ALL TALK AND NO ACTION:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

By

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Abstract:
In the decade from 1998 to 2008, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was witness to one of the most brutal violent conflicts in recent history. Crimes against humanity and large-scale violations of human rights occurred on a regular basis, resulting in the death and displacement of millions of people. The international community responded to this crisis with humanitarian efforts such as the donation of billions of dollars in aid and engagement in diplomatic mediations. However, despite the increasing viability of humanitarian intervention as a policy option for international actors, as well as the ‘groundbreaking’ formal adoption of the Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, no intervention was undertaken. This produces a puzzle: why, despite acknowledgement of the severity of the crisis, did the international community respond with humanitarianism, but stop short of intervening?

The answer can be found in an examination of the international normative environment at the time of the conflict. Using a three-stage normative life-cycle model developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, this thesis posits that the reason the international community engaged in humanitarian actions was because the norm of humanitarianism is at stage 2 of its life cycle, making it well-entrenched enough to compel members of the international community to act. However, the norm of humanitarian intervention is only at stage 1 of its life cycle, meaning that it is weak and underdeveloped. Its weakness is exacerbated by the fact that humanitarian intervention often clashes with the highly entrenched stage 3 norms of realpolitik, and specifically the norm of self-interested engagement, which demands that a state only become engaged with another if it is in the first state’s interests to do so. Thus, despite the brutality of the conflict, the norm of humanitarian intervention was not strong enough to provoke an intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been completed without the help of a few important people. My thesis supervisor, Professor Kim Richard Nossal, Sir Edward Peacock Professor of International Relations at Queen’s University, always struck a perfect balance between giving me the freedom to really make this project my own, and pointing me in directions I would not have thought of. I owe him a great thanks for always trusting in my abilities, and am in awe of his editing skills which are, to my endless amazement (and humbling), astoundingly thorough. This thesis also benefitted immensely from the conversations I had with Brigadier-General Larry Aitken, former Canadian peacekeeper in MONUC, whose insights into the situation in the DRC were invaluable.

I wish to express my appreciation to the Political Studies Department at Queen’s University, which was very accommodating and provided a solid academic environment for the completion of this thesis. I would also like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and Queen’s University, without whose support I could not have completed this work.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

SETTING THE STAGE: THE DRC AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was wracked by a brutally violent conflict from the mid-1990s through the 2000s. Throughout its various stages, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of over 5 million people,\(^1\) with millions more displaced and permanently scarred. The constant fighting has left the country in an extremely fragile position, with its economy in effect demolished and its human development index consistently among the lowest 20 countries in the world.\(^2\) The conflict has also at various points threatened to destabilize the entire Great Lakes region of Africa, an area already reeling from a series of conflicts, notably the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and civil conflict in Uganda. Indeed, the instability in the DRC was actually spurred on by the fallout from the Rwandan genocide, when thousands of Hutu refugees and former génocidaires flooded the Kivus region of eastern Congo.

The development and continuation of conflict in the DRC coincided with the development of a new framework of thinking about humanitarian intervention in the international arena. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, articulated most comprehensively by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), drew increasing attention to intervention as a viable approach to the management of intra-state conflict in cases of gross violations of human rights. Over the turn of the millennium, R2P’s conception of intervention for purely humanitarian purposes gained a place in both policy debates and the academic world. Support for the doctrine went so far as to result in its limited embrace by the international community in the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document.

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Given the seemingly groundbreaking international approval of R2P by the United Nations in 2005, a puzzle becomes apparent. If humanitarian intervention has been accepted and endorsed by 191 states, what accounts for the lack of intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo? Blatant and well-documented crimes against humanity were occurring on virtually a daily basis, some directed at specific ethnic groups, and others just wanton destruction by poorly trained militias and government forces. Given the levels of abuse, it would seem that the DRC is a case where intervention would not only be called for, but could also be easily justified under a humanitarian framework. The puzzle is deepened by the fact that the world was not ignorant of the conflict. Since the 1994 Rwandan genocide there was sustained international attention to the violence in the DRC, with discussions about it occurring amongst most of the world's major powers and many non-state actors. There was also a massive humanitarian aid presence in the country, including one of the largest UN peacekeeping forces in the world, the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), which began deployment to the DRC in 1999. Thus, the questions this thesis poses are two-fold: Given the levels of acceptance that R2P has seemingly brought to humanitarian intervention, first, why has there been no humanitarian intervention in the DRC, and secondly, why does the conflict still demand sustained attention from the international community? In other words, there is no action, but then why all the talk?

The answer, this thesis argues, is to be found in an examination of norms in global politics. The hypothesis is based on a normative life-cycle model developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, which suggests that at any given time international norms are at one of three stages, each of which corresponds with its overall strength and entrenchment in the international community. This thesis will argue that the norm of humanitarianism, encompassing both the expectation of action as well as the actual taking of ameliorative action in the face of massive humanitarian disasters, is at stage 2 of the normative life cycle. This gives the norm enough clout to ensure that international actors are pressured to, and respond to, humanitarian disasters with humanitarian aid, diplomatic measures, and at

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least rhetorical concern for the people of that country. Given that the DRC has been witness to one of the most devastating humanitarian crises in recent history, the norm of humanitarianism provides a convincing explanation for the international attention given to the conflict in the DRC, and the resulting humanitarian engagement.

By contrast, the norm of humanitarian intervention is only at stage 1 of Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, meaning that it is in the beginning stage of its life cycle and not strongly supported internationally, although it is emerging as a potentially viable norm. This fact alone would make humanitarian intervention unlikely in the DRC. However, it is further compounded by the fact that humanitarian intervention tends to react strongly with norms espoused by realpolitik conceptions of international relations and foreign policy. Specifically, humanitarian intervention frequently violates the norm that states should not engage in conflicts when either the conflict or the country in question is not in their interests. This and other realpolitik norms are fully entrenched in stage 3 of the normative life cycle, meaning that they are well-established amongst members of the international community. Consequently, the norms of realpolitik easily outweigh or take precedence over the norm of humanitarian intervention when there are no interests in the affected country. It is readily apparent that since the end of the Cold War, the DRC has not been in virtually any major power’s interests, as it is neither in any power’s sphere of influence nor important for any major national interest-based reasons. Thus, the norm of self-interested engagement would dictate that, contrary to the norm of humanitarian intervention, countries should avoid military engagement in the DRC. This explains why despite public, widespread international acknowledgement of the massive humanitarian crisis and ongoing perpetration of mass crimes against humanity in the DRC, no humanitarian intervention has been undertaken in order to stop them from occurring.
Chapter 2

Theoretical and Methodological Approach

METHODOLOGY

This thesis posits that the normative life-cycle model developed by Finnemore and Sikkink provides an accurate account of the development of international norms, and has the potential to provide an explanatory framework which can be applied to other international events. It will demonstrate both of these conclusions through the use of the DRC as an example, identifying three norms and their respective developments, and using these norms to explain international events and non-events.

It should be noted that this thesis will not account for changes in each of the norms at work in the DRC case. Finnemore and Sikkink’s model attempts to do this, identifying the mechanisms, motivations and dominant actors which precipitate normative change. While I accept their arguments, my case study is not concerned with examining the way that norms change. Rather, the account is static, looking at a ‘snapshot’ of a single case, in order to demonstrate that their model can explain the outcome of a situation through attention to international norms. This does involve identifying the aforementioned criteria (mechanisms, motivations and dominant actors) in order to ascertain which stage a norm is at. However, the reasons for the change from one stage to another will not be analyzed.

The Single Case Study Method

The logic of the single case study method is that, by applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s theoretical model to the DRC, one can show not only that the model is successful in explaining this case, but that, correspondingly, it could be successfully be applied to other cases. In essence, the DRC is used as an example of how the model can be applied in order to generate plausible conclusions about the world. This method involves studying a single case in a relatively in-depth manner, with the belief that the findings will hold true in other cases.
The DRC was chosen as the case study because of a puzzle that demanded explanation. There is a considerable amount of academic literature on the topic of humanitarian intervention, published both before and after the publication of the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).\(^4\) Humanitarian intervention has become an exciting and intriguing concept. However, the true catalyst for the puzzle was the fact that the basic ideas contained within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine had been endorsed by the entire community of states in the 2005 United Nations World Summit Declaration. R2P had seemingly become a major priority for the United Nations and the international community.

At the same time as this was happening, one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the last century was taking place. The degree of human suffering in the Democratic Republic of Congo, perpetrated by militias and rebel groups, is shocking even to those who are familiar with the often brutal nature of African civil wars. According to the international community’s (at least rhetorical) care for humanitarian crises, and the growing acceptance of R2P (culminating in the 2005 World Summit Declaration), it seemed that the DRC should have immediately been seen as a prime country to demonstrate its commitment to the protection of human beings, both leading up to and after the 2005 World Summit Declaration. When an examination of the responses to the DRC conflict showed that in fact this had not happened, it raised the question: In light of the world’s seemingly increasing acceptance of humanitarian intervention, what could possibly be stopping the international community from engaging in humanitarian intervention in the Congo? The level of suffering was so great that, especially in light of the failure to react during the Rwandan genocide, it seemed inconceivable that the international community could ignore such a situation again. This pointed to some factor which was not being considered, or some situation in the reality of the international sphere, which was forcing the international community to at least purport to care about the DRC but stop short of intervention. In addition, it became apparent that this had implications for the validity of the 2005 World Summit Declaration. What did this

\(^4\) This academic literature will be the subject of Chapter 2, “The Norms of Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Intervention.”
seeming contradiction mean for the actual status of the concept of “humanitarian intervention”? The need for answers to these questions was what led to the selection of the DRC and humanitarian intervention as the project for study.

A Note on the Application of this Model to the Democratic Republic of Congo

As noted previously, the application of the Finnemore-Sikkink model to the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo will focus less on the mechanisms by which norms change from one stage to another, and more on the identification of normative strength and corresponding policy outcomes. In order to do this, I will consider a short-term period, a snapshot of the DRC over approximately ten years. Upon examination of the DRC since the Rwandan genocide, I decided that an appropriate time period to consider would be bounded by the beginning of the second war in 1998 and the end of 2008. This period was chosen because it has a reasonable amount of stability, both in terms of the situation in the DRC as well as the international normative environment, giving me the ability to consider it a “snapshot”. Although the intensity of the fighting in the country waxed and waned, the nature and reasons for the conflict remained fairly stable (whereas during the first war, the reasons for fighting were quite different.) In addition, the international environment, as it pertains to the norms of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention, remained relatively stable during this time, with no major changes which would precipitate a dramatic shift in these particular norms’ developments. Examining, for example, a time period which included the fall of the Berlin wall would not be stable, as the international environment and norms would drastically change, to the point where the period could not be considered to be a single unit and would have to be examined by engaging in comparative analysis. The period from 1998 to 2008 did not result in changes dramatic enough to claim that it should be divided up into sub-periods.

However, given the rapidity with which norms can sometimes change, especially during stages 1 and 2 of their development, it is conceivable that the particular norms I am concerned with could have changed moderately during the ten-year time period I am examining. While my aim was not to focus on
how these changes occur, any such changes will certainly be accounted for should they happen. The time period was chosen specifically because it is unlikely that the norms would have changed drastically, but in the event that they do, full account will be given to them, as well as the changes in behavioural logics and policy outcomes that fact will bring.

THE NORMATIVE LIFE-CYCLE MODEL

In the years following the end of the Cold War, states’ decisions to intervene in places where massive humanitarian crises were occurring came under increased scrutiny. In particular, there has been great interest in the reasoning which leads to such decisions, as it indicates what factors international actors find persuasive when considering their policy options. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have developed a model which posits that these sorts of political decisions can be understood by looking at changes in the international normative environment. The authors’ basic premise is that the influence of norms causes actors to behave in a certain way. Correspondingly, as norms change and develop, one can observe behavioural changes which accompany this phenomenon. Their ultimate hypothesis is that by accounting for the ways norms change, one can account for both stasis and change in the international political environment and actions taken therein.

Finnemore and Sikkink’s model purports to give a complete account of normative change at the international level. They posit that international norms develop according to a “life cycle”, where, at any point, norms can be categorized as being at one of three stages. Each stage has different causes, characteristics, and expectations for action, or what Finnemore and Sikkink call “behavioural logics.” Increased acceptance of a norm will result in slow changes in behavioural logics, so when one observes states adhering to a certain logic, one can identify which stage a norm is at. The logics are identifiable through the trails of communication and observations which accompany an international action, which are secondary indices of the norm’s existence. As the authors rightly point out, “we can only have indirect

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evidence of norms just as we can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action (interests or threats, for example).\(^6\) Thus, actions, organizations, and actors provide the clues to normative identification.

Before delving into this model, it is important to clarify what is meant by “norms”. E. H. Carr noted in 1939 that “the idea of certain obligations automatically incumbent on civilized men has given birth to the idea of similar (though not necessarily identical) obligations incumbent on civilized nations. A state which does not conform to certain standards of behaviour towards its own citizens and, more particularly, towards foreigners will be branded as ‘uncivilized’.”\(^7\) In modern terms, Ingebritson identifies norms as “established practices, codes of conduct, and standards of acceptable behaviour…that influence state interests and identity.”\(^8\) Two points should be noted about this definition: First, implied in the notion of a norm is a standard of behaviour or prescription for action which must be taken in accordance with normative observation. Secondly, norms can be tied to the identities and interests of international actors. States which subscribe heavily to, for example, norms around human rights may eventually come to view human rights promotion and protection as not only key to their self-identification, but also come to define the interests they look to fulfill in their foreign policies. For instance, Canada’s attention to human rights in the domestic sphere leads it to identify with human rights protection as a tenet of its foreign policy. The fact that Canada also has a large immigrant population makes it within its national interest to work towards the promotion of human rights in other countries which have large diasporas in Canada. Thus, human rights norms influenced Canada’s international identity.

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\(^6\) Ibid., 892.


As noted, norms usually contain prescriptions for action within them; sets of rules, codes, and standards which are based on views of what are “appropriate” ways of acting. As Finnemore and Sikkink point out, the standards of “appropriateness” which a norm demands are determined by looking to the judgments of a community or society. These standards are generally based on the values and expectations of that society as a whole, or at least the majority of the society. By reference to the society’s judgments about certain activities and rules, one can understand the reasoning behind normative dictates. Correspondingly, it is possible to determine whether a norm exists by looking both at the rules and behavioural expectations of states, which can be ascertained, as already mentioned, through secondary trails of communication and evidence. However, norms can also be identified by looking at the kind of behaviour that generates disapproval or outrage by other members of a community. When disapproval results from an action, it is likely that a norm has been violated. Conversely, when behaviour produces praise and acceptance (or, in cases of highly internalized norms, no reaction at all), it is likely conforming to some existing norm.

Bearing this conception of norms in mind, we can now turn back to Finnemore and Sikkink’s model of normative change and influence, which, it must be remembered, only applies to the international arena. Clearly, not all international norms carry the same influence at all times, nor do they carry the same weight in relation to one another. The amount of influence an international norm has can be ascertained by understanding normative development as a three-stage process. The first stage is “norm emergence”, the second features a “norm cascade”, and the third involves the internalization of the norm. An understanding of each of these stages allows one to categorize norms, draw conclusions about their importance as a whole, and to theorize about what happens when two or more norms interact.

“Norm emergence” occurs when actors who are termed “norm entrepreneurs” become convinced of the importance of an idea or principle and seek to convince the international community of its

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10 Ibid.
importance. They do this by means of persuasion, where by framing the new norms in terms which are either congruent with existing norms or play upon values which are widely subscribed to, they attempt to sway members of the international community towards acceptance of the norm.\textsuperscript{11} The motivations for entrepreneurs to undertake this course of action may be varied, although Finnemore and Sikkink note that it is often due to empathy, altruism, or ideational conviction,\textsuperscript{12} motivations which are especially evident in the case of human rights or human security norms. Norm entrepreneurs may act through existing organizations such as the United Nations, through transnational NGO networks, or through the creation of new organizations specific to the cause. The creation of preliminary networks of organizations whose purposes are to advance and institutionalize a norm facilitates the publication of the norm, which allows it to begin to become institutionalized in international rules such as bilateral foreign policies or the policies of multilateral organizations.\textsuperscript{13} However, this may also happen after the norm has reached its “tipping point” beyond which a normative cascade occurs.

This brings the norm to the second stage of development. If a norm continues to gain momentum and support in the international community, eventually it will reach a threshold where a “critical mass” of states comes to support it. If this critical mass is reached, using the analogy of a scale, international favour will tip quickly towards the widespread acceptance of the norm. This is what the authors refer to as the “normative cascade”, meaning that large numbers of states begin accepting the norm in rapid succession. When critical mass is reached, the tipping point represents the boundary between stages 1 and 2 of the normative life span, and the normative cascade constitutes the second stage. As the normative cascade occurs, it results in the increasing institutionalization and entrenchment of the norm. It should be noted here that this tipping point and normative cascade by no means always happens - some norms never cross the boundary from stage 1 to stage 2, and for one of any number of conceivable

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 895, 897.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 898.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 900.
reasons (the norm is too radical, too idealistic, etc) never become widely accepted. Obviously, the full normative life cycle model applies to those norms which do progress beyond the first stage.

The question of what exactly constitutes the critical mass necessary to precipitate the cascade is not an easy one to answer. Finnemore and Sikkink make two suggestions, which address both the power politics involved in normative development and the simple fact that norms need widespread support to become successful. The first hypothesis is that when certain key states support the norm, states which carry a large amount of persuasive weight in the international arena either because of their sheer power or because they have a well renowned moral stature, the norm will quickly shift towards acceptance. The other hypothesis is that the tipping point can be reached when a certain number of states adopt the norm.\(^{14}\) However, this number is extremely difficult to determine. Empirical studies suggest that at least one third of the total number of states must support a norm for it to reach a tipping point, but this amount is by no means certain. The authors point to a combination of pressure for conformity, international legitimation, and desire of state leaders to enhance their esteem through some kind of peer pressure-like phenomenon as the reasons that states rapidly bandwagon onside the norm.

This type of phenomenon features quite prominently in Finnemore and Sikkink’s analysis, and deserves further consideration. It is widely acknowledged that states (and to some extent international organizations) are keenly aware of the benefits that come from being attentive to international opinion.\(^{15}\) Being labelled a ‘rogue’ or disreputable state has large consequences and potential ramifications, both economic, social and political. For this reason, states are often vulnerable to ‘socialization’ techniques, such as diplomatic praise or censure, limiting of aid, sanctions, or other incentives, designed to coerce a

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\(^{14}\) Ibid., 901.

state into conforming to a norm.\textsuperscript{16} This ‘everyone is doing it and so must you’ attitude clearly exemplifies Finnemore and Sikkink’s characterization of the phenomenon as one of peer pressure. NGOs also participate in the socialization process through the well-known activity of “naming and shaming”, highlighting the norm-breaking behaviour of a state and damaging its reputation internationally and sometimes domestically.

Returning to the normative life-cycle, at the end of the normative cascade, when the vast majority of countries have accepted the norm’s legitimacy, norm internalization occurs.\textsuperscript{17} At this point the norm becomes a part of the international system, and is usually unquestioned by actors. A good example of such a norm is that of sovereignty. Until recently (and arguably currently), sovereignty was simply accepted as a fundamental tenet of the international system, and states, IOs and NGOs always took this norm into consideration. The norm ceases to be a point of discussion, and is so firmly entrenched both in state policies, international institutions and international law that it is taken for granted. The consolidation and internalization of the norm can also be aided by iterated behaviour and habit.\textsuperscript{18} Norm internalization may represent either the end of stage 2 of the norm’s development, or the beginning of stage 3. Stage 3 consists entirely in the norm’s unquestioned acceptance by the international community. Once a norm has reached this stage, it has completed the evolution of its life cycle.

