mechanism that makes use of a number of disciplinary technologies to specifically produce “traditional” Indianness.

More and more, Band membership and citizenship laws in some Indigenous communities are codifications of disciplinary procedures for the production of “traditional” Indians. Indeed, in some corners of Indian Country, the code outlines and describes the processes entailed in construction of Indianness rather than simply a description of Indianness. For instance, the Paul First Nation, a Stoney-Cree community in Alberta, states in the preamble to its membership code that its objective is to preserve the traditional culture. There, the text of the Membership Code opens with the following:

> WHEREAS THE PAUL BAND OF INDIANS has the unique combination of heritage and culture with our Cree and Stoney Peoples, a heritage and culture of which we are proud, and the foundation of all that we do; and we are determined to keep our culture, languages and traditions intact.

The opening recital to the membership law for the Red Bluff Indian Band is similarly candid about the objective of protecting its unique cultural identity:
It is the intent of the Red Bluff Indian Band through the Red Bluff Indian Band Membership Laws to take control of our lives and to preserve our culture. By assuming jurisdiction over our membership, we shall be assured that our future generations shall be Red Bluff Indian Band Members according to our laws.

In order to obtain the stated objective—the anti-colonial imperative of protecting and rejuvenating Indigenous “traditional” culture—some Band membership laws outline a process that contemplates technical measures to constitute prospective members as docile bodies, bodies that could be trained and educated in traditionalism.

At their core, Band codes and membership laws are prescriptive, detailed programmes of disciplinary technologies. Some of these codes functioned by operationalizing the norm of traditionalism through a system that entailed what Foucault identified as the “means of correct training,” namely the disciplinary technologies of surveillance and hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination (Foucault, 1975). Many membership laws specify a network of relations, instituting an “integrated system” for the functioning of these technologies of disciplinary power.

Generally, Foucault explained it as following:

disciplinary power became an “integrated” system, linked from the inside to the economy and to the aims of the mechanism in which it was practiced. It was also organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from
bottom to top and laterally; this network “holds” the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another (Foucault, 1975: 176-177).

In some communities, a range of specialized authorities is charged with carrying out a vast number of heterogeneous tasks and responsibilities (Rose, 1996: 86). To be sure, membership codes institute a dense network of power relations, establishing numerous vectors of disciplinary management (Heyes, 2011: 162). The Taku River Tlingits Membership Code, for example, describes an elaborate web of figures enmeshed in the production of Indianness. In that code, overlapping and integrated roles and responsibilities are distributed amongst the Chief, members of the Band Council, an Enrollment Officer, the Membership Commission, the Elders Council, and representative members from each of the Taku river Tlinglit houses: Yanyeidi, Daxlawedi, Xooxetaan, Ganaxadi, Decitaan, and Tietlhit. Drawn into this web of authorities is, of course, the “applicant”: the person actively seeking recognition and acceptance as an Indian by these specialized personnel.

The array of specialized authority figures are deeply integrated into the mechanism for determining the status—Indian or otherwise—and the inscription of Indianness on individuals. Indeed, these authorities—existing variously as membership committees, Elder councils, and the like—are linked together as an “examining apparatus,” invested with the responsibility for the adjudication of Indianness (Foucault, 1975: 185). This tightly arranged cadre functions to bring together the two critical disciplinary technologies of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment. As Foucault tells us, “[t]he examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing
judgement [sic],” as “the heart of the procedures of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected” (Foucault, 1975: 184-185). Since the mid- to late-1980s, the examination has become a fixture in the disciplinary mechanism for determining Indianness in some Indigenous communities. Unlike the hospital, the classroom, or the observatory, there is no corresponding architectural site for carrying out examinations for Indianness. Nevertheless, some Indigenous communities have adopted various disciplinary techniques and methods that make both hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment simultaneously possible. As Foucault observed in Discipline and Punish, the shift to disciplinary society was marked by the escape of these disciplinary technologies from architectural structures into the social body. As sovereign society transformed into the disciplinary form of modernity, new spaces were reorganized as “enclosures,” what Foucault described as “the protected place of disciplinary monotony” where disciplinary mechanisms can function (Foucault, 1975: 141). These enclosures—the analytical spaces for optimization of surveillance and hierarchical judgement—are constructed for the examination of Indianness (Rose and Miller, 1992: 286). Indeed, there is a number of substitutes which achieve the desired clinical force of the examination, ranging from interviews to trial-like procedures. For instance, the membership code for the Sandy Bay Ojibway First Nation in Manitoba stipulates that, as part of the process for membership, the “applicant” will be interviewed. In other places, the examination is conducted as a hearing. The membership law for Kispiox, a Gitxsan community in British Columbia, provides that “The Membership Committee may conduct an investigation and is entitled to hold oral hearings for applications.” Similarly, in the Mohawk community of Akwesasne, when a
person applies to become a member, “the Akwesasne Membership Board must grant to the applicant a full hearing.”

The routines and procedures that put the individual under examination for Indianness is accompanied by an immense documentary regime. In previous social formations—the sovereign society, for instance—the ordinary, everyday individual person was “below the threshold of description” (Foucault, 1975: 191). However, in the disciplinary society, greater specificity and detail must be gathered about the person. The bureaucratic process of documentation makes each individual a “case,” an object to be known and analyzed (Rose, 1988: 189). As a case, the individual is brought into a “network of writing”:

the examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them. The procedures of examination were accompanied at the same time by a system of intense registration and of documentary accumulation (Foucault, 1975: 189).

This objectivizing technology—the bureaucratic procedure of transforming an applicant into a “case” to be examined by way of documentation—has been operationalized in some Indigenous communities. The Cheslatta T’en in British Columbia have codified a meticulous documentary procedure. In Part 4 of the Cheslatta T’en Membership Code By-Law provides for the authority of the examining bodies to collect the necessary documentation required to adjudicate the eligibility for membership.

Part 4 – Admission
4.1 This Code shall be administered by the Membership Clerk and the Membership Committee appointed by Band Council.

How to apply

4.2 A child shall apply for membership by way of parent or legal guardian.

4.3 Persons applying for membership must:

(a) comply with the requirements for eligibility contained in Article 3;

(b) complete and submit to the Membership Clerk an Application for Registration on Form 1; and

(c) provide to the Membership Clerk any information, documents, certificates, or other proof as required to determine entitlement to membership.

Through personalized information, the individual becomes an object to be known with great specification. Loosely-related personal data and information is systematically organized and separated into individual “dossiers,” specific records for each case that “enable the authorities to fix a web of objective codification” (Rabinow and Dreyfus, 1983: 159). The Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn Membership Code, which was passed by a community referendum on March 28, 2009, outlines the requisite documentation. Section 10 of this code stipulates the process and the attendant written forms as follows:

10.0 Application Process

10.1 A completed application for membership for each applicant shall be made to the Registrar.

10.2 The Registrar may, from time to time, create and set the form for all
Applications for Membership in the Algonquins of Pikwàkanagàn. Any form so created shall contain the following minimum information about the applicant:

a) The name, mailing address, date of birth, marital status, membership of applicant;

b) The name of the applicant’s spouse if applicable;

c) The names of the applicant’s dependent children; if any;

d) Individual or family ties to a member of the community;

e) Reasons for wanting to be a member;

f) Copy of marriage certificate or declaration of common law relationship;

g) Proof of registration under the Indian Act;

h) Proof of Algonquin Ancestry;

i) A Police Information Check from Country of residence.

j) Whether the member or child has been adopted.

An entire biographical narrative of intensely personal details of each case emerges from the documentary apparatus. Case-specific knowledge is registered, accumulated, and the raw information is systematically organized in order to both describe and evaluate the individual applicant’s Indianness. “The case,” as Foucault explained, “is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded” (Foucault, 1975: 192).
The examination extends beyond the physical boundaries long after the subject departs. Panopticism, where the applicant and his or her potentiality for Indianness is subject to near permanent visibility, is dispersed outward from the adjudicating authorities even after preliminary inquiries have concluded. As Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, “the Panopticon brings together knowledge, power, the control of the body, and the control of space into an integrated technology of discipline” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 189). The matter of space and geography—where observation continues—figures into a number of membership procedures. The Ehattesaht Indian Band, for instance, regulates the distribution of individuals in the space of its geographical territories in order to optimize and extend surveillance.

