AMERICAN MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE NEOLIBERAL WAY OF WAR

by

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Abstract

*American Military Contractors and the Neoliberal Way of War* explores the historical patterns of modern military contracting and its place in the political economy of American war. During the post-September 11 wars, contractors have played a prominent role, comprising over half the US total force. While the participation of contractors in major US contingency operations is not new, the scale and scope of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan is without precedent. The study emerges from a puzzling historical development: during the Vietnam War, contractors constituted about 10 percent of the US footprint. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the figure climbs to 53 percent. What accounts for this change? The answer turns on one ideational and one institutional condition. Institutionally, the transition began with the US military’s shift from a mixed volunteer and draftee force to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. Doing so removed personnel procurement from a statist framework through the introduction of the logic of the labour market. This institutional change was a necessary precondition for the gradual incursion of neoliberal market logic into military personnel policy. A series of reforms in subsequent decades initiated path dependent processes of military neoliberalization that eventually yielded the troop-contractor ratios of the post-September 11 wars. The dissertation develops a theoretical framework drawn from traditions in critical International Political Economy that conceptualizes five decades of uneven neoliberalization in the Department of Defense. Empirically, it undertakes a comparative study of US contracting practices during the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars, tracing gradual institutional change in the Department of Defense from the 1970s to the present.
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Table of Contents

Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
Table of Contents v
List of Tables and Figures vi

Chapter 1
American Military Contractors 1

Chapter 2
What is Neoliberalism? 23

Chapter 3
Military Contracting in the Vietnam and post-September 11 Wars Compared 74

Chapter 4

Chapter 5
Assessing the Causes of post-September 11 Contracting: A Critique 172

Chapter 6
The Determinants of US Military Contracting in the post-September 11 Wars 207

Chapter 7
The Neoliberal Way of War 252

Bibliography 268
List of Tables

2.1 Contracting in Vietnam and the post-September 11 wars compared ............................................. 124
4.1 The many causes of US military contracting compared ............................................................. 205

List of Figures

1.1 US Troops and Contractors as % of Total Force ........................................................................... 2
2.2 US Troops and Contractors: Afghanistan 2001-2013 ................................................................. 104
2.3 US Troops and Contractors: Iraq 2003-2013 .............................................................................. 105
2.4 Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan 2008-2013 ............................................................. 114
2.5 Private Security Contractors in Iraq 2008-2013 .......................................................................... 114
2.6 Department of Defense Contractor Personnel by Function (Iraq 2008-2011) ............................ 121
3.1 US Draftees and Contractors 1963-1971 ..................................................................................... 153
4.1 Armed Conflict 1946-2012 by Region ......................................................................................... 178
4.2 Armed Conflict 1946-2012 by Type ............................................................................................. 179
4.3 Warsaw Pact – NATO Demobilization 1989-1998 ....................................................................... 188
5.1 Military and Contractor Personnel by Function in Iraq Q3 .......................................................... 250
Chapter 1
American Military Contractors

What is the American way of war? Is it public or private? Is it an expression of national interests or an opportunity for commercial gain? The answer, as it often does, falls somewhere in between. For most of its history, the United States went to war with a public armed force, cobbled together from a population spread across the continent and deployed in the service of some common good. In a democracy, no instance of collective public action surpasses the gravity of the state’s use of armed force. However, the American wars in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-2011) mark a change in this American way of war. The post-September 11 conflicts have come to be characterized, in part, by the significant participation from the private sector. To a greater extent than in any other American conflict, the US has relied on public-private partnerships to supplement the state armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contracting on this scale and with the scope witnessed during the post-September 11 wars is unprecedented in modern history. It is the neoliberal way of war.

This study explores military contracting with an eye towards historical patterns in the political economy of American war. Its primary focus is the use of contractors in the two longest conflicts in US history, the Vietnam War and the post-September 11 wars, and is animated by a peculiar trend in military contracting. During the Vietnam War, contractors in the employ of the US made up about 10 percent of the total American footprint in Southeast Asia. In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors make up about 53 percent. The empirical puzzle is this: what accounts for the increase in private sector participation? In response, this inquiry undertakes a comparative historical case study of US military contracting in the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. It analyzes these cases through a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the emergence of the
private military industry as an outcome of economic neoliberalism and the transition to an All-
Volunteer Force in the US.

As the figure below illustrates, the late past two decades have seen an increase in the
proportion of contractors serving alongside US forces. Beginning with US operations in the
Balkans during the 1990s and continuing through the 2000s, it is clear that outsourcing is an
increasingly vital part of military planning. Two observations are immediately discernible. The
first is that non-state actors have, in some capacity, always played a role in US military
operations. Historians have long documented the wartime use of civilians as manufacturers,
maintenance, engineers and, in most nineteenth century conflicts, as hard labourers (Epley 1990;
Halloran 1986).

