PANIC ATTACK: A MICRO-SITUATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE VIOLENT ACTIONS OF POLICE

by

Michal Klein

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Abstract

The use of force by police has been explored through a range of social science perspectives. However, the majority of those perspectives have failed to account for the impact that situational factors have on the use of coercion by police. While situational perspectives have been utilized, they have primarily focused on solitary features of the situation; thus, ignoring a situation’s various component parts. The general absence of consideration given to situational force is exhibited within the sociological literature more generally. This absence contributes to a diminished appreciation for the circumstances that transpire within the context of the situation. This thesis explores the role that the situation plays in the generation of police use of coercion. In addition, this thesis observes whether contemporary theoretical developments can elaborate the explanatory value of the situation in studying the use of violence by police. Specifically, this thesis utilizes Collins’ (2004) micro-situational theory of violence and his concept of forward panic.

To examine the utility of Collins’ theory, eight theoretical propositions are used. This research examines the extent to which the propositions were empirically observable and whether they had a value added impact. The propositions examined were: 1) cross-purpose, 2) tension/fear, 3) the prolonged building of tension/fear, 4) docile lingering, 5) suspect in a position of weakness, 6) suspect outnumbered, 7) overkill and piling on of violence, and 8) rhythm. To observe the propositions a multiple case study analysis was conducted using Internet videos and newspaper articles. It was found that in all nine cases each of the propositions as described by Collins (2004) were present. The findings suggest general support for using Collins’ theory to explain police violence. In addition, his theory was found to have value added capability, as each of the situational components of the theory combined to impact on police violence.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the seminal study conducted by Westley (1953) regarding the use of force by police, the topic has become a widely observable and controversial issue. There are several important reasons why this issue demands attention. First, according to Geller and Toch (1996), the use of force by police has a significant impact on the public’s confidence in the ability of the police to discharge their duties. They explain that any improper use of coercive action can foster a distrust in the police from the citizens whom they protect. Second, as Blackler and Miller (2005) maintain, the timing and extent of force is frequently a reflection of police discretion. By implication, it is important to ensure that the use of authority in such cases is consistent with legal standards. Failing to do so could violate a citizen’s civil liberties. Finally, with the increasing availability of video evidence, such as was popularized in the Rodney King case, it is no longer unusual for a situation involving the police use of force to reach high levels of visibility. This increase in visibility has made it imperative that researchers develop a better understanding of the use of force by police.

The use of force by police has been considered from many different social science perspectives. At the institutional level, force has been explored by examining the hierarchical structure of police departments (Friedrich 1980; Fyfe 1982; Dunham and Alpert 1995; Worden 1996; White 2000; and Alpert and McDonald 2001). By contrast, a cultural perspective has also been employed as a way to assess the influence of unofficial norms and values on police conduct in situations which could potentially involve force.
(Fyfe and Skolnick 1994; Herzog 2000; Terrill, Paoline, and Manning 2003; McCluskey, Terrill, and Paoline 2005; and Westmarland 2005). As well, social structural differences reflected in racial, class, and gender categories have been investigated in relation to both officer and suspect. Social-psychological accounts, which focus on the influence of affective states on officers’ use of coercive action have been popular in the research literature (McLaughlin 1992; Crawford and Burns 1998; Kop, Euwema, and Schaufeli 1999; Terrill and Matrofski 2002; Alpert and Dunham 2004; Burke and Mikkelson 2005; Manzoni and Eisner 2006). While these perspectives differ from each other in a variety of important ways, they share a significant common theme. Specifically, they restrict attention to what individuals bring to the situation, and therefore ignore the impact and importance of the situation itself.

In addition, situational perspectives have been used to explain the use of force (Fridell and Binder 1992; Vrij 1995; Alpert, Kenney, and Dunham 1997; Crawford and Burns 1998; Engel, Sobol and Worden 2000; Homant, Kennedy, and Hupp 2000; Phillip and Smith 2000; Cancino 2001; Crawford and Burns 2002; Terrill and Matrofski 2002; Terrill 2003; Alpert and Dunham 2004; Alpert, Dunham, and MacDonald 2004; Leinfelt 2005; Terrill 2005; Weidner and Terrill 2005; McCluskey et al. 2005; Manzoni and Eisner 2006; Leinfelt, and Kawak 2008). Those approaching the use of force from this perspective have investigated for instance the impact of suspect resistance, the presence of bystanders, and situation types on the use of force.

Despite the vast number and diversity of approaches used to understand the use of force, including those of a situational nature, researchers have yet to systematically dissect the situation to identify the sequence and impact of its various components. This reflects a more general lack of attention to situational forces within the sociological
literature more generally. As Birkbeck and LaFree (1993) suggest, this contributes to a lack of understanding regarding what happens in the context of an encounter between individuals and how it impacts upon them. For most sociologists the situation is seen as providing little more than the means to acquire the opportunity to commit the criminal act (McCord 2004; Collins 2004; Birkbeck and LaFree 1993). This thesis will examine the role of the situation in the generation of police use of force.

**Purpose of the Research**

The primary question that this research asks is: can contemporary theoretical developments elaborate the explanatory value of the situation in studying the use of violence by police? The research will demonstrate that rather than focusing on the individuals or those factors outside of the situation, our attention must be directed toward what transpires within those immediate situations that officer(s) face.

This thesis will employ the micro-situational theory of violence put forth by Collins (2004). Specifically, it will use his concept of forward panic (or hot violence). Collins’s (2004) theory maintains that when a situation loses its intersubjectivity, there is a shift in the emotional energy (EE) of the situation. This change in EE generates an intense feeling of tension/fear. Collins (2004) asserts that if an individual(s) is exposed to a situation in which the experience of tension/fear is prolonged, they will become overwhelmed by this feeling. Collins (2004) explains that when one is overcome with this tension/fear, he/she will release it in a hot rush of violence, which Collins refers to as a forward panic. This thesis will explore the value additive ability of each of the propositions made by Collins’s theory of forward panic to explain the use of violence by police.
Violence, as Collins (2004) explains, includes any type of physical action taken against another human being, from a simple push to the deployment of a firearm. By exploring violence through the lens of a forward panic, it can be observed whether or not the situation influences the use of force that exceeds that which would be required. The identification of what influences such actions is pertinent to the study of force, as such actions are what call into question the officer’s ability to effectively perform his/her duties and employ force as legally prescribed (Alpert and Dunham 2004:19).

This thesis will incorporate a multiple case study analysis. The cases for this analysis will be taken from Internet videos. The videos will be used to provide a sample of differing situations in which officers have employed physical force. Likewise, an analysis of these videos will be used to determine whether or not the concepts derived from Collins’s (2004) situational theory of violence can be identified as having an accumulative influence on an officer’s use of violent actions.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 identifies how theories, apart from those which employ situational perspectives explain force. Also, this chapter will assess the relevant empirical evidence found in studies that utilize non-situational perspectives. In doing so, it will demonstrate that the majority of theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain the use of force ignore the situation as a whole. In addition, this chapter will also provide a discussion of the situational theories that have been used to explain force, including their empirical findings and limitations. Furthermore, this chapter will present Collins’s (2004) micro-situational theory of forward panic.

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1 This thesis makes use of YouTube videos. YouTube is an Internet based website designated to the publication of video clips; it allows its users to upload and share videos with one another via the World Wide Web. As stated by youtube.com.
Therefore, this chapter will show how the situation has yet to be systematically dissected to explain the use of force.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology that will be used in this multiple case study analysis. It will indicate how the propositions identified by Collins (2004) will be investigated. Likewise, it will provide an understanding for the use of Internet videos as the primary data source for this analysis.

Chapter 4 is comprised of an analysis of the nine videos used in this multiple case study. Finally, chapter 5 will address the importance of the findings as they relate to our understanding of how the situation can be used to explain how officers come to use violent actions. In addition, it will identify the limitations of this thesis and suggest future avenues for research.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter will begin by presenting a detailed discussion of how force has been measured and distinguished as a concept. As previously stated, several theoretical approaches have been used to explain the use of force. This chapter will explore how several perspectives explain the use of force and the significant findings that are associated with each. These perspectives include: the hierarchical construction of the police force and its changing policies, the culture of policing, social structural differences of race, class and gender, and social-psychological. These theories will show how the actions taken within an immediate situation affecting the officers’ use of force have not been addressed. Rather these theories focus on how background factors and previously established motivations increase the likelihood of the usage of force. Additionally, those theories that approach force from a situational perspective will be discussed to show how they have contributed to the understanding of coercive action. Such situational theories include: (1) Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory utilized by Phillips and Smith (2000); (2) Terrill (2005) and his use of Tedeschi and Felson’s (1994) coercive action theory; (3) Weidner and Terrill’s appropriation of Turk’s (1969) norm resistance theory; and (4) Alpert and Dunham’s (2004) theory of reciprocity. In addition, Collins’s (2004) micro-situational theory will be presented, specifically his postulation regarding a forward panic. In presenting these theories, it will be suggested that a more systematic understanding of the situation’s impact can be achieved something — previously utilized situational approaches have failed to do. Using Collins’s theory, it will also be shown that motivations for violence (force) that are established outside of the situation are not
sufficient to maintain an act of violence. Rather, violence is a structural property of the situation, and that which transpires within a situation propels one to use violent actions.

**Measuring Force**

According to Alpert and Dunham (2004), much of the research surrounding the use of force has focused on measuring the frequency and severity of its use. This type of investigation does not seek a causal explanation. Rather, it attempts to identify what type of force is being used and whether force is being overused.

This area of research has advanced considerably since the seminal study conducted by Westley (1953) which found that violence was used by police during patrol activities. However, Westley (1953) ignored the types of violence used by police. In addition, observations have progressed beyond those of Freidrich (1980) who observed force as a dichotomous variable (excessive vs. non excessive) and Fyfe (1982) who investigated the use of lethal vs. non-lethal force.

In an attempt to move beyond dichotomies, Klinger (1995) noted that only a few studies looked at anything other than lethal force. As a result, he focused his study on the non-lethal uses of force, thereby contributing to the understanding of the use of force in two very substantial ways. First, when examining types of force used, voice commands were found to be the most common type of force used by police. Voice commands were recognized as a form of force as they are considered an imposition of authority and control. Secondly, Klinger (1995) demonstrated that during a single encounter, officers often used more than one type of force. When doing so, they primarily began with a lower level of force than the highest level they ultimately achieved. His work suggests that force is rarely used and when it is, it tends to be deployed at lower levels. According
to Klinger (1995), examining the multiple types of force used during a given situation allows for a more complex understanding.

Garner, Schade, Hepburn, and Buchanan (1995) also demonstrated the importance of measuring force on a continuum. Garner et al. (1995) state that by using a dichotomy like physical and non-physical, studies are incorrectly measuring force. The reason for this, they assert, is that officers are trained to use force based on the concept of a continuum. The continuum provides the officer with the appropriate level of force to be used against a suspect based on the level of resistance the suspect offers.

According to Garner et al. (1995) the continuum identifies the highest and most appropriate level of force to be used against a given level of resistance. Thus, by measuring force this way, they state that one can better determine the severity of force used. Force, for the purpose of their study, was measured using a hierarchical structure in regards to its severity: “0 no force; 1 police presence; 2 verbal directive; 3 restraint; 4 chemical agent; 5 tactics and weapons; and 6 used a firearm. Resistance was measured in a similar fashion: 0 no resistance; 1 psychological resistance; 2 verbal; 3 passive; 4 defensive; 5 active; 6 firearm used” (Garner et al. 1995:152-53). Using the continuum, they found that overall force was rarely used and when it was, it was at the lower end of the continuum. Garner et al. (1995) assert that their measure of force allows for a more in-depth understanding of the frequency with which different types of force are used.

In an effort to expand beyond measuring force on a continuum, Alpert and Dunham (1997) created a measurement system that they termed the ‘force factor.’ This system allowed for the simultaneous calculation of the level of force used by police relative to the level of suspect resistance. Alpert and Dunham (1997) asserted that the level of force used should be commensurate with that which is identified as permissible
by the use of a force training continuum of a given police agency. Force and resistance were ranked in a similar fashion to that of Garner et al. (1995) giving each escalation of force and resistance a numerically higher ranking.

According to Alpert and Dunham (1997) the ‘force factor’ is calculated by subtracting the level of resistance the suspect exerted by the level of force used, to determine the ‘force factor.’ A positive value would indicate more force was used relative to the level of resistance; whereas a negative value would indicate less force was used relative to the level of resistance encountered. However, Alpert and Dunham (1997) found that regardless of a negative or a positive value, it was not an indicator of force being reasonable or unreasonable. This is due to the fact that police are granted by law the right to use greater force than the level of resistance they encounter. As well, some officers may be able to control highly resistant suspects with minimal force.

Terrill’s (2001) work advanced knowledge beyond both the continuum and the force factor concepts, developing what he termed the Resistance Force Comparative Scale. The scale codified each occurrence of both resistance and force in a sequential fashion within a given encounter using the totality of all acts of force and resistance in a given situation. The purpose of this scaling scheme was to discern whether force was being used in accordance with the prescribed continuum policy of a given department during police-suspect encounters. Terrill (2001) found that officers tended to increase and decrease the level of force used based upon the kind of resistance they met. The data revealed that those officers who encountered highly resistant suspects had a greater tendency to provide them with a secondary verbal warning, however, failure to comply with that warning often resulted in a greater level of force being used.
Similar to the previous findings, several studies examining the prevalence of force have reached a consensus regarding the likelihood of its use, suggesting that regardless of the method of measurement, officers tend to use force relatively infrequently against the suspects/citizens they encounter (Friedrich 1980; Bayley and Garafalo 1989; Terrill 2003; Leinfelt 2005; Gallo, Collyer and Gallagher 2008). Several studies have also found that even when force is used, officers tend to employ force at lower levels (Terrill 2003; Alpert and Dunham 2004; Alpert Dunham and MacDonald 2004; Bazley, Lersch, and Mieczkowski 2007; Terrill et al. 2008).

As previously stated, when looking at causal factors contributing to the use of force, a wide variety of theoretical approaches have been taken. As a result, a diverse number of factors have been explored regarding the use of force. To begin, an organizational approach will be examined.

**Organizational Structure**

The organizational theoretical approach is concerned with two different aspects of a policing agency, the hierarchical structure and the policies employed. One of the principle standpoints of this approach concentrates on how the policies of a department diminish the use of force. This particular approach views policy as providing the necessary restraint or impetus for force to be used. Worden (1996) suggests that the organizational approach also identifies the hierarchical structure of the police force as significant in explaining why force is used. This perspective stresses that the way the command structure operates has a direct influence on whether or not officers will use force.

Several studies using this perspective have explored the implications of both policy and departmental structure on the use of force (Friedrich 1980; Fyfe 1982;
Dunham and Alpert 1995; Worden 1996; White 2000; Engel 2000; Alpert and McDonald 2001). Those studies exploring departmental structure, like that of Worden (1996), observed the impact of the department’s level of bureaucratization on the use of coercion. The main finding from this study was that departments that were less bureaucratized (rigidly structured) had fewer use of force incidents. Worden (1996) explains that when departments are less bureaucratized, those in command have more intimate contact with officers and can address their issues on a more personal level. However, some conflict exists within the literature regarding the impact of those officers in a more powerful position within the hierarchy. Engel (2000) suggests that departments with “active supervisors”\(^2\) tend to see an increase in the amount of force used by officers during physical interaction with a suspect.

Studies exploring the impact of policy, like that of White (2000), explore changes to policies that prevent officers from using certain types of force. He found that when policy provides detailed information regarding the use of elective\(^3\) and non-elective shootings,\(^4\) the use of force was reduced. White (2000) maintains that changes to policy which limit and clarify when force should be used significantly reduce the usage of force. Fyfe (1982) and Alpert and Dunham (1995) have reached a similar conclusion regarding policy change and its ability to reduce the use of force by police. However, both Cao et al. (2000) and Alpert and Dunham (2001) suggest this type of policy change was not significant in reducing the use of force by police.

\(^2\) Engel (2000) defines active supervisors as “those with a heavy involvement in both patrol duties and their role as a supervisor; they see themselves as having power within the organization and over their subordinates, and lack inspirational motivation skill.”

\(^3\) Elective shootings are those where the officer was physical assaulted without a weapon.

\(^4\) Non-elective shootings are those where the officer was assaulted with gun, knife, or other weapon.
Cultural

The cultural approach suggests that there is a set of commonly held beliefs present among the majority of police officers (Armacost 2004:494). A culture specific to police officers is said to have emerged out of the type of activities police officers are required to perform. The perilous nature of police work is said to elicit a need for an increased level of secrecy among officers. According to Armacost (2004), the majority of officers believe that both the citizens they protect and higher-ranking officers do not fully grasp the gravity of the work they do and lack intimate knowledge of the requirements of their daily activities. The absence of intimate knowledge, in conjunction with the ever-present danger of policing, creates a culture of silence amongst them.

Officers are said to resort to force as a result of the police culture in two ways. The first results from an intense strain that develops due to the ever-present danger of the nature of their duties. This strain is said to lead to a sub-cultural belief which values using whatever means are necessary to protect one’s self (Westmarland 2005:155). In addition, the culture of silence is also postulated to elicit higher levels of force, as the officers do not fear that another officer will inform on them as a result of their actions. Several researchers have explored police use of force from the cultural perspective (Fyfe and Skolnick 1994; Herzog 2000; Terrill et al 2003; Mccluskey et al. 2005; Westmarland 2005).

Terrill et al. (2003) examined police culture by observing the impact of pro-cultural attitudes held by officers. They found that officers with a strong pro-cultural attitude were more likely to use all forms of force, ranging from verbal to physical impact

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5 According to Terrill et al. (2003) officers were of pro-cultural attitudes when they showed distrust of citizens, supervisors, positive orientation toward aggressive crime fighting tactics, and endorsed selective enforcement of the law.
(punches, batons, kicks). In addition to cultural beliefs, Westmarland (2005) observed the impact of the code of silence on the use of force. He found the code of silence to be most prevalent when officers physically assaulted a suspect.

**Social Structural**

Many of the explanations for the use of force employ a social structural argument. As Porpora (1989) explains, such arguments explore the differences in human relationships by exploring the way they are structured. These theories focus on the impact of the social structures of race and gender, specifically looking at how one’s position within each of those structures influences their reaction (Porpora 1989:200). Many researchers have explored the use of force looking specifically at the structural differences between races as a significant factor in determining when an individual will use force or have force used against them (McLaughlin 1992; Worden 1996; Crawford and Burns 1998; Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; Brandl, Stroshine, and Frank 2001; Garner, Maxwell, and Hereaux 2002; Terrill and Matrofski 2002; Alpert and Dunham 2004; Terrill 2005; McElvain and Kposowa 2008).

