Abstract

This thesis is a critical examination of civic nationalism that focuses on the disconnect between nationalist ideology and the social bases of nationhood, and the implications that this disconnect has for the feasibility of civic nationalism as a policy prescription for issues such as intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration. While problems with the principles of civic nationalist ideology are important, my focus here is the more significant problem that civic nationalism is based on a general theory of nations and nationalism that treats them as solely ideological phenomena. Against this I argue that the term ‘nationalism’ refers to several different phenomena, most importantly a ‘system of culture’ or way of organizing society as described by Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, and that augmenting Gellner and Anderson’s theories with the kind of relational social theory used by authors such as Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly provides an alternative explanation that is a better match for the evidence. If this is the case, I contend, then civic nationalism is both a misrepresentation of the history of nations and nationalism and infeasible as a prescription for policy issues such as intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration. These arguments are supported with empirical evidence that is principally drawn from four cases: France, the United States, Northern Ireland, and Canada.
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A distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ types of nations and nationalism is one of the basic tenets of contemporary nationalism studies, and a popular frame for these subjects outside of academia. In countless journal articles, newspaper editorials, and in partisan rhetoric, a civic variety of nationalism, based on the voluntary association of politically like-minded individuals, is contrasted with an ethnic kind, based on common ancestry and related ascriptive characteristics. The specific terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ were first used consistently in this context by Anthony Smith in the 1980s, but he was building on a long tradition that can be traced back through Hans Kohn’s ‘political’ (Western) and ‘cultural’ (non-Western) nations and nationalism, Friedrich Meinecke’s *Staatsnation* (state nation) and *Kulturnation* (cultural nation), and nineteenth-century political debates over the proper borders of France and Germany among figures such as Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges and Theodor Mommsen.\(^1\) In short, some version of this distinction has existed for at least two hundred years.

Its use was mostly limited to academics studying nationalism (a relatively small group prior to the 1990s) until Michael Ignatieff’s book *Blood and Belonging*, the companion to a highly successful BBC documentary series that he both developed and participated in, became an international best-seller and won several awards at the height of public interest in nationalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. “What’s wrong with the world is not nationalism itself,” Ignatieff wrote, but “the kind of nation, the kind of home that nationalists

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want to create and the means that they use to seek their ends.” There is a “struggle going on between those who still believe that a nation should be a home to all, and race, color, religion, and creed should be no bar to belonging, and those who want their nation to be home to only their own. It’s the battle between the civic and the ethnic nation.”\(^2\) Newspapers and other media picked up on this, and Ignatieff’s simplified version of Smith’s distinction became a focal point for both academic and public debates.

Over the past two decades, numerous books and articles have employed some version of the distinction, and its influence outside of academic circles continues to grow. Many authors use it as a frame for case studies or comparison, and it is common to see articles documenting—or, more likely, advocating—a transition from ethnic to civic nationalism in a particular case or set of cases.\(^3\) Introductory textbooks across the social sciences and humanities routinely introduce the study of nations and nationalism using the distinction, politicians invoke it to justify their decisions, and even advertisers have recognized its popular resonance by incorporating it into major commercial campaigns.\(^4\)

Most current advocates of the distinction can be divided into two overlapping groups: those who primarily use it as the basis for analyzing nations and nationalism, whether in specific cases or in general, and those who primarily use it as a basis for policy prescriptions, most of whom at least implicitly rely on the analysis of the former. The most prominent members of the

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\(^3\) An early example, cited in many similar articles, is Raymond Breton, “From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11, no. 1 (1988).

\(^4\) Canadian Member of Parliament Michael Chong, for example, resigned from cabinet in November of 2006 to protest the official recognition of the Québécois as a ‘nation within a united Canada’ on the grounds that it violated his principles as a civic nationalist.

A decade-long advertising campaign for the Honda Motor Company promoting their ‘Civic’ line of automobiles is titled ‘Civic Nation’. One commercial features shots of several different, heavily modified Honda Civics driven by people of different ages and ethnicities. As the advertisement comes to a close, the cars converge on the same road, implying that their drivers are united by what they share more than they are separated by their differences. This may seem like a superficial example, but it clearly assumes that the concept of ‘civic nationhood’ will be intuitive to consumers, and the campaign was developed by a firm that bills itself as specialising in ‘multicultural advertising’.
first group are Hans Kohn and Liah Greenfeld, who argue that nationalism is an ideology that
began as civic by definition, first emerging in England sometime between the mid-sixteenth and
mid-seventeenth century, and then spreading to France and the United States due to the
convergence of several major cultural, social, and political changes. Its spread to Eastern Europe
and beyond, however, preceded the necessary conditions for civic nationalism there, and instead
led to a reactionary ethnic nationalism devoid of nearly all of the virtues of its progenitor. This
historiography functions as both a description of the history of nations and nationalism and a
theory of their explanation, and in one way or another serves as the foundation for most
scholarship that uses the civic/ethnic distinction.

The second group includes a more diverse range of authors such as Brian Barry, Jack
Snyder, and Christian Joppke, who all argue that civic nation-states are normatively preferable to
either ethnic or plurinational states, and that policy problems such as intra-state nationalist
conflict and immigrant integration are best addressed by developing or imposing an integrative
civic nationalism through institutions that rigorously defend and encourage liberal values. The
prescriptions made by this group of authors are not necessarily derived from the first's
historiography and attendant theory of nations and nationalism, but the prescription implies an
unstated theory of these phenomena that would have to be similar to that perspective in order for
it to be considered feasible.

The trouble with this is that the distinction between civic and ethnic types of nations and
nationalism is itself a part of civic nationalist ideology, which is better understood as a reflection
of how contemporary liberal majorities see themselves than an accurate representation of the
nature of these phenomena. In fact, this general problem is best seen as a summary of several
distinct but interrelated conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and factual errors that together
pose one of the most pervasive and resilient obstacles to progress in nationalism studies. This is no mere academic quibble. Policy decisions informed by this mistake are regularly made around the world, and have often had life-altering consequences for millions of people, sometimes persisting for generations. Its roots are theoretical, but this problem is deeply practical in its effects.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide the first comprehensive rejection of civic nationalism as a tool of analysis to substantively addresses this full set of problems, their interrelationship, and their practical consequences.

I will argue that the most important of these problems is that civic nationalism is based on a general theory of nations and nationalism that treats them as solely ideological phenomena, meaning that it is the successful diffusion of ideas alone that have produced nations in the past, and can build them in the present and future. Problems with the principles of civic nationalist ideology related to logical consistency, conceptualization, and inference have been ably and repeatedly criticized by other authors, but that is not my focus. Such 'problems in principle' are still important, and I devote a chapter to them, but my main concern is the inadequacy of the general theory of nations and nationalism (covering all types, not just civic) that theorists of civic nationalism employ, and the consequences of this for the feasibility of civic nationalism as a policy prescription. In other words, my focus is the role of ideology in the explanation of nations and nationalism, and the management of policy issues related to these phenomena, not the specific principles of civic or any other nationalist ideology.

My response has two parts. First, I contend that nationalism is more than just an ideology, and most importantly can also be understood as a ‘system of culture’ or way of organizing society, as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson have notably argued. My adoption of Gellner
and Anderson’s theories of nations and nationalism is only partial, however, and augmented by relational social theory (or ‘relationalism’), a constructivist social ontology which has been most prominently applied to nationalism by Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly.\(^5\) Relationalism treats social phenomena as the product of regularities in social relations rather than substantial entities: in other words, social groups are the way that we conceptualize particular kinds of enduring, processual relationships between people, not ‘things’ in themselves. The most important characteristic of Gellner and Anderson’s theories, I argue, is that they identify what Gellner calls processes of ‘exo-socialization’, such as mass education, intra-state transportation infrastructure, and inter-regional economic trade and migration. It is these usually institutionally-driven ‘relational mechanisms’, to use Tilly’s term, that create ties between people who may otherwise have never come into contact with one another. Ideology is important, but social relationships are the foundation of nationhood and, while ideology can shape these relationships (especially when institutionalized), it is the relationships themselves that generate a sense of national identity and facilitate shared ideological values, not the other way around as civic nationalists would have us believe. There are civic nationalists, but there are no civic nations.

The second part of my argument builds on the first. Many authors, as I mentioned above, see civic nationalism as the solution to important policy issues such as intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration. Some base this prescription on civic nationalist historiography and the theory of nations and nationalism that informs it, but others, especially normative philosophers and other political participants, often just find the stated principles of civic nationalism appealing because they seem to be consistent with their other political commitments, and advocate civic nationalism on that basis. Regardless of what motivates it, however, the civic nationalist prescription is not feasible because it proposes an ideological

\(^5\) ‘Ontology’ is the study of existence as such, and a ‘social ontology’ is a theory of what and how social things exist.
solution to problems that are fundamentally about how people are related to one another, and is likely to exacerbate the problem in the process.

The remainder of this introduction begins with a brief review of previous critiques of civic nationalism that will help me to then situate and explain the details of my own arguments. This is followed by an overview of the approach and methods that the thesis employs, and finally a brief explanation of the purpose of each chapter and how it contributes to the overall argument.

1. Overview of the argument

1.1. Previous critiques of civic nationalism

The first significant critiques of the civic/ethnic distinction were published in the mid-1990s, and there are four that have been particularly influential. In an article titled “Misunderstanding Nationalism” (1995), Will Kymlicka reviewed Ignatieff’s book along with Liah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, William Pfaff’s The Wrath of Nations, and Yael Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism. He argues that authors who use the distinction often conflate ethnicity and culture, overlook the cultural component of civic nationalism, and ignore clear evidence that purportedly civic nations cannot be based on shared political principles alone because of the wide range of mutually incompatible political beliefs held by conationals. Membership in nations seen as civic such as France and the United States involves participation in a common societal

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culture anchored by a shared language and history, not just a shared commitment to universal liberal values. Furthermore, the claim made by Ignatieff and Pfaff that ethnic nationalism is the cause of nationalist conflict because of its ethnic exclusivity contradicts the fact that such conflict is often the result of civic nationalists trying to forcibly incorporate national minorities. These analyses, Kymlicka contends, tell us more about the psychology of cosmopolitan liberals at the end of the twentieth century than they do about nationalism.\(^7\)

A year later Bernard Yack published “The Myth of the Civic Nation”, now the best-known and most widely cited critique of the distinction.\(^8\) The classification of nations and nationalism into civic and ethnic types, he contends, serves normative as well as descriptive purposes. Most importantly, “distinguishing civic from ethnic understandings of nationhood is part of a larger effort by contemporary liberals to channel national sentiments in a direction—civic nationalism—that seems consistent with the commitments to individual rights and diversity that they associate with a decent political order.”\(^9\) In the process, it ends up indulging in a considerable dose of the ethnocentrism it is supposed to protect us from, and reflects a mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking. Following Kymlicka, Yack argues that civic identities are as much an inherited cultural artefact as ethnic identities and, while nations may come to be associated with certain political principles, those principles are not a sufficient condition for national identification. The key problem, he explains, is that civic nationalism promotes liberal principles without accounting for the conditions that make their implementation possible. Both the social contract and popular sovereignty tacitly assume the existence of a prepolitical cultural

\(^7\) Kymlicka does not explicitly extend this characterization to Greenfeld, but it is applicable. Tamir’s book is also critically assessed, but serves as a liberal nationalist foil to the civic nationalism of the others. For a discussion of the important differences between civic nationalism and liberal nationalism, see chapter three.

\(^8\) Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," in *Theorizing Nationalism*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999 [1996]). This article, which I first read many years ago as an undergraduate, was the original inspiration for this thesis.

\(^9\) Ibid., 104.
community, and reflect norms that “tend to say much more about the way in which we should order lives within given national communities than about why the boundaries of these communities should take one shape rather than another.”

Rogers Brubaker has also provided an influential criticism of the distinction. From an analytical perspective, he argues, the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ are ambiguous and can be understood in very different ways, depending on how culture fits into the scheme. On the one hand, if ethnicity is strictly limited to biological descent then ‘ethnic nationalism’ applies to such a narrow range of cases that rhetoric emphasizing common culture would have to be described as a kind of civic nationalism (assuming, as those who use the distinction usually do, that ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ exhaust the possibilities). Similarly, a strict interpretation of ‘civic’ based on an acultural, ahistorical, universalist, voluntarist, and rationalist understanding of nationhood risks defining it out of existence. On the other hand, a broad definition of ethnic as ‘ethnocultural’ or civic as including common values, customs, history, and a sense of common identity makes it difficult to exclude cases from either category. This ambiguity “and in particular the uncertain place of culture in the civic-ethnic scheme, calls into question the [analytical] usefulness of the distinction itself.” It is also normatively problematic. Civic nationalism, for example, is routinely characterized as more inclusive than the ethnic alternative because it is supposed to be based on common citizenship, a shared political creed, and voluntary association. But citizenship

10 Ibid., 111.
11 The argument was developed over three publications, beginning as the final section of a book chapter and then revised twice as a full chapter in subsequent books. Rogers Brubaker, "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism," in The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction Between "Civic" And "Ethnic" Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi, et al. (Zurich: Verlag Rüegger, 1999); Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). Brubaker’s book Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany is often cited as a text that advocates the use of the civic/ethnic distinction but, in fact, he only uses a variation of these categories to classify nationalist ideologies.
12 Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 139.
and political creed are both by definition exclusive as well as inclusive, and an entirely voluntary account of nationhood is implausibly ahistorical and ignores “the ways in which choices are meaningful only against the horizon of unchosen cultural contexts” pointed out by communitarians and liberal nationalists.13

The last of the four major critics is Anthony Marx. Over two books and an article, he argues that contrary to the “Whiggish triumphalism” of Western historiography, civic nation-states were built on a foundation of racial and religious exclusion.14 Through detailed comparative analytic histories of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil in Making Race and Nation, and France, England, and Spain in Faith in Nation, Marx contends that while some of these cases may now be consolidated ‘civic nations’, in each case initial solidarity was the product of systematic and intentional exclusion of large categories of people from the nation. He describes this process as an application of the ‘logic of exclusionary cohesion’, whereby distinctive groups are demarcated, demonized, and deprived as ‘outsiders’ in order to provide a referent that can further unify and solidify the support of the ‘in-group’. Both “the establishment of national unity through exclusion and the forgetting of this ignoble past were essential ingredients. . . in the ultimate emergence of Western democracy,” Marx says, but the “political imperative for forgetting should not blind us to the analytic necessity to remember.”15

Together, these authors represent a more or less coherent perspective that can be summarized as follows.16 The distinction between civic and ethnic types of nations and nationalism is itself a component of civic nationalist ideology, which reflects the self-

13 Ibid., 143.
15 Marx, Faith in Nation, 31-32.
16 There are real differences between each author’s argument, but I do not think that any of them would have serious objections to this general synthesis.
understanding of many contemporary liberals more than anything else. Civic nationalism is not limited to ‘the West’ or inherently inclusive, and has frequently been the cause of conflict through the coercive inclusion or exclusion of minorities. Membership in any nation is only voluntary for immigrants, and cannot be based on shared values alone, given that ‘universal liberal values’ are equally resonant across many national boundaries and conationals often have mutually incompatible political views. However the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ are defined, they only represent symbolic elements of a self-understanding that is the product of participation in a common culture, language, and history. Nations can serve as a context for liberalism, but are not constituted through liberal practice, and, while it may be politically expedient to forget this fact, it is a grave analytical error that is likely to either create problems or make them worse.

This is the same kind of argument that has been made against taking ethnic nationalist ideology seriously for at least the past forty years, but it has not been nearly as successful against civic nationalism. The critiques are widely-read by scholars of nationalism, and Yack’s article is routinely cited as an ‘alternative perspective’ in most summaries of the distinction, but it is treated as ‘something to keep in mind’ instead of a decisive blow against using civic nationalism.

There are several potential explanations for the persistence of the distinction. The simplest is that most of the authors who use it do so unreflectively. It is an easy and widely recognized way to frame empirical research that seems intuitively plausible, at least in part because it is consistent with many of those authors’ self-understandings. Even when the critical literature is acknowledged, however, it is often implicitly dismissed as ‘theoretical’—read as the speculative musings of normative philosophers.

Furthermore, there is a common perception that rejecting civic nationalism entails the endorsement of ethnic nationalism and all of the bad, illiberal things associated with it. This
reasoning begs the question by assuming what is at issue in the argument, however, because it only follows if we accept the premise that the dichotomy accurately reflects the range of available options.\textsuperscript{17} Some critics of civic nationalism such as Walker Connor do see nationalism as an inherently ethnic phenomenon (though not as ethnic nationalists themselves understand it), but this is not a necessary consequence of rejecting the civic nationalist perspective.\textsuperscript{18} As Andrew Sayer says, though, what impresses us about dichotomous “rhetoric is its symmetry and the simplicity of its basic organizational principle, rather than its descriptive or explanatory adequacy.”\textsuperscript{19}

It is also apparently easy to evade some of the arguments made by civic nationalism’s critics by slightly reformulating the distinction. The most common response is a to say that there are no ‘pure’ civic or ethnic nations, and that these terms instead represent analytical ideal types that are not required to directly correspond with the real world. In practice, the reformulators say, all nations reflect a mixture of civic and ethnic characteristics, so the only real mistake that previous authors made was not recognizing that the dichotomy should be a continuum.\textsuperscript{20}

Most criticisms that are vulnerable to this line of defence focus on what I earlier called ‘problems in principle’, which includes both inconsistent or misconceived premises of civic nationalist ideology and similarly mistaken arguments that fall outside of the ideology itself but nevertheless affect its analysis. For example, civic nationalists often treat social contract theory as though it is a historical account of nation-formation, when in fact it is a heuristic used by

\textsuperscript{17}The phrase ‘begs the question’ is often misused as though it means to raise a question. I am using it to refer to the logical fallacy also known as petitio principii in Latin. In other words, this is a circular argument.


\textsuperscript{19}Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, Second ed. (London: Routledge, 1992), 265.

normative political philosophers to provide a counter-factual standard of justice. These critiques still have considerable merit in spite of the reformulations but, regardless, this particular debate focuses on what could be called the ‘ideological model’ of civic nationalism, meaning the way that civic nationalism is described by its advocates, instead of the theory of nations and nationalism that underlies civic nationalism, which is the more serious problem. The previous critiques of civic nationalism that I reviewed above take this second problem as their starting point, but then focus on the model without developing that foundation much further.

The basic premise of this starting point is related to a well-known argument made by Charles Taylor against what he calls ‘atomism’, known as the ‘social thesis’. Atomism characterizes individuals as fully autonomous outside of social relations. This is wrong, Taylor says, not just because humans cannot physically survive alone, but more importantly because “they only develop their characteristically human capacities in society. The claim is that living in society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being. . .outside society, or. . .outside certain kinds of society, our distinctively human capacities could not develop.” Taylor uses this social ontology as the foundation for his communitarian political philosophy, but it does not entail his specific normative commitments, and is generally consistent with some other perspectives.

The same kind of ontological argument, in fact, is a basic premise of the most significant critiques of civic nationalism. Kymlicka, for example, argues that a ‘societal culture’ is the

necessary context for individual autonomy and the proper functioning of liberal institutions. According to Yack, nationhood is the social context of liberalism rather than its product, which is similarly motivated, and Brubaker approvingly mentions the communitarian social thesis and its liberal nationalist cousin in his critique of the distinction.

None of these authors take this line of argument much further, however. It is obvious that their critiques are based on alternative theories of nations and nationalism that feature, among other things, a different social ontology than civic nationalism, but their focus on the particulars of the civic nationalist model leaves the ontological foundation of the critique underdeveloped. This is also true of policy-oriented critics, who argue that civic nationalists (or ‘integrationists’ more generally) seriously misunderstand the social bases and resilience of ethnic and nationalist identities, only to then bracket the issue and focus on alternative policy prescriptions. This thesis is meant to fill that gap.

1.2. *Filling the gap*

As I explained above, my argument has two parts, but it progresses in four stages. The first two stages focus on civic nationalism’s conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems; the third offers an alternative perspective on nations and nationalism informed by relational social

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24 To be fair, two of the three major critiques of civic nationalism were published as either a journal article or a book chapter, and there is only so much that can be accomplished in 6–8,000 words.

theory; and the fourth demonstrates the infeasibility of civic nationalism as prescription for regulating intra-state nationalist conflict or facilitating immigrant integration.

Stage one

The first stage deals with the ‘problems in principle’ that have been the main focus of previous critiques of civic nationalism, and establishes the kind of tendencies and reasoning behind them. I begin by making a distinction between patriotism, liberal nationalism, and civic nationalism, which are often mistaken as synonyms, and then focus on the problems that are specific to civic nationalism, which can be divided into three categories: ‘membership’, ‘political culture’, and ‘questionable analyses’. Membership in civic nations, for example, is often characterized as inherently inclusive and voluntary because it is in principle open to everyone with citizenship and based on consent rather than ascription. It is easy to demonstrate that citizenship is just as exclusive as it is inclusive, however, and the consent claim is based on the misinterpretation of social contract theory that I mentioned above. The second category, political culture, covers similar conceptual errors in the tenets of civic nationalist ideology, and the third category, questionable analyses, addresses misconceptualizations that are not part of nationalist ideology, but affect its interpretation, such as the use of ideal types to try to avoid empirical criticism. The purpose of this stage of the argument is to demonstrate that civic nationalist ideology includes many misconceptualizations, and that most of them are the result of a misguided and unsustainable attempt to force nationalism into the mold of a specific kind of normative liberalism.
Stage two

There is a subtle but significant shift between authors who make strictly normative arguments for civic nationalism and those who use it for explanatory purposes as well, and this is the starting point for the second stage of my argument. For normative political philosophers such as Brian Barry, the important thing about civic nationalism is that it proposes a model of nationhood that is consistent with his conception of liberal equality; theories of nationalism as such do not seem to interest him, and play no explicit role in his argument. Social scientists such as Liah Greenfeld, however, end up proposing two distinct images of civic nationalism that share an unrecognized tension. On the one hand, there is the ideological model of civic nationhood, which is how these authors always represent it in contrast to ethnic nationalism: consensual versus ascriptive, liberal versus illiberal, modern versus traditional, etc. On the other hand, there is their explanation of nation-formation, which is basically the successful diffusion of a particular nationalist ideology throughout a given territory. These two images are in tension because in the first civic nationalists choose to come together as conationals because of their shared political values, but in the second civic nations are the product of indoctrination. Nevertheless, most theorists of civic nationalism do not seem to be aware of this tension, and the second image represents the general theory of nations and nationalism employed by those who are interested in explaining its development and spread. The purpose of the second stage of my argument is to deconstruct this theory, explain its weaknesses, and make the differences between key units of analysis such as nations and nationalism clear.

Civic nationalist historiography provides the best entry-point for this task. Greenfeld and Kohn, whose works serve as the historical basis of most explanatory theories of civic nationalism,
argue that the first emergence of any kind of nationalism was civic nationalism in England, sometime between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth century. Through very detailed, mostly intellectual histories, they explain the emergence of the idea of the nation as the result of the convergence of several major cultural, social, and political changes. The ideas associated with nationalism were not all new, but the transformation of English society and the need to justify middle class dominance provided the first opportunity in history for those ideas to spread throughout a society and take hold. France and the United States were inspired by the English example a century later. This historiography provides both a history of the origin and spread of civic nationalism and a theory of nationalism as such. Kohn, Greenfeld and, in fact, every prominent theorist of civic nationalism interested in explanation other than Anthony Smith see nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon, and nations as an epiphenomenal manifestation of the successful diffusion of nationalist ideology.

There are two main problems with this approach. First, nationalist ideology is just one component of a more complex set of phenomena; and second, theorists of civic nationalism make some important methodological mistakes in the way that they treat ideology itself.

There are good reasons to see nationalism as more than an ideology. Smith, for example, identifies five different and substantive meanings for the term.\(^{26}\) This is possible because ‘nationalism’ is what linguists call a polyseme: a single word with one spelling and pronunciation, but multiple different—though etymologically and therefore semantically related—meanings. Words with the suffix ‘-ism’ are particularly ambiguous and, notably, can denote a ‘system’ or way of organizing things as well as a doctrine, as with ‘capitalism’. Nationalism presents a similar case. Like capitalism, it refers not just to a doctrine or ideology, but also to a way of organizing society. In fact, two of the most influential theorists of

nationalism, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, argue that nationalism is best understood as what Anderson calls a ‘cultural system’. As he puts it, part of the difficulty in analyzing nationalism “is that one tends unconsciously to hypostasize the existence of Nationalism with-a-big-N (rather as one might Age-with a-capital-A) and then to classify ‘it’ as an ideology. . . It would, I think, make things easier if one treated it as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’, rather than with ‘liberalism’ or ‘fascism’. ”

Similarly, while Gellner’s opening declaration in Nations and Nationalism that nationalism “is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” is widely cited, the rest of the book rejects the idea that the development of any particular nationalist ideology is an important constitutive component of nationalism itself. Both authors argue that while ideology plays an important role in the development and practice of nationalism, our focus should be on the new way of life and social relationships created through specific processes of modernization. For these authors, nationalism is primarily the process through which nations are made and perpetuated.

There are two sets of methodological problems with how civic nationalists treat ideology: one focused on ideology, and another focused on units of analysis. The former set includes four related issues. First, the intellectual history of an idea is not necessarily the history of the phenomenon that it addresses (I call this ‘intellectualism’); second, texts written by intellectuals and other elites, no matter how famous, do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of the masses (‘diffusion’); third, even if elite ideas are dispersed throughout an entire population, there is no guarantee that they will be understood, interpreted, or enacted as their authors intended (‘interpretation’); and finally, even if a person fully understands a particular ideology, it will not

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28 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). The fact that so many authors quote this misleading statement as a summary of Gellner’s argument suggests his work is more often cited than read.
necessarily determine that person’s beliefs or behaviour, and it may not affect the person at all (‘indifference’). Separately and even more so together, these problems strongly suggest that ideology cannot bear the weight of the civic nationalist argument.

Treating nationalism as just an ideology also tends to elide the distinction between different units of analysis, which is why most theorists of civic nationalism characterize nations as epiphenomenal manifestations of the spread of nationalist ideology. The heart of the problem with this is that it fails to distinguish between ‘participant’ and ‘observer’ perspectives. The former focuses on the self-understanding of social actors, and the latter on disinterested analysis of that self-understanding and the circumstances surrounding it. Studying participant perspectives is important to scholarly analysis but, as Rogers Brubaker rightly argues, we must avoid using ‘categories of practice’ as ‘categories of analysis’. Ideology is important, and is often reflected in things such as citizenship policy, national symbols, and participant self-understandings, but it is a category of practice: “a key part of what we want to explain, not what we want to explain things with; it belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit.”

Stage three

This sets the foundation for the third stage of my argument, in which I propose an alternative approach to nations and nationalism that modifies Gellner and Anderson’s arguments with relational social theory, and argue that is a better fit for explaining nation-formation in France and the United States than civic nationalist historiography.


As I said earlier, relationalism is a constructivist social ontology that treats social phenomena as the product of regularities in social relations rather than substantial entities, meaning that social groups are the way that we conceptualize particular kinds of processual relationships between people, not ‘things’ in themselves. There are two main schools of relational social theory: the ‘Bourdieu school’, based on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu; and the ‘New York school’, named for the ideas developed in a series of meetings organized by Harrison White and Charles Tilly at Columbia University and the New School for Social Research during the 1990s, and best known through Mustafa Emirbayer’s “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology”. 31

Beginning in the early-1990s, Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly each developed influential theories of nations and nationalism featuring a relational social ontology: Brubaker’s derived from Bourdieu, and Tilly’s based on a combination of social network theory and philosophical pragmatism influential among members of the New York school. In brief, Brubaker argues that nations are ‘practical categories’, or participant perspectives on the world rather than substantial entities, generated by particular kinds of political ‘fields’, or configurations of relations between social actors. Nationalism is “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.” 32 Tilly defines nations as a ‘categorical relation’ in which networked actors on one side of a boundary claim to share a common history, culture, and destiny with all persons on their side of the boundary and distinctness from others beyond the boundary, and nationalism as a form of contentious politics centred around the claims that nations and states should be congruent and obligations to nations supersede all others.

32 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 17.
Brubaker and Tilly are right that all social phenomena are best understood in relational terms, and their work has provided significant advances in our understanding of nations and nationalism, but I disagree with them on some things. Tilly, for example, focuses almost exclusively on nationalism as a social movement and puts too much emphasis on particular boundary claims as the distinctive quality of nations. Brubaker, on the other hand, overstates his point when he says that national groups do not exist outside of participant perception. We should not take participant self-understandings at face value, but a strictly cognitive approach leaves too much unexplained. Brubaker says that nationalist politics cannot be reduced to crude elite manipulation, and argues that the instrumental use of national categories is only effective under certain conditions and activated by situational cues, but he does not really explain why these particular categories are politically resonant. He treats nationhood as a practical category produced through the intersection of a variety of different fields, but the social relationships that facilitate such participant perspectives should be understood as a dimension of nationhood as well. A relational approach to nations does not require them to be a solely cognitive phenomenon and, indeed, my contention is that nationalist ideology would have no mass resonance if it were not for the existence of a particular set of enduring social relations.

Accordingly, I argue that a modified relational approach that combines parts of Brubaker and Tilly’s theories with Gellner and Anderson’s provides a better explanation of what nations and nationalism are and how they come about than the civic nationalist alternative. Both pairs of authors begin with the premise that nationalist ideology should not be seen as an accurate reflection of the bases of nationhood. Gellner and Anderson argue that ideology is just one aspect of a set of phenomena that is better understood as a system of culture. Brubaker and Tilly, on the other hand, while recognizing that nationalism is more than an ideology, see the ‘national’
quality of any phenomenon as a participant perspective that is based on networks of social relations and shapes behaviour but does not have any basis in reality. In my view, an approach that combines the processes of nationalization described by Gellner and Anderson with Brubaker and Tilly’s relational ontology addresses some of the tensions in each theory and matches well with the available evidence.

To help do this, I propose that we adopt two separate analytic concepts, ‘ideational nationhood’ and ‘relational nationhood’, that correspond with the participant and observer perspectives that I mentioned earlier. The first refers to nations as they are perceived by social actors, and the second to the dense network of overlapping social ties created and perpetuated through nationalizing processes. Separating these two concepts allows us to provide an account of the bases of national identity and participant self-understandings without relying on the accuracy of the latter or leaving their mass appeal unexplained. Any theory of nationalism based solely on nationalist ideology, civic or otherwise, is inadequate and reflects the preferences of political actors more than anything else.

I support this argument by testing the civic nationalist account of early nation-formation in France and the United States against the historical record and comparing it to my alternative. In both cases, the evidence shows a striking inconsistency between civic nationalist accounts of nationalist ideology and the evidence, and provides good reason to believe that the efficacy of the social processes associated with nationalization was primarily due to the fact that they created a dense network of new, mutually reinforcing social relationships, rather than the simple diffusion and acceptance of nationalist ideology.
Stage four

The final stage of my argument addresses the immense practical importance of the conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and factual errors demonstrated in the first three stages by applying my critique to two policy issues that civic nationalism is widely prescribed as the solution to: intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration. In short, I argue that whatever civic nationalism’s normative appeal may be, it is not a feasible solution in either case.

Most theorists of civic nationalism attribute intra-state nationalist conflict to ‘elite manipulation: contending national identities within the same state are seen as the highly contingent, malleable products of ideological manipulation by opportunistic elites. The best way to deal with this, they argue, is to encourage or impose a uniform civic identity based on things like shared citizenship, individual rights, and a common public language.

There are several problems with this prescription, however. Civic nationalism is presented as a neutral shared identity among individuals, but in most cases it reflects the culture of the state’s majority nation, which usually developed from a dominant ethnic core. The imposition of the majority’s culture on minority national groups is more likely to create or aggravate conflict than resolve it, especially when resisters are denigrated as backwards, illiberal ethnic nationalists. Furthermore, coerced assimilation, forced population transfer, and genocide each played an important role in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century building of ostensibly civic nations, but these and other similar methods are normatively unacceptable to contemporary liberals and democrats. Even if they were, however, the conditions that allowed for successful nation-building at the beginning of the ‘age of nationalism’ are now uncommon because of that success. Target populations are no longer isolated peasants with no sense of political identity
beyond their immediate relationships, and it is significantly more difficult to reforge such identities than it is to introduce them for the first time. Integration is possible in deeply divided societies, I will argue, but not until after the conflict itself has been addressed through a pragmatic approach that includes plurinational recognition and power-sharing, and even then it will be the product of the long-term development of inter-group relationships, not the adoption of a shared nationalist ideology. I apply these arguments to the case of Northern Ireland to explain why civic nationalism was not an option there, and only a consociational power-sharing agreement was able to bring the violence to an end.

Even when integration is the right move, however, civic nationalism is not the right model. Civic nationalists argue that the most important mechanisms of immigrant integration are basic language training, employment counselling, and especially the inculcation of respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law among newcomers. Just as with intra-state nationalist conflict, however, the civic nationalist response reflects the self-representation of the majority instead of the most important bases of social cohesion. This self-representation indulges in an implicit particularism by portraying ‘universal liberal principles and values’ as the foundation of the host society while simultaneously characterizing them as a product of the unique and noble traditions of the state and its people. In practice, this means that the apparently inclusive rhetoric of civic integration can be used as a tool of exclusion. Even when the desire for inclusion is sincere, however, civic integrationist measures are not enough to achieve integration because they provide few mechanisms for creating the kind of relationships that immigrants need in order to become full participants in their new society, such as the so-called ‘weak ties’ of bridging social capital. Civic integration is best understood as a kind of symbolic politics that is more an ‘immigration policy’ (which determines the selection
criteria for new immigrants) than an ‘immigrant policy’ (which determines how people who get in are incorporated). In short, it is not an integration policy in practice. The Canadian case, I will argue, provides preliminary evidence that supports these arguments.

1.3. Summary

In short, the core premise of this thesis is that civic nationalism is an ideology supported by an inaccurate explanation of nations and nationalism, and is therefore infeasible as a prescription for intra-state nationalist conflict or immigrant integration. I advance this contention by providing a comprehensive analysis that addresses both civic nationalist ideology and the theory of nations and nationalism underlying its use as a tool of analysis, testing the claims of civic nationalist historiography against the historical record and offering an alternative interpretation based on my relational approach, and applying this cumulative analysis to explain why civic nationalism is infeasible as a policy prescription, all supported with detailed empirical evidence from four different cases. My hope is that these efforts will clear the ground for more productive research and policy recommendations in the future.
2. **Approach and methodology**

This is a problem-driven thesis that is deeply inter-field and inter-disciplinary by necessity.\(^{33}\) Nationalism is a major focus not just in political science, but across the social sciences and humanities. Indeed, most of nationalism studies’ core literature comes from other disciplines, especially sociology and history.\(^{34}\) Like James Scott, whose own work is notably interdisciplinary, I think that this is a good thing:

> If half of your reading is not *outside* the confines of political science, you are risking extinction along with the rest of the subspecies. Most of the notable innovations in the discipline have come in the form of insights, perspectives, concepts, and paradigms originating elsewhere. Reading exclusively within the discipline is to risk reproducing orthodoxies or, at the very least, absorbing innovations far from the source. We would do well to emulate the hybrid vigor of the plant and animal breeding world.\(^{35}\)

The research and ideas of many sociologists, historians, and philosophers have significantly influenced the development of this thesis and its conclusions. This influence has been particularly extensive in the case of sociology because of the important role that relational social theory plays in my argument, and the fact that most theorists of nationalism are sociologists.

The core of the thesis, however, is still grounded in political science, especially the field of comparative politics, which has traditionally been the centre of nationalism studies in the discipline. Conceptual analysis in support of empirical inquiry is an essential task in all social

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\(^{33}\) For the importance of problem-driven research, see Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).


scientific research, and it has recently attracted more attention from comparativists. The early work of scholars such as Giovanni Sartori has been used as a foundation for a new focus on conceptual analysis by authors such as David Collier, John Gerring, and Gary Goertz. This is, as Gerardo Munck argues, a positive development in the field, and lends support to my belief that the conceptual and theoretical arguments that I am advancing here make an important necessary contribution to the empirical study of nationalism.

In political science the term ‘theory’ is so often associated with normative political philosophy (which focuses on the moral and ethical context of politics) that it is worth explicitly stating that while this thesis does discuss and is relevant to some normative arguments, it is not an exercise in normative philosophy. Non-normative theory is sometimes called ‘empirical’ or ‘positive’ to indicate that it is derived from or can be tested against the empirical world, but I prefer the term ‘explanatory theory’ in this case because it extends to logical and conceptual analysis as well as derivation from experience.

37 Collier and Gerring recently co-edited a useful book that reprints six of Sartori’s most important articles on conceptual analysis, including the classic “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics”, along with another half-dozen chapters written by other authors who have been influenced by his model. David Collier and John Gerring, eds., Concepts and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori (New York: Routledge, 2009). See also Giovanni Sartori, Fred W. Riggs; and Henry Teune, eds., Tower of Babel: On the Definition and Analysis of Concepts in the Social Sciences, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1975); Giovanni Sartori, ed. Social Science Concepts. A Systematic Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984); David Collier and James E. Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993); David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997); David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo; and Andra Olivia, "Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications," Journal of Political Ideologies 11, no. 3 (2006); Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). For an overview of the importance of conceptual analysis to comparative politics as a whole and a brief review of the different clusters of literature that address issues that are related to it, see Munck, "Comparative Politics".
38 Within the wider field of nationalism studies, Walker Connor is the most influential political scientist who focuses on conceptual analysis. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Approach

My overall approach to this thesis logically begins with relationalism, which is a theory of social ontology. Peter Hall defines ontology as

the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of causal relationships within that world. If a methodology consists of techniques for making observations about causal relations, an ontology consists of premises about the deep causal structures of the world from which analysis begins and without which theories about the social world would not make sense. At a fundamental level, it is how we imagine the social world to be.\(^{40}\)

Political scientists have historically been reticent to engage in ontological discussions and tended to leave them to philosophers. Over the past twenty-five years or so, though, ontology has increasingly come to the fore of the discipline, and, as Colin Hay explains, “political analysts have not so much moved into novel terrain as acknowledged, reflected upon, challenged, and, in some cases, rethought the tacit assumptions on which their analytical enterprises were always premised. No political analysis has ever been ontologically neutral.” Our ontological choices, whether we acknowledge them or not, have profound epistemological, methodological, and practical political consequences.\(^{41}\)

Relational social theory emphasises the processual nature of social life, meaning that it is dynamic, continuously developing, and there are no truly static conditions, despite how we may perceive particular configurations of relations at any given time.

\(^{40}\) Peter A. Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research,” in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 374.

This fits well with historical institutionalism, which supplies many of the principles that inform my analysis. Starting with the assumption that institutions play a central role in social and political life, historical institutionalists define them as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank–firm relations. In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization.”\(^{42}\) Institutions are the emergent product of a particular series of historical processes and events, which are ‘path dependent’ in the sense that the range of current possibilities is constrained by the developmental path that led to the present. Historical institutionalists do not see to simply reduce social and political life to institutional causes, however, and “typically seek to locate institutions in a causal chain that accommodates a role for other factors, notably socioeconomic development and the diffusion of ideas.”\(^{43}\)

The compatibility between relationalism and historical institutionalism has not been widely discussed, but it is easy to make the connection. Kathleen Thelen, for example, argues that historical institutionalists conceive of institutions “in relational terms”, citing Ira Katznelson’s advocacy of a “relational and configurative” approach to comparative politics that he calls “configurative macroanalysis”.\(^{44}\) To my knowledge, however, Daniel Nexon is the only author to explicitly propose a synthesis of relational social theory and historical institutionalism.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.: 942.
“Relational institutionalism,” he explains, “combines the historical-institutionalist insight that ‘institutions’ operate as ‘ligatures fastening social sites, relationships, and large-scale processes to each other to produce historically variable outcomes’ with a sociological-relationalist understanding of structures as patterns of social interaction (social ties) that take on particular network properties.” Based on this definition, my own approach can be described as relational institutionalism as well.

Methodology

Within this framework I have employed several different qualitative methods to support my argument. Given the focus of the thesis, much of this support is based on the logical analysis of concepts and theories, but this analysis is grounded in empirical evidence.

I reference many different cases throughout the dissertation, but focus on four: France, the United States, Northern Ireland, and Canada. France and the United States are used to test civic nationalist historiography’s representation of nation-building. They were chosen as examples of what Harry Eckstein calls a ‘crucial case’, which he defines as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that opposed.” As Anthony Marx puts it, if these states are where nationalism is supposed to have “developed in its earliest and supposedly ‘civic’ form,

45 Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14. Katzenelson was one of Nexon’s supervisors at Columbia, and both can be seen as members of the ‘New York school’ of relational social theory.
then that is where the accuracy of this image would have to be assessed and where this ‘civic’ path and motivation would be clearest.”

Northern Ireland and Canada, on the other hand, were chosen as what John Gerring calls ‘typical cases’, meaning that each of them is a case that exemplifies “what is considered to be a typical set of values, given some understanding of a phenomenon.” Northern Ireland presents a typical case of intra-state nationalist conflict, and Canada of immigrant integration. Using typical cases to ground and illustrate my theoretical arguments regarding each of these issues provides some justification for middle-range generalizability in the absence of a large-n analysis, which would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

Most of the research for these cases was conducted using secondary sources, with the exception of some primary documents written by historical actors. We already have all of the evidence we need to demonstrate that civic nationalism is an inappropriate tool of analysis; the problem is that this evidence has been either misinterpreted or ignored. I rely mainly on the work of historians for the French and American cases, and social scientists for Northern Ireland and Canada, but this only reflects the role that each case plays in my argument.

The evidence that this research uncovered is analysed using two principal methods: intellectual history and process-tracing. The heavy reliance of civic nationalist historiography on the history of elite ideas requires a close examination of how these ideas are presented and the intellectuals with whom they are associated, which I have done mindful of Quentin Skinner’s advice that understanding texts “presupposes the grasp both of what they were intended to mean, and how this meaning was intended to be taken.” The majority of my case analysis, however, is

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guided by what Alexander George and Andrew Bennett call ‘process-tracing’, a single-case qualitative method that attempts to identify social processes and causal mechanisms through historical reconstruction. More specifically, I rely on what George and Bennett call ‘analytic process-tracing’, which is “deliberately selective, focusing on what are thought to be particularly important parts of an adequate or parsimonious explanation.”

Terminology

Finally, I should point out that I have often used the term ‘civic nationalist’ in the text to refer to scholars who treat civic nationalism as a tool of analysis. My main reason for doing this is stylistic: ‘theorists of civic nationalism’ is a bit clumsy, and does not read well when repeated frequently. There is a more substantive justification for this choice too, however. Michael Ignatieff has openly declared himself a civic nationalist, and this status is equally unambiguous for authors such as Brian Barry who make explicitly normative arguments in favour of civic nationalism. Someone like Liah Greenfeld, however, may disagree with this characterization on the grounds that she intends to provide an empirical analysis without any normative purpose. Accordingly, I acknowledge that it is not logically necessary that anyone who takes civic nationalism seriously is thereby a civic nationalist. In practice, however, there are very few authors on that list who do not at least implicitly advocate civic nationalism, so I do not think that my terminological choice introduces any significant distortion.

51 Ibid., 211.
3. Structure of the thesis

There are eight chapters, including this introduction, which are organized as follows. The second chapter, ‘Civic nationalism’, provides an overview of civic nationalism that traces its history, identifies and describes its essential characteristics, and explains the wider political and academic context that led to its emergence and current prominence. With this established, each of the next three chapters corresponds to a different stage of my argument: ‘Problems in principle’ (chapter three), which addresses inconsistent or misconceived premises of civic nationalist ideology, and similarly mistaken arguments that fall outside of civic nationalism itself but nevertheless affect its analysis; ‘Nationalism beyond ideology’ (chapter four), which argues that nationalism is more than just an ideology, and that the civic nationalist conceptualization of ideology is significantly flawed; and ‘A relational approach to nations and nationalism’ (chapter five), which presents my alternative approach to these phenomena, tests civic nationalist historiography of France and the United States against the historical record, and argues that my relational approach is a better fit for the evidence. Chapters six and seven present the final stage of my argument by applying the analysis developed in the previous chapters to intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration, respectively. The conclusion, chapter eight, reviews the central arguments of the thesis and discusses its policy implications and ideas for further research.
Chapter 2

Civic nationalism

‘Civic nationalism’ is the term currently used to describe a type of nationalist ideology that can be traced back to at least the late eighteenth century, and some people argue should be regarded as nationalism’s original form. The defining characteristic of civic nationalism is said to be the principle that the boundaries of the nation are by definition coterminous with those of the popular state: all citizens are co-nationals by virtue of this status, their shared political values, and their desire to live together in order to put these values into practice. It is always defined against ethnic nationalism, which is said to be an unfortunate imitation of the original based on a belief in common ancestry and related ascriptive characteristics.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of civic nationalism that traces its history, identifies and describes its essential characteristics, and explains the wider political and academic context that led to its emergence and current prominence. It begins with a discussion of the earliest academic distinction between two types of nationalism, the German Staatsnation and Kulturnation, which formalized an older political debate and provided a basis for subsequent analysis. The next section deals with the related but more prominent distinction between Western and Eastern forms of nationalism that laid the foundation for the distinction between civic and ethnic types. With these antecedents identified, the third section addresses the most influential articulations of the civic/ethnic distinction and establishes the range of its variations. This is followed by an explanation of the political and academic context that is at least partly responsible for the civic/ethnic distinction’s current influence and, finally, the conclusion outlines the central themes of civic nationalism that can be drawn from this overview.
1. *Staatsnation and Kulturnation*

The earliest forerunner is the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German distinction between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*.¹ Friedrich Meinecke cites Fr. J. Neumann’s *Volk und Nation* (1888) and A. Kirchhoff’s *Zur Verständigung über die Begriffe Nation und Nationalität* (1905) as its first instances, and Koppel Pinson lists eight different authors writing between 1900 and 1935 who organized their analyses this way.² The most prominent advocate of the distinction, however, was Meinecke himself, whose *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* was originally published in 1907.³

Meinecke, described by Felix Gilbert as “the leading German historian in the first half of the twentieth century,”⁴ contends that there are no generally valid criteria for distinguishing individual nations from one another. “We can see at a glance,” he says,

> that nations are large, powerful communities that have arisen in the course of a long historical development and that are involved in continual movement and change. For that reason the character of the nation has something indeterminate about it. A common place of residence, a common ancestry or, more exactly, since there are no racially pure nations in an anthropological sense, a common or similar mixture of blood, a common language, a common intellectual life, a common state or a federation of several similar states – all these things can be

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¹ David Brown proposes that Karl Marx made a similar distinction before this, but his evidence is unconvincing. “Marx distinguished different conceptualisations of the nation,” he says, “in terms of the type of class interests they promoted. A liberal and democratic conception of the nation was therefore one which promoted the interests of the oppressed classes. By contrast, the ethnic and ethnocentric conception of the nation...was seen by him as a romantic myth of uniqueness and superiority which comprised an alienative reaction by insecure middle classes.” He supports his case with quotes from Erica Benner’s *Really Existing Nationalisms* and Marx’s *The German Ideology*, but both are used out of context. David Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms?,” *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no. 2 (1999): 284.
³ Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*.
⁴ Felix Gilbert, “Introduction,” in *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), vii. Gilbert was supervised by Meinecke at the University of Berlin, but this characterization is consistent with other accounts.
important and essential elements or characteristics of a nation, but that does not mean that every nation must possess them all to be a nation.\textsuperscript{5}

The only necessary conditions for all nations, Meinecke argues, are a ‘natural core’ based on blood relation and a firm territorial base, which he contends are together the lone suitable foundation for a unique and self-conscious intellectual community.

The distinctiveness of each nation prevents any generalizable explanation of the development of particular communities beyond this, but two broad types can be identified: the \textit{Staatsnation} (state nation, or ‘political nation’ as it is commonly and more ambiguously translated), based on the unifying force of a common political history and constitution, and the \textit{Kulturnation} (cultural nation), based on a shared cultural heritage.

Political nations “arise not only through a demand for self-determination but also through the quiet workings of the state and through a shared political life within the same political system.”\textsuperscript{6} The French were the first to experience the desire to form their own political constitution and direct their own political destiny, but the development of a political nation is a slow historical process and it is impossible to specify the exact moment that one is ‘born’. “We can only say that wherever a lively and durable feeling of political community exists, effective both within and beyond the borders of the state,” Meinecke explains, “there the population of a state has become a political nation and the state a national state.”\textsuperscript{7}

Cultural nations, by contrast, are based on a standard language, a common literature, a common religion, or some combination thereof. Though in many instances cultural nations have developed apolitically, Meinecke contends that political institutions have often significantly influenced their growth, and the relationship may be particularly strong between the state and

\textsuperscript{5} Meinecke, \textit{Cosmopolitanism and the National State}, 9.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
religion. Such cases, he says, “suggest that a cultural nation can be a political nation as well, and we often do not know whether political ties or the ties of religion and church are the stronger in holding it together. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish cultural and political nations from each other on the basis of either internal or external structure.”

Cultural nationality has generally preceded its political form, though, and before the French Revolution most nations existed solely as cultural entities. “We can distinguish,” Meinecke explains,

an early period in which nations have a more plantlike, impersonal existence and growth and a later period in which the conscious will of the nation awakens. In this later period, if only through the agency of its leaders, the nation becomes aware of itself as a great personality, as a great historical unit, and it now lays claim to self-determination, the mark and privilege of the mature personality.

The rise of individualism and democratisation led to the development of political nations that either coincided with or came out of pre-existing cultural nations. Some, like the French and the English, had existed as both cultural and political nations during the *ancient régime*, but their political nationality had been imposed from above, leaving them imperfect. Mature nations, he maintains, are those where both cultural and political nationality coincide based on a popular desire for self-determination.

The basis of Meinecke’s distinction is the contrast between French and German conceptions of nationhood that first became current with German intellectuals in the early nineteenth-century as a response to the French Revolution, and was best-known by the turn of the twentieth as a rhetorical standard in the debate over the annexation of Alsace–Lorraine to the German Empire at the end of the Franco–Prussian War. Meinecke himself was a proud German

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8 Ibid., 11.
9 Ibid., 12.
nationalist and Cosmopolitanism and the National State should be read as, among other things, an attempt to defend and legitimize the ‘German conception of nationhood’ in response to French intellectuals like Ernest Renan who dismissed it as mistaken.\textsuperscript{10}

In his famous lecture “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” Renan rejects race, language, religion, material interests, and geography as potential bases for nationhood, and argues instead that a nation is a “a soul, a spiritual principle” constituted by both a rich legacy of common memories and a continuing desire to live together and perpetuate that heritage. It is

a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clear expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation’s existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.”\textsuperscript{11}

This lecture, now the classic text for nationalist ideologies that draw on the principle of voluntary association, was, as Meinecke notes, aimed directly at Germany’s claim to Alsace–Lorraine.\textsuperscript{12} Renan never states this explicitly, but it was obvious to his audience and is clear as he draws his conclusions:

According to the ideas that I am outlining to you, a nation has no more right than a king does to say to a province: ‘You belong to me, I am seizing you.’ A province, as far as I am concerned, is its inhabitants; if anyone has the right to be consulted in such an affair, it is the inhabitant. A nation never has any real interest


\textsuperscript{11} Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 19. The lecture was originally delivered at the Sorbonne, 11 March 1882. Renan was best known for his Vie de Jésus (1863), the first in a seven-volume account of the historical origins of Christianity.

\textsuperscript{12} Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, 12.
in annexing or holding on to a country against its will. The wish of nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must always return.  

Meinecke accepts Renan’s definition of the nation, but maintains that its applicability is limited to a particular historical context. It comes, he says, from ‘the spirit of 1789’ and the desire for national self-determination, but this desire was preceded in France as everywhere else by a period when nations existed but “in which the national will did not take on such a clear and conscious form.” France, just as Germany, is founded on a cultural base, but “the German national idea developed so slowly and matured so late because it had to assimilate so much heterogeneous material and because the historical ground in which it grew was still not as well cleared as the soil of the French nation.” Political and cultural nationality are two sides of the same coin, and too heavy emphasis on either will leave a nation-state deficient.

2. Western and Eastern nationalism

Both the distinction between Staatsnation and Kulturnation and the contrast of French and German conceptions of nationhood that inspired it significantly influenced the closely related but

14 Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, 12.
15 Ibid., 25.
more prominent distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms. There are many examples of this typology from the early twentieth century onward, but its most influential advocate was Hans Kohn, a historian born in Prague to a middle-class Jewish family, who spent most of his adult life in the United States.

In his best-known book *The Idea of Nationalism*, first published in 1944, Kohn argues that national characters “are not determined prehistorically or biologically, nor are they fixed for all time; they are the product of social and intellectual development, of countless gradations of behaviour and reaction.” In the Western world (defined as England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States and the British dominions) nationalism is predominantly political, and was “preceded by the formation of the future national state, or, as in the case of the United States, coincided with it.” Outside of the Western world, nationalism arose later and at a more backward stage of social and political development. There, it “grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern—not primarily to transform it into a people’s state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands.”

Western nationalism is a product of standards that grew out of the secularized Stoic-Christian tradition. It has found its chief support in the political and economic strength of the middle classes, Kohn explains, and is “basically a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future.” This political nationalism arose in an effort to build a nation that could meet the demands of the present without too much

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17 The distinction between Western and Eastern Europe is long-standing, dating back to the Roman Empire and the later Christian Schism. See Norman Davies, *Europe East and West* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006).
20 Ibid., 574.
sympathy for the past, and was closely tied to concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century.

Outside of the Western world, nationalism “was basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal society. It stressed the past, the diversity and self-sufficiency of nations.” Its supporters, Kohn says, were the aristocracy and the masses. Nationalism outside of Western Europe, beginning as the dream and hope of scholars and poets, was a reaction to the older nationalism of the West. “Nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe,” he writes, “created often, out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a political reality.”

The differences between Western and non-Western nationalisms are due to disparities in social, political and economic development. “So strong is the influence of ideas,” Kohn contends that

while the new nationalism in Western Europe corresponded to changing social, economic, and political realities, it spread to Central and Eastern Europe long before a corresponding social and economic transformation. The cultural contact among the educated classes of the continent changed their moral and intellectual attitude while the economic order and the ways of life of the vast majority of the peoples remained untouched.

Nationalism outside of Western Europe thus began prematurely, a product of cosmopolitan elites imposing Western norms on an economically and culturally underdeveloped system. These conditions led to different interpretations of nationhood, which produced diverging types of

21 Ibid. Rogers Brubaker rightly notes that Kohn himself did not speak of ‘Eastern nationalism’, “but his principle distinction was indeed between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’.” It has since become convention to speak of Kohn’s distinction as an opposition between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms. Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 224.
23 Ibid., 457.
nationalism: “one based upon liberal middle-class concepts and pointing to a consummation in democratic world society, the other based upon irrational and pre-enlightened concepts and tending towards exclusiveness—which were to supply the ideological background of the great conflicts of the contemporary world.”

This distinction, which Kohn’s friend and occasional collaborator Louis Snyder dubbed the “Kohn Dichotomy”, bears obvious similarity to those discussed in the previous section. Most clearly, as Aira Kemiläinen notes, “it corresponds to a great extent to the division of European political thought into ‘Western’ and German thinking.” Its connection with Meinecke’s Staatsnation and Kulturnation is only partial, though, because while both men thought that nationalism can be a force for good, they disagreed on why this is the case.

