Selective Solidarity
The politics of immigrants’ social rights in Western welfare states

By

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Recent research has cast doubt on the suggestion that immigration weakens the societal foundation of a redistributive welfare state: there is little evidence of a negative relationship between immigration-induced diversity and public support for social programs. This research has largely overlooked, however, that unease about immigration is likely to have a more selective effect on solidarity. In some countries, the public has become less willing to share benefits with newcomers, and policy-makers have acted upon that sentiment, implementing limits and restrictions on immigrants’ welfare access. By combining quantitative data analysis of fourteen countries and a qualitative comparison of the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden, this research explores when and how such expressions of selective solidarity are most likely to occur. The main findings are threefold.

First, there is no evidence that actual patterns of immigrant welfare dependence are an important driver of selective solidarity or immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Second, more important is how those patterns are politically translated. In the Netherlands, high levels of immigrant welfare dependence are commonly described as a sign that immigrants are lazy welfare cheats. In Canada and Sweden, the discourse is less accusatory and divisive, and attempts at welfare exclusion are consequently rarer. Country characteristics, in particular the political strength of anti-immigrant parties, the nature of national identity, and the structure of the welfare state, explain why the political translation differs between countries. Third, the primary constraint on immigrant-excluding welfare reforms tends not to be public opposition but legal prohibitions on differential treatment embedded in national legislation and international treaties. Sometimes politicians are forced to amend or withdraw from existing
legislation before they can pass exclusionary reforms; in other cases the reforms are simply not possible.

In sum, in some welfare states access to benefits has changed from an individual social right to a privilege for those lucky enough to be born in the country or to have lived long enough on its territory and acquired the necessary documentation. But this development is not unavoidable. Where forces of cohesion are stronger than forces of division, welfare states will likely address immigrant welfare dependence by more sanguine means than disentitlement.
This thesis has benefited tremendously from the advice, help, and support from a large number of individuals and institutions. As much as it might sound as an empty cliché, I sincerely mean that I could not have produced this work without them.

First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor, Keith Banting. It was my interest in his work that made me decide to leave my native Netherlands and pursue graduate studies in Canada. This was quite a leap of faith, but it turned out to have been a great decision. Keith has been a fantastic mentor and role-model. His guidance extended far beyond what any graduate student can reasonably expect: not only has his feedback on my thesis consistently been constructive and challenging, he has also gone out of his way to assist me in advancing my publication record and expanding my professional network. It has been a true pleasure and privilege working with him.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIO  Aanvullende Inkomensvoorziening Ouderen (Supplemental Income Provision Elderly, NET)
AIP  Anti-immigrant party
AOW  Algemene OuderdomsWet (tax-paid pension benefit, NET)
AUT  Austria
AWBZ  Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (exceptional health costs benefit, NET)
BEL  Belgium
BEU  Beperking Export Uitkeringen (Limitation of the Export of Benefits Act, NET)
BQ   Bloc Québécois
BUB  Besluit Uitbreiding en Beperking (Decision Expansion and Reduction Insurance Sphere
     Public Insurance Programs, NET)
C   Centerpartiet (Center party, SWE)
CA   Canadian Alliance
CAN  Canada
CBS  Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Bureau for Statistics, NET)
CCNS  Cultural Changes in the Netherlands Survey
CD/CP  Centrum Democraten/Centrumpartij (Center Democrats/Center Party, NET)
CDA  Christen Democratisch Æppel (Christian Democratic Appeal, NET)
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CES  Canadian Election Studies
CHST  Canada Health and Social Transfer
CIC  (Department of) Citizenship and Immigration Canada
CPB  Centraal Planbureau (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
CPC  Conservative Party of Canada
CPP  Canada Pension Plan
CSS  (Department of) Community and Social Services (Ontario)
CU   ChristenUnie (Christian Union, NET)
D66  Democraten '66 (Democrats '66, NET)
DEN  Denmark
DPES  Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies
EBO  Eget boende (own housing for asylum seekers, SWE)
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EI</td>
<td>Employment Insurance (CAN)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIN</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Folkpartiet (Liberal People’s Party, SWE)</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>GER</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Guaranteed Income Supplement (CAN)</td>
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<td>GL</td>
<td>GroenLinks (Green Left, NET)</td>
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<td>HRSDC</td>
<td>(Department of) Human Resources and Skills Development Canada</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>IFHP</td>
<td>Interim Federal Health Program (CAN)</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalization Service, NET)</td>
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<td>IOI</td>
<td>Immigrant Overrepresentation Index</td>
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<td>IRE</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>IWI</td>
<td>Inspectie Werk en Inkomen (Labour and Income Inspection, NET)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSP</td>
<td>International Social Survey Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>KD</td>
<td>Kristdemokraterna (Christian democrats, SWE)</td>
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<td>LIS</td>
<td>Luxembourg Income Study</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn, NET)</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderate Rally party, SWE)</td>
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<td>MLM</td>
<td>Multilevel regression model</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Miljöpartiet (Environment party, SWE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPP</td>
<td>Member of Provincial Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Ny Demokrati (New Democracy, SWE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party (CAN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVU</td>
<td>Nationale VolksUnie (National Popular Union, NET)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Old Age Security (CAN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLP</td>
<td>Ontario Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Ontario Progressive Conservatives</td>
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PCP Progressive Conservative Party (CAN)
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party, NET)
PvdD Partij voor de Dieren (Party for the Animals, NET)
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party, NET)
RMO Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (Dutch Council for Social Development)
RPC Reform Party of Canada
S Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (Social Democratic Workers’ Party, SWE)
SA Social Assistance (CAN)
SCB Statistiska Centralbyran (Statistics Sweden)
SCF Survey of Consumer Finances
SD Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)
SER Sociaal-Economische Raad (Socioeconomic Council, NET)
SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Political Reformed Party, NET)
SLID Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
SNES Swedish National Election Studies
SOM Society, Opinion, and Media Survey (SWE)
SOPEMI Système d’observation permanente des migrations
SOU Statens Offentlige Utredningar (Public investigations, SWE)
SP Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party, NET)
SVB Sociale Verzekeringenbank (agency administrating popular insurance programs, NET)
SWE Sweden
SWI Switzerland
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UI Unemployment Insurance (CAN)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
UWV Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (agency administrating employee insurance programs, NET)
V Vänsterpartiet (Left Party, SWE)
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, NET)
Wajong Wet Werk en Arbeidsondersteuning Jonggehandicapten (youth disability benefit, NET)
WAO Wet Arbeidsongeschiktheid (disability benefit, NET)
WRR Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council for Government Policy, NET)
WVS World Values Survey
Until the early 1990s, welfare states appeared to become more and more accessible to immigrants. Social rights were increasingly detached from citizenship, and passports became less relevant for access to health care, education, or a social benefit. This led to optimistic predictions among social scientists (Hammar, 1990; Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 1996). In probably the best-known study in this tradition, Yasemin Soysal enthusiastically proclaimed: “A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organizing and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging” (Soysal, 1994, p. 1).

The unfortunate irony is that at the very moment that these studies were being published, the first signs were becoming visible of a development in exactly the opposite direction. In some countries, the social rights of immigrants have become a topic of political contestation, and politicians have pushed for reforms to make the welfare state less inclusive of its immigrant population. In 1994, for example, the state of California held a referendum on ‘Proposition 187’. The bill proposed to deny undocumented immigrants any access to health care and education and was supported by an overwhelming 59 percent of the voting public. The federal court later overturned the initiative, but only two years later, an encompassing welfare reform formalized dramatic cuts in immigrant eligibility. Since the mid-1990s similar policy changes have taken place on the other side of the Atlantic. The welfare systems of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom are now all less inclusive of immigrants than they were twenty years ago.
These changes are of clear social relevance. On the one hand, we see that global migration continues to increase and the number of people who do not live in their country of birth is growing (United Nations, 2011). On the other, we see that in some countries this growing subset of the population is becoming less protected by the institutions designed to guarantee a minimum standard of living and to reduce the inequalities that pure market capitalism would produce. In short, the combination of increasing migration and increasing immigrant exclusion raises serious concerns about the future of equality in Western welfare states.

Strangely enough, however, these policy reforms have been the focus of attention of only a handful of recent scholarly contributions (Banting, 2000; Boucher & Carney, 2009; Sainsbury, 2012). In part, this reflects that social scientists have only recently turned their attention to the relationship between immigration and welfare state institutions. For a long time most students of comparative social policy did not spend much time discussing international migration. Even lengthy books specifically reflecting on the future of the welfare state (Clark & Lipset, 2001; Pierson, 2001a; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Castles, 2004) or the likely impact of globalization on social policies (Cavanna, 1998; Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000; Swank, 2002; Tsukada, 2002; Giddens, Diamond, & Liddle, 2006) largely ignored immigration as a factor of relevance. Similarly, only very recently have scholars of immigration started to focus on the connection between their main subject and welfare state politics. Immigration has been a subject of systematic inquiry for economists, geographers, sociologists, and psychologists long before it attracted the attention of political scientists. And when it finally did, the first explorations were aimed at understanding admission and naturalization policies, anti-immigrant politics, and the political participation of immigrants, not at analyzing immigrants’ place within welfare state institutions.

Over the last 15 years or so, this scarcity of attention to the immigration-welfare nexus has come to an end, and a growing body of literature now addresses this very subject. So far, the overwhelming majority of this literature studies the effect of immigration on welfare institutions
at the most aggregate level, exploring whether immigration and immigrant-induced diversity can be expected to have a negative effect on overall support for social programs and the overall generosity of welfare state structures. As such, more subtle effects have been largely overlooked. We know, for example, that immigration is unlikely to lead people to withdraw their support for the welfare state altogether (Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2004; Crepaz, 2008; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009), but much less studied is the question whether it might increase calls for changes in eligibility requirements, or more specifically, amendments in social policies aimed at excluding immigrants. Similarly, there is now much evidence to suggest that immigration has demonstrably little effect on overall welfare state generosity (Soroka, Banting, & Johnston, 2006; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Gerdes, 2011), but the origins of the kinds of welfare reforms we started our discussion with are largely unknown.

These kinds of ‘subtle’ effects are the main topic of this research. In short, my main goal is to explore under which conditions we are most likely to see public support for the exclusion of immigrants from social benefits, and relatedly, under which conditions the exclusionary policy reforms in line with such sentiment are most likely to be implemented.

One of my key arguments is that this question cannot be understood by relying exclusively on either theories of welfare state reform or theories drawn from the comparative study of immigration. Since the social phenomena of interest are located at the interface of welfare and immigration politics, we can only develop a satisfactory account by combining insights from both areas of political science and applying them to this specific type of change. Doing this has resulted in three main insights about the nature of the politics of immigrants’ social rights.

First, the economics of immigrant integration are of little use in understanding where and when the sentiment that immigrants should be pushed off benefits is most likely to gain currency. Certainly, anti-immigrant politicians often argue that these types of reforms are necessary because immigrants place such a large burden on the welfare state. If that were the main driver of these changes, however, we would expect the public and the political elite to be
most in favour of benefit restrictions where and when immigrants are most overrepresented among benefit recipients. This is not the case.

This brings me to the second point. The feeling that the welfare state should first and foremost protect native-born citizens - a sentiment I will refer to as selective solidarity - does not only originate in concerns about the economic sustainability of the welfare state, but also in attitudes about the entitlements of immigrants. More important than the actual costs of immigration, then, is the way that these costs become translated into political discourse. In some countries, levels of immigrant welfare dependence are not only a prominent topic of discussion, but also tend to be exaggerated and framed as evidence that immigrants are lazy welfare cheats. In other countries, they are hardly discussed at all or invoked to draw attention to the difficulties immigrants experience on the labour market. Which of these translations becomes dominant deeply influences the level of selective solidarity. In sum, then, understanding the exclusion of immigrants from social programs and benefits requires understanding the political translation of immigrants’ welfare dependence. Political, cultural, and institutional factors are of large importance in shaping this translation. The costs of immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs are most likely to be brought up in divisive terms in countries with a sizeable and influential anti-immigrant party, an exclusionary national identity, and a non-universal welfare state structure.

The third conclusion is that the institutional dynamics of implementing social policy changes that limit or restrict immigrants’ access tend to be very different from what we know about welfare retrenchment of a more general nature. While across-the-board cutbacks in social policy are almost invariably met with large and well-mobilized public opposition, immigrant-excluding welfare reforms have more often garnered public approval than social outrage. Instead, a much more important institutional obstacle to exclusionary social policy changes is posed by legal prohibitions on differential treatment. In some cases governments advocating selective solidarity have been forced to withdraw from international treaties before they could
implement their desired restrictions. In other instances, the legal obstacles proved so formidable that policy-makers abandoned their attempts altogether.

I pursue these three main arguments as follows. The second chapter develops a theory of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, drawing from the theoretical literature on new institutionalism, social policy change, and the comparative politics of immigration. This theory consists of two main hypotheses: first, I hypothesize that the costs of immigrant welfare dependence are most likely to be translated into suggestions for welfare exclusion in countries with a sizeable anti-immigrant party, an exclusionary national identity, and a non-universal welfare regime. Second, I expect that political communities marked by widespread selective solidarity are more likely to attempt the implementation of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms than countries where selective solidarity is more muted, but that these attempts can only be successful if they are able to navigate existing legal obstacles.

The third chapter outlines my methodological design, and explains how I test my two hypotheses by a variety of inferential techniques. Chapter Four undertakes a preliminary test of the first hypothesis by conducting a quantitative analysis of the relationship between levels of immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity in fourteen Western welfare states. However, the bulk of this research consists of a more qualitative test of my theory in three case studies. Chapter Five discusses the Netherlands, which has experienced a significant surge in selective solidarity, and has introduced a wide variety of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Chapter Six analyzes the value of my theory in understanding recent policy developments in Canada, which has mostly been able to escape such divisive politics and has been marked by relative policy stability in this area. Chapter Seven moves to Sweden where, despite very high levels of immigrant welfare dependence, governments of all political stripes have over the last two decades attempted to include newcomers in the generous Swedish system of social benefits. The final chapter discusses what we can learn from a focused comparison of the three case studies, and reflects on the theoretical, political, and normative implications of the findings of this research.
While the relationship between immigration and welfare state institutions is the topic of a growing body of literature, there are still aspects of this nexus that have received little systematic attention. In particular, the majority of scholars who have analyzed this relationship have done so at its most aggregate level. The conclusion that has come out of this research is that immigration has had little demonstrable effect on the nature of social policies. While there is indeed little evidence that welfare states have responded to immigration by implementing across-the-board cuts in benefit levels or social spending, this conclusion overlooks that in many countries social programs have changed through amendments that make it more difficult for immigrants to access them.\footnote{In addition, there are also examples of social policy changes that are explicitly aimed at \textit{including} immigrants who were excluded by previous arrangements (Bommes 2000) or even at offering more to immigrants than to native-born citizens. In this study, such policy changes will be treated as the opposite of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.}

It would be wrong to assume, however, that these policy changes, which I will refer to as immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, have taken place in every Western immigrant-receiving country. While some countries have attempted to restrict immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits as much as possible, we have seen few such attempts elsewhere. This chapter develops a theory aimed at understanding under which conditions immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are most likely to take place. This theory combines insights from institutionalist theory, the comparative literature on social policy change, and the literature on the comparative politics of immigration. In brief, I hypothesize that these reforms come about as the result of a two-step process. First, we need to pay attention to how the costs of immigrants’ use of welfare become
politically translated. I expect that the way immigrants’ patterns of welfare dependence are perceived by the electorate and by decision-makers is influenced more by general perceptions about the value of immigration than by a careful assessment of economic realities. Second, only when the perception has become widespread that immigrants are a drain on the system, should we expect immigrant-excluding welfare reforms to follow.

This chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly lays out how I will use the terms welfare state institutions and immigration. Section two reviews the literature on the relationship between immigration and the welfare state, after which section three introduces the concepts of selective solidarity and immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. I then move on to the core of this chapter and construct a theory of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Section four first discusses which conditions are likely to favour public and political support for immigrant welfare exclusion. Section five then addresses how and when we can expect these sentiments to lead to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. The final section summarizes my hypotheses.

2.1 Defining the welfare state and immigration

Before we explore the different ways that welfare states have responded to immigration, it is important to be clear about the two central concepts in this exploration. Most authors follow Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) and conceptualize a welfare regime as a coherent system of social policies, stratification mechanisms, and redistributive measures, of which we can find at least three varieties in the Western world (see also Pontusson, 2005, pp. 142-81). The liberal type, exemplified by Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States, is generally the least generous in its entitlements; the ‘conservative-corporatist’ or Christian democratic welfare regime (present in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and

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2 Scholars typically use the term welfare regime or architecture to describe a system of social policies, and refer to countries where such a system is in place as welfare states (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003).

3 In subsequent research, it has been argued that this classification does not fit all cases that Esping-Andersen discusses equally well, and should therefore be extended with separate categories for Australia and New Zealand on the one hand (Castles, 1993) and for Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal on the other (Ferrara, 1998). For that reason, none of these cases will be included in this project.
Switzerland) heavily involves social partners in the drafting of welfare policies and as a result offers employees strong protection against exploitation; and, finally, the social-democratic model of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, is universalist in its scope and typically offers the most extensive welfare services.

Most commonly, scholars describe welfare states by detailing the set of social policies they provide. Transfer programs generally receive most attention, for reasons that are both methodological (data is widely available) and theoretical (they are the most visible redistributive mechanisms and are most likely to elicit controversy). We should distinguish between three types of transfer benefits. The first type consists of universal programs: funded through general taxes, these benefits are available to everyone\(^4\) on the same terms. In many welfare states, the public pension benefit is an example of a universal program. Second, contributory programs are (at least partially) funded out of insurance premiums and are only available to those individuals who have contributed by paying the premiums. Unemployment insurance and sickness insurance are typical examples of contributory transfer benefits. The third and final type is that of means-tested benefits. Like universal programs, they are funded from general taxes, but they are only offered to those people who fall below a certain threshold of financial resources\(^5\). Social assistance, or ‘welfare’, is the classic example of a means-tested benefit. Of course, transfer benefits are not the only social policies that welfare states offer. Where relevant, I will also discuss two other sets of social policies: first, social services such as health services, child care, and integration and settlement programs; and second, labour market policies such as activation programs, minimum wage-setting, and tax credits for employers to reward hiring practices.

Defining immigration poses some challenges. While international migration can be defined as the act of changing one’s country of residence, there is much less uniformity in how social

\(^4\) As we will see, ‘everyone’ does not necessarily include all groups of immigrants. In particular undocumented migrants tend to be excluded from universal benefits.

\(^5\) For some benefits, eligibility is established exclusively by looking at individuals’ income (and not at their assets or savings). Technically, those benefits should be called ‘income-tested’. In the remainder of this text, I use the term means-tested loosely, and refer with it to income-tested programs as well.
scientists, let alone public commentators and politicians, understand the label ‘immigrant’. There are at least four areas of contention. First, some scholars maintain that only those people who have acquired or are in the process of applying for permanent residency qualify as immigrants (Sainsbury, 2006), while others include foreign students and seasonal workers as well (Blume, Gustafsson, Pedersen, & Verner, 2007). Second, some commentators include the (grand)children of immigrants in their analyses (Wagner, Büchel, Haisken-DeNew, & Spiess, 1998; Bengtsson, Lundh, & Scott, 2005), even though according to the strict definition of international migration formulated above the very notion of a second- or third-generation immigrant is a contradiction in terms. A third ambiguous case is formed by people who migrate back to their country of origin after an extended stay elsewhere (sometimes called remigrants). If migration is understood as changing one’s country of residence, these people should be considered immigrants – and in fact, they do show up in some statistics as incoming migrants. However, few scholars or politicians have this group of people in mind when discussing the immigrant population. Finally, in some discussions the term seems to exclusively denote the foreign-born population that has not (yet) been naturalized (Sales, 2007, p. 30; Joppke, 2010, pp. 35-6), even though citizenship status is irrelevant if we simply define migrants as people who changed their country of residence.6

Here, I will define immigrants as people who reside in a different country than their country of birth, and thus include temporary migrants and naturalized citizens but exclude remigrants and the children of immigrants. This definition facilitates data collection, because most agencies that provide relevant statistics conceptualize immigrants as foreign-born individuals as well, and a distinction between native- and foreign-born also commonly appears in cross-national surveys. Besides the methodological appeal, this definition also has analytic advantages. It offers a relatively clear-cut categorization that includes virtually all immigrant groups that are affected

6 In some public, parliamentary, and even academic debate, the term ‘immigrants’ is used even more carelessly, and sometimes seems to refer only to ethnic minorities with a (distant) foreign background. In this parlance, for example, the children of Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands qualify as immigrants while a Belgian family that just settled in Amsterdam does not.
by the kinds of policy reforms we will be looking at. As we will see, immigrant-targeted welfare cuts seldom affect second-generation immigrants, and are rarely adopted with remigrants in mind.

Since some of the reforms that we will be talking about apply more to some groups of migrants than others, it is useful to break down the rather heterogeneous group of foreign-born individuals into different categories (see Figure 2.1). First, we need to distinguish between documented and undocumented migrants, or in other words, between those who have a legal permit to stay in the country and those who do not. Within the undocumented immigrant population, we can further distinguish those who illegally entered the country and those migrants who entered legally but became undocumented afterwards (for example, by overstaying a temporary permit or remaining in the country after receiving a negative response on a refugee claim).

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**Figure 2.1. Classification of immigrant groups.**

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7 This group is sometimes referred to as ‘illegal migrants’. I prefer the term undocumented migrants because the label ‘illegal’ wrongfully associates a group of people who for a variety of reasons can lack a residence permit with criminality (it seems particularly inaccurate to use the term for denied refugee claimants who cannot feasibly be deported).

8 This classification scheme is neither exhaustive nor universally applicable. For example, it omits so-called ‘postcolonial migrants’ – people who move from their country of origin to what used to be their colonial motherland (Messina, 2007, pp. 34-7), and would need slight amendments in some of the countries under study. (In the Netherlands and Finland, for example, all migrants are initially considered temporary migrants, and can only apply for permanent residence status after spending five and four years, respectively, in the country; Koikkalainen, et al., 2012; see also Chapter Five.)
A crucial distinction within the documented immigrant population is between those who have a permit to stay in the country indefinitely (either in the form of permanent residence status or citizenship), and those who are entitled to stay for a designated period of time only – temporary migrants. Within both of these subcategories, there are further relevant distinctions to be made. The three largest groups of temporary migrants are international students, temporary foreign workers, and refugee claimants awaiting a determination of their request for asylum (in the European context, the latter group is generally referred to as ‘asylum seekers’). Permanent migrants are typically subdivided in economic (or labour) migrants, family migrants (either those who migrate to be with their family, or those who migrate to start a family), and refugees (either refugee claimants that have received a positive response on their claim, or refugees that are explicitly invited – either by the state or by private sponsors – to immigrate).

2.2 The progressive’s dilemma: immigration versus the welfare state?

“You cannot simultaneously have free immigration and a welfare state.” This quote, uttered by Milton Friedman during a libertarian conference in 1999, is perhaps the best known expression of a general consensus among public commentators and academics alike. Typically framed as the ‘progressive’s dilemma’, even the most careful analysts seem to agree that there is an inherent tension between liberal admission policies and generous social policies (Bommes & Geddes, 2000). For example, a volume on this subject in the Netherlands simply posits “solidarity cannot exist without borders” (Entzinger & Van der Meer, 2004, p. 7) as a truism that does not require any further explanation.

To a certain extent, this tension is undeniable. Combining entirely open borders with generous social policies does risk significant increases in social expenditure. However, the picture is often painted much more darkly than that. In fact, many have suggested that a steady inflow of newcomers inevitably leads to the demise of the welfare state as we know it. For example, Anthony Messina makes the rather sweeping statement that “immigration reinforced
and accelerated neo-liberal economic and political change across Western Europe” (Messina, 2007, p. 190) without offering any evidence or citing any empirical study that reaches this conclusion. Similarly, Hans-Werner Sinn and Wolfgang Ochel (2003) suggested that the 2004 expansion of the EU would mean Western welfare states will crumble under the weight of migration from Central and Eastern Europe, while at least at this point in time these predictions have not materialized.

One of the most frequently mentioned pieces of evidence by proponents of this view is that the United States, with its long history of immigration, has developed a rather minimal social safety net, whereas the presumably more homogeneous and isolated populations of Western Europe have come to be covered by more expansive systems of social programs.9 Following this line of reasoning, Gary Freeman argued as early as 1986 that immigration “has led to the Americanization of European welfare states” (Freeman, 1986, p. 61). According to Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser (2004), the difference in ethnic composition accounts for no less than 50 percent of the transatlantic differences in welfare state generosity. The comparison between the United States and Western Europe also appears in less academic accounts as an argument to describe immigration as a threat to the welfare state:

This is America versus Sweden. You can have a Swedish welfare state provided that you are a homogeneous society with intensely shared values. In the US you have a very diverse, individualistic society where people feel fewer obligations to fellow citizens. Progressives want diversity but they thereby undermine part of the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests. (Goodhart, 2004, p. 30)10

As this quote suggests, the ‘dilemma thesis’ builds first and foremost on the assumption that immigration-induced diversity makes it difficult to sustain the solidarity necessary to legitimize an extensive welfare system. This argument goes back at least to the writings of T.H. Marshall

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9 In a different version of this argument, Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson invoke diversity as one of the reasons why Canadian party politics have traditionally not been dominated by a clear class cleavage: “A definition of politics stressing both bicultural and regional diversity […] has diverted demands of subordinate classes into forms which obscured the class bases” (1988, p. 3).

10 It is rather ironic that Goodhart chooses Sweden as an example. It has a (slightly) larger percentage of foreign-born population than the United States, and admits a much larger number of non-Western immigrants per capita on a yearly basis (OECD, 2011b).
(1950), who argued that the historical reason for extending social rights was some form of pre-existing solidarity in a community (see also Jenson, 2003, pp. 315-6). To many observers, the idea that this ‘natural solidarity’ would emerge in an open society with a continuously changing religious, ethnic, and linguistic composition is apparently so implausible that they are not explicit about the causal mechanisms in this relationship. Nevertheless, we can distinguish at least five different arguments in this literature for why immigration-induced diversity might weaken the base of support for redistribution and social programs.

First, some authors defend a biological hypothesis, arguing that there is a strong and positive relationship between feelings of solidarity and similarity in genetic composition. Freeman, for instance, maintains that “racial or ethnic animosity is genetically inbred [...] whatever the potential benefits, replacement migration runs against deeply ingrained human instincts” (Freeman, 2009, p. 7).

A second mechanism is less deterministic and is rooted in social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982). We can summarize this long-standing and well-developed literature by three of its main assertions: (1) individuals use social categories they deem important to classify people around them; (2) individuals derive their social identity from these categories; and (3) individuals tend to develop positive feelings towards people who share the social categories they identify with (the in-group), and negative feelings towards people who do not (the out-group). Since race, religion, and language are commonly invoked social categories, so the argument goes, it is likely that native-born citizens will consider newcomers with a different background as members of the out-group. In that scenario, the native-born population will not feel a propensity to share with people they consider not to belong to their own community.

A third mechanism relies heavily on the assumptions of social identity theory but differs from it by paying almost exclusive attention to the role of trust. According to this argument, diversity has a negative effect on trust, which, in turn, will translate in lower levels of solidarity. In a well-known recent study in this tradition, Robert Putnam (2007) goes further and posits
what he calls ‘constrict theory’, predicting that diversity even makes people less trusting of members of their own in-group:

Inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television. (Putnam, 2007, pp. 150-1).

Whereas this long list of diversity’s negative effects does not include any explicit reference to willingness to pay taxes or support for social programs, Putnam’s work is often cited to make exactly these links - not only by public commentators (Goodhart, 2004, p. 33; Caldwell, 2009, p. 49), but by academics as well (Freeman, 2009, pp. 2-6; Burgoon, 2011, pp. 2-3).\(^{11}\)

A fourth argument builds on the assumption that people are willing to contribute to a redistributive welfare state out of reciprocal altruism: the willingness to share, in this account, does not have biological or socio-psychological origins, but is based on a rational calculation that all members of the community contribute when they can and receive support when they cannot (Fong, 2007). This theory offers a powerful explanation for why in virtually every welfare state, the public exhibits much more support for pensions and sickness insurance than for social assistance (Shapiro & Young, 1989; Meier Jaeger, 2007): while few would argue that becoming sick (let alone old) is something you can be held accountable for, many more people would argue the able-bodied poor are simply facing the consequences of their own life choices (Appelbaum, 2001). From this perspective, there are at least two reasons why immigrants are likely to be seen as undeserving of state support, and therefore, why an increase in immigration could be hypothesized to lead to a decrease in solidarity. First, as newcomers to a community, immigrants have a shorter history of contributing to the system and therefore might seem less entitled to tax-financed benefits. Second, they tend to be overrepresented among recipients of exactly the types of benefits that are least likely to be warmly supported by a reciprocal altruist.

\(^{11}\) Even some politicians cite Putnam in arguing that immigration threatens the welfare state: see Section 7.3.1.
These mechanisms can be exacerbated by stereotypes. Some people, for example, believe that the very reason immigrants migrate is to profit from a generous welfare system. Others think that there is something about immigrants that make them particularly likely to claim welfare (for example that they have a larger incentive to go on welfare because the level of a benefit is high in comparison to the standard of living in their country of origin, or that they are just lazy people). Those beliefs likely reinforce the perception that immigrants are less deserving of entitlements than native-born citizens (Bommes & Geddes, 2000; Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Boeri, 2009). Accordingly, Woojin Lee, John Roemer, and Karine van der Straeten (2006, p. 447) predict diversity to result in a “decrease in the public sector [...] because many voters believe that the poor minority is undeserving and is a main beneficiary of the welfare state”.

Finally, some authors describe a mechanism that draws from power resource theory, which posits that the size of a welfare state and its base of support among the public depends on the efforts of organized labour and left-wing parties to bring about economic equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 2001). In this account, immigration appears as a threat because it is expected to weaken those efforts. One of the first to make this observation was Walter Korpi, who feared that “a factor significantly decreasing the possibility to mobilize workers is the growing proportion of immigrants among them” (Korpi, 1978, p. 314). For similar reasons, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack (1985) have argued that an inflow of labour migrants reduces the mobilizing and organizational potential of proletarian powerhouses such as trade unions. More recently, Moses Shayo (2009) reasoned that an increase in diversity will mean that fewer people will identify first and foremost with their social class and that therefore overall support for redistribution will decrease.\footnote{As will be clear from these examples, the novelty in this argument is not the observation that immigration divides the working class – in fact, these authors often refer to some of the theories discussed above (in particular, social identity theory) to make this amenable. Instead, this mechanism differs from previous ones by elaborating on the expected effects of this division.} Yet another variant of this argument is that immigration-induced diversity has diverted the attention of the left from its traditional calling: rather than combating poverty and economic inequality, the argument goes, the left now also
dedicates much of its time and resources to fighting discrimination and ethnic inequality (Fraser, 2001).\textsuperscript{13}

Despite the intuitive plausibility of many of these claims, the available empirical evidence for these arguments is mixed. The findings are more robust in some countries than in others, and there is more evidence for some observable implications of these arguments than for others.

One of the hypotheses that finds most consistent support in empirical research is that diversity has a negative effect on trust. A large number of studies have found that trust is lower in diverse neighbourhoods (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Putnam, 2007; Letki, 2008; Lancee & Dronkers, 2011). The evidence that such a decrease in trust necessarily erodes support for redistribution and welfare programs, however, is weaker. In a case study of Canada, for example, Stuart Soroka, Richard Johnston, and Keith Banting (2004) find a weak negative relationship between diversity and trust, but do not observe any concomitant decrease in support for welfare programs. Comparing a number of European welfare states, Wim van Oorschot and Wilfred Uunk (2007, p. 234) actually find that “more immigration makes people more solidaristic with immigrants”. In another comparison of European welfare states, Henning Finseraas (2012) finds that people who express negative attitudes on immigration are equally likely to support redistribution as other respondents. Other studies do find some support for the thesis that diversity decreases support for social programs, but seldom is the evidence overwhelming. Alesina and Glaeser (2004, p. 153), for instance, find that in the United States there is a weak negative relationship between a state’s percentage of black population and its public support for welfare. Similarly, in a comparison of sixteen Western democracies, Markus Crepaz (2006) finds a very weak negative relationship between diversity and support for welfare programs. In a study of seventeen European countries, Steffen Mau and Christoph Burkhardt (2009, p. 255) come to the same conclusion: “overall, it seems that there is an association

\textsuperscript{13} An additional concern is that some of the policies adopted with these new goals in mind – in particular, multiculturalist policies – might actually run counter to efforts aimed at fostering support for redistribution. Because multiculturalist policies inevitably reify differences between groups of citizens, some observers fear they have a negative effect on social cohesion and solidarity (Barry, 2001, p. 88).
between migration and welfare state solidarity, but it is not particularly strong”. One might expect the effect to be stronger when one focuses on perceptions of diversity, but that does not seem to be the case either. Claudia Senik, Holger Stichnoth, and Karine van der Straeten (2009) study the relationship between perceived levels of immigration and support for redistribution among native-born citizens in a large number of European countries, and also find a very small negative relationship.

The only two studies that I am aware of that do find a strong negative effect of diversity on support for redistribution are county-level analyses in Sweden. First, Maureen Eger (2010) finds that counties that have recently received a large inflow of immigrants display much less support for universal welfare programs than their counterparts that have welcomed a smaller number. A second study, a working paper by Matz Dahlberg, Karin Edmark, and Heléne Lundqvist (2011), finds a similarly large and negative effect of an increase in a county’s refugee population on the support for social benefits among its inhabitants.

The picture is similar when we look at studies that measure the effect of diversity on the size of the welfare state. On the one hand, there is some evidence for the claim that has most often been brought forward, namely that diverse communities have developed less generous welfare state structures. Alesina and Glaeser (2004, p. 141), for example, show that there is a strong negative correlation between racial fractionalization and social welfare spending in a comparison of a large number of countries at all levels of economic development. On the other hand, it is more contested whether this necessarily means that immigration-induced diversity will reduce the size of already existing welfare state structures (Crepaz, 2008). Christer Gerdes, for example, finds no relationship at all between the intake of refugees in Danish communities and the size of the public sector, and concludes that “welfare states with well-established institutions are not very sensitive to a change in ethnic diversity due to immigration” (Gerdes, 2010).

However, this relationship would be much weaker if one would repeat their analysis for Western and non-Western countries separately. And in Mau and Burkhardt’s comparison of 17 Western European countries (2009), there appears to be no relationship at all between the two variables.
Comparing a large number of Western countries, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza (2007) find the effect of immigration on welfare spending to be insignificant. In another cross-national comparison, Soroka, Banting, and Johnston (2006) do find a negative relationship between changes in the share of immigrant population and welfare spending, but note at the same time that this conclusion is heavily influenced by the cases of the United States and the Netherlands and that the effect of immigration would almost disappear when these two cases are excluded. In this context, it is interesting to note that Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2010), when comparing states within the US, find only a weak negative relationship between changes in the percentage of foreign-born and welfare expenditure.

All in all, we can summarize the large body of empirical literature on the relationship between diversity and (support for) welfare state institutions by four observations: first, there is some evidence of a negative relationship between diversity and solidarity, but only few studies conclude that the relationship is strong; second, the evidence is more convincing in Sweden and the United States than in other contexts; third, there are more indications that diversity erodes trust than support for welfare programs; and fourth, there is more evidence that historically diverse communities have developed weaker welfare states than that the recent inflows of migrants have decreased the generosity of already existing welfare state structures.

2.3 When solidarity becomes selective: welfare chauvinism and exclusionary reforms

The scarcity of systematic and unambiguous evidence supporting a negative aggregate effect of immigration on either solidarity or welfare state institutions is not surprising. There are at least four reasons that help us understand this counterintuitive outcome, and at the same time, predict a more selective effect on solidarity instead.

First, most of the theoretical mechanisms reviewed above give little reason to expect diversity would induce people to stop supporting the principle of a welfare state they might benefit from themselves. All that we can logically deduce from the arguments of biological
animosity, social identity theory, and reciprocal altruism is that some parts of the native-born population will be unwilling to share the welfare state with immigrants. Putnam’s constrict theory seems to offer more grounds to expect an overall decrease in solidarity, but as we have seen, he mostly theorizes about diversity’s effects on social trust and social capital, and those effects do not necessarily translate in a decrease in support for social programs. Power resource theory offers a more direct link between immigration and an erosion of welfare state institutions, but suffers from a major theoretical weakness: it suggests that we can understand welfare retrenchment by the same theoretical tools that are usually employed to explain welfare state expansion. This view has been widely challenged in the literature, because it ignores institutional obstacles to welfare state change (Cox, 1993; Pierson, 1994). In other words, while the presence of a unified and strong left might be important to ensure the emergence of generous welfare programs, it is of less relevance in understanding whether these programs will be retrenched once they are institutionalized.

The second, and perhaps most important, reason is that the strongest opposition to immigration tends to be found among blue-collar workers and the unemployed, exactly those groups of voters who can also be expected to be adamant supporters of redistribution (Crepaz, 2008; Svalfors, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Even the most xenophobic unemployed workers are unlikely to advocate dismantling social programs that they are relying on as a source of income.

Of course, one might reply that these individuals can nevertheless be swayed in an electoral campaign by the most vocal critic of immigration, and therefore forget about economic interests while casting a vote (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). This, however, is where the third reason comes into play. Whereas anti-immigrant sentiment used to be voiced by parties with a right-wing economic agenda, modern anti-immigrant parties tend to defend a more centrist or even leftist

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15 Moreover, Putnam’s findings have not been replicated in studies outside the United States (Banting, 2008; Gesthuizen, Van der Meer, & Scheepers, 2009).
16 While Paul Pierson is rightfully credited for his comprehensive and convincing defence of this argument (1994; 1996), he has not been the first to make this point (Cox, 1993, p. 197; Schmidt, 1983).
position on issues of redistribution (Hainsworth, 2000, p. 10; Mudde, 2000, p. 174; Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Rydgren, 2003, p. 56; Ivarsflaten, 2005; De Lange, 2007).¹⁷ Those voters who are most likely to be affected by a diversity-driven decrease in solidarity, therefore, now have the opportunity of acting on that sentiment in the voting booth without being afraid that their vote will dismantle the welfare state. In addition, the entrance of these parties on the political scene even makes it possible that unease about immigration leads some people who otherwise would not vote for a pro-welfare party to do so.

Finally, there are strong institutional barriers to (support for) welfare retrenchment (Pierson, 1994; 1996; Huber & Stephens, 2001, pp. 202-311). Not only does the median voter in virtually every capitalist society benefit from redistribution, but welfare state institutions also enjoy much greater legitimacy than can be explained by economic self-interest alone (Brooks & Manza, 2007). Therefore, any plans for across-the-board reductions in benefits will be confronted with an opposing majority. Conversely, suggestions to reduce immigrants’ social rights will not be met by the type of large and well-mobilized opposition general welfare retrenchment is likely to elicit.¹⁸ After all, one group of people that will benefit most from a welfare system that is inclusive of immigrants is future newcomers, and they obviously have no role to play in the decision-making process. Among the people who could affect that process, on the other hand, few have anything to lose from these types of reforms.

In sum, then, it seems that worries about immigration’s overall corrosive impact on the welfare state are exaggerated. Not only is the empirical evidence mixed and ambiguous, upon closer inspection the theoretical grounds for this thesis are shaky at worst, and in need of

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¹⁷ Even Herbert Kitschelt, who argued some fifteen years ago that “there is no structural position in advanced capitalism in which [parties that combine a right-wing position on immigration with a left-wing position on social programs] can entrench themselves” (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995, p. 23) and therefore predicted this type of party never to become successful, has acknowledged this trend. In 2004 he updated his prediction and concluded that a rotation in the electoral space has now made this structural position available (Kitschelt, 2004).

¹⁸ Obviously, these reforms might stumble upon more opposition in some countries than in others. In no political community, however, are reductions in the social rights of newcomers likely to garner as much public protest as more general cutbacks in social policies. See also Section 2.5.
qualification at best. None of this, however, should be interpreted as a reason for optimism or complacency. Just because immigration has not made native-born respondents dislike a redistributive welfare state in general does not mean that there are no aspects of the welfare system they would like to see amended.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, while the tension between diversity and solidarity does not seem to fuel neo-liberalism, it is likely to manifest itself in the form of welfare chauvinism.

The term welfare chauvinism is occasionally used in the literature on anti-immigrant politics, but it usually comes without a clear definition.\textsuperscript{20} Markus Crepaz and Regan Damron define it as follows: “the sense that immigrants are attracted to a country because of its generous welfare benefits, do not pay taxes, take away the jobs of natives, depress wages, and abuse health care, education, and other public services” (Crepaz & Damron, 2009, p. 439). In this definition, the term refers to a set of stereotypes and beliefs (like sexism or ageism). My interest, however, centers on an understanding of welfare chauvinism as a political ideology (like liberalism or socialism). This is also how Paul Hainsworth uses the term: “In practice, [welfare chauvinism] means propagating the idea of reserving or prioritizing state-provided goods and benefits [...] for nationals, on the basis of a distinctly restrictive citizenship, rather than to the population at large, on the basis of equity” (Hainsworth, 2000, p. 10). This definition certainly offers a more useful conceptualization for our purposes, but it might lead one to overlook that the sentiment under study here does not only entail a willingness to exclude outsiders from benefits, but also a belief that the state should offer those benefits to insiders. What I am interested in, then, is \textit{general support for a redistributive welfare state, but a desire to restrict its benefits to native-born citizens}. Because of the various associations the term welfare chauvinism tends to invoke, I will most often refer to this policy position by the term ‘selective solidarity’ (but note that where the term welfare chauvinism does appear, I rely on the strict definition formulated above).

\textsuperscript{19} After all, empirical research shows that many people are simultaneously in favour of some redistributive mechanisms, and opposed to others (Meier Jaeger, 2012)
\textsuperscript{20} For examples, see studies by Cas Mudde (2000), Rachel Gibson (2002), Jens Rydgren (2003), Anton Derks (2007), and Mary Hilson (2008).
As noted, there are good theoretical reasons to argue that this selective sense of solidarity is a more likely outcome than an across-the-board decrease in support for social programs. For that reason, the lack of clear evidence of a negative relationship between immigration and support for the welfare state might simply reflect that most studies have operationalized the variables of interest too broadly. Indeed, the empirical evidence in research that does specifically measure selective solidarity is more robust than the studies reviewed in the previous section. For example, it is telling that Mau and Burkhardt (2009) who, as discussed above, only find a weak relationship between diversity and solidarity and no relationship at all between diversity and social expenditure, do observe a strong negative relationship between share of non-Western immigrants and citizens’ willingness to grant equal rights to newcomers. Erzo Luttmer (2001) uses a different way of capturing selective solidarity, and finds that support for welfare decreases with an increase in the number of recipients in a local community, but that it increases with an increase in the number of recipients in the community with the same race as the respondent. Yet another strategy is used by Ann-Helen Bay and Axel Pedersen (2006): they survey support for universal welfare programs among the Norwegian electorate, and find that this support drops when respondents are asked if they would still be in favour of such programs if they were to be extended to non-citizens.

Not only can we understand why we see little aggregate effect of diversity on welfare state support, it is equally unsurprising that the effect of immigration-induced diversity on welfare state policies does not manifest itself on an aggregate level. However, to argue that immigration has not changed the configuration of Western welfare states would be to deny the many immigrant-excluding welfare reforms that have been adopted over the last two decades or so, which I will define as reforms that restrict or qualify immigrants’ access to social programs. Scholars have noted the exclusion of immigrants from welfare state institutions in a large variety of countries, including Austria (Crepaz, 2008, p. 75; Howard, 2006, p. 445); Denmark (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Sainsbury, 2012); Germany (Ireland, 2004, p. 27; SOPEMI, 2004);
Netherlands (Minderhoud, 2004; Huisman, 2009); Norway (Hagelund, 2005); the United Kingdom (Mynott, Humphries, & Cohen, 2002; Dwyer, 2006; Wilkinson & Craig, 2012), and the United States (Fragomen, 1997; Demleitner, 1998; Kretsedemas & Aparicio, 2004; Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Roempke Graefe, De Jong, Hall, Sturgeon, & Van Eerden, 2008; Handler, 2009; Sainsbury, 2012).

Immigrant-excluding welfare reforms come in different guises, and entail different degrees of exclusion. In order to make sense of this wide variety, it is useful to make a few analytic distinctions, not only in the grounds for exclusion, but in the severity of exclusion as well.

To start with the former, immigrants can be excluded from benefits on two grounds. First, in some cases a category of migrants is excluded on the basis of their status. The immigrants with the weakest social position in this regard are undocumented immigrants: they are commonly barred from social services and insurance programs. Better protected, but still in a clearly disadvantaged position, are temporary migrants. Immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in 1996 and 1999 in the United Kingdom, for example, excluded temporary migrants from non-contributory benefits and denied welfare to asylum seekers who are awaiting a decision on their application (Sales, 2002). In most welfare states, immigrants with a permanent residence status are well-protected and differ little in their social rights from citizens (Hammar, 1990; Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 1996). However, recent developments suggest that this equality is not set in stone. The welfare reforms of the mid-1990s in the United States, for example, excluded all non-citizens from food stamps and Supplemental Security Income (Fragomen, 1997).

A second type of reform excludes immigrants temporarily through the installation or extension of residence requirements for access to benefits. All welfare states require immigrants - regardless of their status - to have lived a minimum number of years in the country before

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21 One ground that is omitted from this discussion, and matters for social rights in some idiosyncratic cases, is ethnicity. Ethnic German immigrants (so-called Aussiedler), for example, used to have more access to the German welfare state than guest workers with the same status and length of residence (Bommes, 2000, p. 101; Kaiser & Paul, 2012). Zeev Rosenhek observes similar privileges for ethnic Jews in Israel (Rosenhek, 2000).
being eligible for tax-funded pension programs. This minimum requirement can vary considerably, however, from one country to another, and some governments have decided to place residence requirements on other benefits as well. Denmark, for example, has recently placed a residence requirement of seven years on access to a complete social assistance benefit (Andersen, Elm Larsen, & Hornemann Möller, 2009).

Figure 2.2 is a graphic summary of the above discussion. It shows that immigrants tend to enjoy more social rights the more robust their status, and the longer they have lived in their new country of residence. Obviously, the exact configuration of this graph differs from country to country, and this general figure should not be interpreted as a representation of any empirical case. Instead, it is merely meant to illustrate that the exclusion of immigrants from social programs does not take place along one dimension only. Migrants that have acquired citizenship can still be affected by reforms that exclude migrants through residence requirements, and migrants that have lived in a country for a long time can still be excluded if policy-makers decide to exclude migrants on the basis of status.

Immigrant-excluding welfare reforms do not only differ from each other in the groups of immigrants they target, but also in the severity of the exclusion they entail. Some reforms make immigrants altogether ineligible (like the exclusion of temporary migrants from non-contributory benefits in the UK), while others mean immigrants receive a lower benefit than native-born citizens (such as the coupling of social assistance to duration of residence in
Denmark). Yet other reforms do not exclude immigrants or lower their benefits, but make the requirements for access more onerous for newcomers than for native-born citizens. The German government, for instance, decided to cut the unemployment and social assistance benefits of those immigrants who do not attend their integration courses (SOPEMI, 2004, p. 107).

In sum, as a way to deal with the tension between open borders and generous welfare institutions, policy-makers in a number of countries have made use of a variety of strategies to restrict or qualify immigrants’ access to social programs. However, it would be wrong to suggest that there is something inevitable or necessary about this response. After all, policy-makers who are eager to avoid a large immigrant welfare clientele can consider at least three alternatives to decreasing immigrants’ social rights: (1) making admission policies more selective so as to admit fewer and/or more highly skilled immigrants; (2) investing in integration policies and immigrant-targeted active labour market policies to enhance immigrants’ chances on the labour market; and (3) implementing across-the-board welfare reforms to achieve an overall reduction in social spending. And indeed, some countries have steered clear of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, and have chosen one of these three alternative strategies.

The key puzzle, then, is why in some settings politicians have opted for the strategy of disentitling immigrants, while their counterparts elsewhere formulate a different policy response. So far, however, there have been very few attempts in the literature to develop a theory to unravel this puzzle, and to understand when and how immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are most likely to come about. In fact, the first step in developing such a theory has been made only very recently in Diane Sainsbury’s (2012) comparison of immigrants’ social rights in six countries. And even in this study, the emphasis is more on providing a comprehensive descriptive overview of cross-national differences in immigrants’ access to social benefits rather than on understanding why some countries choose one strategy over another.

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22 Of course, it is interesting to reflect on which of the four options is most effective at reducing or avoiding large-scale immigrant welfare dependence. I will briefly return to this question in the conclusion. My main interest, however, is in exploring and understanding the large cross-national differences in which of these options is most actively pursued.
than on developing a theoretical account of the causal sequences that have led to those differences. The next two sections aim to develop such an account.

2.4 The origins of selective solidarity

In order to theorize the origins of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, I draw from three bodies of theoretical literature: new institutionalism and institutional change, the dynamics of general social policy reform, and the politics of immigration. By combining insights from these well-developed subfields of comparative political science, I develop a two-step theory of the politics of immigrants’ social rights. In this section, I will discuss the first step, and theorize why in some countries but not in others the public and the political elite have come to believe that the state should privilege native-born over immigrants in extending social rights. Section 2.5 moves on to the second step, discussing how such sentiments of selective solidarity can lead to the adoption of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, and which institutional roadblocks welfare chauvinist policy-makers are likely to be confronted with.

2.4.1 Economic reasons for cutbacks?

A good place to start our exploration is a discussion of the economic rationale for reform. In the general literature on social policy, a pervasive argument is that cutbacks in welfare generosity come about in response to economic pressures. At any rate, almost every student of social policies would agree that policy-makers today face strong incentives to pursue retrenchment. In

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23 In Sainsbury’s account, the politics of immigrants’ social rights are influenced by the welfare regime, incorporation regime, admission policy, the framing of immigration, the policy venues where immigrants’ social rights are established, party politics, the territorial setup of a country, and the efforts of immigrant organizations. Unfortunately, however, she does little to specify this rather unparsimonious model. There is no discussion of the relative leverage of each of the variables, their interaction, or the stage in the causal sequence they are most important. As such, it is difficult to derive generalizations or observable implications from her explanation. An additional problem is that her model makes no analytic distinction between general cutbacks in social policies and immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, assuming the two types of policy change are driven by the same logic (see, in particular, pp. 40-41, 281). As we will see, however, we can expect that when it comes to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, the role of framing is larger, and the institutional obstacles are different.
particular, scholars have pointed at the recent slowdown in productivity growth and the massive increase of the service sector (Pierson, 2001b; Huber & Stephens, 2001), the ageing of the population and the decline in fertility rates (Esping-Andersen, 1996a; Pierson, 2001b; Myles, 2002; Taylor-Gooby, 2002), and economic globalization (Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000, p. 2) as daunting threats to the future economic sustainability of the welfare state. In those accounts, then, welfare retrenchment is explained as a measure to cope with formidable economic pressures.

Similar economic considerations are common in discussions about the social rights of immigrants. In this case, it is immigrants’ comparatively large reliance on transfer benefits that is presented as the reason their entitlements should be scaled back. In essence, this line of reasoning insists that immigrants make so much use of benefits that full welfare inclusion would make a redistributive welfare state unsustainable. Not only do politicians frequently reason along these lines, but this type of argument has traction among academics and public commentators as well (Engelen, 2003; Goodhart, 2004; Grubel & Grady, 2011).

If the desire to exclude migrants from welfare benefits indeed originates in the objective pressure immigrants exert on the welfare budget, we would expect this sentiment to be most pervasive where immigrants are most costly to the welfare system. In almost every Western welfare state there is evidence that immigrants are more likely to be poor, unemployed and reliant on state support than native-born citizens, and moreover that more recent cohorts of immigrants perform worse in this respect than earlier cohorts (Brochmann, 1996; Clark & Schultz, 1998).24 Nevertheless, there are large differences in this regard from one country to

24 While some authors have taken this conclusion to mean that an increase in immigration will make supporting the welfare state more costly, others point at offsetting effects. For example, there is evidence that immigrants are likely to contribute more than they take out in the long run (Borjas, 1999), and that they stimulate the economy by taking on jobs that are unattractive to native-born citizens (Brochmann, 1996; Messina, 2007, p. 23; Facchini & Mayda, 2009) Indeed, virtually every study that has tried to measure the overall economic impact of migration on the welfare state (not to be confused with studies focusing exclusively on how much immigrants make use of welfare state services, such as Van der Geest & Dietvorst, 2010; Grubel & Grady, 2012) concludes that it is positive but small (Spencer, 2003; Venturini, 2004; Zimmerman, 2005).
another. In some countries, immigrants are strongly overrepresented among those who receive benefits targeting the poor and unemployed, depend on those benefits as a major source of income, and stay on those programs for a long period of time (Chiswick & Hurst, 1998; Clark & Schultz, 1998; Voges, Frick, & Büchel, 1998; Barrett & McCarthy, 2008). In other countries, the degree of overrepresentation is much smaller (Adserà & Chiswick, 2006; Van Tubergen, 2006).

The existing literature typically points at two sets of institutional characteristics to explain these differences. First, immigration policies are of obvious relevance. While some countries employ a wide range of measures to minimize the chance that immigrants end up depending on social programs – for instance, by employing skill and language criteria in their admission policy – other countries are much less demanding in that regard (DeVoretz, 1995; Borjas, 1999; Boeri, Hanson, & McCormick, 2002). Moreover, it matters which category of immigrants is targeted. While in some countries most of the inflow of migrants has been specifically selected on the basis of human capital characteristics, in other countries the bulk of the immigrant population is admitted for humanitarian reasons. In effect, admission policy functions as an institutional screen which allows through different levels and mixes of immigrants in different countries, with different implications for the welfare state.

Second, the economic integration of immigrants is also affected by welfare state institutions themselves.25 The extent to which immigrants have access to benefits differs considerably from one program to another. Obviously, immigrants are unlikely to be disproportionately receiving benefits they have difficulty qualifying for. The more stringent the eligibility requirements for

25 A common argument is that immigrants are more likely to rely on social benefits when those benefits are higher. One version of this thesis posits that immigrants have a ‘welfare penchant’, and are more likely than native-born to draw benefits (Mollenkopf, 2000; Scheffer, 2004; Koopmans, 2010). A second version maintains that a generous welfare state can function as a magnet for immigrants with a poor work ethic (Freeman, 1986; Carens, 1988; Heitmueller, 2005). Neither of these arguments has found confirmation in academic research. Once one controls for eligibility, immigrants tend to be equally or, more often, less likely than native-born citizens to make use of social benefits (Tienda & Jensen, 1986; Reitz, 1995; Castronova, Kayser, Frick, & Wagner, 2001; Boeri, 2009, p. 20; Sainsbury, 2012, p. 126). Moreover, as far as immigrants are drawn by economic characteristics of the destination country, standard of living, wage equality, and overall economic standing have been found to be much more important than the system of social benefits (Voss, Hammer, & Meier, 2001; WRR, 2001; Kvist, 2004; Kaushal, 2005; Yang & Wallace, 2007; Barrett & McCarthy, 2008).
programs with generous benefits such as public pensions, unemployment benefits or sickness insurance, the more likely immigrants will, in times of need, be compressed onto the programs of last resort such as social assistance, where they are likely to stand out demographically in the caseload (Taylor-Gooby, 2004, p. 23; Boeri, 2009). A second crucial set of social policies are labour market regulations. Protective labour market institutions such as a high minimum wage, rigid dismissal laws, and tax increases for double employment make it harder for newcomers to the labour market such as immigrants to be vertically mobile, and therefore increase the chance that they need to rely on the state for income support (Esping-Andersen, 1996b; Nickell, 1997; Miller & Neo, 2003; Engelen, 2003; Kogan, 2004; Rueda, 2005).26

2.4.2 The importance of political translation

In sum, there is truth to the argument that immigrants usually make greater use of transfer programs than the established population. However, it seems unlikely that there is a direct one-on-one relationship between patterns of immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity. Many studies conclude that objective facts are of little importance in the formation of public opinion, especially when it concerns sensitive policy areas such as redistribution (Bullock, 1999, p. 2059) and immigration (Messina, 2007, p. 76; Sides & Citrin, 2007, p. 496; Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2009).

Social facts, in other words, undergo a process of political translation. This process consists of two mechanisms. The first concerns saliency: similar developments receive much more attention in some communities than in others. This is largely because of a mechanism that scholars of political behaviour call priming: by redirecting the attention of the public to a particular topic, political elites influence how important various issues are considered to be (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The second mechanism of relevance is framing: elites can manipulate public opinion on a particular topic by “encouraging readers or listeners to emphasize certain

26 Some observers, however, still advocate extensive labour market regulation, reasoning that immigrants would otherwise be too vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous employers (Wilkinson & Craig, 2012).
considerations above others when evaluating that issue” (Chong & Druckman, 2007a, p. 637). In short, whereas priming affects whether a social fact becomes topic of discussion, framing influences how the topic is most commonly discussed.27

Students of social policy have long recognized the importance of political translation (Heclo, 1974). According to Robert Cox (2001), it explains why in the 1990s Denmark and the Netherlands implemented welfare reforms while German welfare institutions remained largely unchanged. Whereas in the former two countries, “political leaders [were] framing issues in ways that generated widespread support for reform initiatives”, in Germany “many political actors [were] rejecting the suggestion that reform was either necessary or desirable” (Cox, 2001, p. 464). Indeed, welfare politics have repeatedly been shown to be susceptible to priming and framing (Smith, 1987; Schmidt, 2000; Kuipers, 2006). For these reasons, while concerns about a declining workforce or increasing unemployment rates might be the ultimate driver of cutbacks in social policy, few scholars would argue that the relationship between economic incentives for welfare retrenchment and support for welfare retrenchment is straightforward.

When it comes to immigrant use of welfare, we might expect the process of political translation to be especially important.28 There are two main reasons for this. First, the issue of immigrants’ welfare entitlements seems more susceptible to priming and framing effects than the more general subject of the appropriate size and structure of a welfare state. There is persistent evidence that some issues are more amenable to priming and framing than others (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Soroka, 2002; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008), and opinions on immigration-related topics have often been found to be among the subjects that are most

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27 Some scholars use the terms priming and framing somewhat differently (for an overview, see Chong & Druckman, 2007b, pp. 114-116). Others use the terms agenda-setting and second-level agenda-setting to describe roughly the distinction I am making here (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Edy & Meirick, 2007).

28 Not all authors agree. According to (some versions of) realistic conflict theory, anti-immigrant attitudes are primarily a response to immigration’s objective economic threats. In this account, the reason why working class citizens tend to have more negative attitudes towards immigrants is because they compete with them for low-skilled jobs. However, much of the evidence in support of this theory is based on perceptions of economic threats rather than on objective economic data (Sniderman, Peri, De Figueiredo, & Piazza, 2000).
susceptible to such elite manipulation (Roberts, Wanta, & Dzwo, 2002; Wettstein, 2012). More specifically, the topic of immigrants’ entitlements has a number of characteristics that make it particularly likely that actual economic facts on immigrant welfare dependence will be distorted by priming and framing.

For one thing, frames tend to be more influential if they are frequently repeated without being challenged by an alternative frame (Soroka, 2002; Chong & Druckman, 2007b). A dismissive discourse on social rights in general is likely to be contested by labour movements. Recent immigrants, however, are much more poorly placed to challenge accusatory frames and to initiate a ‘framing contest’ (Boin, ’t Hart, & McConnell, 2009). Recent immigrants lack the organization and mobilization potential to take part in public discussions about their welfare entitlements. A frame that blames immigrants for their welfare dependence is therefore likely to go unchallenged and become the dominant mode to discuss the subject.

Moreover, the influence of a dominant frame has been found to be larger for issues that are related to dramatic events which many individuals are worried about. In such circumstances, sensationalist and simplistic frames are likely to gain the upper hand and to have a large effect on public opinion, political discourse, and public policy (Soroka, 2002; Kelleher & Wolak, 2006; Boin, ’t Hart, & McConnell, 2009). In recent years, immigration has become such a ‘dramatic’ issue. Politicians and commentators commonly frame it as a danger to national security, referring explicitly to tragedies such as the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London, the riots in Parisian banlieues, or the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh (Leiken, 2005; D’Appollonia & Reich, 2008; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Caldwell, 2009). In many countries, the public has become worried about the effects of immigration, and such worries have led many individuals to distort and exaggerate facts about migration and ethnic diversity (Nadeau, Niemi, Levine, 1993; Wong, 2007; Jedwab, 2008; Transatlantic Trends, 2010).

A final characteristic of immigrants’ welfare dependence that makes political translation seem more consequential is that it is particularly amenable to be framed in us-versus-them
terms. When native-born citizens consider immigrants to belong to a different social group, such frames are likely to be successful. In the words of Frank Mols, “it is the extent to which a frame mobilises social identity that determines whether a frame is strong and persuasive” (2012, p. 332). In fact, Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn (2007, p. 120) find that the very act of drawing attention to social identity can already be enough to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiment. In other words, it seems plausible that the rhetorical question ‘why should we, native-born citizens, pay for them, immigrants?’ is more likely to sway people in a welfare chauvinist direction than its counterpart ‘why should we pay for those members of our social group who are in need of state support?’ would mobilize support for general welfare retrenchment.

This brings us to the second main reason why it is plausible that the disconnect between economic reality on the one hand and public opinion and political discourse on the other is larger in the politics of immigrants’ social rights than in general welfare politics. To a larger extent than discussions about general welfare politics, the entitlements of immigrants invoke a set of considerations about who truly ‘belongs’ in the political community.29 For that reason, even in a country where immigration contributes positively to the economy, people can still voice principled objections to immigrants’ access to social benefits. This is especially likely when deservingness perceptions become racialized (Wright, 1977; Gilens, 1999; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001; Kretsedemas & Aparicio, 2004, p. 6). Indeed, survey research suggests that identity concerns tend to be more important than economic concerns in driving anti-immigrant sentiment in general (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and welfare chauvinism in particular (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Oesch, 2008). For these two reasons, then, it seems likely that economic factors only play a small role in the formation of attitudes about immigrants’ entitlements, and

29 Certainly, general discussions about social policy are influenced by considerations regarding which social groups have the most right to be heard (Jenson 1993, p. 150). The difference with discussions about immigrants’ entitlements, however, is that they can contest the very idea that immigrants are a social group that is part of the political community in the first place.
that people will refer to facts that confirm their pre-existing beliefs, but ignore those that fit less comfortably with their position.

2.4.3 SHAPING TRANSLATION: THE ROLE OF POLITICS, CULTURE, AND INSTITUTIONS

Whether or not levels of immigrant welfare dependence become a prominent topic of discussion, and in which way the topic is discussed, thus depends on more than the economics of immigrants’ integration. Instead, we need to look at country characteristics in order to predict

Figure 2.3. Hypothesizing the political translation of the welfare costs of immigration.
how the subject is most likely to be translated politically. Since the very sentiment of selective solidarity is predicated on the categorization of immigrants as an out-group (cfr. Sniderman, Peri, De Figueiredo, & Piazza, 2000), it seems likely that the political translation of immigrants’ welfare costs will be more negative in the presence of political, cultural, and institutional factors that encourage such categorization.

As such, three characteristics seem of particular importance. First, we can expect anti-immigrant parties to prime the issue and frame it in a negative light. Second, in a country with an exclusionary national identity the costs of immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to be discussed as the result of immigrants’ own laziness than in a community with a more inclusive identity. Third, and finally, the dominant frame is likely to be more divisive in non-universal than in universal welfare states. These hypotheses are summarized in Figure 2.3. Below, I discuss each of the three country characteristics and their expected effect on the political translation of immigrants’ welfare use in more detail.

**Anti-immigrant parties.** First, the costs of immigration are more likely to be discussed, and to be discussed in a negative light, in the presence of anti-immigrant parties. For our purposes, we can define such organizations as political parties that both advocate restrictions in immigration policies and demonstrate hostility towards the immigrant population (Fennema, 1997; Gibson, 2002; Messina, 2007). It is important to reiterate that most modern anti-immigrant parties are in favour of a redistributive welfare state. The Comparative Manifesto Project, which has developed quantitative indicators of political party positions in 25 democracies since 1945, classifies almost all of the anti-immigrant parties in modern immigrant-receiving countries as more pro-welfare than anti-welfare (Klingemann, Volkens, 30

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30 Some immigration scholars argue that country characteristics deserve little attention, because individual characteristics (such as age, socio-economic status, or education) are more powerful predictors of public opinion (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Masso, 2009). Cross-country differences in public opinion, however, cannot fully be explained by individual characteristics (see also Chapter Four). Moreover, while analyzing the effect of demographic variables on anti-immigrant attitudes is instructive, it does not lead to practical recommendations in the way studying the effect of policies does.
Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006). Moreover, when these parties do criticize the welfare state, the most common argument is that it is too easy for immigrants to abuse the system (Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000, pp. 203-5; Gibson, 2002; Carter, 2005, p. 32; Halvorsen, 2007, p. 253). For that reason, most of these parties can be described not only as anti-immigrant parties, but as welfare chauvinist parties as well (Mudde, 2000, pp. 104-6, 136, 174; Derks, 2007, p. 179).

These parties have not been equally successful in every Western welfare state. While in some countries they have managed to become the third largest (Denmark, Finland), second largest (Netherlands, Norway), or even the first largest (Switzerland) party in parliament, in others their success has remained limited to occasionally securing a modest portion of the vote in local elections. It is beyond the scope of our discussion to address explanations for this cross-national variation in depth - what I am mostly interested in is the effect of this variation, not its origins. Fortunately, the literature is mostly in consensus on this point. In existing empirical studies, the factors that have been most consistently found to contribute to the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties are: a proportional electoral system with a low threshold, a party system with a niche for an anti-immigrant party, party organization characterized by charismatic leadership and high levels of party discipline, and large cohorts of voters with xenophobic and anti-establishment attitudes (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Messina, 2007, pp. 73-96; O’Malley, 2008).

In countries where anti-immigrant parties have made much headway, we can expect (economic) concerns about immigration to be a more prominent part of political discourse, and as such, to increase the likelihood that those concerns spread among the broader public (Rydgren, 2003). As Hugh Mehan (1997, p. 267) puts it, “the idea that the immigrant is the enemy does not just bubble up naturally in the citizenry. [...] This anti-immigrant sentiment is

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31 Only the French Front National appears as consistently anti-welfare, while the scores for the Swiss Popular Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei) are inconsistent from one election to the next.

32 This last point poses a problem for my theoretical model. I expect anti-immigrant parties to increase selective solidarity, but on the other hand these parties are more likely to be electorally successful if many voters endorse immigrant exclusion. I will return to this problem of endogeneity below, in Section 2.6.
manufactured and promoted by elites”. Similarly, Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Pontus Odmalm argue that Denmark and Sweden have historically dealt with immigration issues in broadly similar ways, until the *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party) in Denmark started to politicize immigration. As a result, “by the early 1990s, the two countries started to diverge significantly as both Danish policy and the rhetoric surrounding it became notably more restrictive compared to Sweden” (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008, p. 367). Fifteen years ago, Birgitta Ornbrant and Markku Peura reached the same conclusion: “The entrances of populistic parties in the parliaments is probably contributing to racist attitudes in the societies and in part explains the differences between Sweden on the one hand and Denmark and Norway on the other” (Ornbrant & Peura, 1993, p. 205).

The effect of anti-immigrant parties is not limited to directly influencing public opinion. Their electoral success has also led mainstream parties in some countries to adopt a more restrictive tone and agenda on immigration issues (Rydgren, 2003). Pippa Norris (2005) theorized that mainstream right-wing parties are particularly susceptible to what she coined the ‘contagion’ effect. In subsequent research, Joost van Spanje (2010) and Tim Bale and his colleagues (2010) found evidence of this effect for some left-wing parties as well. In other words, anti-immigrant parties are likely to fuel anti-immigrant sentiment (and more specifically in relation to the current discussion, selective solidarity) not only directly but also indirectly by influencing the behaviour of other political parties.

As such, anti-immigrant parties can be expected to increase selective solidarity through both mechanisms of political translation. First, by frequently bringing up problems associated with immigration, and in particular, the overrepresentation of immigrants among welfare dependents, anti-immigrant elites can prime the issue, bringing it to the forefront of everyone’s mind. In such a discursive climate, immigration can be invoked as the cause for social ills or policy failures in virtually any policy area. Taken-for-granted norms and institutions, such as the freedom of religion or the moral responsibility to grant asylum to the persecuted, can then
become objects of political contestation. In the context of this study, the suggestion to exclude immigrants from benefits seems more viable once immigrants’ overrepresentation among welfare dependents has become a prominent theme in political discourse (Faist, 1996, p. 240). In a recent study, Daniel Hopkins (2010) found politicization of the immigration issue to be related to increases in anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States. Rosemary Sales reaches the same conclusion in a more qualitative study of the United Kingdom (Sales, 2007, p. 10).

Second, anti-immigrant elites can be expected to frame the issue in a way that encourages anti-immigrant sentiment. By presenting the immigration issue consistently in a way that emphasizes negative considerations over positive ones, anti-immigrant elites increase the chance that the public will associate immigration with societal problems. The anti-immigrant frame, in addition to presenting immigration as the root of various evils and a threat to national identity, security, and welfare state sustainability, usually consists of four components. First, evaluating immigration as a negative development is described as ‘common sense’. Anti-immigrant politicians frequently argue that they are ‘saying out loud what people are thinking inside’ (Rydgren, 2003, p. 58). Even some academic critics of immigration appeal to this curious authority argument (Huntington, 2004, p. 26). Second, and relatedly, the anti-immigrant stance is framed as the voice of democracy. A persistent argument is that immigration has predominantly been an elite project, either run by multiculturalist ethnic engineers, immigration advocacy groups, or employers looking for cheap labour (Freeman, 1995; Stoffman, 2002; Messina, 2007; Bosma, 2010).33 Anti-immigrant politicians and commentators frequently complain that the public at large has never been asked if it favours open immigration policies, and will, if available, quote survey data that finds a majority of the electorate in favour of restrictions (Huntington, 2004, pp. 82, 166-7). Another strategy is to publicly ask for more

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33 Interestingly, on the other side of the political spectrum some critics have recently started to argue that the influence of elites on immigration policy has become too small. Sales, for example, laments that “there is perhaps no area of policy making in which the government’s agenda is so distant from the majority of academic commentary. The study of migration has increased dramatically in recent years and most commentary is broadly ‘pro-migrant’ and critical of current policy making” (Sales, 2007, p. 12).
‘openness’ about immigration, for example by requesting a parliamentary inquiry to calculate the net fiscal burden or contribution of immigration (Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000, p. 205; House of Lords, 2008), and to frame any opposition they might find to such requests as elitist and anti-democratic.

