Potential for synthesis between REDD+ and community forest management as understood through the lens of global political ecology

by

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Abstract

Global climate change is one of the defining issues of the 21st century. The phenomenon of natural climate variation being pushed beyond normal ranges has been fueled largely by industrial activities and those which support them (i.e. land-use change and the over-exploitation of natural resources). The urgency is well established with reports demonstrating an increased occurrence of rare, highly damaging weather events, and shifts in the natural range of species. The necessity of action on climate change has resulted in the development of novel global initiatives designed to address the problem across global and regional scales. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is emblematic of this new wave of conservation strategy. It brings together parties which are often seen as opposed on environmental issues in collaborative environmental practise.

This thesis explores the development of REDD+ as an effective and equitable solutions to this problem. REDD+ is a policy architecture designed for global deployment, the success of which will depend largely upon the engagement and involvement of local community groups. Community forest management (CFM) may inform the REDD+ design process, and enhance both land-use strategies by way of synergy. The pathway to that point is, however, uncertain and marred with potential pitfalls. This thesis uses the instructive and critical lens of political ecology to assess the potential for integrating greater CFM elements into the REDD+ policy structure. It explores how the narratives of CFM and REDD+ clash at discursive levels, while also identifying elements of each which may make them mutually beneficial. The thesis finds that much of the conflict between positions on REDD+ are the result of contrasting environmental understandings, some of which are informed by negative experiences with past environmental conservation initiatives. Greater community-centric attributes may assist in improving the local
and regional acceptability of REDD+ projects by appealing to the “alternative” values of forest-dependent peoples. Some suggested policy modifications are made to improve the overall design of REDD+ to be inclusive of the concerns of forest user groups, and potential areas for future research projects are discussed.
Acknowledgements

The tea has all been taken and the words all placed in their appropriate positions. While this thesis represents my thoughts distilled into a deliverable tome, and I claim the arguments presented here as my own, it would be a monument to dishonesty should I fail to recognize those who offered their generous support and friendship along the way. To begin with, this thesis would never have taken shape without the capable guidance of Dr. Allison Goebel, who was a constant sounding board for the myriad of ideas that have gone into developing my research. Dr. Goebel challenged me, showed me how to hone my ideas, and has made an indelible impression upon my growth as an academic.

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<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community-Based Natural Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCBA</td>
<td>Climate, Community &amp; Biodiversity Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFM</td>
<td>Community Forest Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCPF</td>
<td>Forest Carbon Partnership Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFI</td>
<td>Fauna and Flora International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPIC</td>
<td>Free, Prior, and Informed Consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPP</td>
<td>Forest Peoples Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTFP</td>
<td>Non-Timber Forest Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Payments for Ecosystem Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (plus conservation, sustainable forest management, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+ SES</td>
<td>REDD+ Social &amp; Environmental Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRI</td>
<td>Rights and Resources Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDRIP</td>
<td>United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-REDD</td>
<td>United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries</td>
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<td>VCS</td>
<td>Verified Carbon Standard</td>
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1.0 Introduction

“Deforestation presents one of the most significant and intractable global environmental challenges of our time. Without meeting this challenge, we are unlikely to avoid dangerous climate change by the end of this century” (Scheyvens, 2012, p. 2).

1.0 Chapter Introduction

At a time when much global attention is focused on the issue of climate change, rampant deforestation presents a major concern for global policy-makers. The degradation of forests, often tied to the conversion of forested lands to pasture or simply the extraction of trees as a raw material for use in industry, has been credited with being a significant source of human generated greenhouse gas. Some accounts place deforestation as the second greatest anthropogenic contribution to climate change with nearly 25% to one-third of emissions (Houghton, 2005; Zarin, 2012), while others argue that deforestation and forest degradation accounts for only 10% (Harris et al., 2012). Regardless of the range of estimates in the academic literature, even the more conservative estimates reflect the great importance of addressing forest health as a factor in solving the problem of climate change. All signs point to the necessity of protecting forests from further decline; if not for their intrinsic value, then for their environmental-economic importance. Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus conservation, sustainable forest management, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) is one of the most recent policy offerings available for debate and refinement.

The concern which surrounds climate change is allowing for a more holistic appreciation of the benefits humanity derives from forests. Environmental awareness is now moving away from an understanding which had previously been strictly dominated by the value forests held as
sources of timber and fuel (Myers, 1988). Both the academic and popular literature recognizes
the importance of the alternative utility derived from forests on global and local scales (Pierce,
Shanley, & Laird, 2012). Their provision of carbon sequestration is perhaps among the most
important of these, especially when considering a global and long-term scope. Global financial
institutions, many of which have historically been heavily criticized for their approach to
environmental issues, are now adopting the language and vocabulary of ecological economics.
Economic rationalism has, for better or worse, entered the discussion about environmental
policy. The politics of valuation will be discussed in this thesis, as the market-tied cost of
sequestered carbon dioxide is a prime concern for many critics of REDD+ policy design. The
objective here is to develop an understanding for the potential that greater integration of
community-centric policies within REDD+ architecture may have by assessing the divergent
discourses and knowledge formulations which enter this debate. In doing so, the hope is to
identify some of the potential benefits and pitfalls of using a community-centric approach to
REDD+.

This introductory chapter provides a background on REDD+, including a brief history of
its evolution within global-policy space. The concept of Community Forest Management (CFM)
is also introduced, the argument for potential synergy between these forest management
architectures is briefly outlined, and the research question is established. The second chapter will
outline the methodological approach for applying a political ecology analysis to the research
question. The nature of political ecology research necessitates that the researcher defines its
methodological application, and this is outlined in Chapter Two. Chapter Three serves to
demonstrate the political ecology analysis of REDD+ and CFM strategies at the global level to
enable a discussion of their potential for integration as a core element of REDD+ where possible.
Chapter Four builds upon the lessons learned in the previous chapter to develop a model for
synergy. This chapter also includes a brief application of this mode of analysis to Indonesia and
Bolivia¹ and concludes by highlighting some key findings for the specific regions. The
concluding chapter will discuss the findings and outline recommendations for REDD+ policy
design in how it approaches the needs of communities. It will also describe the limitations of
these findings and will explore some means by which the approach may be improved upon in
future work.

1.1 Background

For the purpose of this thesis, “forests” are to be understood as having an inherent
political nature, and competing understandings and discourses surrounding the meaning of
“forest” will be unpacked. The sheer act of defining the term, or assigning ecological parameters
to its implications, has impacts for forest-user groups and the policy development of REDD+
(Putz & Redford, 2010). The primary definitions which will be addressed in this thesis are the
technocentric definition used by the United Nations system and the populist definition more
favoured by indigenous groups. This thesis does not privilege any particular forest discourse, but
rather appreciates an array of perspectives on how forests are to be understood, inclusive of both
technical and cultural parameters. Delineation along definitional grounds is critical in the context
of forest management and deforestation research, as some definitions will explicitly include or
exclude variables which are central to competing definitions and understandings of the same
space. The development of a deforestation avoidance regime which is both effective and

¹ Although Bolivia is included as a partner country to the REDD+ process, it has not made significant movement
towards implementing national REDD+ projects – the leadership of this country has been hostile towards
conservation initiatives which incorporate elements of capitalism (i.e. carbon credits) (Lang, 2010). This tension is
useful for the analysis which will occur, as is the history of this country with other similar carbon forestry projects.
equitable requires researchers and policy-makers alike to navigate this tension between contrasting meanings ascribed to the landscape.

Deforestation avoidance, in the form of REDD+, is a relatively new policy prescription within environmental policy designs. Although the exact manner in which this policy framework will function is still a subject of much debate, it is increasingly likely for it to have a market-based funding mechanism similar (and perhaps appended) to the carbon market established through the Kyoto Protocol (Phelps, Webb, & Koh, 2011). In taking this form, REDD+ would guide the creation of a global network to enable forest-specific payments for ecosystem services (PES). Under REDD+, a baseline record is created for potential carbon dioxide emissions resulting from the processes of deforestation and forest degradation. Market values are applied to these potential emissions, which enables the creation of tradable carbon credits owned by the parties which control the forest territory. This creates a financial incentive to utilize tropical forest resources in a sustainable manner, and rewards what some may call the “non-productivity” of these forests.

Currently those countries which have elected to participate in PES regimes such as REDD+ have done so more for the satisfaction of their peoples' environmental values than for accreditation purposes. Some arrangements have taken shape as "debt for nature swaps" in which transactions involve forgiveness of debt in exchange for efforts towards environmental conservation (Cubbage, Harou, & Sills, 2007). Others have simply been a financial commitment by the donor country for environmental conservation within the recipient country. Regardless of the exact nature of PES regimes, all include some stipulation that in exchange for the financial assistance the recipient country will increase its capacity for environmental conservation (i.e.
environmental performance conditionality). A result of this is that the opportunity costs\(^2\) of pursuing the environmental conservation action is reduced and domestic finances can be more readily applied towards other concerns.

These transactions have historically been uncommon and thus notable when and where they have occurred. However, PES-based projects (a category which includes REDD+ eligible activities) present an opportunity for policy-makers to communicate the importance of ecological variables in the readily translatable “language” of economics. Furthermore, REDD+ is a particularly attractive mechanism for many less-developed countries because it offers an opportunity to engage in international climate change efforts without necessitating the reduction of energy usage or the curtailment of development by way of “modernization”. This is not to suggest that there are no problems associated with REDD+, and it also does not mean that REDD+ would be universally advantageous for all stakeholders. Some have described deforestation avoidance as being among the most cost effective\(^3\) climate change solutions (Stern, 2007). This cost effectiveness makes REDD+ a likely component in the suite of responses to climate change, despite the opposition it may garner as a consequence of being a market-based instrument. The objective of this thesis is to examine the tension arising from the development of REDD+ using the critical lens of political ecology, and to see what elements of Community Forest Management may allow this seemingly inevitable policy to be more widely accepted. Achieving a high degree of acceptability, accomplished through greater contextual sensitivity

\(^{2}\) The expense associated with the difference in values associated with applying resources towards one activity rather than another, including the benefits which may have occurred as a result of the alternative choice.

\(^{3}\) Now that one of the main technical challenges, the capacity for Measurement, Reporting, and Verification, has matured. This had been one of the main challenges for introducing deforestation avoidance measures to the global policy arena: proving how much carbon had actually been sequestered on a region to region basis in order to provide an accurate account of emissions avoided, being the main condition for project reimbursement.
and community-linked processes, will be an important dimension of analysis for REDD+ to achieve its stated long-term goals.

Community Forest Management (CFM) is an application of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). This represents a class of natural resource management strategies, core to which is the notion that decentralization and greater power at the community level should create a more sustainable and equitable distribution of benefits and access. Reality is more complex, of course, as there are numerous preconditions which need to exist in order for CFM (and indeed CBNRM) to be successful (Blaikie, 2006; Pagdee, Kim, & Daugherty, 2006). CFM is a forest management strategy which involves a wide range of activities, not all of which may appear to be aligned with ecological interests.

The tool which will be used to investigate these ecological interests is political ecology. Political ecology, as a term and as a research strategy, resists concrete definition. For many it represents the synthesis of ecology and political economy to better understand the narratives and practices of environmental destruction. For others it describes the intentions of environmentally inspired political movements, an opportunity to link environmental justice messages to extant calls for greater social justice or pedagogy based in activism (Jarosz, 2004). Perhaps most important to note in this introduction is that, when we look at how political ecology operates within a research context, it recognizes the importance of social relations and the power wielded through them. Those employing this tool in their research do so with the knowledge that environmental degradation is never strictly the consequence of mismanagement or a deficit of technical capacity. Although this no doubt complicates matters for all stakeholders, in the core of what connects all political ecology works is an understanding that social dynamics regarding
power and ownership need to be analysed in order to fully understand the cause and outcomes of environmental damage (Greenberg & Park, 1994).

Forest degradation and deforestation are particularly good candidates for analysis under a political ecology framework because of the divergent understandings which exist in regards to the cause and solution to the problem. The archetypical perspectives that can be broadly identified here are the managerialist/technical and the populist/social. They seek to answer questions from different starting points, and they make different assumptions about what type of outcome is to be expected. Stevenson and Dryzek (2012) use the definition of discourse provided by Hajer and Versteeg (2005) to identify these worldviews:

"...a discourse is ‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and political phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practises’. Any discourse will typically contain what Hajer (1995) calls a ‘storyline’ about how problems came to be (or came to be overcome) and what should therefore be done (or not done).” (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012, p. 191)

To see nature for the discourses and narratives applied to it, and not solely as a matter of pure science, is to understand it as an inherently political concern. As such, political ecology illuminates the power relations among the often competing interests of forest stakeholder groups. It reveals the different meanings and understandings of “forests”, and probes the institutional, political, and economic power these stakeholders wield to establish their environmental understandings in forest management regimes. Through an investigation into the global political ecology of REDD+ policy development, the objective of this thesis is to understand the role that greater integration with community forest management could have in achieving successful outcomes.
In the social terrain of deforestation avoidance, stakeholders such as forest-dependent communities reliant on forests for their livelihoods and cultural meaning are often less able to assert their views and practices if they conflict with more powerful stakeholders such as government actors or international business interests. The hypothesis promoted here is that greater integration between REDD+ and CFM will allow for enhanced benefits to communities engaged in REDD+ projects, and should be included as a core element of REDD+ policy design. Despite its potential, this synergy may not come without significant difficulty. One of the main concerns surrounding the implementation of REDD+ is that it will recentralize forest management (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010). The fear is that peoples’ forests may become fortresses in which traditional and historically sustainable resource-use practices are vilified on the basis of rudimentary scientific understanding. Indeed, payment for ecosystem services, which REDD+ projects would provide, can become perverse incentives for the participant landholders. This is especially relevant to instances where property rights are not clearly defined, such as within tenure regimes where the state maintains the only legally relevant title on land ownership. In situations where the connection between environmental health and human wellbeing is ignored and functional alternatives are not provided for communities, the following downward spiral can occur:

1. People removed from land in order to create pristine reserves free from human "exploitation"
2. Fracturing of social, cultural, and economic ties between people and nature
3. Exacerbation of problems with already precarious livelihood strategies
4. Increase the incentive for evicted people to participate in illegal extraction while decreasing the incentive to foster sustainable nature-human interactions

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4 Local communities may be displaced under some policy directives, particularly in regions that have a low capacity for enforcement, making an outright denial of access seem more efficient and easier to monitor than a permitting system.
5. Greater environmental disturbance, either inside or outside the confines of the conservation area, resulting in a failed project

CFM may have a synergistic relationship with REDD+ in that it represents an effort to engage forest-using communities in conservation efforts, and has effectively been demonstrated in other forest-carbon projects (Pagdee, Kim, & Daugherty, 2006). The basic premise which guides CFM efforts is that enhanced tenure security and increased clout in decision-making processes will result in forest users becoming more amiable to the goals of forest conservation. Such an intervention may be able to increase the degree by which REDD+ is acceptable for communities, and to become more likely to survive ever-changing political landscapes. It may also aid in the prevention of carbon leakage.\(^5\) There are currently calls for greater focus on social and ecological considerations throughout the academic literature, and the primary REDD+ policy documents drafted by the United Nations and World Bank systems describe these "alternative concerns" as being important (Busch, Godoy, Turner, & Harvey, 2011; Visseren-Hamakers, McDermott, Vijge, & Cashore, 2012). However, these calls are often ill defined and do not reflect the capabilities of a global governance system.

It is important here to acknowledge the fact that CFM and REDD+ may not be compatible in every instance. A particular problem for assuming such compatibility on a broad scale is that different REDD+ eligible countries manage their land with contrasting tenure regimes, and divergent institutional cultures for how claims of ownership are to be taken into account. The assumption being made here at the outset is simply that, in some situations, these

\(^5\) Carbon leakage is a major issue for forest carbon projects. "Leakage" refers to the generation of carbon emissions by one activity as a consequence of the prevention of other activities. In this instance it typically implies that the prevention of forest exploitation in one area encourages those who had a stake in that forest to exploit other forest resources where they may face less (or no) costs or penalization. In some situations this may lead to greater forest degradation than the exclusion-based conservation efforts prevented by disturbing whatever equilibrium may have existed in human-nature interactions within the alternative forest.
two policy interventions will address some of the caveats with REDD+ and result in a more successful deforestation avoidance regime. Should this be the case, then wherever integration between these strategies is possible it should also be strongly encouraged through institutional arrangements. The objective here is to determine what some of these circumstances might be and investigate some the relevant power dynamics surrounding nature-human interactions which could help determine the outcome.