With respect to the race of the officer, McLaughlin (1992) found that it was not a significant factor in terms of whether or not officers received complaints for use of excessive force against citizens. McElvain and Kposowa (2008) and Brandl et al. (2001) have corroborated the assertion through their work. A certain degree of ambivalence has been observed in relation to those studies observing the race of the suspect and the use of force. Terrill and Matrofski (2002) found that non-white suspects (African American and Hispanic) had a greater chance of having physical force used against them. Several studies, (McLaughlin 1992; Worden 1996; Jacobs and O’Brien 1998) have found similar results to those of Terrill and Matrofski (2002). However, Garner et al. (2002) found that
the race of the suspect did not affect either the prevalence or severity of force used. Similar results have been found in several other studies (Herbst and Walker 2001; Alpert and Dunham 2004; Terrill 2005).

Researchers have also explored social structural differences, regarding gender differentials between male and female officers’ and their use of force. Bazley et al. (2007) found that on the whole, male officers were more likely to use higher levels of force than their female counterparts. Furthermore, in terms of overall involvement in use of force incidents, male officers were also involved in more incidents compared with female officers (Bazley et al. 2007: 190). Multiple studies have also concluded that the gender of the officer is not a significant factor in the use of force (Paoline and Terrill 2004; Schuck and Rabe-Hemp 2005; Hoffman and Hickey 2005; McElvain and Kposowa 2008).

Additionally, gender differences between male and female suspects have been observed to discern whether women or men are more likely to have force used against them. Holmes, Reynolds, Holmes, and Faulkner (1998) identified that male suspects were perceived as presenting the biggest threat to police officer safety. They found that, as a result, male suspects were more likely to be the objects of force and also more likely to have a more severe form used against them. Identical results regarding suspect gender have been found in many studies (Crawford and Burns 1998; Brandl et al. 2001; Terrill and Matrofski 2002; Garner et al. 2002).

Social structure has also been explored collectively, observing the impact of race, class, and gender as a whole. A pair of studies has explored these differences in structural relationships using Donald Black’s (1976) theory of law, looking specifically at his concept of stratification. Stratification is the vertical component of Black’s (1976) theory of law which explores the vertical distances between individuals in social space.
Stratification is a vector that situates individuals relative to one another. When law is being applied in a downward direction it, “varies directly with vertical distance” (Black 1976:21). Law being applied in an upward direction “varies inversely with vertical distance” (ibid). Black’s concept of stratification is often used as a measure of status to determine whether those individuals with a lower status than the officer are more likely to have greater force (law) applied to them than those of a higher status.

Status is commonly observed through the differences between officer and suspect race, age, and occupation. These differing aspects have been used to ascertain whether observed differences across these factors impact the use of force. Each of these arguments looks at the type of person and his/her position within the social structures to identify how that relationship will determine the reaction he/she will receive from police. In the study conducted by Alpert et al., status was operationalized using the variables age and race; those who were “younger than thirty were considered to be of lower status and have less authority” (2004:482). Race was divided into white and non-white groups (African-American and Hispanic). Minorities were said to have less authority than whites. According to Alpert et al. (2004) when officer authority was greater than that of the citizen, dominant force had greater odds of being used. In their study exploring the impact of occupational status, Norris, Birkbeck and Gabaldon (2006) found that officers tended to use more verbal and physical force against those citizens with higher status occupations than the officer. The findings observed in the studies conducted by Alpert et al. (2004) and Norris et al. (2006) demonstrate uncertainty regarding the impact of status differentials on the use of force.

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6 Dominant force was identified using the force factor; if the force level exceeds the resistance it is considered dominant.
Several studies have taken what they call an ecological approach to understanding status and the use of force. Specifically, Kane (2002) states that this approach seeks to understand how types of neighborhoods influence how officers will react to those who live there. This approach suggests that specific neighborhoods are home to certain people who are more likely to be characterized as being of a disreputable nature. The officer(s) may connect the type of area with all individuals living there and act in a more negative manner toward them. This perspective suggests that structural differences across neighborhoods, including race and economic status will influence the officer’s use of force against people who live in those areas. Several researchers have made use of this approach in understanding police use of force.

Among those taking this approach, McLaughlin (1992), Kane (2002), and Terrill and Reisig (2004) have observed police use of force from this perspective. Terrill and Reisig (2004) specifically examined neighborhoods based upon their “concentrated disadvantage” measured as: “percentage of poverty, percentage of unemployment, percentage of female-headed families and percentage of African American” (Terrill and Reisig 2004:301). They found that police officers were more likely to commit acts of misconduct in areas that were high in structural disadvantage, as well as areas with high crime rates (Terrill and Reisig 2004:306). Kane (2002) also came to a similar conclusion, finding that concentrated disadvantage increased the use of force by police.

Social-Psychological

A social-psychological perspective has been taken by many researchers to discern how one’s affective state and beliefs influence the use of force. As stated by Geller and Toch (1996), this particular approach maintains that individuals vary in their behavioral predilections. The premise set forth is that certain ways of thinking and personality can
impact one’s decision to use force. According to Geller and Toch (1996), a latent constituent of this perspective is that the deportment and views are based upon an officer’s age, level of education, and experience. Thus, older, college-educated officers have different viewpoints than younger, less educated officers. These disparities, according to Geller and Toch (1996) are expected to emerge in the actions of the officers.

Studies observing the influence of age, like that of McElvain and Kposowa (2008) focus primarily on whether older officers compared to younger officers, through their experiences, have developed alternative methods and beliefs about the use of force as a means of conflict resolution. McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that younger officers with an average age of thirty-four were more likely to be involved in deadly force incidents than those over the age of thirty-four. Brandl et al. (2001) came to a similar conclusion, finding that younger officers were more likely to receive excessive force complaints.

According to McCluskey et al. (2005), studies looking at officer experience focus on how their experiences and time on the job help them to develop alternative methods of dispute resolution as opposed to using force. In the study conducted by McCluskey et al. (2005) it was found that those officers with more experience were less likely to use physical force, even when they worked in departments that valued a high level of aggression. Likewise, McCluskey et al. (2005) found that more experienced officers tend to use less overall force. Several studies (Ho 1997; Brandl et al. 2001; McCluskey et al. 2005; Paoline and Terrill 2007; McElvain and Kposowa 2008), have also found that officers with more experience tend to use less force overall.

In addition, research has focused on the social-psychological implications of the officer’s level of education. Studies looking at education, investigate whether officers
with higher level of education pursue less coercive methods of dispute resolution (Paoline and Terrill 2007). It is believed that through their participation in higher education, police officers will have a high regard for an approach that values dialogue through verbal communication than those less educated officers. In their research, Paoline and Terrill (2007) found that those officers who had some college education or a four-year degree were less likely to use higher levels of force (physical and weapons) compared with those with only high school education (Paoline and Terrill 2007:191). McElvain and Kposowa (2008) also found that officers with a college education were less likely to use deadly force than those officers with high school or some college education. However, in opposition to the above findings, Brandl et al. (2001) found that the educational level of an officer was not a factor in determining which officers were likely to receive a complaint for excessive force.

In a similar manner, it is argued that the age of the suspect influences the use of coercive action by police. According to Crawford and Burns (1998), younger people are said to have a negative attitude toward officers. Several researchers, including McLaughlin (1992), Crawford and Burns (1998), Terrill and Matrofski (2002), and Alpert and Dunham (2004) have explored age to determine if differences in the use of force are related to the age of the suspects. Terrill and Matrofski (2002) found that younger suspects had increased odds of having ‘major physical force’ (punches, kicks, hits with baton) used against them than older suspects. This has been a recurrent finding as several studies have found that younger suspects with a mean age of thirty are more likely to have force used against them (McLaughlin 1992; Crawford and Burns 1998; Terrill and Matrofski 2002; Alpert and Dunham 2004).
Agnew’s (1992, 2001) General Strain Theory (GST) is a specific theoretical approach that has been used to explain force from a social-psychological perspective. GST, as stated by Agnew (1992, 2001) focuses on the individual’s affective reactions to stressors or strains with which they are presented, and how the exposure to strain contributes to one becoming involved in deviant behavior. This particular theoretical perspective argues that when individuals are confronted with certain types of strains, or in other words stresses or stressors, they in turn elicit differing kinds of deviant reactions. These deviant reactions are also accompanied by certain emotions. The principle emotion is often that of anger according to Agnew (1992, 2001). The unfavorable emotional experience of those who are exposed to strain is the primary cerebral component that connects strain with the deviant reaction. When anger is combined with strain, several possible reactions are possible, including retaliatory responses (violence).

Those researching police use of force primarily focus on how job-related strains contribute to the officer using violence or force against a suspect. GST suggests violence is often the result of a response to pressures produced by negative feelings, such as anger. It is suggested that strain producing elements coupled with the experience of key emotions (particularly anger) may make it more likely that officers will use force. Likewise, Burke and Mikkelson (2005) examined a number of stressors “quantitative demands (time spent performing tasks), cognitive demands (difficulty in job-related decision making), emotional demands (disturbing situations), demands on hiding emotions, sensorial demands (concentration), responsibility, role clarity, role conflict, and leadership quality (such as supervisor showing consideration for the officer)” (Burke and Mikkelson 2005:274). However, Burke and Mikkelson (2005) concluded that job-related
stress did not increase police desire to use force. Likewise, Manzoni and Eisner came to a similar conclusion; also suggesting that job related stress did not increase the use of force.

Burke and Mikkelson (2005) also examined the effect of shift work as a stressor on police and their willingness to approve of the use of force. They found that those officers who worked shift work on a consistent basis held a more positive attitude towards using force. In addition to supporting the use of force, they were also more inclined to denounce the use of social skills\(^7\) in the day-to-day performance of their jobs (Burke and Mikkelson 2005:275).

**Critique**

A primary criticism of each of the above theoretical viewpoints is that they treat each of the causal factors as essentially extraneous to the situation. First, in looking at the social structural viewpoint, force is applied differentially based upon the individual’s position within the social structure. Thus, these viewpoints do not look at how the situation involving officers and suspects influences the use of force; rather they identify race, class and gender differences as exogenous factors that influence relevant outcomes.

Theories that focus on the hierarchical structure of the policing agency and their official policies also ignore the influences of the situation. Instead, they identify how changes to policies alter the range and character of situations in which officers may or may not use force.

In contrast, cultural theory does take into consideration some aspects of the situation. It suggests that officers develop a clandestine way of acting based upon the circumstances they face. Further, police culture is said to have developed as a result of

\(^7\) Burke and Mikkelson (2005) when speaking of social skill are discussing officers desire to use verbal means of communication to solve the situation.
their handling of situations, and the way that they are scrutinized. Due to the cultural
beliefs that are established prior to a situation occurring, officers will come to use force to
affect an arrest. Therefore, what influences the use of force here is not the situation that
each officer faces; rather, it is the cultural beliefs that have been established about the
handling of similar incidents. Thus, based upon previously established informal norms
and values, officers will or will not come to use force.

Theories looking at the social psychological dimensions also fail to account for
the importance of the immediate situation. Advocates of this perspective focus on factors
external to the situation: observing how one’s age, education, and experience establish the
reaction he/she will have in a situation in which they may or may not use force. Likewise
those utilizing GST to explore the social-psychological factors fail to examine the
situation; rather, they explore the cumulative strain resulting from exposure to many
stressful situations. Consequently, the primary criticism raised in regard to each of the
above-mentioned theories is that they ignore the implications that the situation itself has
on the use of force. These theories focus not on the situation, but on what individuals
bring to it as the cause for action.

A secondary criticism of each of these theories is that they assume that factors that
are established outside of the situation are sufficient enough to compel an individual to
use force. Specifically, each of the theories assumes that those factors, which occur
independently of the situation, are enough to explain force. In the latter part of this
chapter, it will be shown using the work of Collins (2004) that each one of these
explanations identifies external motivating factors far removed from the situation.
Likewise it will be shown through the use of Collins’s (2004) micro-situational theory of
violence that external motivations are not always enough to sustain the individual in
situations which involve the use of physical force. Building on the work of Collins (2004), it will be shown that the situation is a necessary component to explain how a person is able to come to use violent physical force and the situation is integral to understanding when force will be used.

**Situational**

As previously noted, research has explored the use of force from a situational standpoint. According to Friedrich (1980), this particular theoretical approach to the use of force suggests that specific characteristics of the situation contribute to force being used. He explains that the primary focus of those analyses that utilize this vantage point is to understand how citizen and officer behaviors within the immediate context of a situation impact upon the use of force. Those utilizing this approach have investigated the effect of suspect resistance toward police, the suspect(s) level of intoxication, and the influence of bystanders. According to Alpert (2004), each of the aforementioned factors is a feature of the situation that may impact upon the use of force.

As stated, those utilizing the situational perspective have explored the impact of suspects’ behavior, focusing on level of resistance. Terrill et al. (2008) conducted a comprehensive analysis of the effects of suspect resistance and police use of force, examining the type of resistance, its prevalence, as well as the prevalence and type of force with which officers responded. Terrill et al. (2008) found resistance to be significant, increasing the odds of an officer using force. The most common form of resistance encountered by police was verbal, followed by defensive (blocking officer actions), passive (going limp), and active (physical assault). They also found that the most prevalent form of force used by police was handcuffing and the highest level of force used against a resistant suspect was open-handed control tactics. Numerous studies have
identified that the resistance displayed by a suspect has a significant impact on the use of coercion; as the amount of resistance increases so too does the use of force (Freidrich 1980; McLaughlin 1992; Fridell and Binder 1992; Worden 1996; Kavanagh 1997; Holmes et al. 1998; Terrill 2003; Leinfelt 2005).

Additionally, studies examining behavior have also explored the level of intoxication exhibited by a suspect, as it is believed that intoxicated suspects display higher levels of resistance (Alpert and Dunham 2004:155). McLaughlin (1992) found that over half (56%) of those suspects who were the subject of a use of force report were under the influence of drugs or alcohol. This study reveals a significant relationship between officer use of force and suspects’ level of intoxication. This relationship has been observed in other studies (Engels et al. 2000; Garner et al. 2002; and McCluskey et al. 2005), showing that intoxication did in fact increase the likelihood that officers’ will use force. However, contrary to these findings, several studies like those of Crawford and Burns (1998) and Alpert and Dunham (2004), have suggested that the suspects’ level of intoxication does not affect the use of force by police.

The presence of bystanders during police citizen encounters has also been observed as a pertinent situational factor. Homant et al. (2000) found that the presence of bystanders could alter officers’ perception of the seriousness of the situation, modifying the way that they act. The presence of bystanders has been found in many studies to increase the use of force by police (Crawford and Burns 1998; Homant et al. 2000; Terrill and Matrofski 2002;). Terrill and Matrofski (2002) found that in encounters that were officer initiated and bystanders were present at the scene, the odds of force being used increased significantly. They also suggested that when officers initiate contact with a civilian, they feel a greater responsibility for the outcome of that encounter, often feeling
the urge to provide greater safety to bystanders and to ensure the situation does not get out of their control, thus, increasing the need to use force to control the situation. However, Kavanagh (1997) and Cancino (2001) found that bystanders did not increase the likelihood that of police using force.

Looking at a wide variety of situational types, several factors have emerged as pertinent to the use of force by police. Fridell and Binder (1992) found that officers were more likely to use deadly force during incidents that were highly ambiguous and that tended to surprise the officer. Virj et al. (1995) found that high noise levels impaired officers’ perceptions, making them perceive the situation as more dangerous than it was, thereby reducing their ability to shoot effectively. Alpert et al. (1997) found that during police pursuits, force was being used at the end of a pursuit at a far greater rate than was officially recorded. Crawford and Burns (1998) found that in circumstances where officers had intimate knowledge that the area where they were conducting the arrest was dangerous, verbal commands doubled. When the arrests took place at night, officers increased the use of tactics (holds and pain compliance techniques and non-lethal weapons). Manzoni and Eisner (2006) found that when officers were exposed to incidents that were characterized as having increased levels of both prospective and genuine danger, force was used more frequently than by officers whose jobs did not place them in similar peril.

In addition to the above studies, structuration theory by Giddens (1984) has been used by Phillips and Smith (2000) to gain insight into the use of force from a situational perspective. This theory is identified as a situational explanation because it focuses on how both time and location intersect to have an immediate effect on the use of force. Phillips and Smith (2000) use three pertinent concepts derived from this theory to explain
force. The first of such concepts is “locale,” which is a term that considers the location “through and within which action is structured” (Phillips and Smith 2000:481). Second, the concept, “duree” explores time as it is felt and comprises everyday life (ibid). Finally, “practical consciousness” refers to the intelligibility of social beings through which they react to their surroundings and demonstrates their capacity to act (Phillips and Smith 2000:481). Phillips and Smith (2000) use this approach to observe how officers’ concept of time (day/night) and location (private or public) affect their actions. The principle finding of this study was that time and place interacted with one another to impact upon the use of force. Phillips and Smith (2000) found that officers were more likely to use more severe forms of force including punches, kicks and baton hits at night in public areas.

In addition to the above theory, Tedeschi and Felson’s (1994) theory of coercive action has been used by Terrill (2005) to understand the use of force. This theory looks at the exchange between individuals, and can be identified as a situational theory. As stated by Terrill (2005) coercive action is the result of, “a rational decision-making process based on the expectations of success in achieving outcomes, the values of outcomes, and the expectations and negative values of costs” (Terrill 2005:109). The theory suggests that coercion is observed as a “goal-oriented” action which is targeted toward the domination of others, “achieving justice, and/or assert and protect the identities of others” (ibid).

Terrill (2005) contends, based on Tedeschi and Felson’s theory, that officers may resort to force in order to form or sustain their identities. In addition, the use of force should be more pronounced in the presence of third persons, as their identities may be further threatened in this context (Terrill 2005:109-110). The premise of this argument
stems from the knowledge that officers are, by the very nature of their job, trained to maintain their authority at all times (ibid). The primary findings of this study were that when officers encountered resistant suspects, they were less likely to raise their level of force then when no resistance was offered. Rather, they often provided suspects with second chances to comply with her/his verbal direction. Consequently, Terrill (2005) asserted that by providing a secondary opportunity to comply with the demands of the officer, the situation often resulted in the officer having to use even greater levels of force than would have initially been required.

Also using a situational approach, Turk’s (1969) norm resistance theory has been tested by Weidner and Terrill (2005) to understand the use of force. Norm resistance theory is a situational theory as it highlights the influence of both the suspects’ and officers’ behavior as an aspect of the situation that influences the use of force. Norm resistance theory suggests that violence erupts when two groups are at opposition in regard to their norm beliefs (Weidner and Terrill 2005:87); when those who are not in a position of power act in a manner that is counter to that of those in authority, the chance of violent action increases. However, it is lowered when the situation is reversed (ibid). This theoretical approach suggests that the more sophisticated and the more organized one is, the more likely a violent act will occur. Organization refers to the amount of social support the offender or those in the position of enforcer have for committing an improper act. Sophistication refers to one’s understanding of his/her opponents’ behavioral structure and ability to exploit it (Weidner and Terrill 2005:87).