The three stages of normative development, their actors, motives and dominant mechanisms have been helpfully compiled into a table by the authors, which is reproduced here.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 902.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 904.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 905.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 898.
This constitutes the basic approach and theoretical framework that this thesis will use in examining the international community’s response to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. With this introduction, the thesis will now turn to a deeper examination of the norms involved in this case, those of humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention, and self-interested engagement (realpolitik). It will examine their constitutions and respective stages of development, as well as their interactions. The thesis will then proceed with the application of the norms to the DRC, beginning with the necessary background information on the conflict, and finally turning to the question of how all three norms were at work in the DRC during the period from 1998 to 2008.
Chapter 3

The Norms of Humanitarianism and Humanitarian Intervention

THE NORM OF HUMANITARIANISM

Definition

“Humanitarianism” can be defined as “the worldview, aspirations, professional vocabularies and actions affirming the common dignity of humankind regardless of differences in race, gender, religion, national belonging, political creed, or any other accident of birth or contextual circumstance.”\(^{20}\) One of the most fundamental principles which can be derived from this definition and specifically from the phrase “common dignity” is the idea that all human beings are equal, and are equally deserving of fair treatment and freedom from suffering. Clearly, humanitarianism is inextricably intertwined with modern conceptions of human rights, for if one respects the fundamental equality of all human beings, it naturally follows that one believes that human rights should be affirmed everywhere in the world. The linkages between these two concepts have helped propel humanitarianism towards the forefront of international policymaking.\(^ {21}\) As the international human rights movement gained strength and acceptance, so too did the notion that when massive human suffering is taking place, those afflicted have a right to humanitarian assistance.\(^ {22}\)

However, the definition just given is very broad, and exemplifies the long-standing problem of the ambiguity surrounding the concept of humanitarianism.\(^ {23}\) More recent discussions have attempted to narrow the concept, with one definition describing humanitarianism as “assistance to enable communities


to survive emergencies and to reduce human suffering.”

This presents a more specific characterization of the way in which humanitarianism is often practiced today: although humanitarianism certainly encompasses non-crisis situations, it tends to be invoked most noticeably in places where there are large scale instances of human suffering, since these are the most obvious cases where human dignity and quality of life are threatened.

The norm of humanitarianism has developed from the basic assumptions behind this conceptualization. The norm prescribes the kinds of behaviours which should be undertaken in order to “affirm the common dignity of humankind” when situations arise in which it is threatened. Both the word itself and the accompanying norm have very compassionate, altruistic connotations, and the actions which are taken in the name of humanitarianism are generally seen to be positive, with goals of helping other humans simply because they are human.

Before continuing, a note about the nature of the norm of humanitarianism must be made. Finnemore and Sikkink claim that there are two basic types of norms: ‘regulative’, which order and constrain behaviour, and ‘constitutive’, which create new interests or actors. Constitutive norms may operate to build and construct a certain identity, and regulative norms specify how one should properly act once the identity has been established. However, there is a third type of norm which can be called ‘evaluative’. Evaluative norms are similar to regulative norms in that they prescribe behaviour;

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28. There are some discrepancies amongst scholars regarding the terms ‘regulative’ and ‘prescriptive’. Finnemore and Sikkink identify two categories of norms, ‘evaluative/prescriptive’ and ‘regulative’. However, both Katzenstein and Kowert and Legro use the terms ‘prescriptive’ and ‘regulative’ interchangeably, and instead refer to what Finnemore and Sikkink call ‘evaluative/prescriptive norms’ as simply evaluative norms. My analysis will adopt this approach, using three categories of norms: evaluative, prescriptive/regulative, and constitutive.
however the motivation for the behaviour is different, as evaluative norms tend to base the propriety of
the behaviour on moral ideals.\textsuperscript{29} When a state violates a regulative norm, it may not cause the kind of
moral outrage that the violation of an evaluative norm does, as the evaluative norm relies on standards of
morality or ethics to determine what appropriate behaviour is. While both violations result in behaviour
that is recognized as illegitimate,\textsuperscript{30} the reasons underlying this illegitimacy differ.

From this brief description, it is clear that humanitarianism is an evaluative norm. Unlike norms
such as diplomatic immunity, where the behaviour of a state is prescribed for reasons of a non-moral
nature, the arguments in favour of humanitarianism are explicitly moralistic. They are based on a belief
in the dignity and equality of all humans, and a belief that the duty to help others arises not because it may
be practical to do so, but because as fellow human beings we have a moral obligation to aid those in need.

\textbf{Constitution}

Not surprisingly, the norm of humanitarianism justifies a vast number of different actions, with a vast
number of goals. Humanitarianism has been identified as the catalyst for actions ranging from
environmental protection to crisis management, disaster relief, development strategies, refugee protection
and repatriation, and all forms of emergency assistance. Each agency which engages in humanitarianism
also has its own standards and methods of acting, and responds to different sorts of crises in different
ways.

For example, one of the most traditionally-cited humanitarian agencies is the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose diverse activities include providing water to civilians in war
zones, promoting humanitarian law to armed forces and police, and managing health in detention


Another major humanitarian organization is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose primary purpose is to “safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees.”\(^{32}\) Among other things, the agency sets up refugee camps, helps protect refugees from violence, and helps to repatriate refugees if possible, or resettle into willing third-party countries.\(^{33}\) While there is often very little continuity between the methods and activities of separate humanitarian agencies, the ultimate goal remains the same: to ameliorate the suffering of other human beings.

For the purposes of this thesis, the actions which constitute humanitarianism will follow a framework developed by Geldenhuys. In his extensive analysis of foreign political engagement, which encompasses all the ways in which foreign countries become involved in the affairs of other states, he places all categories of engagement on a wheel, with placement based on how collaborative or confrontational the actions are.\(^{34}\) The wheel is reproduced here:

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For the purposes of this thesis, humanitarianism will be considered to include all the actions which fall on Geldenhuys’ “collaboration” side of the wheel. Like humanitarian endeavours, these activities are mostly non-coercive, are done with the approval of the host government, and involve cooperation with the actor and target.\textsuperscript{35} They are also all types of political involvement which can aid in the protection of the rights of populations, one of the ultimate goals of humanitarianism.

Of the activities on Geldenhuys’ “collaborative” side of the wheel, perhaps the most well-known is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is frequently identified as being a military as opposed to humanitarian exercise; however, as the late Sergio de Mello, former civilian head of the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) notes, humanitarianism is the ‘raison d’être’ of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{36} Although peacekeeping’s traditional mandate is to “help manage a conflict and create conditions in which

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 66.

the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed,”37 and the majority of peacekeepers are military officers, the role of peacekeeping has evolved to include a multitude of non-military activities such as facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. Another factor which places peacekeeping within the category of humanitarian and not military action is that peacekeepers require the consent of the host country to become involved in a situation. While military action is often non-consensual, peacekeeping forces, like humanitarian agencies, only enter a country with the permission of the government. They are by definition unbiased parties in a conflict situation, present in order to help stop a conflict and restore peace.

The status of peacekeeping as a humanitarian activity may perhaps be less clear when peacekeepers act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The broader rules of engagement in a Chapter VII mission are usually invoked as a response to intense fighting in a conflict situation, where it is apparent that stronger force must be used to ensure that civilians are protected. However, as Geldenhuys’ model notes, these sorts of missions still fall under collaborative approaches despite the change in the means by which peacekeeping is carried out. Although the peacekeepers may not be as collaborative with individual factions within a country, their cooperation with civilians and the presiding government (when there is one) remains constant. The nature of this kind of peacekeeping is necessarily more militaristic, but the goal is still to alleviate human suffering. Thus, these missions can still considered to be humanitarian endeavours.

The agencies which engage in humanitarianism can be loosely divided into three categories: International and domestic NGOs such as Médecins sans Frontières, international organizations such as the United Nations and even the World Trade Organization (through debt relief and development strategies), and states. As already noted, NGOs such as the ICRC, Médecins sans Frontières and Oxfam are often involved within the country itself, doing much of the work ‘on the ground’ to actually help affected people. However, other agencies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are

also extremely effective at putting pressure on other actors to help, and bringing media attention to a crisis. International organizations, of which the UN is chief, are often the most active in a crisis, engaging in humanitarianism on multiple levels from oversight and coordination of humanitarian relief to facilitation of diplomatic mediation. Finally, some of the most visible humanitarian actions engaged in by states include sending humanitarian aid to war-torn or disaster areas, sending teams to countries to mediate disputes and work “on the ground”, and engaging in diplomatic endeavours which aim to halt hostilities.

**The State of the Norm**

With this explanation, it is now possible to examine the status of the norm. As Thakur notes, during the twentieth century increasing numbers of countries began to come to an agreement about international human rights norms.\(^38\) Given that the norm of humanitarianism is heavily integrated with the human rights agenda, as human rights norms developed, so did the norm of humanitarianism. Applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s model to the norm’s development, it is clear that humanitarianism is at the far end of stage 2 of its life cycle.

The normative development of humanitarianism actually began in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Most analysts point to the Swiss businessman Henry Dunant as one of the chief normative entrepreneurs of humanitarianism. After witnessing the 1859 Battle of Solferino, Dunant was so affected by the suffering he saw that he began lobbying for the codification of rules which would protect civilians and the wounded during wartime. His efforts resulted in the adoption of the first Geneva Convention in 1864, and Dunant also founded the ICRC in order to uphold the new laws.\(^39\) These events were followed by an increasing number of people and organizations lobbying for attention to human rights in the laws of war. Consistent with Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, the operative mechanism being utilized was

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persuasion, where each norm entrepreneur and organization had to persuade militaries, states and international organizations of the importance of humanitarian efforts. As the entrepreneurs gradually achieved success, the norm’s tenets and prescriptions for behaviour began to be codified in international treaties and developing international law, with the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1919 to prosecute violations of the laws of war, and the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. The norm was progressing through stage 1 of its life cycle.

The norm’s transition to stage two can be clearly tied to the revelations of the atrocities committed in the course of the Second World War, both during the Holocaust and in the Pacific. In addressing the crimes committed in Europe, the Nuremburg trials specifically held not only states and governments but also individuals responsible for the horrors perpetrated during the Holocaust. This gave enormous reinforcement to the priority of human life and human rights over all other considerations, including military command structures, combat duties, and civil duties. After these trials, and with the advent of the United Nations, human rights and humanitarianism proliferated rapidly throughout the international system and became codified in treaties such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Throughout the next fifty years, there would be increasing numbers of treaties, declarations and optional

40 Ibid.

41 The other “horrors” of WWII related to Japanese treatment of prisoners of war, whose fundamental rights under the Geneva Conventions were completely ignored. For example, in Philippine prisoner of war camps, prisoners had their teeth, fingernails and toenails pulled out, were subjected to numerous types of torture such as being forced to look at the sun with their eyelids propped open for hours at a time, and some were simply beaten to death over tiny infractions. See Major Stewart Wolf and Lt. Col. Herbert S. Ripley, “Reactions Among Allied Prisoners of War Subjected to Three Years of Imprisonment and Torture by the Japanese,” American Journal of Psychiatry 104, no. 3 (1947), 182-3.

protocols dedicated to upholding human rights principles. As states increasingly signed these treaties, the normative cascade associated with a stage 2 norm was occurring, and human rights and humanitarianism became increasingly institutionalized.

During this time, there was also a rapid increase in the number of humanitarian agencies dedicated both to enacting the principles of human rights treaties and pushing for the development of new ones. The United Nations in particular established institutions whose sole purpose was to deliver humanitarian aid and assistance, such as the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943–47 and the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in 1946.44 There was also an expansion in the mandate of humanitarian agencies, with some organizations opting to ignore the ICRC’s key principles of political neutrality and impartiality in favour of a more activist approach advocated by groups like Médicins sans Frontières. Various United Nations agencies also expanded their mandates by gaining the ability to go within states to aid civilians, instead of having to wait until the civilians crossed an international border.45

The Cold War represented a “mixed blessing” for humanitarianism. Although intrastate conflicts featuring considerable human rights violations occurred during this time,46 international attention to them was often subsumed by broader concerns of nuclear threats and power rivalries. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, however, attention was reoriented to the suffering of people in war-torn areas, no matter what their orientation towards Communism.

The renewed attention to humanitarian crises in the 1990s removes any doubt that the norm of humanitarianism is at stage 2. Increased awareness of intrastate strife, as well as some of the most deadly and horrific civil conflicts in recent history (the Rwandan genocide, the conflict in Sierra Leone, etc),

combined to make the promotion of humanitarianism an obligation for all states, and an increasing determinant of states’ reputations and esteem.

This development can be attributed to a number of factors. Part of the reason for humanitarianism’s entrenchment is the fact that in the 1990s, domestic populations also began taking note of humanitarian crises. Armed conflicts are now far more publicized in the Western world due to a number of factors: the influence of the mass media and the so-called CNN effect, the power of public opinion, domestic and international advocacy groups, and value systems. As Eric Morris notes, “notions such as charity, solidarity and common humanity are deeply embedded in the culture of many societies, making it difficult for them to turn their backs on the suffering of others when they are in a position to help them.”47 When the nightly news broadcasts pictures of starving refugees in impoverished countries, most people have a hard time stomaching the idea of disregarding them completely.48

Because of this sentiment, if states are not seen as “doing something” to help the people whose images are broadcast on television and in newspapers, national governments often pay a political price, and lose moral credibility.49 Thus, humanitarianism can be a pressing concern for national governments, as its neglect can result in the degradation of its domestic reputation.

However, there is another way that humanitarianism can be useful for national governments. Humanitarian projects can often be used as substitutes for more meaningful, but costly, political or military action. As noted, in the face of armed conflicts of an especially brutal nature, states meet with pressure both from their publics and the international community to “do something” to help. However, in the cases of states with military capabilities, governments also feel pressure not to stage costly and risky interventions in far-away places. Humanitarianism is the perfect substitute for military action,50 as not

47 Ibid., vii.


only do governments have the appearance of “doing something”, but they avoid engaging in ways which carry considerably more risks.

Humanitarian agencies and international organizations have also contributed to the norm’s development. They have made it nearly impossible to ignore the norm, forcing states, especially in the West, to give humanitarianism a “central role” in their responses to crises.51 By using the media to give public appeals for humanitarian aid, “naming and shaming” states and governments who do not provide any, and lobbying for increased engagement in areas of conflict, these agencies have played a considerable role in the norm’s development.

Indeed, humanitarianism’s proliferation is readily apparent. To take the donation of funds to humanitarian aid as a prime example, in 2008 the European Commission allocated €39 million (approximately $56 million – all figures in US dollars) to its humanitarian aid budget, which has been steadily increasing from year to year.52 This trend is reflected in many other regions as well, and the world’s aggregate humanitarian assistance expenditures have been consistently increasing, from approximately $3 billion in 1990 to over $9 billion in 2008.53 In addition, the UNHCR’s budget in November, 2008 was approximately $1.85 billion, compared to approximately $1.1 billion in 1997.54 As another example, the ICRC received approximately one billion Swiss Francs ($900 million) in donations in 2007, whereas it received approximately $757 million CHF ($682 million) in contributions in 2004,

51 “Saving the World,” 11.


although the budget of the ICRC has tended to be more stabilized.\footnote{International Committee of the Red Cross, “Finance and Administration: Extract from ICRC Annual Report 2007,” http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/annual-report-finance-and-administration-2007 (accessed 19 May 2009); International Committee of the Red Cross, “Finance: The Fiscal Year 2004,” http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/6D5H27/$FILE/icre_ar_04_finance.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 19 May 2009).} Overall, there is a general trend amongst all international actors of increasing financial contributions for humanitarian goals. The fact that virtually every country in the world which is able to do so contributes to humanitarian aid gives further proof that the normative cascade associated with a stage 2 norm has occurred.

Finally, states and organizations pursue humanitarian endeavours in order to enhance their international reputations. In accordance with what Finnemore and Sikkink would expect from a stage 2 norm, actors seek to demonstrate their commitment to humanitarianism in order to enhance their international legitimacy and standing. Being seen as “doing something”\footnote{Rieff, quoted in “Saving the World,” 13.} is not only valuable in the domestic sphere, but is also an asset in the international arena. Given the increasing moral value placed on humanitarianism, actors seek to make it known that they are contributing to help suffering humans in order to gain the approval which comes with this, and because doing so can establish their reputations as states with strong respect for human rights. Humanitarian aid contributions increase moral credibility while satisfying both public and international opinion;\footnote{Larry Minear, Colin Scott and Thomas G. Weiss, The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 74; Chandler, Kosovo to Kabul, 79-80.} thus, as humanitarianism has become increasingly institutionalized and important, policymakers have increasingly claimed that their policies are guided by humanitarian principles.\footnote{Chandler, “Military Humanitarianism,” 678.}

All of the aforementioned developments point to the conclusion that humanitarianism is a stage 2 norm. However, a final indication of the state of the norm is the fact that humanitarian agencies consistently receive strong respect, especially when they are working on the ground. Humanitarian workers are valued by both sides of a conflict, and there is a strong taboo against deliberately targeting...
aid workers or forcing them to discontinue their work. To do so provokes a very strong response from the international community, and often from domestic populations as well. To use a recent example, the March 2009 expulsion of 13 foreign aid agencies in Darfur, Sudan prompted worldwide shock and outrage, with an explosion of media coverage and a denunciation by United States President Barack Obama and the European Parliament, among others. The fact that even the most ‘rogue’ states do not often expel or harm humanitarian workers indicates a respect for their work, or at the very least a fear of international condemnation and repercussions.

The norm of humanitarianism has not progressed beyond stage 2 of its life cycle, which is evident simply because it is not as institutionalized as other norms such as sovereignty. The most obvious indication of this is the fact that domestic governments must still be pressed at times, either by media or public opinion, to contribute to humanitarian causes. There is ample evidence that if a humanitarian emergency is not well publicized, domestic governments can use that opportunity to ignore it completely. If the norm was at stage 3, humanitarian responses would generally be automatic. In addition, there are still large problems in funding of humanitarian agencies, especially those associated with the United Nations. States must often be persuaded to give more aid and resources than they originally intended in order for the agencies to address the multitude of issues which may not necessarily be on the media’s agenda. This is especially the case in peacekeeping missions where, after the fighting has stopped, media coverage tends to drop while thousands of displaced persons and refugees must rebuild their lives with help from the international community, resulting in continued demands for funding. The fact that state incentives to completely embrace humanitarianism are sometimes outweighed by self-interested concerns or are prioritized lower depending on the amount of public awareness suggests


that the norm and its moral imperatives, while present, are not institutionalized enough for the norm to be considered to be in stage 3.

In short, humanitarianism displays many of the characteristics associated with stage 2 of the normative life cycle model. The fact that the actors are mainly states and organizations, the motivations are often legitimacy and esteem, and the mechanisms used to demonstrate this are socialization, institutionalization and demonstration make its stage 2 classification abundantly clear. This chapter will now turn to the associated, but significantly different, norm of humanitarian intervention.

THE NORM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Definition
The general concept of intervention can be described as “deliberate involvement by larger states into the internal affairs of smaller ones using economic leverage, diplomatic techniques, or military means to influence or control target states’ policies of governance, their social and economic development programs, and foreign relations.”61 This definition is extremely broad, reflecting the view that any type of interference in a sovereign country should be considered to be an intervention. However, this thesis will take the view, advocated by Geldenhuys, that such a characterization is not appropriate.62 In line with more recent conceptualizations, it will instead conceive of intervention as involving armed military incursion into a state by forces not native to it.

“Humanitarian interventions” have been conceived of as “those undertaken for the stated purpose of protection or assisting people at risk.”63 Or, more comprehensively, “[a] response to actual or threatened denial or violation of basic or fundamental human rights, whether of individuals or

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62 Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement, 40.

groups…undertaken with a view to remedying the situation.”  The intervention can be either consensual or imposed on the national or regional government, with the former usually occurring in the aftermath of natural disasters, and the latter generally involving the provision of food and humanitarian supplies to aid civilians. Non-consensual interventions are usually military in nature, with an outside party (or parties) intervening in a sovereign country or region to halt fighting and protect human rights. This relatively broad concept began to gain acceptance during the latter half of the Cold War, and continued to develop throughout the 1990s; however, after a number of difficult and in some cases questionably legitimate interventions (most notably Kosovo and Haiti), members of the international community demanded a more precise conception of what humanitarian intervention is and where it could be invoked.

This resulted in the articulation of a new but related doctrine: that of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), this doctrine mandates that when large scale killing or ethnic cleansing is occurring, the international community has a responsibility to intervene in a state for human protection purposes. The justification for this position is based on two fundamental ideas: First, the primary responsibility for the protection of a sovereign state’s citizens lies with the state itself. However, secondly, if a state is either unwilling or unable to fulfill that responsibility, then the norm of non-intervention contained within the principle of

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64 Derived from the definition given by Nick Lewer and Oliver Ramsbotham in ‘Something Must be Done’: Towards an Ethical Framework for Humanitarian Intervention in International Social Conflict, Peace Research Reports 33, Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, August 1993, 25-9, quoted in Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement, 40.