According to Kenneth Wolf, whose intellectual biography of Kohn is indispensable, Kohn’s analysis must be approached with the clear understanding that he was both a liberal humanist and an active nationalist before he became a scholar of nationalism. Most importantly, the character of these political commitments means that nationalism was only instrumentally valuable to Kohn, at least in principle. It appears at first that Kohn thought nationalism “was basically a progressive, if not always beneficial force,” but a closer look reveals that it was not the ideology of nationalism that Kohn was extolling but rather “the age of nationalism,” an age that “brought to private and public life a new morality and dignity.” It was not the supreme loyalty to the nation-state idea that made the post-French Revolutionary period a progressive and hopeful one but rather the idea of liberty. The ideas of liberty and community were central ones in Kohn’s thought; world unity was the highest form of community or “integration” to which man could aspire. As paradoxical as it may appear, the

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24 Ibid.
26 Aira Kemiläinen, Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän Kasvatusopillinen Korkeakoulu, 1964), 115-16.
idea of nationalism was not the principal focus in Kohn’s essays on Western nationalism. Nationalism was important in so far as it embodied and helped spread the values, institutions and attitudes of modern Western civilization. It is only by understanding this point that we can do justice to Kohn’s historiographical contribution to the study of modern nationalism.28

Wolf argues that the root of this position is Kohn’s conception of Zionism, which was influenced by Martin Buber—to whom Kohn dedicated his first book on nationalism—in particular.29 After reading Buber’s work and hearing him speak while a student in Prague, Kohn adopted some of his ideas, including the belief that an ethical nationalism could reconcile the tension between the individual and the community and the hope that twentieth century nationalism would promote unity among the peoples of the world.30 Buber’s ‘cultural Zionism’ redefined ‘the Jewish question’ as a human question, and his and Kohn’s interpretations of Jewish nationalism were “characterized by a mission to spread the prophetic ideal of universal justice and brotherhood; in Kohn’s later works modern Western nationalism was distinguished by a similar mission to spread a similar ideal.”31

For Kohn, one of the consequences of these commitments was the acceptance and defence of imperialism. He was primarily interested in the promotion of world unity and imperialism, like the political nationalism that inspired it, “helped bring about a single civilization and hence, despite its admitted disadvantages, was not to be condemned, but rather

31 Ibid., 54. Given the nature of his dichotomy, it seems counterintuitive that Kohn would favour Buber’s ‘cultural Zionism’, but the key factor in his evaluation is the relationship between nationalism and the state. In his early work, Kohn denounced aggressive ‘political nationalism’ and showed admiration for cultural nationalists like Herder, but “[b]y the time he wrote The Idea of Nationalism, he was convinced that nationalism could be political and yet not disastrous – if the national state was also a liberal one.” (23-24) Buber’s cultural nationalism was praiseworthy because it embodied the values of Enlightenment liberalism, and was therefore compatible with the Western, political nationalism that Kohn described in his later work. Cultural nationalism only becomes a problem when it is ‘statist’ and self-referential, though Kohn thought that is what happens in most cases.
should be seen as a necessary force in world history.\textsuperscript{32} The subtitle of one of his later books, \textit{The Age of Nationalism: The First Age of Global History}, is meant to imply that the Age of Nationalism is a stepping stone to the day when humanity will be united under the universal principles of liberalism and humanism that first emerged in the Western world.

John Plamenatz’s distinction between Western and Eastern nationalisms has also been influential.\textsuperscript{33} In his essay, Plamenatz defines nationalism as “the desire to preserve or enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or even create it when it is felt to be inadequate or lacking.”\textsuperscript{34} It is distinct from two related phenomena, patriotism and national consciousness, which are respectively devotion and loyalty to the community that one belongs to and a sense of and pride in what distinguishes that community from others. The latter two have existed since at least Ancient Greece, but nationalism did not emerge until the eighteenth century.

Like Kohn, Plamenatz locates the origin of nationalism in ‘the West’, but his referents are different. The English and the French, he argues, have had a heightened national consciousness since at least the fifteenth century, but nationalism did not materialize there because it is “a

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Its most notable influence was on Ernest Gellner. Gellner initially found Plamenatz’s distinction unpersuasive, according to a book review published in 1977, but by 1981 he had developed his own typology of ‘nationalism-inducing and nationalism thwarting situations’ that he used Plamenatz’s essay to illustrate, and later in \textit{Nations and Nationalism} he described the piece as “a fascinating and rather moving essay by the late Professor John Plamenatz, an essay which might well have been called ‘The Sad Reflections of a Montenegrin in Oxford’.” Gellner admired the logic of Plamenatz’s argument, but said that his own approach has at least two advantages over it: his “contrast is not simply asserted as a contingently, historically encountered distinction, but is a derived consequence of a simple model into which, by way of hypothesis, certain very basic and elementary factors have been fed”; and the identification of a third, ‘diaspora’ variant of nationalism that Plamenatz did not discuss. Brendan O’Leary argues that Gellner implied but did not identify a fourth type, ‘satisfied nationalism’, which is characteristic of mature homogenous industrial societies, and that this among other things suggests that Gellner’s “typology was directed towards explaining nationalist conflicts rather than forms of nationalism.” I agree on both counts. Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism," \textit{Theory and Society} 10, no. 6 (1981); \textit{Nations and Nationalism} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 99-101; Brendan O'Leary, "Ernest Gellner's Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Nationalism?," in \textit{The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 49; 82, n. 35.
reaction of peoples who feel culturally at a disadvantage,” and those nations have never been threatened in that way.\textsuperscript{35} For Plamenatz, ‘Western nationalism’ refers to the nationalism of the Germans and Italians, and ‘Eastern nationalism’ to the more recent nationalisms in Slavic Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America. In the case of the former, “[w]e have the nationalism of peoples who for some reason feel themselves at a disadvantage but who are nevertheless culturally equipped in ways that favour success and excellence measured by standards which are widely accepted and fast spreading, and which first arose among them and other peoples culturally akin to them” such as the English and the French.\textsuperscript{36} In the latter case, “[w]e have. . .the nationalism of peoples recently drawn into civilisation hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This is the nationalism of peoples who feel the need to transform themselves, and in so doing to raise themselves; of peoples who come to be called ‘backward’, and who would not be nationalists of this kind unless they both recognized this backwardness and wanted to overcome it.”\textsuperscript{37}

The initial impetus for Western nationalism, Plamenatz explains, was the spread of ideas about man, morals, and society from England and France eastward. These nations were the pacemakers of their time, and their progressiveness engendered a sense of cultural inferiority in other nations that were part of the same civilization.\textsuperscript{38} When the Germans and Italians first became nationalists, though, “[t]hey had languages adapted to the needs, practical and intellectual, of the consciously progressive civilisation to which they belonged,” along with

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 33-34.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 26.
\end{flushright}
universities, professions with high standards, and everything else needed to run the one thing that they felt differentiated them from the objects of their envy, a national state of their own.39

The development of Eastern nationalism was much different. In Slavic Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America, the ideas of Western civilization were introduced to peoples who were not culturally equipped to deal with them and, “to assert themselves as equals in a civilisation not of their own making,” those peoples had “to make themselves anew, to create national identities for themselves” in order to compensate for these inadequacies.40 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Slavs (which Plamenatz focuses on to exemplify his argument) had acculturated to German society to climb the social ladder, but by the nineteenth century resistance to Germanisation began to surface. The reasons for this included the spread of nationalist doctrines from the Germans that stressed the importance of ‘national authenticity’ and ‘being true to one’s cultural identity and native genius’, but Plamenatz argues that the more important factor was the “great social revolution turning societies in which the tightly-knit, tradition-bound and self-supporting village is the most important community into urbanized societies, with extensive trade, much greater social mobility, and a need for more complicated and centralized types of administration.”41 Modernization created new opportunities for personal advancement, but those opportunities required skills that were not part of the native culture and therefore not available to everyone, so it was in the interest of the ambitious “to acquire a culture of their own as well suited to these opportunities as the alien culture,” even if that meant imitation.42

39 Ibid., 29-30.
40 Ibid., 30.
41 Ibid., 32.
42 Ibid., 33.
These different contexts are the key reason that Eastern nationalisms tend to be less liberal than their Western counterparts. In their sincere efforts to create or transform their nations, nationalist leaders in the East are often demanding and even oppressive of their subjects. They see themselves as liberators—and in some ways they are, by weakening old hierarchies and offering new kinds of opportunity—but their efforts are often heavy-handed. Nevertheless, Plamenatz insists, we must see this nationalism as part of a social, intellectual and moral revolution of which the aspirations to democracy and personal freedom are also products. It is connected with these aspirations, and even serves to strengthen them and to create some of the social conditions of their realisation, even though it so often perverts them. In a world in which the strong and rich people have dominated and exploited the poor and the weak peoples, and in which autonomy is held to be a mark of dignity, of adequacy, of the capacity to live as befits human beings, in such a world this kind of nationalism is the inevitable reaction of the poor and the weak.\(^{43}\)

3. **Civic and ethnic nationalism**

The distinction between Western and Eastern types of nationalism, and Kohn’s argument in particular, remain influential today and form the foundation of the distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ types of nations and nationalism which now dominates nationalism studies. Anthony Smith, the person most responsible for the development of this typology, follows Kohn closely when explaining the initial development of nationalism as an ideology, but diverges from his account in other important ways.\(^{44}\) The most notable are his insistence on the importance of

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 36.

\(^{44}\) Smith appears to be the first person to have used the term ‘civic nationalism’, in *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986), but it represents the same concept that he had called ‘territorial nationalism’ since the first edition of *Theories of Nationalism* (1971). He first used the term ‘civic nation’ in *State and Nation in the Third World* (1983), but the earliest use of that term appears to have been made by sociologist Franklin Henry Giddings in 1901. The
‘dominant ethnicity’ across types, and his assertion that these are ideal types that do not directly correspond with existing cases but instead describe tendencies in the formation and justification of nations and nationalist movements. There are no purely civic or ethnic nations, he maintains, and all nations feature both civic and ethnic characteristics regardless of which is emphasized in a particular circumstance. Smith also maintains that while civic nationalism originated in Western Europe, its subsequent spread has not been limited to the Western world, and one of his objectives is to avoid the normative quality that characterized Kohn’s and other previous classifications of nationalism.

Nations, Smith says, are founded on ethnic ‘cores’ which provide symbolic resources such as myths, memories, values, and traditions that serve as the basis for their claims to land and statehood. Nations only emerged in the modern period, but “we cannot derive the identity, the location, or even the character of the units that we term nations from the processes of modernization tout court,” he argues. “We must go further back and look at the premodern social and cultural antecedents and contexts of these emergent nations to explain why these and not other communities and territories became nations and why they emerged when they did.”

Ethnic communities or ‘ethnies’, which Smith defines as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a


sense of solidarity,” played a much larger role in the ancient and medieval worlds than modernists are willing to admit, he argues. There were ethnic minorities, diaspora communities, frontier ethnies, ethnic amphictyonies, and states and empires dominated by particular ethnicities. The crystallization of such groups “as self-aware communities, as opposed to other-defined categories,” he says, “was the product of external factors such as folk cultures resulting from shared work and residence patterns; group mobilisation in periodic inter-state warfare producing memories and myths of defeat and victory; and especially the impact of organized religions with scriptures, sacred languages, and communal priesthoods.”

Smith identifies two types of ethnies, which he calls ‘lateral’ and ‘vertical’, based on variations in these factors. Lateral ethnies are aristocratic, but often also include clerics, scribes, and wealthier urban merchants, and develop through the interactions associated with this shared social status. Vertical ethnies, which cut across class lines, are ‘demotic’ and forged through the experience of common defence in warfare. While the boundaries of lateral ethnies are often ragged and indeterminate, owing to their territorial dispersal and status-derived cultural inclusivity, vertical ethnies are sharply bounded and characterized by an emphasis on religious purity and cultural assimilation.

The exact origins of the transition from ethnies to nationhood are unclear, Smith says, but Western European revolutions in the division of labour, control of administration, and cultural co-ordination, all revolving around the creation of centralized and culturally homogenous states, are what made it desirable. Like ethnies, nations are named populations sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories but, in addition to these features, they also

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48 Ibid., 192.
share a mass, public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members. However, because the effects of the three revolutions were uneven, and because the two types of *ethnie* provided different bases for nation-formation, two distinct types of nation emerged.

Like Kohn, Smith says that the first nations were Western and civic. England, France, Spain, and Holland began as ‘ethnic states’, he argues, and were gradually transformed “into genuinely ‘national states’ through the unification of the economy, territorial centralization, the provision of equal legal rights for more and more strata, and the growth of public, mass education systems.”\(^{49}\) In most cases, this entailed a lateral *ethnie* becoming dominant in the social institutions and political life of the whole population, and the forcible incorporation of other ethnic minorities against their will. Civic nations also developed in non-Western contexts, but not until the twentieth century, and usually in postcolonial states. Some followed the original ‘dominant *ethnie*’ model of Western civic nations, while others, where there was no dominant group, developed a second, ‘political culture’ model, in which a supra-ethnic political culture, not associated with a particular *ethnie*, was created.\(^{50}\)

Ethnic nations emerged in the early nineteenth-century. The revolutions that changed the West, Smith argues, were experienced unevenly in Eastern Europe, which consisted mostly of “polyethnic empires made up of a host of separate ethnic communities and cultures subordinated to a core *ethnie* exercising political domination . . . and placing dynastic allegiance before other loyalties.”\(^{51}\) The incongruity between politics and culture made the territorial delimitation of the nation and its integration problematic, forcing nation-builders, who were usually members of a vertical *ethnie*, to rely on folk symbols and populist mythologies. This pattern is also consistent

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with the two subsequent waves of ethnic nationalism that have occurred: the first in the overseas territories of European colonial empires in the early to mid-twentieth century, and the second beginning in the 1960s with the sub-state nationalist movements of Western Europe and other parts of the developed world, and peaking in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and the surge of nationalism in its former territories.

It is worth noting here that while Smith has played a major role in the development of the civic/ethnic distinction, his theory of nations and nationalism is much more nuanced than that of most of his imitators. Furthermore, his former students Eric Kaufmann and Oliver Zimmer argue that Smith’s position has been changing since the mid-1990s: he has moved away from using the distinction to explain national formation and focused this analysis on ideology instead. This is true to an extent, but the shift has been inconsistent. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that Smith’s argument is in some ways very different from those made by some other theorists of civic nationalism.

If Smith has done the most to develop the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms, Michael Ignatieff, himself a declared civic nationalist, is most responsible for popularizing it. At the height of public interest in nationalism in the early 1990s Ignatieff’s Blood and Belonging, the companion to a highly successful BBC documentary series that he both developed and starred in, became an international best-seller and won several awards. “What’s wrong with the world is not nationalism itself,” he told his audience, but “the kind of nation, the kind of home that nationalists want to create and the means that they use to seek their ends.” There is a “struggle going on between those who still believe that a nation should be a home to

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53 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (Toronto: Penguin, 1994). It won Ignatieff the prestigious Lionel Gelber prize for non-fiction in international relations in 1994, beating out four other nominees, including Henry Kissinger, who was nominated for his book Diplomacy.
all, and race, color, religion, and creed should be no bar to belonging, and those who want their nation to be home to only their own. It’s the battle between the civic and the ethnic nation.”

Newspapers and other media picked up on this, and his simplified distinction became a focal point for both academic and public debates.

According to Ignatieff, civic nationalism “maintains that the nation should be composed of all those—regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity—who subscribe to the nation’s political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.” Civic nationalism is necessarily democratic, because it vests sovereignty in the entire citizenry. It also has the greatest “claim to sociological realism. . . [as] most societies are not mono-ethnic; and even when they are, common ethnicity does not of itself obliterat division, because ethnicity is only one of the many claims on an individual’s loyalty.” Elements of this ideal were first achieved in Britain, but civic nationalism did not come into its own until the French and American revolutions.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, claims “that an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the national community that defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community.” This may be more psychologically compelling, he suggests, but it is sociologically less realistic. Ethnic regimes are, on the whole, more authoritarian than democratic, as “common ethnicity, by itself, does not create social cohesion or community, and when it fails to do so, as it must, nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled toward maintaining unity by force rather than by consent.”

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54 Ibid., 249.
55 Ibid., 6.
56 Ibid., 7.
57 Ibid., 8.
Ignatieff’s position on this issue, however, is strikingly inconsistent across his work.

After outlining the principles of civic nationalism in *Blood and Belonging*, he goes on to say that

Such an ideal was made easier to realize in practice because the societies of the Enlightenment were ethnically homogeneous or behaved as if they were. Those who did not belong to the enfranchised political class of white, propertied males—workers, women, black slaves, aboriginal peoples—found themselves excluded from citizenship and thus from the nation. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these groups fought for civic inclusion. As a result of their struggle, most Western nation-states now define their nationhood in terms of common citizenship and not by common ethnicity.\(^{58}\)

However, in a review of Liah Greenfeld’s *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* and Rogers Brubaker’s *Nationhood and Citizenship in Germany and France* published in *The New Republic* less than a year before *Blood and Belonging*, he argues that

The very success of liberal contractualism in Britain and America depended on the ethnic homogeneity of the societies involved, not to mention the scrupulous exclusion of natives, blacks and women from political rights. This manufactured ethnic homogeneity made self-interest convergent, made the vision of liberal contractualism appear a plausibly warm version of communitarianism. To this day, liberal civic nationalism works effectively only in societies that have dominant ethnic majorities (as in France or Britain) or that are so abundant (as in America) that ethnic competition can be contained and attenuated.\(^{59}\)

These positions are clearly incompatible—in the first, citizenship is the sole basis of civic nationhood, even if it was facilitated by a degree of ethnic homogeneity in the early days, while in the second civic nationalism is *dependent* on the presence of either a dominant ethnic majority or several ethnic groups of relatively equal power. The latter is consistent with Anthony Smith’s position, but differs significantly from Ignatieff’s argument in *Blood and Belonging*, which is

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58 Ibid., 6.
what he is known for and continues to reference as the definitive statement of his approach to nationalism.

It is also unclear whether Ignatieff’s ‘civic nationalism’ is actually nationalism on his own account. Liberals, he says, must be willing to accept that a ‘post-national’ politics is neither possible nor desirable, and recognize that nationalism “looks like an atavism only if one lives, to use Isaiah Berlin’s phrase, in a “sated” nation, that is, in one of the small number of nations with a state of their own, recognized borders, and no suffering minority beyond their territory.”60 In a review of Yael Tamir’s Liberal Nationalism, though, he associates nationalism exclusively with stateless minorities:

The central distinction between patriotism and nationalism is that patriotism expresses devotion to a nation-state that is already established, while nationalism asserts a commitment to a nation that does not yet have a state of its own, or whose political legitimacy is contested by another nation. To be a nationalist is to defend one’s right against a competing right.61

Here and in Blood and Belonging, ‘civic nationalism’ seems to be just a metaphor for state patriotism:

The cosmopolitan order of the great cities. . .depends critically on the rule-enforcing capacity of the nation-state. . .In this sense, therefore, cosmopolitans like myself are not beyond the nation; and a cosmopolitan, post-nationalist spirit will always depend, in the end, on the capacity of nation-states to provide security and civility for their citizens. In that sense alone, I am a civic nationalist, someone who believes in the capacity of nations to provide the security and the rights we all need in order to live cosmopolitan lives.62

60 Ibid., 46; 42.
62 Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, 13-14.
There are some exceptions, such as Ignatieff’s recent statements about the character of Quebec nationalism where he seems to use the term literally, but in general the metaphorical use is consistent.

Also important to Ignatieff’s approach to nationalism, and a telling parallel with Kohn’s, is his view that imperialism is desirable and even necessary under some circumstances. This appears to be a relatively late development in his thought, but there are traces of it as early as Blood and Belonging. In a discussion of what distinguishes the reorderings of the European state system after the settlements at Versailles and Yalta from that which followed the fall of Communism, for example, he says that the defining characteristic of the latter is that there is no imperial authority to enforce the system, and it is more volatile as a result.

According to Denis Smith, Ignatieff did not become an active advocate of the benefits of imperialism until the late 1990s. Faced with the failure of humanitarian intervention in places like Rwanda and Srebrenica, Smith says, Ignatieff seemed to suffer a crisis of faith in the liberal internationalism that had been his driving intellectual force.

Passages from The Warrior’s Honor, in which Ignatieff suggests that liberal internationalism has ‘reached the end of its tether’,
appear to confirm this: “. . .a liberal interventionist foreign policy may be a contradiction in terms: principle commits us to intervene and yet forbids the imperial ruthlessness required to make intervention succeed.”\textsuperscript{68} Nation-states are the only bodies able to deal with large-scale violence effectively and, as a result, the most significant problem facing the post-Cold War world is the disintegration of states.

In the series of books and articles that followed, Ignatieff steadily moved his focus away from nationalism and towards the more general topics of human rights and security on which his approach to the former is based.\textsuperscript{69} The most significant shift came after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 and the consequent invasion of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{70} In the preface to \textit{Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan}, he explains that unlike his previous books which had focussed on the dynamics of ethnic conflict and international intervention, this book deals with

the imperial struggle to impose order once intervention has occurred. It is focussed on the conflict at the heart of the nation-building enterprise everywhere, between the imperial interests of the intervening powers, chiefly the Americans, and the local interests of the people and their leadership to rule themselves. The essential paradox of nation-building is that temporary imperialism—empire lite—has become the necessary condition for democracy in countries torn apart by civil war.\textsuperscript{71}

While he recognizes the tension between human rights and imperialism, Ignatieff argues that the global ascendancy of human rights would have been impossible without


\textsuperscript{69} Nationalism does, however, remain a prominent theme in his work, particularly in books like \textit{The Rights Revolution. The Rights Revolution} (Toronto: Anansi, 2000).

\textsuperscript{70} Smith, \textit{Ignatieff's World}, 69.

\textsuperscript{71} Michael Ignatieff, \textit{Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan} (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), vii.
the accompanying ascendency of the American empire.\textsuperscript{72} Though its history as “the white man’s burden” has given it a bad reputation, “imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do only outside help—imperial power—can get them back on their feet. Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in the human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world.”\textsuperscript{73}

Many other authors have also contributed to the development and promotion of the civic/ethnic distinction, but the most important of these are Liah Greenfeld and Michael Keating.\textsuperscript{74} Greenfeld’s unique contribution is to introduce two additional dimensions to the distinction: ‘individualistic-libertarian’ and ‘collectivist-authoritarian’ conceptions of the nation (which she elsewhere describes as ‘composite’ and ‘unitary’).\textsuperscript{75} The former is the original definition of the nation and “assumes the moral, political, and logical primacy of the human individual, who is seen not simply as a physical unit of society, but as its constitutive element, in the sense that all the qualities of the latter have their source in the nature of the former.”\textsuperscript{76}

Composite nationality reflects the principles of liberal democracy, where popular sovereignty is

\footnote{\textsuperscript{72} Danny Postel, "From Tragedy and Bloodshed, Michael Ignatieff Draws Human-Right Ideas," \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education}, March 8 2002; Ignatieff, \textit{Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan}, 122.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{73} Ignatieff, \textit{Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan}, 106.}


\footnote{\textsuperscript{75} Liah Greenfeld, \textit{Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9-12; "Is Modernity Possible without Nationalism?," in \textit{The Fate of the Nation-State}, ed. Michel Seymour (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 46-47. This is her most significant contribution in this context, but her insistence that nationalism is not a product of modernity but in fact constitutes it is also a unique position that distinguishes her approach from other authors who employ the civic/ethnic distinction.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{76} Greenfeld, "Is Modernity Possible without Nationalism?" 46.
the product of the actual sovereignty of the individuals who joined together to form the nation.77 The collectivist conception of the nation, on the other hand, tends towards authoritarianism and casts the community itself as an individual “with a will, interests, and purpose of its own, which have priority over and are independent of wishes and aspirations of its human members.”78 In this case, popular sovereignty is seen as the logical implication of nationhood instead of its constitutive basis.79

With these basic conceptions of the nation established, Greenfeld goes on to describe ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism in much the same terms as Ignatieff, while emphasizing that they are distinguished by criteria for membership and closely related to the composite and unitary conceptions of the nation.80 “Individualistic nationalism cannot be but civic,” she explains, “but civic nationalism can also be collectivistic. More often, though, collectivistic nationalism takes on the form of ethnic particularism, while ethnic nationalism is necessarily collectivistic.”81 Accordingly, she identifies three types of nationalism: civic nationalism that is either individualistic (as in the United States) or collectivistic (as in France), and ethnic nationalism that is always collectivistic (with Germany as the paradigmatic case).

Michael Keating’s main contribution to the debate is the assertion that minority nationalism, which is usually portrayed as ethnic by definition, can also be civic. Keating’s definition of civic nationalism is basically the same as the others that have already been discussed, but he argues that there is no principled reason to associate the characteristics of civic nationalism exclusively with the state, using Scotland as the paradigmatic example of a stateless

77 Ibid., 47; Nationalism, 11.
78 Greenfeld, “Is Modernity Possible without Nationalism?,” 47.
79 Nationalism, 11.
81 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 11.
civic nation. “A civic minority nationalism, based neither on statehood nor ethnic identity, may appear precarious,” he says, “but it certainly cannot be excluded a priori as an ideal type. The labelling of minority nationalisms as ethnic again reflects a bias toward the existing state order and a dismissal of minority movements as exclusive, divisive and disruptive.”

4. Modernization, nation-building and integration

The current influence of both the Western/Eastern and civic/ethnic distinctions can at least in part be traced back to the rise of ‘modernization theory’ following the Second World War. Inspired by the significant challenges of decolonization in the ‘Third World’, many social scientists sought to uncover the processes through which broad-based economic, social, and political development occurs. Their efforts produced a wide variety of competing conceptualizations of what modernization entails, but most can be categorized as either ‘critical variable’ or ‘dichotomous’ approaches. Critical variable theories equate modernization with the achievement of a single type of social change, such as industrialization. The dichotomous approach, which most modernization theorists opted for instead, describes modernization as a series of transitions “from primitive, subsistence economies to technology-intensive, industrialized economies; from subject to participant political cultures; from closed, ascriptive status systems to open, achievement-oriented systems; from extended to nuclear kinship units;
from religious to secular ideologies, and so on.” In this case, modernization is not just a process of change, but a progression toward a set of definitive goals.84

“Nowhere,” as Dean Tipps argues, “is the influence of nineteenth-century evolutionary theory more evident than here. Through the device of ideal-typical contrasts between the attributes of tradition and modernity, modernization theorists have done little more than to summarize. . .the earlier efforts by men such as Maine, Tönnies, Durkheim, and others in the evolutionary tradition to conceptualize the transformation of societies in terms of a transition between polar types.”85 Indeed, Henry Maine’s distinction between ‘status’ and ‘contract’, Ferdinand Tönnies’ between ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’, and Emile Durkheim’s between ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ associations anticipate many of the features that characterize modernization theory’s ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ dichotomy.86 Maine’s assertion in Ancient Law, first published in 1866, that “the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract”—from a society based on inherited social status to a contractual relationship in which “the individual parties to the contract act towards each other without regard to any properties other than the capacity of each to fulfil the terms of the contract”—still captures the essence of the approach more than a century after his pioneering contribution.87

Tönnies’ distinction between ‘Gemeinschaft’ (community) and ‘Gesellschaft’ (society), however, has been more widely influential, especially in the context of our discussion. In Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, first published in 1887, he argued that consciousness can be

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84 Ibid.: 204.
85 Ibid.
divided into two contrasting modes: *Wesenwille* (‘natural’ or ‘essential will’ that is spontaneous and affective) and *Kürwille* (‘rational will’ that is deliberative and calculating). The most important consequence of this is the different psychologies that each kind of will entails. The exercise of natural will fosters the development of an ‘organic’ sense of self that is in harmony with its habitat and closely identified with other human beings, whereas the exercise of rational will leads to the development of a ‘mechanical’ sense of abstract personhood that is estranged from both the natural self and other people.\(^8\)

Tönnies’ account of the main patterns of human association is based on this psychology. The contrast he develops is succinctly summarized by Jose Harris as

between an ‘organic’ Community (*Gemeinschaft*), bound together by ties of kinship, fellowship, custom, history and communal ownership of primary goods; and a ‘mechanical’ Society (*Gesellschaft*), where free-standing individuals interacted with each other through self-interest, commercial contracts, a ‘spatial’ rather than ‘historical’ sense of mutual awareness, and the external constraints of formally enacted laws. In Community individuals developed their identities within the wider, co-existing, whole, whereas in civil and commercial Society individual identity was ontologically prior to that of the wider group, attachment to which was merely secondary and instrumental. Communities were both grounded in, and fostered the growth of, intuitive ‘conscience’ and natural will, whereas Societies were both grounded in, and fostered the growth of, ‘self-consciousness’, rational calculation and arbitrary will.\(^9\)

It is important to note, though, that Tönnies insisted that both the different forms of will and the types of association that they lead to have been a part of all human associations throughout

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\(^8\) Jose Harris, "General Introduction," in *Community and Civil Society*, ed. Jose Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xvii; Shils, "Henry Sumner Maine in the Tradition of the Analysis of Society," 153-55. It is worth noting that while both Tönnies and Durkheim use the terms ‘organic’ and ‘mechanical’ and their theories bear important similarities, Durkheim reverses the attribution, describing traditional communities as ‘mechanical’ and modern societies as ‘organic’.

\(^9\) Harris, "General Introduction," xviii.
history. The crucial question is not whether a particular facet of society belongs to *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*, but where it is positioned on the continuum between the two.\(^{90}\)

The subtleties of Tönnies’ analysis, however, have often been lost in its application, and modernization theory reflects only its broadest strokes.\(^{91}\) The clearest example of this is the ‘nation-building’ school that emerged in the 1950s and came to dominate the literature on political development. Advocates of nation-building saw a state-wide national identity as a necessary condition for modernization, but the nation was not simply ‘there’ waiting to be discovered but instead had to be built, just as they believed had been the case for the Western nations, and the United States in particular, that served as their blueprint. The goal, as Anthony Smith explains, was “the ‘national participant society’ of the democratic Western states. And the manner of the building processes was also Western: social mobilization, linguistic assimilation and the use of the mass media and mass education.”\(^{92}\)

This concern for nation-state integration is the clearest parallel between modernization theory and contemporary civic nationalism, though not all approaches to integration are based on civic nationalism. According to John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon, there are at least three types of civic integrationist approaches: republican, liberal, and socialist.

“Republicans,” they explain, “support the civic ‘nation-state’. Liberals champion the nation-state and international institutions, preferably as preludes to the construction of a cosmopolitan political order. Socialists have been divided with regard to the nation-state. Some see it as a

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90 Ibid.
91 As Jose Harris explains, “admirers, critics and antagonists have found what they wanted to find in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, and even as an acknowledged classic it has been far more often referred to than read.” Ibid., xxix.
barrier to the creation of a global socialist civilization; others see it as a bastion against the global capitalist order.”

Republican and liberal integrationism are the most relevant to our discussion, and are comparable to Greenfeld’s distinction between collectivistic and individualistic civic nationalisms, respectively. Republicans are primarily concerned with creating a strong political community, and argue that civic virtue is best promoted through a common and deliberative public culture that requires the integration of the population through shared institutions and practices such as citizenship, education, language, religion, and military service. Liberal integrationists, on the other hand, focus on enabling individual autonomy with measures like a universal bill of individual rights that restricts legislative action. In this case, the population is in principle ‘integrated’ through their collective and equal subjection to the rule of the same law that prevents discrimination based on personal characteristics such as ethnicity or religious faith.

5. Conclusion

The main characteristics of civic nationalism, as represented in the preceding overview, can be concisely summarized as follows. First, theorists of civic nationalism see it as nationalism’s original form. Its focus on rationality, freedom, and equality is derived from a secularized version of the Western Stoic-Judeo-Christian tradition, which could only take hold and flourish

94 This is not necessarily the case for its theoretical precursors, however. Meinecke, for example, argues that most political nations are founded on cultural nations, and Plamenatz sees Western nationalism as an imitation of the original English and French nations, which are not themselves nationalistic.
under the unique social and political conditions present in early-modernizing states such as England and France. The political rise of the middle class was especially important in this process, and the democratic revolutions of the late-eighteenth century were a watershed in the development of civic nationalism. Its liberal variant sees civic nations as a stepping-stone to cosmopolitanism, whereas the republican variant sees them as the proper foundation for a limited political community, but otherwise these interpretations are more or less the same. In short, a civic nation is a group of citizens of the same state whose relationship is based on their voluntary, shared commitment to a set of modern, progressive, and universally valid political principles and a desire to pursue the realization of those shared values together.
Chapter 3

Problems in principle

With the characteristics of civic nationalism established, we can now move on to assessment. As I explained in the introduction, the most common criticisms of civic nationalism deal with what I call its ‘problems in principle’. These problems can be divided into two categories: inconsistent or misconceived premises of civic nationalist ideology, and similarly mistaken arguments that fall outside of civic nationalism itself but nevertheless affect its analysis. For the purposes of this discussion I have grouped together several issues related to the first category under the headings ‘membership’ and ‘political culture’, and those related to the second category under the heading ‘questionable analyses’. Before these problems can be addressed, however, it is important to isolate civic nationalism from two positions that it is often conflated with, patriotism and liberal nationalism, in order to avoid analytical confusion.

The chapter is organized as follows. After explaining the differences between patriotism, liberal nationalism, and civic nationalism and why this distinction is significant, I move on to membership in section two. There are several different issues that could be discussed under this heading, but I focus on the claims that civic nationalism is inclusive and membership in a civic nation is voluntary, with special attention to the role of the social contract in the second claim. Section three assesses the premise that civic nations are based on a shared political culture, both on its own and through two other assertions that are said to exemplify these values: that in civic nations the state is neutral toward different cultures, and that civic nationhood is based on the principle of popular sovereignty. The final section focuses on three questionable analyses that
involve the misuse or misinterpretation of outside concepts or heuristics in the analysis of civic nationalism: the social contract; ideal types; and modernism.

1. Patriotism and liberal nationalism

It is common for both proponents and critics of civic nationalism to treat it as synonymous with either patriotism, liberal nationalism, or both. In fact, these three positions are distinct, and it is important to differentiate between them in order to avoid analytical confusion. The term ‘patriotism’ can be used either to describe a commitment and practice of loyalty to a patria (fatherland, country, or state), or refer to one of two normative positions: ‘republican patriotism’ and ‘constitutional patriotism’. The term ‘liberal nationalism’ has historically been used loosely to refer to any combination of liberalism and nationalism, but since the early 1990s has come to refer to a specific cluster of normative positions that invoke one or more of three types of arguments about the relationship between liberalism and nationalism that I explain below: the ‘intrinsic value argument’, the ‘cultural argument’, and ‘instrumental arguments’. The following discussion clarifies the similarities and differences between these positions, and explains why it is important not to confuse them with civic nationalism.

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2 Given some questions that I have received when presenting this part of my argument, it is worth noting that I do not mean to advocate either patriotism or liberal nationalism by making this distinction. I do think that certain versions of these positions are more plausible than civic nationalism, but the purpose of the distinction is to help
Descriptive patriotism

Walker Connor has long maintained that a “fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has been a tendency to equate nationalism with a feeling of loyalty to the state,” which he says is properly called patriotism, “rather than with loyalty to the nation.”3 Most contemporary authors who have addressed this issue tend to agree with him in principle, but argue that nationalism and patriotism are indistinguishable in practice and that the contrast is effectively meaningless as a result.

In his book Banal Nationalism, for example, Michael Billig contends that the distinction between patriotism and nationalism is only rhetorical: “‘Our’ nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien. A new identity, a different label, is found for it. ‘Our’ nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’—a beneficial, necessary. . .force.”4 This assertion is a part of his broader argument that, in general,

liberal Western academics today find it easier to recognize nationalism in ‘others’ than in themselves. Nationalists can be identified as extremists who, impelled by a violently emotional psychology, seek irrational ends; or they can be painted as heroic figures who, in particular, are to be found overseas, battling against repressive colonialists. Nationalism can be seen almost everywhere but ‘here’.5

clarify the specificity of the civic nationalist argument and avoid the serious analytical problems that can arise from confusing it with others.

4 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), 55. Michael Hechter makes a similar argument: “Although patriotism—the desire to raise the prestige and power of one’s own nation state relative to rivals in the international system—is often considered to be nationalistic, the present definitions rules this usage out. Patriotism is no form of nationalism at all, for here the boundaries of the nation and governance unit are already congruent. This limitation is not, however, very damaging. Since few states, if any, qualify as nation states, patriotism (as defined in this book) hardly exists. Most of what passes as patriotism in common parlance implicitly advances the interests of one nation at the expense of others in multinational states. In the present framework, such activities are instances of state-building nationalism.” Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.
5 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 15. Andrew Vincent describes this as the ‘mutually disagreeable’ position on the synonymy of nationalism and patriotism: “First, patriotism is seen as a verbal ‘sleight of hand’ to avoid the pejorative and unpleasant connotations of nationalism. The separate use of patriotism thus has a face-saving
Billig's book is important, and I agree with much of what he has to say. In particular, I share his concern that nationalism is too often characterised as something that ‘other’ people engage in; as violent, disruptive, and alien to the liberal democracies of the West. This perspective is clearly wrong, and it ignores the ‘banal’ nationalism that Billig asks us to recognise in our everyday lives. Whether doctrinal nationalists or not, most people raised in modern societies understand themselves and behave as nationals.

Nevertheless, Billig’s take on patriotism is too narrow. It is definitely the case that some nationalists call themselves patriots in opposition to other nationalists whom they wish to denigrate, but this is not the whole story. The reason that the distinction makes sense in the first place is that there are real historical and conceptual differences between patriotism and nationalism, which Billig ignores because of the way that the distinction has so often been misrepresented.

For example, in one section Billig focuses on Connor’s distinction between patriotism and nationalism, arguing that he characterises nationalism as an irrational, primordial force, and limits patriotism to immigrant societies such as Australia, the United States, and Canada outside of Quebec, on an explicitly evaluative basis.6

This is not an accurate representation of Connor’s position. Nationalism, for him, is neither irrational nor primordial. A nation

is the largest group that can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family. . .The sense of unique descent, of course, need not, and in nearly all cases will not, accord with factual

character. Second, it might well be the case that patriotism did have an older and more distinctive meaning, but, since the nineteenth century, that older sense has been lost in all but theory.” Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 117.

6 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 55-59.
history. Nearly all nations are the variegated offsprings of numerous ethnic strains. It is not chronological or factual history that is the key to the nation, but sentient or felt history. All that is irreducibly required for the existence of a nation is that the members share an intuitive conviction of the group’s separate origin and evolution. Logically, such a sense of one’s nation’s origin must rest upon a presumption that somewhere in a hazy, prerecorded era there existed a Japanese, German, or Thai Adam and Eve. But logic operates in the realm of the conscious and the rational; convictions concerning the singular origin and evolution of one’s nation belong to the realm of the subconscious and the nonrational (note: not irrational but nonrational).  

Connor distinguishes patriotism from nationalism not to praise the former or to denigrate the latter, but for the sake of analytic rigour. By his definition, immigrant societies such as Australia, the United States, and Canada outside of Quebec do not qualify as nations. They are states, and loyalty to the state is properly called patriotism.

I disagree with Connor’s assertions that all nationalism must have an ethnic basis and that immigrant societies are non-national, but his fundamental point that loyalty to the state and loyalty to the nation must be kept analytically separate in spite of rhetorical misappropriations is right, and consistent with other theories of nationalism that are not based on ethnicity.

Republican patriotism

This descriptive use of the term patriotism, however, has recently been overshadowed by a number of prominent normative, usually anti-nationalist positions that can be divided into two

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7 Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 202-03.
main categories: ‘republican patriotism’ and ‘constitutional patriotism’. The republican interpretation is most closely associated with Maurizio Viroli, who begins by arguing that the language of modern nationalism came about as a transformation or adaptation of the language of patriotism, by which words like ‘country’ and expressions like ‘love of country’ were given new meanings, while a number of themes like cultural or ethnic unity and purity that republican patriotism did not address at all or treated as minor compared to the main question of common liberty, assumed a central role.8

This in itself is relatively uncontroversial and consistent with most descriptive accounts. The origins of patriotism can be traced back to at least Greek and Roman antiquity, where it was both a religious and a political sentiment. The patria or fatherland was “a sacred soil inhabited by gods and ancestors and sanctified by worship” and was identified “with respublica, common liberty, common good.”9 Nationalism, on the other hand, focuses on the nation; a modern social category usually characterised by, at least, a common language, culture and territory, but sometimes also by a common religious faith and a purportedly shared ancestry. Although inherently political, nationalism requires loyalty to the state only in those circumstances where the state is understood to be an expression of nationhood.

Viroli’s own distinction between patriotism and nationalism is sharper than this, though. “Whereas the enemies of republican patriotism are tyranny, despotism, oppression, and corruption,” he says, “the enemies of nationalism are cultural contamination, heterogeneity,

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10 Ibid., 18-19.
racial impurity, and social, political, and intellectual disunion.”¹¹ This does not mean, however, that republican patriots disregard the culture, ethnicity, language, or traditions of peoples; in fact, the republic is meant to express “the common liberty of a particular people with its particular background and its particular culture.” The crucial distinction, he explains, “lies in the priority or the emphasis: for the patriots, the primary value is the republic and the free way of life that the republic permits; for the nationalists, the primary values are the spiritual and cultural unity of the people.”¹²

Viroli grounds his conception of patriotism in a particular Roman tradition that, after losing its influence during the medieval period, he says, recovered to form the basis for a distinctive republican language of patriotism in the Italian city-republics by the beginning of the Renaissance.¹³ For this variety of patriotism the basis of political virtue is love of the republic, a rational sentiment because its focus is the common good that every citizen should want to preserve.¹⁴ This love of the republic should not be confused with “love of the republic in general or attachment to an impersonal republic based on universal values of liberty and justice,” however. Instead, it is an “attachment to a particular republic with its particular way of living in freedom. A purely political republic would be able to command the philosopher’s consent, but would generate no attachment, no love, no commitment. To generate and sustain these sorts of passions one needs to appeal to the common culture, to shared memories.”¹⁵

In short, Viroli recognizes that republics require a shared cultural identity to flourish, but denies the claim he attributes to nationalists that this kind of unity should be the focus of politics. Republican patriotism is an antidote to the excesses of nationalism, he argues, and only relies on

¹¹ Ibid., 1-2.
¹² Ibid., 2.
¹³ Ibid., 24.
¹⁴ Ibid., 25.
¹⁵ Ibid., 13.
nationality as a foundation for promoting common liberty. “We do not need more citizens attending national festivals with great fervour; nor do we need more citizens willing to offer their lives to protect their country’s religious or ethnic or cultural unity,” he maintains. “We need, instead, more citizens willing and capable of mobilizing when one or more citizens are victims of injustice or discrimination, when unfair laws are passed or constitutional principles are violated.”16

**Constitutional patriotism**

The other prominent contemporary interpretation of patriotism, ‘constitutional patriotism’, is most closely associated with Jürgen Habermas but can be traced back to the immediate post-war period in Germany. According to Jan-Werner Müller, the deepest roots of constitutional patriotism are in the work of Karl Jaspers who, in the years following the end of the Second World War, advocated the notion of ‘collective responsibility’ in place of the charge of ‘collective guilt’ that had been levelled against Germany.17

Habermas introduced his own version of constitutional patriotism during the German Historikerstreit (‘historians’ dispute’) of the late 1980s that revolved around the interpretation of National Socialism and the Holocaust, their comparability to Stalinism and the Gulag, and what Habermas claimed was the attempt by some conservative historians to ‘normalize’ German  

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16 Ibid., 185.
identity and return to nationalism. Constitutional patriotism was the best alternative for West Germany, but an unproblematic return to pre-national patriotism was not possible.\(^\text{18}\)

Just as Karl Marx saw capitalism as a necessary prerequisite for communism, Habermas argues that nationalism laid the foundation for constitutional patriotism. The nation-state, he says, provided the “cultural and ethnic homogeneity on the basis of which it then proved possible to push ahead with the democratization of government since the late eighteenth century. . .The nation-state and democracy are twins born out of the French Revolution,” and “both have been growing in the shadow of nationalism.”\(^\text{19}\)

Nations, Habermas says, were originally communities of shared descent, territory and culture that were not closely associated with states until the middle of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution, however, marks a change in the meaning of the term ‘nation’ “from designating a prepolitical entity to something that was supposed to play a constitutive role in defining the political identity of the citizen within a democratic polity.”\(^\text{20}\) The dissolution of the traditional social order, the rise of popular sovereignty, and the advent of new networks of communication together facilitated the emergence of a new ‘nation of citizens’ that derived its identity from republican praxis instead of ascriptive ties. Still, this legal-political transformation would have lacked force

if a nation of more or less self-conscious citizens had not emerged from a people defined by its subjection to state power. This political mobilization called for an idea that was vivid and powerful enough to shape people’s convictions and appealed more strongly to their hearts and minds than the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights. This gap was filled by the modern idea of the nation, which first inspired in the inhabitants of state territories an awareness of the new, legally and politically mediated form of community. Only a national

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 26.


\(^{20}\) Ibid., 258.
consciousness, crystallized around the notion of a common ancestry, language, and history, only the consciousness of belonging to “the same” people, makes subjects into citizens of a single political community—into members who can feel responsible for one another. The nation or the Volksgeist, the unique spirit of the people—the first truly modern form of collective identity—provided the cultural basis for the constitutional state.  

Thus nationalism, a term that Habermas reserves for the process of creating and perpetuating ethnically defined nation-states, was a necessary catalyst for modern republicanism.

Republicanism, however, is not conceptually dependant on nationalism, and in fact there are significant and irreconcilable tensions between the two. The most important is their different conceptions of freedom: republicans, Habermas explains, value the private liberty of members of civil society and the political autonomy of citizens, whereas nationalists value national power and self-determination. Nationalism played a critical functional role in the implementation of citizenship and the development of a state-wide national consciousness in the heyday of the nation-state, but it has outlived its usefulness now that this integrative purpose has been served, and its history of excess has left it normatively untenable.

This renunciation of nationalism does not take nationhood with it, though. Habermas is somewhat ambiguous on this point, describing the nation as ‘Janus-faced’ as he advocates a shift in emphasis from the ethnic nationhood that nation-states were founded on to a civic nation created through the democratic process. “A previous background of consensus, constructed on the basis of cultural homogeneity and understood as a necessary catalyzing condition for democracy,” he argues,

becomes superfluous to the extent that public, discursively structured processes of opinion- and will-formation make a reasonable political understanding possible.

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even among strangers. Thanks to its procedural properties, the democratic process has its own mechanisms for securing legitimacy; it can, when necessary, fill the gaps that open in social integration, and can respond to the changed cultural composition of a population by generating a common political culture.  

Thus, while civic and ethnic nations are founded on different principles, the boundaries of civic nations are determined by the ethnic nations that precede them. Furthermore, civic nations are neither the product nor the object of constitutional patriotism. The latter supports republicanism by encouraging loyalty to the political principles defined in the constitution, but civic nations are the result of the ‘republican praxis’ and communicative context that democracy facilitates within the boundaries determined by ethnic nationality.

Liberal nationalism

The term ‘liberal nationalism’ is often applied generally to any combination of liberalism and nationalism, but when used specifically it refers to two related sets of ideas regarding this relationship: one that was prominent during the nineteenth century, and another that emerged at the end of the twentieth. “In the first half of the nineteenth century,” Hugh Seton-Watson explains,

it was generally assumed that individual liberty and national independence or unity would go together: both were regarded as equally desirable by nationalists, equally objectionable by absolutist governments. Nationalism and liberalism were a single cause. Their champions were for the most part members of the educated elite, whether ‘upper’ or ‘middle’ class. They desired political freedom for

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themselves, and assumed that in demanding it they spoke for the whole nation except for reactionary rulers, indigenous or foreign.  

There were many differences in detail among the various champions of liberal nationalism but in general, according to Carlton Hayes, they all agreed that the political map of the world should be redrawn so that every nation would have its own state, which notably required the “dissolution of each imperial domain into its constituent national elements and at the same time the unification of disjointed parts of a nationality into a new commonwealth.”

Contemporary liberal nationalism first gained prominence in the early 1990s, and is in many ways an outgrowth of the ‘liberal–communitarian’ debate that dominated normative political theory during the previous decade. Some forms of liberal nationalism, for example, can be seen as a response to the communitarian charge that post-war liberal theory has an unrealistically ‘atomistic’ theory of the self that fails to recognize that both individual identity and autonomy require a particular social context (the ‘social thesis’ discussed in the introduction). As Margaret Moore explains, liberal nationalists have developed three types of arguments to support their position: the ‘intrinsic value argument’, the ‘cultural argument’, and ‘instrumental arguments’.

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The intrinsic value argument holds that liberals should give institutional recognition to nations because they are intrinsically valuable moral communities. This argument, Moore says, “rests on a particular view of moral reasoning, and suggests that claims about national identity and national attachments cannot simply be theorized within the confines of liberal theory, but these communities themselves are ethically valuable, and should be entitled to the kind of regard and consideration that a moral community normally warrants.”27 It proceeds in two steps by contending first, that national attachments and relationships are important to personal identity, and second, that a common public culture is necessary to ground both the obligations of membership in and the internal goods provided by national communities.

There are two closely related but analytically distinct versions of the cultural argument for liberal nationalism: one that focuses on the importance of cultural membership for individual autonomy, and another that emphasises the importance of culture for individual self-respect and well-being. The first, often called the ‘autonomy argument’, has four premises: (a) individual autonomy, rather than toleration, is the fundamental liberal virtue; (b) the meaningful context of choice necessary for autonomy is best provided by a common ‘societal culture’; (c) the importance of a rich and flourishing societal culture to the exercise of autonomy gives liberals a good reason to adopt measures that would protect it; and (d) the particular cultures that people are attached to should be protected because they provide the context in which autonomy is exercised.28 An “important advantage of this argument,” Moore explains,

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28 Ibid., 53-54.
membership in many national communities—this argument suggests that, in fact, there is a close internal connection between autonomy and cultural/national identity. If liberalism is based on autonomy, liberals cannot simply and crudely identify freedom with preference-satisfaction: they must be concerned to ensure that the appropriate conditions for the exercise of autonomy are also met. The national or encompassing culture provides the options and gives a sense of the meaning or value of these options from which the individual chooses and so forms his/her life. On this view, the opposition between autonomy and national/cultural identity is a superficial one: in fact, a rich and flourishing culture is an essential condition of the exercise of autonomy.”

The other version of the cultural argument focuses on the importance of culture to individual identity and self-respect. According to this position, cultural groups provide “an anchor for their [members’] self-identification and secure belonging”, which is necessary because an individual’s “well-being is crucially dependent on the integrity and flourishing of the encompassing group with which s/he identifies, or belongs.” On this basis the argument is then made that such ‘encompassing groups’, like individuals, need to be autonomous (in this case through political sovereignty) in order to flourish because they are in the best position to judge their own interests.

Instrumental arguments for liberal nationalism, Moore explains, focus on the state instead of the individual, “and the kinds of goods or benefits that attach to the state when its members share a national identity.” These arguments fall into two categories: those that focus on the importance of a shared national identity to the solidarity and liberal virtues required to support a liberal conception of justice, and those that focus on its ability to provide the solidarity and relations of mutual trust required for democratic institutions to function as they should.

29 Ibid., 55.
30 Ibid., 60.
31 Ibid., 74.
Differences from civic nationalism

These are complex arguments and it is easy to understand how patriotism and liberal nationalism can be confused with civic nationalism, especially because they are compatible in many ways. This compatibility ranges, though, from the close similarity of constitutional patriotism to the very different conception of the relationship between liberalism and nationalism reflected in the cultural arguments made by contemporary liberal nationalists.

Constitutional patriotism explicitly invokes civic nationhood, but Habermas’ position is more complicated than this may suggest. For him, civic nationality is a relationship that developed among ethnic co-nationals through republican praxis. Constitutional patriotism is meant to support republicanism, and is therefore only indirectly related to nationality. As Jan-Werner Müller puts it, constitutional patriotism is intended to be “a transformative conception of living together that is different from civic nationalism” that suggests “a different moral psychology than nationalism of any sort, whether ethnic or civic.” In particular, he says, it does not fall victim to what we might call the foundationalist fallacy: it simply doesn’t claim . . . that men and women have to come together ex nihilo, so to speak, to create a polity based on pristine universal values: constitutional patriotism transforms, it doesn’t create out of nothing. In the same vein, it doesn’t fit what we might call the rationalist-voluntarist fallacy: in other words, it doesn’t claim that attachment has to be purely rational and voluntary; again, it reshapes (or rather, we reshape) our dispositions and emotions, and does not depend on a completely unrealistic pure politics of will.

Accordingly, while constitutional patriotism may be similar to civic nationalism in practice, it is meant to be a transformative, anti-nationalist form of politics and has different objectives than civic nationalism.

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32 Müller, Constitutional Patriotism, 71.
33 Ibid., 70.
More generally, several concepts or arguments associated with either patriotism or liberal nationalism can be conceived in ways that are consistent with civic nationalism. Descriptive patriotism, for example, is obviously compatible with loyalty to the civic nation-state. It does not have any necessary relationship with nationhood, however, and can describe loyalty to any kind of state (an imperial dictatorship, for example), so the general concept remains distinct from nationalism, civic or otherwise. Similarly, the intrinsic value and instrumental arguments put forward by contemporary liberal nationalists are both acceptable to most civic nationalists so long as the nation in question is civic, though some of the more cosmopolitan-minded liberal civic nationalists might be uncomfortable with the idea that nations have intrinsic value.

The compatibility of civic nationalism with nineteenth-century liberal nationalism’s anti-imperialism and support for national self-determination is somewhat more ambiguous. On the one hand, as I explained in chapter two, authors such as Hans Kohn and Michael Ignatieff have advocated imperialism as a legitimate means of imposing their preferred form of nationalism. Both see this as part of a cosmopolitan mission, though it seems likely that Ignatieff considers imperialism a temporary measure, and there is no indication that he shares Kohn’s desire for a world federation. The civic nationalist rejection of sub-state nationalism, which characterizes it as an ethnic fantasy that should not be indulged, appears to be similarly motivated. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find a civic nationalist who would be unwilling to support national self-determination in principle. It is tempting to attribute the difference to the statist bias of civic nationalists, but some sub-state nationalists are civic nationalists too, so it seems likely that relative social position explains it best: civic nationalists are usually members of a dominant majority in their unit of reference who want to maintain and extend their dominion.
Republican patriotism is more clearly incompatible with civic nationalism. Viroli argues that patriotism should be seen as a passionate attachment to the culture, history, political values, and freedom of a particular people, and explicitly rejects civic nationalism’s focus on universal liberal values. Republican patriotism is the way that we should conduct politics within a historically constituted republican community and, unlike civic nationalism, is not concerned with the constitutive character of that community itself.