![US Troops and Contractors as % of Total Force](image)

*Figure 1.1 source: Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011); Congressional Budget Office (2008)*

The second observation is that the proportion of troops to contractors remained roughly
similar for most of American history. Save for the Korean War, contractors never amounted to
more than twenty percent of the total force. Indeed, there has always been some role played by private actors, but new patterns have begun to emerge. In the late twentieth century, trend lines of contractor usage began pointing upward. It was only until the US engagement in the Balkans during the 1990s that contractors came to be used in much larger numbers. In the decade that followed, as the US fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the resort to contractors as a supplement to uniformed military personnel intensified. For the first time in history, private sector personnel outnumbered uniformed troops in the prosecution of large scale military operations.

In the 1990s, the private military industry was already ascendant. Over the decade, annual global revenues of the private military industry nearly doubled from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $100 billion in 2000. Projections around the turn of the millennium anticipated annual global revenues topping $202 billion by 2010 (Leander 2005: 806). These forecasts, however, were made before the paradigm shifts of the post-September 11 era, and were quickly dwarfed by actual expenditures on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To give a sense of scale, between 2002 and 2011, $206 billion was spent on military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States alone (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 22). On the ground, over half of the US footprint in the post-September 11 wars has been comprised of agents from the private sector.

By no means was this an accident. The presence of contractors on the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan is symptomatic of broader trends. By 2001, a series of historical currents converged to create the conditions for an extraordinarily profitable industry which will be discussed later. But the contracting boom in the US during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is the product of its own determinants. This inquiry argues that the emergence of the military
contracting sector in the US was aided by the gradual incursion of market logic into military manpower decision-making.

Institutionally, the American abandonment of the Selective Service draft and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 marks a critical juncture in this process. This change forced the US military to compete in the labour market for human resources in a way that the draft had precluded for decades. More important, however, are the transformative effects of economic neoliberalism in the United States. The onset of this paradigm slowly but dramatically altered how US military policy dealt with personnel issues, ultimately leading to the battlefield composition of the post-September 11 wars. Military neoliberalization, as it is called here, has far reaching implications for the study of neoliberalism, the state and war in the twenty-first century.

The Neoliberal Way of War

For decades now, scholarship in political economy has grappled with macro-level shifts from post-World War II Keynesianism to post-Fordist/neoliberal paradigm (Amin 1994; Jessop 1993; Lipietz 1989). American Military Contractors and the Neoliberal Way of War follows in this tradition and contributes to the literature a military dimension of epochal change. The argument here takes Polanyi (1944) as its starting point, arguing that economic practice is deeply embedded in the social and political relations of a community. The premise is that an account of Polanyian embeddedness must also include the state practice of warfare within its political economic context. In this sense, it is an argument from political economy as much as it is cultural; one that should appeal to the interests of critical scholars and security scholars alike. As historian John Keegan (1993: 12) argues “war embraces much more than politics…it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture
itself.” If war is deeply embedded in culture and the ideas, norms and practices of a society, then it must be also be, to some degree, embedded in political economy. It follows, then, that if the conduct of war is drawn from social practices, *then the nature of planning for war is conditioned by the prevailing political economy of an era.* But, as is well known, ideational context is by no means static. It is subject to ruptures that can alter fundamental assumptions and ideational shifts that alter priorities. This inquiry untangles the interwoven fabric of American political economy and American military policy through an exploration of private sector participation in war.

History shows that a defence industrial base is a necessary feature of a militarized state and the US is no exception. Indeed, American military reliance on private sector production goes back to the earliest years of the Republic (Halloran 1986) and the participation of private actors as manufacturers or labourers in the US defence supply chain is nothing remarkable. As the US industrialized and the armed forces matured over the next two centuries, the iron triangles of politics, military and industry were forged (Adams 1982). But while the dynamics of defence production and political regulation has a long history, the influence of the arms industry did not enter the broader public’s imagination until President Dwight Eisenhower, in his 1961 farewell address, gave the military-industrial complex its enduring name. Over the following half century, the military-industrial complex grew in size, scope and sophistication into its current sprawling form, with broad implications for defence policy and democracy alike (Roland 2007; ).

In the 1980s, the ascendancy of economic neoliberalism arrived with the political force and intellectual infrastructure to permit the roll-back of the state from many American industrial sectors, including the more or less integrated management of military production and service delivery. As in other sectors of the American economy, the 1980s and 1990s saw the ideological influences of neoliberal public management enter the logic of defence force planning. After
2001, American military needs of the global war on terror created conditions for exponential growth of the private military industry. But the period of the industry’s greatest success also brought about its most potent scandals. Murder, prisoner abuse, profiteering and fraud are only some of the consequences of massive wartime contracting under weak regulatory control. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the contradictions of private sector participation in war were brought into sharp relief, along with the dynamics of the global political economy of violence. What is more, wartime contracting raises broader questions about what happens to the advanced capitalist state when it devolves fundamental tasks – like military violence – to the market.