Third, this self-portrayal as the true defenders of democracy also leads to a powerful us-versus-them frame, in which ‘we, ordinary citizens’, are pitted against ‘they, the elite and its protégés’: mainstream political parties, special interest groups, and of course, newcomers to the political community. Hans-Georg Betz and Carol Johnson (2004, p. 316) put it as follows: “One of the central features of contemporary radical right-populist discourse is its attempt to delineate who ‘the people’ are and who does and should not legitimately be part of the people [...] The apparent arguments for ‘genuine’ democracy are actually arguments for excluding some groups.” Finally, the anti-immigrant frame relies heavily on exaggeration. Terms such as ‘mass immigration’ or even ‘a tsunami of immigration’ are used without reference to any actual numbers. Rather than saying that immigrants are overrepresented among welfare programs, the anti-immigrant elite prefers to speak of ‘foreigners who plunder our benefits’. This technique is particularly fruitful because of the above-mentioned tendency of people to exaggerate social developments they are most worried about: this process is likely to be exacerbated if the exaggerations are reinforced by political elites.

National identity. Second, we can expect the nature of a country’s national identity to influence whether discussions about the costs of immigration center around suggestions for exclusion. As mentioned above, concerns about national identity tend to feature prominently in anti-immigrant attitudes (Huntington, 2004; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), and more generally, there is much research suggesting that nationalism tends to be associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Skenderovic, 2007; Shayo, 2009). However, it would be wrong to suggest that an attachment to a nation-state necessarily leads to xenophobia. It is important to make a distinction between chauvinism, a
blind belief that one’s nation is superior to all others, and patriotism, a critical loyalty to one’s political institutions and founding principles. A growing body of survey research suggests that chauvinists are indeed more likely to have negative attitudes about immigrants, but that this is not the case for patriots, who in some studies even appear to evince more tolerance of immigration-induced diversity than individuals who lack affective attachment to the nation-state (De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kunovich, 2009; Ariely, 2011; Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012).

Even more important than the differences in the national attachment of different individuals is the variation in the nature of nationalism from one country to another. As the large body of literature on ethnic and civic nationalism attests, there are significant differences between political communities in the criteria for ‘belonging’ they formulate. While so-called ‘civic nations’ demand aspiring members to adhere to their political values and institutions, ‘ethnic nations’ stipulate the much more demanding membership requirements of ethnicity and ancestry (Meinecke, 1907/1970; Greenfeld, 1992). And while this literature has rightfully been criticized for its tendency to speak of ‘nations’ as fixed and unchangeable entities (Csergo, 2003; Marx, 2003), this critique should not make us lose sight of the large differences in the nature of national identity from one country to another, and, within one political community, from one time period to another. Some national identities are intimately tied up with characteristics that immigrants are unlikely to exhibit, while others are much more open to newcomers.

Previous studies have used a wide variety of strategies to classify how inclusionary different national identities are. Some have engaged in the qualitative historical analysis of nationalist movements (Greenfeld, 1992; Marx, 2003). Others have conducted qualitative interviews with citizens and asked which national features they deem to be crucial (Kiely, Bechhofer, & McCrone, 2005). Most students of comparative nationalism, however, have probed the nature of different national identities either by analyzing nation-building policies or by using cross-
national surveys to measure public opinion on nationalism. In this research, I will focus my attention on these two indicators of a country’s national identity as well.\textsuperscript{34}

The study of nation-building policies such as integration regulations and naturalization requirements is instructive because their very purpose is to influence the formation of national identity, and as such serve as a good reflection of what decision-makers want that identity to look like. Moreover, we can expect that such policies have an effect on popular understandings of national identity. Matthew Wright, for example, found that citizens of countries with a more inclusive citizenship regime tend to have more inclusive conceptions of national identity (Wright, 2011). Importantly, most research suggests that inclusionary nation-building policies tend to have a positive effect on social cohesion in diverse societies. Indeed, while some commentators have argued that accommodating differences between citizens is likely to exacerbate intergroup tension (Barry, 2001; Sowell, 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011), the empirical pattern seems to be the opposite (Kymlicka, 2011). Indeed, in political systems that respond to differences within society by incorporating rather than ignoring them, we tend to find that intergroup tension is less pronounced, that people are more tolerant, and that overall levels of social capital are higher (Lijphart, 1968; 2004; Weldon, 2006; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010).\textsuperscript{35}

Similar conclusions have been reached in studies that examine cross-national survey data on public attitudes towards nationalism. Such research invariably finds that the meaning of nationalism differs considerably from one country to another, and that this matters for attitudes

\textsuperscript{34} For methodological reasons, however, in the quantitative analyses in Chapter Four I only look at nation-building policies and not at public opinion data. See Section 4.1.

\textsuperscript{35} We can understand why some studies reach a different conclusion when we look at their operationalization of the variables and their case selection. To start with the latter, studies concluding that multiculturalist diversity policies have a negative effect tend to exclude the Canadian case (see, for example, Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Koopmans, 2010), where such policies seem to have had success (see Chapter Six). In regards to the former point, it is important to emphasize that what I am asserting here is that most evidence suggests that in diverse societies inclusive nation-building policies tend to have a positive effect on inter-group attitudes. In other words, I am not making a claim here about the effect of diversity in itself, nor am I summarizing the findings of research on the effect of policies on other outcomes than inter-group attitudes.
towards immigrants (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Kunovich, 2009; Escandell & Ceobanu, 2010; Ariely, 2011; Green, Sarrassin, Fasel, & Staerklé, 2011). While in some political communities there is a strong relationship between nationalism and anti-immigrant attitudes, in others that relationship appears to be much weaker or non-existent. In some countries, nationalism even appears to be associated with a positive stance on immigration (Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2010).

In sum, then, there are good reasons to expect that the nature of a country’s national identity shapes the political translation of the costs of immigrants’ reliance on social benefits. Where the dominant conception of the nation-state is an inclusionary one that is explicitly open to newcomers, it seems less likely that immigrants will be framed as undeserving of the benefits of the welfare state, regardless of how much they actually make use of them.

Welfare regime. A final country characteristic of relevance is the nature of the welfare regime. We can draw from the more general literature on social policy to formulate at least three reasons to hypothesize that countries with a more universal welfare system are less likely to respond to immigrant welfare dependence by suggestions for exclusionary welfare reforms. First, policy-making tends to be ‘path-dependent’: at any given time, possible courses of action are constrained by previously established institutional structures (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2004). As Ali Hajighasemi puts it, “national governments […] operate within the existing institutions and programmes and it seems probable that governments in industrial societies avoid initiatives which are likely to lead to a radical restructuring of the national welfare state” (2004, p. 81). Applying this insight to our current discussion, we would expect it to be difficult to implement immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in an institutional structure that is based on the principle of equal access for all (Sainsbury, 2012).

The second and related insight of relevance is that politicians and bureaucrats, when faced with new developments, tend to model new policies on existing examples (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). As a result of this process, policies with similar functions tend to grow alike – hence the
term ‘isomorphism’ to denote this mechanism (Morgan, 2005). Since universal welfare states primarily tend to make use of active labour market policies to fight unemployment (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Huo, 2009), we can expect such systems to develop programs aimed at stimulating immigrants’ labour market participation rather than to implement reforms that disentitle immigrants from benefits.

Finally, the literature on social policy teaches us that solidarity tends to be higher in universal welfare states. Walter Korpi (1980) was one of the first to assert that the chance welfare recipients are seen as undeserving is low in universal welfare states, because the number of people that are simultaneously contributing to and benefiting from the system is high. This argument has become even better known through the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) and Bo Rothstein (1998). Scott Matthews and Lynda Erickson (2008) formulate the same empirical expectation, but add a slightly different theoretical explanation for it. They reason that living in a universal welfare state not only affects one’s material interests, but also one’s values. In other words, a universal welfare state can socialize citizens into valuing institutionalized solidarity. Christian Larsen (2008) offers yet another theoretical elaboration of this argument: he maintains that the institutional structure of a welfare state frames the way the public perceives people who receive government transfers, and this frame tends to be at its most positive in more generous welfare systems. Whatever the exact causal mechanism behind it, many studies do indeed find that support for universal programs tends to be higher than for means-tested programs (Forma, 1997) and, more generally, that solidarity tends to be higher in universal than in non-universal welfare states (Evans, 1996; Halvorsen, 2007; Meier Jaeger, 2007).36

Building on this insight, a number of authors have therefore theorized that universal settings are likely to mute selective solidarity (Banting, 2000). In line with this expectation, Mau

36 Some studies find no or even a negative relationship between universality and solidarity (Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Gelissen, 2000; Arts & Gelissen, 2001). For as far as I am aware, however, unchallenged are the findings that respondents in universal welfare states are more likely to (a) see recipients as deserving of state support, (b) argue that recipients cannot be blamed for being in a position of welfare dependence; and (c) think that unequal treatment between different social groups is unjustifiable.
and Burkhardt find that (after controlling for many relevant variables) in social democratic welfare states respondents are much more likely to say that immigrants should be given the same rights than in the Christian democratic welfare regime (Mau & Burkhardt, 2009, p. 226). Similarly, Crepaz and Damron (2009) find that the more comprehensive a welfare state is, the more tolerant its inhabitants tend to be towards immigrants.\textsuperscript{37,38}

In summary, there are good reasons to expect the relationship between patterns of immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity to be weak. Instead, I hypothesize that the outcome depends crucially on the political translation of immigrant welfare dependence. Only where the costs of immigration become a prominent topic of political discussion, and are framed as the product of a welfare penchant of immigrants can we expect suggestions for welfare exclusion to become pervasive. This political translation seems particularly likely in countries with a sizeable anti-immigrant movement, an exclusionary national identity, and a non-universal welfare state structure.

2.5 Institutional dynamics of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms

Once the idea that immigrants’ access to social programs should be reduced has gained currency among the public and the political elite, we can expect immigrant-excluding welfare reforms to follow. There are two main mechanisms by which this can come about.

First, a spread of support for selective solidarity might lead policy-makers to conclude it is in their interest to implement immigrant-excluding welfare reforms on their own initiative. This

\textsuperscript{37} Again, some authors disagree. Ruud Koopmans (2010), for example, argues that in welfare states with generous entitlements, immigrants are more likely to be stigmatized as public-money drawing parasites than in more residual welfare states, simply because the intuitive appeal of such an argument is larger there. However, the evidence he relies on does not support this claim, because he analyzes the effect of universalism on \textit{policy outcomes}, not on \textit{attitudes}.

\textsuperscript{38} In the American literature on the racialization of welfare, it has been argued that part of the reason why the overrepresentation of African Americans on welfare has created such resentment is that the means-tested nature of the program has made the overrepresentation particularly visible to the public at large (Gilens, 1999). I do not review this argument here because it cannot be used to explain why immigrants’ use of social assistance has led to different responses in different countries - even in universal welfare states social assistance functions as a means-tested safety net.
could be simply because they have adopted the central tenets of the welfare chauvinist doctrine and therefore believe it is good for the country, but also, more cynically, because they expect to be rewarded electorally (Van Spanje, 2010; Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010). Second, the spread of welfare chauvinism can lead to changes in the distribution of power (Knight, 1995). When more people vote for anti-immigrant parties with a welfare chauvinist agenda, their presence in parliament and therefore, their political influence, becomes larger. While none of these parties has ever managed to reap a majority of the votes in a national election, they have been able to exert considerable pressure on governments by striking a deal of guaranteed support in return for policy influence (as in Denmark from 2001 to 2011), or even by formally joining a government coalition (as in the Netherlands from 2002 to 2003). Immigrant-excluding welfare reforms seem especially likely when these parties manage to convince economically right-wing parties that the most expedient area to cut is in immigrants’ access to benefits and programs.

When we look at the institutional dynamics of implementing immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, it becomes clear that there are large and theoretically relevant differences between this type of policy change and more general welfare reforms. One of the main insights in the literature on welfare retrenchment is that politicians who want to reduce the overall generosity of the welfare state face formidable institutional obstacles. Many social programs are popular among the citizenry; as a result, retrenchment efforts will be met by a well-mobilized opposition, and any party that voices or implements such measures will be punished at the next election (Kitschelt, 2001; Brooks & Manza, 2007; Sachweh, Ullrich, & Christoph, 2007; Rehm, 2007; Huber & Stephens, 2001).

In order to circumvent these institutional obstacles, politicians have been observed to make use of two strategies. First, they can engage in what Kent Weaver calls ‘blame avoidance’ (Weaver, 1986). By obfuscating the severity of reforms, striking cross-party package deals which make it unclear to the electorate which party is primarily responsible, and compensating those
who are most obviously hit, politicians can reform social policies without having to worry about negative electoral repercussions. The second strategy is almost the exact opposite: rather than avoiding to be held responsible for them, politicians can get away with welfare reforms by successfully convincing the electorate that it is necessary to implement them (Schmidt, 2000; Cox, 2001; Kuipers, 2006, pp. 147-78; see also Section 2.4.2).

In the case of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, both the institutional obstacles and the strategies politicians employ to navigate them are different. To begin with the former, while a large part of the electorate would object to general cutbacks, a much smaller portion would be affected by immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Moreover, the targets of those policy changes, recent and future migrants, have limited access to the decision-making process and are therefore unlikely to pose an obstacle. In countries where selective solidarity is pervasive, left-wing parties may, for ideological reasons, be reluctant to propose restrictions on immigrants’ social rights. Once such proposals are on the table, however, even those parties might feel compelled to vote in favour of exclusion for electoral reasons. In other words, compared to more general welfare reforms, immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are more likely to pass through parliament because no party depends on the people affected by the reforms for its re-election.

This does not mean, however, that immigrant-excluding welfare reforms face no institutional obstacles at all. While welfare chauvinists have little to fear from public opposition, their attempts to exclude immigrants from social programs can be thwarted by legal obstacles. Indeed, many scholars note that the most important source of the protection and advancement of immigrants’ social rights are courts and legal activists (Guiraudon, 2000; 2002; Joppke, 2001). The 1994 California referendum on ‘Proposition 187’ offers a forceful example. While the bill, also known as the ‘Save Our State-initiative’, garnered a handsome majority of the vote, it was overturned by the federal court shortly after its electoral victory (Valenty & Sylvia, 2004). Other examples of the judicial branch of government reversing attempts to exclude immigrants

In short, legal institutions limit how far policy-makers can go in differentiating in social rights between immigrants and native-born citizens. Most obviously, the constitution of every country under study in this project\textsuperscript{39} prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin. In those jurisdictions in which the courts have the power of judicial review, they can overrule reforms that violate this principle. Moreover, not only national, but also international law can constrain immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for example, includes the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of national origin (Article 2), as well as a number of articles that are more closely related to social rights. Article 22 is the most pertinent:

> Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22)

Although the UDHR is not a legally binding document, it does constitute normative pressure. Moreover, many of the UDHR’s provisions are also included in UN treaties that do have legal status in the countries that are party to them. Three are particularly relevant.\textsuperscript{40} First, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), like the UDHR, guarantees the non-discrimination principle (Article 2) and the right to ‘social security, including social assistance’ (Article 9). No less than 160 countries are party to this covenant. Second, the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by even more countries (a total of 193), stipulates that all children, regardless of status, should be treated

\textsuperscript{39} Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. See also Section 2.1 and Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{40} In December 1990, the UN General Assembly also adopted a convention on the protection of the rights of migrant workers, which explicitly guarantees the right for all immigrants to enjoy the same working conditions (Article 25) and access to social benefits (Article 27) as native-born citizens. So far, however, the convention has only been signed by emigration countries.
equally (Article 2), and guarantees ‘for every child the right to benefit from social security’ (Article 26).\(^{41}\) And third, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (ratified by 145 countries) demands that all recognized refugees have the exact same rights to social benefits as native-born citizens (Article 23 and 24).

The importance of international law is even greater for member states of the European Union (EU) (Geddes, 2003; Stokke, 2007). First, there is little a member state can do to exclude citizens of other member states. Citizens of the EU have the right to move freely from one member state to another in accordance with the Schengen agreement (and its incorporation in EU law as a result of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam). More importantly, the supranational arrangements also have consequences for access to social benefits and programs. Indeed, ever since the early 1970s, member states have been obligated to open their social programs and benefits to all EU citizens who work on their territory (commonly referred to as \textit{lex loci laboris}, codified in regulations 1408/71 and 574/72).\(^{42}\) Moreover, judgments from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have expanded the obligations that follow from this principle. For example, the ECJ ruled in 1986 that member states are obliged to offer child benefits to migrant workers from within the EU even if their children still live in their country of origin (\textit{Pinna} case, 41/84). Similarly, in the \textit{Ten Holder} judgment, the court ruled that a Dutch woman who had returned to the Netherlands after having lived and worked for a long period of time in Germany and started to experience serious back problems, was still covered by German social security law until she took up work in the Netherlands (\textit{Ten Holder} case, 302/84).

\(^{41}\) The United States is a notorious defector to both treaties. Perhaps even more interesting is that upon accession to these international agreements, Belgium announced it interpreted the non-discrimination principle “as not necessarily implying an obligation on States automatically to guarantee to foreigners the same rights as to their nationals” (Government of Belgium 1983), while France declared when it joined the ICESCR that it would not interpret Article 9 as a prohibition for “establishing residence requirements for the allocation of certain social benefits” (Government of France 1980).

\(^{42}\) This directive has different implications for different types of programs. Because eligibility is based on the location of \textit{employment}, EU citizens cannot move to another country to claim residence-based programs such as social assistance. Instead, member states have the right to place a three month residence requirement on such programs for migrants within the EU. The story is different for contributory programs: not only do EU citizens start building up eligibility from the moment they start working, they can also count the years they worked in other member states in assessing eligibility and benefit level.
Second, all EU members (as well as other European countries, including Norway and Switzerland) are signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which has proven an obstacle for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. The best-known example in this regard is *Gaygusuz vs. Austria*, a case in which a Turkish man, lawfully resident in Austria for over ten years, was denied emergency assistance on the basis of his nationality. When his appeals to the Austrian authorities proved futile, he applied to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ruled unanimously in Mr. Gaygusuz’ favour and declared that Austria’s decision violated Article 14 ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination (Gortázar Rotaeché, 1998).

Since the obstacles to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are legal rather than democratic, politicians intent on implementing these changes are likely to resort to different strategies than their counterparts who are trying to bring about a more general cutback in welfare policies. First, welfare chauvinist politicians can try to work around the legal prohibitions. For example, excluding immigrant groups with a weak legal status is less likely to be frustrated than attempts to curtail the benefits of citizens or permanent residents (see Figure 2.2). In most Western welfare states, immigrants without a permanent resident status have been excluded from a variety of social programs (Soysal, 1994; Faist, 1995; Kvistad, 1998), and their access has been further restricted in recent years (Kurthen, 1998; Minderhoud, 2004). Undocumented immigrants are most vulnerable in this regard. Except for providing education to children and emergency health care, there is very little that a state can be forced to offer to people who are not legally entitled to stay within its borders. Temporary migrants are somewhat better protected, because denying them access to contributory programs that they paid into is easily construed as discrimination, even though this has happened in the past on a fairly large scale (Ryner, 2000, p. 60), still takes place in some instances (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010), and is actively promoted today by a large number of anti-immigrant politicians. Temporary migrants are in a much weaker position, however, against exclusion from non-contributory programs such as social assistance. The justification here is that the very reason for their migration is
employment, and that temporary migrants who lose their job should lose their residence permit, not receive income support. And even though this justification does not apply to asylum seekers (or refugee claimants), their relatively weak legal status has also made this group of migrants susceptible to welfare exclusion in recent years (Minderhoud, 1999; Schuster, 2000; Bloch & Schuster, 2002; Mynott, Humphries, & Cohen, 2002).

A related, but more indirect, strategy is what institutionalists call ‘patching up’ or ‘policy layering’ (Genschel, 1997; Streeck & Thelen, 2005): policy-makers can avoid unchangeable institutions by adding or amending other policies that make the original institution perform in a new way. For example, rather than by making amendments to social policies, differentiation in access to benefits can be achieved by changing admission policies. When the legal system prohibits residence requirements affecting permanent migrants, welfare chauvinists can decide to implement a residence requirement to acquire permanent residency instead. This strategy avoids the legal road blocks while still achieving the intended goal.

If such strategies are unavailable or unsuccessful, another option is to amend or abolish the legal obstacles. An example of the former took place in 2003, when the EU introduced the so-called Family Reunification Directive (directive 2003/86). This amendment to the unconditional right of a family life as enshrined in Article 8 ECHR enabled member states to demand that people who want to bring over family members from outside the Union satisfy certain criteria (such as having stable financial resources and suitable accommodation) (Groenendijk, 2006). Complete abolition of legal obstacles seems less likely. After all, many policy-makers would consider withdrawing from the EU or repealing constitutional rights too drastic a measure, for both practical and normative reasons. Nevertheless, this does not preclude that these strategies will sometimes be advocated in parliament, in particular by anti-immigrant politicians.

43 All member states eventually decided to make use of that option, albeit some were quicker to do so than others. Sweden, for example, only introduced these kinds of restrictions in 2007. See Chapter Seven.
All in all, while the spread of selective solidarity will make the implementation of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms more likely, there are limits to how far these reforms can go. I expect the limitations to be more formidable in countries that have a strong and activist judiciary, and are bound by multiple international human right conventions. Moreover, I hypothesize that politicians who are eager to reduce immigrants’ access to social programs will attempt either to change these obstacles or work around them.

2.6 Summary of main hypotheses

By combining insights from the theoretical literature on new institutionalism, social policy change, and the politics of immigration, the previous sections have produced a theory of the origins of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. This theory consists of two main hypotheses. First, I expect a weak relationship between the costs immigrants objectively impose on the social budget on the one hand and selective solidarity on the other. Instead, I hypothesize that the costs of immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to be translated into suggestions for welfare exclusion in countries with a sizeable anti-immigrant party, an exclusionary national identity, and a non-universal welfare regime. Second, in those contexts where support for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms is widespread, I expect that attempts at implementing those policy changes can be thwarted by legal obstacles, and that policy-makers, in turn, will try to overcome those obstacles either by working around them or by changing them so they pose less of a barrier. Figure 2.4 offers a graphic summary of my theory of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

For presentation purposes, I am summarizing in one sentence what technically speaking should be considered three separate hypotheses: (a) the costs of immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to be translated into suggestions for exclusion in countries with a sizeable anti-immigrant party than in countries where such parties have had less success; (b) the costs of immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to be translated into suggestions for exclusion in countries with an exclusionary identity than in countries with an inclusionary identity; and (c) the costs of immigrant welfare dependence are more likely to be translated into suggestions for exclusion in non-universal welfare states than in universal welfare states.
Figure 2.4. Graphic representation of main hypotheses.

One might rightly point out that this theoretical model will be difficult to test because of endogeneity problems: some of the independent variables may themselves be influenced by the dependent variables they have been theorized to affect. For example, successful immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are likely to decrease the degree to which immigrants make use of benefits. In other words, while I am interested in testing whether high levels of immigrant welfare dependence might lead to high levels of selective solidarity in the short term, it seems plausible that in the long term an increase in selective solidarity would result in the adoption of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms and therefore in a decrease in immigrants’ use of social programs. A second example of endogeneity can be found in the relationship between anti-immigrant parties and public support for immigrant exclusion. While there are good reasons to hypothesize that the arrival on the political scene of anti-immigrant parties increases anti-immigrant sentiment, there is also evidence that those parties are more likely to be successful in countries where many voters harbour anti-immigrant attitudes in the first place (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002).45 And the same can be said about another independent variable, the nature of national identity. While I hypothesize that an inclusionary national identity is

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45 Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that AIPs do not come to the fore in every country with high levels of public opposition to immigration. Institutional factors, most obviously the electoral system, are important as well (see Section 2.4.3).
likely to mute concerns about immigrant welfare use, one could also argue that a political
community where few perceive immigrants as welfare leeches is likely to understand itself as an
inclusionary and welcoming one.

These complications pose considerable methodological challenges. In particular,
disentangling these endogenous relationships requires careful attention to the timing of events.
In other words, many of the hypotheses in Figure 2.4 cannot be conclusively falsified or
validated in a static test. For that reason, I will test this theory of immigrant-excluding welfare
reforms by employing a wide range of methodological techniques: quantitative analysis of both
longitudinal and cross-national income and survey data, content analysis of parliamentary
debates, qualitative interviews, and the qualitative analysis of policy developments. The next
chapter elaborates on the methodological design of this study.
In the following four chapters, I will assess whether the theoretical model summarized in Figure 2.4 holds up to empirical scrutiny. Chapter Four analyzes quantitative data in a partial test of the first hypothesis: it explores whether there is evidence of a relationship between immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs and levels of selective solidarity among the population at large. After that, Chapters Five, Six and Seven conduct a more complete test of my theory by studying recent relevant developments in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden. This chapter briefly discusses the methodology of my empirical analyses. In the following, I will first explain why I have chosen to combine quantitative and qualitative techniques; second, I discuss the design of my quantitative analysis; and third, I explain the empirical domain and the methods of data collection and analysis in the three qualitative case studies.

3.1 The advantages of a mixed methodology

Empirical political scientists have long quarrelled over the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative research methods. In recent years, however, many comparatativists have become convinced that the two sets of techniques can be fruitfully combined, and in fact, that a mixed methodology enables a more rigorous test than either approach can produce in isolation (Lieberman, 2005). This is mostly because quantitative and qualitative methods each have distinct strengths and weaknesses. Quantitative techniques, for example, tend to produce results with high levels of external validity that warrant generalization beyond the studied sample, whereas qualitative techniques tend to result in findings with higher internal validity, painting a
more complete and fine-grained picture of the case(s) under study than one can capture in numbers (Gerring, 2006). Therefore, if qualitative and quantitative analyses lead to similar conclusions, researchers will be able to advance those conclusions with more confidence.

This research follows this insight. It begins with a preliminary test of my theoretical model that is quantitative in nature, in order to assess whether we can find evidence of its observable implications across a relatively large set of countries. Moreover, it allows us to identify which cases are particularly instructive to study in more detail.

At the same time, however, there are limits to what a quantitative analysis can teach us about my theory of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. For some of the crucial aspects of my theoretical model there are no useful cross-national data available (for example, the views of politicians on immigrant entitilements); other aspects are simply not particularly amenable to quantification (for example, the motivations behind policy changes). Case study analysis allows me to study welfare chauvinism’s traction not only among the public at large, but also among politicians and policy-makers. Moreover, this approach enables a fine-grained measurement of the development of immigrants’ inclusion and exclusion in social policies, as well as of the arguments that have been invoked to justify changes in immigrants’ access. As such, the case study approach allows me to test not only the first, but also the second hypothesis of my theory, concerning the implementation of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

In addition, in the context of this research the case study approach has some distinct methodological advantages. As we have seen, the process by which immigrant-excluding welfare reforms come about is a highly complex one, in which some factors are affected by the very developments they set in motion (examples are the endogenous relationships between the success of anti-immigrant parties and the pervasiveness of anti-immigrant sentiment, and between the nature of national identity and levels of selective solidarity). Tracking the developments in these countries over an extended period of time enables me to disentangle some of these complications. More generally, within-case analysis makes it possible to gauge the
effect of the multiple independent variables that appear in my theoretical model, even though the number of cases under study is small.

3.2 Stage 1: Quantitative analysis of fourteen countries

The first stage of this research consists of a quantitative analysis of the relationship between levels of immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity among the public in the fourteen typical examples of the three types of welfare regime Gøsta Esping-Andersen identified (1990): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The data are drawn from the Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and the World Values Survey (WVS). I measure the effect of immigrant welfare dependence on selective solidarity in a series of multilevel regression models that allow me to control for both country-level characteristics such as the nature of a country’s welfare regime and individual-level characteristics such as age, religiosity, and employment status. For purposes of cross-validation, I rerun these models several times, using different indicators of selective solidarity, different indicators of immigrant welfare dependence, different survey years, and different country samples. Detailed descriptions of the operationalization and character of the dependent and independent variables, as well as more elaborate considerations regarding statistical techniques are included in Chapter Four.

3.3 Stage 2: Qualitative analysis of three countries

After the preliminary quantitative test, I proceed by testing my theoretical model in a comparative case study analysis of the politics of immigrants’ social rights in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden from 1991 to 2010. I first explain why I select this time period and these cases, after which I discuss which sources of information I will rely on in my assessments.
3.3.1 Justification of Empirical Domain

Given the importance of a longitudinal perspective, I analyze the three cases over a long time period (1991-2010). This choice is partly informed by data availability (for example, Canadian parliamentary debates are not online available before the early 1990s, and the Swedish statistics agency did not collect information on immigrants’ welfare use before 1990; see also below). But theoretical considerations are also important. Political parties with a welfare chauvinist agenda were virtually absent until about two decades ago. Relatedly, immigrants’ use of social programs was rarely discussed in Europe before the 1990s (Freeman, 1995; Messina, 2007). Indeed, we will see that in the two European countries under study, discussion of immigrants’ access to benefits is often accompanied by comments that this topic has been ignored for too long. And while it is of course important for methodological reasons to ensure variation on the variables of interest, there is simply little to analyze in the period before the 1990s.

For these three countries, this time frame offers considerable variation on all relevant independent variables. First, this sample includes one example of each of Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Even though the Netherlands is sometimes classified as a social democratic regime because of its relatively high levels of social spending and decommodification (Vis, Van Kersbergen, & Becker, 2008; Crepaz & Damron, 2009), the structure of its welfare state, especially in preferring passive government transfers over active labour market policies, is decidedly Christian democratic (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 162; Binnema, 2004, p. 113; Pontusson, 2005, pp. 146-7).

Second, there is great variation in the success of anti-immigrant parties in these three countries. In the Netherlands, AIPs have slowly gained appeal since the 1980s. Until the elections of 2002, anti-immigrant sentiment was mostly voiced by the politically marginalized

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46 There have been some occasional cutbacks in the social rights of asylum seekers in some of the countries under study as early as the 1980s (Sainsbury, 2012, p. 182), but those changes received little political attention and were relatively minor in scope.

47 One might argue that these cases are so different that the research design is indeterminate. However, I am not only comparing these countries with each other, but also analyzing them at different points in time. In such longitudinal analyses, many relevant variables are obviously kept constant.
Center Party, but since the appearance of Pim Fortuyn on the political stage in 2001, anti-immigrant parties have managed to secure a sizeable portion of the Dutch vote. In Canada, on the other hand, anti-immigrant parties have remained virtually absent. The Swedish case, finally, has a yet different history with anti-immigrant parties. In the elections of 1991, the xenophobic message of New Democracy appealed to enough voters to win the newly formed party 25 seats in parliament (out of a total of 349), but it lost all of those again in the next election. No other anti-immigrant-party entered parliament until the election of 2010, when the Sweden Democrats managed to win 5.7 percent of the seats in the Riksdag. In sum, then, this sample includes a case where anti-immigrant parties have had no success, one case where their success has been steadily increasing, and one where the organized anti-immigrant movement has managed to achieve representation in parliament on two separate short-lived occasions.

Third, these cases differ in the kinds of legal obstacles immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are likely to be confronted with. On the one hand, the tradition of common law and the power of judicial review make the Canadian judiciary much more potent than its Dutch and Swedish counterparts. On the other hand, the two European countries are more constrained by international law, most obviously the obligations following from EU membership. Finally, even though Sweden has been party to the ECHR since its inception, it joined the EU in 1995 and the obligations flowing from Schengen membership have only gone into full effect in March 2001. As such, in addition to significant differences on this variable between the countries, there is also considerable variation within one of the cases.

A similar observation can be made about the final independent variable of relevance, the inclusiveness of national identity. Whereas until the late 1990s the national conceptions of Canadian, Swedish, and Dutch identity were among the most inclusive of the Western world, the Netherlands has made a dramatic U-turn in this respect. The public has started to embrace a

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48 While some might see the former Reform Party as an anti-immigrant party, it can better be understood as a populist right-wing party. See Section 6.3.2.
more exclusionary understanding of what it means to be Dutch, and recent governments have implemented a series of restrictive changes in national-building policies.

While these differences on the crucial independent variables are useful to probe their effect on the dependent variable, at the same time there are two important similarities that facilitate the comparison. First, as Figure 3.1 shows, these countries have admitted a comparable number of immigrants in proportion to their population during the period under study. Even though Canada has historically had a more sizeable annual intake than the Netherlands and Sweden, this difference became much smaller since the 1990s. Any difference we might observe between these countries in their exclusion of immigrants from benefits can thus not be convincingly attributed to differences in the size of the recent immigrant population.49

![Figure 3.1. Annual inflow of foreign-born population per 1,000 citizens in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden, 1991-2009. (Source: OECD, 2011b.)](image)

For similar reasons, it is methodologically convenient that these three countries have experienced similar economic fortunes over the period of study (see Figure 3.2). Even though

49 The composition of these countries’ immigrant populations in terms of the country of origin, however, is quite different. Whereas from 1998 to 2007 63 percent of immigrants to Canada were Asian, these percentages were 25 and 42 for the Netherlands and Sweden, respectively. Conversely, 48 percent of migrants to the Netherlands and 50 percent of those to Sweden were European in these ten years, while only 15 percent of the migrants to Canada were from the European continent. (Data from OECD, 2011b.)
there are differences in timing and severity, all three countries experienced recessions in the early 1990s, early 2000s, and late 2000s, and faced similar economic pressures at roughly the same points in time. For that reason, if we see more immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in one of these countries, we cannot simply attribute that difference to budgetary pressures. Since all countries have faced incentives to save money somewhere at the same moments, we can make meaningful comparisons between, for example, a country that decides to implement a general cut in benefit levels and one that attempts to save money by disentitling immigrants. In sum, the three countries under study display sufficient similarity to allow for meaningful comparison (in having similar admission levels and economic trajectories) and sufficient variation on the independent variables of interest to assess their effect on the dependent variable.

![Figure 3.2. Real GDP growth in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden, 1991-2010. (Source: OECD, 2011a. Data for 2010 are OECD estimates.)](image)

Of course, one might point out that even with this carefully selected set of cases, it is impossible to conclusively test every observable implication of my theory of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Even though the combination of cross-sectional and cross-temporal analysis allows for the isolated assessment of multiple observable implications, there are limits to the conclusions
we can draw on the basis of this comparative case study, or indeed, this research design as a whole. For one thing, this is because some of the variables are difficult to disentangle. The rise of anti-immigrant parties in the Netherlands, for example, took place over the same time period as the reconceptualization of Dutch national identity in a more exclusionary direction. It is therefore difficult to assess the independent role of each of these two developments. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the main goal of these case studies is to test the internal validity of my theory. In other words, after I have explored the external validity of one of my two hypotheses, I turn to assessing whether the theoretical model furthers our understanding of developments in three cases of particular interest.50

3.3.2 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

In order to analyze these three countries in light of the theoretical model outlined in Chapter Two, I have collected information on four topics. First, I have gathered longitudinal indicators of immigrants’ use of welfare services and selective solidarity among the public. National statistical agencies document detailed information on patterns of welfare use among the immigrant and non-immigrant population. National election studies, in turn, offer rich and longitudinal data sets, containing questions on both redistribution and immigration that have been asked in the exact same formulation at different points in time.

A second area of study is the level of selective solidarity among politicians and political elites in general. For this purpose I have conducted qualitative interviews with the relevant

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50 The value of studying these three cases is further underlined by the findings in Chapter Four. As we will see, Canada appears as the only non-universal welfare state that is successful at escaping selective solidarity. Since the economic integration of immigrants to Canada has recently slowed down, it constitutes an instructive case to assess whether selective solidarity will rise as immigrants’ relative reliance on welfare benefits becomes larger as well. The Netherlands offer an opportunity to study the effect of changes in the country characteristics that we expect to influence the political translation of immigrant welfare dependence. While old survey data suggest that selective solidarity is relatively muted in the Dutch context, if the theoretical model is correct we should expect it to spread as a result of the increasing success of AIPs and the restrictive change in popular understandings of Dutch identity. Sweden, finally, by itself seems to falsify the supposition that selective solidarity is fuelled by a large overreliance of immigrants on welfare benefits. In the next chapter's sample, Sweden consistently appears as displaying the lowest levels of selective solidarity while also having the highest overrepresentation of immigrants in its transfer benefits.
spokesperson of each parliamentary party in these three countries.\textsuperscript{51} In addition, I have spoken to senior civil servants in ministries responsible for social policy and immigration. In total, I have interviewed 38 politicians and civil servants. In order to measure the prominence of selective solidarity in political discourse in more detail, I have also analyzed parliamentary debates from 1991 to 2010 in order to see how frequently, and in what way, immigration is discussed in the context of its interaction with the welfare state.\textsuperscript{52}

Third, a crucial component of the analysis is evidence of both the formal position of immigrants in the three welfare systems under study and policy changes in this area over the last two decades. For this part of the analysis, I have surveyed policy documents on welfare and immigration policy issued by the Canadian, Dutch, and Swedish governments since 1991. In addition, I have used the interviews I conducted with civil servants to corroborate the conclusions from this policy analysis.

Finally, in order to assess the value of my theory it is necessary to complement the description of immigrant-exclusionary policy reforms with an analysis of the motivations behind the reforms. Both the parliamentary debates and the interviews with parliamentarians and senior civil servants have been instrumental in assessing the motivation behind policy changes.

Overall then, I study the developments over the last twenty years in Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden by relying on a variety of methods: semi-structured interviews with MPs and civil servants, diachronic policy analysis, parliamentary discourse analysis, and the quantitative study of income and survey data from national statistical agencies.

\textsuperscript{51} Some parliamentary parties preferred me to speak with the spokesperson on social affairs, while others referred me to the spokesperson on immigration. Dutch environmentalist party GroenLinks and the ideologically similar Swedish Miljöparti refused to be interviewed for this study.\textsuperscript{52} For reasons of online data availability, my analysis of parliamentary debates starts in 1995 in the Netherlands and in 1994 in Canada.
This chapter undertakes a partial test of the first hypothesis of the theory developed in Chapter Two. More specifically, it explores the relationship between immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs and mass levels of welfare chauvinism in fourteen immigrant-receiving welfare states: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

As described above, my theoretical model predicts the direct relationship between objective immigrant welfare dependence and subjective opposition to the costs of immigration to be weak. Instead, how the public evaluates immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs is expected to depend heavily on country characteristics such as the type of welfare regime, the strength of the anti-immigrant movement, and the nature of national identity. It is worth reiterating that this prediction runs counter to a commonly held assumption about the origins of selective solidarity. Indeed, one of the most intuitive and often-heard arguments is that objections to immigrants’ place in the welfare state tend to be loudest where the overrepresentation of immigrants among recipients of government transfers is highest. The theory of reciprocal altruism seems particularly in line with such a prediction. After all, when immigrants are among the most frequent beneficiaries of welfare programs, it seems more likely that the public will perceive them as undeserving abusers of the welfare system (O’Connell, 2005; Hero & Preuhs, 2007). This argument is present outside academia as well. Anti-immigrant politicians often attempt to legitimize their exclusionary reforms by referring to ‘objective facts’ concerning the use of social
benefits by immigrants (Menz, 2006, p. 409; Halvorsen, 2007, p. 253). Indeed, in the last few years immigration sceptics in various countries have called for economic estimates of immigrants’ ‘price tag’ as a strategy to increase public discomfort about (the costs of) immigration (House of Lords, 2008; Van der Geest & Dietvorst, 2010; Grubel & Grady, 2011).

As pervasive as this assumption might be, it has not been subject to systematic scrutiny. While studies on the determinants of general unease about immigration are countless, only recently have scholars started to address selective solidarity in particular (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Crepaz & Damron, 2009). Similarly, there is much research that analyzes the effect of all kinds of objective indicators of immigration on anti-immigrant attitudes, but rarely have scholars analyzed the effect of immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs (for exceptions, see Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2009; Banting, Soroka, & Koning, forthcoming). To the best of my knowledge no study to date has offered a systematic cross-country analysis of the relationship between immigrants’ overrepresentation in government transfers and welfare chauvinism.

The main goal of this chapter is to provide such an analysis. It is structured as follows. The next section maps immigrants’ relative use of transfer benefits and the public levels of welfare chauvinism in the countries under study, and provides univariate information on the country characteristics that can be hypothesized to influence the main relationship of interest. The second section proceeds to analyze the relationship between immigrants’ dependence on social programs and welfare chauvinism in a series of multi-level regression models. The final section discusses possible objections to the analyses in the chapter, and draws overall conclusions.

4.1 Univariate analyses: mapping immigrant welfare reliance and selective solidarity

For a cross-nationally comparable indicator of immigrants’ overrepresentation among recipients of government transfers, I use data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which provides

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53 Some might argue that a more appropriate indicator would be an estimate of the total objective ‘costs’ of immigration. (Such an estimate would also account, among other things, for the costs incurred by immigration in other areas of the budget, as well as for the benefits immigrants bring to the host country’s
data on both immigration status and welfare income in different countries at different points in time. I use these survey data to construct an Immigrant Overrepresentation Index (IOI), which is calculated as the difference in the amount of money in government transfers received by the average immigrant (IR) and the average native-born person (NR), expressed as a percentage of the average transfer received by native-born citizens (expressed in a formula, $IOI = \frac{IR - NR}{NR} \times 100$). If in a certain year the average immigrant receives 50 percent more in social assistance than the average native-born citizen, the IOI for social assistance in that year is 50. If, on the other hand, immigrants receive on average 50 percent less, the score is -50.54

For each country, I calculate an IOI for four different sets of government transfers: (1) social assistance; (2) social assistance and unemployment benefits combined; (3) social assistance, unemployment, public pension, and family benefits combined; and (4) all benefits combined.55 The reasons for distinguishing these specific types of IOIs are threefold.

First, public support tends to be lower for means-tested programs such as social assistance than for more universal programs such as public pension programs. Similarly, the unemployed and the able-bodied poor are generally seen to be less deserving of state support than the sick and the elderly. These four IOIs, then, can be placed on a scale of ‘deservingness’: if immigrants’ overrepresentation on welfare programs indeed spurs selective solidarity, we should expect the

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54 One could think of other ways to measure immigrants’ reliance on government transfers, such as (1) a comparison of the percentages of immigrants and native-born that receive benefits, or (2) a measure that is exclusively based on how much benefits immigrants are receiving without comparing this to the receipt among native-born citizens. Both these measures have disadvantages over the operationalization I have chosen. The former measure does not capture that the level of a benefit can differ substantially between one recipient and another, and is therefore an imprecise indicator of welfare dependence (Mood, 2011). The latter measure is not only troubled by cross-national differences in benefit generosity and eligibility requirements, but is also a poorer indicator from a conceptual point of view (after all, by their very nature feelings of selective solidarity entail a comparison between the deservingness of immigrants and native-born). Despite these conceptual problems, however, I have rerun all analyses with these alternative operationalizations for the purpose of cross-validation. See below, in particular footnotes 73 and 74.

55 In addition to the four transfer benefits mentioned in the third indicator, this includes disability benefits, non-basic pension benefits such as widowers’ benefits, maternity/paternity benefits, sickness benefits, and near-cash benefits such as food stamps.
effect to be larger for the IOI for social assistance than for the IOI for total transfer benefits.

Second, these four sets of IOIs allow us to acknowledge the interplay of the different transfer programs in a system of welfare provisions (Nelson, 2005). In many countries, an important reason for immigrants’ overrepresentation among recipients of social assistance is their failure to qualify for programs with higher benefit levels. For that reason, it makes more theoretical sense to calculate IOIs for different sets of government transfers than for each transfer in isolation.\(^{56}\)

Finally, in order to account for cross-national differences in welfare systems it makes sense to distinguish between all transfer programs and ‘core’ transfers only (social assistance, unemployment, family, and pension benefits). The set of benefits a state offers varies considerably from one country to another, and this is reflected in the LIS data as well. Data for social assistance, unemployment, family, and pension benefits, however, are available in the data set for every welfare state under study.\(^{57}\) In one sense, then, the IOI for these core transfers allows for a cleaner comparison than the IOI for the total of all benefits for which data are available.

Figure 4.1 displays IOIs for different sets of government transfers in 2000. Unfortunately, the LIS does not include a question on immigrant status in the Netherlands and Finland, so it was impossible to calculate any IOIs for these two countries.\(^{58}\) Looking at the IOIs for the other twelve countries, it first seems worth noting that the degree of immigrants’ overreliance on

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\(^{56}\) Moreover, such a strategy would also make little sense from a conceptual point of view. It seems implausible, both intuitively and theoretically, that welfare chauvinism could be driven by an overrepresentation of immigrants among recipients of, for example, child benefits in particular.

\(^{57}\) Still, there are significant cross-country differences in the size of each of these transfer benefits. As Appendix Table A1.1 illustrates, the countries under study differ considerably not only in the percentage of GDP they dedicate to social spending, but also in the relative size of each of the individual programs.

\(^{58}\) There is no variable for immigrant status in the UK either, but there is a question on ethnicity. I have therefore decided to calculate IOIs for the UK by comparing white and non-white respondents instead. (While there is a strong overlap in the United Kingdom between ethnicity and immigrant status - see also Sainsbury, 2012, p. 116 - this obviously raises concerns about the comparability of the data. I have thus conducted all analyses without the United Kingdom as well. See below, in particular footnotes 70 and 71.)
government transfers depends on the type of transfers we are talking about. As the black bars in Figure 4.1 show, if we combine all government transfers documented in the LIS, in half of the countries immigrants are receiving less than native-born citizens, and in none of the other countries is immigrants’ overrepresentation particularly high. The same observation holds when we narrow our focus to four of the core programs of the modern welfare state: social assistance, unemployment benefits, child benefits, and public pensions. Of course, this is in large part because in most of the countries under study, immigrants are on average younger than the native-born population, and are therefore less likely to be in receipt of pension benefits. But that does not change the fact that an Austrian, German or American arguing that the state pays out more money in social transfers to immigrants than to native-born citizens is wrong. The picture becomes different when we focus on programs that target the poor and unemployed. In all countries under study, immigrants receive more in combined social assistance and unemployment benefits than the non-immigrant population, and for 10 of the 12 countries, their overrepresentation becomes even higher when we look at social assistance alone.

![Figure 4.1. Overrepresentation of immigrants in various transfer programs, 12 countries, 2000. (For more details, see Appendix Table A1.2.)](image-url)

(For more details, see Appendix Table A1.2.)
Perhaps even more striking than the differences between programs are the differences between countries, especially when we exclusively focus on social assistance. Immigrants’ overrepresentation is massive in Sweden and Norway (with IOIs as high as 840 and 730, respectively), but modest to negligible in Canada, Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland. It is clear that a large part of this variation can be explained by countries’ welfare regime and admission policy. Even though a systematic quantitative analysis would take up too much space here, some patterns are particularly obvious. For one thing, IOIs are at their highest in universal welfare states. Moreover, the type of admission policy goes a long way in explaining variation within types of welfare regimes. Countries with relatively selective admission policies such as Denmark, Canada, and Austria display much lower IOIs than otherwise similar countries with more open admission policies such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany, respectively.

Figure 4.2. Overrepresentation of immigrants in social assistance, 1988-2004, in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, and Switzerland (panel A); and in France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States (panel B).

Figure 4.2 zooms in on IOIs for social assistance only and shows the development from 1990 to 2005 for nine countries for as far as data availability permits. Again, it is beyond the scope of

\[59\] In order to maximize the number of data points, the IOIs for Belgium, Canada, France, and Germany have been based on a comparison between citizens and non-citizens rather than on immigrants and native-born. In addition to excluding Finland and the Netherlands, Figure 4.2 also omits Norway because
this chapter to offer systematic and exhaustive explanations for the picture that emerges. Nevertheless, it seems worth emphasizing that the countries under study do not only differ considerably in the degree to which immigrants are overrepresented among recipients of social assistance, but also in how this overrepresentation has evolved over time. Indeed, immigrants’ overrepresentation seems to be increasing over time in some countries (panel A), while it seems to be more stable or declining elsewhere (panel B).  

Reliable longitudinal and cross-national data on the dependent variable are more challenging to acquire. Indeed, an important reason for the scarcity of cross-national studies of selective solidarity is the lack of useful survey data. There are some surveys that ask respondents specifically about the welfare use and welfare entitlements of immigrants, but few have been conducted cross-nationally and those few only cover a small number of countries. The next best thing is to use different questions from large cross-national surveys in order to offer a general impression of the degree to which respondents (1) see the position of immigrants in the welfare system as a problem, and (2) are comfortable with differentiations between the native-born and immigrant population. Figure 4.3, based on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Values Survey (WVS) aims to do exactly that. It shows the support for a number of statements that could be interpreted as indirect indicators of welfare chauvinism for the fourteen countries under study, by showing the mean of the country-level percentages (black bars), as well as the percentages for the highest (grey bars) and lowest (white bars) scoring countries.

Two observations stand out. First, large portions of the electorate in Western welfare states display scepticism about immigration and a willingness to differentiate between native-born citizens and newcomers. As the black bars illustrate, in these fourteen countries on average...
more than half the population reports less concern about immigrants than about other vulnerable groups in their country and agree that their government spends too much money assisting immigrants, and the average support for statements that employers should prioritize the native-born when jobs are scarce and that legal migrants should not have the same rights as native-born citizens is over 40 percent. While, as said, none of these indicators directly measure the concept of selective solidarity, it seems safe to conclude that a large number of people are uncomfortable sharing with a growing subset of the population in their countries.

![Figure 4.3. Indirect indicators of welfare chauvinism, three data sources, 14 countries.](61)

The second observation emerges from a look at the grey and white bars, which show the highest and lowest country score on each indicator. The score on these indicators differs considerably from one country to another, especially on the questions whether employers should prioritize native-born and whether immigrants have a negative effect on the economy. Figure 4.4, which

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61 Question wording has been changed to allow for easy interpretation. Where possible, the percentages are based on citizen respondents only (unfortunately, in the most recent wave of the WVS the citizen variable has not been surveyed in each of the countries under study). Data on these eight variables were not available for all fourteen countries (data are missing for CAN, SWI, NOR, and USA on the first two items; for BEL on the third and last three items, and for DEN on the other two items).
shows countries’ average distance from the mean score on the eight indirect indicators of welfare chauvinism, illustrates this point in more detail. Support for welfare chauvinist statements tends to be high in Austria and Germany and low in the Netherlands\(^6\) and Sweden.

Figure 4.4. Average distance from mean score on welfare chauvinism, three data sources, 14 countries. (See Appendix table A1.7 for more information.)

Certainly, these generalizations simplify some interesting details, but overall the country-level correlations of the scores on these indicators are high.\(^6\) In other words, it makes sense to assume that the items in Figure 4.4 tap the same underlying sentiment, and that taken together they therefore offer the best measure of welfare chauvinism we can construct on the basis of available data.\(^6\) Unfortunately, few of the indicators have been measured at different points in time. It is

\(^6\) As we will see in Chapter Five, attitudes on immigration have become considerably more negative in the Netherlands over the last ten years. In the relatively old survey data used in this chapter (ranging from 1995 to 2003), however, selective solidarity still appears low by comparative standards.

\(^6\) Because the indicators reported in Figure 4.3 have been drawn from different surveys, it is impossible to calculate correlations for all items on an individual level. The average correlation of the country-level percentages is 0.57, and combining all percentages in one scale yields a very high Cronbach’s alpha (0.91).

\(^6\) It is reassuring that the values in Figure 4.4 are well in line with the country-level estimations of welfare chauvinism compiled by Henning Finseraas (2012). For the 12 European countries that are included in both my and his sample, the correlation between the scores in Figure 4.4 and the 2002 data of Finseraas is large (0.731) and significant (p=0.003, one-tailed test).
therefore, impossible to offer a systematic analysis of historical trends in selective solidarity on the basis of the ISSP and WVS. For as far as data are available, the only observations we can make with some degree of safety are that it seems to be on the rise in Austria and Ireland, but in decline in Norway and Sweden (see Appendix Figures A1.1 and A1.2).

Before I proceed to assess the relationship between immigrants’ overrepresentation in government transfers and welfare chauvinism, I will first briefly discuss how these fourteen countries differ on some characteristics that can be thought to influence this relationship.

First, it seems important to point to differences in the size of the immigrant population. It is possible that a large overrepresentation of immigrants in the welfare system is only of relevance if the number of immigrants is high - in other words, the native-born public might not be too concerned about immigrant welfare use if there are only few immigrants to begin with. Figure 4.5 shows the number of foreign-born residents as a percentage of the population in the countries under study. Clearly, the differences are large. Immigrants make up more than 20 percent of the population in Switzerland, while they hardly amount to 3.5 percent in Finland.

![Figure 4.5. Number of foreign-born as percentage of the population, 1995-2005, 14 countries. (Source: OECD, 2011a, 2011b, and own calculations.)](image)

Second, on the basis of institutionalist theory we expect that concerns about immigrants’ welfare dependence tend to be less pronounced in universal welfare regimes. Following
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classic typology, I classify Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as universal welfare states, and the other countries in my sample as non-universal (for our current purposes, it is less relevant to distinguish between the Christian democratic welfare states of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland on the one hand, and the liberal welfare states of Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on the other).

Third, I hypothesize that the nature of a country’s national identity influences how the public evaluates patterns of immigrant welfare dependence. As described in Chapter Two, scholars have employed various strategies to capture differences in countries’ national identity. Probably the most common technique has been to use survey data on public attitudes regarding requirements for citizenship and national belonging (Janmaat, 2006; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008). For mostly methodological reasons, however, in the analyses in this chapter I choose to operationalize the inclusiveness of each country’s national identity differently, and rely on two types of nation-building policies. First, I use a comparative measure of the inclusiveness of a country’s naturalization policy that I have developed elsewhere (Koning, 2011). As the determinants of the conditions under which aspirant-members are allowed to join the political community, naturalization regulations are of obvious relevance in shaping how open a state is towards immigrants within its borders. Second, I use Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka’s

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65 There are at least four reasons to prefer operationalizing national identity as nation-building policies in the quantitative analyses. First, an indicator based on survey data would result in a particularly undemanding test of my hypothesis. It would measure whether a group of respondents that indicates it is comfortable with granting immigrants easy access to citizenship would also be likely to formulate few restrictions for immigrants’ access to social benefits. Second, such an operationalization would create large problems of endogeneity. Whereas one could challenge the assumption that nation-building policies primarily influence public attitudes rather than the other way around (see below, Section 4.4), the assumption of exogeneity would be much more problematic in an analysis of the relationship between identity attitudes and welfare chauvinism. Third, and more pragmatically, there is no cross-national survey that has asked the same identity questions in all fourteen countries under study. Fourth, many identity questions are context-specific and are therefore ill-suited for cross-national analysis. For example, the fact that in ISSP data a larger percentage of British consider English to be important for being a ‘true’ Englishman than the percentage of Irish respondents who argue that immigrants should master Irish more likely reflects a difference in the role of the two languages than an identity difference. Ultimately, it is worth noting that survey-based indexes tend to be significantly, although not very strongly, correlated with policy-based ones (Koning, 2011).
Multiculturalism Policy Index, which captures the degree to which a country recognizes and accommodates immigrant-induced diversity in its public policies.\textsuperscript{66} Perhaps even more than naturalization policies, these diversity policies are a clear indicator of how willing a state is to include immigrants in its national culture. Combining these two measures, I construct an indicator from 0 to 1 of the inclusiveness of a country’s national identity. As Figure 4.6 shows, the indicator has a high degree of face validity and ranges from inclusive Canada (0.90) to exclusionary Denmark (0.05).

My theoretical model expects anti-immigrant movements to play an important role in the political translation of immigrants’ welfare dependence as well. In the quantitative analyses in this chapter, however, I will not include an indicator of the size of each country’s anti-immigrant movement as a control variable. The reason for this omission is purely methodological. Since there is evidence not only that anti-immigrant parties spread selective solidarity, but also that

\textsuperscript{66} The index does not only measure differences across countries, but has also been calculated for three different points in time (1980, 2000, 2010). In the multivariate analyses that follow, I use the score that is closest in time to the year of the survey. Figure 4.6 is based on scores from 2000 only.
high levels of selective solidarity are likely to lead to increased success of anti-immigrant parties, we would need fine-grained longitudinal data to disentangle this reciprocal relationship. Unfortunately, such data is not available. The survey questions I use to measure the dependent variable have only been asked on one, two, or three occasions, which is not enough to allow for a careful analysis of the relationship between anti-immigrant party success and selective solidarity, let alone if we also want to explore how the relationship between immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity is influenced by AIPs. Therefore, I will omit considerations about anti-immigrant movements from this chapter, and leave the analysis of their role in the politics of immigrants’ social rights to the qualitative case studies that follow.

4.2 Multilevel regression modeling

Testing the hypothesis that is central to this chapter poses a problem that is common, if not endemic, in the study of comparative politics. Whenever a researcher attempts to explain individual behaviour or attitudes (in this case, selective solidarity) by characteristics of the political community (in this case, immigrants’ overrepresentation in the welfare system), she needs to account theoretically and methodologically for the difference between the unit of analysis of the independent and the dependent variable (Coleman, 1986). If not, she might commit an ecological fallacy, and make inappropriate inferences about one level of analysis on the basis of empirical observations at a higher level.67 Similarly, in careless multilevel analyses composition effects can lead to wrong conclusions: differences in the dependent variable at one level of analysis cannot be conclusively attributed to independent variables at that same level if one does not take the values on a lower level of analysis into account (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002).68 Third, using a simple regression model to estimate the relationship between

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67 A hypothetical example is concluding that immigrants are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties on the basis of a positive relationship at the municipality level between the number of immigrants and the success of anti-immigrant parties.

68 For example, at an aggregate level it might be the case that anti-immigrant sentiment tends to be higher in post-communist countries than in established democracies, but without controlling, among other
variables on different levels of analysis would result in correlated errors: one would be forced to assign country-level attributes to individual-level cases, thereby violating the assumption that error terms are uncorrelated, and artificially increasing the significance levels of country-level coefficients. In order to deal with these difficulties, I use multilevel modeling (MLM), a type of regression analysis, also known as mixed linear modeling or hierarchical linear modeling (De Leeuw & Meijer, 2008; Albright & Marinova, 2010).

In the MLM, the main dependent variable is a composite index of various indirect indicators of public welfare chauvinism. Depending on the survey used, the content of this variable differs. In total, I run four separate analyses: one for the 2003 wave of the ISSP (see Table A1.3), one for the 1995 wave of the ISSP, one for the most recent available WVS data (see Table A1.4), and one for wave 4 of the WVS only (see Table A1.5).

For the main independent variable, I use the estimates of immigrants’ overrepresentation in various transfer programs (IOIs) that I calculated on the basis of income survey LIS. As becomes apparent from Figure 4.1, the distribution of these estimates is far from normal (most obviously, the scores on the IOIs for social assistance and for social assistance and unemployment benefits are much higher in the Scandinavian cases than elsewhere). To avoid modeling such a skewed distribution in a linear form, I have transformed the IOIs for each analysis in such a way that they can be used in a linear regression analysis.69

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69 An alternative solution to these problems is a technique called two-step regression. This entails first making separate estimates of the covariances within each cluster of lower-level cases (in our case, countries) before estimating the effects of upper-level variables. (The MLM, conversely, produces a single estimate of the effect of lower-level variables for all clusters.) This technique is of course only possible when the number of cases within each cluster is large enough (Jusko & Shively, 2005). In the data I use here, the clusters seem large enough for two-step regression, even though there are a few clusters that are fairly small considering the number of independent variables in the model (for example, in the fourth wave of the WVS, I estimate the effect of 9 individual-level independent variables, and the data set only includes 320 respondents for some countries). Because my main interest is in estimating the effect of country-level variables while controlling for the effect of individual-level variables, however, two-step regression does not seem to offer a distinct advantage over MLM. In any event, in large enough samples two-step regression and MLM tend to produce similar results overall (Gelman, 2005, p. 459).

70 Using Tukey’s ladder of powers (Scott, n.d.), I have transformed the variables in such a way to best approximate a straight line when ordering the cases from low to high (and indeed, after the
Unfortunately, the different timing of the various waves of the LIS, ISSP, and WVS make it impossible to always match data from the same years, or to consistently employ the same lag between the data on immigrant benefit use and public opinion data. In order to maximize the number of cases, I use a three year lag for the analysis of ISSP data from 2003, a five year lag for the analysis based on the most recent WVS data, and no lag in the other two analyses.\(^7\)

As country-level control variables, I include the share of immigrants as percentage of the population in the survey year, a dichotomous variable for universal welfare states, and the estimate of the inclusiveness of a country’s national identity. On the individual level, I control - where available - for age, sex, education, employment status, occupation, income, religiosity, citizenship, and the citizenship of the respondent’s parents at time of birth. In existing research, these generally appear to be the most important demographic predictors of attitudes towards immigrants in general (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Hello, Scheepers, & Sleegers, 2006), and of welfare chauvinism in particular (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Oesch, 2008; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010). For full information on descriptive statistics and coding, see Appendix Table A2.1.

Table 4.1 shows basic results for the MLM based on data from the ISSP 2003. It estimates the effect of IOIs for the different sets of transfer benefits on selective solidarity, while controlling for the various individual-level variables. (In these and subsequent tables, I will use the term IOI\(_{sa}\) to refer to the IOI for social assistance; IOI\(_{unsa}\) for the IOI for social assistance and unemployment benefits; IOI\(_{core}\) for the IOI for social assistance, unemployment benefits, family benefits and pension benefits combined; and IOI\(_{total}\) for the IOI for all benefits combined.)

Table 4.1. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in various transfer benefits on welfare chauvinism, ISSP 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-4.765</td>
<td>-4.752</td>
<td>-4.742</td>
<td>-4.738</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI_{sa}</td>
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<td>IOI_{unsa}</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOI_{core}</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI_{total}</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.064</td>
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<td>-0.547</td>
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<td>-4.061</td>
<td>-4.061</td>
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<td>3.177</td>
<td>3.177</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer/manager</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
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<td>Non-manual worker</td>
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<td>-0.821</td>
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<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.063</td>
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<td>Citizen</td>
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<tr>
<td>-2 Restricted Log L.</td>
<td>102599</td>
<td>93752</td>
<td>93749</td>
<td>93753</td>
<td>93766</td>
<td>93766</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Variance estimates</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: country</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>389.1</td>
<td>389.1</td>
<td>389.1</td>
<td>389.1</td>
<td>389.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: country</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11,450</td>
<td>11,450</td>
<td>11,450</td>
<td>11,450</td>
<td>11,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multi-level model estimates. See Appendix Table A2.1 for detailed information. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level $p < 0.1$.

The first and most obvious conclusion that we can draw is that the individual-level variables turn out to be strong predictors of selective solidarity. As expected, we find selective solidarity to be higher among older respondents, the less well-educated, the unemployed, manual workers, people whose parents were citizens at their time of birth, and citizens. The coefficients for sex, non-manual labour, income, and religiosity, on the other hand, fail to reach statistical significance. All in all, the individual-level variables help to explain about half of the variation in welfare chauvinism between countries (compare the country-level variance estimates of model 0 and I). The predictive power of individual-level variables is, of course, no surprise. There is much more variation in welfare chauvinism between individuals than between countries and it
makes sense that, for example, two randomly selected manual workers are more similar in their views on this issue than two randomly selected individuals within a certain country.

More important is the finding that none of the coefficients for the IOIs reach statistical significance. As such, this analysis confirms the expectation that objective patterns of immigrant welfare dependence have little to do with welfare chauvinism. There is clearly no evidence that a large reliance of immigrants on welfare benefits automatically leads to widespread objections to immigrants’ social rights. Perhaps most importantly, even when we only focus on social assistance - the program that is most likely to invite questions about recipients’ deservingness - we still do not see any indication of a positive relationship between immigrant welfare dependence and welfare chauvinism (but instead a statistically insignificant negative coefficient).

Table 4.2 shows the results of the same analysis based on the most recent data of the WVS. Again, the individual-level variables go a long way in explaining welfare chauvinism. As in the ISSP data from 2003, welfare chauvinism appears to be positively associated with age, low education, unemployment, and manual labour. In contrast to the previous analysis, we now also find statistically significant coefficients for income (negative effect), gender (women displaying higher levels of welfare chauvinism), religiosity (negative effect) and non-manual labour (negative effect). Taken together, the individual-level variables explain about a third of the variation between countries (after all, the country-level variance estimate goes down from 110 to 73 after the introduction of the individual-level variables).

This analysis deals out an even more powerful blow against the hypothesis that welfare chauvinism is a response to high levels of immigrant welfare dependence. Again, we find no evidence of a significant effect for three of the IOIs. Moreover, we find a strong, significant, and negative coefficient for the IOI for social assistance. In other words, the analysis suggests that welfare chauvinism tends to be highest where immigrants’ actual use of social assistance is lowest! When the overrepresentation of immigrants’ social assistance is included (model II), the
log likelihood is at its lowest (suggesting that the MLM reaches its best ‘fit’), and the IOI for social assistance is able to explain no less than 47 percent of the variation between countries that remains after controlling for the individual-level variables (compare the country-level variance estimates of models I and II). In sum, these findings support the expectation that levels of immigrant welfare dependence are not automatically translated into widespread pleas for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

Table 4.2. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in various transfer benefits on welfare chauvinism, WVS 4&5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
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<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
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</thead>
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<td>-1.690</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI&lt;sub&gt;sa&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>-5.024</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td><strong>0.118</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.118</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.118</strong></td>
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<td>1.650</td>
<td>1.652</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td><strong>-7.741</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7.739</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7.747</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7.750</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>2.885</td>
<td>2.888</td>
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<td>(ref)</td>
<td>(ref)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-manual worker</td>
<td><strong>-1.170</strong></td>
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<td><strong>-0.759</strong></td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td><strong>-0.431</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 2: country</td>
<td><strong>110.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>60.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>75.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>72.6</strong></td>
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<td><strong>707.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>707.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>707.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>707.5</strong></td>
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Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level p < 0.1.

The other two analyses produce largely similar results. For the sake of brevity, in Table 4.3 I only report the coefficients for the various IOIs - the full models are reported in Appendix Tables A2.2 and A2.3. On the individual level, the MLM based on 1995 ISSP data shows significant
negative coefficients for education, income, and religiosity, and significant positive coefficients for citizenship and citizenship status of parents at time of birth. In wave 4 of the WVS, welfare chauvinism turns out to be significantly higher among older respondents, women, the lower educated, manual labourers, people with low income, the non-religious, and citizens. All in all, while some variables have significant coefficients in some but not other analyses, the results for the individual-level variables are largely consistent. At any rate, there are no significant coefficients that are positive in one analysis but negative in another. The most noticeable difference is in the extent to which these variables help to explain cross-country variation. While as said, the reduction in variance is as high as 50 percent for the ISSP 2003 and about 33 percent for the most recent data of the WVS, the percentage is 23 percent for wave 4 of the WVS and only 9 percent for 1995 data of the ISSP.\textsuperscript{72}

Table 4.3. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in various transfer benefits on welfare chauvinism (individual-level variables not shown), ISSP 1995 and WVS 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>ISSP 1995</th>
<th>WVS 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOI_{sa}</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>-7.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI_{ur}</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI_{core}</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI_{total}</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multi-level model estimates. Bold coefficients are significant at the level $p < 0.1$. See Appendix Tables A2.2 and A2.3 for full results.

As far as the effects of the IOIs are concerned, Table 4.3 again lends little credence to the argument that welfare chauvinism is a reaction to immigrants’ objective burden on transfer benefits. While the coefficients in the analysis of the 1995 ISSP data are positive, none of these reach statistical significance. In the fourth wave of the WVS, on the other hand, we find two negative coefficients that do turn out to be statistically significant. Importantly, the data from wave 4 of the WVS shows the strongest evidence for a negative relationship when it concerns

\textsuperscript{72} These differences are to a large degree caused by differences in the number of countries in the data set. The reduction in variance is higher in the analyses based on respondents from eleven countries than in the two analyses where fewer countries are included.
social assistance and unemployment benefits. Again, this is all the more noteworthy because these are exactly the types of programs for which the ‘intuitive’ hypothesis predicts immigrant overrepresentation to have the largest positive effect on selective solidarity.

All in all, then, all four analyses tell the same story: there is no evidence that a large reliance of immigrants on transfer benefits increases welfare chauvinism among the population, and in some cases we even find evidence of a negative effect when we focus on those benefits that tend to be most contentious in Western welfare states. Because the coefficients for the IOIs are difficult to interpret (after all, many of them have been transformed in order to satisfy the assumptions of the linear multi-level regression model), it is useful to illustrate the size of these effects in a graphical form. Figure 4.7 shows separate plots of the effect of immigrant overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism for each of the four analyses, while setting all the individual-level variables at their mean values.

The first two plots, based on ISSP data, show that the effect in these analyses turns out to be not only statistically insignificant (after all, it is possible to draw a horizontal line within the area marked by the dotted lines representing the 95 percent confidence intervals), but also substantively insignificant. In the most recent data of the ISSP (panel A), moving from the country with the highest score to the country with the lowest score on the IOI for social assistance only reduces the level of welfare chauvinism by one point on a 100-point scale. For

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73 To corroborate these conclusions, I have conducted a number of different analyses and they all reproduce these same main findings (I am not showing the results here, but can make them available upon request). First, I have rerun all analyses excluding the UK (for which the IOI is based on ethnicity rather than immigration status), and the results are similar but with larger standard errors. Second, I have rerun the analyses using IOIs based on the difference between citizens and non-citizens rather than that between native-born and foreign-born. These results are somewhat different, but again display the same patterns (more evidence of a negative than a positive relationship, and most IOI coefficients are small and insignificant). Third, I have rerun the analyses using different indicators of immigrant welfare dependence. I first reran the analyses by measuring the effect of the absolute amount immigrants receive in various sets of transfer benefits in 2011 Canadian dollars. Next, I calculated the effect of IOIs based on a comparison of the percentage of immigrants and native-born who are in receipt of benefits rather than the amount they receive. Again, in these analyses I find mostly small and insignificant effects, and in two cases evidence of a significant negative effect (for the percentage-based IOI for total benefits in the 1995 ISSP data, and for the amount of social assistance and unemployment benefits in the most recent WVS data). Finally, I have looked at scatter plots of all bivariate relationships, and they do not suggest that the absence of positive relationships is the result of nonlinearity or outlying cases.
1995 data of the ISSP, the estimated effect is an increase of just over 5 points (panel B). The findings are more robust (and indeed, statistically significant) in the analysis of WVS data. In the most recent data (panel C), we find an estimated decrease of 22 points in welfare chauvinism when one moves from the country with the highest IOI for social assistance to the country with the lowest. The estimated decrease for 1999/2000 data of the WVS (panel D) is smaller (14 points), but still statistically significant.

