DISPOSSESSING BARE LIFE
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING POWER RELATIONS THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT THE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

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Abstract

In the past twenty years an increasing number of Global South nations have vied for the rights to host prestigious and expensive sport mega events. This trend requires significant reflection given the enormous economic costs of these events, which often produce little capital gain for the host nation (Whitson & Horne, 2006). Furthermore, sport mega events are often utilized for their symbolic capital (Belanger, 2009), which sometimes manifests through forcing people from their land for the sake of “beautification” (Davis, 2006). In this project, then, I asked how technologies of power were utilized by FIFA, corporate stakeholders, and the South African government to control people who were marginal to, or impeded the success of, the World Cup in Nelspruit, South Africa. This project consisted of two parts: the first involved constructing a theoretical framework for better understanding power as it operates through sport mega events in general. To this end I employed Marxian notions of the ordering of physical space, Foucauldian conceptions of sovereignty and governmentality, and Agamben’s (1998) state of exception to determine how particular bodies are constituted and controlled through sport mega events. In the second part, I applied this theoretical framework to the events in South Africa to better elucidate how people became displaced and killed because of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. I used South African popular news and documentaries as empirical evidence and conducted a discursive analysis of said news media. Through this coverage it became apparent that the mega event created the conditions in which new forms of rogue sovereign partnerships could arise through a historically and spatially contingent process of capitalism. The rogue sovereigns’ para-juridico-political orders, the discourses and practices of accumulation by dispossession as a tactic and effect of governementality, and other historical non-capital subjectivities such as racial identity, all contributed to constituting Agamben’s state of exception in which people could be displaced, killed or left to die in the events surrounding the World Cup.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Africa is a continent with a rich reservoir of resources, but the continent’s biggest asset by far is the warmth, friendliness, humility and humanity of its people. This was the inspiration for the Official Slogan of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, ‘Ke Nako. Celebrate Africa’s Humanity’ . . .” We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence from Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa’s time has come,” President Mbeki has said repeatedly. (“Ke Nako,” 2008)

In the lead up to the first ever World Cup on African soil, the international media devoted significant space to discussing whether or not South Africa would be successful in its 2010 hosting duties. Success was predominantly defined in terms of having the infrastructure in place for the opening ceremonies and in keeping tourists safe from high rates of criminal activity. The international media paid less attention, however, to the displacement of poor South African citizens via beautification programs and the influence of the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in structuring national laws – with serious consequences for impoverished and marginalized people in South Africa. Much of the South African news coverage did follow these events, however, and functioned to produce competing regimes of truth while acting as an important form of resistance in documenting “illicit” activities of the state and FIFA.

In this project I examine the various types of power that operated through two particular moments during the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa: first, the
dispossession of South African citizens as they exchanged their land for the sake of mega event development; and, second, the assassinations of “whistleblowers” who had revealed the injustices of the South African state and FIFAs’ involvement in the dispossessions. I employ a case study of popular news articles and documentaries about Nelspruit, South Africa, to recreate these moments. I construct a theoretical framework for understanding the interrelations of power in effect when nations, particularly Global South nations, pursue mega events as part of their “development.” In order to create this framework, I employ a cultural studies-style analysis whereby theory permeates my analysis of each particular “moment.” In a dialectical fashion, these events then help to inform and shape my theory.

**Purpose**

My primary goal for this project is to construct a theoretical framework to help elucidate and explain the material and discursive production of disciplined and biopolitically-constituted bodies through sport mega events’ infrastructural developments. I then utilize the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa as a case study to exemplify these theoretical underpinnings. While the construction of my theory is necessarily informed by my analysis of the World Cup in South Africa, for the sake of clarity the structure of this project consists of the theoretical framework followed by the case study. By utilizing both discursive and material analyses in my theoretical framework section, I elucidate how technologies of power operated through both the
material environment and associated discourses to produce and legitimate particular actions surrounding sport mega events.

In the second part of this project I utilize a case study to demonstrate how my theoretical perspective operates with regards to a specific mega event, that is, the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. In order to understand why certain stadiums were located in particular spaces and to determine how particular bodies were constituted and regulated, I employ the theoretical framework I have constructed, making use of Marxian notions of the ordering of physical geographical space to stimulate further capital accumulation, Foucauldian theories of governmentality, discipline and sovereignty, and Agamben’s state of exception. My focus is on stadium construction and its associated dislocations in Nelspruit, as well as the popularly reported assassinations of “whistleblowers” who accused the government of illegally selling the Matsafeni community’s land for one rand (CDN$0.14) to build the stadium (Cross & Tanner, 2009).

Research questions

Contextualizing my research in the current era of globalized capitalism, I seek to determine: a) how Foucauldian technologies of power interacted through the World Cup; b) how this regulation operated on a material basis through land dispossessions; c) how the material and discursive elements of these powers are mutually constitutive and inherently inseparable; and d) how the specific socio-political history of South Africa contributed to a particular form of capitalism and resistance.
For my theoretical framework I ask, specifically: How are Foucauldian technologies of power – consisting of governmentality, sovereignty, and disciplinary measures – utilized by transnational sporting governing bodies, corporate stakeholders, and national states to regulate people who are marginal to, or impede the success of, sport mega events in the Global South? How can we effectively put discursive and materialist theories of capitalism into productive conversation with one another to better understand how a contingent form of power operated through World Cup-associated dispossessions?

For the case study portion of this project I ask: How were particular people of Nelspruit disciplined, governed, and biopolitically regulated through their dislocations and interactions with FIFA, big business and the state, and how does this relate to Marxian theories of capital accumulation and new forms of sovereignty? In Chapter 3 I explore, specifically, how people were dispossessed of their land and how this can be understood as a new form sovereignty, which affected the ways in which people defined their existence. In Chapter 4 I focus on the killing of whistleblowers and seek to determine how new sovereigns created their own moral orders and how people came to be constituted as “bare life” (Agamben, 1998) that could be killed or left to die.

**Rationale**

These questions are important for a number of interconnected reasons. First, an examination of how certain material projects in the built environment are framed by transnational corporations such as FIFA, the state, and the media alike actively construct what we know about “development.” Who is performing this constitution? Is
development framed by the community or by new relationships between corporate and public actors? It is necessary to theorize about and construct a theoretical framework for understanding the implications for citizens and non-citizens of their countries hosting mega events as part of “development.” This becomes particularly relevant when Global South nations are increasingly including the pursuit of sport mega events in their “development agendas” (Cornelissen, 2004). This process is exemplified by Delhi, India hosting the 2010 Commonwealth Games and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. When high opportunity costs are associated with holding such events, it is particularly important that we understand how people who are already marginal to the global market economy may be further exploited through these endeavours that generally profit the rich (Whitson & Horne, 2006). I also argue that these mega events are different from other sorts of capitalist development, as they are often utilized specifically for image projection purposes (Cornelissen 2004; Whitson & Horne, 2006; Maennig & du Plessis, 2009), and thus the regulating of bodies that are at odds with this agenda is particularly relevant.

Scholars have already written on the “development” discourses utilized by the South African state, large corporations, and FIFA to justify South Africa hosting the 2010 World Cup. This tendency to actively utilize a discourse of development was particularly pertinent during the South African bid process, as, “every bid city/country must construct a compelling narrative of why they would be both capable and desiring hosts” (Black, 2007, p. 263). The South African Local Organizing Committee (LOC) – comprised of
both business and state representatives – eagerly accepted this challenge, basing the
country’s bid on the ability of the World Cup to expedite South Africa’s development
agenda (Cornelissen, 2004). The utilization of this development discourse fit well into the
existing plans of South Africa’s state agenda and was a primary reason that the country
was granted the rights to host the 2010 World Cup (Cornelissen, 2004). This “betterment
of South Africa-development” rhetoric was subsequently utilized when people were
dispossessed for stadium and infrastructural-related programs and, in some instances, put
into Temporary Relocation Areas and Reconstruction and Development Programme
houses (Benit-Gbaffou, 2009). There is an increasing need to highlight these processes as
more and more Global South nations – such as India and Brazil – include the pursuit of
sport mega events in their “development” agendas.

While an understanding of the material realities of those in South Africa is important,
and while we must understand how discourses are constituted through the media and
frame how people define their lives, these two theoretical perspectives are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, I will argue, that in order to understand how decisions were made
about the exchange of land for stadium construction, we must contemplate the capitalist
development discourse within which the decisions were embedded; conversely, to
understand how certain discursive images of a “clean” and “crime-free” South Africa
were projected we must understand how the built environment was organized. It is also
vital to examine how people became constituted as those who could be dispossessed of
their land and those who could be killed or left to die. From this starting point, one can
then begin to deduce the biopolitical, disciplinary and sovereign functions of material interventions and discursive framing.

**Literature review: South Africa, FIFA, and soccer**

_Scholarly interest in the 2010 FIFA World Cup: A dearth of literature_

Over the last few years much academic literature has been written that pertains specifically to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Mega events generally elicit scholarly interest, yet the fact that this was the largest sporting event ever held on the continent of Africa has sparked much academic theorizing and debate. While there has been a significant amount of literature debating South Africa’s ability as a “developing country” to host the World Cup, most of the literature focuses on the materialist underpinnings of World Cup infrastructural development. For instance, Glynn Davies (2009) and Kamilla Swart and Urmilla Bob (2009) have researched the organizational structure of FIFA and the South African state, and their influence on where particular stadiums were to be located. Other academics have also studied the material dispossession of people through World Cup-associated infrastructure and housing developments. Caroline Newton (2006) argues from a materialist perspective that the physical displacement of people associated with the N2 gateway project – a housing development project along the highway connecting the airport to the city of Cape Town – can be understood as akin to the forced removals associated with the South African apartheid regime. In a related manner, Claire Benit-Gbaffou (2009) argues that with the
Greater Ellis Park area’s regeneration efforts, “The priority is to relocate the poor elsewhere, out of the way of development, without trying to include them in the neighbourhoods being regenerated” (p. 208). Thus, it is apparent that many scholars have utilized a materialist theoretical framework to focus on the capital accumulation interests of FIFA and on dispossessions.

A small number of sport sociology scholars have begun to examine how the material layout of space may operate on a more symbolic and discursive level. For instance, from a Marxist geographical perspective, Christoph Haferburg, Theresa Golka and Marie Selter (2009) argue that the material nature of the built environment inevitably leads to a preservation of “apartheid’s unique spatiality” (p. 179). This “segregation” can begin to be symbolically assuaged through new World Cup-associated spatial arrangements, such as Public Viewing Areas made famous by Germany in its hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup. The authors argue that the spatial intervention of bringing people together physically assisted in constructing and celebrating a national German identity that up until that point had been consciously and unconsciously shunned since ill-fated German nationalism helped create the conditions for the Second World War (Haferburg, Golka, & Selter, 2009). Other World Cup academic literature that investigates the relationship between the material and discursive include Wolfgang Maennig and Stan du Plessis’s (2009) discussion of how the 2010 Durban stadium was built to project a specific image of what South African identity “is,” as well as Peter Alegi’s (2008) investigation into the disputes arising over the location of the Cape Town stadium as a result of the symbolic
capital that FIFA wanted to accumulate. Therefore, some investigations have looked at the dialectical relationship between physical space and a nation-building identity.

However, few have attempted to explicitly bridge the gap between the material and the discursive in conversations about the sovereign, biopolitical and disciplinary technologies employed by the state, FIFA, and the popular media. For instance, no literature can be found on how the resultant physical ordering of space served a disciplinary and biopolitical function, or how these technologies of power operated through, and were legitimated by, specific capitalist development discourses. Few academics acknowledge the corruption allegations in Nelspruit (for one of the few instances, see Davies, 2009), but popular media abounds regarding the illegality of the municipal government’s dispossession of people’s land. Furthermore, little has been written on how FIFA, as a transnational corporation, has actively structured the laws of particular countries through an exercise of sovereign power. These are gaps I attempt to fill with my analysis.

*Sport in capitalist, postcolonial South Africa*

In order to fully understand the processes through which South Africa has pursued capitalist development and utilized mega events to advance its global agenda, I must situate this analysis within the socio-political historical climate of the country. The South African state has been attempting to change not only the discourse and ideologies associated with the African continent, but also economic development, and thus market function and strategies, within its borders. Many have argued that the end of apartheid
represented the success of capitalist expansion (for instance, see McDonald, 2008; Saul, 2005); the white Afrikaaner National Party government recognized that black South Africans needed more capital and freedom to participate in a growing market economy. Nelson Mandela, the first democratically elected president and international symbol of freedom and equality, helped create and support a capitalist development business climate that continues to grow to this day. While formalized racial segregation is no longer official political policy or law, the economic inequality that existed during apartheid has continued, and some even argue has been exacerbated (McDonald, 2008; Desai, 2002), along racial lines due to state privatization policies. For instance, there are ongoing tensions regarding the privatization of water and affordable housing (Desai & Pithouse, 2004). A new black elite has emerged, although the vast majority of black South Africans still exist on the economic and social margins (McDonald, 2008).

The South African state is intimately involved in capitalist development and market mechanisms within the country. The state supports water privatization (Desai & Pithouse, 2002; McDonald, 2008) and offers tax credits to private construction companies (Benit-Gbaffou, 2009) while not extending the same benefits to the country’s citizenry (Naidoo, 2007). Marxian geographer David Harvey (2006) contends that, “In its neo-liberal configuration, the state functions more clearly now as an ‘executive committee of capitalist class interests’ than at any other time in history” (p. 106). The traditional nation-state is not less relevant, just increasingly porous with shifting functions in an attempt to establish “a good business climate” (Harvey, 2006, p. 106). The South African
state is dedicated to constructing this “climate” with respect to capital investment and accumulation as it implements policies that will enable corporations to invest in the domestic economy, both from within South Africa and from the international business community.

A primary method that South Africa has utilized in order to facilitate this business climate is to develop what are known as “World Cities.” The contemporary notion of World Cities arose from Milton Friedman in the 1980s, who associated it with the broader world economy (McDonald, 2008). World Cities function as transnational urban systems, with “an outward-focused service economy, the creation of tightly networked business hubs connected to other world cities via high-tech transportation and telecommunication systems, and the development of world-class facilities to cater to a transnational elite” (McDonald, 2008, p. 2). McDonald (2008) argues that Cape Town, South Africa, has specifically pursued a World City agenda through investment in infrastructure such as airports and convention centres, as well as through the privatization of water.

Sport mega events are one of the primary ways that urban spaces attempt to market themselves as World Cities. Due to the significant media exposure garnered by events such as the World Cup and Summer Olympics, sport mega events offer a unique opportunity for cities to promote themselves (Whitson & Horne, 2006). Anouk Belanger (2009) and Richard Gruneau and David Whitson (1993) argue that sport epitomizes the
dialectical relationship between political economy and culture; through sport and other cultural phenomena,

…the production of images and the marketing of pleasures have become so significant that political struggles centred in and through popular culture may now be as crucial as the more traditional struggle against class domination at the workplace or in state policy. (Belanger, 2009, p. 56)

Rob Beamish utilizes a more Marxist – and less cultural – theorization, and thus locates political economy within the very structure of sport. The logic of capital that impels it to expand consumes all private spheres of labour, such as sport. Labeling sport as a normative and material resource, Beamish (1979), in a conference paper presented at Queen’s University, states, “The ability of a dominant group to organize itself, have access to and control of normative and material resources, permits it to control the political agenda, political decisions and maintain a given set of social relations” (p. 33-34, in Ingham & Hardy, 1984, p. 87). Sport is thus understood to function in the capitalist system in multiple ways. Primarily for my interests it embodies a commodification of a private activity, as well as offers the ability of urban centres to market themselves in the world economy, thus increasing networks within the global capitalist system as a World City.

South Africa has attempted to do just this. To say that sport in South Africa represents solely a commodification of a private activity would be to simplify a very complex subject. Soccer, or football as it is known outside North America, was initially introduced into South Africa through colonial rule (Booth, 1998). However, the sport was
subsequently embraced by the impoverished black population and co-opted as a form of resistance (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998a); for example, the political prisoners on Robben Island – of which Nelson Mandela was one – utilized soccer as an “escape” from their daily reality, a story that was repeatedly featured during the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s coverage of the FIFA World Cup. The hosting of the World Cup by South Africa represents a way in which, partly, the political and economic elite utilized this “sport of the masses” – a cultural activity already rich in complex meanings – in order to further accumulate capital.

John Saul sheds light on many of the underlying reasons South Africa and the African continent in general might utilize mega events to project a specific image of the continent to the rest of the world. Due to a general worldwide attitude of Afro-pessimism – or the belief that Africa cannot emerge from poverty and barbarism – the continent is actively trying to project an image of African Renaissance (Saul, 1999). Thus, I will argue that one of the limits to capital accumulation in South Africa is this broader global discursive formation of Afro-pessimism, and the World Cup presented the nation with the opportunity to project a “successful” image of itself. This was only made possible through sovereign, biopolitical and disciplinary technologies of power, however, that regulated and constituted specific racialized, gendered and classed bodies into particular spaces and forms of behaviour.
In order to understand the intricacies of power as it operated through the World Cup, it is necessary to understand the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). FIFA represents a powerful transnational corporation that has a complicated – that is, sometimes supporting, often exploitative – relationship with nation-states. John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson have written extensively on this organization. In their conceptualization, FIFA is a combination of an International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) and an Offshore Financial Centre (OFC), as the organization is comprised of many member nations, each with equal voting rights, as well as has significant economic capital (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998b). They characterize the structure of FIFA as having an internal tension between two “articulations of power”: the outer circle is a …case of progressive global bureaucratization and rationalization, albeit with a democratic façade. At another, deeper level, FIFA’s inner circle is best viewed as an hierarchical organization, so steeped in oligarchic and corporate patronage that its organizational coherence borders on a form of total power often understood in European social thought as “oriental despotism.” (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998b, p. 303)

Thus, FIFA has a more “democratic” outer structure of member nations with voting rights, but its inner executive is often maintained through nepotism and patronage and, I argue, behaves more like a corporation.

A major contention of these authors is that the organization of FIFA reflects and is structured by changing world politics. For instance, many African nations joined as
members after gaining independence at the end of World War II. However, Sugden and Tomlinson (1997) also view FIFA as a space in which resistance to hegemonic world politics can operate. For example, Latin American countries helped shape the structure of FIFA even when they did not have a strong voice on the international political stage, which was epitomized when Brazilian Joao Havelange became a very influential FIFA President in 1974. Sugden and Tomlinson (1998a) also argue that the structure and operation of FIFA has been used for political resistance, as South Africa was suspended from FIFA in 1961 due to the nation’s policy of apartheid. The country was not allowed back into the Federation until the end of apartheid in 1991. Not all agree with this assessment of the resistive force inherent to FIFA, however. For instance, Paul Darby (1997) contends that little resistance can operate through FIFA, as the organization itself has exploited many of its weaker member nations through processes of economic and cultural imperialism. I believe Sugden and Tomlinson’s contributions to academic literature to be very important in terms of elucidating the structure of FIFA and the politics of its membership. However, they have not focused significantly on what is happening “on the ground” through FIFA’s relationships with other nations, and they lack an in-depth examination of the organization’s sovereign forms of imperialism.

One of FIFA’s main influences “on the ground” is through the World Cup. FIFA owns the World Cup Finals tournament. They merely award the rights to host this prestigious tournament to the country that has the most appealing bid. It is the host country, however, that is responsible for creating the games with their own capital. Public
money was invested through both national and municipal governments to fulfill the obligations, or “guarantees,” in the bid agreement between FIFA and the 2010 FIFA World Cup Local Organizing Committee (LOC) of South Africa (for instance, see “Government’s 2010,” 2010; “Amendment Act,” 2010). The LOC was a non-profit company that included representatives of government, South African football, business, and labour (Davies, 2009). As a result of these agreements and structures, the relationship between business and the South African government was formally institutionalized at the beginning of the bid process. Public and private South African capital was consequently mobilized to create the stadiums and infrastructure necessary for a World Cup project. South Africa was due to receive the revenue from potential increased tourism and business investment (Davies, 2009), for instance, but it was FIFA that profited enormously from its selling of media rights to the largest television audience in the world (“FIFA makes,” 2011).

Although FIFA itself spends little on infrastructural development within host countries, they benefit more from hosting the tournament in some areas rather than others. South Africa, due to its symbolic capital as a “developing nation,” and the fact that many of the world’s premier players come from the African continent (Darby, 2002), offered a particularly lucrative opportunity for FIFA. With narratives questioning “Africa’s ability” to host a World Cup proliferating through popular media discourse of the event, many people likely tuned in, in part, to watch whether “Africa” succeeded or failed. Thus, there was a further heightening of the symbolic capital of FIFA’s product by
hosting the World Cup in South Africa. The fact that the 2010 Finals drew the largest audience of all time, and that more revenue was generated through the selling of broadcast rights than ever in FIFA’s history (“FIFA makes,” 2010), exemplifies that this strategy has paid off for the transnational corporation.

Furthermore, the expansion of FIFA’s product into South Africa allowed for the transnational corporation to tap a previously less lucrative market. The selling of television broadcast rights secures the majority of revenue for FIFA, with television contract revenues for the 2006 World Cup held in Germany encompassing approximately 58% of FIFA’s income (Davies, 2009). Marketing rights, or the “sole right to market a variety of goods. . . and to sell the sponsoring organization’s goods. . . within designated areas” (Davies, 2009, p. 34), was second, bringing in approximately 25% of FIFA’s revenue (Davies, 2009). Thus, hosting a World Cup in a country with an as-yet relatively untapped television audience provided much potential for the further accumulation of capital by FIFA.

“The Scene”: Nelspruit, South Africa

Nelspruit – a city recently renamed Mbombela – in Mpumalanga province, was an ideal place for both South Africa and FIFA to host a World Cup soccer match. With a population of only 484 245 inhabitants (as of 2004), it was the most rural of the selected host cities (Maennig & du Plessis, 2009). One of the primary motivations that Nelspruit had for vying for a stadium was that it wanted to change, “the perception of the city from a platteland (rural) town” (Tomlinson, 2009, p. 107). In an attempt to achieve this image
projection outcome, Nelspruit jockeyed for the right to host four tournament matches in a new stadium, named Mbombela. Originally, the cost estimate in the 2003 Bid Document budgeted 300 million rand (CAD$42.8 million) for construction of the new stadium, but by 2006 this had increased almost three-fold to 855 million rand (CAD$121.9 million) (Davies, 2009). A primary concern associated with Mbombela and the federal and provincial governments investing such significant money in the stadium was that Nelspruit has no large sports teams, and thus “the costs of operating and maintaining the stadium may exceed the income it generates” (Tomlinson, 2009, p. 107). Recent news reports from South Africa indicate that the stadium is not, in fact, being heavily utilized.

Most contentious, however, over and above the construction and operating costs of the stadium, was how the municipal government came to possess the land on which the stadium was built. Numerous allegations surfaced that the municipality had bought the land illegally for a single rand from the people who had been living on it (Cross & Tanner, 2009; Davies, 2009). These citizens were subsequently forced off their land for the building of the stadium, with no initial plans for resettlement. Furthermore, many of the school children from Nelspruit were dislocated from their school building, as it became the construction company’s office (Cross & Tanner, 2009). Again, there were no initial plans for the relocation of this school. Several whistleblowers accused the government of corruption and, allegedly, were murdered as a result (Cross & Tanner, 2009). Due to these allegations and other “procedural irregularities” (Davies, 2009, p. 45), the municipality was stripped of its World Cup administration duties and the
provincial government had to step in (Tomlinson, 2009). There have since been plans to build a new school, but only after significant mobilization from the people of Nelspruit. These events are explored in greater depth throughout this project.

**Methodology**

In order to investigate the research questions I have posited, I undertake an analysis of popular texts associated with infrastructural development in the lead up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. My subjects/objects of study include the actual material location of infrastructure, such as stadiums and highways, and the associated relocation of people. First, I use news media generated in South Africa as my primary evidence to glean the “happenings” surrounding the World Cup, and supplement these news stories with documentary film evidence. Second, I conduct a textual analysis of how these “developments” and “dispossessions” were framed in South African popular news.

This project is grounded in a cultural studies methodology in which theory is inherent in my analysis. The “(non)discipline” also utilizes conjunctural analysis, whereby scholars reject simplification and “embrace…the complexity, contradiction and contingency of the world” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 241). Furthermore, a cultural studies approach involves actively theorizing (Slack, 1996), often through a dialectical approach of moving between the “concrete” of real life example and more “abstract” theorizing (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Thus, in order to understand how particular land exchanges occurred, I not only refer to various news media publications, but also actively utilize
both Marxian notions of the ordering of physical geographical space to stimulate further capital accumulation, and Foucauldian notions of sovereignty, discipline and governmentality to determine how particular bodies were constituted and regulated. I understand these processes as being contingent, complex, and often contradictory, with a critique of power relations inherent in my project. In a dialectical fashion I use theory to inform my analysis of the case study, but also utilize the example to reformulate my theory.

My focus is on the city of Nelspruit and two moments during the lead up to the World Cup that were associated with the city’s major stadium construction project: a) the controversy regarding the exchange of land between community members and the municipality that became the site on which the stadium was built; and b) the alleged assassination of whistleblowers who attempted to expose the corrupt dealings involved with the land exchange and the construction tenders-granting system. While these two moments are my focus, I also theorize about other World Cup-associated infrastructural developments, such as the N2 gateway project, whereby South African citizens were displaced from informal settlements along a major highway and put into Temporary Relocation Areas (TRAs).

Data collection and analysis

For this analysis I pursue three primary sources of data. Firstly, I utilize the popular media databases *Lexus Nexus* and *Factiva* to find newspaper and online news articles from South Africa that document stadium construction in Nelspruit. I use the news media
as a basis for determining, empirically, the events that took place as well as people’s conceptions of what was happening in this location. I employ the search terms “Mbombela and World Cup,” “Temporary Relocation Areas and World Cup,” “Nelspruit stadium rand” and “Blikkiesdorp.” I search the national newspapers for the two years preceding the World Cup, inclusive of the event. These newspapers include: *The Sowetan*, *The Sunday Times*, *Pretoria News*, *Pretoria News Weekend*, *Cape Times*, *BBC Monitoring Africa*, *Mail & Guardian*, and *The Times*. In total I analyze over 518 documents – some of which were dismissed for irrelevancy.

Secondly, I consult anti-eviction groups, such as the global housing watchdog *Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions* (see Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2007, 2008), to assist in documenting the dislocation of South Africans and the areas or “camps” to which they were relocated. I supplement these online resources with material from a book written and edited by people dislocated for the N2 gateway project entitled *No Land! No House! No Vote! Voices from Symphony Way* (see “Symphony Way,” 2011). This book contains stories and anecdotes of those inhabiting Symphony Way, as they describe their conditions of living and explicitly connect their situation to World Cup developments.