65 Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement, 41.


soverignty gives way to an international responsibility to protect.\textsuperscript{68} This implies that the international community at large has a corresponding ‘fallback’ responsibility to the citizens of a state, giving it the legitimacy to act in the state’s place.\textsuperscript{69}

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine as a whole actually contains three separate responsibilities: the Responsibility to Prevent, the Responsibility to React, and the Responsibility to Rebuild. Armed intervention falls under the Responsibility to React category, which in its “just cause threshold” outlines what the international community has an obligation to do when one or both of the following are occurring:

- large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.\textsuperscript{70}

The other two categories concern the responsibility to take measures to prevent these acts from occurring in places where they have a real likelihood of happening, and the obligation of the international community to help reconstruct the affected state and society once an intervention has been undertaken.\textsuperscript{71}

Some have recently come to associate the Responsibility to Protect doctrine solely with humanitarian intervention. However, as one of the architects of R2P points out, this is a mistake. Gareth Evans states, “The very core of the traditional meaning of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes – nothing more or less. But ‘the responsibility to protect’ is about much more than that.”\textsuperscript{72} Humanitarian intervention and R2P are related, but contain some significant differences. R2P encompasses a much broader spectrum of responses to gross violations of human rights,

\textsuperscript{68} Alex Bellamy, \textit{Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities} (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2009), 52.

\textsuperscript{69} ICISS, \textit{Responsibility}, 17.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 32.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 20, 39.

\textsuperscript{72} Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 290.
of which military intervention is only one part. In addition, the Responsibility to React seriously limits
the types of situations that military intervention can be applied to, with its use being restricted to only
situations described in the block quotation above. Humanitarian intervention, however, can be
undertaken in diverse situations, of which atrocity crimes are only a part. For example, the U.S.
intervention in Somalia was a humanitarian intervention; however, the goal of that intervention was not to
stop crimes against humanity, but to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian aid and food supplies.
Geldenhuys concludes that there are six principal objectives of interventionary actions: “Providing
humanitarian relief, promoting good governance, rebuilding state structures, nation-building, supporting
self-determination, and promoting peace.”73 In this way, although R2P as a whole encompasses a much
broader range of actions, the applicability of humanitarian intervention is much wider, encompassing R2P
situations as well as others.

Given these discrepancies, for the purposes of this thesis it will be necessary to define what is
meant by “humanitarian intervention”. Humanitarian intervention will refer to situations which fall under
the just cause threshold of the Responsibility to React, where large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing
are occurring at the hands of a state or non-state actor. This does not imply that a situation must fulfill the
other five criteria that the ICISS has deemed necessary for military intervention to be legitimate under the
Responsibility to React (right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable
prospects for success), nor must the ICISS conception dictate the exact type of response or character of
the intervention.74 Instead, only the just cause threshold of the Responsibility to React will be employed
as the defining indicator of the kinds of situations to which the norm of humanitarian intervention will
apply.

There are a number of reasons that this categorization is appropriate. First, by definition the
Responsibilities to Prevent and Rebuild are not military interventions, a characteristic which this thesis

73 Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement, 63.
74 This thesis does not focus on the norm of the ‘Responsibility to React’ – it is not clear that the Responsibility to
React is either comprehensive enough or the absolute authority over the criteria which make interventions
‘legitimate’.
has already stipulated must be present for an action to be a “humanitarian intervention”. Secondly, the concept of “humanitarian intervention” in general is far too broad to analyze as a whole. The justifications for traditionally-conceived humanitarian intervention are too diverse to place under a single heading, and it would be virtually impossible to develop any coherent conclusions about them. Thirdly, there is a pragmatic aspect to this categorization. At the point of writing, virtually the only codified set of rules which attempt to delineate exactly when intervention is justified are those of the Responsibility to React. Because of the weak state of the norm of humanitarian intervention, which will be discussed shortly, it has not yet been developed enough to begin institutionalizing and codifying rules for intervention in non-genocidal or atrocity crime situations. Thus, for practical purposes, the Responsibility to React’s just cause threshold will be taken as the template for the kinds of situations where the norm of humanitarian intervention applies.

Conceived of as just outlined, humanitarian intervention is a norm. Based on a certain threshold of suffering, advocates of humanitarian intervention attempt to prescribe what the appropriate response of the international community, or specific states within that community, should be. The kinds of responses demanded will absolutely depend on the situation at hand, but the general action taken, the decisions which must be made, and the principle behind them is of the same kind.

As in the case of humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention is an evaluative norm; there is a sense of morality or an ethical standard which underlies the concept of intervention in order to alleviate human suffering. This is easily demonstrated when examining violations of the norm, or the reactions when interventions have failed to happen in places such as Rwanda. The sense of failure that the international community faced in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide is a moral failure to respond to a clear-cut case of genocide.75 The sentiments expressed after the fact by many leaders and populations (for

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75 In fact, in the case of Rwanda it is widely acknowledged that certain policymakers actually made the situation worse, withdrawing a large portion of the peacekeeping contingent there and further destabilizing the situation. For a more detailed account of this, see Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003); Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002).
example, Bill Clinton is said to have snapped at his foreign-policy team, angry with them for not steering him toward a moral course in Rwanda, and also issued a formal apology to the Rwandan people for failing to act)\textsuperscript{76} indicate a sense of moral responsibility to help those whose basic humanity is being violated, and to fulfill a responsibility to those who are victimized in this way.

**Constitution**

Humanitarian intervention operations involve a wide range of approaches, often utilizing ground forces and counter-insurgency tactics. However, this is not always the case: in the Kosovo intervention in 1999, ground forces were never used, and instead a campaign of high-level bombing was utilized to convince Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal Serb forces to surrender. These tactics reflect both the nature of the situation on the ground, as well as the willingness and commitment of the country or organization to the cause. Many countries are reluctant to suffer casualties in humanitarian conflicts, as is blatantly obvious in the cases of Somalia and Kosovo. The complete removal of US forces from Somalia and the persistent reluctance of NATO to send ground forces to Kosovo even though the civilian casualties would have been lessened points to a wariness of full-scale engagement.\textsuperscript{77} The reasons for this will be discussed in a subsequent chapter on realpolitik.

The question of who should carry out humanitarian interventions is a difficult one, being wrestled with by both policymakers and scholars. Initially, many pointed to the United Nations as the appropriate body for carrying out military interventions. However, in order to maintain world faith in the United Nations, others believe that the UN should never participate in armed, unauthorized intervention within a sovereign country. Such critics point to the fact that the United Nations Charter provides very limited


\textsuperscript{77} See, for example, Power, Chapter 12 “Kosovo: A Dog and a Fight,” 374-5.
options for interfering within the internal affairs of a state without that state’s permission, and humanitarian intervention is usually done without the host state’s consent. Therefore, they maintain that such actions are most properly undertaken by either individual countries or coalitions of countries. The caveat to this is that coalitions or unilateral missions often lack the legitimacy and authority that the United Nations has, and their motivations are frequently questioned. This sentiment has become especially prominent since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was sometimes justified by the Coalition of the Willing as being for humanitarian purposes. Added to this debate are questions of timing, and whether, because coalitions are almost always able to mobilize troops far more quickly than the United Nations, it makes more practical sense to focus on smaller groups of countries to carry out interventions.

This debate does not need to be explored more fully in this context; suffice it to say that humanitarian interventions have been undertaken by various groups, including individual states, coalitions, regional organizations (such as the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia and Sierra Leone and NATO in Kosovo), with or without the approval of the United Nations Security Council, and utilize a variety of military strategies.

**The State of the Norm**

The state of the norm of humanitarian intervention will be discussed in three sections. The first will examine the development of the norm in the 1990s and early 2000s, up until the adoption of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Declaration. The reason for this is that some scholars and advocates initially believed that the endorsement of the Responsibility to React at the summit represented a

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80 ICISS, *Responsibility*, 16.
significant change in the norm’s status. This will be discussed in detail, followed by an account of the state of the norm in the post-World Summit period.\textsuperscript{81}

\textit{Prior to the 2005 World Summit}

Over the course of the twentieth century the norm of humanitarian intervention ceased to be a fanciful idea, and became a viable one which has important implications for the nature of the international system. Since the 1990s, the norm has become far more publicized, and has been propelled into international discourse by normative entrepreneurs with aspirations to reshape the international order.\textsuperscript{82}

In the early part of the twentieth century, humanitarian intervention was considered to be a ‘lawyer’s doctrine’, with the goal of justifying a set of exceptions to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{83} However, as in the case of the norm of humanitarianism, the shock of the Holocaust and international complacency spurred a number of people into action to attempt to prevent it from happening again. One of the first major normative entrepreneurs was Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who invented the word ‘genocide’ and drafted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. He worked tirelessly to promote this document, which contained within it not only a clear definition of genocide, but also prescriptions for action if and when the international community discovered it was occurring.\textsuperscript{84} The treaty was enacted into international law on October 16, 1950.\textsuperscript{85} The post-World War II attention to atrocity crimes was mostly stalled by the deepening of the Cold War however, when East-West tensions significantly obscured attention to humanitarian problems, and when any humanitarian intervention would be complicated by considerations of spheres of influence and the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In this section, any use of the term “Responsibility to Protect” will be assumed to refer to and include the Responsibility to React’s defining just cause threshold.
\item Chandler, \textit{Kosovo to Kabul}, 6.
\item Walzer, “The Argument,” 29.
\item Power, \textit{A Problem from Hell}, 64.
\end{enumerate}
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nuclear threat. With the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw a renewed attention to the issue of humanitarian intervention.

After the international community’s failure to prevent or respond to genocide in Rwanda, there was international outcry that “something must be done” to prevent such things from happening again. However, the lack of political will to actually do something was evident when ethnic cleansing continued in Bosnia, and began happening in Kosovo in 1999. Most people and governments accepted that external military intervention was the only way to stop the fighting, but the Security Council, in the face of a threatened veto by Russia, failed to act.\(^{86}\) It wasn’t until the conflict began to threaten the stability of the entire Balkan region that intervention began to be considered.

In spite of this reluctance, by this time other actors had become convinced that some concrete action needed to be taken in order to prevent the mass suffering of human beings from occurring without resistance from the international community. They began to develop the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and the embedded Responsibility to React with its just cause threshold, as concrete guidelines for the international community’s response. As the sole even moderately developed guidelines for humanitarian intervention, R2P quickly came to represent humanitarian intervention as a whole. One of the foremost of these normative entrepreneurs of the Responsibility to Protect has been former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans. As one of the co-chairs of the ICISS, he was instrumental in coordinating the research and writing of the document. Afterwards, he was involved in extensive lobbying on behalf of R2P, both through existing organizations and through the creation of new ones such as the ‘Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect’.\(^ {87}\) Evans has been joined by a number of other actors, especially Kofi Annan, who made human security and human rights one of his top priorities during his tenure as Secretary-General. After the doctrine was adopted by the UN’s High-Level Panel, Annan secured a spot for the doctrine in his agenda for renewing the UN, expressed in his “In Larger Freedom” document.

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87 Ibid., 288.
Some authors maintain that this resulted in a significant change in the normative context around R2P and humanitarian intervention, as it paved the way for the Responsibility to Protect to be discussed at the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations.88

The Responsibility to Protect was initially endorsed most favourably by Canada, Germany, Argentina, Australia, Colombia, Croatia, Ireland, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Sweden, and Tanzania.89 The doctrine was also embraced by the United Kingdom which, after the controversy over the Kosovo intervention, was adamant that a set of guidelines was needed to direct future interventions. The UK promoted this extensively both through its position as a permanent member of the Security Council, as well as in its bilateral relations.90 These normative entrepreneurs, who believed both in the doctrine as well as in the moral impetus behind it, attempted to persuade members of the international community to support the norm. This puts the norm at stage one of the normative life cycle.

However, the initial change in the way humanitarian intervention was viewed was met with sustained resistance from a number of sources. The Security Council was split over approval of the doctrine. Both the United States and China were opposed to many of the criteria for intervention, the US because of concern about troop commitments, and China because of its insistence on a strict adherence to state sovereignty.91 While the Chinese government accepted that massive humanitarian crises are “the

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89 Ibid., 151.


91 Ibid.
legitimate concern of the international community,”92 it did not accept either a responsibility to protect or the legitimacy of intervention. Russia was extremely wary of any potential for the West to engage in action in its sphere of influence.

In the General Assembly, many members of the Global South were also opposed to the guidelines for intervention set out by R2P, in particular Egypt and India. There are two large reasons for this. First, they believed that the question of what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ intervention was extremely murky. Egypt’s Assistant Foreign Minister for Multilateral Affairs, Ambassador Soliman Awaad, once claimed that legitimacy is only fulfilled when ‘norms and criteria of humanitarian intervention [are] indiscriminately applied to all cases without double standards or politicization’.93 However, many in the Global South believed this standard could never be reached, and alleged that any acceptance of humanitarian intervention would result in its application for political motives by the Global North. This seemed only to be confirmed by the invasions in Afghanistan and especially Iraq.

Secondly, many governments in the General Assembly feared that legitimation of intervention for humanitarian purposes could result in their becoming targets of intervention because of their own violations of human rights.94 Thus, the norm still faced strong resistance. Although it seemed that the moral imperative behind the doctrine was not the subject of the attacks, as even its most bitter opponents like Mohammed Ayoob have admitted that the sovereignty as responsibility approach has 'considerable moral force',95 the fact that it seemed virtually impossible to attain consensus over any sort of criteria for

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94 Ibid., 562.

operationalization presented a huge problem for the eventual acceptance of the norm. In the case of a norm such as this, it cannot move forward until its operational principles are agreed upon.

However, prior to the 2005 World Summit Declaration there were some indications that the norm’s progression had not stalled completely. For example, at a 2002 conference of the Fund for Peace on the perspectives from the Americas on military intervention, a group of leaders from academia, government, the military, the media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) adopted the language of the ICISS and accepted the principle of the responsibility to protect civilians from massive human rights abuses.96 Another pivotal event occurred when the Constitutive Act of the African Union was enacted on 11 July 2000. Under the Constitutive Act, the sovereign rights of all states and prohibitions on the use of force were affirmed; however, in the same article (4h), the Union is also given the right to intervene explicitly in a member state in limited cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, with Assembly approval.97 This was truly groundbreaking, as it was the first time that any organization had officially incorporated such a clause into its founding document, and also because it created an institutional mechanism that permits the regional arrangements for intervention advocated by the Responsibility to React.98 Regardless of the likelihood of the AU engaging in such an intervention, this event points to the fact that military intervention in humanitarian crises had evolved at least somewhat: it was now considered “a legitimate if extraordinary response.”99

Thus, prior to the 2005 World Summit Declaration, the norm was still at stage 1 of Finnemore and Sikkink’s model. The motivating factors for the acceptance of any definitive framework codifying humanitarian intervention had not gained international legitimacy, nor had the norm even come close to a “tipping point.” Although this period witnessed the beginnings of transnational networks for the

96 Ibid., 982.
advancement of R2P and humanitarian intervention in general, most of the advocacy was still being done by a few normative entrepreneurs who were committed to the principles of intervention in order to stop human suffering.

*The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document*

The 2005 United Nations World Summit saw high level representatives from all 191 member-states come together in New York to discuss the future and direction of the organization. The outcome document from this World Summit included a clause which endorsed the basic principles of R2P, including the Responsibility to React. At first glance, many believed this represented a renewed commitment to the doctrine and its fundamental principles. In Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, such a widespread endorsement could also have represented the norm’s tipping point and beginning of the normative cascade. However, this is not the case for three major reasons: The concept of the Responsibility to React which was endorsed is significantly weakened from its original intent and does not actually commit countries to act when the just cause threshold is reached; the weakened version of the Responsibility to React was not rapidly engaged with by countries following its adoption; and any attempts to operationalize even the weakened concept are still met with large scale problems of political wrangling and lack of political will.

Paragraphs 138 and 139 of Section IV (Human Rights) of the World Summit Outcome explicitly endorse two important concepts. The first is that each individual state has a responsibility to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second states that the international community accepts the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations from these crimes. The document then goes on to state that:
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.\(^\text{100}\)

The declaration also urges the General Assembly to continue to consider and develop the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

While seeming to be an extremely important endorsement of the Responsibility to React, in actual fact the impact of the declaration was not as significant as many initially believed. This is because, as Bellamy notes, the United States, supported by China and Russia, successfully whittled away the Council’s responsibility from an obligation to act to a commitment to “stand ready” to act.\(^\text{101}\) The declaration states that the international community is *prepared* to take collective action, not that they accept that they have a responsibility to do so (as opposed to using diplomatic and peaceful means to stop genocide, which they accept a responsibility to do). This is a far more watered down concept than that of the original Responsibility to React, and does not constitute an acceptance of the moral responsibility to intervene militarily to protect human lives. Thus, humanitarian intervention is no more likely to take place than before the document was published.

The declaration was not followed by any sort of “normative cascade,” in which countries began to accept and promote the doctrine. There was no rapid acceptance and engagement with the doctrine in the years following the declaration, with few if any more declarations or indications of support than prior to the World Summit. Some may claim that the outcome document does constitute a normative cascade because 191 governments signed it; however, this endorsement is rhetorical only, lacking in any operational guidelines, and thus does not represent a full endorsement of the norm. In addition, in the


years following the World Summit, no substantive progress was made on implementing the declaration’s recommendation that the General Assembly and Security Council endorse the doctrine.  

Finally, there have been no successful attempts to actually institutionalize the doctrine in international law or treaties and conventions. Attempts to do so have been met by political wrangling and posturing, indicating that acceptance of the norm is still not very strong. In fact, in the 2005 declaration discussions Russia, China and the United States refused to even discuss concrete criteria for intervention. Three months prior to the 2005 World Summit in June, 2005, a high-profile task force organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace, which was chaired by George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich, investigated the relationship between the interests of the United States and the agenda for UN reform advocated by Kofi Annan, which included the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect. The task force ultimately argued that when a state does not protect its citizens, the fact that other nations have a responsibility to take action to protect those citizens “cannot be denied.” This certainly was a very encouraging sign; however, it once again expressed mere rhetoric in terms of the intent of the United States to engage with the Responsibility to React. This was once again reflected in the World Summit outcome, where rhetorical acceptance was present, but actual guidelines were not discussed.

It is evident that there is still a problem with political will, one of the largest barriers to humanitarian intervention, as no countries are willing to commit to the norm. The fact that countries will not even discuss implementing the doctrine or drawing up guidelines for humanitarian intervention indicates that they are not convinced of the norm, or do not support it fully. Given all of these factors, one may conclude that the 2005 World Summit Declaration did not constitute the tipping point or normative threshold of R2P or humanitarian intervention.

102 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit” (paper presented at the conference “The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?” Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada, 6-7 October 2005), http://www.una.org.uk/humanrights/R2P%5B1%5D.pdf (accessed 25 March 2009).


The Post-World Summit Era

In the years after the 2005 World Summit declaration there has been more incremental progress in the area of the Responsibility to Protect, but there have not been any substantial or norm-altering events. The initial normative entrepreneurs have been joined by some prominent moral leaders in their promotion of the Responsibility to React. For example, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu of South Africa, in urging the need for action on Kenya’s ethnic conflict, invoked the Responsibility to Protect.105 Kofi Annan’s successor, Ban Ki-moon, has also enthusiastically endorsed the concept. Even Pope Benedict XVI, when speaking to the UN General Assembly in April, 2008, gave explicit support to the Responsibility to Protect, claiming that, “Recognition of the unity of the human family, and attention to the innate dignity of every man and woman, today find renewed emphasis in the principle of the responsibility to protect.”106

In addition, there has been a continuation of small-scale, often rhetorical endorsements of the Responsibility to React. In April 2006 the Security Council adopted a resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, which reaffirms the World Summit’s conclusions regarding R2P. Another resolution in August of the same year made reference to R2P in the context of Darfur.107 These events indicate that the norm’s progress may not have stalled completely, but they do not represent any great steps towards stage 2.

In short, the norm of humanitarian intervention, as represented by the endorsement of the Responsibility to React, has not progressed beyond stage 1 of its normative life cycle. The characteristics of a stage 1 norm – the use of the mechanism of persuasion, the importance of normative entrepreneurs, and the altruistic/empathetic motivations of the supporters of the norm – are still clearly the dominant ones in the case of humanitarian intervention. Although some rhetorical endorsement has happened, it


has not been matched by any corresponding action or real commitment to the norm’s implementation. Clearly, the norm has not evolved past stage 1 of Finnemore and Sikkink’s normative life cycle.

Bearing these discussions in mind, one can now turn to the norms associated with realpolitik conceptions of international relations. As the more entrenched norms, realpolitik’s interactions with the two developing norms have the potential to either greatly help or hinder their normative development. A discussion of the norms in relation to one another will make clear the likely outcome of such normative interactions, and will be the final piece of the theoretical puzzle needed in order to turn to the case study, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Chapter 4
Realpolitik and Its Effects

THE NORMS OF REALPOLITIK

Theoretical Introduction to Realpolitik

Realpolitik has its basis in the paradigm of realism, being the more descriptive or explanatory side of realist theory.108 According to Hans Morgenthau, the fundamental tenets of realism are that interest is defined in terms of power, where political power is characterized as “the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large,” and that recognition of this will provide an explanatory framework through which one can understand international politics.109 Realists generally believe that the promotion of state (national) interests are, and should be, of paramount importance in any state’s policymaking. Both classical and structural realists also share the belief that at any given point the international system exhibits a certain balance of power among states,110 which influences the actions of policymakers, and determines which state(s) have the ability to enact their preferences and control the international system.

