A LETTER
TO
THE VISCOUNT FOLKESTONE;
ON THE
UNLAWFULNESS
OF THE
VOTES OF THANKS
TO
MR. WARDLE, AND THE LATE MINORITY.

BY JOHN PERN TINNEY, ESQ.

"It will in time
Win upon power, and throw forth greater themes
For insurrection's arguing."

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1809.
A LETTER

TO

THE VISCOUNT FOLKESTONE, M. P.

My Lord,

Salisbury, May 12, 1809.

THREE years have not elapsed since I had the duty of announcing to your lordship that, with the unanimous voice of all the electors of this city, you were returned by them as a representative of the commons of England in parliament. Of all the duties which I had to discharge in the tenure of a laborious and important office, there was none which afforded me a higher gratification than the business of that day. I thought that I was an instrument of public benefit in proclaiming the delegation of a personage of high dignity and character to assist in the legislation, and to protect the liberties of my country.

I thought that the function which your lordship then accepted was national and independent. I knew that you did not enter parliament as an ambassador from the fifty-four persons whose suffrages had entitled you to your seat; I did not consider that to us or to our successors, you were in any degree responsible for the measures you might pursue, or the counsel you might give in that high tribunal. I knew that your pure sentiments of honour would place you far above the influence of sordid reward, and that
the hereditary dignity of your house left nothing in the distinctions of rank to allure you from the obligations of your trust by the hope of personal advancement. I thought that the strong tie of personal interest, if your temper could possibly be affected by any other tie than that of duty, would affect and control your judgment. I was confident that the known superiority of your understanding, and the unquestioned uprightness of your heart would fix you steadily in that deportment which regards with equal love and veneration the necessary prerogatives of government, and the privileges of the people.

I have considered that day, and I trust without personal vanity, as fortunate and honorable to myself. The body of your electors conceive that you have fulfilled all their expectations of the duties which you were to perform as a legislator and a national counsellor. For your conduct in a late remarkable occasion, by which you were distinguished in parliament, they have given you their public commendation, and, at the same time, they thought fit to vote their thanks to Mr. Wardle, and to your venerable colleague Mr. Hussey, for the part which they took in the House of Commons, in the course of the criminal inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York. Perhaps, my lord, it was my fault, and in one sense, certainly my misfortune, that I was unable to concur in the applause for your general conduct, which your electors almost unanimously expressed, or, in the vote of thanks, which they made to Mr. Wardle and Mr. Hussey, with
like applause, and to the rest of the 125 members who lately supported Mr. Wardle's accusations of the Duke of York in the House of Commons.

With respect to Mr. Wardle I know nothing, but of his public character. He has become of great public consideration by the unrelenting hostility with which he prosecuted his accusation of an illustrious member of the royal house. I cannot consider the means by which he acquired the private and most confidential correspondence of that victim of his accusation, the disclosure of which was so useful in maintaining his case, as those which any one of very correct notions of honour or propriety would be anxious to avow. His very equivocal testimony, when examined before the house, was calculated to leave upon the mind no very certain conviction of his correctness of recollection or veracity: but whatever were his motives in the institution of his great labour, whatever were the means of his success, or the ultimate object of his hopes, with his triumph over one, in whose honour every British subject is deeply interested, and whose transgressions, not of the basest kind, are already visited with sufficient severity, a generous mind will not long sympathize, nor will he, who thinks that the rigour of punishment should be stayed when the ends of justice are attained, be now disposed to prolong it.

In any eulogium of the exalted character of Mr. Hussey, which his warmest admirers can make, I should always zealously and loudly join.
His parliamentary conduct has not been that which accords with my notions of the honour, interests, or safety of the United Kingdom; but unexperienced, and little instructed in the important questions in which he has passed his disinterested judgment, it would be arrogant and rude if I did not feel and express the highest deference for his opinions, though, in respect to authority of equal weight, I might venture to retain my own. During a long course of parliamentary duty, he has always acted uprightly, generously, and independently. All those who have the happiness of knowing him in private life, regard him with reverence, affection, and admiration. He is a man that every lover of integrity, honour, and wisdom would wish to make his friend, and in his friendship every wise man would find improvement, gratification, and distinction.