1.2 REDD+

REDD+, or Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation Plus sustainable forest management, is an internationally-developed policy framework under development with the intent of reducing carbon emissions and promoting forest health. The rules of this framework are being negotiated in many spaces of regional and international dialogue, developing programs which can be applied at variable scales. The focal points of this thesis are the processes of the UN-REDD\(^6\) and the FCPF\(^7\), which have the greatest potential to influence climate change response regimes within both regional and international contexts.

The objective of REDD+ is deforestation avoidance with the specific intent of reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases resulting from the decreased biological capacity for carbon sequestration in tropical forests. There are a number of proposed side benefits which could dovetail from these projects where they are situated. In some critical scholarly and popular accounts these benefits simply represent an efficient means of paying "lip service" to other related international obligations (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012). The language which promotes this criticism comes as a necessity within policy design. Global policy prescriptions for social

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\(^6\) The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries.

\(^7\) The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility.
and biological factors cannot be made overly specific as a consequence of differing regional contexts and internal political realities. The concerns regarding how genuine these “alternative promises” made through the REDD+ process are will be unpacked in more detail throughout this thesis. A point of universal agreement, however, is the recognition that some form of forest-centric regime ought to be implemented within the response global climate change.

The Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project in the Bolivian Amazon is often held up as an example which can inform REDD+ and other PES regimes. This project was launched as a cooperative initiative between the Government of Bolivia, Fundación Amigos de la Natureleza (a Bolivian environmental organization), The Nature Conservancy, American Electric Power, BP Amoco, and PacifiCorp (Boyd, 2009; Brown, Burnham, Delaney, Powell, & Vaca, 2000). The partnership would raise the finances necessary to buy out the forest concessionaires’ logging rights to the lands west of the Noel Kempff Mercado National Park. This practise is similar to other forms of conservation by procurement in the form of land trusts. Through their purchase of the land and expansion of the national park, they protect it from logging or conversion to an agricultural landscape. The carbon sequestration capacity of this forest was preserved as a result. In this case, the governing institutions had adopted a preservationist discourse surrounding the issue of deforestation: that it was an immediate concern and that (at least initially) people ought to be excluded (Boyd, 2009). The timing coincides with the growing attention surrounding climate change (in the form of pressure to see real results in developing a global climate change solution). Boyd, who conducted a number of interviews in the communities surrounding the national park, has documented local resentment towards the project:
"A former director of the national NGO noted that the project aimed primarily to 'protect the Park to avoid leakage of carbon, deforestation, invasions, or timber extraction, and to restrict communities from entering to extract anything from the Park.' (Adolfo Moreno, personal communication, 2001)" (Boyd, 2009, p. 2387).

Quotes such as these demonstrate the protectionist mindset that had been applied to the Park. This managerialist approach to conservation poses a direct challenge to communities surrounding the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project, which had previously viewed the forest "as their supermarket, from which they obtained animals, fruits, medicinal plants, and wood for construction and furniture" (Boyd, 2009, p. 2387). This tension which exists between organizations formed to protect the ecological integrity of forests and the communities who depend upon them is instrumental for understanding the broader picture of deforestation avoidance. More recently the concerns surrounding benefits for forest user groups in this area have been partially assuaged by a greater role played by community groups, and an overall greater appreciation of participatory development. Additionally, that the deforestation/degradation discourse was successfully adopted by the communities meant that they perceived a greater legitimacy of the projects. Even so, equity concerns and critical assessments regarding gender issues and the disbursement of benefits from the project still remain more than a decade after the inception of the project (Boyd, 2010).

Deforestation avoidance was recognized for its potential impact on global carbon emissions in 1997 at the CoP 3 meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan. However, the difficulties for accurately accounting the emissions that would be prevented made this an untenable addition to the Kyoto Protocol which came out of CoP 3 (Singh, 2008). The technological capacity to accurately measure forest type, cover, and potential for carbon sequestration simply did not exist at the necessary scale to obtain
the quality of information required to contribute towards a global carbon market. Moreover, no agreement could be reached over what activities should be categorized as forest degradation, partially owing to clashing perspectives on the definition of "forest". The proposal for countries to be credited for avoided deforestation was shelved in the United Nations system until 2005 when the Coalition for Rainforest Nations proposed it at the CoP 11 in Montreal, Canada (Lederer, 2011). At this stage technological capacity had increased alongside a growing confidence that measurement technologies would continue to mature, encouraging potential donor countries to reconsider this strategy. Furthermore, experiences with PES regimes continued on an intergovernmental basis in the absence of a global system for incorporating the value of the carbon emissions within carbon trading. CoP 11 marked the initiation of a two-year negotiation process on how the UNFCCC should address the development of a deforestation avoidance strategy. This led to the decision at CoP 13 titled: "Decision 2/CP.13 Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action". This decision encouraged the UN system to develop a cross-agency programme, which took form as UN-REDD. The World Bank responded with the creation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (FCPF, 2008).

1.3 REDD+ at Present

In less than a decade, deforestation avoidance has gone from being a side-barred suggestion in global environmental diplomacy to being an expected feature of any future international climate change agreement. The current prioritization of REDD+ can be seen in the UN-REDD process. There are currently 46 partner countries involved in the UN-REDD process, 16 of which are receiving readiness support through UN-REDD to develop their national

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8 The majority of the project types which are eligible for carbon credits through the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms (Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism) are energy projects.
programmes (UN-REDD, n.d.). This may expand to as many as 40 supported countries by 2015. This support is largely directed towards building the technological capacity to verify and monitor deforestation and forest degradation, and to provide legitimacy for the carbon credits derived through deforestation avoidance.

The initiatives developing a globally scaled REDD+ strategy are relying upon pilot projects, the feedback from which is informing the efforts to make REDD+ more concrete through the UNFCCC. Bilateral agreements between REDD+ countries and donors are continually developed, and have provided an important form of experiential learning for how these projects may be negotiated at an international scale. Norway is particularly notable in this regard as being the largest benefactor for bilateral deforestation avoidance projects and political arrangements worldwide through this period and continues to be the largest contributor to the UN-REDD Programme Fund. Of the four donor countries that have participated in financing readiness activities through the UNDP Multi Partner Trust Fund Office, Norway has contributed far more than the combined sum of the others (See Table 1.1: Contributions to the UN-REDD Programme Trust Fund (in US$) (United Nations Development Group, 2013a)). Norway's strong position within the funding of REDD+ is also demonstrated through its funding of the REDD+ Joint Programme Partnership Support (See Table 1.2: Contributions to the REDD+ Joint Programme Partnership Support Fund (in US$) (United Nations Development Group, 2013b)). The finances in this trust fund are designated as a grant pool for REDD+ readiness projects in the absence of an established global carbon credit market.

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9 The trust funds are kept separate so as to ensure that donations are directed towards their intended objectives. As the names should suggest, the UN-REDD Programme Fund financing activities undertaken by UN-REDD, whereas the REDD Joint Programme Partnership Support (which also appears as REDD+ Partnership Secretariat Services Joint Programme) has the focus of financing the cooperative endeavours of the involved parties.
Table 1.1: Contributions to the UN-REDD Programme Trust Fund (in US$) (United Nations Development Group, 2013a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Partner</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>Deposit Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway, Government of</td>
<td>141,192,649</td>
<td>105,818,255</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>12,987,013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, Government of</td>
<td>8,076,988</td>
<td>8,076,988</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan, Government of</td>
<td>3,046,138</td>
<td>3,046,138</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, Government of</td>
<td>1,963,350</td>
<td>1,963,350</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>118,256,081</td>
<td>118,256,081</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dominant involvement of Norway in REDD+ financing continues to be a theme in the REDD+ Joint Programme Partnership Support Fund. This second, smaller trust fund was established to finance and organize the three UN bodies comprising UN-REDD so that they may be equipped to assist countries with the scaling-up of their REDD+ programmes. The Government of Canada, which highlights its participation in this initiative as one of its measures taken to help prevent dramatic global climate change, is included on this list of voluntary contributors (“Canada’s Action on Climate Change: Canada's International Action,” 2012).

Table 1.2: Contributions to the REDD+ Joint Programme Partnership Support Fund (in US$) (United Nations Development Group, 2013b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Partner</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>Deposit Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway, Government of</td>
<td>811,400</td>
<td>811,400</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland, Government of</td>
<td>267,600</td>
<td>267,600</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland, Government of</td>
<td>216,844</td>
<td>216,844</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan, Government of</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, Government of</td>
<td>188,067</td>
<td>188,067</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada, Government of</td>
<td>42,629</td>
<td>42,629</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,726,540</td>
<td>1,726,540</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REDD+ is predicated upon the concept of opportunity cost, as resources spent pursuant of one action cannot be applied to another. Forest conservation represents dual costs, first the investment in maintaining a conservation regime, and second in the decreased capacity to capitalize upon those forests as an exploitable resource. REDD+ would allow for these
conservation initiatives to be financed through a global carbon market\textsuperscript{10}, enabling REDD+ countries to recoup these hypothetical losses. Participation in carbon credit markets is largely voluntary at present, with national carbon objectives being attached to non-binding international agreements. The complexities surrounding REDD+ which had kept it out of the list of mechanisms outlined by the UNFCCC in the Kyoto Protocol have had a similar effect on regional carbon market systems where they exist. Although they are expected to be attached to these markets in the future\textsuperscript{11}, UN-REDD and the World Bank's FCPF exist to provide finance and capacity building for these projects in their initial and experimental phases.

Although this thesis recognizes that there are multiple iterations of deforestation avoidance policy, the focus here is largely upon those which have the broadest applicability on a global scale. As such, the primary focus will be on the approach of REDD+ taken by the UNFCCC, as well as the FCPF initiative of the World Bank, as the results of these processes are the most likely to become features in any post-2012 climate change agreement (Venter et al., 2009).

1.4 Community-Based Forest Management

Community-based forest management as a means of governing forests reflects a move away from centralized institutional structures and core authorities towards a more networked approach in which peripheral agents have more control over how their region is managed. Forest decentralization and devolution\textsuperscript{12} as a trend for enabling greater involvement by local community

\textsuperscript{10} Or, should a truly global carbon market fail to materialize, networks of regional markets may fill this gap.

\textsuperscript{11} For instance, the carbon trading market in California is currently exploring the possibility of including carbon credits derived from deforestation avoidance (Cossett, 2011).

\textsuperscript{12} These terms are often used to communicate the same idea. As this thesis dives further into the politics of community/institutional power dynamics some delineation is important. Decentralization refers simply to the dispersal of the central authority. In practice it takes form as the opening of regional offices without any real change in who has power (although it does allow for significantly improved community-institutional relationships
agents reflects an understanding that when these local agents have a greater role in decisions about their land, they will act in their own long-term interests (Brosius, Tsing, & Zerner, 1998). These long-term interests are generally assumed to have some affinity with the ecological sustainability of the resource to be managed. This is of course not always the case, and one can easily envision a scenario in which parties within the community see that the short-term exploitation of a resource outweighs these long-term gains. This is particularly true for regions where clear ownership has not been defined. Pagdee et al. have identified that uncertainty in the local tenure regime is a factor that is associated with failure in CFM projects (Pagdee et al., 2006). Should land-tenure arrangements be insecure, temporary in nature, and the institutions governing tenure be perceived as weak or culturally irrelevant, community members may have more incentive to exploit resources over a less sustainable period of time to “cash-out”.

Despite these potential flaws associated with CFM, this strategy is widely understood as one which delivers many social and ecological benefits. Many of these benefits include the stated target, and non-target/secondary, objectives of the REDD+ policy design. It has been particularly well received by community centric organizations and academics, a result of allowing communities to have enhanced powers of self-determination. Some of these benefits include: carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, and the preservation and market penetration of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (Huettner, 2012; Klooster & Masera, 2000; Maryudi et al., 2012; Singh, 2008).

Important to mention here is that these systems are not seen utilized within an exclusionary framework. Extractive management practises are generally allowed under these

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and the facilitation of community consultation). Devolution refers to the dispersal of the power that the central authority held.
systems, so long as these practises do not conflict with the communal interests. For instance, CFM systems often allow for the continuance of some degree of forestry operations, or extraction of NTFPs, under locally-defined management principles. This process necessitates local participation and leadership in developing the CFM system.

1.5 Potential Synergy

Potential for integrating elements of CFM into a REDD+ deforestation avoidance regime has had some traction among academics interested in these forest management regimes. As mentioned previously, REDD+ will very likely become an element of any post-Kyoto protocol agreement on climate change. The near inevitability of some form of deforestation avoidance regime being carried forward makes it important in the planning stage to address the potential pitfalls. Understood as a globally-designed policy framework, the core elements of REDD+ (essentially the global finance structures) are consistently applied whereas the on-the-ground reality is situation specific. If we are to assume that deforestation avoidance ought to be a component of a future climate change plan, which is likely given its cost-efficiency (Stern, 2007), then all efforts should be made to ensure that the resultant policy structure is both effective and compatible with human wellbeing. One means of doing this may be in identifying the potential cohesion between community-based resource management strategies (where successes have already been realized) and the mechanisms of deforestation avoidance.

Fauna and Flora International (FFI), a well-known international environmental conservation organization, has participated in REDD+ readiness utilizing a community-oriented approach. FFI is particularly notable in its recognition of the importance of local forest users in deforestation avoidance regimes. Alongside the Government of Aceh, Indonesia and the carbon
trading firm Carbon Conservation, FFI assisted in creating the first REDD+ project\textsuperscript{13} to be certified by the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)\textsuperscript{14}. This project, covering the Ulu Masen Ecosystem in the Indonesian province of Aceh on the island Sumatra, was financially supported by Merrill Lynch, an investment bank, through a contract to procure $9 million in carbon credits from the REDD+ project (Mcgregor, n.d.). The aspect of this specific certification body which should be highlighted here is that their focus is on social and environmental dimensions of carbon forestry projects. The manuals developed for using their certification recommends the usage of an additional third-party auditor for verifying the actual sequestration achieved, as the "CCBA does not issue quantified emissions reductions certificates" (CCB Standards, 2008). Therefore, much like shade-grown or fair-trade coffee, the CCB Standards add value to carbon credits which differentiate them with social and ecological information.

This thesis enters the dialogue surrounding REDD+ from a midstream point. Certain projects, such as bilateral deforestation avoidance projects and projects which generate carbon credits through the Clean Development Mechanism provide some analogous points of reference (Lederer, 2011). However, there are no examples of completed REDD+ projects using the UN-REDD framework, and the precise structure of REDD+ remains a matter of intense debate. Among these matters is the question of scale. How scale is addressed is an important concern among forest users because it will, in part, determine how they will be impacted by carbon

\textsuperscript{13} CCB covers carbon forestry projects and is not a REDD+ specific standard. CCBA designed this standard with the express purpose of assessing project design and the provision of social and biological co-benefits. It was developed to compliment carbon accounting programs such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), which focus more on the carbon being sequestered by a project. A REDD+ specific standard known as REDD+ Social & Environmental Standards (REDD+ SES) is now being developed, in part by the CCBA, to better reflect the needs of REDD+ countries.

\textsuperscript{14} The CCBA being an organization which oversees the CCB standard for carbon forestry projects. They are not an auditing organization themselves, leaving that function to outside firms experienced with environmental auditing (ex. Rainforest Alliance and Ernst & Young).
forestry. This is a complicated issue for REDD+ policy design, as the options under examination by policy developers (national and sub-national scales) all have potential benefits and drawbacks.

1.6 Objectives

The objective of this thesis is to determine what potential exists for legitimate synergies between REDD+ and CFM forestry management regimes. The driving questions behind this thesis are whether CFM strategies are compatible with deforestation avoidance through REDD+, and can this make for a more acceptable policy option. Many authors have previously written upon REDD+ and CFM strategies, arguing that practitioners of the former may learn much from the experiences of the latter (Cronkleton, Bray, & Medina, 2011; Harley, Riddell, & Ndobe, 2012; Palmer Fry, 2011; Skutsch, 2011). These generally focus on important material aspects of regional implementation of REDD+ projects, such as what role may be played by the community. The approach taken by this thesis is unique in its focus on the discursive elements inside (and equally instructive: outside) the spaces of global policy negotiation. In taking this approach towards research, and heavily relying upon political ecology as a research methodology, this thesis also has the objective of developing political ecology as a research tool. In accomplishing this objective, the thesis will develop an understanding of political ecology which may be applied to political contexts across scales, and will provide a discussion on the usefulness of this approach for future works.

