Talking Scot: English Perceptions of the Scots During the Regal Union

By

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Abstract

From 1603 until 1707, England and Scotland were joined by what scholars have described as the regal union. A dynastic accident that came into being when James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne as well, it forced the two kingdoms to share a single monarch without creating a unified legal system, religious hierarchy, political structure or British culture. This dissertation re-evaluates the resultant Anglo-Scottish relationship by examining what English people actually said about the Scots and Scotland during moments when this union was strained. Specifically, it explores discourses about the Scots that circulated immediately after the regal union, and those which appeared during the Bishops’ Wars (1638-40), the Cromwellian Union (1651-59), the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis (1679-81), and the parliamentary union of 1707 that renegotiated the terms of engagement. By doing so, it challenges widespread assumptions that an uncomplicated xenophobia dominated English approaches to the Scots, and illuminates the existence of a more nuanced Anglo-Scottish dynamic that still informs British politics today.

The Scots were too similar to be Other, and too different to be wholly Same – their “familiar alterity” creating difficulties for the English. At the start of the regal union, the notion of what constituted a Scot was malleable and utilitarian, which encouraged the English to reject their partnership in the creation of a new British kingdom. During periods of outright Scottish assertiveness, however, the English were forced to remember their northern neighbours. At each of these moments, the Scots variously became beggars, locusts, radicals, worthy partners in empire, protestant deliverers and even role models, before the English were able to write them out of the equation again. Finally, in
1707, a parliamentary union mandated that within official discourse, the Scots were to be interpreted as familiars and as equals, in an attempt to cement their position and thus solidify the Anglo-Scottish relationship. In many ways, this meant nothing more than a divergence between official and popular discourses, but it did permanently intertwine English and Scottish development, no matter how intense divisive pressures became.
Acknowledgements

In fulfillment of a very old promise, this dissertation is dedicated to E.A. Clarke... with love and squalor.

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Chapter 1: Introduction – The Problem of Familiar Alterity
and the English Evasion of Britain

From 1603 until 1707, England and Scotland were linked by what scholars have
called the union of the crowns, or the regal union.¹ The product of Elizabeth I’s stalwart
refusal to fulfill one of her primary duties as monarch – to provide an heir of her own
body – this union came into being when her cousin, King James VI of Scotland,
succeeded her on the English throne and linked the two crowns in his person and dynasty.
James’s right, as the great-grandson of Margaret Tudor, was relatively straightforward
and he obtained his second crown without contest. The problem, however, was that while
he saw this as the birth of a new era, in which the English and the Scots would come
together in brotherly love and shared religion to rebuild the kingdom of Britain and
resurrect its ancient glory, his subjects in either realm preferred to view their situation
simply in terms of sharing a king. Attempts to create a unified British political
infrastructure through the English and Scottish parliaments failed miserably and, in the
end, James had to be content with the mere removal of the hostile laws that separated the
two kingdoms and the eventual cross-border naturalization of his subjects.

The relationship between these two peoples thus remained ambiguous while the
Stuarts ruled. England and Scotland shared a protestant faith, but their churches upheld
divergent disciplinary practices; they shared a language, but strong dialects persisted;
they shared a monarch, but no legislative, religious or legal institutions; and they shared
an island, but there were vast disparities in the quality and quantity of land in each

¹ For surveys of the regal union, see David L. Smith, A History of the Modern British Isles: The Double
the Union, 1603-1707 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Keith Brown, Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the
kingdom, as well as the levels of trade and urban development. England was stronger, bigger, and richer, but the Scots were stubbornly protective of their sovereignty and aggressively defensive of their Kirk, and so there was an ongoing game of religious, cultural, and political tug-of-war throughout the century. With the brief exception of a closer union in the 1650s, imposed through the Cromwellian army’s reluctant conquest and military occupation of Scotland, this situation remained unchanged until 1707, when a single British parliament was created at Westminster. Although legislative authority was thus finally unified, it was agreed that separate legal traditions and national churches would be preserved. But this was far from the happy moment when the hearts and minds of the English and the Scots finally met. It was a shotgun wedding necessitated by a combination of domestic and international politics.

Unsurprisingly, then, some scholars have commented on the consistent English disdain for the Scots. Bruce Galloway, for example, has argued that the Jacobean negotiations for a closer union were wrecked by an “enormous residue of misunderstanding and ill-will.” Moreover, Jenny Wormald has been perhaps the most outspoken critic of England’s alleged “Scotophobia,” exposing the prejudice that existed against the grasping, dirty, aggressive beggars from the north who were detested by all, and who were unable to do any good except force the English into a proper appreciation of the pre-Scottish Elizabethan age. By the mid-century Civil Wars, it has even been suggested that national animosities were such that they contributed to the purgation of the

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3 Most of Wormald’s work deals with the English hatred for the Scots in some capacity. The specific examples cited above can be found in Jenny Wormald, “The Union of 1603,” in Roger Mason (ed.), *Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17-40.
English military and the subsequent formation of the New Model Army as a specifically English national force, which was then unleashed on Scotland as well as other “stranger” communities. And according to Brian Levack and Allan Macinnes, English opinions of Scotland finally reached a nadir on the eve of the parliamentary union. Anti-Scottish sentiment therefore often appears to be a defining feature of what has been termed the “awkward” relationship between the two kingdoms during the regal union. But is this really how the English always perceived their northern neighbours? And did animosity really always propel English actions when the Scots were involved?

II

This dissertation contends that England’s experience of the regal union was informed by more than simply prejudice, hostility and a straight-forward English belief in their own superiority, and a closer look at one specific example helps to illuminate why. In 1617, a popular satire about Scotland, most often referred to as “A Perfect Description of the People and Country of Scotland,” began to circulate in manuscript and print. It was written in response to James VI and I’s first and only progress back into Scotland, and purported to be a letter sent home by an Englishman attending the king while he visited his native country. The piece was anonymous, although scholars generally attribute it to Sir Anthony Weldon (1583-1648), and the text’s impressive lifespan attests to its success. Weldon had accompanied James on his progress, and his suspicious fall into disgrace

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shortly thereafter, combined with his subsequent alleged authorship of the scathing *Court and Character of King James*, do indicate that he may have penned it. But regardless of who originally wrote the document, the satire’s importance lies not in its provenance, but in its popularity. The text went through five separate editions and clearly influenced at least three other printed “characters of Scotland” before 1707, and continued to resonate thereafter.\(^7\) There are also numerous extant manuscript copies scattered throughout British and North American archives, some of which date as late as the eighteenth century. Powerful because of its accessibility and genuinely funny prose, Wormald has claimed that the text helped to ensure that Scotophobia remained entrenched in England throughout James’s reign.\(^8\)

“A Perfect Description” recounted in raucous detail the sights and smells of Scotland and its people. From the outset, the reader was told that:

> For the Countrie I must confesse it is to good for those that inhabit it, and to bad for others to be at the charge of conquering it, the aire may be wholesome but for the stinking people that lyve in it, and the grounde might be made fruitfull had they witt to manure it. Theire beasts generally are small (woemen excepted) of which store there is not greater in the world.\(^9\)

Scottish churchmen were portrayed as ignorant, illiterate and proud, missing the true path to righteousness and hating even the slightest order and ceremony because they mistook it

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\(^7\) This description of Scotland is reproduced in Anonymous, *A Description of Scotland, Fourth Edition*, (S.L., 1626); Rupert, *A Perfect Description of the People and Country of Scotland* (London, 1649 and 1659 x2); A Gentleman in the Service of the Public, *Terrible Newes from Scotland*, (London, 1647); Owen Felltham, *A Brief Description of the Low-Countreys* (London, 1671), which is the same text as Owen Felltham, *Batavia, or, the Hollander displayed...To which is Added, a Perfect Description of Scotland* (London, 1672, and 1697). There were also several Amsterdam editions of *Batavia*. Texts influenced by the “Perfect Description” include Mr. R.L.S., *A Letter out of Scotland* (London, 1681); Anonymous, *A Journey to Scotland giving a Character of that Country, the people and their Manners* (London, 1699); E.B., *A Description of Scotland and its Inhabitants* (London, 1705); Anonymous, *The Comical Pilgrim* (London, 1722).


\(^9\) The text was well enough known that different editions contain only very minor deviations. All quotations here are provided from the British Library manuscript Add. 15226, a miscellaneous collection of seventeenth-century prose and verse wherein the full text of the satire appears unabridged. BL Add. 15226, ff. 39v-40r.
for idolatry. And, to ensure that these characteristics were interpreted as being thoroughly Scottish, the author added a quip about St. Andrew presenting Christ with an oatcake. The general Scottish population was portrayed as cheap, dirty and dull, and only those of sufficient rank to have been schooled abroad were considered tolerable. But it was the women who received the harshest treatment. They were the only monsters to be found in the land, locked away in cages by their men whose “greatest madness” was the idiotic fear that they might “loose what no man that hath two of his sences will seeke to gitt.” As the author succinctly put it, “their brethes commonly stinkes of pottage and their Lynnen of pisse, their hand of pigs turds, their whole bodies of Sweat, and their splay feet never offend in socks, To be chained in marriage to one of them were to be tyed to a dead Carkasse and cast into a stinking ditch.”

Clearly, whoever composed the letter was not enamoured of Scotland, prompting one contemporary to complain that the author probably did not actually accompany James at all, and conjured these images out of thin air to undermine what little spirit of cooperation existed within the regal union. The “Perfect Description” can thus be categorized with what has been called the “simple nationalistic satire” of the later seventeenth century, which promoted homogeneity and served to distinguish one group from another in a basic way. It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that this satire, or others like it, functioned as uncomplicated anti-Scottish propaganda. After all, for something to qualify as satiric at all, a moral ambivalence and a witty awareness of the unfairness of the accusations is usually available within the text, encouraging

10 Ibid., 45r.
readers to reflect on their own condition.\textsuperscript{12} Nationalistic satire, then, was part of a process of coming to terms with one’s own society, and not just a way of mocking others. According to Jill Twark, who has charted how satire functioned in post-reunification Germany, this type of text frequently appears precisely because it employs a “linguistic playfulness” which resists simple propagandistic uses and can therefore be used for emotional or intellectual support when engaging in identity politics. It is about laughing when one does not know what else to do, and commenting without being able to offer a specific solution.\textsuperscript{13} By 1617, this was precisely the situation the English found themselves in as they sat uncomfortably shackled to their northern neighbours in a union they did not necessarily want or understand. Their political situation therefore welcomed any text that would help stabilize their own identity vis-à-vis Scotland and maintain some boundaries between the kingdoms even within the context of increasing ties. The idea was not to hate the Scots, but to understand what England was.

A brief and simplified survey of the different manifestations of the “Perfect Description” helps to illuminate this impulse. First and foremost, the satire’s publication history shows that a certain amount of uncomplicated Scots-bashing could and did occur in England, establishing a clear divide between the two peoples. Printed editions of the satire appeared in 1647 and 1649: both years when the Scottish covenanters, erstwhile allies of Parliament during the English Civil Wars, were proving themselves increasingly uncooperative. After King Charles surrendered into Scottish custody in 1646, the Scots


first sold him back to the English and then forged a military alliance with him in 1647, which spawned a second civil war. In 1649, the Scots proclaimed Charles II King of Scotland, Ireland and England almost immediately after the English had executed his father and declared an English republic, pushing the two nations towards yet another conflict. Likewise, a shortened version of the tract appeared printed with a new “character” and an old anti-Scottish poem in 1699, just as the Scots colony at Darien was being crushed by the Spanish, and the English and the Scots were at each other’s throats over economic disaster and diplomatic differences. In all of these contexts, it seemed appropriate to muster the “Perfect Description’s” ready-made diatribe against Scottish barbarism in order to voice English anger, condemn Scotland’s poor political judgement, and belittle Scottish culture, encouraging conquest.

But in addition to these angry outbursts, two London editions appeared in 1659, as well as single printings in 1671, 1672 and 1697. These dates point toward more complicated uses for the text and alternative reasons why it was marketable just then. The 1659 editions are particularly interesting, since this was the year in which Protectoral rule disintegrated, forcing another political reconfiguration in the British kingdoms. Oliver Cromwell was dead, uncertainty prevailed as English society limped towards the Restoration, and the brief incorporating union with Scotland was coming apart, making this a moment when the English would have been painfully concerned with their own future. Hostility to Scottish Presbyterians and their role in initiating the Civil Wars and revolution should be considered, but it is also worth noting that the familiar appearance of this witty piece of prose would have allowed the release achieved through humour, which was often required during socio-political transitions and which has been so well
documented by Twark. Equally important, by stereotyping the Scots, a mental boundary could be put back in place between the two nations, helping to concretize a specifically English identity after a decade of what was, in effect, a British Commonwealth.

The 1671, 1672 and 1697 editions were all appended to Owen Feltham’s *A Brief Character of the Low-Countrieys*, which was subsequently retitled *Batavia, or, the Hollander displayed in Brief Characters & Observations*, and offered a type of satirical “double-feature.” The Dutch were thus Feltham’s primary target, and his *Brief Character* first appeared without the Scottish satire in 1652, playing on Anglo-Dutch competition and hostilities. There are thus several ways of reading the 1671 decision to combine it with Weldon’s piece, the most obvious answer being profit. Satire can easily descend from something reformatory into pure entertainment, and the success of both these texts meant that a discerning observer would have seen opportunity in selling them together simply because it would help lure the eager consumer of humorous works. But this explanation does not account for the timing. Why was it only in 1671 that someone thought to print satires against Scotland and the Low Countries together? The likely answer is that while the Dutch had never really fallen from view, the Scots were more periodically topical, and had only recently become a pressing concern again. In 1669, the Duke of Lauderdale had initiated new negotiations for a closer union between England and Scotland as a way of distracting parliament from Charles II’s negotiations with France. He then promptly wrecked the negotiations in 1670 after the Treaty of Dover was signed, but the Anglo-Scottish relationship had become entangled in the great

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14 Feltham’s satire printed in 1652, 1659, 1660, and 1662 without the satire of Scotland.
politics of the day once more. The “Perfect Description” was thus again related to an impulse both to define boundaries and build bridges between the two nations in a period of political uncertainty, and the appearance of the text speaks more to the English concern with potential machinations within their own state than any particular feelings about Scotland.

Manuscript copies also help expose fluctuation in the meaning of the “Perfect Description” by preserving the text along with other documents transcribed into a single notebook. Such transcriptions indicate a variety of responses to the text, ranging from appreciation of the humour, to outright condemnation of the sentiment. Circa 1627, someone associated with the University of Cambridge compiled a book of jests in prose and verse. It included jocular epitaphs, jokes about horse races and Thomas Nashe, and a copy of the “Perfect Description,” among other things. Here, the document was transcribed in full, and did not include any indications that the copyist thought it was anything other than amusing. Lumped in with a plethora of English jokes, the Scottish satire was domesticated, indicating a certain begrudging acceptance of the proximity of the Scots, since a level of familiarity with the Scots was required for the joke to be funny. This familiarity was central to the effectiveness of the humour and, when it was lost, the joke disappeared as well. This is evidenced by another manuscript copy that indicates the scribe thought the piece to be a relatively accurate description of a foreign people. In this copy, the punctuation and word choice were re-worked, and the formatting was formalized, turning the satire into a documentary. The same text could therefore be about relative familiars and copied as a begrudging act of coming to terms with new

\[16\] BL Stowe 151, f.17-23.
influences, or it could be a testimonial to the foreignness of Scotland and transcribed as an act of distancing.

The “Perfect Description” could also be read as being about politics at home, and John Rous copied the satire into a collection of political pamphlets, verse and prophecies, prefacing it with the qualification that it was “a most stinking letter full of foul uncharitable censure, malice and envy.”\textsuperscript{17} For Rous, the text was not a simple nationalist attempt at boundary maintenance, but part of a divide within England itself over the acceptability of Scotland and specifically of Scottish reformed religion – and Rous found it alarming that his contemporaries could find such an uncharitable diatribe against godly brethren amusing. His anxiety about Weldon’s text was reflective of a broader trend wherein religious reformers recognized no boundaries.\textsuperscript{18} It also gestured towards satire’s ability to influence early-modern religious and political debates by allowing Scottish topics to inflame tempers about English debates; and it participated in a more general satirical project which, according to Andrew McRae, fostered a “contemporary fascination with discord and contestation.”\textsuperscript{19} Nor was Rous the only one enraged by the appearance of this “libel;” another interlocutor wrote to a friend in Edinburgh seething that the author of the satire “hath a Pope in his bellie, a Jesuit in his Eare, a traytor in his skin, a firebrand in his hand (and I need not tell you), a lyar in his

\textsuperscript{17} BL Add 28640, f. 51.
\textsuperscript{19} Andrew McRae, Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3 14.
throat."\(^{20}\) Weldon’s satire was therefore often involved in more than a simple process of Othering. It was part of a broader need to redefine or reinforce English identity through the complex sounding-board that Scotland could create in a century when political amalgamation, among other crises, threatened to undermine it.\(^{21}\)

Unlike Said’s Orient, Scotland was not a controllable and distant Other against which England could consistently assert the superiority of its selfhood. The portrayal of this foreign nation was never static, and the Scots had the capacity to speak back.\(^{22}\) Scotland was not a conquered kingdom, and the “Anglo-Scottish union began the wrong way around, as the king of the lesser power came to rule the greater.”\(^{23}\) This meant that the tools of colonial or post-colonial analysis simply do not apply because it was fundamentally not a colonial situation. The English were thus joined to the Scots without possessing an incontestable superiority, leading them to seek distinctiveness within a union that they could not break. Forced into an ill-defined union and tethered to a separate people through a shared monarchy and the need for land-based security, the English began to view the Scots as what Sir Francis Bacon called “alterinos,” or other ourselves. They were neither fully same nor other, but somewhere in between.

A similar concept appears in the modern theoretical writings of Hannah Arendt, who has interrogated the ways in which human beings interact with one another and with

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\(^{20}\) Anon., “Answer to the Satire.”


their world. As with any theorists, various thinkers have criticized elements of Arendt’s thought, but her exposition of the truly political agent highlights the problem of simultaneous familiarity and difference extremely well. Political participation, in her estimation, requires an extremely high degree of individuality, which then requires mediation through speech acts in order to achieve action, ensuring that political agents encounter and interact with what she calls “alteritas” on a regular basis.²⁴ For her, it is thus possible to talk about human distinctiveness as separate from Otherness in certain contexts, and she writes:

> Otherness in its most abstract form is found only in the sheer multiplication of inorganic objects, whereas all organic life already shows variations and distinction, even between specimens of the same species. But only man can express this distinction and distinguish himself, and only he can communicate himself and not merely something – thirst or hunger, affection or hostility or fear. In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings.²⁵

Other is too extreme a label for situations where there is overt interaction with the external group, and thus for the Anglo-Scottish dynamic wherein the degree of agonistic interaction bred simultaneous sameness and difference.

This quality of familiar alterity – as opposed to Otherness – meant that over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Scots could be all things and nothing to the English, as the situation required. Changelings, the Scots were described as beggars, locusts, radicals, worthy partners in empire, role models, and more. The major side effect of this situation was that the English were often able to ignore the Scots in their pursuit of their own destiny and self image. But when crisis struck, and the Scots

²⁵ Ibid.
were able to force themselves, their opinions, and their self-perceptions back into view, the English tried their hardest to ensure that even the most British of events were construed as lacking in Scottish agency. In 1603, this often meant conceiving of Britain as either the ancient forbear of England alone, or as England writ large when thinking about the present or the future. By 1707, it was manifested as the complete denial of Scottish autonomy in order to placate fears that the Scots might disrupt English politics, trade and religion and ensure that the joint succession to the English and Scottish thrones would remain unchallenged.

This process established a dynamic that sat awkwardly between aggressive English expansionist and protectionist thrusts, and which would reverberate throughout the heyday of the British empire and continue further still into modern devolutionist debates. It is therefore essential that scholars explore the problem in greater detail if they hope to flesh out the meaning of Britain and the character of the Anglo-Scottish partnership more fully. My dissertation contributes to this process by focussing on interpretations and conversations that emerged on only one side the border, the English side. This is not to say that England is inherently more important, that British history should be written in an Anglocentric way, or that there is no work left to be done about Scottish perceptions of the English during the same period. Rather, the model was adopted partly to place some constraints on a study that might otherwise become impossibly broad, and partly to alert readers to the influence of allegedly peripheral regions upon the core. It seems “obvious” that the Scots had to deal with the presence of the English behemoth residing next door, but the fact that the English had similar external factors to consider as they developed their church, state and society is often forgotten.
III

Investigations into the nature of Britain and what doing “British history” might mean are not new. J.G.A. Pocock first proposed a “new British History” that would “denote the plural history of a group of cultures situated along an Anglo-Celtic frontier and marked by an increasing English political and cultural domination” in 1973.26 His call, however, went largely unheeded until the idea of a British approach was popularized in the early 1990s by Conrad Russell’s work on the Scottish and Irish dimensions of the English Civil Wars.27 Since then, a variety of works have engaged with the question of what doing British history means, and there have been attempts to move away from the high-political Russellian narrative and into more cultural realms, most notably in the form of two edited collections that were published later that decade.28 More recently, there have even been motions to import these methodologies into literary studies, and to begin to look at how contemporaries constructed Britain through discourse and how it, conversely, constructed them.29 But for all this, and taking into account John Morrill’s persistent demand that British history be done in a holistic fashion – and not just in an episodic or comparative way – it is far from clear what a responsible British history looks like.30

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30 For a recent incarnation of this argument and rebuttals by Tim Harris and Quentin Skinner, see David Armitage, ed., British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Glenn Burgess provided a useful summary of the potential pitfalls of this approach at the end of the 1990s – Anglo-centrism, exaggeration of the level of unity, loss of the European context, and distraction from indigenous factors within each nation – but he also remained hopeful of its potential, reminding historians of the new British History’s potential as a higher-level integrative framework. Since then, the field has continued to flourish, and the utility of the concept has been steadfastly defended by scholars like Tim Harris and Allan Macinnes, who have proven its usefulness for the later seventeenth century (although Macinnes has now branched out into a broader Atlantic perspective that he feels is ultimately more beneficial). But for all this, the approach has remained most useful at the level of elite politics, and even Harris, who set out to write what he calls a “social history of politics” often ends up narrating the history of kings and their courts instead. Likewise, much of the literary scholarship remains invested in the traditional canon. It is absolutely critical that this situation be rectified, given that this was an age when the public was first acquiring a sustained political agency. A broader and more populist approach, that puts the everyday into a more sustained dialogue with the court, will increase our understanding of the interaction between British kingdoms. It will also illuminate the relationship between reality and perceptions in greater detail, and expose both the tension and integration inherent in the idea of Britain. With particular

34 Mark Knights, “History and Literature in the Age of Defoe and Swift,” History Compass 3 (2005), 1-20; Mark Knights, Representations and misrepresentations in later Stuart Britain: partisanship and political culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
reference to the Anglo-Scottish case, it will reassert the importance of “peripheral” influences like Scotland over England, instead of just continuing to document “the ebb and flow of English influences on the kingdom of the Scots” by demonstrating that it was not just the king who had to think in terms of multiple kingdoms.  

English subjects did the same thing all the time when they remarked on Scottish events and acknowledged the issue by the very fact of trying so hard to domesticate events of pan-Britannic significance.

Taking the relationship between England and Scotland as its focus, a related field of inquiry, more unapologetically invested in elite politics and state formation, is scholarship about the British unions. These inquiries naturally cluster around the two “end points” of the regal union and the parliamentary union, and there are only three monographs that try to navigate the century as a whole or seriously consider the Cromwellian interlude. Thematically, literature surrounding the regal union tends to centre on the process of imagining something called Britain and the levels of cultural bonding between the two nations, while scholarship dealing with the parliamentary union emphasizes political intrigue and economics – a not unexpected breakdown given that the union of the crowns resulted from dynastic accident and the parliamentary union was the

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35 Keith Brown, “Seducing the Scottish Clio: Has Scottish History Anything to Fear from the New British History?” in Glen Burgess, ed., *The New British History: Founding a Modern State, 1603-1715* (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 244. The only extensive work on this subject is Martin Breslow, *A Mirror of England: English Puritan Views of Foreign Nations, 1618-1640* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), in which he argues that foreign nations created a mirror which, by gazing upon, the English could judge themselves. There have been works like Tristan Marshall, *Theatre and Empire: Great Britain on the London Stages under James VI and I* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), which examine a portion of this process, but none that address the entirety of the regal union.

product of political negotiation. But the question then emerges of how one gets from an attempt at the union of hearts and minds in 1603, to a closer union founded upon political necessity and only the most begrudging acceptance of partnership in 1707. Furthermore, this trajectory contributes to the sense that there was an increasing distaste for the Scots throughout the regal union, an approach which has been shown above to require some emendation. A more complete understanding of English anxieties about the changes they faced, and their uncertainty about how to approach the Scots, can help undermine this teleology and explain the shifts in focus that occurred over time.

It should be noted that this focus on anxiety and English identity constitutes a reversal of the argument put forward by Krishan Kumar about the British state and the component identities found within it, which contends that England wholeheartedly embraced an imperial identity from the seventeenth century onwards. Following Benedict Anderson’s dictum that the nation is not a natural thing but a human creation, communally imagined by disparate individuals, Kumar believes that England comfortably envisioned itself as constituting the British empire – an empire which

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encompassed Scotland, Ireland and Wales before it moved overseas.\(^{38}\) Linda Colley’s well-known thesis also plays a part in developing this argument. Colley claimed that a British identity could only be forged when the incessant imperial wars of the eighteenth century, fought against a Catholic France, allowed for the fusion of English and Scottish goals, hopelessly entangling empire and identity.\(^{39}\) The acceptance of Colley’s thesis has thus allowed Kumar to deny the English any separate identity from the Scots because the former subdued the latter in a period before nationalistic self-identification was possible. By the time this type of identification was feasible, England was Britain, and Britain England, which explains the post-empire English crisis of identity. In this story, the English possessed a strong enough sense of superiority that the building of the “inner empire” was never a cause for concern.\(^{40}\)

Arthur Aughey’s work is, however, more useful and bolsters the argument that the English viewed the Scots with a good deal of ambivalence. His perspective allows for the experience of inner empire, but denies that this experience negated Englishness. According to him, it did cause some confusion, but the “idiom” that it nurtured was not as aggressive as Kumar would have us believe. Instead, it created an awareness of the need to balance the demands of complex inter-relationships with other British peoples while maintaining a sense of self.\(^{41}\) Sometimes this meant aggression, but more often it meant compromise. It is this quality that ensured the adaptability and durability of the Anglo-Scottish relationship, and allows it to persist even in the face of modern devolutionist

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threats.\textsuperscript{42} It is unwise to underestimate the difficulty that the failure to conquer Scotland posed, especially given the fact that it was the Scottish dynasty that ascended the English throne and not vice-versa. The English could not be comfortable in their superiority, which remained unconfirmed, and helped undermine their ability to view the Scots as Other.

In order to achieve a better understanding of the Anglo-Scottish relationship, a shift away from traditional categories of historiography is therefore required, and there needs to be room for a history of perceptions as evidenced through communication as well. This does not mean creating yet more narratives about the development of the printing press or the postal service; it means documenting how people talked about the world around them – how they interacted with the traditional categories of society, religion, economics and politics. We need to ask how early modern English people digested and reinterpreted the realities and conundrums of the regal union, and how they represented their conclusions to others. Put another way, more attention needs to be paid to the process of manufacturing meaning and the always messy realm of public discourse. This requires an openness to using both print and manuscript sources, in order to determine what people were talking about, how, and why.

Diaries, letters and other manuscripts are indispensible because they help identify personal opinions, explain specific contexts, and even occasionally gauge reactions to printed campaigns since manuscript, oral and printed traditions often interacted with one another. While some of these private documents were only virtually connected to a larger

conversation through shared interest, others were thus explicit reactions or contributions to more public debates. But the utilization of pamphlets, treatises, and especially newsbooks, in an era of an ever-increasing demand for printed literature, is also necessary in order to define the contours of the larger-scale debates in the first place. Ephemeral genres such as pamphlets were intimately tied up with ideological and market forces – forces which necessitated that printed material resonate with consumers – and shed light on commonly held opinions and concerns. If a text was a commercial production, then it needed to strike enough of a chord with the people for them to buy it, and if it was propaganda, it could only hope to be successful if it played upon pre-existing and widespread social values.

But what of competing texts and voices? This brings us to the concept of the public sphere, which is a highly contested theoretical construct. Originally envisioned by Jürgen Habermas in 1962 as an abstract space wherein private individuals came together to debate public matters of concern through transparent and rational–critical language, he saw the phenomenon as linked to the rise of the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century.


45 The original 1962 German edition of Habermas’s work had very little impact on the English speaking world, but the work became popular after the 1989 translation. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural
Since then, the Habermasian model has been seen as both temporally and theoretically constrictive, and the entire concept of a public sphere has been contested and re-evaluated. Although Habermas has not been without defenders of his periodicity, an increasing amount of work has been done attempting to push the birth of the public sphere as far back as the sixteenth century, when the Elizabethan regime attempted to engage its subjects in a type of popular defence of religious reform.\textsuperscript{46} More interestingly, the nature of the public sphere itself has been re-imagined as well as unravelled by theorists. The idea that any language can be truly transparent, or that power dynamics can be left at the door has been rejected, and personal interest, emotional investment, and confusion have been added to the idea of publicity. Many thinkers even contend that no single, unified, public sphere ever did or could exist, and instead posit a series of publics whose membership overlapped, and whose goals could complement or compete with one another.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, despite this plurality, public participation often appears to be driven by the desire to change or convince the whole of society, and not merely one or two smaller publics, even if this was not an achievable goal.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{46} Mark Knights is a strong advocate for keeping the public sphere in the eighteenth century: Mark Knights, \textit{Representation and misrepresentation}. Work that pushes the dates back includes, but is not limited to: Zaret, \textit{Origins of democratic culture}; Peter Lake and Steven Pincus, eds., \textit{The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Bronwen Wilson and Paul Yachnin, eds., \textit{Making Publics in Early Modern Europe: People, Things, Forms of Knowledge} (New York: Routledge, 2010).


That said, acknowledging the disorder of multiple publics and the various interests of their participants makes the concept of a sphere of publicity more useful rather than less. Participation and debate begin to look more human, and it is clearer why their outcome matters. According to Arendt, we lose the human condition itself when public conversation comes to an end. Arendt was admittedly working within a much more closed definition of publicity, and like Habermas, saw the penetration of the private and the personal as an infection instead of a healthy normalcy. But her notion that publicity, politics, and the human condition are dialogic processes is insightful and should be retained.\textsuperscript{49} English discussions of Scotland can thus be seen as one “thread” in a larger conversation, one way of relating individuals and kingdoms to each other and to the world. They were one piece of a basic human need to locate meaning through communication, although that communication was not designed to come to any firm conclusions. The point was to perpetuate the dialogue in order to maintain the status quo or effect change as the situation required, and it took \textit{sustained effort} for the English to erase Scottish agency in the way they did. The discourse helped to regulate the reality, and render it intelligible, and was a critical part of how the English coped with the proximity of the Scots.

\textbf{IV}

The following chapters examine English conversations about the Scots and Scotland in great detail. As such, they are not meant to create another high political narrative of the union project, but to provide a very close interrogation of the language

\textsuperscript{49} Arendt, \textit{The Human Condition}, 58, 178.
used to describe England’s fellow captives in an unwanted British reality, and the
associated ideas that went along with that relationship. To do so, they employ a spectrum
of source material that includes but is not limited to proclamations, union treatises,
private letters and diaries, entering books, official reports, newspapers, ballads, plays and
formal addresses produced throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Ranging over time, space and media, this material might seem unrelated, but it can and
should be analyzed together because it is part of an ongoing public conversation.
Although membership in that public changed, and the style of debate evolved to suit the
times, these disparate publications and private sentiments represent an ongoing
interaction with the meaning of Scotland. In other words, Scotland was an “object”
whereby other related issues were made public. According to Bruno Latour, common
interests, issues or concerns form a centre around which publics can coalesce; or, put
another way, certain texts and topics function as “things” that can focus discourse. Each
object or issue “generates a different pattern of emotions and disruptions, of
disagreements and agreements... each object gathers around itself a different assembly of
relevant parties” and “triggers new occasions to passionately differ and dispute.”50
Whether publishing a newspaper with a subscription base in the thousands, or writing a
letter to another individual, everyone who spoke or thought about Scotland was virtually
connected to this conversation. They were actively engaged in a communal form of
interpretation, which then sought to regulate the world around them and to achieve some
control over that which was otherwise unmanageable.

Since England was the bigger, richer, and more powerful partner, English interest in Scotland was sporadic and is most obviously linked to crisis points when the Scots were able to force themselves back into view. Added to this, the impossibility of writing a comprehensive survey of everything said or written about Scotland during the regal union has made it necessary to adopt a case-study approach when sketching English perceptions of and reactions to the Scots. Five vignettes will therefore be presented: the regal union and negotiations to expand it, the Bishops’ Wars, the Cromwellian union of the 1650s, the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, and the debates surrounding the Parliamentary Union that ultimately redefined the terms through which the English and the Scots related to one another. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that cooperation, amity, anxiety, confusion, and sometimes even empathy arose alongside anti-Scottish hostility. These reactions were spurred on by encounters with Scotland’s stubborn attachment to its ancient sovereignty, a Presbyterian Kirk, and markedly different Scottish economic systems and military traditions that were variously taken as proof of traits ranging from barbarity, to zealotry, to models of obedience. It is this confusion of sentiment that illuminates the familiar alterity of the Scots, and the continuous tendency to cope with this problem by “unwriting” Scottish interjections.

In each of these instances, there were three broadly-conceived discourses about the Scots that English people could draw from as it served their purposes. The simple, national-antagonistic thread has already been introduced through Weldon, as has the notion that it could sometimes function in a more complicated way than was once thought. But the discourses of religious and political differences require further explanation. It is easy to forget that the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century
arguments for the recreation of an ancient British polity that would serve as a protestant bulwark against antichrist masked some very substantial differences between the English and Scottish churches. The English reformation had been administered from above, maintaining hierarchy and fiercely defending the role of traditional authority within the church. The Scots, on the other hand, had won their reformation through rebellion, and created a Presbyterian system that prided itself on its more perfect reformation. This meant that English people looking at the Scottish Kirk might be enamoured or repulsed by what they saw there, or more often, some combination of the two. Likewise, parallel, but not identical, political traditions emerged in the two kingdoms in the wake of the regal union, and English commentators who looked across the border saw everything from a model government with model citizens, to an oppressed people suffering from arbitrary rule. At each flashpoint reviewed in this study, all three threads made an appearance. Interlocutors then pulled pieces from some or all of them depending on what approach was most useful in any given situation. As they reconfigured their strategies in order to reassert English control over the British narrative, one discourse often became more useful for coping with a particular crisis, but all three approaches necessarily evolved.

The source-base used to expose these conversations means that the following study will provide a macro-level view of the thoughts on offer about the Scots. But it also “zooms in” at times to investigate what was occurring on the micro-level. Discussions about the border during the Jacobean union debates, an analysis of the Verney family’s correspondence during the revelation of the Popish Plot, and a look into the Cromwellian garrison experience in Scotland all bring our narrative to a more personal level. This has
been done not just to reconnect voices and historical actors where possible, but also to elucidate more fully the conflicting approaches to and perceptions of Scotland, even at the more localised level. The Verney letters, in particular, look like a microcosm of the larger debates and concerns touching the Scots that surfaced in 1679. Equally important, a closer examination of individual English interactions with the Scots – both along the Anglo-Scottish border in the early seventeenth century and in relation to the garrisons erected in Scotland in the 1650s – suggests that violent anti-Scottish rhetoric was often about something more than basic ethnic hostility. It could mask a good deal of Anglo-Scottish cooperation, integration, and even good will.

The first chapter outlines James VI and I’s vision of Britain, or the complete and perfect union of the hearts and minds of his English and Scottish subjects, as well as English reactions to the proposal. James’s own role in undermining the realization of these goals is acknowledged; however, his approach to union was necessarily very different from that of his subjects. Through a variety of union treatises, letters and diaries, it becomes clear that Britain did not materialize because the English obstinately refused to recognize the existence of a partner with whom they could create it. Embroiled in selfish concerns, the English gaze turned inward and the empire collapsed in on itself. Scotland, when it did appear, was an imaginary construct bearing little relation to the real kingdom, and it fluctuated between ancient enemy and protestant imperial ally. This was itself another way of controlling the Scots and manipulating their significance, placing them at a safe distance from which they could not interfere, and it converted Scotland into a blank slate to be written upon instead of an active agent in its own right. By denying the reality of Scotland – and their relationship to it – the English were able to use
the idea of the Scots to interrogate internal concerns, which was useful only until the Scots reasserted their presence.

During the Bishops’ Wars, the English seemed, at first glance, to have been split between two camps: one eager to embrace their Scottish liberators, one to condemn Scotch traitors. But upon closer examination, a tendency either to universalize or domesticate issues and events emanating specifically out of Scotland highlights a refusal to address British (in this case, Anglo-Scottish) concerns. The Scots were foreign enough to trigger an English frenzy, but their grievances could be converted into English ones with sufficient ease that they took on a ghostly quality, vanishing from view as quickly as they had appeared. At most, the consequences of Scottish actions might be allowed to stand, but the inclination to ignore the agents behind those actions helped return conversation to the question of what England itself should be. The problem was that Scottish sameness – and England’s resolution not to acknowledge it – ensured its security, while Scotland’s difference roused England into action. Sharing a monarch as they did, the Scots sometimes needed to remind the English of their presence in order to defend their own interests, but asserting too much difference in order to do this could be a dangerous thing.

In the 1650s that difference caught up to Scotland when, after the Scottish proclamation that Charles II was king over the entirety of the British Isles, and not just king of Scotland, English and Scottish interests openly clashed. The Scots had already fought against the English in the second civil war and this new post-regicide conflict made them noticeable indeed. The English response was conquest, supported by a dramatic increase in the level of overt anti-Scottish rhetoric. But even during this very
natural backlash, there were still alternative approaches to the Scots. English soldiers, in particular, often entangled their futures with Scotland in very positive ways. Moreover, Scotland was not annexed after the conquest, but given an official offer of formal union. Competing perspectives about Scotland, promoted by its familiar alterity, were then able to cause trouble once again, because the English were simultaneously involved in an elaborate process of self-fashioning as a newly conceived republic. Indecision about their relationship with the Scots meant a more fundamental indecision about the nature of the republic. Was it an empire unto itself, or an empire of the Roman ilk? Instead of revelling in imperial imagery, the new republic choked on it, and Scotland’s position in relation to England was left undefined yet again.

The Cromwellian union was undone by the Restoration, but England was again discussing the Scots during the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis of the late 1670s and early 1680s. This time, Scottish rebellion was not seen as liberating and even advocates of Scottish Presbyterianism tended to see the radical Covenanting rebellion that took place there as legitimately threatening. Once the threat was removed, crown supporters altered the meaning of Scotland until the Scots became appropriate role models for the English, but even before this occurred, the Scots were never completely written off as simply inferior or barbaric. Their status was contested, but they were still not wholly Other. Furthermore, by eventually portraying the Scots as role models, crown supporters reversed the assumed relationship between the two kingdoms, wherein the Scots should have been naturally drawn towards English culture and practices. Even if England was able to generate a national identity – or in this case, focus on its own internal debates about what that should be – the unresolved relationship to Scotland was still dangerous.
because it provided a politically malleable object that threatened to lead the English away from home-grown concerns.

Only in 1707 were the English forced to decide if the Scots were Same or Other. After a century of concerted avoidance of the subject, Scotland was officially united with England as a familiar through parliamentary union. But just because the Scots were officially welcomed, did not mean that murmuring stopped – it just meant that the official and unofficial discourses diverged more obviously. The meaning of Scotland though, had finally been resolved. It was a partner, despite residual differences, and the Scots would be allowed to infiltrate England itself as well as its colonies. This ensured that the ability publicly to manipulate its significance for a variety of uses was severely constricted.

What remained was the by now well-established tactic of denying Scottish agency (and even the Scottish presence) in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The English had been very effectively and actively disregarding the Scots for over a century. There was no reason to give this up now. Union could be construed as having been achieved on English terms, and the English could soothe their fears by telling themselves that the Scots had never been autonomous enough to have caused any trouble in the first place.

To assume that the English always, or ever, possessed an uncomplicated sense of self-assurance and superiority is therefore to believe a carefully constructed English mythology. This fact is so obvious that it is often overlooked, and historians need to remember that England could not exist in such close proximity to the Scots without experiencing some “feedback.” The fact of the regal union with Scotland and the Scottish insistence upon defending their sovereignty and interests meant that the English could
never truly ignore them. As a result, the English had to pursue a public discourse that would actively and continuously undermine Scottish issues and interjections. This discourse portrayed Scotland in whatever light was most useful. Same or Other, friend or foe, enemy or ally, the role played by the Scots shifted seamlessly from one to the other, reinforcing the ambiguity of the regal union, while convincing the English that they could control the real relationship with as much ease as they could the imaginary one.

Sometimes they were successful, and other times they failed, but the familiar alterity of the Scots perpetually destabilized English attempts at even an implicit form of imperial domination. What the relationship did allow was an increasing confidence in the English ability to deprive the Scots of agency, an approach that was perpetuated even after the awkwardness of the regal union had come to an end.
Chapter Two: Imagined Polities, Failed Dreams, and the Beginnings of an Unacknowledged Britain

Before a drunken and ill-fated attempt to sail for Virginia with one of the play’s main protagonists, the sea captain in *Eastward Ho!* (1605) explains to another adventurer:

As ever the sun shined on, temperate and full of all sorts of excellent viands: wild boar is as common there as our tamest bacon is here; venison, as mutton. And then you shall live freely there, without sergeants, or courtiers, or lawyers, or intelligencers – only a few industrious Scots, perhaps, who, indeed, are dispersed over the face of the whole earth. But as for them, there are no greater friends to Englishmen and England, when they are out on’t, in the world, than they are. And for my part, I would a hundred thousand of ’em were there, for we are all one countrymen now, ye know; and we should find ten times more comfort of them there than we do here.

The new world was thus not just a place of plenty, it was also a place of escape. Sergeants, lawyers, courtiers and intelligencers – the accepted plagues of English society – would be left behind; however, no one could ever quite escape the universal pests otherwise known as the Scots. Although such comments were no doubt amusing to many contemporary Englishmen, they were not appreciated by the Scottish monarch who by then sat on the English throne, nursing dreams of a resurrected Britain. As a result, George Chapman, Ben Jonson and John Marston, the playwrights who collaborated on the production, found themselves imprisoned, although court patrons quickly intervened on behalf of Jonson and Chapman. According to Bruce Galloway, this was indicative of the extreme tensions surrounding the union project and the regime’s sensitivity to any

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The ill-timed joke has therefore been grouped with other anti-
Scottish jibes, like those found in *The Malcontent* and *The Fleire*, and is popularly cited as an example of anti-Scottish prejudice in the wake of the regal union.\(^3\)

Jenny Wormald’s work outlining English aggression and prejudice towards Scotland’s belligerent independence and integrity offers a likely explanation as to why these playwrights would risk such a flippant remark at a time when officials were especially vigilant. In various venues, she has thus identified an unapologetic English hatred for the Scots that helped to fuel the Gunpowder Plot, to smear the reputation of James VI and I (who was otherwise a relatively effective monarch), and to wreck negotiations for a closer union.\(^4\) “Hatred of the Scots,” Wormald claims, “ran through every stratum of English society – merchants, lawyers, academics. What had hitherto been indifference tinged with contempt now [after James’s accession] became open and bitter resentment.”\(^5\) Wormald’s argument is persuasive, but it is important to remember that at least some contemporary comments, like the above passage, were relatively gentle undertakings that aimed as much to reconcile through humour and familiarity as to condemn. There might not be an easily envisioned place for the Scots in England, but as

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the sea captain reminded his audience, within the context of the burgeoning British empire, they might still prove useful.

This is not to deny that many inappropriate comments were made about the Scots while the king pursued a closer union between 1603 and 1607. Instead, it is to argue that the fear generated by the proceedings was not really about Scotland or anti-Scottish sentiment at all, but was the result of anxiety over England’s future. Faced with a situation where dynastic accident threatened the traditional boundaries of the “empire” of England (to use the term in the Henrician sense), the English did everything they could to ensure that those boundaries stayed in place. Some hurled insults and bile, some attempted more calmly to poke holes in the instrument of union or delay parliamentary decisions ad infinitum, and some tried completely to ignore the Scottish element of the problem. And although a few men came forward to defend the king’s vision in treatises, and others were happy to play with the idea of Britain in print and on the stage, this allowed it to live in the social imaginary, but denied it entrance into the material world. It also occasionally lost sight of Scotland altogether or, alternately, attempted to keep the Scots firmly outside of England proper.

In 1603, the union of the crowns asked the English to consider the question of “who are the Scots” more thoroughly in order to define the terms of a new Anglo-Scottish relationship. They did not come to any uncontested answers, but they did stumble upon another question: “who are the English?” The desire to maintain England as an empire unto itself thus clashed with the reality of an expanding polity complete with multiple kingdoms and competing centres and peripheries, and the English attempts to evade this situation through a combination of hostility, mockery and verbal slips established a
dynamic that would trouble the two kingdoms throughout the next century as their churches and political structures continued to diverge, and the economic divide increasingly marked Scotland out as “backwards.”

II

On 24 March 1603, James Stuart ascended the English throne, but instead of becoming James I of Great Britain, in many ways he remained bifurcated as James VI of Scotland and James I of England. The result of a change of context more than a change in personality type or style of leadership, this division was wrapped up in a failure to communicate the need for a united island to confused subjects in both kingdoms. In England, in particular, James had failed to convince subjects of the “necessity” and “utility” of such a perfect union with the Scots, despite his modern reputation as “the most writerly of British monarchs” and a generally “compulsive communicator.” Any discussion of English perceptions of the Scots during the regal union must therefore address James’s vision, and why it did not become a reality. There was a real opportunity for partnership with Scotland in 1603, and it was rejected. Part of the problem was that James himself appears to have had no coherent and practical plan for union. According to Conrad Russell, James’s fundamental problem was finding a union that would secure a

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6 The English relationship with the Welsh, the Cornish and especially the Irish was also complicated, and sometimes even more fraught with contradictions, at least in Ireland’s case. But as the focus of this study is English perceptions of the Scots, generated by the specific experience of the regal union, I have not attempted an equally complex discursive study about English perceptions of these other “fringe” societies. Wormald, “James VI and I,” 187; Jenny Wormald, “One king, two Kingdoms,” in Alexander Grant and Keith Stringer, eds., Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History (New York: Routledge, 1995), 123; Conrad Russell, “The Anglo-Scottish Union 1603-1643; a success?” in A. Fletcher and P. Roberts, eds., Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 249.

7 Objections against the change of the name or style of England and Scotland, SP 9/210/47; Neil Rhodes, Jennifer Richards, and Joseph Marshall, eds., King James VI and I: Selected Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 1, 15.
single dynastic succession in both realms without recourse to parliament, a self-imposed obstacle that encouraged him to try anything and everything that might further his ends. This was because he held his English crown by right of inheritance and in direct contrast to Henry VIII’s will, which was confirmed in statute and disallowed a foreign successor. This meant that James’s ascension effectively placed at least some monarchical rights above parliamentary acts, a position that James felt he had to safeguard. But by denying the need for parliamentary assistance in obtaining his crown, James also established the monarchy as the only truly British institution within the new political context: there was no single parliament or name for the two kingdoms, the subjects of each realm were not yet naturalized in the other, and Great Britain lacked a single unified law. This situation not only encouraged incoherence in James’s attempts permanently to link the English and Scottish successions, it also ensured the union was difficult to break – since no one knew what exactly was to be broken in the first place. Only a truly incompetent monarch could undo a relationship constituted by the monarchy itself.

Acknowledgement of the central role of the monarchy in the proposed and actual unions has led others to argue that to understand them, scholars need to take seriously James’s claims to embody a perfect union. Even in non-union contexts, James

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encouraged rhetoric that emphasized his person over his politics, and sermons preached to an eager public at Paul’s Cross tied the welfare of the king’s person to the prosperity of the godly kingdom. Drawing on James’s own accounts of his leadership, the Gowrie conspiracy, and his reaction to the Gunpowder Plot, these sermons avoided questions of divine right monarchy, and dwelt instead on conspiratorial threats and divine protection.\textsuperscript{11} This analysis makes sense given that one of James’s most quoted phrases itself involves metaphors of personhood. As is well known, he famously claimed in his 1604 speech to parliament that “I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body.”\textsuperscript{12} Anne McLaren suggests that this and other statements illuminated James’s threateningly patriarchal body. Although argued from the perspective of embodiment and gender politics, McLaren’s thesis thus resembles J.P. Sommerville’s argument that absolutist ideology existed in and was disruptive of Jacobean England, and she claims that the English Commons wrecked the union negotiations because they feared that they would have to become utterly subjugated to royal authority. Like Scotland, which James claimed to have tamed to the point of ruling with his pen, the English feared they too would have to play the role of the proper wife.\textsuperscript{13}

James encouraged the view that the union sprang from and was “inherent in his Majesties Royal Blood and Person,” and that it was from this starting point that a “further

\textsuperscript{12} Rodes, Richards and Marshall, King James VI and I, 296-7.
conjunction and nearness of mutual Love and friendship” must progress. He also used other patriarchal imagery, and at one point he even spoke of fatherhood when he explained that he thought his kingdoms were like “two Twinnes” who should have “growne up together.” But as he continued, exasperated at the delays he faced by 1607, he also explained that “The errour was my mistaking: I knew mine owne end, but not others feares.” True, Scotland was a more obedient child, offering “always to obey mee when it should come to them,” but just because James demanded that the English Commons desist from stalling negotiations does not mean he expected his two kingdoms to play the same role in a British union. McLaren is right to highlight the potentially frightening absolutist implications of some of James’s rhetoric, but she focuses on only half of what he had to say and ignores how English MPs might have reacted to the other half. It was not James who would maintain the conquest of Scotland, nor be husband to it, but England – James would be ruler of the whole, in the same capacity that he was currently ruler in each, only after England had taken the lead in forging a new Britain. The complex system of analogous relationships used to explain the body politic could accommodate both the king and the English nation as father/husband figures within the British context.

James was quite clear that he saw England as the senior partner in any union with Scotland. “Can you imagine,” he asked, “I will respect the lesser, and neglect the greater?” Such a union would therefore come to England “as if you had got it by

14 1604 Authorization for commissioners of the two kingdoms to treat of union, BL 17747 and SP 14/10B/32.
15 Rhodes, Richards and Marshall, King James VI and I, 308.
16 Ibid., 319.
Conquest,” although he cautioned that this must be “such a Conquest as may be cemented by love, the onely sure bond of subjection or friendship.” “You are the husband,” he continued, “they the wife: you conquerors, they as conquered.” This is hardly the “like subjection on the part of England” that McLaren argues spooked the Commons. Furthermore, not all James’s metaphors were involved with embodied politics. He also coaxed the English towards embracing their Scottish cousins by likening his role to that of a shepherd over a single flock, which they now threatened to divide, and the process of union to the means whereby “little brookes loose their names by their running and fall into great Rivers, and the very name and memories of the great Rivers swallowed up in the Ocean.” The latter statement perfectly illuminates James’s notion of hierarchy within unity. The Scots were the little brook, important but small and without much force or current, while the English were the great river into which they would spill. Together, they would merge into an ocean, the kingdom of Great Britain, over which the “imperial crowne” would rule. And although it has been suggested that James tried to erase his Scottish nationality in an attempt to “English himself,” he was, in fact, doing exactly as he said he would and attempting to merge individual Scottish and English

17 Ibid., 317, 309, 312. It is worth noting that while the Scots were also ambivalent about their newfound relationship with the English, there was at least a segment of Scottish society that found the idea of Britain alluring. A pro-British stance had been possible since 1540s because the Scots believed in the power that an imperial protestant regime could wield. James was therefore less concerned about justifying the idea of Britain to the Scots, who were willing to entertain the idea so long as the English approached it in the right way. The English rejection of closer union, however, made this a moot point. Roger Mason, “Scotching the Brut: Politics, History and National Myth in Sixteenth-Century Britain,” in Roger Mason, ed., Scotland and England, 1286-1815 (Edinburgh: John Donald Press, 1987), 60-84.
19 Rhodes, Richards and Marshall, King James VI and I, 296-7.
identities into a conglomerated British one. His rhetoric was not an attempt to “fit in” in England; it was an example of how to create something new.