The cultural arguments of contemporary liberal nationalists, especially the autonomy argument, are the furthest from civic nationalism in this range for at least three reasons. First, for liberal culturalists the nation is a necessary condition for the practice of liberal commitments, whereas for civic nationalists the nation itself is an expression of those commitments. Second, nationhood based on shared political values alone is simply not enough to act as a facilitating societal culture, which “provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.”\(^3^4\) In fact, it is even possible to ground liberal nationalism on a conception of nationhood that focuses on ethnicity, so long as it provides the social conditions that liberal nationalists are looking for. Finally, this kind of liberal nationalist is much more amenable to plurinationalism than are civic nationalists. One of the central premises of Kymlicka’s book *Multicultural Citizenship* is that liberalism requires the recognition and support of minority nations, and Yael Tamir advocates what she describes as a multinational consociational model in *Liberal Nationalism.*\(^3^5\)

In summary, while civic nationalism clearly has much in common with the sets of arguments clustered around the terms ‘patriotism’ and ‘liberal nationalism’, they are not

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\(^3^4\) Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 76.

\(^3^5\) Ibid; Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*. 

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synonymous and some arguments are unique to each position. Most importantly, the core of civic nationalism is the *constitutive character* of the nation, whereas patriotism and liberal nationalism are focused on the conduct of politics within a national context. It is not difficult to combine some aspects of each position, as we have seen with constitutional patriotism, but recognizing the specificity of civic nationalism is necessary for an accurate analysis.

2. *Membership*

A central tenet of civic nationalism is that membership in the nation is inclusive and voluntary. This section briefly demonstrates the misguided reasoning behind the first claim before moving on to an examination of the social contract argument that is often used to support the second.

*Inclusion*

Membership in civic nations is regularly characterized as inherently inclusive. As Rogers Brubaker argues, however, the fact is that “all understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion.”

The two such criteria that civic nationalists usually point to are citizenship and political values. Citizenship, though, is by nature both an inclusive and exclusive status, and it is the modern

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states’ most effective measure of social closure.\(^{37}\) It is ‘inclusive’ in the sense that it is possible to acquire citizenship in a way that it is impossible to acquire ascriptive traits, but this does not get us very far. Similarly, the supposed ideological basis of civic nationhood is said to make it uniquely open, but this can obviously lead to the exclusion of people who do not share the majority’s political values and, as I explain in the next section, the idea that civic nationhood is based on shared political values is itself dubious.\(^{38}\) In fact, as Anthony Marx argues and I will demonstrate in later chapters, deliberate exclusion has played an important role in the development of purportedly civic nations.\(^{39}\)

*The social contract*

The second claim, that membership in civic nations is voluntary, is often supported by referencing the ‘social contract’. A close examination of social contract theory, however, reveals that this argument is a serious misinterpretation.

There are three general types of social contract theory. The oldest, which some scholars trace back as far as Ancient Greece, has been described as a ‘contract of government’ or ‘contract of submission’.\(^{40}\) In this case, a bilateral agreement defines the terms of governance between the rulers and the subjects of an already existing society: the people promise the ruler

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\(^{38}\) Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, 142.


obedience, and he promises them protection and good government. So long as the ruler keeps his part of the bargain the people must keep theirs but, if he misgoverns, the contract is broken and the people no longer owe him their allegiance. This was the only notion of a social contract that had currency prior to the Reformation, and it was especially prevalent during the Middle Ages.\footnote{J.S. McClelland, 	extit{A History of Western Political Thought} (London: Routledge, 1996), 173. Patrick Riley makes a convincing argument that it is a mistake to trace any theory of political legitimacy that relies on ‘will’ further back than the Middle Ages. Patrick Riley, 	extit{Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).}

The second approach, sometimes referred to as the ‘social contract proper’, is rooted in Protestant theology and emerged in its most robust form in mid-seventeenth century England.\footnote{It has also been called a ‘pacte d’association’ (pact of association), a ‘Gesellschaftsvertrag’ (social contract), a ‘Vereinigungsvertrag’ (union contract), and a ‘pactum unionis’ (union pact). McClelland, 	extit{A History of Western Political Thought}, 173-74; Gough, 	extit{The Social Contract}, 2-3; Ernest Barker, “Introduction,” in 	extit{Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau} (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 1-3.} This contract is a multilateral agreement between all the individual members of a society on its creation and continued existence. Security, efficiency, and equality are some of the reasons that its different advocates have proposed for entering into the contract, but the essential characteristic of this theory is the principle that, whatever its justification and institutional form may be, a political association is only legitimate if it is based on voluntary consent.\footnote{Hobbes may be the exception; he does not think it is illegitimate, for example, for a foreign sovereign to conquer and rule over another state so long as his rule remains consistent with the purpose of forming the commonwealth in the first place (i.e., physical security).}

The third and final type is the ‘moral social contract’, a twentieth century variant which holds that morality itself can and should be decided on a contractual basis. This is a significant departure from the other two approaches, which are grounded in the natural law tradition, but it still draws on many of the same principles.\footnote{John Rawls, 	extit{A Theory of Justice}, Revised ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999); David Gauthier, 	extit{Morals by Agreement} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).}

These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive but, in general, it is the second type that civic nationalists have in mind.\footnote{It is also likely, though, that some of them think that they are drawing on Rawls as well.} The social contract ‘proper’ is most closely associated with
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but Rousseau is the only one to use the term itself.\textsuperscript{46} As Michael Lessnoff explains, however, this language may unfortunately give the impression that the theory (or theories) in question maintain that ‘society’ is the result of a contract made by (non-social or pre-social) individuals. Such a conception can easily be ridiculed, not just as historically inaccurate, but on the more fundamental ground that it is incoherent. Not only has man been always by nature a social animal, the concept of contract is itself a social concept, which presupposes social life among men. Pre-social men, if they could exist, could not even have the concept of a contract (or pact or covenant), and hence could not make one (they could not even have a language).”\textsuperscript{47}

This would be a devastating critique if it were what the major contract theorists had intended but few, if any, have actually made this argument. Instead, “they have been concerned with the origin and justification of specific sorts of social institutions, and . . .above all, institutions of political authority, centralized government and positive law.”\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, civic nationalists may be the only proponents of social contract theory to endorse the above caricature, which Lessnoff describes as the first premise of a common ‘straw man’ argument against the social contract.

In some respects, this mistake is easy to understand. Locke, for example, uses ‘society’, ‘community’, and ‘people’ to describe the kind of association that he advocates. What is clear from his definition of these terms, however, is that their meaning in practice is much more circumscribed than their potential extension:

Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united to one society, as to quit every one his executive power and of the law of nature, and to resign it to the


public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-
ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one
people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one
joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby
he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws
for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof,
his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state
of nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with
authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries that may
happen to any member of the common-wealth; which judge is the legislative, or
magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men,
however, associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are
still in the state of nature.49

For Locke, ‘civil society’ and the other terms that he uses for it here refer only to the set of
institutions collectively known as the modern state. More specifically, as John Dunn explains,
“What it refers to in modern terminology. . .is essentially the state liked: the non-pathological
state,” in opposition to the absolutist state proposed by either Robert Filmer or Thomas Hobbes.
Recognizing this, Dunn says, is just a matter of good “linguistic hygiene”.50

The principal social contract theorist evoked by civic nationalists, however, is not Locke
but Rousseau. Hans Kohn devotes several pages of The Idea of Nationalism and his other work
to championing Rousseau as the classic prophet of civic nationalism, and his example has been
followed by many other authors.51 “A nation that expressed itself through the general will,”
Kohn argues,

could for Rousseau not be a product of nature. German romantic thinkers
misunderstood him when they transferred his ethnocultural antithesis (nature and
folk traditions against aristocratic and urban civilizations) to the field of society

49 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 47-48 (§. 89).
50 John Dunn, “The Contemporary Political Significance of John Locke's Conception of Civil Society,” in Civil
Society: History and Possibilities, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 55. The fact that the formation of Locke’s civil society is a two-step process—first the agreement to create
the state, and then the majority decision on what kind of government it will have—does not affect this.
51 Hans Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815 (Toronto: D. Van
Nostrand Company, 1967); The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction, 2005).
and of nationalism. They established a distinction between state and nation: they regarded the state as mechanical and juridical construction, the artificial product of historical accidents, while they believed the nation to be the work of nature, and therefore something sacred, eternal, organic, carrying a deeper justification than works of men. Nothing could be further from Rousseau’s thought; for him the nation and the nation-state were nothing “natural” or “organic,” but a product of the will of individuals. While, according to German romanticists, every man “belonged” by “nature” to a nation, according to Rousseau, men united as a nation by free declaration.  

For Rousseau, Kohn says, all true nations are constituted by a voluntary act; they are based on the universal principles of law, liberty, and equality; and they are held together by a feeling of brotherhood and mutual devotion to these principles and their expression through the fatherland.

This is a significant misinterpretation. The Social Contract is not a liberal-democratic theory of the nation-state, but instead a modern adaptation of Classical and Renaissance city-state republicanism. Rousseau did endorse nationalism, most notably in The Government of Poland, but not as a principled nationalist. The Social Contract is a theory of the ideal state and, while Rousseau argues that nationalism is sometimes required to facilitate the realisation of this ideal in practice, it is not a necessary condition of the theory in principle, and the relationship between nationhood and the social contract is different than Kohn suggests.

Rousseau himself says that the purpose of his social contract is to provide “a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”  

It does this by casting the citizens of the state as a corporate, sovereign entity called the ‘body politic’ which, because of its voluntary nature, cannot have interests contrary to the individuals who compose it. Laws are decided by the body politic according to the ‘general will’ or common good, and the government’s only role is the

52 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 249.
execution of these laws and the preservation of liberty. Rousseau’s ideal state is composed of around ten thousand citizens and governed democratically but, in larger states, government by aristocracy or even monarchy is legitimate.

The term ‘la nation’ is not systematically analysed or even explicitly defined in Rousseau’s work but, as Marc Plattner explains, he appears to employ it “more or less interchangeably with le peuple—‘nations’ are the equivalent of ‘peoples.’ And both of these terms sometimes seem to refer to what are clearly political units, whereas in other cases they designate prepolitical groupings of men.”

It is clear from his history of human development in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, however, that the formation of nations precedes that of political societies. Once families and language had been established, Rousseau says, “men slowly came together and united into different bands, eventually forming in each country a particular nation, united by mores and characteristic features, not by regulations and laws, but by the same kind of life and foods and by the common influence of the climate.”

The difference between state and nation is equally clear in the Social Contract. “Just as an architect, before putting up a large building, surveys and tests the ground to see if it can bear the weight,” Rousseau says, “the wise teacher does not begin by laying down laws that are good in themselves. Rather he first examines whether the people for whom they are destined are fitted to bear them.” Timing is especially important. A nation must reach maturity before being subjected to the kind of state that Rousseau proposes, but “Peoples, like men, are docile only in their youth. As they grow older they become incorrigible. Once customs are established and

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55 Ibid.
57 Rousseau, "On the Social Contract." 165. One clear implication of this statement is that Rousseau assumes that the existence of a people must precede the laws that will govern them.
prejudices have become deeply rooted, it is a dangerous and vain undertaking to want to reform them. The people cannot abide having even their evils touched in order to eliminate them, just like those stupid and cowardly patients who quiver at the sight of a physician.”

This brings us to a key mistake in Kohn’s interpretation. The act of entering into the social contract, he contends, is itself constitutive of the nation—it creates a nation where there was none before—but, as the evidence just presented demonstrates, this is not what Rousseau says at all. The social contract and its institutions transform subjects into citizens, reshape the national character, and provide the foundation for a real patrie, he argues, but only a particular kind of nation is well-suited for this endeavour: “One that, finding itself bound by some union of origin, interest or convention, has not yet felt the true yoke of laws. One that has no custom or superstitions that are deeply rooted. . .finally, one that brings together the stability of an ancient people and the docility of a new people.” A legislator can found a republic that will reshape the national character under these circumstances, but the nation itself is a prerequisite for rather than a product of this process.

The coincidence of these conditions is rare, and Rousseau says that Corsica—an island home to around 150,000 people at the time—is the only country in Europe that still meets them. In the Constitutional Project for Corsica, he describes national character as the first principle of establishing a healthy state, “for each people has, or ought to have, a national character.” Corsica meets this condition easily because “Islanders above all, being less mixed, less merged with other peoples, ordinarily have one that is especially marked,” Rousseau says, and the “Corsicans

58 Ibid., 165-66.
59 Ibid., 169-70.
60 Rousseau’s influence on Viroli’s conception of republican patriotism is evident here.
in particular are naturally endowed with very distinct characteristics."\(^{61}\) This is a kind of nationalism, of course, but it is purely instrumental and obviously not itself the purpose of the social contract. Even *The Government of Poland*, Rousseau’s most nationalistic treatise, evokes nationalism only as a means of dealing with non-ideal circumstances rather than as an end in itself.

Given the preceding assessment, it seems clear that social contract theory has been misappropriated by civic nationalists and does not support their position at all. This interpretation of social contract theory plays an important role in civic nationalists ideology, but its misattribution to social contract theorists is an example of what Quentin Skinner calls the ‘mythology of prolepsis’: “an account which might be true of the historical significance of the works becomes conflated with an account of what they were doing which could not in principle be true.”\(^{62}\)

3. *Political culture*

Another set of principles that are important to civic nationalism revolves around political culture. This includes both the idea that civic nations are based on shared political values, and two claims that are said to exemplify these values: civic nation-states are neutral toward different cultures, and civic nationhood is based on the principle of popular sovereignty. All three claims, however, have been decisively refuted by earlier critics of civic nationalism.

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As Bernard Yack argues, to claim that purportedly civic nations such as Canada, France and the United States are held together by shared political principles alone is unrealistic. “However much they may have come to stand for certain political principles, each [Canada, France, and the United States] comes loaded with inherited cultural baggage that is contingent upon their peculiar histories.” “The political identity of the French, the Canadian, or the American,” Yack contends,

is not based on a set of rationally chosen political principles. No matter how much residents of the United States might sympathize with political principles favoured by most French or Canadian citizens, it would not occur to them to think of themselves as French or Canadian. An attachment to certain political principles may be a necessary condition of loyalty to the national community for many citizens of contemporary liberal democracies; they are very far from a sufficient condition for that loyalty.63

Will Kymlicka makes a similar point, arguing that the idea that membership in civic nations is based on shared political principles

is obviously false of the 92 per cent of Americans who are native-born, since their citizenship has nothing to do with their political beliefs. They automatically acquire citizenship by descent, and cannot be stripped of it if they turn out to be fundamentalists or fascists. And it is only half-true of immigrants to America. The US government does require immigrants to swear allegiance to the constitution, but it also requires them to learn the English language and American history. These legal requirements of gaining citizenship are intended to integrate immigrants into the common societal culture.64

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Principles of freedom and equality by themselves are vague and do not tell us much about the communities that they are attributed to, including something as basic as where the boundaries of the community ought to be drawn.

Wayne Norman also addresses this issue in a book chapter titled “The Ideology of Shared Values”. Using Canada as a case in point, Norman argues that the “belief that in a pluralistic, multi-ethnic state, national unity is based in some sense on shared values” is false or misleading. Most seriously, he says, this position conflates a number of crucial distinctions between different kinds and categories of values, and it would be more reasonable to look to a shared identity as the basis for national unity. “The “bottom line” for liberals and social democrats,” Norman explains,

is that the ideology of shared values buys them nothing, politically or intellectually. It does not explain how a multinational federation such as Canada stays together, nor why it ought to. It doesn’t even explain why liberals are committed to the social and political principles that they believe ought to be shared—since they believe that such principles, such as fundamental civil, political, and social rights, should be enforced even if they are not (yet) shared. Indeed, they must surely believe that basic liberal democratic principles (such as the self-determination of peoples and the equality of basic individual rights) must be adhered to even if they undermine national unity.”

The ideology of shared values gets the connection between shared identity and shared values backward, he says, because it is usually a common identity that leads to common values and not the other way around.

None of this means that at least some shared political values are not a necessary condition for national unity, however; just that they are insufficient. Rainer Bauböck’s argument that the

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66 Ibid., 145.
role of liberal–democratic values in social cohesion is not “positive in the sense that there is a shared set of beliefs that unites citizens in the same way as believing in a religious doctrine unites a community of faith” is instructive. “The role of democratic values,” he says,

is primarily negative in providing legitimacy for coercive political rule. All political rule, even the most liberal and democratic, is coercive, and for that reason needs to be justified toward those over whom it is exercised. The core values of democracy offer substantive as well as procedural justification. Citizens are not required to believe in these values, they are merely asked to accept the legitimacy of a government that respects them. The proof is that citizens who openly proclaim that they do not share these values will not be disqualified. They continue to enjoy the status, rights, and liberties whose value foundations they reject.\(^\text{67}\)

In short, while shared values may contribute to social cohesion, they cannot account for it on their own. This issue is addressed at greater length in the following chapters.

**State neutrality**

The doctrine of state neutrality, which requires the state to deal with ethnocultural identities as it does with religion, is often considered an expression of civic nationalism’s emphasis on shared political values over other characteristics. The basic premise behind this approach is ‘benign neglect’: the state does not try to prevent people from expressing their particular cultural attachments, but does not nurture such expression either. This is seen as a way of supporting the shared political values that the nation is purportedly founded on, preventing ethnocultural challenges to national unity, and ensuring that all citizens are treated equally. As Will Kymlicka

explains, however, “the idea that the government could be neutral with respect to ethnic and national groups is patently false.” Governments cannot avoid deciding which societal cultures will be supported. And if it supports the majority culture, by using the majority’s language in schools and public agencies, it cannot refuse official recognition to minority languages on the ground that this violates ‘the separation of state and ethnicity’. This shows that the analogy between religion and culture is mistaken. . .It is quite possible for a state not to have an established church. But the state cannot help but give at least partial establishment to a culture when it decides which language is to be used in public schooling, or in the provision of state services. The state can (and should) replace religious oaths in courts with secular oaths, but it cannot replace the use of English in courts with no language.\textsuperscript{68}

Accordingly, civic nationalist claims of state neutrality only serve to obscure the dominance of a particular culture, regardless of whether the intent was sincere.

\textit{Popular sovereignty}

Finally, Bernard Yack has persuasively argued that the claim that civic nations are founded on the doctrine of popular sovereignty is problematic.\textsuperscript{69} Liberal democratic culture, as he explains, encourages “modern citizens to think of themselves as organized into communities that are logically and historically prior to the communities created by their shared political institutions. . .The doctrine of popular sovereignty insists that behind every state there stands a people, a community of individuals that makes use of the state as a means of self-government

\textsuperscript{68} Kymlicka, \textit{Multicultural Citizenship}, 111.
and thus has the right to establish the limits of power.” This clearly poses a significant problem for civic nationalists. If popular sovereignty logically requires a ‘people’ or nation to exercise it, then the nation obviously cannot itself be constituted through that act.

4. Questionable analyses

Up to this point I have focussed on the inconsistent and misconceived premises of civic nationalist ideology, but there are also other ‘problems in principle’ which fall outside of civic nationalism itself but nevertheless affect its analysis, and it is important to address them as well. I am calling these ‘questionable analyses’ because they involve the misuse or misinterpretation of outside concepts or heuristics in the analysis of civic nationalism and related issues. I discuss three here: the use of social contract theory for empirical analysis; the use of ideal types as an ‘escape hatch’ for unrealistic claims; and the suggestion that the differences between ethnic and civic nations is parallel to those between traditional and modern societies.

The social contract (2)

I addressed the serious problems with applying the social contract theory to nations instead of states in second section of this chapter, but it is also wrong to treat the social contract as a tool of empirical analysis. A classic fallacy in moral philosophy is the ‘is-ought problem’, the derivation

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of claims of what \textit{ought} to be on the basis of statements of what \textit{is}.\footnote{W.D. Hudson, ed. \textit{The Is-Ought Question: A Collection of Papers on the Central Problem in Moral Philosophy} (London: MacMillan, 1969).} The civic nationalist use of social contract theory is the perhaps more definitively fallacious reversal of this problem: claims about what \textit{is} are derived from statements about what \textit{ought} to be.

As Bernard Yack explains, the “idea of a purely political and principled basis for mutual concern and solidarity has been very attractive to Western scholars,” but it does not reflect the reality of the situation, or even the assumptions that those principles are based upon:

Social contract arguments serve to legitimate, through actual or implied consent, different ways of ordering the social and political relationships within a predefined group of individuals. For these arguments assume that there is sufficient reason for individuals deliberating about justice and the social contract to pay attention to each other’s proposals and decisions, rather than those made by individuals outside of this group. Since the whole point of these theories is to determine the proper order \textit{within} a given group of individuals, the assumption of a prepolitical community is safely tucked away in most of the debates about the meaning of liberal democratic principles.\footnote{Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," 107-09.}

None of the social contract theorists intended their theories as empirical analysis and in any case, as explained in section two, they were talking about states, not nations. Properly understood, social contract theory is a counter-factual heuristic meant to outline the principles of legitimate political authority, not provide an accurate historical explanation of state formation.

\textit{Ideal types}

Another questionable claim that is common among proponents of civic nationalism involves ideal types. Defenders of the civic/ethnic distinction have generally responded to critics who
argue that it is empirically inaccurate by invoking Anthony Smith’s qualifying claim that, as ideal types, their descriptions are not required to directly correspond with the real world, and that in practice all nations reflect a mix of civic and ethnic characteristics.

An ideal type, as Max Weber defines it,

is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. . .An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. . .[Yet,] when carefully applied, those concepts are particularly useful in research and exposition.\(^{73}\)

Thomas Burger explains further:

Weber realized (1) that the formulations he was analyzing do not inform about the real world, but about an ideal one, and (2) that this ideal world, or model, which is a mental construct, is related to the real world in ways which—after analysis—can be specified for every relevant instance, though not in general (unless “idealizing” is accepted as such a specification). From this insight, two things immediately follow. (1) Statements about the model must not be treated as if they constituted a theory of a class of empirical phenomena. (2) The construction or selection of a suitable model and its application to a particular case must not be confused with the testing of empirical hypotheses.\(^{74}\)

On the face of it, these clarifications may seem to support the defence of civic nationalism against empirical criticism. The retreat to ideal types, however, does not solve the problem of abstraction because it still maintains that the tenets of civic and ethnic nationalist ideologies accurately reflect the constitutive character of nations. Ideal typification is intended to accentuate certain aspects of the real world, not excuse us from its constraints. Shifting from a


‘realist’ dichotomy to an ‘ideal typical’ continuum may effectively address some of the criticisms that have been levelled against the distinction, but the attributes of an ideal type must still be present in some cases of the class it refers to and, most importantly, *feasible*. In short, ideal types can be a useful heuristic, but have been misappropriated by some theorists of civic nationalism as a kind of evasive maneuver.

*Modernism*

Finally, as I explained in the previous chapter, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is often said to be analogous to the one between traditional and modern society. As André Lecours puts it, “this theoretical and ontological basis leads to the argument that types of nationalism are a function of socio-economic and intellectual conditions,” associating “ethnic nationalism with an embryonic, inefficient or corrupt state and a pre- or early industrial economy,” and “the absence or weakness of Western values and ideas such as liberalism, representative democracy and secularism,” while holding that “civic nationalism accompanies industrialisation as well as liberal and democratic values and governments.”

A clear difficulty for this argument is that civic nationalists are committed to the idea that nations and nationalism are inherently modern phenomena. This is less of a problem if the argument focuses solely on the ‘borrowed’ rhetoric and ideology of ethnic nationalist elites while denying their referents, but to acknowledge the reality of either ethnic nations or popular ethnic nationalist movements would seem to concede that the traditional/modern distinction does not

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apply. If nationhood depends on modern technologies and institutions, and there are ethnic nations, then ethnic nations must be just as modern as their civic counterparts.  

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to address civic nationalism’s ‘problems in principle’, which demonstrate, for example, that civic nationalist ideology is essentially the ‘nationalization’ of a certain kind of normative liberal philosophy. First, though, I argued that it is important to maintain the distinction between patriotism, liberal nationalism, and civic nationalism, which are often treated as synonyms, in order to isolate the specifics of civic nationalism and clarify that it whereas patriotism and liberal nationalism are primarily concerned with the conduct of politics within a national context, civic nationalism is focussed on the constitutive character of the nation. With this established, I moved on to the two sets of principles within civic nationalist ideology that are most problematic: membership and political culture. Against the assertions that civic nations are inherently inclusive and voluntary, I argued that it is obvious that citizenship is just as ‘exclusive’ as it is ‘inclusive’, and provided a detailed explanation of why it is wrong to try to use social contract theory to support the claim that membership in civic nations is consensual. Regarding political culture, I addressed three claims: that civic nationhood is based on shared

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76 Dominique Schnapper avoids this criticism by arguing that all nations are civic, and that the very idea of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms. Properly understood, Schnapper says, a nation is a modern democratic community that integrates its members through universal citizenship, and whose existence legitimates the internal and external action of the state. So-called ‘ethnic nations’ are actually just *ethnie*, which she defines as “groups of men who live as heirs of an historical and cultural community (often expressed in terms of common descent) and who share the desire to maintain it,” that do not have their own state. Most theorists of civic nationalism, however, do not follow Schnapper on this issue and stick with the argument that ethnic nations are less developed than civic. Dominique Schnapper, *Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 16.
political values, and that these values are expressed through the doctrines of state neutrality and popular sovereignty. After explaining that shared political values are an insufficient condition for national unity and are an expression of national identity than its basis, I reiterated Kymlicka and Yack’s straightforward but persuasive arguments the state cannot be culturally neutral because its function depends on some degree of cultural uniformity, and popular sovereignty cannot be the basis of civic nationhood because it logically requires a pre-existing ‘people’ to exercise its sovereignty. Finally, I addressed what I call ‘questionable analyses’ that fall outside of civic nationalist ideology itself but nevertheless affect its analysis: the use of social contract theory for empirical analysis; the use of ideal types as a way to shrug off unrealistic claims; and the suggestion that the differences between ethnic and civic nations is parallel to those between traditional and modern societies. In each case I argued that theorists of civic nationalism have misunderstood these concepts and that these misunderstandings are serious enough that we should disregard an claims that depend on them.
Chapter 4

Nationalism beyond ideology

The previous chapter focused on civic nationalism’s ‘problems in principle’, both in terms of the inconsistent or misconceived premises of civic nationalist ideology, and similarly mistaken arguments that fall outside of civic nationalism itself but nevertheless affect its analysis. As important as these problems are, however, civic nationalism’s most significant flaw has not yet been addressed. There is a notable shift between how theorists of civic nationalism describe its principles or ‘ideological model’ and how they explain its development and spread. The ideological model focuses on the attributes that are said to define a civic nation, many of which were critically assessed in the previous chapter. The development and spread of civic nationalism, however, is explained using a theory of nationalism that characterizes it as a solely ideological phenomenon, and nations as an epiphenomenal manifestation of the spread of nationalist ideology. This introduces some tensions into the overall argument (it seems problematic for membership to be based on both voluntary consent and ideological indoctrination, for example), but these inconsistencies are less important than the theory of nationalism itself, which is the foundation of civic nationalism.

The purpose of this chapter is to deconstruct that theory of nationalism, explain its weaknesses, and prise apart key units of analysis such as nations and nationalism to lay the foundation for the alternative approach that I develop and apply in the following three chapters. The term ‘nationalism’, I will argue, refers to more than just an ideology, most importantly a ‘system of culture’ or way of organizing society as authors such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict
Anderson have argued. Furthermore, the civic nationalist conception of ideology itself is flawed, and has led to numerous significant methodological errors of interpretation and inference.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a summary of the civic nationalist historiography of the development of civic nationalism in England, France, and the United States, which provides the best entry-point for my task. The next section extrapolates and examines the general theory of nationalism underlying this account and demonstrates that civic nationalists see nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon. In section three I explain how the term ‘nationalism’ can have more than one meaning, and argue that beyond ideology it most importantly refers to a system of culture or way of organizing society. The final section addresses several methodological problems with the civic nationalist understanding of ideology and its application to nationalism, ranging from its intellectualist bias to the failure to recognize nations and nationalism as distinct units of analysis.

1. The origin and spread of civic nationalism

This section provides a charitable exposition of the civic nationalist historiography of the origin and spread of civic nationalism to establish the context of my analysis.¹ It focuses on Hans Kohn

¹ The term ‘historiography’ literally means ‘the writing of history’, but it is also often used to refer to the study or practice of the principles of historical research. My use of the word is limited to the first meaning, so the phrase ‘civic nationalist historiography’ refers to the historical account of civic nationalism that theorists of civic nationalism have provided. When discussing the ontological, epistemological, and methodological principles of historical research I use the term ‘historiology’, following Alexandre Grandazzi, Allan Megill, and Masayuki Sato’s examples. Historiography puts certain principles into practice—historiology is the study of those principles themselves. Alexandre Grandazzi, "The Future of the Past: From the History of Historiography to Historiology," Diogenes 38 (1990); Allan Megill, "Historiology / Philosophy of Historical Writing," in Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing ed. Kelly Boyd (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999); Masayuki Sato, ""Historiology" And Historiography: An East Asian Perspective," in The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-Cultural Approaches to Historiography, ed. Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).
and Liah Greenfeld’s accounts because few other authors have written extensively about civic nationalism’s history, and most of those who have discussed it defer to at least one of them.²

Both Kohn and Greenfeld locate the first emergence of nationalism, of any type, in England.³ Kohn dates this in the mid-1600s, about a century later than Greenfeld, but they generally agree on the confluence of circumstances that led to and reinforced it: a new social hierarchy, the character and needs of the successive Tudor reigns, the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and the English Civil War. The principal characteristics of English nationalism, they say, are individual liberty and political equality based on popular sovereignty and the application of reason.

“The idea of the nation was adopted in the first place,” Greenfeld explains, “because of the social transformation in the course of which one elite was replaced by another, and, the old definition and justification of the existence of aristocracy becoming obsolete, there was a need for a new definition and justification.”⁴ The high social mobility of sixteenth-century England, she says, was the result of the dissolution of the feudal order following the end of the War of the Roses and the accession of the Tudor dynasty to the English throne. With the fall of the old nobility and the elimination of the clergy from key administrative positions, a new meritocratic aristocracy emerged: talented and well-educated people of modest birth who were recruited from the minor gentry and lower classes.

² Anthony Smith is also a common reference in this context, but the main components of his history of civic nationalism are based on Kohn’s, and authors who cite Smith rarely include the things that differentiate the two. ³ Despite some important differences, much of Greenfeld’s account of the origin and spread of nationalism is derived from Kohn’s work. Greenfeld does not explicitly recognize this, however, and in fact she does her best to convince the reader that her argument is almost entirely original, citing relatively few secondary sources in general and at one point even suggesting that the most valuable part of the article that Kohn wrote on English nationalism (which was later incorporated nearly verbatim into The Idea of Nationalism) is its references. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 497, n. 2; Hans Kohn, "The Genesis and Character of English Nationalism," Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 1 (1940). For a usefully abbreviated version of Greenfeld’s account of English nationalism, see Liah Greenfeld, "The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France," Research in Political Sociology 5 (1991). ⁴ Greenfeld, Nationalism, 86.
This, Greenfeld argues, was the beginning of nationalism:

The redefinition of nobility in the literature as a status based on merit, and not on birth, was a simple acknowledgment of this change, the transfer of authority from one elite to another, which was virtually happening before one’s eyes. A fundamental transformation of this kind, however, required a rationalization and a justification which were not to be found in the acknowledgment. *It is at this juncture, I believe, that nationalism was born*. The idea of the nation—of the people as an elite—appealed to the new aristocracy, and the slowness with which the Crown before 1529 confirmed its status by the granting of titles contributed to this appeal. In a way, nationality made every Englishman a nobleman, and blue blood was no longer necessary to achieve or aspire to high positions in society. The new aristocracy was a natural aristocracy, an elite of intelligence and virtue, and its superior position was justified by the service it, being so endowed, could render to others.\(^5\)

This idea also appealed to the growing middle class (composed of landed gentry, professionals, and merchants) and, by the 1540s, most nationalist literature came from its members.

Kohn similarly emphasises the importance of the breakdown of feudal society and the growing prominence of the middle class to the emergence of nationalism, but he sees these developments as necessary but insufficient conditions for English nationhood, which did not crystallize until the seventeenth century after the experience of the Puritan Revolution (the Whig term for the English Civil War), as discussed below.

Nevertheless, Kohn and Greenfeld agree on nearly everything else about the development of nationalism in England, including the sources of the ideas that served as its foundation. Renaissance values such as reason, natural law, individual liberty, classical republicanism and patriotism resonated with the newly ascendant classes, and found unique expression in English Protestantism, particularly under the influence of the Puritans.

\(^5\) Ibid.
Henry VIII’s break with Rome opened the doors to Protestantism in England, which Greenfeld describes as a “powerful lubricant in the development of the national consciousness.”6 The Protestant principle of the ‘priesthood of all believers’ reinforced the rationalist individualism of English nationalism, she says, and the centrality of the Old Testament to Protestantism provided the English “with the language in which they could express the novel consciousness of nationality, for which no language existed before. This language reached all levels of society and was, as a result, far more important than the language of Renaissance patriotism known only to a small elite.”7 Here readers found the example of a unique, chosen people that shared a covenant with God, providing nationalists with a powerful rhetorical idiom, particularly for parliamentary speeches and pamphlets during the civil war.

Perhaps the most important contribution that Protestantism made to the development of English nationalism, though, was that it transformed literacy into a religious virtue. All members of society were encouraged to read vernacular translations of the Bible and, because literacy was exceptionally widespread in England at the time, only those at the bottom of the social ladder remained unaffected. The fact of sharing a common idiom, however, was secondary to a more significant effect that this had on the population, Greenfeld argues:

the reading of the Bible planted and nurtured among the common people in England a novel sense of human—individual—dignity, which was instantly to become one of their dearest possessions, to be held dearer than life and jealously protected from infringement. This was a momentous development. Not only had it awakened thousands of individuals to sentiments which common people nowhere had experienced before, and gave them a position from which they were to view their social world in a new way, but it opened a new, vast terrain to the possible influence of the national idea and at once immensely broadened the population potentially susceptible to its appeal. For the newly acquired sense of dignity made masses of Englishmen a part of that small circle of new aristocrats and clergymen, the men of new learning and new religion, who were already enchanted by the

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6 "The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France," 346.
7 Nationalism, 52.
idea of the people as an elite, and of themselves as members of such a people. The masses, too, would find in their Englishness the right and guarantee of the new status to which they were elevated by self-respect, and see their individual destinies as linked to the destiny of the nation. In turn, this consciousness of belonging to the English nation, the national consciousness to which the reading of the Bible made common Englishmen so receptive, reinforced the effects of reading and further strengthened the sense of dignity and respect for the individual which resulted from it.8

While Henry VIII was responsible for making England Protestant, this was not the only influence that the House of Tudor had on the emergence of English nationhood. Henry himself, as Kohn explains, “played for English history and nationalism a role similar to that of the absolute kings on the continent” by eliminating the last traces of feudal power, centralizing the state, and strengthening the middle class and the gentry that were his base.9 Mary’s brutal persecution of Protestants after restoring Catholicism as the state religion had the unintended effect of reinforcing an English-Protestant identity, especially among the now displaced new elite, but among the simple men and women who had found dignity through personal religious study as well. Elizabeth appealed to this growing nationalist sentiment and used it to her advantage.

The eventual result of this combination of circumstances—the new social hierarchy, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Tudors—was the English Civil War. Greenfeld recognizes the importance of this event to the disassociation of nationhood from the Crown, but for Kohn it was much more than that. The preceding century had set the stage for English nationhood, he says, but England did not become a nation until after the Civil War. “Whereas Italy and Spain were declining, Germany was devastated economically and intellectually by the

8 Ibid., 54.
long-drawn horror of the Thirty Years War, and the French nation afforded the magnificent spectacle of a stable society on a classical basis,” Kohn explains,

the English people were being deeply stirred by the convulsions of the Revolution. The tendencies of a nascent nationalism which had germinated under the Tudors now broke through in a volcanic eruption. It filled the English people with an entirely new consciousness, a sense that they, the common people of England, were the bearers of history and the builders of destiny at a great turning point from which a new true Reformation was to start. For the first time the authoritarian and aristocratic tradition on which the Church and the State had rested was challenged in the name of the liberty of man. The English Revolution was a synthesis, far-reachingly important, of Calvinist ethics and a new optimistic humanism. Being a Calvinist revolution the new nationalism expressed itself in an identification of the English people with the Israel of the Old Testament.”

France

There was a sense of pre-national, patriotic identity among France’s elite at least as early as the fifteenth century, Greenfeld says, but it was not until the mid-eighteenth that a national consciousness emerged. Though France was inspired by England’s example, she argues, “French nationalism was significantly different from the English. It was an ambivalent, contradictory tradition, created by two discrete developments: the effort of the traditional elite to justify and preserve its privileges, and the effort of the ascending middle classes to alter their situation.”

Like in England, the emergence of nationalism in France started with the redefinition of the country’s social and political hierarchy but, in this case, nationalism was deliberately adopted instead of accidental. As a result, the “conscious desire to become a nation preceded any real change in the condition of the people which would necessitate such a

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10 Ibid., 165-66.
11 Greenfeld, ”The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France,” 353.
redefinition of a collective identity,” leading the French aristocratic and intellectual elite to develop a deep ressentiment toward their more successful English counterparts.¹² Kohn’s account—which, unlike Greenfeld’s, goes beyond the French Revolution—is similar in many respects, but he puts more emphasis on the middle class, and attributes the ambivalence of French nationalism to the conflict between revolutionaries and traditionalists.

“The continental Europe of the seventeenth century and of the first half of the eighteenth,” Kohn explains, “still lived in the prenationalistic age. But in the growth of centralized states, in the secularization of political life, in the rise of individualism with its faith in liberty and its confidence in man’s power, with the acceleration of economic life demanding the loosening of the static forms of traditional organization—the foundations were laid for the rise of nationalism” in France, which was also influenced by the sometimes conflicting models of Antiquity and Anglo-American nationalism.¹³

“In their favorite Latin authors the late-eighteenth-century the French found an idealized republican past of virtue, simplicity, and justice in sharp contrast to the corruption of the royal court and the iniquities of their age the new France saw herself as Rome renascent—republican Rome first, imperial Rome later.”¹⁴ This tradition’s virtues of patriotism and combative spirit, renewed most influentially by Rousseau, were, however, ill-suited to the critical attitude of eighteenth-century individualism.

Greenfeld agrees that the French conception of liberty, under the influence of Rousseauan republicanism, differed significantly from the English, but she attributes this to more than just a self-indulgent infatuation with the Ancients. Since at least the mid-eighteenth century England

¹² Ibid.: 356.
¹³ Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 204.
had been an object of general admiration in France, especially among intellectuals, who held the principles of English nationalism—citizenship and the belief in active participation based on liberty and equality of the members of the nation—in high regard. The original adoption of nationalism in France, however, was not, as it had been in England, “an acknowledgement of a fundamental transformation in social structure, but as a rationalization of a threatened traditional social arrangement.”\textsuperscript{15}

After the death of Louis XIV it became clear that France had lost its pre-eminence in Europe, in part due to Louis’ policies but also because of England’s growing dominance. This fact, Greenfeld argues, “introduced an element of tension into the development of the French national consciousness which had a significant impact on its later character.”\textsuperscript{16} There were two roads back to glory: either introduce liberal reforms modelled after England or degrade the rival power. Intellectuals such as Montesquieu and Voltaire favoured the former, and this was the first approach taken, but the task proved more difficult than expected and Anglophilia gradually gave way to Anglophobia.

“The French aristocratic and intellectual elite in the second half of the eighteenth century,” Greenfeld explains, “found itself in a position which was—from a sociological point of view—a perfect breeding ground for ressentiment,” a term coined by Nietzsche and later developed by Max Scheler, which refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred and the inability to satisfy them. The two necessary conditions for the development of this psychological state are the perception of a fundamental comparability between the subject and the object of envy, and an actual inequality that is insurmountable. France met them both:

\textsuperscript{15} Greenfeld, "The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France," 356.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
Drawn into competition with England by adopting the English national idea as its model and by the desire to regain its glory, France lacked the social conditions necessary for the implementation of this model, thereby making equality with (even less superiority over) England impossible. It was perceived as essentially comparable, equal to England, and at the same time was clearly inferior to it. And the aristocratic-intellectual elite in France—whose members now identified their status with that of France as a whole—was in the position to be personally wounded by the superiority of England and to feel ressentiment generated by the relative position of the country.”

This is important because ressentiment may lead to the “transvaluation of values”; the reinterpretation of the object of envy’s value scale to denigrate its highest values and elevate the resentful party’s strengths to the top.

Early French nationalist thought, Greenfeld argues, was unmistakably shaped by ressentiment, and this had a significant impact on the liberal thought of the period. French liberals, resentful of England’s success, rejected it as a model and reinterpreted the concepts of nation, liberty and equality to have different meanings that were sometimes diametrically opposed to the original. “The most influential of these positions,” she says,

drew predominantly on the ideas of Rousseau and Mably. Through the idea of the indivisible and sovereign general will, the nation was redefined as an autonomous entity, existing above and dominating the wills of its individual members. This, in its turn, changed the meaning of citizenship, which could no longer be understood as the active participation in the formation of the collective policy that presumably expressed the general will. Citizenship became limited to the willingness to carry out the will of the nation. Civic liberty lost much of its meaning, while political liberty, which was emphasized, came to designate the unobstructed realization of the general will.

Consequently, this strain of French nationalism, which Greenfeld calls “elite”, tended towards the collectivist-authoritarian type, emphasizing the position of France as a whole relative to other

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17 Nationalism, 178.
18 “The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France,” 357.
19 Ibid.: 358.
powers rather than the rights of individuals in France, and concentrating on glory of the collective instead of individual liberty.

There was, however, another strain of nationalism in France. Non-elite or ‘bourgeois’ nationalism was inspired by its elite counterpart, but had different motivations. France’s elite pursued nationalism because they needed a new justification for their existence, and thought that service to the nation by improving its standing relative to others would provide it. The rising middle class, by comparison, were unsatisfied with their social status and saw nationalism as a way to improve their lot in life. Faithfully following the English example by defining the nation as a unity of free and equal members was the best opportunity for the middle class to take full political advantage of their newly acquired wealth and education. The enemies of bourgeois nationalism were domestic despotism and status privilege, not another nation, and the best way to improve France’s standing in Europe was to address its own deficiencies by providing liberty and dignity for all. “This nationalism,” Greenfeld contends, “was fundamentally constructive.”

Still, though, even bourgeois French nationalism was essentially different from its English model because the sequence of national development was in some ways the opposite of what had taken place in England:

There, the novel identity only symbolized and finalized the ongoing processes generated and supported by other factors. Nation was a title given to the story. In France, on the other hand, the title existed before the story was written. The French wanted to be a nation before they were one. Even in the case of the middle classes, who were interested in fostering individualism and liberty, the creation of a nation was a condition was a sine qua non for the achievement of such liberal goals. . .It was the first goal to be achieved, and it became the ultimate goal. As a result, in this other current of French nationalism, too, collectivity overshadowed the individual.  

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20 Ibid.: 362.
21 Ibid.: 363.
Kohn puts more emphasis on the role of middle class nationalism than Greenfeld, and is less convinced of its affinity with the English model. “The nationalism that grew up in France under the impulse of the Revolution,” he says,

was not the fruit of a tradition of individual liberty as in the English-speaking countries. It was filled with a spirit of fierce pride and admiration for the hard splendor of power and authority. These revolutionary democrats did not understand liberty in the way that it was understood by Englishmen who agreed to limit their own rights in order to limit those of others. They understood it, as Sorel so well said, in the way of the king of France, who recognized no other right but his own.\(^{22}\)

The bourgeois revolutionaries were steeped in eighteenth-century ideals such as natural law, the social contract, and popular sovereignty, and were just as influenced by Rousseauan republicanism as Greenfeld says elite nationalists were.

For Kohn, the ambivalence of French nationalism was the result of the conflict between this revolutionary middle class and the traditionalist émigré nobles who favoured the restoration of the Catholic monarchy and opposed the rationalist individualism of the Revolution. The strength of the opposing interpretations of nationalism that this division represents has oscillated throughout France’s history but, though traditionalist nationalism has “attracted the masses in the form of authoritarian democracy, it has so far never prevailed for any length of time. The faith in the liberty of the individual, underlying the Declaration of Rights, has so far reasserted itself again and again.”\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\) Kohn, *Prelude to Nation-States*, 11.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 46.
“Contrary to the widely-held opinion,” Greenfeld says, “American nationalism is the second-oldest nationalism in the world. It derives directly from the original English nationalism, beginning as a nationalism, in other words, and the trajectory of its development, as a result, is altogether different from that of all other nationalisms.”24 English settlers in America were already nationals and no longer had to contend with the social stratification of traditional society, putting them in the unique position to fully realise the national ideal. For this reason, Greenfeld argues, the American nation is, in an analytical sense, “an ideal nation: the national element in it is challenged by the fewest number of confluences, it is a purer example of a national community than any other.”25 The distinct character of the American nation was only embryonic during the Revolution, and was not delivered until after the Civil War, but there was never any doubt that American society was a nation. The paradox of proud English nationals seceding from England is only apparent: both Greenfeld and Kohn contend that the Americans revolted because they were free Englishmen who recognized that natural rights were universal, not English. These factors, coupled with a secularized religious tradition inspired by the Puritan Revolution, laid the foundation for the American nation to become the embodiment of eighteenth-century philosophy.

Nationalism in the American colonies before the Revolution was, without question, first English and then British. In fact, Greenfeld explains, national identity in America “preceded not only the formation of the specific American identity (the American sense of uniqueness), but of the institutional framework of the American nation, and even of the national territory, all of

25 Ibid., 22.
which...are conventionally thought of as foundations of nationality.\textsuperscript{26} The subsequent development of a distinct identity did not itself, however, interfere with the loyalty of Americans to the English nation, which was simply one nation with two countries.

The War of Independence seems to contradict this but, as Greenfeld explains, there is no paradox here:

A drive for secession was inherent in the nature of the English nationalism which, furthermore, rendered it legitimate. English national identity, from its earliest days, provided for two types of national loyalty: one was concrete and materialistic, for its referent was concrete reality, materialized in a territory, ways of life, and specific political institutions; and the other, the original one, was idealistic and abstract—this loyalty was to the national values. The idealistic loyalty to national values, which could be and usually was as ardent a patriotism as the more earthly love of country, was by its very nature a stimulus for disaffection and revolt, for the more intense the commitment to the ideals, the more sensitive, the more intolerant, one became to the imperfections in their realization. It was this idealistic patriotism that in the seventeenth century had driven some Englishmen to “removal” and others to rebellion; it was this patriotism that has bred discontent in England ever since. The central English value—Liberty, embedded in reason, and in regard to which all rational Englishmen were equal—was, at least since Milton, defined as “self-government.” Another word for it was “independence.”\textsuperscript{27}

Faced with what they asserted were illegitimate acts by an unrepresentative and unrepentant government, the colonists—good, rational Englishmen who had until then enjoyed the individual dignity and equality that their nationality provided them—exercised their liberty and exited the now unequal union. “The American colonies revolted,” Kohn argues, “not because they were oppressed, but because they were free and their freedom carried the promise of still greater freedom, one unrealizable in the more settled and static conditions of old society but

\textsuperscript{26} Greenfeld, Nationalism, 402.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 412.
beckoning as a possibility in the new continent.”28 Their rights, as Thomas Paine argued in his influential pamphlet *Common Sense*, were natural and universal, not parochially English.

The idealistic nature of American nationalism was particularly apparent in its modified understanding of ‘the constitution’. In England, the constitution referred to the character of a state as it was expressed in its institutions and ways of life, but Americans interpreted it as a formal statement of the fundamental principles of the polity.29 By the time that it was fully ratified, Kohn says, the new American Constitution was

a great step forward on the road to nationhood. The traditionally strong isolationism of the thirteen states had been overcome, a new foundation for peace and security, for economic prosperity and thriving commerce, had been created. An example had been set, not only in the republican form of government but in its federative character, which combined a far-reaching independence of historical, parochial entities with the existence of a strong central authority for common concerns, the number and extent of which would naturally grow with the development of communications and intercourse. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights have remained the unshakeable foundations of the new nation.30

Western settlement and immigration were two other significant factors in the formation of American unity. For its part, settlement in the West provided a new context for American patriotism to develop without the interference of previously established state loyalties. “The emergent communities did not have a sense of their own particularity and did not tend to distinguish between their interests and the interests of the United States as a whole.”31 Immigrant loyalty was even more certain because immigrants came with the purpose of becoming American. “The reasons for the immigrants’ loyalty to America and the process in which it was formed,” Greenfeld argues, “allow one to make an important observation regarding the nature of national

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29 Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, 413.
31 Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, 433.
loyalty in general: the immigrants’ commitment did not derive from the love of country; it derived from the uplifting, dignifying effects of liberty and equality, the exhilarating lure of opportunity, and the enjoyment or even the expectation of greater prosperity.”

Like the West, she says later, “immigration helped to put certain uniquely American qualities into sharper relief. It reinforced and gave a new meaning to the claim that America had a universal mission, and that the American nation itself was a universal nation, the nation of mankind. Its uniqueness was a result of a unique fusion of peoples, all of whom, so it was felt and so it was inscribed in the national consciousness, came hither in search of freedom, for America was the asylum for the oppressed.”

American nationhood was not fully realised, however, until after the Civil War. Despite being fought over states’ rights against a centralizing federal government, Greenfeld says, the War was perceived as a struggle over slavery. The issue for the Northern states was a pragmatic interest in the territorial and political preservation of the American union, not ideals, but, because the Northern cause became identified with the cause of emancipation, its triumph eliminated “the most jarring inconsistency of the American life.” For many Americans, “the Civil War marked the line between the dream of nationality and its realization, which was comparable to the significance and the Constitution for other generations. . .The establishment of the geo-political referent of national loyalty completed the long process which brought into being the American nation as it exists today.”

As Kohn explains, though, the importance of political and economic aspects in the development of American nationhood should not be overemphasised. At its core, American nationalism “has been primarily an ideological nationalism, the embodiment of an idea,

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32 Ibid., 435.
33 Ibid., 437.
34 Ibid., 473.
35 Ibid., 480.
which, though geographically and historically located in the United States, was a universal idea, the most vital and enduring legacy of the eighteenth century.”

Summary

Kohn and Greenfeld argue that nationalism, which began as civic by definition, first emerged in England due to the convergence of several major cultural, social, and political changes. The ideas associated with nationalism were not all new, but the transformation of English society and the need to justify middle class dominance provided the first opportunity in history for those ideas to spread throughout a society and take hold. Protestantism played a particularly important role in this process, but both authors characterise that role as primarily facilitative and, curiously, do not see the thoroughly Protestant nature of English nationalism as a threat to its civic status. England was the only nation for somewhere between one and two hundred years, and all subsequent nationalism is imitative.

The effects of premature imitation were clear in France, Greenfeld says, where nationalism was first adopted by traditional elites in an attempt to justify and preserve their privileges instead of as a result of a change in the social order. Without the social conditions necessary to implement the English model of nationhood, elite nationalism in France grew out of ressentiment and deliberately rejected English nationalism’s emphasis on individual liberty in favour of collective glory. The later bourgeois nationalism adopted by the French middle class was closer to the English model, but still collectivistic because it started with the nation as an aspiration instead of allowing it to develop naturally as in England.

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American nationalism, by contrast, is a direct derivation from the original English nationalism and the purest example of the (civic) national ideal anywhere in the world. English settlers in America were already nationals, and the Revolution was, counter-intuitively, a straightforward expression of English nationality rather than its rejection—in a sense, Kohn and Greenfeld are saying that Americans are ‘more English’ than the English themselves.

2. Nationalism as an ideology

The central premise of the preceding historiography is that nationalism is an ideology. This is a common definition, classically stated by Elie Kedourie in his book *Nationalism* (1960), in which he argues that nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century that “pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states.” The specifics of Kedourie’s argument are contentious, but most scholars agree with him that nationalism is best understood as an ideology, especially when it comes to classification. As Anthony Smith explains, early classifications of nationalism “appear to have been mainly the products of historians of ideas; their primary referent has been, not the movement or group, but the ideology in its various historical and

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37 The term ‘ideology’ itself is not always used, and sometimes it is substituted with ‘doctrine’, but the effect is the same. I use ‘ideology’ here in its neutral sense of set of related ideas that form the basis for a program of political belief and action.

38 Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Fourth edition ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 1. Kedourie’s view of the relationship between nations and nationalism is similar to Dominique Schnapper’s. Discussing the high value that he says nationalism places on diversity, he argues that “This view, applied to politics, drastically alters the idea of the nation. A nation, to the French revolutionaries, mean a number of individuals who have signified their will as to the manner of their government. A nation, on this vastly different theory, becomes a natural division of the human race, endowed by God with its own character, which its citizens must, as a duty, preserve pure and inviolable.” Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 51.
geographical garbs.”

This approach remains dominant, and Smith appears to be the only theorist of civic nationalism who recognizes that nationalism is anything more than an ideology.

In The Idea of Nationalism, for example, Kohn argues that the “process of history can be analyzed as a succession of changes in communal psychology, in the attitude of man toward all manifestations of individual and social life. . . . Nationalism is an idea, an idée-force, which fills man’s brain and heart with new thoughts and new sentiments, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized action.”

This is about as far as most theorists of civic nationalism go in defining nationalism as such.

Greenfeld’s more elaborate position is a bit idiosyncratic, but its greater detail helps to clarify the role of ideology in civic nationalist theories of nationalism.

She begins her book Nationalism by saying that the word will be used “as an umbrella term under which are subsumed the related phenomena of national identity (or nationality) and consciousness, and collectivities based on them—nations; occasionally it is employed to refer to the articulate ideology on which national identity and consciousness rest, though not—unless specified—to the politically activist, xenophobic variety of national patriotism, which it frequently designates.”

This suggests that nationalism as an ideology is of only secondary concern to Greenfeld but, on the same page, she says that the “only foundation of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism

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41 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 3.
is a particular perspective or a style of thought. The idea which lies at the core of nationalism is the idea of the ‘nation.’”

Adopting what she describes as a Weberian perspective, Greenfeld says that social reality is essentially symbolic, social action is meaningfully oriented action, and the meaningful orientations or motivations of social actors should be the central focus of social science. In her later work, she calls this a ‘mentalist’ approach, and says that both Weber and herself are mentalists rather than sociologists because sociology is based on Marxist historical materialism. The mentalist approach, she explains, differs from much of the current literature on nationalism for two reasons: it regards modernity as a consequence of nationalism instead of the other way around, and it is neither ‘structuralist’ nor ‘idealist’ because it rejects the reification of both structures and ideas and recognizes the significance of human agency.

The conventional modernist account of nationalism, Greenfeld says, is based on a materialist conception of social reality that explains culture (‘ideal phenomena’) as the consequence of economic or political structures, a common language, or a shared history (‘real factors’). Economic and political structures have received the most attention and, as a result, this

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42 Ibid., 3-4. She makes a similar argument in an later article on American nationalism: “This distinctiveness, the specificity of nationalism, as I have argued on numerous occasions, is strictly conceptual. The only foundation of nationalism in general, the only factor without which no nationalism is possible, is the presence of a certain idea—the idea of the “nation.” ” American Nationalism,” 19.