1.7 Conclusion

This opening chapter has introduced the main concepts which will be under analysis throughout the rest of the thesis. In producing this thesis, the raison d’être is to develop a detailed understanding of the discourses of climate change governance as it relates to deforestation
avoidance – specifically the REDD+ mechanism. The objective for doing so is to better inform the REDD+ policy development process, to demonstrate the discursive elements which encourage the implementation of greater community-centric elements at the core of this policy architecture. It makes relevant contributions to this area, and the lessons learned here are set to enhance inquiry and analysis of the climate change regime.
2.0 Methodology - Political Ecology Discourse Analysis for Global Environmental Governance Regimes

2.0 Chapter Introduction

Much of this thesis deals with knowledge creation as it relates to environmental issues. Scientific knowledge is critical in relation to deforestation avoidance, given the urgency of climate change and biodiversity loss. Here, however, the discussion focuses on the convergence of "understandings" and their influence on global policy. In doing so, the thesis utilizes a methodology rooted in a social-constructivist academic tradition, described by Hajer as having "an anti-essentialist ontology; it assumes the existence of multiple, socially-constructed realities instead of single reality, governed by immutable natural laws" (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006, pg.176).

The research process itself does not immunize against the conveyance of particular knowledge formulations, given that it presents tropical deforestation as an environmental problem. As such, one could argue that this thesis performs the role of developing a "fragile Earth" narrative. Self-reflexivity is critical within social-constructivist work; this methodological approach is grounded by certain scientific realities, however, it privileges certain values attached to those realities. For instance, deforestation and forest degradation accounts for roughly 20% (Singh, 2008) of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions, depending on the methodology used for deriving an estimate (Harris et al., 2012). Climate change may increase average global temperatures by an estimated 2°C to 5°C (Stern, 2007). These findings stand apart from the values which are applied to them. However, research in the area of climatology is largely

Furthermore, by couching any phenomenon in the terms of "problem", "issue", or "concern", the author adopts applies values to that phenomenon.
conducted by individuals who perform their roles because of their values regarding the global environment.

Discourses "coordinate the actions of large numbers of individuals who never need communicate with each other directly" (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012, p. 191). Stevenson and Dryzek refer to this power as "discursive democracy"; within these systems it is not only the actors which need analysis, but perhaps more importantly the ideas put forward by those actors (and manifestation thereof). The focus here on global environmental discourse has relevance beyond the global discussions of environmental issues. This is due to their pervasive nature, as narratives remain beyond their "usefulness", and may outlive the institutions which they encourage or by which they are encouraged. This is an important feature for the success of climate change negotiations. Although bold efforts on preventing dramatic climate change have been stalled at the insistence of powerful actors within the state system, the notion that such bold actions are required has survived. This persistence manifests itself through the numerous intergovernmental fora held on climate change.

2.1 Political Ecology

To explore the environmental knowledge surrounding REDD+, this thesis applies a global political ecology framework informed by the practices of discourse analysis. These tools are used to explore the causes and consequences of environmental issues, the formulation of environmental knowledge and to identify the pathways through which this knowledge informs action within global systems. The political ecology framework is difficult to define. As a methodology, political ecology offers an approach which is reflexive to scale, responsive to changes over time, and is adaptive to cultural norms and regional power assemblages. Perhaps most importantly, it allows the researcher to challenge accepted notions surrounding human-
environment interactions while using a mixed methodological approach. As a result of its inherent cross-disciplinarity, political ecology places the onus of definition upon the researcher at the outset.

Political ecology was chosen as an instrumental lens for this thesis for a number of reasons. The first is found in its challenge to widely accepted perspectives and discourses regarding environmental conservation. This challenge is underpinned by an understanding that environmental concerns are inherently political in nature. Therefore, power relations between global governance and local environmental contexts can be probed, and that ecosystems are more than non-human flora, fauna, and physical features. The notion that communities have political clout within CFM and community-based resource management regimes in general is important here. It should be determined whether these communities are identified as partners in conservation or as the cause of environmental degradation. Additionally, REDD+ is a globally-oriented policy with the objective of creating new forms for forest capital through carbon credits. The initial capital for REDD+ projects has come from relatively few actors, including some whom also maintain large investments in industries which – it may be argued – promote environmental degradation (such as Norway with its vast petro-chemical industry\textsuperscript{16}). As such, REDD+ has become a flashpoint for ideas about how we understand the cycle of environmental degradation in general, and the drivers of deforestation in particular. How much of a voice within this discussion is allowed for forest-dependent communities? How much of the diversity thereof

\textsuperscript{16} A 2012 report co-published by Rainforest Foundation Norway and Friends of the Earth Norway claims that “the Norwegian government has invested 27 times more in the industry sectors that are destroying the rainforest than it has pledged to spend on saving it” (Regnskogfondet & Naturvernforbundet, 2012). Following this report, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) has adopted a protocol through which the companies it invests the assets of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global are expected to take actions towards mitigating their impact on the global climate (NBIM, 2012).
is even possible to be represented? These are questions that the political ecologist may investigate.

The second concept linked to political ecology is the notion of environmental justice. This presents the question of who has access to the goods and services derived from the environment, and what groups are able to determine the rules for their usage (Schlosberg, 2007). REDD+ can be investigated in light of climate justice. It is both a challenge to and an observation of the inequity found firstly in both the creation and suggested solutions to the problem of climate change, and secondly in the distribution of environmental harm anticipated to result from climate change. This concern is one which has developed a great deal of traction within the scholarly literature as well as the environmental social consciousness of many developing countries. For instance, a major concern surrounding the use of carbon credits as a response to climate change is that they do not actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such an argument is based on the notion that the procurement of carbon credits, whether by voluntary means or governmental decree, allows polluting parties to continue with business-as-usual operations while appeasing environmental criteria. This concept of political ecology is useful because it introduces the possibility that environmental harms and benefits represent an issue of inequity and injustice.

The third concept is the notion of "Carbon Colonialism" or "Green Dependency Theory" (Bachram, 2004; Ervine, 2012). Proponents of this theory argue that carbon markets reinforce power dynamics within the international state system by encouraging green dependency. Through this process, certain institutions and forms of knowledge are prioritized. Furthermore, to those critical of REDD+, deforestation avoidance represents the continuation of the colonial legacy. They argue that, in much the same way that colonial states determined the development
pathways of their colonies through the exploitation of primary resources, and the lasting legacy of minimized production capacity, REDD+ would reorient local capacity towards external objectives. This concept is important for analyzing the generation of narratives which link the self-identified "victims" of such processes with environmental concerns. How do these groups, and the organizations which claim to represent them, use land-based concepts to contend with global economic forces?

Although the purpose of this thesis is not to standardize political ecology as a research methodology, an activity which has been discouraged by a number of political ecologists (Greenberg & Park, 1994), certain useful core attributes can be identified. There is some congruity between these concepts and the four theses of political ecology identified by Robbins: degradation and marginalization, environmental conflict, conservation and control, and environmental identity and social movement (Robbins, 2004). These modes of analysis can be applied to a number of concerns. These theses may carry varying relevance to any particular socio-ecological issue as some elements may not present themselves as prominent concerns. The global focus of political ecology demonstrated through this thesis enables a discussion of all four categories with equal relevance, as none can be ignored given the situational specificity of regional contexts (see Table 2.1).

The first thesis described by Robbins, *Degradation and marginalization*, seeks to understand environmental degradation in its broader socioeconomic context rather than ascribing blame to the parties most directly involved (Robbins, 2004). In challenging the assumption that these parties (often marginalized communities) are the primary instigator of environmental degradation, it allows the political ecologist to pursue the systemic drivers which encourage deleterious human-environment interactions. These drivers may be far removed from the context
in which the forest-dependent community exists, led by forces far beyond their control, yet they hold significant consequence for the community. This is of course not to suggest that traditional land-use practices are environmentally benign in every instance. However, it allows the political ecologist to investigate the process by which knowledge regarding human-environment interactions is developed, and which elements of society stand to benefit most from the particular framing of that knowledge.

The second thesis which has particular relevance to the case of REDD+ is *conservation and control*, which highlights the struggle between ecologically-oriented conservation initiatives and the resource users who depend upon the land targeted for conservation for their livelihood strategies (Robbins, 2004). This is of particular concern for regions where the land tenure of already marginalized communities is difficult to acquire or defend (e.g. in statutory tenure regimes). In some instances, exclusionary conservation methods may be used in order to attract international donors and develop an image of environmental stewardship. The conservation and control thesis may also be useful in understanding the process of environmental knowledge creation, whereby agents in positions of power create knowledge which justifies exclusion-based conservation. This is perhaps the dimension of political ecological analysis which is most critical of western-based conservation organizations, which may not always have a clear understanding of the local conflicts surrounding land occupation and resource control.

The first two of Robbins theses have identified broad modes of analysis encouraged by the political ecology approach. The third thesis, *environmental conflict*, relates to these as it outlines the means by which human-environment interactions occur (Robbins, 2004). However, it differs greatly in its degree of specificity, as it approaches environmental conflicts as being inherently linked to existing regional conflicts surrounding gendered, class, and racial struggles.
for equality. A prime historical example of this can be found in race or ethnicity-based rights surrounding land-ownership, and the legacies which have resulted from such regulation. It opens up questions which are often ignored by conservation and development agencies in developing their program because it is open to the possibility that hierarchy exists within the culture surrounding the project area. The discursive implication of not considering this notion is that the culture is flat and without a defined power structure.

The fourth and final thesis identified by Robbins is an analysis of *environmental identity and social movement*. Rather than seeing environmental conflicts as stemming from social stratification, inequality is seen as stemming from issues of environmental access and definition (Robbins, 2004). It enables the researcher to analyse social movements in light of global political and economic forces. In doing so it allows the political ecologist to understand the processes under which certain groups may be disciplined for participation in their traditional practices. Other processes of assimilation may be uncovered, by which communities are encouraged to reinterpret their cultural identities along the lines of resistance towards global trends. One aspect of this thesis which differs from that of environmental conflict is that it focuses on resistance to external influences rather than stratification driven by internal social struggles.
Table 2.1: Theses of political ecology outlined by Robbins (2004, p. 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis</th>
<th>What is explained?</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degradation and marginalization</td>
<td>Environmental change: why and how?</td>
<td>Land degradation, long blamed on marginal people, is put in its larger political and economic context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental conflict</td>
<td>Environmental access: who and why?</td>
<td>Environmental conflicts are shown to be part of larger gendered, classed, and raced struggles and vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation and control</td>
<td>Conservation failures and political/economic exclusion: why and how?</td>
<td>Usually viewed as benign, efforts at environmental conservation are shown to have pernicious effects, and sometimes fail as a result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental identity and social movement</td>
<td>Social upheaval: who, where, and how?</td>
<td>Political and social struggles are shown to be linked to basic issues of livelihood and environmental struggles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final concept of political ecology comes from Adger et al.’s work on applying a global political ecology framework. The work of Adger et al. is important in how it outlines the basic presumptions taken by stakeholders with regards to environmental issues. These are defined as the technologically intensive managerialist discourse and the populist discourse. As the names suggest, the former emphasizes technological solutions to environmental issues, and argues that science-based management will lead to more efficient outcomes. The latter approach emphasizes people-centric problems and solutions, understands environmental issues as resulting from technological failures, and perhaps it also sees an ironic cycle of technological solutions begetting the need for further technological solutions. Although any individual agent or organization may have varying degrees of commitment to one (or indeed both) of these ideological frameworks, they are useful in understanding political conflict over issues of socio-ecological interaction where environmental degradation is a concern. Therefore, it informs the narrative deconstruction of the REDD+ policy process. Forest stakeholders generally approach environmental issues with some presuppositions. These presuppositions may have an impact on how problems are identified, the tools used to analyse them, the theoretical assumptions made
which lead the stakeholder to use "ideologically appropriate" interventions, as well as the parameters through which success is defined.

Adger et al. (2001) identifies the discursive divide surrounding a variety of critical environmental concerns in the following table. This table was left unabridged for, although REDD+ specifically targets forests and the role they play in stabilizing climate, they are inherently linked to a wide array of environmental concerns (which includes desertification and biodiversity).

Table 2.2: Global Environmental Discourses as outlined by Adger et al. (2001, p. 702)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characterizing Managerial and Populist Discourses in Global Environmental Issues</th>
<th>Global Environmental Management (GEM) discourses</th>
<th>Populist discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deforestation</td>
<td>Neo-Malthusian discourse on increasing population and agricultural conversion in developing countries with slash-and-burn farmers being the primary villains.</td>
<td>Populist discourse believes deforestation to be a significant issue caused by the marginalization of rural poor and external forces of globalization such as Northern consumption of timber products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desertification</td>
<td>Neo-Malthusian discourse suggests that local resource users in drylands are degrading the ecosystems on which they depend. Only international action and strict regulation can prevent further desertification.</td>
<td>Populist discourse accepts the evidence that desertification is important but suggests that it is the inevitable consequence of historic marginalization of pastoralists and smallholders in both the colonial and post-colonial periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiversity Use</td>
<td>Bioprospecting discourse promotes sustainable utilization of biodiversity as the solution to an impending extinction crisis. This solution can be promoted through international cooperation and institutions.</td>
<td>Biopiracy discourse portrays an extinction crisis promoted by the institutions and interests of capitalism that threaten both cultural and biological diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change</td>
<td>Managerial discourse on the compelling science of climate change requiring new markets for carbon and global institutions.</td>
<td>Profligacy discourse also accepts climate change as a major problem and as the key symptom in the crisis of global over-consumption espoused by capitalism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important element presented in this brief overview is that, within a managerialist discursive framework, coordinated international efforts are necessary in order to counter the trend of environmental degradation. Furthermore, it presents the notion that these efforts should
not divert far from the status-quo of global institutionalism and the expansion of capitalism; precisely the understanding of environmental issues which the populist discourse takes the most exception to. Rather, the populist discourse looks towards communities and their local forms of environmental knowledge, perhaps recalling and romanticizing a time when society was resilient without technological enhancement. Both perceive environmental crisis, but differ in their optimism regarding further development as a solution to the crisis.

Despite its breadth, the political ecology approach is useful as an analytical tool because it allows the researcher to approach environmental issues in ways which challenge widely held assumptions. Political ecology, as it has been developed for this thesis, is guided by the following principles:

1. **Environmental issues (and human interaction with them) are inherently political issues**
   a. They can, therefore, be deconstructed as social issues as well as physical/ecological ones
   b. We can also see them as issues of environmental justice
   c. Within a global economy, environment-human interactions must be seen as linked to global processes

2. **Political ecology highlights power differentials between social groups**
   a. This includes elite and marginalized groups, both within and between regional contexts
   b. Asymmetrical dynamics surrounding environmental conflicts may intensify or reproduce colonial-style core-periphery constellations of power
      i. They may also cause the reinterpretation of local identities in alignment with more dominant forms of knowledge
   c. Conservation initiatives may highlight or intensify pre-existing hierarchies within and between communities

3. **Environmental issues are described in radically different terms by competing discourses and knowledge formulations**
   a. These discourses represent particular agents and their interests
      i. These include how problems are perceived and defined, the approaches taken to solve them, as well as the indicators selected to determine their success
This represents a discursive spectrum spanning from managerialism to populism

2.2 Political Ecology and Documentary Analysis

Thus far the concepts of political ecology which inform the analytical framework to be used throughout the remainder of this thesis have been established and briefly outlined. These elements lend themselves to the positing of different kinds of questions to explore REDD+. These questions will interrogate materials relating to REDD+, with a focus on their community-centric aspects, to assess the possibility that greater recognition of these aspects may improve REDD+ policy design. This stage will rely heavily upon a critical reading of global policy documents, global and regional forest research think-tank reports, and the public statements of civil society. This analysis will, at first, attend to material relevant to the global level in order to better understand the processes which enable forests to be governed by structures such as REDD+. The objective is to utilize the political ecology framework to better understand the compatibility of these regimes at discursive levels. To accomplish this, the political ecology framework will be applied to the case of REDD+, with specific questions applied probing the community dimensions of the deforestation avoidance regime. Following the development of this framework, the thesis will analyse the potential for implementing this framework within regional contexts. In doing so the goal is to determine the effectiveness of this approach, and its potential for wider utilization.