![Figure 4.7. Estimated effect of overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, ISSP 2003 (panel A); ISSP 1995 (B); WVS 4&5 (C); and WVS 4 (D). (Dotted lines indicate 95 % confidence interval.)](image)

Table 4.4 shows summary results for MLMs that estimate the effect of the IOI for social assistance while controlling for three country-level variables: the size of the immigrant population, the type of welfare regime, and the inclusiveness of national identity (see Appendix Tables A2.4, A2.5, A2.6, and A2.7 for full results). Because of the small number of cases on the
country level, Table 4.4 introduces the control variables in a step-wise fashion: the first three models include only one of the control variables, the next three take in two of the variables, and the final model controls for all three variables at the same time.\textsuperscript{74} While this last model is the most direct test of the hypothesis under examination, the interpretation of the coefficients is troubled by the small number of cases. For that reason, it is useful to compare its results with those in less saturated models.

The results confirm many, but not all, of our expectations concerning the effect of country-level variables. For one thing, the size of the immigrant population appears in most cases to be unrelated to selective solidarity. Indeed, only three of the sixteen coefficients reach statistical significance. On the other hand, however, all coefficients do point in the same negative direction, suggesting that if the size of the immigrant population has any effect on levels of welfare chauvinism, it is a negative one (in other words, that welfare chauvinism tends to be lower in countries with more sizeable immigrant populations).\textsuperscript{75} The results for the nature of national identity are slightly more in line with our expectations. The analysis of the most recent WVS data consistently points at a strongly negative and significant effect. However, this finding is not replicated in the analyses of the other data sets. In sum, then, the results only offer modest support for the hypothesis that the chances of selective solidarity are lower in political

\textsuperscript{74} Again, for the purposes of cross-validation I have rerun the analyses summarized in Table 4.4 in three different ways: (1) I have conducted these same analyses for all other sets of transfer benefits; (2) I have conducted the analyses while excluding the United Kingdom, and (3) I have rerun the analyses with alternative indicators of immigrant welfare dependence (absolute amounts and comparisons of recipiency rates). Although the results differ from one analysis to another, in particular in the extent to which I find significant effects of immigrants’ welfare dependence, they do replicate the main conclusions regarding the effect of the three country characteristics: I consistently find little evidence of an effect for the size of the immigrant population, large and occasionally significant coefficients for national identity, persistently large and significant coefficients for welfare regime, and in those models where I control for welfare regime, I find insignificant effects of the degree of immigrant dependence on transfer benefits. These results are not shown, but can be made available upon request.

\textsuperscript{75} I have run separate models that also include interaction terms of the IOIs and the percentage of the foreign-born population, in order to explore the possibility that the effect of immigrants’ welfare dependence on welfare chauvinism is different in countries with a large immigrant population than in countries with a small immigrant population. Overall, these analyses have produced little support for that hypothesis. Only in case of the IOI for all benefits in the analysis of 1995 ISSP data did I find some evidence of such an effect. In that case, the results suggested that a large dependence of immigrants on transfer benefits leads to an increase in welfare chauvinism in countries with a small immigrant population, but to a decrease in countries with a large immigrant population.
communities with an inclusive national identity than in those with a more restrictive identity. Finally, the expectation that welfare chauvinism is lower in universal welfare states finds more unequivocal support. The coefficients for this variable are large, in the expected negative direction, and, with the exception of the 1995 ISSP data, statistically significant. In sum, it seems safe to conclude that selective solidarity is indeed lower in universal welfare states.

Table 4.4. Effect of immigrant overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, controlling for various country level variables (individual-level variables not shown).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>ISSP 2003</th>
<th>ISSP 1995</th>
<th>WVS 4&amp;5</th>
<th>WVS 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>-0.533</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>-5.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>-1.322</td>
<td>-1.607</td>
<td>-5.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Foreign-born</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-1.139</td>
<td>-0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>3.273</td>
<td>3.897</td>
<td>-1.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>-0.550</td>
<td>1.328</td>
<td>-4.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusive identity</td>
<td>-0.632</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>-14.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>2.553</td>
<td>4.392</td>
<td>-1.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Foreign-born</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
<td>-1.191</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universality</td>
<td>-7.317</td>
<td>-12.048</td>
<td>-14.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>-1.325</td>
<td>1.499</td>
<td>-4.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Foreign-born</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-1.187</td>
<td>-0.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusive identity</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>3.291</td>
<td>-14.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>3.735</td>
<td>4.136</td>
<td>-0.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>$\text{IOI}_{sa}$</td>
<td>2.979</td>
<td>4.900</td>
<td>-1.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Foreign-born</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
<td>-1.335</td>
<td>-0.455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multi-level model estimates. Bold coefficients are significant at the level $p < 0.1$. See Appendix Tables A2.4, A2.5, A2.6, and A2.7 for full results.

Besides looking at the independent effect of these country characteristics on welfare chauvinism, we should also assess how they influence the relationship between immigrant welfare dependence and welfare chauvinism. Again, we find the welfare regime variable to be of most consequence. When we control for this variable, we no longer find statistically significant coefficients for the IOI for social assistance. In other words, while on aggregate welfare
chauvinism might be lower in countries where immigrants are most overrepresented among recipients of transfer benefits, this relationship appears to be spurious upon closer inspection. Instead, what we should conclude is that the seeming relationship between immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity is the result of the dual patterns that (1) immigrants’ dependence on welfare benefits tends to be higher in universal welfare states, and (2) levels of selective solidarity tend to be lower in universal welfare states (see Figure 4.8).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 4.8. Relationship between immigrant welfare dependence, welfare regime, and selective solidarity.**

Again, it is helpful to express these conclusions in plots as well, in order to get a graphic sense of the size of the effects reported in Table 4.4. Figure 4.9 does this by showing the effect of the IOI for cash benefits in separate regression lines for universal and non-universal welfare states separately (panels A and C), and in separate lines for the highest and lowest score in our sample on the national identity variable (panels B and D). In all graphs, the values for all individual-level variables have been set at their mean value. For the sake of brevity, I am only showing the plots for the most recent data from the ISSP (panels A and B) and the WVS (C and D).

The graphs offer another illustration of the conclusions described above. Most clearly, we see that welfare chauvinism tends to be lower in universal welfare states. In the ISSP data, we see that the public in non-universal welfare states scores about 7 points higher on our 100-point welfare chauvinism index than respondents in universal welfare states, and that difference is
even more than twice as large (15 points) in the ISSP data. Moreover, we see that when we control for welfare regime, we do not find a significant effect of the IOI for social assistance on welfare chauvinism. Moving from the lowest to the highest IOI in our data set increases welfare chauvinism by about 7 points in the ISSP data and decreases it by about 5 points in the WVS data, but neither of these effects are statistically significant (as a look at the dotted lines indicating the 95 percent confidence intervals tells us). National identity appears to reduce levels of welfare chauvinism only in the WVS data. While the value on welfare chauvinism is almost identical among countries with inclusionary and exclusionary national identities in the ISSP data, the WVS data suggest that moving from the country with the least inclusive identity to the country with the most inclusive identity reduces welfare chauvinism by about 12 points.

Figure 4.9. Estimated effect of immigrant overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, while controlling separately for welfare regime (panels A and C) and national identity (B and D), ISSP 2003 (A and B); and WVS 4&5 (C and D). (Dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence interval.)
Finally, we can look at the cumulative effect of these two country characteristics by drawing plots based on the MLMs that control simultaneously for welfare regime and national identity (model VII in Table 4.4). These plots are reported in Figure 4.10 for the most recent data from the ISSP (panel A) and the WVS (panel B) (again, all individual-level control variables have been set at their mean values). For presentation purposes, the plots do not report confidence intervals - all regression lines of the IOI for social assistance are insignificant.

Again, we see how important welfare regime and national identity are in reducing welfare chauvinism. In the ISSP data, respondents in a non-universal welfare state with an exclusionary national identity (single black line) are on average 10 points more welfare chauvinist than their counterparts in a country with a universal welfare state and inclusionary national identity (double grey line). In the WVS data, this difference is even larger: just over 25 points. It is important to emphasize just how large this combined effect is. In the ISSP data, we find the highest country score on welfare chauvinism for Germany, 14 points higher than Sweden, the lowest scoring country on this measure. In the WVS data, the difference between the most and least welfare chauvinist country amounts to 37 points. In other words, in both cases the difference between the single black and double grey line is as large as about 70 percent of the maximum cross-country difference we can find in our survey data.

![Figure 4.10. Estimated effect of immigrant overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, while controlling simultaneously for welfare regime and national identity, ISSP 2003 (panel A) and WVS 4&5 (panel B).](image)
All in all, then, the quantitative analyses lead us to four main conclusions about the relationship between immigrants’ reliance on the welfare system and selective solidarity: first, on the aggregate level the two seem mostly unrelated; second, when we focus on the programs that typically stir the most opposition (in particular social assistance) there is evidence of a negative relationship; third, when we control for the welfare regime of the countries under study this negative relationship disappears; and fourth, characteristics of the welfare regime and national identity have a dampening effect on selective solidarity. The next section discusses possible objections to these conclusions.

4.3 Conclusions: the importance of inclusive institutions

The results suggest, in contrast to what ‘common sense’ might tell us, that a strong overrepresentation of immigrants in the welfare system does not lead to mass opposition to the costs of immigration. Whether or not immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs turns into an argument for exclusion does indeed seem to depend on country characteristics, in particular the structure of the welfare state and the nature of national identity.

Despite these supportive results, it is necessary to discuss possible objections to the cross-national analyses in this chapter. Two are particularly pertinent. First, one might argue that the low number of country cases casts doubt on the validity of the regression results. This is a valid objection, which for both methodological and theoretical reasons I have not been able to address by expanding the country sample. Instead, I have reran the analysis for different sets of survey data, different country samples, and different operationalizations of immigrant welfare dependence, and all those analyses produced largely the same results (see footnotes 73 and 74).

As an additional robustness test, I have employed a technique called qualitative comparative analysis, a method of data analysis that has been specifically designed to deal with a medium-sized sample like the one in this chapter (Ragin, 1994). It involves first dichotomizing the variables of interest and then using the Boolean method to ascertain whether they are
systematically related (Nelson, 2005; Skaaning, 2007). The main conclusions are largely in line with the regression results. The analysis suggests that countries lacking both a universal welfare system and an inclusive national identity will inevitably experience high levels of selective solidarity, even if immigrants’ objective burden on the welfare state is relatively low. Moreover, even if they promote an inclusive national identity, non-universal welfare states still appear susceptible to selective solidarity when immigrants are strongly overrepresented in the welfare system. In other words, the qualitative comparative analysis suggests that a non-universal welfare state can only sustain solidarity when the overrepresentation of immigrants in the system of transfer benefits is relatively low and national identity is inclusive. In sum, just like the multilevel regression models, the qualitative comparative analysis suggests that the actual ‘burden’ immigrants place on transfer benefits matters less than country characteristics.

A second objection one might rightly raise is that in static comparisons it is difficult to capture the type of dynamic theory presented in Chapter Two. As discussed above, concerns about endogeneity have already forced me to abandon assessing the effect of anti-immigrant movements, and to employ a partial operationalization of the inclusiveness of national identity. But this has not addressed all possible endogeneity concerns. In the absence of longitudinal analysis a negative covariance between IOIs and welfare chauvinism can also be interpreted in a very different manner: the more immigrants become overrepresented among welfare recipients, the higher welfare chauvinism becomes; the more pervasive welfare chauvinism becomes, the higher the likelihood of exclusionary reforms; and finally, if these reforms become implemented, we would of course expect them to decrease immigrants’ reliance on transfer programs. In this interpretation, then, in the short run high IOIs lead to higher welfare chauvinism, but in the longer run higher welfare chauvinism leads to lower IOIs. If this is correct, the null findings in

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76 The outcome of the analysis, in Boolean terminology, is as follows: UWR + ioi*uwr*INI → wc; and IOI*uwr + uwr*ini → WC (upper case letters refer to the presence of a variable, lower case letters to the absence of a variable, UWR stands for a universal welfare regime, IOI for a high immigrant overrepresentation, INI for inclusive national identity, and WC for high levels of welfare chauvinism). More details on the qualitative comparative analysis are available upon request.
this chapter do not reflect that there is no relationship between immigrant overrepresentation and welfare chauvinism, but instead that this relationship is a complex one, with contradictory long-term and short-term effects.

To a certain extent, this observation highlights the limitations of the methodology I have employed. The kinds of fine-grained comparative and longitudinal indicators of the main dependent and independent variables that would be needed to control for endogeneity are simply not available. Again, this shows the value of complementing the medium-N quantitative analyses in this chapter with case studies of a more qualitative nature. However, for as far as we are able to assess, there is not much evidence that the possibility of this feedback loop has significantly distorted our conclusions.

First, if in the relationship between IOIs and welfare chauvinism short-term effects and long-term effects run counter to each other, we would expect there to be more evidence of a negative effect when the lag between income and survey data is larger (after all, we would expect immigrant overrepresentation to increase welfare chauvinism in the short term, but decrease it in the long term). However, the analysis of the ISSP data from 2003 (which uses a three year lag) does not show stronger evidence of a negative relationship than the ISSP data from 1995 (no lag), and neither is there more evidence of a negative relationship in the most recent WVS data (five year lag) than in the data from 2000 (no lag).

Second, if it is the case that welfare chauvinism is a response to patterns of immigrant welfare use, we should at least observe a positive relationship in changes in these two variables; in other words, we should expect welfare chauvinism to increase in countries where immigrants’ reliance on transfer programs is becoming larger, and vice versa. As Figure 4.11 shows, however, if we plot the percentage change between the first and last available IOIs\textsuperscript{77} against the change over the same years in the percentage of respondents that agree with the statement that employers should prioritize native-born when jobs are scarce (see Appendix Figure A1.2), we do

\textsuperscript{77} I have used the transformed values of IOI\textsubscript{sa} in order to maximize cross-national comparability. To allow for easy comparability with negative changes, I have assigned a maximum score of 100 percent increase.
not find support for that expectation. We do indeed see an increase in IOIs to be accompanied by an increase in chauvinism in Ireland, and we witness the opposite relationship in Austria, France, the United States, and Sweden. The other six cases, however, do not follow the expected pattern. Overall, the changes over time in these two variables seem largely unrelated. The correlation is low (0.15) and statistically insignificant (p = 0.7, two-tailed test).

![Figure 4.11. Scatter plot of change in IOIs for social assistance (x-axis) and support for prioritizing native-born in hiring practices (y-axis).](image)

In sum, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that selective solidarity is more than a response to objective patterns of immigrant reliance on welfare programs, and that welfare regime and national identity are more powerful predictors of such sentiments. As such, this chapter lends much credence to the first hypothesis of my theoretical model. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to corroborate these conclusions by a technique that allows for a more careful analysis of timing and context-specific factors. Besides, this chapter only sheds light on one of my two hypotheses. For that reason, in the next chapters I will study three cases in more depth, not only to further analyze the relationship between immigrant welfare dependence and selective solidarity, but also to explore how the dominant understanding of immigrant welfare dependence in a country has been important in shaping social and immigration policies.
I can only conclude that as far as [foreigners’ policy] is concerned there certainly is a foundation of solidarity in our society.
- Junior Minister Elizabeth Schmitz (PvdA) (TK13-845, October 16, 1996)

Our social safety net [is] meant to support citizens of this country [...] The youth is our future. But we are talking about Dutch youth, youth that grows up here, and is raised in accordance with Dutch norms and values and according to our culture.
- Former Minister Rita Verdonk (independent) (TK70-5531, March 31, 2009)

Students of immigration politics increasingly pay attention to the Netherlands. This is not surprising. After 50 years of experience with large-scale immigration, more than 20 percent of the Dutch population is now either a first or second generation immigrant, and this proportion is expected to increase to 25 percent by 2030 (CBS, 2012). Among West European countries, only France hosts a larger proportion of Muslims (Vaisse, 2008). More important than these raw demographic figures, the nature of Dutch immigration politics has changed drastically over the last fifteen years or so. While in the mid-1990s the Netherlands had some of the most generous immigration policies in the Western world and mostly employed a consensus-oriented and depoliticized approach to immigration policy-making, in the new millennium immigration became one of the most prominent and controversial topics on the political agenda. Within the scope of only a few years, two prominent immigration critics were assassinated, anti-immigrant parties achieved unprecedented electoral success, and immigration policies became among the most restrictive in the Western world. Compared to 20 years ago, it is now much harder to be

78 All translations in this thesis are mine, unless stated otherwise. In order to facilitate verification, I use the official Dutch referencing code for Dutch parliamentary debates and documents. More extensive documentation is included at the end of the bibliography.
admitted to the Netherlands as a family migrant or a refugee, to acquire Dutch citizenship, and to live on Dutch territory without being pressured to conform.

The social rights of immigrants did not survive this restrictive climate unscathed. Starting with a 1998 exclusion of undocumented migrants from social services, the last fifteen years has seen the adoption of a series of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. By now, only immigrants with the most robust status are entitled to welfare benefits, and only after they have spent considerable time in the Netherlands and successfully participated in integration and language classes. As the opening quotes to this chapter illustrate, these formal policy changes reflect an underlying ideological shift. In 1996, junior minister Elizabeth Schmitz observed ‘a foundation of solidarity’ towards immigrants among Dutch politicians and citizens. Thirteen years later, by then former immigration minister Rita Verdonk bluntly stated that the Dutch welfare state is only meant to support ‘citizens’ who subscribe to ‘Dutch norms and values’. In the streets, the bureaucracy, and the parliament, one is today bound to encounter the sentiment that the Dutch state owes more to native-born citizens than to newcomers on its territory.

This chapter traces this sudden surge in selective solidarity and the social policy changes it triggered. What we will see is that while restrictions on immigrants’ eligibility for social benefits are often publicly justified as a necessary and calculated response to the reality that immigrants are overrepresented among the recipients of transfer benefits, economic factors offer at best a partial explanation for the adoption of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

Instead, in line with the theory described in Chapter Two, I will illustrate that these reforms can only be understood when we look at how immigrant reliance on social programs has become translated politically. As we will see, not only have political actors noted frequently that immigrants’ reliance on programs is large, but they have done so in divisive terms. At its most benign, immigrant welfare dependence has been explained as a sign that immigrants are particularly likely to be caught in a welfare trap, and should therefore be ‘helped’ by being pushed off benefits. In other cases, it has been used to fuel the stereotype that immigrants have
an innate tendency to cheat the system. Three parallel developments help to explain why this political translation has become dominant: (1) the success of anti-immigrant parties thanks to favourable political and social conditions; (2) a more general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism resulting in an exclusionary conception of Dutch national identity; and (3) a heightened attention to ‘deservingness’ in the formulation of social policy.

In the context of this translation, immigrantexcluding welfare reforms have become a widely accepted policy tool to reduce immigrant welfare use. We will see that most exclusionary reforms have been passed with handsome majorities, facing little opposition from progressive parties or societal movements. On the other hand, the scope of immigrantexcluding welfare reforms has been constrained by legal roadblocks, in particular the imperatives of the ECHR.

This chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews seven ways in which the Dutch welfare state has become less inclusive of its immigrant population, after which Section 2 shows that these restrictive reforms reflect an underlying ideological shift among both the political elite and the public at large. The remainder of the chapter uses the theoretical model developed in the second chapter to explain these developments. Section three tests the first hypothesis and explores explanations for the sudden rise in selective solidarity. I will show that this ideological shift does not follow economic reality, but instead depends on a political translation of immigrants’ welfare costs shaped by political, cultural, and institutional factors. The final section then tests the second hypothesis, and discusses how the unease about the costs of immigration has led to the adoption of immigrantexcluding welfare reforms, and how legal institutions have made these reforms less dramatic than its instigators would have wanted. I end by speculating about the policy developments we might expect in the near future.

5.1 A history of immigrantexcluding welfare reforms

In the mid-1990s, one could still describe the history of immigrants’ formal position in the Dutch welfare state as one of the gradual extension of social rights. For example, in 1993 Menno
Vellinga wrote: “Once the immigrants have been legally admitted, they enjoy the same rights and obligations in the economic and social spheres as Dutch nationals” (Vellinga, 1993, p. 156). Similarly, three years later (Penninx, 1996, p. 193) concluded that “in general, equality for immigrants in this field has been reached”. Only a decade later, those conclusions had become outdated. Writing in 2004, Godfried Engbersen describes the recent trend as “not in the direction of inclusion, but exactly of exclusion of unwanted migrants” (Engbersen, 2004, p. 33). More recent developments support Engbersen’s observation. I will briefly describe seven examples of this restrictive turn.

First, the social rights of undocumented migrants have been almost entirely stripped away. The centre-left Lubbers-III cabinet was the first to state (in 1989) that more needs to be done to avoid undocumented migrants making use of social benefits and programs (see Table 5.1 below for an overview of Dutch cabinets since 1986). It asked a parliamentary committee (named Zeevalking after its president) to investigate the issue, and increased identification control in the administration of benefits (Minderhoud, 2004). The successor ‘Purple’ cabinet (an alliance of the ‘red’ of labour party PvdA and the ‘blue’ of conservative party VVD) continued down this road and promised in its 1994 coalition agreement to develop a law to formally disentitle all foreigners without a legal residence permit. In 1995, the government lived up to its promise and proposed a first version of the law, named the Linking Act (Koppelingswet) in reference to the link between social rights and legal residence in the Netherlands it entails. After several parliamentary debates, consultations with advisory organs, and legislative amendments, the law passed in November 1996 and went into effect on July 1, 1998. Since then, undocumented migrants are barred from all social benefits and provisions with the exception of education for under-aged children, legal counselling, and emergency medical care.

79 While the VVD brands itself as a liberal party, for analytic purposes it can be better described as conservative.
80 This is not to say that the government followed all the advice it solicited. The Council of State (the most important legal-constitutional advisory organ) recommended on several occasions to include a stipulation allowing for the provision of welfare in exceptional situations, but the government decided against including such a proviso.
Table 5.1. Cabinets of the Netherlands, 1986-2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Political complexion</th>
<th>Takes office</th>
<th>Coalition partners</th>
<th>Majority/minority (initial House seats of total 150)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubbers II</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>1986/07/14</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
<td>Majority (81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubbers III</td>
<td>Center-left</td>
<td>1989/11/07</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA</td>
<td>Majority (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kok I</td>
<td>Purple*</td>
<td>1994/08/22</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Majority (92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kok II</td>
<td>Purple*</td>
<td>1998/08/3</td>
<td>PvdA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Majority (97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende I</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>2002/07/22</td>
<td>CDA, LPF, VVD</td>
<td>Majority (93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende II</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>2003/05/27</td>
<td>CDA, VVD, D66</td>
<td>Majority (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende III</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>2006/07/07</td>
<td>CDA, VVD</td>
<td>Minority (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende IV</td>
<td>Center-left</td>
<td>2007/02/22</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, CU</td>
<td>Majority (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutte I</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>2010/10/14</td>
<td>VVD, CDA (PVV#)</td>
<td>Minority (52/76#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutte II</td>
<td>Purple*</td>
<td>2012/11/05</td>
<td>VVD, PvdA</td>
<td>Majority (79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In Dutch politics, the label purple is commonly used to refer to coalitions of the social democratic PvdA (which uses red as its party colour) and the conservative VVD (blue). # While the PVV was not a formal coalition partner in the Rutte-I cabinet, it provided 'guaranteed support' for the government's agenda in exchange for policy concessions.

A second group of immigrants that have been targeted is that of temporary migrants. The services available to refugee claimants (or as more commonly called, asylum seekers) have been scaled back in particular. The 1987 Arrangement Accommodation Asylum Seekers (Regeling Opvang Asielzoekers) and the subsequent 1994 amendment excluded asylum seekers from all general social services and programs (and from the labour market as well). Instead, all refugee claimants were to be placed in so-called asylum centres with some pocket money and access to health care services for as long as the authorities need to determine their status (Minderhoud, 1999). The conditions in those centres are deliberately kept as modest as possible.81 As of 2000, asylum seekers whose claim is unsuccessful have to leave the Netherlands within four weeks, after which they lose the benefits and face arrest (Meyers, 2004, p. 100).

Asylum seekers are not the only group of temporary migrants whose access to benefits has reduced. The Dutch welfare state distinguishes three types of benefits: (a) employee insurance

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81 In 1996, these conditions were made somewhat more generous. A proposal to increase the municipal benefits available to asylum seekers was passed by an overwhelming majority (only fringe anti-immigrant party CD voted against the bill).
programs (*werknemersverzekeringen*) such as unemployment benefits and disability benefits, which are accessible to everyone working in the Netherlands and paying premiums; (b) public insurance programs (*volksverzekeringen*) such as child benefits and pension benefits, for which one qualifies either by working in or being a long-term resident of the Netherlands; and (c) social provisions such as social assistance that are available to long-term residents only. As will be clear, what is understood by ‘long-term resident’ is of relevance here. The content of this term has largely developed over time as the result of jurisprudence, but politicians have nevertheless been eager to establish formally that public insurance programs, and in particular, social provisions, are not intended for people with an ephemeral connection to the Netherlands. The 1999 Decision Expansion and Reduction Insurance Sphere Public Insurance Programs (*Besluit Uitbreiding en Beperking kring verzekerden volksverzekeringen*, known as BUB) formalized that people who do not work in the Netherlands need to be a long-standing resident in order to qualify for public insurance programs - international students, for example, are explicitly excluded (Article 20). In 2006, a large-scale social assistance reform explicitly stated that only people with a ‘durable connection’ to the Netherlands are eligible. These formalizations of existing practices entailed few practical implications, but their political portent was clear.

Third, even the social rights of family migrants and labour migrants have been limited in a number of regards. One of the main examples is closely related to the abovementioned considerations regarding temporary migrants. Immigrants to the Netherlands can only receive a permanent residence permit after a prolonged period of time in the Netherlands. For economic migrants, this residence requirement is five years, during which their status is that of a temporary immigrant. People who arrive through the family reunification stream have an even

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82 While the exact content of this term is unclear and in fact judges enjoy quite some interpretative leeway in practical cases, this connection is measured along three dimensions: a legal dimension (measured by applicants’ residence status), a social dimension (measured by the scope of their network of Dutch family members and friends), and a financial dimension (measured by employment history in the Netherlands).

83 Indeed, in 2009 then minister Piet Hein Donner informed parliament that “the gateway to the Dutch welfare state for labour migrants has been significantly tightened over the last two decades” (35-3-13416, September 18, 2009).
more vulnerable status in their first years in the Netherlands: their right of residence is dependent on the partner that sponsors them - which means not only that the migrant has no access to any benefits, but also that if the relationship breaks down the newly arrived migrant is forced to leave the country. This period of ‘partner-dependent right of residence’ used to be three years, but has been increased to 5 years in 2012.\footnote{Interestingly, Rita Verdonk, certainly one of the most welfare chauvinist cabinet members the Netherlands has seen, decided against extending this period to five years during her incumbency as Minister of Immigration and Integration (2002-2003) because she worried this would leave female migrants in too vulnerable a position.}

The residence requirement for permanent residence permits has consequences for migrants’ access to social benefits. As a senior civil servant at the Department of Social Affairs\footnote{Formally, the department is called the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, but I will use the shorter version in the remainder of this chapter.} puts it, “you can simply make more stringent demands concerning reintegration and access to provisions of people who do not have a permanent residence status” (interview NET13). In other words, the fact that there is a five year waiting period before migrants can become permanent residents basically implies that social provisions such as social assistance have a five year residence requirement as well - unless, again, if the applicant has a demonstrable ‘durable link’ to the Netherlands. The only category of immigrants that is exempted from this restriction is recognized refugees: even though they also have to wait five years before they can acquire a permanent residence permit, they are eligible for social provisions in the interim.

It is important to emphasize that the residence requirement on social provisions apply to migrants from within the EU as well. In some respects, these individuals have a privileged position within the Dutch welfare state in comparison to immigrants from outside the union. For example, they can more easily take Dutch insurance benefits with them when they leave the Netherlands (see below), and they are allowed to count the time they have worked in their country of origin in calculating eligibility for employee insurance programs. But in accessing social provisions, they face the same obstacles as other labour migrants, even though the legal technicalities are slightly different. In accordance with EU directive 2004/38, no EU citizen has
the right to claim benefits in another EU member state in the first three months of residence. After that period, EU citizens can technically apply for social assistance, but since the 2006 social assistance reform, until they have a permanent residence status (at a minimum, for the first five years after arrival), they can be removed from the Netherlands if they pose an ‘unreasonable burden’ on social assistance. In practice, this means that even for EU migrants there is a 5 year residence requirement for access to social assistance. After all, as a civil servant explains: “The mere fact that you claim welfare is [usually interpreted as] enough indication that you do not have sufficient means of supporting yourself, and thus that you can be sent back to your country of origin” (interview NET15).

In contrast to social provisions, public insurance programs can be immediately accessible to immigrants. But this is only the case if they are employed. Family migrants with children, for example, are ineligible for child benefits for the first five years after they arrive, unless they find employment. And even working migrants face some residence requirements. For example, since 1991 the health care benefit AWBZ (Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten), which funds health care costs that are not covered by health insurance, has a residence requirement of one month for each year that the person has not lived in the Netherlands or another EU country, with a maximum of 12 months. Naturally, the stepwise nature of Dutch immigration law is of little relevance for access to employee insurance programs. After all, like native-born Dutch people, migrants build up the right to these programs by working in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, there is one employee insurance program that has a residence requirement, the costly Wet Werk en Arbeidsundersteuning Jonggehandicapten (Wajong), a disability benefit for people who have become disabled before adulthood or during their studies. A comprehensive 1996 reform introduced, among other things, a residence requirement of six years (Wajong, article 10.2).

A fourth example of recent attempts in the Netherlands to reduce immigrants’ access to social programs regards the pension program AOW (Algemene Ouderdomswet), which is funded from general tax revenues. In order to qualify for a complete pension, one needs to have
lived in the Netherlands uninterruptedly from age 15 to 65. Every missing year results in a 2 percent decrease in the pension benefit. Inevitably, then, many elderly immigrants have a ‘gap’ in their pension benefit. Those immigrants who for that reason fall below a certain income threshold are eligible for a specific type of social assistance called Supplemental Income Provision Elderly (Aanvullende Inkomensvoorziening Ouderen, or AIO). In 2006, about 5 percent of all Dutch residents above the retirement age made use of this supplement, all of whom had an international work history (SVB, 2007a). Until recently, many politicians expressed worries about the relatively low level and, in particular, low uptake, of the AIO. In 2004, for example, at the request of a motion by Fatma Koşer Kaya (of liberal party D66), the government transferred the administration of the AIO from the municipal welfare offices to the executive agency administrating popular insurance programs, SVB (Sociale Verzekeringsbank). The explicit aim of this rearrangement was to increase the take-up of this benefit among elderly migrants who were entitled to it.

In the last few years, in contrast, the AIO is more commonly described as unreasonably generous and costly, and the objections do not only exist among right-wing parties. In 2007, the center-left Balkenende-IV cabinet asked a number of governmental and non-governmental research agencies to investigate the feasibility of forcing all incoming migrants to buy in their public pension gap upon entry in the Netherlands. Ultimately, the government decided against such a compulsory AOW buy-in, but the opposition against the AIO remained large. In 2011,

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86 This is particularly likely among immigrants who have no pension income from their previous country of residence.
87 For one thing, the costs would simply be unreasonably high for immigrants with a large gap. Immigrants arriving in the Netherlands at age 40, for example, could be looking at costs as high as 80,000 euro (SVB, 2007a, p. 18). Second, as a senior civil servant at the Department of Social Affairs explains: "[Another] problem is that you would have to force everyone, also for example, the high-skilled labourers that you like to have here. And the buy-in becomes so expensive that people already for that reason do not want to come and work here" (interview NET13).
88 Other suggestions to avoid the dependence on AIO among elderly immigrants, such as reducing the residence requirement of the AOW from 50 to 40 years, have occasionally been made but have never been taken seriously. When the largest Dutch trade union suggested such a reduction, PvdA junior minister Ahmed Aboutaleb immediately dismissed it because such a measure "would affect a much larger group and have [...] large budgetary effects" (kst-29549-13, November 19, 2007).
parliament passed a law to reduce the level of income assistance offered to elderly immigrants (and remigrants).

A fifth example does not, strictly speaking, concern the social rights of immigrants, but can nevertheless be seen as part of the trend under discussion. Since the late 1990s, almost all parliamentary parties have started to formulate objections to the so-called ‘export’ of social insurance programs: the practice of paying out benefits to people who do not reside in the Netherlands, either because they paid premiums in the past (as in the case of pensions), or because they are considered to have a strong connection to the Netherlands (as in the case of child benefits for children who temporarily live abroad while their parents are still in the Netherlands). The first sign of this trend was the introduction of the Limitation of the Export of Benefits Act (*Wet Beperking Export Uitkeringen*, better known as *Wet Beu*\(^{89}\)), which went into effect in 2000. The law introduced what was labelled the ‘territoriality principle’, which implies that insurance benefits can only be exported to EU member states and countries with which the Netherlands has a bilateral social security agreement (SVB, 2007b). Moreover, the law severely limited the export possibilities for most employee insurance programs (UWV, 2007).

The adoption of the *Wet Beu* did not mute politicians’ concerns about the export of benefits. The center-right Rutte-I cabinet that took office in 2010 promised in its coalition agreement to stop the export of child benefits and to introduce, for other benefits, a ‘country of residence principle’ (*woonlandbeginsel*) which ensures that the level of exported benefits are adjusted to the standard of living in the country where the recipient resides. In November 2011 a large parliamentary majority supported the introduction of the country of residence principle for child benefits.\(^{90}\)

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\(^{89}\) While it is unclear whether much should be read into this, it seems worth translating the law’s acronym - the term ‘beu’ is Dutch for being sick of or fed up with something.

\(^{90}\) Significantly, when the center-right Lubbers-II cabinet tried to implement a country of residence principle, a majority of the House resisted. In the words of a senior civil servant at the Department of Social Affairs, “now it is for the first time that there is a parliamentary majority that to a large extent, almost across the House, says: no, of course, that makes much sense. Because a child benefit from the Netherlands is more than a monthly wage on the countryside of East Turkey” (interview NET13).
Sixth, integration policies in the Netherlands have become increasingly ungenerous over the last ten years. For the present discussion, two aspects of this turn are of particular relevance. First, access to a number of benefits has become conditional on successful participation in integration and language classes. Rita Verdonk (at that time VVD Minister of Immigration and Integration) was one of the first politicians to suggest (in 2003) cutting the social assistance benefits of immigrants who had not integrated ‘well enough’, but the government did not stay in power long enough for her to execute these plans. Three years later, her suggestion was taken up by PvdA parliamentarians Jeroen Dijsselbloem and Saskia Noorman-Den Uyl, who proposed compelling several groups of immigrants to acquire “sufficient oral and written skills in the Dutch language and knowledge of Dutch society” or risk losing their benefits: social assistance recipients for whom a lack of language skills proves a barrier in finding employment, social assistance recipients with under-aged children, and so-called ‘old-comers’ (typically the generation of guest workers who came to the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies) on unemployment or disability benefits (kst-30308-66, June 21, 2006). These suggestions became incorporated in Dutch integration law in December 2006. In 2010, Stef Blok (VVD) introduced a private bill suggesting limiting social assistance benefits to immigrants who master the Dutch language at the (fairly low) A2 level, excluding even refugee migrants who do not speak Dutch (kst-32328-2, March 4, 2010). While the Rutte-I government fell before this bill was passed, it can be expected to resurface in the future. Finally, in its 2010 coalition agreement the first Rutte cabinet showed its desire to take the requirement to fit in one step further by stating it will also cut social assistance benefits “in case the behaviour or clothing of someone факtually reduces his [sic] chances on the labour market” (Government of the Netherlands, 2010).

91 As early as 2006, then Amsterdam alderman Ahmed Aboutaleb (PvdA) argued that burqa-wearing women should not be entitled to social assistance. His comment was widely covered in the national press, and pollster Maurice de Hond even surveyed the public on the issue. According to this survey, only 20 percent of the respondents disagreed with Aboutaleb.
In addition to coupling access to welfare state benefits to integration, the number of immigrant-targeted services the state is willing to pay for has also been scaled down. Virtually all labour market programs for immigrants have been abolished, as well as other immigrant-targeted programs such as state-funded interpretation services in health care. Indeed, the budget for integration\(^{92}\) has been scaled down to such an extent that a senior civil servant commented somewhat sarcastically: “If you add up everything and end up at 500,000 euro, it would be much” (interview NET11). The government has even become unwilling to pay for the integration classes immigrants are required to take. The center-left Balkenende-IV cabinet started to ask immigrants to cover parts of the expenses, after which the Rutte-I cabinet decided to ask immigrants to pay the entire bill. Refugees can take a state loan if they do not have sufficient resources.

Finally, in addition to all these formal measures to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits, the Dutch parliament has also become increasingly attentive to whether these rules are strictly enforced. This first emerged after the implementation of the Linking Act. Politicians often complained in parliament about instances in which municipalities made an exception and extended some benefits to undocumented migrants. For example, when in 2000 the city of Amsterdam offered welfare to migrants who had been in the Netherlands since before 1992 but had lost their residence status as a result of recent legislative changes (often referred to as ‘white illegals’), Joop Wijn of Christian democratic party CDA suggested reducing intergovernmental transfers to Amsterdam and all other municipalities who similarly violate the Linking Act. More recently, parliamentarians have repeatedly stressed that the five year residence requirement on access to social assistance should be strictly enforced - regardless of how ‘durable’ an immigrant’s link to the Netherlands might be. In June 2008, Eddy van Hijum (CDA) and Hans Spekman (PvdA) introduced a motion to strictly enforce the five year’s residence requirement, which

\(^{92}\) The responsibility for integration has shifted several times in the last few years from one ministry to another. At the time of my interviews, integration was a sector within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I will refer simply to ‘the Department of Integration’.
passed with an overwhelming majority (about 93 percent). A year later, Jan Jacob van Dijk (CDA) again urged the government to strictly enforce the five year’s requirement: “We are very worried about this. How will the members of government make sure that someone who has worked here [less than] five years but is not a Dutch citizen will not be claiming welfare? We are worried about the consequences for the Dutch social security system” (kst-1750-368, February 26, 2009). It is unsurprising, then, that governments feel compelled to frequently reassure parliament that it is not true that ‘too many foreigners are making use of benefits’ (see, for example, 34-3-12704, January 21, 2009, or 35-3-13416, September 18, 2009).

All in all, over the last twenty years the Dutch welfare state has become decidedly less inclusive of the growing immigrant population. A wide range of reforms have restricted all categories of newcomers’ access to benefits, limited the possibility to take benefits across borders, and abolished or downsized social programs that had been specifically designed to assist immigrant integration. While the first of these reforms were implemented in the mid-1990s, the push to differentiate in social rights between immigrants and native-born citizens has become especially pronounced over the last ten years or so. In other words, in a very brief period of time the Netherlands has undergone a far-reaching metamorphosis in its approach to the social rights of newcomers.

5.2 From taboo to cliché: increasing concerns about immigrant welfare reliance

This metamorphosis in public policy reflects a change in elite and public opinion on the entitlements of immigrants. Over the last ten years, the belief that the Dutch state owes more to native-born citizens than to immigrants seems to have become more pervasive. Before I turn to explanations for this ideological shift, this section first illustrates how large it has been.

It is not easy to assess change in the public’s evaluation of immigrants’ place in the welfare state. Only occasionally have Dutch respondents been surveyed on this subject, and there are hardly any questions measuring selective solidarity that have been asked at several points in
time. We know, for example, that in Eurobarometer 30 (administered in 1988), only 25 percent of Dutch respondents agreed with the statement that ‘most immigrants could get along without welfare if they tried’, and that some twenty years later about two thirds disagreed in Eurobarometer 71.3 (2009) that ‘immigrants contribute more in taxes than they take out in health and welfare services’. However, since these questions do not appear in other waves of the survey series, we cannot assess whether this difference reflects an increase of selective solidarity over time.

![Figure 5.1. Anti-immigrant attitudes, 1978-2004. (Source: CCNS.)](image)

Nevertheless, there are at least three pieces of indirect evidence that do suggest that Dutch citizens have become less willing to share their welfare state with newcomers. First, while on a

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93 Unfortunately, these questions have not been asked in 1982, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1999, 2001, and 2003. Figure 5.1 displays interpolated data for these years. For presentation purposes, I have reformulated the questions and collapsed some of the answer categories. The original questions are as follows: (1) “In case you would get people of a different race as close neighbours, would you have no objection, would you accept it but not be very happy about it, or would you resist it?” (Score displays the percentage of respondents that did not pick the option ‘no objection’ - missing values are excluded.) (2) “Between a Dutch family and a guest worker family, who should, in your opinion, receive a newly available house?” (Score displays the percentage of respondents who answer ‘Dutch family’ - the option ‘it should not make a difference’ is also available.) (3) “Imagine there are two employees, one foreigner and one Dutch person, who are on all other accounts the same. If one of them should be fired because the company runs into trouble, who should that be in your opinion?” (Score displays the percentage of respondents that answer ‘foreigner’ - the option ‘it should not make a difference’ is also available.)
number of questions that have repeatedly been asked about ethnic diversity and immigration
the public's attitudes seem to be relatively stable over time or to have become more positive
(Government of the Netherlands, 2007), the results are different when people are asked
specifically about immigrants' access to state-funded services. Figure 5.1 shows results from
three questions from the Cultural Changes in the Netherlands Survey (CCNS) that have been
probed annually from 1978 to 2004. While on two questions there is no evidence of an increase
in anti-immigrant attitudes over time, the number of people who agree with the only question
that directly asks whether native-born Dutch should have more entitlements to a social service
than immigrants has increased steadily since the late 1980s (at the same time that an anti-
immigrant party first achieved parliamentary representation - see Section 5.3.2).

![Figure 5.2](image-url)

**Figure 5.2.** Support for statement that employers should prioritize native-born citizens, the Netherlands and 13 other welfare states. (Source: WVS.)

Second, even though survey results suggest that the hostility towards immigrants has only
increased marginally (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007, p. 23), this increase is unusual from a
comparative perspective. Indeed, in most Western welfare states the public has become more
positive towards immigrants over time. Figure 5.2 reports the percentage of respondents who
agreed with the statement ‘when jobs are scarce, employers should prioritize native-born citizens over immigrants’ in the three waves of the WVS that the question was asked in the Netherlands. The first bar shows the results for the Netherlands, while the second bar maps the percentage of respondents that agrees with this statement in the other thirteen countries discussed in Chapter Four. While the common trend appears to be one of declining chauvinism, the picture for the Netherlands is different. In fact, while in 1990 a Dutch respondent was about 70 percent less likely to agree than a respondent from another welfare state, by 2006 that difference had shrunk to about 20 percent.94

Third, in the absence of questions that directly measure selective solidarity, we can approximate the concept by combining existing survey questions. In each wave of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) since 1998, all respondents have been asked to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 7 both concerning income redistribution (where 1 means ‘income differences should be larger’ and 7 means ‘income differences should be smaller’), and asylum seekers (where 1 means ‘the Netherlands should admit more’ and 7 means ‘asylum seekers should be sent back to their country of origin’).

Table 5.2. Percentage of respondents in favour of income redistribution and opposed to asylum seekers, 1998-2010. (Source: DPES.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 shows the percentage of respondents, in each wave of the DPES since 1998, who give at least a score of 5 on both questions, indicating to be at the same time in favour of income redistribution and opposed to asylum seekers. The proportion of voters who demonstrate this type of selective solidarity is decidedly larger in 2006 and 2010 than in earlier election years. In sum, then, while there is not enough data to warrant conclusive statements on the evolution of

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94 Independent samples t-tests confirm that all differences are statistically significant at level $p < 0.01$. 

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the electorate’s views on immigrants’ social rights over time, the indirect pieces of evidence that we can assemble suggest an increase in the proportion of welfare chauvinists.

The increased unease about (the costs of) immigration is much clearer among the political elite. In keeping with the Dutch tradition of depoliticization (Lijphart, 1968), immigration was for a long time kept off the political agenda (Scheffer, 2007, pp. 49-50; Lechner, 2008, p. 150). Indeed, until about twenty years ago it was considered taboo, even a display of racism, to criticize any aspect of immigration or multiculturalism in political debate (Entzinger, 2006, p. 133; Lechner, 2008, p. 150). Certainly, there were occasional mentions of immigration-related problems, including the costs immigrants incur on the welfare system (Government of the Netherlands, 1994; Lakeman, 1999), but such observations typically received little attention and were never politicized. The only party that explicitly branded itself as an anti-immigrant party, the CD (in parliament from 1989 to 1998), was denounced by all mainstream observers as the political branch of a dying breed of neo-Nazism. Paul Ulenbelt (SP) remembers the reaction when his party first voiced concerns about immigrant integration in 1984:

At that time, [our party] said: ‘this is not going well at all’. [...] We even said back then: ‘everything that people have built up in terms of social premiums, they can take that with them if they return to Morocco, Turkey, or wherever. They can use that money to build up something over there.’ Well, the SP was then categorized as fascists. That was considered right-wing. (interview NET05)

This ‘conspiracy of silence’ (Messina, 2007) was quickly breached in the new millennium. In a now almost legendary op-ed, Labour intellectual Paul Scheffer spoke of a “multicultural drama” that had been ignored for too long, and warned, among other things, of “enormous numbers of stragglers and people without prospect, who will increasingly burden Dutch society” (Scheffer, 2000). It led to a nation-wide discussion about the merits of immigration, including a highly visible parliamentary debate. With the entry on the political scene of Pim Fortuyn, who ran his 2002 election campaign on an anti-immigration platform, the era of depoliticization of immigration was definitely over.
In this changed climate, advisory bodies quickly started to describe the overrepresentation of immigrants on welfare as ‘a problem’ and ‘one of the biggest issues of concern’ (WRR, 2001, pp. 13, 121). A 2003 report by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, or CPB) concluded that “any successful policy will be restrictive as regards access to the country or its welfare arrangements” (Roodenburg, Euwals, & Ter Rele, 2003, p. 9). In a May 2011 report, the Dutch Council for Social Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, or RMO) made the same recommendation, in surprisingly frank and uncompromising terms:

The RMO advocates an economic migration policy, which clearly outlines for which parts of the labour market migrants are needed, and which expects self-reliance and autonomy from migrants [...] Who does not contribute (anymore) to welfare and innovation cannot stay and is not allowed to make a claim on the welfare state. Part of the integration problems can be explained because [sic] too generous access to benefits undermines the social and financial support for the welfare state [...] The maxim is thus: ‘You are more than welcome, but we are not going to take care of you’. (Frissen & Van Diepen, 2011)

Figure 5.3. Questions and motions in parliament advocating the expansion (black bars) and reduction (white bars) of immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits, 1995-2010. (For more information, see Appendix tables A3.1-A3.4.)
These kinds of recommendations are well in line with prevailing majority sentiment in parliament. It would take up too much space to detail all episodes of the almost parliament-wide increase in support for restricting immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits. By means of aggregate illustration, Figure 5.3 reports the number of questions and motions brought forward in parliament each year from 1995 to 2010 that directly address immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.95

The figure shows that whereas parliamentary activity aimed at expanding immigrants’ social rights decreased over time, voices to exclude migrants from benefits and services have grown louder and louder. Of course, the widespread support for restricting immigrants’ social rights might not be surprising considering it is no longer taboo to note that immigrants lay a larger than average claim on the welfare system. Still, it is important to note that acknowledging immigrants’ overrepresentation does not logically necessitate the advocacy of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. After all, one could think of at least three alternative strategies to decrease immigrants’ reliance on welfare benefits: (1) making admission policies more selective and admitting more highly skilled immigrants; (2) investing in integration policies and active labour market policies to enhance immigrants’ chances on the labour market; and (3) implementing across-the-board welfare cuts to achieve an overall reduction in social spending.

In interviews with the relevant spokespeople of the largest parties in parliament96, I asked about the desirability of each of these four strategies (immigrant-excluding welfare reforms and the three alternatives). The answers are summarized in Table 5.3.

95 Figure 5.3 excludes motions and questions that were unaccompanied by a clear evaluation on behalf of their author (such as questions that seemed to be asked primarily to acquire information), as well as motions and questions that, while related to immigrants’ position in the welfare state, are mostly about something else (such as motions proposing to attract more high-skilled migrants, or to make a benefit more generous for all recipients).
96 My interviews were with Cora van Nieuwenhuizen (VVD), Hans Spekman (PvdA), Sietse Fritsma (PVV), Eddy van Hijum (CDA), Paul Ulenbelt (SP), and Fatma Koşer Kaya (D66). Considering the high level of party discipline in Dutch parliamentary parties (Andeweg, 2004), it seems safe to assume that at the time of my interviews, these six spokespeople conveyed the official position of about 87 percent of all members of the Dutch Lower House of Parliament. The other 13 percent was composed by
Table 5.3. Political parties’ views on four possible strategies to avoid/reduce immigrant welfare dependence.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Christian dem.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first observation we should make is that the option of restricting immigrants’ access to social benefits is popular across the ideological spectrum. The most ardent supporters of this strategy are undoubtedly the VVD and the PVV. Both parties suggested increasing the residence requirement on social provisions and public insurance programs to 10 years, and have, when possible, voted in favour of almost all welfare chauvinist motions and bills (see Appendix Table A3.3). On several occasions, both parties have expressed support for the ‘Danish model’ of social assistance, which ties the benefit level to the number of years the applicant has lived in the country (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The CDA has also advocated scaling back immigrants’ access to benefits, but it has not followed the VVD and PVV in all their proposals. Eddy van Hijum describes his party’s position as follows:

I think that the welfare state has gone too far in the last decades, both in the direction of immigrants and in the direction of benefit recipients in the Netherlands. [...] But at the same time we have said: ‘there are also boundaries that we do not want to touch’. The five year period for welfare for example, that the VVD and PVV want to extend to ten years or longer, we said about that: ‘we are not going to touch that’. [Similarly,] we try to draw a very sharp distinction between [social provisions] and insured rights that you build up here - if you work here you are insured for unemployment, disability, and old age - you should be able to take those rights with you. That applies to immigrants, that applies to everyone; we are not going to touch that. (interview NET04)
The other three parties are more reluctant to advocate differential treatment between newcomers and native-born citizens, and indeed, have been critics of some restrictive policy changes. When asked, Hans Spekman (PvdA), Paul Ulenbelt (SP), and Fatma Koşer Kaya (D66) all rejected the thesis that immigration poses a threat to the future of the Dutch welfare state. Moreover, as soon as restrictions on immigrants’ access to benefits came up, both Koşer Kaya and Ulenbelt hurried to emphasize their commitment to the principle of non-discrimination. For example, Ulenbelt declared: “When people are ultimately here, you need to treat them like any other. Even the Polish labourer who is here for three years and becomes occupationally incapacitated in a greenhouse should get a disability benefit. It is simple: sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander” (interview NET05).

Nevertheless, all three parties do advocate some restrictions. For example, none object to the principle of the Linking Act that undocumented migrants should not have access to any other benefits than the most basic ones (although the SP did vote against the bill). The current residence requirements on access to social assistance are supported by all three parties, even though D66 voted against a 2008 motion (by Van Hijum and Spekman) to enforce those requirements without exceptions. The PvdA and D66 were both in favour of a 2008 suggestion to investigate the possibilities of a stricter form of a ‘grow-in’ model of social security, and all three parties have supported the restrictions in the export of benefits. The proposal to tie immigrants’ eligibility for social assistance benefits to participation in integration and language classes was brought forward by the PvdA and supported by all parties in parliament.

The second option, employing a more selective admission policy, enjoys even more support in the Dutch parliament. The PVV advocates the most restrictive policy: it proposes to stop all non-refugee migration from ‘Muslim countries’97, to reduce the number of refugees to

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97 The PVV defines a Muslim country as any country in which more than 50 percent of the population is Muslim, and therefore includes, for example, countries such as Lebanon under this label. As Fritsma explained to me, this proposal aims to circumvent the (even more) clearly discriminatory option of only admitting non-Muslim individuals: “You can’t look at a person at Amsterdam Airport, [and establish] are you a Muslim or not? You just look at the country of origin” (interview NET03).
1,000 per year\textsuperscript{98}, to increase the requirements for family migration, and to exclusively admit temporary labour migration. The VVD’s suggestions are only marginally less drastic: the overarching message of its stance on immigration is to stop the admission of migrants who are ‘without prospect’ (\textit{kansloos}). For that reason, it advocates increased requirements for family migration, limiting asylum migration to ‘real’ refugees, and only admitting high-skilled labour migrants. The CDA advocates a similar but more modest, package (selective labour migration, stricter requirements on family migration, reduction in asylum migration). At the other side of the political spectrum, the SP also proposes a large reduction in the intake of migrants, but its opposition is mostly rooted in the belief that open borders exploit immigrants who are willing to work for a low salary, and reduce the wages for the native-born population. For that reason, it advocates more restrictions on labour migration than on family or asylum migration. The PvdA proposes fewer restrictions than these four parties, but nevertheless believes that the overall intake should decrease, proposing reductions in labour migration (for similar reasons as the SP) and an income threshold for family migrants. Among the interviewed parties, only D66, then, does not propose restrictions in admission policy: it advocates active recruitment of educated labour migrants, and does not propose additional restrictions on family or asylum migration. Interestingly, however, Koşer Kaya refused to share the conclusion that her party’s plans would result in an increase of immigration: “The tendency is that soon more will leave than come in. We shouldn’t exaggerate the numbers” (interview NET06).

In sharp contrast to these two restrictive policy options, few parties endorse attempts to stimulate the economic integration through targeted labour market programs. The Rutte cabinet even planned to reduce the entire integration budget to zero. Fritsma (PVV) dismissed immigrant-targeted policies on the basis that “there have always been programs to encourage labour market participation, but the problem has never been solved” (interview NET03). Cora van Nieuwenhuizen explains the position of the VVD in similar terms:

\textsuperscript{98}This would entail a reduction of about 90 percent in comparison to the most recent available numbers (CBS, 2012).
All those organizations with an addiction for subsidies, we should stop with that. That goes for targeted policies as well. It is some sort of hugging culture and a pampering that all these organizations cling to, because ‘it is all so necessary’. Then I think that if that policy would be the solution, we wouldn’t have these problems anymore, because we’ve been doing it like that forever. (interview NET01)

Similarly, the CDA is ‘critical’ of this strategy, and D66 objects to immigrant-targeted policies because ‘we should stop treating people in groups’ (interview NET06). Only the PvdA and SP, then, advocate immigrant-targeted programs such as employment assistance, education services, and internships programs.

Finally, the general positions of these parties on the appropriate size of the welfare state are fairly predictable. The VVD and, to a lesser extent, the CDA, champion less intervention in the market (and indeed, the Rutte-I cabinet scaled down both youth disability benefits and means-tested social services). On the other hand, the socialists and social democrats advocate preserving or enhancing the available services and programs. The position of D66 and the PVV deserve some more attention. D66 is the only party that advocates welfare reform for the explicit reason that a rigid labour market and passive welfare benefits constrain the opportunities of newcomers on the labour market such as immigrants. Koşer Kaya:

Do you know why there are so many entrepreneurs among Turkish Dutch people? Because they do not get the opportunities, so they think: I will do it myself. That’s great, very innovative, and very positive, but it is a consequence of [the structure of the labour market]. So you have to dare looking at that system, but also at the system of social security. [...] You have to make sure that you on the one hand change something about the duration of a benefit, but on the other hand that people can more easily go from one job to another. [...] Whether we’re talking about immigrant or native-born, if we want a future-proof system, then we need to dare changing it now. (interview NET06)

What is noteworthy about the PVV is that it actively resists most proposals for welfare retrenchment. It was perhaps the most vocal critic of the 2010 increase in the retirement age99, and it withdrew its support from the Rutte-I cabinet in April 2012 exactly because it refused to

99 PVV’s opposition to the AOW reform brought then VVD leader (and later prime minister) Mark Rutte to state: “Our colleague Pechtold [D66] has been worrying recently about the alleged extreme right-wing tendencies of his colleague Wilders [PVV], but as far as I’m concerned the fact that colleague Wilders on the point of the AOW is cosily taking sides with the SP and leans up against [union leader] miss Jongerius indicates the ultimate uncovering of the PVV. As far as I’m concerned the PVV is not extreme right-wing but extreme left-wing” (TK24-2066, November 12, 2009).
support plans for further retrenchment. Party ideologue Martin Bosma (2010, p. 36) describes the PVV creed as follows: “The state has the responsibility to protect the weak. Thus we will strive for excellent health care, benefits for people who want to work but are unable to, and a decent AOW. [...] But besides the new party will distinguish itself by a hard line on the issue of mass immigration and islamisation.” This pro-welfare position is relevant not only because it shows that among all parties in parliament the PVV most clearly champions selective solidarity, but also because it distinguishes the PVV from earlier Dutch anti-immigrant parties. While both the CD and Pim Fortuyn’s LPF often described immigration as a threat to the welfare state, neither party ever expressed warm support for generous social policies in the first place. Indeed, Fortuyn’s argument that “the very carefully crafted arrangements of the welfare state are under pressure because of [immigration]” (Fortuyn, 2002, p. 121) seems curious coming from a person advocating the most residual of welfare states:

> It is necessary to drastically reform the social security arrangements. In that system we will have a social assistance benefit for everyone without income, to which everyone will contribute during their life according to capacity. We can then also abolish the [public pension benefit] AOW. If you want a better insurance, you can get one from a private insurance company. (Fortuyn, 2002, pp. 84-5)

All in all, in twenty years’ time the topic of immigrants’ position in the Dutch welfare state has transformed from a taboo to one of the most prominent subjects of discussion. The public, and more clearly, the political elite, have become increasingly critical of immigrants’ reliance on social programs and benefits. More importantly, political parties are in almost unanimous agreement that levels of immigrant welfare dependence can most effectively be reduced by restrictive changes not only in admission policies, but also in immigrants’ access to benefits.

100 This difference also becomes apparent when we look at the attitudes of voters. Data from the Dutch DPES suggest that those who voted for the CD and the LPF were significantly less likely to favour income redistribution than other voters. PVV voters, on the other hand, turn out to be significantly more likely to advocate a reduction in income differences. These conclusions are based on a comparison of CD and non-CD voters in the DPES of 1994 and 1998, LPF and non-LPF voters in the DPES of 2002, 2003, and 2006, and PVV and non-PVV voters in the DPES of 2010 (the PVV also competed in the election of 2006, but it was impossible to make the comparison for this election because the variable on vote choice did not include the PVV as a separate answer option). All differences mentioned are significant at level p < 0.05. The calculations are not shown, but can be made available upon request.
5.3 Explaining the rise in selective solidarity

This section discusses explanations for the remarkable spread in selective solidarity in the Netherlands. First I will illustrate that, contrary to what politicians often suggest, there is little evidence that economic reality is an important driver of the unease about immigrants’ place in the welfare state. Instead, I will argue in the second subsection that a better explanation can be found in the political translation of immigrants’ welfare costs, which has been particularly conducive to the spread of selective solidarity.

5.3.1 The limited relevance of economics

As we have seen, proponents often justify immigrant-excluding welfare reforms as a necessary response to economic reality. Immigrants make so much use of social programs, so the explanation goes, that unlimited access will surely make a redistributive welfare state an unsustainable project. When asked why his party so often highlights the costs of immigration, Fritsma answered: “The more migration you have, the more expensive the welfare state becomes. The most important is that it costs so much money that it is harmful for the preservation of our welfare state” (interview NET03).

Critics like Fritsma are certainly right that immigrants in the Netherlands experience economic difficulties. On virtually every indicator of economic performance, immigrants (and in particular, those with non-Western origins) have historically fared worse than native-born citizens. To give just a few examples, there is evidence that in comparison to native-born Dutch citizens, immigrants are more likely to be unemployed or employed in jobs with low levels of job security (Becker, 2000; Van Oorschot, 2004), to receive social assistance and disability benefits (WRR, 2001; Chorny, Euwals, & Folmer, 2007), and to make use of those benefits for a longer period of time (Snel & Linder, 2008). Figures 5.4 and 5.5 present the most recent official data on immigrants’ reliance on transfer benefits. As Figure 5.4 shows, non-Western immigrants are about twice as likely as native-born citizens to be in receipt of non-pension transfer benefits.
than native-born citizens. The difference is even larger when we focus exclusively on those who rely on transfer benefits as their only source of income: while only 4.8 percent of the native-born Dutch population is in that predicament, the percentage is 18.9 for non-Western immigrants.101

There are serious problems, however, with using these kinds of data as a motivation for advocating selective solidarity. For one thing, it rests on the assumption that immigrants are primarily to blame for their high levels of welfare dependence, and therefore ignores other explanations for this outcome. The current strains on immigrants’ economic integration can at least partly be traced back to a particularly counterproductive combination of past policy decisions in the areas of admission, integration, labour market regulation, and budgeting.

Figure 5.4. Share of population receiving non-pension benefits, by country of origin, 2008. (Source: CBS, 2012.)102

101 As Figure 5.5 reveals, it would be wrong to conclude from these differences that immigrants are overrepresented among recipients of all transfer benefits. At least at this point in time, immigrants do not rely disproportionately on disability benefits, and are only somewhat more likely to receive unemployment benefits. For obvious reasons, they are even strongly underrepresented in the most costly public insurance program, the AOW. In fact, it is only on social assistance that immigrants lay a comparatively large claim. And even in this case it is important to make a qualification: social assistance statistics include the above-mentioned AIO benefit for elderly migrants with low pension income. In other words, immigrants’ relatively high reliance on social assistance is partly a function of the lengthy residence requirement on the AOW.
Only very recently (in 2004) have the Netherlands started to employ a selective admission policy aimed at attracting high-skilled labour. After having welcomed a large number of guest workers to address labour shortages in the 1960s (Geddes, 2003; Meyers, 2004), from the early 1970s on the Netherlands started to curtail labour migration, culminating in a complete stop in 1979 (Vellinga, 1993). As a result, the relatively large numbers of migrants that arrived each year after that period were almost exclusively family migrants and asylum seekers—migrants who were not admitted on the basis of their human skills. In addition, the Netherlands took a long time to develop policies facilitating the economic integration of immigrants. Until well into the late 1970s, most politicians assumed that guest workers would return to their country of origin, and

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102 The distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ in Dutch statistics is rather arbitrary (Indonesian and Japanese migrants, for example, are coded as ‘Western’, while Turks are considered ‘non-Western’).  
103 Before the arrival of guest workers, the immigrant population in the Netherlands mostly consisted of citizens from (former) colonies Indonesia, Suriname, and the Dutch Antilles.  
104 Moreover, even though governments tried, they were largely unable to regulate the size of these migration flows (Van Amersfoort & Penninx, 1994, p. 133). Migration control was easy to circumvent by crossing the borders on a tourist visa and acquiring the necessary documentation from within the country. Stories about abuse of the family migration system abound, although admittedly, almost all the evidence of family migration fraud I know of is anecdotal (Scheffer, 2007)
therefore reasoned there was little need for integration policies (Entzinger, 1984, pp. 81-94). In fact, the only services that were initially offered to immigrants could probably best be labelled segregationist, in particular the now infamous ‘education in own language and culture’ classes that were specifically designed to prepare children of immigrants for a life in their parents’ country of origin. Immigrant-targeted socio-economic policy remained absent until the mid-1990s (Penninx, 1996).

Labour market regulations have also contributed to immigrants’ difficulties. For one thing, since 1994 there have been strict limitations on asylum seekers’ access to the labour market (Ghorashi, 2005), leaving them no choice but to depend on the state. More generally, the rigid structure of both the welfare state and the labour market constrains the social mobility of newcomers. In the post-war years, dominated by Christian democratic politics\textsuperscript{105}, the Netherlands developed a corporatist welfare state that emphasized income replacement over labour activation (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997; Becker, 2000; Huo, 2009, p. 59), and aimed to protect the rights of employees over those of newcomers to the labour market (Rochon, 1999, p. 204; Taylor-Gooby, 2004, p. 23).\textsuperscript{106} And finally, right after the era of guest worker migration the Netherlands went through a severe welfare crisis, which has become known as the ‘Dutch disease’ (Entzinger, 1985; Visser & Hemerijck, 1997).\textsuperscript{107} As inactivity levels soared, so did the costs of the by then comprehensive welfare system. To make things worse, politicians and civil servants eager to reduce unemployment levels decided to channel large portions of the unemployed population (including many former guest workers) into disability benefit WAO

\textsuperscript{105} The twelve coalition governments that were in power during the era of welfare state formation (roughly from 1948 to 1972) were all composed of at least two of the three confessional parties that ultimately joined forces to form the CDA in 1980. The Catholic Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic Popular Party) was partner to each of these governments, while the protestant Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party) and Christelijk-Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union) both took part in ten of these governments.

\textsuperscript{106} Just how passive these arrangements are can be gleaned from the facts that until 1980, the Netherlands had the lowest female labour force participation of all OECD countries, and that it still scores comparatively low in this regard (Van Kersbergen, 1995; Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 166; Seeleib-Kaiser, Van Dyk, & Roggenkamp, 2008, p. 25).

\textsuperscript{107} Unable to finance social expenditures with premiums and taxes, the Dutch government decided to use unexpected revenues from natural gas to pay for the social security deficit. It did not work.
(Wet Arbeidsongeschiktheid) (Kuipers, 2006, pp. 139-42; Snel, Stavenuiter, & Duyvendak, 2002). By 1990, on a working-age population of roughly 9 million, about 1 million people were officially ‘disabled’. In sum, it is not surprising that many observers argue that the Dutch welfare state has done more harm than good to its immigrant population (Mollenkopf, 2000; Buruma, 2006; Chorny, Euwals, & Folmer, 2007, p. 32; Scheffer, 2007, pp. 38-40, 113-8, 201).

All in all, the problem with suggesting that levels of immigrant welfare dependence warrant exclusion is that such an argument pays no attention to the origins of those levels. But the link that anti-immigrant politicians draw between selective solidarity and levels of immigrant welfare dependence is also problematic from a more general theoretical point of view: it suggests that calls to reduce immigrants’ entitlements are mostly a response to economic reality. Such an account quickly runs into problems. Indeed, economic facts are, at best, of secondary importance in explaining the rise of selective solidarity. Four observations are critical here.

First, at the most aggregate level, it is not the case that pleas to exclude immigrants from welfare state benefits have been loudest at times when the economic integration of immigrants was most troubled. In fact, it has been the exact opposite. A series of reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s both made the labour market more flexible and the system of benefits more active (Hartog, 1999; Van der Veen & Trommel, 1998). In February 2008 the Balkenende-IV cabinet decided to loosen the restrictions on asylum seekers’ access to the labour market, allowing them to work 24 weeks each year. Moreover, a series of restrictions in admission policy in the late 1990s changed the composition of the immigration inflow considerably. Whereas in the mid-1990s around 45 percent of all incoming migrants came through the family stream, a decade later that share had been reduced to around 31 percent. The decrease in the relative intake of refugees was even starker: from 33 percent in 1995 to just over 3 (!) percent in 2005 (CBS, 2012).  

108 In reality, at least 30 percent of them were in fact able-bodied, unemployed citizens (Huo, 2009, p. 58).  
109 While it is true that international refugee movement decreased in general over this time period, the drop in refugee intake in the Netherlands was particularly dramatic. Of all 34 OECD countries, only Germany, Denmark, and the United States experienced a steeper decline in their intake of asylum seekers over this time period (OECD, 2011b).
As a result of these policy changes, the economic standing of the immigrant population as a whole has improved considerably. This does not become immediately apparent when we look at the official data on immigrant use of transfer benefits. Because the Netherlands only started to collect information on country of origin in the administration of social benefits after it was explicitly instructed to do so by a 1999 motion introduced by Henk Kamp (VVD), there is unfortunately no official data available on immigrant benefit receipt before that time. One of the few diachronic observations we can make, therefore, is that from 1999 to 2008, the percentage of non-Western immigrants who relied on social benefits (other than pensions) as their only source of income dropped slightly from 15 to just over 12 percent (CBS, 2012). But more indirect evidence over a longer period of time suggests a larger socio-economic improvement. Figure 5.6, for example, illustrates that while non-Western immigrants are still more likely to be unemployed than Western immigrants and native-born Dutch, the size of this difference is much smaller today than it was twenty-five years ago.

Figure 5.6. Unemployment rate, by country of origin, 1981-2010. (Source: CBS, 2012.)

Existing research confirms this conclusion. A wide range of studies have noted an increase in recent years in immigrants’ labour market participation (Dagevos, Gijsberts, & Van Praag,
2003), employment (Lower House of Parliament, 2003; Entzinger, 2006), income (Kloosterman, 2000), and education (Government of the Netherlands, 2007). A senior civil servant in the Department of Integration takes the available evidence as a reason for optimism:

I have to say that on the labour market and in education it is looking better and better over the last years: a doubling of the number of highly educated, a decrease in unemployment, an increase in labour market participation - also in higher occupations, all those kinds of things. [...] There are even people who say: the progress there is now, is insanely good: from a group of illiterate parents to 40 percent inflow in higher education in one generation. (interview NET11)

In sum, then, for as far as data availability allows us to draw firm conclusions, the history of the economic integration of immigrants to the Netherlands seems to be one of slow but steady improvement. In other words, while immigrants in the Netherlands are still worse off socio-economically than native-born citizens and are therefore still more likely to resort to the welfare state for support, it seems safe to assume that immigration is costing the Netherlands less today than it did a couple of decades ago. If selective solidarity were really a response to economic developments, we should have seen a decline in this sentiment over time, not a sudden increase.