44 For Greenfeld, structuralism is equivalent to materialism, and materialism means Marxist historical materialism. This is a narrow, tendentious interpretation of these terms and the concepts that they represent.
‘materialist conception’ of nationalism takes on a structuralist form. Greenfeld says that she has no problem with the importance of structures as such, and that they play an important role in her analysis of nationalism, but structuralism reifies structures as objective social forces that are independent from individuals, and renders individual behaviour merely epiphenomenal.

She provides less detail about ‘idealism’ and does not name any adherents, but says that it “regards ideas rather than structures as the moving forces in history. According to it, ideas beget ideas, and this symbolic generation accounts for the phenomenon of social change. Like reified structures, ideas act through and move individuals, seen as vehicles or representatives of clusters of ideas.”

The best alternative to these deficient perspectives, Greenfeld argues, is to focus on human agency:

Both ideas and social structures are only operationalized in men. Neither structural constraints nor ideas can beget other structural constraints and ideas. What they can do is produce different states of mind in the individuals within their sphere of influence. These states of mind are rationalized and, if rationalized creatively, may result in new interpretations of reality. These interpretations, in turn, affect structural conditions, which then can produce other states of mind at the same time as they directly affect states of mind, and the infinitely complex process is endlessly and unpredictably perpetuated.”

In short, the beliefs and values of individual actors form their motivations. These motivations lead to social action, which then creates structures. The causal direction can, however, be reversed, and the same phenomenon can, at different points in its development, be either a cause or an effect in the social process.

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45 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 497, n. 16.
46 Ibid., 19.
Based on these premises, Greenfeld describes nationality as a symbolically constructed psychological identity. Such generalized identities (cultures) are powerful because they define a person’s position in his or her social world, provide both personal and public expectations that shape individual action, and reflect the image of the social order (structure). Religious, estate, and caste identities performed this function in pre-modern societies.

A generalized identity only changes when the image of the social order changes as well. There are two ways that this can happen: either a genuine structural change occurs, or the desire to change an order that is resistant to change emerges. “In neither case,” she explains, “does the emergent image simply mirror the transformations already ongoing: there is always a discrepancy between the image of reality and reality. Whether or not inspired and triggered by them, it represents a blueprint of a new order (a model) and, by motivating actions of individuals harboring it, causes further transformations and gradually modifies social structure in accordance with its tenets.”

These assumptions, Greenfeld argues, allow for the causal primacy of ideas without denying causality to structures, and are consistent with the historical development of nationalism, which can be divided into three analytically distinct stages: structural, cultural, and psychological. The initial adoption of a national identity is always precipitated by a change in the position of influential social groups. This structural change undermines the traditional cultural self-understanding of the affected groups and creates an identity crisis (anomie). The idea of the nation and a national identity are adopted to solve this crisis. Finally, in cases where national identity is accompanied by psychological ressentiment, the character of that identity emphasises indigenous and new ideas that are hostile to the original principles of nationalism.

\[48\] Ibid., 21.
This complex perspective is clearly special to Greenfeld in many ways, but it effectively parses out the basic role of ideology in the general civic nationalist theory of nationalism in a way that other authors leave implicit. With the exception of Anthony Smith, all prominent theorists of civic nationalism treat nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon, and nationality as the successful diffusion of a particular nationalist ideology throughout a given territory. This diffusion is contingent on the presence of certain social factors, but nations and nationalism themselves belong strictly to the realm of ideas.

3. Nationalism beyond ideology

Some scholars, however, are not convinced that nationalism is just an ideology. In fact, and in spite of common misinterpretations to the contrary, two of the most influential theorists of nationalism, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, persuasively argue that nationalist ideology is only one component of a more complex phenomenon or set of phenomena.

In addition to nationalist ideology, Anthony Smith explains, the term ‘nationalism’ can also signify the process of forming and maintaining nations and nation-states, a national consciousness or sentiment, a language or symbolism of the nation, or a social and political movement. In his early book *Theories of Nationalism*, he says that it is inadequate to define nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon because nationalist ideology suffers from being too remote from the sphere of action, if it is chosen as the sole unit of analysis in isolation from the movement which is its expression and vehicle. The main argument against isolating the ideology and taking it as the main referent, is that to do so risks attaching too much weight to the statements

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and declarations of a tiny minority of intellectuals in the generation of that enthusiasm for nationalism in far wider circles that forms the focus of our concern. It also entails operating in the confined conceptual framework which aims to establish causal priority for ideal and material factors.”

Kohn’s typology, for instance, makes a reasonable distinction between ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ versions of nationalist ideology, but the distinction, Smith says, “becomes less acceptable when it goes on to use these versions to provide the basis for a typology of causes. It assumes a necessary correlation between types of social structure and philosophical distinctions, whereas the evidence points to a far more complex relationship.” Smith’s own preference is to combine ideology and movement, while recognizing that they are separable, and “define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.”

It is not clear, however, that this definition avoids the problems associated with treating nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon. In another discussion of Kohn’s dichotomy, this time in National Identity, Smith says that “Civic and territorial models of the nation tend to produce certain kinds of nationalist movements: ‘anti-colonial’ movements before independence has been attained and ‘integration’ movements after independence.” If a combination of ideological model and sovereign status is sufficient to determine the route that nationalist movements will follow, though, then they seem to be little more than empty vessels to be filled with nationalist ideology. Eric Kaufmann and Oliver Zimmer argue that Smith’s recent work has led to a clearer differentiation between “the formation of nations, national movements and nation-states in the long historical durée. . .and the construction and reconstruction of nationalist

50 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 208.
51 Ibid., 197.
52 National Identity, 73. Emphasis in the original. This definition, he says, also “embodies elements from both the ideology and the language-cum-symbolism of the nation, with references to wider sentiments and aspirations.”
53 Ibid., 82.
arguments along ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ lines.” This may be the case, but I think that these things are still more intertwined for Smith than either his former students suggest or the logic of his theory requires, and I will return to this issue shortly.

Polysemy

For the moment, though, the important point about Smith’s argument is that he explicitly recognizes that the term ‘nationalism’ represents more than just nationalist ideology; in fact, he identifies five distinct meanings. This is possible because nationalism is what linguists call a ‘polyseme’: a single word with one spelling and pronunciation but multiple different—though etymologically and therefore semantically related—meanings. Words with the suffix ‘-ism’ can be particularly ambiguous.

As H.M. Höpfl explains, ‘-ism’ derives from the Greek -ismos or -isma, usually employed to form action nouns from verbs (‘baptism’, for example). It passed into other European languages through the Romans, and continued to indicate action, a course or habit of

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55 According to The Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar, “Many English words have multiple meanings, which are all uses of the same word that have grown apart over time. . .Theoretically, a polyseme, with meanings which are all ultimately related, is distinguished from a set of homonyms, which are different words (with different meanings) which have all come to have the same form.” Polyseme, in The Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar, ed. Sylvia Chalker and Edmund Weiner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a general and detailed overview, see Yael Ravin and Claudia Leacock, “Polysemy: An Overview,” in Polysemy: Theoretical and Computational Approaches, ed. Yael Ravin and Claudia Leacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Fred Riggs, the only other author that I know of who has explicitly described nationalism as a polyseme, argues that the main reason that polysemy is a pervasive problem in social science is that its practitioners are reluctant to accept neologisms. There is some truth to this, but I think that the case of terms like nationalism, which originated in political discourse, is more complicated than his explanation suggests. Fred Riggs, “Social Science Terminology: Basic Problems and Proposed Solutions,” in Terminology: Applications in Interdisciplinary Communication, ed. Helmi B. Sonneveld and Kurt L. Loenin (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1993).
acting, or the result of an action until the sixteenth century. By the mid-1500s, the suffix also became “a new way to refer to theological or religious positions considered heretical, and also to refer to the doctrines of various philosophical schools.” Its usually derogatory connotation faded in the nineteenth century, but the eruption of new -isms around that time still initially designated “the whole phenomenon of a minority conspicuous because of its heterodoxy in doctrine and singularity in conduct.” The obvious next move in polemic, however, is for the heterodox group to describe their opponents in similar terms, and “once the habit of employing -isms had become established, it is common to find people inventing a name to describe their own position along with one to designate their opponents, or indeed to adopt the name first applied to them by those opponents. And thus the political world comes to be demarcated into -isms.”

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that -ism is “simply a convenient suffix to denote a doctrine,” Höpfl cautions. “For -isms do not simply designate anything whatever. Indeed the range of possible meanings intimated by a term in -isms is enormous and undiscriminating.” Beginning in the nineteenth century, he says, the suffix -ism could also denote agents and causes, and it developed the same connotations and semantic capacities as the term ‘system’, which “has from Greek times been a specialized academic term to denote a coherent, articulated complex of any kind, and then derivatively an orderly exposition or theory of some subject.” In the eighteenth century terms such as ‘political system’, ‘feudal system’,

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57 Ibid.: 7. A striking feature of these new -isms, Höpfl says, is that “They all seem to emerge out of a rather unusual context, which might perhaps best be described as educated political polemic. This is a kind of political discourse which is by no means universal, for it conducted not by professional politicians, nor by writers in their service, but by intellectuals. And what the discourse of intellectuals presupposes is that political activity ought to be construed as the conflict of doctrines and that the right doctrine is the key to right political conduct; in other words that the qualification for political activity is intellect.” Höpfl, “Isms,” 8.
and ‘mercantile system’ were commonplace, and “by the nineteenth century, ‘system’ might denote either a practice, or a ‘concrete system’—that is, a system deemed to exist in the world—or a phenomenon of some complexity, or a doctrine. It had therefore precisely the same range of connotations as -isms, and thus ‘the x-ist system’ and ‘x-ism’ came to be alternative ways of saying the same thing.”

The term ‘capitalism’ is a good example. “It almost never means a doctrine or set of beliefs,” Höpfl says;

indeed theorists of ‘capitalism’ commonly emphasize that doctrines are an epiphenomenon of capitalism which can either dispense with them or alternatively generate them ad libitum. Equally ‘capitalism’ almost never has as its focal meaning ‘conduct characteristic of capitalists’ or the ‘manner of living of capitalists’; it means precisely the ‘system’ within which capitalists operate, and which determines their conduct.61

This refers to a Marxist conception of capitalism, but the duality of doctrine and system is also clearly present in less particular understandings of the term.

Nationalism as a system of culture

‘Nationalism’ presents a similar case. Like ‘capitalism’, it refers not just to a doctrine or ideology, but also to a way of organizing society. In fact, a conception of nationalism as what has been describe as a ‘cultural system’ is a key component of contemporary nationalism studies,

60 Ibid.: 10. “It seems,” he continues, “that in this assimilation, the conception of a whole made up of interacting parts (which is inherent in the idea of a mechanical system) was communicated to -isms, just as the idea of agency or capacity of being an agent, already implicit in the Greco-Roman use of -isms, was communicated to the idea of a system, a kind of entity of which it had previously been possible to predicate only existence, functioning, possession of interacting components, and other intransitive characteristics.”
61 Ibid.: 11.
despite the ubiquity of research focusing on nationalist ideology. The clearest evidence of this is found in the influential work of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.\textsuperscript{62}

Though Gellner opens his famous book \textit{Nations and Nationalism} with the declaration that nationalism “is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,” he rejects the idea that the development of any particular nationalist ideology is an important constitutive component of nationalism itself. The precise doctrines of nationalist ideologues, he argues,

are hardly worth analysing. We seem to be in the presence of a phenomenon which springs directly and inevitably from basic changes in our shared social condition, from changes in the overall relation between society, culture and polity. The precise appearance and local form of this phenomenon no doubt depends a very great deal on local circumstances which deserve study; but I doubt whether the nuances of nationalist \textit{doctrine} played much part in modifying those circumstances.\textsuperscript{63}

Gellner’s alternative explanation describes nationalism as both an effect of and a functional prerequisite for industrial society, taking the emphasis off the influence of ideas and focusing instead on the social relations that generate, transmit and support them. It is not the case “that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.”\textsuperscript{64}

Agrarian society, Gellner explains, is both stratified and segmented. A small minority of ruling classes (clerical, military, administrative, and sometimes commercial) enforce a rigid cultural separation from the majority of the population who are agricultural producers (peasants, themselves divided into laterally insulated communities). Literacy is generally limited to clerics,

\textsuperscript{62} Gellner and Anderson are easily the most frequently cited authors in the field. The following discussion of their work is adapted from the “Modernism” section of Stephen J. Larin, “Conceptual Debates in Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration,” in \textit{The International Studies Encyclopedia}, ed. Robert Denemark (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).


\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 39.
and the organization of political units varies considerably, ranging from city-states to empires. The central fact about such a society is that “almost everything in it militates against the definition of political units in terms of cultural boundaries.”

Industrial society is radically different. Unlike a traditional social order, where knowledge and culture are passed on through self-perpetuating local relationships, the high productivity and perpetual growth associated with industrialism require a more complex division of labor on a much larger scale. The most efficient means of achieving this is a centralized education system that provides a standard skill set to a consequently literate and mobile workforce that can effectively interact with and understand people whom they do not know. This process, which Gellner calls ‘exo-socialization’ (on the analogy of exogamy), is only possible with the resources and capacity of the modern state, and is characterized by the universalization of the ‘high culture’ (literate idioms and styles of communication) previously associated with the clerical class. In modern society, everyone is a cleric, and culture “is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimum shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce.”

Nationalism, accordingly, should be understood as first and foremost the process through which nationhood is made. It is

the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with

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65 Ibid., 11.
66 Ibid., 38.
mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.67

Nationalism is not explicable as either the ‘awakening’ of long dormant nations-in-waiting or the result of a world-historical intellectual error, Gellner insists. It is, “on the contrary, the crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world.” 68

Benedict Anderson’s approach to nationalism similarly focuses on nationalism as a cultural system rather than an ideology. “Part of the difficulty” in analyzing nationalism, he says, “is that one tends unconsciously to hypostasize the existence of Nationalism with-a-big-N (rather as one might Age-with-a-capital-A) and then to classify ‘it’ as an ideology. . . It would, I think, make things easier if one treated it as if it belonged with ‘kinship’ and ‘religion’, rather than with ‘liberalism’ or ‘fascism’.” 69

Anderson’s definition of the nation as an ‘imagined community’ is probably more frequently cited than any other. The nation, he says, is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign:

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. . . The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. . . It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. . . Finally, it is imagined

67 Ibid., 57.
68 Ibid., 49.
as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.70

Unlike authors such as Gellner or Eric Hobsbawm, however, Anderson does not think of nations as ‘invented’—‘imagined’ is not the same thing as ‘imaginary’, so to speak.71 “In fact,” he explains, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even those) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”72 In the case of nations, the imagined community is dependent on systems of mass, standardized communication, which Anderson thinks is best exemplified by the development of print capitalism in vernacular languages.

4. *Methodological problems*

Even if they were to accept that nationalism is more than an ideology, however, there are several broadly methodological problems with the way that theorists of civic nationalism characterize ideology and its effects. These can be divided into two sets: one focused on ideology as such, and the other on units of analysis.

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70 Ibid., 6-7.
4.1. Ideology

There are at least four inter-related and important methodological problems with the way that most civic nationalists treat ideology itself. First, the intellectual history of an idea is not necessarily the history of the phenomenon that it addresses (I will call this ‘intellectualism’); second, texts written by intellectuals and other elites, no matter how famous, do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of the masses (‘diffusion’); third, even if elite ideas are dispersed throughout an entire population, there is no guarantee that they will be understood, interpreted, or enacted as their authors intended (‘interpretation’); and finally, even if a person fully understands a particular ideology, that is not a sufficient condition for determining their beliefs or behaviour, and it may not affect them at all (‘indifference’).

In a sense, the last three problems are derived from the first, as the following passage from David Bell’s review of historical studies of French nationalism (including Greenfeld’s) usefully illustrates. Such studies, he says

most often begin (and sometimes end, as well) with an interrogation of a narrow range of suspects: appropriate articles in the Encyclopédie and various dictionaries, key works of the philosophes, famous political pamphlets. Too often this approach has led historians into the trap of simply stringing together isolated citations from large, complex works without much reference to genre, literary convention, political language, vocabulary shifts, the circumstances of composition, or the author’s social and institutional status. The result has been centuries-long narratives of “national identity” which are in fact mostly spurious. Yet even when conducted properly, the history of the concept of the nation remains something very different from the history of nationalism and national identity. The latter project requires investigation not simply into a national “idea,” but into how the changing and contested parameters of national identity fit into broader patterns of social, cultural, and political change. If it takes canonical sources into account, it must always stop to ask what resonance and reception they had at the time and how they played off against other works. With what justification can we accept an author’s claims to speak for particular social,
political, or cultural groups? How were conceptions of the nation contested by such groups? Too often these questions are not even posed.\footnote{David A. Bell, "Recent Works on Early Modern French National Identity," \textit{The Journal of Modern History} 68 (1996): 92.}

With these questions in mind, I will address each of the four problems in turn.

\textit{Intellectualism}

Both Kohn and Greenfeld mistake the history of the concept of nationalism for that of the phenomenon itself, basing their accounts on the writing of authors such as Milton, Rousseau, and Paine (key works of philosophers and famous political pamphlets, as Bell puts it), and it is common for other theorists of civic nationalism to follow their lead. Given that both authors believe that nationalism is fundamentally an \textit{idea}, this is not surprising, but Greenfeld, at least, seems to recognize in principle that even if it is exclusively ideational, intellectual history cannot provide an adequate explanation of nationalism on its own.

Her mentalist approach, she says, is influenced by the work of historian Marc Bloch, one of the founders of the French \textit{Annales} school of historiography that emphasises the \textit{‘histoire des mentalités’}.\footnote{Greenfeld and Malczewski, "Politics as a Cultural Phenomenon," 408. Indeed, it seems likely that Greenfeld had \textit{mentalités} in mind when she named here approach ‘mentalism’. The \textit{Annales} school takes its name from the journal \textit{Annales d'histoire économique et sociale}. The term ‘\textit{mentalités}’ was first used in the relevant sense by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in his influential book \textit{Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures} (1910), but the evolutionary teleology of his work is not inherent in the \textit{mentalités} approach. For background on the \textit{Annales} school and the study of \textit{mentalités}, see Patrick H. Hutton, "The History of Mentalities: The New Map of Cultural History," \textit{History and Theory} 20, no. 3 (1981); Peter Burke, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities," \textit{History of European Ideas} 7, no. 5 (1986); Michael Bentley, \textit{Modern Historiography: An Introduction} (London: Routledge, 1999).} Like her, Greenfeld explains, Bloch believed that good social science must focus on the human mind, which “is historically and culturally constituted, and, while being the only
active element in history and culture, is always defined by its place within this larger process. It is this processural (as opposed to structural) nature of both culture and the mind, the all-important fact that they occur in time, as well as their tight interdependence, that Bloch’s notable definition of history as ‘the science...of men in time’ captures.”

This stated influence is not born out in practice, however. The *mentalités* that interest Bloch and like-minded historians are the attitudes of ordinary people toward everyday life. As Peter Burke explains, the history of *mentalités* has three distinctive features:

In the first place, a stress on collective attitudes rather than individual ones. Secondly, an emphasis on unspoken or unconscious assumptions, on perception, on the workings of ‘practical reason’, or ‘everyday thought’ as well as on conscious thoughts or elaborated theories. And finally, a concern with the structure of beliefs as well as their content, with categories, with metaphors and symbols, with how people think as well as what they think.

Unlike intellectual history and the traditional ‘history of ideas’, this approach shifts attention away from elites to the common people and focuses on relatively unstructured thought instead of ideology. Greenfeld and Kohn imply that their histories reflect the thoughts, dispositions, and lives of ordinary people, but the reality is that their characterization of civic nationalism is almost exclusively derived from the writing of a narrow set of intellectuals (which, as I argue in the next chapter, are often misrepresented in the first place). They share Bell’s concern with how nationalism fits into broader patterns of social, cultural, and political change, but their answer,

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75 Greenfeld and Malczewski, "Politics as a Cultural Phenomenon,” 411.
that some such changes inspired nationalism and provided the conditions for its successes, is still addressed from an elite perspective.

Diffusion

The often sharp differences between elite and mass beliefs is the point of departure for the entire ‘political behaviour’ field of political science. In a highly influential article titled “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”, for example, Philip Converse argues that there are important and predictable differences between elite and mass belief systems, most notably a sharp drop in ideological consistency below the elite strata of society.

Using the classic liberal–conservative ideological continuum to test the consistency of the American political beliefs, Converse found that the voting public could be divided into five different stratified categories which he calls ‘levels of conceptualization’: (1) ideologues; (2)

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78 I thank Scott Matthews for first bringing this to my attention. In this context, ‘political behaviour’ usually refers to the behaviour of political actors such as voters, lobbyists, and politicians. Most behaviouralist consider themselves empiricists and often use large-n quantitative methods in their research. For a recent overview of this field, see Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

near-ideologues; (3) ‘group interest’; (4) ‘nature of the times’; and (5) no issue content.\textsuperscript{80} The first two categories include those respondents who either consistently relied on ideological principles to evaluate political issues, or mentioned such principles but were inconsistent in their application. The third category includes those respondents who did not rely on ideology to determine their positions, and instead evaluated parties and candidates based on their expected treatment of different social groups.\textsuperscript{81} Converse describes the fourth level as a residual category for respondents who invoked some policy considerations but did not fit into the other categories: those who praised or blamed parties or candidates for the ‘nature of the times’ (\textit{e.g.} war or peace, prosperity or depression), and those who felt personal gratitude or indignation toward a party or candidate for a particular policy. The final category is for respondents whose evaluations had no ideological character whatsoever.

Based on the distribution of his results within these categories, Converse argues that at the time of his study ideology did not play an active role in the political opinions of nearly 85\% of American citizens.\textsuperscript{82} Understanding of common political ideologies fades out almost before passing the percentage of the population that has completed standard college training, and the objects that are central in a belief system undergoes systematic change. These objects shift from remote, generic, and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or “close to home.” Where potential political objects are concerned, this progression tends to be from abstract, “ideological” principles to the more

\textsuperscript{80} Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems.” 218.

\textsuperscript{81} This category is considered non-ideological, Converse says, because “These people have a clear image of politics as an arena of group interests and, provided that they have been properly advised on where their own group interests lie, they are relatively likely to follow such advice. Unless an issue directly concerns their grouping in an obviously rewarding or punishing way, however, they lack the contextual grasp of the system to recognize how they should respond to it without being told by elites who hold their confidence.” He calls this ‘ideology by proxy’. Ibid., 216.

\textsuperscript{82} The estimated proportion of voters in each category, based on the proportion of the total sample, are as follows: (1) 3.5\%; (2) 12\%; (3) 45\%; (4) 22\%; (5) 17.5\%. Ibid., 218. As Stephen Bennett explains, later research supports the general consistency of these findings: “Low levels of political information among the mass public have been observed again and again since Converse’s 1964 study.” Stephen Earl Bennett, "Democratic Competence, before Converse and After,” Critical Review 18, no. 1-3 (2006): 120.
obviously recognizable social groupings or charismatic leaders and finally to such objects of immediate experience as family, job, and immediate associates.\textsuperscript{83}

To explain this, Converse says, we need to understand ideological ‘constraint’ (by which he means consistency, interrelatedness, or interdependence), which has three different sources: logical, psychological, and social.\textsuperscript{84} Logical constraint includes things such as the principle of contradiction (mutually contradictory propositions cannot both be true and cannot both be false) but, Converse argues, “few belief systems of any range at all depend for their constraint upon logic in this classical sense.”\textsuperscript{85} Psychological constraint, on the other hand, is the experience of ideologies as logically constrained clusters of ideas. “Often such constraint is quasi-logically argued on the basis of an appeal to some superordinate value or posture toward man and society,” he says, “involving premises about the nature of social justice, social change, ‘natural law,’ and the like. Thus a few crowning postures. . .serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole.”\textsuperscript{86}

The most important source of ideological constraint, however, is social, and it comes in two forms. First, certain perspectives tend to coincide and, Converse argues, this coincidence “has obvious roots in the configuration of interests and information that characterize particular niches in the social structure.” In other words, people who share similar interests or experiences tend to have similar beliefs. This type of constraint is closest to the classic meaning of the term ‘ideology’, he says, because beliefs emerge due to a particular social relationship but are justified

\textsuperscript{83} Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," 213.
\textsuperscript{84} Converse also divides constraint into two types: static and dynamic. Static constraint is “the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes.” Dynamic constraint, on the other hand, is the probability that a change in one opinion would psychologically require an individual to modify other beliefs. Ibid., 207.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 210.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 211.
according to “more abstract and quasi-logical reasons developed from a coherent world view.”

The second source of social constraint, diffusion, has two dimensions:

First, the shaping of belief systems of any range into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of creative synthesis characteristic of only a miniscule proportion of any population. Second, to the extent that multiple idea-elements of a belief system are socially diffused from such creative sources, they tend to be diffused in “packages,” which consumers come to see as “natural” wholes, for they are presented in such terms (“If you believe this, then you will also believe that, for it follows in such-and-such ways”).

Accordingly, there are two different types of information that are transmitted: ‘what goes with what’, and ‘why’. It is easy to know that two ideas go together without understanding why. For example, Converse says, most Americans know that “Communists are atheists”, but a much smaller proportion are likely to be able to explain why that is the case. This kind of “perceived correlation would for most people represent nothing more than a fact of existence, with the same status as the fact that oranges are orange and most apples are red.” The other kind of information, the ‘why’ that he calls ‘contextual knowledge’, is more complex and abstract, and consequently more difficult to successfully diffuse.

Converse’s core argument, then, is that ideological consistency sharply declines below the elite strata of society, mainly because of barriers to diffusion. The “ordering of individuals on this vertical information scale,” he says, “is largely due to differences in education, but it is strongly modified as well by different specialized interests and tastes that individuals have.

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87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 212.
90 The term ‘contextual knowledge’ is borrowed from Anthony Downs’ *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957).
acquired over time (one for politics, another for religious activity, another for fishing, and so forth).”

Mass publics simply do not share the same belief systems as elites:

The broad contours of elite decisions over time can depend in a vital way upon currents in what is loosely called ‘the history of ideas.’ These decisions in turn have effects upon the mass of more common citizens. But, of any direct participation in this history of ideas and the behavior it shapes, the mass is remarkably innocent. . .it is likely that an adequate mapping of a society (or, for that matter, the world) would provide a jumbled cluster of pyramids or a mountain range, with sharp delineation and differentiation in beliefs from elite apex to elite apex but with the mass bases of the pyramids overlapping in such profusion that it would be impossible to decide where one pyramid ended and another began.  

Diffusion of nationalist ideology

The diffusion of specifically nationalist ideology from elites to the masses is a long-standing issue in the study of nationalism. Converse himself recognized the relevance of his research to this question, explaining that because the “nation as a bounded, integral group object is difficult to experience in any direct way, and its psychological existence for the individual depends upon the social transmission of certain kinds of information,” it is possible “that decades or even centuries after the literati have come to take a nation concept for granted, there may be substantial proportions of the member population who have never heard of such a thing.” He based this argument on a brief passage in Florian Znaniecki’s book Modern Nationalities, but Walter Sulzbach had already warned a decade before Znaniecki that a “history of national consciousness should not, like a history of philosophy, simply describe the thought of a limited

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92 Ibid., 255-56.
93 Ibid., 237.
number of eminent men without regard to the extent of their following. As in the histories of
religions, we need to know what response the masses have given to different doctrines.”

The most influential discussion of this issue, however, is the opaquely named ‘When is a
nation?’ debate between Walker Connor and Anthony Smith. In his initial article, Connor says
that too little attention has been paid to when a ‘developing’ nation comes into being. Most
nations, he argues, emerged no earlier than the end of the nineteenth-century, much later than the
dates customarily assigned. The most significant reason for this is that “national consciousness is
a mass not élite phenomenon, and the masses, until quite recently semi- or totally illiterate, were
quite mute with regard to their sense of group identity(ies).” Relying on the musings of elites to
determine the pervasiveness of national consciousness is highly suspect, he argues, especially
given that until quite recently many elites did not even consider the masses to be part of their
nation, as evidenced by exclusion of large sections of the populace from the political process.

Smith disagrees. “Leaving aside the question of the linkage between the nation and
democracy, and participation and voting,” he says, “can we accept the postulate that nationalism
and the nation are mass phenomena?” Nationalist ideology, he concedes, appeals to ‘the people’,
but the criteria for membership in the people—which tend to change over long periods—are

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94 Florian Znaniecki, Modern Nationalities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), 81-82; Walter Sulzbach,
95 The debate began with a short article titled “When is a nation?” published by Connor in 1990, though Umut
Özkirimli has characterised the title as “the central organizing question of the contemporary theoretical debate on
nationalism.” A related article (“From Tribe to Nation?”), written at the same time, is reproduced in Connor’s book
Ethnonationalism. In 2002 Smith published one critique under the same title, and another titled “Dating the nation”,
to which Connor responded in 2004. Other authors have also addressed the issue. An edited collection was published in
2005 based on an Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism conference titled “When is the nation?”
Walker Connor, “When Is a Nation?”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 13, no. 1 (1990); Ethnonationalism: The Quest for
7, no. 2 (2002); “Dating the Nation,” in Ethnonationalism and the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the
Study of Nationalism, ed. Daniele Conversi (London: Routledge, 2004); Walker Connor, “The Timelessness of
Nations,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 1/2 (2004); Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac, eds., When Is the Nation?
Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2005); Umut Özkirimli, Theories of
96 Connor, “When Is a Nation?,” 92.
97 Ibid.: 97-98.
often exclusive. “In earlier ages, they may include only upper and middle class adult males, yet these members may possess intense national awareness. On the other hand, we may find cases where all the residents within the nation’s territory, including newcomers, are treated as members, but they are loosely integrated and display little awareness of belonging to a nation.” Inclusivity is neither the defining characteristic of nationhood nor the determinant of its legitimacy and, in fact, typically the nation is not a mass phenomenon, Smith argues.98

In a recent article co-authored with Nicolas Prevelakis, Greenfeld takes a similar position:

It should also be noted that this essay has only dealt with the formation of ethnic and national identities, and barely touched the question of their spread to the entire population defined as the nation, which is typically (though not always) done through various state mechanisms, the most important of which is the education system. In many cases, it may take up to three generations for the national idea to become the form of consciousness of the entire population. And even though nationalism is the dominant form of consciousness today, there is no doubt that, in many communities defined—and officially recognized—as nations, large parts of the populations still rely, for their understanding of the world and the guidance of their actions, on prenational—especially religious—worldviews.99

What is striking, however, is that this interpretation of nationalism is plausible for anyone but a civic nationalist. Civic nationhood is by definition a mass phenomenon which requires the political enfranchisement of everyone subject to the authority of the state that represents it. Smith

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98 Smith, "When Is a Nation?" 10. “Massimo d’Azeglio’s celebrated remark: ‘We have made Italy, now we must make Italians’,” for example, “simply recognised the absence of a ‘mass nation’ in the Italian peninsula. But it also implicitly recognised the physical, symbolic and political reality of ‘Italy’. Hence, one could argue that a nation of Italy already existed, but it was not (yet) a mass nation—some would say, it is still not a mass nation.”

99 Liah Greenfeld and Nicolas Prevelakis, "The Formation of Ethnic and National Identities," in The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert Denemark (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). She also ends another recent article, co-authored with Jonathan Eastwood, by saying that “In many cases, such as much of Latin America in the early nineteenth century, nationalism, after being imported, came to dominate elite political discourse relatively quickly and yet did not spread to the mass of the population for some time. Logically, it is apparent that, given that nationalism is fundamentally an idea, it enters a society one mind at a time. Is there a critical threshold beyond which we ought to take a certain degree of national sentiment or self-identification to constitute a nation? If not, what sort of a ‘thing’ do we take a nation to be?” She leaves the question unanswered. Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan R. Eastwood, "Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," in The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization, ed. Thomas Janoski, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 265.
balks at this “modernist” definition of the nation, saying it entails that “no nation could be said to exist prior to the early twentieth century, since in the vast majority of cases women were not enfranchised until after the First World War. But such a radical modernism, besides forcing us to rewrite the very terms of European and American histories, conflates a sense of belonging with political participation and enfranchisement.” Yet this is exactly what civic nationalism does, and Smith’s protest reflects the distance of his own ethno-symbolic approach from other theories that incorporate civic nationalism more than anything else.

**Interpretation and indifference**

Reading the literature on ideological diffusion, it is easy to get the impression that bridging the gap between elite and mass beliefs is simply a matter of extending socialization through more effective standard education and mass media. Ideological diffusion, however, is not so straightforward. Even if everyone receives the message, it is still interpreted by its recipients, and there is no guarantee that it will be interpreted as intended—or that the recipients will care about the message at all.

As intellectual historian Keith Baker explains, for example,

Books are not mere objects; nor are ideas isolated units. Texts, if read, are understood and hence reinterpreted by their readers in con-texts that may transform their significance; ideas, if received, take on meaning only in relation to

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100 Anthony D. Smith, “The Genealogy of Nations: An Ethno-Symbolic Approach,” in *When Is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, ed. Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac (London: Routledge, 2005), 96. In his response to Smith, Connor says that he is interested in the *right* to and not the *level* of participation, and that he did not address the matter of female suffrage in his initial article. “It was not germane to the specific context,” he says, “because the right of women to vote was denied throughout the nineteenth century to all women; had women of the aristocracy and gentry been favored in this regard, it would have been germane.” Connor, “The Timelessness of Nations,” 43-44.
others in the set of ideas into which they are incorporated. Thus it is important to insist upon the distinction between examining the circulation of ideas and understanding their meaning to social actors, and to avoid treating ideas as if they were causal, individual agents of motivation and determination.\textsuperscript{101}

The same holds true for other systems of mass communication and, in fact, distortion may be more likely in this case because the information is at least once removed from its textual source.

Converse recognizes the importance of the context of reception when he talks about group interest and the separation of ‘what goes with what’ from ‘why’ as information moves down the social strata. In fact, he argues that the plurality (45\%) of the mass public, and especially those who are most politically involved, make their political decisions based on the perceived interests of their social group rather than any abstract consideration.\textsuperscript{102} As John Zaller explains, “The psychological literature on opinion change lends great support to the notion that individuals typically fail to reason for themselves about the persuasive communications they encounter. Instead, people rely on cues about the ‘source’ of a message in deciding what to think of it.”\textsuperscript{103} The most common source of such cues is the leadership of different social groups, leading to the phenomenon that Converse called ‘ideology by proxy’.\textsuperscript{104} “In short,” Donald Kinder says, “ostensibly ideological identification need not have genuinely ideological underpinnings, just as increases in the use of ideological vocabulary need not entail increases in ideological thinking. No doubt for some Americans, ideological identifications do summarize a


\textsuperscript{102} Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," 234-36. The figure is from Table I on page 218.


\textsuperscript{104} Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," 216.
general political stance: for government intervention or free enterprise; for social change or stability. But not for most.\textsuperscript{105}

Finally, there is the straightforward point that even those recipients who fully understand an ideology may reject it. As the earlier quote from Baker suggests, the mere diffusion of an ideology can influence thought and action, but it does not determine them.

4.2 Units of analysis

The second important methodological problem with treating nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon is that it tends to elide the distinction between different units of analysis. Nationhood and national identity, for example, are often described as though they are simply epiphenomenal manifestations of the spread of nationalist ideology.

Most theorists of civic nationalism commit this error, but Anthony Smith and Dominique Schnapper are notable exceptions. Smith, for example, rightly argues that good comparative analysis requires terminological clarity and the selection of “one referent to serve as the sole unit throughout.”\textsuperscript{106} He says this in reference to the different senses of the term ‘nationalism’, but his ethno-symbolic approach clearly distinguishes between nationalism, nations, \textit{ethnie}, and other units of analysis as well. Ethno-symbolism, he explains in his most recent book, is in no way intended to supersede the standard modernist account, by which he means, primarily, Gellner.

Rather, its focus on symbolic and social elements seeks to supplement and, where necessary, amend the predominantly political and economic models offered by

\textsuperscript{105} Kinder, "Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion," 395. Both Kinder and Zaller see their work as an extension of Converse's argument.

\textsuperscript{106} Smith, \textit{Theories of Nationalism}, 208.
modernists. In other words, it aims to continue where conventional accounts leave off, and supply those cultural and symbolic dimensions that they tend to overlook. One is often left with the sense that many modernist accounts never reach their target because they fail to enter into the ‘inner world’ of the members of national communities. This is exactly what a cultural history of the nation, such as that proffered by ethno-symbolism, aims to make good.107

Further, in response to Siniša Malešević’s recent claim that ethno-symbolism is ‘idealist’, Smith says that “Elie Kedourie may have believed in the determining power of ideas, but ethno-symbolists do not. The ethno-symbolic approach is a species of historical sociology, and it does not presuppose an ideal form of reference. At the outset, in The Ethnic Origins of Nations, I defined the ethnie as a form of socio-cultural community, not as an intellectual or ideological system.”108

Schnapper agrees that nationalism should not be conflated with nationhood, but for her this is because the term ‘nationalism’ designates either “claims of ethnies to be recognized as nations, that is, to make the historico-cultural community (or ethnie) coincide with the political organization; or the will to power of extant nations to affirm themselves at the expense of others.”109 Nationalism is an instrument of ideological and political conflicts, and tells us nothing about the scientific concept of the nation.

I disagree with Schnapper’s characterization of nationalism (and nations, for that matter), but her emphasis on ‘scientific’ or analytic concepts raises an important point. “The sociological analysis of the nation is not to be confused with the political discourse of nationalists,” she says.110 In other words, Schnapper wants to keep ‘participant’ and ‘observer’ perspectives

107 Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London: Routledge, 2009), 40. It is worth noting the Smith was Gellner’s doctoral student at the London School of Economics.
110 Ibid., 11.
separate. The former focuses on the self-understanding of social actors, and the latter on disinterested analysis of that self-understanding and the circumstances surrounding it. Studying participant perspectives is important to scholarly analysis but, as Rogers Brubaker explains, we must avoid using ‘categories of practice’ as ‘categories of analysis’. As part of his critique of the ‘substantialist’ treatment of nations (explained in the following chapter), Brubaker argues that it takes a conception inherent in the practice of nationalism and in the workings of the modern state and state-system—namely the realist, reifying conception of nations as real communities—and it makes this conception central to the theory of nationalism. As analysts of nationalism, we should certainly try to account for this social process of reification—this process through which the political fiction of the nation becomes momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice. This may be one of the most important tasks of the theory of nationalism. But we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing this reification of nations in practice with a reifications of nations in theory.\[^{111}\]

Theorists of civic nationalism make the same mistake by using the principles of civic nationalist ideology as a basis for theoretical analysis. Ideology is important, and is often reflected in citizenship policy, national symbols, and participant self-understandings, but it is a category of practice: it is, as Brubaker says, “a key part of what we want to explain, not what we

\[^{111}\] Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15-16. Brubaker reiterates this distinction in several of the essays in Ethnicity without Groups. It is clearly related to Bourdieu’s distinction between ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’, and Brubaker credits Bourdieu with the term ‘category of practice’. Brubaker also uses Heinz Kohut’s distinction between ‘experience-near’ and ‘experience-distant’ concepts, which Clifford Geertz used as well. Geertz described it as the simplest way to express an epistemological and methodological dilemma that has various other formulations: “‘inside’ versus ‘outside’, or ‘first person’ versus ‘third person’ descriptions; ‘phenomenological’ versus ‘objectivist,’ or ‘cognitive’ versus ‘behavioral’ theories; or, perhaps more commonly ‘emic’ versus ‘etic’ analyses, this last deriving from the distinction in linguistics between phonemics and phonetics, phonemics classifying sounds according to their internal function in language, phonetics classifying them according to their acoustic properties as such.” Brubaker traces the basic contrast back to at least Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method, which criticised the use of lay concepts for analytical purposes. Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Clifford Geertz, ”‘From the Native’s Point of View”: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 56-57.
want to explain things *with*; it belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit.”

Walker Connor is right to invoke “the wisdom of the old saw that when analyzing sociopolitical situations, what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is” when it comes to understanding participant behaviour, but it is a grave error to mistake this phenomenological principle for an ontological assertion. Nations are perceived and justified through ideologies limited only by the imagination, but there is no reason to assume that there is a direct correspondence between ideology and nationhood. The mere perception of co-nationality is not enough to make it so.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I argued that while the ‘problems in principle’ discussed in the previous chapter are important, the most significant problem with civic nationalism is the general theory of nations and nationalism used in explanations of its origin and spread. This theory treats nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon, and nations as merely the successful diffusion of nationalist ideology throughout a given territory. To establish that this is an accurate assessment I first provided a synopsis of the civic nationalist historiography of the origin and spread of civic nationalism in England, France, and the United States, followed by a discussion that explains how nationalism is reduced to an ideology by theorists of civic nationalism, using Greenfeld’s argument as an illustration. With this accomplished, I then proposed that the term ‘nationalism’ is a polyseme that represents more than just an ideology, and most importantly also

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113 Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, 93. In its most general sense phenomenology is the study of experience, whereas ontology is the study of being or what ‘is’.
refers to a ‘system of culture’ or way of organizing society as Gellner and Anderson have argued. Finally, I raised two sets of methodological problems with the way that theorists of civic nationalism characterize ideology and its effects that can be divided into two categories: one focused on ideology as such, and the other on units of analysis. The first set includes four interrelated problems that I labelled ‘intellectualism’, ‘diffusion’, ‘interpretation’, and ‘indifference’, which together demonstrate that it is highly unlikely that mass self-perception and identification can be adequately explained through an intellectual history of elites. The second set of problems focuses on the need to treat nations and nationalism as separate units of analysis. This amounts to using a ‘category of practice’ in place of a ‘category of analysis’, I argued, and defeats the purpose of scholarly inquiry. With these premises established, I can now explain my alternative approach to nations and nationalism, and show that it is a better fit for the evidence by testing civic nationalist historiography against the historical record.
Chapter 5

A relational approach to nations and nationalism

In the previous chapter I argued that the most significant problem with civic nationalism is that it treats nationalism in general as a solely ideological phenomenon. Against this interpretation, I explained that the term ‘nationalism’ covers more than just an ideology, and most importantly also refers to the kind of cultural system or way or organizing society described by authors such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Furthermore, while ideology still plays an important role in nationalist politics, the civic nationalist conception of ideology suffers from several methodological problems, ranging from an intellectualist bias to failing to treat nations and nationalism as distinct units of analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to outline an alternative approach to nations and nationalism that combines elements of Gellner and Anderson’s arguments with relational social theory, which I argue is a better match for the evidence than the civic nationalist perspective, and to apply this approach as part of a test of the civic nationalist account of nation-building in France and the United States.

Relational social theory (or ‘relationalism’) has played an important but largely unrecognized role in recent scholarship on nations and nationalism. Relationalism is a type of social constructivism that treats social phenomena as the product of regularities in social relations rather than substantial entities. Simply put, social groups are the way that we conceptualize particular kinds of enduring, processual relationships between people, not ‘things’ in themselves. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly each developed influential theories of nations and nationalism featuring a relational social ontology: the former derived from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, and the latter based on a combination of social
network theory and philosophical pragmatism influential among members of a network of academics based in and around New York.

In this chapter I argue that a modified relational approach that combines parts of Brubaker and Tilly’s theories with Gellner and Anderson’s provides a better explanation of what nations and nationalism are and how they come about than the civic nationalist alternative. Both pairs of authors begin with the premise that nationalist ideology should not be seen as an accurate reflection of the bases of nationhood. Gellner and Anderson, as I explained in the previous chapter, argue that ideology is just one aspect of a set of phenomena that is better understood as a system of culture. Brubaker and Tilly, on the other hand, while recognizing that nationalism is more than an ideology, see the ‘national’ quality of any phenomenon as a participant perspective that is based on networks of social relations and shapes behaviour but does not have any basis in reality. In my view, an approach that combines the processes of nationalization described by Gellner and Anderson with Brubaker and Tilly’s relational ontology addresses some of the tensions in each theory and matches well with the available evidence. To facilitate this argument, I propose that we adopt two separate analytic concepts: ‘ideational nationhood’ and ‘relational nationhood’. The first refers to nations as they are perceived by social actors, and the second to the dense network of overlapping social ties created and perpetuated through nationalizing processes. Separating these two concepts allows us to provide an account of the bases of national identity and participant self-understandings without relying on the accuracy of the latter or leaving their mass appeal unexplained. If this is the right approach, then any theory of nationalism based solely on nationalist ideology, civic or otherwise, is inadequate and reflects the preferences of political actors more than anything else.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I introduce relational social theory, which is well-known in sociology but not political science, through a brief history of its development and a description of its main principles. The second section explains how relationalism has previously been applied to the study of nations and nationalism, which to this point has been almost exclusively limited to the work of Brubaker and Tilly. Following a critical examination of these theories, I explain how they can be combined with Gellner and Anderson’s arguments as described above, and the implications of this relational approach for the study of nations and nationalism in general and civic nationalism in particular. Finally, I provide an analysis of early nationalization in France and the United States as a test of the civic nationalist accounts described in the previous chapter. I focus on two key issues: nationalist ideology and processes of nationalization. In both cases, the evidence shows a striking inconsistency between civic nationalist accounts of nationalist ideology and the historical record, and provides good reason to believe that the efficacy of the social processes associated with nationalization was primarily due to the fact that they created a dense network of new, mutually reinforcing social relationships, rather than the simple diffusion and acceptance of nationalist ideology.

1. Relational social theory

Relational social theory has a long history. In fact, according to Charles Tilly and Robert Goodin, relational approaches once predominated in social science. “Classical economists, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Georg Simmel,” they say, “all emphasized social relations, regarding both
individuals and complex social structures as products of regularities in social relations.”¹ During the twentieth century, however, relational analysis was overtaken by methodological individualism and holism. Tilly and Goodin argue that relationalism was maintained only in pragmatist philosophy, network analysis, and some parts of organizational or labour economics but, as I explain below, it persisted in other literatures as well.

First, though, it is important to contextualize relational theory by comparing it with its opposite, which is usually referred to as ‘substantialism’.² As Mustafa Emirbayer explains in his influential “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology”, the substantialist perspective “takes as its point of departure the notion that it is substances of various kinds (things, beings, essences) that constitute the fundamental units of all inquiry. Systematic analysis is to begin with these self-subsistent entities, which come ‘preformed,’ and only then to consider the dynamic flows in which they subsequently involve themselves.”³ There are two main types of substantialism: ‘self-action’, which conceives things as acting under their own power and independently of all other substances (best exemplified by rational choice theory), and ‘inter-action’, which locates action in the relationships among different entities that remain independent, fixed, and unchanged throughout the interaction (best exemplified by variable-centred quantitative analysis).

Norbert Elias argues that substantialism is rooted is Western languages, which, he says, are constructed in such a way that we can often only express constant movement or constant change in ways which imply that it has the character of an isolated object at rest, and then, almost as an afterthought, adding a verb which expresses the fact that the thing with this character is now changing. For example, standing

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² It is worth noting, based on a response I received when presenting part of this argument, that the contrast between relationalism and substantialism in this discussion is primarily intended to help illustrate the key characteristics of relationalism, and I am not implying that all authors who do not explicitly endorse relationalism as substantialists. Many authors who are unfamiliar to relational social theory hold views that are nevertheless compatible with it.
by a river we see the perpetual flowing of the water. But to grasp it conceptually, and to communicate it to others, we do not think and say, ‘Look at the perpetual flowing of the water’; we say, ‘Look how fast the river is flowing.’ We say, ‘The wind is blowing,’ as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of processes to static conditions, which we shall call ‘process-reduction’ for short, appears self-explanatory to people who have grown up with such languages.4

A relational perspective, on the other hand, uses description and naming to deal with aspects and phases of action, not purportedly independent entities, and relations between terms or units are ongoing processes, not “static ties among inert substances.”5 In short, the substantialist social entities of everyday language—societies, groups, and even persons—are better understood as a shorthand for complex and changing configurations of joint activity than as things in themselves.

As indicated at the beginning of this section, relational thinking is as old as social science and, according to Emirbayer, at least one form can be traced as far back as Heraclitus (c535–c475 BCE).6 Most contemporary relational social theorists, however, trace their lineage to Georg Simmel (1858–1918), whose ‘formal sociology’ focuses on the basic forms of social interaction that underlie more complex forms and contexts of social behavior. There are currently two influential schools of relational social theory: the ‘Bourdieu school’ and the ‘New York school’.7

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5 Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," 289.
6 Ibid.: 287.
7 There are, however, other contemporary perspectives on relational social theory, some of which have been developed in other languages. The most significant is the Italian sociologist Pierpaolo Donati’s ‘relational sociology’, which he also refers to as ‘relational realism’, first introduced in Introduzione alla sociologia relazionale (1983). Donati, like most other relational theorists, is influenced by Simmel, but his main intention is to provide a fundamental revision of the general theories of society proposed by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann. He says that he appreciates Bourdieu’s work, but rejects it, the New York school of relational theory (represented by Mustafa Emirbayer), and any other relational theory (which he denigrates as ‘relationism’) that is not based on the philosophy of social science known as ‘critical realism’. Donati’s work has recently received considerable support from Margaret Archer, sociology’s most influential critical realist, who wrote the foreword to Donati’s only English book on his theory (Relational Sociology, 2011), as well as a number of articles on the relationship between critical
Pierre Bourdieu was one of the first contemporary authors to elaborate a fully relational sociology, beginning in the 1960s. As Bourdieu’s collaborator Loïc Wacquant explains, the relational perspective that forms the core of Bourdieu’s sociology is part of a broad “structuralist tradition that came to fruition in the postwar years in the work of Piaget, Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, and Braudel, and that can be traced back to Durkheim and Marx.” The root of Bourdieu’s relationalism, however, is Ernst Cassirer’s distinction between substantial and relational concepts.

realism and Donati’s relational sociology. The philosophical differences between the different schools of relational theory are real and important, but each approach is similar enough in practice—at the level I am interested in, at least—that I feel justified in bracketing these philosophical differences for the purposes of this discussion.

Guy Bajoit and Nick Crossley have each also written books advocating a turn to relational sociology, and a number of Chinese scholars have recently published articles about a specifically ‘Chinese relationalism’. The primary objective of some of the latter authors, however, appears to be to appropriate relationalism to vindicate what they call ‘the traditional Chinese perspective’ on social life against ‘Western individualism’. Finally, several authors persuasively argue that Michael Mann’s work is inherently relational, though he has not described it this way himself. Pierpaolo Donati, "Building a Relational Theory of Society: A Sociological Journey," in Sociologists in a Global Age, ed. Mathieu Deflem (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 164; Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences (London: Routledge, 2011); Margaret S. Archer, "Critical Realism and Relational Sociology: Complementarity and Synergy," Journal of Critical Realism 9, no. 2 (2010); Guy Bajoit, Pour Une Sociologie Relationnelle (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992); Nick Crossley, Towards Relational Sociology (New York: Routledge, 2011); Qin Yaqing, "Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory," Social Sciences in China 30, no. 3 (2009); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).


Bourdieu shares Elias’ concern with ordinary language as a source of substantialism, warning that it predisposes us “to think the social world in a substantialist manner.”\textsuperscript{11} In the preface to \textit{Practical Reason}, he argues that all modern science is relational, but this philosophy is only rarely brought into play in the social sciences, undoubtedly because it is very directly opposed to the conventions of ordinary (or semi-scholarly) thought about the social world, which is more readily devoted to substantial ‘realities’ such as individuals and groups than to the \textit{objective relations} which one cannot show, but which must be captured, constructed and validated through scientific work.\textsuperscript{12}

Moreover, as Wacquant says, this “linguistic proclivity to favour substance at the expense of relations is buttressed by the fact that sociologists are always competing with other specialists in the representation of the social world, and especially with politicians and media experts, who have vested interest in such commonsense thinking.”\textsuperscript{13}

Bourdieu’s response to substantialism is the relational concepts of field and habitus. He defines a field as

\begin{quote}

a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between [social] positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation. . .in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{13} Wacquant, “Toward a Social Praxeology,” 15.

Simply put, Bourdieu uses the term ‘field’ as a metaphor to represent a structured system of social positions, occupied by either individuals or institutions, and the power relations between these positions. Its boundaries are always marked by more or less institutionalized barriers to entry, but they are imprecise, rarely juridical, and can only be determined by empirical investigation.

Habitus, the Latin root of the English word ‘habit’, is the term that Bourdieu uses to refer to the acquired dispositions of thought, behaviour, and taste that link social structure and action. Both habitus and field are relational concepts but, as Wacquant explains, a “field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action.”

Habitus and field are also mutually constitutive—or ‘ontologically complicit’, as Bourdieu puts it. “The relation between habitus and fields operates in two ways,” he says. “On one side, it is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of the field. . . On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction. Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one’s energy.” In short, the social world is made up of both objective relations and subjective dispositions, each of which is continuously reshaped by and inseparable from the other.

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16 Bourdieu and Wacquant, “The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology,” 100.
17 Previous uses of this term
18 Wacquant, “Toward a Social Praxeology,” 16.
20 As an aside, Rogers Brubaker argues that it is important to treat the concepts, propositions, and theories set forth in Bourdieu’s works “not, in the first instance, as bearers of logical properties and objects of logical operations, but
The New York school

As Ann Mische explains, the ‘New York school’ of relational sociology emerged in the 1990s under the influence of Harrison White at Columbia University and Charles Tilly at the New School for Social Research. White, a pioneer of social network analysis, and Tilly, whose work evolved from what he called ‘old structuralism’ to ‘relational realism’, each organized a series of interdisciplinary workshops and small conferences attended by faculty and graduate students from both schools over the course of the decade. “As participants wrestled with the tensions generated in these conversations,” Mische says, “they developed not a unified theory (important differences remain among them), but rather a shared focus on the communicative grounding of network relations and the implications of these relations for understanding dynamic social processes.”

White’s book Identity and Control, first published in 1992, served as an important inspiration for relational thinking among social network analysts, as did Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin’s article “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency” published two years later. The best known statement of some of the ideas developed in this context, however,

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as designators of particular intellectual habits or sets of habits. The more general and abstract the concept or proposition, the more important it is to read it in this dispositional manner. All of Bourdieu’s ‘meta-theory’—all general propositions about structures, habitus, practice, capital, field, and so on—must be read in this manner.” Rogers Brubaker, "Social Theory as Habitus," in Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, ed. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma Lipuma, and Moishe Postone (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 220.


22 Ibid., 81.

is Emirbayer’s “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology”, though Emirbayer himself is also strongly influenced by Bourdieu.24

The most widely influential member of the New York school is Charles Tilly.25 It is difficult to provide a complete and concise summary of Tilly’s thoughts on the practice of social research, given that about a quarter of his vast oeuvre of roughly 700 scholarly publications deals primarily with method and explanation, and his views changed over time.26 In the last ten to fifteen years of his life, however, he came to describe his overarching approach as ‘relational realism’. In contrast to ‘holism’, ‘methodological individualism’ and ‘phenomenological individualism’, relational realism is defined by its concentration on “connections that concatenate, aggregate, and disaggregate readily, forming organizational structures at the same time as they shape individual behaviour. Relational analysts follow flows of communication, patron–client chains, employment networks, conversational connections, and power relations from the small scale to the large and back.”27 Some variation of this perspective has been adopted by many of Tilly’s former colleagues and students, and it has been especially influential in the study of social movements.28

27 "Holism is the doctrine that social structures have their own self-sustaining logics...Methodological individualism insists on human individuals as the basic or unique social reality...Phenomenological individualism refers to the doctrine that individual consciousness is the primary or exclusive site of social life." Tilly and Goodin, "It Depends," 10-11. See also Charles Tilly, "Macrosociology, Past and Future," in The Relational Turn in Macrosociology: A Symposium (New York: Center for Studies of Social Change, 1995); Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Stories, Identities, and Political Change (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties (Boulder: Paradigm, 2005).
28 See, for example, Margaret Somers, "'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science," American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (1998); Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds., Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
2. Previous relational approaches to nations and nationalism

Rogers Brubaker and Charles Tilly are the most prominent of the handful of scholars who have analysed nationalism from a self-consciously relational perspective. Their contributions to the study of nationalism are influential and significant, but the relationalist basis of this significance is rarely appreciated or even recognized. Many students of their work seem unaware of the ontological entailments of the models they are following, and few have adopted a deliberate and consistently relational approach.  