James’s aim, then, in bringing the question of union to parliament and in establishing a union commission, was to begin the project of forging a new polity and a new nation through a tiered system of amalgamations. England’s borders would become the middle shires in this new kingdom, but since he knew such a process would take time, he insisted that he only wanted to lay a foundation and not to come to firm conclusions. In the mean time, he suggested focussing on removing the hostile laws, and issues of naturalization and commerce. Furthermore, James believed this work was providential, and pointed to the many signs that God wanted a more perfect union to take place. In the proclamation announcing his new royal style, he explained that “the Isle within it selfe hath almost none but imaginarie bounds of separation without, but one common limit or rather Guard of the Ocean Sea, making the whole a little world and mind.” In his 1604 instructions to the Commons, he explained how important the Anglo-Scottish union was, writing that to ignore “Gods benefit so freely offered unto us is to spit and blaspheme in his face by preferring war to peace, trouble to quietnes, hatred to love, weaknes to strength and division to union.” He reminded England of their long history of warfare with Scotland, and the previously ever-present concern that continental powers would use

22 Larkin and Hughes, Stuart Royal Proclamations, 18, 96; Rodes, Richards and Marshall, King James VI and I, 311.
23 Rodes, Richards and Marshall, King James VI and I, 314.
24 Larkin and Hughes, Stuart Royal Proclamations, 95.
25 James VI and I’s letter to the Commons concerning union, 1 May 1604. SP 9/208/5.
Scotland to attack England through a “backe-doore.” A closer relationship with the Scots was not just beneficial to the English; it was necessary, and now it was being bestowed upon them freely and without wars.

Contemporaries seemed to agree that these two kingdoms had a long history of warfare and animosity and this narrative has worked its way into the historiography. Despite the alleged hostility, however, Keith Brown has recently claimed that “if regal union represented an Anglo-Scottish marriage, this middle-aged couple had been living together for the better part of forty years” – a statement that is in direct contrast to Wormald’s description of a “ramshackle” marriage that “lurched” forward, trapping the two nations in a relationship of “distaste and distrust.” While Wormald’s direct and sarcastic prose is seductive, and definitely gestures at some truth, Brown rightly emphasizes the significant period of peace between the two nations by the time of the regal union. Regardless of a lingering distaste for each other’s cultures, there was no animosity between the national parliaments, and outright conflict had not yet developed between the two churches, even if an authoritarian Episcopal regime in England was attacking domestic advocates of Presbyterianism. England and Scotland could even find things to agree on, such as the need to civilize the “barbarous” Scottish Highlands and wild Ireland, and thus tame the Celtic fringe. Moreover, a level of cultural bonding was starting to take place between the two nations, which was observable through the

26 There are passages in the proclamation establishing the new royal style, and in the 1604 and 1607 speeches to parliament. Larkin and Hughes, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, 95; Rhodes, Richards and Marshall, *King James VI and I*, 323, 296.
disintegration of Scottish feuding culture as it was infiltrated by English “gentlemanly conduct,” and an increased Scottish interest in English fashions and manners.29

The more obvious cultural bond, and one that also demonstrated a certain acceptance of the idea of Britain, was connected to radical protestant culture. Arthur Williamson and Jason White have both argued that the idea of Britain was most appealing to those invested in the great – and global – apocalyptic mission. The newly united kingdom would be the protestant bulwark against the antichrist, because Scotland and England would combine their strength and focus their energy, finally defeating Spain and the papacy. And if James was not bellicose enough, his son, Prince Henry, supported these aggressive goals until his untimely death in 1612 – well after parliament had formally undermined the union project in 1607.30 Rhetoric about an engaged and imperial Britain thus surrounded the young prince, and an imagined Britain was frequently invoked on stage.31 But as Jane Dawson has cautioned, it is important to remember that this was a bond shared between co-religionists in England and Scotland, and not an identity. A certain amount of cooperation and integration could be achieved, but there

31 Marshall, Theatre and Empire.
was no sense of a multinational state, despite James’s best efforts.\(^{32}\) Instead, to a variety of people, for a variety of reasons, the idea of Britain “sounded distinctly un-English.”\(^{33}\)

Equally important, it is not just Wormald who has been pessimistic about the state of the Anglo-Scottish relationship post-1603. Frauke Reitemeier’s examination of descriptions of Scotland published in England before and after the regal union concludes that although a slightly broader range of information was available as time progressed, the facts on offer remained stereotypical and do not indicate any deeper understanding of the Scots. If anything, she claims, the belief that Scotland was a superstitious backwater became more entrenched.\(^ {34}\) It also appears that the word Britain itself, continued its traditional slippage into a synonym for England. And even when Britain and England remained distinct from one another, in most texts there was a clear sense that the latter thoroughly dominated the former.\(^ {35}\) But this bullheadedness was always in dialogue with a regal union that stubbornly asked the uncomfortable question of what the relationship between England, Scotland, and Britain was. “By bringing Scotland within the ambit of the English multiple monarchy (which already included the subordinate kingdom of Ireland),” Colin Kidd explains, “the vexed issue of locating authority [and we might add identity] in the British Isles was, if anything, intensified and rendered even more opaque.

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\(^{34}\) Frauke Reitemeier, “‘There are Very Few Englishmen that Know, Bicause we Want the Books’: On English Descriptions of Scotland Before and After 1603,” *Renaissance Forum* 7 (2004).

and ambiguous." Authority and identity were issues that needed to be discussed, but a lack of control made the English weary of them. As J.G.A. Pocock so eloquently stated when he called for a new approach to British history, the English did usually come out on top, but “the fact of a hegemony does not alter the fact of a plurality,” and that plurality helped shape English history.  

Looking from the top down, James believed the English had a strong disliking for the Scots and, more importantly, an inability to hold their tongues about the subject. He was forced to scold parliament in 1607 for the uncharitable words of Sir Christopher Piggott who, in February of that year, blurted out that the Scots were perfidious, barbarous, faithless, bloodthirsty, traitors who had not suffered above two kings to die in their beds. In a long speech, James thus reminded parliament that such statements would wreck union negotiations in both the English and the Scottish parliaments, adding that “yet have your neighbours of Scotland this advantage over you, that none of them have spoken ill of you (nor shall as long as I am King) in Parliament, or any such publique place of Judicature.” He also emphasized the imprudence of talk that he would prefer Scotsmen over Englishmen for offices, and that the Scots would swarm south. “I owe no more to the Scottish men than to the English,” he claimed, as “I was borne there,

39 Rhodes, Richards and Marshall, King James VI and I, 311.
and sworne here and now raigne over both.” Moreover, James noted that technically, the larger quantities of unoccupied territory in Scotland might encourage the English to deposit their idle poor there, not vice-versa, urging the English to leave off such “foolish and idle surmises.”

He begged that when parliament met again they would take up the “trewth and sincerity” of his vision and “advance the greatnesse of your Empire seated here in England.” Instead, Sir Edwyn Sandys moved to scrap debate on the Instrument generated by the union commissioners, and suggested that discussions of an immediate and perfect union commence. As no one could agree on how this could be achieved, negotiations were, for all intents and purposes, permanently halted. Of James’s goals, only the revocation of the hostile laws was realized before parliament abandoned the project, free trade being permanently undermined and naturalization temporarily stalled until it was settled in Calvin’s Case of 1608.

Whether or not we label the regal union a success, James therefore established a context within which his English subjects had to look their Scottish counterparts in the eye, and he was aggressive enough in promoting his vision that he elicited a number of

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40 Ibid., 312-16.
41 Ibid., 324.
42 The debates over naturalization took place between February and April of 1607, and involved contributions from Sandys, Bacon and various others. They swirled around the fear of a swarm of beggarly Scots, whom the English believed would swarm south and infest their country, feeding off of English prosperity without giving back or being held properly accountable for their new-found liberties. There was general agreement that should naturalization be accepted, it would apply only to those born after the regal union, although the issue was put aside by parliament when union negotiations were wrecked. James continued to press the matter and achieved affirmation that the post-nati should indeed be naturalized in Calvin’s Case, which successfully argued that allegiance was owed to the person of the king, and not just the specific monarchical office, effecting mass denization of Scots born after 1603 by virtue of the now joint monarchy. It was the second major legal victory upholding the crown prerogatives, the first being Bate’s Case (1606), that reaffirmed the royal right to levy impositions. This chapter deals with the debates when they are thematically related to other conversations, and not as part of a high-political narrative about the rights of the monarchy vis-a-vis parliament, and in so doing has left aside the details of the legal arguments. For further information on the naturalization debates, see especially Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland, 103-137.
responses. What the English said when faced with this situation was constrained by the king’s own Scottish nationality, his obvious desire that the union succeed, and his overt distaste for any rude comments about impoverished Scots. But much was still said. There were outbursts, issues raised by the borders, histories, squibs in plays, and most notably, treatises written for and against the union project. It could be argued that these sources, in dialogue with the king, represent a very restricted, elite discussion, of little interest to the English more generally, and this is especially true of the Latin components of the debate. James’s proclamations, however, would have been read from the pulpits for all to hear, and his speeches to parliament were of enough interest to be published in his Workes in 1610, creating – at the very least – an awareness of the issues up for debate.\(^4^3\) Diaries from outside the London confines also record the circulation of union treatises and the announcement of a new British flag in 1606, and one critic of the union complained that “there is nothing now more in the mouthes of men then discounting ye Union of England and Scotland.”\(^4^4\) There was also a variety of union treatises printed in English in quarto and octavo format, aimed at a broader audience and defending the king’s vision. Thus, although there is disagreement over how frequently the Anglo-Scottish union was of interest to the English, a conversation had clearly begun and it had, to some degree, breached the confines of court and parliament.\(^4^5\) As the century progressed, this

\(^{43}\) Rhodes, Richards and Marshall, *King James VI and I*, 17.

\(^{44}\) Tristan Marshall has unearthed these references in the diaries of Adam Winthrop and Walter Yonge. Marshall, *Theatre and Empire*, 3; Anonymous, “A Brief Replication to the Answere to the Obiections Against the Union,” in BL Stowe 158, f. 34r.

\(^{45}\) Keith Brown claims that the issue of union was rarely of interest, except at specific moments like James’s accession while Brian Levack believes the union was one of the most constant and controversial topics of the seventeenth century. Keith Brown, *Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603-1715* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 2; Brian P. Levack, *The Formation of a British State: England, Scotland and the Union, 1603-1707* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 14.
conversation would become an increasingly expansive one, involving cheap, ephemeral pamphlets, newsbooks and ballads, and in order to maintain consistency in approach, vernacular sources are given primacy in the following analysis, although Latin treatises do make the occasional appearance. Moreover, since historians have already made extensive use of these more complicated tomes, it is important to reconsider the role of less abstract works in the unfolding of the union debates.

III

Despite the varied perspectives regarding the regal union in recent scholarship, no one denies that, at some level, the conversation it generated only highlighted that “the two nations were still poles apart.” There was persistent unease about the idea of embracing the Scots, which took a number of forms, manifesting most clearly in the formal writings questioning or supporting the union. But perhaps the most influential text attempting to ensure that some distance remained in place was the “Objections Against the Change of the Name or Style of England and Scotland into the Name or Style of Great Britanny.” Generated by the Commons as a reaction to James’s proclamation establishing a new style, the “Objections” circulated in manuscript and were also printed in full in John Thornborough’s *Discourse Plainely Proving the Evident Utilitie and Urgent Necessity of the Desired and Happie Union* (1604). They alleged that there were multiple problems with the title, King of Great Britain, which were categorized into four groups for clarity and effect: matters of common reason, matters of estate inward, matters

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of estate foreign, and matters of honour. On a general level, the Commons thus claimed that there was neither need for, nor gain to be had from, changing the royal title. They also denied that there was any precedent for such a change.

When speaking of the state itself, the “Objections” outlined how a change in the royal style necessitated the dissolution of the old kingdom and the creation of a new one, since the ancient constitution was dependent upon having an English king-in-parliament. Parliamentary summons, the great seal, laws, oaths and courts would all be undone by the death of an English monarchy and the birth of a British one. This may seem like a strange kind of logic to the modern reader, but Conrad Russell and J.H. Elliot have demonstrated how keenly the threat was felt by legally-minded Englishmen, making this particular subset of issues the most powerful. Drawing on this phobia, it was further suggested that foreign treaties would also be made void by a change in name, and that the king’s international reputation and standing would be demoted, as he would then hold an unrecognized title. Even private families protected their names, the Commons argued, so kingdoms should as well. A new name would erase England’s precedence over Scotland, obscure England’s past glories, and be generally disliked by the people. Furthermore, in his abstract explaining the motivations behind the “Objections,” Sir Francis Bacon added that it was feared union would “draw on a deluge of poore people.” He also noted that any formal change to the royal style still required parliamentary ratification and emphasized that questions related to the historicity of ancient Britain helped to fuel fears

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47 SP 9/210/47.
49 SP 9/210/47.
that the king was trying to erect a new kingdom. Bacon was himself a supporter of union, but hopes for preferment ensured that he kept the court well informed of all developments, accounting for his pessimistic reports.

The concerns outlined in the “Objections” consistently appeared in other texts that both questioned and supported the union and, as the more detailed list of complaints makes evident, these anxieties were all rooted in a new relationship with Scotland. The issue of needing precedent in order to justify a closer union with Scotland, in particular, was a common theme. By 1603, the Tudor celebration of Arthurian legend was transforming into an appreciation of England’s Anglo-Saxon heritage, and the idea of ancient Britain was only occasionally still deployed in ecclesiastical discourse as a way of establishing the existence of proto-protestantism in the ancient realm. Whether Britain ever really existed (or at least whether it existed as the Britain of legend), was thus muddy, although there were ways around this. According to Philip Schwyzer, late Tudor writers circumvented the problem by ventriloquizing British mythology into Welsh mouths, regardless of the fact that the Welsh did not wholeheartedly subscribe to Merlin’s prophecies of a new Britain either. Such acts of projection allowed the useful concept of an “ancient, insular, uncorrupt, and imperial” Britain to be employed without

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50 SP 14/7/58.
51 The Arthur legends were recounted in various Tudor and Stuart English histories that drew on Geoffrey of Monmouth, whose twelfth-century Historia Regum Britanniae recounted the founding of the island by Brutus, grandson of Aeneas, and Merlin’s prophecies that a new Arthur would reunite the isle. Although there were still defenders of the historicity of Arthur and Brutus, which are especially notable in attacks on Polydore Vergil, a growing scepticism is also convincingly argued by Colin Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 75, 101 and Roger Mason, “The Scottish Reformation and the Origins of Anglo-British Imperialism,” in Roger Mason (ed.), Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 186. For attacks on Vergil, see Daniel Woolf, Reading History in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 23-4.
worry over its factual accuracy, since it was only the Welsh who were ignorant of their history.\footnote{52}

The idea of Britain was thus too powerful for the English to ignore, but also too dubious to invoke without some backlash. Knowing this, James decided to try his luck with British imagery anyway because it seemed to fit the contemporary situation so well, and he presented Britain as the “true and ancient Name, which God and Time have imposed upon this Isle.”\footnote{53} Predictably, some of his subjects had their doubts about this. Bacon noted a level of unease with the idea that the entire island was ever united as Britain in the past, and the “Objections” themselves complained that international standing would be lost if James changed his style since the ordering of nations was “guided by [the] antiquitye of Kingdomes,” implying that Britain was not ancient.\footnote{54}

Similarly, in a manuscript treatise of 1604, Henry Spelman complained that England was giving up a glorious name in favour of an old and dusty one, which no one remembered, even if Britain had once been an historical reality.\footnote{55} Put another way, “surely if Brittaine get life new again it must neede be newe.”\footnote{56} According to these authors, there was nothing to be gained from combining with the Scots to form a new polity, and Britain could certainly be seen as new.

\footnote{52 Philip Schwyzzer, “British History and “The British History”: The Same Old Story?” in David Baker and Willy Maley, eds., \textit{British Identities and English Renaissance Literature} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 11-23.}


\footnote{54 Francis Bacon, \textit{A Brief Discourse Touching the Happie Union of the Kingdomes of England, and Scotland}, (London, 1603), A7; SP 9/210/47.}

\footnote{55 Bruce Galloway and Brian Levack, eds., \textit{The Jacobean Union: Six Tracts of 1604} (Edinburgh: Clarke Constable, 1985), 170.}

\footnote{56 BL Stowe 158, f. 35v.}
But there were also those who, like James, believed that a shift to a British style constituted the restoration of an ancient kingdom, adopting a defensive tone against unbelievers. Thornborough was among them, celebrating the “ancient name” of Great Britain in his writings.\(^{57}\) Similarly, the anonymous “Discourse on the Proposed Union,” emphasized early British independence and resistance to the “Romane yoke,” asking, “is there anie other name well warranted for all but Brittanie?” \(^{58}\) Sir John Hayward answered negatively, claiming Britain was an ancient kingdom, now re-established by James’s accession. None of this, though, was as involved as William Harbert’s, *Englands Sorrow, a Farwell to Essex* (1606), which dramatized an encounter with Britain’s ghost, whom he found adrift on the Severn in a boat with a broken oar. Here, Britain was clearly established as England’s predecessor, who was now “Banisht by those that by my glory gaine.” Harbert claimed that he aimed to eulogize England’s great lords; however, Britain’s righteous anger at being forgotten dominates his work, and he has her ghost chastise the English for their poor memory, reminding them that the other British kingdoms were more amenable to her return.\(^{59}\) God’s will as well as hers demanded a closer union, and now only English cooperation was wanting:

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You have one God, one King, one land you have,
One watry wall doth both your coast engire,
yborne alike yee be, and have like grave
Both valiant, wise, attempt with like fire,
You onely want one name, and one desire:
Wish you home peace; This you secures, in warre
Valure united growes more valiant farre.\(^{60}\)
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\(^{58}\) BL Harl 6850, ff. 39r-40r, 41r.

\(^{59}\) William Harbert, *Englands Sorrow or, A Farwell to Essex* (London, 1606), C3v, G3r.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., H1r.
As the poem closes, James has Britain proclaimed throughout the land, pointing towards a glorious future since, once risen, she will “never fall again.” Schwyzer has found this text as alarming as it is reassuring, highlighting Britain’s desire for a genuine resurrection that can only be obtained by consuming her children. He thus reads other works, like Shakespeare’s *King Lear*, as rebuttals which argue that union must be pursued without recourse to nostalgia, bloodlines or prophecy. But although Britain’s palpable anger is admittedly unsettling in Harbert’s poem, it is important to remember that Schwyzer’s description of a monstrous mother was not the vision which the poet depicted, but the nightmare outlined by others. For Harbert, the real villains were Britain’s children, who overthrew their queen and mother before she gave way on her own – matricides who would be stronger if they had continued to live under her rule than they now were divided and solitary.

Problems of interpretation such as this led Hayward and some others to affirm the historic nature of the kingdom of Britain in only the most fleeting way, quickly moving to question whether historicity was the issue at all. He suggested that even if Britain had never existed, the constitution would not be undone by a change in name. Pointing to various historic examples of changing titles, and the inability of kingdoms to make treaties with one another if a change in name could void all contracts, Hayward asked “that wee bee not too much amazed at everie accidentall change, fearing we know not what, like a Deere, which then looketh most about when he cometh to the best feede.”

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The benefits of union far outweighed unjustified fears, enlarging the power and dominion of the realm. By uniting with the Scots, the burdens of the state would be distributed, liberty and prosperity would be increased, and glory and a more assured defence would be secured with the help of this warlike people.\textsuperscript{63} Defenders of the union could therefore cast it as a reincarnation of sorts, making the issue of weaving a foreign element into English society irrelevant, as the story became the ongoing saga of one people instead of the conjunction of two. But if the Scots remained too distinct comfortably to see them as British – and they did stubbornly refuse to allow their own heritage as a sovereign state to be erased – other authors, Hayward among them, could jump from the past to the future.\textsuperscript{64} This manoeuvre bypassed the present discomfort created by the union negotiations by looking past it and shifted an interior gaze, which ignored Scotland as tangential, to an exterior one, which concentrated on a future of Anglo-British expansion wherein the Scots were useful in the periphery. The latter is a theme that will be examined in greater detail below.

The other debate over precedent involved whether or not there were any historical examples of the type of perfect union James desired. According to Galloway, this was one of the most dominant aspects of the debate, and his observation is hard to disagree with when met with lengthy digressions about the unions of Castile and Aragon, Scotland and France, Poland and Lithuania, Wales and England, Brittany and France,

\textsuperscript{63} Sir John Hayward, \textit{A Treatise of Union of the Two Realmes of England and Scotland} (London, 1604), 35-51, 56, 3-6.
\textsuperscript{64} For a brief overview of the Scottish versus the English perspective, see Levack, \textit{The Formation of the British State}, 32-67 and Galloway, \textit{The Union of England and Scotland}, 30-53. In general, the Scots were cooperative with James’s vision but viciously defensive of their sovereign status. They were also more consistently apocalyptic.
Spain and Portugal and other such examples. In the Commons, Sir Edwyn Sandys followed a vague denial that any precedent for a perfect union existed with a speech giving specific case studies. Norway, Denmark and Sweden were all united at one point, he explained, but never conglomerated under a single name – and this was just one of many such cases. Furthermore, he argued that a change in royal title must be followed by a change in the name of the kingdom, and as a kingdom must be indivisible, the separate states of England and Scotland could not be encompassed in the single kingdom of Britain. Other treatises looked to past and current unions in order to protect English law, which they felt was also threatened by the vagueness of the union project and the drive for a single name. Spain and Portugal had maintained separate jurisdictions, as had the kings of England while they remained the dukes of Normandy. Even the conquered principality of Wales was not immediately subject to English law or given place in the English parliament, the implication being that a union created by dynastic succession could hardly hope to forge closer bonds than one born of conquest. Equally important, a certain desire just to annex Scotland and be done with it should be read into the use of the Anglo-Welsh example as well. Legal-historical concerns about the change in royal style therefore reflected a determination to protect Englishness. Either the Scots must be pushed away, or, if they were to be accepted, they must be swallowed up and anglicized. The fusion of the two nations was not viable because it would destroy the best and most fundamental elements of English society.

65 Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland, 47.
67 SP 14/7/65; SP 14/7/80.
There were also attempts to find precedents for kings and kingdoms successfully changing their titles and expanding through combination, which were undertaken in response to anti-unionist fears. The process of conjunction, these authors argued, did not necessarily entail the obliteration of the historic component kingdoms in order to create something new. Thornborough, for example, echoed the sentiments of James’s river metaphor, explaining that “many villages make one Shire, many Shires one kingdom, many kingdomes one Imperial Monarchy.” But he also gestured towards the medieval union of the Heptarchy, the seven individually named Anglo-Saxon kingdoms which became England, an uncontested example of beneficial change which Bacon also used when speaking in favour of naturalizing the Scots, and one which had entailed a significant erasure of old names and boundaries. Non-English examples also supported unification and a change in name, one author claiming that a process of gathering was universal. The Holy Roman Empire, the Swiss Cantons, even France and Spain were all collections of smaller, previously independent units, which gathered strength as they gathered territory.

Sir Henry Savile’s well-circulated “Historical Collections” was the most nuanced example of this style of argument, and it comprehensively rehearsed historical precedent. Ranging through classical and contemporary examples, Savile explained that, despite personal preferences, the new name of Great Britain was necessary to bury ancient hostilities. He then used historical data to generate a number of suggestions for

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70 BL Harl 6850.
making any union perpetual: the king should be tender to his non-native nation, there
must be servants from both nations around the king, high civil and ecclesiastical offices
in a particular kingdom should be held by natives of that kingdom, and councils for each
kingdom should sit near the king to dispatch business. In the Anglo-Scottish case, the
laws must also remain distinct, as should burdens like taxation and wardships, indicating
that Savile still felt some unease with the idea of fully embracing the Scots.\textsuperscript{72} Even when
defending the new style, authors could easily slip into attempts at distancing and
exclusion.

Discussions of precedent therefore demonstrate how quickly conversations about
joining England and Scotland became conversations about an independent English
history and the unfolding of an Anglo-British future. Many times, Britain did become a
synonym for English ancestry, and the question was not if the Scots shared the same
heritage, but if the Britons were truly the sires of England. If they were not, then
continental examples seemed to argue that building a British kingdom of the sort James
desired would be difficult, and could only be accomplished with the most careful of
oversight. Any arrangement that threatened England’s legal-political framework was
incomprehensible, and proposals for change were undermined by the lack of a historical
template. This is why Steven Ellis believes that the English wanted Scotland to be either
a dependent kingdom like Ireland, or an incorporated region like Wales, making it
absorbable without alteration to England itself.\textsuperscript{73} It would be more accurate, though, to

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 209-39.
say that they simply wanted the Scottish issue to go away. As Russell put it: “If their king chose, on his spare time, to be king of the Scots, that was nothing to do with them.”\textsuperscript{74} The problem of Britain, and the awkward nature of the various historical examples of unions that did not quite fit the current situation, indicated that the enterprise was best abandoned. But this was not necessarily because the Scots themselves were odious. It was because England was already perfect the way it was. Why, after all, when it was “already in a good state of body mind goods and manner of Government” would anyone want to put the kingdom “all in adventure by some new manner of mingled, unaccustomed and cold kind of Phisick, and so by seeking to cure a little kind of Qualm in ye stomach or ill taste in ye mouth only will endanger the disturbance of the hole body?”\textsuperscript{75}

Not all of the discussion about Britain, however, was centred on the past and there were those, like Hayward, who looked toward the future instead. These voices believed the two kingdoms were providentially ordained to be ruled by a single king, and that this was evident in the geography and culture of the island.\textsuperscript{76} The idea that God willed an Anglo-Scottish union was not a new one, and it had been rehearsed extensively during the so-called “rough wooing,” when Henry VIII and then Protector Somerset tried to force a marriage between Edward VI and Mary Stuart onto the unwilling Scots.\textsuperscript{77} The serendipitous nature of two protestant kingdoms inhabiting a single island appeared in

\textsuperscript{74} Russell, “The Anglo-Scottish Union,” 249.
\textsuperscript{75} BL Harl 1314, f.16.
\textsuperscript{76} The histories being produced at this time also made much of this, and John Clapham’s The Historie of Great Britannie (1606), for example, continuously made note of God’s guiding hand and culminated in King Egbert’s unification of the Heptarchy, clearly intending connections to be made with the more recent regal union. For more discussion of providentialism and the idea of union within historical texts, see Daniel Woolf, The Idea of History in Stuart England: Erudition, Ideology and the “Light of Truth” from the Accession of James I to the Civil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 41-58.
Somerset’s propaganda, and the image of a fateful island fortress can be found in less hostile contexts as well, such as Shakespeare’s *Richard II*, where John of Gaunt describes England (conflating it with Britain) as:

This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
This fortress built by Nature for herself
...
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands.78

James’s comments about common boundaries and providential unions begun in his person were clearly not unfamiliar, and the union treatises themselves drew on the same imagery. For example, in “The Divine Providence in the Misticall and Reall Union of England and Scotland,” it was important that the two kingdoms comprised “one Island unsevered, but closed and bounded with Ocean,” brought together by God in language, monarchy and religion. Moreover, the author noted that the Island was also roughly the shape of a triangle, with Wales, England and Scotland each in one corner, which he felt was important because this was the only non-divisible geometrical shape.79

Playing on the aural similarities between triangle and Anglia, the description of the triad also immediately invited comparisons to the Holy Trinity. In one of the printed treatises, this link was made explicit and the three nations were described representing “the three persons of the Trinitye.”80 Here, the union was not just providential; it also possessed a divine quality within itself. Although written in French by the Scottish-born

79 BL Add. 38139, f.42r.
John Gordon, a London translation appeared as part of the English conversation in 1603. Gordon had followed James to England, becoming Dean of Salisbury by the end of the year, and soon complemented his treatise with the publication of a sermon, wherein he argued that unity was divine, and disunion the seed of all destruction – a belief he was not alone in possessing.\(^{81}\) The English therefore needed to embrace the Scots unless they wished to contradict God’s will, or to spit in God’s face, to use James’s words. The new name was central to this process because, according to Thornborough, “if the olde enmity of English, and Scottish be removed, and yet the names stil remaine, I feare that the verie names woulde ever put ill men in minde of olde grudge, and incite new variance.”\(^{82}\)

Putting it another way, Hayward explained that without a more complete union, England and Scotland were like sand without lime: grains that would blow apart at the first wind.\(^{83}\)

But why was God so invested in Britain? Williamson, White and Marshall have argued that the answer lies in radical protestant idealism and a focus on the great apocalyptic battle. And it is true that unlike some of the historically-oriented writings, this rhetoric included an aggressive edge that gestured towards expansion instead of retrenchment. The creation of a protestant bulwark against antichrist, however, was not always the only issue raised by those interested in empire in the first years after James’s accession.\(^{84}\) The providential nature of a union provided, and not sought-out, meant that the religious aspect was always present, but union supporters tended to try to convince

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\(^{82}\) Thornborough, *The Ioyeful and Blessed Reuniting*, 48.

\(^{83}\) Hayward, *A Treatise of Union*, 7.

their audiences by making heavy references to more worldly gains that God was also offering. Scotland was a protestant brother in a global struggle – and agreement in religion was consistently touted as one of the signs of God’s will – but the potential threat to English security if it remained on its own, and future English glory if it accepted and partnered with Scotland, were of at least equal value. While union negotiations were still alive, the long-term meanings that could be superimposed on Britain were more varied than a myopic focus on the great apocalyptic struggle. Besting Spain and destroying the antichrist were never very deep under the surface when the English looked beyond their borders, but the lure of peace and prosperity at home and worldly prestige abroad should not be overlooked either.

Gordon therefore described God raising James like a new Constantine, and Sir William Cornwallis conjured a battle between true and false faiths, but a great deal of space was also dedicated to the immediate and mundane gains of union. The most obvious benefit stemming from the creation (or re-creation) of Britain was security from foreign attack and freedom from civil war. Another Scottish writer, Robert Pont, investigated this in full. His Latin treatise, printed in London and Edinburgh in 1604, also survives in what appears to have been intended as a formal translation into English, and it is thus worth including him in discussions of the English debate because the transcription shows at least some interest in circulating the ideas more extensively. For Pont, the Anglo-Scottish union would create an empire, founded on shared godliness, but great because it would allow for the “increase and augmentation” of the people. The newfound

86 Galloway and Levack, The Jacobean Union, xlvii.
imperial strength would withstand foreign invaders, tame the Irish and the wild Islanders of Scotland, and prevent any future unrest between England and Scotland that might otherwise follow. \(^{87}\) Cornwallis compared the process to buying new strength and youth for one’s body, making the newly “increased dominions...terrible to the world without any terror to ourselves.”\(^{88}\) Dystopic visions of a fragmented island also appeared to emphasize this point, such as the one found in the anonymous *Rapta Tatio*, as did visions of ineffective involvement in European battles if England continued to stand alone. They were matched by claims of a more “fearefull” kingdom and “greater profits” if the union were to succeed.\(^{89}\)

Hayward’s aspirations for Britain have been described above, but it is worth adding that he found the Scots to be particularly propitious partners because they “commit their lives to any adventure, not only for the safetie, but for the glorie of their state.”\(^{90}\) Like the sea captain of *Eastward Ho!* these writers could thus find utility for the Scots when they thought beyond England’s borders. The threat of more mouths to feed might be the worst nightmare of some in England, but as these texts insisted, more mouths also meant more hands – and hands could cultivate land, sail ships, and fight in wars. And any Scots that might previously have sought to stir trouble by looking towards England would now be reoriented towards the bounds of the island, defending it against foreign invaders. The Scots were allies in more than just spiritual matters. Cornwallis described them as England’s missing half, referring to Plato’s *Symposium* and the story of

\(^{88}\) Cornwallis, *The Miraculous and Happie Union*, B⁴v, C₁v.  
\(^{90}\) Hayward, *A Treatise of Union*, 5.
the potent creatures with two heads, four hands and four legs, which Zeus divided lest they became strong enough to challenge the gods. But the space created for the Scots in an expanding British empire was also a way of keeping England distinct. In effect, Scottish energy, and Scottish people, could be deflected away from England and into the world at large, creating a partnership that would benefit England without threatening the foundations of their kingdom, straining English resources, or tainting England with Scottish backwardness in any way. This particular image of expansion was thus just as successful at policing English boundaries as rhetorics of exclusion, since it declined to offer the Scots any useful or productive place within the bounds of England itself.

IV

On a less abstract level, there were doubts as to whether or not the Scots were worthy marriage partners in the first place, such as Piggott’s outburst in the Commons, which soon won him a stay in the Tower. Once committed, Piggott wrote James to beg his pardon, but he failed completely to back away from his description of the despicable and regicidal Scots. Instead, he pleaded ignorance and inexperience, claiming that his “soule made an absolute distinction between the well deserving Scottishmen which had bene gods good instruments too great happiness & comfort for the preservation of your Majestie in Your tender years and the latter succeeding tyme from them which had proved false.” It is unlikely that many were convinced, especially since Piggott was not the only one to make inappropriate comments in the Lower House. Both Mr. Hare and Nicholas Fuller highlighted Scottish poverty, Hare calling the Scots beggarly and Fuller

91 Cornwallis, The Miraculous and Happie Union, D. 92 BL M 485/82.
snarling that Scottish merchants were really just pedlars given a more respectable name.  

These were, moreover, the milder version of such sentiments, and another list of objections against the union warned that the Scots would prey on every man’s estate, adding, like Piggott, that a history of Scottish political unrest meant they were dangerous to the king’s person.  

A manuscript described by Galloway as the “Paper Book” also had fabulously harsh words about “the incroaching of Scotts on our ground,” responding to the possibility that parliament might naturalize the post-nati. Metaphors about transplanting trees, moving hungry livestock, and the impossibility of finding enough room for two great ships in one small harbour were all deployed. They culminated in the inflammatory complaint that “Pharao[sic] Lean Kyne will feed upon our fatt pastures, Whereas wee (on the Contrary parte) shall think it hard and indeed needless to send ours to the cold [Scottish] moores” – a statement offensive enough to James that he made specific reference to it in his 1607 speech. It was true, the author wrote, that the proposed union was like a marriage, but it was one where the bride was a “suttle widow” who would make away with all the man’s goods before the wedding day.  

In Edward Sharpham’s *The Fleire*, which was performed in 1606 and printed in 1607, the theme of Scottish poverty was addressed in a lighter spirit, although Michael Redmond has argued that the play itself is highly critical of James’s government and statecraft more generally. The vices of the court, which were perpetuated by James’s inability to maintain decorum, are exposed by the fallen seignior Antifront, his aristocrat-

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93 Both of these comments are recorded in the State Papers, but came to my attention via David Harris Willson, ed., *The Parliamentary Diary of Robert Bowyer, 1606-1607* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 203n-204n, 208n.  
94 SP 14/7/59.  
95 BL Harl. 1314, ff. 45r-47v; Rhodes, Richards and Marshall, *King James VI and I*, 312.  
96 BL Harl. 1314, 56r.
turned-whore daughters, and their companions – problems which can be related to James’s own foreignness and to his plans for a perfect union. Faithlessness and dishonesty, in particular, seem connected to James’s schemes when a courtier named Ruffles explains that “I did pray oftner when I was an Englishman, but I have not praid often, I must confesse since I was a Brittaine: but doost heare Fleire? canst tell me if an Englishman were in debt, whether a Brittaine must pay it or no?” That having been said, the Scots were also more explicitly discussed through the character of Sir Jacke-have-little, a man knighted in order to “get mee a good wife.” Various jokes about oaten cakes and Scottish jigs gesture towards the poverty and simplicity of his nation, as does the ease with which Jacke is repeatedly duped; but he and his bride are also redeemed at the end of the play when Antifront is restored to power, forgiving them and blessing their union. In this case it was the bridegroom and not the bride who was the hapless Scot, and unlike in the scenario rehearsed in the “Paper Book,” both parties would benefit from the union.

Private people also reacted to the increased prominence of the Scots after the regal union. For example, John Tawte, a cobbler in Chichester, got drunk one night in 1603 and ran up and down the streets shouting that the Scots had brought the plague into England with them. Even in 1608, after the union project was formally dead, John Bacheler of Newcastle was in similar trouble for wishing that Elizabeth had had a son so that the

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99 *Ibid.*, F1r-F1v.
100 SP 14/4/2.
“Scotes men should not dominer no morein this land.” Another Englishman, writing a letter to his nephew in London in 1607, sent what was probably a copy of the articles of union (although the “articles” he speaks of are no longer attached) along with his note. More importantly for the present purposes, he closed the letter: “Away with Scots and Danes and English atheists, their complices or woe to England for ever.” This might be a reference to what were, from the English perspective, unorthodox Scottish religious practices, or it might simply be another outburst against the generally damnable Scots. Either way, the anger and disgust generated by a specific set of pseudo-foreigners is still palpable today. This was the type of irrational hatred that Wormald has argued fuelled the gunpowder plotters, citing Guy Fawkes’s alleged desire to blow all the Scots back into Scotland and the plotters’ plans to massacre all the Scots living in London. Although not always noted for its anti-Scottish component, the Gunpowder Plot did therefore include a reaction to the idea of Anglo-Scottish union that was part of a broader phenomenon. Furthermore, disgust with the idea of Britain seems to have been especially common among Catholic expatriates, and Christopher Highley has demonstrated that English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh exiles tended to quarrel hotly when forced into close proximity on the continent.

101 BL M 485/29.
102 BL M 485/26.
103 Under Elizabeth, the divergence between the English and Scottish disciplines had become much more obvious, and Sir Henry Spelman thus worried that despite the fruitful sharing of clerics in the past, England might now be plagued by “fiery spirited ministers” from the north. Galloway and Levack, The Jacobean Union, 176.
105 Christopher Highley, Catholics Writing the Nation in Early Modern Britain and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
There was therefore a level of ethnic hostility between the English and the Scots (and between the English and other British nations), but it is also important that such tensions are not exaggerated and that anti-Scottish sentiments are not dismissed without exploring all the causes. Although it is often taken for granted that the English were a xenophobic culture, Nigel Goose has cautioned against this approach, explaining that the English were neither hostile to all foreigners – a precondition for the term to apply – nor were they usually violent towards outsiders after the Evil May Day riot against aliens in 1517. This means that scholars need to take a more critical look at anti-Scottish language and resentment instead of simply falling back on the easy explanation. Moreover, the Scots were not really alien or properly Other at all. As has already been noted, there had been a prolonged period of peace between the two nations by 1603, both countries were protestant, both spoke the same language, and both now lived under the same king. This meant that English comments about the Scots were of a different nature than that those about the Turks, the Spanish, or even the Irish. It is thus essential that alternative languages about the Scots and the union be investigated, and that hostility and acceptance are both fully evaluated before any final judgements are made about the Anglo-Scottish dynamic.

One strand of the conversation about union which very effectively illuminates the complicated and messy relationship between the English and the Scots was the question of whether or not Scottish kings historically owed homage to their English counterparts. The topic was broached by some of the less sensitive English commentators during

discussions about a closer union, and would reappear in a very heated exchange when the regal union was renegotiated in 1707. As David Armitage and John Robertson have demonstrated, to a certain degree, imperial expansion began at home, and the Scots had to deal with a potentially aggressive imperial power when negotiating with the English. The issue, though, was not as simple as a frustrated England and a stubbornly independent Scotland, and both Armitage and Robertson acknowledge that Ireland bore the brunt of England’s real imperial thrust. The Scots, as protestants and a sovereign nation, were a stumbling block, complicating the relationship between union, conquest, and empire.\(^{107}\) Although James himself argued for an empire without province, continual strains existed on account of the power-structure underlying the regal union, helping to wreck any move towards perfecting it.

Along with the concepts of apocalyptic cooperation and of Britain itself, questions about sovereignty and authority would thus recur whenever the English were forced explicitly to acknowledge their Scottish step-siblings. Savile’s otherwise careful treatise explained that the Scottish kings had indeed owed homage to English kings in the past – and not just when for their possession of Cumberland and Huntington – before quickly changing the subject and moving on to the general qualities of successful unions.\(^{108}\) For once, the remarks in the “Paper Book” were equally contained, noting that “Scotland was held of England by homage,” and then continuing to the other reasons why England and


Scotland could not meet as equals. But not everyone was so brief, and the argument received book-length treatment in Edward Ayscu’s *A Historie Contayning the Warres, Treaties, Marriages, and other Occurrents between England and Scotland* (1607). In what was a detailed account of the various battles that the English had won over the Scots, and the many marriages between English noblewomen and Scottish kings, Ayscu unapologetically rehearsed the instances when Scottish monarchs did homage to their acknowledged superior in England. The message was not lost, and the owner of the edition now held by the Cambridge University Library added an arrow in the margins in order to highlight where the text discussed the Scottish promise *perpetually* to serve the English king.\(^{110}\)

The belief that Scotland was technically a feudal dependency of England is important, and not only because it speaks to the tensions between conquest and cooperation within the Anglo-Scottish relationship. It undermined both the notion that Scots were truly foreign, and the possibility that they were equal and sovereign partners. In other words, Scotland was neither different enough, nor similar enough, to be easily categorized and dealt with from there. In order to avoid this problem, Ayscu tried fully to anglicize the Scots, citing the nine separate English intermarriages with the Scottish royal line.\(^{111}\) This allowed him to stress that the union was really just the formal possession of an already colonized society. It was also why he was careful to note the long years of peace with Scotland under Elizabeth, and James’s uneventful accession to the English

\(^{109}\) BL Harl. 1314, f. 60r.


throne: the Scottish king was not really Scottish. The English, for their part, were not always convinced that their progenitors had been interested in conquering the barren lands of Scotland through warfare or intermarriage at all. Sir Thomas Craig therefore complained in his *De Unione Regnorum Britanniae Tractatus* (1605) that he had met multiple Englishman who had flatly denied that their kings and armies had ever attempted the task. England was alleged to be a superior nation in every way, and if its rulers had ever wanted Scotland, they would simply have taken it.112

But if the Scots were neither familiar nor foreign, how should they be approached? There was talk in the Commons of treating them in a fashion akin to an irritating distant cousin who had come to stay indeterminately at the family home. According to Robert Bowyer’s diary entries for March 1607, many felt that the Scots wanted union because it would grant them all the advantages of Englishmen without any of the rules or responsibilities. They therefore needed to be taught what was best for them – led with the carrot and the stick to see the cost-benefit exchange of becoming English. It was suggested that they should be allowed to keep their separate laws and privileges, but be refused naturalization, because their resultant suffering would make them beg for a perfect union on English terms, safeguarding England’s traditional identity and enlightening the Scots in the process. Laurence Hyde even suggested that a time limit be put on this process, ensuring that all ties would be severed if the Scots did not learn to cooperate in a timely fashion.113 A condescending attitude, however, is to be expected from the Commons, where many remained unconvinced that a closer union was

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112 Craig, *De Unione*, 242, 356.
necessary and where the most concentrated resistance can be located. Focused on protecting English sovereignty and law, MPs were unlikely to be fervent advocates of a change that would threaten those things.\textsuperscript{114}

Some treatise writers tried to convince the sceptical by taking the opposite approach and demonstrating the respectability and honourableness of the Scots. In this case, they were seen as similar enough to merge with England in an organic process whereby the integrity of both kingdoms would be preserved and strengthened. Cornwallis and Hayward, in particular, tried to undermine perceptions of extreme Scottish poverty by explaining that Scotland might not have all the amenities that the English would like, but that it met the needs of the Scots who were an able, brave, and godly people.\textsuperscript{115} Rapta Tatio went further, explaining that it was the English who owed the Scots a great debt: “They have bred us a King, they have brought him safe, they have brough him every way perfect; of nature, good; learning great, vertues many; of issue fruitfull; and on his head a crown, before he came here.”\textsuperscript{116} There was even the possibility that Scottish law might have something to offer, by tempering the inflexibility of the English system.\textsuperscript{117} These efforts demonstrate that it was possible to think and speak positively about the Scots despite the doubts and anxieties created by the regal union. That said, it is impossible to ignore the fact that unionists often had ulterior motives, repaying past acts of patronage.

\textsuperscript{114} White, “Militant Protestants,” 163.

\textsuperscript{115} Hayward, A Treatise of Union, 5; Cornwallis, The Miraculous and Happie Union, C.3r. After the union negotiations had been crushed, Sir Thomas Egerton also published a similar defence of the Scots in his justification of his vote to naturalize the post-nati. In it, he gave historical examples of other absorbed people, and outlined the ancient, noble and famous history of the Scots, ending his treatise by asking: “How long shall this suspicion and bout continue?” Sir Thomas Egerton, The Speech of the Lord Chancellor of England, in the Eschequer Chamber, touching the post-nati (London, 1609).

\textsuperscript{116} Skinner, Rapta Tatio, F.4v.

\textsuperscript{117} This does not seem to have been a continuous or particularly convincing approach, but it was put forward in Thornborough, A Discourse, 18-19; Hayward, A Treatise of Union, 13.
and hoping for future ones. Cornwallis, Hayward and Thornborough were all consistent recipients of royal favour, and Bacon, who also wrote in favour of a perfect union, aspired to it. Their ultimate priority was also furthering the union and not defending the Scots, highlighting the functional nature of describing the Scottish nation, who could be painted as worthy allies or some sort of biblical plague as the situation required.

One such fascinating exercise in manipulation was a treatise answering the answers to the “Objections.” It claimed that “brotherly love” was precisely the reason that a new royal style and a closer union were not required. As long as parliament removed the hostile border laws, the author explained, there was no reason that the English and the Scots should avoid intermarriage, trade, and general acts of good neighbourliness, while still inhabiting separate countries. This was because these acts needed to be underwritten by love and not labels. Similarly, the need for security was said to be an issue of love and not a matter related to the union, the author asking if the English could really “think so badly of Scotland” that they believed the Scots would attack their own natural king or allow such an attack to be routed through their lands. “You must give Scotland a new place, not a new name,” the treatise concluded, “if you fear such a Backdoore.” Once again, fears about the union were not necessarily related exclusively, or even primarily, to hatred of the Scots. If Englishmen were truly xenophobic, an editorial gag reflex should have kicked in, preventing this argument from unfolding the way it did. The author’s own principles, the foreknowledge that few besides the king would listen to such an argument, or the possibility that the court might exact punishment for what could be read as satire

118 BL Stowe 158, ff.36r-37r.
119 Ibid., 39r.
were all good reasons for having second thoughts in that context. But the issue was not expelling foreigners; it was the need to block the creation of a new kingdom called Great Britain, which would indeed consume anything that stood in its path. The Scots were secondary, and easily forgotten once this primary goal was achieved.

The position between sameness and difference which the Scots inhabited – and which made them useful but also, at times, unmemorable – is best encapsulated in Bacon’s terminology. He described them to the Commons as “alterinos,” or other ourselves: different in external lands and goods, but the same in mind and body. A fine balance would therefore have to be maintained between expansion, integration, and preservation if England was to unite with Scotland and become “one of the greatest monarchies, in forces truly esteemed, that hath been in the world.” But Bacon’s approach was always balanced, and often prophetic too. In a collection of thoughts on the union that he drew up for the king, he weighed the points of conjunction and separation between England and Scotland – a process he shared with John Dodderidge’s union treatise, also composed in 1604. Both men noted that the problem was one of equality, and that neither the Scots nor the English could be left feeling aggrieved if a closer union was to be achieved. As is so often the case with Bacon though, more so than with his contemporaries, his commentary haunts the modern reader by attacking the issue with unapologetic accuracy. Both England and Scotland shared a religion, but they split apart on issues of doctrine; no natural boundaries divided their kingdoms, but memories of past grievances erected walls as high as mountains; and a shared language was disrupted by

120 Spedding, The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, 316.
121 Ibid., 323.
122 Ibid., 218-34; Galloway and Levack, The Jacobean Union, 143-51.
undeniable dialects. Serious work was required to join the two peoples together, and if any issue was ignored, it could cause the entire project to collapse. To emphasize his point, Bacon explained that at least some laws and punishments needed to be harmonized, otherwise “libels may be devised and written in Scotland, and published and scattered in England,” or “treasons may be plotted in Scotland and executed in England.” This is exactly what the Covenanters would do under Charles I over three decades later.

In a union treatise that he published in 1603, Bacon also said that only time and nature could cement an Anglo-Scottish union. A single name, language, law, and purpose should all be established (although he, like most, soon backed away from the idea of fully merging the two legal systems), but ultimately it was a matter of letting the greater draw the lesser. For him, the Scots would not remain alterinos forever; they would eventually become fully same. And since this process was one that only time could facilitate, Bacon’s perspective only encouraged the English desire to focus on themselves and their own future. Whether reactions were friendly or hostile, then, discussing the Scots was a way of getting back to England. In short, the union project did not fail – if it is even appropriate to use that term – because of Scotophobia. It was undermined by the English inability actually to engage with Scotland. Furthermore, this type of manipulation of the category of Scotland did not only occur at the discursive level, and there are very real interactions that illuminate the category of things “Scottish” shifting in meaning to suit a myriad of English interests too.

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124 Ibid., 232.
125 Bacon, *A Brief Discourse*. 
At first glance, the meaning of Scotland seems as if it should have been more static and externally-defined along the borders, but there were unexpected dynamics at work there as well. According to James, his ascension to the English throne fundamentally altered the borderlands, changing them from a peripheral backwater into a heartland. In his proclamation announcing the regal union and his plans to perfect it, he therefore explained that the Anglo-Scottish border was “in fertile and all other benefits nothing inferior to many of the best parts of the whole Ile,” and commanded that it “shall be no more the extremities, but the middle, and the Inhabitants thereof reduced to perfect obedience.”\textsuperscript{126} The urgency of James’s plea was underlined by the plentiful references to past hostilities that have already been described, implying that the borders had hitherto been a site of perpetual conflict and could easily remain so, an exaggeration that is perpetuated today.\textsuperscript{127} In fact, the area did experience a brief episode of chaos after Elizabeth’s death in what became known as “Busy Week,” but this was the exception that proves the rule of general stability and cooperation. This last-chance raiding frenzy was justified with claims that the laws carried no force between the death of one monarch and the coronation of the next, and resulted from opportunism more than ancient hostilities, although the English desire to embarrass their new foreign-born king cannot be ignored either.\textsuperscript{128}

Events like Busy Week seem to indicate that Anglo-Scottish hostilities were alive and well, and that if given the chance, parties on both sides of the border would attack

\textsuperscript{126} Larkin and Hughes, \textit{Stuart Royal Proclamations}, 18.
one another. The apparent animosities, however, were easily transformed into alliances, and Jared Sizer has convincingly demonstrated that Busy Week was a joint Anglo-Scottish affair with risings occurring in each kingdom as well as episodes coordinated between the two.\footnote{Ibid.} English perceptions of, and interactions with Scots along the border were thus complex and heavily dependent upon the context that framed them. For example, praising the new king meant accommodating his desire for union, and so one narration of James’s progress from Edinburgh to London therefore paused to celebrate his passage through Berwick. “Happy day,” the author wrote, “when peaceably so many Warlike English gentlemen went to bring in an English & Scottish king, both included in one person, into that towne that many a 100 years hath bin a towne of the enemie, or at the least, held in all leagues either for one Nation or the other.”\footnote{Thomas Millington, \textit{The True Narration of the Entertainment of his Royall Maiestie, from the time of his departure from Edenbrough; till his receiving at London} (London, 1603), C.1r.} A symbol of ancient hostilities, Berwick could be rewritten as a place of cooperation and cohabitation to appease the king. For his part, James reduced the garrison to only one hundred men, whose new mission included rebuilding the decayed church as well as maintaining law and order. He also commanded that a new stone bridge be erected to replace the dilapidated wooden one over the river Tweed, a symbolic shift away from fortress-building.\footnote{The building of the new bridge is cited in Krista Kesseling, ““Berwick is our England”: Local and National Identities in an Elizabethan Border Town,” in D. Woolf and N. Jones, eds., \textit{Local Identities in Late Medieval and Early Modern England} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 108.} Both acts were intended as powerful symbols that the differences between the two peoples had come to an end, and that the old peripheries could quickly become a newly united heartland. In practice, however, the English had always been (and would
continue to be) much more ambivalent about the Scots than this type of ceremonial activity indicated.