A second observation suggesting that economic facts are not the primary driver of pleas to exclude immigrants from welfare state benefits is that these pleas have often been made in reference to practices that involve very few costs. For example, when an internal SVB report detailing cases of fraud in the export of child benefits to Turkey and Morocco leaked to the press, parliamentarians quickly called for a parliamentary emergency debate to urge the minister not only to increase efforts to combat fraud, but also to reduce the export of child benefits altogether. PVV’s Sietse Fritsma argued that the fraud, in addition to the already ‘extremely large claim non-Western immigrants make on our social services’, was a good reason to stop the export of all benefits to Turkey and Morocco. The VVD advocated stopping the export of child benefits to all countries. The SP, PvdA, SGP, and CDA all agreed that restrictions were warranted to fight this type of fraud in the future. The number of potential fraud cases that spurred the entire debate was estimated to be at a maximum 371 - not even 2 percent of the total
caseload of exported child benefits. It seems unlikely, then, that the costs of the export policy are what motivated the parliamentary opposition.

Similarly, recent suggestions to deny migrants from Central and Eastern European EU member states access to unemployment benefits and other programs have not been based on economic analysis either. In response to an article in national newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad*, Fritsma and Van Dijck (PVV) complained about the ‘massive’ use of unemployment benefits among Polish migrants, argued that many Poles actually come to the Netherlands to make use of those benefits, and therefore proposed to refuse all CEE migrants access to the welfare state in the first 10 years they are in the country (ah-tk1654, May 2, 2007). In reality, the use of unemployment benefits among Polish migrants was not ‘massive’ at all: in that year (2007), 432 residents with a Polish background received unemployment benefits. On an estimated Polish population in the Netherlands of 120,000, that amounts to a mere 0.36 percent - about three times lower than the percentage of native-born citizens in receipt of unemployment benefits (CBS, 2012). The number of Polish migrants on welfare - another recurrent bone of contention not only for the PVV but for the VVD, CDA, PvdA and SP as well - turned out to be even lower: 350 in 2007. Less than a year later, the burden of Polish migrants on the welfare system was again topic of parliamentary discussion, and again politicians of all stripes expressed their worries in strong terms. In response, minister Jan Piet Hein Donner (CDA) informed the House that at that time (January 2008), the number of Polish migrants on welfare was estimated at 180. Certainly, these numbers might increase in future years when more immigrants from Poland will have lived long enough in the Netherlands to qualify for social assistance benefits, but what is important to note is that the very low numbers in 2007 and 2008 were already enough to spur long parliamentary discussions and exclusionary suggestions.

The critique of inexpensive practices is closely related to a third reason to doubt that the exclusion of migrants from benefits has much to do with economic motivations: some of the
exclusionary reforms that have been proposed are likely to have little economic effect. The best example in this regard is the suggestion by the VVD and PVV to increase the residence requirement for access to social assistance from 5 to 10 years. Judges already often waive the current residence requirement. As a senior civil servant at the Department of Immigration explained: “if someone has been in the Netherlands for a relatively long period of time and claims welfare, in particular article 8 ECHR makes it hard to repeal the residence permit and stop the welfare payments” (interview NET12). A colleague in the Department of Social Affairs agrees: “Municipalities [...] think that someone has a durable link with the Netherlands quite quickly, so [they] just give someone welfare” (interview NET13). Yet another civil servant added: “An additional problem is that municipalities are close to welfare applicants. What they reject in welfare, they get back in night-time loitering, and appeals on emergency accommodation and free food. They see the people at the counter” (interview NET15). If municipalities already judge people to have a durable link with the Netherlands after less than 5 years and thus do extend social assistance in case of need, extending the residence requirement to 10 years is unlikely to have any significant economic impact.

Something similar can be said about the first Rutte government’s proposal to link eligibility for social assistance to someone’s ‘choice of clothing’. Even though it has never been explicitly stated, it is clear to most observers (including all civil servants I spoke with) that this policy is meant to target women who wear the burqa. Again, this policy is unlikely to have any economic impact worth mentioning. Even though exact numbers are unavailable, most estimate the number of burqa-wearing women in the Netherlands at around 150-200 (De Wijk, 2008; Vermeulen, et al., 2006). Moreover, it is not entirely clear how the practical implication of this policy proposal is any different from the already existing requirement in social assistance law that applicants need to make a demonstrable effort to remove barriers to finding a job. As a senior civil servant puts it: “Already, we can cut off people if they do not undertake enough effort

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110 Similar to the Integration sector, the Immigration sector has been part of different ministries at different points in time. I will simply use the label ‘the Department of Immigration’.
to find a job. This is already attainable” (interview NET14). This same observation was made by a 2006 team of experts asked to investigate the legal feasibility and normative desirability of a ban on the burqa: “The experts point out that it is already possible with existing legislation to make demands regarding clothing in a myriad of specific situations [...] Refusing a social benefit because the applicant destroys her chances on the labour market by wearing the veil is warranted” (Vermeulen, et al., 2006, p. 6). Again, it seems clear that this proposal is not a response to demonstrable economic facts, but rather an attempt to appease a public unease rooted more in cultural than economic concerns.

A third example is the plea to implement a ‘country of residence principle’ in case of the AOW; in other words, to adjust the level of a Dutch pension to the standard of living of the country the recipient resides in. Again, the suggestion seems to be based more on ideological than on economic motivations. After all, the vast majority of exported pensions go to countries with a very similar standard of living as the Netherlands: the top three destination countries of AOW export are Belgium, Germany, and Spain (SVB, 2007b). Only about 8 percent of exported pension benefits are sent to Turkey and Morocco, the two countries that are most frequently mentioned in justifications for this policy reform.

The final, and perhaps best evidence that economic realities are unimportant to politicians who advocate the exclusion of immigrants from welfare state benefits is that they admit so themselves. When I asked the immigration spokesperson of the PVV, Sietse Fritsma, why his party advocates scaling back the social rights of immigrants, he responded: “It is a matter of principle. I think that is the most important answer to your question. We can also expect migrants to make a contribution to Dutch society first” (interview NET03). Even when I explicitly inquired about the centrality of economic arguments, he emphasized that those are at best secondary: “We believe that we have to protect our identity, our core values. That is the primary, the most important consideration for us.” His colleague at the VVD, Cora van Nieuwenhuizen, made a similar case:
The basis is the principled point. The financial aspect is a consequence of that. [...] It starts with that there are simply problems in society. They are overrepresented in crime, large groups of people seclude themselves, also reject Dutch society. [...] You need to make it as unattractive as possible to take advantage of the system. Because that, in my mind, is the worst category: those who come here and do not want to integrate. People who detest Dutch society, who think that everything is too decadent here, object to the equality of men and women, object to our liberal position on homosexuals, constantly make a big fuss about those things, but at the same time do want to make use of our benefits and get a subsidy for everything, etcetera etcetera. That is the group that we need to get rid of. (interview NET01)

CDA’s Eddy van Hijum similarly denied the importance of economic factors in explaining his party’s restrictive line on immigration:

I don’t think it has that much to do with costs. It is much more the societal debate that at a certain point was set in motion about the success of integration policy, or rather the lack thereof. [...] That led to a parliamentary inquiry, and ultimately brought us to take a number of measures to sharpen some regulations. [...] But I can’t say that it has been based on a very rational cost-benefit analysis of the costs for the welfare state. (interview NET04)

And also Paul Ulenbelt (SP) invoked other than economic arguments: “The biggest problem is not even financial in nature. The biggest problem has to do with that if you walk through certain neighbourhoods in large cities, you think you are on a holiday in a different country” (interview NET05). Hans Spekman (PvdA), then, seems right in his characterization of contemporary debates about the exclusion of immigrants from welfare state benefits:

[A concern for costs] might have something to do with it, but I rather feel that these arguments originate from the fact that in the Netherlands we do not have enough control over a couple of guys who botch up everything. And that creates so much irritation, fear, and anger, that everything that falls in this little box works. Among other things the costs. But rationally and emotionally as well, I think [that] once we get control over those boys who do not know how to behave themselves there is little ground left to still be talking about those costs. (interview NET02)

In sum, it is difficult to explain the increased concerns about immigrants’ entitlements by actual economic developments. Not only are we unable to understand why the spread in selective solidarity took place when it did, upon closer inspection it also seems dubious that it are really economic considerations that lead politicians to advocate immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.
For that reason, we need to turn our attention to how the topic of immigrants’ position in the Dutch welfare state has recently become translated if we want to understand why it has suddenly come to be seen in a more negative light.

5.3.2 THE POLITICAL TRANSLATION OF IMMIGRATION’S WELFARE COSTS

As we saw in the previous section, there are no obvious economic reasons why someone would more adamantly advocate immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in the Netherlands today than ten or twenty years ago. Nevertheless, concerns about the costs immigrants incur on the welfare budget did increase significantly over the last decade, both among the public and the political elite. The answer to this paradox is that for political, cultural, and institutional reasons, these costs have become a more prominent topic of political discussion, and that politicians have become more likely to frame them in divisive terms, encouraging native-born citizens and other politicians to see immigrants as undeserving of welfare state support.

Two aspects of this political translation are worth emphasizing. First, the costs of immigrant welfare dependence have often been exaggerated. For example, rather than saying that immigrants are overrepresented among recipients of welfare benefits, PVV parliamentarian Tony van Dijck put it as follows in a parliamentary debate in November 2009:

Mass migration [...] slowly but surely destroys our social security. Solidarity erodes and our social programs are being plundered. [...] By now already a quarter of a million Polish people are living in this country. We give all of them child support and a social benefit. We treat them to our social security. [...] We now have three million people who do not have a job, and [the elite’s] solution is to invite additional hundred thousands of people to the Netherlands and to treat them to a house, a social benefit, and a flat screen TV. (TK24-2071,2072,2076, November 12, 2009)

In other instances, the exaggeration has been more subtle. The VVD, for example, reported on its website in May 2008 that “migrants are currently overrepresented in the social security system: almost one in four is dependent on a benefit”.111 As is shown in Figure 5.4, this is not true. While it is indeed the case that about one in four non-Western immigrants is in receipt of a

benefit, the percentage is much lower (namely, about 14.6) when we focus on all immigrants who are dependent on a benefit as the only source of income. In 2008, the distortion of economic facts even became the explicit subject of a parliamentary debate on the welfare costs incurred by a general amnesty that was passed that year. While the center-left government reasoned these costs should be calculated by adding up the welfare costs paid out to all refugees who would not have received legal status without the amnesty, the PVV argued that the calculation should also include those asylum seekers who would have acquired legal status in the absence of the amnesty. Sietse Fritsma (PVV) put a motion forward to this effect, which was only supported by the PVV, the VVD and independent Rita Verdonk.

Second, immigrant welfare dependence has often been framed as reflecting a penchant among immigrants to draw benefits. One version of this argument is that the generosity of Dutch social benefits attracts immigrants with a dubious work ethic. Eddy van Hijum (CDA), for example, told me that “even someone like GroenLinks’ Tofik Dibi says that Moroccan youth know perfectly well how high the level of social assistance benefits is in the Netherlands, and consider that a factor to come here” (interview NET04). Similarly, Hans Spekman (PvdA) declared that “[you shouldn’t] blindly open provisions to anyone who might show up here on a late afternoon, because otherwise it is of course totally logical that people do show up, because they can then immediately go on welfare or receive child benefits” (interview NET02).

A second version of this argument is that there is something about immigrants that make them more likely to make use of benefits than native-born citizens. Stef Blok (VVD), for example, argued that “[social assistance] benefits are admittedly modest according to Dutch standards, but they do offer a reasonable alternative to low-skill jobs to immigrants from countries where social security is often entirely absent or otherwise very minimal” (kst-32328-3, March 4, 2010). Sietse Fritsma (PVV) went further and suggested that some immigrant groups are overrepresented among benefit recipients because they have a natural tendency to cheat the system. “For Moroccans and Turks, the Netherlands is apparently one big casino. They enjoy
making a fraud gamble with our tax money”, he lamented in parliament (TK70-5527, March 31, 2009). Unsurprisingly, Fritsma also appealed to this line of reasoning when I asked him why his party believes reductions in immigrants’ social rights is the best strategy to decrease immigrant welfare dependence: “only restrictions in social provisions would give an incentive to this group of people” (interview NET03).

A debate that took place in 2004 offers a telling illustration of just how common the view had become among Dutch politicians that immigrants should primarily be blamed for their disproportionate use of transfer benefits. A parliamentary majority asked Prime Minister Balkenende to inform parliament about “possibilities to restrict the access of immigrants to social security” (see kst-29861-2, March 9, 2005). Note that Balkenende was not asked to investigate possibilities to reduce immigrants’ use of social security. Apparently, the Dutch parliament saw immigrants’ overrepresentation among benefit recipients first of all as a sign that the benefits are too easily accessible for newcomers, not that the Dutch state was doing a poor job at facilitating immigrants’ economic integration.

In line with the first hypothesis of my theoretical model, we can understand why this political translation came to the fore by looking at changes in the role of anti-immigrant parties, in the conception of national identity, and in the structure of the welfare state.

Anti-immigrant parties. First, the spread of selective solidarity has been encouraged by the increased political presence of anti-immigrant parties. The extremely proportional electoral system of the Netherlands (the electoral threshold is only 0.67 percent) facilitates the emergence of new parties, but, as Figure 5.7 shows, anti-immigrant parties did not achieve significant electoral success until the twenty-first century. Before I move on to discuss the effect these parties have had on politics and policy-making, it is therefore necessary to first say a few words on why they recently became so much more successful.

First, we can explain anti-immigrant parties’ sudden success by looking at political and social conditions that facilitated their rise. First, 2002 was a particularly opportune time to voice
the populist message that there is no real choice in Dutch politics. At that time the country had been governed for eight years by a coalition of the PvdA and the VVD, the two parties that traditionally shaped the main fault line in elections. In the absence of clear cleavages between existing political parties, it was easy for Fortuyn to frame the 2002 election as a battle between him and the established elite. Interestingly, before Fortuyn was politically active, Rudy Andeweg (2001, p. 119) already used this line of reasoning to predict the future success of populist parties: “Without some meaningful choice within the system, voters may choose against the system”.

![Figure 5.7. Share of seats in Lower House of Parliament occupied by anti-immigrant parties, 1991-2012.](image)

Second, a common component in the message of anti-immigrant parties is the depiction of multiculturalism as an elitist project that silences any opposition. That argument has become gruesomely plausible after the assassination of Fortuyn, and two years later, of movie director, columnist, and Islam critic Theo van Gogh. That two of the most vocal immigration critics were

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112 The graph maps the percentage of seats taken by the CD, the LPF, the PVV, as well as by independents Geert Wilders and Rita Verdonk (who both started an anti-immigrant movement after their break with the VVD - the PVV and Proud of the Netherlands, respectively).
killed for their views\textsuperscript{113} in two years’ time seemingly confirmed that there was something horribly wrong about the Dutch approach to immigration that had been allowed to continue for decades under the banner of tolerance and political correctness. And while this obviously cannot explain the initial success of Fortuyn himself, it does seem plausible that it has made it easier to mobilize voters by framing immigration as a threatening development (Boin, ’t Hart, & McConnell, 2009).

A second explanation has to do with the parties themselves. As a large body of literature attests, whether anti-immigrant movements become successful or not depends to a large extent on the quality of their organization, the frame of their message, and the charisma of their leader (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Carter, 2005; Messina, 2007, pp. 88-94). One reason why anti-immigrant parties initially fared poorly in the Netherlands was that they were badly organized, too closely associated with fascism, and led by uncharismatic leaders. The Nationale VolksUnie (NVU), the first post-war political movement to compete in Dutch parliamentary elections on a platform of opposition to diversity, is a case in point. This fringe party, counting a maximum of 200 members and headed by the overtly racist and anti-democratic Joop Glimmerveen, only managed to secure 0.4 percent of the vote in the 1977 parliamentary elections (Voerman & Lucardie, 1992). The Center Party, which won one parliamentary seat in the 1982 elections, suffered from many of the same problems. Although more than the NVU, the CP tried to brand itself as a democratic movement, those attempts were largely unsuccessful. In 1984, its sole member of parliament, Hans Janmaat, abandoned the party to found a more moderate alternative, which, significantly, he labelled the Center Democrats. The strategy led to (modest) success in 1994, when the CD won three parliamentary seats. This, however, proved to be Janmaat’s ceiling. He was unable to manage the multiple internal party conflicts, and at the 1998 election the CD disappeared from

\textsuperscript{113} We should note that animal rights activist Volkert van der Graaf, the murderer of Fortuyn, has said little about the motivation for his crime other than that he saw Fortuyn as “a danger to society” (Jensma, 2012).
parliament. Cas Mudde and Joop van Holsteyn, in a prophetic comment, attributed this limited success largely to Janmaat’s own leadership skills: “Should Janmaat [...] be replaced by a person of higher calibre, then the Dutch extreme right arguably would enjoy success, like its Flemish or Austrian counterparts” (Mudde & Van Holsteyn, 2000, p. 163).

The first person of ‘higher calibre’ to voice the anti-immigrant message was, of course, Pim Fortuyn. Rhetorically gifted, he avidly rejected comparisons with Jörg Haider and Jean-Marie Le Pen, and insisted he was a true democrat (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005, pp. 16-17, 56). The fact that he was openly gay likely aided in convincing people that his platform had little to do with fascism. After his assassination, however, his party proved too poorly organized to have any lasting success. While the LPF did join the coalition government on the basis of its large electoral victory, internal conflicts quickly dominated the party, and the coalition fell only a year later. In the ensuing elections, the LPF lost 70 percent of its seats. The party did not fare much better as an opposition party: four of the eight remaining parliamentarians left the party, and either continued independently or joined other factions. In the elections of 2006, the party received only 0.2 percent of the popular vote.

The PVV seems to have all the necessary ingredients of a successful anti-immigrant party. The eloquent Geert Wilders was already an experienced parliamentarian when he founded the PVV. And unlike anti-immigrant parties of the past, the Freedom Party is blessed with a good organization. It quickly managed to develop a wide network of financiers (Bosma, 2010), and Wilders’ leadership has only occasionally been contested internally.114

The sustained presence of a large anti-immigrant party over the last ten years has had two main effects that are of relevance here. First, the LPF and especially the PVV (which, as we have seen, was the first anti-immigrant party with a left-wing position on redistribution) have actively primed the costs of immigration and the overreliance of immigrants in the welfare system and

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114 The only challenges the PVV has faced in this regard so far are the recent departures of MPs Hero Brinkman, who left the parliamentary party in protest against Wilders’ ‘autocratic rule’ (Boon, 2012), and Marcial Hernandez and Wim Kortenoeven, who abandoned the party when they were placed on an unelectable position on the party list for the 2012 elections (Volkskrant, 2012).
framed the subject in divisive and accusatory terms.\textsuperscript{115} The most obviously relevant episode in this regard started on July 17, 2009, when Sietse Fritsma (PVV) asked a wide range of departments how much money they spent on non-Western immigrants. The government waited until after the summer to respond, but in the end only provided some of the calculations Fritsma asked for. This was partly because of limited data availability, but Immigration Minister Eberhard van der Laan (PvdA) indicated that there was also a ‘political’ reason to not answer Fritsma’s questions in full:

Immigrants, both Western and non-Western, are members of our society. Their presence cannot be reduced to a simple cost-benefit analysis along the measuring rod of the euro. Just like that does not happen for the costs and benefits of native-born citizens, disabled people, pensioners, or whichever other category of people [sic]. We do not evaluate citizens, but we do evaluate policy. The answers to the questions are therefore aimed at the costs and benefits of [diversity] policies. (ah-tk-3692, September 16, 2009)

Predictably, the response merely added fuel to the fire. Once again the PVV could make a plausible case that the Dutch immigration system is run by elitists who value political correctness over democratic transparency. This is exactly what Fritsma argued when I asked him about the episode:

I basically received a flat refusal to map the costs. And that refusal is incomprehensible, really. People need to know what happens with their tax money. And people have the right to know that as well. [...] It’s part of the democratic process. How can you vote for something if you don’t know what the consequences are for the themes that you have to base your vote on? [...] Now you are cutting that off, and that are almost GDR practices, so to speak. (interview NET03)

The clash between Van der Laan and Fritsma received much attention, both within and outside parliament. Some journalists even made attempts to do the calculations for Fritsma (Wynia, 2009). The PVV itself started a website entitled ‘what does the mass immigration cost?’

\textsuperscript{115} Interestingly, Sietse Fritsma rejected the suggestion that his party has affected the salience of this issue, let alone public opinion on immigration in general: “I doubt it. [...] I think there have always been serious questions marks in society about immigration policy” (interview NET03). As we saw above, there is indeed ample evidence of anti-immigrant attitudes before the 2000s. Fritsma’s argument, however, ignores that in most immigration countries, public attitudes have become less xenophobic over time, while they have not in the Netherlands. Moreover, it does not take the political saliency of those attitudes into account (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).
(www.watkostdemassaimmigratie.nl), inviting citizens to share any worries they might have about the costs of immigration.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, it paid an independent research agency to make the calculations it was interested in (Van der Geest & Dietvorst, 2010).\textsuperscript{117} Even today, PVV politicians still bring up the report’s estimate that a typical non-Western immigrant costs the Dutch welfare state about 50,000 euros per year.

Besides explicitly placing the costs of immigration on the political agenda, the PVV has also managed to increase attention to this subject by bringing it up even when it is not directly related to the discussion at hand. For example, in his contribution to a discussion on the increase of the retirement age and the reform of public pension benefit AOW, Tony van Dijck quickly changed the subject from pension reform to the costs of immigration:

This debate is not about the affordability of the AOW or about ageing. It is about cold retrenchment. It is about a black hole in the public treasury. [...] This government puts a very small finger in the AOW-hole in the dike. It is deaf and blind, however, to the financial dike breach that is occurring behind its back: the costs of mass migration. [...] The PVV chooses the conservation of our social security or of what is left of it. The PVV chooses the conservation of the AOW. And it is possible. Stop the immigration from Muslim countries now and we can all have our pension when we reach 65. That is the essence of this debate: do we choose the Netherlands or do we choose even more immigration? (TK24-2071, November 12, 2009)

The second reason why the success of anti-immigrant parties is relevant here is because it has offered an incentive for mainstream parties to move in a more restrictive direction on issues of immigration. To put this more bluntly, mainstream parties seem to support immigrant-excluding welfare reforms today out of a fear that more voters will choose the PVV at the next election if they do not. While my interviewees rejected the suggestion that their parties have adopted a more restrictive line on immigration out of electoral considerations, some of their comments do lend credence to this argument.

\textsuperscript{116} Interestingly, the website - which is still online - never offered an answer to its name-giving question. It merely offers a platform for people to post complaints they might have about the costs of immigration.\textsuperscript{117} It is important to note that the report did not attempt to calculate the overall net effect of immigration on the Dutch economy. It explicitly states at the outset that it is a ‘partial’ study which does not account for, among other things, the effects of immigration on the labour market or on economic growth in general (Van der Geest & Dietvorst, 2010, p. 7).
For example, when asked whether the VVD’s proposals are inspired by increased public dissatisfaction about immigration, Cora van Nieuwenhuizen wholeheartedly agreed. The SP’s Paul Ulenbelt was even clearer on this point: “The parliament represents the people. That thus means that you have to voice public opinion in politics. If you don’t do that, you will not be elected and someone else will. It’s as simple as that” (interview NET05). Christian democrat Eddy van Hijum specifically referred to the PVV when describing how he sees his role as a representative of the people:

Of course it is the case that political parties’ viewpoints are reactions to the discontent that is felt in society. The problem is sometimes rather that we identify and translate it too late, and that therefore let us say populist parties get the chance to cater to this in an in my view rather unhealthy way, than that we have been too early with it. I think it is a function of the political system to exactly detect that kind of discontent, not to repeat it like some sort of megaphone, but to address the underlying problem. (interview NET04)

National identity. A second political development that shaped the dominant discourse on immigrants’ social rights is a more general backlash against immigration which led to far-reaching reforms in nation-building policies, and a change in the conception of Dutch national identity. The changes in social policy can be understood as part of a more general effort to redraw the lines between the Netherlands and anyone who might want to live on Dutch territory.

As discussed above, by the new millennium a belief had become widespread that politicians have historically been guided too much by politically correct naïveté, that this produced overly generous and fraud-sensitive immigration policies, and that those policies, in turn, are responsible for the current integration problems. In a few years’ time, Dutch governments implemented drastic changes not only in admission policies (Meyers, 2004; Minderhoud, 2004; Lechner, 2008), but in naturalization and integration policies as well. To start with the former, probably the best known reform is the 2000 legislation requiring every migrant who wants to acquire Dutch citizenship to renounce their other nationalities (De Hart, 2007). But at the same
time, the process of acquiring Dutch citizenship also became more onerous: since 2000, for example, all applicants need to pass a comparatively difficult naturalization exam (Joppke, 2010, p. 56). Moreover, the emphasis on cultural assimilation has become more pronounced. In a recent study, Semin Suvarierol characterizes the information that aspirant-citizens receive in the Netherlands as follows: “Not only does the citizenship material assume a unitary national identity, but also it does not offer any space for divergent practices and at times strongly qualifies these practices as unacceptable” (Suvarierol, 2012, p. 225).

The restrictive turn is even more obvious in integration policies (Entzinger, 2006; Vink, 2007). Until the mid-1990s, the Netherlands employed a relatively generous and group-based approach to the accommodation of immigrants. This so-called ‘minority policy’ was partly based on the myth that most guest workers would eventually return to their country of origin, and partly a natural outgrowth of the rights religious minorities enjoyed under the system of pillarization (Lijphart, 1968). And while we should not exaggerate how ‘multicultural’ these policies were (Vink, 2007), or how warmly they were endorsed by the political elite (Koning, 2007), it is safe to say that they entailed a comprehensive set of group rights and anti-discrimination measures. Starting with the first Purple government, however, this policy apparatus was gradually replaced by a more assimilative ‘integration policy’. This entailed, among other things, the abolition of education in immigrants’ mother tongue, the introduction of mandatory integration classes, a reduction in funding for accommodative services such as public language assistance, the repeal of ‘multicultural’ targets in public media, and the abolition of quota-based minority employment projects (Geddes, 2003; Entzinger, 2006).

According to some observers, these policy changes should be understood as a concerted effort to protect the liberal and tolerant characteristics of Dutch national identity from more conservative immigrant cultures (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Bosma, 2010). If that has been the intention, however, it seems the baby has been thrown out with the bath water. Rather than reinforcing liberalism and tolerance, the policy changes reflect and encourage an
understanding of Dutch national identity rooted in very different values. Indeed, they embody a view government officials have repeatedly voiced (Vink, 2007) and which has become pervasive in media coverage as well (Korteweg, 2006; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007): the Netherlands should not be open to differences, but instead should seclude itself from outside influences.\textsuperscript{118} In this view, immigrants have to make a compelling case to explain why they need to be on Dutch territory, and once they are admitted, must prove themselves before they deserve full inclusion.

Survey data suggest a similar change in the nature of Dutch nationalism. Data from 1998 already suggested that nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment are positively related in the Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), but since then Dutch nationalism appears to have become more exclusionary. On two occasions, the ISSP has asked respondents in the Netherlands about their views on the meaning of national identity. And as illustrated in Figure 5.8, the answers were very different before and after the turn of the century.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Public opinion on national identity, 1995 and 2003. (Source: ISSP.)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{118} This view is not shared, however, by all advisory bodies. The Scientific Council for Government Policy argued in a 2007 report that rather than asserting one unchangeable national identity, the Netherlands should promote various modes of identification with the Netherlands and leave room for simultaneous ties to other national or sub-national communities (WRR, 2007).
Respondents appeared significantly more likely in 2003 than in 1995 to think that different ethnic groups should blend into larger society and that in order to be truly Dutch it is important to speak Dutch, to respect Dutch laws, to be a Dutch citizen, and to be a Christian.\(^\text{119}\) In short, rather than remaining stable, views on the meaning of Dutch national identity have become more restrictive over this time period.\(^\text{120}\)

The relevance of this changed understanding of national identity is that it can be used to justify differentiation in social policies between native-born and newcomers. We already saw good examples of this practice, such as Verdonk’s claim that social policies should only be used to protect people who were raised according to Dutch norms and values, or Van Dijck’s argument that we need to make a choice between the Netherlands and immigration. Other instances of this discourse abound. For example, Stef Blok (VVD) objected to the income supplement for elderly immigrants (AIO) by stating: “I wouldn’t know how you could justify it to Dutch tax-payers who are not on welfare. [...] That people come here from countries without old age security is not our fault” (kst-29389-17, May 25, 2009). In our personal interview, Cora van Nieuwenhuizen explained the VVD’s position as follows: “Where other parties often start with ‘people should be able to share in our welfare and to vote in our elections’, we do not start with sharing, voting, or talking, but with participating. [...] Dutch citizenship needs to be earned, we always say. It’s worth the investment” (interview NET01).

The role of this view as a driver of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms can be inferred in a different way as well. Even when I specifically asked about social policies or immigrants’ welfare

\(^{119}\) Two-tailed independent samples t-tests show that all differences are statistically significant at level \(p < 0.001\). The exact wording of the first question was as follows: “Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?” (The bars in Figure 5.8 represent the percentage that gave the second response.) The other four items were based on the question: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Dutch. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? Very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all?” (The bars in Figure 5.8 represent the percentage that answered ‘very important’.)

\(^{120}\) Respondents were also asked how important they considered being born in the Netherlands and having lived in the Netherlands for most of one’s life to be. The differences in responses in 2003 and 1995 on these questions were smaller, and not statistically significant.
dependence, some of the politicians I interviewed changed the subject to more general concerns regarding immigration’s threat to Dutch identity. Fritsma, for example, repeatedly emphasized that the main goal of his party’s immigration proposals is to ‘stop the islamisation of the Netherlands’ (interview NET03). Paul Ulenbelt elaborated on cultural differences that cause neighborhood disturbances (and talked, for example, about immigrants who ritually slaughter a goat on their balcony). Van Nieuwenhuizen talked about crime, alcoholism and homophobia among immigrants, as well as the ‘uncomfortable feeling’ she has when sitting in a train where people are speaking in a different language (interview NET01). In sum, the fact that politicians explicitly invoke cultural concerns when asked to comment on immigrants’ position in the welfare state illustrates the importance of the more general backlash against immigration and multiculturalism for the spread of selective solidarity.

Welfare regime. The third development that we need to look at is the restructuring of the Dutch welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s. After the ‘Dutch disease’ (see above) the Lubbers and Kok cabinets introduced a series of reforms that sharpened eligibility requirements and reduced benefit levels (Hemerijck, Unger, & Visser, 2000; Green-Pedersen, 2002). Sickness (Huber & Stephens, 2001), disability (Kuipers, 2006), unemployment (Green-Pedersen, 2002), and social assistance benefits (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997) underwent the most dramatic transformations. The overarching goal of many of these reforms was to reduce the number of benefit recipients by making it harder to qualify for social programs (Green-Pedersen, Van Kersbergen, & Hemerijck, 2001; Van Oorschot, 2004).

The effect of these changes was not only that the welfare state became less redistributive (Pontusson, 2005). As Romke van der Veen and Willem Trommel (1998, p. 23) argue, the reforms in the 1980s and 1990s also meant that “the Dutch welfare state, which was until the 1980s a mixture of social democratic and corporatist features, was gradually infused with liberal characteristics”. Reasoning from an institutionalist point of view, this transformation is of large consequence for our current discussion. First, in an institutional context where disentitlement is
the most common response to rising social expenditure, pushing immigrants off benefits is naturally considered a feasible and intuitive strategy to reduce levels of immigrant welfare dependence. Second, since we know that welfare regimes shape public attitudes about redistribution, we should expect that the cutbacks resulted in heightened attention for recipients’ ‘deservingness’. It can be no surprise, then, that the entitlements of immigrants have also come under scrutiny - especially since non-Western immigrants make up such a visible part of the welfare caseload.

Indeed, many of my interviewees made an explicit link between the series of general welfare reforms in the 1980s and 1990s on the one hand, and the restrictive changes targeting immigrants on the other. A senior civil servant at the Department of Integration, for example, gave the following explanation for cutbacks in integration services:

I think that overall - and that’s not just about [immigrant] integration - over the last few years more individual responsibility has been asked of citizens. This fits well with that. You see the same thing with benefits in general. A benefit used to be more of an income provision that you could stay in for a longer period of time. And the last ten, fifteen years, such reforms in social security have taken place that it becomes more of a trampoline than a safety net. You fall into it, and you can stay in it for a little while, but ultimately the idea is that you leave it again. [...] Larger demands are placed on everyone’s own responsibility, and that goes for immigrants as well. (interview NET11)

Hans Spekman (PvdA) drew a similar analogy when explaining why he believes labour migrants should not have access to benefits from the first day they are in the country: “At the same time that we were naive in migrants’ fraud we were also still naive in the fraud that Dutch people committed. So I think that was the era of naïveté. [...] Solidarity is undermined if you very lightly allow anyone to get [a benefit] who in reality shouldn’t be entitled to it” (interview NET02).

Overall, then, the findings in this section are supportive of my first hypothesis. The sudden spread of selective solidarity in the Netherlands cannot be understood by an exclusive focus on developments in immigrants’ welfare dependence. Indeed, the costs immigrants incur on the welfare budget rarely led to any suggestions for immigrant-
excluding welfare reforms until three parallel changes in the political and institutional structure took place. First, the increased presence of anti-immigrant parties has heightened the attention for immigrants’ position in the welfare state, and has encouraged a political discourse that frames this topic in divisive terms. Second, a broader unease about immigration and multiculturalism has led to a more exclusionary conception of Dutch national identity, one which, among other things, understands access to social programs as a reward for national belonging rather than a social right in itself. And finally, a transformation in the structure of the Dutch welfare state has made suggestions for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms more likely, not only because it has invited questions about the deservingness of benefit recipients, but also because it has made disentitlement a more feasible approach to reducing social expenditure.

5.4 Institutional catalysts and roadblocks: the implementation of immigrant-excluding reforms

In this final section, we will explore the process by which the increase in selective solidarity has led to the implementation of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. In line with the second hypothesis, we will see that on the one hand a lack of well-mobilized opposition facilitated the adoption of restrictive policy changes, while on the other hand national and especially international legal prohibitions on differential treatment have posed roadblocks in attempts to disentitle immigrants. Indeed, these roadblocks have proven so formidable that it seems unlikely the Netherlands will go much further in disentitling immigrants than it already has.

To start with the first point, the disentitlement of immigrants in the Netherlands has been met with little opposition. Apart from objections from immigrant advocacy groups such as Forum, Vluchtelingenwerk, and the Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkaanse Nederlanders, politicians have had little to fear from supporting immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. In fact, since 2002 parliamentarians seemed to have been driven by a different kind of fear, namely that
too soft an approach to immigration will drive more voters to the LPF or PVV. A closer look at the parliamentary votes on the bills and private motions that reduced immigrants’ access to the Dutch welfare state illustrates this point forcefully (Table 5.4). With the exception of the reduction in the AIO benefit, all of these legislative proposals passed with a handsome majority.

Table 5.4. Passed welfare chauvinist bills and motions, 1995-2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Bills (year)</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>% support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Wajong</em> Reform (1996)</td>
<td>Places 6 year residence requirement on youth disability benefits</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linking Act (1998)</td>
<td>Disentitles undocumented migrants</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>BUP</em> (1999)</td>
<td>Formalizes exclusion of temporary migrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Beu</em> Act (2000)</td>
<td>Limits export of benefits</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alien Act Reform (2000)</td>
<td>Disentitles asylum seekers</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWB Reform (2006)</td>
<td>Formalizes residence requirements on access to welfare</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Residence Principle Act (2011)</td>
<td>Introduces ‘country of residence principle’ in the export of child benefits</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of AIO (2011)</td>
<td>Reduces additional income supplement for elderly citizens with a pension gap (mostly immigrants)</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private motions (date)*</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>% support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dijsselbloem, Noorman-Den Uyl (2006/6/12)</td>
<td>Makes access to welfare conditional on learning Dutch for immigrants outside the labour market</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visser (2006/10/26)</td>
<td>Installs an independent committee to investigate how much legal leeway there is for disentitlement of immigrants</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Hijum (2008/1/17)</td>
<td>Presses government to ensure in EU negotiations that social rights of migrants in one member state do not translate to rights in the Netherlands</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Hijum, Spekman (2008/6/25)</td>
<td>Presses government to either reduce unemployment and welfare dependence of immigrants from CEE countries or repeal their residence permit</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Hijum, Blok (2008/11/27)</td>
<td>Asks government to investigate access to and utilization of the social system by immigrants, as well as possibilities to reduce their utilization</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamp, Van de Camp (2008/12/10)</td>
<td>Asks government to develop plans for a stricter grow-in model of social security</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Hijum, Spekman (2009/12/10)</td>
<td>Presses government to consider ending the export of child benefits</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Since the implementation of the six year residence requirement came up very little during the parliamentary discussion of this encompassing bill, it is unlikely that the parties who opposed it did so in objection to the exclusion of newcomers. * This bill has not been voted on, but has been passed as a so-called ‘Royal Decision’ (*Koninklijk Besluit*). ° The CDA (19% of MPs) voted against the bill because it felt the bill did not go *far enough* in excluding asylum migrants. ° This overview omits ten motions that did not pass. All of these were submitted either by the VVD or the PVV during the incumbency of the center-left Balkenende-IV cabinet.
In several cases, even politicians who expressed reservations about a bill indicated to support the principle behind it. For example, environmentalist party GL and the SP both voted against the Linking Act and suggested amendments to reduce its severity. However, they both subscribed to the overall goal the bill tried to achieve. GL, for example, stated: “The members of the parliamentary party of GL [...] can appreciate the principle that people who are here unlawfully in principle cannot access any of the collective services. [But] that principle can already be realized by applying existing policies” (kst-24233-76c, May 23, 1997). Similarly, socialist senator Jan de Wit said that his party agrees on the basic principle behind the law, but feels it is ‘redundant’ and that its implementation is little more than ‘symbolic politics’ (ek25-1255, March 24, 1998). Something similar happened with the Beu Act. The SP and GL raised objections to the law, but mostly because they feared it would be implemented before pending negotiations about social security agreements were finalized, not because they fundamentally opposed it. In the end, the law passed through parliament without a vote.

The parliament-wide support for these proposals, however, should not be taken to mean that political stripe is irrelevant. One way we can see this is by looking, again, at the questions and motions that have been introduced in parliament regarding immigrants’ access to the welfare state (see Appendix Tables A3.2-A3.5). Of the 23 questions asked in parliament in the period 1995-2010 criticizing immigrants’ use of social programs, seventeen came from the VVD and/or PVV. Of the eighteen questions that, conversely, expressed concern whether immigrants are included enough, twelve were posed by left-wing parties SP and PvdA. Finally, of the seventeen motions proposing to curtail immigrants’ eligibility for social programs, the PVV voted for sixteen of them, the VVD for fifteen, and, on the other hand, D66 and GL for only five and three, respectively. Moreover, it is telling that the only government in the last twenty years that did not introduce restrictions on immigrants’ access to welfare benefits was the center-left Balkenende-IV cabinet - the only coalition in the period under study the VVD did not take part in. However, in the absence of a government pushing for exclusion, opposition parties
enthusiastically took over that role. Indeed, no government faced more questions and motions criticizing immigrants’ use of the welfare system than the fourth Balkenende government.

The conclusion to take from all this, then, seems to be that in the Netherlands conservative governments and political parties have more often proposed immigrant-excluding welfare reforms than their more progressive counterparts, but that once such proposals were on the table other parties have felt compelled to vote in favour of them. The way these reforms have come about is thus sharply different from what we know about the politics of general welfare reforms. We have seen that conservative and anti-immigrant parties have, for ideological reasons, proposed more immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, but that these bills have often passed with a considerable majority because no party depends on the people affected by the reforms for its re-election.

At the same time, however, the exclusion of immigrants would have been more dramatic if it were not for the legal-institutional obligations that the Netherlands is committed to. Probably most importantly, it is impossible in the Netherlands to implement any policy that directly discriminates between native-born citizens and legal immigrant residents. Not only is the non-discrimination principle codified in the first article of the Constitution, it is also guaranteed in a large number of treaties that the Netherlands is party to – among others, the ECHR, the UDHR, and the ICESCR. Similarly, whichever reforms Dutch politicians might design, under no circumstance can they violate the nationally and internationally codified obligation to offer every legal resident a minimum standard of living and the right to a private life. For example, even though the government of the Netherlands established in 2005 that any non-permanent immigrant claiming social assistance should be deported, in practice deportation is rare because in many cases it would violate the immigrants’ right to a private and family life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR (Zorlu, Hartog, & Beentjes, 2010, p. 11).

Besides posing legal obstacles, these commitments are also a source of normative pressure. Indeed, many of my interviewees felt compelled to point out that the differentiations they endorse
are not forms of discrimination. To a senior civil servant at the Department of Social Affairs, it seems highly unlikely that overtly discriminatory changes in social policy will ever be implemented:

Some members of parliament think that you should further distinguish even after you have been admitted. But we have always said about that: the Netherlands is committed to all kinds of things within the EU, all kinds of things within the ILO, all kinds of things within the UN, otherwise with the Council of Europe; we are simply built in entirely. The principle of equal treatment is simply sacred. Period. (interview NET13)

When devising ways to limit immigrants’ access to the Dutch welfare state, politicians thus need to inform themselves of the legal feasibility of their plans. In 2006, Arno Visser (VVD) proposed to install a committee to investigate “which international treaties are relevant in regards to the file ‘migration and social security’, and the ways in which it is possible within international law to withdraw from, or amend these treaties” (TK18-1259, October 26, 2006).

Moreover, the author of almost every welfare chauvinist proposal needs to go at length explaining why it does not violate the non-discrimination principle. For example, when suggesting tying immigrants’ eligibility for social assistance to language proficiency in Dutch, Stef Blok (VVD) spent much time arguing that it falls within the ECHR provisos outlining under which conditions differential treatment is justified. During our interview, Cora van Nieuwenhuizen (VVD) shared her frustration about this incessant obligation to justify differential treatment:

See, that is the difficulty we have with the Convention for Human Rights and the principle of non-discrimination. There are already now all kinds of differentiations in society, on the basis of how long you have worked somewhere. And we don’t have a problem with that at all. Of course, there needs to be a foundation, a fair principle behind it. [...] You can never discriminate a group. But if people have worked longer, they [should] receive a benefit longer. That’s a problem we have in Europe. (interview NET01)

In line with our expectations, Dutch politicians have employed two broad strategies to deal with these legal commitments. First, they have worked around them. The most dramatic immigrant-excluding reforms have targeted those groups of immigrants who enjoy the least legal protection - temporary and, in particular, undocumented migrants. Relatedly, policy-makers have used the
strategy of policy-layering: avoiding unchangeable institutions by adding or amending other policies that make the original institution perform in the desired fashion. For one thing, the legal obligation (flowing from, *inter alia*, Article 20 of the Constitution, Article 22 UDHR, and Article 9 ICESCR) to offer everyone in the Netherlands a minimally decent standard of living has made it impossible to repeal the social assistance of legal residents. For that reason, residence requirements on welfare need to be accompanied by the provision that newcomers lose their legal residence status as soon as they apply for social assistance. Similarly, confronted with the impossibility of disentitling permanent migrants from social provisions, the VVD and PVV propose to increase the residence requirement to acquire a permanent residence permit instead.

A second, albeit less used, strategy has been to amend or abolish the legal obstacles. The *Beu* act, limiting the export of benefits, had a transition period of 3 years, meaning that after its ratification in 2000 people could still receive benefits abroad until 2003. In March 14 of that year, however, the Central Appeals Tribunal (*Centrale Raad van Beroep*, the highest court for administrative law) judged that the act violated ILO Convention 118, which includes, among other things, an unconditional requirement to export long-term disability benefits. In response, the Netherlands withdrew from the convention, and then introduced the export stop again.

More recently, the first Rutte cabinet used similar strategies to push through some of its proposals. As Eddy van Hijum (CDA) states, “[there is currently much discussion] about the agreements we made in the coalition agreement and whether or not they are feasible in the European context, or whether you should make efforts in the European context to amend some rules” (interview NET04). Not only European agreements, but also bilateral social security treaties have been the focus of the first Rutte government. In 2010 then Minister of Social Affairs Henk Kamp (VVD) started renegotiating forty of such agreements in order to implement the ‘country of residence principle’.

Many of the legal commitments that hinder immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, however, proved practically impossible to abandon. Indeed, when junior minister Henk van Hoof (VVD)
responded to the previously mentioned Visser motion and commented on the possibility of withdrawing from international legal obligations, he made it clear that most restrictions on differential treatment are the direct result of the Netherlands’ membership in the EU and the Council of Europe, and that therefore withdrawal from these treaties would have consequences that a majority in parliament would not want to accept. In many cases, then, Dutch politicians simply have had to accept that their legislative powers are not infinite. We saw this already in case of the five years’ residence requirement on access to social provisions. In that example, the immutability of the legal framework means that attempts to reduce immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits do not work as effectively as their instigators would want.

In other examples, the effect has been that attempts at welfare exclusion failed altogether. For example, in the formulation of the Linking Act the CDA proposed to make it impossible for anyone to appeal a rejection of benefits on the basis of residence status. Since such a proviso would be in violation of article 6 ECHR, the proposal never made it into the Linking Act. Something similar can be said about the VVD’s support for the ‘Danish model’ in social assistance law, which ties the level of the benefit to the number of years the recipient has lived in the country. In contrast to its Danish counterpart, the Dutch judiciary can directly test whether legislation is in line with European law. And since the model violates article 14 ECHR, the VVD has, at least for the time being, abandoned this proposal. As Cora van Nieuwenhuizen admitted, “within the European agreements we have made, it simply does not fit” (interview NET01).

All in all, it therefore seems the Netherlands has come close to the limit of how far the exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state can realistically go. This has been communicated to parliament on several occasions. In 2007, for example, the Socio-Economic Council advised that “the possibility for further measures [to exclude migrants] is very limited, especially because of international legal obligations” (SER, 2007, p. 124). Similarly, in 2009 Social Affairs

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121 Interestingly, the PVV has not. Sietse Fritsma argued that the model ‘could also be translated to the Netherlands’. After all, so he argued, ‘no European directive is set in stone’ (interview NET03).
Minister Jan Piet Hein Donner (CDA) concludes the following about recent adjustments to the Dutch welfare state:

In demarcating our social security system a balance has been sought between the desire to offer social protection to labour migrants who contribute to the economy on the one hand and preventing that by offering this protection the Dutch social security would become a pull factor in itself to reside here on the other. The government concludes that this balance has been reached. Further measures to restrict access to our system, for example a grow-in model through the formulation of residence requirements [the Danish model], would not only distort this balance, but also result in unequal treatment in equal cases. [35-3-13416, September 18, 2009]

In this context, it is instructive to look at a letter then junior minister Van Hoof (VVD) sent four years earlier, outlining possibilities for restrictions on immigrants’ access (kst-29861-2). This welfare chauvinist wish list contained six proposals: (1) cut welfare for temporary migrants who do not have a durable connection to the Netherlands; (2) increase information-sharing between municipal welfare offices and immigration services; (3) extend the residence requirement for family migrants from 3 to 5 years; (4) cut welfare of refugee claimants in an appeal procedure; (5) force all incoming migrants to buy in their pension gap or renounce the right to the AIO supplement; and (6) introduce a Danish model of social assistance. As we have seen, the first three proposals have already been implemented, and the last three are legally and/or practically unachievable. Future immigrant-excluding welfare reforms seem unlikely, then, simply because politicians have tried all the reforms they can think of.

Another reason is that further restrictions, such as cutting welfare of refugees who do not speak Dutch, extending the residence requirement on social assistance to 10 years, implementing residence requirements on employer insurance programs, or restricting the export of unemployment and pension benefits, do not enjoy support from any party other than the VVD and the PVV. The CDA, which has been instrumental in many of the reforms discussed in this chapter, is a pivotal player in this regard. As we saw in the quote by Donner, and earlier in Van Hijum’s remark that there are certain ‘boundaries he does not want to touch’, there

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122 The letter contained a total of eight suggestions, but two of those were amendments to admission policies.
seems to be little enthusiasm among Christian democrats for more drastic measures. At the end of our interview, Van Hijum came back to this point:

In my opinion [we should be in favour of] a grow-in model, in which you need to emphasize the autonomy of people much more, especially when they come here, but you will have to do that within the framework of international rules of the game and also the fact that you have to recognize that our society is simply becoming more open and international. And that thus also means that you must be able to build up social security rights, also as a labour migrant. And that if it is about AOW or disability, you shouldn’t fuss about the export of it. That I really consider very clear boundary conditions that we have set, just like social assistance for refugees [...] After several reforms and restrictions, we are by now at a level where you also have to ask yourself what you want to preserve. (interview NET04)

More drastic immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, then, even if they would overcome legal scrutiny, only seem possible in the scenario that the VVD, the PVV, and/or potentially a different anti-immigrant party, would manage to form a majority government. That scenario does not seem likely. In the last two parliamentary elections, the two parties won a combined total of 55 and 56 seats, respectively. While this share is very large from a historical point of view, the two parties are still 20 seats short of a majority in the Lower House of Parliament.
It seems difficult to believe that the VVD and PVV will ever be able to bridge this gap and win the minimum of 76 seats that are required for a parliamentary majority. At any rate, opinion polls suggest that outcome is unlikely. Figure 5.9 shows, since the PVV achieved parliamentary representation, how many seats these two parties (as well as Rita Verdonk’s short-lived movement) would have in the Lower House of Parliament according to a weekly opinion poll (Synovate, 2012). From a low of 30 seats in early 2007, the VVD and PVV were polling to secure 65 seats by October 2010. However, after the ‘honeymoon period’ (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2003) following the installation of the first Rutte government, their combined support declined again to the same level where it was before.

In conclusion, in less than twenty years’ time the Netherlands have made immigrants’ possibilities to access the welfare state about as restricted as possible. In contrast to most of its postwar history, in the new century the overrepresentation of immigrants among recipients of transfer benefits became a reason for most politicians to become more selective in offering state-funded programs and services. This shift in both ideology and policy is well in line with the theoretical model described in Chapter Two.

Supporting the first hypothesis, we have seen that the sudden unease about immigrants’ use of social benefits and programs did not come about as the result of any increase in immigrant welfare dependence. Indeed, there is little evidence that the shift has been guided by economic motivations. Instead, it have been three political developments that made the welfare costs of immigration more politically contentious, and the dominant political discourse on the subject accusatory and divisive: a large presence of anti-immigrant parties, a more general exclusionary trend in the conception of national identity, and an institutional context that placed increasing attention on the deservingness of benefit recipients.

In line with the second hypothesis, this climate of selective solidarity proved a fertile breeding ground for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Most proposals to limit immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits were adopted by a large majority of politicians, and were
met by a mostly approving public. National and international legal commitments, on the other hand, have proven a source of frustration for welfare chauvinists. In some cases, policy-makers have been forced to work around or amend legal roadblocks before they could implement the restrictive reforms they wanted. In other cases, the proposed reforms were so starkly in violation of legal prohibitions that there were few options but to abandon them altogether. In fact, at this point it seems that the Netherlands have come close to reaching the legal boundaries of the potential for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, and for that reason, it seems unlikely that the social rights of immigrants will be curtailed much further in the future than they already have been over the last two decades.

In the next two chapters, we will explore how the political translation of immigrants’ place in the welfare system has played out in two very different politico-institutional settings.
The Canadian discourse on immigrants is one of immigrants being central to the economic strengths of the country. [...] And that view is deeply held. For a long time, it was also reflected in raw labour market reality of performance of immigrants.

- Senior civil servant at HRSDC (interview CAN14)

It is neither sort of an obsession of ours that immigrants represent some disproportionate threat to the programs or the welfare state more generally, nor do we see particular concerns by Ontario politicians in the public or even in the private realm. [...] People have all kinds of concerns about social assistance, [but] I don’t think immigration considerations factor significantly into [them].

- Senior civil servant at CSS, Ontario (interview CAN21)

Consultations reveal that Canadians are concerned about the sustainability of Canada’s social benefit system. The government is addressing that broader challenge by opening a dialogue on improving social security in Canada. For our part we will contribute to the solution by focusing more on those immigrants less likely to require public assistance. Changes to the sponsorship obligations and their more rigorous enforcement will enhance the fairness of access to social benefits.

- Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi (LPC) (House of Commons, November 1, 1994)

Canada’s history of immigration is a long one. Not only has immigration been of foundational importance, it has also (unlike in other settler societies such as the United States) persisted as a source of demographic growth throughout the country’s history. During the twentieth century, Canada has admitted more than 13 million immigrants. At times, as many as 2.5 million came within the span of ten years. As a result, foreign-born citizens make up a large part of the Canadian population, and the percentage continues to rise. In 1991, 15.5 percent of Canadians was foreign-born, in 2006 that percentage had gone up to 19.8 percent, and the number is expected to rise to between 25 and 28 percent by 2031 (Statistics Canada, 2010).

The sheer size of immigration is not the primary reason for Canada’s prominent place in the comparative immigration literature. Instead, it is the way that immigrants are accommodated
and the outcome of that accommodation that has attracted most comparativists to the Canadian case. Canada employs some of the most generous and inclusive naturalization and diversity policies in the Western world, has avoided the nativist backlash seen elsewhere, and - until recently at least - seems to have experienced comparatively little trouble integrating its immigrant population into the labour market and society more generally. Indeed, in international comparisons the Canadian model of immigration and integration is often praised as a ‘success story’ worthy of emulation (Aalandslid, 2009; Hojem & Ådahl, 2011).

It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Canadian politics have by and large steered clear of the kind of selective solidarity we saw in the Dutch case. Immigration is typically presented as a benefit to, rather than a drain on, the Canadian economy and accordingly, immigrants’ reliance on transfer benefits has occupied a much smaller space in political discourse. This does not mean that the costs of immigration have never been under discussion. When it comes to welfare use by undocumented migrants, refugee claimants, and recent family migrants, Canadian politicians have on occasion raised objections and suggested policy adjustments in an exclusionary direction. It is important to note, however, that suggestions for immigrant welfare exclusion have overall been rare. When the costs of immigration become the topic of parliamentary discussion, politicians more commonly advocate reducing those costs by amending admission policy than by disentitling immigrants from social benefits and programs. This follows a long-standing tradition in Canada of on the one hand carefully selecting immigrants who are most likely to be self-sufficient, but on the other hand treating those who ultimately pass the rigorous selection criteria in fundamentally the same way as native-born citizens. Broadly speaking, we can say that most immigrants are included in the Canadian welfare system as soon as they have been admitted to the country, and that there have been relatively few changes in this regard over the last two decades.

This chapter reviews the politics of immigrants’ social rights in Canada over the last two decades. In line with the theory developed in Chapter Two, I argue that the policy stability in
this area can be understood by analyzing the political translation of immigrants’ place in the welfare state and its effect on policy-making. While it is true that immigrants’ reliance on transfer benefits is low by comparative standards, the lack of a basis in economic facts is at best only a partial explanation for the relative absence of selective solidarity in Canada. Indeed, while the economic integration of immigrants has recently slowed down, there has been no concomitant rise in pleas for welfare exclusion. In other words, relatively independent of empirical reality, the political translation of immigrants’ economic integration has mostly been a positive one. At any rate, only very rarely have Canadian politicians made suggestions for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. The absence of an explicit anti-immigrant party, and in particular, the central space immigration occupies in popular conceptions of Canadian national identity offer powerful explanations for the limited traction of selective solidarity and the near absence of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

This chapter is structured as follows. The next section traces relevant policy developments in immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits. Because a large portion of the programs of the Canadian welfare state are administered at the provincial level, I will refer in this section not only to federal politics but also to developments in the most immigrant-dense province of Canada, Ontario. Section Two examines the traction of selective solidarity among the public and the political elite. The third section offers an explanation for the relative absence of welfare chauvinist discourse. The final section reflects on the likely future development of the politics of immigrants’ social rights in Canada.

6.1 Continuity of the Canadian model of immigrants’ social rights

This section reviews recent developments in the social rights of various immigrant groups and pays separate attention to pension programs and integration services. What we will see is that

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123 This chapter will by and large ignore developments in the province of Quebec. The centrality of sub-state nationalism in Quebec politics gives a distinct character to the political discourse on immigration and integration (Jenson, 1997; Rocher et al., 2007), which is beyond the scope of this project to explore.
the entitlements of immigrants have hardly been challenged over the last twenty years. At the same time, however, when it regards the position of undocumented migrants, refugee claimants, and family migrants in the Canadian welfare state, politicians have occasionally expressed objections and formulated suggestions for exclusion.

As in any welfare state, undocumented migrants are in the most vulnerable position. They are denied access to all transfer benefits, and politicians seem eager to keep it that way. Especially in the mid-1990s, provincial and federal politicians often brought up cases of ‘illegals on welfare’ as a way to accuse the government of mismanagement. In 1989, a new right-wing party, the Reform Party of Canada (RPC), started to compete in federal elections, and by 1997, it had become the second-largest party in parliament. A non-trivial part of Reform’s platform was advocating a stricter line on immigration in general and on the entitlements of refugee claimants and undocumented migrants in particular. While Reform was certainly most vocal in raising these types of concerns, similar arguments could be heard from center-left politicians as well. Partly in response to this political pressure, in 1994 the government led by Jean Chrétien of the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) (see Table 6.1 below for an overview of federal governments from 1984 to 2012) implemented bill C-44, which increased identification controls and expanded the possibility for deportation so as to reduce the likelihood that undocumented migrants would end up in the refugee system and rely on welfare.

The exclusion of undocumented migrants is not limited to transfer benefits. The only service they have been able to make use of is subsidized emergency health care, and it seems unlikely that this will continue to be the case in the future. In 2009, an undocumented migrant

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124 The 1990s were turbulent times for the political right in Canada. Reform was successful in replacing the existing Progressive Conservative Party (PCP) as the largest party of the right, but soon realized it needed to build coalitions if it were ever to win an election. In 2000, it joined forces with a number of former members of the PCP and other (provincial) conservative parties to form the Canadian Alliance (CA). In 2003, the Alliance and the PCP merged to create the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) of current prime minister Stephen Harper. See below, in particular section 6.3.2.  
125 See, for example, comments by Derek Lee (House of Commons debate/April 21, 1994) and Martin Cauchon (House of Commons debate/September 19, 1994) of the LPC, and Réal Ménard of the BQ (House of Commons Debate, March 5, 1999).
who was denied treatment for her kidney problems because of her illegal status appealed, arguing that the denial violated her right to life and security of the person (Toussaint v. Canada, 2009). In a unanimous verdict, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in 2011 that undocumented migrants have no right to free medical services, and cannot receive ongoing health care (Humphreys, 2011). In sum, then, undocumented migrants are almost entirely excluded from the Canadian welfare state.

A second group of immigrants whose access to social benefits and services has recently been subject of discussion is refugee claimants. For as long as the federal government takes to administer their claim, these migrants are entitled to legal aid and SA, even though the exact eligibility requirements differ somewhat from one province to another. Since 1995, the federal government has also offered health care benefits to asylum seekers through the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP). This program has been a frequent target of critique. Particularly contentious has been the fact that the IFHP covers some supplemental services (such as dental and ophthalmological care) that are not included in the basic provincial health


<table>
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<th>Political party</th>
<th>Takes office</th>
<th>Majority/minority (initial House seats/total)</th>
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<td>Mulroney I</td>
<td>PCP (conservative)</td>
<td>1984/09/17</td>
<td>Majority (211/282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulroney II</td>
<td>PCP (conservative)</td>
<td>1988/12/12</td>
<td>Majority (169/295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>PCP (conservative)</td>
<td>1993/06/25</td>
<td>Majority (167/295)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chrétien I</td>
<td>LPC (liberal)</td>
<td>1993/11/04</td>
<td>Majority (177/295)</td>
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<td>Chrétien II</td>
<td>LPC (liberal)</td>
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<td>Chrétien III</td>
<td>LPC (liberal)</td>
<td>2001/01/29</td>
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<td>Martin I</td>
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<td>Martin II</td>
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<td>Harper I</td>
<td>CPC (conservative)</td>
<td>2006/02/06</td>
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<td>Harper II</td>
<td>CPC (conservative)</td>
<td>2008/11/18</td>
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<td>Harper III</td>
<td>CPC (conservative)</td>
<td>2011/06/02</td>
<td>Majority (166/308)</td>
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care package for the population as a whole. Recently, the government decided to remove those supplemental services as of June 30, 2012.

More generally, refugee claimants’ use of financial support and medical care has repeatedly spurred objections in the Ontarian and federal legislature. The most common critique has been that the costs would be much lower if only the federal government would process refugee claims more quickly.\(^{126}\) But occasionally, some right-wing politicians have also directed their critique at refugee claimants themselves.\(^{127}\) It is important to note, however, that with the exception of the recent reform in the IFHP, the policy response to concerns about ‘bogus refugees’ and the costs they incur has predominately been to amend refugee admission policy, not refugee claimants’ eligibility for social benefits. In 1987, the center-right Mulroney government implemented the so-called ‘Refugee Deterrents and Detention Bill’ (C-84) and a subsequent 1992 reform (bill C-86), which introduced “fingerprinting of refugee applicants to discourage welfare fraud, public hearings of refugee cases, harsher detention procedures, and deportations without hearings” (Knowles, 2007, p. 239). During the subsequent Liberal governments, three more bills on refugee policy passed: the combination of the previously mentioned 1994 C-44, as well as the 1997 C-84 and 1998 C-40 facilitated the deportation of claimants with a criminal record and further enhanced identification controls. More recently, the current center-right Harper government has implemented additional changes. In 2010, parliament passed the so-called Balanced Refugee Reform Act (C-11), which among other things limited the possibilities for appealing a rejection of a refugee claim. According to a senior civil servant at the Department of

\(^{126}\) Examples of this critique abound. In Ontario, see comments by Elaine Ziemba (NDP) on April 18, 1994; Cameron Jackson (OPC) on November 16, 1994; and Carl DeFaria (OPC) on June 28, 2001 and June 16, 2003. On the federal level, see comments by Derek Lee (LPC) on April 21, 1994; Art Hanger (RPC) on February 9, March 1, and December 14, 1995, and May 13, 1996; Oscar Nunez (BQ) on February 11, March 3, and April 9, 1997; Leon Benoit (RPC) on October 13 and October 14, 1999; Bernard Bigras (BQ) on May 1, 2000; Madeleine Dalphon-Duiral (BQ) on June 4, 2001; Gurmant Grewal (CA) on June 4, 2001; Randy White (CPC) on November 2, 2004; Ed Komarnicki (CPC) on January 29, 2007; Nina Grewal (CPC) on March 2, 2007; and Alice Wong (CPC) on April 20, 2009.

\(^{127}\) See for example, in Ontario comments by Cameron Jackson (OPC) on May 2, 1991; or, on the federal level, comments by Art Hanger (RPC), March 3, 1997, Grant McNally (RPC), February 5, 1999; and Randy White, February 27, 2001 (CA).
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), “one of the drivers [...] in the reform was to reduce the overall cost of, mostly the negative, asylum seekers on the provincial welfare systems” (interview CAN11). Yet another piece of refugee legislation, giving more individual leeway to the Minister in deportation decisions (bill C-31, also known as ‘Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act), passed in June 2012. In sum, then, while concerns about the costs of refugee claimants are alive and well, they have led more to restrictions in admission policy than to cutbacks in refugee claimants’ access to social benefits.

Other temporary migrants, most importantly temporary foreign workers and international students, are less protected than refugee claimants. Most of them are excluded from SA, they only have access to child benefits after having spent 18 months in the country, and they frequently experience practical problems in accessing health care services (Hennebry & Preibisch, 2012). This group of migrants is even excluded from some contribution-based programs. Temporary residents must pay monthly premiums for Employment Insurance (EI), but many cannot access the benefits if they become unemployed (Basok, 2003; Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Considering their limited eligibility, it is perhaps unsurprising that temporary migrants’ reliance on the welfare system has hardly ever been politicized. In fact, most often when the social rights of temporary migrants are the topic of discussion, it is in pleas for expanding rather than restricting them. In particular the federal left-wing New Democratic Party (NDP) has in recent years frequently advocated more inclusion, but they have found little support for their plans from the LPC and the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC).

In contrast to immigrants with a temporary residence permit, permanent residents are well protected. Unlike the Netherlands, Canada places no residence requirement on a permanent residence permit. From day one onwards, recognized refugees and economic migrants have the exact same access to non-contributory transfer programs such as SA and child benefits as

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128 About 50 percent of temporary workers and almost all international students have a closed permit, which means that they are not allowed to work for more than one employer. They therefore cannot meet the "available for work" test for unemployment benefits.
native-born citizens.\textsuperscript{129} The health care system is only marginally less inclusive: the provincial health care programs of the three most common migration destination provinces (British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec) have a three-month waiting period for new arrivals, which means that immigrants need to secure temporary private health insurance in the interim. (Refugees who cannot afford private insurance can make use of the previously mentioned IFHP.) The equal treatment of permanent migrants and native-born citizens enjoys almost unanimous political support. It is true that in Ontario, the Ontario Progressive Conservatives (OPC) has occasionally made suggestions for exclusionary reforms. For example, MPP Cameron Jackson suggested cutting social assistance for the duration that immigrants spend on trips to their homeland (Legislative Assembly of Ontario debates/October 18, 1993), and the 2011 OPC election program proposed a one-year residence requirement for social assistance (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, 2011, p. 30). But such proposals have never been echoed by federal parties, let alone by non-conservative political movements.

The situation is different for one class of permanent migrants: family migrants are admitted to the country on the condition that a relative will sponsor them, signing a formal undertaking with the state to support them economically. For the duration of the sponsorship period (between 3 and 10 years, depending on the nature of the relationship), these migrants are expected not to make use of social assistance or supplementary health care (and if they do, their sponsors are required to repay the costs to the province). These sponsorship agreements are not always observed for the full duration, however. Marriages or family relationships can collapse, for example, or sponsors can get into economic difficulty themselves. In those cases, the individual sponsorship breaks down, and the agreement is cancelled. In other cases, sponsorship agreements have not been enforced because officials have difficulty monitoring

\textsuperscript{129} A telling example of permanent residents’ equal treatment is that they can even access veteran benefits in case they fought at the same side as Canada in the Second World War or the Korean War. This arrangement was repealed in 1995, but reintroduced in 2009. Parenthetically, the reintroduction led to strong objections from Boris Wrzesnewskyj (LPC), who was concerned that the policy change enabled Red Army veterans to access these benefits under certain conditions as well (House of Commons Debate/November 2, 2009).
them - the federal administration of immigration status is not linked to the provincial SA administration, which raises the possibility of fraud.

Political parties have typically advocated a strict observance of sponsorship agreements.\(^\text{130}\) Whenever stories emerged of sponsors who renege on their agreement, politicians have been quick to express their indignation. This has been especially the case for politicians in conservative parties, such as Reform’s Ed Harper (House of Commons debate/April 14, 1995) and Val Meredith (House of Commons debate/November 1, 1995), and Ontario premier Mike Harris (OPC) (Blackwell, 1999). However, there has also been critique from some Liberal politicians (see, for example, Paul Szabo’s comment in the House of Commons on February 1, 1994). Federal and provincial governments have tried to reduce the size of sponsorship defaults by two strategies. The first has been to sharpen the requirements for sponsorship in admission policy. In May 2000, minister Eleanor Caplan (LPC) first tabled Bill C-31, which among other things aimed to “tighten up sponsorship provisions to ensure that those who sponsor new immigrants are both able and willing to meet the financial obligations they undertake” (House of Commons debate/May 1, 2000). The bill went through both houses of parliament relatively quickly and received royal assent in November 2001.\(^\text{131}\) The second strategy has been to exert greater effort to prevent sponsored immigrants from using SA. In 2004, when it was reported that 7500 sponsored immigrants in Ontario (about 2 percent of all sponsored immigrants) were on SA, the province started to contact sponsors to make it explicit that SA benefits paid to the immigrants they are supposed to sponsor will be considered a debt to the government of Ontario, and that this debt can only be waived under extraordinary circumstances. By September 2009, the number of sponsored immigrants on social assistance had gone down to 5,000. In a widely publicized court case that went all the way up to the Supreme Court, eight

\(^{130}\) The only exception I am aware of is the recent suggestion by some members of the BQ to waive the sponsorship agreement once an immigrant acquires Canadian citizenship (see for example, the plea by Raymond Gravel, House of Commons Debate/October 23, 2007).

\(^{131}\) Because the 2001 elections took place before the bill could pass, it was retabled in the new parliament as bill C-11.
sponsors who were forced to repay a SA debt appealed to have their debt waived, but a unanimous Supreme Court rejected their appeal (*Mavi v. Canada*, 2009).

The distinction between family migrants and other permanent residents is irrelevant for contributory programs such as EI and the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). These programs, by their very nature privilege those who have integrated in the labour force over those who have had trouble doing so, and are therefore indirectly less generous to the immigrant population than to native-born citizens. Indeed, Michael Pal, Sujit Choudry, and Matthew Mendelsohn (2011) find that, because of requirements for new entrants and the regional nature of the EI system, immigrants on average have to work for a longer period of time to qualify for EI than native-born citizens do. Nevertheless, these differences are small, and by and large one can say that permanent migrants have almost the exact same access to premium-based programs as native-born Canadians.

The story is more complicated, however, for the Old Age Security (OAS) benefit, a pension program that is funded from general tax revenues. Immigrants must live in the country for ten years before they are eligible for OAS at all, and must be resident for 40 years to receive the full benefit. For those residents in the country between 10 and 40 years, the benefit is proportional to the number of years spent in Canada. However, the effects of pro-rating are mitigated for low-income immigrant elderly: they can receive a top-up benefit, the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) (*Baker, Benjamin, & Fan, 2009*). To make things more confusing, since 1984 recent elderly

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132 New labour market entrants need to have a minimum work history of 910 hours - the rough equivalent of half a year of full-time work - before they are eligible for EI. Also relevant is that the EI program provides more generous terms for both eligibility and benefits in areas with high unemployment rates. Immigrants tend to live in areas where unemployment is low and, therefore, the EI system is less generous.

