Canada, the United States and the Command and Control of Air Forces for Continental
Air Defence from Ogdensburg to NORAD, 1940-1957

by

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in conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the evolution of the bilateral Canadian-American continental air defence operational-level command and control relationship from the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement to the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957. It takes a functional approach, focusing on the efforts of Canadian air force officers in conjunction with their American counterparts to develop efficient command and control arrangements to ensure effective air defence of North America while at the same time safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. It explores the evolution of certain command and control principles such as cooperation, unity of command, operational command, and operational control, and argues that because Canada was able to avoid having its air defence forces come under American command, Canadian sovereignty was assured. It also demonstrates that the Canada-U.S. bilateral continental air defence command and control relationship had its origins in Canadian, American, and British joint command and control culture and practice. Canadian steadfastness, along with compromise and accommodation between the two North American nations, operational and doctrinal factors, and also cordial professional working relationships and personalities, all played important roles in the evolution of this command and control relationship from the “cooperation-unity of command” paradigm of the Second World War towards “operational control” in an air defence context throughout the early Cold War. This paradigm shift culminated in 1957 with the integration and centralization of combined air defences under an overall NORAD commander exercising operational control. The thesis also demonstrates that by taking
an active role in Canada-U.S. command and control arrangements, Canada was able to
avoid a negative “defence against help” situation with the United States and ensure that it
secured a proverbial “piece of the action” in the bilateral North American continental air
defence mission. Moreover, through this active functional approach, Canadian officers
were able to safeguard Canadian sovereignty and at the same time perform an effective
and important operational role in the combined efforts with the United States to defend
the continent from aerial attack. This dissertation therefore makes an important
contribution to the study of command and control and the history of North American
continental defence.
Acknowledgements

How much space do I have? This dissertation would not have been possible without the assistance of several people and I will now do my best to thank as many of them as possible. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Allan English, for all of his help and advice, for sharing his impressive knowledge of command and control in the Canadian Forces, and for his example of perseverance and professionalism during my time as one of his graduate students. I would also like to thank my co-advisor, Rich Gimblett, for his help and advice, and especially his positive encouragement and reassurance to me during some difficult times. Both advisors gave me the freedom to work independently but also ensured to rein me in whenever my focus started to become too broad, and for that I am grateful. Thanks also to my other committee members, Joseph Jockel, Charles Pentland, and Wendy Wall for their insightful questions and comments.

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not have persevered throughout this journey without her enduring love, support, understanding, encouragement, and patience, and for that I will always be grateful.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated in honour of my family, who supported me throughout this journey: my parents Marlene and Manard Goette, my brother Steve, my Oma Ina Goette, and most of all, my wife Sandra and my daughter Sarah.

It is also dedicated in memory of those I lost along the way: my Aunt Janis Smith and my Opa Erich Goette.
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Air Commodore</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABDA</td>
<td>American-British-Dutch-Australian Command</td>
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<td>ACGS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>ACHQ</td>
<td>Area Combined Headquarters</td>
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<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defence Command (RCAF)/Air Defense Command (USAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCC</td>
<td>Air Defence Control Centre</td>
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<td>Air Defence Study Group</td>
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<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa</td>
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<td>AHSG</td>
<td>Canada-U.S. Ad Hoc Study Group on air defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIAW</td>
<td>Air Interceptor and Air Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Air Ministry File, Public Records Office, London</td>
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<td>AMAS</td>
<td>Air Member for Air Staff</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Air Officer Commanding</td>
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<td>ARAACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Command</td>
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<td>ATIP</td>
<td>Access To Information and Privacy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Air Vice-Marshal</td>
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<td>BSP</td>
<td>Basic Security Plan</td>
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<td>CAB</td>
<td>Cabinet File, Public Record Office, London</td>
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<td>United Canada-United States Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chief of the Air Staff</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee</td>
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<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre</td>
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<td>CFC IRC</td>
<td>Canadian Forces College Information Resource Centre</td>
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<td>Commanding General</td>
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<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>CINCADCANUS</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Air Defence Canada-United States</td>
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<td>CMSS</td>
<td>Centre for Military and Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>COAC</td>
<td>Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast</td>
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<td>ConAC</td>
<td>Continental Air Command</td>
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<td>Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CUSRPG</td>
<td>Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group</td>
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<td>DCER</td>
<td>Documents on External Relations</td>
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<td>DCinC</td>
<td>Deputy Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs</td>
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<td>DEW</td>
<td>Distant Early Warning</td>
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<td>DHH</td>
<td>Directorate of History and Heritage, Ottawa</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>Eastern Air Command</td>
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<td>EADP</td>
<td>Emergency Air Defence Plan</td>
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<td>EDP</td>
<td>Emergency Defence Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
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<td>FONF</td>
<td>Flag Officer Newfoundland Force</td>
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<td>G/C</td>
<td>Group Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOCinC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding-in-Chief</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JPC</td>
<td>Joint Planning Committee</td>
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<td>JSPC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans Committee</td>
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<td>JWPC</td>
<td>Joint War Plans Committee</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Canada-U.S. Military Co-Operation Committee</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Minister of National Defence</td>
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<td>MSG</td>
<td>Canada-U.S. Military Study Group</td>
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<td>NARA</td>
<td>United States National Archives and Records Administration</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVFORCONAD</td>
<td>Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Defence Act</td>
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<td>NEAC</td>
<td>Northeast Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEF</td>
<td>Newfoundland Escort Force</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Air Defence Command</td>
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<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board on Defence</td>
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<td>Public Records Office, London</td>
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<td>Queen’s University Archives</td>
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<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
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<td>RCN</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>Regional Planning Group</td>
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<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<td>Royal Military College of Canada</td>
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<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCGS</td>
<td>Vice-Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<td>WPD</td>
<td>U.S. Army War Plans Division</td>
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<td>Map 1</td>
<td>Command Boundaries, RCAF Air Defence Command and U.S. Northeast Command</td>
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Chapter One
Introduction

In its history Canada has never fought a war alone. Entering conflicts allied with another country or as a member of a coalition is part of the Canadian way of war.¹ This principle has held true in Canada’s participation in expeditionary operations, the defence of overseas trade, and continental air defence. Before the Second World War, Canadian armed forces primarily fought with, and as a part of, British forces. However, after 1939 the Canadian military increasingly began to operate with United States forces. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the area of continental air defence, as Canada and the United States worked together to protect North America from Axis aggression during the Second World War and from the growing Soviet nuclear strategic bomber threat during the early Cold War period.² In evolving this continental air defence partnership, the two North American countries tackled several important issues, one of the most important of which was command and control over the operations of their combined forces.

This dissertation examines the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship from the beginning of the collaboration between the two nations for the defence of North America, embodied in the Ogdensburg Agreement between Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1940, to the establishment of the bilateral Canada-U.S. North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in September 1957. In particular, this study focuses on the degree of command and control authority that each nation was willing to grant to a commander to exercise over their combined military forces in order to accomplish a mission. This was embodied in specific command and control principles (i.e., cooperation, unity of command, operational control, strategic direction, etc.), the
definitions of which varied depending on the degree of authority and responsibility to be 
exercised. This dissertation shows that the effort to find compromises between the 
unique joint command and control cultures of Canada, the United States and also Britain 
had a significant effect on how the two North American nations’ continental air defence 
command and control relationship would grow and evolve from the Second World War 
to the formation of NORAD. Perhaps most importantly, this study also demonstrates that 
the evolving 1940-1957 Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control 
relationship was an important part in the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty.

Command and Sovereignty

The concern for command arrangements is not entirely based on emotion or pedantry. 
They are real concerns of national sovereignty. 

-Douglas Bland

In 1941, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton, Canada’s top soldier and future 
Minister of National Defence, noted that “the acid test of sovereignty is the control of the 
armed forces.” The careful study of the history of Canadian-American command and 
control arrangements from 1940 to 1957 undertaken in this dissertation will allow 
revision of McNaughton’s statement to reflect the reality of the bilateral North American 
defence relationship. Indeed, the definitions of command and control principles during 
this time period (especially during the Second World War) were in flux and continuously 
evolving. Because of this, military personnel oftentimes used various command and 
control terms much more freely and with less precision in their meaning than do serving 
members of today’s Canadian Forces (CF).

“Command” focuses on legal and personal authority derived from a nation’s 
governing institutions for the proper management, administration, deployment, and
performance of the military. It is currently defined in CF doctrine as “the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the co-ordination and control of military forces.”5 “Control,” on the other hand, derives from command but is subordinate to it, and focuses on the use by a commander of forces for operational and tactical purposes. It is defined in current CF doctrine as:

that authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.6

Oftentimes, as McNaughton’s quote demonstrates, servicemen used the words “control” and “command” interchangeably to mean the same thing. In this case, the key issue for Canada in its continental defence relationship with the United States was therefore not control but *command*: that command over Canadian air defence forces was in fact the “acid test of sovereignty.” Accordingly, this dissertation will argue that because Canada was able to maintain command of its forces in all continental air defence command and control arrangements with the United States, Canadian sovereignty was secured.

Concern as to the degree of Canadian command and control authority over its military forces for continental defence purposes has indeed been an important issue in recent years. This has been an especially relevant subject in light of recent continental defence policy and organizational developments in both Canada and the United States, including, but not limited to: the formation in 2002 of the United States Northern Command; the continuing debate regarding Canadian participation in American ballistic missile defence; the establishment in 2005 of new Canadian unified commands as a part of Canadian Forces Transformation; and the expansion of the mission of NORAD to include maritime surveillance roles. In particular, some have feared that Canada’s
continental defence command and control relationship with the United States has negatively affected Canadian sovereignty and will continue to do so well into the future.

For example, in 2002, in anticipation of the possible creation of a new Canadian-American North American Continental Defence Command, Michael Byers, an international lawyer from the University of British Columbia, completed a report entitled “Canadian armed forces under US Command.” In it Byers stressed that the operational control arrangement for the NORAD (discussed in Chapter Nine) has had a negative impact on Canadian sovereignty. Feeling that the NORAD definition of “operational control” is too broad and includes “many of the powers civilians would envisage as falling within command,” Byers argued that “concerns about sovereignty [therefore] cannot be overcome by technical distinction between ‘command and operational control.’”

This dissertation differs with Byers’ arguments and offers an alternative hypothesis based on a careful examination of archival documents that outline the historical evolution of a number of command and control principles, including operational control. Whereas Byers argues that “control over one’s armed forces is regarded as a central quality of a sovereign state,” as mentioned above, this dissertation will demonstrate that the retention of command over a country’s armed forces is regarded as a central quality of a sovereign state. The differentiation between command and operational control is not a simple case of semantics, as Byers has posited. Instead, it is representative of a fundamental feature of Canadian military tradition and command and control culture: to retain command when operating with other nations’ armed forces in continental defence endeavours, thereby ensuring Canadian sovereignty.
National Command: A Service Prerogative

One of the main characteristics of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship was the exclusion of administration and discipline over Canadian forces in bilateral command and control arrangements. Instead, as prominent Canadian military historian C.P. Stacey has noted, authority over such matters remained a national prerogative, a custom that was consistent with Allied command and control practice during the Second World War: “the basic principle of Allied cooperation... was that ‘administration and discipline’ should remain under national control, being quite distinct from operational command.”10 There was therefore an important distinction between command and control authority exercised at the operational level by Canadian or foreign commanders and at the national headquarters at the strategic level of warfare in Ottawa.

In military parlance, there are three distinct levels of war/conflict. The strategic level is the one “at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses the elements of national power to accomplish those objectives.” The operational level is the one “at which campaigns and other major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.” The tactical level of war is where “forces are deployed directly for battle and combat power is applied directly to defeat an enemy at a particular time and place.”11 The operational level of war thus connects the strategic and tactical levels and focuses on the utilization of military forces to accomplish missions. Because it was at the operational level where the most important command and control interaction between Canada and the United States took place from 1940 to 1957, the main focus of
this dissertation will be on the evolution of operational-level command and control arrangements between the two countries.

Responsibility for administration and discipline was not inherent in operational-level command and control authority, but was instead part of the command or “national command” that Canada’s civilian government maintained over Canadian forces as exercised through the service chiefs of staff, a practice that has continued to this day. During 1940-1957, these national authorities were the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and specifically the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) for air force operations. All aspects of national command, which included authority over the assignment and original composition of forces, logistics, and administration and discipline, were a service prerogative. These powers could not be assigned or delegated to an operational commander of a foreign nation, meaning that the retention of national command in combined command and control arrangements was an effective guarantee of Canadian sovereignty.12

How the retention of national command as a service prerogative protected Canadian sovereignty was perhaps best articulated by Canadian political scientist Douglas Bland, who explained that “national command is an indivisible characteristic of sovereignty that cannot be delegated unconditionally to foreigners or international institutions.”13 Importantly, the retention of national command as a service prerogative was not just a Canadian military practice; as this dissertation will demonstrate, it was also consistent with American command and control practice and culture.14

National command exercised by the Canadian military in the period 1940-1957 was derived from the National Defence Act (NDA). As Peter Haydon explains, the NDA
“established that the three service chiefs were responsible for the overall control and direction of their respective services, under the direction of the Minister [of National Defence].” It was these service chiefs who had the authority through the NDA to assign forces to a command organization and delegate operational command of them to operational-level commanders in order to carry out the assigned tasks. As Haydon further notes, this arrangement ensured a clear chain of command up from the operational-level commanders to the service Chiefs of Staff and thence to the Minister of National Defence (MND): “the operational commanders were thus responsible to the Minister through their service Chiefs of Staff for the activities of all units under their command.”

This arrangement between the operational-level commanders and the military and political authorities in Ottawa was articulated in late 1941 by Brigadier Maurice Pope, the Canadian Army’s Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS) and member of Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). He explained that the function of the service chiefs in Ottawa was to assign missions and to provide the means necessary thereto. It is for the local [i.e., operational-level] commanders... to execute the missions they receive. The Department of National Defence can only exercise its true function by means of directives. Any action on its part to take charge of operations as such, would simply hamper the responsible commander in the field.

Operational command, as the term itself denotes, is focused on conducting operational-level activities such as campaign planning and the movement of units in order to accomplish a mission. In the 1940-1957 period, a service chief could technically exercise operational command of his service’s forces. However, as Pope’s above quote demonstrates, this was not normal practice because if a service chief were to exercise
operational command himself he “would simply hamper the responsible commander in
the field.”\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, the exercise of this operational-level command and control
authority by a service chief also threatened to be a distraction from his service national
command responsibilities at the strategic level in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{20}

Instead, in Canadian military practice during 1940-1957 a service chief usually
delegated operational command to his service’s operational-level commanders. For
example, the RCAF’s Chief of the Air Staff delegated operational command to the Air
Officer Commanding (AOC) Eastern Air Command (EAC) in Halifax during the Second
World War and to the AOC RCAF Air Defence Command (ADC) in St. Hubert during
the 1950s. However, a service chief could also grant operational command (or
operational control) to a commander from a different service for joint operations or, if
necessary, even to a foreign commander in command of bilateral or multilateral forces.\textsuperscript{21}

Indeed, as this dissertation demonstrates, the issue of delegating operational command or
operational control of RCAF forces to an American commander was a key issue in the
Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship.

Operational-level factors therefore played a large part in the decision to permit or
refuse one’s forces to come under the operational command or operational control of a
foreign commander. This dissertation will demonstrate that during the 1940-1957 period,
national command and also operational command of Canadian air forces defending North
America remained with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, specifically the RCAF’s Chief of
the Air Staff, and through him, Canadian operational commanders. In this way, the
Canadian military was able to safeguard Canada’s sovereignty in its continental air
defence relationship with the United States. This dissertation thus takes a more military
approach to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty, and this perspective is worth exploring in further detail.

**A Functional “1957” Approach vs. a Political “1958” Perspective and Ensuring “A Seat at the Console”**

Borrowing a designation from American political scientist Joseph Jockel, this dissertation takes a very “1957 view” instead of a “1958 view” of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship. This categorization is based on the differing interpretations of the founding of NORAD, the military or “functional” perspective and the “political” perspective. The “1957 view” concerns the September 1957 establishment of NORAD as a bilateral Canada-U.S. command organization with operational control authority over the two nations’ air defence forces. It focuses on the purely military or “functional” aspect of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship, and in particular the efforts of officers from the two nations’ air forces to ensure effective coordination of air defence forces at the operational level in order to efficiently accomplish the military task of defending North America from aerial attack. This is in contrast to the “1958 view,” which is based on the May 1958 exchange of diplomatic notes (now called the NORAD Agreement) as NORAD’s founding date. This perspective, advocated largely by officials from Canada’s Department of External Affairs (DEA), placed emphasis on the “political” aspects of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship, with particular focus on diplomatic procedure and the desire for greater government consultation at the political (strategic) level.²²

This dissertation is therefore not a Canadian political or diplomatic history of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship. It is written as Canadian military history, focusing specifically on the Canadian armed forces’ role in the maintenance of
Canadian sovereignty from 1940 to 1957. The central issue that this study examines is how Canadian military officials were able to ensure effective functional command and control arrangements for the efficient prosecution of the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence effort while at the same time maintaining Canadian sovereignty by retaining command over air defence forces. It is therefore intended that this dissertation, with its “functional” perspective, will be useful to understanding the Canadian Forces’ role in protecting Canada’s sovereignty and also provide empirical historical examples of efficient command and control for current and future continental defence arrangements with the United States in the post-11 September 2001 security and defence environment.

Lastly, it should be noted that while the functional 1957 viewpoint did not belittle the importance of consultation as emphasized in the 1958 political perspective, its emphasis was on taking more of a direct role in the bilateral continental air defence mission by ensuring that Canadian forces played an active and integral part of the overall air defence effort with the United States. In other words, whereas the 1958 political view focused on Canada having a proverbial “seat at the table” to ensure a say in continental air defence policy and strategy, the 1957 functional perspective allowed for a more intimate operational relationship between Canadian and American military personnel. This is akin to what Canadian political scientist Joel Sokolsky has called a “seat at the console.” This concept is of equal if not more importance than “a seat at the table” because it allowed Canadian officers at the operational level working hand-in-hand with their American colleagues to safeguard Canadian sovereignty while at the same time to fulfill an important operational role in the defence of the continent.

Securing “A Piece of the Action” to Avoid a “Defence Against Help” Situation
In undertaking a functional “seat at the console” approach, the Canadian armed forces were also able to avoid what is called a “defence against help” situation with the United States. This concept deserves further explanation. RCAF official historian W.A.B. Douglas observes that “so often in coalition warfare, large and powerful allies sometimes seemed to pose the greatest threat,” and this is demonstrated in the concept of “defence against help.” First articulated by Norwegian academic Nils Ørvik in 1973 as a security “strategy for small states,” “defence against help” dictated that a country had to establish and maintain military credibility if it was to avoid unwanted “help” from its larger neighbours:

One credible objective for small states would be, while not attempting military resistance against a large neighbour, to persuade him that they are strong enough to defend themselves against any of the large neighbour’s potential enemies. This could help avoid the actual military presence of the great neighbour on one’s territory for reasons of military ‘help’ and assistance.

In the case of the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental defence relationship during 1940-1957, there were only two countries involved and there was much disparity between them. Although Canada was the larger partner geographically, the United States was much the greater in terms of population, economic power, and military might. These factors, and also the strategic reality that Canada’s geography placed it between the United States and its enemies during this time period, meant that the “threat” that Douglas referred to above put Canada in a classic “defence against help” situation.

The concept of the “defence against help” in a Canadian context thus stresses the requirement of Canada to maintain a certain credible level of defensive capabilities for fear of the United States losing confidence in Canada’s ability to defend itself, which would thus prompt a potential American usurping of Canadian sovereignty by taking
independent unilateral action in Canadian territory, waters, or airspace in order to protect
U.S. security and defence interests. General Pope articulated the dilemma succinctly in
a 1944 letter to a colleague on the topic of post-war planning with the United States:

To the Americans the defence of the United States is continental defence, which includes us [Canada], and nothing that I can think will ever drive
that idea out of their heads... What we have to fear is more a lack of
confidence in the United States as to our security, rather than enemy
action.  

Therefore, according to the concept of “defence against help,” not only were Canada’s
enemies a threat to Canadian security and sovereignty, but so too was its closest ally.

Former Canadian army officer Louis Grimshaw observes that Canada began to be
faced with a “defence against help” situation with the Americans during the Second
World War as the two countries began to collaborate closely on protecting North
America from potential enemy attack. This situation continued into the Cold War period
in light of the rising threat posed by the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Grimshaw
explained, during this time “Canadian actions would be determined not by ‘what we think
the Soviets might do,’ but rather by ‘what we think the Americans think the Soviets
might do.’” He pointed out that from the Second World War onwards, if there was any
time that Canada’s southern neighbour “felt threatened by any deficiencies in Canadian
security arrangements,” it was very likely that the United States would “act in its own
national interest” by defending itself “through Canada.” Indeed, as Grimshaw notes
further, because “American home defence policy requires a secure Canadian ‘flank’...avoiding any situation which would invite American intervention” in the form of
unilateral and independent action in Canadian territory to defend itself from enemy attack
was therefore a key security and defence concern of the Canadian government once the
two North American countries began their continental defence collaboration in 1940. In the time period studied in this dissertation, Canada therefore had to ensure both its security from the enemy and also its sovereignty by collaborating with the United States in continental defence efforts.

Although some academics have argued that the military situation during the Second World War and the Cold War put Canada in an unenviable situation in which it was forced to bend to American pressures and for all intents and purposes became a U.S. “satellite” or “protectorate,” this dissertation takes a more positive approach. It shows that in its continental air defence command and control relations with the United States, Canada in fact was very effective in safeguarding its sovereignty by avoiding a “defence against help” situation. Canadian steadfastness played an important part in accomplishing this, but so did – perhaps surprisingly – the very accommodating and respectful approach that the United States took with its northern neighbour. Granted, some American operational-level commanders and officials were oftentimes annoyed with Canadian resoluteness – what U.S. PJBD Chairman Fiorello LaGuardia called Canada’s “pride and little brother attitude.” However, as this dissertation shows, the Americans were also very cognizant and respectful of Canadian sensibilities regarding sovereignty and command and control, and did not try to “bully” their northern neighbour into accepting their position.

Importantly, this study shows that the Canadian military in general since 1940 and the RCAF in particular during the early Cold War period also aided the cause for Canadian sovereignty by their attitude towards the continental air defence relationship with the United States. Instead of taking a belligerent approach to American defence
concerns, the Canadian military advocated taking an active and important role in the overall Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship by coordinating with its southern neighbour in arranging effective and efficient bilateral command and control arrangements. Therefore, instead of taking a negative “defence against help” perspective to the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship, this dissertation utilizes a more positive “piece of the action” approach.

The concept of Canada securing a “piece of the action” is best articulated by Canadian military historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer. In his 2000 Occasional Paper for the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS) entitled “From ‘Defence Against Help’ to ‘A Piece of the Action’: The Canadian Sovereignty and Security Paradox Revisited,” Lackenbauer posits that the conscious decision to secure a proverbial “piece of the action” by actively participating in continental defence efforts with the United States enabled Canada to protect its sovereignty from American intervention. Early Cold War RCAF officers definitely understood this requirement to secure a “piece of the action.” For instance, writing in 1954, staff officer Air Commodore W.I. Clements said:

I feel that one of the most important considerations is that now, in peacetime, we have a good opportunity of getting a set-up that would suit us or come somewhere near it (‘us’ being Canadians – government, services and civilians). If nothing is done until war comes we might find things moving with great rapidity and the Americans might, on the excuse of national survival, suddenly take over everything overnight and if New York, etc., were being hydrogen bombed Canada’s complaints about national sovereignty might not be heard above the other noises. I feel Canada should take the initiative now in view of what we stand to gain.
What was it that Canada stood to gain? As mentioned above, it was a “seat at the console” for the RCAF where it could safeguard Canadian sovereignty and perform an important operational role in continental air defence.

However, active participation with the U.S. in the North American air defence effort also promised another – if often overlooked – advantage for Canada. Not only would Canadian sovereignty be protected, but working with the Americans would also provide a good degree of protection for Canadian territory and people from enemy attack. In other words, as Lackenbauer has observed in another publication, Canada’s continental defence relationship with the United States was not simply a choice between sovereignty or security, but by actively engaging with the Americans in the defence of North America Canada could at the same time safeguard both its sovereignty and security.

This dissertation adopts Lackenbauer’s “piece of the action” argument. It does so by stressing that, despite the overwhelming power of the United States, by taking an active role in arranging an effective continental air defence command and control relationship with the United States while at the same time ensuring that Canadian forces did not come under American command, Canada was able to avoid a “defence against help” situation with the United States, maintain Canadian sovereignty, and provide effective air defence for the continent. The “functional” perspective utilized in this dissertation therefore offers a fresh means of examining the Canadian military’s role in maintaining Canada’s sovereignty through command and control arrangements with the United States, and provides important empirical historical continental defence command and control lessons for today’s Canadian Forces.
Other Areas of Focus in this Dissertation

In examining the evolution of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship from 1940 to 1957, this dissertation will cover a variety of important issues related to this subject. To be sure, the Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Navy played important roles in defending North America from attack in the period studied in this dissertation. However, due to space constraints and the fact that by the early Cold War the air defence mission dominated the problem of continental defence in North America, for the sake of brevity and focus, this study will concentrate on the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence operational level command and control relationship. Nonetheless, because air defence during the Second World War was an integral part of the overall continental defence effort – army, navy as well as air force – in both Canada and the United States, the bilateral continental air defence command and control relationship of these two countries during this conflict will be discussed within the overall context of their combined continental defence efforts.

Furthermore, during the Second World War, the air forces that Canada and the United States utilized in the continental defence role also played a very important part in the defence of Allied shipping. In fact, it was in the maritime trade defence role that the two nations’ air forces conducted the majority of their defensive combined operations. Accordingly, the issue of command and control over maritime air forces became intimately involved with the overall Canada-U.S. debate over continental defence forces during the war and is also worth examination in this dissertation.

This study will also demonstrate the importance of individual professional interaction to the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship. It was crucial for
Canadian military personnel to foster a cordial and effective personal working relationship and common views with individuals from their own service, members from the other Canadian services, and especially American personnel in both planning functions and at the operational level in order to ensure effective air defence command and control. Sometimes, as Chapters Four and Five demonstrate, the relationship between Canadian and American personnel could be difficult and confrontational. However, Chapters Six to Nine show that a personal working relationship between like-minded people could go a long way in forming a close bond among airmen and common views on air defence during the early Cold War. This relationship was manifested in the establishment of efficient command and control arrangements for the defence of North America from Soviet strategic bombers.

There is also a need to clarify some of the terminology utilized in this dissertation. Mention has already been made of how command and control principles were still evolving in the 1940-1957 period and military personnel oftentimes used command and control terms such as “control” and “command” interchangeably to mean the same thing. In fact, as this study will demonstrate, the modern definitions of command and control terms came from years of evolution and change. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this dissertation will utilize the modern definitions of command and control principles from current CF doctrine. Accordingly, in quotations that contain command and control terminology not adhering to current definitions, the modern command and control term will be placed in square brackets.

Much in the same way, in the 1940-1957 period – and especially during the Second World War – the operational level of warfare was also still a relatively new
concept in the English-speaking world. For example, Joe Sharpe and Allan English explain that Commonwealth aircrew during the war saw the term “operational” to “indicate that someone was ready to go on ‘ops’ as opposed to still being in training.”\textsuperscript{36} What this meant was that the exact meaning of the term “operational” and the relationship of the operational level with the other two levels of warfare was still evolving during the war and continued to evolve and clarify during the early Cold War period. As a consequence, military personnel at times used the term “operational” when referring to the operational level of warfare but also freely used the terms “strategic” and “tactical” interchangeably to mean the same thing.\textsuperscript{37}

In the same vein, military personnel during the time period studied also used the terms “joint” and “combined” interchangeably, oftentimes in reverse of today’s usage. However, to be consistent with current military terminology, in this study “joint” will mean multi-service, while “combined” will refer to multilateral (two or more nations) interaction, usually in a coalition or an alliance.\textsuperscript{38} Accordingly, as with command and control principles, for the sake of clarity and consistency this dissertation will use the most recent terminology from CF doctrine throughout. This practice will serve both as a basis of understanding for the reader and as a comparison to any military terminology utilized in the time period of this study.

Lastly, although this dissertation examines the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship, there will be certain issues and areas related to this topic that it will not discuss. These include the deployment and detailed descriptions of Canadian and American military aircraft. Additionally, the controversies and debates surrounding the Avro Arrow interceptor and nuclear air defence weapons will not be examined, those
being largely political topics that had little effect on the operational-level Canada-U.S. command and control arrangements for air defence. Finally, because this dissertation ends with the establishment of NORAD in 1957, its focus on the enemy threat in the Cold War period is limited to the Canadian and American efforts to defend North America from Soviet manned intercontinental bombers. It does not include the launching of the Sputnik satellite, nor the resulting effect of the rising Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat to the continent or the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis on the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship.

Because this dissertation focuses only on the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship and not the association of Canada with other nations, the spotlight will be on bilateral command and control arrangements. In fact, the United States was consistently adamant that continental defence remain a purely Canada-U.S. concern, not a multilateral one with the involvement of other nations.\(^{39}\) Therefore, multilateral command and control arrangements, for example those for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), will only be discussed in relation to how they impacted the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationships.

**Outline of Chapters**

There are a total of ten chapters in this dissertation, which includes this current Introduction as Chapter One. Chapter Two is a critical examination of previous relevant written work related to the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship from the Second World War to the early Cold War period. It is divided into two parts, the historiography of the study of Canadian and American air defence, and an examination of the literature on historical command and control topics. It shows that
there are in fact only a small number of secondary source publications that have touched
on Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control from 1940-1957 and that
this dissertation, based largely on primary source documents from both countries, will fill
an important gap in the historiography.

Chapter Three examines specific command and control principles, concepts,
organization, and ideas that are relevant to Canada-U.S. continental air defence during
the Second World War and early Cold War. It does so by analyzing Canadian, American
and British command and control and organizational culture and practice, categorizing
them into five individual command and control “systems.” It also differentiates between
command concepts such as unity of command, command and control principles, and
command organizations. Chapter Three demonstrates that since 1940, Canada and the
United States sought to reconcile variously each country’s own joint system of command
and control, the Canadian joint committee cooperation system, and the American unity of
command system, all for bilateral combined Canada-U.S. air defence command and
control.

Chapter Four examines the beginning of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence
command and control relationship during the first years of the Second World War and the
efforts of both countries to form combined plans to defend North America from potential
Axis attack. During this time, the unique Canadian and American command and control
cultures often conflicted, but the two North American countries were eventually able to
find the middle ground by establishing a compromise cooperation-unity of command
system. In the resulting Canada-U.S. Defence Plan, ABC-22, the two countries agreed
that the Canadian joint committee cooperation system would be put into effect, but in the
case of an emergency operational commanders could put the American unity of command system in place, subject to confirmation by the countries’ chiefs of staff.

Chapter Five outlines the command and control relationship between Canadian and American operational-level commanders during the Second World War. Focusing on Newfoundland, where the forces of both nations were stationed, and on the Pacific coast after the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it shows that despite the ABC-22 arrangements, disagreements still persisted amongst Canadians and Americans regarding what the command and control relationship between their forces should be. Despite several efforts by American military officials to implement unity of command over combined Canada-U.S. forces under an American officer, Canadian officials refused to concede that the military threat to North America necessitated this measure, and secured reassurances from the U.S. military leadership in Washington that mutual cooperation would suffice. Chapter Five also examines how personalities amongst operational-level commanders played an important part in the command and control relationship and analyzes how effective ABC-22’s mutual cooperation principle was following implementation after Pearl Harbor for continental defence and maritime trade defence operations. Importantly, the chapter also reveals that when it became apparent that the Canadian joint committee cooperation system was not working for combined Canada-U.S. maritime air operations in the Northwest Atlantic, a change was needed. This led to the implementation of the much more effective British operational control system, which proved to be an important precedent for future Canada-U.S. air defence command and control arrangements.
Chapter Six addresses Canadian-American continental defence collaboration and command and control arrangements in the years immediately following the Second World War, and Canada’s efforts to avoid a potential “defence against help” situation with its southern neighbour. It outlines the development of a new Soviet aerial threat to North America and discusses how the focus of Canada-U.S. planning began to change from one concentrated on continental defence (defending against air, land, and sea threats) towards one more increasingly concentrating on continental air defence to face this new danger to the vital population and industrial centres of North America. It also examines the creation of the new Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan to defend North America against this enemy. Chapter Six demonstrates how in this plan Canada and the U.S. maintained the cooperation-unity of command compromise system of combined command and control but also now included a new air defence appendix. For the first time, this appendix considered the possibility of utilizing the principle of operational control as the basis of the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship.

Chapter Seven examines how, as the danger from the Soviet Union continued to grow in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Americans became increasingly concerned about an air attack on North America coming through Canadian airspace. The United States began to press Canada for greater measures to coordinate their air defences. This led to new arrangements for fighter aircraft cross-border interception and mutual reinforcement. At the same time, the Canada-U.S. continental defence command and control arrangements gradually evolved away from the co-operation-unity of command compromise paradigm and towards a system more focused on operational control, as embodied in the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan and the exercise of operational
control authority over one country’s air defence forces by the other country’s operational
commander in national airspace. Chapter Seven also touches on individual air defence
command and control and command organization developments in Canada and the
United States. It outlines significant developments in air force command organization in
Canada and the United States towards national functional air defence commands, and
also the arrangement of air defence assets under centralized command and control.

Chapter Eight demonstrates how the evolution of Canada-U.S. continental air
defences into a more integrated system continued in the early-1950s, by examining the
interesting – and previously largely undocumented in the historical literature – case study
of the RCAF’s command and control relationship with a new American unified command
in Newfoundland and Labrador, U.S. Northeast Command. It shows how the principle of
operational control in national airspace was formalized in a specific agreement between
the two countries that allowed the RCAF to exercise this command and control authority
over United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft over Newfoundland. Moreover, this
chapter analyzes the further evolution of the command and control principle of
operational control in an air defence context for North America, which formed a crucial
precedent for NORAD.

Chapter Nine discusses the period between the Soviet Union’s explosion of a
thermonuclear bomb in 1953 and the establishment of NORAD in 1957. It outlines the
culmination of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship
by discussing efforts by USAF and RCAF officers to integrate North American air
defences and centralize them under one overall commander. The chapter demonstrates
that a key concern of Canadian officials was a potential surrender of sovereignty by
giving command of Canadian air forces to the Americans in such a scheme, but this was allayed by deciding, at the suggestion of RCAF Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Roy Slemon, on operational control as the command and control principle to be exercised by the NORAD Commander-in-Chief (CinC). Operational control continued to evolve in an air defence context from 1953 into the version that was utilized for NORAD in 1957 and still appears in the NORAD Agreement today. Importantly, Chapter Nine demonstrates that NORAD, far from hindering Canadian sovereignty, was an effective safeguard of it, as it integrated RCAF air defence forces into the American system, was a bilateral command organization with Canadian as well as U.S. personnel, and also included a Canadian Deputy CinC who exercised operational control in the NORAD CinC’s absence. Lastly, the concluding Chapter Ten summarizes all of the main points in this dissertation and offers command and control lessons learned for today’s Canadian Forces.

Conclusion

In summary, this dissertation is a focused study of the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship from the Second World War to the establishment of NORAD. It fills an important gap in the historiography of Canada’s efforts to defend North America in concert with the United States and in so doing provides a solid basis for understanding the current debates regarding command and control in the ongoing Canada-U.S. continental defence relationship. Indeed, there are several similarities between the continental defence command and control issues of the early Cold War era and those facing the Canadian Forces in the present day.

The issue of ensuring efficient command and control is an especially poignant one to today’s Canadian air force, for as Allan English has noted:
effective command and control (C2) is essential to the conduct of military
and integrated operations and especially to the application of aerospace
power. However, in much of the current C2 doctrine, the terms ‘command,’
‘control’ and ‘command and control’ are not defined clearly or are defined
in ways that fail to provide practical help to military professionals in the
exercise of command or in the design of command arrangements.40

English and John Westrop suggest that to help allay this problem, certain topics must be
“explored related to command in an Air Force context” and that one of these is “the
evolution of command, control, and command and control in the period 1929 to the end
of the Cold War.41 By discussing Canada-U.S. command and control relations in an air
force context with a focus on continental air defence, this dissertation will also be an
important contribution towards addressing these gaps in the history of Canadian military
aviation. In so doing, it is hoped that this study will provide important command and
control lessons learned and examples for today’s Canadian Forces in general and the
Canadian air force in particular.
Chapter Two
Literature Review

In order to undertake a study on the 1940-1957 Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship, it is first necessary to examine the relevant historiography on the subject. This literature review chapter will address this requirement in two main parts. The first will consist of an examination of the academic historical writing on continental air defence during the Second World War and the early Cold War period. The second part will be a discussion of the historiography of air defence command and control.

Second World War Continental Air Defence

Although there has been some academic historical work on the air defence role of Canadian and American air forces during the Second World War, the main focus has been on the individual efforts by each country, i.e., the air defence of Canada and the air defence of the United States, but rarely the cooperative efforts of both together. Accordingly, there has been little written on actual continental air defence – that is, bilateral Canadian-American efforts to work together to protect North America from any potential enemy aerial attack during the Second World War. This literature review chapter therefore begins by examining the historical writing on American air defence and then on Canadian air defence.

The history of American air defence during the Second World War is well served by official histories. These are the United States Air Force’s multi-volume series, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, published in the late 1940s shortly after the establishment of an independent air force in the United States.¹ Written by a number of American academic air force historians and edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James
Lea Cate, these official histories outline the wartime experiences of the fledgling American air forces during the war, when they were still part of the U.S. Army (the Air Corps – renamed in June 1941 the U.S. Army Air Forces, or USAAF). None of the volumes is dedicated solely to air defence, but some contain parts on air defence topics, such as the chapter entitled “Air Defense of the Western Hemisphere” in Volume One of the series. These accounts provide useful background on the USAAF’s role in defending the United States from a potential Axis aerial attack; however, they make very little mention of Canada or any combined Canadian-American continental air defence efforts. In addition, most of these USAAF official histories are upwards of 60 years old, and tend to be rather dated.

One publication that partially solves this problem is a more recent USAF official history, Kenneth Schaffel’s *The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945-1960.* Although largely focused on American air defence in the early Cold War era, Schaffel’s 1991 book also includes two chapters that outline the development of American air defence roles and doctrine during the inter-war period and the USAAF’s mission to defend the United States from potential Axis aerial attack during the Second World War. However, even though these chapters allow one to gain a good understanding of the organizational and doctrinal basis of American air forces during this conflict, as with the Craven and Cate series there is again very little mention of Canada.

In Canadian air force historiography the situation is not much better. Unlike Schaffel’s *Emerging Shield,* there is no official history focused specifically on the RCAF’s role in air defence during the Second World War and early Cold War. However,
historians interested in Canadian air defence during the Second World War are well served by Volume Two of the Department of National Defence (DND) Directorate of History and Heritage’s (DHH) official history. Written by a team led by academic historian W.A.B. Douglas, *The Creation of a National Air Force* includes an entire section on the air defence of Canada during the Second World War. It consists of three chapters that outline the RCAF’s policy and procurement issues, the air defence of eastern and central Canada, and the protection of Canada’s Pacific coast from enemy attack, respectively. These chapters are by no means strict narrative accounts of the RCAF’s efforts to build up its meagre resources to protect the country from enemy attack; they also contain thoughtful and critical analysis of policy, procurement, force structure, and air defence planning based largely on impressive and extensive primary source research. Indeed, *Creation of a National Air Force* is the clear starting point for anyone wishing to study the RCAF’s air defence mission during the Second World War. Importantly, although its focus is not specifically on the Canadian-American combined mission to protect North America from aerial attack, Volume Two of the RCAF official history does at times discuss common Canada-U.S. air defence efforts during the Second World War, notably those in Newfoundland, at Sault Ste Marie, and on the west coast.

Unfortunately, despite the excellent job done in *Creation of a National Air Force* to form the basis for additional work on the RCAF’s air defence mission in Canada during the Second World War, there has been very little academic historical writing on this subject outside of Douglas’s official history. In June 2001 the Canadian air force’s Office of Air Force Heritage & History hosted a conference on “Canada in NORAD” at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs. This organization later published a number
of the papers presented in the conference proceedings, two of which dealt with the
RCAF’s Second World War air defence efforts. The first, by Colonel (Retired) Ernie
Cable entitled “Continental Air Defence Before NORAD,” outlines the various means by
which the RCAF built up its air defence organization and carried out its mission during
the war, including descriptions of the Aircraft Detection Corps, the establishment of a
rudimentary radar net in eastern Canada, and the effect that these measures had on the
daily lives of Canadians living nearby. However, Cable’s article touches only briefly on
coordinated Canadian-American air defence efforts during the war. Moreover, it is not
academic history, lacking footnotes and analysis and based largely on secondary sources
instead of primary archival source material, a common feature of most of the writing on
the history of the RCAF.

The second article in the conference proceedings is my “Plugging the Holes in the
Roof: The Origins of a Northern Aerial Threat to North America.” It is academic air
force history based on both primary and secondary sources that analyzes strategic
bombing theories, aircraft technology, and the subsequent growing aerial threat to North
America by the beginning of the Second World War. The article also examines RCAF
perceptions and planning on how to deal with this new threat. Importantly, it does so by
situating RCAF air defence efforts to defend central Canada during the Second World
War in the context of bilateral Canada-U.S. continental defence planning and measures,
notably American-manned radar posts in northern Ontario and Manitoba and the
combined Canada-U.S. task to defend the vital canal at Sault Ste Marie from a potential
enemy bomber attack by way of Hudson Bay. It concludes that these Second World War
experiences set an important precedent for future Canada-U.S. continental air defence
cooperation during the Cold War, an argument that is echoed in this dissertation in regard to command and control.

Post-Second World War Continental Air Defence

The situation regarding the academic writing of the history of Canada-U.S. continental air defence during the early Cold War is marginally better than the Second World War historiography on the subject. Although a number of publications focus individually on Canadian or American air defence, there are also a few that pay specific attention to the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence effort during this time period. We begin our examination of these sources with a discussion of Canadian writing on early Cold War air defence.

Unfortunately, academic research and writing on the post-Second World War RCAF in general and its air defence mission in particular has been minimal. There are several reasons for this situation. For one, most of the Canadian academic work on RCAF air defence and Canada-U.S. continental air defence has focused on the “political” or “1958” approach, with the “1957” service or “functional” perspective being neglected.6 This has been additionally skewed in that much of the academic work has been written either by diplomatic historians, journalists, or political scientists, not military historians.7

Most of the air force history related to Canadian air defence during the Cold War deals with equipment procurement, and especially the debacle surrounding the development and eventual cancellation of the Avro Arrow. Little of this written work is academic air force history, and instead largely falls into the category of “popular” air force history. Oftentimes, such publications are useful reference works, but they contain
minimal, if any, footnotes or analysis. Only Randy Wakelam’s excellent Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) War Studies Master’s thesis analyzing RCAF early Cold War fighter procurement stands out as a notable exception.

Also common are works that could be termed as “reference” publications dealing in varying degrees with the history of Canadian air defence in the early Cold War. These books, such as Samuel Kostenuk and John Griffin’s *RCAF Squadron Histories and Aircraft 1924-1968*, sections of Lieutenant-Colonel D.J. Goodspeed’s *The Armed Forces of Canada 1867-1967*, and Don Nicks, John Bradley & Chris Charland’s *A History of the Air Defence of Canada 1948-1997*, provide good reference material and decent descriptions of some general issues (in addition to excellent photographs), but do not go into any kind of detail or contain significant analysis. Most importantly for the academic air force historian, the majority of these books do not have footnotes that provide references for their material. One exception is Hugh Halliday and Brereton Greenhous’s *Canada’s Air Forces 1914-1999*, which contains some footnotes and analysis. Nonetheless, because this book is a general account of the entire history of air forces in Canada up to 1999 that is targeted towards a more general, non-academic audience, it is limited in detail on most subjects, including air defence.

There are also a small number of other academic Canadian air force publications that touch on the RCAF’s air defence role worth mentioning in this literature review. In the book edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris entitled *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*, there are chapters that examine two of the men who held the RCAF’s top position of Chief of the Air Staff during the early Cold War. In his examination of the career of Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis, Jeff Noakes outlines Curtis’s
experiences climbing the ranks of the RCAF.\textsuperscript{12} This included Curtis’s time on the
Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Working Committee on Post-
Hostilities Problems late in the Second World War, which “examined the future of the
Canadian-American defence relationship.”\textsuperscript{13} However, except for a discussion of aircraft
procurement, Noakes dedicates little space to the RCAF’s air defence role and its
relationship with the United States. In comparison, in his article in \textit{Warrior Chiefs}
examining the career of Air Marshal Roy Slemon, Sandy Babcock discusses aircraft
procurement and force structure issues, but also examines Slemon’s close association
with air defence.\textsuperscript{14} This includes his concern for the ability of the RCAF Auxiliary to
defend Canada from air attack; and in particular his endeavour “towards the full
professionalization of the air defence role in Canada by repeatedly arguing for the
removal of the Auxiliary from this important function and for an increased involvement
of the RCAF in it.”\textsuperscript{15} Importantly, Babcock also discusses Slemon’s role as Chief of the
Air Staff in the successful efforts of the RCAF in the mid-1950s to centralize continental
air defence under one authority and his important role as the Deputy Commander-in-
Chief of NORAD from 1957 to 1964.

Babcock also discusses RCAF force structure and the role of the Auxiliary in air
defence in another article where he is critical of how the Canadian air force leadership
allowed the RCAF’s reserve formation to “whither on the vine.”\textsuperscript{16} An academic air force
historian who addresses this subject in a more positive light is Major Mat Joost.\textsuperscript{17} In his
article entitled “The RCAF Auxiliary and the Air Defence of North America, 1948-1960”
from the “Canada in NORAD” conference proceedings, Joost examines the contribution
of the Auxiliary to the air defence of Canada by examining its equipment, personnel, and
training operations. He demonstrates that besides its operational fighter squadrons, the Auxiliary performed a number of important functions, including “trained radar plotters and aircraft controllers, intelligence officers and medical staff.” Indeed, the role of these “non-flying” RCAF personnel in the air defence of Canada is one that has been neglected in Canadian air force history. Although some academics have recently begun to dedicate greater attention to non-flying air defence functions such as the construction and manning of the massive Canada-U.S. radar lines in the Canadian Arctic during the Cold War, this is still a relatively new area of historical research.

To be sure, recently there has been a slowly growing body of Canadian academic air force historical publications, aided by support from such organizations such as the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC) in Trenton. Some deal with air defence, with my article on RCAF air defence leadership and Mathew Trudgen’s piece on 1947-1960 USAF-RCAF air defence relations in the forthcoming CFAWC publication Sic Itur Ad Astra: Canadian Aerospace Power Studies Volume 1: Historical Aspects of Canadian Air Power Leadership being good examples. Nonetheless, overall it is still an uphill battle to find good academic analytical pieces based on solid primary source research that examine the RCAF’s air defence role during the early Cold War.

One of the main reasons for the lack of a foundation for Canadian Cold War academic air force history is the absence of an official history on this period. Due to budget cuts in the 1990s, the fourth volume in the DND official history of the air force, which would have covered the post-war period, had to be scrapped. Perhaps even more unfortunate is the fact that no preliminary work – the excellent narratives that DHH produces and upon which official histories are based – was undertaken. Finally, there is
also an issue of access to the primary source research that has hampered academic air
defence historical writing in Canada. One factor is that there are very few memoirs
written by or biographies written about the RCAF’s air – or general – ranking senior
officers. Another has to do with the primary source documents. Although DHH has an
excellent collection of Cold War documents, notably the invaluable Raymont
Collection, the majority of the relevant RCAF files are held at Library and Archives
Canada (LAC) and are, regrettably, still restricted and subject to lengthy and oftentimes
fruitless Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) procedures.

A comparison of this Canadian situation regarding the study of post-Second
World War air defence with the American one is revealing. There are, to be sure, also
similar issues facing American academic air force historians such as certain documents
remaining restricted in U.S. archival institutions. Nonetheless, in terms of official
histories and historical narratives the record is much better. Schaffel’s *Emerging Shield*
is an excellent official history account of the USAF’s efforts to defend the United States
from air attack during the Cold War. In particular, it is a valuable resource on the
American service’s efforts to develop air defence doctrine and aircraft, and build and
enhance measures to counter the growing Soviet nuclear strategic bomber threat.

Nonetheless, although the RCAF and the USAF worked hand-in-hand during the early
Cold War period to protect North America from this threat, there is surprisingly little
mention of Canada and of the combined Canada-U.S. continental air defence effort in this
official history. The only significant exception is in Chapter Nine, where Schaffel does
dedicate a few pages to the establishment of NORAD. This account contains not only
important background information, but also key observations by NORAD’s first
Commander-in-Chief (General Earle Partridge, USAF) and his Canadian Deputy Commander-in-Chief (Air Marshal Slemon) on the importance of the bilateral Canada-U.S. air defence command organization based on interviews that Schaffel conducted with the two airmen.

Schaffel’s work is supplemented by a number of USAF and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff command historical narratives that deal with U.S. air defence and continental air defence.26 These focused studies provide key information on American air defence command organization and command and control developments, and at times some insights on Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relations. Most importantly, the majority of these USAF and JCS narratives include good footnotes which contain valuable information and insights for further archival research on these subjects.

By far the best historical account of the evolution Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship in the early Cold War period is Joseph Jockel’s seminal work on the subject, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958.27 Jockel is an American political scientist who is the Director of Canadian Studies at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York. Based largely on primary source documents, his book is an important and balanced historical account that addresses both the “1958 political” and “1957 functional” aspects of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence from the years immediately following the Second World War to the signing of the NORAD Agreement by the Canadian and U.S. governments in 1958. Jockel argues that the intimate Canada-U.S. (and in particular RCAF-USAF) continental air defence relationship, although most conspicuous to the
public after the controversial establishment of NORAD in 1957 (see Chapter Nine in this dissertation), in fact had its origins as far back as 1945, when the two countries began collaborating to defend North America from a new potential Soviet atomic aerial threat after the Second World War.

Written in the early 1980s and published in 1987, No Boundaries Upstairs was a groundbreaking publication that set the standard for all future studies of Cold War Canada-U.S. continental air defence. Nonetheless, Jockel’s focus was on the ministerial and chiefs of staff level, and did not examine in detail how senior officers in the RCAF other than the Chief of the Air Staff felt about the air defence relationship with the United States. In addition, although Jockel gained unprecedented access to previously classified American documents through U.S. ATIP procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), there was still a large body of American and Canadian archival records that remained restricted when he wrote his book. Therefore, this dissertation also fills in some of the gaps based on new information from files that have subsequently been declassified/opened (for example, the previously-classified Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan – see Chapter Seven).

Lastly, Jockel’s most recent book, Canada in NORAD 1957-2007: A History, also briefly discusses the background to the establishment of NORAD. It does so by largely reiterating similar points from No Boundaries Upstairs, with some minor changes in light of research (largely secondary sources) that has been done since the publication of that book in 1987. However, the main focus of this publication is the history of NORAD since 1957, which is beyond the years examined in this dissertation. The book’s main
value to this dissertation is the introduction of the “1957” and “1958” perspectives regarding NORAD in functional military terms and political terms, respectively.

**Command and Control**

Command has been one of the most contentious, yet one of the least studied, issues throughout the history of Canada’s air forces.

-Allan English

If there has been little written on Canadian air defence history, by comparison there has been far less literature dealing with the history of air defence command and control. Although there have been a bevy of Canadian publications on the study of command and control recently, they have largely been contemporary in nature, with Allan English, John Westrop, Joe Sharpe, Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann leading the way. English in particular has recognized the importance of examining the historical development of command and control, stressing that it can provide the Canadian air force with “valuable insights that can help lead us in understanding the continuing evolution of command concepts.”

Nevertheless, the unfortunate reality is that, despite English’s conclusion, there have in fact been very few Canadian historical studies on command and control in general and air defence command and control in particular. Instead, examination of command and control in history has usually been integrated into wider studies of historical topics, appearing as loose threads in the overall tapestry, usually focusing on expeditionary operations, not continental air defence. Canadian historical studies of command and control, or “command relations” as they have previously been known, are thus few and far between.

One of these rare studies on historical command and control is Paul Dickson’s chapter entitled “Colonials and Coalitions: Canada-British Command Relations between

Dickson focuses on coalition command relations, and in particular the important part that personalities played in the military relationship between Canadian generals and their British colleagues (and superiors) during the campaigns in Northwest Europe in 1944-1945. However, this article largely concerns expeditionary army command experiences, usually at the government policy and tactical levels, and does not delve into actual command and control principles. It thus has only minimal relevance to air force operational-level command and control issues.

Another Canadian historical study on a command and control topic is Wilfred Lund’s Queen’s University Master’s thesis, “Command Relations in the North West Atlantic, 1939-1943.” This work is a very important command and control piece because it discusses naval command relations surrounding the creation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, the only active theatre of war to be commanded by a Canadian. However, although Lund’s thesis is a valuable study of naval command and control developments, it makes very little reference to the air force’s role, despite the fact that maritime air power played a large part in joint operations with the RCN for the defence of maritime trade in the Northwest Atlantic. The recent two-part RCN official history produced by DHH, *No Higher Purpose* and *Blue Water Navy*, remedies this problem to some degree, ensuring to make mention of the RCAF in their overall discussion of the establishment and growth of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command. However, the best source that addresses the Canadian maritime air power subject is W.A.B. Douglas’s aforementioned RCAF official history, *Creation of a*
National Air Force.\textsuperscript{36} Douglas briefly examines air force command and control issues in the context of an overall discussion of the RCAF’s maritime air power efforts during the Second World War. In doing so he provides important insights into both joint and bilateral RCAF command and control culture and practice, such as the Canadian military’s distaste for unity of command and the background to the establishment of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command in an air force context.

In addition, my Queen’s University Master’s thesis, “The Struggle for a Joint Command and Control System in the Northwest Atlantic Theatre of Operations: A Study of the RCAF and RCN Trade Defence Efforts During the Battle of the Atlantic,” also addresses historical Canadian command and control issues.\textsuperscript{37} Focusing on Canadian maritime air power, it describes the difficulties experienced by the RCAF in its efforts to form an effective joint command and control relationship with the RCN in order to protect Allied shipping in the Northwest Atlantic during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{38} It touches briefly on Canada’s relationship with the United States in performing this task, but its main value is its examination of Canadian joint command and control culture and practice, specifically the RCAF-RCN relationship, which, as this current study shows, formed an important basis for the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship from 1940-1957. In a way, then, this dissertation is a continuation of the examination of joint command and control begun in my Master’s thesis.

Lastly, it is also worth mentioning those publications that, although not specifically focusing on Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control issues, discuss the subject to some degree. Allan English gives a good overview of the history of Canadian air force leadership and command and control in two of his most
recent publications for the CFAWC, *Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations* (with John Westrop) and *Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations*.\(^{39}\) In particular, in the first publication English and Westrop note that the Second World War Canadian practice of relinquishing operational command of the RCAF’s overseas expeditionary forces to Britain’s Royal Air Force had an overall negative effect on the command capabilities of the RCAF leadership. In particular, they argue that “the absence of an operational-level RCAF command structure limited opportunities for senior RCAF officers to become exposed to strategic- and operational-level planning considerations” and “also meant that the RCAF had little say in the employment of RCAF units overseas.”\(^{40}\)

However, English and Westrop also note that the commanders of the RCAF’s Second World War Home War Establishment command organizations in Canada, Eastern Air Command and Western Air Command, fared much better, as they “exercised full command (operational and administrative) over assigned forces.”\(^{41}\) As this dissertation demonstrates, the retention of this command and control authority by RCAF commanders in Canada was a practice that continued in the post-war period and proved to be a crucial asset to the RCAF in its evolving continental air defence command and control relationship with the United States. Overall, English’s CFAWC books give a solid background on the most important leadership and command and control issues facing today’s Canadian air force. However, because these publications are general examinations of leadership and command and control, English is only able to give a
cursory examination of the historical account of the subject based on the limited secondary sources available.\textsuperscript{42}

Another author who discusses the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship during the Second World War is U.S. Army official historian Colonel Stanley Dziuban. He completed a dissertation at Columbia University during the 1950s on Canadian-American military relations during the Second World War, which was later published as a volume of the U.S. Army “Special Studies” official history series and entitled \textit{Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945}.

Dziuban was a former officer on the staff of the U.S. Army Operations Division’s Strategic and Policy Group who at times attended meetings of the Canada-U.S. Military Co-Operation Committee. When he began his research on \textit{Military Relations Between the United States and Canada}, Dziuban therefore had the advantage of having an intimate understanding of and an “inside look” at the Canada-U.S. planning process. Moreover, Dziuban’s superiors gave him unprecedented access to the previously classified American wartime documents on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, causing some consternation amongst Canadian officials since the equivalent files were still restricted in Canada.

Importantly, though not specifically focusing on air defence, Dziuban dedicated an entire chapter in \textit{Military Relations Between the United States and Canada} to “Organization and Command.”\textsuperscript{45} Given Dziuban’s free access to American documents (notably those of the PJBD), when published in 1959, his official history was a groundbreaking study that outlined some of the difficulties experienced by Canadian and American planners in making command and control arrangements for combined continental defence plans. However, Dziuban makes some incorrect conclusions in the
book regarding command and control relations, largely because his primary source base was limited to American documents and thus did not include the Canadian perspective that this dissertation addresses.

One source that in particular gives a good account of the Canadian perspective of the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship during the Second World War is the memoir by Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*.46 Pope was the Canadian Army member of the PJBD during much of the war and his book gives significant insight into the Canadian-American disagreements, some details of which did not appear in the official record contained in the PJBD Journals that Dziuban relied on for his publication. Importantly, Pope demonstrates the important role that Canadian planners played in standing up to American pressure to accept U.S. strategic direction and unity of command over Canadian forces in combined Canada-U.S. continental defence operations.

Another important source that provides a more balanced account of the wartime Canada-U.S. command and control relationship is noted Canadian military historian C.P. Stacey’s seminal official history, *Arms, Men and Governments: the War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945*.47 Although acknowledging some of the difficulties inherent in the Canada-U.S. continental defence command and control relationship, Stacey also highlights the successes experienced by the two nations’ armed forces in eventually coming to mutually agreeable arrangements. Importantly, Stacey dedicates an entire section to the debate between mutual cooperation (the Canadian preference) and strategic direction and unity of command (the American preference) as the main command and control principle for combined Canada-U.S. continental defence plans.
In addition, Stacey also spends a number of pages discussing some of the problems regarding command and control in Newfoundland that Canadian and American operational-level commanders had to face in their combined efforts to defend the island from potential Axis attack (discussed in Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation). In both instances, although Stacey’s book is a Canadian official history, he includes both the Canadian and American perspectives, using primary sources from both countries so as to provide an account that is as balanced as possible. Lastly, Stacey also discusses Canadian military organization in *Arms, Men, and Governments*, which provides important insights into Canadian command and control culture and practice and the development of the Canadian joint committee cooperation system of command and control (see Chapter Three).

Another publication that dedicates some time to the Canada-U.S. continental defence command and control defence relationship during the Second World War is Galen Perras’s *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance 1933-1945: Necessary, but Not Necessary Enough*. Utilizing an impressive array of American and Canadian primary sources, Perras dedicates several pages of his book to Canada-U.S. defence planning and command and control relationships. Indeed, his notes in particular are also very useful for insights into further research on this topic. However, Perras’s focus is largely on the Pacific Coast, and as a result he neglects the interaction between Canadian and American operational-level commanders in Newfoundland, which as Chapter Five of this dissertation shows, was where some of the most important command and control developments occurred. Lastly, Perras dedicates a number of pages to the efforts by the Americans to implement unity of command on the
west coast, but does not go into any kind of detail regarding what the command and control authority of unity of command actually entailed.\textsuperscript{49}

In terms of post-Second World War historical command and control, there are very few publications by Canadian authors that deal with continental air defence to any significant degree. One that bears mentioning is Sean Maloney’s \textit{Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948-1954}.\textsuperscript{50} Although he focuses largely on naval issues, Maloney, a member of the faculty at RMC, provides good insight into the formation of Canadian, American, and Canadian-American command structures. Importantly, Maloney categorizes command systems, specifically the U.S. unity of command system and the British joint committee system. However, the focus of these systems is on command organization, not command and control. Although he does make mention of various command and control principles such as operational control, unity of command, strategic direction, cooperation, etc., he does not define them, perhaps on the assumption that the reader has an understanding of these terms. However, because these command and control principles were still evolving, particularly during the Second World War, this is an oversight of Maloney’s that this dissertation addresses.

It should also be noted that Maloney presents excellent documentation in \textit{Securing Command of the Sea}, and his notes are invaluable for further research into a variety of topics, including continental defence plans and command and control structures. Nonetheless, Maloney’s book is very technical in nature in that it describes the details of certain organizations and developments but generally lacks discussion of the various military personalities involved. Furthermore, Maloney’s book also suffers
from using too many military abbreviations, thereby requiring one to have a knowledge of such terminology in order to sort through most of the military jargon.

Another source that touches on historical command and control topics is Commander (Retired) Peter Haydon’s *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered.*\(^{51}\) In his examination of Canadian participation in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Haydon provides perhaps the best account to date of Canadian military organization in the Cold War. In stressing the failure of Canada’s Progressive Conservative government and the officials in the Department of External Affairs to understand the command organization of the Canadian military and its bilateral defence responsibilities, Haydon examines both Canadian-American planning for continental defence and the organizational structure of the Canadian armed forces. In particular, in the context of Canadian command organization, Haydon outlines the important relationships between the government, the military chiefs of staff, and the commanders at the operational level, especially in terms of national command and operational command (see Chapter 1). Nonetheless, although Haydon does make note of several command and control arrangements, the overall general focus of his book on the Cuban Missile Crisis itself does not permit any kind of detailed analysis of command and control. Finally, it must be stressed that the notes in Haydon’s book are also very helpful for providing clues for further research into command and control and Canadian military organizational structure issues.

Regarding publications on continental air defence command and control by American historians, Schaffel’s *Emerging Shield* USAF official history is worth briefly mentioning. Although this book is a general examination of American air defence during
the early Cold War, it does at varying points contain vital information on USAF air
defence command organization. Notably, these instances include efforts by the American
air force leadership to centralize air defences in the United States in order to achieve
greater efficiency in light of the growing Soviet aerial threat. However, Schaffel’s book
does not deal with specific Canada-U.S. command and control arrangements for
continental air defence.\textsuperscript{52} One source that does is Jockel’s aforementioned \textit{No}
\textit{Boundaries Upstairs}, which is to date the best publication touching on the Canada-U.S.
continental air defence command and control relationship. Although Jockel’s focus is not
specifically on command and control, he discusses it as an important part of the overall
examination of the origins of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship from
the early post-Second World War years to the establishment of NORAD. Most
importantly, Jockel outlines the cross-border interception arrangements agreed to
between the Canadian and American governments during the 1950s, and he also
dedicates an entire chapter to efforts by both nations’ air forces to centralize their air
defence efforts under one commander with the creation of NORAD. In particular, Jockel
demonstrates that the proposed operational control authority to be exercised by the USAF
Commander-in-Chief (and his Canadian deputy in his absence) became a viable option to
the United States and especially Canada because it meant that Canadian air defence
forces would not come under American command.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This dissertation supplements Jockel’s work and addresses certain command and
control issues that he did not discuss or could not discuss because of the restrictions
placed on certain primary source material at the time. For instance, although \textit{No}
Boundaries Upstairs examines post-war bilateral command and control arrangements in the 1946 Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan, in addition to the NORAD operational control issue, it does not discuss the origins of this and other command and control terms. My dissertation, however, analyzes the evolution of specific command and control principles based on Canadian, American and British joint command and control culture and practice during the Second World War. Therefore, based on extensive research of Canadian, American, and British documents, some of which have previously remained closed to researchers, my dissertation builds on Jockel’s solid foundation and aims to fill the gap in the historiography on the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship during the Second World War and early Cold War period.