**Non-State Actors, Profit and War**

Militarism and profit, of course, have been inextricably linked for centuries (Nossal 1998; Mockler 1985; Mockler 1969). Conceptualizing and naming these actors, however, is rather difficult and symptomatic of an important historical trend: the proliferation of different types of non-state actors that engage in different kinds of armed conflict (Avant and Haufler 2012; Reno 2011; Percy 2009). These actors which include guerrillas and rebels, jihadists and vigilantes, militias and mercenaries, terrorists and private military firms have come under renewed scholarly attention (Fitzsimmons, 2013; Malet 2013; Strachan and Scheipers 2011; Khalil 2013; Reno 2011; Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010; Kirsch and Gratz, 2010; Hedgehammer 2010-2011; Weinstein 2007). For International Relations (IR) theorists, recognition of the increasingly fragmented field of security practice is crucial. The inherent dynamism in the arrangement of combatant assemblages has altered core assumptions about the state’s monopoly on violence and undermined twentieth century conceptions of interstate violence (Anders 2013; Krahmann 2013; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Malesevic 2009; Kaldor 2007). As a non-state combatant,
“mercenaries,” military contractors, and their legally incorporated military contracting firms need to be located within the spectrum of other non-state actors who participate in armed conflict.

The preferred nomenclature in this inquiry is “contractor.” Now, “contractor” is a term of recent vintage and evokes a whiff of anachronism when projected backwards into the past. Therefore it is necessary to posit a working definition of this actor. In a general sense, the military contractor is a civilian, non-state actor that freely exchanges commercial goods or services for payment with a military client or its agent. Admittedly, this definition is quite strained but makes greater sense when it is positioned relative to other non-state actors that participate in armed conflict. The point is that the contractor is a civilian that does business with the military as a matter of commercial intercourse. Within the scope of this definition, it is possible to profile a wide range of military contracting, which is to say, military labour as benign as construction work and as lethal as paramilitary security. Reliance on the term “contractor” will become more significant as the argument develops, especially in chapter three which compares contracting in the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars.

It is also crucial to bear in mind what these contractors are not. They are not “mercenaries.” This point has been made by many before but should still be reiterated. Over the past decade, scholars in IR and political philosophy have generally agreed that this actor is conceptually distinct from others who take up arms (Krahmann 2012; Baker 2011; Pattison 2010a; Fabre 2010; Pattison 2008; Percy 2007; Lynch and Walsh 2000; Avant 2000). Moreover, very few scholars actually treat mercenaries and private military firms as interchangeable actors (for recent exceptions see Fitzsimmons 2013a; Walzer 2008). In short, private military contractors are not mercenaries largely because the category of mercenary is largely unsuited for
empirical analysis. The term “mercenary” itself is much like “terrorist,” and other subversive actors. It is one of disapprobation and laden with a strong normative subtext that condemns what it means to describe. Therefore it cannot be employed as a useful analytical concept for historical comparison. Second, military “contractors” should not confuse the individual contractors with military firms. Overwhelmingly the language used to classify private sector participants in war focuses on the firm. Hence a nomenclature of the “private military firm,” the “private security company” and “private military company,” or “private military and security company” (see for example Kinsey 2006; Schreier and Caparini 2005; Singer 2003; Mandel 2002).

In order to compare how contractors have been employed by the US military, it is first necessary to develop a common vocabulary. Now, to be fair, the current conceptual vocabulary of PSCs, PMCs and PMSCs has its utility but also contains significant limitations. Foremost among them is that talk about military firms places a relatively new, post-Cold War actor as the central unit of analysis. The (unintentional) analytical consequence is that the private military and security firm has no past tense. Try and project the PMSC onto the past and the anachronistic language becomes immediately apparent. What is needed is a common analytical language because the current terminology of “PMSC” simply will not do. By dispensing with the notion of the “private military and security firm,” it is possible to undertake cross-historical analysis of private sector participation in war without relying on its anachronistic usage.

A labour-centric conception of military contracting overcomes this limitation and permits cross-historical comparisons by using a common conceptual vocabulary. The analysis of military contractors that unfolds in the coming chapters will rest on a six-part classification of private military labour:
(1) *Construction and reconstruction* activities associated with building and maintaining physical structures for military clients and rebuilding physical installations and structures for the broader population.

(2) *Operations and logistics* functions are quotidian tasks and logistical activities needed to sustain military or civilian programs. These functions include a wide variety of tasks including vehicle and aircraft maintenance, base support operations and project management. Also included in this category is a range of functions relating to private sector delivery of services relating to advanced computer and communications technology.

(3) *Advisory and training* functions provide military and civilian clients with practical knowledge and information that enable clients to better execute other classes of labour.

(4) *Executive* functions are the most controversial functions in this classification. They are physical actions that entail a high degree of personal risk and are undertaken on the ground in the tactical environment.

(5) *Supply* functions provide material resources necessary to carry out executive, operational and reconstruction tasks within a theatre of operations. These are the “make or buy” decisions government agencies face and it is uncontroversial for governments to turn to the private sector to acquire the goods necessary to undertake their required functions.

(6) *Production* functions are the tasks with the longest history of private sector involvement, and are the oldest actors in the historical narrative about military contracting.