Any person applying for membership with The Ehattesaht Indian Band must show intent to reside within one of The Ehattesaht Bands Indian Reserves or on Federal Crown Land for a period of time. A person must display genuine intent of residency by establishing an ongoing physical presence within The Ehattesaht Indian Band Reserves or Federal Crown Lands and show some indication that his or her presence is not just transitory in nature.

Spatial management is instrumental to the continuous functioning of disciplinary power and hierarchical judgement, particularly in the maintenance of traditionalism. This is particularly evident in the Blood Tribe Membership Code which contemplates the residency on the Blood reserve of the applicant in tandem with the approval of the individual’s degree of traditionalism and his or her character. Article 5 of the Blood Tribe’s code specifies that a person is eligible for membership on the following grounds:

(i) has applied for membership in the Band;
(ii) is normally resident on the Reserve;

(iii) in the judgement of the Chief and Council (of the Tribunal) has a significant commitment to, Knowledge of, and an appreciation of the history, customs, traditions, culture, language and lifestyle of the Tribe;

(iv) in the judgement of the Chief and Council (or the Tribunal) has a character and lifestyle that would not cause his or her admission to membership in the Tribe to be detrimental to the future welfare or advancement of the Tribe;

This spatial organization is critical to the continued functioning of disciplinary power in two notable ways. In the first, the “applicant” is subjected to continued surveillance by way of panopticism. As both Foucault and Jeremy Bentham remarked, panopticism maximizes a near permanence of visibility despite the spatial distribution of the subject under observation (Hoffman, 2011: 34; see also Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 189). As a result, “surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its actions” (Foucault, 1975: 201). Indeed, “[v]isibility is a trap” that induces within the applicant an awareness that, although discontinuous in actions, he or she may be under surveillance: the applicant “must never know whether he [or she] is being looked at at any one moment; but he [or she] must be sure that he [or she] may always be so” (Foucault, 1975: 200, 201).

The second critical aspect of spatially managing the distribution of bodies in a geographic domain rests on what Foucault called the “composition of forces.”

Traditionalism has been thoroughly individualized in some First Nations, but it is achieved—in part—by the harmonization of individuals who comprise a mass or social
body. “This composition gives rise to a combinatory individuality by first treating individual bodies as mobile elements to be connected to other individual bodies as well as to a totality of bodies” (Hoffman, 2013: 29). Individuals of the whole, of the wider social body are mere elementary parts, Foucault explains. “The individual body becomes an element that may be placed, moved, articulated on others” (Foucault, 1975: 164). The probationary periods where individuals are expected to become knowledgeable in traditions, customs, the histories of the Indigenous nation, and acquire fluency in the Indigenous language appear to be individualized training programs, courses of training that are undertaken solely by the individual. But the disciplinary technology here—the composition of forces—views the method of immersion as a technique for the normalization of traditionalism: controlled exposure, contact, and experience in a “traditional” milieu will invariably develop “traditional” capacities within the individual. In other words, the composition of forces within the traditional community will subtly coerce synchronized comportment from the probationary applicant.

In many instances, these initial examinations serve as instruments to screen “applicants” into differentiated programs of training. The hearings, inquiries, interviews, and other examinations inform a system of ranking and classifying applicants. This technique—the “art of distributing bodies”—relies upon the grade given to the applicant and the corresponding corrective intervention that must be undertaken. In some First Nations, individual "applicants" are compelled to undertake a program of training and disciplined education in the norms of Indianness. “Individuals whose tendencies threatened to move them off the normal curve required care, healing, treatment to restore them to the normal range” (Brass, 2000: 310). Like some bands and tribal councils
governing Indianness, the Carry the Kettle Band in Saskatchewan code provides the means for prescribing a regime of training upon the applicant in order to sufficiently achieve the requisite knowledge, disposition, and cultural bonds. The Carry the Kettle Band *Rules of Membership in the Band* stipulates that:

In reviewing an application for membership, the Chief and Council may impose a period of probationary membership not to exceed five (5) years, in order that the applicant may have the opportunity to establish or re-establish social and cultural ties with the Band, to learn Band custom, tradition and history, and otherwise to adopt the way of life of the Band community. At the end of such probationary period or sooner if agreed by the applicant and the Chief and Council, the vote required by section 4 (d) shall be conducted.

Here, the applicant is constrained to a period of time in order to develop his or her capacities prior to further assessment and judgement. But this particular training/trial period—an “anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour” as Foucault calls it—does not terminate or come to an end in all communities across Indian Country (Foucault, 1975: 152). The Matsqui Indian Band in British Columbia, individual comportment remains a perpetual concern even long-after membership in the community has been conferred. As section 12 of the membership code for Matsqui states: “The Peacemaker Tribunal may call a Band meeting to revoke the membership of a Matsqui member, upon proof of severe anti-social behavior detrimental to the peace, order and good government of the Matsqui community.” In this interesting example, the decision of the Peacemaker Tribunal must be ratified by the community. According to the Matsqui membership code, revocation of the membership requires that a “minimum 75% majority of the Matsqui Bands eligible electors
must consent before the Peacemakers Tribunal may revoke a person’s membership in the Band.”

These technologies were very often deployed to inscribe the traditionalist norms onto the bodies of the applicants and train applicants to become traditional Indians. Indeed, membership in some First Nations is contingent upon the judgment that individuals submitting to the process undertake specific training and improvement. In line with the popular understanding of “traditionalism,” some Indigenous communities demand that the individual be fluent in the traditional language. The Tsuut’ina, a northern plains group located in Alberta, speak a language from the Athabascan linguistic group known as Sarcee. When an individual applies for citizenship in the Tsuut’ina Nation, the adjudicating apparatus demands fluency in Sarcee. As section 5. (c) “Application for Citizenship” of the Tsuut’ina Citizenship Code states: “To be admitted to Citizenship under this provision, a person 18 years or older, must, to the satisfaction of the Citizenship Evaluation Board: (i) Understand and speak the Tsuu T’ina Spoken language.” For acceptance into the Selkirk First Nation, located in the Yukon Territory, language is also a factor for membership. Section 30 of the Selkirk Membership Rules states that, “In determining whether an individual will be recognized as a Selkirk Indian person, the Membership Committee may consider ... cultural ties to the Selkirk Indian people through language or customs.”

The normalization of a prescribed mode of Indianness made use of self-disciplinary technologies. Recognition of Indianness demanded that the individual negotiate his or her own self-understanding and that this must be outwardly expressed. As Nikolas Rose explains, “[t]he truthful rendering into speech of who one is and what one does—to one’s parents, one’s teachers, one’s doctor, one’s lover—was both identifying, in that it
constructed a self in terms of a certain norm of identity, and subjectifying, in that one became a subject at the price of entering into a game of authority” (Rose, 1996: 96). In this way, discipline could function to modulate any affinities and loyalties for non-Indigenous societies and cultures possibly harboured by the applicant. That is, the applicant could identify him- or herself as “traditional,” and subject him- or herself to the subjectification of the “traditional.” In some First Nations, this self-discipline is exercised by way of a verbalized vow or confession. The Musqueam Indian Band in British Columbia, for instance, grants recognition as one of its own only when an applicant “has sworn an oath to maintain the traditions, culture and best interest of the Band,” according to section 2. (c)(iii) of its code.