To summarize, there has been a relatively limited number of secondary source publications that in one way or another have touched on Canada-U.S. air defence and/or command and control from 1940-1957. Regardless, the fact remains that there is no study that includes a focused examination of the bilateral Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship during this time period. The purpose of this dissertation is to fill that gap in the historiography.

Because most secondary source works examine this subject only peripherally, primary sources form the bulk of the research material for this study. These include relevant memoirs and accounts from military officers involved in the development of the 1940-1957 Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship. The majority of primary sources utilized in this dissertation, however, consist of official government and military service documents. These include the ones published in the excellent Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s Documents on

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Canadian External Relations series, and especially those in official files held in Canadian and American archival institutions, notably the Department of National Defence’s Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa, and the United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. By analyzing these sources, it is hoped that this academic air force historical account of the 1940-1957 Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship will be an important contribution to the historiography of the RCAF and its role in continental air defence and of Canadian-American relations.
Chapter Three
Command and Control Systems, Principles, Concepts and Ideas

Command is a military matter, almost mystical.
- Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, 1946-1953

Introduction

Before examining the historical evolution of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship, it is first necessary to discuss some of the command and control principles, concepts, ideas, and terminology that will be covered in this dissertation. This chapter will include an examination of specific concepts such as unity of command and also operational-level command and control principles such as cooperation, unity of command, operational command, and operational control. Whereas a concept focuses on an idea or a notion, command and control principles represent the different degrees of command and control authority that can be granted to an operational commander.

It must also be remembered that command and control authority embodied in a principle is different from command organizations. A command organization is a physical entity – “a command” – headed by an individual, the commander, who works in his/her own headquarters with his/her own staff. The commander of a command can be given a certain degree of command and control authority over the military forces assigned to his/her command organization, depending on the situation. This authority is embodied in the specific command and control principle assigned to the commander by a superior, usually a nation’s chiefs of staff representing the government.

The main focus of this chapter will be on what can be termed as “systems” of joint command and control based on a particular country’s military culture. These systems combine the structure of specific command organizations, and their relationships...
with each other, with the specific command and control authority assigned to each commander for joint operations. Indeed, since Canada-U.S. bilateral air defence command and control culture and arrangements evolved from Canadian, American and British joint command and control culture, an examination of these countries’ joint systems of command and control is warranted.

Historian Sean Maloney argues that during the Second World War there were two basic forms of Allied joint command systems. They were the British (and, by extension, the Canadian) “joint committee system” (he also refers to it as “joint command”) and the American “unified command system.” However, Maloney discusses these systems only in reference to command organizations, not the actual command and control authority exercised by the commanders. This chapter examines both, and after careful research of relevant Canadian, American and British sources reveals that there were in fact five basic command and control systems that in one way or another influenced Canada-U.S. bilateral command and control relationships for continental air defence. The first was the British joint committee system. The second was the Canadian joint committee cooperation system, which was a hybrid of the British system with unique Canadian characteristics. The third was the American unity of command/unified command system for joint operations. The fourth was the British operational control system for maritime defence operations, which was also a hybrid of the British joint committee system. The last was the coalition supreme command system, which evolved out of the American unified command system during the Second World War and became the basis for NATO command organization during the Cold War. Each system will be discussed briefly in the following pages.
The British Joint Committee System

The British joint committee system of command and control was derived from British constitutional and parliamentary government culture and practice. As the British Joint Staff Mission to Washington explained in November 1941, the system was based on the English political custom of collective responsibility and solving disputes through discussion and compromise. According to British custom, this was achieved by the formation of committees to discuss important and potentially divergent issues. After time, this cultural practice extended to the military sphere for joint command and control arrangements.

The result was the British joint committee system, which Maloney describes as consisting of “three commanders in chief, one from each service, all jointly responsible for a geographic command.” The three organized a committee, “forming a body of equals” to deal with joint issues and operations. It was the army commander who usually chaired and coordinated this joint committee, and reported to the chiefs of staff. The British Joint Staff Mission described this command and control system as follows:

In an operational theatre, therefore, we adopt the system of co-equal Commanders unless one Service is clearly the predominating partner. In theory it may be argued that this system is not so effective as that of Unified Command. In practice, however, under modern conditions Command of any Service is a matter of such technical complexity that it can be undertaken effectively only by a Commander with the necessary background and experience. The handling by one Commander of Naval, Military and Air forces is, therefore, impracticable in our view as a normal procedure. In addition, as in the case of higher direction... difficulties will arise in finding a Commander with the necessary standing and knowledge.

This description involved many implications, and they are worth further elaboration.

The term “co-equal Commanders” meant that no one service operational-level commander had any greater command and control authority over another; instead, the
command and control relationship among them was to be one of simple cooperation and coordination of efforts. The phrase “unless one Service is clearly the predominating partner” was also an important provision. It allowed one service operational commander to have greater command and control authority over the other two commanders if the military task in that area was clearly focused on that commander’s area of expertise. As we will see below, it was this provision that the British utilized to form the maritime operational control system of command organization and command and control.

The crux of the joint committee system as articulated by the British Joint Staff Mission was a recognition of service expertise and equality. Given the technical complexities of modern warfare and the resulting specialization of each individual service, no commander could have an absolute understanding of both his own service and the other two. Since one commander cannot be an expert in army, navy, and air force operations, to give him greater authority over the other three – as is done in a unified command (see below) – was impracticable in British eyes.

In addition, another characteristic of the British joint committee system was greater oversight of the operational commanders by the service chiefs of staff. As the British Joint Staff Mission further explained:

Each Service Commander in the field is bound by his directive from the Chiefs of Staff at home, thus ensuring a common aim for all Commanders in one theatre. Further, the higher strategy for all theatres is necessarily linked and must emanate from the central authority in London. Service Commanders in the field are concerned, therefore, only with the local strategy of their theatre, which in turn must be considered by them within the terms of their respective directives. Close collaboration is achieved by a local Joint Staff working in a Combined [i.e., joint] Headquarters.

The focus here was on the directive that the British Chiefs of Staff gave to each of the three service commanders in an operational theatre, which ensured that there was a
common aim for all regarding joint matters. Issues of grand/national strategy and military strategy remained purely the prerogative of the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff, respectively, in London.⁹ In their directive from the chiefs of staff, the operational commanders thus received only the amount of strategic information that London deemed necessary to give them. These commanders therefore only had a minimal direct impact on the development of the strategic “big picture”; instead, the main concern of the operational commanders was the operational situation in their own theatre – what the Joint Staff Mission called the “local strategy of their theatre.”¹⁰ Accordingly, any actions that they undertook had to adhere to the directive given to them by the chiefs of staff.¹¹

These requirements were in stark contrast to American practice, which permitted operational commanders greater authority and autonomy and less oversight from higher authority. As American political scientist Richard Leighton put it, whereas the Americans “favoured a broad delegation of responsibility and authority to a commander, on the principle that he should be assigned a job, given the means to do it, and held responsible for its fulfillment without scrutiny of the measures employed,” the British “kept a vigilant check on [their] commanders, with little regard to channels of command.”¹² Significantly, the Canadian military also utilized the British practice of operational commanders referring to higher authority, and as we will see in the following chapters this proved to be a constant irritant to the Americans.

Overall, in practice the joint committee system worked very well for the British. Operational efficiency for joint matters was ensured by establishing a joint staff consisting of officers from each service command who would work together in a joint headquarters. An operational service commander went about his business without much
reference to the other two service commanders, as “questions requiring joint
consideration and decision normally fell within the terms of the general policy laid
down in the parallel directives issued by the respective Chiefs of Staff.” Most of the
issues facing the commanders that required decisions were service-specific, meaning that
they did not have to refer to the other service commanders in the operational theatre.
When the rare occurrence of a decision of a joint nature arose, the commanders dealt with
it according to the policy laid down in the joint directive issued by the chiefs of staff,
which normally ensured agreement between them. However, in the extremely rare
instance where the three commanders simply could not agree on a joint decision, they
then had to refer to higher authority in London to arbitrate. Although on the surface this
seemed to be a very complex and tedious undertaking, the British Joint Staff Mission
argued that modern communications technology meant that a ruling on a controversial
joint issue could be achieved quickly. As we will see below, this provision to refer to
higher authority would become an important characteristic of the coalition supreme
commands established by the Allies during the Second World War and repeated in the
NATO commands in the Cold War period.

In summary, the British Joint Staff Mission admitted that the British joint
committee system was not perfect but stressed that it was based on practical experience
and English political culture and practices. However, although the British joint
committee system worked effectively in regions where only British and Commonwealth
forces operated, it was not the case for combined operations in areas with American
forces. As Maloney has noted, U.S. officers felt that “the joint committee system was
inefficient and disrupted a cardinal principle of war, unity of command.” ¹⁶ A discussion of the American unity of command system is therefore in order.

**The American Unity of Command System for Joint Operations**

The main characteristic of unity of command is having one person in charge of a theatre of operations, resulting in a clear and indivisible chain of command. However, there are differences between unity of command/unified command (both terms are used interchangeably) as a *concept* or idea and as an actual command and control *principle* that outlines the specific authority of the overall commander over the forces in his command. Most of the literature on unity of command focuses on the concept, and this will be discussed briefly below. However, this dissertation also examines unity of command as a command and control principle as practiced by the U.S. military for joint operations. Accordingly, the American unity of command *system* combined the *concept* of unity of command/unified command of one overall theatre commander with the actual command and control authority entailed in the *principle* of unity of command.

Colonel Ian Hope provides an excellent definition of unity of command as a concept: “American practice of unity of command requires the placement of all forces operating in a specific theatre to achieve a distinct objective under a single commander.” ¹⁷ Hope thus places great emphasis on unity of effort in an operational theatre and suggests that it is one of the main objectives of an American commander exercising unity of command. He therefore concludes that the insistence on unity of command in an operational theatre is a “long-standing and distinctly American practice.” ¹⁸ However, unlike the British joint committee system of command and control, which evolved from both political and military practice and culture, the
American unity of command system had more uniquely military origins. Furthermore, the first U.S. definitions of the term were focused solely on unity of command as a concept; it was only later that it evolved into an actual command and control principle.

Hope notes that the first instance where the American military began putting into practice the concept of having one overall commander in charge of an operational theatre was during the U.S. Civil War, when President Abraham Lincoln appointed General Ulysses S. Grant as the General-in-Chief of the U.S. Army, thereby unifying “all northern military efforts under one brain.”\(^{19}\) Shortly thereafter, the concept of unity of command as placing all forces for the execution of an operational task under one commander became entrenched in U.S. Army doctrine. Therefore, when the United States entered the First World War, its military championed the idea of implementing unity of command on the Western Front under Marshal Ferdinand Foch.\(^{20}\)

In practice, however, the actual authority that Foch exercised over allied forces with unity of command on the Western Front in 1918 was still rather limited. Nonetheless, the American military leadership was convinced by the Allied victory in 1918 that the concept of one overall commander was a sound one, and was “the sole means to achieve operational level cognition and cohesion essential to unity of effort.”\(^{21}\) During the inter-war period, U.S. Army-Navy joint planners worked to establish doctrine to guide operational commanders in joint operations. In particular, they endeavoured to establish a system of unity of command by combining the concept of an overall commander of an operational theatre with the proper command and control authority embodied in a principle of unity of command in order to make it effective.
The result was the 1935 joint doctrine publication, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.*\(^{22}\) It was a groundbreaking document that clarified operational level joint command and control arrangements by enshrining specific definitions of command and control principles. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* stipulated that joint operations between the U.S. Navy and Army (which included most land-based air forces) would be coordinated either by “mutual cooperation” or “unity of command.” The two American services would “normally” coordinate their operations by mutual cooperation, which was not defined (but was compatible with Canadian command and control culture and practice – see below). Unity of command would only be implemented in the following cases: when the President ordered; in specific joint agreements between the Secretaries of War and the Navy; and “when commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.”\(^{23}\) As we shall see, in practice the last provision meant the institution of unity of command in an emergency in the event of a major enemy attack.

Most importantly, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* specified the authority that an overall commander would exercise by including a specific definition of the command and control principle of unity of command:

a. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph b. below, unity of command in an operation vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both services by the organization of task forces, the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary to insure the success of the operation.

b. Unity of command does not authorize the commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the service to which he does not belong, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination.\(^{24}\)
Interestingly, the definition of unity of command from *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* is very similar to the current definition of “operational command.” In addition, the clause excluding authority over administration and discipline was also consistent with Canadian command and control culture and practice. These responsibilities remained with the service chiefs of staff as part of their national command authority. As we shall see throughout this dissertation, the exclusion of authority over administration and discipline would be a constant characteristic of all Canada-U.S. command and control arrangements for continental air defence.

To summarize, the American unity of command system consisted of vesting operational command of joint forces in a theatre in one single operational commander. Put into practice, American unity of command system therefore meant that there would be one commander from any service – but usually the one with the most forces – who would command the air, ground, and naval forces in the theatre. This “single authority” would be able to choose among campaign plans, resolve the conflicting claims of feuding officers for resources, and assign operational priorities. Unity of command centred on the idea that “too many cooks ruin the soup”; that is, that it was of absolute importance to avoid duplication of effort and competition for resources. Delay in issuing orders would be minimized, for there would be a clear chain of command.

The American unity of command system was an effective means of maintaining centralization of command and control, unity of effort, and a clear chain of command, all of which were crucial to ensuring operational effectiveness and military efficiency. It is therefore not surprising that U.S. officers favoured it over mutual cooperation. It was also not surprising that when Canada and the United States began cooperating in the
defence of North America U.S. officers endeavoured to implement the unity of command system as the basis for the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, these provisions for cooperation and unity of command in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* would form the basis of Canada-U.S. Second World War command and control arrangements.

**The Canadian Joint Committee Cooperation System of Command and Control**

At the beginning of the Second World War, Canada’s operational commands were organized according to the joint committee cooperation system of command and control, which was a hybrid of the British joint committee system with unique Canadian characteristics. These attributes specifically epitomized the Canadian desire to minimize command and control authority – in both joint and combined situations – of one service over another service’s forces, and emphasized the principle of cooperation. The Canadian joint committee cooperation system was thus based on Canada’s British political and military cultural heritage, but at the same time reflected the country’s growing desire for greater autonomy since the end of the First World War.

On 10 September 1939, Canada declared war on Nazi Germany and entered the conflict on the side of Britain and France. It was the Royal Canadian Navy that was the first Canadian service to deploy its forces by commencing patrols of the North Atlantic Ocean. Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) immediately requested that Canada place the RCN’s warships at the Admiralty’s disposal, just as it did in the First World War. Canadian naval officers had trained and served in the RN throughout their careers, and had therefore absorbed the Royal Navy’s rich culture and heritage as their own. As such, it was not surprising that Vice-Admiral Percy Nelles, the RCN Chief of the Naval Staff,
was favourable to the Admiralty request. The Canadian government, however, did not concur.\textsuperscript{30}

Canada’s Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, explained to the Admiralty that on constitutional grounds Canadian forces could not be placed under the operational command or control of the British.\textsuperscript{31} Instead, he instructed that Canadian ships were to \textit{cooperate} with the Royal Navy, and he set down this command and control relationship in an official Order-in-Council on 17 November 1939.\textsuperscript{32} In doing this, Mackenzie King set an important precedent: Canada would resist having its forces commanded by an outside service. The Prime Minister thus established cooperation as the main command and control principle under which Canadian forces would operate.

Mackenzie King’s decision was not a brash one, but had in fact been based on Canadian political and military thinking and practice since the First World War. During that time Canada sought – and achieved – greater autonomy from Britain. The culmination of this endeavour was the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which granted Canada full autonomy by giving the Canadian government the authority to conduct its own foreign relations independent of London.\textsuperscript{33} This achievement was not lost on Mackenzie King or his Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, O.D. Skelton in 1939. Protective of gains already made, the two men were not willing to allow London to dominate Canadian foreign and defence policy, as it had in the past. Therefore, in any conflict, it would be the Canadian Parliament that would decide the degree of Canadian participation.\textsuperscript{34} As C.P. Stacey remarked, the Second World War “put to the test the genuineness of the ‘nationhood’ [that Canada] had acquired, and show[ed] just how
significant ‘constitutional progress’ was when weighed in the power balance of world war.”

Canada’s geo-strategic situation and its inter-service relationship also played a part in the military’s utilization of the cooperation principle. The relative safety of North America from attack and the knowledge that Britain would help Canada in an emergency led Canadian political and military leaders to argue for a more independent stance, separate from the traditional British link. Furthermore, compared to the Canadian Army, the RCN and the RCAF were rather young – and smaller – services, the former having been created in 1910 and the latter only receiving full independence from the Army in 1938. The two smaller services were therefore wary of being dominated by the Army, and as Canadian historian Roger Sarty has noted, “they jealously guarded their independence.” Accordingly, as M.V. Bezeau has remarked, the leaders of Canada’s three military services were “able to resist centralized control and insist on mutual and voluntary cooperation as the only basis for joint planning and command.”

There was to be no unity of military command and control over the three Canadian services. As W.A.B. Douglas has noted, the American system of unity of command “was alien to Canadian doctrine and practice.” Although some Canadian officers had studied unity of command during their time overseas at British staff schools, these were just hypothetical explorations and had no bearing on Canadian joint command and control practice. Instead, based on British custom, coordination between the three services was achieved through a Joint Staff Committee (later renamed Chiefs of Staff Committee) and its subsequent sub-committees at the strategic level. This established in Canada what Bezeau has called the “committee principle” of “three separate service
staffs or commanders who cooperated together for mutually agreed goals.”41 This committee practice was repeated at the operational level, where again, based on British custom, the three operational commanders on each coast formed joint committees (the Joint Services Committee Halifax and Joint Services Committee Victoria) to oversee joint issues and operations.42 Their command and control relationship, as Bezeau has indicated, was based on the principle of cooperation: “each of these joint bodies was really concerned more with coordination than with command, and confirmed the established tri-service policy of voluntary cooperation as required.”43

Clearly, if cooperation was the only accepted command and control arrangement within the Canadian armed forces itself, it was no wonder that Canada even more strenuously insisted on cooperation in its efforts to guard its sovereignty and independence when operating with the armed forces of other nations. In other words, not only did Canada want to maintain its joint committee cooperation system for Canadian joint command and control, it also desired to implement it in its combined command and control relationships. Accordingly, the Canadian government’s refusal at the beginning of the Second World War to place the RCN’s vessels under the command and control of Britain, with which Canada had had a longstanding connection both militarily and politically, was an early indication of the way that Canada would deal with any potential continental air defence command and control arrangements with the U.S.

The British Maritime Defence Operational Control System

The British operational control system consisted of the assignment of the command and control principle of operational control by a nation’s chiefs of staff to a commander from another nation or service over the forces of the original nation. It had
its origins in the British joint committee system before the Second World War; in particular it was the enactment of the “expertise” provision outlined above by the British Joint Staff Mission. This clause permitted one commander-in-chief to exercise greater authority over another service’s forces in an operational theatre if the military task or mission in that area was clearly focused on the CinC’s area of expertise.\textsuperscript{44} In the case of the British maritime operational control system, this provision was a recognition of the primacy of the navy in maritime trade defence operations during the Second World War.

In the late 1930s, poor performances in joint maritime trade defence in home waters prompted British military authorities to implement the “expertise” provision in the joint committee system of command and control. The result was the establishment of four Area Combined Headquarters (ACHQ) in certain geographical theatres on the British coast. Each ACHQ was a joint headquarters where the three service operational commanders could together coordinate the maritime trade defence mission in order to ensure greater unity of effort. Shortly after the ACHQs were established in the summer of 1938, British military authorities concluded that the British Army contribution to the maritime trade defence mission was negligible and that the new joint headquarters should only include the RN and Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command operational commanders and an Army liaison officer. Therefore, by 1939, the four ACHQs consisted of a joint RN-Coastal Command staff, with the RAF Air Officers Commanding the assigned Coastal Command Groups working closely with the Admirals commanding the naval commands, plus Army liaison officers as required.\textsuperscript{45}

This new arrangement proved to be sufficient in subsequent pre-war joint RN-RAF maritime trade defence exercises. However, when the campaign to protect convoys
from German U-boat attacks during the Battle of the Atlantic began to intensify in late 1940, the Admiralty began to grow concerned about the insufficient performance of Coastal Command maritime patrol aircraft. Feeling that the Air Ministry was not committing sufficient resources to Coastal Command for its job of protecting shipping properly, the RN leadership sought to secure greater influence over maritime patrol operations. Specifically, the Admiralty complained to the British War Cabinet that the RN had “no responsibility of the day-to-day operational control of Coastal Command aircraft which are carrying out what are essentially naval operations.”

After much discussion on the status of the RAF’s maritime air power organization, the British War Cabinet announced that “Coastal Command should remain an integral part of the Royal Air Force, but that for all operational purposes it should come under the control of the Admiralty.” Nonetheless, the resulting Coastal Command Charter that outlined the RN-Coastal Command relationship did not specify what command and control authority “operational control” actually entailed. It simply stated that “operational control of Coastal Command will be exercised by the Admiralty through the Air Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Coastal Command.” However, put into practice, the Admiralty’s “operational control” over Coastal Command was, as the Air Ministry described it, a “polite myth.” The naval CinC only had the authority to issue “general directives” as to the objectives to be obtained; it was the air force group commander who actually exercised “operational control” as he remained responsible for the “day-to-day detailed conduct of air operations.” In other words, instead of having operational control over Coastal Command resources, the RN CinC only had the authority to issue his requirements for air coverage to the RAF group commander, who
would then exercise operational control by assigning Coastal Command forces to accomplish the mission. This RN authority was more akin to what came to be known as operational direction, not operational control. Nevertheless, although the 1941 Coastal Command Charter did not specifically define operational control, it did establish an important precedent regarding the British operational control system: the detailed employment of forces in order to accomplish the task or complete the mission remained the prerogative of the service/component commander from which the forces came.

The evolution of operational control as a command and control principle took a large step forward in 1944 when the Americans asked the British to define the Coastal Command-RN relationship. Finally forced to sit down and articulate in written form what command and control authority the principle of operational control actually entailed, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry devised the following definition:

Operational Control comprises those functions of Command involving composition of Task Forces or Groups or Units, assignment of Tasks, designation of objectives and co-ordination necessary to accomplish the Mission. It shall always be exercised where possible by making use of normal organisation Units assigned, through the responsible Commanders. It does not include such matters as Administration, discipline, Internal Organisation and training of Units… It is recognised that the Operational Authority may in emergency or unusual situations employ assigned Units on any task that he considers essential to effective execution of his operational responsibility.

Importantly, this 1944 British definition resembles very closely the modern definition of operational control. Indeed, as this dissertation will demonstrate, the command and control principle of operational control evolved significantly between the Second World War and the establishment of NORAD in 1957. As Chapter Nine shows, U.S. planners considered a definition of operational control that was very similar to the British 1944 version for the new Canada-U.S. continental air defence bilateral command organization.
Though it was not the definition that was eventually utilized for NORAD, it was an important consideration that helped American and Canadian planners to define operational control in an air defence context.

Regardless, there were common characteristics of all definitions of operational control throughout the term’s evolution as a command and control principle, and they were significant. Operational control did not include the original disposition of resources, which is an aspect of operational command. In addition, it also did not include authority regarding administration, training, and discipline, which were service prerogatives as part of the national command that the service exercised over its forces. Operational control was therefore an attractive command and control principle for services whose forces were earmarked to come under a commander from another service or country because it avoided both the term “command” and the surrender of national command and operational command authority to this commander.

Lastly, it is important to analyze the British operational control system in comparison to other more offensively-focused and expeditionary command and control systems. Comparing the Atlantic to the other theatres of war such as the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe, historian Sean Maloney has criticized the failure of the Allies to establish a supreme command (see below) for maritime trade defence during the Second World War as the “immaturity of coalition command organization in the Atlantic theatre.” The reason for this, he explains, was that the Battle of the Atlantic campaign was “primarily defensive in nature” with a specialized functional mission focused on operations to protect convoys from U-boat attack, performed mostly by naval and
maritime patrol forces, not the “diverse” multi-service, multi-functional and multinational forces in other primarily land-based theatres.\textsuperscript{54}

Maloney obviously puts a negative spin on the lack of a coalition supreme command in the Atlantic. However, a different, more positive, perspective holds that it was because the Allied Battle of the Atlantic mission was so specialized and functional in nature that it required an equally specialized operational command and control arrangement in order to be effective: the British operational control system. Therefore, as this dissertation will demonstrate, the operational control system proved to be ideal for Canadian-American specialized functional and defensive command and control situations. These included maritime trade defence roles, such as the establishment of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command in April 1943 (see Chapter Five), and the North American continental air defence mission, such as the RCAF-U.S. Northeast Command relationship (Chapter Eight) and the establishment of NORAD (see Chapter Nine). For the latter, the key was tailoring the operational control system to the bilateral North American air defence situation, and evolutionary changes to the U.S. joint unity of command system proved to be an important consideration for Canada-U.S. planners.

**Wartime Changes to American Unified Commands and the United States’ 1946 Unified Command Plan**

The U.S. military put its unity of command system into practice during the Second World War in several theatres throughout the world. It consisted of three service (army, navy and air force) operational commanders organized into one geographic theatre. It was the service that provided the majority of resources to the command that usually also provided the overall CinC, also called “supreme commander” for the command. The operational commanders would thus be designated what came to be
called “component commanders,” and they were to be subordinate to the CinC/supreme commander.55 “In this way,” Maloney has noted, “the Americans believed that a single man had responsibility for the conduct of operations within the area and that confusion and interservice rivalry could be eliminated.”56

At first, it was one of the three operational service commanders who would take on the role as CinC/supreme commander – a practice currently referred to as “double hatting.” This CinC/supreme commander would therefore also retain command over the component forces of his own service in the theatre.57 However, during the Second World War, operational experiences with the Allied coalition “supreme commands” (see below) led the American military leadership to make a change to this arrangement. In 1943, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff released a new directive entitled “Unified Command for U.S. Joint Operations.” It defined a unified command as a command organization “in which a force composed of units of the Army and Navy operates as a single command unit under an officer specifically assigned by higher authority.”58 The JCS would assign the overall joint CinC based on what the objectives were in the particular theatre and which service would have the dominant role in terms of operations.59 For example, if the theatre consisted mostly of land operations, the JCS would assign an Army officer as the overall joint CinC; if it was maritime operations he would be from the United States Navy (USN), and so on.

Importantly, “Unified Command for U.S. Joint Operations” indicated that, unless specifically instructed by the JCS, the overall joint CinC would not be double-hatted. He would not assume command of the component forces from his own service in the theatre; instead a separate component commander from his service would be assigned for this
purpose. The overall joint CinC was to be supported by a joint staff consisting of representatives from the component commands, the purpose of which was “to insure an understanding of their several capabilities, needs, and limitations, together with the knowledge essential to efficiency in integration of their efforts.” The overall joint CinC was thus to be responsible only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was to exercise his command and control authority through the component commanders. This authority “normally” would consist of the assignment of missions to the forces; however, the document specified that in “carrying out its mission the tactics and technique of the force concerned” was the responsibility of the individual component commanders. This provision left much leeway for the detailed operational employment of forces to the component commanders, and thus adhered to the principle of centralized command and decentralized execution. Lastly, as with the definition of unity of command in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, administration and discipline were excluded from the authority of the overall joint commander and remained a service prerogative. The change regarding the component commanders into the American unity of command system during the Second World War proved to be an important one, as it set a precedent for the unified commands that the United States would establish after the end of the war.

The experience of the Second World War indeed showed the American military leadership that successful joint operations and unity of effort in an operational theatre required a single CinC with component commands under his authority. Accordingly, in 1946, the JCS decided to seize upon the success of its wartime unity of command system by establishing a new Unified Command Plan (UCP). Approved by President Harry Truman in December 1946, the UCP established seven unified commands in specially
designated “strategic areas.” They were (with year of the standing up of each in brackets): Far East Command (1946), Pacific Command (1946), Alaska Command (1946), Atlantic Command (1947), Caribbean Command (1947), European Command (1947), and Northeast Command (1950). These unified commands each had a single CinC who was responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CinC also had his own joint staff organized into a headquarters, and would exercise unity of command “over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of Service” as provided for in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The “general principles” of each unified command established in the Unified Command Plan were:

Unified command in each command will be established in accordance, in so far as practicable, with Chapter 2, paragraph 12, of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, [with] component forces consisting of Army, Army Air, and Naval forces. Forces assigned to a command will normally consist of two or more components and each will be commanded directly by an officer of that component. Each commander will have a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the Services under his command in key positions of responsibility. Commanders of component forces will communicate directly with appropriate headquarters on matters such as administration, training, and supply, expenditure of appropriate funds, and authorization of construction, which are not a responsibility of unified command. The assignment of forces and the significant changes therein will be as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These principles therefore ensured greater centralization and efficiency of command and control, and also maintenance of the maxim that operational command/unity of command did not include administration and discipline.

The new UCP unified commands were thus purely operational-level commands, leaving the strategic-level issues to higher authority. Strategic direction and national command authority remained the purview of the JCS, which was responsible “for assign[ing] forces to the unified commands and prescrib[ing] the mission and tasks of
Therefore, whereas the unified commanders had responsibility to conduct joint operations, as Ian Hope has indicated, “the sustainment of these operations remained squarely in the hands of the JCS, because only they could manage overall global war strategy and set priorities between unified commands.”

Because the mission assigned by the JCS was usually oriented towards a specific service, UCP practice was to affiliate the unified commands with a parent service chief of staff as the “executive agent” for that particular UCP command. This custom, which the RCAF later adopted for its Air Defence Command (see Chapter Seven), guaranteed that certain services dominated specific UCP commands. For example, the U.S. Navy dominated Pacific Command, the U.S. Army dominated European Command, and as we will see in Chapter Nine, the USAF dominated Continental Air Defense Command when it was established in the mid-1950s.

Lastly, in addition to its regional/geographic unified commands, the UCP also provided for the establishment of what became known as “specified commands.” A “specified command” was a unified command that consisted of forces from only one service tasked with a specific mission by the JCS. The first specified command to be established was Strategic Air Command (SAC), a purely air force functional command organization that was responsible for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. SAC was originally established by the USAAF (after 1947 the independent USAF) as a service-specific command. However, after exerting pressure on his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanding General of the USAAF, General Carl Spaatz, convinced the JCS to make SAC a UCP specified command in 1946.
As we shall see in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, the JCS UCP unified commands had an important influence on both Canadian air defence command organization and Canada-U.S. bilateral continental air defence command and control relations. This was particularly true with the standing up of Northeast Command in 1950, the establishment of the JCS UCP unified command Continental Air Defense Command in the mid-1950s, and the formation of NORAD in 1957.

The Allied Second World War Coalition Supreme Command System

During the Second World War, the American military sought to impose its unity of command system of joint command and control onto the new multilateral coalition commands that it established with its allies. The U.S. was able to achieve this successfully, albeit with certain unique differences that represented the complexity of alliance warfare and the concerns of the nations involved, with the resulting Allied “supreme commands.” These commands proved to be efficient and effective for coalition command and control during the Second World War, and as Maloney has noted, they set an important precedent as “the first multinational, multiservice coalition commands, which formed the basis for NATO command organization.”

Because Canada and the United States considered forming a North American NATO supreme command during the 1950s, it is therefore worth exploring the coalition supreme command system in further detail.

Shortly after the United States officially entered the war as a belligerent in December 1941, American and British military and political officials met in Washington to discuss combined strategy and how the Allies would organize to fight the war against Germany and Japan. At the resulting Arcadia Conference, General George Marshall, the
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, was adamant that in all theatres where the Allies would be fighting together in combined operations the American system of unity of command had to be implemented. In his opinion, for successful joint and combined operations, “the most important consideration is the question of unity of command.... With differences between groups and between services... there must be one man in command of the entire theater – air, ground and ships.”

Although the British were hesitant to accept this American practice, preferring to insist on their own joint committee system, they eventually relented, and agreed that “one Allied commander should have supreme command in each theater of operations.”

The first coalition supreme command to be established was the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA) in late December 1941. It was made responsible to the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), which decided that the ABDA supreme commander would be a British officer, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Wavell. The ABDA supreme command, however, had a short life, as Japanese advances in Southeast Asia and the Pacific led to its disestablishment on 25 February 1942. However, ABDA had set an important precedent for the Allies, leading to the establishment by the CCS of additional coalition supreme commands. They included: the Southeast Asia Supreme Command, established in August 1942 under RN Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten; the Mediterranean Supreme Command, established in November 1942 under U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower; and the Northwest Europe Supreme Command, established in late 1943, again under Eisenhower.

The Allied coalition supreme commands consisted of geographically structured command organizations with component air, land, and sea forces of various nations and
“coalition staffs drawn from all services.” The supreme commander, who was always either an American or British officer, was responsible to both the CCS and, “as the ranking representative of his own nation in the area,” to the political authority in his own country: President Roosevelt for the United States and Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill (who was also the Minister of Defence) for Britain. As with the American unity of command system for U.S. joint operations, one of the important hallmarks of a supreme commander was that he did not have authority over the administration and discipline of the various national forces under his command. Once again, this remained a national service prerogative, which was also consistent with Canadian practice.

There were, however, a number of differences between the American unity of command system for U.S. joint operations and the Allied coalition supreme command system. For one, the definition of the command and control principle of unity of command was not included in the supreme command system, so the actual command and control authority assigned to the supreme commander depended on his specific directive from the CCS. Nonetheless, there were a number of uniform characteristics and aspects of the supreme commands contained in the directives. One was that the supreme commander was not allowed to directly command the component forces of his service in the theatre. He was only to exercise his command authority through his component commanders, who were responsible for the actual conduct of operations. This was an important distinction because it allowed the supreme commander to have an overall “big picture” of the strategic and operational situation in his theatre and meant that he would not get bogged down with detailed operational and tactical matters. Therefore, instead of being a field commander directing forces in battle at the scene, the supreme commander’s
role was more as a coordinator in a headquarters whose authority was to assign missions, oversee deployment of forces in the theatre, and having "the final responsibility of choosing among various possible of courses of action."\(^81\)

There were also specific restrictions regarding the authority of the supreme commander to interfere with the composition of the forces of varying nationalities under his command. Specifically, he was not allowed "to alter the 'major tactical organization’ of national forces or to disperse them among multinational task forces."\(^82\) Again, this authority fell under national command, which remained a national service prerogative.

Lastly, there was one very important restriction on Allied coalition supreme commanders: the right to appeal to higher authority. This principle had its origins in Marshal Foch’s 1918 exercise of unity of command during the First World War. Although Foch was the overall commander on the Western Front, each subordinate national commander, notably British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, still had the right to appeal to his own government if he received any orders from the French marshal which he felt put his soldiers needlessly at risk.\(^83\) During the Second World War, as Leighton has noted, the national component commander “in a theatre was expected by his superiors at home to be a watchdog for national interests.”\(^84\) Therefore, component commanders again had the right to appeal to their own chiefs of staff if they received an order that they felt contradicted or jeopardized the interests of their country or put their own forces unnecessarily in peril. The difference between the First World War provision and the Second World War right to appeal was that during the latter conflict the component commander had to first inform the supreme commander of his intention to appeal to higher authority and give him the reasons for doing so. The purpose here was
to have a chance to discuss the matter in the hope that the two officers could solve the
dispute at the operational level first before having to bring it to a higher authority. 85

This right of a component commander to appeal to higher authority proved to be
a major irritant to some supreme commanders, notably American ones. For example,
Leighton has called this provision “the symbol and the crux of the problem of command
in a coalition.” 86 However, Douglas Bland has taken a more positive approach to this
position. He recognized that with the establishment of a supreme command consisting of
multinational forces, there was always the possibility that the advice of a supreme
commander “may run counter to that of national military staffs” and that national leaders
would fear “los[ing] control over how their troops are used and to what ends.” 87
Therefore, Bland continues, the national component commander’s right to appeal to
higher authority

was the concept that allowed generals and politicians to subordinate their
forces to an allied commander but at the same time to retain control of
those forces. This concept is a confidence-building measure that is rarely,
if ever, exercised but, like deposit insurance in a bank, it is the device that
allows trust to develop where none might exist otherwise. Without it little
trust would prevail, but once in place the idea unlocks almost boundless
potential for alliance cooperation. 88

Thus, to summarize Bland’s perceptive arguments, the right to appeal provision was an
effective measure for the governments of countries providing the forces to the supreme
commander to safeguard their sovereignty and, in fact, enhance allied cooperation.

The Second World War supreme commands therefore set important precedents
for alliance coalition command organization and command and control relationships. In
so doing, they formed the basis for the NATO commands that were established in the
early 1950s. 89 Because Canada and the U.S. considered establishing a NATO command
for North America (see Chapter Nine), it is worthwhile to briefly examine how the coalition supreme command system applied to this multilateral alliance.

**The NATO Coalition Supreme Command System**

In the wake of the Berlin Crisis of 1948 (see Chapter Seven), the majority of the liberal democratic countries of North America and Europe decided to form a new alliance to defend themselves from the growing Soviet threat. The resulting North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, creating NATO. Based on an idea from Canadian Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, the new alliance soon established five Regional Planning Groups (RPG) to oversee planning in the most strategically important areas. They were: Western European RPG, North Atlantic Ocean RPG, Northern Europe RPG, the Southern Europe/Western Mediterranean RPG, and the Canada-U.S. RPG. Consisting of military officers, each RPG was responsible for developing combined defence plans for its area and also to provide advice to NATO’s political Standing Group in order to resolve differences between members. Since the strategic situation at the time did not warrant it, the setting up of individual command organizations for each RPG was deferred for the moment.

The explosion by the Soviet Union of its own atomic bomb in late August 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 convinced NATO’s leadership of the need to establish formal command organizations. Consequently, based on the Second World War coalition supreme commands, at varying points throughout the early 1950s, four of the RPGs were stood up as NATO command organizations, each with a supreme commander at its head. Each supreme commander was responsible to the NATO Military Committee (consisting of the member nations’ chiefs of staff) for “the development of
defence plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements, and for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their command.” The restrictions placed on the supreme commander’s authority over the multinational forces under his command were similar to those in place during the Second World War.92

The one exception to the standing up of the NATO RPGs as supreme commands was the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG). Originally CUSRPG consisted of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the U.S. JCS, plus a Regional Planning Committee working group staffed by their representatives. Both the Canadian and American Chiefs actively took part in the body’s activities until 1951, but after then delegated most of the CUSRPG’s duties to the Planning Committee.93

There were a number of important reasons why Canada and the United States decided against standing up CUSRPG as a NATO supreme command. The most significant was that both nations – especially the U.S. – saw the task of defending the continent as a special one that was separate from NATO. It was a bilateral responsibility, not a multilateral one, that necessitated a “special relationship” between the two countries, and the Americans in particular did not want to duplicate it with other allies because to do so would be too “cumbersome.”94 In addition, the U.S. shared intelligence and research and development information with Canada that specifically dealt with bilateral North American defence matters. Since NATO was not “leak-proof” from a security perspective, the Americans did not want other countries to also be privy to this kind of information. Furthermore, because the Canada-U.S. air defence system was so important in protecting the SAC deterrent, the Americans were fearful that any kind of multilateral control of these defences “might lead to [similar] attempts to control
As Joseph Jockel has noted, although Canada and the United States comprised a NATO region, the alliance itself in American eyes, was for the defence of Europe, not North America. As NATO developed a military command structure, the U.S. made sure that its aegis did not extend to the continental United States. The U.S. was determined to preserve exclusive national control over defence at home, especially over the Strategic Air Command.

From a U.S. perspective, it was important to keep the SAC deterrent in American hands to ensure that its protection, in the form of continental air defence arrangements with Canada, remained a purely bilateral arrangement. It was therefore not surprising that American policy consistently opposed any proposals to establish CUSRPG as a NATO command.

Besides, it was questionable as to whether or not the coalition supreme command system applied to North American defence was in Canada’s best interests. William Willoughby and General Charles Foulkes have both described the NATO supreme commands as the “European pattern command system” and have suggested that it was not in fact a good option for Canada. In all likelihood, if Canada and the U.S. set up a North American NATO command it would be an U.S. officer who would be the supreme commander. As Willoughby remarked, when Canadian authorities realized this probability, “their enthusiasm” for a NATO supreme command system “quickly subsided.” Nonetheless, the multilateral aspect of NATO continued to appeal to a number of Canadian political and military officials. Therefore, as Chapter Nine demonstrates, in Canadian eyes the possibility of utilizing NATO coalition supreme command system in North America – or at the very least having some kind of NATO connection to North American air defence – continued to persist and to have an impact on
Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control arrangements during the 1950s.

**Conclusion**

Canadian and American joint continental defence command and control systems were based on their own unique command and control experiences and cultures. The Canadian military borrowed heavily from the British joint committee system, which emphasized collective responsibility and solving disputes through discussion and compromise in a committee formed by a “body of equals” to discuss joint issues and operations. No one service operational-level commander had any greater command and control authority over the other, based largely on equality but also on the belief that no one commander could have a complete understanding of the complexity of operations of services other than his own. Another characteristic of the British joint committee system was greater oversight of the operational commanders by the chiefs of staff in London, who were responsible for strategy. This was in stark contrast to the American unity of command system, which permitted U.S. operational-level commanders more leeway. It combined both the concept of unity of command, having one person in charge of a theatre of operations in order to have a clear and indivisible chain of command, and the command and control principle of unity of command, which was one officer exercising operational command over all forces in a theatre.

Later in the Second World War, the American unity of command system underwent a change that led to the designation of the service operational-level commanders as “component commanders” and the addition of one overall CinC/supreme commander who would have overall authority. The United States continued utilizing this
system after the Second World War with the establishment of joint unified commands as part of the JCS Unified Command Plan. Furthermore, the practice of having one overall CinC/supreme commander was also repeated for combined theatre operations for multinational coalition command and control during the Second World War and afterwards in NATO. The main differences with the coalition supreme command system was that it was not necessarily the command and control principle of operational command that the overall commander exercised over component multinational forces, and that it incorporated the right for component commanders to refer to higher authority, including their own national authorities in their country’s capital, which was an effective safeguard of national sovereignty that also enhanced allied coordination.

The Canadian joint committee cooperation system was based on the British joint committee system but also had other characteristics that were unique to Canadian military culture and practice. In particular, its emphasis on cooperation between operational-level commanders epitomized the Canadian desire to minimize command and control authority of one service over another’s forces. It was also representative of Canada’s growing desire for greater autonomy since the end of the First World War and the efforts of each of Canada’s three services to safeguard its independence. Lastly, the British operational control system involved the assignment of the command and control principle of operational control by a national chief of staff to a commander from another service or nation to exercise over the forces of the original nation. This operational control system was a hybrid of the British joint committee system in that it was an example of the implementation of the clause in this system that allowed for one CinC to exercise greater authority over another service’s forces in an operational theatre if the military task or
mission was clearly focused on the CinC’s area of expertise. It ensured effective command and control while at the same time avoiding the forces of one service coming under the command of the other.

As the remaining chapters of this dissertation will demonstrate, Canada and the United States at varying points considered all of these different command and control systems for their continental air defence command and control relationship. Indeed, the unique Canadian and American command and control cultures conflicted at times as the two countries began to work together to defend the continent from aerial attack. Therefore, the key to the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship since the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940 was figuring out a way to reconcile each country’s own joint system of command and control for effective bilateral combined Canada-U.S. air defence command and control. It is how the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship evolved from a compromise cooperation-unity of command system during the Second World War to a hybrid operational control-unified command system under one overall air defence commander by 1957 that will be the focus of the remainder of this dissertation.
Chapter Four
Canada-U.S. Wartime Planning for Command and Control, 1940-1941

Canadians were just as reluctant as Americans to place their troops under foreign command...

-Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, U.S. Army official historians

Introduction

In the period from 1940 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States remained neutral as Canada and its allies faced the Nazi onslaught in Europe. Nonetheless, after the shocking defeat of France in 1940, the U.S. became alarmed by the growing German threat to North America and sought to make arrangements with Canada to coordinate for the defence of the continent. This endeavour led the two countries to produce the first bilateral plans for this purpose. This chapter examines the formation of these plans during 1940-1941. It focuses on specific command and control arrangements discussed between the two North American nations, a topic that was a key – and often delicate – issue. Canada was reluctant to surrender part of its sovereignty and command and control of its forces to American commanders, but the United States, as U.S. Army official historian Stanley W. Dziuban has explained, stood staunchly by its “unwillingness to leave in the hands of another power the defense of continuous border areas whose adequate defense was vital to the security of the United States.”

As later chapters demonstrate, the primary threat to the continent in the Cold War was from Soviet long-range strategic bombers, which required specific command and control arrangements between the Canadian and American air forces. However, during the Second World War bilateral Canada-U.S. air defence command and control planning was conducted in the overall context of continental defence – that is, defending North
America from enemy land, sea, as well as air attack. Therefore, this chapter will discuss bilateral air defence command and control as part of the overall Canada-U.S. continental defence effort.

During the Second World War, Canada championed its joint committee cooperation system of command and control while the U.S. desired to implement its unity of command system. As this chapter demonstrates, these unique joint command and control cultures often conflicted as the two countries began working together to draft bilateral plans to defend the continent from the possibility of attacks from Nazi Germany. In the end a compromise between the two systems was struck. Through this compromise Canada was successfully able to resist American pressure to place Canadian forces under U.S. command, thereby retaining national command and ensuring Canada’s sovereignty.

**The Beginning of the Canada-U.S. Continental Defence Relationship**

The effectiveness of German forces in defeating France came as a shock to the United States and Canada, and for the first time the two countries felt directly threatened by Nazi Germany. The only thing standing in the way between the Germans and North America was Britain, whose chances of survival against a German invasion were rather bleak by summer 1940. Air strikes alone against Canada had the potential to be very destructive, not only for their material damage, but also because they threatened to “play on the public’s exaggerated fears that it would ‘interfere with the flow of personnel and material to Great Britain.’”3 Indeed, Senator Raoul Dandurand’s famous claim during the inter-war period that Canada was a “fireproof house, far from inflammable materials” was growing increasingly obsolete.4
Canada’s armed forces reorganized as best they could with their meagre resources in order to face the threat to the continent. On 1 August the Canadian Army created Atlantic Command (headquarters in Halifax), which encompassed eastern Quebec, the Maritimes, and Newfoundland. This was followed in October with the establishment of Pacific Command (headquarters in Victoria), which covered British Columbia, Alberta, the Yukon and the District of Mackenzie. The Army completed this reorganization in order that it would correspond to the respective Royal Canadian Air Force commands that had been established in 1938-1939, Eastern Air Command and Western Air Command. The goal of this reorganization was to ensure the greatest degree of cooperation between these two services. Four weeks later, on 28 August, the Joint Service Committee Halifax was re-named the Joint Service Committee Atlantic Coast, and on 1 October the Joint Services Committee Victoria was re-named Joint Services Committee Pacific Coast. These bodies were tasked to coordinate joint operations on Canada’s east and west coasts, respectively. They were based on the Canadian joint committee cooperation system of command and control, which was a hybrid of the British joint committee system (see previous chapter). Each committee consisted of the three service operational commanders on the each coast and was chaired by the Army commander. However, unlike in Britain where the three operational commanders operated in a joint Area Combined Headquarters, no joint headquarters was established in Halifax or Victoria at this time. As the next chapter demonstrates, this oversight proved to be a detriment to the effective execution of operations later in the war.

Also in August, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee released its Defence of Canada Plan for 1940. Although it established a “system of ‘Joint Command,’” the plan
sounded more impressive than it really was. It did not authorize any Canadian army, air force or naval officers to exercise any degree of operational command or control over any of the other services. Instead, each of the service commanders on both coasts was to have “a collective as well as an individual responsibility. Collectively they are responsible for the success of the enterprise as a whole. Individually each is responsible for the control and employment of his own forces.” In reality, what this meant was a simple reiteration of the joint committee cooperation system of command and control. As Canadian historian W.A.B. Douglas noted, the service operational commanders “insisted that they could achieve the desired degree of co-operation without the formal subordination of two of them to a third.”

Although Canadian armed forces did the best that they could to shore up the country’s defences, military leaders understood that there was no chance that Canada could defend itself against an all-out enemy attack. The Chiefs of Staff Committee realized that Canada’s only hope against “a first-class power” such as Germany hinged on securing American assistance, and they pressed the government to begin defence conversations with the United States. The Americans were every bit as concerned as the Canadians with a threat to North America, and so on 17 August 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King at the border town of Ogdensburg, New York, to discuss continental defence. The result of this meeting was the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Consisting of civilian and military members, the PJBD was an advisory body (it had no executive authority) that met in secret and made recommendations on defensive measures that required governmental approval before implementation.
Formal defence discussions between the two North American countries began shortly thereafter. During these talks, the American officers felt that they held a definite advantage in securing favourable command and control arrangements for the two North American nations. Noting that the United States did not at that time have the resources needed to fight any kind of expeditionary war, U.S. military planners emphasized that continental defence would be the main focus of the American military in the near future. They felt that the Canadian defence measures in North America were alarmingly weak because of the comparatively small size of Canada’s military and the fact that the bulk of its forces were deployed overseas to protect Britain. Because this strategic situation would make Canada reliant on the U.S. for continental defence, the American military expected to dominate any potential command and control defence relationship with Canada.12

The First Canada-U.S. Bilateral Defence Plan: The October 1940 “Black Plan”

The PJBD soon began working on a joint defence plan, which it released on 10 October 1940. It was officially called the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan–1940, but it was commonly known as the “Black Plan” because it “postulated a German victory over Britain, the disappearance of the Royal Navy as an effective fighting force, and a concerted Axis effort against North America.”13 The plan provided for defence responsibilities in territorial waters and land areas on the lines of national sovereignty: Canada would protect Canadian territory and the United States would protect American territory.14 There was no specific section on command and control relationships in the final version of the “Black Plan.” Dziuban has recorded that “as each of the drafts of the 1940 Plan was prepared, including the last (10 October 1940), no
command provisions whatever were included.”\textsuperscript{15} However, subsequent examination of archival documents has revealed that the original drafts of the “Black Plan” in fact contained a section on command, and it is worth discussing briefly.

The command section in the original drafts of the “Black Plan” outlined, for the first time, that the Canada-U.S. continental defence command and control relationship would be based on a compromise between the Canadian joint committee cooperation system and the American unity of command system. Specifically, it stated that “the operations of combined forces of the two nations will be coordinated by either mutual cooperation or the exercise of unity of command.”\textsuperscript{16} Canadian and American forces would “normally” practice “mutual cooperation” in their combined operations and unity of command would only be required in the following two cases: when provided for in joint agreements between the two governments; or when commanders of Canadian and U.S. forces agreed that the situation required the exercise of unity of command and further agreed as to the service that will exercise this command and control authority.\textsuperscript{17}

The definition of unity of command was consistent with the one in the American 1935 joint doctrine publication, \textit{Joint Action of the Army and the Navy} (see previous chapter). Indeed, all the command and control arrangements in the draft “Black Plan” closely mirrored those in \textit{Joint Action of the Army and the Navy}, and in fact appear to be copied right from the U.S. doctrine publication. This meant that at an early point Canadian planners had knowledge of American command and control doctrine, and in particular that mutual cooperation was the primary command and control principle upon which U.S. joint operations were to be based. As we shall see, this proved to be an
important factor in Canada’s successful efforts to establish mutual cooperation as the command and control basis of the 1941 Canada-U.S. defence plan, ABC-22.

Nonetheless, the PJBD decided to leave out the section on command and control from the final version of the October 1940 “Black Plan,” largely at the behest of the Canadian members. Essentially, they had predicted (accurately, as it turned out – see below) that the command and control provisions would be a very controversial issue if the plan in which they appeared went forth for approval to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and government. This would put the document under intense examination and review, which would prolong its approval by the two nations.\textsuperscript{18} Since it was necessary to get the proverbial ball rolling on the preparation of defence installations, the command section was left out of the final 10 October 1940 version of the plan so as to secure quick government approval. However, this did not mean that the discussion of command and control arrangements was over.

American planners in the U.S. Army War Plans Division (WPD) were disappointed with the lack of command and control provisions in the “Black Plan,” feeling that “the whole issue of command has been side-stepped.”\textsuperscript{19} Specifically, these officers were adamant that “mutual cooperation” was not sufficient for the command and control relationship of Canadian and American continental defence forces, warning that it would present “a most difficult problem.”\textsuperscript{20} What added to this American concern over the lack of command and control provisions was that the responsibilities for the defence of Newfoundland in the “Black Plan” were not entirely clear.

In late August 1940, talks between the Newfoundland Government and Canada led to an agreement placing the British colony’s tiny military forces under Canadian
command. However, in September 1940, the United States and Britain concluded a Destroyers-for-Bases deal whereby in return for 50 old destroyers the Americans received lengthy leases on British bases. Three sites in Newfoundland were included in this agreement: a naval base at Argentia, which was 131 miles west of St. John’s; an air base at Stephenville on the island’s west coast; and an army base named Fort Peperell on Lake Quidi Vidi, just outside of St. John’s. These American bases, which opened at various points throughout 1941, were considered United States territory and were thus to be defended by U.S. military forces. This arrangement meant that both American forces and Canadian forces were stationed in Newfoundland to defend the colony.

As a consequence, although the “Black Plan” indicated that “initial” defensive responsibility for Newfoundland still remained with Canada, the Americans felt that it “implied subsequent allocation of the responsibility to the United States.” Such an assumption came from the American belief that Canada, as a minor military power, “possessed little if any mandate beyond its own territories,” and from the American standpoint that because Canada had approached the United States for defensive assistance in its time of need, the Canadians had thus “accepted the need for American strategic direction in the western Atlantic.” Consequently, although the “Black Plan” had no command and control provisions, American officials, in Dziuban’s words, felt that the territorial responsibilities outlined in it “presumably included command responsibility.” These concerns proved to be a major challenge for the Canadian military, and it was under this atmosphere that negotiations between Canada and the United States on the command and control provisions for the “Black Plan” continued in early 1941.

Continental Defence Command and Control in the Event of a British Defeat
At the beginning of 1941 it was becoming more probable that Britain was going to survive and continue the fight against the Axis. With the English Channel, not the Western Atlantic, as the first line of defence, Canadian PJBD members announced to their American counterparts at the Board’s 20 January meeting that the “Black Plan” was out of date and that a new plan for 1941 “should be drawn up at once.” The resulting Plan 2, later known as ABC-22 (both terms will be used), will be discussed below. Nevertheless, because there was still the possibility that Britain could fall to Axis forces, the American PJBD Section insisted on completing the detailed aspects of the “Black Plan,” most notably those dealing with command and control.

The “Black Plan” had provided a basis for future Canada-U.S. collaboration on defending North America. However, this document was only an outline plan, listing certain responsibilities but not going into any kind of detail regarding bilateral command and control provisions. These issues were dealt with in the army-air force operational implementation plan, which the Canada-U.S. planners called Plan 1. The “Black Plan” envisaged the defeat of Britain – which would include the large number of Canadian forces overseas being lost defending the island nation – and a major assault on North America. Canadian planners understood that their only hope of survival in such a situation hinged on assistance from the United States. Therefore, for Plan 1 Canada was more willing to grant the United States greater command and control authority over Canadian forces when fighting together with American forces in the defence of the continent than in a scenario in which there was no major attack on North America. Based on recommendations from the Canadian Section PJBD and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the government agreed with the American proposal that the U.S. Army Chief
of Staff could, so long as it was with Canadian consent and consultation, exercise “strategic direction” (the term “strategical direction” was also used) over Canadian land and air forces in Plan 1.27

When the Canadian Section of the PJBD asked their American counterparts for clarification of what command and control authority the principle of strategic direction actually entailed, the U.S. Section defined it as follows: “By the term strategical direction is meant the assignment of missions and the allocation of the means to accomplish them.”28 This definition of strategic direction contained command and control authority that was inherent in the definition of “unity of command” in the U.S. joint doctrine publication Joint Action of the Army and Navy, which, in turn, was a predecessor of the modern definition of “operational command” (see above, pages 57-58).29 Accordingly, at the operational level, Plan 1’s provision of American strategic direction meant (in modern command and control terminology) the exercise of operational command by the United States over all military forces in Canada and Newfoundland.30 In other words, as former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee General Charles Foulkes explained in an article in 1966, because of the strategic basis of Plan 1, “Canada agreed to accept operational command of all troops in Canada by a U.S. commander,” subject to consultation with Canadian authorities.31 Moreover, as we will see shortly, because strategic direction contained command and control authority inherent in “unity of command” as defined in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, it was therefore not surprising that American planners began using the terms “strategic direction” and “unity of command” interchangeably when referring to their desired operational-level command and control relationship with Canada in ABC-22.
The similarities between strategic direction, unity of command, and the modern definition of operational command are therefore good illustrations of the evolutionary state that most command and control principles were in during the Second World War. Furthermore, the use of the word “strategic” during the war to describe the command and control authority that we now know today is exercised at the operational level as the command and control principle of operational command is a good example of how the term “operational” and the relationship of the operational level with the other two levels of warfare was also still evolving during this conflict. Since “operational” was still entering into the lexicon of military terminology, military personnel, as the “strategic direction” example demonstrates, oftentimes utilized the terms “strategic” and “tactical” when in fact they were referring to command and control authority exercised at the operational level of war. As later chapters in this dissertation will show, the definition of command and control principles and also the term “operational” would continue to evolve and clarify further during the early Cold War period.

Lastly, there was also a provision in Plan 1 that gave the individual Canadian service chiefs or a Canadian operational commander “the right to appeal to the Canadian government if, in his opinion, Canadian national interests are imperilled by the strategic directives received from the United States.”32 As Chapter Three demonstrates, this provision was not only consistent with the right to appeal to higher authority granted to national commanders serving under Marshal Ferdinand Foch on the Western Front in 1918, but would also later be granted to component commanders in the coalition supreme command system of command and control during the Second World War. To summarize, in the event of an Axis assault on North America, Canada recognized that the
United States would be the preeminent power and should have strategic direction over forces defending the continent in Plan 1. Nonetheless, by making this strategic direction authority subject to Canadian consultation and having a provision for the right to refer to higher authority, the Canadian government also ensured that it would have a say in the deployment and movement of its forces.

Unlike Plan 1, however, Plan 2 envisaged the survival of Britain and the entry of the United States into the war alongside the British Commonwealth, and this scenario was becoming much more likely by the spring of 1941. As one Canadian strategic estimate noted, there was “no probability [of] a large scale attack on our shores”; all that could be expected were enemy “‘tip-and-run’ sea and air raids against ports and other military objectives in Newfoundland and Eastern Canada.” The Canadian planners thus felt that in this more strategically favourable climate Canada had more leverage in its command and control discussions with the Americans. In particular, the Canadian PJBD members felt that they did not have to accept American strategic direction for Plan 2 as they did for Plan 1. It was therefore with a much more optimistic attitude that the Canadian planners began their negotiations on command and control arrangements for ABC-22. As we will see in the sections below, these efforts led to several disagreements with American planners.

**ABC-1 and its Effect on Canada-U.S. Bilateral Continental Defence Arrangements**

There was much delay in the production of ABC-22. The main reason was that the Americans first hoped to “ascertain their commitments as a result of United Kingdom-United States Conversations” then ongoing in Washington. These British-American service discussions, begun in January, concerned the possibility of Britain’s
survival and the entrance of the United States into the war alongside the British Commonwealth. It must be emphasized that these talks were purely British-American: the Dominions, including Canada, did not take part, although they were each allowed to have an “observer” who would be briefed by the British delegates after each session.35

The resulting ABC-1 Staff Agreement assigned responsibility for the defence of the Western Hemisphere to the United States, and this brought forth the possibility that Canadian forces might come under American command in North America. However, Canadian military authorities fought hard to ensure that the British-American planners acknowledged the special concerns of Canada regarding continental defence. Although the planners did expect that any Canada-U.S. defence plan would “conform generally” to ABC-1, they also recognized that the British-American agreement should not prejudice any bilateral Canada-U.S. arrangements for the defence of North America.36 Because of this, the ABC-1 Agreement contained a special provision stating that strategic direction over forces operating in Canadian “waters and territories” would not automatically be given to the U.S., but would be “defined in United States-Canada joint agreements.”37 This was a significant achievement for the Canadians, and it would prove to be a crucial asset in their continued command and control discussions with the Americans for Plan 2.

Nonetheless, as Dziuban has noted, because ABC-1 recognized American strategic responsibility for the defence of the Western Hemisphere, it “undoubtedly strengthened the U.S. resolve to press for what it considered a sound military solution of the command question” in North America. In other words, it gave the Americans encouragement in their efforts to implement their unity of command system for ABC-22.38 Canadian military officials, however, were not intimidated. The improved strategic
situation upon which both ABC-1 and ABC-22 were based in fact strengthened the Canadian position in North America, fortifying the resolve of the Canadian Section PJBD to resist American efforts to place Canadian troops under U.S. strategic direction or unity of command. The two sides were at loggerheads, and as C.P. Stacey astutely noted, “the provisions of ABC-22 concerning command led to the most serious difference of opinion between the two national Sections of the Board that took place during the war.”

**Canadian Opposition to U.S. Strategic Direction for Plan 2**

The Canadian and American PJBD service members met in Montreal on 14 April 1941 to begin preliminary negotiations on Plan 2. Each side put forth their country’s view of what the command and control relationship between the two countries should be in the event of the United States entering the war alongside the Allies. The Americans advocated U.S. strategic direction over all Canadian and U.S. forces as in Plan 1, but the Canadians disagreed, arguing that the improved strategic situation did not warrant it. Instead, the Canadian members insisted that the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship should be based on the principle of cooperation. The American members, although admitting that cooperation was “possible,” still insisted that this command and control principle “is definitely wrong, inconsistent with Plan No. 1 and invites confliction [sic], delay and uncertainty.” It was therefore not surprising that the two sides were unable to find a middle ground at this meeting. Instead, they essentially agreed to disagree on command and control for the moment and decided that it would be best to seek further advice from their respective Chiefs of Staff and governments.

Nonetheless, with the American planners admitting that cooperation was at least a
possibility, it gave the Canadians PJBD service members further encouragement to push harder to make it the basis for command and control for ABC-22.

In opposing American strategic direction in Plan 2, the Canadian PJBD members had the full support of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In a memorandum to the Cabinet War Committee, the Chiefs recommended “most strongly against the acceptance by Canada of any proposal giving the United States unqualified strategic control of Canadian Armed Forces” for ABC-22. Their main concern was that American strategic direction would potentially allow the United States to re-distribute Canadian forces to other areas of North America, which was a national command responsibility. In particular, the Chiefs feared that this authority could possibly lead American commanders to remove forces from Canadian territory without Canada’s consent in order to provide added protection to their own vital points. This would have entailed a significant blow to Canadian sovereignty.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee instead endorsed a suggestion by the RCN member of the PJBD, Captain H.E. Reid. “Rastus” Reid, who would later become the RCN’s Chief of the Naval Staff, recommended that the U.S. retain strategic direction over its forces in its own territory and Canada retain strategic direction over its forces in Canada and Newfoundland. When Canadian-American forces operated together, the command and control relationship between the two nations’ forces should be “the same mutual co-operation which has been so evident between the U.K. and Canadian forces now operating in the Atlantic area.” The Cabinet War Committee concurred, and officially sanctioned the Canadian PJBD Section’s efforts to resist U.S. strategic direction and come to a more agreeable command and control solution.
The Waters Get Muddied: Confusion Between Plan 1 and Plan 2

Although now armed with official government endorsement for resisting American strategic direction in ABC-22, the Canadian Chairman of the PJBD, O.M. Biggar, acted far too aggressively in his subsequent correspondence with his American counterpart, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. As Stacey has remarked, “Biggar now had the chance of communicating these [Cabinet War Committee] decisions to the Americans. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he handled it somewhat ineptly.” Biggar did not consult the Canadian Service PJBD members before writing LaGuardia, and this only made the continued command and control negotiations for ABC-22 more difficult.