This thesis will approach political ecology as a documentary analysis tool by posing the following questions:

1. How is the policy architecture designed?
   a. What voices are prioritized and what voices are silenced?
   b. How are social and environmental safeguards incorporated?
2. Who participates in conservation?
a. What can we identify as being their interests in participating?
b. What parties are excluded?
c. How do they define the problem?
d. How do they define the solution?

3. Who benefits from environmental initiatives?
   a. Is participation a requirement?
   b. Are some parties able to benefit more than others?

4. Does the global "consensus" approach enhance or decrease the power of forest dependent communities?

5. How do they define “forest”?

### 2.3 Literature for Analysis

These questions stand as points of reflection for analyzing the global policy design and documentation of REDD+. They reflect upon the assumptions that knowledge producers maintain as they develop the narratives of REDD+ and carbon forestry. Questions as seemingly benign as "how do they define ‘forest’" can have dramatic consequences for policy design processes. This analytical framework will provide a comparative light to contrast the approaches taken by REDD+ and CFM strategies. This presents a significant difficulty, as the far more global orientation of REDD+ should lessen its ability to respond to the parameters of regional contextuality (at least where the overarching design is concerned). As CFM does not rely upon formalized, globally-integrated structures and networks, more situational information can be obtained. Therefore, the focus will be on policy statements regarding REDD+ with particular attention paid to how these documents address community-related elements and concerns.

However, much like any argument based upon data derived from global processes, its usefulness at the ground level must be questioned. The objective is not to prescribe universal solutions but rather to develop an understanding which may be applicable in certain circumstances where discursive challenges may be met.
The first class of organizations from which policy documents will be sourced can be classified as the global governance group. This group is largely responsible for designing REDD+ as well as for the implementation and financing of initial REDD+ projects. UN-REDD and the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) are perhaps the two most crucial in this category. UN-REDD is a joint initiative between three agencies within the United Nations system which have global forest governance (and social concerns) within their mandates (UN-REDD, n.d.). These organizations include the FAO, UNDP, and UNEP; the joint program documents will be the primary focus here. The documents which can be sourced from these organizations are more policy focused, cover issues at a broad scale, and are often designed to achieve a consensus with the more stringent, prescriptive elements being designated as recommendations. The language of these documents is often discretionary in tone, and allows for regional interpretation; they do, however, outline generally agreed upon values and goals of the international governance system. Mission statements will also be taken from the online presences of each organization as these provide the means by which they present their message in a format for popular consumption, as well as the framing of knowledge generation with regards to their roles and identities.

The first set of REDD+ related documents from the global governance group which will be analysed are their statements and declarations of inception. These documents outline the formulation and reorganization of resources towards deforestation avoidance, and are available in their original form. The focus here is on the UN-REDD (as a joint initiative between FAO, UNDP, and UNEP) and the FCPF, as these are the most recognizable global institutions which have been organized to respond to REDD+. This is a useful starting point for a number of reasons. Firstly, these organizations and the space between them facilitate the formulation of the
global network required for a functional REDD+ regime. Secondly, despite the origins of REDD+ style conservation initiatives pre-dating the creation of these organizations, calls for some form of deforestation avoidance program has been a feature of climate change negotiations within the United Nations system for some time. Taking these into consideration, UN-REDD and FCPF have become necessary elements of a REDD+ system\textsuperscript{17}, and it behoves us to take special consideration of their particular framing on the issue of deforestation and forest degradation. The document chosen to represent the UN-REDD formulation is the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD): FAO, UNDP, UNEP Framework Document dated June 20, 2008. The equivalent document for the FCPF is an information memorandum dated June 13, 2008. These documents outline the rationale for global intervention on deforestation, while specifically outlining initial ideas on how the involved parties should function in various roles.

The second group from which documents will be sourced are policy papers taken from international NGO's and think tanks. These organizations are more removed from the ramifications of global-governance policy (both in its design constraints and the local impacts resulting from them). As a result of this distancing, these organizations are able to more clearly represent positions which may not always be tenable within policy space. They have greater freedom to explore policy options reflecting the interests that their individual mandates represent. Even so, this class of organizations is very influential, and include many perspectives which inform those who have the power to enact policy development and change. The diversity of interests represented by these organizations is something to be acknowledged prior to

\textsuperscript{17}At least in its initial stages. However, any free-standing carbon market which involves credits which were created through REDD+ projects is likely to evolve from, or procure elements of through policy osmosis, this intersection of UN/World Bank ideas.
engaging them, as they are not always in alignment. For reasons which will be developed further, the level of confidence surrounding CFM is far greater than that which surrounds REDD+ within this class of organizations. This may stem partially from the longer history with CFM, and indeed community resource management more generally, whereas REDD+ is a relatively recent iteration of PES-based conservation strategy.

Two organizations which will be analyzed in this section are the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) and Forest People Programme (FPP). The RRI is a collaborative effort between 14 core organizations focused on socio-environmental problems. The parties represented here range from Indigenous groups (e.g. Tebtebba) to groups which develop strategies for ecosystem valuation (e.g. Forest Trends). The FPP is an organization which represents the interests of forest dependent peoples, and works to strengthen the ability of indigenous peoples to defend their traditional land claims. Both of these organizations strongly favour community-centric approaches for land-use management practises.

The second group of this thematic category represents the critical observer segment. Within environmental political theory these organizations are often seen as having a positions farther entrenched upon a political spectrum than other environmental agents, thereby allowing those other agents to voice shared concerns in political fora and be seen as "legitimate" political entities (Opotow & Weiss, 2000). This is to say that they allow those organizations to appear less radical by comparison. They function by generating public concern for the issues they represent and campaign upon, concern which must then by addressed by the status quo. They operate outside of traditional political structures and are therefore not beholden of the constraints which those structures would otherwise present. Many of these organizations would be considered “populist” within the spectrum of global political ecology presented by Adger et al. (2001), as
they are characterized by a deep distrust of market-based instruments for environmental conservation. Furthermore, they tend to promote social rather than technological solutions to environmental problems. They are generally unwilling to explore pathways to sustainability which engage with the parties and processes of capitalism and market environmentalism, and rather prioritize those which champion the poor and/or marginalized.

This methodological approach based upon documentary analysis is critical to research on the potential for greater integration of CFM into REDD+ projects. The role of political ecology in this analysis is primarily to enable the posing of difficult questions, and to read these document "against the grain" in order to create arguments about what is really being said. In doing so, the hope is that their compatibility at discursive and material levels can be assessed. An informed recommendation surrounding the integrative approach can be developed from this process.

2.4 Why Political Ecology?

The global climate change regime is not simply wrapped up in the creation of individual policies, or sets of procedures; it is a forum for ideas, not all of which stand upon equal footing. Global governance is not a framework which lends itself to democratic practise as it is understood in the liberal democratic sense (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012). Rather, it may be more useful to imagine a space where ideas converge, evolve, become actionable through debate, or fail to gain meaningful traction. The means by which environmental knowledge enters this space, and how it is presented through it, is a major concern when approaching problems with this understanding of global systems in mind. As Hajer and Versteeg explain:

"Dying forests do not contain in themselves the reason for the public attention and concern they receive. The fact that they do receive this attention at a specific place and
time cannot be deduced from a natural-scientific analysis of its urgency, but from the symbols and experiences that govern the way people think and act” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006, p. 176).

This is why this thesis explores the knowledge and discourse of multiple environmental actors, despite the differences in the interests which they may represent. REDD+ cannot be viewed strictly as an agreement negotiated upon between states, nor can its implementation at national, regional, and bilateral levels be seen as projects which only concern state authorities and associated elite groups. Though state actors are responsible for developing and acknowledging the text of international agreements, there are many non-state actors engaged in knowledge production and narrative shaping which cannot be ignored. Discourses created by non-state actors, including civil-society organizations, may influence the decisions of state actors by making certain outcomes less tenable than others. Therefore, the assertions and interventions posed by non-state actors, which may or may not make claims of representing particular groups, merit analysis in efforts to decode the constellation of forces which together shape global action on environmental problems.

The following chapter will see the application of this analytical lens to a selection of actors as an assessment of their positions on REDD+. Particular attention is placed upon the discussions of community-centric attributes of the deforestation avoidance strategy. The questions which guide this political ecology approach will be discussed where they provide for the most informative exposition.
3.0 Utilizing the Lens of Global Political Ecology

3.0 Chapter Introduction

This chapter applies the political ecology framework to documentary analysis. The objective is to determine how multiple stakeholders are responding to REDD+, and to deconstruct the promotion and opposition of this particular deforestation avoidance strategy. The approach taken towards the different organizational classifications will be adjusted to reflect the particular needs of analysis for each. These classifications are the Global Governance Narratives, and the International NGO and Civil Society Narratives. The latter is further divided to reflect a range of voices from international policy research centers and Indigenous-peoples’ organizations. As the major research question of the thesis explores the possibility that CFM-style policy frameworks may enhance REDD+, particular attention will be paid to how these various organizations present the social aspects of REDD+.

The political ecology approach that is used in this thesis challenges many of the widely held understandings of environmental issues. It approaches “the environment” as a construct with inherent social and political dimensions alongside grounded scientific attributes. Political ecology highlights the asymmetry of power relationships, and demonstrates how environmental conservation initiatives may either modify or intensify these hierarchies. Additionally, the approach helps to highlight the plurality of environmental knowledge through which issues such as deforestation are understood.

3.1 Global Governance Narratives

The first narrative under review is associated with the system of global governance. It focuses primarily on the two overarching, intergovernmental bodies operating at the international
scale to develop a global REDD+ policy, which may be integrated with existing market-based efforts on climate change.

3.1.1 UN-REDD

The United Nations system has historically been the forum in which a globally-scaled REDD+ policy (as well as other numerous global environmental initiatives) has been developed. Although most decisions reached by the UN are considered “soft laws” and not legally binding (in the interest of maintaining the legitimacy of state sovereignty), participation within the system allows states to have a voice in the development of global priorities. UN-REDD is a programme created within this system, representing the cooperative action undertaken by UN agencies most closely attached to global forests and environmental issues, as well as social concerns linked to these. These agencies, UNEP, UNDP, and FAO, reflect various approaches to deforestation avoidance, and "play to their strengths" within their mandates outlined through the UN-REDD Framework Document (UN-REDD, 2008). UN-REDD warrants particular attention when analysing the creation of global deforestation avoidance regimes largely as a consequence of its pedigree as a UN joint programme. The UN system has a history with both large-scale climate change negotiations (see UNFCCC) as well as a record of responsiveness to the concerns of marginalized community groups (see UNDRIP\textsuperscript{18} and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

Among the group of global governance institutions which will be analysed in this section, UN-REDD and its constituent agencies are largely responsible for capacity building in countries eligible for REDD+ type projects. Other actors, notably the Norwegian and Australian governments, have also been leaders in this space. Through bilateral agreements these actors

\textsuperscript{18} United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
have greatly informed the development of REDD+ policy and have provided a number of experiments which can be drawn from for those working on deforestation avoidance at a global scale.

UN-REDD describes its mandate in the following paragraph taken from the programme website:

"The UN-REDD Programme brings together technical teams from around the world to help develop analyses and guidelines on issues such as measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of carbon emissions and flows, ensuring that forests continue to provide multiple benefits for livelihoods and the environment, and supporting the engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Civil Society at all stages of the design and implementation of REDD+ strategies. The UN-REDD Programme also seeks to build consensus and knowledge about REDD+, to ensure a REDD+ mechanism is included in a post-2012 climate change agreement." (UN-REDD, n.d., emphasis added)

This mandate includes a number of features which can be analysed. The first is the focus on technical capacity for measuring the sequestration of carbon emissions. This is a necessary feature of REDD+ projects, and indeed any project based upon PES concepts, as it serves to rationalize (for market consumption) the services of nature as product groups. Without the adequate "measurement, reporting, and verification" of carbon emissions, the credits which account for them may not be appropriately valued within a market system. As a consequence, credits may represent arbitrary values of carbon emissions while the actual carbon sequestration which has occurred may be far more, less, or completely negligible. Each of these potential divergences of market-price and reality have consequences for the effectiveness of the deforestation regime.

This mandate attempts to bring together the technocentric managerialist understanding with that of the socially-focused populism by also highlighting their function in protecting forest-
derived social and ecological benefits, as well as engaging Indigenous and civil society organizations. These elements are more difficult to provide guidelines for at the global level without the end result being watered down. Whereas technical approaches are more readily applied universally (such as LiDAR\textsuperscript{19}) social and environmental concerns are far more context specific. The language surrounding technical, environmental, and social dimensions of deforestation avoidance reflects this complexity in appropriate degrees to which universality may be applied.

The UN-REDD Framework Document, which outlines the coordination across FAO, UNDP, and UNEP in forming the programme\textsuperscript{20}, is instructive for demonstrating the initial narratives presented by the organization, including their understanding of deforestation. The text of the document is indicative of the early concerns within the UN system surrounding the legitimacy of carbon credits derived from deforestation avoidance. Much of this centers around technical matters, including the baseline emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (UN-REDD, 2008). The issues of contention most relevant to this thesis are those which relate to community participation in the designing of REDD+. The UN-REDD Framework Document explicitly defines itself as a rights-based regime:

"The application of UNDP, UNEP and FAO rights-based and participatory approaches will also help ensure the rights of indigenous and forest-dwelling people are protected and the active involvement of local communities and relevant institutions in the design and implementation of REDD plans." pg. 7 (UN-REDD, 2008)

Statements such as this are to be expected given the institutional fora in which they are made, as these bodies operate in a system which has codified human rights and outlined special

\textsuperscript{19} An advanced remote sensing technology useful in the context of ecology and conservation initiatives as it can be used to measure the above ground biomass of an area (Asner, 2009).

\textsuperscript{20} As well as external global finance organizations, including the FCPF and Global Environment Facility.
privileges for indigenous peoples (Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). These statements are seen rebuked by their equivalents in the critical observer segment, which argue that their rights are not being recognized through this process.

3.1.2 FCPF (World Bank)

The second major organization which may fall under "Global Governance Institutions" categorically is the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), an initiative led by the World Bank. The FCPF website outlines the mandate of the facility in the following:

"The FCPF has created a framework and processes for REDD+ readiness, which helps countries get ready for future systems of financial incentives for REDD+. Using this framework, each participating country develops an understanding of what it means to become ready for REDD+, in particular by developing reference scenarios, adopting a REDD+ strategy, designing monitoring systems and setting up REDD+ national management arrangements, in ways that are inclusive of the key national stakeholders." (FCPF, n.d.)

One of the main criticisms of the FCPF, and perhaps the World Bank in general, is that it is insufficiently responsive to local concerns. As demonstrated by this mandate, the objective is not to develop new global norms or values through policy design, but rather to use a communitarian approach, allowing countries to implement their own iterations of REDD+. The connotations to be found in the statement above are to be expected given the context specificity of REDD+ itself; "key national stakeholders" cannot be defined further in such statements, given that they vary by country (and may delineate further at subnational levels). The following statement outlines an important aspect of the governance structure of the FCPF:

"The Participants Committee is made up of an equal number of forest (REDD+) countries (14) and financial contributors (14), and is also comprised of observers representing indigenous peoples, civil society, international organizations, the UN-REDD Programme, the UNFCCC Secretariat and the private sector." (FCPF, n.d.)
This evenness of representation is no doubt designed to respond to the needs of both donor and recipient groups. An important aspect of this arrangement is that although most "financial contributors" are governments of countries participating in the FCPF, this is not a strict requirement. The notable exception to the trend of state authorities informing FCPF policy from the donor perspective is The Nature Conservancy. The current assemblage of the participants committee can be found on Appendix A.

A memorandum issued by the facility on June 13, 2008 (following the Bonn Climate Change Talks) establishes the discourse of environmental emergency, as well as a failure of conventional conservation practise. The following points are made at the outset (emphasis added):

- "Forest loss and degradation has been on the international community's agenda for over three decades. However, little progress has been made in reversing deforestation trends in most tropical and subtropical countries" (FCPF, 2008, p. 1).
- "The once-vast tropical forest estate is disappearing - mostly through conversion to agriculture - at a rate of approximately five percent per decade, a trend that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future" (FCPF, 2008, p. 1).
- "Many forest-rich countries are also among the poorest in the world. Forest resources directly contribute to the livelihoods of 1.2 billion people living in poverty..." (FCPF, 2008, p. 1).
- "Almost 100 million people, many of them in small indigenous communities, live in remote areas in closed tropical forests. Another 800 million rural people live in or around tropical forests and savannas and rely on their resources for fuel, food or subsistence income" (FCPF, 2008, p. 1).