The Examination: Lauren’s Story

In some communities, the vast “machinery of government” that emerged out of the expanding administrative structures in Indian Country coupled with the customary authority of elders. Elders occupied a particularly crucial station in efforts designed to regenerate Indianness. As the indigenous scholar, Gail Valaskakis, noted, elders were regarded as “real” Indians and stewards of authentic Indianness, “an insight,” we are told, “that not only redeems Indian blood but also places value on the experiences and knowledge of elders, whose age often resonates with bloodlines” (Valaskakis, 2005: 221). This insight provided the impetus for additional structures designed and implemented for greater administration over Indianness. Indeed, the social standing of elders and their customary authority was transformed in some communities into a formalized appendage of governance, sanctioned as official administrators and regulators of Indianness within community constitutions, laws and membership codes. An assortment of administrative
bodies, titled “Elders Council” or “Elders Committee,” were installed in some corners of Indian Country to oversee and regulate the internal affairs of the various First Nations. The mandate of the Elders Council of the Dene Nation provides an illustration:

The Elders Council is established to advise the Dene leadership and Dene on all issues concerning Denendeh [translated as “Land of the People”]. They will assist in addressing membership concerns arising from various internal and external activities; make recommendations regarding language, tradition and culture; and, assist in making decisions on these issues. The Elders Council will also provide advice on traditional knowledge and cultural and spiritual values. The Elders Council will operate as an advisory council and through its collective wisdom and knowledge it will reinforce the vision and mission statement of the Dene Nation.

The administrative functioning of these committees was recorded and documented in two films by the Mohawk film producer, Tracey Deer. In *Mohawk Girls* and *Club Native*, produced in 2005 and 2008 respectively, Deer interviews and chronicles the revelations of several women from her home community of Kahnawá:ke in respect of their seemingly ambiguous Native identities. In both films, Deer follows the recent experiences of Lauren, a teenaged girl on the cusp of adulthood who wants to be recognized as a member of the Mohawks of Kahnawá:ke. Although Lauren had lived in Kahnawá:ke for most of her life with her full-blooded Mohawk mother, the governing council has refused to recognize her as a Mohawk because her father was not Mohawk. Mixed-bloodedness, in Kahnawá:ke, has been and remains extremely controversial and has prevented the formal acknowledgement of Lauren as a Mohawk Indian. In fact, the Mohawk Council of Kahnawá:ke issued a formal
declaration that Lauren did not meet the community’s standards on Indianness (Deer, 2005). Nevertheless, in the film Lauren persists in her petitioning of the Council and eventually secures an opportunity to “demonstrate” and “prove” her Indianness. To be recognized as a Mohawk, Lauren must subject herself to the approval process of the regulatory body responsible for controlling Indianness in Kahnawá:ke.

In Mohawk Girls and Club Native, Deer accompanies Lauren as she makes her way through the administrative system that oversees management of membership. As with many First Nations, the Mohawks of Kahnawá:ke employed a system of membership regulation that enlisted the authority of elders as adjudicators with the faith that community elders are known to possess a specialized knowledge over matters of Indianness, a specialized knowledge believed to be inaccessible to the lay person, and thus requiring the services of duly identifiable elders. The special status of elders is explicitly recognized in the Kahnawá:ke Membership Law, which defines an elder as follows: “an adult person who is a member of the Kanien’kehá:ka [Mohawk Nation] of Kahnawá:ke and who has gained and continues to hold the trust, respect and confidence of the Kanien’kehá:ka of Kahnawá:ke and who has a good knowledge of the customs and Kanien’kehá [Mohawk] of the Kanien’kehá:ka of Kahnawá:ke.” In Kahnawá:ke, select elders comprised the “Council of Elders.” Commissioned under Mohawk law, the Council of Elders is mandated to review and provide a decision respecting applications around membership, including instatement, reinstatement, suspension, and revocation.

Lauren’s account of her experience is telling of the bureaucratic management of Indianness in her community. Prior to her appearance before the Council of Elders—which is always conducted in camera—Lauren was required to submit to a lengthy and detailed
investigation into her background and character. As Lauren reveals in the film, “they [the Council of Elders] will be digging up all this stuff [personal information]” in order to “prove how Native you are” (Deer, 2008). Sandra Shurman, another Kahnawá:ke resident whose Mohawk status was under scrutiny, corroborated Lauren’s portrayal of the administrative measures taken by the Council of Elders in the management of Indianness in Deer’s film, *Club Native*. Shurman recounts her own experience of the invasive inquiry conducted by the Elders to arrive at a determination of her status as Mohawk or not. Of the tedious interrogation by the Council of Elders, Shurman gives a sense of the questioning that an applicant undergoes before the Elders: “Where do you live? Who do you live with? Where’s your father from? And, are your mother and father still together to this day?” (Deer, 2008).

At the conclusion of the Elder’s review of her application, Lauren is placed on a sort of probation that leaves open the opportunity for Lauren to be fully received as a member of the Kahnawá:ke Mohawks at some time in the future. Behind closed doors she is given some conditions and further instructions from the Council of Elders. She is told by the elders that, “It is strongly encouraged that you develop stronger connections with your culture and language. The Council of Elders wishes to revisit your application every two years for six years” (Deer, 2008).

**Examining the Spread of Traditionalism Across Indian Country**

I have argued above and in the preceding chapters that, in the closing decades of the twentieth century, there was a discernible rise of a discourse that took “traditional Indianness” as its target. At the same time, disciplinary technologies and institutions emerged to give power-knowledge a constitutive function in the development of individual Indianness. That is, the intermingling of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse and modern
disciplinary power operated as part of the larger anti-colonization project to produce a mode of Indianness that was “authentically” Indian and free of the “colonial stains,” as Taiaiake Alfred observed (Alfred, 2005). These broader claims raise a number of empirical questions about the scope and limitations of this study and the phenomena examined: where, in Indian Country, did the discourse and disciplines spread; and, what was the magnitude of the reach? Indeed, references to “Indians” and “Indian Country,” which have been deployed repeatedly throughout this study, evoke questions about the degree of representation and generalizability that claims made here extend to the broader Indigenous population, individual persons, and First Nations communities. To address these concerns, I have developed what I call the Traditionalism Index, a quantitative measure to express the considerably abstract and qualitative nature of the traditionalism dimension of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse.

As I have developed it, the Traditionalism Index is a composite summary measure of traditional Indigenous culture. A set of indicators has been selected based on the texts studied above to measure the scope of traditionalism in Indian Country, such as: the requirement to speak the traditional language; the requirements to live in the community; and the requirement to conduct oneself in a manner consistent with the traditional Indigenous lifestyle, and so forth. Having defined these indicators (a description of each is provided below), the calculation of the $I_{TRADITIONALISM}$ is as follows:

$$I_{TRADITIONALISM} = \frac{1}{5} [Res + Cha + Lan + Loy + Kno]$$

The values obtained by the calculation above are normalized in order to obtain Traditionalism Index scores that lie in the 0 to 1 interval. The typical Min-Max
standardization formula, immediately below, is applied to calculated values the 

\[ \text{TRADITIONALISM} \]

\[ X_{i,0 to 1} = \frac{X_i - X_{\text{Min}}}{X_{\text{Max}} - X_{\text{Min}}} \]

At the upper limit of 1, communities and First Nations are conceptually pure in traditionalist requirements for membership/citizenship. Conversely, the lower limit of 0 indicates the complete absence of traditional cultural requirements. The indicators used for calculating the Traditionalism Index are all categorical variables. Here, they are calculated using binary values, 1 or 0, each respectively corresponding to a response of “Yes” or “No” to a qualitative assessment of the evidence. The response is determined by discrete decision rules described for each below.

Residence (Res)

Yes: individual must live in First Nation community or in traditional territory in order to obtain membership/citizenship.

No: membership/citizenship is not contingent upon residence within the territory of the First Nation.

Example: the Brokenhead Ojibway Nation Citizenship Law states: “In considering whether to approve the citizenship applications of the persons referred to in Section 5(1)(c), the Citizenship Committee shall look at the following matters: ... (ii) whether the applicant will have a stable and nourishing home environment within the reserve.”
Character (Cha)

Yes: the applicant must be of a character, live a “way of life,” and/or conduct oneself in accordance to the traditional lifestyle of the First Nation.

No: there is no tradition-based criteria of character for membership/citizenship.

Example: section 6 (d) of the Membership Code of the Sunchild Band states that, “In considering applications for Membership in the Sunchild Band, the following factors shall be considered: ... d. Whether the applicant follows a way of life consistent with the people of the Sunchild Band.”

Language (Lan)

Yes: the applicant must demonstrate fluency in or significant understanding of the indigenous language of the First Nation.

No: there is no linguistic requirements for membership/citizenship.