133 It is important to emphasize that deterring EI use among immigrants in particular has not been the policy intention of any of these program features. As a senior civil servant at the responsible department (HRSDC) explained, "What we are trying to do is to promote labour market attachment. One of the things that we are trying to do is discourage that first taste of EI [...] The other thing is, if you just joined the labour market, you have no history of contributing to EI. So it makes sense that you build up - and a new entrant is a new entrant, this applies to young people as well - it makes sense that you develop some contributions before you draw down on the system. It is actually a fairly sensible insurance principle."

134 When the program was first created in 1952, this requirement was 20 years. To encourage immigration, however, it was lowered to 10 only five years later.
immigrants to Canada can also apply for a partial OAS and the additional GIS if they have spent at least 10 years in Canada and a country with which Canada has a bilateral social security agreement. The size of the OAS is still determined on the basis of the number of years spent in Canada, but the provision can lead to earlier access to the GIS top-up, which can provide a total benefit as high as a full OAS. However, this practice came to be seen as abuse of the system and when a 1996 reform denied this option to elderly immigrants under a sponsorship agreement135, the party-wide support was striking. Even critical opposition members such as Richard Bélisle (BQ) hailed the reform as “only fair to all taxpayers” (House of Common Debates/April 24, 1996).

Further changes in this policy constellation seem unlikely in the immediate future. While it is true that a number of politicians from the NDP, the LPC, the BQ, and even the CA have suggested reducing the residence requirement for accessing OAS136, all those proposals have been made by individual MPs and have never become the official position of any Canadian party. In fact, the immigration spokesperson of each party I spoke to unequivocally rejected the idea of lowering the OAS residence requirement. The reaction from Don Davies, the NDP immigration critic, is perhaps most telling: “there have been a couple of individual MPs who have floated that idea, but our official policy, and I make the policy on this issue in our party: totally opposed to that” (interview CAN02).

Finally, in order to map the position of immigrants in the Canadian welfare state it is important to discuss the various programs specifically designed to improve the economic fortunes of immigrants. Once immigrants are admitted as permanent residents, they can make use of a wide range of federal and provincial settlement programs, most importantly language training, employment assistance, and skills development (Wong, 2008; Biles, 2008). Moreover,  

135 This means that these applicants now only receive the partial OAS (which theoretically can be as low as 1/40th of a full OAS). Only those elderly immigrants who have been in the country for less than ten years and who are not under a sponsorship agreement - a very small group of migrants, mostly consisting of elderly refugees - can still receive a partial OAS with a GIS top-up.
136 This position has been defended on one or more occasions by the NDP’s Dawn Black, Chris Carlton, Olivia Chow, Libby Davies, Brian Masse, Irene Mathyssen, Penny Priddy, and Bill Siksay; the LPC’s Colleen Beaumier, Sukh Dhaliwal, Ruby Dhalla, Maria Minna, Bernard Patry, and Bob Rae; the BQ’s Nicole Demers and Raymond Gravel, and the CA’s Gurmant Grewal.
the funding for these integration services has increased significantly over the last decade or so. A senior civil servant at CIC characterized the recent developments in integration as follows:

Our budgets have been growing quite dramatically [...] The most recent motions in the House have just been to spend more money. The exceptional thing about settlement and integration is that while in many files [...] different parties take different approaches, there seems to be a party-wide consensus on settlement and integration. The Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP all have been keen on doing more, doing it better, and doing it faster. (interview CAN12)

One hurdle for integration that has recently received much attention is that the credentials of high-skilled immigrants are often not recognized by Canadian employers. According to some observers, this problem is one of the most significant obstacles to their successful economic participation (Reitz, 2001; Girard & Bauder, 2007; Ferrer & Riddell, 2008). Immigrants in this predicament themselves have even accused Canadian immigration policy of being ‘immoral’, arguing that the qualifications that made their applications for admission successful turned out to be seriously discounted once they entered the labour market (Canadian House of Commons, 2003, p. 12). These critiques have been taken seriously by Canadian policy-makers. Not only has the issue frequently come up in parliamentary debates and election campaigns, over the last ten years governments have undertaken several initiatives to assist immigrants in having their qualifications recognized. In 2003, the federal departments HRSDC and Canadian Heritage launched the Foreign Credential Recognition Program, and in 2007 the government founded the Foreign Credentials Referral Office as part of CIC. In January 2009, federal and provincial governments agreed on a ‘Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications’. Overall, Canadian politicians have been eager to invest in facilitating the economic integration of immigrants, and they seemed to have become more eager over time.

All in all, then, the story of recent developments in immigrants’ inclusion in the Canadian welfare state can be summarized by three main observations. First, while the overall approach is an inclusionary one, giving most permanent residents practically undifferentiated and immediate access to welfare state benefits and a wide range of settlement services, family
migrants and temporary migrants experience exclusion from certain programs and services. Second, over the last two decades this approach has not been subject to a welfare chauvinist backlash but remained relatively stable. Only when politicians were concerned that program integrity was at stake, as in the case of welfare use by undocumented migrants, ‘bogus’ refugee claimants, and family migrants on a sponsorship agreement, have we seen calls for exclusion. Third, and finally, in the few instances where the costs of immigration did become a widespread concern among politicians, the policy reaction has more often been to amend admission policy than to restrict the social rights of newcomers who had already been admitted.

6.2 Xenophobia in decline

The policy developments in the previous section are well in line with how the public at large and the political elite tend to evaluate the position of immigrants in the Canadian welfare state. This section shows that views on the entitlements of immigrants have become more positive over time. Moreover, we will see that for as far as concerns about the costs of immigration exist, the dominant view is that those costs should be alleviated by amending admission policy rather than by limiting immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

Canadians tend to have comparatively positive attitudes towards immigration, including its effect on the welfare state (Hiebert, 2006; Adams, 2007; Banting, 2008; Crepaz, 2008; Jedwab, 2008). It even appears that Canadians who believe that immigrants make heavy use of welfare benefits are more likely to support a redistributive welfare state than others (Banting, Soroka, & Koning, forthcoming). In sum, there is little reason to suspect that sentiments of selective solidarity are widespread among the Canadian public.

Moreover, as far as data availability permits us to draw firm conclusions, selective solidarity seems to have become scarcer over time. Unfortunately, researchers have only occasionally surveyed Canadian respondents explicitly about immigrants’ appropriate position in the welfare system. For example, the 2009 Transatlantic Trends found that 75 percent of Canadians agree
with the statement that legal immigrants should be given the same access to social benefits as native-born citizens, and the 2010 wave of the same survey found that only 4 percent supports making health care benefits an exclusive privilege for citizens (with fully 60 percent indicating that also ‘illegal immigrants’ should have access to health care). However, these questions have not been asked in different waves of the survey. The Canadian Election Studies (CES) has asked respondents on five occasions (1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2011) whether they agree with the statement that “we should look after Canadians born in this country first and others second”. The percentage of people who answered ‘agree’ or strongly agree’ has decreased over time from over 50 in 1997 to less than 38 percent in 2011\(^\text{137}\), suggesting that selective solidarity is indeed in decline in the country.

![Bar chart showing support for statements about employers prioritizing native-born citizens in Canada and 13 other welfare states.](chart.png)

**Figure 6.1.** Support for statement that employers should prioritize native-born citizens, Canada and 13 other welfare states. (Source: WVS.)

A look at more indirect pieces of information supports this conclusion. First, it is instructive to compare the answers of Canadian respondents to the question whether employers should prioritize

\(^{137}\) More specifically, in 1997 50.7% of respondents gave one of these two answers; the percentages were 40.7% in 2000, 39.2% in 2004, 30.4% in 2008, and 37.7% in 2011.
native-born citizens in hiring practices (as we have seen, the only question coming close to measuring selective solidarity which has been asked in multiple waves of the WVS) with those of respondents from the other thirteen countries studied in Chapter Four. As shown in Figure 6.1, we see that Canadians have consistently taken a slightly more inclusive stance on this issue, and that in line with the general trend in other countries their views have become more inclusive over time.

Second, we can look at questions measuring more general attitudes towards immigration that have been asked repeatedly over a long period of time. Figure 6.2 shows the responses to three questions on immigration featuring in successive waves of the Environics Focus Canada survey. What we see is that since the late 1990s, Canadians seem to have become less likely to think that overall immigration levels are too high, that most refugee claimants are not real refugees, and that immigration has a negative effect on the economy. While this information does not constitute direct evidence on how views on immigrants’ social rights have evolved, the fact that the trend is almost identical for three fairly distinct immigration-related questions makes it seem plausible that those have become more positive as well.

A final strategy that allows us to infer the development over time of levels of selective solidarity among the population is to combine different questions from existing surveys. In every wave since 1993, the CES have asked respondents about their views on both immigration levels and welfare state institutions. Figure 6.3 shows the percentage of people who argue that fewer immigrants should be admitted to the country but at the same time think that the government should spend more on health care (solid line), that the federal government should spend more on welfare (dotted line), and that more should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor (dashed line). As the other pieces of (indirect) evidence, this analysis suggests that Canadians evince less selective solidarity today than they did twenty years ago.

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\[138\] In the fourth wave, however, the difference between Canada and the other thirteen countries appears to be statistically insignificant (\( p > 0.4 \), two-tailed test).

\[139\] The longitudinal comparison is somewhat troubled by the fact that the surveys did not offer ‘neither’ as an answer possibility to these questions before 2003 but did do so afterwards. However this might have affected the response patterns, it clearly cannot account for the overall decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes (especially since it mostly takes place before 2003).
Figure 6.2. Anti-immigrant attitudes, 1977-2011. (Source: Environics Focus Canada.)

Figure 6.3. Percentage of respondents who are opposed to immigration but in favour of redistribution and social spending, 1993-2011. (Source: CES, and own calculations.)

This is not to suggest that concern about immigrant reliance on welfare is completely absent. As one of the senior civil servants I spoke to rightfully pointed out: “there is lots of public opinion in Ontario that immigrants are a drain on the system. You just have to look at the Globe chat rooms to see that” (interview CAN24). There are a number of anti-immigrant interest groups, most notably the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform and canadafirst.net, which express strong objections to costs incurred by immigration flows. And one can certainly find occasional critiques of immigrants’ welfare use in public commentaries (Stoffman, 2002, pp. 88-93, 108-118) and right-wing newspapers such as the Toronto Sun (Lilley, 2011) or the Calgary Herald (Bissett, 2011). In other words, the point is not that there are no immigration sceptics in Canada criticizing the immigrant ‘burden’ on the welfare state. Rather, this group is small and seems to be shrinking over time.

The immigration spokespeople of Canada’s three largest federal parties shared this observation when asked about their perception of public opinion on this issue. The NDP’s Don Davies, for example, told me that most Canadians have a ‘gut’ preference for immigration (interview CAN02). Kevin Lamoureux (LPC) stated that “all in all, I think the vast majority of Canadians are okay with the way that immigration has served our country” (interview CAN03). Rick Dykstra (CPC), finally, was somewhat more cautious, saying that “I think that Canadians do worry about the cost of it [...] They want to see that things are managed properly and money isn’t wasted”, but at the same time also stated that most Canadians would be opposed to a reduction in overall immigration levels: “there is a general consensus from a majority of the people across the country that [...] we should leave those numbers where they are” (interview CAN01).

The exact questions I used were the following: (1) Do you think Canada should admit more immigrants, fewer immigrants, or about the same as now? (I included those respondents who answered ‘fewer’); (2) “How much do you think should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada?” (I included respondents who answered ‘much more’ or ‘somewhat more’); (3) “Should the government spend more, less, or about the same as now on welfare?” (I included those answering ‘more’); and (4) “Should the government spend more, less, or about the same as now on health care?” (I included those answering ‘more’.)

The Globe and Mail is a Toronto-based, national newspaper.
Given these perceptions, it is hardly surprising that politicians do their best to be seen as pro-immigrant in public. In a careful multi-method analysis of the 2004 and 2006 elections, Jerome Black and Bruce Hicks (2008, p. 254) conclude that “all of the parties worked to convey the impression that they valued immigration and immigrants”. Perhaps even more strikingly, they find that when elections become more competitive, political parties try to outbid each other by moving their immigration policies in a more ‘permissive’ direction (p. 255).

It seems safe to say that Canadian policy-makers tend to evince even more positive views about immigration and its impact on the welfare state than the public at large. Certainly, in the early to mid-1990s the costs immigrants incur on the welfare state were a recurrent subject of political debate, especially when it concerned immigrants who seemed to be ‘abusing’ the system. For example, in 1993 Cameron Jackson (OPC) complained that “[there are] illegal refugees, approximately 10,000 of them in the city of Toronto, who are on welfare” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario debate/July 8, 1993). Similarly, Yvonne O’Neill of the Ontario Liberal Party (OLP) lamented that undocumented migrants could too easily access social assistance (SA) because of insufficient information sharing between welfare offices and immigration agencies (Legislative Assembly of Ontario debate/November 15, 1994). One could hear similar voices at the federal level. RPC member Jay Hill, for example, mentioned media reports about undocumented migrants receiving welfare payments and commented that “Canadians are compassionate and would like to open their doors to legitimate refugees, but this abuse is an unacceptable drain on our already overburdened social programs” (House of Commons debate/January 31, 1994).

In the new millennium, however, the dominant view among Canadian policy-makers seems to be that immigration is a contribution to rather than a drain on the welfare system. All three of the immigration spokespeople I spoke to described immigration as a necessary resource for the future sustainability of the welfare state in light of declining population growth (interviews CAN01, CAN02, CAN03). And such comments can be heard often in parliament as well. See, for
example, John Cannis (LPC): “Our birth rate in Canada is not that high [...] If we are going to grow and sustain the social safety net that Canada is so recognized for, then we need immigration. We need input” (House of Commons debate/September 22, 2010).

Concerns remain, of course, in particular in two areas. The first of these is more about the immigration system than about immigrants themselves. As mentioned above, the fact that refugee claims take a long time to be processed, and that applicants rely on state services in the meantime, still bothers politicians from left to right. And this concern does not only exist among politicians. According to senior staff I spoke to federally at CIC (interviews CAN11, CAN12) and provincially at both the departments of social services (interview CAN21, CAN22) and immigration (interview CAN24), discussions about the costs associated with long refugee determination procedures have been frequent within the civil service as well.

Second, still today right-wing politicians sometimes criticize immigrants’ benefit use when the perception arises that newcomers are in some way better protected than native-born citizens. We already saw one example of this, namely in the recent repeal of supplementary health care benefits offered to refugee claimants under the IFHP that are not included in basic health care coverage. Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, previously member of the RPC, framed the cutback as a matter of equality: “Canadians are a very generous people [but] we don’t want to ask Canadians to pay for benefits for protected persons and refugee claimants that are more generous than what that they are entitled to themselves” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012). A second example can be drawn from the 2011 Ontario provincial elections. When the OLP of premier Dalton McGuinty proposed to offer tax credits to employers who hire recent immigrants, opposition leader Tim Hudak (OCP) denounced the plan as a form of positive discrimination. Within a week, the conservative challenger had drafted a radio ad arguing that the government cares more about newcomers than about native-born Canadians:

At a time when 500,000 Ontarians are out of work, Dalton McGuinty is spending your tax dollars on ... an affirmative action subsidy. Ten thousand dollars per job for the
lucky few. It’s not fair and it’s not equal. Tim Hudak will create jobs for hard-working Ontario families. Regardless of who they are or when they came to Canada. (Radwanski, Howlett, & Mehler Paperny, 2011)

In order not to exaggerate the importance of these events, three qualifying remarks are in order. First, today even the political right tries to attract the immigrant vote, and has therefore shifted in a more inclusive direction on the immigration file. This has been noted not only by academics (Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, & White, forthcoming), but by politicians as well. In 2005, for example, Liberal MP Wajid Khan remarked sarcastically that “after years of making anti-immigrant statements, the Conservatives are now trying to cast themselves as pro-immigrant” (House of Commons debate/April 7, 2005).  

Second, when the Conservatives or other right-wing organizations do present critiques of immigrants’ place in the Canadian welfare state, they spur significant opposition. Complaints that immigration costs too much money or, more specifically, proposals to limit immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits rarely enjoy parliament-wide support in contemporary Canadian politics. For example, both the NDP and the Liberals (as well as a wide range of activists and public commentators) objected strongly to the recent cutbacks in the IFHP (see House of Commons debates/May 31, 2012 and June 18, 2012). Even when it comes to migrants without a legal residence permit, there is no consensus that complete exclusion from welfare services is warranted. Liberal Gurbax Malhi, for example, has recently started to argue that all undocumented migrants without a criminal record should be given a general amnesty on the grounds that “immigrant workers contribute to our economy and society, and deserve the basic safety net protections that all other workers enjoy” (House of Commons debate, October 3, 2005). In April and May of 2006, Malhi was joined in this plea by other MPs, including Raymonde Folco and Andrew Telegdi (LPC), Paul Dewar and Bill Siksay (NDP), and Johanne Deschamps and Meili Faille (BQ).

\[143\] Ironically, Khan defected to the CPC only two years later.
Perhaps the most instructive example in this regard is the reception of a recent study (Grubel & Grady, 2011) by the Fraser Institute, a right-wing think tank that has repeatedly criticized Canada’s immigration system for being too lax. The report, co-written by former RPC parliamentarian Herbert Grubel, concludes that an average immigrant poses a net fiscal drain of 6,051 dollars on the Canadian economy, and adds the following political interpretation:

Most Canadians are happy to live with the welfare state that redistributes income from the rich to the poor [...] But the transfers to immigrants are altogether different from those to needy Canadians. Until they arrive at our borders, immigrants are foreigners and not part of the Canadian social contract that guides the welfare state provisions. Immigrants are only here because we allow them to come [...] By the same token, we are free to stop these fiscal burdens on ourselves if we choose to do so either by changing immigration policies or by severely limiting immigrants’ access to the benefits of the welfare state. (Grubel & Grady, 2011, p. 23)\[^{144}\]

These conclusions have not had the impact their authors might have hoped. The Vancouver Sun denounced the study as ‘incomplete’ and ‘disingenuous’ (Hume, 2011), and only two months after the report’s publication Metropolis, a network of immigration scholars and policy-makers, published a response challenging its main findings (Javdani & Pendakur, 2011).\[^{145}\] Perhaps even more importantly, with the exception of the CPC’s Rick Dykstra, all of my interviewees evaluated the report in negative terms. Lamoureux (LPC) simply said he didn’t believe the conclusions (interview CAN03), while Davies’ (NDP) rejection was more emphatic: “Mister Grubel is a former member of a far-right party in our parliament, and the Fraser Institute is an ideologically driven right-wing think tank in this country. [...] Instead of offering valid comment and research to the debate, they tend to have their conclusion in advance and then try to find the data to

\[^{144}\] It is worth emphasizing the contradiction in this argument. Grubel and Grady justify reducing the ‘fiscal burdens’ on the basis that Canadians have no moral obligations towards people ‘until they arrive at our borders’, but at the same time advocate ‘severely limiting’ the social benefits of immigrants who have already been admitted.

\[^{145}\] Authors Mohsen Javdani and Krishna Pendakur argue that the report is swamped by methodological flaws, and that an accurate calculation arrives at a net fiscal transfer of 450 dollars per immigrant (or 7 percent of Grubel and Grady’s estimate). Moreover, they challenge the report’s political interpretation: “The main result [...] is driven by the fact that immigrants have lower incomes than do Canadian-born workers. [However,] lower average wage of immigrants provides a cheap labour input for firms [...] immigrants increase the production and variety of goods and services in the economy [and] immigrants also provide a boost to international trade” (Javdani & Pendakur, 2011, p. 13).
support it” (interview CAN02). The senior civil servants I spoke with described the report as ‘flawed’ (CAN11), ‘incomplete’ (CAN14, CAN15), and ‘unrealistic’ (CAN24), or simply referred to the Metropolis study for their views on the issue (CAN12).

This is closely related to the third and final point we should make in this context: patterns of immigrant welfare use are rarely on the agenda within the Canadian bureaucracy, and when they are, they appear as an indicator of (unsuccessful) economic integration, not as evidence that immigration poses a ‘drain’. A senior civil servant at CIC responsible for integration services, for example, said that “[welfare use] is one factor that is looked at along with everything else. But it is not the driving force” (interview CAN12). A colleague responsible for admission policies made a similar point: “Within policy-makers in the federal government [...] we don’t spend a lot of time looking at the number of people among immigrants who are on welfare” (interview CAN11). And also at HRSDC, which administers all federally operated social programs in Canada, I was told that immigration is rarely discussed as a threat to the sustainability of the welfare state (interview CAN14). At the provincial level, the story is largely the same. For one thing, federal civil servants told me that they had rarely heard complaints about immigrant use of social assistance in negotiations with the provinces (interviews CAN11, CAN12). My interviewees in Ontario confirmed this. A senior civil servant at the department responsible for the Ontarian social assistance program (CSS) stated: “Is immigration a cause for concern around the financial sustainability or integrity of the programs? No, we don’t particularly feel that that is the case. We are looking at all sorts of things, but we don’t have any indication to think so nor is there a political discourse currently that puts a spotlight on that as a reason for concern” (interview CAN21). And finally, also at the provincial Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration there seemed to be no indication of selective solidarity: “I don’t necessarily worry that immigration is going to make the social assistance system collapse. [...] So definitely we talk about it, but [not] in terms of ‘o my goodness, the social assistance programs are under such pressure we will have to stop immigration’” (interview CAN24).
We can get a more complete sense of the level and nature of attention in Canadian politics to immigrants’ social rights over the last two decades by looking at the number of private motions, questions, and petitions that have been tabled on the subject in the House of Commons. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, by and large there has been little parliamentary activity on the subject. Only in the mid-1990s, when RPC politicians frequently criticized the welfare costs of family migrants and refugee claimants, and in 2007, when members of the NDP repeatedly advocated a reduction in the residence requirement for OAS, did the topic receive sustained attention. Moreover, we see that calls for inclusion have been more frequent than calls for exclusion, especially in recent years.

The lack of support among contemporary politicians for reducing immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits also becomes apparent when we look at their views on the best way

146 The figure only includes motions, questions, and petitions that were clearly accompanied by a normative evaluation (and thus excludes, for example, questions that seemed genuinely aimed at acquiring information). The graph also excludes comments that, while related to immigrants’ social rights, were mostly about something else (such as admission policy, or more general social policy changes).
to avoid a large immigrant welfare clientele. In interviews with the immigration spokesperson of the three largest parties in Canadian parliament\textsuperscript{147}, I asked about the desirability of the four alternative strategies one might consider to achieve that goal: (1) restrict immigrants’ access to social benefits; (2) make admission policies more selective; (3) invest more in integration assistance; and (4) implement across-the-board welfare retrenchment. The answers are summarized in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2. Political parties’ views on four possible strategies to avoid/reduce immigrant welfare dependence.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Social-dem.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Some</td>
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The most striking observation that emerges from Table 6.2 is just how much politicians of different parties seem to be in agreement. For one thing, Dykstra, Davies, and Lamoureux all expressed support for continued investment in a formidable set of integration and settlement services. And even though it is true that the CPC has been less supportive of programs aimed at cultural recognition than the NDP and the LPC (Ryan, 2010), the Conservatives have been as eager to invest in programs designed to facilitate economic integration as their political rivals. Indeed, the budget for integration has increased considerably during the incumbency of the Conservative Harper governments, with support from both the NDP and the Liberals.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{147} Considering the high level of party discipline in Canada (Godbout & Høyland, 2011), it seems safe to assume that the answers I received from Rick Dykstra (CPC), Don Davies (NDP), and Kevin Lamoureux (LPC) reflected the position of about 98 percent of the members of the Canadian parliament at the time the interviews were conducted (mid-2011).

\textsuperscript{148} In 2011, there has been a slight cut in the integration budget, but according to Dykstra, this reflected changed settlement patterns rather than a difference in policy orientation (interview CAN01). The senior civil servants at CIC I spoke with expected services such as language programs, employment assistance, and credential recognition initiatives to be expanded rather than reduced in the near future (interviews CAN12, CAN13).
A second and even more relevant subject of consensus is that all three politicians reject differentiation in social rights between immigrants and native-born citizens (even though they do support the principle of the sponsorship mechanism for family migration). Dykstra (CPC) put it as follows: “Our emphasis isn’t on placing restrictions once people are here. Our emphasis is on setting policy in place where those restrictions are unnecessary. [We prefer making] a decision at the front end versus having to regulate at the back end.”

This comment echoes Canada’s traditional strategy of employing a selective admission policy aimed at immigrants with high human capital who are unlikely to claim welfare services. In the 1990s, the Liberal Chrétien governments increased the percentual intake of economic migrants from around 40 to well over 60 percent of the total inflow, with the explicit aim to decrease the pressure on social programs (see also the opening quote to this chapter). The relative reliance on economic migration has continued to rise under the Conservative Harper governments, and seems likely to increase even further in the next few years. Dykstra (CPC) told me that: “60/40 isn’t quite the split I think we will need over the upcoming years for Canada to continue to grow its economy. It’s obviously going to have to be higher on the economic side” (interview CAN01). And also Immigration Minister Jason Kenney has in recent years repeatedly emphasized his commitment to “select those immigrants who are likely to succeed in the Canadian economy” (Citizenship and Immigration Committee/February 17, 2011). The NDP is the only Canadian party that seems to take exception to this preference for selective admission policies. The party has always been an advocate of a larger intake of refugee and, in particular, family migrants. Unsurprisingly, Davies expressed his dislike of the current government’s increasing emphasis on economic migration:

When they want to convince Canadians that they are doing a great job, the economy has never been better. But if it’s [admission] policy, well, gee, we can’t afford anything anymore. [But] I challenge the Conservatives’ economic claim as well. I don’t believe that their particular approach is actually better for our economy. [...] I quite frequently think of what’s written on the Statue of Liberty in the United States: ‘give me your tired, give me your poor, give me your huddled masses yearning to breathe free’. That was an
immigration policy that didn’t say: ‘give me your wealthy, give me your rich, give me your highly skilled, highly trained to build my economy’. And I would argue that the United States’ economic growth from say, the middle of the 19th century [...] to now has been... pretty good! (interview CAN02)

Finally, the three parties differ predictably in their views on overall welfare retrenchment as a strategy to facilitate immigrants’ integration. The Conservatives, and to a lesser extent, the Liberals, are generally in favour of little state intervention in the market - and indeed, both parties have recently cut in social programs and reduced redistributive mechanisms while in power (Evans, 2002; Kneebone & White, 2009; Banting & Myles, forthcoming). The social democratic NDP, on the other hand, advocates a more expansive welfare state and more specifically, rejects the supposition that flexibilization of the labour market or overall retrenchment would facilitate the economic integration of immigrants (interview CAN02).

To wrap up, we have seen that the belief that immigrants’ access to the welfare state should be curtailed exists in Canada, but that is not particularly prominent, and that its traction seems to have diminished over time. The public thinks increasingly favourably about immigrants’ impact on the economy, and is increasingly unlikely to express selective solidarity. When civil servants voice concern about immigrant reliance on welfare programs, the concern tends to be that admission or integration policies are not functioning properly, not that newcomers are overburdening the system. Today’s political parties, finally, reject limitations in immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits, and instead tend to believe in the effectiveness of integration assistance and selective admission policies.

6.3 The origins of Canadian xenophilia

This section offers an explanation for these low levels of selective solidarity. In line with my first hypothesis, I will first show that while the economic case for immigrant welfare exclusion is indeed weak in Canada, economic reality can at best offer only a partial explanation for the

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149 My use of this term should not be confused with that of Star Trek fans, who refer with it to a sexual preference for extraterrestrials.
relative absence of welfare chauvinism. In the second subsection I will argue that we can understand dominant views on immigrant entitlements better by turning our attention to the way this subject has most commonly been discussed. More specifically, we will see that the lack of an explicit anti-immigrant party and the centrality of immigration in popular conceptions of Canadian national identity have produced a political discourse that leaves little room for pleas for immigrant welfare exclusion.

6.3.1 The Limits of Economic Explanations

At first glance, the positive views among Canadian voters and policy-makers on immigration and its interaction with the welfare system seemingly offer potent support for the intuitive economic hypothesis. There is little objective basis in Canada for an argument that immigrants are lazy welfare cheats. For one thing, the relatively ungenerous nature of social assistance programs in Canada (Gough, Bradshaw, Ditch, Eardley, & Whiteford, 1997) makes it implausible that immigrants who rely on welfare are in that position by deliberate design. More importantly, from a comparative perspective immigrants’ reliance on welfare programs is small. Canada does not have the large immigrant welfare clientele that is troubling the other two countries in this comparative case study. This is mostly because of two sets of policies.

First, in the words of Keith Banting, “the immigration regime has been designed as much as possible to limit immigrant utilization of welfare” (Banting, 2010, p. 807). As we saw above, by far the largest number of migrants Canada admits are economic migrants, who are specifically selected on the basis of their human capital (Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010). Second, labour

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150 Nevertheless, however, both commentators (Stoffman, 2002, pp. 86, 123, 172) and politicians often make exactly that suggestion. In 2010, for example, immigration Minister Kenney’s (CPC) commented that “the generosity of our social welfare schemes [...] creates incentives for dubious refugee claims”.

151 Among the economic migrants that were admitted to Canada over the last ten years (2001-2010), 76 percent had a BA degree or higher and 86 percent spoke at least one of Canada’s two official languages (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011). These numbers are certainly lower for family and refugee migrants, but as noted, they are less numerous than economic migrants and, besides, most family migrants depend on their sponsor rather than the welfare system if they run into financial difficulties during the first years in the country.
market policies have facilitated the economic integration of immigrants. Canada’s ‘liberal’ welfare state does not offer generous benefits to the unemployed, but instead pushes them (back) into the labour market by active policies and sheer economic necessity (Olsen, 2002; Banting & Myles, forthcoming). In addition, the absence of protective institutions such as rigid dismissal laws, high minimum wage, and extensive limits on work hours has made the labour market flexible and comparatively open to newcomers. Moreover, in contrast to many immigrant-receiving welfare states, since 1994 refugee claimants in Canada have access to temporary work permits, which means they are not forced to rely on the state\textsuperscript{152} And finally, Canada offers a wide range of immigrant-targeted active labour market policies, which have been shown to reduce welfare dependence even among refugees (Hiebert, 2002).

Figure 6.5 shows recent data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), a large-scale income survey annually conducted by Statistics Canada among on average 55,000 respondents over the age of sixteen.\textsuperscript{153} Immigrants are slightly more likely (about 15 percent) to be in receipt of any type of federal or provincial government transfer than native-born citizens. Moreover, the immigrant population also tends to receive more Canadian dollars in transfer benefits (about 32 percent more than native-born citizens). These are raw numbers, however, and do not take the demographic differences between the two groups into account. As can be gleaned from the white bars in Figure 6.5, which represent utilization data for foreign-born individuals who have been in Canada for more than forty years, the overrepresentation of immigrants on aggregate has much to do with the fact that immigrants are on average older than native-born citizens (according to the 2006 Census, 19.6 percent of immigrants are above the

\textsuperscript{152} Reducing refugee claimants’ welfare dependence has been the explicit aim of this policy. Mary Clancy (LPC) announced it as follows: “This government has [...] introduced regulatory changes that will allow refugee claimants to work while awaiting the outcome of their claim, thus reducing the burden on social assistance” (House of Commons debate/January 31, 1994). Soojin Yu, Estelle Ouellet, and Angelyn Warmington (2007, p. 25) found that about 76 percent of claimants make use of temporary work permits.

\textsuperscript{153} It is worth noting, that these data have been collected in 2009, in the middle of an economic recession that hit immigrants particularly hard. In other words, these data are likely to overestimate ‘typical’ levels of immigrant welfare dependence in Canada.
age of 55, while that percentage is only 11.5 for native-born Canadians). Indeed, immigrants who have arrived less than ten years ago are slightly underrepresented among benefit recipients.

Figure 6.5. Use of federal and provincial government transfers, by immigration status, 2009. (Source: SLID.)

Figure 6.6. Percentage of population receiving various transfer benefits, by immigration status, 2009. (Source: SLID.)
Figures 6.6 show separate utilization rates for SA, EI, OAS, GIS, and child benefits. For all five programs, the recipiency rate is higher for immigrants than for native-born citizens. With the exception of the GIS (which, as discussed above, has been specifically designed to cover elderly individuals with an incomplete pension benefit), however, the aggregate differences tend to be small. For understandable reasons, immigrants who have been in the country for a long time make more use of OAS and GIS, while recent arrivals place a larger claim on SA, EI, and child benefits. In sum, while immigrants are somewhat more likely to make use of transfer benefits than native-born Canadians, the objective ‘burden’ they place on the welfare state is small, especially by comparative standards.

In sum, then, economic facts seem to have something to do with the limited spread of selective solidarity in Canada. There are at least three limitations, however, to an explanation that is rooted exclusively in economic facts.

First, such an explanation is not in line with developments over time. As we saw in the previous subsection, views on immigrants’ place in the welfare state have become increasingly positive over the last two decades. In that same time period, however, the economic integration of immigrants has slowed down considerably. Until the mid-1990s, immigrants tended to outperform native-born citizens in economic terms and were actually underrepresented among benefit recipients (Akbari, 1989; Baker & Benjamin, 1995; Sweetman, 2001). But this is no longer the case. Recent cohorts of immigrants are more likely to have a low income (Waslander, 2003; Green & Worswick, 2010), to be unemployed (Fleury, 2007), and indeed, to receive transfer benefits (DeVoretz & Pivnenko, 2004; Pinsonneault, Lechaume, Benzakour, & Lanctôt, 2010) than previous cohorts and native-born citizens.

Figure 6.7, which shows the average amount of social assistance transferred to native-born citizens and immigrants in Canada from 1982 to 2009, illustrates this trend. The graph shows

154 While mostly unrelated to the current discussion, the graph also reflects how much less generous social assistance benefits have become since the mid-1990s. From 1967 to 1995, the federal government paid 50 percent of all provincial SA costs in accordance with the Canada Assistance Plan. In 1996, this
that immigrants’ relative reliance on welfare has increased sharply over time. Indeed, while in the early 1980s immigrants received about 40 percent less social assistance than native-born citizens, in the late 2000s they received almost 60 percent more. And while it is true that the degree of overrepresentation should still be considered small from a comparative perspective, the key point is that concerns about immigrants’ welfare use have not been loudest at times when immigrants were most overrepresented among welfare recipients. If actual patterns of immigrants’ reliance on welfare benefits were truly the driving force behind selective solidarity, we would have seen an increase, not a decrease, in welfare chauvinism.


plan was replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), a block transfer that is unaffected by the level of SA expenditure and therefore offers an incentive for provinces to reduce the level of their SA programs. Ronald Kneebone and Katherine White (2009) observe that except in Newfoundland and Labrador, SA benefits have decreased in all provinces since the introduction of the CHST. This is not the place to elaborate on possible explanations for this trend. In fact, it is still somewhat of a puzzle. The difficulties immigrants experience in having their foreign qualifications recognized (Reitz, 2001; Green & Worswick, 2010) and discrimination on the labour market (Hiebert, 2006; Scott, 2010) are often mentioned as important factors, but it seems implausible that either of these two obstacles to successful economic integration has become more formidable over time. For that reason, explanations that point at larger trends in the labour market seem more convincing. Some authors have argued, for example, that while economic immigrants have become more skilled, the education levels of native-born Canadians have also increased, and that as a whole the skilled labour market has become more competitive (Picot & Sweetman, 2005). More recently, analysts have shown that many of the skilled migrants who ran into socioeconomic difficulties after 2000 were intending to work in the information technology sector, which just then was experiencing a dramatic downturn (Picot & Sweetman, 2009).
Second, an exclusive focus on economics ignores that objections to immigrants’ access to social programs have often been motivated by other arguments. As we saw, a large part of the critique was targeted at those who received benefits while they were technically not entitled to them (such as undocumented migrants, or family migrants on a sponsorship agreement). In those instances, it seems that concerns about system integrity and fairness rather than about economic sustainability are driving the objections.

The same conclusion results from data on how politicians tend to frame their objections. Figure 6.8 shows the results of a systematic analysis of all statements criticizing immigrants’ use of social programs that were made in parliament from 1994 to 2010 and were accompanied by some sort of explanation. For each of those statements, I recorded whether the explanation featured words such as ‘abuse’, ‘crime’, and ‘fair’ suggesting a ‘principled’ objection or rather terms such as ‘costs’, ‘taxpayer’, and ‘burden’ suggesting an ‘economic’ objection.\(^{156}\)

\(^{156}\) In total, I coded 119 statements. Figure 6.8 only shows the six most commonly mentioned ‘frame’ words. In addition to those six, I counted the frequency of the terms ‘illegal’ (9.2%), ‘take advantage’ (8.4%), ‘integrity’ (5.9%), ‘fraud’ (5.0%), ‘bogus’ (3.4%), ‘credibility’ (0.8%), and ‘fake’ (0.8%) as indicators of principled objections and ‘drain’ (4.2%), ‘sustain’ (3.4%), ‘afford’ (2.5%), tab/bill (1.7%), ‘loadstone’ (0.8%), ‘pressure’ (0.8%), and ‘struggle’ (0.8%) as indicators of economic objections.
As it turns out, economic frames have not been more prevalent than principled ones. While the terms ‘costs’ and ‘taxpayer’ indeed appear most frequently in objections to immigrant welfare use, overall politicians have been as likely to use principled as economic arguments. It is interesting to note as well that the use of the ‘economic’ frame has become more uncommon over time (while, as we saw above, an economic critique would seem to make more sense today than twenty years ago). While in the period from 1994 to 1999 about 74 percent of all objections were at least partly couched in economic terms, that percentage was only 54 percent in the period from 2000 to 2010. Again, this shows that a look at economic reality can only tell part of the story of the dominant discourse on immigrants’ position in the welfare state.

A third and final limitation of an economic explanation is that even in the instances that politicians did raise economic objections, they often relied on exaggeration and the opportunistic use of facts in doing so. A particularly blatant example of the latter is that some RPC members reported diametrically opposite ‘evidence’ on immigrants’ economic integration depending on the topic of discussion. In debates on immigration levels, the social rights of refugee claimants, or the enforcement of sponsorship agreements in family migration, Leon Benoit, Herbert Grubel, and Art Hanger repeatedly argued that restrictions are necessary because immigrants pose a disproportionate burden on the welfare state.\(^{157}\) However, when these same politicians were asked to comment on employment equity policies, they suddenly reported that immigrants outperform native-born citizens economically! Hanger:

\begin{quote}
No other bit of data shows the absolute folly of employment equity like the data on performance of immigrants. [...] They do better than the white males that are alleged to be discriminating against them and thereby are allowed to receive an undue and unfair benefit from employment equity. (House of Commons debate/March 30, 1995)
\end{quote}

Similar comments were made by both Grubel (House of Commons debates/February 13, 1994) and Benoit (House of Commons debates/April 6, 1995). If politicians report such wildly

\(^{157}\) See, for example, comments by Benoit on October 13 and November 9, 1999; by Grubel on February 22 and March 7, 1994; and by Hanger on February 2, April 15, and September 23, 1994.
contradictory statements about the economics of immigration depending on political expediency, objective facts can be of only limited importance.

Similarly instructive is the observation that pleas for exclusion have often relied on the exaggeration of economic facts. For example, in 1994 the RPC repeatedly drew attention to the use of welfare among refugees, arguing that refugees pose ‘an unacceptable drain on our already overburdened welfare system’ (Jay Hill, House of Commons debate/January 31, 1994), that “social services [...] are struggling with the flow of refugees” (Art Hanger, House of Commons debate/February 3, 1994), and that many refugees “have come to exploit or drain our social services” (Jim Hart, House of Commons debate/September 19, 1994). Utilization data hardly justify such strong language: around the time that these comments were made refugees constituted only 4 percent of social assistance caseload in the province of Ontario.158 Data on family migrants on a sponsorship agreement, that other group of migrants that has been the frequent target of critique, have similarly been exaggerated. Ontarian premier Mike Harris allegedly claimed in October 1999 that the ‘majority of sponsors’ in Ontario had reneged on their agreement159, while the actual percentage at the time was about 16 percent (see House of Commons Debate/October 28, 1999).

Perhaps the most common type of exaggeration has been to argue that Canada has the most generous admission policy in the world, and can therefore not afford to be more generous. A good example is the following quote by Art Hanger (RPC):

The minister's projected numbers continue the pattern of allowing numbers of family and refugee class immigrants that are virtually unheard of in the industrialized world today. [...] Even today as a percentage of our population Canada is still accepting more immigrants than any other industrialized nation on earth. Why does this government want to up the number even more? (House of Commons debate/February 2, 1994)

Such comments are patently false. In 1994 (when the comment above was made), there certainly were countries that admitted more immigrants than Canada, both in absolute and in relative

159 While Liberal MP John McKay attributes this quote to Mike Harris (House of Commons debate/October 28, 1999), I have not been able to verify it in a different source.
terms. Moreover, as we saw above, Canada has one of the most selective admission policies in the Western world, relying on economic migration to a larger extent than almost all other immigrant-receiving nations. A comparison with the other two cases in this qualitative comparison is particular instructive: from 1989 to 1994, about 12.6 percent of all incoming migrants in Canada were refugees, whereas those percentages were as high as 37 for the Netherlands and even 50 for Sweden (OECD, 2011b). The complaint that the level of refugee migration to Canada is ‘unheard of’ thus has very little to do with actual facts.

In sum, while immigrants’ relatively successful economic performance plays a role in muting selective solidarity, we cannot fully understand the politics of immigrants’ social rights by exclusively looking at objective patterns of immigrant welfare dependence. After all, while in recent years immigrants have taken a relatively larger share of the welfare caseload, this has not led to increased calls for exclusion. Moreover, economic facts seem to have played a small role in those instances that immigrants’ use of social programs did become the subject of critique.

6.3.2 The Political Translation of the Welfare Costs of Immigration

For a fuller understanding of the limited spread of selective solidarity, then, we need to turn our attention to how patterns of immigrants’ welfare reliance have become translated in the political system. As we have seen above, only very rarely have discussions centered on the use of benefits by immigrants who were already admitted to the country. Instead, most debates in this area have been about the entitlements of refugee claimants and undocumented migrants. And even when it comes to those categories of immigrants, the costs for the welfare system have more often been blamed on defaults in the immigration system than on immigrants themselves. The following quote by Alice Wong (CPC), then parliamentary secretary for Multiculturalism, is illustrative of the way in which the costs of immigration have most commonly been framed:

\[\text{For example, the United States and Germany, admitted more immigrants than Canada in absolute terms, while Sweden and Switzerland took in a larger number relative to the size of their population.}\]

\[\text{This unsubstantiated argument also enjoys currency in public commentaries (see, for example, Stoffman, 2002, p. 91).}\]
Hon. Members of the House know very well that this government is a strong advocate and supporter of the humanitarian division of our immigration program. [However,] we also face significant challenges [...] We have a system where even the most straightforward successful refugee claims are currently taking too long to reach a decision. Unsuccessful refugee claimants regularly take over five years before they finish the various levels of appeals available to them. This is five years of federally funded health care and provincially funded social programs, on top of court costs and IRB costs. (House of Commons debate/April 20, 2009)

To understand why the subject of immigrant welfare dependence has never been framed in the divisive terms we saw in the previous chapter, we need to look at three country-specific factors: party politics, the nature of national identity, and the structure of the welfare state.

**Anti-immigrant parties.** First, Canada has never had the type of anti-immigrant party like the ones that have entered national parliament in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, or Norway. The majoritarian electoral system rewards political parties with a centrist agenda, and for that reason extremist movements have little chance of securing parliamentary representation. As we have seen, however, there has been one federal political party that has voiced objections to the costs of immigration more often than any other: the short-lived Reform Party of Canada. The party sent its first member to national parliament in 1989 as a result of a by-election. In the elections of 1993, it managed to secure 52 of the 295 seats, and in 1997 it even became the second-largest party in parliament, winning 60 of 301 seats. Starting in late 1999, however, the party started to join forces with other right-wing political parties and eventually became part of the current Conservative Party of Canada (Flanagan, 2009).

In some respects, the RPC was similar to West European AIPs. For one thing, it was decidedly populist. Its leader Preston Manning explicitly hailed the ‘common sense of the common people’ as the most useful guideline for political decision-making (Manning, 2003; Flanagan, 2009, pp. 20-36), and Reform politicians often framed their policy positions accordingly. For example, Ian McClelland finished his plea to cut social assistance to asylum seekers who appealed a rejection to their refugee claim by saying: “It is not meanspirited; it is merely common sense” (House of Commons debate/March 3, 1997). Just like AIPs in Western
Europe, when Reform advocated restrictions in immigration policy it often did so in the name of democracy. Its 1989 election manifesto lamented that “there is perhaps no area of public policy where the views of Canadians have been more systematically ignored through the undemocratic structuring of political debate than the area of immigration” (Reform Party of Canada, 1988, p. 25). In parliament, RPC members frequently accompanied their pleas for lower immigration levels with public opinion polls that suggested the majority of voters agreed with them.\footnote{See, for example, contributions by Art Hanger (House of Commons debate/March 15 and September 28, 1994), Sharon Hayes (House of Commons debate/June 9, 1994); Philip Mayfield (House of Commons debate/September 19, 1994), and Ted White (House of Commons debate/February 14, 1994).} Generous immigration policies, on the other hand, were framed as serving only the “desires of a few special interests” (Art Hanger, House of Commons debate/February 25, 1994).

A second way in which Reform resembled other AIPs is that it often brought up objections to immigration in largely unrelated discussions. In a debate about emergency assistance to farmers, for example, Preston Manning argued that funds for such assistance would be amply available if the government would not spend so much money on illegal immigration (House of Commons debate/November 3, 1999). Similarly, when the House of Commons debated a proposal to ban the promotion of tobacco products, Ted White (RPC) made a few comments on the actual bill but then quickly changed the subject entirely and started to discuss illegal immigration (House of Commons debate/October 8, 1998).

A third reason why Reform might be considered an anti-immigrant party is that it attracted the support of anti-immigrant organizations and voters. Indeed, some observers have been able to trace connections between the Reform Party and outwardly anti-immigrant organizations such as the National Citizens’ Coalition and the Northern Foundation (Dobbin, 1992, pp. 105-38). Wolfgang Droege, the leader and founder of a neo-Nazi movement called Heritage Front, publicly commented that he saw the rise of the RPC as a reason for hope, and he was even a member of the party until his membership became public knowledge (Dobbin, 1992, p. 131; Flanagan, 2009, p. 92). More generally, RPC voters tended to have more negative attitudes
towards immigration and ethnic diversity than those who voted for other parties (Flanagan, 2009, pp. 41, 148). Data from the CES of 1993 and 1997, the only two elections in which Reform competed successfully, confirm this conclusion. As Table 6.3 illustrates, in both elections people who reported to have voted for the RPC were considerably and significantly more likely than other voters to think that admission levels should be lowered, that less should be done for racial minorities, that native-born should receive preferential treatment, and that immigrants generally do not want to fit in.\footnote{163}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1993 vote</th>
<th>1997 vote</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada should admit fewer immigrants</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less should be done for racial minorities</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should look after native-born first</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many immigrants do not want to fit in</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
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* Significant at level $p < 0.05$. ** Significant at level $p < 0.001$. This is a summary table (for the second statement, the percentage includes respondents who either indicated ‘much less’ or ‘somewhat less’ should be done; for the last two statements, the percentage includes respondents who either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’). The gamma coefficients, measuring the association between anti-immigrant sentiment and a vote for RPC, have been calculated on the basis of all available ordinal answer categories. See Appendix Table A5.1 for complete results and question wording. Data are drawn from CES 1993 and 1997.

Despite these similarities, it is important to point out a number of crucial differences between the RPC and AIPs such as the Dutch PVV. First, the RPC never really promoted selective solidarity: with its squarely right-wing economic agenda (Dobbin, 1992; Patten, 1999),\footnote{164} it did

\footnote{163}{In reviewing studies conducted with these same data, Jerome Black and Bruce Hicks (2008, p. 246) conclude that “Reform voters were not particularly more inclined to admit fewer immigrants”. This conclusion, however, is based on analyses that include anti-immigrant attitudes along with many other independent variables such as age, gender, and religiosity. While including such controls makes sense for certain purposes, it does not for ours. For example, the findings that men are more likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes than women, and that men are more likely to vote RPC than women, by no means shows that anti-immigrant attitudes play no role in an RPC vote. A more plausible interpretation is that part of the reason why men were more likely to vote RPC is that they were more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes.}

\footnote{164}{Preston Manning himself rejects descriptions of Reform as a ‘right-wing’ party (Manning, 2003, pp. 29, 275), and also Tom Flanagan, former director of research for the RPC, describes the party as “far from consistently conservative” (Flanagan, 2009, p. 12). Considering its conservative stance on moral issues,}
not combine its restrictive stance on immigration policy with support for generous social policies like most modern AIPs do. Second, immigration has never been the number one concern on the RPC agenda: tax reduction, democratic reform, and especially symmetrical federalism were bigger priorities. Indeed, in RPC election manifestoes and other party literature immigration policies tend to occupy a marginal space.\textsuperscript{165}

Third, the RPC’s electoral strategy in the area of immigration can be described by what Murray Dobbin (1992) calls ‘calculated ambiguity’. While the party did try to cater to the anti-immigrant vote, it was careful not to scare more mainstream voters away in the process. The party elite weeded out overt racists\textsuperscript{166} and steered clear of evidently discriminatory policy suggestions, even when they were voiced by grassroots members.\textsuperscript{167} Instead, the party tried to brand itself as a generally pro-diversity party. Between the 1993 and 1998 elections, for example, Reform recruited minority candidates in an attempt to shake off its xenophobic image.\textsuperscript{168} Similarly, Reform politicians often prefaced their suggestions for restrictive reforms with a general pro-immigration statement. For example, Art Hanger, who as we have seen was certainly one of the most vocal immigration critics, repeatedly stated he was “proud to be a

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\textsuperscript{165} Its 1989 election manifesto barely dedicates one page of a total of 29 to immigration (Reform Party of Canada, 1988). The 1996 and 1999 ‘Blue Books’ (statements of principles and policies) similarly spend only about 2 percent of the pages on immigration (Reform Party of Canada, 1996; 1999). It is also worth noting that Preston Manning does not discuss immigration at all in his political autobiography (Manning, 2003) - the only thing he mentions is that he has been called ‘anti-immigrant’ by his opponents.

\textsuperscript{166} For example, when Doug Collins, a man who had made racist comments in his past, was supported by acclamation as the candidate for Capilano-Howe Sound in the 1989 election, Preston Manning asked him to provide a written condemnation of racism. Collins refused, and was consequently not nominated (Dobbin, 1992, p. 145; Manning, 2003, p. 33).

\textsuperscript{167} During a 1994 party convention in Ottawa, Manning rejected almost all grassroots resolutions on immigration for being too extreme, including one suggesting to bar all immigrants from social benefits during their first five years in Canada (Flanagan, 2009, p. 197)

\textsuperscript{168} While none of the 52 members of the 1993 RPC House caucus were non-White or born outside the Western world, the 1997 caucus did count four non-Western immigrants: Gurmant Grewal (born in India), Rahim Jaffer (born in Uganda), Inky Mark (born in China), and Deepak Obhrai (born in Tanzania). As such, the RPC caucus became much more diverse than the factions of the Bloc, NDP, and PC, which included no non-Western immigrant members at all, and only slightly less diverse than the Liberal parliamentary party (13 of the 158, or 8.2 percent, of Liberal parliamentarians were non-Western immigrants - a slightly higher share than the 4 out of 60, or 6.7 percent, of Reform).
citizen of a country that has gained an international reputation for its fairness, compassion and its acceptance of immigrants of all kinds” (House of Commons debate/February 2, 1994).

These differences are of theoretical relevance. The party did increase parliamentary attention to immigration and its effects on the welfare system, and anti-immigrant sentiment increased somewhat after the arrival of Reform on the national stage (see Figure 6.2). But compared to most AIPs, the RPC spent less time priming immigration as an issue of concern, and tended to frame its critique of immigration policies in less extremist and divisive terms. For that reason, the party did not foster selective solidarity among the population in the same way we saw the PVV do. But there is also a second respect in which the RPC’s effect on immigration politics has been smaller: other parties in parliament tended to respond to Reform’s restrictive suggestions by rejecting them, not by adopting more restrictive positions themselves.

Some scholars do argue that the Chrétien governments have been affected by a ‘contagion effect’, as evidenced for example by its increased reliance on economic migration, its introduction of a 975 dollar fee for all new immigration applicants, and its reforms in refugee policy (Black & Hicks, 2008). Politicians have made this argument as well. Art Hanger, for example, boasted that his party had “set the agenda in immigration policy” (House of Commons Debate/November 16, 1996). On the other side of the political spectrum, Osvaldo Nunez (BQ) accused Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi (LPC) of being “afraid of the Reform Party, and [...] becoming increasingly hard on immigrants and refugees” (House of Commons Debate/April 6, 1995), and Louise Hardy (NDP) criticized Liberal immigration plans by saying that “this government must advance policies that represent the values of Canadian citizens rather than reacting to the hysteria of right-wing politicians” (House of Commons Debate/May 27, 1998).

Even if it is true that the Liberals implemented more restrictive policies at the time of the RPC’s ascendance, however, they certainly did not adopt a more restrictive tone in their discourse. In fact, the Liberals’ most common response to Reform’s immigration proposals was vehement and at times personal criticism. To give just a few examples, Immigration Minister
Sergio Marchi characterized the RPC as “these customers who continue to spin mythology around immigration” (House of Commons debate/September 29, 1994), Brian Tobin lamented that Reform promoted “an irresponsible attitude [...] with respect to Canada’s immigrants [and] anybody who does not have a right-wing, narrow-minded, bigoted attitude about people in the country” (House of Commons debate/November 3, 1994), and John Richardson accused the party of “fueling fear and hate [by] espousing an extreme Canada that is anti-bilingual, anti-multicultural, anti-rural, anti-immigrant, disunited, weak and Americanized” (House of Commons debate/October 3, 1997). Lou Sekora simply called the RPC a ‘racist’ movement (House of Commons debate, June 3, 1999), and Sheila Copps even went so far as comparing Preston Manning to American Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke (Herrington, 1991). Other parties were no less aggressive in their accusations. Even members of the Progressive Conservative Party decried Reform’s “racist and discriminatory policy on immigration and refugees” (David Price, House of Commons debate/June 5, 2000).

In short, party politics are an important factor in explaining the political translation of immigrants’ welfare costs in Canada. The only party in recent history that actively opposed immigration and multiculturalism was in parliament for only a short period of time, dedicated most of its time and resources to other policy areas than immigration, and tended to frame its critique more as an accusation that existing governments had failed to handle immigration properly than as an attack on the immigrant population for abusing the welfare system. Moreover, the response of other parties in parliament has been to reiterate their commitment to generous immigration policies, not to follow Reform in a more restrictive direction.

National identity. Discussions about immigrants’ place in the welfare state have also been influenced by the nature of Canada’s national identity. As a settler society that has relied on immigration for demographic growth throughout its history (Knowles, 2007; Kelley & Trebilcock, 2010), the country is rightfully described as a ‘nation of immigrants’. According to the 2006 Census, almost 24 percent of the population over 15 years old was born outside
Canada, and another 16 percent is made up by the children of immigrants. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that a welcoming and inclusive approach to newcomers has become a crucial component of ‘Canadianness’.\textsuperscript{169}

This understanding of national identity is reflected in Canada’s commitment to a set of multiculturalist policies that recognize and accommodate immigration-induced diversity (Kymlicka, 2003; Ryan, 2010). As early as 1971, Canada proclaimed itself a multicultural society, and in 1988 parliament adopted a Multiculturalism Act aimed at protecting the cultural rights of ethnic minorities. Multiculturalism has even been codified in the constitution: Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the first part of the Constitution that outlines fundamental individual human rights) guarantees “the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”.

The centrality of diversity in Canada’s national identity also becomes apparent in parliamentary discourse. Politicians of all stripes often refer to immigration as one of Canada’s defining features. Prime Minister Stephen Harper (CPC), for example, commented in a recent throne speech: “we are a country of immigrants. Our identities are bound up in the stories of ancestors from hundreds of lands” (House of Commons debate/March 3, 2010). Perhaps even more telling is the way then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (LPC) finished the very first comment he made in parliament after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001:

Finally, I want to make another very important point. Canada is a nation of immigrants from all corners of the globe, people of all nationalities, colours and religions. This is who we are. Let there be no doubt. We will allow no one to force us to sacrifice our values or traditions under the pressure of urgent circumstances. We will continue to welcome people from the whole world. We will continue to offer refuge to the persecuted. I say again, no one will stop this. (House of Commons debate/September 17, 2001)

The public seems to have a similar understanding of what it means to be Canadian. Richard Johnston and his colleagues find that nationalist respondents in Canada actually tend to be

\textsuperscript{169} Again, it is worth noting that the generalizations I am making apply primarily to Canada outside Quebec. The distinct nature of Quebecois identity has made the discourse on cultural diversity quite different from the rest of Canada.
more favourable to immigration and immigrants than their less nationalist counterparts (Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2010). More generally, in national surveys many respondents mention their country’s stance on immigration and multiculturalism as a source of pride (Adams, 2007, pp. 86-7). One such survey, the Environics Focus Canada, asked respondents how important to Canadian identity they believed a variety of symbols to be. The results of the most recent wave of this survey are reported in Figure 6.9. More than 56 percent of all respondents thought that multiculturalism was ‘very important’ to Canadian identity (with another 30 percent answering ‘somewhat important’). As such, multiculturalism was deemed only marginally less central to Canadian identity than the national anthem, and decidedly more important than hockey, bilingualism, or the Queen.

![Figure 6.9. Views on importance of several symbols to Canadian identity, 2010. (Source: Environics Focus Canada.)](image)

In the context of these findings, it is instructive to take a look at a recent Canadian nationalist manifesto (Griffiths, 2009). Entitled Who We Are, the book is almost explicitly presented as the Canadian counterpart to the American Who Are We? by Samuel Huntington (2004). But while
author Rudyard Griffiths echoes some of Huntington’s arguments concerning the importance of teaching national history and infusing public life with more nationalist symbols, his view on immigration is almost the complete opposite. In contrast to Huntington’s alarmist discussion about the migration of South Americans to the United States, *Who We Are* is virtually unreservedly positive about the role immigration has played in Canada’s history (Griffiths, 2009, pp. 74-95). Indeed, Griffiths describes immigration as a source of national pride, boasting that “Canada has achieved the status of an immigration powerhouse” (p. 81) and framing his country’s stance on immigration as one of the primary exponents of ‘Canadian exceptionalism’:

> I believe Canadians’ endorsement of high immigration over the last quarter century is in large part the expression of a latent national ambition, the conviction that Canada is an exceptional country different from the European powers and our American neighbours [...] Canadians today have embraced immigration as one of the key distinguishing features of national identity. (Griffiths, 2009, p. 79)

In a country where support for immigration goes hand in hand with nationalism, efforts to make a nationalist appeal for immigrant exclusion are clearly in vain. In fact, politicians more often invoke nationalism as an argument for *inclusion*. For example, Gurbax Malhi (LPC) suggested to ease the sponsorship requirements in family migration on the basis that “Canada is a multicultural country and immigrants are a great contribution to multiculturalism in Canada” (House of Commons debate/May 13, 1999). Similarly, his colleague Colleen Beaumier (LPC) finished a plea to reduce the residence requirement for OAS from 10 to 3 years by saying: “In closing, I want to remind members of the House that Canada has been, remains, and always will be a country of immigrants” (House of Commons debate/October 23, 2007). And Olivia Chow (NDP), while proposing to expand the possibilities for family migration, argued that “it is un-Canadian to keep families separate” (House of Commons debate/September 30, 2010).

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170 The book’s main thesis is that sustained migration from Latin America, in particular Mexico, is threatening the traditional characteristics of the United States, namely the English language and the protestant work ethic. He therefore advocates assimilation and dramatically reduced immigration.
Finally, in order to understand the political translation of immigrants’ position in the Canadian welfare system we need to look at that system itself. According to our theory, we should expect Canada’s liberal and comparatively ungenerous welfare regime to be a fertile context for discussions on whether immigrants truly deserve the benefits they make use of. Such an institutionalized focus on deservingness might explain why we occasionally do encounter proposals for restrictions when immigrants are seen as being treated more generously than native-born Canadians. Overall, however, the overall trend in Canada is that immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits has *not* become a salient topic of political controversy. This is for a large part because of the two reasons outlined above, but we can also point at two features of the Canadian welfare state that have aided in muting selective solidarity.

First, while most of its social programs that are funded out of general tax revenues are means-tested, the health care system is an exception: according to the Canada Health Act, provincial governments are required to offer *universal* health care to its citizens and permanent residents. For this program, then, some of the same theoretical propositions that we made about universal welfare states apply: not only does its structure leave little room for differentiation, the universality principle itself also enjoys much legitimacy among the population. Proposals to exclude immigrants from health care, then, are less likely to garner much support. For example, when Art Hanger (RPC) criticized the health care costs incurred by HIV positive refugee claimants, Mary Clancy (LPC) declared: “This government believes in health care for all Canadians. We believe in health care for people who come to this country” (House of Commons debate/March 3, 1997).

The results of a recent analysis of Canadian public opinion are interesting in this context. Respondents who believe that immigrants make much use of welfare were found to be less supportive of social assistance benefits, but *more* supportive of universal health care, than those who thought few immigrants are on welfare (Banting, Soroka, & Koning, forthcoming).

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171 In this context, the way Oscar Nunez (BQ) responded to a Reform Party motion suggesting to cut social assistance for refugee claimants is as confusing as it is ironic: “The very spirit of this motion is disturbing. [It] goes against the universality principle, which is fundamental to our social security system” (House of Commons debate/March 3, 1997).

172 The results of a recent analysis of Canadian public opinion are interesting in this context. Respondents who believe that immigrants make much use of welfare were found to be less supportive of social assistance benefits, but *more* supportive of universal health care, than those who thought few immigrants are on welfare (Banting, Soroka, & Koning, forthcoming). Indeed, according to the Environics Focus Canada survey, Canadians consider their health care system to be the single most important aspect of Canadian identity (see Figure 6.9).
debate, May 5, 1995). More recently, Paul Szabo (LPC) made the same point in a general discussion about the Canadian health care system:

> There is universality. This means that health care is going to be available to all in Canada regardless of whether they are citizens or have landed status or, indeed, are refugees. People who are on our shores are going to have accessibility. Health care is going to be universally available to all those who are in Canada. That is our value. (House of Commons debate/April 14, 2004)

A second feature that helps explain why we have seen few suggestions for limiting immigrants’ access to welfare programs in federal politics is that most social programs are administered at the provincial level. This is how Keith Banting explains why during the mid-1990s Canada decided to take in fewer refugee and family migrants:

> In many European countries as well as Australia and the United States, such politics led to the adoption of longer residency periods for welfare programs. But the Canadian federal government does not control the terms of access to social assistance and health care, which are provincial responsibilities. It therefore pulled the lever it does control, admission criteria. (Banting, 2010, p. 807)

Some of my interviewees made similar comments. A senior civil servant at HRSDC remarked coolly “because we don’t run the programs, it is not an issue that we have to worry about so much” (interview CAN14). A colleague at CIC also pointed at the relevance of the federal government’s ‘sphere of responsibility’: “I do not want to say that the federal government is not concerned about welfare uptake by immigrants and refugees. We are, but in terms of a hit on our fiscal position it is not front and center” (interview CAN11).

The importance of these two factors should not be exaggerated, however. After all, suggestions to limit immigrants’ access to non-universal programs have been as uncommon as proposals to bar them from health care. And while the federal nature of the Canadian welfare state might explain why objections to immigrants’ access to welfare benefits have been rare in federal politics, they do not explain why we have not heard more of them on the provincial level, in particular in the most immigrant-dense province of Canada, Ontario. In fact, interviewee CAN11 directly added to his abovementioned comment: “But if they [=concerns about
immigrant welfare uptake] were front and center for provinces and territories, we would certainly be looking at policy settings or policy adjustments that would provide some relief, but that's not the case”.

Overall, then, the limited spread of selective solidarity in Canada has to do with more than immigrants’ relatively successful economic integration. Indeed, it can be understood as the product of a particularly favourable political translation brought about by a specific political, cultural, and institutional context. Canadians tend to think of their country as a nation of immigrants, and are therefore unlikely to draw lines between themselves and the immigrant population. Political parties, in turn, have not offered much encouragement to do so either. Therefore, even though the welfare structure might invite questions about the deservingness of benefit recipients, the question whether ‘immigrants’ as a group are entitled to the programs they make use of is unlikely to be raised.

6.4 Political battles at the margins of the Canadian model

In line with our second hypothesis, we have seen that the most straightforward explanation for the stability of the Canadian model of immigrant incorporation in the welfare state is that there is little evidence of selective solidarity among the political elite and the public at large. In a country where about 14 percent of the Members of Parliament are foreign-born, and about 40 percent of all residents over 15 are either immigrants or the children of immigrants, the view that the state should privilege native-born citizens enjoys little currency. In other words, we have seen few immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in Canada not only because the political elite considers them undesirable, but also because it has nothing to gain electorally from implementing them. This section explores the value of the second hypothesis further and analyzes the institutional hurdles suggestions for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms will

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\[173\] In 2012, 42 of the 305 Members of the House of Commons were born outside Canada, 22 of whom in a non-Western country.
stumble upon. As such, this section also allows us to assess the potential for exclusion in the unlikely event that politicians will come to believe such reforms are necessary in the future.

For one thing, the observation that immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are met by less public opposition than general welfare reforms (see Section 2.5) is less pertinent in Canada than in the other countries in this study.\textsuperscript{174} As we have seen, Canadians tend to have favourable views on immigration, and are therefore unlikely to vote for a party they consider xenophobic. In other words, adopting an overtly anti-immigrant stance can have serious negative electoral consequences (Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, & White, forthcoming), and for that reason, we can consider the institutionalized support for immigrant inclusion a nontrivial obstacle to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

The obstacles to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms that come out of the legal system are at least equally formidable. While it is true that Canada is not bound by supranational law in the same way EU member states Sweden and the Netherlands are, it is party to the ICESCR which prohibits discrimination (Article 2), and guarantees all residents the right to ‘social security, including social assistance’ (Article 9). National law, in particular the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is also a source of protection against immigrant exclusion. Besides the previously mentioned Section 27 on the protection of multiculturalism, the most relevant Charter rights for our discussion are the principle of non-discrimination (Section 15), and the ‘right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’ (Section 7). Finally, in Canada human rights are protected at the provincial level as well, which can pose yet another obstacle to differentiations between immigrants and native-born in the extension of social rights. The Ontario Human Rights Code, for example, guarantees the “right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, [and] citizenship” (Section 1).

\textsuperscript{174} One might even argue that across-the-board retrenchment is easier to sell in Canada than immigrant-targeted cuts.
In two respects, the role of the judiciary in the legislative process is much larger in Canada than in the other two cases under study. First, judges in Canada have the power of judicial review and can therefore repeal new or existing laws if they find them to be in violation of the Constitution or provincial human rights legislation.\textsuperscript{175} This also means that there is considerable space for legal activists to fight exclusionary reforms. For example, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union has since 2003 been involved in a (so far unsuccessful) attempt to prove that the exclusion of temporary foreign workers from EI violates Charter Section 15 (Basok & Carasco, 2010, pp. 357-8). Second, the Canadian legal system is based on the common law tradition in which precedent-setting court decisions constitute a form of legislation. An instructive example for our present discussion is the 1985 Supreme Court verdict that denying an oral hearing to refugee claimants constitutes a violation of Section 7 of the Charter (Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, see Kelly & Trebilcock, 2010, pp. 402-4)\textsuperscript{176}. On several occasions, politicians have blamed this court decision for the high costs of the refugee system (see, for example, the contributions by the CA’s Randy White, House of Commons Debate/February 27, 2001; and Ted White, House of Commons Debate/March 31, 2003). For this very reason, Tony Valeri (LPC) even went so far as to suggest repealing Charter rights for refugee claimants altogether (House of Commons Debate/February 22, 1995).

The federal nature of Canada’s welfare system also offers a legal safeguard against immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. The CHST, a federal block transfer that helps to fund provincial welfare programs, prohibits any residence requirement for access to SA. In 1995, when the province of British Columbia was faced with a sudden influx of interprovincial migration, the BC government tried to implement a three month waiting period for newcomers, but was forced by the federal government to drop it (National Council of Welfare, 1997). For that reason, if the OPC had won the 2011 elections in Ontario, it is unlikely that it would have been

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{175} While judicial review formally exists in Sweden, so far no judge has ever made use of it. See below.
\textsuperscript{176} Because Section 7 guarantees legal rights to ‘everyone’, the Supreme Court reasoned that even though refugee claimants do not have landed immigrant status, they still have the right to a fair trial that, in case their claim is denied, explains the reasons for the denial and offers the opportunity to respond.
\end{footnotesize}
able to implement its proposal to “require welfare recipients to be residents of Ontario for one year before collecting benefits” (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, 2011, p. 30). Besides the unlikelihood that it would survive a human rights challenge, such a proviso would undoubtedly be challenged by the federal government. This observation was also made by one of my interviewees in Ontario:

We don’t have an ability to restrict access. I think actually that there are fairly significant legal impediments even if someone wanted. The provincial Conservative Party, their platform says they would like to introduce a one-year wait before someone could be eligible for social assistance. Our understanding of current federal legislation that funds much of this is that that would be precluded under the Canada Social Transfer. (interview CAN21)

Again, however, it should be emphasized that more important than the institutional roadblocks for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms is the fact that few politicians advocate such policy changes. Instead, as we saw in Section 6.2, there is a parliament-wide consensus that Canada should continue to admit a large annual inflow of immigrants, that these immigrants should be entitled to a wide series of settlement and integration services, and that their social rights should be equal to those of native-born citizens. In fact, in recent years Immigration Ministers have repeatedly expressed their enthusiasm about the breadth of societal and political support for inclusive immigration policies. In 2005, for example, Minister Joe Volpe (LPC) praised the “consensus around the country that in order to address the demographic imbalance immigration is one of the most important issues, if not the most important program at the government’s disposal” (House of Commons Debate/November 1, 2005). Five years later, his successor Jason Kenney (CPC) declared: “I celebrate the fact that in Canada there is a broad political consensus that is perhaps unique in the democratic world that is favourable toward both immigration and the protection of refugees” (House of Commons Debate/April 29, 2010).