Finally, I analyze documentary films made and produced by South Africans that chronicled the events surrounding the World Cup. The documentaries are entitled *Fahrenheit 2010* (see Cross & Tanner, 2009) and *Tin Town* (see “Tin Town,” 2010); the former traces stadium dislocations in South Africa in general and the conflict surrounding
Nelspruit specifically, and the latter invites the viewer into a Temporary Relocation Area and describes it in comparison to concentration camps. Both offer “on the ground” perspectives as they interview people dislocated for the mega event, and document the alleged atrocities committed by FIFA, large corporations, and the South African state.

By utilizing these three specific types of resources I glean both the occurrence of site negotiations, dislocations, relocations, and suspected assassinations, as well the discourses in which these practices were embedded. I then apply my theoretical framework to the information gathered from these sources in order to better understand how particular marginalized people in South Africa were regulated.

I use the media sources predominantly as primary sources offering evidence for the events that occurred during and around the World Cup in South Africa. I understand these documents as truthful representations, to the extent that they were productive of the discourses that proliferated before and during the World Cup, whether or not the facts themselves were always “truth.” As Dimeo (2007) argues, this methodology, “offers the chance to question the supposed truths that are being presented, while also recognizing the influence texts can have even if they are factually incorrect” (p. 7). This influence amounts to constructing “discourse” and thus constituting “truth” (see Foucault, 1980), regardless of the “actual” events that unfolded.

A further reason for utilizing news media coverage and not conducting interviews, for instance, is because newspapers are a cultural resource that documents as well as constitutes people’s actions – ideas that are elaborated in Chapter 3. Furthermore, I pay
heed to Chandra Mohanty (1986) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s (1988) contention that Western scholarship has often inflicted epistemic violence through attempting to speak for the subaltern\(^1\) in the Global South. I want to use South African primary texts to allow the “subaltern” to speak, as their voices are already present in these cultural resources. As Scott Morgensen (2011) explains, there is not always a need to conduct new interviews or perform ethnographic research with particular communities, as many voices are already being produced from within these populations. As an academic, then, I am attempting to bring to a different audience the voices of people who have already generated claims and discourses in popular news media and documentary films, although I acknowledge that it is still me who conducts the analysis.

*Discourse analysis*

An important component to my project is coding and analyzing themes in popular discourse. What can discursive analysis reveal about power relations and the regulation and production of particular bodies? My goal is to determine how discourse contributed to dispossessing certain people, as well as how the violence of these acts was related to capitalist rhetoric. I utilize a discourse analysis with a Foucauldian theoretical perspective, understanding that power is inherent in the words, phrases, and images that

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\(^1\) the “subaltern” is a Gramscian term that refers to those of lower rank, or the “non-elites” of India or South Asia. Subaltern Studies was a publishing collective that theorized subaltern relations. The purpose of this group was to expose the struggles of the proletariat, for instance, and reclaim acts of resistance from elite, albeit left-leaning, intellectuals (Prakash, 1990). Ranjit Guha edited a number of journals for the subaltern collective, which included scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, Partha Chatterjee, and Shahid Amin.
are used with regards to particular subjects and/or objects. Words and discourse structure our relationships with each other; discourse is then productive, as it constitutes specific bodies and prescribes certain ways of being in and thinking about the world (Foucault, 1995), with individuals as the vehicle of this power (Foucault, 1980). Foucault defined power as the result of combining a set of practices and a regime of truth that brings something which does not exist into reality (Foucault, 2008). The coupling of practices with a regime of truth operates through discourse; power functions as discourse creates knowledge, or “truth,” which constitutes subjects and produces their actions.

My analysis of discourse does not examine power at the level of intention; what I investigate is how power is manifest through words and images in its,

…external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there – that is to say – where it installs itself and produces its real effects. (Foucault, 1980, p. 97)

Thus, I utilize discursive analysis in order to determine, regardless of intent, how the framing of the particular issues of dispossession through infrastructural development constituted and produced a real way of being amongst those displaced and those consuming mass media.

Therefore, a significant part of my analysis is to determine what discourses proliferated through popular news media in the lead up to the World Cup. The events that occurred in Nelspruit which were reported in news media were constitutive of particular “truths” through their associated discourses. I am also interested in how particular discourses of “development” were being mobilized. If we understand a mechanism of
governmentality – to be elucidated in Chapter 2 – as being a change in the way in which people define their existence, then we must understand how people were coming to accept particular “truths” during the World Cup in South Africa. To this end, I conduct a discourse analysis of the news articles to determine the dominant themes related to “development,” “right to life,” “right to the market,” “governing,” “whistleblowers,” “race,” “apartheid,” and “land.” I analyze these themes to document how particular “truths” were constituted – and thus how power operated – through discussions of land, market exchanges, and the killing of whistleblowers.

**Chapter outline**

What these methodologies reveal is that the World Cup in South Africa created the conditions in which new forms of partnerships could arise through a historically and spatially contingent process of capitalism. These partnerships represented new forms of sovereignty as rogue sovereigns appeared in a field of governmentality; the rogue sovereigns defined their own moral orders for the sake of capital accumulation, but their actions were in part structured by larger governmental discourses such as the “right to life.” The rogue sovereigns’ para-juridico-political orders, the discourses and practices of accumulation by dispossession as a tactic and effect of governmentality, and other historical non-capital subjectivities such as racial identity, all contributed to constituting a state of exception in which people could be actively killed – such as “whistleblowers” – and those who could be left to die – such as those in the temporary relocation areas. These processes can only be understood through a recognition of how the material
environment and technologies of governmentality, sovereignty and discipline mutually constitute and sometimes contradict each other.

In Chapter 2 I lay out a theoretical framework for understanding how Marxist theories of primitive accumulation and capitalism can be put in productive conversation with Foucauldian technologies of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental power to understand dispossessions through the World Cup. I first outline Foucauldian technologies of power and follow with more Marxist conceptions of accumulation by dispossession. I then present influential postcolonial theorists’ understanding of capitalism and argue that we must understand capitalism as a contingent process, partly a function of histories that are not just “pre-capital” in nature. In the first of two sections entitled Reading Capitalism through Foucault and Marx, I argue that these major theorists have an inherent understanding of both materialist and discursive effects of power in their respective theories. In the second section, I present influential postcolonial theorists’ work on colonial governmentality and use this as a starting point for articulating materialist conceptions of the market with discursive understandings of how people define their lives. I follow this up with an introduction to Agamben’s argument regarding sovereignty as inherently biopolitical, and I argue that we must understand new forms of sovereignty as creating the space through which people can be killed or left to die.

Chapter 3 is based on the moment of land negotiations between the Matsafeni community and the municipal government in Nelspruit, South Africa. I document
newspaper coverage of the illicit R1 deal and the negotiations for a more fair exchange. I then give a brief history of dispossession for sport mega events and argue that the exchange of land for the World Cup represents a specific form of accumulation by dispossession, as land was monetized and exchanged in the market economy and bought by the “state” for the interests of private accumulation. People were also dispossessed through school demolitions and other infrastructural developments; I chronicle such forms of accumulation by dispossession and argue that this form of capitalism occurred as a specific function of South Africa’s history. A main argument in this chapter is that the World Cup demonstrated the emergence of new forms of sovereignty, as public-private partnerships were created for the purposes of capitalist accumulation. However, materialist and sovereign conceptions of power are not enough to explain people’s lives in South Africa; next I argue that a governmentality framework allows us to understand how people framed their everyday existence, partly as a function of materialist processes. I conclude the chapter by reiterating that the processes of capitalism can only be understood as contingent on the actors involved and the particular history of South Africa.

In Chapter 4 I examine the moment in Nelspruit in which “whistleblowers” were killed for speaking out against the unfair granting of tenders. As in Chapter 3, I begin by documenting newspaper coverage of these events, and then theoretically discuss how the media represented competing regimes of truth that constituted discourses through which power operated. Next, I elaborate on the previous chapter’s argument regarding
sovereignty, as I explain that the new sovereigns – as represented by the public private partnerships – are “rogue” in nature and constitute their own paralegal juridico-political orders. Through these orders, and as a result of capital accumulation interests and identity constitutions such as race, people became those who could be killed but not sacrificed. This state of exception was epitomized through the killing of whistleblowers and as people were left to die in temporary relocation areas. Power also operated in forms other than sovereignty, however, as people framed their lives and attempted to effect resistance through “right to life” and “right to the economy” discourses. “Ordinary citizens” governed themselves and their state through these forms of rhetoric.

In Chapter 5 I reiterate my theorizations and argue that we need a complicated and nuanced understanding of capitalism as it operates in different areas of the world through sport mega events. I also outline some future directions for research that can elucidate how people are intimately affected by these events, and argue that the social sciences need to take seriously sport as a site through which forms of power always operate, with significant effects for those who live in places that host mega events. The research needs to remain political, as we must always shed light on how people are being dispossessed for the benefit of large corporations such as FIFA.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework as Literature Review

Introduction

As more and more Global South nations include the pursuit of sport mega events in their development agendas, it becomes increasingly important to theorize the implications. Specifically, we must ask how power operates through the various economic transactions, discourses and other events involved in hosting. While I recognize that capitalisms come in many different forms and are always affected by the conditions with which they come into contact, I believe it is useful to outline a general theoretical framework for understanding these processes and how capitalisms are contingent, drawing on major theorists of power and capitalism. Therefore, in this chapter I outline a theoretical framework for analyzing sport mega events in the Global South. I ask: How do Foucauldian technologies of power operate through transnational sporting governing bodies, corporate stakeholders, and nation-states to regulate people who impede the success of the event? How and to what extent can we reconcile discursive and materialist theories of capitalism? How do we theorize people who have been killed or left to die in events related to the World Cup?

First, I outline Foucault’s technologies of discipline, governmentality and sovereign power and explain how they often all operate at the same moment, although the specific place and time affects how these forms precisely articulate. Next, I draw on more materialist conceptions of capitalism – such as those posited by Karl Marx and David
Harvey – to understand how power operates through primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession of people through the monetization and exchange of land. I then engage with scholars of colonialism to elucidate capitalism as a process that does not subsume all with which it comes into contact; instead, we must comprehend how non-capital antecedents actively transform capitalism. I argue that we can understand land as one of these antecedents, and a unique form of capitalism and primitive accumulation occurred as a function of South Africa’s history. Kalyan Sanyal (2007) argues that in postcolonial societies there exists a space of non-capital which comprises a needs economy; I apply Foucault’s conceptualization of power to this space to argue that people may inhabit this needs economy due to multiple smaller dominations, partly a function of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000) History 2.

In the next two sections I attempt to read capitalism through both Marx and Foucault. In the first, I attempt to reconcile or complement the material with the discursive as I demonstrate that both Marx and Foucault recognize the importance of the material and discursive world. These cannot be separated, I argue. Next, I use two postcolonial theorists to demonstrate how the market and the judiciary can be understood in the context of governmentality.

I also spend time detailing theories of sovereignty. Giorgio Agamben (1998) provides a compelling explanation of sovereignty, arguing that it has an inherent biopolitical function by constituting who can live and who can be killed. When we understand new forms of sovereignty arising in a broader field of governmentality, as
argued by Judith Butler (2006), I believe that we must extend Agamben’s argument and determine how people are constituted as “bare life” as a function of Butler’s “rogue sovereigns.” In the final section I argue that we need to extend Sanyal’s conception of two spaces of postcolonial capital to include a third space, as represented by Agamben’s state of exception. People become constituted as bare life – and are not kept alive – as a function of capital but also of other, smaller dominations that are part of a population’s History 2.

**Foucault’s technologies of power**

There are a number of different technologies of power at work as transnational sporting governing bodies, corporate stakeholders, and nation-states participate in regulating people who are marginal to, or impede the success of, sport mega events in the Global South. The notion of “technologies of power” is elucidated by Foucault although, I will argue, can work in conjunction with more Marxian ideas regarding capital accumulation and the ordering of space. In order to understand how technologies of power operate in the context of sport mega events, however, we must first understand what Foucault means by “power”: specifically technologies of sovereignty, discipline and governmentality.

Power, in Foucault’s (1990) conceptualization, is not something that is possessed or exercised over people; instead, it operates from below through “innumerable points of application” (p. 94) and has a productive – as opposed to strictly prohibitory – role. “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from
everywhere” (Foucault, 1990, p. 93) and manifests as a “multiplicity of force relations” (Foucault, 1990, p. 93). We therefore cannot escape power, as it is manifest in the form of multiple, smaller dominations between people. As a methodology, then, we must look at the effects of power at its extremities and from below: power is not about the domination of one person or group of people over another, rather it is a multiplicity of force relations that produce many forms of dominations (Foucault, 1980).

Power is productive through discourse and practice: it is not held or exchanged, it is exercised (Foucault, 1980, 1990). Power is not exerted from one point or individual, but instead comprises many smaller practices and discourses that can become economically advantageous or politically useful at a particular moment (Foucault, 1980). Discourses themselves are power, because they produce what is “known” about the world; in other words, discourses create “truth.” To “fight” power, then, is to disrupt these knowledges so they no longer stand as “truth” or, in Foucault’s (1981) words, “to bring it about that [people] ‘no longer know what to do’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous” (p. 12). Resistance is thus manifest through challenging the “commonsense” by way of a critique of dominant discourses.

Much of Foucault’s work involves describing and differentiating between sovereign, disciplinary and governmental technologies of power. He states that particular technologies may dominate at one particular moment in time and in one particular place (Foucault, 1991); however, a common theme of his later lectures is that multiple forms of
power are at work in any given time or place (for instance, see Foucault, 2003, 2007, 2008). He urges us to consider juridical sovereignty, disciplinary techniques and governmentality as functioning in a triangle, with population as its target and security apparatuses as the mechanisms through which power acts (Foucault, 1991). Conceptualizing how these variations of power coexist and often mutually reinforce each other can help us understand the discourses and practices associated with sport mega events being hosted in a postcolonial context. While all three technologies of power are at work concurrently, for the sake of clarity I initially analyse them here separately.

Foucault’s discipline

Discipline is a technology of power that attained prominence during the 17th and 18th centuries as a way to control both the body and the mind (Foucault, 1995). The emergence of disciplinary power marked a transition from sovereign control over individuals via spectacular punishment – such as public torture – to an invisible surveillance of individuals that regulates and produces behaviour. A primary arena of this new power is found in institutions that use disciplinary techniques to reform individuals. Foucault (1995) utilizes the examples of the prison, the military, and the school to explain how bodies are controlled through physical activity. In Foucault’s estimation, discipline creates a hold over bodies,

…not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). (Foucault, 1995, p. 138)
Central to his notion of discipline is that of the docile body, which can be produced and disciplined.

Another vital component of Foucault’s (1995) discipline is the Panopticon. The Panopticon is an architectural prison design that places cells in a circular arrangement around a central guard. The prisoners cannot see the guard, but the guard can potentially be watching any one of the prisoners at any moment. Those being “watched” internalize this constant threat of surveillance and behave accordingly. Foucault termed this internalization of surveillance as the Panoptic Gaze, and explained that this was an efficient and rational system of discipline (Foucault, 1995). Because both efficiency and rationalism are ideal characteristics of capitalist economics, discipline through the Panoptic Gaze becomes an effective method for regulating and producing individual behaviours in a market-oriented society (Foucault, 2008).

**Foucault’s governmentality**

The second technology of power that operates as a regulatory and controlling apparatus is governmentality. Foucault (2003, 2007, 2008) explained his notion of governmentality through biopolitics \(^2\) a few years after he published *Discipline and...* 

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\(^2\) Governmentality is associated with the new form of “governing” that employs tactics to the end that people will act in an “improving” direction through their own “self-interest” (Foucault, 1991). Liberalism, the idea of individual freedom, and market economy discourses are key to governmentality: the economy becomes the site of truth, and intervention in the population is only justified to the extent that it allows the market and people to operate “freely.” Through the transition to governmental reason that Foucault elucidates, management of the life of the population became a primary concern (Foucault, 1991), particularly as it related to legitimating government intervention to maintain a healthy workforce (Foucault, 2008). Biopolitics is a function of governmentality, as it is a technology of power involved in managing the
*Punish*, as a response to his genealogical research into neoliberalism. Whereas discipline operates through institutions to control the activities and productivities of individual bodies, biopolitics, he argues, regulates people at the level of the population: population is the target, and tactics are employed to arrange conditions such that people are compelled to behave in a particular manner (Foucault, 1991). The management of the life of a population is of utmost importance. With this technology of power, the idea of the statistical “normal” is paramount, and tactics are employed to keep a population functioning around norms of life and death through public health campaigns, for instance (Foucault, 1990).

Intrinsic to Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is an explication of governmentality and the free market economy. In a series of lectures at College de France entitled *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault (2008) explains that with the advent of capitalism the market became the site for determining truth via the valuation of goods - that is, prices are determined by the natural mechanisms of the market. Because it becomes the site of truth, government action is verified by its effect on said market. This resulted in a laissez-faire government mentality that sought to intervene in the general population only as much as the intervention was consistent with the “natural” workings of the capitalist economy (Foucault, 2008). Managing the life of a population is inherently intertwined with the life of a population. Foucault (2008) explains biopolitics as, “the attempt, starting from the 18th century, to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race…” (p. 317). The conditions that created a shift in governmental reason to target the population also brought about changes that legitimated and necessitated managing the life of this population through biopolitics.
market: people must be alive and healthy to be productive members of a society. Thus, government intervention in the population becomes justified at a public health level, for instance, as these programs function to create a healthier, and thus more productive, workforce that can then maximize its utility in the free market.

Foucault's sovereign power

The third major technology of power that Foucault outlines is sovereignty; an explanation – and a critique of theories of – sovereignty can be found in a number of his texts and lectures. He draws on Machiavelli’s *The Prince*³ and Hobbes’s *Leviathan*⁴ to explain how the sovereign has been conceptualized historically. Through these understandings of sovereignty, power is exercised by a Prince or the soul of the Leviathan to retain control over territory and, as a result, to retain control over the territory’s subjects (Foucault, 1991, 2003). This arrangement is characterized by the monarchy’s relationship with land in feudal states (Foucault, 2003). The sovereign’s end

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³ According to Machiavelli, sovereignty is concerned with exercising power over a territory; the Prince is external and singular to his principality, and his relation to his territory is continually under threat (Foucault, 1991).

⁴ Foucault (2003) locates in Hobbes’ *Leviathan* a schema for sovereignty: “In this schema, the Leviathan, being an artificial man, is no more than the coagulation of a certain number of distinct individualities that find themselves united by a certain number of the State’s constituent elements. But at the heart, or rather the head, of the State, there is something that constitutes it as such, and that something is sovereignty, which Hobbes specifically describes as the soul of the Leviathan” (p. 29). The problem of sovereignty in this case is how a number of different wills and individuals can be united in a single body, with sovereignty at its head. The laws, according to Hobbes, are the walls of the government and the nation (Hobbes, 1995, in Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006). People volunteer to be subject to this sovereign through agreeing to a social contract for protection, for instance.
or goal is for the “common good.” This common good, however, is defined in terms of obeying the “laws” or juridical-political order: it is a,

…state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which they are assigned, and respect the established order so far as this order conforms to the laws imposed by God on nature and men: in other words, “the common good” means essentially obedience to the law, either that of their earthly sovereign or that of God, the absolute sovereign. (Foucault, 1991, p. 95)

The foundation of sovereignty in this regard is thus circular reasoning: what defines sovereignty is, in effect, submission to sovereignty (Foucault, 1991).

Of central import to sovereignty is the law. The idea of sovereignty is founded and supported by juridical thought, which, in Western societies, has, “centered around royal power ever since the Middle Ages” (Foucault, 2003, p. 25) and seeks to define the amount of power the king could/should have. Sovereignty is based on defining what is “right” and what is “wrong” through legal codes; the legality of sovereignty is meant to prohibit specific types of behaviour (Foucault, 2007) that act to protect the “right” of the prince, governor or government to function over a particular territory (Foucault, 1991). The law, in essence, “represents the will of the sovereign; [crime] attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of the Prince” (Foucault, 1995, p. 47).

Sovereignty in a liberal democracy consists of a juridical order created, in part, to limit the power of the state (Foucault, 1991). In this configuration, citizens are understood to hold power as they elect the government that will govern. These laws define “right” and “wrong,” as argued by Foucault (1991, 1995). Even in liberal
democracies, the government of states will mobilize the idea of “sovereignty” to suspend law, whereby “sovereignty’ denotes the task of any state to preserve and protect its own territoriality” (Butler, 2006, p. 55). Sovereignty is therefore utilized through different forms of state power and, as a construct, is understood in multiple ways.

The importance of the law to Foucault’s conceptualization is exemplified through his discussion of not obeying the “law”: one could suffer serious corporal penalty through public spectacle, meant to threaten and deter others from committing the same “crime” (Foucault, 1995). One of the ultimate forms of power the sovereign/king has, therefore, is the right over life and death. Put succinctly, the sovereign has the right to let live or make die: as Foucault (2003) explains, “the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign” (p. 240).

Consistent with Foucault’s broader conceptualization of truth and power, he argues that most theories of sovereignty are limited because they suppose a top-down understanding of domination. In Society Must be Defended, Foucault (2003) lays out an alternative methodology for understanding power of the sovereign: specifically, he argues, we must look at how power operates through people, at its capillaries, within the network in which it circulates. Power is not about a homogeneous domination of a class or state over others, but is manifest between individuals, as people are, “in a position to both submit to and exercise power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays” (Foucault, 2003, p. 29). Regarding the question of sovereignty, then,
…rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject. To grasp the material agency of subjugation insofar as it constitutes subjects… (Foucault, 2003, p. 28)

Power, therefore, does not emanate from a single sovereign, but multiple smaller dominations produce people who are subject to a sovereign through identities such as race and class, as will become apparent in Chapters 3 and 4.

**Accumulation by dispossession and the question of land**

Whereas Foucault argues that discourse and associated “truths” effectively constitute power, Marx locates power in the material world, specifically through social relations of economic production. Through his theories of capitalism and socialism, he popularized historical materialism as a methodology. Specifically, Marx utilizes the philosophical notion of “practical materialism” to examine humans’ relationships with the world around them, including with raw materials and with the means of production (Foster, 2000). Marx takes a “realist” ontological stance, “emphasizing the existence of an external, physical world, independent of thought” (Foster, 2000, p. 6). He believes in a close relationship between the natural sciences and the social world, and that one constructs his or her own human-natural relations through action, or material praxis (Foster, 2000). Human consciousness is a result of people’s interactions with the material environment, and thus “thought” is structured through material reality (Marx & Engels, 2002).
David Harvey, a Marxist urban geographer, has written at length on capitalism as a grounded, material process. He states that, “diverse material processes (physical, ecological, as well as social) must be appropriated, used, bent, and re-shaped to the purposes and paths of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2006, p. 78). Capitalism, according to Harvey and Marx, thus has a basis in material reality, a reality which often becomes subsumed through the process of capital accumulation. Both Marx and Harvey understand land as being one of the key material factors in creating a capitalist system, partly through its relationship with primitive accumulation.

Marx’s notion of primitive – or original – accumulation is appropriate for understanding how capitalism begins in a particular area of the world. In Capital, Marx (1965) explains that primitive accumulation is the, “historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production” (p. 714). He further describes how primitive accumulation occurs; it is, “…when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and ‘unattached’ proletarians on the labour market” (Marx, 1965, p. 716). Therefore, primitive accumulation involves separating the producer/labourer from his or her means of production – oftentimes taking away people’s land so they cannot subsist any more – thus “freeing” him or her to participate in the wage labour force (Marx, 1965). Primitive accumulation in Marx’s original writings refers to the process by which feudal serfs were forced into the expanding capitalist system in England. Marx recognizes that such primitive accumulation proceeds differently in diverse places and across time, although in most
places it has a physically violent nature. Thus, in *Capital*, Marx (1965) explicitly lays out the process of primitive accumulation in England, although in later writings he elaborates on how the process may differ in places such as Russia (Coulthard, 2010).

David Harvey (1982, 2004) critiques and expands the commonly over-simplified Marxist explanation of primitive accumulation. He states that assumptions of an “already-occurred” primitive accumulation are faulty, as several commentators have agreed that this process occurs continuously and into the present-day. Harvey (2003) explains,

> The disadvantage of these assumptions is that they relegate accumulation based upon predation, fraud, and violence to an “original stage” that is considered no longer relevant or, as with [Rosa] Luxemburg, as being somehow “outside of” the capitalist system. A general re-evaluation of the continuous role and persistence of the predatory practices of “primitive” or “original” accumulation within the long historical geography of capital accumulation is, therefore, very much in order… (p. 144)

He coins the term for the ongoing process of primitive accumulation as “accumulation by dispossession” and outlines the various methods by which this occurs in today’s global system. For instance, accumulation by dispossession is at work through, “the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations,” the “conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights,” and the “monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of the land” (Harvey, 2003, p. 145). Land exchange and property rights are thus key components of Harvey’s conceptualization of accumulation by dispossession.
Alternative understandings of capitalism’s primitive accumulation

Accumulation by dispossession as a concept can thus be utilized in order to understand the effects of power inherent in the process of land exchanged for the World Cup; however, many scholars argue that this theoretical concept must be heavily nuanced. The primary lens through which Marxian theories of dispossession operate is capitalism: land subsistence is understood as “pre capital” while the process of bringing people who subsist on the land into the waged economy is understood as a process of capitalism. Many colonial and postcolonial theorists take issue with this lens, however. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Marcus Taylor, and Kalyan Sanyal, for instance, attempt to understand the ways that the transformation of the idea of land into private property occurs through a change in the conceptualization of land as a result of both capital and non-capital processes.

Primitive accumulation in the postcolony is often explained in terms of the global expansion of the capitalist system; however, many postcolonial scholars find fault with Marxist theories as they attempt to describe the process of capitalism in the “global system.” Chakrabarty (2000) and Taylor (2011) critique orthodox Marxist approaches, explaining that these theories are based in historicist thought and tend to describe capitalism as a bounded system. According to Chakrabarty (2000), historicism involves understanding historical time as being empty and homogenous; the teleology of capitalism as a totalizing force transforms this time into capital relations and modes of being. In other words, capitalism in these interpretations is a system, with an inside and
an outside, while the logic of capital subjugates all with which it comes into contact. Most theories of capitalism have a deterministic spatial and temporal logic: areas of the world that have not yet undergone processes of capitalism – that is, the “Third World” – are often posited as “waiting rooms” of capitalism (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 65), and are positioned as spaces where capital has not yet, but will eventually, penetrate and subsume.