Rogers Brubaker

Brubaker first uses an explicitly relational approach in “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event” (1994). This essay and others

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29 For exceptions, see Patrick Hossay, "Methodological Madness: Why Accounting for Nationalism-and Many Other Political Phenomena-Is Difficult for Social Scientists," Critical Sociology 27, no. 2 (2001); Marc Helbling, Practising Citizenship and Heterogeneous Nationhood: Naturalisations in Swiss Municipalities (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008); "Struggling over Citizenship and Cultural Boundaries: Charles Tilly's Constructivist Approach," Swiss Political Science Review 369-75, no. 15 (2009); Sherrill Stroschein, "Microdynamics of Bilateral Ethnic Mobilization," Ethnopolitics 10, no. 1 (2011); "The Relational Evolution of Political Identities: Polarization as Process," in The Relational Turn in World Politics, ed. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon (forthcoming). Henry Hale describes his approach as relational in The Foundations of Ethnic Politics, and suggests that it is similar to Brubaker’s, but his argument is somewhat different from those that I am concerned with here. For Hale, ethnicity is a psychological mechanism of uncertainty reduction which is relational because it acts as a ‘rule of thumb’ for deciding how the world relates to the individual and how the individual relates (and might relate) to the world. This is consistent with other relationalist approaches in the sense that participant perspectives shape social relations, but Hale appears to see ethnic perceptions as the product of basic human psychology rather than contingent configurations of social ties (though ethnicity is only ‘activated’ in certain circumstances). Furthermore, Hale is not committed to a general relational social ontology and, in a recent symposium on his book, says that he chose the term ‘relational’ for the sake of convenience and that he has no principled objection to using other terms to describe his theory, such as Michael Hechter’s suggestion, ‘sequential’. Henry E. Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); John Breuilly et al., "Sixth Nations and Nationalism Debate: Henry E. Hale's the Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World," Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 4 (2011).

were later reprinted in his book *Nationalism Reframed*, where he further develops his relational approach, particularly in the chapter focusing on ‘the triadic relational nexus’ linking national minorities, nationalising states, and external national homelands.\(^{31}\)

There are two levels of relation here. The first, the ‘triadic nexus’ itself, is relatively straightforward. “Projects of nationalization or national integration in the new nation-state, for example, ‘exist’ and exercise their effects,” Brubaker explains, “not in isolation but in a relational field [in Bourdieu’s sense] that includes both the national minority and its external national homeland.”\(^{32}\) Minority and homeland elites monitor state activity for signs of nationalization or national integration and, if they perceive such signs, might mobilize against them, which in turn can affect the behaviour of the nationalizing state. These categories can be combined in different ways, but his point is that the relationship between them is dynamic and interdependent, and none can be properly understood in isolation from the others.

The second level of relation is internal to each category, which Brubaker argues are best understood as relational fields themselves. They must, he says, “each be conceived not as a given, analytically irreducible entity but rather as a field of differentiated and competing positions, as an arena of struggle among competing stances. The triadic relation between these three ‘elements’ is, therefore, a *relation between relational fields*; and relations *between* the three fields are closely intertwined with relations *internal to*, and *constitutive of*, the fields. The approach to the national question adopted here is consistently and radically *relational*.”\(^{33}\)

Brubaker develops and sharpens these ideas in *Ethnicity without Groups*, a collection of essays he says is intended to give the constructivist project renewed analytical purchase by

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\(^{32}\) Ibid., 58. Brubaker uses the term ‘field’ in the same sense as Pierre Bourdieu but does not explain it in detail.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 67-68. Emphasis in the original.
avoiding the substantialism of both holist and individualist analyses.\textsuperscript{34} In \textit{Nationalism Reframed} he argues that nationalism (which he defines as “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life”) is not engendered by nations, but “is produced—or better, it is induced—by \textit{political fields} of particular kinds. Its dynamics are governed by the properties of political fields, not by the properties of collectivities.”\textsuperscript{35} Here he goes further, arguing that a relational perspective entails that ethnicity, race, and nation

should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms. This means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routes, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes. And it means taking as a basic category not the ‘group’ as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Charles Tilly}

Tilly did not write substantially about nationalism until the early 1990s, starting with a special issue of \textit{Theory and Society} on ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union that he co-edited in 1991.\textsuperscript{37} He

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ethnicity without Groups} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
\textsuperscript{35} Brubaker, \textit{Nationalism Reframed}, 17.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ethnicity without Groups}, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{37} Charles Tilly, "Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union," \textit{Theory and Society} 20 (1991). Many scholars are familiar with Tilly’s chapters in \textit{The Formation of National States in Western Europe}, but these deal with state-building rather than nation-building properly understood, and deliberately do not address nationalism. “We began our work,” he explains, “intending to analyze state-making and the formation of nations interdependently. As our inquiry proceeded, we concentrated our attention increasingly on the development of states rather than the building of nations. There were several reasons for this drift. One was the greater ease with which we could arrive at some
published other articles on the subject over the next several years, consistently defining nationalism as a form of contentious politics, often manifested as a social movement, that is either state-led or state-seeking.\textsuperscript{38} Relationalism did not become an explicit part of his analysis of nationalism until the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{39}

The two clearest examples of this later approach are a chapter in an anthology about the role of culture in state formation, and a book that he co-authored with Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow on contentious politics.\textsuperscript{40} In the first, a brief epilogue to George Steinmetz’s edited book \textit{State/Culture}, Tilly advocates a move toward relational analyses of political processes in social research, using nationalism as an example of a ‘culturally rich state-linked process’.\textsuperscript{41} A nation, he argues, “is a categorical relation in which agents on one side of a boundary claim (1) common historical origins, culture, and destiny for all persons on their side of the boundary and (2) distinctness from others beyond the boundary, and in which those agents gain widespread acquiescence to their claims on both sides of the boundary.”\textsuperscript{42} Nationalism is the collective claim that nations and states should be congruent and that obligations to nations supersede all others or, alternatively, the invocation of these claims exclusively on behalf of a specific nation. It also exhibits, he says, “the paradox of a general process characterized by path-dependent particularism,” meaning that while many of the same causal mechanisms play a role

\textsuperscript{38} For examples, see Charles Tilly, "National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us," \textit{Daedalus} 122, no. 3 (1993); "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992 " \textit{Theory and Society} 23 (1994); "The State of Nationalism," \textit{Critical Review} 10, no. 2 (1996).

\textsuperscript{39} The one early exception is Charles Tilly, "A Bridge Halfway: Responding to Brubaker," \textit{Contention} 4, no. 1 (1994).

\textsuperscript{40} See also chapter six of Tilly, \textit{Durable Inequality}.


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 416.
in the generation of different nationalist claims, “each new assertion of nationalism responds to its immediate historical and cultural context, then modifies conditions for the next assertion of nationalism. Like all culturally constrained social processes, nationalism proceeds in cultural ruts that greatly limit the directions it can go, relies on collective learning, but by its very exercise alters relations—including shared understandings—among parties to its claims.”

In *Dynamics of Contention*, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly further develop this approach, arguing that the tendency to analyze mass national movements as merely a reflection of nationalist sentiment or ideology is ‘cognitively deterministic’ and ignores much of what is interesting and important about nationalism. Instead, nationalism should be understood as a species of contentious politics, which they define as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” And, like other forms of contentious politics, we cannot understand nationalism “as the expression of any single discourse, ideology, or nominally distinct form of contention”—it must be seen in relation to other forms of politics.

3. *A modified relational approach*

Like Brubaker and Tilly, I think that all social phenomena, including nations and nationalism, are best understood in relational terms. Nevertheless, I do disagree with them on some issues.

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43 Ibid., 418.
44 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow; and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
46 Ibid., 227.
Tilly, for example, focuses almost exclusively on nationalism as a social movement, and puts too much emphasis on particular boundary claims as the defining quality of nations. Brubaker, on the other hand, overstates his point when he says that nations do not exist outside of participant perception. Neither author adequately explains why the masses find nationalist claims so persuasive. Accordingly, in this section I propose an approach that builds on Brubaker and Tilly’s arguments, but differs from them by arguing that a relational understanding of nationhood does not entail that it is only a mental construct, and that the dense network of social relations implicit in Gellner and Anderson’s ‘system of culture’ accounts of nationalism should be understood as a national phenomenon in its own right. To facilitate this argument, I suggest that we adopt two analytically distinct but interrelated concepts, ‘ideational nationhood’ and ‘relational nationhood’, which respectively refer to nations as participants perceive them and nations as an observable network of relations between people. These concepts represent mutually constitutive phenomena which, when treated separately, help to explain both why treating nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon is inadequate, and how a shared sense of national identity can develop and persist among a specific population in spite of ideological inaccuracy.

Brubaker says that his position is an application of a general argument for conceiving all social life in relational terms, and therefore a call to reconceptualize the reality of nationhood, not dispute it. But, in fact, he does dispute the reality of nations in an important sense. “Reduced to a formula,” he explains,

my argument is that we should focus on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening, and refrain from using the analytically dubious notion of ‘nations’ as substantial, enduring collectivities. A recent book by Julia
Kristeva bears the English title *Nations without Nationalism*; but the analytical task at hand, I submit, is to think about nationalism without nations.  

This clearly reduces nationhood to something that is real only to *participants*, and has no basis as a category of analysis.

Brubaker does not use the term habitus in his work on nationalism, but it is nevertheless an important part of his Bourdieuan analysis of nationhood. He does define a national minority as a *"field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances"* adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual political entrepreneurs, but this definition is meant to relegate nationhood itself to a category of practice embedded in the relations between these political actors.

Brubaker is right that we should not take participant self-understandings at face value but, as Craig Calhoun argues in a debate with him, “it is a sociological misunderstanding to think that the reality of nations depends on the accuracy of their collective self-representations.” A strictly cognitive approach leaves too much unexplained. Brubaker says that nationalist politics cannot be reduced to crude elite manipulation, and suggests that the instrumental use of racial, ethnic, or national categories, which is often unselfconscious, is only effective under certain conditions and activated by situational cues. He does not really explain, however, why these

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48 Ibid., 61. Emphasis in the original. It is worth noting that Brubaker explicitly rejects the idea that the cognitive approach that he develops in *Ethnicity without Groups* is a form of individualism. There is “nothing intrinsically individualistic about the study of cognition,” he says. “The domain of the ‘mental’ is not identical with the domain of the individual. Indeed the kind of knowledge in which we are interested—schemes of perception and interpretation through which the social world is experienced in racial, ethnic, or national terms—is social in a double sense: it is socially shared knowledge of social objects. A cognitive approach to the study of ethnicity directs our attention not to individual psychology but to ‘sociomental’ phenomena that link culture and cognition, macro- and micro-level concerns. Cognitive construction, in short, is social construction.” *Ethnicity without Groups*, 86. Emphasis in the original.
particular categories are politically resonant. The tendency to ‘naturalize’ and ‘essentialize’ them may be grounded in human cognition, potentially derived by analogical transfer from reasoning about biological species, he says, but their impetus is left conspicuously underexplored.51

A relational, processual understanding of nationhood does not require it to be a solely cognitive phenomenon. This is only one of the two kinds of analysis that relationalists generally emphasize, as Daniel Nexon explains:

Post-structuralist and some Bourdieu-inspired constructivists stress patterns of symbolic relations: discourse, webs of meanings, and the like. . .Others, in contrast, emphasize social relations: patterns of interaction involving exchange, information flows, and so on. In principle, all of these scholars would agree that intersubjective relations involve both symbolic and non-symbolic dimensions. . . Many. . .relationists combine analysis of discursive and social relations. But, in practice, one can share a ‘relationalist’ approach yet hold very different conceptions of the most important ‘stuff’ that comprises relations.52

Brubaker and Tilly incorporate both kinds of analysis in their work, but see nationality as a cognitive category that, though it is both produced by and shapes social relations, remains conceptually independent from them. Simply put, my argument here is that we should treat nationhood as both symbolically and substantively relational.

‘Ideational’ and ‘relational’ nationhood

To facilitate this argument, I propose that we adopt two analytically distinct but interrelated concepts: ‘ideational nationhood’ and ‘relational nationhood’. The terms are adapted from a similar distinction between types of social cohesion made by James Moody and Douglas White,

51 Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 84.
who argue that, analytically, it “can be partitioned into an ideational component, referring to members’ identification with a collectivity, and a relational component, referring to the observed connections among members of the collectivity.”53 In my adaptation, ideational nationhood refers to nations as they are perceived by social actors, and relational nationhood to the dense network of overlapping social relations created and perpetuated through nationalizing social processes. The first is a category of practice, and the second is a category of analysis.

For Brubaker and Tilly, specific and complex configurations of social ties are the driving force behind nationalist politics, but nations are participant perceptions or claims that have no objective reality. These perceptions and claims are shaped by and in turn reshape the fields or networks that they are situated in, especially through political institutions, but the ‘national’ character of this relationship is strictly cognitive. This is ideational nationhood.

Left at that, though, it remains unclear why people find nationalist representations of the world persuasive. This is what the concept of relational nationhood is intended to address. Bourdieu makes an argument about social class that is similar to what I have in mind. “[N]ot all social groupings are equally probable,” he says,

and this social artefact which is always a social group has all the more chances of existing and durably subsisting if the assembled agents who construct it are already close to each other in the social space (this is also true of a unity based on an affective relationship of love or friendship, whether or not it is socially sanctioned). In other words, the symbolic work of constitution or consecration that is necessary to create a unified group (imposition of names, acronyms, of rallying signs, public demonstrations, etc.) is all the more likely to succeed if the social agents on which it is exerted are more inclined, because of their proximity in the space of social positions and also because of the dispositions and interests associated with those positions, to mutually recognize each other and recognize themselves in the same project (political or otherwise).”54

54 Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 33.
Bourdieu calls this a ‘probable class’ because it is not mobilized and does not have a sense of itself as a group, but “is a set of agents which will present fewer hindrances to efforts at mobilization than any other set of agents” because of their relationships.55

Relational nationhood is analogous to the ‘social space and positions’ (or relational field) in Bourdieu’s conception of class, and is closely related to Gellner and Anderson’s conception of nationalism as a system of culture.

For them, nationalism is fundamentally a form of social organization that constitutes nations through the creation and maintenance standard cultural idiom. This is accomplished through what Gellner describes as processes of exo-socialization, most of which are what Tilly calls ‘relational mechanisms’: social processes that “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks.”56 The generalizability of some of the historical claims that Gellner and Anderson make, such as the necessity of industrialization or print capitalism to nationalization, has been rightly criticized over the years, but the form of social processes that they identify as essential to the development and perpetuation of nations is persuasive, and does not entail accepting the specific histories that these authors provide.

A wide variety of different relational mechanisms can help create and maintain the network of social ties that constitute relational nationhood, and their presence and effects vary depending on the circumstances. Gellner and Anderson focus on industrialism and capitalism, of course, but the most consistent across cases are directly related to modern state-building. A transportation infrastructure connecting the different regions of the state, popular military service, and standardized mass education are three common mechanisms that dramatically reorganized social relations during the rise of the modern state, bringing people together who often had no

56 Tilly, Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties, 26-27.
previous contact and shaping their interactions to conform to the constraints and demands of this new institution.

Mass media has also played an important role but, as Gellner and Anderson argue, this was not primarily through the diffusion of specific messages (such as the principles of an ideology) that we might expect. Vernacular print capitalism, Anderson explains, laid the bases for national consciousness first and foremost by creating unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community.  

Gellner makes a similar point that is worth quoting at length. The “actual formulation of the idea or ideas, the question concerning who said or wrote precisely what, doesn’t matter much,” he says.

What matters is whether the conditions of life are such as to make the idea seem compelling, rather than, as it is in most other situations, absurd. In this connection it is worth saying something about the role of communication in the dissemination of the nationalist idea. This term plays a crucial part in the analysis of nationalism of at least one noted author. But the usual formulation of the connection between nationalism and the facility of modern communications is somewhat misleading. It gives the impression that a given idea (nationalism) happens to be there, and then the printed word and the transistor and other media help this notion to reach audiences in distant valleys and self-contained villages and encampments, audiences which in an age not blessed with mass media would have remained untouched by it. That is altogether the wrong way to see it. The media do not transmit an idea which happens to have been fed into them. It matters precious little what has

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been fed into them: it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted. The most important and persistent message is generated by the medium itself, by the role which such media have acquired in modern life. That core message is that the language and style of the transmissions is important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such comprehension, is include in a moral and economic community, and that he who does not and cannot, is excluded. All this is crystal clear, and follows from the pervasiveness and crucial role of mass communication in this kind of society. What is actually said matters little.58

Relational nationhood, however, is not just a restatement of these authors’ arguments. First, my focus is the kind of relational mechanisms that Gellner and Anderson identify rather than their full theories of nationalism. Second, it should be seen as a state-influenced ‘network’ instead of a state-bound ‘system’ of relations because the former term does not imply the unity and closure of the latter. The dense and overlapping networks of relations that connect co-nationals often coincide with the boundaries of particular institutions, especially the state, but they are not ‘organically’ coupled with these institutions and regularly cross state and other institutional boundaries, as my discussion of intra-state nationalist conflict in the next chapter.

58 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 126-27. Emphasis in the original. The ‘noted author’ that Gellner mentions is Karl Deutsch, whose sixty-year-old book Nationalism and Social Communication anticipates both Gellner and Anderson’s arguments in several ways. Like Gellner and Anderson, Deutsch explains nationalism as the product of several large-scale social processes that are generally associated with modernization, but focuses on those that deal specifically with communication. His approach is often characterized as an instance of the ‘ideological diffusion’ model that I am criticizing, but this is not entirely accurate (it is unclear if Gellner is attributing this position to Deutsch, or just using his work as starting point to discuss the relationship between nationalism and communication). Deutsch’s general political science is based on ‘cybernetics’, the study of self-organizing and self-regulating systems, in which the flow of information plays a crucial role. He argues that nationality is the product of state-driven modernization processes that increase contact amongst the state’s population, and defines a nation as the resulting community constituted by a shared culture that facilitates communication. “The essential aspect of the unity of a people,” he says, “is the complementarity or relative efficiency of communication among individuals—something that is in some ways similar to mutual rapport, but on a larger scale.” (188) The necessary ‘equipment’, as Deutsch puts it, includes things such as “learned habits, preferences, symbols, memories, patterns of landholding and social stratification, events in history, and personal associations.” (97) Accordingly, for Deutsch, just as for Gellner and Anderson, the capacity to transmit information is more important than specific information itself. This basic similarity, and the fact that Gellner and Anderson’s arguments have become far more influential than Deutsch’s over the past twenty years, is the reason that I have not discussed Deutsch further. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, Second ed. (Cambridge: M.I.T Press, 1966).
demonstrates. Institutions significantly shape the dynamics of interpersonal relations, but social relations are path-dependant processes that are subject to diverse influences. The boundaries of ideational nationhood are sharp because they are categorical and cognitively imposed, whereas the boundaries of relational nationhood are rough, indeterminate, and constrained by the persistence of previous configurations. Third, my approach emphasizes the social ties that facilitate a shared culture, which are present but often implicit in Gellner and Anderson’s theories, rather than culture itself (without discounting its significance). One reason for this is that the intent of the present argument is to focus on the importance of one set of factors to nations and nationalism, not provide a full theory of these phenomena. More importantly, however, sharing culture is an insufficient condition for national identity. This is especially true when it comes to languages, many of which are used across national boundaries, but also of values, lifestyles, and other cultural patterns. English Canada and the United States, for example, have very similar cultures, and it is relatively easy for members of either society to function or even ‘pass’ as a member in the other, but Canadians and Americans nevertheless have distinct national identities. The institutionally shaped relationships between members of each nation seem to be the principal differentiating factor. In other words sharing is what is most important, not the specific ‘cultural content’ that is shared.

My emphasis on relational nationhood does not mean, however, that ideational nationhood is epiphenomenal. Participant self-understandings of their nationality, based on either explicit ideological principles or socialized dispositions, guide behaviour and have a direct impact on policy choices. Ideas cannot create relationships on their own, but they do shape relationships through things like citizenship policy, which determines who is subject to the kind of relational mechanisms described above. In this sense, ideational and relational nationhood are
mutually constitutive, in the same way as Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field. Furthermore, it is important to understand that there is no necessary correspondence between the ‘content’ of ideational and relational nationhood. While members of the same network are likely to share the same culture and similar ideas, cultural attributes and patterns are not inherently restricted to particular networks, as the previous example of Canada and the United States demonstrates, and, most importantly, the shared self-understanding of the relationship between conationals provided by a particular culture is not necessarily an accurate representation of the real network of ties that connects them.

This general approach to nations and nationalism has clear implications for civic nationalism specifically. If social relationships are constitutive of nationhood, then the general theory of nations and nationalism used by most civic nationalists, which characterizes nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon, is fundamentally flawed. There are unquestionably civic nationalists but, as I explained in the previous chapter, the principles of any ideology are consistently held only by a relatively small segment of the population, so there must be something more than principle behind mass national identification. In the following section I test the civic nationalist historiography of nationalization in France and United States against the historical record. The evidence, I will argue, is strikingly incongruous with this historiography, and suggests that the relational approach that I have just described provides a better explanation of the bases of national identification in each case.
4. *Nation-building in France and the United States*

As I explained in the previous chapter, most theorists of civic nationalism argue that the predominance of civic nationalist ideology in France and the United States means that both are civic nations. In this section I test that account by examining the history of nation-building in each case. The available evidence, I argue, clearly demonstrates that civic nationalist historiography is inaccurate, and suggests that the relational approach that I outlined above provides a more plausible explanation of the bases of nationality than the ideological model favoured by civic nationalists. Theorists of civic nationalism have been selective and tendentious in their representation of nationalist ideology and the people that they attribute it to, and assumed that factors such as the social processes that I refer to as relational mechanisms are just vehicles for ideological diffusion. It does not take much digging, however, to find unambiguous evidence that many of the intellectuals and political actors who have been portrayed as civic nationalists held views and behaved in ways that diverge significantly from civic nationalism’s principles, most notably by restricting membership in the nation according to class, ethnicity, or religion. These are still participant perspectives, however, and do not necessarily reflect the bases of national identification in France or the United States more accurately than anything that civic nationalists claim. In fact, I will argue that the evidence suggests that the creation and maintenance of new social ties was the foundation of nationalization in each case, regardless of what participants perceived to be the bases of their conationality.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full history of nationalization in France and the United States, so I have relied on representative examples to support my analysis. For each case I begin by discussing the accuracy of the civic nationalist portrayal of important
intellectuals and political actors, and then move on to a more general account of participant perspectives on nationhood (what I earlier called ideational nationhood). These ideological questions have been the focus of most scholarship on French and American nationalism, and it seems definitive that the civic nationalist account fits the facts to the story instead of the other way around. The ideas associated with civic nationalism were present in each case, but contemporary theorists of civic nationalism have exaggerated their influence and taken them out of context. The social processes through which nation-building occurred in these cases are much less well-documented, but the evidence that is available strongly suggests that it is primarily the creation of new social relationships (i.e. relational nationhood) that led to a shared national identity, not the diffusion and acceptance of a particular set of nationalist principles alone.

4.1 France

French nationalism, David Bell explains, has received little empirical, historical attention, “despite the fact that the theoretical literature nearly always discusses it and, indeed, often puts great emphasis on it.”59 Instead, this literature usually relies on selective intellectual history, particularly among theorists of civic nationalism, as explained in the previous chapter. As Bell says, for example, most of Liah Greenfeld’s “evidence comes from men who we would call ‘intellectuals’: Bousset and Jurieu, Montesquieu and Boulainvilliers, Rousseau and Raynal. Generalizing from them to large swaths of the French population requires more proof than these

59 David A. Bell, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being French: Law, Republicanism and National Identity at the End of the Old Regime,” *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 4 (2005): 1217. “Fortunately, a reevaluation has now begun,” he continues. The few examples he lists, however, are spread over ten years, and not much has changed since the article was published.
men’s own claims, coupled with simple references to their social origins.\textsuperscript{60} I begin this section by addressing the civic nationalist misrepresentation of such intellectuals with a discussion of Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, whose pamphlet \textit{What is the Third Estate?} is often characterized as the French Revolution’s clearest statement of civic nationalism.\textsuperscript{61} This is followed by a wider discussion of a widespread and persistent perception among the literate population that French history was significantly shaped by the struggle between two peoples, the Gauls and the Franks, and the characterization of the Revolution as a Gaulish revolt against imperialist Franks. I then turn to the role of religion, which straddles the line between participant perceptions and processes of nationalization, before fully focusing on the latter, which I argue have been misinterpreted by theorists of civic nationalism.

\textit{Participant perspectives}

Sieyès participated in the French Revolution and is considered by many to be one of its most eloquent spokesmen. He is best known for his influential pamphlet, published just months before the revolution began in 1789, in which he insists that the nation properly understood includes all working citizens living under a common law and represented by the same legislature, and excludes the nobility, which serves no purpose in modern society.\textsuperscript{62} This argument is often seen as the clearest Revolutionary statement of the civic conception of nationhood, but things are not so straightforward as they seem.

\textsuperscript{61} The misrepresentation of Rousseau was already addressed in chapter three.
\textsuperscript{62} Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, "What Is the Third Estate?," in \textit{Political Writings}, ed. Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003). The First and Second Estates are the clergy and the nobility, respectively.
The Third Estate is usually imagined to be synonymous with ‘the people’—the entire population of the state that is not noble—but Sieyès’ definition limits membership to employed citizens, which excludes the unemployed, foreigners, women, children, and all others without citizenship from the Third Estate and therefore the nation.

Those who did qualify for membership, however, were not a uniform group. As Georges Dupeux explains, “within the third estate there were many different social categories, some poor, some well-to-do, with widely opposed interests, and having as their sole unifying bond the face of being ‘base commoners’. There are reasons for suggesting that the poorest sections of the community hardly belonged to this group. In a way they were outside the social order and may be seen as forming a ‘fourth estate’.”

Moreover Georges Duby, in the epilogue of his history of the tripartite conception of feudal society, cautions the reader not to see the ascendance of the Third Estate as the levelling of society:

In the hall of the Tennis Court, in 1789, three arms were raised for the oath. These were not the arms of workers. Nor were the deputies of the Third Estate—those well-appointed men then busily engaged in the destruction of “feudalism”—peasants. . .No more proletarian than the White Capes, they, too, demanded their natural liberty and equality. But they demanded these things for themselves, for the dominant class to which they belonged, and whose dominance they by no means intended to see abolished. The original rift, accordingly, continued to gape as large as ever—a moat beyond which, as though under guard, the “toiling classes” had been corralled.

William Sewell’s careful analysis of Sieyès’ pamphlet and other work in A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution demonstrates that Sieyès was well aware of the Third Estate’s dynamics, and that the call for citizen-worker unity at the beginning of the pamphlet was a pragmatic political move meant to obscure the elitism evident in its supporting argumentation and Sieyès’

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private notes. The aristocracy is always portrayed as the enemy of the entire Third Estate or nation but, in practice, Sieyès makes no appeals to the lower classes. Instead, the argument assumes a male, bourgeois reader who “is reminded over and over that his pride has been wounded by those who hold him in contempt, that the necessity of passively accepting the dictates of aristocrats endangers his manly honor.”

His further claim that the “available classes” were the natural representatives of the nation, Sewell argues, clearly illustrates the deep contradiction in Sieyès’ argument:

On the one hand, he claims that the Third Estate is the entire nation because its members do all the useful work of society and that the nobility is alien to the nation because of its idleness. But he then presents as the natural representatives of the people as a whole those classes of the Third Estate whose wealth frees them from the daily press or labor and gives them sufficient leisure to concern themselves with public affairs. . . It reveals not only an instability in Sieyes’s text but an instability in the Revolution itself. It gives us a glimpse into a chasm that reaches the core of the “bourgeois” revolutionary project.

In addition to this, Sewell says, Sieyès’ unpublished notes seem to prove incontestably that he had a very low opinion of the majority of his compatriots. He continually spoke of them as instruments of labor, working machines, biped instruments, moral and intellectual nullities, passive beings. His attitude toward this dehumanized mass oscillated considerably, but the oscillations were always between disdain and pity. Never in his notes did he consider that the mass of humans condemned to painful labor might be morally valid citizens, capable of legitimate political judgments. Everything indicates that Sieyes wished to confer political power only on a restricted minority of the population, on those who were active, moral, educated, well-to-do, and capable.

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66 Ibid., 61. Sewell uses the terms ‘bourgeois’ and ‘bourgeoisie’ in the eighteenth-century sense of the wealthy and educated non-nobles of the cities.
67 Ibid., 152. The ‘available classes’ of late-eighteenth-century France, Sewell says, were usually rentiers rather than entrepreneurs.
68 Ibid., 163-64.
All of this does not necessarily mean, however, that Sieyès was simply cynical. He never explicitly stated, Sewell explains, that the worker’s right to membership in the nation should also entitle him to participate actively and equally in political affairs. Though some of his statements seemed to imply equal political rights for all, even his declaration of citizen rights “did not specify what he meant to include as rights of citizen; he may have been thinking of what he would later dub ‘passive rights’ attached to all citizens, rather than the ‘active rights’ limited to those who make an active contribution to society.” ⁶⁹

It would be a mistake to generalize Sieyès’ elitism to all revolutionaries based on this information alone, but there is evidence to suggest that those who took power following the Revolution shared some of his opinions. While the delay of manhood suffrage until 1848 is possibly explained by the hiatus of republican government between Napoleon’s coup d’état and the 1848 Revolution, no one in France at the time would have argued that the nation ceased to exist during this sixty-year period. Even one hundred years after the Revolution, as Christian Joppke explains, “Colonial, Third-Republican France (as most colonial, pre-universal suffrage states). . . distinguished between ‘nationalité’ (in the sense of formal state membership) and ‘citoyenneté’ (denoting full citizenship rights), the former including colonial subjects and women in the metropole, and the latter being reserved to male metropolitan French.” ⁷⁰

A more general, fascinating, and rarely discussed contradiction to the civic nationalist historiography of French nationalism is the roughly three-hundred year debate over the ethnic

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⁶⁹ Ibid., 182.
origins of the French, which reached its peak influence after the Revolution. Mysteriously, Greenfeld and Kohn both make reference to this debate, but only in passing.\textsuperscript{71}

The three main players are the Gauls, the Romans, and the Franks. The order of appearance is undisputed, but their roles vary according to who tells the story. The Gauls, as they were called by the Romans, were first mentioned in the historical record in the late sixth century BCE by the Greek geographer Hecataeus of Miletus, who called them \textit{Keltoi} (Celts).\textsuperscript{72} Most of these people had been incorporated into the expanding Roman Empire by the first century BCE. The Gaulish language was eventually replaced by vulgar Latin, and an amalgamated Gallo-Roman culture emerged. Roman control lasted until the fifth century, when the last Roman outpost in Gaul fell to the West-Germanic Franks under Clovis I in 486 CE. During the Middle Ages, the mixed origins of the people living in the territory that became France was almost forgotten.\textsuperscript{73} By the twelfth century, it was commonly believed that the population was of entirely Frankish descent, and that the Franks could be traced back to the Trojans of ancient Greece. The nobility, however, maintained that they were the descendants of the Frankish conquerors of the Gauls, which legitimized their present rights and properties as well as the kingship.\textsuperscript{74}

This conquest history, in various forms, gained modern significance during the Wars of Religion (1562–98) and the subsequent development of absolute monarchy. François Hotman, a famous Protestant jurist, wrote a widely-read pamphlet titled \textit{Franco-Gallia} (1573) following the


\textsuperscript{73} As Léon Poliaikov explains, ancestry was considered relatively unimportant at the time—what mattered to these people was that they were Christian. Léon Poliaikov, \textit{The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe}, trans. Edmund Howard (London: Sussex University Press, 1974), 20.

\textsuperscript{74} Jacques Barzun, \textit{The French Race: Theories of Its Origins and Their Social and Political Implications} (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1966), Chapter 2. Barzun’s book, originally published in 1932, is still the most complete history of ‘Gauls and Franks’ debate in English, and covers many more perspectives than I am able to in this context.
The Franks, Hotman argues, are Germans, not Trojans, who both drove the Romans from Gaul and established the new monarchy. “The Gauls and the Germans were in fact originally fraternal peoples. They settled in two neighboring regions, on either side of the Rhine. When the Germans entered Gaul, they were in no sense foreign invaders. They were in fact almost going home, or at least to visit their brothers.” Imperial absolutism had been imposed on the freedom-loving Gauls by the Roman invaders, and the Franks, who loved liberty as much as their Gaulish brothers, had returned to set them free. The purpose of this history was to assert a long-established aristocratic right against absolute rule. As Michel Foucault explains, “it is clear that the Roman invaders Hotman is talking about are the equivalent, transposed into the past, of the Rome of the pope and his clergy. The fraternal German liberators are obviously the reformed religion from across the Rhine; and the unity of the kingdom and the sovereignty of the people is the political plan for a constitutional monarchy that was supported by many of the Protestant circles of the day.”

The next major statement about the Gauls and the Franks came in the early eighteenth century from the Catholic nobleman Comte Henri de Boulainvilliers. Unlike Hotman, Boulainvilliers framed the relationship as a conflict, and positioned the nobility against both the monarchy and the common people. In *Histoire de l’ancien gouvernement de la France* (published after his death in 1722), he argues, as Eugen Weber puts it, that “the Gauls had become and remained subjects of the Franks, as much by right of conquest as by the obedience the strong exact from the weak, liberty and liberties being the prerogative of the Franks alone.

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and of their descendants; the only ones to be recognized as nobles. . .as lords and masters.”

This was a reproach against the erosion of noble liberties and privileges by an arrogant monarch from above, and the rising Third Estate (who were descendants of the Gauls) from below.

Boulainvilliers’ distinction proved influential, and “the race war soon became a fairly familiar metaphor” that continued through the Revolution. “There were other arguments in 1789, and other issues,” Weber explains, “but the metaphor of racial conflict, of historical wounds reopened and decisions up for grabs was handy; and reference to Franks and Gauls made doubly clear that revolution was legitimate, being no more than the justified rebellion. . .of the Gallic people against the remains of Frankish supremacy.”

Sieyès’ pamphlet is the clearest evidence that this perspective was widespread, and is worth quoting at length:

If the aristocrats were to try to keep the people in a state of oppression, even at the price of that liberty of which they would have shown themselves unworthy, the people will still dare to demand why they might be entitled to do so. If, in reply, they were to invoke a right of conquest, it would have to be conceded that this amounts to wanting to go back a little far. But the Third Estate should not be afraid of going back to such distant times. All it needs to do is to refer to the year before the conquest, and since it is strong enough now not to be conquered, its resistance would doubtless be effective enough. Why not, after all, send back to the Franconian forests all those families still affecting the mad claim to have been born of a race of conquerors and to be heirs to rights of conquest?

Thus purged, the Nation might, I imagine, find some consolation in discovering that it is made up of no more than the descendants of the Gauls and Romans. Indeed, comparing lineage for lineage, might there not be some merit in

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78 Ibid.
79 Thus Boulainvilliers, and those who accepted his characterization of French politics, saw France as what Donald Horowitz calls an ‘ethnically ranked system’. Where social class and ethnic origins coincide, Horowitz says, “it is possible to speak of ranked ethnic groups; where groups are cross-class, it is possible to speak of unranked ethnic groups. . .If ethnic groups are ordered in a hierarchy, with one superordinate and another subordinate, ethnic conflict moves in one direction, but if groups are parallel, neither subordinate to the other, conflict takes a different course.” Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Second ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 22.
80 Despite the rare objections of skeptics such as Voltaire,” Michael Dietler explains, “the historical and philosophical literature of the time reflects a general acceptance among intellectuals of the ethnic construction of class.” Dietler, “Our Ancestors the Gauls,” 587.
pointing out to our poor fellow citizens that descent from the Gauls and the Romans might be at least as good as descent from the Sicambrians, Welches, and other savages from the woods and swamps of ancient Germania? “Yes,” some might say, “but the conquest disrupted all relationships, causing hereditary nobility to be transferred to the descendants of the conquerors.” Well and good! We shall just have to transfer it back again. The Third Estate will become noble again by becoming a conqueror in its turn.  

Others put the issue more sharply. “How long will you endure that we bear the infamous name of French,” one complainant to the administrators of the department of Paris wrote, “now that we have at last thrown off our shackles? While they repudiate the offer of brotherhood, we make a show of extravagant servility in calling ourselves by their name. Are we really the offspring of their impure blood? God forbid, citizens! We are descended from the pure-blooded Gauls.” Empress Catherine II of Russia, on the other hand, wrote to Baron von Grimm: “Do you not see what is happening in France? The Gauls are driving out the Franks. But you will see the Franks return and then the ferocious beasts thirsting for human blood will either be exterminated or forced to hide wherever they can.”

Rome provided a source for symbolic resources and institutional models for the republic, and then the empire under Napoleon, but, Michael Dietler argues, the Gauls “provided a better potential foundation for an emotionally charged sense of ethnic community.”

The conflict narrative was reinvigorated during the Bourbon Restoration (1814–1830), and became a key theme in Romantic historiography. “The student of the period,” Jacques Barzun explains, “sometimes feels that every adult Frenchman between 1800 and 1850 must have been compelled to set down his own ideas about the Franks and the Gauls, Clovis and

82 Sieyès, “What Is the Third Estate?,” 99. In a note on page 177, editor Michael Sonenscher claims that Sieyès, like Voltaire, had no patience for this kind of historical justification. Sonenscher does not, however, provide any textual evidence for this claim and, whether Sieyès actually believed what he was saying or not, he obviously expected that these claims would resonate with his readers.
83 Mr. Ducalle, quoted in Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, 29.
84 Catherine II (April 1793), quoted in Ibid.
85 Dietler, "Our Ancestors the Gauls."
Charlemagne, the régime in power and the panacea just ahead.” François Dominique de Reynaud, Comte de Montlosier, published a three-volume work in 1814 that took up Boulainvilliers’ cause, branding most of his “fellow citizens as an alien race: freedmen, slaves wrested from their masters’ hands, folk with whom the count’s kind had nothing in common except, presumably, conflict.”

The most influential authors during this period, however, were the famous historian Augustin Thierry and historian and statesman François Guizot. They read and agreed with Montlosier’s understanding of French society, but fought on the other side. Just like the Saxons in England who had been conquered by the Normans, Thierry argued, the Third Estate in France was descended from a conquered people and had to set things right. Guizot stated their perspective clearly:

The Revolution was a war, a real war, such as the world recognises when it is waged between nations. For over thirteen centuries France contained two nations, a people of conquerors and a people of the conquered. . .Franks and Gauls, lords and peasants, nobles and commoners, all these, long before the Revolution, were all alike called Frenchmen and were equally entitled to claim France as their country. But time, which nourishes all things, will not destroy anything that is. . .The struggle continued throughout all the ages, in every possible manner, with all kinds of arms. When in 1789 the representatives of all France met together in a single assembly, the two peoples hastened to resume their ancient quarrel. The day had at last arrived for bringing it to a close.”

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88 As Weber explains, “Historians were the clerisy of the nineteenth century because it fell to them to rewrite foundation myths; and history was the theology of the nineteenth century because it provided societies cast loose from the moorings of custom and habit with new anchorage in a rediscovered—or reinvented—past.” Indeed, “most political and intellectual figures of nineteenth-century France bore Thierry’s mark, and had to take sides for or against his thesis.” According to Barzun, Thierry’s “works went through dozens of editions in a short time and the demands made upon him by editors and publishers very soon contributed to loss of health and eyesight.” Weber, *My France*, 23, 25; Barzun, "Romantic Historiography," 320.
89 Weber, "Gauls Versus Franks," 10. Thierry’s understanding of England was shaped by the work of David Hume and Walter Scott.
The July Revolution (1830), Léon Poliakov argues, marks “the starting-point of the triumphant career of the Gallic view of France” championed by Thierry, Guizot, and others.91 “Nos ancêtres les gaulois” became a rallying cry for all members of French society and, by the time of the Second Empire (1852–1870), even Napoleon III saw fit to celebrate Vercingetorix, a Gaulish king who tried to liberate Gaul from the Roman Empire in 52 BCE, alongside Caesar as a father of the French nation. In history lessons, which became mandatory in primary schools in 1867, Vercingetorix was characterised as the original French national hero.92 The victory of the Gaulish history of France was solidified during the Third Republic. In *Les Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France* (1877), Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges devoted four chapters to the legend of the Frankish enslavement of the conquered Gauls, lamenting that it had a very strong hold on both historians and the masses.93 Jean Macé, founder of the *Ligue de l’enseignement*, wrote a popular book for young people titled *La France avant les Francs* (1881) that attacked other books that began French history with Clovis.94 The phrase ‘our ancestors the Gauls’ was not found in this book, however, and, starting in the 1880s, reconciliation was taught over conflict, and textbooks were more likely to use the phrases ‘les Gaulois nos premiers ancêtres’ or ‘les Gaulois nos vrais ancêtres’. Nevertheless, France’s Gaulish heritage remained a powerful theme throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. During World War II, the occupation government of Marshall Pétain and the Resistance struggled for control over Gaulish

91 Ibid., 32.
92 Dietler, "Our Ancestors the Gauls," 588-90. Napoleon III commissioned a statue of Vercingetorix (with a face modelled after his own) that was erected at Alésia, the site of the final Gaulish defeat, in 1865. Napoleon saw the defeat as a painful but necessary step in the progression from barbarism to civilization. According to Timothy Baycroft, the phrase ‘our ancestors the Gauls’ “remained in use in French school-books well beyond the Second World War.” Timothy Baycroft, "France: Ethnicity and the Revolutionary Tradition," in *What Is a Nation? Europe 1789-1914*, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 35, n. 22.
94 Ibid., 14.
symbols, especially Vercingetorix—the former to justify surrender to an overwhelming force, the latter insurrection. Later, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s xenophobic Front National party has used to the slogan “Gaul for Gauls” in its rallies.

Finally, as this overview of the Franks and the Gauls debate suggests, religion also played an important role in French nationalization. In his book Faith in Nation and article “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions”, Anthony Marx argues that French national unity was founded on the exclusion of non-Catholics from the state.95 “Religious groups seen as assimilable,” he explains, were forced to convert or lose rights after the French religious wars of the sixteenth century threatened the crown, and again when absolutist rule was shaken by revolt in the next century. Catherine de Medici and her sons maneuvered to retain power against noble challengers by harnessing the passion of anti-Protestantism, consolidating an alliance with the Guise faction, which was cemented with the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of the Huguenots. Toleration and order were restored only by the Catholic-converted Henri IV, who inherited the throne after the death of the last of Catherine’s sons. But Louis XIV again faced challenges from restive nobles and peasants, forcing the monarch to flee Paris during the Fronde. To further consolidate his rule, the sun king restricted the Huguenots and in 1685 expelled those remaining, thereby aligning himself further with the Catholic Church, which reciprocated by offering offices to idle nobles. The absolutist French state was thus built with the crutch of religious exclusion, except for the notable period when relative peace allowed for toleration under Henri IV’s Edict of Nantes. By the time of the French Revolution, expulsion had produced relative religious homogeneity allowing for a liberal rhetoric of more inclusive nationalism.96

Marx overstates his argument, given that the conflicts that he describes were largely elite power struggles and not enough to nationalize the masses, but religion did play an important role in French nation-building. The exclusion of non-Catholics provided not only a set of shared social context for the population, but also the earliest institutional infrastructure for socializing

96 Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” 116. These major ‘waves of religious exclusion’ were preceded by earlier exclusions, such as the expulsion of the Jews in 1394. Faith in Nation, 46.
the masses. The population of France did not all see themselves as French, however, for some time after the period that Marx suggests.

Processes of nationalization

In fact, as Eugen Weber demonstrates in his well-respected study of nationalizing processes, most peasants in rural France did not conceive of themselves as members of any nation as recently as 1870, and many still did not as late as the First World War. The extension of French national consciousness throughout the territory of France was not completed until more than a century after the French Revolution, and was accomplished only through the deliberate and often coercive assimilation project initiated by the Third Republic (1870–1940).

Nineteenth-century peasants were regarded as savages by many Parisians and other city-dwellers. Peasants were not integrated into French civilization, and the prevailing belief was that they “had to be taught manners, morals, literacy, a knowledge of French, and of France, a sense of the legal and institutional structure beyond their immediate community.”

The first condition for this transformation was roads. France had them, but the layout was designed to serve the government and cities, and did not have a supporting network of secondary highways to connect the countryside. “What has to be remembered,” Weber explains, “is that the

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97 To give just one example, David Bell argues that the Church provided the modern French state with a model for linguistic assimilation. David A. Bell, "Lingua Populi, Lingua Dei: Language, Religion, and the Origins of French Revolutionary Nationalism," The American Historical Review 100, no. 5 (1995).
99 Ibid., 5.
highway system was only a skeleton. The main roads, to which most of our statistics refer until the 1860’s, stood in the same relation to France as the Nile to Egypt: fertilizing only a narrow strip along their course, becoming nationally relevant only in terms of their tributaries and of what irrigation could be based on them.”

The same was true for the first railway lines. There were efforts to improve road conditions from at least mid-century, but the first real change came in 1881 when the public interest in building rural roads was recognized by law and a serious effort to improve and expand the road system began. Similar laws led to the growth of railroad system at the same time. Most notably, 16,000 km of railway track, at a cost of more than nine billion francs, was built over ten years under the 1879 Freycinet Plan. “For the first time,” Weber says, “millions flowed into the country-side, especially through those disinherited regions this study is about.”

The reason for these and other measures was “a political conjunction in which the interests of capital and of the politicians who sought ways to please it coincided with a political situation that lent new weight to the votes (hence views) of rural populations,” but their effects were cultural and political. “There could be no national unity,” Weber argues, “before there was national circulation.” The new roads and railways joined France’s several parts into one.

Other state co-ordinated initiatives were designed with nation-building in mind. Compulsory primary education and military service were powerful assimilators, which both implemented and were facilitated by language standardization.

According to Abbé Grégoire’s report *Sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue français* (1794), nearly half of France’s 26 million people

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100 Ibid., 196.
101 Ibid., 210.
102 Ibid., 209.
103 Ibid., 218.
had little or no understanding of standard French, and only 11.5 per cent of those who did speak it were fluent, at the time of Revolution. Use of French, which derives from the langue d'oïl dialect francien, was concentrated around Paris and the Île-de-France region, and there was significant linguistic diversity throughout the rest of the country, particularly in the south.

There were at least seven prominent regional languages in 1789. Occitan (languedocien or langue d’oc, sometimes equated with provençal), a Romance language related to French, was the most widely-spoken in the south, and there were significant numbers of Breton, Basque, Catalan, Corsican, Flemish, and German speakers concentrated in different peripheral regions.

France’s many languages became a political issue for the revolutionary governments as early as January 1790. The Estates-General and then the National Assembly had initially accepted and even encouraged multilingualism and translation, but the National Convention, led by the Jacobins, began a campaign in 1794 to eradicate patois and make French the only language used throughout the Republic. The Jacobins were influenced by authors such as Condorcet, who in Cinq mémoires sur l’instruction publique (1791) argued that a standard education, including language, is essential for political equality, but they had other concerns as well. Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac’s report for the Committee of Public Safety, for example,

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104 Anthony R. Lodge, French: From Dialect to Standard (London: Routledge, 1993), 199. As Lodge explains, Grégoire’s statistics were calculated to have maximum political effect and may be somewhat exaggerated. Estimates from other sources, however, do not vary significantly from these numbers.

105 The languages of northern and southern France are conventionally distinguished by their words for ‘yes’: ‘oui’ (langue d’oïl) and ‘oc’ (langue d’oc), respectively.

106 Grégoire identified more than 30 different languages and patois used in France at the time of his report, but not all of them were widely-spoken. James E. Jacob and David C. Gordon, "Language Policy in France," in Language Policy and National Unity, ed. William R. Beer and James E. Jacob (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 113.

107 Bell, "Lingua Populi, Lingua Dei: Language, Religion, and the Origins of French Revolutionary Nationalism," 1405; Anne Judge, "France: 'One State, on Nation, One Language'?," in Language and Nationalism in Europe, ed. Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 72. At first there were two opposing factions in the Convention, both members of the Jacobin political club: the Girondins, who favoured federalism that accommodated the state’s different groups, and the Montagnards, who were committed to an integrated unitary state. The Montagnards prevailed, expelling the Girondins from both the club and Convention and killing their leaders. As a result, the terms ‘Jacobin’ and ‘Montagnard’ are often used as synonyms.

108 Judge, "France: 'One State, on Nation, One Language'?," 72-73.
declared that “federalism and superstition speak low-Breton; emigration and hate for the Revolution speak German; the counterrevolution speaks Italian and fanaticism speaks Basque.” Regional languages, which had already been identified with feudalism and the lower classes, were now in and of themselves a threat to the state.

The Jacobin project, however, was unsuccessful. As James Jacob and David Gordon explain, “the French state posed little threat to the underlying linguistic bedrock of France for nearly a century after the Revolution,” and the limited extent of French nationhood outside of French-speaking areas is well-illustrated by a comment that the Basque Deputy, Garat, made to Napoleon in 1804: “The Revolution passed over them like a great phenomenon which they little understood and which left them what they were before.” The revolutionaries had worked out an educational policy that included teaching *le français national*, a clear and simple form of standard French, but they were unable to implement it before losing power. Napoleon and his successors did little to further the cause beyond what was necessary to improve the efficiency of administrative communication. In 1863, about a quarter of the country’s population still spoke no French.

The Third Republic, founded in 1870 following the defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War, gradually changed all of this.

Compulsory, free education played a primary role. “What made the Republic’s laws so effective was not just that they required all children to attend school and granted them the right to do so free,” Weber argues. “It was the attendant circumstances that made adequate facilities and teachers more accessible; that provided roads on which children could get to school; that,

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110 Ibid.
111 Judge, "France: ‘One State, one Nation, one Language’?," 73.
above all, made school meaningful and profitable, once what the school offered made sense in terms of altered values and perceptions.\textsuperscript{113} Students learned French, new skills, and new ideas, and through this interaction slowly came to see themselves and others like them across the country as co-nationals.

The increasing ease and practice of internal economic migration had a similar effect. Strangers arrived in once insulated communities, Weber explains, “in such numbers as to affect their cohesion and their way of life. . .In France as a whole, the percentage of the population born in one department and living in another, 11.3 in 1861 and 15 in 1881, climbed to 19.6 in 1901. By the end of the First World War one-quarter of the French people lived outside the department where they were born.”\textsuperscript{114} This migration affected both urban and rural areas through interactions with different people and increased demand for education, particularly literacy, because migrants found it useful in their work and for keeping in touch with family by mail. These experiences and the knowledge they provided led to greater political awareness, especially among rural migrants who brought urban ideas and behaviours back home with them. The kind of employment that migrants participated in matter here, though:

Chimney sweeps had few opportunities to establish the sort of relationships that would alter their mentality. The porters and stevedores who worked on the markets, dockyards, or railway stations of Paris, the laborers who went to work in the southern vineyards, above all the petty civil servants, who however low their station were endowed with much prestige, were likely to return home with the radical and anti-clerical ideas they had picked up in town, and to infect their village.\textsuperscript{115}

Accordingly, the experience of these interactions, along with literacy,

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 303.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 290.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 289.
access to books, newspapers, and other sources of information, forged a new attitude to politics, and this in turn cast up new leaders, different from and competing with those molded by the local hierarchy. None of this was entirely new, not even in isolated areas at mid-century. But only improved communications turned a tiny trickle into a mainstream. . .the fundamental point is not the appearance of new ideas, but the appearance of conditions that made such ideas relevant.\textsuperscript{116}

Military service provided another form of migration, with similar results. Systematic conscription in France began in 1798, but was applied unevenly across classes until the 1890s, when all able-bodied men began to serve in the military for two or three year terms. The cross-regional interactions that service provided led to new relationships and knowledge in same way as economic migration, and in some ways was more effective. Even Breton troops who were reluctant to learn French could not help but learn to understand it in this context, for example. The most important effect of military service, however, was that it created a sense of common fate across urban, rural, and class divides through the shared experience of war. The watershed, Weber argues,

was likely the war with Prussia, which mobilized unusually great numbers while focusing attention on their fate, a war also in which the connection between local and national interests became more evident to large numbers of people, marking the beginning of change. The old prejudices took their time to die, and the 1870’s offer scattered instances of enduring antipathy. But the role played by war in promoting national awareness was reinforced by educational propaganda, by developing trade and commercial ties, and finally by something approaching universal service. By the 1890’s there is persuasive evidence that the army was no longer “theirs” but “ours.” Ill-feelings between troops and civilians were countered by the sense of nationality being learned in the school, and in the barracks too. At least for a while, the army could become what its enthusiasts hoped for: the school of the fatherland.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 291.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 298.
As Weber says, however, while “the army turned out to be an agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, civilization. . .Its contribution in all these realms matters less in and of itself than as one factor among many. It was the conjunction of a multiplicity of factors, like the bound rods in the lictors’ bundle, that made their force; it was their coincidence in time that made their effectiveness and their mutual significance.”

4.2 United States of America

The scholarly literature on American nationalism is sparse, in part because until fairly recently it was unusual for the term to be applied to the United States in the first place. Americans are ‘patriots’, but nationalism is a violent, atavistic problem that other people have. “During the 1950s,” as David Waldstreicher explains, “a formidable body of literature insisted that America itself was primarily an idea,” and this dominant trend has continued. There have been some more realistic books and articles published on American nationalism over the past fifteen years, especially following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, but most have maintained the perspective that “the history of racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States is a peripheral topic. Exclusionary practices, whether sanctioned by law or social convention, are seen as aberrations in an otherwise egalitarian historical narrative of the American nation.”

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118 Ibid., 302.
The exceptions to this rule have generally focused on a perceived oscillation between the dominance of civic and ethnic nationalist ideology, particularly among people who have held high government office.\footnote{For example, see Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).} I begin this section by addressing the misrepresentation of Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln as quintessential civic nationalists. This is followed by a discussion of the widespread and persistent view that to be American was to be white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant. I then turn to a discussion of the processes of nationalization in the United States, which are similar to those of France, but differ in some ways because most Americans considered themselves English or British nationals at the time of the Revolution.