Weidner and Terrill (2005) suggested that those who come into contact with authorities whose norms coincide with their own are more likely to be accepting of their imposed authority. When offenders’ ideals differ from those with whom they come into
contact, violent confrontation is more likely to occur. The premise here is that authority is based upon the ideal of deference: when one defers to authority, conflict is less likely to result and thus social order is kept intact. More specifically, this theory considers the presence of bystanders that encouraged the suspect to resist, officers’ previous knowledge of the area and suspect, whether it was an officer initiated encounter, and the presence of bystanders. Weidner and Terrill (2005) found that organization, as defined above, was a significant predictor of overt conflict (verbal and physical fighting) between citizens and officers, presence of bystanders encouraging suspect resistance Also, officers’ knowledge of persons and area and encounters being officer- initiated both significantly increased the level of overt conflict.

Alpert and Dunham (2004) developed their authority maintenance theory to specifically explain the use of force. Authority maintenance theory concentrates on two key concepts: reciprocity and authority. According to Alpert and Dunham (2004) reciprocity refers to the standardized exchange of actions and reactions that support the expectations of all parties. They assert that interactions that involve force signify a breakdown in reciprocity (Alpert and Dunham 2004:176). Once this occurs, the actors have abandoned the goal of mutual benefit or cooperation and the interaction has deteriorated into one in which personal goals take precedence. The other key component of this theory is authority. Alpert and Dunham defined authority as one’s ability to direct or control the behavior of others (2004:177). When officer and suspect are interacting with one another, they bring to the situation differing amounts of authority (ibid). The balance of authority is said to affect both the officers’ and the suspects’ behavior when they interact with one another (Alpert and Dunham 2004:177-178).
Alpert and Dunham (2004) utilize this perspective to analyze the impact of resistance during interactions between police and suspects. They observed both the level of resistance presented by the suspects and the amount of force exerted by officers. They concluded, based upon their analysis, that officers did not exceed the level of force necessary beyond that of the level of resistance that they encountered (Alpert and Dunham 2004:159).

Micro-Situational

The micro-situational theory of violence as presented by Collins (2004) maintains that violence is everywhere and varies considerably in its nature. Violence can be as brief as a slap in the face or as vast as a war. It can be fiery like a quarrel or as detached as dropping a bomb. Violence can be jovial and frightening, it can happen covertly or publicly (Collins 2004:1). Collins (2004) explains that regardless of how diversified the occurrence of violence is, a handful of operations in cooperation and in varying amounts or intensity, provide for both how and when violence will occur. To discern how and when this will occur we must ignore the social background, culture, and the motivation and get as close as possible to the dynamics and characteristics of the violent situation itself (ibid). Collins (2004) explains that we must ignore the premise that there exist certain violent individuals and must focus instead on the violent situation. He maintains that micro-situational theory demonstrates that it is the violent situation and not the individual, which forms the “emotions and acts” of those who enter them (Collins 2004:2).

Collins (2004) explains that the primary issue with the way violence is understood stems from the way it has become distorted in its depiction. Hollywood and television news media have created a sensationalist view of it, emphasizing images of bloody
carnage that exceed that which is humanly possible (Collins 2004:10). Stories told in the aftermath of a violent situation and boasting about violence have helped to affect what one expects violence to look like. This has contributed to making violence a “modern-day mythology” (ibid). Collins (2004) explains that there are many myths about violence. The first being that violence is contagious; if two people start a fight, bystanders will immediately join in and begin fighting as well. He explains that this is false and that the majority of people in a situation of violence will distance themselves from it out of fear. The only exception being when certain groups are at odds with one another, and an individual fight breaks out, will other group members join in (Collins 2004:11). This type of situation is highly structured and only through that structure can one overcome the ever-present fear.

A second myth Collins (2004) explains is that violence is long and drawn out, and those involved in an incident of violence are able to receive multiple blows. In the case where firearms are used, people use tremendous cunning and calculation to gain the upper hand (Collins 2004:14). The point being made here is that people drastically exaggerate the actual time frame of a violent event (ibid). Collins (2004) maintains that violent acts are very short in duration, usually not consisting of much more than a single hit. Individuals rarely possess a surplus of motivation to sustain a violent act (Collins 2004:18). Combatants, as Collins (2004) suggests, are usually satisfied once an injury has been incurred and content on stopping the violent altercation at that point. Even events in which an individual may have been involved in a hand-to-hand fight, later returning with a weapon, these are generally considered separate episodes of violence (Collins 2004:15). There are two important exceptions to when violent altercations will not be short and episodic. The first is when violence is highly structured and controls are in place to
prevent injury or minimize it (ibid). The second is descriptive of the term “hitting a man when he is down” (ibid). This type of violence is not illustrative of a fight but more of a massacre or punishment (Collins 2004:16).

The second exception is more pertinent to the discussion of an officer’s use of violent actions, as the first applies mainly to entertainment violence like sports. The second exception primarily exists when there is a significant difference in force between those in opposition. What we learn from this exception is that it is the violent confrontation rather than the violence itself that is harder to maintain for an extended period of time. The tension of the confrontational situation becomes difficult to maintain.

As previously stated, Collins (2004) maintains that violence is very difficult to commit and most individuals are incapable of adeptly performing violent acts. The reason for this, Collins (2004) explains, is that violent situations are “shaped by an emotional field of tension/fear” (Collins 2004:19). For an act of violence to be committed one must be able to circumvent this emotional field by “seizing the emotional rhythm as the dominator, leaving the other side stranded as a victim” (ibid). However, this is not a learned ability; it is a “structural property of the situational field and not the individual” (ibid). The emotional rhythm develops as a result of the “emotional energy” (EE) present within the situation (ibid). Collins (2004) explains that EE is a variant result of all personal interactions. It fluctuates with the level that those present “become entrained in one another’s emotions and bodily rhythms and are caught in a common focus of attention” (ibid:19). Situations are categorized as mutually beneficial when all of those involved have feelings of harmony and “intersubjectivity,” and produce a sense of vigor, self-assurance, and keenness for what the group was doing (ibid:19). This is what Collins (2004) refers to as EE within a given situation.
He also suggests that violent interactions are very arduous as they operate counter to traditional methods of interaction. As a result of the propensity for individuals to become “entrained in each other’s rhythms and emotions,” an encounter is at “cross purposes-an antagonistic interaction people experience a pervasive feeling of tension” (Collins 2004:20). This is what Collins (2004) denotes as “confrontational tension”; when this tension increases in magnitude it flows over into an emotion of fear (ibid:20). When one is able to circumvent this tension/fear they are able to commit an act of violence. However, the ability to do so is determined by the situation and not the individual (ibid:20). Those who are engaged in an altercation with one another “get into a state of fear or high tension as soon as it comes to the point of violence” (Collins 2004:42). Collins (2004) defines this tension/fear as a “collective interactional mood” (Collins 2004:42). This collective mood typifies the violent interaction on all sides of a confrontation (ibid).

Collins (2004) makes intelligible the presence of tension/fear through an analysis of military personnel in combat. He observed that there were an exceeding number of incidents involving wild firing, friendly fire, failure to discharge one’s weapon, ammunition put in backwards, and infinite cases of self-defecation, all of which Collins (2004) claims lead to the identification of tension/fear in military combat, during situations where officers were involved in trench warfare. Likewise, tension/fear exists in all situations of violence. Similarities between instances of military tension/fear can be observed in police violence (Collins 2004:71). There exists a significantly minimal number of officers who have ever discharged their weapons. When they do, it is usually chaotic with the officer often missing her/his intended target at a very close range (ibid). Further, a large number of bystander fatalities have also resulted from police wild firing.
Police shootings often end in what I will later discuss as “overkill” (ibid). These acts, as Collins (2004) suggests, are evidence of the tension/fear within a violent situation.

The fear that is experienced in violent situations is crucial to the understanding of when violence will occur. According to Collins (2004), it would appear logical that individuals would fear being harmed and this would follow many of the indications given for situational tension/fear. However, there exist many situations where individuals are willing to go through pain. There are many incidents where the experience of pain has been “ritualized” and when it occurs at the focus of social attention, demonstrates a strong sense of group membership (Collins 2004:74). The important observation being made is that it is not the cause, but rather the reception of the harm that is important. Collins (2004) states that soldiers would rather endure harm than dishonor their comrades by failing to inflict harm on another individual. This suggests that it is not the fear of injury, but rather committing the act of violence that elicits fear. Evidence exists in the military context, as most are able to adjust to the deaths of their fellow combatants, yet their fighting abilities rarely improve, showing a continued presence of tension/fear.

Likewise, Collins (2004) explains that military personnel rarely fear what would seem the most perilous of violent situations, including being attacked by heavy artillery. They do however fear engaging the opposition in small arms fire or bayonets. Collins (2004) explains that an individual’s level of tension/fear increases based upon his/her proximity to a violent situation and the potential for him/her to have to use violence (Collins 2004:75). Collins (2004) maintains that it is the “tension of the confrontation itself” that becomes pertinent to understanding violence (Collins 2004:77). Tension/fear increases when encounters become increasingly focused (ibid). Violence will depend on the social characteristics. Put more succinctly, the closer the combatants come to one
another, the harder it becomes to commit an act of violence. Hostility is generally conveyed at a distance and away from the presence of those who it is directed toward (Collins 2004:79).

Collins (2004) explains that to understand the development of tension/fear, the concept of EE must be reexamined in relation to a violent interaction. First, individuals in non-violent interaction become “entrained in one another’s bodily rhythms and emotional tones” (Collins 2004:79). This type of interaction is considered to be automatic and most desirable among all individuals. Individuals become engaged “in a pronounced micro-interactional rhythm; a smoothly flowing conversation to the beat of a common intonational punctuation” (ibid). This interaction formality produces feelings of “intersubjectivity and moral solidarity” (ibid). Therefore, when conflicts occur in the direct presence of another human being, it is difficult for one to commit an act of violence. The reason it becomes so difficult is because it violates the mutual cognizance and “bodily-emotional entrainment” (Collins 2004:79-80). In order for one to be successful at violence, the individual must be able to upset their opponents’ “rhythms breaking through their mode of entrainment and imposing one’s own actions” (Collins 2004:80).

Violent situations then produce another form of tension. Collins (2004) refers to this tension as “non-solidarity entrainment” (Collins 2004:80). It occurs when one attempts to take action against another. This attempt runs counter to the desire to become unified and achieve a desired mutual rhythm. The tension is further confounded as “violent situations have their own entrainment and focus” (Collins 2004:81). Attention is centered on the violence alone, the situation as one that is violent, “and sometimes an emotional entrainment in which the hostility, anger, and excitement of each side gets the
other more angry and excited” (Collins 2004:82). Collins (2004) asserts that “shared consciousness and entrainment” make violence all that more difficult to carry out successfully. Most people are incapable of entering what he calls the “confrontational zone” (ibid). Most people are content to flirt with it for a moment, but before long their “body’s emotions” will compel them to retreat to a safe distance. Finally, Collins (2004) states that if you remain in the zone for too long you will become ineffective at violence.

He identifies two specific ways in which violence will transpire. One is through cold calculation conducted by the individual, where he or she is able to self-entrain using the situational dynamics. However, I will focus here on hot violence and his concept of “forward panic” (Collins 2004:83). A forward panic, as Collins (2004) explains, arises out of the tension/fear of a hostile situation. Although tension/fear is a standard prerequisite for all situations of violence, here tension is drawn out “working towards a climax” (Collins 2004:85). There is a transformation from a somewhat docile lingering, restraining one’s self, until the opportunity emerges to bring the conflict “to a head, to be fully active” (ibid). When the opportunity presents itself, the tension/fear is expelled in a “hot rush” (ibid). This form of violence according to Collins (2004) is akin both in its appearance and physiology to that of an actual panic situation.

Collins (2004) explains that when we observe the emotional continuance of a forward panic in depth, we see several important factors emerge. We see the escalation of tension that is then expelled into what is explained as an uncontrolled attack when a situation provides one to do so (Collins 2004:89). Tension increases as individuals who are at odds with one another increase in their proximity to one another. The increase in tension is not because this is the point where one may be injured; rather it is the time when an individual “must face the other person down to put him or her under ones violent
control” (Collins 2004: 90). There is an extended circumstance “of being frustrated in what they normally expect to carry out in any interaction” (Collins 2004:90-91). In the case of police-citizen interaction this could include a car chase, or failure to comply with the demands and authority of the officer (ibid).

Collins (2004) states that the tension/fear that emerges from this type of violence has been likened to that of an adrenalin rush. However, individuals experiencing a rush of adrenaline do not necessarily react violently. Thus, the response of “anger or violent attacks on a now helpless victim, occur only in particular kinds of situational sequences” (Collins 2004:92). Those involved in a forward panic often experience a strong emotion of anger. In certain circumstances it can reach the “extreme of rage or frenzy” (ibid). The implication made by the terms ‘frenzy’ and ‘rage’ are that the experience of anger is dominating and gripping. However, anger is not the only emotion that can be expelled in a forward panic (ibid). Collins (2004) explains that a person may exude laughter, which may continue even after the forward panic is over. Individuals may also express a mixture of these emotions. Regardless of what combination of emotions is expressed, there are two important attributes of the emotions (Collins 2004: 93).

The first characteristic is that the emotions experienced are “hot”, and are the result of being in a “situation where one is highly aroused or steamed up” (Collins 2004:93). It emerges in a “rush, explosively” and it takes considerable time to restore one’s composure (ibid). Also, the emotions experienced in a forward panic are “rhythmic and strongly entraining” (ibid). Those caught up in the act of a forward panic continue to repeat their hostile acts, “with their emotions flowing in self-reinforcing waves” (ibid). In the course of a forward panic, all of the elements which emerge in the “hot rush of a successful, unopposed attack are cycling back upon themselves: anger, release from the
tension/fear, elation, laughter, sheer noisiness as a form of aggression; all of these
generating a social atmosphere” which helps the individual to keep perpetuating his
actions (Collins 2004: 94)

A forward panic is a type of violence that is temporarily inextinguishable (Collins
2004:94). Collins (2004) describes it as the “overuse or overkill of force” exceeding that
which would be required to defeat an opponent. The individual has “fallen off the point of
tension into a forward panic situation” and cannot escape its tunnel-like effect (Collins
2004:94). It has the visible look of an “atrocitcity,” it’s the powerful against the meek, the
equipped against the unequipped. The appearance is “always ugly” regardless of the level
of injury the opposition receives (Collins 2004:94). Forward panics can be observed in
one-on-one conflicts, however, they are more pronounced when performed by a group,
where they have power over an individual or “an armed force against the temporarily
unarmed” (Collins 2004:128). Therefore, the more people present or the larger the group
involved, the greater the likelihood of a forward panic occurring (ibid). This, Collins’
explains, is why most incidents of police atrocities of force tend to involve a large number
of officers which helps to sustain the violence as they feed off one another’s actions

How then does a group facilitate a forward panic? There is tremendous
importance placed upon the “emotional process building up in time, the entrainment in
emotional rhythms from one body to another, the prime attraction and pleasure of social
interaction of all kinds come from entrainment in a strongly rhythmic bodily emotional
pattern” (Collins 2004:130). Individuals are incredibly vulnerable to this entrainment
during the escalation of tension, as they are seeking solidarity with the group (ibid). The
act of drawing in members of the group itself increases the level of tension (ibid). The
explosion into group violence, “especially in the rhythmic, repetitive pattern that constitutes overkill and the atrocity” is extremely enthralling to those involved as it creates a tremendous amount of unanimity (ibid). The entrainment experienced in a forward panic becomes appealing as violence breaks with the way one normally interacts with others (ibid).

The building of tension/fear is what contributes to a hot rush of violence. This building of tension/fear Collins (2004) explains, works to exacerbate the situation by adding incremental elements of danger to the situation that works to intensify it. As Collins (2004) explains, those background factors such as race and gender do not become a part of the cause of violence. Rather we see here that violence is facilitated by a culmination of situational factors and time spent on the cusp of confrontation. Finally when one recognizes the opponent as being weak, he springs forward in a violent manner. Likewise, Collins (2004) makes intelligible that neither the strain nor the motivation that is accumulated prior to a confrontational situation is sufficient to sustain a violent act. He maintains that violence requires a build-up of tension that is acquired during the course of a given situation, which causes the individual to be incapable of remaining in the zone of confrontation, forcing him/her to move forward in a hot rush of violence. This hot rush of violence allows the individual to release the built up tension/fear that has accumulated during the confrontation once the opponent has been observed as weak.

Previous situational explanations of the use of force have been utilized to discern under what circumstances an officer is more likely to use force; identifying the types of situations, the level of resistance, suspect intoxication and the presence of bystanders as significant. However, these explanations only identify singular factors as being pertinent to explaining the use of force. They do not look at the situation to identify the sequence
and impact of its diverse elements. Using the theoretical postulates set forth by Collins (2004), this can be achieved providing a more nuanced understanding of the situation and its influence on violent action. By doing so, it can be shown that regardless of the type of situation an officer faces, the situational exchange between those involved can be shown to play a significant role in the development of the use of violent physical actions.

In addition, the specific situational theories like structuration theory, which advocates the importance of previously acquired knowledge of time and location to determine when force is used, fails to account for the impact of the immediate situational circumstance. Using Collins’s theory, it can be shown that background factors may be pertinent, but not necessary, for understanding when force will be used when we observe the micro-situational circumstances. In addition, coercive action theory does provide for a type of interaction in which an officer would desire to use force. However, it is demonstrated by Collins (2004) that the desire and the actual commission are quiet distant from one another when we observe the micro-situational details.

Norm resistance theory refers to the importance of the interaction between citizen and officer. It does not however express how the resistance facilitates force being used. In addition, norm resistance theory suggests it is the individual who determines when force will be used. Through the theory set forth by Collins (2004), it is clear how the interaction between citizen and officer, regardless of the situation, can lead to force being used and how the situation, not the individual, determines under what conditions force will be employed. Finally, the situational theory proposed by Alpert and Dunham (2004) shows how the breakdown in mutual exchange between officer and suspect affects the use of force. However, the resultant decision to use force is based upon previously established levels of authority. Again, based on the postulation that was set forth by Collins (2004)
background characteristics are important, but not sufficient in understanding when force is used. Rather, Collins (2004) maintains that situational factors are continually pertinent in the explanation of violence. Thus, it is the situation and not the individual that specifies when one will use force.