These classes of labour may at first seem unremarkable, and in a sense they are – the language of private military and security companies already denote these very kinds of activities. But the criticism here is not that the existing concepts fail to denote the right tasks. Rather, the criticism is that these tasks are often used to *connote* an analytically limited concept. Changing
the conceptual focal point from firm-type to the labour-type provides analytical leverage needed for historical analysis. With this new conceptual vocabulary, it becomes possible to view private sector participation in war historically and without the anachronistic conceptual strictures of a firm-centric perspective.

**American Military Contracting in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan**

This study is the first dedicated comparison of military contractors, as defined above, and their deployment by the US military in the Vietnam and the post-September 11 wars. By adopting an historical-comparative agenda it is possible to identify and explain continuity and change in the practice of military privatization. The cases have been selected for empirical comparison because of their similarities and the all-important differences which are indispensable for theory building. This latter point is particularly salient for the literature on marketized security. A decade or so after the start of the post-September 11 wars, this literature has reached a maturation point whereby its broader theoretical implications to the field of International Relations can be established (Krahmann 2013; Godfrey et al. 2013; Joachim and Schneiker 2012; Krahmann 2010; Cutler 2010), though this is not to exclude earlier connections between private military contracting and IR theory (Avant 2006; Leander 2005; Krahmann 2005). Here, the agenda aims to push the contemporary debate both outward and back in time: outward in the sense that it expands upon existing scholarship on post-September 11 military contracting and backward in time in that it takes an historical-comparative look at private sector participation in war.

First, a word is in order about the nature of the cases at hand. The private military industry operates in a global market with multiple state and non-state actors subscribing to the available services (Leander 2013; Krahmann 2010; Spearin 2009; Avant 2005). This inquiry is a
study of the way the United States has deployed military contractors in different conflicts. The US variety of contracting is the central focus not because it is the only subscriber, but because it is by far the largest. And, while the primary focus is on the expansion of military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is also important to remember that private military contractors have been integrated into US regional commands. This is particularly salient in Africa, where the execution of police and military policy is largely carried out by private firms (Aning, Jaye and Atuobi 2008; Bah and Aning 2008; McFate 2008). Thus, the sheer scale of American contracting in the post-September 11 period is one of a kind. There US is a subscriber like no other to private military services.

The study focuses solely on the United States and its historical use of contractors, observed across two period of conflict. The first historical case is the Vietnam War, and the period of direct American involvement, 1954-1973. This conflict was, more or less, a geographically and temporally self-contained case of US force projection. As a torturous event in American history and, until recently, America's longest war, the Vietnam conflict is a field of study unto itself and has been subject to immense scrutiny. The second case is the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2001-present. Here, the two settings are treated as a single case study, hence the terminology of “post-September 11 wars.”

Two objections may immediately arise that are worth addressing early. The first objection is that these are not “wars” at all. Indeed, in the juridical sense, they are something different. Technically, all three were “contingency operations” whereby armed forces were deployed and engaged in hostilities with an opposing force. As contingency operations the American military operations in Southeast Asia, Iraq and Afghanistan entailed a different set of legal obligations. None of the three were legally declared wars by US Congress, which come
with defined legal responsibilities under US and international law. Yet, each military operation carried with it the trappings of state-enacted warfare, death and destruction. Therefore, in this inquiry, “war” is used in a general conceptual category, rather than a narrow legal sense.

The second, and more substantive possible objection, is that the conflation of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars into a single case is deeply problematic. After all, they are two different wars, separated by geography, politics and culture. The battle space is not contiguous and the US does not fight against a consolidated enemy force. However, both wars are intrinsic features of US foreign policy in the 2000s and cannot be completely understood in isolation. Despite the particular dynamics of each theatre, the two are intimately related in the context of US foreign policy. From the American perspective, the two share a similar geopolitical context and time period, not to mention operational and budgetary restrictions. Both were prosecuted under the same rubric of the “global war on terror” initiated after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Indeed, each conflict has its own dynamic, but these similarities permit grouping the two into a single category. Thus, it is permissible, with due recognition of their differences, to refer to each conflict as a single case under the category of the post-September 11 wars.

Though all wars are unique, there are important similarities between the post-September 11 wars and Vietnam that make them viable comparative cases. Both involved the long-term occupation of impoverished states; both involved the deployment of US troops numbering in the hundreds of thousands; both were waged by conventional forces against an indigenous counter-insurgency; both involved limited multilateral support for US operations; both entailed reconstruction and development into the overall mission objectives. On this last point, take a description of the overall objectives in Vietnam from one historian of that war. The same words could be used to describe the American mission in Iraq or Afghanistan:
During the period of direct American involvement beginning in 1954, the US mission in Vietnam designed and implemented a range of far reaching economic, political, and eventually military development projects in one of the most thorough and ambitious state-building efforts in the postwar period. The projects consisted of installing a president; building a civil service and training bureaucrats around him; creating a domestic economy, currency, and an industrial base; building ports and airfields, hospitals, and schools; dredging canals and harbours to create a transportation grid constructing an elaborate network of modern roadways; establishing a telecommunications system; and training equipping and funding a national police force and a military, among others (Carter 2008: 6).