Realism is often contrasted with “idealism”, a philosophy sometimes associated with Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Idealism is not a paradigm in itself but is reflected in other paradigms such as liberalism and constructivism. It is a way of understanding both human behaviour and corresponding political patterns, which is radically opposed to realism. In the words of E.H. Carr, traditional realists


110 See for example Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 183; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979), 119.
maintain that “politics are not (as the utopians pretend) a function of ethics, but ethics of politics.”\textsuperscript{111} This reflects a fundamental difference between how idealists and realists view the ordering of events and reactions: realists essentially claim that the events of politics and the acts of sovereigns determine what is considered morally or ethically good, while idealists maintain that there is some kind of ethical standard to which decisions should adhere. This difference in turn has a very large impact on both the evaluation of political figures and judgment of whether political actions are “good” or “bad”, with idealists asserting that it is appropriate to applaud or condemn state actions which violate what they conceive of as the rules of morality or ethics. Clearly, this philosophy is reflected in the norms of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. However, traditional realism takes a different view of the ability to judge actions, maintaining that while political actions may be judged by moral standards, and should be squared with moral standards as often as possible, the state has “no right” to put morality before prudence of action.\textsuperscript{112}

Neorealists or structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz take a different view of the relationship between morality and politics. They believe that using morality to guide policy is patently dangerous, and that discarding rationality in favour of morality should be avoided at all times. Moral goals are not appropriate goals, and rationality and calculation of interests are the only appropriate guides in international relations.\textsuperscript{113}

Bearing this discussion in mind, realpolitik can be conceived of as “the methods by which foreign policy is conducted,” based on a certain rationale.\textsuperscript{114} Waltz identifies the main elements of realpolitik as: “The ruler’s, and later the state’s, interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculations based on these necessities can discover the

\textsuperscript{111} Edward Hallett Carr, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations} (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 64.

\textsuperscript{112} Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, 12.


\textsuperscript{114} Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, 117.
policies that will best serve a state’s interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the states.”

In practice, realpolitik, especially as exemplified by policymakers like Henry Kissinger, has emphasized the enactment of pragmatic foreign policies over policies with moralistic bases, and has come to be associated with amorality or immorality. It directs all policies towards the question of what would best improve a state’s national interest, where this interest is primarily defined in terms of the state’s power and security. Power can be defined in different ways, but is most often associated with military strength, economic prosperity and the ability to either convince or coerce other states into enacting policies which are favourable to one’s own state. Realpolitik’s tenets affect every area of international policymaking: economic, diplomatic, financial, security, military, development, and so on.

As a final note, realpolitik policies often clash with those associated with more ‘ethical’ policymaking. In many situations, policymakers must choose between a course of action which is inherently moralistic, often with a focus on helping others, and policies which are more pragmatic or better for the state, but which ignore ethical considerations. The question of which type of policy is typically favoured is of special relevance to this thesis.

115 Ibid.

116 Wayman and Diehl, “Realism Reconsidered,” in Wayman and Diehl, Reconstructing Realpolitik, 3.


The Norm of Self-Interested Engagement

A distinction must be made between realpolitik theory and practice. Realpolitik theory is a way of explaining decisions which are taken, and presents a framework which attempts to predict how states will relate to each other. However, realpolitik diplomacy or practice is realpolitik in action; it is a way of considering a real-world situation, which mandates that actions be taken which focus on concerns like power politics and strategic interests. These actions or prescriptions are the norms of realpolitik. Based on a certain situation, actions are prescribed which are believed to be necessary to take. The theoretical underpinnings of realism and realpolitik have given rise to the realpolitik school of diplomacy.

A potential problem exists in the association of realpolitik with norms. Realpolitik theory and realism in general are not often credited with any recognition of international norms. If this is the case, then since realpolitik practice is based on realpolitik theory, it is unlikely that realpolitik practitioners would accept that there are international norms, and would certainly reject the idea that their actions are based on normative dictates. However, a more in-depth reading of realism reveals that many realists do in fact acknowledge the existence and power of norms. This includes Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, who was cited in previous discussions of the nature of international norms. It is chiefly structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz who would potentially take issue with the idea of there being norms underlying political behaviour, including realpolitik-based behaviour. Nonetheless, even Waltz himself noted, when using the analogy of a group to describe the behaviour of states in a system, “In spontaneous and informal ways, societies establish norms of behaviour. A group’s opinion controls its members…Praise for behaviour that conforms to group norms reinforces them. Socialization brings members of a group into conformity with its norms.”

Clearly, the majority of the realist school does in fact acknowledge the existence and power of norms to some degree, meaning that the theory underlying realpolitik diplomacy does recognize that norms can play a role in decisionmaking processes.

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120 Waltz, *International Politics*, 75-6.
Thus, it can certainly be maintained that implicit in a realist approach are considerations of norms, such as the norm of non-intervention in cases where there are no strategic interests. While such norms may not be explicitly referred to when considering realpolitik decisionmaking practices, with the focus mainly being on considerations of rational self-interest as the way to understanding decisionmaking,\textsuperscript{121} nonetheless the norms are underlying factors.

Unlike humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention norms, the norms of realpolitik are not evaluative. Instead, they fall into the category of prescriptive/regulative norms, in that they constrain and dictate behaviour, but not on the basis of moral or ethical considerations. Realpolitik norms are based on far more pragmatic assumptions about the world, and their ultimate goal is also extremely pragmatic: the survival of the state. Correspondingly, when a realpolitik norm is broken, it does not cause the type of moral outrage that the breaking of an evaluative norm would.

When referring to the ‘norms of realpolitik’, the use of the plural should be highlighted. The complexity of realpolitik theory means that there is not a singular norm as in the case of humanitarian intervention; instead there are many norms at work. Realpolitik tenets reflect a view the world as full of more or less dangerous competitors, see violent conflict as sometimes strategically valuable, see relative power (power as compared to other states) as more important for security than absolute power (power as conceived of only in reference to one’s own state), and view the dispositions of other states as major factors in decisionmaking.\textsuperscript{122} Interests which are given priority over others are those that maximize economic, political, military, or other types of power, which are all strategic interests.\textsuperscript{123}

Despite the plurality of realpolitik norms, one norm in particular is relevant to this thesis. Realpolitik dictates that all actions should be taken with a view to the improvement of the state. Based on


\textsuperscript{122} Johnston, “Legitimation, Foreign Policy,” 1, 12.

this idea, it follows that a state should never expend valuable military, political or economic power in situations where doing so would not benefit one’s state at all. If this is the case, it implies that a state should only “engage” with another state, including in cases of armed intervention, when it is in the first state’s interests to do so (or, alternatively, when to fail to do so would have consequences which are not in the state’s interests). This can be termed the norm of “self-interested engagement.” In situations where a state will have nothing to gain by engaging with another, the norm dictates that the state should refrain from that engagement; and a state may engage with another, including militarily, when doing so will increase its overall well-being and power. The norm of self-interested engagement is a fundamental tenet of realpolitik foreign policy, and is visible in virtually every type of decisionmaking. For instance, states do not engage in trade with countries which they do not want to see prosper, and they attempt at all times to ensure that trade deals work towards their own interests. Politically, states often refuse to engage in diplomatic relations with countries which they perceive as threats to them, as was the case between the United States and Cuba during the Cold War. In the case of military interventions, this norm is especially obvious and has been demonstrated many times over the last five decades, whether in the United States’ engagement in the Vietnam War, Russia’s interference in Georgia, or in the 1994 intervention in Haiti, where the United States led a “humanitarian” mission in a country of large geostrategic importance.124 Certainly there are exceptions to this norm, but it can be observed with consistent regularity. It is the norm of self-interested engagement which will be the discussion of subsequent sections.

The State of the Norm

All of the norms of realpolitik, including the norm of self-interested engagement, fulfill the criteria of Finnemore and Sikkink’s third stage of normative development. The clearest indicator of this is the fact that realpolitik is so thoroughly institutionalized as an integral consideration in the decisionmaking

process of every sovereign state. The reason that decisionmakers engage with realpolitik diplomacy is not because of concerns about legitimacy or esteem, as in the case of a second stage norm; realpolitik motivations are simply seen as being natural and intelligent ways of conducting foreign relations. Considerations of the effects of engagement on state interests are extremely habitualized, are seen as being ‘safe’ policy options, which come the closest to guaranteeing a state’s survival, and their consideration in international relations is generally a given.

In addition, realpolitik norms, including the norm of self-interested engagement, are heavily institutionalized within the bureaucracies of virtually all states. For example, in the US State Department, junior-level officials are well aware that morally-based arguments for action (as opposed to realpolitik-based ones) are “necessarily suspect in a department steeped in the realist tradition.” Even in the European Union, which is often seen as being one of the most progressive organizations in terms of integrating respect for human rights into its common foreign and security policy, analysts still note that “it would be naïve to pretend that [individual member-states’] national foreign, security and defence policies do not remain strong.” The value placed on national interested priorities is still reflected in the heavily bureaucratized decisionmaking processes of the EU. China’s bureaucracy is also heavily steeped in realpolitik-based foreign policy, with Thomas Christensen describing China as “the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.”

However, perhaps the most obvious indication that the norm of self-interested engagement is highly developed is the fact that in many decisions, in order for self-interest-based courses of action to be ignored there must be very heavily important, persuasive justifications. As Power notes, in the cases of virtually all discussions of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, the realpolitik response (usually not in

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favour of engagement) was always the strongest and most primary one, with concessions only given when it became absolutely apparent that failure to change the policy would result in major, negative ramifications in either the domestic or international spheres. This clearly indicates the ingrained nature of this norm. With this account, this chapter will now examine the effects of interactions between the norms of the previous chapter, and the norm of self-interested engagement.

**NORMATIVE INTERACTION**

**Self-Interested Engagement and Humanitarian Intervention**

The interactions between the norm of self-interested engagement and those of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention have been well documented, especially in recent years. In examinations of virtually every situation where the two norms have come into conflict, and specifically in situations where gross violations of human rights were occurring, strategic interests were always a wall which any push for humanitarian intervention encountered. Bellamy puts this succinctly: “When a crisis gets to the point where only military intervention will do, it is in the hands of a combination of realpolitik and the strength of individual leaders’ moral commitments, and there is little that [R2P] criteria can do to shape the leaders’ calculations of interests, values, costs and benefits.”

Scholarly examinations of intervention situations reflect this principle over and over again. Pearson, Baumann and Pickering claim that the “least strategic of interests would of course be interventions for humanitarian reasons”, Economides states that “realpolitik, not moralpolitik, is still dominant in more internationally active Western states”,

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Maogoto acknowledges that “in practice principles of justice are often subjugated to the vagaries of realpolitik”.

This fact is evident at almost any point in the last 100 years. In her extensive examination of cases of genocide in the twentieth century, Samantha Power convincingly accounts for US and Western European action and inaction with reference to how strategically important a country or regime was. When word of widespread massacres perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenians began to surface in 1915, Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr. urged the United States government to take action. However, his warnings went unheeded, partly because of the US’s interests in remaining uninvolved in World War I, and also because diplomats were expected to stay out of business that did not concern US national interests. Similarly, when Szmul Zygielbojm, a Polish Jew, relayed reports of German atrocities and begged for the bombing of Auschwitz and the Warsaw ghetto in World War II, he was told that the government was not prepared to do what he requested because “in the view of our high command, aircraft were not available for this purpose.” In other words, the atrocities were not strategically important enough for the Allies to expend vital air power. The pattern is repeated again and again: In Cambodia, Defence Secretary James Schlesinger testified to Congress, “The value of Cambodia’s survival derives from its importance to the survival of South Vietnam”, despite the fact that mass violations of human rights were clearly occurring; and in Iraq during the Kurdish ethnic cleansing and possible genocide, the US and Europe largely ignored the attacks because of their strategic alliance with Iraq against Iran.

This is not to say that the self-interested engagement norm always impedes humanitarian interventions; on the contrary, when realpolitik considerations coincide with humanitarian crises, it

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132 Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik, 8.

133 Power, Problem from Hell, 6-7.

134 Ibid., 36.

135 Quoted in Power, Problem from Hell, 92.

136 Power, Problem from Hell, 177-8, 193.
provides a very strong impetus to intervene. This is most evident in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, where the just cause threshold of the Responsibility to React was certainly met. When the genocidal Serbian government under Slobodan Milosevic began to threaten peace and stability in the backyard of Western European nations, it became a large priority for the European community, not only because of the humanitarian element, but because of the problems it posed for the stability of the region and relations with Russia.\footnote{Economides, “Balkan Security,” 110-12.} Similarly, when NATO made the decision to bomb Kosovo, the success of the mission became imperative not only because of a desire to save the Kosovar Albanians, but also because of the threat to the reputation of the United States, the continuing issues that Milosevic poses, the coherence and credibility of NATO, and the credibility of the EU.\footnote{Ibid., 119.} In these cases, of which NATO’s Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq is another example (as action was not taken to protect the Iraqi Kurds until long after Iraq had invaded Kuwait and it was clear that Saddam Hussein was not an ally,\footnote{Power, Problem from Hell, 241} humanitarian protection is often trumpeted, rhetorically, as a ‘priority’ of the mission. In cases where there is strong domestic or international support for humanitarian intervention, the two norms can also work in tandem.

While these interventions seem to be very positive developments for the norm of humanitarian intervention, and can certainly relieve human suffering, they also result in what many have noted is the inconsistent application of humanitarian intervention. This is not only a problem for the affected countries, but a problem for the development of the norm. When certain countries are picked for intervention because of their lack of, or possession of, strategic interests, this hinders other countries’ tendencies to support the norm, and tarnishes the norm’s reputation. For example, the United States, which is (perhaps unfairly) often cited as the most blatant violator of the norm, is content to denounce any human rights abuses of states such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria, but is unwilling to condemn similar abuses in geopolitically or economically important countries such as India,
China, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil.\textsuperscript{140} Condemnation of human rights abuses and corresponding intervention in states with strategic interests allows countries to claim they “care” about humanity, but critics insist that singling out certain conflicts over others simply reflects the ‘hypocritical selectivity’ of major powers.\textsuperscript{141} As the discussions surrounding the 2005 World Summit adoption of R2P demonstrate, this only increases less powerful countries’ suspicions of any humanitarian intervention, no matter how “legitimate”.

As a final note, recent developments highlight the increasing strength of the norm of intervention. Although there is no question that realpolitik clearly encompasses the more established group of norms, normative entrepreneurs of humanitarian intervention, including media, NGOs and scholars, are gradually succeeding in changing this certainty. This is most obvious in the change in language surrounding humanitarian intervention. Instead of dismissing it outright, states are now put on the defensive, being forced to justify their lack of intervention when massive human casualties are occurring. David Chandler puts this eloquently, stating that “In the past, [attempts] to ignore the realities of the world order would have seemed mad or at least utopian, yet today these ethical crusaders have the capacity to put governments on the defensive.”\textsuperscript{142} Thus, when the two norms interact, clearly realpolitik is the strongest. However, whether that will continue to be true in the coming years remains to be seen.

**Self-Interested Engagement and Humanitarianism**

Interactions between the norms of self-interested engagement and humanitarianism have been considerably less conflictual than interactions with humanitarian intervention. In fact, as humanitarianism gains strength, there is increasing recognition that it may be within countries’ strategic or national interests to engage in humanitarianism, especially when the impact of domestic consciences on foreign


\textsuperscript{141} Maogoto, *War Crimes and Realpolitik*, 10.

\textsuperscript{142} Chandler, *Kosovo to Kabul*, 86.
policy is considered. However, beyond this notion, which has not been fully developed, the simple fact that humanitarianism requires far fewer resources than intervention does means that it is likely to be viewed either favourably or neutrally by realpolitik. Given that contributing humanitarian aid and supplies tends to increase a state’s international standing and legitimacy at a fairly low cost, in many cases this could fulfill the self-interested engagement criteria. In fact, as already noted in chapter two, humanitarianism can be especially agreeable with realpolitik when the relationship between humanitarian intervention and self-interested engagement is considered further. When the two norms clash and it becomes apparent that it is not within a state’s interest to engage in a humanitarian intervention, even when gross violations of human rights are occurring, humanitarianism provides a politically appealing alternative to intervention. In this way, humanitarianism can actually work in tandem with self-interested engagement.

However, this brings up a potential issue, as some may argue that if this is the case, the development of humanitarianism has actually stunted the progress of the humanitarian intervention norm by providing an easy alternative. In this way, it may look as if humanitarianism is part of the reason countries do not engage in intervention, as not only is humanitarianism in stage 2 of its life cycle, and thus more powerful, but the reason for non-intervention could be due to the presence of the alternative. However, this hypothesis can be dismissed because of one glaring point: there would simply be no need to consider an alternative if there was not some underlying resistance to humanitarian intervention to begin with, or if some other norm was not conflicting with it in the first place. In other words, if there was not a problem, there would be no need for an alternative solution. Although humanitarianism can provide a politically appealing alternative to intervention, the principal reason that intervention is rejected is not because of humanitarianism, but because of the norm of self-interested engagement.

Humanitarianism simply provides a well-entrenched, well-accepted substitute, and becomes a low-cost

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way for states to claim that they support human rights, as well as satisfying the growing attention to humanitarian issues in foreign policies.\textsuperscript{144} So long as the resources needed do not detract from the ability of a state to pursue more strategic concerns, humanitarianism can work alongside realpolitik.

Of course, at times states may be opposed to giving humanitarian aid. A good example of this is the case of Cuba, where long-standing conflicts between the government of Fidel Castro and a succession of American administrations persistently prevented any sort of humanitarian aid from flowing. In this case, reputational and security concerns took precedence over humanitarianism. Similarly, in cases of ‘rogue’ states, or states who blatantly squander humanitarian resources, countries may refuse to give humanitarian aid unless certain concessions are made. This is more a pragmatic concern, but also reflects the way that humanitarian aid can be used in agreement with realpolitik, in order for states to gain benefits for themselves.\textsuperscript{145}

In sum, while there is still a divide between rhetorical human rights discourses and realpolitik norms, such a gap often does not exist with humanitarianism. Instead, the fact that the norm of humanitarianism is only in stage 2 of its normative life cycle while the norm of self-interested engagement is in stage 3 is often irrelevant, because the norms are not necessarily conflictual.

With this final piece of the theoretical puzzle in place, the stage is set to turn towards the case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Each of the norms just discussed will play prominently in the analysis of the international community’s responses to the conflict, as each was at work during the time period being examined. Their interactions, strengths and weaknesses will ultimately account for the policy outcomes that were taken, and will show that norms do indeed play a significant role in determining international policy. However, before this can commence, a brief introduction to the history of the conflict in the DRC is necessary.

\textsuperscript{144} Economides, “Balkan Security,” 123.

\textsuperscript{145} This can also be seen in the issue of ‘tied aid’, which clearly reflects the notion that wherever possible, even humanitarianism should be used to states’ national advantage.
Chapter 5

Background: The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

THE TWO WARS OF THE DRC

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country whose history has been marked by corruption, unrest, and often brutal dictatorship. The country was the personal property of Belgian King Leopold until 1908, and remained under Belgian colonial rule until 1960, under what has been widely acknowledged as one of the most vicious colonial regimes in history. When Belgium finally relinquished control of the DRC during the waves of decolonization following the Second World War, the country was in no way prepared for independent statehood. Its first non-colonial head of government Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in 1961, resulting in the installation in 1965 of the now-infamous dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and ushering in years of brutality and unprecedented corruption.\(^\text{146}\) The scramble for control and influence over the country then known as Zaire by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War\(^\text{147}\) further exacerbated Mobutu’s despotic power and kleptocratic tendencies, resulting in a serious decline in both the standard of living of Zairians and the country’s economic welfare. By the end of the Cold War, when Mobutu’s power began to wane, it became apparent that the country’s wealth had been systematically stolen, and civil unrest began to percolate.