\textit{Participant perspectives}

Just as with France, theorists of civic nationalism have read the intellectuals and political actors that they associate with American civic nationalism selectively. Two in particular, each connected to a different critical juncture in American history, are worth discussing: Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the \textit{Declaration of Independence} (1776) and third president; and Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth president, who presided during the American Civil War and issued the \textit{Emancipation Proclamation} (1863) that formally freed all slaves in states or portions of states that had rebelled.

Hans Kohn argues that the election of Jefferson, who he describes as a champion of the eternal, inherent, and inalienable rights of man, is an “outstanding example not only of the birth
of a new way of life but of nationalism as a new way of life.”\(^\text{123}\) Jefferson, he says, “believed the young nation had been singled out by Providence to become the embodiment of the rational and liberal ideals of the eighteenth century.”\(^\text{124}\) He saw America as a universal nation, both in principle and in racial and linguistic composition. “Every man,” he quotes from Jefferson, “and every body of men on earth, possesses the right of self-government. They receive it with their being from the hand of nature. Individuals exercise it by their single will; collections of men by that of their majority.”\(^\text{125}\)

As historian T.H. Breen explains, however, Jefferson’s republican nationalism awarded a privileged role to independent agrarian property holders, [and he]. . . began to express second thoughts about the kind of open-ended rights talk that had inspired the black slaves of Boston. To be sure, he still claimed to believe that all men were created equal and were endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, but like many contemporaries after 1780 he carefully explained that since blacks were not fully human they could not possibly share the same natural rights as did the white yeomen farmers who figured so prominently in his strangely tortured Notes on the State of Virginia. Republican patriots were white men who cultivated the land, who had sufficient real property to preserve an independent political judgment, and who had enough virtue to resist the soft, effeminate manners of a European aristocracy.\(^\text{126}\)

To her credit, Greenfeld recognizes this stain on Jefferson’s allegedly civic nationalist record. He was deeply troubled, she says

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\(^\text{123}\) Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 271.

\(^\text{124}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{125}\) Jefferson, quoted in Ibid., 280.

\(^\text{126}\) T.H. Breen, "Interpreting New World Nationalism," in Nationalism in the New World, ed. Don H. Doyle and Marco Antonio Pamplona (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 56. The “black slaves of Boston” that Breen refers to were a group that in 1773 sent a petition to British General Thomas Gage asking for abolition. Also, Breen makes a distinction between revolutionary and republican nationalism. The former spoke the universal language of rights, and employed an emotional rhetoric that left the successful white revolutionaries feeling as though they had opened Pandora’s Box. “The new sovereign republic,” on the other hand, “discouraged people from thinking in radical terms of universal rights and equality. The key word defining republican nationalism was citizen, not subject, and since not everyone could become a citizen in the independent government of the United States, it swiftly became clear that the challenge was determining who would qualify as a citizen.” (55)
by the problem of men owning other men, though chiefly on account of its effects on the owners [including himself]. After all, it was not difficult, in the framework of his view of human nature, to find a perfectly rational basis for slavery. The claim to liberty was based on reason. For Jefferson, reason was infallible and unassailable, perfect. This implied that there could be no degrees of reason: one either had it in its perfection, or did not have it. The Negroes, so Jefferson staunchly believed, were intellectually inferior to white men. This imperfection of their reason, which negated it altogether, excluded them from the race of men who were born equal and endowed by nature with an inalienable right to liberty.  

Unfortunately, Greenfeld chooses to interpret these facts as an aberration from an inevitable progression toward the true civic character of American nationhood, rather than evidence that at least some of the founders of the United States did not conceive of nationhood as theorists of civic nationalism would have us believe. Rationality confers liberty to those who have it: white men.  

Lincoln is also commonly understood as a civic nationalist, largely for his role in the formal abolition of slavery, which he had often denounced as inconsistent with the country’s founding principles of freedom and equality.

As Anthony Marx explains, however, this is a yet another selective characterization.

Alongside and often opposed by the abolitionists, there emerged a more moderate movement in favour of returning the slaves to Africa. The American Colonization Society, founded in 1817, used federal government and other support to found Liberia and to transport 13,000 blacks there. Lincoln himself advocated this approach, convinced that the “physical differences between the white and black race...will forever forbid the two races living together upon terms of social and political equality,” and that the necessarily inferior position of blacks was inconsistent with American values. Better they should leave. Lincoln even used the term “nigger,” which would come into even greater usage after emancipation.

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127 Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, 430. Kohn, on the other hand, writes as though Jefferson was a perfect egalitarian.
128 It is difficult to understand how Greenfeld can simultaneously recognize the seriousness of these problems and dismiss them as aberrations. Ibid., 459.
Greenfeld argues that “for many Americans, the Civil War marked the line between the dream of nationality and its realization, which was comparable to the significance of the Revolution and the Constitution for other generations.”

She also recognizes, however, that for Lincoln the purpose of the Civil War was to preserve the Union: “with regard to the slaves of the Rebels. . .I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. . .My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it. . .What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save this Union, and what I forbear I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union.”

If Lincoln was an exception, Greenfeld’s nonchalance about his racism might be understandable, but it is easy to demonstrate that his perspective had long been shared by the majority of Americans, and surpassed by many, in both the North and the South. Lincoln was assassinated during the final year of the war, but slavery was abolished at its end, as his Proclamation had promised. “Even in the North, where blacks made up less than 2 percent of the population,” however, “early official discrimination and calls for increased white immigration (from Europe and the South) reflected significant social resistance to racial equality.”

State unity was the primary objective of the war and, now that it was over, the pragmatic choice for reconciliation and reconstruction was to allow the Southern states to impose segregationist “black

with Stephen Douglas: “I am not nor ever have been in favour of bringing about in any way, the social and political equality of the white and black races. . .Blacks must remain inferior.” (121) Jefferson also favoured returning the slaves to Africa, as he indicated in Notes on the State of Virginia (1784).

Greenfeld, Nationalism, 480.
Lincoln, quoted in Ibid., 473.
Marx, Making Race and Nation, 126.
codes’ and later ‘Jim Crow’ laws, some of which remained in place until 1965. A variety of “nonracial subterfuges”, such as property and literacy requirements and a poll tax were implemented to deny the vote to blacks.\textsuperscript{133} “Racial inferiority per se,” as Marx explains, “was used to justify discrimination and exportation as consistent with adherence to the ‘democratic creed of the nation’ as applied only to whites.”\textsuperscript{134} The displacement of sectional animosity onto blacks, he argues, “helped to pacify the regional antagonism that threatened the Union and its economy. Whites could be and were unified as a race through a return to formal and informal discrimination. Blacks thus served as a scapegoat for white unity, allowing for greater stability and reducing the impediment of regional antagonism standing in the way of further nation-state consolidation.”\textsuperscript{135}

Returning to the founding of the republic, it is clear that Greenfeld and Kohn’s claim (discussed in the previous chapter) that the Revolution was an expression of the colonists’ Englishness has some merit, but certainly not because of their love of liberty alone. At the time of the Revolution the American white population was over 60 percent English, nearly 80 percent British, and 98 percent Protestant.\textsuperscript{136} As Breen explains, the Americans had initially attempted to demonstrate, often in shrill patriotic rhetoric, their loyalty to almost everything associated with Great Britain. Before the 1760s they assumed that popular British nationalism was essentially an inclusive category and that by fighting the French in Canada and by regularly proclaiming their support of the British constitution, they merited equal standing with other British subjects who happened to live on the other side of the Atlantic. The colonists were slow to appreciate the growing conflict between nation and empire. . . They believed that the English accepted them as full partners in the British Empire, allies in the continuing wars against France, devout defenders of Protestantism, and eager participants in an expanding world of commerce. Insomuch as Americans during this period spoke the language of national identity, as opposed to that of different

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Ibid., 140.
\item Ibid., 135.
\item Ibid., 136.
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regions and localities, they did so as imperial patriots, as people whose sense of self was intimately bound up with the success and prosperity of Great Britain.  

Ordinary Americans were not interested in developing a separate identity until it became clear that the English had come to see the colonists as different and inferior.  

The shock of English efforts to distinguish themselves from Americans helps to explain the emotional character of latter’s response. “Indeed,” Breen argues, “if one attempts to explain the coming of revolution as a lawyer-like analysis of taxation without representation or as an enlightened constitutional debate over parliamentary sovereignty, one will almost certainly fail to comprehend the shrill, even paranoid, tone of public discourse in the colonies.” Their British brothers, the Americans complained, “had begun treating them like ‘negroes,’ a charge that cannot be easily explained as an American echo of English political opposition.”

This perspective was widespread and openly expressed. James Otis Jr., a respected lawyer and associate of John Adams, publicly lectured an imagined representative of English society during the 1760s: “You think most if not all the Colonists are Negroes and Mulattoes—You are wretchedly mistaken—Ninety nine in a hundred in the more northern Colonies are white, and there is as good blood flowing in their veins, save the royal blood, as any in the three kingdoms.” The anonymous author of A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania (1760) asked, “Can the least spark of reason be offered why a British subject in America shall not enjoy the like safety, the same protection against domestic oppression? . . .Are you not of the same stock?

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139 Ibid.: 32.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.: 32.
Was the blood of your ancestors polluted by a change of soil? Were they freemen in *England* and did they become slaves by a six-weeks’ voyage to *America*?142

These attitudes were rooted in the white-American self-understanding that Eric Kaufmann calls ‘the Anglo-Saxon myth of descent’, adherence to which can be traced as far back as the sixteenth century in England.143 The United States, he explains, began as a collection of cultural regions based around an English settler core: Puritans in New England, Quakers in the Middle Atlantic states, southern English Cavaliers in the coastal South, and Anglo-Scottish Presbyterians in the Appalachian backcountry.144 In addition to a fierce adherence to Protestantism, these groups also shared a myth of common descent from the Anglo-Saxon tribes in England that were conquered by the Normans in 1066 CE.145

Reginald Horsman addresses this belief extensively in his book *Race and Manifest Destiny*. “The various ingredients in the mytho of Anglo Saxon England, clearly delineated in a host of seventeenth and eighteenth-century works,” he says,

appear again in American protests: Josiah Quincy Jr., wrote of the popular nature of the Anglo-Saxon militia; Sam Adams stressed the old English freedoms defended in the Magna Carta; Benjamin Franklin stressed the freedom that the Anglo-Saxons enjoyed in emigrating to England; Charles Carroll depicted Saxon liberties torn away by William the Conqueror; Richard Bland argued that the English Constitution and Parliament stemmed from the Anglo-Saxon period. . .George Washington admired the pro-Saxon history of Catherine Macaulay and she visited him at Mount Vernon after the Revolution.146

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142 Anonymous, quoted in Ibid. “The word ‘slaves’, ” Breen says, “catches our attention. It is hard to believe that in this context the author was using it as a political abstraction, to describe a people without rights. The complaint is about ‘the blood of your ancestors,” and it clearly carried a message of racial debasement. ”


145 “The English,” as Poliakov puts it, “had four great mythologies with which to construct their own myth of origin—the Greco–Roman, the Celtic, the Germanic and the Hebrew. It is well known that the two latter were the mainstay of their traditions and were carried across the Atlantic.” Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*, 38.

The most explicit evidence of the American infatuation with the Anglo-Saxons both before and after the Revolution, Kaufmann argues, are the words of Jefferson, “who proclaimed to John Adams after drafting the Constitution in 1776 that the Americans were ‘the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.”147 Jefferson also suggested “marking the seal of the United States with portrayals of the two great ancestral crossings, that of the sea by Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs, and that of the desert by the children of Israel.”148

By the mid-nineteenth century, Kaufmann explains,

the Anglo-Saxon myth came to be grafted onto American experience. . .For instance, the New England town meeting was likened to the Anglo-Saxon tribal council, and the statements of Tacitus regarding the free, egalitarian qualities of the Anglo-Saxons were given American interpretation. The most widely read American historians of the late nineteenth century—George Bancroft, William Prescott, John Motley, and Francis Parkman—helped popularize the myth, as did English literature scholars. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century utterances by American elites such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson provide further evidence that the Anglo-Saxon myth was a historicist force in the American conscience collective.149

There are obvious parallels between the common English and American association with the Anglo-Saxons and the French association with the Gauls. “The idea that the Anglo-Saxon English had self-selected themselves through immigration to escape the British (Norman) yoke to bring the torch of freedom to America,” Kaufmann argues, “was a quintessential myth of

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149 Kaufmann, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America, 18.
ethnogenesis.” Walter Scott’s books, particularly *Ivanhoe* (1820), were widely read and portrayed English history as a series of clashes between hostile races, favouring the Anglo-Saxons. In fact, Augustin Thierry’s understanding of the conflict between the Franks and the Gauls was deeply influenced by Scott’s historiography, and he published a well-received book titled *Histoire de la Conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands* in 1825. David Hume’s best-selling, six-volume *History of England* (1754–62) “contrasted the ‘degenerate’ and ‘abject’ Britons [the Celtic people that dominated England until the fifth century CE] with the valiant Anglo-Saxons,” and depicted “William the [Norman] Conqueror in the blackest of colours as the tyrant who put an end to the liberties of the English by ‘seizing their possessions and reducing them to the most abject slavery’.” Beyond intellectual debate, the Leveller and Digger movements during the Puritan Revolution explicitly associated Anglo-Saxon origins with the working class and their cause.

Divine election is a key component of the Anglo-Saxon myth. Linda Colley argues that Protestantism was the most important factor in the establishment of British national identity in her well-received book * Britons.* She begins her story with the *Acts of Union* (1707), but her argument is equally applicable, with some allowable adjustment, to both England and America in the seventeenth century:

More than anything else, it was this shared religious allegiance combined with recurrent wars that permitted a sense of British national identity to emerge alongside of, and not necessarily in competition with older, more organic attachments to England, Wales or Scotland, or to country or village. Protestantism

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153 Ibid., 47.

was the dominant component of British religious life. Protestantism coloured the way that Britons approached and interpreted their material life. Protestantism determined how most Britons viewed their politics. And an uncompromising Protestantism was the foundation on which their state was explicitly and unapologetically based.\(^{155}\)

This does not mean that the British were invariably pious, or “particularly assiduous in terms of their attendance at formal worship. Church attendance was actually in decline here as it was in other parts of western Europe. But the Protestant world-view was so ingrained in this culture that it influenced people’s thinking irrespective of whether they went to church or not, whether they read the Bible or not, or whether, indeed, they were capable of reading anything at all.”\(^{156}\)

This Protestant identity, Kaufmann explains,

also fed off a tradition of anti-Catholicism that was well established in Britain by the early eighteenth century, forged as it was through protracted warfare with France and fanned by a stream of popular pamphlet literature. In the American colonies, the French and Indian War of 1754–1763 helped to ignite these inherited British anti-Catholic sensibilities. The treatment of French-speaking, Catholic, Acadian refugees illustrates the degree to which an exclusive Anglo-Protestant consciousness operated in this period just prior to independence, for “at no time were the Acadian exiles given more than grudging acceptance.”\(^{157}\)

A good example of this is Alexander Hamilton’s staunch opposition to the Quebec Act of 1774, which retained the laws and customs—including Catholicism—of the French in Canada, as ‘popish’ and an affront to American (read Protestant) values.\(^{158}\) A formal separation of church and state was instituted after the Revolution, but this had more to do with the premise that true conversion could not be coerced more than anything else.

\(^{155}\) Ibid., 18. Colley does not spend much time discussing the United States, but clearly thinks that her argument is applicable there as well. America, she says, “raucously proclaimed itself not just independent, but freer, better and more genuinely Protestant than the mother country.” (4)

\(^{156}\) Ibid., 31.


\(^{158}\) Ibid.
Processes of nationalization

Efforts toward nation-building began in earnest after the Revolution. Indeed, as John Murrin argues, the colonists had not entirely expected secession, and it would be some time before they would come to uniformly understand themselves as American nationals. Unlike the French, however, the Americans were branching off a pre-existing English (or perhaps British) national identity. The facts that everyone spoke English, most were Protestant, and the literacy rate was high provided powerful means for creating new networks of relations and a sense of shared identity across the independent republic.

Unfortunately, the sparse literature on American nationalism focuses almost entirely on ideology, and there is no equivalent to Weber’s excellent Peasants into Frenchmen that thoroughly addresses the actual processes responsible for nationalization. There are exceptions, however, which paint a picture that is similar to the French case. Interestingly, Stephen Minicucci argues that early nation-builders of most political stripes themselves emphasized processes of nationalization that would creation mutual interests and relationships across the territory.

Conscription was not introduced in the United States until the Civil War, but military service during the Revolution still helped lay the foundation for national identity. As Max Savelle puts it,

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the common cause against a common foe [the British] drew men together. The mingling of New Englanders, southerners, and Middle State men in the fight against the common enemy must have tended to dull the sharpness of the state loyalty distinctions among them. The adoption of the Articles of Confederation, albeit at first hardly more than a military alliance, did have the effect of organizing the states and their peoples into a viable common institution.¹⁶¹

Following the Revolution, Federal politicians and bureaucrats, along with merchants in search of a wider market, set out to bridge the considerable divisions among the new country’s population by actively promoting easier transportation, trade, and communication.

The first half of the nineteenth century saw a transportation revolution throughout the United States, George Taylor explains, that tied the country’s regions and people together with roads, bridges, canals, steamboats, and railroads.¹⁶² The effects of this ‘revolution’ were not quite as dramatic as in France, given that rural settlers in the United States were not isolated and distinct from their urban counterparts in the same way that French peasants were, but it did address the ‘problem of space’ by bringing people who would otherwise not have interacted with one another into contact and facilitate migration throughout the country.¹⁶³

This processes was encouraged by state policies aimed at economic integration, such as internal improvement programs, railroad land grants, protective tariffs, and the establishment of the post office and a national bank. According to Minicucci, the purpose of such economic integration was not only economic growth, but also an ‘interest-based’ kind of nation-building: by creating a common and protected national market, the government provided the population

¹⁶³ The term ‘problem of space’ is from Minicucci, "The "Cement of Interests"."
with incentives to develop, maintain, and strengthen relationships across the territory in preference to regional or external alternatives.\textsuperscript{164}

The state also played an active role in the development of a communication infrastructure. One of the features of post-Revolutionary liberal constitutionalism, Paul Starr explains, was the creation of a widespread postal network and the promotion of a free press through measures such as discounted shipping costs.\textsuperscript{165} Newspapers were particularly influential in this process, Paul Nord argues:

In 1791, James Madison explained (in a newspaper article) the relationship between public communication and republican government. ‘Whatever facilitates a general intercourse of sentiments,’ he said, ‘as good roads, domestic commerce, a free press, and particularly a circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people,. . .is equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits, and is favorable to liberty.’ The next year, the Congress passed a postal act that clearly established the newspaper as a favored instrument of national communication policy. This act set postage for newspapers so low that newspaper circulation would be heavily subsidized. In the debates over this 1792 act, no one proposed setting newspaper rates equal to letter rates; everyone took the subsidy of newspaper circulation to be a proper function of federal policymaking. Throughout the period, the arguments changed little. In 1817, John C. Calhoun seemed to almost be quoting Madison’s essay of 1791. He urged Congress to ‘bind the republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals. Let us conquer space. . .It is thus that a citizen of the West will read the news of Boston still moist from the press. The mail and the press are the nerves of the body politic.’\textsuperscript{166}

As in France, mass education played a crucial role in nation-building in the United States. In post-Revolution America, however, the early drive for public education came from below, at least in the North and West. As John Meyer \textit{et al.} explain, the state was very weak in most communities during the nineteenth century, and “the spread of schooling in the rural North and

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
West can best be understood as a social movement implementing a commonly held ideology of nation building. It combined the outlook and interests of small entrepreneurs in a world market, evangelical Protestantism, and an individualistic concept of the polity.” Southerners were also deeply Protestant, but the South’s significantly different political economy during this period led to a different approach to education; on the eve of the Civil War the South provided only 10.6 days of public school per white child, compared with 63.5 in the North and 49.9 in the West.

In the rest of the country, however, the process of school-formation based on an institution-building social movement similar to the one that led to the mass voluntary creation churches in American society. “These groups acted not simply to protect the status of their own children,” Meyer et al. argue,

but to build a millennial society for all children. Their modes of thought and action were at once political, economic, and religious. That these school promoters were often in fact ethnocentric and served their own religious, political, and economic interests is quite clear; but they were doing so in a very broad way by constructing an enlarged national society.

This focus of education began to shift in the mid-nineteenth century with the reforms initiated by Horace Mann in Massachusetts, which led to a system of standardized, secular ‘Common Schools’ intended to instill basic skills and a sense of common purpose and ideals. The United States’ federal structure and the divisions between the North and South, however, meant that state-driven formal education did not become dominant until the Progressive Era (c. 1890–1920), which in its push for modernization bears some resemblance to France during the Third Republic.

168 Ibid.: 600.
169 Ibid.: 601.
Finally, David Waldstreicher argues that local nationalist festivals and other celebrations played an important role in the early development of American nationhood.\textsuperscript{170} “These nationalist celebrations, he says, “consisted of far more than parades: there were orations, celebratory dinners at which politically rousing toasts were given, and printed commentary on all of these in their wake.”\textsuperscript{171} Abstract nationalist ideology is not insignificant, he says, but it was the “mobilization of citizens to celebrate patriotic occasions, with the reprinting of accounts of these events, [that] gave the abstractions of nationalist ideology a practical sense.”\textsuperscript{172} “Such rituals might have aspired to a unity beyond political division,” he argues, “but, because of their origins and the political needs of various groups, they did not and could not merely reflect ideological consensus. Instead, they engendered both nationalism and political action.”\textsuperscript{173} Participants developed a practical sense of American nationhood and developed new relationships with other celebrants, both those they met and the ones that they read about in newspapers, pamphlets, and other publications. “During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, newspapers transformed the very rituals that they might seem to merely describe.”\textsuperscript{174} A good example of such celebrations are the Grand Federal Processions that were held across the country from 1787–88, organized by the Federalist Party. “The processions,” Waldstreicher says, “transcended local significance because they were repeated, recorded, and reinterpreted: as each state ratified the Constitution, Federalists in all the other states reprinted accounts of the faraway festivals in their local newspapers and celebrated again. The local uses of the streets reverberated nationally.”\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{170} David Waldstreicher, "Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent: Celebrations, Print Culture, and the Origins of American Nationalism," \textit{The Journal of American History} 82, no. 1 (1995); Waldstreicher, \textit{Perpetual Fetes}.\textsuperscript{171} Waldstreicher, \textit{Perpetual Fetes}, 8.\textsuperscript{172} “Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent,” 38.\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Perpetual Fetes}, 8.\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 10.\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
4.3 Summary

The evidence presented in these two brief sketches clearly demonstrates that there are major problems with the civic nationalist account of nationalization in France and the United States. It misrepresents key intellectuals and political actors, ignores widespread nationalist self-understandings that are inconsistent with civic nationalist principles, and tendentiously focuses on just one of several effects produced by the social processes responsible for nationalization.

Sieyès, Jefferson, and Lincoln all advocate principles and behaviour that are consistent with liberal-democracy, and this is what theorists of civic nationalism emphasize when using these authors to support their historiography. The meaning of this advocacy, however, has to be understood in the context of the widespread beliefs about class, ethnicity, race, and religion that these men shared with their contemporaries. Clearly, their arguments on behalf of ‘the people’ were restricted to a specific subset of the state’s male population rather than everyone subject to its authority. The Third Estate was similar to what we would now call the middle class, the inalienable rights of men did not apply to non-whites because they were not considered fully human, and liberty was the heritage and destiny of the Gauls or the Anglo-Saxons. These views were not shared by everyone, but they were held by many intellectuals and political actors that are often characterized as civic nationalists, and widely influential among the segment of the general population that was literate.

This does not mean, however, that France and the United State are ‘really’ ethnic or religious nations. It demonstrates that many early French and American nationals viewed themselves quite differently from how they have been portrayed in civic nationalist historiography, but these ideological self-understandings are no more accurate representations of
the mechanisms responsible for national identity than those of civic nationalists. As I argued in the previous chapter, simple ideological diffusion of any kind is a flawed and incomplete explanation of mass nationalization, and the evidence just presented suggests that social relations are in themselves at least as important as the ideas that they interact with.

The processes of nationalization that I described above are not contentious. Both Greenfeld and Kohn attribute nationalization to more or less the same social processes, many of which are closely associated with modernization: administrative centralization, the improvement and spread of transportation infrastructure, language standardization, mass compulsory education, mass media development and consumption, intra-state trade and economic migration, and mass military service. The disagreement is on how to interpret these processes and their effects. For theorists of civic nationalism, the principal effect of these processes was the diffusion of civic nationalist ideology.

Nationalist ideology is unquestionably part of nationalization but, as we have seen, elite nationalist ideology in France and the United States was inconsistent with the civic nationalism in important ways. Furthermore, we know from the studies of ideological diffusion discussed in the previous chapter that individual understanding and even awareness of any ideology is dramatically inconsistent across social strata. Given these facts, it is difficult to see how the successful diffusion of any set of ideological principles alone could be responsible for mass nationalization in France, the United States, or anywhere else.

The authors whose work informs my alternative account focus on culture instead of ideology. This is potentially confusing because ideology is obviously cultural, and the notoriously indeterminate term ‘culture’ is often defined as a ‘set of values and beliefs’ that sounds a lot like ideology, but for Gellner, Anderson, Brubaker, and Tilly it has a broader
meaning that includes practices and dispositions. More than just a ‘way of thinking’, for these authors culture is a ‘way of life’ that goes beyond politics and is both produced by and regulates the way that people interact with one another.

This perspective is a much better fit for the evidence just presented. The processes of nationalization in France and the United States, ranging from standardized education to military service, certainly spread ideas, but they also spread and homogenized language, practices, habits, dispositions, and expectations by redefining the social milieu, bringing together people who otherwise would not have interacted, and forcing them to establish a rapport in the broadest sense of the word. Nationalization, on this account, first and foremost produces nationals rather than principled nationalists.

As I argued above, however, common culture by itself is not enough to explain national identity. This premise is present to varying degrees in Gellner, Anderson, Brubaker, and Tilly’s theories despite their focus on culture, but it is best addressed using the concept of relational nationhood that I introduced earlier. Since it is common for cultural traits such as language, practices, and dispositions to be shared across national boundaries, the determining factor for national identity is the network of social ties that produces and is reproduced by shared patterns of culture.

This is amply demonstrated by the processes of nationalization in France and the United States just discussed. France’s schoolchildren, for example, were certainly taught that “la France est votre patrie” and that being French was synonymous with being free (though, as we have seen, this was for some time after the Revolution characterized as a Gaulish birthright and not just a property of citizenship), but, whatever the content of this education, its efficacy was dependent on its form. Students in France, the United States, or anywhere else are nationalized
not merely by being exposed to ideas—the significance of these ideas is that they help to frame lived social ties. As mass education was institutionalized, people who had previously had little or no interaction with one another were brought together to learn a standard language, new skills, and new ideas. This common, collective experience was repeated all over the country and, combined with other processes that linked these relatively isolated schooling experiences with the inter-regional interactions through as military service, economic migration, increased commercial trade, and mass media, produced both a shared way of life and a sense of common identification. The specific ideological or other cultural traits did and do not matter; it is their coincidence with specific networks of social ties that made French and American nationals.

5. **Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce an alternative approach to nations and nationalism that modifies Gellner and Anderson’s ‘system of culture’ arguments with the kind of relational social theory advocated by Brubaker and Tilly, and to use this approach as part of an evaluation of civic nationalist historiography of French and American nation-building.

I began by explaining that relationalism, which is well-known in sociology but has only recently been applied in political science, is a constructivist social ontology that treats social phenomena as the product of regularities in social relations rather than substantial entities, meaning that social groups, for example, are the way that we conceptualize particular kinds of enduring, processual relationships between people, not ‘things’ in themselves. There are two influential schools of relational social theory, the ‘Bourdieu school’ and the ‘New York school’,
which respectively provide the foundation for Brubaker and Tilly’s relational approaches to nations and nationalism.

My modified relational approach starts with the premise that the most important characteristics of Gellner and Anderson’s theories is that they identify what Gellner calls processes of ‘exo-socialization’, such as mass education, intra-state transportation infrastructure, and inter-regional economic trade and migration. It is these usually institutionally-driven ‘relational mechanisms’, to use Tilly’s term, that create relational ties between people who may otherwise have never come into contact with one another. Ideology is important, but social relationships are the foundation of nationhood and, while ideology can shape these relationships (especially when institutionalized), it is the relationships themselves that generate a sense of national identity and facilitate shared ideological values, not the other way around, as civic nationalists would have us believe. To facilitate this argument, I proposed the adoption of two separate analytic concepts: ‘ideational nationhood’, a participant perspective which refers to nations as they are understood by social actors, and ‘relational nationhood’, an analytical perspective that refers to the dense network of overlapping social ties created and perpetuated through nationalizing processes.

Finally, I argued that a critical analysis of civic nationalist historiography of nation-building in France and the United States demonstrates that it is deeply flawed and best seen as a tendentious, ideologically motivated story rather than an accurate representation of history. My discussion of each case was divided into two sections, ‘participant perspectives’ and ‘processes of nationalization’. The first clearly shows that the civic nationalist account of nationalization in both France and the United States misrepresents key intellectuals and political actor and ignores widespread nationalist self-understandings that are inconsistent with civic nationalist principles.
The second provides evidence that my alternative relational approach to nations and nationalism is a more promising way to explain the emergence of nationhood in these territories than ideological diffusion alone.

This completes the third stage of my argument and the foundation of my critique of civic nationalism. In the following two chapters I move on to the fourth and final stage of my argument, where I explain the practical implications of the preceding contentions for the feasibility of civic nationalism as a policy prescription for intra-state nationalist conflict regulation and immigrant integration.
Chapter 6

Conflict regulation

In the preceding three chapters I have argued that the principles of civic nationalist ideology are inconsistent and often misconceived, that theorists of civic nationalism are wrong to treat nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon, and that a relational approach is a better fit for the history of French and American nationalization, and nations and nationalism in general, than civic nationalist historiography, which is politically motivated and inconsistent with the evidence. The purpose of this and the next chapter is to apply this cumulative analysis to two important policy issues that civic nationalism is commonly prescribed as the solution to, intra-state nationalist conflict regulation and immigrant integration, and to demonstrate that civic nationalism is not a feasible response to either of these issues.

Intra-state nationalist conflict is conflict between two or more different groups of nationalists residing within the same state, and is often mistakenly referred to as ‘ethnic conflict’. Civic nationalism, often in the guise of ‘national integration’, is the preferred conflict regulation policy of most democratic states and international organizations, and the dominant approach among academics who study such conflicts. Civic nationalists and other integrationists attribute intra-state nationalist conflict to a wide variety of causes, but tend to focus on a version of what is often called the ‘elite manipulation’ argument: national identities are seen as highly contingent, malleable products of ideological manipulation by opportunistic elites. Integrationists argue that plurinational states are inherently unstable and unjust, and insist that an integrated nation-state is the only way to rectify these problems.
In this chapter I will argue that civic nationalists misrepresent the causes of intra-state nationalist conflict and that, while deliberate integration may be appropriate in rare circumstances, in most cases it is a potential result of successful conflict regulation rather than a means of achieving it, and even then civic nationalism is not an appropriate model. Civic nationalist historiography obscures the majoritarian bias of civic nationalism and the undesirable methods and processes through which purportedly civic nations were built, which, even if they were once attractive, are now no longer viable. In most cases, intra-state nationalist conflict is the product of and perpetuated by political decisions and their path-dependent, institutionalized consequences, and its regulation is constrained by durable identities and the network of social relationships that undergird them. While integration may be possible, it is a process that will take several generations, and only if the conflict has been pragmatically addressed in the short- and medium-term.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section one defines intra-state nationalist conflict and surveys the five most common ways to explain it. The second section offers a similar overview of methods of regulating conflict in plurinational states, providing a useful analytic vocabulary for both this chapter and the next. Part three addresses civic nationalism as a form of intra-state nationalist conflict regulation, first by discussing the principles and recommendations of its most prominent advocates in this context, and then explaining the problems that make civic nationalism a poor choice. In the final section I apply these arguments to the case of Northern Ireland to explain why civic nationalism was not an option there, and only a consociational power-sharing agreement that recognizes the territory’s plurinational character was able to bring the violence to an end.
I. Intra-state nationalist conflict and its causes

‘Intra-state nationalist conflict’ is conflict between two or more different groups of nationalists residing within the same state. This is often referred to as ‘ethnic conflict’ but, as John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary argue, we should distinguish nationalist from ethnic conflict, even though ethnicity is often important to nationalists.1 Some authors claim that there is no such thing as ‘nationalist’ or ‘ethnic’ conflict, arguing that these adjectives wrongly attribute the cause of the conflict to the simple presence of national or ethnic groups in the same state.2 They are right to question ‘primordialists’ who characterize nationality and ethnicity as inherently conflictual, but most people who study nationalist or ethnic conflict are not primordialists, and use these terms to refer to conflict that is significantly framed or otherwise affected by the national or ethnic perceptions of its participants, as I do here.3

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2 Bruce Gilley, "Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004).

Intra-state nationalist conflict has been attributed to a wide variety of causes, which can be usefully divided into ‘proximate’ and ‘underlying’ types. Proximate causes are the short-term catalysts that provoke (usually violent) conflict. Michael Brown suggests four categories, distinguished by whether they are triggered by elite or mass-level factors, and whether those factors are internal or external to the state: ‘bad leaders’ (elite/internal); ‘bad neighbours’ (elite/external); ‘bad domestic problems’ (mass/internal); and ‘bad neighbourhoods’ (mass/external). ‘Bad leaders’ includes power struggles involving civilian or military leaders, ideological contests over state affairs, and criminal assaults on the state. ‘Bad neighbours’ is similarly concerned with leadership, but in this case the “discrete, deliberate decisions by governments to trigger conflicts in nearby states for political, economic, or ideological purposes of their own.” ‘Bad domestic problems’ covers state collapse due to political or economic crisis, and ‘bad neighbourhoods’ includes things such as “swarms of refugees or fighters crashing across borders, bringing turmoil and violence with them, or radicalized politics sweeping throughout regions.”

Most explanations of intra-state nationalist conflict, however, focus on long-term, underlying factors. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, many politicians and commentators alike attributed the violent conflict that erupted in these and other regions to ‘ancient hatreds’ between the combatants, but serious scholars reject this claim and instead offer a variety of explanations that can be divided into five general types: psychological, structural, political, economic, and cultural. Psychological explanations tend to

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5 Ibid., 15-16.
6 As Brown notes, though, “underlying factors can play a more catalytic role if rapid changes take place in the area in question”. Ibid., 13.
focus on human nature, but the other four types deal with historical contingencies. In practice
most explanations rely on more than one of these categories, but separating them analytically is a
helpful way to clarify their distinctive characteristics. Authors who advocate civic nationalism as
a solution to intra-state nationalist conflict have attributed it to the full range of these potential
causes, but tend to focus on politics, economics, and structure.

The most common political explanation of nationalist conflict is ‘elite manipulation’,
which is favoured by civic nationalists and comes in two versions. The first suggests that ethnic
and nationalist conflict is often provoked by elites in order to distract the population from other
political or economic troubles. “Ethnic bashing and scapegoating are tools of the trade,” Brown
explains, “and the mass media are employed in partisan and propagandistic ways that further
aggravate inter-ethnic tensions.”

The other version is more drastic, arguing that ethnic and
national groups are themselves an elite fabrication. For these authors, who are sometimes called
‘instrumentalists’, such groups are best understood as “interest groups for which ethnicity serves
as an effective strategy.”

Paul Brass, for example, argues that “ethnic selfconsciousness,
ethnically-based demands, and ethnic conflict can occur only if there is some conflict either
between indigenous and external elites and authorities or between indigenous elites.”

Ethnic
communities are created through the selection of some cultural symbols from a variety of
available alternatives in a manner that benefits particular social groups, leaders, or elites, who
use ethnicity as a basis to “make demands in the political arena for alteration in their status, in

7 Ibid.
8 Lynn Hempel, "What's It Worth to You? The Questionable Value of Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnic
actually makes a distinction between an ‘ethnic group’ as any group of people that is distinguishable from other
groups by objective cultural markers such as language, custom or religion, and an ‘ethnic community’, which is
conscious of membership in such a group. For the sake of simplicity in this discussion, however, I have used ‘ethnic
group’ as a synonym for ‘ethnic community’ in Brass’ sense.
their economic well-being, in their civil rights, or in their educational opportunities,” just as any other interest group does.\textsuperscript{10}

Another political consideration is the type and fairness of the state’s institutions. Authoritarian states that privilege the interests of a particular group will generate resentment among groups that do not benefit from or are oppressed by the regime, and have no institutional mechanism for changing their circumstances.\textsuperscript{11} Democratic institutions can create conflict as well, however, especially in states with majoritarian electoral systems that can turn elections in deeply divided societies into censuses that leave minority groups in perpetual opposition.\textsuperscript{12} The character of a country’s influential nationalist ideologies can also lead to conflict. This is most obviously the case when some residents of the state are excluded in principle from membership in the nation because of their ethnicity, religion, or some other attribute.\textsuperscript{13} Unwanted inclusion in a nation can also be a source of contention, however, especially when the imposing group denies the self-identifications of the people it is trying to incorporate.

There are at least three prominent economic explanations: general economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic development and modernization. The first focuses on the destabilizing effects of economic slowdowns, stagnation, deterioration, and collapse, but is usually used as a context for the political entrepreneurs of the ‘elite manipulation’ argument rather than a stand-alone explanation.\textsuperscript{14} Discriminatory economic systems have a more direct effect. “Unequal economic opportunities, unequal access to resources such as land and capital, and vast differences in standards of living” that are predominantly organized according

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 19. For a discussion of how instrumentalism fits into wider conceptual debates over ethnicity and nationalism, see Larin, "Conceptual Debates."
\item \textsuperscript{11} Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict," 8.
\item \textsuperscript{12} For a discussion of this and associated problems, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," \textit{Journal of Democracy} 4, no. 4 (1993).
\item \textsuperscript{13} Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict," 8-9.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 10.
\end{itemize}
to group membership, Brown explains, “are all signs of economic systems that disadvantaged members of society will see as unfair and perhaps illegitimate.” Economic development or modernization, however, are not necessarily the solution, and can themselves lead to conflict. Economic growth always privileges some individuals, groups, and regions more than others, and these are usually the ones that were on top to begin with. More generally, economic modernization can be a destabilizing force through the introduction of new technologies and divisions of labour, and lead to profound social changes that undermine traditional political institutions. In particular, uneven modernization across regions has attracted considerable attention since the publication of Michael Hechter’s widely-read book *Internal Colonialism*.

Scholars focused on structural explanations have directed their attention to at least three factors: weak states, intra-state security concerns, and ethnic geography. A weak state is one that does not have the capacity to exercise meaningful control over its territory, for reasons ranging from a lack of political legitimacy to reductions in foreign aid. This can lead to the emergence of power struggles between elites, pervasive criminal organizations, massive humanitarian problems such as famines, widespread human rights violations, and conflict between the centre and periphery, especially if peripheral groups have been oppressed by the central government under the control of a rival. Security concerns are another possible effect of a weak state. Groups within certain states are open to security threats from other groups and feel compelled to defend themselves. Barry Posen argues that the concept of the ‘security dilemma’

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15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid.
18 Brown, ”The Causes of Internal Conflict,” 5.
19 Ibid., 5-6.
from realist international relations theory is a useful analogy for this situation.\(^{20}\) The problem or ‘dilemma’ is that it is often difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive moves, so groups that take steps to defend themselves are perceived to threaten the security of others regardless of their intentions. Without some way to reduce the uncertainty, the situation can quickly spiral out of control. Michael Brown calls the third structural explanation ‘ethnic geography’, but the problem applies to national as much as ethnic groups. It refers to the spatial distribution of ethnic or national groups within a heterogeneous state. Countries with highly intermingled populations are less likely to face secessionist demands than those that are spatially segregated but, if such demands are made, it raises the possibility of attacks on unwanted groups who live within the territory that the secessionists see as their own.\(^{21}\)

The influence of these explanations is not limited to authors who endorse civic nationalism, however, and, while those who advocate alternative prescriptions do often emphasize other explanations of conflict, there is considerable category overlap among the different positions. Many opponents of civic nationalism, for example, are concerned with the political dynamics and legacy of institutional design, as well as structural problems that may affect institutional efficacy.

Psychological explanations are also common across positions, but their premises vary. Many advocates of civic nationalism, for example, favour the psychology of rational choice theory, and explain behaviour like elite manipulation as a function of individuals pursuing their material self-interest. Other authors focus on the psychology of groups. One of the best known is Donald Horowitz’s ‘psychology of relative group worth’, which is based on Henri Tajfel’s social


\(^{21}\) Brown, ”The Causes of Internal Conflict,” 6-7.
identity theory. In *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Horowitz argues that a sense of group worth is a fundamental part of individual self-esteem and, because groups can only be evaluated comparatively, there is a natural inclination toward group loyalty, a desire for relative ingroup advantage, and a willingness to incur costs to maximize intergroup differences. Ethnic groups attribute such differences to putatively ascriptive relationships that are difficult or impossible to change, and this leads members to perceive a loss in inter-group competition as a permanent disability. The main ethnic contrast in the African, Asian, and Caribbean states that concern Horowitz is between ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ groups (or, analogously, ‘traditional’ and ‘progressive’ or ‘modern’). The specifics vary across cases but, in general, “to be advanced means to be interested in education and new opportunities, to be tied into the modern sector; to be backward means to have some inhibition on taking up new opportunities and to be somewhat apart from full participation in the modern sector of the economy.” This perspective bears clear similarities to the distinctions between political/Western/civic and cultural/Eastern/ethnic nations and nationalism discussed in chapter two.

Finally, advocates of civic nationalism do not often rely on cultural explanations (with the notable exception of ideology, which they tend to see as a primarily political cause of conflict), but many other authors do. The three most common of these are cultural discrimination, incompatible group perceptions, and religion. Cultural discrimination includes such things as legal and political constraints on the use and teaching of minority languages, interference with religious freedom, and other similar actions intended to delegitimize a particular culture.

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24 Ibid., 148.
25 Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict." 12. Brown focuses on cultural discrimination against minorities specifically, but this focus assumes that the majority ethnic or national group is in power.
‘Incompatible group perceptions’ means that group perceptions of themselves and others can lead to conflict. This is especially true when groups believe or at least profess contradictory histories about the same events, which are often exaggerated or otherwise distorted in favour of fostering in-group solidarity and pride. Religious explanations attribute group antagonisms to differences in religious principle, competing claims over sacralised territory, and other issues derived from one or more religious perspectives.

2. **Approaches to conflict regulation**

A wide range of potential solutions to intra-state nationalist conflict have been proposed that partly map onto the causes discussed in the preceding section, but they are more consistently clustered around two other issues: whether nation-states are considered normatively preferable to plurinational states, and whether national identities are considered to be malleable or durable. A taxonomy of modes of ethnic and nationalist conflict regulation has been developed by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary over several articles (one written with Richard Simeon), which they have most recently organized using a typological distinction between democratic practices that are either ‘integrative’ or ‘accommodative’. This section first discusses practices that are unacceptable to democrats, then assimilation and integration, and finally the range of available

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accommodative options. In general, authors who favour integration, such as civic nationalists, are nation-statists who characterize national identities as malleable and attribute nationalist conflict to ideological manipulation by entrepreneurial elites. Authors who favour accommodation, on the other hand, tend to see plurinationalism as normatively acceptable or even desirable, characterize national identities as a durable result of conditions that go well beyond elite ideology, and attribute nationalist conflict primarily to institutions and political behaviour based on a nation-statist ideal that favours majority ethnic groups and nations.

Undemocratic practices

There are three main practices that are considered unacceptable by most democrats that have been widely used to address intra-state nationalist conflict in the past: genocide, forced mass-population transfer, and hegemonic control. Genocide is the systematic killing of a genos, a race or some other ascriptive kind, with the intent to exterminate. McGarry and O’Leary argue that this term should be limited to cases where the victims are believed to share ascriptive traits, and that the term ‘politicide’ should be used for the systematic mass killing of people who are targeted for other reasons, such as ideology. Forced mass-population transfers are the physical relocation of one or more groups to a new territory, and often accompany genocide. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ became a common way to describe this practice during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Forced mass-population transfers, like genocides, are often

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27 Partition and secession are also options, but are excluded here because they require the break-up the state. For a discussion of the differences between partition and secession, see Brendan O’Leary, "Analysing Partition: Definition, Classification and Explanation," Political Geography 26, no. 8 (2007).
associated with imperialism, and are also likely to be advocated in response to the perceived threat of ‘ethnic swamping’. Finally, hegemonic control is a method used mostly by imperial and authoritarian regimes to regulate ethnic or nationalist conflict, and has been the most common means of stabilising plural societies in world history. These states use their control over security and policing system to suppress “latent divisions between ethnic communities which might otherwise have been manifested, especially in conditions of economic modernisation.” Control is ‘hegemonic’ if it makes “an overtly violent ethnic contest for state power either ‘unthinkable’ or ‘unworkable’ on the part of the subordinated communities.” In authoritarian empires this approach has usually been intended to manage differences but, in communist states, it has been used as a tool for eliminating them and imposing a new, transcendent identity. Hegemonic control is at odds with the principles of liberal-democracy, but it has nevertheless been instituted in liberal democracies in the past, and is especially likely in those states “where there are two or more deeply established ethnic communities, and where the members of these communities do not agree on the basic institutions and policies the regime should pursue, or where the relevant ethnic communities are not internally fragmented on key policy differences in ways which cross-cut each other.” In these circumstances, “‘majority rule’ can become an instrument of hegemonic control.”

29 Ibid., 10.
30 Ibid., 23.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 22-23.
33 Ibid., 25.
Assimilation and integration

The most common approaches to intra-state conflict that are generally considered acceptable by democrats are assimilation and integration, both of which are closely associated with civic nationalism. Assimilation is intended to eliminate both public and private differences between groups in order to create a common national identity. This is done though either ‘fusion’, where two or more communities mix to form a new one, or ‘acculturation’, where one community adopts the culture of another that absorbs it.\(^{34}\) These processes may be either voluntary or coercive. The latter case may include state refusal to provide public education in minority languages, outlawing the use of unofficial languages, religious standardization under a state church (or, alternatively, outlawing religion) and barring rivals, ‘historical standardization’ of a shared mythology throughout the state’s territory regardless of its accuracy, and banning parties that represent minority nationalist or ethnic communities or interests.\(^{35}\)

Integrationists favour voluntary assimilation because it leads to a shared public culture, but they are less willing than assimilationists to establish it coercively and are relatively unconcerned about private differences. Their principal aim is equal citizenship, which is to be accomplished by creating common political institutions and establishing a shared public language and set of political values. Other differences are expected to be privatized and ignored, using the separation of church and state as a model. Accordingly, integrationists are against the ethnicization of political parties or civic associations, favour electoral systems that require broad-based support, and oppose any sort of group autonomy such as publicly funded religious school

\(^{34}\) McGarry, O'Leary; and Simeon, "Integration or Accommodation?," 42.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 43.
There are three main types of integration, as I briefly mentioned in chapter two: republican, socialist, and liberal. Republican integration is the closest to assimilation, and is primarily concerned with creating a strong political community. Republicans argue that civic virtue is best promoted through a common and deliberative public culture that requires the integration of the population through shared institutions and practices such as citizenship, education, language, religion, and military service. Socialist integration, often referred to as ‘social transformation’, regards class as the central component of social life, and sees politics based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, or language as an obstacle to understanding and addressing the real problems underlying conflict in society. Liberal integrationists, finally, focus on enabling strong individuals with measures like a universal bill of individual rights that restricts legislative action. In this case, the population is ‘integrated’ through their collective and equal subjection to the rule of the same law that prevents discrimination based on personal characteristics such as ethnicity or religious faith.

The institutional prescriptions advocated by Donald Horowitz and his supporters, known as ‘centripetalism’ (evoking a centripetal force that ‘brings things together’, in opposition to a centrifugal force that separates), are on the cusp between integration and accommodation. Centripetalists argue that the disadvantages of majority-rule institutions in deeply divided societies can be mitigated through vote-pooling electoral systems that encourage the election of moderate politicians who are capable of winning support from other ethnic communities. They advocate two different electoral systems: one with territorial distributive requirements such as a presidential electoral college, and another with ‘alternative’ or ‘preferential’ voting for both legislative and presidential elections. The first is intended to ensure that candidates campaign

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36 Ibid., 45.
37 Ibid., 46-48.
38 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
across a range of different regions in the state, and the second is meant to force them to moderate their platforms by requiring an absolute majority rather than a plurality to win. Centripetalists also support federalism in circumstances where it may help encourage brokerage parties by institutionally dividing ethnic or national enclaves.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Accommodation}

The alternative to assimilation or integration is institutional accommodation that recognizes the plurinational nature of the state. Definitively accommodative measures include substantive multiculturalism, consociation, and territorial pluralism. Arbitration is a technique sometimes used for achieving one of them.

Substantive multiculturalism involves the protection and maintenance of multiple communities, both publicly and privately. This can be put into practice in at least three different ways: (1) some degree of group self-government, and proportional representation of all groups in key public institutions; (2) a share of public power for each group through consociational arrangements (explained in the next paragraph); and (3) a share of public power through territorial autonomy for certain groups.\textsuperscript{40} These measures, however, go much further than those that are usually associated with the term ‘multiculturalism’ which, by tolerating private differences while promoting integration into public life, is essentially liberal integration by


\textsuperscript{40} McGarry, O'Leary; and Simeon, "Integration or Accommodation?," 57-58.
another name. Such “multiculturalists tolerate other cultures, but only up until the point at which these cultures challenge liberal principles.”

Consociation is the term used to describe a set of institutional prescriptions advocated by Arend Lijphart and his supporters. It has four key features: (1) a cross-community power-sharing executive; (2) proportional representation of communities in the public sector, including the legislature, judiciary, and elite levels of the bureaucracy, police service, and army; (3) community autonomy or self-government; and (4) veto rights that enable each partner to prevent legislative or constitutional changes that threaten they believe threaten their interests. These features can take different forms, and all four are not required to classify a state as a consociation (veto rights, for example, are usually present only in contexts where there is high historic mistrust or antagonisms). Consociation can be undemocratic or democratic, formal or informal, corporate or liberal. The first two choices are clear enough. In the case of the latter, a corporate consociation accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria which are assumed to be permanent, whereas a liberal consociation allows groups to determine their own organization and representation by rewarding “whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other criteria based on programmatic appeals.”

Federation, cantonisation, union state devolution, and other measures that provide significant autonomy to territorially concentrated communities are forms of territorial pluralism. The most extensive form, a full pluralist federation, has three main features: (1) significant and

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41 Ibid., 57. Stanley Fish, the authors relate, calls this ‘boutique multiculturalism’.
43 McGarry, O’Leary; and Simeon, "Integration or Accommodation?,” 62.
constitutionally entrenched autonomy for federative entities, both in the division of power and in the allocation of fiscal resources, which cannot be rescinded unilaterally by the federal government; (2) consensual or consociational rather than majoritarian decision making rules within the federal government; and (3) the state is formally recognized as plurinational. \textsuperscript{44}

Finally, arbitration is a form of third-party intervention. In a general sense, any conflict-regulation that is the result of third-party intervention could be considered arbitration but, as McGarry and O’Leary argue, it is useful to restrict the use of this term “to cases where the relevant third-party intervention is characterised by procedural neutrality of some kind. . . because it involves conflict regulation by agents other than the directly contending parties.”\textsuperscript{45} The role of the arbiter is to pursue the common interests of the conflicting parties and regulate their political interactions. There are two main types of arbitration: internal, which is carried out by an actor who is not a member of the main antagonistic communities; and external, which can be performed by a single external actor or state, or a bi-partisan or multi-partisan force (e.g., two states sharing sovereignty over a disputed territory, or the United Nations, respectively).\textsuperscript{46}

2.1 \textit{Civic nationalism as form of conflict regulation}

Civic nationalism is widely prescribed as an important part of the solution to intra-state nationalist conflict. Authors such as Michael Ignatieff, Brian Barry, and Jack Snyder make this

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 63-64.

\textsuperscript{45} McGarry and O’Leary, "Macro-Political Regulation," 27. The authors also note that “arbitration is distinguishable from mediation because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate them.”

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 28-30.
recommendation explicit, but it is often left unstated and assumed to be either synonymous with, or an obvious component of integration. Civic nationalism is also associated with centripetalism and some types of assimilation, and is partially endorsed by some substantive multiculturalists and territorial pluralists who support overlapping ‘plurinational’ or ‘nested’ identities. These approaches obviously differ from integrationism but, in each case, one of their objectives is some degree of public integration characterized by a sense of civic nationhood. As McGarry and O’Leary have explained, “integration is the preferred policy of most democratic states and international organizations, and the dominant approach among academics who study national, ethnic, and religious conflicts, especially in North America. Integration is often preferred by dominant communities within states, but also by small, dispersed minorities, such as immigrant communities, or ‘middlemen’ minorities who cannot aspire to a state of their own.”

Ignatieff and Barry are standard liberal integrationists. As I mentioned when describing Ignatieff’s position in the first chapter, however, he appeared to moderate his integrationism with a dose of territorial pluralism for Quebec not long before he became a federal politician in Canada.

Barry held to strict integrationism throughout his career, from his first book Political Argument through to his major contribution to the debate over the ‘politics of difference’, Culture & Equality. In the latter he advocates a “unitary republican citizenship in which all

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47 “Power Shared,” 16.
48 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (Toronto: Penguin, 1994); The Rights Revolution (Toronto: Anansi, 2000); “Agenda for Nation Building: Liberal Leadership for the 21st Century,” (2006). In Blood and Belonging he characterises Quebec nationalism as ethnic and clearly states that he is a civic nationalist. By the time he was the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, Ignatieff appears to have changed his mind (without explicitly recognizing it) and characterised Quebec as a distinct civic nation that overlaps with the wider Canadian civic nation.
citizens share the identical set of common citizenship rights,” which, he says, is the fundamental basis of liberalism.\(^5^0\) Barry was a political philosopher and focuses more on principles than conflict, but he does argue that any approach to addressing diversity other than integration “is a formula for manufacturing conflict, because it rewards the groups that can most effectively mobilize to make claims on the polity, or at any rate it rewards ethnocultural political entrepreneurs who can exploit its potential for their own ends by mobilizing a constituency around a set of sectional demands.”\(^5^1\) Liberal egalitarianism is seen as a fairer way to deal with conflict between groups, and is best facilitated through integration or assimilation into a common “civic nationality”. Barry defines this shared identity as a cluster of attitudes toward fellow citizens, including a belief in mutual equality among citizens and their interests, a willingness on the part of citizens to make sacrifices for the common good, and a firm expectation of one another that the willingness to make such sacrifices, up to and including one’s life if necessary, will be reciprocated.\(^5^2\)

Snyder’s preferred outcome is more or less the same as Ignatieff and Barry’s, but it is worth discussing his position because of how he gets to this prescription. In *From Voting to Violence*, Synder argues that transitions to democratic politics create the conditions for nationalist and ethnic conflict, and the best (and perhaps only) way to avoid violence and successfully democratize is to establish a stable civic nation-state before democratic institutions are introduced.\(^5^3\)

“What before democratization begins,” Synder explains,
nationalism is usually weak or absent among the broad masses of the population. Popular nationalism typically arises during the earliest stages of democratization, when elites use nationalist appeals to compete for popular support. Democratization produces nationalism when powerful groups within the nation not only need to harness popular energies to the tasks of war and economic development, but they also want to avoid surrendering real political authority to the average citizen. For those elites, nationalism is a convenient doctrine that justifies a partial form of democracy, in which an elite rules in the name of the nation yet may not be fully accountable to its people. Under conditions of partial democratization, elites can often use their control over the levers of government, the economy, and the mass media to promote nationalist ideas, and thus set the agenda for debate. Nationalist conflicts arise as a by-product of elites’ efforts to persuade the people to accept divisive nationalist ideas.54

For Snyder and most of civic nationalism’s other advocates, nationalism is essentially a convenient ideological tool that opportunistic elites use to manipulate the masses into collective action that serves their interests.