Before taking the parallels too far, a caveat is in order. Though tempting, it is risky to identify the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars as being two of a kind. Each of these points of comparison noted above can be parsed much further to reveal significant divergences. Comparison should only be undertaken with care to acknowledge the structural and operational dimensions of each conflict. James Lebovic (2010) points out the numerous operational differences between Iraq and Vietnam. And indeed, much of his analysis can be extended to the Afghanistan conflict. Iraq started as a conventional war that became a counterinsurgency. Vietnam began as a guerrilla war and, in large part, became a conventional war against the North. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US sought to transform governance and society, whereas in Vietnam, the US fought in support of a status quo government. The scale to which the US was involved in the Iraq War was significantly smaller than its involvement in Vietnam, measured in the number of personnel mobilized, firepower brought to bear, and the casualties incurred. In Iraq, the US found itself in the middle of sectarian fighting with shifting coalitions comprised of multiple ethnic, religious and national identities. In Vietnam, the US fought against a unified nationalist force with centralized control and forces emanating from Hanoi. Though external state actors like Iran and Pakistan play a role in the post-September 11 wars, their influence in the combat theatres is far less than was the influence of China and the Soviet Union in Vietnam (Lebovic 2010). This brief comparison highlights important similarities and divergences. But the important point here is that when talking about major US military operations, there is a limited
universe of cases that make for valid comparisons. The Vietnam and post-September 11 wars fit the bill. In both instances, a civilian contractor workforce was used to supplement American uniformed personnel. But despite the similarities between the cases, the use of contractors was clearly quite distinct.

This study argues that two major determinants account for the differences in the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars: the prevailing political economy of the era and the institutional mechanisms for raising an armed force (i.e. the presence or absence of a draft). The Vietnam War was fought, in part, with drafted military labour and in the context of a statist political economy of intervention, management and benign paternalism. The post-September 11 wars were fought with an All-Volunteer Force within the context of a neoliberal political economy which emphasizes privatization and deregulation of state activities. These crucial determinants explain the qualitative and quantitative differences between the two cases.

One additional consideration is important to mention here. In both conflicts, the demand for technical skills also drove contracting practices to a certain degree. It is impossible to ignore the fact that the US military sourced certain technical capabilities in the private sector as a matter of necessity – it did not have the in-house capacity to accomplish certain tasks. However, this factor does not have independent explanatory leverage over the question. Indeed, technical need is necessary for contracting in the first place, but it is also a recurring feature of complex overseas missions and thus endogenous to the scale of contracting in both conflicts. These arguments unfold in chapters four, five and six where the determinants of military contracting are addressed at length.
Theory and Method

The theoretical framework in this inquiry is economic neoliberalism, the ideas that it denotes and the policies that it entails. More specifically, the project hinges on a better theoretical understanding of neoliberalism drawn from critical International Political Economy literature that accounts for its complexities and contradictions in practice. Fundamentally, this theory is rooted in ideational sources of political change. It is based on an important assumption that the political dynamism of ideas and the transformations that they can bring to bear upon institutional practices. Commenting about the Keynesian revolution in the 1930s, Margaret Weir notes that policy innovation is contingent upon the availability of ideas that provide the rationale for policy departures that buck convention. “Clearly,” she says, “if such ideas are missing in the national setting or are only advocated by those without access to centres of national power, there is little chance that they can emerge as the basis for redesigning policy (Weir 1989: 54-55). As will be discussed at length, economic ideas matter even in the field of military security. Just like other policy fields, philosophical and paradigmatic questions come into play about fundamental issues like the role of the state, the mechanisms by which public services should to be delivered (in this case military security), and the degree to which military security ought to be exposed to market forces. Ideas and their institutional articulations matter.

This theoretical contribution also marks an important divergence from other explanations of state resource mobilization. Structural realists may argue that the distribution of material capabilities determined the nature of contracting. As Robert Komer writes of the Vietnam War, “even allowing for many miscalculations, the disparity in strength and resources between the contending sides would have suggested a different outcome, as indeed it did to successive US administrations. Yet there emerged an equally great disparity between the cumulatively
enormous input…and the ambiguous results achieved (Komer 1986: 9). Similarly, from a Tillian perspective, explaining the use of contractors as the American state leveraging its resources to make war, is unsatisfying. Military contracting can certainly be interpreted as a matter of state resource extraction, but such an approach makes no distinctions among different cases of this phenomenon.