Chakrabarty, Taylor and Timothy Mitchell (1991) urge us to take a more nuanced approach to understanding the contingencies of capitalism in various areas of the world, as capitalism transforms, and is transformed by, non-capitalist histories with which it comes into contact. Instead of problematic historicist theories of capitalism, Chakrabarty (2000) advocates for understanding the “history of capital” as being discernible only once capital has come into being. He argues that to avoid historicist understandings of capitalism, one must recognize that there are different “histories” to capitalism’s becoming. One can only know these historical processes that created capitalist relations once the relations are already in place. Chakrabarty (2000) calls this, “a past posited by capital itself as its precondition” (p. 63), as the history of capital can only be understood once it is in “being” (p. 62). The history that is integral to the development of capitalism in an area he terms “History 1” (Chakrabarty, 2000).

Marcus Taylor (2011) critiques the idea of primitive accumulation to demonstrate the eurocentrism and teleology of theories of capitalism. He uses the example of Michael Webber’s work (2008, as cited in Taylor, 2011) to explain how the paradigm of primitive
accumulation may be problematic. Webber, according to Taylor (2011), attempts to locate in China the social processes of primitive accumulation as outlined by Marx; these include the transformation of pre-capital modes of being into a capitalist system through land dispossession and privatization, for instance. He inevitably comes to the conclusion, however, that this is a non-linear process, that there is no clear transition, and that there is not a singular logic driving the process of capitalism (Taylor, 2011). Taylor (2011) accuses Webber of attempting to “shoehorn” (p. 4) diverse social processes into a Eurocentric and unique theory of primitive accumulation. Instead, Taylor (2011) argues we must,

…talk of capital as a process that constantly inhabits, remakes, and is fundamentally remade in its interactions with institutional forms, regimes of value and alternative temporalities that have their lineage in other histories and modes of being…[and] to reconceptualize such boundaries [between capital and non-capital] as frontiers that are made and remade through historically contextualized struggles. (p. 5)

Capitalism, then, is not a structure, but a process that comes into contact with other forms of being through diverse processes that may resemble, but will never be the same as, Marx’s “capitalism arising” through primitive accumulation in feudal England.

To support his argument, Taylor (2011) employs Chakrabarty’s understanding of history; the latter’s key contribution is in elucidating an alternative type of history not associated with capitalism. Chakrabarty (2000) argues that one can deduce from Marx’s argument a second type of “history.” In *Theories of Surplus Value, Volume 3*, Marx states that capital encounters antecedents of its history but “not as antecedents established by
itself, not as forms of its own life-process” (p. 468, in Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 63). Chakrabarty interprets this to mean that Marx recognizes a history outside of capital that does not contribute to its self-reproduction. Chakrabarty (2000) terms these “antecedents” “History 2.” According to this understanding, History 2 is not separate from capital, but is intertwined with it; capital, through its becoming, encounters these antecedents as each mutually interacts with the other. These antecedents can either become subordinated to capital or not; but, according to Chakrabarty (2000), History 2s will always affect the social relations inherent in capital through a constant battle with its “becoming.” Thus, according to this theory, there is no “outside” or “inside” to capital. Furthermore, using the heuristics of History 1 and History 2, capital’s “becoming” can exist alongside its “being.” The implication of this theorizing, according to Chakrabarty (2000), is that, “Difference, in this account, is not something external to capital. Nor is it something subsumed into capital. It lives in intimate and plural relationships to capital, ranging from opposition to neutrality” (p. 66). Historical and spatial differences, then, must be considered when understanding how capitalism arises and “exists” in a particular area of the world.

History 2s can be integrated into capital or can continue to exist in tension with capital’s being. Chakrabarty (2000) quotes a passage of Marx’s *Surplus Value Volume 3* that indicates money and commodities are not necessarily antecedent to capital’s being; they could exist without being subsumed by the logic of capital. These relations within History 2 had to be destroyed as independent forms and subjugated by capital using, if
necessary, violence or the power of the state (Chakrabarty, 2000). Utilizing this understanding of History 2, then, I argue that land can be understood as an antecedent to capital’s being, but is not necessarily inherent to it. In order for land to be part of the capitalist system, it must be transformed into private property or have capital embedded in it, processes that involve the extraction of labour from a workforce and consequent accumulation of surplus value to profit a few. However, land can continue to exist alongside capitalist processes if it continues to belong to a community for subsistence purposes, for instance. Land is not inherent to capitalism, and thus forms part of History 2.

Kalyan Sanyal (2007) also takes issue with the notion of “primitive accumulation,” but for reasons different from Taylor. While recognizing that Marxist ideas of development tend to be too historicist, with an emphasis on transition, Sanyal (2007) posits that transitions to capitalism do not actually occur within the postcolonial world. Instead, primitive accumulation occurs as an ongoing function of capitalist expansion; in other words, capitalism can only occur in these areas of the world through an intimate, ongoing relationship between processes of primitive accumulation and capitalism (Sanyal, 2007). The former does not merely “precede” the latter. Primitive accumulation, in Sanyal’s formulation, differs from Marx’s conception because the dispossessed are not a “reserve labour force” that can become part of “capital,” but in fact are never incorporated into the system. Instead, they comprise a “wasteland” of the dispossessed (Sanyal, 2007).
Sanyal’s (2007) primary argument is that this “wasteland” of non-capital is sustained by the “reverse” of primitive accumulation, whereby the means of labour – that is, food and shelter, for instance – are transferred from the space of “capital” to this space (or wasteland, or “need economy”) of “non-capital.” This is not a transfer necessary for capitalism Sanyal (2007) argues: people could just be left to die and the capital would continue to accumulate. In a similar vein, Glen Coulthard (2010) argues that for primitive accumulation to occur, capitalists need only appropriate the land, while the expropriated people do not necessarily become a part of the labour force of the capitalist system. The reason that expropriated people are kept alive through a transfer of capital to the “wasteland” – in order to “sustain” the population at a subsistence level – is to “legitimate” the capitalist system in light of broader discourses of human rights (Sanyal, 2007). In other words, the discursive construction of equality and the right to life necessitates keeping people alive. Sanyal (2007) argues that the development industry is meant to do just this. “Development” has become about the “management of poverty” and meeting people’s basic needs, instead of the post war period understanding of development as a “transition to capitalism” (Sanyal, 2007). Furthermore, while people who are “outside of capital” may not partake in creating surplus value, they are still involved in social reproduction as they subsist and take care of their young (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

Sanyal (2007) is drawing on an argument of Foucault’s that is not specific to the capitalist system. Sanyal (2007) employs Foucault’s “ship of fools” metaphor, which the
latter utilizes to describe how “the mad” were excluded from the cities of the “normal,” while being “included” through the idea of spiritual salvation (see Foucault, 1988). In order to heed Taylor (2011) and Chakrabarty’s (2000) arguments that our analyses of capitalism should not be capital-centric, it is useful to turn to Foucault. While the “wasteland of the dispossessed” may be excluded from capital, such exclusion occurs through expropriated people’s constitution as immoral and deviant (Foucault, 1988), in part because of their impoverished status, but also due to identities such as class and race; the latter is particularly relevant in South Africa due to its history of apartheid. It is thus these components of the History 2 of South Africa – such as the constitution of race and class – that, I argue, assist in constituting this “wasteland of dispossessed”; the logic of capital is not sufficient to explain which people are forced into this space and for what purpose.

Is capitalism then a “system” with an inside and outside to it? Chakrabarty and Taylor’s ideas can be reconciled with Sanyal’s framework to a certain extent. Capitalism as a process (Taylor, 2011) meets other, pre/non-capital formations and value regimes (Chakrabarty, 2000) and propels people into capitalist processes or into the space of non-capital (Sanyal, 2007) through nuanced and contingent forms of primitive accumulation (Marx, 1965) and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004). These processes of capitalism and primitive accumulation/accumulation by dispossession are contingent upon the particular History 2s that said processes encounter. People are disconnected
from their land and while a few may become a “reserve army of labourers,” many are never able to survive beyond having their basic needs met.

Given the various theories of capitalism and primitive accumulation, where can I situate my analysis of land dispossession as primitive accumulation in South Africa, while recognizing the nuances and contingencies of this particular area and moment? What theories are best able to help us understand the “situation” of the World Cup in South Africa and how might these happenings inform our theories? I do not believe that Taylor’s (2011) caution regarding the use of primitive accumulation as an analytic heuristic forecloses the relevance of land dispossession in this case study of South Africa. As I have argued previously, this land dispossession occurs within a very particular post-apartheid socio-political context of land transfer, or, in Chakrabarty’s (2000) terms, a History 2. This is different from Webber’s (2008, as cited in Taylor, 2011) work, which attempted to describe China’s development in terms of a strict definition of primitive accumulation that posits the process as merely a forerunner to capitalism. Instead, I am recognizing the contingent and nuanced processes involved in forcing people from their land as a function of the community’s History 2, as primitive accumulation can occur prior to, or through, capitalist processes.

The framing of a “community’s right to land” is one example of how the particular history of South Africa, built upon a tribal system and the fight for equality in an apartheid state, has affected the process of capitalism. The need to historicize discourses around land rights in South Africa is exemplified by Gillian Hart’s (2006) work. As she
argues, land has been of central import to social movements and socio-political rights
carries tremendous symbolic and moral force because of the dispossessions that occurred
during colonialism and apartheid. These periods of South African history saw black
South Africans thrown off of 87% of their land and placed into reserves or Bantustans on
the remaining 13% (Walker, 2000 in Hart, 2006). She argues that the land question in
South Africa has to be understood in this historical context of racialized dispossessions
and the resultant social movements that fought for land rights. Therefore, any theory of
accumulation by dispossession for the World Cup must take into consideration South
Africa’s “land question” as its History 2, which, has not always been solely a function of
“capitalism.”

A very particular form of accumulation by dispossession was at work, then, in South
Africa. People were separated from their means of subsistence through the monetization
and exchange of land. However, this was not an individualizing force, nor has it
propelled workers into the capitalist workforce, two elements of the primitive
accumulation as described by Marx (1965) with respect to agrarian England. Land can be
understood as a function of History 2 because it does not necessarily become part of the
capitalist system; land can be used as a commons, for the good of all, or it can be used for
capital accumulation in the interest of private or public entities. The particular History 2
of the area – that is, South Africa’s history of apartheid, capitalist expansion and protest,
for instance – partake in defining if and how land becomes part of the capitalist system.
Reading capitalism through Foucault and Marx I: Reconciling the material and discursive

Land is, in part, a material antecedent involved in the expansion of capitalism. The “ideas” of land and the economy are intimately related to material practices of production, consumption and exchange through processes of capitalism. However, prominent theorists of capitalism place different emphases on the importance of the material and the discursive in explaining how power operates. It is my contention that Foucault’s theory of power can help us understand how capitalism is associated with a transformation of knowledge/discourse combined with material practice. Furthermore, Marx’s theory of capital has an inherent recognition of the importance of ideas and abstraction. In this section I discuss the discursive in Marx and the material in Foucault. I utilize Chakrabarty and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak to conceptualize Marx in a more discursive formulation, and proceed to argue that there is an inherent recognition of materiality and practice in Foucault’s understanding of truth and the economy. I thus seek to find points of convergence between Marx and Foucault in order to better theorize the material and discursive in processes of capitalism.

Chakrabarty’s reading of Marx provides an interesting foundation to articulate materialist conceptions of capital with discursive explanations of capitalism and the “market.” Surplus value is a product of labour abstraction, Chakrabarty (2000) explains. Surplus value, according to Marx (1965) is the capital that is produced above an object’s use value – as a product of the human labour needed to create it – and is therefore the
abstraction of this labour. Abstract labour then, according to Chakrabarty’s reading of Marx, is, “a way of explaining how the capitalist mode of production managed to extract from peoples and histories that were all different a homogenous and common unit for measuring human activity” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 50). The process of abstracting requires a material reality, however. In Grundrisse, Marx explains,

As a rule, most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to all...the point of departure of modern economics [is] namely the abstraction of the category ‘labour,’ ‘labour as such,’ labour pure and simple, [and] becomes true in practice. (p. 104-105, in Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 54)

Therefore, Marx recognizes that people and their histories are heterogeneous, but through the concrete practice of producing surplus value, people’s labour is homogenized and can then be abstracted as a “common unit” (Chakrabarty, 2000).

According to Chakrabarty (2000), the idea of abstract labour as posited in Marx’s critique of capitalism was only possible with Enlightenment ideas and values of human equality, freedom and rights. One can only critique capitalism through the lens of human equality, as one can only deem abstract labour comparable if one values the labour as equal (Chakrabarty, 2000). In other words, one can only critique the alienating and exploitative aspects of the capitalist system when one considers that all individuals are equal and should be “free.” These ideas, according to a Foucauldian perspective, are discursive constructions; equality and freedom are not actual “truths” but are constructs created as a function of time and place, in this particular instance the Enlightenment in
Europe. Therefore, drawing on Chakrabarty, I believe Marx’s critique of capitalism can only be understood as a function of the discourse in which he was embedded.

But what is the relationship between discursive and materialist conceptions of labour? Marx understands the abstraction of human labour as a material process: large numbers of people must be physically labouring and producing objects with use value in order for this value to be comparable and exchangeable (Chakrabarty, 2000). Therefore, the abstraction of labour occurs only through material practices: the practices that one carries out are then productive of particular ideas. The practices of discipline, according to both Marx and E.P. Thompson, are fundamental to industrial capitalism and the abstraction of labour (Chakrabarty, 2000). Capitalism’s inner logic compels the labourer to be treated like a machine, with physical movements reduced to mechanistic properties and abstracted to take the form of the object produced (Marx, 1965). The factory clock oversees this disciplined labour (Thompson, 1974). According to Marx, it is the practice of discipline that makes abstract labour visible (Chakrabarty, 2000) but, as I have argued through Chakrabarty above, his theory betrays the significance of discursive ideas of equality and freedom in elucidating and critiquing abstract labour.

This explanation of capitalism’s labour abstraction as a material practice is not wholly inconsistent with Foucauldian theorizing. In a strikingly similar vein, Foucault (1995) argues that technologies of discipline manifest in material practices such as the uniform space of the factory and the working day schedule; these practices create “productive bodies.” He states that practices, which can be material in nature, are
combined with regimes of truth to produce power effects (Foucault, 1980). Regimes of truth are discursive constructions; it is the idea that disciplinary institutions and technologies are the way the world is to be ordered that is most significant to Foucault. Yet here we find in Foucault an inherent recognition of the importance of the material world: the material practice of discipline must be combined with a regime of truth for power to operate. The idea of the disciplines and disciplinary technologies are thus constituted through practice as much as through ideas. While Marx places his critical emphasis on the material world, the two theorists are not wholly incompatible through this notion of practice.

An alternative way to understand the intimate relationship between the material and discursive in Marxian understandings of the economy is through postcolonial literary critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Spivak subscribes heavily to a Marxist understanding of labour relations and the international division of labour, but does so from a Derridean language perspective. In her influential text *Can the Subaltern Speak*, Spivak (1988) argues that language and the economy are “co-originary,” as the market is only understood through the usage of a specific language; thus, one cannot separate English linguistics from ideas of the free market economy and, as a corollary, the experience of those under imperial and/or colonial rule. Returning to Foucauldian theoretical language, then, discourse is inherently structured by the language we use, as the latter constructs our understanding of the world and therefore constitutes practices such as those of the
free market economy. Capitalism then can only make sense within this particular linguistic formation.

Spivak’s (1988) reading of Marx also allows for a more nuanced and contingent idea of capitalist class. Marx, Spivak (1988) claims, understands that the working class is not a homogenous entity and was only joined in a class formation due to their common exploitation and alienation through capitalism. Spivak (1988) argues that in understanding representation as two-fold in terms of political representation of interests and representation in the reportraying sense, Marx was able to focus on the former in his interpretation of the working class. Marx constructed “models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other” (Spivak, 1988, p. 276). Their representative is merely a political representative; Marx’s working class, thus, is not a homogenous entity and cannot be re-presented – or re-portrayed – as a unitary subject (Spivak, 1988). This theoretical understanding is consistent with Chakrabarty’s (2000) argument that the “working class,” as understood by Marx, is heterogeneous except for common labour extraction and exploitation. I believe we can employ Foucault to understand how the workers become “united”: through an understanding of a shared oppression – which can be understood as a discursive construction – the working class can identify as commonly exploited abstract labour and form a class consciousness in order to revolt. This discursive understanding of abstract labour is therefore key in Marx’s idea of a socialist revolution.
Respect for the material world and material practice is evident in much of Foucault’s theorizing, as well. The material layout of space, particularly in terms of the functioning of the economy, is fundamental to Foucault’s different technologies of power. While present in much of his work, Foucault most explicitly lays out his theories of space in his lectures at the College de France entitled *Security, Territory, Population*. In these lectures where he describes governmentality most closely, Foucault (2007) documents how sovereign, disciplinary and security mechanisms create spatial divisions. Sovereign power, according to Foucault (2007), is fundamentally about space because it involves maintaining and retaining control over a territory. The subjects – that is, the people within the principality – are defined as such only as far as they inhabit this area. With sovereignty, there is also the problem of the seat of government and from where the most effective juridical laws can be imposed. As Foucault (2007) states,

> A good sovereign, be it a collective or individual sovereign, is someone well placed within a territory, and a territory that is well policed in terms of its obedience to the sovereign is a territory that has a good spatial layout. (p. 14)

Also important in sovereign power is the notion of circulation: walled and enclosed towns have to be spatially and materially “opened up” for juridical, administrative and economic mechanisms to ensure and protect the seat of the sovereign (Foucault, 2007). This idea of the necessity of “circulation” complements Marx’s (1965) explanation of capital as “value in motion.” Thus, the layout of sovereign space not only allows a sovereign power or prince to retain control of his or her territory, but also allows for the opening of capitalist markets.
Disciplinary space is quite different from sovereign space, as the idea of discipline is to divide and regulate bodies in an orderly fashion. This can be partially accomplished through the layout of space within a city or town: utilizing the example of the French town of Richelieu, Foucault (2007) describes disciplinary towns as, “the constitution of an empty, closed space within which artificial multiplicities are to be constructed and organized according to the triple principle of hierarchy, precise communication of relations of power, and functional effects specific to this distribution” (p. 17). Therefore, these towns tend to be arranged in a grid-like fashion with parallel streets. Foucault (2007) explains that the structure is not completely symmetrical, however; rectangles of differing sizes are created by streets, with the larger spaces organized in one section of the town and inhabited by richer folks. A commercial area is also found in the smaller rectangles of the grid, allowing for easier circulation of goods. Again, the importance of the material layout of space for circulation of capital – oftentimes in the form of goods – is apparent in Foucault’s writings.

Finally, Foucault elaborates significantly on his idea of “security space” associated with governmental mechanisms of power. Because governmentality is based on the idea of “working with” or “managing” more natural elements of the world and tendencies of the population, the security structure of cities is also based on managing the material world (Foucault, 2007). Comparing disciplinary and security space, Foucault (2007) writes,

Discipline works in an empty, artificial space that is to be completely constructed. Security will rely on a number of material givens. It
will, of course, work on site with the flows of water, islands, air, and so forth…It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed. (p. 19)

As with other security and governmental mechanisms, then, the arrangement of physical space is to create the most productive and healthy population, utilizing measures to ensure disease prevalence, for instance, is statistically “normal.”

Governmentality and its associated security mechanisms complement and uphold a capitalist economic system. To this end, towns need to be able to circulate goods and therefore cannot be enclosed by walls or constricted by curfews. Foucault (2007) acknowledges that these conditions, though, can also increase insecurity because of the, “influx of the floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers, and so on, who might come, as everyone knows, from the country” (p. 18). Therefore, governmentality involves minimizing the risks posed by these populations while maximizing the circulation of capital, often through the structure and the layout of the town/country (Foucault, 2007).

Inherent to Foucault’s conceptualization, thus, is an important notion of materiality. He is not a materialist in the Marxian sense; Foucault does not believe that social relations are constituted predominantly in terms of interactions with the material world. He does, however, acknowledge that a series of natural and artificial “givens” – such as rivers and houses – have “overall effects bearing on all who live in it” (Foucault, 2007, p. 21). These elements comprise a field of intervention in which governance attempts to
affect a population. Furthermore, the population itself is inherently material, as it represents a “multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the materiality within which they live” (Foucault, 2007, p. 21). The mechanisms of power associated with governmentality, discipline and sovereignty manifest in part through the material layout of space, and regimes of truth/power are necessarily bound to material practices.

Furthermore, discursive constructions as elucidated by Foucault create what we know to be true and thus shape how we act with respect to capitalism and the market economy. People construct and participate in their material world according to the regimes of truth that constitute particular ways of being. For instance, according to Foucault’s (1991) theorizing on governmentality, the economy was first conceptualized as occurring at the level of the family, and the art of government in the 16th to 18th centuries was defined as amassing wealth and managing goods at this level; the art of government was thus about inserting “economy” into political practice. There was a transformation in the 18th century about how the economy was understood, however. According to Foucault (1991),

The word “economy,” which in the sixteenth century signified a form of government, comes in the eighteenth century to designate a level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of complex processes that I regard as absolutely fundamental to our history. (p. 93)

The idea of the economy as a way to order existence thus became paramount to material practices.
The modern day idea of the economy was only possible through the construction of the idea of the population, made possible through the amassing of people by the advent of statistics. With the isolation of the “idea” of the population, “the new science called political economy” takes hold,

…arising out of the perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth; and this is accompanied by the formation of a type of intervention characteristic of government, namely intervention in the field of economy and population. (Foucault, 1991, p. 101)

Thus, it is the discursive construction of the population that allows for modern day ideas of the economy, which help uphold the materialist practices of the capitalist system.

Inherent to Foucault’s theorizing is a recognition that these discursive constructions arise precisely because of material realities. The “idea” of the population was only able to come about because of “general processes” outlined by Foucault (1991), including “the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century, connected with an increasing abundance of money, which in turn was linked to the expansion of agricultural production through a series of circular processes” (p. 98). Thus, I argue, Foucault recognizes the importance of the materiality of population growth, for instance, in helping constitute the idea of the population, even if he contends that power operates through the discourses of truth with which these processes are combined.

The material economy, according to Foucault, is not the basis of power. He argues that various practices and technologies may be associated with and contribute to the market economy, but it is not the market that itself is the sole source of power. Instead,
various phenomena, techniques, and “procedures of power” may become politically and economically useful (Foucault, 1980). At this point, these technologies of power can be “invested and annexed by more global phenomena” (Foucault, 1980, p. 99). In other words, we cannot explain power as simply the “domination of the bourgeois class” because a hegemonic domination can only take form through various smaller dominations that, for various reasons, are already occurring. These dominations can then be utilized for the goal of capital accumulation. Foucault employs the example of the exclusion of the “mad” to explain that at a particular moment exclusionary mechanisms lent themselves to economic profit and political effectiveness, thus were “colonized and maintained by global mechanisms and the entire state system” (1980, p. 101). Therefore, the materialist base of capitalism is not the ultimate form of power to Foucault, but capitalism and the market-based system are large enough forces that various technologies of power may be appropriated for capitalist ends.

In this vein, Foucault (1990) states that biopolitical and disciplinary technologies of power have become useful to capitalism, and that capitalism itself relies on these operations of power:

This biopower was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes…If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth century as techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the
administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them…The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of production. (p. 141; emphasis in original)

Therefore, those technologies developed during the 18th century that were not solely for the purposes of capital accumulation, ended up contributing vitally to how the capitalist economic system operates today. The material accumulation of capital was not the only driving force of these powers, however: various technologies became economically and politically useful, and were fundamental to allowing capitalist production and expansion, but the capitalist market was not their sole reason for “being.”

Foucault believes that power operates through discourse and becomes tied to material reality; Marx believes that truth and consciousness only occurs at the level of practice, as something becomes true only when it has a material reality. However, the two theorists are compatible to a certain extent: Foucault contends that material practices become combined with a discursive formation of truth; people define their lives and activities through the market economy because the market becomes the site of truth (Foucault, 2008) when attached to the material practices of labouring. Marx (1965), alternatively, argues that the capitalist economy is a material truth that necessitates exploiting labour, but this does not undermine Foucault’s contention that people then understand their existence in this manner. Foucault also recognizes the importance of biopolitical technologies and the material ordering of space for allowing capitalism to
operate. While Marx and Foucault tend to be pigeonholed as materialist and discursive theorists respectively, both recognize the importance of ideas and of material practice, placing different emphasis on each. I argue, then, that through a nuanced understanding of Marx and Foucault it is not possible to separate the material from the discursive, or to separate the practice of commodity production, consumption and exchange from the discursive ideas that one can, and should, produce, consume and exchange commodities in the first instance.

**Reading capitalism through Foucault and Marx II: Colonial governmentality, the market and the judiciary**

Many postcolonial scholars have drawn on Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality to explain how colonialism fundamentally altered the ways in which “property” and “land” were understood through the expansion of capitalism. Timothy Mitchell (1991) writes of how in Egypt, at the end of the 20th century, the idea of private property of land was introduced through French colonization. The Ottoman Empire had understood land as the property of the state; the French, however, believed private property to be fundamental to “civilization,” which was acknowledged as “human reason” overcoming ignorance and prejudice. According to Mitchell (1991), colonialism was viewed as the spread of this “reason,” and the imposition of the law of property (often through the forcible seizure of land) by the French provided the basis for the establishment of market relations. The principles of private property were framed as
being “universal” and “fundamental” to civilization, and thus were “true in every country” (Mitchell, 1991). As Mitchell (1991) notes, Modern economics sees the existence of property as self-evident, representing an axiomatic set of rules without which the act of exchange could not occur. In the positive accounts of law and economics, the genealogy of what is taken to be a universal system of rules is not open to investigation. This is inevitable, for if the axiomatic had its origins in particular histories and political acts, its claim to universalism would be lost. (p. 55)

In Foucauldian terms, claims to a universal law of private property and exchange establish the truth of the market, and become the truth through which we articulate our existence and engage in particular practices. Postcolonial theorist David Scott draws significantly on Foucault’s notions of governmentality to describe a theory similar to Mitchell. Like Foucault, Scott (1999) argues that modern power is not about targeting the bodies of individuals, but is concerned with rearranging the conditions in which people define their lives so that they can no longer articulate their existence through older, “pre-modern” ways of being. About the transformations produced by modern power in areas of the world undergoing colonization, Scott (1999) states that the consequence, “is that the old, premodern possibilities are not only no longer conceptually approachable expect in the languages of the modern, but are now no longer available as practical historical options” (p. 23). This modern power, “seeks to arrange and rearrange these conditions (conditions at once both discursive and nondiscursive) so as to oblige subjects to transform themselves in a certain, that is improving, direction” (Scott, 1999, p. 34). Scott, like Taylor and
Chakrabarty, understands capitalism as a process that encounters non-capitalist ways of living; however, his theorizing is more modernist and globalizing as he writes of all “pre-modern” ways of being subsumed through technologies of governmentality and the market. While this description of capitalism should be heavily nuanced and understood as contingent, Scott’s contribution in elucidating a new type of power – colonial governmentality – through processes of colonialism and the expansion of the capitalist market is valuable.