These statements taken from the FCPF document are notable for their construction of both "why" deforestation is a problem and "how" this problem occurs. However, it does so in primarily economic terms, as it includes far more mention of various social parameters when compared with ecological factors. What is constructed here is a value narrative; forests have,
thus far, not merited transitional efforts by global actors on their own accord, but they may when couched in terms of global economic dependence upon them.

Instructive elements can be drawn from the governance structure, and the approach taken by the FCPF on stakeholder consultation. Within the FCPF approach, participation by forest dependent peoples is something which is to be defined at the national level, while being a suggested action through the global regime. This comes across through the "stakeholder participation" principle highlighted in the June 13, 2008 Memorandum:

"Countries will, for example, make special efforts to ensure that forest-dependent indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers meaningfully participate in decisions that may affect them and that their rights are respected consistent with national law and applicable international obligations." (FCPF, 2008, p. 4)

This approach is problematic for a number of reasons. The first being that the rights of indigenous peoples vary with national law and legal precedents may exist to illustrate the weaknesses of whatever protection marginalized communities may have. This is particularly apparent where land tenure is concerned, as the local legalities surrounding legitimate land claims may vary drastically across or within national contexts. This may lead to major tensions where occupied lands fall under the authority of agencies of the state, which may not recognize the claims to the land of a particular group. It is not surprising to see civil society, indigenous and international organizations (with the exception of The Nature Conservancy, which has secured a status as financial contributor\(^{21}\)) being relegated to "observer status". However, the FCPF routinely mentions that their consensus-based approach allows for their voices to be heard.

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\(^{21}\) A $5 million dollar contribution to the FCPF REDD+ Readiness Fund is required to be counted among the Donor Participant group (FCPF, 2011).
The equal footing between donor countries and forested participant countries within the Participants Committee should be highlighted here. The recent FCPF annual report highlights this: "The FCPF was among the first global partnerships to adopt an innovative governance structure in which developing countries have the same voice as financial contributors" (FCPF, 2011). This is an interesting structure in that it does not allow for donor state to have explicit control over the development of the initiative, or the direction of the finances which they have contributed. If true, and if this structure immunized the process against implicit forms of control, it would represent a marked reduction in the trend of conditionality (where non-target clauses are included in a contractual transaction).

3.1.3 Global Governance Group Summary

A number of trends have emerged from this analysis of global governance stakeholders in the REDD+ debate. The dominant discourse communicated by these organizations is heavy managerialism, with each organization representing a specific form of expertise. This is not to say that they have become fora in which the voices of forest dependent communities have been ignored. UN-REDD and FCPF both appear to understand the importance of responding to the concerns of communities and civil society organizations through various means of consulting.

How these institutions define forests may open them up for criticism, however, as the operational definition may well be incompatible with those widely held by community and scientific organizations. Both UN-REDD and the FCPF use the definition for "forest" as outlined by the FAO, which follows: "Forest are lands of more than 0.5 hectares, with a tree canopy cover of more than 10 percent, which are not primarily under agricultural or urban land use" (FAO, 2000). An explanatory note attached to this definition specifically includes forestry plantations, and excludes agroforestry systems (FAO, 2000). The first issue which some groups may have
with such a definition is that it may include the use of biodiversity-poor monocultural systems 
(Harvey, Dickson, & Kormos, 2010). Should market environmentalism encourage conservation 
planners to take the most cost-effective means of maximizing carbon sequestration, other 
ecological variable may not benefit from these projects. Secondly, the full-scale exclusion of 
agroforestry systems may be problematic, despite the definitional issues which these systems 
also have (Nair, 2011). Given the potential that agroforestry may hold in providing alternative 
livelihood strategies for forest-dependent communities (Leakey, Tchoundjeu, Schreckenberg, 
Shackleton, & Shackleton, 2005; Smith, 2003) while still allowing for some carbon sequestration 
(Albrecht & Kandji, 2003; Montagnini & Nair, 2012; Ramachandran Nair, Mohan Kumar, & 
Nair, 2009).

3.2 International NGO/Civil Society Group

International organizations may be representative of, but do not necessarily represent, broad groups of peoples and interests. Others, such as global policy think-tanks, may exist outside of governmental contexts in order to provide an academic perspective on policy-related issues. They are often very specific in their focus, such as the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) which focuses on the social issues related to land tenure. Here these organizations (and assemblies) are divided into two segments: the Global Policy Research Centers and the Critical Observers from Civil Society. The second segment if further divided into groups which are more social or environmentally focused; however, significant overlap is to be expected between the two.

3.2.1 Global Policy Research Centers segment

This section focuses on two forestry research groups which have been approaching REDD+ from particular angles. The organizations which will be analyzed here are the Rights
and Resources Initiative and the Forest Peoples Programme. A separate section for the research intensive organizations is utilized here in order to provide some analysis of the organizations which are informing the debate surrounding REDD+ from a more academic perspective.

3.2.1.1 RRI (Rights and Resources Initiative)

The Rights and Resources Initiative is a coalition of organizations which work on policy issues related to forest tenure and reform. The organizations which this coalition comprises represent an array of positions on the issue of deforestation avoidance generally, and REDD+ in particular. Some examples of these groups include Tebtebba, an international indigenous people’s organization, and Forest Trends, an organization which promotes the expansion of market-style solutions to preventing deforestation. The varied assemblage of organizations represented in the initiative may lead to certain assumptions regarding the benefits perceived to result from the partnership. These include access to, and platforms within, global discussions which may otherwise be inaccessible for them. It may also provide an enhanced ability to forge unlikely partnerships across sectors and interests.

Many of the publications to be found on the RRI website are the results of research into land-tenure issues their partner organizations have undertaken. The initiative does, however, issue its own policy briefs and this section of the analysis will focus primarily on these. A centerpiece of the work conducted by RRI is their forest-tenure data, with the objective of enhancing community rights (RRI, 2012a). Perhaps a consequence of the multiple voices which contribute to the position which the RRI takes on forest tenure issues, the overall tone and shape of discourse in their literature is tempered optimism. The strategy of the organization, as apparent through their literature, is to use the trends towards what has been termed by others as
“neoliberal conservation” and confronting them in ways which promote the rights of forest dependent peoples.

Deforestation is characterized by the RRI as a complex issue; it is presented as having multiple proximate and distal causes and is therefore an inherently complex problem. However, critical to note here in this analysis is that much of their work delves into the pressures which dictate the actions that forest dependent peoples may participate in on the ground. Deforestation is seen as a problematic human-environment interaction. However, rather than depicting local communities as the loci of deforestation, assumptions are made that political, legal, and institutional pressures exist which reinforce environmental harm.

Additional stress on this point can be found in the solutions which they highlight as being the most promising: all of which center around the objective of creating and maintaining regimes which protect the rights of forest inhabitants. CFM is promoted here as one promising strategy which could enhance social and ecological variables (RRI, 2012b). The Rights and Resources Initiative promotes the local ownership of the landscape; the formalization of traditional land claims. Notable here is that the approach does not reject ownership, a key element of the “green neoliberalism” found in REDD+. In particular is the promotion of exclusion rights (RRI, 2012a), as the excludability of a resource forms the basis from which the ownership of property is legitimized. Therefore, the encapsulation and capitalization of natural resources is still present within the solutions promoted by the RRI, although this largely takes shape as community-owned resources.
3.2.1.2 FPP (Forest Peoples Programme)

The Forest Peoples Programme has participated in the Rights and Resources Initiative; however, it deserves special mention here for many of its features and activities independent of the RRI. Where documents which stem from the RRI should promote a more holistic view of REDD+ activities, its composite organizations (FPP included) exist as independent entities which pursue their individual objectives. For the FPP this means a greater focus on the elements of forest management which impact indigenous peoples and other groups which are more likely to be impacted by this new strategy. One may argue that this organization has taken a stance towards REDD+ which one may expect from an activist organization.

Another unique aspect of the work conducted by the Forest Peoples Programme can be found in its development of training tools for indigenous communities. These stand out among the documents prepared by FPP, and they are the result of collaboration between FPP and other organizations which act on behalf of Indigenous peoples. The political ecology approach to research allows for the exploration of alternative motivations of particular statements and tools developed by organizations such as the FPP. The development of manuals for Indigenous peoples and leaders to prepare for engagement with REDD+ policy demonstrate certain assumptions. Prime among these assumptions is that market-tied conservation initiatives, under the banner of deforestation avoidance, are an inevitable policy intervention. These may represent a form of anticipatory self-discipline; the pre-emptive adaptation to rules enforced through the power structures which foster REDD+ as a means of engaging them on terms which they may define. Such a proactive process may be a rational reaction based upon historical experiences, and cultural memories, which deal with negative impacts from colonial forces. It communicates a message that the forms of environmental knowledge which will form the baseline for the
development of international environmental regimes can be best understood as foreign elements. The manual designed for use by Indigenous communities themselves presents forests from this technocentric perspective – forests as “carbon sinks”, and carbon credits as a tradable commodity. The discussion is not, however, limited to understanding the scientific or economic rationale for these projects, but also outlines the logic behind the “anti-REDD+” perspective. This is presented strongly in the following passage:

“While REDD, which will be part of the post 2012 climate agreement, may provide some financial and other opportunities for indigenous peoples who live and depend on forests, the concept and manner in which it is being shaped and implemented pose some problems which have to be addressed. Indigenous peoples fear that they will be excluded once more from their forests as what has happened in the establishment of Forest Protected Areas in the past. If their forests are designated as carbon forests and are used for emissions trading, there is a great possibility that they will be prevented from practicing their own traditional forest management practices and to use their forests for ceremonial purposes, shifting cultivation, as sources of timber and non-timber forest products and medicines, and other agro-forestry activities” (Erni & Tugendhat, 2010a, p. 29).

These documents also focus on the material implications of Indigenous peoples rights, including a breakdown on the implications of UNDRIP and the standardization of FPIC as a norm within global governance. Large portions of these manuals focus on capacity building for resistance. These include the shaping of messages which center on rights and environmental justice. In reference to the FCPF, one of the major participants in the design of REDD+ from the global governance group previously outlined, the FPP notes the following:

“However, many people, and above all we Indigenous peoples, are not happy at all with the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, and we have on many occasion (sic) heavily criticized the World Bank. First of all, the World Bank has not properly consulted with forest peoples. In this the World Bank was even ignoring its own internal safeguard policies and the rules of the FCPF.” (Erni & Tugendhat, 2010a, p. 51).
3.2.2 Critical Observers from Civil Society segment

The critical observer group provides an additional layer of complexity for the implementation of REDD+, particularly at the ground level. This segment is largely defined by its critical voices relating to forest-management policy and land-use practices. Distinctions can be drawn between those groups which are especially focused on community/social and environmental issues. Much like all of the groups and organizations which have been under analysis here, the critical observer segment is at work producing knowledge. Entities which fall under this category will privilege specific forms of knowledge, especially those which stand as alternatives to “market environmentalism”.

The communities which have the greatest exposure to risk as a result of the process of designing and implementing REDD+ are indigenous and forest-dependent communities (Ghazoul, Butler, Mateo-Vega, & Koh, 2010; Huettner, 2012). Organizations which promote the rights of these often marginalized community groups have been at the forefront of engagement with international processes, as well as producing materials to better explain the REDD+ process to community groups. This puts them at a unique position in terms of the narratives they produce surrounding the creation of a deforestation avoidance regime.

This analysis will draw upon the proceedings of two open meetings as counterpoints to global meetings for negotiating the environmental regime. The most recent of these, which have an impact on global REDD+ discourse, are the World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (Peoples’ Agreement), and the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Conference on Rio+20 and Mother Earth (Kari-Oca 2). The declarations of these conferences focus on the inherent values of nature, characterizing attempts at incorporating nature within financial systems as an assault on the inviolable rights of Earth as a de facto entity.
3.2.2.1 The “Peoples” Coalitions

The timing of the first declaration under analysis here is April 22, 2010, four months after the UNFCCC CoP 15 in Copenhagen. Much of the language of the document can be seen as a response to the meeting in Copenhagen, but also to the general trend towards the alignment of environmental conservation and capitalism. This conference was organized by Bolivia, and large sections of it can be seen as a reflection of the indigenous-populist stance taken by Evo Morales in his approach to environmental issues, discussed later in this chapter.

These declarations frame the issue of climate change in much the same fashion as other actors, and use their position to further enhance the narrative of environmental destruction. They apply much of the knowledge which has informed the global debate over developing responses to climate change, including the 2°C threshold for elevated, irreversible environmental destruction. The notable discursive point which sets this declaration apart from those of the global governance group, for instance, is that the problematization is not internalized as an unfortunate consequence of necessary historical development practise (i.e. expansionist capitalism). Rather, capitalism is strongly portrayed as an option which was chosen by the leaders of nations historically privileged with the positions to make such choices, and one which cannot coexist with “sustainability”. Such conclusions can be drawn throughout the document, which seeks to challenge the increasing influence that the proponents of market-based instruments have over the environmental epistemic community. For instance:

"The corporations and governments of the so-called "developed" countries, in complicity with a segment of the scientific community, have led us to discuss climate change as a problem limited to the rise in temperature without questioning the cause, which is the capitalist system" (WPCCC, 2010).

Of particular relevance here are the following paragraphs taken from the People's Agreement:
“The definition of forests used in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which includes plantations, is unacceptable. Monoculture plantations are not forests. Therefore, we require a definition for negotiation purposes that recognizes the native forests, jungles and diverse ecosystems on Earth.”

“The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be fully recognized, implemented and integrated in climate change negotiations. The best strategy and action to avoid deforestation and degradation and protect native forests and jungles is to recognize and guarantee collective rights to lands and territories, especially considering that most of the forests are located within the territories of indigenous peoples and nations and other traditional communities” (WPCCC, 2010).

The first paragraph of this selection highlights an important issue regarding knowledge creation as it concerns forests and conservation initiatives. It demonstrates the existence of a discrepancy surrounding the focus of debate on a seemingly simple question: what is a “forest”? How stakeholders define this question is a notable feature of their position on environmental issues. The various (and not always distinct) classes of land-cover which may fall under a broad definition may represent radically different concepts than a more specific one, to the point of definitional exclusion. This appears to be the case with the Peoples’ Agreement. The document targets monoculture plantations as an example to demonstrate the divisiveness on what land-cover and land-use practises may be considered as forests.

The second paragraph makes indirect reference to community-based natural resource management as a legitimate strategy for achieving the stated goals of the climate change regime. In doing so, the authors of this document have positioned indigenous communities and other forest-dependent peoples as being central to conserving forest resources and enhancing their carbon sequestration potential. The article does not go on to identify the specific means by which a community-centric approaches may be effective. The reason for this may be that this approach,
while in keeping with the rest of the document in its populist overtone, can be enacted in various forms including some which replicate themes of capitalism (e.g. enclosure of resources).

Many of the same narratives demonstrated by the Peoples’ Agreement can be found in the Kari-Oca 2 Declaration (referred to as Kari-Oca 2 hereafter). This document can be seen as a response to international negotiations orchestrated through the Rio+20 Earth Summit conference which took place in the summer of 2012.

Common between the Kari-Oca 2 and the Peoples’ Agreement is an intense distrust for capitalism, the commodification and valuation of nature, market environmentalism, and the processes of globalization. Both single out REDD+ as a carbon-sequestration strategy that has the potential to imperil already marginalized communities, and both documents also highlight the critical role of community empowerment in solving the crisis of climate change. Taking the narrative of "Green Economy" espoused by market optimists, the Kari-Oca 2 presents a counterpoint:

"The Green Economy is nothing more than capitalism of nature; a perverse attempt by corporations, extractive industries and governments to cash in on Creation by privatizing, commodifying, and selling off the Sacred and all forms of life and the sky, including the air we breathe, the water we drink and all the genes, plants, traditional seeds, trees, animals, fish, biological and cultural diversity, ecosystems and traditional knowledge that make life on Earth possible and enjoyable" (Kari-Oca 2, 2012).