With respect to your lordship, if it were in my power, I should as gladly join in the zealous commendations of those who have applauded you, in equal measure, with your venerable colleague. I doubt not, that your purity of principle and integrity of heart, as yet necessarily wanting the test of long probation, will one day entitle you to equal honour with that conferred upon Mr. Hussey. Of the merit of your public conduct, men will think differently, according to their general opinion. The public, at large, including the body of your constituents, have commended, by liberal presumption, in terms which are more naturally chosen, upon a principle of
long experienced consistency. Of the merit of your public conduct, men may, as yet, think differently, according to their general opinions of public questions; we are, as yet, unable to applaud the motive, where we disapprove the tendency, or lament the result. Your uniform opposition to the King's ministers, the distinguished favour of the rabble of Westminster and the city, which among your own order you exclusively enjoy, and the eulogium of the editor of the Political Register may suspend the approbation of those who think it meritorious to support the government, who think the rabble are the deluded victims of prejudice and faction, and who dislike the revolutionary principles, and the virulence of that pen which, however flattering to your lordship, is too frequently devoted to calumny, and the attainment of revolutionary changes.

I entertain no sort of doubt that your lordship well deserves the highest commendation which your friends can confer, and, in the thanks which you have received from your constituents, I should heartily have concurred, if they had only referred to private character and conduct. They referred particularly to your vote in support of Mr. Wardle's accusation of the Duke of York, and I dissented to them as impolitic, unjust, cruel, unconstitutional, and dangerous. The grounds of my dissent being general, may, possibly, be worthy of public consideration; and, therefore, I presume to trouble your lordship with a public statement of them,
and to solicit the attention of those who may have opportunity to apply them in the unprecedented, and I think unlawful proceedings of the public meetings throughout the empire.

It might seem irrelevant to any purpose connected with my view of the question to examine the merits of that case, the prosecution of which has rendered Mr. Wardle and your lordship illustrious in the public favour. The evidence adduced by him in support of it, and the protracted deliberations with which it closed, are subject to the inspection of all those who can delight in the degradation of the great, or the malignity of the vindictive and abandoned. The House of Commons, which was the only tribunal competent to decide the important question, acquitted the Duke of York of corruption, and connivance at corruption. In respect to all those who might have dissented to that judgment of the Commons, the Duke voluntarily bore the utmost punishment to which the severest justice could subject him, and retired from his high office in the state.

We have all a common interest in the character of the great. When the sovereign is traduced by traiterous slander, the subject suffers a diminution of his tranquillity and security. When the princes of the royal house are exposed to ignominy and disgrace, the happiness and the hopes of the nation in their succession to the crown are impaired and weakened. When the great and powerful are marked by vulgar censure with derision and scorn, the or-
nament of society is defaced, and its essential props are laid bare to the hostile attacks of the public enemy, and the domestic conspirator.

When the patriarch exposed his nakedness in lascivious drunkenness, he who exulted in that infirmity is not honored by the sacred historian, but he whose filial piety threw a mantle over his father's shame is yet regarded with just commendation.

At a time when the stability of government and the safety of society render the character of the great peculiarly important, it were better to withdraw from the public consideration whatever might tend to their dishonour and reproach. National justice is instituted for national security. The inviolability of the sovereign is not conferred upon him for his personal gratification, but because accusation levelled against the supreme power must invalidate its foundation, and weaken its energy. That justice, which becomes detrimental to the commonwealth, ceases to be expedient. The principle which places the sovereign out of the reach of criminal charge might teach us to moderate that vengeance which atta-

fects infamy to those who may hereafter ascend the throne. Though the highest subject is at a great distance from him who is clothed in the splendour of majesty, (never to be sullied by accusation or suspicion,) yet those who may hereafter assume that splendour, the law having acquitted them of guilt, and released them from inquiry, and especially when the law has imputed to them no ground of censure, ought
not to be defiled by popular aspersion; the more to be deprecated because its object has no means of defence or exculpation. However the present generation may rejoice to vilify one who may hereafter wield the imperial sceptre, yet posterity may justly complain of that inconsiderate harshness which would affix an incurable mark of infamy upon the character of a future sovereign. Such a proceeding is, at least, impolitic.