This inquiry takes this nested view of institutions and ideas, and theorizes their interactions in a novel way. It draws upon insights from literature from critical political economy and blends it with the historical institutionalist tradition of path dependency. Synthesizing these two literatures extends the conceptual scope of each tradition in ways that will be valuable to theorists working in both paradigms. Moreover, this theoretical framework has not been applied to the study of the private military industry and permits an explanation of trends in military contracting that have gone unnoticed until now. Within this theoretical frame, the empirical portion of the inquiry is carried out through a qualitative comparative study of two cases. It is a historical comparison of two time periods in the history of US war. The method of difference is used to explain why US military contracting in the post-September 11 wars differs from contracting in the Vietnam War. In this sense it is a within-case study of the United States. Taking this approach permits the isolation of conditions that account for the different quantitative and qualitative features of contracting in both cases (George and Bennett 2005).

Within each of the case studies, the method of historical sequence elaboration is used to establish the relative significance of historical causes (Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu 2009) Historical sequencing is used to establish the relative significance of the historical determinants to the respective dynamics of wartime contracting. Here, as mentioned, the major determinants are neoliberalism and the end of the American military draft. Sequence elaboration is a way of
demonstrating how different factors affect initial explanations in a systematic study of history. It begins from the intuitive notion that multiple factors in an historical sequence have different effects based on the order in which they occur. When historical events or transitions are located in their chronological sequence, they can be assessed for their relative significance upon one another and the historical outcomes. Methodologically, this is an interdisciplinary approach that combines the systematic theorization of political science with the contextual richness of historical analysis (Lawson 2012).

The empirical content of this project is sourced primarily in historical texts and publicly available government documents. There is a voluminous literature on the Vietnam War, far more than can be processed by any single study. General histories are extremely helpful establishing context. Regarding the more esoteric element of contracting during the war, the US Army’s Vietnam Studies series and materials from the Center of Military History provide unparalleled insight into the role that the private sector played in the conflict. With regard to the post-September 11 wars, the growing academic literature as well as publicly available government documents provides the basis for all empirical claims. Archival materials, particularly from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Budget Office are indispensable.

**Contribution to Literature**

*American Military Contractors and the Neoliberal Way of War* follows in a rich and expanding literature on private military and security firms prompted by the unprecedented growth of the private military industry during the 2000s. It shares with its predecessors a recognition that military privatization is changing the way wars and other contingency operations are fought. But the inquiry differs in one important sense. It is committed to both a rich empirical exposition of US military contracting and to sophisticated theorization so that that the
phenomenon can be located within the academic literatures on IR and IPE. Using the theoretical framework of economic neoliberalism, this inquiry situates two cases of military contracting in the context of broader historical transformations. Much of the historical tale will be familiar to readers. The conflicts that are discussed here have been given ample treatment before and will continue to receive their rightful scholarly attention. However, the analysis here addresses these histories in a different manner. Focusing on the military contracting through an analysis of institutional reform within the US Department of Defense, and ideological shifts in the US political economy, explores historical dimensions of wartime contracting whose importance has been overlooked.

This study aims to make constructive theoretical and empirical contributions to both IR and IPE literatures. Theoretically, the project delves into two major concepts: neoliberalism and the state. An entire chapter is dedicated to a theoretical elucidation of this historical determinant and ideational construct, including an explanation of how it can be used to frame empirical analysis. Turning this theoretical lens on the history of American military contracting reveals that the phenomenon is part of a long historical process of neoliberalization. Exploring the neoliberal basis for military contracting is a propitious starting point for a progressive research into cases of military privatization in other jurisdictions. The project’s grander theoretical question about the changing nature of the advanced capitalist state is more challenging. It involves theorizing the state itself and the emulsification of public and private spheres in the conduct of war. This is the theoretical issue lurking at the edges of this inquiry and is discussed in the conclusion.

Empirically, it explains the historical determinants of military contracting in the United States and especially the expansion in scale and scope of military contracting in the post-September 11 wars. Using the process tracing method to undertake a cross-historical comparison,
This inquiry contributes an important pair of case studies to this growing body of work. The case study of Vietnam is the first substantive integration of the Vietnam War case into the literature on the private military industry and, in doing so, uncovers a history that has been treated as a minor element of that war. The case studies of military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan contribute to scholarly understanding of these conflicts that are still in the process of unfolding. This is an important contribution to highlight. Since military contracting is a constantly unfolding phenomenon, scholars have attempted to make sense of its patterns in real time. Naturally, this creates difficulties for researchers searching for complete information and a link to the bigger picture. During the post-September 11 era, scholarship could only contain a portion of the story. This inquiry is distinct from its predecessors in that it has the benefit of hindsight not available in previous research. Undertaken in the last, fledgling years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it can account for the full arc of the conflicts (Afghanistan remains a bit of an exception since at time of writing the war there is in its twelfth year). In more pragmatic terms, the project develops a conceptual vocabulary about non-state combatants. Indeed, private sector participation in war is not a new phenomenon, but the political economy of the industry today is quite different from that of the past. The historical perspective and empirical exposition help build scholarly expertise with regard to both the private military industry and non-state combatants more broadly.