This new power elucidated by Scott was effected through a shift in the political terrain, targeting the population as a whole – as per Foucault’s governmentality through biopolitics thesis – and constitutes

the new, self-regulating field of the social: it is here, by the arrangement and disposition of the instrumentalities and institutions that sustain it – public opinion, private property, the division of labour, the market, the judiciary – that the tendency toward the identification of interests operates to ensure that the new rights-bearing and self-governing subjects do as they ought. (Scott, 1999, p. 38)

In maintaining consistency with Foucault, Scott (1999) argues that this form of governmentality is not about the imposition of laws, but of employing tactics that compel people to operate in an “improving” direction, acting out of their own self-interest. In Scott’s conceptualization, then, the market and the division of labour are paramount in structuring how people define and act out their lives.

Mitchell and Scott provide a compelling basis for articulations between Foucauldian and Marxist theories. Both Scott and Mitchell argue that modern power involves
changing the conditions of existence to fundamentally alter how people can – and should – define their lives. This can occur through the imposition of new laws and the associated discourses of universalism (Mitchell, 1991) and through “tactics” such as the constitution of the field of the social and public opinion (Scott, 1999). There is a material underpinning to these changing conditions of existence, with the relationship between the discursive and nondiscursive important to each. Mitchell (1991) finds in the changing of laws and the associated discourses upholding these laws the justification for forcible removal from land – or primitive accumulation. Similarly, Scott (1999) argues that the new tactic of the social is based on the division of labour, and the establishment of private property and the market; these “ideas” have a material reality in terms of practices that constitute and uphold the discourses that oblige people to act in a particular way. In other words, the discourses of private property and the market are, according to each scholar, intrinsic in redefining how people articulate their existence; private property itself also has a material reality.

I argue that the theoretical significance of these theorists is as follows: the law of property – which is an exercise of sovereignty through the juridico-political system – and the forcible seizure of land – which is the material practice of primitive accumulation/accumulation by dispossession – allow mechanisms of governmentality and the market to take hold, with associated discourses that justify the very same laws and disposessions; sovereign power, material processes and governmental discourses of the market are thus fundamentally intertwined. The interconnected nature of these processes...
was at work in South Africa prior to and during the World Cup. Exchange of land and resistance to unfair market dealings were voiced in discourses of capitalism and the right to property. The space of the newspaper was vital to creating the conditions in which these discourses could proliferate. These ideas will be elaborated in the following chapters.

**Agamben: Sovereignty and bare life**

Giorgio Agamben has written at length on the intimate relationship between biopolitics and sovereignty. The sovereign inherently serves a biopolitical function, Agamben (1999) argues, because he/she/the state structure ultimately defines who is and is not a citizen; the act of constituting citizenship is the act of defining who is worthy of life, and is therefore inherently concerned with the management of the life of the population. Those who are not worthy of life – as defined by the sovereign – he calls *homo sacer* or “bare life.” For example, when people are abandoned by sovereign law and not protected by the right to life, these subjects can be killed without it being a “murder” as defined by the state constitution. According to Agamben (1998), people abandoned by sovereign law also cannot be sacrificed. To “not be sacrificed” means that these *homo sacer* are excluded from the religious sphere; as opposed to capital punishment, which historically was a “purification rite,” “in the case of *homo sacer* a person is simply set outside human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law” (Agamben, 1998, p. 82). Agamben (1998) elaborates,
What defines *homo sacer* is...both the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken [excluded from both political and divine law] and the violence to which he finds himself exposed...the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may commit. (p. 82)

Sovereign law, thus, defines political citizenship and, as a corollary, defines those who do not fall within the law. This, to Agamben, is the ultimate management of life through biopolitics.

Agamben (1998) uses the example of the concentration camps in the Second World War to explain the constitution of bare life. He states that particular people – such as those with disabilities and a Jewish ethnicity – were deemed unworthy of life and thus considered non-citizens or non-political subjects by the German state. These people could then be killed but not sacrificed and thus became bare life through mass executions in the camps. These actions demonstrate sovereign law’s management of life and death; the “legal” concentration camps and the executions within represented to Agamben the ultimate form of biopolitics (Agamben, 1998).

A main thrust of Agamben’s argument as it departs from Foucault is that biopolitics and the constitution of certain people as non-citizens has inherently been a product of sovereignty since its first conceptualization. According to Agamben (1998), “the inclusion of bare life in the political realms constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (p. 6; emphasis in original). Biopolitics operates through defining who is a political subject and, therefore, constituting those who
are not and abandoning the latter to a state of exception. Agamben (1998) argues that we must, then, understand the intimate relationship between biopolitics and the juridico-institutional sovereign order: by excluding certain people from protection of the law, the law inherently includes these non-political subjects, or “bare life” as they exist in this “ban” (Agamben, 1998). Thus, the very sovereign structure of law is inherently violent as it seeks to define, and thus manage, who is considered political life and who is not. Modern democracies represent the point at which law and life, inside and outside of politics become indistinguishable, as everyone has an increasing susceptibility to becoming bare life. Agamben’s argument opposes Foucault’s conceptualization, as the latter contends that biopolitics operates through governmentality as the state is only able to intervene to the extent that it promotes the life of the population (Agamben, 1998). Both of these conceptualizations are useful; Foucault helps explain how intervention in the population to promote life is justified through the truths of the market, while Agamben’s theory explains how life comes to be defined by the state itself and how particular people can be killed. Both are biopolitical, but for different ends and through different means. Both, also, can operate at the same time, as sovereignty and governmentality function at the same moment in a particular place.

I believe that Agamben’s notion of the sovereign defining who is a political citizen and who is not can productively complement some of Foucault’s theorizations of power. As Foucault argues, in order to understand how sovereign power is produced we must look from the bottom and understand how particular people become constituted as subject
“to” this power. One of the ways in which people are constituted as non-political subjects is in part through the defining power of the state. We can use Foucault’s ideas about the economy appropriating minor dominations and apply this to Agamben’s conceptualization of the state structure: those who are already produced as particular subjugations due to race, ethnicity and gender, for instance, can be subject to more major dominations of the state. One of these major dominations may take the form of constituting who is a political subject and who is not through law and the juridico-political order.

**Alternate theories of sovereignty**

Judith Butler provides an interesting articulation between Agamben and Foucauldian conceptions of power. Her theory of rogue sovereigns is particularly helpful in understanding how sovereignty can operate both within and perhaps independently of a heterogeneous nation-state. In *Precarious Life*, Butler (2006) describes a new era of sovereignty as arising within a field of governmental technologies of power. Utilizing a Foucauldian understanding of governmentality, Butler (2006) argues that Foucault was correct in describing a change from predominantly sovereign state power to more “modern” governmental mechanisms. She departs from the French philosopher, however, by stating that sovereignty has remerged through mechanisms of governmentality, “with the vengeance of an anachronism that refuses to die” (p. 54). It is not the “state” as a static, unitary entity that is reinscribing itself through governmentality because, “governmentality designates a field of political power in which tactics and aims have
become diffuse, and in which political power fails to take on a unitary and causal form” (Butler, 2006, p. 56). Butler elaborates of whom, precisely, this new “sovereign” consists:

…because our historical situation is marked by governmentality, and this implies, to a certain degree, a loss of sovereignty, that loss is compensated through the resurgence of sovereignty within the field of governmentality. Petty sovereigns abound, reigning in the midst of bureaucratic army institutions mobilized by aims and tactics of power they do not inaugurate or fully control. And yet such figures are delegated with the power to render unilateral decisions, accountable to no law and without any legitimate authority. The resurrected sovereignty is thus not the sovereignty of unified power under the conditions of legitimacy, the form of power that guarantees the representative status of political institutions. It is, rather, a lawless and prerogatory power, a “rogue” power \textit{par excellence}. (Butler, 2006, p. 56)

Butler specifically alludes to the situation where state-associated actors are able to suspend the law and rights of individuals who have been deemed a “threat” to said state. Her case study is the suspected terrorist detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. However, her theorizing is relevant for understanding how acts of sovereignty may arise inside and outside of governmentality mechanisms in general: various “rogue” sovereigns may be in the position to make their own, “unilateral” decisions and suspend laws of their own para-juridical orders to construct Agamben’s (1998) sovereign ban.

Sovereign actors and mechanisms of sovereignty need not only arise through the state apparatus, however. John and Jean Comaroff (2006) draw on Jacques Derrida to argue that criminal organizations can act as “phantom states” in which they provide citizens with the basic services, protection, and moral order once provided by the
dominant structure of a nation-state’s government. They proceed to argue that market fundamentalism has blurred the line between licit and illicit deals, and that

…politics and crime, legitimate and illegitimate agency, endlessly redefine each other. The line between them is a frontier in the struggle to assert sovereignty or to disrupt it, to expand or contract the limits of the il/licit, to sanction or outlaw violence. Most postcolonies, as I suggested above, bear the historical traces of overrule [effected through colonialism] that either suspended legalities or deployed them to authorize predation and criminalize opposition. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 11)

While there may be organized gangs of criminals who create their own moral order, particularly as this line between licit and illicit is blurred, the battle over legality and market fundamentalism in postcolonies ensures that “criminals” are not always distinct from “politics” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006). I argue that, as a consequence, there are continuous struggles over definitions of legalities and moral codes not only within the state structure but also in other “rogue” sovereigns that may arise.

Moving forward: Constitution of bare life through capital and non-capital histories

But what is the relationship between these various legalities and moral orders of different – sometimes rogue – sovereigns and those who can be killed or relocated into camps? It is helpful to attend to Agamben’s (1998) idea of bare life to address this question. With the recognition that there is a constant negotiation over criminality within and without the state structure, as argued by John and Jean Comaroff (2006), and that even criminal organizations can govern and create laws and moral orders much like nation-states, then we should expand Agamben’s idea of the constitution of bare life:
competing sovereigns, rogue sovereigns, and (il)licit partnerships can also define who is bare life and who is not through their own (para)laws and moral codes. In other words, it is not just the “official” constitution and juridico-political order that defines who is worthy of life and who is not; less “official” institutions/partnerships/gangs can also define their own “laws” in their own interests and constitute who is bare life accordingly.

We can use Foucault’s theorizing to better complicate the understanding of this constitution of bare life. As Foucault argues, traditional theories of sovereign power are insufficient to explain how power operates. Instead, we must look at how power is constituted at its capillaries and investigate, “all the mechanisms and effects of power which don’t pass directly via the State apparatus, yet often sustain the State more effectively than its own institutions, enlarging and maximizing its effectiveness” (Foucault, 1980, p. 72-73). We therefore have to look at how people are constituted through various technologies of power and smaller dominations that serve to uphold state mechanisms and the capitalist system.

People come to be constituted as bare life, or those who can be killed but not sacrificed, through a variety of mechanisms. Agamben (1998) argues that this occurs through the construction of a juridico-political order by the state. We must complicate how people are defined as bare life by this “state,” however: the state itself is not a homogeneous entity and is not necessarily the most important constituent of the juridico-political order, as per more recent theories of sovereignty and globalization (to be elucidated in the following chapters). In addition, people are defined as bare life through
a number of different moral codes and “juridical orders” of sometimes competing and sometimes cooperating sovereigns. These orders are often created around new capitalist partnerships, as the pursuit of capital accumulation by these actors defines a particular way of living and manifests as a material reality: legitimated by the “truth” of market mechanisms, people are forced from their homes and some are killed or left to die in acts of accumulation by dispossession.

Employing a Foucauldian understanding of power, in which power is effected by all people and constitutes particular ways of being, we must look at how particular people come to be constituted as bare life “from the bottom” and through various mechanisms/technologies, and how they become subject to different sovereigns, some of which include those pursuing capitalist interests. This constitution occurs through legal codes, moral orders, and for the sake of capital accumulation, but is also a result of spatially specific histories, such as the constitution of race and “the land question” in South Africa. In other words, people are constituted as bare life through capital and non-capital, or History 1 and History 2. Race and “the land question,” in turn, affect how capitalism materially and discursively manifests in this particular area of the world.

It is worthwhile here to return to Sanyal’s (2007) two spaces of postcolonialism: that of capital, and the outside/wasteland of capital that is sustained through the flow of means of labour from the capital to the non-capital space. I would like to add a third space to this conceptualization, a space that is in constant negotiation and flux with the non-capitalist population kept alive by the development industry. I would like to posit
that the “wasteland” is comprised of individuals that are kept alive through a need economy, as explained by Sanyal, but also people who are not. Not everyone in the wasteland is given the necessary means of labour and reproduction; some are left to die, while others are actively killed. Those who are killed or left to die – Agamben’s (1998) homo sacer – are exemplified by those forced into concentration camps of the WWII holocaust, as well as many suffering from HIV/AIDS in various areas of the world.

People become constituted as subjects that can be killed or left to die for reasons such as sexual, gender, race and class identities and other “smaller dominations” elucidated by Foucault (1980, 1990, 1991).

Therefore, non-capital space is actually composed of Agamben’s (1998) “political citizens” – those kept alive by the development industry – but also those who are constituted as bare life. The “line” between the two is in a constant state of negotiation due to factors such as processes of capitalism, the moral order of particular sovereign entities, and other History 2 components such as race and “the land question.” This process of constituting particular people as bare life occurs from the bottom, through various capillaries of power, as is consistent with Foucault’s theorizations. These constitutions may then be exploited by the market or the state for the interest of capital accumulation. Importantly, though, the economy of Marx and the sovereign order of Agamben are not the only forces defining who is worthy of life and who is not.
Chapter 3: Dispossession in Nelspruit

By 2007, the textbook example of land redistribution had become entangled in corruption and legal battles. Members of the Mbombela council and the trust had arranged for land purchases – the most famous of which was the R1 land sale in return for jobs. (Smillie, 2009, para. 14)

Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the process through which South African citizens exchanged their land for the World Cup. I first empirically document newspaper coverage of land negotiations in Nelspruit, South Africa, including the “illicit” R1 deal and the more “fair” deal subsequently implemented. I also chronicle the school disposessions and associated protests. Sport mega events – whether in the North or South – have a history of displacing people; I therefore outline some of these disposessions and argue that similar processes occurred in South Africa. Even the “fair” land deal between the Matsafeni community and the municipality can be understood as David Harvey’s (2004) accumulation by dispossession, as land became monetized and exchanged for the World Cup. This is a very particular and contingent form of capitalism, however, as the land was bought by the state – thus becoming “public property” - but was utilized for the capital accumulation interests of larger corporations such as FIFA.

In the subsequent section I explain that people were not just dispossessed of their homes but of other “rights,” such as education. The demolition of schools – and the
accusations associated with these actions – demonstrate that the particular racial apartheid history of South Africa may have contributed to who was dispossessed as well as how a particular culture of mass protest may have influenced the process of capitalism. I also document other dispossessions associated with World Cup infrastructural developments and argue that these events were framed through redefinitions of the “social good.”

A main thrust of my argument is that this moment of the World Cup represents a new form of sovereignty, as public private partnerships emerged that acted primarily in the interest of capital accumulation. These relationships between corporate and state actors form a network of overlapping sovereignties as they assist in creating new laws and affect strategies of accumulation by dispossession. Materialist conceptions of capitalism are not enough to explain how people came to define their existence, however; in the following section I elucidate how people defined their lives and their rights in terms of the “market,” as the public private partnership became normalized and the idea of “development” was generally associated with the capitalist economy. An analysis of popular news discourse reveals that many took for granted the monetization and exchange of land, with little critique of the “idea” of commodification. This represents the operation of Foucault’s governmentality, which was also evident as people fought for their “right to land” through the judiciary as a way to gain access to “fair market dealings.”
To conclude this chapter I argue that those people removed from their land were constituted in a particular way as a function of South Africa’s History 2. In the case of the World Cup in South Africa, History 2 factors such as race and land rights were articulated with governmentality mechanisms to constitute how people interacted with capitalist processes, as many fought through racialized dispossessions and for their land rights in capitalist economic discourse. However, History 2 also transformed capitalism, as mass protests succeeded in having schools built, and as the process of accumulation by dispossession was partly a function of South Africa’s racial apartheid history.

The Matsafeni community and the R1 land deal

The new Mbombela stadium is situated on the outskirts of Nelspruit in Mpumalanga province, on land bought by the municipality from the Matsafeni Trust. This trust was established after the Matsafeni community was returned this land in a large post-apartheid land claim settlement. This area, according to many news reports, “had once belonged to the Matsafeni people who lived, farmed, and even buried their dead there” (Eberl, 2009, para. 2), and is often framed in popular discourse as the ancestral land for the community (Eberl, 2005; Cross & Tanner, 2009). The Mdluli clan – members of the Matsafeni community – had inhabited this area for decades but had given a portion of it to Hugh Lanion Hall (of HL Hall and Sons) who assumed ownership of the land with the beginning of apartheid in 1948 (Alcock, 2008). Other reports indicate that this was not a willing transfer, however. For instance, a major defender of the Matsafeni community’s rights is Paddy Hartdegen, an architect who writes a column for Property 24, an online
news community. In one of his reports on Nelspruit, he argues that the Matsafeni, “were forcibly removed from their ancestral land in apartheid South Africa” (Hartdegen, 2008, para. 1). Therefore, there are competing claims as to the nature of these apartheid land “deals.”

After apartheid ended in 1990 and the African National Congress (ANC) was elected in 1994, the new government implemented a Land Restitution Act, whereby communities could lodge land claims asking for land they had inhabited prior to apartheid and the government would redistribute it in as fair a manner as possible (Alcock, 2008; Hartdegen, 2008). The Matsafeni community proceeded to lodge a claim. In 2003, HL Hall and Sons transferred the ancestral “property” to the state (“Mpumalanga’s 2010,” 2009) and this land was “returned” to the community; the Matsafeni were awarded 6000 hectares by the National Land Commission in, “a textbook example of land redistribution” (Smillie, 2009, para. 10). Thereafter, “the Matsafeni families established a vibrant community, built a school and a community hall, established their own homes, put in roads, electricity, running water and sanitation” (Hartdegen, 2008, para. 1). They also set up the Matsafeni Trust to oversee and protect this land.

The South African government thought that the Matsafeni property was an ideal location for the World Cup’s most rural stadium site. To this end, the municipal government – working on behalf of the Local Organizing Committee – engaged in “negotiations” with the community to use this space for stadium construction. Initially, a one rand (or R1, the South African currency) deal – about fourteen cents in Canadian
dollars – was in place for 118 hectares (Hartdegen, 2008). Much news coverage documented the “unfairness” of this deal. Many reports alleged that it was the Trust’s management that was responsible for “giving up” prime land for R1. For instance, according to Hartdegen (2008), the Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs, Dinah Pule, made a deal with the Board of the Trust for the municipality to buy the land. Other reports stated that this R1 deal was made between Differ Mogale, the 2010 City Coordinator, and the Board (Arenstein & Ntsaluba, 2008). The Board was always implicated in these discussions, however.

Some said that there was a conflict of interest between those involved in the R1 deal. Reports exposed a relationship between 2010 City Coordinator Differ Mogale, former Matsafeni Trust Board chairperson Terry Mdluli, and Nelspruit Mayor Justice Nsibande, who were all members of the same tourism company (Arenstein & Ntsaluba, 2008). The R1 deal was made, allegedly, without the trustees calling the special meeting required to solicit the majority of the community vote – which was 75% according to Justin Arenstein and Gcina Ntsaluba (2008) and 60% according to Tshwarelo eseng Mogakane and Eleanor Momberg (2007). Other reports framed the land deal as a “donation” which would benefit the Matsafeni community: one article indicated that Mastafeni trustee Terry Mdluli’s Mdluli clan “donated” the land to the municipality, “for a mere R1 in return for jobs for the beneficiaries of the trust” (Alcock, 2008, para. 4). These reports were substantiated by other news outlets, such as The Star (see Smillie, 2009) and the African Eye News Service (see Mogakane & Momberg, 2007). It is apparent, then, that
there were many conflicting stories about how this deal was put into place; regardless of the allegations, however, most news reports indicated that the R1 land deal was unjust to the members of the Matsafeni community.

The Matsafeni Trust beneficiaries discovered and fought this deal. They hired human rights lawyer Richard Spoor (Smillie, 2009) to represent 750 of the Trust’s 1250 beneficiaries (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007). According to Spoor, the official beneficiaries were concerned with the fact that a general meeting was not held to obtain consent of the community and were concerned with a lack of transparency, “including the fact that the trustees are failing to provide financial records or to account for their actions” (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007, para. 7). In October 2007, the municipal council declared the R1 land deal between Differ Mogale and the Matsafeni Trust null and void (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007). According to Barry Moody (2009) of Reuters News Agency, “An angry high court judge…blocked the deal, accusing the municipality of being like colonial settlers who tried to buy land for mirrors and shiny buttons” (para. 6). Desmond Golding, Mpumalanga’s government director for the World Cup, defended Mogale and the deal, saying the latter consulted all relevant authorities including the 2010 political committee, the mayor and the municipal manager (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007). With the voiding of the contract, however, the government was in effect building a stadium on private property.

In January of 2008 an independent commission of inquiry was set up to look into the relationship between Mogale, Mdluli andNsibande, for failing to declare their conflicts
of interest in deals relating to the stadium. Spoor was able to help the Matsafeni, “remove discredited leaders who agreed [to] the one rand sale” (Moody, 2009, para, 29). The inquiry recommended that criminal charges be filed against Mogale and Nsibandе (Arenstein & Mogakane, 2008). New trustees were also appointed by the court as Matsafeni Trust negotiators “on behalf of the community” (Smillie, 2009, para. 8), comprised of professional trustees and members of the Mataffin and Mdluli clans (“Mpumalanga’s 2010,” 2009).

In January of 2009 negotiations resumed between the municipality and the new trustees. A contract was signed on April 29th, 2009 between the Matsafeni land beneficiaries and the Mbombela municipality, with the latter purchasing 69.7 hectares for R8.7 million rand (CAD$1.2million), priced by an independent land valuer (Mogakane, 2009). According to Differ Mogale, still in position as Mbombela’s 2010 coordinator, “The land includes the portion on which the stadium is being constructed as well as portions on which two new schools will be erected and the streets and servitudes required to provide [the] precinct with infrastructure” (Mogakane, 2009, para. 7). According to HL Hall and Sons, the company that owned the land prior to the land redistribution settlement, the Matsafeni Trust entered a joint venture with the company to further community and economic development in the area surrounding the stadium (“Mpumalanga’s 2010,” 2009).

Community infrastructure was to be disassembled and community members were to be uprooted and moved for the stadium construction:
... their only two schools will be bulldozed to make way for a stadium parking lot. Community members are to be moved 25km away to make way for hotels, shops and housing estates. In return, according to the nullified land-sale agreement, they will be offered temporary jobs on the construction of the stadium. (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007, para. 12-13)

Thus, physical dis- and relocation were constant threats seemingly justified through capital accumulation initiatives such as creating a retail and service industry of shops and hotels.

Much of the media coverage of the controversies in Nelspruit documented the two schools that were demolished for the World Cup. The event was featured prominently in the documentary Fahrenheit 2010 (see Cross & Tanner, 2009), for which school children and other members of the Matsafeni community were interviewed. They had been removed from their schools in 2007 so that the construction company could use the buildings for its offices; eventually the schools were bulldozed to construct the stadium’s parking lot (Cross & Tanner, 2009). Students protested three times by lighting a squad car on fire and clashing with the police via stone-throwing (Cross & Tanner, 2009). The school children were “moved into hot temporary classrooms that residents say are converted containers” (Moody, 2009, para. 17). Reuters reported that they were shown a document from September of 2008 in which municipal officials promised new schools would be built by July 2009 (Moody, 2009). They were not.
History of dispossession for sport mega events

Sport mega event organizers have a history of utilizing accumulation by dispossession, or the displacement of people, to stimulate further capital development through event-hosting. In *Planet of Slums*, Mike Davis (2006) elucidates the processes through which people are cleared from their land in the name of “city beautification,” often associated with hosting mega events. He dates the beginning of this practice to the reign of Baron Haussman in Paris in the 1860s, who enacted a regime of urban redevelopment that continues today, “to simultaneously maximize private profit and social control” (Davis, 2006, p.98). According to Davis (2006), in the name of, variously, beautification, modernity and progress, the state and powerful corporate actors “redraw spatial boundaries to the advantage of landowners, foreign investors, elite homeowners, and middle-class commuters” (p. 98) in order to, “clear, build, and defend islands of cyber-modernity amidst unmet urban needs and general underdevelopment” (p. 99). This understanding of land clearance and islands of “cyber-modernity” in a sea of underdevelopment is particularly relevant in Global South nations, where impoverished people and slum dwellers are more numerous than in other areas of the world.

Most of the literature on the displacement of people through hosting sport mega events concerns the modern Olympic Games. This is primarily due to the fact that the Olympics require significantly greater stadium and associated infrastructural developments; while the Olympics need many multi-purpose buildings and an Olympic village in one city, the World Cup is spread across various cities and can often make use...
of existing facilities (Tomlinson, 2009). Therefore, hosting the Olympics Games involves potentially greater displacement of people and is consequently more often studied.

Davis (2006) traces the history of displacement for mega events to the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, where “the Nazis ruthlessly purged homeless people and slum-dwellers from areas of Berlin likely to be seen by international visitors” (p. 106). Urban renewal programs associated with Games in Mexico City, Athens and Barcelona also included mass evictions (Davis, 2006). In Barcelona, over 600 families were evicted from Olympic redevelopment sites, as cited by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) (2007), a non-profit housing and evictions watchdog based in Geneva. Furthermore, in preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, USA, “approximately 30,000 poor families and other individuals [were] forced from their homes by Olympic gentrification, the demolition of public housing, rental speculation, and continuing urban renewal” (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2007, p. 113). Therefore, evictions and displacement of people have not just occurred in the Global South or under what are popularly viewed as tyrannical regimes.