In communicating his opposition to American strategic direction to LaGuardia, Biggar wrote that it was “very unpropitious” for Canada to “surrender to the United States what she has consistently asserted vis-à-vis Great Britain,” especially since the U.S. was not yet even an active belligerent in the war. The problem was that in making this argument, Biggar did not make any distinction between Plan 1 and Plan 2. This was an important consideration since the Americans still felt that there was a real possibility of the Plan 1 scenario occurring: British defeat and an Axis assault on North America. They were thus very upset with Biggar’s position, feeling that Canada was reneging on its agreement to place its forces under U.S. strategic direction for Plan 1. Importantly, in his replies to Biggar’s letters, LaGuardia only muddied the waters further by also continually failing to make the distinction between Plan 1 and Plan 2. In one letter to Biggar, LaGuardia wrote “I fear that we are getting dangerously apart.” The American PJBD Chairmen then reiterated the U.S. position in favour of strategic direction, remarking that “it is far better to trust in the honor of the United States, than to the mercy
of the enemy.” Again, he did not differentiate between the two plans. Unfortunately, the effect of the correspondence between Biggar and LaGuardia was only to make the confusion over the ABC-22 command and control situation even worse.

LaGuardia also forwarded Biggar’s letters to members of the U.S. Army War Plans Division. As Stacey has noted, these officers were “amazed and shocked” with what they viewed as Canadian backtracking on strategic direction arrangement for Plan 1. They concluded that this military issue had now become a political one. LaGuardia agreed, and decided to appeal directly to President Roosevelt. The American PJBD Chairman asked Roosevelt to intervene directly to solve the command and control deadlock by speaking with Mackenzie King. The President refused, insisting that this was an issue that the PJBD had to sort out on its own. However, understanding that the U.S. PJBD Section still needed an official government stance on the command and control issue and after consulting with his Secretaries of War and the Navy, Roosevelt submitted the following as the American basis for further discussions with the Canadians:

The United States not being an active belligerent is, nevertheless, virtually ready to undertake the defense of the Canadian eastern coast, including the land and waters of Newfoundland and Labrador. Canada has not either the men or the material to undertake this except as a participant on a much smaller scale than the United States. Canada is really devoting its war effort to sending as much in the way of men and materials across the ocean as possible. In the active carrying out of war plans the strategic responsibility ought to rest with the United States, in view of the fact that in actual defense nine-tenths of the total effort will fall on the United States.

Once again, there was no differentiation between the two defence plans or the strategic scenario upon which each was based. As Stacey has noted, Roosevelt’s arguments were in fact “more relevant to Plan 1 than to Plan 2.” The President’s statement thus did little to solve the command and control debate on ABC-22. Brigadier Maurice Pope, the
Canadian Army PJBD member, thus feared that the “ambiguous situation” caused by the recent confusion over the two plans was “giving rise to a good deal of misunderstanding” and apprehension between the two sides in finding a solution. These concerns were confirmed at the next meeting of the PJBD.

“Don’t let the bastards grind you down!”: The 28-29 May 1941 PJBD Meeting

The resulting 19th Meeting of the PJBD in Washington in late May was the most strained in the history of the Canadian-American body. From the beginning, the Americans were still intent on securing strategic direction over Canadian forces for Plan 2 and the Canadians were equally intent on resisting this formula. This was demonstrated vividly by Pope’s recollection of the advice given to him by the Minister of National Defence before the Canadian Section departed for the American capital:

As far as I can today recall, Mr. Ralston’s admonition to me as I left Ottawa could be summed up by a new-fangled dog-Latin tag current in Washington a year or two later, *Non illegitimus carborundum*, which was said to mean, ‘Don’t let the b...s grind you down!’

The official record contained in the PJBD Journals does not reveal the level of friction between the two sides. However, reports of the meeting by those who attended and in particular the recollections of General Pope provide important insights.

The PJBD discussed Plan 2 on 29 May. Pope described the negotiations as “a nightmare” in which the Americans launched “an all-out offensive, and to us fell the less comfortable role of defending our positions.” The meeting started at 9am and lasted well into the evening, with only a short break for lunch. It was a hot day, but after 6pm the building’s air conditioning system was shut off, and the Canadian Section, in Pope’s words, “wondered if our American friends were subjecting us to a special form of heat treatment.” Finally, at about 10:30pm, “after prolonged wrangling,” the two civilian
Secretaries of the PJBD, John Hickerson for the United States and Hugh Keenleyside for Canada, presented a draft command and control arrangement for Plan 2.\textsuperscript{58} This proposal has never before been discussed in the historical literature regarding the 28-29 May 1941 PJBD meeting and its contents are examined here for the first time. It granted Canada “strategic direction and command of its forces operating in Canada and Newfoundland.”\textsuperscript{59} However, this arrangement dealt only with forces for continental defence; the arrangement for maritime forces was quite different. Canada was granted strategic direction and command over its naval and maritime air forces only for coast defence and the protection of coastal shipping, but strategic direction of Canadian forces engaged in the defence of ocean-bound maritime trade was assigned to the United States.\textsuperscript{60}

Pope understood that this arrangement would not be acceptable to either the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Canadian Government, and he spoke out against it. By this time the Americans were now using the terms “strategic direction” and “unity of command” interchangeably in reference to the operational-level command and control arrangement that they preferred with Canada for ABC-22. They countered Pope’s objection by stressing that U.S. strategic direction/unity of command was “essential in war” and therefore also necessary for ABC-22. To back up this position, they cited the precedent of Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s exercise of strategic direction/unity of command over all Allied armies on the Western Front in 1918 and how the U.S military felt that it was a crucial factor in Allied victory in the First World War (see previous chapter). Pope disagreed with this line of reasoning, arguing that the huge number of forces (350 Divisions) on the Western Front and the strategic setting in 1918 were “totally different
to a situation when there was a war in the Western Hemisphere and our joint coastlines exposed only to occasional hit and run raids.” Simply put, the strategic situation upon which ABC-22 was based – British survival and no major Axis assault on North America – was not serious enough to warrant U.S. strategic direction or unity of command over Canadian forces. Pope’s stance had the desired effect and the proposal was withdrawn. Instead, the official record contained in the PJBD Journals stated that “since no mutually acceptable solution of the problem of command relationship[s] was found after a full discussion of the subject,” both Sections of the PJBD agreed to proceed with their talks on command and control arrangements for ABC-22 “on the basis of command by cooperation.”

The first battle had been won: the Canadians had successfully resisted American demands for U.S. strategic direction over Canadian forces in Plan 2. The Canadian planners understood that they had achieved a great concession from the Americans, but they also recognized that their U.S. colleagues were not happy with “cooperation.” As Biggar noted, the Americans felt that settling on this command and control principle “had the effect of whittling away the power to such an extent as to leave what remains of little value.” Thereafter, the debate on the final command and control provisions for ABC-22 switched to one between the Canadian preference for the principle of cooperation and the U.S. desire to have at least some kind of provision for unity of command.

**Finalizing the Command and Control Arrangements for ABC-22**

The service members of the PJBD met at various points throughout June and July 1941 to draft the new command and control arrangements for Plan 2. Finally, on 28 July the Board released its final draft of ABC-22. The command and control
arrangements contained in the new plan mirrored those originally proposed for the October 1940 “Black Plan,” which were, in turn, very similar to those in the American 1935 joint doctrine publication *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* (see above). Overall, they represented a significant victory for the Canadian planners.

Specifically, ABC-22 outlined that each nation would retain strategic direction and command of its own forces. The combined Canadian-U.S. military effort was to be based on the command and control principle of “mutual cooperation” and the forces of each nation were required, “to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the other nation.” In addition, like *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, ABC-22 also included a provision for the exercise of unity of command over Canadian and American forces in an emergency situation, to be implemented in the following circumstances:

a) When agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or
b) When the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate establishment of unity of command in cases of an emergency.66

The final definition of unity of command in ABC-22 was very similar to the one in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, with only minor differences in wording to reflect bilateral operations (i.e., “both services” was changed to “both nations,” etc.):

Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to co-ordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such co-ordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective co-ordination.67
As the Chapter Three demonstrates, this definition of the principle of unity of command was similar to the modern definition of “operational command.” For ABC-22, this meant that unity of command entailed vesting operational command of both joint and combined forces in a theatre in one single operational commander. Furthermore, by specifying that unity of command did not include authority over administration and discipline, ABC-22 also ensured that these responsibilities remained a service prerogative under the national command exercised by the respective country’s chiefs of staff.

National command authority was also safeguarded by an additional clause that was appended to the definition of unity of command regarding authority for the movement of forces from one area to another: “In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Oceans, nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land area, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.” However, in an emergency situation ABC-22 did provide for the temporary movement of forces if the operational situation required it. Lastly, the plan also provided for the exchange of liaison officers between commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

ABC-22 therefore combined the Canadian joint committee cooperation system and the American unity of command system. It ensured that national command would be retained by each nation’s chiefs of staff. Although the plan contained provisions for unity of command in an emergency or agreed to by the Canadian and American chiefs of staff, it was cooperation that was established in ABC-22 as the main principle upon which the command and control relationship between Canadian and American operational commanders would be based in the event of U.S. entry into the war. Thus,
the new plan was consistent with Canadian joint command and control culture and practice embodied in the joint committee cooperation system.

The American planners were never fully satisfied with the command and control arrangements in ABC-22. The U.S. Army War Plans Division in particular felt that that “mutual cooperation is an ineffective method of coordination of military forces” and that the plan was therefore “considered defective in its provisions relative to command arrangements.” However, although the senior U.S. Army PJBD member Lieutenant-General Stanley Embick agreed with his War Plans Division colleagues, given the difficulties already experienced in negotiating the command and control arrangements for Plan 2, he concluded that the arrangements in ABC-22 “probably represent the best compromise possible under present conditions.” Besides, as the American planners all too easily forgot, cooperation was also the main command and control principle for U.S. joint operations according to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, which stated that “operations of the Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation.” Indeed, because the arrangements in ABC-22 mirrored those in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, the new Canada-U.S. defence plan was also consistent with American joint command and control culture and practice.

The United States Secretary of the Navy approved ABC-22 on 16 August and the Secretary of War did the same two days later. President Roosevelt’s approval came on the 29th of that month. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff submitted their endorsement of ABC-22 to the government on 30 September, and the Canadian Government gave its official approval to the plan on 15 October. In the end, ABC-22 was appended to existing American and Canadian defence plans and distributed to the relevant operational
commanders. It was only to be put into effect upon the entry of the United States into the war.\textsuperscript{75} This, of course, proved to be a short time indeed, when Japanese carrier aircraft launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

The service members of the PJBD took satisfaction that they, not the civilian members, had completed the final negotiations on the command and control provisions for ABC-22. Canadian and American military authorities felt that the issue was a military one: in their opinion it was best to avoid political interference, such as the unfortunate Biggar-LaGuardia correspondence which had caused so much consternation and confusion over Plan 1 and Plan 2, and leave the service members of the PJBD to their devices to come to a mutually agreeable solution.\textsuperscript{76} Therefore, in the end ABC-22 was a “functional” military plan to handle a military situation. As we shall see in future chapters, this practice of having service planners complete detailed command and control arrangements set an important precedent for future Canada-U.S. air defence planning.

Conclusion

In the summer of 1940, the defeat of France and the Low Countries to German forces came as a shock to both Canada and the United States. Alarmed by the growing threat that Hitler’s Germany posed to North America, the two countries soon came together to formulate bilateral defence plans for the defence of the continent. In these plans the issue of command and control over combined Canadian and American forces became a very important and controversial one. Canada agreed to U.S. strategic direction over its forces in the event of a “Black Plan” situation of the defeat of Britain (and along with it the bulk of Canadian forces overseas) and a major Axis assault on North America. Nonetheless, even though Canada gave up a great deal of command and control authority
in Plan 1 to the United States, Canadian planners were still able to secure important concessions from the Americans in the provisions. These included the entitlement to consultation and the right of the Chiefs of Staff and operational-level commanders to appeal to higher authority if they disagreed with an American directive, both of which ensured that Canada would have a say in the deployment and movement of its forces.

By early 1941, the improved situation necessitated a re-examination of Canada-U.S. defence plans. Since it was becoming much more likely that Britain would survive, Canadian planners insisted on drafting a new plan based on the United States entering the war as a partner with the British Commonwealth against the Axis Powers. Since the new strategic situation upon which this new plan was based was much more optimistic than the purely defensive 1940 “Black Plan,” the Canadian PJBD members felt that they were in a much stronger position to secure a more favourable command and control arrangement with the Americans. In particular, the Canadians desired that their joint committee cooperation system of command and control be utilized for the new Plan 2. However, as the larger of the two nations in this continental defence effort, the Americans still desired to retain the strategic direction power that they had secured in Plan 1, and they exerted significant pressure on the Canadians to accept this arrangement.

Nonetheless, Canadian planners insisted that the strategic situation upon which ABC-22 was based was not serious enough to warrant U.S. strategic direction or unity of command over Canadian forces. All that could now be expected were “tip and run raids” by small groups of enemy forces, and the Canadians steadfastly resisted American pressure to accept their proposals. The result was that the negotiations surrounding the command and control provisions for Plan 2/ABC-22 were very difficult and oftentimes
heated. Nonetheless, the Canadians stood their ground and remained firm in their convictions. They prevailed in the end, securing “mutual cooperation” as the main command and control principle upon which Canada-U.S. combined operations would be based in Plan 2. In this sense, ABC-22 was consistent with Canadian command and control practice and culture. Furthermore, by maintaining national command authority over its forces, Canada was thus also able to safeguard the country’s sovereignty.

The Americans did score a small victory with ABC-22 by securing a clause allowing for the implementation of unity of command by mutual agreement by the two nations’ chiefs of staff or in an emergency by operational-level commanders, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Canadian and American military leadership. In fact, the provisions for mutual cooperation and unity of command in ABC-22 closely mirrored those in the principal U.S. joint doctrine publication, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, and were therefore also consistent with American command and control practice and culture. By and large, the command and control provisions in ABC-22 were in fact quite favourable to Canada, especially given its concessions for American strategic direction in Plan 1 and the original American intention to secure U.S. strategic direction over Canadian forces in Plan 2. Nonetheless, even though the U.S. desire for unity of command had hit a roadblock, it did not dissuade the Americans from trying to implement this command and control system for continental defence again. Indeed, the debate over mutual cooperation and unity of command spilled over into the relations between Canadian and U.S. operational-level commanders in the field, and this will be the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter Five  
The Canada-U.S. Command and Control Relationship at the Operational Level  
During the Second World War, 1941-1945

Introduction

The arrival of U.S. troops and aircraft in Newfoundland in early 1941 marked the first time that Canadian and American commanders were tasked to coordinate their forces at the operational level in a combined effort to defend North America from attack. It was a new experience for both nations’ armed forces, and it brought forth several significant differences of opinion between the Canadian and American militaries regarding what the command and control relationship between their forces should be. The U.S. commanders in particular desired to implement the American unity of command system for all combined forces in Newfoundland. However, this flew in the face of the established Canadian joint committee system of command and control. This debate was apparently settled in late July 1941, with the Canada-U.S. Defence Plan ABC-22 entrenching mutual cooperation as the main command and control principle upon which the Canada-U.S. operational-level command and control relationship was to be based. However, even though this plan was only to be placed into effect upon the entry of the United States into the Second World War as an active belligerent, American commanders in Newfoundland continued during this period of neutrality to press for the establishment of unity of command, which was also allowed for in ABC-22 in certain circumstances. Canada was able to successfully resist this American pressure, but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 brought forth a new set of variables to the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship.
With the United States officially in the war, ABC-22 now came fully into effect and with it mutual cooperation. However, as this chapter demonstrates, disagreements between the two nations continued to arise about whether or not the enemy threat to the continent warranted the activation of the clause in ABC-22 providing for the exercise of unity of command. The Americans, still in shock by the destructiveness of the Japanese attack, immediately began pressing Canada to implement unity of command under U.S. officers in Newfoundland and now also on the Canada-U.S. Pacific coast. In both theatres, however, Canadian military officials successfully defended their position on mutual cooperation, stressing that despite the entry of both Japan and the United States into the war the enemy threat to North America was still minimal and did not require unity of command. In maintaining this stance in the face of intense American pressure, not only was Canada able to safeguard its sovereignty by retaining national command of its forces, but it was also able to successfully resist having its forces come under American operational command under the unity of command system.

The air forces that Canada and the United States utilized in the continental defence role also played a very important part in the defence of Allied shipping, notably off the east coast. In fact, it was in the maritime trade defence role that the two nations’ air forces conducted the majority of their combined operations. Accordingly, the issue of command and control over maritime air forces became intimately involved with the overall Canada-U.S. debate over continental defence forces during the war. As this chapter demonstrates, the disagreements over mutual cooperation and unity of command continued, but it was in the context of the maritime trade defence role where the most important developments in the operational-level Canada-U.S. command and control
relationship occurred. When mutual cooperation proved incapable of ensuring efficient coordination of maritime air power, the two North American countries decided to implement the British operational control system to coordinate their air forces in the defence of allied shipping. In so doing, Canada and the United States set important command and control precedents for the defensive use of air power that would be continued in their post-Second World War continental air defence relationship.

**Canada-U.S. Operational-Level Relations in Newfoundland Before Pearl Harbor**

Different perceptions in Canada and the United States of how the defence of Newfoundland fit into the overall defence scheme for North America was a crucial factor in the ongoing debate on command and control of forces tasked to protect the British colony. The Americans saw Newfoundland as a separate entity outside of the continental United States and Canada, and as the larger partner in the new Canada-U.S. alliance, they naturally desired that one of their commanders be allowed to exercise unity of command there. The Canadians, on the other hand, viewed Newfoundland as an integral part of the overall defence of eastern Canada. Feeling that their special interests in the British colony were paramount – and the fact that they had deployed to the colony first at the behest of both the Newfoundland and British governments – the Canadian military leadership felt that responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland and the command and control system that should be implemented for this purpose should be Canada’s prerogative.¹

The first U.S. forces began to arrive in Newfoundland in January 1941 to take possession of their new bases secured in the British-U.S. Destroyers-for-Bases deal the previous September. The new U.S. Army Newfoundland Base Command was located at
Fort Pepperell near St. John’s. It originally consisted of 1,000 troops and their equipment and was under the command of Colonel Maurice D. Welty. By April Colonel Welty also had command over a squadron of U.S. Army Air Corps (in June 1941 re-named U.S. Army Air Forces, or USAAF) B-17 bombers at the Newfoundland Airport at Gander. In July 1941, Argentia, on the west side of the Avalon Peninsula, was officially commissioned as a United States Navy base. It came under the command of Rear-Admiral A.A.L. Bristol, who was also commander of the USN’s Task Force 1, later re-named Task Force 4. Although Canadian service personnel accepted the American presence, they were cautious in their dealings with their U.S. counterparts. This caution was wise, as the Americans arrived fully intending to implement their unity of command system of command and control in Newfoundland. However, in early 1941 it was still Canadian military forces that were predominant in the British colony.

By the summer of 1940, the RCAF had already established one flight of Bomber Reconnaissance (maritime patrol) aircraft in Newfoundland to patrol its sea approaches. In August 1940, the small Newfoundland Militia was placed under Canadian command. The Canadian Army posted Brigadier Phillip Earnshaw to St. John’s as the commander of the Canadian Army’s Force “W” (two divisions), and tasked him oversee the military build-up there. In November Earnshaw was assigned the title “Commander Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces, Newfoundland.” It was not an independent command but was a sub-command of the Army’s Atlantic Command under Major-General W.H.P. Elkins.

In May 1941, the Royal Canadian Navy established the Newfoundland Escort Force (NEF) at St. John’s under the command of Commodore L.W. Murray. This
organization of naval escort vessels had the responsibility to protect shipping in the North Atlantic from German U-boat attack. Shortly thereafter, in July 1941 the RCAF created Number One Group Headquarters in St. John’s under the command of Group Captain (later Air Commodore) C.M. “Black Mike” McEwen. No. 1 Group was tasked with responsibility for all RCAF forces in Newfoundland and, most importantly, to control air operations in support of the NEF. Operational command of Canadian air forces in Newfoundland, however, still remained with the primary RCAF command organization on the Canadian east coast, Eastern Air Command, which passed orders through No. 1 Group Headquarters from Halifax. Coordination of the three Canadian services in the colony was accomplished by the establishment of a Joint Services Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, consisting of the senior officers of the three Canadian services in St. John’s. It was subordinate to the Joint Services Committee Atlantic Coast, and like this body was also based on the Canadian joint committee system of cooperation. It was these operational-level Canadian air force, army and naval commanders, coordinating their operations by means of cooperation, who dealt with American commanders in Newfoundland throughout the Second World War.

From the beginning, the Canada-U.S. operational-level command and control relationship in Newfoundland was ambiguous because the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence was still in the process of drafting bilateral defence plans (see previous chapter). Colonel Welty’s superiors had ordered him to “cooperate” with the USN in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy to defend the U.S. bases in Newfoundland. However, his instructions were silent regarding what his command and control relationship with Canadian commanders would be, only stating that he was to
“participate with Canada” in defending the colony from attack.\textsuperscript{7} Despite several requests to superiors to clarify the command and control situation, Brigadier Earnshaw was unable to secure concrete policy guidelines from either Halifax or Ottawa because of the ongoing PJBD discussions. Unfortunately, this lack of clarity regarding the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship in Newfoundland persisted for several months.\textsuperscript{8}

The situation at the operational level in Newfoundland was clarified somewhat with the approval of ABC-22 by the Canadian and U.S. governments by the autumn of 1941 (see previous chapter).\textsuperscript{9} Nevertheless, despite the mutual cooperation/unity of command provisions in this Canada-U.S. defence plan, ambiguities and disagreements regarding the command and control issue persisted in Newfoundland throughout the last months of 1941. This situation was due largely to the fact that that ABC-22 was not in effect because the United States was not yet officially in the war, and also because of the arrival of a new U.S. Army officer in St. John’s.

Due to the growing number of U.S. forces in Newfoundland and the increased USAAF operations in the defence of maritime trade by the autumn of 1941 (see below), the U.S. Army decided that it was time to appoint a general officer to the colony. In October 1941, Major-General Gerald C. Brant arrived in St. John’s to take over responsibility for U.S. Army forces in the colony as the new Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command.\textsuperscript{10} Brant was brash and aggressive, and his personality did not make him amenable to accepting mutual cooperation as a basis for command and control of combined forces in Newfoundland. A former classmate of U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, Major-General Brant was, in the words of Canadian official historian W.A.B. Douglas, “a soldier moulded in the tradition of the old army.”\textsuperscript{11}
Although he was a USAAF officer, Brant was not an advocate for an independent air force in the United States; unlike most airmen at the time, he felt that that the air services should remain under the U.S. Army. Brant was, however, a staunch advocate of unity of command. Therefore, immediately upon arriving in Newfoundland, he began to constantly exert pressure on the Canadians to establish unity of command – exercised by himself – in the colony, and this attitude only served to alienate him from the Canadian operational-level commanders. Indeed, Brant’s efforts towards achieving unity of command and Canada’s successful resistance to them soon became a recurring theme in Newfoundland for the next several months.

Major-General Brant over-estimated the strategic threat to Newfoundland, considering the possibility of an Axis attack to be great. After Adolf Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 21 June 1941, the USSR was no longer collaborating with Nazi Germany and it had become less likely that the Germans, now heavily engaged with the Red Army on the Eastern Front, would attempt an assault on North America. Importantly, this development in the war overseas had a direct impact on how Washington regarded Newfoundland in the overall strategic picture. No longer did American planners anticipate a heavy attack on the colony; instead they had begun to adopt a view towards defending the island that was more consistent with the Canadian one of only tip-and-run raids. Nevertheless, as Chapter Three demonstrates, because the United States granted much more authority and autonomy to its operational-level commanders in the field during the Second World War, Brant continued to advocate his more dire strategic appreciation of the threat to Newfoundland. Unfortunately for those who had to deal with the new Newfoundland Base Commander, this lack of oversight
from Washington permitted Brant to continue his quest to implement unity of command under himself in the colony.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 only made Brant more apprehensive.

\textbf{Pearl Harbor: The Americans Again Attempt to Impose Unity of Command}

Following the surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Canadian Government quickly declared war on the Empire of Japan. ABC-22 immediately came into effect against Japan, and then also against Germany when Hitler declared war on the United States a few days later.\textsuperscript{17} The Pearl Harbor attack again brought the issue of command and control of combined Canadian-American continental defence forces to the fore. Previously, with Canada fully engaged in the war and the U.S. officially neutral, it was unclear what the actual command and control relationship between the two countries’ military forces was. However, now with the U.S. as a belligerent, there was no question at all: mutual cooperation would be the means by which Canadian and American commanders would coordinate their forces. Nevertheless, disagreements between the two nations persisted about whether this practice should be continued or the provision in ABC-22 for unity of command should be implemented.

During the post-Pearl Harbor period, the continuing Canadian-American differences of opinion regarding command and control largely centred on conflicting interpretations of the seriousness of the actual threat that their combined forces faced. Devastated by the scale and surprise of the Japanese attack, the Americans were anxious to take all the defensive precautions they felt were necessary now that they were belligerents in the war, and this included implementing unity of command in a number of theatres.\textsuperscript{18} Such matters played out once again in Newfoundland, where the potential for
enemy attack grew in the mind of Major-General Brant, and also now in British Columbia, where early Japanese successes in the Pacific brought forth a new seriousness to the Canadian-American defensive arrangements on the west coast.

Both Americans on the Pacific coast and Canadians in British Columbia were very shocked and frightened by the Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent Japanese advances in the Pacific. Numerous calls came to Ottawa from British Columbians demanding that substantial reinforcements be sent to the province immediately. This was followed shortly by demands in the U.S. for greater defence centralization on the Western seaboard. According to one U.S. Army War Plans Division study, the entire west coast, from the Mexican border to Alaska constituted “a single physical theatre of operations” that should ideally “be governed by one headquarters.”19 As Douglas has noted, on the east coast, Brant “anticipated the fall of Great Britain, German victory in Africa, and ‘devastating air raids’ against all his installations as a prelude to a ‘probable attempt in later stages to capture and hold Newfoundland.’”20 The U.S. Army officer immediately pressed for unity of command of all Canadian and American forces under himself.

Nevertheless, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee felt that the strategic situation did not require the measures that the Americans were proposing. Although ABC-22 provided for unity of command in an emergency, the Canadian military leadership felt that the current enemy threat still did not necessitate this measure on either coast. The Chiefs correctly predicted that in the Pacific the Japanese would focus their offensive to the southeast, not the northeast towards the North American Pacific coast, and that Germany, still heavily engaged in the USSR, would not risk an attack on the east coast. For some time Canadian and American commanders on both coasts had already
been coordinating their defences, and there was therefore no need to make significant changes to the anticipated forms and scales of attack. The Chiefs thus concluded that a command and control relationship between Canadian and American forces in Newfoundland and on the Pacific coast based on mutual cooperation, as provided for in ABC-22, was satisfactory and that unity of command under an American officer was not necessary. The next task was to convince the Americans of these conclusions.

For the Pacific coast situation, it took a direct approach with the American military leadership in Washington to secure reassurance that the current forms and scales of attack did not require unity of command. After the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States Section of the PJBD immediately pressed Canada to place all of its military forces in British Columbia under U.S. unity of command. American PJBD Chairman Fiorello LaGuardia outlined the U.S. position on unity of command on the Pacific coast in a 2 January 1942 letter to Canadian Chairman O.M. Biggar. He argued that British Columbia “geographically was an enclave” within the newly-formed U.S. Western Theatre of Operations, which stretched from Southern California up to and including Alaska. Stressing that the Puget Sound-southern British Columbia area in particular was of crucial strategic importance and therefore “cannot be most effectively defended under the control of several commanders,” LaGuardia formally requested that the Canadian and U.S. governments implement the provision for unity of command in ABC-22 by placing Canadian army and air forces (except for those involved in maritime trade defence operations) in British Columbia under the “Supreme Command” of the U.S. Army commander, Lieutenant-General John L. Dewitt.
To appease the Canadians, LaGuardia (again demonstrating the American propensity to use strategic direction and unity of command interchangeably) emphasized that Dewitt’s powers over Canadian forces would be limited to giving “strategical and tactical directives” to Canadian forces, and he would not be permitted to “transfer Canadian forces from Canadian Territory without the consent of the Canadian Commander or the Canadian Government; alter the tactical organization of Canadian units; or interfere in their administration or discipline.” In other words, authority over these areas was inherent in national command and operational command, which remained with Canada. LaGuardia ended his letter to Biggar by stressing that unity of command under Dewitt was “a wise precautionary measure, in advance of the occurrence of an actual attack.”

As Galen Perras has noted, LaGuardia’s request “met a Canadian stone wall.” After meeting on 3 January, the Canadian PJBD Section came to the unanimous conclusion that “no case whatever had been made for the institution of a U.S. unity of command over Canadian Army and Air Forces.” Once again, the U.S. request for unity of command was representative of a fundamental Canada-U.S. disagreement on anticipated enemy intentions. The Americans, “as usual,” did not include any updated forms or scales of attack to justify their position. The strategic threat to the west coast was in fact “precisely the situation that was contemplated last Spring when ABC-22 was drafted.” Since the Canadians had then held out for mutual cooperation, there was thus no new reason why they should not again resist this new attempt by the Americans to establish unity of command.
At that time the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were in Washington for discussions with the Americans and the British. They decided to take advantage of their presence in the U.S. capital to resolve the command and control issue by speaking directly to their American counterparts, USN Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Harold Stark and U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall. Although unknown to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff at the time, Admiral Stark had in fact been advocating to General Marshall that *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*'s provision of mutual cooperation, *not* unity of command, should be the primary command and control principle upon which American *defensive* joint operations should be based. Specifically, although Stark felt that unity of command may be necessary for mixed task forces for offensive operations, he believed that mutual cooperation was better suited for defensive ones. This opinion proved to be beneficial to the Canadian stance on bilateral Canada-U.S. command and control. In Washington, the Canadian Chiefs asked Stark and Marshall the specific reasons why, in their view, a change in the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship was necessary. The response was very revealing. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that the threat was no more than sporadic hit-and-run raids and “stated unequivocally that they did not subscribe to the necessity of Unified Command either in Newfoundland or on the West Coast.”

This *official* U.S. military opinion not only satisfied the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, but also convinced them of the effectiveness of a direct approach to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, the Canadian military leadership announced that any further deliberation and decisions regarding the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship would no longer come under the purview of the PJBD, but instead would be
“entirely a matter of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.” Only if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff directly approached the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee about implementing the unity of command provision in ABC-22 – which appeared unlikely – would the Canadian military leadership consider the matter again. Therefore, although members of the U.S. Section PJBD tried at various times during the winter and spring of 1942 to convince their Canadian counterparts of the need for unity of command on the west coast, because no proof was given that mutual cooperation had broken down and no formal request came from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff (by March 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS), the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee refused to contemplate these requests.

Public pressure in British Columbia did, however, lead the Cabinet War Committee decision, taken over the objections of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to approve a system of Canadian unified command on the east and west coasts in March 1942. In the new scheme, the two senior members of each Joint Service Committee in Halifax and Vancouver became “commanders-in-chief, East and West Coast Defences,” respectively, and were granted the authority to oversee all operations in their areas of responsibility “while retaining tactical command of their own particular service.” In Newfoundland, the senior member of the Joint Service Sub-Committee in St. John’s, Major General L.F. Page, was designated as “commanding Newfoundland defences,” although he was still responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, East Coast Defences in Halifax. However, this was purely a Canadian military arrangement, not a bilateral one with the United States. Furthermore, the new Canadian unity of command system was in fact a façade, for, as Douglas has noted, “in practice… all that changed were the titles. The commanders-in-chief did not interfere in the operations of the other services.” In
other words, although there was the appearance of the concept of unity of command in that all services on each coast came under one officer, in actual practice Canadian operational-level commanders continued the joint committee system of cooperation.

On the east coast, the enemy threat remained a key consideration regarding the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship after Pearl Harbor, but the professional relationships between the Canadian and American operational-level commanders also proved crucial. One measure that the Canadian military took was to re-assert Canadian authority through promotions. The RCN commanders in Newfoundland and Halifax, Commodores L.W. Murray and G.C. Jones, respectively, were both promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral. The Canadian Army replaced Brigadier Earnshaw in December 1941 with Major-General L.R. Page as the new General Officer Commanding Canadian-Newfoundland troops. Page was two days senior to Major-General Brant, but his attitude was much more conciliatory towards the American officer than his predecessor.35 In January 1942, the new Canadian Army commander went out of his way to carefully outline to Major-General Brant the Chiefs of Staff Committee’s conclusions regarding the enemy threat to North America and the continuation of mutual cooperation during a series of meetings between the two soldiers. This personal approach went a long way towards smoothing things over with Brant. Page admitted that there was not enough cooperation between the Newfoundland Base Command and the Canadian services but that “the fault was largely ours.” Brant agreed that the cooperation with the Canadian commanders was not as close as it should be and he reassured the Canadian Army officer of his “desire to co-operate and get on with the war.”36
Although Brant’s meeting with Page put the unity of command issue to rest for the moment, the Newfoundland Base Commander’s relationship with Canadian commanders in the colony continued to be a rocky one. Brant had a particularly difficult relationship with the RCAF commander in Newfoundland, Air Commodore McEwen. As a U.S. Army “traditionalist,” Major-General Brant disliked the idea of an independent air force and was therefore was not enamoured with the upstart young Canadian airman.  

Unfortunately, the resulting difficult working relationship between Brant and McEwen had a negative effect on RCAF-USAAF cooperation for maritime trade defence (see below). It also led to an unfortunate incident between Brant and the Canadian commanders in the late spring of 1942.

Friction between Brant and the Canadian commanders in Newfoundland spilled over during a meeting at St. John’s in June. Unlike the USN commander at Argentia, Brant refused to adhere to RCAF air traffic control and identification regulations, feeling that it “meant handing over the control of his aircraft to the RCAF” and that it was “none of our [Canadian commanders’] business where his aircraft go or what they are doing.”  

Brant concluded that “the whole situation is that the (tail) RCAF is trying to wag the dog (U.S. Army).”  

After Brant proceeded to ridicule the RCAF “at considerable length,” Page and McEwen issued him a thinly-veiled threat to shoot down any USAAF aircraft that did not adhere to the regulations. Brant retorted that he was willing to take that risk and stormed out of the meeting. This clash of personalities had a direct result on the command and control situation in Newfoundland; as Rear-Admiral Murray noted at the time, “the system known as cooperation, which we favour, is very difficult to achieve with an officer of this type commanding one of the five services involved.”  

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Brant was reprimanded by his superior for the incident and later apologized to the Canadians for his behaviour. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee accepted the apology and considered the matter closed. Thereafter relations between the Newfoundland Base Commander and the Canadians were “extremely good” and mutual cooperation proved effective for continental defence coordination. Brant did not bring forth the unity of command issue again; however, he never did feel comfortable with mutual cooperation. In October 1942 Brant officially agreed that in an emergency he would place himself under the unity of command of Major-General Page, who was the senior officer in Newfoundland, as per ABC-22. Nonetheless, privately Brant felt that mutual cooperation was defective and also that “Canadian aid [is] negligible anyway, and not to be depended on.” In the event of an actual attack he was convinced that the main defensive effort will be done by the U.S. Army and that he had “no misgivings [as to] who the actual Commander would be [i.e., himself].” Fortunately, there was no enemy attack on Newfoundland during the war to test whether or not Brant would adhere to official policy or his own personal views on the exercise of unity of command.

Although the Canadians were apprehensive that the U.S. Army might promote Brant to Lieutenant-General, thereby outranking Major-General Page, this fear proved unfounded. When Brant was reassigned in December 1942, his replacement as Newfoundland Base Commander was in fact an officer of lower rank, Brigadier-General John B. Brooks, although he was shortly promoted to Major-General. Nevertheless, the account of Brant’s relationship with Canadian officers in Newfoundland is an example of the important role that personalities and personal relations between commanders play in operational-level command and control relationships. Brant, a hardnosed old-fashioned
type of U.S. Army officer set in his ways before he arrived in St. John’s, made the command and control relationship between Canadian and American commanders a divisive and strained one. Fortunately, as later chapters will demonstrate, RCAF and USAF officers would draw on their common bonds as airmen and continental air defence advocates to ensure a much smoother operational-level Canada-U.S. command and control relationship.

In the end, there were no enemy attacks on North America during the Second World War (except the Aleutians – see note # 27) to determine whether or not mutual cooperation was an effective means of command and control to coordinate combined Canada-U.S. defensive operations. Nonetheless, mutual cooperation was put to the test in the Northwest Atlantic, where the two countries’ air forces worked together to coordinate their operations to defend Allied shipping from U-boat attacks. Since this experience set important precedents for future Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control arrangements during the Cold War, it is worth discussing in the remainder of this chapter.

**Early Canada-U.S. Maritime Air Power Command and Control Relations**

One area of growing concern during the Second World War that had a significant impact on the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship was the increased German threat to maritime trade in the North Atlantic. Incursions by German battleships and battle cruisers into the waters off Newfoundland in search of Allied convoys during the winter and spring of 1941 caused considerable alarm in Ottawa and Washington. Concerns that these Axis warships might also train their heavy guns on targets on Newfoundland’s coast, notably the vital escort port of St. John’s, led to an increase of
American forces in the colony. With the sinking of the battleship Bismarck by Royal Navy vessels and aircraft in May 1941, however, the German surface raider threat declined significantly.47 Thereafter the German Navy focused on utilizing its growing U-boat fleet to attack shipping in the North Atlantic. By the summer of 1941, these U-boats began to spread their area of operations into the Western Atlantic, where sea and air convoy defences were weaker. The consequence of this German strategy was that, although continental defence remained an important issue for Canadian and American air forces, the main focus of their command and control relationship became coordinating their operations in the defence of maritime trade.48

Another response to the increased threat of the U-boats in the Western Atlantic was greater American involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic. The United States agreed to provide destroyer escorts for American ships in Commonwealth convoys, and by July the USN assumed responsibility for the defence of all American and Icelandic merchant vessels travelling between North America and Iceland.49 Further British-American discussions culminated in mid-August, when President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill met at Argentia for the Atlantic Conference. At the meeting the two leaders agreed to implement the USN’s Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 4 (commonly known as WPL-51) by September. Canada was not consulted in this decision and the Canadian naval leadership was quite perturbed to discover that the plan gave the Americans responsibility for the Western Atlantic and placed the operations of the RCN under American direction.50 Specifically, Rear-Admiral A.L.L. Bristol, Commander of USN Task Force 4 at Argentia, was given “coordinating supervision of the operations of Canadian escort units, which latter will be effected through and with”
RCN Commodores Murray in St. John’s and Jones in Halifax, who still retained “entire charge of the availability of Canadian escort units.”51 Through this arrangement, Murray and Jones were thus still able to retain operational command of their forces, which consisted of authority over the availability of RCN escorts.

WPL-51, however, did not specifically address command and control authority over Eastern Air Command maritime patrol aircraft in the Northwest Atlantic. Nonetheless, as Douglas has noted in the RCAF official history, “since the American doctrine of unity of command assumed naval control and direction of maritime air operations far from shore, the US Navy was inclined to exercise command over the RCAF for these purposes as well.”52 Believing that they could dictate which forces could be assigned to the defence of Allied shipping, the USN informed the RCAF in September 1941 that American air forces (naval and USAAF) would conduct all long-range cover for convoys, while Eastern Air Command, including No. 1 Group in Newfoundland, would be relegated only to the coverage of Canadian and Newfoundland coastal waters.53 Such responsibilities, however, fell under the operational command that Eastern Air Command exercised over its squadrons. The USN thus had no authority to dictate RCAF operations, and senior Canadian air force officers began building a case against having its maritime air forces coming under American unity of command.

In a letter to Air Force Headquarters, the RCAF’s top commander on the east coast, the AOC Eastern Air Command Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) N.R. Anderson, pointed out that the RCAF had more experience in maritime patrol operations, having conducted sorties from distances of 600 to 800 miles to sea since the war began. It was, Anderson concluded, therefore not logical, nor conducive to the maintenance of morale in the
squadrons, to relegate Eastern Air Command coverage to coastal zones. Group Captain F.V. Heakes, an officer on the staff of No. 1 Group, agreed with Anderson. With a first-hand view of the military situation in Newfoundland, he could see that the Americans in fact did not have sufficient maritime patrol forces in the colony to take on full-scale convoy coverage duties without “continued RCAF assistance.”

In early October, Admiral Stark formally requested that the RCAF place Eastern Air Command under USN unity of command. The USN Chief noted that ABC-22 allowed for unity of command if the other country’s chiefs of staff agreed to its implementation, a clear reference to clause 9.(a) of the Canada-U.S. defence plan (see previous chapter). Admiral Stark argued that unity of command was necessary in order to ensure “maximum efficiency” and the “complete coordination of the efforts of the Canadian Navy, the Canadian Air Force and the United States Navy in their common purpose of providing effective protection for shipping.”

The Air Staff in Ottawa disagreed with the USN admiral’s reasoning. Regardless of the fact that ABC-22 was not even in effect because the U.S. was not yet in the war, the RCAF officers placed greater emphasis on clause 9.(b) of the Canada-U.S. defence plan, which only provided for unity of command “in case of extreme emergency” and subject to confirmation by both nations’ chiefs of staff. As no such emergency existed at the time, USN unity of command was thus not necessary in the eyes of the RCAF. Since the beginning of the war, the Air Staff explained, “co-operation had provided a satisfactory basis for the co-ordination and joint action of Canadian air forces with Canadian and British Naval forces.” Besides, the USAAF was only required to support the USN’s maritime patrol operations, yet “strangely enough” the RCAF was being
“asked to place part of its forces under the command of the United States Navy.”58 These arguments satisfied the Canadian Minister of National Defence for Air, C.G. “Chubby” Power, and at the 9 October meeting of the Cabinet War Committee he convinced his colleagues that there was “no reason to give to a foreign neutral power more than had been given to the Canadian and British Navies.”59

With the full support of his government, on 15 October the RCAF’s Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal L.S. Breadner, informed Admiral Stark that even though the closest possible coordination between all forces in the Northwest Atlantic was desirable, the situation at the time still did not necessitate unity of command. Instead, Breadner advocated the continuation of the system of cooperation between Eastern Air Command and American air forces, and he informed Stark that the RCAF organization was setting up a system of coordination in the form of liaison officers, which was also provided for in ABC-22.60 This was not the response that Admiral Stark was hoping for, but he respected the RCAF’s decision and issued orders for the USN air forces in Newfoundland to cooperate with Eastern Air Command. Upon hearing of Stark’s acceptance of the RCAF position, Breadner informed the Minister of National Defence for Air, and added a message of relief: “We have held them off, so far!”61

**Pearl Harbor and Renewed American Pressure for Unity of Command**

Following the Pearl Harbor attack and the entry of the United States into the war, American officers began a fresh attempt to impose unity of command over Eastern Air Command maritime patrol operations. In Newfoundland, their main focus was to gain control over the RCAF’s No. 1 Group. The American officers’ primary concern was that Air Commodore McEwen “could not independently and without reference to the Eastern
Air Command headquarters at Halifax take immediate action to support the [USN] Atlantic Fleet task force” in the protection of shipping.62

The Americans took their concern to the PJBD. After discussion, on 20 December 1941 the Board released its 22nd Recommendation. It called for the decentralization of command and control authority in order to permit easier local cooperation and give operational-level commanders in Newfoundland greater freedom of action to deal immediately with the operational situation.63 This measure was consistent with the military principle of centralized command and decentralized execution, which was a hallmark of American operational-level practice at the time (see Chapter Three). However, as American official historian Stanley W. Dziuban has noted, the wording of the PJBD’s 22nd Recommendation was not very precise, as it “gave broad scope to the measures that might be taken.”64 The RCAF was also uncomfortable with the measure. Because the recommendation led to a decrease in the AOC Eastern Air Command’s authority over RCAF forces in Newfoundland, the Air Staff immediately suspected that the Americans would try to capitalize on this situation by implementing U.S. unity of command over No. 1 Group. Indeed, the RCAF was even more suspicious of American intentions now that the United States was formally at war. Moreover, the division of responsibility for maritime air power between the USN and the USAAF became a particular troubling concern of the Air Staff.65

Unlike in Canada, during the inter-war period the United States did not establish a separate air force but instead permitted the USN and U.S. Army to each have its own air arm. The 1935 U.S. joint doctrine publication Joint Action of the Army and the Navy granted the navy responsibility for all inshore and offshore patrol for the purpose of
protecting shipping and defending the coastal frontiers, and assigned the U.S. Army Air Corps responsibility for the defence of the coast itself through the tasking of long-range bombardment aircraft to destroy any approaching hostile forces. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* also included a provision that U.S. Army aircraft could temporarily execute USN maritime patrol functions in support of or “in lieu” of the navy if the USN did not have the aerial resources it needed to fulfill its responsibilities.66 This is what happened during the Second World War, when the USN did not have sufficient maritime patrol aircraft to fulfill its coastal patrol and trade defence roles and had to rely on the long-range aircraft resources of the USAAF’s Number I Bomber Command to fill the gap.67 The problem was that there was significant disagreement between the two services as to how to go about carrying out this defensive role.

Whereas USN maritime air doctrine emphasized the more defensive function of convoy escort and patrol of fixed sectors of coastal waters (which mirrored British and Canadian practice), USAAF doctrine had more of an offensive focus. Influenced heavily by the strategic bombing theories developed at the U.S. Air Corps Tactical School, USAAF doctrine emphasized the concept of “forward air defence,” an offensive form of defence that utilized aircraft to seek out and destroy attacking enemy forces.68 As a consequence, during the war the USAAF implemented a “seek and sink” doctrinal focus for its anti-submarine operations instead of the proven defensive one developed by the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command and utilized by the RCAF. Furthermore, because *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* stipulated that USAAF support to the USN was only a “temporary” expedient, it gave the USAAF little reason to dedicate time and
resources away from its strategic bombing role and towards the development of anti-submarine doctrine.\textsuperscript{69}

Because of the division of responsibility for maritime air power between the USN and the USAAF and their differing doctrinal focuses, it is therefore not difficult to understand why the RCAF was so opposed to the idea of placing its maritime trade defence forces in Newfoundland under any U.S. commander. Specifically, the Air Staff feared that American unity of command over No. 1 Group aircraft would lead to the splitting of RCAF forces in Newfoundland into two parts, one under the USAAF and the other under the USN. The division of RCAF squadrons on U.S. service lines would have been disastrous for Canada’s air force. Not only did it contravene the concept of the indivisibility of air forces, it would have also meant a complete loss of the RCAF’s responsibility for the air defence of the colony against enemy attack even though Canada had more military aircraft in Newfoundland than the Americans. Moreover, these factors all promised to have a negative effect on the RCAF’s morale and also the efficiency of its maritime patrol operations.\textsuperscript{70} This latter concern was one that was also held by the RCN commander in Newfoundland, Rear-Admiral Murray. Specifically, he feared that the splitting of the RCAF on U.S. service lines threatened to “involve a loss of RCAF effort over the sea, thereby weakening the support now given to the RCN in its responsibility for the protection of trade in coastal waters.”\textsuperscript{71} Nor was Murray the only one to comment on the command and control situation.

Group Captain Heakes made the important observation that the strength of the American argument declined exponentially with the decreasing number of United States forces in Newfoundland, as U.S. commanders would no longer be able to argue that the
country with the largest forces should exercise unity of command. He predicted, accurately as it turned out, that the Americans would soon transfer many of their forces currently in the colony to the Pacific to face the Japanese threat, and this would only solidify the RCAF’s position on mutual cooperation.\textsuperscript{72} Air Vice-Marshal Anderson agreed with these conclusions, adding, “Canadian commanders cannot relinquish their command or responsibility to their government.” Mutual cooperation, the AOC Eastern Air Command concluded, would have to suffice as the preferred command and control principle to coordinate Canadian and American maritime air defence operations.\textsuperscript{73}

Nevertheless, Anderson also understood that the responsibilities of both Air Commodore McEwen’s headquarters in St. John’s and his own headquarters in Halifax were growing greater every week. Therefore, to ensure greater efficiency and to placate American concerns about McEwen’s lack of local authority over air operations, Air Vice-Marshal Anderson agreed to the decentralization of command and control of No. 1 Group aircraft in Newfoundland in fulfillment of the PJBD’s 22\textsuperscript{nd} Recommendation. However, because the RCAF still viewed the colony as an integral part of the overall defence of the Canadian Atlantic coast, the AOC Eastern Air Command decided that it was imperative that he retain operational command over all RCAF forces in eastern Canada so that “the whole of the command’s resources [were]... immediately available to reinforce stations in any part of the region where the enemy struck.” Therefore, Anderson only granted McEwen “local operational control” (the term “tactical control” was also used, though neither command and control principle was defined) over No. 1 Group forces in Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{74} The Americans reacted favourably towards this measure, and it came into effect on 20 January 1942. Thereafter, the AOC Eastern Air Command in Halifax
gave only “general directives” to the AOC No. 1 Group in St. John’s. This arrangement ensured that McEwen’s maritime patrol aircraft would be available, through cooperation, to support USN forces based in Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{75}

In the U.S. Army official history, Stanley Dziuban has written that with the implementation of the PJBD’s 22\textsuperscript{nd} Recommendation for No. 1 Group in Newfoundland, “the U.S. Navy task force commander at Argentia finally achieved the unified operational control of all the air and naval resources of the two countries available for his task” of protecting maritime trade.\textsuperscript{76} This is an incorrect assessment. Actual operational control of RCAF aircraft in Newfoundland did not rest with the American commander at Argentia, Rear-Admiral Bristol, but was instead exercised by Air Commodore McEwen, the Canadian AOC No. 1 Group in St. John’s.

The arrangement between Canadian and American air forces in the colony thus continued to be one based on the principle of mutual cooperation, as provided for in ABC-22. It took the form of a system of air coverage for convoys whereby “cooperation of the RCAF with the US Navy [was] accomplished by means of proposals mutually acceptable.”\textsuperscript{77} In Argentia, Rear-Admiral Bristol sent “proposals” for air coverage to McEwen in St. John’s, who then had the right to decide whether or not he would employ his resources to meet the USN request. In order to ensure that proper air coverage was provided to shipping, the Americans and No. 1 Group also developed a system of mutual assistance for maritime patrol operations: if one maritime patrol force (i.e., USN air forces at Argentia) was unable for any reason (i.e., weather conditions) to provide aircraft to protect shipping in any given area, it could request that another force (i.e., No. 1 Group RCAF or the USAAF at Stephenville or Gander) provide aircraft to perform the task in
the steady. This system worked well for most of 1942, as there were no instances of the No. 1 Group commander refusing any of the U.S. admiral’s requests for air coverage.

**The Intensification of U-boat Operations and the Failure of Mutual Cooperation**

By March 1942, Canada and the United States were facing a massive U-boat campaign against shipping in the Western Atlantic. Before Pearl Harbor, so as not to infringe on American neutrality and bring the United States into the war, Hitler had placed strict restrictions on U-boat operations in North American waters south of Newfoundland. However, after Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S., Hitler gave his U-boat commanders a free hand to attack all shipping in the Western Atlantic just at a time when the United States was moving the bulk of its maritime forces to the Pacific to make up for losses to the Japanese. After U-boats ravished unescorted shipping off the U.S. coast in the first few months of 1942, the United States finally agreed to implement the proven convoy system in its waters. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the small number of German U-boats attacking shipping off the U.S. coast was significant, and the RCAF in fact used the poor American anti-submarine performance off its Eastern Seaboard as further evidence of why Eastern Air Command aircraft should not come under American unity of command.

By April 1942, with fewer easy pickings off the U.S. east coast, the U-boats once again began focusing their operations against convoys on the main North Atlantic shipping lanes. This German step put greater pressure on Canadian and American maritime patrol forces in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland. By the middle of the year, it was becoming clear that the efforts of Canada and the United States to coordinate their maritime air power based on ABC-22’s command and control principle of mutual
cooperation were insufficient, as escorts complained of poor communication and scanty air coverage. To help the Canadians and Americans remedy this problem, the British decided to send experts from RAF Coastal Command to North America to assess the situation there and make recommendations for improvement.

Coastal Command had been conducting maritime patrol operations in North Atlantic since the beginning of the war. The RAF command organization worked with the Royal Navy in joint headquarters by utilizing the British operational control system of command and control (see Chapter Three). This proved to be a very efficient means of coordinating maritime trade defence operations, and combined with the development of the best anti-submarine weapons and doctrine, Coastal Command became the premier maritime air power organization in the world. Therefore, the British airmen who visited North America were well placed to comment on the efforts of Canadian and American maritime patrol forces to protect Allied shipping in the Western Atlantic.

One of the British officers’ main criticisms was regarding the command and control organization that Canada and the United States had in place in the Western Atlantic. In particular, the Coastal Command experts made an issue of the existence of several command organizations in the area – what historian Sean Maloney has called “fragmented national commands” – and the Canadian-American reliance on mutual cooperation to coordinate air forces for multiple tasks (i.e., the defence of shipping and continental defence against enemy attack). As a solution, the RAF airmen insisted on command and control centralization: Canada and the United States should implement the British operational control system and place all of their anti-submarine forces, naval and air, under one single authority.
The disadvantages of the system based on cooperation were especially beginning to show at the operational level in Newfoundland. By autumn 1942, the RCAF had begun adhering to the RAF Coastal Command practice of only providing air coverage to convoys that intelligence indicated were actually threatened by U-boat attack. As a result, No. 1 Group frequently did not provide all of the air patrols that the USN admiral at Argentia (by now Rear-Admiral Brainard) proposed because intelligence from Ottawa indicated that there were no U-boats in the area.86

That the mutual cooperation system was proving inefficient was further demonstrated by an incident in late November. When fog at Argentia prevented USN aircraft from providing coverage to a nearby convoy, the RCAF attempted to compensate by providing aircraft from Sydney. However, when No. 1 Group requested further assistance from Major-General Brant’s USAAF aircraft at Gander the request fell on deaf ears, and it allowed a German U-boat to sink one ship and damage two others. The failure of the mutual cooperation system of coordinating Canadian-American maritime air defence operations greatly frustrated the RCAF. Its commanders on the east coast were fed up with both Major-General Brant’s lack of cooperation and Rear-Admiral Brainard’s constant “proposals” for air cover of convoys which intelligence from Ottawa indicated were not threatened. Consequently, the Air Staff decided to join the RCN in its campaign during the winter of 1942-1943 to have all air and sea anti-submarine forces in the Northwest Atlantic brought under one Canadian authority.87

**Implementing the British Operational Control System**

Canada-U.S. maritime trade defence command and control arrangements agreed to in 1941 before the U.S. officially entered the war (see above) were based on the
majority of American air and naval forces being located in the Western Atlantic. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, however, changed this situation, as the U.S. was forced to re-deploy most of its forces to the Pacific to make up for losses. This left Canadian maritime trade defence forces greatly outnumbering American ones in the Northwest Atlantic, a situation that should have led to greater Canadian command and control influence in the area. However, there was what can be described as a “hangover” effect after Pearl Harbor, whereby the U.S. was able to hold on to its superior command and control position in the Northwest Atlantic for several months despite the re-deployment of most of its forces. This situation was not lost on the leaders of Canada’s navy and air force, and it only added impetus to their push for a Canadian theatre Commander-in-Chief. A Canadian CinC made sense for Eastern Air Command both in terms of operational efficiency, as the failure of cooperation had demonstrated, and because it had the majority of maritime air forces in the area. Furthermore, by late 1942 the RCAF was providing all of the convoy coverage to the north and east of Newfoundland, which is where the bulk of U-boat operations against Allied shipping were taking place.88

Canadian planners began discussions with their American service counterparts in the early winter of 1943, and they soon discovered how effective the RAF Coastal Command officers’ visit to North America had been on American thinking about trade defence. Constructive criticism from the British airmen had led the USAAF to transform No. I Bomber Command into the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, eliminating its continental defence bombardment role and tasking it solely with anti-submarine operations. The most important effect of the Coastal Command officers,
however, was that the USN and USAAF became amenable to centralizing command and control in the Northwest Atlantic under Canadian authority.89

To the Canadians’ pleasant surprise, the USN and the USAAF revealed that they were willing to surrender operational control over all of their anti-submarine forces in the Northwest Atlantic to Canada provided that one commander, i.e., a Canadian CinC, was made responsible for the entire anti-submarine effort in the area. This proposed arrangement was very appealing to the RCAF leadership, as it promised to allow the AOC Eastern Air Command to gain operational control of American maritime patrol aircraft in Newfoundland.90 Discussions on command and control continued in Washington during the winter of 1943, and culminated at the Atlantic Convoy Conference in March.91

The major triumph for Canada at this meeting of Canadian, American and British experts on the anti-U-boat campaign was Allied agreement for the creation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command theatre of operations. Established on 30 April 1943, the new command organization was based on the British system of operational control, as Canada was granted operational control over all air and surface escorts in the area west of 47°W and north of 40°N, including Newfoundland. Rear-Admiral Murray became the theatre CinC, where he exercised operational control over all naval forces. He also was also given operational direction over all maritime patrol aircraft, which he exercised through his deputy, the AOC Eastern Air Command, Air Vice-Marshal G.O. Johnson, who oversaw the detailed maritime patrol operations.92

Johnson’s official title was re-designated Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command. He now exercised “general operational control” over all Allied
air forces employed in the defence of shipping in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command. In Newfoundland, Johnson delegated the “local operational control” of all maritime patrol operations to the AOC No. 1 Group, Air Vice-Marshal (formerly Group Captain) Heakes.\(^9^3\) “General” operational control meant that the new Eastern Air Command CinC continued to pass on “general directives” to the AOC No. 1 Group, although now they included directives for the use of USN and USAAF aircraft in the defence of convoys. “Local” operational control meant that Heakes retained operational control over RCAF forces in Newfoundland and now also had operational control over all American maritime patrol forces in the colony.

In order to carry out the provisions of this new command and control arrangement in Newfoundland, a team from the USAAF’s new 25\(^{th}\) Anti-submarine Wing joined Heakes’ staff at No. 1 Group Headquarters in St. John’s on 30 March 1943. Although the USAAF group technically did not have to make this move until the new command organization came into existence on 30 April, they did so in good faith, desiring to get a head start on learning the RCAF’s methods so that they would be “ready to operate under the new scheme immediately the word go is given.”\(^9^4\) Finally, the USN installed a liaison staff from Argentia at Heakes’ headquarters in St. John’s in May, shortly after Heakes had assumed local operational control of all Newfoundland maritime patrol aircraft.\(^9^5\)

The creation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command was indeed a significant accomplishment in Canada’s military history. It was the first time that Canadian naval and air force officers ever had CinC status in an active theatre of war.\(^9^6\) Not only did the CinC Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, Rear-Admiral Murray,
have operational control over all Canadian and U.S. naval escort ships, but his deputy, Air Vice-Marshall Johnson, also had operational control over USN and USAAF maritime patrol aircraft. Importantly, the establishment of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command was a recognition by the Allies of the necessity of command and control centralization in order to ensure operational efficiency of bilateral maritime air defence operations. American historian Stanley W. Dziuban has indicated that this new theatre of operations was “the only instance of unified command under ABC-22.” To make this claim, however, is to confuse the issue. Although the concept of unity of command – the centralization of command and control under one commander – was achieved, it was done so through the implementation of the British operational control system, not the command and control principle of unity of command in ABC-22. Nonetheless, by centralizing command and control under one commander according to the British system of operational control, as the following chapters will demonstrate, Canada and the United States set an important precedent for the command and control of bilateral continental air defence forces during the Cold War.

Conclusion

At the operational level during the Second World War, Canada was able to safeguard its sovereignty because at no time did its continental defence forces or maritime trade defence air forces come under American command. In fact, Canada was able to chalk up significant accomplishments and lessons learned in its command and control relationship with the United States. The Newfoundland situation demonstrated that ambiguities and disagreements regarding command and control of combined forces could lead to a difficult situation for commanders. Moreover, the Canadian experience
with Major-General Brant in the British colony also showed the importance of operational-level commanders maintaining a cordial and professional relationship so as to ensure effective command and control and coordination of combined operations.

Before Pearl Harbor, Canadian operational-level commanders found themselves under pressure from the U.S. commanders in Newfoundland to implement unity of command. However, by consistently relying on a the most recent strategic estimates of the enemy threat to the continent, Canadians were able to successfully argue that the danger posed to the colony did not require unity of command and that mutual cooperation, as provided for under ABC-22, was sufficient. With the activation of the ABC-22 bilateral defence plan after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Canada for the first time formally coordinated with its southern neighbour for the active defence of North America in a time of war. Again the Americans pressed for unity of command, this time on both coasts, and once more Canada was able to resist these efforts by stressing that the threat to North America still did not warrant this measure.

Significantly, Canada not only safeguarded its national command authority over its forces, but by insisting on mutual cooperation instead of unity of command also did not allow its forces to come under American operational command. Furthermore, by deciding to deal directly with the American Chiefs of Staff on command and control issues, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee re-asserted the primacy of the Canadian service chiefs, acting on behalf of the Canadian government, to decide on any all command and control arrangements with the United States.

It was, however, not the continental defence role but the coordination of maritime air forces to protect Allied shipping in the Western Atlantic that became the primary
means by which the two nations utilized their defensive air power at the operational level during the Second World War. The RCAF resisted constant efforts by the USN and USAAF to place its maritime patrol forces under U.S. unity of command. Canadian airmen consistently stressed to their American comrades that the operational situation did not require this measure. The RCAF also feared that the convoluted organization of maritime patrol assets in the United States and the resulting inefficient maritime air power doctrine of the USAAF would have a negative effect on any RCAF forces placed under U.S. unity of command. For these organizational, operational, and doctrinal reasons, the RCAF continued to insist that coordination of Canadian-American maritime patrol operations continue to be accomplished through mutual cooperation.

With the implementation of ABC-22 after Pearl Harbor, mutual cooperation became the standard Canadian-American operational command and control principle upon which the two nations’ continental defence forces would be based. As we shall see in the next chapter, this practice would continue in the years immediately following the Second World War. Mutual cooperation proved to be an effective means of command and control for continental defence in a time of minimal enemy action. However, as the combined efforts by Canadian and American air forces in the defence of maritime trade in the Northwest Atlantic proved, when engaged in continuous defensive air power operations against the enemy, coordination of forces requires more effective and centralized command and control.

The British operational control system utilized in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command after April 1943 proved to be a much more appropriate means of command and control to coordinate bilateral Canada-U.S. defensive air operations than
mutual cooperation. The new system safeguarded national sovereignty in that it did not contain command and control authority inherent in national command. At the same time, the British operational control system ensured more centralized and effective command and control. This in turn ensured greater operational efficiency to coordinate maritime patrol operations, which proved to be an important factor in the eventual Allied victory over the U-boats in mid-1943. Importantly, with the establishment of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command theatre of operations and its utilization of the operational control system by its CinC, Rear-Admiral Murray, and his deputy, Air Vice-Marshal Johnson, a precedent was established that would have a significant effect on the Canadian-American continental air defence command and control relationship in the early Cold War period.
Chapter Six  
Maintaining the Status Quo? Replacing ABC-22

Introduction

I think it safe to say, therefore, that if we do not push the Canadians too rapidly we may expect slow but steady progress toward what integration of our defense systems which seems so essential to the defense of the North American continent.