One might speculate that politicians do not propose immigrant-excluding welfare reforms exactly because they are legally unfeasible. Dykstra, Davies, and Lamoureux, however, did not mention any of the legal impediments described here in explaining why they oppose differentiations between immigrants and native-born citizens. Such an argument also rarely comes up in parliamentary debates.
This is not to say that the politics of left and right are irrelevant in the politics of immigrants’ social rights, however. Of the 23 motions, petitions, and questions that were tabled in parliament from 1994 to 2010 criticizing immigrants’ use of or access to social programs and benefits, none were brought forward by the left-wing NDP, while the right-wing RPC was responsible for fifteen (see Appendix Tables A4.1-A4.3). Conversely, of the 26 motions, petitions, and questions that advocated an expansion of immigrants’ social rights, 14 were presented by the NDP and another 9 by the LPC (see Appendix Tables A4.4-A4.6).

Today, while all political parties embrace the core features of the Canadian model of immigration and welfare, there are strong disagreements between left and right about the practical interpretation of this model, especially in two areas. First, the right advocates much more rigorous admission policies than the left. According to Rick Dykstra (CPC), on this point there are no large differences between his party and the former RPC:

[We] place more emphasis on one’s ability, or the family’s ability, to participate in Canadian society in a much quicker way [...]. And I’m not so sure it comes from Reform, or Alliance, or what have you. I think it is more a traditional view that is held by, I guess, [...] the conservative people in the country, and that is that one’s citizenship is to be honoured and one’s citizenship is to be earned. (interview CAN01)

As we have seen, this ‘traditional view’ entails support for a large reliance on economic migration at the expense of family and refugee migration. The NDP, conversely, not only favours higher immigration levels, but it is also less focused on selecting those that are least likely to turn to the state for support. For example, NDP members have on several occasions opposed the policy of denying admission to people with disabilities or health conditions who are likely to need extensive health care. In the area of family migration, since 2003 the NDP has repeatedly advocated giving everyone the opportunity to once in their life sponsor the migration of a family member who would not be eligible under the current system, such as a child over 22, a sibling, an aunt or uncle, or a first cousin. In the area of refugee migration, the party has been

178 See, for example, parliamentary contributions by Judy Wasylycia-Leis on December 12, 2007, March 11, 2008, January 27, 2009, and June 19, 2010; and by Olivia Chow on June 17, 2010).
a strong supporter of extensive legal rights for refugee claimants during the application process, and has championed a lenient approach towards those who fail their application, especially those who cannot feasibly be deported.\textsuperscript{179}

The disagreements are even starker when it comes to temporary migration. On the one hand, the current Conservative government sees great value in using the temporary foreign worker program - “one of the best programs we have”, according to Rick Dykstra (interview CAN01) - to fill short-term labour demands. From 2006 (the year Stephen Harper first took office) to 2010, the intake of temporary foreign workers increased by almost 70 percent, from roughly 255,000 to 433,000 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011). If anything, the government seems keen on increasing these numbers even more. On the other hand, left-wing politicians in Canada, in particular members of the NDP, are virulent critics of the program. Their objections are threefold: first, temporary migrants should have more options to receive permanent residence status; second, temporary migrants’ limited labour rights and access to EI and health care leave them vulnerable to exploitation; and third, a large reliance on temporary migration dampens domestic wages.\textsuperscript{180} It is worth quoting Don Davies (NDP) at length:

First of all, it [= the reliance on temporary migration] represents a significant departure from Canada’s historic approach to immigration, which has been citizenship-track. This can be encapsulated by the slogan: ‘if you’re good enough to work here, you’re good enough to be a citizen here.’ [...] There is a place for some intelligent niche Temporary Foreign Worker program. But not the way that this program has developed. This program has developed into, basically, a way to import cheap labour [...] If they are exploited, and you know, they in a not insignificant number have been and are, they don’t know where to access help or assistance. We deduct Canada Pension Plan premiums from them, Employment Insurance premiums from them, but they’ll never get them, so there’s a bit of an economic exploitation there [...] The Canadian Restaurant Association [and] the agricultural sector in British Columbia [...] claim they need to bring in people from Mexico to harvest their vegetables. Well, if you pay twenty dollars an hour, and had a health and welfare plan, and paid pension benefits, maybe

\textsuperscript{179} See for example, Bill Siksay’s plea to naturalize failed refugee claimants who cannot be deported because of dangerous situations in their country of origin (House of Commons debate/May 9, 2006), a plea in which Siksay, parenthetically, was joined not only by colleagues from his own party, but from the BQ as well.

\textsuperscript{180} Examples of these critiques abound. To give just a few: on the first point, see Olivia Chow (House of Commons debate/October 8, 2009, November 21, 2009); on the second point, see comments by Dick Proctor (September 25, 2003) Pat Martin (March 30, 2008), and Olivia Chow (April 17, 2008); on the last point, see contributions by Bill Siksay (June 2, 2006) and Olivia Chow (February 26, 2009).
you would have domestic Canadians who would come out and do that work. So the fact that they can bring in people from outside I think does have a wage-dampening effect in many industries. I think that’s maybe why the Conservatives like it, and why a number of employers want it. (interview CAN02)

Rick Dykstra’s reaction when I presented these kinds of critiques revealed just how politically sensitive the disagreements on temporary migration are. He started by dismissing them as ‘red herring arguments’ and ‘more fallacies than truths’, and then proceeded to say:

I think part of the problem when we talk about this issue, is that people forget what the title of the program is. It is a temporary foreign worker program. [...] In large part it was never meant to be a program of citizenship. It was meant to be a temporary program where assistance was provided for a period of time to a specific business, to a system through the work season. So while I appreciate that there are also those on the sidelines looking in as to whether a program is successful or not successful, I would suggest that if you actually did an in-depth review and understanding of what this program has actually provided, you’ll see that it is probably one of the most successful programs that this country has ever engaged in. (interview CAN01)

In sum, while one would be hard-pressed to find a Canadian politician in today’s parliament openly advocating reductions in overall admission levels, significant cutbacks in integration services, or limits to immigrants’ access to social programs, the immigration file is not free of controversy. Unlike Dutch immigration politics, then, what we see in the Canadian case is not only that the political elite tends to think more favourably towards the inclusion of immigrants, but also that when right-wing politicians do voice suggestions for exclusion, the left does not feel compelled to give concessions in a restrictive direction out of a fear for electoral repercussions.

All in all, this case study is largely in line with the theoretical model in Chapter Two. As suggested by the first hypothesis, we have seen that large differences on the crucial independent variables (in particular, party politics and national identity) have produced a very different discursive climate regarding immigrants’ social rights than what we saw in the Dutch case. Immigrants’ access to and reliance on welfare programs have not been very salient in Canadian politics. While it did receive some attention in the mid-1990s, and there are certainly parts of the population that might think that immigrants pose a burden on the welfare system, from a comparative perspective the political interest in the subject has been small. Equally importantly,
whenever the welfare costs of immigration did become topic of discussion, they were framed as indication that the system of immigration and integration policies is not working, not as evidence that immigrants are lazy welfare cheats.

Part of this positive reception can be explained by mere objective economic reality: in comparison to their counterparts in other Western countries, immigrants in Canada tend to be successful in their economic integration and to place a small demand on the programs and benefits of the welfare state. However, for a more complete explanation we need to look beyond economic facts. After all, even now immigrants experience more problems on the labour market, the political translation remains largely unchanged. Much of this has to do with the absence of a European style anti-immigrant party, and even more importantly, the central role Canada’s history with immigration plays in the conception of its national identity. In this political and cultural context, there is little room for the divisive thinking that is so central to the sentiment of selective solidarity. In line with the second hypothesis, the absence of a welfare chauvinist backlash has resulted in a striking degree of policy stability over the last two decades. The Canadian model of taking in a large but carefully selected group of immigrants, to offer them extensive integration and settlement services, and to provide permanent migrants with the same protections of the welfare system as native-born citizens, thus seems likely to persist in the future.
To us it is clear that the equality goal implies that immigrants will have the same rights and responsibilities as the rest of the population.

- Kerstin-Maria Stalin (MP) (Pr. 1998/1999:37, anf. 113, December 16, 1998)\(^ {181} \)

Unemployment rates over 50 percent have become common among [immigrants and refugees], and the welfare dependency can in certain areas reach up to 100 percent. [That immigrant neighborhoods] are affected by this negative development is not because of the people who live there. [...] The problems that immigrants in these neighborhoods are affected by are primarily Swedish problems. [...] And it is certain that none of them knew what social assistance was before they came to Sweden.


Do not ask what immigration costs, because that question is wrongly posed. Immigration can be a large success. It is not the immigration that is costly. It is the segregation that is costly.

- Lars Leijonborg (FP) (Pr. 2002/03:25, anf. 3, November 28, 2002)

The Swedish welfare state has long drawn the attention from admirers and critics alike. While some have pointed at its comparatively low levels of income inequality and poverty rates to argue that no other country has been better able at offering a good life to its citizens (Rothstein, 1998), others have reviled the lack of individual freedom in this system marked by a large public sector, high social spending, and a large degree of state intervention in most aspects of social life. An early critic even called Swedes the ‘new totalitarians’ and likened their welfare model to Aldous Huxley’s dystopian *Brave New World* (Huntford, 1971). Others reached a more nuanced conclusion: “To know Sweden is to be ambivalent about it” (Heclo & Madsen, 1987, p. 4).

In recent years, this prototypical universal welfare state has become a country of immigration. While Sweden still had a net emigration rate in 1973, it quickly started to welcome

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\(^ {181} \) In order to facilitate verification, I use the Swedish referencing code for parliamentary debates and documents. More extensive documentation is included at the end of the bibliography.
more and more immigrants afterwards. Especially in recent years the increase has been spectacular: annual intake levels have almost tripled since 1996. By now, more than 14 percent of the Swedish population consists of (first-generation) immigrants (OECD, 2011a; 2011b), and the percentage is expected to rise to over 18 by 2030 (SCB, 2012). These large groups of immigrants have been met by comparatively generous integration and naturalization policies. Moreover, as we will see in this chapter, today they face little formal exclusion in accessing the benefits of Sweden’s encompassing welfare state.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume that the integration of immigrants in Sweden is an unproblematic and seamless affair. Unemployment and welfare dependence rates are dizzyingly high, social interactions between immigrants and native-born are scarce, and on several occasions the Swedish nation has been stirred by xenophobia-motivated violence. Some academics describe the integration of immigrants as the ‘most important challenge’ to the Swedish welfare state (Hilson, 2008, p. 114). Others have gone further and predicted integration problems to result in a crumbling of social cohesion and as such, of the foundation of the welfare state Sweden is so well-known for: “different groups will turn against one another, protecting their assets and interests in a future marked by drastic cuts in the welfare sector” (Westin, 1996, p. 225).

This chapter finds no evidence to support such predictions. While the overrepresentation of immigrants among welfare recipients is indeed large, few politicians have suggested reducing it by disentitling newcomers from programs and benefits. In fact, recent social policy developments have been aimed at including immigrants more, not less. As we saw in Chapter Four as well, Sweden thus offers a particularly damaging blow to the hypothesis that a large overrepresentation of immigrants in the welfare system is associated with widespread support for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms.

Even more so than the previous two cases, the Swedish case shows the importance of political translation. Rather than interpreting immigrants’ welfare rates as evidence of laziness or a welfare penchant, policy-makers have taken them as a sign that the Swedish welfare state
has not been successful enough at helping immigrants to employment, and that it should therefore renew and expand its efforts to do so. The most powerful explanation for this benign political translation can be found in the structure of the Swedish welfare state: not only has it made egalitarianism a cornerstone of the national identity, it has also institutionalized active labour market policies rather than disentitlement as the standard operating procedure to deal with groups who experience trouble in the labour market. In this light, it is unsurprising that Swedish governments have adopted almost no immigrant-excluding welfare reforms over the last twenty years, and instead, have mostly amended the social policy apparatus to make it more inclusive of the immigrant population.

The chapter is structured in the same way as the last two. The next section reviews relevant policy developments in immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits in Sweden over the last two decades, and shows that by and large, the development has been an inclusionary one. Section two then illustrates how this development reflects a broad consensus among the political elite and the public at large that immigrants should be treated on the same terms as native-born citizens. In the third section, I then proceed to offer an explanation for these patterns in public policy and public opinion. We will see that we cannot understand them by looking at raw economic numbers, but that instead we should turn our attention to how those numbers have been translated in the Swedish political, cultural, and institutional context. The final section discusses institutional obstacles to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms and reflects on likely future developments in the politics of immigrants’ social rights in Sweden.

7.1 A story of gradual inclusion

Over the last two decades the Swedish welfare state has become more inclusionary towards its immigrant population, even though there have been a few restrictive reforms as well. This section discusses the recent history of the social rights of different categories of immigrants and pays separate attention to the pension system, the export of benefits, and integration services.
As in all other welfare states, in Sweden immigrants without a legal permit to stay enjoy few social rights. In hardly any country, however, has the dividing line between inclusion and exclusion been as stark as here. Everyone who plans to stay in Sweden for more than three months is required to obtain a residence permit, and anyone who is allowed to lawfully stay for at least a year will be registered in the national population register (folkbokföringsregistret). Migrants who do not go through this process or overstay their permit become undocumented migrants. And while it is true that the number of undocumented migrants is small by comparative standards, their exclusion is serious. While they are technically eligible to apply for social assistance, the municipality (which administers the welfare program) has the right to refuse if they suspect applicants have the funds to finance travels to their country of origin. The municipality can also choose to arrange the travel itself (interview SWE14). Unsurprisingly, few undocumented migrants therefore attempt an application for social services in the first place: in a 2010 national survey, the vast majority of municipalities indicated they had not seen a single person without a legal residence permit at their welfare office (Socialstyrelsen, 2010, p. 228).

Undocumented migrants have also been excluded from other services. Until recently, children who had not applied for a residence status had no access to public schools. And the exclusion from health care has been severe as well. While undocumented migrants below the age of 18 were eligible for health care and dental care on the same terms as legally resident children, undocumented adults were barred from all health services except emergency care, and even for those services they were expected to foot the bill themselves. In addition, civil servants in the welfare, education and health care sectors have a duty to report undocumented migrants to the migration board so that deportation can be arranged.

182 In fact, with the exception of asylum seekers, every migrant is expected to acquire a residence status even before travelling to Sweden.
183 According to 2008 data, undocumented migrants comprise only 0.11 percent of the population, the fourth lowest among the 27 EU member states (Papadopoulos, 2012).
184 18 Percent of municipalities indicated to have granted a social assistance benefit to an undocumented migrant, while 14 percent reported to have denied a social assistance benefit to this category of migrant. Taking the possibility of overlap into account, this means that between 68 and 82 percent of all municipalities have never seen undocumented migrants at their welfare office.
This policy regime made Sweden one of the most restrictive countries in the world in its treatment of undocumented migrants, and it has been criticized by a variety of organizations, including Doctors Without Borders (2005), the UN Human Rights Council (2007), and the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (Socialstyrelsen, 2010, p. 276). At the same time, it is worth noting that the treatment of undocumented migrants on the ground has not always been as strict as the formal regulations require. In practice, few municipal authorities observe the duty to report undocumented migrants (Socialstyrelsen, 2010), and health care providers have been known to follow their Hippocratic oath and offer health services to undocumented migrants anyway. Moreover, a senior civil servant at the agency responsible for enforcing the eligibility requirements (the National Board of Health and Welfare, Socialstyrelsen) reported that the board often looks sympathetically at these kinds of deviations from the regulations, and that its enforcement role in those cases was ‘not clear’ (SWE13). In addition, this interviewee pointed out that while there are people who advocate a closer observation of these restrictions, “they are not steering the government policies”.

As the number of people in Sweden without a legal residence permit grew, the political opposition to the restrictive regime became larger. Since the mid-1990s, especially parliamentarians from the Environment Party (Miljöpartiet, MP) have been vocal in their criticism, and they have often been joined by members of the socialist Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V) and the People’s Party (Folkpartiet, FP). The social democratic Persson governments (in power from 1996 to 2006, see Table 7.1 below), however, have been reluctant to heed these objections, and it took a right-wing coalition government to implement reforms in a more inclusionary direction. The first step, taken in 2008, was to make sure that undocumented migrants can no longer be denied emergency care if they are not able to pay for it (Pr. 2008/2009:45, anf. 88-95, December 9, 2008). In March 2011, a majority of parliamentarians (the coalition partners in the Reinfeldt government, as well as the MP) agreed to a more encompassing inclusionary reform, making the children of undocumented migrants eligible for
public education, and expanding the range of health care services that adults without a legal residence permit can make use of.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Political complexion</th>
<th>Takes office</th>
<th>Government party(ies)</th>
<th>Majority/minority (initial seats of total 349)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlsson I</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1986/3/13</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Minority (159)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlsson II</td>
<td>Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bildt</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>1991/10/4</td>
<td>M, FP, C, KD</td>
<td>Minority (170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsson III</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1994/10/7</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Minority (161)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persson I</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1996/3/22</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Minority (161)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persson II</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1998/10/7</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Minority (131)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Person III</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>2002/10/21</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Minority (144)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinfeldt I</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>2006/10/6</td>
<td>M, C, FP, KD</td>
<td>Majority (178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinfeldt II</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
<td>2010/10/5</td>
<td>M, FP, C, KD</td>
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Despite these reforms, the disparity between undocumented migrants and all other groups of newcomers is still pronounced. In sharp contrast to those without a permit, everyone who is registered in the *folkbokföringsregister* has full access to health care, and migrants with a residence permit of more than one year can make use of all social provisions such as social assistance and child benefits.\(^\text{185}\) In other words, all migrants (including, for example, temporary labour migrants and international students) who are expected to stay in Sweden for more than a year are fully included in the welfare state.

The regulations are somewhat different for refugee claimants. As is the case in many European welfare states, these asylum seekers can make use of designated accommodations (Hammar, 1985; Westin, 1996). On March 30, 1994, the center-right Bildt government also offered these migrants a modest housing allowance in case they preferred to find a place to stay.

\(^{185}\) Since 2001, Swedish social insurance law makes a distinction between benefits for which one qualifies by residing in Sweden (such as child benefits and housing allowance) and those that require employment history (such as sickness insurance and income-related parental benefits) (Försäkringskassan, 2010). I will discuss the latter category of insurance programs below.
for themselves (SOU, 2003:75, pp. 163-96; Borevi, 2012, p. 66). This policy, which has become known as the EBO Act\textsuperscript{186}, has been subject to frequent criticism. In December 2004, the social democratic minority government proposed to scrap the housing allowance, because it had the unintended consequence of overcrowding (many asylum seekers claimed the housing allowance and then joined family members in already small apartments) (Pr. 2004/05:46, anf. 163-207, December 8, 2004). And while the proposal did not receive majority support in parliament because all parties except the conservative Moderates (Moderata Samlingspartiet, M) rejected it unanimously, the critique of the EBO Act persisted. In 2009, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet, S) affirmed during its national congress that it would abolish the law as soon as it would be able to (Lundgren, 2009). Even more recently, the newly represented anti-immigrant party Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) joined the Social Democrats in their opposition to the housing allowance for asylum seekers, and in October 2011, SD politician Carina Herrstedt introduced a (unsuccessful) motion proposing the abolishment of the EBO Act (Mo. 2011/12:Sf346, October 5, 2011).

Whether asylum seekers stay in an asylum centre or in a place of their own choosing, they can make use of a wide range of services and benefits. For one thing, they receive a cash benefit to cover daily expenses. Moreover, refugee claimants have access to some health care services, and the range of available services has become more encompassing over time. Since 1996, adult asylum seekers are eligible for subsidized emergency health care (Pr. 1996/97:48, anf. 278-85). More recently, they have also been granted access to subsidized health and dental care that cannot be deferred, as well as contraceptive counseling, obstetric care, and abortion services (Socialstyrelsen, 2010). While the overall direction of recent policy developments is thus inclusionary, there have been some exceptions. In 1992, for example, the center-right government reduced the level of daily pocket money for asylum seekers and the expenditure on medical services (Pr. 1992/93:18, anf. 1-19, November 6, 1992; see also Sainsbury, 2012, p. 223),

\textsuperscript{186} EBO is short for eget boende, or own housing.
and since 2000 some categories of refugee claimants have faced reductions in their health care access.\textsuperscript{187}

The story for migrants with a permanent residence permit is largely similar: while there have been some exclusionary reforms, overall policy-makers have aimed at expanding rather than restricting their social rights. While access to some non-contributory benefits such as child allowance was initially tied to citizenship, this principle has been gradually replaced by a \textit{ius domicili} that allows immediate and complete access to everyone with a legal residence permit (Sainsbury, 2006, pp. 237-39). From day one onwards, then, permanent migrants have full access to health care and social provisions such as social assistance. The egalitarian thrust becomes even more apparent when we look at policy-making in times of economic austerity. Just as the Netherlands and Canada, Sweden went through a deep recession in the mid-1990s. And as in the other two cases, this entailed a large increase in the number of welfare dependents, in particular among the immigrant population. But rather than restricting immigrants’ access to benefits like the Dutch, or relying on a more selective admission policy like the Canadians, the Swedes opted for a cutback that affected native-born citizens and immigrants alike. The Persson government formally provided that \textit{all} social assistance recipients who did not participate in the labour market programs or other skill-enhancing activities they were offered would be cut in their benefits (Socialstyrelsen, 2005). As Diane Sainsbury puts it, “the Swedish economy was in serious trouble […], and policy-makers responded by making \textit{across the board cuts} in social benefits” (2012, p. 213, my emphasis).

The example of regulations affecting family migrants is equally telling. As we saw in the other two case studies, some politicians have recently become concerned about the welfare use

\textsuperscript{187} The large number of people who applied for temporary protection in Sweden during and in the aftermath of the wars in former Yugoslavia would, according to the then extant law, be registered in the national register because they were expected to stay in Sweden for at least a year, and therefore, enjoy the exact same health care access as any native-born Swede. The Persson governments (with support from the Moderates) saw this as an undesirable outcome, and decided that any refugee claimant applying for temporary protection or arriving as the result of a mass refugee situation could not be registered until they had lived in the country for three years. This led to vehement criticism from all other parties in parliament (\textit{Pr. 2002/03:33}, \textit{anf.33-68}, December 10, 2002; see also Försäkringskassan, 2010).
of family migrants. But the strategy to alleviate this concern has, again, been decidedly less exclusionary. While a few suggestions were made in the early 1990s to implement something like the sponsorship requirement we saw in Canada\textsuperscript{188}, they received very little support in parliament and were quickly dismissed by the social democratic government. As the last country in the EU to do so (\textit{SOU}, 2008:114, p. 11), in November 2009 Sweden ultimately did implement a mechanism aimed at reducing the welfare dependence of family migrants. Since the introduction of the so-called Support Requirement (försörjningskrav), before people can bring family members over, authorities first check whether the applicants make at least a minimum wage and have the housing space to accommodate the newcomers. According to responsible minister Tobias Billström (M), at least part of the rationale behind this requirement was that “it is not appropriate that Swedish taxpayers take the responsibility to arrange housing and support for those who have come to Sweden without an immediate need for protection” (\textit{Pr. 2009/10:85, anf. 34}, March 10, 2010). Importantly, the Support Requirement only applies to about a quarter of all family migrants, since aspirant immigrants who are children, quota refugees, otherwise protected migrants, or citizens of Switzerland or any EEA country are all exempted from this policy (\textit{SOU}, 2008:114).

In sum, every migrant who is expected to reside in Sweden for more than a year has full access to health care, social assistance, and residence-based insurance programs such as child care and housing allowance. In order to acquire access to work-related insurance programs such as unemployment insurance and sickness insurance, on the other hand, immigrants need to work and pay premiums. This entails no direct exclusion, but more indirectly these contributory programs privilege people with a long history on the Swedish labour market over newcomers. In practice, therefore, immigrants can rarely make use of these more generous entitlements during the first years they live in the country. Many studies find that compared to their native-born counterparts, the immigrant unemployed are much more likely to rely on social assistance, and

\textsuperscript{188} See, for example, the speech by Lars Biörck (M) (\textit{Pr. 1992/93:55, anf.55}, January 21, 1993).
much less likely to receive unemployment benefits (Sjögren Lindquist, 2007; Hilson, 2008). For some migrants, this indirect exclusion disappeared when Sweden joined the EU in 1995. Since then, immigrants from EU member states can use the years they worked in their country of origin in the calculation of their access to work-related insurance programs. So-called ‘third country nationals’, however, still face the same difficulties in accessing contributory programs.

We see some of the same dynamics in the pension system. Since 1959, Sweden has had a residence-based pension paid out of general tax revenues as well as an employment-based pension program funded in large part by social premiums. While the eligibility requirements of both tiers of the public pension system have changed considerably over time, the rules regarding the residence-based program are of most concern to us here. First introduced in 1913, the folkpension was initially tied strictly to citizenship and residence in Sweden, thus excluding all foreigners in Sweden and all Swedish citizens abroad. While these rules were strict in one respect, they were generous in another. After all, they meant that immigrants could enjoy a full public pension as soon as they acquired Swedish citizenship (Johansson, 2010). As mentioned above, Sweden has gradually abandoned the citizenship principle in its welfare system, and in 1978 it opened up the pension program to non-citizens. The reform made every elderly resident of Sweden, regardless of citizenship, eligible for the folkpension after a minimum residence of 10 years (Försäkringskassan, 2010) - which is very low by comparative standards (compare, for example, the residence requirement of 50 and 40 years that the Netherlands and Canada, respectively, demand for a full public pension benefit).

This system was in need of overhaul, however, when Sweden decided to join the EU. In order to facilitate the free movement of people, the pension system needed to be more similar to that of other member states. In 1993, therefore, the folkpension became a pro-rated benefit that required 40 years’ residence for complete access, and deducted 2.5 percent for every year short

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189 Overall, we can say that the contributory employment-based pension programs Sweden has had since 1959 entailed hardly any direct exclusion of newcomers, but for the reasons mentioned above have been scarcely available to, in particular, recent immigrants (Johansson, 2010).
of that number (Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2003). As a result, many elderly immigrants had to turn to the municipal welfare office to receive a minimum income.

This consequence was quickly noted by politicians. In fact, when the discussions about the pension reform were still in its earliest stages, Ragnhild Pohanka (MP) already made suggestions to counter the consequences the reform would have for the immigrant population: “I think it is important that we give immigrants a folkpension. Otherwise they are dependent to live only off social assistance” (1990/1991:96, *af*. 90, April 17, 1991). While Pohanka was quickly joined in her pleas by members from the Left Party, it was only in 1998 that a majority of the Riksdag agreed that policy changes were necessary. First, parliament adopted a bill allowing UN recognized refugees to count the years in their home country in satisfying the residence requirement. Going into effect in January 1999, this practically meant that this group of refugees had full access to a public pension when they reached retirement age, regardless of the number of years they had lived in Sweden (Försäkringskassan, 2010). A second reform aided a much larger group of elderly immigrants. January 2003 saw the launch of the Income Support for Elderly (*äldreförsjörningsstöd*), a tax-free, income-tested benefit, at a slightly higher level than social assistance, specifically designed for seniors who do not qualify for a full public pension.

When it comes to the possibility to take benefits abroad, the distinction between residence-based and contributory programs is again crucial. Residence-based insurance programs can only be enjoyed abroad during temporary stays of up to six months, and most of these programs cannot be exported outside the EU (and, since June 2006, Switzerland; see Försäkringskassan, 2010). And while it is possible to receive the Swedish public pension benefit in Canada as well, this is only because of a bilateral agreement between the two countries. And even in this case there are additional requirements: only people who have resided in Sweden for a minimum of twenty years are eligible for this arrangement.

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190 This has occasionally been criticized in parliament. In 2006, Yilmaz Kerimo (S) tabled a (unsuccessful) motion suggesting to enable the export of the public pension to all countries (*Mo.2006/07:Sf268*, October 25, 2006).
Exporting contributory benefits, on the other hand, is much less restricted. In fact, all emigrants remain entitled to the rights they accumulated by paying premiums, including rights to the contributory pension program. While awaiting a decision on their refugee claim, asylum seekers can choose to either opt into the insurance programs and bring all the premium rights with them in case their claim is denied, or opt out of the insurance programs and be exempted from paying insurance premiums (Pr. 2004/05:134, anf. 135-141, June 7, 2005).

Finally, the inclusionary character of the politics of immigrants’ social rights in Sweden also becomes apparent when we look at integration programs and services. Over the last two decades Swedish policy-makers have demonstrated a large willingness to invest more in programs specifically designed to improve immigrants’ position in the labour market and society more generally. First, unlike in many other European countries, the integration budget has grown steadily in Sweden over the last ten years or so (R.S. 2009/10:233, June 10, 2010). From 2009 to 2012 alone, the Reinfeldt government has increased the money it spends on integration services by 23 percent (Collett, 2011). Even though Sweden had already been offering a generous set of services ever since it first introduced a coherent immigration policy in 1975 (Hammar, 1985), the range of available programs and services has become more encompassing over time (Olwig, 2011). For example, in November 2002 the third Persson government announced extra investments in Swedish language training, anti-discrimination campaigns, internship programs and active labour market policies (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2007). And also the center-right government has undertaken a large number of new integration initiatives ever since it came to power in 2006 (R.S. 2009/2010:233, June 10, 2010). In 2010, it introduced a far-reaching overhaul of the integration system, specifically aimed at enhancing the labour market opportunities of immigrants.

By now, newcomers can avail themselves of a formidable set of programs and services. Newly arrived migrants are welcome to discuss and plan an integration trajectory with local employment services. Meant to be tailored to the skills and preferences of the individual
migrant, such an ‘integration plan’ typically entails lessons in civic orientation and language classes, and can also include internship programs, mother tongue education, additional schooling, and subsidized work offers. Separate from this integration trajectory, all immigrants are eligible to follow state-funded classes in ‘Swedish For Immigrants’.

It is worth emphasizing that two of the programs the center-right government has introduced are specifically immigrant-targeted labour market programs. First, immigrants in the first three years after their arrival (as well as Swedes who have been unemployed for more than 12 months) can make use of ‘new start jobs’ (nystartjobb): these jobs are partly subsidized by the state as a way to incite employers to hire immigrants. Even more clearly targeting immigrants are ‘entry jobs’ (instegsjobb): available for newly arrived immigrants only, these jobs require participants to follow Swedish language classes in addition to working in their new employment. To make it attractive for employers to make use of this program, the state subsidizes no less than 75 percent of all wage costs (Government Offices of Sweden, 2009).

Not only in expanding the available services does Sweden differ in its integration approach from countries that have moved in a more restrictive direction. While countries such as the Netherlands use a ‘stick’ to incite participation in these programs, Sweden has opted for a ‘carrot’ approach. For example, in 1992 the center-right Bildt introduced the Introduction Benefit (introduktionsersättning), a tax-free cash benefit at a higher level than social assistance, for all refugees, accepted asylum seekers, and family members of refugees who participate in integration programs (Westin, 1996; Grönqvist, Johansson, & Niknami, 2011). This benefit, which is available for up to two years, was welcomed by all politicians except small anti-immigrant party New Democracy (Ny Demokrati, ND), which considered it a form of positive discrimination.

Interestingly, most right-wing politicians reject the label ‘immigrant-targeted’ program to distinguish these policies from the targeted programs that existed under the social democratic integration regime. As a result of the 2010 reform, this benefit has been replaced by the ‘Establishment Benefit’ (etableringsersättning), available for every refugee migrant who follows the integration trajectory. Interestingly, ND’s Lars Moquist suggested the ‘Dutch solution’ as an alternative: “Just set requirements for documented skills in Swedish - couple it to economic sanctions in the form of heavily reduced social assistance” (Pr. 1992/1993:60, anf. 233, February 11, 1993).

191 Interestingly, most right-wing politicians reject the label ‘immigrant-targeted’ program to distinguish these policies from the targeted programs that existed under the social democratic integration regime.
192 As a result of the 2010 reform, this benefit has been replaced by the ‘Establishment Benefit’ (etableringsersättning), available for every refugee migrant who follows the integration trajectory.
second example is more recent. Starting as a pilot project in 13 municipalities in 2009, in 2010 the
Reinfeldt government introduced a financial reward for all immigrants who complete their
introductory language class in one year.

All in all, the Swedish welfare state has over the last two decades become more inclusionary
towards its immigrant population. Compared to the reforms aimed at expanding immigrants’
social rights that have taken place over the last few decades, the few reforms that entailed some
form of restriction are relatively marginal. The one case where immigrants’ access did decrease
significantly, namely the increase of the eligibility requirement for a public pension from ten to
forty years, came about not as the result of the politics of selective solidarity, but rather as a
functional imperative of joining the EU. Moreover, even in that case we saw that politicians
quickly took efforts to ameliorate the pension rights of immigrants. In the next section, we will
see that these inclusionary developments reflect an overall positive outlook towards
immigration among the Swedish public and political elite.

7.2 Increasing solidarity with immigrants
This section traces how immigration and, in particular, immigrants’ social rights, are evaluated
by the political elite and the public at large. We will see that public opinion tends to be positive
about immigrants and their place in the welfare state, even though there is a minority of
(sometimes extremist) immigration critics. These views tend to be even more positive among
policy-makers. While on occasion there has been some concern about welfare tourism or the
costs of the large annual intake of refugees, most political parties oppose restrictive reforms in
either admission or welfare access.

Not all Swedes are unreservedly positive about immigrants’ place in the welfare state. One
of my interviewees at the Department of Health and Social Welfare told me that occasionally
people call in to complain that immigrants are treated more generously than native-born Swedes
(interview SWE12). Besides, public intellectuals such as Jonathan Friedman, taxpayer interest
groups such as skattebetalarna.se, and explicit anti-immigrant networks such as Sweden Confidential frequently complain about the costs immigrants incur on the national budget.

More generally, objections to immigration tend to be formulated by a vocal and at times aggressive minority (Eastmond, 2011). Acts of xenophobic violence have not been uncommon in Sweden. In the early 1990s, racists in the community of Trollhättan set a refugee center on fire (Ornbrant & Peura, 1993), beat up two Somali asylum seekers, and burnt the local mosque to the ground (Geddes 2003). In 1991, a man by the name of John Ausonius but better known as ‘the Laser Man’ shot eleven people for the mere fact of ‘looking like immigrants’ (Rydgren, 2006, p. 56). In 2009, Peter Mangs followed in Ausonius’ horrible footsteps and terrorized the immigrant-dense city of Malmö for two years. In 2012, he was convicted of two murders and four attempted murders, all of which targeted immigrants (Johansson-Murie, 2012).

![Figure 7.1. Support for statement that employers should prioritize native-born citizens, Sweden and 13 other welfare states. (Source: WVS.)](image)

The acts of these extremists do not reflect, however, majority unease about immigration. In fact, Swedish respondents express positive attitudes in both national and cross-national surveys, and
those views seem to have become more positive over time. We already saw one indication of this in Chapter Four, where Sweden appeared as the country with the least welfare chauvinist public of the fourteen countries under study. One of the questions that was used in that chapter illustrates the limited traction of selective solidarity particularly well. Figure 7.1 compares the percentage of Swedes who agree that employers should prioritize native-born citizens, in different waves of the WVS, with the average percentage in the thirteen other countries under study in Chapter Four. The share of people who support such discriminatory hiring practices is much lower in Sweden than in other countries.\textsuperscript{194} Moreover, that share has declined considerably since the 1990 wave and has since been only about 10 percent.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.2.png}
\caption{Anti-immigrant attitudes, 1990-2010. (Source: first question SOM, second question SNES.)\textsuperscript{195}}
\end{figure}

Other survey data similarly suggests that selective solidarity is in decline in Sweden. While unfortunately Swedish national survey series have rarely asked respondents how they feel about immigrants’ social rights in particular, there are two questions tapping more general

\textsuperscript{194} Independent samples t-tests confirm that in each wave, the difference between Sweden and the other countries is significant at level \( p < 0.01 \).

\textsuperscript{195} Figure 7.2 reports linearly interpolated data for missing years.
immigration attitudes that have been asked repeatedly in the Society, Opinion, and Media Survey (SOM) and the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) that tell part of the story.\textsuperscript{196} As Figure 7.2 illustrates, the number of people who argue that Sweden should admit fewer refugees seems to have declined over time, as has (albeit to a smaller extent) the percentage of respondents who believe it a bad idea to increase funding to immigrants for the purposes of cultural protection.\textsuperscript{197}

![Graph showing percentage of respondents who are opposed to taking in refugees, but in favour of social benefits and redistribution, 1988-2010.](source: SNES and own calculations.)

\textsuperscript{196} Although the 2010 data of the SNES have not yet been released, Iris Alfredsson at the Swedish National Data Service has been so kind to provide me with the 2010 results reported in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{197} While the percentage of respondents who evince anti-immigrant attitudes in this figure might seem high in an absolute sense, it is important to keep in mind that survey characteristics such as question wording have a large influence on response patterns. For that reason, national survey data are mostly useful to draw conclusions about the development of anti-immigrant attitudes over time, not about whether anti-immigrant sentiment is more or less pronounced in Sweden than elsewhere. Cross-national survey data are more suited for such comparisons, and as we have seen, in such data Swedes appear to have more favourable attitudes towards immigrants than respondents elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{198} The graph shows interpolated data for missing years. Respondents were asked to say whether they thought ‘Taking in fewer refugees’, ‘Reducing social benefits’, and ‘Reducing income differences in society’ was a ‘very good’, ‘fairly good’, ‘neither good nor bad’, ‘fairly bad’, or ‘very bad’ idea. Figure 7.3 shows the percentage of people who thought that reducing the intake of refugees was either a ‘very good’ or a ‘fairly good’ idea and also believed it would be a ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ idea to reduce income differences (solid line); and the percentage who favoured reducing the refugee intake and at the same
In the absence of questions that directly measure feelings of selective solidarity, we can also look at the percentage of respondents who simultaneously express support for redistribution and social benefits but object to immigration. Figure 7.3 shows this information for each available wave of the SNES. Overall, we see that the percentage of people who favour the welfare chauvinist policy mix increased in the late eighties but has been in decline since the mid-nineties. From 1994 to 2010, the percentage of Swedish respondents who favour both income redistribution and a reduction of refugee intake seems to have gone down by over 50 percent.

In sum, then, it seems that there is scant support for selective solidarity among the Swedish population, especially in recent years. Ironically, however, there is some evidence of a tension between immigration and general solidarity. Sweden has in fact been singled out as an instructive example by some of the first academics to worry about the Progressive’s Dilemma. Walter Korpi, for example, was writing about the Swedish case when he explained why his power resource theory would expect immigration to lead to a decline of the welfare state. More importantly, there is evidence to support these kinds of worries. For one thing, the increase in immigration in Sweden over the last twenty years did coincide with episodes of welfare retrenchment (Ginsburg & Rosenthal, 2002; Kvist, Fritzell, Hvinden, & Kangas, 2012). And as we saw above, high levels of immigrant welfare dependence led policy-makers in the mid-1990s to make access to welfare more restrictive, even though this reform was relatively minor in scope (see also Sainsbury, 2006, p. 238; 2012, p. 213). More generally, the suggestion that the welfare state as a whole should be restructured because of the advent of immigration has commonly been made in Swedish political discourse (Borevi, 2012, pp. 57, 65; see also below).

At the level of public opinion, there is evidence of this tension as well. For example, the percentage of people who give unconditional support for the welfare state has declined in the same time period that immigration has increased (Meier Jaeger, 2012). And as we saw in Chapter Two, two recent studies conducted at the Swedish county level found a strong negative time thought it was a ‘very bad’ or ‘fairly bad’ idea to reduce social benefits (dashed line). Non-responses and ‘don’t knows’ have been excluded from the analysis.
relationship between immigration inflows and support for social programs (Eger, 2010; Dahlberg, Edmark, & Lundqvist, 2011).

While it thus seems that immigration in Sweden might have had a negative effect on solidarity, it is worth repeating that there is no evidence that it has led to selective solidarity. In other words, while diversity might have made Swedes less willing to share, it did not make them more supportive of differentiating in social rights between native-born Swedes and immigrants.

We can characterize the views of the political elite in largely the same terms. In fact, politicians and policy-makers tend to perceive immigration in an even more positive light than the public at large. Carl Dahlström and Peter Esaiasson, for example, found that in survey questions about immigration, the views of members of parliament tend to be about 40 to 50 percentage points more favourable than those of general respondents (2011, p. 7). This does not mean that the costs of immigration have never lead to controversy in the Riksdag. For one thing, on two occasions a small anti-immigrant party has surpassed the electoral threshold of 4 percent (see also below). And for both parties, criticizing (the costs of) immigration has been one of the spearheads of their parliamentary activity. Parliamentarians of New Democracy (in parliament from 1991 to 1994) frequently brought up the high welfare dependence of immigrants (Pr. 1993/94:6, anf. 169, October 13, 1993; Pr. 1993/94:21, anf. 72, November 10, 1993), and described immigration as a drain on the budget (Pr. 1992/93:6, anf. 61, October 14, 1992; Pr. 1992/93:18, anf. 5, November 6, 1993). In some of their contributions, they also accused newcomers of being welfare abusers. ND member Claus Zaar, for example, argued that many immigrants tend to use their welfare checks to fund trips to their country of origin while they cover their daily expenses with income from the black labour market (Pr. 1993/94:106, anf. 129, May 18, 1994), and he even went so far as to suggest that the reason why immigrant families tend to be larger is because they like to take as much advantage of child benefits as possible (Pr. 1992/93:91, anf. 81, April 14, 1993).

Unsurprisingly, the ND proposed a series of restrictions in immigrants’ access to services and benefits: their long list of exclusionary proposals included stopping funding of mother
tongue education, reducing financial assistance to refugees, stopping the export of benefits, implementing more demanding requirements for accessing benefits for immigrants than for native-born Swedes, forcing asylum seekers to work in designated jobs while staying in asylum centers, and limiting refugee claimants’ access to health and dental care (Pr. 1992/93:6, anf. 119, October 14, 1992; Pr. 1992/93:16, anf. 103, November 4, 1992; Pr. 1992/3:18, anf. 18, November 6, 1992; Pr. 1992/93:60, anf. 233, February 11, 1993). The party also proposed to tie the level of benefits to the length of stay in Sweden, among other things by only offering 80 percent of a full social assistance benefit to people who had lived in Sweden for two years or less (Pr. 1992/93:6, anf. 119, October 14, 1992).

The anti-immigrant party that has been in parliament since 2010, the Sweden Democrats, similarly brings up the costs of immigration on a regular basis (Pr. 2010/11:31, anf. 79, December 9, 2010; Pr. 2010/11:33, anf. 29, December 13, 2010). Even more so than the ND, the Sweden Democrats frame immigration as a direct threat to a redistributive welfare state. SD politician Johnny Skalin, for example, argued in parliament that it is “unpleasant that much needed welfare investments have for so many years taken a backseat to an unmotivated and incomprehensible mass immigration policy” (Pr. 2010/11:30, anf. 3, December 8, 2010; also see Pr. 2010/11:36, anf. 61, December 16, 2010). Similarly, an SD motion proposing to disentitle family migrants in the first five years after arrival explicitly states that “mass immigration constitutes a direct threat to Swedish welfare” (Mo. 2010/11:Fö231, October 26, 2010).

These kinds of comments are rarely heard, however, from the mouths of mainstream party members, at least during the last decade or so. Up until the early 2000s, Moderate politicians did occasionally express concern about immigrants’ welfare dependence, and sometimes accused newcomers of drawing welfare while hiding assets in their country of origin or working in the underground economy.199 Undoubtedly the loudest voice among immigration critics

199 Particularly controversial has been a 1997 party document in which the Moderates described what the ‘ordinary Swede’ tends to think of immigrants: “He can’t avoid seeing what immigrants receive. They receive social assistance, they have their rent paid for, they have free public transit passes, child care
within the Moderate party was Sten Andersson's. Three years in a row, he started the parliamentary year by submitting a motion asking for a comprehensive calculation of the costs of immigration (Mo. 1999/2000:Sf503, September 24, 1999; Mo. 2000/01:Sf603, September 21, 2000; Mo. 2001/02:Sf208, September 21, 2001), and he repeatedly described immigrant integration in Sweden as a ‘total failure’ (for example, see Pr. 1994/95:84, anf. 36-42, April 3, 1995). As said, however, the Moderates have become an explicitly pro-immigration party since the early 2000s. In a telling illustration of this change, the party placed Sten Andersson on an unelectable position for the elections of 2002. Since then, the party has advocated as inclusive policies as its mainstream counterparts (see below).

Only in response to a few isolated events have the welfare costs of immigration occasionally led to widespread support for restrictive solutions. For example, the large intake of Bosnian

![Figure 7.4. Motions and interpellations in parliament advocating the expansion (black bars) and reduction (white bars) immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits, 1991-2010.](image)

that’s practically free. With three children, they receive a standard of living that would correspond to a before-tax income of multiple hundreds of thousands [of Swedish crowns]. He can’t help but think about that. Every time he sees a black-skinned family he thinks about that” (Moderaterna, 1997).

In response, Andersson quit the party, completed his mandate as an independent, and, in 2002, became a member of the Sweden Democrats.
refugees in the aftermath of the war in Yugoslavia led to fierce discussions in parliament about the limits of Sweden’s reception capacities (Eastmond, 2011), and the 2004 expansion of the EU made some parties (including prime minister Persson’s Social Democrats) worry about possible ‘welfare tourism’ from the new member states (Doyle, Hughes, & Wadensjö, 2006). But all in all, Swedish politicians have more commonly suggested inclusionary than restrictive measures to reduce immigrants’ welfare dependence. Figure 7.4 shows all the motions and interpellations brought forward in parliament from 1991 to 2010 that directly discuss the social rights of immigrants. While in some years exclusionary suggestions could quite frequently be heard, in particular when New Democracy was still represented in the Riksdag, overall the number of proposals to expand immigrants’ social rights has been much more numerous.

Table 7.2. Political parties’ views on four possible strategies to avoid/reduce immigrant welfare dependence.

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<tr>
<td>KD</td>
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This becomes even more apparent when we look at how Swedish political parties assess the desirability of four different strategies to reduce immigrants’ welfare dependence: (1) restricting immigrants’ access to programs and benefits, (2) reducing the intake of immigrants, especially of those who are most likely to lay a claim on the state, (3) investing more in integration

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201 The figure excludes motions and interpellations that, while related to the social rights of immigrants, were primarily about something else (such as increasing the compensation municipalities receive for refugee accommodation, changing social programs for all recipients, or amending admission policy).
assistance, and (4) reforming the welfare state in a more general manner. I asked each party’s opinion on these strategies in my interviewees with the immigration spokesperson of seven parliamentary parties: Magdalena Streijffert (S), Mikael Cederbratt (M), Ulf Nilsson (FP), Fredrick Federley (C), Erik Almqvist (SD), Christina Höj Larsen (V), and Emma Henriksson (KD). The answers are summarized in Table 7.2.

The most important conclusion to draw from Table 7.2 is that neither of the restrictive options enjoys much support in the Swedish parliament. To start with the first strategy, even Erik Almqvist of the Sweden Democrats expressed a dislike of curtailing access to social benefits. When I asked his party position on residence requirements, conditionality requirements, or reduced rights for temporary migrants, he dismissed all such proposals off hand: “To be honest, we have almost never talked about immigrants in that way. [We do think] that immigration is too high. [...] But we very seldom talk about that too much subsidies, or too much pensions, are going to immigrants. [...] We think that everyone who has a permit to be here should of course have the same rights” (interview SWE05).

This statement does not seem entirely accurate. For one thing, local SD politicians have criticized immigrants’ access to pension benefits. Moreover, in a 2007 overview of its immigration policy proposals, the party speculates about reducing the social rights of recent temporary migrants (Sverigedemokraterna, 2007, p. 4). Even more clearly contradicting Almqvist’s remark is the campaign video the party ran in the 2010 elections: it shows a group of women in burqa jumping the queue at a welfare office, leaving an elderly white woman without a

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202 Unfortunately, the MP refused to participate in this research. Considering the large degree of party discipline in the Riksdag (Hagevi, 2000), I can assume the views of these seven people to reflect the official position of about 93 percent of Swedish parliamentarians at the time of my interviews (early 2011).

203 Rune Karlsson, SD city council member for the town of Ale, for example, has criticized the Income Support for Elderly on his website for being too generous. See http://www.sd-ale.se/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33:aefs&catid=4:pensioner&Itemid=33 (visited August 29, 2012).

204 The exact proposal reads: "Heavily segregated and immigrant-dense communities should be able to request and receive an exemption from the requirement in the Social Services Act to take care of all people who live in the community. The exemption would apply to those people who in recent years obtained a temporary residence permit" (Sverigedemokraterna, 2007, p. 4). When I asked Almqvist about this document, he denied it contained any suggestions to reduce immigrants’ access to benefits. After the interview, I e-mailed Almqvist, this time explicitly quoting the passage cited above. He never responded.
pension. Finally, in parliament the party proposed to force family migrants to rely on their relatives in the first years in the country (Mo. 2010/11:För 231, October 26, 2010) and to repeal the housing allowance available for asylum seekers (Mo. 2011/12:Sf 346, October 5, 2011). Nevertheless, it is telling that Almqvist decided to claim his party opposes reductions in immigrants’ benefit access: apparently even the anti-immigrant party believes that overtly advocating differentiation in social rights is not a viable political strategy.

Unsurprisingly, then, all other politicians I spoke to also rejected this policy measure. Again, one could make qualifying remarks to these responses and point out, for example, that the Moderates and the Center Party (C) have a fairly restrictive position on the access of undocumented migrants to health care. Overall, however, all mainstream parties have spent more time advocating further welfare inclusion than exclusion, especially in recent years. To give just a few examples, the Moderates have repeatedly advocated expanding the export possibilities of pension benefits, the Social Democrats have suggested waiving the costs of naturalization for low-income immigrants, the People’s Party has long been a champion of improving health care access for undocumented migrants, the Center Party favours efforts to increase immigrants’ uptake of social benefits and programs, the Left Party wants to increase the Income Support for Elderly to the level of a full public pension benefit, and the Christian Democrats (KD) frequently suggest more access to education for both immigrant adults and undocumented children.

The second restrictive strategy, making admission policies more selective, is almost as unpopular. Only the Sweden Democrats unequivocally believe in this option. As Almqvist explained to me, his party sees a reduction in family and asylum migration of 90 (!) percent as the most effective strategy to alleviate integration difficulties: “Since we already have such big problems, we think that it might be better to have almost a stop at least of immigration from those parts of the world where we see that people coming here really just feed the segregation” (interview SWE05). All other parties, on the other hand, favour overall increases in immigration
levels, although they differ in the type of migration they most adamantly try to attract. On the one hand, the Left Party proposes increasing the intake of refugee migrants (by expanding the definition of a refugee) and of family migrants (by repealing the Support Requirement), but it is more hesitant about economic migration because it fears that too open a system might lead to the exploitation of migrant workers (interview SWE07). For that reason, it advocates reinstating the practice of setting annual labour migration targets that the Reinfeldt government abolished in 2008. The political right, on the other hand, targets its arrows exactly at attracting more labour migrants. All coalition parties of the current government favour a further liberalization of Swedish economic admission policy, for example by making it easier for blue-collar workers to enter the labour migration stream and reducing the number of permits that tie immigrants to one specific field of employment. At the same time, it needs to be noted that these parties also look favourably towards other migration streams. Other than the previously discussed Support Requirement, none of these parties formulate any restrictions on family migration. And even though the Moderate Party used to have a restrictive position on refugee migration, they no longer favour reductions in annual intake levels.205

The position of the Social Democrats is most ambiguous. During the incumbency of the Carlsson and Persson governments, the party both curtailed refugee migration by narrowing the grounds for asylum (Geddes, 2003, p. 119; Borevi, 2012) and reduced the options for family migration outside the nuclear family (Pr. 1998/1999:95, anf. 36, May 18, 1999). Indeed, as Magdalena Streijffert admitted, for the Social Democrats a more selective intake with the purpose of reducing problems with immigrant integration “has been a strategy in the past” (interview SWE01). Today, there are still Social Democrats who favour restrictions in admission policy206, but also many who favour liberalization. According to Streijffert, the party is now split in ‘two camps’: “one that believes we have too restrictive policies in this area, and one that

205 The Moderates still emphasize that other EU countries should take in more refugee migrants, but according to Mikael Cederbratt that is not to alleviate the inflow to Sweden. He described his position as asking other EU states: “we are the best in the class, why don’t you do like we do?” (interview SWE02)
206 See, for example, the contribution by Göte Wahlström (Pr. 2007/08:83, anf. 1, March 26, 2008).
believe we [...] have to have tougher policies. So it is quite hard to work on these issues in the Social Democratic party” (interview SWE01). Since the Social Democrats now frequently criticize the Support Requirement in family migration and have muted their objections to open labour migration, it seems that for now the liberal camp has the largest say in the formulation of party positions. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any time soon the party would become as fervent an advocate of increased migration as the Left Party, and for example, start criticizing the very restrictions on refugee migration it implemented at the beginning of the century.

In contrast to the limited support for restrictive options, almost all parties are in favour of investing in integration policies and immigrant-targeted active labour market policies. Again, the Sweden Democrats pose the exception, arguing that any service, program, or benefit that is exclusively available to immigrants is a form of positive discrimination (interview SWE05). All other parties, however, see integration policies as the most effective remedy against immigrant welfare dependence. This is clearest among the center-right parties. As soon as the coalition government of Fredrik Reinfeldt took office, it introduced a large-scale reform of the integration regime, focusing on active labour market policies, internship programs, and skill enhancement initiatives. Moreover, even long before it took office politicians from the coalition parties argued in parliament that the only way to reduce immigrant welfare dependence is to invest in integration initiatives.207 The position of the left-wing parties is little different. Christina Höj Larsen (V) reluctantly agreed that the integration policies of the current government are “not too bad” (interview SWE06), and Streijffert even admitted that the plans her party proposed in the 2010 election campaign are very similar to the reforms the center-right implemented in 2007: “we have the same solutions, but we call them by other names” (interview SWE01).

By far the most controversial question in Swedish immigration politics is whether or not general welfare and labour market reform would facilitate the economic integration of

immigrants. On the one hand, left-wing parties reason that since immigrants disproportionately rely on social programs and benefits, any type of retrenchment will hit immigrants harder than native-born citizens. Kalle Larsson (V), for example, has repeatedly made this point, arguing that “being against the welfare state means being against immigrants” (Pr. 2000/2001:93, anf. 2, April 6, 2001). In addition, the left argues that this policy response is based on a misdiagnosis of the origins of immigrants’ unsuccessful economic integration. Streijffert (S), for example, told me that those who propose retrenchment adhere to the following line of reasoning: “If you don’t have a job, you are lazy. [Immigrants] just need to look for jobs, so we need to have a low benefit, because then they will feel it. It is the typical Swedish expression: hungry wolves hunt better. That is really the attitude” (interview SWE01). In sum, the political left sees pleas to aid immigrants by welfare retrenchment as nothing more than a right-wing ploy to bring about a smaller and less generous welfare state.

The Moderates, the People’s Party, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats, on the other hand, all see the structure of the Swedish welfare state as a partial culprit in creating current integration difficulties. For one thing, they consider protective labour market institutions to be an obstacle for immigrants’ economic integration, and therefore advocate more flexible dismissal laws, fewer regulations on small businesses, and more freedom in determining one’s working hours. When asked how the welfare state could best change to address immigrants’ current economic problems, Emma Henriksson (KD) answered:

“Our labour market is a very fixed labour market. If you have a job, you don’t quit. Because you know: ‘If I take a new job, I will be the last one to be employed, and then if

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208 Equally telling is Environment Party’s Ywonne Ruwaida’s response when Moderate Mikael Odenberg argued that labour market and welfare reform would improve the plight of immigrants: “I listened very carefully to the Moderates today, and I am very concerned about the attitude. Indirectly the Moderates say, if I can be blunt: immigrants are welfare parasites. They don’t talk about the discrimination there is against immigrants” (Pr. 2004/05:36, anf. 23, November 24, 2004).

209 Comments like this come up in almost every debate on immigration. For particularly pertinent examples, see Moderate motions Mo. 2001/02:Sf400, October 5, 2001 and Mo. 2002/03:A229, October 23, 2002; and comments in parliament by Lennart Rodin (FP) (Pr. 1996/97:106, anf. 7, May 21, 1997); Stefan Attefall (KD) (Pr. 1998/99:23, anf. 158, November 26, 1998); Karin Pilsätter (FP); (Pr. 1998/99:42, anf. 58, January 20, 1999); and Göran Lindblad (M) (Pr. 1999/2000:91, anf. 25, April 4, 2000).
there is a crisis, I am the first one to go.’ [And for the] employer, because of the regulations we have, it is very difficult to get rid of someone if it is a bad match [...] That’s [...] why it is difficult for young people and for immigrants to get into the labour market, because there is so little movement in the labour market. (interview SWE07)

Moreover, the center-right parties believe that the difference between a wage income and a passive benefit has historically been too small to stimulate employment-seeking efforts, especially among newcomers on the labour market. For that reason, they favour lower benefits, lower taxes, and fewer possibilities to receive a benefit without having to do something in return (such as participating in a labour market program).\(^{210}\) Indeed, Mikael Cederbratt (M) explained the policy changes his party implemented upon taking office in exactly this light:

> We have indeed a lot of immigrants in the system, but we have a national problem too [...] The problem is that, if you go back a couple of years, the economic difference between having a low-paid job or a benefit from the welfare system was too small. So there was no incentive to look for work. That’s why we have lowered the taxes on work, mostly on the lower levels. We have also lowered a little the money from the system, so the gap is bigger. [...] That’s the difference with the Social Democrats, who say: ‘We take care of everybody. No matter what happens, we will be there’. And we say: ‘You try first, and otherwise we’ll be there’. (interview SWE02)

Finally, the Sweden Democrats oppose any reductions in welfare state generosity (interview SWE05).\(^{211}\) This is noteworthy not only because this distinguishes the party from its anti-immigrant predecessor, New Democracy, but also because it makes it the first party in Swedish parliament to advocate selective solidarity.

Again, however, the Sweden Democrats are very much alone in advocating this sentiment. As this section has shown, no mainstream political party today is in favour of reducing immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. And by comparative standards, there is also little support for such policy changes among the public at large. The next section discusses the origins of the limited traction of selective solidarity in Sweden.

\(^{210}\) Again, this line of reasoning is almost ubiquitous. See comments by Ana Maria Narti (FP) (Pr. 1999/2000:96, ant. 110, April 12, 2000) and Tobias Billström (Pr. 2004/05:66, ant. 9, January 28, 2005).

\(^{211}\) Political opponents agree on the characterization of SD as a pro-welfare party. Frederick Federley (C), for example, described the anti-immigrant party as follows: “They are like a classical social democratic party, with racism. So the addition is the racist part and the islamophobic part” (interview SWE04).
7.3 Explaining the Swedish paradox

The near absence of suggestions for immigrant welfare exclusion might at first seem difficult to understand. As we will see below, the reliance of immigrants on welfare benefits is very large - even larger than what we saw in the Netherlands. As such, the Swedish case offers a clear blow against the thesis that selective solidarity is most likely to emerge where immigrants objectively lay the largest claim on welfare programs and services. In this section, I will begin by elaborating on this point, and show that economic considerations have played a small role in politicians’ views on the social rights of immigrants. The second subsection then turns to how the costs of immigration have most often been discussed in Sweden, and finds an explanation for this political translation in political, cultural, and institutional factors.

7.3.1 Why economic explanations fail: white lies, half-myths, and non-economic concerns

In one sense, the way immigration has been perceived by both the public and the political elite in particular follows the realities of immigrants’ economic integration quite well. As we saw in the previous section, both public and political unease about the costs of immigration were at their highest in the early to mid-1990s. The immigration sceptics of New Democracy played an important role in the debate, the Moderates and Social Democrats defended their most restrictive immigration agenda in the last twenty years, and nativist resentment was peaking. At the same moment, economic troubles were mounting: for the first time since the Second World War, the Swedish economy shrunk three years in a row (from 1991 to 1993; OECD 2011a) and unemployment rates reached unprecedented levels (Bergmark & Palme, 2003). The economic recession had large consequences for the immigrant population in particular. As Figure 7.5 illustrates, immigrant levels of welfare dependence were higher than ever.²¹² Overall, then, it

²¹² Immigrants’ economic difficulties in the mid-1990s can also be gleaned from data on unemployment. Until the early 1970s, immigrants were less likely to be unemployed than native-born Swedes
seems that concerns about the costs of immigration were indeed most pronounced when those costs were at their highest.

![Figure 7.5. Percentage of population receiving social assistance, by country of origin, 1991-2007. (Source: SCB, 2011.)](image)

However, this is as far as an economic explanation can take us in understanding mass and elite views on immigrants’ position in the welfare state. After all, it does not explain why even at the peak of immigration scepticism calls for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms were still rare and the overall reception was still overwhelmingly positive. In other words, looking at patterns of immigrant welfare dependence is of little use if we aim to comprehend why immigration is seen in such a positive light in the first place.

After all, immigrants are greatly overrepresented among welfare recipients in Sweden. Most observers point at three explanations for this outcome. First, many have argued that the small

(Hammarstedt, 2009). After then, immigrants’ relative employment rates slowly deteriorated, reaching a low point in 1994 (SOU 2004:21).

213 A fourth explanation that appears frequently both in government documents (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2007; Socialstyrelsen, 2010) and in political debate (see, for example, Pr. 1996/97:33, anf. 70, November 26, 1996; Pr. 1998/99:42, anf. 183, January 20, 1999; Pr. 2004/05:5, anf. 7, September 20,
gap between the (relatively high) level of benefits such as social assistance and unemployment benefits on the one hand and the (relatively low) entry-level job wages on the other provides little incentive to seek employment (Sjögren Lindquist, 2007; Azhar Hussein, Kangas, & Kvist, 2012). Relatedly, many have pointed out that protective regulations such as limited recognition of foreign credentials, restrictions on work hours, and onerous requirements for self-owned businesses places newcomers at a disadvantage (Gustafsson, Hammarstedt, & Jinghai, 2004; Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2007). Probably most damaging to immigrants is the principle of ‘last in first out’ in Swedish dismissal law: in the event of discharges, the people with the shortest employment history are always the first to be fired (Hjerm, 2005).

Second, since 1972 and until very recently, virtually none of the immigrants that entered Sweden were selected on the basis of their human capital. While after the Second World War Sweden initially took in a large number of labour migrants selected on the basis of both skills and country of origin, it started to reduce economic migration in 1967 and implemented a full stop of labour migration from non-Nordic countries in 1972 (Hammar, 1985; Westin, 1996; Soininen, 1999). The overwhelming majority of immigration to Sweden, then, consisted of refugees: while they only amounted to about 10 percent of all incoming migrants in 1970, that percentage had soared to no less than 70 percent by 1990 (Hansen & Lofstrom, 2001). As a result of this admission policy, the human capital of immigrants tends to be low (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2007; Hammarstedt, 2009).

2004; and Pr. 2004/2005:13, ant. 323, October 13, 2004) is that immigrants’ difficulties are the result of discrimination. Certainly, Swedish society is not free of racism and xenophobia and there is indeed evidence that immigrants are likely not to be hired in the presence of a similarly qualified native-born alternative (Socialstyrelsen, 2010). Nevertheless, there are limits to this explanation. It cannot explain why the problems with economic integration are much larger in Sweden than elsewhere, especially in light of the comparatively positive immigration attitudes among the Swedish public. Moreover, it is unlikely that discrimination is the reason why immigrants experience more difficulties today than in the 1960s, since most evidence suggests that xenophobia has declined over time in Sweden.

Before joining the EU, Sweden still only admitted about 200 labour migrants per year (Ornbrant & Peura, 1993, p. 207). Under the Reinfeldt governments, however, labour migration policy has been liberalized and annual intake levels have increased significantly (Migrationsverket, 2010).

Admission policy particularly privileged citizens of other Nordic countries.

Still today, Sweden admits more refugees in absolute terms than countries with much larger populations such as Germany and Italy (Migrationsverket, 2010).
Third, some believe that integration policies in Sweden have had a counterproductive effect. For example, many politicians (see, for example, *Pr.* 1992/1993:16, *anf.* 104, November 4, 1992; *Pr.* 1998/1999:23, *anf.* 150, November 26, 1998), but some academics as well (Eastmond, 2011) argue that before the activating reforms of the Bildt and later Reinfeldt governments, integration policies made newcomers passive by providing benefits and services but not offering enough incentives to find employment. A different aspect of past integration policy that many now agree did not work as intended is the so-called Whole Sweden (*Hela Sverige*) strategy. From 1984 to 1994, the migration board assigned each successful asylum claimant to a municipality of residence in an effort to ensure that all communities took in a proportionate share of newcomers, but the perverse consequence was that many immigrants were sent to areas with a weak labour market (interview SWE13; Borevi, 2012, p. 52).

These admission, integration, and labour market policies have produced serious problems. In comparison with native-born citizens, immigrants in Sweden are more likely to be hospitalized (Grönqvist, Johansson, & Niknami, 2011), to have bad subjective health (Hjerm, 2005), to have a small social network, and to have access to few political resources (Franzén, 2004). Most horrific are the data on employment. It is not only that immigrants who find a job are likely to be employed in low income and low status occupations (Hammarstedt, 2001; Valenta & Bunar, 2010). They also have much trouble finding a job in the first place. Recent data suggests it takes on average 7 years for a male immigrant and 10 for a female immigrant to find a first job after arriving in Sweden (Hammarstedt, 2009). Compared to native-born, immigrants are about three times as likely to be unemployed (Gould, 2001), and run a larger risk of falling back into unemployment after finding a job (Socialstyrelsen, 2010). For these reasons, they also tend to have a much lower income than native-born citizens (Ginsburg & Rosenthal, 2002; Timonen, 2004; Morissens & Sainsbury, 2005; Blume, Gustafsson, Pedersen, & Verner, 2007).

As a result, immigrants are less likely to be able to take care of themselves financially, and therefore lay a larger claim on the welfare state than the rest of the population (*SOU* 2003:75,
Socialstyrelsen, 2010). Indeed, immigrants have been found to be overrepresented among recipients of unemployment benefits (Hansen & Lofstrom, 2001; Gould, 2001), early retirement benefits (Gustafsson & Österberg, 2004), and, in particular, social assistance benefits (SOU 2003:75; Franzén, 2004; Morissens & Sainsbury, 2005; Barrett & McCarthy, 2008, Hammarstedt, 2009).

Recent data from Statistics Sweden echo these findings. As Figure 7.6 illustrates, immigrants are strongly overrepresented among recipients of social assistance. This goes especially for recent immigrants and those who were born in Asia and Africa.\(^{217}\) It is important, however, to make at least two qualifications to the picture shown in Figure 7.6. First, Statistics Sweden includes the Introduction Benefit in social assistance data, which explains why the recipiency rates are so high for recent migrants from refugee-sending countries. Second, many immigrants end up on

\(^{217}\) Moreover, immigrants also tend to receive a higher social assistance benefit than native-born. In 2009, for example, the average native-born welfare recipient received a total of about 35,000 Swedish crowns (about 5,000 Canadian dollars), while this was 59,000 crowns for immigrants (about 8,500 Canadian dollars), and even 73,000 crowns for refugees (about 10,500 Canadian dollars) (SCB, 2011).
social assistance only because they do not qualify for more generous, employment-related benefits (Bergmark & Palme, 2003, p. 121; Hilson, 2008; Socialstyrelsen, 2010, p. 113).

This becomes apparent when we look at Figure 7.7, which shows the average amount native-born citizens, European immigrants, and non-European immigrants receive in a variety of transfer benefits. While immigrants are overrepresented in other benefits than social assistance as well, their overrepresentation is much smaller. In the case of the most costly benefit in the Swedish welfare state, the pension system, immigrants are for obvious reasons strongly underrepresented. In other words, while immigrants’ overreliance on the welfare state is large, an exclusive look at social assistance gives an amplified estimate of this overreliance.²¹⁸

![Figure 7.7. Average household receipt of various transfers in Canadian dollars, by country of origin, 2010. (Source: SCB, 2011.)](image)

Nevertheless, there is no denying that immigrants in Sweden lay a large claim on the welfare state budget. But as we have seen, few politicians seem overly worried about the costs of

²¹⁸ According to the last available wave of the LIS (2005), when we take a comprehensive look at all programs in the data set, immigrants receive only about 13 percent more money in transfer benefits than native-born Swedes (an average of 98,800 versus 87,400 Swedish crowns, respectively).
immigration. Even though recent economic studies are unanimous that immigration poses a (small) net loss to the Swedish treasury (Storesletten, 2003; Ekberg, 2009; Gerdes & Wadensjö, 2012), and comparative analyses suggest that there are few countries in which immigration is costing more money than in Sweden (Boeri, 2009; see also Chapter Four), politicians still claim, like Ulf Nilsson (FP) did when I asked him, that “it is more winning than losing with immigration in Sweden” (interview SWE03). With the exception of Almqvist (SD), none of my interviewees considered immigration an economic threat and instead, all argued the exact opposite, namely that Sweden would benefit economically from taking in more newcomers (interviews SWE01, SWE02, SWE03, SWE04, SWE06, SWE07). Such comments can be heard frequently in parliament as well, in particular from the mouths of Social Democrats (see, for example, Pr. 2000/01:53, anf. 57, January 19, 2001; Pr. 2010/11:33, anf. 27, December 13, 2010; Pr 2010/11:37, anf. 42, December 17, 2010).

One particularly common variant of this argument is that immigration is necessary to alleviate ageing and its straining effects on the Swedish pension system. Again, the available evidence lends little credence to this theory. Most economic studies show that to make up for baby-boomers’ mass retirement, much more immigration would be required than is either practically feasible or politically viable (Kleinman, 2003; Venturini, 2004). In his study of the Swedish case, Jan Ekberg concludes that “even a modest increase in the employment rate among the population that already resides in the country will have a greater positive fiscal effect than large-scale migration” (Ekberg, 2009, p. 21). Nevertheless, politicians continue to mention immigrants’ alleged benign effect on ageing when discussing the economics of immigration (for recent examples, see comments by Ulf Nilsson, FP, Pr. 2010/11:16, anf. 8, November 17, 2010; Maria Ferm, MP, and Mikael Cederbratt, M, Pr. 2010/11:31, anf. 78, 85, December 9, 2010).