Olympic Games hosted in Asia have also resulted in large-scale evictions and massive displacement of people. The 1988 Seoul Games instigated such large-scale displacement of the poor that a Catholic NGO claimed the city “vied with” apartheid South Africa as “the country in which eviction by force is most brutal and inhuman” (Davis, 2006, p. 106). COHRE estimated that 700,000 people were evicted in Seoul for these Olympics (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). The destruction of 48,000 buildings for
redevelopment in Seoul was “condemned by the UN Habitat conference in 1987 for being one of the world’s most physically violent and brutal housing relocation policies” (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2007, p. 79), along with, ironically, South Africa’s township system. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch determined that 350,000 people would be resettled for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, solely for stadium construction, as planners and developers worked together to justify mass evictions under the guise of patriotic excitement (Davis, 2006). COHRE reported that as of June 2007 already 1.25 million people had been displaced in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Games when accounting for all associated infrastructural development - that is, not just stadium construction (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2008).

The South African ‘fix’ and land reclamation as accumulation by dispossession

This particular pattern of dispossession – that is, forcing people from their land without paying them “fairly” for it – was repeated in South Africa. Specific to Nelspruit, the government made attempts to materially dispossess South Africans of their land through attempts at making the “illegal” R1 land deal for property that should have been worth – on the “fair market economy” – well more. As explained above, allegations abound that the Matsafeni community was not consulted properly as the government and the Trust’s board attempted to make the R1 deal. The process of “consultation” was framed in a few different ways in popular media. For instance, it was variously reported that, “Provincial and municipal officials initially tried to convince the Matsafeni community to donate the land for just R1” (Mogakane, 2009, para. 12; emphasis added),
to Mpumalanga provincial government officials threatening to reverse the land transfer settlement if the community doesn’t agree to sell “prime portion” for R1 through “outrageous intimidation” (Arenstein & Ntsaluba, 2008, para. 8; emphasis added).

Regardless of what rhetoric was utilized, each report highlights attempts at the government’s accumulation by dispossession. South Africans being forcibly removed from their land was even more explicitly described by Hartdegen, who expresses disgust at how the government treated the Matsafeni people:

> Worse still the provincial government tried to bulldoze the community into accepting the transaction, and sent in trucks to forcibly remove the families and resettle them on a tract of land 25km away. These actions have the hallmarks of the forced removals imposed on the people of District Six, Sophiatown, Cato Manor and many other parts of South Africa under the Nationalist Party government of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. (Hartdegen, 2008, para. 2)

Popular discourse, therefore, not only identified this R1 deal as illicit dispossession, but compared it to the History 2 of racial apartheid in South Africa. This illicit deal, and the more “legal” selling of property that followed, were undertaken in part for the South African state and FIFA to accumulate capital through use of the land.

The process of taking land from community members in order to build a stadium for the World Cup – or for any other sporting event – can be understood by employing Marxist theoretical concepts. Capital, according to Marxist geographer David Harvey (2004), can be accumulated through geographical expansion, conceptualized by Harvey as a spatio-temporal fix (STF). According to Harvey, “fix” has a double meaning: first, by fixing capital into the ground, in the form of infrastructure for instance, one may be
able to accumulate more capital through assisting in the circulation of goods or through providing a venue for profit-making events and retail outlets (Harvey, 1982). Second, there is also a “geographical” fix to the problem of overaccumulation: one can move a factory to a new geographical area of the world in order to “fix” overaccumulation, or in order to employ labour at a cheaper price and thus create more surplus value (Harvey, 2004). Geographical expansion, however, often necessitates forcing people from their land so that it may be appropriated for further accumulation. Thus, I argue that accumulation by dispossession – in which people are separated from their land – is closely associated with a spatio-temporal fix of capital.

Building a stadium in Nelspruit, South Africa, I believe, is an example of a spatio-temporal fix. Capital is being “fixed” into the ground through the construction of a stadium. This capital is produced through the social relationship between the construction workers who act as labourers and the capitalists that employ them. This labour is fixed into the ground because the actual stadium itself is not being exchanged as a commodity – it is not part of the circulation of capital. This fixing of capital allows surplus value to be accumulated through selling tickets to the sporting event, or selling media rights to televise the event.

World Cup-associated geographical expansion – moving the event every four years, in this case to the Global South – allows FIFA to accumulate more capital than it would if the event was always in the same location. This is not a fix in the sense that FIFA is overaccumulating capital in the Global North; however, moving the event to the South
suits their interests of generating even greater profits by catering to new markets in the African continent, for instance. This was one of the main reasons FIFA historically “allowed” member nations from the Global South to join their organization, as “The Third World offered great opportunities for market development” (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998b, p. 313) More significantly, expanding the World Cup to South Africa, a “developing country,” allows FIFA to capitalize on the symbolic capital of “fixing” the South African economy by helping to generate tourist dollars – the effectiveness which is heavily debated by many scholars (for instance, see Horne & Whitson, 2006). In its bid for the World Cup, South Africa itself played into this discourse of being a developing country whose economy the World Cup could “assist” (Cornelissen, 2004). Although beyond the scope of this project, I argue that this is a third type of fix that FIFA attempted to effect through hosting the World Cup in South Africa and, more recently, other Global South countries.

More importantly for theorizing land exchange, the case of stadium construction in Nelspruit exemplifies Harvey’s (2004; 2006) accumulation by dispossession in the form of the commodification and exchange of land. Physical dislocation of people from the land was most obvious during the apartheid era, when black communities had to give up their land to white Afrikaaners (Hart, 2006; Saul, 1993). However, as explained in Chapter 2, monetizing land is a form of accumulation by dispossession because the process constitutes land as an exchangeable product. The post-apartheid land reclamation process – whereby communities were able to submit claims for land they had previously
inhabited – did not constitute land as something to be exchanged on the market, nor did the Matsafeni community have to give up anything for said land. Therefore, while people were forcibly displaced from their land, this was not an example of accumulation by dispossession and land did not enter the capitalist system through this process. Land did become exchanged, however, for the World Cup. As described above, an independent valuer was hired to assign a particular value to the land, and this land was exchanged in the capitalist system when 69.7 hectares was eventually bought from the Matsafeni Trust by the Mbombela municipality for R8.7 million. This is an example of Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession, as land became monetized and exchanged and thus became a part of the capitalist system, as a result of the conditions created in part through the World Cup.

This exchange was of a particular capitalist nature, however, because the land was purchased by the municipality – which is supposed to act in the interest of the “public good” – for capital accumulation. This end goal of capital accumulation is described in newspaper reports. For instance, Differ Mogale, Mbombela’s 2010 coordinator, is quoted as saying,

> It is the intention to use the stadium and other infrastructure as leverage to develop the precinct into a strong economic node. The precinct has certain unique benefits and a specific development framework will be developed to realize the full potential of the area. (Mogakane, 2009, para. 10)

This municipal representative, then, articulates potential as the ability to develop economically and, in effect, accumulate more capital.
The municipality, as a function of the South African “state,” was therefore attempting to make money from the land deal; this is a very particular form of capitalism. Capitalism, as conceptualized by Marxists and even Foucault (for instance, see Foucault, 2008), is an individualizing force that foregrounds private property. One could argue that the process of land exchange for the World Cup was not strict privatization as understood through orthodox Marxism, because the municipality is a public structure and the benefits of building the stadium were justified through discourses of economic development for the city/province/country and thus, the population. However, most evidence indicates that the “public” is unlikely to see significant return on their investment (Whitson & Horne, 2006). In most cases, it is the multinational corporation FIFA that benefits most substantially from the World Cup, and thus, from such a land transfer. This is because it is the selling of media and marketing rights that makes the most money, and it is FIFA that receives this income, as well as a significant proportion of the ticket sales (municipalities only receive 10% of the latter, for instance) (Davies, 2009). FIFA’s financial records released in March of 2011 indicated that they had made $631 million tax-free profit from the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (including $2.41 billion in revenue from television rights), whereas the country has yet to break even on its investment in stadium and infrastructure (“FIFA makes,” 2011). Therefore, even though the land may have become “public” in name, it was not the South African public that directly accumulated capital from the use of this land during the World Cup.
I argue that land, as exemplified through the exchanges and transfers that occurred in Nelspruit during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, is part of Chakrabarty’s (2000) History 2, as it does not necessarily become part of a capitalist system. Because the state bought the land, it could be used as a “commons” for the public good. However, the very particular nature of the state’s relationship to FIFA – to be elucidated below – meant that FIFA, a private corporation, accumulated most of the capital. Therefore, while land could continue to allow for subsistence as other forms of capitalist enterprise developed in a similar spatial and temporal location, the particular process of capitalism as it manifest through FIFA and the South African state meant that land, although public property, was utilized for the capitalist system.

**School disposessions**

Forms of dispossession beyond removing people from their houses were reported in the South African news media and in the documentary *Fahrenheit 2010*. The event to gain the most media coverage was the closing of two schools to make office space for construction companies and, in the long term, to make way for the Nelspruit stadium parking lot (Cross & Tanner, 2009). *Fahrenheit 2010* documents how, at the time of filming, the schools were being torn down for a road, with no future plans to rebuild them. The children were forced to take classes in “containers” that were too hot and overcrowded (Moody, 2009). Those interviewed in connection with the story called the actions “racist,” posing the question, “if we were white, would this have happened?”
Therefore, a community’s racialized identity was being actively used to explain the pattern of disposessions.

Many protested the demolishing of Cyril Clarke Secondary and John Mdluli Primary schools. Showing dissent for the too-hot prefabricated classrooms they had been given, and demonstrating discontent over the failure of the government to fulfill its promise of new schools, the students protested. According to news reports (for instance, see Moselakgomo, 2011; Moody, 2009), they blocked the entrance to the stadium with tables and chairs and set a library and temporary classroom on fire. Seven people were arrested. The author of one article describes the protest in detail:

Frustration over the failure to keep that promise [of new schools by July 2009] erupted earlier this month [of October, 2009] with stone-throwing youths clashing with police on three occasions. A squad car was set on fire. Residents say the police retaliated by storming into their houses and firing buckshot and rubber bullets. Phumzile Rooi, 23, sat listlessly outside her hut and showed an ugly wound on her leg she said was from a rubber bullet. Police spokesman Superintendent Malcolm Mokomene said only two policemen and one protestor were hurt. He denied officers had stormed into residents’ houses. (Moody, 2009, para. 19-21)

Students were among those arrested and beaten. One Fahrenheit 2010 interviewee explained that now, because of the World Cup, he has a criminal record (Cross & Tanner, 2009).

Various state entities discussed the protests. Anthony Bernadie, leader of the Democratic Alliance, blamed the government, stating, “These actions are a direct result of the education department’s inability to heed the pupils’ demands” (Moselakgomo, 2008, “Anger flares,” para. 8). The provincial education department spokesman Zwane
responded to the protests, saying, “MEC Mmathulare Coleman has said the construction of two schools was top priority and the contractors would be appointed soon” (Moselakgomo, 2008, “Anger flares” para. 12). New schools were eventually built, likely as a result of the protests and media attention surrounding the dispossession of school children. Therefore, people of Nelspruit – including youth – were able to mobilize and effect resistance that saw their demands realized. Without delving into the private discussions of various state actors it is impossible to determine whether or not the eventual building of schools was solely based on this protest. Nevertheless, the constant delay of building until much pressure was exercised through media attention and mass demonstrations suggests that protest was instrumental in bringing about the schools’ eventual construction.

The case of the school dispossession can be understood utilizing my theoretical framework. Community members, particularly black youth, were being dispossessed for the sake of capital accumulation for the municipality, FIFA, and the construction company. Students were having basic “rights” – such as education – taken away from them and were thus increasingly being constituted as bare life by the state. Popular discourse alleged that the dispossession occurred partly as a function of the community’s constitution as black and impoverished. However, the particular South African history of protest and struggle for community rights – a component of History 2 – may have forced the government to remain accountable to its promise to rebuild the schools. As John Saul (2005) argues, “mass action was the key factor forcing the apartheid government onto the
path of ‘reform’” (p. 177) and has remained an important part of South Africa’s political democracy. Therefore, the capitalist endeavours brought about by the World Cup were being framed and re-shaped by discourses and practices of protest that were not solely a part of the community’s history of capital. While Marx theorizes that people’s consciousness and thus behaviour is actively shaped by the materialist underpinnings of the economy (Marx & Engels, 2002), this example illustrates that Foucault’s ideas of power and discourse are as helpful in understanding the situation in South Africa: the ways in which people were being constituted through ideas of race and resistance were as important for explaining the process of capitalism in South Africa as were the materialist underpinnings of capitalism itself.

**Accumulation by dispossession for infrastructural development**

Other examples of primitive accumulation and land dispossession for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa abound. For instance, it was not only stadiums that were physically dislocating people and contributing to the World Cup’s accumulation by dispossession. Other infrastructure also associated with World Cup developments assisted in this very same process. The N2 Gateway project is one such example. The idea for this housing development project along the N2 highway that connects the Cape Town airport to the city proper was part of the city’s development plans prior to South Africa winning its World Cup bid (Newton, 2006). However, the project was expedited in the wake of the bid’s success as the housing development facilitated the goals of both FIFA and the municipality. This project, in essence, was an attempt to clean up the slums along this
well-travelled tourism route and to build more aesthetically-pleasing, safer housing. In explaining why people were dislocated from the N2, Ashraf Cassiem, the Anti-Eviction Campaign Coordinator, states,

They tried to evict those families as well, you know, for the...because they want to beautify the place, they wanted to clean up the freeway and shit so they wanted to beautify it...the World Cup is coming, the people that come to watch it: they mustn’t see this. (“Tin Town,” 2010)

Activists were thus utilizing concepts of beautification and symbolic capital to explain why people were being forced from their homes for the World Cup.

Some of the dispossessed were relocated in manners similar to those of the previous apartheid state. Many people who lived in the slums were uprooted to Temporary Relocation Areas (TRAs) that, although more solidly built than most dwellings in the slums, marginalized impoverished people even further by locating them on the outskirts of core economic activities (Newton, 2006; Smith, 2010). Some have even reported that the TRAs served a panoptic function and resembled “concentration camp”-like settings (Newton, 2006). The policy elicited significant anger by activists, as Legassick (2008, as cited in Newton, 2006,) argues, “[Minister Sisulu] and her messenger MEC Richard Dyantyi (who has said that removal to Delft is ‘necessary’) are behaving like old apartheid ministers trying to engage in forced removals” (p. 106). As in Nelspruit, popular discourse regarding the N2 gateway project explicitly drew on a link between forced removals during the apartheid regime and forced removals in the name of the World Cup. South Africa’s racialized political history was actively contributing to how
various World Cup processes were being framed, while the policies and material actions themselves appears to have contributed to the entrenchment of apartheid era segregation in the post-apartheid state.

South African citizens were thus dislocated from their homes for neighborhood beautification and for capitalist interests; this is dispossession. Even when people were placed in newer houses, the buildings were often temporary, too small, and not in areas of employment/production (Newton, 2006). Spaces from which people have been removed – such as Ellis Park, a stadium site in Johannesburg – were given over to capital interests and those who were willing to build there. These companies were given large government subsidies (see Benit-Gbaffou, 2009) while much of the impoverished citizenry of South Africa were having their public property – such as water – privatized (Desai, 2002; Naidoo, 2007; McDonald, 2008). Thus, capitalist interests were being foreground as the state limited its citizenry’s access to what is often thought of as a “public good” while assisting in granting corporations the opportunity to make money.

The World Cup assisted in structuring these new relationships and opportunities in a very specific way. Noll and Zimbalist (1997, as cited in Whitson & Horne, 2006) argue that upscale entertainment facilities, such as those associated with sport, are often able to obtain tax holidays and public subsidies. Through sporting events such as the World Cup, political ideologies have stressed consumerism over “social rights” and have, “brought market-oriented meanings to agendas like ‘community development’, as well as new definitions of the public good” (Whitson & Horne, 2006, p. 76). This process was
manifest through the 2010 FIFA World Cup as construction companies were given government subsidies for infrastructural development. However, “the word ‘infrastructure’ is the new code word for the unceremonious clearance of the fragile shelters of the poor” (Seabrook, 1996, p. 267, as cited in Davis, 2006): World Cup infrastructure, framed as a public good for capital accumulation purposes, amounted to dispossessing many South Africans of their homes and land.

The framing of “community development” through market-oriented strategies was also exemplified in Nelspruit as the Matsafeni Trust, for instance, made arrangements with HL Hall & Sons in order to “develop economically” (see “Mpumalanga’s 2010,” 2009). As land is repurposed from subsistence to more commercially-oriented endeavours, a change is effected in what is understood as the “social good,” which comes to be defined in market-oriented discourse. In exemplifying this rhetoric, deputy municipal manager Roelf Kotze states about the Matsafeni’s land, “The biggest challenge is to ensure we offer adequate infrastructure at the right place at the right price, so that we create an environment conducive to investment” (Healing, 2005, para. 24). This appeal to “investment” opportunities is a component of capitalist economic discourse. As argued above, this infrastructure and market-oriented discourse manifested materially through the World Cup as accumulation by dispossession.
Who is ‘the sovereign’? Sovereignty, globalization and the public-private partnership

In South Africa during the World Cup, what was the relationship between accumulation by dispossession and sovereign power? If there was a sovereign, who was it? While heeding Foucault (1991) and Butler’s (2006) contention that sovereignty is often upheld through governmental and disciplinary mechanisms, it remains important to understand how this type of sovereignty operates in coordination and/or competition with other technologies of power. To do this we must understand who is involved in defining particular juridico-political orders and for what purposes. In this section I explore how, in the current globalized capitalist order, the public-private partnership (PPP) represents new forms of sovereignty as transnational organizations and corporations partake in defining laws and constitutions. The purpose of many of these PPPs is to accumulate capital, often through accumulation by dispossession. The next section will explain how people were dispossessed of land through the PPP, while the following details how new laws were created through cooperating sovereigns.

In order to understand how the PPP may function as a form of sovereignty, it is first vital to understand current global trends in economic thought. Classical economics is an economic doctrine that promotes capitalism as the rational mechanism for ordering society; it is the idea that if everyone participates to their fullest extent in the free market, then they will have their needs satisfied adequately due to natural market laws such as utility maximization and supply and demand (Heilbroner, 1961). Neoclassical economics
draws on these ideas and is associated with liberalism, as it is grounded in the notion that people should be “free” to act in a particular manner (although this is only freedom within the market, as I explain below). Another important aspect of this type of economy is Hayek’s idea of imperfect knowledge. According to Hayek (1948), the world is too complex for individuals to fully comprehend, and thus a centrally planned government cannot possibly control an economy it can never exhaustively know. Individuals who pursue their own interests will be spontaneously ordered by the supply and demand of market mechanisms, which will ensure a better distribution of goods than any individual or government is able to plan (Gray, 1982). This belief was central to the laissez-faire capitalist growth model of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Laissez-faire (or let things be) government is based on protecting the freedom of the individual (Peck & Tickell, 2002). That is, the individual is responsible for him or herself with limited government intervention, and the private market is supposed to meet the needs of all individuals if they fully participate in it.

Many have argued that in the current era of globalization, as national borders become increasingly permeable and large corporations and international governance bodies increasingly impact and govern nation states, there is a “crisis of sovereignty,” or that the sovereign as traditionally described by Hobbes and Machiavelli no longer exists/is no longer relevant. Jorge Nef (2002) explains the crisis of sovereignty as arising through the process of globalization: a neoimperial order, characterized by the hegemony of global financial institutions, has, “increased the ongoing erosion of national sovereignty,
reducing the scope of the UN system and multilaterality in general [as global financial institutions] make the rules of world politics, economics and culture in terms of Western interests” (p. 59). He states that neoliberalism has become the hegemonic ideology in this system, and that elite internationalism has displaced elite nationalism (although, as will become clear below in my discussion of overlapping sovereignties, one cannot separate the two) (Nef, 2002). These thoughts echo David Harvey’s contention that, since 1970, the global political system has been particularly broken, and we have thus entered a period of “new” imperialism through the United State’s hegemony via finance capital (Harvey, 2004). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001), in their landmark book entitled *Empire*, take up a similar argument when they state that sovereignty has become deterritorialized and decentred through globalization, with Empire now rescaled from the level of the nation state. The new global order consists of a network form of sovereignty which includes dominant and less dominant nation-states, supranational institutions, major capitalist corporations, and other powers, with divisions and hierarchies crossing local, national and regional boarders (Hardt & Negri, 2001). In these dominant arguments, therefore, the nation-state has become increasingly less relevant in terms of defining laws and constituting a juridico-political order.

However, not all scholars of sovereignty believe that the nation-state is becoming less relevant. Some, such as Shalini Randeria (2007), argue that, “the state is both an agent and an object of globalization…[and] remains indispensable, as its laws and policies play a key role in transposing neoliberal agendas to the national and local levels”
Instead of reducing the influence of the nation-state, Randeria (2007) argues that globalization results in an overlapping of sovereignties, as international financial and trade organizations, transnational corporations, states, and NGOs/civil society all influence the creation of legal codes, with multiple laws sometimes applying at different scales to the same geographic place. We have, Randeria (2007) states, entered a period of legal plurality, as

...law today transcends state boundaries in complex and significant ways due to a proliferation of actors, arenas, methods and forms of rule-making and dispute resolution located at different sites around the world. It is no longer coterminus with the state and its sovereignty over a well-defined territory and a population to be governed. (p. 2)

Thus, in Randeria’s conception, sovereignty concerns creating law, and because multiple actors now influence the shaping of these laws, sovereignty has become diffuse and overlapping.

It is through Randeria’s lens of deterritorialized, cooperating and competing sovereigns that we can begin to understand how new laws and processes of accumulation by dispossession were at work in South Africa, often through relationships between the state and national and international corporations such as construction companies and FIFA. This decenters Nef’s argument that elite internationalism is displacing elite nationalism, as the former and the latter work together in new global relationships, often operating through capitalist accumulation logic to constitute new laws and orders. Cooperating sovereign entities – such as FIFA and the South African government – may
institutionalize relationships in a number of different ways, but the public-private partnership is perhaps the best currently theorized.

The way in which land was exchanged for the World Cup in Nelspruit, South Africa, epitomizes capitalist processes associated with the public-private partnership (PPP). We have entered an era of “rollout” capitalist enterprise whereby the state enters into partnerships with corporations in order to combine resources and to run more “efficiently” (McDonald, 2008). As Belanger (2009) argues, sport is becoming a central feature of the new entertainment economy, and with it comes a blurring of the public-private divide, as the interests of private capital accumulation become linked with public money investment. Therefore, sport, and football in particular, becomes a site whereby PPPs are created. These PPPs can take various forms. For instance, public private partnerships were created as the government granted subsidies to construction companies for building World Cup-associated infrastructure and stadiums.

A slightly different manifestation of the public private partnership was exemplified by the Matsafeni community’s own negotiations. For instance, the Matsafeni Trust signed a “joint venture” deal with HL Halls and Sons to build economic development and community initiatives in the vicinity of the stadium (“Mpumalanga’s 2010,” 2009). Previous Mbombela Mayor Lassy Chiwayo is quoted on the HL Hall and Sons website as saying, “This initiative is a display of practical public private partnership (PPP) in action. Mombela Local Municipality supports such an endeavour of the private sector in mobilizing resources for the betterment of people’s lives” (“Mpumalanga’s 2010,” para.
10). Through these sorts of initiatives, a very particular process of capitalism was operating through the World Cup: a community group – not the state – joined with a corporation in order to stimulate economic development around the World Cup site. This community group was partly defined as such through the particular tribal history of South Africa and through the land reclamation process. Therefore, South Africa’s historical and socio-political context was actively shaping the way in which unique capitalist partnerships were created through the World Cup. As Marcus Taylor (2011) argues, the History 2 of a particular area was helping transform capitalism, as capitalism did not subsume all with which it came into contact but was actively changed by these antecedents.

**A sovereign state? The land deal**

Technologies of sovereignty were in operation as people were dislocated for the World Cup: those in “positions of power” within a territory were attempting to gain hold of land by various – sometimes “illicit” – means, often through forming relationships between public and private actors. The illicit nature of some of these relationships was manifest most explicitly in the R1 deal. Sovereign power operated through these relationships as various sovereign actors attempted to “bully” the Matsafeni community in order to gain access to and control over their land. The acts themselves were illegal according to the juridico-political code of South Africa and thus had varying levels of
success, but these particular actors were defining their own “sovereign law and order” according to the logic of accumulation by dispossession.

The “illicit” partnership between some of the state actors and members of the Board demonstrates sovereign power as manifest in the globalized climate of the public-private partnership. As Randeria (2007) argues, with globalization processes we have seen an amplification of overlapping sovereignties as non-state actors are increasingly involved in attempting to create laws and manage territory in particular areas of the world. While not an officially sanctioned PPP, the informal relationships between those of the Matsafeni Board and those of the state represent attempts at constituting this new form of sovereignty. The competing juridico-political order of South Africa proper – which defined the R1 deal as “illegal” – was successful in the end, but the moment itself highlights the ways in which forms of sovereignty are always in negotiation and rarely, if ever, homogeneous or stable.

With respect to the R1 land deal, the sovereigns themselves were multiple and diffuse; the state was not one entity functioning as a coherent unit but instead consisted of different people with competing interests, such as those accused of signing the R1 deal and those who attempted to expose these happenings – events to be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4. Dissent and diverging opinions within the state were captured through popular news reports quoting various officials. Vusi Sibiya, spokesperson for the

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5 defined here as those within the government apparatus and leading business people in South Africa; this is not power in the Foucauldian sense, but they are the people who were involved in illicit capital accumulation endeavours
Mbombela municipality, is quoted as saying, “According to council, no such [R1] contract exists. The sale is null and void. Mogale was not authorized in terms of the regulations, or by anyone who was, to buy or sell land” (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007, para. 4). Therefore, some members of the council were trying to distance themselves from the “illegal” actions of 2010 City Coordinator Differ Mogale, thus demonstrating they were acting in different interests. The idea of competing sovereigns and “internal bickering” was echoed by Mpumalanga’s government director for the World Cup Desmond Golding who stated,

> Who else did Mogale need to consult [in relation to the 1R land deal]? Let me put it on record that this province will not be held to ransom by internal (political) bickering. As far as I’m concerned, there is nothing illegal in the land deal. (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007, para. 19)

It is clear, then, that there were different ideas of which actions were “legal” and which were not – the juridico-political boundaries were not necessarily adequately defined or were at least in constant negotiation – and the image of “internal bickering” suggests that there were competing sovereign actors within the structure of the state.