There are four types of nationalism, Snyder says—counterrevolutionary, revolutionary, ethnic, and civic—which develop according to variations in elite motivation and opportunity. Counterrevolutionary nationalism is likely to emerge when elite interests are not adaptable to democracy, administrative institutions are strong, and representative institutions are weak, as in Germany before the First World War. Revolutionary nationalism, exemplified by late-eighteenth century France, is the result of the opposite: adaptable elites seeking popular support amid the collapse of the state. Ethnic nationalism, like the first type, is driven by unadaptable elite interests, but in this case the basic building blocks of political or administrative institutions have never been laid, so elites can only appeal to loyalty based on popular culture as they did in nineteenth-century Serbia. Each of these three types of nationalism, Snyder argues, is

54 Ibid., 32. “I do not claim that nationalism and nationalist myths are the only cause of conflict between nations,” Snyder later explains. “The rational pursuit of conquest, as well as security fears, imbalances of power, reckless leaders, misperceptions, and a whole host of other factors may cause conflict between social groups, including nations. . .However, while I do not claim that my theory explains every case of nationalist conflict, I do claim that it identifies a central feature in many cases of nationalist conflict that have concerned scholars and spurred contemporary public debates.” (84)
exclusionary and “likely to produce violent nationalist conflicts with the excluded groups inside the country and with any of these groups’ purported foreign allies.”

Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is inclusive. It develops when elites are not threatened by democratization, and representative and journalistic institutions are already well established before political power is extended to the mass population. “Under those conditions,” Snyder says, “as in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nationalists lack both the motive and the opportunity to purvey divisive doctrines. While civic nationalisms are not predicted to be pacifistic, they have far less reason to fall prey to the kind of reckless, ideologically driven conflicts characteristic of the other three types.”

The conditions for each type of nationalism depend in part on the timing of democratization relative to the development of the country’s economy and political institutions. Exclusionary nationalism is most likely to prevail when the democratizing country is poor, when its citizens lack the skills needed for successful democratic political participation, and when its representative institutions, political parties, and journalistic professionalism are weakly established during the early phase of the democratic transition. Conversely, exclusionary nationalism is less likely to thrive in countries that democratize after the necessary economic resources, citizenship skills, or political institutions are already in place.

Accordingly, transitions to democracy are almost always successfully consolidated when they occur in states that have high levels of per capita income, roughly $6,000 in the purchasing-power equivalent of 1985 dollars. At these levels of income, almost all states other than oil sheikdoms have large middle classes and highly literate populations with the skills needed to participate effectively in democratic deliberations. The more advanced the state in these terms, the more likely it is to develop a civic form of

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55 Ibid., 38.  
56 Ibid., 39.  
57 Ibid., 37.
nationalism, or temper its nationalism with civic features, such as effective guarantees of civil rights to ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{58}

The \textit{sequence} of democratization, therefore, is crucial to its success and avoiding nationalist conflict. A country should “be rich and modernized, have adaptable elites, and establish a thick web of liberal institutions before embarking on the process.”\textsuperscript{59}

If conflict is already underway, the best course of action is to promote an over-arching civic identity by creating a dense web of ethnic-blind and highly professionalized institutions—“courts, police, and armed forces that will carry out state policy equally toward all individuals, regardless of ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{60} However, because this is not a short-term possibility in circumstances of intense nationalist conflict, Snyder argues that “moderate, balanced [hegemonic] ethnic control regimes that contain ethnopolitical mobilization of the majority as well as the minorities, may be a better strategy for the long run, provided it is combined with the gradual fostering of civic institutions.”\textsuperscript{61} ‘Ethnofederalism’, consociationalism, and other types of power-sharing lock in ethnic identities and should be avoided.\textsuperscript{62}

Ignatieff, Barry, and Snyder are the three most prominent authors who explicitly advocate civic nationalism as a solution to intra-state nationalist conflict, but their objectives are shared by

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 72.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 315.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 332.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 334. I refer to what Snyder calls ‘ethnic control’ as ‘hegemonic control’ earlier in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{62} “Admittedly,” Snyder says, “actual states that approximate the civic model may discriminate against some racial or ethnic groups, such as the Irish in the British union and the African Americans and Native Americans in the United States, and sometimes these exclusions may lead to violence. If so, these deviations prove my point rather than undermine it. However, sometimes civic states may find themselves in conflict with ethnic minorities not as a consequence of deviations from the civic ideal, but precisely \textit{because} they are civic. This is most likely to occur in relatively weakly institutionalized civic states when mass groups are first gaining admission to the democratic process. If ethnic minorities within the civic state clamor for group rights or political autonomy, this may be seen as a dangerous challenge to the new democracy’s insecure civic principles. . .However, civic nationalism should reduce violent conflict once democracy is consolidated, insofar as ethnic demands can be effectively accommodated as normal interest-group lobbying in the peaceful democratic process. In short, inclusive civic nationalism dampens internal violence, except when civic principles are unevenly applied or when weak civic states fear the legitimacy of their civic principles is coming under a severe challenge.” Ibid., 80-82.
nearly all integrationists, most of whom are implicit civic nationalists.\textsuperscript{63} Integrationists attribute intra-state nationalist conflict to a wide variety of causes, but tend to focus on a version of the elite manipulation argument that draws on elements of all five of the explanations discussed in the first section of this chapter. National identities are seen as highly contingent, malleable products of ideological manipulation by opportunistic elites. Civic nationalists argue that plurinational states are inherently unstable and unjust, and insist that an integrated nation-state is the only way to rectify these problems.

3. Problems with the prescription

There are several problems with the civic nationalist prescription, however, that together leave it incapable of effectively regulating intrastate nationalist conflict. The most obvious, based on the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, is that civic nationalist historiography is grossly inaccurate and thus a poor model to emulate. Civic nationalism is presented as a neutral shared identity among individuals, but in most cases it reflects the self-understanding of the state’s majority nation, which usually developed from a dominant ethnic core. The imposition of this majority identity on minority national groups is more likely to create or aggravate conflict than resolve it, especially when resisters are denigrated as backwards, illiberal ethnic nationalists. Furthermore, coerced assimilation, forced population transfer, and genocide each played an

\textsuperscript{63} There are other authors who explicitly advocate civic nationalism for this purpose, but their work is either derivative of the three authors discussed here or less influential. See, for example, David Brown, "Ethnic Conflict and Civic Nationalism: A Model," in \textit{Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict}, ed. James L. Peacock, Patricia M. Thornton, and Patrick B. Inman (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). Also, it is debatable whether socialist integrationists are best understood as civic nationalists, because their principal normative objective is the abolition of nationhood through social transformation.
important role in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century building of ostensibly civic nations, but these and other similar methods are normatively unacceptable to contemporary liberals and democrats. Even if they were, however, the conditions that allowed for successful nation-building at the beginning of the ‘age of nationalism’ are now uncommon because of that success. Target populations are no longer isolated peasants with no sense of political identity beyond their immediate relationships, and it is significantly more difficult to reforge such identities than it is to introduce them for the first time. The civic nationalist approach to intrastate nationalist conflict is a nation-statist solution that privileges the interests of a majority that largely misunderstands itself. It misdiagnoses the causes of such conflict as wholly the result of elite ideological manipulation, and overestimates the malleability of political identities that are the result of path-dependent processes that created enduring social relationships and associated identities. Accordingly, in most cases the conflict itself will have to be addressed before there is any hope of integration, which is a potential result, rather than a means, of conflict regulation. And even then, civic nationalism’s ideological conception of integration, as we saw in the previous chapter, is does not accurately reflect the processes of nationalization.

As Anthony Marx has argued, “the ethnic conflicts and exclusions embedded in recent nation-building are not fundamentally different from the processes of Western nation-building,” despite the ‘voluntarist’ misrepresentations of some civic nationalists. 64 He summarizes the danger in ignoring this as follows:

By misremembering our own history, we have been condemned to expect repetition of what did not happen in the first place. We look for an idealized image of the past to be confirmed by recurrence. And when others do not follow that path assumed to have been previously proven effective and ennobling, we are shocked and disapproving. We hold our disappointment against those who fall

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below a false standard, which we smugly believe our predecessors had met, though they had not. But as the mythic image of the past retains its hold, others still attempt to follow, drawn into unforeseen dangers, and are denigrated for their failure to repeat what did not happen and may not be possible. The result is an ongoing tragedy of huge proportions.\textsuperscript{65}

The root of this misremembering is reflected in two famous aphorisms: “history is written by the victors”, and “where you stand depends on where you sit”.\textsuperscript{66} The relevance of the first is obvious enough. Most states depict their own history as a triumph of shared destiny and good intentions.\textsuperscript{67} The second, which means that a person’s perspective on something depends on how it affects their interests, helps to explain both the sincerity of the victors’ belief in their historiography and why their civic nationalism is usually unpopular with the members of minority nations.

As Anthony Smith explains, from the standpoint of affected minorities, civic nationalism is neither as tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. . \textsuperscript{68}For civic nationalisms often demand, as the price for receiving citizenship and its benefits, the surrender of ethnic community and individuality, the privatization of ethnic religion and the marginalization of the ethnic culture and heritage of minorities within the borders of the national state. \textsuperscript{66}The civic equality of co-nationals destroys all associations and bodies that stand between the citizen and the state, and the ideology of civic nationalism relegates the customary and vernacular to the margins of society, to the family and folklore. In doing so, it also delegitimizes and devalues the ethnic cultures of resident minorities and immigrants alike, and does so consciously and deliberately. . This deliberate and open denigration of cultures and mores other than those of the hegemonic ‘civic majority’ has helped to create the present internal crisis of the national state.\textsuperscript{68}
The term ‘civic majority’ is important here, because it alludes to the concepts of ‘dominant ethnicity’ and ‘majority nationalism’. As I explained in chapter two, Smith argues that most nations are formed around a core ethnie that dominates the development of the national culture, providing the nation with its legitimating myths, symbols and conceptions of territory. In *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* he says that early civic nation-building usually entailed a lateral ethnie becoming dominant in the social institutions and political life of the whole population, and the forcible incorporation of other ethnic minorities against their will. “Through their cultural influence and political–economic domination,” Smith says,

the English, French and Castilian ethnie stamped their outlooks and lifestyles, myths and symbols, on the state and traditions of the whole population, but without destroying the traditions and myths of incorporated ethnic minorities. . . Yet the dominant culture of the expanded state remained that of the original core ethnie, even if outlying areas were allowed to retain their local character, and subordinate ethnie their cultures, until the advent of the age of nationalism.

Members of contemporary, consolidated nations supported by a civic nationalist ideology, however, avoid recognizing this fact. When it comes to popular understandings of history, Eric Kaufmann explains, dominant ethnic narratives are

subordinated to official “civic” national histories which emphasize immigrant contributions and diversity and irrupt the binding members of the dominant group to their heroic and mythic ancestors. Even the state’s censuses and ethnic monitoring forms often only refer to minority categories as distinct ethnic groups, with the majority occupying the residual category of “white”. Whether this reflects the unreflective power of the dominant group to hide itself as nonethnic, or demonstrates the political weakness of dominant ethnic lobbyists, the end result

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is a non-recognition of the dominant ethnie, whose members may only know who they are not (minorities), rather than carrying a positive sense of who they are.⁷¹

The majority is left to believe that they came together based on the shared political principles alone, and are unlikely to have these beliefs challenged because of their social position.

Beyond their social base, the eighteenth and nineteenth-century state and nation-building processes associated with contemporary civic nationalisms were often exclusionary, violent, and employed methods such as coercive assimilation, forced population transfer, and genocide. Indeed, Dominique Schnapper, whose advocacy of civic nationhood was mentioned in chapter four, cautions that the “term integration must not lead to misunderstanding: it is not a matter of an irenic process. On the contrary, it is normally by means of internal violence—by reducing political and cultural particularisms—and external violence—by war—that the processes of national integration have occurred.”⁷² Even Ernest Renan, the supposed prophet of ‘contractual’ civic nationalism, stated bluntly that “unity is always effected by means of brutality”.⁷³

Even if these methods were acceptable to liberal–democrats, however, their efficacy in contemporary conflicts is constrained by what Walker Connor calls “the factor of chronological time and intervening events”, or the path dependency of the development of nations and nationalism. “In emphasizing the manner in which the nations of Western Europe and Eastern Asia were created from rather disparate ethnic materials,” he argues,

authorities have failed to consider that the fact that the models predate the nineteenth century may obviate their pertinence to the current scene. No examples of assimilation are offered which have taken place since the advent of the age of

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nationalism and the propagation of the principle of self-determination of nations. . . By and large, those peoples who, prior to the nineteenth century, were seduced by the blandishments of another culture—those who became “them”—were not aware of belonging to a separate culture-group with its own proud traditions and myths. There was no keen competition for group allegiance. By contrast, peoples today are everywhere much more apt to be cognizant of their membership in a group with its own mythical genesis, its own customs and beliefs, and perhaps its own language, which in toto differentiate the group from all others and permit the typical individual to answer intuitively and unequivocally the question, “What are you?”

In other words, early nation-building occurred under conditions that its own success has largely eliminated. As John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary argue, “unless assimilation/integration projects are targeted at people willing to acquire a new civic identity (like voluntary migrants) and to modify their ethnic identity, they produce rather than provoke conflict.”

The problem is not just incompatible self-perceptions on their own, however, and is in many ways dependent on the social conditions that led to and perpetuate them.

One of the most important factors in intra-state nationalist conflict is how groups and their members are related to one another. Social and especially institutional relations within and between groups play a major role in the dynamics of conflict and constrain its potential resolution. This is obvious in the sense that an unequal distribution of power and recognition often leads to conflict, which must be addressed before anything democratic will be possible, but the configuration of intra- and inter-group relational ties is a key factor in any long-term changes.

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The cleavages in deeply divided societies are fundamentally divisions in ‘social space’, meaning the distribution of relationships of all types within a society. In most cases the antagonistic groups are the product of the same kind of relational mechanisms that I described in the previous chapter, except that in this case those processes were either inconsistent within one state or occurred in independent territories that were later incorporated into the same state by conquest or other means. As a result, while there are often important, non-conflictual social ties between groups in divided societies, most of their members’ lives are enmeshed in separate networks of intra-group relations shaped by things such as language, religious affiliation, and other everyday factors that pattern social interaction and are generated, renewed and reinforced by various public and private institutions. These social ties are persistent once they are established, and do not change quickly. Connor calls this constraint on nation-building ‘durative time’: “the total assimilation of a large people predominating in a particular territory requires a period of long duration extending over several generations. To be successful, the process of assimilation must be a very gradual one, one that progresses almost without visibility or awareness.” And change is particularly difficult when the groups are already in conflict.

Advocates of civic nationalism explain intra-state nationalist conflict as the result of ideological division and attendant inequalities, and argue that we simply need to replace two or more competing ideologies with civic unity. This mistakes a possible long-term outcome of successful conflict regulation for the means of achieving it. Mass national identity, as I argued in the previous chapter, is heavily dependent on a dense network of shared social ties, and claims of conationality will not be widely accepted without them. In fact, as Connor argued in an well-

77 Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 54. In a note, Connor qualifies his statement on assimilation, saying that it “presupposes that the government is not prepared to take such extreme measures as coercive population transfers and forced intermarriages.” 65, n. 62.
known article criticizing Karl Deutsch, trying to impose an integrated, homogeneous identity on groups that have already developed separate national identities of their own is likely to prolong or exacerbate conflict.\(^{78}\) Integration is not really a method of conflict regulation—it is the result of a long-term change in social relations and participant self-perceptions, which is only possible after the conflict itself has been resolved.

Most civic nationalists would argue that I overestimate the durability of national identities. Snyder, for example, argues that while the development of an overarching civic identity may take time when conflict is already underway, it is achievable through the rigorous promotion of ‘ethnic-blind and highly professional institutions’, imposed using hegemonic control if necessary.

But civic nationalism’s record in conflict regulation is questionable even under favourable conditions, as McGarry and O’Leary explain:

Turkey still faces a large dissident Kurdish minority despite eight decades of “Kemalist” civic nationalism. British civic nationalism, within a tightly centralized union at the centre of a global empire, could not prevent the breaking away of Ireland in 1921. Irish nationalists mobilized successfully without the advantages of their own self-governing institutions. They were able to establish democratic legitimacy without the need of a referendum, by winning the overwhelming majority of Ireland’s seats in every election between 1885 and 1918. Britain’s civic and unitary state proved incapable of preventing a nationalist rebellion in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s, or of preventing the resurgence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. Even France, the home of Jacobinism, has been unable to erode Corsican nationalism in the late twentieth century. The failure of [integrative] unitarist or national-federalist forms of civic nationalism may explain why all Western multinational democracies, including the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, France, and Denmark, are now more disposed towards decentralized autonomy regimes, if not full-blown multinational federalism.\(^{79}\)

\(^{78}\) Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?," *World Politics* 24, no. 3 (1972).

Civic nationalists overestimate the malleability of national identities and treat a path-dependent, fundamentally relational problem as a matter bringing hearts and minds together through institutions that mandate equal treatment, ignoring the short- to medium-term obstacles that must be overcome in order to make it possible.

In a recent book, John Nagel and Mary-Alice Clancy provide a clear explanation of the necessity of a pragmatic rather than ideological approach to intra-state nationalist conflict regulation that is worth quoting at length:

Although a shared society appears normatively attractive, it may not always be the most practical immediate goal to deal with the violence and conflict which arise from deeply embedded cleavages. The idea that groups can be encouraged to abandon their ethnic identities so that they forge a shared society, in short, may be unrealistic and impractical and could have unfortunate consequences which expedite further conflict and violence. As Varshney reminds us: ‘the world might well be a happier place if we would eliminate ethnic. . .conflicts from our midst, but a post-ethnic, postnational era does not seem to be in the offing. . .our short-to-medium-run expectations should be better aligned with our realities’.

The task of conflict management. . .is not always to neutralize ethnicity as an object of political mobilization or to try and transform differences so that a new shared identity emerges instead. A more realistic settlement of ethnic disputes accepts that ethnic divisions between groups will remain; but the significant issue is how to ensure that differences do not become the focus for politically destabilizing claims and violence. Crucially, ethnicity, while a marker of difference between groups does not have to be a cause of violent conflict and animosity. Conflict can be successfully managed via democratic forms which allow for cooperation between groups to take root, even if ethnic modes of political mobilization remain important.”

This does not mean that integration is an illegitimate objective, however. In fact, advocates of accommodation at least implicitly favour some form of integration when they reject secession or partition as an appropriate response to conflict in specific cases. The difference is in their judgement of the means and time required for this to occur. John McGarry refers to this as

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the ‘consociational paradox’: “The paradox is that the institutional accommodation of rival
groups and an extensive period of cooperation between them is more likely to transform
identities in the long run than any of the integrationist options. . .This is what happened in the
Netherlands, where a long period of power-sharing between Catholics and Protestants eroded the
salience of divisions to a point where consociational institutions were no longer necessary.”81 In
short, integration may be possible in deeply divided societies, but it is the end result of successful
conflict regulation, not a method of conflict regulation itself, and when it does occur it does not
follow the civic nationalist model.

4. Conflict regulation in Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland between Nationalists (mainly Catholics who want to rejoin the
southern Republic) and Unionists (mainly Protestants who want to remain in the United
Kingdom) is one of the best-known cases of contemporary intra-state nationalist conflict. Since
1969, over 3500 people from a population of approximately 1.8 million have died because of
political violence in Northern Ireland. Fortunately, most of the violence has ended since the
implementation of the consociational Belfast Agreement of 1998. The purpose of this section is
to use the case of Northern Ireland to help demonstrate that civic nationalism is a poor choice for
intra-state nationalist conflict regulation in practice, and why a more pragmatic approach is
necessary in the short- to medium-term, even when integration is a long-term objective.

4.1 A brief history of the conflict

The colonial plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth century is the one indisputable cause of the contemporary conflict—without it, Northern Ireland would not exist.\(^8^2\) Ireland was first conquered by the Tudor monarchs of England in the sixteenth century. Faced with a native population that refused to become loyalist Protestants, the Tudors strengthened English rule on the island through the colonization of Ulster by Scots and English settlers. Carried out by the Stuarts, the Tudors’ Anglo-Scottish successors, the plantation was initially unstable and did not go as planned: the Irish were not completely driven off the lands intended for colonization, and there were eventually far more Scots than English settlers. English rule was not fully consolidated until the island had been reconquered twice more in the seventeenth century, by Oliver Cromwell and then King William of Orange. “Tudor, Stuart, Cromwellian, and Williamite state-building conquests and settlements established patterns of ethnic and religious differentiation which have persisted to the present day, and understanding their consequences is indispensable for understanding Northern Ireland.”\(^8^3\)

The Ulster plantation led to a conflict over political power, the distribution of land, and religious faith between three communities divided by language, religion, and political status. First, the native Gaelic Irish, a pastoral, Roman Catholic people ruled by a feudalized aristocracy, who claimed descent from the Celts who had conquered Ireland nearly two thousand years previously. Second, lowland Scots settlers, many of whom had settled prior to the plantation, who were small tenant farmers, agricultural labourers, and artisans, and mostly Presbyterians.

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\(^8^2\) This brief history is primarily drawn from McGarry and O’Leary’s book *The Politics of Antagonism*, which I consider the most balanced analytic account of the conflict available. See also John Whyte, *Interpreting Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Finally, the Anglo-Irish planters, who were mostly nobles but also included many lower-class tenants and artisans. They were nominally Anglican, but behaved like exclusivist Calvinists and were uninterested in converting the natives, which reinforced the boundaries between the conquerors and the conquered. By the nineteenth century, most Presbyterians and Anglicans had come to see themselves together as Irish Protestants of British stock, but the Protestant and Catholic communities never fused.84

After an attempt by Irish Catholics to drive the English out in 1641, Ulster was reconquered by Cromwell’s armies. From 1641 to 1652, an estimated 504,000 native Irish (approximately one third of the population) and 112,000 colonists and English troops died, which “suggests a veritable holocaust from the war, and the deliberately induced famines which featured in the Cromwellian campaign.”85 The Protestant share of the population grew from five to twenty per cent within a decade, and their land ownership doubled from forty to eighty per cent through large-scale confiscations between 1641 and 1685. “Full-scale genocidal programmes (entailing executions, transportation, and transplantation of the native Irish to the colonies) were initiated but halted by pragmatic considerations.”86 Cromwell’s actions, however, did not lead to similar circumstances in the rest of Ireland.

The next stage of British imposition came out of the 1688 ‘Glorious Revolution’, which left only Catholic Ireland loyal to King James, who was overthrown by the Protestant William of Orange. William’s victory led to further settler land-confiscations in Ulster and, from the 1690s until the 1720s, Catholics were subject to batches of repressive ‘penal laws’, which remained in force until the eighteenth century and were not repealed until the nineteenth century. “These laws,” McGarry and O’Leary argue,

84 Ibid., 57-61.
85 Ibid., 67.
86 Ibid.
anticipated the twentieth-century system of apartheid. Catholics were excluded from the religious, political, and social establishments, i.e. from the ownership of property, membership of the professions, and representation in parliament and government. Catholic ecclesiastics were made outlaws; inter-marriage with Catholics was banned; Catholic schools and Catholic burials were made illegal; a Catholic patriarch could not dispose of his estate by will, instead his land was divided amongst all his sons unless the eldest son converted to the Church of Ireland; Protestant guardians were imposed on Catholic minors due to inherit land; and a host of other statutes were passed ‘which had they been enforced or enforceable would have extirpated Catholicism in Ireland in a generation’. The penal laws succeeded in the more limited but still drastic objective of almost eradicating the Catholic landed élite. 87

This was the beginning of the first ‘Protestant ascendancy’ in Ireland, which was at its strongest during the indirect rule of Ireland by the Protestant settlers from 1691–1800. By 1778, Catholic land ownership had been reduced to five per cent of all the land in Ireland, and most Catholics had become farmers, landless labourers and, outside of Ulster, urban traders.

The confidence of the Protestant oligarchy grew over the course of the eighteenth century due to the continued successful repression of the native Irish, and a kind of ‘colonial nationalism’ emerged among a faction known as the Patriots. Encouraged by the American Revolution, they sought greater autonomy for Ireland’s parliament, and in 1782 achieved formal legislative independence for the Irish kingdom. Not long after, the internal threat implied by war with revolutionary France inspired the British government to improve the standing of Catholics in Ireland, and the Catholic Relief Act was pushed through the Irish parliament in 1793. It gave propertied Catholics the right to vote for members of parliament, but not the right to sit in parliament themselves.

A new organization that had formed two years prior, the United Irishmen, embraced Catholic emancipation as part of a civic nationalism modelled on the stated principles of the

87 Ibid., 69.
American and French revolutions. The United Irishmen, led by Wolfe Tone, proposed to expel the British and unite the population of Ireland as equals and “abolish the memory of all past dissension, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in place of the denominations Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter.” As McGarry and O’Leary explain, however, the “high ideals of the United Irishmen were not wholly accomplished in practice. The actions of many Catholic peasants in the Defender organizations which joined the rebellion were difficult to distinguish from ethnic sectarianism, and Catholic killings of Protestants undoubtedly had the long-term effect of deradicalizing the more liberal Presbyterians, weaning them off their interest in republican and non-denominational Irish nationalism.”

The insurrection failed, but demonstrated that the native Irish could again be a problem for British rule. The British government’s solution was the Acts of Union 1801, which incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom and instituted direct rule from Westminster through parliamentary union. This was the first formal accomplishment of British state-penetration in Ireland, though British rule was remained incomplete and was persistently seen as illegitimate.

The Union was continually challenged throughout the nineteenth century. In the 1830s, Daniel O’Connell established a group known as the ‘Repealers’. Its demand for legislative independence for Ireland through a repeal of the Union was unsuccessful, but the British government did grant Catholic emancipation under a strict property-franchise. By the late 1870s, the Protestant landlord Charles Stewart Parnell was able to attract support for Irish home rule and founded the Irish Parliamentary Party. A Liberal government was formed at Westminster under William Gladstone, with Parnell’s support, after Gladstone endorsed home

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88 Tone, cited in Ibid., 72.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 84.
rule. Attempts to put this policy into practice failed, however, due to its polarizing effect on the House of Commons.\(^91\) The United Irishmen, Young Ireland, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood developed a tradition of revolutionary nationalism, but it did not become a real military threat to Britain until Michael Collins became leader of the Irish Republican Brotherhood after the First World War.\(^92\)

In 1911, as the British cabinet drafted the third home-rule bill in 25 years, the recently formed Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) announced that it would ignore the bill if it passed and establish a provincial government in Ulster loyal to the Crown. In 1912, the Ulster unionists began military training for thousands of Protestants as members of what became known as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The bill, which proposed very limited autonomy for an all-Ireland parliament, was passed by the House of Commons in January of 1913, but was rejected by the House of Lords two weeks later; the process was repeated, with the same result, six months later. The option to amend the bill so counties in Ulster could temporarily vote themselves out of home-rule was vigorously debated as political antagonisms intensified. The Crown strengthened its forces in Ulster, and the UVF began stockpiling arms. In June of 1914, the House of Lords demanded that all of Ulster be excluded from home rule, and a month later the UUC declared itself the provisional government of Ulster.

During the First World War the parties agreed to postpone the crisis and, though the home-rule bill was passed into law in September of 1914, it was subject to a new act that suspended its operation until after the war. Both Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists voted to support the United Kingdom’s war effort, but the anti-war movement and militant separatism gained support as the war dragged on.

\(^91\) Ibid., 86-90.  
\(^92\) Ibid., 72-73.
In 1916, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) began an insurrection in Ireland known as the Eastern Rising. It resulted in more deaths and ranged wider than any nineteenth-century rebellion, but was quickly put down. The execution of the leaders of the Rising and the fear of conscription decisively shifted Irish nationalist opinion in favour of separatism. Sinn Féin, an Irish nationalist political party founded in 1905, merged with the IRB in 1917 and saw success in by-elections against the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), later crushing the IPP in the 1918 Westminster election. Sinn Féin won a total of 73 of Ireland’s 105 seats, 47.6 per cent of the popular vote in all contested seats, and 65.5 per cent of the popular vote in the counties that would eventually become the Irish Free State. Sinn Féin’s MPs refused to take their seats at Westminster and set up their own Irish parliament in Dublin. The British government’s uncompromising response, due to the dominance of the Unionists and Conservatives, led republican militants to begin organizing a guerilla war.93

The 1920 Government of Ireland Act partitioned Ireland into two parts: Northern Ireland, which included six of Ulster’s nine counties and was to be governed from a parliament in Belfast; and Southern Ireland, comprised of Ireland’s remaining twenty-six counties, which would have a similar parliament in Dublin. Though the Unionists had not sought home-rule, they saw the advantages of a Belfast parliament to shoring up their position, and lobbied hard to ensure that Northern Ireland only included those Ulster counties in which Protestants were in a substantial majority (making them just under two-thirds of the population). The Irish nationalists rejected the Government of Ireland Act and decisions that had led to it, and a bitter war of independence was waged between 1919 and 1921 by the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Irish Republican Army against Crown forces. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, negotiated between the British Government and Sinn Féin, granted Southern Ireland dominion status under the Crown,

93 Ibid., 96-98.
but maintained nearly everything implemented in Northern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act.

The period from 1920–62 can be described as a second Protestant ascendancy characterised by hegemonic control. Northern Ireland’s constitutional status during this period had four distinctive features: first, sovereignty over its territory was formally contested by both the British and Irish states; second, it was not fully integrated into either of those states; third, Northern Ireland’s institutions lacked bi-communal legitimacy; and fourth, the political unit created by the Government of Ireland Act was a semi-state or a regime rather than a state. Nevertheless, the regime was capable enough to allow the Protestant majority (via the Ulster Unionist Party) to exercise territorial, constitutional, electoral, coercive, legal, economic, and administrative control over the Catholic minority. It is beyond the purpose of this brief history to discuss the details here, but suffice it to say that almost everything about Northern Ireland in this period was designed to exclude Catholics/Irish nationalists from power and ensure their domination by Protestants/unionists.

From 1963–72 the unionist control regime weakened and collapsed. There are several contending explanations for why this occurred, but the least partisan is that the regime depended on specific patterns of British and Irish state development that changed during this period, affecting the motivations of both internal and external political actors. The end of hegemonic control, however, did not reflect or lead to an end of antagonisms between the two communities. In fact, rising expectations during the civil rights movement, and the perception that the end of control meant that the complete overthrow of the regime was possible, led to radicalization on both sides. In 1969 a paramilitary group, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, broke away from its increasingly Marxist namesake with the intent of using violence to force the withdrawal

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94 Ibid., 110.
of Britain from Ulster and the unification of Ireland. Protestants joined their own paramilitary groups in great numbers, and the Democratic Unionist Party and Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party—both opposed to any kind of reform in Northern Ireland—were formed in the early 1970s. The British army, too, was perceived to favour the unionist side, and on 30 January 1972 shot dead thirteen unarmed civilian civil-rights demonstrators in Derry/Londonderry, on the day now famously known as ‘Bloody Sunday’.

This perception made it difficult for Britain to position itself as a neutral arbitrator between the republicans and unionists, as it first seriously attempted from 1972–85. Westminster’s arbitration policy had main three premises: first, encourage the rival groups to work together towards an internal solution of the conflict; second, ‘modernize’ Northern Ireland’s administration and economy so that it was on par with the rest of Britain; and third, maintain impartiality by treating political violence as criminal violence, to be dealt with by normal legal processes.95 Under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973 the Northern Ireland parliament was abolished, its legislative powers were transferred to Westminster, and a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland office was created to administer the territory. Near the end of 1973, a consociational agreement was reached in Sunningdale, England, which established a Northern Ireland Assembly that was to be elected by proportional representation and use a power-sharing executive. It also created the Council of Ireland, a cross-border body to be made up of seven members of the Northern Ireland executive and seven members of the Irish government, a secretariat, and a consultative assembly with 30 members of the Northern Ireland assembly and 30 members of the lower house of the Irish parliament. Neither side could be convinced that this arrangement was in their interests, however, and the measures taken under Sunningdale collapsed in 1975 amidst intensifying paramilitary violence. The Assembly was

95 McGarry and O’Leary, Politics of Antagonism, 184-85.
dissolved and direct rule from Westminster resumed. Six years later, a prime ministerial summit led to a formal agreement on the creation of a British–Irish Intergovernmental Council and, after limited progress, negotiations between Britain and Ireland resumed in 1983.

Solitary British arbitration of the conflict ended with the Anglo–Irish Agreement, an international treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland signed in 1985, which represents the first radical attempt by the two states to cooperate on the issue. The agreement had thirteen articles which, among other things: affirmed that any change in the status of Northern Ireland required the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland, likely through a referendum; created an intergovernmental conference where both governments discuss and attempt to resolve differences over public policy matters affecting Northern Ireland; and committed both governments to pursue a devolved government in Northern Ireland.96

Summarizing the agreement’s constitutional significance, McGarry and O’Leary explain that first,

it formalized inter-state co-operation in conflict-management. Second, it signified that while the unionist guarantee remained—Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK as long as unionists constitute a majority—unionists would have no veto, tacit or explicit, on policy formulation within Northern Ireland. Third, the Agreement bound the Republic to a constitutional mode of reunification which is known to be practically infeasible in the medium term, although in the longer run, if demographic and attitudinal changes were to occur, Irish reunification might be feasible.97

In short, it was an attempt by the British and Irish negotiators to force the necessary conditions and incentives for a new version of the Sunningdale Agreement to be successful. Unionists resisted, but eventually agreed to negotiate, knowing that if they did not the two kin-states would cooperate to govern Northern Ireland without devolution.

96 Ibid., 221-22.
97 Ibid., 226.
The Anglo–Irish Agreement was widely supported by the publics of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, but opposed by the majority of Northern Ireland’s population. Interpretations ranged significantly, but unionists and Irish nationalists each consistently perceived it as a victory for the other side disguised as a compromise. Its imposed and incomplete consociationalism was ultimately unsuccessful, but the Agreement laid the foundation for fundamental changes in the conflict during the 1990s.

By the early 1990s, the United States and Irish-Americans began to play a constructive role in the promotion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Bill Clinton, the first American president to go to Northern Ireland, visited the region three times during his presidency and helped convince Irish nationalists that there was merit in negotiation. In 1993, the Irish and British governments issued a Joint Declaration of Peace which stated that the British government had no strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland, the people of Northern Ireland have the right to self-determination, and that a united Ireland could only come about by peaceful means. In April of the following year, the IRA announced a temporary ceasefire, followed by what it called the “cessation of military operations” in August. Unionist paramilitary activities continued until October, when the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced that the groups it represented were declaring their own ceasefire. Subsequent negotiations ended in February 1996 with an IRA bombing in the London Docklands, which it said was retaliation for the British government acting in bad faith in negotiations by excluding Sinn Féin. The British Labour Party won a majority in the May 1997 election, however, and the Irish election in June also returned a new government. At the end of June the British and Irish issued a joint statement calling for the IRA to renew its ceasefire within five weeks, after which Sinn Féin would be allowed to
participate in peace negotiations. The IRA complied in July, and Sinn Féin was subsequently invited to join the multi-party talks at Stormont.

The Belfast Agreement of 1998 (also known as the ‘Good Friday Agreement’) is the end result of these talks, and was passed by dual referendums in the Republic and Northern Ireland, with 94.4% and 71.1% in favour respectively. Crucially, the Agreement is not only consociational but also federal, confederal, and plurinational, meaning that it recognizes the two national communities as equals with the right to self-determination in addition to providing an institutional framework for sharing power between them. Its provisions include: two semi-presidential figures elected together using a parallel consent cross-community procedure, which requires them to have the support of 50% of registered nationalists and 50% of registered unionists, as well as a majority of the Assembly; a proportional Executive Committee with positions allocated based on the d’Hondt rule, filled by Ministers who take a Pledge of Office rather than an Oath of Allegiance; proportional representation in the Assembly through a single-transferable vote electoral system; proportional representation in the public sector, including the police force; communal autonomy in areas such as education; minority veto rights in the Assembly, courts, and through enabling political appeals to both the British and Irish Governments; and a formal recognition of the equality of the British and Irish communities in Northern Ireland. The Agreement’s federal features include things such as the recognition of the right of the ‘people of Ireland’ to self-determination and Northern Ireland’s right to join the Republic by referendum, and the devolution of some powers from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the recognition of Northern Ireland as a legal entity in the Irish Constitution. The Agreement’s main confederal features are the North/South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council. The first is an all-Ireland body intended to bring together Ministers
with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and in the Republic. The second establishes that Britain, Ireland, and all devolved governments and dependent territories of the United Kingdom can meet and agree on common policies and to delegate functions. Finally, the Agreement promises protection to the unionists should they become the minority through demographic shifts.  

The initial implementation of the Agreement was rocky, and the Assembly was suspended several times due in part to a dispute over the decommissioning of IRA weapons, but serious political violence in Northern Ireland has ended, the past two elections (in 2007 and 2011) have gone without incident, and the deployment of the British army in Northern Ireland—which began in 1969—ended in 2007. As McGarry and O’Leary explain, for example, lethal political violence dropped from 509 killed in the nine years before the Agreement to 134 in the nine years during its development and after, and even these numbers give an exaggerated sense of the violence in the second period because 29 of the 134 died in the 1998 Omagh bombing and it is unclear what proportion of the deaths were the result of intra- rather than inter-community violence. 105 members of the security forces were killed in political violence in the first period, and only two in the second, both in 1998. 99 Over a longer time frame using the twelve years before and after the peace process began in 1994, the decline from 909 people killed in the first period and 179 in the second is even more noteworthy. 100 Furthermore, it seems unlikely that there will be a significant resurgence in political violence, given that the IRA and Unionists ceasefires have largely held, with some significant but isolated exceptions, throughout the post-

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100 Ibid., 53.
Agreement period. Politically, there is evidence that the policy differences between Sinn Féin and the SDLP are now much less significant than they were before the peace process began and since the Agreement. Sinn Féin has at least tacitly abandoned the support for violence, opposition to taking seats in a Northern Ireland Assembly or government, and nearly all other positions that distinguished it as radical. And this shift has been accompanied by converging attitudes between Republicans and Unionists on many of the main points of the Agreement, but no sign of the rival national identities becoming less important. Given this and other evidence, it seems fair to say that the Belfast Agreement, with some modifications by the St. Andrew’s Agreement of 2007 (primarily concerned with the police service), has led to successful regulation of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

The Belfast Agreement succeeded where the Sunningdale Agreement failed, McGarry and O’Leary argue, because it goes beyond traditional consociation and may be best described as ‘consociation plus’. Lijphart’s original formulation of consociationalism, they explain, was state-centred and assumed that the relevant divisions were within a single society that was congruent with the state. Stateless nations, however, prefer to see themselves as distinct societies that share a state with one or more others. They also put at least as much emphasis on autonomy from the central government as sharing power in that government (preferring territorial to corporate and collective over portioned autonomy); sometimes aspire to trans-, inter-, and intra-state institutions; and may want the state to be officially designated as plurinational.

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101 Ibid., 53-54.
102 Ibid., 55.
103 Ibid., 56.
105 Ibid., 40-45.
Accordingly, traditional consociationalism on its own would not have been enough for either nationalists or unionists in Northern Ireland. Irish nationalists were opposed to internal power sharing within the United Kingdom. Radicals wanted national self-determination and complete withdrawal of the British state from Ireland, and moderates wanted any consociation to include a formal role for the Irish Government. Unionists opposed consociation because they were concerned about the Irish nationalists’ insistence on a formal relationship with Ireland, and they had no incentive to share power after 1972, since the default option was direct rule from by their conationals. “Any feasible agreement in Northern Ireland,” McGarry and O’Leary contend,” had to deal squarely with the disputes that flowed from the inequitable legacies of the partition of Ireland in 1920, which had occurred without any formal respect for Irish self-determination.”

The SDLP signed the Agreement because it provides a number of institutions that join both parts of Ireland and an oversight role for the Irish government; Irish republicans were brought on-side by the recognition of the right of the people of the whole island of Ireland to self-determination; and unionists were persuaded to ratify it because it entrenched the principle that Northern Ireland cannot become a part of the Republic unless a majority in the region agree, the Republic’s constitution was changed to reflect this, and the new British–Irish Council acknowledges the region’s link with Great Britain. These provisions, accompanied by a number of others such as the adoption of a ‘Pledge of Office’ instead of a ‘Oath of Allegiance’, and the requirement that members of the Assembly designate themselves as ‘nationalists, unionists, and others’ instead of Catholics and Protestants, represent a serious and mutual recognition of national claims that made the Agreement possible.

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106 Ibid., 46.
4.2 Civic nationalism in Northern Ireland

John McGarry identifies three different civic nationalist perspectives on the Northern Ireland conflict: republican, unionist, and social transformationist. Republican, or Irish civic nationalism, has the longest lineage and advocates a united Irish republic that transcends what are seen as rival sectarian identities. This position was first put forward by Wolfe Tone in the 1790s, who was inspired by the French Revolution, and later represented by Young Ireland in the 1840s. In recent history civic nationalism has become the dominant discourse and expressed goal of every Irish nationalist party.

The central premise of the republican perspective, which has been most closely associated with Sinn Féin since the 1970s, is that Ireland’s divisions are a result of Britain’s historic policy of ‘divide and rule’, not deep-rooted sentiments. British imperialists governed Ireland by privileging Irish Protestants and, when faced with an Irish nationalist rebellion, partitioned the island without the support of Irish MPs. This resulted in the creation of a ‘statelet’ with an inbuilt Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, and a nearly homogeneously Catholic state in the south of Ireland, leading to two sectarian identities. The division persists, republicans argue, because Protestants fear for their religious identity in a united Ireland and benefit from significant British financial support. Unionists are considered a pariah group still operating with a seventeenth-century Ascendancy mindset who are at odds with the Enlightenment values of republicans. While more moderate nationalists such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party argued that a united Ireland was unattainable in the short term and were therefore open to
compromise with the unionists, Sinn Féin opposed any form of accommodation until the beginning of the current peace process.\textsuperscript{107}

Unionist, or British civic nationalism, is a comparatively recent development in Northern Ireland. The argument that an integrated United Kingdom is the best solution for the Northern Ireland conflict was uncommon among unionists until it was taken up by Ulster Unionist Party politicians after the ‘prorogation’ of the Stormont Parliament in 1972. Several unionist integrationist organizations were formed after the Anglo–Irish Agreement of 1985, and by the 1990s all unionist politicians advocated an integrated United Kingdom as something that could include Catholics and even Irish nationalists.

Like their republican counterparts, unionist civic nationalists argue that the divisions in the Northern Ireland conflict are not deeply rooted. From their perspective, however, the conflict is the result of Britain’s decision to withdraw from the rest of Ireland and establish a devolved parliament in Belfast instead of integrating Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom. The separatism of republicans in Northern Ireland is blamed on manipulation by nationalist political parties, priests, and republican paramilitaries, and seen as encouraged by the Republic of Ireland’s irredentism, the British government’s lack of commitment to the Union, and the failure of British political parties to organize in Northern Ireland. Republican nationalists are seen as reactionaries who tried to cleanse the Irish Free State of Protestants in the years following partition, and Sinn Féin is regularly characterised as fascist. Accommodation was not considered an option before 1998.\textsuperscript{108}

The third approach that McGarry identifies is the ‘social transformation’ school that blames Northern Ireland’s divisions on social injustice, and sees a fundamental transformation of

\textsuperscript{107} McGarry, “Civic Nationalism,” 111-12.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 112-14.
the entire society as the only solution. However, while social transformationists are in favour of integration, it is debatable whether they should be classified as civic nationalists, given that they often advocate the transcendence of nationhood itself. The prescriptions of such ‘post-nationalists’ may approximate those of some civic nationalists in practice but, since they advocate something different than civic nationalism, I will not pay any further attention to them in this context.

“The problem with the first two approaches,” McGarry explains,

is a rather fundamental one: neither has any cross-community appeal or is likely to develop this in the foreseeable future. For over a century Northern Ireland has been divided electorally into two rival ethno-national blocs, and the divisions have become particularly intense during the past thirty years. . . . There has been no swing voting between the two blocs, and any change in their respective share of the poll has been the result of differential birth-rates and electoral participation rates. Nor have parties from outside the two ethno-national blocs shown any sign of making a political breakthrough. Rather. . . .the ‘middle ground’ has been squeezed in recent decades.

There are several reasons that neither community has been prepared to accept the inclusive appeal of the other. First, these appeals have been made during a period of polarizing violence; second, both sides “interpret the civic language of their rivals as a politically correct smokescreen designed mainly for external consumption and not meant to be taken seriously by their ostensible targets”; and third, each community has a distinct national identity, and neither wants to be subsumed within the other, regardless of equal citizenship. In the end, McGarry argues, the compromise represented by the Good Friday Agreement came about because events made it

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109 See, for example, Rupert Taylor, "Northern Ireland: Consociation or Social Transformation?,” in Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective, ed. John McGarry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). This position is particularly common among Marxists.


111 Ibid., 116-17.
clear that each community’s first preferences were unattainable in the short term, not because their attachment to a united Ireland or United Kingdom weakened. 112

Many factors contributed to these circumstances, but one of the most significant is the early failures of British and Irish state and nation-building. As the preceding history demonstrated, the Union was sharply imbalanced, provided no equality of opportunity for Catholics, and blocked Irish efforts to increase autonomy. Indeed, as Linda Colley argues in *Britons* (which I discussed in the context of American nationalism in chapter five), early British national identity was fundamentally Protestant and built on the deliberate exclusion of non-Protestants, especially Catholics. Ireland was treated as a colony, and “was cut off from Great Britain by the sea; but it was cut off still more effectively by the prejudices of the English, Welsh and Scots.”113 Over time, Britain’s economy and urban infrastructure modernized while Ireland lagged behind. This culminated, catastrophically, with the Great Famine of 1846–51, which the descendants of those who survived blame on the English government. The formally non-denominational school system established in the 1830s was managed by parish priests and therefore Catholic in practice. And Ireland was not administratively integrated into the kingdom, either; it had a separate legal system, and was governed by a centralized bureaucracy, setting it apart from the rest of the United Kingdom where local politics was left for local elites and other affairs were dealt with by Westminster.114 As McGarry and O’Leary explain,

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112 Ibid., 117.
the communicative integration of territories through print and national media; and the rationalization of bureaucracies, in which loyalty was no longer attached to traditionally legitimated persons but rather to imperial abstractions (such as the ‘state’ or ‘nation’). But the processes which encouraged ethnic integration and nation-building elsewhere in early modern Europe were mostly absent from the relationships between the two largest islands of the nineteenth century UK.\textsuperscript{115}

In fact, British nation-building in Ireland outside of Protestant Ulster succeeded only in establishing English as the common language.

Irish nationalists failed to create an island-wide identity as well, which “owed something to the military weakness of guerrillas and the power of the British empire, more to the resistance of Protestants, but had its most profound roots in the ideological development of Irish nationalism which seemed to spell the blunt message that the English language, the Protestant religions, and the British state were its antithesis.”\textsuperscript{116} Non-Catholics were ineligible to be Irish.

Accordingly, Northern Ireland has been home to two groups with different national identities since it was created. If Britain had handled the union differently, there is a good chance that Ireland would still be as least as much a part of the United Kingdom as are Scotland and Wales, and Northern Ireland would never have existed. It was, after all, just the beginning of the ‘age of nationalism’, and mass national identities had not yet ossified. Integration would not have progressed along the lines of civic nationalism any more than it did in France or the United States, but direct nation-building was an immediate possibility during this period.

That is not what happened, however. Both British and Irish nation-building failed in Northern Ireland, and there is now so much social space between the two communities that direct nation-building is no longer possible or desirable. It does not matter how ‘inclusive’ civic

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 107-08.
nationalism is in principle. Nation-building requires more than just ideas, and nationalist ideology cannot transcend a community’s lived experiences.

Civic nationalists see the Belfast Agreement as a failure—and, from a nation-statist perspective, it is, at least in the short to medium-term. But, as McGarry argues,

The proper way to assess the Agreement’s contribution to stability. . . is not to contrast contemporary Northern Ireland with societies that are not divided, but to contrast it with pre-Agreement Northern Ireland. By this standard, the Agreement stands up remarkably well. Northern Ireland has widely accepted constitutional arrangements for the first time. The Agreement has helped to consolidate ceasefires by the region’s main paramilitary organizations. 1999, the first full year since the Agreement was reached, is the only year in the last thirty-one in which no soldier or police officer has been killed. The Northern Ireland Tourist Board recently reported that tourist spending levels in 1999 set a record, and that the number of visitors was up 11 per cent over the previous year.”

And, as reported earlier in this chapter, the situation has continued to improve since McGarry’s chapter was published. Consociationalism is a pragmatic response that recognizes Northern Ireland as the home of two distinct nations that deserve equal respect as such. Life there would, undoubtedly, be easier if this were not the case, but it is, and our choices need to reflect the reality of the situation. It may be that, in a few generations’ time, consociational institutions will no longer be necessary, but this will be the result of the slow creation of a dense network of inter-group relational ties in a context of mutual respect and trust, not the imposition of a civic nationalist ideology that privileges one group and tells the other that their self-understanding is simply mistaken.

117 McGarry, ”Civic Nationalism,” 125.
5. Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was the feasibility of civic nationalism as a means of regulating intra-state nationalist conflict. The first two sections provided an overview of potential causes of such conflict, the range of approaches to regulating it, and specific arguments made by civic nationalists. I then argued that the civic nationalist prescription misrepresents the causes of intra-state nationalist conflict and that, while deliberate integration may be appropriate in rare circumstances, in most cases it is a potential result of successful conflict regulation rather than a means of achieving it, and even then civic nationalism is not an appropriate model. Civic nationalist historiography obscures the majoritarian, nation-statist bias of civic nationalism and the undesirable methods and processes through which purportedly civic nations were built, which, even if they were normatively acceptable, were only effective prior to the ‘Age of Nationalism’. Contemporary conflicts are the product of rival nation-building projects, and must be addressed pragmatically through measures including plurinational recognition and power-sharing (such as ‘consociation plus’), as my discussion of Northern Ireland demonstrated. Integration is not possible until the conflict itself is addressed, and is a medium- to long-term process that develops through increasing inter-group interactions and inter-relations, not ideological imposition. Even when integration is the right choice and feasible, however, civic nationalism is still the wrong model, as the next chapter demonstrates.
Chapter 7

Immigrant integration

Intra-state nationalist conflict is not the only problem that civic nationalism is supposed to solve. Immigrant integration is one of the most pressing policy concerns of the early twenty-first century: falling birth rates, increasing immigration, and the pervasive popular perception that newcomers are not integrating into their host societies has led to a growing backlash against multiculturalism in countries of immigration around the world. One of the outcomes of this backlash has been a hard push for ‘civic integration’, which is essentially civic nationalist ideology applied to immigration. Civic integrationists argue that the most important mechanisms of immigrant integration are basic language training, employment counselling, and especially the inculcation of respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law among newcomers.

Language training and employment assistance are obviously essential components of immigrant integration, and the values that civic integrationists champion are indeed important for participation in a liberal-democracy, but civic nationalism is no more an appropriate model for successful immigrant integration than it is for regulating intra-state nationalist conflict. Just as with the latter, the civic nationalist response to immigrant integration reflects the self-representation of the majority instead of the real bases of social cohesion. This self-representation indulges an implicit particularism by portraying ‘universal liberal principles and values’ as the foundation of the host society while simultaneously characterizing them as a product of that society. In practice this means that the apparently inclusive rhetoric of civic integration can be used as a tool for exclusion. Even when the desire for inclusion is sincere,
however, civic integrationist measures are not enough to achieve integration because they provide few mechanisms for creating the kind of relationships that immigrants need in order to become full participants in their new society, such as bridging social capital that crosses segmental boundaries. Civic integration is best understood as a kind of a symbolic politics that is more an ‘immigration policy’ (which determines the selection criteria for new immigrants) than an ‘immigrant policy’ (which determines how people who get in are incorporated). In short, it is not an integration policy in practice.

The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section I provide a brief overview of how immigrant integration has been conceptualized in migration studies. Section two defines civic integration and traces its development. The next section elaborates on the problems with the civic nationalist prescription for immigrant integration identified above, and explains why developing the kind of social ties that characterize bridging social capital should be one of the most important objectives of immigrant integration policy. The final section focuses on Canada, an important case of immigrant integration that is generally considered successful. The Canadian model of ‘multicultural integration’, I will argue, incorporates most of the principles championed by civic integrationists, yet preliminary evidence suggests that the development of a network of inter-group social ties may play the most important role in immigrant integration.

1. *Immigrant integration*

As explained in the previous chapter, the term ‘integration’ is usually used to refer to a process through which persons become equal participants in a society’s shared public life. It is one of
many terms used for this process, including absorption, acculturation, cohesion-building, enfranchisement, inclusion, and incorporation. As Adrian Favell says, however, all of these terms are either vaguer than ‘integration’, subsumed by it, or “concepts that can be used descriptively without necessarily invoking the active intervention of some political agency.”

This last point is important because while integration can conceivably take place without the intervention of the state, it is usually seen as a form of state-directed social engineering in migration policy debates.

Because migration studies is primarily a ‘data-driven field’, migration theory is generally underdeveloped, and its integration subcategory is no exception. Integration, Favell explains, “is rarely problematized or examined when it is used as a conceptual shorthand. Its effectiveness seems to lie in the fact that it best fits the undefined, progressive-minded conceptual space gestured to when academics talk about the (counterfactual) goal of successful interethnic relations or a less dysfunctional multicultural or multiracial society.”

Approaches to integration in practice have, however, been classified in several different ways. In the previous chapter I explained McGarry et al.’s distinction between ‘liberal’, ‘republican’, and ‘socialist’ approaches to integration but, in the context of migration, it is more

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1 Favell lists these and other related terms in Adrian Favell, "Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe," in International Migration Research: Constructions, Omissions and the Promises of Interdisciplinarity, ed. Michael Bommes and Ewa Morawska (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 42. It is worth noting that it has become common in migration studies for American scholars to make a distinction between ‘old’ assimilation (defined as I did in the previous chapter) and ‘new’ assimilation, which is synonymous with what I call integration. For a discussion of the ‘return of assimilation’, see chapter five of Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).


common to talk about ‘national models’ or ‘philosophies’ of integration that are less general than these categories. The term ‘national model’ refers to an ideologically driven citizenship and integration regime in a specific country, usually grounded in either civic or ethnic nationalism.