Officials in Northumberland dared not contradict these gestures in public, but the private correspondence received by the court told a completely different story. A letter was sent just before James made his final decision to curtail the garrison at Berwick outlining various objections, and John Crane, the Comptroller of the border commission, wrote a letter to Robert Cecil in January 1604 that essentially confirmed the need for a heavy hand in Northumberland. In it, he begged that the king immediately “appoint anie of place and qualitie to the choise command here” in part because of “the inveterate passions of the two nations, who convening here dailie ingender newe occasions of dislike.”

That same month, although with reference to more westerly territory, the earl of Cumberland reported confusion over jurisdiction in the face of ever increasing crime. He warned that unless a sufficient authority was established “yt is not possible to suppresse the acustomed Thefts and disorders, that will fall upon the Inhabitants on both syds, but especiallie on the English.” The earl claimed this was especially true since the north was also overrun with impoverished Scots who had swarmed out of Scotland since the regal union.

In December, reports were still coming in from the Captain stationed in Berwick citing the “disordered persons of the Scottish side” who “do stir upp the antient and barbarous custome of deadly ffeuds.” Moreover, a quick survey of the

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132 BL M 485/19.
133 SP 14/6/42.
134 BL M 485/50.
Northumberland quarter-session indictments shows that cross-border violence and thieving continued through 1604 and beyond.\footnote{Northumberland County Archives, Quarter Session Indictments, Volume 1, pp. 20-108.}

The bleak picture painted in these reports can be explained in a number of ways. For one thing, it is important to acknowledge that a certain amount of lawlessness was present in the north throughout the seventeenth century, and Sizer has claimed that the borders were not tamed or fully integrated until after 1707.\footnote{Sizer, “Law and Disorder,” 282.} Furthermore, the ongoing conflict in Berwick between town officials and military men also played a role. Krista Kesselring has argued that the second half of the sixteenth century had been a period of particularly intense conflict between these groups, during which time both sides tried to convince the crown that they were the essential element in maintaining stability.\footnote{Kesselring, “Berwick is Our England,” 92-112.} The post-union correspondence can thus be read as the last gasp of a conflict wherein the military were determined to justify their presence. Finally, the fact that the townspeople also stood to benefit from reports of Scottish violence is just as important a consideration. The north had long defined itself in terms of its proximity to Scotland, and northern elites had gleaned special exemptions from loans and gifts which the union now threatened to undermine.\footnote{Diana Newton, \textit{North-East England, 1569-1625: Governance, Culture and Identity} (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2006).} Reports of lawlessness might buy some extra time before new expenses had to be shouldered and new ways of relating to the kingdom as a whole needed to be found.

But the reports of violence masked yet another context, which was the unreported ability of the English and the Scots who lived in the borderlands – at least in the east – to
ignore their supposed hostility towards one another when it suited them. Border, or march laws, established special courts, forbade Anglo-Scottish marriages, prohibited cross-border landholding, and restricted cross-border commerce; one could not, for example, sell an English horse to a Scot. Regardless of this fact, intermarriage was common, as was cross-border landholding, illegal commerce and generally congenial relations.\textsuperscript{139} All of this demonstrates how easily the English borderers shifted their perspectives on the Scots, depending upon the particular identity they wanted to project to other Englishmen: borderer, patriot, defender, exploited subject, or even reiver (a border criminal, or raider) were all options. The last possibility, and the whole issue of violent criminals along the borders that was used so frequently to defend the special status of the region and the need for extra resources, illuminates this point more clearly. While Crane and others were complaining that the crimes they encountered were fuelled specifically by national animosities, many of the actual indictments show cross-border criminal cooperation. Like Busy Week, the thieving and murdering that continued in its wake contained a truly British component, and joint Anglo-Scottish bands were consistently tried for their crimes in Northumberland. An English gentleman and his Scottish companion stole a black-brown mare together in 1604, two Englishmen and a Scot made off with seven oxen in 1605, and an English yeoman and a Scotsman ran away with a red branded ox in 1612, to name just a few incidents.\textsuperscript{140} Independently English and Scottish crimes continued apace, both locally and across the borders, but participants also had no qualms

\textsuperscript{140} Northumberland County Archives, Quarter Session Indictments, Volume 1, 36, 54, 99.
about putting aside national differences to attempt a raid, or some other form of criminal activity.

In June 1607, after it had become clear that a perfect union would not be achieved through parliament, James did manage to secure an “Act of the Utter Abolition of all Memory of Hostility,” although he was disappointed by the tempering of the unionist rhetoric and the replacement of extradition arrangements with unclear provisions for reciprocal jurisdictions.\(^{141}\) What the act did achieve was the formal repeal of all laws previously based on the assumption that the Anglo-Scottish border was a hostile one—fundamentally altering the type of narratives that borderers might create without much changing their actual experiences. English subjects could now pass freely into Scotland without license, and the border lords lost the privilege of “Crosbowes, handgun, harkbuttes or demiharke or to use or keepe in his or theire howses or elsewhere any such crowsbowes handguns harkbuttes and demiharkes.” Armour and horses could also now be transported into Scotland, and old laws prohibiting Scottish residents and Anglo-Scottish marriages in England were also repealed.\(^{142}\) Another great symbolic gesture, the abolition of the hostile laws again meant more in theory than practice, given the extent of pre-union commerce and mobility. According to Sizer, the clause attempting to disarm the border lords was particularly ineffective; however, despite their refusal to stop stockpiling weaponry, they had at least lost much of the incentive to use it.\(^{143}\)

Along the border, then, a consistent approach to the Scots could be even more difficult despite the fact that this was the one place that the English were constantly faced

\(^{142}\) BL M 285/7.
\(^{143}\) Sizer, “Law and Disorder,” 56-60.
with the “real thing.” For the English, the Scots were still, to some extent, a blank slate upon which they could draw, whether it was on account of political necessity, ignorance, or self-absorption. Even in the north, the Scots inhabited a position that fluctuated between friend and foe, familiar and foreign, allowing the English to interpret their significance in different ways as was convenient. While this meant that relations were, usually, more amiable than some borderers wanted London to believe, it also meant that the tendency to ignore any real Scottish agency could extend throughout all of England. This gave the English the illusion of control over Anglo-Scottish scenarios and increased the likelihood of Scottish frustration – conditions which were likely to lead to Scottish attempts to demonstrate that the English lacked this power.

VI

Christopher Ivic has observed that although John Speed’s *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine* (1611) positions itself in support of James’s vision, the text cannot help but betray a certain level of anxiety as well. England and Scotland are embodied beside their maps, but Britain remains amorphous and unrealized in corporeal form. The only exception is the frontispiece, but here the Briton is an archaic and primitive man, meant to depict diversity and not provide a symbol of unification. Furthermore, the idea Britain associated with him is one of the past, and not of the present.144 This chapter has argued that the reason that Britain did not, and could not, materialize was because the English failed to find a partner with whom they could build her. This is not to say that Scotland was not present and willing to negotiate; rather, it is to argue that the English were more

interested in talking to themselves, and about themselves, than in engaging in a
conversation with equals. If the English were to expand their borders, it would only be as
undisputed conquerors. The shock of being forced into a more equal regal union with
Scotland got a conversation about partnership started, which James himself actively
couraged, but the narcissistic English gaze soon settled back where it was most
comfortable. When Scotland did come up, it was an imagined Scotland, designed to serve
English needs, and not the Scotland that actually sat across the border. Those who did
acknowledge that a distinction existed between the real and the imagined Scotland were
likely to find a place for the Scots in an imperial setting, but still could not envision them
merging with the English at home.

Wormald has described this process as the empire of England closing in on itself.
The English, she believes, missed an opportunity, and this was not because attempts at
union were “premature.”145 It is because “what could have produced consideration of the
nature of the state which would become a central issue in the course of the seventeenth
century, was used instead as the opportunity for a wonderful outburst of debate about that
much more fascinating subject, the nature of the English constitution.”146 The constant
need to renegotiate the Anglo-Scottish union throughout history, she argues, has been
(and still is) the result of an “ingrained reluctance to ask, let alone answer, fundamental
questions about the nature of Britain.”147 In this, Wormald is entirely correct, but her
explanation as to why the English constitution was more interesting than state formation,

145 Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, 103.
146 Jenny Wormald, “The Creation of Britain: Multiple Kingdoms or Core and Colonies?” Transactions of
147 Ibid., 194.
and why the English failed to establish a stable form of union is flawed. The English tendency to ignore Britain, to manipulate the meaning of Scotland, and even to lash out against their neighbours was not the result of an uncomplicated Scotophobia, but rather a deep anxiety about the nature and identity of their own kingdom, which they constantly felt the need to protect. As Derek Hirst put it, “Shakespeare’s generation fleshed out the meaning of nationhood,” but now, “[a]s that generation reached maturity, it was inexorably confronted with the subversion of the “England” it had conjured.”

This was a problem indeed.

England’s perceptions of Scotland were therefore varied, and utilitarian, but they were never wholly hostile. This is an essential distinction to make when understanding the Anglo-Scottish dynamic, and the role which that dynamic played in other political negotiations throughout the century. When analyzing Shakespeare’s Macbeth, which contains an illusion to the “twofold balls and treble sceptres” carried by the descendents of Scottish kings, as well as other indicators that it is not really about Scotland, Claire McEachern addresses the Englishness of the Scottish play.

Echoing Bacon’s belief that the Scots were alterinos, McEachern states that:

Scotland is alien and admirable, other and self. Arguably the doubleness of Macbeth’s Scotland results from the ways in which English national identity acquires as of 1603 a new perspective, as England begins to be imagined not as an exclusive self-determining property, but in a newly conscious relation to its awkward neighbours.

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149 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, IV, i, l.121.

The first part of this observation is extremely relevant; however, the concluding thoughts needs to be tempered by Wormald’s commentary, and the evidence provided above, which demonstrate that the English fundamentally refused to see themselves in relation to the Scots, even when the situation demanded it. But once these approaches are combined, the “awkwardness” of the regal union starts to make more sense. The undefined and in-between position of the Scots within the English imagination is precisely the reason they were able to phase in and out of view, and why they could be so many things to so many people. It is also why the English were never wholly comfortable in approaching the Scots as a subordinate people, as they did with the Irish or even, at times, the Welsh. This situation also meant that Anglo-Scottish relations during the regal union were relatively calm and amicable until, at various moments, the Scots demanded to be heard on their own terms. At those moments, the English were forced to digest their presence anew, which had a variety of outcomes that were usually – although not always – detrimental to the Scots.
Chapter Three: The Bishops’ Wars and the Elusiveness of National Borders

A translated copy of a letter dated 28 June 1638 survives in the State Papers endorsed, “written by a Jesuit to his superior in France.” The author, identified only as “G.T.,” may or may not have actually been a Catholic, but his one short letter highlights many of the themes used by both historians and contemporaries to make sense of the Bishops’ Wars – the two armed conflicts between Charles I and his Scottish subjects between 1638 and 1640. Scotland had apparently not been kind to G.T., and he complained:

I have never been in a country where things go so slowly or stupidly as in this country. I seem to be in the middle of Spain. As a proof of it I will tell you a little of what is going on in Scotland, where the good people, under the mask of religion, are setting up an anarchy, and to that end refuse everything the king offers them, because they seem to be able to resist all that he can do against them.¹

Charles, for his part, was no more praiseworthy than the Scots, having “gone on too quietly, and in the judgement of wise men has too much dispised them, and shown such a feebleness that his subjects begin to raise the head, and make little revolts and mutinies even in England.” The situation was quickly getting out of hand, and Archbishop Laud and the Earl of Strafford suggested the king consider the use of Irish forces, which irritated the English even more. “But I know not what better he could do,” admitted G.T., “for in England everybody is discontented, and to raise an army here is to put a sword in their hands to defend themselves, for the party of the puritans is so numerous, and has such correspondence with the Scotch, that they begin already to break down the altars which the Archbishop had raised... with a thousand other insolences”² Rebellion,

¹ Calendar of State Papers Domestic (hereafter CSPD), Charles I/393/71.
² Ibid.
mismanaged attempts to put it down, and religious causes that recognized no borders would all be recurring themes.

If one puts aside the contemptuous tone, G.T.’s analysis is a remarkably accurate description of what had already occurred, and how the rest of the conflict would play out. The Bishops’ Wars evolved most immediately out of a riot that broke out in Edinburgh on 23 June 1637 when Charles I clumsily tried to impose a new service book on a largely Presbyterian Scotland. Mythologized as a people’s revolt against popery and embodied in the figure of Jenny Geddes, who allegedly threw the first stool, this event marked the beginning of a sequence of other riots and petitions that would bleed into the Bishops’ Wars. As organized opposition grew, the protesters became known as Covenanters for their circulation of and subscription to a document called the National Covenant, a band promising to defend both the king and the true religion. By 1638, both the king and the Covenanters were openly arming and the quarrel was becoming more overtly constitutional, raising questions regarding the crown’s authority over the Kirk and its institutions and eventually over the Scottish parliament as well. In June 1639, the two

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armies gathered at the border, but since neither side was fully prepared for war, a peace agreement was concluded at Berwick after a single and bloodless encounter at Kelso, ending the first “war.”

Despite the peace, king and Covenanters could not see eye to eye on religious and constitutional issues, and both sides continued to arm, during which time Charles called the Short Parliament in an attempt to raise funds. The uncooperative nature of this parliament, and the Yorkshire trained bands’ lack of interest in a second round of hostilities, undermined Charles’s preparations. The Scots, on the other hand, were signally successful in recalling continental war veterans and securing financial support for their cause.⁴ Then, on 20 August 1640, while the king was still mustering his forces, the Covenanting army crossed onto English soil and seized Newcastle in what became known as the second Bishops’ War. This humiliating defeat, the financial demands made by the Covenanting army in its wake, and English collusion with the Scots, forced Charles to summon the Long Parliament, thus contributing to the mounting pressures that led to the English Civil Wars.⁵

The actual physical combat involved in the Bishops’ Wars was therefore minimal, but a very real war of words accompanied it. The Covenanters undertook an impressive

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⁴ For an account of the difficulties in Yorkshire, see David Scott, “‘Hannibal at our Gates’: Loyalists and Fifth-columnists during the Bishops’ Wars – the Case of Yorkshire,” *Historical Research* 70 (1997): 269-293.

⁵ English collusion with the Scots was most famously argued by Conrad Russell, who suggested that future parliamentarians could best be identified by the pro-Scottish sympathies during the Bishops’ Wars. John Adamson has also claimed that Anglo-Scottish communication was critical in bringing down Charles I’s regime; however, he believes that the English nobility cooperated with the Covenanters for their own purposes and lacked any ideological ties to their cause. David Scott has tested these theories using Yorkshire as a case study. Conrad Russell, *The fall of the British monarchies, 1637-1642* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); John Adamson, *The noble revolt: the overthrow of Charles I* (London: W&N, 2007); Scott, “Hannibal at our Gates.”
propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the English not to fight; instead, they should press Charles for redress of mutual grievances through parliament. Scholars have not failed to comment on this, and Joad Raymond has argued that a “quantitatively limited” but “disproportionately significant” amount of Covenanter-commissioned print proved “instrumental” in altering the London book trade. Covenanter tracts, then, encouraged the explosion of print that began in England in 1641 by opening up a British conversation about issues of common concern (especially matters of faith) through the strategic distribution of texts.  

Kevin Sharpe has suggested that this was necessary to the development of an English oppositional ideology that soon began to evolve alongside the Scottish one, but which would have been incapable of taking shape on its own. The Bishops’ Wars were therefore the first major attempt to use print to “manipulate the political opinion and fundamentally to alter the political process of another nation,” and it was a wildly successful experiment, although it also demonstrated that the process was impossible to control.

The English response to Scottish complaints about episcopacy and authoritarianism has been a matter of considerable interest. It now seems that there was, at the very least, a powerful element in English society that welcomed the determined Scottish resistance to Caroline policy as a way of forcing an English parliament and ensuring that English grievances were aired. These men, motivated by defence of the true religion and parliamentary privileges, might even in many cases have become

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parliamentarians later on. A pro-Scottish attitude also manifested itself among the English forces through disorderly conduct. And while a number of these instances reflected a more general lack of discipline, some soldiers were clearly motivated by sympathy for the Scottish Presbyterian cause. These men broke altar rails and attacked Catholics while en route to the border because of their frustration over what they felt was a misdirected military effort and their refusal to believe in the justice of fighting fellow protestants while Catholicism still threatened the world. And yet, not everyone was sympathetic, and several historians have reminded us that a certain amount of prejudice, and the growing divergence between English and Scottish interests, ensured that even those who were initially supportive of the Covenanting cause grew increasingly disenchanted with Scotland and its army.

But the rush to identify the fact of either pro- or anti-Scottish sentiments among the English population during the Bishops’ Wars has led to a lack of appreciation for what the comments themselves can tell us about how contemporaries perceived the Anglo-Scottish relationship in a situation where dynastic union co-existed with formal conflict. Instead of just collating angry or supportive comments, we should ask how commentary about the Scots reflected changes to the Anglo-Scottish dynamic and shifting concerns within England itself. This will allow for a clearer comparison of

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9 Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*.
English perceptions of Scotland during the rest of the seventeenth century and reintroduce the distinction between contemporary English thoughts regarding things Scottish, issues of British significance, and events with either universal or local significance. Furthermore, while much ink has been spilt analyzing Covenanter propaganda and its role in the outbreak of the Civil Wars, it is equally important to assess England’s printed responses. Although these have, as a rule, received less attention than the Covenanter tracts, they are conceptually rich as well and merit further consideration in and of themselves – especially given that this period serves as the gateway to the mid-century print explosion. Moreover, Charles I broke his silence and ended the personal rule to answer the Covenanters in a series of declarations, so it is worth pausing to ask what he had to say and why he felt it necessary to say it when he addressed his kingdoms.\textsuperscript{12} We must therefore ask what type of framework the English press placed the Covenanter rebellion within, and what sort of ramifications this had. How did Charles perceive the conflict, what other complementary texts appeared, and were there dissenting voices?

State papers and other manuscript sources can then be used to help access individual responses to the wars and assess the potential effectiveness of royal and pro-court literature, illuminating a greater variety of opinion than is apparent in print alone. Besides the oft-quoted \textit{Calendar of State Papers Domestic}, a number of newsletters, private letters, and commonplace books survive detailing a variety of reactions to the

\textsuperscript{12} Kevin Sharpe has emphasized the importance of Charles’s public speech during the Bishops’ Wars. Kevin Sharpe, “The King’s Writ: Royal Authors and Royal Authority in Early Modern England,” 117-138, in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake, eds., \textit{Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England} (London: Macmillan, 1994), 134.
Scots, but also highlighting common themes. Surveying the situation between 1638 and 1640 reveals a period when the anti-Scottish sentiment that is often thought to have spanned the seventeenth century was largely suspended, despite the reality of English and Scottish armies facing off. More importantly, it shows that those defending the king’s cause, or the Covenanter’s, believed that universal models best described the conflict, and that this naturally led them to move from abstract and theoretical frameworks to a domestic context in order to give events meaning. There was, in the end, no need to fixate on the Scots despite the presence of a Scottish army, since after eleven years of personal rule, the English had their own issues to work out. Scotland was like a ghost, vanishing after the English had heard a scream and felt a thud: invisible, illusory, and ultimately, forgettable. And so, despite the appearance of another opportunity for the English and the Scots to come together and live out the apocalyptic dream of forging a great protestant empire, pro- and anti-Covenanter literature alike preferred to use Scotland as a springboard to other topics instead of investigating it as a partner or issue in its own right.

II

In 1638, there were various restrictions regarding the press, and it is necessary briefly to outline the structure and efficacy of Caroline censorship in order to contextualize the arena of print during the Bishops’ Wars. As always, there were a variety of corporal punishments that could be inflicted on seditious authors post-publication – the 1637 example of Bastwick, Burton and Prynne and the loss of their ears is recounted in almost any textbook – but what concerns us here is the system of pre-publication censorship that was also in place. Theoretically, all English publications produced under the Caroline regime were supposed to be read by an episcopal censor who would make
note of any necessary changes. Once these were made, the manuscript went to the Stationers’ Company, which rechecked it, and entered it into the register. The assumption that this system worked smoothly led to Christopher Hill’s famous depiction of a world in which almost any topic might be construed as a “dangerous subject,” creating a build-up of dissent that was “bubbling below the surface” until the 1641 collapse of censorship laws and the Court of High Commission released it.\textsuperscript{13} Revisionist accounts, however, have challenged this interpretation and argue that censorship was far less effective than previously thought, and that a greater variety of opinions appeared in print than was previously realized. Sheila Lambert, in particular, has emphatically stated that the “early Stuart state was in no position to control the media in the modern sense of the term,” and argues that commercial factors, not licensers, were often dominant in deciding what material was printed.\textsuperscript{14} Likewise, other historians have noted that early modern authors often disagreed with specific censors, but not with the idea of censorship itself, which aimed only at enforcing temporary taboos created by international diplomacy or politically tender issues at home.\textsuperscript{15}

Anthony Milton has tried to balance these perspectives and believes that censorship \textit{was} an important issue, but that the issue was not one of free speech but of legitimation. Arguing that different religious groups vied for control of the licensing system in order to “establish their own criteria of orthodoxy,” Milton believes that both

puritans and conformists thought that gaining control over publication was a means of establishing the boundaries of acceptability. As part of this process, charges of repressive censorship were often used as polemical tools to gain sympathy, explain away inconvenient doctrine, or tar opponents, and do not necessarily reflect arbitrary restrictions per se. Within this system, self-censorship was prone to occur, preventing authors from submitting texts that too overtly challenged the prevailing orthodoxy and were therefore likely to be rejected and possibly encourage punishment. This makes knowing which ideological group controlled the licensing process at any particular time critical for historians, and in the 1630s, it was the staunchly anti-puritan Laudians. These avant garde conformists enforced Charles I’s ban on theological debate and seditious libel through the Court of High Commission and the Star Chamber, after a 1637 decree gave them full authority over the press.

During the Bishops’ Wars, the Laudian licensors thus remained firmly in control of the official English press, even if they could not stem the tide of surreptitious Covenanter literature being imported into the kingdom from Scotland and the Netherlands. The court was well aware of the advantage it possessed by controlling officially licensed works, and it used this power to produce officially sanctioned texts that bolstered the crown’s position on a variety of subjects. It was therefore not just future parliamentarians, but future royalists as well, who used the press to garner support. Jason

17 Ibid., 630-638.
18 Ibid., 641-642.
McElligot argues that, in the years to come, the royalists would pursue a “lively, vibrant and exciting use of print” as they adapted to, and embraced, new political realities despite their alleged conservatism throughout the Civil Wars. And although the literature published in defence of Charles’s position during the Bishops’ Wars was less varied than McElligot’s Civil War samples, there is a clear sense that the king was beginning to understand the need to respond to his opponents in kind, and it is possible to identify a growing awareness of the need for a popular royalist press. And yet, strikingly, none of this literature took advantage of alleged English xenophobia and historic hatred of the Scots. Instead, pamphlets, ballads, and proclamations took their cue from the crown and concentrated on identifying a popular conspiracy which aimed to foment rebellion against lawful authority. Pausing to discuss the meaning of rebellion, they decried rebels not Scots, probably in order to keep avenues for reconciliation open – condemnatory ballads lambasting the Scots not appearing until after Charles began losing control in 1640. Pro-court arguments also consistently advocated obedience, resonating with the well-known Tudor Homily on Obedience, tactics that were supported by frightening images of heat and consumption should the Covenanter succeed, and by an obsession with the role of the press. This trend was increasingly apparent as it became clear that the Bishops’ Wars would not be fought with swords and over territory, but with ink and over allegiance.

One of the first English publications against the Covenanters was not actually of English origin at all. It was a reproduction of Scottish objections to the Covenant movement. Support for the National Covenant had swept through Scotland with amazing

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speed, but met with resistance in the north-east, particularly from a group of moderate scholars at the University of Aberdeen who became known as the Aberdeen doctors. When faced with a delegation of Covenanting ministers bent on winning support for their radical Presbyterian reforms, the Aberdeen doctors entered a printed exchange wherein the two sides debated the validity of the Covenant.21 Sidestepping the whole issue of their position on the various religious innovations themselves – Charles had, by this time, been forced to revoke the new Scottish prayer book in a failed attempt to pacify Scotland – the Aberdeen doctors consistently argued for obedience to lawful authority and for the need to have a lawful justification of every action. To do this, they printed the “demands” that they made of the visiting Covenanters, after which a series of replies and counter-replies followed from the Aberdeen press. This exchange was then reprinted on Robert Young’s London presses. Young was the king’s official printer for Scotland, despite his continued English interests, and this fact was advertised on the title pages of these pamphlets.22 Immediately signalling legitimacy and royal approval to potential readers, Young’s imprint also allowed the court to appropriate the Aberdeen doctors’ perspective on the crisis as its own.

Both The Generall Demands Concerning the Late Covenant and The Answers of Some Brethren of the Ministrie appeared as London editions in 1638, advertising the appropriate response to what they saw as groundless claims that the true religion was in danger. These tracts outlined the Covenanters’ and the Aberdeen doctors’ positions in full, but always allowed the doctors the last word. Significantly, besides vindicating the

22 They were also reproduced in Edinburgh.
Aberdeen doctors, the decision to authorize new editions of Scottish attacks on the Covenanter rebels also implied that the issue was not one of ethnicity, but of the rebellion of only some disloyal and unruly subjects against their king. London editions of John Corbet’s, *The Ungirding of the Scottish Armour* (1639), and the Marquis of Huntley’s, *The Character of a True Subject* (1640), both Scotsmen, similarly implied that the problem was the Covenanter rebels, not the Scots as a whole. This, however, removed the possibility of recourse to a xenophobia-based campaign by pro-court authors. Perhaps this decision was made because of Charles’s Scottish heritage, or because those supporting the Crown’s altercation with the Covenanter rebels did not think that denigrating the Scots would generate any support, but a clear choice had been made to avoid casting the Bishops’ Wars as a national conflict as would later happen when Catholic Ireland rebelled. And it appears, at the very least, that despite the failure of James VI and I’s dreams of a British monarchy, the issue of how the English related to the Scots had become considerably more ambiguous than it had been under to Tudors. One could no longer simply let loose angry diatribes about the good-for-nothing, sawney Scots in the public forum. But the corollary, the idea that a shared protestantism in some way unified the island, was simultaneously being challenged because Charles’s episcopalianism was violently clashing with Covenanter Presbyterianism, and would later come into conflict with puritan radicalism in England itself. As a result, the relationship between the nations remained unclear.

Part of the reason for the reproduction of the Aberdeen debates was that Charles wanted to keep his diplomatic and military options open, maintaining a strict secrecy about his dealings with the Scots. The two Aberdeen pamphlets were therefore the only
items concerning Scottish affairs printed on English presses in 1638 and no new English pieces were commissioned.\(^{23}\) This ensured that the Covenanter cause was publicly condemned without explaining the possible English ramifications of a unified Scottish defence of their religion by emphasizing internal Scottish divisions; Charles tried to ensure that the conflict was extraneous to the English religious and political settlements by showing that the issues up for debate were about Scotland, and the protagonists were all Scots, though this hope soon crumbled. It also protected the personal rule by defending the opinions of the crown without proposing war (and consequently, an English parliament, which would be required to fund it). As such, the arguments of the Aberdeen doctors were warmly welcomed and helped define the pro-court position that would emerge in the coming years, even if Charles largely failed to win his English subjects over to this interpretation.

Rhetorics of obedience and authority permeate the doctors’ texts, and the ringing condemnation of, “by what authority,” opens the *Generall Demands*.\(^{24}\) By what authority had the Covenanters sent a delegation to Aberdeen, and by what authority had they created a new interpretation of what they claimed was an old oath? The doctors recognized the authority “truly and properly monarchical of the King,” and regardless of the nature of proposed religious reforms, refused to recognize the right of the Covenanters to make tumults and form bands that could potentially undermine this authority. Pointedly, they asked: “Whether it be fitting to swear to defend the Kings

\(^{23}\) Sharpe has suggested that no one was interested in Scottish news until war was certain; however, Fissel and Donald disagree. Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 796; Fissel, *The Bishops’ Wars*, 7; Donald, *Uncounselfed King*, 183-184, 187.

\(^{24}\) John Forbes and Alexander Henderson, *Generall Demands, Concerning the Late Covenant Propounded by the Ministers and Professor of Divinitie in Aberdeen* (London, 1638), 1.
Person and Authoritie, with this limitation, In the defence and preservation of the true Religion, laws and liberties of this kingome?" In their “Duplies,” which appeared in The Answers, the problem was made even more explicit. “Now certayne it is,” they wrote, “that in a Free Monarchie subjects have not the Sword from God, except by the hand of the King.” The Covenanters should remember their role, which was to offer all due obedience to their ruler in matters temporal, even when spurred on by the spiritual, as the laws of their kingdom required. According to the Aberdeen doctors, the quest for a godly society was laudable, but the path to achieving it must also be just. The doctors therefore claimed that “we aime indeed at the same end which ye professe, to wit, at the Truth, and purity of Religion, and peace of Church and Kingdome: But we are not as yet perswaded, that your way is lawfull and convenient for attaining to this end.”

John Ford has claimed that the conflict between the Aberdeen doctors and the Covenanters was one of interpreting how best to tie the bonds of God’s universal law. While the Covenanters argued that the necessity of protecting the Kirk from popish innovations meant eliciting an oath that would bind takers to rooting out corruption in all facets of religious life at whatever cost, the doctors believed divine will was best served by reinforcing the ties to monarchical authority. It is therefore no wonder that the court would encourage an English edition of the Aberdeen doctors’ arguments, since they bore a striking resemblance to concepts promoted by the crown through the Homily on Obedience for almost a hundred years. Read from the pulpits regularly, this homily

25 Ibid., 24, 23.
27 Ibid., 18.
reminded parishioners that “the high power and aucthorities of kynges, with theyr makyng of lawes, judgements and officers, are the ordinaunces not of man, but of God,” and that “we must refer al judgement to God, to kynges and rulers, and judges under them,” not act independently. Just as the Aberdeen doctors claimed, any “violence and injury that is committed against aucthorities is committed agaynst God.” This homily clearly defended the crown’s role as head of the church and placed the Covenanter rebellion not within the narrative of historic national conflicts between England and Scotland, or the struggles of the true church, but within the ongoing history of unlawful popular rebellions, such as those led by Perkin Warbeck and Jack Cade – a comparison that would be made more explicit in later literature. The homily itself was, of course, a response to the initial development of Calvinist resistance theory, which the monarchy maintained was illegitimate, and which Charles feared was beginning to rear its ugly head once again.

One issue that the rhetoric reminiscent of the Homily on Obedience was not equipped to deal with, however, was the role of the Scottish press in bypassing the usual protocols that governed the publication and distribution of print. Pro-court literature would display a continuing obsession with the nature and efficacy of print, an anxiety that was usually betrayed by some metaphor about pen or ink. In the case of the Aberdeen debates, it was not the doctors who raised it, but the king’s commissioner, the Marquis of

Hamilton. He appended a preface to the *Generall Demands* in order to defend himself against Covenanter accusations that he had looked fondly on their supplications and because he wished to prevent men’s minds from being “poisoned” by Covenanter lies. Hamilton therefore noted that he would try “by my pen to doe out that blot which they by their pen have laid upon me.”

Blots, poison and lies were the likely outcome of any publications that were not issued under the watchful eye of authority. The Covenanterers, although equally concerned about the power of print, never used such violent rhetoric when describing the press. They felt that print was most easily used to illuminate truth, not cast aspersions, and they approached the issue as one of intellectual (not physical) disputes. Descriptions of violent letters would thus remain the purview of court and pro-court writers and were an essential part of how they perceived Scottish rebels, and later, their English supporters.

Charles’s proclamations were most explicitly engaged with the problem of Scottish print. The first proclamation to his English subjects regarding the Bishops’ Wars was issued 20 February 1639. It was to be read from every pulpit, and 10,000 copies were also to be printed to ensure maximum distribution. In this proclamation, as Sharpe has noted, the multitude of printed pamphlets produced by the Covenanterers were listed first among their traitorous acts, appearing before unlawful meetings, raising of arms, and the taking control of Scottish castles. “The Print is the Kings in all Kingdomes,” Charles seethed, and “these seditious men have taken upon them to Print what they please, though

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31 Forbes and Henderson, *Generall Demands*, A2v
We forbid it, and to prohibit what they dislike, though We command it.”

At Easter of that year, Charles followed this up with what became known as the Large Declaration. Ghost-written by Walter Balcanquhall (coincidentally, an expatriate Scot), this mammoth text was claimed by the king as his own and made the same complaints. The Covenanters had erected their own scheme of censorship and publication, and “have discharged Our own Printer for printing any thing which concerneth these troubles, or may make against them, though commanded by us and our Councell.”

These documents commanded Charles’s English subjects not to receive any of the literature being produced by the Covenanters, but they were clearly ineffective, and on 30 March 1640, Charles issued yet another proclamation “against libellous and seditious Pamphlets, and Discourses sent from Scotland.”

This time Charles noted that the full force of the law would be deployed against anyone in possession of Scottish literature. Specifically:

that all and every person and persons of what degree or quality soever, now have or hereafter shall have any such libellous and seditious Discourse or Pamphlet, either in Manuscript or in Print, concerning his Majesties proceedings with his Subjects in Scotland, (other then such relations and Discourses concerning the same, as have been published and printed by his speciall Licence and Authority) and shall not within ten dayes after the date of these presents, bring and deliver the same to one of his principall Secretaries of State; All and every such person and persons shall incur the uttermost of such punishments and penalties, as by the Lawes of this Realm are to be inflicted.

Clegg has pointed out that the emphasis on people of “what degree or quality soever” is indicative of Charles’s increased determination to regain control over print, even when it came to regulating the better sort, who were often able to ignore decrees against illicit

35 Charles I, Proclamation (20 February 1639).
36 Walter Balcanquhall, A Large Declaration Concerning the Late Tumults in Scotland (London, 1639), 323, 415.
37 Charles I, A Proclamation against Libellous and Seditious Pamphlets, and Discourses sent from Scotland (London, 1640).
38 Ibid.
literature with relative ease.\textsuperscript{39} There was something particularly troubling to the regime about Covenanter literature which caused Charles to attack it so aggressively – most likely its effectiveness in convincing the English not to support the crown should the rebellion become an Anglo-Scottish national conflict. And while these proclamations therefore do not attach physically violent descriptors when discussing Scottish print, there is a clear sense that such literature was pernicious and insidious, subverting the proper hierarchy and undermining loyalty. In other words, that it had a violent and malignant effect on society, even if it did not constitute a violent act in itself. Ranking it among treacherous deeds such as the commandeering of castles though, suggests that this categorization had not been completely ruled out either.

For Charles, then, Scotland first and foremost represented a physical space from which his authority could be undermined. The Scots and traditional Anglo-Scottish animosities were not the problem, religious dissent that challenged the spiritual and secular hierarchies in both realms was. This was clearly outlined in another declaration, drafted by secretary Francis Windebank and issued prior to the meeting of the Short Parliament, wherein one of the many charges Charles hurled against the Covenanters was that they attempted “to raise again the partition wall between the two Nations and divide them, thereby to awaken those ancient National animosities.”\textsuperscript{40} The problem was not a garden variety border conflict; it was rebellion and the usurpation of the royal authority that governed both realms. Charles’s proclamations thus made no moves to incite a xenophobic reaction that might have helped to stem the tide of seditious literature

\textsuperscript{39} Clegg, \textit{Press Censorship}, 211.
\textsuperscript{40} Francis Windebank, \textit{His Majesties Declaration Concerning His Proceedings with His Subjects in Scotland, Since the Pacification in the Camp Neere Berwicke} (London, 1640), 28.
because he felt the problem was not uniquely Scottish. Rebellion was something infections. It was something that gathered strength and popularity as it unfolded, and knew no political bounds. Having crossed the Anglo-Scottish border in the past, most notably during the Northern Rebellion of 1569, Charles worried it would do so again.  

And his emphasis on the possession of Scottish literature indicates that he believed that ownership of Covenanter tracts was the first sign that this was occurring. Moreover, since Charles was quick to judge and slow to forgive, this opened another arena for conflict within England itself as the thirst for news, frustration with the personal rule, and in some cases, sympathy for the Scottish cause, undermined Charles’s attempts to recall the flood of Scottish pamphlets.

Charles’s initial approach to the problem of print makes sense when viewed with reference to how he believed such a rebellion began, and scholars now argue that the regime was beginning to fear a popular conspiracy. According to Richard Cust, the fear of what has been referred to alternatively as a popular or a puritan conspiracy grew out of the Elizabethan struggle with the Presbyterian classis movement in the 1580s and 1590s, and so it was only natural that it reappeared during this conflict with the Presbyterian Scots. Essentially the worry was that “various groups of factious and self-interested troublemakers were seeking to play on the irrational and destructive impulses of the people and pull down the monarchy.”

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42 Lee and Donald have both commented on Charles’s demanding disposition, especially when it came to the Scots. Lee, *Road to Revolution*, 136; Donald, *An Uncounseled King*, 24.
concept to the popish plot, but the two constructs remained “mutually exclusive,” and individuals were concerned with one model over the other based on whether they perceived popery or puritanism to be the greater threat.\textsuperscript{44} Cust has read the \textit{Large Declaration} as explicitly concerned with a popular conspiracy, condemning only a minority of rebels who used religion as a cloak for sedition in order to dupe the crown’s loyal subjects into disobedience, and it is difficult to doubt his conclusion when reading the text itself.\textsuperscript{45} One passage complains that “all Our royall and gracious intentions to that people were frustrated, by the rebellious and obstinate courses of some few who misse-led the rest,” while another refers to the Scots as a whole as “Our good but simple and seduced people.” He also complains that the rebels are “shot quite through the head with popularitie.”\textsuperscript{46}

The shorter 1639 proclamation, however, is even more explicit when outlining the idea of a popular conspiracy. In this proclamation, rebellion is “fomented” by some “factious spirits” under “pretences of Religion, the common cloak for disobedience,” who have “Treacherously induced many of our people to swear to a Band against Us; which Band and Covenant (or rather Conspiracy) of theirs, could not be with God.”\textsuperscript{47} Both of these documents were supposed to ensure that “Our loyall Subjects here [in England] and elsewhere, may not be infected, with their false, wicked, specious, but most seditious Informations.” The threat was one of rebel infection and deception influencing


\textsuperscript{45} Cust, “Charles I and Popularlity,” 250.

\textsuperscript{46} Balcanquhall, \textit{A Large Declaration}, 124, 184, 405.

\textsuperscript{47} Charles I, \textit{Proclamation} (20 February 1639).
unsuspecting simpletons, and was equally serious in both realms. Even when Charles cautioned his English subjects that they should fear potential border raids, the enemy therefore remained “these men and their Covenant,” who were consumed by “brain-sick distempers,” or men of “unquiet spirits” and “broken fortunes,” singling out conspiratorial leaders from the Scots as a whole. 48

Charles’s attempts to elicit loyalty in both his realms by exposing a popular conspiracy garnered some support, but might have been more effective if his own printed pleas were more inspirational. The Large Declaration, as an almost 500-page tome, was an especially inappropriate counter-measure to the concise, accessible and persuasive Covenanter pamphlets. If the expense of such a large volume did not prevent his subjects from reading it, a lack of stamina may have done so in at least some cases. 49 For those who did invest the time and money, the self-image presented by the crown was less than awe-inspiring. The reader was told of rebel contempt for “Our Crowne, dignities and Royal Commandment,” manifest in the Covenanters’ belief that “their King in their Ecclesiasticall Assembly hath no more power then any Towne Clerke, Taylor, or Seller.” And while these insults to regal authority were supposed to be self-evidently wrong, dwelling on them implicitly affirmed that monarchy could be challenged. Moreover, the reproduction of various Covenanter tracts and protestations, even within a carefully constructed animadversion, allowed readers access to documents and ideas that might otherwise have been difficult to obtain, and were most certainly considered illegal.

48 Ibid.
49 Paper was the most expensive element of the printing process in this period, ensuring that the size of the book itself (as opposed to size of the print run) determined the final retail price. Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering, 72, 80.
Conrad Russell has described this as “the problem of diminished majesty,” and argues that Charles possessed a “relentless determination” to note when, where, and how, his authority was challenged. This tactic both magnified the conflict for observers and caused Charles himself to cling more stubbornly than ever to his own ideal construction of royal supremacy. It therefore converted a conflict with a foreign rebel force into an analysis of kingship at home, by amplifying problems his English subjects were increasingly aware of. And these tendencies were not restricted to the *Large Declaration*. The 1639 proclamation noted that “the question is not now, whether a Service Book to be received or not, nor whether Episcopall government shall be continued, or Presbyteriall admitted, but whether We are their King or not.” The tactics of the Aberdeen doctors depended on the construction of a strong, authoritative, lawful monarchy which Charles believed he embodied. But instead of demonstrating the grandeur of his crown, he continued to fixate on “how farre they [the Covenanters] would trench upon Regall power.” In the 1640 declaration, he even complained that Scottish libels were “scandalous and dishonourable to Our Government” and that they have “wounded Our Authority” – statements meant to rally the troops against the tumultuous rabble-rousers, but which were in many ways counter-productive.

III

A smattering of other literature was published in 1639 and 1640 that empathically supported the crown’s perspective. Again, it adopted the theme of obedience to lawful authority, and again, it refused to cast the conflict in terms of Anglo-Scottish hostilities or

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51 Charles I, *Proclamation* (20 February 1639).
of Scottish backwardness and anti-Scottish sentiment, let alone some sort of anti-Presbyterian crusade. The regime clearly approved of several of these pieces and Henry Leslie’s *A Full Confutation of the Covenant Lately Sworne and Subscribed by Many in Scotland* (1639) was published “by authority.” Moreover, Henry Peacham’s *The Duty of All True Subiects to Their King* (1639), the anonymous *Loyalty’s Speech to England’s Subjects* (1639), and Corbet’s *Ungirding* (1639), all appeared with proper imprimaturs.

The others – Wye Saltonstall’s *The Complaint of Time* (1639 and 1640), Corbet’s other contribution, the pseudonymous *Epistle Congratulatorie of Lysimachus Nicanor of the Society of Jesu* (1640), and Huntley’s *Character of a True Subject* (1640)53 – likely only bypassed the censors for commercial reasons and their adherence to the same themes suggests that they would have been approved for publication had they been submitted.

All of these pamphlets reinforced one another and fit neatly with the royal proclamations and the Aberdeen dispute. The only possible exception was the *Epistle Congratulatorie*, which was the lone satiric contribution, condemning the Covenanter movement as more extreme and reprehensible than the Jesuits, but possessing strong enough thematic ties to override its stylistic difference. It is also important to include here as the only pamphlet deemed dangerous enough for the Covenanters to offer specific replies, and there were two Scottish responses printed before the year was out.54

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53 There are two 1640 editions of the Huntley text. The first was printed without his permission, so Huntley published a revised edition soon after, Marquis of Huntley, *The Character of a True Subject, or the Loyall Fidelity of the Thrice Honourable Lord* (London, 1640); Marquis of Huntley, *The Marquesse of Huntley his Reply to Certain Noblemen, Gentlemen, and Ministers, Covenanters of Scotland* (London, 1640).

The idea of a popular conspiracy is clearly present within all of this literature. As a loyal Scot, now in Ireland, Corbet specified already in his dedication to the Earl of Wentworth at the outset of the *Ungirding* that the Covenanters did not represent the whole Scottish nation, only the “factious spirits there,” the “mad-men” and those suffering from a “brain-sick malady.” In the work proper, he continued, “it’s notorious, that the whole body of the kingdome for the most part, did never dream of such a thing, as to take up armes against the Lords anointed, but were most deceitfully perswaded.” Leslie agreed, and went a step further, warning that a popular conspiracy is a much more dangerous thing than a popish plot. The Gunpowder Plot entailed “a few discontented Gentlemen, and the thousand Papists in England not guilty of it,” he wrote, “but in the present Rebellion of the Puritans, they have ingaged a great part of that Kingdome, and many who indeed know not what the matter means.” And should the plot succeed, the king would suffer more completely than under a popish tyranny, “For instead of one Pope, he must be subject unto a thousand.” Similarly, *The Epistle Congratulatorie* began by outlining the likenesses between Jesuit and puritan plotters, because “the Jesuit is called the Popish Puritan: and the Puritan is called the Protestant Jesuit.” Quickly, however, the fictional narrator explained that the Covenanters were the more extreme group as followers of John Knox and George Buchannan, “for how beit we grant that it is lawful to excommunicate Kings, yet wee hold it not necessary, that upon

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55 John Corbet, *The Ungirding of the Scottish Armour* (London, 1639), A3r-A3v
56 Ibid, 13.
excommunication, either deposition or killing should follow.” According to these authors, the Covenanters’ goal was anarchy, eloquently described by Saltonstall as an “equality of disorder.”

It is important to emphasize that conspiracy models were simultaneously too universal and too domestic to allow any significance at all to a specifically Scottish context. Popish plots were part of the universal struggle between the godly adherents of the true church and the minions of Antichrist – it included the atrocities on the continent such as the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572 and the conflicts of the Thirty Years’ War – and opposition to them was therefore part of a supra-national project. This was a truism apparent even in Foxe’s ever popular Acts and Monuments. Moreover, if popular conspiracies were structurally similar to popish plots, it was of equally little importance where disobedience began, since their significance had universal implications for monarchy and order, but had to be dealt with at a local level. This was particularly true of the Covenanting example, because their initial opposition to Charles in his role as a Scottish king quickly bled into an attempt to spread disorder beyond Scotland through printed pamphlets, demonstrating the irrelevance of national borders. The Epistle Congratulatorie therefore noted the royal irritation at Scottish “libels and letters” before dismissing it, and both the Ungirding and A Full Confutation made note that pamphlets were paving the way for a conflict that would spread throughout the three kingdoms.

58 John Corbet, The Epistle Congratulatorie of Lysimachus Nicanor of the Societie of Jesu, to the Covenanters in Scotland (London, 1640), 34.
61 Corbet, Epistle Congratulatorie, 68; Corbet, The Ungirding, 3; Leslie, Full Confutation, 13.
Ireland was at risk too, as both Leslie and Corbet noted, because the Scottish context “doth encourage you [in Ireland] in this your disobedience.”

It was also extremely tempting to domesticate the issue since the Covenanters, as partakers in a conspiracy against the crown, were ultimately noteworthy as rebels, not as Scots; and rebellions were a familiar problem, though they always failed. It was not until after the destruction and chaos of the Civil Wars and Interregnum that the much more frightening, secular implications of a conspiracy (as opposed to a simple rebellion) were defined. Thus, the language of rebellion permeates these texts, often citing specific English rebellions to contextualize the issues. It has already been noted that Leslie described popular conspiracy as a “Rebellion of the Puritans,” and The Ungirding similarly proclaimed that the Covenanters “publish Rebellion.” Huntley also explained in his speech that he had allowed himself to be imprisoned rather than be party to what he described as a Scottish rebellion, undermining claims that the current debate was about salvation, and implicitly associating the covenanters with a lineage of failed uprisings that lacked potency, upright leadership, and just cause. Peacham’s Duty of All True Subjects took a more generalized approach to the problem and explored universal principles that could rectify it. This approach meant that the closest he ever came to mentioning the Covenanters specifically was when he noted that England was now “in great hazard and danger because the enemy laboureth to winne to himself by Libels and letters, as many friends and abettors as he can.” This did not mean that the theme of domestic rebellion

62 Leslie, Full Confutation, 4.
63 Corbet, Ungirding, 33; Huntley, The Marquesse of Huntley his Reply, 2.
64 Henry Peacham, The Duty of All True Subjects to Their King: As also to their Native Country in Time of Extremity and Danger (London, 1639).
was absent though, and Peacham continually explained how good English subjects
“ought with all Patience to endure the Dominion of their Sovereign Prince and performe
this condition without grudging, mutinie or rebelling.”65

The anonymous Loyalty’s Speech to England’s Subjects read the events in
Scotland in terms of rebellion as well, and its subtitle claimed it was published so “That
Rebellion may not take strength in Our Time.”66 Personifying loyalty, this pamphlet then
provided the rebellion with an explicitly English narrative:

Thus might I with teares remember the wrong that I suffered in the Northern Rebellion... [and] I
passe over without speech (but never to be remembered without sighes) the lamentable Rebellions
made in Lincolnshire, the disorder in Norfolke by Ket and his bad companie, the intolerable
boldness in Kent by Jack Straw and his accomplisces.67

The outcome of these actions was, unsurprisingly, destruction and combustion. The
rebels wanted to “raise a flame that may give light,” but the result would be that “the
Common wealth shall burne.”68 Saltonstall also provided a history of English rebellion
and came to the exact same conclusion about the results, prefacing his versified
Complaint of Time with a warning that “the Chronicles of this Land doe witnesse that
Rebels have been always overthrown in their designes.” He listed Mortimer, Tom
Miller,69 Jack Straw, Wat Tyler, Perkin Warbeck and Jack Cade, noting that “The Scots
therefore cannot promise to themselves any better fortune.”70 Rebellion could only breed
destruction, Saltonstall continued:

65 Ibid., 5.
66 Anonymous, Loyalty’s Speech to Englands Subjects; Perswading them not to suffer Rebellion (London, 1639), title.
67 Ibid., 4-5.
68 Ibid., 5.
69 According to a popular Elizabethan play, Tom Miller was one of the other alleged conspirators that
helped Jack Straw foment rebellion in the peasant’s revolt of 1381. The Life and Death of Jack Staw
(London, 1593).
An armed brook of men sprung from contention
That in despight of mercy will proceed
To court their ruine, and desire to bleed.
Is there a Plurisie, and an excesse
In Spirituall matters that must find redresse
By such cruel Salve?\(^{71}\)

The answer was presumably yes, at least when it came to zealots, and the authority of the king was required to keep them in check.

These authors thus all chose to combat rebellion – both as a universal problem faced by rulers, and in its more particular English forms – by promoting loyalty and obedience to lawful authority, against earlier forms of Calvinist resistance. This, as we have seen, was exactly the same tactic deployed by the Aberdeen doctors in 1638 and in the *Homily on Obedience*. Corbet’s *Ungirding* even made reference to the Aberdeen doctors, noting that the Covenanters had not successfully answered the charges of abjuring lawful church practices and being unable to muster support from the great protestant divines for resisting the king.\(^{72}\) “Hee is not onely worldly minded,” wrote Corbet, “but *treasonably* minded to take up armes against Authoritie under colour of Religion.”\(^{73}\) Leslie was even more forceful in his explanation of the need to respect lawful authority. Comparing the Covenanters’ rash oath to that made by Herod, he continued: “And yet I must tell you, it is not altogether so haynous a crime to take the head from a prophet, as to pull a Crowne from a Kings head.”\(^{74}\) *Loyalty’s Speech* explained that this was because “the religious duty to your Prince,” as well as “the Kinde affection to your Country, and the Common care amongst your selves” were necessary in

\(^{71}\) *Ibid.*., A3r.

\(^{72}\) Corbet, *Ungirding*, 14, 43.

\(^{73}\) *Ibid.*, 50.

\(^{74}\) Leslie, *A Full Confutation*, 31.
a happy commonwealth. Rebellion and sedition were thus “capital in themselves,” and “never subjects would draw their Swords in seditious manner, but sheathe them in the gultie intrails of their own bowels.” Huntley, in an attempt to cast himself as the archetypal loyal subject, assumed all this was understood when he resolved that the Covenanters “may take my Head from my shoulders, but not my Heart from my Sovereigne.”

Peacham’s *Duty of All True Subject* is even similar enough to earlier arguments that it can be read as a new, context-specific, *Homily on Obedience*. Both the *Homily on Obedience* and Peacham’s work grew out of Paul’s letter to the Romans, wherein the apostle commanded that “every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God.” They then both moved through the possibilities of good and wicked rulers, God’s sole right to punish the wicked through providence (or, in Peacham’s case, through divinely appointed rulers), and ended with ringing condemnations of treason and the inescapable fate of traitors. Peacham thus began by noting that “it hath pleaseth God to establish this order amongst men, that is, to be governed by Kings and Soveraigne Magistrates, unto whom hee hath given power of ruling and rainging over them, wee must readily and willingly yield them all obedience, tendering unto them our service.”