Example: section 5 (c) of the Tsuu t’ina Citizenship Code states that, “To be admitted to Citizenship under this provision, a person 18 years or older, must, to the satisfaction of the Citizenship Evaluation Board: ... (i) Understand and speak the Tsuu t’ina Spoken language.”

Loyalty (Loy)

Yes: membership/citizenship requires loyalty or commitment to the First Nation.

No: there is no loyalty requirement to obtain membership/citizenship.

Example: the Nisga’a Lisims Government requires new citizens to pledge loyalty to the Nisga’a Nation. The Oath of Nisga’a Citizenship requires new citizens to affirm the following: “Will you be loyal to the Nisga’a Nation, uphold its value, protect and obey its constitution and fulfil your duties as a Nisga’a citizen?”
Knowledge ($K_n$)

Yes: membership/citizenship is contingent upon an applicant’s knowledge of the traditions, history, and/or customs of the First Nation.

No: there is no knowledge requirement to obtain membership/citizenship.

Example, section 17(iii) of the Tall Cree Band Membership Code states that, “Where the Council may approve or refuse the application or completion of a probationary period, the Council may have regard to: ... (iii) the person’s knowledge of the history, customs and culture of the Tall Cree Band.”

Data and Results

Following the methodology of the index construction described in the previous section, the applied empirical analysis of the Racial Index is computed using raw data from First Nation band membership codes. The sample under analysis in this section is drawn from the exact dataset described in the previous chapter. 31 While the Government of Canada recognizes only 618 First Nation bands, there are currently only 267 First Nations (43% of all federally recognized Indian bands) that have elected to control their own membership (Canada, 2017). According to the Government of Canada, as “of June 2017, 229 bands have assumed control of their own membership under section 10 of the Indian Act, while 38 control membership through self-government legislation outside of the Indian Act” (Canada, 2018). Put another way, 43% of First Nations have availed themselves of the authority to control their membership and determining eligibility criteria for individual membership. Of the 267 First Nations that manage their own membership, only 259 individual band membership codes were collected—or 42% of all federally recognized

31 For exact specifications of the dataset, see the earlier discussion on pages 187 through 189.
Indian bands. In aggregate, the total membership for the 259 First Nations included for analysis here amounts to 390,015 individuals, as of November 2018. The membership of the 259 First Nations being analyzed amounts to approximately 39% of the total registered First Nations population of 991,652 individuals reported to the Government of Canada (Canada, 2017).

The findings provide some insight into the developments occurring across and throughout Indian Country in recent decades. Table 4.1 below presents the Traditionalism Index scores of all 259 First Nations included in the sample. In the 30 years since 1987 when Indian Bands were permitted the authority to control membership, all but one band included here—Fort William First Nation where membership is subject to referendum—have noticeably adopted traditional cultural criteria for membership. Indeed, using the Traditionalism Index score for the Indian Act (this legislation does not entail cultural criteria and thus the score is 0.00) as a comparator brings the First Nations scores into sharp relief. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, there are 13 First Nations which account for approximately 44,361 individual members (4.5% of the total registered First Nations individuals) that scored 1.00, indicating pure traditionalism.

Not every First Nation sampled had a membership or citizenship code that entailed “traditionalist” eligibility criteria. Of the 259 First Nations in the sample, there were 152 communities (or 25% of all First Nations included) that had no conditions that stipulated that members demonstrate some degree of traditionalism. Figure 4.1 below present a graphical representation of the Traditionalism Index scores—from 0.00 to 1.00—by population. The minimum score of 0.00 received by the 152 communities noted above amounts to approximately 161,700 individuals, or 41% of those captured in the sample,
thus leaving 41% subject to traditionalist conditions. While only a minority of communities maintain membership codes without traditionalist criteria (41%), the majority of individuals are subject to traditionalist conditions for membership. In fact, 59% of individuals in the sample of 259 Indian bands—228,315 of 390,015— are beholden to traditionalist requirements for membership.

**Figure 4.1: Traditionalism Index Score by Population and Cumulative Frequency**

![Image of a graph showing the distribution of Traditionalism Index scores by population and cumulative frequency.]

**Table 4.1. Traditionalism Index 2018: Data for 259 of 618 First Nations**

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<th>Loy</th>
<th>Kno</th>
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Note: Res = Residence; Cha = Character; Lan = Language; Loy = Loyalty; Kno = Knowledge; and, TI = Traditionalism Index.
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Conclusion

Anti-colonial impulses in the waning decades of the twentieth century and the opening years of the twenty-first century were marked by a resistance discourse that viewed “traditionalism” as a promising strategy for cultural liberation. Many prominent strands of thinking around decolonization maintained that, in order to overcome the destructive effects of colonialism, it was necessary for Indigenous individuals to step out of, and away from, western conceptions of “selfhood” and western cultural forms of individual existence. It is argued that “traditional” Indigenous ways of being—pre-contact cultural practices—produce “authentic” and “real” lives; western colonial existence, in contrast, was only destructive of Indigenous life, stripping Indigenous lives of meaning and value. Constructing meaningful lives of Indigenous individuals, therefore, entailed actively resisting colonizing discourses and practices. But, out of the resistance emerged a new discourse—the discourse on race and traditionalism—and a set of non-discursive practices that reshaped Indigenous society.

The emergence of the traditionalist discourse on Indianness was coextensive with the transformation in some corners of Indian Country towards the modern form of what Foucault identified as “disciplinary societies.” The recognition of one’s Indianness, and thus membership or citizenship in a First Nation, was not a given; Indigenous identity was not something that was “always, already.” I have argued here that contemporary Indigenous identity—one’s Indianness—is a product of disciplinary mechanisms that have normalized “traditionalism” as the decolonized mode of individualized Indianness. In a parallel sense to the biopolitical regulation of race, the traditionalism dimension of the discourse on Indianness operated to standardize an “ideal type” of decolonized Indianness,
but it was the connection between this technical knowledge and disciplinary technologies that produced programs for the production of “traditional Indianness.” Membership and citizenship codes are much less instruments of sovereign-power for the delineation of Indianness than they are programmatic instructions for the constitutive disciplinary practices for the codification, surveillance, training, and judgement of “traditionalism.”

The construction of the traditional Indian came not by way of “sovereign” declaration, but rather through modernity’s programmatic achievement. Membership and citizenship codes described a coordinated set of disciplinary practices and mechanisms that sought to produce the “traditional Indian.” Individuals seeking recognition and acceptance of their Indianness were rendered as docile subjects capable of bearing a set of prescribed attitudes and behaviours. Popular tenets of the discourse on traditionalism were normalized through disciplinary practices: an individual must learn the traditional Indigenous language and, in some cases, become fluent; an individual must undertake traditional ceremonies and rituals; an individual must take up the traditional customs, habits and overall way of life of the Indigenous society; and, the individual must discipline the body, inscribing it with traditionalism by way of various manipulations of its appearance and comportment. In short, the “traditional” Indian—the “real” or “authentic” Indian at the heart of the anti-colonial discourse—is not a cultural given, but rather is one mode of Indianness among many to be constituted as an effect of knowledge and disciplinary power.
Conclusion

Anti-colonial theories of Indigenous resistance and the regeneration of Indigenous nations are beleaguered by a narrow conception of political power. The conventional style of thinking in this tradition conceives of power as something held by the colonizer and used to subjugate the colonized. Thus, the solution to this political problem commonly proffered by scholars, activists, and observers of Indigenous politics follows a typical formulaic approach: liberation will ensue by way of extricating the subjugated from the grips of the colonial power. In this project, Indigenous nations and peoples overcome the colonizer, step out of and away from the colonial relationship, and undo the effects that colonization has had on Indigenous societies and individuals, regaining the autonomy they had in the pre-colonial era. However, the mode of power that informs this analysis overlooks a range of relatively nascent forms of politics—the politics of recognition, the politics of difference—\textsuperscript{32}—that put the viability of this decolonization project into question. This classical analysis of politics, which understands power as a possession and a force for repression, obscures emergent political problems that can only be articulated in terms of alternative theoretical conceptions of power. What’s more—and perhaps most startling—is that the anti-colonial praxis that is underwritten by these theories is reproducing the very form of society—and thus identities or subject positions—it purports to resist.