The models approach became popular, Favell argues, “because it proved to be such an effective heuristic strategy: reducing the problem of the vague and indefinable object of enquiry—a national ‘society’ in all its complexity—to a ‘model’ which captures the key explanatory variables of social change. These were invariably identified as ‘path dependent’ historical sources of national cultural difference.” The best that this approach can do, however, is explain the participant self-understanding of citizenship and nationhood reflected in state policy and perhaps individual behaviour, which presents the danger of confusing participant perceptions of integration with the actual processes through which immigrants are integrated into the host society. As Favell puts it, the “reproduction of ideas of integration and citizenship in academic discourse, for all of their progressive veneer...may be just reproducing a certain vision of a unitary modern nation-state or nation-society that corresponds closely to what those who

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4 Other classifications that have been influential but nevertheless found less traction, including Stephen Castles’ distinction between ‘differential exclusion’ (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), assimilation (France, Britain, and the Netherlands), and multiculturalism (the United States, Canada, Australia, and Sweden). Stephen Castles, "How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity," *New Community* 21, no. 3 (1995). For an overview of several different typologies, see Gary P. Freeman, "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies," *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004).


7 It is very common for authors to make this interpretive mistake when reading Brubaker’s work. He uses a version of the civic/ethnic distinction to categorize different ideological perspectives that influence citizenship and integration policy in *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, but he does not endorse these perspectives as an accurate representation of the processes of social integration. See Rogers Brubaker, "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism," in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction Between "Civic" And "Ethnic" Nationalism," in *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi, et al. (Zurich: Verlag Rüegger, 1999); Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*. 
peak from a powerful position in society most want to hear, but not how these societies really function.”

Classifications aside, the focus of most discussions of immigrant integration is one or more of its social, economic, cultural, or political ‘dimensions’, using a wide range of measures such as housing segregation, cultural adaptation, academic and occupational achievement, persistence of racist attitudes, and social mobility. While each of these dimensions is important, for the sake of this discussion I will use the terms ‘social integration’ or ‘integration’ on its own to include them all, and measure its success by the degree to which an immigrant and his or her descendants can successfully participate and be accepted in the everyday public life of their new society (including politics, the economy, and culture), relative to someone who was born there.

2. Civic integration

Beginning in the 1990s, Christian Joppke argues, major immigrant-receiving countries in Western Europe, Oceania, and North America began to downscale or retreat from their commitment to multiculturalism (which, as he characterizes it, is defined by a wide range of policies that treat majority and minority cultures as equally valuable and grant rights on that

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8 Favell, "Integration Policy," 358. Favell is mainly concerned with ‘methodological nationalism’ here, but his point is more generally applicable than that.
9 Integration differs from assimilation in that it does not require things like the use of the public language at home. The public/private distinction is problematic in some circumstances, however, especially when it comes to the relationship between ‘private’ cultural values in family life that are incompatible with the state’s commitment to individual liberty (a man prohibiting the female members of his family from receiving an education or taking employment, for example). Public values trump private in such circumstances, in which case integration effectively becomes assimilation.
basis) and replace it with policies intended to encourage civic integration.\textsuperscript{10} There are several factors that contributed to this, he says, but the most important are “(1) the lack of public support for official multiculturalism policies (a cause largely outside the liberal spectrum), (2) these policies’ inherent shortcomings and failures, especially with respect to the socio-economic marginalization and self-segregation of migrants and their children, and (3) a new assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters.”\textsuperscript{11}

The downscaling of multiculturalism policy started as early as 1988 in Australia with the Fitzgerald Report, Joppke contends, but the decisive retreat began in The Netherlands over the following decade. Since the early 1980s, the Dutch had been Europe’s most enthusiastic multiculturalists, but by the end of the 1990s The Netherlands was home to one of Europe’s biggest socioeconomic integration failures. In most European Union countries, the unemployment rate for migrants from outside the EU is about twice that of those who were born there, but in The Netherlands this rate has fluctuated from between 3 and 5.4, and in 1999 only one-third of migrants from outside the EU were gainfully employed. This, along with other factors such as significant residential segregation, high drop-out rates among immigrants, and a


\textsuperscript{11} Joppke, "Retreat of Multiculturalism," 244.
prison population that was one-third foreigners in 1997 led to the perception that multiculturalism had failed.12

The Dutch government’s response was to establish a new ‘civic integration’ approach intended to help migrants participate in mainstream institutions and achieve personal autonomy by learning to speak Dutch and integrating into the labour-market. Its first manifestation was the Newcomer Integration Law (1998), which obliges most migrants from outside of the European Union to participate in a twelve month integration course consisting of 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for employment. Participation in the course is mandatory, but in practice the law emphasized service over coercion until the change in the political mood following the assassination of anti-Muslim politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002. The centre-right government elected in the wake of this event replaced the rhetoric of ‘respect for diversity’ with one of ‘instilling Dutch values and norms’, shifted the financial burden for integration courses to migrants, and tied the granting of admission and permanent residence to passing an integration test.13 This last measure, Joppke argues, “creates a linkage between the previously separate domains of migration control and immigrant integration. It also constitutes an entirely new view on immigrant integration. So far the prevailing view had been that a secure legal status enhances integration; now the lack of integration is taken as grounds for the refusal of admission and residence.”14

The Netherlands is the most dramatic case of the shift away from multiculturalism, Joppke argues, but it is part of a broad policy trend across Europe, Oceania, and North America (‘all Western liberal democracies’) to move beyond distinct ‘national models of integration’

12 “Beyond National Models,” 6. In addition to this, Joppke says, 47 per cent of all those on welfare in the Netherlands in 1998 were immigrants.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.: 7-8.
(discussed in the previous section) and converge on civic integration. States in these regions, he says, are both responding to the integrative failures of multiculturalism and naturally progressing toward a shared citizenship and integration regime that better reflects their universal liberal values. The general principles of this convergence are to (1) be inclusive and recognize that integration is a two-way process of mutual accommodation that requires both migrants and the receiving society to adapt; (2) foster a respect for the basic values of the receiving society, including the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law; (3) require and provide training for competency in the receiving society’s public language, history, and institutions; and (4) focus on socio-economic integration through employment.¹⁵

3. **Problems with the prescription**

Just as with intra-state nationalist conflict, however, the civic nationalist response to immigrant integration is based on an inaccurate historical model, and reflects the self-representation of the majority instead of the most important bases of social cohesion. As I demonstrate below, this self-representation indulges in an implicit particularism by portraying ‘universal liberal principles and values’ as the foundation of the host society while simultaneously characterizing those values as a product of the unique and noble traditions of the state and its people. In practice, this means that the apparently inclusive rhetoric of civic integration can be used as a tool for

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exclusion. Even when the desire for inclusion is sincere, though, civic integrationist measures are not enough to achieve integration because they provide few mechanisms for creating the kind of relationships that immigrants need in order to become full participants in their new society, such as bridging social capital. ‘Civic integration’ is a kind of a symbolic politics that is more an ‘immigration policy’ (which determines the selection criteria for new immigrants) than an ‘immigrant policy’ (which determines how people who get in are incorporated). In short, it is not an integration policy in practice.

Using civic nationalist historiography as a model for immigrant integration policy is just as imprudent as trying to use it as a model for resolving intra-state nationalist conflict. All purportedly civic nations had an at least tacit ‘whites only’ immigration policy until the 1960s, and those migrants who were admitted were expected to assimilate to the point that their children would be indistinguishable from the majority. Furthermore, the religious affiliation of immigrants has been an important site of contention throughout the history of paradigmatic ‘civic nations’ such as the United States. A sense of Protestant mission has been prominent in American political rhetoric since the country’s founding; Catholics were deliberately excluded or discriminated against for much of its history (the nineteenth century ‘Know-Nothing’ movement is one prominent example); and, in a survey conducted in 1996, 55% of respondents said that being a Christian is either somewhat or very important to making someone a true American (a number which, given the surge in anti-Muslim attitudes following the 2001 terrorist attacks, is likely even higher now). The French case is somewhat different, but religion is still a major

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fault line in French society, as the 2005 rioting of marginalized French-born Muslims of North-African descent demonstrates.18

The absence of a true tradition of civic nationalism, however, does not necessarily eliminate the prescriptive value of civic integration, Joppke argues. Even regimes that have historically been associated with ethnic nationalism, such as Germany, have begun to move toward civic integration. It is, he says, “indeed driven by the attempt to commit and bind newcomers to the particular society that is receiving them, notionally making them familiar with the ‘British’ or ‘Dutch’ values and ways of doing things. But, if one looks closer, these particularisms are just different names for the universal creed of liberty and equality that marks all liberal societies—there is nothing particularly ‘British’ or ‘Dutch’ about the principles that immigrants are to be committed to and socialized into.”19 Contemporary public identity in these and other immigrant-receiving countries is ‘liberal identity’, he says.20

As Per Mouritsen explains, however, these ‘universal liberal values’ often play a particularistic role in civic integrationist discourse.

On the one hand, the values and practices of a group are associated in the blunt categories of public discourse with universally shared values such as democracy, human rights and equality—often in connection with a critique of old-fashioned nationalism (immigrants need do no more than love our ‘political values’). On the other hand, these abstract principles are presented as accomplishments of distinct national histories and circumstances. General de Gaulle once stated that ‘these values are universal, because they are French’, just as liberty in the US is intimately linked to the frontier and flight from European persecution.21

19 Joppke, "Retreat of Multiculturalism," 253. Joppke’s position on civic integration is sometimes difficult to pin down. His descriptive argument about the civic integrationist backlash against multiculturalism is straightforward enough, but it is not always clear if he sees civic integration as ‘universalist’ or ‘particularist’, or if he is in fact an advocate of civic integration. This ambiguity is present across several articles published in a short period of time.
21 Mouritsen, "Political Responses to Cultural Conflict," 23. Most of Mouritsen’s work uses Denmark to exemplify this argument. See Per Mouritsen, "The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation: Common Values, State Religion and Islam in Danish Political Culture," in Multiculturalism, Muslims, and Citizenship: A European
Accordingly, the rhetoric of civic integration can become a kind of ‘inclusionary exclusion’ that allows politicians to cryptically defend their particular culture in universalistic terms. Specific policies that are often associated with civic integration can have a similar effect. French secularism, for example, requires a separation of religion and state that has repeatedly led to controversy over Muslim women wearing the hijab (a veil that covers the hair and neck) in public schools. The state’s determination to prohibit the hijab and other outward signs of religion seems consistent with religious neutrality at first glance, but it in fact privileges those religions that do not require outward signs of observance. Arguably, a person can be an observant Christian without outwardly demonstrating this fact in a way that members of some other religions cannot. Furthermore, some recent policy changes made in the name of liberalism, such as ‘pre-departure’ integration tests even in cases of family reunification, have been criticized as disingenuous and often illiberal by both opponents of civic integration policy and some advocates like Joppke.

Even when the advocacy is sincere, however, civic integration policy is an inadequate approach to immigrant integration because most of it does not deal with the process of integration at all. Tomas Hammar makes a distinction between ‘immigration policy’ and ‘immigrant policy’: the former regulates the selection and admission of foreigners, and the latter

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22 Recall the arguments against the possibility of ‘cultural neutrality’ in chapter three.
deals with migrants after they have arrived.\textsuperscript{24} Civic integration policy is presented as a means of incorporating migrants into the host society (an immigrant policy), but its primary function is to indicate who the host society is willing to accept based on its own symbolic self-representation (an immigration policy).\textsuperscript{25}

Training in the public language and familiarity with prevailing social norms are essential to integration, of course, but these measures are better seen as necessary conditions for integration than the mechanisms for achieving it (my ability to speak English, for example, would play a crucial role in facilitating my integration into American society, but would not create relationships or a new sense of identity on its own). As Mouritsen puts it, “the problem of ‘living apart together’” that concerns civic integrationists “is not only about culture and multiculture, but also about insufficient participation in the material community of welfare states. This, in turn. . .reflects a lack of skills, social capital and networks, poor labour market participation, segregated housing, and political marginality.”\textsuperscript{26}

Joppke partially agrees with this, but attributes the problem to the way that civic integration has been implemented rather than the approach itself. Some civic integrationists, he says, see integration failures such as Muslim segregation as a cultural problem that needs to be addressed with a more ‘muscular’ (particularistic, sometimes effectively illiberal) liberalism. However, to “say that the European Islam problem is one of deficient cultural integration,” he argues, “and that it can be countered by culture-focused integration policies (whatever they might be) is to ignore the socioeconomic underpinnings of the problem.”\textsuperscript{27}

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\textsuperscript{25} This argument is made by those who see civic integrationist policies as insincere as well. See Groenendijk, "Pre-Departure Integration Strategies."
\textsuperscript{26} Mouritsen, "Culture of Citizenship," 26.
\textsuperscript{27} Joppke, "Role of the State in Cultural Integration," 5.
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Muslims have been unable to integrate into European societies, he argues, is that they are on average poorer and less educated than people who were born there, and many have adopted political Islam as a protest ideology against this condition. Classic immigration countries such as Canada and Australia, he explains,

select predominantly highly skilled, resourceful, and language-competent immigrants, which removes the point of coercive integration. The majority of migrants to Europe, by contrast, are not ‘selected’ at all, but they enter on the basis of ‘rights’ through family reunification and asylum. Because a majority of these migrants are unskilled and (with the exception of France) not proficient in the language of the receiving societies, and often directly become dependent on welfare, they pose serious adjustment problems. 28

In short, Joppke argues that civic integration only works under certain socioeconomic conditions (i.e., when immigrants are relatively wealthy professionals who are fluent in the receiving country’s public language). If those conditions are not met, migrants have trouble integrating, and politicians adopt defensive civic integration policies that move away from neutral liberal principles and become more particularistic, which only exacerbates the problem. The right selection policy “is vastly more effective than the best ‘cultural integration’ policy could ever be,” he says, “precisely because it obviates the need for the latter.” 29

Joppke is right to point out the significance of selection, but misses what is most important about it: social capital and the kind of relational ties that it represents.

The term ‘social capital’ refers to an old idea, but its current name and first contemporary analysis were provided by Pierre Bourdieu as part of his relational sociology. He defines it as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable

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29 "Role of the State in Cultural Integration," 11.
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.”

This definition, Alejandro Portes explains, consists of two parts: “first, the social relationship itself that allows individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates, and second, the amount and quality of those resources.” Social capital allows people to gain access to economic and cultural resources that would otherwise be unavailable to them.

The concept has become a major tool of analysis in political science over the past twenty years, driven in part by the success of Robert Putnam’s influential research program. His distinction between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital is useful: the former are relationships that tend to be exclusive and reinforce in-group solidarity, whereas the latter are relationships that tend to be inclusive and create links across social cleavages. Putnam’s examples of each type of social capital, however, are particular types of groups (e.g., a church is ‘bonding’ and a service group is ‘bridging’ social capital), which is misleading. Like Portes, I think that social capital loses some of its heuristic value when characterized as something possessed by anything other than individuals, and I consider bonding and bridging social capital to be types of relations that people have with one another.

Both bonding and bridging social capital have important implications for immigrant integration. Most previous studies have focused on bonding social capital, explicitly or implicitly, through the study of migrant enclaves. ‘Ghettoization’ is, of course, a major concern for civic integrationists, who argue that it is one of the negative effects of multiculturalism policies. Many

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33 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 22.
34 For Portes’ persuasive critique of Putnam’s understanding of social capital, see Portes, "Social Capital,” 18-21.
scholars, however, rightly argue that migrant neighbourhoods play an important role in short-term integration by providing newcomers with an immediately accessible social network that speaks their language and understands the specific challenges that they face. Some research even suggests that tightly bonded migrant communities can increase economic integration among the second generation.  

There is evidence, however, that medium to long-term integration is dependent on social relations with the properties of bridging social capital, which Mark Granovetter famously called ‘weak ties’. In his article “The Strength of Weak Ties”, he defines them as the acquaintance relationships that people have outside of their primary social networks; the latter, which he refers to as ‘strong ties’, are equivalent to bonding social capital. Focusing on employment, Granovetter argues that weak ties are vital to receiving information about new opportunities because they serve as a bridge between networks (communities) that are otherwise isolated.

Most research on the effects of social capital on immigrant integration only addresses bonding, but some authors have begun to explore the importance of bridging relationships in this context as well. Jean Kunz, for example, argues that bridging social capital is essential for immigrants to expand their networks beyond their own ethnic community and to acculturate into the receiving society. By doing this, they will have more social and economic opportunities. Recent studies have suggested that, in terms of employment, ethnic network is useful mainly in finding jobs with low human capital requirements. For those who are highly skilled and educated, it is the bridging capital that enables immigrants to advance economically and socially.

35 Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530, no. 1 (1993); Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, "The Complexities and Confusions of Segmented Assimilation," Ethnic and Racial Studies 33, no. 7 (2010). ‘Assimilation’ is synonymous with ‘integration’ in this context, and ‘segmented’ refers to the several different paths to assimilation beyond traditional acculturation to the middle class that the authors have identified.

36 Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973). The “strength of a tie,” Granovetter says, “is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.” (1361)
In other words, bridging social capital is critical in increasing the economic returns on human capital.\textsuperscript{37}

Jacqueline Hagan makes a similar argument:

Critical for immigrants’ long-term incorporation is whether the social context of neighborhoods, workplaces, and associations fosters the development of an expansive network of “weak ties” with non-coethnics. Most of the research on immigrants’ settlement and social networks highlights the short-term benefits of family and kin-based resources for initial settlement, but does not illuminate the effects of network dynamics over time. . . newcomers to the community draw on the resources of these social networks to find housing and jobs. Immigrants also can draw on such social relations long after the initial settlement stage.\textsuperscript{38}

And Damaris Rose \textit{et al.} make the same case. Weak ties, they argue, are likely to act as “gateways” facilitating the flow of information or as bridges to other spheres of society or other resource systems removed from the individual’s network of strong, dense ties; they may also lead to new networks of strong ties. In this sense, access to weak ties may become a key element in social integration processes because of their potential to open up access to a wider range of resources (e.g., for finding a job, resolving a family problem) thus facilitating an individual’s becoming more autonomous and less exclusively dependent on strong ties to a small, locally based and homogeneous community.\textsuperscript{39}

What Joppke is missing in his argument about immigrant selection is that well-educated, relatively wealthy immigrants have more (bridging and bonding) social and cultural capital than the less-educated poor, and it is these resources, and the capacity that they provide to generate

\textsuperscript{39} Damaris Rose, Pia Carrasco; and Johanne Charboneau, "The Role Of "Weak Ties" In the Settlement Experiences of Immigrant Women with Young Children: The Case of Central Americans in Montréal," (Toronto: Working Papers Series, Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, 1998), 3. It is noteworthy that this and Hagan’s article focus on the integration of immigrant women, who are often less well-integrated into their new societies than immigrant men because gender roles leave them with fewer opportunities to establish relationships outside of their migrant community.
more, that puts them in a better position to integrate.\textsuperscript{40} Civic integration offers few resources for those who do not already have social capital to develop it, with the main exception of language training, which both provides language skills that can facilitate integration and the opportunity to meet and form relationships with people from different communities.\textsuperscript{41} Even the most dedicated liberal-democrat will struggle to participate in a new society if they do not have the kind of cross-community relationships that undergird and facilitate participation in public life. The following section is meant to help demonstrate this. While there has not yet been much research on the effect of bridging social ties on immigrant integration (the authors quoted above all describe their work as ‘first steps’), there is evidence from Canada, widely regarded as one of the world’s most successful countries of immigration, that such relationships play an important role.

4. \textit{Immigrant integration in Canada}

Canada is widely recognized as a country of immigration where integration is generally successful. In this section I explain that its ‘multicultural integration’ approach is compatible with much of what civic integrationists prescribe, in spite of their rhetoric to the contrary, and argue that the available evidence suggests that the development of inter-group social ties is the most important factor to successful integration in Canada rather than shared political values.

\textsuperscript{40} Cultural capital is Bourdieu’s term for the forms of knowledge, skills, and education that a person has which may give them a higher status in society. See Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital."

\textsuperscript{41} Citizenship, once achieved, \textit{is} a form of bridging social capital, but it only creates \textit{formal} ties among those who share it, and is in most circumstances really a relationship with the state. Its principal value to integration is that it provides access to other institutions that act as relational mechanisms such as public education.
Canada did not have any official integration policy prior to 1949, before which the presumption was that immigrants were responsible for their own integration. This change was part of the beginning of a significant shift in the politics of immigration following the Second World War. Although Canada had received large numbers of immigrants in the past, restrictive policies deliberately limited admission to whites of European descent. This ‘whites only’ immigration policy persisted until the 1960s, when it began to change as a result of factors such as the discrediting of scientific racism, the emergence of a new international human rights regime, and the success of the decolonization movement.

Immigration flows to Canada shifted significantly in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of these changes. As Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos explains, Europeans accounted for approximately 80% of immigration to Canada until 1967. By 1974, this had fallen to 40%, and non-European immigration had increased significantly: Hong Kong, Jamaica, India, the Philippines, and Trinidad were among Canada’s top ten sources of immigration. By 2002, immigrants from mainland China were the largest single group entering Canada, making up 15% of a total intake of 228,575. These changes led to Canada becoming one of the most culturally

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42 Settlement assistance was originally introduced to help families of Canadian soldiers and refugees adapt to Canadian life after the War. John Biles, "Integration Policies in English-Speaking Canada," in Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-First Century, ed. John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Frideres (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 175, n. 2.
43 There was, however, a hierarchy of desirability even within this group. “While immigrants from the British Isles and northwestern Europe were granted what might be likened to ‘most favored immigrant’ status”, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos explains, “immigrants from southern and Eastern Europe were greeted with far less enthusiasm and subjected to assimilatory pressures based on the principle of ‘Anglo conformity’.” Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, ”A Model for Europe? An Appraisal of Canadian Integration Policies,” in Politische Steuerung Von Integrationsprozessen: Intentionen Und Wirkungen ed. Sigrid Baringhorst, Uwe Hunger, and Karen Schönwälder (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 81.
44 Ibid. For a persuasive discussion of the normative and institutional conditions for the transformation of Canadian immigration policy during this period, see "Global Norms, Domestic Institutions and the Transformation of Immigration Policy in Canada and the Us," Review of International Studies 36 (2010). Also, as Will Kymlicka argues, these changes were not limited to Canada, despite the claims of some nationalist historiography. Will Kymlicka, "The Canadian Model of Diversity in Comparative Perspective” (paper presented at the Eighth Standard Life Visiting Lecture, University of Edingburgh, April 29 2004).
45 Triadafilopoulos, ”A Model for Europe?,” 82.
diverse countries in the world, especially in its major cities such as Toronto, where nearly half of the population of 5.5 million is now foreign-born.

The federal government adopted the first official multiculturalism policy in the world in 1971, which was later entrenched in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and followed by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988.\textsuperscript{46} The preamble of the Act states that “the Government of Canada recognizes the diversity of Canadians as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society and is committed to a policy of multiculturalism designed to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage of Canadians while working to achieve the equality of all Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada.” And one of the explicit objectives of the Immigrant and Refugee Protection Act (2001) is “to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and Canadian society.”\textsuperscript{47}

As the wording of these policies suggests, multiculturalism in Canada has always been conceived as an integrative policy and, as Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka argue, the Canadian approach to immigrant integration is best described as ‘multicultural integration’. This approach respects cultural diversity with institutional recognition, but also includes the primary components of civic integration.\textsuperscript{48} The principal difference between ‘multicultural integration’ and ‘civic integration’ is the former’s emphasis on facilitating new relationships through

\textsuperscript{46} Multiculturalism was initially adopted as a way of placating white ethnics who were concerned that the binational (British and French) vision of Canada that became prominent in the 1960s left their contributions and needs unrecognized. Kymlicka, "The Canadian Model".

\textsuperscript{47} Every province also has its own multiculturalism act, with the exception of Quebec, which is official committed to ‘interculturalism’. In my view this is a rhetorical rather than a substantive difference, however, so I will not discuss it further here.

\textsuperscript{48} Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, "Is There Really a Backlash against Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index" (paper presented at the Eighteenth International Conference of the Council of Europe Studies, Barcelona, Spain, June 20-22 2011).
programs such as local settlement agencies instead of focusing almost exclusively on the
symbolic characteristics that immigrants are expected to adopt.

The Canadian integration regime was never planned or restructured on a comprehensive
basis, Banting and Kymlicka explain, and should be understood as a complexly layered, path-
dependent assemblage of policies and programs.49 These include “not only support for cultural
diversity, but also assistance for minorities to overcome barriers to wider engagement, promotion
of intercultural exchange, and support for immigrants to acquire one of Canada’s official
languages ‘in order to become full participants in Canadian society’.”50

Immigration is a concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and provincial governments
with federal paramountcy, meaning that the federal government has legal dominance when
provincial and federal approaches diverge. Provincial involvement in immigration has ebbed and
flowed since Confederation, but provincial governments are now more active than ever and have
all signed separate agreements on immigration with the federal government. A process is also
now underway to formalize the participation of municipal governments, which play a vital role
in immigrant integration. Community organizations that provide integration support are
recognized as key players. Indeed, as John Biles explains, “Canada provides the majority of
services provided to newcomers through third-parties, whether immigrant service provider
organizations, educational institutions, or partners in the private sector. These organizations are
critical players in the integration of newcomers to Canada.”51

49 Ibid. The authors persuasively use the concepts of ‘drift’, ‘conversion’, and ‘layering’ to explain Canada’s
particular policy and program configuration, and cite Gary Freeman’s argument, mentioned earlier in this chapter,
that “No state possess a truly coherent incorporation regime. . .Rather one finds sub-system frameworks are weakly,
if at all, co-ordinated.” Freeman, "Immigrant Incorporation in Western Democracies," 946.
50 Banting and Kymlicka, "Is There Really a Backlash?", 10.
51 Biles, "Integration Policies," 140-41.
There are far too many policies and programs to discuss them all here, so I will instead focus on those that are essential to understanding Canada’s integration regime.\textsuperscript{52}

The federal government has instituted integration policies through a wide range of departments and agencies, but three are particularly important: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canadian Heritage, and Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC). The first three years of settlement are handled mainly by CIC, after which responsibility for longer-term integration shifts to Canadian Heritage and the rest of the Government of Canada, and HRSDC is involved in a wide range of cross-government initiatives that affect immigrant integration. CIC provides funding and support to service provider organizations that deliver programs and services in four major categories: “(i) official language acquisition handled by the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada Program (LINC); (ii) the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP); (iii) the Host Program; and (iv) Refugee Programs.”\textsuperscript{53} Canadian Heritage programs are meant to promote a shared sense of identity, and HRSDC focuses on the development of human capital.

All of the provinces have signed agreements with the Government of Canada, though the most substantive are with Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. The \textit{Canada–Quebec Accord} (1991) is the most comprehensive, giving Quebec selection powers and control over its own settlement services while Canada retains responsibility for defining immigrant categories, setting levels, and enforcement. CIC continues to deliver settlement and integration programs in the other three provinces, but they now have the authority to select some immigrants

\textsuperscript{52} John Biles “Integration Policies in English-Speaking Canada” is the most comprehensive overview of Canadian immigration policies and practices, and is the basis for most of this brief survey. The Conservative Party of Canada has begun making incremental but significant changes to Canadian immigration and immigrant policies since winning a majority government in 2011, but I have left those aside here because most of the changes have not yet come into effect. It is worth noting, however, that it seems clear that the Conservative vision is influenced by civic integrationist ideology, especially given some of the justificatory rhetoric used to support the new policies.

\textsuperscript{53} Biles, "Integration Policies,” 141.
through provincial nominee programs.\textsuperscript{54} Quebec, Manitoba, and British Columbia are the only provinces that have assumed responsibility for integration services, but the other provinces are still active participants in these issues because provincial responsibilities such as housing, education, and health are integral to the integration process.\textsuperscript{55}

Municipalities and especially community organizations are responsible for the delivery of many integration programs and services. Municipal governments in cities that receive large numbers of immigrants often provide income support, subsidized housing, emergency shelter, child care, and provide these services in many different languages.

A complex array of non-governmental community organizations are funded by all three levels of government and provide services at the local level. Biles divides them into five categories: “(i) the immigrant service provider organizations (SPOs); (ii) the multicultural and ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic minority organizations; (iii) the issue-based organizations; (iv) the so-called ‘universal’ organizations; and (v) the private sector.”\textsuperscript{56} The first category is the most influential, and characterized as powerfully integrative by Banting and Kymlicka: SPOs delivery the majority of Government of Canada-funded integration and settlement services, ranging from official language instruction to employment counselling. The second and third include advocacy groups that focus on the promotion of either general multiculturalism, the needs of a specific community, or a specific issue such as anti-racism. ‘Universal’ organisations that provide services for all Canadians but have specific programs for newcomers and private sector individuals and businesses are usually focussed on helping immigrants enter the workforce.

Unfortunately, the literature on immigrant integration in Canada is modest relative to the significance of the topic and, in any case, it is difficult to assess the efficacy of these policies

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 157-58.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 159.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 166.
directly. Stuart Soroka et al.’s “Ties That Bind? Social Cohesion and Diversity in Canada” is often cited in this context, and is a useful place to start. The authors use data from the *Equality, Security and Community Survey* and the *Canada Election Study* to evaluate the effect of diversity on social cohesion in Canada across six measures: pride in country; sense of belonging; interpersonal trust; social values; social networks; and voting. Their analysis shows that differences between ethnic and religious minorities and the majority on these measures are almost entirely limited to the first generation of immigrants, with the exception of sense of belonging and social trust, which are persistently lower among immigrants across generations. Recent immigrants have also had more difficulty entering the labour market than earlier cohorts.

Soroka et al. identify two standards of successful integration: ‘a common sense of national identity and shared values’ and ‘engagement in the social and political life of the country’. Given the differences in social trust and sense of belonging between immigrants and the majority, the authors argue,

if social cohesion is well rooted only in a common sense of national identity and shared values, then Canada faces enduring challenges. . . Crafting effective policy responses is a subtle art, since nurturing a common identity and shared values is problematic in a multination, multicultural country. We have already handed out a lot of Maple Leaf flags. Indeed, seeking to build a single, overarching sense of identity may well be counterproductive. . . Moreover, this thinner sense of a Canadian culture among the historic communities may actually have benefits in a multicultural era, making it easier for new Canadians to feel comfortable here. In the final analysis, however, faith in the future of Canada as a single state assumes that the first theory of cohesion, with its emphasis on common national identity and shared values, is simply too narrow to capture the social realities and potential of the modern world.


Ibid., 584-85.
The second conception of social integration provides a more optimistic view:

Our measures of engagement in the social and political life of the country find virtually no significant differences across ethnic communities. Membership in groups that are likely to bridge social backgrounds does not differ across ethnic communities; and initial differences in the probability of voting collapse when controls are added. If the true source of social cohesion in today’s multicultural world is to be found in the engagement of ethnic groups in community life and in the democratic processes through which we manage our diverse identities and values, then Canada seems to be reasonably positioned for the future. Moreover, this conception of social cohesion generates a policy agenda that can be reasonably tackled within Canadian political life—an agenda of removing the remaining barriers to political participation and of strengthening the effectiveness of democratic institutions and accountability.60

Soroka et al.’s interpretation of how Canada measures up to the first standard is heavily influenced by its status as a plurinational state, and the identity and value integration of second-generation immigrants is quite high within English-speaking Canada and Quebec taken separately, but they are right to emphasize relations as the foundation of social integration. People can participate in society without sharing values or a common identity, but it seems unlikely that those things could develop without cross-community social interaction.

Bonnie Erickson is also right to argue, however, that membership in voluntary associations is not always a good measure of social integration.61 In her commentary on Soroka et al.’s chapter, Erickson explains that memberships in such associations may only be nominal, and participation in some recreational and youth-oriented organizations are more likely to lead to

60 Ibid., 586.
bonding than bridging social capital. To see how integrated newcomers are, we need to be more precise by looking at direct measures of their actual social networks.62

Social ties and integration

Only a small fraction of the literature on immigrant integration in Canada focuses on the relational character of immigrant lives outside of their immediate communities, and none that I am aware of uses the kind of social network analysis that Erickson advocates. There are, however, a series of recent statistical analyses using survey data that do test the relationship between bridging social ties and immigrant integration. The fact that the majority of these studies focus on economic integration through employment is a limitation, but that narrow focus reflects a general problem in the literature on immigrant integration that needs to be overcome rather than something specific to this approach. Nevertheless, the following studies do suggest that inter-group economic integration has broader implications, and some directly address non-economic elements of social integration.

Elisabeth Gidengil and Dietlind Stolle, for example, have investigated the role of both strong and weak ties in the political integration of immigrant women.63 Focusing on what they call the ‘participatory’ rather than the ‘formal’ dimension of integration, Gidengil and Stolle argue that immigrant women are significantly less politically integrated than women who were born in Canada, especially among those who have a lower household income or have been in

63 Elisabeth Gidengil and Dietlind Stolle, “The Role of Social Networks in Immigrant Women’s Political Incorporation,” International Migration Review 43, no. 4 (2009). Most research on immigrant integration, the authors point out, “emphasizes bonding ties within the immigrant’s own ethno-cultural community.” (728)
Canada for less than ten years. Strong social ties do not appear to either help or hinder political integration, they say, with the exception that the more immigrant women regularly talk and meet with people from their home country, the less likely they are to engage in unconventional political activities and the less they tend to know about Canadian politics.\(^64\) Weak ties through voluntary associations and employment do have a positive effect on integration, especially in the case of the former. “The more associations an immigrant woman belongs to (excluding ethnic and immigrant associations), the more likely she is to vote and to take part in less conventional political activities and the more she typically knows about Canadian politics.” The effect of workplace relations tends to be confined to voting: immigrant women who regularly socialize with their co-workers are about 10% more likely to vote than those who do not.\(^65\) More important than the type of tie, however, is whether immigrant women have any ties at all. Social isolation clearly impedes political integration: having at least one associational membership and close friends are important factors in determining whether immigrant women are likely to get involved in political activities or have adequate political information and knowledge of government services.\(^66\)

Emi Ooka and Barry Wellman recently analyzed the comparative value of intra- and inter-ethnic group relationships when looking for a job in Toronto.\(^67\) The fact that the analysis is based on data from the “Ethnic Pluralism in an Urban Setting Research Project” (1978–79) may affect the present applicability of the results due to significant changes in Canada’s immigrant

\(^{64}\) Ibid.: 747.  
\(^{65}\) Ibid.: 749-48.  
\(^{66}\) Ibid.: 751.  
demographics over the past 30 years, but some characteristics of the results suggest they are useful in spite of this limitation.\textsuperscript{68}

In general, the ethnic heterogeneity of social networks increases over succeeding generations; the longer members of a group have resided in Canada, the greater the diversity of their contacts.\textsuperscript{69} About half of first generation immigrants who have a postsecondary education belong to heterogeneous social networks, twice as many as those with only high school or less, and members of the latter category are also likely to lack English communication skills and live in ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods. Postsecondary education has an opposite effect for the second generation: half of people with just high school education had heterogeneous social networks, whereas only 35\% of people with postsecondary education had such networks. By the third generation, level of education did not appear have a significant effect, with around 60\% cent of both groups belonging to heterogeneous networks.\textsuperscript{70}

Both men and women attained higher incomes when they used their inter-ethnic job contacts: women who did this had a 10\% higher mean income than women who did not, and men saw a more modest increase in mean income of 2\%. This benefit, however, was not consistent across all ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic ties are likely to be beneficial for members of low-status ethnic groups, whereas intra-ethnic ties are relatively more beneficial to job seekers from higher-status ethnic groups. Furthermore, the group status of job contacts themselves affects their value.

\textsuperscript{68} The sample contains 2,338 Toronto residents between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five, belonging to one of ten ethnic groups in Toronto. Ooka and Wellman focus on the five ethnic groups in the study that included more than one generation: English, German, Italian, Jewish, and Ukrainian. This data set was chosen, Ooka and Wellman explain, because they “are the only data that provide information for studying in detail the kinds of job contacts that members of different ethnic groups have used in their job searches and information about income they have earned in these jobs. Because it focuses on job search experiences among the five European groups in the late 1970s, this chapter does not directly address the recent experiences of immigrants to Canada. However, our study provides a reference point for investigating the extent to which racial and ethnic segregation in the labour market can condition the structural advantages or disadvantages of intra-/inter-ethnic ties when minority members mobilize their ties for job searches.” Ibid., 200.

\textsuperscript{69} The authors define a person’s social network as heterogeneous if at least two of their closest friends are from another ethnic group.

to job seekers: people who have contacts with members of higher-status ethnic groups have higher incomes than those whose inter-ethnic contacts are members of lower-status groups. The highest status group, English men, almost always used intra-ethnic contacts to find jobs (85%), and these ties were more beneficial than their contacts with other higher-status ethnic groups and much more beneficial than their contacts with low-status ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{71} In short, inter-ethnic relationships were very valuable to some people, such as immigrants who belong to low-status ethnic groups, but “the advantages of using inter-ethnic ties was conditional on the positions of the ethnic groups to which job seekers and job contacts belonged.”\textsuperscript{72} These ties were least important to newcomers who were members of the majority ethnic group.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada has recently published several reports that similarly address the importance of heterogeneous social networks to immigrant integration, based on Statistics Canada’s “Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada”, which was conducted in three waves (2000–05).\textsuperscript{73}

The ethnic diversity of friendship networks, Li Xue says, “appears to be the main factor within social network indicators linked to labour market outcomes for both male and female immigrants.”\textsuperscript{74} This effect, however, is more important for women, and affects them differently over time: “Female immigrants are less likely to find employment in Wave 2 (i.e. from six

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 211-14.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 216.
\textsuperscript{73} The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) is the first country-wide longitudinal survey conducted with the recent immigrant population since the 1970s. The survey was designed to study how newly arrived immigrants adjust to life in Canada during their first four years, and capture information about the economic, social, and cultural aspects of integration. It is a ‘longitudinal’ survey because each of the respondents were interviewed more than once. The sample was selected from the population of immigrants 15 years of age and over who landed from abroad between 1 October 2000 and 30 September 2001, with only one participant from each family unit. The interviews took place at six months, two years and four years after landing in Canada. 12,000 individuals took part in Wave 1, 9,300 of that initial group participated in Wave 2, and 7,700 in Wave 3. The final sample represents 157,600 immigrants.
\textsuperscript{74} Li Xue, "Social Capital and Employment Entry of Recent Immigrants to Canada: Evidence from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada," (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2008), 22. It is worth noting, Xue says, that the LSIC cohort’s arrival in Canada coincided with an economic slowdown, which likely affected its employment prospects.
months to two years in Canada [see footnote 76]) and Wave 3 (i.e. from two years to four years after landing) relative to the base period—Wave 1 (the first six months in Canada). . .Furthermore, for female newcomers, friendship diversity has more impact on employment likelihood in Wave 2 and 3 than in Wave 1.”75 For men, on the other hand, “the ethnic diversity of friendship network displays significantly less effect on employment in Wave 3 than in Wave 1. . .This result suggests that as time goes on, the effect of ethnic diversity decreases for male immigrants. In other words, the effect of ethnic concentration increases.”76 Furthermore, like Ooka and Wellman, Xue found that the effect of ethnically diverse relationships varies across ethnic groups, though the interaction is more complex than a division between low- and high-status groups:

A diversified friendship network is especially important for female economic class immigrants and Filipino newcomers in the Canadian labour market. For male immigrants, social capital is more related to employment status of some specific groups. After controlling for disparity within different groups, a diverse friendship network has stronger effects on the employment likelihood of male skilled workers but weaker impacts on employment entry of Black, Filipino and Southeast Asian, Japanese and Korean [than for other groups].77

In a different report, Xue argues that there is a significant and positive correlation between belonging to diverse social networks and higher wages for immigrants. An increase in workplace ethnic diversity from a total concentration in one ethnic group to a total diverse workplace network, for example, would increase the real weekly wage by 13.8% for men, and 14.5% for women.78 It seems, however, that this kind of diversity is “most beneficial for those

75 Ibid., 24-25.
76 Ibid., 25. The ethnic diversity of friendship has more impact on the probability of finding employment for male skilled workers than for family class male immigrants, however.
77 Ibid.
78 “Social Capital and Wages: Outcome of Recent Immigrants to Canada,” (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2008), 16.
with a university degree, and not for the less educated, neither more educated. For example, workplace diversity has 35.5% weaker effects for those with a high school diploma or less, 46% less returns for those with some post-secondary education, and 34.3% weaker for female immigrants with a master’s degree or a PhD.79

There also appears to be a significant and positive correlation between inter-group relationships and immigrant health, though this effect is limited to skilled workers and refugees and does not extend to family class immigrants (likely because of the higher number of older persons in the latter category).80 “Our results,” Jun Zhao, Li Xue, and Tara Gilkinson explain in their report, “indicate that friendship networks have a significant effect on the respondents’ self-reported status of health. Both the frequency of contact with friends and the ethnic diversity of friends have significant and positive effects on immigrants’ health.”81 Importantly, however, they did not find significant effects of family and relative networks or group and organization networks on the health for all immigrants.82

These studies all suggest that bridging social capital and the kind of relations that it represents can have a significant effect on immigrant integration, especially for women and members of low-status groups. They are, however, only the first attempts to address this question, and the results are therefore tentative.83 Nevertheless, the premise seems to be sound, and many knowledgeable commentators argue that the main obstacle to integration at the moment is that

79 Ibid., 17-18.
80 Jun Zhao, Li Xue, and Tara Gilkinson, "Health Status and Social Capital of Recent Immigrants in Canada: Evidence from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada," (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010).
81 Ibid., 16.
82 Ibid.
83 As Xue puts it, for example, the evidence seems to show that bridging social capital “plays an important role in facilitating the economic assimilation of recent immigrants in terms of a higher probability of getting employment. However, due to data limitations, this study focuses only on the relatively short period of the first four years after landing. Further research will be required to improve our understanding of the role of social capital in newcomers’ employment entry process over a longer time span.” Xue, "Social Capital and Employment Entry," 26-27.
immigrants do not have enough access to diverse networks, and that the recent decline in immigrant employment success, for example, could be improved by actively developing institutions that link workers to jobs, and encouraging professional licensing bodies to make professional accreditation more accessible to immigrants.\textsuperscript{84}

It is difficult to determine the degree to which Canada’s integration regime is responsible for creating these ties, but there is some evidence that local settlement services play a crucial role. In a study of immigrant women in Montreal, for example, Damaris Rose \textit{et al.} found that establishing weak ties through settlement services can significantly improve the chances of successful integration:

family and close friends were indeed very important for “front line” assistance for new arrivals. . .these networks were not necessarily \textit{sufficient} in terms of their potential for diversified medium term social support. . .although not all immigrant women are heavily dependent on front-line settlement services offered in the formal system (apart from essential government services that all immigrants use), such services are often a precious resource that not only facilitates adaptation but can also offer alternative ways out of problematic situations, open doors (such as to jobs beyond traditional immigrant “job ghettos”) and suggest new horizons (such as, there is life after divorce).\textsuperscript{85}

For the women interviewed by Rose \textit{et al.}, government supported service provider organizations played the most important role in their integration, providing them with both necessary services and, crucially, the opportunity meet and form relationships with people from other communities. This is hardly definitive, but again suggests that such research is headed in the right direction.

\textsuperscript{84} Triadafilopoulos, ”A Model for Europe?.”
\textsuperscript{85} Rose, Carrasco; and Charboneau, ”The Role Of ”Weak Ties”,“ 13.
5. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to argue that civic nationalism is no more an appropriate model for successful immigrant integration than it is for regulating intra-state nationalist conflict. Language training and employment assistance are obviously essential components of immigrant integration, and the values that civic nationalists champion are indeed important to participation in a liberal-democracy, but the civic nationalist response to immigrant integration reflects the self-representation of the majority instead of the relational basis of social cohesion. This self-representation, I argued, indulges an implicit particularism by portraying ‘universal liberal principles and values’ as the foundation of the host society while simultaneously characterizing them as a product of that society, allowing apparently inclusive rhetoric to be used for exclusion. Even when the desire for inclusion is sincere, however, civic integrationist measures are not enough to achieve integration because they provide few mechanisms for creating the kind of relationships that immigrants need in order to become full participants in their new society, such as bridging social capital. Instead, I argued, civic integration is best understood as a kind of symbolic politics that is more an ‘immigration policy’ (which determines who gets in) than an ‘immigrant policy’ (which determines how people who get in are incorporated).
Chapter 8

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I have argued that civic nationalism is not a tool of analysis but is instead a normative ideology that reflects the self-understanding of many contemporary liberals more than anything else. This basic argument has already been ably articulated by authors such as Will Kymlicka, Bernard Yack, Rogers Brubaker, and Anthony Marx, but my original contribution is to extend this critique beyond the ‘ideological model’ of civic nationalism to the general theory of nations and nationalism that informs it by arguing that these are not solely ideological phenomena, that my alternative, relational approach provides a more promising analytical framework, and that civic nationalism is not a feasible prescription for policy issues such as intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration for many reasons that are closely tied to its exclusive focus on ideology. In this conclusion I will first review the arguments that I made in the preceding chapters, then offer a brief assessment of their policy implications, and finally suggest what further research could be based on this thesis.

I. Review of the argument

After providing an overview of civic nationalism that traces its history, identifies and describes its essential characteristics, and explains the wider political and academic context that led to its emergence and current prominence in chapter two, I began my critique by focusing on civic nationalism’s ‘problems in principle’ in chapter three. These problems, as I explained, have been
the primary focus of previous critiques of civic nationalism. I started this chapter by clarifying the differences between patriotism, liberal nationalism, and civic nationalism, the most important of which is that civic nationalism is focused on the constitutive character of the nation, whereas patriotism and liberal nationalism are focused on the conduct of politics within a national context. Problems specific to the principles of civic nationalism were then divided into two categories: inconsistent or misconceived premises that are internal to civic nationalist ideology, and similarly mistaken arguments that fall outside of civic nationalism itself but nevertheless affect its analysis. In the first category I focused on membership and political culture, arguing that membership in civic nations is neither inherently inclusive nor voluntary, that shared values are an insufficient basis for social cohesion, and that state neutrality and popular sovereignty are fundamentally misconceived in this context. The final section explained how some theorists of civic nationalism have misunderstood concepts such as the social contract, ideal types, and the modernity of different types of nationalism.

In chapter four I argued that as important as these ‘problems in principle’ are, the most significant problem with civic nationalism is the general theory of nations and nationalism used by most theorists of civic nationalism who want to explain its development and spread. These authors treat nationalism as a solely ideological phenomenon, and nations as the successful diffusion of that ideology throughout a given territory. To establish that this is an accurate assessment I first provided an overview of the civic nationalist historiography of the origin and spread of nationalism in England, France, and the United States, followed by a discussion that explained how nationalism is reduced to an ideology by theorists of civic nationalism, using Greenfeld’s argument as an illustration. With this accomplished, I then proposed that the term ‘nationalism’ is a polyseme that represents more than just an ideology, and most importantly also
refers to a ‘system of culture’ or way of organizing society as Gellner and Anderson have argued. Finally, I raised two sets of methodological problems with the way that theorists of civic nationalism characterize ideology and its effects that can be divided into two sets: one focused on ideology as such, and the other on units of analysis. The first set includes four inter-related problems that I labelled ‘intellectualism’, ‘diffusion’, ‘interpretation’, and ‘indifference’, which together demonstrate that it is highly unlikely that mass self-perception and identification can be adequately explained through an intellectual history of elites. The second set of problems focuses on the need to treat nations and nationalism as separate units of analysis. This amounts to using a ‘category of practice’ in place of a ‘category of analysis’, I argued, and defeats the purpose of scholarly inquiry.

Chapter four introduced my alternative approach to nations and nationalism that modifies Gellner and Anderson’s ‘system of culture’ arguments with the kind of relational social theory advocated by Brubaker and Tilly, and tested civic nationalist historiography against the historical record of French and American nation-building.

I began by explaining that relationalism, which is well-known in sociology but has only recently been applied in political science, is a constructivist social ontology that treats social phenomena as the product of regularities in social relations rather than substantial entities, meaning that social groups, for example, are the way that we conceptualize particular kinds of enduring, processual relationships between people, not ‘things’ in themselves. There are two influential schools of relational social theory, the ‘Bourdieu school’ and the ‘New York school’, which respectively provide the foundation for Brubaker and Tilly’s relational approaches to nations and nationalism.
My modified relational approach starts with the premise that the most important characteristics of Gellner and Anderson’s theories is that they identify what Gellner calls processes of ‘exo-socialization’, such as mass education, intra-state transportation infrastructure, and inter-regional economic trade and migration. It is these usually institutionally-driven ‘relational mechanisms’, to use Tilly’s term, that create relational ties between people who may otherwise have never come into contact with one another. Ideology is important, but social relationships are the foundation of nationhood and, while ideology can shape these relationships (especially when institutionalized), it is the relationships themselves that generate a sense of national identity and facilitate shared ideological values, not the other way around, as civic nationalists would have us believe. To facilitate this argument, I proposed the adoption of two separate analytic concepts: ‘ideational nationhood’, a participant perspective which refers to nations as they are understood by social actors, and ‘relational nationhood’, an analytical perspective that refers to the dense network of overlapping social ties created and perpetuated through nationalizing processes.

Finally, I argued that a critical analysis of civic nationalist historiography of nation-building in France and the United States demonstrates that it is deeply flawed and best seen as a tendentious, ideologically motivated story rather than an accurate representation of history. My discussion of each case was divided into two sections, ‘participant perspectives’ and ‘processes of nationalization’. The first clearly shows that the civic nationalist account of nationalization in both France and the United States misrepresents key intellectuals and political actor and ignores widespread nationalist self-understandings that are inconsistent with civic nationalist principles. The second provides evidence that my alternative relational approach to nations and nationalism
is a more promising way to explain the emergence of nationhood in these territories than ideological diffusion alone.

The last two chapters focussed on the final stage of my argument, the feasibility of civic nationalism as a policy prescription. Chapter six addressed intra-state nationalist conflict. The first two sections provided an overview of potential causes of such conflict, the range of approaches to regulating it, and specific arguments made by civic nationalists. I then argued that the civic nationalist prescription misrepresents the causes of intra-state nationalist conflict and that, while deliberate integration may be appropriate in rare circumstances, in most cases it is a potential result of successful conflict regulation rather than a means of achieving it, and even then civic nationalism is not an appropriate model. Civic nationalist historiography obscures the majoritarian, nation-statist bias of civic nationalism and the undesirable methods and processes through which purportedly civic nations were built, which, even if they were normatively acceptable, were only effective prior to the ‘Age of Nationalism’. Contemporary conflicts are the product of rival nation-building projects, and must be addressed pragmatically through measures such as plurinational power-sharing, as my discussion of Northern Ireland demonstrated. Integration is not possible until the conflict itself is addressed, and is medium- to long-term process that develops through increasing inter-group interactions and inter-relations, not ideological imposition.

Finally, chapter seven argued that civic nationalism is no more an appropriate model for successful immigrant integration than it is for regulating intra-state nationalist conflict. Language training and employment assistance are obviously essential components of immigrant integration, and the values that civic nationalists champion are indeed important to participation in a liberal-democracy, but the civic nationalist response to immigrant integration reflects the self-
representation of the majority instead of the relational basis of social cohesion. This self-representation, I argued, indulges an implicit particularism by portraying ‘universal liberal principles and values’ as the foundation of the host society while simultaneously characterizing them as a product of that society, allowing apparently inclusive rhetoric to be used for exclusion. Even when the desire for inclusion is sincere, however, civic integrationist measures are not enough to achieve integration because they provide few mechanisms for creating the kind of relationships that immigrants need in order to become full participants in their new society, such as bridging social capital. Instead, I argued, civic integration is best understood as a kind of symbolic politics that is more an ‘immigration policy’ (which determines who gets in) than an ‘immigrant policy’ (which determines how people who get in are incorporated). In the last section of the chapter, I focused Canadian model of ‘multicultural integration’, where the development of a network of inter-group social ties seems to play the most important role in immigrant integration.

2. *Policy implications*

The most important policy implication of my overall argument has already been addressed: civic nationalism may be an effective means for a majority national group to legitimize its dominance, but it is not a solution to the problems associated with intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration, and it never will be. It is attractive as an abstract ideal, especially when framed as the sole alternative to ethnic nationalism, but only because civic nationalism
misrepresents both history and the social bases of nations and nationalism. The first condition for all valid prescriptions is that they must be feasible, and civic nationalism does not pass that test.

It is possible that the popular belief that conationality is based on the principles of civic nationalism may be politically useful in some circumstances. The focus of this thesis has been on uncovering the real social bases of nations and nationalism, and their implications for policy issues that are significantly affected by these phenomena. It could be argued, though, that civic nationalism is a ‘useful fiction’ or ‘noble lie’ that, while not an accurate description of the actual social processes governing national phenomena, may make it easier for policy-makers to pursue more effective measures. This is certainly not the case for intra-state nationalist conflict regulation which, as I have argued, is often held back by claims to civic nationhood, but a narrative of shared political values may be useful during a post-conflict reconstruction in the long term, so long as it is not intended to undermine the plurinational agreement that serves as its foundation. Similarly, while civic nationalism does not provide the requisite tools for immigrant integration, the process is likely to go more smoothly if the majority understand membership in the nation as ‘civically inclusive’ instead of ‘ethnically exclusive’, if those are the only available choices in the popular imagination.

This is not a necessary lie, however. Civic nationalism does not have a monopoly on liberalism, as my discussion of liberal nationalism in chapter three demonstrated, and it seems to me that there is no good reason not to publicly recognize that plurinational states are the worldwide norm and that it is our relationships that make us conationals. A better public understanding of the way the world works is likely to lead to greater gains over time than any short-term benefit derived from perpetuating this nation-statist myths of civic nationalism. Our answer to the question of ‘civic or ethnic’ nationalism should be ‘neither’.
3. Further research

The main objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive demonstration of the unsuitability of civic nationalism as a tool of analysis and its infeasibility as a policy prescription. My alternative relational approach to nations and nationalism plays a major role in this task, but the focus of the thesis means that what I have presented here is in some respects best seen as a foundation for further research using that approach. There are at least two ways that this agenda should be pursued that will hopefully both provide corroborating evidence and demonstrate the usefulness of this approach.

First, full histories of nationhood and nationalism in France, the United States, and other cases associated with civic nationalism based on the relational approach that I am advocating or something similar. The historical study of nationalism has progressed significantly over the past forty years, but the rarity of serious historical studies of some cases that go beyond debates over nationalist ideology is almost shocking. This is especially true of American nationalism, which began to attract more attention in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, but is still the most understudied major case of nationalism in the world. We need more studies that treat nationalist ideology as a factor in the history of nations and nationalism, not its focus and explanation.

Second, our understanding of both intra-state nationalist conflict and immigrant integration could benefit significantly from the use of social network analysis. For example, I suspect that a study combining a network analysis of social relationships and a survey/interview analysis of nationalist self-understandings in a plurinational state would show a strong correlation between support for state-wide civic nationalism and membership in majority-group social networks, and the opposite for minorities. Similarly, as I suggested in chapter seven, direct
analysis of immigrant social networks would provide more useful evidence for evaluating the impact of inter-group relationships on immigrant integration. This would be especially helpful in overcoming the economistic focus of many integration studies, which is partly a result of the fact that employment data is convenient for statistical analysis.
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