In any common case, a measure similar to that, which so large a portion of the nation pursues, with regard to the Duke of York, would be considered an intolerable violation of equity, and a breach of a fundamental rule of criminal justice. If the individual members of a grand jury which had liberated a prisoner and recorded in their court, after an examination of the accuser's case, that it afforded no ground of inculpation, should afterwards declare their conviction of the truth of the accusation, and subject the criminal to a severer punishment than would have resulted from their charging him with guilt, in as much as the infamy of reproach, which cannot be obviated, is more to be dreaded than that penalty, which would be an atonement for transgression, is there an honest heart which would not repudiate such proceeding as palpable and insufferable injustice? If the accused person having sustained the process of criminal inquiry, and obtained, after mature investigation, a conclusive acquittal, should still be stigmatized by his jurors, and by others, as a culprit acquitted but not exculpated, might we not complain of the
unavailing authority of the judicial law, or reprobate such stigma as slanderous and illegal? After the acquittal of the persons charged with treason in 1794, did not the persons then liberated by the judgment of their peers manfully assert their recorded innocence, and was not the reproach cast upon them as "acquitted felons," considered as unlawfully severe? The Duke of York must be entitled, at least, to equal privilege with persons accused as traitors, and acquitted or liberated by due course of law. The English nation, by its representatives in parliament, has heard the accusation and the evidence of his enemies, and has recorded its judgment of acquittal. Can any part of the nation yet maintain the accusation, and justly cast upon him the penalty of guilt? He has patiently awaited the judgment of the country, and is exculpated by its voice, WHERE ONLY ITS VOICE CAN BE CONSTITUTIONALLY HEARD. Is it the fate of his royal dignity to be excluded from the common benefit of the process of judicial inquiry, and to bear a heavier punishment than that of convicted crime, when our highest national tribunal has adjudged that he is not subject to suspicion? Such a proceeding is, at least, unjust.

The law, administered by a constitutional tribunal, may sometimes be applied with vindictive severity. The quality of guilt in human judicature, cannot always be the measure of justice, which, in its purity, will proceed with scrup
pulorous strictness, and never mitigate its wrath from a tender consideration of human weakness and imperfection, or of powerful temptation and inducement. Punishment being instituted for the prevention of offences, must sometimes fall more heavily than natural equity would demand, or humanity desire. Policy to deter others from crime, rather than any maxim of proportion between offences and the penalties inflicted upon transgressors, is necessarily the foundation of all human judgment. But a self-constituted tribunal, which exercises its function when the laws are silent, should be tempered with mercy; it should shew some indulgence to that infirmity which is the common calamity of our mortal nature, and feel some commiseration for those whom strong temptation may have betrayed; penitence should pass as an expiation of offence, and censure should be silent when the offender is humbled in self-accusation, and submits to voluntary punishment.

The conduct of those who unfeelingly pursue the Duke of York with unmanly asperity, who aggravate the corrupt influence of an abandoned woman, in the distribution of six or twelve cases of military promotion into a charge of general corruption, who ridicule his honour, impeach his veracity, vilify his general character, and subject him to reproach, from which a vagabond liberated from the stocks, or a thief discharged from the prison ships ought to be protected; such conduct cannot be reconciled with any principle of humanity, or any rule of mercy.
"Corpora magnanimo satis est prostrasse Leoni,
Pugna suum finem, quum jacet hostis habet."

Still to accuse and to punish one who, in all humility, has yielded to the vengeance of his enemies; and when fortified by a lawful adjudication of innocence, still incurred the penalty of guilt; still to applaud and uphold his unrelenting prosecutor, and to stimulate his immitigable wrath, is a proceeding unworthy of the generosity and the natural temper and loyalty of the British nation. It is, at least, a proceeding of cruelty.

The votes of applause conferred upon the minority, and of censure expressed or implied upon the majority of the House of Commons, in their late important decision, are unconstitutional, whether they be considered with reference to the Duke of York accused of malversation, or to the more immediate objects of that applause or censure.