Other arguments that are sometimes invoked to assert that immigration has a positive effect on the economy have found more support in empirical research but seem poorly applicable to the Swedish case. For example, in a recent party document the Moderates maintain that
immigration has a positive effect on employment levels, because it raises mobility, thereby expands the labour market, and therefore reduces frictional unemployment (Moderaterna, 2010). Apart from the lack of convincing data\textsuperscript{219}, it is difficult to see what this theory has to do with a country where only about 12 percent of the foreign-born population came to for reasons of work (SCB, 2012). Similarly, the argument that immigrants cost less money than native-born because they tend to arrive after already having enjoyed a costly education, as made for example by Fredrik Lundh Sammeli (Pr. 2010/11:31, anf. 80, December 9, 2010) seems unconvincing in Sweden, a country with some of the lowest immigrant self-sufficiency levels, and one of the largest adult education systems (Nordlund, Stehlik, & Strandh, 2012) in the world.

Besides presenting unsubstantiated economic arguments, mainstream politicians more commonly defend immigration by stating that economic considerations should not be decisive. Particularly illustrative in this regard are the responses Sten Andersson (M) used to receive to his repeated requests for a comprehensive calculation of the costs of immigration. For example, junior minister Maj-Inger Klingvall (S) told him the following in 2000\textsuperscript{220}:

The question how much immigration costs pops up regularly in the debate about immigration and refugee policy. A pervasive theme is the hunt for a number which describes the total costs of immigration. The primary reason why the government has not actively worked to produce such a number either today or in the past is that there are other values and beliefs that underlie immigration and refugee policy. Sweden will continue to pursue a humane refugee policy which means that people who flee from persecution or war will have a sanctuary here. No more than we measure the use of children and pensioners in crowns and ören should we treat immigrants as coldly calculated investments that we expect to deliver returns. (Pr. 1999/2000:99, anf. 24, April 25, 2000).

Members of other political parties have made this point as well. For example, the Left Party's Kalle Larsson (V) has often lamented the focus on ‘statistics and numbers’ in the immigration debate (see, for example, Pr. 2007/08:43, anf. 2, December 13, 2007), and in a recent party

\textsuperscript{219} The document quotes a Eurobarometer survey, which finds that 59 percent of the unemployed who migrated found a job within a year, as opposed to 33 percent of those who stayed in their home country (Moderaterna, 2010, p. 124). At most, however, this data tells us that immigration has a negative effect on unemployment in Europe. Besides, on the basis of this information we cannot tell whether these people found a job because they migrated or migrated because they found a job abroad.

\textsuperscript{220} See also the response by junior minister Leif Blomberg (Pr. 1994/1995:84, anf. 36, April 3, 1995).
document the Christian Democrats explicitly state that the value of asylum migration can never be measured in money (Kristdemokraterna, 2010, p. 9).

That economic considerations have little impact on the politics of immigrants’ social rights in Sweden does not only become apparent when we look at champions of inclusionary policies. We also see that economic considerations are at best of only secondary importance in the critiques that have occasionally arisen about immigrants and their place in the welfare state, and that many of the economic arguments that have been made are based on exaggeration and conjecture rather than on careful analysis of available evidence.

To start with examples of the former, in some cases politicians have expressed worries about immigrants’ use of certain benefits, not because of the costs involved, but because they believe it stands integration in the way. The left-wing parties in parliament (S, MP, and V), for example, have recently started to object to immigrants’ large use of the Caretaker Allowance (vårdnadsbidrag), a benefit for parents who prefer not to send their children to preschool but to take care of them themselves. The reason for the unease is not that the benefit costs too much money, but that it risks isolating immigrant women (interviews SWE01, SWE06). For similar reasons, the Social Democrats advocate repealing the housing allowance for asylum seekers: not because they are unwilling to pay for the allowance, but because they are afraid that the benefit leads to unhealthy and dangerous living conditions.

In other cases, the objections are about system integrity. The position of the Moderates and the Center Party on undocumented migrants’ access to health care is a case in point. The interviewees from both parties explicitly denied that there is any economic motivation behind their stance. Mikael Cederbratt (M) said it makes for bad and counterproductive public policy to say “you are not allowed to be here, you are breaking the law, but we are giving you everything” (interview SWE02), while Fredrick Federley (C) argued that open access would lead to the curious situation that “an American [tourist] should pay for the operation him- or herself, but someone who is here not supported by the law should have it for free” (interview SWE04).
Even the Sweden Democrats, who commonly frame immigration as a threat to the welfare state, seem to be motivated first and foremost by non-economic arguments. It is worth quoting Erik Almqvist at length on this point:

The economic costs are actually more of a consequence of other problems that we can see with a multicultural system. I think the main problem is that the society gets split [...] I am sure you know about Robert D. Putnam and his idea about social capital. I think you can see that social capital has decreased in Sweden where multicultural systems are growing. People don’t trust each other as much when they don’t relate to each other. When you don’t identify yourself with the majority in a country, you feel like a threatened minority because your values are always questioned because you relate to a smaller group. And that also makes it harder to have a functional democracy, because democracies are at their most functional when as many people as possible believe that the governmental policy is good. And if we have minorities that are because of values and culture often quite a bit different from the majority, in how they want the society to be, and what they want individuals to have for roles and responsibilities and so on, they will always feel like the democracy doesn’t really represent them. So I think it is a problem on a more basic level than just the economic costs. (interview SWE05)

When I asked him why his party then decided to use such a clear economic frame in its campaign video (the one with burqa-clad women jumping the line at the welfare office, see above), Almqvist said that the video’s main purpose was to “provoke the debate”, not to “give a broader view on our basic ideology” (interview SWE05).

When immigration critics do invoke apparently economic arguments, they seem to do so more to illustrate a principled point than to respond to economic reality. Indeed, one could ask why Sten Andersson (M) made so many requests for a calculation of the costs of immigration in the period from 1998 to 2002, considering the already large set of studies to that effect available at the time, including research by Jan Ekberg (1983; 1999), Björn Gustafsson and Torun Österberg (2001), Kjetil Storesletten (2000), and Eskil Wadensjö (1973).221

And finally, we can point at the tendency of immigration critics to misrepresent or exaggerate the costs of immigration to illustrate that economic facts are not directly translated into political discourse. For example, when Gustaf von Essen (M) asserted that “most

221 Andersson’s fellow party member Gustaf von Essen made this very point in parliament. Unsurprisingly, Andersson dismissed the studies Von Essen mentioned by stating: “there are people with a considerably higher education [than me] who question these numbers” (Pr. 1997/98:, anf. 60-63, March 25, 1998).
immigrants” are “permanently dependent on social assistance” (Pr. 1993/94:6, anf. 179, October 13, 1993), according to actual data only about 18 percent of immigrants received social assistance (SCB, 2011). Similarly, Leif Bergdahl’s (ND) argument that the increase in the uptake of early retirement benefits over the 1980s is “first and foremost an immigration problem” (Pr. 1993/94:120, anf. 1, June 8, 1994) also exaggerates the numbers that come out of empirical research (Gustafsson & Österberg, 2004). Even more obviously unsubstantiated were Claus Zaar’s suggestion that immigrants are responsible for the economic crisis in Sweden (Pr. 1992/93:91, anf. 81, April 14, 1993), Bert Karlsson’s assertion that each year immigration costs 80 million crowns (about 11 million Canadian dollars) (Pr. 1993/94:6, anf. 188-192, October 13, 1993), and Sten Andersson’s theory that refugees tend to settle in those communities where social assistance levels are highest (Pr. 1994/95:16, anf. 34, October 27, 1994).

The distortion of economic data was also clear in discussions about the 2004 EU expansion. Driven by fears of massive Eastern European welfare tourism, for some time the Social Democrats (and to a lesser degree, the Moderates and the People’s Party) advocated transitional rules and temporary limits on the rights in Sweden for citizens of the new member states (Doyle, Hughes, & Wadensjö, 2006; Eriksson, 2006). In a public statement, Prime Minister Göran Persson explicitly worried that the welfare state could come under pressure as a result of the expansion (Eriksson, 2006, p. 77). And when a documentary reported that Estonian women working as a nurse for ten hours a week in Sweden would be allowed to bring their husband and children over and then collectively live off state benefi
t222 In absolute numbers, native-born Swedes still made up a larger portion of the early retirement caseload. And while it is true that the use of early retirement benefits had increased among immigrants from 1980 to 1990, it had so among native-born citizens as well. Among 60 to 64-year olds (by far the most represented age group among recipients), uptake levels increased by the exact same percentage among native-born citizens as among immigrants (Gustafsson & Österberg, 2004, p. 65).

223 Until 1998, municipalities were allowed to decide the exact level of social assistance benefits within a wider, nationally established, framework (Hansen & Lofstrom, 2001).
hindsight. The documentary had made an unwarranted generalization on the basis of an idiosyncratic case. As Jonas Eriksson puts it, “much energy was thus put into discussing a non-existent rule” (2006, p. 81). More importantly, Sweden ultimately did not implement any transitional rules, and economic analyses have found little evidence of the welfare tourism Persson was afraid of (Doyle, Hughes, & Wadensjö, 2006; Gerdes & Wadensjö, 2008).

Overall then, economic facts do not seem to matter much in discussions about immigration and welfare in Sweden. Whether it is in advocating inclusion or exclusion, politicians rarely invoke economic arguments, and instead tend to explain their position by humanitarian considerations, principled objections, or cultural concerns. And when economic data or theories do come up, they appear more as illustrations of an already established ideological position than as the underlying foundation of an evidence-based conclusion. To understand how immigrants’ position in the Swedish welfare state is evaluated, then, we need to move beyond the mere patterns of immigrant welfare dependence and look at how these patterns have been translated.

7.3.2 UNDERSTANDING WELFARE DEPENDENCE AS UTANFÖRSKAP

Contrary to what immigration critics have suggested (see for example, comments by AIP members Claus Zaar, Pr. 1992/93:18, anf. 5, November 6, 1992; and Erik Almqvist, Pr. 2010/11:31, anf. 79, December 9, 2010), Swedish politicians do not ignore the reality of immigrants’ large dependence on welfare. It comes up in virtually every debate on either immigration or welfare policies, and politicians of all stripes frequently quote the kinds of statistics reviewed in the previous section.224 One could even argue that the fact that immigrants make much use of welfare benefits is such a common topic of discussion that the association between the two has become institutionalized (Eastmond, 2011). On occasions, politicians have even used the words ‘welfare recipient’ and ‘immigrant’ interchangeably (see for example, Pr. 1996/97:112, anf. 77, June 2, 1997; Pr. 2001/02:114, anf. 47, May 28, 2002). Similarly, it would

224 All of the politicians I interviewed agreed that immigrants are overrepresented among welfare recipients, and shared recent data to illustrate how dismal immigrants’ position on the labour market is.
be wrong to suggest that there is any politician who sees the patterns of immigrant welfare dependence as something positive. See, for example, Ragnhild Pohanka’s (MP) observation on this subject: “I completely agree that social assistance’s goal is to offer a way out when nothing else is available. But it has now become a [permanent] source of support, and that is wrong” (Pr. 1996/97:65, anf. 2, February 13, 1997). Almost identical statements have been made by politicians from the Moderates (Pr. 1994/95:33, anf. 8, December 1, 1994), the Social Democrats (Pr. 1995/96:6, anf. 142, October 11, 1995), the Left Party (Pr. 1998/99:42, anf. 47, January 20, 1999), and the People’s Party (Pr. 2000/01:53, anf. 58, January 19, 2001).

The big difference with what we saw in the Dutch example, then, is not that immigrants’ welfare dependence is left out of political discussions, but that it is discussed in a different light. To Swedish politicians, being on welfare is a lamentable position, associated with low income, few job prospects, and isolation - a situation most often captured by the term utanförskap (see, for example, Pr. 1998/99:23, anf. 148, November 26, 1998; Pr. 1999/2000:51, anf. 69, January 18, 2000; and Pr. 2008/09:25, anf. 9, November 11, 2008). This concept, which can be loosely translated as social alienation, was nicely illustrated by Fredrick Federley (C):

I don’t know how many people I have seen, just sitting in their apartment and watching TV, saying: ‘I hate this life. It’s like being in prison. I know nobody, I have no contacts, I don’t learn Swedish, I’m not allowed to study, I’m not allowed to work, I can just sit here and watch Oprah all day.’ You know, it destroys people when you feel that you are not part of something, that you don’t contribute, that you don’t have any friends in your life, that you have no set times to hang your life onto: not getting up in the morning, not getting to bed in the evening in order to be fresh the next day, and so on. (interview SWE04)

In keeping with this understanding of what it is like to be a welfare recipient, politicians take the large reliance of immigrants on welfare as a sign that the Swedish state has not served immigrants well enough, not as a sign that immigrants are lazy welfare cheats who should be pushed off their benefits. As Karen Borevi (2012, p. 83) puts it, immigrant welfare dependence is seen as “something that society - rather than the individual - should be blamed for” (her emphasis). Indeed, all the politicians I spoke to, with the exception of the Sweden Democrats’
Erik Almqvist, framed the integration *problematique* in this light. Magdalena Streijffert (S) said that “migration could be good, but then politicians need to change the policies” (interview SWE01), Mikael Cederbratt (M) declared that “we have to focus on getting them a job [and] if we do that, all the other questions are naturally resolved” (interview SWE02), Emma Henriksson (KD) said “the costs for the social benefit system” is merely the “minor problem”, while the big problem is “that they don’t get established in the labour market” (interview SWE07), and Ulf Nillsson (FP), finally, said that while economic considerations might be important, “the biggest problem with if a person does not work but lives on benefits is that it is a risk of *utanförskap*” (interview SWE03).

To understand why immigrants’ large-scale welfare dependence has come to be seen in this light, we need to look beyond economic factors and at country-specific characteristics, especially the lack of success of anti-immigrant parties, the centrality of egalitarianism in Swedish national identity, and the universal structure of the Swedish welfare system.

*Anti-immigrant parties.* First, anti-immigrant parties have not been able to steer the immigration debate in the same way their counterparts have in other Western European countries. There are two reasons for this: they have had scant electoral success, and in the two instances that an AIP did achieve parliamentary representation the response of mainstream parties has been dismissive and exclusionary. I will discuss each of these reasons in some detail.

In only two elections did an anti-immigrant party manage to surpass the electoral threshold: in 1991 New Democracy won 25 of the 349 seats in the *Riksdag*, and in 2010 the Sweden Democrats managed to obtain a total of 20 seats. Other AIPs, such as the Skåne party, the Sjöbo Party, the Sweden Party, the National Democrats, Keep Sweden Swedish, and the Swedish Progress Party all tried their luck, but none of these parties were able to win even one percent of the vote in national elections (even though they have had more success in local elections). For most of recent history, therefore, parliamentary debates on immigration did not have any participants with an explicit anti-immigrant stance, with the exception of an occasional
rogue such as Sten Andersson. For that reason, the ND and SD might have been able to convince some people of their restrictive proposals when they were in parliament, but they have never been there long enough to have had a sustained effect (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008).

To explain why anti-immigrant parties have been so unsuccessful in Sweden, we can point both at factors related to the parties themselves and to characteristics of the larger institutional structure. To start with the former, many Swedish AIPs were too closely associated with racism, fascism, and neo-Nazism to appeal to more than only the most xenophobic portions of the electorate. During the first election the Sweden Democrats participated in (1998), it was still an extremist movement, and won a meager 1,000 votes. After Mikael Jansson replaced former Nazi Anders Klarström as party leader, however, the party started to purge itself from all overtly extremist elements (Rydgren, 2006). It implemented a uniform ban, ousted its most extremist members, rewrote its party principles, explicitly denounced Nazism, and, more recently, changed its party logo from the torch-shaped Swedish flag (similar to the logo of neo-fascist parties such as the Italian Movimento Socialista Italiano) to a blue anemone (the so-called blåsippa). As current party leader Jimmy Åkesson comments on this transformation,

> even the party’s immigration policy was adjusted somewhat to reality. [...] Perhaps most important was that we affirmed the principle of open Swedishness, that it should be possible for people with an origin in other countries to become Swedish. Swedishness does not sit in the colour of your skin but in your values and behaviour. (Åkesson, 2008, pp. 10, 13)

Only through these efforts did the SD manage to broaden its appeal, winning more seats in every national election so far.

The importance of party organization also becomes apparent when we look at the demise of New Democracy. Ever since its inception, the party was simultaneously led by aristocrat businessman Ian Wachtmeister and self-made record label director Bert Karlsson. After their

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225 A cursory glance at survey data does suggest that the number of people who believe that Sweden should admit fewer refugees and that it is a bad idea to give immigrants financial assistance to preserve their traditions increased after the ND took place in parliament, and decreased after the party disappeared in 1994 (Figure 7.2; see also Rydgren, 2006, p. 99).
electoral success in 1991, the two became increasingly at odds about the direction of the party, with accompanying disagreements among backbenchers as a result. When Karlsson started to criticize his fellow party leader in public in 1994, Wachtmeister resigned and the party quickly crumbled, winning no more than 0.2 percent of the vote in the following elections (Andersen & Björklund, 2000; Rydgren, 2006).

The limited success of AIPs also reflects the broader institutional structure. The electoral system itself does not seem to pose much of a hurdle. While the electoral threshold is higher than in the Netherlands (parties need 4 percent of the national vote or 12 percent of the vote in one district in order to win a seat in parliament; Lundell, 2008), AIPs have had large success in countries with electoral systems similar to the Swedish one, such as Norway and Denmark. In at least three other respects, however, the Swedish political system has been thought to be inimical to modern AIPs. First, several scholars have pointed out that the centrality of the economic cleavage makes it difficult for parties to win over voters with arguments that are not directly about redistribution (Rydgren, 2003; 2006; Loxbo, 2010). In other words, even though a sizeable portion of the Swedish electorate might harbour anti-immigrant feelings, it is unlikely that those sentiments will influence their vote, since class voting is still high in Sweden by comparative standards.

Second, according to Jens Rydgren (2006), there is little space for an anti-establishment party in the dominant party system of Sweden, which has been ruled by Social Democrats for 74 of the last 100 years. After all, he reasons, the argument that all mainstream parties are the same seems difficult to make considering the large and persistent differences between the Social Democrats and their center-right opponents. In other words, any voter who yearns for ‘a change’ could simply not vote for the Social Democrats.

Third, and finally, the institutionalized statism seems to leave little space for populist movements. As Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen have pointed out, Sweden has never known a

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226 Ian Wachtmeister has recently become politically active again, functioning as political advisor to the Sweden Democrats for the 2010 election (Larsson & Kihlström, 2010).
strong tradition of popular democracy. In their description, policies appear as the product of a long process of consultation and research undertaken by committees and work groups, and the role of parliament is reduced to merely affirming or rejecting the suggestions made elsewhere (1987, pp. 6-9). Accordingly, they show that Swedish politicians who have presented themselves as the voice of the masses have had little success (Heclo & Madsen, 1987, pp. 23-46). While their argument might apply less today than when they made these observations, it seems plausible that part of the reason for the limited success of AIPs in Sweden is that not many voters are attracted to a populist electoral strategy.

Overall, then, both characteristics of the parties themselves and of the political system help to explain the limited fortunes of anti-immigrant parties in Sweden, and, as such, why suggestions for restrictive immigration policies have seldom been heard in the Riksdag. In addition, even during the few years that anti-immigrant parties did have some seats in parliament, they still have not been able to exert a large influence on policy discussions.

This is not because of the behaviour of these parties themselves. They used similar strategies as we saw, for example, the Dutch PVV make successful use of. Both the ND and the SD have, as we saw above, frequently framed immigration as a danger for the future sustainability of the welfare state. Moreover, both parties have undertaken much effort to prime immigration and to frame it as the source of various social ills, not in the least by bringing up the subject in discussions that are at best only indirectly related. For example, in a debate about foreign policy, the ND’s Lars Moquist suddenly started to talk about illegal immigration (Pr. 1992/1993:67, anf. 12, February 24, 1993), and his party colleague Leif Bergdahl started a discussion that was supposed to be about pension reform by arguing that immigrants are responsible for the strains on the pension system (Pr. 1993/94:120, anf. 1, June 8, 1994). Similarly, SD politicians Johnny Skalin and Erik Almqvist argued in discussions about unemployment benefits that they could be much more generous if immigration levels would be lowered (Pr. 2010/11:36, anf. 61, December 16, 2010; Pr. 2010/11:37, anf. 41, December 17, 2010).
The explanation for AIPs’ limited effect on political discussions, instead, is that mainstream parties in Sweden have behaved differently than their counterparts in other countries who were confronted with the emergence of AIPs. Certainly, we can point at a few isolated examples of a contagion effect. For example, it does not seem coincidental that the Social Democrats and the center-right Bildt government moved in a more restrictive direction on refugee policy at the time of New Democracy’s ascendance (the former by formulating stricter criteria for admission, the latter by reducing cash benefits of refugee claimants) (Rydgren, 2006; Eastmond, 2011). Maud Björnemalm (S) made an implicit but clear reference to New Democracy when justifying her party’s stricter line on refugee issues: “We need to pursue a refugee policy with clear rules that are understandable for the Swedish people, because otherwise lies and myths will thrive, as well as xenophobia” (Pr. 1992/93:91, anf. 44, April 14, 1993). Magdalena Streijffert told me more explicitly that her party has occasionally defended restrictive policies exactly because they feared a nativist backlash that would result in success for anti-immigrant parties: “After the crisis in the beginning of the 1990s in Sweden, it was really sensitive. And the argument about this was: if we discuss those issues openly, the Sweden Democrats will come into the parliament. […] [That is] also why we were quite restrictive when it comes to the health care system for undocumented migrants” (interview SWE01).

Overall, however, mainstream parties have responded more often by refuting and dismissing the arguments and policy proposals of anti-immigrant parties than by adopting them (Rydgren, 2003, p. 60; Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011). At any rate, all the mainstream politicians I spoke to denounced the strategy of taking a harsher line on immigration to decrease the SD’s electoral niche, and believed such a strategy would have a counterproductive effect. Ulf Nilsson (FP) and Christina Höj Larsen (V), for example, referred to the example of Denmark, where the Dansk Folkparti only grew larger after mainstream parties moved in their direction (interview SWE03, SWE06). Fredrick Federley (C) referred to the situation in the Netherlands:
I could see that clearly the VVD has been listening to other groups in parliament, and I think that’s not taking the question seriously. That’s just saying to people: what you have been told which is not actually the truth probably, that is what we will take into our concerns now. So we are confirming the scares in your beliefs, instead of saying how it actually is. (interview SWE04)

Similarly, Emma Henriksson (KD) argued that adopting the views of AIPs has increased rather than decreased their success in other countries (interview SWE07), and Magdalena Streijffert (S) and Mikael Cederbratt (M) even referred to a recent academic study that reaches this conclusion (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011).227 Perhaps more importantly, these MPs also claimed that they still would not change their position even if it would lead to more electoral success. Concerns that voters have about immigration are often ‘not true’ (SWE02) and ‘miss the bigger picture’ (SWE07), so my interviewees told me, and therefore the role of an MP is to ‘explain’ (SWE01) and ‘inform’ (SWE03), rather than to voice those concerns in parliament.

This dismissive stance becomes even clearer when we look at parliamentary debates. Virtually every politician who has advocated restrictions in immigration policies has been met with hostile reactions (Borevi, 2012). In some cases, those reactions have been nuanced (see, for example, comments by Alf Svensson, KD, Pr. 1993/94:3, anf. 14, October 6, 1994). Often, however, the response has been more aggressive. Personal insults have not been uncommon (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2011, p. 3). Anti-immigrant politicians have frequently been accused of discrimination and racism and in some cases, the critique even went so far as to involve a comparison with Nazi Germany (see comments by the Left Party’s Berith Eriksson, Pr. 1992/93:16, anf. 6, November 6, 1993; Christian Democrat Märtha Gärdestig, Pr. 1993/94:6, anf. 193, October 13, 1993; Social Democrat Juan Fonseca, Pr. 1996/97:106, anf. 5, May 21, 1997; and Left Party member Kalle Larsson, Pr. 2008/09:47, anf. 2, December 11, 2008).228

227 While beyond the scope of the current discussion, it seems worth noting that not all political scientists agree that a dismissive strategy is most effective in muting the electoral success of AIPs (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010; Loxbo, 2010). Here, however, my main interest is in illustrating that the Sweden Democrats have had little success at changing the mainstream policy positions, not providing an explanation for the SD’s limited electoral fortunes.
228 Some have been particularly prone to hurl insults at any restrictive suggestion. A case in point is Kalle Larsson (V), who accused the People’s Party of being racist for suggesting a language test as part of the
good example of this hostile treatment took place in April 1993, when Social Democrat Georg Andersson launched a personal attack against Claus Zaar (ND):

I feel disgust and repugnance for the cynicism and xenophobia that Claus Zaar just expressed. It is sickening that a member of the Swedish parliament in this way cultivates prejudice and creates the breeding ground for growing xenophobia and racism. [...] I have seldom met someone who admits he is xenophobic. But I have met some who are, and I include Claus Zaar as one of them. (Pr. 1992/93:91, anf. 87, 89, October 6 1994)

Immediately afterwards, Berith Eriksson (V) stood up and proclaimed: “Mister Speaker! I first and foremost want to endorse Georg Andersson’s last contribution. He spoke for many of us, I believe” (Pr. 1992/93:91, anf. 90, October 6 1994).

The case of Sten Andersson offers another good illustration. After the elections of 1994 and the demise of New Democracy, the Moderate politician was left as the most outspoken critic of generous immigration policies in parliament, and, as such, a welcome target of critique for parliamentarians who wanted to paint the Moderate Party as a whole in a negative light (see for example, Pr. 1996/97:106, anf. 1-26, May 21, 1997). Andersson’s contributions were typically met with dismissive reactions from politicians of all political stripes (see Pr. 1999/2000:76, anf. 76-93, January 21, 2000), and since 1998 even colleagues from his own party started to distance themselves from him (Pr. 1997/98: anf. 60-63, March 25, 1998). In 2001, the Moderates placed Andersson on an unelectable position for the upcoming elections, and the Malmö politician who had represented the Moderates in parliament for almost twenty years quit the party. At the very first debate after his resignation, Moderate Anna Kinberg started her speech by saying: “Let me first note that I am no longer a fellow party member of Sten Andersson. I am very proud of that” (Pr. 2001/02:35, anf. 14, November 27, 2001). In the remaining months until the elections, any comments and questions Andersson made in parliament were simply answered by silence (see Pr. 2001/02:35, anf. 9-11, November 27, 2001; Pr. 2001/02:76, anf. 9, March 5, 2002).

naturalization procedure (Pr. 2005/06:41, anf. 76, November 30, 2005), and called the Support Requirement in family migration a form of discrimination (Pr. 2009/10:85, anf. 9, March 10, 2010).
As this example illustrates, mainstream political parties have not only met anti-immigrant politicians with hostility, they have also made much effort to reduce their political influence.\textsuperscript{229} Perhaps the most effective way they have done so is by refusing any cooperation and erecting a \textit{cordon sanitaire}. The Bildt government, for example, could have had a majority in parliament if it had reached an agreement with New Democracy. It refused to do so, however, and therefore needed to rely on left-wing parties to pass their bills, as it did, for example, in a large pension reform in the early 1990s (Gould, 2001, pp. 39-40; Lundberg, 2005).

The Sweden Democrats have received the same treatment. Two years before the 2010 election, Social Democrat Luciano Astudillo already wanted to know whether the government would cooperate with the Sweden Democrats in case they would win seats. Moderate party leader Reinfeldt declared that “me and the Moderates will forcefully work to make sure that the values that the Sweden Democrats stand for will not spread in Sweden”, and a total of seven other politicians of various parties (M, S, MP, FP) all affirmed they would never work with the anti-immigrant party (\textit{Pr. 2008/09:25, anf. 1-21, November 11, 2008}). True enough, even though in 2010 the coalition parties (M, FP, C, KD) lost their majority, they refused to negotiate with the Sweden Democrats.\textsuperscript{230} In order to pass an encompassing reform of immigration policies, for example, they reached an agreement with the Environment Party. At the presentation of the accord, Prime Minister Reinfeldt explicitly stated that the agreement was “a way to close the door for xenophobic forces” (Magnusson & Larsson, 2011). In sum, the second main reason why anti-immigrant movements have had little influence on political debate in Sweden is that the hostile and exclusionary response by mainstream parties has rendered them

\textsuperscript{229} Politicians have not been alone in attempting to silence anti-immigrant movements this way. Swedish media deliberately ignored the SD entirely until the International Free Press Society criticized this boycott in 2006 (Cohen, 2009). And even still, the SD faces uncooperative media. In the run-up to the 2010 elections, none of the television stations was willing to air the party’s campaign video (interview SWE05) and the largest daily newspaper \textit{Aftonbladet} refused to run any SD campaign ads (Helin & Mellin, 2009).

\textsuperscript{230} The SD has frequently complained about this. Sven-Olof Sällstrom, for example, decried: “Like jealous little children they sat down in the corner of the sandpit, took all the shovels and buckets with them, and refused to let the new boy in class come along and play. They in fact have no idea what kind of results possible negotiations could produce. They have refused to negotiate” (\textit{Pr. 2010/11:33, anf. 29, December 13, 2010}).
politically toothless. For that reason, anti-immigrant parties in Sweden have not been able to change the dominant mode of discussing immigration and its interaction with the welfare state.

_National identity._ A second reason why pleas for immigrant welfare exclusion are so rare in Swedish discourse can be found in the nature of its national identity. Unlike the Canadian case, it is not so much the protection of immigrants as such but rather the near-sanctity of egalitarianism that makes calls for immigrant exclusion unlikely. Foundational to the character of Sweden is the history of its generous and encompassing welfare state. Per Albin Hansson, often credited as the founder of this system[^231], famously argued that the state should offer a ‘people’s home’ *(folkhem)* where everyone is treated as equal brothers and sisters:

> In a good home there prevails equality, thoughtfulness, cooperation, helpfulness. As applied to the larger peoples’ and citizens’ home this implies a breaking down of all social and economic barriers which now divide citizens between the privileged and the forgotten, the rulers and the dependent, the rich and poor, the satiated and the utterly destitute, the plunderers and the plundered [...] The foundation of the people’s home is community and solidarity. The good home knows no privilege or neglect, no favourites and no stepchildren. (Quoted and translated by Heclo & Madsen, 1987, p. 157)

This concept has found much popular resonance (Borevi, 2012, pp. 26-7). Many authors have noted that Swedes tend to pride themselves for the generous system they live in and the comparatively low levels of inequality it has resulted in (Heclo & Madsen, 1987, p. 154; Kvist, Fritzell, Hvinden, & Kangas, 2012; Sainsbury, 2012, p. 222).

Survey data from the 2003 wave of the ISSP support his conclusion, even though this is not immediately obvious. On the one hand, only about 62 percent of Swedish respondents indicate to be ‘very proud’ or ‘somewhat proud’ of their social security system, and even fewer (41 percent) express pride in ‘the fair and equal treatment of all groups in society’.[^232] On the other

[^231]: One could question this reading of history. Sweden was a welfare state laggard and only started to develop an encompassing system of social insurance after Hansson’s death in 1946 (Olsson Hort, 2002).

[^232]: These percentages are low both in comparison to other countries (among the fourteen countries under study in Chapter Four, only respondents from Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States were less proud of their social security system, and only Germans expressed less pride of the fair and equal treatment in their society), and in comparison to other sources of pride (for example, more Swedes were proud of achievements in sports and science than of these two aspects). For the sake of legibility, I am not reporting the calculations referred to in this paragraph. Those can be made available upon request.
hand, however, these low numbers mask three important patterns in the data. First, Swedes are not very prone to express pride in their country in the first place: no less than 76 percent agreed with the statement that “there are some things about my country that make me feel ashamed”, and only 33 percent indicated to be ‘very proud’ to be a Swede.\(^{233}\) Second, many of the respondents who show no pride of Sweden’s welfare system or equality levels seem to do so because they want Sweden to be more egalitarian and inclusive. For example, fully 41 percent of those who said they were not proud of the ‘fair and equal treatment of all groups in society’ agreed that legal immigrants should have the exact same rights as native-born citizens. Moreover, people who said there are things about Sweden they are ashamed of were significantly less likely to think that the government spends too much money on immigrants, that more should be done to exclude illegal immigrants, and that immigration levels should be lowered than respondents who reported no shame of their country. Third, and finally, the minority of Swedes who do express pride in their country are also likely to be proud of its treatment of all social groups. In fact, every question in the ISSP survey that taps some type of national pride is positively and significantly correlated with pride in Sweden’s fair and equal treatment of groups in society.

All in all, the ISSP data tell us that Swedes who are proud of their country include fairness and equality as a reason for their pride, and that many of the respondents who indicate not to be proud seem to do so partly because they think the state is not inclusive and egalitarian enough in its treatment of the immigrant population.

In keeping with these findings, the Swedish ‘passion for equality’ (Kvist, Fritzell, Hviden, & Kangas, 2012, p. 6) has been of great importance in shaping immigration policies. Ever since the earliest attempts to formulate a coherent set of immigration policies in 1968, the political elite has been unanimous in emphasizing the importance of equality (jämlikhet), including equal access to social rights (Borevi, 2012, pp. 38-43). This has led to some of the most generous

\(^{233}\) Among the fourteen countries we have focused on so far, no country had a more ‘ashamed’ population, and only Germans and Dutch respondents expressed less pride than Swedes.
diversity and naturalization policies of Europe (Messina, 2007; Hilson, 2008; Eastmond, 2011). And in recent years, Swedish governments have seemed prone to make those policies even more inclusive. Since the passing of the 2001 Act on Swedish Citizenship, for example, it is now possible to hold dual citizenship. Other examples of the ongoing attempts to accommodate immigrant-induced diversity include the recent requirement for media to reflect cultural variety in Sweden, and the exemption of religious minorities from dress codes in the police and military (Tolley, 2011). According to Banting and Kymlicka’s Multiculturalism Policy Index (2011; see also Table A1.7), Sweden now has the third most multicultural policies in the world.

The institutionalization of egalitarianism in Sweden has made proposals for differentiation in social rights difficult to defend. As Charles Westin (1996, p. 214) points out, the equality norm meant that “immigrant workers were to enjoy the same social and economic rights as Swedes [...] This right has never seriously been questioned”. Indeed, politicians have often affirmed their commitment to egalitarianism in discussions about integration and immigrants’ social rights. See for example, integration minister Mona Sahlin’s (S) opening to a debate on the subject in 2002 (and note how she talks about more than the equality of all ‘Swedes’ or ‘Swedish citizens’): “The goal is very clear [...] all human beings who live in our country should have the same rights, the same duties, but also the same possibilities. The changes we should discuss today are: how do we make that possible?” (Pr. 2002/03:25, anf. 1, November 28, 2002).

Moreover, politicians frequently invoke the equality principle in objections to restrictive proposals. For example, when in the early 1990s a few Moderates suggested implementing a form of sponsorship requirements in family migration, the social democratic government rejected the proposals on the grounds that “Swedish citizens were not required to support their elderly parents” either (Sainsbury, 2006, p. 239; see also Borevi, 2012, p. 74). And when Sten Andersson (M) argued that the city of Malmö already takes in a disproportionately large share of asylum seekers and that therefore newcomers should not be allowed to settle there anymore, junior minister Leif Blomberg (S) expressed his disagreement as follows:
I think it is important that we as people in Swedish society, regardless of where we are born, will have the same rights and responsibilities. We should be equal [...] I as a human being should have the right to live wherever I want, for whatever reasons. That is obvious. That right I have as a Swede, and that right I should therefore also have if I have received a residence permit. (Pr. 1994/95:84, anf. 38, April 3, 1995).

Just like egalitarianism has offered a weapon against suggestions to restrict immigrants’ rights, so it has also been used as a tool to advocate further inclusion. For example, Gunilla Wahlén (V) argued that the children of asylum seekers should have more access to social services by saying that “an asylum-seeking child should have the same right to protection, support, and education as other children in Sweden” (Pr. 2003/04:115, anf. 143, May 13, 2004), and Ulf Nilsson (FP) advocated increased health care access for undocumented migrants on the basis that “all human beings have the same human rights” (Pr. 2008/09, anf. 90, December 9, 2008).

In sum, part of the reason why immigrants’ welfare dependence is rarely discussed in divisive terms in Sweden is because us-versus-them frames go against the norm of egalitarianism. In other words, there is a deeply rooted cultural reason why Swedes are unlikely to advocate offering less protection to immigrants than to native-born citizens.

Welfare regime. Third, and finally, we cannot understand the positive political translation of immigrants’ large welfare dependence without looking at the Swedish welfare state itself and, more specifically, at its universality and its historical focus on full employment. While over the last twenty years there have been cutbacks in the generosity of pension benefits, social insurance programs, and social assistance (Bergmark & Palme, 2003; Lundberg, 2005), the majority of scholars agree that the structure of the system has remained unchanged (Swank, 2002, pp. 122-60; Olsson Hort, 2002, p. 151; Hilson, 2008, p. 110).234 This is relevant for a variety of reasons.

First, in keeping with our institutionalist theory, the structure of the Swedish welfare state has produced a climate in which recipients of government transfers are unlikely to be seen as

234 This is not to say that the outcomes have remained stable as well. While Sweden used to have very low unemployment rates (the average between 1970 and 1991 was only 2.3 percent), since the economic crisis of the mid-1990s they have increased significantly and now hover around 7.5 percent (OECD, 2011a). Moreover, the unemployed population is now much more likely to rely on means-tested benefits than on contributory insurance programs than 20 or 30 years ago (Kuivalainen & Nelson, 2012).
undeserving. Because almost everyone simultaneously pays to and draws benefits from the system, there is little reason for working citizens to look jealously at an immigrant on welfare, not in the least because in the event they would become sick or unemployed they have access to more generous contributory insurance programs themselves (Franzén, 2004; Sjöberg, 2005).

Second, restricting immigrants' social rights is not an apparent option in a universalist context. As a senior civil servant in the Department of Health and Social Welfare explained:

The Swedish welfare system is a general system and it is universal. So it is not diversified between who you are, where you work, or anything. [...] It’s one-size-fits-all. [...] Since immigrants in Sweden as soon as they receive this permit to stay will be covered by the same system as everyone else in society, the likelihood of exclusionary reforms is smaller. They are eligible for the same system under the same conditions. (interview SWE12)

In other words, differentiation between immigrants and native-born citizens goes against the very logic of the institutional structure.

Instead, ever since the 1950s a central aspect of the Swedish welfare model has been the ‘work principle’ (arbetslinjen), a commitment to full employment based on the rationale that high employment levels are not only necessary to fund the expensive welfare system, but also that they are much more effective than any other instrument at lowering income inequality (Heclo & Madsen, 1987, p. 196; Socialförsäkring, 2005). Accordingly, the Swedish system has traditionally laid a much larger emphasis on active labour market policies than on passive unemployment benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1992; Bergmark & Palme, 2003; Huo, 2009), and this emphasis has become even more pronounced in recent years (Jenson 2012).

In the words of a government report, to be in favour of arbetslinjen is about as controversial in Swedish politics as being in favour of peace (Socialförsäkring, 2005, p. 9). It is unsurprising, then, that politicians frequently express their commitment to this principle in discussions about the economic integration of immigrants (Borevi, 2012, p. 44). Some of my interviewees did so even though I did not ask about the principle specifically (interviews SWE03, SWE04, SWE12), and the term often comes up in parliamentary discussions as well. Minister Lars Enqvist (S), for
example, concluded a comment on high unemployment levels among immigrants by declaring that: “the work principle is central in Swedish social policy [...] Everything needs to be done to make it possible for people to support themselves with a job of their own” (Pr. 1999/2000:68, anf. 146, February 17, 2000).

In other words, we can understand Swedish political parties responding to large-scale immigrant welfare dependence by immigrant-targeted labour market programs as the institutionalized reaction to unemployment. Whenever a particular group of people were disproportionately unemployed, Swedish governments have responded with targeted programs (Heclo & Madsen, 1987, p. 171; Bergmark & Palme, 2003, pp. 112, 115). A senior civil servant at the Department of Employment made this point as well:

Labour market policies in Sweden are targeted at so many different groups. When the ship industry was breaking down, we had targeted labour market policies for ship employees, and then we had all kinds of policies targeted at people who have been unemployed for a while, or at young people. So it’s really part of the package. We have so many different programs. (interview SWE11)

Some immigrant-targeted programs have been modelled explicitly on programs that were designed for other social groups. A job introduction program for immigrants (arbetsplats-introduktion för vissa invandrare), for example, has been based on an earlier program that targeted the unemployed with a disability (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2007, p. 127), and the ‘entry jobs’ (instegsjobb) used to exist as a program for youth newcomers on the labour market.

For this reason, critiques that integration services and immigrant-targeted labour market programs are a form of positive discrimination have enjoyed little currency in Sweden. Certainly, Sten Andersson (M) (Pr. 1992/93:91, anf. 99, April 14, 1993), and members of the ND (Pr. 1992/93:16, anf. 103, November 4, 1992) and SD (Pr. 2010/11:30, anf. 48, December 8, 2010, SWE05) have all made this argument, but the mainstream majority sees integration policies as an obvious part of the wide range of social programs the welfare state has to offer. As a senior civil servant at the Department of Employment explained:
We don’t have any discussion about positive discrimination, or affirmative action in this context, because active labour market policy is such a widely used tool in Sweden and has been for such a long time. [...] Everyone sees this as normal active labour market policy in Sweden. So why should it be different from someone who is long-term unemployed? (interview SWE11)

The politicians I interviewed made similar arguments. Ulf Nilsson (FP), for example, said that concerns about positive discrimination might be reasonable “if we hadn’t something like that for Swedes, but we have” (interview SWE03). Fredrick Federley (C) said that the targeted programs are “just the same thing as we have for people who are born in Sweden” (interview SWE04), and Christina Höj Larsen (V) said that her party’s support for targeted programs is “just the same as [our efforts] to get women into positions of power in society” (interview SWE06).

Overall, on the basis of an exclusive look at the economics of immigrants’ integration, it might be puzzling why there is hardly any support for pushing immigrants off benefits in Sweden, and instead, an almost parliament-wide support to spend more on the immigrant population. A look at political, cultural, and institutional factors offers an answer to that puzzle. Anti-immigrant parties have had little effect on political debates, egalitarianism is a central value in the national identity, and the benign policy response is well in line with the institutional structure of the welfare state.

In the final section, I will turn more explicitly to the second hypothesis of my theory, and discuss the effect of this political translation on policy changes, paying particular attention to the institutional dynamics immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are likely to face, and reflecting on what we could reasonably expect to happen in this policy area in the near future.

7.4 The future of the Swedish approach to immigration and welfare

As we have seen, the majority of the political elite is keen on protecting the social rights of immigrants, and therefore suggestions for immigrant welfare exclusion are seldom heard. Even if Swedish politicians suddenly suggested immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, however, there are clear limits to how far such reforms could go. As the other two countries under study,
Sweden is bound by a legal-institutional framework that is likely to thwart attempts to drastically reduce immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits.

Not only does the constitutionally enshrined principle of non-discrimination (Chapter 2, Article 12) make it impossible to directly differentiate in social rights on the basis of national origin, but as an EU member state and party to the ECHR, the UDHR, and the ICESCR, Sweden is also bound by many of the same international treaties that have obstructed immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in the Netherlands (Stokke, 2007; Migrationsverket, 2010). In this light, it is unsurprising that the Sweden Democrats favour leaving the EU. As Erik Almqvist told me: “We are fully aware that the EU comes with more and more demands on immigration policy, and they want to form a common immigration policy for the entire EU. [...] But we don’t want to be part of that” (interview SWE05).

Equally telling, however, is that other parties have taken the opposite position and clung to international agreements in order to push their immigrant-inclusionary agenda. The Environment Party, for example, submitted a motion in 2006 arguing that Sweden should ratify the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families as a way to further enshrine the (social) rights of immigrants:

The Environment Party believes that Sweden should ratify the convention there is on the rights of migrant workers and their families. The rules we have do not cover the protection this group needs. [...] The conditions for migrant workers - wherever in the world they might be - are too often poor, with minimum wages and tough labour conditions, and therefore the government should endorse all efforts that are made to improve migrant workers’ position. (Mo. 2005/06:K22, March 29, 2006.)

In other cases, politicians have argued that inclusionary reforms are necessary to better live up to the international treaties Sweden is already party to. A case in point is Gunvor Ericson’s (MP) argument that undocumented migrants’ limited health care access goes against the UN treaties Sweden has signed (Pr. 2008/09:45, anf. 89, December 9, 2008). Similarly, before Sweden granted the children of undocumented migrants access to health care and education in 2011,

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235 The Convention, which among other things guarantees equal treatment of migrant workers in social security (Article 27), has so far not been signed by any country with a net immigration rate. See above.
politicians frequently argued that the country violated the Convention of the Rights of the Child, in particular its directive to operate in the best interest of all children regardless of legal status. This argument was voiced as early as May 1994 by Brigitta Dahl (S) and Eva Zetterberg (V) (Pr. 1993/94:112, anf 2-3, May 27, 1994), and has since been repeated numerous times in motions and parliamentary commentary by politicians of the People's Party (Pr. 1998/99:63, anf. 78, March 4, 1999; Mo. 2004/05:S0556, September 30, 2005), the Left Party (Mo. 1998/99:Sf612, October 25, 1998; Mo. 2003/04:S0417, October 10, 2003; Pr. 2003/04:115, anf. 116, May 13, 2004), and the Environment Party (Pr. 2002/03:25, anf. 94, November 28, 2002).

In sum, in Sweden national and international legal obligations do not only offer a source of protection against possible future attempts at immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. They also function as a tool to bring about more inclusion. At the same time, however, the importance of these legal safeguards should not be overstated. While the Swedish judiciary technically has the right to strike down government bills on the grounds of unconstitutionality, it has never made use of that power (Stjernqvist, 1990; Nergelius, 2011). Moreover, unlike their counterparts in other EU member states, the national courts in Sweden have been disinclined to make use of the possibility of supranational judicial review through the ECJ (Wind, 2010). Given this judicial reluctance to overthrow decisions by the legislature or the executive, the views of politicians are what explain the relative absence of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms in Sweden.

At this point in time, all political parties except the SD are decidedly pro-immigrant. In immigration debates politicians have repeatedly noted this consensus. In a discussion about the recognition of foreign credentials, for example, Ana Maria Narti (FP) noted that “it is nice to take place in a debate where we don’t immediately end up in party politics and controversy for controversy’s sake”, a point that minister Leif Pagrotsky (S) was quick to agree with (Pr. 2004/05:50, anf. 47-48, December 14, 2004). Similarly, Göte Wahlström (S) started a more general debate about immigration policies by noting approvingly that “in large parts of the area of migration policy there is a large political consensus” (Pr. 2007/08:43, December 13, 2007).
This is not to say, however, that political stripe is irrelevant in the politics of immigrants’ social rights. For one thing, a look at the interpellations and motions that were tabled over the last two decades on this issue suggests a clear difference between center-left and center-right parties. Of the 36 interpellations and motions that criticized immigrants’ access to or use of social benefits and programs, 12 were submitted by New Democracy, 15 by the Moderates (seven of which by Sten Andersson), and another five by the People’s Party. The Left Party and the Environment Party did not submit any such proposals (see Appendix Tables A6.1, A6.2). When it comes to suggestions for inclusion, we see similar left-right dynamics: of the 105 motions and interpellations advocating more inclusion, the Left Party and the Environment Party are responsible for 23 each, and the Social Democrats for another 18 (Appendix Tables A6.3, A6.4).

Moreover, even on the issues that mainstream parties have reached agreements on, there is still controversy. For example, although all parties with the exception of the SD now agree that undocumented migrants should have access to some health care services, disagreements are large on the exact scope of services they should be entitled to. On the one hand, the Left Party and Environment Party have advocated offering everyone on Swedish soil equal access to health care regardless of residence status. The Moderates and the Center Party, on the other hand, agree with this position as far as children are concerned, but think that the only subsidized health care service that undocumented adults should have access to is emergency care.

Another instructive case is immigrants’ access to pension benefits. While every party agreed on the introduction of the Income Support for Elderly, there has been disagreement on how generous this benefit should be. The Left Party has suggested increasing the level of the Income Support to the level of a normal public pension, and the Environment Party has argued that not only UN recognized refugees should receive a public pension regardless of length of residence, but that this regulation should apply to everyone who arrives through the asylum stream.\(^\text{236}\) Parties to the right on the political spectrum, however, have shown little support for such ideas.

\(^{236}\) In addition, the MP has complained that the administrative requirements are too onerous, and that there are not enough efforts to increase the uptake (Pr. 2007/08:43, anf. 3, December 13, 2007).
As Fredrick Federley (C) puts it, “it all sounds great, but somebody has to pay for it” (interview SWE04).

Again, however, it should be emphasized that political disagreements are more often a matter of divergent views on the best ways to organize an immigrant society, not on whether Sweden should have a generous and open immigration system in the first place. Indeed, even the Christian Democrats, Center Party, People’s Party, and, since the turn of the century, the Moderates, have more often advocated inclusionary rather than exclusionary reforms (see Appendix Tables A6.1-A6.4). The only scenario, then, under which we can expect proposals for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms to become more common is that the Sweden Democrats would manage to attract a larger portion of the vote and as such enhance its political strength.

This is not unthinkable. For one thing, the so-called ‘Voter Barometer’, a monthly poll conducted among an average of about 1200 voters by research company United Minds, finds some evidence that the percentage of people who would vote for SD is growing. Although the Barometer reports some fluctuation in support for SD over time, since the election in 2010 the party has never polled below the 5.7 percent it received then, and in June 2012 its support was estimated to be as high as 8.7 percent (United Minds, 2012).

Besides pointing at these survey data, we can also draw on two theoretical reasons to expect that SD might increase its influence on the immigration debate in the near future. First, the party does not seem to suffer from the defects that most often lead to the downfall of AIPs. The party leader, Jimmy Åkesson, is uncontested and there is little sign of internal dissent within the party. Moreover, the Sweden Democrats have dissociated themselves (albeit not completely) from the extremist image it had in the 1990s. Second, the party seems more likely to effectively spread unease about immigrants’ place in the welfare state than New Democracy.

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237 Only one SD parliamentarian so far has left the party, and this case had nothing to do with internal political disagreements. In September 2011, William Petzäll was asked to give up his seat because of alcoholism problems, but he declined and continued as an independent (Baas & Wendel, 2011). He died a year later, after which his seat returned to the Sweden Democrats.

238 A video recently started to circulate that shows three prominent SD members harassing an immigrant man on the street, kicking and pushing him while shouting racist insults (Röstlund, 2012).
has been able to do. Not only is the anti-immigrant message much more central to the Sweden Democrats than it was to its predecessor (Ignazi, 2003, p. 159; Rydgren, 2006), but more importantly, it also defends a more leftist position on issues of redistribution and social policy and is therefore better placed to capture the welfare chauvinist vote. While New Democracy used to defend a squarely neo-liberal economic agenda and tended to attract the vote of business owners and the middle class (Rydgren, 2006, p. 10), the Sweden Democrats have portrayed themselves as ‘middle-of-the-road’ on economic issues (Åkesson, 2008, p. 6) or even as adamant supporters of a generous welfare system (interview SWE13). As such, the party has been more popular among the unemployed and low-income workers than the ND (Eger, 2010, p. 212). Data from the Swedish National Election Studies corroborate these conclusions. Whereas self-reported ND voters in the 1991 election were much more likely than other voters to think that cutting social benefits is a good idea and that reducing income differences is a bad one, there are no significant differences on these issues between self-reported SD voters and other respondents in the 2010 iteration of the survey.239

On the other hand, however, even if the Sweden Democrats become a larger player in the Riksdag, it still seems difficult to imagine future immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. For one thing, the AIP would more likely focus any political influence it acquires on changing admission policies than on curtailing immigrants’ social rights. More importantly, it is doubtful that the party will ever be able to exert significant political influence in the first place. Even if the Sweden Democrats exceed the wildest predictions, they will never win a majority of the seats, and therefore will have to convince some of the other parties in parliament to cooperate with them. And that does not seem likely, considering the hostile reactions the Sweden Democrats tend to receive from their colleagues in parliament, and the principled stance all mainstream parties seem to take on the need for a cordon sanitaire.

239 These calculations are not shown, but can be made available upon request.
This brings us full circle. In summary, the Swedish case has been instructive in light of the theory presented in Chapter Two. While there are few countries in the world where immigrants are as overrepresented in the welfare system, this has not led to any immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. Instead, in many respects, including the social rights of undocumented migrants, the access to non-contributory programs, and the scope of immigrant-targeted services, the Swedish welfare state has become more generous towards its immigrant population. The reason for this paradoxical outcome can be found in political, institutional, and cultural characteristics. In the absence of vocal anti-immigrant parties, and in the context of a universalist welfare state that has always strived for full employment, the large welfare dependence of immigrants has been politically translated as a sign that the state has not served immigrants well enough, and that it should undertake more efforts to improve immigrants’ standing in the labour market. The exclusionary option of disentitling newcomers from programs and benefits, conversely, does not only go against the very structure of the system, but also against the value of egalitarianism that is central to Swedish national identity. For that reason, there have been few attempts at immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, and there is little evidence to suggest that such attempts will become more frequent in the near future.
The main goal of this research has been to shed light on why in some countries, but not in others, immigrants’ use of social programs has recently become politically contested. More specifically, I have aimed to explore under which conditions it is most likely that the population becomes unwilling to share a redistributive welfare state with newcomers, and relatedly, that policy-makers will restrict or limit immigrants’ access to benefits. This final chapter summarizes the findings of this inquiry, draws comparative conclusions from the three case studies, and discusses the theoretical, political, and normative implications of the outcomes of this study.

So far, there have been few attempts in the literature to develop a theory specifically designed to explain the phenomenon of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. However, this has not prevented politicians, public commentators, and academics from speculating freely about the origins of these policy changes. Political proponents tend to publicly justify these exclusions as a response to ‘incontrovertible facts’ about immigrants’ use of social benefits. Immigrants make so much use of social programs, so the explanation goes, that unlimited access will surely make a redistributive welfare state an unsustainable project. As Martin Bosma, commonly seen as the brain behind Dutch anti-immigrant party PVV, puts it, “the facts are the facts, and that’s what we should base our actions on” (Bosma, 2010, p. 206). Similarly, many observers have pointed at the tension between open borders and generous welfare policies to argue that differentiation in social rights or even the downright exclusion of (some groups of) migrants from certain benefits is but a necessary response to the economic pressure of immigration (Engelen, 2003; Goodhart, 2004).
One of the key conclusions of this research is that this ‘intuitive’ explanation is wrong. There is some indication that concerns about immigrants’ welfare use become more pronounced in economically difficult times. But it is not the case that calls for the exclusion of immigrants from social programs have been loudest where and when immigrants are most reliant on the welfare system. In other words, the welfare costs of immigrants cannot explain cross-national or cross-temporal differences in the politics of immigrants’ social rights.

To many political scientists, this conclusion might seem unsurprising. A large literature shows that the same social facts can receive a very different treatment in different political communities. In the comparative literature on social policy change, for example, many have noted that the way political elites talk about pressures on the welfare system, and the frequency with which they do so, has a large influence on whether retrenchment ultimately takes place. The importance of such processes of political translation of economic facts is particularly large, however, when it comes to the welfare costs of immigration. Immigration is a topic that is particularly sensitive to framing effects. Changes to immigrants’ welfare access are motivated not only by considerations about the economic sustainability of the welfare state, but also by beliefs regarding the entitlements of newcomers to a society. Therefore, rather than focusing primarily on the actual costs of immigrants’ welfare dependence, it is important to direct our attention to the way these costs are translated into political discourse. In some contexts, immigrant welfare costs are carefully kept off the table. In others, they are at the center of political attention. In some settings, the costs are explained as the outgrowth of immigrants’ difficulties on the labour market, and therefore serve as an argument for expanding state efforts to assist integration. In others, they are framed as evidence that immigrants are generally lazy and have a tendency to take advantage of the system. Characteristics of the political system help to explain which of these translations most likely becomes dominant. Immigrants’ welfare dependence is most likely to lead to suggestions for welfare exclusion in countries with a large anti-immigrant party, an exclusionary national identity, and a non-universal welfare regime.
The second main conclusion is that the institutional dynamics of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are different from what we know about social policy changes of a more general nature. Whereas across-the-board cutbacks in social programs have been shown to solicit large-scale opposition from the electorate, immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are likely to meet less public resistance. Few voters will themselves be affected by policy changes aimed at disentitling future newcomers to the country. In other words, immigrant-excluding welfare reforms tend to target people who have no voice in the decision-making process. Instead of democratic opposition, a more significant obstacle to exclusionary welfare reforms is posed by prohibitions on differential treatment flowing from both domestic and international legal structures. In order to push through their proposals, therefore, politicians seeking to disentitle immigrants are forced to employ different strategies than their counterparts who are intent on scaling back social programs in a more general fashion. Most importantly, the implementation of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms often necessitates either working around or amending the relevant legal roadblocks.

These two major conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the previous chapters. First, a quantitative comparison of a dozen Western welfare states found no positive relationship between levels of immigrant welfare use and selective solidarity. In some countries, such as Austria and Ireland, concerns about immigrant welfare use are widespread despite the fact that the actual welfare costs of immigration are low by comparative standards. Conversely, in other countries, such as Sweden and Norway, we found respondents to display few signs of selective solidarity even though the use immigrants make of transfer benefits is extremely high. This finding is not just based on a simple aggregate comparison. When we control for individual characteristics (such as religion, age, and employment status) and for country characteristics (such as welfare regime type and nation-building policies), the conclusion stands: respondents in countries where immigrants make much use of transfer benefits are not more likely to be welfare chauvinist than their counterparts in communities where immigrant welfare
dependence is low. Moreover, we find the same result if we base our calculations on different types of transfer benefits, different indicators of immigrant welfare dependence, different indicators of selective solidarity, different time periods, or different country samples.

Second, the more qualitative analyses of recent developments in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden, which allowed for a more complete testing of my theoretical model, are also largely supportive. To start, immigrants’ reliance on transfer benefits is much larger in the Netherlands and Sweden than in Canada. As Figure 8.1 shows, while in recent years240 about 12 percent of immigrants in the Netherlands, and about 16 percent in Sweden, were receiving social assistance, welfare use among their counterparts in Canada has hovered around 5.5 percent. As such, immigrants tend to be overrepresented among welfare recipients by a factor of 5.5 in the Netherlands and 5.8 in Sweden, but of only 1.2 in Canada.241

![Figure 8.1. Percentage of immigrant population in receipt of social assistance, Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden, 1999-2007. (Source: CBS, 2012; SLID; SCB, 2012.)](image)

These economic differences do not correspond to levels of selective solidarity among the public.

A first illustration of this point is Figure 8.2, which shows the percentage of citizen respondents

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240 For reasons of data availability in all three countries, the graph only displays data for 1999-2007.
241 Over this time period, native-born social assistance recipiency rates averaged around 2.3 percent in the Netherlands, 4.7 percent in Canada, and 2.7 percent in Sweden.
in these three countries who agreed that immigration is not good for the economy, that government spends too much money on immigrants, and that legal non-citizens should not have the same rights as citizens in the 2003 wave of the ISSP.\textsuperscript{242} While Canadians are less likely to argue that immigration is bad for the economy than the Dutch, respondents in these two countries answer almost identically to the other two questions, despite the large differences in actual levels of immigrant welfare dependence.\textsuperscript{243} Even more tellingly, in Sweden, where immigrants’ reliance on the welfare state is highest, the support for these indirect indications of selective solidarity tends to be lower than in both the Netherlands and in Canada.

Figure 8.2. Indirect indicators of welfare chauvinism among Dutch, Canadian, and Swedish public, 2003. (Source: ISSP 2003. See Table A1.3 for more information.)

The picture becomes even clearer when we turn our attention to the development of public attitudes over time. Unfortunately, there are no cross-national surveys that could help us in this

\textsuperscript{242} I have recoded some of the scores for presentation purposes. See Table A1.3 for more information.  
\textsuperscript{243} Two-tailed independent-samples t-tests suggest that neither of the two differences are statistically significant (p values are 0.73 and 0.46, respectively). These similarities in response patterns are surprising in light of the different nature of the politics of immigrants’ social rights in these two countries. It is important to note, however, that survey data do suggest a large difference in the direction of change of public attitudes: while Canadians seem to become more positive about immigrants’ place in the welfare state over the last two decades, the opposite trend appears in the Netherlands. See below.
regard, and national surveys in these three countries have not used the same question to trace the development of general immigration attitudes over time. For that reason, we cannot use these national surveys to compare absolute levels of xenophobia or selective solidarity. What we can do, however, is compare the direction of change. Figure 8.3 shows the development from 1991 to 2010 in respondents’ general objections to overall immigration levels.\textsuperscript{244}

\[\text{Figure 8.3. Objections to immigration among Dutch, Canadian, and Swedish public, 1991-2010. (Source: DPES, CCNS, Environics Focus Canada, SOM, and own calculations.)}\]

Again, the picture does not match economic developments. The economic integration of immigrants has recently deteriorated in Canada, but improved in the Netherlands and Sweden.

\textsuperscript{244} Missing years are replaced with interpolations. The Canadian data is drawn from the Environics Focus Canada surveys, and shows the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement ‘there is too much immigration in Canada’. The Swedish data is based on the Society, Opinion and Media survey, and represents the percentage of people who believe it is a ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good idea’ to ‘take in fewer refugees’. Longitudinal data in the Netherlands is harder to find, and therefore Figure 8.3 relies on two questions that, in those years that they were asked at the same time, produced very similar results. From 1991 to 2004, the Cultural Changes in the Netherlands Survey has asked respondents whether they believe there are ‘too many foreigners in our country’. From 1998 to 2010, the Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study surveyed whether, on a 7- scale, people believe that the Netherlands should admit more asylum seekers (1) or send as many back as possible to their country of origin (7). The line in Figure 8.3 represents, from 1991 to 1997, the percentage of respondents who agreed there were too many foreigners in the CCNS, from 2005 to 2010, the percentage of respondents who gave a score of 5 or higher on the asylum question in the DPES, and, from 1998 to 2004, the average of those two scores.
What we see, however, is that attitudes about immigration have become more favourable over time in Canada and Sweden, but have remained relatively stable in the Netherlands.

The same conclusion emerges when we focus more squarely on feelings of selective solidarity. Figure 8.4 shows the portion of the population that simultaneously favours income redistribution and opposes immigration. Again, because of differences in question wording from one national survey to another, we should be careful in drawing comparative conclusions about overall levels of welfare chauvinism. The differences in the direction of change, however, are telling. We see that in both Canada and Sweden, the percentage of the electorate that favours the welfare chauvinist policy mix has decreased over time, while the Netherlands shows the opposite development.

Figure 8.4. Percentage of respondents in favour of income redistribution but opposed to immigration, Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, 1991-2010. (Source: DPES, CES, SNES, and own calculations.)

Missing data are replaced with interpolations. The line for the Netherlands shows the percentage of people who gave a score of 5 or higher on (a) a 1-7 scale asking whether income differences should be made smaller and (b) a 1-7 scale asking whether the Netherlands should admit more asylum seekers (1) or send as many back as possible to their country of origin (7). The line for Canada shows the percentage of respondents who indicated (a) that much more or somewhat more should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada and (b) that Canada should admit fewer immigrants. The line for Sweden is based on the percentage of respondents who indicated that they think it a very good or fairly good idea to (a) reduce income differences in society and (b) take in fewer refugees. See also Table 5.2 and Figures 6.3 and 7.3.
The mismatch between developments in immigrants’ welfare use and selective solidarity does not only become apparent when we look at the public at large. We see the same disconnect when we look at politicians’ views on how the welfare state should deal with newcomers. Again, it is useful to summarize the insights from the three case studies in comparative graphs. One thing we can look at is parliamentary activity. Figure 8.5 shows the number of motions, petitions, and questions that parliamentarians have brought forward over the last twenty years advocating a reduction of immigrants’ access to programs and benefits, minus the number proposing more welfare inclusion. As such, it indicates how the social rights of immigrants have most commonly been discussed over time.

![Figure 8.5. Number of questions, motions, interpellations, and petitions advocating immigrant welfare exclusion minus number advocating inclusion, Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden, 1991-2010.](image)

The pattern is similar to what we saw in public opinion data. In the Netherlands, suggestions to exclude migrants have become more common over time, whereas Canada has experienced the opposite development. In Sweden, proposals for inclusion have consistently outnumbered proposals for exclusion, with only a few exceptions (1993-1994, the heydays of anti-immigrant
New Democracy; 2004, when many politicians worried about the consequences of the EU enlargement for the Swedish welfare state; and 2010, when anti-immigrant party Sweden Democrats first made its parliamentary appearance).

Equally telling is the picture that emerges when we look at how these countries have aimed to defuse the tension between open immigration and generous welfare policies. As said above, while some observers have suggested that the exclusion of newcomers from benefits is but a necessary reaction to an overrepresentation of immigrants among welfare recipients, this strategy has not at all enjoyed the same currency in each of these welfare states. For example, all three countries experienced an economic crisis in the mid-1990s, among other things characterized by high levels of immigrant unemployment. But the policy reaction was strikingly different. In the Netherlands, politicians undertook more efforts to make sure undocumented migrants could not make use of social assistance or other transfer benefits, culminating in the Linking Act which formally excluded everyone without a legal residence permit from all benefits and programs except emergency care and education for children. The Liberal government of Canada, conversely, decided to make changes to its admission policy, making sure that a larger part of the annual intake of newcomers would consist of people who had been specifically selected on the basis of economic criteria. In Sweden, finally, the reaction was yet different. It introduced changes to social policy of a general nature, and required all welfare recipients to demonstrate they are active at either looking for a job or improving their qualifications, or lose their benefits.

How these three countries have responded to family migration offers another instructive example. Again, the Netherlands moved most clearly in an exclusionary direction: by extending so-called partner-dependent residence permits and increasing the waiting period before migrants can claim independent permanent residence status, it made sure that family migrants are not able to access any residence-based social benefits in their first years in the country. In Canada, those types of arrangements were already in place, but policy-makers did not choose to
expand the duration of sponsorship agreements, but instead to increase governmental oversight on whether these agreements were being upheld in practice. Sweden, finally, did not introduce any mechanism of this sort until 2007, and in sharp contrast to the other two cases, this policy change has been met with fierce criticism from opposition parties. Moreover, the arrangement it ultimately adopted is decidedly less restrictive than what the Netherlands and Canada have implemented. The so-called Support Requirement only affects about 25 percent of all incoming family migrants, and entails a one-time test whether the ‘sponsor’ has sufficient housing space and makes at least a minimum wage. Most importantly, it does not include any restrictions on benefit access for the migrants themselves.

More generally, there are at least four strategies policy-makers can make use of in avoiding or reducing high levels of immigrant welfare dependence: (1) restrict immigrants’ access to benefits; (2) employ a selective admission policy that ensures only immigrants who are likely to do well economically enter the country; (3) expand integration services to stimulate immigrants’ vertical mobility; and (4) implement across-the-board cutbacks in welfare state generosity to bring about an overall reduction in social spending. In my interviews with the parliamentary spokespeople on these issues of all major Dutch, Canadian, and Swedish political parties in these three countries246, I asked which of these strategies their party deems desirable. Figure 8.6 summarizes the answers I received on these questions: for each country, it shows the percentage of political parties that are in favour of each of the four alternatives, weighted by the percentage of seats they occupied in parliament at the time these interviews were conducted (early to mid-2011).247

The picture that emerges is striking. In the Netherlands, almost 80 percent of parliament favours restrictions on immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits, and the support for employing a more selective admission policy is even larger (more than 90 percent). The two

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246 In total, the politicians I interviewed represent the official views of 87 percent of Members of the Lower House of Dutch parliament, 98 percent of the Canadian House of Commons, and 93 percent of the Swedish Riksdag.

247 For a detailed overview by party, see Tables 5.3, 6.2, and 7.2. In those cases that a spokesperson only expressed partial support for a policy strategy, I coded the party as being half in favour.
other options enjoy much less support. Perhaps most strikingly, only about 1 in 3 Dutch parliamentarians advocate improving immigrants’ social position by immigrant-targeted integration services. In contrast, in Canada the dominant view is that immigrant welfare dependence can best be avoided by combining expansive integration services and selective admission policies (the NDP has argued, however, that the mix of the immigrant inflow should be adjusted to reduce the percentual intake of economic migrants). Disentitling immigrants from social programs and benefits, on the other hand, receives no support from any of the major federal political parties. Politicians in Sweden, finally, favour the most inclusionary approach. Very few advocate either welfare exclusion or restrictive admission policies, and with the exception of small anti-immigrant party Sweden Democrats, all parties favour a wide set of integration programs and services. In addition, all right-of-center parties believe that a flexibilization of the labour market and an overall cut in welfare generosity could improve the economic integration of the immigrant population.

Figure 8.6. Political party support for different responses to Progressive’s Dilemma, Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden.

248 The only exception is the Conservative government’s recent decision to cut supplementary health care services for refugees. In Ontario, the only party that has ever advocated a reduction of immigrants’ social rights is the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party. In the 2010 election campaign, it proposed a one year residence requirement on access to social assistance.
In sum, a variety of empirical evidence shows that the political translation of the costs immigrants incur on the welfare system has been very different in these three countries. In the Netherlands they tend to be framed as evidence that immigrants have a welfare penchant and therefore serve as an argument for welfare exclusion. In Canada, when the costs of immigration come up they are typically framed as indication that the immigration system does not work properly, and therefore, they can lead to pleas for a selective admission policy. In Sweden, finally, the high levels of immigrant welfare dependence are usually explained as a sign that the welfare state is not doing enough to help immigrants succeed economically, and therefore are taken as a reason to expand the number of programs and services immigrants can make use of. And importantly, we have seen that differences in actual levels of immigrant welfare dependence do not help to explain why the politics of immigrants’ social rights are so different in these three countries.