Kari-Oca 2 presents the "Green Economy" in a negative light, where many mainstream environmental organizations position it as a necessary component of their environmental programs moving into the future. At first reading this would appear to be an intractable position, and a similar statement can be made regarding the Peoples Declaration. However it would be faulty to describe these documents, which establish an argument based upon an Indigenous worldview, as carrying an uncompromising tone as though such were unique in climate change
regime building. Many developed states have taken similarly "extreme" negotiation stances where their carbon dioxide reductions targets are concerned. To see as intractable the position that the "Green Economy" is simply an attempt to further usurp natural resources into capitalist systems and rationales, without acknowledging elements of intractability within the opposition, is not intellectually useful here. This is to say that the outright rejection of capitalism may be as radical of a notion as is the outright approval of so-called "market environmentalism". One assertion which can be made of those who have adopted either stance is that they do not do so within a vacuum, as agents espousing views while representing a group depend upon those groups for sustained legitimacy. The implication of this is that Indigenous leaders may view resistance as their only option; the goal of this resistance being to cause the resultant policy formulation to be more in their favour. In the case of the People's Agreement, the call to participate in the open dialogue which would produce it was presented in a way which would alienate those with opposing views (Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012).

When taken together, these documents present a significant challenge for REDD+ project developers as it establishes them as colonizing agents. They characterize climate change as a problem created by outsiders, and one which should be solved by outsiders, taking on the establishing discourse of "common but differentiated responsibility". Furthermore, they position climate change itself as an expression of colonialism, both in the imposition of the phenomenon as well as the solutions being developed to solve it. They attempt to provide a new framework for the global debate under which the discussion may be inclusive of social concerns and the inherent values of nature rather than a strictly technocentric debate. They articulate the viewpoint that those groups which stand to gain most from REDD+ and market environmentalism are those which have produced the climate change problem.
3.3 Summary of Global-Scale Approach

The first major finding drawn from this process is that among the many concerns held by those critical of REDD+, the lack of community engagement is central to their opposition. These concerns are legitimized through the language used by the global governance institutions, which (largely by consequence of ensuring the recognition of state sovereignty) leave the details of implementing stakeholder participation strategies to the participating countries themselves. This was seen first in the UN-REDD case which focused on building the capacity of institutions and finance mechanisms. It was seen again through the FCPF, which states explicitly that although broader inclusivity and stakeholder engagement is a central tenet of the FCPF partnership, the exact nature of that engagement is left to the designs of participating state bodies. On issues of finance it would appear that countries must comply with the global governance system, while social and ecological concerns are left to the discretion of individual governments. This promotes an unevenness of how REDD+ is to be perceived.

This is of course a consequence of pragmatism in international relations. Beyond a communitarian understanding of international relations, a further reaching policy architectures may result in a program deemed less acceptable by participant countries. This can be seen in the preliminary design phase of REDD+, which includes non-target social and environmental benefits as secondary objectives. Relegating these aspects to discretionary features should enable “participation at will” by the countries which would host REDD+ projects. Although this may make deforestation avoidance more attractive to those participant countries, it may also reduce the potential that the program has for greater benefits beyond carbon sequestration. Some have demonstrated concerns that this would make REDD+ counterproductive in terms of the social
and ecological benefits that could potentially be derived from a well-implemented iteration of deforestation avoidance as a conservation strategy.

As a counterpoint to this concern, one of the main detractors for REDD+ proponents was the lack of local capacity for validating carbon credits derived from deforestation avoidance projects as legitimate (Palmer Fry, 2011). The greater technological capacity for establishing global greenhouse gas emissions baseline inventories has reduced some issues related to this problem, however they remain persistent. Researchers from the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) have found that the ability of many countries to measure their domestic forest carbon stocks is an area which still needs improvement, despite the increase in efforts to do so (Romijn, Herold, Kooistra, Murdiyarso, & Verchot, 2012).

All of the organizations analysed above present the issue of deforestation and forest degradation as one which values human life. Although their discursive implements were radically different across classification, each group represents an interest in global forests that goes beyond the metrics of forest stock depletion. This may potentially be a point upon which common appreciation for the task of developing a deforestation avoidance regime can be focused. However, a point on which they may contrast is in their application of cultural variables into the value-based approach of "protecting forests as protecting people". The global governance institutions appear to value human life and state sovereignty as being two main priorities. The limitations (as well as the allowances) of the FAO definition of "forest" may be a hindrance in the pursuit of these priorities, as it does not adequately reflect the "meaning" of forest for the hundreds of thousands of forest dependent people.
The politics and presentation of environmental valuation is a major point of contention. While the global governance group appears to have this as a central tenet of their approach (as the creation of carbon credits relies upon some form of valuation) it comes across as unattainable for cooperation across discursive segments on this aspect of REDD+. The perspective on anti-valuation put forward by Costanza is instructive here:

"The issue of valuation is inseparable from the choices and decisions we have to make about ecological systems. Some argue that valuation of ecosystems is either impossible or unwise, that we cannot place a value on such ‘intangibles’ as human life, environmental aesthetics, or long-term ecological benefits. But, in fact, we do so every day. When we set construction standards for highways, bridges and the like, we value human life (acknowledged or not) because spending more money on construction would save lives. Another frequent argument is that we should protect ecosystems for purely moral or aesthetic reasons, and we do not need valuations of ecosystems for this purpose. But there are equally compelling moral arguments that may be in direct conflict with the moral argument to protect ecosystems; for example, the moral argument that no one should go hungry. Moral arguments translate the valuation and decision problem into a different set of dimensions and a different language of discourse; one that, in our view, makes the problem of valuation and choice more difficult and less explicit. But moral and economic arguments are certainly not mutually exclusive. Both discussions can and should go on in parallel" (Costanza et al., 1997, p. 255).

One may take this argument to mean that the intangible price put on the holistic value of nature (Gaia, or Pachamama, should one view nature as an entity) is less intangible, but is instead exceptionally high. REDD+ policymakers ought to focus on dividing the concepts of valuation and marketization as a material priority, rather than discussing them as being conceptually interchangeable. This thesis deals primarily with the market-based iteration of REDD+, as the post-2012 global climate change dialogue is most likely to take shape using this mechanism rather than a fund-based approach. However, it may be wise to create and foster a space for alternative interpretations of fundamental policy mechanisms within the regime itself. For instance, where open-market systems for carbon credits are rejected, bilateral agreements
(such as that which Norway currently has with Indonesia and Guyana) may still be encouraged by the global governance system itself. Valuation and ecologically-tied performance based indicators may still be effectively deployed in deforestation avoidance projects without incurring the discursive consequences associated with the “capitalization” of nature. Such a measure may also limit the availability of carbon credits available within these markets, enabling some limited control over the incentives for participation. Although this approach may allow for some flexibility, and potentially reduce the likelihood of local policy rejection, it does not appease those concerns surrounding the notion of “owning” nature.

The politics of ownership are particularly relevant in this issue, as many forest-dependent communities may see themselves as being either owners of the land, or even as being a part of the landscape in a metaphysical sense, on the basis of traditional practise rather than legally recognized title. The villification of traditional land-use practices, for instance, may result in those land-use practices being performed outside of the traditional management structures of those practises. Greater community involvement and representation within the designing of REDD+ projects may provide the necessary compromise to allow for traditional practices to continue while achieving environmental performance criteria. As political ecology illuminates the linkages between external forces and the rationalization of particular human-environment interactions, it is particularly instructive here. For REDD+ project to incorporate stronger forms of CFM strategies, including forest monitoring by local communities, the benefits accrued by those involved in these projects may decrease the pressures to engage in unsustainable practices (Danielsen et al., 2011).

This is where the World Peoples’ Assembly and Kari Oca 2 meeting of indigenous peoples are particularly relevant. The declarations which resulted from both of these meetings
represent the heavily populist discourse of environmental colonialism. Such a message carrying forward from these meetings is perhaps to be expected, given that the terms in which calls for participation in these fora were laid in such a way which would privilege this position. Moreover, it may be politically advantageous for indigenous leaders to adopt contrarian positions towards REDD+ policy given its potential to recalibrate local institutions and increase the risk exposure of already marginalized groups. Where political relevancy can be found in the politics of identity, “indigeneity” is often presented as a point of differentiation from mainstream culture and norms (Doolittle, 2010). One can envisage the opposition to REDD+ among indigenous leaders and organizations as stemming from the grander notion of “us vs. them” in defence of traditional values. This framing of power dynamics is warranted on the grounds of historical trends towards marginalization. The minimization of this risk exposure may be a necessary element of the deforestation avoidance regime in order to maintain the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous groups and forest dependent communities.

Within this debate, the concept of deforestation, despite being universally characterized as an issue of human wellbeing, has not been adequately addressed in the context of the cultural dynamics of forests. The global dialogue should not be one which prioritizes the scientific aspects of climate change at the expense of cultural variables. Such a claim will no doubt come with criticism. The issue at hand, of deforestation and climate change, are indeed prime issues for scientific concern and analysis – to communicate otherwise would inadequately convey the environmental problem, which may result in partial solutions. However, it is crucial to acknowledge this scientific perspective towards deforestation and climate change as being an element of a dominant cultural system.
The positions held by critical indigenous organizations are particularly instructive when seeking to understand the role of “green economy” and “green democracy” in this debate. These organizations present the concepts as mutually exclusive concepts while the global governance organization group present them as mutually reinforcing. The indigenous groups highlight the success of community-led initiatives in the design of environmental programs and policy objectives. They highlight participatory initiatives, rather than those which are primarily expert-led, and they also promote the use of traditional ecological knowledge in place of “higher technology” and proprietary solutions.

The institutionalism found in the approach of the global governance organizations, and not simply the managerialist discourse, may be a major point of contention for those critical of the REDD+ process. This would fit with the contrasting positions of managerialism and populism and how they address not only environmental concerns, but questions of policy in general. The dynamic at play in this divide is the conflicting understandings of how environmental problems should be approached – by institutions or by communities themselves. This may be an area in which this thesis and research approach is only capable of providing an analysis and actionable policy prescriptions. However, greater CFM elements embedded within the policy architecture of REDD+ may assuage some of these concerns. Allocating local land-use decisions within communities should provide greater legitimacy for the actions which are taken (Kull, 2002). This would only be possible as a core element of REDD+ with the reinterpretation of forest management in regions where the management of forest resources is deemed to be a function of a central government authority. However, following such a realignment of priorities, the discussion would not be one of managerialism against populism, but rather something which exists as a gradient between.
Not all indigenous organizations oppose REDD+ outright in the way which the proceedings of the World Peoples’ Assembly and Kari Oca 2 meetings would suggest. For instance, Tebtebba and the Forest Peoples Program have each adopted approaches towards deforestation avoidance which do not necessarily oppose the notion of market values for nature. Instead, these organizations approach REDD+ from the perspective that some form of land-based deforestation avoidance program is likely to develop through the global climate change regime. REDD+ represents a potential threat. This response can be seen in their issuance of a series of documents which prepare indigenous communities to adapt to REDD+. Critical observers of this process may be inclined to see this activity as being a form of pre-emptive self-discipline in light of a perceived inevitability – perhaps a practise adopted as a reaction to historical experiences with the forces of colonialism. This is to say that these organizations are preparing indigenous communities to respond to REDD+ programs in ways which minimize their exposure to risk.

These guides do not appear to be oriented towards the rejection of REDD+ (as was seen with the critical indigenous organizations) but rather highlight the means by which indigenous peoples can engage with the REDD+ process in proactive ways. In one instance a guide for REDD+ indigenous trainers articulates a series of slogans which may be used by Indigenous peoples advocacy groups. “No rights, No REDD” is an archetypical example found in this research (Erni & Tugendhat, 2010b). The concept transmitted here, which is consistent across the messages from indigenous organizations regardless of their degree of opposition towards REDD+, is that the policy framework itself ought to respect indigenous people’s rights.

An interesting feature of these many organizations is that they often act in collaboration with other agencies, occasionally in unexpected ways. An example of this can be found in the partnerships in which Indigenous organizations such as Tebtebba and the Forest Peoples
Programme participate. For instance, manuals for activist organization and civil engagement have resulted in these organizations participation with other groups which have similar goals. Tebtebba and the FPP are also core members of the Rights and Resources Initiative, of which Forest Trends (an organization which promotes PES as a conservation tool) is a member. This is not to say that Forest Trends is unaware of the equity concerns raised by the critics of REDD+. Indeed, a July 2012 policy briefing issued by Forest Trends speaks directly to this (Forest Trends, 2012). The implication here is that while Forest Trends is optimistic about the prospects of REDD+ and explores best practises, they exist to help develop and expand markets for ecosystem services (Forest Trends, n.d.). Indigenous groups generally act with a greater degree of caution, as these policy experiments are being conducted on their land (which may carry greater meaning than simply the place where they make their homes).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored many aspects of the REDD+ dialogue, and the positions held by important actors. The objective of this thesis has been to use the critical lens of political ecology as a tool for documentary analysis to determine the potential synergies and drawbacks of community-centric REDD+ policy structure; this matter was addressed in this chapter. In pursuit of this research question, the thesis has outlined a number of discursive elements which REDD+ policymakers and researchers ought to address in their work. Certain elements came from the regional analysis which could only be hinted towards when analyzing the global interventions (which were generally based upon consensus reached by the associated epistemic community). This demonstrates a need for greater research into regional applications of CFM-driven REDD+ projects. The following chapter further develops a synthesis model for CFM and REDD+ forest management strategies.
4.0 Discussion

4.0 Chapter Introduction

The previous chapters have developed political ecology as a research tool and applied it to varying participant organizations within the global dialogue. The political ecology approach may be limited in some contexts, as it focuses primarily on matters of social, economic, and political concern. However, the implementation of political ecology in this thesis, which has taken shape as a critical discourse analysis, has proven to be instructive in uncovering many avenues through which equitable policy solutions may be developed. Much has been learned from this process, and that which can be put forward as advice for policy-makers will be summarized in the second half of this chapter.

4.1 Applications of REDD+

The previous chapter focused on the global political ecology of REDD+. Although local responses to REDD+ have informed this global architecture, the analytical approach taken towards political ecology prioritizes global discourses. This has been done in an attempt to better understand (and perhaps reconcile) some of the discursive implications of the REDD+ debate. Having developed a model for analysing the global political ecology of REDD+, the thesis turns to a brief investigation on the potential for applying this model towards the interface of global-to-regional contexts. The objective for undertaking this additional exploration is to determine the possibility for applying this means of assessment, and to determine if such a methodology warrants a more thorough application than the scope of the thesis would allow for.

The shift in scale in moving towards a more regional perspective alters the questions one may ask, and will determine the types of resources which are available for analysis. The
decreased scope of analysis will imply that there is less focus on the consensus/harmonization based approaches common to the agencies of global governance. Information for this section will be drawn from a number of sources, including academic assessments of local projects and government statements. The brevity of these case study examples forces the analysis towards specific political-economic-ecological aspects of the regions themselves.

4.1.1 Indonesia

The forests of Indonesia are perhaps some of the most globally important of all; their conservation, some say, should be a high priority if for no other reason than the treasure trove of biodiversity to be found in their fold (Myers, Mittermeier, Mittermeier, Da Fonseca, & Kent, 2000). The geography of Indonesia features two of the most biodiversity-rich regions on the planet, Sundaland and Wallacea (Myers et al., 2000). Critical in regards to REDD+ is that Indonesia is the largest emitter of forest carbon. Table 4.1 shows that when the emissions from land-use change and forestry are accounted for alongside that which stems from energy production and usage, Indonesia ranks as the third greatest carbon dioxide emitting country (when not accounting for population or economic variables).

Table 4.1: Total Emissions of Carbon Dioxide from the Top Six Emitting Countries Including Forestry-Related Sources (2007) (Noordwijk, Purnomo, Peskett, & Setiono, 2008, p. 9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emission sources</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Indonesia¹</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>5,752</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>1,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry and peat</td>
<td>-403</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>2,563²</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,085</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,017</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,014</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,316</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,745</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,577</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Total emissions may in fact be anywhere between 1.5 and 4.5 Gt CO₂ per year; a further investment in data collection is needed to reduce this uncertainty margin

² A significant part of the peatland emissions may in fact belong to the ‘agriculture’ domain, which has consequences for eligibility under REDD regimes
The Norway-Indonesia REDD+ partnership has been a critical element of recent forestry practices in Indonesia. This bilateral arrangement would have Norway reward Indonesia with up to $1 Billion USD for activities which promote the development of REDD+ projects (Edwards, Koh, & Laurance, 2011). A notable deliverable of this process has been a moratorium on new concessions for peat and old growth forests. This is an important move towards environmental conservation for a country in which influential industry groups have been able to expand land-intensive operations such as palm oil production (Edwards et al., 2011).