Finally, these situational theories and those of a non-situational nature ignore what Collins (2004) terms the “dirty little secret about violence.” The dirty secret being that violence is not easy to commit. The above theories assume that once there is sufficient previously established motive, motives including the presence of an officer in a specific situation, establishment of a certain disposition, one will then easily be able to commit a violent act. Similarly, those theories presented which identified the structure of the police department and policies, sub-cultural beliefs, social structural positions, or affective states also assume that once these motives were understood, force could easily be employed. However, Collins (2004) explains that violence is not easy, and through the micro-situational understanding of it, we are able to see that very few people can actually commit acts of violence. Collins (2004) explains that much of what facilitates the use of violence comes from the structural properties of the situation. Those previously established motivations are not always a necessary condition for violence to occur; rather it is a necessary condition is the situation. Through that which transpires within a situation, individuals are afforded the ability to perpetuate violent actions.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a detailed discussion on the differing ways that the concept of force has been measured and observed. Additionally, it has explored the numerous theoretical perspectives that have been used to explain force. In doing so, this chapter examined those theoretical perspectives on: the hierarchical construction of the
police force and its changing policies, the culture of policing, social structural differences of race, class and gender, and the social-psychology of the participants. It was argued that the aforementioned perspectives, although showing significant findings in relation to the use of force, disregard the immediate situations officers face as important elements of an explanation of the use of force. Situational theories were also discussed which identified the demeanor of suspect e.g., (resistance, intoxication), and situation types including the location and time to explain when force will be used. These perspectives, although dealing with situational elements have only dealt with very limited aspects of a situation. They have not taken a structured approach to studying the situation, identifying how the sequence and impact of its various components influence the use of violence. However, using Collins’s (2004) theory of violence, specifically his concept of a forward panic (hot violence), this can be achieved. Using Collins (2004) theory, the situation can be observed to see how changes in the situational dynamic change one’s emotional experience and lead to a pervasive feeling of tension/fear. As tension/fear builds, the individual becomes overwhelmed until she/he explodes into a hot rush of violence (forward panic). In addition, Collins (2004) demonstrates that background motives are not enough to sustain someone through an act of violence; rather, it is the structural property of the situation that allows one to commit an act of forward panic like violence. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology employed in this research. This chapter will describe the data used in this analysis, as well as the analytical approach that will be utilized.
Chapter 3
Methodology and Data

Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of the methodology utilized in this multiple case study analysis of Internet videos and news articles. It provides a description of the data that are employed, and information regarding how these data were retrieved. Further, clarification is also given on the necessity and purpose of using Internet videos as the primary source of data. In addition, the chapter illustrates the exploratory nature of this research. Finally, the analytical procedure utilized in this study is discussed. This thesis takes a descriptive approach, employing eight theoretically derived propositions: 1) cross-purpose, 2) tension/fear, 3) the prolonged building of tension/fear, 4) docile lingering, 5) suspect in a position of weakness, 6) suspect outnumbered, 7) overkill and piling on of violence, and 8) rhythm. Showing how each of the elements described in those propositions is observed within multiple situations of police violence.

Data

The primary data for this analysis were obtained from the website, www.YouTube.com. This is a website designated to the publication of video clips. It allows its users to upload and share videos with one another via the World Wide Web. As stated by youtube.com, in the “about” section of the website, “People can see first-hand accounts of current events, find videos about their hobbies and interests, and discover the quirky and unusual.” YouTube videos were selected to observe situations of violence in context. As Collins (2004) explains, in order to discern the impact of the situation on violence there is a need to observe how the dynamics and the characteristics of the
situation unfold (Collins 2004:1). The videos provide this opportunity, circumventing
many of the difficulties surrounding direct observation of such situations and various
other modes of data collection. These issues are discussed in detail below.

One possible source of data from which observations could have been made is
court records. However, those records contain categorizations of the individuals, which
establish their roles as perpetrators and victims within the context of the records.
Likewise, the roles are discussed in ways that emphasize the culpability of the suspect in
contrast to that of a police officer. As a result of the theoretical framework being
employed, every attempt is made to avoid looking at those pre-prescribed roles that may
be imputed within documents such as court records. Collins’s theory of forward panic
maintains that the totality of the incident must be observed in order to distinguish how the
situation impacts what transpires and how participants end up being categorized.
Therefore, data that could potentially shape the roles of those involved does not allow for
the entirety of the situation to be observed before establishing culpability.

Police records are another mode of data that could have been used. However, as
Alpert and Dunham (2004) explain, it is difficult to gain access to information involving
police use of force incidents. The reason for such difficulty, is that police forces are
reluctant to relinquish data or to let outsiders observe their actions because the findings of
the research may reflect negatively upon the agency. The videos, however, allowed for
the circumvention of this issue, as they are available for public viewing at any time. In
addition, no special permission from a police department to gain access to these data is
required.

Direct observation through a series of police ride-alongs was considered, but
rejected. The opportunity to observe a highly specific situation (violence) has been shown
by many researchers to occur relatively infrequently during police-citizen interactions (Friedrich 1980; Bayley and Garafalo 1989; Terrill 2003; Leinfelt 2005; Gallo et al. 2008). In contrast, the use of the videos assures that multiple cases can be observed and include the use of violence and can also be collected within a reasonable time frame.  

There are several theoretical assertions made by Collins (2004) regarding the appropriateness of video recordings as a data source. First, when observing violence in context the observer can become engulfed in the violence alone, ignoring the situational products as they unfold (Collins 2004:7). By using a recording, one is able to revisit the situation allowing for the identification of key elements that may have been missed by viewing the situation first-hand (ibid). Likewise, by having the ability to revisit the violence over and over, the researcher has time to grow accustomed to the shock of viewing the violence (ibid). Doing so, Collins (2004) suggests allows one to observe in greater detail the micro-situational factors as they unfold.

**Case Selection Criteria**

This thesis makes use of multiple cases for the analysis. Yin explains that by observing multiple cases it will “provide more robust evidence” for the analysis (2009:53). To attain the cases for this analysis a search of the YouTube site was conducted using a keyword search. The key terms (police use of force and police violence) were entered into the sites search field. The searches revealed thousands of potential cases that matched those parameters. The selection criterion that follows was then used to establish the cases that are utilized in this research.

Videos that were designed to provide instructional information for police officers were eliminated. These videos did not deal with actual situations in which physical force was used. Likewise, many of the videos found were posted multiple times allowing for
the elimination of repetitious postings. As YouTube is designed for individuals to create and post their own videos, several compilation videos containing more than one incident of violence were found. Those videos were also eliminated.

Further, only those cases that involved the use of actual physical violence were chosen. Selecting these cases allows for the evaluation of two key theoretical components of a forward panic situation. Collins (2004) maintains that the violence observed during a forward panic manifests as an “overkill” and a “piling on” of violence. Likewise, Collins (2004) asserts that forward panic violence is also rhythmic in nature. Therefore, selecting those cases in which officers were physically engaged with a suspect allowed for the empirical assessment of these claims.

In addition, situations were selected, whenever possible, which allowed for a depiction of the situation from beginning to end. As a result, videos that depicted the situation from the point of initial contact between officer and suspect and continued to provide details of the situation to the point where officers began to leave the scene were selected. The purpose of this particular criterion is to allow for observations relevant to each of the propositions that Collins (2004) asserts contributes to a situation of forward panic. By having access to as much of the complete situation as possible, it can be observed whether or not Collins’s claims are demonstrated including: cross-purpose, tension/fear, building of tensions/fear, docile lingering, weakness in the suspect before the violence, or outnumbered suspects.

Also, videos that were produced for television viewing were excluded from the analysis for several reasons. The possibility exists that they may have been edited for public viewing, the language and actions of both the suspect and officers may have been altered or deleted. Any tampering with the video could possibly remove valuable
information needed for this analysis. Likewise, the videos produced for television were excluded because they contain interpretations of the situation by a third party and in many cases the officers themselves. Again, based on Collins’s theory, any interpretation by a third party could be an over-embellishment of the reality of the violent situation.

**News Sources**

Electronic news articles are used to supplement several of the cases, and to provide details that were absent from the videos. Details may be missing, as persons filming the incidents may not have begun to do so until the violence began, or until they came to realize that violence might occur. Therefore, the potential exists that several of the videos may not contain all aspects of a situation necessary for the analysis. As a result, the missing information will be obtained from newspaper articles.

Accordingly, multiple news sources are utilized in order to achieve data triangulation (Yin 2009:116). Data triangulation involves multiple data sources to ensure the accuracy of the information being conveyed (ibid). The use of multiple news sources mitigates against the over-embellishment and use of stereotypical language that Collins (2004) suggests hide the true nature of the occurrence.

To obtain these news articles, a key word search was conducted using www.google.ca, a search engine that scans the Internet for keywords on web pages and then compiles a list of sites that match those search words (Google.ca). The names of each of those videos that did not contain the necessary information were entered into this search engine. These search term criteria were chosen, as it is largely the only information that is consistently provided on the YouTube site regarding each of the videos. Articles that were returned through the Internet search which discussed updated charges against
those involved, their medical conditions, or articles discussing factors that did not pertain
to the circumstances surrounding the situation were not utilized.

Selected Cases for Analysis

A detailed narrative of each of the cases selected is provided. The narratives are
presented in order to provide a fuller understanding of the circumstances surrounding
each of the events. See Appendix A for a table providing a brief synopsis of each of the
cases. Likewise, a detailed narrative for each case is provided in Appendices B through J.

Case (A)

The video for this case can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5KrKaw7Q. The title of the video is “Police Beating Caught On Video 5 Cops Fired In Alabama.” To supplement the video several news sources were consulted. The first article was found on CNN.com. The title of the article was “5 Alabama police officers fired over beating caught on camera.” The article can be found at http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/20/alabama.police.beating/index.html#cnnSTCText. The second article was entitled “5 Alabama Police Officers Fired for Beating Suspect on Tape.” It can be located at Fox News.com http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520877,00.html. Please see Appendix B for the narrative regarding case (A).

Case (B)

The video for case (B) is entitled “Polish Man Tasered to Death by RCMP at Vancouver Airport.” It can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QP CgwCS3viQ. Two news articles were obtained to help with the analysis. The first article is entitled “Taser video shows RCMP shocked immigrant within 25 seconds of their arrival.” The article was located at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2007/11/14/bc-taservideo.html. The second article, “Video of Taser death at Vancouver
airport to be released.” was found at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2007/11/14/bc-taserrelease.html. See Appendix C for a detailed case narrative.

**Case (C)**

The title of the video used in case (C) is “UWO arrest October 14 2009.” It can be located at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17mj553jzhM. Further, two article were employed to help provide further contextualization. The first article was “UWO student can't recall violent arrest”; it can be found at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2009/10/16/uwo-beating.html. The second article “Man violently arrested at UWO may have been intoxicated.” The article can be located at http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20091016/UWO_arrest_091016/20091016/?hub=TorontoNewHome. See Appendix D for the case narrative.

**Case (D)**

The video for this case is “Dash Cam Video Of Non Use Of Excessive Force During Traffic Stop”, located at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebdpCY4k5-I. See Appendix E for the narrative.

**Case (E)**

The video in this case is “Police Brutality - Police car footage of Jenkins' arrest.” The video can be seen at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQ3_mMUEq6Y. See Appendix F for the narrative.

**Case (F)**

The video for this case is entitled “Police brutality at No Borders Camp.” It can be located at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=plgnprCVO-Y. See Appendix G for the narrative.
**Case (G)**

The video employed for this case is titled “Omaha Police Chase and ShootOut!”, it can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6wHBjdtY0&feature=Play List&p=F557B91ED70D383E&index=8. To supplement this video several news articles were accessed. The first article is “Chase Suspect May Be Connected To Other Crimes: *Investigators Look At Robert Carter In String Of Crimes*. The article was found at KETV.com, http://www.ketv.com/news/10435191/detail.html. The Second article “Chase Car Was Reported Stolen; More Crimes May Be Linked: *Robert Carter Hospitalized*. This article was also discovered at KETV.com, http://www.ketv.com/news/10430172/detail.html. The final article, consulted was Man In Chase Identified; Remains In Critical Condition: *High-Speed Chase Ends; Police Report Shots Fired.*”. This article was also retrieved from KET.com, http://www.ketv.com/news/10421891/detail.html. See Appendix H for the narrative.

**Case (H)**

The video used to observe the situation as it transpired was “Philadelphia Police Violence Beating ... Philadelphia police,” which was obtained from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXY7439OH8I. Several articles supplemented the video evidence for this case. The first was “Video Shows Philly Police Kick, Hit Suspects 15 Officers Taken Off Streets.” The article was found at KCTV.com, http://www.kctv5.com/news/16185649/detail.html. The Second article was “Philadelphia Police Chase Ends With Violent Brawl.” It can be found at FoxNews.com, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,354308,00.html. Finally, the article “6 Philadelphia Officers Benched: Mayor Calls Actions in Videotaped Beatings 'Unacceptable’” was retrieved from Washington Post.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/07/
Case (I)

The video used to obtain the information for Case (I) was “Police Beat Down.” The video can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmWqfdw06Lk. See Appendix J for the narrative.

Analytical Approach

This is a multiple case study analysis, utilizing propositions derived from Collins (2004) with regard to a forward panic. This study is an exploratory analysis of the propositions derived from Collins’s theory. This study takes on an exploratory approach for a number of reasons. Firstly, Collins (2004) does not describe a method for empirically observing the occurrence of a forward panic. Collins does, however, describe the conceptual components in great detail. No ideal approach exists from which his theory should be analyzed. As a result it is left up to the individual researcher to discern how to observe the assertions in Collins’s theory.

Secondly, this research is exploratory in its observation of the theoretical assertions made by Collins. To date there has yet to be an empirical examination of his theory. Therefore, a previously established set of measures does not exist that can be drawn upon to make observations about this theory. One of the reasons for the lack of empirical examination is the level of abstraction of the concepts used in the theory. Several of the concepts as Collins presents them e.g., (tension/fear, docile lingering, and rhythm) can be interpreted in multiple ways. As a result of the indefinite nature of these concepts, this study observes their presence in relation to the proposition set forth by Collins (2004).
To conduct this exploratory multiple case study analysis, this thesis takes a descriptive approach. As Berg (2007) explains, descriptive case studies make use of a detailed theory to provide the overall structure that the analysis will follow. As previously stated, the analysis will utilize Collins’s theory of forward panic as a guide. In doing so, the analysis will examine eight propositions derived from this theory: 1) cross-purpose, 2) tension/fear, 3) the building of tension and fear, 4) docile lingering, 5) suspect in a position of weakness, 6) suspect outnumbered, 7) piling on and overkill, and 8) rhythm. Each one of the propositions Collins (2004) claims is a situational component that contributes to forward panic violence. These propositions are employed in this study to systematically explore the situation to identify the sequence and impact of its various components on police violence. As Collins’s theory states, through this specific situational perspective a more comprehensive understanding of the situation and its cumulative impact on violent actions can be achieved.

Likewise, as Berg (2007) states there must be a way to connect the data under observation to the propositions being used. By observing each of the above-mentioned cases (A) through (I), the analysis will use the definitions and explanations of each proposition provided by Collins (2004). Those details will be used to determine the presence of and extent to which the situational elements described in the propositions are empirically observable. Likewise, through this analytical approach the value added capability of the theory to explain police violence will be assessed. According to Smelser (1964) the concept of value added originates from the discipline of economics. As Smelser’ explains the value added approach maintains that certain factors must be present to explain an occurrence with each of the components contributing, “its value to the explanation of the episode” (Smelser 1964:120). Therefore, as Collins (2004) illustrates
each one of the propositions as explained below, are necessary components in the explanation of a forward panic. If the theory is to have a value added capacity, each one of the components as described below will be present within all the cases observed.

**Propositions**

An explanation of each of the propositions derived from Collins’s theory of forward panic violence is provided below. Each one is said to be an integral part of the situation involving violent actions. As stated each of the aspects covered in the assertions will be observed in the analysis conducted for this study.

**Cross-purpose**

Collins (2004) asserts that in order for a forward panic to develop the situation must first be at a cross-purpose. A cross-purpose refers to the interaction between those involved and the conflicting purpose of the interaction. Collins (2004) states that when the situation is at a cross-purpose it will elicit tension/fear.

**Tension/fear**

Tension/fear, Collins (2004) asserts, occurs when the situation breaks from normal social interaction creating a situation where intersubjectivity is no longer experienced. Further, Collins (2004) suggests that tension/fear in a situation can be seen in both the facial expressions and body posturing of the individuals involved. According to Collins’s theory, the situation is no longer intersubjective when the parties involved cease to communicate in a respectful and mutually beneficial manner, and one or both parties are not afforded the opportunity to communicate. Collins (2004) explains that when the situation breaks from one’s expected normal interaction, tension/fear is a result. He also explicitly states that when the police are unable to maintain control of a situation, the lack of control contributes to a situation of tension/fear. Finally, tension/fear can be physically
manifested (Collins 2004:43). Tension/fear is said to be visible in a person’s eyes when they are raised and drawn together (ibid). According to Collins (2004), one’s body posture can also give the appearance of tension/fear. When a person’s body appears to be simultaneously moving towards and away from the situation, this posture is indicative of tension/fear (ibid:43).

**Prolonged Building of Tension/fear**

Collins (2004) explains that a forward panic involves a build up of tension/fear. The build up involves an extended set of circumstances that will increase the level of danger, exacerbating the situation, and running counter to the expected interaction. Likewise, Collins (2004) referred again to the maintaining of control within every interaction in which an officer is involved.

**Docile Lingerence**

Collins (2004) explains that during a forward panic an individual will experience a docile lingering. A docile lingering is identified as a period in which an individual is incapable of being physically involved within a situation, restraining oneself before she/he is able to be fully active (use violence). In addition to restraining of oneself, that individual will simultaneously be experiencing a pervasive feeling of tension/fear.

**Suspect in a Position of Weakness**

Another key component of a forward panic is that one’s opponent will be in a position of weakness. Collins (2004) explains that the individual(s) will be in a position of physical disadvantage compared to their attacker. Collins (2004) maintains that when an individual is in a position of physical disadvantage, which he identified as including being unarmed, he/she is more likely to be a victim of forward panic violence.
**Suspect Outnumbered**

Collins (2004) states that a forward panic will have an increased likelihood of occurring when there are multiple persons present. Collins (2004) explains that this provides the attacker(s) with the ability to achieve dominance over the victim and sustain the violence of a forward panic.

**Overkill and Piling on of Violence**

Collins asserts that a forward panic will be seen as a piling on of persons and an overkill of violence. Collins (2004) contends that an overkill of violence can be discerned through the repetitive use of violent actions which exceed that which would be considered necessary within a given situation. Likewise, Collins (2004) explains that the overkill of violence is observed as descent straight into the violent actions because individuals will lack restraint in their actions. A pilling on is described by Collins (2004) as the physical overwhelming of an individual through violent means.

**Rhythm**

Finally, Collins (2004) contends that individuals will become engrossed in forward panic violence as they ultimately become “entrained” in the repetitive and rhythmic actions of one another. The entrainment is the result of one’s involvement in a violent situation. The violent situation creates a feeling of unanimity within a situation that breaks with normal interaction. Therefore, persons are drawn in by the rhythm of the violent actions. Rhythm can be identified as the repetitive recurrence of an action within a system of motion.

**Conclusion**

This chapter identifies the data sources used for the multiple case study analysis of YouTube videos and newspaper articles. In addition, it provides justification for using
YouTube videos as the primary source of data for this study. Furthermore, this chapter identifies the analytical approach that will be utilized for this thesis, which includes those propositions outlined by Collins’s theory of forward panic. In addition, this chapter outlines the exploratory nature of this research.