In addition to this three-way comparison, this study presents at least three other reasons to conclude that economic facts regarding immigrants’ integration are at best of only secondary importance. First, patterns of immigrant welfare dependence cannot explain diachronic differences within each country. In the Netherlands, selective solidarity seems to have spread over the last fifteen years while immigrants’ employment outcomes have improved. In Canada, conversely, over the last twenty years newcomers have started to turn to the state for support in larger numbers, but this has not led to a concomitant rise in selective solidarity. Second, politicians themselves tend to argue that their position on the social rights of immigrants is primarily motivated by other than economic reasons. Some of my interviewees freely admitted that their plans to reduce immigrants’ benefit access are not based on a careful cost-benefit analysis. Others referred to principled or cultural reasons when asked to justify their policy position on this subject. Third, in those instances that politicians did invoke economic arguments for placing limits on immigrants’ access to social programs, they often depended on a rather opportunistic use of facts. For example, critics have often aimed their welfare chauvinist
arrows at targets that involve few costs (for example, many Dutch politicians criticized the reliance on unemployment benefits among Polish migrants at a time that not 1 in 150 Polish citizens in the Netherlands were making use of them), relied on exaggerations when describing economic reality (politicians of Swedish anti-immigrant party New Democracy, for example, on several occasions maintained that the majority of immigrants are on welfare), or even changed the facts according to political expediency (for example, the very Canadian politicians who maintained that the welfare dependence of immigrants was becoming economically unsustainable also argued against employment equity policies on the basis that immigrants tend to outperform native-born citizens).

As hypothesized, we can much better understand the origins of selective solidarity when we turn our attention to three country characteristics. First, the sustained presence of a large anti-immigrant party in the Netherlands has made the social rights of immigrants more amenable to political contestation. Not only have anti-immigrant politicians consistently taken up a sizeable share of the seats in Dutch parliament over the last ten years (on average about 9 percent over the 2002-2011 period), they have also had a larger influence on government policy and the policy positions of mainstream parties than in the other two countries under study. The short-lived LPF was a coalition partner in the even shorter-lived Balkenende-I cabinet (2002-2003), and the PVV provided guaranteed support to the Rutte-I cabinet (2010-2012) in exchange for policy concessions. And even though it is true that both anti-immigrant parties have been met with accusations of xenophobia (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007, p. 20), all the spokespeople of mainstream parties I interviewed asserted that the ascendance of the LPF and PVV demonstrate that the political elite has unjustly ignored concerns about immigration, and it is necessary to take such concerns more seriously in the future. Conversely, in Canada and Sweden the electoral success and political influence of anti-immigrant parties have been much less pronounced. True enough, the Liberal Party of Canada adopted a more restrictive position on admission policy right at the time that a populist party seemed to reap electoral benefits from its immigration
critiques, and the Swedish Social Democrats explicitly justified restrictions on refugee policy as a way to defuse the looming success of anti-immigrant party Sweden Democrats. Overall, however, the response from mainstream parties to outwardly anti-immigrant voices has tended to be dismissive and hostile. The Sweden Democrats, for example, have been faced with a cordon sanitaire since even before they entered parliament in 2010.

An additional difference of relevance is that Dutch anti-immigrant parties have been much more explicit in propagating selective solidarity than either the Canadian Reform Party or the Sweden Democrats. Indeed, while it is true that all these parties have repeatedly drawn the attention to the costs immigrants pose on the welfare budget, the Dutch AIPs (especially the PVV) have framed their critiques in more explicitly divisive terms. Most importantly, while the PVV has proposed a wide range of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms (such as increasing the residence requirement on social assistance to ten years, and disentitling Dutch children temporarily residing in Turkey or Morocco from child benefits), immigration critics in the Canadian and Swedish parliament have made very few of those suggestions. Indeed, the Reform Party of Canada hardly ever targeted immigrants who already had been admitted, and tended to advocate restrictions in admission policy, not in immigrants’ access to programs and benefits. The Sweden Democrats have certainly made some suggestions for welfare exclusion (for example, a party document suggested allowing municipalities to prioritize taking care of long-term residents over recent newcomers), but they have been discreet about them when communicating with the public at large. When I asked about these plans, the SD immigration spokesperson simply denied they existed.

A second explanation can be found in the character of national identity. Over the last ten years, the understanding of what it means to be Dutch has undergone a significant transformation. The argument that the character of the Netherlands needs to be protected against foreign influences has become more common among policy-makers and the public alike, and it has resulted in considerable restrictions in naturalization and integration policies. In
contrast, Canada has invariably promoted an inclusive national identity that is explicitly open to accommodating (immigration-induced) diversity, and Swedish governments have over the last twenty years become increasingly involved in conceptualizing the equal treatment of diverse groups as a fundamental characteristic of ‘Swedishness’. These different conceptions of national identity have had predictable effects on discussions about immigrants’ entitlements to welfare programs and benefits. In the Netherlands, the argument that the state owes more to ‘true’ Dutch people than to immigrants has become pervasive, and at times politicians have even explicitly framed cultural belonging as a condition for enjoying equal social rights. In Canada and Sweden, conversely, popular conceptions of national identity have served as an argument against suggestions for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. In case of the former, it is the understanding of Canada as a nation of immigrants that has made suggestions for differentiating between native-born and immigrants unlikely to be successful; in the latter, it is the Swedish tradition of egalitarianism that performed that function.

Finally, we need to pay attention to the structure of the welfare state if we want to understand why patterns of immigrant welfare dependence become translated politically the way they do. For one thing, the universal system of Sweden has produced a climate in which a larger portion of the electorate believes that human beings have a right to state support regardless of their life history than in the other two cases.249 This decreases the chance that any group that makes much use of transfer benefits will be considered undeserving. In both the Christian Democratic regime of the Netherlands and the more liberal system of Canada, the deservingness of recipients is much more in focus, which makes it more likely that eyebrows will be raised about a group of people that is overrepresented in certain programs. Second, the

249 For example, in a 2006 survey of the International Social Survey Programme on the role of government, 28.6 percent of Swedish respondents said that it “definitely should be the responsibility of the government to provide jobs for everyone”, whereas that percentage was 19.5 in the Netherlands and 12.5 in Canada. Similarly, 27.0 percent of Swedes indicated that it “definitely should be the responsibility of the government to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed”, and the comparable figures were 15.9 for the Netherlands and 18.1 for Canada. See also the findings of more systematic research, such as Matthews and Erickson, 2008; Larsen, 2008; Finseraas, 2012.
structure of the welfare state also influences the way that policy-makers are likely to respond to new developments. One of the main pillars of the Swedish system is the so-called ‘work principle’, a commitment to full employment that has resulted in a wide range of active labour market policies. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Swedish policy-makers have turned to these same tools to address high levels of immigrant welfare dependence. In the Netherlands, conversely, the unemployed have traditionally been met with passive benefits rather than with active programs. This leaves benefit reduction - either for the population in general, or for immigrants in particular - as a much more likely answer to increases in the size of the welfare clientele. (And indeed, in Dutch policy documents and parliamentary debates, the phrases ‘reducing immigrants’ reliance on programs’ and ‘reducing immigrants’ access to programs’ are used almost interchangeably.) Finally, one might expect disentitlement to be a more common response in Canada as well, considering the large number of means-tested programs and, compared to Sweden at least, small number of active labour market policies, but the encompassing set of integration services aimed at ameliorating immigrants’ economic performance that have been offered since at least the 1980s has gone largely unchallenged (and in fact, has been expanded even more). We need to turn to the two factors described above to understand that outcome.

The sharp differences in the political translation of immigration’s costs for the welfare state have led to very different policy outcomes. In fact, country-level differences in the dominant discourse on immigrants’ social rights turn out to be much more important than party-level differences in ideological orientation. In other words, two ideologically different parties in one country are more likely to see eye to eye on this subject than two ideologically similar parties in different countries. This does not mean that party differences are non-existent or irrelevant. In all three countries, we see that parties of the left are more likely to advocate inclusion than parties of the right. But the more striking observation is that in each of these three countries, political parties are by and large in agreement about the desirability of immigrant-excluding
welfare reforms. With hardly any opposition from inside or outside parliament, Dutch governments have scaled down the entitlements of migrants in a large number of ways: they stripped undocumented migrants from almost all benefits, mandated that only individuals with a 'durable connection' can make use of social assistance and other social provisions, increased residence requirements for family migrants, lowered the benefit available to elderly people with a pension gap, restricted the possibilities to export benefits abroad, and scrapped almost the entire budget for integration services. In Sweden, reforms aimed at more welfare inclusion, such as the expansion of social rights for undocumented migrants, an increase in services available to refugee claimants, the implementation of a variety of immigrant-targeted labour market programs, and the introduction of a specifically immigrant-tailored pension benefit, have gone through parliament with a similar level of consensus. In Canada, there certainly are important disagreements between especially the CPC and the NDP (concerning, in particular, the appropriate emphasis on economic migrants, or the entitlements of temporary migrants), but few parliamentarians challenge the model of carefully selecting newcomers, offering them a wide range of settlement services, and, most importantly, extending the same benefits to permanent residents as to native-born citizens.

Finally, this research has highlighted the importance of national and international legal structures in the politics of immigrants’ social rights. This is most apparent in the Dutch case, where attempts at immigrant-excluding welfare reforms have been most numerous. It seems safe to say that policy-makers would have gone further in excluding immigrants from the welfare state if the Netherlands were not bound by national and international legal prohibitions on differential treatment. In 2006 parliament unanimously adopted a motion asking the government to investigate the legal possibilities of implementing a range of reforms (such as coupling the level of a social assistance benefit to the years someone spent in the country, and denying social assistance to refugee claimants in an appeal procedure), but those changes were deemed legally impossible and have therefore been abandoned. In other cases, welfare exclusion
could only come about after withdrawing from international conventions (in case of the restrictions on exporting disability benefits, which required abandoning ILO convention 118) or by carefully navigating the legal obstacles (for example, since denying social assistance to permanent migrants violates the non-discrimination principle, Dutch governments have set longer residence requirements for achieving permanent residence status instead). In the other two cases, the legal obstacles to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are of less relevance simply because fewer attempts at such reforms have been undertaken. In some cases, legal commitments to equal treatment have instead been used as a weapon to advocate more inclusion. In Sweden, for example, in the discussions that ultimately led to granting the children of undocumented migrants unrestricted access to education, many politicians argued that the extant policy constellation went against the UN Convention on the Right of the Child.

Table 8.1. Summary of recent policy developments in immigrants’ social rights in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social rights of undocumented immigrants</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to general tax-funded pension benefits</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to non-contributory programs</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant-targeted programs</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1 summarizes the overall direction of recent developments in the social rights of undocumented migrants, immigrants’ access to general tax-funded pension benefits, migrants’ access to non-contributory programs such as social assistance, and specifically immigrant-targeted programs such as integration services and immigrant-tailored active labour market programs. This summary merely highlights what we have seen before: overall, the Netherlands have moved in a more restrictive direction, Canada has mostly been marked by policy stability, and Sweden has become more inclusionary over time.
Overall, then, the comparative study of the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden by and large supports the theory of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms described in Chapter Two. Table 8.2, which summarizes the comparative conclusions of the last pages, illustrates this succinctly. What we see is that immigrant-excluding welfare reforms are not a necessary result in countries where immigrants’ overrepresentation among welfare dependents is high, and that whether these policy changes come about can be better understood by looking at the political translation of the welfare costs of immigration.

Table 8.2. Overview of relevant comparisons in the politics of immigrants’ social rights in the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant welfare dependence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant parties</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare regime</td>
<td>Non-universal</td>
<td>Non-universal</td>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective solidarity among public</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective solidarity in parliament</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Low - stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred strategy to handle Progressive’s Dilemma</td>
<td>Disentitle &amp; selective intake</td>
<td>Selective intake &amp; invest in integration</td>
<td>Invest in integration &amp; general reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall policy direction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Netherlands, the combination of large and influential anti-immigrant parties, an exclusive national identity, and a non-universal welfare regime have produced a dominant discourse that blames immigrants for their high levels of welfare dependence, and as such have produced a fertile breeding ground for immigrant-excluding welfare reforms. In Sweden, objective levels of immigrant welfare dependence are at least as high as in the Netherlands, but in the absence of a successful anti-immigrant party and in a context of an inclusive and egalitarian national identity and a universal welfare regime, the translation has been less divisive, and as such the policy response has been more inclusive. The policy response in Canada, where immigrants make comparatively little use of transfer benefits, can be characterized as more inclusive than the
Netherlands, but more exclusionary than Sweden. While the crucial role of immigrants in the character of its national identity has proved a weapon against suggestions for disentitlement, it has implemented a series of restrictions aimed at attracting only those immigrants who are unlikely to turn to the state for support. Moreover, the continued use of sponsorship agreements in the area of family migration (and in fact, a stricter adherence to those agreements than in the past), shows that even in the extension of social rights Canada is not as inclusionary as self-congratulating politicians make it out to be.

The findings of this project are important for a number of reasons. First, they add to the study of the relationship between immigration and welfare politics. The focus of recent scholarship on the aggregate effect of immigration on welfare state institutions and public support for redistribution paints an incomplete picture of the immigration-welfare nexus. After all, such a focus seems to ignore that politicians who are worried about immigration’s impact on the welfare budget have more options at their disposal than pushing for a general retrenchment of the welfare state. Especially in the context of widespread anti-immigrant sentiment, the alternative option of reducing immigrants’ access to the welfare state is likely to be much more popular. In contrast to one of the central assumptions in the available literature, this research finds that xenophobia reduces the likelihood of across-the-board welfare retrenchment. In the case of the Netherlands, we saw that policy-makers tend to respond to economic pressure by reducing immigrants’ welfare access, not by cutting in the generosity of the system as a whole. Ironically, the Swedish case suggests that it is in a community that is firmly committed to equality that social policy cutbacks of a general nature can be a more likely response.

Second, these findings have implications for the more general literature on the politics of immigration. For a long time, political scientists studying immigration have understandably targeted their analyses at admission, naturalization, integration, and diversity policies. While such research is undoubtedly important, we have seen in the previous pages that concerns about
immigration can be so powerful that they even lead to changes in policies that have not been
designed to manage migration or immigrant-induced diversity. Some of my interviewees in the
Netherlands, for example, explicitly defended amendments in social policies as a strategy to
address concerns about the effect of immigration on Dutch national identity. The study of such
spill-over effects seems a promising venue for future research, not only because of its
implications for the practice of policy-making, but also because they would allow us to paint a
more complete picture of the impact of immigration on domestic politics.

Third, this research also speaks to more general studies of social policy change. A large
literature on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ has explored how policy-makers can tackle the
challenges of today (such as ageing, economic globalization, or the emergence of the hour-glass
economy) in face of widespread public support for most welfare state institutions. While
scholars have occasionally noted that changes in eligibility requirements are among the most
feasible reforms in the era of the institutionalized welfare state (Pierson, 1996, p. 174; Visser &
Hemerijck, 1997, p. 77), the theoretical relevance of policy changes that disentitle newcomers to
the political community seems to have been underappreciated. After all, by targeting
unprotected groups with little organization behind them, immigrant-excluding welfare reforms
avoid the mass objections other policy changes are likely to solicit. At the same time, they face
very different institutional obstacles in the form of legal prohibitions on differential treatment.
In sum, in sharp contrast to what is tacitly assumed in the only existing comparative study of
immigrants’ social rights (Sainsbury, 2012, pp. 40-41, 281), this research shows that the
implementation of this specific subtype of social policy change proceeds very differently from
the kinds of changes that the literature has based its theoretical propositions on.

Besides these theoretical contributions, this project also has more practical and political
implications. First, it highlights the importance of inclusive institutions in diverse societies. We
have consistently seen that sentiments of selective solidarity are unlikely to arise in political
communities that encourage cohesion. Canada’s inclusionary approach to immigrant diversity,
for example, has made it unlikely that Canadians think about immigrants as an ‘out-group’. In the case of Sweden, the universal structure of the welfare system has played a similar role. In the quantitative data analysis in Chapter Four, we saw that respondents in universal welfare states with an inclusionary national identity are much less likely to evince selective solidarity than their counterparts in countries without such cohesive structures. In line with the findings of many other studies, then, this research suggests that inclusive welfare and diversity policies can be a remedy against intergroup tension. A second conclusion of practical political relevance is that we should be sceptical about justifications of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms on the basis of objective economic pressures. There is no evidence that selective solidarity arises in response to actual levels of immigrant welfare dependence. Instead, there are many indications that the politics of immigrant social rights are often detached from economic reality. In many cases, the economic justification for immigrant welfare exclusion turns out to be little more than a façade to hide ideological objections to immigration and ethnic diversity.

This leads me to the final section: the normative implications of this research. Up until this point, I have attempted to discuss the politics of immigrants’ social rights in purely empirical terms, even though many of the terms I have intended as mere descriptors of social reality (such as inclusion and exclusion, or equality and differentiation) are bound to invoke normative associations. In closing, I will explicitly address the normative questions this research are most likely to give rise to: how should we evaluate immigrant-excluding welfare reforms? Should we consider them primarily as the malicious and divisive tools of opportunistic politicians, or as a mostly reasonable response for a redistributive system coping with increased cross-border mobility?

To be sure, some types of differentiation between immigrants and native-born can be justified by considerations of both practicality and fairness. For example, a public pension

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250 A normative analysis of the relationship between immigration and welfare state institutions offers enough material for an entire research project, and indeed, several theorists have engaged in such an analysis in much more depth than I will here (Blake, 2001; Miller, 2007). Instead, I merely intend to reflect on what the findings of this study could add to these kinds of normative discussions.
benefit without a residence requirement would seem difficult, if not impossible, to finance. Besides, in case of immigrants who move from one well-developed welfare state to another, it is not clear why old age security should be paid for exclusively by the country where they happen to be residing on the day they pass retirement age. For similar reasons, the observation that immigrants tend to be more poorly covered by contributory programs such as sickness insurance or unemployment insurance than native-born does not imply that these programs are unjust. The mechanism of insurance premiums guarantees that applicants can only access this type of program after they have assisted in financing it, and those who for that reason are not eligible are directed to less generous benefits of last resort such as social assistance. A third example of a justifiable differentiation is offering fewer services and programs to undocumented migrants than to documented migrants. Especially in countries that border on emigration countries, a welfare system that treats those who enter through the indicated channels in the same way as those who do not risks making admission policies obsolete.

In this sense, I do not disagree with authors who advocate ‘differentiated citizenship’ (Engelen, 2003). However, if these are the kinds of differentiation advocates have in mind, the societal relevance of their pleas is unclear. Which policy-makers are they supposed to convince? There are no Western welfare states that employ no residence requirement on their public pension benefit, give immigrants easier access to insurance programs than native-born citizens, or offer undocumented migrants the exact same set of benefits that documented migrants can avail themselves of. In other words, the kinds of differentiation in social rights that are most easily justifiable are present in every immigrant-receiving welfare state.

As we saw in the previous three chapters, however, the suggestions for welfare exclusion that immigration critics have put forward over the last two decades tend to go much further. They include proposals to deny emergency health care and the most residual cash benefit to undocumented migrants even if they cannot feasibly be deported, to give legal immigrants less or no access to programs of last resort, to set restrictions on the possibility to bring built-up
entitlements to contributory programs across borders, to deny immigrants access to benefits they pay into, and to pose eligibility requirements for immigrants that native-born citizens do not have to satisfy.

Our normative evaluation of these kinds of differentiations should be more negative. Where they occur, they bring about a change in the nature and function of national welfare states. While the welfare state was initially designed to mitigate the negative externalities of unfettered capitalism and to offer a social safety net to those people within its territory that run into economic trouble, reforms such as the ones that are taking place in the Netherlands move it in the direction of becoming a set of privileges for those who are lucky enough to be born in the country, or to have lived long enough on its territory and acquired the necessary documentation. Especially in an era of increasing cross-border mobility, such a development should be regarded as a threat to the most important liberal values.

Certainly, there is a great deal of disagreement among liberal philosophers on what a commitment to liberty and equality entails (Kymlicka, 2002, pp. 53-101). One particularly pertinent controversy regards the boundaries of the liberal state, or in other words, whether the state has more moral obligations towards some human beings than others. To those who adhere to a cosmopolitan interpretation of liberalism, any such delineation is unjustifiable (Abizadeh, 2007). More mainstream theorists, on the other hand, do not see anything wrong with privileging people within the borders of the political community (Rawls, 1999; Blake, 2001).251 Despite these disputes, all liberal egalitarians would agree on at least the following two principles of social justice: (1) differential treatment within a state should only occur on the basis of morally relevant criteria; and (2) even in those cases that we can justify why some people have fewer resources than others, under no circumstance should anyone be so destitute

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251 There is a wide range of different arguments for this position. For example, some reason that a state has more obligations towards its residents because they are the ones who pay taxes, others argue that a state does not have the authority to influence the lives of non-residents, and yet others think that mere physical proximity can be a justifiable ground for differentiation (just as we might feel compelled to give money to people who ask for it merely because we happen to be standing right next to them).
that it challenges the very possibility of autonomous agency. In light of the first principle, we cannot accept restrictions on benefit export because they disentitle individuals from built-up social security rights for the sole reason that the recipient decided to move to another country. Similarly, additional residence requirements for immigrants on contributory programs should be condemned because they involve a distinction between people exclusively based on the arbitrary criterion of place of birth. The second principle makes it clear why liberals should reject restrictions on immigrants’ access to the programs that serve exactly to guarantee a minimum level of autonomy, such as subsidized health care and transfer benefits of last resort.

Of course, one might object that what is socially just is not always practically feasible. However, a defence of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms on practical grounds is bound to run into trouble as well. The case for differentiation tends to rely on implausible, if not patently false, assumptions. For example, the often-made argument that restrictions are necessary to fend off those who merely move to a country to avail themselves of the benefits of the welfare state has found no empirical support in economic studies (Voss, Hammer, & Meier, 2001; WRR, 2001; Kvist, 2004; Kaushal, 2005; Yang & Wallace, 2007; Barrett & McCarth, 2008). Similarly, the suggestion that access should be curtailed because immigrants have a larger propensity than native-born citizens to draw benefits goes against all the available evidence that immigrants are actually less likely than native-born to claim the benefits they are entitled to (Tienda & Jensen, 1986; Reitz, 1995; Dörr & Faist, 1997; Moon, Lubben, & Villa 1998; Castronova, Kayser, Frick, & Wagner, 2001; Capps, Hagan and Rodríguez, 2004; Kretsedemas, 2004; Ma & Chi, 2005; Boeri, 2009, p. 20; Sainsbury, 2012, p. 126). Third, and finally, this research has offered ample evidence that the depiction of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms as a necessary response to economic reality is inaccurate. Most importantly, there are alternative strategies to avoid or decrease immigrant welfare dependence than disenitlement.

For that reason, in order to justify immigrant-excluding welfare reforms one needs to demonstrate that they score better on the criteria of fairness and effectiveness than (1) adjusting
admission policies, (2) investing in integration services, and (3) implementing across-the-board welfare reforms.\textsuperscript{252} That would be difficult. Certainly, all three of these options would raise normative concerns as well. Again, some liberals object to any type of border control because it violates the freedom of movement (Abizadeh, 2008). Moreover, no liberal would accept immigration policies that do not accommodate refugees (after all, they are in need of protection exactly because they cannot live an autonomous life in their country of origin), or do not allow for family migration (because liberals believe that all people have the right to a private life). Expansive integration services, in turn, might raise concerns about unequal treatment, especially if the set of programs that immigrants can make use of is larger than what is available for native-born citizens (Barry, 2001). And overall welfare retrenchment, finally, is likely to trigger worries about whether the state will still be able to compensate for inequalities for which the disadvantaged cannot reasonably be held responsible.

However, in comparison to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, all three strategies have distinct normative advantages. Amending admission policy to ensure a larger proportionate intake of migrants who are likely to do well economically avoids differential treatment among residents of the same political community. The same thing can be said about general cutbacks in welfare generosity: they might make society less equal, but it would be an inequality that is less demonstrably based on arbitrary criteria. Moreover, considering that protective labour market institutions have been shown to favour labour market ‘insiders’ over ‘outsiders’, one could even make the case that some types of welfare reform would actually increase equality of opportunity in an immigration society. Integration services, finally, could also be explained to have a favourable effect on equality of opportunity. As we have seen, in many welfare states it would be difficult to argue that immigrants have the same chances on the labour market as native-born citizens, because economic migrants often have a harder time to demonstrate their qualifications, and

\textsuperscript{252} A different discussion would be which (combination) of these strategies is most recommendable. Since this is first and foremost a cross-national study of immigrant-excluding welfare reforms, I will limit myself here to arguing that of these four strategies to deal with the tension between open borders and generous welfare institutions, implementing immigrant-excluding welfare reforms is the least recommendable one.
migrants who have been admitted on humanitarian grounds tend to have lower linguistic and/or vocational skills. Integration programs aimed at taking away those disadvantages can be justified, therefore, as a contribution to rather than a diminution of equality.

Similarly, there is little reason to suggest that immigrant-excluding welfare reforms would address the problems they are supposed to tackle better than the alternatives. As said, they tend to be based on faulty assumptions regarding the nature of immigrant welfare dependence. Moreover, especially when they come about after politicized and divisive debates, they can be expected to reinforce tensions between immigrants and native-born citizens, and as such have the counterproductive effect of contributing to integration difficulties. The other three policy responses seem more effective. First, by mere mathematical necessity across-the-board cuts reduce social spending to a larger extent than cutbacks that are aimed at only a portion of recipients. Second, as the Canadian case shows, a selective admission policy can effectively avoid a large immigrant welfare clientele. And third, since lower levels of human capital have been shown a crucial explanation for immigrants’ overrepresentation among welfare dependents, the rationale for programs aimed at increasing immigrants’ human capital seems obvious.  

In sum, even if we accept there is an inherent tension between open borders and generous welfare, we cannot be complacent about the trend in countries that increasingly limit immigrants’ access to social programs and benefits. In other words, opposition to immigrant-excluding welfare reforms cannot be brushed off as the naive pleas of utopianists and wishful thinkers. On the contrary, these exclusionary reforms are not only normatively undesirable, but there is also little evidence that they are an effective response to economic reality, let alone the only tools that policy-makers have at their disposal. We might have objections to the alternatives. But they are certainly better than institutionalizing selective solidarity.

\[\text{253 At the same time, however, we should not attribute panacean qualities to this policy response. As the Swedish case shows, even in the presence of generous integration services, the combination of an almost exclusive intake of refugee and family migration on the one hand and protective labour market institutions on the other is still likely to result in overall troubled economic integration.}\]
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Data sets


315

Parliamentary documents


## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1. Summary data for univariate analysis

Table A1.1. Size of programs as percentage of all government transfers in LIS, 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social assistance</th>
<th>Unemployment benefits</th>
<th>Child/family benefits</th>
<th>Pension benefits</th>
<th>% Social spending*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>21.2</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>9.4</td>
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<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>11.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kingdom</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A1.2. Immigrants’ overrepresentation in government transfers in 12 countries, 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All transfers</th>
<th>Pension, child, unemployment, social assistance benefits</th>
<th>Unemployment benefits and social assistance</th>
<th>Social assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
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<td>54.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>158.5</td>
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<td>34.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>-3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>62.8</td>
<td>142.3</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>-21.5</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>-2.8</td>
<td>174.5</td>
<td>840.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>-79.9</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>163.1</td>
<td>186.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>-41.6</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>104.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LIS. Cell entries show the difference between immigrants’ and native born citizens’ receipt as a percentage of native-born citizens’ receipt. * UK data is for 1999, and is not based on comparison between native-born and foreign-born, but on comparison between white and non-white population.
Table A1.3. Indicators of welfare chauvinism, ISSP 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigration is good for the economy (% disagree or disagree strongly)</th>
<th>Immigrants take jobs away from native-borns (% agree or agree strongly)</th>
<th>Government spends too much money on immigrants (% agree or agree strongly)</th>
<th>Legal non-citizen immigrants should have the same rights as citizens (% disagree or disagree strongly)</th>
<th>Composite index*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>41.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>55.2</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>44.4</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>39.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages are based on citizen respondents only. * Cronbach’s alpha: 0.723

Table A1.4. Indicators of welfare chauvinism, WVS 4&5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>When jobs are scarce, employers should prioritize native-born (% ‘agree’)</th>
<th>Pro redistribution, but anti-immigration (mean score)*</th>
<th>Composite score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUT</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2006</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEL</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWI</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This variable has been constructed by combining two survey questions: (A) ‘How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement that incomes should be made more equal; 10 means you agree completely with the statement that we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort, and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between’ and (B) ‘How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? 1. Let anyone come who wants to? 2. Let people come as long as jobs are available? 3. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? 4. Prohibit people coming here from other countries?’ Respondents receive a score of 3 if they give a response between 1 and 3 on question A and a response of 4 on question B; a score of 2 if they give a response between 4 and 6 on A and 4 on B or a response between 1 and 3 on A and 3 on B; a score of 1 if they give a response between 4 and 6 on A and 3 on B; and a score of 0 for any other combination of responses. * Cronbach’s alpha: 0.349.
**Table A1.5. Indicators of welfare chauvinism, WVS 4.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employers prioritize native-born (% agree)</th>
<th>Pro redistrib., but opposed to immigration (%)</th>
<th>Less concerned about immigrants than others (%)</th>
<th>Less prepared to help immigrants than others (%)</th>
<th>Composite score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>77.0</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>75.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>53.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>40.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>43.5</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>40.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages are based on citizen respondents only. * This variable has been constructed by combining two survey questions: (A) ‘In order to be considered just, what should a society provide? Please tell me for each statement if it is important or unimportant to you. This time I would like a score out of 5 where 1=very important and 5=not important at all. Reduce income differences in society?’ and (B) ‘How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? 1. Let anyone come who wants to? 2. Let people come as long as jobs are available? 3. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? 4. Prohibit people coming here from other countries?’ Respondents receive a score of 3 if they give a response between 1 and 2 on question A and a response of 4 on question B; a score of 2 if they give a response of 3 on A and 4 on B or a response between 1 and 2 on A and 3 on B; a score of 1 if they give a response of 3 on A and 3 on B; and a score of 0 for any other combination of responses. The table indicates the percentage of citizen respondents with a score of 2 or higher on this variable. † This variable has been constructed by combining four survey questions: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of (A) elderly people in your country; (B) unemployed people in your country; (C) immigrants in your country; (D) sick and disabled people in your country? (1=much; 5=not at all). Respondents’ score on this variable is computed as their score on C minus their average score on A, B, and D. The table indicates the percentage of citizen respondents with a score below 0. ‡ This variable has been constructed by combining three survey questions: ‘Would you be prepared to actually do something to improve the conditions of (A) elderly people in your country; (B) immigrants in your country; (C) sick and disabled people in your country? (1=much; 5=not at all). Respondents’ score on this variable is computed as their score on B minus their average score on A and C. The table indicates the percentage of citizen respondents with a score below 0. + Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.669.

**Table A1.6. Summary data on indicators of welfare chauvinism.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ISSP 2003</th>
<th>WVS 4&amp;5</th>
<th>WVS 4</th>
<th>Average difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>44.1</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>40.2</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>35.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>35.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
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<td>32.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-level correlation between WVS 4&5 and WVS 5 0.96; between WVS 4&5 and ISSP 2003 0.64; between WVS 5 and ISSP 2003 0.75 (all significant at level p < 0.05).
Figure A1.1. Percentage of citizen respondents that disagrees or disagrees strongly with the statement ‘immigration is generally good for the economy’, and agrees or agrees strongly with the statement ‘immigrants take away jobs from native-born citizens’, 1995-2003.

Figure A1.2. Percentage of respondents that agrees with the statement ‘when jobs are scarce, employers should prioritize native-born citizens over immigrants’, 1990-2006, 14 countries. (The graph has been split up for presentation purposes only.)
Table A1.7. Inclusiveness of national identity, 14 countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Multiculturalism Policy Index 0-8 (2011)</th>
<th>Naturalization policy 0-15 (Koning, 2011)*</th>
<th>Composite score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Mean</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* In order to facilitate comparison, I have inverted the original scores.

Appendix 2. Background information on multi-level regression models

Table A2.1. Overview table of variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St.dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Welfchauv</td>
<td>Composite score of welfare chauvinism (dependent variable)</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>47.6</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>16.9</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WVS 4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female (1=female; 0=male)</td>
<td>ISSP 2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSP 1995</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>WVS 4&amp;5</td>
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<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>WVS 4</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Highest education level attained by respondent</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>ISSP 1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.59</td>
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<td></td>
<td>WVS 4&amp;5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WVS 4&amp;5</td>
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<td>0.23</td>
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<td>Non-manual worker (1=non-manual worker; 0=other)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WVS 4&amp;5</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.48</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>WVS 4&amp;5</td>
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<td></td>
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### Income
Income scale of respondent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>1.04</th>
<th>0.85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0.80</td>
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### Religiosity
Frequency of religious service attendance

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Level</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>1.04</th>
<th>0.85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
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<td>ISSP 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1.90</td>
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<td>WVS 4&amp;5</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS 4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.63</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Citizenship
Citizenship (1=citizen;0=non-citizen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1.04</th>
<th>0.85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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### Parents
Citizenship status of parents at birth

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1.04</th>
<th>0.85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSP 1995</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Welfare:** See Table A1.3 for ISSP 2003, Table A1.4 for WVS 4&5, and Table A1.5 for WVS 4. For ISSP 1995, score is a composite of 'Immigrants are generally not good for the economy', and 'Immigrants take jobs away from native-born people'.

**Education:** For ISSP 2003, 0=no formal qualification, 1=lowest formal qualification; 2=above lowest qualification; 3=higher secondary completed; 4=above higher secondary; 5=university degree completed. For ISSP 1995, 1=none, or still at school; 2=primary completed; 3=primary completed; 4=secondary completed; 5=secondary completed; 6=semi-higher or incomplete university; 7=university completed. For WVS 4&5 and WVS 4, 1=incomplete secondary school of technical/vocational type or less; 2=complete secondary school of technical/vocational type, or complete or incomplete secondary school of university-preparatory type; 3=some university or higher.

**Income:** Country-specific income scale, ranging from low to high.

**Religiosity:** For ISSP 2003 and 1995, 1=never; 2=once a year or less frequently; 3=several times a year or once a month; 4=2 or 3 times a month; 5=once a week; 6=several times a week. For WVS 4&5 and WVS 4, 1=never or practically never; 2=once a year or less often; 3=only on special holy days; 4=once a month; 5=once a week; 6=more than once a week.

**Parents:** 0=neither parent a citizen; 1=one of the parents a citizen; 2=both parents a citizen.

### Table A2.2. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in various transfer benefits on welfare chauvinism, ISSP 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-7.704</td>
<td>-7.605</td>
<td>-7.624</td>
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<td>-8.902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Country level</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOISA</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOIUNSA</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOICORE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOITOTAL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Individual level</em></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.315</td>
<td>-0.315</td>
<td>-0.726</td>
<td>-0.730</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.971</td>
<td>-1.971</td>
<td>-1.972</td>
<td>-2.169</td>
<td>-2.168</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>-0.386</td>
<td>-0.383</td>
<td>-0.434</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents native-born</td>
<td>5.878</td>
<td>5.877</td>
<td>5.874</td>
<td>5.058</td>
<td>5.069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>8.423</td>
<td>8.430</td>
<td>8.433</td>
<td>8.343</td>
<td>8.330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Restricted Log L.</td>
<td>74734</td>
<td>59610</td>
<td>59607</td>
<td>59614</td>
<td>50290</td>
<td>50294</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance estimates</th>
<th>Level 2: country</th>
<th>Level 1: individual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: country</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 1: individual</td>
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<td>453.7</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Level 2: country</th>
<th>Level 1: individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,244</td>
<td>8,224</td>
<td>8,224</td>
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Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level p < 0.1.
Table A2.3. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in various transfer benefits on welfare chauvinism, WVS 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
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<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Country level*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOI&lt;sub&gt;la&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOI&lt;sub&gt;insula&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI&lt;sub&gt;core&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI&lt;sub&gt;total&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Individual level*

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<tbody>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer/manager</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual worker</td>
<td>0.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual worker</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>17.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Variance estimates*

- 2 Restricted Log L: 33127
- Level 2: country: 48.5
- Level 1: individual: 321.3
- N: 8

Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level $p < 0.1$.

Table A2.4. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, with country-level control variables, ISSP 2003.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
</tr>
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</table>

*Country level*

<table>
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<td>Universality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusive identity</td>
<td>-0.632</td>
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</table>

*Individual level*

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>Employer/manager</td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.058</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents native-born</td>
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</table>
### Table A2.5. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, with country-level control variables, ISSP 1995.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOlsa</td>
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<td>4.392</td>
<td>1.499</td>
<td>4.136</td>
<td>4.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-1.335</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusive identity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.315</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>-0.318</td>
<td>-0.318</td>
<td>-0.314</td>
<td>-0.316</td>
<td>-0.315</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.254</td>
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<td>-1.973</td>
<td>-1.972</td>
<td>-1.978</td>
<td>-1.973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>-0.387</td>
<td>-0.383</td>
<td>-0.386</td>
<td>-0.380</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
<td>-0.386</td>
<td>-0.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents native-born</td>
<td>5.877</td>
<td>5.856</td>
<td>5.875</td>
<td>5.873</td>
<td>5.847</td>
<td>5.858</td>
<td>5.877</td>
<td>5.853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**-2 Restricted Log L. Variance estimates**

| Level 2: country | 40.7 | 26.9 | 38.8 | 50.9 | 16.9 | 34.4 | 48.9 | 11.2 |
| Level 1: individual | 453.7 | 453.7 | 453.7 | 453.7 | 453.7 | 453.7 | 453.7 | 453.7 |

**N**

| Level 2: country | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Level 1: individual | 8,224 | 8,224 | 8,224 | 8,224 | 8,224 | 8,224 | 8,224 | 8,224 |

Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level p < 0.1.

### Table A2.6. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, with country-level control variables, WVS 4&5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.162</td>
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<td>-0.831</td>
<td>1.121</td>
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<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
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<td>Share</td>
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<td>-0.455</td>
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<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.118</td>
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</table>

Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level p < 0.1.

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Table A2.7. Effect of immigrants’ overrepresentation in social assistance on welfare chauvinism, with country-level control variables, WVS 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
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<td>Country level</td>
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<td>IOIsa</td>
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<td>-7.048</td>
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<td>-0.164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>2.067</td>
<td>2.065</td>
<td>2.067</td>
<td>2.073</td>
<td>2.067</td>
<td>2.061</td>
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<td>-5.116</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td>0.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
<td>(Ref)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-manual worker</td>
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<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.356</td>
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<td>0.317</td>
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<td>-1.551</td>
<td>-1.554</td>
<td>-1.552</td>
<td>-1.563</td>
<td>-1.552</td>
<td>-1.548</td>
<td>-1.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>-0.442</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
<td>-0.443</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
<td>-0.442</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>-0.474</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
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<td>17.026</td>
<td>17.035</td>
<td>17.029</td>
<td>17.015</td>
<td>17.034</td>
<td>17.030</td>
<td>17.006</td>
</tr>
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-2 Restricted Log L.
| Variance estimates | | | | | | | |
| Level 2: country | 24768 | 24766 | 24756 | 24762 | 24754 | 24760 | 24751 | 24749 |
| Level 1: individual | 19.4 | 23.4 | 5.9 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 29.1 | 6.4 | 4.8 |
| N | 271.6 | 271.6 | 271.6 | 271.6 | 271.6 | 271.6 | 271.6 |
| Level 2: country | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Level 1: individual | 3844 | 3844 | 3844 | 3844 | 3844 | 3844 | 3844 | 3844 |

Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level $p < 0.1$. 

Multi-level model estimates. (Ref) = reference category. Bold coefficients are significant at the level $p < 0.1$. 

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Appendix 3. Questions and motions on immigrants’ welfare use in the Netherlands

Table A3.1. Questions in Dutch parliament criticizing immigrants’ use of/access to welfare benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interpellant(s) (party)</th>
<th>Subject of criticism/inquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995/6/20</td>
<td>Hoogervorst, Van Hoof (VVD)</td>
<td>Ease of claiming Dutch disability benefits in Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/7/13</td>
<td>Verhagen (CDA)</td>
<td>Slow implementation of Linking Act in some municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/9/29</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Leiden University’s refusal to follow Linking Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/28</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Some municipalities’ reluctance to implement Linking Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/1/14</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Two cities extending benefits to undocumented migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/6/8</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Use of social assistance benefits to fund family reunification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/3/23</td>
<td>Wilders (VVD)</td>
<td>Overrepresentation of asylum seekers among recipients of disability benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/5/30</td>
<td>Wijn (CDA)</td>
<td>Receipt of benefits by ‘white illegals’ in Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/7/25</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Social insurance number fraud among undocumented migrants with the aim to claim social benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/12/12</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Refugees on welfare receiving additional benefits to fund family reunification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/5/12</td>
<td>Weekers, Van Baalen (VVD); Van As, Varela (LPF)</td>
<td>Immigrants forging marriage and birth certificates for the purpose of applying for social benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/1/30</td>
<td>Visser (VVD)</td>
<td>Adoptive parents of children without legal status receiving benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2/15</td>
<td>Huizinga-Heringa (CU), Visser (VVD)</td>
<td>Trafficking of Somali children with the aim of child benefit fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/2</td>
<td>Fritsma, Van Dijck (PVV)</td>
<td>Polish migrants’ ‘massive’ use of unemployment benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/25</td>
<td>Nicolaï (VVD)</td>
<td>Welfare fraud among Somali refugee claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2/27</td>
<td>Spekman (PvdA)</td>
<td>The welfare costs associated with the recent amnesty policy for long-term asylum seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/4/7</td>
<td>Ulenbelt (SP)</td>
<td>The costs of immigration, in particular concerning migrants from CEE countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/5/13</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV)</td>
<td>Welfare dependence of immigrants from CEE countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/7/17</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV)</td>
<td>A series of 4 questions regarding the costs incurred by non-western immigrants in various areas of the budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/8/13; 2009/8/14</td>
<td>Van Hijum (CDA)</td>
<td>Uncritical extension of unemployment benefits benefits to immigrants in town of Winterswijk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2/8</td>
<td>De Krom, Blok, Meeuwis (VVD)</td>
<td>Study benefits for refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2/9</td>
<td>De Krom (VVD)</td>
<td>Increase in illegal migration in Spain, and the likelihood that many of these end up on Dutch welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/9/8</td>
<td>Van Hijum (CDA)</td>
<td>SVB campaign to raise awareness about AIO benefit for elderly immigrants with pension gap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A3.2. Motions and private bills proposing to curtail immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Mover(s)</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Parties in support (rejected/passed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/6/12</td>
<td>Dijsselbloem, Noorman-Den Uyl (PvdA)</td>
<td>Make access to welfare conditional on learning Dutch for immigrants whose lack of language skills prevents reintegration on labour market</td>
<td>No vote; became law on 2006/12/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/26</td>
<td>Visser (VVD)</td>
<td>Install an independent committee to research how international and European law affects the Dutch rule of law, in order to know how much leeway there is for disentitlement of immigrants</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, VVD, GL, D66, SP, SGP, LPF, CU, Wilders (passed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/12/12</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV)</td>
<td>Install ten year residence requirement for all social services and programs</td>
<td>PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/1/17</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV)</td>
<td>Deport EU citizens who are in the country for longer than three months and are on welfare</td>
<td>PVV, VVD, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/1/17</td>
<td>Van Hijum (CDA)</td>
<td>In EU negotiations, emphasize the Netherlands’ authority over its admission policy, and ensure that social rights of migrants in one member state do not automatically translate to the Netherlands</td>
<td>SP, PvdA, GL, PvdD, VVD, CU, SGP, CDA, Verdonk (passed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/1/17</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV)</td>
<td>Enforce the restriction on EU citizen’s access to welfare in the first three months more strictly</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/6/25</td>
<td>Van Hijum (CDA), Spekman (PvdA)</td>
<td>Reduce unemployment and welfare dependence of immigrants from CEE countries or repeal their residence permit</td>
<td>SP, PvdA, PvdD, CU, SGP, CDA, PVV, Verdonk (passed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/7/3</td>
<td>Teeven, Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Repeal residence permit of any EU migrant who claims welfare within first 10 years in the country</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/7/3</td>
<td>Teeven, Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Adjust contributory programs paid out to EU citizens to premiums paid in the country of origin</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/7/3</td>
<td>Teeven, Kamp (VVD)</td>
<td>Cut welfare of CEE labour migrants who are able to work and for whom work is available</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/9/24</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV)</td>
<td>Include all welfare-receiving refugees in the calculation of the costs of the general amnesty</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/11/27</td>
<td>Van Hijum (CDA), Blok (VVD)</td>
<td>Investigate access to and utilization of the social system by immigrants and the possibilities to reduce their utilization; also, cooperate with export countries to combat fraud and abuse</td>
<td>CDA, PvdA, VVD, D66, SP, SGP, CU, PVV, PvdD, Verdonk (passed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/12/10</td>
<td>Kamp (VVD), Van de Camp (CDA)</td>
<td>Develop plans for a stricter grow-in model of social security</td>
<td>PvdA, D66, VVD, SGP, CDA, PVV, Verdonk (passed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/3/31</td>
<td>Fritsma (PVV), Verdonk (indep.)</td>
<td>Stop all child benefits to children resident in Morocco or Turkey</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/11/5</td>
<td>De Krom (VVD)</td>
<td>Deport labour migrants on welfare; stop export of social services and popular insurance programs; increase residence requirement for family migrants from 3 to 5 years; and only give benefits to refugees who participate in integration classes</td>
<td>VVD, PVV, SGP (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Interpellant(s) (party)</td>
<td>Subject of criticism/inquiry</td>
<td>Parties in support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/12/10</td>
<td>Blok (VVD)</td>
<td>Stop export of child benefits to all non-EU countries</td>
<td>VVD, SGP, PVV, Verdonk (rejected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/12/10</td>
<td>Van Hiju (CDA), Spekman (PvdA)</td>
<td>In reconsidering the export of unemployment benefits, the government should also considering ending the export of child benefits and other benefits as well</td>
<td>SP, PvdA, D66, PvdD, VVD, CU, SGP, CDA, PVV, Verdonk (passed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2/25</td>
<td>Blok (VVD)</td>
<td>Make all immigrants’ access to social assistance conditional on language proficiency</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table A3.3. Questions in Dutch parliament defending immigrants’ use of/access to welfare benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Interpellant(s) (party)</th>
<th>Subject of criticism/inquiry</th>
<th>Parties in support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995/11/9</td>
<td>Noorman-Den Uyl (PvdA)</td>
<td>Lack of special benefits for asylum seekers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/1/8</td>
<td>Van Dijke (RPF)</td>
<td>Reduction in allowance for asylum seekers</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998/2/3</td>
<td>Sipkes (GL)</td>
<td>Lack of access to welfare for citizens from Dutch Antilles when looking for a job in the Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/6/19</td>
<td>Van Zijl (PvdA)</td>
<td>Case of legal resident not receiving child benefits</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/8/11</td>
<td>Halsema, Rosenmöller, Van Gent (GL)</td>
<td>Lack of access to social services for foreigners involved in lengthy appeal procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/4/16</td>
<td>Albayrak (PvdA)</td>
<td>Lack of medical care for foreigners awaiting a permit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/10/20</td>
<td>Verburg (CDA)</td>
<td>Lack of access to health insurance by seniors abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999/12/21</td>
<td>Stroeken, Verburg (CDA)</td>
<td>Legality of BUB</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000/1/18</td>
<td>Stroeken, Bileved-Schouten (CDA)</td>
<td>Exempt emigrants from paying benefit premiums</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000/8/9</td>
<td>De Wit (SP)</td>
<td>Unfair grounds for guest workers’ lower disability benefits</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000/9/5</td>
<td>Santi (PvdA)</td>
<td>Restrictions on benefit export to Suriname</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002/3/22</td>
<td>Marijnissen (SP)</td>
<td>Lower tax breaks for people with a pension gap</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003/11/13</td>
<td>Kant (SP)</td>
<td>Six-year residence requirement on Wajong</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006/5/19</td>
<td>Verbeet, Meijer, De Vries (PvdA)</td>
<td>Pension rights of refugees in relation to Article 24 of Geneva Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007/2/28</td>
<td>Spekman (PvdA)</td>
<td>Administrative negligence leading to failure to pay out benefits to immigrant children</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008/9/16</td>
<td>Karabulut (SP)</td>
<td>Ineligibility for secondary education of refugees on welfare</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009/9/8</td>
<td>Spekman (PvdA)</td>
<td>Immigrant parents in EU losing custody over children for being overly dependent on state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/9/29</td>
<td>Karabulut (SP)</td>
<td>Financial problems among young human trafficking victims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3.4. Motions and private bills proposing to expand immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mover(s)</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Parties in support (rejected/passed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001/11/20</td>
<td>De Wit (SP)</td>
<td>Stop the reductions in rent subsidy for those who live with undocumented migrants</td>
<td>SP, GL (rejected)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

2004/11/24 Koşer Kaya (D66) Transfer administration of AIO from municipal welfare office to SVB in order to increase uptake CDA, PvdA, SP, GL, LPF, D66, CU, SGP (passed)

2010/11/2 Spekman (PvdA), Sterk (CDA), Anker (CU) Make family members of refugees on a temporary residence permit eligible for social benefits and health care insurance Dropped before put to vote

Appendix 4. Questions, motions, and petitions on immigrants’ welfare use in Canada

Table A4.1. Questions criticizing immigrants’ use of/access to welfare benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Interpellant (party)</th>
<th>Subject of criticism/inquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994/2/22</td>
<td>Grubel (RPC)</td>
<td>Costs of medical services for family migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/4/15</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Costs in health services for HIV positive immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/4/21</td>
<td>Lee (LPC)</td>
<td>Costs of failed refugee claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/10/24</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Sponsorship breakdowns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/10/24</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Cases of people on benefits while sponsoring relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/3/22</td>
<td>T. White (RPC)</td>
<td>Immigrants who claim child benefits but not report full world income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/4/24</td>
<td>Harper (RPC)</td>
<td>Lawsuit leveled by sponsored immigrants on welfare in Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/5/5</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Health care access of refugee claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/10/6</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Health care costs of refugee claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/11/6</td>
<td>Meredith (RPC)</td>
<td>Costs of sponsorship breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/12/4</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Sponsored migrants on welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/12/14</td>
<td>Meredith (RPC)</td>
<td>Absence of bonds to ensure compliance with sponsorship agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/10/13</td>
<td>Benoit (RPC)</td>
<td>Costs of immigrants in Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/12/6</td>
<td>McKay (LPC)</td>
<td>Costs of refugee claimants’ use of health and housing services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/9/21</td>
<td>R. White (CA)</td>
<td>Costs of family reunification for health care and social programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/11/2</td>
<td>R. White (CPC)</td>
<td>Criminal refugees’ access to medical benefits and cash assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/4/22</td>
<td>D’Amours (LPC)</td>
<td>Costs for health care of parents and grandparents family migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/5/18</td>
<td>Folco (LPC)</td>
<td>Costs of parents and grandparents family migration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4.2. Motions and private bills proposing to curtail immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Mover (party)</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997/3/3</td>
<td>Hanger (RPC)</td>
<td>Reduce social assistance for failed refugee claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/10/14</td>
<td>Benoit (RPC)</td>
<td>Hold emergency debate about costs of immigration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table A4.3. Petitions proposing to curtail immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Petitioner (party)</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995/2/22</td>
<td>Valeri (LPC)</td>
<td>Exclude undocumented migrants and refugee claimants from Charter of Rights and Freedoms protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2/19</td>
<td>Cummins (RPC)</td>
<td>Deport criminal illegal immigrants who abuse the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/11/2</td>
<td>Wrzesnewskyi (LPC)</td>
<td>Deny veteran benefits to those who fought on side of Red Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4.4. Questions defending immigrants’ use of/access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Interpellant (party)</th>
<th>Subject of criticism/inquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994/11/29</td>
<td>Ianno (LPC)</td>
<td>Misconception that immigrants are a drain on social security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/10/28</td>
<td>McKay (LPC)</td>
<td>Ontario premier’s exaggeration of sponsorship breakdowns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/12/6</td>
<td>McKay (LPC)</td>
<td>Limited health and housing services for refugee claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2/28</td>
<td>Bulte (LPC)</td>
<td>Immigrant children in Ontario who are denied education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/4/7</td>
<td>Szabo (LPC)</td>
<td>Immigrant children in Ontario who are denied education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2/16</td>
<td>Chow (NDP)</td>
<td>Rationale for the ‘cruel’ 10 years residence requirement on OAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10/8</td>
<td>Chow (NDP)</td>
<td>Temporary workers’ limited EI and health care eligibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4.5. Motions and private bills proposing to expand immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Mover (party)</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995/6/5</td>
<td>Fillion (BQ)</td>
<td>Restore veteran benefits to immigrants who fought on allied side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/3/4</td>
<td>Taylor (NDP)</td>
<td>Negotiate with British government that pensions to British immigrants in Canada are indexed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/6/8</td>
<td>Graham (LPC)</td>
<td>Give access to student financial assistance to persons determined convention refugees but not yet landed (bill C-487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/25</td>
<td>Beaumier (LPC)</td>
<td>Reduce OAS requirement to 3 years (bill C-362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/6/18</td>
<td>Dhalla (LPC)</td>
<td>Reduce OAS requirement to 3 years (bill C-428)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4.6. Petitions proposing to expand immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (y/m/d)</th>
<th>Petitioner (party)</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996/3/12</td>
<td>Riis (NDP)</td>
<td>Restore HRDC-funded services for immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/6/14</td>
<td>Riis (NDP)</td>
<td>Restore HRDC-funded services for immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/3/23</td>
<td>Grewal (RPC)</td>
<td>Offer same OAS to all citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/3/14</td>
<td>Patry (LPC)</td>
<td>Abolish 10 year residency requirement on OAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/4/17</td>
<td>Masse (NDP)</td>
<td>Abolish 10-year residency requirement on OAS and GIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/4/19</td>
<td>Chow (NDP)</td>
<td>Abolish 10 year residency requirement on OAS and GIS, waive sponsorship agreement in case of breakdown involving a senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/1</td>
<td>Mathyssen (NDP)</td>
<td>Abolish 10 year residency requirement on OAS and GIS, waive sponsorship agreement in case of breakdown involving a senior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/2</td>
<td>Wasylycia-Leis (NDP)</td>
<td>Abolish 10 year residency requirement on OAS and GIS, waive sponsorship agreement in case of breakdown involving a senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/9</td>
<td>Chow (NDP)</td>
<td>Eliminate 10 year residency requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/16</td>
<td>Carlton (NDP)</td>
<td>Eliminate 10 years residence requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/5/29</td>
<td>Chow (NDP)</td>
<td>Eliminate residence requirement on OAS and GIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/6/1</td>
<td>Siksay (NDP)</td>
<td>Eliminate residence requirement on OAS and GIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/4/10</td>
<td>Black (NDP)</td>
<td>Eliminate 10 year residence requirement on OAS, and waive sponsorship breakdowns involving seniors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/3/2</td>
<td>Sweet (CPC)</td>
<td>Provide victims of human trafficking with residence status, housing, legal counselling, health care, and other social services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A5.1. Relationship between vote for Reform and attitudes on immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should Canada more or fewer immigrants?</th>
<th>1993 vote</th>
<th>1997 vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>2268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should be done for racial minorities?*</td>
<td>1993 vote</td>
<td>1997 vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat more</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat less</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much less</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should look after Canadians born in this country first and others second</td>
<td>1993 vote</td>
<td>1997 vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>1539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many immigrants do not want to fit in</td>
<td>1993 vote</td>
<td>1997 vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>1451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 1997 survey only offered the answer options ‘more’, ‘about the same’, and ‘less’.
Appendix 6. Questions and motions on immigrants’ welfare use in Sweden

Table A6.1. Interpellations criticizing immigrants’ use of/access to welfare benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993/3/30</td>
<td>86, 27-32</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Cut services for refugees who leave region where they were settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/3/21</td>
<td>76, 12-19</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Give coupons to refugee claimants instead of pocket money to avoid fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/5/27</td>
<td>112, §9</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Benefit fraud by immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/4/3</td>
<td>84, 36-42</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Level of welfare benefit for refugees is too high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/2/8</td>
<td>52, 17-23</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Welfare fraud by foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/3/25</td>
<td>86, 55-67</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Map costs of refugee policy for Swedish welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/4/25</td>
<td>99, 24-30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Map costs of refugee policy for Swedish welfare state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A6.2. Motions proposing to curtail immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/5/11</td>
<td>Fi42</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Stop funding of education in native tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/11/1</td>
<td>Fi36</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Stop funding education in native tongue, and reduce financial assistance to refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/1/26</td>
<td>S628</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Reduce immigrant services, refugee accommodation, and cash assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/1/26</td>
<td>Fi211</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Reduce financial assistance for refugees, decrease funding of Swedish language classes, and stop funding education in native tongue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/2/3</td>
<td>Si22</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Cut benefits of refugees who do not participate in allocated employment and do not learn Swedish; decrease assistance for legal aid; stop export of all benefits; cut social assistance for immigrant women who do not speak Swedish; make asylum seekers pay for medical services; and stop funding of native tongue education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/5/6</td>
<td>Fi93</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Cut benefits of refugees who do not participate in allocated employment and do not learn Swedish; reduce settlement services by 20%; stop export of benefits; make asylum seekers pay for medical services; reduce social assistance in first two years by 20%; stop funding of native tongue education; cut immigrant-targeted ALMPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/1/13</td>
<td>S607</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Make immigrant associations and advocacy groups largely in charge of asylum centres, to reduce costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/1/20</td>
<td>S621</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Reduce refugee settlement and integration services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/1/25</td>
<td>A262</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Repeal immigrant-targeted job training programs, cut benefits to those who do not participate in Swedish language classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/5/10</td>
<td>Fi31</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Reduce refugee settlement services; abolish native tongue education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1/16</td>
<td>S608</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Devolve immigrant settlement to advocacy groups, replace settlement benefit with loan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/10/7</td>
<td>So665</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Prevent immigrants from using social assistance for trips to country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/10/7</td>
<td>S630</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Reduce benefits for immigrants who do not participate in integration programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/3</td>
<td>Sf04</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Decrease funding for native tongue education; introduce loan system for new immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/9/24</td>
<td>S603</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Map the costs of asylum and refugee policy since 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/4/28</td>
<td>Fi49</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Stop extra subsidies for immigrant-dense neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/9/21</td>
<td>S603</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Calculate the costs and benefits of immigration policy since 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/9/28</td>
<td>Sf03</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Force newly arrived migrants to take care of themselves ‘for a certain time’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

2001/9/21 Sf208 M Map the costs of immigration and refugee policy since 1985
2002/10/16 Sf216 FP Introduce three year support requirement for all family migrants except refugees
2003/10/6 Sf396 C Cut social assistance of immigrants who do not make us of internship offers
2003/10/7 Sf388 FP Introduce three year support requirement for all family migrants except refugees
2004/2/6 Sf32 M Cut daily and housing allowance of adult asylum seekers who do not cooperate in revealing their identity, conditionally introduce introduction benefit
2004/3/29 Sf44 KD Conduct annual study on effects of immigration from new EU countries on Swedish social security system, review 10-hours rule
2004/3/25 Sf39 FP Repeal 10-hours rule, deny part time labourers in Sweden without residence permit all social benefits, repeal export possibilities of range of social programs
2004/9/30 Sf248 FP Implement three year waiting period before labour migrants can access social security, implement five year support requirement for family migration
2005/9/30 Sf255 M Strictly enforce cutting introduction benefit to those who don’t follow language classes or are otherwise engaged in their introduction plan
2006/2/24 Sf19 FP Investigate possibilities to change EU labour law so a support requirement can be installed even for labour migrants
2010/10/26 Fi231 SD Introduce five year support requirement for family migration, no sponsoring for people who have received welfare in last year

Table A6.3. Interpellations defending immigrants’ use of/access to welfare benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994/5/27</td>
<td>112, 1-10</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Increase services to immigrant communities and refugee families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/1/29</td>
<td>56, 22-25</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Offer pension benefit for immigrants with pension gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/2/13</td>
<td>65, 1-6</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Extra support services for elderly immigrants, including a pension benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/3/4</td>
<td>63, 54-57</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Pension access for elderly migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/5/18</td>
<td>98, 32-35</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Extra psychotherapeutic help for refugee children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/1/18</td>
<td>51, 68-74</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>More financial security for newcomers, in particular elderly migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/4/4</td>
<td>91, 23-30</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Extra funding for settlement services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/11/28</td>
<td>25, 93-99</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Social rights of refugee children, in particular access to health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/6/14</td>
<td>127, 72-78</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>More opportunities for adult immigrant schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/12/14</td>
<td>50, 46-52</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>More funding for re-schooling opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/6/4</td>
<td>119, 1-7</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Increase pension uptake by refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/12/9</td>
<td>45, 88-95</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Extend medical care to undocumented immigrants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A6.4. Motions proposing to expand immigrants’ access to welfare state benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991/1/22</td>
<td>Sf260</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Give immigrants access to public pension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991/1/25</td>
<td>Sf357</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Review access to public pension for immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/1/16</td>
<td>Sf601</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Introduce introduction benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/10/20</td>
<td>Sf1</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Give access to public pension for all categories of refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992/10/22</td>
<td>Sf2</td>
<td>Count years in country of origin in calculation of public pension for convention refugees, war resisters, and <em>de facto</em> refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/1/25</td>
<td>A477</td>
<td>Expand immigrant-targeted active labour market programs in Stockholm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/12/6</td>
<td>Sf12</td>
<td>Repeal reduction in daily benefit for asylum seekers who avoid authorities; introduce program for torture victim refugees; reduce medical fees for asylum seekers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/4/26</td>
<td>So61</td>
<td>Open mental health institute for refugees who have been victims of torture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1/18</td>
<td>A276</td>
<td>Implement more immigrant-targeted labour market programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1/23</td>
<td>Sf615</td>
<td>Develop plans for ‘carrot’ benefit to entice refugees to stay where they were placed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1/25</td>
<td>A287</td>
<td>Spend additional 125 million SEK (about 18 million Canadian $) on immigrant ALMPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/5/4</td>
<td>A56</td>
<td>Offer state loans to immigrants starting an own business, offer individual-tailored education for immigrants, decrease premiums for employers who hire immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/2/6</td>
<td>Ub9</td>
<td>Expand education program for immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/10/3</td>
<td>Sf212</td>
<td>Give tax reduction for people who receive a partial pension benefit from another EU country as to cancel the costs associated with international money transfers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/10/6</td>
<td>Sf624</td>
<td>Develop pension plan for elderly immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/10/7</td>
<td>Sf633</td>
<td>Introduce introduction benefit higher than SA, expand education in native tongue, facilitate immigrant entrepreneurialism, expand immigrant-targeted ALMPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/9/29</td>
<td>U203</td>
<td>Develop benefit to assist migrants who return to country of origin in first three years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/1</td>
<td>Sf208</td>
<td>Develop a state-funded pension for immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/3</td>
<td>Sf11</td>
<td>Increase funding of immigrant organizations, facilitate immigrant entrepreneurship (e.g. by offering loans)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/6</td>
<td>Sf10</td>
<td>Introduce introduction benefit higher than SA, expand immigrant-targeted ALMPs (e.g. decrease employer premiums for those hiring immigrants)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/6</td>
<td>Sf622</td>
<td>Offer newly arrived immigrants a benefit higher than SA, offer language training to all incoming migrants (not just asylum seekers), expand immigrant-targeted ALMPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/6</td>
<td>So432</td>
<td>Invest in language services in elderly care, offer public pension to elderly immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/10/6</td>
<td>N307</td>
<td>Develop a start-up capital benefit for immigrant entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/4/29</td>
<td>So62</td>
<td>Offer benefit for elderly immigrants without income from social insurance/pensions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/4/29</td>
<td>Sf40</td>
<td>Offer public pension to all categories of refugees (not just UN refugees), make sure that any new income provision for elderly immigrants works retroactively</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/4/29</td>
<td>Fi65</td>
<td>Offer education to children of asylum seekers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/12</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Expand immigrant-targeted ALMPs, offer public pension to elderly immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/22</td>
<td>Ub709</td>
<td>Compensate immigrants for taking SFI during studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/22</td>
<td>Sf608</td>
<td>Increase subsidies for immigrant organizations, offer relocation support for immigrant families with children in racist environments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/23</td>
<td>:So311</td>
<td>Offer public pension to elderly immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/23</td>
<td>Sf222</td>
<td>Give tax reduction for people who receive a partial pension benefit from another EU country as to cancel the costs associated with international money transfers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/25</td>
<td>Sf612</td>
<td>Offer education to children of asylum seekers, offer public pension to elderly migrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/27</td>
<td>Sf634</td>
<td>Make start-up benefit available to immigrants on social assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/28</td>
<td>Sf635</td>
<td>Open SFI to all immigrants (not just refugees), guarantee education in native tongue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/10/28</td>
<td>Sf263</td>
<td>Explore reducing (now 3 year) waiting period for early retirement benefit for refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/9/27</td>
<td>Sf3</td>
<td>Ensure that common EU policy does not infringe upon immigrants’ social rights,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

equate humanitarian migrants with convention refugees for social protection

1999/10/3 A230 FP Launch work/education programs for migrant women, start-up benefit for immigrants
1999/10/4 St259 KD Increase benefits for adoption parents
1999/10/5 St640 MP Introduce introduction benefit higher than SA, open SFI to all immigrants (not just refugees), guarantee state-funded education in native tongue
2000/2/9 St3 V Reject government’s proposal to only register refugees who come to Sweden as the result of mass refugee situation after three years and keep it at one
2000/4/27 Fi46 S Invest more in development projects in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods
2000/9/25 Ub228 KD Stop denying primary education to adult immigrants on welfare
2000/9/28 St611 C Develop national pension plan for elderly migrants
2000/10/4 St634 V Make naturalization procedure free for applicants
2000/10/5 St625 S Make sure that immigrants on welfare do not pay interest on ‘home equipment loan’
2000/10/4 St303 S Develop a pension plan for elderly immigrants
2000/10/5 A812 FP Offer child care during Swedish language instruction
2001/09/20 St1 M Extend export time of ÄFS from three to six months
2001/9/30 N263 C Develop loan programs, work resource centre, and consultant services for immigrants
2001/10/1 St341 V Investigate possibility for export of public pension to non-EU countries
2001/10/1 St300 S Offer welfare recipients extra incidental social assistance to pay for naturalization
2001/10/3 A319 M Investigate how immigrants are treated by employment services and improve
2001/10/4 St363 S Relax repay requirements for immigrant home equipment loans
2001/10/5 St400 MP Develop a pension plan for elderly immigrant women
2001/10/5 St348 V Conduct a systematic investigation of all the ways that the social security system discriminates against immigrants indirectly, as in the case of the public pension
2002/4/4 St31 MP Invest in translation services, prohibit cutting welfare for poor performance in language classes, encourage education uptake among undocumented children
2002/10/15 A320 KD Start a ‘job guides’ program to help immigrants to a job
2002/10/22 N306 C Develop loan programs, work resource centre, and consultant services for immigrants
2002/10/23 Ub484 S Fund elementary education classes of adult students without gainful employment
2003/2/4 St7 M Guarantee full access to education and care for refugee claimant children
2003/3/24 A5 KD Start a ‘job guides’ program to help immigrants to a job
2003/9/29 So406 V Fund research on negative health outcomes from immigrants and solutions
2003/10/1 So417 V Expand social services for asylum seekers’ children
2003/10/2 So343 C Expand preventive health care for children of immigrants
2003/10/5 N329 C Develop immigrant entrepreneur program
2003/10/7 St403 KD Offer authorized translation services to refugee claimants during the application
2003/10/7 St402 KD Give every immigrant the right to mother tongue education,. start ‘job guides’ program
2004/9/7 Ju293 FP Start information outreach for shelter services for violence-exposed migrant women
2004/11/12 St9 KD Reject government’s proposal to cut housing allowance for asylum seekers
2005/9/30 So556 FP Give refugee children full access to health care
2005/9/30 Ju380 FP Start information outreach for shelter services for violence-exposed migrant women
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005/10/1</td>
<td>Si333</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Offer new start jobs to immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005/10/4</td>
<td>A363</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Offer new start jobs to immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/10/4</td>
<td>So551</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Investigate ways to improve social services’ treatment of elderly migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/10/4</td>
<td>Si336</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Expend study allowances, improve pension outcomes for immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/10/5</td>
<td>Si430</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Offer new start jobs, introduce employment support program for immigrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005/10/5</td>
<td>A420</td>
<td>KD</td>
<td>Offer new start jobs to immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/3/29</td>
<td>K22</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Develop additional protocol to the ESCR Convention, ratify UN agreement on social rights of labour migrants, give two individual cases (torture victims) access to benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/4/6</td>
<td>So41</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Analyse sources of low uptake of social services by elderly immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/24</td>
<td>C276</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Improve conditions in asylum seeker housing, reintroduce housing allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/25</td>
<td>Si268</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Make public pension exportable</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006/10/27</td>
<td>N295</td>
<td>KD</td>
<td>Develop a language course for immigrant women who are starting a company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/27</td>
<td>Si219</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Offer public pension to all quota refugees, war resisters, and de facto refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/30</td>
<td>A270</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Develop labour market program for migrant women, investigate indirect discrimination of immigrants in unemployment benefits, expand benefits for migrant students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/10/31</td>
<td>Si296</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Extend health care to all ‘hidden’ refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007/10/4</td>
<td>C300</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Guarantee higher minimum quality of asylum seeker housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008/10/1</td>
<td>N387</td>
<td>KD</td>
<td>Develop a language course for immigrant women who are starting a company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/10/3</td>
<td>So392</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Cut immigrant on welfare less in their welfare if they start working more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/10/7</td>
<td>A377</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Increase micro-credits available for immigrant entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/9/24</td>
<td>Si206</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Give all declined refugee claimants their built up pension rights with them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10/5</td>
<td>Si372</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Give adult and ‘hidden’ refugees right to health care, increasing housing allowance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>