The public judgment against criminals of whatever rank or description can only pass through the medium of constituted authority. National judgment cannot be referred to a local jurisdiction. The rabble at some of the county meetings, impelled by passion and resentment, incapable of discretion, and deaf to all argument, which was not suited to a determination made previous to their pretended deliberation, could express nothing resembling the grave dictate of national justice. Their sentence was but a tu-
multuous outcry of unscrutinized and unauthorized voters, who might be misled by malignant faction, or misguided by prejudice or error. Their decisions expressed by acclamation, or counted by the head without reference to age, station, understanding, wealth, or connection, were necessarily of the meanest and most uncertain value. Such proceedings avail nothing with the wise, and they were no more the voice of the counties than they were an expression of truth, justice, or intelligence. The sense of a popular deliberative assembly can only be fairly ascertained by the ballot or the poll, and where the question to be decided has been simply and fully stated in the mandate of convocation. The corporations, though far more respectable, were equally incompetent, because their proceedings, though more calm and dignified, were yet founded in the zeal of party spirit, and could not be guided by that caution, prudence, and protracted deliberation, which are essential to correct decision. All are alike disqualified from any proceeding of national justice, because the accused cannot be cited to their bar, and because in their assemblies there is a total defect of evidence, and an impossibility of defensive argument. When any of them undertake to determine the guilt of him whom they presume to be a state offender, they indiscreetly exceed their legal function, and violate the constitution by assuming a privilege which the law has happily
confined to a more orderly, discreet, and enlightened jurisdiction.

But the more important quality of the proceedings at the public meetings, violating a fundamental maxim of the British constitution, and inconsistent with any form of government and legislation, is the right assumed at those meetings of distinguishing individual members of parliament by their approbation or censure.

The privileges of Englishmen, enjoyed by immemorial usage and hereditary right, and confirmed by various declaratory statutes, are ascertained by the uninterrupted customs of the realm, and enumerated by the sage expounders of our constitution. By what authority can any meeting of the people presume to judge their legislators, to distribute rewards and penalties, (reward more enviable, and penalty more dreadful to a generous and patriotic mind than the favour of a prince, or the disgrace of the royal displeasure) to question the validity of a decision of parliament, to dictate to the electors whom, on a future exercise of their franchise, they shall favour with their suffrage or reprobate with their indignation, to vote as national grievance that which the law has determined, and to determine without reference to the legislature what must be the remedy for that grievance; to decide that the legislature is impure, venal, and corrupt; and in all respects to arrogate the authority of a pure, unmixed democracy? The Bill of Rights, that great bulwark of the constitution, which secures all the liberties of
the people, and has distinctly provided for them, gives no such authority to any meeting of the people. If such authority had been given, it is not probable that the Bill of Rights would have remained to elucidate a question upon the existing constitution of England.

An independent House of Commons is the mainspring of the law, and of the public liberty; its function is to deliberate and determine. If awed by power or corrupted by meaner influence, its character of vigour and purity is extinguished; and that equally, whether the ministration of the unlawful control proceed from the sovereign or the subject.

The representative faculty of the House of Commons is not correctly understood by many, and in their erroneous conception of it they mistake its nature, character, and duty. Its members are not representative of their immediate constituents, nor is it collectively representative of any particular limited description of the collected nation. Even in its faculty of universal representation, it is sometimes to act rather by its controlling supremacy, than to express the general will. The British constitution does not presume that its decisions are to be necessarily expressive of the general will, because it is one office of national sovereignty in part exercised by that house, sometimes to repress and always to direct that will. The great body of the people, actuated by human passions, and subject to error and deception, are to be governed by the legislative power, and cannot be superior
to that power. Their passions are to be re-
strained, their error unclouded, and their de-
ception removed in all ordinary process, by the
House of Commons, jointly with the other branch-
es of the parliament, which, in the discharge
of that duty, instead of pretending to express the
voice of the nation, is to silence its clamour,
to coerce its rude temper, and, in spite of its
improvident desire, to execute justice, and to se-
cure the commonwealth from detriment. The
legislative power, partly resident in that assem-
bly, is to consult and to conclude, undoubtedly
with some regard to the wishes of the people,
but principally with a view to justice and po-
litical permanent expediency. It would be no
apology to the nation that its representaives,
in compliance with its ungovernable clamour,
had violated the honour of the country, or sa-
crificed the meanest of its interests.