Consequently, the analysis that follows in Chapter 4 examines each of the component parts of a forward panic. In order to do so, each of the above-mentioned cases (A) through (I), will be examined. They will be investigated to discern whether and to what degree each of the elements described in the propositions derived from Collins’s theory of forward panic are present. Through this process of analysis, the value additive capability of the theoretical assertions to explain police violence will be assessed.
Chapter 4
Analysis and Findings

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings for this multiple case study analysis. The analysis focuses on the eight propositions identified in Collins’s (2004) theory of forward panic. Specifically, it looks at the cross-purpose, tension/fear, building of tension/fear, docile lingering, weakness of the suspect, outnumbering of the suspect, overkill and piling on of violence, as well as the rhythmic nature of the violence. The eight propositions, as described in Chapter 3, are utilized to observe each of the cases (A) through (I). The propositions will be employed to discern whether and to what extent the characteristics of each is evident within situations of police violence. Finally, through this analysis the value additive ability of Collins’s theory of forward panic to explain the use of violence by police will be examined.

Findings

Cross-purpose

A cross-purpose of noticeable similarity was found in cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I). Each of the cases involved a suspect(s) attempting to avoid contact with the police. Similarly, the officers in each of the cases were also closely following the suspects in their vehicles, with their lights and sirens on, providing a distinct indication that they wanted the suspect(s) to stop. However, the suspect(s) overtly ignored the officer’s signals to do so by continuing to drive away from them. Thus, the similarity between the cross-purposes is present in the suspects’ failure to comply with the demands of the officers. This failure to comply conforms to Collins’s description of a cross-purpose, as it demonstrates a conflicting purpose within the interaction between officer and suspect.
The remaining four cases (B), (C), (E), and (F) also involved cross-purpose. However, they were noticeably different from the above cases in regards to the way the cross-purposes developed. Cases (B) and (C) were similar with respect to their divergence in the development of a cross-purpose. The two situations involved a suspect creating a public disturbance. The suspects, when confronted by the officers, ignored their attempts to communicate verbally. In case (B) the suspect threw up his hands and walked away from the officers when they attempted to communicate with him. In case (C) the suspect became verbally belligerent and non-compliant to the officers’ commands. The conflicting purpose in these two situations emerged out of the suspect’s unwillingness to comply with the officers’ commands and their apparent desire to have him do so, thus complying with the propositional requirement.

In case (E), the situation appeared at first like a routine traffic stop. However, when the officer approached the suspect’s vehicle, the suspect ignored the officer’s effort to make contact with him. The cross-purpose in this situation was evident in the failure of the suspect to comply with the officer’s attempt to speak to him. Case (F) differed in the development of a cross-purpose as it involved a situation in which protestors and officers were in a standoff with each other. The cross-purpose in this situation appears to be the presence of the officers within the situation, as the protestors did not want them there. This is made intelligible in the initial moments of the situation where the officers can be seen pushing back two protestors who bumped into them, thereby suggesting discontent with police presence. Likewise, the loud chanting in the officers’ faces provided a clear indication that the protestors were unhappy with the officers’ presence. Despite marked differences in the way they were displayed, a cross-purpose was evident in each case.
Cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I), are similarly expressive of a situation in which tension/fear is present. According to Collins, a situation produces tension/fear when it is no longer intersubjective; the parties involved do not communicate in a respectful and mutually beneficial manner, and one or both parties are not afforded the opportunity to communicate. Correspondingly, each of these cases involves a suspect using a vehicle to flee from the police, driving at a high rate of speed. The officers then follow the suspects, also driving at a high rate of speed. As a result, each of the cases becomes indicative of a situation with tension/fear present. In each situation there is a complete lack of communication between the officer and suspect. Neither the officers nor the suspects are capable of communicating with one another due to the high-speed chase they are involved in.

In addition to the lack of intersubjectivity identified within cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I), an additional factor was identified as contributing to tension/fear within them. Collins (2004) specifically stated that incidents involving police, who are unable to maintain control over the situation, will lead to tension/fear. This is said to occur as it runs counter to what police expect to occur within a given situation (Collins 2004:90-92). As each of the cases involves a situation where the police are chasing a suspect, the lack of control over the situation by police is demonstrated. Therefore, further revealing tension/fear in the above-mentioned cases.

Cases (B) (C) (E) and (F) also exhibited tension/fear. However, the way that tension/fear is evoked differed from the previously mentioned cases. In case (B), tension/fear emerged through interpersonal contact. The situation demonstrated tension/fear in the initial moments of the officers’ arrival. The situation did appear to be
cordial; the officers began to talk to the suspect calmly, but when the suspect threw up his hands and moved away it changed the dynamics of the situation. There was no longer a semblance of an intersubjective interaction, as the officers began to yell and point at the suspect. Further, tension/fear was visible in the body posturing of the officers’ involved. As they formed a perimeter around the suspect, their backs were arched away from the suspect. This body posturing suggests tension/fear as the officers appeared to be both pushing their bodies towards the situation yet being cautious in their approach at the same time. This physical manifestation, according to Collins (2004) is indicative of tension/fear. Tension/fear can be observed in (B) as it corresponds to Collins’s assertions. There is an observable breakdown in the intersubjectivity of the communication between officers and suspect and a physical manifestation of it in the officers’ actions.

With respect to Case (C) tension/fear emerged, also on a more interpersonal level. In case (C) it was more difficult to determine tension/fear, as only the violence was observable in the video. However, the press coverage provided clarification. When officers arrived on the scene the suspect was barricaded in an office. When the suspect emerged from the office, multiple news sources indicate that he approached officers in a “violent manner.” It was determined, based upon the information available, that the initial interaction was one that created tension/fear, as it was hostile and the exchange did not allow officers and the suspect to communicate in a mutually beneficial manner. Tension/fear, again in this case, conformed to Collins’s proposition, as there was observable degeneration in the intersubjective nature of the communication between the parties involved.

In Case (E), the suspect ignored multiple attempts made by the officer to establish communication with him. Although taking multiple steps to establish verbal contact with
the suspect, they did not respond to those attempts. By not communicating, the suspect did not allow for an intersubjective interaction at the onset of the situation. However, after multiple attempts to gain access to the suspect’s vehicle, the suspect finally opened his door for the officer. Once the door opened, tension/fear was observed in the body posture of the officer. His posture was initially relaxed, his knees were bent and he stood directly in front of the car door. After the door opened, the officer stepped toward the back of the vehicle. He kept the lower half of his body and part of his upper body behind the driver’s side doorpost, and leaned in slightly to speak to the suspect. When doing so his whole body was visibly rigid in appearance. This change in posture is indicative of tension/fear, as it demonstrated an attempt at pushing oneself into the situation while simultaneously being cautious. Again, it demonstrates a lack of intersubjectiveness in the interaction and is combined with the visible signs of tension/fear, thereby conforming to the proposition.

Finally, tension/fear was discernable within (F). The loud yelling and angry gesturing of the protestors demonstrated that this situation was not characteristic of an intersubjective interaction. The two sides did not communicate in a manner that allowed for respectful communication, as communication was relegated to loud yelling and chanting by the protestors. Likewise, tension/fear was seen in the facial expressions and actions of the officers. Several officers’ faces visibly manifested the physical signs of tension/fear. Their eyes were wide, eyebrows raised and drawn together. They also did not engage in eye contact with the protestors. They looked to their left and right at the faces of their fellow officers. This signified tension/fear, as the officers appeared to be looking for comfort in the situation by assuring themselves that their fellow officers were there. Again, with case (F) there is a lack of intersubjectivity observed in the interaction.
between officer and suspect, which is combined with the physical manifestation of it in
the officers, to be illustrative of tension/fear as it is asserted by Collins’s proposition.

**Prolonged Building of Tension/Fear**

A prolonged building of tension/fear was found in cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I) and was exhibited in a parallel manner. First, each of the cases involved the suspect(s) fleeing the police at a high rate of speed. Second, officers chased the suspects through city streets where they had to avoid injuring civilians during the chase. The addition of civilians on the roadways forced officers to often take evasive maneuvers to avoid hitting them. These aspects, when taken in combination, show how each element added an incremental level of danger to the situations. In addition, the chases lasted over several miles, exposing the officers to those dangers for a significant period of time. The length of the chases added to the exacerbation of the situations, as it prolonged the amount of time the police spent being unable to gain control of the situations. Further, the length of the chases also increased time spent experiencing danger, which also exacerbated the situations. Therefore, through the above-mentioned elements, these situations exhibit a building of tension/fear as asserted by the theory of forward panic. They contain an extended set of circumstances that increase the level of danger, exacerbate the situation, and prevent the officer from maintaining control.

In analogous fashion, cases (A), (D), (G), and (I) displayed an additional element which added to the building of tension/fear not seen in case (H). Each of these cases also saw suspects engage in erratic driving including: swerving from lane to lane, failing to stop at stop signs and lights, and driving off-road. Each of these actions exacerbated the situation as they increased the level of danger confronting the officers who were potentially putting themselves in harm’s way as a direct result of following the suspects.
Furthermore, the erratic behavior added to the difficulty in controlling the situation as it increased the complexity of apprehending the suspect(s), and further exacerbating the situation. This additional factor can be seen to correspond with the proposition.

Although comparable to the aforementioned cases, case (G) contained an added element, not observed in any of the preceding cases, which contributed to the building of tension/fear. In case (G) the suspect discharged his firearm at officers on three separate occasions. After the first shot was fired, tension/fear could be heard in the officer’s voice as he spoke over the police radio. Prior to the first shot fired, the officer’s voice was audibly calm and steady. After the first shot, the officer increased the volume of his voice and he stuttered as he said the following “621 he just shot at me. He’s got the shotgun and he shot at me. He shot through the back/black window.” This change in voice and speech showed an increased level of tension/fear, as the officer was noticeably distressed by the gunfire. This additional facet of danger conforms to Collins’s proposition as it further intensified the pursuit, as the officer(s) knew that they would be forced to place an armed suspect under their control.

The remaining cases differed in the way tension/fear increased, but it was nonetheless present in each of them. In case (B) tension/fear could be seen building prior to the officers’ arrival on the scene. The police were called to the location, because the suspect was unable to be controlled by security or customs officials. This added to the danger of the situation, as the officers understood that they had to confront an individual that trained persons were unable to control. Also, since the call was for the police to attend an airport, and given the fear instilled by the terrorist act of 9/11, the actions of the suspect indeed conceivably increased the officers’ fears of danger in this situation. Once the police arrived on the scene, tension/fear built even further. The suspect did not
respond to the officers’ attempt to speak to him (possibly because he could not speak English). He responded to the attempts by making a threatening gesture towards the officers. He also kept moving away from the officers limiting their ability to control the situation. These factors in combination contributed to the building of tension/fear, each adding a level of danger to the confrontation, adding to the exacerbation of the situation, thus, conforming to the assertions made by the proposition under observation.

Similarly, in case (C), tension/fear also began to build in this situation prior to the officers’ arrival. First, the police were called as the suspect was acting in a manner that made it difficult for campus security to control him, thus, increasing the level of danger. Further, the situation took place in a school. This location, given the events that took place at Columbine High School in Colorado U.S.A, Virginia Tech University in Virginia U.S.A, and Dawson’s College in Quebec Canada, combined with the multiple reports of the suspect’s irrationality; the police would have conceivably understood the situation to be dangerous prior to their arrival. Once officers arrived, reports suggested that they attempted to speak to the individual. Avoiding communication, the suspect approached officers in a threatening manner. There was reportedly a brief attempt to gain physical control of the suspect, but he escaped. This interaction added to the danger because the suspect had attempted to attack officers and the officers had been unable to control the situation. These events illustrate the building of tension/fear as they show the additive nature of the danger that worked to increasingly aggravate the situation preventing officer(s) from gaining control. This demonstrates the proposition as stated by Collins (2004).

Case (E) also built in a differential manner, as the majority of the officers who were involved were not directly exposed to those factors that contributed to the building
of tension/fear. During this time period, only one officer was present. However, throughout the incident, he could be seen speaking into his radio, and thus it is reasonable to believe that the information conveyed contributed to a building of tension/fear in other officers as they responded. As discussed previously, in case (E) the suspect refused to initially open his door to officers. Once he did, the visible signs of tension/fear were evident in the officer’s body posture. As the situation continued, both the officer and suspect began yelling at one another (words inaudible), after which the officer’s attention became focused directly on the suspect. Prior to the yelling, the officer did not maintain constant eye contact with the suspect. This change in demeanor suggested that the situation had changed to one where there was an increased concern about the suspect’s actions.

The suspect then attempted to stand up and get out of the vehicle. This added to the tension/fear as it would override the officer’s ability to control the situation, and may have been construed as a threatening gesture, thus, adding to the level of danger. There was then a brief verbal interaction (words inaudible), after which the suspect stood up again, further adding to the sense of danger. The officer at this point could be seen saying something into his radio; he and the suspect then began wrestling on the ground. However, it was not until additional officers arrived that the forward panic began. The violence that transpired will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter. Each of the above factors contributes to an increased level of danger, and with the addition of each element a further exacerbation of the situation, and a lack of control. Therefore, as a result a building of tension/fear can be discerned as per the proposition.

Finally, in case (F), tension/fear mounted through the intense chanting and gesturing by the protestors within a few feet of the officers. The protestors were angered;
this could be discerned in their tone of voice, as well as the aggressive nature of their
gesturing. These actions added to the tension/fear as the officers understood that they
might have to control a very angry and aggressive crowd. Second, as the protestors
continued to chant and gesture, they moved in close to officers. This increased
tension/fear as it brought the confrontation closer and with a large fence behind the
officers, they were limited in their ability to retreat from the confrontation. Next, a
protestor danced into an officer, and was quickly arrested. This would add to the
tension/fear as now the citizens were beginning to make physical contact with officers,
thereby threatening the police officers’ ability to control the situation. After contact was
made with the officer, the other officers came together, and tension/fear became
discernable in their faces, as their eyebrows were raised and drawn together. Additionally,
the physical contact made by the protestor also introduced another element of danger to
the situation. The building of tension/fear was evident in this situation through the
increased anger and aggressiveness shown by the crowd, the encroachment of the
officer’s physical space, and physical contact made by the suspect. Each of those factors
added an element of danger that exacerbated the situation. Likewise, the officer’s ability
to maintain control over the situation was also threatened in this case. Thus, conforming
to the proposition made by Collins (2004) regarding the building of tension/fear.

**Docile Linger**

Cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I) contain a docile lingering, and it is exhibited in a
comparable manner. In each of the cases, the police were restrained within the confines of
their vehicles for a significant period of time. This restriction prevented them from having
any interpersonal contact with the suspect(s). Likewise, the time spent following the
suspect(s) increased the amount of time spent being inactive. Further, there was present
within each of the situations a significant volume of traffic on the roadways during the pursuits. This prevented the officers from using vehicle-on-vehicle intervention, as they risked harming civilians. This further added to the docile lingering, by adding to the level of restraint police must employ. Finally, it should be mentioned that in case (G), officers were unable to use vehicular intervention due to the suspect’s use of a firearm. Therefore, it could be observed in these cases that the officers were forced to remain submissive and inactive, unable to intervene in the situation, while at the same time experiencing heightened tension/fear, consistent with the assertions made by Collins.

Moving to case (B), docile lingering, like that of mounting tension/fear, could be considered as occurring when the officers received their call for service to deal with the contentious suspect. The time period between the service call and their arrival was inactive although there was an escalation of tension/fear for police as they traveled to the scene. Once on the scene, the officers remained submissive in the face of growing tension/fear. They attempted to communicate with the man despite his visible agitation, without becoming violent themselves. Officers continued to remain non-violent even after the man walked away from them and displayed physical signs of anger. The officers experienced a docile lingering that corresponds with the assertions made by Collins. The officers also experienced an extended period of time where tension/fear was building and remained non-active.

The officers in situation (C) displayed a docile lingering similar to those in (B). Also, beginning at the point of the initial call for service, the officers were unable to be directly active as they drove to the scene of the incident. While driving, they experienced the onset of tension/fear in knowing they would confront a highly distraught suspect. Likewise, according to news reports, when the officers arrived at the school they
remained submissive by attempting to speak with the suspect. While speaking to the man, the officers were said to not have become violent despite the fact that they were facing this aggressive individual who approached the officers with agitation. There was an attempt by officers to take control of the man (non-violently), but he escaped, compelling officers to chase him. While increasing tension/fear, the chase also added to the time that officers were not physically engaged with the suspect. The officers did experience a period of time where they were not violent, while simultaneously experiencing tension/fear.

In (E) docile lingering also occurred when the officer first approached the vehicle, and until he and the suspect became involved in a wrestling match on the ground. During this time period, the officer refrained from the use of violence. The officer did so despite what were likely viewed as incendiary actions enacted by the suspect. However, in this situation the forward panic did not really occur until the arrival of other officers. This will be discussed in a latter section. These officers, as with tension/fear, did not experience a docile lingering directly. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that a docile lingering was experienced on the way to the scene. In this situation, the initial officer could be seen speaking into his police radio on multiple occasions, even in the period immediately before he and the suspect begin to wrestle on the road. He continued to still convey information up until this moment. Therefore, as the officers drove to the scene, they were experiencing the building of tension/fear through these radio transmissions, even though they were not directly active. Thus, again the situation is expressive of the proposition as stated by Collins (2004). The officers experienced a period of time as they drove to the scene where they were unable to be active, while experiencing pervasive feelings of tension/fear.
Finally, in case (F) the officers experienced a significant period of docile lingering. The officers stood against the large fence while protestors positioned themselves in front of them, shouting loudly and making angry facial gestures. Although this no doubt added to the tension/fear, the officers still did not engage in violence. The protestors began moving closer to officers, yet the police remained still and did not engage the protestors. Even when the protestor bumped into the officer and was arrested (thereby increasing tension/fear) officers still did not engage in violence. It was not until the pepper balls were fired and people dispersed that the situation became violent. Until that point, the officers stood in front of the protestors experiencing the chanting, gesturing, encroachment on space, and affronts to their authority in a nonviolent fashion. Thus, this situation also follows the proposition as set out by Collins (2004) regarding the non-violence of the officers in the presence of tension/fear.

**Suspect in a Position of Weakness**

Within all of the cases that were observed, the suspects demonstrated several similarities in regards to weakness. First, in all of the cases, the suspects were alone at the point when violence occurred. Specifically, the suspects were isolated from all others at the point of violence taking place. Thus, they did not have other individuals from whom to draw support, whereas the officers did. Second, with the exception of case (G), those suspects in opposition to the officers were unarmed, while all of the officers were visibly armed. The officers within each of the cases had access to a firearm and a baton, whether used or not.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned similarities, cases (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G) contained elements of suspect weakness distinct from each other. Beginning with case (B) the suspect could be seen in a position of weakness in the moments just prior to
the violence occurring. The suspect in this situation was surrounded by officers, blocking him from making any attempt at escape. Thus, the suspect was cut off and unable to retreat in any direction. This inability to retreat puts him in a position of physical disadvantage as officers surrounded him.

Cases (C) and (F) were similar to one another in regards to an additional element of suspect weakness. In each of these situations the suspects were observed retreating from officers at the point when they were attacked. In (C) the suspect evaded police and was running from them when he was tackled on the main floor of the building. In (F) the suspect (protestor) was running away after the pepper balls were shot into the crowd. By running away, the suspect was unable to see the violence coming or to present a threat to the officers. It should be stated that Collins (2004) contends that running from one’s opponents suggests weakness since those in flight appear unable to handle the tension/fear of the situation.