This situation was drastically exacerbated by the fallout from the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. Rwanda shares a large portion of its border with the DRC, and when Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) gained the upper hand in the conflict and forced the retreat of massive numbers of Hutu civilians and \textit{génocidaires}, many fled across the border to the DRC. These events seriously destabilized the situation in the eastern region of the country, specifically in the provinces of North and South Kivu. Two major problems resulted: first, the conflict created massive numbers of refugees, many

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\(^{147}\) Ibid., 2.
of whom were members of the genocidal *Interahamwe* (Rwandan Hutu militias) and Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR, the former Rwandan national army). These refugees were organized into camps by humanitarian aid agencies, where the Hutu *génocidaires* were virtually indistinguishable from Hutu civilians, and were able to use the camps in order to organize counter-raids on Tutsi both across the border in Rwanda as well as in the Kivus region of the Congo. Secondly, these events galvanized already-existing ethnic tensions between Hutu and Congolese Tutsi. In subsequent years, massacres and ethnic cleansing of Congolese Tutsi occurred repeatedly, drawing in both local militias as well as international actors. In autumn 1996, over twelve groups were already involved in the conflict in the Kivus, including Rwandans, Burundians, members of the Zairean army (Forces Armées Zaïroises, or FAZ), local gangs of Maji Maji guerrilla forces, rebel groups from Uganda and the Sudan, and tribal vigilante forces. Mobutu’s toleration and sometimes encouragement of ethnically-based attacks allowed the violence to reign unchecked, as the various groups waged a war which devastated the region.

While these events were occurring, a new rebel group was developing: the AFDL, or *Alliance des Forces démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*. Based in eastern Congo, it represented the alliance of four rebel groups which opposed Mobutu’s regime. In late 1996, the alliance, partnered with Ugandan and Rwandan troops, began a cross-country trek to ‘liberate’ the Congolese people and topple Mobutu’s regime. Led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the AFDL ultimately succeeded in overthrowing the dictator in May 1997, though not without enormous casualties, as civilians either became caught in the fighting or were massacred after the retreat of Mobutu’s forces. The overthrow of Mobutu and installation of Laurent Kabila as president ended what is considered to be the first Congolese war.

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150 Ibid., 252.
Although many Congolese initially welcomed Kabila’s regime and its promise of change, it became rapidly apparent that this dictator would not differ greatly from his predecessor. Kabila quickly moved to eliminate all political opposition, and was not opposed, when faced with political instability, to resorting to the same xenophobic methods as Mobutu. For example, in August, 1998, when confronted with instability in the east, he rounded up all Tutsi in the capital city of Kinshasa. Kabila focused his attention on unifying the armed forces and overseeing a cultural revolution, but all the while the Kivus were still in disorder, with, among other groups, ex-FAR/Interahamwe bands and local Maji Maji creating unrest. In addition, over the subsequent months Kabila not only eliminated all peaceful political opposition, contrary to what he had promised, but also pushed to consolidate all power within his own hands, a move which alienated many of his allies. As Kabila estranged other members of the AFDL, those who supported his rise to power, and former supporters Rwanda and Uganda, the forces of unrest continued to grow. By June 1998, Rwanda had completely reversed its support for Kabila, and relations with Rwanda became extremely hostile. At this point, Kabila’s power-seeking ways and his mishandling of the conflict in the east collided, as Rwandan armed forces joined with other anti-Kabila rebel groups and, with the support of a newly-formed anti-Kabila movement, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), began a military push across the country to once again oust the leader. This marked the start of the second Congolese war, and by August, 1998, Rwandan and RCD forces had taken control of a large portion of Eastern Congo. The government in Kinshasa responded with increased violence against Congolese Tutsi and others suspected of supporting the rebels, with

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153 Ibid., 13.

Kabila himself calling for the massacre of Tutsi in Kinshasa and other cities. These massacres were often shockingly brutal, with dehumanization of the victims going so far that cannibalism was often reported.\textsuperscript{155}

What is notable about this second war is that it became rapidly internationalized. The Tutsi (Banyamulenge) in the eastern part of Zaire and the RCD were supported by both Uganda and Rwanda, who wished to see the demise of the once-friendly Kabila regime. Although Kabila’s regime ultimately prevailed, it would have been almost certainly overthrown if it were not for the support of troops from neighbouring countries, including Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad (financed by Libya), and Sudan.\textsuperscript{156} With fourteen countries participating in the conflict in some way or another, it has often been termed “Africa’s first World War”. The fighting during the conflict was both brutal and chaotic, with alliances between outside forces and internal militia groups changing on a very short-term basis, and mass violations of human rights and atrocity crimes being reported. The fighting engulfed virtually all regions of the country at one point or other, with civilians often caught between rival factions. It was one of the deadliest wars in the last twenty-five years, resulting in the deaths of approximately 3.3 million people,\textsuperscript{157} and the displacement of millions more. The conflict was ended, at least officially, by the signing of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement between the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe on 11 July 1999.\textsuperscript{158} This was followed by the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force, Mission de l’Organisation de Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC), into the country in 2000.

\textsuperscript{155} Scherrer, \textit{Genocide and Crisis}, 254.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 255; Weiss, “War and Peace,” 14.


\textsuperscript{158} Scherrer, \textit{Genocide and Crisis}, 277.
THE POST-WAR CONFLICT

Although the Lusaka Agreement may have temporarily stopped official fighting by international forces, it by no means resulted in the end of conflict in the DRC. Dissatisfaction with the Kabila regime, and the maintenance of ethnic tensions especially in the eastern region, resulted in continued fighting. The post-war period was marked by increasingly ethnicized violence, and the continued perpetration of large-scale crimes against humanity by both government and militia forces. The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 by his own personal bodyguard did not alleviate these issues nor usher in a new era of peace, as the presidency was taken over by his son Joseph Kabila, a perhaps less brutal but equally corrupt leader.

The extremely poor economic situation in the country further exacerbated the conflict, as it meant that militias and even government armed forces had virtually no income, and relied on raping and pillaging of local villages in order to survive. However, human rights abuses and crimes against humanity went far beyond basic survival needs, involving the recruitment of child soldiers, mutilation, cannibalism, hostage-taking, wanton rape and sexual violence against women and children, the use of rape and sexual slavery as tools of war, and extrajudicial killings for no apparent reason or based solely on ethnicity or tribal loyalty. As an example of the nature and scale of the horrific crimes, one can look at the case of the Bambuti, a largely non-political indigenous group in the east. Members of this group were the victims of widespread crimes against humanity perpetrated by rebel groups such as the RCD-N (the National faction of the RCD) and the MLC, or Mouvement de Libération du Congo, another anti-Kabila rebel group supported by Uganda. These two groups organized some of the most well-documented cases of ethnic cleansing in the conflict. One such operation was called “Effacer le tableau” (Erasing the Board), and, according to victims, the purpose was to steal or destroy everything worth having, as well as killing or clearing the pygmy population. Rape, forced incest, torture, mutilation and in particular cannibalism were widely reported, as apparently some rebels believed that to rape or kill and eat a

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159 Thomas Turner, “War in the Congo,” Foreign Policy in Focus 5, no. 10 (2000), 1.
Bambuti would give them supernatural powers. The accounts given by victims from this group are truly horrifying, revealing a level of dehumanization and brutality that is almost too shocking to comprehend.

However, the RCD-N and the MLC were by no means the sole perpetrators of abuses; virtually every group active in that region was responsible for committing mass crimes against humanity. This included Rwandan soldiers, the second wing of the RCD (the RCD-Goma), former members of the Interahamwe and Maji Maji rebels.

Human rights abuses and violence were also strongly tied to access to resources. As the most resource-rich country in Africa, the DRC has ample reserves of gold, coltan (an ore used to make cell phones), diamonds, and numerous other minerals. There were well-documented massacres in gold mining areas of both Kilo and Mongbwalu in late 2002, as rebel factions fought for control over the mines.

As rebel violence (supported at times by Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan forces) once again escalated in the northeastern part of the country in late 2002 and early 2003, groups began to call on the United Nations and the Security Council to do more to stop the violence and protect civilians. At the urgent request of the United Nations and the Secretary-General, France agreed to spearhead a “firefighting” mission entitled Operation Artemis to secure the ravaged town of Bunia, in the northeast of Orientale province. The EU-based force was successful in pacifying the town, but the rest of the region remained unstable for some time. This was despite a shift in the mandate of MONUC from a mission

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161 Ibid., 15-19.


authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter to Chapter VII, giving the peacekeepers more robust rules of engagement and the ability to engage with combatants when civilians are threatened.

The next few years saw the continuation of war crimes and rebel fighting, although on a more reduced level, as groups vied for control over the Kivus and northern Orientale province. They also witnessed the emergence of Brigadier General Laurent Nkunda, a rebel who at that time worked for the RCD-Goma and was dedicated to protecting the Congolese Tutsi from the perceived Hutu threat. He would eventually become an extremely powerful rebel leader, and one of the most brutal human rights violators in all of the eastern Congo. In 2002, in accordance with a series of power-sharing measures designed to pacify the country, Joseph Kabila also engaged in a program which attempted to convince rebel factions to lay down their arms and integrate into the national army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The failure of this program led to increased violence, and additionally, it soon became apparent that the FARDC was in fact committing many of the alleged crimes against humanity.

However, Joseph Kabila cooperated with the international community in its diplomatic attempts to restore some sense of order and stability to the country, especially in western areas where it seemed more feasible. In 2006, with military and diplomatic support from the rest of the international community and the United Nations, the DRC completed its first set of free and fair elections, resulting in the legitimate reinstatement of Joseph Kabila as president of the DRC.

The fighting in North Kivu erupted again in 2007, mainly between renegade General Laurent Nkunda’s forces, the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP); a new armed group called the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) made up of Congolese and Rwandan Hutu,

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some of whom had participated in the genocide in Rwanda; and the FARDC. At various points each group fought each other for control of land and resources, with civilians once again being the main casualties, especially when fighting was split along ethnic Hutu and Tutsi lines. This fighting intensified throughout 2007 and 2008, despite the signing of a peace agreement in early 2008. The intensified fighting between the CNDP and FARDC sparked enormous international attention, and even spurred talk of another EU bridging mission to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and help stabilize the situation. Violence intensified during this time in the north of the country as well, as the Ugandan and Sudanese-originating Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) engaged in a widespread campaign of violence. These forces massacred almost 1000 Congolese civilians in this region on 24 and 25 December 2008, and they have continued a campaign of fear and bloodshed across the north of the DRC, especially along the borders of Uganda and Sudan.

In early 2009, the Rwandan and Congolese governments agreed to a joint offensive against the FDLR and Laurent Nkunda, resulting in his arrest and detention. This has changed the situation in the east, but atrocities and firefights still occur sporadically. The overall situation in the DRC is somewhat more stable; however, in the north the threat from the LRA is still strong, and the potential still exists for increasing violence and the continued perpetration of crimes against humanity in the near future.

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This brief discussion makes two points abundantly clear. Firstly, the conflict in the DRC is extraordinarily brutal, and has been devastating to the Congolese people. Secondly, the conflict itself is complex and changes quickly. Despite this, the responses of the international community have been fairly static over the period from 1998-2008. It is these responses, and the norms driving them, which this thesis will now turn to, beginning with the norm of humanitarianism.
Chapter 6

The DRC: The Role of Humanitarianism

When conflict broke out in 1998 in the Democratic Republic of Congo for a second time in as many years, it quickly became clear that the civilian impact of the violence was going to be devastating. Although the conflict itself was not as highly publicized as similar conflicts such as the genocide in Darfur, a large part of the international community was in fact aware of and concerned about the humanitarian situation in the DRC. An analysis of the responses of the international community reveals that the majority of its members did in fact observe the norm of humanitarianism, and responded to the crisis with various forms of humanitarian assistance. This chapter will demonstrate what actually happened when the situation in the DRC exploded in 1998 with the assault on then-president Laurent Kabila, both initially and as the conflict deepened in subsequent years. It will divide the responses by time period, with the first being from 1998 to 2003 during the ‘second war’, and the second period being from 2004 to 2008, when the war was technically over, but the eastern part of the country remained unstable and violence continued between rival groups. The thesis will examine the involvement of a range of actors, including governments (the United States, the European Union, China, individual states in Africa and Europe, and leading middle powers with strong human rights records, such as Canada and the Netherlands); international organizations (the United Nations and the African Union); and international and domestic NGOs.173

The analysis will focus on a number of key humanitarian actions as indications that the international community respected the norm of humanitarianism. In accordance with Geldenhuys’ model of foreign political engagement (as outlined in chapter 2), some of the chief ways in which humanitarianism is traditionally expressed is through the giving of humanitarian aid and assistance by states, whether through assistance projects or simply donating funds, attention to the conflict perpetuated

173 Although Russia is a major power and member of the Security Council, it did not play a major role in the debates around the types of humanitarian action taken in the DRC.
by NGOs and international organizations, diplomatic engagement for the purposes of stopping a humanitarian crisis and relieving citizens’ suffering, a related presence of international dialogue and attention to the crisis, peacekeeping missions, and electoral assistance and monitoring. Based on Finnemore and Sikkink’s model, it is appropriate to use these actions as indicators of the norm of humanitarianism because they provide the secondary trail of communication and evidence which reveals the existence of a norm at work. Since norms cannot actually be observed, the fact that states engage in actions reflective of a respect for humanitarianism indicates that states are following the norm. In addition, indices such as international dialogue also provide evidence of the existence of the mechanisms of normative development which Finnemore and Sikkink discuss, as they often reveal actors’ motivations and reasons for acting.

In this analysis, the types of humanitarian responses will be grouped into three main areas: Diplomatic engagement by states and international organizations; NGO engagement; and overall humanitarian aid donations. Included within the first category are diplomatic mediation and international dialogue, peacekeeping missions and electoral assistance; the second category includes NGO responses both within the country and in terms of international advocacy; and the last category includes international, bilateral and multilateral aid.


State and International Organizational Responses

When the second war broke out in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the civilian toll of the fighting became rapidly apparent, and the international community began to slowly to turn its attention to the conflict. Although still limited at this point in time, the United States’ domestic media began reporting on the crisis.174 The Clinton administration also increased its attention to the Great Lakes region, and as

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early as November, 1998, began diplomatic discussions with Zambia about a peaceful solution to the conflict in the DRC. The DRC began to appear in policymakers’ speeches, such as a speech by David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, who stated that the Democratic Republic of Congo was an atrocity on which the United States was focusing. This confirms what some authors have noted was a policy of US engagement in the Congo under the Clinton administration, a phenomenon commonly attributed to the lingering guilt over failing to act during the Rwandan genocide.

Canada also acknowledged the brutality of the conflict at this time, with Lloyd Axworthy, minister of foreign affairs, condemning the continuation of conflict and the increasing violence, and noting that the call for cessation of hostilities made at a meeting in Victoria Falls seemed to have fallen “on deaf ears”. However, this rhetoric was not echoed by one of Canada’s middle power counterparts, the Netherlands, which from all indications was not yet diplomatically engaged with the DRC.

The United Nations and its agencies became involved in the Congo crisis virtually from the outbreak of hostilities. Indeed, many UN agencies were already present in eastern DRC, managing relief camps which had developed with the end of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. However, the Security Council was slow to respond to the developing conflict. Concerned with other conflicts such as the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, the Council drafted no resolutions relating to the DRC in 1998, even as the fighting expanded and increasing numbers of regional governments became involved. However, this situation

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eventually changed, especially due to the efforts of the Office of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was, not unusually, extremely adamant about the need for the Security Council to play a role in aiding the DRC, and urged the Council to consider taking humanitarian action. As early as July 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the deployment of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeeping troops, and his office was consistently engaged in an ongoing dialogue with the Security Council, making recommendations for the restoration of human rights and the deployment of peacekeeping forces. As a result, in 1999 the Security Council drafted four resolutions pertaining to the DRC, which called for and welcomed the Lusaka Peace Accords and their accompanying ceasefire, and began making preparations for a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission under MONUC. It also requested the Secretary-General to take steps to equip up to 500 military observers to facilitate future rapid UN deployments to the DRC.

Although the Secretary-General’s actions were undoubtedly influential, a large part of the Security Council’s engagement is also due to the United States’ concern for the Great Lakes region. Throughout this period, the United States continued to engage diplomatically with the DRC, announcing that it would make finding a solution to the conflict a priority, and sending US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke to the country in December, 1999. Holbrooke also chaired an ‘unusual’ meeting of African leaders and UN officials, with the ultimate agreement that the United Nations should become involved in the Congo conflict. This led to Security Council authorization of the creation of a 5,500 member peacekeeping force for the DRC, in a resolution which was introduced by the United States.

To emphasize its commitment to resolution of the African war, the United States also named the month of its presidency of the Security Council ‘the month of Africa’ in January, 2000.¹⁸⁵

The African Union and its member countries were heavily involved in the mediation of the conflict from its beginnings, a role which continued throughout the second war. In September, 1998, African defence ministers met at the Organization for African Unity to attempt to mediate the conflict, but unfortunately talks broke down.¹⁸⁶ Foreign and defence ministers also attempted to negotiate a ceasefire one month later in October with the same outcome.¹⁸⁷ These sorts of diplomatic talks continued on a regular basis, with South Africa taking on the strongest role both in terms of mediation and contributing to a peacekeeping force.¹⁸⁸ It also co-chaired, with Zambian officials, the ceasefire agreement in Lusaka in August, 1999.¹⁸⁹ Algeria also organized a mini-Summit on the DRC on 30 April 2000, which “made it possible to consolidate the process achieved under the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and to give new impetus to efforts towards the restoration of peace.”¹⁹⁰ Clearly, both the African Union and many of its member states were heavily involved in the diplomatic process to stop the conflict.

Because the United States is often influential “simply through its sheer symbolic weight,”¹⁹¹ the involvement of the Clinton administration spurred on increased attention to the conflict by other states.


¹⁹¹ Prunier, Africa’s World War, 340.
Canada became somewhat involved in the diplomatic mediation process, with Lloyd Axworthy, the minister of foreign affairs, and David Kilgour, the secretary of state (Latin America and Africa), taking part in a January, 2000 meeting of the UN Security Council on the situation in the DRC. Kilgour also held bilateral meetings between key players during this time.\textsuperscript{192} This was followed up with a visit by Mr. Kilgour to the DRC on 4 and 5 July 2000 to discuss the crisis with Congolese officials; Kilgour also met with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State to engage in two round tables on the crisis in the Great Lakes region.\textsuperscript{193}

At this stage in the conflict, China remained largely uninvolved in diplomatic efforts to mediate the crisis. It did not take an active diplomatic or humanitarian aid role, and although it made occasional statements in support of the peace process and UN peacekeeping, the extent of its involvement in humanitarian terms was largely limited to its membership in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{194}

As the conflict wore on at the turn of the millennium, states continued to facilitate international dialogue to help the civilian suffering. The UN agreed to expand MONUC’s troop ceilings to 8700 in 2002, and the Security Council continuously debated the situation in the Congo and the increasingly


blatant violations of human rights there, issuing three resolutions on the Congo in 2001, three in 2002, and six in 2003.\textsuperscript{195}

As these events were occurring, a major diplomatic shift was taking place. Until the end of 2000, the United States had been the leading coordinator of diplomatic efforts in the DRC conflict. In fact, as late as February, 2001, General Colin Powell was engaged in meetings with Joseph Kabila.\textsuperscript{196} However, this year would largely mark the end of the United States’ leadership role in the Congo crisis. George W. Bush came to office with a limited interest in Africa, and the events of 11 September 2001 helped to orient the administration’s foreign policy completely away from Africa and towards the new “war on terror.” This could have left a serious and potentially devastating lack of leadership and corresponding interest in the DRC. Fortunately, the loss of the United States’ leadership was quickly replaced by the leadership of other countries. In the Global North, the European Union and especially France took up the charge, and on the African continent, South Africa used its resources to continue humanitarian and especially diplomatic efforts.\textsuperscript{197}

This shift in leadership became especially evident when in 2003, the escalating brutality of the violence in the DRC made it apparent that more intense measures needed to be taken in order to quell the fighting and provide civilians with desperately needed assistance. On 13 May 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, seeking to continue the role of the United Nations as a strong promoter of humanitarianism, requested a ‘coalition of the willing’ be formed to address the extreme violence directed at civilians in Ituri, in the eastern DRC. The peacekeepers in place there were both under-staffed and ill-equipped to respond to the kind of violence occurring there, and were being overwhelmed.\textsuperscript{198} Thus far, the European Union and its member countries had largely remained silent in respect to the DRC; however, Kofi


\textsuperscript{197} Prunier, Africa’s World War, 340-1.