**Overlapping sovereignties and guarantees with FIFA**

The relationship between FIFA and the government is another example of the PPP in practice. This latter example best demonstrates Randeria’s (2007) contention of cooperating sovereigns, as the South African state signed various guarantees with FIFA that effectively created new laws. These agreements essentially constituted a new juridico-political order as FIFA and the South African government cooperated in changing
“nation-state-determined” legal code. As previously argued, Randeria (2007) maintains that we have entered an age of legal plurality in which competing sovereigns – including members of the nation state – sometimes impose different laws. The idea of legal plurality was significant during the lead up to the World Cup because the South African state had different laws than those which would benefit FIFA. Because FIFA was granting hosting rights to South Africa, the state had to acquiesce to the demands of FIFA, and signed guarantees that effectively changed the law in the run up to and during the event. Thus, the willingness to be a partner sovereign was a requirement for hosting the World Cup. The national government entered into 17 specific guarantees with FIFA, which were combined into an Act of Parliament in September 2006 termed the Special Measures Act (“Government’s 2010,” 2010). These guarantees include FIFA’s ownership of media and marketing rights (mediated by the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Trade and Industry), the granting of work permits (mediated by the Ministry of Home Affairs), and the dispensing of medical care (mediated by the Ministry of Health) (“Government’s 2010,” 2010).

The Minister of Finance and the President of FIFA also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on October 27, 2006 that regulated tax matters (“Government’s 2010,” 2010). These included creating a “tax-free bubble” around designated sites where profits on consumable goods would not be subject to income tax or value added tax (VAT) (“Amendment Act,” 2010). As a result, FIFA and its title sponsors accumulated the money from selling these products but the South African state received no tax monies for
the sales. The corporations themselves also did not have to pay taxes to the government, and therefore this law cost them, and FIFA, less money. FIFA was directly involved in creating these new laws, but could only do so through the nation-state. Thus, in the example of the World Cup, it is apparent that the nation-state has not necessarily decreased in importance through globalization processes, but is brought into partnership with other corporations and produces particular sovereign mechanisms – in the form of creating laws, for instance – through these partnerships.

FIFA also mandated that municipal governments were responsible for city beautification; thus, accumulation by dispossession efforts to “clean up” the N2, for example, demonstrate new sovereign technologies of power. According to the South African government’s official 2010 FIFA World Cup website,

> Host cities are responsible for fulfilling the obligations contained in the host city agreements signed with FIFA, with support from national and provincial government. The host-city agreements include aspects such as stadiums and official training grounds, supporting infrastructure, an official fan park, city beautification and compliance with FIFA marketing guidelines within the cities. (“Government’s 2010,” 2010, para. 4; emphasis added)

Therefore, FIFA was intrinsic in controlling how the municipalities engaged with their citizens – sometimes through forced removals – as a result of juridico-political agreements within their public-private partnership. Beautification practices, such as accumulation by dispossession and relocating people viewed as a “threat” to the success of the World Cup, were thus in part brought about by sovereign mechanisms of power. These new sovereign technologies were a function of Randeria’s (2007) legal pluralities
and cooperating sovereigns, with state and FIFA actors working together to create new laws and practices. Of importance, however, is that South African citizens were also partaking in this “beautification” process through governing their own behaviour, as will be elaborated in the following chapter. Therefore, these acts of “beautification” were not just enacted through new sovereign mechanisms but also became a tactic of governmentality.

In essence, the transnational corporation of FIFA was involved in shaping laws that regulated the actions of South African citizens. These laws denote a new sovereign – which could be understood as the public-private partnership between FIFA and the South African government – that was acting out of the interest of capital accumulation, as the guarantees were meant to make FIFA and its title sponsors the most money possible. Accumulation of capital in this instance motivated the actions of particular sovereign actors, but the people who could be dispossessed of land and schools were those that were already constituted as “lesser” because of impoverished status and race. These sovereign mechanisms did not operate in the absence of other technologies of power, however; governmental mechanisms were also implicated, as people were regulating their own behaviour in ways consistent with capitalist market mechanisms.

**Land and colonial governmentality: A fair market economy as discourse**

While accumulation by dispossession and the spatio-temporal fix were exemplified by the exchange and use of land in Nelspruit, these materialist conceptions of accumulation are not adequate to explain the ways in which people came to articulate
land in popular discourse. In order to understand how people were defining their lives, it is necessary to turn from discussions of sovereignty to Foucault’s theory of governmentality. Shaun Smillie (2009) of The Star wrote a report about the Mastafeni community that exemplifies Foucault’s idea of governmentality. Smillie (2009) states that,

But as dump trucks rumble past the well on their way to the Mbombela 2010 World Cup stadium, the Matsafeni community hope that better days are ahead. Their hope is that the Mbombela municipality will come up with a deal whereby the community will be uplifted in exchange for the land on which the stadium is being built. But as the concrete walls of the stadium grow higher, there is concern that the structure will be finished before the council starts improving the infrastructure in the Matsafeni community. “If the stadium gets completed before, then the government will not sort out our problems,” explained Dan Khumalo, an interim trustee member of the Matsafeni Trust. (para. 5-7)

The report proceeds to detail the appalling conditions in which the Matsafeni community was forced to live, including problems with finding clean running water, proper sanitation and electricity.

What this and other similar news reports reveal is the way in which the community articulated its existence in a particular manner through discourse. According to this report, most of the community members were subsistence farmers. What they were proposing, then, was to give up their land and exchange it – a process of monetization and primitive accumulation/accumulation by dispossession – in order to be “uplifted.” They were, in effect, asking to become part of the market economy and arguing that they should be allowed to participate in this market, ideas that are basic to the classical
political economy of Adam Smith⁶, for instance. This is governmentality: people were actively engaging in economic discourse and fighting to be treated fairly by the market without critiquing whether or not “the market” is fair to all in the first instance.

The social space of the newspaper is vital to constituting market discourses and allowing them to proliferate. According to Scott (1999), “public opinion” is a tactic of governmentality that organizes life. Scott (1999) states that the press creates a domain in which only particular knowledges are able to circulate, and is “a sphere in which fluency in these knowledges…would be a condition of participation, and in which participation would be the only rational and legal way of exercising influence in what now counted as politics” (p. 46). The idea that the press forecloses other possibilities of articulating existence is slightly too modernist: many alternative news sources are accessible through the internet, for instance. However, it is still worthwhile to attend to how the most popular discourse is framing particular practices because these newspapers are accessible to many and thus help structure the ways in which people think. In other words, popular press creates a social space in which certain actions and discourses dominate.

I argue that newspaper accounts of the World Cup helped construct “public opinion” through this social space and constituted a “population” that could then be governed

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⁶ Adam Smith is best known for publishing *The Wealth Of Nations* (1776) in which he propounded the market as the “invisible hand” that orders the social system, “whereby ‘the private interests and passions of men’ are led in the direction ‘which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society’” (Heilbroner, 1961, p. 39). The “laws of the market” create the conditions in which people can pursue their own self-interest and, “competition will result in the provision of those goods that society wants, in the quantities that society desires, and at the prices society is prepared to pay” (Heilbroner, 1961, p. 40). Thus, if everybody participates equally in the capitalist system, the “invisible hand” of the market will ensure that everyone’s needs are satisfied.
through, in part, governing itself. Benedict Anderson’s (2006) concept of an “imagined community” is useful for detailing how this process operates. Anderson (2006) points to the rise of print capitalism as being intrinsic for linking people across time and space within the frame of a nation. The “fictive linkage” between people arises precisely as a function of industrialization and the commodification of the newspaper; Anderson (2006) argues that this self-contained object, reproducible on a large scale, allows for the “almost precisely simultaneous consumption (‘imagining’) of the newspaper-as-fiction” (p. 35). This linkage functions to create an imagined community and, to apply a Foucauldian concept, a population that can be governed (for instance, see Foucault, 1991; Foucault, 2008). It is evident, then, that the materialist underpinnings of production and consumption of news are intrinsic to the proliferation of discourses. One must recognize the inherently intertwined nature of these processes to understand the power that was produced and operated through news coverage of the World Cup: the quotes I have drawn from these capitalist-produced newspapers exemplify and helped constitute how people articulated their existence.

Therefore, there is not just a material basis to this capitalist system as posited by Marxists; regardless of how “fair” the actual market dealings were, in popular media South Africans were framing their existence and sense of justice within a market-oriented discourse. The use of this type of discourse creates truth, which then helps perpetuate the capitalist system. In Smillie’s (2009) quote above, for instance, there was no contestation over whether or not land should be exchanged for “upliftment” of the community;
instead, it was taken for granted that land could/should be commodified and exchanged for other economic opportunities.

Members of the government also contributed to this popular market rhetoric through quotes in major newspapers. For instance, Janice Healing (2005) of the *Sunday Times* explains at length the economic development plans for Mpumalanga province:

“Executive Mayor Reginah Mhaule says she believes the future of the city lies in fully exploiting the tourism potential of the region, attracting more investment to the city, and the continued use of public-private partnerships” (para. 2). Through this “story,” the Executive Mayor contributed to the normalization of the public-private partnership.

Furthermore, this example demonstrates how government officials were utilizing public space to shape popular discourse, and thus contribute to the ways in which many South Africans were coming to describe their existence in terms of the market economy. With regards to industry, the Executive Mayor states,

> We are developing a strategy to market the industrial park to prospective investors and tenants to ensure we get the full job-creation benefits. However, we are very aware that the environment is one of our huge assets; the site will therefore only be used for light industrial activities and warehousing. (Healing, 2005, para. 16)

Again, investment in industry and capitalist relationships such as the PPP were being constructed as the ways in which South Africans should define their lives.
I employ David Scott (1999) and Talal Asad’s (1992) concept of colonial governmentality to understand how neo-colonialism\(^7\), as represented by FIFA in its relationship with the South African state and big business, transformed technologies of power, “the consequence of which is that the old, premodern possibilities are not only no longer conceptually approachable except in the languages of the modern, but are now no longer available as practical historical options” (Scott, 1999, p. 23). Foucault states that with modern government,

> It is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved. (Foucault, 1991, p. 95)

I believe that the process of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession can be understood beyond strictly materialist conceptions of power by employing this notion of colonial governmentality; by forcing people from their land and into the market economy, justified through a discourse of development, the conditions by which people can articulate their existence in terms of their relationship to the land are fundamentally changed.

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\(^7\) Neocolonialism refers to the ways in which colonial relations between the North and South have been reproduced through new global trade relations and transnational monetary institutions. Barbara Heron (2007) explains, “The terms of world trade, acquired national debts of crippling proportions, and externally imposed fiscal policies known collectively as ‘structural adjustment’ (spearheaded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) have been instrumental in compromising the autonomy of post-colonial state and keeping them in a dependent relationship with the former colonizing powers, thereby continuing exploitative relations have been operating for the last five hundred years. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the consequences of these economic processes have been particularly harmful” (p. 17). The uneven relationship between FIFA and the South African nation-state may be understood as one form of
A materialist conception of the economy posits that it is the material world that structures consciousness and ideas. Karl Marx and Frederich Engels (2002) argue that consciousness – and thus ideas and discourse – is the result of our interaction with the immediate sensuous environment through the satisfaction of basic needs. They write that, “The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas” (Marx & Engels, 2002, p. 48). Marx would therefore state that people are articulating their existence in terms of the market economy solely because the material division of labour and processes of primitive accumulation, for instance, structure this understanding.

I want to argue that the material processes of accumulation by dispossession and the spatio-temporal fix are not enough in themselves to explain how South Africans were acting and understanding their situation with respect to the World Cup; we have to understand how people articulated their existence at the level of discourse, and how power functioned to create the market as the site of truth and consequently constituted complex and contingent material relations. It is helpful here to return to Foucault, who explained the importance of economic theory in structuring discourse and, thus, truth:

The importance of economic theory – I mean the theory constructed in the discourse of the economists and formed in their brains – the importance of the price-value relationship is due precisely to the fact that it enables economic theory to pick out something that will become fundamental: that the market must be that which reveals something like a truth...inasmuch as prices are determined in accordance with the natural mechanisms of the market they

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neocolonialism, partly as a function of the benevolent rhetoric that FIFA is assisting “needy” South Africans through stimulation of their economy.
constitute a standard of truth which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous. (Foucault, 2008, p. 32)

Speaking in the language of the market, then, comes to frame what is understood as “true,” and governmental practice begins to be judged on how it allows the natural mechanisms of the market to operate. In this way, the “idea” of the market propels people into participating in it, and there is not a simple deterministic relationship between the material world and the realm of discourse.

Popular South African news accounts contributed to and helped structure the market as the site of truth, particularly in evaluating government behaviour. Many articles reflect a concern for how “correct” or “fair” the government was acting, especially with regards to the R1 land deal. For instance, in recognizing the “illegal” accumulation by dispossession nature of the arrangement, it was reported that, “Mbombela started building the province’s 2010 stadium on the site almost three years ago, without actually owning the land or obtaining Matsafeni or national government permission to use it” (Mogakane, 2009, #7, para. 14). Therefore, of major concern to this reporter is whether or not the land was owned; there is no critiquing of the discourse of the right to own land in the first place. It is taken as “truth” that land is to be owned, sold and exchanged for the World Cup. Even “permission” is articulated in a way that assumes ownership of the land.

Some reporters drew comparisons to colonial era seizure of land. For instance, one reporter noted that, “High Court Judge Ntendeya Mavundla, who issued the interdict, warned Mbombela’s legal team that its treatment of the Matsafeni was little different
from those of colonialists who usurped land from Africans in return for ‘mirrors’ or ‘shiny buttons’” (Eberl, 2009, para. 10). This important voice of resistance is only resistance within a capitalist discourse: the effect of this message is to insinuate that these were not fair exchanges. Like the last, this quote takes for granted that exchange of land is acceptable if it is for a reasonable sum; again, there is no critique of the idea of monetization and exchange of land in the first place. Furthermore, people who had not been personally materially dispossessed were also engaging in this economic doctrine discourse. Therefore, it was not only people’s material realities of dispossession through the market that were structuring consciousness, but the idea of the market as truth helped constitute the economic discourse spoken by these people and, in effect, legitimated material market exchanges.

Accumulation by dispossession and material market mechanisms may also be utilized as a tactic of governmentality, however. Capitalist endeavours may organize the material terrain such that only particular activities can be performed in the future. For instance, the spatio-temporal fix of capital, as represented by the stadium, structures future activities and discourse in two major ways. First, there is significant opportunity cost in investing in stadiums. Opportunity cost refers to money spent on one particular endeavour in the stead of others that are equally or more important (Henderson, 2008). For instance, the government invested R8.4 billion in stadium construction and upgrades (Davies, 2008), instead of in healthcare. This opportunity cost, therefore, directly affects where money can be spent and contributes to the normalization of capitalist enterprise.
Second, the opportunity costs of investing in such fixed capital are compounded by the capital in dead labour that is tied up within this infrastructure and which determines the future mechanisms for further accumulation of capital. Harvey (1982) explains that, “fixed capital engages the productive [labour] of subsequent years” and thus “exercises a coercive power over future users” (p. 220). Future activities are thus “locked in” to the fixed capital as, for instance, the stadium can only contribute to certain economic enterprises. The investment in stadiums only becomes productive so far as they may be utilized in the future for entertainment and sporting events or as a tourist destination. Therefore, I argue, accumulation by dispossession and the spatio-temporal fix represent a particular form of governmentality as they structure the material environment in such a way that only specific future activities, and the discourses associated with those, become feasible and, sometimes, required.

**Rights discourse as a form of governmentality: Is this resistance?**

The economy was not the only way in which people articulated their existence in South Africa, however. During the World Cup, the judiciary and rights discourses were mobilized to discursively frame South Africans’ lives. David Scott (1999) and Timothy Mitchell (1991) both speak to the importance of the discourse of law and rights in governing conduct; the judiciary constructs a social space in which people must act in a particular way to “improve” their existence through market mechanisms, acting out of their own self-interest.
South Africans did use “right to land” discourses and the judiciary both discursively and materially. For instance, National Department of Land and South African chief Land Claims Commissioner Tozi Gwanya articulated support for the Matsafeni by saying:

The law is very clear. This land was returned to the Matafeni as part of a land claim. The law says that no community that receives such land can sell or otherwise alienate it for five years without a certificate from the minister saying government has no objections. No such certificate was requested or issued, and with more than half of the beneficiaries now challenging the deal, there will be no certificate. (Arenstein & Mogakane, 2008, para. 10)

The language of the law, then, was being used in the press to define the “rights” of the Matsafeni, and thus to materially structure how and where they could live.

In a similar fashion, the hiring of human rights lawyer Richard Spoor, and his subsequent use of the courts to fight for the “land rights” of the Matsafeni, exemplifies the practices that were made possible by the judiciary. This use of the judiciary was voiced in popular media when Spoor threatened,

We do not want to jeopardize Mpumalanga’s 2010 plans but, if necessary, the 750 beneficiaries I represent will file legal papers to win back control of their ancestral land by dissolving the board of trustees and forcing them to step down. (Mogakane & Momberg, 2007, para. 8)

In this case, rhetoric of the right to land was being actively constituted and mobilized, and thus exerted a governing effect. The “right to land” as utilized here reifies the dominance of market economic discourse: the Matsafeni were not saying that they had the right to land as a public commons, but instead that they had the right to exchange their land for a fair price in the market economy. Thus, the law and the judiciary helped
structure the ways in which people framed and fought for their “rights,” and thus contributed to governmentality.

Can the use of the judiciary and rights-based language be understood as a form of resistance? According to Foucault (1980), resistance operates when dominant discourses are challenged. By this definition, then, resistance was not being performed when the Matsafeni community used the language of land rights to fight for their land, because they were still operating within a liberal political economic discourse of fair market exchanges and land ownership. This form of “agency” – that is, fighting for “rights” – may be interpreted as a weak form of resistance because the community voiced its right to the land as a community, which resists the individualizing tendency of the liberal market system. This weak resistance can be understood as a function of the community’s History 2 (Chakrabarty, 2000), as the tribal history of South Africa actively constituted the group’s identity as a community. However, this History 2 became utilized for the purposes of the market, as very few actively challenged the idea of the economy and fair market exchanges as “truth.”

Conclusion

In Nelspruit people were removed from their land by a sovereign power in order to accumulate capital through a spatio-temporal fix. However, people were also removed from their land and put into temporary dwelling areas in order to “beautify” the area around the stadiums. Land dispossession was accomplished partly through violence of the state as sovereign and governmental mechanisms of power interacted in unique ways.
New sovereigns emerged as FIFA and members of the South African state established relationships through the public-private partnership and formed new laws that assisted in capital accumulation. Less formalized, but as important, relationships were established between particular members of the state and the business community in order to create land deals that would allow them to gain control over a territory for capital. This process was epitomized in attempts at making the R1 land deal. However, this deal was blocked, in part because of effects of governmentality: South Africans used land rights and discourses of the right to fair market dealings to exchange their land for a “fair” price. The use of the judiciary and economic discourse in this instance served to further reify the importance of capitalist mechanisms in defining people’s lives.

Foucault (2003) argues that to understand sovereignty we must look from the bottom to see how subjects are constituted through relationships and material subjugation. Utilizing this sort of methodology, we need to look at how people became subject to different “sovereigns.” One of the ways this was accomplished in Nelspruit was through the influence of capital: various state actors, corporate interests, and FIFA dispossessed people of their land for accumulation purposes. This helped constitute the Matsafeni community, for instance, as subject to capital and to those that control/try to accumulate it.

However, as Marcus Taylor (2011) explains, we should not privilege capital as the “sovereign author of historical process” (p. 3). People engage materially and symbolically with their environment and are constituted in many different ways. In the
instance of the school children’s protest, some argued that this dispossession had occurred partly as a function of racism – that is, it would not have happened to white people. The comparisons to the forced removals under the apartheid state also portray the significance of race in the understandings of how and why certain people were moved. Thus, the perception among many was that ideas of race and the constitution of racial subjects articulates with the interests of corporations and those attempting to accumulate capital in order to remove people from their land. Therefore, particular people could be moved because of their constitution as “lesser” subjects through, for example, capital and race.

Those who were removed from their land were regulated through juridico-political mechanisms of sovereignty; these mechanisms were used by the community itself to fight for “land rights.” Community members were constituting themselves, and being recognized by most in the state as, political subjects under South African law. This community was able to fight for its constitution as political subjects because of the juridical frameworks in place, as well as the culture of protest and Gillian Hart’s (2006) “land question.” The legal structures, however, can also be understood as a function of governmentality: people were only able to voice resistance in liberal economic discourse because laws were defined in terms of rights to land ownership and exchange. Therefore, even resistance was framed in terms of the “fairness of the market.”

Fighting for “rights” as a tribal community and mass protesting of school disposessions were unique to the political climate of South Africa, however, as a result
of the country’s apartheid history and culture of protest. In other words, it was South Africa’s non-capitalist history and social relations that helped structure people’s interactions with processes of capitalism. In this instance, land, and the relationships surrounding land, symbolize the unique tension between History 1 and History 2 as capitalism transforms, and is transformed by, social relations existing prior to its influence.
Chapter 4: Executions and Sovereign Power

By last year, tenders and contracts relating to the construction of the stadium were to be investigated by the municipality. One of those whistleblowers was the speaker of the municipality, Jimmy Mohlala, and there is speculation that the 2010 land deal was behind his murder last weekend. (Smillie, 2009, para. 16-17)

Introduction

In this chapter I analyze the moment at which dissent was silenced as those who “blew the whistle” on the illegal granting of stadium tenders were allegedly killed. Many journalists in South Africa reported on the political officials who unearthed illegal or irregular granting of stadium tenders in Nelspruit; up to twelve of these officials subsequently died under suspicious circumstances. I first outline the events as they were reported in popular news publications in South Africa as well as in the South African-produced documentary Fahrenheit 2010 (see Cross & Tanner, 2009). I then use a Foucauldian lens to ask how the silencing of dissenters, and the news stories revealing this silence, operated to construct what was known as “true” in South Africa at the time of the reporting.

I also elaborate on my argument about the emergence of new sovereigns; while in Chapter 3 I demonstrated how the public-private partnership has emerged as a new form of sovereign that acts in the interest of capital accumulation, in this chapter I argue that these new sovereigns function as Butler’s rogue sovereigns, because they create their
own moral codes and paralegal orders in a broader field of governmentality. Through constructing their own sorts of juridico-political orders, the sovereigns constitute particular people as Agamben’s bare life when the latter threaten the accumulation process. In the case of Nelspruit, the whistleblowers came to inhabit the state of exception as defined by these rogue sovereignties and could thus be killed. However, because these events occurred in a broader field of governmentality that defines a “right to life,” the killers attempted to keep their actions quiet. While these rogue partnerships demonstrate the heterogeneity of the “state,” much popular discourse also blamed the state for being slow to prosecute those accused of killing the whistleblowers. The state was accused of constituting some lives as less valued than others. I argue that this constitution of bare life was not only a function of capital and the paralegal sovereignties, but also of South Africa’s particular History 2.

Whistleblowers who were killed were not the only ones constituted as bare life during and for the World Cup. In the following section I describe how many of the people dispossessed of their homes were put into temporary relocation areas, which were frequently compared to concentration camps. In this case I argue that bare life does not just manifest through killing, but also through letting people die without having their basic needs met. I believe these camps – as Agamben’s state of exception – represent a third space of postcolonial capital. People who are dispossessed through the process of capitalism are not always kept alive in Sanyal’s needs economy; instead, some people are
left to die as a function of their particular constitution—in this case, partly through elements of their History 2.

Lastly, I explain that other Foucauldian technologies of power were apparent during this moment of the World Cup. The relocation camps represent the confluence of sovereign, governmental and disciplinary technologies, as the population was regulated in order to benefit capitalist market mechanisms. People also participated in technologies of governmentality as popular media discourse engaged in “right to life” and “right to the economy” discourses. Furthermore, newspapers revealed how people were attempting to govern each other and hold the government accountable: some authors appealed to their fellow citizens to behave “appropriately,” while others asked the government to behave in this manner. These appeals were framed in terms of market mechanisms, however, which further demonstrates the broader field of governmental technologies of power.

**Reporting on whistleblowers being killed**

One of the most contentious stories circulating in South African media in the lead up to the World Cup was the alleged murders of various South African “whistleblowers.” The most prominent killing was the shooting of Mbombela Council Speaker and ANC member Jimmy Mohlala outside his house in KaNyamazane on January 4th, 2009. The story was also featured prominently in the *Fahrenheit 2010* documentary in which political commentator Dr. Dale T. McKinley described Mohlala as being “gunned down” (Cross & Tanner, 2009). Mohlala was to testify a week after his death in the disciplinary hearing of Jacob Dladla, the former municipal manager who was accused of irregularly
granting tenders to, and thus financial mismanagement of, the R2-billion Mbombela stadium (Molele & wa Afrika, 2010a). A number of newspaper articles documented the search for those responsible for his shooting, as well as for the person who pulled the trigger. Mohlala’s son and his widow were initially targeted, as they, “were allegedly tortured by police, who are said to have wanted them to confess to the crime” (Hlatshwayo, 2011b, para. 15). Subsequent investigations could not connect Mohlala’s family to his murder, however.

In March 2011, South African newspapers reported that two of those arrested in the death of Mohlala were police constables who, after having undergone an internal disciplinary hearing, were dismissed from service (see Hlatshwayo, 2011a; “Mpumalanga constables,” 2011). Dumisani Stanley Mhlanga, 34, and Musa Finish Mkhabela, 31, were charged by the disciplinary hearing with, among other things, corruption and violation of the South African Police Service’s Code of Conduct. According to Mpumalanga police commissioner Lieutenant General Thulani Ntobela, “The evidence gathered suggests that the constables were at the murder scene using state resources for untested, and questionable reasons. This warranted their official removal from the police service” (Hlatshwayo, 2011b, para. 8). After numerous deferrals, the two constables, along with Jenny Mabika-Mona, her son Sakhile Mabika-Mona and Moses Mahugela, were expected to appear in court on charges of murder on March 23rd, 2011 (Hlatshwayo, 2011b; “Mpumalanga constables,” 2011).
Some media implied that the state was actively trying to delay the proceedings. For instance, in an article published by *City Press*, Sizwe sama Yende (2011) quotes the suspects’ lawyer as saying, “The last time we were here the state postponed the case for the same reason [i.e. lack of evidence]. It seems that the state is not serious…why does it take six months to investigate?” (para. 7). Therefore, within popular discourse were accusations that the state was participating in the cover-up of the killings through delaying the prosecution of the suspects.