The situation in case (D) helps to clearly demonstrate how the weakness of the suspect plays an important role in the development of a forward panic. When the vehicle stopped, the driver got out of the car and onto the ground with his arms out to his sides. The suspect was vulnerable as he was not in a position from which he could defend himself or cause any harm to the officers. The second suspect did not get out of the vehicle, prompting the officers to remove him. By not getting out of the vehicle and lying down on the ground, the suspect may have forced officers to use great caution in approaching him. They did not know whether or not he was armed and did not know whether he might fight. Through this situation it was possible to see how being in a position of weakness contributed to a forward panic. A similar occurrence was observed in (H), involving multiple suspects with only two of the three being subjected to violence.
However, due to poor video quality, it was not discernable why the front passenger had violent actions used against them by the police.

The suspect involved in case (E) can also be identified as being in a position of weakness. As the suspect began to get out of the car, before he could fully stand upright, the officer grabbed him. As a result, he was unable to gain a firm footing or to have the room to make a move against the officer. In addition, after the brief scuffle and the arrival of additional officers, the suspect was lying face down on the road. He was not moving and the officer who pulled him over was lying on top of him. From this position, the suspect was unable to attack the arriving officers or to defend himself.

In case (G), despite the suspect being armed, there were several factors that contributed to the suspect being in a position of weakness. First, officers were at the top of a large embankment while the suspect was at the bottom. The officers were able to view the suspect from an elevated position that provided them, but not the suspect, with cover. Second, the suspect had his attention directed towards the car that drove over the embankment, not at the officers on top of the hill. Thirdly, despite the suspect being armed, he was clearly in possession of less firepower than the five officers visibly displaying firearms and aiming them in the suspect’s direction. Together, these factors make the case that, despite the suspect being armed, he was still in a position of weakness relative to the officers present.

The above findings indicate that although there were observable differences regarding the dimensions of weakness within the observed cases, each suggested the multidimensional character of weakness. Each of the suspects was shown to have been vulnerable in some respect just prior to the point at which officers came into physical contact with them. Their weakness indicated that they were not in the position to become
the aggressor, or to display a power advantage over the officer(s). Therefore, although they differed in type, the weaknesses correspond to the proposition as set out by Collins (2004).

**Suspect Outnumbered**

In Cases (A), (B), (C), (E), and (G) the suspect(s) involved were outnumbered. In each of these cases the suspect(s) were outnumbered in a similar manner to one another, each situation involved multiple officers and a single suspect. In case (A) the suspect was outnumbered by the police six to one. In (B) four officers acted against a single suspect. In case (C) the number opposing a single suspect grew from four to six officers. Case (E), at the onset, appeared to be different from the above cases. However, although there was a brief struggle between the lone officer and the single suspect, this was not the point at which the forward panic began. It was not until the arrival of the four additional officers that the forward panic took place. Finally, in (G) at least six officers, all armed, were present at the scene when the violence began. Although the numbers fluctuated in terms of how many officers were involved, the cases are still consistent with Collins’s proposition, because the police outnumbered the suspects. This analysis demonstrates that in each of the above cases a single suspect was in opposition to numerous officers.

Cases (D) (F) (H) and (I) differed from the aforementioned cases in the ratio of officers to suspects involved. Case (D) involved two suspects and six officers. The observed difference here was that only three officers were seen using violence against the driver of the vehicle, while the passenger was handcuffed. Case (F) involved the presence of over forty-to-fifty officers, and forty-to-fifty suspects. However, at the point of violence in situation (F) only three officers became involved with a single suspect. Additionally, case (H) involved three suspects and twelve officers. Finally, in case (I),
there were six officers and two suspects. Nonetheless, as in the previous situations, groups of officers began to target suspects individually. Although the ratio of officers to suspects fluctuated, at no point were there any less than three officers per suspect.

Although cases (D), (F), (H), and (I) contrasted with cases (A), (B), (C), (E), and (G) concerning the ratio of suspects to officers, when looking closely at the situations it could be seen that they mirror one another in the type of dominance displayed. In each of the situations, when violence occurred, multiple officers confronted a single suspect. Finally, although the officer to suspect ratio initially conflicted with the other cases, they still corresponded to the proposition offered by Collins (2004), as they involved a larger group of individuals acting against a smaller group.

**Overkill and Piling On of Violence**

Several of the cases ((A), (D), (E), (H), and (I)) similarly correspond to characteristics of the piling on and overkill as proposed by Collins (2004). First, the suspects in these cases did not exhibit any type of resistance or threatening behavior toward the officers. In (A) the suspect appeared to be unconscious, lying face down on the ground. In case (D) it could be seen that the suspect got out of the car and lay face down on the ground with his arms out at his sides. The suspect in (E) could be seen lying flat on the ground, not moving, with an officer on top of him. Finally, the suspects from (H) and (I) were both removed from their vehicles by officers and thrown to the ground, without making attempts to resist the officers’ actions. In these cases it could be observed that the suspects did not present the officers with an imminent threat to their personal safety, nor did they attempt to resist.

Secondly, in each of the situations there was no hesitation in the officers’ decisions to use violence. They did not employ any form of restraint or verbal techniques;
rather they moved directly into a violent assault. In Case (A), immediately upon 
approaching the suspect, officers can be seen punching and attempting to jump on the 
suspect while he is on the ground. In (D), as the suspect lay on the ground, the officers 
immediately began to punch the suspect. The officers in situation (E), immediately upon 
approach, began to encircle the suspect and an officer began punching him. Likewise, (H) 
and (I) showed officers removing the suspects from the vehicle and immediately hitting 
them; the officers moved directly into violence upon contact with the suspect, avoiding 
the use of any other techniques.

Finally, the violent acts observed in each of these situations involved both a 
similar type and style of violence used by the police. They each involved multiple officers 
using punches, kicks, and knees to various parts of the suspect’s bodies. The violence was 
multifaceted, rapid, and successive. The officers punched and kicked these suspects. Each 
of the violent acts could be described as unrestrained, as officers unleashed a ceaseless 
outpouring of violent actions, without pause. In addition, at no point during the rapid and 
successive blows to the suspects, did they make any attempts to get up off the ground, or 
to flee the scene once the violence was underway

Therefore, through observation in the homogeneity of the above factors in (A), 
(D), (E), (H), and (I), the overkill and piling on does have a strong correspondence to 
Collins’s proposition. With regard to the overkill of violence, there were many rapid and 
violent acts. Violence was used against non-resistant suspects who made no attempt to 
harm the officers when they came into actual physical contact. In addition, within each of 
these situations, the violence committed by the police lacked restraint. Likewise, violence 
was committed against suspects who made no attempt to flee or attack the officers. As a 
result of the suspects’ lack of physical threat or attempts to flee, the violent actions taken
by police can conceivably be seen as exceeding that which would be required in the situations. Finally, within each of the above cases there was the presence of a literal “piling on,” as multiple officers could be seen on top of each of the suspects.

The remaining cases diverged from those previously mentioned, but they did nevertheless contain a “piling on” and “overkill” of violence. Beginning with (B), the overkill of violence was visibly different. The suspect in this case was not physically attacked with hands or feet, he was shot with a taser (electronic shocking devise). As mentioned, the suspect was not complying with the officers’ commands. However, the suspect was shocked not once, but three times sequentially. After the first shock, the suspect stumbled backwards and could be seen falling to the ground. He was shocked twice more as he was falling. The overkill in this situation could be seen in the rapid succession of taserings administered to the suspect. At no point did the officer pause to see what impact any of the shocks had upon the suspect. The officer repeatedly tasered him until he fell.

Additionally, once the suspect was on the ground, the officers began to get on top of him, and to struggle with him forcefully. In this way a literal piling on by officers can be observed. The above factors identified in case (B) combine to show that this case contains multiple elements that correspond to the proposition made by Collins regarding the overkill and piling on of violence which can be seen in the repetitive and immediate use of violence. Further, as the police did not assess the impact that the initial tasering had upon the suspect, the subsequent shocks that followed may be seen as exceeding the amount of violence necessary in this situation. Finally, a physical piling on of officers was observed. In this way, case (B) conforms to the proposition as stated by Collins (2004).
Case (C) is similar with respect to the way that the overkill and piling on occurred. The suspect in this situation was resisting, and he and the officers can be seen engaged in a physical struggle. During the struggle, the officers forcibly put the suspect on the ground. The suspect can then be seen on the ground with four officers on top of him. With the officers on top of him, the suspect appeared to be unable to move. He was not seen to make any attempt to do so. Once on the ground, the officers began punching and kneeing the suspect frequently and rapidly. Here the overkill of violence can be highlighted in the suspect’s inability to pose harm to the officers once they were on top of him. The officers, despite their dominance over the suspect, continued to relentlessly punch and knee him. Likewise, the piling on was literal in this situation. At the beginning of the situation, four officers were on top of the suspect, and were later joined by two more.

A piling on and overkill of violence, as Collins describes it, can be identified in case (C). The officers in this case use frequent and successive violent actions against the suspect. In addition, once the officers had gained physical control over him they both continued and increased their use of violence, therefore perhaps exceeding the amount of violence necessary in this situation. Finally, a physical piling on of officers was observed.

In case (F) the officers could be seen grabbing the suspect by the neck and by his shirt and throwing him to the ground. Once on the ground, he was hit several times, sequentially, with a baton. Officers then got on top of him, and each of them respectively began shoving his body into the ground repeatedly. The suspect was, at no point physically resistant nor did he present an imminent threat to police. The officers in this case also did not display signs of hesitation when proceeding into their violent actions. Finally, it could be seen that there was a literal piling on, as three officers could be seen
on top of one suspect. This situation corresponds to the proposition as stated by Collins (2004).

Lastly, in case (G) the overkill of violence can be discerned in the large volume of bullets fired. The police fired a total of twenty-six shots at the lone suspect. The large number of shots was one of the defining components in identifying the overkill of violence in this situation. The officers at no time stopped to see what effect the initial shots had. Further adding to the overkill, officers made no attempt to issue a verbal command or warn the suspect prior to shooting him; they moved directly to the shooting stage. In a sense, the piling on is figurative in this situation. Rather than physically being on top of the suspect, the officers overwhelmed him with gunfire. Through the above details, this case corresponds to the proposition as stated by Collins (2004). There was an overkill of violence observed in the abundance of shots fired without knowledge of their affect, lack of hesitation in doing so, and a piling on of bullets.

*Rhythm*

Although previously explained in the methodology section, it is imperative that it be understood that rhythm is not used in a colloquial manner. Rather it is identified as a regular recurrence of elements in a system of motion. Rhythm is observed in the violence that took place in cases (A), (C), (D), (E), (H), and (I) and it did so in a similar manner. These cases demonstrated congruence with one another as the acts of violence were committed with the officers’ own body parts, and delivered in a sequential and continuous manner. The officers in case (A) demonstrated rhythm through the repetitive kicks and punches they used against the suspect. In (C) the officers repetitively punched and kneed the suspect as he lay on the ground, in (D) two officers could be seen simultaneously and recurrently punching the suspect, in (E) multiple officers could be observed kicking and
punching the suspect continuously and without pause, (H) involved officers repeatedly kicking the suspects on the ground, and in (I) the suspect was unceasingly punched as an officer alternated between his left and right hand. There is a repetitive recurrence of violence observed in each of the above cases, therefore, showing a correlation to the proposition.

Situation (B) differed from the aforementioned in the type of violent means used. Rather than the officer’s own body, the officer here used a rapid succession of shocks from a taser. The officer delivered the shocks one right after another with a minimal delay between the first and the third shock. Similarly, in case (G) violence was observed in the repetitive and continuous shooting by the officers. During the shooting, there was no discernable pause between the first shot fired and the twenty-sixth shot. Although there was an observable distinction in the type of violent acts seen, there was still rhythm observed in each of the situations, as defined by Collins (2004). The rhythm occurred in the regular recurrence of the taserings and firing of bullets.

Despite the violence demonstrated in case (F) being less prolific than what was observed in the aforementioned cases, it was nevertheless rhythmic. The majority of the violent action was demonstrated in the constant shoving of the suspect’s body into the ground. The recurrence of the act of shoving qualified the action as rhythm. Although the situation did not contain the same vigorous type of violence as the others, it could be demonstrated that the violence did have a perceptible rhythm to it, thereby conforming to the proposition as stated by Collins.

**Conclusion**

This multiple case study has examined nine different cases, across eight propositions derived from Collins (2004) theory of forward panic violence. In doing so, it
observed whether and to what extent those propositions were present as per the assertion made about them by Collins (2004). This process was conducted to distinguish the ability of the theory of forward panic to explain police violence. Chapter 5 will provide a detailed discussion of the findings in relation to the theoretical assertions made by Collins (2004). The theory’s “value added” ability to explain police violence will also be assessed. Furthermore, the limitations of this thesis and avenues for future research will be discussed.
Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusion

Introduction

Granted to them through legislation, police officers are afforded the legal right to employ force against the citizens they police (Miller and Blackler 2005:39-42). Regulations are enacted to help officers identify when and how much force can be used legally. Despite these regulations, the decision to use force is ultimately left to the officers’ discretion (ibid). The manner in which officers exercise force has demanded the attention of researchers. As stated in Chapter 1, the improper use of coercion undermines the public’s confidence in the ability of the police to perform their duties. Furthermore, if not used in accordance with legal standards, police use of force may violate civil liberties of civilians.

As was shown in Chapter 2, many different theoretical perspectives have been used to explain force. Despite their empirical support, several of these perspectives ignore the role of the situation as an explanatory factor in the use of coercion. In addition, Chapter 2 also demonstrated that those researchers who have attempted to explore force from a situational perspective have focused on only singular aspects of the situation. It is important to identify the type of situation, suspect actions, location, and type of interactions as situational factors affecting the use of force. However, it was established that despite the diversity of approaches taken, researchers have yet to systematically dissect situations to identify the sequence and impact of various components on the use of violence by police. As a result, this research sought to ascertain whether contemporary theoretical developments elaborate the explanatory value of the situation in studying the
utilization of violence by police. Specifically, this research sought to employ Collins’s (2004) micro-situational theory of a forward panic or hot violence to explore this topic.

To empirically investigate the utility of Collins’s theory, a multiple case study analysis was conducted. Nine different cases of police violence were analyzed. The analysis was organized around eight propositions derived from Collins’s theory of forward panic. The situational factors as described in the propositions were observed within each case to identify whether and to what extent the cases were consistent with empirical observations. In the following chapter, I discuss the theoretical assertions made by Collins and how these assertions relate to the empirical findings of this thesis. The “value added” capacity of the theory is also addressed. This chapter discusses an emerging theme concerning the emotional expression of tension/fear, as well as the limitations of this study, and recommendations for those conducting future research. Finally, information regarding the practical implications this research has for policing is provided.

Understanding the Situation and Violent Action

The data for this thesis are consistent with Collins’s (2004) theory of a forward panic in that they strongly suggest that the situation impacts on the use of violent actions taken by police. For a situation of forward panic to develop, certain factors are required to precipitate a violent act, specifically:

1. The situation must be at a cross-purpose;
2. It must invoke a feeling of tension/fear;
3. There is a building of tension/fear;
4. There exits a docile lingering;
5. One’s opponents will be in a position of weakness;
6. One’s opponent will be outnumbered;

7. The violence will appear as overkill and a piling on; and

8. The violence will be rhythmic in nature.

Through this exploratory multiple case study analysis, it was revealed that each of the components that construct a forward panic was evident in each of the cases. As a result, this study provides general support for the situational theory of forward panic outlined by Collins (2004). In addition to establishing general support for Collins’s theory, the value additive capability of the theory is also substantial. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, a “value added” approach is validated by the presence of all the factors that are established as essential to the explanation of an event, with each component providing “its value” to the explanation (Smelser 1964:120). Therefore, because each of the propositions utilized from Collins’s theory is supported across the nine cases, the theory’s value added capability in explaining police violence is significant. As Collins (2004) asserts, each one of the propositions is an integral factor necessary to the explanation of a forward panic.

**Cross-purpose**

Collins (2004) asserted that for a situation to develop into a forward panic it must first be at a cross-purpose. A cross-purpose signifies a conflicting purpose within an interaction. This is the point at which the situation becomes adverse (Collins 2004:90). Collins (2004) states that, when a situation is at a cross-purpose it will begin to elicit tension/fear. These data show that in cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I) a cross-purpose was present and developed in a similar manner. In each case the suspect(s) intentionally avoided contact with the police and failed to yield to their attempts to interact with them. The remaining cases also followed the theoretical assertion made by Collins (2004). Each
contained a conflicting purpose in the interaction between those involved. However, the remaining cases differed in the way their cross-purposes originated. In cases (B) and (C) the suspects did not comply with the verbal commands of the officers. In (E) the suspect would not interact with the officer at all, despite the officers’ attempts to engage the suspect verbally. In case (F) the angry yelling and chanting provided a clear indication that the protestors did not welcome the officers’ presence. This research supports Collins’s (2004) theoretical assertion regarding a situation of forward panic containing a cross-purpose.

**Tension/Fear**

Collins (2004) described tension/fear as the emotional product of a situation that lacks intersubjectivity, as it does not follow “normal” interaction rituals. Situations illustrative of intersubjective interaction provide the opportunity for mutually beneficial communication, allowing those involved to interact in a way that facilitates a reciprocation and validation for what is going on, and to become entrained in one another’s emotional rhythms. Tension/fear is the result of the change in the “emotional energy” of those interactions that do not afford intersubjectivity. Tension/fear is said to occur in those situations that violate the intersubjectivity of an interaction such that individuals no longer feel emotional gratification from the interaction. A state of tension/fear is reached when the situation comes to a point where violence may occur. Collins (2004) suggests that as a result of their training officers are taught to maintain control during interactions in which the suspects challenge the officer’s ability to maintain control. This process most likely causes tension/fear, as the interaction unfolds in a manner contrary to the officers’ expectations.
The data demonstrate that in relation to tension/fear, cases (A), (D), (G), (H), and (I) showed similar manifestations. There was a complete absence of intersubjective interaction across these cases when officers chased suspects at high-speed. The suspects refused to stop for the officers, ignoring their lights, sirens, and signals to stop. This altered the expectation of the interaction. Officers anticipated that they would be able to control the situation and the suspect would defer to their authority (Collins 2004:90-92). Within these situations a complete lack of intersubjectivity can be observed. This violates what is anticipated as normal interaction.

Cases (B), (C), (E), and (F) differed in the manner in which they produced tension/fear. Cases (B) and (C) demonstrated similarities in the way tension/fear manifested within them. In both of these cases, the suspects refused to communicate with the police officers verbally despite various attempts. Exclusive to case (B), officers could be seen displaying physical signs of tensions/fear with their raised eyebrows and arched backs. These are two physical manifestations Collins claimed were indicative of tension/fear. Case (E) demonstrated tension/fear as the suspect blatantly disregarded the officer’s attempts at communication. In this case, the suspect refused to open his window or door to the officer, thereby denying him control of the situation. In this case the officer exhibited physical signs of tension/fear. The officer assumed a posture that was indicative of forcing himself into the situation while remaining cautious. Again, Collins (2004) identified this type of body posture as being expressive of tension/fear. Finally, case (F) was also indicative of a situation of tension/fear. The loud, angered yelling in the faces of the officers was suggestive of tension/fear as it did not allow for intersubjective interaction.
Although not directly observing the officers’ emotional states, each of the cases was expressive of a situation that would elicit tension/fear. It was shown that each of the situations demonstrated a lack of intersubjectivity in the interactions. Further, in terms of the officers’ ability to assert control, the suspects’ actions were shown to have severely limited officers’ ability to do so. The findings therefore support the claim that tension/fear was elicited in each of the situations observed, consistent with the above postulation by Collins.