Thus, this dissertation is written for a wide audience of interested scholars, namely researchers of military contracting over the past decade, IR scholars interested in US defence policy, and critical IPE scholars interested in neoliberalism. The body of research on military contractors spans different fields of inquiry and much of it has done well to explore many dimensions of the industry but significant gaps remain. This is in part because of the difficulty of
systematically analyzing current history, but it is also a product of disciplinary approaches to the subject. Scholars undertaking research on military contracting often operate at cross purposes. Researchers in the sub-discipline of security studies are predominantly interested in the empirical and practical implications of military privatization. At the same time, scholars in the sub-discipline of IPE and political sociology are driven by abstract theoretical questions, usually undertaken from a critical angle. This project aims to provide a common ground that will be of interest to both fields. Explaining the historical trends of military contracting in a theoretically grounded, but empirically rich manner is an important way of building connection between different sub-disciplines. Additionally, the research should be of interest to historians working in the small but potent literature comparing the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars (Taylor and Botea 2011; Lebovic 2010; Ryan and Fitzgerald 2009; Gardner and Young 2008; Elliott 2007; Lock-Pullan 2006). Ultimately, the project contributes a theoretically informed and empirically grounded explanation of the private military industry and the advanced capitalist state in the twenty-first century. For political scientists more broadly, the significant question at hand addresses how advanced capitalist states interact with the private sector in the field of security.

**Ordinem Operandi**

*American Military Contractors and the Neoliberal Way of War* is divided into five substantive chapters. Chapter two defines neoliberalism and establishes the conceptual and technical framework for the project. It disentangles the various uses of the term “neoliberalism” before developing a theoretical synthesis which serves as the theoretical framework for the subsequent empirical case studies about military neoliberalization.

Chapter three begins the historical case studies of military contracting in the Vietnam and the post-September 11 wars in earnest. It undertakes a descriptive account of US military
contracting in both case studies. Using the classification of military contractor elucidated above, this chapter compares the qualitative and quantitative features of the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Doing so not only provides a more nuanced instrument to discuss military contracting, but it also identifies how different aspects of US military operations have been carried out by the private sector. It finds that the kind of military contracting that has characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan took embryonic form during the Vietnam War.

Chapter four explores the determinants of US military contracting in the Vietnam War. It argues that the scale and scope of contracting varied with the changes in the US political mission. Basic state-building infrastructure projects turned into projects designed to support US military operations after 1965. Despite the rapid troop buildup that year, contractor levels remained relatively stable. This can be explained by referring to the military draft which provided the US with cheap non-market labour, as well as broader programs of social engineering that were characteristic of the Keynesian welfarist political economy of the era.

The final chapters take aim at the overdetermined causes of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapter five assesses and then dispenses competing explanations for the scale and scope of contracting in post-September 11 wars. It explores prominent explanations of the rise of the industry in the 1990s and assesses their analytical leverage in explaining the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars. It finds that explanations of the industry’s emergence in general do not necessarily explain the post-September 11 dynamics of US military contracting in particular. This observation paves the way for the final discussion about the historical forces that determined the scale and scope of military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Chapter six is the analytical crux. It argues that the differences in military contracting between the post-September 11 wars and the Vietnam War are attributable to two particular determinants: military neoliberalization and the absence of a military draft. Both are necessary conditions that account for the qualitative and quantitative features of contracting in the post-September 11 wars.

The concluding chapter develops connections between post-September 11 contracting, the future of the sector and future research. It moves beyond the confines of the two case studies and connects recent developments to theoretical, policy and legal literature on private military contracting in the US and around the world.
Chapter 2
Neoliberalism: Theoretical Foundations

Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)

Walt Whitman, Song of Myself

At the core of the broader argument about the proliferation of private military labour during the post-September 11 wars lies a sophisticated concept. Neoliberalism is the prime determinant in the military contracting trends that were raised in the introductory chapter. If this is the case, then it is essential to establish what exactly is meant by “neoliberalism,” a fraught and confusing polysemy that is widely used for different purposes in different disciplines. Therefore, this chapter defines the theoretical concept at the core of the argument and clarifies its distinctiveness among other concepts that share the same name. First it disentangles the various uses of neoliberalism in the International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) literature. It is a necessary step in order to clear the brush from the grounds on which the broader theoretical framework will be set. Second, it develops the critical political economy conceptualization of neoliberalism as an unevenly realized and improvised form of political governance. Third, it develops neoliberalism as a key determinant that can explain the pronounced role of the private sector in the post-September 11 wars.

Part I discusses the ubiquity and diversity of neoliberalism in the IR and IPE literature. The term “neoliberalism” has the unfortunate distinction of being a master concept in at least two major strands of literature in the study of world politics. In the field of IR, it is one half of the so-called “neo-neo” debate that pitted neorealism against neoliberalism in the 1980s. Neoliberalism, in this sense, is associated with literature on “neoliberal institutionalism” and the study of international regimes that emerged in the 1980s, in contradistinction to the ascendant neorealism.
In IPE, “economic neoliberalism” has a considerably different association. Here, it is used by critical approaches to the study of global capitalism and its effects, giving way to rich theoretical veins of thought in political science, sociology, geography and anthropology.