-Ray Atherson, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, August 1946

As the end of the Second World War began to draw near, the issue of what the future of the Canada-U.S. continental defence relationship would be occupied the thinking of planners from both North American nations. One of the first to address this subject was Major-General Maurice Pope, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington and the Canadian Army Member of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence. In a letter to a colleague in Ottawa, Pope accurately predicted that the two North American nations would continue their “intimate defence relationship” in the post-war period. Perhaps sensing the growing animosity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, he felt that the Americans would approach the Canadians about a new defence plan sooner rather than later “so as to have it ready to be put into effect when the next war comes.” There was no doubt in the Canadian Army officer’s mind that when a new conflict did break out Canada would become directly involved. “To the American,” he explained, “the defence of the United States is continental defence, which includes us, and nothing that I can think of will ever drive that idea out of their heads.”

Given this situation, Pope warned that one of the main concerns of Canada was to avoid a “defence against help” situation with its southern neighbour: “what we have to fear is more a lack of confidence in United States as our security, rather than enemy action.” It was absolutely crucial, Pope added, for Canada to maintain sufficient military
forces, not so much to defend against any potential enemy (though this would also a requirement), “but more to ensure that there was no apprehension as to our security in the American public mind.”3 In Pope’s professional opinion, Canada should therefore continue its close defence relationship with the United States in order to avoid a “defence against help” situation, and the renewal of the wartime Canada-U.S. defence plan, ABC-22, was the first and most important step.4

The central issue that this chapter examines was whether or not the United States would apply the “defence against help” concept by insisting on a post-Second World War continental defence command and control relationship that was undesirable to Canada. It will be shown that despite American desires for greater command and control authority when drafting a revision of ABC-22, the two nations in the end agreed to continue the status quo for the time being in the June 1946 Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan (BSP), which maintained the mutual cooperation-unity of command compromise arrangement. Nevertheless, with the development of the Air Interceptor and Air Warning appendix to the BSP, the foundation was laid for greater Canada-U.S. air defence integration in the late 1940s to early 1950s and the genesis of the operational control provision for the North American Air Defence Command in 1957.

The early Cold War period examined in this chapter was uncharted waters for Canada-U.S. continental defence collaboration. Whereas the two nations had come together to defend North America in 1940 because of wartime expediency, now they were commencing discussions during peacetime to prepare plans to protect the continent during the next war emergency. In September 1945, the Soviet threat was not yet that apparent, so – at least for the moment – Canadian-American planners were afforded the
luxury of time. Nevertheless, this did not mean that these officers were unaware of the potential threats to the continent. Until 1953, the danger to North America was still a more traditional one from all three environments, sea, land, and air. As such, the focus of planners largely remained on overall continental defence. However, this did not mean that they were ignorant of the growing Soviet strategic bomber threat to North America and the need to pay close attention to the need for continental air defence. Because this aerial danger to the continent was a relatively new development and since it eventually grew to dominate the Canada-U.S. command and control defence relationship, it is worth exploring in some detail.

Air Power, Strategy, and Air Defence

If there is another war it will come against America by way of Canada from Russia.
-Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Diary Entry for 11 September 1945

At the end of the Second World War, USAAF airmen were convinced that strategic bombing had been the “winning weapon” that had secured victory against Germany and Japan. Although most of these officers did not necessarily recognize that an enemy might be able to utilize offensive air power against North America (they were too focused on their own sometimes messianic belief in U.S. offensive air power and their efforts for an independent air force), this requirement to think about continental air defence in the Cold War era did not escape the attention of Canadian-American planners.

Indeed, although the USSR had focused mostly on tactical air power in support of Red Army ground operations during the Second World War, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was intent on developing an atomic bomb and also building up a strategic bomber force
to deliver this weapon during the post-war period. He knew that one major advantage that the United States had over the Soviet Union was the capability to use its bombers to drop atomic bombs on the USSR and he wanted to close this gap – quickly. Therefore, when a few USAAF B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers were forced to make emergency landings on Soviet territory in 1944-1945, Stalin grasped the opportunity to develop the capability to strike against the North American industrial heartland. Soviet technicians meticulously took the American B-29s apart piece by piece, and by 1949 had re-engineered the design of the aircraft to produce the Tu-4 “Bull” long-range strategic bomber.7

Senator Raul Dandurand’s “fireproof house” would soon no longer be fireproof: Canada and indeed the entire continent were now vulnerable to aerial attack.8 This fact was not lost on Canadian officials. In January 1945, the government’s Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems final report concluded that any future threat to North America would be significantly different from the one faced in the Second World War. No longer did the two oceans provide full protection to the continent; the advance of air power technology and doctrine had necessitated that provisions be undertaken for protection against aerial attack, especially in the Canadian North, which lies between the two potential protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union. The most likely route for the new Soviet strategic bomber force to take was the shortest one: over the North Pole and across the Canadian Arctic towards the industrial heartland of North America.9

Continued defence collaboration with the United States in general and the requirement to examine continental air defence in particular therefore became a growing priority for Canada in the years following the Second World War. A revised Canada-
U.S. defence plan that addressed the growing strategic bomber threat in addition to traditional naval and ground threats was thus a top priority for Canada-U.S. planners during this time. Indeed, a key aspect of this new scheme was the command and control relationship between the two nations’ armed forces.

The Americans Ask for a New Bilateral Defence Plan

As early as October 1944, American officials began discussing the desirability of revising ABC-22. A new plan should not only reflect the most modern military realities, but also “be studied periodically and revised as necessary so that it can be made effective immediately if either of the two nations is threatened.”

In September 1945 these ideas were formalized in a study by the Joint Planning Staff (JPS), a sub-committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report recommended that “in light of changed world conditions,” ABC-22 should be revised to constitute a “continuing basis for joint action by the armed forces of Canada and the United States in defense of the northern half of the western hemisphere.”

The JCS approved this report and tasked the U.S. Section of the PJBD to approach the Canadians about a new defence plan. At their initial post-war meeting on 5 September, both the U.S. and Canadian sections of the PJBD formally agreed that defence collaboration between Canada and the United States should continue in the post-war period and that the Board should continue to be the primary medium through which discussions should take place.

At the next meeting on 7-8 November the U.S. Section presented its Canadian counterparts with a formal proposal from the Secretaries of War and the Navy to revise ABC-22. The Canadian government gave its approval on 19 December, but only based “on the understanding that any new plans for joint defence would be submitted to the Government for decision.”
In early January 1946, the Canadian Section of the PJBD produced a short outline of a new Canada-U.S. defence plan, and one of the areas addressed was command and control. “The principle of Command,” the document read, “should remain as simple as possible.” Operational command and control was to remain on national lines so long as troops from one nation only were operating in an area. In the case of combined operations involving both Canadian and American forces, however, “the Command should be a designated Command, designated by the Governments concerned.” What this meant was that when operating alone, forces of one nation would remain under the command and control of their own officers, but in the case of combined Canada-U.S. operations, operational command should be exercised by a commander from either country that has been agreed upon by both nations’ governments. This proposed arrangement ensured that administration of component parts of a force and national command would remain a national prerogative. Importantly, it left the decision on combined command in the hands of the two nations’ political leaders, representing, as General Charles Foulkes indicated 20 years later, “the limit to which the Canadian government was prepared to go” at that time. The issue now was what the Americans had in mind regarding continental defence command and control.

The CA-1 Outline Defence Plan and the CANUSA Proposal

At its meeting on 16-17 January 1946, the PJBD drafted an outline “Canada-United States Security Plan,” short title CA-1. The “General Mission” of both countries was “to provide for the security of the United States and Canada against armed attack,” and the plan was to be placed in effect by the respective countries’ Chiefs of Staff “when so directed by the Canadian and the United States Governments.” One of the most
interesting parts of the draft outline plan was the command and control authority and command organization features.

The command and control provisions of the plan were similar to those of ABC-22, although the drafters of the plan were confused over the difference between “a unified command” and the command and control principle of “unity of command.” CA-1 provided that “a unified command” may be established for any Canadian-American force working in a particular area (geographical) or for any common purpose (functional). Those authorized to establish a unified command included a proposed combined Canada-U.S. Chiefs of Staff organization (see below) or in emergency circumstances “the immediate commanders of the Canada-United States forces concerned [if they] agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command.”20 The definition of unity of command was kept the same as the one in ABC-22:

Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to co-ordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such co-ordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operation. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective co-ordination.21

Although the definition of “unity of command” remained the same, there was one very important difference between CA-1 and the wartime plan. The draft new plan did not contain the clause in ABC-22 stating that the principal command and control relationship between the two nations’ armed forces would be based on “mutual co-operation.” This may have been a simple oversight (“mutual co-operation” did appear in the final 5 June
1946 version of the plan – see below), but it was an important one because it foreshadowed actual American thinking on the ideal Canada-U.S. command and control relationship.

The most groundbreaking aspect of the CA-1 draft plan, however, was the proposal for a combined “United Canada-United States Chief of Staff” (CANUSA). This organization was to be established “in time of emergency” and charged with the responsibility for “the implementation and strategic direction” of the plan.22 The CANUSA proposal was the brainchild of the U.S. Section, and in particular the senior U.S. Army PJBD member, Major-General Guy Henry, who had replaced Lieutenant-General Stanley Embick upon the latter’s retirement. However, as Joseph Jockel has noted, what the Canadians did not know was that Henry, by devising the CANUSA proposal independently without first consulting his superiors, had in fact “far exceeded the mandate” that the JCS had given the U.S. PJBD section.23

Throughout the Second World War, the U.S. had gone to great lengths to avoid “encirclement” by smaller allies when it came to the higher direction of the conflict.24 Canada, even though it was the United States’ close partner in the defence of the North American continent, was still too small a power to justify any sharing of strategic command and control authority as the U.S. had done with Britain in the wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff organization.25 During the war the Canadian military leadership did actually ponder the idea of requesting membership on the Combined Chiefs of Staff but, as C.P. Stacey has noted, no formal Canadian proposal came forth “because informal investigation led to the conclusion that any such request was certain to be refused.”26 It was therefore extremely doubtful that the JCS would accept CANUSA
or any similar proposal that would give Canadians any share over the strategic direction of a future war, especially one that not only included defensive operations but offensive ones, likely in conjunction with other European allies. Canada-U.S. defence collaboration – and any strategic or operational command and control arrangements – was thus to be bilateral only.\(^{27}\)

Nevertheless, Canadian-American planners remained oblivious to these issues and continued planning based on the assumption that Major-General Henry’s combined Chiefs of Staff proposal was based on approved U.S. defence policy.\(^{28}\) It was not until the CA-1 document came to the attention of the U.S. Joint Staff Planners, a joint planning body that worked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in March that the JCS set the record straight. The American military leadership was weary of the CANUSA proposal, fearing that approval of it would set a precedent for “similar organizations” that they would have to acquiesce to “either bilaterally or multilaterally” with other allies “in the event of war.”\(^{29}\) As a consequence, the JCS instructed Henry to withdraw the CANUSA proposal. Thereafter it was a dead issue.\(^{30}\)

The only Canadian commentary on any of the command and control provisions of CA-1 came from Canada’s Ambassador in Washington (and future Prime Minister), Lester B. Pearson. Specifically, Pearson was concerned with the unity of command provision in the document: “by giving the single Commander power to issue any instructions necessary for effective coordination, he could, I suppose, do pretty well what he wished.”\(^{31}\) The ambassador’s statement demonstrated that he had a fundamental misunderstanding of the power and authority (and specifically the limitations on them) that an officer exercising unity of command entailed. However, it would be an
exaggeration to say that Pearson was being overly alarmist. Because the CA-1 document did not also contain the provision for mutual cooperation in ABC-22, it is not difficult to understand why Pearson – and his Department of External Affairs associates – would be cautious about the possibility of Canadian forces coming under American operational command. In any event, CA-1 was only a preliminary draft outline plan submitted to get the proverbial ball rolling on a new Canada-U.S. defence plan. If anything, the document demonstrated the need for a new bilateral planning organization, not just the PJBD itself, to undertake the detailed planning.

**Drafting the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan**

One recommendation in CA-1 that Canadian and American authorities acted on was for the establishment of “joint groups” to study and develop the new bilateral defence plan and submit various studies “in connection with the security of both countries.” The two North American nations thus agreed to the creation of a bilateral planning group, called the Canada-United States Military Co-Operation Committee (MCC). In keeping with the wartime tradition of having the military members of the PJBD do the detailed bilateral defence planning, the MCC consisted of Canadian and American PJBD service members. Membership on the new Canada-U.S. planning body also included officers from the two nations’ chiefs of staff organizations, the JCS’s Joint Planning Staff for the U.S. and the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) for Canada, which was the planning organ of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Finally, the MCC also had one representative each from the Canadian Department of External Affairs and U.S. State Department. Two of the RCAF members of the MCC were Air Vice-Marshal Wilfred Curtis and Air Commodore C.R. “Larry” Dunlap. Both would later rise to the rank of
Air Marshal and become the Chief of the Air Staff. This is significant because it meant that the future leadership of the RCAF had an intimate understanding of Canada-U.S. air defence planning in the early Cold War period. As the next few chapters will demonstrate, this awareness helped foster the development in the early Cold War period of a close bond between Canadian and American airmen and common viewpoints regarding integrating Canada-U.S. continental air defence efforts and centralizing command and control.

Meeting alternately in Ottawa and Washington, the MCC was tasked with the responsibility of drafting Canada-U.S. defence plans and reporting back to the PJBD. As each section of the MCC was to submit drafts of the new defence plan and any other recommendations to their respective chiefs of staff, who would then pass them on to the appropriate government officials (i.e., the Secretary of Defense and the President for the U.S. and the Cabinet Defence Committee for Canada) for acceptance. If approved by these authorities, the defence plan and recommendations would then be implemented.

Having established the process for detailed bilateral defence planning, both the Canadian and U.S. Sections of the MCC began working separately on drafts of the new Canada-U.S. defence plan during the spring of 1946. On 6 May, the U.S. Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), a sub-committee of the JCS’s Joint Staff Planners, completed a report entitled “Matchpoint,” a preliminary continental defence plan. First and foremost, the document stressed that the best defence was a good offence against the enemy. Any defensive plan devised in conjunction with the Canadians, therefore, would be “prepared for execution in conjunction with and not as a substitute for the offensive campaign.” Defending bases, especially those from which offensive operations might
be launched, was therefore of key importance to the Americans. In addition, among other issues, such as an appreciation of enemy capabilities and the need to provide for bilateral defence measures in the areas of air defence, reconnaissance, trade defence, and defence against enemy lodgements, the JWPC plan also called for “a command structure capable of insuring [sic] prompt action, jointly where necessary in an emergency.”

These command and control arrangements were contained in two appendices, which were essentially two separate versions of a defence plan. Appendix “A” was for the eyes of U.S. planners only (hereafter “U.S. version”), while Appendix “B” was for Canadian consumption (hereafter “Canadian version”) at the upcoming MCC meeting. Importantly, there were significant differences between the command and control provisions in each appendix.

In the U.S. version, the JWPC indicated that during peacetime it might be necessary to establish combined Canada-U.S. commands exercising unity of command in certain areas of the continent. Since it was highly likely that both Canadian and U.S. forces would be co-located in strategically important (and vulnerable) locations, the American planners felt that unity of command would ensure greater efficiency in times of peace as well as war. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Chiefs of Staff of both countries should establish further combined commands “operating under the principle of unified command as are determined to be necessary.”

Most importantly, it was imperative that all air defences (including aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and air warning services) be placed under unified command during wartime. Finally, for areas where combined commands had not already been established, the U.S. version of the plan, echoing a similar arrangement in ABC-22, included a provision for local area
commanders to institute unity of command in an emergency, subject to confirmation “by higher command.” 40 There was no mention of mutual cooperation.

This proposal was significant because it went further than any previous Canadian-American continental defence command and control arrangements had gone before. ABC-22 was a wartime defence plan and even then it only provided for unity of command if approved by the two nations’ chiefs of staff or by operational-level commanders in an emergency, subject to later confirmation. It did not presuppose the establishment of unity command upon the outbreak of hostilities. As we saw in the previous chapter, not once during the war did the U.S. and Canada enact this command and control provision. Therefore, to propose the establishment of unity of command over Canadian and American forces in time of peace and also to maintain it during war would indeed have been a remarkable change in the two nations’ command and control relationship. 41 It was thus not surprising that the JWPC kept this proposal out of the Canadian version of their draft defence plan.

Nevertheless, there was one very significant clause in the section on command and control in the U.S. version of the plan. It specified that any principles and provisions contained “are necessarily dependent upon the views of the Canadians as well as the United States toward combined or unified command.” 42 Perhaps learning from the experiences of the American PJBD Section in 1941, the U.S. planners understood that they could not bully the Canadians into accepting their preferred ideas on command and control for the post-war bilateral defence plan. Instead, they recognized the need to respect Canadian opinion and come to an agreeable compromise that satisfied both
parties. The U.S. would therefore not impose a “defence against help” situation on Canada regarding command and control.

As a result, in the Canadian version of the plan, the JWPC settled on the status quo from ABC-22 for command and control. Mutual cooperation would remain the primary Canada-U.S. command and control relationship, with a provision for unity of command in an emergency. Indeed, as we will see shortly, this provision would be very close to the one that would appear in the final 5 June 1946 version of the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan.

**The June 1946 Canada-United States Basic Security Plan**

Both Canadian and American sections of the MCC met on 20-23 May in Washington to finalize the post-war bilateral defence plan. On the last day, they produced two documents, a joint Appreciation of the threat to the continent and a draft Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan to replace ABC-22. The former will be discussed first, followed by a more extensive examination of the latter.

The Appreciation outlined the prospective threat to the continent during the immediate post-war period. Although the immediate danger was slight, amounting to only minor raids, the geographic barriers of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the frozen Arctic no longer protected North America due to the rapid development of military technology, notably air power, which had increased in both range and destructive power by the end of the Second World War. The Appreciation took a page right out of the USAAF’s strategic doctrine by emphasizing that by 1950 enemy capabilities would have grown to a point to be able to launch attacks on the political, military, economic, industrial and population “nerve centers” of North America. Moreover, the enemy could
be expected to utilize not only strategic bombers dropping conventional bombs, but also atomic bombs (the expectation was that the “potential enemy” – no country was named, although it was obvious to all that it would be the USSR – would develop this weapon in three to five years), plus seize “objectives in subarctic regions of Canada, Alaska, or Labrador,” and utilize “guided missiles, rockets or aircraft launched from submarines.”

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was most likely that the enemy would launch these attacks over the North Pole via the Arctic approaches.

To counter this threat, the Appreciation indicated the necessity of a new Canada-U.S. defence plan capable of providing a whole range of defensive measures, especially a comprehensive air defence system of radars to provide warning and interceptor aircraft and other anti-aircraft measures to destroy incoming enemy aircraft. Since it was expected that this threat would develop in a relatively short time (in about four years), the Appreciation concluded with the following: “in view of the considerable time required for detailed planning and for the completion of the above undertakings, it is essential that certain elements of these tasks,” with the development of air defences at the top of the list, “be initiated immediately.”

After minor revisions, none of which had to do with command and control provisions, the final draft of the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan was released on 5 June 1946. It was a bilateral defence plan that would be put into effect by each nation’s Chiefs of Staff when directed to do so by their respective governments. The BSP echoed some of the assessments in the 23 May Appreciation and outlined the main tasks that the two countries were required to undertake to provide adequate protection of the continent. That the northern aerial threat had taken on a whole new importance to North American
defence was evidenced by first three main defence tasks of Canada and the United States. “Joint Task One” was to “protect vital areas” from air attack and the second and third were to defend the northern area of Labrador and Alaska (and the land, sea and air communications therein), respectively. Task four was to defend Newfoundland, task five to shield the highly populated and industrial heartland of eastern Canada and the Northeastern U.S. from attack, and joint tasks six and seven outlined the requirement to protect overseas shipping in the Northwestern Atlantic and Northern Pacific, respectively.46

Joint Task One was to be a combined effort between Canada and the United States, as each was required to defend the continent from aerial attack by setting up and operation of “an effective common air defence.”47 Canada had the primary responsibility for Joint Task Two, defence of northern Canada and Labrador, with the U.S. required to assist its northern neighbour. The defence of Alaska was the job of the American military, with help from Canadian forces as required. The defence of Newfoundland (Joint Task Four) remained the primary responsibility of Canada. The principal role of the U.S. in the British colony was to defend its own bases and the secondary one was to cooperate with Canadian forces in the overall defence of the island.48 Joint Tasks Five and Six, the defence of Eastern Canada and the Northeastern portion of the U.S. and the protection of Western Canada and the American Northwest, fell on national lines, with provisions for each nation to provide assistance to the other as required. Finally, for Joint Task Seven and Eight the responsibility for defending overseas shipping in the Northwest Atlantic and North Pacific was a combined effort, although the wording suggested that the U.S. would be the primary actor in this endeavour.49
Even though the BSP was a war plan, it also contained a section that indicated the necessity to implement certain measures “immediately [i.e., during peacetime] in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Plan in the event of emergency.” These preparatory measures would “be effected by specific agreements” which were embodied in the appendices to the BSP. The most urgent of these appendices to be prepared was “investigation and establishment of the essential elements of a common system of air defence.” Aside from the command and control provisions (see below), coordination in the BSP included the provision of liaison and cooperation between commanders “for all matters requiring common action”; the establishment and use of common base facilities in each country for combined training, tests, and exercises (which included “the stationing of combat forces during peace in the territory of the other nation”); and the establishment (or in the Canadian case the continuation) of military missions in each nation’s capital “to facilitate common decision and action.” Finally, there was provision at the end of the plan that the BSP would be subject to annual revision, initiated by the PJBD.

Command and control provisions were contained in Section VIII, “Co-Ordination.” Like ABC-22, it established “mutual co-operation” as the primary Canada-U.S. operational command and control relationship and contained the provision for the establishment of unity of command by the two countries’ chiefs of staff or in an emergency, subject to later confirmation. However, unlike the Second World War plan, the BSP also included a new clause permitting the commander exercising unity of command to move forces from one operational theatre to another. In ABC-22 this had been specifically forbidden without the commander first receiving authorization by the
service chiefs of staff, the purpose of which was to protect service chiefs’ operational command responsibility and authority for the movement of forces. However, the BSP put this authority into the hands of the designated commander exercising unity of command, who would have “complete freedom of movement of all forces of any nation or service under his command to any areas within his jurisdiction.”

There was no explanation for the insertion of this new clause. However, it is highly likely that this change was in response to frustrations experienced by American and British supreme commanders in command of combined unified commands during the Second World War. In several instances, most notably the short-lived American-British-Dutch-Australia unified command established in late 1941, the supreme commanders were hamstrung by national regional jurisdictional restrictions which forbade them to transfer forces from one national territory to another. Given the need to act quickly in an emergency in the atomic age, securing national approval from a country’s service chief to move forces from one operational area to another could result in a slow and therefore dangerous delay. Thus, the new clause in the draft Canada-U.S. defence plan was perceived as essential in order to ensure quick reinforcement to threatened areas. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the desire to act quickly in an air defence emergency led to the establishment of new PJBD Recommendations in the 1950s for cross-border interception and mutual reinforcement.

In the end, the 5 June 1946 Basic Security Plan was a watershed in the Canada-U.S. defence relationship. It accomplished in peacetime what the two countries had only previously done in time of war. For that reason, although the BSP was in fact a war plan, the Canadian section of the MCC made it clear to their superiors that “certain preparation
measures would be required in peacetime” in order to ensure that the plan could be carried out as designed in wartime. Therefore, as Peter Haydon has noted, the Basic Security Plan, became the “umbrella for a series of interrelated military agreements for defending the continent and its ocean frontiers.” These were the appendices to the BSP that outlined the detailed force requirements that were necessary for the implementation of the plan. It was these BSP annexes that occupied much of the time of the MCC planners for the next few months. As we will soon see, the most significant of them was the one for air defence.

To Approve or Not to Approve: The Canadian Government and the BSP

In July 1946, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the Basic Security Plan as basis for continued Canada-U.S. planning. However, when it came time for Canadian Government to examine the BSP, there was some consternation in Canadian political circles (notably by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and the Department of External Affairs) concerning the acceptance of the document, and this led to some delay in it being formally approved. Importantly, it should be noted that the controversy surrounding the BSP did not have to do with the command and control provisions, likely because they were so similar to those in ABC-22. Instead, much of the concern regarding the BSP centred on the issues of U.S. installations on Canadian territory, the proposed heavy expenditures involved, especially for the Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix (see below), and the estimate of the enemy threat to the continent.

Concern over the BSP culminated at the 11 February 1947 Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, when the Canadian Government announced a rather convoluted and
odd-sounding formula for approving the new Canada-U.S. defence plan and its appendices. Based on recommendations from the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, the committee decided:

a) that the Appreciation and Basic Security Plan (with appendices) should not be treated as documents which require acceptance (or rejection) by the governments; the Basic Security Plan is to be regarded as a joint defence plan designed to ensure the security of the North American continent, agreed between the Canadian and United States Chief of Staff; and

b) that the Chiefs of Staff Committee (with appropriate civilian officials) be responsible for recommending the degree, sequence and rate of implementation of the agreed plan, such ‘implementation programmes’ to be submitted from time to time for decision by the government.63

The BSP was therefore to be treated as a war plan to be put into effect by the Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff by decision of the two nations’ governments. In Canada, based on each appendix – and especially the financial implications that they entailed – the Canadian Section of the MCC was to devise “implementation programs” to be undertaken during the ensuring fiscal year. The Chiefs of Staff then reviewed these programs, and if agreed to by all three service chiefs, submitted them once a year (usually in autumn) for government decision.64 In Canada it fell to the Cabinet Defence Committee to consider the implementation programs, which if approved then went forward subject to the necessary funds being voted by Parliament. All implementation programs were therefore subject to government examination “on the basis of what is necessary if and when the security of the North American continent is threatened.”65

The Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix of the Basic Security Plan

The appendix was a bombshell, calling for, in essence, Fortress North America.

-Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*66
Throughout the mid-to-late 1940s, the focus of Canadian and American planners was on completing the appendices to the Basic Security Plan. None of them dealt entirely with command and control arrangements, as the development by the MCC of a specific appendix on this issue underwent constant delays (see below). One BSP appendix that did contain certain command and control provisions, however, was the one entitled “Air Interceptor and Air Warning” (hereafter AIAW plan).

Completed in December 1946, the AIAW plan had two distinct phases. The first, to be placed in effect by 1950, was designed to counter the anticipated enemy threat of enemy bombers flying at subsonic speeds. It was anticipated that these aircraft would be armed first with conventional bombs and then, after 1950, a limited number of atomic bombs. In addition, this phase also considered the possibility of a threat posed by “short-ranged guided missiles of the [German Second World War] V-1 and V-2 type.” Again, the Soviet Union was not specifically named as “the enemy” in the AIAW plan, although there was no other likely foe. To defend against this threat, the plan called for Canada and the U.S. to construct an integrated early warning and ground control intercept system of radars and fighter-interceptor aircraft defences. A vast array of radar chains would be established across North America. They would be located on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and along the Arctic Ocean seaboard from north Alaska to northern Labrador and Greenland, plus radar stations concentrated around the vital economic and populated areas of the Great Lakes and the U.S. east coast. Working in conjunction with this radar system would be an extensive fighter-interceptor force, which was to number 975 American and 828 Canadian aircraft distributed throughout the continent.
The second phase, to begin in 1955, was designed to deal with an augmented and more dangerous enemy threat of large numbers of supersonic bombers armed with atomic bombs and also long-range rockets and guided missiles. It called for air defences to be moved farther north, with a distant early warning radar network in the Arctic augmented by increased fighter-interceptor aircraft presence and also advanced ground-to-air missile batteries. The overall goal of the AIAW plan was “to provide maximum feasible security during Phase I with a reasonable degree of flexibility and economy for transition to meet requirements of Phase II.” The completion of the entire air defence system as outlined in the plan, the planners stressed, was crucial and “any omission of any part will greatly prejudice the overall effectiveness of the system.” Importantly, the intent was that this air defence complement an overall offensive forward strategy, not replace it. To achieve these strategic aims, the MCC noted, “it is desirable to avoid the commitment of a large percentage of our available resources for defensive purposes only,” and the AIAW plan was therefore designed “with a view toward providing maximum benefit for possible offensive operations.”

The key to integrating this vast air defence scheme was an effective system of command and control. Each country would establish its own “Air Defense Command Headquarters” at locations to be determined to coordinate their respective early warning and air interceptor systems. These were to be national command organizations responsible for air defence of their own country’s territory, but with each headquarters having staff representatives from both nations’ armed forces. Importantly, the AIAW plan also contained a provision for a combined Canada-U.S. Air Defence Headquarters to be established “at the proper time to control, coordinate and operate the common air
defense system in time of an emergency.” Its headquarters would also have staff representatives from both nations’ armed forces, and this new combined Air Defence Command would exercise “operational control” (not defined) of all allocated Canadian and U.S. air defence units deployed in North America.75

Finally, the plan called for air defence units to be grouped into geographic zones within Canada and the United States “coincident with one another at the border.” Each zone was to have its own headquarters to control the forces and each headquarters was to be “under the command of their respective Air Defence Command Headquarters.”76 What this meant was that operational command of Canadian zones remained in Canadian hands and operational command of U.S. zones remained in American hands.

Interestingly, there was no mention of the nationality of the man who would be in command of this new combined Air Defence Command, although in all likelihood it would be an American air force officer. In addition, exactly what command and control authority “operational control” actually entailed was not mentioned in the AIAW Appendix. However, with the inclusion of the term in the appendix, it was clear that Canadian and American airmen were beginning to think of operational control in a continental air defence context. As the next chapters will demonstrate, the meaning of this command and control principle would continue to evolve as the air defence relationship between the two nations’ air forces grew increasingly closer. Nevertheless, although the AIAW Appendix did not specifically define operational control, it was clear that the role of the commander of the combined Canada-U.S. Air Defence Command, when established, was to be a limited one of co-ordination: operational command was therefore to remain with the component commanders, which in this case were the
commanders of the (still only proposed) Canadian Air Defence Command and U.S. Air
Defense Command. Moreover, national command would continue to remain the
prerogative of the national chiefs of staff, thereby safeguarding Canadian sovereignty.

The seeds of North American air defence integration were thus clearly planted in
the AIAW Appendix. Nevertheless, the combined Canada-U.S. effort to protect North
America from the Soviet aerial threat was only still in the planning phase. Because of the
convoluted implementation process established by the Cabinet Defence Committee in
February 1947 (see above), the appendix, including the provision for a combined Canada-
U.S. air defence command exercising operational control, was not etched in stone. The
MCC described the situation best when it submitted the document: “it must be borne in
mind that this appendix can serve as a planning document only. It is not intended that it
should stipulate precise commitments for future years.”

In the end both nations’ Chiefs of Staff approved the AIAW Appendix to the BSP
in principle. However, the will of the military and political leadership to implement in
full this expensive and vast scheme was lacking. The key, then, was how much and
which parts of the appendix each nation was willing to spend on and implement. As
such, the focus of the AIAW plan switched to the annual implementation programs that
the Chiefs of Staff submitted to the government for approval. Although many of the most
expensive aspects of the appendix never received assent for implementation, one that did
receive the green light was the formation by each nation of its own Air Defence
Command organization for the command and control of air defences. Another aspect,
which might easily be overlooked, was contained in the implementation programme for
1948-1949. It assigned the U.S. responsibility for the “initiation and formulation of a
standardized air defence doctrine and operating procedure including the co-ordination of
anti-aircraft fire.”80 The RCAF would henceforth adhere to the USAF way of defending
the continent from aerial attack. Continental air defence integration was thus inevitable
and the rough basis for its command and control was established by 1947.

The Command Appendix to the Basic Security Plan

Before ending this chapter it is necessary to comment on the Command Relations
appendix to the Basic Security Plan. Work on this document was slow, largely because
the other appendices, upon which force structure planning depended, had more priority.
Nevertheless, MCC members were sure to keep Canada-U.S. command and control
issues in the back of their mind. In a December 1947 Situation Report on the BSP,
Canadian Vice-Chief of the General Staff Major-General C.C. Mann stressed that the as-
et yet unwritten Command Relations appendix “will be a most interesting one to develop.”
It would involve integration of forces, he continued, and this would bring forth
potentially thorny issues of boundaries (including command in contiguous national
operational zones), responsibilities and also the difficulty of establishing adequate
communications, all of which “have yet to be resolved.” Nevertheless, Mann was
confident that the Canadian and American planners would be able to agree upon “an
acceptable formula” for command and control.81

Throughout much of 1947, Canadian and American planners discussed the
necessity to produce a Command Relations appendix to the BSP, but no detailed planning
on the subject took place. Instead, the planners were limited to only orally discussed
ideas on command and control on an informal basis at their meetings. In the meantime,
they sought permission from their respective Chiefs of Staff to set up sub-committees to
begin work on bilateral command and control studies. In August 1947, the RCAF member of the JPC tabled study entitled “Command Relations – Canada-U.S.” It suggested that North America to be separated into four theatres of operations, Air Defence, Northwest, Northeast, and Southern, consisting of joint and combined Canada-U.S. unified commands headed by “supreme commanders.” The paper was clearly influenced by the 1946 U.S. Unified Command Plan (see next chapter), but was still only in a very preliminary form. Consequently, the JPC decided that it was unsuitable to table it at the next MCC meeting. Therefore, the Command Relations appendix was put on the back burner yet again. As a result, as we will see in the next chapter, it would not be until the drafting of the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan and its Command Relations appendix that concrete command and control provisions for continental air defence during the Cold War would be established.

**Conclusion**

During the first few years of the Cold War, Canada and the United States maintained the command and control status quo established during the previous conflict. The Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan maintained the mutual cooperation-unity of command compromise in ABC-22 as the principal command and control relationship between the two nations’ armed forces in the event of war throughout the mid-1940s. This arrangement seemed acceptable at this time because there was no great urgency to change it during this time of peace. However, as we will see in the next chapter, this period of relative global calm would not last and it soon became a key priority to reassess the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship.
Although the BSP’s section on command and control largely mirrored ABC-22, it also included a new clause allowing a commander exercising unity of command the freedom to move forces within his theatre of operations. In the age of modern aerial warfare, the requirement to move forces from one area to another quickly without the delay that having to refer to national authorities would mean was an important consideration. This new clause in the BSP was a way to begin addressing this concern, and as the next chapter will demonstrate, it laid the foundation for new cross-border interception and mutual reinforcement arrangements between Canada and the United States in the 1950s.

The Basic Security Plan was indeed a watershed in the Canada-U.S. defence relationship. For the first time Canada and the United States had the opportunity to plan for the next war during a time of peace. Several aspects of the BSP, notably the expensive and comprehensive Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix, caused some consternation in military and political circles. Nevertheless, none of the controversy surrounding these documents had to do with command and control.

What the Basic Security Plan and especially its Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix did establish was that North America was no longer safe from attack. Significantly, in these documents Canadian-American planners began the process of finding the best ways to counter the growing Soviet aerial threat. They planted the seeds on the integration of Canadian-American air defences, including examination of the best way to secure efficient command and control of air defences. Most importantly, both the command and control “status quo” of the BSP and even the proposed operational control continental air defence system in the AIAW Appendix ensured that Canada would still
retain command over its air forces: there was no “defence against help” dilemma forced upon the country by its southern neighbour that would hamper Canada’s sovereignty.
Chapter Seven
Emergency Planning, Command Organization, and Coordinating Canada-U.S. Air Defence Command and Control

Introduction

When Canadian and American planners devised the Basic Security Plan in 1946, it was a time of peace, reconstruction, and relative international bliss. The scenario posited by the BSP, the outbreak of another major total war, this time with the Soviet Union, seemed rather far-fetched to some at the time. Nevertheless, the period of relative global calm did not last very long, and by 1948 the possibility of an armed conflict erupting between the West and the USSR became much more realistic. As the Soviet Union built up its strategic bomber force and, in 1949, acquired its own atomic weapons, the need to protect North America from aerial attack became much more important. The air defence “crisis” of 1950 precipitated by the outbreak of the Korean War made the issue one of even greater concern, and it soon became a key priority for Canadian and American planners to re-examine the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship. Further integration of the two nations’ air defence efforts was a necessity, and greater command and control centralization was a key goal.

The main issue that this chapter examines is how the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship evolved as the two nations reacted to the growing Soviet atomic air threat and sought to co-ordinate their air defence efforts into one integrated system. The time period 1949-1953, from the USSR’s possession of the atomic bomb to its explosion of a thermonuclear weapon, saw significant developments in air force command organization. These included the move towards functional commands and the arrangement of air defence assets under centralized command and control. It also
resulted in a major shift in Canada-U.S. planning away from long-term projections to short-term capabilities-based emergency plans. With the growing requirement of the RCAF and the USAF to reinforce each other and have their fighter-interceptors cross the border into the other’s airspace to effectively fight an air defence battle, important questions regarding sovereignty and in particular whose command and control authority these forces would be under came to the fore. Most importantly, this chapter examines the fundamental change of Canada-U.S. air defence command and control from the co-operation-unity of command paradigm to one more centred on the principle of operational control.

**The Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan**

Since the Canada-U.S. Military Co-Operation Committee began work on the appendices to the Basic Security Plan, it had been conscious of the future need for a combined short range implementation plan based on current force capabilities to be put into effect in an emergency.¹ By 1948, growing concerns in Canadian and especially American military circles about Soviet intentions and strategic bombing capabilities began to make the need for an emergency capabilities-based defence plan a priority. This was highlighted by the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Airlift Crisis that year. These events caused a major confrontation with the USSR, and the leadership of the USAF grew increasingly concerned that its air defence capabilities were insufficient to adequately protect the U.S. from the growing possibility of Soviet Tu-4 bomber attacks.²

In the summer of 1948, the MCC set out to revise the bilateral planning process to address new concerns. It separated Canada-U.S. defence planning into three distinct
parts: an outline long-range Basic Security Plan (MCC 100/4); a Basic Security Program (MCC 200, later MCC 122) that dealt with implementation issues; and a capabilities-based emergency plan (MCC 300) to be put into effect immediately during a crisis. The latter document eventually became known as the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan (EDP). It was the only one of the series of three bilateral planning documents that included command and control provisions.

The Canada-U.S. planners released the first EDP, MCC 300/1, on 25 March 1949. Based on “forces currently available,” it addressed three main defence tasks that Canada and the U.S. would undertake in the event of an emergency: the defence of vital areas against air attack, the protection of sea lines of communication, and the employment of mobile striking forces to reduce Soviet amphibious/airborne lodgements. The document was to be revised annually to keep it consistent with other plans and up-to-date with current Canadian and American defence capabilities. The EDP was to be placed into effect when so ordered by each country’s Chiefs of Staff.

Although planners expected the Soviets to mount a major attack on shipping, they anticipated only minor small-scale amphibious operations and a rather minimal air threat to the continent. The plan thus projected only limited attacks by Soviet Tu-4 strategic bombers flying one-way missions and carrying conventional bombs or a small number of chemical and biological weapons. Significantly, the EDP estimated that the USSR would not be in possession of an atomic bomb in 1949.

The main focus of the EDP was maintaining high military production of the North American economies to sustain offensive capabilities in a total war effort against an enemy. Planners anticipated that any Soviet strike on North America would only be a
minor one in support of a main assault in Eurasia. As such, defensive measures to protect the continent from attack were to be minimal so as not to distract from and interfere with the principal military effort overseas. The EDP thus remained consistent with previous Canadian-American plans by ensuring the maintenance of an overall offensive wartime strategy during a total war.

In order to achieve this limited defensive strategy, the plan called for “basic undertakings,” which included, among others, the “establishment and coordination of an emergency air defense system” and also “command arrangements for control of the combined military effort in execution of this plan.” As we saw in the previous chapter, although planners recognized the importance of drafting a command and control appendix to the BSP, the development of such a document was in fact was very slow. Nevertheless, because of the need to have a capabilities-based plan ready in an emergency, command and control provisions were prevalent in the EDP. Each country was responsible for defending its own territory and “the sea and air lines of communication associated therewith.” Arrangements for operational command and control of Canada-U.S. forces were spelt out in Appendix “E,” Command.

The Command Appendix to the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan

In November 1948, the MCC planners completed a draft Command Appendix to the EDP. It considered the establishment of a combined “Canada-U.S. Defense Command” that would oversee all forces engaged in the defence of the continent. The planners justified the proposed new command organization by noting that a “well-integrated and unified defense effort” was required to counter a multi-faceted and wide-ranging enemy attack. They based the “Canada-U.S. Defense Command” on what they
termed as a “combined command” which was based on the concept of unity of command (see Chapter Three): “it is mandatory for the effective prosecution of modern warfare for a single commander to exercise command direction [not defined] over all forces regardless of the media in which these forces operate.”¹¹ The new command was to be headed by a U.S. officer, who would co-ordinate the defence effort from his remotely located headquarters. Under it would be the various component commands, which would have “operational control” (not defined) of Canada-U.S. forces and would also be responsible for the actual “accomplishment of the missions and tasks set forth in” the EDP, “including the formulation of detailed plans.”¹² In other words, the Canada-U.S. Defense Command would be in charge of overseeing and coordinating the overall continental defence effort but the component commanders would be responsible for the detailed planning and employment of forces (actual carrying out of operations), which was part of their operational command authority.

Nevertheless, when the Canadian and American planners forwarded the draft Command Appendix to their superiors, it was rejected. It is unclear why. Unfortunately, the documents that may shed some light onto this subject are still restricted and currently unavailable to researchers.¹³ Interestingly, it appears that it was the opposition by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, not (as one would expect) the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, to the combined command idea that led to the draft EDP Command Appendix being rejected. In fact, we do know that the Canadian military leadership was in favour of a combined Canada-U.S. command as late as the summer of 1949. However, upon being informed of JCS opposition to the concept, the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided to let the matter drop, believing that it would be dealt with during the talks then
going on surrounding the formation of NATO commands.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, although the combined command proposal was rejected, it showed that planners were at the very least thinking on the lines of greater centralization of command and control during the late 1940s. As we will see in Chapter Nine, this would prove to be a valuable asset for air defence planning later on in the mid-1950s.

In the end, when the EDP was released in March 1949, there was no mention of a combined Canada-U.S. command in the Command Appendix. Instead, it outlined that command and control authority fell to the individual Canadian and American operational-level commanders in each area. Unfortunately, the document did not mention specific command and control arrangements. Instead, it indicated that “any force located in Canada, including Newfoundland and Labrador, and employed in execution of the tasks set forth in this plan, will operate under a commander designated by Canada.” The same was true for any forces located in the U.S., which were to operate under a commander designated by the United States.\textsuperscript{15}

Importantly, there was no mention of the customary mutual cooperation-unity of command provisions that had appeared in previous Canada-U.S. plans. As we will soon see, although command and control arrangements were left out of the EDP Command Appendix, Canadian and American officers later interpreted this provision to mean that a commander would exercise operational control or tactical control over these forces (see below). Essentially, what this arrangement meant was that operational control was to be usually based on national lines depending where the forces were located: if they were in Canada, they would come under a Canadian commander; if in the United States they would be under an American officer. However, there was one important difference in the
wording of the EDP Command Appendix, and it had to do with the designation of command and control authority.

The document stated that forces “will operate under a commander designated by” [emphasis added]” the respective country. Although, as noted above, this usually meant that American forces would operate under the operational control of a Canadian commander in Canadian territory and Canadian units would be under the operational control of an American commander in the United States, this would not always be the case. Even though a country had the authority to assign the commander, it did not necessarily mean that it had to choose a commander from its own nation’s armed forces. For example, if American forces were located in Canada for EDP operations, Canadian authorities (not stated – it only said “by Canada” – but likely either the Chiefs of Staff or the Government) could designate either a Canadian or an American officer to exercise operational control. This was an important provision because technically it meant that American forces could operate under U.S. operational control in Canada. Alternatively, Canadian forces could operate under Canadian operational control in American territory, although it was assumed that the former scenario was much more likely than the latter.

The purpose of this arrangement was not to erode the sovereignty of the host nation; instead it was a functional arrangement to allow the nearest and most capable (i.e., in terms of the number of forces available to him) commander at the time, whether he was a Canadian or an American officer, to ensure efficiency of military operations in an emergency situation. As we will see below in the discussion of RCAF-USAF mutual reinforcement and cross-border interception agreements, this EDP Command Appendix arrangement also provided a solution to the problem of finding a way to defend certain
areas of each country, as it permitted the deployment of forces from either nation into threatened regions. For example, if Canadian forces were absent in northern British Columbia but American forces were present in nearby Alaska, the provision would allow the Americans, operating under their own commander, to react to an emergency attack on the Canadian province. It thus guaranteed that the local commanders had the authority that they needed to deal with an immediate threat to an area, which ensured operational flexibility and military efficiency.

Lastly, the EDP Command Appendix contained two provisions that ensured autonomy – and sovereignty – of forces engaged in operations. The first stipulated that “forces of either country serving in the territory of the other will be under the immediate command [not defined] of a commander designated by the country furnishing the force.”\textsuperscript{16} In other words, once a force entered into the other nation’s territory, even though it might come under the operational control of the other country’s commander, it would remain under the operational command of its own officers. This ensured national command and also that units would not be broken up, as there would still be a clear national chain of command and the unit commanders would still be able to give detailed operational instructions to their forces, thereby avoiding confusion. Secondly, there was also a clause stating that “regardless of the area in which operating, the internal administration of forces furnished by either country shall be the prerogative of the country furnishing the force.”\textsuperscript{17} This was a re-assertion of what had by then become a long-held Canadian and U.S. practice in joint and combined operations: that administration and discipline remained a service prerogative as part of its national command authority.
In summary, the EDP Command Appendix at long last abandoned the mutual cooperation-unity of command provisions that had been the principal Canada-U.S. command and control relationship since 1941, and instead began the movement towards operational control. As we will see in the next two chapters, the definition of this command and control term and its application to the Canada-U.S. air defence relationship would continue to evolve. Importantly, because operational control still ensured that Canada would retain operational command and national command over its air forces, it also protected sovereignty: again, in terms of command and control there was no “defence against help” dilemma forced upon the country by its southern neighbour. Nevertheless, how the RCAF and the USAF actually applied the EDP Command Appendix provisions to the growing air defence mission in the late 1940s and 1950s still needs to be addressed, and it will be examined in the remainder of this chapter.

**The Air Defence “Crisis” and Revision of the EDP**

The JCS approved the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan MCC 300/1 on 21 April 1949. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee gave their final assent in late October. Nonetheless, because the EDP was based on forces currently available (a “capabilities-based plan” in modern military terminology), it required annual revision by the MCC (usually by July) and re-approval by each nation’s chiefs of staff. This gave each country the opportunity not only to give updated force levels and other capabilities to carry out the plan, but also to make changes to any part of the plan, including the Command Appendix, that they deemed necessary.

The first revision of the EDP (MCC 300/2) was completed in May 1950 in response to the air defence “crisis situation” caused by Soviet detonation of an atomic
bomb in August 1949 and heightened by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. With the Cold War turning “hot” in the Far East, military leaders were finally convinced of the need for proper continental air defences. This led to the establishment by the U.S. and Canada in the early 1950s of an extensive system of radars similar to that proposed in the 1947 Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix to the BSP (see previous chapter).\(^\text{19}\) Indeed, the revised EDP reflected the new air defence priorities.\(^\text{20}\)

Based on recent intelligence of improved USSR strategic bombing capabilities (notably the number of atomic bombs that it possessed – estimated to be between 25 and 45) and intentions, MCC 300/2 was a cold re-assessment of how North American air defence forces would be employed in the event of a sudden Soviet attack. The Military Co-Operation Committee agreed that the current state of Canadian and American defensive capabilities meant that it would be impossible to defend every kilometre of the two countries, and they had to make some hard choices on what the priorities would be. Therefore, “after exhaustive study” the combined planners decided that the only way to utilize the two countries’ limited air defence resources was to concentrate them in five “critical areas” and, unfortunately, accept risks elsewhere.\(^\text{21}\) In the meantime, both nations would endeavour to increase their capabilities to protect the continent from the growing Soviet atomic threat. The two most pressing priorities were the “extension and integration of the Canada-United States early warning and control systems” and an increase in the number of anti-aircraft defences, including modern weapons and more all-weather fighter squadrons and bases. Nevertheless, the planners also re-iterated the now long-held stance that investment in North American defence should not take away from the main focus of Europe and the strategic offensive.\(^\text{22}\)
The Chiefs of Staff Committee approved MCC 300/2 11 July 1950 and the JCS one month later. Despite minor revisions, however, the Command Appendix remained essentially the same during the early 1950s. The only changes that it underwent were in reference to the establishment by the United States of one of its new unified commands, U.S. Northeast Command. Although the main role of this new command organization was air defence, U.S. Northeast Command was not part of the USAF’s Air Defense Command (see below) but instead was a JCS command organization and will thus be examined separately in the next chapter. Instead, the focus of air defence command and control in the early 1950s switched to specific arrangements between the USAF and the RCAF. However, before discussing them, it is first necessary to examine how Canada and the U.S. organized their own continental defence – especially air defence – forces after the Second World War.

**Canadian and American Post-War Air Defence Command Organization**

The story of Canadian and American air defence command organization in the years following the Second World War is essentially one of an endeavour by airmen from both countries – and with differing degrees of success – to centralize command and control of all resources for defending each country under a functionally-based unified command headed by an air force officer. This section examines each nation’s experiences, starting first with the U.S. and then Canada.

In 1946, the U.S. decided to seize upon the success of its wartime expeditionary command organization by establishing new regionally/geographically-based unified commands under the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Unified Command Plan (see Chapter Three). However, a unified command for continental defence was not included in the
new plan. After the Second World War, in stark contrast to the U.S. Army’s traditional geographical-regional command organization and “reflecting AAF traditions and wartime doctrinal lessons,” the leadership of the USAAF established three new functional command organizations: Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Air Defense Command (ADC); the latter of which was stood up at Mitchell Field, New York, in March 1946. Finally, after a long struggle, in 1947 American airmen finally achieved the establishment of a separate and independent air force. The USAF maintained the new functional command organizations and charged ADC with the mission to defend the continental U.S. against air attack.

Unfortunately, in the first few years of USAF ADC’s existence, the Commanding General (CG) of USAF ADC was limited in his ability to carry out his air defence mission by both insufficient command and control authority and lack of resources. Although authorized to exercise “direct control of all active and coordinate all passive means of air defense,” in reality this power was rather limited, as much of the authority for planning and command and control of operations fell to the individual subordinate air force component and unit commanders (i.e., the USAF’s First and Fourth Air Forces). In terms of resources, due to the USAF’s overwhelming doctrinal focus on the offensive – and the development and expansion of SAC in particular – ADC was truly the “Cinderella” of the service in the early post-war years. As one USAF narrative put it, “an Air Defense Command existed but not an air defense.”

American airmen desired that all air defence resources, regardless of service, should be centralized under the operational control of one USAF commander who was responsible for the air defence of the continental United States.
gained a small measure of assistance in achieving this goal in April 1948, when the Secretary of Defense assigned primary functional (i.e., as opposed to regional) defence responsibility for air defence to the USAF. At the same time, the U.S. Army was also assigned the responsibility to maintain anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) capabilities and to provide them for continental air defence “in accordance with joint doctrines and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Unfortunately, however, the JCS never did issue any policies or procedures, and inter-service disagreements continued to plague efforts to organize American air defences into an effective and centralized command organization. Although both the U.S. Army and USAF chiefs at different points suggested the formation of a unified air defence command, the JCS members were unable to come to any kind of unanimous decision. As a result, the USAF had to rely on joint inter-service cooperation agreements.

At one point, ADC was disbanded altogether, its resources combined with Tactical Air Command under a new USAF command, Continental Air Command (ConAC), which took over the air defence mission. However, the air defence “crisis” of 1950 finally made American leaders pay more attention to protecting the country from aerial attack. Air defence received the same priority as SAC and overseas expeditionary forces and Congress began allocating more funds to the USAF to build up active continental air defence capabilities. Greater centralization was also achieved when the U.S. Army formed the Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM) in July 1950 and moved its headquarters to Mitchell Field in November of that year to be closer to ConAC HQ. In August 1950, the JCS assigned the Commanding General, ConAC, limited authority over ARAACOM forces, including the designation of states of alert and Rules of Engagement.
(ROE) for AAA, and “operational control [not defined], insofar as engagement and disengagement was concerned.” Finally, at the beginning of 1951, the USAF disbanded ConAC and re-established Air Defense Command as “a major command with the sole mission of air defense of CONUS [the continental United States].” Its new headquarters was established at a more isolated and less vulnerable spot in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where it was joined shortly by ARAACOM.

Nevertheless, the issue of establishing some kind of tri-service joint air defence command organization remained an unsolved problem in the United States during the early 1950s. Until American military leaders could put aside their inter-service differences regarding the importance of the continental air defence mission and agree on the need for a unified joint air defence command, nothing would be accomplished. Fortunately, the post-Second World War air defence command organization situation in Canada was at least marginally better.

Despite the success of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command utilizing the British system of operational control for convoy defence operations, the Canadian armed forces reverted back to the Joint Committee cooperation system of command and control immediately after the war. Nevertheless, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee remained open to British and American ideas and concepts, including unified commands, throughout the early Cold War era. In fact, the Chiefs had their subordinate Joint Planning Committee undertake several studies in the late 1940s/early 1950s that examined different command organizations for the Canadian armed forces. Some of them included establishing unified commands in Canada, notably the May 1951 proposal entitled “A Proposed System of Unified Operational Commands.” Nevertheless, in the
end and against the advice of the Chairman, the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided to retain the joint committee cooperation system for the time being and take a wait-and-see approach on what the command structure for the defence of the continental United States would be. 44 This decision by the leadership of Canada’s armed forces was fully consistent with Canadian military practice of reacting to American developments in command organization instead of being proactive.

Nevertheless, at the very least the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided to re-categorize Canadian defence roles to reflect the Cold War environment. Echoing the U.S. Secretary of Defense and also the EDP, each Canadian service was assigned “primary responsibility” for tasks to be undertaken regarding certain potential threats to the country. The RCAF was responsible for air defence, the RCN for coast and seaward defence, and the Army for reducing enemy lodgements on Canadian territory. 45 Although the Canadian Army and RCN maintained their regional/geographic command organization, when Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis became the Chief of the Air Staff in 1946, he insisted that the various roles of an air force necessitated that the RCAF be organized on a functional basis. After some resistance from Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, Curtis was finally able to win him over. Thus, with the re-categorization of the armed forces’ defence roles in 1948, the RCAF was able to lay the foundation for the creation of at least one Canadian functional joint command organization, Air Defence Command. 46

The RCAF demobilized quickly after the Second World War and maintained only a minimal force, the Auxiliary, to provide protection against aerial attack. As Allan English and Colonel John Westrop have noted, with no Regular Force units to protect the
country from aerial attack, “there was no national command and control organization for air defence” at this time. 47 The air defence situation was perhaps best revealed in a 1948 capabilities-based emergency defence plan for Canada. Although the Air Defence Appendix of the plan anticipated only a small Soviet bomber capability, it stated bluntly, “there are no defences immediately available.” 48 In fact, besides the Auxiliary, the only air defences available in the country were those of the Royal Canadian Navy: four squadrons of fighter aircraft (eight machines per squadron) and the anti-aircraft guns of the naval ships “which happen to be in port.” 49

However, in light of the increasing Soviet aerial threat to North America by the late 1940s, the RCAF soon began to address its shortcomings. On 1 December 1948 it established No. 1 Air Defence Group and charged it with the responsibility for protecting the country from air attack. 50 In response to the air defence “crisis” of 1950, air defence in Canada also received more attention and priority funding. Air Defence Group grew significantly, and on 1 June 1951 it was elevated to command status. 51

The new RCAF Air Defence Command expanded greatly during the 1950s, reaching its authorized strength of 19 fighter-interceptor squadrons (nine Regular Force and ten Auxiliary) by 1955. 52 Upon its establishment, RCAF ADC exercised “overall operational control” (not defined) over all of the forces assigned to it. 53 A measure of air defence centralization was also achieved when the Canadian Army’s Anti-Aircraft Command moved its headquarters to St. Hubert in April 1949. Its commander became the senior anti-aircraft advisor to the Air Officer Commanding RCAF ADC and was responsible to him “for operational control of its units.” 54 Thus, by the early 1950s command and control of the air defence system in Canada was adequately centralized
under RCAF authority. How it was co-ordinated with American scheme for protection against aerial attack is the focus of the rest of this chapter.

**Further Expansion and Coordination of Continental Air Defences: The Draft Canada-U.S. Emergency Air Defence Plan and the Pinetree System**

Until one man is given responsibility for the defence of both Canada and the U.S. it is unrealistic to talk of giving him authority to control the entire operation.  
- Group Captain K.L.B. Hodson, DAPS

As per provisions in the EDP, detailed air defence operational planning was undertaken by each nation’s air defence command headquarters. In late 1950, the two prepared a draft combined “Canada-United States Emergency Air Defence Plan” (EADP) to fulfill the air defence tasks of the EDP. Although still classified and not currently available to researchers, a description of the EADP is available in a Chiefs of Staff Committee document of 9 December 1950. The aim of the combined plan was “to prepare for operational integration” of Canadian and American air defences in the event of war to protect the continent’s “vital areas.” Since the air defence battle would be fought over large parts of Canada and the United States, irrespective of international borders, the draft plan called for operations to be “conducted from air bases and within airspaces of either nation according to the tactical situation.” In terms of command and control, it specified that each nation would retain operational control of its own aircraft when flying over its own territory. However, if the “tactical situation” of the overall air battle dictated the necessity of interceptors from one country crossing the border into the airspace of the other for reinforcement and/or to interdict enemy bombers, the draft plan stipulated that some kind of operational control authority over these aircraft be exercised by the “host” country.
However, when each nation’s air defence command forwarded the EADP to its respective chiefs of staff for approval, it was met with resistance. Although the JCS and the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that further integration of the Canada-U.S. air defence effort was desirable, they felt that the command and control provisions required more study. Furthermore, the cross-border interception issue was a different matter entirely that required an official government-to-government agreement. This was the purview of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which at that moment was in fact discussing the air defence issue.

On 1 February, the PJBD produced a document on a proposed new integrated Canada-U.S. air defence scheme. Eventually known as the “Pinetree System,” it called for consolidation and extension (especially northward) of the current Canadian and American aircraft control and radar warning organizations “into one operational system directed towards meeting the current combined air defense problem of the two countries.” This necessitated a massive radar building programme to plug current gaps in coverage and also a more integrated system of warning and interception.

Key to the latter aspect was command and control of forces engaged in air defence. The plan outlined that command of forces would be retained by each nation’s government, but “operational control” would be “passed” (not stated, but likely from USAF ADC and RCAF ADC) to the respective Group commanders “regardless of international boundaries” in order to carry out the air defence battle. “Operational control” was defined “for this purpose” as “all functions of command solely operational except that deployments and dispositions of forces will be effected only after being mutually agreed upon by commanders concerned.” In addition, there was a provision
that “this authority may be delegated.” Finally, the plan stated that “overall operational control” (this time not defined) of the whole air defence system would be exercised by the commander of USAF ADC in Colorado Springs.63

The definition of operational control was rather simplistic in that it did not actually entail what “functions of command solely operational” actually were. However, by specifying that deployment and disposition of forces were to be effected only after consultation by the respective commanders, it did confirm that national command authority for deploying forces remained with the respective service authorities. In addition, with the added provision for the delegation of operational control authority, the plan ensured that local commanders would have the authorization that they needed to deal with the aerial threat in their area immediately, thus ensuring military efficiency of the air defence battle. Finally, the last provision for “overall operational control” was an odd one that it could be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be seen as a precursor to NORAD whereby operational control of all air defence forces was under an overall CinC. However, the more likely interpretation is that the emphasis was not on command and control authority over air defence operations (i.e., interceptions and engagements), but on the operation (i.e., the functioning) of the new integrated electronic air warning and control system; in other words, that the USAF ADC commander would have the radar reporting facilities at his disposal.

In any event, emphasis was placed on the latter aspect when the PJBD forwarded its air defence proposal, later known as the Pinetree System, for approval as Recommendation 51/1.64 At this point the command and control provisions were far too rudimentary and required further refinement. As an interim solution, RCAF planners felt
that the arrangements in the EDP Command Appendix would suffice. According to their interpretation of these command and control provisions, the AOC ADC would have “operational control” (not defined) over Canadian territory and the commander of USAF ADC would have the same authority in American airspace. Although recognizing that a single integrated system under a single commander with operational control of the entire air defence battle was “the theoretically best approach and it may ultimately be practical to achieve,” the RCAF understood that the time to implement it had not yet arrived. Instead, for the near future at least there would be two co-ordinated systems, one Canadian and one American, with each air defence commander exercising operational control in his own airspace as per the EDP Command Appendix provisions.

Although discussions between Canadian and American air defence planners continued throughout the next several months, the two sides could not come to any kind of agreement on command and control. Finally, at the September 1952 PJBD meeting, Air Vice-Marshal Frank Miller, the RCAF Member and Deputy CAS, suggested that in light of the continued failure to come to a satisfactory agreement on air defence command and control, instead of establishing an “integrated” Canada-U.S. air defence system, the two countries would have to settle on a “co-ordinated” one for the time being. The USAF PJBD Member agreed, and this was embodied in a revised statement, finalized in early January 1953, which read: “The primary responsibility for the coordination of the common [air defence] system will be exercised by the U.S. Commander assigned the operational responsibility for the air defence of the United States.” It made no mention of any specific command and control arrangements for the coordinated Canada-U.S. air defence system. Instead, command and control issues were dealt with separately in the
individual agreements finalized by the PJBD on mutual reinforcement and cross-border interception and engagement.

**RCAF-USAF Reinforcement: PJBD Recommendation 51/6**

It is the inherent right of a nation to control the air space over its territory in the interests of its national security and self-preservation.

-U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1950

In light of the air defence “crisis” of 1950, Canadian and American airmen increasingly saw their efforts to protect their countries from aerial attack as a common problem that required an integrated Canada-U.S. system. Of particular concern was that interception, engagement, and mutual reinforcement might have to take place during a peacetime air defence emergency (i.e., before an actual declaration of war) as well as during war and would necessitate interceptors from both counties to quickly cross into each other’s airspace and be deployed at various RCAF and USAF bases. These measures were all necessary to make sure that the air defence concept of “defence in depth” could be achieved: “an enemy should be attacked as far out as possible initially and the pressure on him increased as he neared his objectives by the employment of increasing numbers and varieties of weapons.”

In the case of North America, this meant pushing the air battle as far north as possible, thereby ensuring that it could be fought most effectively within the shortest amount of time of the continental radar network detecting an incoming bogey. As we will see in the next two sections, both the mutual reinforcement and cross-border interception and engagement issues had command and control implications.

In late 1950, the RCAF approached the USAF about the issue of reinforcing one another’s interceptor resources in an emergency. In particular, since both services were
striving for greater air defence coordination and integration, Canadian airmen felt that each service’s respective air defence command should have “blanket permission... in emergency to reinforce one another,” and this authority should be embodied in a governmental agreement between the two nations. The JCS agreed, and authorized the U.S. Section PJBD to begin negotiations with the Canadian Section.

Air Marshal Curtis also concurred. However, the RCAF CAS also noted that one of the key issues that needed to be addressed was airspace sovereignty, and in particular, “under whose command and control would such forces come?” “If,” Curtis explained in a letter to Brooke Claxton, “such forces are an integral part of our Air Defence System they would have to come under our control [although] they would remain under the immediate command of the U.S. subordinate commander.” This was consistent with the provisions in the EDP Command Appendix, but there were more factors involved.

The key issue was not just the matter of interceptors crossing the border of one country into the other, but also the fact that the air defence system employed in Canada and the U.S. at that time required intricate cooperation between the pilot in the aircraft and the air controllers on the ground. The radar systems carried by interceptors were still quite rudimentary, having changed very little since the Second World War. As such, much like the system that Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding employed for the Royal Air Force’s Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain, when ground radars picked up an intruding aircraft, interceptors were scrambled and vectored on to the enemy bomber by the local Air Defence Control Centre (ADCC) in each sector. Joseph Jockel terms this as “tactical co-operation,” although carefully study reveals that the pilot-air controller relationship straddles both the operational and tactical levels of war. Indeed, as we will
see shortly, Canadian and American officers consistently used the terms “operational control” and “tactical control” interchangeably.