Michel Foucault’s theoretical work and methodological framework for analyzing the operation of power in modernity provides a fuller picture of the politics that has

\textsuperscript{32} Nikolas Rose examines the “new ethical politics” grounded in modern forms of power, such as disciplinary power and biopolitics. In \textit{Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought}, Rose points out that the “politics of recognition—of national, cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic identity—whether in its Western forms of multiculturalism or its non-Western forms of fundamentalism, disputes conventional notions of the relations of state and citizen, and the sources of political legitimacy and citizenship” (Rose, 1999: 2).
transformed some corners of Indian Country in the last 50 years. Indeed, the central
concern of the investigation in this dissertation has been the imperative to map out and
trace the outlines of anti-colonial politics that fall outside the prevailing notions of politics
and power. I have argued that the Red Power movement was coextensive with new forms
of politics that were concerned with phenomena—discourse, disciplinary power, and
biopolitics—that elude conventional political analysis based on orthodox conceptions of
power. Immaterial abstractions that had not traditionally been at the centre of political
struggle and strife emerged as the new locus of contestation. Red Power and the politics
that followed centred phenomena such as identity, culture, and society as critical
components of anti-colonial liberation projects. Moreover, in this politics—a politics of
recognition—the conventional understanding of power fails to fully grasp the political
implications and insteadneglects to account for traditionally apolitical phenomena. This is
especially true in regards to Indianness, the focus of this study.

Viewed from Foucault’s theoretical perspective, I have shown that, since the Red
Power movement of the 1960s, some regions of Indian Country have undergone profound
social transformation. Using his archaeological method, there are evident shifts and
ruptures in the epistemological understanding of Indianness. Chapter one of this
dissertation investigated the historical contingencies and the political struggles over the
morality of Indianness and discursive construction of Indian identity. Indeed, colonial
positional superiority saw the eventual cultural hegemony of its racial and cultural
discourse on Indianness in some corners of Indian Country. Colonial cultural hegemony
shaped and constrained anticolonial resistance in decidedly western epistemology. Red
Power politics, which sought to accomplish the liberatory objectives that came out of anti-
colonization theories, introduced the epistemic breach that saw Indianness, reconfigured in these colonial terms. The new epistemology cast Indianness in a grammar of race and culture and organized the Racial-Traditionalist discourse that circulated throughout some corners of Indian Country in the decades that followed. This politics stands in sharp contrast to orthodox analysis of political power. While the Red Power movement was closely tied to a politics centered on the acquisition of power for Indigenous people, the struggle for rights, and sovereignty for Indigenous nations, the understanding of power informing these analyses do not account for the new politics that emerged.

Thus, in chapters three and four, I used Foucault’s genealogical method to bring the political undercurrent in Indian Country into sharp relief. This analysis complemented the archaeology of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness, introducing Foucault’s understanding of power in sovereign and disciplinary societies. Chapter three examined how the racial tenets of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse were given political purchase and taken up into the anti-colonization project. An entire order of modern politics, not recognizable in pre-modern sovereign social forms, took race as the target for biopolitical management. Ideas of racial regulation—a concept at the heart of Foucault’s notion of biopower—were deployed by some Indigenous governing bodies in service of regenerating the racial composition of Indian Country. By the mid- to late-1980s, some of Indian Country had developed institutions designed to secure a decolonized milieu of racial Indianness. However, securing racial “purity”—or managing risks associated with racial “impurity”—was not the sole target of modern power.

Colonial cultural hegemony—the rise of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse—was co-extensive with the spread of disciplinary power throughout some regions of Indian
Country. In the decades that followed the Red Power social transformation, the Racial-Traditionalist discourse normalized “traditionalism” as the mode of decolonized Indianness, *par excellence*. “Traditionalism” as an antidote to western modernity was not a given, however. As I argued in chapter four, “traditional” Indianness was an individual and community achievement. In addition, traditional Indianness was produced and maintained by an archipelago of disciplinary institutions that normalized individual behaviour and comportment that was deemed consistent with the Racial-Traditionalist discourse.

“Traditionalism” is achieved by learning the traditional Indigenous language, learning traditional practices and activities, and inscribing the body with adornments and other decorations that distinguished the person as a “traditional” Indian. Since the Red Power movement, a number of programmes and manual for the achievement of “traditionalism” have been produced out of the hegemonic colonial knowledges of Indianness, detailing technical disciplinary procedures that the individual must carry out in order to meet received standards. To be sure, an expansive literature exploded in the last 50 years, meticulously delineating “traditionalism” and setting it apart from other, lesser forms of Indianness.

Nowhere, perhaps, is the technical implementation of biopower and disciplinary power more evident and articulated than in certain First Nations’ citizenship codes and other directives that control membership. In chapter four, I showed how some Indian Band membership codes—an authority devolved from the colonial power in the mid-1980s—adopted criteria intrinsic to the regulation of race. Blood quantum and biological descendancy were formalized in some membership laws, and administered by a vast dispositif—an apparatus of biopower. The race of the population in Indian Country,
therefore, could be controlled not through pre-modern sovereign power, which entailed the physical death or elimination of the threat or “contaminate,” but rather through positive forces that shape the conditions such that the desired race will thrive and others will weaken and decline.

Similarly, some citizenship codes and membership laws have adopted technical and programmatic features for the production of traditional Indianness. The examination in chapter five investigated not only the discursive tenets of traditionalism, but also the disciplinary techniques that some First Nations citizenship procedures involve. These documents specify the self-disciplinary routines and rituals that one must successfully undertake as a condition for recognition of membership in a particular Indigenous community. Indeed, one’s Indianness is not assured, but instead obtained in a dense network of power relations that entails functions for the hierarchical observation and training of the individual. First Nations’ membership in some communities, I argued, is a complete and austere institution in the modern sense, found in disciplinary societies for the totalization of individuals, for distributing and fixing individuals in the spatial dimension, coding and cataloguing them, obtaining time and effort from them, and training them to become ideal-type “traditional” Indians.

**Quantitative Findings**

The wider qualitative claims of this genealogical investigation are borne out in the data and results of the empirical inquiry into both biopower and disciplinary power. In chapter four, where the political purchase of the racial tenets of the discourse on Indianness was explored, the quantitative investigation found that the biopolitical
management of race had expanded in some parts of Indian Country since 1985, when Indian bands opted to control their membership pursuant section 10 of the Bill C-31 amendment to the Indian Act. This is consistent with the discourse analysis in chapters two and three, but also the qualitative conclusions drawn from chapter four, which focused solely on biopower. While the Indian Act is condemned—and rightly so—as a racist instrument of colonization, some First Nations have taken up racial tenets of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse, and have instituted biopolitical measures for the racial management of the population in Indian Country. Indeed, 94% of First Nations (255 of 259 in the sample) increased the biopolitical reach of the governing apparatus, while a further 5% (3 First Nations sampled) embraced the already racially-inclined Indian Act conditions of Indianness.

Similarly, in chapter five, the findings confirm to the expansion of disciplinary power and adoption of “traditionalism” in some corners of Indian Country in recent decades. Indeed, in the closing decades of the twentieth century, Indianness was taken up in discourse and invested as a discipline for the production of “traditional” Indianness. Once colonial domination had been relaxed, some parts of Indian Country was transformed by the emergence of disciplinary institutions. Most notable in this study was the focus on individual Indianness and how First Nation membership/citizenship emerged as a disciplinary program for the production of “traditional” Indianness. Again, like the racial dimension of the Racial-Traditionalist discourse, some First Nations included in the sample studied in this dissertation have embraced “traditionalism.” And, as with First Nations where biopower has increasingly circulated, citizens and members in the majority of First Nations are produced through disciplinary programs. The calculations on a number of
disciplinary indicia—the Traditionalism Index—substantiate the qualitative conclusions drawn from the discursive analysis and genealogical investigation. Of the sampled Indigenous nations, 41% (107 of 259) of First Nations have adopted traditionalist criteria for citizenship since the mid-1980s. Interestingly, 13 First Nations—accounting for approximately 44,361 Indigenous individuals of the 390,015 capture in the sample—have instituted “pure traditionalist” criteria (e.g. Indigenous language fluency, residency in the First Nation, loyalty to the First Nation and its traditions, living a traditional “way of life”, and knowledge of Indigenous culture and history) for citizenship.