A Mozambique hit man named “Josh” admitted to the press and the police that he was “hired by a top Mpumalanga politician, a soccer boss, and two businessmen to kill Mohlala” (Molele & wa Afrika, 2010b, para.10). As Charles Molele and Mzilikazi wa Afrika, two reporters extensively covering the “whistleblowing” events, document:

Josh has claimed in an affidavit, now in the possession of the police, that he was hired by Mpumalanga government officials and the soccer boss as a “cleaner” from 2000 until 2009 to eliminate political and business opponents. His work included smuggling drugs, poisoning certain individuals and carrying out hits. He said that some of the people he had targeted for killing were Nkambule, former mayor of the Gert Sibande district council Andries Gamede, Scopa chairman Fish Mahlalela and Mbombela Mayor Lassy Chiwayo…The gangster further claimed that he was hired, along with three Zimbabwean nationals and a fellow Mozambican, to kill Mohlala. Four of the men who helped carry out the hit on Mohlala have since been killed, allegedly to destroy evidence. (Molele & wa Afrika, 2010a, para.16-18, 21-22)

Molele and wa Afrika published a series of articles about “Josh.” Their news articles link African National Congress (ANC) Youth League secretary James Nkambule to Josh. Nkambule was reportedly working with top police officers in Pretoria to repatriate Josh.
to South Africa to testify against a senior ANC politician and a soccer boss in the death of Mohlala. Josh, in return for offering evidence, was to be placed in a witness protection program. Nkambule was arrested before he could deliver Josh, however. Police charged Nkambule with, “defeating the ends of justice, conspiracy to commit crime, incitement and fraud” (Molele & wa Afrika, 2010b, para. 7) in association with Mohlala’s death.

Later reports indicate that Nkambule’s charges were related to falsifying the information regarding Josh. In fact, there was considerable skepticism as to whether or not Josh actually existed. For instance, it was reported that, “[Nkambule] was due to appear in court this week on charges of fraud and defeating the ends of justice after police accused him of fabricating the sworn statement by Josh” (wa Afrika & Hoffstatter, 2010a, para. 26). It was also reported that some members of the ANC believed Josh to be fictitious. For instance, Lucky Ndinisa, the ANC provincial secretary in Mpumalanga, is quoted by the Mail and Guardian as saying, “There was a time when we thought we would see Josh. I now believe he is imaginary” (Letsoalo, 2010, para. 14). Therefore, there was significant discussion in popular discourse as to whether or not Josh was “real.”

Since 2006, Nkumbule had been complaining of being poisoned. He died from “bowel complications” (Molele, 2010, para. 16) the week he was to appear in court. Considerable popular discourse framed Nkambule as being murdered to prevent him from testifying about Josh. For instance, a Sunday Times article features sub-headings such as “Nkambule’s death saves fat cats” and “Trial would have meant chance to be cross-examined about hit-squad claims” (wa Afrika & Hofstatter, 2010b). Therefore,
many believed Nkambule was “silenced” to protect those involved in the murders. Early autopsy reports have indeed indicated that Nkambule was poisoned (wa Afrika & Hofstatter, 2010a; wa Afrika & Hofstatter, 2010b). The Sunday Times (wa Afrika & Hofstatter, 2010b) claims to have obtained a confidential report of the autopsy conducted by Mpumalanga chief medical officer Dr Gantcho Gatchev that states Nkambule’s death was “unnatural” (para. 11) and “suggestive of … poison ingestion” (para. 12). The authors of many of these articles positioned Nkumbela as the whistle blower on an Mpumalanga “hit squad.” For instance, the headline of a Sunday Times article reads, “Poisoned: The man who blew the whistle on Mpumalanga’s hit squad” (wa Afrika & Hofstatter, 2010a), while a Mail & Guardian (Letsoala, 2010) report identifies Nkambule as “the Mpumalanga whistle-blower” (para. 22).

It was not only people involved in irregularly granting tenders for the 2010 FIFA World Cup stadium who were killed, however; these deaths were part of a larger pattern of political activists and government officials killed in Mpumalanga province. Many of the political killings occurred during the month of January between 2009 and 2011, and have thus been dubbed the “January murders” (for instance, see Moselakgomo, 2011a; Moselakagomo, 2011b; “Mpuma killing,” 2011). This pattern has been recognized by the South African state, which has acknowledged that there is a “problem.” The national police commissioner Bheki Cele organized a team of 12 detectives to investigate these murders (Moselakgomo, 2011a). Although news reports often cite the beginning of the politically-motivated killings as 1998 (for instance, see “Mpuma killing,” 2011), the
probe will only investigate those killed since and including Mohlala in 2009. The list of those killed since 1998 include: Saul Shabangu (1998); Hebron Maisela (1998); Sydney de Lange (1998); Rose Alleta Mnisi (1999); Joshua Ntshuhle (2005); Thandi Mtsweni (2008); Jimmy Mohlala (2009); Mike Sifunda (2009); Simon Lubisi (2009); Lucas Shongwe (2009); Samuel Mpatlanyane (2010); and John Ndlovu (2011)” (Moselakgomo, 2011a, para. 13).

Competing regimes of truth

It is particularly relevant here to revisit my methodological justification for using news articles to establish what was known about particular events surrounding the World Cup. While all news articles are necessarily framed according to the social position and discursive historicity of those who write them, they are also productive of the knowledge, and thus truth, of particular events. This argument relates to Foucault’s conception of the relationship between power, knowledge, and truth: the knowledge produced and disseminated through discourse constructs what we know to be true about a particular subject. As Michel Foucault (1995) explained in *Discipline and Punish*, power directly produces knowledge as power relations constitute a field of knowledge and knowledge itself produces power relations. The creation of knowledge is productive of power relations because it determines what is and what can be said and understood about a particular topic. Thus, news articles and the “facts” presented therein assist in constructing what is known about events in Nelspruit, and are consequently partly constitutive of truth regardless of the “actual” events that took place.
The news reporting of these crimes in South Africa can consequently be understood as both promoting and challenging various regimes of truth. Foucault (1990) explains that,

…power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another… (p. 92)

This “moment” of the World Cup represents a process whereby the media, various state entities, and citizens – although these are overlapping categories and by no means homogeneous in themselves – formed a malleable and tense multiplicity, each representing their own force relation and constituting a particular form of organization in this specific time and place. The newspaper functioned as a common cultural resource where competing truths could struggle; these confrontations between regimes of truth transformed the cultural landscape as different knowledges were accepted or rejected as “true.”

In the case of whistleblowers in Nelspruit, there were a number of different attempts at challenging what was “known” and thus existed a number of competing discourses. Politicians such as Mohlala who were trying to expose the “irregular granting of tenders” were attempting to bring these practices to light, or, as Foucault would say, create a discourse around what “illegal” acts were being perpetrated. Threatened by such exposure, those engaging in “illegal” activity were rumoured to have created a hit list and
killed a number of people, effectively “silencing” this [counter] discourse. This silencing was challenged, or resisted, as whistle-blowing politicians made deals with hit man Josh to interview with both the police and the media about what was going on. The media reported heavily on these proceedings. Other stories propagated the idea that Josh did not even exist. Documentaries such as *Fahrenheit 2010* (see Cross & Tanner, 2009) also covered the events in significant detail. There was thus not only one dominant discourse about the tenders-granting system and the killings associated with them; instead there existed several discourses that competed for “truth” through framing events in a particular manner, as well as through attempts at silencing particular discourses.

**Foucault’s sovereignty in Nelspruit**

According to Foucault (2003), to understand how sovereign technologies of power operate we must determine the various force relations that constitute people as subject to a particular sovereign. One of the contributions that this case study makes to understanding sovereign power in the Foucauldian sense is that it challenges the idea of homogeneous entities inflicting power over one another. As Foucault (1990) explains, power is not projected from a central point and inflicted onto all else,

…in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; [instead] it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. (p. 93)

The actions of different ANC members are more consistent with Foucault’s than Hobbes or Rousseau’s understanding of sovereignty, as they very much challenge the notion of a
unitary sovereign state emanating power in an attempt to repress its citizens. It is apparent from the documented evidence that some politicians were involved in the illegal granting of tenders, while others, such as speaker Mohlala, were working to expose these unfair dealings. Thus, the state was not acting as a single entity, nor trying to force citizens to act in a particular way. The idea of a homogeneous state entity was also disrupted through the R1 land deal elucidated in Chapter 3, as some members of the state participated in these negotiations while others fought them. This line of argument forces me to ask if there is a body – or bodies – that can be understood as acting like a “sovereign,” and how various technologies of power may operate through or around them.

“Rogue sovereigns” and the constitution of bare life

It is useful to delve deeper into the less formalized relationships between various mega-event stakeholders. As explained in Chapter 3, we have entered an era of new forms of sovereignty, as multiple sovereigns work with or against each other to create laws; this situation creates a landscape of legal plurality. Multiple sovereigns working together was exemplified through the illicit partnerships constructed around the R1 land deal, for instance, as Matsafeni Trust Board chairperson Terry Mdluli, and Nelspruit Mayor Justice Nsibande agreed to the “unfair” deal. In a similar manner, the arranged killing of whistleblowers by an informal relationship between government officials, a “couple of businessmen and a soccer boss” (Molele & wa Afrika, 2010b, para.10), characterizes these deterritorialized and competing sovereignties. As Randeria (2007)
argues, the nation-state is becoming increasingly an object and subject of globalization. This case study demonstrates that the nation-state, through globalization, is increasingly an object and subject of competing sovereigns as well, as “corrupt” business people and transnational corporations such as FIFA attempt to make deals with members of the nation-state to help structure law and to gain access to resources. These relationships can be characterized as more and less formal public-private partnerships.

How can we characterize these relationships as sovereign? What sort of juridico-political order is associated with these new forms of sovereignty? While the suspension of law by rogue sovereigns at Guantanamo Bay as described by Judith Butler (2006) is quite different from the law in relation to killing whistleblowers in Nelspruit, I think her conception of petty and rogue sovereigns arising within governmental technologies of power is quite relevant. While not being granted the power to create and destroy law by any particular “state entity,” those involved in the “corruption” in South Africa created their own juridico-political order by acting in an “unlawful” manner. Even though they could not suspend the South African constitutional or state laws – and thus had to “cover up” their actions – these various partnerships were able to establish their own “legal code” or a “paralegal code” in a manner of speaking.

I argue that the constitution and juridico-political order of South Africa represent the dominant sovereignty, but there was a resistant and overlapping sovereignty operating through these “corrupt” relationships. As outlined in Chapter 2, Jean and John Comaroff (2006) utilize Derrida’s conception of phantom states to explain how non-state actors can
compensate for state resources and order when the latter are lacking. Furthermore, while not legally sanctioned by nation-states’ criminal codes, informal organizations often construct their own “moral orders.” Partha Chatterjee (2004) explains how, in the slums of Calcutta, people who inhabited a state of illegality constructed their own paralegal arrangements to deliver civic services, partly through organizing and making deals with those in positions of authority.

The relationship between those involved in killing the whistleblowers and the relationship between those involved in the R1 deal can be understood using this “rogue sovereignty through paralegal order” framework. These actors constituted their own laws and norms within their informal “organization,” even if not sanctioned according to nation-state law. As new sovereigns become increasingly influential in the global sphere, their norms and codes regulate actions and power in an ever more dominant fashion. They do not displace the nation state law, but operate in coordination – and often competition – with these laws. As Butler (2006) argues, these sovereignties are exercised in a broader field of governmentality: while sovereigns may have their own internal moral code, their actions may not necessarily be sanctioned in broader rights discourse. Therefore, as exemplified by the killing of whistleblowers, some of these sovereign relationships must keep their actions quiet because they are not deemed “acceptable.”

**Sovereignty, bare life, and the killing of whistleblowers**

In the case of Nelspruit, then, the “corrupt partnership” comprised of businessmen and politicians constituted Jimmy Mohlala and the other murdered whistleblowers as
being unworthy of life because the latter impeded the accumulation of capital of this partnership. If we take seriously Randeria’s (2007) conception of legal plurality and my argument that the informal partnerships constructed around the World Cup act as rogue sovereigns, then we must extend Agamben’s (1998) argument to these other forms of sovereignty. If it is the sovereign structure and juridical order that constitutes particular people as bare life, and if there is a proliferation of these types of sovereignties through capitalist globalization, then we should understand these sovereignties as constituting their own bare life, through their own moral orders and codes. The murder victims thus embody Agamben’s (1998) *homo sacer*, or bare life, as they could be killed but not sacrificed within the codes of the “corrupt” informal partnerships.

What is the relationship between the structure of these codes and orders and the ability to constitute bare life? Agamben (1998) draws on Carl Schmitt to argue that the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception. Agamben’s conception is very state-centred, though; he argues that it is the state and the law that include people within the political system and thus constitute those who are “outside” as bare life. He explains that sovereign power operates more through the *structure* of the state than the people who seem to “possess” this power: the problem of sovereignty and power has too often been reduced to, “the question of who within the political order was invested with certain powers, and the very threshold of the political order itself was never called into question” (Agamben, 1998, p. 12). Thus, to Agamben, sovereignty is not merely a top-down imposition of power by “powerful people,” but power is constituted through the very
structure of sovereignty. He is quite critical of Marx for believing that the state would be the site of liberation through socialism; Marx, argues Agamben, did not adequately critique the very construction and constitution of the state and therefore did not recognize the violence inherent in its structure.

Agamben uses the example of the holocaust to demonstrate how the state defined, through the juridico-political order, some people as being non-political subjects and thus unworthy of life. The killing of whistleblowers is not equivalent to the constitution of bare life that occurred through the World War II concentration camps; the whistleblowers were not mass murder victims constituted as *homo sacer* through violent racism and state-sanctioned anti-Semitism. However, they were deemed as a threat to the accumulation process because the whistleblowers were exposing illegal accumulation tactics, such as illicit granting of tenders. This can be compared to the threat that Jewish people during World War II (Agamben, 1998) and potential Islamic terrorists in Guantanamo (Butler, 2006) posed to the nation; because people who are Jewish and Muslim have been seen as threats to a German Aryan nation and the safety of American interests, respectively, they were constituted as those who could be killed but not sacrificed. My contention is that through global expansion and imperialism, the nation-state – and thus protection of this entity – becomes linked to processes of capital accumulation. Furthermore, other sovereigns emerge – such as transnational corporations – whose end goal is the creation of surplus value and profit. Therefore, in this context, the protection of sovereignty is as much about protecting one’s capital accumulation interests
as it is protecting the sovereign’s territory. Thus, when particular people become “threats” to this accumulation process, they are acting outside the makeshift “law” and moral code of the sovereign as partially defined by capital accumulation interests. Consequently, the informal sovereign as represented by the “licit” and “illicit” public-private partnerships constitute those threats as bare life within their own paralegalities.

A main thrust of my argument is that the informal public-private partnerships formed as a result of the World Cup constituted bare life through mechanisms outside of the state structure; those murdered were still political subjects as defined by the South African nation-state’s Constitution (“Constitution of,” 1996). However, there is evidence in popular media discourse that the state also deemed these lives less worthy. The judicial pursuit of the criminals who killed the whistleblowers indicates that these subjects’ murders were considered homicides – and thus they were not constituted as bare life by the structure of the state. However, the media reports of the state’s tardiness and apathy in prosecuting the murder suspects suggests that those killed may not have had life – as defined by said state – worthy of finding a “killer.” This could be due, in part, to the whistleblowers impeding the capital accumulation process.

A number of news reports voiced concern regarding the state’s slow-moving judicial process. For instance, Democratic Alliance leader Anthony Benadie is quoted as saying,

“The ANC promised to investigate these deaths but to date we are still waiting for the findings of the probe or at least to see the face of the investigation’s chairman,” he said. “We hope that Cele’s actions will show tangible results this time around.” (Moselakgomo, 2011b, para. 7-8)
Another article published by *South African Press Association* quoted Benadie as saying,

> The ANC and especially premier [David] Mabuza, have been suspiciously silent on the matter. The [Democratic Alliance] believes that the probe is long overdue. The ANC must give the absolute assurance that no politician or official will attempt either directly or indirectly to interfere or tamper with this investigation. (“Mpuma killing,” 2011, para. 2)

Nkambule, one of the whistleblowers who claimed himself to have been poisoned and subsequently died, was also openly critical of the state’s handling of the killings. The *Sunday Times* reported that, “Nkambule recently slammed the police investigations into the murders – which might have also exposed tender irregularities – as slow” (wa Afrika & Hofstatter, 2010a, para. 26). These examples demonstrate that some of those working within the South African state – such as the Democratic Alliance – and those within civil society – such as the media – were resistant to the constitution of the whistleblowers as bare life. These voices of resistance actively opposed the killers and the state, as they accused the latter of valuing some lives as lesser than others.

In understanding precisely how bare life is constituted, though, we must acknowledge that capital is not the sole sovereign actor (Taylor, 2010). Furthermore, it is important to heed Chakrabarty’s (2000) contention that a nation’s non-capitalist history transforms the conditions of capitalism and, I argue, affects those who are subject to a sovereign. People were not constituted as bare life simply for the capital accumulation interests of rogue sovereigns. Many of the popular critiques of the forced removals and the killing of whistleblowers compared these actions to atrocities committed under the apartheid state; much of popular discourse argued that those who were black were
significantly more likely to be forced from their homes, killed as whistleblowers, and put into temporary relocation camps, than those who were white. It is thus important to clarify that the particular racialized history of South Africa – a component of South Africa’s History 2 – contributed to who was constituted as bare life. Racial identity was a key component, when articulated with other identities, in defining who could be killed. Or, in a Foucauldian understanding of sovereignty, people were constituted as subject to various sovereignties not only through capital accumulation endeavours or formal/informal orders, but also through race and other identity constitutions. These various constitutions then affected how particular actors – such as informal public-private partnerships – were able to accumulate capital.

In sum, most theories of sovereignty are based on the juridico-political order of the nation-state and other governance organizations. Through this case study of Nelspruit, South Africa during the 2010 FIFA World Cup, I am arguing that corporations are also increasingly becoming sovereign actors, partly through the killing of people acting against corporate accumulation interests; this is most effective when working with state actors. To make sense of this form of power it is useful to articulate Agamben’s (1998) sovereignty with Randeria’s (2007) new legal pluralities, Chakrabarty’s (2000) History 2, and more Marxian notions of capital accumulation: in Nelspruit, South Africa, we saw transnational corporations working in collaboration with various state actors to constitute who was bare life – partly as a function of their own “moral order” but also as a result of
other subjugations such as racial identity – and thus who could be killed, often for the sake of profit.

**The camps and bare life**

In this section I argue that the constitution of bare life was not only observable through the killing of whistleblowers, but was also apparent among those placed in “Temporary Relocation Areas” – or “camps” – after they had been removed from their homes. While not murdered like the whistleblowers, people were left to live – and in many cases die – without having their basic needs met. Sovereign technologies of power, particularly Agamben’s (1998) state of exception, were exemplified in the structure of these camps. However, as with the case of the whistleblowers, his state of exception must be qualified by understanding how race, as well as other subjugated identities, contribute to the constitution of bare life. Furthermore, I argue that bare life need not solely include those who are actively killed, but also includes those who are left to die without having their basic needs met, which was exemplified through the space of the camp. We can understand the camp as representing the third space of post-colonial capital, which includes those not fortunate enough to reside in Sanyal’s (2007) needs economy and thus who are not, I argue, kept alive by the development industry. Finally, the camps themselves are a good place to locate the articulation of various sovereign, governmental, and disciplinary technologies of power, as all operated within this physical structure.

It was alleged that many of the people dislocated for the World Cup were put into “Temporary Relocation Areas” (TRAs). In the documentary *Tin Town* (see “Tin Town,
2010), South Africans were interviewed about their lives in a TRA named Blikkiesdorp after they were evicted from their homes as part of the N2 gateway project. In the *Tin Town* documentary and in a book of resistance written and edited by the N2 pavement dwellers entitled *No Land! No House! No Vote!* (see Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers, 2011), “residents” of Blikkiesdorp specifically cite the World Cup as the reason why they were sent to this most notorious of relocation camps. One Blikkiesdorp interviewee named Alie Blankenberg, in tears, explains,

…what this government is doing is, destroying lives man. Not physically but mentally destroying lives man. And, and I don’t think it’s fair what they doing. With this World Cup [shaking head]…with this World Cup…this World Cup have destroyed my life. It’s supposed to be a joyous occasion the World Cup, but not for me. Not for 90% of the people here, it’s not a joyous occasion. I don’t know what to do. Really I don’t know what to do [head in hand, wiping tears]. (“Tin Town,” 2010)

Both the Local Organizing Committee and FIFA officials denied that people had been removed to Blikkiesdorp for the World Cup (“Tin Town,” 2010). Whether or not the government and FIFA admitted to forcing people into these Temporary Relocation Areas, much general popular sentiment held this to be true.

Some explicitly described the TRAs as concentration camps. For instance, one “resident” interviewed for the *Tin Town* documentary states,

No one wanted to move. They took us from Etlam…and moved us to akazuero because this is *basically concentration camp*. We are isolated here with the fence right around. This is our toilet ah here now. There is no toilet um shower facility, no water, toilet doesn’t work. 18 families uh is using this toilet. There’s supposed to use…[unintelligible]…one toilet in working condition. If a person get at here they must use this bucket to do their thing in. They just
dumped us here and they totally forgot about us. ("Tin Town," 2010; emphasis added)

The rhetoric of camp occupants comparing their conditions to that of “concentration camps” and arguing that they were treated as nothing more than “animals” reveals sovereign and biopolitical technologies of power as described by Agamben. Agamben (1998) argues that the concentration camps during the holocaust represented the ultimate and physical form of biopolitical and sovereign power. The walls of the camp represent this sovereign structure, as those residing within could be killed but not sacrificed; this was the ultimate management of the life of those deemed non-political subjects. Thus, there is much significance in TRA occupants equating their conditions with concentration camps.

While there was no South African state extermination policy, plan or practice, the idea that people could be treated like animals – that is, not human and not political subjects – with not even basic water and sanitation needs met represents biopolitics penetrating the body. Blikkiesdorp itself has been the subject of national and international news media due to its dire conditions. The author of a Guardian (UK) report in particular highlights the extreme heat, high criminal activity and high rates of tuberculosis within the TRA (Smith, 2010a). Furthermore, Blikkiesdorp is located a significant distance from economic activity, and there are high rates of death due to motor vehicle accidents in the intersection nearest the camp (Smith, 2010a). Therefore, while people who were dislocated for the World Cup – as argued in popular discourse – were not necessarily being killed by the state, many were being left to die in these camps.
By way of this example I argue that “ordinary citizens,” like the whistleblowers, were being constituted as bare life as a specific and contingent articulation of capital, class and race, in part a result of the PPP between the state and FIFA; the people too impoverished to be seen by the world and thus dispossessed for capital in a highly racialized manner were being constituted as less than human. They were not being killed, but left to live – and perhaps die – in poor conditions that did not always meet their basic needs. Bare life can be understood as increasing susceptibility to being left to die, I believe, and does not just need to manifest through the actual act of killing. Therefore, the people being dispossessed of their homes and put into Temporary Relocation Areas such as Blikkiesdorp were being constituted as less than human and non-political subjects.

The people who were left to die – as part of Agamben’s (1998) state of exception – did not just inhabit Kalyan Sanyal’s (2007) second space of postcolonial capital. Sanyal argues that through the process of primitive accumulation, not everyone is brought into the capitalist system. Many are left in a space of non-capital, where they are not part of the labour force of capitalism but have their basic needs met through capital transferred to this “needs economy,” justified through a discourse of development. I argue that the World Cup examples of dislocated people being left to die in the TRAs and whistleblowers actively being killed by illicit partnerships demonstrate that not everyone is kept alive. Some lives are deemed less worthy than others – as constituted through race and capital – and thus become bare life. These people represent a third space of
postcolonial capital that, I argue, is in constant negotiation with the needs economy as a function of capitalist interests and particular smaller subjugations/dominations.

Not only were sovereign-biopolitical mechanisms of power apparent in TRAs, but technologies of discipline were also present. As shown in *Tin Town*, Blikkiesdorp consists of rows of white tin buildings laid out uniformly in a grid-like pattern portraying Foucauldian disciplinary space ("Tin Town," 2010). As Foucault (1995) states, physical space is often ordered to discipline factory workers, school children and military combatants. This is accomplished through organizing people in rows where they can be easily monitored and their lives highly organized. This is precisely the layout of space in the camps in which people were placed: the “dwellings” are laid out in a grid-like fashion and high walls surround the compounds. The walls are topped with barbed wire. Much of the rhetoric of those interviewed spoke of these security mechanisms that operated in a disciplinary fashion. For instance, one interviewee reported:

> Like I said before this is a concentration camp, in a concentration camp you can’t do what you want to do, you can’t go where you want to go because of…you are isolated you are 24, 24/7 you are under surveillance: where you going, what are you doing. ("Tin Town," 2010)

Some also stated that they would not leave the compound after 9pm because they would be beaten. This demonstrates the constitution of a threat that operated in a panoptic fashion: people may have internalized the surveillance of the camp walls and the police and may have behaved according to these threats.
Governmentality was also a technology of power that operated through enclosing people in a particular space. As explained in Chapter 2, Foucault (2007) argues that opening up the towns for circulation to aid trade and the economy also put people at risk of the, “floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers” (p. 18) Governmental mechanisms involve minimizing the risks of “these people” while maximizing the circulation of capital through the structure and layout of the town. Therefore, a governmental lens is helpful in understanding how the layout of space in South Africa regulated the population while serving to increase the flow of capital. Specifically pertaining to the World Cup, people were dispossessed of their land and were put into TRAs in order to decrease the “risk” to tourists of criminal activity and to decrease the images of racialized impoverishment that may hinder the investment of tourism and business dollars in the South African economy. Therefore, the space of the camps not only highlights Agamben’s state of exception and the third space of postcolonial capital, but it represents the confluence of sovereign, disciplinary and governmental technologies of power.

**Governmentality through the “right to life”**

It is apparent, then, that sovereign technologies of power worked alongside governmental and disciplinary mechanisms in Nelspruit during this moment of the World Cup. As Foucault (1991) and Butler (2006) make explicit, no type of power exists in a vacuum, and governmental, disciplinary and sovereign technologies often uphold and support each other. In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault (2007) states,
So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. . . In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security. (p. 8)

I have already explored the confluence of sovereign, disciplinary, and governmental mechanisms of power as represented by the TRAs, but how did these various technologies interact through actual killings? In this section I explore how governmentality operated in the context of the rogue sovereigns who killed the whistleblowers.