Annan’s request for a firefighting force in Ituri facilitated the real beginning of European engagement. After brief discussions, France agreed to be the leader of this coalition. Under French leadership, the EU mounted “Operation Artemis,” dispatching a force containing 1400 troops to secure the town of Bunia in Ituri. The mission ultimately achieved its goals, with the EU forces securing and disarming the town of Bunia as well as the surrounding area. This mission also spurred on a change in the mandate of MONUC, changing it from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mission and increasing its ceiling from 8,000 to 10,000 troops. These events made it abundantly clear that the EU was prepared to become far more involved in the conflict, and were followed up by increased diplomatic engagement, with France in particular taking on a leadership role in providing humanitarian responses to the DRC.

**Non-Governmental Organizations**

Throughout the second war, NGOs were extremely active both on the ground in the DRC and internationally in attempting to draw attention to the conflict. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, two of the largest and best-known humanitarian NGOs, engaged in activities to publicize the conflict and to pressure states and organizations to take steps to stop them. For instance, during the period from 1998 to the end of 2003, Human Rights Watch International published 99 documents on the DRC. This can be compared to 142 stories on the conflict in Kosovo, a far more internationally publicized and strategically important conflict, but which was not subject to massively more attention than the DRC. Amnesty International published 178 materials, in the following breakdown:

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### AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL COVERAGE

<table>
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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>URGENT ACTION</th>
<th>REPORTS/DOCUMENTS</th>
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<th>TOTALS</th>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other major NGOs such as Oxfam International were also continuously involved in the DRC, both on the ground and lobbying at the national and international level. The International Rescue Committee has also been involved in the DRC on the ground since 1996, and during this period produced a number of mortality surveys publicizing the plight of Congolese.

In terms of ground-level involvement, accounts of total numbers of NGOs are difficult to locate. However, in 2002, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that there were 53 NGOs active in Kinshasa and 14 UN humanitarian agencies, as well as 48 international NGOs active in eastern DRC, and 4 local NGOs active there, and 10 UN humanitarian agencies. The NGO community, both domestically and internationally, clearly took up the call for humanitarian assistance in the DRC.

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Overall Humanitarian Aid

In terms of specified “emergency humanitarian aid” given to the DRC, statistics were taken from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. This organization has the most complete and up-to-date records of humanitarian aid donations, whereas information from state governments can be incomplete or difficult to find. The OCHA’s donation records include both funding which was given when the OCHA issued a Consolidated Appeal for aid, as well as funding which was not in response to an appeal.208 The humanitarian aid donated to the DRC is displayed in the following table, which is somewhat limited by the absence of data for 1998 and 1999.

<table>
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<th>YEAR</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL**</td>
<td>$771.1 million</td>
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</table>

*All figures rounded to the nearest hundred thousand
**Data not available for 1998 and 1999.209

Breaking down aid contributions by actor, USAID would ultimately prove to be one of the largest and most dedicated providers of aid to the Congo, and during the period from 1999 to 2003, the United States contributed $312.9 million (all figures in US dollars) in humanitarian aid through the OCHA. Canada also contributed at least $12.3 million in humanitarian aid through the OCHA.210 The European Union and its constituent countries, especially Britain, France and Germany, while not strongly engaged

208 The limitation of statistics from the OCHA is that the organization relies on funding data which organizations and donors have specifically given to it, meaning that organizations which choose not to report their contributions to OCHA will not have their funding included in the totals. Nonetheless, OCHA statistics are useful for giving a general idea of the amounts of humanitarian aid flows.


diplomatically, did donate substantial amounts of humanitarian aid over the five year period. The European Commission gave $103.8 million through the OCHA, United Kingdom gave $10.8 million, while France gave $1.9 million, the Netherlands gave $20.4 million, and Germany gave $9 million. China did not give any aid through the OCHA, nor did the African Union (although given the fragile economic status of many African states, this is not surprising.)

In terms of overall development aid, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ranks extremely high in terms of sheer amounts of aid, although the per capita funding may be considerably less than other countries. In 2002 and 2003, the DRC was the top official development aid recipient of all the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). A breakdown of official development aid from 2000 to 2003 is presented here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMOUNT (USD)</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
<td>$327 million</td>
<td>$1,368 million</td>
<td>$5,421 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The foregoing data makes two conclusions clear. First, the DRC was not neglected by states and governments who are capable of giving humanitarian aid; in fact the DRC received substantial amounts of funding directly from states and regional organizations. Secondly, the data demonstrates a clear trend that as the conflict worsened, coming to a head in 2003, the international community responded with massively increased aid. For example, from 2001 to 2002, both development and emergency aid more than doubled, and from 2002 to 2003 development aid almost quadrupled. Whether through their own initiative or because of prodding from NGOs or IOs, states and organizations recognized that the DRC was in dire humanitarian need, and responded accordingly.

211 Ibid.

With these responses in mind, it is now possible to turn to the international community’s responses during the period from 2004 to 2008, when the second war was officially over.

THE POST-WAR CONFLICT: 2004-2008

State and International Organizational Responses

With the ‘official’ end of Africa’s world war in 2003, the need for aid to the Congo remained but with a somewhat different focus. Since the large-scale fighting had stopped for the time being, the focus of aid became centred around the rebuilding of state capacity and the lives of civilians whose lives had been so disrupted. In this respect, the EU continued to take a leading role in development efforts. For instance, when the DRC decided to undertake its first national elections in decades, the EU sent a police mission, entitled EUPOL KINSHASA, to help the Congolese National Police keep order and monitor the elections.\(^{213}\) The United Nations and other countries such as Canada also aided the DRC in establishing the framework to allow elections to take place in a safe and fair environment. As a result, the 2006 national elections were deemed free and fair by observers, and resulted in the re-election of Joseph Kabila to the presidency. After the elections were over, the EU continued its efforts to help the Congolese rebuild their state, initiating EUPOL RD CONGO in July, 2007. This mission centred around helping the Congolese national police to build a police force which was competent and incorrupt. The EU also launched a joint EU-UN Humanitarian Action Plan for the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006, which encompassed over 330 projects and was valued around €681 million.\(^{214}\)

Once again, the Secretary-General’s office continually pushed for increases in troops to the region and continued its attention to the situation there. The Security Council gradually accepted the need for increased numbers of peacekeepers in the DRC, in order to maintain the Pretoria Accord ceasefire


signed in 2003. Over the course of the years from 2004-2007, the Security Council increased MONUC’s personnel ceiling to almost 19,000, making it one of the largest peacekeeping missions in the world.

The United States continued to be largely a diplomatic background player in the DRC. However, its humanitarian agencies were still extremely active, and it still gave large amounts of humanitarian aid, which will be addressed shortly. In addition, as fighting intensified towards the end of 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (in only her third visit to Africa since 2005) finally met with African leaders, including Congo’s Joseph Kabila, to attempt to come to some kind of agreement to stop rebel leaders in the eastern Congo. When these efforts failed and fighting between Laurent Nkunda and government forces continued to be stepped up, the United States sent a Disaster Assistance Response Team to the Congo, in addition to increasing its delivery of humanitarian supplies.

The situation in the eastern and northern DRC deteriorated rapidly in 2008 and as mass violence and human rights abuses erupted anew, the international community reacted quickly with diplomatic tactics. African leaders, fearing a more widespread regional war, convened an emergency meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. They pledged to help stop the crisis, attempt to uphold a recent ceasefire and, if MONUC forces were overwhelmed, to send African peacekeepers to the Congo. The leaders were keenly aware of the fact that humanitarian and diplomatic assistance was extremely necessary, with the Southern African Development Community’s executive secretary, Tomaz Salomao, stating “We are aware we are facing a tragedy and time is not on our side.” When rebels came close to


taking the town of Goma in October, 2008, Western diplomats and African leaders worked “around the clock” to stop the fighting and solidify the ceasefire.\footnote{Jeffrey Gettleman and Celia Dugger, “African Leaders Act to Defuse Conflict in Congo,” \textit{The New York Times}, 9 November 2008.}

The European community continued its diplomatic leadership role during the resurgence of violence in 2008. In October, Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, undertook shuttle diplomacy between the DRC and Rwanda, which was allegedly funding Laurent Nkunda and his FDLR.\footnote{Europa, “Commissioner Michel Continues Regional Shuttle Diplomacy and Announces €4 Million Humanitarian Aid for Vulnerable People in North Kivu,” http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1605&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 5 April 2009).} Both France and Britain also initiated a push to maintain peace in the Goma region, which included increased humanitarian help. However, the best-publicized instance of EU engagement occurred when EU diplomats began discussions of a possible second deployment of European forces to “protect Congolese civilians, or at least help deliver humanitarian aid,” in a humanitarian, not military, mission.\footnote{Yves Boussen, “Europe Launches Diplomatic Drive for Congo Peace,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LV27197.htm (accessed 4 April 2009).} The European community engaged in discussions about this possible “Artemis-esque” bridging mission for many weeks, with France advocating the deployment of up to 1500 troops and Britain also warning that troops might have to be sent as a last resort if diplomatic efforts failed.\footnote{Robin Henry, “UK Poised to Deploy Troops to Congo,” \textit{The Times of London}, 1 November 2008.} Ultimately, however, this mission did not materialize. Britain gave a number of contradictory messages about its support, and ultimately refused to send troops; Germany also opposed sending its forces, making an EU mission virtually impossible.\footnote{Ian Traynor and Julian Borger, “UK Blocking European Congo Force,” \textit{The Guardian (UK)}, 14 November 2008.} Despite the fact that the EU was under pressure from aid agencies, world dignitaries and some of its own diplomats to send a bridging force to help the ailing MONUC troops,\footnote{Stephanie Nebehay, “Clear Evidence of war Crimes in Congo: EU,” \textit{Ottawa Citizen}, 28 November 2008; Ingrid Melander and David Brunnstrom, “EU Split on UN Call for Congo Bridging Mission,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L886560.htm (accessed 4 April 2009); Joe Bavier, “EU Envoy Urges}
do so,\textsuperscript{224} no mission was mounted. Instead, EU countries kept calling for urgent international action, with David Miliband, British Foreign Secretary, and French Foreign Secretary Bernard Kouchner saying that there was “no excuse for turning away”.\textsuperscript{225}

Canada provided diplomatic assistance during this time through its role as the co-chair of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, a group of states interested in furthering peace and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{226} However, the majority of its involvement was done through humanitarian aid and development programs, often through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). For instance, in 2008 CIDA delivered CAD$8.4 million in humanitarian assistance and food aid, and also contributed $15 million to support victims of sexual violence.\textsuperscript{227} The Netherlands is the other co-chair of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region and was diplomatically involved in the DRC in this manner as well. Like Canada, it was also involved in the Congo through development and humanitarian aid initiatives, for example giving €50 million in monetary assistance in 2008 alone.\textsuperscript{228}

China had always continued diplomatic relations with the DRC, engaging in multiple bilateral meetings, but mostly on the issues of trade and investment. For the most part China held the view that African nations should pursue their own paths, and that the internal affairs of any state are its own


responsibility. In March 2005, China’s premier Wen Jiabao met with Joseph Kabila and, among other discussions, indicated that China was willing to play an “active role” in implementing the peace agreements and promoting regional peace through dialogue. However, once again reflecting its commitment to non-interference, China’s diplomatic engagement was done largely through its involvement in the Security Council.

Non-Governmental Organizations

As expected, many NGOs continued to be active in the DRC during this period. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continued to publicize the conflict, especially as the humanitarian situation became increasingly desperate in 2008. From 2004-2008, Human Rights Watch International published 147 stories, press releases, and other materials about the DRC. Amnesty International published materials in the following breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>URGENT ACTION</th>
<th>REPORTS/DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>PRESS RELEASES</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The number of NGOs on the ground in the DRC continued to be substantial, with at least 206 NGOs active within the DRC at the time of writing.\textsuperscript{233} Oxfam and the IRC also maintained their presences there, as well as engaging in continued publicity campaigns. In general, NGO engagement and advocacy remained steady in the DRC, with largely the same characteristics as in the period of the second war.

**Overall Humanitarian Aid**

The total amount of humanitarian aid donated to the DRC continued to rise throughout the post-war period. The aggregate emergency humanitarian aid funding, according to the OCHA, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL AID (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$192.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$208 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$303.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$364.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$341.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$1,410.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The countries which are the subject of this analysis continued to donate substantially, and in increasing amounts from the second war. Canada donated $49.9 million, the Netherlands $84.8 million, the European Commission $110.1 million, France gave $21.7 million, Germany $20.8 million, the United Kingdom $214.6 million, and the United States $261.2 million. China and the African Union, once again, did not contribute through the OCHA. In addition, once again the timing in which countries allotted more aid to the DRC was directly related to their perception of its increased need. For example, virtually every country responded to the increased violence in 2008 with stepped-up humanitarian aid. In October 2008,


\textsuperscript{234} United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “ReliefWeb: Appeals & Funding (Home).”
European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel allotted €4 million in emergency funding for people in North Kivu, with a further €12 million forthcoming, to be channelled through NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC. In November 2008, with the outbreak in violence in Goma, Britain also provided an extra £5 million in aid on top of the £37 million in yearly aid it normally gives.

In terms of overall official development aid, the DRC was once again one of the world’s top recipients. In 2004, the Congo was the third largest donor recipient of all LCDs, and for the period of 2007-2008, was also the third largest recipient of humanitarian relief, behind only the Sudan and the West Bank and Gaza/Occupied Palestinian Territory. The actual statistics are presented in a table here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMOUNT (USD)</td>
<td>$1,815 million</td>
<td>$1,828 million</td>
<td>$2,049 million</td>
<td>$1,217 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No data available for 2008.*

Clearly, the international community once again demonstrated a sustained awareness of the nature of the conflict in the DRC, and committed to aiding the country through humanitarian contributions.

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236 Henry, “UK Poised to Deploy Troops to Congo.”

237 UNOHRLLS, “Development Aid at a Glance.”


ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES

The responses of the international community, both states, international organizations, and NGOs, have all been described in some detail in order to answer one question: Why did the international community pay attention to the conflict in the DRC? The information relayed above demonstrates that the norm of humanitarianism was in fact the motivating factor behind the international community’s response. This hypothesis is confirmed by three principal points. First, the actions taken by members of the international community were consistent with the actions prescribed by the norm of humanitarianism. Second, the types of actors, motivations, and mechanisms used to carry out these actions correspond with what a stage 2 norm such as humanitarianism would exhibit. Finally, the more powerful norm of self-interested engagement, as outlined in the section on normative interaction in Chapter 3, would likely support the use of humanitarianism as a response to this conflict. This eliminates a potential barrier to humanitarianism, and provides further support for the assertion that it was the motivating factor.

The character of the actions which members of the international community undertook is consistent with the dictates of the norm of humanitarianism. As stated previously, although there are a wide variety of actions prescribed by this norm, they are all designed to ameliorate human suffering. Using, as this chapter does, the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance, diplomatic dialogue and mediation, peacekeeping, and attention to the conflict by NGOs as key indicators of the norm of humanitarianism, it is obvious that almost every actor’s response to the DRC crisis involved engagement in one or more of these activities. Both individual states and the United Nations engaged in multiple rounds of diplomatic negotiations, bilateral, multilateral and regional, to stop the conflict. Most states and international organizations gave sustained amounts of humanitarian aid, and aid and development workers were sent from multiple states, NGOs and organizations like UNICEF and UNHCR. In addition, NGOs were engaged both diplomatically and on the ground to help civilians, and the United Nations and the Security Council were actively involved in attempting to halt the crisis and help civilians, as well as helping facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. In other words, the prescriptions of the norm of humanitarianism were followed by multiple organizations at multiple times.
Many critics, editorials and NGOs have noted that the aid given to the Congo has been far less than what was needed, and the responses of states have often been spotty or ineffectual. MONUC’s ineffectiveness is also regularly attacked, with strong credibility, as a force of 17,500 is not nearly enough to stabilize a country as large, regionally divided, and populous as the DRC. Certainly, the information above demonstrates that some countries have not been actively engaged in the conflict at all times. Despite the fact that humanitarianism was a compelling force, actors such as China, the United States and the European Union were not consistent in their engagement with humanitarian actions other than financial aid. While initially being heavily involved in the diplomatic efforts in the DRC, the United States eventually withdrew almost completely from them. Conversely, the European Union was not heavily involved until the latter part of the second war in 2002 and 2003. China remained largely uninvolved throughout the process, instead restricting most of its engagement with the DRC to trade-related concerns. These critics are also correct in asserting that the aid sent was by no means adequate to help stabilize the crisis and help the majority of affected citizens.

However, other factors must also be taken into consideration when evaluating humanitarian aid efforts. The inadequacy of the aid given is partially due to a number of factors inherent in the DRC: the country’s vast geographic area, the sheer numbers of civilians who needed aid (as the DRC is one of the most populous countries in Africa), and fact that the Congo is simply one of the most underdeveloped nations in the world. The country was poverty-stricken before the conflict even began, suffering from years of corruption and misrule, with the result that the amount of aid needed to reach all civilians would simply be staggering. As a special report from the Council on Foreign Relations’ Centre for Preventive Action stated in 2008, “the problems of the Congo are so immense that the weak Congolese state is still unable to master them by itself.”\footnote{Anthony W. Gambino, \textit{Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress} (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc., 2008), 43.} In a state as fragile and underdeveloped as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ability to help every citizen is directly tied to the ability to stabilize the country economically and politically. Thus, the amount of aid that would be needed would be staggering, making
virtually all contributions inadequate. So while critics are right to assert that the international community
could have contributed more consistently, this limitation must be borne in mind.

Another factor that indicates that the norm of humanitarianism was at work is the moralistic tone
which underlay much of the rhetoric surrounding state responses and international commentary on the
conflict. In the formal outline of humanitarianism (see Chapter 2), it was noted repeatedly that
humanitarianism contains a sense of moral responsibility to aid those who are suffering. Such sentiment
was ever-present in discussions of action and inaction around the conflict. To note a few examples: In
1998, Kofi Annan was said to feel that because the UN had played a prominent role in ending the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the UN must “in all fairness” do as much to help in the Congo,
indicating a sense of moral responsibility for the human beings there.241 In 2003, when discussing the
possibility of a firefighting intervention to secure the town of Bunia, Richard S. Williamson, a senior US
diplomat, stated that “There is no question that [the dynamic of the Rwandan genocide] lies heavy on us.
And that’s a good thing. It’s a good thing we are all conscious of it.”242 In 2007, the Netherlands’
development minister Bert Koenders stated that “The international community must not be allowed to
forget Congo.”243 Near the end of 2008, Britain and France’s foreign ministers claimed in a joint
statement that there is “no excuse for turning away” from the DRC, and “The international community
must support humanitarian delivery, strengthen the United Nations force, and help promote and enforce
agreements.”244 In the same year, Karel De Gucht, Belgium’s foreign minister, went so far as to say that
the EU had a “moral responsibility” to help the Congo by providing a bridging force until more MONUC
peacekeepers could arrive.245


243 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Koenders: "The International Community Must Not Be Allowed to Forget
be.html (accessed 5 April 2009).

244 Naughton, “Britain and France Call for Urgent Action.”

245 Brunnstrom, “EU Aims to Up Military Goals.”
International media outlets also echoed this moralistic undertone. For instance, an editorial in *The New York Times* on 31 May 2003 stated bluntly that “when genocidal massacres are occurring, the world has a duty to step in.”\(^{246}\) In a story entitled “Don’t let it happen all over again”, *The Economist* urged that “The United Nations must be given more and tougher peacekeepers to prevent a catastrophe,”\(^{247}\) again implying the responsibility of the international community to aid the ailing country and its citizens. Clearly, members of the international community felt somewhat morally responsible for the plight of civilians in the DRC, lending further credence to the idea that their actions were motivated by the norm of humanitarianism.

The second reason that humanitarianism was the likely motivator for action in the DRC is that the mechanisms by which the international community’s responses were carried out conformed to what one would expect from a stage 2 norm. The dominant actors in this scenario were states, international organizations and networks of NGOs, all of which are expected to be active when a stage 2 norm is at work. The motivations of the actors to help, in order for the norm to be at stage 2, would be legitimacy, reputation and esteem. This can be seen in the interaction between NGOs and other actors. As already noted, over the course of the ten years from 1998 to 2008, Amnesty International produced 250 publications on the situation of the DRC, and Human Rights Watch produced 226, and in many of these publications, the organizations specifically pushed members of the international community to act, engaging in traditional “naming and shaming” techniques. These techniques play on states’ concerns for their reputations, and their desire to be seen as legitimate supporters of human rights. As just a few examples of this, in June 2002, Amnesty International specifically targeted large international organizations for failing to prosecute and give justice for victims of June, 2000 and May, 2002 massacres in the town of Kisangani, stating: “The United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations such as the European Union and the African Union, as well as governments committed to peace and justice,


\(^{247}\) *The Economist*, “Don't Let It Happen All Over Again,” 1 November 2008, 18.
should make it clear that the perpetrators of the Kisangani atrocities in June 2000 and May 2002 and their leaders will be brought to justice.”