Limitations

The generalizability of the findings in this study is constrained by geographical boundaries. The scope of this study is limited to what is commonly called in Indigenous vernacular as “Indian Country.” Indian Country is, in many ways, an undefined colloquialism that loosely refers to “where Indigenous people live as Indigenous individuals in Indigenous communities.” This is evident from the empirical results analyzed in chapters four and five, where composite indices were constructed to illustrate in quantitative terms the direction and magnitude of Racial-Traditionalist transformation in First Nations in Canada. However, it was not demonstrated that the same inferences could be extended beyond the borders of Indigenous communities and First Nations. I would caution the use of these findings to describe anti-colonial resistance and Indigenous politics in Settler milieu where Indigenous people are the numerical minority. One particular reason comes to mind to support this caveat.
As indicated in chapters two and three, other discursive treatments of Indianness exist; not only inside Indian Country, but also outside in urbanized settings where indigenous people are the minority. There are competing discourses that circulate with varying degrees of political purchase. But, as chapters three and four made clear, Indian Country is marked by dense networks of power that signify that some Indigenous communities are embracing Racial-Traditionalist discourse on Indianness. A cursory glance at the decidedly non-Indigenous locales—settler society and its communities—indicates that these same networks and the density thereof do not appear with the same magnitude. Indeed, it is clear that outside of Indian Country, in considerably populated urban centres—as large as Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver or as small as Lethbridge, Sudbury, or Moncton—Indigenous people comprise a minority segment. Outside of Indian Country, away from the reserve or community, Indigenous people co-mingle with disparate groups and associations in the large, heterogeneous populations.

Moreover, this study is silent on colonial state-centric debates and discussions around Indigenous identity. In recent years, Indigenous women—most notably Sharon McIvor—have continued to challenge the Crown with respect to the exclusion of a number of groups from registration as status Indians under the *Indian Act*. Two significant amendments to the *Indian Act*—Bill C-3 from 2011 and 2017’s Bill S-3—have been forced upon the state to address lingering statutory exclusions created by the state. While there is some overlap in the concerns, I have chosen to focus on matters that are internal to First Nations citizenship codes and the institutions established to administer and regulate their specific national identities.
And, as a Foucauldian genealogy—a history of the present—this discourse is not fixed; it is not settled history. In some parts of Indian Country, the present continues to be marked by ongoing resistances, both discursive and material, to the colonial hegemony. As with Indigenous women that have challenged the colonial state’s definition of Indian and control of Indian status—on the grounds of their gendered exclusion and the further exclusion of their children—matters of First Nation membership remain in flux. Kahnawá:ke, for instance, has revisited its membership code. In 2010, Kahnawá:ke instituted a “Community Decision-Making Process, a consensus building process to develop and amend Kahnawake laws” where the membership code was among the first pieces of legislation to be examined. As it has been reported, “[a]fter more than a decade, Kahnawake’s controversial membership law will soon be amended, resolving an issue affecting “mixed race” residents who have been waiting in limbo to apply to be on the community’s registry” (CBC, 2018).

Similarly, internal discussions by members and potential members of the Sawridge First Nation continues to challenge colonial constructs of Indianness. After more than 30 years, the Federal Court admonished the Sawridge First Nation (SFN) for failing to meet its Bill C-31 obligations to include women and their children that were reinstated under that amendment to the Indian Act:

The SFN has a legal history of attempting to assert complete control over its membership. In L’Hirondelle v Canada, 2003 FCT 347 (CanLII), affirmed 2004 FCA 16 (CanLII) [L’Hirondelle], this Court held that SFN could not continue to ignore the legal requirements regarding membership imposed by the Indian Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter] and the clear directions of the courts. In L’Hirondelle, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld an injunction mandating compliance, stating “For those persons entitled to membership, a simple request to be included in the band’s membership is all that is required. The fact that the individuals in question did not complete a Sawridge Band membership application is irrelevant.” Yet in 2008, SFN attempted to have the Indian Act provisions declared unconstitutional, an application that was dismissed: Sawridge Band v Canada, 2008 FC 322 (CanLII). Furthermore, the Court held in Poitras v Twinn, 2013 FC 910 (CanLII) that L’Hirondelle is not a legal barrier to an applicant’s membership status. However, SFN continues to refuse to implement L’Hirondelle (Twinn v. Sawridge First Nation, 2017 FC 407 at para. 43).

Faced with such an incontrovertible order from the court, Sawridge will have no choice but to modify how it structures the boundaries of its membership.

**Indigenous Feminist Resistance and the Limits of Traditionalism**

It is important to point out that the analysis that I have undertaken in this Foucauldian genealogy of what I have called the Racial-Traditionalist discourse is a limited variant of what some anti-colonial proponents have called “traditionalism.” This is true in several respects and warrants a number of qualifications about the constraints that ensue from the sketch of “tradition” used in the analysis of this study. In the first—and closely related to a crucially important second implication—the variant of traditionalism employed in my analysis tracks from the colonially-constructed version that is reproduced
in neocolonial settler maneuvers of cultural hegemony. Secondly, as a corollary and fundamental to understanding the limits of this mode of traditionalism, this colonial form of cultural hegemony is a profoundly heteropatriarchal masculine project. Speaking to this, Joane Nagel explains:

Given the close association between nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideologies of masculinity, colonialism, imperialism, militarism and nationalism, given the fact that it was mainly men who adhered to and enacted them, and given the power of those movements and institutions in the making of the modern world, it is not surprising that masculinity and nationalism seem stamped from the same mould—a mould which has shaped important aspects of the structure and culture of the nations and states in the modern state system (Nagel, 1998: 251).

In recent times, Indigenous feminists have not only brought this to light, but their critical gendered perspective in anti-colonial theory has burgeoned into a compelling canon of resistance literature that challenges deeply held—and acutely masculine—assumptions about traditionalism. In this section I want to highlight the intellectual advancements made by Indigenous feminists in this regard and, at the same time, draw attention to the narrow and circumscribed form of traditionalism at the heart of colonial imaginings of Indianness.

In much of the Indigenous feminist literature, the analysis of the colonial/masculine construction of “tradition” has developed nuanced perspectives on its potential in decolonization. As I have examined in the early chapters of this thesis, some anti-colonial theories have suggested the revitalization of Indigenous tradition as a form of Indigenous
resistance and resurgence. In these theories, tradition is proffered as the remedy, and it is also oftentimes suggested uncritically or prefigures in patriarchal theories as static.

“Liberation is framed by some as a decolonization discourse, which draws on traditional culture,” Joyce Green notes (Green, 2007: 23). But as Green explains, Indigenous feminist theory and resistance has not adopted the same indifference to tradition: “Aboriginal feminist analysis goes further than other Aboriginal libratory critiques in suggesting that not all pre-colonial Aboriginal social practices were innocent of oppression, including sex oppression. This questions the veneration of tradition” (Green, 2007: 23). Without the gendered lens of analysis, anti-colonial theory and resistance that reifies and aggrandizes colonial conceptions of tradition fails to account for the inherently sexist nature of colonialism which positions males and masculinity atop social, political, and economic strata.

Voices from within the Indigenous feminist movement have been at the forefront of advancing this critique, taking exception to the morality of the gendered order that proponents of Indigenous traditionalism have advocated indiscriminately without regards to its intrinsic masculinity. Decolonization, from the perspective of some of these feminists, has entailed interrogating popular conceptions of patriarchy found in colonial discourse and how this discourse—as I have argued in the early chapters of this thesis—have circulated throughout Indian Country. Again, Green points out that, “[c]olonialism is closely tied to racism and sexism. These twin phenomena exist in the context of colonial society, directed at Indigenous people, but they have also been internalized by some indigenous political cultures in ways that are oppressive to Indigenous women” (Green, 2007: 22 – 23). As a sexist phenomenon that privileges and empowers men in settler society, colonialism
has also entrenched the same in First Nations. As Gina Starblanket points out, “legacies of colonialism have resulted in the concretization of patriarchal systems of band government and male privilege within Indigenous communities” (Starblanket, 2017: 23). And, as Green (noted above) and other Indigenous feminists have pointed out, colonial patriarchy has been installed in masculine visions of Indigenous traditionalism.