Like the *Homily on Obedience*, he explained that “the Lord commands all nations to put their necks (that is) to submit themselves under the yoake of the King of Babylon”

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75 Anon., *Loyalty’s Speech*, 1-2.
and that those who refuse, provoke God’s vengeance. He then gave classical examples, but also several from medieval France and Spain, in order to prove this point.\textsuperscript{80} In the second part of the pamphlet, Peacham described the need to love one’s native country, but this only served to highlight the gruesome fate of traitors at the hands of lawful authority. The narrative was therefore about the English, and how they should meet rebellion, and never about the errors of the Scots. For this reason, Peacham concluded by noting that in times of danger (the Covenanter threat is obviously implied here), citizens should “freely and cheerfully, and if need be with the hazard of our lives, open our purses, with the widest, for the common good.”\textsuperscript{81} The real threat to England was sympathy for the Scottish Covenanters and a failure to help the crown mobilize against them, not the Covenanters themselves. Despite this impressive argument, Peacham’s approach does not appear to have resonated with the English since, in April 1640, when the Short Parliament was asked to offer the wealth of the nation against the Scots, it stalwartly refused.

By 1640, some authors were therefore experimenting with other rhetorical tactics as Charles’s poor performance during the Bishops’ Wars was becoming bigger news and the regime was starting to lose strict control over the press. Saltonstall published a second edition of his \textit{Complaint of Time} in 1640, to which he appended a new preface that was much less careful about keeping the issue of Scottishness out of the discussion. The Covenanting movement was still a “Puritan powder-plot,” led only by “some Scots,” but stereotyped Anglo-Scottish competition seeped into the text through remarks about

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, 11, 14-22.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid.}, 62.
“rebellious blewcaps” and Saint George dominating Saint Andrew.\textsuperscript{82} The potential of real military conflict between the two nations meant that even the title was altered, becoming *England’s Complaint: Against Her Adjoyning Neighbours the Scots*, and the new preface noted that the work had been reissued in “defiance of the Scots,” and urged the English to “arme, arme, arme, against their malicious heart.”\textsuperscript{83}

Furthermore, the future royalist pamphleteer, Martin Parker, published three pro-court ballads in 1640 that were much more overtly anti-Scot than what had come before, although he did not completely abandon the framework of rebellion versus obedience. In *A True Subjects Wish*, Parker rhymed:

\begin{quote}
the factious Scot
is very hot,
His ancient spleene is ne’er forgot
He long hath bin about this plot.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

Parker also attacked the “proud outdaring Scots” and “saucy Jacke;” however, he also explained that the Covenanters were “faithlesse Rebels” and that despite their claims, religion did not allow “that any subiect arm’d should be,/ against his Prince.” The real reason to aid the crown was therefore to “scourge the Scots disloyalty.”\textsuperscript{85} Parker also continued the emphasis on English loyalty and valour in his *Britaine’s Honour*, wherein he described how two valiant Welshmen had stood their ground at Newburn Ford while everyone else ran away. He claimed these men were inspirational, and demonstrated how “True Brittains scorne to turne their tayles,” attempting to shame his compatriots into

\textsuperscript{82} Wye Saltonstall, *Englands Complaint: Against Her Adjoyning Neighbours the Scots* (London, 1640), A3\textsuperscript{v}-A3\textsuperscript{r}.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., A3\textsuperscript{r}.
\textsuperscript{84} Sir Charles Firth, “Ballads on the Bishops’ Wars, 1638-40,” *Scottish Historical Review* 3 (1906): 263.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 264-265.
actions.\textsuperscript{86} For the most part, this appeal fell on deaf ears, but Parker does record one instance of an English troop who chased off Scottish looters in the north in \textit{Good Newes from the North}. By this point though, he had completely abandoned any attempt to qualify that the problem might only be some Scots, and spoke instead in general terms about how “The Scots” tended to “afflict the people in outrageous wise” and steel “Money plate and such good geere” as they could get their hands on.\textsuperscript{87} It was no longer about a conspiracy that bred rebellion, which English obedience and loyalty would crush. Now, Parker sought to re-ignite ancient hostility against a hostile foreign force.

But outright Scots-bashing in the press during the Bishops’ Wars was generally very rare, despite Mark Stoyle’s claims that “English dislike of the Scots remained extremely strong during the early seventeenth century.”\textsuperscript{88} It would be much more accurate to say that opinions about the Scots were often ambiguous and in flux, and at this particular moment, it seems they were quite popular. To his credit, Stoyle does note the Bishops’ Wars were an abnormality within a larger trend of English xenophobia, but one should be cautious of his suggestion that anti-Scottish sentiment was so naturally and easily attached to the king’s cause from 1639 onwards.\textsuperscript{89} As is now clear, Charles’s aim was to drum up hostility against disobedience and rebellion more generally, and he was careful to avoid specific criticism of the Scottish nation. And despite the later anti-Scottish backlash that Stoyle has so convincingly argued occurred with the remodelling of the parliamentary army, the most noteworthy thing about this period was the lack of...
Scotophobia, and in some cases, an outright pro-Scottish attitude. Besides the secret correspondence Russell has unearthed between future parliamentarian lords and the Scots, there were a number of pamphlets and ballads produced during 1640 that praised Scottish actions, denying that defence of the true religion constituted rebellion at all. The most famous of these was the anonymous ballad, *God-a-mercy Good Scot*.

*God-a-mercy Good Scot* was an anti-papal diatribe attacking English bishops, the title of which was also its refrain. According to the balladeer, corrupt agents “The peace of this kingdome they sought for to marr/ to change our sought plentie to famine and war,” but the Scots had exposed them and begun the process of driving them off. In the same vein, the first and second parts of *Scotlands Encouragement: Scotland’s Triumph in Spight of Rome and Spaine*, rejoiced in the toppling of popery and bishops. “O noblest enterprise, without example,” exclaimed the first part, “That Scottish Lambe on Romish Wolfs did trample;” while the second announced that “God who light can cut of darkness bring,/ by women weak this Babel down did ding,” referencing Jenny Geddes’s fateful stool. Scottish aggression was considered far from rebellious, and instead, “all ages who their [the Scots’] storie read,/ May blesse the time when first they march’d ov’r Tweed.” The anonymous *An English Challenge and a Reply from Scotland* was slightly more ambiguous, highlighting Anglo-Scottish disagreements and doubts about Scottish intentions. Ultimately though, it too explained that every Scot “loves the Truth and hates the false,” and had risked war for the good of the whole island. “Since ye [the English]

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92 Anon, *Scotlands Triumph over Rome, the second part*. 
want hearts to act your parts,” explained the Scottish speaker, “Mars hath called the valiant Scots.”

It is impossible to discover the exact distribution of this material, but the broadside format made it cheap and rhymes would have aided in making it memorable. And whether or not a substantial number of people actually consumed these ballads, they are still worth commenting on because this type of rhetoric would have been extremely dangerous to publish even the year before, despite seditious ballads being a staple of manuscript culture – the Caroline regime was starting to lose control, and this was opening up the press to a greater variety of opinion on all kinds of things, including the Scots and the Bishops’ Wars. The other noteworthy element of these songs, moreover, is that despite being the polar opposite of Charles’s understanding of the conflict, both perspectives tended to erase the Anglo-Scottish border. While Charles was afraid of a popular conspiracy creating a rebellion that would know no bounds, those writing in favour of Scottish action celebrated a truly British liberation. The sense of Presbyterian difference that would haunt later literature was not problematic in this context and pro-Scottish ballads optimistically sang of a unified goal.

This was also not the only pro-Scottish literature being produced in England, and according to DavidComo, the Cloppenburg press was busy printing Covenanter literature not in Amsterdam, but surreptitiously in London throughout 1640. Five Covenanter tracts were printed on this press, and these, in order of appearance, were: An information from the states of the kingdome of Scotland, A remonstrance concerning the present troubles, The intentions of the armie of the kingdome of Scotland, The lawfullnesse of our

93 Anonymous, An English Challenge and a Reply from Scotland (London, 1640).
expedition into England manifested, and Our demands of the English lords manifested. The press, Como argues, was operated by English puritans who were uninterested in the Presbyterian cause, but who saw the opportunity to help break down authoritarian restrictions on the dissemination of other radical religious ideas. The Cloppenburg editions also added a variation of the Marprelate pseudonym to the title pages of two of the tracts as an indication of their English heritage. This was a pointed allusion to the boisterous and railing personal attacks on episcopacy undertaken by the infamous Martin Marprelate in 1589 and 1590, during his well-known campaign to involve a more popular audience in English religious controversy. Como has aptly read this as being suggestive of a continuity of radical religious “tactics and political style” from Marprelate to the Civil Wars and, in many ways, use of the pseudonym serves as recognition that the Covenanter rebellion held meaning for a specifically English religious culture, placing it within the historical narrative of internal English debate. Those involved with this venture, then, saw the universal nature of the Covenanter struggle while simultaneously domesticating the issue and ignoring the problem of Scottishness in much the same way as other English publication did.

94 Dates from Como, ‘Secret printing’.  
95 Ibid., p.81.  
98 Como, “Secret printing,” 82.
A sizeable portion of manuscript evidence also survives for this period, and reveals a more consistent pro- versus anti-Scottish divide than the aforementioned pamphlets do because it was not regulated in the same way. This is not surprising because, as we have seen, the perspective presented in print only began to fracture in 1640. But manuscripts also remind historians that despite the relative lack of armed combat, people preparing for the Bishops’ Wars did not know this would be the case. This is not to accuse scholars of denying that contemporaries were afraid; on the contrary, David Cressy and Conrad Russell have both commented on the capacity for English hysteria during the second war, making special note of the council’s order for extra ordinance to be stockpiled at the Tower of London.99 Instead, it is to identify that the emphasis on the logistical errors in Charles’s military preparation, pro- and anti-Scottish politicking, and the search for the roots of the Civil Wars has overshadowed acknowledgment of the genuine distress felt by some English men and women between 1638 and 1640. It is important to re-emphasize this sense of panic because it illuminates an important part of how the Scots were perceived. One of the few identifiable traits they did actually possess was that they were an impressive martial force to be reckoned with. Despite literary portrayals of them as beggars and fools, carrying oatcakes and playing the bagpipes, the Scots were not to be taken so lightly when it came to war.100 As we have seen, even when national conflict did not loom just over the horizon, the English

99 Cressy, England on Edge, 38; Russell, Fall of the British Monarchies, 147.
100 See Weldon’s “Perfect Description of Scotland,” various copies and editions of which are outlined in the introduction, and J.O. Bartley, Teague, Shenking and Sawney (Cork: Cork University Press, 1954), 79-88.
tended to comment on Scottish martial prowess – a potentially useful attribute that the English desired throughout the seventeenth century to harness.

The interest in, but difficulty of, obtaining accurate news about the Covenanter was part of what fuelled English unease during the Bishops’ Wars, and apart from the Large Declaration, there was very little available in print. This was not abnormal and Ian Atherton has argued that manuscript news was far more important than printed relations into the eighteenth century.101 In this case though, newsletter writers could not always discern what was happening either, hampered by distance and lack of Scottish intelligence. Edward Rossingham’s newsletter dated 11 June 1639 therefore explained that in regards to the “northerne newes,” the reports “are soe various, as I knowe not what is true, but I will write what I heare, hereafter wee shall knowe, what part of it is true, and what falce.”102 This might otherwise be interpreted as a standard disclaimer about untested news, but in this case, even the king’s army and officials in the north had difficulty obtaining information.103 In a letter written from York on 16 April 1639 by Edward Norgate to Robert Read, Francis Windebank’s secretary, Norgate expressed his frustration as follows:

Hither are come more then a good many of the Scots with many complaints of insolencies done by the Covenanter and losses sustained by themselves. But there is no grater discord between the 2 Nations then in their reports. Some of them tell how narrowly they escapt what Castles and Townes taken, what people imprisoned. That the Covenanters are all mad with rage and rebellion and will venture upon any attempt, though never so desperate or dangerous. Others againe deny this, and say they came fairly on, that the Covenanters have not hurt anyone, not somuch as a

102 Lord Scudmore’s newsletters acquired during the Bishops’ Wars, BL Add 11045, f.27r.
103 Atherton argues that news in the seventeenth century was always uncertain, and connoisseurs of news culture were therefore encouraged to read widely, with correspondents offering disclaimers accordingly. Atherton, “Itch Grown a Disease,” 45.
broken pate can appear more then the stealing a little plate from the Earl of Winton... What to do with these reports, or how to reconcile ‘em in faith I know not.\textsuperscript{104}

Henry de Vic was also concerned about the lack of information from Scotland and wrote to Windebank that “the Covenanters worked with a dark lantern: they see both us and what we do, and we see neither them nor their actions.”\textsuperscript{105} Civilian letters also noted the difficulty of obtaining information, and as the Pitt family discussed whether or not Elizabeth Brandling should be rushed from Alnwick, William Catherens related the refusal of the military oath by Lord Saye and Sele and Lord Brooke, but offered no insights into the war itself because “howe ye Business standes betwixt ye kinge and ye Scotts we heare nothinge.”\textsuperscript{106} Even when the issue became more pressing after the 1640 Scottish invasion, a letter from Sir Edward Hartopp to Sir John Coke explained that the size of the Scottish army “is variously reported,” and also corrected the allegedly common story that the Scots had burned Newcastle.\textsuperscript{107}

While information was sparse, apprehension was plentiful. Thomas Windebank, the Secretary of State’s son, thus wrote to Robert Read, “I cannot blame you for your apprehensions of the business in hand; we ourselves begin to be a little daunted when we look upon our enemy’s strength and cast our eyes back again upon our own confusion and wants.”\textsuperscript{108} The Pitts fretted as well, and Elizabeth confessed to her brother that “my fere groe dayle greater I know not whether my danger be more,” which troubled Edward enough to want to send a coach “to remove you from the mouth of the enemy and bring

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{State Papers} 16/417/107  
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{CSPD}, Charles I/418/87  
\textsuperscript{106} Correspondence of the family of Pitt, BL Add 29974, 294.  
\textsuperscript{107} BL Add 64921, f.112.  
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{CSPD}, Charles I/423/14
you amongst your friends.”\textsuperscript{109} Dr. William Griffith also reported to his wife from London that “The Intelligence out of Scotland is every day more uncomfortable, and though he initially had hopes for peace, he now heard that the Covenanter army was within miles of the king, and that they were “thousands in number more then wee are.”\textsuperscript{110} By the second Bishops’ War, a rumour from the border had put Berwick “into a great fright,” although officials refused to believe it after the first war had come to nothing.\textsuperscript{111} When it finally sank in that the Scots were indeed ready to fight this time, the earl of Northumberland worried that the “Scotts are drawing their army towards our borders, and making provision to feede them, and I feare I shall in my next letters send you some newes of the dissolution of a good part of ours for want of pay.”\textsuperscript{112}

Despite the consistent avoidance of published discussion about the possible military outcomes, the Scots therefore do appear to have been perceived by some as a formidable foe, organized and dangerous enough to be feared. During the Bishops’ Wars, the Covenanters had taken Scotland through a military revolution, following the Swedish model, and the English forces had visibly failed to keep pace.\textsuperscript{113} Mark Charles Fissell describes an English army full of untrained men, unkempt weapons, and general disorder, and nothing illustrates this better than when, in June 1639, someone shot a bullet through the king’s tent.\textsuperscript{114} Cressy claims that the situation was so extreme that it was a “common conceit” in 1640 that the English suffered more from their own troops than from the

\textsuperscript{109} BL Add 29974, 280, 288, 290. \\
\textsuperscript{110} National Library of Wales, Carreglwyd, Series II, 15. \\
\textsuperscript{111} CSPD, Charles I/456/43; CSPD, Charles I/457/48. \\
\textsuperscript{112} Earl of Northumberland to Earl of Leicester, 22 July 1640, BL M286/7, f.91. \\
\textsuperscript{114} Fissell, The Bishops’ Wars; CSPD, Charles I/423/16.
Some were thus ashamed when the inevitable defeat came, and Captain John Barry wrote to Sir Philip Perceval that “the kings inabilities to make resistance, the shame and dishonour ye like noe storie makes mention of, ye ever happened to the nation.” And Rossingham, the news-writer, had already conveyed the same sentiment after the first conflict, when he wrote that “there was a sermon preacht in some Church about London, wherin was ventis this passage following, That it had bine much better all the rivers should runn with blood, then that the kinge should have made such a dishonourable peace with his subjects of Scotland.”

That said, fear and shame are both self-reflexive emotions, and even if these anxieties allowed the Scots agency as a martial power for a time, they ultimately did little to offer a coherent picture of the Scottish actors themselves. The real emphasis landed on English shortcomings, and the impact on England of a Scottish victory in the north. As had occurred during the union debates, the English tendency towards a narcissistic gaze won out. Scotland’s role as a foil for English politics, instead of as an autonomous partner in the Stuart multiple monarchy – despite the whole conflict proving that they were – established several problems that would haunt the Scots in the future. First and foremost, it made it very difficult for the Scots to defend their interests when every time they got England’s attention, social, religious and political similarities caused a reflective glare that the English were disinclined to look past. And secondly, it meant that when the Scots did make enough noise to get noticed, they would be met with hostility and anger for disturbing a specifically English monologue. It was at these moments when the

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116 Correspondence papers of the earl of Egmont 1640-1641, BL Add 46924, f.99v.
117 BL Add 11045, f.38r.
aggressive “gothic” imperialism described by Allan Macinnes was activated; the rest of the time, the English were happy to allow Scotland to ignite debates, but were then disinclined to take Scottish concern into account after that point.\footnote{This will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter.}

Already during the Bishops’ Wars, there were some colourful descriptors provoked by the Scottish Covenanting army. As English society began to take sides regarding the nature and extent of royal authority over church and State, those interested in protecting the true religion and the role of representative assemblies often expressed brotherly support and admiration for the Scots, while some of those who defended the prerogatives of the crown in matters both temporal and spiritual desperately tried to push the Scots back out of the English political discourse by Othering them. Perhaps the most quotable quote to come from all this was Thomas Windebank’s angry rant in the wake of the first Bishops’ War. Writing to his cousin, Robert Read, Windebank complained of his long, wet, cold time in the field during which he and his men had kept up spirits:

\begin{quote}
with the hopes of rubbing, fubbing, and scrubbing those scurvy, filthy, durty, nasty, lousie, itchy, scabby, shitten, stinking, slovenly, snotty nos’d loggerheaded foolish, insolent, proud, beggarly, impertinent, absurd, proud-headed, villainous, barbarous, bestiall, false, lying, rogueish, divelish, long ear’d short hair’d, damnable, Athisticall, puritanical Crue of the Scotch Covenant.
\end{quote}

\footnote{SP 16/424/50.}

\footnote{CSPD, Charles I/420/121; CSPD, Charles I/451/71.}

Edward Norgate similarly commented that “Nothing here is so false and so detested as a Scotch Covenanter,” and Viscount Conway complained that of all the Scotsmen travelling to and from London, “there is not one, of what quality soever he be, who tells one true word.”\footnote{CSPD, Charles I/420/121; CSPD, Charles I/451/71.} A verse libel among the earl of Northumberland’s papers cast Scotsmen as spoiled, mad, fanatics and contrasted the forced loans and fines experienced in England to the relative calm in Scotland. Accused of attempting to “burne their
Neighbours houses to fire their owne,” the Scots were depicted as expert conspirators who specialized in “the murder of their kinge.” The product of “Calvins tinder box,” the poet called for “knocks” to end the troubles.\textsuperscript{121}

But although these comments were exuberant – Stoyle has mused that an entire chapter might be devoted to Windebank’s statement alone – it is the fact that there were not more such statements during the Bishops’ Wars that is truly striking.\textsuperscript{122} And although a tidal wave of anti-Scottish sentiment would wash over England as the Civil Wars progressed, between 1638 and 1640, there was plenty of sympathy for the Scots to go around. The Covenanter literature Charles so pointedly disallowed was very difficult to get rid of and at least a portion of the English population was interested in reading it. Robert Read found twenty-two copies of one of the Covenanter pamphlets during his search of the post in February 1639. There was also a man caught spreading seditious Scottish books in York in March, and even a pamphlet circulating among Captain Rolleston’s brigade in Suffolk as the Covenanters were crossing the Tweed.\textsuperscript{123} Rossingham also made note of Covenanter tracts being “sprinkled” or “cast” about, on at least three separate occasions.\textsuperscript{124} Some of this may be attributed to curiosity, but there are also records of potentially treasonable pro-Scottish comments. John Alured claimed that the Scots were “brave boys, and would make us all quake” in July 1638, and Ralph Fewler announced that “the Scottish Covenanters were no way to be accused, for they did

\textsuperscript{121} BL M286/7, f.187.  
\textsuperscript{122} Stoyle, \textit{Soldiers and Strangers}, 75.  
\textsuperscript{123} CSPD, Charles I/413/120; CSPD, Charles I/413/121; CSPD, Charles I/414/13; CSPD, Charles I/464/79.  
\textsuperscript{124} BL Add 11045, f. 3v, f.5v, f.118r.
nothing but in defence of their own right and maintenance of the gospel.”

There was also a libel in circulation in March 1638 stating “the Covenanters to bee noe Rebells, but good, and loyall subjects, notwithstanding the kings late proclamation to the contrary,” and the anglicized Scot, Lord Carr, unabashedly claimed in 1639 that the Covenanters were “loyall, and as good subjects, as the king has in any of his dominions.” This, in combination with the 1640 ballads praising the Scots for ousting popery from England, indicates that the regal union bequeathed the potential for unity as well as discord between the British peoples.

V

This chapter began with a condescending Jesuit’s account of the Bishops’ Wars as he saw them, so it is perhaps fitting to end with an undated satirical newsletter which also tried to reduce the conflict into something more manageable. Sympathetic to no one, this author believed that the whole ordeal was folly. The king’s officers were untested, the soldiers serving under them were “halfe starving and halfe naked,” and the women in both kingdoms were likely to riot for lack of men. The great question between the nations, he explained, was that “between the Puritan & the Papist, which is the best Christian;” yet in reality, both were reprehensible. “For the Papist with his darke lantern would undermine all government” and “the puritan like blind bayard is soe bold as to summon all the zealous” of other kingdoms, but “he neither loveth any puritan nor any rebellion” at home. Jaded, he concluded “luck is all.”

We must therefore never lose sight of the fact that some people preferred not to get involved in the religious and

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125 CSPD, Charles I/395/29; CSPD, Charles I/413/42
126 BL Add 11045, f.3r, f.19r.
constitutional divisions that were forming during and after the Bishops’ Wars, and would have preferred to avoid any context wherein they would be asked what they thought of the Scots at all.

For those that did have an opinion though, there was a noteworthy tendency to discuss the Scots and their demands only insofar as they could be used as a springboard into either universal or domestic issues – never specifically British ones. The Scots were rebels or saviours, involved in general processes that also had familiar domestic lineages. Paradoxically, however, open conflict between English and Scottish armies generated a discourse that vindicated James VI and I’s attempts at closer union by erasing Anglo-Scottish difference and temporarily marginalizing the anti-Scottish rage that would become so important in the coming years. The process was thus markedly similar to that which Ethan Shagan has described with respect to public responses to the Irish rebellion but with drastically different results. In 1641, when the Irish uprisings broke, the crown responded by condemning treason and rebellion, and the English puritans by condemning popery. The problem, according to Shagan, was that allegations of crown support for Irish papists made the ideologies of obedience and anti-papery newly incompatible, and so the nation began to arm because internal modes of processing external threats were geared towards conflict. So why then, did almost the exact same circumstances (ideologies of anti-papery and obedience, with the crown implicated in popery through its support of what was seen as a highly corrupt Episcopal structure) not cause them immediately to fight violently amongst themselves?

The answer, I would argue, lies not only in the degree of popish plotting in which the crown was involved but also how “external” Scotland was. Instead of being described as either foreign or domestic, the kingdom occupied a liminal space, phasing in and out of sameness and difference from the English perspective. The Scots were foreign enough that they provoked the mustering of forces and triggered momentary panic and response, but their complaints – and more importantly, their faith – were similar enough to England’s that they quickly faded from view as an appendage in what would become a domestic issue. Once this happened, there was no longer any external pressure to keep opposing parties armed since English and Scots were allegedly working in tandem towards mutual goals, and a calmer style of debate once again became the order of the day. This made the situation fundamentally different from the threat posed by the Catholic Irish. The difficulty in all this for the Scots was that they needed to maintain an element of difference in order to ensure that their own issues were addressed, and in the process of doing so, risked re-emerging as a more clearly external foe. This is what happened in 1648 and 1650, and ultimately resulted in Cromwellian conquest.

Although the printed literature during the Bishops’ Wars was more unified in its approach to Scotland than that of later periods, the manuscript sources and government papers indicate that there was already a rift between those who believed that Scotland was familiar and those who felt that it was foreign. The best way of compensating for this divide, and for allowing the English to get back to focussing on their own internal problems, was to acknowledge the usefulness of Scottish acts, while leaving the nature of Scotland and its people unaddressed. David Scott’s account of the activities of what the Yorkshire gentlemen did during the Second Bishops’ War corroborates this hypothesis.
Despite the anti-Scottish sentiment that many of these northerners felt, officials recognized the utility of momentary cooperation with the Scots in order to protect the county resources, which they felt the crown was likely to squander in preparations for armed conflict. The subsequent erasure of Scotland was then effected in order to bypass the question of the unwanted union, putting off the question of what to do with the Scots.

The opening up of public discourse, and Scottish perseverance at ensuring their demands were recognized, meant that there was an increasingly pressing need to decide if the Scots were protestant brethren or uncivilized foreign enemies. Within this context, the Bishops’ Wars functioned not only as the gateway to the Civil Wars, but also as the opening act in a more general renegotiation of the union of the crowns. The next chapter will therefore investigate what happened when this negotiation broke down and the English were forced despite various reservations to conquer Scotland. It will probe the incorporating union that resulted from this conquest, and fostered an unusually acute awareness of the Scottish presence. But ultimately we will see how even this experience of closeness failed to concretize the meaning of Scotland, contributing to an identity crisis within the Commonwealth that was only resolved by the Restoration and the final termination of the Commonwealth and protectoral experiments.

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129 Scott, “Hannibal at our Gates.”
Chapter Four: The Interregnum and Experimentation with an Incorporating Union

Up until this point, we have been charting the effects of the loose dynastic union that mediated the Anglo-Scottish relationship, but in September 1651 Oliver Cromwell defeated the Scottish army at Worcester, and the English became de facto conquerors and lords of an unexpected empire. Although the English would ultimately prefer a strategy of unification over annexation, they were still forced to maintain military outposts throughout the Interregnum in order to keep control of the Scots. In a thought-provoking article entitled “The English Republic and the Meaning of Britain,” Dererk Hirst has highlighted the simultaneous expansionist and protectionist impulses that this reality generated. Specifically, he has illuminated the tension between apocalyptic fervour – especially the dream of a protestant Anglo-Scottish empire that would defeat antichrist – and English chauvinistic-exclusiveness.¹ As part of this analysis, Hirst commented on the relative silence of the English press on matters Scottish, particularly after 1654, although he did classify the extant material as military updates, religious reports, occasional judicial commentaries, histories, or unapologetic diatribes against the Scots. Despite this impressive survey, Hirst did not have the space to give full consideration to the material at hand, and a more detailed analysis of this highly eclectic conversation is still required.² Furthermore, although conversations about the Scots did indeed drop off during the second half of the 1650s, those comments which did circulate (both in the early and later years of that decade) illuminate the strategies used by the English to process their new

² Ibid., 459-60, 473-4.
situation as conquerors of, and then partners with, the Scots. Sometimes these strategies were useful; at other times they simply betrayed anxiety and confusion. But taken as a whole, they undoubtedly add to our understanding of the practical and imaginative stumbling-blocks involved in constructing a new regime during this incredibly tumultuous period, especially given the growing divergence between Scottish and English attachments to monarchy and Presbyterianism.

Not all of the information available about Scotland was straightforward, and one exceptionally strange story that appeared in a 1653 newsbook recounted the bizarre tale of Margaret Rayne. It read:

The Judges have sat severall times this weeke upon Criminall Causes at Edinburgh. There was one Triall of a very strange nature. There was brought before them one Margaret Rayne (so called) 18. years of age, who hath constantly been held a woman till of late, that She was accused of that detestable abomination of Buggery with a Mare, who upon ordinary search was thought to be a Hermaphrodite, but now by an Inquest of Chirurgeons is found to be a man of that sort which the learned call Hyposadians [possessed of an abnormally placed urinary opening]. This Creature, by evidence of certain persons is convict of that beastly Crime, and I beleeve will be burned, together with the beast, according to the Mosaicall Law.³

In this report, Scotland was a puzzle of contradictions, of things that should not be, and yet were, and it was strangely captivating as a result, albeit in a “train-wreck-cannot-look-away” kind of way. It was a place full of apparently brutish people, but this appeared more enthralling than dangerous. The story thus contains implicit condemnations of the aberrations Scotland tended to produce (intriguingly, the story does not appear to be paralleled by reports of like occurrences in any other foreign nations, including Ireland), but it also represented something very different from the now familiar anti-Scottish sentiment that could rear its ugly head at times of crisis. Margaret’s story both filled and sold the newsbook, and in so doing, it provided a gateway to Scottish events while

³ Mercurius Politicus, 140, (10-17 February 1653): 2229-2230.
maintaining a comfortable distance between the reader and the subject material. Trading on the established market for tales of monstrous births and sensational murders in order to get attention, the choice to place the report in a familiar English stylistic framework might also have threatened to bring the sins of Scotland home.  

It could be argued that the story of Margaret Rayne was simply an example of Scottish barbarism, and as such that it functioned as part of the justification for the civilizing and imperial impulse which Hirst argues existed within the English Commonwealth and Protectorate. And yet, it does not appear to have been deployed in this manner. Margaret’s story was scintillating and scandalous, but the newsbook never explicitly stipulated that she, or her crimes, were representative of the Scottish nation as a whole, thus justifying conquest. It therefore serves as a reminder that the imperialist impulses which did exist in Interregnum England were often muted and implicit, and the story gives force to Hirst’s comment that it was truly “remarkable” that England failed to “make more of the ideological and propaganda openings that its British conquests had created.”

This chapter seeks to explain this lack of overt imperial celebration, at least with regards to Scotland, by examining curious stories like this one, as well as the staggering number of anti-Scottish diatribes that appeared alongside them. Since Hirst has already made note of meaningful gaps, it will do so by examining the material that does exist. But in order to complicate and complement this analysis, it will also examine the relationship between the English garrisons established north of the border and their

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5 Hirst, “The English Republic,” 469.
Scottish neighbours. This will help explain how discourse and action were related to one another, why discourses about Scotland were so overwhelmingly negative in this period, and what the Anglo-Scottish relationship in the 1650s looked like in more general terms. It will also identify the other factors, besides chauvinism, that help explain the English reluctance fully to embrace an imperial role despite a newly acquired incorporating union. In short, it will once again investigate how Scotland’s familiar alterity complicated the relationship between the two kingdoms.

While an inquiry into the garrisons might seem out of place in a history of discourse, it is a necessary litmus test. Like the examination of the borderlands under James, it can help expose knowingly fictitious discursive strategies, and aid scholars in asking if the anti-Scottish rhetoric that emerged during the Interregnum told the whole story. Moreover, the Cromwellian occupation of Scotland simply cannot be overlooked, and it is absolutely essential that historians ask how this affected the ways in which the English situated themselves in the wider world. This approach therefore helps to fill the geographical gaps in the historical narrative. Beyond this, it also serves to augment the printed records, since information about the occupation serves as a bridge between the early 1650s, when conversation about the Scots broke off, and 1659, when the English began once again explicitly to question the union they had created.

Undertaking this type of analysis means that it is tempting to use an ever-extending set of temporal boundaries and begin with the outbreak of the wars of the three kingdoms, or even with Charles I’s personal rule. But the need for coherence must restrict this impulse to the Interregnum: the period from January 1649 until March 1660 when England morphed from a monarchy into a republic, a protectorate (with varying degrees
of military rule), and finally, back into a monarchy again. Furthermore, not only are these years generally accepted as legitimately set apart from the years of Stuart rule which bracket them, they also represent the only period of political union between England and Scotland during a century otherwise characterized by a mere union of the crowns. Therefore, while the occasional reference to Civil War experiences and animosities must and does appear, this chapter will largely restrict itself to the remarkable years after the regicide and before the Restoration.

It must also be noted, that due to the type of extant sources, this chapter will focus less on royalist perspectives than on opinions voiced by those who were, if not wholly supportive of the new regime, not actively seeking to restore the monarchy either from within England or from beyond the seas. Royalists had lost control of the English press by 1649 and did not participate in the occupation of Scotland. Moreover, evidence of royalist opinion about the Scots during the Interregnum indicates that they were no more enamoured with Scotland than they were with any of the other rebellious British domains. In fact, a memorandum in the Surrey History Centre reveals that Stuart advisors distrusted the Scots, believing they had made a secret agreement with the English radicals, a document which sets the tone for future relations.6 It has even been argued that no one detested the Scots more than the exiled Charles II on account of his rough handling by Covenanters between 1650 and 1651, with the newly covenanted king allegedly exclaiming that he would rather be hanged than ever return to Scotland.7

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6 Surrey History Centre, Papers of Sir Edward Nicholas, 1287/12.
Royalist impotence, and their general anti-Scottish outlook, then, mandates that they only appear here as peripheral characters, re-entering our narrative as the Restoration approached.

II

Much of the existing historiography surrounding the Interregnum is dominated by the figure of Oliver Cromwell, complemented by a rich body of scholarship surrounding the parliaments and councils of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Such studies often analyze the problem of finding a lasting political settlement during a very unsettled decade, and attempt to decipher whether it was Cromwell, parliament, the council, or the army holding the reins of government. Likewise, attempts at analysing foreign policy in this period, have to grapple with the issue of precisely whose policy is being discussed, because the evaluation of its success or failure requires at least some knowledge of a policy’s aim – and this was a period in which there were many competing aims. Amidst this more traditional debate, military histories of the Civil War and Interregnum are still exposing the experiences and goals of the army, while research into radical religion has

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not lost its stamina since the appearance of Christopher Hill’s famous *The World Turned Upside Down.*

The fact that the Interregnum witnessed a brief incorporating union between England and Scotland is therefore easily glossed over in a sea of other research about what is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important periods in English, if not European history more generally. There are, however, a number of historical threads that do question the relationship between England and Scotland throughout the Civil Wars and Interregnum, especially between 1654 and 1659, when a protectoral ordinance (and, after 1657, a parliamentary act) granted Scotland thirty elected officials in the protectoral parliaments as well as free trade with England and her colonies. One such perspective compares and contrasts the ways in which the English treated Scotland and Ireland during the Interregnum. Predictably, it has concluded that the protestant Scots fared much better than the Catholic Irish because the Scots were seen as misguided protestant brethren who could be brought to see the light once the corrupt elements from their society were removed, while the Irish were papist barbarians. According to David Stevenson, this meant that Cromwell and the English army first attempted to argue Scotland into submission, reluctantly conquering it only after talk had failed.

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11 The corrupt influences in Scotland being those ministers and magnates who had proclaimed Charles Stuart (eldest son of Charles I) King of Great Britain and then supported him in a war against England.

Scots over the Irish was also reflected in the behaviour of the New Model army which massacred the populations of Drogheda and Wexford but committed no like atrocities in Scotland. And finally, the Irish and Scottish acts for settlement were themselves widely divergent, Ireland being annexed and colonized, and Scotland being formally offered union. This occurred despite the Council of State’s initial dislike of the anti-republican and religiously intolerant Scots, as civilians were soon overwhelmed by the prominence of returning military commanders in the wake of the Scottish defeat. These commanders were more committed to the concept of protestant bonds than their civil counterparts, valuing matters spiritual over any secular implications raised by their faith, and they were thus more able to overlook Scottish secular failings.

The other important approach to Anglo-Scottish relations in this period is best described as a “nationalistic-antagonistic” model. Although it investigates the Civil War period, and does not carry through into the Interregnum, Mark Stoyle’s Soldiers and Strangers provides the most compelling explanation of this perspective. In it, Stoyle argues that at least some of the heat of the Civil Wars was fuelled by ethnic differences and that the creation of the New Model Army was a self-consciously English act that expelled foreigners. Moreover, he contends that the New Model Army fought more fiercely against non-English groups than previous parliamentary forces had – a new

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vigour was discernable against the Cornish, Welsh, and Irish – and that the English relationship with the Scots was transformed from partnership to hostility, and was marked by a naked ambition to get the Scottish army off English soil and out of English politics.¹⁵

These assumptions have often been extended into the republican period, and various scholars have highlighted the bad blood that by then existed between the English and the Scots. Scotland had outstayed its welcome when occupying northern England during the first Civil War and it had dared to invade the realm in support of the Stuarts not once, but twice, forcing the New Model Army to conquer it for the sake of English security. The Scots might thus have been protestant brethren, but there was a significant amount of animosity too, and instead of moving Scotland and England closer to the celebrated parliamentary union of 1707, the Cromwellian union drove them further apart.¹⁶ According to Allan Macinnes, the emergence of the New Model Army marked the “establishment of an assertive English national consciousness among the rank and file as well as officers” that continued throughout the Interregnum. From that point until the collapse of the Protectorate, he argues, a “gothic” vision of English superiority based on common law, civility over barbarity, and English expansionism, governed English relations with her dependencies, including Scotland.¹⁷ The English were indeed able to see themselves as generous conquerors, bringing the gift of English liberties, but this type

of outlook only contributed to the rift between England and Scotland. Moreover, Scotland’s lack of a parallel republican culture served to reinforce the gulf between the two nations. Finally, conquest proved a financial irritant. While the Scots chafed under English rule and lamented the loss of their sovereignty, English government was undermined by the incredible expense of military occupation, estimates of the cost ranging from £130,000-£270,000 per annum.

Religious squabbles have also been used to identify the divide between the two nations, and R. Scott Spurlock’s recent monograph on Cromwellian Scotland demonstrates that the English army actively tried to undermine Scottish Presbyterianism, believing that it was leashed to a false covenant. Moreover, even after the army desisted from their attacks on the Kirk, it continued to foster independency and harboured many baptists, who used its infrastructure to spread their doctrine in an inhospitable environment. Attempts at effecting religious toleration also meant that Quakers began proselytizing in Scotland, eventually becoming the only sect to weather the Restoration there, much to the chagrin of the Kirk. All of these points of tension were fuelled by the difficulties of achieving acceptable standards of law and order in this newly conquered territory, infuriating English civil and military administrators in Scotland. The roving of moss-troopers (rogue bandits whose guerrilla tactics made them incredibly hard to subdue), Glencairn’s rising (1653-1655), and continuing rifts in the Scottish Kirk meant

that these men spent a good deal of the Interregnum striving for accommodation and stability in Scotland – a goal that was never really achieved, although the possibility of success was finally on the horizon when Richard Cromwell’s rule collapsed in 1659, leaving the whole of Scottish government in constitutional limbo.22

Scholarship about the Cromwellian union is therefore healthy; however, there is still room for a more extended examination of the discourses surrounding it that might further illuminate how the English navigated their possession of this unruly kingdom and their de facto imperial status. None of the work discussed above is exclusively dedicated to discourse, and all of it ignores the very real cultural bonds that were forged between average English soldiers and Scottish men and women during the occupation that will be discussed below. Kirk session records abound with stories of Englishmen issuing marriage banns with Scottish women, standing surety for others in the Scottish Presbyterian church, and even remaining in Scotland in the wake of English withdrawal. Such personal connections need to be exposed and added to our analysis of how the English perceived their northern neighbours, especially when that relationship was at its most strained.

III

The Interregnum offers a particularly intriguing period in which to interrogate English perceptions of Scotland, following as it does on the so-called “explosion” of print that occurred during the Civil Wars, when the annual output of titles jumped from roughly 600 to over 4000, and the material being produced shifted from elite literature to

cheap pamphlet-style fare.\textsuperscript{23} For this reason, several scholars have identified the Civil Wars and Interregnum as the point when the public sphere first emerged, but for them, it was a wilder, more raucous arena than Jürgen Habermas ever imagined. According to David Zaret, Habermas’s description was “very nearly the opposite of the reality of early-modern printing and print culture.”\textsuperscript{24} Zaret thus argues that the appearance of a public sphere was stimulated by religious turmoil more than economic transitions, and that the higher stakes involved in salvation invited the participation of more individuals in printed debates.\textsuperscript{25} Similarly, Joad Raymond has noted that discourse was generally somewhat unruly, writing that “it was precisely this capacity to speak to the unknown, to the crowd, the multitude, even the many-headed hydra, that empowered the pamphlet to imagine a public, and to speak to and fashion the public’s opinions.”\textsuperscript{26}

Although this might indicate that chaos reigned and emotive, propagandistic literature dominated, the mid-century turmoil was accompanied both by attempts to cajole, and a new thrust towards rationalization.\textsuperscript{27} Sharon Achinstein’s work is extremely useful in explaining this concept, and she has highlighted godly efforts to train readers in objectivity and critical analysis amidst the flood of information. For Achinstein, then, some people promoted rational-critical debate, while others attempted to compel a

\textsuperscript{26} Raymond, \textit{Pamphlets and Pamphleteering}, 97.
\textsuperscript{27} According to Nigel Smith, the opening of the public sphere was socially traumatic, and contemporaries saw disorder when really repetition reigned. Nigel Smith, \textit{Literature and Revolution in England, 1640-1660}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
specific response.\textsuperscript{28} And her analysis is particularly convincing if one looks forwards and backwards in time, taking note of the already-visible disjunction between the two objectives during the Bishops’ Wars, and the continuing post-Restoration obsession with the language of interest.\textsuperscript{29}

In many cases the two objectives overlapped, as interlocutors believed that the self-evident truth of their perspective would convince people to act accordingly, creating a myriad of rhetorical strategies that often talked past one another. For example, the royalists maintained a language of chivalry and love, while independents and Presbyterians continued to employ various forms of godly argumentation and plain speaking.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, although the output of the press decreased dramatically once again in the aftermath of the regicide as the civil administration and the military regained control of the presses, several scholars have demonstrated that religious and political debates were, by no means, at an end. Instead, competing discursive strategies persisted. Peter Lake and Steve Pincus have been at the forefront of this movement, arguing that a developing public sphere sprouted in the post-reformation period, taking form during the Civil Wars, and only fully blooming after 1688.\textsuperscript{31}


\textsuperscript{31} Peter Lake and Steven Pincus, “Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England,” in \textit{Journal of British Studies} vol. 45, no. 2 (April, 2006): 270-292; Peter Lake and Steven Pincus, eds., \textit{The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).
negotiation of publicity throughout the Interregnum, an approach that is substantiated by Jason Peacey’s account of official cooperation with propagandists through an elaborate exchange of opportunity, reward and recognition that offers glimpses of unauthorized opinions.32

Discourses about Scotland that existed within this ever-expanding mess of propaganda and debate reflect the impulses both to cudgel and convince; however, certain trends can be discerned. Print produced during the early years of the Interregnum, for example, betrayed an anxiety about crossing the Anglo-Scottish border in its incessant justification of the act itself, supporting the contention that there were lingering protestant bonds between the two nations. Beginning with A Declaration of the Army of England Upon their March into Scotland (1650), but carried through into a variety of other pamphlets, it was argued that Scotland was the original and persistent aggressor, and that it was the Scots, and not the English, who had broken the terms of the Solemn League and Covenant (the treaty that bound England and Scotland together in defence of religion, liberties, and a godly king).33 The English therefore justified the invasion of their erstwhile godly ally both on account of Scottish support for Charles I during the second Civil War, and in terms of the Covenant itself. In the English reading of the Covenant, religion had “the first place, civil Liberties the next, the Kings Interest and constitution of

Parliament the last, and these with subordination one to another.” As Henry Parker put it, “the life of a bodie politick consists not in living, but in living free” – the Solemn League and Covenant promised this in its support for religion and liberty, and all other clauses were secondary, even the continuation of monarchy.

The Scots, complained a myriad of voices, also threatened future aggression with their proclamation of Charles Stuart as king of Scotland, England and Ireland, as opposed to Scotland alone. “The difference betwixt [us and] them is this,” quipped one broadside: “that wee having cast off their King, it is their design to settle him upon us again, by force.” Scottish Presbyterianism was thus seen as infected with an imperial design to “transplant the Kirk in all her glory of power and dominion on this side of Berwick” and to re-impose monarchy; this was a significant threat, and the fear that it generated underwrote the army’s aggressive religious policies towards Scotland once it had been conquered. The idea was that if this was not the case, and Scotland had no religious-political expansionist designs, the Scots would not have complained of England’s recent change of government at all. Mocking Scotland’s inability to look to its own problems, several authors thus asked what right the Scots had to interfere in English politics, even if the government should change many times more – Cuthbert Sydenham, a salaried writer

34 Army of England, A Declaration, 7.
35 Parker, Scotland’s Holy War, 16.
for the Rump Parliament, pointedly adding “may they live as happily without us, as we can do without them.”

Despite all of this, early pamphlets were careful to explain that they bore no ill-will towards the majority of the Scottish people because it still seemed strange that one godly kingdom would invade another. For this reason, the Declaration of the Army noted that the English bore a “tenderness” towards many Scots, “who through the cunning practises of some wicked and designing men, byassed by particular Interests, or for want of a true and right Information, and Representation of the great and wonderful Transactions wrought amongst us,” had been led astray. This statement was repeated almost verbatim in Mercurius Politicus, the Commonwealth’s official newspaper, and in various other places. The majority of Scots only needed the English to liberate them from their oppressors, and to be provided with examples of godly living, civil liberties, and friendship, after which they would whole-heartedly welcome the invading army. The English therefore offered union instead of annexation when they eventually conquered Scotland, even if that offer was actually more of an ultimatum.

Oliver Cromwell himself struggled to reconcile a desire to protect those who were godly at heart with the need to protect England from the horrors of Scottish covenanting, helping to explain the reactions of those serving under him and the style of reporting at

39 Army of England, A Declaration, 4; Mercurius Politicus, 4 (June 27-July 4, 1650); Parker, Scotland’s Holy War, 65; Anonymous, A True Relation of a Second Victorie Over the Scots at Hamilton, (London, 1650), 3.
home.  

He accused the General Assembly of intentionally prejudicing the Scottish people against their English liberators through “hard and subtle words,” and of domineering “in matters of conscience, wherein every soul is to answer for itself to God.” Thus, he maintained his commitment to brotherly affection with the majority of Scots, while deriding authority figures who had not only led them astray, but who had also threatened another invasion of England. “There may be a Covenant made with death and hell,” he continued, admonishing Scottish leaders to do some soul-searching in order to discover if their aims were truly godly, or if they were merely bent on worldly gain.

This high-level, and extremely dangerous corruption meant that Cromwell defended his otherwise suspect actions by emphasizing the need for “securing ourselves [England],” notwithstanding his continuing desire to live peaceably with the Scots.

Despite this anxiety about the conquest – or perhaps because of it – another, more general, approach to Scotland was to be rude and condemnatory. As a result, anti-Scottish literature poured from the English press in greater quantities than in any other period examined by this study, regardless of the fact that it undermined the “tenderness” towards the average Scot that other pamphlets were trying to establish. And while nothing produced in the Interregnum can rival John Cleveland’s Civil War description of Scotland as the “haemorrhoids” that seized on England’s “north postern,” there were

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 357.
many writers who set their pens to work on similar tirades. A Brief Vindication of the religion and Government of New England, in a bid to popularize the religious establishment there, attacked the allegedly tyrannical rule of Scottish Presbyterianism that caused the “debauch, slavish, and beast-like ignorant condition of the generality,” while A Briefe and Witty Discourse or Dialogue, between a York-Shire man, and a Scottish man proclaimed, “some of the Scots are Fools in the First place, Cowards in the second place, ignoble in the third place, beggarly in the fourth place, and something else in the fifth.” Similarly, John Hall, who had travelled with Cromwell into Scotland, likened the Scots to locusts, and a satirical pamphlet about a white-faced calf portrayed them as the pedlars of folly. The infamous “Description of Scotland” also appeared again, this time in two separate printed editions in 1659.

One particularly colourful description claimed that all Presbyterians bore a crest dominated by the symbols of their own interest, “Enssigned with a Helmet of Ignorance... Mantled with Guiles and Tyranny, Doubled with Hypocrisie over a Wreath of Pride and Covetousness.” And although there were four identifiably Presbyterian nations throughout Europe, Scotland was named among them and specifically described as boasting “in her Eshucheon the field of Rebellion, charg’d with a Stool of Repentence.” To the English, the stool of repentance (the place of public penance meted out to sinners by Kirk officials) became a symbol of Presbyterian tyranny and hypocrisy since there

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44 John Cleveland, “The Rebel Scott,” BL Eg 2725, ff.8-9.
47 For a more detailed description of the history of this work, see the introduction.
seemed to be an endless stream of penitents ordered there. According to Spurlock, it was precisely this Presbyterian intolerance that most irritated Commonwealth officials, even more so than the Kirk’s opposition to English occupation, and reams of condemnation continued to pour off the presses until Cromwell’s ascension as Lord Protector. At this point, attacks of this nature were allegedly muted by Cromwell’s more moderate religious mindset and his realization that the tactic was merely antagonizing the Kirk and thus hindering settlement.49 But Cromwell became Lord Protector in 1653, and the attack reproduced above was printed in 1657, illustrating that even if such rhetoric declined, it did not disappear, at least in the London presses. Moreover, the appearance of several Quaker tracts in 1655, 1657 and 1659, alleging Scottish Presbyterian brutality against their members, helped to perpetuate this image, even if the Quakers themselves were a questionable breed.50

Equally important, those who could not read – or who possessed very minimal literacy -- could consume anti-Scottish perspectives visually. The image that accompanied a broadside entitled, Old Sayings and Predictions Versified and Fulfilled (1651), depicts a Scottish Presbyterian minister domineering over Charles Stuart, but also indirectly controlling Jockie, the average Scottish man, in order to enhance his own authority. The notion that the general Scottish population might have been acting in ignorance and thus be redeemable is communicated; however, a caption printed above this panel also reminds the literate not to trust Jockie, who will “turne the stone of all

your plots. For none turns faster then the turne-coat Scots.”

The average Scot might have been manipulated by noblemen and Presbyterian divines, but this was not to say that Jockie was an admirable character. Similarly, the 1652 image from the front of Samuel Chidley’s, *The Dissembling Scot set forth in his Colours or a vindication of Lieu. Col. John Lilburn and Others*, shows the Scotsman being cloaked in religion, but actually composed of dissimulation, rebellion, plunder, cruelty, fornication, whoredome, invasion and intrusion. He is holding a flag marked with the cross of St. Andrew and labelled persecution. A “good Commonwealthsman” is distracted from his petitioning and looks on, and his thoughtful visage seems to imply that he is in the process of discovering Scottish hypocrisy. Luckily for England, despite the character of Fortune serving the Scot, the flag of persecution placed in one hand, and sword of cruelty in the other, prevent him from seizing her forelock, providing the commonwealthsman with time to act. As an aside, it is worth noting that these depictions, like the descriptions contained in many of the texts themselves, usually referred to male figures, and Anna Suranyi’s emphasis on the frequent descriptions of women when the English assessed foreigners is not a priority here.

Furthermore, the cover image from the Chidley pamphlet is misleading, since it seems to advertise a polemical work that will, as the caption claims, discover “many a Knavish Knack.” The title, which might alert the reader to the more serious debate contained within, does not even appear with the image, but is provided inside the booklet.

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51 Philalethes, *Old Sayings*.
54 Ibid, cover.
on the next leaf. And while the image comments on “the Scot” in a general way, Chidley himself is only concerned with one, very specific Scotsman. This was David Brown, pamphleteer, who had portrayed the agitations of John Lilburne the leveller, and of Chidley himself, as those of “bloody Petitioners.” The real issue, then, was not the character of the Scots, but an ideological disagreement between Chidley and Brown over the rights of man, and of soldiers in particular, who Chidley felt were entitled to agitate for their due. The Brown-Chidley debate was extended into the anonymous *Cloathing for the Naked Woman, or the Second Part of the Dissembling Scot* (1652), which responded to another one of Brown’s pamphlets wherein he had insinuated that a preacher at Whitehall had supported the Ranters. Once again, David Brown was the only target of the response; and once again, the issue was a growing divide in English and Scottish political cultures, not an ingrained ethnic hostility. Pamphlets such as Chidley’s, and the anonymous sequel, therefore invite two conclusions: a certain amount of Scots-bashing was popular and might increase the marketability of a pamphlet; and, historians should be cautious about the actual quantity of anti-Scottish literature being produced, since not everything that appeared to be about ethnicity actually was. This is not to say that anti-Scottish rhetoric was any less significant a phenomenon in the period, but merely to caution against an over-simplified approach based on the cataloguing of titles, or even of imagery. These pamphlets, at least, were using anti-Scottish sentiment to open the door to completely separate religious and political issues.

55 Ibid., 2, 14.
The notion that such negative depictions of the Scots could be linked to more complex issues brings us back to the story of Margaret Rayne, and the idea that not all reports were driven wholly by anger and hostility even when they were uncomplimentary. Margaret was more of a curiosity than anything, although the abominable nature of her crime clearly helped the cause of English superiority. She was not, however, the only curiosity, and in 1653 a pamphlet appeared entitled *A False Jew: Or, a Wonderful Discovery of a Scot, Baptized at London for a Christian, Circumsised at Rome to act as a Jew, re-baptized at Hexham for a believer, but found out at Newcastle to be a Cheat*. The pamphlet recounted the story of one Thomas Ramsey, alias Joseph ben Israel, who was a Scotsman trained in a Roman seminary, and who was eventually sent back to England in the guise of a Jew. There, he was allegedly converted by and accepted into Thomas Tillam’s Baptist community at Hexham, where the conversion was lauded until it was exposed as a sham.57 Ian Thackray reads this strange episode as an example of the continuing concern about a popish plot or, more particularly, a branch of it that would incorporate the manipulation of, or cooperation with, sectarian groups.58 He also suggests that the whole situation could have been fabricated in order to undermine the growing

57 Thomas Weld, *A False Jew: Or, A Wonderful Discovery of a Scot, Baptized at London for a Christian, Circumsised at Rome to act as a Jew, re-baptized at Hexham for a believer, but found out at Newcastle to be a Cheat*, (Gateshead, 1653).
popularity of the baptist community in the north, and bolster the authority and authenticity of competing Newcastle divines.  

But Thackray takes no note of the fact that the perpetrator of the deception was not the English Baptist community, but a Scotsman, who appears to have travelled the world, adopting one false religion after another. Whether or not the story was an invention, this detail is noteworthy because it illuminates the fact that the Newcastle divines – in fabricating or relating the tale – were attacking not just the Baptists, but the Scots as well. The moral of the story, according to the pamphlet was, after all, to warn “the church of Christ, to try the spirits whether they be of God,” before blindly admitting them into a congregation. Ramsey, the Scot, was a very powerful corruptive force that had to be carefully avoided and separated out from godly communities. This malign agency meant that he was more dangerous than the descriptions of Scots usually allowed. Ramsey was not a caricature, obsessed with the stool of repentance, but a master of deception, capable of infiltrating and infecting other religious communities and, as a result, he destabilized the categories wherein Scots were usually placed. He was not a member of the redeemable ignorant mass, nor a tyrannical Presbyterian minister or statesman; he was also not a fool, and although he could be seen as a pedlar of folly, he was to be feared, not mocked.

The various reports on witchcraft that appear in *Mercurius Politicus*, are much more straight-forwardly condemnatory, and reflect other discourses in a less problematic way, demonstrating that sometimes reports of curiosities fit within more general moulds.

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A report from November 1652, for example, explained that when the new English commissioners for the administration of justice sat in Leith, they faced a disturbing backlog of cases, in which many of the defendants were allegedly held based on no other evidence but their own confessions, forcefully extracted by Kirk officials. Two such women, charged with witchcraft, complained that they had been tortured:

they declared that they were forced to it [their confessions], by the exceeding torture they were put to, which was by tying their Thumbs behind them, and then hanging them up by them, 2 Highlanders whipt them; after which they set lighted Candles to the Soles of their Feet, and between their Toes, then burnt them by putting lighted Candles into their Mouths, and then burning them in the head. There were 6 of them accused in all, 4 whereof dyed of the torture.61

Another woman, also charged with witchcraft, was allegedly starved and then laid on a cold stone, with only a hair shirt dipped in vinegar to cover her. The English judges were appalled, and swore to investigate the sheriff, ministers and all other tormentors.62 It was not witchcraft, or the Scottish fascination with it, that offended the English – they were, after all, simultaneously engaged in their own anti-witch hysteria – it was the cruel means of extracting confessions and the delays inherent in the system. Scotland was backward and brutish and, more importantly, it was implicitly argued that only superior English justice could end the persecutions and civilize it, removing the oppressive forces previously in power. Finally, it was again a small segment of privileged society that was condemned, while the general Scottish population were portrayed as victims.

Likewise, the very next edition of the paper reported on another witchcraft conviction, this time of a man, who was later shown to be “a simple fellow” and thus reprieved. His simplicity was critical, since it allowed the authorities to plant any thoughts in his head and words in his mouth that they desired. “By this you may guess,”

the report continued, “upon what Grounds many hundreds have heretofore been burnt in this Countrey for Witches.” 63 As late as 1659, however, the English were still being shocked by Scotland’s approach to witches, and a letter from a Colonel Sawrey in April of that year describes a strangulation and burning that he witnessed. By this point, the victims had learnt to be defiant, but for all the years of English occupation – which was supposed to bring with it English law and civility – Sawrey reflected that “if once a person have that name and come upon an Assize it’s hard to get off with lesse then this poore creature.” 64 The actual success at liberating the masses was, apparently, minimal.

The pamphlet literature produced during the Interregnum that discusses the Scots was therefore coherent in some ways, and contradictory in others. The reasoned justification of English invasion, which claimed that the majority of Scots could be saved simply by removing the top layer of Scottish society appeared in many places – even the pamphlet labelling the Scots as fools, cowards and ignoble beggars tempered the statement with the obligatory qualifier that it was only “some” Scots. Godly brethren were presumably readily found lower down the social scale. The discourse, however, was destabilized by ubiquitous anti-Scottish rhetoric, and it was further undermined by the exceptional characters of Thomas Ramsey and Margaret Rayne, who were respectively more terrifying and more engaging than the above models allowed for. One discourse attempted to categorize and compartmentalize Scottish society. Another, more discriminatory one, tried to lump it all together, and a third (albeit minor modulation)

defied either action. The Scots were, as always, slippery characters. But, as Hirst has explained, all of these perspectives were contained within a very small body of literature, most of which appeared during the first half of the decade. It is thus necessary to ask how all this operated vis-a-vis the perspectives and experiences of those actually in contact with the Scots, before turning to a more sophisticated analysis of the only continuous narrative source of information – *Mercurius Politicus* – in order to fill in the gaps. How were people reacting when actually faced with the Scots, and how did actions compare to words?

IV

The success of the military campaign against the Scots was, of course, part of the press coverage regarding things Scottish during the Interregnum, both in *Mercurius Politicus* and in various pamphlets. A 1651 almanac therefore focussed almost exclusively on how the remainder of the Scottish war would play out, predicting that famine and hardship would drive the Scots to a failed attempt to raise troubles in Ireland in order to distract the English army. By September, the almanac continued, “still we are troubled with Scottish newes, but inclining rather to peace than war.”65 Although not wholly accurate, the almanac was correct in predicting an easy English victory and was complemented later that year by *A Perfect List of all the Victories Obtained by the Lord Generall Cromwell* (1651). The real problem thus turned out to be maintaining order after the conquest, and not the conquest itself. The royalist highlanders, who rebelled in what became known as Glencairn’s Rising were elusive, and although they failed to obtain any

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significant victories, they did harass the English army and effect some losses. There were also moss troopers throughout the Scottish periphery, who threatened to make Scottish roads impassable to the English.

Manuscript news and letters therefore record problems from an early date. One newsletter from Leith in 1652, for example, related the reading of the English Parliament’s “Declaration of the intended union with Scotland,” after which, despite cheers from the English soldiers, the Scots were so senseless “of their own goods that scarce a man of them shewed any signe of rejoicing. Though the most flourishing of their Kings would have given the best jewel in their crownes to have procur’d a vote in Parliament for their equal shares or staking in the Lawes of England.” It was the highlanders though, who offered the most resistance, first under the eighth Earl of Glencairn and, subsequently, under Lieutenant-General John Middleton. According to Dow, the guerrilla warfare that they conducted in the name of Charles Stuart made it extremely difficult for the English to combat them, ultimately forcing Monck into a campaign of pillaging royalist centres, which – in combination with dissent among the rebel ranks – broke the bulk of resistance by the late autumn of 1654, although various rebel leaders remained in the field until 1655. In the interim, the need to moderate English policies in Scotland was brought into focus by the rebellion, and conciliation was

67 Mercurius Politicus, 128 (November 11 – November 18, 1652), 2010; Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, 61-71.
also mandated by the protectoral ordinance that enacted union.69 There was, however, another consequence of rebellion: the reinvigoration of anti-Scottish sentiment, reflected both in print (as outlined above) and in manuscript sources. In April 1654, Colonel Robert Lilburn, head of the Scottish forces before Monck arrived, wrote to Cromwell complaining of the “bloudinesse, rebelliousness, and wretchedness of the spirits of the generality of this monstrous people,” which required that “more then an ordinarie care may be had how publique peace in this Nation for the future may be preserved, and this evill spirit driven out of the inhabitants.”70 Similarly, upon Monck’s arrival, he found “the desigine of this insurreccion is more universall then I expected,” and noted that the corruptive influence had spread to the borders of England as well.71 The Scots were not only a problem in their own right, they were now corrupting the English too. The highlanders themselves, complained a soldier named John Baynes, were despicable, and “declare every day more and more their cowardice, they dare not let us come so near them as to view them.”72

Baynes was a cornet serving in Scotland throughout the Interregnum, and his letters survive as part of his cousin, Adam Baynes’s papers, many of which were published by the Bannatyne Club in 1856. His duties took him into the highlands, but he spent most of his time at Leith. Things were fairly quiet for him until Glencairn’s rising, when he became involved in the frustrating attempts to crush it. During this time, Baynes not only complained of the elusiveness of the highland rebels, but also noted that “the

69 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, 74-160.
70 Colonel Lilburne to the Protector, Dalkeith 1 April 1654, in Firth, Scotland and the Protectorate, 67-68.
71 Colonel Monck to the Protector, Dalkeith 22 April 1654, in Firth, Scotland and the Protectorate, 90.
72 WC Trevelyan, ed., Letters from Roundhead Officers Written from Scotland and Chiefly Addressed to Captain Adam Baynes, July 1650-June 1660, (Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1856), 82.
country people here show themselves our enemies on all occasions,” and was unsure how any of them would react to union. Baynes had other important observations as well. As part of the reports he sent back to his cousin, he mentioned that “some of the worst of the prisoners which were ordered for Barbadoes are escaped out of prison, and are gone” – a description of the attempt forcibly to export troublesome Scots. This was not the only report, and the *Weekly Intelligencer* (the Tuesday supplement to *Mercurius Politicus*) Thursday publications) published an article about the attempted escape of another group of deportees in August 1654. The story explained that 200 Scottish prisoners were loaded onto a ship with the intention of employing them in the plantations in Barbados, but that somehow the Scotsmen got control of the ship. They were only recaptured when an English seaman managed to cry out to the captain of a nearby ship, who subdued them and brought them back to port. Moreover, there was apparently enough human trafficking in progress that year that the Scots had developed a system, whereby they would buy back their freedom upon arrival in Barbados and then return home again on the next ship, a problem that Monck thought serious enough to raise with Cromwell.

Hirst addressed this issue when he wrote that “union was nevertheless inseparably associated with the sword, in its potential as well as its origins.” His comment is insightful, and builds on the work of David Armitage who has argued that the expansionist imperial British ideology evident in policies such as Western Design (the English attempts to expand their control of the new world at Spanish expense) shared

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73 Trevelyan, *Letters from Rounhead Officers*, 71, 68.
74 Ibid., 71.
75 *Weekly Intelligencer*, 108 (August 22 – August 29, 1654), 107.
76 Abstract of a letter from General Monck to the Protector, 1 August 1654, in Firth, *Scotland and the Protectorate*, 153.
77 Hirst, “The English Republic,” 466.
traits with an imperial ideology that began at home. As early as the rough wooing, when Henry VIII tried to force a marriage between his son and the infant Mary Queen of Scots while his propagandists argued for an Anglo-Scottish protestant union and an English imperium over Scotland, a discourse of Roman colonization and of civility over barbarity emerged, though it had always sat awkwardly in relation to Scottish sovereignty. Once England possessed other kingdoms (to which the English felt that they brought superior law and religion), the impulse for security and civility drove a commercial expansion that would justify its existence on the principle of spreading liberty.\textsuperscript{78}

It has already been noted that some pamphlet literature argued that the English were liberating the bulk of Scotland from their oppressors – although it needs to be emphasized that this assumed a protestant cooperation that would trump the conquest – and that there was a clear sense of the superiority of English justice and civility depicted in accounts of witchcraft trials. But there were much more explicit discussions of conquest, such as that found in The Antiquity of Englands Superiority over Scotland (1652), which provided a list of instances when Scotland acknowledged its obedience to England, even before 1066. The author felt that this proved England’s right of conquest not just through “\textit{ius ad rem},” but through “\textit{ius iure}” too, and he therefore argued that England must now follow the Roman example of incorporation by degrees, devastating Scotland anew if it resisted.\textsuperscript{79} The exportation of conquered peoples to service the colonies could therefore be seen as the extension of this expansionist impulse – serving to


\textsuperscript{79} A Welwisher to this Commonwealth, \textit{The Antiquity of Englands Superiority over Scotland. And the Equity of Incorporating Scotland or other Conquered Nation, into the Commonwealth of England}, (London, 1652).
quell resistance closer to home, and stabilize colonies abroad. Timothy Venning thus
makes note of a plan to establish a new West Indian colony, to which 8,000-10,000 men a
year could be transplanted from Scotland, since this would increase English wealth and
remove “blocks” of Scottish troublemakers. 80

The problem with this type of imperial approach was that it built on anti-Scottish
rhetoric alone, and ignored the original discourse of protestant brotherhood. The very fact
that there were rebels to send overseas in the first place was problematic to a narrative
invested in the liberation of fellow protestants – an issue that the author of The Antiquity
ignored. If Scotland’s people were misguided but essentially godly, lying in wait for
English liberators to rescue them from an oppressive and self-serving nobility and priest-
class, there should have been no rebellion at all. And while it could be argued that this
problem could potentially be side-stepped by blaming the highland chiefs, it was hard to
ignore the fact that the whole country assisted them – a fact to which multiple letters
home attested. The practical empire building of conquest, and the forced relocation of
those who resisted, chafed against the religious rhetoric established by the New Model
Army, early Interregnum literature, and the offer of union itself, which presumed a
Protestant bond and a cooperative relationship.

Some thinkers, such as James Harrington, the famous republican author, did hope
that cooperation would trump conquest as an imperial destiny unfolded, despite the poor
prospects. In The Commonwealth of Oceana, Harrington explains that Scotland, which
he calls Marpesia, would be pacified once “the yoke of the nobility” was broken, and that
the grateful inhabitants would then show their thanks by providing the Commonwealth

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80 Venning, Cromwellian Foreign Policy, 48.
with “an inexhaustible magazine of auxiliaries.” Such numbers would be indispensable in all the Commonwealth’s endeavours, because Marpesia was “inexhaustible of men, and men through her barrenness not only inured unto hardship, but bucked in your arms.” Harrington saw that the time had come for the implementation of imperial dreams and the exploitation of Scottish resources along the same lines that Jacobean proponents of union had envisioned. But in the end, cooperation was not forthcoming, and the men were not offered; they were forcibly removed. Scots did not work alongside the English; they begrudgingly serviced their growing system of international trade.

At first glance, it might appear that the English outlook had merely shifted from a desire to foster protestant bonds into a harder imperialist stance that aimed to conquer and civilize, and was fuelled by anti-Scottish rhetoric. But even if this was the general progression of England’s Scottish policy (and it is by no means certain that ideas were that well thought through), a brazen English superiority was contested by more than just the early literature. Many soldiers occupying the Scottish garrisons were either unaware of, or indifferent to, their superior status, and there are abundant examples of Englishmen integrating into Scottish communities as equals. During the occupation, army headquarters were located at Dalkeith, just south-east of Edinburgh, and there were numerous garrisons scattered throughout Scotland, which after ten years, became a familiar part of the landscape. William Ferguson has thus argued that despite the inevitable dissolution of the Cromwellian union at the Restoration, some garrisons had

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put down roots in the Scottish community, and forged a closer cultural contact between
the English and the Scots that endured. He records one minister at Inverness, in the
highlands, lamenting the eventual departure of the garrison in 1662:

never a people left a place with such reluctancy. It was even sad to see and heare sighes and teares,
pale faces and embraces, at their parting farewell from that town. And no wonder; they had peace
and plenty for ten years in it. They made that place happy, and it made them so.83

That said, not all relations were so cordial, and it is also important to remember that in his
study of the regimental history of the army, Sir Charles Firth recounted the tale of a
Scottish “fanatic” who stabbed quartermaster Farley of Captain Hutton’s troop in January
1658. The Scotsman was said to have prayed for God’s help against the English nation.84
And while the following account will focus largely on positive bonds, the tensions that
these bonds cut across should never be forgotten.

The Kirk session records, which Margo Todd has shown to be indispensible to
understanding Scottish society and religion, record the sins and penance of congregants in
particular parishes.85 Many of these records are incomplete, entries not surviving for the
turbulent years of the Interregnum, although there are several record books that cover
either the whole period, or some extended part of it. Edinburgh records, in particular,
survive for the parishes of Cannongate and Old Kirk (the latter’s records only beginning
in 1655). These records, though kept by Scots, include information about a smattering of
Englishmen, illuminating actual English approaches to Scottish society in a way that
English diaries themselves rarely record. Very little information is available about

83 William Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England: a Survey to 1707, (Edinburgh: John Donald
Publishers, 1977), 140.
84 Sir Charles Firth, The Regimental History of Cromwell’s Army, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), 248-249.
85 Margo Todd, The Culture of Protestantism in Early Modern Scotland (London: Yale University Press,
2002).
English perceptions of the Scots in these middle decades, and a careful use of Scottish records helps us recreate action and hypothesize about opinion.

Edinburgh was Scotland’s social, political, and commercial center, and was located very close to army headquarters at Dalkeith and to the citadel at Leith. A significant number of soldiers were therefore garrisoned there, or passed through, and it is not surprising to find Englishmen appearing frequently in the session books. Despite the army’s best efforts to maintain moral discipline, these session records are thus riddled with English fornicators and drunkards taking their pleasure with female Scottish parishioners – the usual vices of an occupying army. But there are more unusual records as well. Between 1650 and 1660, twenty-one English soldiers put forward their names and consigned tokens in the parish of Cannongate in order to be wed to Scottish parishioners. Each of these men required two other men, usually, but not always English, to testify to their unmarried state because they were outsiders.86 In Old Kirk, the minister did not record the issuing of banns, but there were enough Englishmen marrying Scottish women that in May 1655, six elders and six deacons were asked to provide the names of all those who had undertaken such marriages.87 And it cannot be argued that each of these soldiers was simply swayed by his fiancée’s need to remain in good stead in her parish, for there were also two cases – Luke Dent and Joyce Gray in April 1654; and Christopher Every and Dorothy Crickmore in Jan 1657 – wherein both the bride and groom were described specifically as “English.”88

86 NAS, CH2/122/4.
87 NAS, CH2/133/1/11.
Not only do these actions go against the grain of anti-Scottish and anti-Scottish and anti-Presbyterian discourses, it also reminds scholars that some soldiers were already Presbyterian and that others could be led away from independency. For independents, there were plenty of English ministers who could, and did, marry Anglo-Scottish couples living in Scotland outside the authority of the Kirk, so there was no need to integrate into the local Presbyterian community in this way if a soldier did not desire it. Thus, there was no technical reason to enter into the Presbyterian Kirk to legitimize a relationship unless the soldier in question was either already of the Presbyterian persuasion, or considering moving in that direction. There is no way of knowing which of the categories the aforementioned soldiers belonged to, but it is highly probably that there were at least some new entrants into the Presbyterian community, and this is supported by evidence from the Stirling records. In Stirling, many in the English garrison opted to wed their Scottish brides outside the Kirk, creating a problem of “clandestine” marriages that Kirk officials found frustratingly difficult to verify. Since the Kirk officials automatically suspected sin instead of sacrament, relations with the English were more strained at Stirling, but even so, many of these Anglo-Scottish couples still sought recourse to a Presbyterian baptism for their children when the time came. In fact, the problem of meeting all of these requests, without allowing bastard bearing to slip by unpunished, was so intense that in January 1656 the Stirling session appealed to the Presbytery for guidance on how to handle the situation. It would seem that, after a flirtation with more

89 Some may have bowed to pressure from their wives' families, but even in these cases, the person in question would have had to have possessed sufficiently flexible religious sensibilities to allow conversion to and integration into the Scottish Presbyterian Kirk.

radical religion, many of the Anglo-Scottish Stirling couples sought reintegration with the Presbyterian Kirk and access to the parish community, its rights, and its relationships.

Furthermore, the Scottish Registry of Births and Deaths, confirms that some soldiers remained in Scotland after the Interregnum and the removal of English forces, fully integrating into the community there. Birth records for Cannongate indicate that at least five Englishmen who announced marriage banns there remained with their Scottish wives in Edinburgh after the Restoration, raising their children, and making a new home, all the while living and dying under the Presbyterian Kirk.\textsuperscript{91} And while the records of Old Kirk and Stirling did not record marriage banns, and therefore provide no searchable names of Anglo-Scottish couples, Stirling’s records reveal another phenomenon: Scottish brides returning to England with their husbands. Elizabeth Peddie, Helen Gillfillan, and Helen Risk were all granted papers by the session testifying to their lawful marriage to English soldiers and good standing in the parish community, so that they might integrate more easily into their new English community. While some Englishmen chose to embrace Scotland completely after the Restoration, others, who had forged links but longed for England nonetheless, chose to bring a piece of Scotland home.\textsuperscript{92} Intermarriage was, then, a significant phenomenon that has been largely ignored by historians, with the exception of Firth and Spurlock, both of whom were unable to divert much attention to it in the face of other research concerns.\textsuperscript{93} This is an oversight that is even more striking

\textsuperscript{91} www.scotlandspeople.gov.uk searches show records for children born to Myles Polwart and Jeane Ogilvie, James Calpie and Marie Leith, John Halliwell and Margaret Grey, Robert Bolt and Agnes Yule, and John Conning and Catharen Aytoun after 1662, all of whom issued banns in Cannongate during the interregnum which list the groom as an Englishman.

\textsuperscript{92} NAS, CH2/1026/4/193; NAS, CH2/1026/4/203; NAS, CH2/1026/4/204.

\textsuperscript{93} Spurlock, \textit{Cromwell and Scotland}, 56; Firth, \textit{Scotland and the Commonwealth}, xxxiv. Spurlock is interested in the English evangelical influence upon Scottish women, whereas Firth simply notes in his
when one considers that the steady progression of marriage ceremonies was made note of in *Mercurius Politicus* as well, which in December 1650 read:

> And now let me give you an observation that our English Lads, & Scotch-Lassies begin to mingle geer [sic] very orderly, so that there is scarce a day but the Bag-pipes are heard at Marriage; some private Souldiers have married Knights and Lairds Daughters, and others of them marry Maid-Servants of the Great Citizens of Edenburgh, who are absent, so that we are like to stock our selves of a new Generation.  

English soldiers and their spouses also became involved in the daily in-fighting within their new parishes, demonstrating that they simply could not remain aloof from their new Scottish surroundings. In Cannongate, one Percy Bowis married a Scotswoman, Agnes Gilphillan, who he seems to have been unable or unwilling to control. Agnes was cited to the session for her scolding and abusive exchanges with another Scotswoman while they were both drunk, and both women, “not sensible for their sin,” were referred to the magistrate.  

Stephen Squib, described as “Englishman,” was more directly involved in another brawl and lodged an official complaint against one Bessie Callendar with the session on account of her verbal abuses. Bessie admitted that she had called Stephen a “cheating Rogue,” but instead of apologizing, offered to prove before the court that he was one. The case was again referred to the magistrate.  

Similarly, in Old Kirk, Francis Adams, an English soldier complained to the session that Margaret Halbert and Margaret Dundas said “he kept ane infamous house and infamous persones men and women and that he suffered them to commit sinne in his house with his own consent.” When witnesses were brought in so as to corroborate the charges, neighbours denied the introduction to this collection of documents that intermarriage occurred, and that the English soldiers involved were required to secure permission from their superior officer.

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94 *Mercurius Politicus*, 27, (December 5 – December 12, 1650), 441.
95 NAS, CH2/122/4/254.
women had ever made such accusations, but noted that Francis’ wife was a great curser and swearer. Ultimately, the session decided that they could prove nothing, and admonished all parties to live in peace.\textsuperscript{97} Many English soldiers had therefore ensconced themselves thoroughly enough into their new surroundings that they started to get involved in the same kinds of daily disputes they would have faced at home. And when things did escalate, these men had no qualms about taking their concerns to the allegedly tyrannous Kirk sessions, hoping their opponents would, at the very least, sit in the stool of repentance. In practice, the English seemed not to have imbibed the lessons that the press attempted to teach.

The Kirk sessions also had an unforeseen utility in the context of English occupation, and the Stirling record book contains one strange case where an English independent and a Scottish woman may have used the Presbyterian Kirk to affect a mutually desired divorce. Arthur Web, an English soldier, had married Elspet Cunningham, Scotswoman, at some point prior to October 1656, when Elspet came before the session and confessed her sin of fornication. She and Arthur had a child together under the guise of what Elspet described as a clandestine and unlawful marriage – Elspet claimed she no longer spoke with Arthur, and they had not slept together since the child was born. Seven days later, Arthur also appeared before the session, and both parties professed contrition for the sin of fornication.\textsuperscript{98} Arthur and Elspet were sent to the Presbytery (the next court in the Presbyterian hierarchy) so the resolution is not recorded in the Old Kirk book, but given the general Scottish suspicion of clandestine marriages, it

\textsuperscript{97} NAS, CH2/133/143.
\textsuperscript{98} NAS, CH2/1026/4/66-67.
is possible that Arthur and Elspet did their penance and parted ways. Once again, the Kirk’s authority does not appear to have been seen by this Englishman as oppressive, and in this case, may have been genuinely liberating. Utilization of the church courts, then, coupled with the various Anglo-Scottish marriages, parallels the notion of cooperation and integration put forward earlier in the Interregnum, and denied difference, sometimes erasing the category of Scottish all together – a tendency we have seen before. And although Ferguson is probably overly optimistic in assuming bonds forged during the occupation were strong enough to endure throughout the century, these relationships did further complicate any straightforward approach to the Scots in the exact years when Hirst notes that English politicians feared the influence of Scottish placemen in the protectoral parliaments, and struggled under the financial burdens created by maintaining the garrisons. At the very least, these experiences diverged from the unapologetic ideas about conquest and empire building that swirled around the issue of the forced exportation of Scots to the colonies. The various perceptions and experiences of Scotland, then, were always competing; the stability of any one vision was constantly undermined by the obnoxious tendencies of the others to appear.

V

Multiple perspectives also littered the pages of *Mercurius Politicus*, the state-sponsored newsbook edited by Marchamont Nedham, a man most famous for his political oscillations. Writing for parliament in the first Civil War, for the king in the second, and for all the successive regimes of the 1650s after that, Blair Worden has noted that Nedham’s “political opportunism, and his untiring reversal of political allegiance, have
disconcerted past and present alike.” Despite this, Worden still believes that there was consistency in Nedham’s anti-puritan republicanism, and in the jocularity and plainness of his prose.\textsuperscript{100} *Mercurius Politicus* itself was not the only Interregnum newsbook, but it is the only one to span the decade, and its utility was affirmed by the Commonwealth in the form of a £100 pension for Nedham. The serial was also “high quality,” and “served politics to the people in digestible sippits;” although its opponents derided it as “the only pamphlet in pay, and a libel of the establishment,” which could be found “feeding upon the garbidge of the weekly intelligence.”\textsuperscript{101}

Both Peacey and Worden argue that *Mercurius Politicus* was an important part of the anti-Scottish propaganda campaign that helped justify the English army’s conquest throughout 1650 and 1651, and the paper was at no loss to provide the requisite commentary.\textsuperscript{102} Nedham dwelled on the Scottish manipulation of Charles Stuart and the Scots’ desire for power, not a king, merrily noting that if Charles refused to act as a puppet, “then down go his Breeches; for they’ll handle him without Mittens, as old Buchanan did his grandfather.”\textsuperscript{103} Charles was the “young Tarquin,” the highlanders his “beloved beasts,” and the lowlanders were perverted by the “Presbyterian Wilde-fire, which turns Conscience into Combustion, and the world into Cinders” – Cromwell was, of course, the great purveyor of freedom in this scenario, and if liberation failed it must


\textsuperscript{102} Peacey, *Politicians and Pamphleteers*, 195-266; Worden, “‘Wit in a Roundhead,’” 326.

\textsuperscript{103} *Mercurius Politicus*, 1 (June 6 – June 13, 1650), 8.
be “for want of hearts to receive their own happiness.”

The Scots were also cast as the aggressors throughout the recent troubles. They were the “infesters and invaders of this Common-wealth” whose commissioners had tried to stir troubles in England upon the late king’s execution and “raise a domestick warre amongst us.”

The tenor of the paper’s approach to Scotland therefore appears to be one of general condemnation and anti-Scottish sentiment, but other articles contradict this approach and take on the persona of the protestant kinsman who understands that the bulk of the Scots have been deceived and manipulated. Cromwell’s letter to the Speaker of the English Parliament in September 1650 is reproduced as part of this initiative, wherein he says that “God hath a people here fearing his Name, though deceived,” and that the “Ministers of Scotland have hindred the Passage of these things to the hearts of those to whom we intended them.” Similarly, once in Scotland, the soldiers were said to have found the Scots “much admiring at their Guests for their great civility, so that now the women are ready to run all a wooing to Edinburghe to bring back their Husbands, and showr down blessings up on the General at every Town.” At one point, Nedham even suggested that the Scots were worthy of pity, though he condemned the Scottified party in England as trying to “make a Bonfire of this renowned Republick,” reaffirming the potential threat that a more monarchical Scottish culture posed to the Commonwealth.

These fluctuations of voice continued throughout the 1650s, reflecting the divide found in

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104 Mercurius Politicus 4 (June 27 – July 4), 49, 62, 55.
106 Mercurius Politicus, 14, (September 5 – September 12, 1650), 222.
107 Mercurius Politicus, 10 (August 8 – August 15, 1650), 153.
108 Politicus 14, 210; Mercurius Politicus, 13 (August 29 – September 5, 1650), 193.
pamphlet literature as Nedham twisted and turned to meet the propaganda needs of the moment.

A civilizing rhetoric also appears, wherein the English were portrayed as godly and magnanimous conquerors. Predictably then, Scottish prisoners were barbarous, “rather like Beasts then men,” who were “exceedingly cruel towards one another,” sometimes even killing each other. Moreover, Scottish ministers and lords were driven only by their own ends, keeping poor people in a state “not sensible of any thing that may tend to their proper good” – rhetoric which echoed Cromwell’s own sentiments.109 But this meant that the English influence was benign, and served to enlighten the populace. Many Scots allegedly came to hear the army’s preachers, and the army maintained their civil posture by not stooping to taking so much as six pence from anyone.110 Once union was decided upon, the English could also rectify Scottish justice, and abolish the “regall power of their Lairds of mannors,” which “eased the People much in their Fees.”111 As was noted in Mercurius Politicus, 90 (February 19 – February 26, 1652), this only made sense:

because all new Acquisitions in this form, made by Conquest tend not only to the ease & benefit of the People Themselves, but also to the content of the conquer’d Party; whereas under Monarchs and Grandees it hath been ever seen that in such cases they arrogate all unto themselves, and take Advantage by every new Conquest, for the inslaving of all the rest that are under their Power... But in States governed by the People, the case is much otherwise; for they ever deale more nobly with their Neighbors upon the like occasion, admitting them into a participation of the same Libeteries and Privileges with themselves, by which means they hold them the more Fast in the bonds of affection and obedience.112

109 Mercurius Politicus 23, (November 7- November 14, 1650), 377; Mercurius Politicus, 24 (November 14 – November 21, 1650), 388.
110 Politicus 24, 388; Mercurius Politicus, 21 (October 24 – October 31, 1650), 353.
111 Mercurius Politicus, 106 (June 10 – June 17, 1652), 1664.
112 Mercurius Politicus, 90 (February 19 – February 26, 1652), 1425.
Unfortunately, as the witchcraft trials, the highland rebels, and continued thieving demonstrated – all of which were reported on in the same newsbook -- civility and partnership were not quick to come. Even within the self-contained discourse of Mercurius Politicus then, competing perspectives and inconvenient realities about Scotland appeared alongside one another, and certain news reports undermined more general rhetorical platforms. And if this one forum could not hope to furnish a coherent approach to Scotland, how much more fraught would public conversation as a whole be?

England had conquered Scotland. A coherent policy and perspective was therefore required at some level, in order to lend coherence to an already tenuous state, but each narrative contained elements too easily contested by other competing narratives, and all were doomed to failure, if scrutinized, as a result.

Part of the problem was that the real Scotland had come into conflict with the imagined one, and there was a certain level of confusion as a result. To illustrate this point it is necessary to repeat one more curious story. In the town of Dinning in Perthshire, a June 1652 issue tells the reader, some typically oppressive ministers came to remove preachers whom they had formerly deposed for opposition of the Kirk, but whom the congregation had invited back. Since the preachers were much beloved by the community, the local women thus rallied to their support like “Amazons,” beating back the offending officials. Upon closer reading, it becomes evident that the beloved preachers were independents, and the women were preventing the Kirk from re-asserting authority over their congregation, actions that should have been praiseworthy from the anti-Presbyterian perspective. But conflicting ideas about Scotland complicated the

\[113\] Mercurius Politicus, 107 (June 17 – June 24, 1652), 1686.
meaning of the story. Pious actions were undertaken by unruly Amazonian women, while the independent pastors faded into the background. Was this progress? It is possible that Nedham himself did not know.

*Mercurius Politicus* also followed the trend of declining levels of information identified by Hirst. Even so, there is a noteworthy issue from October 1655, which reproduces a letter from the Scottish council to the Kirk, entreating ministers to stop praying for the pretended king, which they did “notwithstanding the dangerous tendencies and repeated Prohibitions thereof.” It continued, moreover, by stating that it was the Protector’s intention – and the council’s – to “unite Hearts as well as Countries, and to gain those who are to be wrought upon, who shall evidence a desire of living peaceably and submissively.”¹¹⁴ This echo of James VI and I’s desire to unite the hearts and minds of his subjects seems out of place, especially given the quantity of anti-Scottish rhetoric that appeared in the paper as a whole, but it also testified to the growing familiarity of both the English and the Scots with the Cromwellian union. Scotland had been subdued, and was in “the most peaceable condition that ever it was since the memory of this age,” all that remained was for the citizens of both countries to embrace the *de facto* situation.¹¹⁵ And although this was never accomplished rhetorically in print, the Kirk session records indicate that it had potential in the face-to-face reality created by the presence of English garrisons.

In May 1659, when the reinstated Rump Parliament demanded the resignation of Richard Cromwell, the context of discourses concerning Scotland was altered once again.

¹¹⁴ *Mercurius Politicus*, 278 (October 4 – October 11, 1655), 5666-5667.
The collapse of the Protectorate was accompanied by the re-emergence of the royalist voice and, more importantly, effectively undid the Cromwellian union and voided the authority of all courts and councils erected since 1653 by protectoral authority. For this reason, despite *Mercurius Politicus*’s frantic coverage of the political chaos within England itself, there was still space to record that a petition was presented by some representatives from Edinburgh, requesting that consideration be given to Scottish affairs, protecting their liberties in a new act of union. The article concluded by musing that “Its very remarkable, that this Petition from Scotland, is the first that hath been presented from that Nation, to any Power in England, since the late Troubles.”¹¹⁶ A separate pamphlet printed in London also outlined that delays in settling the judicatories in Scotland would prevent the collection of revenue and retard justice, which would only hurt good and loyal subjects there.¹¹⁷ Scotland had finally been tamed, but it was too late for this victory to be celebrated. Instead, the restoration of monarchy in 1660 brought a return to the looser dynastic union of the pre-war years. Equally important, the financial expense of the Cromwellian union and the need to find a scapegoat on which to blame the late troubles revived anti-Scottish discourses yet again.

*Britains King Revived: Or, a Seasonable Warning To the Kingdom of Scotland* (1660), therefore warned the Scots to make account for all things either done or not done for the Stuart cause. “Else be assured,” it continued, “if you altogether hold your peace at this time, enlargement and deliverance from this unjust infamy, shall rise to Scotland

¹¹⁷ Robert Pittiloh, *Scotland Mourning: Or, a Short Discovery of These Consequences Which Accompanies the Delay of the Settling of Judicatures in that Nation*, (London, 1659).
from another place; but you and your fathers houses may be destroyed.”¹¹⁸ For the most part, this prophecy came true and attacks on Scotland began to pour off the press once again. As has already been noted, Anthony Weldon’s infamous “A Perfect Description of Scotland” appeared in two separate print editions in 1659. Peter Du Moulin’s *The History of the English & Scotch Presbytery*, charting the destructive nature of Presbyterianism also saw an English edition that year, emphasizing the particular defects of the Scottish Covenanters, and *The Scotch Covenant Condemned* appeared in 1660, deriding the Presbyterian faith and highlighting its past domineering designs.¹¹⁹ The only good thing about Scotland, according to this renewed trend, was that it had provided a base from which Monck could conduct his blessed work, and even in this context there was room to remember Scotland’s bellicose past. Robert Wild, for example, published a series of poems that celebrated Monck and the restoration of monarchy and acknowledged the role of Scotland in remaining peaceful during this turbulent time. But poem IX still began with anxiety about what might come out of the north:

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But hark! Me thinks I hear old Boreas blow,
    What mean the North winds they bluster so?
More storms from that black nook? Forbear (bold Scot!)
    Let not Dunbar and Worcester be forgot.¹²⁰
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Thankfully, the rumblings were no more than Monck mustering his forces.

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¹¹⁸ *Scotlands True Friend, Britains King Revived: Or, a Seasonable Warning to the Kingdom of Scotland*, (London, 1660).
VI

The tangle of contradictions examined here indicates that it is perhaps time for historians to change their approach to how they analyze Anglo-Scottish relations during the Cromwellian occupation. As outlined at the start of this chapter, scholars generally portray the English as hostile towards at least some segment of Scottish society. The enthusiasm of the Bishops’ Wars, it seems, was lost after almost a decade of warfare. The expense of union with Scotland is regularly referenced, as is the anti-Scottish sentiment emanating from so many print and manuscript pages. As Brian Levack put it, “in the final analysis the Cromwellian union probably did more to exacerbate tensions between the English and Scottish people than to reduce them.”

"121 Frustration and discord based upon ethnicity therefore appear to be the themes of the 1650s. But one strand of discourse emphasizing protestant brotherhood, the fact of union itself, the marriages of English soldiers to Scottish women, and the English willingness to participate in Kirk discipline, indicate that the relationship was more complex. Moreover, anti-Scottish rhetoric sometimes masked other more important issues: insecurities about religious and political differences.

Added to this is the problem of interest – and here we should pause to remember how Diana Newton and Krista Kesselring’s studies treated the Jacobean border. As outlined in chapter one, this scholarship established that border inhabitants regularly manipulated the appearance of their relationship with the Scots (which could be both hostile and cooperative) in order to maintain their special status as border lords, or allow

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121 Levack, The Formation of the British State, 204.
civic officials to best military commanders. Likewise, Interregnum constructions of Scotland as an inhospitable and volatile nation no doubt had a sincere element, and tempers did flare, but there were other incentives too. Religious and political differences existed, and they created a very serious rift between the two kingdoms; this cannot be denied. But we cannot ignore the fact that relating stories about the backwardsness of Scottish society, or the opposition of the Presbyterian Kirk, also justified the deficit created by occupation and helped ensure troops stationed in Scotland got a share of the money that was available as well. Hirst has demonstrated that Berwick made huge profits from its supply trade with the troops sent to Scotland, and so it is clear that there were English interests on both sides of the border invested in justifying the occupation. Thus, it was entirely possible for soldiers to respect the Scots and integrate into Scottish communities, while the army simultaneously promoted anti-Scottish rhetoric, because groups and individuals took different approaches based on context.

That said, just because competing perspectives can be explained – and acknowledgement of the fact that different people or groups simply held different and competing opinions should be added here – does not mean that the constant contradictions exposed by competing discourses about Scotland were not a problem given the Interregnum context. Humans are contradictory creatures and any one person’s ideas are seldom coherent, so how much more must this tendency be amplified when describing communal discourses? But as Sean Kelsey has noted, the English were faced

with the difficult situation of reconstructing their self-image after the regicide.

Previously, the English had a better sense of who they were, and it was easier for the English thought-process to collapse in on itself and focus on a well-defined domestic scene as it had during the Jacobean union debates. In the 1650s, after several contested years as a republic, they faced several more of negotiating what it meant to be a Protectorate – something which even historians cannot fully agree on. England was therefore constantly engaged in an elaborate project of self-fashioning, and the addition of Scotland to this process complicated matters further. Was England now truly an empire, having conquered the Scots? Or were they part of a protestant union, having undertaken war only against a malignant faction? Were the Scots Same or Other?

Several recent studies of contemporary “Englishness” have highlighted a similar vagueness regarding modern-day English national identity. For example, Arthur Aughey describes an anxiety about provincialism in the wake of imperial collapse, and Isobel Linsay highlights the English possession of negative self-stereotypes which indicate difficulties generating value systems and identity more broadly, especially when compared to their Scottish neighbours.\(^{124}\) According to Krishan Kumar, this is the result of the building of the “inner empire” in the pre-modern period that subjugated Ireland, Wales and eventually Scotland, creating a pattern in which the English would see themselves as an “imperial,” instead of a “national” people. This process, according to Kumar, is best exposed through the Civil Wars and Interregnum, because that period “increasingly drew attention away from a purely English self-awareness to a realization

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of England’s destiny in a larger framework.”\textsuperscript{125} England could not focus on itself when distracted by the periphery.

This argument is seductive, and it is tempting to follow Kumar’s claims that expansionism was creating positive imperial identifications that complicated English nation-building; however, it has been demonstrated that the process was by no means actually so straightforward. The rhetoric underpinning the hard imperialist discourse in the Interregnum was constantly undermined by arguments about protestant brotherhood and cooperation, and through actions that defied the notion that the English had brought civility to a backward land. The problems Kumar identifies are therefore more likely the circumstances of the second empire, and the relationships Linda Colley has argued for in her famous \textit{Britons: Forging the Nation}; although such difficulties do serve to highlight the disruptive potential of empire more generally, which J.G.A. Pocock has claimed often creates a “characteristic ambivalence” among conquerors and conquered alike.\textsuperscript{126} During the Interregnum, swallowing the \textit{de facto} imperial situation was not easy, nor were imperial ideals easily consumed. That persistent, anti-Scottish rhetoric, which continuously reasserted itself, reflected a desire to keep the Anglo-Scottish border in place, not remove it – to demarcate difference in the face of increased political and societal ties. Nedham himself warned against any man “un-Englishing” himself, a phobia that neatly sums up the issue.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Mercurius Politicus}, 62 (August 7 – August 14, 1651), 984.
English self-perceptions were, in all likelihood, muddied by the competing discourses that attempted to make sense of their new appendage. According to Richard Jenkins, “Categorisation may be more significant for the categoriser(s) than for the categorised” and “disagreements over categories produce boundaries internally;” an observation clearly relevant here. Once it was conquered, Scotland’s role vis-à-vis England had to be defined in order to define the English polity, but the very act of trying to assess Scotland’s meaning threw England’s inability to do so into sharp relief.

Scotland could not be protestant brother and imperial conquest all at once, any more than the whole of its people could be brutes while some were godly. Anxiety about the rebellion and frustration with the people sat uncomfortably with Anglo-Scottish intermarriage and integration, while curious stories often denied all categorization or concrete evaluation – a problem confounded by the fact that Scotland could not be wholly ignored either. Despite reduced coverage of things Scottish, the occasional report still appeared in Mercurius Politicus, or as a pamphlet, and the garrisons remained in Scotland throughout the decade. And every time one perspective emerged, it was potentially destabilizing to at least one other narrative, preventing the celebration of either an imperial or a nationalistic English identity. Hirst claims that the English gained only “bloodshed and fiscal exactions” from the union, but perhaps a healthy confusion should be added to that list. As English society stabilized in the wake of the Restoration, the idea of Scotland would become easier to handle again. Although new political divisions complicated the situation, creating new disjunctions and misunderstandings between the

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128 Jenkins, Social Identity, 85.
two kingdoms, England was ultimately able to resurrect old approaches to the Scots, so that by the time the parliamentary union approached, the English knew how to handle the situation.
Chapter Five: Contemplating the Chimera – Discourses about Scotland during the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis

In the midst of the Exclusion Crisis, the *London Gazette* ran two advertisements describing Scottish criminals in an attempt to discover their whereabouts. John Haddoway, alias Scot, was charged with treason, and his pale and pock-marked complexion seems to have complemented his inward depravity. The reader was told: “He is a man of middle stature, his Face full of Pockholes, grey eyes, in one of them a blemish, of a whitely complexion, with a black Peruque, with a Campaign Coat of grey stuff, with blew Loops.” Anyone aiding in his capture was to receive ten pounds.1 William Forbes was simply a thief, but he too was appropriately dishevelled. Mr. Forbes was “aged 40 years and upwards, tall of Stature, Brown dark lank Hair, hanging down on his forehead, curling at the ends with a sad Grey suit, with a Sky coloured facing, and a broad stammering Scotch Speech.” He was also worth ten pounds.2 Although these men were admittedly members of the social underbelly, their descriptions help elucidate how the English might have viewed the Scots during these years. A Scotsman, the reader discerned, was pale, blemished, greasy and burdened by a thick stammering accent. He was socially inferior, worthy of notice only insofar as one had to monitor against his unseemly activities. And yet, during the exact same period, the Scots as a whole were once again showing themselves to be much more, adding fuel to a number of important domestic English debates. And in a variety of pamphlets, newspapers and personal papers – as well as elsewhere in the *Gazette* itself – news from Scotland could feature

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2 *London Gazette*, August 30 - September 2, 1680, n. 1543.
prominently, proving that if a Scot was somewhat pathetic, the Scots were much more noteworthy.

II

As is well known, the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis polarized English society between roughly 1678 and 1682. Even before the crisis struck, tensions swirled around Charles II’s friendly relations with France, the Duke of York’s Catholicism, the seemingly interminable Cavalier Parliament, and the legitimacy of religious dissent, when in the fall of 1678, Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey was found dead and Titus Oates claimed to have evidence of a Catholic plot to murder the king. After this, a series of plots and counter-plots, trials and executions, addresses and abhorrences, feasts and counter-feasts, and pope- and presbyter-burnings began to unfold, all underwritten by fear. The Lord Treasurer Danby himself was implicated in the scandal, and Charles’s concern that further investigation would reveal the secret clauses of the Treaty of Dover, or compromise the interests of his brother and heir, meant that the Cavalier Parliament was finally dissolved in 1679. This paved the way for a rapid succession of elections and continual demands that James, Duke of York, be barred from inheriting the crown on the grounds that he was a Catholic.

5 Mark Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 1678-81 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
The role of Scotland in all of this is often overlooked by historians. But as Tim Harris has suggested, “[t]he story Oates had to tell was a self-consciously British one.”

Oates was the original conjurer of the Popish Plot, and he claimed that Jesuits were conspiring to send priests into Scotland, disguised as Presbyterians, to rouse the sectaries in that kingdom. The Catholics in Ireland were then to rise up, and Charles II would be assassinated in England, replaying the mid-century troubles. This would be accomplished with French financial and military aid. Oates did not control the narrative for long, and the plot soon took on a life of its own. Local chapters were added to the story, as well as new popish plots and rival Presbyterian ones, prompting Roger L’Estrange to complain in 1680 that it had created an “age of narratives,” wherein the “tampering [of] Scotland into rebellion” was but one of many. Real trouble erupted on 3 May 1679, when it appeared as though Oates’s prophecy might be fulfilled. On that day, James Sharp, Archbishop of St. Andrews, was murdered by a small band of radical Covenanters, marking the start of an armed insurrection in defence of radical Presbyterianism in Scotland. By 29 May – a day that was supposed to be celebrated as the anniversary of the Restoration and Charles II’s Birthday – the rebels had gathered at Rutherglen, where they read and posted a declaration denouncing the royal supremacy, episcopacy, and the Scottish indulgences.

The Duke of Monmouth, Charles II’s illegitimate son and one of the figureheads of the English exclusionist cause, was sent north to fight the rebels, easily routing them at

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6 Harris, Restoration, 137.
8 R. L’Estrange, L’Estrange’s Narrative of the Plot set for the Edification of His Majesties Liege-People (London, 1680),1.4.
Bothwell Bridge in June. The major body of resistance was broken, but radical conventicling continued and declarations surfaced at Queensferry and Sanquhar in June 1680, denouncing Charles as a tyrant, perjurer, and usurper, and proclaiming that the Catholic York could not inherit the throne. In July, Richard Cameron, the erstwhile rebel leader was slain in a skirmish at Airds Moss, but conventicling and radical covenanting continued under the direction of Donald Cargill. Before Cargill could be apprehended in July 1681, however, he had excommunicated both Charles and York for their persecution of the Kirk and their false faith.\(^9\) All of this found its way into print headlines, private journals, and letters.

And some eyes were already focused on Scotland and its people even before the Popish Plot was fully revealed or the Scottish insurrection began. A printed account of one of the Earl of Shaftesbury’s alleged 1678 speeches to the House of Lords thus stated:

> Popery and Slavery, like two Sisters, go hand in hand, sometimes one goes first, sometimes the other, in a doors, but the other is always following close at hand.

> In England, Popery was to have brought in Slavery; in Scotland, Slavery went before, and Popery was to follow.

> ... Scotland hath outdone all the Eastern and Southern Countreys, in having their Lives, Liberties and Estates subjected to the Arbitrary Will and Pleasure of those that Govern. They have lately plundered and harassed the richest and wealthiest Countries of that Kingdom, and brought down the barbarous High-Landers to devour them.\(^10\)

Just as during the Bishop’s Wars, there was concern in at least some quarters that Scotland could be a testing ground for arbitrary government and popery, and that this would make their introduction into England easier. As Harris has explained, such claims

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were linked to a dissenter-based anxiety that was fuelled by the anti-Presbyterian settlement in Scotland and the wide-ranging powers of monarchy there. And just as during the Bishops’ Wars, this concern competed against a rival fear of Scottish religious radicalism that was conceivably linked with domestic dissent and popular plots to overthrow the monarchy at home.\textsuperscript{11} Alarm became more pronounced in 1679, as evidenced in material like the anonymous \textit{Some Particular Matters of Fact, related to the Administration of Affairs in Scotland under the Duke of Lauderdale} (1679), wherein the author complained of the hardships imposed by the use of highland troops and the suppression of petitions.\textsuperscript{12} On the other side of the spectrum, Charles’s proclamation against the Scottish rebels, republished in the \textit{Gazette} and as part of a separate pamphlet, reminded readers of the “scandal of all Government, and the contempt to Our Laws” then playing out in Scotland, which could easily threaten England too.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, as George Hickes was later to point out, English dissenters might look upon these events gleefully, and he even accused them of harbouring Scottish rebels and republishing Scottish Presbyterian complaints.\textsuperscript{14} Whether this was directly or indirectly tied to the new emergence of party politics is debateable, but a divide in opinion – which will be examined in more detail below – was clearly apparent.

Moreover, there was a certain amount of interest in Scottish issues more broadly throughout the Restoration period. James Sutherland’s study of Restoration newspapers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Harris, \textit{Restoration}, 21.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Anonymous, \textit{Some particular Matters of Fact relating to the Administration of Affairs in Scotland under the Duke of Lauderdale} (London, 1679).
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{London Gazette}, May 8 - 12, 1679, n. 1406; Anonymous, \textit{A True and Impartial Account of the Examinations and Confessions of Several Execrable Conspirators Against the King & His Government in Scotland} (London, 1681), 13-19.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Hickes, \textit{The Spirit of Popery}, A\textsuperscript{r}.
\end{itemize}


found that the first hundred issues of Nathaniel Thompson’s *The Loyal Protestant and True Domestic Intelligence; Or, News both from City and Country* carried forty-one stories from Scotland, and the first fifty issues of T. Beskin’s *The Domestick Intelligence; Or, News both from City and Country Impartially related* carried over forty as well.\(^\text{15}\) Part of this interest was generated by York’s periods of Scottish exile – York was removed from the fraught English political scene between November 1679 and February 1680, and again from October 1680 until March 1682 – but there were also stories of wild weather, social turmoil, and other topical reports.

Despite the Scottish element of the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, and a more general (if occasional) English interest in things Scottish, the major historical debates currently concerned with this period tend to ignore Scotland and are instead heavily invested in questions of modernity; historians argue specifically about when political parties were born, how and when the Anglican church developed, if secularization occurred, whether or not the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis mark the birth of the public sphere, or if the crisis was simply a manifestation of ongoing seventeenth-century troubles.\(^\text{16}\) More interestingly, there is an increasing insistence on the continued centrality


\(^\text{16}\) While Steve Pincus has most emphatically argued for a newly secular Restoration context in which economic/national interest trumped religious devotion – here, he is sometimes supported by other scholars on specific points, although few argue for such a dramatic shift – the majority of studies work tends to emphasize continuities throughout the seventeenth century, or at least until 1689. Scholars are not, however, so unified about what this continuity means. Tim Harris argues that the continuities prove the roots of party to lie within the civil war and Mark Goldie concurs, arguing for a continuity of “puritan politics.” For Jonathan Scott, the continuity between 1642, 1679, and 1689 is so strong that it prevented any important developments from taking place until the resolution of the last conflict in the form of the Glorious Revolution, when religious and political interests finally fused behind the military aspirations of a Dutch conqueror, allowing the modern state to develop. That said, Gary De Krey argues that change and continuity were balanced, and that links in the religious and political debates existed between 1659 and 1679, but that the roots of party, and thus modern politics, emerged during the latter crisis. Mark Knights

Scottish events could not help but get tangled up in these issues since Scotland was the historic cradle of Presbyterianism and aggressive religio-political reform within the British Isles. Therefore, the radical covenanting rebellion that erupted there in 1679 seemed to confirm that Scotland was still the seedbed of religious malcontentment, even if Scotland’s secular revolutionary credentials had been undermined by the Scottish attachment to monarchy during the Civil Wars and Interregnum. To date, however, only Harris has investigated the obvious religio-political continuities in terms of the so-called “British problem,” arguing that persistent issues generated by the Stuart’s multiple kingdoms haunted authorities from the Civil Wars through to the Glorious Revolution. That said, despite his desire to write a multi-national social history of politics, Harris often digresses from his investigation of widespread concerns and ideas in order to enter concurs that the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis saw the earliest glimmers of party, but emphasizes the diffusion of interests and general disorganization of those years which prohibits the historical labelling of any but the most extreme as either Whig or Tory; for him, the real change lay in the dominance of the political language of interest. Many issues and structures, he claims, remained the same over the course of the century, but the mode of discourse shifted. From the continental perspective, Jonathan Israel has also argued pointedly for a radically secularizing enlightenment that flowed from the thought of the Dutch Philosopher Benedict Spinoza to other more moderate thinkers like Locke, starting in the mid-seventeenth century. Steve Pincus, \textit{Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668} (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996); Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, eds., \textit{A Nation Transformed: England after the Restoration} (New York: Cambridge, 2001); Jonathan Israel, \textit{Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Harris, \textit{Politics Under the Later Stuarts}; Goldie, \textit{Roger Morrice}; Scott, \textit{England’s Troubles}; De Krey, \textit{London}; Knights, \textit{Politics and Opinion}; Mark Knights, “Judging Partisan News and the Language of Interest,” 204-220 in Jason McElligot, ed., \textit{Fear, Exclusion and Revolution: Roger Morrice and Britain in the 1680s} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
the more traditional arena of high-political historiography, inviting a separate and more thorough analysis of discourse.\(^18\)

A more detailed explanation of why people thought it was worth discussing the Scots when there was so much political and religious turmoil in England itself is therefore still required. The English were simultaneously preoccupied with domestic matters and did tend to possess a narcissistic gaze – as has been established in earlier chapters – and yet a body of literature and correspondence specifically commenting on Scotland still temporarily emerged, some of which was not directly related to the privileged position of the court. There were military and religious narratives about the Covenanter rebellion in Scotland, narratives of suffering, of a puissant Scottish force and a disorganized rabble. Accounts appeared in personal correspondence, in newspapers, in printed pamphlets, and in Roger Morrice’s *Entring Book*, and were followed by accounts of the Duke of York’s sojourn there. And this does not even include the available histories of Scotland, Scottish songs, or general news stories from the north. It is necessary to ask how these reports from and about Scotland aligned with the now-familiar national prejudices that were highlighted once again by Haddoway and Forbes, and how Scottish events and topics integrated with debates at home. More specifically, we need to ask what this discourse can tell us about the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis.

\(^{18}\) Harris, *Restoration*; Mark Goldie also highlights that Scotland and Ireland are one sub-theme of Roger Morrice’s *Entring Book*, but he fails to pursue the theme, Goldie, *Roger Morrice*, 28-29. The “British problem” is a reference both to the New British History which tries to incorporate the histories of all the kingdoms within the British archipelago without privileging the English, but also to a collection that specifically deems this relationship problematic, both historically and historiographically. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill, eds., *The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
as a whole, and if the process of digesting Scotland functioned in the usual manner or if things were changing.

The surviving excerpts of conversation about the Scots suggest that the visibility of the border was still heavily dependent upon how useful it was to recognize that divide, but the balance between Scottish sameness and difference was now inflected through a slightly different conceptual framework. An emphasis on the divisions within Scotland highlighted an increasing openness to the view that Scottish society was variegated and possessed of traits beyond the simply stereotypical. But in many ways this only converted the Scots from a monolithic caricatured people into more convenient and adaptable tools for use within English controversies – a process that was supported by a subtle shift in the way Scottish rebellion was viewed. No longer were Scottish dissidents discussed in relation to English popular revolts. Now they became part of a genealogy of conspiracy and plotting, and most importantly, heirs to a tradition that had spawned the Civil Wars. While peasant revolts had been something spontaneous, populous, and external, conspiracies contained both public and private, internal and external components, emphasizing the capacity for cross-border cooperation and corruption among the domestic elite. This made conspiracies and plots more dangerous than rebellions and, equally important, the conspiratorial model assigned blame to a few manipulative men, ultimately allowing the regime to repaint the Scots as quintessentially loyal subjects and role models for their English brethren.

This chapter addresses the construction of this narrative through printed and manuscript ruminations about the Scots between 1678 and 1682, with an emphasis on the crisis years between 1679 and 1681. The dates are, like any endpoints, artificial, but they
are also not completely arbitrary. 1678 marked the outbreak of the Popish Plot and thus began the events leading up to new parliamentary elections – these parliaments providing a forum and impetus for debate which might not otherwise have existed – and imposed an important interpretive framework for interaction with Scotland. Similarly, although the parliamentary venue was closed in 1681, Charles did not regain control of London until 1682, finally neutralizing the political crisis. Events in Scotland also dictate that 1682 is a natural endpoint, since York remained in Scotland until that year, and his presence was one of the major reasons for continued English interest in things Scottish.

III

As must be expected, these years saw a certain level of good, old-fashioned Scots-bashing. And anti-Scottish rhetoric appeared most memorably in a broadside ballad about the murder of Archbishop Sharp, which came complete with a detailed illustration of the chaotic scene. Thus, readers were told in 1679 that:

If any Villans, for the Future, would
know the worst way, to dip their Hands in Blood,
Let them to Scotland go, to end that strife,
This Prelate’s Fall, will Teach them to the Life. ¹⁹

And if the reader did not find this sufficiently derogatory, Thomas Kirk’s, *A Modern Account of Scotland* (1679), might satisfy. Here Scotland’s geography was likened to a louse, both because of its uneven coastline and its people’s tendencies to “prey upon its own Fosterer and Presever,” England. Furthermore, Scottish people were “Proud, Arrogant, Vain-glorious boasters, Bloody, Barbarous, and Inhuman Butchers,” who were

as noteworthy for their putrid cooking as their predilection for killing their kings. The Catholic conspirator, Elizabeth Cellier, appears to have agreed with this assessment, noting that when the young Thomas Dangerfield – her now discredited co-conspirator in an attempt to insinuate a Presbyterian plot and her subsequent accuser in the “Meal Tub Plot” – needed a partner in crime, he found a Scotsman and went to Edinburgh.

Another colourful anti-Scottish text is R.L.’s *Letter out of Scotland* (1681). This pamphlet has been attributed to Roger L’Estrange, the licensor of the press and self-appointed public defender of the crown. L’Estrange, who was known in his own time as “old crack-fart” and “towzer,” and who has recently been hailed as the voice of “popular royalism,” had a difficult relationship with print. On the one hand, he recognized the need for publicity, writing “Tis the press that has made ‘um mad, and the press must set ‘em right again;” but on the other hand, he consistently scoffed at the vulgar and the rabble without making it clear how this group differed from his own reading public. Geoff Kemp claims that this “paradoxical” attempt simultaneously to inflate and deflate the public was characteristic of the man and his times, and in the *Letter out of Scotland* (1681), L’Estrange allegedly spoke to his public once again. Readers were told of R.L.’s tribulations there, where he was surrounded by “plaguy Scots,” who would dash

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22 Until recently, the *English Short Title Catalogue*, and *Early English Books online* both attributed this work to L’Estrange, when after consultation, an annotation was added.
out his brains were he to speak his true opinions. Nevertheless, he sent his thoughts to a correspondent in London, who promptly printed his letter, which related that:

I am now learning to play upon the Scotch Bag-pipes, which I will Endeavour to set up instead of the Organs in Churches: I am also learning to speak through the Nose, and am getting by Heart the Scotch-Covenant, I may be a Proselite at last.  

While the pamphlet was thus clearly unkind to the Scots, and L’Estrange seems not to have had any particular affinity for them, it should be noted that this was not his work, a point that will be taken up again later. L’Estrange always published with Henry or Joanna Brome, and he removed himself to the Low Countries during the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, not to Scotland. Furthermore, when read closely, the text is clearly a satiric impersonation of L’Estrange’s voice, not something he would have written on his own. In fact, the real L’Estrange identified the truly despicable element in three kingdoms as a more general group of those who wanted to “enflame the Vulgar without any sort of avail to the Cause in question,” in a “Master-plot” to “get the money out of One Pocket into Another.”  

Regardless, a scathing mockery of the Scots did appear in this printed text, condemning them through biting sarcasm, and it was not entirely unrepresentative. As with the descriptions of Haddoway and Forbes, the abrasive sound of the Scottish accent made its appearance, but this pamphlet added for good measure a healthy repugnance towards Scottish Presbyterianism.

Furthermore, although only the most extreme treatises of the Interregnum had identified Scottish barbarity and juxtaposed it to English civility, the texts available during the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis regularly returned to the barbarous nature of

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the Scottish rebels. Conventicles and especially the murderers of Archbishop Sharp were all smeared with this subhuman quality, revealing a new tendency to frame the Anglo-Scottish relationship within the classical rhetoric of civility. The English empire was expanding, and encounters with “uncivilized” peoples were by this point well publicized. This meant an increased engagement with the term, and allowed shifts in notions of barbarity to take place, evidenced in the differences between Hobbes’s and Locke’s thoughts about the original nature of man. Charles II himself found utility in this increasingly popular rhetoric, accusing the radical Covenanters in Scotland of committing a “barbarous and Inhumane Assassination” that would horrify any good Christian, while a pamphlet account of the “Barbarous Murder” of Sharp, labelled the assassins “monsters.” After the murder, the rebels were said to continue committing “strange Insolencies and Barabrities, wherever they come” and, in a particularly “barbarous” and “inhuman” moment, even desecrated the bodies of the Bishop of Argyle’s children. According to some authors, Scottish Covenanters had left behind the ideals of civilization that set contemporary Europeans apart from their historic predecessors as well as the peoples found in the far reaches of the earth. While barbarity had often been implied in the past, the term itself was now used with much greater frequency.

There were, however, other interpretations of events that had little to do with issues of civility or vague notions of Scottish unpleasantness. These illuminate an internal

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29 London Gazette, May 8–12, 1679, n. 1406; Anon., A True Narrative of the Late most Horrid and Barbarous Murder, title, 2.
English uncertainty about the true nature of religious dissent and the relationship between conscience and politics which betrayed competing fears of arbitrary government/popyr and Presbyterianism/revolution that were very similar to those outlined during the Bishops’ Wars, but which now had much more impressive genealogies and traditions. This supports recent scholarship detailing a growing partisanship about a variety of topics and the ideological divide that was already present by 1678. To return to Shaftesbury’s alleged speech to the Lords, some people clearly worried that Scotland was the testing ground for popery and arbitrary government. This speech continued by highlighting the newly created standing army now in Scotland, allegedly ready to invade and placed under the popish York’s command, which was given as yet one more sign of a move towards Catholic absolutism. And if this was the most alarming issue relating to Scotland, it was not the only cause for concern about an excessively authoritarian approach to government north of the border. Clare Jackson has noted that although England ceased to apply torture to suspected criminals in 1640, Scottish law continued to allow the use of devices such as the “boot” in cases of suspected witchcraft, treason, sedition or murder. The application of torture was carefully regulated, but this did not prevent a growing sense that Scottish rule was somehow despotic and cruel, and various observations about the torturing of Scots continued to appear throughout the crisis years.

31 Hickes, The Spirit of Popery, 73.
32 Clare Jackson, “Judicial Torture, the Liberties of the Subject, and Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1660-1690,” 75-102, in T.C. Smout, ed., Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-1900: Proceedings of the British Academy 127 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); The Domestic Intelligence, or, News from City and Country, 14 July 1679, n. 3; Anonymous, The last Speeches of the two Ministers Mr. John King and Mr. John Kid (London, 1680), 17; Anon., A True and Impartial Account of the Examinations, 7; Hickes, The Spirit of Popery, 1.
One instance of judicial torture in Scotland was particularly detrimental to Scottish government, then under the guidance of the Duke of Lauderdale. This was the case of the radical Presbyterian James Mitchell, Archbishop Sharp’s would-be assassin, who had missed his mark when trying to shoot Sharp in his coach in 1668. Mitchell hid for several years before returning to Edinburgh, where he was recognized by Sharp himself in 1674. In the subsequent attempts to pry information from him about other radical Presbyterians, Mitchell was tortured and possibly offered pardon in return for intelligence. He acquiesced, but Scottish privy councillors denied that they had offered him clemency, and executed him in January 1678, causing considerable damage to the council’s reputation and linking Scottish government with arbitrary violence and perjury. 33 The memorialist Gilbert Burnet recorded that the whole affair was “look’d at by all people with horror” as a “complication of treachery, perjury and cruelty.” “Let my readers see to what height of wickedness men may be carried,” he continued, “after they have once thrown off good principles.” 34

The Tories and the crown defended authoritarian measures by evidencing the need to crush sedition and to stabilize royal authority in both kingdoms, since they feared collaboration between Anglo-Scottish rebels that could only lead to anarchy. 35 The court was supported in this endeavour by Hickes’s Ravillac Redivivus (1678), which made note of the false news that was travelling between England and Scotland, and grumbled that Mitchell’s actions had “conjured up the Fanatical Spirit again, to act in more insolent

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irregularities, than any time heretofore,” an obvious reference to the previous generation of Covenanters who had incited the Bishops’ Wars.\textsuperscript{36} The council, he claimed, never offered Mitchell a pardon. Mitchell’s lawyer only claimed that this was the case because there was nothing else to be done after the confession was signed. Furthermore, Hickes wrote many pages explaining the Jesuitical tendencies of the radical Presbyterians, which justified the use of torture. Conventicles were the seedbeds of sedition and the root of rebellion.\textsuperscript{37} And as Richard Greaves has pointed out, cross-border radicalism was indeed a problem, and there is evidence of English financial support for Scottish radicals and the periodic outbreak of disorderly conventicling in Northumberland.\textsuperscript{38}

Not everyone agreed with Hickes’s interpretation, and Andrew Marvell’s “Scaevola Scotto-Brittannus” was also in circulation, wherein Marvell treated Mitchell in much the same way earlier poets had figured John Felton, the man who assassinated Charles’s I’s favourite, George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. Marvell dwelt on the crushing of Mitchell’s bones as the boot was tightened by the “panting attendant,” and concluded that Scotland would rid itself of Sharp yet.\textsuperscript{39} In much the same way as we have seen before, Marvell played upon the familiar alterity of Scotland to make the threat to England seem much more plausible. And according to Jackson, his poem “perceptively captured the dual manner in which Scotland could be appropriated by external observers as both an alien, barbarous, and foreign land, yet also one that remained sufficiently

\textsuperscript{36} George Hickes, \textit{Ravillac Redividus, Being a Narrative of the late Tryal of Mr. James Mitchell} (London, 1678), 3, 45.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{38} Greaves, \textit{Secrets of the Kingdom}, 54, 57.
familiar to represent a realistic and imminent threat." Furthermore, he was not Hickes’s only opponent when it came to the use of torture. Hickes would have the exact same debate in 1680, after an anonymous edition of the last dying speeches of the covenating ministers John Kidd and John King appeared, Kidd beginning his speech by lamenting his tortured and broken body.  

The events of 1679 were even more alarming. Sharp’s assassination and the subsequent rebellion seemed to confirm both the pervasive fear of sectarian chaos which had helped ensure the Restoration, and the protestant fear of a popish plot that trumped Scottish misbehaviour. And although no one condoned the assassination, there were still competing interpretations of the event. The wildly anti-Scottish ballad produced to commemorate the crime has already been noted, and other accounts explained how a small band of “fanatics” had “barbarously” murdered Sharp, slashing his hands as he held them up in prayer while his daughter looked on. One pamphlet even surmised that the act was committed as retribution for the death of Mitchell. But there was an alternative account in circulation which claimed that the man who led the attack, David Hackston, was actually motivated by a financial quarrel and personal grudge against the

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40 Jackson, “Judicial Torture,” 82.
41 Anonymous, The Last Speeches of the Two Ministers Mr. John King and Mr. John Kid at the Place of Execution at Edinburgh on the 14th day of August, 1679, (London, 1680): 17; Hickes, The Spirit of Popery, 1.
42 Anon., The Manner of the Barbarous Murther; Anonymous, A True Account of the Horrid Murther Committed upon his Grace, the Lord Archbishop of Saint Andrews (London, 1679); Anonymous, A Narrative of the Horrid Murther Committed on the Body of the Late Right Reverent James Lord Archbishop of St. Andrews (London, 1679); Anonymous, A True Narrative of the late most horrid and Barbarous Murder, committed by eleven Phanaticks upon the person of James, Lord Arch-Bishop of St. Andrews (London, 1679).
43 Anon., A Narrative, 1.
Archbishop. 44 Roger Morrice, an English Presbyterian who regularly recorded British news in the hopes of someday writing a dissenting history, found this account so convincing that he copied down a version of it in his *Entring Book* a mere four days after the assassination with a header reading: “None of the Murderers were rank’t amongst any sort of Dissenters.” 45 Apparently, this alternative narrative maintained some currency, despite all the other “more accurate” accounts, because Hickes was still complaining in 1680 that some people believed it. 46

In between Sharp’s murder and the rebel defeat at Bothwell Bridge, disparate radical covenanting groups came together and posted a declaration at Rutherglen, after which they temporarily occupied Glasgow. But the problem of assigning stable meanings to these events was compounded by the difficulty of getting hold of the latest Scottish news in the first place. On 18 June 1679, Morrice complained that “the Letters out of Scotland are so inconsistent and irreconcileable that we have no matter of fact to give judgement upon whether they be dissipated or whether they increase.” 47 Similarly, John Verney, a London merchant and a “trimmer,” – one who avoided the extreme opinions of either side during controversies – noted in a letter to his father dated 16 June that “as to ye Scotch Rebellion we have heard but little since my last by Plestoe, some saying they Increase (& are headed by Scotch-lately French Officers) others that they are quell’d.” 48

48 BL M 636/32, John Verney to Ralph Verney, 16 June 1679.
He and his correspondents were consistently flustered by the difficulty of proving any of the Scottish news to be true.

The Verneys wrote many letters, and the extant manuscript collection is well known to historians studying the late-seventeenth century. Susan Whyman has examined it in detail with regards to sociability and authority, and has highlighted the diversity of the correspondents who represented every category of society mentioned in Gregory King’s famous tables. And while the Verneys’ experiences cannot be generalized, their correspondence does provide a window into common issues that affected English society as a whole in this period. By reading this correspondence, we can thus see how at least one extended family network internalized and debated issues surrounding Scotland among themselves. Whether or not their personalized interpretations of events perfectly reflected the opinions of all of those around them, their correspondence does allow historians to evaluate how several individuals, scattered throughout the kingdom, digested and reacted to the Scottish rebellion and York’s Scottish exile.

The key correspondent in all of this was John, the second son of Sir Ralph Verney, first baronet of Middle Claydon. Eventually, John’s older brother would pre-decease him and John would take over the family lands and title, becoming first Viscount Fermanagh in 1703 but, during the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, he was simply a merchant with the Levant Company and the family’s London agent sending news, gossip, and provisions to his father and brother. He was also a moderate during this period, who sympathized with religious dissenters and had not yet developed his later Tory

This central trio of Ralph, the country gentleman father, Edmund, the feckless elder son set to inherit, and John, the London merchant, conducted fascinating conversations about many topics, among which the Scottish rebellion featured prominently in the summer of 1679.

When John first heard of the rebellion he promptly wrote to Ralph and Edmund to pass on the news and speak his mind. “All the Towne,” he wrote, was talking of the 8,000 or 10,000 then in arms. And since it was feared that the Scottish militia would be sympathetic to the rebel cause, several English regiments were being raised. When writing his father, he enclosed a copy of the Rutherglen declaration, but stipulated “I fancy this is made for ‘em not by them, for I cannot believe them soe very sordid as this wicked Declaration makes em to bee.” John thus reacted with excitement, and a certain amount of disbelief. Ralph echoed John’s alarm, copying out even more exaggerated accounts of the size of the rebel army and the destruction they had already reaped, while worrying that even the English soldiers raised to fight them were “not fond of the impleyment.” John’s brother had also already begun to consider the English implications of this news. Edmund thought things looked very bleak indeed, and immediately noted that if the crown were to lose control of Scotland, “It might Prove a Dangerous Back Doore to Lett in an Ennemy upon Us.” When John wrote his father back, he too looked to the English ramifications of a Scottish rebellion and informed him that: “Our people are soe jealous of ye Governmt that they wont believe but this is a trick to get an Army

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50 Whyman, Sociability and Power.
51 BL M 636/32, John Verney to Edmund Verney, 12 June 1679; BL M 636/32, John Verney to Ralph Verney, 12 June 1679.
52 BL M 636/32, Ralph Verney to John Verney, 16 June 1679.
53 BL M 636/32, Edmund Verney to John Verney, 16 June 1679.
together & then have no more need of Parliamts: But this is the opinion onely of some that are out of Play.” By the end of the month, after it had become apparent that the rebellion was easily crushed after all, Edmund wrote that he had heard of many people who likewise worried that the crisis had been fabricated in order to undermine English freedoms. What began as an outward gaze therefore quickly became introspection and worries about domestic politics, and even a concern that there was a conspiracy aimed at establishing an authoritarian regime in England afoot.

After the rebel defeat at Bothwell Bridge, there was a palpable sigh of relief in the Verney correspondence. Not only were Ralph, Edmund and John glad to hear that Monmouth’s forces had succeeded, but John Stewkeley, John’s cousin and friend wrote to Ralph to deliver the good news, as did Penelope Osborne, Ralph’s sister. There was, nevertheless, disagreement about what kind of force the rebel army had been and how much of it was really defeated. Were they the powerful foe that the Verneys had originally feared, or were the majority of rebels quickly slain or captured while the rest ran away, as was reported in the newsbooks John sent to his father? John noted that some doubted the truth of the victory because the letters carrying news of it were not from Monmouth, and Stewkeley wrote to Ralph informing him that there were those who thought it “but a party routed.” Edmund even heard that Monmouth had been wounded and that there were still 30,000 rebels to defeat.

55 BL M 636/32, John Stewkeley to Ralph Verney, 26 June 1679; BL M 636/32, Lady Osborne to Ralph Verney, 26 June 1679.
By this point John was beginning to lose patience with the Scots, and fumed to his father that “The Scotch nation haveing the symptomes of a feaver, markt with Rebellion, the Duke of Monmouth hath applied a most fit rememedy for such a distracted Distemper which was to let them bloud, as more particularly you’ll see in the Gazett.” He then applied the Popish Plot framework, complaining that the rebels were led by “sedition-Trompeting Preachers,” whose victory would have led to the disembarkation of French troops in Scotland and Ireland. The narrative breaks off before the obligatory recitation of the plans to kill Charles II and set his Catholic brother on the throne, but any contemporary could have filled in the missing pieces. Ralph could not muster as much spleen, and restricted himself to bittersweet sentiments. He was “glad the troubles in Scotland are over,” he wrote, but “alas poor people, they have long sufferd wch made them take this unjustifiable way to deliver themselves.” He was, of course, referring to the episcopal repression of popular Presbyterianism in Scotland following the Restoration, and exposing his own sympathy for religious dissenters.

The Verney correspondence thus highlights how, for brief moments, the Scots could make their presence felt and force the English gaze north of the Tweed. The correspondence also shows, however, that if there was a certain amount of broad-based consensus that the rebellion was dangerous, there were also disagreements, even within the same family, about the causes and ramifications of it. For most of the correspondents, the rebellion was a popular conspiracy led by fanatic covenanters challenging legitimate authority, but for Ralph – and even for John at the start – the rebellion could also

57 BL M 636/33, John Verney to Ralph Verney, 3 July 1679.
58 BL M 636/32, Ralph Verney to John Verney, 30 June 1679.
represent the final breaking point of a godly people suffering under an unwanted and oppressive national church. The sympathy in Ralph’s voice is unmistakable, even if the inability to condone the violence is equally explicit. Furthermore, there was a tension between the external event, and the internal ramifications that many of the correspondents seemed ultimately to privilege, which was reflected in the differing accounts detailing the composition of the rebel army. While the army began as a terrifying and seemingly organized Scottish force, subsequent descriptions soon depicted it as a small and cowardly rabble that only the “fanatics” in England doubted had been routed. Various dangers prompted a shift in English focus that moved first to Scotland (where rebellion had erupted), then to Britain (since the rebellion reminded the English that Scotland was a back-door to their own kingdom that might let in arbitrary rule or cross-border fanaticism), and finally to home soil (as the Popish Plot was ultimately all an attempt to get at the English crown). The danger grew as the narrative expanded to encompass multiple British kingdoms, but was finally tamed through a process of domestication. Once the threat at home was identified – as either popery or dissent – it could be dealt with accordingly.

Roger Morrice’s *Entring Book* provides yet another vantage point from which to assess the Scottish tumults. Morrice had been a vicar in Derbyshire during the Interregnum and was forced by the Act of Uniformity to vacate his living along with over nine hundred other dissenters on 24 August 1662, or Black Bartholomew’s Day. After this, he was patronized first by Lord Holles and then by Sir John Maynard, two of the leading Presbyterian voices in parliament, to whom he acted as a chaplain and a man of
Morrice was thus not without connection to business.\textsuperscript{59} He was also not well known in his own right. This was because, as Jason McElligott has so eloquently put it, “he spent much of the last half of his life quietly compiling the raw materials for a projected history of Britain since the Reformation, a history which he never actually wrote due to a combination of ill health and an equally debilitating inability to stop researching and start writing.”\textsuperscript{60}

Morrice’s notes, which form what is now known as the \textit{Entring Book}, include Scotland among their many themes, although a recent collection of essays aimed at showcasing them self-consciously avoids questions relating to the “New British History.”\textsuperscript{61} Morrice’s quick response to Scottish events has already been noted in his unwillingness to admit the involvement of any dissenters in the murder of Archbishop Sharp, and when armed rebellion in Scotland followed shortly thereafter, he was equally quick to comment in an attempt to separate religious dissent from armed rebellion. On 10 June 1679, after hearing of the Rutherglen declaration, Morrice wrote that “two things are here noted. 1\textsuperscript{st}. That no faction Knowne yet on earth would agree in such a declaracion. 2ndly. That no other Expresse is yet come when the rebellion is so great and dangerous.”\textsuperscript{62} He thus appeared extremely concerned that the dissenting cause not be tarnished by the actions of the Scots. But as reports from the north poured into London, Morrice was forced to admit that a sectarian uprising had occurred and began recording descriptions of the rebel forces and the king’s troops, under the command of the Duke of

\textsuperscript{59} Goldie, \textit{Roger Morrice}, 40-49.
\textsuperscript{62} Morrice, \textit{The Entring Book}, 159-16.
Monmouth. He also noted, however, that Lord Grey, who was supposed to command two regiments of foot, had declined this service on the grounds that the Act of Pacification of 1641 had prohibited sending forces from one of the Stuart kingdoms into the others. The act itself does not contain such a prohibition, but the sentiment is repeated elsewhere, and was probably the result of the lightning-rod created by Charles I’s decision to commission Irish troops during the Bishops’ Wars.⁶³ Grey therefore seems to have worried that by crossing into Scotland he could set a precedent whereby Scottish troops could enter England, and since Morrice copied Grey’s objection, he probably concurred. Consistently, then, the real ramifications of Scottish events were domestic. Somehow Scottish dissent was linked to English dissent, hence Morrice’s attempts to separate dissent and rebellion, protecting his own position. And when forced to concede that a dangerous sectarian force had appeared in Scotland, the military actions taken to put down the Scottish rebellion were most troubling in their English implications.

Morrice’s concern that Scottish troops could be used for some ill purpose reappeared after Charles sent the Duke of York into Scotland in a vain attempt to calm English political tempers. On 3 January 1680, Morrice recorded that “It is commonly said the Duke has raised 5,000 foot and 500 horse in Scotland. But whether there bee any Orders actually given out for raising them yet, I know not.” More terrifyingly, in October of that year, as York commenced his second Scottish exile, the Scottish militia became a

“stated Army of 6000.” Morrice related all of this relatively calmly, but Shaftesbury’s interpretation helps highlight the underlying fears. In *A Speech lately Made by a Noble Peer of the Realm* (1681), Shaftesbury decried:

where’s this Duke, that the king and both Houses have declared unanimously thus dangerous? Why he is in Scotland raising of Forces upon the Terra firma, that can enter dry foot upon us, without hazard of Winds or Seas, the very place he should be in to raise a party there, to be ready when from hence he shall have notice... We all think the business is so ripe, that they have Garrisons, the Arms, the Amunition, the Seas, and Souldiery in all their hands; they want but one good summe of Money to set up.

Shaftesbury had, admittedly, somewhat over-played his hand with this speech and was arrested on suspicion of treason in the summer of 1681 for this and like attempts to exclude York which the court claimed indicated that he intended to overpower the crown. Although a sympathetic jury returned a verdict of ignoramus, the Tory reaction had begun and such wild statements would no longer be tolerated. Nonetheless, by setting Morrice’s early concern alongside Shaftesbury’s later and more extreme accusations, it becomes apparent why the creation of a standing Scottish army was so alarming, especially when Alexander Mudie’s *Scotiae indiculum* (1682) later commented nonchalantly that its forces had the right to march into any of the British domains.

Steadfast supporters of the crown were alarmed by events in Scotland for other reasons. The headway made by dissenters in the wake of the Popish Plot generated a mirror fear of sectarian chaos, which would lead England back into civil war, a view especially prominent among Church of England clergymen. According to Burnet, “nothing was so common in their mouths as the year forty-one, in which the late wars

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66 Harris, *Restoration*.
begun, and which seemed now to be near acted over again.” Crown servants were equally concerned that all order could be undermined, and James Butler, the Anglo-Irish Duke of Ormond and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland noted that peace in Ireland depended on quiet in the king’s other kingdoms. He thus kept a close watch on Scottish settlers in Northern Ireland when he first heard news of the rebellion, in case the rebels tried to raise disorders there too.

Ormond was a Protestant Irish royalist who, although powerful for many years, had consolidated his position in England at the Restoration when he became a Knight of the Garter and his family developed even closer connections at court. He was also Lord Steward of the Household and Chancellor of the University of Oxford, although his position as Lord Lieutenant when he was within Ireland was much more imposing than any of his English posts. According to Toby Barnard, he was a complicated figure, and deserves praise for his calm refusal to sever contacts with Catholic relatives and friends at the outbreak of the Popish Plot, doing much to help defuse potential hysteria in Ireland. But Ormond was much more unsettled by news of rebellion in Scotland, a kingdom which he did not understand. “He fully shared the prejudice of many cavaliers,” Barnard argues, “that the Scots, with their subversive principles, had originated the Civil Wars and engineered the regicide of 1649.”

Ormond’s papers are full of newsletters about Scotland, and examinations taken from anyone who had sailed from Scotland and landed on the Scottish coast. On 17 June

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69 MS Carte 146, pp. 189-190; MS Carte 146, pp. 191-193.
71 Ibid., 13-14.
1679, Robert Colvill thus wrote to him, concerned that “there is a dayly concours of peoples arriving here from Scotland, of which some are so ignorant and others so cunning that there is little either of truth or certainty to be gathered from ym... I dare not then so much as hope that their brethren here will continue much longer quit, some of whom seem already to be upon the ring, in so much that I would judge it very usefull to stop all manner of intercourse with Scotland for some time.”\footnote{MS Carte 45, f. 506.} This was, however, impossible, as the many examinations that continued to be sent to Ormond testified. And it became even more of a problem after the rebellion was put down. As Ormond noted in a proclamation he had printed at the end of the month, “many of the persons who were guilty of the said Rebellion, may, to avoid the just punishment which they deserve, endeavour to fly into this Kingdom of Ireland,” and all mayors, sheriffs and justices should continue to search for them.\footnote{MS Carte 59, ff. 587-588.} He also had George Rawdon search the post for evidence of Scotch-Irish collaboration with the Scottish rebels.\footnote{MS Carte 221, ff. 396-397.} And unlike in England, where there was still a lingering interest in the radical covenanter declarations being produced in Scotland but no real concern for English safety, Ormond still found “great industry” was being used in disbursing the Queensferry and Sanquhar declarations throughout the Scottish communities in Ireland in 1680.\footnote{MS Carte 45, f. 555.}

From the Anglo-Irish perspective then, the Scottish rebellion and covenanting movement meant very tangible danger. The Irish context made borders seem even more permeable, as bodies and documents moved easily across the North Channel. Although...
no sectarian uprising occurred in Ireland, Ormond therefore perceived a very real threat, and his letters communicated this to the court. Furthermore, unlike Morrice or the Verneys, Ormond never worried about the exact rebel numbers, or the details of their defeat, because whether Monmouth won or lost, there could still be trouble in Ireland. This was a narrative about the dangers of radical Presbyterianism, very clearly focussed on the possibility that the toleration of conventiclers in one kingdom could undermine all authority throughout the British Isles.

IV

There was also a good deal of commentary about Scotland in the English newspapers. Although the London Gazette – the crown-sanctioned newspaper focussing primarily of foreign affairs – had been the sole newspaper since the Restoration, the lapsing of the licensing laws in May 1679 meant that competitors entered the scene, many following domestic affairs more closely. The marketability of these papers clearly demonstrated that there was a ravenous demand for news, and the brief existence of a penny post, started in March 1680, increased circulation further still, as did the ever growing number of coffeehouses. The latest news about the Popish Plot always featured prominently, often appearing as the first article and taking up the most space in all the papers, but sensational stories, information about trade and wars, and the comings and goings of royalty were also reported.76 This periodical press, according to C. John Sommerville, represented the “commodification of information,” reorienting news towards the future and emotionalizing it to keep people interested in order to turn a

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76 Sutherland, Restoration Newspaper, 44-75.
profit. But while it is important to recognize the commercial element in all of this, monetary gain was balanced with ideological agendas and each newspaper crafted its stories and formatting to support a particular point of view.

The most consistent periodical in this period was the *London Gazette*, but it is often overlooked by scholars interested in explaining the development of the free press because of its affiliation with the court. Thomas O’Malley, however, has demonstrated that it must be acknowledged as a “long-term voice of authority.” It could be employed to increase a person or event’s profile, to help legitimize Church of England clergymen and their perspectives, or to disparage dissenters. The *Gazette* was where readers met Haddoway and Forbes; it was where Charles II published all of his proclamations against “Field-Conventicles, those Rendesvouses of Rebellion, and Forgers of all Bloody and Jesuitical Principles;” and it was where the most flattering interpretations of York’s time in Scotland could be found. When rebellion first broke out in Scotland, readers of the *Gazette* encountered a story that sounded frightfully like the start of the Civil Wars. The first story in the 9-12 June 1679 edition explained that fourteen to fifteen thousand well-armed men, “in good order,” forced the crown’s troops to retreat and posted a declaration in defence of the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant, and against Episcopacy and the royal supremacy (and it attached the Rutherglen declaration to hammer the point home). This story was then immediately followed by an article noting

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that only three days later, another express had arrived stating that “The Rebels Continue still in Arms, and we are informed that their number is very much increased.”

By the next report, readers were told that rebel numbers were actually in flux, dependent upon the “humour of the Rabble.” There had now been a few skirmishes, all landslide victories for the crown. The trained bands in Edinburgh were also said to be loyal and had cheerfully sworn their loyalty to the king, a statement which was probably intended to calm fears that there was widespread sympathy for the rebels, a concern which the Verneys had testified was indeed in circulation. And although the *Gazette* wanted to establish that a threat did exist, they were also quick to “correct” initial reports and explain that the sectarian uprising was just that: a disorder created by a group of lewd extremists who were easily defeated. This is why, when Monmouth routed the main rebel force at Bothwell Bridge, the *Gazette* reported that the rebels were “Totally Rout’d, some hundred being left dead upon the Place, many hundreds made Prisoners,” and all this “without any Loss to His Majesties Forces, save two or three common Soldiers.” The main body of Scottish subjects, who had been loyal, were ecstatic, and feasted Monmouth after his victory. A general pardon was then issued to all but named rebel leaders, and the laws against House-Conventicles were suspended everywhere but Edinburgh, Dalkieth, St. Andrews, Glasgow and Stirling, in an attempt to create conditions that everyone could live with. Nothing was ever said about those who must have sheltered the fleeing rebels,

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80 *London Gazette*, June 9-12, 1679, n.1415.
82 *London Gazette*, June 23-26, n. 1419.
or those committed to the cause who crossed the Irish channel and caused Ormond so much worry.

Moreover, now that the rebellion was safely quelled, Scotland could be transformed by the *Gazette* into an example of how loyal Stuart subjects should behave by shifting the emphasis from the conspirators on to those who had always been loyal (and also occasionally those who had been deceived but now realized the error of their ways). In an impressive rhetorical volte-face, the newspaper swung from describing a massive Presbyterian uprising that threatened both kingdoms, to depicting the Scots as the Catholic Duke of York’s loudest supporters. At the end of York’s first stay in Scotland, the *Gazette* therefore printed a lengthy account of his teary parting from his Scottish subjects at the head of the paper. York claimed he had “all the short time of his being here, met with all possible demonstrations of Civility and Kindness... from all sorts of People.” Furthermore, he observed, “those restless people, who used to give them some trouble, were nothing so considerable as their Friends the Republican Party in England (with whom he knew they kept Correspondence and Communication).”\(^{84}\) This was a not so subtle jibe at what he felt was the galling lack of loyalty among English dissenters and those who supported them, and the report was complemented two weeks later by a letter from the Scottish privy council which was also printed as the first story in the *Gazette*. Scotland, it read, “hath been very much refreshed and renewed by having your royal Brother among us, in whom we have seen the Moderation of Spirit and equality of Justice that is so remarkable in your Sacred Race, and has raised in us a just abhorrence of those seditious Persons and pernicious Principles, which would lead us

\(^{84}\) *London Gazette*, February 9-12, 1680, n. 1485.
back into those dreadful Confusions.” They then begged that the succession not be altered, referencing Scotland’s allegedly unbroken succession of monarchs and implicitly invoking a chain of inheritance which could be traced through the ages all the way back to Fergus. By the time York left for good, the paper explained that his presence had been most welcome: “The Peace and Tranquility of this Kingdom, is the effect of his prudent and steady Conduct of Affairs; and the humours of our wicked Phanatics are much restrained from generous Eruptions, upon their apprehensions of his Vigilance and Justice: for they dread nothing so much as to see him upon the Head of His Majesties Councels and Forces against them.” The Gazette was thus clearly determined to highlight Scottish reports that bolstered the crown’s position and demonstrated both that York was a praiseworthy leader and that the real dissident threat came from English exclusionists and republicans, not from the north.

The Gazette approached Scotland as a painter does a canvas, taking some inspiration from beyond the frame, but also imposing an image of the editor’s own choosing upon it. And when the Gazette was no longer pleased with its rendition, like the painter, it merely washed over the canvas and started again, without any need for continuity between the old and the new. Scotland was neither consistently good nor evil, neither Same nor Other. To change metaphors, it was a crowbar that could be used to gain leverage in English politics. The reality of a radical Presbyterian uprising, the prevalent fear of sectarian chaos in the post-Restoration years, and the general belief that Scottish Presbyterians had started the Civil Wars meant that the Gazette’s initial strategy

86 *London Gazette*, April 17-20, 1682, n. 1713.
to bolster the authority of the English church and state was to portray events as the
natural, if horrifying, actions of a nation full of religious dissenters. But once the threat
subsided, the newspaper also realized that Scotland could be much more useful as a
model for England to follow. The occasional account of the latest rebel defeat or over-
zealous actions reinforced the dangers posed by sectarian disorder, but for the most part,
the *Gazette* wanted to locate the real problems in England.87

It helped that all of these reports were underwritten by an understanding of
Scottish events as some form of plot or conspiracy. Whereas during the Bishops’ Wars,
narratives about Scottish uprisings were provided with genealogies of rebellion – Wat
Tyler, Jack Cade, Jack Straw, Perkin Warbeck and the like being regularly rehearsed –
the covenanter rebellions of 1679 were placed within a tradition of plotting.88 This is
noteworthy because there was a subtle but important distinction to be made between the
two concepts. Plots and conspiracies were less spontaneous, penetrated the structures of
authority more deeply, and could involve fewer people but were ultimately more
threatening to society as a whole because, as the Civil Wars and Interregnum had
demonstrated, they might actually turn the world upside down. They were led by
manipulative fanatics and aimed specifically at revolution, in one form or another, and as
such, were likely to involve zealots in both England and Scotland, but not the entire
population in either kingdom. The rival conspiracy theories – of popish and Presbyterian
plots – that had been in their infancy during the 1630s were now well-developed, and the

88 It should be re-emphasized that the language of conspiracy was beginning to emerge during the Bishops’
Wars, and that Charles I, in particular, was committed to this framework. However, when actual historical
exempla were provided, especially as time went on, printed literature tended to imbue the Scottish
disturbances with meaning by discussing them in terms of rebellion, not conspiracy.
Popish Plot and the Interregnum stood respectively as the ultimate manifestations of the disorder such schemes could cause. In various printed matter, the murder of Sharpe and the subsequent covenanting rebellions were placed within this framework, adding urgency to the issue while highlighting cross-border cooperation, internal divisions within each individual kingdom, and the role of master manipulators.

The word “rebellion” still appeared consistently, but the genealogy attached to Scottish events indicated a conspiracy. The importance of the Popish Plot interpretive framework has already been discussed, but it is necessary to outline how the competing phobia of a Presbyterian plot operated in more detail. One of the descriptions of the murder of Archbishop Sharp is particularly telling in this regard:

But that restless Bigotry, which had in the late Rebellion distracted our Religion; dissolved Monarchy, unhinged our Property, and enslaved our Liberties, did soon prompt the Execrable Authors of Naphtali; and Jus Populi, who in those Books endeavoured to persuade all Men to Massacre their Governours and Judges by the misapplied Example of holy Phineas, and did in specific terms assert, That there could be no greater Gift made to JESUS CHRIST, than the sending the Archbishop of St. Andrews’s Head in a Silver Box to the KING.\(^\text{89}\)

This passage explicitly linked the opening act of the 1679 covenanting rebellion with the Civil Wars and the radical tracts which followed the Pentland Rising of 1666, and therefore with insidious attempts at manipulation of the masses and violence against authority. Similarly, Hickes’s *The Spirit of Popery* rehearsed the horrors brought about by the Scottish Covenanters of the 1630s and 1640s, and complained that Sharp’s murderers operated on the same principles. He also looked to the Pentland Rising, and to *Naphtali* for antecedents, as opposed to popular rebellions located in the more distant past;

\[^{89}\text{Anonymous, *A True Account of The Horrid*, 3.}\]
something that also occurred in a ballad of 1681 and an anonymous pamphlet of 1682.\textsuperscript{90} This is not to say that the old tropes of obedience versus rebellion were not present – and, in fact, the very act of comparing 1638 and 1679 implied that the issue was one of loyalty and obedience – but that the stakes were higher.\textsuperscript{91}

This framework also meant, however, that a larger proportion of the Scottish population could be absolved from responsibility since conspirators had either duped them or kept them completely in the dark. Moreover, the border became less significant to the whole process because plotters naturally drew upon external resources, and cross-border cooperation had very tellingly featured prominently during the Civil Wars. The conspiracy model therefore allowed newspapers, and pamphlet narratives dealing with Scotland to convert their approach with relative ease, moving from accounts of an extremely threatening Presbyterian conspiracy, to reports which revealed the impressive loyalty of Scottish subjects. And it was not just the \textit{Gazette} that participated in this process; \textit{Smith's Currant Intelligence, or an Impartial Account of the Transactions both Foraign and Domestick} – a short-lived serial which specialized in shipping news and in fact-checking the reports made in other newspapers over a span of twenty-four issues in 1680 – demonstrated similar tendencies.\textsuperscript{92} In its February 17 edition, the paper complained that another newspaper had misreported Scottish behaviour towards the Duke of York. Accounts that “the common people here offered some affronts to the Dukes

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[90]{Hickes, \textit{The Spirit of Popery}, 27-29, 33-34; Anonymous, \textit{The Loyal Letany} (London, 1681); James Crawford, \textit{A Serious expostulation with that party in Scotland, commonly known by the name of Whigs wherein is modestly and plainly laid open the inconsistency of their practices} (London, 1682), 4.}
\footnotetext[91]{\textit{A Letter from Scotland} even asked “Is there any Crime more severely threatened in scripture than resisting Authority?” Anonymous, \textit{A Letter from Scotland with Observations upon the Anti-Erastian, Anti-Prelatical, and Phanatical Presbyterian Party there} (London 1682), 1.}
\footnotetext[92]{Sutherland, \textit{The Restoration Newspaper}, 114-116.}
\end{footnotes}
Servants while they were at their Devotions, by throwing stones at the Church Windows, and that some considerable disturbance was like to have happened,” were all “malitious lyes.” By the end of the month, in fact, Scottish subjects wanted nothing more than to know that York had arrived safely back in London, despite the bad winds, for “never any Prince in so short a time gained more upon the Affection of any people.” Since the majority of news stories about Scotland in this paper appeared on the front of the page, it is probable that the newspaper thought this was an important message.

The pro-dissent newspaper produced by Benjamin Harris entitled *The Domestick Intelligence, or, News from City and Country; Published to prevent False Reports*, put an interesting twist on the Scotland-as-model approach. In this paper, Scotland was noteworthy not for its treatment of York, but for its celebration of the much more popular Monmouth, who was the leading candidate for the throne should York be excluded. Edinburgh entertained him with “all spendour imaginable” after he freed them of their “fears and Consternations wherein they were brought by the late insurrection.” Furthermore, Monmouth, “by his moderate and indifferent carriage there, had the happiness to oblige all sorts of People, even his very Enemies.” The Magistrates were so grateful that they even “presented his Grace with a Copy of his Freedom of that City written in letters of Gold, in a Gold-box of nine Inches over.” But when it came to the sectarian rebellion, *The Domestick Intelligence* was even more condemnatory than the other papers, reinforcing the loyalty of English dissenters. In this paper, rebellion was

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93 *Smith’s Currant Intelligence, or an Impartial Account of the Transactions both Foraign and Domestick*, February 17, 1680, n. 2.
94 *The Domestick Intelligence, or, News from City and country: Published to prevent False Reports*, July 9, 1679, n. 1.
95 *The Domestick Intelligence*, July 17, 1679, n.4.
portrayed as mentally and physically repulsive. The second issue explained that “From Scotland we hear, that upon Review of the dead bodies after the fight of the twenty second of June last past, there are found about nine Hundred of the Rebels slain, and that there are about 2 or 3 Hundred more lye wounded at Hamilton, who not having Chirugeons [sic] sufficient to take care of their Wounds are putrifying this hot season.” Rotting rebel flesh also reappeared just before the paper discontinued publication, when readers were told that “the inhabitants about Hamilton and Glasgow, are lately seized with a Disease, which proves very mortal to those who are infected therewith, which some judge to proceed from the Putrifaction of the Air, occasioned by the Number of Dead [rebel] Bodies which were found among the Corn.” Rebel bodies were as disgusting and disruptive in death as they were in life.

At first glance, it is surprising that a newspaper supporting dissent would carry stories celebrating the man who crushed an army fighting for their right to practice the true faith and describing the repulsiveness of rebels who claimed to be fighting for the godly cause. But this was an effective way of demonstrating that English dissent did not subscribe to the traditional covenanting justifications for resistance put forward by the rebels. The radical trajectories in Scotland and England had diverged, and the English had no particular attachment to the covenanting tradition or to a Presbyterian system that would be as oppressive to dissent as the current Anglican framework. The difference in

96 The Domestick Intelligence, July 10, 1679, n.2; The Domestick Intelligence, October 21, 1679, n.31.
97 The idea of a Protestant association did reappear at times, and oaths of association were proposed during the exclusion crisis, but for the most part covenanting had become a useful propaganda tool for the Tories and dissenters were forced to defend themselves from accusations that they were trying to resurrect a dangerous civil-war tradition. The radical Scottish tradition of resistance to any monarch who refused to take and honour the covenant would increasingly set the radical trajectories in England and Scotland on different courses, causing problems during the revolutions of 1688-90, the union settlement and beyond.
the shades of protestantism being practiced in the two kingdoms was now driving a 
Wedge between them instead of serving to unite. Moreover, whether or not the godly 
were being oppressed, physical resistance seemed too extreme while the memories of the 
civil Wars and revolution hung close overhead, and so Harris tried to place distance 
Between dissent and rebellion in much the same way Morrice had in his Entring Book. 
But despite this desire to demonstrate loyalty, there was still an obvious twinge of unease 
about the use of torture to gain information about other rebels, hinting at a lingering 
discomfort with the nature of Scottish government. On 5 August 1679, it was reported 
that the covenancing ministers Kidd and Lennox had been “tormented with the Boot...but 
however that the Torture hath contracted a Feaver and Laments upon Kidd.”98 There was 
no other reason to comment upon Kidd’s fever than for sympathy’s sake, and despite the 
rebellion, the application of torture still reeked of arbitrary government. 

The Domestick Intelligence therefore moved back and forth between Scotland-as-
Model and Scotland as breeding something that should be feared in much the same way 
as did the Gazette, but for different purposes. This process was a movement between 
domesticating and Othering Scotland. If Scots were model subjects of the Stuart crown, 
then there was really no difference between “us” and “them” – or at least there should not 
be – but if Scotland was the seedbed of either sectarian chaos or arbitrary government, 
then it was indeed a foreign country. Scotland was thus a chimera, or two creatures at 
onece, and this was occasionally reflected in the physical formatting of the newspapers. 
Scottish news sometimes appeared as the watershed between foreign and domestic 

98 The Domestick Intelligence, July 14, 1679, n.3; The Domestick Intelligence, August 5, 1679, n.9.
reports in *The Domestick Intelligence* and in *Smith’s Currant Intelligence*, although never in the *Gazette*, demonstrating once again that Scotland was at best half-Other. That said, this trait arguably made the Scots even more useful during moments of crisis than proper Others like France or Spain. Arguments about the self could be conducted at what was allegedly, but not really, one remove.

Newspapers were complemented by printed material of all sorts that referenced Scotland, and more specifically, the covenanting rebellion and York’s Scottish exile. Scottish history, music, and general news also appeared and, taken together, this literature further illuminates a widely divergent set of opinions regarding the meaning of Scotland. These publications included London reprints of the radical declarations emanating from Scotland. As noted, the Rutherglen declaration appeared as a stand-alone London edition, and also in the *Gazette*, and the Solemn League and Covenant, which the rebels swore to uphold, also reappeared in 1680. Also noteworthy, the Queensferry and Sanquhar declarations were printed under the title *A True and Exact Copy of A Treasonable and Bloody Paper...Together with their Execrable Declaration* as well. These declarations were pointed affirmations that radical Presbyterians continued to covenant with God, and complained that the governors of Scotland:

> hath made Butcheries and Murthers on the Lords People, sold them as Slaves, Imprisoned, Forfaulted, Banished and fined them, upon no other account, but for maintaining the Lords right to rule Consciences... Neither can it be thought, that there is hope of their returing from these Courses, having so often shewed their Natures, and Emnities against God, and

99 *The Domestick Intelligence*, n. 3; *The Domestick Intelligence*, July 22, 1679, n. 5; *Smith’s Currant Intelligence*, February 14, 1679, n.1.  
all Righteousness, and so often Declared, and Renewed their Purposes and Promises of persevering in absoluteness.\footnote{101}

The rebels therefore proclaimed that these governors were “no lawful Rulers as they have Declared us to be no lawful Subjects.” “We declare War against such a Tyrant and Usurper” as Charles II, announced the Sanquhar declaration, “and all the Men of his Practices, as Enemies to our Lord Jesus Christ, his Cause and Covenants.”\footnote{102}

It was assumed that the destructive potential of such explicit claims to the right to resist was self-evident, and these particular texts did not come with commentary. But news pamphlets discussing the rebellion contained examples of the chaos that resulted from such beliefs, in case anyone had any doubts. Besides the barbarous murder of Archbishop Sharp, the rebels temporarily seized Glasgow, where they tore a picture of the king into hundreds of pieces. They also sacked the Bishop of Argyle’s house, and dug up the graves of his dead children, running swords through the bodies, and then leaving them above ground.\footnote{103} Finally, the rebels allegedly travelled with a pair of gallows, one of which was set aside for the gentry – a clear sign that this sectarian rebellion was also aimed at social levelling.\footnote{104} Such stories implied that this rebellion really was a Presbyterian plot in action, aimed at destroying the church and crown throughout the three kingdoms. They outlined the actual violence that aligned perfectly with the genealogies of conspiracy described above, and stood as reminders of the need for loyalty and obedience to the crown. Fortunately, the covenanters were easily beaten, despite the

\footnote{101} Anon., \textit{A True and Exact Copy}, 6.  
\footnote{102} Ibid., 7, 10.  
\footnote{104} Anonymous, \textit{A Further and more particular account of the Total Defeat of the Rebels in Scotland; The Number of the Slain, Two Standards and 12000 Prisoners brought into Edenburg} (S.L., 1679):2.
initial reports that their forces were numerous and well organized. This was because God had intervened, and as one pamphlet put it, “no sin is more detestable to good and sober men than that of Rebellion, so none is more remarkably punisht here by Divine hand than that.”

As events in Scotland seemed to be a popular conspiracy according to this reading, reports were always careful to separate covenanters and field convicticlers from the majority of loyal Scottish citizens, who “are so far from encouraging them, that they express the greatest Abhorrence and Detestation.” When discussing Sharp’s murder, accounts explained that it was “those of that same [radical Presbyterian] Profession and Way,” who undertook this crime and others. And other pamphlets always specified that they spoke of “rebels,” “phanaticks,” and “resolute fellows in that kingdom, specified or known by the name of Field Conviticlers, or rather Rebellious Sectaries,” as opposed to the Scots in general. When discussing the rebellion, the north of Scotland was seen as a bastion of loyalty, but even those unruly areas in the south could experience loyalist back-pedaling when people paused to think about their actions. In A further Account of the Proceedings Against the Rebels in Scotland (1679), this is evident in rebel numbers, as the covenanter army “have not of late encreased their numbers, but rather moulder away; and the Gentry in general throughout the land appear very vigorous for the King’s

105 Anonymous, A Further Account of the Proceedings Against the Rebels in Scotland, since the Arrival of his Grace the Duke of Monmouth (London, 1679); Anon., A Further and more particular account; Anon., The Full and true account; Anonymous, The last True and New Intelligence from Scotland (London, 1679).


107 T.W., A fresh relation from the Kings army in Scotland (London, 1679).


109 Anonymous, A Narrative of the horrid Murther Committed on the Body of the Late Right Reverend JAMES Lord Arch-Bishop of St Andrews (London, 1679); Anonymous, A True Narrative of the late most horrid and Barbarous Murder, Committed, By eleven Phanaticks (London, 1679).
service.” All of this trouble, it seemed, was stirred up by a few overly zealous ministers, and “Many of the Prisoners seem to be very sensible of their wickedness in joyning in this horrid Rebellion and do confess, that their ministers drew them into the same, by bold and seditious sermons, perverting and abusing scripture, scandalizing and misrepresenting the Governement.”

An Oatesean narrative about a popish plot opposed this version of events, and An Appeal From the Country To the City (1679) claimed that it was actually papists who, “first by their counsels procured the poor Inhabitants to be oppressed, and then sending their disguised Priests and Emissaries amongst them, encourage the poor silly Natives to Mutiny against those oppressions.” According to this pamphlet, the king could be sure the ordeal was part of a popish plot and not a Presbyterian one, because if it were the former, the English fanatics would have risen as well (as had occurred during the Civil Wars), and they did not. And despite the censure heaped upon Benjamin Harris for publishing this narrative, this pamphlet was not the only place where this interpretation appeared. A ballad entitled Rome’s Hunting Match for III Kingdoms (1680) claimed that it was the papists who “fireth up the Northern Pole,” and The Loyal Letany (1681) described “a new model’d Jesuit in a Scotch Bonnet.” The Domestick Intelligence even argued that one of the reasons torture was used on captured rebels was “to see if they can find any Jesuits concerned with them which may be much suspected considering the

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110 Anonymous, A further Account of the Proceedings Against the Rebels in Scotland, since the Arrival of his Grace the Duke of Monmouth (London, 1679), 2, 4.
111 Anonymous, A Further and more particular account of the Total Defeat of the Rebels in Scotland (S.L., 1679).
112 Charles Blount, An Appeal from the Country to the City (London, 1679).
management of their business.”

In either version, though, manipulative leaders were singled out for censure and authors avoided descending into specifically ethnic condemnations. Instead, they were invested in questions of where the real threat to authority lay: with the pope, or with the presbyter?

The printed pamphlets also sometimes rehearsed the Scotland-as-model arguments that appeared in newspapers, some promoting Monmouth, others York. It was always safer to praise York though, especially as time went on, and some of the later literature was truly laudatory of Scottish loyalty, especially after the rebellion had been crushed. The anonymous *The Convert Scot and Apostate English* (1681) therefore noted that when York needed shelter, Scotland provided it, asking: “what can/ But this, Merit Oblivion?” “All that is past of Guilty fact,” it concluded, “Lies buried here, in this one Act.”

Similarly, in *An Heroick Poem on Her highness the Lady Anns Voyage into Scotland* (1681), Anne traveled from “faithless Albion to glad Albony,” and in *A New Ballad of Jocky’s Journey into England* (1681), the Scottish Jocky was so horrified by the Popish Plot hysteria that he tried to run away back into loyal Scotland, and had to be actively persuaded that the English had really, at length, been freed from the plotting disease. England was the disloyal partner because, as Jocky noted, English Whigs were trying to undermine all government by creating narratives about Jesuitical plots.

Moreover, Hickes’s *Spirit of Popery* was addressed to English and not Scottish dissenters, indicating where the problem lay. English dissenters were more ingenious,

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113 Anonymous, *Rome’s Hunting Match for III Kingdoms* (London, 1680); Anon., *The Loyal Letany; The Domestick Intelligence*, n.3.
were spreading Scottish propaganda, and had the “Covenanting spirit” among them, which was another way of saying they sought to overthrow the crown.\textsuperscript{116}

Once again, Scotland faded from view. What started as a Scottish threat was thus translated into a domestic issue in this context as well, and was part of an ongoing campaign to convince the English reading public that they should be as loyal as Scotland. This meant that English readers met loyal as well as filthy Scots in print. There were still examples of anti-Scottish sentiment, as has been noted, and some thought that Scottish loyalty was merely the result of the Scots always following the opposite path of that which England chose, but for the most part, the barbarian had been tamed.\textsuperscript{117} A good example of this was the continued popularity of Scottish songs or anything written to a Scottish tune, which did not seem to carry any stain of disloyalty or foreignness. Three such tunes about Scottish lovers were even written by Thomas D’Urfey, friend to Ormond and Charles II.\textsuperscript{118} Scotland not only quickly returned to its unthreatening status after the rebellion – with newspapers reporting more mundane events like Edinburgh fires and Scottish murderesses – it now became a model to be emulated.\textsuperscript{119}

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In this period, descriptions of Scotland as either a legitimate threat or a model kingdom were therefore much more common and powerful than the long-established

\textsuperscript{116} Hickes, \textit{The Spirit of Popery}, A1r, A3v, A2v.
\textsuperscript{117} J.S., \textit{Scotch Politics in a letter to a friend} (London, 1682).
\textsuperscript{119} News like the Edinburgh fire of February 10, 1680 was lost among reports of loyal gestures to York in \textit{Smith’s Currant Intelligence}, as the Murderess beheaded there for killing a Lord was lost amidst putrefying rebel bodies, which \textit{The Domestick Intelligence} reported November 25, 1679. But this would soon be the only news coming from Scotland until the next time the kingdom made a nuisance of itself.
discourse of its inferiority. While Haddoway and Forbes still had a role to play, and lousy Scotland might persist in the occasional act of duplicity, the English found it much more interesting, in the context of the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis, to treat Scotland as a intermediary agent. The covenanting rebellion, and York’s subsequent Scottish exile could be used as sounding-boards to continue English debates about the role of dissent and the possibility of a popish successor. Torture, standing armies, and the oppression of the godly led Shaftesbury, Morrice, Ralph Verney and others to lament what they perceived as arbitrary rule in Scotland, because they feared it boded ill for England, even if no one argued in favour of the rebellion itself.

It is impossible to say whether anyone secretly believed that the Scottish resistance was just, since political reality mandated that the best anyone could do was blame it on the Jesuits, but it is doubtful that this was the case. Even Richard Ashcraft, who has exposed an English strain of radical thought willing to countenance rebellion during these years (and which built many of its arguments out of a defence of religious dissent), has explained that English radicalism was fundamentally based upon natural law and was not related to a need to fulfill the obligations of a divine covenant.\(^{120}\) While the centrality of religion in the popular response to these crisis years cannot be denied, by the time of the Popish Plot, English religious dissidents no longer wanted the Solemn League and Covenant. They were on a quest for toleration or comprehension of dissent – and the Scottish rebellion was altogether too much wrapped up with covenants and covenanting

for them to want to embrace it. This, coupled with the general Restoration distaste for a notion so closely associated with the Civil Wars and regicide, was in all likelihood, enough to create a consensus against the Scottish uprising. It is therefore not surprising that English dissenters sought to distance themselves from the Scottish rebels in an attempt to salvage the dissenting position at home.

Others reacted to the rebellion as if it were proof of the chaos that would result from religious dissent. It was said that “41 is come again,” or at least that it would come again, if the rebellion were not put down. This was not arbitrary rule, but a well-ordered society crushing a rebellion that no one, not even the Scots, sanctioned. And when the crown carried out its responsibility to defend Scottish subjects against sectarian tumults, the Scots reciprocated by acting out the part of the loyal subject, and welcoming York. The real threat was thus not the Scottish dissenters, but their English counterparts, who were attempting to disrupt the political balance and alter the line of succession. The English needed only to follow the loyal Scottish example to end the crisis at home. Time and time again, as had occurred before the Civil Wars, external Scottish events were internalized and discourses about Scotland were shifted to ask English questions. However, at the exact same time that Scotland was functioning as another England, and the conundrums in the two kingdoms appeared similar, Scotland became repugnant in some cases. The bodies of its dissenters putrefied the air, and the country itself became so unseemly that one could attack Roger L’Estrange simply by pretending that he had

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visited Edinburgh and adopted a few Scotch vices while there, so it is important to remember that the discourse was never monolithic.\textsuperscript{122}

At first, then, these debates seemed interminable, as there was a steady stream of opinions from both sides. But as time wore on, and example after example of loyal Scottish support poured into print, it became clear that the court was winning. Scotland supported York’s inheritance. Scotland would lead the way. Dissent should be crushed. And although discourses about the Scots cannot be taken to represent the whole gamut of English sentiment, the closing tenor of this conversation provides early indications that the Rye House Plot (1683), which sought to foment rebellion and remove Charles and York, could not succeed. Everyone had condemned violent rebellion, and the mass of literature criticizing dissent and praising Scottish acceptance of royal policies was considerable. It was not wise to challenge this. Therefore, while Harris is right to highlight the role of Scotland in confirming everyone’s worst fears, the relationship between England and Scotland was much more complex than this, and positive depictions were just as powerful as negative ones.\textsuperscript{123} This was because a dynamic interplay between Scottish events, and English interpretations of them, allowed the category of Scotland to move from Other to Same, from Same to Other, or be both at once. Furthermore, this partial inability to separate Scotland from the self, reaffirmed in these years, helps explain why the English were so shocked and perplexed at Scottish resistance to the Act of Succession and the prospect of an incorporating union at the turn of the century. Boundaries were not yet lost, but they were clearly phasing in and out of sight.

\textsuperscript{122} R.L., \textit{Letter out of Scotland.}  
\textsuperscript{123} Harris, \textit{Restoration.}
Chapter Six: Seen but not Heard – The English Vision of Union in 1707

The ill-defined terms of the old regal union came to an end on 1 May 1707 when the separate parliaments of Scotland and England were formally abolished, and the parliament of Great Britain was established in their stead. The union provided for forty-five Scottish representatives in the House of Commons and sixteen representative members in the House of Lords. Notably, it followed several years of political grandstanding and pamphlet wars, and it must be included in any discussion of English perceptions of Scotland for all of these reasons. It is also, undeniably, the unspoken and uncomfortable issue that needs to be addressed when asking questions about Anglo-Scottish relations in any form from the British reformations forward since it is tied to questions of nation, empire, sovereignty, and pan-protestant identity. For our purposes though, what is noteworthy about the union negotiations and celebrations is that, despite their obvious ambivalence towards the Scots over the past century, the English were now officially forced to accept them as friend instead of foe, as same instead of other. This is not to say, by any means, that all of England welcomed the Scots with open arms, but rather that the political necessities forcing union also forced a change in the discourses that swirled around Scotland. And by placing a closer union with Scotland front and centre, as the direct object of the debate, people had to make concrete choices regarding their feelings about their neighbours to the north, instead of continuously drifting between disdain and admiration.

The religio-political culture of England had been redefined in the wake of the Glorious Revolution and this had reoriented the rules of engagement: Whigs and Tories battled for political control, Jacobites on both sides the border sought to reinstate the
traditional line of succession, and the Anglican church had reluctantly come to accept that it must to learn to live with dissent. The category of Scotland was now tangled up in all of these conflicts, but it was still manipulated according to domestic needs, and the explicit political negotiations that sought to redefine the terms of the Anglo-Scottish relationship both forced Scotland into clearer view, and ensured that the English worked harder than ever before to deny the possibility of true Scottish agency. While questions of political economy, and the possibility of using brute force to secure English interests surfaced, an equally important and enduring issue was finding a religious settlement that everyone could live with. It was immediately apparent that Scottish Presbyterianism caused problems for all parties, tied as it was to a genealogy of conspiracy, an aggressive imperial drive to overtake all of Britain, and its natural opposition to the Anglican hierarchy. The high churchmen were most likely to have issues with it as a result, but even dissenters like Daniel Defoe felt the need to tame the beast, rhetorically speaking, before it could be brought into the fold.

II

For the most part, when forced to take a stand, English observers decided that the Scots were the vile, beggarly, despicable creatures they had always suspected them to be. And despite the queen’s known antipathy to denigrating the union in print, a few anonymous authors did risk openly libelling the Scots.

Their Countrey is that barren Wilderness
Which Cain did First in banishment possess;
An open-mouth’d Asylum that receives
Your broken Debtors, and your Fugitives,
A sure Retreat for Rebels and for thieves,
A greedy, dark, degenerate place of sin
For th’ Universe to shoot her Rubbish in.¹

Even Defoe, acting as an official propagandist for the regime, knew his audience well enough that he tended not to argue in the positive, but in terms of negatives:

I have heard it suggested by the Enemies of the Scots Nation, that they are poor and mercenary, and may be bought by the Court with 100 000l. If this Slander be true, ‘tis first a Sign that the present Government in England does not bribe them now. Secondly, ‘tis plain, that they are not to be brib’d into the Union; for that Money has not produc’d the Effect yet.”

This passage never refuted the charge that the Scots were “poor and mercenary;” it merely argued that they had not acted in this manner during the union negotiations. Defoe fought tirelessly for the union, but not as explicitly for the Scots. Both of these rhetorical approaches to the problem of Scotland had obvious ramifications for the way in which the English believed the union would operate, undermining the sense that it could be an equal partnership, and hinting at the merits of a political (if not military) conquest.³

Contemporary unease, and even open hostility, to the parliamentary union has ensured that observers have always asked how and why it came about, beginning with Defoe’s History of the Union of Great Britain (1709), and George Lockhart of Carnwarth’s Memoirs Concerning the Affairs of Scotland (1714). Respectively, these works cast the union as the natural evolution of the providential British empire, and the

³ While W.A. Speck has argued that England’s growing military strength meant that a very real threat of conquest hung over the parliamentary union negotiations, and that troops were stationed on the Anglo-Scottish border to make the point. But however convincing this argument may be at first glance, Christopher Storrs’s contention that continental wars equally enhanced England’s military prowess and undermined its ability to fight at home is more convincing. W.A. Speck, The Birth of Britain: A New Nation, 1700-1710 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 20; Christopher Storrs, “The Union of 1707 and the War of Spanish Succession,” 31-44 in Stewart Brown and Christopher Whatley, eds., The Union of 1707: New Dimensions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
betrayal of Scotland’s sovereignty in exchange for personal gain. Although one cannot expect the perspectives of a professional propagandist trying to garner favour with the crown and a disillusioned Jacobite to align, the differences of opinion are still informative since they highlight issues over which future generations would continue to disagree, albeit for continuously evolving reasons. Was union good or bad? Were the motives for it economic, political, religious, or personal? And how was union achieved in England and Scotland? There has been consistent interest in these questions, although the current historiographical debates are largely framed by the work of T.C. Smout, William Ferguson and P.W.J. Riley.

In 1963, Smout published an influential monograph, arguing that the parliamentary union was inevitable because it was driven by Scottish economic deterioration. He claimed that the regal union had undermined Scotland’s economy by increasing dependence on trade with England, while shutting the Scots out from the profits of the new world and undermining their European trade through English-driven foreign policy. Smout therefore concluded that in 1707, incorporation was the only viable course of action available to Scotland, and that it could not hurt the English economy either. Ferguson and Riley both produced answers to Smout in the 1970s, with Ferguson


\[5\] For a detailed summary of the historiography from the eighteenth century until T.C. Smout, see Allan Macinnes, *Union for Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-50.

\[6\] Smout was echoing economic arguments put forward in Scotland during the union debates themselves; however, his powerful presentation of the struggling Scottish economy has become a landmark in union historiography and has reasserted the importance of trade. Whether or not historians agree with Smout’s conclusions that Scotland’s economy was desperately weak, or that union was the optimum solution, there is a general agreement that economics had a major role to play in forging the union treaty. T.C. Smout, “The Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707.I. The Economic Background,” *Economic History Review, New Series*, 2007, 60.
tracing the *longue durée* of Anglo-Scottish national rivalry, shifting the locus of the union drive from Scotland to England. Specifically, Ferguson argued that after 1688, Scotland’s government could no longer be managed from the English court, destabilizing the regal union and forcing contemporaries to reassess the nature of the Anglo-Scottish relationship. Ultimately, this led England to demand a parliamentary union for its own political security, manipulating pliable politicians in Scotland in order to get it.  

Riley likewise rejected Smout’s Scottish-driven economic explanation, relegating Scottish concerns and politics to the realm of venal and self-interested magnate relationships that the English had to learn to overcome.  

English party politics, especially those related to the war effort and the succession, drove union negotiations.  

Economic concerns – most notably those related to the Darien fiasco, and the resultant loss of one quarter of all Scottish liquid capital – only affected Scotland, who did not have the final say anyway.  

Many other scholars have agreed that it was English politics, not Scottish complaints or desires, which drove the union; in particular, they claim that the pressing need to secure the war effort against France and prevent a French-sponsored Jacobite intervention at home by securing the protestant succession was a weighty concern.

Maurice Lee, Jr. has argued that an incorporating union was the inevitable product of a shared monarchy that had to cater to the much more demanding English Parliament, and John Young has been equally insistent that the English were destined to get what they wanted concerning union, one way or another. This was especially true since English demands were backed by stunning displays of military prowess in Europe that implicitly threatened to effect a conquest of Scotland, and were used to secure an influx of Whig-friendly Scottish MPs, reinforcing the Whig’s political dominance.¹¹ All of these accounts ignore the role of religion (either as a unifying or divisive factor) in favour of politics, and Brian Levack has even argued that what happened during the seventeenth century “was that the union, considered both as an ideal and a reality, had been secularized.”¹²

In 2007, the tercentenary of the union produced a fresh burst of publications, many of which focused almost exclusively on the Scottish context, assuming not incorrectly that there had been a real opportunity for the Scots to thwart English desires.¹³

According to Karen Bowie, Scottish union debates were widespread enough to constitute


the birth of a fully-developed Scottish public sphere – not only was there a vociferous pamphlet war there, but the Scottish country party instigated a major anti-union initiative in the form of seventy-nine addresses against incorporation with a total of more than 20,000 signatures.\textsuperscript{14} Bowie’s agenda, like that of other recent authors, is to write agency back into accounts of how and why the Scots accepted union by demonstrating the active and genuine participation of the Scottish public in the union debates. Other studies have verified the active role of Scots and especially the Presbyterian Kirk in securing union.\textsuperscript{15} Presbyterianism, say Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick, was often caught up with Revolutionary principles, making the parliamentary union the end product not of 1603, but of 1688. And although they acknowledge the role of bribery, English pressures, and economic hardship, they insist that it was a sizeable minority of ideologically driven men who self-consciously pushed the union through in the end.\textsuperscript{16} This was possible because of the disorganization of the anti-unionists, and because the revolution had detached the idea of Scotland from its traditional attachment to the Stuart monarchy, making both categories unstable. The revolutionary settlement and union negotiations, then, loosened the category of Scottish nationhood just enough for a union to be forced through and Scottish sovereignty abolished, but also allowed a sense of nation to be quietly reattached to the Scottish people and their culture, ultimately preventing Great Britain from becoming a nation-state proper.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Bowie, \textit{Scottish Public Opinion}, 115.
\textsuperscript{16} Whatley and Patrick, \textit{The Scots and the Union}; Whatley and Patrick, “Persistance, Principle and Patriotism.”
\textsuperscript{17} This assumption is supported by the work of Ian Ross and Stephen Scobie, who have argued that it was precisely at this moment that the Scottish vernacular was enshrined as a literary language, and by Colin
Allan Macinnes has approached the issue from an international, imperial perspective, in order to explain the cross-border incentives for union. His interpretation affirms the importance of England’s desire for union – since the English needed to secure their maritime empire – while still testifying to Scottish agency evidenced by their independent pursuit of empire. According to Macinnes, the Scottish attempt to establish a colony at Darien (located within the territory of William III’s Spanish allies) simultaneously convinced the English of the need for incorporation and weakened Scottish morale, ultimately allowing English interests to triumph but also highlighting the Scottish ability to make trouble. The Scots ensured that the English did not get what they wanted easily: England had to pay Scottish arrears, provide an equivalent for losses suffered through the Darien venture, and turn a blind eye to an estimated £300,000 worth of Scottish profiteering that resulted from the manipulation of trading rights before the union came into effect. Furthermore, the reality of the financial threat posed by the Scots is substantiated by other research demonstrating that the English East India Company was a very active proponent of union because its members were concerned

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about Scottish re-entry into the international trading game, even though the Scottish company was already ruined by Darien.¹⁹

The fact that union was of critical importance in both kingdoms should therefore not be overlooked. It is not sufficient merely to explain one side of the story and it is now time to focus on England again in order to add texture to the new Scottish narratives. This means that we must move from Macinnes’s account of how and why a sceptical English parliament passed the Act of Union, to how the English populace reacted to the process. Most discussions of the parliamentary union within English-oriented scholarship present it as a blip on the radar of state formation, privileging 1688 or focussing on the intricacies of party politics.²⁰ Those historians, discussed above, who have been concerned with how the English reacted to union have tended to focus on the high political aspects of it. There is no dedicated study of the public debate about the union in England, the complex anxieties expressed by English contemporaries when presented with the prospect, or the reactions of devout Anglicans and dissenters written to complement the rich Scottish studies that are now available. Admittedly, various authors do mention blatantly anti-Scottish works like William Atwood’s *The Superiority and Direct Domination of the Imperial Crown of England over the Crown and Kingdom of Scotland* (1704), which was burnt by the common hangman in Scotland, but what of the other pamphlets, sermons, addresses and new stories that engaged in the union debate?


Brian Cowan has postulated that this type of aversion to taking the public sphere into account is often the result of the need to refute Namierite histories on their own terms, restricting historical inquiry to answering a set of questions composed by a previous generation. But this only emphasizes the pressing need to rectify the situation, since the field of eighteenth-century studies as a whole has managed to move beyond such a binary inquiry into lofty ideals and mundane self-interest.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, the requisite sources to complete this task have survived. Despite the obvious sensitivity of offering one’s opinion on the Scots and the union while Queen Anne attempted to push the union through, a fair body of print survives on the subject. There is also a corpus of thanksgiving sermons and addresses that have been largely ignored and which offer clues as to how future relationships between the two peoples might unfold. A closer examination of this material can explain the disconnect between one thesis, which argues that the Anglo-Scottish relationship had been pushed almost to its breaking point by 1707, and Linda Colley’s approach, which claims that British nation-building began on an optimistic note at exactly the same time.\textsuperscript{22}

Finally, while those studying the Scottish side of the union negotiations have now begun emphasizing the role of religion in the union debates, those interested in England have taken a wholly secular approach. Although the English were indeed becoming increasingly averse to the domestic politicization of religion – a latitudinarian spirit was


increasingly influential – it was this very trait that made the religious question so important to them: was not union with a nation of Presbyterian fanatics, tainted by rebellion and plotting, dangerous in and of itself, as well as to the Church of England? It is therefore important to recognize that while the maintenance of separate churches and legal systems is now celebrated because it established a flexibility that allowed the union to endure, for contemporaries, there was considerable unease with the arrangement. Whether or not Scottish Presbyterianism was becoming more constitutionalist and tolerationist, it was perceived as an institutionalized form of enthusiasm by those dwelling south of the border.²³ And this, coupled with the longer-standing prejudice against the Scots, gave rise to a number of English anxieties about the union which mirrored those apparent in Scotland.

By filling out the political narrative with a discussion of the hopes and anxieties that the English felt about the union, we will gain a better understanding of the union negotiations themselves. Moreover, a closer analysis of English union discourse re-establishes the centrality of religion during the negotiations – although religion did function differently than it had during past Anglo-Scottish encounters outlined in previous chapters. This chapter will follow discussions about the Scots and the union between 1702, when Anne appointed union commissioners for the first time in a failed attempt to secure the succession, and 1707, when the union came into effect. Since the

manuscript sources available for this period are extensive, but are the product of the political actors and as such reflect the already well-documented political negotiations, it will focus instead on printed sources since they reveal more widespread concerns. These can be roughly divided into general printed accounts of Scotland and the union negotiations, the writings of Daniel Defoe and other newspaper sources, and the thanksgiving sermons and addresses that celebrated the union.

III

The political events leading up to the union are familiar to many readers. In 1701, the English parliament passed the Act of Settlement to protect the Protestant succession since William III himself had lacked an heir, and the Duke of Gloucester, Queen Anne’s last surviving child, had died in 1700. By this act, the electress Sophia of Hanover and her descendants were legally established as the heirs to the English, Irish and Scottish thrones, but the Scots took umbrage at English failure to consult with them, and used the opportunity to try to force a change in the Anglo-Scottish balance of power. In 1703, the Scottish parliament therefore passed the Act Anent Peace and War, the Wine Act, and the Act of Security, outlining that they were a sovereign kingdom and would choose a different successor than the English unless the terms of the regal union were renegotiated and Scottish interests respected. This only aggravated the situation, and the English responded in kind in 1705 with the Alien Act, threatening to treat all Scots as foreigners and break off various lucrative trading relationships if the succession issue was not settled by Christmas. At this point, the idea of a closer union – already mooted in 1689 and 1702– began to dominate discussions. And after some intense Scottish politicking, union
commissioners were appointed in both kingdoms, and a parliamentary union ratified in 1707.24

Anne made it known from the beginning of her reign that she was in favour of a closer union, thus tainting any criticism thereof with sedition.25 For this reason, there was less literature specifically about Scotland and the union negotiations available than might initially be thought, with about a dozen extant titles appearing per annum between 1702 and 1707, excluding the celebratory material published after the union took effect. But these publications are incredibly rich and range in length from just a few pages, to several hundred, including within their ranks the usual smattering of anonymous authors, as well as more established names. Equally important, at least one author thought there was enough contemporary interest in Scotland to justify publishing a new survey of that kingdom, claiming that “the Union of England and Scotland is now grown a considerable Subject in every Bodies Mouths.”26 People were talking, despite the difficulties involved in doing so, and six approaches to Scotland can be discerned scattered throughout this literature: the Scottish perspective that occasionally infiltrated the English discussion; a facile complete union or conquest model; the threat-driven realization that large numbers of Scots had already penetrated England and her dependencies; the homage argument; a

25 In Anne’s letter to the Scottish Parliament, June 1702, which was published in the London Gazette, Anne explained that union was necessary for the security and happiness of both nations; and, in Defoe’s Review, he mentions that Queen Anne had ordered that nothing be written against the negotiations in 1706. London Gazette, No. 3819 (15-18 June 1702), 1; Defoe, Review, Vol. III, No. 19 (5 October 1706), 473.
26 Thomas Morer, A Short Account of Scotland. Being a Description of that Kingdom, and what the Constitution of it is in Church and State (London, 1702), 1.
variety of beliefs about the dangers of Scottish Presbyterianism; and a projecting interest in Scotland and mercantile expansion.

The Scottish idea of Britain had consistently differed from the understanding circulating in England, and the eighteenth-century parliamentary union negotiations continued the separate traditions. In this period, the standard Scottish concerns, outlined in the Scottish pamphlet wars, were summed up in the writings of James Hodges. Hodges’s work articulated fears that Scottish representation in a British parliament would be too small to ensure that the union treaty remained in force, that removing government to London would drain people and wealth from Scotland, that the Scottish nobility would be undermined, that a proud Scottish sovereignty was being exchanged for nothing of value, and that free trade might not benefit the Scottish economy (or possibly even offer it harm). These arguments were made more directly available to the English in his *The Rights and Interests of the Two British Monarchies*, published in London and Edinburgh in 1703, with a subsequent 1706 London edition. In this pamphlet, he argued more generally that the problem was one of interest. An incorporating union that respected the

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28 In this chapter, the practice of focussing on English editions has been continued, despite the increasing maturity of Scottish printing and increased communication between the two nations. This has been done both for consistency, and because place of publication does still help reveal the intended audience. There was no reason to print something in Scotland, intended for English readers when there was a more than sufficient selection of printers south of the border. Similarly, publication in Edinburgh implies a desire to distribute to a Scottish audience, which in and of itself implies different terms of debate because the Scots were considering a separate set of issues and had their own approach to the concept of Britain. Furthermore, although the same issues appear in English print as in Scottish pamphlets, there was a difference of emphasis, and this difference of emphasis is very revealing.
separate interests of both nations could simply not be conceived of, and a confederation was required instead.\textsuperscript{30}

The Scottish notion of a federative union was refined from sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century visions of a unified protestant Britain, evolving as experience revealed the impossibility of uniting the kingdoms on all fronts towards something more qualified. As such, federative thinking was in direct competition with English gothic notions of incorporation since it sought to preserve distinctiveness and independence at some level.\textsuperscript{31} It was thus hardly surprising that it appeared in this debate, with Hodges publishing in London for maximum impact, reminding the English that Scotland was an equal, whose sovereignty and institutions had to be respected. The constant emphasis on Scottish sovereignty, though, invited mockery by the time the twenty-five articles of union were being debated. In an oft-quoted speech, Lord Belhaven begged pardon to shed a single tear as “I see a Free and Independent Kingdom delivering up that which all the World hath been fighting for since the Days of Nimrod... to wit, A Power to manage their own Affairs.”\textsuperscript{32} His speech did not appear in a stand-alone London edition, but there were at least four Edinburgh editions, and it was seen as important and familiar enough to include in a 1707 London collection of remarkable speeches. It was also publicly mocked in several pamphlets including one by Defoe:

\begin{quote}
Some said my Lord cry’d
Tho others deny’d
Which Matter of Moment it’s hard to decide,
But here’s a more difficult Matter remains,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30}James Hodges, \textit{The Rights and Interests of the Two British Monarchies, Inquir’d into, and Clear’d, with a Special respect to an United or Separate State} (London, 1703), 13.

\textsuperscript{31}Alan Macinnes, \textit{The British Revolution, 1629-1660} (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

\textsuperscript{32}Anonymous, \textit{A Compleat Collection of all the Remarkable Speeches of Both Houses of Parliament from the Year 1641, to the Happy Union of Great Britain} (London, 1707), 163, 146,
To tell if he shew’d us less Manners or Brains.\textsuperscript{33}

The English incorporationist and Scottish confederal perspectives were more explicitly compared and contrasted in, \textit{An Inquiry into the Reasonableness and Consequences of an Union with Scotland} (1706), written by the Anglo-Scottish projector William Paterson, but published as the proceedings of the fictitious “Wednesdays Club.”\textsuperscript{34} According to this publication, all the other literature about the union negotiations was either “long, tedious or perplexed heaps of words,” or “performances of prejudiced spleenitick and uneasie people.”\textsuperscript{35} Paterson offered a remedy in the form of an alleged dialogue between multiple English and Scottish club members, the latter of whom were named Mr. Grant and Mr. Rose. In the pamphlet, Rose singularly argued for a confederal union, which would include a joint succession, communication in trade, committees for handling mutual interest and, on occasion, mutual taxes.\textsuperscript{36} As the work progressed, however, Rose was trounced, and the English preference for incorporation was shown to be more appropriate. Confederation was alleged to lean more towards division than union, and incorporation was said to include protection for Scottish laws and religion, making it increasingly appealing. The club then concluded that they “upon the whole, do


\textsuperscript{35} Paterson, \textit{An Inquiry}.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, 6.
think the objections or doubts upon the part of the Gentlemen of Scotland are either ill-grounded, or very frivolous."\textsuperscript{37}

Closer scrutiny of the Scottish case for confederal union therefore revealed the inconsistencies in the argument and demonstrated that the Scots misunderstood the situation. This belief was highlighted in a particularly callous remark that claimed Scotland had never been “more easie and happy in itself, nor Justice more Impartially Administred” than during the Cromwellian occupation.\textsuperscript{38} It was in the Scots’ best interest to let the English manage their affairs, illustrating that the defeat of the Scottish confederal perspective simultaneously rendered the Scots inferior, unimportant, and less rational. The \textit{Inquiry} and its conclusions also had broader implications. Although there is no evidence explaining how many copies of this particular work were produced, or how people read it, the \textit{Inquiry} is a microcosm of how the debate as a whole could (and according to many English authors, should) be read. A rational and open engagement with Scottish ideas led naturally to the conclusion that the Scots were wrong, justifying incorporation in the face of Scottish objections, and undermining Scottish opinions.

The legitimacy of the Scottish position was also challenged by making the few Scottish voices in favour of incorporation available through the English press. This made it appear that the Scottish perspective on union included both the assertion, and the subsequent rejection, of the confederal position. William Seton of Pitmedden’s, \textit{The Interest of Scotland in Three Essays} (1700), was therefore reprinted in England in 1702 to correspond with the meeting of the first union commissioners, and his speech in the

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, 9, 21, 133.  
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, 66.
Scottish parliament on the articles of union was also published in London in 1706. Seton’s message was unambiguous: complete union or complete separation. “That there is a Necessity for Scotland either to unite with England, or separate from it,” he wrote, “is evident by the Experience of 97 years.” But by 1706, there was only one solution justified by “reason and experience,” and that was incorporation. Seton was an advocate of the court interest and his position is no surprise, although his particular brand of zeal for the union has been called “distinctive.” All the elements of what will become a familiar platform appeared in his work – religious toleration, parliamentary union, communion in trade, and the need for British security – but Seton was atypical in that he proposed a union of laws as well, claiming that a group of lawyers from both nations could simply create a new body of law out of the separate English and Scottish traditions. Had Seton familiarized himself with the details of the Jacobean union debates, he would have probably been less optimistic about this last point.

Simon Mackensie also published incorporationist arguments in 1704 in his Vis Unita Fortia, which was then reissued as a Perswasive to Union in 1706. Seton’s social opposite, Mackensie styled himself a husbandman from the north of Scotland, but he agreed that a parliamentary and economic union (he was non-specific about legal incorporation) was necessary. Over time, he believed this would “gently bring both the Nations into a nearer Acquaintance, and Friendship... and to a Similitude of Manners and

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40 Seton, The Interest of Scotland, 110; Seton, A Speech, 2.
41 Macinnes, Union and Empire, 105.
42 Seton, The Interest of Scotland, 47.
43 Simon Mackensie, Vis Unita Fortior: Or the Union of Great Britain in Its Civil and Religious Concerns (London, 1704); Simon Mackensie, A Persuasive to the Union now on Foot (London, 1706).
Fashions” that would increase the strength of both nations. Until that occurred, however, minor differences would exist in harmony, especially in religious matters. Like Seton, Mackensie claimed that objectivity brought him to rational conclusions, implicitly criticizing the irrationality of those of his countrymen who disagreed. He also noted that he was encouraged in his project by the queen’s zeal for union, thus implying that anti-unionists were disloyal.

In a strange turn of events, it was also a Scot who was responsible for publicizing an approach to the union usually attributed to the English: the possibility of conquest. It was only natural that the union debate would explore the possible use of force given that the only time an incorporating union had been attempted in the past was in the wake of the Cromwellian occupation. According to W.A. Speck and John Young, the English concern that civil war or border skirmishes might erupt should Scotland follow a divergent succession, spurred parliament to reinforce the Anglo-Scottish border with extra troops in the wake of the Alien Act. “It was not a choice between Union and independence for Scotland,” Speck wrote, “but between the treaty and English conquest.” And yet, it seems to have been the London-based Scottish Presbyterian pamphleteer and newspaper editor, George Ridpath, who injected the idea of conquest into the broader public conversation, and not any sort of official literature. Ridpath’s, *The Reducing of Scotland by Arms, and Annexing it to England, as a Province, Considered* (1705), was something of a sensation. There were two London editions,
numerous copies of which survive, and there was an immediate printed response. Ridpath himself claimed that “The Reducing of Scotland by Arms, and annexing it to England, has been so much of late the subject of Publick Discourse, that no Man can be ignorant of it,” and he is substantiated in this claim by a 1704 letter from London, warning that “the spirit here runs upon 20 (conquest) or 23 (union).” Despite this, Anne’s well-known interest in union and the fact that she was queen of the Scots as well as the English, meant that prudence required the English refrain from publishing such sentiments. It took a Scotsman’s anxious complaint to bring the issue into print, and Ridpath and his publisher were rewarded for their effort by being bound to appear at the Queen’s Bench.

The Reducing of Scotland by Arms rehearsed the various ways monarchs had oppressed the Scots since the regal union, especially with reference to the Kirk, culminating in William III’s undermining of the Darien colony. This history had been driven, Ridpath believed, by the fact that:

They [the English] have been apt to think that it [liberty] grows nowhere but English Soil; and that’s perhaps the Reason why they are so little sensible of the Complaint of other People that want it, and are for ingrossing it all to themselves. Thus the Scots, thus the Irish, and thus their own American Plantations, do all of them complain of their too great Narrowness of Soul on that Head, and allege that while they pretend to fight for their own Liberty, and that of all Europe, they are very niggardly in dispensing it to any other People.

An anonymous reply tried to rebut Ridpath’s accusations by claiming that all of his sarcasm about English liberties was actually truth, since the English were uniquely attached to liberty and would thus never annex another territory, even though they could

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49 Anonymous, Remarks upon a late Dangerous Pamphlet, Intitled, the Reducing of Scotland by Arms, and annexing it to England, consider’d (London, 1705), 1.
50 Ridpath, The Reducing of Scotland by Arms, 16.
do so at any time. This was not especially calming, and it is easy to see how scholars have seen the first decade of the eighteenth century as one of especially poor Anglo-
Scottish relations.\textsuperscript{51} The gloves were off. Ridpath’s anonymous interlocutor then charged the Scots with arming and having devolved into mob politics, pointing to the 1705 execution of Captain Green and two of his crewmen for alleged acts of piracy against the Scots.\textsuperscript{52} Most scholars acknowledge that these executions were essentially a publicly sanctioned lynching, and Whatley and Patrick argue that the Scots were soon ashamed, but this did nothing to quell English rage at the spectacle. One printed commentary even claimed that the Scots were driven by a desire to loot Green’s ship and to “Darien ‘em,” since the evidence had clearly exonerated the accused.\textsuperscript{53} Anger was swelling in England by 1705.\textsuperscript{54}

The Ridpath scandal did not end with Green’s execution, which was a scandal unto itself. Hodges echoed Ridpath’s initial alarm and took it upon himself to outline all the reasons an English conquest of Scotland was untenable in his \textit{War betwixt the two British Kingdoms consider’d} (1705), which appeared in both London and Dublin editions. Together, the two men outlined how “the Scots are capable to ruin England, more than England is capable to ruin them.”\textsuperscript{55} Neither man outright rejected a union, and

\textsuperscript{51} Anon., \textit{Remarks upon a late Dangerous Pamphlet}, 4.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Whatley and Patrick, \textit{The Scots and the Union}, 200, 231; Anonymous, \textit{A Letter from Scotland, To a Friend in London: containing a Particular Narrative of the whole Proceedings against the Worchester and her Crew} (London, 1705). The wrongfulness of Green’s execution was also outlined in Anonymous, \textit{The Case of Captain Tho. Green, Commander of the ship the Worchester}, (London, 1705), and there were various other tracts printed after the union took effect.
\textsuperscript{54} Earl of Roxborough to George Baillie of Jerviswood, (London, 4 January 1706/7), in Earl of Minto, ed., \textit{The Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood} (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1842), 32.
\textsuperscript{55} James Hodges, \textit{War Betwixt the two British Kingdoms Consider’d, and the Dangerous Circumstances of Each with regard thereto Lay’d Open} (London, 1705), 15.
both indicated the merit of confederation, but this did little to soften the retaliatory tone. Hodges pointed to the numerous Scots in Ireland and their capacity to join with the Irish, as well as Scottish sway with English dissenters, in order to emphasize the Scottish ability to generate British disturbances. In essence, the Scots were threatening to live up to their reputation as radical conspirators, an unsettling proposition given the English belief that Scottish Presbyterianism had sparked the Civil Wars. Ridpath similarly highlighted the potential for disturbance in Ireland, and also noted that there were many thousands of Scots living in England and her dominions and contributing important services to the English economy, who could undermine the empire proper. And more terrifying still, Ridpath asked, “What will they do with the Scots in their Armies and Fleets?” These were serious threats, especially since another pamphlet estimated that 10,000 Scots resided in England and there were in fact significant numbers of Scots living in England and her colonies.

An anonymous response tried to shrug such threats off by reminding readers that England had beaten Scotland in the past and could do so again, but admitted that the country would be “vexed” in the process. The pamphlet then tried to draw the focus back from division to unity. Meanwhile, William Atwood, the Whig propagandist, was less conciliatory, and after decrying the Scots blustering, “as if they were at the Head of an Army entring the Borders,” he went back to his established tactic of explaining the nature

56 Ibid., 86, 93.
57 Ridpath, The Reducing of Scotland by Arms, 66-67. James Johnstone, Reflections on a late Speech by the Lord Haversham (London, 1704), 25 also notes the Scottish presence, not just in English colonies, but in the army and navy as well.
of Scotland’s dependency upon England in order to demand compliance in the union.\textsuperscript{60} The fraught nature of this discussion, coupled with the fact that both Ridpath and Atwood faced legal censures, meant that the hypothetical discussion of conflict stopped here, but it could hardly have been far from people’s minds after these intemperate exchanges.

Atwood argued that the whole debate about conquest was irrelevant anyway because, according to him, Scottish kings already owed homage to the English crown. This meant that the Scots had little choice but to accept English demands, an argument that had appeared already under James VI and I, when it had been equally unwelcome. The belief that Scotland was an English dependency constituted a violent attack on the very idea of a Scottish kingdom, which Atwood attempted to provincialize within a now well-established English empire. The claim was a sharp blow since, according to Jackson, the early modern Scottish sense of nationhood was linked not to ethnicity, which was defensible in the face of such assertions, but to \textit{regnum}, which was not.\textsuperscript{61} Ethnic nationhood in early modern Britain was untenable, and theories of monogenesis and the whole problem of barbarous Britannic roots meant that genealogies were only so helpful in creating social bonds, making issues of sovereignty and loyalty the critical points of debate.\textsuperscript{62} John Robertson has thus argued that in Scotland, the critical issue was not economic or religious concerns, but the search for an elusive Scottish sovereignty, separate from England but also from Jacobitism.\textsuperscript{63} The homage pamphlets attacked this

\textsuperscript{60}William Atwood, \textit{The Scot Patriot Unmask’d, in Animadversions upon a Seditious Pamphlet intituled, the Reducing of Scotland by Arms} (London, 1705), 5.
\textsuperscript{61}Jackson, “Conceptions of Nationhood,” 67.
\textsuperscript{62}Kidd, \textit{British Identities}.
weak point, and James Drake’s *Historia Anglo-Scotica* (1703) and Atwood’s *The Superiority and Direct Dominion of the Imperial Crown of England* (1704) are commonly referenced as examples of blatant attacks on Scottish autonomy, important enough that they were publicly burnt in Edinburgh.\(^{64}\) Atwood’s second union pamphlet, discussed above, received the same fate, and Macinnes has shown that the Scots also highlighted their disgust at the products of insensitive writers by rewarding those who published rebuttals.\(^{65}\)

Drake claimed that the *Historia Anglo-Scotica* was not his own work, but a manuscript he had found, written by an unknown contemporary of Charles I. He published it, he said, for the edification of his readers.\(^{66}\) Essentially a chronicle of English superiority over Scotland, it traced moments when the Scots had done homage to the English crown since the time of William the Conqueror, leaving off the account as tension rose once more during the reign of Mary Tudor.\(^{67}\) Atwood’s work was even more brazen, attempting to show the authority of the “imperial crown of England” over Scotland – taking “imperial” to mean both sovereignty and superiority over provinces. Atwood was trying to undermine the authority of Ridpath’s translation of Sir Thomas Craig’s *Scotland’s Sovereignty Asserted*, and claimed that even the Picts’ territorial claims were contingent upon their allegiance to their British neighbours in the south.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{64}\) For example, Whatley and Patrick, *The Scots and the Union*, 201; Macinnes, *Union and Empire*, 127; Bowie, *Scottish Public Opinion*, 88; Jackson, “Conceptions of Nationhood,” 68.

\(^{65}\) Atwood, *Scotch Patriot Unmask’d*, title; Macinnes, *Union and Empire*, 127.


\(^{67}\) Ibid.

But Atwood did not leave matters there, and continued to explain that the Scots should not complain since, historically, they did not care who ruled them anyway. History showed:

that the Scots have been so far from holding the Succession of their Kings Sacred, that they used to make themselves Lords over the Lives of those truly humane Creatures, and if they called them Gods, forced them to dye like Men; but, as the Beings of their Kings were by themselves rendered precarious, they thought it no diminution to the Honour of those Nominal Kings, nor of their Superior states of the Realm, to do Homage, and Swear Allegiance, to the head of the British Monarchy.69

Reminiscent of Sir Christopher Piggott’s 1607 outburst that the Scots had not suffered over two kings to die in their beds, Atwood’s insensitivity was thoroughly disruptive of Scottish court appeals for closer union. But the ire he roused from Scotland did not stop his pen, and he continued in his assumption of Scottish dependency in his second response to Ridpath, The Scotch Patriot unmask’d (1705). Here, he outlined the need to protect the imperial unity of the crown, the ridiculous nature of the Scots wanting the benefit of English trade without being subject to English policies, and their lack of other options. And, in this, he was supported by other literature.70 Like the threat of conquest, the assumption that the Scots were already subject to the English undermined the role of one of the partners supposedly involved in union negotiations and rhetorically provided the English with the right unilaterally to decide on changes affecting Britain as a whole.

It is important to note that while the stir caused by the Ridpath-Atwood debate did eventually settle, the issues could easily flair up again, and in the wake of Belhaven’s speech to the Scottish parliament, another anonymous pamphlet sniped that Scotland owed homage to England, and outlined the superiority of the English over the Scottish

69 Ibid., 15.
70 Atwood, Scotch Patriot Unmask’d; Anon., Remarks upon a late Dangerous Pamphlet, 2.
Church for good measure too. There was clearly a strain of English thought that saw the Scots as already dependent, and viewed any possible concessions to Scotland as beneath them. For these people, Scottish sovereignty and broader identity was completely irrelevant, or even a contradiction in terms, and the best possible outcome of any constitutional changes would be a situation that denied the validity of Scottish difference, ensuring that Scotland could never cause trouble again. And Scotland was, historically, very good at causing trouble for the English.

In 1702, the memoirs of Henry Guthrie, late Bishop of Dunkeld were published, rehearsing this history and explaining once again that the mid-century troubles began as the cloaking of malcontent dispositions with religious pretexts. Moreover, a collection of state treatises also released that year, entitled *Miscellanea Aulica*, similarly contained documents reiterating Scotland’s role in instigating the Civil Wars. Finally, a 1704 pamphlet asked: “Is there not a Storm gathering in the North? Does it not portend ill to England? Did not the Solemn League and Covenant, arise from thence?” And in case people had forgotten the specifics of this despicable document, the Solemn League and Covenant was reprinted in both 1706 and 1707. The Scots were therefore clearly tied to conspiratorial and destructive histories, as they had been at the start of the Popish Plot.

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74 Humphrey Mackworth, *A Letter from a Member of Parliament to his Friend in the Country* (London, 1704), 7.
and Exclusion Crisis. Moreover, anxiety about Scottish disturbances was still linked to
discomfort with the idea of Scottish Presbyterianism, and another pamphlet asked: “Is not
Episcopacy and Prelacy declared in Scotland to be an unsupportable Grievance? Have not
they made High Treason to Speak or Write for Episcopacy in the Church? And do you
not think they will do the same thing in England if they Prevail?”

This high-church author was reacting specifically to proposals that the union
should protect the Scottish Presbyterian Kirk, an insidious force which he thought would
undermine the Church of England if it were not kept in check. He was also spurred on by
rumours of Episcopalian oppression north of the border; an image of suffering that was
fostered by Scottish Episcopalian in an attempt to woo Queen Anne and the English
Tories, through which they hoped to leverage the post-Revolutionary Scottish religious
settlement. Two pamphlets, published in 1703 and 1704, and a petition asking for aid
from Church of England Bishops for their Scottish brethren, therefore requested that
Scottish Episcopalian receive toleration. These products were part of a larger, London-
based Scottish Episcopalian initiative, which had attempted to garner sympathy from
London audiences for the Scottish Episcopalian cause since the Revolution. Alastair
Raffe has traced their activities, describing how their quest to portray their Presbyterian
foes as irrational, radical, and persecuting both drew on, and reinforced, extant English

76 Macworth, A Letter from a Member of Parliament, 7. The same concern appear in Blackerby Fairfax, A
Discourse upon the Uniting Scotland with England (London, 1702), 36 when he considers why
Presbyterians would not be content with toleration.
77 A Gentleman, The Liberty of Episcopal Dissenters In Scotland, as it Stands by the Laws there, Truly
Represented (London, 1703); Anonymous, A Dialogue Betwixt a Presbyterian Minister and a Gentleman of
Episcopal Perswasion (London, 1704); TNA SP 54/3/42A.
stereotypes. Episcopalian efforts, far from being signally successful though, were met at every step by an even more determined Scottish Presbyterian campaign to ensure that a clause protecting the Kirk would appear in any treaty. The situation was further complicated by the English dissenting interest that supported a latitudinarian civil religion of dissent, which was neither pro-Episcopalian nor wholly pro-Presbyterian either.

The Scottish Episcopalian battle for legitimacy was an interesting problem since their situation could most plausibly be improved through the expansion of English toleration, as it had been secured in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. The Scottish Episcopalian cause, then, gestured towards incorporating union; however, this sat uncomfortably with English religious and political divisions. The Episcopalians in Scotland were much more closely affiliated with Jacobitism than their sister Episcopalians in England. And although by outward appearances, the Scottish Episcopalians had much in common with the high-church Anglicans, who tended to be Tory, their pleas for toleration aligned politically with the Whig platform. Furthermore, the union project was largely driven by Whig, and not Tory-Anglican interests, and the “The Rank-and-file tories,” according to Riley, “developed a roaring in the ears at the very mention of union.” This was apparent in the “Church in Danger” debates in the English House of

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Lords in December 1705, where those who were concerned about the safety of the Church of England pointed not only to English dissent, but more emphatically to Scotland, which might “advance another Covenant.”\textsuperscript{83} Although the Lords resolved sixty-one to thirty that the Church of England was indeed safe, the issue clearly continued to fester, since it burst forth again just a few years later in the Sacheverell affair.\textsuperscript{84} The agendas of high churchmen and political parties on either side of the border were therefore not aligned, highlighting ideological differences between English and Scottish parties and obscuring the path to productive alliances.

English unionists recognized that it was essential that some agreement be reached about religion in order to gain Scottish cooperation, but since the Presbyterians were firmly in control in Scotland, unionists marketed toleration as a guarantee that the Kirk would be respected as distinct within Britain. They then tried not to comment on the fate of the Scottish Episcopalians.\textsuperscript{85} The Scot, Simon Mackensie, had suggested that the issue would be settled if people could just readjust their perception, viewing “these lesser Differences,” between Episcopacy and Presbyterianism, as “the different strings on a well-tuned Harp, the different sounds whereof, are so far from making discord, that they rather make a sweet Harmony.”\textsuperscript{86} John Humfrey’s English-grown solution was similar, if more complicated. Humphrey was a moderate nonconformist minister dedicated to the reunion of English protestantism, and when presented with the prospect of an Anglo-

\textsuperscript{83} Clive Jones, “Debates in the House of Lords on “The Church in Danger,”” 1705, and on Dr. Sacheverell’s Impeachment, 1710,” \textit{Historical Journal} 17 (1976): 765.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, 768.
\textsuperscript{85} Stephen, \textit{Scottish Presbyterians}.
\textsuperscript{86} Mackensie, \textit{Vis Unita Fortior}, 8[b].
Scottish union, he began to think on a British scale.\textsuperscript{87} His scheme included making a distinction between worship, and church government, the latter being “the Governement of the Queen over all Christian Churches in the Land, as United in a National Church, for the outward Peace one with another.”\textsuperscript{88} Humfrey hypothesized that since the secular government was “mix’d,” the ecclesiastical government could be too; bishops could be appointed to exercise authority in conjunction with the officials of other protestant groups, and work with them to enforce each group’s specific discipline.\textsuperscript{89} In an equally idealistic vein, the anonymous \textit{The Queen an Empress} (1706) imagined the mutual respect of a protestant brotherhood that required no policing because it was united against popery. In this perfect world, England, Scotland and Ireland would all be governed by one parliament, which would meet at York, and witness the birth of a new British nobility. Had the three kingdoms entered into this arrangement sooner, the protestant interest on the continent might have been secured, and the Civil Wars at home avoided.\textsuperscript{90} The misalignment of religious interests between the two kingdoms, which has been discussed in all the preceding chapters as well, demonstrates that these dreams were utopian.

Therefore, other pamphlets, like those engaged in the homage debates, were forced actively and consistently to argue that the overt differences between the Scottish and English Churches were illusory – the inconsequential result of the separate Scottish


\textsuperscript{88} John Humfrey, \textit{A Draught for a National Church Accomodation} (London, 1705), 8.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Ibid.}, 16-20.

\textsuperscript{90} Anonymous, \textit{The Queen an Empress, and he Three Kingdoms one Empire} (London, 1706).
evolution of traditions that were originally derived from England.\textsuperscript{91} Once again, this can be read as an attempt to deny Scottish agency and distinctiveness, and allow the English to control the nature of the union because they knew best. Discounting the Scottish perspective also allowed some authors to slip back into impolitic statements, or claims that the Church of England, being superior, should simply take over. And in a letter addressed to Sir John Packington, which was published on two separate occasions, the reader encountered the following:

Certainly no Scots-man, who understands and Loves the true Interest of his Country, \emph{who would have Freedom maintained there and here}, can take it amiss, if we stipulate that none but their Barons (which have Four Hundred Pounds Land of Inheritance \emph{per Annum}) shall come into St. Stephen’s Chappel; and whosoever hath that Estate, \emph{and is Conformable to Episcopacy}, may I presume to be, humanly speaking, safely trusted. \textsuperscript{92}

Here, the Scots should just acknowledge the legitimacy of the Church of England, and take it as an honour to be admitted to its fold, leaving the Kirk behind. Moreover, the letter also played on the “Church in Danger” theme, highlighting the history of Presbyterian persecution and thus providing a reason why the Kirk should be allowed to collapse.\textsuperscript{93} Military conquest aside, even from this perspective, union was hardly the mutual agreement of equals. It was the political manipulation of one nation by the other, justified by the irresponsible and generally condemnable behaviour of past generations of Scottish Presbyterians. In the end, it was easiest to maintain the status quo, and an act for the security of the Scottish Kirk was passed in conjunction with the union, perpetuating

\textsuperscript{91} Morer, \textit{A Short Account}, 61-62; Blackerby, \textit{A Discourse}, 34.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
distinct forms of church government in the two kingdoms and allowing these conflicts to continue.

The labyrinthine nature of the religious question also encouraged frustrated authors to attack the Scots in other ways. In 1704, James Johnstone complained that while Scotland had been vigilant to prevent libels against England throughout the years, English authors constantly attacked Scottish antiquity, sovereignty and independence, noting that “every Impudent Libeller may safely make our Country the Subject of his Buffoonry and Laughter.”\(^94\) Although these words were an exaggeration, there was some truth to what Johnston said. We have already met the anonymous verse which depicted Scotland as the rubbish bin of the world, but it is worth commenting that this description was complemented with images of the Scots as lice-ridden beggars, fanatics, and filthy bullies.\(^95\) This unflattering account was supported by *A Description of Scotland, and its Inhabitants* (1705), which clearly played on Anthony Weldon’s early seventeenth-century work known by that name. Here, the Scots were no more trustworthy than cannibals, the lousy inhabitants of a barren land, and the producers of the most hideous women known to man.\(^96\) A piece of rogue literature about a Scot was even produced in two parts, capitalizing on the recent interest in Scotland and making light of Scottish vice. “And why a Scots Rogue! Some will ready to say,” asked the preface: “But I say why not a Scots Rogue... As barren as the Soil of that Countrey is in other respects, ‘tis fruitful

\(^94\) Johnston, *Reflections on a Late Speech*, 16.
\(^95\) Anon., *A Trip Lately to Scotland* (London, 1705).
enough in that Commodity. And seeing there are Rogues in all other Countreys, it wou’d be a Blemish to Scotland to find none there.\textsuperscript{97}

But if the prospects of national and religious union met with an ambiguous response in English pamphlets, the benefits of an economic union were more promising, particularly with regards to the fisheries. According to Levack, this was the only asset Scotland had to offer at the economic bargaining table, and the English press, wanting to appear loyal, made the most of it.\textsuperscript{98} Already in 1702, \textit{A Memorial Briefly pointing at some Advantages of the Union}, suggested that the Scottish fisheries could be developed into the training grounds of seamen for the British trading companies and navy. This would be a mutually beneficial partnership because the Scots fishing-related industries would be stimulated, and the English East India Company would never want for sailors again.\textsuperscript{99} M. Martin’s \textit{Description of the Western Islands} (1703) also pointed to the potential for this area to become the “nursery of Stout and Able Seamen in a very short time, to serve the Government on all Occasions,” and a 1705 pamphlet explained that the Scottish desire for free trade would be balanced by English access to the lucrative Scottish fisheries and the security gained by permanently removing the threat of conflict along a land border.\textsuperscript{100} Unsurprisingly, the potential for maritime wealth and human resources to be gleaned from Scotland persisted as a theme right through until 1707.\textsuperscript{101} And, since the Scots were

\textsuperscript{97} Anonymous, \textit{The Scotch Rogue: Or the Life and Actions of Donald Macdonald. A High-Land Scot} (London, 1706), ii.
\textsuperscript{98} Levack, \textit{Formation of the British State}, 144.
\textsuperscript{99} J.B. \textit{A Memorial Briefly pointing at some Advantages of the Union of the Two Kingdoms} (London, 1702).
\textsuperscript{100} M. Martin, \textit{A Description of the Western Islands of Scotland}, (London, 1703); Anonymous, \textit{An Essay upon the Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland} (London, 1705), 1. Much of the first page of the latter is illegible, but there is an Edinburgh edition of the same year that survives in much better condition.
\textsuperscript{101} Anon, \textit{The Queen an Empress}, 18-20; Guy Miège, \textit{The Present state of Great Britain in two parts... part II} (London 1707).
eager for a full communion in trade, there were no obstacles to these proposals on that front.

The overall thrust of the print produced in the years leading up to the union therefore does resemble Paterson’s fictitious Wednesdays Club debate. The Scots, lice-ridden as they were, derived their political and religious systems from the English, demonstrating the English right to guide them into an incorporating union. Whether or not Scotland was a formal English dependency, the Scottish perspective on union was simply wrong, and the English could proceed without reference to Scottish arguments, focusing instead on their own indigenous concerns: namely, religious threats and economic prospects. Furthermore, the whole issue of Jacobitism was never explicitly addressed (although a crisis generated by the succession implied that this was a problem), and the English conducted their debates with an eye to undermining Kirk-based Scottish objections to the union and easing English discomfort with a foreign Presbyterian tradition. These fights took place over the details of union; however, this should not obscure the real goal of the negotiations. The aim was to create a new British state that would rival the power of France – a goal that everyone could supposedly agree on.102

IV

All the same themes appeared in the pro-union writings of Daniel Defoe. Defoe, like so many of the other print commentators encountered over the course of this study, was a fiery personality. A frequently bankrupt dissenter, best known today for his authorship of Robinson Crusoe, he has been described as “the journalist and polemicist without peer, the criminologist, the urbanist, the proto-feminist, the early theorist of

102 Anonymous, A Prediction, Said to have its Rise from Scotland (London, 1706?).
globalism and imperialism, the poet and satirist, moralist and social critic, the promoter of Britain’s mercantile power and prophet of its future imperial glories.”¹⁰³ “Champion of the union” might also be profitably included. Defoe was patronized by the English Secretary of State, Robert Harley, and was sent to Scotland to advocate for union in 1706, acting as Harley’s eyes, ears and mouth. A former merchant, he understood society through political economy, so it is no surprise that the issue of trade featured prominently in his writings as he argued in favour of an incorporating union.¹⁰⁴ Although Defoe quickly inserted himself into the Scottish debates, he also published some things primarily for an English audience.¹⁰⁵

The first two parts of his Essay at Removing National Prejudices Against a Union with Scotland, both published in 1706, and his Review of the State of the English Nation, published thrice weekly, were both addressed to English readers. The Review discussed a range of topics (especially trade and religious dissent), but it also consistently followed the union negotiations from September 1706 through until 1 May 1707, providing some commentary on the enduring nature of the union after that date as well. Moreover, J.A. Downie has estimated that it averaged roughly 400 copies per edition, with increased circulation through coffee houses and group reading.¹⁰⁶ The Review is especially revealing as a source though, because unlike traditional newspapers, it furnished readers with essays on current events instead of just reporting them.

¹⁰⁵ For a survey of Defoe’s participation in the Scottish debates see Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion.
From the fall of 1706, when he arrived in Edinburgh, Defoe worked to reduce mutual Anglo-Scottish prejudice and distrust, which he felt was an irrational impediment to the union. “‘Tis in vain to commence a Treaty of Union, and which must after be referred to in the great Councils on either Side,” he wrote, “while National Aversions remain unmov’d, and Immortal Prejudices fill the Minds of the People.”  

Animosities were, in fact, so intense that Defoe claimed it would be lunacy to ignore them, especially seeing as they were both national – “the Dregs of old Feuds between Nations at frequent Wars with one another” – and religious – differences in protestant disciplines rousing distrust. For this reason, he believed that there was no medium between union and war. But this was not the gloating of a potential conqueror, the like of which Ridpath had lashed out against in 1705. Defoe was instead concerned that the English might not win at such a contest. Even if the English could conquer the Scots, he continued, “at the End of every War, they [the Scots] shall have the better of you; it shall cost you more to hold them, than to gain them, and more to lose them, than both.”

Statements like this support Laurence Dickey’s argument that Defoe’s goal was less to convince the Scots of the benefits of union, and more to prevent the English from undermining their reputation as a freedom-loving people by invading Scotland to secure the succession. This raises an important point, alluded to above, which is that even if Defoe eventually did come to respect the Scots, his writings advocating the union were aimed at removing animosities,

108 Defoe, Review, (No. 132, 5 November 1706), 526.
109 Defoe, Review, (No. 118, 3 October 1706), 470; Defoe, Review, (No. 120, 8 October 1706), 478.
not creating sentimental attachment.\textsuperscript{111} Although he spilled much ink explaining the need to put aside former quarrels, he never launched into a panegyric on Scotland or the Scottish people, and with over one hundred editions of \textit{The Review} printed during his stay in Edinburgh, it cannot be said that he lacked either the time or opportunity to do so.

When trying to remove English prejudice about Scotland itself, Defoe explained that “the Barrenness and Coldness of the Country and Climate is a Jest, that would soon be explain’d and expunged.” So why then was the land so poor? The answer: “there wants nothing but Liberty and Industry to recover Scotland.”\textsuperscript{112} If this was not condemnation through compliment, it was at the very least a half-hearted attempt at praise. Moreover, Defoe’s explanation of Scottish agitation against the union was restricted to negation. There were addresses against the union, but they did \textit{not} represent the country’s trading interest; there were Cameronians about, but the whole nation could \textit{not} be described as extremist; the Kirk was \textit{not} opposed to union, and did \textit{not} want a fast against it.\textsuperscript{113} Even in \textit{The Essay}, where Defoe called for the two peoples to become “Brethren in Blood and Nation, Brethren in Possession, Prospect and Power,” it is possible to find arguments addressing the utility of the Scots, but no genuinely positive statements about them or their country.\textsuperscript{114} Clearly, the English often felt that Scotland was a wasteland, that the Scottish people were largely anti-unionist, that the kingdom was full of radical Presbyterian extremists who might rise up against union, and that the


\textsuperscript{112} Defoe, \textit{Review} (No. 163, 16 January 1706/7), 650.

\textsuperscript{113} Defoe, \textit{Review} (No. 141, 26 November 1706); Defoe, \textit{Review} (No. 142, 28 November 1706); Defoe, \textit{Review} (No. 143, 30 November 1706); Defoe, \textit{Review} (No. 150, 17 December 1706).

official Presbyterian Kirk was only moderately more cooperative. And so, a combination of Defoe’s own initial unease with the idea of Scotland and a belief that his readers would not swallow any praise of the Scots, drove him into a defensive posture. Despite this reactionary position, however, Defoe was just as careful to depict the Scots as a non-entity as other authors were, at least when writing for the English – allowing his audience the luxury of believing that they were at the helm of union negotiations.

Defoe’s obsession with removing obstacles instead of building bridges actually made his task simpler in some ways. No specific strategies for forgetting the hostilities of the past needed to be given beyond the fact that war was bad and peace was good, so people should reject fighting and embrace union. But English Episcopal hostility to the Scottish Presbyterian church required a more thorough critique. In The Essay, Defoe therefore took a very practical approach, explaining that since the Church of England already co-existed with dissenters, it made no difference if some poor Scottish Presbyterians added to their ranks because proportionately, dissenters would still be in the minority overall, even if they remained dominant in Scotland itself.\(^{115}\) Moreover, according to Defoe, numbers were irrelevant because union would confirm and secure, not alter and endanger the religious settlements in both countries; the parliaments of both kingdoms could ensure this by passing claims of right for their churches in conjunction with the union treaty.\(^{116}\) This would protect the Presbyterian settlement in Scotland and the Anglican establishment in England, while still providing room for dissent in both.


These issues also continuously appeared in *The Review*, where Defoe tirelessly rehearsed the illogical nature of the position that the church was in danger. He believed that since both the English and Scottish churches felt threatened, one or both of them must be wrong, and in this case it was both.\(^{117}\) Defoe had a novel way of explaining the confusion: English party politics. The high-church Tories wanted to gain authority in England by stirring trouble between the English and Scottish Churches, and taking the reins of power during the resultant chaos. The other side of this coin was that they needed to avoid union since it would secure religious toleration throughout Britain, making the Tory-Anglican position in England even more precarious than it already was, forever keeping them from power. According to Defoe, these malicious English churchmen and party politicians were even responsible for much of the anti-union propaganda circulating in Scotland.\(^{118}\) The cause of the trouble, and the ability to rectify the situation were therefore neatly contained to England, and Whig solidarity at home and policing of the Tory Anglicans would allow the union to pass. The Scots once more became an inactive partner in a union that would be proposed, adjusted and concluded in England, and Scotland would naturally become more open to the union once the situation at home was resolved.

When the Scots were attributed a positive quality, it was that of economic utility. And unlike fellow authors, Defoe did not restrict his vision to the fisheries. Offering suggestions similar to those made during the Interregnum, he claimed that Scotland was “a Treasure of Men, as may be demonstrated by the Vast Numbers they have in our

\(^{117}\) Defoe, *Review* (No.123, 15 October 1706), 490.

Armies and Navy, and in the Armies of the Swede, the Pole, the Muscovite, the Emperor, Holland and France.” “What might not England now do,” he continued, “had she in her Pay all the Scots, actually in the Service of these Princes.”

Evoking mercantilist arguments that a large population would help drive the economy, Defoe argued that more hands meant more labouring power which meant more wealth. Opening the colonies to the Scots was thus beneficial to England and worth both the risk and some small concessions in the way that Scotland would be taxed. People were the “Wealth the Union shall bring us; this the Treasure to be rais’d out of the Barren Mountains of Scotland.”

Parliamentary union would protect this arrangement because it secured peace, which in turn, secured trade – this meant increased wealth for both people in a promising British future, wherein Britain was the dominant power in Europe.

There was, however, one other economic concern that Defoe had to address, and that was the alleged stockpiling of goods in Scotland before British free trade took effect. The argument supposed that the Scots were using their historic trading privileges with the French (which would be lost at the union) to obtain French goods at a better price than the English could, and then would sell them in London after the union. Defoe denied the Scots even this much ability to make trouble, and claimed that what was actually happening was that English merchants were masterminding the transfer with Scottish partners in a bid to extract the maximum profits from union. This undermined the threat since the money would all stay within the English economy. While some

120 Defoe, *The Essay... Part II*, 67, 85.
122 Defoe, *Review* (Vol IV, No. 35, 1 May 1707), 139.
questionable English manoeuvring did occur – the merchants in Chester seem to have been involved in a similar scheme using new-world tobacco – Macinnes has shown that the Scots were not innocent either. But Defoe ignored this, and as the eighteenth century dawned, he either disabled or commodified the Scots as part of his promotion of the union. He assumed that although distinct national interests would persist, the union would ensure the continued quiescence of Scotland, since they would be guided in British matters by a shared general interest. The best way to deal with an unwanted marriage, it would seem, was to let the new bride fulfill her wifely duties on occasion, and otherwise try to pretend she was not even there. This complete disregard for the Scottish perspective established a problematic precedent within the broader discourse about union, leaving room for the potential continuation of all the cultural, economic and religious issues that many on both sides of the border felt remained unresolved.

The attempt to ignore Scotland and work the union out at home is also observable in the *London Gazette*, which did not report any of the anti-union agitation in Scotland. Instead, the paper restricted itself to reporting only official business relating to Scotland: the meeting of parliament, the appointment of union commissioners, and the passing of the union itself. But the *Gazette*, which was still more akin to an official newspaper than any of its competitors, is also noteworthy since it always published the Queen’s proclamations and speeches. In this period, it was also the most widely read paper, with ten to eleven thousand copies printed per edition. Anne’s speeches to the English

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parliament, when it met to consider the articles and after it had accepted them,
emphasized the increased security brought about by union, which she felt was “of the
greatest Importance to the Wealth, Strength, and Safety of the whole Island.”\textsuperscript{126} They also
celebrated the fact that, “this great Work, which has been so often attempted without
Success, can be brought to Perfection in My Reign.”\textsuperscript{127} Most striking though, was Anne’s
statement after both her kingdoms had accepted the union that: “I Desire and Expect from
all My Subjects of both Nations, that from henceforth they Act with all possible Respect
and Kindness to one another, that so it may appear to all the World, they have Hearts
dispos’d to become One People.”\textsuperscript{128}

Coupled with her references to failed attempts at closer union, this was an obvious
allusion to (and appropriation of) James VI and I’s vision of a British union of hearts and
minds. While it has been demonstrated that Anne made efforts to identify herself with
Elizabeth I and Charles II, the clear connection she sought to establish with James I has
hitherto been overlooked.\textsuperscript{129} The link to James was an obvious one, given the thematic
overlap of the two reigns, but the glaring contextual differences between the negotiations
in the first decade of the seventeenth century, and those overseen by Anne, have
prevented scholars from commenting on her resuscitation of a long-dead ideal in order to
enhance her royal prestige. Anne used this rhetoric to obscure the fact that her
parliamentary union was, in reality, wholly different from the one James had proposed,

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{London Gazette}, 6-10 March 1706/7, n. 4312, 1.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{London Gazette}, 27-30 January 1706/7, n. 4299, 1.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{London Gazette}, 6-10 March 1706/7, n. 4312, 1.
\textsuperscript{129} Robert Bucholz, \textit{The Augustan Court: Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture} (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993); Hanna Smith, ““Last of all the Heavenly Birth”: Queen Anne and Sacral
Queenship,” 137-149 in Clive Jones, ed., \textit{British Politics in the Age of Holmes: Geoffrey Holmes’s British
Politics in the Age of Anne 40 Years On} (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
and to bolster the monarchical image in a post-revolutionary context. Tempers were flaring, the number of Scottish representatives in the Westminster parliament made it clear that the partnership was unequal, and the idea of protestant brotherhood had disappeared; only the idea of a communication of trade survived – but this was ignored. And it is worth noting that the same rhetorical strategy was employed by the thanksgiving sermons and addresses published to celebrate the parliamentary union and support Anne.

V

The thanksgiving addresses printed in the *Gazette* were scripted very carefully in order to complement Anne on her own terms. Now that the union was a *fait accompli*, their focus returned to the real reason for union, which was security.¹³⁰ Already on 1 May, the address from St. Albans thanked her for what they knew would “prove a lasting Addition to the Strength, Peace, and Prosperity of the whole Island;” New Romney rejoiced in a union, “by which their Wealth, Strength and Safety, are not only united, but thereby the more effectually secured and established in the great Body of Great Britain.”¹³¹ They also repeated the idea that despite all the former national animosities, this would be a union of hearts and minds. The St. Alban’s address continued in the hopes that “all Your People sincerely join Hearts and Hands,” an address from Durham promised that “as we and Scotland are One Nation, we will endeavour to become so in Interest and Affections too,” and one from Corke was printed which claimed that the queen “hath truly made Great Britain one People, by providing that they shall for ever

¹³⁰ Almost all of the addresses, which appeared continued into August, mention security. *London Gazette*, 1-5 May 1707, n. 4328 -14-18 August 1707, n.4358.
¹³¹ *London Gazette*, 1-5 May 1707, n. 4328, 1, 4.
hereafter have the same Head and Heart, the same Prince and legislature.\textsuperscript{132} The Corke address admittedly manipulated the meaning of the allusion, but the maintenance of the rhetoric is still worthy of comment. In order to demonstrate their loyalty, English signatories willingly subscribed addresses claiming the union went beyond political necessity to encompass a closer affection between two previously competing nations. This rhetoric served to elevate Anne as monarch, but it also hijacked James’s much more Scottish interpretation of union in order to celebrate an incorporating union which the English clearly hoped to control. Finally, as with Shakespeare’s famous obsession with order, the spate of references to newfound affections alert historians to what the words were meant to hide: a genuine anxiety about having to coexist more closely with the Scots.

The thanksgiving sermons allowed authors much more room to expand on these themes before a variety of audiences, providing important insights into the broader public discussions about union. Printed sermons reflected both oral and written communication, were relatively short and therefore cheap, were easily bundled into collections, and were thus more likely to have a guaranteed audience than some other printed media.\textsuperscript{133} At least one reader, a James T. Bell, engaged actively with them, signing his name to Richard Allen’s sermon and marking it “The Union,” presumably in order to place it together with

\textsuperscript{132} London Gazette, 1-5 May 1707, n. 4328, 1; London Gazette, 8-12 May 1707, n. 4330, 1; London Gazette, 5-8 May 1707, n. 4329, 2.

other similar material later.\textsuperscript{134} Sermons were also very conscious of the need to hold the attention of their audience in order to deliver a final moral message, and many of these sermons discussed the history of warfare between England and Scotland as a way of catching people’s attention while making a point.

“Some ages our Historiens have nothing of Moment recorded in them,” noted Hugh Todd in a sermon he preached at Penrith, “but dismal, frightful Accounts of Battles, Murthers, Massacres and Devistations, such as terrify the Reader.”\textsuperscript{135} Deuel Pead’s account of past hostilities was even more alarming: “greater Devastation made between these than any other two Kingdoms in the World; the Borders on both sides never yet neglected (if the least opportunity presented) to write their irreconcilable Hatred in bloody Characters, witness the Rapes, the Thefts, the Burnings, the Murthers.”\textsuperscript{136} Comparing Anglo-Scottish battles to biblical conflicts such as the wars between Ephraim and Judah, union sermons told stories of blood, robbery, oppression and treachery.\textsuperscript{137} Such arguments ignored the fact that the Anglo-Scottish border had been pacified for over a hundred years because war provided racy material that engaged with people’s proclivity for gore. Moreover, it served to heighten Anne’s glorious achievement in effecting union where others had failed. Likened to Deborah, Anne was guided by God

\textsuperscript{134} Richard Allan, \textit{A Sermon Preach’d on Thursday the First of May, 1707}, (London, 1707), 1. [Gale document CW121847524]
\textsuperscript{135} Hugh Todd, \textit{A Sermon Preach’d at Penrith, Not far from the Contines of the Two United Kingdoms, on Thursday May 1, 1707} (London, 1707), 16.
\textsuperscript{136} Deuel Pead, \textit{The Honour, Happiness, and safety of Union. Or, A Sermon Upon the Uniting England and Scotland, Preach’d at the Parish Chuch of St. James Clerkenwel, Mary 1. 1707}, (London, 1707), 5-6.
\textsuperscript{137} Christopher Taylor discussed Ephraim and Judah in his sermon on Hosea 1:11 and John Bates outlined the horrors of Anglo-Scottish hostility in a similar when when preaching on Ecclesiastes 6: 9-12. Christopher Taylor, \textit{A Thanksgiving-day Sermon, Preach’d on the First Day of May, 1707 On Occasion of the Happy Union Between England and Scotland} (London, 1707), 5; John Bates, \textit{Two (United) are Better than One Alone. A Thanksgiving Sermon upon the Union of the Two Kingdoms} (London, 1707), 4.
and had secured a union “of the highest importance to the whole island, and to the Protestant Interest in general.”

This brought the reader back to the issue of security, and Anne was loudly praised by all the sermons for achieving it. The union did, after all, ensure the protestant succession and the continuance of war against France, an issue of very great importance to the Whigs. This was because of the looming Jacobite threat and the fact that “there was a real prospect that the war of Spanish Succession could turn into the War of the British Succession.” Daniel Williams thus noted that the church and the revolutionary settlement were now safe, William Talbot rejoiced that “Riches and Plenty at home, and Safety from Enemies abroad, must be the happy Consequences of it,” and Todd specifically stated that the union undermined the power of France. More specifically, several sermons reflected on the importance of the final closure of the proverbial “back door,” or the land border with Scotland that the English always worried was susceptible to a combined Franco-Scottish attack. Peace and security at home guaranteed the safety of the Church of England and encouraged the growth of wealth, and these gains were to be cemented in mutual affections. Once again, a union of hearts and minds appeared, this time as the best way to secure the newly founded Great Britain. The lesson of the first of May (the day the union came into effect), was “to Love as Brethren, to Love as Brittains,

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138 Allen, A Sermon Preach’d, 8.
140 Daniel Williams, A Thanksgiving-Sermon, Occasioned by the Union of England and Scotland, Preach’d at Hand-Alley, May the 1st, 1707 (London, 1707), 9; William Tarbat, A Sermon Preach’d before the Queen at the Cathedral Church of St. Paul on May the First, 1707 (London, 1707), 10; Todd, A Sermon Preach’d at Penrith, 18.
141 Williams, A Thanksgiving-Sermon, 12; Todd, A Sermon Preach’d at Penrith, 19; Allen, A Sermon Preach’d, 11; Taylor, A Thanksgiving-Sermon, 20; Pead, The Honour, 6.
to Love as Members of that great Empire,” since the realm would constantly have God’s blessing if they were united in affections.142

Much like Defoe, these sermons also devoted considerable space to speculating on the usefulness of acquiring so many new subjects. “And if Riches, next to Hands, be the Strength of a Kingdom,” Talbot preached, “what may we not hope for from the increase in Seamen, the Improvement of our Shipping, and consequently the Advancement of our Trade.”143 John Bates envisioned a general increase in trade and manufacture, but more specifically, “Our Plantation Abroad we may expect will soon be better Peopleed and more Fruitful.”144 Moreover, the future was truly bright since there were now “more Forces, stronger Armies, greater Trade, more Havens, more Eyes to watch it, more Great men to defend it, more Genius’s produced upon it for its Honour and Service.”145 But for all this talk of a grand united future, there was still very little said about the Scots that could be called positive, and many sermons betrayed as much anxiety about the union as praise for it, undermining the florid rhetoric describing newfound brotherly love. Charles Bean and Giles Dent both warned that the union could be undone, urging that both nations respect each other and all the details contained in the union treaty, a sure sign that a union of hearts and minds was an ideal and not a reality.146 And although John Bates believed that the Scots were a stout, warlike, and honourable people, Patrick Dujon highlighted the barrenness and poverty of the north which only the “Riches

144 Bates, *Two (United) are better than one Alone*, 21.
and Fertility of the South will make amends for.” Dujon did concede that Scotland’s population would be of use, but he described the union itself as an act of condescension. “But it should hardly be expected that ever they [the generous people of England] should be brought to that strain of self-denial,” he noted, “as to let them [the Scots] into all the sweets of their profitable Places at Home, and to share the Advantages of their foreign Trade, and Plantation Improvements and Acquisitions Abroad.”

What the English were most worried about, however, was their church. Bates thus issued an order to his audience:

Those Doctrines that confine the Validity of Christ’s Ordinances to Episcopal Ordination, those that represent Popery more favourably than Presbytery, &c. now must appear strange Doctrines... So likewise those Doctrines which make no difference betwixt our Ceremonies and rank Heathenish Idolatry, must appear every whit as strange, if now Preached in the North-part of our Island. The Statesmen’s Temper, and if not this, their Terror must teach Church-Men not to Infringe Charity, for what they think, or are willing to make, Truth.

The Church of England and the Presbyterian Kirk had clearly not yet learned to live together, and there was enough mutual distaste that Bates felt it necessary to address the issue. “Be thankful, I say, for this Union,” he commanded. Pead also noted that there were many men afraid that the Kirk would undermine the English Church, commenting that “Did men truly govern themselves by Christian Principles, I cannot think it impossible that Unity of Affection and Diversity of Opinion should cohabit.” It seems, however, that they did not. Another two sermons suggested that perhaps the Scots could be converted to Episcopalian ways now that the Anglo-Scottish union was otherwise

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147 Bates, Two (United) are better than one Alone, 12; Patrick Dujon, A Sermon Preached in St. George’s church in Doncaster, May 1 (London, 1707), 13, 10.
148 Bates, Two (United) are better than one Alone, 28.
149 Ibid., 29.
While it is certainly correct to say that the English had been steadily moving away from a union founded on protestant affinities with Scotland over the course of the seventeenth century, it is therefore equally certain that religion still played a major role in approaching the union itself. Throughout the negotiations, the English believed that Scottish Presbyterianism was suspect and threatened to undermine the treaty, and these anxieties did not go away just because an agreement had been reached. Claims of mutual love and respect sat awkwardly with this type of distrust and suggested that the separate national churches would never be wholly comfortable with one another, or at least not without the passage of a significant amount of time.

VI

Joseph Browne’s choice of words in his *Patriots of Great Britain: A Congratulatory Poem to those Truly Noble and Illustrious Peers who Happily United the Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland* (1707) perhaps best sums up the issues raised in the thanksgiving sermons and addresses. Great Britain was to be held together by “chains of Love,” and “ty’d” by mutual interest. Brown was sincere in his attempt to celebrate the union, imagining a Britain united in “soul and body,” but the metaphor of bondage was still somewhat unintentionally and ironically descriptive. While Macinnes, Whatley, and Patrick have noted the bonfires celebrating union in May, they also describe a lack of enthusiasm for the Scots shortly thereafter. And Ferguson, perhaps most appropriately of all, explained the situation by quoting Swift: “Blest Revolution, which

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creates/Divided Hearts, united States.” Even the chorus of praise for Anne could not drown out the discomfort made apparent in earlier literature.

The overall impression one gets from the literature surrounding the parliamentary union, then, is that the English had decided that the Scots really were dangerous and beggarly, and that this time they meant it! Jacobean rhetoric about one people, one heart and one island could not hide the deep-rooted prejudice against Scottish poverty and anxiety about the pernicious nature of her church. But since political circumstance now forced the English and the Scots together into a closer union, the English press attempted to take the sting out of the nettle. Readers were given the impression that the Scots lacked agency, and that they could therefore be contained or avoided until a way could be found to make them useful. Only the church issue continued to be a serious problem, despite Defoe’s arguments that it was really just an English controversy, highlighting the continued role of religion in the eighteenth-century negotiations, now as an obstacle (instead of an agent) of union.

The attempt to disinvest the Scots of agency also explains the confusion about whether or not the Anglo-Scottish relationship was stretched to the breaking point by 1707. The English were indeed exasperated with all things Scottish, but the new constitutional relationship, coupled with their refusal to admit the Scots could act on their own, gave the surface impression that there was a new dawn. Colley’s belief that the English and the Scots could at least agree on a protestant, imperial quest to best France ignores this problem and fails to take into account the fact that the English were not

comfortable with a discernibly Scottish contribution to even this lofty vision. The English perception of Scotland as a non-entity is important because it allowed old and unaddressed problems in the Anglo-Scottish relationship to carry forward into a new imperial age.

The parliamentary union of 1707 secured a British political identity without creating a British national identity, but it did illustrate that the English were already hopelessly tangled up with Scots. In a response to Tom Nairn’s devolutionist and Euromorph arguments, J.G.A. Pocock has argued that “there can be a “British” history of the English, but never a post-British or an anti-British one,” a statement that is strangely as appropriate to the situation in 1707 as it is to the devolution referendum of 1997.154

Struggle as they might to deny the mutual influence that the Scots and the English had over one another, the best the English could come up with when they had to “re-jig” the relationship, was to move closer together instead of further apart. And in their decision to contain Scotland by engulfing it (making the situation stomachable by casting a cloak of invisibility over the Scots that would only be lifted if they behaved appropriately), the English set an important precedent. No matter how distasteful a solution might be, the Anglo-Scottish union would always adapt to circumstances as required, instead of collapsing. And it is for this reason that some scholars doubt that even the loss of the Republic of Ireland and the creation of a new Scottish Parliament will fundamentally alter the British dynamic in the Atlantic archipelago.155

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Chapter Seven: Conclusion – Persistent Evasion at the Dawning of a New Age

Linda Colley has argued that the parliamentary union established a new geographic form that helped foster a sense of British nationhood. After 1707, Britain was “marked out by the sea, clear, incontrovertible, apparently pre-ordained.”¹ Now, conveniently grouped together by the island’s natural bounds, the English and the Scots asked: who are the Britons? The answer they came up with was that they were protestant, traders, anti-Catholic, and most especially anti-French.² The preceding study, however, indicates that even when fighting an epic battle with the French, it is unlikely that the relationship was ever that simple. And as Tony Claydon and Ian McBride have argued with regards to the eighteenth century, issues of faith could act either as “solvent,” or as “cement.”³ Others have pointed to the increasing ability of Catholics to live peaceably in eighteenth-century protestant England, competition between Anglicans and dissenters for souls, resources and political control, and infighting among Anglicans themselves, in order to highlight the continuing politics of faith.⁴ This indicates that while Colley has asked some very important questions, her own interpretations sometimes lack complexity, and often ignore the distinction between being something, and struggling to become it.

² Ibid., 53-60.
During the regal union, the English had used Scotland to discuss loyalty, rebellion, resistance, empire, the nature of the true church, and the role of government. The Scots themselves had been enemy, ally, barbarian, role model, and a productive contributor to empire. Already in 1603 there was disagreement about the nature of the regal union, and the character of the Scots. A Scottish dynasty sat on the English throne, and the shock of being forced into a union that indicated partnership over domination was hard to swallow. The relationship was not as fraught as some scholars – most notably, Jenny Wormald – have led us to believe, but the awkwardness of it did lead the English to disconnect the Scotland that actually bordered their territory from the Scotland they imagined. Indecision about whether the Scots were Same or Other in the wake of this union therefore nurtured what has been referred to here as the familiar alterity of the Scots.

With the advent of the Bishops’ Wars, the English once again caught sight of Scotland. And while the crown’s supporters attached Covenanter grievances to a tradition of popular rebellion, those who sympathized with the Scottish desire to protect and further religious reformation cast the conflict as part of an all-encompassing fight against popery. The Scots brought a wide array of religious and political issues to the fore, but almost as quickly as they had asserted their presence, the English shifted the focus away from the Scots once again. Therefore, although the Bishops’ Wars were quintessentially British in origins, they were soon being discussed in universal terms, and given current meaning through the use of English domestic examples. This meant that the English were concerned with finding specifically English solutions, an approach that clashed with the Anglo-Scottish nature of the conflict itself. When the Scots tried to remind England that
there were cross-border issues at stake, they were repaid for their effort through conquest and incorporation in a Cromwellian union.

By the Interregnum, the English in general were thoroughly sick of the Scots and anti-Scottish sentiment was palpable in printed products. Not only had the Scots caused a good deal of trouble during and after the Civil Wars, they continued to be extremely expensive and unruly to govern thereafter. The pan-protestant sentiments, and the formal offer of union that opened the period, clashed with the reality of military occupation and the fact that the most productive role that many English officials could envision for the Scotland was as a supplier of men to the colonies. The difference in perspectives between wanting to believe Scotland was familiar, and wanting to see it as foreign, caused added complications in a period when Commonwealth and protectoral rule were far from stable. Was England an empire unto itself, or was it an expansionist, conquering entity, branching out through the British Isles and into the new world, forcibly deploying British resources to maintain its growing colonies? The scenario was further muddied by personal experience. On a one-on-one level, the English and the Scots had more in common than either party expected. Intermarriage and permanent post-Restoration settlement indicated that cooperation and strong social bonding could and did occur at the individual level, making the garrison experience about both the maintenance of social boundaries and their dissolution. Only time could have resolved these tensions, which was something the Interregnum governments did not posses.

Although the Restoration settlement allegedly turned the clock back to 1641, the Anglo-Scottish relationship had clearly evolved, as had the political mechanisms designed to deal with turmoil in both kingdoms. When a radical covenanting rebellion
broke out in Scotland in 1679, the meaning of events was refracted through an emerging party system in England, and the Scots were used as a tool in English political manoeuvrings. This time, the memory of the Civil Wars meant that no one in England was willing to support a Scottish rebellion, least of all dissenters, who were by then working to establish their loyalty to the crown from a position outside the national church. Covenanter actions were cast as barbarous and given a genealogy of conspiracy that made their actions unpalatable to everyone. That said, the very act of emphasizing the conspiratorial elements of the Covenanter rebellion left room for the English to fight over how to portray the Scottish majority, who clearly failed to condone rebel actions. Dissenters would have preferred that Scottish Presbyterians be seen as a godly, suffering society, oppressed by arbitrary government, while the crown and its supporters portrayed Scotland as the epitome of loyalty. Emphasizing the Scottish respect for James, Duke of York, the Tories were eventually able to claim that the Scots should be seen as role models for unruly English Whigs, reversing the typical belief that the greater would draw the lesser, and arguing that England should follow the Scots. Although Scotland was thus very important in these debates, the real Scots had very little to do with things after the initial uprising had occurred.

Finally, at the start of the eighteenth century, politics required a redefinition of the old regal union, giving rise to the parliamentary union in 1707. After over a century of indecision as to the exact status of the Scots, England was formally required to acknowledge them as familiars in exchange for the extinguishing of Scottish sovereignty. Tempers ran hot, and threats of conquest, as well as arguments that Scotland was already a province of the English crown, appeared in print, but international diplomacy and the
need for a protestant succession mandated that a more moderate accommodation be reached. As discussed above, this changed the discursive context through which the English related to the Scots, but it did allow established tactics to persist. The union negotiations revealed a misalignment between English and Scottish religious groupings and political parties, and the best way of dealing with all of this was simply to deny that the Scots had the ability to disrupt English society – in other words, to maintain difference within unity, but to deny that difference any power. Post-union Britain therefore furthered the disconnect between the officially sanctioned approach to Scotland and the inevitable murmurings from below, but it also ensured that the two kingdoms would be forced to cooperate when faced with future crises. That cooperation might be tainted with a good deal of condescension, and English self-congratulatory superiority, but it did leave the door open to negotiation: one of the key elements contributing to the longevity of Great Britain.

II

After the union, Daniel Defoe offered another interpretation of what Britain looked like in *A Tour Thro’ the Whole Island of Great Britain*. Published in three volumes between 1724 and 1726, volume three contained a section dedicated exclusively to Scotland, which can be fruitfully compared to his earlier writings – analysed in the previous chapter – about Scotland and the union. Defoe tried to be objective, explaining that “he shall best pay the Debt of a just and native Writer, who, in regard to the Reader, should conceal nothing which ought to be known, and in regard to his Country, expose
nothing which ought to be conceal’d.”⁵ His dissenting sympathies, however, shine through, as does his obsession with political economy, and his desire to rehabilitate the Scots in English eyes. Unlike his contribution to the union debates, Defoe felt comfortable praising specific Scottish accomplishments in order to promote cooperation and give substance to the name of Britain by the 1720s. Even in the Tour though, there was a constant sense that England was at the helm, and although the Scots might be able to teach the English a thing or two about piety, the English possessed a superior knowledge of trade and industry – the things that would guide Britain into a new imperial age. For Defoe, when it came to matters of this world, the English must remain in control.

Defoe’s first letter from Scotland recounted his entrance into that kingdom along the eastern shore. At first, it seemed that he had come upon an entirely foreign land, complete with strong winds, barren landscape and, should one be able to find inhabitants, strange customs. But, “Having pass’d this Desart, which indeed, makes a Stranger think Scotland a terrible Place,” Defoe found himself looking upon the Lowlands, which “give you a Prospect of a fruitful and pleasant Country.”⁶ From this point on, he saw Gentleman’s houses with impressive parks, an abundance of Scottish churches, and even some Scottish manufacturing.⁷ Defoe described the Scottish nobility as “antient, illustrious, and personally great,” their houses lavishly furnished and brimming with art; the churches, moreover, were always full, since the “People of Scotland do not wander

about on the Sabbath-days, as in England.” These sights led him to conclude, that “the Scots do not want Manners.” It was a noteworthy departure from the list of negatives he had provided during the union debates, and implied that if the English were to look past their first impressions, they would find that they had acquired a worthy ally. Acutely aware that there were areas of Scottish society that still needed improvement (he was especially concerned with Scottish poverty), Defoe also proposed a number of solutions. He explained that four things would bring Scotland in line with English standards: time, a refocusing of Scottish energies from emigration to industry at home, investment, and enclosure.

Furthermore, religion, as always, loomed large for Defoe, even in a survey that was supposed to dwell upon place and not people. In a separate letter, he explained how, at Dumfries, he had stumbled upon John Hepburn preaching to a Cameronian field meeting. While he refused to comment on the nature of the sermon, or the doctrines being preached, Defoe had nothing but admiration for the devotion of the congregants.

Pointedly, he wrote:

He held his Auditory, with not above an Intermission of half an Hour, almost seven Hours; and many of the poor People had come fifteen or sixteen Miles to hear him, and had all the Way to go home again on Foot. I shall say nothing to it, for my Business is not to make Remarks on such Things; only this I may add, that if there was an equal Zeal to this in our Part of the World, and for that Worship which we acknowledge to be true, and of sacred Institution, Our Churches would be more throng’d, and our Ale-houses and Fields less throng’d on the Sabbath-day than they are now.

Despite his unease with covenanting theology, Defoe admired Scottish piety, which he felt might usefully be imported England. As during the Tory backlash following the

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8 Ibid., 159, 174.
9 Ibid., 148.
10 Ibid., 186.
Exclusion Crisis, the Scots became a model for their English brethren, but this time it was about faith, not obedience. It should be emphasized though, that while Defoe’s writings show him to have been sympathetic to the idea of Scottish dissent, he did not support covenanting itself. It was the spirit of such assemblies, and not that doctrine for which they stood, that he wanted to see implemented in England. He therefore explained how the city of Dumfermling had fallen into decay after Charles II had taken the National Covenant there, musing that “it seems to have something in it that is not, perhaps, so well remember’d as to be forgot.”\footnote{ibid., 227.} The Scottish and English dissenting traditions, we will recall, had diverged. Even before the union, it had become impossible to make cross-border religious or political alliances without imposing a myriad of qualifications first: Episcopalians in the two kingdoms had especially different agendas, and Anglo-Scottish religious and political impulses tended to work at cross purposes. In some ways, British projects had become more difficult, and not more natural, over the course of the seventeenth century.

Finally, although Defoe was increasingly respectful of the Scots in general, when it came to political economy, he was a strong advocate of the English model. Defoe was far from condemnatory of Scottish poverty, arguing that “People tell us, that Slothfullness begets Poverty, and it is true; but I must add too, that Poverty make Slothfullness, and I doubt not, were two or three brisk Merchants to settle at Kirkubry...they would soon find the People as industrious, and as laborious as in other places.”\footnote{Ibid., 190.} But he did see “improvement” as fundamentally generated by English ingenuity. With the exception of

\footnote{ibid., 227.}
\footnote{Ibid., 190.}
Glasgow, made rich by its own investment in trade, the two most praiseworthy places Defoe encountered were Irwin and Inverness. In both cases, he attributed success to the effects of the old Cromwellian garrisons that had once occupied Scotland. Irwin was “rich and fruitful, fill’d with Gentlemen’s Seats and well-built Houses,” the prosperity of the region driven by fact that New Model soldiers had taught the Scots “the Manner of Husbandry practis’d in England, which they have never left off to this Day.”

Likewise, many English soldiers had settled in Inverness following the disbanding of the garrisons at the Restoration, ensuring that this region also practiced enclosure. Defoe was especially pleased to stop in Inverness since the soldiers’ cultural legacy also included English clothing, customs and food, which he found much more agreeable to his sensibilities. Scottish economic development should, he felt, be based on English ingenuity, as English forms of enclosure had manifestly demonstrated their superiority. Moreover, the Scots could also learn from the English in terms of trade and investment. Despite Glasgow’s success, many other regions faltered, and Defoe openly acknowledged that English competition could be detrimental in Scottish markets. The real problem, though, was that Scottish nobles removed themselves from their homeland and thus failed to reinvest in the domestic economy. If the Scots – like the English – could learn to be more patriotic, time, investment, hard work, and new agricultural systems would catapult Scotland into the modern age.

The union, then, did provide new contexts and new challenges, and might at times even allow the English to see the Scots more clearly. But Scottish autonomy was

\[13\text{ Ibid., 196.} \]
\[14\text{ Ibid., 266-7.} \]
\[15\text{ Ibid., 234.} \]
undermined by incorporation because now, more than ever, the English could feel justified in taking the lead. The loss of Scottish sovereignty decreased Scotland’s potential for rabble rousing because it disrupted the balance between formal sameness and difference that had governed the seventeenth century. The Scots had lost recourse to moments of unruly strangeness and their capacity to act as a truly foreign threat. And so, although very real differences between England and Scotland persisted (particularly in matters of faith), these issues had to be negotiated under the assumption that the Scots were familiar characters. Evasion became easier and condescension more likely when it failed. This is not to say, with Colley, that the eighteenth century necessarily saw the forging of a new British nation. Instead it is to emphasize that old disruptive differences, and even old tactics for dealing with them, were being mediated by new overarching structures.

III

It would probably be inaccurate to refer to the Anglo-Scottish unions as “successful” when speaking in terms of cultural bonding, but they have been enduring. And part of what has allowed the various permutations of this relationship to persist is the flexibility and utility evident in the English understanding of things Scottish. English approaches to the Scots during the regal union were far from laudable, but they were often ingenious. Able simultaneously to embrace and to distance themselves from the Scots, the English consistently used the category of Scotland to help navigate their own domestic issues. Contrary to popular opinion, xenophobia was not the dominant paradigm, familiar alterity was. This means that Scotland had more sway over England than is often acknowledged, but also that Scotland’s power was attached to a tendency to
phase in and out of view. The Scots could (and still can) cause trouble and force British
issues to the fore, but the English would only allow them the spotlight for so long. To
defend their own sense of autonomy, the English were therefore forced actively and
consistently to undermine the idea of Scottish agency, a process that diverted energy
away from a specifically English imperial agenda. The building of the inner empire was
not self-assured, just as the forging of a British identity was not uncontested – if it can be
said to have ever existed at all. Unwanted though the partnership may have been, it did
exist and it contributed to the way in which early modern English history unfolded.
Historians of seventeenth-century Britain would do well to remember this, and specialists
focussing on the eighteenth century need to take the complex dynamics developed during
the regal union into account. If this study has revealed anything, it is that even the most
Anglocentric accounts are subject to a healthy decentring, and that, perhaps, it is the
Scots who will have the last laugh after all.
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