In any event, besides the issues of sovereignty that came with mutual reinforcement and cross-border interception, there were also practical operational and tactical matters that needed to be solved. Specifically, the location of certain elements of the air defence system in place in North America necessitated that the Air Defence Control Centres of one nation would be required to vector interceptors from the other country. For example, both Canada and the U.S. had interceptor bases and ADCCs located near the border in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence area, but in the Prairies the only ones near the border were in the United States. As Air Vice-Marshal Miller noted,

it would be better if we used the control facilities rather than the international boundary as a line of demarcation between the control responsibility of the national commanders. For example, Canadian fighters operating over Canada but being controlled by a US GCI [Ground Control Intercept station, i.e., an ADCC] would obviously be under the control of the American commander.79

As Curtis alluded to above, some formal means of operational command and control arrangements was required, and they had to embody the EDP Command Appendix provisions that ensured effective co-ordination between interceptors and ground control centres.

Therefore, in the spring of 1951, the RCAF and USAF devised a draft accord on command and control. It outlined the following arrangements:

When squadrons of one country are operating in the area of responsibility of the other, they will be under the control of the nearest Air Defence Control Centre of that area for all functions normally performed by an Air Defence Control Centre. For all other purposes, they will remain under the control of their parent organization.80
The key aspect of this arrangement was the word “nearest.” In areas such as the west coast and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Valley it meant that RCAF control centres would have tactical control over USAF and RCAF interceptors. However, in areas such as the Prairies and Newfoundland, where there were no Canadian ADCCs, tactical control over USAF fighters would be exercised by American control centres on the U.S. side of the border in both American and Canadian airspace.  

RCAF planners continued studying the mutual reinforcement subject throughout the summer of 1951. In September Curtis submitted a draft proposal on the issue to his colleagues on the Chiefs of Staff Committee advocating for authority for each nation’s air defence commander to re-deploy each other’s forces for mutual reinforcement. In terms of command and control, the CAS noted that the current provisions in the EDP Command Appendix would apply: “any force located in Canada will operate under a commander designated by Canada, and that the forces of either country serving in the territory of the other will be under the immediate command of a Commander designated by the country furnishing the force.” There was no mention of provisions for the “nearest” ADCC to exercise tactical control that appeared in the April 1951 draft RCAF-USAF accord. As we will see shortly, Canadians and Americans would not re-visit this aspect of command and control until the spring of 1952 and in the context of a new PJBD Recommendation on cross-border interception.

After discussing Curtis’s proposal at its 18 October meeting, the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that the mutual reinforcement of Canadian and American air defence forces in the event of war “was militarily desirable,” but that the RCAF should refer the matter to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in order to secure a formal governmental
agreement. The PJBD moved quickly, producing Recommendation 51/6 on 12 November. It stipulated that when the air defence commanders of each country both agreed that the tactical situation warranted mutual reinforcement, they would “have the power, in the event of war, to authorize the redeployment” of interceptors to either country. Although the recommendation made no mention of command and control authority, the MND had previously noted to the Cabinet Defence Committee that the current provisions in the EDP Command Appendix that Curtis referred to in his September proposal would apply. Accordingly, the AOC Air Defence Command would be in charge in areas of the country covered by RCAF ADC squadrons: the west coast, central Canada and eastern Canada. However, since there were no RCAF air defence forces located in the Prairies or in Newfoundland, Canada would have to designate a USAF officer as commander.

In the end, Recommendation 51/6 allowed USAF interceptors to enter Canadian airspace and be redeployed to RCAF bases in a wartime emergency. It also permitted the stationing of RCAF fighters at U.S. bases if the progress of the air battle so dictated. As Jockel aptly put it, “the local air defence commanders would be able to draw upon the interceptors in their region, regardless of nationality, and use them to destroy hostile aircraft.” It was thus one important step in the overall Canada-U.S. effort to coordinate and integrate their air defence systems, although it still did not allow for mutual reinforcement during a peacetime air defence emergency. However, as we will see below, subsequent Canadian-American agreements concerning cross-border interception and engagement went a long way to remedying this deficiency.

Cross-Border Interception: PJBD Recommendations 51/4 and 53/1
International boundaries cannot be respected when fighting an air battle.
- General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee

USAF ADC… had a strong incentive to regard the boundary as tactically irrelevant and to begin interception of hostile or potentially hostile aircraft over Canadian territory.
- Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*

In August 1950, not long after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Harry Truman authorized the USAF to intercept and “destroy aircraft in flight within the sovereign boundaries of the United States which commit hostile acts, which are manifestly hostile in intent, or which bear the military insignia of the USSR, unless properly cleared or obviously in distress.” The USAF had been clamouring for this “right to shoot” for years, and it now felt that the time had come to ensure that this authority could be exercised across the border in Canadian airspace as well in order to help achieve defence in depth for the air defence battle. American airmen understood that the RCAF only had enough interceptor resources to protect specific regions of Canada and that other potential areas of approach, such as Newfoundland and the Prairies, would remain undefended as a result. In their eyes, some kind of arrangement with the Canadians was required in order to plug this gap in the air defences.

The USAF formally approached Canada on the cross-border interception issue in August 1950, and after much negotiation the PJBD came to an agreement in the form of Recommendation 51/4 of 9 May 1951. The new arrangement gave reciprocal permission to the USAF and the RCAF to cross each other’s border and intercept unidentified aircraft. However, reflecting Canadian concerns over sovereignty, the recommendation also contained specific restrictions that irked American airmen. USAF interceptors were only allowed to cross the border to intercept unidentified aircraft that were actually heading towards the United States. In addition, pilots would have to wait
until the intruder was in American airspace before they could press the trigger. In other words, USAF fighters could intercept unidentified aircraft over Canada, but they could not engage and destroy them until they crossed the border.96

The Canadian Government quickly approved PJBD Recommendation 51/4 on 30 May 1951.97 However, assent from President Truman did not come until October due to USAF uneasiness with the restrictions, especially the lack of a “shoot order” in Canadian airspace. The American airmen thus only accepted the recommendation as an “interim measure,” and instead left the door open for changes to the arrangements when the time was right.98

This time came in the spring of 1952. The previous December, the Canadian government had given the RCAF permission to engage an aircraft (force it to land or open fire on it) in peacetime. However, this did not apply to any arrangements with the U.S. on cross-border interceptions.99 Accordingly, in April 1952 USAF Headquarters approached its service’s PJBD Member, Major-General R.L. Walsh, regarding a proposed revision to the “restrictive” Recommendation 51/4. It suggested that the Canadian and American air defence commanders be authorized in peacetime to employ fighters “from either or both countries” to intercept potentially hostile unidentified aircraft “over the national territory of either country regardless of International Boundary.”100 According to the USAF proposal, tactical control authority to order the fighter to engage the aircraft was to be exercised by the air defence commander “responsible for identification,” depending on specific circumstances: “No attempt to be made to order intercepted aircraft to land nor to open fire unless the aircraft commit(s) a hostile act, is (are) manifestly hostile intent, or is (are) declared hostile by the Air
Defense Commander responsible for identification.”101 This clause adhered very closely to the Rules of Engagement that the RCAF had adopted upon receiving approval for its own peacetime “shoot order” in December.102

Nevertheless, the actual nationality of the air defence commander “responsible for identification” was unclear in the document. According to the RCAF’s interpretation, “the exact meaning of the USAF proposal” was

that *either* USAF or RCAF aircraft, directed *either* by a USAF or RCAF air defence controller, could order interception of aircraft over U.S. or Canadian territory, and if it was deemed that a hostile act was being committed or intended, could order the aircraft being intercepted to land or be shot down.103

This issue had to be resolved before any formal agreement could be finalized.

Indeed, the RCAF had mixed feelings about the USAF proposal. Canadian airmen agreed that the restrictions contained in Recommendation 51/4 should be removed so that the air defence battle could be fought properly, but they also did not fully agree with the proposed new provisions advocated by the USAF because they did not go far enough to address Canadian sovereignty concerns. As an alternative, they suggested their own amendment to the PJBD recommendation that dealt with these matters. It stipulated that American fighters would be permitted to investigate unidentified airplanes over Canadian territory “only when it is not possible for a Canadian military aircraft to carry out the investigation.”104 In addition, USAF aircraft would have to adhere to RCAF ROE and only the Air Officer Commanding RCAF ADC (or an officer who has been delegated this authority) could order the engagement. This solved the air defence commander “responsible for identification” problem. With these provisions, the RCAF counter-proposal concluded, “the onus of responsibility for the engagement of aircraft over
Canadian territory remains with the Canadian Air Defence Commander.” Tactical control and the ever-important authority to issue the “shoot order” would thus be in Canadian hands, while command would still remain a national prerogative.

The Canadian Government approved of the RCAF’s counter-proposal as a basis for further talks with the Americans. However, before tabling the document as a formal Recommendation at the next meeting of the PJBD, Air Vice-Marshal Miller felt that it was first necessary conduct service-to-service talks with the USAF to ensure that it dealt with the concerns that the American airmen had with 51/4. These discussions between RCAF and USAF officers from each service’s headquarters and ADCs took place from the autumn of 1952 into the early winter of 1953, and by late January a draft agreement was ready for the PJBD meeting that month. It contained the provisions in the RCAF 8 September 1952 counter-proposal, with minor differences in wording.

There was, however, one potential problem with the proposed agreement that had to do with command and control. Much like the EDP Command Appendix clause stating that any force operating in Canadian territory would “operate under a commander designated by Canada,” the RCAF counter-proposal also had a similar provision that permitted delegation by the national air defence commander of authority to order an engagement to another officer. Once again, the nationality of this officer was not specifically mentioned. As the Department of External Affairs Member of the PJBD, R.A. MacKay noted, in areas of Canada where there were no RCAF aircraft, it was also likely that there were insufficient communications facilities as well, and this meant that the Air Officer Commanding RCAF ADC would have to delegate tactical control authority for engagements “to an officer of the USAF.” This made MacKay and other
officials in East Block a bit uneasy. Nevertheless, when they approached Claxton about the matter, the MND noted, correctly, that because these arrangements were consistent with the command and control principles in the EDP Command Appendix, the Canadian Government should approve them.\textsuperscript{109}

Besides the command and control concerns outlined by MacKay, a number of other issues delayed the completion of a formal agreement. As a result, it was not until October 1953 that the PJBD tabled the new cross-border interception arrangements as Recommendation 53/1. The new document, which superseded 51/4, largely resembled the September 1952 RCAF counter-proposal, but with some additions. There were minor differences in and added emphasis on certain phrasing, and the ROE clause was clarified further.\textsuperscript{110} Most importantly, the new recommendation also included the provision for the delegation by the national air defence commander of tactical control authority to order engagements to another officer. To help allay Canadian concerns, it also included an additional phrase stating that this authority “should, to the greatest extent possible, be retained by the Air Defence Commander.” Nonetheless, 53/1 also stated that “when circumstances so necessitate,” the commander may delegate his authority “to a qualified officer not less in status than the senior officer in an Air Defence Control Center.”\textsuperscript{111}

As Jockel has noted, this last phrase “had been carefully inserted by the two air forces.”\textsuperscript{112} Although Canada was “for political reasons” unwilling to specify that this could be an American or Canadian officer, as MacKay and Claxton alluded to above, this was implicit in the recommendation and understood by USAF and RCAF air defence commanders.\textsuperscript{113} Therefore, in order to ensure military efficiency by making certain that a potential hostile aircraft was intercepted as quickly as possible, the air commander could
delegate tactical control interception and engagement authority to the nearest ADCC, regardless of nationality. In portions of eastern and central Canada near the border and in the Vancouver area, this meant that Canadian commanders would be able to order interceptions; but in the Prairies where there were no RCAF ADCCs, it meant that this authority would be delegated by the Air Officer Commanding RCAF ADC to a USAF officer at an American Air Defence Control Centre.\textsuperscript{114} The Canadian Government approved PJBD Recommendation 53/1 on 3 November 1953 and President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his assent the following month.\textsuperscript{115}

In the end, PJBD Recommendation 53/1 complemented PJBD Recommendation 51/6 nicely. As Jockel has noted, once an American fighter deployed to Canadian airspace for an interception actually destroyed a hostile aircraft “it would not be peacetime for long” and the RCAF and USAF air defence commanders “could then immediately draw upon emergency reinforcement authority granted them by Recommendation 51/6.”\textsuperscript{116} Both PJBD Recommendations therefore ensured that the air defence battle could be fought effectively while at the same time adhere to the EDP Command Appendix’s provisions. Tactical control and operational control could be exercised by officers from one nation over the forces of the other, but command would always remain in national hands, thereby ensuring sovereignty.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The time period 1949-1953, in which the Soviet atomic air threat to North America became apparent, also saw significant developments in Canada-U.S. air defence command organization and command and control. Both the RCAF and the USAF adopted functional commands and the two nations realized the requirement for a short
range capabilities-based plan to be put into effect in a crisis with the adoption of the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan. The two air forces also strove for greater centralization of air defence assets, both domestically in the form of joint and unified commands and in a combined effort to achieve an integrated system to protect the continent from aerial attack. Unfortunately, these efforts were only partially successful, but they did produce significant developments in the evolution of the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship.

Both the EDP Command Appendix and PJBD Recommendation 53/1 included provisions for a country to designate a commander of either nationality to exercise operational control authority in its territory, while Recommendation 51/6 ensured that each air defence commander could rely on quick and efficient interceptor reinforcement. These agreements did not erode the sovereignty of the host nation, but were instead functional arrangements to make sure that the air defence battle could be fought effectively and the concept of “defence in depth” could be achieved. As Canadian political scientist Andrew Richter noted, these measures ensured “that the most effective system, regardless of nationality, would be in operation during times of crisis.” They were thus indicative, he concluded, of “a conceptual shift away from a nationally oriented security model and toward a new paradigm that recognized the commonalities in Canada-US air defence interests.”

The two nations’ air defence systems were not yet integrated – they were only coordinated – but by the end of 1953 the seeds for greater Canada-U.S. command and control centralization had been sewn. As we will see in Chapter Nine, with the Soviet Union’s explosion of a thermonuclear bomb in August
1953, it would not be long before Canada and the U.S. began studying the possibility of establishing a combined command that centralized air defence command and control.

Finally, the period 1949-1953 saw a fundamental shift in the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship, as the cooperation-unity of command paradigm that had been accepted since 1941 was gradually replaced with one centred on operational control. Nevertheless, this command and control principle was still in its infancy with regard to how it fit into the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control system, as the lack of a clear definition and the tendency of RCAF and USAF officers to use the term interchangeably with “tactical control” demonstrated. As we will see in the next chapter, operational control would continue to evolve as a command and control principle. Regardless, in the end, with the acceptance of operational control as the principal Canada-U.S. air defence command and control concept, Canada continued to exercise command over its own forces: there was no “defence against help” dilemma forced upon the country by its southern neighbour.
Chapter Eight
The U.S. Northeast Command-RCAF Command and Control Relationship, 1949-1953

The special arrangements proposed for northeast Canada are admittedly equivocal but our military strength is so inconsistent with our political desires that no solution can be found at present to satisfy both Service and State.

-Air Commodore H.B. Godwin, RCAF Staff Officer

Introduction

Many are familiar with the story behind the creation of NORAD in 1957. As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, this command organization established operational control over all Canadian and American air defence forces under the United States Air Force NORAD Commander-in-Chief and his RCAF deputy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, during peacetime and war emergency. However, what most do not know is that prior to NORAD, an RCAF officer exercised the very same command and control authority over the USAF forces U.S. Northeast Command over Newfoundland and Labrador. This chapter examines how the Canada and the United States were able to come to this agreement.

U.S. Northeast Command consisted of the American bases in Newfoundland, Labrador and Greenland, and had responsibility for air defence of the northeast approaches to the continental United States. Because it was a unified command that reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was not part of the USAF’s air defence command structure and therefore did not fall under the jurisdiction of USAF Air Defense Command. This necessitated separate and special arrangements for the air defence command and control relationship in the northeast part of North America that were outside of regular USAF-RCAF channels. As we will see, securing agreement on this issue was not without its controversies. Several political considerations were involved,
especially regarding territorial rights and sovereignty issues in the new Canadian province. Indeed, the continuous presence of U.S. forces in Newfoundland at the bases that they had secured in the Destroyers-for-Bases deal with Britain during the Second World War persisted as an important topic with the Canadian Government – and opposition political parties. Even though it took longer than expected, the two countries were able to come to mutually acceptable arrangements. Although they consisted of window dressing to reassure Canadian political sensitivities, in the end these arrangements ensured Canadian sovereignty as well as military efficiency and competent command and control of air defences.

The Establishment of Northeast Command and the Situation in Newfoundland at the End of the Second World War

When President Harry Truman signed off on the Unified Command Plan in December 1946 (see Chapters Three and Seven), only six of the seven new unified commands were actually stood up in the months that followed. The exception was Northeast Command, which was to encompass U.S. forces in Newfoundland, Labrador and Greenland, and tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the mission to protect the United States from air attack in the northeastern approaches to the continent. The small number of post-war U.S. forces in Newfoundland was a factor that went into this decision, but the most important reason was that the JCS felt that standing up this new unified command involved “political difficulties involving the Canadian Government.”3 Indeed, as the head of the U.S. Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld noted at the time, the location of Northeast Command on “foreign territory would provide excellent propaganda for the communists and would generate misunderstanding and friction with Canada and the United Kingdom.”4 As such, the
issue of standing up the unified command was put on the back burner for the time being. Nonetheless, it would not be very long before international developments, notably the Berlin Airlift, made it necessary to re-visit the issue of activating the new unified command.\(^5\) This factor and the changing constitutional position of Newfoundland in the late 1940s brought forth new questions regarding the Canada-U.S. command and control situation in the northeast.

As the end of the Second World War drew near, the Canadian Government was faced with the question of whether or not it would continue to provide for the defence of Newfoundland and what stance it should take regarding the future of the U.S. bases located there after the cessation of hostilities. After some study, in January 1945, the government decided to maintain the status quo in that Canada “should continue to accept responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, and that the part of the United States in the defence of these territories should be limited to the operation of their leased bases in Newfoundland.”\(^6\) The Americans concurred and agreed that Canadian responsibility for the defence of the British colony be recognized in the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan of 1946 (see Chapter Six).

When Newfoundland joined Canadian Confederation in the spring of 1949, this arrangement was formalized.\(^7\) As the new 10\(^{th}\) province, Newfoundland was now officially Canadian territory, and responsibility for its defence thus fell to the Canadian armed forces. However, the American bases remained due to the long-term (99 years) leases as part of the Destroyers-for-Bases deal with the British in 1941 (see Chapter Four). Once again, as in the Second World War, Canadian as well as American forces would be co-located in Newfoundland. The Canadian Joint Planning Committee
recognized this fact but also realized that that “the present local numerical superiority of United States over Canadian forces may, however, create difficulties in discussions concerning Command” even though, they reiterated, the primary responsibility of U.S. forces was to protect their bases. What this meant was that the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship in Newfoundland would continue to be an ongoing issue during the Cold War. Indeed, the U.S. decision in 1949 to stand up Northeast Command brought the matter to the fore.

**Standing Up Northeast Command**

In light of increasing international tensions with the Soviet Union and the growing likelihood of aerial attack on North America, in April 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the time to stand up Northeast Command in Newfoundland was coming soon. “Recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue,” the American Secretary of Defense instructed the U.S. Section of the PJBD to inform their Canadian colleagues of American intentions. According to the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941, the U.S. had no obligation to notify – or seek approval from – Canada about the impending standing up of a new command organization on its bases in Newfoundland. However, American officials felt that “it would be most impolitic not to do so.” Therefore, as a courtesy to their northern neighbour and key ally, from the very beginning the Americans were proactive in ensuring that they kept Canadian officials up-to-date regarding Northeast Command.

The Chairman of the U.S. Section of the PJBD, Major-General Guy Henry, informed his Canadian counterpart, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton, of
American intentions in early May 1949. In this letter, Henry explained that the commander of Northeast Command

would be responsible, in so far as U.S. responsibilities and interests are concerned, for maintaining the security of the Northeast Command and for participating in the defense of Canada and the United States against attack through the Arctic regions. He would, of course, cooperate closely with appropriate Canadian authorities in the discharge of his peacetime responsibilities, and in an emergency would operate in accordance with combined plans.  

Additional advantages of Northeast Command, Henry stressed, were that the new unified command would further Canada-U.S. defence and is “a logical step in our preparations” to implement the Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan (see previous chapter). Finally, since it was a Canadian officer who would have the responsibility in the EDP for the overall defence of Newfoundland, Henry argued that “his task will be facilitated if he has a single responsible U.S. commander with whom to deal in connection with defence matters,” not only in an emergency, but also for other mundane day-to-day matters that arise.  

An official Canadian response, however, much to the annoyance of the Americans, did not arrive until July. The main reason for the delay was because of the Canadian federal election in June, and in particular the pressure that the government was under by the Opposition regarding “extra-territorial rights now exercised by the U.S.” in the new Canadian province.  The Canadian Government sought reassurances from the Americans that Northeast Command was not a territorial or regional but an “administrative and tactical” peacetime command organization that would be in accordance to provisions then being drafted in the new Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan. Finally, the Canadians were wary of the political implications of what appeared to
be a U.S. territorial command organization on Canadian soil. There was fear that the name “Northeast Command” would give the impression that the U.S. was responsible for the defence of the entire northeastern part of the continent, including Newfoundland, and in particular that it would be “open to interpretation that Canadian forces have come under United States command in the Arctic.” Therefore, instead of the current designation, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee suggested to their American counterparts that the new command be titled “U.S. Forces, Northeast.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were quick to reassure the Canadians of their concerns. The JCS outlined the terms of reference for the commander of Northeast Command in a letter to their Canadian counterparts, noting that they were consistent with provisions in the EDP, and explained that the new unified command was “primarily intended to provide a more direct operational control [not defined] by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” through the U.S. Unified Command Plan over all U.S. forces stationed in Newfoundland “and to facilitate development of joint and Canadian-United States plans and surveys necessary for use in an emergency.”

Nevertheless, the U.S. Section of the PJBD, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Department of External Affairs officials all felt that Northeast Command’s terms of reference were too broad and obscure, with the Canadians in particular fearing that they “might be intended to allocate wartime defence responsibilities to the proposed Command – a matter which would, of course, have to be the subject of intergovernmental consultations.” The Chiefs of Staff Committee thus sought further assurances from the JCS that the new unified command was a separate
American command organization for peacetime administration and operational control of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{18}

The U.S. military leadership, frustrated at the length of time that it was taking to bring this issue to a close, responded in early December. They reiterated that the new unified command’s purpose was to “facilitat[e] planning and the tactical employment of U.S. forces assigned to the command” and reassured their friends to the north that the missions assigned were consistent with those stated by the Canadians. In addition, the JCS made it clear that the new command organization would plan in concert with Canadian forces in the defence of the Northeast, including Newfoundland and Labrador and the sea and air approaches therein, and that it would be in accordance with official Canada-U.S. defence plans “as may be agreed upon from time to time by the governments of the United States and Canada.”\textsuperscript{19} Finally, as a compromise, the JCS offered the title of “\textbf{United States} Northeast Command” for the new unified command so as to emphasize that it is solely an American organization responsible for U.S. forces.

Although not fully comfortable with the proposed name for the new U.S. unified command, the Chiefs of Staff Committee leaned towards accepting the JCS proposal. The RCAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis, reminded his colleagues that “this matter had been referred to the Canadian authorities as a courtesy and that the establishment of the command could have been carried out by the U.S. authorities without any reference to Canada.”\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, the Secretary of State for External Affairs was even more frank in his recognition of the lengths that the Americans had already taken to keep Canada informed:

I gather that it is the Canadian military view that it would be very difficult
for us to suggest what a U.S. organization should be called, especially when Washington has, at our suggestion, completely remodelled the functions proposed for the Command in negotiations extending over a period of a year.  

Still, it was not until May that the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Canadian Cabinet gave their final assent of the JCS proposal.  With the way now clear, in August the JCS informed the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee that U.S. Northeast Command would be stood up effective as of 1 October 1950 at Fort Pepperrell, St. John’s, with Major-General Lyman T. Whitten, USAF, as its CinC.

During this entire process the JCS, through the U.S. Section PJBD, was proactive in ensuring that Canada was kept informed of American intentions to stand up Northeast Command. Not only were the U.S. military leaders patient with the Canadians regarding how long the consultative procedure took, they were also very accommodating to Canadian wishes and sensitivities, even going so far as to change the name of the new unified command to reassure the concerns of their neighbours to the north. These were actions that the JCS did not have to do, both according to the Leased Bases Agreement and the United States’ right to organize its own forces as it sees fit. Nevertheless, in stark contrast to the concept of “defence against help” (see Chapter One), the U.S. military leadership decided to err on the side of caution – or in this case consultation – to keep its continental defence ally informed. This would not, however, be the end to Canadian concerns over U.S. Northeast Command.

The Air Defence Mission, Interceptors, and the Issue of RCAF Involvement in U.S. Northeast Command

…the word “operational” made very little impression on us…

-Department of External Affairs official commenting on the original 1950 terms of reference for U.S. Northeast Command
Once established, American unified commands usually consisted of one overall commander-in-chief to oversee operations and two or more component commands from different services to carry out the detailed operations. However, U.S. Northeast Command was unlike other unified commands in that it had only one component command, Northeast Air Command. Major-General Whitten was also its commander, therefore giving him two “hats” as the unified command CinC and the commander of the component command. As such, although some U.S. Army anti-aircraft artillery forces were assigned to Northeast Air Command and there was a small number of naval liaison officers on its staff, U.S. Northeast Command was solely an air force unified command tasked with the mission to defend the U.S. from attack through Arctic regions in the northeast approaches to the continent. However, upon its establishment, the new U.S. unified command did not actually have any interceptor aircraft resources to carry out this mission, as the arrival of two squadrons was only scheduled for July 1952. Nevertheless, the need to provide greater air defence resources for the northeast approaches to the continent was becoming more apparent.

The Soviet Union’s detonation of an atomic bomb in September 1949, fully four years ahead of intelligence estimates, and the outbreak of the Korean War made it increasingly likely that the USSR would bomb targets in Newfoundland – notably the U.S. leased bases – in any attack on North America. One of the most crucial roles of North American air defences was to protect “the war-making capacity” of Canada and the United States. Logically, this included the industrial, economic and political centres of the two countries – the proverbial “Home Front.” However, another important part of American “war-making capacity” was the offensive power of the USAF’s Strategic Air
Command. Therefore, protecting the U.S. bases in Newfoundland and the RCAF base at Goose Bay, where large SAC forces were also located, from Soviet aerial attack became a crucial task for air defences in the Canadian province. As a consequence, the USAF began accelerating plans for stationing interceptor squadrons at its bases. However, on the Canadian side, due to pressing requirement to provide interceptors to protect the vital areas in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence area, the RCAF was unable to provide fighter protection to the new province at that time.

With the Americans planning to station USAF fighter squadrons in Newfoundland to begin active air patrols, Canadian officials began to fear that U.S. Northeast Command would no longer be an “administrative rather than operational” command and that air defence of Canadian territory in the northeast would thus fall to the United States by default. This was made especially apparent when stories began to appear in the Canadian and American press implying that Canada had conceded air defence protection of the Maritimes to the USAF. Furthermore, in February 1951, the Canadian Joint Services Committee East Coast submitted a draft Canada-U.S. local defence plan for Newfoundland to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that proposed giving U.S. Northeast Command “control and direction of the over-all Area Air Defence system” of fighters and air control and warning resources. This alarmed Canadian authorities, who actively began seeking arrangements with the U.S. to provide for a Canadian contribution to U.S. Northeast Command in order to ensure Canadian interests and sovereignty.

The problem faced by planners was how to find a compromise between safeguarding Canadian sovereignty and ensuring effective command and control within the “area air defence” concept that was to be put into place in Newfoundland. In line
with the EDP, the air defence effort would be focused on the “critical areas” in Newfoundland and Labrador, which were the U.S. bases and installations located in the Canadian province. Nevertheless, although air defence forces allocated to Northeast Air Command were for the protection of the U.S. bases, the modern concept of area air defence made it impracticable that any distinction between defending installations and defending geographical areas could be made. Accordingly, given the location of the U.S. bases, the air defences “in a limited sense” provided for these installations also gave protection for the entire Newfoundland region. In the eyes of the RCAF planners, this situation meant that “the Air Defence Forces of Northeast Air Command are an important, albeit a special, part of the Air Defence of Eastern Canada.”

In a Staff Study, RCAF planners suggested that all air defence forces in Newfoundland, both American and Canadian (if and when they were assigned), be grouped together into one entity as an “Air Defence division” of the USAF’s Northeast Air Command. In order to maintain Canadian sovereignty, the Canadian airmen also stipulated that “regardless of what freedom of action is allowed the Northeast Air Command Air Defence Forces, the ultimate responsibility for the Air Defence of Newfoundland must remain with the Canadian Air Defence Commander.” Some kind of agreement on command and control between Northeast Air Command and the RCAF’s Air Defence Command was therefore required.

The Canadian airmen felt that the proposed command and control arrangement for the integrated Canada-U.S. air defence system outlined in PJBD Recommendation 51/1 (the Pinetree System – see previous chapter) would work in the Northeast. The RCAF planners agreed that “overall control” should be vested in the commander of the USAF
Air Defense Command “in close co-ordination and co-operation with” the Air Officer Commanding RCAF Air Defence Command. Actual “operational control” of the integrated air defence forces in the western and eastern areas should be exercised by the individual group commanders in each area. This RCAF staff proposal was based on a desire by Canadian officials, notably those from DEA, who wanted to maintain Canadian responsibility for the defence of the new province by ensuring that the chain of command in Newfoundland went from Headquarters U.S. Northeast Command through Air Defence Command HQ in St. Hubert before going to the JCS in Washington.

The CinC of U.S. Northeast Command, Major-General Whitten, was not entirely in agreement with the RCAF Staff Study. In his opinion it gave too much emphasis on political sovereignty issues at the expense of effective air defence of Newfoundland. Knowing full well that the RCAF did not have the resources it needed to defend the area, the USAF officer worried that if the Canadians overzealously trumpeted their sovereign responsibility to defend Newfoundland, the JCS would misinterpret it as a concrete commitment to provide defences for the province and therefore be disinclined to deploy forces to U.S. Northeast Command. In Whitten’s view, the wording of an agreement on air defence responsibility in the Northeast therefore needed to be such that it was able to “reassure both sides that the defense requirement will be met as well as to reassure the politician that he still has his job.” At the very least, if U.S. Northeast Command was to operate the air defence system in the Newfoundland area under Canadian control, Whitten felt that it should be limited to the planning stage so that his command had the freedom of action for effective execution of complex operations. As a compromise, he
offered to have RCAF officers serve “in key positions” on the staff of Northeast Air Command.\textsuperscript{39}

**A RCAF Deputy CinC for U.S. Northeast Command?**

With Major-General Whitten’s comments in mind, the RCAF planners set out to revise their study, finalizing a new version on 24 April 1951. The reworked document first echoed the area air defence situation in Newfoundland and the need to ensure Canadian sovereignty, again reiterating that “over-all responsibility [be] vested in the Canadian Air Defence Commander.”\textsuperscript{40} This time it specified that only all American air defence forces in the Newfoundland area should be grouped together into an air defence division of U.S. Northeast Command (i.e., Northeast Air Command), conspicuously omitting reference to Canadian forces. The reason why was soon made apparent. Canadian air defence forces in Newfoundland were to be only attached to, not become a part of, the division “for purposes of operational control [not defined].” Most importantly, a new deputy CinC position for U.S. Northeast Command would be established and filled by a RCAF officer.\textsuperscript{41} However, unlike the deputy CinC arrangements agreed to six years later for NORAD (see next chapter), this RCAF officer would not assume command in the absence of the CinC. Instead, he would coordinate planning of U.S. and Canadian forces in the area and have direct access to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee so as to ensure that U.S. Northeast Command would carry out its activities “in accordance, where applicable, with Canadian governmental policies and responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{42}

To ensure that the DEA desire to have the chain of command go through ADC HQ first before going to Washington, there was a provision that the deployment and
redeployment of Canadian air defence units to Newfoundland “and the operational practices and procedures of those forces will be subject to mutual agreement on a continued and flexible basis” between the CinC of U.S. Northeast Command and the AOC ADC. In addition, certain staff positions in Northeast Air Command were to be earmarked for Canadian personnel. Finally, the study concluded with a provision that these arrangements would be subject to review at either country’s request.43

Air Vice-Marshall F.R. Miller, the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (and future Chief of the Defence Staff), liked the RCAF planners’ proposal. However, he felt that the provision giving the AOC ADC responsibility for the air defence of Newfoundland but not control (“How can he be responsible if he has not the control and cannot say what US forces will be used?”), which was vested in the commander of Northeast Air Command, was problematic and that the provision of a RCAF deputy would not remedy this issue.44 Group Captain K.L.B. Hodson, the RCAF’s Director of Air Plans and a member of the JPC, was sympathetic to AVM Miller’s views, but noted that the arrangement for command and control in Newfoundland was a necessary one to ensure, at the very least, an appearance of Canadian responsibility while ensuring effective protection of the province – and the important U.S. bases located within its borders – from air attack:

The responsibility is obviously a nominal one made necessary by the situation in which Canada has to be ‘responsible’ at least ostensibly for the Air Defence of her newest province, whereas in fact the bulk of the forces are US, the important targets are US, and operational control must logically be invested in a US Commander.45

This appearance of responsibility, it was hoped, would be secured not only by the proposed RCAF deputy position, but also by the provisions ensuring AOC ADC oversight on deployment and re-deployment and operational practices and procedures to
be used by USAF aircraft defending the Newfoundland area. “To make the best of an
awkward situation,” Hodson concluded, in the RCAF proposal “real operational control”
would be vested in commander of Northeast Air Command, with “the semblance of
overall responsibility invested” in the AOC ADC.46

To say the least, this was a convoluted and confusing arrangement at best. In
effect, it did not entail a true deputy CinC function. As the Canadian Army’s Director of
Military Operations and Planning (DMO&P) put it, “the position appears to be more that
of a Canadian liaison officer with certain specifically assigned responsibilities.”47 It is
therefore not surprising that the Americans rejected the proposal when the Canadian
Section PJBD presented it to them in October 1951. The JCS was uncomfortable with
having any kind combined Canada-U.S. command, feeling that it was not warranted at
that time. Even if a NATO command was eventually established in the area (see next
chapter), in all likelihood U.S. Northeast Command would be no more than a subordinate
component command of it, not the principal operational unified command, which thus did
not justify the need for a Canadian deputy.48

Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff of the USAF, General Hoyt Vandenberg, did like
the idea of Canadian participation in U.S. Northeast Command, feeling that it “would do
much to allay Canadian apprehension over US activities in Canada and would be
beneficial to military operations in the Northeast.”49 Therefore, the JCS countered the
Canadian proposal with one of their own that rejected a combined Canada-U.S. command
with a RCAF deputy and instead offered Canadian participation on the staff of U.S.
Northeast Command.50 Nonetheless, as Joseph Jockel has noted, the Canadian
Government, notably DEA officials, was uncomfortable with “the notion of Canadian
officers serving in subordinate roles in an American command which was located on Canadian soil,” and it rejected the JCS proposal.51

Following the rejection of both the Canadian RCAF deputy CinC proposal and the JCS Canadian staff representation counter-proposal, Canadian planners went back to the drawing board. This time, instead of just the RCAF planning staff studying the command and control issue in Newfoundland, the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided that it needed to be a fully joint project, and it assigned the task to the JPC. This planning body spent the better part of the winter of 1952 studying an alternative arrangement.52

The JPC submitted a new study in 18 February 1952, but it simply was a case of new wine in an old bottle as it reiterated the crux of the deputy RCAF CinC idea but repackaged it by giving the Canadian officer the title “Assistant Chief of Staff” to the staff of U.S. Northeast Command. This officer, the paper was careful to note, “will not exercise a command function” but was to act in a liaison capacity to the CinC U.S. Northeast Command.53 Essentially, this new Canadian staff position was a reiteration of the RCAF deputy CinC proposal, only in this case the Canadian position of deputy CinC was replaced with “Assistant Chief of Staff.” This was a more realistic designation given the liaison responsibilities as outlined in the original terms of reference. Nevertheless, the new proposal did not provide a concrete solution to the air defence command and control problem in Newfoundland; if anything, it only muddied the waters further.54

Indeed, Canadian authorities had grown weary of the idea of a RCAF officer serving in a subordinate role in a U.S. command. In particular, DEA officials, adamant that Canada had at no point given up (or delegated) responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland to the U.S., were still uneasy about the provision for RCAF air defence
forces operating in Canadian territory to come under the operational control of the commander of Northeast Air Command. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes, agreed, and stressed the need for Canadian command in Canadian territory:

I think it is important to realize that the Canadian Government would never accept opinion that the Government cannot accept [sic] that any American can have command over Canadian territory except over those particular portions which have been leased to the United States. Therefore, we must start from the assumption that the responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland and the Northeast approaches to Canada is a Canadian responsibility and cannot be delegated to anybody else. This is altogether different from any arrangements which may be made regarding a Supreme Commander [i.e., a NATO command] in time of war.

Understanding that “a Canadian officer would have no place on the staff” of a JCS unified command, Foulkes earnestly suggested that Canada must therefore “develop some form of a cloak of Canadian control in the area.” This cloak was RCAF operational control over USAF forces in Newfoundland.

Newfoundland As Part of the Integrated Canada-U.S. Air Defence System and RCAF Operational Control

Inasmuch as AOC ADC has not been given any forces nor have any forces been planned for him to carry out the responsibility of the air defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, his responsibility in this area is purely academic.

-Group Captain S.W. Coleman, Director of Air Plans, Air Force Headquarters

In spring of 1952, the JCS announced that USAF F-94B Starfire all-weather fighter-interceptor squadrons would begin arriving in Newfoundland in the autumn to commence active air defence patrols. The need to re-visit the air defence command and control relationship in Newfoundland thus became a higher priority in Canadian circles. After rejection of its previous proposals, the JPC once again had to try to find a
compromise between Canadian sovereignty and an “adequate operational command system” to provide for sufficient air defence of the new province. Ideally, the RCAF should have been able to provide air defence in Newfoundland, but other priorities prevented the Canadian service from doing this. As previously mentioned, its fighter interceptor resources were still stretched thin given the magnitude of the air defence mission. Because of this, the RCAF’s Air Defence Command had to give precedence to the designated “critical areas” in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Valley and the West Coast, leaving no fighters for Newfoundland.

Overseas commitments also played a factor, specifically the decision to send 12 fighter squadrons (1 Canadian Air Division) to Europe to fulfill NATO air defence needs. As General Foulkes observed, some senior Canadian officials were uncomfortable with this arrangement, “based on the argument that it is unsound for Canadians to be defending West Germany while Americans defend Canada.” Lester Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and future Prime Minister, agreed, and added that “the public might find it difficult to understand why Canada was sending 12 squadrons to Europe while the United States was sending four into Canada.” Even the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, was sympathetic to this line of thinking. “Personally,” Claxton wrote in a letter to Pearson, “I would rather see an R.C.A.F. squadron there [i.e., in Newfoundland], even if this meant reducing our commitment to NATO by one, or weakening the air defence of some other part of Canada.” However, the MND realized that “there is more involved than this” and that a robbing Peter to pay Paul-type of solution was not feasible. General Foulkes agreed, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee observed that “this argument appears
attractive at the outset, but on closer examination reveals that this course is both impractical and unacceptable." Stripping interceptors from other areas of Canada would lessen the already weak air defence protection provided by the RCAF to these most crucial war-making capacity regions, and taking squadrons away from 1 Canadian Air Division would be in breach of Canada’s NATO commitments at a time when they were needed most. Besides, Foulkes explained, the aircraft earmarked for Europe were the wrong kind anyways: they were F-86E Sabre day fighters, not the all-weather night interceptors like the CF-100 Canuck that were required for the harsh conditions in the northeast.

Regardless, even if the RCAF had had the resources that it needed to defend Newfoundland from aerial attack, the presence and role of American air defence forces in the province – and the Canadian military leadership’s attitude towards this – did not necessarily mean that they would have actually been deployed there. The problem centred on the fact that U.S. Northeast Command was a unified command that was responsible to the JCS, not the USAF ADC, which at the time was coordinating its plans with RCAF ADC (see previous chapter). U.S. Northeast Command’s main air defence task was to defend the U.S. bases in Newfoundland and Labrador, and most importantly the SAC forces located at them. Indeed, as the Chiefs of Staff Committee noted, “if it were not for the requirement to defend the US bases, there would probably be no need to provide aircraft for the defence of Newfoundland.” The JPC agreed, adding that “from the standpoint of purely Canadian installations and activities this area has not warranted, vis-à-vis other important areas of Canada, a portion of Canada’s limited air defence force.” Nevertheless, the fact of the matter was that “the nature and extent” of
American activities at the leased bases drew “the enemy’s attention to the Northeast areas of Canada in general,” and this necessitated some kind of air defence. Until such time that the RCAF had sufficient numbers of interceptors – and the collective will of the Canadian military leadership – to permit a deployment of squadrons to Newfoundland, which was not likely any time soon, to fulfill the Canadian responsibility to defend the province, it was clear that the USAF forces of Northeast Air Command would be the only ones present to fulfill this air defence task.

To solve the command and control-sovereignty problem inherent in this situation, the JPC decided to re-orient its viewpoint regarding the U.S. bases. Rather than regarding them as part of Strategic Air Command’s mission, they might be considered part of the overall integrated continental air defence “Pinetree System.” Instead of concentrating on the regional aspect of the bases – their location in the Northeast/Newfoundland – the focus should instead be on the functional role of continental air defence. In this case, U.S. Northeast Command should report to the Commanding General USAF Air Defense Command instead of the JCS. Therefore, in light of provisions in the EDP Command Appendix and discussions then ongoing between RCAF ADC and USAF ADC (see previous chapter) on integrating North American air defences, the JPC concluded that it would not be unreasonable to expect U.S. Northeast Command’s air defence forces to come under the operational control of the AOC ADC in St. Hubert. This essentially meant applying the command and control principles contained in the Command Appendix of the EDP to the RCAF-U.S. Northeast Command situation in Newfoundland. However, to do so necessitated a revision to the EDP, as the
American bases and U.S. Northeast Command were specifically excluded from provisions in the appendix.  

Nevertheless, there was anything but complete agreement in Canadian circles on the proposed new command and control arrangement in Newfoundland. By late June 1952, the Chief of the Air Staff had produced a draft memorandum outlining the RCAF operational control proposal for the Canadian Section PJBD to present to their American counterparts at their next meeting. However, DEA officials were uncomfortable with the terms of reference contained in the document. They felt that, in effect, “actual operational control” for air defences in Newfoundland would be exercised by the CinC U.S. Northeast Command and that he would only be responsible to the AOC ADC “insofar as they fit into the coordinated air defence system.” As M.H. Wershof, an official with DEA’s Defence Liaison Division put it, in practice the CinC U.S. Northeast Command “would be free to decide on which occasions he should be responsible to the Canadian Air Defence Commander for his activities, since the defence of the leased bases is virtually the same as the defence of the island of Newfoundland.” At issue was the fact that Curtis’s terms of reference only indicated that the AOC ADC would have “operational direction” over USAF forces in Newfoundland. In order to appease DEA, the CAS changed this term to “operational direction and control,” which more closely reflected the JPC’s original intention.

In the meantime, it appears that information regarding the RCAF operational control proposal was leaked to the new CinC of U.S. Northeast Command, Lieutenant-General Charles T. Myers. Nevertheless, Myers felt that it was an attractive option and on 30 June presented a revised compromise counter-proposal to his superiors at USAF
Headquarters in Washington. Unlike his predecessor Major-General Whitten, Myers was willing to accept RCAF ADC operational control if it would help to allay Canadian apprehension over USAF activity over Canadian territory. However, instead of being responsible to USAF ADC as the Canadians suggested, he suggested that U.S. Northeast Command remain a unified command reporting to the JCS. Therefore, in Myers’ counter-proposal, the arrangement in Newfoundland would not be part of the integrated Canada-U.S. continental air defence system, but would be a separate arrangement between the AOC ADC and the CinC U.S. Northeast Command.\textsuperscript{77}

In August, the USAF leadership approved Lieutenant-General Myers’ idea and also secured the concurrence of Air Vice-Marshal A.L. James, the RCAF ADC commander.\textsuperscript{78} However, as mentioned above, to effect the CinC U.S. Northeast Command’s proposal, it required a revision of the Command Appendix of the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan. The MCC worked on this throughout the summer and autumn of 1952. For the time being, a footnote was added to the air defence “Responsibility for Planning” section of the EDP Command Appendix, indicating that “the Command relationship between CINCNE and AOC Air Defence Command is at present under review, and amendments will be made when new command arrangements are firm.”\textsuperscript{79}

In the meantime, USAF Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg sought to bring his JCS colleagues on board regarding the proposed command and control arrangement in Newfoundland. In October, he submitted a memorandum to them suggesting that the command and control principles of the EDP Command Appendix apply to U.S. Northeast Command air defence forces. If realized, USAF fighter-interceptors and aircraft control
and warning units, which included radar stations and army anti-aircraft artillery, 
operating on or over Canadian territory would come under the operational control of the 
RCAF ADC commander. The JCS referred the matter to the MCC in early November, 
requesting the U.S. Section begin negotiations with the Canadian Section on a “military 
agreement” that would provide for Canadian operational control of American defence 
forces operating from bases in Canada.

Also at this time, the Canadian Government gave approval for the temporary 
deployment of the USAF’s 59th Fighter Interceptor Squadron to Goose Bay for the 
protection of that Labrador air base. Since discussions regarding command and control in 
Newfoundland were still ongoing, as a temporary measure the AOC ADC was authorized 
“to delegate the necessary authority to the Commanding General, NEAC [Northeast Air 
Command], to intercept and engage hostile aircraft” but in so doing was to adhere to 
Canadian Rules of Engagement. As we shall see shortly, this ROE arrangement would 
also appear in the final Canada-U.S. agreement.

The New U.S. Northeast Command Clause to the EDP Command Appendix

Canadian authorities from DEA were still wary of proposals for RCAF 
operational control in Newfoundland. As Wershof noted, “if a Canadian commander has 
‘over-all control’ it should be real and not illusory. We want to know how it will 
work.” The formal JCS proposal, which the U.S. Section MCC presented to the 
Canadian Section on 7 November 1952, went a long way to address these concerns. In 
addition to suggesting that the EDP Command Appendix command and control 
provisions be applied to Newfoundland to give Canadian operational control over U.S. air 
defence forces, the document also contained other concessions. It specified that, since
the primary task of the USAF forces would be defending the U.S. bases, “decision for
deployment to and from the U.S. Northeast Command or redeployment within the U.S.
Northeast Command would be reserved to the U.S. military authorities.”84 Movement of
these forces within Canadian airspace, however, “would be coordinated with the
Canadian military authorities insofar as possible,” and the AOC ADC would, “of course,
have final authority” regarding ROE and authority to fire on hostile aircraft.85 The latter
was an important part of the arrangement. As Claxton later explained in a memorandum
to the Cabinet Defence Committee, “these command arrangements [i.e., for
Newfoundland] may involve deployment of US forces in peacetime.”86 Indeed, as we
saw in the previous chapter, it was more likely that interceptions would take place before
an actual official outbreak of hostilities (i.e., a formal declaration of war). The command
and control principles of the EDP only applied in time of war, but the JCS’s proposed
interception arrangements guaranteeing both RCAF ROE and final firing authority
extended the AOC ADC’s operational control authority over American air defence forces
in peacetime as well as time of war.

The idea was in general acceptable to the Canadians, and the JPC recognized that
“US authorities were now seeking to meet Canadian wishes in respect to control of US
air defence forces operating over Canadian territory.”87 Nevertheless, instead of simply
applying the EDP Command Appendix command and control provisions, Canadian
planners still desired that a special section be added to the document containing separate
special arrangements for USAF forces operating in and over Newfoundland.88 American
planners agreed, and both the Canadian and U.S. Sections of the MCC worked together
throughout much of November on the proposed new EDP clauses, producing the draft revised appendix on 21 November. The updated Command Appendix specified that when operating over Canadian territory, American air defence forces would be considered to be employed in tasks implicitly for the EDP. In this instance, the AOC ADC would be granted “operational control” of U.S. Northeast Command aircraft. This command and control term was defined as “the power of directing, co-ordinating and controlling the operational activities of deployed units which may, or may not, be under command or operational command. It specifically excludes redeployment.” This was very similar to the definition utilized by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command in Halifax during the war and also to the modern definition of the term. The key words in this definition were “directing, co-ordinating and controlling.” As with previous and future definitions of operational control (see next chapter in particular), it centralized control over operational forces for a certain task or tasks in the hands of one commander but left it up to the subordinate commanders to carry out these tasks as part of their operational command authority over their forces. As such, operational command would be retained by the CinC U.S. Northeast Command, which it will be remembered, also had a second “hat” as the commander of the component command, Northeast Air Command.

Importantly, the revised EDP Command Appendix also formalized the very important provisions regarding the deployment of aircraft that was contained in the JCS’s memorandum of 4 November. Although the CinC U.S. Northeast Command had the authority to redeploy his air defence forces within his command, “insofar as possible” this was to be done in coordination with the AOC ADC. In addition, if the American
commander desired to re-deploy his aircraft to a base in Canada “outside the leased bases” he had to have the authority of the RCAF air defence commander in St. Hubert. 93 “In any case,” the clause concluded, “this designated Canadian commander is to be informed of any deployment of US air defence forces into, out of, or within Canadian territory,” whether in time of war or peace. 94 To the dismay of DEA officials, there were no references to the JCS’ proposed interception arrangements in the revised EDP Command Appendix. 95 However, as we shall see shortly, the provision for RCAF ROE and final firing authority were contained in the detailed final arrangements agreed to by the two airmen in April.

Despite the MCC’s progress in drafting a revised EDP Command Appendix, DEA officials were still not fully comfortable with the operational control arrangement for Newfoundland. Specifically, as R.A. Mackay noted, the lack of effective communications at that time would in his opinion prevent the RCAF commander at ADC headquarters in St. Hubert “from exercising effective operational control.” 96 There was some truth to this statement, and the revised appendix addressed it. Importantly, the new document noted that the RCAF ADC commander and the CinC U.S. Northeast Command would agree upon “detailed arrangements for exercising this operational control.” 97 In other words, the AOC ADC and the CinC U.S. Northeast Command would work out the detailed implementation of Canadian operational control themselves. This would give the AOC ADC much leeway in how he would exercise his operational control authority over U.S. Northeast Command forces. As we shall see, it potentially gave the Northeast Air Command commander much freedom of action in Newfoundland.
When the MCC formally submitted the revised EDP Command Appendix to the Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff on 27 November it also attached a memorandum that spelt out the special situation in the northeast and why the separate command and control clauses were required. The Canadian and American planners emphasized the concept of area air defence, stressing that the air approaches to Newfoundland consisted of the “probable routes of enemy aircraft attacking the industrial areas of Eastern Canada and the United States.” The air defence forces of U.S. Northeast Command, the MCC concluded, were thus “an important and special adjunct of the Canada-U.S. air defense systems.” The term “adjunct” was used on purpose. It emphasized that the air defence command and control arrangement in Newfoundland was a separate one in the EDP that was outside the co-ordinated Canada-U.S. continental air defence system. This ensured that the U.S. Northeast Command chain of command, although going through RCAF ADC HQ in St. Hubert, would still as a unified command go to the JCS in Washington, not the USAF ADC commander as originally proposed by the Canadians in 1950. In closing, the MCC recommended quick approval of the new Command Appendix by the two countries’ Chiefs of Staff, even “without awaiting approval of the revision of the entire” EDP.

Approval of the revised EDP Command Appendix was relatively quick, given how slowly things had previously progressed. The JCS gave their assent on 10 December 1952, followed one week later by Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee. Each body also instructed that the USAF and RCAF Chiefs of Staff were to forward directives detailing the new command and control arrangements in Newfoundland to CinC U.S. Northeast Command and the AOC ADC, respectively. Finally, the revised EDP
Command Appendix formally came into effect on 10 February 1953, when it was approved by the Canadian Government. This cleared the way for the Chiefs of Staff of the RCAF and USAF to issue their directives to the AOC ADC and CinC U.S. Northeast Command, respectively.

**Formal Directives and Agreements: Putting RCAF Operational Control into Practice**

The new (as of 1 February 1953) RCAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Roy Slemon, sent his directive to Air Vice-Marshal James on 5 March. He outlined that the purpose of the document was to “amplify certain principles” in the revised EDP Command Appendix for the AOC ADC. Slemon directed the RCAF air defence commander to confer with the CinC U.S. Northeast Command on “detailed plans for the implementation” of the operational control arrangements “at the earliest opportunity,” and instructed him to forward these plans to Air Force Headquarters in Ottawa for approval once completed. Referring to the new appendix, the RCAF Chief noted that although the AOC ADC had operational control over USAF aircraft operating over Canadian territory, the CinC U.S. Northeast Command would still “exercise command and operational command over all US Air Defence Forces operating in Canada.”

Nevertheless, the American commander was also to ensure that when his forces were operating in Canadian airspace that they acted “in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement and all other operational procedures set by Canadian Air Defence Command.”

Slemon then provided definitions for the various command and control terms referred to in the EDP Command Appendix. “Command,” he explained, “implies full authority over all forces in all respects, including training, administration and the function
of moving units. Command in this sense, is not exercised by one service over any other service in Air Defence. This definition is consistent with what today is called national command or full command, which is a service prerogative (see Chapter One). It was also keeping in practice with the Canadian maxim utilized in all combined operations since the beginning of the Second World War that administration and discipline remained in national hands, again an exercise of national command. Next the RCAF Chief defined “operational command” as:

the functions of directing, supervising and controlling the training policy and operations of assigned units, including their redeployment in the area of Operational Command. It does not include the direct administration or logistical support of assigned units which although the responsibility of their respective National authorities should conform to the policy directives issued by the overall Operational Commander.

Although somewhat different from the modern definition of the term, this version of “operational command” still contained aspects of command that were not present in the definition of “operational control” contained in the EDP Command Appendix. Specifically, the authority over training policy and the redeployment of units was made apparent in this version of the command and control term. Again, it reinforced the maxim that administration was a national command prerogative.

Essentially, then, as long as his aircraft conformed to RCAF ROE and that he consulted with AOC ADC regarding redeployment, the CinC U.S. Northeast Command was allowed to run his own show when it came to detailed operations. The RCAF air defence commander’s operational control authority was only to give the American commander directives on the effect that he wanted achieved. According to this
arrangement, Canada still maintained its responsibility to defend Newfoundland while at the same time effective command and control of air defence operations was assured.

The U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff’s directive to the CinC U.S. Northeast Command was more simplified. It spelled out the same command and control arrangements as Slemon’s document and designated Lieutenant-General Myers as “the immediate commander of U.S. forces assigned” to the unified command. The directive also instructed him to make the necessary arrangements to implement the operational control authority with the AOC ADC. The JCS approved the directive on 2 April 1953, and it was forwarded to the CinC U.S. Northeast Command one week later.  

The AOC ADC and the CinC U.S. Northeast Command signed the formal agreement on Newfoundland command and control arrangements on 21 April 1953 at RCAF ADC HQ in St. Hubert, Quebec. It divided Eastern Canada into four separate air defence sectors, 1, 2 and 3 RCAF Air Defence Control Centre Sectors and U.S. Northeast Command 64th Air Division Sector (see Map 1). As per the revised EDP Command Appendix, in the American air defence sector the CinC U.S. Northeast Command was to exercise command and the AOC ADC operational control over all USAF air defence forces. The agreement also outlined that the AOC ADC was to exercise command over any RCAF air defence units in the American sector. USAF aircraft in the 64th Air Division Sector were to adhere to RCAF ROE including interceptions, and “operational procedures for air defence forces are to be standardized, as far as possible, with those in effect in the Canadian air defence system.” Finally, the provisions for deployment and re-deployment discussed above were also included in the agreement. All arrangements
contained in the agreement were to be placed into effect immediately, which meant that they were effective in the current state of peace as well as in wartime emergency.¹¹¹

Most importantly, the document stated that the AOC ADC was to exercise his operational control authority through the CinC U.S. Northeast Command.¹¹² This was an important arrangement. Since there were no RCAF forces in Newfoundland at that time and therefore no Canadian air force officer assigned to command the 64th Air Division Sector, it meant that AOC ADC had only one choice as a component commander in Newfoundland: the CinC U.S. Northeast Command. As one U.S. State Department official put it, the AOC ADC “would be ostensibly in command, although it was understood that, in the absence of Canadian defense forces, it would be appropriate and necessary for him to delegate operational responsibility to the American Commander in the Northeast.”¹¹³ Therefore, although on paper there was official RCAF AOC Air Defence Command operational control to ensure Canadian sovereignty, in reality actual operational control in addition to operational command remained in the hands of the CinC U.S. Northeast Command, provided that he adhered to RCAF Rules of Engagement. The American commander would remain the principal air defence commander in the Newfoundland area until such time that Canada decided to take over the entire air defence effort by deploying aircraft there. This never happened.

With sovereignty for Canada and military efficiency for U.S. Northeast Command operations secured, it was not surprising that this agreement was renewed periodically until 1957, when all air forces in North America came under the operational control of the newly-established bilateral command, NORAD.¹¹⁴ That is the story of the next chapter.
Conclusion

Many lessons can be learned from the history of the RCAF-U.S. Northeast command and control relationship. First, contrary to naysayers denouncing the American intentions and advancing the “defence against help” concept, the U.S. was in fact very cognizant of Canadian sensibilities regarding the presence of their forces in Newfoundland. They recognized that it was not the Canadian government but the British who had negotiated the U.S. base rights during the war, and that special arrangements would have to be made for command and control in the new Canadian province. Thus, the Americans were very proactive in informing the Canadians step-by-step of their intentions regarding Northeast Command, something that they did not have to do. Second, the Americans were quite accommodating of Canadian wishes regarding Northeast Command, making concessions on both the name of the new unified command and the bilateral command and control arrangements – again, something that they did not have to do.

Finally, this example proves that a middle ground can, in fact, be found regarding securing Canadian sovereignty while at the same time ensuring effective command and control, efficiency in military operations, and, perhaps lost in the equation, adequate air defence coverage of the area. Ideally, Canada should have provided the fighter defences required to protect Newfoundland, but priorities elsewhere, including the “critical areas” in other parts of the country as well as NATO commitments, meant that U.S. Northeast Command interceptors defending American bases in the province had to fulfill this role. Although critics may argue that having USAF aircraft protecting Newfoundland instead of RCAF fighters had a negative effect on Canadian pride as well as sovereignty, it must
be remembered that one of the key facets of an alliance is to help an ally defend itself when and where needed, even if on or over its own territory.\textsuperscript{115} By securing a favourable operational control arrangement with the Americans, Canada was able to blunt the apparent damage done to Canadian pride and sovereignty, ensure that it retained overall responsibility for the air defence of Newfoundland, and have a voice in how U.S. forces in the province carried out defending the new Canadian province from enemy aerial attack. In the end, the operational control arrangement for U.S. Northeast Command was a beneficial situation for both Canada and the U.S. that laid the foundation for the two countries’ next bilateral air defence endeavour: NORAD.
Chapter Nine
Integrating North American Air Defences Under Operational Control

Will the existing arrangements for command and control be adequate, and if not, what steps should Canada take to ensure that the air defence system operates with maximum effectiveness and at the same time Canadian interests are protected?

-“The Air Defence of North America,” Department of External Affairs Defence Liaison (1) Division memorandum

Introduction

By the end of 1953, the air defence of North America consisted of two coordinated systems, one Canadian and one American. Each country’s national air defence commander, the Air Officer Commanding RCAF Air Defence Command for Canada and the Commanding General USAF Air Defense Command for the U.S., had authority over operations in his own airspace as per the Command Appendix of the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan. In addition, there was also a special arrangement in the EDP for RCAF operational control of U.S. Northeast Command interceptors operating in Newfoundland airspace. However, with the Soviet Union’s test explosion of a thermonuclear bomb in August 1953, the increasing danger posed by a potential Soviet air attack led to greater calls by American and Canadian airmen to bring the Canada-U.S. air defence effort closer by integrating their air defences and centralizing command and control under one overall authority.

It was very likely that this authority would be a senior USAF officer, and in the eyes of Canada’s Department of External Affairs this brought forth an uncomfortable issue: “The central and most significant problem is whether Canada is prepared to have the responsibility for the air defence of Canada, including the command of Canadian air defence forces, vested in a United States officer” from a headquarters in the U.S.

“Whether or not Canada is prepared to accept this surrender of its sovereignty in the
interest of the defence of North America,” DEA concluded, “is the most difficult and the most important issue.” However, as this chapter will demonstrate, the solution to this sovereignty problem was avoiding the vexing issue of U.S. command over Canadian air defence forces in Canada by limiting the command and control authority of an overall American air defence commander to operational control.

Therefore, the main issue that this chapter examines is how the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship continued to evolve from 1953. It will demonstrate how the existing coordinated Canada-U.S. air defence system was centralized into an integrated continental air defence system in 1957 in which authority for operational control of all continental air defences came under one combined command organization headed by an American Commander-in-Chief and a Canadian Deputy Commander-in-Chief (DCinC), the North American Air Defence Command. Indeed, throughout this time period, the definition of operational control in the air defence context continued to evolve into the version that appears in the NORAD Agreement to this day. In fact, the firmness shown by several RCAF officers and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes, of insisting on operational control for Canada-U.S. air defence was indeed a vital factor in the American acceptance of this command and control principle as the basis for NORAD and the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty.

Re-Assessing the Canada-U.S. Coordinated Air Defence System

The USSR’s explosion of a thermonuclear device in August 1953 and further advances in Soviet aerial technology with new jet-powered long-range strategic bombing capabilities had a significant effect on American (and as a consequence, Canadian) strategic policy. Whereas before the U.S. felt that North American critical points could
survive atomic bomb attacks (which would only destroy structures in a one-mile radius), it did not feel that they could survive thermonuclear bombs (ten or more-mile radius). As a consequence, the main American strategic policy went from believing that the U.S. could win a war with atomic weapons to one based on deterring the Soviets from attacking. Deterrence required credibility, and credibility in this case required the capability to learn about an enemy attack quickly in order to launch a swift Strategic Air Command counter-attack and give air defences the opportunity to destroy as many attacking enemy bombers before they could strike at North American vital points.  

The new Mid-Canada radar line and the approval of the Distant Early Warning Line in the autumn of 1954 meant that the ability to detect attacking Soviet bombers flying along the Arctic approaches to North America was growing. However, the current Canada-U.S. coordinated system of air defence then in existence was becoming increasingly insufficient to deal with these new developments. As American and Canadian airmen quickly came to realize, the air defence situation by the mid-1950s necessitated a sophisticated and integrated continental air defence system in order to effectively fight the air defence battle in the nuclear age.

In 1953, Canada and the United States established the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group (MSG), a sub-group of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, to study the increasingly important issue of air defence. Although the initial main focus of the new bilateral body was on the new radar detection system in the Arctic, in light of the Soviet explosion of a thermonuclear bomb, the MSG soon began re-evaluate the current coordinated Canada-U.S. air defence system. They concluded that due to the development by the Soviet Union of high-performance jet bombers, “consideration of the
defense of Canada and the United States separately was unrealistic.” Accordingly, the MSG began to study the possibility of centralizing Canadian and American air defences into one integrated system. Thus, in the spring of 1954, the commanders of USAF ADC and RCAF ADC agreed to the establishment of a combined Canada-U.S. Air Defence Study Group (ADSG) to be responsible to the MSG. Based in Colorado Springs, the ADSG consisted of personnel from RCAF ADC and USAF ADC, and was tasked with finding the most effective means of providing for the air defence of North America. Indeed, pressure on Canada from the United States soon made this issue all the more imperative.