If such be the function of the House of
Commons, how important is it that its mem-
bers should, individually, participate in the cha-
racter which it ought collectively to main-
tain. No human institution was ever capable
of fulfilling the design in which it originated,
or all the purposes for which it exists. The
individual members of that house are necessa-
ry subject in degree to the influence of the
royal favour, but much more naturally, exten-
sively, and fatally, to that of popular esteem.
Emanating from the great body of the people
with whom it must always sympathize, and when
it shall surrender to them its delegated trust, must again incorporate; to whom it is bound by grateful obligation for enjoying its supreme capacity, and will be finally responsible for the exercise of its duties, and from whom it is to solicit future confidence and honour; it cannot excite our wonder that the most capricious, unjust, and improvident suggestions of the popular will, are advocated in that house which, in its legislative dignity, ought to regard, exclusively, the interests of the people, and not in any degree their unwise and fatal desires. Considering that unlimited obedience to those desires so often rashly conceived, and insolently expressed, would not only impair the dignity of parliament, but endanger the state itself, it seems a happy circumstance that from the complicated structure of our government, the force of the popular will is not irresistibly predominant, but that the influence of the crown, and of our hereditary honour and property is able to suspend and temperate its application.

The constitution is equally jealous of the influence of the crown, and of that of the people, and requires a legislature strictly independent. It has evinced its jealousy of the crown, by excluding from the representation, and the elective franchise, almost every person who subsists from the bounty, or in the service of the crown, and if any one accepts an office which does not disqualify him from sitting in the House of Commons, he is nevertheless sent back to the
electors, that it may be their own free choice to delegate a representative who is in the employment of the state. If the ministers of the King should venture to cast the royal censure upon any member of either house for his parliamentary conduct, or should dare to intimidate him in deliberation, Parliament would instantly appear in vindictive indignation of such great transgression. With imperative authority, and resi
tless, but dignified supremacy, they would assert their independence as the faithful guardians of their own privileges which are essential to the public liberties.

Less provident precaution has been taken against the influence of the people, because its application, occasionally lawful in the exercise of the elective franchise, has at other times been rarely attempted. The mode of its application, in the present instance, is almost without precedent. The rabble of the counties, and the municipalities of the empire, have never before presumed to censure the legislature in a body, to intimidate a majority of its members by reproach and commination, and to corrupt the minority by fulsome adulation, and the promise of future confidence and honour. Such measures are without example, or constitutionalpropriety, and are contrary to every principle of law.

What right have the freeholders of Middlesex, or the livery of London, supposing it were possible that they could express their deliberative judgment at a tumultuous meeting at Hackney,
or in the Guildhall, to throw the opprobrium of their malignant and uninformed condemnation upon the Commons of England in parliament assembled? What privilege have they to entitle them to stigmatize any individual member, who sits in parliament not as their representative, but as a representative of the United Kingdom, and in whose honour and inviolability the highest and the lowest of their fellow subjects have an equal interest? What rule of liberty has assigned to them the function of conferring national dignity and praise upon any member who sits in parliament to discharge a duty and to legislate, possibly in apparent coercion, regardless of their favour, and indifferent to their resentment? What franchise gives them to determine whom they or other electors shall hereafter delegate to the great council of the realm when called by the sovereign to elect a national representative? This newly assumed function of the people, unheard of in the wholesome times of English liberty, and unknown to the expositors of our laws, is a violation of the independence of the individual legislator, whether he is elated by their praise or distinguished by their blame, and not less a breach of the privileges of parliament, and a violent outrage against the British constitution.

The dignity and trust of the legislator is more splendid and important than that of any other functionary. It was among the crimes of King James, that, as a recompence to Jefferies, infa-
mous in history, and as a mean of governing the future proceedings of the courts, he promoted him, in grateful acknowledgment of his judicial rigour towards the insurgents in the Duke of Monmouth's rebellion, to the highest authority in the state, and to the honour of the peerage. In like manner he degraded those upright judges, who fearlessly vindicated the common rights of the subject upon the ever memorable acquittal of the seven bishops. If the crown should now interfere, either by reward or otherwise, to influence the administration of our ordinary justice, it would excite the lawful indignation of the injured and insulted country, and the just resentment of parliament. If the people should in like manner interfere by their censure or approbation of the reverend ministers of the laws, the proceeding would be equally indecent and unlawful. The Judges of this day, like Lord Mansfield, and those who presided with him upon the bench, at the time of Mr. Wilkes's sedition, would despise that clamour, disregard the threat of personal violence, and hold popularity, proffered as the reward of judicial duty, in contempt and scorn. It is far more important that the purity of the legislature should be preserved inviolate, unimpaired by the corruption and control of power, and untainted by the influence of popular applause and condemnation. It is not in the nature of the human heart to retain its calm integrity and unimpaired impartiality of interest, after the gratifying applause of a
great multitude, which natural vanity will interpret as the voice of a grateful nation. The virtues which are most admired, will then tend to corrupt and to pervert our judgment. A generous mind will be most disposed to return some part of the debt of gratitude incurred by that distinction which even heroes emulate. It is not in the faculty of the human understanding to retire from the festivities of the London Tavern, elated by the intemperate excess of democratic zeal, and heated by the adulation of men who assume the name, and are regarded as worthy of the rights and duties of patriots, with a power of cool and tranquil judgment, inquisitive, collected, and unbiassed. If it be the right of the nation to have a legislature faithful to duty, impartial in debate, upright in decision, intelligent, provident, and independent, those who, in any circumstances, on any occasion, presume by any means to controul the judgment or the vote of any individual member, violate that right, and undermine the constitution. Such proceedings, if those principles are correct, are in the highest degree unlawful and unconstitutional.

If, my lord, it were in my power to designate that form of government under which I should chuse to exercise industry, and to enjoy the fruits of labour with the full security of law, and the full enjoyment of all practical liberty; guided by the instructions of the wise, but much more guided by the experience of, at least, one hun-
dred and twenty years, I should, undoubtedly, describe the British constitution as it was established at the accession of King William, and as it now subsists in complete practical perfection. The power and irresponsibility of the monarch, the responsibility of all his executive servants, the supremacy of the legislature, the incorruptible integrity of justice, and the full enjoyment of every right, which the subject can anywhere enjoy consistently with the dignity, strength, and security of the nation, would justify my work. If I were then to define that constitution under which I should feel most miserable and insecure, though I think a savage republican form the least honourable and happy that could long subsist, yet I should describe it as preferable in every respect to any form or limitation of power where the actions of the legislator were cognizable by the mob of the metropolis, or by the petty, untaught, and aspiring municipalities of the country. I should feel much for the insecurity of the state, where that undefinable, irresponsible, and unenlightened prerogative of the populace was permitted to exist. I should cease to expect honour, integrity, or wisdom from the law-givers of that commonwealth; (the poverty of language compels me to give them a denomination to which they could be no more entitled.) I should instantly tremble for the instability of all personal dignity, and the insecurity of all private character. Rather than be subject to the harsh direction, or the uncharitable and re-
lentless censures of a thoughtless, vindictive, and cruel rabble, (the rabble of every country, by whatever appellation they may pass, are thoughtless, vindictive, and cruel) I would prefer to live without dignity or hope, an exile in some desolate island, where calumny would no more reach me than the sweet solace of society; and where, if I could not boast of the protection of law, I might, at least, be secure from the attack of rapine, injustice, and unfounded accusation.