Colonial representations of Indigenous traditionalism are replete with patriarchal and sexist perspectives of women, and Indigenous feminists have highlighted the reproduction of these views in Indigenous society and anti-colonization politics. Starblanket underscores this, observing that “struggles over the meaning of pre-colonial cultural practices are so deeply marked by gender and sexuality, the recovery of pre-colonial knowledge about identities, roles and relationships must specifically be accompanied by analyses of decolonization that focus on gendered oppression” (Starblanket, 2017: 26). Métis scholar, Emma LaRocque, has pointedly revealed that, in these male-led, masculine politics, “it is worrisome that a discernable pattern is already there: Native women are “honoured” as “keepers” of tradition, defined as nurturing/healing, while Native men control political power” (LaRocque, 2007: 66).

LaRocque similarly objected to the presumed “traditional” role of women in decolonization, rejecting the gendered subordination of Indigenous women to masculine imaginings of tradition. As LaRocque has stated, “[w]omen cannot saddle ourselves with the staggering responsibility of teaching or nurturing the whole world; nor should we assume sole responsibility for “healing” or “nurturing” Aboriginal men. To assume such roles is tantamount to accepting patriarchal definitions about the nature and role of women” (LaRocque, 2007: 65).
Indigenous feminists have challenged the selective use of traditionalism in masculine-produced theories of decolonization and heteropatriarchal proposals for structuring Indigenous societies. A number of Indigenous feminists warned of “neotraditionalism,” the refashioning of Indigenous womanhood as the mother of a regenerated race under the auspices of “tradition.” As Jo-Anne Fiske observed, “[t]he evolving concepts of nation carry within them founding myths and legends, couched in traditions and languages understood to convey unbroken ties to a past era. The political is shrouded in neotraditional symbolism that is meant to resolve present dilemmas in an image of the past and to project a future that will replicate this purified past” (Fiske, 1996: 73). Some prescriptions of traditional Indigenous womanhood in anticolonial resistance meant re-peopling and rearing the purified nation, relegating Indigenous women to the maternal dimension of decolonization projects. These visions of traditional womanhood—as the traditional mother of the Indigenous nation—have been rebuffed by some Indigenous feminists as masculine interpretations designed to meet patriarchal ends. In reflection upon the imagining of Indigenous women as mothers to the rejuvenated nation—the “traditional woman”—Oneida scholar Lina Sunseri points out that, “[m]ost importantly, identities which are defined by an ideology of purity of “race” have the potential to be very oppressive and dangerous, especially for women, since they are seen as bearers of the imagined pure nation” (Sunseri, 2000: 148; see also Sunseri 2008). Despite this resistance from within the anti-colonization movement, the masculine-centric patriarchal perspective on authentic Indigenous tradition was actively deployed in certain spaces of Indian Country.
Indigenous feminists have noted the elitist origins of the restrictive, and sometimes superficial, description and deployment of traditionalism by male Indigenous figures. In her book, *I Am Woman: A Native Perspective on Sociology and Feminism*, Stó:lō academic and celebrated author Lee Maracle reflected upon her suspicion of the rise of traditionalism, particularly as it was deployed by an urban elite: “I noticed that much of the traditionalism in the urban areas was coming from a very narrow few. These few had been highly mis-educated in the settler institutions and were full, inside and out, of settler traditions and ways” (Maracle, 1996: 36 – 37). Maracle, as she explains, was secure in her station in life and did not feel the need to subsume her relationship with her community under a label of “traditionalism” especially how it was construed by those that were “highly mis-educated” (Maracle, 1996). As a political device, a largely male cadre of Indigenous leaders—assimilated to colonial modes of discourse and politics—proffered a self-serving interpretation of traditionalism, one far removed from Indigenous communities. Starblanket points out how Indigenous women have been categorized according to this masculine interpretation of tradition.

The experience of Indigenous women deemed to be sufficiently “cultural” (those who understand traditional knowledge and values with a level of depth that erases the need for critique) are accounted for, while those deemed to be “culturally deficient” (those whose interest in engaging in critical conversations is dismissed as a product of physical or intellectual exposure to outside contamination) are discounted as peripheral, or as unrepresentative of a common view (Starblanket, 2017: 26 – 27).
Indeed, it has been a male-led project of interpreting and supporting the narrow view of tradition, the “collective memory” of Indigenous pre-contact traditions as Starblanket calls it (Starblanket, 2017).

The collective memory of traditionalism has been used to remove the “culturally deficient” Indigenous women from the masculine visions and material life of Indigenous existence. In this respect, some Indigenous feminists have argued that these interpretations of traditionalism—established to benefit men, both settler and Indigenous alike—are to be questioned and challenged as a colonial variety of Indigenous identity shored-up by settler society. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson is unequivocal in rejecting attenuated interpretations and the political use of traditionalism that shares colonial exclusions: “I don’t accept the narrow, singular interpretations of our knowledge systems that lead to “tradition” steeped in dogma, exclusion, erasure, and violence, and I am not willing to replicate that in the beautiful Indigenous worlds we will create in the present and in the future” (Simpson, 2017: 130). In her 2017 work, As We have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical Resistance, Simpson advocates for a vision of tradition that is inclusive of all genders—not just the man/woman colonial binary of gender. Like Simpson, Green has argued that such traditionalist representations tended toward a cultural fundamentalism that supported oppressive gender relations, and thus they were antithetical to the decolonization imperative. To this end, Green has remarked that, traditionalism as a form of “fundamentalism should be eschewed by Aboriginal liberationists as well as by post-colonial vanguards” (Green, 2003:1).

More generally, a number of Indigenous feminists have problematized the use of tradition as a marker of identity, drawing attention to the fluid nature of tradition and how
it has shifted under conditions of colonialism (Sunseri, 2000: 148). As Cree/Métis scholar and author Marilyn Dumont noted, “there is a continuum of exposure to traditional experience in Native culture, some of us have been more exposed to it than others, but this does not mean that those who have been more exposed to it are somehow more Indian, as if we are searching for the last surviving Indian (Dumont, 1993: 47). Kanien’kehá:ka scholar, Kahente Horn-Miller, expressed similar apprehension about the use of bygone culture as a qualifier of one’s Indianness. According to Horn-Miller, “Indians, too, have created their cultures by remembering or recovering and reinterpreting their past; but their Indianness does not depend on preserving a requisite portion of that past” (Horn-Miller, 2018: 361). Indeed, for some Indigenous women, traditionalism was not to be blindly followed or uncritically accepted as intrinsic to their identity. Métis feminist, Emma LaRocque points out that “[c]ulture is not immutable, and tradition cannot be expected to be always of value or relevant in our times” (LaRocque, 1996: 14).

Other Indigenous feminists have developed considerably nuanced views of traditionalism by problematizing the political utility of the concepts of culture and tradition, pointing to them as colonial epistemological constructs deployed specifically for the domination of Indigenous peoples by colonizing authorities. In her book, *Mohawk Interruptus: political life across the borders of settler states*, Mohawk feminist, Audra Simpson, examines how settler colonialism has developed concepts such as culture—and its cognate tradition—in furtherance of dispossessing Indigenous people of land, inflicting violence, and the denial of rights, amongst many other colonial imperatives. Drawing on her academic expertise and acumen in anthropology, Simpson demonstrates how colonial knowledges and disciplines have cultivated the colonial image of her people as a static
anachronism of “tradition,” rather than vibrant, dynamic peoples. And, much like Edward Said’s analysis in *Orientalism*, Simpson argues that the colonial knowledge creates “the Iroquois,” its world, and how the Iroquois understands him or herself amongst other Iroquois as cultural artifacts and objects of cultural tradition. The colonial knowledge authorities’ (e.g. anthropologists) “own desires and inventive process have been the textual inheritance of the Iroquois, and the dominant space for perceiving their actions and, most important for this book at hand, Iroquois engagements with each other and with the state” (Simpson, 2014: 92).