American Pressure for More Integrated North American Air Defence

As the ADSG commenced its work, American officials began putting greater pressure on Canada to further integrate North American air defences. The USAF in particular felt that Canadian thinking on this issue was too “complacent, or conservative,” and that there was too much emphasis on “coordinated” Canada-U.S. air defence endeavours. Furthermore, although the Americans also noticed “a number of small signs all adding up to a gradual change in realization of the danger of political obstruction to the defense of this continent,” they felt that there was “still a requirement for a major change in Canadian political attitude toward air defence strategy.” Acceptance of an integrated North American air defence concept would be one major step towards achieving this goal. However, as the Canadian Section PJBD understood only too well after a visit to USAF ADC Headquarters in Colorado Springs, the ultimate objective of the American airmen was to centralize the two nations’ air defence efforts under an integrated Canada-U.S. continental air defence command organization.
What the USAF felt privately, Representative Sterling Cole (Republican – New York) made public during a speech New York City in late April 1954. Noting the threat posed by the Soviet Union’s possession of a hydrogen bomb, he stressed that Canada and the U.S. needed a more unified continental defence program and “an organization to provide a common response to a common threat.” Cole therefore called for the establishment of a Canada-U.S. North American Continental Defence Organization: a unified as well as a combined command that would consist of army, naval and air force units from both countries. Moreover, Cole felt that this new command organization should be similar to a NATO command “headed by a supreme commander whose responsibility and authority in the field of continental defense would parallel those now exercised by General Gruenther in his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe.” As a follow-up, Cole also wrote privately to U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, stressing the need for a combined continental defence command. In concluding this letter, the Congressman noted that “without such unity of command, I frankly do not believe our two countries can exploit all possibilities for creating an effective continental defense.”

Wilson referred the matter to the JCS, which studied the issue and released a report in June 1954. Although indicating their preference for a combined Canada-U.S. command, the Joint Chiefs concluded that this option was simply not feasible at that given time. There were indications from Canada’s military that it preferred the existing arrangements, although the JCS was convinced that Canadian officers would “give due consideration to any U.S. proposal intended to improve these arrangements.” In any event, years of bilateral defence planning experience had shown that Canadian military
planners were handcuffed by the political restraints of the government. The Joint Chiefs felt that this would transcend to any combined Canada-U.S. command, and that the endeavour was therefore not warranted.\textsuperscript{16}

As for Ottawa, the JCS pointed out that the political leadership in Canada would be opposed to a bilateral command organization and would instead likely push for a NATO command. However, to the Joint Chiefs a combined NATO command for North America was also out of the question, as they preferred a bilateral relationship for continental defence. To advocate for such an international organization at this time, the JCS concluded, “may serve only to jeopardize the working agreements currently in effect” with Canada.\textsuperscript{17} That put the matter to rest – at least in U.S. circles.\textsuperscript{18}

Congressman Cole’s public remarks had, however, struck a chord in Ottawa, greatly irritating many Canadian officials.\textsuperscript{19} In light of this reaction, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee tasked its planning body, the Joint Planning Committee, to produce a study exploring the various options open to Canada and the United States in forming a combined command for the defence of North America.\textsuperscript{20} The JPC set to work on this task and was ready with a report by mid-July 1954.

\textbf{NATO Command Organization and the JPC “Command of Continental Defence Forces” Report}

The JPC document, entitled “Command of Continental Defence Forces,” dealt primarily with command organization. It recognized the weakness of the current coordinated North American air defence system and concluded that “some form of centralized control” was required in both peacetime and wartime.\textsuperscript{21} In light of Congressman Cole’s recent actions, the JPC warned that it was possible that the U.S. might approach Canada about the question of appointing a CinC for the air defence of the
Canada-U.S. NATO region. It was thus prudent to be proactive in order to protect Canadian sovereignty and ensure that Canada got “a piece of the action” for continental air defence.²²

Accordingly, the JPC presented four possible options for a combined Canada-U.S. air defence command organization: 1) the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander Canada-U.S. responsible to the NATO Standing Group; 2) the appointment of a CinC for Canada-U.S. combined continental defence forces responsible to the NATO Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group; 3) the appointment of a CinC Air Defence Canada-U.S. responsible to the NATO Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group; and 4) the appointment of a CinC Air Defence for the Canada-U.S. region, responsible jointly to the Canadian and U.S. chiefs of staff. None of the options detailed specific command and control arrangements, as this was left to be determined at a later time.²³ Instead, the main focus was on what kind of command organization there should be for North America, and the main issue inherent in all four options was the degree to which any Canada-U.S. combined command would be connected to NATO.

The JPC concluded in the study that the first two alternatives, the appointment of a NATO Supreme Allied Commander or a CinC for the Canada-U.S. region, was not feasible. The first option called for the elimination of CUSRPG and the establishment of a NATO continental defence command with a supreme commander with authority over Canada-U.S. maritime, land and air forces reporting directly to the NATO Standing Group. The second had similar characteristics, except that it suggested keeping CUSRPG and simply having a NATO CinC report to it. Nevertheless, the JPC felt that a NATO supreme commander or a CinC overseeing Canadian-American air, land and sea forces in
North America was not warranted. The main threat to the continent was an aerial one specifically requiring a functional air defence combined command solution, not a multi-service and multi-role one (i.e., both joint and combined command).^24

Furthermore, there was still no compelling reason to stand CUSRPG up as a NATO command. As Chapter Three demonstrated, Canada and the U.S. previously had the option of establishing a supreme command for the Canada-U.S. NATO region in 1952 but chose against it. The United States preferred a bilateral continental defence relationship with Canada only, not a multilateral one with other NATO allies whose security measures were suspect and who might, USAF airmen feared, try to gain some influence over Strategic Air Command. Moreover, the prospect of an American supreme commander did not sit well with Canadian authorities. Since these factors had not changed by 1954, the JPC report concluded that the NATO supreme command or CinC options were not feasible.^25

The third option was much more appealing to the Canadian planners. It called for the appointment of a CinC Air Defence Canada-U.S. that would be responsible to the CUSRPG and the two nation’s chiefs of staff for air defence planning and operations. Unlike the previous two alternatives, this option was functional in nature in that its focus would be purely on air defence. A greater degree of centralization under one CinC would be accomplished and would thus ensure flexibility, coordination, and “optimum utilization of the resources available.”^26 For these reasons, the third option was the one most favoured by the JPC. However, because of the known U.S. abhorrence of establishing any type of multilateral NATO command for North America, the Canadian
planners concluded that the Americans would likely not agree to it. Instead, they would prefer the fourth option.

This last alternative also called for the appointment of a CinC Air Defence Canada-U.S., only he would be responsible to the two nations’ chiefs of staff “co-equally.” Importantly to the Americans, it would not be a NATO command but a bilateral command organization for air defence. Like option three, this alternative had the advantage of centralizing the combined effort to protect the continent from aerial attack under one authority, therefore ensuring efficiency in carrying out the air defence mission. However, the JPC also pointed out that the lack of a NATO connection might also prove disadvantageous to Canada (though an advantage in American eyes): Canada would not have its coveted multilateral “safety in numbers” but would have to deal with the Americans on a purely bilateral – and in its view unequal – basis.

In concluding its study, the JPC reiterated its preference for option three, though the members recognized that the U.S. would prefer the fourth alternative instead. Accordingly, the Canadian planners recommended that if the Americans found the third option unacceptable and pressed them instead for option four, this alternative was also acceptable “from a military point of view” and should therefore be supported by Canada. The air defence effort in North America was becoming further integrated and it might be impossible for Canada to resist this trend. In submitting the report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the JPC thus advised their superiors to deal with this issue quickly and take the initiative by discussing the options with American authorities. If the Chiefs waited until an emergency, the Canadian planners warned, any arrangements with the U.S. for
air defence integration “might provide less favourable results for Canada.”

Unfortunately for the Canadian military, its leadership did not take the JPC’s advice. The Chiefs of Staff Committee discussed the JPC study at its 21 September 1954 meeting. This time it was General Foulkes who advised a cautious approach. He informed his colleagues that “informal talks” with the JCS Chairman indicated that “the United States authorities were not pressing for immediate action” on integrating air defences. The Chiefs therefore decided that Canada should not take the initiative to discuss the JPC study with the Americans, but that further study by the RCAF and the ADSG would suffice for the time being. Therefore, even though the JPC report was proactive in that it explored probable options for a combined Canada-U.S. air defence command, by deciding to take a wait-and-see approach regarding what the Americans would do, the Chiefs of Staff Committee again reverted back to their reactive ways. It would not take long, however, for the U.S. to give Canada something to ponder.

**Air Defence is Centralized in the United States: The Establishment of CONAD**

After a long delay, in 1954 the United States finally began getting its air defence house in order. The JCS decided that the Soviet thermonuclear threat warranted the centralization of American air defences under one command organization, and in July of that year they established the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) under a USAF CinC. Stood up in September, CONAD was tasked with the mission to defend the continental United States against aerial attack. However, unlike other JCS Unified Command Plan commands, CONAD was not designated a “unified” command or a “specified” command but a “joint” command, apparently to ensure more effective command and control. However, this designation proved to be more illusory than true.
CONAD was superimposed upon the existing USAF Air Defence Command structure. As a UCP joint air defence command, CONAD also included army and navy component commands. These were the U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Command and Naval Forces Continental Air Defense Command (NAVFORCONAD), respectively. The role of the commanders of these component commands was to “serve as principal advisers to CINCONAD on Navy and Army matters.” There was also a Marine Corps representative assigned to CONAD’s staff. Other American operational command organizations such as the U.S. Navy’s CinC Atlantic and CinC Pacific and the JCS UCP commands Alaska Command and U.S. Northeast Command were also to support CinC CONAD “in accordance with plans approved by the JCS and mutual agreements by the commanders concerned to insure that plans for and operations of the elements of the early warning system would be responsive to the needs of CINCONAD.” In an emergency these forces would also come under CONAD operational control.34

USAF ADC was also made a component command, and its commander was given another “hat” as the CinC of CONAD.35 In addition to retaining operational control over USAF ADC, the CinC CONAD was also to exercise “operational control over all forces assigned or otherwise made available by the JCS or other authority.”36 Nonetheless, this operational control authority was rather weak and convoluted. According to the CinC CONAD’s terms of reference, operational control was defined as “authority to direct the tactical air battle, control fighters, specify conditions of alert, station early warning elements, and deploy the command combat units.”37 Too much was left unsaid and CONAD had “very little authority in matters of integrated forces.” Indeed, this convoluted operational control authority proved to be a consistent weakness for CONAD
throughout its first two years. However, CONAD’s terms of reference did make clear that operational control did not include discipline, logistics and determining the original composition of component forces. These remained the prerogative of the individual U.S. services as part of the national command authority that they retained. As we will see below, this maintenance of service national command authority was consistent with Canadian command and control practice, and it set an important precedent for the eventual Canada-U.S. operational control arrangement for NORAD.

The establishment of CONAD was important for the USAF, as it signified an important change in American air defence policy. Whereas air defence of the continental U.S. had consisted of the various individual capabilities of each service, now it was centralized into a joint effort under a JCS UCP command. Most importantly for American airmen, by appointing a USAF officer as the CinC of CONAD and assigning him operational control over all joint air defence forces, the JCS had finally formally recognized the primacy of the USAF in air defence in the United States. The confusing and convoluted operational control authority exercised by the CinC CONAD was still far from ideal and the new command did not include responsibility for defending Alaska and the U.S. bases in Newfoundland. Still, much had been accomplished. After finally achieving their long-desired American joint air defence centralization for the continental U.S., the leadership of the USAF now sought to bring Canadian air defence forces into a combined North American integrated system.

**Early Proposals For an Overall Air Defence Commander**

In the background to all of these developments during 1954, the ADSG in Colorado Springs continued to study the options for integrating the Canada-U.S. air
defence effort. By the winter of 1954-1955, the group concluded that the current aerial threat and the consequent requirement to make quick decisions in the modern air defence battle necessitated the establishment of a combined Canada-U.S. air defence command under one overall air defence commander. This command should be responsible to both governments and should be stood up in peacetime in so that it would be ready in the event of an air defence emergency.41

The ADSG presented these conclusions at a briefing for the MSG in February 1955. The MSG concurred, and members agreed to bring the ADSG recommendations to the attention of higher authorities in Canada and the U.S.42 The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee was briefed on the issue on 6 April by Air Commodore C.L. Annis, a staff officer from RCAF ADC and a member of the ADSG.43 He started by first stressing the urgency of the need to integrate the continental air defence system. Annis explained that Canada currently faced two main problems: “one was the threat to her security imposed by the Russian military potential; the other was a threat to her sovereignty resulting from the US reaction to the Russian military threat.”44 The message was clear: Canada needed to ensure that it acted quickly to get a “piece of the action” by accepting the principle of a combined continental air defence command. This was crucial not only to protect North America from Soviet air attack, but also to safeguard Canadian sovereignty, lest it soon find itself in an unavoidable “defence against help” situation with the U.S. The RCAF’s Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Roy Slemon, was sold on the idea of an overall air defence commander, and he set out to make it a reality.45

Nevertheless, there was still one main problem that needed to be addressed before any formal proposals could be forwarded to government authorities: Canadian political
sensitivity towards the establishment of a combined air defence command had to be overcome. The idea of integrating Canadian and American air defences under one overall commander was not necessarily a concept with which officials in the Canadian government, notably the Department of External Affairs, disagreed. The key issue for the military planners was thus to find a means of command and control authority that would address the difficult balance of safeguarding Canadian sovereignty while at the same time also ensuring military efficiency in carrying out the continental air defence effort. As we shall see shortly, the solution to this problem would be avoiding use of the term “command” and implementing the principle of “operational control.” Moreover, although Joseph Jockel noted previously in No Boundaries Upstairs that the idea of having an overall air defence commander exercise operational control was an American one, recently declassified records show that it was in fact a Canadian, Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Roy Slemon, who first suggested this solution.

On 5 December 1955, there was a “Political-Military Meeting” of officials from the U.S. State Department, DEA, the Canadian Embassy, and the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington. General Foulkes and Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the JCS, also attended. At the meeting, Foulkes stressed the need for “the closest integration” of Canada-U.S. air defences and indicated that “Canadian military authorities were convinced that one person should be in command and control of all air defense in North America.” However, because of the sensitive nature of this topic in Canada, Foulkes explained that “to achieve this aim the Canadian proposals would be couched in terms of in terms of operational control [not defined] in order to avoid the politically awkward term of command.”
The idea to focus on the concept of operational control and avoid mention of the word “command” was the brainchild of the RCAF’s top airman, Air Marshal Slemon. The CAS had previously distinguished the differences between operational control and command authority in his 1953 directive to the AOC ADC for RCAF operational control authority over U.S. Northeast Command air forces flying in Canadian airspace (see previous chapter). Slemon thus felt that assigning similar operational control authority to an overall continental air defence commander would be “politically acceptable to both countries.” He explained this reasoning in a briefing that he prepared for Foulkes for the 5 December meeting in Washington:

We are giving consideration now on the military level to the working out of a system of operational control [not defined] which will avoid the use of the term ‘command.’ ‘Command’ infers control of logistics, which is not necessary, and creates a great many political difficulties, particularly in peacetime. However we are completely convinced that operational control of the whole system should be vested in one commander and we are attempting to work out proposals which will allow the operational control of the system without the necessity of adopting a unified system of command.

Admiral Radford agreed that Slemon’s concept of operational control held much promise. Accordingly, at the 14 December 1955 JCS meeting, he concluded that the establishment of a combined Canada-U.S. air defence command was “probably not acceptable to the Canadians at this time.” Instead, the JCS decided that the formal proposal to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee “should be limited to the peacetime integration of operational control of Canadian and U.S. warning systems and air forces assigned to continental air defences.” The wording of this new idea was crucial, and as Jockel has noted, it was “ingenious.”
The key was differentiating between “a command” (i.e., a command organization such as RCAF ADC or CONAD) and the exercise of command and control authority. In the new proposal, the focus would go away from the establishment of a combined command organization since it – and the very mention of the word “command” – was so politically sensitive in Canada at the time. Instead, the focal point would be the actual command and control authority to be exercised, operational control, which of course avoided mentioning the word “command.” Operational control authority could be exercised by a new bilateral entity established to oversee all Canadian and American air defences, or it could be assigned to an existing command organization, such as CONAD. Regardless, operational control still ensured military efficiency in that it maintained effective command and control and made sure that “all of the continent’s air defence resources [would be used] rationally.” Nonetheless, exactly what kind of entity would exercise operational control and what specific command and control authority operational control actually entailed still remained to be determined by Canada-U.S. planners.

**Proposals for Operational Control**

The first attempt at defining operational control in a Canada-U.S. air defence context came from the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), the main planning organ of the JCS. At the behest of the Joint Chiefs, on 5 January 1956 the JSPC gave the following definition of what the operational control authority of a potential overall continental air defence commander should exercise:

> the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission of providing air defense for Canada and the continental United States. Operational control in this respect would not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, unit training and logistics.
This definition of operational control was substantially similar to both the one that the
British gave to their American allies almost 12 years ago in 1944 and the modern
definition of the command and control term. The British definition of operational control
from 1944 was:

Operational Control comprises those functions of Command involving
composition of Task Forces or Groups or Units, assignment of Tasks,
designation [sic] of objectives and co-ordination necessary to accomplish
the Mission. It shall always be exercised where possible by making use of
normal organisation Units assigned, through the responsible Commanders.
It does not include such matters as Administration, discipline, Internal
Organisation and training of Units… It is recognised that the Operational
Authority may in emergency or unusual situations employ assigned Units
on any task that he considers essential to effective execution of his
operational responsibility.56

Close examination reveals that there were only two significant differences between the
JSPC 1956 and British 1944 definition.

The first distinction was that the JSPC version left out the words “those functions
of command.” Given the care then being taken by American and Canadian planners to
avoid any mention of the word “command” in Canada-U.S. integrated air defence
proposals, this omission is understandable.57 The second difference was that the 1956
definition also did not include the phrase in the 1944 version that operational control
“shall always be exercised where possible by making use of normal organisation Units
assigned, through the responsible Commanders.”58 This omission was due to the fact that
the JSPC had not yet addressed the relationship between the overall air defence
commander and his subordinate component commanders, and especially the delegation of
operational control authority.
Nonetheless, by specifically stating that operational control “would not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, unit training and logistics,” the 1956 definition of the term was consistent with the Canadian and American practice that these matters remained a service prerogative under national command. Accordingly, although the JSPC definition of operational control would not in the end be the one used for NORAD, it was a good beginning, as it laid out important principles and precedents that would appear in the final definition of the term.

The JCS and the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved the JSPC document as a basis to begin negotiations with the Canadians towards integrating Canadian-American continental air defences and centralizing authority for operational control of them. Consequently, in February 1956 the JCS and the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed to the establishment of yet another planning body to study the issue, the Ad Hoc Study Group (AHSG), which was to report to the MSG. Because discussions and the resulting recommendations would likely raise “very delicate political matters,” the Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed that the AHSG was to limit its focus only “to the problems of operational control,” not the actual establishment of a command organization.

In the end, the AHSG consisted of officers from the USAF, U.S. Army, USN, RCAF, and Canadian Army, and it began its examination of operational control integration in the summer of 1956. The RCN declined to assign a member to the Ad Hoc Study Group because the Chief of the Naval Staff felt that his service’s participation was unnecessary. There were also no DEA or State Department members on the AHSG, but this was not an oversight. As the Canadian Ambassador in Washington noted to Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, East Block “was aware of the
consultations taking place on the military level” but had decided “that it would be best not to have political officers associated directly with this process.” Although the Department of External Affairs made a conscious choice not to have representation on this military body, as we will soon see, the fact that the AHSG only consisted of military members later led several Canadian political and DEA officials to question the process by which the establishment of NORAD was achieved.

In the meantime, CONAD was undergoing changes that would have a significant effect on the eventual AHSG proposal. The new CinC, General Earle Partridge, felt that the ineffective operational control authority of CONAD could no longer be tolerated, and he set about remedying the situation. Accordingly, in the summer of 1956, both CONAD’s command structure and terms of reference were changed in order to provide more effective command and control. The JCS removed the CONAD CinC’s additional USAF ADC “hat” by making Air Defense Command a completely separate component command under CONAD. In addition, the JCS also broadened CONAD’s mission by assigning responsibility for the air defence of Alaska and the U.S. bases in Newfoundland to CinC CONAD. As a result, effective 1 September 1956 U.S. Northeast Command was disestablished as a JCS unified command and its responsibilities for air defence in that region reassigned to CONAD.

Along with this new command structure for CONAD came revised terms of reference for its CinC which included much more effective command and control authority and more leeway in coordinating operations. CONAD’s authority was expanded to include “the responsibility to determine procedures for conducting the air battle, for exercising operational control of all assigned forces, and for directing
engagement and disengagement of weapons.”66 In addition, the directive also included a new definition of operational control to be exercised by the CinC CONAD that was very similar to the January 1956 JSPC definition: “those functions of command involving composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and direction necessary to accomplish the air defence mission.”67

The clarification of CONAD operational control authority over American air defences had a significant effect on the development in the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship. For one, it further centralized U.S. air defences under CONAD, making it the sole American authority for this task. This made the integration with the Canadian air defence system much easier to accomplish. In fact, the JCS instructed that the new CONAD terms of reference were to be utilized by the AHSG “as general guidance” for its study on integrating operational control of continental air defences.68 In addition, by bringing American air defences under the operational control of the CinC CONAD, not only was another precedent set for the exercise of operational control over air defence forces, but it also reinforced the idea that one overall commander should manage the air defence battle.

Lastly, the disestablishment of U.S. Northeast Command and the assigning of its air defence responsibilities to CONAD left open the whole idea of RCAF operational control in Newfoundland. Although for the time being the AOC ADC retained operational control over USAF forces in the area, both Canadian and American planners knew that it was only a matter of time before this arrangement would have to be revised in light of the ongoing AHSG discussions. Indeed, with the U.S. air defence command
and control house now in order, it gave greater momentum to reach a similar arrangement for combined continental air defence operational control.

The MSG/AHSG December 1956 Proposal on Integrated Operational Control

The AHSG spent much of the summer and autumn of 1956 discussing integrated Canada-U.S. air defence operational control options and drafting a formal proposal on this subject. After producing a draft in September, the AHSG presented its final study to the MSG in October 1956. The MSG examined the document in detail at its meeting in December and made some minor revisions, largely at the request of the Canadian Chairman, Air Vice-Marshal C.R. Dunlap. This future RCAF CAS and Deputy CinC NORAD was considered one of Slemon’s “boys,” meaning that he and the Chief of the Air Staff were on the same page when it came to air defence matters. Dunlap thus had the best interests of the RCAF in mind when revising the AHSG study; and this proved to be a crucial means by which the RCAF was able to safeguard Canadian sovereignty.

The final 19 December 1956 MSG study (hereafter referred interchangeably as the MSG study or MSG proposal) recommended that an overall continental air defence commander should be established, and that he should exercise the authority of operational control based on the NATO combined and JCS UCP unified command system of command organization and command and control. The report stated:

the best method of dealing with the air defence of Canada and the United States is to apply the NATO principle of unified command to North America by delegating to a single commander the authority to exercise operational control over all continental elements of the air defence forces made available for the air defence of both countries.

Nonetheless, all reference to NATO was only in regard to the type of command and control authority the new overall commander should exercise. There was to be no formal
connection between NATO and the new overall air defence commander. As Jockel put it, “drawing a parallel is as far as the study group went.”

Importantly, the planners were also sure to use CONAD as a model for the new overall air defence commander. Specifically, the study explained that the CinC CONAD’s relationship with his subordinate commanders was based on principles established during World War II for joint and combined commands, and is now used in NATO. It provides for the forces of each service to be assigned to and commanded by a commander of the same service although they are under the operational control of joint commanders.

Therefore, it was not surprising that the MSG proposal recommended that the CinC CONAD should don another “hat” and become the new overall air defence commander, Commander-in-Chief Air Defence Canada-United States (CINCADCANUS).

The new CinC was to be responsible to the Canadian and U.S. chiefs of staff, who were in turn responsible to their respective political authorities. Importantly, the study also called for the establishment of a Deputy Commander-in-Chief who would be in charge in the absence of the CinC. The proposal recommended that these officers “should not normally be from the same nation,” which meant, in practice, that there would always be an American CinC and a Canadian DCinC. The new arrangement was to be a completely bilateral effort, as a new headquarters would be set up consisting of a combined staff with officers from both Canada and the U.S.

In terms of organization, under CINCADCANUS the defence of the continental United States and Canada was to be subdivided geographically. The CinC would delegate operational control (defined below) to subordinate component commanders “of geographical areas” yet to be determined. Importantly, national command was to be
retained by the respective service providing the force (see below). This was particularly important for Canada, as the RCAF’s Air Defence Command would be one of CINCADCANUS’s component commands. However, RCAF ADC was no longer a joint command organization. In 1955, the Canadian Army disassociated itself from area air defence under ADC and instead focused on in-close point defence. This actually made things easier for a combined arrangement, for as Jockel has noted, “the RCAF’s command was the only Canadian candidate to be fitted in” the command structure under the new CinC. Besides exercising operational control (and operational command, as per the existing directive from the RCAF CAS), the Air Officer Commanding Air Defence Command was therefore also to exercise national command of RCAF forces, a service prerogative. In other words, for operational control the AOC ADC was to be responsible to the CINCADCANUS in Colorado Springs, but for operational command of RCAF forces he was to be still responsible to Air Force Headquarters in Ottawa.

The AHSG study also concerned the issue of cross-border reinforcement that had been dealt with in PJBD Recommendation 51/6 (see Chapter Seven). It outlined that during peacetime any permanent changes of station had to be outlined in CINCADCANUS deployment plans which had to be submitted to higher authority for approval. As with PJBD Recommendation 51/6, however, in an air defence emergency, component commanders, through operational control delegated to them by the CINCADCANUS, would be permitted “temporary reinforcements from one area to another, including crossing the international boundary to meet operational requirements.”
Besides outlining the organization and structure of the proposed new Canada-U.S. integrated air defence arrangement, the MSG study also detailed the specific operational control authority that the CinC – and his deputy in his absence – was to exercise. Although the AHSG had begun by using the definition of operational control from CONAD’s new terms of reference as a basis of their discussions, in the end the group decided instead to utilize the definition of the term from the U.S. Northeast Command-RCAF ADC arrangement from 1952. The reason for this is unclear, as the documents that may shed light on this still remained classified and unavailable to researchers. However, the most logical hypothesis is that the Canadian members of the AHSG likely insisted on the U.S. Northeast Command-RCAF ADC definition because it was the one that they were most familiar with and accustomed to, and because it was the one that Air Marshal Slemon had suggested using in his 5 December 1955 briefing for General Foulkes.

Operational control in the MSG study was therefore defined as “the power of directing, coordinating and controlling the operational activities of deployed units which may, or may not, be under the command of the authority exercising operational control.” Although not a part of this definition of operational control, a separate clause later in the document specifically outlined that command was to be retained by each country’s respective national commanders: “command of forces of one nationality, which includes such matters of logistic support, administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, should be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities for these aspects of their commands.” This clause mirrored the last
part of the JSPC 1956 and British 1944 definition of operational control, and was, of course, consistent with the principle of national command as a service prerogative.

Importantly, in the end the MSG proposal did not specifically recommend that a bilateral unified command be established – only that it was the “best method” of dealing with the Canada-U.S. continental air defence mission. Emphasis was therefore on the command and control authority of operational control and the person who would exercise it, not the establishment of a combined command organization, which was still politically sensitive.86 This wording thus meant that the new overall air defence commander would be able to have the benefits that the CinC of a unified command possessed in order to ensure military efficiency but not necessarily be at the head of an actual combined Canada-U.S. command.87 This was, to say the least, an awkward arrangement, and it would not last.

**Approving Integrated Air Defence Operational Control**

The MSG submitted the 19 December 1956 study as its Eighth Report to the JCS and Chiefs of Staff Committee. This report formally recommended that the Canadian and American chiefs of staff and governments approve the proposal for an overall air defence commander exercising operational control over integrated Canada-U.S. continental air defences.88 The JCS gave its assent at its 6 February 1957. U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson approved the study on 16 March, which according to American procedure constituted official government approval.89 However, Canadian government decision on the proposal proved to be much slower.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the MSG study in February 1957 and secured the assent of Minister of National Defence Ralph Campney in early
March. Accordingly, General Foulkes prepared a formal memorandum for the Minister to introduce to the Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC) for final official government approval. However, further delays soon set in. The CDC was supposed to discuss the proposal on 15 March, but this meeting was cancelled and rescheduled for a later date. Then Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent called a federal election for 10 June. Not wanting the air defence proposal to become an election issue, the Prime Minister felt that it was wiser politically to table decision on the matter after the vote. Although St. Laurent was confident that his Liberal Party would be returned to another majority government, to his – and most of Canada’s – surprise he lost the election to John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives. With the Americans growing impatient with the Canadian delays, on 12 June 1957 Foulkes implored the outgoing Liberal administration to approve the integrated operational control proposal before it left office. However, St. Laurent (correctly) felt that with the election loss, his government no longer had the mandate to make a decision and that it should therefore fall to the incoming Diefenbaker administration.

Rebuffed, Foulkes set his sights on securing approval for the proposal from the new Tory government, which came into power on 21 June. A trip by Prime Minister Diefenbaker to London shortly after assuming office further delayed government decision on the matter until July. In the meantime, General Foulkes drafted a fresh memorandum for the new MND, George Pearkes, to submit to Prime Minister Diefenbaker once he had returned from overseas. The Defence Minister discussed the matter with the Prime Minister on 24 July, and that afternoon Diefenbaker personally approved the integration of the operational control of Canada-U.S. air defences. Foulkes informed his American
colleagues shortly thereafter, and on 31 July, the Cabinet confirmed the appointment of Air Marshal Roy Slemon as the Deputy CinC of what was now being called the “Canada-United States Air Defence Command” (see below).  

The next day, 1 August, Canada and the United States announced in a joint press statement that they were “setting up a system of integrated operational control” of the two nations’ air defences under a new “integrated command” in Colorado Springs responsible to each nation’s chiefs of staff. Importantly, although the press release did not include the definition of operational control from the MSG study, it did emphasize that “other aspects of command and administration will remain a national responsibility” (see Appendix 4 for the full text of the press release). The message was clear to the Canadian public: Canadian air forces would at no time come under U.S. command. To help reemphasize this expression of sovereignty, at the same time the Canadian government announced in another press release that Air Marshal Slemon would assume the duties as the Deputy CinC of this new bilateral air defence command.  

Finally, on 12 September 1957 the newly re-named (see below) North American Air Defence Command was officially stood up at Colorado Springs. The CinC CONAD, General Earle Partridge, donned another “hat” as the new CinC NORAD with the authority to exercise operational control over Canadian and American air defence forces. That same day Air Marshal Roy Slemon became Partridge’s Deputy CinC to exercise operational control in his absence. Combined operational control over Canada-U.S. air defence forces had become a reality. Moreover, its bilateral organizational structure also proved to be relatively easy to accomplish.
NORAD was placed on top of the existing CONAD structure. As Jockel has noted, the RCAF’s Air Defence Command was simply plugged in to this organization as an additional component command. NORAD and CONAD still remained two separate entities: a bilateral one with General Partridge with his NORAD CinC “hat” on exercising operational control over Canadian and American air defences for continental air defence; and an American national command organization (a JCS UCP joint command) with General Partridge with his CONAD “hat” on exercising operational control over American air defences defending the United States.

NORAD operated on an interim basis from its establishment in September 1957 until it was confirmed by an official governmental exchange of notes on 12 May 1958, known as the NORAD Agreement. In this Agreement and also the final NORAD Terms of Reference that the JCS and Chiefs of Staff Committee gave to Partridge and Slemon in June 1958, the operational control authority that the CinC – and the DCinC in his absence – exercised over combined Canada-U.S. air defence forces was consistent with the definition in the MSG 19 December 1956 report. Moreover, for the sake of clarity, the NORAD Agreement was sure to make the distinction between operational control and command transparent in its definition of operational control, which also included excerpts from PJBD Recommendation 51/6 (see Chapter Seven) on temporary reinforcement:

‘Operational control’ is the power to direct, coordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control [this was consistent with PJBD Recommendations 51/6]. The basic command organization for air defence forces of the two countries, including
administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.  

Lastly, NORAD’s operational control authority over combined RCAF-USAF forces was also confirmed in the revised Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan of 1 July 1958, MCC 300/10.  

Controversy Over Procedure, Not Command and Control

The establishment of NORAD in 1957 proved to be a very controversial topic. Others have documented this controversy well, so only a brief summary is in order here. The main issue was a procedural one: that Prime Minister Diefenbaker unilaterally approved the creation of NORAD himself without first consulting his government colleagues in a Cabinet Defence Committee (which he still had not yet formed after he defeated the Liberals in the 1957 election), or the Department of External Affairs, whom he suspected were loyal to the former Liberal regime (he called them “Pearsonalities”) and therefore not to be trusted. Officials at DEA were also perturbed that there was no formal government-to-government agreement or exchange of notes between Canada and the United States regarding the establishment of NORAD, and in particular one that included a clause on consultation between Canada and the U.S. These matters were remedied in May 1958 with the formal signing of the NORAD Agreement.  

It is very important to note that the concern held by DEA over the approval for establishing NORAD did not have to do with its command and control provisions. In fact, a number of officials from External Affairs were involved at various stages in the development of the final MSG study and did not oppose the operational control provisions therein. DEA was concerned that there was no precedent for peacetime
operational control of Canadian forces by another country in Canadian territory or airspace.\textsuperscript{110} Department officials recognized that there was a precedent with NATO for foreign operational control of Canadian units, but they pointed out that this was an expeditionary command and control arrangement, and therefore did not include continental defence forces operating within Canada and in Canadian airspace.\textsuperscript{111}

Although nobody made this connection at the time, one could argue that precedents for operational control over another nation’s air forces for North American operations had been established with both the formation of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command in 1943 and the RCAF ADC-U.S. Northeast Command arrangement of 1953. The former, it will be recalled (see Chapter Five), gave the RCAF Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command operational control over American maritime air forces during the last two years of the Battle of the Atlantic. The latter gave the RCAF AOC ADC operational control over U.S. Northeast Command aircraft operating in Canadian airspace (see Chapter Eight). Nonetheless, neither of these arrangements foresaw the establishment of a combined command organization like NORAD. Instead, they only consisted of the assignment of the command and control authority of operational control over one nation’s forces to the operational commander of a pre-existing command organization from the other nation.\textsuperscript{112} In Canada, paragraph 18 of the National Defence Act granted the Minister of National Defence the authority to establish military command organizations.\textsuperscript{113} However this only included individual Canadian air force, navy, army and joint tri-service national commands. The NDA was therefore unclear regarding international bilateral/combined command organizations because the legislation did not specifically mention them. NORAD therefore quite
literally set a new precedent for a combined command organization responsible for the
defence of Canadian territory and airspace.

**A Change in Government and a Change in Sensitivities to “Command”**

While General Foulkes was endeavouring to secure political approval for the
MSG study during the spring and summer of 1957, the exact form that Canada-U.S.
integrated operational control would take began to clarify. It will be recalled that during
St. Laurent’s Liberal administration, in order to avoid mention of the word “command”
as much as possible due to political sensitivities, the focus was on the person exercising
operational control authority, the CinC, and not the entity, i.e., a combined command.
However, by spring 1957 correspondence surrounding the MSG study increasingly began
to make reference to the establishment of a formal bilateral Canada-U.S. command
organization.¹¹⁴ In fact, by the time that the Conservatives came to office in the early
summer, the word “command” was being used much more freely, as the term was less
politically controversial with the new government. Accordingly, by the end of July,
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s Cabinet began formally referring to a “Canada-United
States Air Defence Command,” and this was also the wording that appeared in the 1
August 1957 joint press release announcing the new arrangement with the U.S.¹¹⁵

The reason why the word “command” in general and the establishment of a
formal combined command in particular was becoming more acceptable in political
circles is unclear. Jockel makes light of the awkwardness of the original MSG study’s
wording and emphasizes that practicality was the main reason: that Canadian – and
American – officials had “bowed to the inevitable” and “in a bow to reality” had accepted
the formation of a combined command.¹¹⁶ Another possible explanation lies in the
appointment of George Pearkes as the new MND. Pearkes was a former Canadian Army officer who had won a coveted Victoria Cross for valour during the First World War and was the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Pacific Command during the Second World War. After retiring from the Army in 1945 he successfully ran for office as a Progressive Conservative, and since 1955 had been a staunch advocate for further Canada-U.S. air defence integration. As a former operational commander who had dealt with the Americans in combined Canada-U.S. operations in the Aleutians during the war, Pearkes was therefore more inclined to accept the establishment of a formal combined air defence command under an overall commander-in-chief – and describe it in these terms to his boss, Diefenbaker. Whatever the reason, by late July 1957 the focus of the air defence proposal had switched from the person to the entity, and it would be a formal combined command organization exercising operational control.

The name NORAD was the brainchild of CONAD CinC General Earle Partridge, who became the first CinC of the new Canada-U.S. bilateral air defence command. Partridge had never been comfortable with the titles ADCANUS and CINCADCANUS, finding the last four letters of each particularly awkward. Therefore, once both governments had formally approved the proposal he suggested that the new bilateral command organization be named the North American Air Defence Command, or NORAD for short. The JCS agreed, and so did the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee. Accordingly, when it was officially stood up on 12 September 1957, NORAD became the official name of the new combined command.

In the official press release of 1 August 1957, NORAD (still “Canada-United States Air Defence Command” at the time) was described as an “integrated
command.” This designation was, in a sense true, in that it integrated Canadian and American air defence efforts under one CinC and his Deputy. However, the first draft of this press release dated 24 July 1957 referred to the proposed organization as a “unified command.” Nonetheless, at the behest of the Americans – not the Canadians – this was later changed to “an integrated command” in the final press release so as to be consistent with the wording in the MSG December 1956 study. Pearkes approved the changes, noting, “I agree, integrated is better than unified.” Regardless of what word was used, it did not change the fact that, as established in 1957, NORAD was a combined Canada-U.S. unified command that exercised the command and control authority of operational control. It was therefore a hybrid of the British operational control system and the American unified command system of command and control (see Chapter Three).

The Phantom Formal NORAD-NATO Connection

One thing that NORAD was definitely not was a NATO command. As established, NORAD was (and still is) a bilateral Canada-U.S. combined command organization, not an international multilateral NATO combined command. As the 1 August 1957 press release noted, the new air defence command was to report to each nation’s chiefs of staff, who in turn reported to their governments, not to NATO. Unfortunately, in order to curb criticism over the procedure by which NORAD was approved, Prime Minister Diefenbaker incorrectly tried to link NORAD with NATO when defending his government’s actions in approving the establishment of the air defence command. The JCS protested vehemently against this. Although NORAD had some similarities with NATO commands in terms of the type of command it was, i.e., a unified command, that was where the comparison ended. The original MSG study made
reference to NATO, but only in the context that the new proposed operational control arrangement was to be similar to the NATO unified commands – and CONUS as well. Again, the focus was on the type of command organization that NORAD would be. However, this distinction was soon forgotten (or ignored) and then blurred by General Foulkes, External Affairs Minister Sidney Smith, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, who all stressed incorrectly that there was a direct and formal link between NORAD and NATO. As a consequence, the JCS was forced to set the record straight with their Canadian allies that NORAD was a bilateral command, not an international NATO one, and this proved to be a major embarrassment to Diefenbaker and his government.

The crux of this problem was that in the correspondence surrounding NORAD there was too much emphasis on NATO commands as a model for NORAD as a unified command, and not enough on the American UCP commands, notably CONAD, which were better examples of a command organization for the new bilateral air defence command. It will be recalled that NORAD was placed on top of the existing CONAD structure. In fact, it was likely because of the close relationship to CONAD that Foulkes and Diefenbaker preferred the NATO connection. They did not want a combined command exercising operational control over Canadian air forces to be seen by the public as being overly American, so they emphasized a multilateral connection to NATO. This was a classic case of Canadian apprehension over the bilateral defence relationship with the U.S., in which Canada was always the junior partner, in comparison to the more “comfortable” multilateral approach (such as NATO), where Canada had an equal say and the proverbial safety in numbers. To connect NORAD to NATO therefore emphasized multilateralism over bilateralism. However, the JCS and the NATO
Secretary-General made sure to clarify in “categorical rebuttals” to Foulkes’ and Diefenbaker’s argument that NORAD was a NATO command. Instead, they correctly explained that NORAD was in fact a bilateral command organization for continental air defence, responsible to each nation’s Chiefs of Staff, not to the NATO Standing Group as with multilateral overseas NATO commands.

Conclusion

The hard fact [was] that NORAD was advancing Canadian interests and making Canadian sovereignty more, not less secure.

-Prime Minister John Diefenbaker

The establishment of NORAD in 1957 was the culmination of over ten years of efforts by Canadian and American airmen to build, coordinate, and integrate an intertwined and effective air defence system to protect North America from Soviet aerial attack. With Canadian and American air defences integrated and centralized under NORAD operational control, effective command and control and military efficiency were ensured. At the same time, because the NORAD commander exercised (and still exercises) operational control over Canadian air defence forces, leaving command as a national service prerogative under the RCAF, Canada’s sovereignty was safeguarded.

Specifically, what the operational control authority of the NORAD CinC did not include, and this is where Canadian sovereignty was ensured, was any kind of power or authority over the original composition of assigned forces, and also logistics, administration and discipline. The retention of administration and discipline has in fact been the bedrock of Canadian command and control relationships with other nations’ armed forces for years. Administration and discipline are not a part of operational control but instead are part of the national command that Canada’s chiefs of staff
maintained over their forces. In 1957, it was the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and in particular the RCAF’s Chief of the Air Staff, that exercised this national command authority. Although the NORAD CinC could develop plans and make recommendations to the Canadian and American chiefs of staff for the development, composition, and deployment of forces, it was in the end up to the JCS and Chiefs of Staff Committee to accept and implement them, as they had command over the forces in question. If accepted, these plans and proposals were to be “accomplished by the Services in accordance with existing National and Service procedures.”

The plans and recommendations were then coordinated through the component operational commanders concerned, who were responsible to their services for command, administration, training and support for their forces, plus “detailed planning, programming and specific siting for air defence units.” In 1957 the Canadian component commander was the Air Officer Commanding RCAF Air Defence Command, Air Vice-Marshal L.E. Wray.

Moreover, because NORAD was a bilateral command that was responsible to the JCS and Chiefs of Staff Committee, this was another means of safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. As Peter Haydon has noted of this chain of responsibility, “overall, it was a carefully structured system of delegated authority that included stringent checks and balances to prevent the abuse of authority.” Furthermore, this practice was consistent with previous command and control arrangements. Indeed, since the agreement on the Canada-U.S. Defence Plan ABC-22 in 1941, the chain of command for operational commanders was always up to the respective Canadian and American chiefs of staff.

It must also be noted that throughout the long process to establish NORAD, the Americans continued to be cognizant of Canadian sensitivities, especially regarding the
term “command.” The focus on operational control and the establishment of a Canadian Deputy CinC for NORAD was representative of this. In fact, the DCinC NORAD position was another way that Canada was able to safeguard its sovereignty in the North American air defence effort. As Prime Minister Diefenbaker noted in his memoirs, “the appointment of a Canadian as Deputy Commander-in-Chief NORAD would give Canada a desirable measure of responsibility in any decisions that might have to be taken to defend North America against Soviet attack.”\(^{137}\) Indeed, even some officials from the Department of External Affairs recognized the significance of the NORAD DCinC position, with one noting in particular, “the fact that his [the NORAD CinC’s] deputy is a Canadian and that Canadian officers are integrated into the combined headquarters offer further guarantees that Canadian interests will be given proper attention.”\(^{138}\)

Air Marshal Slemon’s recollections of his experiences with NORAD illustrate the significance of the DCinC arrangement. According to Slemon, General Partridge told him shortly after NORAD was stood up, “Roy, I’m supposed to be the Commander in Chief of NORAD and you’re supposed to be the Deputy Commander in Chief. When I go out on a trip, inspecting units or go away to have a little fun, you have the responsibility and the authority.”\(^{139}\) This established a clear understanding of the relationship of the NORAD CinC and his deputy, especially when the latter was absent from Headquarters. It was an understanding that continued with successive NORAD CinCs. As Slemon recalled of his relationship with Partridge’s successor General Laurence Kuter, “he, unfortunately, was sick about a third of the time, in hospital and so on. So I was in the hot seat. But by General Partridge having taken this policy there was no problem, I just carried on.”\(^{140}\) What also helped was the fact that from the beginning
General Partridge went out of his way to ensure Canadian involvement in NORAD as equal partners. Again, Air Marshal Slemon’s recollections are revealing: “although we were a little partner making a relatively small contribution to the operational capability of the joint effort, our views were considered in exactly the same light as our partners, the Americans.” Importantly, in setting up the organization of the NORAD headquarters, Partridge was sure to include Canadian officers among some of the most important positions. For example, he appointed a RCAF Air Vice-Marshal as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in NORAD headquarters, a position that Slemon considered “the guts of our joint effort.”

As the RCAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, remarked to General Foulkes in March 1958, “the allocation to Canada of some of the key senior positions in the [NORAD] Headquarters is particularly advantageous since the incumbents can personally monitor and guard Canadian interests while, at the same time, they will gain experience of future value to the RCAF.” Indeed, this provision of having places of importance in NORAD Headquarters allocated to Canadians continues today in Colorado Springs. It has therefore given Canada what Joel Sokolsky has termed “a seat at the console,” which allows Canadian officers to safeguard Canadian sovereignty while at the same ensuring that Canada has a proverbial “piece of the action” for continental air defence by fulfilling an important operational role in the defence of the continent. Indeed, at no time was this advantageous position more prevalent than on the morning of 11 September 2001, when it was a Canadian who was in charge at NORAD Headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain when the first airliner stuck the World Trade Center in New York City.
Chapter Ten
Conclusion

Introduction

This dissertation has shown that from 1940 to 1957 Canada was able to safeguard its sovereignty in its continental air defence relationship with the United States because at no time did it allow Canadian forces to come under American command. At the same time, Canada was able to negotiate continental air defence command and control arrangements with the United States that ensured military efficiency and protection of North America from enemy attack. This dissertation also demonstrates that the Canada-U.S. bilateral continental air defence command and control relationship and the command and control principles therein were derived directly from Canadian, American and British joint command and control culture and practice, but also incorporated aspects that were unique to each country and the air defence mission. Indeed, the effort by the two North American nations to find compromises between these joint command and control cultures had a significant effect on how the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship grew and evolved from the Second World War to the formation of NORAD in 1957. In an attempt to draw conclusions from this study, this chapter will summarize the main points made regarding the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship in this dissertation and analyze them so as to understand their relevancy and the lessons that can be learned on command and control for today’s Canadian Forces.

Maintaining Canadian Command of Forces: A Safeguard of Sovereignty

Command of Canadian armed forces was indeed the “acid test of sovereignty” in Canada’s continental air defence relationship with the United States from 1940 to 1957.
Since the two North American nations began in 1940 to collaborate for the defence of the continent, Canadian military officials were always careful to ensure that Canadian forces did not come under American command. One of the main characteristics of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship that was consistent throughout the period of study was that responsibility for administration, discipline, and logistics remained in Canadian hands. These military elements were a national service prerogative that remained a part of a country’s national command authority exercised by the service chiefs of staff on behalf of the government, a practice that continues to this day. They were a fundamental part of a country’s command over its armed forces and could not be delegated or assigned to a commander of a foreign nation. Maintenance of national command authority by Canada in its continental air defence command and control relationship with the United States was therefore an effective and crucial means of safeguarding Canadian sovereignty during the Second World War and early Cold War.

Moreover, besides retaining national command, Canada was also able to retain operational command over its forces for continental air defence operations during the 1940-1957 time period. The focus of operational command was on actual operations, that is, the task at hand and how to utilize the means allocated to accomplish it. A service chief delegated operational command to his service’s operational-level commanders. He could also grant operational command (or operational control) to a commander from a different service for joint operations or, if necessary, even to a foreign commander in command of bilateral or multilateral forces. As the situation described in Chapter 5 regarding American pressure to place RCAF maritime air forces under U.S. unity of command demonstrated most vividly, operational-level as well as organizational and
doctrinal factors played a large part in the decision to permit or refuse one’s forces to come under the operational command or operational control of a foreign commander.

In combined continental air defence efforts with the United States in the 1940-1957 period, Canadian operational-level commanders continued to have responsibility for the disposition and deployment of Canadian forces and for the utilization of them for carrying out specific operations. The only time that Canada contemplated granting operational command of Canadian forces to the United States was in the dire situation of the “Black Plan” of 1940, which postulated the defeat of Britain to the Axis and a major enemy assault on North America. However, even in this “worst-case scenario,” Canadian planners were still able to secure important concessions from the Americans. These included the entitlement to consultation and the right of the Chiefs of Staff and operational-level commanders to appeal to higher authority if they disagreed with an American directive, both of which ensured that Canada would have a say in the deployment and movement of its forces in the event of a heavy enemy attack on the continent. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass and Canada and the United States instead based their wartime combined continental defence operations in a second bilateral plan, ABC-22, based on a more favourable strategic situation.

There was, to be sure, a possibility that an American officer might exercise operational command over Canadian armed forces during the war through the unity of command provision in ABC-22, and some U.S. officials felt that this should have been the case. Nevertheless, the implementation of this command and control provision never came to pass, as Canadian military officials remained steadfast in their belief that the enemy threat to the continent was never serious enough to warrant unity of command and
that mutual cooperation would suffice. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee continually refused to consider implementing unity of command unless the American Chiefs of Staff specifically requested them to do so. No such request ever materialized. This insistence on the part of Canada’s military leadership to deal directly with the American Chiefs of Staff on command and control issues reinforced the Chiefs of Staff’s national command authority and the primacy of the Canadian service chiefs, acting on behalf of the Canadian government, to decide on any and all command and control arrangements with the United States.

The British operational control system utilized in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command after April 1943 for combined maritime patrol operations also preserved Canadian command over its forces. The new system safeguarded national sovereignty in that it did not contain command and control authority inherent in national command. Moreover, because it was focused on the command and control principle of operational control, it also did not include authority that was intrinsic in operational command. Indeed, these aspects of operational control became important considerations in the post-war period when Canadian planners began searching for a means of coordinating their air defence efforts with the Americans without having to resort to placing RCAF forces under U.S. command.

After the Second World War, Canada continued to maintain its national command authority and also to ensure that its forces did not come under American operational command. Even though the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan postulated a more dire enemy threat in the form of Soviet strategic bombers armed with atomic weapons, the principal command and control relationship between Canadian and American forces
continued to be based on mutual cooperation. The Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix to the BSP for the first time introduced the possibility that combined Canada-U.S. continental air defence efforts might be coordinated according to the principle of operational control. Exactly what command and control authority “operational control” actually entailed was not mentioned in the AIAW Appendix, but it did demonstrate that Canadian and American airmen were at least beginning to think about this command and control principle in an air defence context. Furthermore, it was also evident that the AIAW Appendix proposal to utilize operational control meant that operational command would remain with the national operational-level commanders and national command would continue to be the prerogative of the national chiefs of staff, thereby safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. In summary, the command and control “status quo” of the BSP and even the proposed operational control system for continental air defence in the AIAW Appendix both ensured that Canada would still remain command over its air forces: there was no “defence against help” dilemma forced upon the country by its southern neighbour that would hamper Canada’s sovereignty.

When the Soviet atomic aerial threat to North America continued to grow throughout the late-1940s and into the mid-1950s, there was a noticeable paradigm shift, as Canada and the United States slowly began to move towards operational control for their combined continental air defence efforts. This gradual change was evident starting with the AIAW Appendix to the BSP, and continued with the command and control provisions in the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan, the Pinetree System, the cross-border interception PJBD Recommendations, the RCAF Air Defence Command-U.S. Northeast Command arrangements, and last but certainly not least, NORAD. In all of
these instances, although the definition of operational control as a command and control principle continued to evolve in an air defence context, it still did not include the authority over forces that were inherent in national command and operational command, both of which continued to remain in Canadian hands. In fact, Air Marshal Roy Slemon explicitly suggested the principle of operational control for NORAD because it limited command and control authority for an overall air defence commander, did not mention the word “command,” and did not contain the authority of operational command and national command, thereby assuaging Canadian political concerns that an overall continental air defence commander would possibly mean a surrender of Canadian sovereignty. In summary, by retaining operational command in its continental air defence relationship with the United States, Canada not only safeguarded its sovereignty, but also ensured a say in the disposition, deployment, and detailed operations of its forces throughout the 1940-1957 period.

The Requirement for a Command and Control Principle to Ensure Efficiency in Defensive Air Power Operations

The maintenance of national sovereignty was indeed a crucial goal of Canadian officials in Canada’s continental air defence relationship with the United States. One of the major dilemmas facing Canadian and American planners and operational-level commanders from 1940 to 1957 was therefore negotiating command and control arrangements with the United States that achieved this objective while at the same time fulfilling the functional requirement to ensure military efficiency and protection for the continent from enemy attack.

Canadian military culture and practice, influenced by the British joint committee system, led to the establishment in Canada of the Canadian joint committee cooperation
system of command and control by the beginning of the Second World War. Therefore, when Canada and the United States began collaborating for continental defence in 1940, Canadian planners insisted that that this joint system of command and control also be utilized for the Canada-U.S. combined command and control relationship. However, U.S. planners and operational-level commanders disliked this principle, feeling that the American unity of command system was more appropriate. Indeed, these unique command and control cultures conflicted at times as the two countries began to work together to defend the continent from aerial attack. Thus, the key to the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship since the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940 was figuring out a way to reconcile each country’s own joint system of command and control for effective bilateral combined Canada-U.S. air defence command and control.

After very difficult and oftentimes heated negotiations, the two North American countries were eventually able to find the middle ground by establishing a compromise cooperation-unity of command system in ABC-22. Importantly, ABC-22 was a functional military plan to handle a military situation and it was the military members of the PJBD who devised the command and control arrangements in it. Indeed, this functional practice of having service planners complete detailed command and control arrangements set an important precedent for future Canada-U.S. air defence planning. Although ABC-22 allowed for the practice of unity of command in an emergency or if agreed to by the two nations’ chiefs of staff, mutual cooperation became the standard Canadian-American command and control principle upon which the combined operations two nations’ continental defence forces would be based. This arrangement was in agreement with Canadian joint command and control culture and practice embodied in
the joint committee cooperation system, which pleased Canadian planners. Moreover, as American military officials often forgot, the provisions in ABC-22 were also consistent with American command and control culture and practice, as mutual cooperation was also the main command and control basis for U.S. joint operations in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*.

Nonetheless, the debate over mutual cooperation and unity of command spilled over into the relations between Canadian and U.S. operational-level commanders in the field. Disagreements between the two nations continued to arise about whether or not the enemy threat to the continent warranted the activation of the clause in ABC-22 providing for the exercise of unity of command. After the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack, the Americans immediately began pressing Canada to implement unity of command under U.S. officers in Newfoundland and also on the Canada-U.S. Pacific coast. In both theatres, however, Canadian military officials successfully defended their position on mutual cooperation, stressing that despite the entry of both Japan and the United States into the war the enemy threat to North America was still minimal and did not require unity of command.

When the Americans attempted to bring RCAF maritime patrol aircraft in Newfoundland under U.S. unity of command, the Canadians once again resisted this pressure from its southern neighbour, arguing convincingly that the operational situation did not require this measure. The Canadian air force leadership also feared that the convoluted organization of maritime patrol assets in the United States and the resulting inefficient maritime air power doctrine of the USAAF would have a negative effect on any RCAF forces placed under U.S. unity of command. For these organizational,
operational, and doctrinal reasons, the RCAF continued to insist that coordination of Canadian-American maritime patrol operations continue to be accomplished through mutual cooperation.

In carrying out the bilateral continental defence mission during the Second World War, Canadian and American forces did not have to undertake active combined defensive operations. The strategic projections had only postulated sporadic “hit-and-run” raids, and in the end there was in fact no enemy attack on North America. Mutual cooperation therefore proved to be an effective means of command and control for continental defence in a time of minimal enemy action. Nonetheless, when put into practice for actual active defensive operations, mutual cooperation was not the efficient command and control principle that its Canadian proponents had felt it would be.

It was, in fact, not the continental defence role but the coordination of maritime air forces to protect Allied shipping in the Western Atlantic that became the primary means by which the two nations utilized their defensive air power at the operational level during the Second World War. It was therefore in the context of the maritime trade defence role where the most important developments in the operational-level Canada-U.S. command and control relationship occurred. Indeed, as the combined efforts to protect Allied shipping from German U-boats in the Northwest Atlantic showed, when it came to the use of air power in active defensive operations, mutual cooperation proved to be inefficient. Instead, greater centralization of command and control with more authority placed into the hands of the primary operational-level commanders proved necessary. Canada and the United States were eventually able to achieve these objectives in 1943 with implementation of the much more effective British operational control
system. This was accomplished though the establishment of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, whereby the RCAF Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command exercised operational control over combined Canadian-American maritime patrol aircraft.

By implementing the British operational control system in 1943, Canada and the United States set important command and control precedents for the defensive use of air power that would be continued in their post-Second World War continental air defence relationship. For one, the British operational control system ensured more centralized and effective command and control. This factor in turn ensured greater operational efficiency to coordinate maritime patrol operations, which proved to be an important factor in the eventual Allied victory over the U-boats in mid-1943. The British operational control system thus proved to be a much more appropriate means of command and control to coordinate bilateral Canada-U.S. defensive air operations than mutual cooperation. Indeed, the combined efforts by Canadian and American maritime air forces in the Northwest Atlantic proved that when engaged in continuous defensive air power operations against the enemy, coordination of forces requires more effective and centralized command and control than mutual cooperation.

After the Second World War, Canada and the United States finalized a new Basic Security Plan and decided to maintain the status quo by reverting to the ABC-22 mutual cooperation-unity of command paradigm for their continental defence command and control relationship. Nonetheless, Eastern Air Command’s practice of operational control authority for the defensive use of air power proved to be an important precedent that sowed the seeds for future Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control
arrangements. Indeed, throughout the mid-to-late 1940s, the focus of combined Canada-U.S. efforts to protect North America from attack gradually changed from continental defence (traditional air, land, as well as maritime threats) to one purely focused on continental air defence against the rising Soviet atomic bomber threat. In addition, unlike ABC-22, the BSP also included a new clause permitting the commander exercising unity of command to move forces from one operational theatre to another. In ABC-22 this had been specifically forbidden without the commander first receiving authorization by the service chiefs of staff. However, this provision was now necessary in the age of modern aerial warfare, as the requirement to move forces from one area to another quickly without delay was crucial in effectively fighting the air defence battle.

In addition, the AIAW Appendix to the BSP called for a complex continental air defence system that would integrate the combined Canada-U.S. effort to defend North America from the new Soviet strategic bomber threat. Although the plan was not realized in the mid-1940s, it did lay the foundation for greater Canada-U.S. air defence coordination and integration in the late 1940s into the mid-1950s, which also included examination by Canadian and American airmen of the best way to secure efficient command and control of their nations’ combined air defences.

The air defence “crisis” of 1950 precipitated by the outbreak of the Korean War made further air defence collaboration an issue of even greater concern, and it soon became a key priority for Canadian and American planners to re-examine the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship. Integration of the two nations’ air defence efforts was a necessity, and greater command and control centralization was a key goal. The time period 1949-1953, from the USSR’s acquisition of the atomic bomb
to its explosion of a thermonuclear weapon, saw significant developments in air force command organization. These included the move towards functional commands – USAF Air Defense Command in the United States and RCAF Air Defence Command in Canada – and the arrangement of air defence assets under centralized command and control within Canada and the United States.

The Command Appendix to the new Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan and PJBD Recommendation 53/1 included provisions for a country to designate a commander of either nationality to exercise operational control in its territory. Although this command and control principle was not yet precisely defined at this time, it represented continued movement towards operational control as the means to achieve more efficient command and control. This phenomenon also firmly entrenched operational control as the cornerstone of Canada-U.S. combined continental air defence command and control practice and culture.

With the growing requirement to make more efficient use of both nations’ air defence resources to accomplish defence in depth, important questions of sovereignty and in particular whose command and control authority these forces would be under came to the fore. The modern air defence battle would be fought over large parts of Canada and the United States, irrespective of international borders. Of particular concern was that interception, engagement, and mutual reinforcement might have to take place during a peacetime air defence emergency (i.e., before an actual declaration of war) as well as during war, and the operational situation would likely dictate the necessity of interceptors from one country crossing the border into the airspace of the other. The resulting PJBD Recommendations 51/6 and 53/1 concerning mutual reinforcement and cross-border
interceptions, respectively, addressed these issues but at the same time did not erode the sovereignty of the host nation. USAF aircraft would have to adhere to RCAF Rules of Engagement and only the Air Officer Commanding RCAF ADC (or an officer delegated this authority) could order the engagement.

These PJBD Recommendations were therefore functional arrangements to ensure that the air defence concept of “defence in depth” could be achieved for the effective prosecution of the air defence battle while at the same time adhering to the EDP Command Appendix’s command and control provisions. Tactical control and operational control could be exercised by officers from one nation over the forces of the other, and the ever-important authority to issue the “shoot order” would remain in Canadian hands for interceptions in Canadian airspace, but command would remain a national prerogative, thereby ensuring sovereignty. Moreover, these measures further coordinated combined Canada-U.S. continental air defence efforts and laid the foundation for further integration in the mid-1950s.

The new arrangement in 1953 for the RCAF AOC Air Defence Command to exercise operational control over U.S. Northeast Command aircraft flying in Canadian airspace – which until now has remained mostly undocumented in the historiography – established another important command and control precedent for bilateral continental air defence. This operational control provision for Canada’s newest province addressed Canadian political sensitivities and at the same time ensured Canadian sovereignty as well as military efficiency and competent command and control of air defences. Furthermore, this new arrangement also represented the continued evolution of the command and control principle of operational control in an air defence context for North
America. As with previous and subsequent definitions of operational control, it centralized control over operational forces for a certain task or tasks in the hands of one commander but left it up to the subordinate commanders to carry out these tasks as part of their operational command authority over their forces. In summary, the RCAF ADC-U.S. Northeast Command arrangement example proves that a middle ground can, in fact, be found regarding securing Canadian sovereignty while at the same time ensuring effective command and control, efficiency in military operations, and also adequate air defence coverage of the area. It was therefore an important command and control precedent that Canadian and American airmen could draw on when it came time to integrate their combined forces under one overall air defence commander in the mid-1950s.

With the Soviet Union’s test explosion of a thermonuclear bomb in August 1953, the increasing danger posed by a potential Soviet air attack led American and Canadian airmen to conclude that the best means to effectively defend the continent against this powerful threat was further defence integration and command and control centralization. This was achieved in the United States with the establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command, a Joint Chiefs of Staff unified command that centralized all American air defence assets. In Canada, the Joint Planning Committee felt that it was prudent to be proactive in order to protect Canadian sovereignty and ensure that Canada got “a piece of the action” for continental air defence, and they suggested four possible options for a combined Canada-U.S. air defence command organization. One included having all Canadian and American air defences centralized under a U.S. commander who would report to both nations’ chiefs of staff, and the JPC correctly predicted that this
would be the one most favourable to the United States. However, despite this proactive JPC report, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee chose not to act on it, deciding instead to take a reactive wait-and-see approach with the Americans.