When US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Africa in May, 2001, Human Rights Watch publicly called on him to urge Uganda to investigate war crimes committed by its forces in the DRC, and also called for the United States to support international investigations into the war crimes committed in the country.

In October, 2008, the organization publicly named many organizations and states and held them accountable for taking action on the DRC; On 18 November 2008, a group of over forty aid groups called for the UN Human Rights Council to convene a special emergency session on the DRC; and on 2 December 2008, Amnesty International issued a press release calling for ‘action, not words’ on the part of the United Nations to protect civilians in the DRC.

In order to avoid tarnishing their reputations, international actors would be likely to engage in humanitarianism.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the dominant mechanisms of normative action in stage 2 are socialization, institutionalization, and demonstration. Pressure was sometimes put on countries by NGOs such as Oxfam, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, attempting to socialize reluctant governments to respect the norm. Another way in which states were socialized to pay attention to the DRC was through the strategic use of the word ‘genocide’ as a description of the situation in the Congo. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s use of the word as a potential threat in the Congo in late 2008

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after a French and British fact-finding mission was likely done for this reason.²⁵³ NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also used this word at various times, well aware of the institutionalized stigma against genocide. Britain and France’s diplomatic efforts at the end of 2008 could also be seen as a demonstration or socialization technique, leading the international community’s response to the most recent outbreak of violence by demonstration.

In addition, further proof that a stage 2 norm was at work is the simple fact that at various times during the conflict, it became apparent that certain countries had to be convinced in order to take some humanitarian action. The most obvious example of this is the difficulty associated with extending the mandate and troop ceiling of MONUC. However, it was also exemplified in the fact that actors, especially states, often had to be prompted by NGOs and humanitarian agencies to give more humanitarian aid. This indicates that the norm is weaker than a stage 3 norm, as if it was completely institutionalized, such convincing would not be necessary and states would likely have been more consistently involved in the diplomatic process.

The final piece of evidence in favour of the norm of humanitarianism is that the norm of self-interested engagement would be in agreement with the use of humanitarianism in responses to the DRC. As this norm had the potential to severely limit the amount of engagement, including humanitarian engagement, that countries exhibited in the DRC, the fact that it would likely support the use of humanitarianism makes it all the more likely that humanitarianism was the motivating factor for action. The norm of self-interested engagement generally mandates that states should not become involved in the affairs of another country unless there are substantial interests there, and virtually no states have significant strategic or national interests in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This fact will be explained in much greater detail in the subsequent chapter on humanitarian intervention; for the time being however a few points can be noted. Since the end of the Cold War, the DRC had disappeared from virtually any country’s strategic radar, given that events in the DRC have little to no bearing on any (non-

²⁵³ Naughton, “Britain and France Call for Urgent Action.”
While some firms and businesses certainly had an interest in the resources contained within the DRC, in fact it would be more beneficial for them to operate in a situation without a strong government, as they would have more opportunities to build contracts to their own advantage. Thus, it would be very easy, in the absence of any kind of outside pressure, for most states to completely ignore the situation in the Congo. Of course, there are exceptions to this assertion. Both China and the African Union have vested interests in stabilizing the DRC, China because of the vast amount of investments it has already made in the country, and African nations because their stability and welfare is directly threatened by the conflict. However, aside from these states, no other governments have any pressing strategic interests in the country.

This cursory explanation highlights the fact that interest in the DRC is relatively low amongst members of the international community. However, it ignores two other major state interests: not to intervene militarily in strategically unimportant countries, and to avoid international and domestic stigma. Given the DRC’s low strategic priority, it would not be within states’ interests to expend vital military power and lives in that country. (Again, this will be elaborated in much greater detail in the following chapter). However, both international and domestic sources of pressure make it virtually impossible for states to ignore massive human suffering without damaging their reputations. In order for states to maintain their reputations, while avoiding intervention, states can use humanitarianism as an alternative to intervention. Thus, in the case of the DRC, the norm of self-interested engagement would likely support the adherence to the norm of humanitarianism.

The above discussion demonstrates that the norm of humanitarianism was in fact the primary motivating factor for the actions taken in regard to the DRC. With the exception of China, which largely remained disengaged from the conflict, the international community in general responded to the conflict in the DRC with humanitarian engagement and assistance.


The final pieces of the puzzle which must be explained in order to fully account for the international community’s reaction to the DRC crisis are the strengths and interactions of the norms of humanitarian intervention and self-interested engagement. It will be shown that the overall outcome of the interactions between these two norms was significantly different from the policy consequences of the norm of humanitarianism. With this discussion, the strength of Finnemore and Sikkink’s normative life-cycle model and its explanatory will become clear, as will the reasons why there was no intervention in the DRC.
THE DRC AS A CASE FOR INTERVENTION

Any discussion of intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo must first establish that the DRC could in fact be considered a legitimate candidate for humanitarian intervention under the criteria explicated in previous chapters. As a reminder, the concept of humanitarian intervention being utilized is derived from the just cause threshold of the Responsibility to React, outlined by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. According to the ICISS, the Responsibility to React comes into play when a state is facing

large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.\(^{256}\)

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo unquestionably fulfills the first and possibly fulfills the second of these criteria. There is little doubt about the first criterion: the loss of life that has occurred since the start of the second war in 1998 is staggering by any standard. Over five million people have died as a result of murder, starvation, disease or malnutrition caused by fighting and its after-effects.\(^{257}\) With the forced evacuation of large numbers of villages, especially in the east, the relocation of millions of refugees to camps with poor sanitation, health care and little access to food and water, as well as the fact that thousands more have been forced deep into the forests by the ongoing fighting, that death toll may actually be undercounted. The deaths resulted from a combination of state action, as in the massacre of Tutsi by Laurent Kabila at the start of the second war, and subsequently from the inability of the state


to protect its citizens. The central government simply had no control over either its armed forces or rebel
groups in the east, and lacked the infrastructure and capacity to enforce laws.

It is debatable whether “genocidal intent” was actually present at any point during any of the
killings. According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
genocide can be defined as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

There have been instances where the word “genocide” has been used by commentators and rights agencies to
describe certain massacres or operations, but these claims have so far not been substantiated by any
international body to the author’s knowledge. However, according to the Responsibility to React,
genocidal intent is not necessary in order for humanitarian intervention to be justified or called for. The
scale of life lost is so enormous that it would be sufficient to fulfill the just cause criteria of the
Responsibility to React.

It is also questionable whether the second criterion – the existence of large scale “ethnic
cleansing” – was ever fulfilled. Over the course of the ten year period from 1998 to 2008, it seems
plausible that small-scale incidents of ethnic cleansing occurred. The tactics used at some points
certainly constituted actions of ethnic cleansing against identifiable groups, with killing, forced expulsion,


259 See, for example, Christian P. Scherrer’s discussion in Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa, 337-9; the
suggestion of genocide by the MLC and RCD-N against the Bambuti between October 2002 and January 2003 in
Réseau des Associations Autochtones Pygmées du Congo and Minority Rights Group International’s Report:
Erasing the Board; Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: ICC Arrest First Step to Justice,”

260 See the discussion of ethnic cleansing against the Bambuti in Réseau des Associations Autochtones Pygmées du
Congo and Minority Rights Group International’s Report: Erasing the Board; Chris McGreal, “Hundreds of
and acts of terror, torture, mutilation, and rape occurring. However, the issue of whether these actions could constitute “large-scale ethnic cleansing” is unresolved. Although over 5 million people have died and millions more suffered horrifying atrocities, it is unknown how many of these were done specifically because of the victim’s ethnicity. This would have to be examined more closely by professionals in order to be substantiated.

However, it is clear that at least one of the Responsibility to React’s criteria for intervention was fulfilled. This means that the DRC would, in the years from 1998 to 2008, have been a prime candidate for armed humanitarian intervention.

REALPOLITIK AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE CONFLICT

In order to determine the actions that realpolitik and specifically the norm of self-interested engagement would likely prescribe in the case of intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the situation as a whole must be considered from two angles. The norm stipulates that for governments to engage militarily in the DRC, those governments would have to have very strong interests there. These interests can be classified as being either “internal” or “external” to the country. Internal interests concern the value of the country in and of itself, whether pertaining to geopolitical strategies, economic or resource-based concerns, or diplomatic issues. External interests encompass the value of the actual intervention, and how proceeding with an intervention would advance or decline a country’s own interests and position in the world system. Both of these angles will be analyzed in the case of the DRC.

**Internal Realpolitik Concerns**

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Democratic Republic of Congo has waned considerably, especially in the eyes of the United States. Africanist Gérard Prunier identifies three periods of US engagement with the Congo: active involvement in the wake of the first Congo civil war in 1960-1965, lack of interest from 1965-1975, and sudden interest when Africa became a Cold War concern during the 1970s and 1980s. This was due to the fact that Mobutu Sese Seko, despite his
brutality and corruption, was a staunch opponent of Communism not only as an ideology but also in respect to the USSR’s potential for influence and access to resources in Africa. However, with the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat in Africa, America no longer needed Mobutu’s strategic alliance. Thus, a fourth stage was ushered in, where Mobutu became a ‘skeleton in the American cupboard’ as democracy spread throughout Africa and America’s support for the dictator became embarrassing and undesirable. This was especially obvious after Mobutu embraced the genocidal ex-FAR/Interahamwe who flooded eastern Congo after the Rwandan genocide.

France and other members of the European Union have traditionally been more concerned with events in Africa, given the fact that many African countries are former colonies of European states. For this reason it can logically be posited that Africa figured more into their strategic interests than those of the United States. In the case of France, Africa was long a strategically important concern, and in the post-decolonization period from 1960 to 1994 France did not hesitate to send troops to its former African colonies in order to ensure that their governments were favourable to French interests, and would help maintain France’s geopolitical power. This likely explains why France was the most forthcoming state in terms of engagement with the DRC, with its spearheading of Operation Artemis, and its willingness to do so again in 2008. However, France’s ability to engage in Africa has become more limited with the development of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, and aside from France and the former colonial power Belgium, European interests in the Congo have been fairly weak. As the turmoil began in the mid-1990s in the Congo there was some concern about regional destabilization, but it did not result in many actions being taken.


262 Ibid.


264 Ibid., 343-4.
The only major power (capable of organizing a military intervention) which could have been said to possess strategic economic interests in the DRC is China. Given the large investments it was continuously making in the DRC and Africa in general, complete state collapse and rebel control of the DRC’s resources would have been antithetical to Beijing’s goals of solidifying long-term resource contracts. However, other Chinese interests would likely outweigh any impetus for military intervention. First, a humanitarian intervention would run contrary to China’s staunch belief in the norm of sovereignty, a belief it had reiterated very strongly in discussions of the Congo. To engage in a humanitarian intervention would weaken its credibility in the eyes of much of the world, especially the Global South. Secondly, if the DRC began to stabilize and the central government gained more control over its eastern provinces, it would likely mean the re-evaluation of mining and resource-based contracts which China has already signed with the DRC. Many of these contracts are alleged to be unfair and exploitive, and would probably not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, the re-evaluation of Chinese contracts was one of the demands that Laurent Nkunda made when threatening to take over eastern areas. In short, despite the fact that China had economic interests in the DRC, a humanitarian intervention would have run contrary to many of its other interests.

Finally, while the DRC itself may not be in most countries’ strategic interests, many of the states surrounding it are. Virtually all of the DRC’s border countries have some stakes in the Congo conflict, and most have even been involved at one point or other. This would make humanitarian intervention an even more complicated and delicate situation. For instance, since its failure to stop the genocide in 1994,


267 Philp, “West Scrambles to Prevent Congo Catastrophe.”
the United States developed a special strategic relationship with Rwanda,\textsuperscript{268} making the United States wary of taking any actions in Congo which would jeopardize that relationship. This was evident from the initial position taken by the Clinton administration on the Congo war in 1998 - the neutral line that Rwanda and the Congo should work out their differences themselves. This stance prompted Reed Brody, advocacy director of Human Rights Watch, to state that the United States and others had chosen stability and good relations with regional governments over accountability.\textsuperscript{269} Similarly, France, Belgium and Britain also had strategic relationships with their own former colonies in Africa. Any intervention in the Congo would therefore have had significant ramifications for relations with strategic African countries, and achieving agreement on an intervention which respects all parties’ wishes would be difficult at best. Again, Brody reflected this point in his statement that in the Congo “Clearly many members of the [Security] Council have ties to the governments that are implicated and don’t want to see human rights concerns weaken those governments.”\textsuperscript{270} All of this points to the fact that the already extremely limited strategic interests in the DRC were almost always further limited by other realpolitik-based concerns.

**External Realpolitik Concerns**

In addition to strategic interests in the country itself, one must also consider the strategic value that a military intervention, especially with humanitarian goals, can have for states and organizations.

As noted briefly in Chapter 3’s section on normative interaction, there can be some external self-interested benefits for states which engage in humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian interventions can have the effect of strengthening a state or organization’s esteem in the international arena. This is perhaps best observed in President George H. W. Bush’s decision to intervene in Somalia, a country with little or no strategic or national interests for the United States. Because of the way that mission ended – with

\textsuperscript{268} See, for example, Thomas Turner, “War in the Congo,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* 5, no. 10 (2000), 2; Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, 341.


\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
American withdrawal after 18 US Rangers were killed in Mogadishu in October 1993 – we tend to forget that the goal of that mission was originally very simple: to provide humanitarian relief in the face of a massive famine. Had the Clinton administration not changed the goals of that mission after it took office in 1993, and essentially declared war against one of the warlords in Somalia, the mission might have ended successfully. This would undoubtedly have raised America’s profile, proving that a superpower can still “have a conscience” and engage in altruistic endeavours for the betterment of humankind. From a domestic point of view, humanitarian interests are also thought by many to be important to the national interest. As Joseph Nye, Jr. points out, few Americans in the information age can look at starving people on TV and not feel that their country should do something. In the case of Somalia, in its initial stages when the mission was strictly humanitarian in nature, some polls put US public support at the astonishingly high level of up to 84%. It is not in a government’s interest to ignore domestic sentiment that a government is “duty-bound” to care about others. Thus, humanitarian intervention can be in a state’s national interest if there is a moral impetus from within the state.

These interests are mainly reputational, with a state (or regional organization, for example, NATO) wishing to gain esteem in the international arena, and also wishing for the approval of its internal populations. One non-reputational benefit of humanitarian intervention would be improved relations with the state in conflict if the mission was successful. Presumably, those victims who had been liberated from oppression and human rights violations would be friendly towards the interveners, resulting in good diplomatic relations and possible privileges in the future. In the case of the DRC, the potential for access to its resources would likely be a strong consideration.


272 Ibid., 31.


However, these potential benefits of intervention in general, with application to the DRC, are enormously outweighed by the potential for damage to external interests. The DRC is the third largest country in Africa behind Sudan and Algeria, being slightly less than a quarter of the size of the United States.\textsuperscript{276} The country is extremely regionalized, divided into eleven different provinces which have vastly different goals and resources. The lack of national unity and fight for control of resources has even led to a resurgence of secessionist sentiments among some provinces, such as Katanga in the south. The land itself is highly underdeveloped, with very little infrastructure and virtually no country-wide roads, resulting in an enormous transportation problem. For example, from the capital Kinshasa to Goma, one of the hot-spots for violence in North Kivu province, it is approximately 1600 km in a straight line, and much longer on almost impassable dirt roads.\textsuperscript{277} The terrain itself is often densely forested, with vast swaths of jungle which are virtually untouched and extremely difficult to navigate. In terms of military intervention, this means that any force would have to be extremely large and would have to possess multiple means of transporting troops across the country in a very short period of time. It would also likely require the existence of a standby force which is able to move from hot spot to hot spot very quickly, and in combat-ready condition. The sheer logistical problems of maintaining such a large force in the field and getting from one place to another would pose a major challenge to any military intervention, both in regard to the possibility of one set of troops being overwhelmed with no aid nearby, and in terms of coordination of forces (especially in a multinational force where troops often have vastly different rules of engagement). It would also make any intervention extremely expensive and require very large numbers of troops. Although fighting was located largely in the east and north, any


intervention force would have had to be prepared for the potential for violence elsewhere, such as in the
capital, Kinshasa. Large troop and resource requirements would not be in the interests of many countries – if any.

This is reflected in the international community’s resistance to placing troops in the Congo, even under the auspices of the peacekeeping force. Virtually each time the Secretary-General recommended an increase in peacekeeping troops, the call was rejected or delayed by members of the Security Council. For example, in 2003 when the fighting was at its strongest in Ituri, the United States resisted the expansion of the force, saying that there was a need for a “long-term political solution” to the Congo’s problems. The troop increase was only achieved once the EU had agreed to provide a bridging force.

The unwillingness to contribute military forces to the Congo is also evident in the fact that no major powers put significant numbers of troops in MONUC. Similarly, in 2008 when calls were made for a second EU bridging force to stop Laurent Nkunda from taking the city of Goma, a senior British official claimed that it was a “political problem,” which Rwanda and Congo simply needed to sit down and resolve. Britain’s minister in charge of Africa, Lord Malloch-Brown, even went so far as to say “There were European troops in Rwanda when the genocide started but they were overwhelmed by the situation,” implying that putting European troops in the Congo would do little to stop the fighting. Some would undoubtedly find the truth of this statement suspect, but it reflects states’ reticence to put

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279 The current figures on MONUC personnel name China as the only P5 contributor, with 218 people. Despite its large size, China’s contribution is outnumbered by the following countries: Bangladesh, 1330; Benin, 750; Ghana, 461; India, 4372; Morocco, 809; Nepal, 1030; Pakistan, 3551; Senegal, 450; South Africa, 1056; Tunisia, 463 and Uruguay, 1324. MONUC, “Military Contingents,” http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=949 (accessed 10 July 2009).

280 Philp, “West Scrambles to Prevent Congo Catastrophe.”

281 The author suspects that Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire would vehemently disagree with Lord Malloch-Brown. In fact, when news of the Rwandan slaughter reached Europe and the UN, the immediate reaction in both Belgium and France was to withdraw all forces. Other European troops only entered Rwanda to evacuate their own country’s foreign nationals. This left a seriously understaffed UNAMIR as virtually the only foreign soldiers remaining in Rwanda during the majority of the massacres, with French troops only arriving after most of the killing had been done. See Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003).
troops into places where there is a high probability of sustaining casualties. Of course, calling for a political solution is mere rhetoric used to cover this fact. The plain fact is that thousands of civilians were dying or being threatened, with military intervention being a clear way to at least limit this from happening while the political problems were worked out. This rhetoric was noted by various NGOs, with Juliette Prodhan, head of Oxfam in the Congo, calling such diplomatic wrangling “air miles diplomacy” designed to cover up calls from aid agencies to send EU forces.\textsuperscript{282} The fact that major powers were unwilling to bolster MONUC or put in a short-term bridging mission reflects a deeper belief that to do so would be contrary to their interests.

The nature of the conflict itself also makes the prospect of a successful intervention very challenging. The conflict was extremely complicated, with an enormous number of rebel groups frequently changing positions and allegiances. This was further exacerbated by the fact that some rebel groups were supported militarily by Rwanda and Uganda,\textsuperscript{283} making them both well-trained and armed. The most recent example of this was Brigadier General Laurent Nkunda, whose Congrès Nationale pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) was obviously being supported by Rwanda until at least the beginning of 2009. The nature of the terrain and the rebel groups’ use of the terrain to their advantage, as well as the distances between villages, would mean that any intervention would likely end up being largely a counter-insurgency operation, which again has a high probability of casualties. Unlike the conflict in Darfur or the Rwandan genocide, the DRC conflict is not clear cut, with no singular, easily identifiable enemy, and massive human rights abuses occurring on all sides of the conflict. In addition, the speed with which conditions on the ground change makes the conditions for troops even more dangerous. This was summed up nicely by Sergey Lavrov, the Russian representative to the Security Council, when it voted to approve the peacekeeping mission in 2000: "The situation is so complicated that it would be not only

\textsuperscript{282} Tristan McConnell, “Cholera Threatens Congo Refugees as EU Says it is Too Early to Send Troops,” \textit{The Times of London}, 11 November 2008.

naive but dangerous to rely on its settlement by external forces, even if these are United Nations forces." It was echoed by Britain's deputy representative, Stewart Eldon, who said that the situation on the ground “does not look promising,” and that more ethnic fighting could spring up as the peacekeeping mission was being prepared.284

The nature of the conflict also made the development of an exit strategy extremely problematic. States generally do not see seemingly endless civil conflicts as being in their interests, and would therefore be unlikely to engage in one. In the case of the United States, this sentiment was encapsulated in the Powell doctrine, which stated that in order for the United States to commit troops to a mission there must be, among other things, a clear set of military and political objectives, and a clearly defined exit strategy.285 As NATO has experienced in Afghanistan and the “Coalition of the Willing” has in Iraq, counterinsurgency operations tend to be extremely drawn out and difficult to bring to an end. In the DRC, with its millions of acres of jungle and often mountainous terrain, it would likely be extremely difficult to definitively disarm all rebel groups. This has undoubtedly made states and regional organizations wary of engaging, even on a temporary basis, in the DRC.