As a prescription for anti-colonial resistance, Simpson advocates for a politics of refusal—refusing to engage in settler politics of recognition that contain Indigenous people to cultural categories, such as the original, pre-contact, traditional Indian. The peril of the colonial politics of recognition, for Simpson, entails not merely reifying Indigenous people as antiquated objects of human development as primitive peoples that will be branded as ‘traditional,’ but instead obscuring ongoing contemporary processes of colonization that serve to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their territory and their claims to sovereignty. “Part of this fetishized, deeply controlled canonical approach to “culture as the pure,” “culture as tradition,” “culture as what is prior to settlement” disavows or pushes away its context of articulation: the political project of dispossession and containment” (Simpson, 2014: 99). By refusing these ethnographic accounts of their culture and political representations as “traditional,” Indigenous people must speak on their own behalf, in their plurality, rather than as one overarching colonial category. By speaking for themselves, Indigenous people interrupt colonial processes of power and, not only express, but exercise their sovereignty. “Within Indigenous contexts, when the people we speak of speak for
themselves, their sovereignty interrupts anthropological portraits of timelessness, procedure, and function that dominate representations of their past and, sometimes their present” (Simpson, 2014: 97).

**Theoretical Implications for Future Research**

A number of theoretical implications arise from the core argument of this dissertation, namely that, since the Red Power social movement, some regions of Indian Country undertook a profound transformation, shifting from a sovereign society into the Foucauldian disciplinary regime of social organization. This transformation is not without consequence as further theoretical work has explored in recent times. Indeed, while Foucault’s genealogies and histories (e.g., madness, sexuality) were primarily focused on the historical shift of western society from sovereign to disciplinary modes of social organization, his studies—and that of his contemporaries—saw a further shift to a post-disciplinary society, the “society of control.” As Gilles Deleuze remarked, “Foucault never believed and indeed said very precisely that disciplinary societies were not eternal. Moreover, he clearly thought that we were entering a new type of society” (Deleuze, 1998: 17). Elsewhere Deleuze notes that, “These are the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing disciplinary societies” (Deleuze, 1992: 4; italics original). These theoretical insights give rise to a number of implications from the central observation of this dissertation—that some corners of Indian Country have reorganized into disciplinary societies.

The distinctions between these social formations—sovereign societies, disciplinary societies, and societies of control—are significant. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have
highlighted the viability of civil society in each regime of power, noting how social structures and institutions—essential features of anti-colonial theories of Indigenous liberation—wither away with the transition from sovereign, to disciplinary, and then to the society of control (Hardt and Negri, 2000; see also Hardt, 1995). Michael Hardt’s theoretical work suggests a more dire political consequence, the complete withering of civil society, namely that this transition across social forms—sovereign, disciplinary, and control—is irreversible (Hardt, 1995: 40). The unidirectional, forward trajectory of social transformation is also maintained by Deleuze (Deleuze, 1998; 1992). Further research would take up this premise, exploring further social transformation in Indian Country and implications for anti-colonial Indigenous liberation. To my mind, Glen Coulthard’s work comes closest to engaging with some of these theoretical implications. Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks ponders some of the transformative effects of the colonial discourse on anticolonial resistance politics.33

Although I was concerned with examining the anti-colonial project of Indigenous liberation and the rejuvenation of traditional identity, it was beyond the scope of this study to pursue a line of investigation that was critical of these two political phenomena that are at the heart of anti-colonial theory: freedom and identity. It is generally axiomatic in the anti-colonization theory that reestablishing authentic indigenous identity—through the regeneration of a “traditional” mode of indigenous existence—will bring about freedom for the decolonized. This general tendency is illustrated in the work of Taiaiake Alfred (whose work was relied on heavily in this dissertation), Wasáse: indigenous pathways of action and

33 See Coulthard’s discussion “Turning our Backs on Colonial Power” (pages 45-47) in Red Skins, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition.
freedom, where he asserts the popular decolonization thesis. There, Alfred writes, “We must remove imperialism from the spaces we inhabit and transform those spaces into something other than what they were designed and forced to be within empire. In essence, rebellion in these terms is recreating freedom and aiming to end the humiliation of living identities that were created to serve others” (Alfred, 2005: 201; emphasis added). There is in this edict for decolonization, however, something very suppositional about the nature of both freedom and identity. Indeed, these central aspects of decolonization—freedom and identity—are treated uncritically in some of the anti-colonial literature. That is to say, the properties of both freedom and identity are regarded as immutable. But freedom and identity do not maintain consistency across the three Foucauldian social regimes: sovereign society, disciplinary society, and the society of control. Thus, it is worth examining the potentiality for Indigenous liberation as well as the integrity of traditional Indianness (i.e. identity) in each social order.

**Empirical Implications for Future Research**

The quantitative work undertaken in chapters four and five on biopower and disciplinary power is considerably underdeveloped, from an empirical perspective. For the more quantitatively inclined social scientist, some of the enumerative results from the indices and calculations raise the possibility for further empirical investigation. Although the indices are adequate instruments to explore the substantially qualitative nature of the phenomena under study in this dissertation (e.g., discourse and identity), the analysis could be enhanced by way of advanced modelling techniques. Augmenting the analysis with statistical models would allow for enriched quantitative findings, namely the estimation and testing of covariance, magnitude, and direction among variables. For instance, we
could estimate the order of magnitude that language had on traditionalism index values and how language covaries with other indicators of traditionalism, such as loyalty to traditional culture.

In order to improve the quantitative investigations, better data and refined data collection procedures are required. The analysis carried out in this dissertation was limited to scarce data that was gathered through a non-random, open-source collection method: only citizenship or membership codes that have been made publicly available were included in the sample. This method of non-random convenience sampling provided satisfactory data for the inquiry and quantitative metrics in this study. However, future research that applies advanced statistical methods for analysis will require robust data—that is, data that can serve multiple statistical functions. In the analysis of the racial and traditionalism indices developed in chapters four and five, data was extracted from qualitative features found in citizenship/membership laws for the sole purpose of coding into categorical variables and calculating index values. This dataset, therefore, would be insufficient for statistical modelling and testing envisioned above. Moreover, longitudinal studies and time series analysis could explore trends across time. My investigation was limited to two points in time; however, these data points were sufficient to identifying both racialist and traditionalist trends within Indian Country. Future research, nonetheless, could investigate greater periodical changes and the magnitude of these changes with greater longitudinal data on time.

In addition to quantitative analysis, there is a glaring omission of pertinent qualitative data that could inform further inquiry and significantly enrich our understanding of the politics of recognition and the politics of difference in Indian Country.
Qualitative methodologies, such as interviewing Indigenous individuals and other key players (e.g. representatives and officials of Indigenous governments, organizations, and institutions) would provide a fuller picture of the cultural hegemony of the colonial discourse on Indianness and how it has shaped Indigenous understandings of Indianness. Interviews and focus groups, as well as surveys, could be designed to collect direct, primary data on critical elements of the racializing and cultural aspects of discourse, and how Indian Country organizes anticolonial resistance through disciplinary power and biopolitics.

These emerging lines of inquiry around identity and indigeneity are shoring up other modes of resistance and political resurgence amongst Indigenous peoples and settler-allies. While the matters of material and territorial dispossession and exploitation continue to dominate understandings and public dialogue of colonization, the issue of identity is at the core anti-colonization politics. Despite the tight link between the material and identity politics of colonialism, these two targets of colonial domination are configured by divergent modes of power. On the one hand, the form of power deployed in territorial displacement and dispossession is a visible form—undertaken by way of physical coercion—and has therefore dominated prescriptions for anti-colonization. On the other hand, the mode of power that has encumbered identity is largely imperceptible under conventional understandings and theories of power. Interrogating different modes of power and how it influences identity brings to light subtle and hidden effects that constrain the potentiality of decolonization and freedom for Indigenous peoples. Indeed, the cunning of colonialism is that it is concealed. Illuminating the unseen of colonialism is critical to the liberatory project of Indigenous peoples.
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