This arrangement has fallen under scrutiny for its implementation. These criticisms question the ecological importance of forested lands which fall under the moratorium, and those which have been excluded from the conservation endeavour. The rationale for implementing this moratorium was to create an environment within the domestic political realm in which a deforestation avoidance regime could be fostered. Functionally, it sets aside a specified area of high ecological concern and prevents future resource extraction. The problematic aspect of this moratorium is that it prevents forest concessions from being granted, rather than extinguishing those which already exist. This has led to situations in which forests which were thought to be protected contain concessions which were granted prior to the moratorium (Evans, 2012).

In a study conducted by Veierland, it was found that community organizations have little room for participating in the development of REDD+ in Indonesia (Veierland, 2011). This finding contrasts against the stated constraints of both the UN-REDD programme in Indonesia and the Norway-Indonesia Letter of Intent, which provide statements which promote the use of inclusive processes.
4.1.2 Bolivia

54.2% of Bolivia is covered in forests, with 50% of that amount being primary forest cover. The country also ranks as the twelfth most biodiverse (Butler, 2006). Bolivia has been a space for experimentation with PES regimes in the past, including a debt for nature swap orchestrated by Conservation International. Perhaps the most notable of these is the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project, discussed at the outset of this thesis. This project, established in 1996, is an early example PES style conservation practices and is often used as a case study for REDD+ projects (Boyd, 2010). In this case, the aspects of the project which encouraged local participation focused primarily on activities which prioritized “masculine” labour (Boyd, 2010). As the technical capacity building aspects of the project drew from this pool of male participants, women were not adequately represented in the project development. Whether this alienation was a consequence of a self-selection process or by passive bias in hiring is unclear in the available literature. However, as Boyd discusses in her research on this issue, retention was poor even where inclusivity efforts secured the participation of women – as one study informant indicated: “we got fed up with the meetings, and you know what men are like – we didn’t enjoy it” (Boyd, 2010). REDD+ carries this risk both with and without greater community elements as a part of its core policy architecture.

The Noel Kempff project itself was successful within certain parameters. For instance, unlike the moratorium found in the Indonesian case study designed to prevent future concessions from being granted, this project bought out forest concessionaires in order to expand an existing national park. The project is expected to, over the course of 30 years, preserve up to 3.5 million tonnes of carbon in the national park. This has been reduced from the initial estimation of 14 million tonnes of carbon (Boyd, May, Chang, & Veiga, 2007). An additional benefit has been the
enhanced legal recognition of traditional forest uses for three communities in a buffer-zone created by the park, and reduced deforestation pressures in the area by providing alternative livelihood sources through sustainable forest management (Asquith, Vargas Rios, & Smith, 2003; Boyd et al., 2007).

A notable aspect of REDD+ in Bolivia is the stance taken by the country’s leadership. Evo Morales has made numerous statements against PES regimes such as REDD+ on the grounds that they encourage market environmentalism. Additionally, Morales was a central figure in the creation of the Peoples’ Agreement mentioned previously. The following excerpts were taken from the Spanish to English translation of a statement made by Morales shortly after the drafting of the Cochabamba Accord:

“Their proposal is to consider only one of the functions of forests, which is its ability to absorb carbon dioxide, and issue “certificates”, “credits” or Carbon rights” to be commercialized in a carbon market. This way, companies of the North have the choice of reducing their emissions or buy “REDD certificates” in the South according to their economic convenience. For example, if a company has to invest USD40 or USD50 to reduce the emission of one ton of CO2 in a “developed country”, they would prefer to buy a “REDD certificate” for USD10 or USD20 in a “developing country”, so they can they (sic) say they have fulfilled to reduce the emissions of the mentioned ton of CO2.”

“While we assert that capitalism is the cause of global warming and the destruction of forests, rainforests and Mother Earth, they seek to expand capitalism to the commoditization of nature with the word ‘green economy’” (Lang, 2010).

In the case of Bolivia, the community-driven approach towards deforestation avoidance appears to be the only one which would be acceptable to the current administration. Statements such as the ones highlighted above are indicative of the populist environmental discourse, and it is notable that such a perspective is being offered by the government of Bolivia. Under the Bolivian Constitution, presidents are only permitted to hold the office for two uninterrupted terms of up to five years. Despite the potential that a new administration may have in improving
the favourability of REDD+ in the country, the timing of negotiations for a post-2012 climate agreement is well within Morales’ second term. A community-driven approach as a core element of REDD+ would likely assuage some of these executive concerns, as it conveys a rights-based approach. However, the rejection of “green economy” measures remains a hurdle. See the following quote from the same statement highlighted previously:

“All forests and rainforests protection mechanisms should guarantee indigenous rights and participation, but not because indigenous participation is achieved in REDD, we can accept that a price for forests and rainforests is set and negotiated in a global carbon market” (Lang, 2010).

This direct translation conveys the message that any global program for deforestation avoidance, and perhaps environmental conservation interventions in general, must proactively respond to the land-based rights of Indigenous peoples. The second half tempers this statement in stating that these guarantees, should they be met, are not sufficient compromises towards developing a market-based system for carbon credits. Efforts towards developing a REDD+ regime in Bolivia have essentially been stalled since September 2010, although both the FCPF and UN-REDD list it as a “partner country”. In an October 2012 press release, the policy board of UN-REDD states that it has “decided to support the implementation of selected activities within Bolivia’s UN-REDD National Programme, in line with the government’s priorities and in accordance with the governments priorities with the UN-REDD Programme’s guidelines” (UN-REDD, 2012). It is upon this point that Bolivia may have some involvement in the REDD+ process at any point in the near future.

Bolivia has remained an active party in developing alternative policy options for REDD+ (Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). This proposal is similar to REDD+ in its purpose, as both are designed to foster environmental conservation. It does, however, utilize a mechanism
which incorporates greater community elements; “local governance” is a condition of the operationalization of this policy. Where the capacity for local governance does not exist, it would be developed as a condition of implementing this strategy. Again, this is consistent with previous Bolivian interventions, given the populist environmental discourse and forms of knowledge which have been promoted by state authorities in the past. This “alternative to REDD+” offers a great deal in terms of its local management structure (much to the benefit of local authorities and entities). Yet despite the focus on developing the populist perspective as a policy formulation, it should be noted that this plan does not challenge the technocratic understanding of deforestation and climate change. “Conventional” forms of knowledge are still prioritized, demonstrating that the issue at hand is understood as a scientific one. Although this may aid in the development of this plan, there remains the potential for it to marginalize perspectives drawn from traditional ecological knowledge.

4.1.3 Summary of Regional Approach

The methodology first developed for a global perspective on REDD+ has been applied to contexts which are more regionally specific. This has shown that the research approach is scalable. The “global” political ecology approach is maintained as a consequence of the de facto globalized nature of REDD+ itself; it allows for an analysis of the flow of asymmetrical power relationships. This further demonstrates that all forests are essentially part of a global system, which are demarked by jurisdictional boundaries and differentiated by (sometimes conflicting) cultural norms and idiosyncrasies in resource management practise. It also demonstrates a need for greater focus on region specific study when analysing the political realities in which REDD+ projects exist.
For example, the inclusion of Indonesia and Bolivia provide some clues into the administrative conditions and institutions which may enable the successful installation (as a separate criterion from successful project outcomes) of REDD+ projects. Although these are only two examples, they demonstrate the importance of governmental priorities and how REDD+ responds to these. In Bolivia, progress on developing REDD+ projects and local institutions to support them has been stalled largely as a result of the discursive implications of market environmentalism which the policy architecture represents. This has been incompatible with the current political climate of Bolivia, which has been a leader in promoting the narratives of community-led environmentalism. The effective application of REDD+ in Indonesia is also unclear, despite the apparent greater enthusiasm of the Indonesian government. Again, these national authorities are engaging with REDD+ in ways which accommodate their national interests. For Bolivia this has meant the maintenance of a “people’s” movement. A country which has enshrined the rights of Mother Nature is unlikely to participate in a regime which consolidates those rights as a saleable product (i.e. Carbon credits). For Indonesia, the implication is expansion of conservation initiatives which allow for some continuance of natural resource development. Striking a balance in how much development is allowed within the REDD+ regime may be the key for legitimization of REDD+ projects in Indonesia. However, the prime importance of Indonesia’s forests makes it unlikely that such allowances will be met without criticism.

Attempts have been made in both instances to encourage deforestation avoidance projects which are community-oriented or community-driven. In the case of Bolivia this has been largely in a pre-REDD+ policy environment, while in Indonesia REDD+ projects have begun to be developed with community engagement as a major theme. The existence of these projects can be
credited to the trend within forest management practices towards devolution and decentralization, based upon evidence that local authority may improve social and ecological variables of the forest resources.

However, as in the earlier example of PES regimes in Bolivia, even these community-centric projects have the potential to mask existing power dynamics within those communities. In order for a community-centric REDD+ project to be effective, it must acknowledge these dynamics in a proactive fashion. Otherwise marginal groups may not benefit from the project, or worse, existing inequality may be exacerbated. Where male and female “roles” are considered, it would be appropriate to develop such projects in ways which encourages local participation in consideration of these traditional dynamics (Boyd, 2010). Such an approach would challenge the assumed discourse of global governance as a system which encourages patriarchy (Bretherton, 2003).

This analysis presents a cursory examination of the domestic implications of global political processes. In doing so, it has demonstrated some willingness within the global governance group to work with the needs of particular countries and/or regional authorities. The limitation with this approach in its brief application here is that it cannot be relied upon to develop an international cross section without greatly expanding the number of research sites. Although it provides some interesting contexts of regions themselves, these cannot be reliably universalized. Indeed, the two cases presented differ from one another greatly enough that one cannot be used as a rule to predict the conditions of the other. Doing so was not the purpose of this endeavour, however, and much was gained in terms of understanding how the political ecology approach can be useful across scales. Therefore, such an approach may be useful for a larger scaled research study where greater depth is allowed.
4.2 Bridging CFM and REDD+

Of the problems associated with the greater implementation of CFM within REDD+ regimes, regional contextuality is perhaps the greatest. This problem stems simply from the fact that CFM regimes are typically designed first as local initiatives, whereas REDD+ is being designed as a global implement which must then be interpreted by authorities in individual countries where projects may take place. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the globally designed policies for REDD+ leave much of the social and environmental considerations up to the discretion of participant countries. The financial mechanisms of the policy structure, however, are being designed for universal application.

The previous chapter also demonstrates that among the major concerns held by social and environmental justice organizations is the potential that REDD+ would alienate forest dependent communities and indigenous groups. This fear has been informed by historical evidence, as past exclusionary conservation initiatives have resulted in the removal of peoples from their traditional lands. These groups, especially those which defend the rights of indigenous peoples, present strong arguments (both historical/traditional and practical) in favour of participatory conservation as an alternative to exclusionary conservation practises. Skutsch offers a partial solution to this concern through the use of community forest monitoring (Skutsch, 2011). This approach presents a means by which technical capacity can be fostered within communities as an effort to engage them in deforestation avoidance. This may be an important aspect of bridging the divide between CFM and REDD+, as the implementation of both conservation strategies present communities with new rules for forest resource use – a factor which has been closely linked to the failure of CFM systems (Pagdee et al., 2006). CFM, and the diffusion of power within forest management regimes, offers many features which could make REDD+ more
amenable to forest-dependent communities. The enfranchisement of stakeholder groups may be a necessary feature of REDD+ as part of a greater integration with CFM style mechanisms. Given that REDD+ will limit the activities which these communities are able to take part in, the diffusion of power and decision making abilities among them may make for a more amenable policy outcome.

The threat of recentralization of forest management cannot be overstated here. The fear is that the features of REDD+ which may be necessary for it to be an effective deforestation avoidance regime are counterproductive to the CFM strategy. This fear is articulated both by critical academics and social justice organizations which have seen the effectiveness of CFM under the conditions of decentralization (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010; Tenure Trends, 2010). In order to combat “leakage” of carbon emissions a national-level approach for establishing an emissions inventory is typically the prescribed remedy. This runs counter to the logic promoted through the recent trend of forest management strategies which have promoted either decentralization or devolution of forest management. Locating decision-making power within communities (either representing local agency or through regional branches of a governmental authority) may increase the perception of legitimate authority as well as the responsiveness of forest managers to local realities and concerns.

The problematic and plural definitions for “forest” is a concern for a community centric REDD+. Presently this concern is found primarily coming from organizations which are more aligned with the populist side of the spectrum, or by those organizations which present a “voice of the voiceless” within the international dialogue. Some may argue that the organizations which represent the institutionalist perspective on REDD+ are more inclined to use the current FAO definition. However, certain arms of the United Nations system express sympathy to the
contested nature of defining forests. The Convention on Biological Diversity is an example of this (CBD, n.d.). This definitional issue was not intended to be the primary analytical focus for this thesis; however, it is a critical political aspect of creating the deforestation avoidance regime. It also identifies the human-environment interactions which would be rewarded under a PES mechanism. Should monoculture plantations and biodiversity rich forests be considered as equally eligible for carbon credits under REDD+, it does raise questions of exactly how the deforestation avoidance regime prioritizes “alternative benefits” (Bekessy & Wintle, 2008; Sasaki & Putz, 2009). Social and environmental certification for forest carbon may provide an answer to this problem, in the sense that differentiation would produce a tiered carbon market.

The concept of greater integration of CFM and REDD+ is a novel idea that has recently caught the attention of the academic community. Many authors are now looking at how enhanced community involvement in the planning and design of local REDD+ initiatives may impact the overall success of these projects (Blom, Sunderland, & Murdiyarso, 2010; Palmer Fry, 2011; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012; Tomaselli & Hajjar, 2011). The role of the community in forest management has been rising through a trend of decentralization or devolution in forest governance 22. This has come with some proven successes; in fact, many of the benefits that are said to result from REDD+ have already been secured through community management (Singh, 2008). CFM can have the effect of providing further legitimization of land claims by communities through arrangements made between the community and relevant state authorities.

There is, however, a distinct level of incongruity between REDD+ and CFM. REDD+ is being designed as an international policy framework. One of the major challenges in the

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22 The difference between "decentralization" and "devolution" in forest management reflects the degree to which the community is given power to govern.
discussion surrounding this deforestation avoidance regime is the concept of "leakage". The leakage of greenhouse gas emissions occurs in carbon forestry projects when the systemic pressures which encourage deforestation and degradation are not addressed within a broader regional context. As a result, any effort to eliminate or reduce these emissions at the local level may result in their displacement to other locales. When leakage does occur it delegitimizes any carbon reductions which have resulted on the site, regardless of whether or not the project has made strides in enhancing local ecological or social co-benefits.

REDD+ is a performance-based mechanism where the primary indicator of success is the amount of carbon which has been prevented from being emitted. The concept of ecological blackmail was briefly discussed at an earlier point of this thesis (Wunder, 2007). PES regimes tend to focus on the realized and potential threats of ecosystem degradation rather than rewarding long-time conservation efforts. Eligibility to participate is also heavily dependent upon the ability of the land user to convert their management strategies towards sustainable practices. These factors bias the assemblage of REDD+ participants towards large-scale forest concessionaires and other groups which have vested interests in the unsustainable use of forests. With the strictly local implementation of REDD+ there is no incentive to not simply move on to the next forest and continue the status quo of their extraction elsewhere outside of the project area. State-level implementation and facilitation of REDD+ is needed then in order to prevent these perverse incentives and leakage of emissions from occurring. This is not as serious where only forest-dependent communities are concerned, as these groups may have less ability and incentive to move to more exploitable landscapes. However, for REDD+ to be effective it will need to engage these large scale actors and define rules which are applicable to the accumulated total of forest users.
One feature of REDD+ which has material consequences for how projects can be developed and communicated is the notion of reduced, rather than eliminated, emissions. This aspect of deforestation avoidance could allow for greater local acceptability, and therefore longer lasting policy intervention. Many of the actors engaged in REDD+ from a conservation-oriented standpoint have previously been engaged in, or have been associated with, exclusionary practices (Li, 2007). This represents a potential roadblock for CFM integration. The perception that conservationists are engaged in exclusionary practices, or threat that this may become the case, may jeopardize the process.