All of these factors combined to a widespread conclusion on the part of numerous governments that the few strategic gains that could be made by humanitarian intervention in the DRC were vastly outweighed by the interest-based reasons for not intervening.

OPERATION ASSURANCE

This conclusion can also be illustrated by Operation Assurance, a planned intervention in eastern DRC in 1996. Although this event falls outside the time period that this thesis is focusing on, the concerns voiced at that time reflect many of the same concerns, and are still relevant.

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In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees (some of whom were members of the genocidal Interahamwe militias or ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises) fled to Zaire, amassing in huge refugee camps along the border between the two countries. Due to a variety of factors such as humanitarian agencies’ ignorance of the situation and lack of resources to deal with it, these refugee camps became launching grounds for assaults on both Tutsi-controlled Rwanda and the Zairian Tutsi, known as Banyamulenge, by the Hutu génocidaires.\footnote{Sarah Kenyon Lischer, \textit{Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 82.} Eventually the Banyamulenge rose against the Hutu attackers, creating a conflictual situation where refugees were caught in the middle. The total number of refugees climbed to over 1.5 million people,\footnote{GlobalSecurity.org, “Military: Operation Assurance/Phoenix Tusk,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/assurance.htm (accessed 5 July 2009).} and the international community began to take notice.

In November, 1996, Canada took on the role of leader of a planned multinational force to “facilitate the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the effective delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid to alleviate the immediate suffering of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in eastern Zaire…”\footnote{United Nations Security Council, \textit{Resolution 1080 (1996)} (15 November 1996), S/RES/1080 (1996).} The mission was titled “Operation Assurance,” and was approved by the United Nations Security Council. However, the mission was never actually operationalized – instead, while initial reconnaissance and preparatory work was being done, the conditions in theatre changed rapidly, negating (in the eyes of policymakers) the need for an intervention. When news of the potential multinational force reached Rwanda and then-rebel leader Laurent Kabila, he apparently decided to escalate violence against the refugee camps, sparking a mass exodus of the refugees back to Rwanda.\footnote{Michael A. Hennessy, “Operation ‘Assurance’: Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaïre,” \textit{Canadian Military Journal} 2, no. 1 (2001), 16.} In effect, by the time the mission was being developed, conditions on the ground had changed so much that it was not deemed necessary.
The preparation for Operation Assurance revealed the many difficulties which any mission in the DRC (Zaire) would have encountered. As indicated, the rapidly changing nature of the conflict outpaced the ability of the military to counter it, and could plausibly account for the reluctance of countries to commit forces to the mission.\textsuperscript{290} In addition, reflecting the nature of the situation as a ‘complex emergency’, the variety of state and non-state actors involved posed serious issues for the development of the mission,\textsuperscript{291} and left lingering questions about what its success would have been. Further operational issues included the lack of airports (infrastructure) in the area of the refugee camps near Goma, political touchiness on the parts of Rwanda and Zaire around where to place the headquarters of the multinational force, and concern about the forces being drawn into a larger regional conflict.\textsuperscript{292} Each of these issues would have still been pertinent in an intervention in the DRC from 1998-2008, and reflects the various strategic disadvantages of an intervention mission there.

\textbf{OPERATION ARTEMIS}

In the discussion of intervention in the Congo, it is possible that some would point to the European Security and Defence Policy’s “Operation Artemis” mission in 2003 as an example of a true humanitarian intervention in the DRC. A cursory look at the operation would seem to confirm this. The operation was undertaken outside the auspices of the United Nations, although it was given the Security Council’s blessing, and all of its troops came from independent nations not under the banner of the UN. Its stated purpose was to “contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation required contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid., 15.


Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.” Indeed, the conditions which precipitated the operation certainly fell under the criteria this thesis utilizes from the Responsibility to React: in the area around Bunia there were massive human rights abuses occurring, including large scale killing which the government (and UN peacekeepers) were powerless to stop. The mission was undoubtedly justifiable, and would seem to fit the criteria of a humanitarian intervention.

However, a deeper look reveals that it cannot be considered to be a true humanitarian intervention. One of the most glaring reasons for this is that it was done with the permission and cooperation of the leader of the Congo, Joseph Kabila, and in “close coordination” with MONUC. Although a humanitarian intervention does not always have to run counter to the wishes of the national government, the fact that there was already a peacekeeping force there in cooperation with Kinshasa makes the operation far closer to a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation than a completely separate military intervention. The mission was practically begged for by the United Nations and Kofi Annan, and the Security Council resolution authorizing it specifically “stresses that this Interim Emergency Multinational Force is to be deployed on a strictly temporary basis to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC’s presence in Bunia”. Essentially, although the operation was trumpeted by the European Union as a successful humanitarian intervention, in reality it was simply a bridging force to allow MONUC to become better prepared to deal with the situation in Bunia. Had the MONUC mission not been so drastically underfunded and lacking in adequate troop numbers to secure Bunia, the UN would have undertaken the mission. Operation Artemis was a “firefighting” endeavour, designed simply to accomplish a task that, at the time, the overstretched MONUC force could not do. As Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams note, such missions “aim to address specific challenges confronting already existing...
UN operations that require greater enforcement capabilities.” Because they are explicitly authorized (and sometimes called for) by the UN, they can be associated with peace operations and in fact “represent a form of subcontracting of the UN’s enforcement powers.” This is further supported by the fact that the mission was so short, and had such stringently enforced boundaries. Although it certainly succeeded in accomplishing its limited goals of securing the region around Bunia, and while the “just cause” threshold of the Responsibility to React criteria was certainly met, the character of Operation Artemis and the circumstances under which it took place make its proper characterization as simply an extension, by non-peacekeeping forces, of the MONUC peacekeeping mission.

In addition, despite the fact that Artemis was not even a full scale military intervention, there are lingering questions about whether the mission was truly “humanitarian” in its motivations. France spearheaded the response to the call for an interim force, and France’s involvement in Africa, as already addressed, is long and troublesome. France’s actions, as opposed to being for purely humanitarian motives, were likely tainted especially by its failure to act in Rwanda and perceived support for the Hutu génocidaires. Once France became interested in the mission, it was able to effectively drag other reluctant states such as Germany into the mission through a fear of appearing to be anti-UN or anti-EU by refusing, or through public shaming, as in the case of Britain. Thus its motivations were not likely purely humanitarian. In addition, France’s position must also be regarded bearing in mind the massive rift in the EU over participation in Iraq, where an ESDP mission could have the effect of unifying the EU and solidifying it as an actor capable of being independent from NATO and the United States.


300 Walker, “Britain Blamed for Hindering Congo Taskforce.”

301 Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, “The Shape of Things to Come,” 512.
Although for all official intents and purposes Artemis was a humanitarian mission, there are numerous indications that the primary motivation for engagement was not concern for the people of the DRC.

NORMATIVE INTERACTION AND THE DRC

The Democratic Republic of Congo was clearly a suitable, and indeed, desperate, case for humanitarian intervention during the period from 1998 to 2008. The scale of the human rights violations and killings was enormous, and the international community was well aware of them. Through an analysis of international responses to this situation, it has become clear that the norm of humanitarian intervention was at play. Intervention was discussed many times during this decade in the context of the DRC, and it was certainly recognized that the fighting urgently needed to be stopped in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives. In addition, the topic of intervention was fresh in policymakers’ minds, as humanitarian intervention had recently occurred in the cases of both Bosnia and Kosovo, and the world was finally conscious that its failure to intervene during the Rwandan genocide had drastic consequences.

All of the information obtained with reference to policymakers at the time further confirms that humanitarian intervention, although considered, was present as a weak stage 1 norm. Those who called for humanitarian intervention were chiefly normative entrepreneurs, such as the Secretary-General’s office and human rights NGOs both on the ground and outside the country, as well as countries like the Netherlands, which was a well known supporter of R2P. Their motivations were primarily empathetic and altruistic in nature, feeling some responsibility to the people suffering in the DRC. The dominant mechanism utilized to achieve their goals was persuasion, with NGOs engaging in public “naming and shaming” of states which refused to do anything to help the DRC, or who vetoed humanitarian intervention, and the Netherlands publicly calling on the EU not to forget the Congo. Clearly, the norm of humanitarian intervention was at play in its stage 1 state.

However, it is also clear that the norms of realpolitik, and specifically the norm that states should not engage in interventions in places where their interests are not represented, were at work in this situation as well. There were few to no strategic or national interests in the DRC for virtually any state or
organization, and the strategic interests which could be fulfilled by a humanitarian intervention were far outweighed by the potential damages to interests. The unwillingness to engage militarily was demonstrated over and over again, whether in relation to increasing the forces of MONUC, the reluctance of major powers to contribute troops at all to MONUC, the reticence of many European powers to participate in Operation Artemis in 2003, and the unwillingness of almost every European nation, the United States or China to provide a bridging force in 2008. Policymakers’ primary concerns were consistently for the security of their own country and people, and the potential losses they would incur from an intervention, reflecting the habit and institutionalization that is common to a stage 3 norm.

Ultimately, the interaction of these two norms in the case of the DRC not only re-confirms their respective stages of development, but also provides a plausible account of why there was no true humanitarian intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period from 1998-2008. Fears of an endless mission, lack of strategic interests, and geopolitical concerns all point to the fact that the small amount of interest in engaging in a humanitarian intervention was overwhelmingly outweighed by realpolitik-based interests. As final proof of this, one can simply look at the number of normative entrepreneurs of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine who suddenly became silent about its viability and possibility in respect of the Congo: Germany, the UK and Canada were all remarkably quiet about their previous convictions in R2P. This once again indicates that the norm was easily outweighed by more self-interested strategic concerns.

In short, given that the norms of realpolitik were at play in the case of the DRC, and given that the strength of these norms clearly outweighed the strength of the norm of humanitarian intervention, it can reasonably be concluded that the decisions not to intervene in the DRC resulted directly from the strength of the influences of the respective norms on international actors.

This discussion completes the analysis of the case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The norms of humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention, and self-interested engagement have all been shown not only to be at work in the international response to the DRC’s crisis, but have been shown to be
at the stages which Finnemore and Sikkink’s normative life-cycle model predicted that they would be. It is chiefly due to their respective strengths and weaknesses that members of the international community took, or did not take, different actions in response to the conflict. This provides clear evidence that the Finnemore-Sikkink model has strong explanatory potential, as well as shedding light on the reasons why, despite intense human suffering, the just cause principle of the Responsibility to React was not invoked, and no humanitarian intervention took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

In an op-ed piece for the *New York Times*, veteran journalist Bob Herbert described the strife in the Democratic Republic of Congo as “The Invisible War.” Such eye-catching headlines are perfect for drawing attention to the country and its struggles, but do not necessarily reflect the reality of the situation. The conflict has not been entirely invisible to the international community, which has engaged with the country both during its wars and in dealing with their after-effects. However, it would not be incorrect to posit that this engagement has not been nearly as consistent as it should have been, nor as effective as it could have been. As is often the problem, humanitarian aid has helped the victims of the conflict, but could not effectively deal with the causes of their plight: the violence and ongoing fight for control over the eastern part of the country. Mass rape is still being committed, with a resurgence towards the end of 2008, hospitals are still too scarce and understaffed to accommodate even minimal amounts of victims, and soldiers are still committing crimes against humanity with no fear of prosecution.

In the absence of a complete colonial-style overhaul of the state itself, some kind of armed military intervention has been the most realistic option for halting the fighting long enough to begin rebuilding the state. Yet, despite the fact that frameworks for humanitarian intervention such as the Responsibility to Protect have been gaining support, and have even been “endorsed” (in an incomplete manner) by the international community at the UN World Summit, no such intervention happened, with the international community content to funnel billions of dollars into the DRC and engage in multiple rounds of diplomatic talks. Although it would be patently wrong and overly cynical to state that these actions have had no impact, as the DRC is in a better position today than it has been since virtually the start of the conflict, the situation is by no means stable. The question of how much more could have been done if an intervention had taken place is a potent one.

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It would be a mistake to overgeneralize when referring to the “international community.” Certainly, the responses of the members of this community have not been uniform, with numerous NGOs, IOs and individuals leading the charge for a progressive and decisive approach to the conflict. However, this fact is often overshadowed by the reality that the overall trends have been towards the adherence to humanitarianism, and the rejection of humanitarian intervention.

The reasons for this general response have been elucidated throughout this thesis. The normative environment from 1998 to 2008 was mostly supportive of humanitarian efforts, with the need for occasional prodding and pushing of states to become involved, but was decisively not supportive of humanitarian intervention. Instead, governments followed the tried-and-true norm of refusing to engage militarily in a state where doing so was unlikely to further their own interests. The model of analysis used to realize this conclusion, developed by Finnemore and Sikkink, is a relatively new one. The normative life cycle model is unique in that it can be applied to virtually any situation when norms are at work, and it has an extraordinary amount of potential to help explain international events and actors’ behaviours. In fact, it is the author’s belief that there are many situations both current and recent which could be explained using this model.

For instance, a cursory examination supports the idea that the ongoing crisis in Darfur could be analyzed using the Finnemore-Sikkink model. In brief, beginning in March, 2003, the Darfur region of Sudan saw increased clashes between government forces, Janjaweed militias, and rebel groups. The conflict stems from a two decade-long civil war, mostly between ethnic groups of Arab and African descent. When fighting broke out, the government in Khartoum allegedly sub-contracted the Janjaweed to “stop the rebellions”; however, what actually occurred was that the Janjaweed engaged in a systemic campaign of crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide.303 The militias appeared to be targeting civilians based on their ethnicity, but also wantonly attacked those who were not of the ethnicity of the rebels. Throughout this campaign, the Sudanese government was complacent in the

303 “Sudan: Tragedy in Darfur,” UN Chronicle 41, no. 3 (2004), 70.
Janjaweed’s crimes, and in fact the militias often acted in partnership with government forces. The conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths and millions of refugees and internally displaced persons.304

As in the case of the DRC, millions of dollars in aid have been pumped into Darfur and the refugee camps set up in neighbouring Chad. There have been rounds of diplomatic negotiations between rebel groups, the government in Khartoum, and other countries, and there are a multitude of UN agencies and NGOs on the ground there (having finally been allowed into the region by the Sudanese government). There has also been an almost unprecedented international awareness campaign, involving international NGOs and domestic groups. Humanitarianism has been exercised consistently as the crisis has worn on, which is consistent with the events in the DRC and the notion of humanitarianism as a stage 2 norm.

However, even after the United States publicly labelled the events in Darfur a “genocide” in 2004, no humanitarian intervention was undertaken. Instead, the Security Council commissioned studies on the violence there and threatened economic sanctions and other restrictions, many of which never materialized.305 This was despite the fact that, as in the DRC, commentators invoked explicitly moralistic tones in describing the conflict. For example, Richard Williamson, United States envoy to the UN Commission on Human Rights, stated that “To fail to act is morally indefensible.”306

The reason for the lack of intervention despite the invocation of the term “genocide” can be tied to the strategic interests that most major powers have in the Sudan. China has both commercial and oil interests in Sudan, and has been wary of endorsing Security Council resolutions which threaten the Sudanese government.307 Despite its use of the word genocide, the US is wary of engaging in another mission with questionable prospects for disengagement, and both it and Britain are overstretched with

304 Ibid., 71.
307 Ibid., 131.
large numbers of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{308} Russia would not likely support an intervention as it is generally opposed to humanitarian intervention, and has also been selling fighter jets to the government in Khartoum. France also has oil interests in Sudan which it would likely not want to jeopardize by engaging in an unauthorized intervention.\textsuperscript{309} Given these interests, it is plausible to assert that the norm of self-interested engagement once again superseded the weaker norm of humanitarian intervention. Thus, it would seem that Finnemore and Sikkink’s model would be applicable to this situation, and many others like it. It is to be hoped that further studies of this model will be forthcoming which will solidify the model as a viable and accurate explanatory device.

For the time being, it is clear that there are major obstacles to the development of the norm of humanitarian intervention. It is uncertain exactly what may precipitate the norm’s movement from stage 1 to stage 2, and even eventually on to stage 3. Perhaps, unfortunately, another Rwanda or Bosnia is needed in order for members of the international community to be more inclined to disregard their own interests in order to protect the lives of others in distant countries. If an unequivocal genocide was to begin occurring once again, perhaps this would spur on acceptance of at least a limited, but binding, form of the Responsibility to React. Another hypothesis is that with the increasing speed of globalization and the growing recognition that conflicts in remote areas of the world have spillover effects everywhere, perhaps more states will come to realize that humanitarian crises must be stopped in order to ensure a more stable and secure world environment. Potentially, neutral or human rights-oriented powers such as the EU countries could precipitate the normative cascade that would force humanitarian intervention into a more prominent position in international policymaking. An excellent parallel to this would be the abolition of the slave trade, which was perpetuated in large part by a single, powerful country, Britain, which precipitated a rapid change in the international normative environment.

The continued evolution of the norm of humanitarian intervention will also depend in large part on the sustainability of efforts to promote it. The normative entrepreneurs who have worked hard to put


\textsuperscript{309} \textit{The Economist}, “Sudan Can’t Wait,” 31 July 2004, 11.
the norm on the international community's agenda must not only continue their efforts, but must especially continue building institutions and transnational advocacy networks which will facilitate the continued development of the norm. In the case of the Geneva Conventions, the success of Henry Dunant was not only in achieving their development, but in the creation of institutions like the ICRC and networks of people who were willing to continue the struggle once he was no longer able to. Such institutions provide the foundations for sustained norm advocacy, and the transition of the norm from stage 1 to stage 2 will depend heavily upon this.

In terms of the prospects for the norm’s attainment of stage 3 entrenchment, I would maintain that it is too early to make predictions. In evaluating emerging norms, we often overlook the time period which is being examined. The norm of humanitarian intervention as expressed by the Responsibility to React is still very young. One need look no further than the other two norms examined in this thesis (humanitarianism and realpolitik) to realize that normative development is often a very long process, with time frames for full development ranging from decades to centuries. To make predictions about the likelihood of the norm reaching its full development potential would not only be premature, but could also have an impact on the norm’s development. For instance, if too many people analyze the norm’s development negatively, it could cause actors to view the norm as “a lost cause”, stunting its progress.

However, it can be argued that if the norm is to succeed in reaching stage 3, it will have to be interpreted fairly narrowly. The restriction of intervention to only those cases where the just cause threshold of the Responsibility to React is fulfilled would seriously limit its applicability, but would also mean that the cases it would be applicable to would be the most drastic and the most desperate. This narrowing of the threshold for intervention could potentially result in more support from wary members of the Global South. For, as noted at various points in the thesis, some of these states have admitted that the Responsibility to Protect does have moral force, so restricting its usage to only cases where the moral impetus is strongest (i.e. in cases of ethnic cleansing or large-scale killing) would decrease their ability to support its moral basis but deny its application. In addition, it would hopefully assuage some of their
concerns about the Global North’s use of intervention for political goals and the legitimacy of such interventions.

That being said, if the norm should in fact reach stage 3, it would result in a large change in the way the international environment functions. Most obviously, in the context of this thesis it would mean that either the norm of self-interested engagement would lessen in strength, or that somehow the conflict between the two norms would be resolved. The most plausible way that this could be done would be if domestic populations became so concerned with genocide and ethnic cleansing that it became firmly within a state’s national interest to expend military and political power to stop them. In this case, the domestic ramifications of failing to intervene would have to be enormous in order to outweigh the other costs. Domestic concern for humanitarian crises could in fact play a large role in helping the development of the norm, as the more concerned publics become, the more decisionmakers are forced to pay attention. Just as domestic pressure helped the norm of humanitarianism to become stronger, perhaps the next step in the train of thought will be to go from support for “helping those in need” to explicitly “acting to stop the cause of that need.”

The fate of the norm of humanitarian intervention remains to be seen over the coming years and decades. It is possible that in the year 2030, the lack of intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo will be seen with the same sort of collective international guilt that the failure to intervene in Rwanda and Srebrenica did. However, it is also possible, and to be hoped, that the conflict will looked upon with the knowledge that because of the changed international environment, such atrocities will truly, and finally, “never happen again.”
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Appendix A: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo