CONSTITUTING GOVERNABLE SUBJECTS: FOUCAULT AND GOVERNMENTALITY’S ACCOUNT OF ‘GOVERNING THROUGH FREEDOM’ AND THE CASE OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS OF CANADA

by

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Abstract

In 1978, Michel Foucault introduced his genealogy of the modern state, or alternatively, what he termed governmentality in which politics is understood as the product of rationalities which make up rule. Foucault’s problematic was to uncover the rationalities of *bio-power* or *bio-politics* which is situated within liberal rule. For Foucault, liberalism is to be viewed as a philosophy of rule that concerned itself with the rationality that the state may be governing too heavily and which increasingly divested itself of its regulatory capacities and consequently sought to guide the conduct of the population through often indirect and distanced means. Subsequently, others have built upon Foucault’s work on liberalism and have concluded that the phrase *governing through freedom* adequately characterizes liberal philosophies of rule. However, numerous critiques have been raised concerning the contention that liberalism brought with it a substantiated increase in freedom. It is this critique that the current research wishes to expand upon by using the case of the Aboriginal peoples throughout Canada between the eighteenth and nineteenth century to display that the concept of *governing through freedom* is far too restricted and that the governmentality literature often presents an incomplete account of classical liberalism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

In his series of lectures entitled *Security, Territory, Population*, given at the College De France in 1978, Michel Foucault introduced his genealogy of the modern state, or alternatively, what he termed governmentality. For Foucault, studies of governmentality focus upon the ideology that politics can be understood as a product of the sensibilities and mentalities which make up rule (Foucault 2007). Studies of governmentality therefore, demonstrate the interplay of macro and micro-structures of particular knowledges which are transformed into technologies that are rendered capable of governing an individual’s behavior (Foucault 2008). Thus, governmentality is presented as an analysis in which certain knowledges, rationalities and discourses capable of governing behavior are uncovered. Foucault’s (2007, 2008) problematic in the delivery of his lectures was to uncover and present the rationalities of what he termed *bio-power* or *bio-politics*; that is to say, a period in time and a form of rule in which the population came to be seen as the object of political strategy and which sought to guide the conduct of the population through often indirect and distanced means. Foucault (2007) contended that this form of rule ultimately came to be known as what is more generally termed liberalism, which is frequently cited as a philosophy of rule that concerned itself with the rationality that the state may be governing too heavily and which increasingly divested itself of its regulatory capacities. As Foucault (2007, 2008) suggested, during the liberal period both society and economy came to be seen as possessing their own natural laws and processes which were to be governed according to and with respect to this supposed naturalness with minimal interference from the state. Foucault’s (2007, 2008) interpretations on the subject and the presentation of governmentality as a methodology have led to the development of a school of critical analysis on the subject which has attempted to contribute to the definition of liberalism and the rationalities that comprise it.
What has developed is a general presentation of liberalism as a philosophy of rule which is characterized by the phrase *governing through freedom*, meaning that, with the development of liberalism, the state displaced much of its paternalistic, authoritarian and pastoral characteristics in favor of governing at a distance through a variety of often non-state actors and the judicious application of direct control.

Although Foucault’s (2007, 2008) governmental analysis presented a new analytical framework for uncovering the varied rationalities of rule which ultimately presented itself as liberalism, numerous critiques have been raised concerning the completeness and accuracy of Foucault and subsequent authors’ claims that liberalism ultimately led to a substantiated increase in the autonomy and agency of the population. Subsequently, authors such as Dean (2002) have suggested that far from increasing the amount of freedom accorded to the population, liberalism in fact retained a great deal of paternalistic, authoritarian and often coercive characteristics which the school of governmentality frequently neglects. Through an investigation of these critiques, Dean (2002) suggests that one will ultimately observe that opposed to witnessing a decrease in the direct control of a specified population or paternalistic forms of rule, the ideals expressed in the concept of *governing through freedom* are merely locally, culturally and ethnically specific. Thus, if one were to examine such cases as those of the Aboriginal populations of Canada from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, one would discover that pastoral and authoritarian rationalities existed within the mentalities that shaped the rule of such peoples and were ultimately transformed into technologies such as Residential and Industrial Schools which were used as tools to conduct the conduct of such populations. Consequently, requiring completion is an investigation which critically examines the contentions of governmentality’s account of liberalism and which demonstrates the contradictions both internal and external to such discourse on the subject. Although it is proposed in the current research that Foucault and others present an
incomplete account of liberalism, it is suggested that governmentality is a viable research tool and
will be employed in this analysis to uncover the rationalities of those who governed the
Aboriginal population in Canada between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in an effort to
demonstrate that much is left out of the governmentality account of liberalism. Therefore, the
present research focuses on an analysis of governmentality and attempts to display that Foucault
and subsequent literature presents an inaccurate and incomplete account of liberalism and the
associated concept of governing through freedom when taking into consideration the case of
Indigenous populations. The current research thus attempts to contribute to those works on the
subject by providing a comprehensive understanding of governmentality as a theory and research
methodology along with the rise of governmentality as a school of critical analysis, and
ultimately endeavors to demonstrate the paternalistic and authoritarian rationalities that exist
within liberal rule which Foucault and others have neglected.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

As previously stated, the current research is predicated upon Foucault’s (2007, 2008) concept of governmentality in which the rationalities which lay “behind” technologies of rule capable of governing an individual’s behavior are uncovered and in which Foucault sought to analyze the technologies, mentalities and programmes of power which particular forms of governance are built upon. According to Foucault (2007), these rationalities, mentalities and technologies are seen as apparatuses for understanding the contingencies of relations of power upon which our present rests. Thus, an investigation of various governmentalities is to be viewed as an examination into where and how, between whom, according to what processes and with what effects power is applied (Foucault 2007). This methodology ultimately stresses the complexity and numerous processes of governing, along with the technologies that subjectify individuals, and also aims to examine the problems and problematizations through which being is constructed in a logical and manageable fashion (Colebatch 2002).

Stemming from this methodology is the premise that governing is to be defined as the *conduct of conduct* which refers to any rational and calculated guidance of human behavior (Scott 1995). Based on the aforementioned definition, studies of governmentality seek to investigate how individuals govern and how individuals govern themselves in relation to the rational and calculated objectives of those who rule (Scott 1995). It is with reference to this methodology that Foucault (2007) sought to present a history of the present; that is to say, a genealogy of the rise of liberalism or what he termed the modern art of governing, which are used as synonyms for a period in time and specific application of rule, in which the economy and the *homo oeconomicus* emerged as distinct spheres which were to be governed with respect to their own natural
processes. It is in reference to this development that subsequent literature on the subject has often associated with the general rise of individual agency or autonomy.

Numerous analyses of various governmentalities have been undertaken since Foucault’s presentation of his genealogy of the modern state in which many focus on his interpretation of liberalism. Weir, O’Malley and Shearing (1997) note that stemming from these analyses, two streams of examination can be identified. Weir et al. (1997) purport that the first area of examination concerns itself with the ways in which programmes of government or the state are formulated and articulated within broad discourses of rule or ‘political rationalities.’ The other area of investigation exemplifies how technologies are employed to put these rationalities into effect. Such analyses have proven useful in suggesting that rule is not a monopoly practice of the state, but instead should be viewed as being derived from an assemblage of technologies and forces that are used to direct conduct (Weir et al. 1997). Therefore, according to Weir et al.’s (1997) interpretation, a governmental analysis first seeks to uncover the rationalities that exist within various arts of governing and secondly how these rationalities are translated into institutions, programmes and technologies which ultimately seek to guide an individual’s conduct and align it with state objectives. These rationalities are exemplified in subsequent governmentality literature which focus on liberalism and one frequently comes across the contention that the liberal philosophy of rule concerned itself with divesting its regulatory obligations to non-state actors, thus breaking the assemblage of monopoly practices of rule and resolving the claim that the state may be governing too heavily. Gordon (1991) confirms that within the governmentality literature, liberalism is presented as a form of rule concerned with preserving the relative autonomy of the individual through maintaining the distance at which the state rules. Liberalism can therefore be characterized as a critique of rule in which society and
economy are to be governed with respect to their natural laws and processes, apart from the technologies of government.

Although liberalism has traditionally been presented as a philosophy of rule which maintained and governed with respect to the autonomy of the individual, many critiques (for example, Gordon 1991; Murray Li 2007) of Foucault’s (2007, 2008) account of liberalism and subsequent literature on the same topic have been raised. These critiques suggest that Foucault and the school of governmentality have neglected to display the rationalities that lie “behind” liberal philosophies of rule which contradict the claim that liberalism was committed to governing at a distance or through freedom. This contradiction is presented as one of the principle critiques of governmentality in which one additionally locates the associated claim that the governmentality literature too often depends on utilizing official discourses of rule to support its genealogies. By relying on official discourses of rule, contradictory rationalities, especially those that oppose the governmentality account of liberalism, often go unevaluated. The contention that governmentality accounts of liberalism rely too heavily on official discourses of rule is especially interesting when considering Foucault’s (2007) claim that within liberalism, rule is divested to numerous non-state actors. When considering Foucault’s (2007) claim, it would therefore be accurate to reason that the various rationalities of non-state actors should also be investigated. However, as Murray Li (2007) suggests, rarely are these rationalities considered and such studies ultimately rely on governors’ interpretations or rationalities that comprise events. Consequently, one frequently finds that rationalities and mentalities which contradict the concept of governing through freedom are neglected in favor of those that promote Foucault’s and the school of governmentality’s version of liberalism, overlooking the proposed authoritarian and paternalistic nature of such rule. Such analyses subsequently lead to accounts of liberalism
that support its normative version which suggest that liberalism generally increased the amount of freedom the population enjoyed.

Based on the abovementioned critique, the need exists to look beyond Foucault and the school of governmentality’s version of liberalism in search of discontinuities and rationalities that may provide a more complex and holistic account of liberal rule. By doing so, it can be concluded that an increase in relative autonomy was not experienced by all individuals, including the Indigenous population of Canada, and that the supposed increase was only enjoyed by those who adopted the characteristics of the *homo oeconomicus*, or *economic man*.† Therefore, the present research focuses on an analysis of governmentality and attempts to demonstrate that Foucault and subsequent governmentality literature presents an incomplete account of liberalism and the associated concept of *governing through freedom*, especially when taking into consideration colonial rule and various forms of social and cultural improvement aimed at the Indigenous peoples of Canada.

Although critiques of the governmentality account of liberalism have been raised, limited research exists which adequately dismisses or contradicts the concept of *governing through freedom* and which demonstrates the proposed authoritarian and paternalistic nature of liberal rule. Additionally, where subsequent literature does exist, it appears to limit itself to two lines of investigation. These lines of investigation are generally the role that political economic practice played within liberal philosophies of rule, and the investigation of civil society in which the emphasis on political economy is often dropped in favor of comprehending the role of freedom within the liberal art of governing. Unfortunately, these interpretations often favor one line of investigation over another and neglect their interconnectedness. Therefore, it is proposed that a

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† Within his genealogy of the modern state, Foucault (2007, 2008) utilizes gender-specific language and refers to all subjects as “men.” Therefore, the present research will conform to his usage and also employ gender-specific language in the same contexts as Foucault.
more holistic account of liberalism requires presentation in which competing, or simply other, rationalities that lay “beneath” liberal rule are uncovered and which may break the coherent façade of a liberalism that suggests an increase in freedom was provided to the population upon its inception. It is proposed, however, that governmentality is still a useful research tool and is employed in this analysis. However, one must be wary of examining official discourses of rule and it is suggested instead that one should examine the mentalities and rationalities that composed the assemblages of rule which contributed to the institutions and technologies employed by the state to enact such rule. Consequently, the programme of colonialism and the varied associated efforts of social and cultural improvement directed toward Indigenous populations by Christian missionaries and the state in an attempt to guide their conduct toward ‘civility’ can be used as an example of such other rationalities which challenge and prove useful in contradicting the concept of governing through freedom.

Pels (1997) notes that in the past decades increased attention has been given to the study of the mentalities of colonialism along with its associated authoritarian and paternalistic nature with respect to Indigenous populations. However, Pels (1997) contends that these studies have continued to present a dichotomous view of struggle between the colonizer and the colonized and suggests that this presentation relies on universalizing and essentializing relationships that fail to uncover the complexity of both colonial and liberal rule. In light of this dichotomous presentation, Pels (1997) notes that there has been a recent call for the re-examination of colonial and liberal rule through the governmentality approach which does not treat the state, the colonizers and the colonized as sovereign subjects. Despite this call however, there appears to be little practical application of governmentality to colonialism, its authoritarian and paternalistic rationalities, and connection to liberal mentalities of rule. Although the practical application of this approach to colonialism is restricted, the limited research does provide some insight into the
authoritarian nature of liberalism taking colonialism and efforts of improvement as an example in which two distinct themes can be uncovered. The first theme is the civilizing of Indigenous peoples based on religious leadership and the other is the role the rationalities of economy and industry played in missionary and state relations with Indigenous populations which ultimately shaped the ‘civilizing’ process.

Belmessous (2005) notes that by the eighteenth century, European cultural tradition had often presented Indigenous populations as savage and unfinished peoples in need of humanization and according to the Christian European order, to be saved. According to this tradition, Christian Europeans felt a moral obligation to bring faith and reason to such populations and until such reason could be cultivated in them, their actions and conduct required guidance through pastoral forms of governance. Consequently, Blake (1999) suggests that forms of pastoral power were employed in Canada as a rationality for governing Indigenous populations well into the nineteenth century, even at a time when liberal philosophies of rule were developing and pastoral power had supposedly been displaced. It is with Blake’s (1999) suggestion in mind that the critique addressed by Weir et al. (1997) and Gordon (1991), which contends that Foucault’s genealogical account of liberalism is incomplete or inaccurate, is situated. Foucault (2007) suggested that as the modern art of governing, or liberalism, took form, one witnessed the displacement of pastoral power in the Western world and consequently, a decrease in the constraining effects of rule as seen with the pastorate and raison d’état. Therefore, according to Foucault (2007), pastoral power is replaced with the rise of liberalism; however, what can be seen when taking forms of Indigenous rule into consideration, is that this account is inaccurate and that forms of pastoral power were employed by state and non-state actors such as missionary groups in their interactions with Indigenous populations well into the nineteenth century with the aim of guiding Aboriginal peoples’ conduct toward salvation and civilization. Blake (1999) confirms
that the colonial project in Canada was led by missionaries, often funded by the state, who in an attempt to secure Indigenous peoples’ salvation, enacted various forms of paternalistic policing with the objective of creating moral Christian communities. In order to achieve their goal, missionaries therefore implemented regimes of pastoral control through the tactics of education, conversion and policing to direct the Indigenous populations’ behavior towards salvation and civilization which, often times, the state directly supported.

It is often noted in the limited governmentality literature on the topic (for example, Blake 1999, Hogeveen 1998), that the rationalities of various missionary groups frequently played an integral role in the governing of the Indigenous populations of Canada; however, often overlooked is the role that the liberal rationalities of economy and industry played in missionary and state relations with Aboriginal populations which ultimately shaped the civilizing process, as often, the adoption of economic and industrious characteristics were viewed as precursors of civility and the ability of the state to govern a population by distanced means. Rose (1993) suggests that within liberalism, one finds the contention that civil man was defined by his economic attributes and that he was to maximize his life as a sort of enterprise and was to therefore be productive, industrious and see to it that he was not idle. Therefore, civilization and the cultivation of civil subjects included reference to economic processes capable of constituting individuals who would subjectify themselves to reflect the characteristics of civil man and ultimately constitute themselves as subjects who possessed the ability to be governed through their freedom. Based on this contention, Smart (2002) notes that Foucault saw human beings as both subjects and objects of knowledge and that through the adoption of various regimes of truth or rationalities, such as those of the state, individuals would come to constitute themselves as subjects of the various forms of power/knowledge, or discourses of truth, that are produced and operate within their lives. As a result, Smart (2002:75) contends that Foucault’s analysis “reveals
the body as an object of knowledge and as a target for the exercise of power…located in a political field, invested with power relations which render it docile and productive, and thus politically and economically useful.” Consequently, the view was historically taken that if individuals were to adopt the abovementioned characteristics, and subjectify themselves as objects of state discourses of truth, they would ultimately come to be governed through freedom and in a manner which respected their natural liberties. By having individuals constitute themselves as subjects capable of being governed through freedom, it can be asserted that more aggressive and interventionist technologies such as discipline and police as found within pastoral forms of rule and raison d’état would no longer be required, as through the adoption of state defined regimes of truth, individuals would come to constitute themselves as subjects capable of regulatory and self-directing behavior.

The emphasis on the adoption of economic principles of behavior can also be viewed in another example. Beginning in the eighteenth century, in the same historical period in which one witnesses the establishment of liberal philosophies of rule, Francis (1998) notes that a change in the definition of civility and what it meant to be considered a civil subject occurred. The new definition of civility was increasingly associated with the acquiring of wealth; an acquisition which the Indigenous peoples were perceived to be disinterested in. Due to their supposed disinterest in the acquisition of material culture, Aboriginal peoples were often viewed as lacking the qualities of order and industry which, if adopted, would allow the population to develop material culture. Resulting from the Aboriginal populations’ perceived lack of order and industry, it was rationalized that they required close monitoring and these qualities cultivated in them through forms of social and cultural improvement. Therefore, Scott (1995) contends that colonial practices, driven by the mentalities of liberalism, sought to re-arrange power so as to oblige subjects to transform themselves toward the goal of improvement and suggests that
individuals were, within liberalism, constrained and obliged to act in ways which ultimately led the individual to become obedient, disciplined, industrious and civilized.

Based on the contention that the actions of certain populations were often constrained by programmes of rule aimed at cultivating in them technologies of the self that would result in the creation of calculating and enterprising subjects, Scott (1995) claims that the concept of governing through freedom and the belief that the liberal state called into question the basis of its authority is in fact a “story book account.” In confirmation of Scott’s (1995) claim, Hindess (2005) purports that opposed to granting freedom to all subjects in general, liberalism was merely committed to promoting particular forms of freedom to certain sectors of the population. Similarly, Dean (2002) claims that the technology of governing at a distance did not necessarily entail governing through freedom or even in a manner which respected individual liberty and notes that within liberalism, individual liberties were often overridden in various attempts to maximize benefits to the state. Therefore, although certain cases may have existed in which subjects were able to be governed through suitable forms of free activity, there were many other instances in which programmes of direct regulation such as those implemented to control the Indigenous population were employed (Hindess 2005). Hindess (2005) thus critiques the governmentality account of liberalism, suggesting that in practice, authoritarianism and paternalism often continued to exist within the liberal rationality of rule and can be found to lay “behind” the concept of governing through freedom. Based on this suggestion, rather than characterizing liberalism as committed to governing through the free interactions of individuals, Hindess (2005) contends that it would be more appropriate to claim that liberalism was merely committed to utilizing freedom as a technology of rule when subjects were able to cultivate suitable habits of self-regulation. In agreement with this claim, Dean (2002) suggests that authoritarianism, in some instances, continued to exist within liberal rule especially in attempts to
govern those who were seen as lacking appropriate forms of self-regulation. It is with this critique of liberalism in mind that Hindess (2001) notes that governance stemming from liberal philosophies of rule can be seen as predicated upon authoritarian and paternalistic rationalities in which forms of control and coercion were often used to guide Indigenous peoples’ conduct so as to align it with the assumptions, mentalities and sensibilities of Euro-Canadians.
Chapter 3
Governmentality

In his attempt to problematize the concepts of politics, governance and government, Foucault (2007, 2008) urged for the negation of universalistic, holistic and dichotomous historical analyses, and instead advocated for the study of the multiplicity of rationalities that shape or give form to such concepts. Foucault (2007:1) suggested that instead of studying the corporeal techniques employed by governors for the purpose of governing, one should study the often overlooked history of the mentalities “behind” technologies of rule, “that is to say the much more general, but of course much more fuzzy history of the correlations and systems of the dominant feature which are [determined in] a given time and for a given sector.” Through the focus on the multitude of technologies of rule, Foucault (2007, 2008) argued that concepts, knowledges, and discourses capable of governing behavior do not develop in a linear and sequential manner. Consequently, Foucault (2007) noted that his aim when investigating various forms of rule was to analyze the technologies, mentalities and rationalities of governing as general technologies of power which lie “beneath” particular forms of governing. It is these technologies, strategies and programmes that are seen as apparatuses for understanding the contingencies of power relations upon which the present, or alternatively, specific moments in history rest.

In his introductory presentation of his works on governmentality, Foucault (2007:1) sought to uncover the rationalities that lay “behind” the concept of bio-power or bio-politics, that is, “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of political strategy, or a general strategy of power.” Therefore, Foucault (2007) noted that his examination into the genealogy of the modern state should be seen as an investigation into where and how, between whom, according to what processes and with what
effects power is applied. Accordingly, Foucault’s (2007) concern was to identify the modern art of governing, characterized by a focus on bio-power, its relations of power, as well as its historical lineage. Foucault (2007) noted that the emergence of governmental reason, and the associated concept of bio-politics, could be located between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries where the general problematic of government was raised and the questions of how to govern oneself and others, how to be governed, and how to be the best possible governor were articulated with an increasing disregard for the sovereign. Within his genealogy of the modern state, Foucault’s (2007) essential problematic was therefore to locate the modern art of governing which he saw as distinguishable from territorialistic sovereignty. It is important to note that for Foucault (2008:2), studying the modern art of governing did not simply entail analyzing the actions that were taken by governors which affected the population, but involved examining the rationalities of governing, or in short “the study of the rationalization of governmental practice in the exercise of political sovereignty.” Consequently, Foucault (2007) claimed that his analysis consisted of reducing the state to a number of functions, suggesting that the state did not have the unity, individuality or essence that it is often given in conventional sociological and historical analyses. With this claim in mind, Foucault (2008) cautioned against reducing technologies of governing to universal or ideal types and instead sought to employ an analysis that began by supposing that commonly perceived universals, such as the state, do not exist. Therefore, it appears that a genealogical analysis of governing is to be based on the principle of eventialisation which claims that there is no necessity at work in history, and instead aims to rediscover the numerous factors, strategies and technologies that culminate in an event (Foucault 1991; Smart 2002). Based on the principle of eventialisation, the genealogy of governmentality seeks to uncover the multitude of rationalities and discourses which become translated into practices, programmes and technologies of rule. Ultimately, this analytical technique detaches such
concepts as the state from their privileged position and resituates them within a perspective that envisions them as technologies of power and as objects of knowledge (Foucault 2007). By following this model of analysis, Foucault (2007:119) purported that one will be able to grasp such concepts’ genealogy, that is, “the way they are formed, connect up with each other, develop, multiply and are transformed on the basis of processes that are something other than relations of power” and see the respect in which relations of power operate.

It is in respect to the abovementioned perspective and methodology that Foucault (2007, 2008) suggested one can undertake a genealogy of the modern state and interrogate its major forms and distinct economies of power. By utilizing this line of investigation, Foucault (2007) developed a genealogical analysis through which the modern state could be understood which focused on (1) the administrative state of justice, corresponding to a society organized around a feudal system; (2) the administrative state, corresponding to a society of regulation and discipline; and (3) a state which was no longer defined by its territoriality, but in which the population became the object of political strategy, which utilized economic knowledge as an instrument and employed the apparatus of security. Consequently, Foucault’s (2007) examination followed a genealogy that concentrated on an attempt to uncover the rationalities of distinct governmentalities, or forms of rule, culminating in an analysis of liberalism in which the concept of bio-power or bio-politics is situated. In order to achieve this end, Foucault (2007) displayed the successive rationalities of the (1) Christian pastorate, as defined above, in which rule was executed for the common good and done to lead to the salvation of all; (2) raison d’état (or reason of state) in which the general concept of the administrative state was established and which guided populations’ conduct through detailed regulation and discipline; (3) and finally liberalism in which the authority of the sovereign became questioned and one witnesses deregulation and the divesting of state power and rule to non-state actors as well as the application of economic
principles, such as accounting and management, to the population (Foucault 2007). It is with this genealogy in mind that Foucault (2007) presented his three meanings of governmentality. These meanings are:

1. “The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflection, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific power that has population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge and the apparatus of security as its essential technical instrument.

2. The line of force, that for a long time throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline and so on – of the type of power we call government and which has led to the development of a series of specific forms of knowledges.

3. The process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as was gradually governmentalized” (Foucault 2007:108-109).

Though an analysis of governmentality is predicated upon a genealogical investigation, Smart (2002) suggests that a number of its major investigative principles have their origins elsewhere, namely in Foucault’s (1969) archeological investigation into the history of thought found within The Archaeology of Knowledge. Smart (2002) notes that it is within The Archaeology of Knowledge that Foucault sought to reveal the ways in which thought was systemized and subsequently translated into particular forms of knowledge. It appears that this line of analysis corresponds with Foucault’s (2007) investigation of governmentalities, as here too, he sought to uncover how governmental practice is thought into being on the basis of specific knowledges. Smart (2002) additionally notes that one of the dominant themes found within The Archaeology of Knowledge is the presentation of archaeology as an alternative mode of investigating statements and objects that have been ignored by traditional methodological analyses. Governmentality can consequently be viewed as an extension of archaeological investigations as it too sought to uncover neglected technologies and rationalities of rule and employed a critical method that did not accept the universalism of concepts often found in traditional forms of analysis. As Foucault (2007) suggested, not all experiences and discourses
are generalizable as they do not produce the same experiences for all individuals, therefore one must uncover the numerous discourses and rationalities that shape human existence, thinking of universals as assemblages of technologies which shape relationships (Foucault 2008). The negation of universal concepts thus requires one to de-center sovereign concepts and/or subjects by emphasizing the ways in which groups of statements and/or rationalities, opposed to singular discourses, achieve efficacy (Smart 2002). Subsequently, Foucault’s archeological and genealogical analyses reveal that “beneath” the conception of universal or holistic subjects, exist multiplicities, breaks, interruptions and fragments which are found within not only discourse but also the relationships between discursive and non-discursive practices such as institutions, economic processes, social practices and behavioral patterns (Smart 2002).

Although the majority of Foucault’s work preceding The Archaeology of Knowledge follows an archaeological method, Smart (2002) notes that shifts of emphasis begin to appear in Foucault’s subsequent work which the governmentality literature draws upon. Smart (2002) claims that one such shift can be identified in Foucault’s increased attention to the conception of the relationship between power and knowledge, or simply power/knowledge, which accords greater interest to the relationships that exist between discursive and non-discursive elements. As a result of this shift of emphasis, discursive practices in Foucault’s (2007, 2008) analysis of governmentalities are not given the priority they were accorded in previous works and instead, Foucault turns toward an analysis of social institutions. Thus, Foucault’s ensuing analyses address the relationships that exist between knowledge, power and technologies of the self through which “power and knowledge relations invest [in] human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” (Foucault cited in Smart 2002:43). Through his focus on the study of social institutions and their relation to technologies of the self, Foucault appears to imply that governing is a way of subjectifying individuals, and in turn, that all individuals come
to constitute themselves based on the *power/knowledge* relationships which are embedded within rationalities and consequently institutions of governing.

Although the shift of emphasis toward the study of social institutions is apparent in Foucault’s work following *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, it is important to note that an element of continuity also exists as he appears to be consistently interested in examining the transformative modes of discursive practices (Smart 2002). Additionally, continuity exists between Foucault’s works that utilize the archaeological method and those which employ a genealogical analysis which center on the concept of history. In both Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analyses, a comparable conception of history can be recognized which exemplifies the multitude of origins which underlie all historical developments (Smart 2002).

Foucault (1977) confirms in *Nietzsche, Genealogy and History* that he does not reduce entire histories to an exclusive concern or search for singular origins or essentialist concepts and ultimately suggests that there is no linear development to history. Therefore, both archaeological and genealogical analyses seek to dispel the myth of an evolutionary and progressive history and instead look to isolate the multitude of beginnings that lie “behind” discursive or non-discursive practices (Foucault 1977). By rejecting the conception of an evolutionary history, Smart (2002) contends that at the centre of Foucault’s analyses is a rejection of the search for unitary origins causing Foucault (1977) to claim that a genealogical analysis is not an attempt to capture the essence of history, nor of a concept. Instead, Foucault (1977:139) suggests that a genealogical analysis must be directed to what is already there and possibly already studied, but that it must be examined from a critical viewpoint and notes that “genealogy is grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operate[s] on a field of entangled and confused parchment, on documents that have been scratched over and reproduced many times” and “cultivate[s] the details and accidents that accompany every beginning: it [is] scrupulously attentive to their petty malice… [the
genealogist]…excavate[s] the depths” (Foucault 1977:162). Thus, the genealogist appears as a pluralist in the broad sense of the term, uncovering beginnings, discontinuities, and different forms of knowledges (Foucault 1977).

This form of analysis is therefore in direct contention with analyses carried out under the name State Theory or Marxism, at least in their crudest understandings, as when interpreted in the simplest sense, State or Marxist Theory does not allow for the investigation of micro-relations of power and tends to base their conclusions upon unitary origins. As Foucault believed that a multitude of technologies and practices are employed within the state, a theory of the state as a universal given is therefore inaccurate and incomplete without an understanding of the micro-power relations which shape rule. In contrast to State Theory or Marxism, Foucault viewed the state as having no essence and believed that it was not an autonomous source of power, characterizing it as a “rational assemblage constituted by the institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections and accumulations of tactics that permit the exercise of this quite specific form of power” (Jessup 2007:37). Therefore, the state, for Foucault, appears as nothing more that the changeable and alterable effects of a multitude of governmentalities and numerous relations of power/knowledge. Thus, instead of conceiving the state as a singular actor, pursuing its own interests, Foucault (2007) suggested that the state must be analyzed as an effect of heterogeneous technologies of power. In developing this analytics of power, Foucault appears to have consequently rejected attempts to develop any general theory of state power – or power more generally – based on a priori assumptions about its essential unity, its pre-given functions, its inherent tendency to expand through its own dynamics of power, or its global strategic employment by a master subject.

Before providing an overview of his genealogical account of governmentality, Foucault (2007, 2008) distinguished two concepts which are integral to his analysis; namely, the concepts
of sovereignty and economy. These concepts are important as they are often employed in a
normative sense in traditional historical and sociological analyses; however, just as Foucault
sought to disturb conventional forms of historical analyses, he also attempted to utilize
conventional concepts in alternative ways through which the multitude of origins and meanings
of such concepts is demonstrated. Foucault (2007) first discussed these concepts in relation to
Machiavelli’s *The Prince* to highlight the shift from rule based on sovereignty to a governmental
rationality based on the concept of economy, that is to say, a way of arranging “things” so as to
ensure their efficacy, often in relation to market processes. The concept of economy, Foucault
(2007) contended, subsequently became an independent science within liberalism, posing the
question of how the functioning of the economy could be translated to the social domain and
additionally how power could operate more efficiently.

In discussing the concept of sovereignty, Foucault (2007) noted that the sovereign existed
in a relationship of exterritorality to his principality, with the sole concern of maintaining his
territory. However, Foucault (2007) suggests that in the sixteenth century there arose a vast
literature of an anti-Machiavellian nature, seeking to replace Machiavelli’s guide for ruling,
which opposed the role and artificiality of the prince and his primary function of territorial
maintenance. It is with reference to the role of the prince that Foucault (2007) implies a
dichotomous relationship existed between the prince and his principality which was brought into
question by the anti-Machiavellian literature. Based upon this dichotomous characterization,
Foucault (2007) noted that sovereign forms of rule cannot be considered true arts of governing as
they do not take into account the plural nature of rule which is characteristic of modern
governmentalities. Consequently, Foucault (2007) noted that the anti-Machiavellian literature
called for an art of governing which was multifaceted opposed to relying on a single governor.
Ultimately, Foucault (2007) claimed that with the rise of the anti-Machiavellian literatures, one
witnessed the dispersal of rule. Within this period, rule and governing, it appears, began to shift from being a responsibility primarily of the state and prince to a responsibility of non-state actors and institutions. The emergence of this new form of governing essentially appeared to be concerned with the question of how to introduce economy, meaning the proper way of managing people, wealth and goods, into social domains (Foucault 2007). Thus, the issue of importance for government henceforth became the introduction of economy into political practice and its application to both institutions and non-state actors (Foucault 2007).

With the introduction of a new art of governing, commencing in the late sixteenth century, it is important to note that which governors sought to govern and how they perceived the role of government. Foucault (2007:96) noted that “government is the right disposition of things,” implying that, from the Middle Ages on, the prince was not simply responsible for governing his territory, but also responsible for the governing of “things.” These “things,” according to Foucault (2007), could be numerous, but above all, it was men and “things” and men and their relationships to such “things” as wealth, territory and goods. Consequently, Foucault (2007:97) suggested that “government is the right disposition of things that one arranges so as to lead to a suitable end.” With this definition in mind, modern government can be seen as distinguishable from sovereignty in the fact that government does not propose an end which is that of the common good, but instead seeks the right way of arranging “things” in order to govern each “thing” to a suitable end as judged by an assemblage of state and non-state actors (Foucault 2007). It is important to note however, that Foucault (2007) stressed that the modern art of governing, in its truly rational and calculated form, was not achieved until the eighteenth century as until that time it was bound up with the administrative monarchy which held onto the sovereign’s sensibilities and rationalities. Consequently, Foucault (2007) suggested that the
unblocking of the art of governing was linked to the emergence of the population as a site to be governed, and the refocus of economy in political terms.
Chapter 4  
Genealogy of the Modern State

Throughout his analysis of modern rule, Foucault (2007) noted that he would like to consider governmentality from the perspective of a genealogy of technologies of power, reconstructing the function of government and governing according to its rationalities and programmes of political action it proposed. Foucault (2007) began his analysis of governmentality by suggesting that one can locate the emergence of the notion of the government of men (which is the foundation for bio-politics) in the Pre-Christian and Christian East which took two forms; that of pastoral power and the practice of spiritual direction, or alternatively, the direction of souls. Foucault (2007) claimed that pastoral power took the form of a king, God or chief acting as the shepherd of men, who were routinely thought of as his flock. The shepherd, or alternatively, pastorate’s power is seen as not exercised over a territory like that of the sovereign, but instead over a flock of men, being concerned with the salvation of all, and is seen as giving “rise to art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hands, and manipulating men, an art of monitoring them and urging them on step by step, an art with the function of taking charge of men collectively and individually throughout their life and at every moment of their existence” (Foucault 2007:165). Consequently, the pastorate was not only to watch over the entire flock and ensure the salvation of all but was also to watch over each individual, acting as a commander, making certain that each one was directed toward salvation. It is in reference to the responsibilities of the pastorate that the concept of a government of all and each was born, in which the salvation and care of all and each individual was to be achieved (Foucault 2007).

Foucault (2007) suggested that one can associate the pastorate to three general elements which include salvation, law and truth. The pastorate is associated with salvation as its primary
objective was the direction of individuals in such a way that led to their salvation. Secondly, it is connected to law (in this instance divine or theological law) as the flock and individual subjects were to submit to the command of God to ensure their salvation. Third, the pastorate is closely related to a particular discourse of truth as earning one’s salvation required a dependence on a particular concept of truth, in this instance that of God or the divine (Foucault 2007). However, it is important to note that these elements combined, created what Foucault (2007:176) termed a general system of obedience in which one witnessed the “subordination of one person to someone because he is someone.” Consequently, the introduction of the pastorate revealed a system of subordination that did not guarantee freedom or liberty nor lead to a mastery of oneself or others as is witnessed in later forms of governing such as liberalism (Foucault 2007).

Spiritual direction and submission are important in another sense as they emphasize the concept of directing one’s conduct, or what is referred to as the conduct of conduct. As previously stated, Foucault (2007) sought to uncover particular knowledges which are transformed into technologies that are rendered capable of governing an individual’s actions. Consequently, the rationality of spiritual direction is of importance in the attempt to understand this concept. For Foucault (2007), the pastorate held the responsibility of not only teaching his flock the concept of salvation, but also directing their conscience so as to lead them to salvation for the good of all and each. For this reason, the Christian pastorate can be seen as developing the technology of the examination of conscience, in which, at all times, individuals produce a discourse of truth based on the direction of the self which ultimately aligns their conduct to the larger objective of salvation (Foucault 2007). Thus, Foucault (2007) contended that the pastorate could be viewed as a form of governing in which some individuals were taught how to govern others, while some were taught how to be governed through such tactics as spiritual direction and the examination of conscience. Smart (2002) therefore notes that within the pastorate, the
political rationality of complete obedience was formed in which one comes to know oneself in order to confess to someone else. Consequently, the pastorate can be seen as giving rise to an art of conducting, directing and leading subjects collectively and individually. It is in this sense that governmentality appears to focus on individuals not as objects of control but is instead interested in analyzing how exercises of power result in producing subjects. It is this method of governing men that Foucault (2007) suggested was the background for the development of the modern art of governing which is primarily enacted upon the population.

With this examination of the pastorate in mind, Foucault’s (2007) genealogy subsequently demonstrates how the modern art of governing was opened up and predicated upon the governing of men. Foucault (2007) noted that resistance to the pastorate, and the general forms of obedience and submission it was associated with, began to appear most predominantly in the seventeenth century in the form of counter-conducts or resistance; that is, conduct opposing this specific form of governing. Foucault (2007) suggested that these counter-conducts brought forth the objective of wanting to be conducted differently, by other means and through other methods. It is important to note however, that these counter-conducts did not always take a religious form, but instead stemmed from political institutions in which one witnessed a transition from an emphasis on the economy of souls to the economy of men and the population. Therefore, from the seventeenth century onward one witnesses the emergence of the ideology of directing men outside the ecclesiastical domain, but paradoxically, also an intensification of the problem of conduct (Foucault 2007). Foucault (2007) thus claimed that the imperative of these counter-conducts was not necessarily to limit the conduct of conduct, but instead to bring forth a problematic of how to conduct or govern outside of ecclesiastical or sovereign relations. Therefore, the question was raised as to what extent the sovereign could truly conduct and lead subjects of a territory if governing was not based upon a theological or divine foundation.
Consequently, the objective of governing became not how to eliminate the pastorate but to determine how the state could benefit from a “better” pastorate, and how one could guide subjects’ conduct more efficiently while maintaining obedience more effectively (Foucault 2007). As a result of this questioning, the relations of governing and government were increasingly thought of in knowable terms as it was rationalized that the pastorate or the sovereign was required to have knowledge of the population to fully understand what the processes of his flock were and the functions he was to perform in order to better govern (Foucault 2007). It appears that because governing during this time attempted to regulate the conduct of those who were ruled, a suitable knowledge of how individuals should conduct themselves also required development. This claim suggests that there is a direct link between the knowledges and rationalities which are produced in a given period of time and the types of governing which become practicable.

Foucault (2007) explained that these counter-conducts contended that the sovereign had a specific task to perform that was separate from divine rule which consisted of governing based upon a model separated from ecclesiastical principles. The sovereign was henceforth required to be more than a shepherd of men and to do more than merely direct his flock; he was to govern. Foucault (2007) claimed however, that with the shift of rule based on ecclesiastical principles to rule based upon the economy of men, a model of rule did not yet exist for the sovereign to follow, which required him to develop one. The model which subsequently developed is what is referred to as the form of governing which has its foundation in what Foucault (2007) termed raison d’état. Foucault (2007:238) contended that this new form of governing can be found to have its origin in reason of state which is loosely linked to the concept of politiques, that is, a particular way of thinking and programming the specificity of government in relation to the exercise of sovereignty. It is on the basis of raison d’état and politiques that Foucault (2007) cites an
exploration began for a form of governing that had a rationality that was uniquely its own and drew away from ecclesiastical rationalities as its foundation (Foucault 2007). Consequently, it is here that the state began to enter into reflexive practice and the problem of when, under what circumstances, and in what forms the state was to develop as a knowable object of analysis began to develop. Thus, Foucault (2007:247) noted that “the entrance of the state into political practice is what [one] should be trying to grasp” when undertaking a genealogical account of bio-politics or the modern art of governing.

Moving from an investigation of pastoral power in tracing the modern art of governing, in which one witnesses the emergence of reason of state, Foucault (2007) outlines his meaning of raison d’état. Referring to Palazzo, Foucault (2007) noted that raison d’état appears as the very essence of the state as well as the subsequent knowledge of the state and is viewed as “a certain political consideration that is necessary in all public matters, councils and plans, which must strive solely for the preservation, expansion, and felicity of the state” (Chemnitz cited in Foucault 2007:257). With reference to this definition, Foucault (2007) contended that it is important to note that this definition does not refer to anything but the state; it does not refer to territory, the pastorate, the sovereign or a natural or divine order of “things,” but instead refers to the maintenance and growth of the state (Foucault 2007). Thus, within raison d’état there is no longer a concern with the origin of a territory or principality, as Foucault (2007:260) notes “we are already in a world of government.” Consequently, the state is viewed as raison d’état’s primary objective and its principle of intelligibility, in which raison d’état is characterized as “the perfect knowledge of the means by which the states are formed, preserved, strengthened and expanded” (Foucault 2007:288). Therefore, within raison d’état, the aim of state preservation, development and by extension the preservation of the population is of central importance which is
secured through the technology and programme of police which is characterized as a cumulative assemblage of actions designed to maintain the state’s growth (Foucault 2007).

Upon identifying the aim of state preservation and its connection to the technology of police, Foucault (2007) subsequently presents an analysis of the function of police in relation to the rationalities of competition and force, noting that the technology of police was utilized to ensure the state’s conservation and growth. It is interesting to note that Foucault (2007) contended that from the introduction of police as a technology of rule, rationalities and programmes of governing were employed in a field of relations of force which is subsequently identified as the threshold for the modern art of governing. Consequently, the concept of police can be defined as a technology and a set of mechanisms by which the state’s power was to be preserved and increased. The concept of police is therefore presented as being concerned with the state’s prosperity and is employed as a technology of rule which aimed to ensure the state’s maintenance, often through programmes of force and competition (Foucault 2007). Accordingly, Foucault (2007) contended that the objective of police was often to control individuals’ actions in such a way that would contribute to the growth and security of the state as well as its progressive development. Thus, the state, through the technology of police, employed programmes of detailed regulation and discipline aimed at regulating all actions that did not contribute to the state’s growth, wealth and overall preservation. Consequently, Foucault (2007) claimed that the development of police was inseparable from the governmental practice of what is generally termed mercantilism; that is, the technique and calculation for strengthening the state through the development of commerce and the application of economy.

In summary, the art of governing based upon the rationalities of raison d’état was characterized by a policy of competition and the employment of a governmental technology that would allow the state to optimize its growth and the organization of relations of power between
the population and production (Foucault 2007). Foucault (2007:341) consequently noted that within raison d’état, one is in a “world of commerce, town, regulation and discipline.” However, with the development of a society increasingly organized around the rationalities of commerce, wealth and discipline, Foucault (2007) suggested that fundamental breaks and critiques of raison d’état became questioned by what is termed the economists. The economists, as Foucault (2007) explained, appear as those who rejected the sovereign model of rule and instead, advocated for the implementation of technologies of governing that centered on rationalities predicated upon the concept of economy. What was called into question by the economists, Foucault (2007) contends, was the detailed system of regulation on which police operated and similarly, the system of generalized discipline of police intervention. Instead, the economists advocated for the installation of a rationality of rule that sought the de-centering of economic processes from the sovereign (Foucault 2007). Consequently, it is the economists, as Foucault (2007) suggested, that invented a new art of governing based on concepts of deregulation and which subsequently initiated the establishment of the modern art of governing.

Based on the rationality of deregulation, that is to say the absence of restraints and the de-centering of the economy, the state and subsequently the economy began to be seen as possessing their own processes, regularities and rationalities that opposed the non-naturalness, or artificiality, produced by programmes of regulation and control employed by the technology of police. Therefore, the objectives of the rationalities proposed by the economists were those of the removal of such regulation and control which would allow processes to function in their natural form. Consequently, the economists concluded that forms of deregulation should be applied to market processes, so as to allow things to do as they will, which ultimately created a critique of state interference. Based on the rationalities of deregulation and respect for natural processes, both economy and society came to be viewed as a specified domain encompassing their own
naturalness particular to men, which was henceforth conceptualized as what has been termed civil society (Foucault 2007). Therefore, the state was not only to become responsible for the preservation of territory but also for civil society, or by extension the population and its management in which individuals were increasingly viewed as autonomous actors (Foucault 2007).

Foucault (2007) noted that the introduction of civil society was the primary transformation of the art of governing with respect to raison d’État, as a new rationality emerged which viewed society as a collection of subjects, or as a population, which was to be ruled with respect to their natural processes. As a result of these emerging rationalities, the art of governing which subsequently developed can be seen as disinterested in imposing systems of large-scale regulation. The essential objective of this art of governing, as Foucault (2007) claimed, was the limitation of state intervention and management insofar as to ensure that natural processes operated efficiently (Foucault 2007). Thus, the state enacted the apparatus of security to ensure the efficient functioning of the natural processes of the economy, society and the population (Foucault 2007). Foucault (2007) noted that this rationality of governing, based on state limitation, adequately explains the insertion of freedom, or the ability to act at will and as an autonomous actor, into governmentality as an element which has become inseparable to governmentality itself. Foucault (2007) thus contended that from the insertion of this rationality onwards, indeed, the condition of governing well was that certain freedoms and liberties were respected (Foucault 2008). Consequently, Gleadle, Cornelius and Pezet (2008:331) note that technologies of government, including those within liberalism consistently sought to enhance citizens’ possibilities for agency and that “governmentality does not meet agency exclusively via bureaucracy and discipline. Instead, governmentality also meets agency by the means of the
managerial 'ascesis of performance,' or as ‘a set of practices of the self that individuals freely accept, so that through their practices they come to embody the organization.’”

The new art of governing introduced by the economists centered on the problem of how not to govern too heavily and between a maximum and minimum of state intervention, and can be seen as distinct from pastoral power and raison d’état in that it did not make reference to, or derive its imperatives from the divine or territorialistic expansion (Foucault 2008). It appears that this rationality of rule can be adequately characterized as a critique of state relations and governing in general as it is a reflexive approach to the problem of government. Ultimately, this new rationality, which Foucault (2007:13) referred to as liberalism, can be located in the middle of the eighteenth century and located within the concept of political economy which is defined as any method “that can procure the nation’s prosperity [and act as] a sort of general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of power in society.” Therefore, political economy is cited as the rationality which ensured the self-limitation of governmental reason by the application of economic principles such as management, limitation and the “correct” organization and distribution of “things” in society which made it possible to arrange “things” in such a way that did not necessitate detailed regulation (Foucault 2008). These rationalities combined can be termed liberalism, that is to say, a rationality whose function was not so much to ensure the growth or the state’s forces, wealth and strength, but to limit the exercise of governmental power (Foucault 2008). Consequently, Foucault (2008) noted that liberalism could be characterized as an intensification of raison d’état as it is seen as a way of perfecting government, as it too attempted to arrange “things” in such a way so as to ensure the state’s efficacy. Thus, far from being a retreat of governance or government, or a lesser concern with the conduct of conduct, liberalism can be viewed as bringing attention to the intellectual and practical techniques of
deregulation, through which civil society is brought forth, managed and aligned with political aspirations.

It is interesting to note however, that as one witnesses the deregulation of social and economic processes within liberalism, one also observes the application of economic processes to the social domain. Consequently, this application can be seen as an attempt to organize society around market principles and to instill a market mechanism within society, proposing that society is to be formed around the model of enterprise, and the application of the economic to non-economic processes (Foucault 2008). As a result of this organization, subjects within liberalism are thought of as *homo oeconomicus* or *economic man*; that is to say, a self-interested and industrious actor who has the ability to make judgments toward a subjectively defined ends (Foucault 2008). *Homo oeconomicus* is therefore, a new element of governmental reason of the eighteenth century which signified a turn to the population in which the human species became the object of political strategy, or a general strategy of power (Foucault 2008). Henceforth, it appears that political reason deals with the question of how to manage the population and institutions which work within that population in which *homo oeconomicus* comes to be defined as an individual who inhabits the economic space of sovereignty known as civil society within liberal rule.

There are many concepts in Foucault’s (2007, 2008) work on governmentality that have been examined in ensuing analyses on the topic and in many critiques of his works. These concepts include freedom and civil society. Throughout subsequent governmentality analyses, these concepts are often identified as areas which require clarification or extension in order to adequately comprehend the way in which they were utilized or neglected by Foucault. These concepts will be further articulated below while investigating governmentality as a school of critical thought, and with reference to the authoritarian and paternalistic nature of liberalism and
the governmentalities which shaped the liberal and colonial rule of Indigenous populations within Canada.
Chapter 5
The Rise of Governmentality as a School of Thought

Based on his examination of rule understood not simply as what actually took place but how governing was thought into being, Foucault’s (2007, 2008) genealogy can be viewed as an attempt to negate normative accounts of rule which focus on universalistic and state-centered analyses. The refusal of normative accounts of rule was perceived as a unique analytical tool for understanding rule which sought to examine the mentalities which lay “behind” particular forms of governing. Thus, Foucault’s approach to revealing such mentalities rejected, as Rose, O’Malley and Valverde (2006) purport, earlier theories of the state such as Marxism which argued that class and power relations held the key to understanding state institutions and forms of governance. The discounting of state theories contributed to the swift dispersal of this approach and the popularization of the analytical perspective of governmentality in the English-speaking world (Rose et al. 2006). Ultimately, Rose et al. (2006) suggest that its popularity stemmed from the originality of its perception of political power which proved useful in analyses of liberal arts of governing which could not be adequately explained by state theories that concentrated on understanding rule by examining the concentration of power within the state. Thus, Foucault’s analytical perspective argued that rule appeared to be composed of numerous components and exercised from a multitude of sites, encouraging the consideration of political power as stemming from various authorities in which top-down control is dismissed in favor of an analysis which locates power within various subjects, institutions and technologies (Rose et al. 2006).

The popularity of the analytical framework of governmentality was additionally drawn from its ability to examine and understand the concept of freedom in relation to the constitution of governable subjects in liberal contexts of rule as the strategy of encouraging self-responsibility,
autonomy and freedom in liberal regimes was understood as a technology of rule which allowed for the cultivation of individual agency instead of its suppression (Rose et al. 2006). This methodology ultimately aids in explaining the strategy of self-responsibility and autonomy in liberal philosophies of rule which provides an explanatory framework for the governance of liberal societies through the populations’ freedom. This explanatory framework has since been analyzed in subsequent works (for example Dean 2002; Hindess 1998, 2005) which attempt to articulate the practical implications of liberal rule as well as provide a more detailed account of the authoritarian and paternalistic nature of liberalism which it is contended Foucault and others have neglected.

Interpretations of governmentality typically sustain the core elements and concepts that Foucault (2007, 2008) utilized in understanding rule, such as his use of a genealogical method, the negation of universal theories, his focus on understanding rule as emanating from a variety of sources, the suggestion that power does not solely concentrate itself within the state, and most notably, the contention that politics should be understood as a mentality, sensibility and technique of rule which is translated into technologies that are rendered capable of governing an individual’s behavior. Following the above mentioned description of governmentality, Gordon (1991) purports that in the general sense, Foucault understood governmentality as the conduct of conduct and was interested in understanding the mentalities which formed certain arts of governing, in addition to the ways in which these mentalities were transformed into technologies of rule which become practicable. Similarly, Weir et al. (1997) note that two streams of examination can be identified within the governmentality literature. The first area of examination is concerned with the ways in which programmes of government are formulated and articulated within broad discourses of rule and the other examines how technologies are employed by both state and non-state actors to put these rationalities into effect. Such emphasis has proven useful
in suggesting that rule is not a monopoly practice of state, but is instead derived from an assemblage of technologies and forces that are used to direct conduct (Weir et al. 1997). Therefore, according to Weir et al.’s (1997) interpretation, a governmental analysis first seeks to uncover the mentalities that exist within various arts of governing and secondly how these mentalities are translated into institutions, programmes and agendas which seek to guide an individual’s conduct and align it with the objectives of the state.

Consequently, Moss (1998) contends that governmental analyses can be undertaken to understand the ways in which power, located in various agencies and actors, guides the conduct of individuals and which often focuses on the management and indirect rule of populations. Thus, governmentality can be viewed as being comprised of rationalities, institutions, calculations and tactics that make rule practicable (Rose et al. 2006). Although the governmentality literature does concede that politics should be understood primarily as a mentality of rule, controversy appears to exist over such areas as Foucault’s usage of the term political, the completeness of his genealogy and the role of technologies of the self within rule (Gordon 1991). Much of the subsequent governmentality literature attempts to clarify the meanings Foucault gave to concepts like the political and attempts to illustrate the importance of technologies of the self within rule in general, but more specifically within liberal governance.

Foucault’s negation of the normative doctrine of rule also brought with it an attempt to dismiss the normative usage of terms that are often connected to an analysis of such rule. His use of the term political can be viewed as one such attempt; however, in so doing, contention over his exact employment and interpretation of the term appears, leading some such as Hindess (1997, 2005) to attempt to clarify the concept by highlighting the various ways in which Foucault employed the term, while expanding on his usage. Hindess (1997) notes that no singular or concrete definition of the political exists; however, conventional definitions typically refer to the
study of the government of the state, with no reference given to outside forces, or more importantly, the rationalities that led to the development of such governments. Within these conventional definitions, Hindess (1997) notes that the state is given an essential priority as a central and universal figure. Hindess (1997) suggests that indeed, in Foucault’s analysis, the state is accorded central priority; however, Foucault does not suggest that the state holds a universal character. Instead, Foucault’s aim is to provide a genealogy which de-centers the state in which he dismisses the suggestion that politics is a totality and monopoly practice of government, and alternatively demonstrates the ways in which rule has become fragmented in the modern period. As a result of Foucault’s dismissal, Hindess (1997) suggests that two divergent usages of the concept of the political can be found within Foucault’s work on governmentality. He notes that the first usage does in fact adhere to the conventional employment of the concept, according the state a central place in Foucault’s examination, and locates the political as pertaining to the operations of state. However, Hindess (1997) further argues that this usage does not entirely correspond to Foucault’s employment of the term as it is ultimately too narrowly focused on the totality of state functions and ignores the role that non-governmental interests and rationalities play within rule. Thus, in Foucault’s work, the transcendence of the traditional usages of the term is realized and the concept is transformed into one which considers the importance of non-governmental action and thought within rule and demonstrates how power is divested in many subjects and institutions instead of solely in the sovereign. Hindess (1997) further suggests that Foucault employs a second and more radical usage of the concept of the political in which emphasis is placed on understanding, in the broad sense, anti-governmental actions and rationalities instead of merely the actions of government that pertain to the state.

Although Foucault has often been praised for introducing a new analytical tool for understanding rule and modifying the usage of concepts such as the political by transcending
conventions accounts, he has also been criticized by some (for example, Gordon 1991; Weir et al. 1997) who suggest that he presented an incomplete genealogy and that his methodology was not fully articulated within his works on governmentality. Consequently, some, such as Dean (2002) and Gordon (1991) have attempted to supplement Foucault’s writing on governmentality and genealogical analyses in general to provide a reference point for governmental analyses. Thus, Foucault is presented as “Nietzschean” in the broad sense as it is cited that he attempted to undertake a history of the present (Gutting 2005). This history of the present, according to Gutting (2005), concerns itself with two phases of analysis; the first places emphasis on uncovering the multiple origins of present rules, norms, practices and institutions that attempt to guide conduct, and the second is the attempt to understand the past through a re-evaluation of the present by examining current conditions in a way which de-centers sovereign and universal concepts. Consequently, Mills (2003) suggests that Foucault transcends the aim of conventional historical analyses which seek to offer an explanatory framework for events in the past, in favor of an examination of the multitude of factors, rationalities, forces and episteme which the present is contingent upon.

As Mills (2003) contends, Foucault was concerned with understanding the different episteme of knowledge that give rise to various rationalities of rule. Similarly, Burchell (1993) claims that a governmental analysis is concerned with understanding different forms of truth or how certain knowledges claim authority and are translated into political rationalities. Thus, governmental analyses seeks to comprehend historically contingent truths and knowledges which shape the arts of governing that emerge in a particular period. Therefore, when one undertakes an analysis of rationalities of rule, one ultimately problematizes the historical conditions of such truths (Burchell 1993). In short, according to Burchell (1993), when one performs an examination of the history of the present, one must introduce new truths in relation to
conventional accounts of rule and question the foundations these truths are built upon. Similarly, such an analysis must illustrate the fragility and varying nature of such truths and disturb standard ways of thinking, drawing attention to differentiated accounts of rule and the subject’s position in relation to such rule (Burchell 1993).

With an emphasis on the historical contingency of truth, Brown (1998) argues that a genealogical analysis is able to transcend conventional and historically conditioned approaches to analyzing philosophies of rule. Therefore, through the concentration on locating alternative or neglected mentalities that shape rule, Brown (1998) notes that a genealogical analysis poses questions that are quite different from those of other historical methodologies. Governmentality thus appears as a methodology that does not seek to examine events that actually occurred, nor is it concerned with analyses of class relations or conventional theories of state that suggest the state is a stagnant and unchanging entity. Consequently, a genealogy of governmentalities seeks to understand the political ontology of a specific time and place and investigates the rationalities of power which have produced particular conditions or philosophies of rule. Ultimately, Brown (1998) notes that a history of the present does not understand rule as predicated upon unitary logics of history and instead exemplifies the multitude of logics that are found within political power. As a result, Brown (1998) suggests that a genealogical investigation does not privilege one truth over another and is able to illustrate the numerous governmental and non-governmental claims to truth that shape modern rule.

Along with the attempt to articulate Foucault’s employment of the concept of the political and demonstrate the ways in which the historical contingency of truth is of key importance in governmentality analyses, Rose et al. (2006) purport that there has been increasing attention accorded to the concept of technologies of the self in governmental analyses, which often focus on the ways in which individuals constitute themselves as governable subjects. Consequently,
Hindess (2005) notes that within Foucault’s works on governmentality one can identify a concern with how individuals constitute themselves as subjects and how the concept of power/knowledge operates within this constitution. Thus, Foucault (cited in Burchell 1993:269) notes that “if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western societies, one has to take account of not only techniques of domination, but also techniques of the self.” Consequently, Hindess (2005) suggests that Foucault’s and subsequent works on governmentality are concerned with analyzing the relationships that exist between social structures, institutions and the individual as well as the effects that institutions have on individuals and in turn, how individuals affirm or resist these effects. Central to the examination of technologies of the self is the investigation of power, as inherent in the suggestion that individuals can constitute themselves as subjects is the presupposition that all individuals possess power. Therefore, instead of presenting power in a negative sense, or as a constraining force, Foucault and subsequent literatures suggest that power is disseminated through all individuals and as a result, allows for analyses which focus on individuals who are seen as possessing agency and are able to play a role in constituting and shaping the relationships that exist between them and larger social structures (Mills 2003). According to this view, power may be manifested in whatever individuals, techniques and programmes that are utilized to guide an individual’s conduct. Consequently government, as Hindess (2005) claims Foucault understood it, leaves the governed to regulate their own behavior and constitute themselves as subjects of rule. Thus, Foucault viewed power as working through people rather than on them, causing him to determine that power comes from a multitude of sources. However, it is important to delineate that in some instances, force, as defined as the securing of compliance by means of physical and psychosocial manipulation and rational persuasion, is apparent in instances of Indigenous rule in which little room is left for the exercise of power or resistance.
Garland (1997) confirms the contention that Foucault’s work on governmentality and ultimately liberalism reveals rationalities that aim to guide an individual’s conduct and which allow them to constitute themselves as subjects. Following the ideology that power does allow for the agency of the individual, Garland (1997) contends that individuals are viewed as having the capacity to make choices regarding their actions and can accept or reject attempts to shape their conduct by those who rule. Consequently, governing is not viewed as an entirely oppressive instrument and does not suppress the interests of the individual but attempts to act on their interests and align these interests with state objectives. Therefore, Burchell (1993) suggests that government can be viewed as a point in which technologies of the self and technologies of coercion interact. This conception of power and technologies of the self has been taken up in subsequent analyses of liberalism where the agency of the individual and the capacity to constitute oneself as a subject is correlated to the rationalities of liberty and freedom. These analyses suggests that, instead of denying the liberty and agency of individuals, liberty or freedom is employed as a technology of rule aimed at constituting subjects who can be governed through their own self-regulation and as Gleadle et al. (2008:331) suggest, by means of the managerial “ascesis of performance.”
Chapter 6

Liberalism

In subsequent governmentality literature on the topic of liberalism, two lines of investigation can be identified. The first line of investigation accentuates the importance of political economic practice within liberal philosophies of rule, while the other examines civil society in which the emphasis on political economy is often dropped in favor of comprehending the role of freedom within the liberal art of governing. Within these analyses, political economy refers to the way in which economic, social and political factors affect each other and how they impact the regulation of activities in various social settings. Although these interpretations of liberalism tend to favor one line of investigation over another, downplaying their interconnectedness, important characteristics can be identified which suggest that liberalism must be understood by means of an examination of political economy, civil society and freedom’s interconnectedness in addition to identifying their associations with the concepts of deregulation, autonomy and agency. By doing so, Hindess (2005) contends that one can uncover a rationality that ultimately problematizes and critiques the role of the state and its ability to rule through authoritarian techniques. Consequently, liberalism is seen as being concerned with the extent to which the state and governmental agencies intervene and impose themselves on the population and one frequently finds the contention that the liberal philosophy of rule concerned itself with divesting its regulatory obligations, thereby addressing and resolving the claim that the state may be governing too heavily. Therefore, as Gordon (1991) suggests, liberalism is presented as a form of rule in which society and economy are to be governed with respect to their natural laws and processes.
Apart from the emphasis on state limitation, the role of political economic practice in the emergence of liberalism is often highlighted in subsequent literatures with attention given to the importance of the market in constituting individuals as subjects and the identification of the economy as a problem space of sovereignty. Burchell (1993) notes that Foucault described liberalism as emerging in relation to and alongside the problem of how free market processes could be reconciled with the exercise of political sovereignty. Ultimately, he notes that Foucault sought to understand the reciprocal relationships among economic, social and political factors and contends that in liberalism one sees the rise of skepticism regarding the sovereign’s ability to adequately understand and know the intricacies of the population (Burchell 1993). This skepticism, coupled with the rationality that society and economy possess their own natural laws and processes, provides a critique of state rule and suggests that it may be beneficial for the state to govern a territory through indirect interference. It is important to note however, that indirect interference, or freedom as it is often referred to, is primarily applied to actions which contribute to securing free market exchange. Thus, Gordon (1991) notes that Adam Smith’s concept of the Invisible Hand provides a good example of the rationality that laid “beneath” the need for free market exchange as the neologism represents the ideology that the market should be left to regulate itself with only minimal interference from government or any other governing body.

Based on this interpretation of liberalism, Burchell (1993) contends that the rationality of laissez-faire is of central importance in analyzing liberalism’s connection to political economy. Here, laissez-faire is understood as a philosophy that emphasizes the need to allow market processes to do as they will without direct interference and highlights the importance of the individual’s capacity for choice and self-direction. Thus, subjects within forms of laissez-faire governing are viewed as subjects of interest who are able to calculate their actions without the direct interference of those who rule. Rose (1993) notes that central to this strategy of governing
is the concept of freedom, as it was suggested that it may be counterproductive for the state to exert direct control over the lives and interests of the population. The term governing through freedom is subsequently used to characterize philosophies of rule, such as liberalism, which sought to minimize or eliminate government intervention in all aspects of social life. Burchell (1993) consequently contends that within liberalism the state sought to govern as far as possible through the promotion of certain forms of free activity and suggests that a contractual relationship appears to have existed between the state and the population insofar as members of the population, in order to acquire liberty and autonomy, were required to account for their own lives and to act “responsibly,” “dutifully” and maximize one’s life “as a sort of enterprise” (Rose et al. 2006). It should be noted however, that although the aforementioned rationality sought to minimize or eliminate state interference, Foucault (2007, 2008) noted that instead of witnessing the abdication of government, one sees the transformation of various forms of governance into ones which involve facilitating and securing free operations of market and transactional processes, which, in some cases, are applied to market actors.

The notion of freedom has been taken up in various literatures (for example, Dean 2002; Gordon 1991; Hindess 2001) which seek to understand the concept as a technology employed in the context of civil society. Analyses of civil society subsequently tend to focus on the ways in which authoritarian and paternalistic rule continued to exist within liberalism and on the characteristics of civil man. As Rose (1993) suggests, civil man was to “maximize his life as a sort of enterprise” and was consequently required to be productive and industrious and see to it that he was not idle. It is interesting to note however, that this reference to the economic characteristics of civil man is often the only tie binding political economic practice and civil society within a vast majority of the governmentality literature. Ultimately, what is taken from the literature is the claim that within liberal rule, individuals were to constitute themselves as
subjects who possessed the ability to be governed by means of their freedom within civil society through the adoption of the characteristics of *homo oeconomicus* such as enterprise, self-responsibility, discipline, obedience and productivity. Consequently, the view is often taken within such literature that if individuals were to adopt the abovementioned characteristics, they would ultimately gain a substantive increase in relative autonomy and could be governed through their free interactions.

Although the abovementioned is the view of civil society and civil man taken up in latter governmentality analyses in relations to liberalism, it does not entirely adhere to Foucault’s (2007, 2008) description of the concept of freedom. In Foucault’s (2007, 2008) works on governmentality, there is no mention of the phrase *governing through freedom* which appears in later governmentality analyses. Thus, one is often left to question what Foucault’s conception of freedom was in the liberal context. Foucault (2008) notes that in his discussions of freedom, he is not necessarily speaking of freedom as manifested in individual rights, but instead speaks of freedom in relation to market processes, for he contends that the limitation of governmental power is given not through respect for the freedom of the individual, but through the freedom of the economy through which individuals are able to obtain freedom and autonomy in relation to economic processes. Consequently, Foucault (2008) suggests that when he speaks of liberalism, he is not claiming that there was a complete shift from an authoritarian government to one which was more tolerant, and similarly, liberalism did not bring with it a quantitative increase in freedom, suggesting that freedom is not a universal which was gradually realized. Therefore, Foucault (2008) contends that he believed that liberalism was not concerned with guaranteeing freedom, but that it is a consumer of freedom as freedom is required to make programmes of liberal rule function correctly and at a distance. Therefore, liberalism appears as a manager of freedom in respect to economic processes. Additionally, freedom is presented as a correlative of
the deployment of the apparatus of security, as security cannot functionally operate without allowing some degree of freedom. Within liberalism therefore, one sees that subjects were obliged to be free and were required to conduct themselves and their enterprises on the foundation of freedom. With this conception of freedom however, Foucault neglects to display the counter rationalities which continued to directly guide individuals’ actions and instead simply suggests that liberalism is a consumer of freedom and therefore leaves a gap in the literature and his genealogy of the modern art of governing. Thus, Foucault neglects to demonstrate that liberalism was in fact only concerned with guaranteeing freedom to certain segments of the population, leaving the concept of liberalism, and its association with freedom, open to numerous interpretations.

Just as the view of freedom has been altered and built upon from Foucault’s (2007, 2008) original presentation of the concept, subsequent literature often neglects to demonstrate political economy and civil society’s interconnectedness. Foucault (2008) presents a quite different version of civil society (based on his interpretation of Adam Ferguson’s text A History of Civil Society), than that of those literatures produced by the school of governmentality, which does not focus on the characteristics of man, but instead a society organized around economic principles. Foucault (2007, 2008) notes that civil society was born out of an attempt to answer the question of how to govern a former space of sovereignty which came to be inhabited by economic subjects and which is subsequently referred to as the economy. In this respect, opposed to acting directly on the behavior of individuals, the state attempted to govern by affecting the populations’ conduct indirectly through influencing the manner in which they regulate their own actions. Foucault (2008) contends that with the rejection of the political sovereign, the rationality was brought forth that governors must not interfere with the interests of the population and that it was impossible for the sovereign to know the economic and thus, the social in its entirety. Consequently, the
rationalities that lay “behind” political economy suggested that the sovereign could not possibly know, and thus govern, all of society as an absolute entity and it became necessary to employ a technology of rule in which economic actors could inhabit a place of former political sovereignty; it is this space of former political sovereignty that would become known as civil society.

Subsequently, Foucault (2007:296) notes that “civil society is a concept of governmental technology, or rather, it is the correlative of a technology of government, the rational measure which must be juridically pegged to an economy understood as a process of production and exchange. The problem of civil society is the juridical structure of governmentality pegged to the economic structure.” Ultimately within Foucault’s (2007, 2008) analyses, there is no mention of civil man’s characteristics, except to say that he is an economic and enterprising individual and that he is the subject of the rationality of political economy.

Building on Foucault’s (2007, 2008) account of civil society and his interpretation of Adam Ferguson’s text, Gordon (1991) argues that civil society consists of groups of individuals who possess an ability to organize themselves with like others based on commonly held values in regard to such concepts as manner, education and labor. Foucault (2008:301) confirms that what links individuals together in civil society is not only their ability to organize themselves, and their sentiments and sympathies, but also their benevolence and loathing of others and the “pleasure taken in the misfortune of others whom one will break.” Thus, civil society, as Foucault (2008:302) notes, “leads the individual to enlist on the side of one tribe or community.” Consequently, within civil society differences between groups and between individuals may become accentuated as they organize themselves based on like mentalities and sensibilities.

Even with the articulation that various forms of difference and division between individuals may become accentuated within civil society, Foucault however neglects to demonstrate the practical application or consequences of such division, which has led to the
criticism that he presents a far too utopian and incomplete genealogy of liberalism. Thus, some (for example, Dean 2002; Hindess 2005) suggest that the development of the notion of governing through freedom or at a distance developed from interpretations of Foucault’s genealogy of the modern state is too restricted as it neglects to present rationalities which suggest that liberalism, far from being a producer or provider of freedom, often retained an authoritarian and paternalistic nature (Hindess 2005). Expanding on this negation, Hindess (2005) suggests that opposed to granting freedom to all subjects in general, liberalism was simply committed to promoting particular forms of freedom to certain sectors of the population. Dean (2002) similarly claims that governing at a distance did not necessarily entail governing through freedom or even in a manner which respected individual liberty and confirms that, within liberalism, liberties may be overridden to maximize benefits to the population or state. Consequently, although there may exist certain cases in which subjects can be governed through suitable forms of free activity, there are many other instances in which direct regulation by the state is practiced (Hindess 2005). Hindess (2005) therefore suggests that in practice, authoritarianism and paternalism continued to exist in the liberal rationality of governing through freedom. Thus, rather than characterizing liberalism as committed to governing through the free interactions of individuals, Hindess (2005) claims that it would be more appropriate to suggest that liberalism was committed to utilizing freedom as a technology of rule only when subjects were able to cultivate suitable habits of self-regulation. It is in agreement with this claim that Dean (2002:38) suggests that authoritarianism continued to exist within liberal rationalities of rule, especially in the attempt to govern those who were seen as lacking appropriate forms of self-regulation and that in fact “liberty and domination are joined in liberal thought like two sides of a single coin: the value of one may appear on the face, but the figure of the other is stamped on the reverse.” Consequently, Dean (2002) notes that
liberalism can be viewed as a form of rule concerned with various forms of “unfreedom” as much as it is with freedom.

Although there exists a lack of empirical evidence, in the form of specific case examples, in Hindess’ (2005) and Dean’s (2002) works on the relationship between liberalism, authoritarianism and paternalism, they contend that liberal rule often concerned itself with paternalistic and authoritarian governance over specific groups, especially over those inhabitants of colonial territories such as present-day Canada. Dean (2002) claims that surely, if liberalism was built upon on the rationality of governing through freedom, liberty should be accorded to all members of the population instead of being selectively applied. Hindess (2005) similarly suggests that while the rationality emerged within liberalism that subjects could be governed through free activity, so too did the mentality that all those who did not possess suitable forms of self-regulation and discipline must be controlled by governmental programmes as they lacked the attributes necessary to be governed at a distance, and therefore, could not constitute themselves in relation to governmental goals. In his works, Hindess (2005) confirms that, within liberalism, not all members of certain populations were automatically granted freedom and such granting was instead predicated upon their ability to become ‘civilized’ members of the specified society. Hindess (2005) therefore claims that when investigating the topic of freedom, one finds contentions that freedom, self-directing behavior and self-regulation were characteristics of both individuals within civil society and the populations themselves which employed this technology of rule. Consequently, the capacity to be governed through freedom and without direct interference of the state was seen as most fully developed among ‘civilized’ members of predominantly Western societies, and less developed elsewhere, most notably in societies that were ruled through imperial and colonial rationalities. The above claim leads one to believe that colonial inhabitants were often viewed as inferior by populations who employed governing
through freedom as a technology of rule due to their perceived incivility. Dean (2002) further suggests that the rationality of inferiority ultimately led to instances in which supposedly uncivilized members of certain populations found their actions to be severely constrained through various governmental technologies and programmes.

Hindess (2001) confirms that the mentality of inferiority coupled with the rationality that the state may benefit more by governing less, resulted in the employment of programmes undertaken within those states that employed liberal and colonial forms of rule aimed at the civilizing of supposedly inferior individuals. Thus, Hindess (2001) contends that within such historical periods and tied to the rationalities of liberalism, one witnesses the assimilation, and in an American context, the extermination of Indigenous populations of imperial colonies. Similarly, he notes that the rationality existed that extended periods of education were needed to teach inferior populations the characteristics which the civil man must possess (Hindess 2001). As a result of these rationalities, Indigenous populations were constituted as subjects in need of improvement and development, instead of self-governing, directing and calculating individuals so as to include them within the governable populations of liberalism.
Chapter 7

Indigenous Governance

Closely associated with the programme of the civilizing of Indigenous peoples, are the rationalities which lay “behind” technologies of colonial rule. In a broad sense, colonial power can be characterized as an attempt to secure direct political control over a society and its inhabitants which is often coupled with an attempt to keep the subordinated population in a position of social and legal inferiority. Based on this characterization, projects of colonialism can be seen to have been utilized as technologies of liberal rule that intended to strengthen the state and its population by appropriating and cultivating subjects capable of self-directing, enterprising and calculated conduct who could transfer these characteristics into the marketplace, thus increasing production, trade and wealth (Blake 1999). Therefore, in order to understand the role of authoritarian and paternalistic governance over Indigenous populations within liberal rule, one has to consider the project of colonialism as driven by liberal rationalities.

Scott (1995) notes that throughout the past decades, analyses of colonialism have greatly increased; however, he claims that a vast number of these investigations have been seriously flawed as they often centre on a normative understanding of colonial rule, emphasizing a dichotomous discourse of exclusionary practices while neglecting to comprehend the rationalities which form such discourse. While analyses of these kinds have been fertile in exemplifying the contradictions inherent within the concept of governing through freedom, Scott (1995) claims that such analyses rarely move past dichotomous and binary logics and neglect to exemplify how programmes, tactics and institutions which attempt to guide conduct were thought into being. This claim leads Blake (1999) to contend that analyses of colonial projects too often rely on understanding rule in terms of its relationship to macro-level theories like Marxism or State
Theory which neglect to demonstrate the intricacies of micro-level power relations and which suggest that power is concentrated in the state. Consequently, Scott (1995) suggests that in place of such analyses, examinations of colonial and liberal rule which utilize the governmentality methodology should be undertaken to display the political rationalities which shaped colonial programmes of rule as well as the historically constituted configurations of *power/knowledge* that such projects were imbued with. Scott (1995) thus notes that in order to comprehend colonial programmes of rule, one must understand the character of the political rationalities that sought to guide the conduct of individuals which can be shown to be closely related and often built upon the rationalities of liberalism. It is suggested that what is important to exemplify in an analysis of colonial governmentalities is not simply whether technologies associated with such rule segmented or divided Indigenous populations, but instead, identifying colonial power’s point of application, the target upon which it sought to work and the domains it sought to arrange, transform and control. Such an analysis would seek to understand what colonial power sought to organize or transform, the target through which it would achieve its ends and how it would employ the target in order to do so. By undertaking such an analysis, Scott (1995) and Blake (1999) claim that one can avoid the dichotomous and binary discourses that plague much of the colonial and liberal literature and ultimately discover that colonial power was not predicated upon a singular and harmonious rationality, but instead incorporated various sensibilities and mentalities aimed at exerting control over Indigenous populations in which rationalities of economy and civil society played distinct roles.

Based on the claim that colonial power was not predicated upon a unitary rationality, Blake (1999) and Scott (1995) contend that when undertaking a governmentality of colonialism, it is important to move beyond the commonly found ideology of Europe’s totalizing influence and its presentation as a universal subject which shaped all liberal and colonial rule and its associated
programmes. By doing so, Scott (1995) argues that it is possible to de-center and problematize official discourses of rule which are often based on a search for unitary origins and which concentrate solely on the practices of the state. By rearticulating the rejection of unitary origins and avoiding the employment of universal subjects, Scott (1995) and Blake (1999) reaffirm the principles Foucault followed in his genealogy of the modern state as he too took on a critical investigation that did not accept the eventualisation of concepts found within traditional historical analyses (Smart 2002). Like Foucault’s genealogy, Scott (1995) and Blake (1999) appear to suggest that one should think of colonial power as assemblages of technologies that form rule instead of concentrating upon a singular discourse. Consequently, this method reveals that “beneath” the conception of universal or holistic subjects, exist multiple and dichotomous rationalities which allow for the investigation of an episteme of a given period and which ultimately considers rationalities that may exist outside the state.

In addition to reaffirming the rejection of an analysis based on the utilization of universal subjects, thereby allowing for an analysis that investigates the mentalities and sensibilities of non-state actors, Scott (1995) suggests that in order to comprehend the project of colonialism, one has to examine the rationalities of liberalism and their interconnectedness with authoritarian and paternalistic forms of power which may be translated into programmes of force. Consequently, Scott (1995), like Hindess (2001) attempts to clarify what he interprets as the main claims of liberal rule. He suggests that liberalism, and modern power, is ultimately committed to disabling outdated forms of power and is subsequently concerned with putting in its place a power that takes the population as its target and attempts to govern the conduct of the population through indirect means. More specifically, Scott (1995) contends that liberalism sought to rearrange power so as to oblige subjects to transform themselves, most often toward the goal of improvement. Thus, he notes that individuals were constrained and obliged, within liberalism
and colonialism, to act in ways which ultimately led the individual to become obedient, disciplined and ‘civilized’ (Scott 1995). As individuals were constrained in ways aimed at cultivating in them technologies of the self that would lead to the creation of a calculating and enterprising subject, Scott (1995) notes that the rationality of governing through freedom and the belief that the liberal state called into question the basis of its authority is in fact a “story book account” of liberalism. Indeed, this claim relates to Dean’s (2002) contention that certain segments of the population were often prevented from obtaining freedom unless they were able to cultivate suitable habits of self-regulation. Consequently, Scott (1995) suggests that contradictory rationalities are often apparent within liberal rule but tend to be left out of ever-present normative analyses. Thus, he contends that it may be beneficial to examine alternative rationalities of rule to exemplify Foucault’s (2007) contention that “behind” all perceived unitary rationalities lay discontinuities and contradictions (Scott 1995). It is with this claim in mind that Scott (1995) provides a concrete example of such contradictions in order to provide a critique of the commonly accepted view of liberalism which demonstrates that internal discontinuities exist within Foucault’s (2007, 2008) account of liberal rule, suggesting that he failed to recognize that liberalism is often paternalistic, authoritarian and coercive.

Although Scott (1995) contends that Foucault recognized the importance of alternative or resistant rationalities within rule, he claims that Foucault often neglected to consider them within his account of liberalism. To exemplify the authoritarian rationalities that exist within and compete against liberal mentalities of freedom and autonomy, Scott (1995) turns to Hobbes as an example. Scott (1995) claims that Hobbes distinctly rationalized that equality and pluralism, rather than being conditions which require freedom from state, are instead conditions which necessitate the existence of an absolute and authoritarian government. The proposed rationality for this claim is that if individuals who possess contradictory rationalities were left to their own
devices, discord within the population would ultimately emerge. Thus, Hobbes contended that a pacifying reason of state must be established and maintained to ensure harmony within society. Du Gay (2002) suggests that if one were to adhere to this rationality and deposit it into technologies of rule, one would inevitably witness the introduction of artificial chains designed to constrain the population in order to prevent discord. Thus, it may be suggested that although Foucault’s liberalism is presented as one which undermines and calls into question such authority, contradictory rationalities exist which call for intrusive measures that are often translated into technologies of rule, especially within colonial programmes. Therefore, Du Gay (2002) notes that authoritarian rule is not eliminated within liberalism, but instead, contradictions exist with regard to the commonly accepted doctrine that such rule was committed to liberty, autonomy and equality.

O’Connell (2009) notes that indeed, Foucault and others’ genealogical account of liberalism is far too restricted in that it does not present contradictory rationalities which document and provide for the nullification of the concept of governing through freedom, and suggests that the case of the Aboriginal peoples throughout the British colonies, including present-day Canada, can be used as an example to do so. O’Connell (2009) observes that colonial power’s point of application and the target upon which it sought to act was often the Indigenous populations of colonial states. Consequently, technologies of power and programmes of rule designed to arrange, transform, control and regulate the perceived uncivil conduct of such peoples were enacted and employed in an attempt to guide their actions, which O’Connell (2009) notes were often infused and predicated upon rationalities of racial categorizing, hierarchical ordering and otherness in which the mentality existed that different populations often exhibit natural degrees of civilization. It was these mentalities of difference that, as O’Connell (2009) suggests, led to the instruction, administration and often authoritarian rule of such peoples, including the
enactment of instances of direct force. O’Connell (2009) claims that the rationalities of hierarchical and racial ordering, often accompanied by notions of inferiority, became the basis for European and Euro-Canadian peoples’ relations with Aboriginal populations throughout the colonies and which legitimized their governing. Belmessous (2005) notes that indeed, by the nineteenth century at the height of classical liberalism, it had been concluded pseudo-scientifically that differences between groups of people were a result of their inherent nature. However, Belmessous (2005) contends that the mentality also arose that the character of individuals in such groups, although innate, was malleable and that with the guidance of those who inhabited the top positions of the hierarchical ladder, could be improved and ‘civilized.’

It is important to note that the social ordering which dominated much of Western thought placed white Europeans in a privileged position at the top of the hierarchical ladder, who were consequently cited as displaying the favorable characteristics of enlightened knowledge, Christian religion and industriousness. The Aboriginal peoples, who were viewed as opposite to that of the white European race, were therefore positioned at the bottom of the ladder by paternalistic and Ethno/Euro-centric ideologies that pictured Native inhabitants of the colonies as barbarous, lacking in civility, intelligence, religion and social organization (Franks 2002). Thus, hierarchical ordering, based on European standards and definitions of civility, labeled and envisioned Indigenous populations as children who were to be guided toward civilization (Franks 2002). Consequently, the Aboriginal population was perceived as requiring education and reform in order to constitute themselves as self-directing, responsible and industrious individuals who would be able to enjoy the benefits of civilized life. Indeed, this hierarchical and racial ordering was often used as a tangible tool for displaying European superiority and Aboriginal inferiority. For example, Miller (2003) notes that missionaries often employed a pictographic ladder to display the path to good and evil within Residential and Industrial Schools. Lacombe’s Ladder
displayed the individual’s journey to either heaven or hell, with those positioned at the top of the ladder, at the side of Jesus, being solely white Europeans. Consequently, those displayed on the path to hell were dark skinned populations such as Aboriginals. Thus, the ladder displayed not only the superiority of the white European race but the inferiority of the Aboriginal peoples as well as the condemnation of their religious beliefs. Consequently, the Aboriginal way of life was depicted as othered, distinctly different and inferior to that of the white European population.

As a result of the othering of Indigenous populations based on rationalities of hierarchical and racial categorizing, Franks (2002) notes that the concept of savage was developed and employed to describe and label those that supposedly existed below the Europeans at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder. Consequently, Aboriginal populations throughout the colonies were considered as such and a single category of savage to which all Indigenous populations belonged regardless of cultural variances, religious beliefs or stage of development was created (Franks 2002). Membership in this category henceforth automatically characterized the individual or population as exhibiting bestiality, cruelty and immorality, but above all, the “Indian came to be understood as one who had not and somehow could not progress into the civilized [and] who would inevitably be destroyed by the civilized” (Franks 2002:562). As a result of this labeling, Europeans in their missions to present-day Canada often held a ready-made image of Indigenous populations as savage in its normative meaning, sinful, requiring domestication, and in need of the guidance and education of those at the top of the hierarchical ladder. Consequently, as it was the white Europeans who inhabited the top positions of the hierarchical ladder, it was thus the duty of this supposedly superior race to ‘civilize’ the perceived moral-less and religious-less inferior populations in an attempt to improve their condition (Franks 2002). It was therefore perceived that enlightened Europeans and Euro-Canadians held a civic obligation to elevate the Indigenous populations from their position in the hierarchical ladder and relieve them of their
supposed “idleness and helplessness” so as to reconstitute them as industrious and self-governing civil men (Franks 2002). Thus, as European, and more specifically British colonies expanded, it became an increasing goal of the European population to improve the condition of the Indigenous peoples in order to reformulate or transform them into, as Franks (2002) explains, useful members of the emerging Euro-Canadian society.

As a consequence of the mentalities of hierarchical ordering and goals of improvement, O’Connell (2009:173) notes that “race became the organizing grammar of imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the measure of man were formed.” Thus, by the height of classical liberalism in the nineteenth century, the civilizing mission which targeted Aboriginal populations was well underway. The transformation of the supposedly uncivil Aboriginal population by Europeans was often predicated on the belief that Aboriginal peoples displayed a lack of regulation and poor social organization and that they should be placed under the guardianship of the state until suitable forms of self-regulation and order could be cultivated in them (Milloy 1999). Indeed, the enactment of the Indian Act of 1876 exemplifies the rationality that the Aboriginal peoples were incapable of managing their own affairs. Through the constitution of the Indian Act, it became the responsibility of the state to take control of the Native population as their guardians, in order to guide their behavior towards the goal of enfranchisement and assimilation which was to be achieved through the implementation of numerous programmes of rule which attempted to reform the character of Indigenous peoples. These programmes of rule were ultimately concerned with ensuring that the Indigenous population would become civilized members of society and resemble as closely as possible the character and values of the dominant Euro-Canadian population (Milloy 1999). Consequently, from the century up to and culminating in the Indian Act, all those Indigenous peoples or populations whom it was thought could achieve civilization, and the state’s goal of assimilation,
were to receive ameliorative attention in an attempt to not only civilize them, but also align their behaviors with state rationalities which were often shaped by economic precepts of industry and philosophies of management in general (Milloy 1999). However, beginning in the century preceding the Indian Act, the Canadian state had grown increasingly pessimistic regarding the Indigenous populations’ ability to achieve civilization and the state’s articulated goal of self-sufficiency. The very act of putting the Indigenous peoples under the guardianship of the state officiated the disappointment state and non-state actors, such as missionaries, held regarding the civilizing mission up to that moment in history and signified that the previous goal of Aboriginal self-government was an impossibility. Thus, the goal of self-sufficiency became officially abandoned as it had been noted in the decades leading up to the implementation of the Indian Act that Indigenous peoples who had received education from the state and missionaries, aimed at cultivating characteristics which would allow self-sufficiency, had failed to become infected with the precepts of civil life (Milloy 1999). Subsequently, it was believed that the Aboriginal peoples would continue to show only limited progress if the goals, programmes and technologies used to achieve assimilation and civilization were to remain the same.

Due to the pessimism regarding the Aboriginal peoples’ ability to achieve civilization throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the target upon which the state and others wished to act upon gradually became altered from its original point of application. Instead of acting upon and targeting programmes of civilization at adult members of Indigenous populations whose, as it was progressively thought, characters had already been developed, the mentality arose that programmes of reform should act upon the children of such populations, as their character was malleable and could be altered more readily (Milloy 1999). Consequently, through the education of the young, the state and church would employ technologies of rule such as boarding schools aimed at eradicating uncivil and un-Euro-Canadian behavior and which
implemented strict programmes of reform such as the *Planting Out Model*, whose supporters rationalized that Indigenous children should and must be removed from their families, at an age before character was formed, in order to divorce them of Native influence and strip them of all association with Indigenous cultures (Milloy 1999).

Through the implementation of such technologies, which would later become known as Residential and Industrial Schools, Aboriginal children would come under the direct control of the civilized white population, which in combination with the education provided to them centering on the tenets of civilized and economic life, would bring about the complete dissolution of Indigenous culture (Milloy 1999). Through the education of the young, the favorable attributes of civil man would be taught to Aboriginal children which would allow for their eventual assimilation into Euro-Canadian society, upon which they could be governed through forms of free activity as self-responsible, directing and industrious citizens. Indeed, these programmes of reform aimed at reconstituting Indigenous peoples as members of Euro-Canadian society corresponds to Foucault’s (2007) concept of *bio-power* or *bio-politics*. Foucault (2007) noted that the concept of *bio-power* was defined as the position in time when the biological features of the human species became the object of political power through which the individual became the object of rule. Thus, closely associated with the concept of *bio-power*, the state took Indigenous peoples as their target and sought to cultivate individuals by breaking them into their respective parts to reconstitute them as civilized subjects who, in this instance, “had to be reduced to civil life and made able to fulfill all the duties of an honest life, even one according to the condition into which God gave him at birth” (Cited in Belmessous 2005:330).
Chapter 8

Missionary Rationalities

As previously stated, technologies of rule which sought to reform Aboriginal populations such as Residential and Industrial Schools were often shaped by both state and non-state actors. Thus, closely associated with the civilizing mission of Indigenous peoples were the activities of various missionary groups whom the state frequently employed to carry-out civilizing efforts. In this employment, the state often demonstrated a key characteristic of liberalism by divesting its regulatory obligations to non-state actors in the enactment of technologies such as Residential and Industrial Schools, in which such groups were made primarily responsible for the functioning of the institutions and programmes aimed at civilization used within them. Just as the citizens of the white Euro-Canadian state held a civic obligation to aid in civilizing and improving the condition of the Native peoples, as Grant (1984) explains, so too did the missionaries who coupled their civilizing mission with the aim of converting Aboriginal peoples to Christianity, as it was progressively thought that civilization was predicated upon the adoption of Christian religion. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, missionary groups had been in present-day Canada for nearly two-hundred years in an attempt to Christianize and civilize the Aboriginal populations which was seen as a principle priority in the New World (Grant 1984).

Consequently, Grant (1984:86) notes that the Christianizing and civilizing mission “was so greatly ingrained in the minds of the missionaries that they could not begin their work without any other expectation” than to guide the Aboriginal populations voluntarily to salvation and civilized life. In order to guide Indigenous peoples to salvation and civilization, throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, missionaries erected day schools for the education of Aboriginal peoples which focused on teaching the tenets of religion, independence
and self-sufficiency. However, as state goals regarding the Indigenous peoples’ ability to achieve self-government and civility became altered in the century leading up to the enactment of the Indian Act, so too did those of the missionaries. In order to aid Indigenous populations in achieving the state’s refined goal of assimilation, missionaries no longer saw the adoption of Christianity and civilized life as voluntary (Grant 1984). Thus, instead of seeking to aid Indigenous peoples in adjusting as voluntarily as possible to life in the New World, missionaries increasingly attempted to impose Western values on such populations through church defined programmes of rule which were carried out within Residential and Industrial Schools (Grant 1984). Therefore, previous policies of peaceful and conciliatory relations between Aboriginal peoples and members of the white Euro-Canadian population were abandoned in favor of a more aggressive policy of forced conversion. This policy, as J.S. Miller suggests, was exemplified by “the very act of turning to children rather than their parents as their chief agents of acculturation, which left the Indians a marginal place in the missionary enterprise and [which] discouraged the emergence of Indigenous leadership” (cited in Grant 1984:95). As a consequence of the abandonment of conciliatory relations, a new era of the civilizing mission was born, marked by programmes of increasingly detailed social regulation which gained widespread public support and which concentrated on high degrees of observation, order and discipline for members of the Aboriginal population (Belmessous 2005, Goddard 1998).

The detailed regulation of Aboriginal populations was ultimately enacted in two distinct forms of rule which included the emergence and heightened implementation of Residential and Industrial Schools and the detailed policing of Indigenous peoples throughout Canada. As both the state and missionaries became increasingly frustrated with Indigenous peoples’ supposedly slow rate of conversion, it was rationalized that only intrusive technologies of rule would give rise to a decisive break of Aboriginal populations from what was hoped to be their former culture.
However, as demonstrated in Blake’s (1999) work on the policing of Aboriginal populations in British Columbia, the state and missionaries often espoused differing and conflicting rationalities in regards to how Indigenous populations should conduct their affairs in addition to the programmes they wished to employ in an effort to guide their conduct. Consequently, as seen within the analysis of the rule of Indigenous populations, there existed numerous rationalities which sought to define the parameters of Aboriginal conduct.

Regardless of the heterogeneous rationalities which made up such rule, within the nineteenth century Residential and Industrial Schools and detailed programmes of policing would come to be employed as the technologies by which the re-socialization of Aboriginal peoples would achieve efficacy (Goddard 1998). By permanently placing Native children in boarding schools, missionaries would develop a general form of policing within such institutions in which they could dictate, implement and monitor activities aimed at regulating all aspects of Indigenous life. The implementation of Residential and Industrial Schools also made missionaries guardians of the Aboriginal peoples as it was commonly perceived that this form of guardianship was necessary if Indigenous populations were to survive contact with Euro-Canadians and become enfranchised citizens of the state. Consequently, guardianship and reform were seen to be in the best interest of Aboriginal populations and can be viewed as distinctly paternalistic as it was thought such reform was needed for their own good. Indeed, it was thought that only such detailed programmes of re-socialization enacted through Residential and Industrial Schools, coupled with the act of policing the wider Aboriginal community, would ensure the true conversion of Indigenous peoples. In order to achieve such conversion, it was rationalized that strict forms of regulation were required in order for Indigenous peoples to achieve an alteration in character and reconstitute themselves as members of white civilized society. Through such regulation, the graduate of a Residential or Industrial School would become the ideal model of
industry and correct manner and would afterwards aid missionaries in converting their Native communities, thus bringing about the extinction of Indigenous culture (Miller 1996). Consequently, the policy of re-socialization through the technology of Residential and Industrial Schools can be adequately described as a policy of *aggressive civilization*.

The policy of *aggressive civilization* was in fact a state sanctioned policy based on the American model of authoritarian and paternalistic rule (Smith 2001). In the mid-nineteenth century, Nicholas Flood Davin submitted a report on Industrial Schools for “Indians and half-breeds” to then Minister of the Interior, John A. MacDonald, who had commissioned Davin to visit Washington on behalf of the Canadian state to examine the American policy of the administration of Indigenous peoples termed the policy of *aggressive civilization* (Smith 2001). Outlined in Davin’s report was the technology of Industrial Schools which were employed by the Americans as an instrument of civilization in which missionary groups played a distinct role. Davin’s report concluded that the American State rationalized that through intensive education and the utilization of programmes aimed at re-socialization, Aboriginal children would quickly become civilized citizens of the United States (Smith 2001). Furthermore, Davin noted that programmes employed within such schools were to focus on rudimentary education, coupled with manual labor for male attendees and precepts of domestication for females. Davin strongly recommended the Canadian state adopt the model of *aggressive civilization*, through which the Americans reported that they had taught their students the characteristics of civil man and claimed they had seen favorable results. The American claims of success caused Davin to rationalize that through the state’s adoption of a policy of *aggressive civilization*, the Aboriginal peoples of Canada would “use every means in their power to abandon their present detached little villages and unite…in forming large settlements, where manual labor schools [would] be established for the education of [their] children” (cited in Miller 1996:80). Based on the policy of
aggressive civilization, such programmes as the Durieu System were employed within in Residential and Industrial Schools, which aimed to eradicate all unchristian and uncivilized behavior by means of strict rules and punishments. Thus, through a strong emphasis on control and the manipulation of the character, behavior and actions of its attendees, Davin purported, the reformation of the Aboriginal peoples to civilized life could be achieved. In order to achieve such ends, missionaries therefore taught students the precepts of ethics, industry, honesty, cleanliness, independence and obedience which all focused on cultivating culturally appropriate behaviors which were followed by strict punishments for those who did not comply (Milloy 1999).

What is seen within the implementation of Residential and Industrial Schools as a technology of rule, in which the state often divested its regulatory capacities to non-state actors, is that there existed a multitude of rationalities which attempted to direct the conduct of Indigenous peoples. The exemplification of the numerous mentalities, and often contradictory rationalities which shape rule, is exemplified in the works of Blake (1999) and Hogeveen (1998) who have applied governmentality to liberal and colonial power in Canada in distinct case studies. These analyses provide the empirical evidence necessary to confirm Hindess (2005) and Dean’s (2002) claims that liberalism, far from increasing the amount of freedom experienced by the population, often retained an authoritarian and paternalistic nature, which was enacted through programmes of colonial rule. Thus, Blake (1999) undertakes an analysis of the rationalities found within liberal and colonial programmes of rule which targeted Indigenous populations in Canada in the nineteenth century and contends that various rationalities existed within Canada, and more specifically the province of British Columbian, that took the Indigenous population as its target and which sought to shape and guide their conduct. Blake (1999) notes that indeed, as was the case with Residential and Industrial Schools, the predominant rationalities that shaped the rule of
Indigenous peoples were those of missionaries and suggests that their influence on the programmes employed by the government of British Columbia is of key importance. Ultimately, Blake (1999) contends that nineteenth century British Columbia appeared as an area of conflict between church and state which can be witnessed in the implementation of the numerous technologies and programmes which took Indigenous populations as their target. Consequently, Blake’s (1999) analysis seeks to comprehend the rationalities which lay “behind” the technologies utilized in Canada to form an orderly and policed Indigenous population.

Blake (1999) claims that in order to understand the authoritarian, paternalistic and often intrusive rule of Indigenous populations in Canada, it is important to note, as Belmessous (2005) and O’Connell (2009) contend, that the inferiority of Indigenous populations was a principle mentality that shaped many of the relationships that existed between Euro-Canadians and the Aboriginal populations. Belmessous (2005) suggests that this cultural paternalism often presented itself as the belief that Indigenous populations, once exposed to the supposedly superior lifestyle of the Euro-Canadian population, would simply come to adopt white European modes of life, leading to their civility. Consequently, missionaries often rationalized that Christianity and civility were dependent upon the introduction of the institutions of advanced Euro-Canadian social life in which various forms of education were enacted to do so (Goddard 1998). Therefore, as Grant (1984) notes, because of their perceived childlike nature, programmes of education were enacted by missionaries in which the mentality routinely arose that is was in such populations’ best interest to strip them of their religious and cultural philosophies to bring them from a state of “barbarism” to civility (Franks 2002). Thus, the missionaries’ goals were ultimately to create moral Christian communities by enacting high degrees of social discipline. However, the effects produced by programmes of missionary education rarely achieved such goals and in fact there exists only one publically available material from the National Archives of Canada (1879) which
suggests the beneficial impact of missionary education. That material comes from Sir William Johnson who reports “I confess that at one time… that ‘civilization’ so to speak should precede ‘Christianity’ in an attempt to improve Indians. I do not now hold this opinion. Deeper thought and wider experience have shown me that mission work, pure and simple is the real means of furthering the well being of uncivilized people. There can be little hope of real progress until their hearts have been reformed by the influence of divine truth.” Ideologically, this quote implies consistency in missionaries’ attempts to act in the Indigenous peoples’ best interest through programmes of self-improvement and conversion. However, what this quote neglects to demonstrate are the tactics of fear and discipline which missionaries often relied heavily upon to turn the Aboriginal peoples toward Christianity and civility (Goddard 1998). In fact, throughout the literature on the topic, one routinely finds that Indigenous peoples often resisted the adoption of Euro-Canadian civility (Goddard 1998). This negation of civility caused Antoine Demis Raudot to report “it is surprising that considering that there are so many nations, there is still none who takes our manners and even by being among us and every day with the French missionaries, they still govern themselves the same way as they did in the past…We would need indefinite work and time to free these peoples and be able to reduce them to take out ways and our customs. I assure you that this work will take several centuries” (cited in Belmessous 2005:346). Thus, often times, Indigenous populations were viewed not merely as primitive and uncivilized, but also incapable of civilization. Hence, missionaries and the state increasingly turned to tactics of direct interference and control to monitor Aboriginals’ behavior in which accounts of missionaries’ unfavorable assessment of Indigenous populations often shaped the technologies which were employed by the state. Indeed, Blake (1999) notes that the rationality came to emerge in the nineteenth century that Aboriginal peoples required routine policing as they were incapable of organization, progression and ultimately orderliness. As a result of this
rationality, Blake (1999) suggests that Indigenous peoples were seen as unable to conduct their affairs properly if allowed to pursue their own forms of governance and thus, a need existed, according to the church and state, to institute paternalistic and controlling political technologies and programmes of rule aimed at aligning their behavior with the sensibilities of Euro-Canadians.

In order to exemplify these rationalities Blake (1999) undertakes an investigation of the mentalities, sensibilities and programmes instituted by missionaries and the state to provide empirical evidence of the authoritarian and paternalistic rule of Indigenous populations within Canada. Blake (1999) claims that the rationality of the perceived inferiority of the Indigenous peoples and subsequently, the need for paternalistic rule was made practicable through a process of detailed policing which missionaries proposed would ease the substantial dissatisfaction felt with the results obtained by the application of both religious leadership and law, such as the Indian Act, to the Indigenous population. Prior to the programme of detailed regulation through the technology of policing, the state rationalized that state law should be applied to Aboriginal peoples in an attempt to align their behaviors and assimilate them into the Euro-Canadian population (Blake 1999). It was thought that the simple application of law and the provision of enfranchisement would persuade Aboriginal peoples to abandon their traditional modes of life in favor of lifestyles similar to that of the Euro-Canadians which would also bring them under the direct legal control of the Canadian state. Instead of witnessing the hoped for results of assimilation however, Indigenous resistance to this programme of rule was prevalent which caused dissatisfaction to spread throughout the Euro-Canadian population due to the programme’s perceived failure and its attempt to exert political control over the Indigenous population.

It is in this programme, and its perceived failure, that one can witness the mentality which existed of Euro-Canadian superiority over Indigenous populations. It is clear in their
attempt to assimilate the Indigenous population that the state regarded their society as inherently superior to the Aboriginal peoples’ and thus, it was their mode of life, beliefs and rationalities which were to be accepted. Ultimate, the solution to these problems, missionary leaders rationalized, was to introduce a legally recognized patriarchal form of rule over the Indigenous population to address and discipline instances of perceived immorality and incivility through the use of various forms of policing and punishments that, in an effort to enforce the precepts of civil life, were often deemed too uncivil to be utilized against the Euro-Canadian population (Blake 1999). Blake (1999) contends that the provincial government of British Columbia did in fact agree with the goal of civility and concluded that the employment of the detailed programme of policing, targeting the colonized Aboriginal population, would instill in them technologies of the self through which individuals would constitute themselves as subjects capable of self-directed and enterprising behaviors and of being governed at a distance. Although the state agreed with the target and the ends of missionary leaders’ plan of policing, Blake (1999) notes that the state appeared to disagree with the methods (for example, harsh punishments such as flogging) which missionaries advocated for. It appears that the state’s rationality for disagreeing with the methods that missionaries proposed was simply that, if the state or church expected to civilize Indigenous peoples, they should not utilize uncivil methods of doing so which could hinder the process of reconstitution. Instead, it appears that the state rationalized that the Indigenous population would be better assimilated into the Euro-Canadian population through measures which did not work upon their body.

Interestingly, Foucault (1977) notes that it is within this period of history that one witnesses a concern with making power operate more efficiently. It is with reference to this claim that one witnesses the implementation of liberal economic principles to Indigenous rule, which emphasized the need to constitute calculating, enterprising, reasonable and responsible
individuals. However, Blake (1999) claims that contradictory rationalities appear within missionary and state goals with respect to this constitution. Blake (1999) suggests that while missionaries sought to fashion moral Christian communities through a type of pastoral power that would ultimately lead to their salvation, the state attempted to maintain an orderly population by cultivating technologies of the self that fostered self-control and domesticity (Pels 1997). Thus, although the state sought to cultivate subjects who were able to conduct their own affairs within state defined parameters, a competing rationality, exemplified by missionary sensibilities, continued to exist which suggested that the Indigenous population was unable to achieve civilization and required not only detailed programmes of regulation such as policing, but also guardianship. Therefore, it was rationalized by missionaries that there existed a need for technologies of intrusive and authoritarian rule, found in the programme of policing that attempted to manipulate their conduct. Thus, the policing of the Aboriginal peoples can be seen as reflective of pastoral power as it attempted to cultivate in such individuals unquestioned obedience and submission to the state.

By examining the rationalities of the church and state, Blake (1999) is able to imply that a homogenous rationality of rule did not exist within colonial or liberal societies and that it was not simply the state who held a monopoly of power. Indeed, Pels (1997) notes that it is impossible to separate the missionary movement from the broader process of colonialism, liberalism and authoritarian and paternalistic rule. Like Hindess (2001), Pels (1997) contends that missionary education was a crucial factor in programmes of colonial rule which often shaped the discourse and rationalities on which the state’s exclusionary processes were based (Pels 1997). Consequently, Pels (1997), like Hindess (2001), notes that for the colonized, education and conversion became technologies of self-control that enabled subordination in which technologies of the self and colonial domination often converged.
Chapter 9
Economic Mentalities

Although Blake (1999) and Pels’ (1997) accounts accentuate the rationalities which lay behind colonial and the often authoritarian and paternalistic rule over Indigenous populations, what is missing is an investigation into how the concept of economy and free market processes shaped the ways in which political power defined rule over such peoples. Foucault (2008:13) believed that the basis of the liberal rationality of rule was political economy which he referred to as any method “that can procure the nation’s prosperity [and is] a sort of general reflection on the organization, distribution, and limitation of power in society.” It is within liberalism, that one witnesses the governmental reason of self-limitation, that is to say, a rationality whose function is not so much to ensure the growth of the state’s forces and strength, as to limit the exercise of governmental power (Foucault 2008). Within liberalism, Burchell (1993) notes that one sees the suggestion that it may be beneficial to govern a territory through indirect influence and the cultivation of the homo oeconomicus, which is a self-interested and calculated actor who inhabits the space of the economic sovereign and who is also viewed as self-regulating and directing (Foucault 2008).

Neu and Therrien (2003) subsequently claim that within liberalism one witnesses the emergence of the attachment of economic principles to the population which are translated into programmes of rule aimed at constituting calculating, enterprising and reasonable individuals, capable of participating in market exchange. Thus, it is suggested that a principle example of the coupling of economic principles to the population can be identified as the general philosophy of accounting which was employed as a technology within liberal and colonial rule to regulate individuals’ behaviors through such principles as cost/benefit analysis and budgeting (Neu and
Therrien 2003). Neu and Therrien (2003) suggest that such principles were used within technologies and programmes of rule aimed at the regulation of Indigenous populations throughout Canada and suggest that from the beginning of colonial contact, the state attempted to take the Aboriginal population as their target, breaking them into their respective parts and reconstituting them as subjects of accumulation and profit (Neu and Therrien 2003). It is important to note however, that such breaking and subjectification of Indigenous peoples consistently retained the rationality that such peoples were inferior to the white Euro-Canadian population which was substantiated through programmes aimed at their reconstitution (Neu and Therrien 2003). Resulting from the rationality of inferiority, Neu and Therrien (2003) purport that programmes of domination and authority used to reconstitute Indigenous peoples often went unquestioned by the state and subjects of the Euro-Canadian population. By positioning Indigenous populations as inferior, the state was able to act in such peoples’ best interest which, in conjuncture with the tenets of liberalism, involved cultivating in them the characteristics of the economic man.

O’Connell (2009) notes that throughout the colonial and liberal period, both utilitarians and political economists attempted to advance ideas of efficacy, industry and independence which often blended into questions and assessments of the Indigenous populations of colonial states, their profitability as well as their ability to participate in European-driven economies. Specifically, political economists and the state both took as a central concern the lack and loss of labor in the colonies in relation to Aboriginal peoples. By sustaining their nomadic, hunter/gatherer lifestyle, the state concluded that Native inhabitants had ultimately limited their ability to participate in the economy. Therefore, O’Connell (2009) suggests that it was rationalized that new economic relations had to be formed between Aboriginal peoples themselves and Aboriginal peoples and the state, often in an attempt to decrease their perceived
dependence. Milloy (1999) notes that indeed, Residential and Industrial School can be seen as one such attempt to create new economic relations within Indigenous populations by educating them on the tenets of progress, development and industry. Consequently, just as the white Euro-Canadian population held an obligation to civilize the Native inhabitants of the colonies, they too held a responsibility to make them into participants of the economy and cultivate in them the Euro-Canadian value of enterprise. Francis (1998) interestingly claims that during this period, the idea of civilization often became conflated with the idea of introducing economy and material culture to Indigenous populations. As the precepts of liberalism, including accumulation, increasingly infused themselves with rationalities of wealth, Francis (1998) notes that civilization often became dependent upon the accumulation of wealth and material goods, opposed to the mere adoption of civilized characteristics of morality and self-regulation. Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, civility came to take on a plural meaning and in one regard referred to human improvement in general, and in the other referred to human improvement distinguished primarily in relation to the concept and acquisition of material culture (Francis 1998). Indeed, Francis (1998:71) suggests that throughout the nineteenth century, missionaries often used Indigenous peoples’ lack of material culture as an explanation as to why Aboriginal populations had made only limited progress and could not be deemed civilized, which caused them to conclude that “the plough and the Bible go together in civilizing [the] Indians.”

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2 Although Foucault argues that theories of the state such as Marxism are inadequate for explaining the contingencies of power modern rule is built upon, his account of the economic man and of the economic rationalities of liberalism in general, appear to correspond and additionally constitute Marxist precepts of capitalism. The rationalities of wealth and accumulation that Foucault (2007, 2008) distinguishes as being central to a genealogical account of liberalism and of those of material culture that O’Connell (2009) discusses are also central to Marxist analyses of rule. Therefore, an apparent contradiction appears in Foucault’s dismissal of state theories as he neglects to demonstrate the ways in which they may link up and are reflective of each other. Although this contradiction or negation is apparent, a comparison of an “analytics of power” to state theories is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The emphasis on the acquisition of material culture corresponds with Neu and Therrien’s (2003) contention that for Foucault, modern government was concerned with ensuring that the greatest possible wealth is produced not only for the individual, but also the nation. In order to achieve such wealth, Neu and Therrien (2003) note that philosophies of accounting were employed for the activation and regulation of the Indigenous population in which it was hoped the state would witness their re-situation as active participants of production. Thus, Neu and Therrien (2003) provide concrete examples of such philosophies and demonstrate how economic rationalities shaped the rule of Aboriginal peoples as much as the civilizing mission did. They suggest that in order to cultivate in Indigenous populations the characteristics of industry and enterprise and to support such supposed dependent peoples, the state began to provide Native inhabitants with annuity payments or what was termed ‘presents.’ These ‘presents’ primarily came in the form of pre-made goods such as clothing or cooking materials; however, with the infusion of liberal tenets into state philosophies of rule and the need to introduce among the Native populations the philosophy of economy, the forms of annuity payments provided to Indigenous peoples were gradually altered.

Neu and Therrien (2003) note that instead of providing Aboriginal populations with fabricated goods, the state rationalized that it would be more productive to provide such peoples with raw products such as agricultural tools, from which they could produce their own goods which would ultimately aid in reconstituting them as productive and industrious peoples. By providing materials such as agricultural tools, it was consequently rationalized that the state would witness a shift in Aboriginal peoples’ relationships with their lands. Additionally, the provision of raw materials was viewed as cost effective as it would allow Aboriginal peoples to sustain themselves within emerging markets, but also allow them to participate within it by selling the goods and products which they did not use, thereby producing profit and wealth that
could be re-deposited in the state. Thus, by providing annuity payments in terms of agricultural products and raw materials, the state aimed to arrange the Indigenous population in such a way as to lead to certain ends; namely that of the economic prosperity of the Aboriginal population as well as the state.

The connection of Aboriginal rule to economic processes is also exemplified in the work of Hogeveen (1998) who analyzes the role of the Hudson Bay Company in defining Aboriginal relations with the state. Hogeveen (1998) further emphasizes Scott’s (1995) contention that Europe has been too much at the centre of colonial analyses and first articulates that Canadian liberalism, although a derivative of Britain, came to possess a distinct rationality due to the population it sought to rule; namely, the Indigenous peoples. Thus, Hogeveen (1998) suggests that one must identify the problems which Canadian liberalism sought to govern and correct and that Canadian liberalism must be viewed as a technology which intended to act upon the actions of others through economic processes. The primary step in an investigation into the economic rationalities which shaped Indigenous governance, Hogeveen (1998) contends, is to understand that the normative framework of liberalism is insufficient when attempting to comprehend the practices of government which affected the lives of Indigenous peoples. Hogeveen (1998) suggests that instead, one must examine the rationalities which lay “behind” the normative discourse of liberal rule and examine the means though which Canadian and liberal rationalities sought to realize their defined ends. Ultimately, Hogeveen (1998) claims that one must examine the rationalities of the Hudson Bay Company as a contributor to rule, its mentalities resulting from the fur trade, its economic aims, and effects on the Aboriginal population, to understand the formation of nineteenth century Canada.

Based on his contention that in order to understand the rationalities that shaped Aboriginal governance, one must examine the mentalities of the Hudson Bay Company,
Hogeveen (1998) contends that the Aboriginal population was merely seen as a means to increase productivity and wealth by such organizations. Consequently, he notes that the Hudson Bay Company sought to persuade and employ the Indigenous peoples to participate in economic practices through which the Indigenous population would be imbued with the precepts of economic life and gradually come to accept and possess modes of life premised upon free market exchange (Hogeveen 1998). Thus, the Indigenous peoples were utilized as a product and function of economic rationalities with the Hudson Bay Company not being so much concerned with the Indigenous populations’ function, troubles or conditions of life, but merely that it existed and was motivated to progress and improve, as defined by Euro-Canadian standards, in order to ensure the efficient running of Canada’s economic markets. Hogeveen (1998) contends that what resulted from such rationalities was a belief that was only concerned with the existence and preservation of the Hudson Bay Company and the Euro-Canadian population, and consequently the amelioration of the Indigenous peoples. Thus, Hogeveen (1998), like Hindess (2001) notes, that strict programmes of improvement, such as education and assimilation, were implemented by the Canadian state to ensure and cultivate subjects capable of following an economic rationality and contributing to Canada’s economic model.

It is noted however, when the Indigenous populations appeared reluctant to accept the economic mode of rule, its failure was attributed to their supposed inherent inferiority opposed to the inherent differentiations in lifestyle. What appears to be neglected in the assessment of Aboriginal inferiority is that their failure to accept Euro-Canadian defined economic models of subsistence was not due to Indigenous deficiency, but instead differing rationalities concerning subsistence and modes of life. Historically, the Indigenous population had ensured the self-sustainability of their peoples; thus, when offered monetary payments for their work, or as incentive to increase productivity it often had little effect (Neu and Therrien 2003). Paradoxically
however, Hogeveen (1998) claims that when Indigenous populations did turn to state defined economic models of subsistence it resulted in their dependence upon the Euro-Canadian population and their associated economic processes as they could no longer sustain their traditional modes of life. By making Aboriginal populations dependent upon Euro-Canadian models of subsistence, whether intentional or not, consequently allowed the Euro-Canadian population to exert authority over Indigenous populations which permitted for intrusive forms of rule and often the application of direct force. Ultimately, Hogeveen (1998) notes that the infusion of the fur trade mentality into the Indigenous mode of life had important cultural, economic and social implications for the Indigenous peoples as their ability to sustain traditional modes of living were undermined and were colonized for the purpose of European subsistence and prosperity. Subsequently, Hogeveen (1998) claims that emphasis was placed on cultivating members of a free population who were willing to participate in the fur trade and market competition. Although the notion of freedom is apparent here, it is misleading in the sense that the Indigenous population was not accorded the liberty to decide their own mode of life, but were instead encouraged to live in the likeness of white Euro-Canadians. Consequently, the enactment of the fur trade can be seen as a tool which was utilized to arrange the Aboriginal population to meet certain ends and which ultimately altered the relationship of the Aboriginal population to “things.” Thus, by altering the relation of Aboriginal peoples to “things” such as land, modes and materials of production, one can witness that the rule of Indigenous populations had a distinct liberal base and can be tied quite adequately to Foucault’s (2007) conception of political economy. Therefore, considering political economy’s connection to civil society, one can rationalize that in order for state and non-state actors to cultivate in Indigenous peoples the precepts of civil life, the liberal conception of the economic man would be of key importance as it
was economic subjects who inhabited civil society; thus, to civilize the Indigenous population was to make them economic subjects.
Chapter 10
Summary and Conclusion

What can subsequently be seen in the investigation of the colonial and liberal rationalities that shaped the rule or governance of Indigenous populations throughout eighteenth and nineteenth century Canada, is that Foucault’s (2007, 2008) genealogy and the concept of governing through freedom, as developed in the latter governmentality literature, is far too restricted as it often fails to consider counter rationalities which suggest that liberalism frequently retained and employed authoritarian and paternalistic mentalities, technologies and programmes of rule. In agreement with Dean (2002), Hindess, (2005) and Murray Li (2009), it is suggested that with the exemplification of these counter rationalities, the claim that liberalism was committed to governing at a distance or through the free activity of all peoples can be dismissed. What is demonstrated when considering the experiences of Aboriginal populations as a specific case example, is that although being a producer and consumer of freedom, intrusive rationalities continued to exist within the same historical period as those of liberalism which took the Indigenous peoples as their target. Consequently, the attempt to arrange, transform and control the conduct of Indigenous populations demonstrates that liberalism was merely concerned with employing forms of free activity as a technology of rule only when individuals were able to constitute themselves as subjects capable of self-regulating and directing behavior within state defined parameters. Thus, the Aboriginal mode of life was to be shaped, molded and aligned with state objectives in an attempt to cultivate in them precepts of civil life. Indeed, it can be claimed that frequently, this shaping and molding was predicated on the rationalities of economic rule and missionary ideals of civility which were employed through programmes of colonialism in which state and non-state actors sought to assimilate the Aboriginal population into white
Euro-Canadian society through the cultivation of individuals who embodied the prescribed modes of economic and civil life in which the concept of technologies of the self was especially important.

As previously stated, Foucault (2007) and the subsequent governmentality literature suggests that individuals constitute themselves as subjects of rule through technologies of the self. Implicit in this suggestion is the rationality that all individuals possess power as they are able to constitute themselves as subjects. Therefore, as power is disseminated through all individuals, it is rationalized that all individuals possess power and subsequently agency. As a result of their possession of power, individuals are seen as being able to accept or reject state defined programmes of rule and their constitution as subjects. However, when taking into consideration the examination of the governance of Indigenous populations, one is left to question the accuracy of Foucault’s conception of power as it appears that such populations’ conduct was often constrained so as to align it with white Euro-Canadian sensibilities in which non-compliance was met by detailed programmes of social and cultural regulation aimed at cultivating civil subjects of the Canadian state. Thus, Indigenous peoples were not left to regulate their own behavior and were not seen as *subjects of interest* who were able to calculate their actions without the direct interference of the state as the concept of laissez-faire and the liberal philosophy of rule would appear to suggest. Although it is noted that such peoples possessed some amount of agency, or power, as they were able to resist programmes of rule, and it is today apparent that various efforts of colonization and the extermination of Aboriginal peoples were unsuccessful in many instances as Indigenous populations continue to exist in present-day Canada, one must question the amount of power such individuals possessed if they could not constitute themselves as subjects of their own governance and were constrained and obliged to act in ways which ultimately led them to become disciplined, industrious and civilized subjects of the Canadian state. Additionally, one
must ask why these forms of power often had little effect. Similarly, a distinction needs to be
made between Foucault’s notion of power and the concept of force, examining if it is possible to
resist instances of force, if it is possible to distinguish between instances of power and force, and
if a threshold exists in which power becomes force.

Based on the above claims, many critiques of governmentality (for example, Murray Li
2009; Weir et al 1997) additionally suggest that Foucault and the school of governmentality
frequently neglect to consider the concept of resistance in their genealogies. This negation is
surprising when considering Foucault’s contention that where there is power, there is also
resistance. The exclusion of resistant rationalities is especially seen within the limited
governmentality literature which investigates the rule of Indigenous populations. Thus,
additional research must be completed centering on the role of resistance which investigates the
ways in which forms of resistance shape, contribute or alter the rationalities, technologies and
programmes that are employed to govern Aboriginal peoples. As Foucault claims that resistance
is present in every instance in which power is exercised, and consequently, systems of power
relations are paralleled by a multiplicity of forms of resistance, further governmentality analyses
must exemplify this claim (Smart 2002). Indeed, O’Malley (1996) contends that resistance is not
external to rule and thus, in the governmentality literature, there should exist an investigation into
the ways in which programmes of government are shaped by resistance.

Furthermore, O’Malley (1996) suggests that, within the governmentality literature,
confrontations between government and non-state actors, or instances of resistance, are frequently
thought of in terms of the failure of the programmes which are employed to shape individuals’
conduct. This suggestion leads one to believe that when a programme of rule does not achieve
its desired ends and is accompanied by resistance, its failure is not the fault of the programmers
but something external to it and is cited as the fault of the people who display resistance and who
do not accept the guiding programme (O’Malley 1996). Thus, O’Malley (1996) contends that when resistance is perceived in terms of its negative impacts on programmes of government, a space is not created in which resistance can be thought of as productive and it is consequently not articulated that resistance may be an essential component of programmes that are deemed successful. Consequently, O’Malley (1996) purports that the governmentality literature neglects to accentuate how rule is often enacted from below and how resistant technologies are often incorporated into programmes to ensure their success. Although he is referring to advanced liberalism, O’Malley (1996) confirms that liberal rule often assimilates and incorporates foreign rationalities into its programmes to ensure such programmes’ success and notes that the practice of governing at a distance or *governing through freedom* may appropriate Indigenous forms of knowledge and practice in order to neutralize or eliminate resistance. Therefore, in order to live as free subjects, Indigenous populations are expected to adopt programmes which are reflective of their cultural traditions but which are situated within state defined technologies of rule. Thus, in order to have greater control over their lives and follow cultural tradition, Aboriginal peoples are expected to adopt foreign technologies of rule within alien frameworks. Although it may appear on the surface that Indigenous populations have gained a substantiated increase in autonomy through the adoption of these programmes, as they are able to follow mentalities and sensibilities reflective of cultural tradition, the intrusive nature of liberalism is not remedied and resistance to programmes still occurs as Aboriginal peoples are only accorded autonomy within state defined parameters. Therefore, further research must take into consideration both the positive effects of resistance in shaping rule, but also how the “Indigenization” of programmes of governance, although a reflection of Indigenous tradition, attempts to adopt such cultures to merely align resistant rationalities with those of state and non-state actors.
Foucault (2007, 2008) and the governmentality literature additionally contends that liberalism was concerned with displacing outdated forms of power and rule and was therefore committed to putting in its place a power which took the population as its principle target and attempted to govern through indirect means. Thus, as the genealogy of the modern state develops, pastoral power is displaced by raison d’état which is further displaced by liberalism. As a result, it would be sufficient to reason that with the dislocation of pastoral forms of governance and raison d’état, one would also witness the displacement of programmes of discipline, total obedience and the salvation of all and each. However, when examining the case of Aboriginal peoples throughout Canada, it is clear that this displacement did not in fact occur as both state and non-state actors such as missionaries sought to secure the salvation of all and each Indigenous person through their conversion to Christianity and civilized and economic life. Thus, pastoral and paternalistic forms of rule remained in state and non-state programmes aimed at the reconstitution of Aboriginal subjects. Consequently, technologies of rule such as the Indian Act can be seen to be paternalistic in the sense that they made state and non-state actors guardians of the Indigenous population and stripped them of their cultural traditions which was thought to be in their best interest. Such programmes can be seen as authoritarian and intrusive as they required the complete obedience of the Indigenous peoples and imposed Western values and sensibilities into their modes of life in an attempt to cultivate economic and civil subjects. Consequently, it is suggested that additional research be undertaken to examine the occurrence of paternalistic and authoritative rule of Indigenous populations throughout not only the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but in additional historical periods such as the twentieth century. By examining the contemporary rule of Indigenous populations and the rationalities which lay “behind” neo-liberal forms of governing for instance, it may be possible to examine whether technologies and programmes of pastoral, paternalistic and authoritarian rule have been
displaced. Ultimately, such additional research will contribute to a greater understanding of the rationalities of liberal rule and the governmentalities which shaped Indigenous conduct.

Additional research will also provide a more accurate depiction of the concept of governing through freedom and a history of Native cultures of Canada taking into consideration the ways in which they were arranged, transformed and utilized by various programmes of rule.

Studies of governmentality therefore demonstrate the interplay of macro and micro-structures of particular knowledges which are transformed into technologies that are rendered capable of governing an individual’s behavior (Foucault 2008). For Foucault (2007), studies of governmentality focus on the ideology that politics can be understood as a product of the sensibilities and mentalities which make up rule. Thus, governmentality is presented as an analysis in which certain knowledges, rationalities and discourses capable of governing behavior are uncovered. By utilizing the rule of the Indigenous peoples of Canada as a distinct case example, it is possible to demonstrate the interactions of macro and micro-structures of rule to exemplify that such rule was not a monopoly practice of state but was instead implemented by various actors such as missionaries and the Hudson Bay Company. Additionally, particular knowledges can be uncovered such as those of civil society, the economic man and political economy which were transformed into technologies of rule aimed at guiding the conduct of such populations. Moreover, the rationalities and discourses of inferiority, Ethno/Euro-centrism, and paternalism are revealed, which combined, prove that governing through freedom does not adequately characterize the liberal philosophy of rule. Thus, one witnesses that liberal rule was in fact not committed to the judicious application of direct control which consequently fragments the claims of the governmentality account of liberalism. By targeting, molding and aligning Indigenous populations’ behavior with state objectives through programmes of detailed regulation, it is argued that the displacement of the constraining effects of rule as employed
within pastoral power and raison d’État did not take place and that systems of subordination are not removed within liberalism. Thus, Foucault and subsequent governmentality literature presents an incomplete account of liberalism and the concept of governing through freedom as they neglect to display counter rationalities, such as those of colonialism, which contradict those of the liberal philosophy of rule. By examining governmentality as a theory, the claims of governmentality as a school of thought and the case of the Aboriginal peoples, it is possible to demonstrate that the governing of all populations through their free interactions and activity is merely locally, culturally and ethnically specific.