It was therefore left to Canadian and American airmen to devise a solution to integrate Canada-U.S. air defence measures and centralize command and control. The dilemma by the mid-1950s was finding a compromise between the need to have one overall commander who had the command and control authority over both nations’ air defence forces that he needed to properly fight the air defence battle while at the same time addressing the Canadian government’s concern over the possibility of having RCAF forces come under American command. Mutual cooperation had previously proven ineffective and Canada was unwilling to surrender operational command of its forces. However, RCAF Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Roy Slemon suggested that the RCAF ADC-U.S. Northeast Command operational control arrangement provided an ideal solution, and it was the one that was in the end adopted for the new bilateral air defence unified command organization, NORAD.

The command and control principle of operational control specifically avoided mention of the word “command” and did not include the authority that was inherent in national command and operational command. However, at the same time it ensured a sufficient amount of command and control authority over combined air forces to allow the American NORAD CinC – or his Canadian deputy – to effectively coordinate combined USAF-RCAF aircraft to fight the continental air defence battle. Operational control therefore became an appropriate command and control principle for combined defensive air power operations because it ensured effective command and control and
operational efficiency, while at the same time avoiding the forces of one nation’s service coming under the command of a foreign commander.

**Other Conclusions**

There are some other conclusions and lessons learned from this dissertation that can prove useful to today’s Canadian air force, and they are worth summarizing. This study has demonstrated the importance of what can be categorized as the “human dimension” to command and control efficiency. Indeed, individual professional interaction and cordial and personal working relationships amongst military personnel proved to be an important factor in ensuring an effective command and control relationship from 1940 to 1957. As the experience of Canadian commanders with U.S. Army Newfoundland Base Commander Major-General Brant showed in Chapter Five, an uncooperative attitude on the part of one individual can lead to a poor relationship amongst operational-level commanders and threaten to have a negative effect on Canadian-American cooperation and operational efficiency.

This Second World War experience was in stark contrast to the situation at NORAD Headquarters after the bilateral air defence command was established in September 1957. In this instance, a close professional relationship between the USAF CinC, General Earle Partridge, and his RCAF Deputy, Air Marshal Roy Slemon, not only ensured the efficient stand-up of NORAD, but also fostered implicit trust between the two airmen which was crucial when Slemon exercised operational control of the nations’ air defences in Partridge’s absence. Moreover, this trust and the proactive and positive attitude that General Partridge displayed towards the combined Canada-U.S. continental air defence effort also proved excellent opportunities for other Canadian personnel. It led
to the earmarking of key positions on the NORAD staff and organizational structure to Canadians, which allowed Canadian airmen a “seat at the console” where they could safeguard Canada’s sovereignty and at the same time make a meaningful and important contribution to the combined continental air defence effort.

However, the advantages of strong professional relationships for effective command and control were not just limited to the operational level. The close bond that RCAF and USAF planners established during the 1950s also allowed them to develop common views on air defence, which subsequently led to mutual agreement on the best ways to coordinate the command and control of their forces protecting the continent from Soviet aerial attack. Among these Canadian airmen were officers such as C.R. Dunlap, Frank Miller, Keith Hodson, Roy Slemon, and Clare Annis, who all either at the time or shortly afterwards held high ranking positions in the RCAF. This factor was important because it meant that the current and future leadership of the RCAF had an intimate understanding of Canada-U.S. air defence planning. This knowledge in turn allowed them to safeguard Canadian interests and sovereignty while at the same time developing a common viewpoint with their American counterparts on the best means on how to achieve further air defence integration and centralized command and control to defend the continent from Soviet nuclear strategic bombers.

Importantly, the Canadian military in general since 1940 and the RCAF in particular during the early Cold War period also aided the cause for Canadian sovereignty by their attitude towards the continental air defence relationship with the United States. Instead of taking a belligerent approach to American defence concerns, the Canadian military advocated taking an important role in the overall Canada-U.S. continental air
defence relationship by actively coordinating with its southern neighbour in arranging
effective and efficient bilateral command and control arrangements. Canada was
therefore able to safeguard both its sovereignty and its security through this “piece of the
action” approach and at the same time avoid a “defence against help” situation with the
United States.

Indeed, beginning with the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940, Canada has made a
conscious choice to take an active instead of a passive role in continental defence by
joining with the United States to coordinate their combined efforts to defend North
America from attack. The protection of a Canada’s citizens from enemy threats was
indeed in Canada’s national interest, and the Canadian decision to secure a “piece of the
action” with the United States in continental defence was therefore an effective means to
accomplish this goal. Moreover, by actively participating in these bilateral defence
arrangements, Canada was also able to protect its sovereignty from unauthorized
independent American intervention in Canadian territory to “help” Canada defend itself.

Command and control also proved to be an important characteristic of Canada’s
“piece of the action” approach to continental air defence collaboration with the U.S.
Despite the overwhelming power of the United States, by embracing a “piece of the
action” approach and taking an active role in arranging effective continental air defence
command and control arrangements with its southern neighbour while at the same time
ensuring that Canadian forces did not come under American command, Canada was able
to avoid a “defence against help” situation with the United States, maintain Canadian
sovereignty, and provide adequate air defence for the continent.
Furthermore, throughout the 1940-1957 Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship, the United States, in stark contrast to a “defence against help” approach with Canada, in fact continued to be very cognizant of Canadian sensitivities regarding command and control arrangements. During the Second World War, although the American planners were adamant that unity of command was necessary for combined operations with Canada, they did not “bully” their Canadian neighbours and force the unity of command viewpoint on them, but instead acquiesced to Canadian views on mutual cooperation. In addition, when the situation in the North Atlantic by late 1942 called for more efficient and centralized command and control of maritime air operations, the Americans recognized that Canada was providing the bulk of these maritime patrol forces and agreed that USN and USAAF forces should come under the AOC Eastern Air Command’s operational control.

Furthermore, when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to stand up Northeast Command in Newfoundland, they were sure to keep the Canadians informed and address the concerns of their northern neighbour – which included a change to the name of the command organization to U.S. Northeast Command. The JCS undertook this courtesy with Canada in good faith and in the interest of cordial and respectful relations with its northern neighbour. Moreover, in doing so they decided to err on the side of caution – or in this case consultation – by keeping their continental air defence ally informed, even though they did not have to, as the U.S. bases in Newfoundland were considered American territory secured from the British in the wartime Destroyers-for-Bases deal. Lastly, as Chapter Nine shows, the Americans were also very cognizant of Canadian sensitivities to the word “command” and the possibility that RCAF air defence forces
might come under the command of an overall air defence commander. This not only
proved to be an important factor in the establishment of operational control as the
command and control principle that the NORAD CinC would utilize to coordinate
combined Canada-U.S. air defences, but also led to the creation of a Canadian Deputy
CinC position in the new bilateral unified command organization who would exercise this
operational control authority in the absence of the CinC.

This dissertation has also shown that in order to ensure efficient command
organization and command and control for defensive air power operations, air forces
should be organized functionally according to their primary mission.1 During the Second
World War, although Eastern Air Command was not technically a functional command
organization, its main role quickly became maritime air defence operations to counter the
growing German U-boat threat. Moreover, after the establishment of the Canadian
Northwest Atlantic Command in 1943, this functional role was enhanced both by the
elevation of the Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command to CinC status and
command and control centralization though the placement of American maritime patrol
aircraft under his operational control for the prosecution of operations in defence of
Allied shipping.

After the Second World War the establishment by Canada and the United States
air forces of national functional air defence command organizations was also a crucial
means by which to centralize each country’s air defence forces and ensure operational
efficiency. Moreover, the establishment by the United States in 1954 of Continental Air
Defense Command, a functional unified command organization, allowed that country to
get its entire air defence house in order and proved to be an effective model for NORAD.
Indeed, NORAD was placed on top of the existing CONAD structure when the bilateral command organization was established in 1957. Furthermore, because Canadian air defence forces had already been centralized into a functional command organization (at the insistence of Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Wilfred Curtis, who was able to convince Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton of the necessity of this measure) RCAF Air Defence Command was easy to simply “plug in” to the CONAD structure as an additional component command under the new NORAD CinC.

Lastly, this dissertation has also demonstrated that for the defence of North America – be it a purely functional mission to protect the continent from aerial attack or a multi-service effort to defend against air, land, and sea threats – a bilateral approach is much more appropriate than a multilateral one. Canada and especially the United States saw the task of defending the continent as a bilateral responsibility, not a multilateral one, which formed a “special relationship” between the two North American countries. The Americans felt that allowing other allies into the continental defence role would be too “cumbersome.” In addition, this “special relationship” also offered certain advantages to Canada as well. These included access to vastly superior American intelligence information, having the ear of one of the world’s most powerful countries, and certain opportunities for Canadian military personnel to have a “piece of the action” and “a seat at the console” though combined defence endeavours with the United States.

**Areas for Future Research**

Although this dissertation fills in some important gaps in the historiography of the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship, it is by no means the end of the story. Indeed, there is still much that needs to be addressed. For instance,
there is still more work that needs to be done on how the RCAF moved away from its parent organization, the RAF, and more towards the USAF in the Cold War period, in terms of both doctrine and culture. This dissertation has addressed this movement to a certain degree in regard to continental air defence, but more still needs to be done on this topic. Unfortunately, many of the relevant primary source documents that may shed some light onto the RCAF-USAF Cold War relationship still remain classified at Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa. Hopefully researchers will one day be able to gain access to these files in order to offer further insights on the Canada-U.S. continental air defence relationship during the 1940-1957 period.

In addition, because the time period studied in this dissertation ends with the establishment of NORAD, a comprehensive history of the post-1957 Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship is still waiting to be written. Most notably, the effect on NORAD operational control of Sputnik and the subsequent development of ICBMs, plus the incorporation of tactical nuclear air defence weapons into Canada-U.S. air defence forces are topics that still need to be addressed. Another possible interesting case study on Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control would be one that examines the Cuban Missile Crisis. Peter Haydon and Joseph Jockel have touched on this topic, but a focused study on command and control based on the most recently declassified documents dealing with the crisis promises to be another important contribution to the historiography.²

Lastly, another area of study that warrants attention is the maritime component of the Canada-U.S. command and control relationship during the Cold War. This includes not only the role of the Royal Canadian Navy and RCAF Maritime Air Command in anti-
submarine warfare as a part of NATO’s trade defence efforts, but also the role of these maritime forces in continental defence after the development by the Soviets in the late 1950s of cruise missile-carrying submarines. Again a start has been made with Haydon’s book on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the recent work by Jon Orr, and the forthcoming Cold War naval Official History by DHH will contain some interesting insights. Nonetheless, this subject should still prove to be a fruitful future research topic for academic historians.\textsuperscript{3} Indeed, further research into these and other historical command and control topics promise to be a valuable asset in understanding the command and control challenges that face the Canadian Forces today and in the future.

In summary, this dissertation has shown that the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship came a long way from 1940 to 1957 in addressing Canadian concerns over sovereignty through the retention of command while at the same time providing an effective and efficient means to provide proper air defence measures for North America. We have seen that this relationship evolved from a compromise cooperation-unity of command system during the Second World War to a hybrid operational control-unified command system under one overall air defence commander with the establishment of NORAD in 1957. It was indeed operational control that formed the cornerstone of NORAD command and control when it was established – and is still exercised by the NORAD commander and his Canadian deputy today. Operational control proved to be an efficient means of command and control for combined defensive air power operations. It has subsequently become the foundation of Canada-U.S. combined continental air defence command and control practice and culture, and offers
an important historical example of effective command and control for today’s Canadian Forces.
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Appendices

Appendix 1  PJBD Recommendation 51/6, 12 November 1951

That when the Air Defence Commanders of the United States and Canada agree that mutual reinforcement of their Air Defence Forces is necessary in the light of the tactical situation:

a. The Canadian air Defence Commander should have the power, in the event of war, to authorize the redeployment of U.S.A.F. Air Defence Forces to Canada and the re-deployment of R.C.A.F. Air Defence Forces to the United States;
b. The U.S. Air Defence Commander should have the power, in the event of war, to authorize the redeployment of U.S.A.F. Air Defence Forces to Canada.

Source: PJBD Recommendations, DHH 79/35.

Appendix 2  PJBD Recommendation 51/4, 9 May 1951

That aircraft controlled by the Air Defence System of the United States or of Canada engaged in intercepting unidentified aircraft crossing the border between Canada and the United States be permitted to fly over the territory of both countries as may be required to carry out effective interception. These flights would be conducted under the following provisions:

a. Investigations by U.S. military aircraft over Canadian territory would only occur in the case of an aircraft headed for the Canada-United States border from the Canadian side whose flight plan had not been transmitted to the U.S. authorities; or which was off course, and then only in the event that the actions of the aircraft gave rise to a reasonable interpretation of intention to cross the international boundary; the activities of Canadian military aircraft over U.S. territory would be similarly restricted.
b. Close investigation with all due precaution, or interrogation, would be performed solely on unidentified multi-engine aircraft for the purpose of obtaining electronic or visual identification. No attempt would be made to order an intercepted aircraft to land, nor to open fire except when the intercepted aircraft is over the national territory of the air force performing the interception.
c. Investigating aircraft would not approach closer, in accordance with Civil Aeronautics Authority and Department of Transport standards, than is necessary to establish identification.
d. Translation of the general principles and limitations of the agreement into operational instructions of the two air forces would be performed by a Canadian-United States team, and
e. These arrangements will remain in force until modified by agreement or terminated by either Government.
This Recommendation was superseded by PJBD Recommendation 53/1.

**Source:** PJBD Recommendations, DHH 79/35.

**Appendix 3  PJBD Recommendation 53/1, 1 October 1953**

(This Recommendation supersedes Recommendation 51/4)

Aircraft controlled by the Air Defence System of the United States, or of Canada, engaged in intercepting unidentified aircraft during peace time, shall be permitted to fly over the territory of either country as may be required to carry out effective interception. These flights will be carried out under the following provisions:

a. Investigations of unidentified aircraft by United States military aircraft over Canadian territory will only occur when it is not possible for a Canadian military aircraft to carry out the investigation; the activities of Canadian military aircraft over United States territory will be similarly restricted. For the purpose of this agreement, an unidentified aircraft is an aircraft which flies within the air defence identification zone in apparent violation of the rules for operation within such zone. When the pattern of behaviour of an aircraft is sufficiently suspicious to justify a belief that it has hostile intentions, it may also be considered to be an unidentified aircraft.

b. In accordance with published civil and military regulations, investigating aircraft will not approach closer than is necessary to establish identification. Investigation or interrogation will be performed solely on unidentified aircraft for the purpose of obtaining electronic or visual identification.

c. The Rules of Interception and Engagement of the country over which the interception or engagement takes place are to apply, even though the intercepting aircraft is being controlled from the other country.

d. The engagement of an aircraft is to be carried out only on orders issued by the Air Defence Commander of the country over which the engagement is to take place, or by an officer who has been delegated the requisite powers. The authority to issue orders to engage an unidentified aircraft should, to the greatest extent possible, be retained by the Air Defence Commander. However, when circumstances so necessitate, he may delegate such authority to a qualified officer not less in status than the senior officer in an Air Defence Control Center.

e. Translation of the general principles of this arrangement into coordinated operational instructions will be carried out by the Air Defence Commanders concerned.

f. This arrangement will remain in force until modified by mutual agreement, or until terminated by either Government.

**Source:** PJBD Recommendations, DHH 79/35.
Appendix 4  Canada-U.S. Press Release on the Establishment of NORAD, 1 August 1957

The Secretary of Defense of the United States, Honorable Charles E. Wilson, and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, the Honourable George R. Pearkes, announced today that a further step has been taken in the integration of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States. The two governments have agreed to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control of the air defence forces in the Continental United States, Alaska and Canada under an integrated command responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. An integrated headquarters will be set up in Colorado Springs and joint plans and procedures will be worked out in peacetime, ready for immediate use in case of emergency. Other aspects of command and administration will remain the national responsibility. This system of integrated operational control and the setting up of a joint headquarters will become effective at an early date. This bilateral arrangement extends the mutual security objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the air defences of the Canada-United States Region.

Source: Press Release by the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, 1 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84
Maps

Map 1  Command Boundaries, RCAF Air Defence Command and U.S. Northeast Command

NOTES

Chapter One


2 For the sake of clarity and consistency, “North America” and “continental defence” in this dissertation will refer solely to Canada and the United States, as there was minimal defence coordination between Canada and Mexico in the time period studied.


4 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 349. McNaughton would also serve as the Canadian Chairman of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence after the Second World War.

5 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Operations, B-GI-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202, 2-1; Canada, Air Force, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000 (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2007), 49. Quote from former.

6 Canadian Forces Operations, Chapter 2, Section I, 202, 3, 2-2.


10 Indeed, Allan English has noted that “command and control arrangements and practices are influenced by national and military culture and historical experience.” Allan English, Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2008), 37. For further discussion on Canadian military culture, see Allan English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).

The Canadian Air Force’s modern definition of “Full Command” is also along similar lines as “national command”: “Full Command is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration. It is applicable only within national services and, therefore, alliance or coalition commanders cannot have full command over forces of other nations.”

Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 51.


Canadian Forces Operations, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2b.

A CGS Memorandum “Note on a Meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defence Held at New York, 19-20 Dec 41,” to CGS, 22 December 1941, DHH 314.009 (D116).

This was in fact the case for the RCAF’s expeditionary experience during the Second World War and the Cold War. During 1939-1945, Canada relinquished operational command of overseas RCAF forces to Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF), and after 1945 placed the RCAF’s No. 1 Air Division under NATO’s Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force. English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 23, 28.

23 Joel Sokolsky, “A Seat at the Table: Canada and its Alliances,” Armed Forces and Society, Volume 16, Number 1 (Fall 1999), 21-22.
27 Major-General Maurice Pope to Colonel J.H. Jenkins, 4 April 1944, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 25, Volume 5749, File 52C(s) Part 1.
31 Whitney Lackenbauer makes this observation regarding American respect for Canadian sovereignty in the north during 1943-1948. As will be shown in this dissertation, it was also applicable to the Canada-U.S. continental air defence command and control relationship from 1940-1957. Lackenbauer, “Right and Honourable,” 161-162, 166.
33 Air Commodore W.I. Clements, RCAF Member, Joint Planning Committee, to Secretary, Joint Planning Committee, 26 May 1954, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3. Emphasis in original.
36 G.E. (Joe) Sharpe, Brigadier-General (ret’d) and Allan D. English, Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces, (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Training Material Production Centre, 2002), 33.
37 Ibid., 33; Goette, “Joint Command and Control,” 119-120.
38 Canadian Forces Operations, Chapter 1, 116, 1-6, and Chapter 8, 801, 8-1; English, Conceptual Foundations, x. British and American military officials finalized these definitions of “joint” and “combined” at the Arcadia Conference in January 1942. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years: The War in the Pacific, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), 164.
39 See, for example, Roussel, North American Democratic Peace, 206-207.
40 English, Conceptual Foundations, viii.
41 English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 228.

Chapter Two


13 Ibid., 243.


15 Ibid., 271.


18 Ibid., 84.


21 Dr. Steve Harris, Senior Historian, DHH, to author, email, 25 August 2003.


23 DHH, Robert Lewis Raymont Fonds (DHH 73/1223). The archival staff at DHH have created an excellent and comprehensive finding aid for this collection.

24 Oftentimes ATIP requests are denied due to restrictions placed on material that deal with highly sensitive intelligence information or information regarding Canada’s allies.

25 Schaffel, *Emerging Shield*.


34 In fact, Lund relegates the only reference to the RCAF in his thesis to one end note. Ibid., 72, note # 21.


36 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force.


38 I also outline the struggle between the RCAF and the RCAF over the ownership of and operational responsibility for land-based maritime aviation in trade defence roles during the Second World War in the following: Richard Goette, “The RCAF and the Creation of an RCN Air Arm: A Study of the Command and Control of Maritime Air Assets,” Canadian Military History, Volume 13, Number 3 (Summer 2004): 5-13.

39 English, Conceptual Foundations.

40 English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 23.

41 Ibid., 22.

42 In fact, English encourages further study on this topic. See English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 228


44 Canadian Official Historian C.P. Stacey discusses this in his memoirs: C.P. Stacey, A Date With History: Memoirs of a Canadian Historian (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1983), 221-222.

45 Dziuban, Military Relations, Chapter V.


49 Perras also fleshes out the west coast unity of command debate in the following article: Galen Perras, “Who will Defend British Columbia? Unity of Command on the West Coast, 1934-1942,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Volume 88, Number 2 (Spring 1997), 63-64.
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Chapter Three

8. Ibid.
9. Military strategy is defined as “that component of national or multinational strategy that presents the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives.” It is the prerogative of a nation’s Chiefs of Staff. *Canadian Forces Operations*, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 1, Section II, Subsection 111.2.
11. British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill put it this way: “... it was not sufficient for a Government to give a General a directive to beat the enemy and wait to see what happens. The matter is much more complicated. The General may well be below the level of his task, and has often been found so. A definite measure of guidance and control is required from staffs and from the high Government authorities.” Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command: The European Theater of Operations, United States Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 37.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. Interestingly, although for coalition warfare the Allies adopted the American unity of command system for *operational* command and control (see next section), for *strategic* management and direction of the war the Americans adopted the British joint committee system. This included the establishment in 1942 of both the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Ian Hope, “Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War,” Carlisle Paper in Security Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2008, 3. For the formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Ray S. Cline, *United States Army in World War II, The War Department, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), 98-106.
17. Hope, “Unity of Command in Afghanistan,” 1. Emphasis in original. See also Leighton, “Allied Unity of Command,” 402. Canadian doctrine defines unity of command as follows: “In a military unit or formation, a single commander will be authorized to plan and direct operations. The commander will be held responsible for an operation’s success or failure, and has the authority to direct and control the personnel and materiel committed to the task.” Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations*, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 1-2. See also Bland, Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance, Chapter 2
21 Bland, Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance, 29-31, 48-49; Hope, “Unity of Command in Afghanistan,” 2; Quote from latter.
22 Joint Action of the Army and the Navy FTP-155, Prepared and Revised by the Joint [USN-U.S. Army] Board, 15 November 1935, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA), Record Group (RG) 165, file WPD 2917-35.
23 Chapter II, “Coordination of Operations of the Army and of the Navy,” Paragraphs 8 and 9, Ibid.
25 The similarities between the two command and control terms are as follows (they are numbered and bolded for easier comparison):

**Canadian Forces Operations** definition of “Operational Command”:
The *authority* [2] granted to a *commander* [1] to *assign missions or tasks* [3] to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and *to retain or delegate OPCON* [operational control] and/or *tactical control* (TACON) as may be deemed necessary [4]. It *does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics* [5].
Source: Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2h.

**Joint Action of the Army and the Navy** definition of “Unity of Command”: 
...unity of command in an operation vests in one *commander* [1] the *responsibility and authority* [2] to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both services by the organization of task forces, the *assignment of missions* [3], the designation of objectives, and the *exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary* [4] to insure the success of the operation.... Unity of command *does not authorize the commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline* [5] of the forces of the service to which he does not belong, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination.
28 Richard Gimblett stresses that the experience of Canadian military forces in the 20th Century has been that the navy, as the most immediately deployable force, generally leads the way. Richard Gimblett, “The Canadian Way of War: Experience and Principles,” Canadian Expeditionary Air Forces, Allan D. English, ed. Bison Paper no. 5 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, 2002), 15.
31 Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History - Volume Two: Activities on Shore During the Second World War (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952), 109; W.G.D. Lund, “Command Relationships in the North West Atlantic, 1939-1943,” MA Thesis, History, Queen’s University, 1972, 6-7. Canadian historian Sean Maloney has criticized Mackenzie King’s decision, noting that although the “relatively small” RCN “logically should have been under the strategic direction of the British CINCAW&I [Commander-in-Chief Americas and West Indies Station] from the outset of the war, this was not promulgated for political reasons.” Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 29.


35 Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 130-132; Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea*, 26. As the next chapter demonstrates, these joint committees were later changed to Joint Services Committee Atlantic and Joint Services Committee Pacific in August 1940.

36 General Charles Foulkes has also stressed that Canada’s “struggle for autonomy” during the First World War and the ill-feelings towards their British commanders during this conflict also had an effect on Canadian attitudes towards command and control relationships with other nations’ armed forces. In 1966 Foulkes wrote that veterans of the First World War, “continue to tell stories of their experiences under British command. Some of these old soldiers continue to show resentment of the British attempts to break up the Canadian battalions, deprive the soldiers of their unit badges, and transfer them as reinforcements to British units where they would lose their Canadian identity. These stories, perhaps a bit exaggerated, tend to keep alive the prejudice to any form of bilateral or multilateral command of Canadian troops.”


41 Bezeau, “Role and Organization,” 156.

42 Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 130-132; Maloney, *Securing Command of the Sea*, 26. As the next chapter demonstrates, these joint committees were later changed to Joint Services Committee Atlantic and Joint Services Committee Pacific in August 1940.


48 Ibid., Appendix VII, 394

50 Committee on Coastal Command Report, 19 March 1941, TNA, PRO, Air Ministry (Air) file 15/338; Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence [hereafter DHH] file 79/599, DHH 79/599, Peyton-Ward, II, 275, 286. Quote from latter. The Commander-in-Chief of RAF Coastal Command from February 1943 to January 1944, Air Marshal Sir John “Jack” Slessor, perhaps put the command and control relationship best: “the sailor tells us the effect he wants achieved and leaves it entirely to us how that result is achieved.” Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief RAF Coastal Command, to Air Vice-Marshal N.R. Anderson, RCAF Air Member for Air Staff, 24 June 1943, DHH 181:009 (D6734).

51 Operational direction is defined here as “the authority to issue directives as to the objectives to be pursued (i.e. the effect that one wants achieved) in operations. It does not include the planning and issuing of detailed instructions for the actual execution of operations.” Goette, “Joint Command and Control,” vii. For a more detailed discussion of “operational direction” see Ibid., Chapter 3 & 124-126. See also Allan English, Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2008), 3-7 for a discussion of the historical evolution of command and control terminology.

52 Commander-in-Chief U.S. Navy to U.S. Navy Commands, Admiralty, Air Ministry and Chief of Staff Army, 11 February 1944, TNA, PRO, Air 15/339.

53 The modern definition of operational control is: “The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON [tactical control] of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.” Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.3a.


56 Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 13.


59 Ibid.

60 Ibid. This document also used the term “component” commanders for the first time in U.S. military terminology to refer to the operational commanders under the overall joint commander.


65 Quoted in Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 14.
68 Ibid., 13-14.
70 The U.S. Army commander of European Command also became the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe when it was established in the early 1950s (see the section on NATO coalition command below). Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 14; Hope, “Unity of Command in Afghanistan,” 5.
71 Cole et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 14; Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953-1954 (Washington: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 137.
73 Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 6.
74 General Marshal quoted in Leighton, “Allied Unity of Command,” 403. In forwarding the unity of command system for Allied coalition command, General Marshall had the full support of President Franklin Roosevelt. Reminiscing about the war, he admitted: “I was very fortunate that the president didn’t interfere with me on command and allowed me more or less complete freedom of action.” Larry I. Bland, ed., George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue, revised edition (Lexington, Virginia: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 452.
75 Pogue, Supreme Command, 41.
76 This decision that a British officer would be the first Allied supreme commander was one of the main reasons why the British abandoned their preference for their joint committee system and accepted the American unified command system as the basis for Allied coalition command. Leighton, “Allied Unity of Command,” 403-405; Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 13-14.
78 Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 14.
80 Ibid., 400-403, 421; Morton, Strategy and Command, 250.
83 Bland, Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance, 44, 47-49, 52.
84 Leighton, “Allied Unity of Command,” 420. Moreover, the national commanders were expected to keep their superiors at home “fully advised of all that concerns your command” and to “communicate your recommendations fully and feely.” Ibid., 421.
87 Bland, Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance, 44.
88 Ibid., 52.
89 Maloney has posited that the “NATO command organization can be considered a ‘descendant’ of its World War II ‘parent.’” Leighton, “Allied Unity of Command,” 400; Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 3. Quote from latter.
91 Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 96-97.
Incidentally, the officers of the CUSRPG Regional Planning Committee were also the members of the Canada-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). As such, when the MCC met, these individuals simply put on their additional CUSRPG “hat” to discuss NATO matters. The only difference between the MCC and CUSRPG was that the chairman for each organization was different. CUSRPG Document CUS-1, “Organization for Canada United States Regional Planning,” 31 October 1949, NARA, RG 59, State Department, PJBD-MCC, Entry E1184, Box 25, File “Military Co-operation Committee III”; JPC Memorandum, “Proposed Extension of the Present Military Cooperation Committee,” 4 January 1950, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 3; Minutes of the 19-23 January 1950 MCC Meeting, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540; Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 85, 96-97; William R. Willoughby, The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 133; DHH 87/47, R.L. Raymont (Colonel), The Evolution of the Structure of The Department of National Defence 1945-1968, Report of the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces (30 November 1979), Appendix A, “The Organization of Higher Control and Coordination in the formulation of Defence Policy, 1945-1964,” 27.

Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 97; Maloney, Securing Command of the Sea, 97. See also Canadian Ambassador to the United States to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 18 July 1949, Joint Staff Fonds, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, July 1949, DHH 2002/17, Box 75, File 5.


Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 96.

Foulkes, “Complications of Continental Defence,” 117-119. Also see, for example, M.H. Wershof, Defence Liaison, to R.A. Mackay, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 March 1951, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40.

Willoughby, Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States, 133; Foulkes, “Complications of Continental Defence,” 118; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 97. Quote from first source. The other members of the Alliance also had no interest in the establishment of a Canada-U.S. NATO command. They feared that it would draw resources away from the other European supreme commands and in any event felt that the defence of North America was purely a Canada-U.S. matter. As such, Canada was the only country that had any real interest in establishing a NATO command for the Canada-U.S. region.

Chapter Four


W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Department of National Defence, 1986), 348-349. Pre-war assessments had predicted possibly enemy attacks consisting of bombardment by two eight-inch-gunned heavy cruisers or one battleship and landings by small raiding parties. The scale of such an attack only grew with the German victory on continental Europe in summer 1940.


In response to the dire situation in Europe, Canada had dispatched the bulk of its forces overseas to Britain. There were only four RCAF maritime patrol (called Bomber Reconnaissance at the time) and one Coast Artillery squadron available to Eastern and Western Air Commands. Furthermore, of these aircraft, only 23 were modern (all on the east coast), enough only for a paltry 1.5 full strength squadrons. Roger Sarty, “Silent Sentry: A Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence 1860-1945,” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1982, 611, 617.


8 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 382; Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Defence of Canada Plan, August, 1940,” DHH 112.3M2 (D497). Quote from latter.

9 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 382.

10 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 357; C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume 1 Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1956), 161. Quote from latter source.


14 Dziuban, Military Relations, 110.

15 Ibid., 111.

16 Joint-Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan (First Joint Draft), 1-2, dated 11 September 1940, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 1.

17 Ibid.

18 Biggar to Mackenzie King, 7 October 1940, reproduced in David R. Murray, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [hereafter DCER], Volume 8, 1939-1941 Part II (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1976), 170; Biggar to Canadian PJBD Section members, 12 October 1940, attached to PJBD Journals, Volume 1, DHH 82/196, File 1b; Perras, Necessary, but Not Necessary Enough, 79.


20 Dziuban, Military Relations, 111.


23 Dziuban, Military Relations, 110.


25 Dziuban, Military Relations, 110.

26 Stuart Memorandum, “J.D.B. Plans for 1941,” 16 January 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 1; Appendix, “Report from Service Members on Progress Made in Carrying out Recommendations of the Board,” attached to Minutes of the 14th Meeting of the PJBD, Montreal, 20 January 1941, PJBD Journals, Volume 1, DHH 82/196, File 1b. Quote from latter.
The definition of unity of command in Joint Action of the Army and Navy was:

a. [U]nity of command unity of command in an operation vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both services by the organization of task forces, the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary to insure the success of the operation.

b. Unity of command does not authorize the commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the service to which he does not belong, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination.

Chapter II, “Coordination of Operations of the Army and of the Navy,” Paragraph 10, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy FTP-155, Prepared and Revised by the Joint [USN-U.S. Army] Board, 15 November 1935, NARA, RG 165, file WPD 2917-35. The modern definition of operational command is: “The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON [operational control] and/or tactical control (TACON) as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.”

Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2b.

Chapter II, “Coordination of Operations of the Army and of the Navy,” Paragraph 10, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy FTP-155, Prepared and Revised by the Joint [USN-U.S. Army] Board, 15 November 1935, NARA, RG 165, file WPD 2917-35. The modern definition of operational command is: “The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON [operational control] and/or tactical control (TACON) as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.”

Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2b.
Crerar, 18 April 1941, RG 24, Volume 2427, Volume HQS 5199-W-B. See also Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 164.


42 Bissel to Marshall, 21 April 1941, NARA, RG 165, WPD 4330-23.

43 Chiefs of Staff Committee to Ministers of National Defence, 22 April 1941, Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, Volume V, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 4, Microfilm # C-11789, copy at Canadian Forces College (CFC) Information Resource Centre (IRC), Toronto.

44 Ibid.; Perras, Necessary, but Not Necessary Enough, 80. See also Crerar to Pope, 15 May 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 2.


46 Chiefs of Staff Committee to Ministers of National Defence, 22 April 1941 and Minutes of the 78th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 23 April 1941, Documents of the Cabinet War Committee, Volume V, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 4, Microfilm # C-11789, copy at CFC IRC.

47 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 351.

48 Biggar to LaGuardia, 29 April 1941, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 8, File Correspondence of PJBD, January to June 1941; Biggar to LaGuardia, 3 May 1941, NARA, RG 165, WPD 4330-25. Quote from latter.

49 LaGuardia to Biggar, 2 May 1941, NARA, RG 165, WPD 4330-25.

50 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 351; Memorandum for Embick by Brigadier-General Harry J. Malony, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, 7 May 1941, NARA, RG 165, WPD 4330-25; Stuart to Crerar, 14 May 1941, DHH 314.009 (D116); Memorandum from ACGS for CGS, “Meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Washington, 28-29 May 1941,” 31 May 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 2. Quote from first source.

51 LaGuardia Memorandum for the President, n.d. [7 May 1941], F.D. Roosevelt Diplomatic Correspondence, Subject: PJBD August 1940-May 1941, Microfilm Reel 3, copy at Massey Library (ML), Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), Kingston.

52 Roosevelt to LaGuardia, 16 May 1941, F.D. Roosevelt Diplomatic Correspondence, Subject: PJBD August 1940-May 1941, Microfilm Reel 3, copy at ML, RMC.

53 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 351.

54 Pope to Biggar, 14 May 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 2.

55 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 164.


57 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 165.


59 (Draft) Permanent Joint Board on Defense – Second Report, n.d. [29 May 1941], NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 8, File Correspondence of PJBD, January to June 1941.

60 Ibid. This provision was consistent with the British-American agreements in ABC-1, which granted U.S. strategic direction for forces operating in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific Areas.

61 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 165-166; Memorandum from ACGS for CGS, “Meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Washington, 28-29 May 1941,” 31 May 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 2. Quote from latter.


63 Biggar Memorandum, “Permanent Joint Board on Defence,” 1 June 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 2.

64 ACGS Memorandum to CGS, “Permanent Joint Board on Defence,” 5 June 1941, ACGS to CGS, 17 July 1941, and Embick to Pope, 10 July 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 2724, File HQS 5199-W-1-B, LAC,
Chapter Five

1 For the Canadian perspective of Newfoundland being an integral part of the overall defence of eastern Canada, see: Elkins to Pope, 30 and 31 December 1941, ML, RMC, Kingston, Major-General W.H.P. Elkins Papers, File 19 “Semi-Official Correspondence Vol. # 3 – November 1941 to May 1942”; Air Vice-Marshal N.R. Anderson, Air Member for Air Staff (AMAS) to Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), 5 March 1942, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Record Group (hereafter RG) 24, Volume 5290, File HQS 15-73-4 Part 1; Memorandum from Joint Planning Sub-Committee to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8 August 1942, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5209, File HQS 15-73-4, Part 2.

85; 12th Meeting of the PJBD, New York, 16 December 1940, PJBD Journals, Volume 1, DHH 82/196 File 1b; Earnshaw to Elkins, 3 February 1941, DHH 355.009 (D29).

3 Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to Commission of Government of Newfoundland, 19 November 1940, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland, 29 November 1940, and same to same, 16 December 1940, reproduced in Bridle, ed., DRBCN, 886-888; Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 22 November 1940 and Memorandum of Meeting – St. John’s, Newfoundland, 28 November to 1 December 1940, LAC, RG 25, Volume 1991, File 1156-C.

4 Appendix, “Report from Service Members of Progress Made in Carrying Out Recommendations of the Board,” attached to Sixth Meeting of the PJBD, Boston, 2 October 1940, PJBD Journals, Volume 1, DHH 82/196, File 1b.; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland, 29 November 1940, reproduced in Bridle, ed., DRBCN, 887; Stacey, Six Years, 179, 541. Elkins’ headquarters was located at the Citadel in Halifax.

5 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 387; Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command (AOC EAC) to Secretary of Defence For Air, National Defence Headquarters, 6 August 1941, DHH 181.002 (D173).


8 See, for example, the correspondence between Brigadier-General Earnshaw and his superiors in Halifax and Ottawa in early-to-mid-1941 in DHH 355.009 (D29), DHH 72/145, and Elkins Papers, ML, RMC, File 3 “Semi-official Correspondence Volume 1 – General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland.”

9 Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22), 28 July 1941, DHH 355.009 (D20).


13 Pope Memo to Crerar, “Permanent Joint Board on Defence Montreal, 10-11 November, 1941,” 12 November 1941, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 3.


16 Earnshaw to Elkins, 1 December 1941, DHH 355.009 (D29); Earnshaw to Elkins, 3 December 1941, ML, RMC, Elkins Papers, File 3 – “Semi-official correspondence Vol. 1 – General officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland”; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 363; Commodore Murray to the Naval Secretary, Naval Service Headquarters Ottawa, 2 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 11,505, File 1550-146/36-1.
17 Order in Council P.C. 9592, 7 December 1941 and Minutes of the 125th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 7 December 1941, LAC, RG 2, Volume 6, microfilm reel # C-4654, copy at CFC IRC; Chiefs of Staff Committee to Ministers of National Defence, 8 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 2725, File HQC 5199-W-1-B Part 2; Atlantic Command to Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland, 8 December 1941,” DHH 355.009 (D20).


21 "Memorandum of conversation with Admiral Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff,” from the American Minister, Ottawa to the Secretary of State, Washington, 11 December 1941, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA), RG 337, Headquarters, Army Field Forces, General Correspondence, 1940-42, Entry 57, File 334.8 “Joint Boards Canada-United States”; ACGS Memorandum, “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2,” 8 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 2725, File HQC 5199-W-1-B Part 2; “Unity of Joint Defence Command Not Essential, Ottawa Declares,” Montreal Gazette, 11 December 1941, clipping in NARA, RG 59, PJBD, Entry E1177, Box 6, File “Public Statements”; Pope Memorandum, “Note on Question of United States-Canada Unity of Command,” 18 December 1941, DHH 112.3M2 (D495); Major-General Maurice Pope, Commodore H.E. Reid and Group Captain F.V. Heakes memorandum “Command Relations – Newfoundland” to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 31 December 1941, DHH 72/145.

22 LaGuardia to Biggar, 2 January 1942, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 9, File Correspondence of PJBD, January to March 1942.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Perras, Necessary, But Not Necessary Enough, 84.

26 Pope to Stuart, 3 January 1942, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 3; “Notes for Meeting Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence,” 3 January 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5209, File HQS 15-73-4 Part 1. Quote from former.

27 Pope to Stuart, 3 January 1942, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 3. Large-scale Japanese operations against the Aleutians “as a Japanese defensive measure against future bombing of Japan” from the Alaskan islands, however, was in a “different category.” For Canadian-American operations in the Aleutians during the war, see Galen Roger Perras, Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

28 Minutes of the 135th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 7 January 1942, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 69, File 14.

29 Chief of Naval Operations memorandum “Unity of command over joint operations” to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, n.d. [2 December 1941], NARA, RG 165, Files of the War Department, File WPD 2917-35; Perras, Necessary, But Not Necessary Enough, 84.

30 Minutes of the 135th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 7 January 1942, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 69, File 14.

31 Ibid.

32 Pope Memorandum to Mackenzie King, 13 January 1942 and Biggar to Mackenzie King, 13 January 1942, reproduced in Hilliker, ed., DCER, 9, 1942-1943, 1151-1153; Embick to Biggar, 14 January 1942, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 9, File Correspondence of PJBD, January to March 1942; Pope Memorandum “Southern British Columbia-Puget Sound U.S. Request for Institution of Unity of Command” to Stuart, 16 January 1942, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 3; Pope to Embick, 19 January 1942, DHH 112.11 (D1A) Volume 3; Minutes of the 138th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17 January 1942, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 17, File 14; Minutes of the 25th Meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Montreal, 20 January 1942, DHH 82/196, File 2, PJBD Journals Volume 2.

33 Minutes of the 151st Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 18 March 1942, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 8, microfilm reel # C-4874, copy at CFC IRC; Memorandum from Chiefs of Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence, Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and Minister of National Defence for Air, 10 March 1942, reproduced in Bridle, ed., DRBCN, 926-927; Stanley W. Dziuban, United States Army

34 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 393.

35 Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Newfoundland, 12 December 1941, LAC, RG 25, Volume 1991, File 1156-C; Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments, 363; Dziuban, Military Relations, 117-118. Murray’s title changed from Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Escort Force to Flag Officer Newfoundland Force (FONF). Jones’ title remained Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast.


37 Waller, Question of Loyalty, 190; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 496.

38 Extract from General Page’s Diary, 18 June 1942, DHH 321.009 (D201); DRAFT Memorandum by Page to Murray and McEwen, n.d. [25 June 1942], LAC, RG 24, Volume 11,927, File 1550-146/36-2. First quote from first source; second quote from second source. Interestingly, despite incidents like this, the United States awarded McEwen with Legion of Merit for his services in Newfoundland “during the critical days of the Battle of the Atlantic.” Burchnell to McEwen, 21 October 1946, Air Vice-Marshal C.E. McEwen Papers, Canadian War Museum Archives, File 58A1 95.4, 1946-1956, 1900192.

39 AOC No. 1 Group to AOC EAC, n.d. [18 June 1942], quoted in AOC EAC to Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa (AFHQ), 19 June 1941, LAC, RG 25, Volume 1991, File 1156-C.


42 Drum to Elkins, 21 August 1942, Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 65, File 11; Extract from General Page’s Diary, 18 June 1942, DHH 321.009 (D201); Elkins to Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 24 August 1942, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5209, File HQS 15-73-4 Part 2; Minutes of the 177th and 178th Meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 25 August and 1 September 1942, respectively, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 70, File 1; Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to GOIC Atlantic Command, 3 September 1942, LAC, RG 25, Volume 1991, File 1556-C; Minutes of the 189th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 9 September 1942, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 9, microfilm reel # C-4874, copy at CFC IRC.

43 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 366; Dziuban, Military Relations, 119; Minutes of the 32nd Meeting of the Joint Services Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, 17 August 1942 and Secretary, Joint Services Committee Atlantic Coast to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 5 September 1942, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 66, File 1; Minutes of the 199th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 14 October 1942, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 11, microfilm reel # C-4874, copy at CFC IRC; LaGuardia to Drum, 1 October 1942, copy in DHH 99/36, W.A.B. Douglas Fonds, Box 14, File 1.


46 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 366.


49 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 387.


51 Ibid., 388.


55 Minutes of the 111th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 9 October 1941, LAC, RG 27C, Volume 5, microfilm reel C-4654, copy at CFC IRC.


57 USN CNO to RCAF CAS, 27 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5177, S. 15-1-350, I; Minutes of the 115th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 6 November 1941, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 6, microfilm # C-4654, copy at CFC IRC; minute by CAS to Power on Admiral Stark’s letter, 3 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, I. Quote from latter.


59 Minutes of the 111th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 9 October 1941, LAC, RG 2 7C, Volume 5, microfilm reel C-4654, copy at CFC IRC.

60 RCAF CAS to USN CNO, 15 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5177, S. 15-1-350, I; Minutes of the 112th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 15 October 1941, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 5, microfilm reel C-4654, copy at CFC IRC; Douglas, “Democratic Spirit,” 40.

61 USN CNO to RCAF CAS, 27 October 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5177, S. 15-1-350, I; Minutes of the 115th Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, 6 November 1941, LAC, RG 2, 7C, Volume 6, microfilm # C-4654, copy at CFC IRC; minute by CAS to Power on Admiral Stark’s letter, 3 November 1941, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 5177, S. 15-1-350, I. Quote from latter.

62 Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 522-523. The USAAF’s 49th Bombardment Squadron is a good example. It was scheduled to arrive in Newfoundland in early December 1941 but had been delayed at Mitchell Field in New York due to poor weather. After Pearl Harbor, instead
of proceeding to Gander, the squadron was re-diverted to Hawaii. See Air Commodore Cuffe for CAS to AOC EAC, 23 December 1941, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5174, File HQS 15-1-204.

73 AOC EAC to AFHQ, 22 December 1941, DH 79/237.

74 Ibid.; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 363; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 389. Quote from latter. The use of “local operational control” and “tactical control” interchangeably is a good example of the confusion regarding both levels of war during the Second World War.

75 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 363-364; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 390.

76 Dziuban, Military Relations, 124.


78 See correspondence between the Canadian and American air forces in Newfoundland from 20 December 1941 to March 1942, DHH 181.002 (D173). See also Douglas et al., No Higher Purpose, 595.


81 See, for example, the following document written by Heakes: Memorandum “Unity of Command, Newfoundland” by Joint Planning Sub-Committee for Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8 August 1942, LAC, RG 24, Volume 5209, File HQS 15-73-4, Part 2. Heakes was an Air Commodore by this time and would become the AOC No. 1 Group commander in December 1942 after being promoted to Air Vice-Marshal.

82 See, for example, “Review of Conditions by Local Escorts (March to September, 1942) and Suggestions for Increasing the Effectiveness,” Memorandum by Commander J.M. Rowland, RN, captain of HMS Walker, 21 September 1942, DHH 181.002 (D121).


86 Martineau, Memorandum to Staff, 31 October 1942, TNA, PRO, Air 15/217; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 530.


88 Douglas, “Alliance Warfare,” 168; Douglas et al., No Higher Purpose, 595. By late November 1942, the USN had only two flying boat squadrons conducting patrols from Argentina and the USAAF two long-range B-17 squadrons operating interchangeably out of Gander and Stephenville. In comparison, RCAF Eastern Air Command had ten maritime patrol squadrons, which included four in Newfoundland under No. 1 Group. Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, Appendix E.

89 Canning to Chief of Staff to The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, Liaison Officer, Eastern Theatre of Operations and 1st Air Force, and Executive Officer, I Bomber Command, 17 February 1942, TNA, PRO, Air 15/217; Craven and Cate, eds., Army Air Forces in World War II, I, 541; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces In World War II, Volume II: Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942-December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 393; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 546.

90 AFHQ to AOC EAC, 3 February 1943 and CNS to Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), 4 February 1943, LAC RG 24, Vol. 5270, S.28-1-2; DCAS Memorandum to Power, 4 February 1943, DHH 77/528; RCAF HQ Ottawa to Air Force, Combined Staff, Washington, 5 February 1943, DHH 77/528; Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 547.


93 Report of Sub-Committee on Command Relations, 9 March 1943, Atlantic Convoy Conference Minutes, DHH 181.003 (D5027).

94 No. 1 Group to EAC HQ, 30 March 1943, DHH 181.002 (D124).

95 Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 549.

96 Goette, “Joint Command and Control,” 71. See also Douglas et al., Blue Water Navy, 23.

97 Dziuban, Military Relations, 126.

Chapter Six
1 U.S. Ambassador to Canada to Secretary of State, 28 August 1946, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 10, File Correspondence of PJBD, January to December 1946.

2 Major-General Maurice Pope to Colonel J.H. Jenkins, 4 April 1944, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5749, File 52C(s) Part 1. He added: “Should then, the United States go to war with Russia they would look to us to make common cause with them, and, as I judge their public opinion, they would brook no delay.” Ibid.

3 “If,” Pope added, “we do enough to assure the United States we shall have done a good deal more than a cold assessment of the risk would indicate to be necessary.” Ibid. See also Memorandum from First Secretary to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 29 February 1944, reproduced in John Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations [hereafter DCER], Volume 11, 1944-1945, Part II (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1990), 1400-1405. Pope also elaborated on this further a couple of months later. See Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Mission, Washington, to Department of National Defence, 27 June 1944, Ibid., 1540-1541.


5 Quoted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, 320. The Canadian Prime Minister was reacting to the Gouzenko Soviet spying affair which had recently been revealed to him.


8 This reference of course refers to the famous statement by Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand, who at the League of Nations in the 1920s noted, “We are a fireproof house, far removed from flammable materials.” Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, A History of Canadian External Policies Volume 2: 1921-1948 The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 61.


10 Memorandum, “Postwar Military Collaboration Between Canada and the United States,” 23 October 1944, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 10, File Correspondence of PJBD, January to December 1944. The author of this State Department document also recommended the continuation of the PJBD.

11 The report also included a brief overview of ABC-22 and stressed that the new post-war defence plan should be “in accord with the latest strategic concept… with particular reference to the Arctic approaches to Canada.” JPS 759, Report by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners, “Military Implications of U.S.-Canadian Defense Agreement,” 22 September 1945, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 1.

12 JCS Minute, 4 October 1945 and JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, 19 October 1945, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 1.

13 Minutes of the 51st Meeting of the PJBD, Montreal, 4-5 September 1945, DHH 82/196, PJBD Journals, Volume 5; Canadian Air Member, PJBD, to Military Staff Officer to Prime Minister, 16 August 1945, DCER, 11, 1599-1601. Quote from former.
Major-General H.F.G. Letson had by this time replaced the newly-promoted Lieutenant-General Pope as senior Canadian Army member of the PJBD.

Extract from a Meeting of the Cabinet, 19 December 1945, DHH 112.3M2 (D125).

Jockel, _No Boundaries Upstairs_, 14; Memorandum by Canadian Section PJBD, “Revision of ABC-22,” 5 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II. This document was based on a study produced by the Chief of the General Staff: CGS Memorandum, “Method of Implementing Revision of ABC 22,” 3 January 1945, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D151) Volume 1. Quotes from 5 January document.

Memorandum by Canadian Section PJBD, “Revision of ABC-22,” 5 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II.


“Principles Providing for Joint Cooperation of Canada-United States Armed Forces and for the Canada-United States Security Plan (CA-1),” 17 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II.

CA-1, 17 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II. As with ABC-22, the establishment of unity of command in an emergency by operational-level commanders continued to be subject to confirmation by the Canadian and U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

The draft security plan, like ABC-22, also specified that “the assignment of an area to one nation shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.” Ibid.; Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22), 28 July 1941, DHH 355.009 (D20).

Canada-United States outline security plan CA-1, 17 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II.

Jockel, _No Boundaries Upstairs_, 15. To be fair, at least one JCS planner defended U.S. PJBD members, stating that they, and Major-General Henry in particular, had “not been provided with adequate help” and that due to this lack of guidance had resorted to “approaching the problems in only very broad terms.” 241th Meeting of the Joint Planning Staff, 13 March 1946, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 2.


See, for example, Major-General Pope Memorandum, “Combined Chiefs of Staff,” 30 May 1944, DHH 2002/17, Box 68, File 4.


Jockel, _No Boundaries Upstairs_, 16. For example, the U.S. members of the PJBD “were very insistent on the insistence [sic] regarding the observance of any limitations on the transmission of information to third parties.” Director of Military Operations and Planning (DMO&P) Memorandum “Canada-U.S. Collaboration” to CGS, 20 January 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D151) Volume 1.

Jockel, _No Boundaries Upstairs_, 15.

In particular, the JCS was loathe to accept an arrangement similar to CANUSA with Brazil and Mexico. 241th Meeting of the Joint Planning Staff, 13 March 1946, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 2; JSP 788/4, Report by the Joint Staff Planners, “Canadian-U.S. Military Cooperation,” 16 March 1946, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 3. Quote from latter.

Jockel, _No Boundaries Upstairs_, 16; JCS 1541/5, “Canadian-U.S. Military Cooperation,” 21 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II; Admiral Leahy
Memorandum for the Service Members, Permanent Joint Board of [sic] Defense, Canada-U.S., 30 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, RG 218, JCS, Entry 940311, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 3.

31 Pearson to Robertson, 29 January 1946, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5749, File 52-C(s).

32 CA-1, 17 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, State Department Files, PJBD, Box # 2, File Basic Security Plan II.


34 Memorandum from the Senior U.S. Army Member, PJBD, to the Secretary of the Canadian Section, PJBD, 18 March 1946, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5750, File 52-C(s) Part 2.2.

35 Ibid; Memorandum by Secretary, Canadian Section, PJBD, 18 January 1946, DCER, 12, 1600-1601.

36 JWPC 433/2, “Matchpoint,” Report by the Joint War Plans Committee, 6 May 1946, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 3.

37 Ibid. Underline in original.

38 Ibid.

39 JWPC 433/2, Appendix “A,” 6 May 1946, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 3. Again, it appears that the distinction between “a” unified command organization and the command and control principle of unity of command was blurred.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 JWPC 433/2, Appendix “B,” “Basic Outline of Joint Canadian-U.S. Basic Defence Plan’ (Draft), 6 May 1946, NARA, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Entry 943011, Box 018, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 3.


45 Ibid.

46 Sections II, IV and VI, Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan (Draft), 5 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5750, File 52-C(s) Part 2.2.

47 Section V, BSP, 5 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5750, File 52-C(s) Part 2.2.

48 Ibid. Newfoundland did not enter into Confederation until 1949 and the U.S. retained its base rights in the colony after the war as per its agreement with the British Government.

49 Ibid. See also Memorandum by Air Vice-Marshall W.A. Curtis, Senior Canadian Member, MCC, to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 June 1946, DHH 112.3M2 (D116).

50 Other priorities had to do with familiarizing and preparing Canadian and American forces to operate in the still relatively little known areas of the far north. Specifically, they included: a program of air photography, mapping and charting; familiarization of operations in and testing of equipment and clothing in Arctic conditions; and the collection of scientific data in the Arctic; and the “collection of strategic information necessary for military operations in Canada, Newfoundland and Alaska.” Section VII, BSP, 5 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5750, File 52-C(s) Part 2.2.

51 Section IX, BSP, 5 June 1946, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5750, File 52-C(s) Part 2.2.

52 Section X, BSP, Ibid.

53 Section VIII, BSP, Ibid.
Specifically, the clause read as follows: “In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Oceans, nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land area, without authorization by the Chiefs of Staff concerned.” ABC-22, 28 July 1941, DHH 355.009 (D20).


DMO&P to Vice-Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), 17 June 1946, DHH 112.3M2 (D116).

Peter Haydon. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 69.

As of December 1947 there were 12 appendices either already approved or in preparation by the MCC. Once approved they were attached to the BSP and subject to further revisions as changes in the strategic situation, military technological advances, etc. dictated. In the word of Major-General C.C. Mann, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and also the senior Canadian Army member of the MCC, “the Basic [Security] Plan states the problems, [and] the Appendices evolve the methods by which they are to be met.” Major-General C.C. Mann, “A Situation Report on the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan,” 11 December 1947, DHH 327.009 (D201).

JCS, Memorandum for the Senior U.S. Army and Navy Members, Canadian-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee,” 2 July 1946, NARA, RG 333, Files of International Military Agencies – PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 1, File “Top Secret General Correspondence, 1941-1956;” Folder 2; Minutes of the 357th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 11 July 1946, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes, DHH 193.009 (D53); Chiefs of Staff Committee Memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee, “Canadian-United States Joint Appreciation and Basic Security Plan; comments thereon by the Chiefs of Staff,” 15 July 1946, DHH 112.1 (D178).

See Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, 338-344, Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 24-29, and also documents from June to November 1946 in LAC, RG 25, Volume 5750, File 52-C(s) Part 2.2.

Extract from Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 11 February 1947, DHH 112.3M2 (D125).


Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 19.

Appendices dealing with combined Canada-U.S. continental defence military operations included: Anti-Aircraft Ground Defence (Appendix “G”); Protection of Sea Lines of Communication (Appendix “H”); and Mobile Striking Force (Appendix “I”). They were all completed by the MCC and given to the U.S. and Canadian Chiefs of Staff approval between July 1947 and September 1948. Anti-Aircraft Ground Defence Appendix (Appendix “G” to BSP), 19 June 1947 and Note by the Secretaries of the JCS, 12 May 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 019, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 7; Extract from Minutes of the 405th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 23 December 1947, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers – December 1947, DHH 2002/17, Box 73, File 5; Protection of Sea Lines of Communications Appendix (Appendix “H” to BSP), 15 October 1947, and Extract from Minutes of the 415th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12 February 1948, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers – February 1948, DHH 2002/17, Box 73, File 8; 1541/52 JCS Minute, 7 September 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 019, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 11; Mobile Striking Force Appendix (Appendix “I” to BSP), 22 July 1947, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 019, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 7; Extract from Minutes of
417th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 2 March 1948, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers – March 1948, DHH 2002/17, Box 73, File 11; Lt. Col. R.G. Sparrow, Plans and Operations, to Director of Plans and Operations, 14 May 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 019, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 11.

Planning Group of the Military Co-operation Committee, Appendix A to the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan, (Draft) Air Interceptor and Air Warning Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1. The main purpose of the plan was to provide for “the defense of the vital areas of the North American continent with due regard to possible and probable avenues of air attack.” Planning Group of the Military Co-operation Committee, Appendix A AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1. The AIAW appendix did not cover ground anti-aircraft artillery defences, as they were included in Appendix “G,” Anti-Aircraft Ground Defence.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

AIAW Plan, 9 December 1946, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 1.

The AIAW Plan was approved “as a basis for long range planning, subject to continued revision in the light of improved equipment and weapons.” Minutes of the 400th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 4 September 1947, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes 1947, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/1302; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 27-29. Quote from former.

This will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. MCC Memorandum, “Programme for Implementation Measures for the Period from 1 April 1949 to 30 June 1950,” 18 March 1948, NARA, RG 59, State Department Records, PJBD-MCC, Entry E1184, Box 25, File “Military Cooperation Committee II.”


Minutes to the 106th Meeting of the Joint Planning Committee, 9 September 1947, LAC, RG 24, Volume 8083, File 2172-10-10 Part 3.

Chapter Seven

See, for example, MCC Memorandum, “Recommendation for Immediate Measures to Facilitate Ultimate Implementation of the Air Interceptor and Air Warning Appendix to the Canadian-U.S. Basic Security Plan,” 3 May 1947, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 019, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 6.

3 MCC Memorandum for the Chairman of the Sub-Committees of the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, 9 August 1948, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 9, DHH 2002/17, Box 55, File 3; Draft MCC 200, Canada-United States Basic Security Program, 10 December 1948, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106); MCC Memorandum to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the United States Chiefs of Staff, 25 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 16; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 2 June 1948, copy in LAC, MG 30, E133, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, Volume 289, File PJBD, Canadian Government, Cabinet Defence Committee, 1-14-2 Part 1; MCC Memorandum for the Chairman of the Sub-Committees of the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, 13 December 1948, NARA, RG 341, Records of HQ USAF, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Operations, Director of Communications – Electronics, Reserve Force Group, General File 1946-1949, # 28 & # 29, Box 18, File MCM 14 April 1949 (Supersedes MCCM-60, 7 February 1949); MCC 100/4, Canada-United States Basic Security Plan, 5 August 1948, NARA, RG 341, Records of HQ USAF, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Operations, Director of Communications – Electronics, Reserve Force Group, General File 1946-1949, Box 17, #27 to #28, Book #2, Canadian-U.S. MCC Subcommittee on Air Interceptor and Air Warning System, December 1946 to October 1948 (MCCM papers).

4 MCC 300/1, Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan, 25 March 1949, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 16; MCC Memorandum for the Chairman of the Sub-Committees of the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, 9 August 1948, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 9, DHH 2002/17, Box 55, File 3. Quote from former.

5 MCC 300/1, EDP, 25 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 16.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 See also see Memo, “Review of Appendices to the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan,” 19 May 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 035, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 11.

9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 The U.S. Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) considered the draft EDP Command appendix in November 1948 and that the issue of the “Combined Command” was to be discussed at the upcoming winter 1949 MCC meeting. However, there is no reference to this issue in the actual MCC minutes. Minutes of the 153rd Meeting of the JPC, 18 January 1949, JPC Minutes, DHH 2002/17, Box 53, File 5; Minute Sheet, Secretary JPC, to JPC, 20 November 1948, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence, DHH 2002/17, Box 55, File 4. Specifically, despite a formal ATIP request the following file at Library and Archives Canada titled “Command of Canada-US continental defence forces,” still remains restricted: LAC, RG 25, Volumes 6046, 6047, & 6048, File 50309-40.

14 JPC Memo, “Background: Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan (MCC 300/2),” 22 May 1951, and Extract from the Minutes of the 446th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 26 April 1949, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 3; Minutes of the 161st Meeting of the JPC, 5 May 1949, JPC Minutes, DHH 2002/17, Box 52, File 5; Secretary, JPC, to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 August 1949 and Brigadier G. Kitging, BGS Plans, to CGS, 12 September 1949, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, November 1948, DHH 2002/17, Box 75, File 8.
Appendix “E” Command (MCC 305), to MCC 300/1, EDP, 25 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 16. See also Memorandum from Acting Head, Defence Liaison Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 11 April 1949, DCER, 15, 1560-1561.

Appendix “E” Command (MCC 305), to MCC 300/1, EDP, 25 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 16.

Ibid.

U.S. Navy Department Memo by W. Miller to Rear Admiral C.D. Glover, Jr., USN, Rear Admiral W.F. Boone, USN, Brigadier General C.V.R. Schuyler, U.S. Army, and Colonel J.S. Cary, USAF, “Canada-United States Basic Security Plan – Report of Status, 23 May 1949, NARA, RG 333, Files of International Military Agencies – PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 2, File “Top “Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 11Secretary, JPC, to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 August 1949 and Brigadier G. Kitching, BGs Plans, to CGS, 12 September 1949, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, November 1948, DHH 2002/17, Box 75, File 8; Extract from Minutes of the 482nd Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 6 October 1949, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, November 1948, DHH 2002/17, Box 75, File 8.

The best account of the radar air defence system in the 1950s is Chapters Three and Four in Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs and C.L. Grant, The Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, USAF Historical Study No. 126 (Montgomery, Alabama: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University [1954]).

Progress Report No. 11 for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence from the Canadian Section of the Canada-United States Military Co-Operation Committee, 11 May 1950, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, May 1950, DHH 2002/17, Box 76, File 5; Minutes of the 71st Meeting of the PJBD, 27-31 May 1950, PJBD Journals, DHH 82/196, Volume 8; MCC 300/2 [also known in the U.S. as JCS 1955/1], Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan, 23 May 1950, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 22. Minutes of the 5-25 May 1950 Meeting of the MCC, 25 May 1950, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540.

EDP, MCC 300/2, 23 May 1950, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section 22; MCC to U.S. JCS and Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, 25 May 1950, NARA, RG 341, Entry 335, Box 723, Air Force, Plans, Project Decimal File 1942-1954, File Canada 600.2 (12 May 1948), Section 3; DEIA Defence Liaison Memorandum, “Revised Emergency Defence Plan (“MCC 300/2”)” approved by MCC on May 25.”, 29 June 1950, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File PJBD, Misc. Papers, Mitchell Field, Langley, Ft. Monroe Mtgs, 2 October 1950; JPC Report 17-14, “Military Cooperation Committee Planning,” to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, State Department Records, PJBD-MCC, Entry E1184, Box 25, File “Military Co-operation Committee III.” Quote from latter. The five areas were: 1) Montreal-Boston-Norfolk-Chicago (i.e., Northeast and Great Lakes area); 2) Vancouver-Spokane-Portland; 3) Fairbanks-Anchorage-Kodiak; 4) San Francisco-San Diego; and 5) Central New Mexico. The considerations that went into deciding these five areas were: 1) the Soviets’ most probable course of action; 2) vulnerability of the various areas, particularly to air attack; 3) density of essential elements of North American war-making capacity within certain areas; extent of Canada-U.S. own defensive capabilities; and 5) extent to which defence of selected areas would indirectly contribute to the protection of other areas by creating defence in depth.