4.3 Persistent Difficulties

Although the compromises highlighted above may resolve some of the tension surrounding the implementation of a REDD+ policy architecture (particularly that which is associated with the rights of forest-dependent people) a number of difficulties would remain. Some of the most pressing can be found in the narrative interpretations of “nature”, “forests”, and the role of people in conservation. For instance, the positions taken by the critical indigenous organizations are intractable where market environmentalism is concerned. This is an aspect of the REDD+ debate which may have no solutions or compromise, as the “capitalist-conservationist” leaders cannot speak with the same terms and “meanings”. This may, and perhaps should, become an important point upon which a dialogue can be built – the acknowledgement and appreciation for diversity. Despite the fact that the Indigenous organizations highlighted in this thesis are not democratic in the traditional sense, they are representative of powerful ideas and their place within the debate should reflect this stature.

Furthermore, the final design of REDD+ (or however it may be called in its final formulation) will determine the extent to which communities are able to engage in it. One matter
of specific concern is the approach to crediting that REDD+ takes. The two primary options which are under debate are a national approach and a nested approach – both dependent upon state authority to reduce emissions leakage at the national level. The nested approach, which should allow for greater benefits to filter towards the local level, can only be readily implemented in locales which have clearly defined property and land-use rights (Hayes & Persha, 2010; Palmer, 2011). This is an area in which REDD+ policymakers must carefully acknowledge, as there is a distinct unevenness of tenure regimes and strategies between countries. A number of preconditions may exist in order for the attainment of localized benefits to be realized in a more rigorous fashion across regional contexts. These include the reasonable expectation that rational “unproductive” uses of the landscape are warranted under a regime which protects their title to the land. Participation is necessitated where the management of peopled spaces is concerned; forced removal is not an option, Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is the only way forward (McCarthy, Gillespie, & Zen, 2012).

A major concern articulated by opponents of REDD+ is the participation of so-called “environmental villains”, which in this case are identified as corporations and the agents working on their behalf. A problematic observation has been made through this discussion: that many of the participants in the REDD+ preparatory regime are the same as those participating in the status quo of environmental degradation. For those who foster this criticism, many of the groups and organizations which are providing the initial financing for REDD+ are incompatible with the stated goals and objectives of deforestation avoidance. Those critical of REDD+ understand deforestation avoidance, but do not see it as a challenge to the neoliberal logic of resource encapsulation and consumption, may understand it as a “rebranding” of these forces. As McGregor articulates: “this is the power of REDD – it does not oppose neo-liberal forces, as did
previous environmental campaigners, but instead seduces them to oppose extractive markets in favour of more environmentally and socially benign ones” (Mcgregor, 2010, p. 29).

The timing of implementation has to be a major consideration. If we are to assume that certain aspects which contribute to successful CFM systems need to be replicated in order for CFM to function alongside or within REDD+ architecture, this raises concerns for regional capacity. A CFM centric model for REDD+ would increase participation costs for countries which do not have adequate policy infrastructure to enact CFM style programs. Land tenure arrangements are notable in regards to regional differences; Figure 4.1 demonstrates the entrenchment of tenure strategies found in Latin America, Asia and the Pacific, and Africa. Community-centric REDD+ may be a challenging intervention, particularly where the state is the only relevant title-holder.

**Figure 4.1: Tenure distribution in Latin America, Asian and Pacific Countries, and Africa.** (Westholm, Biddulph, Hellmark, & Ekbom, 2011).

![Figure 4.1: Tenure distribution in Latin America, Asian and Pacific Countries, and Africa.](image)

- **Latin America**
  - 32%: Public: Administered by government
  - 36%: Public: Designated for use by communities & indigenous peoples
  - 25%: Owned by communities & indigenous peoples
  - 7%: Owned by individuals and firms

- **Asia & Pacific**
  - 4%: Public: Administered by government
  - 25%: Public: Designated for use by communities & indigenous peoples
  - 3%: Owned by communities & indigenous peoples
  - 68%: Owned by individuals and firms

- **Africa**
  - 97.9%: Public: Administered by government
Additionally, although the shift towards greater community agency and autonomy in the management of local natural resources is promoted across the academic literature as a means by which conservation goals can be attained, there are still risks associated with it. For instance, despite the ideal model of conservation groups working towards their own obsolescence through the institutionalization of local forest-monitoring systems, the need for external support may never be fully eliminated (Hayes & Persha, 2010). Given that “in the context of limited budgets, growing external resource use pressures, and unsupportive, and at times corrupt, national forest agencies, local residents can struggle to maintain their management systems and the autonomy they have already been granted” (Hayes & Persha, 2010, p. 546). The present need for such training, the reshaping of environmental knowledge towards technocentrism, and potential need for continued oversight may expose such a project design to criticisms of eco-colonialism.

### 4.4 Conclusion

There is substantial ground for conceiving of a REDD+ regime which has been enhanced by the concepts found in CFM management strategies. Projects on the ground are already demonstrating the potential for communities to become integral components of the management and design of deforestation avoidance projects. This does not, however, mean that the pursuit of such a modified regime would be without challenges. In some respects, the two strategies appear to be diametrically opposed. Indeed, the discursive investigation of the previous chapter demonstrates that REDD+ is far more aligned with the managerialist perspective while CFM is aligned with the populist. Movement towards aspects of REDD+ which better reflect the needs of forest-dependent communities is tied to the debates between these dominant ways of understanding global environmental problems. Reconciliation of these two points may require
the invention of new means by which the environmental and social issues associated with deforestation are understood.

The approach taken here highlights some crucial power dynamics at play. For instance, many organizations are responding to REDD+ with the understanding that the regime is inevitable – that neoliberal conservation is simply an unavoidable trend. Groups which research land-use issues from a people-centric perspective follow this rationality, as can be found in the work of the Rights and Resources Initiative as well as the Forest Peoples Programme. Although these organizations are responding to REDD+ in ways which proactively engage in building regional capacity for asserting land-based rights, the assumption of inevitability demonstrates the asymmetry within the global discussion on how to address climate change. Much of the resistance to neoliberal conservation may well be an extension of broader resistance patterns which respond to this asymmetrical power dynamic (Büscher et al., 2012). Furthermore, within this discussion framework, deforestation avoidance regimes are seen as a global necessity, whereas carbon reductions in developed countries are a matter of domestic discretion. It may be the case that the concepts of deforestation avoidance (whether it takes shape as a market-tied system, bilateral contracts, or a global fund system) and community forest management may have more potential for mutualism than the organizations which promote these strategies. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, elements which promote the rights and livelihoods of forest dependent communities will enhance REDD+ design. Doing so will reduce the likelihood of project rejection and will increase the tendency of community groups to become engaged in conservation efforts, potentially integrating them within their livelihood strategies. The precise mechanism through which these community-enhancements can be delivered will need further investigation, given that it will likely necessitate the modification of tenure strategies where
community-enhanced REDD+ projects are undertaken. Despite this potential drawback, REDD+ may provide the financial incentives necessary to encourage governments to enhance tenure rights for community groups in order to participate in REDD+.
5.0 Overall Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis has not been to argue for or against the REDD+ mechanism itself; neither should it be seen as taking a stance on the issue of green democracy as a counterpoint to the green economy. It adopts the viewpoint, common among academics researching this issue, that the likelihood of some form of deforestation avoidance policy ought to be a major element in negotiating the global climate change regime of the future. While this may not be REDD+ as we understand it today, we must understand how we might develop deforestation avoidance programs to be both effective and equitable. The thesis contributes to this discussion by exploring the discursive impacts resulting from the climate change debate.

This thesis has made use of an analysis of applying a documentary-based discourse analysis to literature published by various organizations which are engaging with the development of REDD+ policy. Special interest has been given here to the inclusion of community dimensions, the equitable distribution of forest resources, and enfranchisement of forest dependent peoples. The purpose of this has been to better understand, using the tools which a political ecology analysis provides, the potential synergy and pitfalls for greater integration of community forest management elements within the core of REDD+ design. In doing so, this thesis prepared an assessment of the present global dialogue surrounding REDD+ development. This was then used as a model for applying an analysis with similar goals to the case studies of Bolivia and Indonesia to explore how the political ecology approach taken in this research may be applied to varying regional or national contexts.

The lessons which have been learned through this analysis are many, although a few stand out as being particularly informative for the development of market-environmentalism
conservation strategies. First is that many global ENGOs anticipate that forest carbon initiatives are very likely to become an element of any post-2012 global climate change regime. The responses to this are less uniform in their appreciation of this perceived inevitability. For instance, while some organizations which primarily focus on ecological aspects of conservation herald the new suite of PES tactics as revolutionary, some organizations which represent forest dependent communities are more cautiously optimistic. Yet across this gradient of hope and fear for what REDD+ may become, efforts as diverse as the organizations which undertake them are being deployed to develop an equitable, efficient, and effective solution for deforestation avoidance.

Additionally, the viewpoints in this analysis can be understood as existing along a spectrum of means by which environmental concepts and challenges are understood. The expected distribution highlighted in the work of Adger et al. (2001), ranging from populist to managerialist, was confirmed to exist in the case of REDD+. This trend was consistent across scales of analysis; messages which can be understood as populist inspired may be articulated by globally oriented bodies, at least where advocacy is concerned. When reviewing the work of Adger et al. (2001) on this area, however, it is interesting to note that although the populist discourses of deforestation and climate change are both present in discussions on REDD+, the managerialist argument can be less evenly applied between the two. The managerialist discourse on climate change, as identified by Adger et al. (2001), is much more consistent with the messages promoted by global governance organizations on the development of a deforestation avoidance regime. Although these authors develop the discursive constructs as a means of simplification, designed to facilitate a discussion on global political ecology, it is still useful in understanding the divisiveness of this issue. For instance, should the global governance
institutions see deforestation avoidance primarily as an issue of climate change prevention it would complicate the dialogue between these organizations and those which represent forest dependent peoples. It may simply be that the managerialist discourse of deforestation has evolved in the decade since Adger et al. produced this framework (2001). UNDRIP has been finalized and FPIC became a critical element of how the United Nations system (along with other global governance organizations which have adopted FPIC principles) approaches issues that have potential to impact Indigenous peoples (Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011).

A plethora of organizations have community rights, land use and access, and forest conservation issues within their purview; this makes it impossible to provide a detailed analysis for every organization, or to explore the implications of this global dialogue within the space allotted by this thesis. The purpose has been to assess a selection of key figures within the debate as representative of divergent discursive positions, which promote contrasting formulations of environmental knowledge and problem solving mechanics. The goal of such an approach is not only to design a research approach which applies to the matter at hand, but also demonstrates how it may be used with different actors, sets of questions, and thematic issues concerning the environment. Despite the limitations of scope present here, every effort was taken to ensure that the dominant narratives of the REDD+ were represented, analyzed, and informed the discussion on how elements of CFM may have a synergistic relationship with deforestation avoidance. It should be noted, however, that this methodological approach will need to be expanded in scope, and include a wider array of agents, discourses, and environmental knowledge to develop a finer understanding of the potential that community-centric REDD+ may have.

A major limitation of this approach can be found in the regional definition and local relevancy of CFM institutions. While the governance of carbon can be rationalized through, and
managed by, market-informed globalist institutionalism, the communitarian institutionalism that
CFM would necessitate in order to effectively be implemented within REDD+ architecture is
more anarchic in nature. This is to say that, although REDD+ may be able to establish
community-based elements as an ideal, the distillation of this idea may not always reflect the
initial intent. Powerful regional groups may reject REDD+ simply based on the lineage of
climate change regimes, or out of resentment for the pedigree of actors involved. Negative
experiences with environmental initiatives may embolden distrust. Furthermore, depending on
the means by which REDD+ projects are planned and deployed on the ground, the CFM
approach may mask regional or local power dynamics. In such situations, detailed analyses of the
potential for elite capture of benefits must be sought and continually monitored. A focus on
"communities" at a ground level cannot be one which essentializes them as homogenous units;
doing so risks both intellectual dishonesty and jeopardizes project outcomes based upon false
assumptions.

Perhaps the most notable threat is that a synergistic relationship between CFM and
REDD+ can be described as a "second best policy option", a problem often associated with
policy development. This problem can be found when knowledge of a problem exists, yet the
"ideal" solution promoted by the epistemic community is perceived as being too radical of a shift
from the status quo. What they call for may be two steps forward, yet a single step is still
favourable when compared with regressive movement. The threat here is that, although all
concerns may not have been addressed by the particular implementation of community-centric
interventions within REDD+, CFM may serve to assuage the concerns of communities, and
encourage the willingness to accept partial victories. It presents the issue as one which has a
“middle ground”, despite some aspects being more binary in nature. Morales’ is particularly
concerned with this aspect of REDD+ (De Angelis, 2011; Turner, 2010). This is not an issue
which can be settled here, and it is one which will require constant re-examination by the
academic community, as regional circumstances change, in order for the regime to be both
effective and equitable over time.

However, it should be recognized that even “community” forest management can be
ignorant to the dynamics of local and regional power structures, the most pressing being “who”
is given a voice. For all that may be highlighted with regards to empowering communities, the
approach of seeing the community level as the unit of debate is less useful than one which
differentiates the roles of those belonging to such groups. The case of the Noel Kempff Climate
Action Project in Bolivia is particularly relevant here, given the inability of the project to
successfully engage local women, a problem noted by Boyd (2010).

Those researching the local implications of forest carbon projects would do well to note
the ideological divide which exists within “the Indigenous perspective” and not categorically
essentialize the complex notion of indigeneity as homogenous. This statement applies both
across regional contexts and within them, to the point that it is ineffectual to isolate the rules,
norms, and power dynamics of individual cultural groups as static and universally applicable.
We see this particularly with the characterization of Indigenous peoples as noble stewards of the
environment. Such an essentialism may represent a form of environmental racism (Baldwin,
2009), and does not adequately represent the complexity to be found in the discourses of forest
dependent peoples.

Additionally, the provision of carbon credits cannot be seen as a “silver bullet” to
eliminate the potential threats associated with predicted climate change. A major criticism which
stems from the anti-REDD+ discourse is the notion that carbon credits are a sort of “free pass”, one which polluting parties are able to purchase to alleviate what may be characterized as “emission guilt”. In short, markets for carbon credits are likely to be a major component of the post 2012 global climate change regime; however, this regime will not be effective if carbon credits are the only effort taken towards developing low carbon economies. The onus is on domestic policy makers to develop nationally relevant low-carbon programs which reduce the demand for carbon credits.

REDD+ may well prove to be an effective measure for reducing the carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Through the dialogue which is unfolding over REDD+, contrasting discourses regarding environmental knowledge can be demonstrated. This thesis has explored the means by which the discourses of global managerialism and local/regional populism enter this debate, and are represented by organizations which are influential to the deforestation avoidance policy design process. The development of an effective, equitable, and durable policy intervention through REDD+ may necessitate the navigation of this discursive divide. To this end, the enhancement of community-centric elements in the core design of REDD+ may well improve this regime. The trend toward decentralization in forest management has proven to be effective in achieving many of the social and ecological parameters included as stated objectives for REDD+. Some would argue that REDD+ threatens to reverse this trend (Toni, 2011), as the prevention of emissions leakage via the displacement of deforestation pressures necessitates some amount of centralized control. This is highly relevant to REDD+, as discourses are pervasive and inform the environmental understandings of key policy-makers. The implementation of greater community-centric attributes as core elements of REDD+ is not without potential drawbacks, as outlined in this thesis. However, it may provide
for the only clear path to a deforestation avoidance regime which reflects the needs of the global
environment and those of forest-dependent communities. Climate change presents a large and
urgent challenge. The solution to climate change should not serve to replicate the environmental
injustice which is reflected in, and has contributed to, the present predicament.
Bibliography


## Appendix A

**Members and Observers of the Fourth FCPF Participants Committee (2011-2012)**

### Fourth FCPF Participants Committee (2011-2012)

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<thead>
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<th>REDD Country Participants</th>
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### Observers

- Forest-Dependent Indigenous Peoples and Other Forest Dwellers
- International Organizations
- Non-governmental Organizations
- Private Sector
- UNFCCC Secretariat
- UN-REDD Programme

### Delivery Partners

- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- Inter-American Development Bank
- United Nations Development Programme

### Bureau of the Fourth FCPF Participants Committee (2011-2012)

- Australia
- Canada
- Central African Republic
- Colombia
- Ethiopia
- Germany
- Guatemala
- Vietnam