The South African state is a liberal democracy governed by a juridico-political order that is consistent with governmentality mechanisms. South Africa’s history as a liberal democracy is particularly well known, given its long-standing apartheid state and the protests and worldwide boycotts calling for racialized black people to become citizens. In 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) became elected as black South Africans were finally allowed to vote alongside white South Africans in the democratic “freedom elections” (Saul, 2005, p. 3). There is also a sovereign juridico-political order in South Africa; laws are enshrined in the legal code and Constitution to govern the conduct and rights of South African citizens and entities such as the state and corporations. The new Constitution grants all people equal standing under the eyes of the law, as well as explicitly states that every person has the “right to life” (“Constitutuion of,” 1996). The new Constitution itself, “both its content and the found object itself…[became] the
populist icon of nationhood” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 24-25) as it was the first South African democratic Constitution (Saul, 2005).

It is impossible to separate the technologies of sovereignty and governmentality in this instance as they interact and operate at similar moments, oftentimes through the same entity, such as the Constitution. In many ways, the laws created through the Constitution – and therefore through the “sovereign order” – have a biopolitical function: they are meant to target the population in order to manage its life. For instance, the “right to life” as laid out in the Constitution is a biopolitical mechanism, as this “right” and its associated discourse help regulate life within the South African population. The right to life, in essence, is the most fundamental right of biopolitics.

The Constitution itself as a representative object – apart from its sovereign significance in defining laws – is vital in constituting the idea of nationhood. The Constitution has come to represent the fall of apartheid and the new liberal democracy ushered in by the ANC (Desai & Pithouse, 2004). Therefore, according to Ashwin Desai and Richard Pithouse (2004), the ANC’s capitalist accumulation policies can be difficult to fight because to voice criticism would be to criticize the ANC, the Constitution and all they represent. Therefore, the Constitution, while creating a juridico-political order, also has a governmental function as it defines the biopolitical right to life and creates conditions in which people are compelled to maintain silence surrounding issues of the ANC’s uneven capital accumulation and distribution.
The juridico-political order of the state is also intimately tied to governmentality insomuch as it regulates the workings of the economy. According to Foucault (2007, 2008), the “idea” of the free market economy is inherent to governmentality, and there was an apparent dominance of “right to the market” discourses in Nelspruit during the World Cup. The law helped structure the way in which these discourses proliferated. As Foucault (1991) explains, governmentality is not concerned with the creation of laws as repressive orders, but they can be used as a tactic that will ensure the proper functioning of the economy and will manage the life of a population. A regime of truth is thus structured around the proper functioning of the economy, and government action – and its creation of “law” – is determined as “good” or “bad” based upon its effect on the market.

The World Cup tenders-granting system is an example of how the law governs to protect the “rights” of individuals and corporate entities by maintaining a “fair” market economy. In the tenders-granting process, a government or business will issue a request for various suppliers to bid on a particular contract (“Tenders Information,” 2010). In the case of the World Cup, for example, governments generally issue tenders for construction companies to build stadiums. Everyone is supposed to have an equal opportunity to bid, and the most competitive offer – as defined by the market – will be granted the tender. Therefore, the market “determines” what company is best suited for constructing the stadiums, and this process is protected by the law.

Governmentality technologies operated as popular discourse also assisted in regulating tenders-granting by appealing to market rhetoric. With the World Cup the
process occurs partly as a function of the state, as the government – and various rogue sovereigns within this structure – grant the tenders. The whistleblowers in Nelspruit were attempting to shed light on the “rogue” nature of some of these deals, as particular “favours” were said to have been made. Popular news media actively participated in the discourse of fair market dealings as, in general, the news articles supported the state actors who had blown the whistle on the unfair tenders granting. Governmentality was operating as state processes were being deemed either “good” or “bad” by civil society based on whether the government was allowing the market to operate “freely” or not.

The significance of the juridico-political order as a tactic of governmentality was also manifest in the actions of those who contravened South African law: the state and corporate actors who were involved in the illicit granting of tenders kept it quiet only because it was defined as illegal. Their authority as state or corporate actors did not constitute them as sovereigns above the legal code. Furthermore, killing the whistleblowers was an act that attempted to hide the illegal actions of those involved in the illicit tenders-granting process. If this was an instance of a “truly” sovereign state as defined by Machiavelli or Hobbes, then those within the state could determine who could be killed because, in their definition, sovereign actors have the right to kill and let live. The sovereigns would therefore not have had to cover up the killing of whistleblowers. This case exemplifies, instead, rogue sovereigns emerging in a broader field of governmentality, as elucidated by Butler (2006); the rogue sovereigns acted according to
their own code, but had to hide their actions because they were not consistent with broader governmental discourses of the right to life.

The discourse of right to life has permeated the South African social system to the extent that these murders of whistleblowers were deemed unacceptable. This “right” is not merely a “law” (as a truly sovereign state could make up its own laws regarding right to life with little influence from the citizenry), but has become an internalized norm as the capillaries of power extend to most within this particular social system: citizens were partaking in defining themselves, and the whistleblowers, as worthy of life. This was manifest most explicitly in the large number of news articles documenting the killings as unjust and pressuring the government to investigate. While Agamben locates in the creation of the sovereign the origin of biopolitics through the constitution of bare life, this example demonstrates that biopolitics and governmentality can also operate in opposition to the creation of a unitary sovereign, as citizens and civil society partake in discourses of human rights and thus also define life worthy of living.

However, these rogue sovereigens, through their attempts at hiding illicit tenders dealings through the killing of whistleblowers, were also contributing to the more generalized discourses of “right to life” and “right to fair market dealings.” One may argue that killing people is the ultimate top-down, repressive act. While this may be true, the fact that these state and corporate actors felt they had to silence dissent meant that the killers thought the tenders-granting practices and the killing of whistleblowers was “wrong”; as a corollary, they were productive in constituting what was understood as
“good” or “right” in South Africa at that time. Not only did governmental mechanisms influence their behaviour – rights discourses forced them to hide their actions – but these rogue sovereigns were also productive of these discourses through their acts of silencing. This case demonstrates Foucault’s contention that power itself is not solely “repressive” in nature. Foucault explains that, “relations of power are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play” (Foucault, 1990, p. 94). The rogue sovereigns, in this case, did contribute to producing the idea of the “rights” of citizens through hiding their own illicit actions, an idea through which power operates.

**Governing each other**

Another way in which governmentality functioned through the 2010 FIFA World Cup, as demonstrated in mass media, was through civil society attempting to govern itself and asking the government to be accountable to its citizenry. The art of government, as theorized by Foucault (1991), involves introducing the economy into political practice, which helps establish continuity between governing the self (morality), the family (the economy) and the state (politics). It was through the constitution of the “population” that the art of governing was able to take hold and connect these various “levels” (Foucault, 1991). There is a vertical integration of these levels, Foucault (1991) argues, such that the state not only governs the family and the individual, but power also operates in the reverse, as people participate in popular discourse – such as the “right to life” and the “right to the free market economy” – and govern the conduct of the state, as well as each
other. It was the governing of self and governing of others, through shedding light on the whistleblowing events and literally asking the government to be accountable, that governmentality occurred at the level of the “ordinary citizen” during the World Cup.

This theme of governing each other was evident in a number of news articles, some pertaining to the particular whistleblower events, but others concerning South Africa and the World Cup in general. As previously articulated, many news stories attempted to hold the state accountable for prosecuting those suspected of killing whistleblowers. This is an example of the media governing the conduct of the state. In another example, the Mbombela pitch had to be reseeded because the grass would not grow (“There’s no,” 2010). There was a sense of general frustration in the media, with one reporter for the *Pretoria News* writing, in an exasperated tone, “We trust that the city’s executive mayor, Lassy Chiwayo, is giving us the correct information when she says this will be resolved within six weeks, but that doesn’t leave much time…Clearly, there can be no tolerance for another failed attempt” (“There’s no,” 2010, para. 4). It is not precisely stated who would not tolerate another failed attempt, but the tone of the article suggests it was the citizenry of Nelspruit specifically and South Africa more generally. Thus, through popular media discourse, this reporter participated in a governing type of power by contributing to a discourse of accountability.

Other news articles contributed to governing the conduct of fellow citizens. For instance, a reporter for the *Pretoria News* told readers, in a paternalistic tone, that workers should not be protesting wages and working conditions for World Cup-
associated infrastructural development because, “It is…unreasonable to protest and at the same time vandalize the very same resources that should be used to create more jobs” (“The infrastructure,” 2010, para. 21). In an even more patronizing passage, the same reporter states, “I want to take this opportunity to encourage South Africans to behave when using our trains and not take to setting trains alight and destroying property, as this would be detrimental to our development objectives” (“The infrastructure,” 2010, para. 36). It is evident that through the social space of the newspaper – a tactic of governmentality – the author was contributing to a discourse of accountability that attempted to influence the ways in which the population behaved. This is not governmentality to the extent that the “telling” is a tactic that structures the ways in which people articulate their existence, but it does contribute to the discourse of accountability over a person’s actions to support the market economy. The appeals to accountability for one’s actions may also operate as a panoptic disciplinary mechanism of power, as people may have internalized this surveillance and consequently monitored their own behaviour.

What is quite interesting is the author’s appeal to “our development objectives” (“The infrastructure,” 2010, para. 36). These development objectives tend to be couched in capitalist market economy discourse. The author of the article alluded to the infrastructural development – such as building more train lines – that would assist in the “capitalist development” of the South African economy. Thus, the mobilization of the term “development” in this manner demonstrates Foucault’s idea of the art of governing:
the author was contributing to a discourse that produces a link between self-governing and the economy. If one wants to be a “proper citizen,” it is implied, one will contribute to development by controlling one’s behaviour.

One article in particular was focused on holding the government accountable for its actions with respect to the Nelspruit whistleblower murders (see “The ANC,” 2010). The writer of this piece was responding to American reporter Dave Zirin’s article published in the left-leaning American journal *The Nation*. In his article, Zirin contends that the World Cup was dividing South Africa, through the bulldozing of houses for stadiums and the regulations allowing few people access to stadium property (“The ANC,” 2010). Zirin specifically refers to the rumoured 20-person hit list that included two Mbombela Stadium whistleblowers. As the author of this *Pretoria News* response article explains:

Zirin lifts a quote from the *Sunday World* from ANC spokesman Paul Mbenyane, denying accusations swirling that the hit list is linked to the ANC. “The ANC wants to reiterate its condemnation of any murder of any person no matter what the motive may be.” To which Zirin notes, rather dryly, “It’s never a good sign when you have to make clear that you are anti-murder.” (“The ANC,” 2010, para. 9-11)

The *Pretoria News* author’s argument is that South Africans have become so used to these allegations and events that sometimes they do not even recognize the absurdity of lacking government critique. In this vein, the author argues,

Sometimes the outside world helps you to see yourself in a different light. The frog in the pot does not always realize he is being boiled alive until it is too late, as the saying goes, if the heat is turned up very slowly…We are slowly being boiled alive in a stew of dissolving institutions and obedience to the rule of law as we tentatively request our government please to turn down the
What the author is alluding to, without explicitly theorizing so, is how dominant discourse in South Africa has constituted South Africans’ ways of thinking to the extent that many cannot challenge or think outside of these discursive constructions. Thus, the article is an attempt to construct a counter/resistant discourse, drawing on a story written from the “outside.” While many articles presented in this project have demonstrated that much South African popular discourse was critical of the events surrounding the killing of the whistleblowers, this article is important in theorizing about governmentality. The author was asking South Africans to be accountable to the idea that these happenings were “wrong,” and to ask their government to behave better. This particular discourse, then, operated as a governmentality technology of power as it was mobilized to contribute to how people defined their lives and how they defined government conduct. Power, as demonstrated by these articles constituting governmental discourses, operates at the level of individuals, as they use the social space of the newspaper to govern conduct, with the population as a target. Power, then, is not just a top-down imposition of sovereign authority.

Conclusion

What becomes clear through the 2010 FIFA World Cup Nelspruit case study is that it is not just the state that has the power to define laws and constitute bare life. Rogue sovereigns as described by Butler are mobilized within the state and corporate sector as a
result of globalization. This process was exemplified by the diversity of actors, including politicians, business people and those affiliated with the sport of soccer itself, implicated in the killings of the whistleblowers. These actors helped define who was worthy of life and who was not, as a function of the threat the victims posed to the former’s accumulation interests. While these codes were not “legal” as defined by the Constitution, the changing nature of the state in an era of globalization – in which the state is involved in agreements with transnational organizations and corporations – displaces the power of legal codes and norms onto private actors or, as Butler would have it, rogue sovereigns who arise in a field of governmentality. The rogue sovereigns consisted, in part, of those who killed the whistleblowers and those who relocated people into Temporary Relocation Areas. The South African state partially supported these informal norms and codes by not swiftly pursuing trials and by not supporting the life of those living in the camps.

A main thrust of my argument is that we must extend Agamben’s thesis of the state of exception to include not only those who are actively killed but also those who are left to die. The ability to place people in camps with just their basic needs met and, in some cases, less, represents the penetration of Agamben’s biopolitical sovereignty into the bodies of those impoverished. Some news articles and documentary films indicate that people were dying in fairly high numbers at these camps due to disease and traffic fatalities. The people who were put into these camps had lives not worth as much as the capital to be accumulated through the stadium, and thus their existence was being
partially defined in a sovereign manner by this capital. As a result, people’s lives were being increasingly constituted as Agamben’s bare life by those with authority to do so, as well as by various non-juridical and non-capital dominations such as racial constitution.

The whistleblowers who were killed and those who died in the camps represent the third space I have added to Sanyal’s conceptualization of postcolonial capital. As he argues, those who are not able to become labourers or capitalists through primitive accumulation inhabit a second space of postcolonial capital, through which they are kept alive by a transfer of capital from the surplus value producing space (Sanyal, 2007). This, he argues, occurs because of human rights discourse – that is, the right to life – and is sustained by “development discourse.” The events surrounding the World Cup demonstrate that not all are “kept alive,” however, as many became constituted as bare life. We must reconceptualize postcolonial capital to include the state of exception, in which people are killed and left to die. This state of exception is in constant negotiation with Sanyal’s second space, however, as the conditions in which people are constituted as bare life change. This process occurs as a function of capital accumulation interests, the moral orders of rogue sovereigns, and constitution of identities such as race, all informed by historical social relations that are not necessarily capitalist in nature.

These constitutions of bare life only occur within a larger field of governmentality and “right to life” discourses. Therefore, although people in Nelspruit and South Africa were being killed or left to die, there was also resistance to these actions, particularly through news coverage that supported people’s right to life. The sovereigns, then, were
acting as momentary forces within broader discourses that defined many people’s existence. Much of these governmentality technologies manifested as capitalist development rhetoric, however, as some authors governed the actions of their fellow citizens and the government by asking them to act “fairly” within the capitalist market economy.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

Theoretical framework

Through this project I have constructed a theoretical framework to help elucidate the various technologies of power that operate as Global South nations host sport mega events. A broad purpose of this project was to demonstrate that we must understand both the material and discursive effects of power as they work to reinforce one another and are generally inseparable. We can begin to do this through understanding the inherent recognition of abstraction and consciousness in Marxist theories of primitive accumulation, as well as the inherent respect for material reality in much of Foucault’s theorizing of power. Postcolonial thinkers such as David Scott and Timothy Mitchell provide an interesting place to construct articulations between Foucault and Marx; they present colonial governmentality as a way to understand how the idea of land and private property fundamentally changed through colonial expansion and altered the ways in which people could define their lives.

Furthermore, postcolonial scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty and Marcus Taylor urge us to understand capitalism and primitive accumulation as ongoing processes that are influenced by social relations arising from an area’s non-capitalist history. Capitalism and primitive accumulation are always contingent; the processes of capitalism are influenced and transformed by various non-capitalist, socio-historical relations with which they come into contact, and therefore capitalisms must be understood as variable according to the areas of the world in which these exploitative social relations come to
reproduce themselves. Furthermore, not all social relations are subsumed by capital and can exist independently or alongside capitalist processes. Land can be understood as an antecedent that is not inherent to capitalism – therefore is part of the History 2 of an area – but can be used for capitalist ends through a spatio-temporal fix or by forcing people from their subsistence activities into the capitalist workforce.

Kalyan Sanyal’s conceptualization of postcolonial capital space can be put into productive conversation with Giorgio Agamben’s theorizing of the state of exception to understand how particular people are killed or left to die. Not everyone is sustained in the space of non-capital; I have argued that some people are constituted as bare life and therefore become *homo sacer* who can be killed or left to die, as a result of Agamben’s juridico-political order. Rogue sovereigns – arising in a space of globalized capitalist expansion – partake in creating this state of exception through their own “moral orders.”

Taking heed of Foucault’s conceptualizations of power, I argued that people can be constituted as bare life through a number of different mechanisms and smaller subjugations – that is, not just through the structure of formalized sovereignty – and can be left to die within this “third space.” Capitalist relations and other non-capital, History 2 factors are involved in these constitutions. This space is in a constant negotiation, however, as mechanisms of power are always changing.

**The 2010 FIFA World Cup in Nelspruit, South Africa**

In the case study portion of the project I used media as empirical evidence to demonstrate how the World Cup created conditions in which a particular form of
capitalism could unfold. In Chapter 3, I focused on the moment in which the Matsafeni community were dispossessed of their land through various land deals. In Chapter 4, I focused on the moment in which whistleblowers were killed for revealing illicit tenders-granting processes. The particular form of capitalism underlying these processes was characterized by rogue sovereignty, as new legal pluralities were constructed through various public-private partnerships between the state, private corporations, and the transnational corporation of FIFA. Power operated through practices within the material environment and were combined with discourses to effect a change in how people defined their existence.

I demonstrated through using materialist theories of accumulation by dispossession that land became exchanged in the market economy as a function of World Cup events. This represented a unique form of accumulation by dispossession, however, as the land was purchased by a public entity – that is, the municipal government – that is to act for the good of the public; however, it was mainly private corporations – such as FIFA – that profited. Furthermore, the act of exchange itself represented an interesting moment in the history of South Africa, as it was the first time the Matsafeni exchanged their land in a monetized form. This is accumulation by dispossession according to Harvey.

The Matsafeni’s use of the judiciary to fight for a “fair” deal was a function of the particular culture of mass action that arose because of South Africa’s apartheid policies. This community was able to reverse the R1 deal and have a more “fair” deal enforced, and thus the History 2 of the area affected the way in which capitalism operated through
the World Cup. However, the community’s fights were for the “right to fair dealings in the market” with no critique of the right to land ownership in the first place. Therefore, land exchange in popular media was voiced as “natural” and “true,” which demonstrates a condition of Mitchell and Scott’s governmentality. Power, then, operated as material accumulation by dispossession became naturalized as the way in which people defined their lives.

Accumulation by dispossession and the killing of whistleblowers occurred partly as a result of new forms of sovereignty that emerged through the 2010 FIFA World Cup. New sovereigns arose in a field of governmentality through licit and illicit public private-partnerships that created their own paralegal sovereign orders or “moral codes.” These new PPPs were represented in a few different ways, in: i) the informal R1 land deals between members of the Matsafeni Board, the mayor, and the 2010 City Coordinator; ii) the more formalized land exchange deal between the Matsafeni and the municipality, in which the latter granted tenders to private construction companies in order to build the stadium; iii) guarantees signed between the municipality and FIFA that allowed the latter to accumulate the greatest profit and effectively changed the law in South Africa; and iv) the illicit partnerships between those who organized the killing of whistleblowers, which included “a top Mpumalanga politician, a soccer boss, and two businessman.” These rogue sovereigns created their own moral codes often around the interests of capital accumulation, although the people who could be removed from their land and those who could be killed were constituted as such through various other subjugations related to
race, for instance. With these new rogue sovereigns – in various manifestations of the public-private partnership – the nation state became both a subject and object of sovereignty in globalized forms of legal plurality.

However, these rogue sovereigns operated in a larger field of governmentality. People still spoke of their “rights” in biopolitical terms, as they fought for the right to life. The entrenchment of “right to life” discourse meant that the illicit partnerships often had to hide their actions – such as the case with the killing of whistleblowers – because their own sovereign paralegal order was at odds with these more generalized governmentality and biopolitical discourses. Therefore, the rogue sovereigns were heavily influenced by biopolitical technologies of power and, through their attempts at hiding their actions, were complicit in reifying these mechanisms.

Power also operated through mechanisms of governmentality as people governed themselves, but also held their own government accountable. As Foucault explains, governmentality involves the vertical integration of the state, the family and the individual, as discourses and practices create the conditions in which people define their existence. In popular news media during the lead up to the World Cup, many authors and commentators were asking their fellow citizens to “behave” while the “eyes of the world” were upon them. Furthermore, the citizenry were attempting to persuade the government to act swiftly to finish stadiums and to prosecute those suspected of killing the whistleblowers. Much of the dissatisfaction was voiced through the use of irony and sarcasm. Ordinary citizens, then, were attempting to govern each other and the state. This
example also demonstrates the confluence of governmentality and discipline: people may have internalized these governing discourses as they began to self-surveil their behaviour in a panoptic fashion.

History 2 factors were implicated in how resistance was performed. The history of mass action as occurred during the apartheid era has become an important component of South African civil society, and thus the mobilization around the school dispossession may have pressured the government to build the schools when it appeared these promises were being broken. Another example of the importance of History 2 factors in shaping the process of capitalism was through the Matsafeni’s pursual of “fair market dealings.” Instead of individuals being proletarianized without a class consciousness, as Marxians might theorize, the community members articulated their rights in terms of their “non-capitalist,” Matsafeni community membership; capitalism with its internal structural logic did not homogenize these individuals into labourers within the capitalist system, but instead the process of land dispossession was fought through, and defined by, the community and its previous history with the land transfer process. The community also utilized laws and the juridico-political structure of the courts that already existed in order to fight “unfair” land deals. Therefore, the process of capitalism as it unfolded in South Africa during the World Cup was contingent upon historical social and political variables and relationships that were not subsumed by capital but, instead, transformed capitalism itself.
This case study helped me theorize and nuance Agamben’s state of exception in the context of the World Cup. The state of exception was created through, in part, the paralegal orders of the various rogue sovereigns elucidated above. I argued that the state of exception contains not only those who were actively killed – such as the whistleblowers – but also those who were left to die – such as those in Temporary Relocation Areas – often through state-sanctioned mechanisms. Those who inhabited the state of exception through the World Cup included those who could be easily dispossessed of their land and put into camps that often did not meet their basic needs, as well as the whistleblowers who were actively killed. Therefore, people in this dispossessed state of postcolonial capital were not always kept alive through the needs economy of Sanyal; many died as a partial function of the events surrounding the World Cup. Those who died in camps – while not actively killed by the state – I argued still exist in this state of exception because the state allowed this to be so. Thus, the state of exception need not only apply solely to those who are actively killed.

People became a part of this third space of postcolonial capital – this state of exception – as a result of various constitutions. These included the capital accumulation interests of various World Cup actors and the processes of racialization that were a result of the particular history of South African apartheid. The killings were often “resisted” in popular discourse because they occurred within a larger field of governmentality; the “right to life” discourse contradicted the actions of these rogue sovereigns and, therefore,
this moment represents the sometimes nervous tension between various technologies of power.

**Contributions**

This project is an attempt to start theorizing about sport mega events in the Global South in light of emerging globalization and postcolonial literature, as well as utilizing older theories of power as conceptualized by Marx and Foucault. One of my reasons for using theory and literature from political studies and postcolonial studies, among others, is because I believe the broader social sciences and humanities – such as the fields of sociology, political studies and geography – have much to contribute to current theorizing of sport. Furthermore, I believe these fields also need to take sport seriously as a site of political, economic and cultural struggles. With this conceptualization of sport we can begin to understand the broad-reaching influence of transnational sporting corporations as sovereign actors and their importance in contributing to law-making in an era of legal plurality. Sport and transnational sporting corporations are also sites of governmentality, as they create new norms and assist in redefining how people live their lives. This was particularly apparent through the naturalized dispossessions occurring around the event and the guarantees that the South African government signed with FIFA, with little popular criticism of either.

I also wanted to bring Agamben’s state of exception into theorizations of sport and postcolonialism; the field of socio-cultural studies of sport has been heavily influenced by Foucauldian notions of discipline and the governing of the self, but I wanted to
complicate these understandings by looking at the impact of sport on a more macro scale, at a “population level.” Therefore, I used Agamben to problematize the Foucauldian relationship between sovereignty and biopolitics; as I demonstrated in this project, the management of life is taken up by different actors – who can sometimes be understood as rogue sovereigns – through processes of globalization. Foucault’s understanding of power can help elucidate how this occurs, however, as those who become bare life do so through a number of smaller dominations and subjugations.

Theorizing sport mega events is particularly relevant as more and more Global South nations pursue these events as part of their “development agendas”; these countries often have greater impoverishment than Global North nations and therefore the opportunity costs associated with Southern nations hosting mega events is greater. Given that there is more impoverishment in certain areas of the world, the regulation of bodies that are at odds with image projection projects – such as impoverished people with respect to mega events – is particularly important to theorize. Sport is often at risk of being dismissed as “apolitical”; with this project, I hoped to show how sport has major implications for constituting particular sovereign relationships, as well as actively constituting contingent forms of capitalism and governmentality associated with hosting mega events.

Future directions

This project is a good starting point for understanding how the hosting of sport mega events can effect material dispossession and, sometimes, deaths, as well as constitute new norms and discourses. However, news media itself is not the sole constitutive force of
how people think, nor can it always accurately reflect how people “on the ground” define their lives. Therefore, an important next step of this project is to interview those dislocated for the event to elucidate how they frame their own lives and how they understand the influence of the state and FIFA in their day-to-day activities. This is particularly important in light of the ambivalence that many South Africans felt about the World Cup. While people recognized many of the shortcomings of hosting the event, the particular place of soccer as an important symbol of anti-apartheid mobilization meant that the event had a cultural significance beyond just governmentality or sovereign technologies. The meaning of soccer, in this instance, is contested cultural terrain, and therefore ideas of “nation-building” should be more closely examined and theorized.

Another important focus in the further development of this project would be to understand how people outside of South Africa interpreted the country and its citizens. In what ways was international news coverage constitutive of South African bodies, and how did this affect what Canadians “know” about “South Africans” and “development”? In what ways were certain people constituted as “successful,” while others became a “threat” that had to be “regulated”? And, in turn, how did this regulation occur through the production of certain kinds of “bodies” and “knowledge,” and how did regulation occur at the level of dispossession, for instance? These questions provide a starting place for analyzing a broader range of impacts associated with mega event development in the Global South and beyond.


The infrastructure is coming and, with it, the jobs. (2010, March 5). *Pretoria News*, p. 13.


Mpumalanga constables dismissed for involvement in murder. (March 14, 2011). *All Africa*. Document AFNWS00020110314e73e000jp