See MCC 300/3, 1 June 1951, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, File CCS 092 (1-10-45) Section B.P.L [Bulky Package – Section 28]. These minor revisions simply reflected changes to Canadian and
American command organization (i.e., the elevating of RCAF Air Defence Group to command status and the establishment of the Continental Air Command in the U.S. – see below).


27 DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 1; Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 53-54; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 10; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 30.

28 Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 4-6. 12. Quote from page four.

29 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 6; Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 50, 54, 61, 64. Upon its creation, ADC only had two percent of the entire air force’s manpower.

30 Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 3, 5. Another USAF study noted that upon its establishment in 1946, USAF ADC “was given two fighter squadrons, a few radars, and an organization of six numbered air forces, only two of which were active” – for the defence of the entire United States. DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 11 (Colorado Springs: North American Air Defence Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, 1965), 1.

31 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 22, 24; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 6; Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 60.

32 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 12-13, 17; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 29; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 17. Quote from first source.

33 Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 17; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 30; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 22-27.

34 DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 5-6; Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 57; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 9, 36; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 16; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 29, 34.

35 DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 5-6; Schaffel, The Emerging Shield, 57; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 9, 36; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 16; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 30, 33-34.

36 ARAACOM began with 23 gun battalions in April 1951, increasing to 45 by the end of the year (10 from the National Guard). Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 26;

37 DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 30.

38 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 30; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 30; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 36, 78. Quote from first source.

39 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 30; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 26; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 36. Colorado Springs thus became the Combat Operations Centre of the U.S. air defence effort. As we will see in Chapter Nine, six and a half years later it would also be the headquarters for NORAD.

40 JCS 1259/194, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the JCS on The Unified Air Defense Command Plan, 8 January 1951 and JCS 1259/196, Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations for the JCS on The Unified Air Defense Command Plan, 19 January 1951, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, copy at ML, RMC; Chronology of JCS Involvement...
in North American Air Defense, 31-32; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 78.

41 Extract from Minutes of the 304th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 November 1944 and CGS to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8 November 1944, Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, Volume 29, February to April 1944, DHH 2002/17, Box 68, File 3 [formerly 193.009 (D30)]; Minutes of the 171st Meeting of the Joint Service Committee Atlantic Coast, 12 October 1945, DHH 2002/17, Box 69, File 8a.


44 As with previous Canadian joint and combined command organizations, responsibility for administration and logistics remained with the respective service chief. JPC Report 25-13, “Planning and Control of Joint Operations in Defence of Canada,” 15 May 1950, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Organization, Defences Against Enemy Lodgements, DHH 2002/17, Box 111, File 6.


For a stark assessment of the poor state of Canada’s air defence capabilities, see JPC Report, “Canadian Air Defence Requirements,” 14 July 1948, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 9, March to August 1948, DHH 2002/17, Box 55, File 3.

The responsibilities of Air Defence Group were as follows:

a) Preparation of an Air Defence plan for Canada including Anti-Aircraft defences.

b) Direct liaison with RAF and USAF on Air Defence procedures and doctrines.

c) Direct liaison with USAF on Air Defence planning for North America under the provisions of the Emergency Defence Plan.

a) Formulation of operational procedures and doctrines for day and night interceptor operations and tactics.


The AOC ADC also had “administrative control of RCAF units” in his command. This command and control authority had previously been exercised by the AOC Training Command. Joint Organization Order 14, 23 May 1951, LAC, RG 24, Acc. 1983-84/216, Box 3108, File HQS-895-100-69/14, Part 1; RCAF ADC history “for background information purposes,” entitled “Air Defence Command,” n.d. [August 1953], LAC, RG 24, Acc. 1983-84/216, Box 3108, File HQS-895-100-69/14, Part 5. Quote from former.


Minutes of the 200th JPC Meeting, 22 August 1950, JPC Minutes, DHH 2002/17, Box 52, File 5.

DMO&P Memorandum, “Canada-United States Emergency Air Defence Plan,” to CGS, 9 December 1950, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, DHH 112.3M2 (D121).

Ibid. Briefly, these areas, described above, included the eastern United States, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence area, and the west coast.

Ibid.
DMO&P Memorandum, “Canada-United States Emergency Air Defence Plan,” to CGS, 9 December 1950, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, DHH 112.3M2 (D121).

Secretary, U.S. Section MCC to Canadian Section MCC, 9 February 1951, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Volume 3. Although the specific Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee decision on the EADP remains classified, I have been able to glean this information from a number of documents that make reference to this document. See Agreed Policy Set Forth in the Canada-US Emergency Air Defence Plan (CANUSEADP), Appendix “D” to (Draft) RCAF DAPS Study, “A Staff Study on Desirable [sic] Control Arrangements for the Integrated Canada-US Air Defence System,” 21 February 1951, Air Commodore (A/C) H.B. Godwin, C/Plans, to V/CAS, 7 September 1951, and D/CAS to AOC ADC, 15 September 1951, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3. These documents also indicate that the RCAF and USAF approved a revised Canada-U.S. EADP that contained agreed upon common technical and doctrinal air defence practices (see the first document cited in this note for a summary of the EADP) but excluded command and control provisions. As with the EDP, the EADP was revised annually. See documents regarding the EADP, August to November 1951 in NARA, RG 341, Entry 335, Box 723, Air Force, Plans, Project Decimal File 1942-1954, File Canada 660.2 (12 May 1948), Section 5 and NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 31, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 29.


By this time, the PJBD had re-numbered its recommendations to reflect the year in which each one was made. The PJBD stressed that the recommendation “should be implemented forthwith as a matter of great urgency.” Minutes of the 74th Meeting of the PJBD, 29-30 January and 1 February 1951, 10-11 January 1951, PJBD Journals, DHH 82/196, Volume 9; PJBD Recommendation 51/1, 31 January 1951, DHH 79/35. The Canadian Government approved Recommendation 51/1 on 20 February 1951, followed by President Truman’s assent on 14 April. Minutes of the 71st Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 20 February 1950, Cabinet Defence Committee Meetings 1951, LAC, RG 2, 18, Box 244, File C-10-9M; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 33.

(Draft) “RCAF-USAF Agreement Concerning Air Defence of Canada and the United States,” 24 April 1951, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3. Arrangements for command and control of air defence forces in the northeast were dealt with in an attachment to this document. It is discussed in the next chapter.


Minutes of the 21-26 September 1952 Meeting of the PJBD, PJBD Journal, copy in LAC, MG 33, B12, Paul Martin Sr. Papers, File 70-5 – National Defence, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, August 1951 to October 1953. Special thanks to Matt Trudgen for providing me a copy of this file.


RCAF PJBD Member to USAF PJBD Member, 4 December 1950, Enclosure “B” to JCS 1541/69, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 36, File CS 092 (9-10-45), Section 24. See also the RCAF’s Roundel service magazine, which in the early 1950s began to dedicate an increasing number of articles and features to air defence topics.

DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 11-12.


RCAF PJBD Member to USAF PJBD Member, 4 December 1950, Enclosure “B” to JCS 1541/69, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 36, File CS 092 (9-10-45), Section 24; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 30; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 53; G/C K.L.B. Hodson, DAPS, Memorandum, “A Study of the Improvements Required in the Defence Measures to be Taken in Canada in the Event of Sudden Attack or Threat of Attack Prior to Discussion with the US of Desirable Methods For Achieving Concerted Action in an Emergency of the Co-ordinated Defence Forces of the Two Nations,” 26 June 1951, AFHQ Fonds, DHH 96/24, Box 4, File 6. Quote from first document.

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, USAF, “Canada-U.S. Air Defense Exercises and Operations,” to the JCS, 27 December 1950 and JCS to Chairman, U.S. Section PJBD, 5 January 1951, Enclosure “A” to JCS 1541/69, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 36, File CS 092 (9-10-45), Section 24; Secretary, U.S. Section MCC, to PJBD, 7 January 1951, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 3, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 16; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 30. Quote from 7 January document.


Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 54; Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 54; Nicks et al., History of the Air Defence of Canada 1948-1997, 9-10; USAF Directorate of Requirements, “General Operational Requirement for an Aircraft Control and Warning System for Air Defense 1952-1958,” 27 December 1951, NARA, RG 341, Records of Headquarters USAF (Air Staff), Directorate of Operational Requirements Air Defense Division Control and Warning Branch Files, 1951-1961, Box 1, Entry E-1040, File SOR-3, General Operational Requirements for an Aircraft Control and Warning System for Air Defense, 1952-1958. JCS historian Robert Watson perhaps described the situation best: “The radar nets [in the U.S.] were tied in with 14 control centers, which would direct the air battle in case of attack. The methods and equipment used at these centers were already approaching obsolescence. Radar data was transmitted to the control centers by conventional human telling [i.e., telephone]. Manual methods of operations were used for computing the tracks of hostile aircraft, assigning weapons, and vectoring fighter aircraft.” Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953-1954 (Washington: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), 112. Academic work on the history of air defence doctrine such as the ground control centre-interceptor relationship is very minimal and therefore offers an interesting area of future study for air force scholars.

Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 50. In fact, according to one RCAF Directive, ADCC commander’s “major responsibilities” included “control and direction of the operations of the flying squadrons allocated to him by the Command HQ” and also “exercise of operational control over the [Army] anti-aircraft forces employed in his area through the appropriate” Army Anti-Aircraft (AA) commander. This is a good example of the evolutionary nature of command and control terminology at this time. AOC ADC Memorandum, “Establishment – Upgrading Officer Position, All ADCC Establishments – Air Defence Command,” 11 December 1951, LAC, RG 24, Acc. 1983-84/216, Box 3108, File HQS-895-100-69/14, Part 3.

As a revised version of the draft RCAF-USAF agreement explained it, the Canadian air defence commander “will exercise tactical control of aircraft airborne under control of Canadian GCI’s,” while the USAF air defence commander “will exercise tactical control of all aircraft airborne under control of United States GCI’s.” Revised page three to (Draft) “RCAF-USAF Agreement Concerning Air Defence of Canada and the United States,” attached to G/C K.L.B. Hodson, DAPS, to AMAP, 21 May 1951, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3. The issue of command and control of air defence forces in Newfoundland is explored further in the next chapter.

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The recommendation was approved by the Canadian Government on 12 November 1951 and by the JCS and President Truman in January and March 1952, respectively. Claxton Memorandum, “Canada-United States Air Defence Mutual Re-Inforcement,” 3 December 1951, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2751, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents Volume XI; Decision on JCS 1541/76, “Movement of Service Aircraft Across the Canada-U.S. Border,” 18 January 1952, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 32, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 30; Secretary, U.S. Section PJBD to Chairman, U.S. Section PJBD, 23 April 1952, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 4, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 23; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 39.

The best overall account of the cross-border interception subject is by Joseph Jockel in his seminal 1987 publication No Boundaries Upstairs (see in particular pages 36-37 and 50-59). What is detailed in this section is the effect that this issue had on Canada-U.S. air defence command and control. General Charles Foulkes, “The Complications of Continental Defence,” in Neighbors Taken for Granted: Canada and the United States, Livingston T. Merchant, ed. (Toronto: Burns and MacEachern Limited, 1966), 112.

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approved by both the Secretary of Defense and the President on 24 August 1950. Minute by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and minute by President Harry S. Truman on Ibid., both dated 24 August 1950. In July, the U.S. had established Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ) in certain “vital areas,” where “all military aircraft were required, and civil aircraft requested, to file flight plans as an aid to identification.” Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, 32.

94 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 50.

95 USAF PJBD Member Status Report for period October 1950 through January 1951, 22 January 1951, attached to Minutes of the 74th Meeting of the PJBD, 30-31 January and 1 February 1951, PJBD Journals, DHH 82/196, File 9, Secretary, U.S. Section MCC, to PJBD, 7 January 1951, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 3, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 16; Minutes of the 75th Meeting of the PJBD, 7-10 May 1951, PJBD Journals, DHH 82/196, File 9. The Recommendation appears in Appendix 2.

96 Minutes of the 72nd Meeting of the PJBD, 2-5 October 1950, PJBD Journals, DHH 82/196, File 8; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 52; Claxton Memorandum for the Cabinet Defence Committee, “United States Air Operations Over Canadian Territory – Interception of Unidentified Aircraft,” 27 November 1950, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2751, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Volume IX; Minutes of the 68th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 1 December 1950, LAC, RG 18, Volume 244, File C-10-9M, “Cabinet Defence Committee Meetings.”

97 Memorandum by AD.P. Heeney, Secretary of State for External Affairs, “United States Air Operations Over Canadian Territory – Interception of Unidentified Aircraft,” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 25 May 1951, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2751, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents, Volume X; Extract from Minutes of the 74th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 29 May 1951, Cabinet Defence Committee Fonds, DHH 2002/03, Series I, File 59; Secretary, Canadian Section PJBD, to Secretary, U.S. Section, PJBD, 31 May 1951, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, Volume 293, File PJBD – Interceptor Flight Rec 51/4.


101 Major-General Robert W. Burns, USAF Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, to Major-General R.L. Walsh, USAF PJBD Member, 14 April 1952, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 4, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 24. The USAF proposal did not define “hostile act” and “manifestly hostile intent” because it was “considered to be impracticable to attempt to list or otherwise define all of the many ways in which an aircraft can commit a hostile act or evidence hostile intent” and because “any agreement specifically spelling out such methods would be too restrictive upon the Air Defence Commander concerned.” As we will see shortly, the RCAF disagreed with this viewpoint.

102 The only difference was the clause in the USAF proposal that allowed the pilot to determine if an unidentified aircraft had “manifestly hostile intent.” For RCAF ROE, see RCAF Directive, “Authority to Intercept and Engage Hostile Aircraft,” n.d. [mid-November 1951], Cabinet Defence Committee Fonds, DHH 2002/03, Series I, File 59.

The provisions were reciprocal: the same would apply to RCAF interceptors investigating unidentified aircraft in American airspace. RCAF PJBD Member Memorandum, “Aircraft Interception – Modification of Agreement,” to Secretary, Canadian Section PJBD, 8 September 1952, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File U.S. Interceptor Flights Over Canada 1951-1952.

Ibid. Again, the provisions were reciprocal, depending on whose airspace the intercept took place.


None of these had to do with the tactical control arrangements. Minutes of the 26-28 January 1953 PJBD Meeting, PJBD Journals, copy in LAC, MG 33, B12, Martin Papers, File 70-5 – National Defence, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, August 1951 to October 1953; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 56. Quote from former.

R.A. Mackay, DEA Member PJBD, to Air Vice-Marshal F.R. Miller, RCAF PJBD Member, 12 November 1952, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, Volume 293, File Proposed Extension Rec. 51/4, Interceptor Flights.

Claxton Memorandum, “Aircraft Interception Modification of Agreement,” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 25 March 1953, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to the 533rd Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 78, File 30. Because the distinction between “operational control” and “tactical control” was not understood at the time as it is understood now, it is easy to appreciate how Claxton could argue that the delegation of tactical control provision in the proposed agreement was consistent with the EDP Command Appendix. This once again demonstrates the evolutionary process of command and control principles and terminology.

Specifically, the clause read (with the new parts in italics): “The Rules of Interception and Engagement of the country over which the interception or engagement takes place are to apply, even though the intercepting aircraft is being controlled from the other country.” Minutes of the 28 September-1 October 1953 PJBD Meeting, PJBD Journals, copy in LAC, MG 33, B12, Martin Papers, File 70-5 – National Defence, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, August 1951 to October 1953; PJBD Recommendation 53/1, 1 October 1953, PJBD Recommendations, DHH 79/35. Quote from latter; emphasis added. The complete recommendation appears below as Appendix 3.

PJBD Recommendation 53/1, 1 October 1953, PJBD Recommendations, DHH 79/35. At the time, Canadian ADCC commanders had to be at the Wing Commander rank, although the RCAF was hoping to raise this to Group Captain. See A/C W.I. Clements to AOC ADC, 29 March 1952, LAC, RG 24, Acc. 1983-84/216, Box 3108, File HQS-895-100-69/14, Part 3.

Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 57.

Senior USAF PJBD Member to JCS, 6 October 1953, quoted in Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 57; R.A. Mackay, DEA Member PJBD, to Air Vice-Marshal F.R. Miller, RCAF PJBD Member, 12 November 1952, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, Volume 293, File Proposed Extension Rec. 51/4, Interceptor Flights; Claxton Memorandum, “Aircraft Interception Modification of Agreement,” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 25 March 1953, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to the 533rd Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 78, File 30.

Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 57-58.

Claxton Memorandum, “Principles Governing the Interception of Unidentified Aircraft in Peace Time,” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 2 November 1953, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to the 537th Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 78, File 34; Extract from Minutes of Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, 3 November 1953, reproduced in DCER, Volume 19, 1953, 1023; Walter D. Smith, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the President, “Recommendation 53/1 of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, concerning the principles governing the interception of unidentified aircraft in peacetime,” 4 December 1953 and minute “Approved” by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on Ibid., 9 December 1953, NARA, RG 59, State Department, Central Decimal File 1950-1954, Box 3186, File 711.56342/2-1853; Minutes of the 10-14 January 1954 PJBD Meeting, PJBD Journals, copy in LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, Volume 286, File PJBD Meetings, June 1953 to January 1955. The Recommendation was also attached to the Command Appendix of the EDP.

Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 55.

Chapter Eight

2. Ibid.
5. Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 14; Webb et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 16; JCS 1259/74, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Establishment of the Northeast Command,” 25 May 1948, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC. Thanks to Matt Trudgen for providing me with copies of printed pages from this microfilm.
10. This was in stark contrast to the concept of “defence against help.” Memorandum by U.S. Section PJBD for Secretary Johnson, 29 July 1949, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 2, File “Top Secret General Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 9.
12. Ibid.
13. Memoranda for the Director of Plans & Operations, CSUSA by Secretary, U.S. Section PJBD, 3 and 5 May 1949 and William P. Snow, Secretary, U.S. Section PJBD, to Major-General Robert L. Walsh, USAF Member, PJBD, 8 June 1949, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 2, File “Top Secret General Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 9; Defence Liaison Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 May 1949, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40; Acting Chairman, U.S. Section PJBD to Secretary of Defense, 2 May 1949 and Memorandum of a Conversation between General Henry and General McNaughton on 23 June 1949, 11 July 1949, Ibid.; McNaughton to McKay, 17 August 1949, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File PJBD, U.S. Government, Northeast Command, 142. Quote from first source. These extra-territorial rights largely had to do with civilian issues such as customs duties and tax exemptions, postal facilities, and legal jurisdiction, not military matters related to the operation of the U.S. bases. However, it was feared that incidents between American servicemen and Newfoundlanders, now Canadian citizens, might have an overall negative effect on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in the new province. As such, the Canadian Government was seeking to re-negotiate several of these rights which had been granted to the U.S. in the original Destroyers-for-Bases Deal in 1941, in light of Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation.
McNaughton to McKay, 17 August 1949, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File PJBD, U.S. Government, Northeast Command, 1-4-2; Extract from 447th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 23 May 1949, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, April 1950, DHH 2002/17, Box 76, File 3; Henry Memorandum for JCS, “Establishment of the Northeast Command,” 28 October 1949, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC; Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Ambassador in Washington, 3 June 1949, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114); Briefing for Secretary of Defense for his visit to Ottawa – 11 August 49, n.d. [likely early August 1949], NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 2, File “Top Secret General Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 10; Memorandum from Minister of National Defence to Cabinet, 16 May 1950, reproduced in Greg Donaghy, ed., *Documents on Canadian External Relations* [hereafter DCER], Volume 16, 1950 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996), 1505; *Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense*, 20-21; Webb et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 17. Quote from first source. The Canadian military in particular liked the idea of dealing with a single American commander in Newfoundland. See Brigadier G. Kitching, BGS (Plans), to CGS, 20 May 1949 and Minute by Vice-Chief of the General Staff, n.d. [21 or 22 May 1949], Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, April 1950, DHH 2002/17, Box 76, File 3.


Secretary, JCS, Memorandum to Senior U.S. Army Member, PJBD, “Establishment of the United States Northeast Command,” 23 September 1949, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC.

Extract from Minutes of the 452nd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 6 October 1949 and BGS (Plans) to CGS, 6 October 1949, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, April 1950, DHH 2002/17, Box 76, File 3; (Unofficial) Memorandum for the JCS from the U.S. Section PJBD, 20 October 1949 and USAF PJBD Member to Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, 21 October 1949, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 2, File “Top Secret General Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 9; R.A. Mackay, Department of External Affairs, to A.D.P. Heeney, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 5 October 1949, Chairman, Canadian Section PJBD, to PJBD Members, 8 October 1949, and Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United Nations to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17 October 1949, LAC, MG 20, E133, McNaughton Papers, File PJBD, U.S. Government, Northeast Command, 1-4-2; Secretary, Canadian Section PJBD, to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 26 October 1949, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114). Quote from last document.

Extract from Minutes of the 452nd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 6 October 1949 Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, April 1950, DHH 2002/17, Box 76, File 3; Chairman, Canadian Section PJBD, to PJBD Members, 8 October 1949, LAC, MG 20, E133, McNaughton Papers, File PJBD, U.S. Government, Northeast Command, 1-4-2; Henry to JCS, 28 October 1949, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC.


Report to the Joint Planning Committee by the Joint Planning Staff, “Proposed United States Northeast Command,” 15 March 1950, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114); Minutes of the 182nd JPC Meeting, 23 March 1950, JPC Minutes, DHH 2002/17, Box 52, File 5; Extract from 460th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 April 1950, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40.

Secretary of State for External Affairs to MND, 6 May 1950, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40.

In the message to the U.S. Section PJBD informing of its decision, the Cabinet Defence Committee indicated that “the Canadian Government appreciates the manner in which the United States authorities have taken into account Canadian views on the early proposals for the command.” *Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense*, 21-22; Webb et al., *History of the Unified Command Plan*, 17; Extract from 463rd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 May 1950, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40; Secretary, Canadian Section PJBD, to Canadian Section PJBD, 24 May 1950, LAC, MG 20, E133, McNaughton Papers, File PJBD, U.S. Government, Northeast Command, 1-4-2; Memorandum from Minister of National Defence, “Proposed U.S. Northeast Command,” to Cabinet, 16 May 1950, reproduced


25 JCS 1259/204, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Forces Proposed for Performance of CINCNE Mission, 13 April 1951, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC.


28 Canadian air force plans in 1950 called for an establishment of five fighter squadrons to be located at St. Hubert, Bagotville, Chatham, Trenton (interim) and Toronto to cover vital points in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence area. This also included radar units at Chatham, Lac St. Joseph, Bagotville area, Pembroke area, and Toronto area. In 1954, an additional CF-100 squadron was assigned to Vancouver to defend the west coast, but no further interceptor aircraft were available for Newfoundland. Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers’ Commanding and Group Commanders Held at Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa, 20-21 March 1950, Air Officers Commanding Conferences, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/2000; Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 92.


East Coast and U.S. Northeast Command were the authorized Canadian and American “planning authorities” as per provisions in the EDP (see previous chapter).

33 D/AMAP/P Study, 21 March 1951, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3. These defences consisted of interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery, but also included an air warning and control system for Newfoundland. This network of radars in the northeast, which was scheduled to be expanded as part of the Pintetree project, merged “with that of the St. Lawrence Valley,” thereby making it an integrated system “intended to offer early warning to the industrial areas of Eastern Canada and the U.S. as much as for the US installations in Newfoundland.” The Canadian Army was also scheduled to have AAA batteries posted to St. John’s according to this study.

34 Ibid. The study also called for “Canadian representation in the appropriate operations rooms.”


36 As a UCP unified command, the chain of command at the time went from Fort Pepperill to the JCS in Washington. M.H. Wershof, Defence Liaison, to R.A. Mackay, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 March 1951, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40. McKay was also the DEA Member of the PJBD.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


41 Ibid; Group Captain K.L.B. Hodson, Director of Air Plans (DAPS), to Secretary, JPC, 4 September 1951, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence, September 1951-January 1952, DHH 2002/17, Box 57, File 1. Quotes from former. See also DHH 73/770, Buss, U.S. Air Defense in the Northeast 1940-1957, 20.

42 Minute, Wing Commander A.C. Hull, DAPS staff officer, to D/AMAP/P, 27 July 1951, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3; G/C Hodson to Secretary, JPC, 4 September 1951, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence, September 1951-January 1952, DHH 2002/17, Box 57, File 1. Quote from latter.


44 AVM F.R. Miller, AMOT, Minute to AMAP, 14 May 1951, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3.


46 Ibid.

47 DMO&P to CGS, 31 October 1951, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence September 1951 to January 1952, DHH 2002/17, Box 57, File 1.

48 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 37; Webb et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 37; Major-General Joseph Smith, USAF Director of Plans, to HQ USAF Operational Plans Division, 20 September 1951, NARA, RG 333, Files of International Military Agencies – PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 3, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 15; Memorandum from Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet to Secretary to the Cabinet, “Appointment of R.C.A.F. Officer as Deputy C-IN-C, U.S. Northeast Command,” 29 October 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1461-1462; JPC Report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Appointment of a Senior RCAF Officer to US North East Command,” 22 October 1951, JPC Minutes to Meeting and Correspondence Volume 10, DHH 2002/17, Box 57, File 1.

49 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff USAF to the JCS on Canadian Participation in the U.S. Northeast Command, 23 October 1951, NARA, RG 333, Files of International Military Agencies – PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 3, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 15.

50 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 20-21; Webb et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 37; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58; DHH 73/770, Buss, U.S. Air Defense in the Northeast 1940-1957, 19-20; JCS 1259/209, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Canadian Participation in the U.S. Northeast Command, 3 October 1951 and JCS 1259/211, Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Canadian Participation in the U.S. Northeast Command, 15 October 1951, JCS 1259/214, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of staff on Canadian Participation in the U.S. Northeast
Command, 24 October 1951, and Memorandum for Chairman, U.S. Section, PJBD, 26 October 1951, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC; Major-General Guy Henry, Chairman, U.S. Section, to Canadian PJBD Section 9 November 1951, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114). Quote from USAF Chief’s Memorandum of 24 October 1951.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.

Major-General Guy Henry, Chairman, U.S. Section, to Canadian PJBD Section 9 November 1951, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114). Quote from USAF Chief’s Memorandum of 24 October 1951.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.

Memorandum from Defence Liaison (2) Division to Head, Defence Liaison (1) Division, 28 August 1951, reproduced in DCER, Volume 17, 1951, 1456-1462; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 58. Quote from Jockel.


72 Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to CAS, 3 June 1952 and Extract from Minutes of the 523rd Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, 30 May 1952, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114); Secretary, Canadian Section PJBD, Memorandum “Canadian Participation in and Command Relations with U.S. North East Command,” to Canadian Section PJBD, 3 June 1952, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40; Minutes of the 11/52 Meeting of the JPC, 25 March 1952 and JPC Report, “Review of the Factors Involved in the Canada-US Relationship in the Northeast Areas of Canada,” 7 May 1952, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 12, March to June 1952, DHH 2002/17, Box 57, File 3. See also G/C S.W. Coleman, DAPs, Memorandum “Command and Control – Newfoundland and Labrador” to C Plans I, 17 April 1952, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3.

73 Specifically, the two relevant clauses in the Command Appendix to the EDP read as follows: “The Command principles set out in paragraph 3a below do not apply in the case of those bases in Canada leased and/or occupied by United States forces for which special agreements exist” and “The Commander-in-Chief, United States Northeast Command is an exception in that while he is within the command structure of the United States Armed Forces, some of his forces are located in Canada. The principle outlined in paragraph 3a above, therefore does not apply in this case.” Paragraph 3a of the Command Appendix read as follows: “Any force located in Canada and employed in execution of the tasks set forth in this plan will operate under a commander designated by Canada.” Appendix “F” Command to MCC 300/3, Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan, 1 June 1951, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 37, File CCS 092 (9-10-45) Section B.P. [Bulky Package – Section 28]. The “special agreements” refers to the original Leased Bases Agreement of 1941.


75 M.H. Wershof, Defence Liaison Division, Memorandum “Basic Provisions for Canada-United States Collaboration on Defence in the Northeastern Areas of Canada” to Heeney, 17 July 1952, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40. DEA also wanted to ensure that it would be the Cabinet that made any decision on command and control arrangements in Newfoundland.

76 Curtis also suggested the appointment of a RCAF liaison officer to the staff of U.S. Northeast Command. CAS Memorandum, “Relationship Between Canadian Military Authorities and The Commander-in-Chief United States Northeast Command,” n.d. [22 or 23 July 1952], Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/105. This was the final version of the CAS’ paper that was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. See Foulkes to Claxton, 23 July 1952, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40.

77 DHH 73/770, Buss, U.S. Air Defense in the Northeast 1940-1957, 20; M.H. Wershof, Defence Liaison Division, Memorandum “Basic Provisions for Canada-United States Collaboration on Defence in the Northeastern Areas of Canada” to Heeney, 17 July 1952, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40. Wershof recorded that Myers “would only be too pleased to place his air defence forces under the Canadian Air Defence Commander” and this was a “complete reversal of the attitude adopted by his predecessor.” Again, this goes to show the importance that individual personalities sometimes plays in the Canada-U.S. air defence command and control relationship.


79 Minutes of the 28th, 29th, 33rd and 34th JPC Meetings, 14 and 19 August, 30 September and 7 October 1952, respectively, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2; Brigadier H.E. Taber for Air Vice Marshal Hugh Campbell, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Mission Washington, to Secretary, U.S. Section MCC, 20 August 1952, and Canadian Draft Revision of the Command Appendix “F” to the Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan – MCC 300/3 (WT 1/52) Proposed by the Canadian Section, MCC, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D106) Part 4. Quote from last document.
80 JCS 1259/253, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Defense Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada, 15 October 1952, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 40.
81 JCS 1259/260, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Defense Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada, 4 November 1952, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 40. The Canadian Section MCC later proposed, and the Americans accepted, that instead of a “military agreement” that the previous idea to continue work on making an amendment to the Command Appendix to the EDP was more practicable. See Minutes to the 4/52 Meeting of the MCC, 21 November 1952, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540.
82 Minutes of a Conference of Air Officers’ Commanding and Group Commanders Held at Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa, 5, 6, and 7 November 1952, Air Officers’ Commanding Conferences, 1952, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/2000. See also Extract from Minutes of the 531st Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12 November 1952, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to the 531st Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 78, File 28 and Minutes of the 26-28 January 1953 Meeting of the PJBD, PJBD Journal, copy in LAC, MG 33, B12, Martin Papers, File 70-5 – National Defence, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, August 1951 to October 1953. The USAF squadron arrived at Goose Bay in November 1952.
84 JCS 1259/260, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Defense Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada, 4 November 1952, Records of the JCS, Strategic Issues, Reel 9 (Section 2), Part 2, 1946-1953, microfilm copy at ML, RMC; Canadian Joint Staff Washington to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 7 November 1952, Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to 531st Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 78, File 28. Portions of the JCS Memorandum, notably the command and control and Canadian ROE proposals, were reproduced in the Canadian Joint Staff Washington document.
85 Ibid.  This ROE arrangement did not, however, apply to USAF aircraft employed on operations in or over Greenland, which of course was part of U.S. Northeast Command but not under Canadian jurisdiction.
86 MND Memorandum “Control of Air Defence Forces and the United States Northeast Command Operating Over Canada” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 8 January 1953, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2752, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents Volume XIII.
87 Minutes of the 41/52 JPC Meeting, 10 November 1952, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent agreed, noting at the 14 November Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting that “a very satisfactory solution of the problem of U.S. military activities in Newfoundland appeared to be in sight,” and adding specifically that “General McNaughton was to be congratulated for his work on this problem in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.” Extract from Minutes of the 90th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 14 November 1952, reproduced in DCER, Volume 18, 1952, 1155-1156.
88 JPC Study, “Changes Suggested to Command Appendix “F” in the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence Plan (MCC 300/4),” n.d. [likely 18 November 1952], JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2.
89 The JPC also made sure to make special note that that Goose Bay was not included as a U.S. base and that the Americans had to have the “express permission of the Canadian Government” to move forces to this air base. See JPC Report for Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Proposals of the US Section MCC for a Military Agreement on the Canadian Operational Control of US Defence Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada,” 12 November 1952, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2.

91 See Chapter Five. The modern definition of operational control is “The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON [tactical control] of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.” Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.3a

92 Revision of the Command Appendix “F” Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300/3), Appendix “A” to Minutes of the 5/52 Meeting of the MCC, 21 November 1952, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540. This excluded “temporary tactical” deployments in “emergency situations,” which did not require previous Canadian permission. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal F.R. Miller, described a hypothetical instance of how this exception would apply: “if a movement of SAC bombers were taking place through Goose Bay, CINCNE could move a fighter squadron from Harmon [AFB, Stephenville, Newfoundland] to Goose Bay for the duration of the operation without obtaining permission.” AVM Miller to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 31 December 1952, LAC, RG 24, Accession 1983-84 049, Box 113, File 096-107-5 Part 1.

93 Revision of the Command Appendix “F” Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300/3), Appendix “A” to Minutes of the 5/52 Meeting of the MCC, 21 November 1952, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540. This excluded “temporary tactical deployment” of USAF aircraft, although the AOC ADC was still to be informed of such movements. A previous paper had defined “temporary tactical deployment” at a period of no more than two weeks. (Draft) Proposed Directive on Amplification of the Can-US Agreement Concerning the Operational Control of US Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada, n.d. [likely 12 November 1952], JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2. The “designated commander” was the AOC ADC, to whom the Chief of the Air Staff delegated the RCAF’s primary responsibility for air defence. As Miller put it, this clause ensured that the Chiefs of Staff Committee “will have, at all times, the complete picture regarding CINCNE’s air defence forces in Canada.” AVM Miller to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 31 December 1952, LAC, RG 24, Accession 1983-84 049, Box 113, File 096-107-5 Part 1; CAS Memorandum “Directive – Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases within Canada” to AOC ADC, 5 March 1953, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/101.

94 Revision of the Command Appendix “F” Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300/3), Appendix “A” to Minutes of the 5/52 Meeting of the MCC, 21 November 1952, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540. This excluded “temporary tactical deployment” of USAF aircraft, although the AOC ADC was still to be informed of such movements. A previous paper had defined “temporary tactical deployment” at a period of no more than two weeks. (Draft) Proposed Directive on Amplification of the Can-US Agreement Concerning the Operational Control of US Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada, n.d. [likely 12 November 1952], JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2. The “designated commander” was the AOC ADC, to whom the Chief of the Air Staff delegated the RCAF’s primary responsibility for air defence. As Miller put it, this clause ensured that the Chiefs of Staff Committee “will have, at all times, the complete picture regarding CINCNE’s air defence forces in Canada.” AVM Miller to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 31 December 1952, LAC, RG 24, Accession 1983-84 049, Box 113, File 096-107-5 Part 1; CAS Memorandum “Directive – Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases within Canada” to AOC ADC, 5 March 1953, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/101.

95 See M.H. Barton, Defence Liaison Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1 December 1952, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40.


97 Revision of the Command Appendix “F” Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300/3), Appendix “A” to Minutes of the 5/52 Meeting of the MCC, 21 November 1952, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540. This excluded “temporary tactical deployment” of USAF aircraft, although the AOC ADC was still to be informed of such movements. A previous paper had defined “temporary tactical deployment” at a period of no more than two weeks. (Draft) Proposed Directive on Amplification of the Can-US Agreement Concerning the Operational Control of US Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases Within Canada, n.d. [likely 12 November 1952], JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 14, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 2. The “designated commander” was the AOC ADC, to whom the Chief of the Air Staff delegated the RCAF’s primary responsibility for air defence. As Miller put it, this clause ensured that the Chiefs of Staff Committee “will have, at all times, the complete picture regarding CINCNE’s air defence forces in Canada.” AVM Miller to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 31 December 1952, LAC, RG 24, Accession 1983-84 049, Box 113, File 096-107-5 Part 1; CAS Memorandum “Directive – Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases within Canada” to AOC ADC, 5 March 1953, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/101.


99 Ibid. The Canadian JPC had approved the EDP Command Appendix amendment at its meeting two days earlier Extract from Minutes of the 43/52 JPC Meeting, 25 November, LAC, RG 25, Volume 5961, File 50221-40.

100 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 44; Minutes of the 5/52 Meeting of the MCC, 10-13 December 1952 and 1/53 Meeting, 24 February-3 March 1953, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540; Minutes of the 46/52 JPC Meeting, 16 December 1952, JPC Minutes to Meetings and Correspondence Volume 15, DHH 2002/17, Box 58, File 3; Secretary, U.S. Section MCC to JCS, 24 December 1952, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 32, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 32; “Chairman Chiefs of Staff Brief on Latest Developments Pertaining to Canada-US Defence Arrangements,” n.d. [likely early March 1953], LAC, RG 24, Volume 21418, File 1855:1 Part 3.

101 MND Memorandum “Control of Air Defence Forces and the United States Northeast Command Operating Over Canada” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 8 January 1953, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2752, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents Volume XIII; Minutes of the 91st Meeting of the Cabinet Defence
Committee, 10 February 1953, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2749, File Cabinet Defence Committee Conclusions Volume VI. At the Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting Foulkes noted that one of the purposes of the revised EDP Command Appendix was “to ensure that no interception of potentially hostile aircraft would be made by U.S. aircraft except on the authority of a Canadian.” American approval of the revised document only required authority from the JCS, not the President.


103 Ibid. The Directive also called for the AOC ADC to “take such actions as he considers necessary to ensure close liaison between” his headquarters and that of the CinC U.S. Northeast Command “for the successful implementation of these plans.”

104 CAS Memorandum “Directive – Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases within Canada” to AOC ADC, 5 March 1953, Raymont Collection, DH 73/1223/101.

105 Canada, Air Force, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000 (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2007), 51; Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 96-98.


107 The modern definition of operational command is: “the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate OPCON [operational control] and/or tactical control (TACON) as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.” Source: Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.2.


110 Air Vice-Marshal A.L. James, AOC ADC, and Lieutenant-General C.T. Meyers, CinC U.S. Northeast Command, “Agreed Control Arrangements by AOC ADC – C IN C NEC,” 21 April 1953, LAC, RG 24, Volume 6172, File 15-73-3. Specifically, “Rules of Engagement” was defined in the agreement as follows: “Rules of Engagement are written authorities and procedures by which an air defence commander [in this case the AOC ADC] determines when, where, by whom, and under what circumstances interceptions and engagements of unidentified or hostile aircraft may take place.”


Chapter Nine


3 Joseph Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 122-123; Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 72; Minutes of the 96th Cabinet Defence Committee Meeting, 3 November 1953, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2749, Cabinet Defence Committee Conclusions Volume VI. See also Claxton Memorandum, “Continental Air Defence,” for Cabinet Defence Committee, 29 October 1953, LAC, RG 2, Volume 2752, Cabinet Defence Committee Documents Volume XIII.


7 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 70-71; Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, V, 1953-1954, 134; Extract from Minutes of the 545th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 6 October 1953, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting Papers, Papers to the 545th Meeting, Joint Staff Fonds, DHH 2002/17, Box 79, File 6.

8 The RCAF had begun posting Canadian airmen to the USAF ADC headquarters starting in 1951. They quickly saw the value of closer collaboration with like-minded air force officers, which paved the way for the establishment of the ADSG. DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 47-48; Joseph T. Jockel, Canada in NORAD 1957-2007: A History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, in association with The Queen’s Centre for International Relations and The Queen’s Defence Management Program, 2007), 12; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 56, 93.


10 Memorandum for Record by “F.P.B,” 15 February 1954, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 2, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder 7. The USAF PJBD Member put it this way: “Many high-level Canadians think and act in terms of defending two separate countries from air attack with two separate forces. This is a natural result of wishing to maintain a public posture of national sovereignty and a lack of appreciation of the nature of the air atomic threat. Fortunately, the aforementioned attitude is not prevalent in the RCAF and it is decreasing in other circles.” Major-General Robert M. Webster, USAF PJBD Member, Memorandum, “Briefing for General Twining’s Visit to Ottawa, 14 February 1954,” for


12 Remarks by Representative Cole before the 135th Anniversary Banquet of Colgate University, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, Thursday, April 29, 1954 at 9:30pm, copy in Chiefs of Staff committee Papers, Papers to 565th Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 79, File 29. Cole was also the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

13 Ibid.

14 Cole to Wilson, 7 May 1954, NARA, RG 341, Entry 335, USAF Plans, Project Decimal File 1942-1954, Box 728, File OPD Canada 600.2 (14 Sept 1945), Section 19; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 95. Quote from former.


17 Ibid.

18 The Secretary of Defense agreed with the JCS and had the Assistant Secretary inform Representative Cole of the decision not to proceed on his proposal. H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to The Honorable W. Sterling Cole, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, 25 June 1954, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 29, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 37.

19 Indeed, Claxton sent a strongly-worded letter about Cole to Secretary of Defense Wilson. In addition, on a number of occasions during the spring of 1954, Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the JCS, had to reassure Canada that the U.S. was satisfied with the current system of air defence co-ordination and that there was no need to establish a combined command. Claxton to Wilson, 12 May 1954, NARA, RG 333, PJBD, Entry 17-A, Box 1, File “Top Secret Correspondence, 1941-1956,” Folder “Briefing Book for the Secretary of Defense Visit to Canada,” See also DEA correspondence during the spring of 1954 and in particular Claxton to Heeney, 25 May 1954, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File Continental Defence. See also: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to MND, Associate MND, Deputy MND, CGS, CNS, and CAS, 11 May 1954, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114). See also DEA correspondence during the winter of 1954 in LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File Continental Defence and LAC, RG 24, Volume 21417, File 1855:1, Part 2 and Donaghy, ed., DCER, 20, 1954, 970-983; Heeney to Claxton, 21 May 1954, LAC, RG 24, Acc. 1997-98/260, Box 59, File TS 096-207-4 Part 3.

20 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to MND, Associate MND, Deputy MND, CGS, CNS, and CAS, 11 May 1954, DHH 112.3M2.009 (D114).

21 JPC Report CSC 1855-1 (JPC) for Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Command of Continental Defence Forces” (13 pages), 14 July 1954, Chief of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to the 568th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 21 September 1954, DHH 2002/17, Box 79, File 29.

22 JPC Report, “Command of Continental Defence Forces,” 14 July 1954, DHH 2002/17, Box 79, File 29. See also Chapter One, pages 9-13, on the importance of ensuring a “piece of the action.”

23 The overall commander in each of the four options was to be an American officer. There was some vague mention of operational control in the JPC report, but it was not defined and there was no elaboration. JPC Report, “Command of Continental Defence Forces,” 5, 14 July 1954, DHH 2002/17, Box 79, File 29.

24 Ibid., 6-8.

25 Ibid., 10-12.

26 Ibid., 12
27 Ibid., 10-11.
28 Ibid., 9.
29 Ibid., 9-11.
31 Extract from Minutes of the 568th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 21 September 1954, Chief 
of Staff Committee Papers, Papers to the 568th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 21 September 
1954, DHH 2002/17, Box 79, File 29. See also DMO&P Brief on JPC Report, “Command of Continental 
Defence Forces,” to VCGS and CGS, 26 July 1954, Ibid.
32 The JCS designated the Air Force as the executive agency for the command and made USAF ADC 
Headquarters in Colorado Springs the new CONAD HQ. Chronology of JCS Involvement in North 
American Air Defense 1946-1975, (Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
20 March 1976), 56; Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert B. Watson and Williard 
J. Webb et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
Narrative, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 1995, 
24; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 31-32; C.L. Grant, The Development of Continental Air 
Defense to 1 September 1954, USAF Historical Study No. 126 (Montgomery, Alabama: USAF Historical 
Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University [1954]), 80; Charge D’Affaires, Canadian Embassy, 
State for External Affairs, 4 August 1954, LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, File Continental 
Defence.
33 The reason for this designation is best described by JCS historian Robert Watson: “A unified command, 
with the usual component command echelon inserted below the commander, would deprive him [the CinC] 
of direct operational control of the forces. A specified, or single-Service, command was open to the 
obvious objection that the mission involved all the Services [i.e., was joint].” Chronology of JCS 
Involvement in North American Air Defense, 52-53; Webb et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 23; 
DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense; Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953-
1954, 137. Quote from last source.
34 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 56; Webb et al., History of the Unified 
Command Plan, 24; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 31-33. Quote from former.
35 Joseph Jockel has termed this U.S. practice as “twinning” – giving one officer more than one command 
titles depending on the specific role or mission he was performing/accomplishing (i.e., as head of which 
for International Relations (QCIR) Presentation, 24 January 2007. See also Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 6.
36 CONAD did not include responsibility for the air defence of Alaska or the U.S. bases in Newfoundland, 
which remained under the authority of the CinC Alaska Command and the CinC U.S. Northeast Command, 
respectively. The CinC CONAD was also required to prepare plans for air defence and early warning 
systems and procedures, which he would then submit to the JCS for approval. Chronology of JCS 
Involvement in North American Air Defense, 56; Webb et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 24; 
DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 31-32; C.L. Grant, The Development of Continental Air 
Defense to 1 September 1954, USAF Historical Study No. 126 (Montgomery, Alabama: USAF Historical 
Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University [1954]), 80. Quote from first source.
37 Terms of Reference for CinC CONAD, 1 September 1954, quoted in DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of 
Air Defense, 34.
38 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 34. The U.S. Army in particular was never comfortable with the 
CONAD operational control authority, feeling strongly that operational control should be exercised through 
the component commands. Moreover, as Jockel noted, “the distinction between operational control and 
command was not entirely clear-cut, and it would be the source of constant bickering between the [U.S.] 
armed services.” Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 95.
39 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 95.
40 Ibid,’ Grant, Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954,80; Kenneth Schaffel, The 
41 Major-General James E. Briggs, USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, to Director, Joint 
Staff, 22 October 1954, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 29, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 38; 
Air Vice-Marshal C.R. Dunlap, Chairman, Canadian Section MSG, to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

42 JCS 1541/102, Report by the Chief of Staff, USAF, to the JCS on A Combined Canada-United States North American Air Defense Command, 5 December 1955, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 29, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 41; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 59.

43 It was a rather large gathering on this day. Besides the Chiefs themselves, those in attendance also included: C.M. Drury, the Deputy MND; R.B. Bryce, the Secretary to the Cabinet; R.A. MacKay, the Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (he had also attended the ADSG’s 7-8 February briefing); Air Vice-Marshal C.R. Dunlap, Chairman of the Canadian Section MSG; plus a few other officers from ADC HQ and AFHQ. Extract from a Special Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 6 April 1955, reproduced in Donaghy, ed., DCER, Vol. 21, 1955, 709-712.


45 Ibid.

46 As USAF official historian Kenneth Schaffel noted, “The JCS correctly perceived that Canada’s political leadership would consider the issue of a joint command to be a hot potato.” Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 250.

47 See, for example, Memorandum from Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 April 1955, reproduced in Donaghy, ed., DCER, Vol. 21, 1955, 713.


50 CAS Memorandum “Directive – Canadian Operational Control of U.S. Air Defence Forces Operating from Bases within Canada” to AOC ADC, 5 March 1953, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/101. In this document, Slemon specifically noted that “command implies full authority over all forces in all respects, including training, administration and the function of moving units. Command in this sense, is not exercised by one service over any other service in Air Defence.”

51 Slemon Brief for Meeting of Consultation Continental Defence, 2 December 1955, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/89. The definition of “command” in Slemon’s document is consistent with what today is called national command or full command, which is a service/environment prerogative. Canada, Air Force, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-000 (Ottawa: Director General Air Force Development, 2007), 51.


53 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 101.

54 Ibid.

55 (Draft) JCS Memorandum for the Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, n.d. [5 January 1956], Enclosure “B” to JCS 1541/103, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime, 9 January 1956, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 29, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 41. USAF
planners had in fact begun reviewing the definition of operational control as part of their re-examination of CONAD’s terms of reference since September 1955 (see below). It appears that this JSPC definition of the command and control term was representative of the findings made thus far. As we will see shortly, a slightly revised version of this January 1956 definition of operational control would be entrenched in the new terms of reference for CONAD in November 1956. Chief of Staff USAF to CinC CONAD, 9 September 1955, NARA, RG 341, Entry 335, USAF Plans, Project Decimal File 1942-1954, Box 728-A, File OPD Canada 600.2 (14 Sept 1945), Section 22.

56 Commander-in-Chief U.S. Navy to U.S. Navy Commands, Admiralty, Air Ministry and Chief of Staff Army, 11 February 1944, TNA, PRO, Air 15/339. The origins of this definition of operational control are discussed in Richard Evan Goette, “The Struggle for a Joint Command and Control System in the Northwest Atlantic Theatre of Operations: A Study of the RCAF and RCN Trade Defence Efforts During the Battle of the Atlantic,” MA Thesis, History, Queen’s University, 2002, 46-50, 126-127. The modern definition of operational control is: “The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON [tactical control] of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.”

Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000, 15 August 2005, Chapter 2, Section I, Subsection 202.3a

57 Interestingly, as the above modern definition of operational control demonstrates, the exclusion of any mention of “command” has continued to be a common feature of the definition of the command and control term.

58 Commander-in-Chief U.S. Navy to U.S. Navy Commands, Admiralty, Air Ministry and Chief of Staff Army, 11 February 1944, TNA, PRO, Air 15/339.

59 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 95; Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 14; Goette, “Joint Command and Control,” 49-50, 121-124. See also above, pages 56-57.

60 The USAF Chief of Staff assigned the staff of CONAD responsibility for undertaking these discussions on behalf of the United States. Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 62; JCS Decision on JCS 1541/103, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime, 18 January 1956, Secretary JCS to Chief of Staff USAF, 18 January 1956, Chief of Staff USAF to CinC CONAD, 11 February 1956, and JCS Memorandum, “Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime,” to Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 February 1956, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 29, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 41.

61 Minutes of the 589th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 21 February 1956, Papers to the 589th Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting, DHH 2002/17, Box 80, File 13.

62 The Canadian members of the AHSG were: Air Commodore M.D. Lister (Chairman) and Group Captain R.M. Cox from the RCAF, plus Colonel G.A. Turcot from the Canadian Army. Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS) to CAS, 11 May 1956, LAC, RG 42, Acc. 1997-98/260, Box 73, File TS 964-204 Part 1; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 64, 68; Decision on JCS 1541/105, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff USAF for the JCS on “Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime,” 27 March 1956 and Decision on JCS 1541/107, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff USAF for the JCS on “Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime,” 20 June 1956, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 29, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 41; JCS Memorandum for the Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee, 27 March 1956, CNS to CAS, 9 April 1956, and Slemon to Twining, 4 May 1956, LAC, RG 42, Acc. 1997-98/260, Box 73, File TS 964-204 Part 1; Foulkes to Radford, 14 May 1956, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84; AVM Dunlap, Chairman Canadian Section MSG, to Major General G.A. Blake, USAF Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, 17 July 1956, LAC, RG 24, Acc. 1997-98/260, Box 59, File TS 966-207-4 Part 4.

General Partridge thus remained CinC CONAD and Lieutenant-General Joseph H. Atkinson took over command of USAF ADC as a CONAD component commander. This new arrangement was placed in effect as of 1 October 1956. DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 37-39, 81; Webb et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 25; Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 67.

In order to resolve the Army AARACOM decentralized control problem once and for all, CONAD’s terms of reference also included a clause stating that “operational control included authority to centralize operational control of forces, including the assignment of individual antiaircraft batteries to designated targets.” DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 38.

Terms of Reference for CinC CONAD, 4 September 1956, quoted in DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 38; also in Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 67.

JCS 1541/109, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime, 13 August 1956, Secretary JCS to Chairman, U.S. Section, MSG, 24 August 1956, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 42. Quote from former.

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JCS 1541/109, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS on Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States During Peacetime, 13 August 1956, Secretary JCS to Chairman, U.S. Section, MSG, 24 August 1956, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 42. Quote from former.

Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States in Peacetime,” Ad Hoc MSG Committee Report on Integration of Operational Control, 22 September 1956, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84; Minutes of the 12th Meeting of the MSG, 21-22 September 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711); (Second Draft); Integration of Operational Control of the Continental Air Defenses of Canada and the United States in Peacetime,” Ad Hoc MSG Committee on Integration of Operational Control, 22 October 1956, DHH 99/36, W.A.B. Douglas Fonds, Box 49, File 16.

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711). As Vice-Chief of the Air Staff Dunlap was also the RCAF member of the PJBD, “and hence it was my duty to brief that body... [and] the Chiefs of Staff Committee on this subject” of integrated air defence operational control. Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap, Deputy Commander-in-Chief NORAD, to General Charles Foulkes, 11 April 1967, LAC, MG 31, G5, Air Marshal C.R. Dunlap Papers. Special thanks to Matt Trudgen for sharing this document with me.


Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 103.

Integration of Operational Control” MSG Report, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711).

Ibid.

Ibid.; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 102. Quotes from former.

Integration of Operational Control” MSG Report, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711).

Each of these commanders was also to be the “principal advisor to the CINCADCANUS on matters of his Service” in the context of continental air defence. “Integration of Operational Control” MSG Report, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711).


Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 21.


Revision of the Command Appendix “F” Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan (MCC 300/3), Appendix “A” to Minutes of the 5/52 Meeting of the MCC, 21 November 1952, MCC Minutes, DHH 80/540. See also the previous chapter.

373
In addition, the new definition emphasized that the CINCADCANUS was only to have authority over units that were already deployed. Responsibility for the original composition of assigned forces was thus still the prerogative of the individual services themselves under their national command authority.

84 “Integration of Operational Control” MSG Report, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711).
85 Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 102.
86 Eighth Report of the MSG, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711).
87 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 72-73; Chief of Staff USAF Memorandum, “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime,” to JCS, 8 March 1957, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 43; Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery, 288.
88 Minutes of the 604th and 605th Meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1 and 15 February 1957, Chiefs of Staff Committee Special Meeting (16 July 1957), DHH 2002/17, Box 87, File 2; MND Memorandum, “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime,” to Cabinet Defence Committee, 11 March 1957, reproduced in Donaghy, ed., DCER, Vol. 23, 1956-1957 Part II, 79-80. On 4 March General Foulkes informally indicated to the Chief of Staff of the USAF that he did not anticipate having any difficulties in obtaining Canadian government approval of the proposal. Chief of Staff USAF Memorandum, “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime,” to JCS, 8 March 1957, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 43.
89 Colonel R.L. Raymont, Executive Staff Officer to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Ross Martin, Privy Council Office, 11 March 1957 and Captain F.W.T. Lucas, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Secretary, JCS, 26 April 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84; Memorandum on Steps in development of Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime, 11 November 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/87; Minutes of the 29 April-2 May 1957 Meeting of the PJBD, PJBD Journal, copy in LAC, MG 30, E133, McNaughton Papers, Volume 286, File PJBD Journal of Meeting, Fort Bagg, North Carolina, 29 April to 3 May 1957; Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs, 103-104; Reginald Roy Interview with General Charles Foulkes, 9 March 1967, quoted in Reginald H. Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 288.
90 Foulkes, Note For Files, Telephone Conversation with General Sparling, Washington, 18 June 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84; House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 15, 22 October 1963 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1963), 510, 527.
91 Extract from Minutes of a Chiefs of Staff Committee Special Meeting, 16 July 1957, Chiefs of Staff Committee Special Meeting (16 July 1957), DHH 2002/17, Box 87, File 2; George Pearkes, Minister of National Defence, Memorandum “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime,” to Cabinet, 22 July 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/87; Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 13 June 1957, reproduced in Donaghy, ed., DCER, Vol. 23, 1956-1957 Part II, 82-83; Foulkes, Note For Files, Telephone Conversation with General Sparling, Washington, 18 June 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84.
92 Foulkes, Note For Files, Telephone Conversation with General Sparling, Washington, 18 June 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84; House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 15, 22 October 1963 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1963), 510, 527.
93 Extract from Minutes of a Chiefs of Staff Committee Special Meeting, 16 July 1957, Chiefs of Staff Committee Special Meeting (16 July 1957), DHH 2002/17, Box 87, File 2; George Pearkes, Minister of National Defence, Memorandum “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime,” to Cabinet, 22 July 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/87; Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 13 June 1957, reproduced in Donaghy, ed., DCER, Vol. 23, 1956-1957 Part II, 82-83; Foulkes, Note For Files, Telephone Conversation with General Sparling, Washington, 18 June 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84.

96 Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 31 July 1957, reproduced in Michael D. Stevenson, ed., D C E R, Volume 25, 1957-1958 Part II (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2004), 21-32; Vice-Admiral B.L. Austin, Director U.S. Joint Staff, to Admiral A. Radford, Chairman JCS, 31 July 1957, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 44.

97 Press Release by the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, 1 August 1957 and Press Release by the Minister of National Defence Appointing Air Marshal C.R. Slemon Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Canada-United States Air Defence Command, 1 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84. At the 31 July Cabinet meeting the Diefenbaker government also confirmed the promotion of Air Vice-Marshals H.L. Campbell to Air Marshal and his replacement of Slemon as RCAF Chief of the Air Staff effective 1 September 1957. Campbell had previously been serving as Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) on the staff of General Lauris Norstad, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Allied Powers Europe. Foulkes to Norstad, 31 July 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84. Quote from 1 August 1957 joint press release.

98 Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 76-78; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 50. In one of his last acts as Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Slemon was sure to reassert that the new bilateral air defence command did not change the fact that the primacy for air defence in Canada remained with the RCAF: “the CAS/RCAF will continue to be the Executive Agent of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff with respect to matters dealing with North American Air Defence, and that communications between CINCNORAD and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff will be channelled through CAS/RCAF.” Slemon to Foulkes, 19 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/85.

99 Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 21.

100 This arrangement ensured that Partridge, as CinC CONAD, remained “a national commander responsible to the United States Joint Chief of Staff for purely national matters.” Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense, 81-82, 87; DHH 73/1501, Nineteen Years of Air Defense, 53; JCS, Terms of Reference for CINCONAD, 8 January 1958, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 16, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 47; Brigadier General R.D. Wentworth, Secretary JCS, Memorandum, “Terms of Reference for the Commander in Chief North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) (U),” 10 January 1958, Papers to the 617th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, DHH 2002/17, Box 81, File 6. Quote from first source.

101 Text of Canadian Note, His Excellency N.A. Robertson, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, to the Honourable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, 12 May 1958, Canada Treaty Series 1958, copy in George Randolph Pearkes Papers, University of Victoria Archives, Accession 74-1, Box 26, File 26.3 (hereafter NORAD Agreement, 12 May 1958). Special thanks to colleagues Hugh Gordon and Dan Heidt for providing me with a copy of this file.

102 Ibid.; Terms of Reference for the Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command, 10 June 1958, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 16, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 51; Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, to CinC NORAD, 10 June 1958, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/87; JCS to CinC NORAD, 10 June 1958, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 16, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 50.

103 NORAD Agreement, 12 May 1958, Pearkes Papers, University of Victoria Archives, Accession 74-1, Box 26, File 26.3.

104 Appendix “F,” Command, MCC 300/10, Canada-United States Emergency Defense Plan, 1 July 1958, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 16, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section B.P. Part 9. The procedures for Rules of Engagement (ROE) for air defence aircraft under NORAD operational control stayed the same in the EDP. These were consistent with the PJBD Recommendation 53/1, which stipulated that the ROE of the country in whose airspace the interception takes place would apply. Annex “A,” Principles Governing the Interception of Unidentified Aircraft in Peace Time, to Appendix “F” Command, Ibid.


108 NORAD Agreement, 12 May 1958, Pearkes Papers, University of Victoria Archives, Accession 74-1, Box 26, File 26.3. Interestingly, Peter Haydon has argued that an official exchange of notes unnecessarily complicated matters: “Rather than be submitted for formal political approval, the NORAD Agreement should have been signed jointly by the Canadian Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, the NORAD Agreement became a politically sensitive strategic concept rather than a simple operational plan for coordinating the activities of the two air forces.” Haydon, *Cuban Missile Crisis*, 77.


111 Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 June 1957, reproduced in Donaghy, ed., *DCER*, Vol. 23, 1956-1957 Part II, 81-82; Jules Léger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 10 September 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/85.

112 For example, for the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, there was no “CinC Canada-U.S. Maritime Air Forces” but simply the elevation of the Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Air Command with operational control authority over the maritime air forces of the USAF and USN in the theatre of operations.

113 Canada, Department of National Defence, *National Defence Act* (1950); Diefenbaker, *One Canada*, Vol. 3, 20. Foulkes, in fact, used the *National Defence Act* provision as justification for the way that NORAD was established during the summer of 1957. See General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to J.W. Holmes, Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 7 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/85. In U.S. constitutional practice, only the approval of the Secretary of Defense was required to establish a command organization.

114 For example, in May General Earle Partridge, the CinC CONAD, began describing the proposal as “the complete integration of the operational elements of the air defense forces of the United States and Canada into a single Command structure.” Partridge to Twining, 14 May 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84. Emphasis added.


In particular, Partridge noted that “from the public relations point of view ADCANUS is cumbersome [and] hard to say or to fit in documents without appearing amusing.” “NORAD in contrast,” he continued, “is punchy[,] forceful and conveys the idea with simplicity.” CinC CONAD to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff DND Ottawa, 13 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/85; JCS 1541/120, Note by the Secretaries to the JCS on Integration of Air Defense, Canada-United States, 16 August 1957, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 44; Jockel, *Canada in NORAD*, 25. Quote from first document.

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Ottawa to CinC CONAD, 3 September 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/85; CinC CONAD to JCS, 11 September 1957, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 45; *Chronology of JCS Involvement in North American Air Defense*, 76-78.

Press Release by the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, 1 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84.

Draft Press Release regarding the appointment of Air Marshal C.R. Slemon as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Canada-United States Air Defence Command, n.d. [24 July 1957], Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/83. This was one of the documents that Pearkes discussed with Diefenbaker on the afternoon of 24 July when the Prime Minister approved the integrated air defence operational control proposal. It will be recalled that the MND Memorandum to the Cabinet that Foulkes had prepared also referred to a “unified command” being established. MND Memorandum “Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime,” to Cabinet, 22 July 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84.

Foulkes to Pearkes, 26 July 1957 and American editorial changes, n.d. [26 July 1957], written on Draft Press Release by the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, n.d. [24 July 1957], Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84; Vice-Admiral B.L. Austin, Director U.S. Joint Staff, to Admiral A. Radford, Chairman JCS, 31 July 1957 and revised (by USAF Chief of Staff and Deputy Secretary of Defense) Draft Press Release by the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, n.d. [26 July 1957], NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 8, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 44; USN Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum for the JCS, 8 January 1958, NARA, RG 218, JCS, Entry 943011, Box 16, File CCS 092 (9-10-45), Section 47. It will be recalled that the correspondence regarding the air defence proposal and the actual title of the MSG study itself was “integration of operational control” of the two nations’ air forces.

Press Release by the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of National Defence of Canada, 1 August 1957, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/84.

Brigadier General R.D. Wentworth, Secretary JCS, Memorandum, “NORAD as a NATO Organization,” to General Sparling, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Washington, 10 April 1958, Raymont Collection, DHH 73/1223/86.

It will be recalled that the MSG study referred to both NATO and U.S. UCP unified commands as the best “method” of command for North American air defence. “Integration of Operational Control” MSG Report, 19 December 1956, DHH 112.3M2 (D711).

It in fact, as Jon McLin noted, “both the sectional [i.e., media] and partisan [i.e., political] opinion lamented the purely bilateral character of the agreement.” McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defense Policy*, 55.

As McLin put it, the effort by Foulkes, Smith and Diefenbaker to make a direct connection to NATO “responded to a long-felt Canadian preference – partly instinctive, partly intellectualized – for multilateral...


Chapter Ten