**Prolonged Building of Tension/Fear**

Tension/fear, according to Collins (2004), builds as those involved experience an extended set of circumstances that continue to run counter to what is expected to occur in a situation. Likewise, the building of tension/fear is further facilitated through a series of incremental increases in the level of danger of a confrontation which work to exacerbate the situation (Collins 2004:90-92). This exacerbation of the situation is said to increase one’s level of frustration as he/she is prevented from performing an expected action (Collins 2004:92). As a result of this build up of frustration, individuals are able to circumvent the tension/fear that prevents violence from ensuing; the accumulation of it becomes too much to bear and must be released (ibid). Of course the videos did not allow for the assessment of the level of exacerbation or the experience of frustration felt, as that would require a test of the officers’ affective state at the time of the incident.

Cases (A), (D) (G) (H) and (I) were found to be homogenous in their building of tension/fear. Each of the cases saw officers chasing suspects at a high rate of speed, and avoiding collisions with civilians by taking evasive actions. Further, each of the chases lasted for several miles, exposing officers to dangers over an extended period of time. In cases (A),(D),(G) and (I), the suspects engaged in erratic driving behavior that increased
the level of danger as officers were forced to continue pursuing them in spite of their actions. Finally, in case (G) the suspect added to the danger by shooting at the officers several times.

Case (B) involved the building of tension/fear prior to the officers’ arrival on the scene. Officers in this case had prior knowledge that they would be dealing with a suspect who was acting in a manner that made it difficult for trained personnel to control him. Likewise, the location of the incident (airport) also contributed to the danger in this situation. Once on the scene, the suspect refused (or was unable) to communicate with the officer verbally. The suspect threw up his hands and made gestures toward officers. Tension/fear in case (C) developed similarly to that of case (B). Like (B) it appeared to develop prior to the officers’ arrival. The officers in this case were similarly advised that they would be facing a suspect who could not be controlled by security personnel. The location of the situation (school) also added to the danger of the situation. Upon their arrival, the suspect would not communicate with officers and acted in a threatening and belligerent manner toward them. Officers had attempted to place the suspect under their control, but he evaded capture and a chase ensued.

Additionally, case (E) demonstrated a different tension/fear building process. The lone officer who was on the scene could be observed speaking into the police radio on multiple occasions, suggesting that officers not yet on the scene were being relayed information and experiencing tension/fear vicariously. At the onset of the situation, the suspect failed to communicate with the officer. Once communication did commence there was a loud verbal altercation. The suspect made an attempt to get out of his vehicle. The suspect and officer continued arguing and as the suspect attempted again to exit the vehicle, he and the officer began to grapple with one another.
Tension/fear was also evident in the interaction between the officers and suspects in case (F). In this case the suspects continuously and repetitively shouted and chanted and also began shaking their fingers in the faces of the officers. The suspects eventually began to move into the officers’ personal space. As they did so, they limited the officers’ ability to move due to the large fence behind them. The situation resulted in a suspect dancing purposely into an officer.

Despite several of the cases differing in the manner in which it was displayed, they all demonstrated a building of tension/fear. Each case presented elements that detracted from the officers’ ability to control the situation, increasing the level of danger and further exacerbating the situation. As a result they showed empirical support for the theoretical assertions made by Collins (2004).

**Docile Linger**

According to Collins (2004), those who become involved in forward panic violence experience a docile lingering where they experience the building of tension/fear, but are unable to be physically active in the situation. When this aspect of a forward panic situation occurs person(s) gain the ability to use violence. This, according to Collins (2004), is the period of time when tension/fear builds to the point such that it spills over in a hot rush allowing those involved to circumvent the tension/fear that prevents violence from occurring.

A parallel docile lingering was demonstrated in cases (A), (D), (G), (H) and (I). The officers in these cases were forced to remain within the confines of their vehicle, preventing them from becoming physically active in the situation. Likewise, due to a high volume of traffic on the roadways, the officers were unable to use vehicle-on-vehicle intervention. Further, in case (G) officers experienced the added threat of gunfire from the

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suspect. This provided them with an additional element that further prevented them from using immediate intervention.

Cases (B), (C), (E) and (F) differed from the aforementioned cases in the manner in which officers experienced a docile lingering. Despite these differences, their development is still analogous to the description provided by Collins. Cases (B), (C), and (E) were similar in the way officers experienced a docile lingering. Like that of tension/fear, the officers spent a considerable amount of time inactive on their way to the scene. Further, in cases (B) and (C), the officers spent additional time attempting to interact with the suspect, again without being physically active. Finally, in case (F), officers experienced a docile lingering as they stood idle in front of many protestors chanting incessantly in their faces, while moving closer and closer into their space. Even at the point where an officer was bumped, they remained non-violent.

The data empirically support the claims made about docile lingering. In each of the cases observed, the officers spent a considerable amount of time experiencing a building of tension/fear and were prevented from physically engaging in the situation. Although there was a variance in the docile lingering experienced in each case, there was nevertheless an experience of it in each of the cases analyzed.

**Suspect in a Position of Weakness**

According to Collins (2004), when individuals at opposition are in a position of weakness, it provides an opportunity to release the built up tension/fear. Those who have been subjected to prolonged tension/fear are able to obtain a position of supremacy and assert their dominance over those instilling the tension/fear (Collin 2004:118-20). All of the cases under observation showed a degree of similarity in relation to suspect weakness. In all of the cases the suspects were alone at the point of violence. Also, with the
exception of (G), all of the suspects were unarmed. Aside from the above parallels, the
suspects in (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), and (G) displayed contrasting disadvantages. In (B) the
suspect was blocked from escape both by a desk and a wall of officers around him. In (C)
and (F) the suspects were running away, a weakness identified by Collins (2004) as
characteristic of those who are unable to handle the tension/fear in the situation. In case
(D), the suspect who was attacked laid face down on the ground, placing himself in a
position of weakness as he was unable to defend himself or attack the officer. In (E) the
suspect was lying on the ground, face down, with another officer on top of him, unable to
defend himself or see the attack coming. Finally, in case (G), the officers were able to
cover the suspect from an elevated position providing themselves with cover, while the
suspect was in an exposed position. Although displaying varying forms of weakness in
many of the cases, the suspects were all, in some capacity or another, in a position of
physical weakness compared with the officers, supporting the above theoretical claim
made by Collins regarding weakness.

**Suspect Outnumbered**

The theoretical premise surrounding suspects being out numbered is that it
demonstrates that a group (more than one) of officers is conducting the violence. Collins
(2004) explains that a group helps to create a feeling of unanimity in a situation that is
overwhelmed with tension/fear. The repetitive action of group violence allows the
individual to become entrained, giving an appeal to the violence as violence breaks from
“normal” interaction. Cases (A), (B), (C), (E), and (G) were homogenous in their officer
to suspect ratio. In each of the cases, it was initially a lone suspect at odds with multiple
officers. Cases (D), (F), (H), and (I) differed in the ratio of officer to suspect at the initial
onset of the interaction. Nevertheless, at the point when violence occurred, the suspects
were alone and were against no less than three officers at one time. Although it is not possible, based on the evidence, to speculate about the officers’ level of entrainment, they can all be seen participating in the act of violence as a group, providing empirical support for the claims made about the commission of violence as a group.

Overkill and Piling On of Violence

“Overkill” and “piling on” is the way Collins (2004) depicted violence in a forward panic. It is violence that goes beyond what would be required in a given situation. Likewise, it is violence used against those who are incapable of providing much resistance against an attacker and occurs in a sudden release as a result of the building of tension/fear (Collins 2004: 92-94). Cases (A), (D), (E), (H), and (I) were observed as being homogenous in the overkill and piling on expressed. At the point of violence the suspects did not pose a threat to the officers’ safety, nor did they provide the officers with any physical resistance when the officers became violent. Upon making contact with the suspects, the officers immediately became violent, avoiding any other mechanisms of control. The violence used was similar in terms of both the type and style; it involved punches, kicks, and knees and was frequent, rapid and successive. In each of the cases, there was a literal piling on of officers, as they can be seen physically on top of the suspects.

The remaining cases differed from those previously discussed cases in their manifestations of overkill and piling on. In (B), the overkill could be seen in the rapid succession of taserings. Officers did not stop to assess the effect the initial shock had. Rather, the officer shocked the suspect three times in quick succession. Although initially resistant, after the first shock, the suspect did not maintain a threatening demeanor. Further, there was a literal piling on of officers in case (B). In (C) the suspect was also
resistant. After the officers had the suspect on the ground, he was no longer a threat, yet he had four officers on top of him and was no longer seen moving. Despite having control, officers began to punch, knee, and hit the suspect with a baton successively and repeatedly. There was also a literal piling on, as in case (B).

Case (F), although not as prolific as the violence seen in any of the other cases, did contain an overkill and piling on. Once the suspects (protestors) began to retreat, the officers immediately descended into violence. The officers repeatedly hit the suspect with a baton and pushed him to the ground. At no time did the suspect attempt to cause the officer harm during this altercation. Finally, case (G) differed from all other cases. The overkill in this case was distinguished by the continuous gunfire by the officers. At no point did they issue any sort of warning; they immediately became violent. Unlike the other cases, the piling on in this case could be observed in the overwhelming number of bullets fired. Despite the differing forms of piling on and overkill observed, the violence displayed in each of the cases adhered to Collins’s postulation.

**Rhythm**

The violent actions in a forward panic, according to Collins (2004), are rhythmic. The rhythm of the violence draws others in as the actions are entraining. The entrainment occurs primarily when groups are involved, as individuals look for solidarity and unanimity during situations of violence. As a result, they are caught up in the reinforcing behavior of the group and drawn into violence. Although entrainment could not be assessed, rhythm was identified in the violent actions committed. Rhythm, in this study, was understood as the regular recurrence of an action in a system of motion. Cases (A), (C), (D), (E), (H), and (I) were similar in the rhythmic nature of the violence displayed. The officers, in these cases, used their individual body parts: hands, feet and knees, to
strike consecutively the suspects in each of the cases. Case (B) differed from the above as it involved the regular recurrence of shocks delivered from a taser. Case (F) involved the continuous shoving of the suspect by multiple officers. Finally, (G) saw the continuous firing of gunshots by at least five officers.

Although the study was unable to evaluate the entrainment of the violence observed in each case, it was nonetheless rhythmic in appearance. Officers exhibited recurrent violent behavior involving more than one officer in each of the cases. Therefore, it can be argued that each of the cases demonstrated a rhythm that corresponded to the theoretical assertions made by Collins (2004).

Limitations

This thesis employed video evidence to provide a real time depiction of a situation. However, in the majority of cases, there was only one camera present. As a result, what was being captured reflected only the perspective of the camera operator or the positioning of the vehicle driven by an officer. It is reasonable to ask what was not being shown in the videos. Factors may have been missed that played a pertinent role in the development of a violent situation. The solution to this would be to use direct observation data. However, as stated, due to the time constraints and the relative infrequency of such incidents, videos provided the opportunity to observe the cases in real-time and expeditiously.

This analysis focused on only those variables related to a forward panic, ignoring alternate explanations. By excluding such explanations, the conclusions reached will ultimately be that situational factors have a strong influence on the use of violence, as there was no alternate explanation investigated. In the future, studies should be reconstituted, investigating along with Collins’s claims, alternate explanations of force.
This will avoid the confirmatory bias found in this research. Furthermore, as a result of this problem, the ability to make generalizations from this study was affected.

The sample size selected for this analysis did not allow for generalizations to be made regarding all situations of police violence. Consequently, in selecting nine cases, this analysis was not representative of all cases of police violence.

An additional limitation relates to the fact that this study samples on the dependent variable analyzing only those situations where violence was present. This method of sampling risks the use of post hoc logic regarding the explanatory value of Collins’s theory. The possibility exists that by knowing violence has already occurred, situational factors will be found to be the resultant cause of the violence. This problem is further confounded by the absence of alternative explanations.

Collins’s theory suggests further limitations. There is a basic question of what constitutes a situation. It is not explicitly asserted in Collins’s theory of violence when a situation of forward panic actually begins. Collins’s theory leaves open to interpretation whether, for instance, a situation is to be interpreted in the Goffmanesque sense as occurring when two individuals come into immediate contact with one another, or whether it can be considered as occurring prior to immediate contact, when they have obtained the knowledge that such contact will occur.

Another limitation of Collins’s theory is the ability or inability to quantify it. The difficulty lies in the concepts like tension/fear or the building of tension/fear. These are very abstract representations. These concepts were shown in the analysis to consist of a vast number of factors. The subjectivity in the identification of what is considered to constitute these components alone provides an indication of the difficulty in operationalizing these elements for quantitative study.
**Future Research**

Future research should explore situations of police-citizen interaction on a much broader scale. In doing so, all possible interactions between police and citizens should be observed. This would prevent sampling on the basis of the dependent variable. Likewise, it would provide the ability to make generalizations about all situations of violent physical force. Further, alternative sources of data should be considered. By including a variety of data sources (such as electronic recordings in the form of video tapes and still pictures, participant observation, and reconstruction of the situation using professional reconstruction techniques), researchers will be able to explore multiple situations not available using video evidence exclusively.

Likewise, researchers should explore the relative value of alternative explanations of police violence. This would help illuminate the significance of Collins’s theory in explaining police violence. The studies should make an effort to observe other situational factors, social structural factors (race, class and gender), and social psychological factors. This would allow for generalizations to be drawn from the theory and would prevent confirmatory bias. Finally, the research should explore the breadth of Collins’s theory of violence. As Collins (2004) explains, there also exist those violent few who are able to coldly calculate their way around the tension/fear. These individuals, including police officers, have developed techniques that enable them to circumvent the tension/fear and commit acts of violence (Collins 2004:83). Exploring the totality of his theory will allow for an observation of the influence that micro-situational factors have upon the use of less prolific violence, for example exploring the use of a single punch or a sniper being able to discharge his/her firearm.
Emerging Theme

In addition to the above findings, an ancillary element of Collins’s theory of a forward panic emerged that was not observed as part of the analysis for this thesis. In his discussion of a forward panic, Collins makes reference to many emotional manifestations on the part of those who are affected. One of the possible emotions displayed by those involved in a forward panic is anger (Collins 2004:92). In certain situations, Collins suggests that anger can reach the “extreme of rage or frenzy” (ibid). The implication being made by the terms ‘frenzy’ and ‘rage’ are that the experience of anger dominates and grips individuals, completely inundating them with this emotional state (ibid).

The video evidence used in this analysis presented several difficulties in discerning the affective states of those involved. The videos were often of poor quality, making it difficult to discern facial expressions at all times. Also in many of the cases, the sound quality was poor, and did not allow for an assessment of tone of voice. Due to these inadequacies, only physical bodily actions could be observed. With that being said, with the exception of the violent actions displayed in each of the cases, alternative physical displays of one’s emotional state were not discernable, except in cases (H) and (I). These two cases contained persons exhibiting similar signs of anger that turned into frenzy/rage.

In case (H), upon the suspect’s vehicle coming to a stop, officers could be seen running toward the suspect’s vehicle. One of the officers could be seen running toward the back of the suspect’s car, jumping in the air and kicking the bumper. In case (I), once the suspect’s vehicle came to a stop, one of the officers could be seen jumping up on top of the hood of a police car and then leaping into the air, kicking the drivers side window of the suspect’s car, and then falling to the ground.
The attempt to kick the inanimate object could be considered an action prompted by anger. Regardless of what they are kicking, the officers were exhibiting overt expressions of aggression. Likewise, the kicking of a vehicle could be discerned as that of an individual who is caught in a frenzy or a state of rage. Collins (2004) explained that frenzy and rage alter one’s affective state causing the individual(s) to be overwhelmed by their feelings of anger; it is uncontrollable. I argue here that the officers were not focused on arrest as much as they were on their anger. This assertion is based on the observation that the act of kicking the car did not aid in the performance of the officer’s duty; it did not assist them in making the arrest, as these acts did not help to open the vehicle or subdue the suspect. The actions of these officers seem to indicate that they were being consumed by their anger and looking for any avenue to expel it. Future research should attempt to explore these manifestations of anger more closely and refine a more accurate measure for it. In doing so, researchers would be able to gain new insight into officers’ affective states.

**Practical Implications**

This research demonstrates utility in the training of police officers. Through this research, a more nuanced understanding of the implications of situations has been shown. The understanding that the prolonged exposure to tension/fear overwhelms an officer, causing him/her to use violence, has implications for the training of police officers. Training practices could be amended to include scenarios that would expose officers to prolonged incidents of tension/fear. Although not training officers to identify specific precursors, it would perhaps help to identify its pervasive feeling. If officers are able to identify when they are experiencing the impact of tension/fear, they could potentially take action against committing violence as a result. The officers may be able to diminish the
impact during times of intensity, by being trained to take a step back, allowing other officers to control the situation; someone who has not yet been exposed to the tension/fear. Although not directly affecting use of force policy, the theory can be identified as having implications for training.

**Concluding Remarks**

This research provides support for the propositions made regarding a forward panic and its contribution to the explanation of violent acts by police. In addition, this thesis adds to the extant literature on force by providing an alternative to current understandings of how situations impact on the use of force. This study went beyond observing how location and action alone facilitate the use of violent force. Rather this study delved deeper into the impact of situational factors. This thesis, through the utilization of Collins’s theory of forward panic, systematically explored the impact of situations on police violence, demonstrating that Collins’s theory has a value additive impact, discerned through the sequence and impact of the theory’s various components on violence. As the findings suggest, empirical support exists to show that when situations lack intersubjectivity and violate the expected interaction, contributing to the experience of tension/fear, there is a compounding of exacerbating occurrences, when it is experienced over a period of time, the suspect(s) are in a position of weakness and outnumbered, violence is manifested in a hot rush. Finally, this study identifies many factors that contribute to the experience of tension/fear that both intensify and compound the experience. This work lays the groundwork for future research seeking to explore micro-situational explanations of violence.
References


## Appendix A

### Table 1. Description of Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
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<th>Number of Officers</th>
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<td>6</td>
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Appendix B

Case A

The situation originates in Birmingham, Alabama U.S.A. Birmingham police stop a suspect for suspicion of illicit drug involvement. While questioning him, the suspect fled from the police and a lengthy chase began and continued for over 50 miles. The chase starts in the downtown area of Birmingham and works its way out to a suburban area of the city. The situation, as it is shown in the video, begins with the suspect driving a minivan at what appears to be a high rate of speed down a city street that is heavily populated with vehicular traffic. The suspect uses a designated right hand turning lane to pass vehicles and to evade police. The police follow the suspect’s vehicle with sirens blaring as the vehicle drives hastily along the turning lane. The suspect then continues straight through an intersection, where he encounters slower moving traffic. The suspect is forced to brake hard in order to avoid hitting the cars in front of him. The sudden braking forces the officer following behind the suspect’s car to move over several lanes in order to avoid hitting the suspect’s vehicle. The suspect then swerves left and right looking for a way to get around the cars in front of him. The suspect forces his way through two cars that were blocking his way. Once the suspect forces his way between the two vehicles, he swerves directly in front of one of the two vehicles.