It is unnecessary to torture the recollection of your lordship and the public, by enumerating the horrors which distinguished the progress of revolution in France. If they served not for awful example, it were desirable, for the character of mankind, that they should be obliterated from the page of history. It is erroneous to think that they had their origin in the factions of that democratic assembly which, in its whole existence, was no other than an instrument of the populace, organized in permanent insurrection. The calamities and the crimes of the rebellion in France are not imputable to the immediate counsels of any assembly, in any sense, constitutionally entitled to government. History will charge them upon that merciless sedition of the electors of Paris, which assumed the right of applauding or censuring the conduct of individual legislators, and, in due process of anarchy, of directing the measures of government. In any country a similar result would ensue from such a privilege of the
people. I therefore think the assuming of it, by the English people, as a dangerous measure. I trust I shall not be considered adverse to the lawful, accustomed, and approved privileges of the British nation for any thing which I have tendered to your lordship's consideration. They have the right of meeting for petition, or even respectful remonstrance to the crown, or either house of parliament. The practice is ancient and unquestioned. But themselves to judge the matter of their proceeding is not their right. It belongs to a higher and a national jurisdiction.

On these grounds, my lord, I dissented to the motion of thanks, which you have lately received from your constituents. To them I stated them in the order in which they are now published, and very frequently with similar expression. I ought, perhaps, to mistrust those grounds, because my opposition had no other support than the voice of Mr. Fisher, with whose respectability your lordship is acquainted.

I should the more gladly have concurred in that motion, from learning that your lordship is a determined opponent of that revolutionary innovation, which promises to perplex the country in the matter of parliamentary reform. I rejoice most sincerely, that your name is not found with those of Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Wardle, in the festive meetings at the Crown and Anchor, held for that dangerous project. Regarding your lordship on the summit of an eminence which
cannot be attained by hereditary right, nor without some credit for integrity and justice, I should be glad to mix my voice with the shouts of gratulation, which, on every side, are raised to cheer you. Your name is honourably proclaimed by the commonalty of London, and by the sturdy peasantry. That which passes for the public voice of the three kingdoms is employed to extol your patriotism, firmness, and virtue. Unhappily the adulation of the multitude is thoughtlessly conferred, and capriciously withdrawn. The fate of Sejanus is the common lot of many who feed on the flattery of popular applause.

"Jam stridunt ignes, jam follibus atque caminis
Ardet adoratum populo caput, et crepat ingena
Sejanus."

That elevation which depends on the favour of the mob is ever perilous and infirm, not worth a wise man's emulation, nor the esteem of the virtuous and just.

Among those who participate in your present precarious glory, you stand deservedly pre-eminent. If enemies you have, they dare not assail your unimpeached integrity and honour by reproach or doubt. Your name has not appeared among those levellers and revolutionists who celebrate their orgies at turbulent and intemperate assemblies. The idol of faction you will not long remain. But you may serve your country, and gratify those who, not vehement in plaudits, will not the less esteem you as an upright, zealous, and independent legislator. By a manly, and un-
yielding opposition to corruption, palpable, gross, and fatal, most to be hated when concealed by a puritanical profession of peculiar morality and piety; by an active zeal to detect, expose, and punish the locusts who blacken the splendour of royalty, while they devour the substance of the land and gnaw the vitals of the country; by an equally firm opposition to those who would subvert the throne by exciting our worst passions with the jargon of speculative reform and revolutionary dogma, and impudently profess their love to the sovereign, and their anxiety to obtain a pure and equal representation of the people, (the same profession which was made by the republican traitors, who rebelled against King Charles, and triumphed in his martyrdom, and also by the jacobinical conspirators, who prepared and conducted the revolution in France.) By such a course of honourable independence, without an indiscriminate opposition to the measures of ministers, which may proceed from personal ambition, or a yet less noble motive; your lordship may obtain a permanent and unenvied reputation; you may augment your personal dignity and that of the family, whose honours (if revolution prevent it not) you will one day bear. Your most glorious honour it may be, that, faithful to the crown which has raised your house to high distinction, you were not wanting in love and service to the people, in whose freedom and prosperity the power and splendour of the crown, and the rights and privileges of nobility are sanctioned and established.
I cannot but apologize for troubling your lordship with this address, and subscribe myself, with much respect,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

J. P. TINNEY.

THE END.

Just Published by the same Author,


—ὤτε Ζεὺς κυδὸς εὐδεχείν.

Also, lately Published,

REFLECTIONS on some Questions relative to the present State of the Nation, in a Letter to the Rev. Dr. Randolph.

"What damned error but some sober brow
"Shall bless it, and approve it with a text
"Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?"