As the suspect swerves he directs his vehicle toward an officer standing on the road attempting to deploy a spike strip (apparatus thrown by officers to provide a controlled deflation of the tires on a vehicle). The officer is knocked to the ground by the suspect’s vehicle. The officer that is traveling behind the suspect is forced to go around to the left of the two vehicles that the suspect cut off and narrowly misses the officer that was struck by the suspect. The suspect continues down the busy street at a high rate of
speed. The suspect could next be seen moving from one lane of traffic to another. Next the suspect moved from the far left lane of a four-lane road onto a highway on-ramp. The pursuit continues up the ramp with police following closely behind the suspect. The vehicle driven by the suspect is then nudged from behind by the police car. The nudge forces the vehicle off the road and into a ditch. The vehicle then begins to roll in the ditch and the driver of the van (the suspect) is ejected from the driver side window and can next be seen lying in the ditch not moving.

As the suspect lay on the ground motionless, several officers exit their vehicles. Six officers in total can be seen running toward the suspect. The first officer is seen running with his arm raised, carrying a baton. As this officer is running, he arches his back and arms away from the suspect as he approaches the suspect. The other officers follow him, running toward the suspect in a chaotic manner. At several points the officers trip over one another in an attempt to find a suitable position around the body of the suspect. One officer hits the suspect with a baton. Then, another officer could be seen running and leaping into the air as if to jump directly on top of the suspect. This officer missed the suspect and fell backwards. He then got up and began punching the suspect several times. Two other officers can then be seen kicking the suspect, while another hits him with a retractable baton. Throughout the entire episode the suspect did not move. He appeared to be unconscious. Even after the police stop hitting him he does not move. The situation ends with officers walking away leaving the suspect lying on the ground.
Appendix C

Case B

This situation takes place at Vancouver International Airport in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. The incident began prior to the arrival of police. In the video the suspect in this case can be seen occupying what appears to be a waiting room of some kind. The suspect can be seen through the glass walls of this room pacing back and forth, carrying a collapsible television tray over his head. The suspect next sets the tray down to pick up a clipboard, which he then throws to the ground. He later picks up the tray again, holding the table portion of it against his chest with the legs facing away from his body. He can be heard at this point yelling loudly, but what he is saying cannot be distinguished. He then steps out into the doorway of the room he is occupying. A woman attempts to speak with him. Two security guards can be seen standing in front of him. The man then moves back into the room and picks up a television/computer monitor and throws it against the ground. The man then tries to pick up the remnants of the monitor and makes a motion as to throw it through the plate glass wall in front of him, but sets it down cautiously.

The man then moves to the doorway, where he stands behind two chairs that he had previously positioned there. As he stands there, the security guards stand in front of him several feet away, motionless for several seconds. At some point during the above taking place, newspaper reports indicate that officers were called to deal with the suspect as attempts by security and customs officers to do so have failed. Upon arrival, the police, immediately attempt to make contact with the suspect. They do so in what appears to be a very non-threatening manner. Two of the officers can be seen with their arms stretched out in front of them, with their palms down, making an up and down motion, as if to say
“Calm Down” to the suspect. A third officer has his hands at his side. As the officers approach the suspect, they can be heard saying “how are you doing bud, what’s going on bud?” The suspect initially seems to be engaging with the officers, but you see him quickly throw up his hands and move away from the officers.

The suspect begins to walk away from the officers. They follow him forming a semi-circle around him. You can see the officers pointing at him and can hear them yelling at him as they surround him, but what they are saying cannot be heard on the video. The suspect is now standing against a desk and officers can be seen backing up from the suspect. After the officers have encircled the suspect one of the officers discharges his taser. The suspect stumbles backwards. Two more distinct cracks of the taser can be heard, one right after another. The suspect subsequently falls backwards to the ground. The officers immediately get on top of the man pushing and shoving against his body. They continue to push the man on the ground for several more seconds. Several of the officers begin to climb off of the suspect and the video ends with the man lying motionless on the ground.
Appendix D

Case C

This situation takes place at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario, Canada. A student entered a building and was reportedly acting in a threatening manner and attempting to enter several offices in the building. Campus police were subsequently called. Before their arrival, the man barricaded himself in an office. When the campus police officers arrived, they attempted to speak with the man, but attempts were unsuccessful. While campus officers attempted to deal with the situation, officers from the London City Police Force were called in to assist. When city police arrived, the suspect exited his refuge, and was reportedly “belligerent and threatening towards the officers.” Police then made an attempt to take control of the suspect, but were unable to detain the man. He managed to evade custody and a chase ensued, commencing on the main floor of the building where the video picked up the interaction between the officers and the suspect.

Once the police caught up with the suspect, four of them can be seen grabbing the suspect and attempting to forcefully take him to the ground. In their attempt, the suspect fights back against the officers, twisting and turning, trying to get away. The officers and suspect continue to struggle against one another. The police then pull the suspect to the ground and he is seen straining against their efforts. Once on the ground, the officers take up positions on top of the suspect, kneeling on him to prevent his movement. While the officers hold the suspect, one of them starts to repetitively knee the suspect. After the officer stopped kneeing him, another officer immediately begins hitting him with his baton on the back using both of his hands to wield the baton. While the baton hits
continued, another officer is seen punching the suspect in the upper portion of his body. At this point in the altercation two more officers arrive.

These supplemental officers cautiously take up a position to hold the suspect down. While they were doing so, another officer can be observed raining down multiple punches on the suspect’s head. Meanwhile, an officer was heard shouting “Give us your arms; stop resisting!” As this is said, the suspect continued to be punched by an officer. The suspect could at no time, once on the ground, be seen providing any visible evidence of resistance. The video ends with an officer saying “Give us your arms; stop resisting” again.
Appendix E

Case D

The location of this situation was not presented in the video or located through a Google search. The situation begins with an officer driving down a narrow city street. The streets are narrow due to a high volume of parked vehicles on the sides of the road. The situation transpires in a suburban neighborhood, which was made clear by the presence of a high number of houses. As the situation begins, the siren from a car can be heard wailing as an officer continues to drive along the street. Several vehicles can be seen approaching in the distance. The officer begins to slow his vehicle and comes to a complete stop, blocking the street. The cars that were quite distant are now visible. A civilian vehicle can be seen followed by two officers. The approaching civilian car avoids the officers’ roadblock by driving over the sidewalk and onto the lawn of a home. The pursuing officers do the same and continue to pursue the suspect. The suspect vehicle narrowly misses the stopped officer and does not appear to decelerate when he gets close to the officer.

As the pursuit continues, the rate of speed continues to increase. This can be discerned through the rapid shifting of the officers’ engine into higher gears and intense revving of their engine. Continuing to evade officers, the suspect begins to run several stop signs in an attempt to get away. The suspect continues to drive on, hitting dips in the road causing the back end of the car to pop up in the air. Next the suspect attempts to take a corner, but is unable to make the turn and drives directly onto someone’s front lawn. Once the suspect’s vehicle comes to a stop on the front lawn, the driver exits the vehicle and lays face down on the lawn, while the passenger, now visible, remains inside the vehicle.
As the suspect lays on the ground with both arms stretched out, officers can be seen running toward him. In a fluid motion, one officer begins to drop to his knees beside the suspect, while at the same time the officer cocks his arm back and brings his fist down on the suspect. The officer continues to punch the suspect wildly and incessantly. A second officer subsequently joins him. This officer stumbles and falls when he drops to his knees. He recovers and begins to put his hands on the suspect taking control of his upper body. A third officer becomes involved in the situation. He too begins to continuously punch the suspect. Two of the officers can be seen simultaneously punching the suspect, while the second officer prevents the suspect from moving. Two officers are now hitting the suspect while a third prevents him from moving. The situation begins to dissipate and only one officer is left to handcuff the driver. On the other side of the car, two officers pull the passenger from the vehicle, place him on the ground and handcuff him.
Appendix F

Case E

This situation takes place in Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A. The first image seen is of a vehicle making a right hand turn onto a street and pulling over to the side of the road. The vehicle is being pulled over by a police officer, made obvious by the flashing lights that are reflecting off the suspect’s car. Next the officer exits his vehicle and walks up to the suspect’s car. He approaches the vehicle, walking in a semi-circle or half moon, approaching wide and then narrowing in to the drivers side door. Once at the vehicle, he attempts to open the door because the suspect did not roll down his window. The door is locked and the officer is unable to open it. The officer then knocks on the window to get the driver’s attention, but the suspect again does not acknowledge the officer. The officer reaches out again to open the door, and remains with his arm outstretched for several seconds until the door is opened.

Once the door opens, the officer takes a step back, standing behind the driver’s side doorpost, and begins to address the suspect (sound not available). The officer is now leaning in, putting only the upper portion of his body in front of the suspect, and keeping the lower half back. Also one foot is pointed toward the suspect, the other pointed away. The officer’s body posture is rigid in appearance. The sound now becomes audible, and it is possible to hear that the suspect and officer are engaged in an argument. What they are saying is muffled, but the tone is one of anger and their voices are very loud. The officer now can be seen staring intently at the suspect as the two continue to yell. The officer takes a brief moment away from the argument to say something into his police radio on the collar of his shirt. While doing so, the suspect attempts to exit the vehicle. With one arm, the officer lightly pushes the suspect back into the vehicle. The officer remains
holding the suspect for a while, but a minute or so later relinquishes his control. They again begin to talk loudly (what they are saying is inaudible). The suspect then hands something to the officer, and the officer tosses it onto the roof of the car, never taking his eyes off the suspect. The suspect immediately tries to stand up again and get out of the car. As the suspect stands up, the officer says something into his radio, then immediately grabs a hold of the suspect when he is almost fully upright.

The officer and suspect wrestle with one another for several seconds before falling to the ground. The officer and suspect continue to grapple with one another on the ground. The officer gains control by throwing a punch in the suspect’s face. The suspect then rolls on his stomach and the officer lies on top of him; the situation appears to have de-escalated. Other officers can then be heard approaching with sirens on. A second officer enters the scene and immediately drops to his knees and begins punching wildly at the suspect several times. A third officer also begins punching the suspect, at the same time as the second officer. Finally, a fourth officer is seen rushing into the situation. One of the two officers grabs the first officer out of the way, and simultaneously begins kicking the suspect. At this point the situation becomes a melee of punching and kicking. All that can be seen is officers punching and kicking the suspect. The violence then begins to dissipate. The suspect is pulled onto the sidewalk, kicked and punched several more times and then finally handcuffed.
Appendix G

Case F

The exact location of this situation could not be determined, however, through evidence observed in the video, it was established that it took place at a U.S./Mexico border crossing. This was evident as the vehicles bared the emblem of the “United States Boarder Patrol,” and the officers wore dark green uniforms characteristic of Boarder Guards in the United States. The situation begins with a group of protestors standing face-to-face with the officers. They are standing in close proximity to one another; officers with their backs against a fence and the protestors in front of them. The protestors could be heard yelling, but they were speaking in a language other than English, possibly Spanish, so I was unable to determine what they were saying. Next, several protestors with arms locked backed into the officers. They were pushed back lightly and the protest continued with the protestors chanting and screaming loudly in the faces of the officers, as the officers stood silently in front of them.

While the protestors continue to chant, officers are seen avoiding eye contact with them. The officers keep looking to their left and right, looking into the faces of their fellow officers. The protestors then begin to move within closer proximity to the officers, continuing to chant, now almost directly in the officers’ faces. They continued screaming very loudly and banging on drums, and pointing their fingers in the officers’ faces. This went on for several more seconds, at which time the existing officers where joined by another group of officers. As the new officers arrived, a protestor can be seen dancing and banging on his drum, dancing directly toward an officer. The officer outstretches his arm. The man continues moving toward the officer, finally making contact with him. The man is then quickly grabbed by officers and arrested.
As a result of the protestor’s actions, the officers begin to move closer together, batons drawn, and yelling. Officers could be heard yelling “Get back, get the fuck back!”, as they lurch forward and backward as a group. After yelling at protestors to get back, an officer fires a pepper ball gun into the crowd. The protestors begin running, with officers giving chase. Three officers catch up to a suspect who has stopped to help someone who has fallen. The officers grab that individual by the neck and shirt and throw him to the ground. Another officer joins in, hitting the man several times with a baton. Then the three officers jump on top of the man shoving him repeatedly into the ground for several seconds. The violence appears to diminish after this, and officers are seen telling the suspects to disperse.
Appendix H

Case G

This situation took place in Omaha, Nebraska, U.S.A. According to news sources, the incident began when the suspect refused to stop for police. The suspect was being sought in connection with several armed robberies. The video begins with the chase already in progress. The suspect’s car is first seen squealing its tires as it pulls onto the street in front of a police car. The officer follows the suspect with lights and sirens on. The speed of the chase steadily increases as they travel along city streets. They are driving 70 miles per hour, according to the officer, calling out the chase over his police radio. The chase occurs originally within a city or town as there is a large number of homes and businesses visible, providing indication that the area is highly populated. The suspect then runs a red light, compelling the officer to follow him. The officer continues to follow, and indicates over the radio that speeds have now reached 90 miles per hour. The chase now enters onto a freeway. There is a large volume of vehicular traffic and the suspect begins swerving from lane to lane to avoid vehicles, forcing the officer to do the same. According to the officer’s radio transmissions, the speed has reached 95 miles per hour by this point. The suspect then makes a hard left and exits the freeway, cutting in front of several vehicles.

As they continue down the off ramp, the suspect fires a shot at the pursuing officer. The glass from the back window of the suspect’s car can be seen shattering. The officer, who was previously quite calm talking over the radio, yells out "621 HE JUST SHOT AT ME, HE’S GOT THE SHOT GUN AND HE JUST SHOT AT ME, HE SHOT THROUGH THE BLACK/BACK WINDOW.” The officer continues to follow the suspect, but the radio is silent. All that can be heard is the car’s engine and siren. Another
officer is heard authorizing the use of vehicle intervention, but the pursuing officer
responds by saying he cannot because “he is shooting at us.” With the chase now back on
city streets, the suspect makes a quick right turn and the front end of the officer’s car
dives toward the ground, as he breaks hard to follow the suspect. The chase continues
down a winding road and officers can be heard over the radio saying “Back off he’s
shooting, you’re too close, you’re gonna get shot.” The chase continues for several more
seconds down the winding road. The suspect then takes a quick left, driving off the road.
Dust is now billowing in the air, two distinct cracks can be heard, and then the officer
says “More shots fired.”

The suspect continues to drive further off road and then comes to a stop. A police
car can be seen driving up an embankment and then turning back away from it, driving
straight into a creek. The video then cuts back to the stopped suspect car and several
officers can now be seen running furiously toward the suspect. Gunfire erupts. According
to news reports over 26 shots were fired at the suspect who was down in the creek with
his gun pointed at the semi-submerged police car, with officers inside of it. The video
then ends with officers standing with their guns pointed down towards the suspect.
Appendix I

Case H

This case took place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. According to information obtained from several news sources, surveillance officers saw four men engage in a shooting. When police attempted to make contact with the men, one of them fled on foot and three others fled in a vehicle. Subsequently, a vehicular chase ensued with several officers chasing the three men. The vehicle traveled along the city streets for several miles until the suspects stopped the vehicle. The video provided the rest of the evidence. As the vehicle came to a stop, there was a transport truck stopped in front of the suspects and behind the suspects’ car were multiple police cars with lights flashing and sirens wailing.

Officers’ began to exit their vehicles and run toward the suspects. As the police approached, one of them was seen kicking the trunk area of the vehicle. A group of five officers began surrounding the driver’s door; one officer pulled the suspect out while the other four officers stood by. As soon as the driver was removed, an officer was seen running up and kicking the suspect in the head. Then all five officers encircled the suspect and began stomping on him repeatedly. The stomping continued for several seconds. The violence against the driver slowed and two officers attempted to handcuff him, while a third kicked and kneed him several more times before he was finally handcuffed. While the driver was being kicked, officers were also seen entering the back seat and pulling another suspect out. Again, as soon as that suspect was on the ground three officers simultaneously began kicking him. A fourth officer joined in, kicking the suspect in the ribs. One officer left. While the remaining three continued to kick him, one of them knelt down to punch the suspect. Finally, after several more kicks, the back seat passenger was
handcuffed. Finally, the front seat passenger was removed and only kicked once. Four officers took this suspect to the ground and handcuffed him. The situation ended with the suspects lying on the ground in handcuffs and officers wandering around.
Appendix J

Case I

The exact location of this incident was unable to be determined, however the situation begins with an in-car view of an officer traveling at a high rate of speed. The engine of the police car can be heard revving as he makes several quick turns to enter onto a four-lane road. It is unclear initially why he is driving so quickly with lights flashing and sirens on. An officer can be heard saying over the radio “Two, Nine, Nine, Lincoln, George, Mary, Two, Nine, Nine, Lincoln, George, Mary, (license plate) from a dodge caravan.” The officer continues down the highway driving for a full minute until a minivan comes into view. Upon approaching the van, police attempt to box it in by pulling ahead of it. The suspect can be seen accelerating toward the back of an officer’s car; the officer immediately moves out of their way. The suspect attempts next to use the oncoming lane of traffic to evade police. As the police and suspect travel down the highway, an officer can be seen in the distance traveling in front of the scene to warn others. However, at this point the chase has caught up to that officer, and the suspect attempts to pass him on the shoulder of the road.

The suspect is unable to get past the officer, and the remaining officers begin to tighten up a box formation and slow the chase down. As they do this, a truck pulls over onto the side of the road, forcing the suspect to move over to avoid hitting the truck, which in turn forces an officer into oncoming traffic. Finally, the suspect is fully blocked in and the officers bring the chase to an end. The police begin to exit their vehicles quickly, running toward the van. An officer is seen jumping off the hood of a police car and drop kicking the suspect’s van.
Officers can be seen trying to get at the suspects on both sides of the vehicle, grabbing at the door handles, but their hands slip off. Three officers rip the passenger from the vehicle and all of them tumble down into the ditch. One of the officers rolls the suspect over in the ditch, while another officer runs up and kicks him in the head. After kicking him in the head, the officer drops to his knees and begins to wildly punch the suspect repetitively. A second officer holds the suspect down while the first officer continues to punch him. This officer is seen alternating between his left and right hands as he punches. Likewise, the officer who is holding him down begins to repetitively punch the passenger with one hand. The driver, at the same time, is seen being yanked from the vehicle, but due to the crowd of officers, the camera is unable to pick up what is going on. The situation ends with both suspects lying on the ground in handcuffs and officers standing over top of them.