Part II begins the theoretical analysis in earnest. This section develops a theoretical synthesis that anchors the conceptualization of neoliberalism used to frame the case about US military neoliberalization. Since neoliberalism is a constantly evolving set of ideas, it is necessary to account for the different ways it has manifested itself over time. To do so, this section draws upon the rich theoretical work of two schools of neoliberal theory: the “varieties of neoliberalism” approach and the “variegated neoliberalism” approach. It discusses hitherto unacknowledged compatibilities that make for an integral understanding of neoliberalism itself. This section locates opportunities for synthesizing the theoretical properties of each approach. What it establishes is a theoretical framework that combines the capacity of the varieties school to account for macro-level shifts in the broader political economy and its institutionalist foundations with the analytical flexibility of the variegation school. These affinities, as well as some tensions, are discussed in detail. The discussion reconciles the two schools in a constructive and fruitful manner that accommodates the best of both while reinforcing weaknesses. The result is a hybrid framework of neoliberalization that nests the economic geography of the variegation school within the institutionalism of the varieties school. This synthesis provides the theoretical foundation for an analysis of the historical trajectory of military neoliberalization in the United States. However, the analysis cannot rest upon these theoretical laurels and suggest that “neoliberalism caused military privatization,” or “the military has been neoliberalized.” While this makes for a captivating headline, the story runs much deeper.
Part III explains more precisely the mechanisms by which military neoliberalization took hold in the United States. It answers the question: if neoliberalism was a prime determinant of military privatization, then what evidence needs to be deployed to make the case? Here, neoliberalism is put on double duty, acting as both a conceptual framework and a determining factor. As a determining factor, the ideational features of neoliberalism – the primacy of the market, devolution of public tasks to private actors – are identified as key drivers of change in the way the US military incorporated the private sector into its total force capacity. That is to say, these ideas must have been in the minds of the enactors of military outsourcing over the years. Once the ideas were in their heads, the decision to privatize or neoliberalize military institutions generated path dependent results that established a role for the private sector in US force projection capabilities. As conceptual framework, neoliberalism is identified as a process-based phenomenon that unfolds in “roll-back” and “roll-out” phases. These conceptualizations allow historical analysis to periodize path dependent and contingent processes of military neoliberalism in an effective and perspicuous manner, as will be done in chapter six. Viewed in this way, roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism serves as a way of accounting for the path dependent processes of military neoliberalization from the mid-1980s to the final stages of the post-September 11 wars. This conceptual framework will be used to understand the evolving nature of private sector participation in the post-September 11 wars.

I. Neoliberalism in International Relations and International Political Economy

To say that “liberalism” has been claimed by different traditions in the study of politics is an understatement. The field of International Relations is guilty of appropriating the term in multiple, sometimes inconsistent ways. The same is true for “neoliberalism,” a label claimed by multiple communities of scholars working within the fields of IR and IPE. Mercifully, though,
the term is applied within a far narrower band of discourse. Neoliberalism’s multiple denotations leave the term ripe for misunderstanding or, more commonly, strategic evasion – like conceptual ships passing in the night. The following section addresses the particular denotations of “neoliberalism” as it is used in IR and IPE\(^1\) and surveys different uses of the term neoliberalism in these two major subfields in the study of world politics. It is not necessary to undertake a full etymology or comprehensive comparison of “neoliberalism” in IR and IPE literature. Rather, the purpose here is to map the disciplinary uses of neoliberalism in order to better situate the theoretical discussions that appear later in this chapter.

**Neoliberal Institutionalism in IR**

In IR, *neoliberalism* is typically partnered with the term *institutionalism*. Neoliberal institutionalism is the label for a theoretical framework oriented towards the study of international organizations, institutions and regimes. The “institutionalism” in the label is derived from its focus on organizations that act as coordinating mechanisms between states in a decentralized global environment. Historically, neoliberal institutionalism emerged in the early 1980s and follows in the intellectual tradition of post-World War II liberal internationalism. During that time, regional integration and the proliferation of formal institutions in world politics prompted the study of how states learn and redefine interests within the context of institutionalized cooperation (Nye 1988: 239). What drew scholarly attention in this period were the formal structures of interstate cooperation. One definition characterized institutions as “a

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\(^1\) Dividing International Relations and International Political Economy into discrete fields of inquiry may appear arbitrary though it is not without some historical precedent (Cox 1981). Moreover, assigning neoliberal institutionalism to the IR field is also contestable. Prominent historiographies suggest that neoliberal institutionalism properly belongs to the IPE subfield (Keohane 2009; Cohen 2008; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998). The disciplinary bifurcation here is offered primarily for heuristic purposes and is not essential to the broader argument though its acceptance is implicit in some of the claims.
formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or related fields (quoted in Stein 2008: 203).

By the 1970s and 1980s, the postwar liberal paradigm was widened by the focus on “regimes” defined by Stephen Krasner as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations.” Krasner and many after him took the interaction of power, as well as these concepts, as foundational to the proper explanation of state behaviour. To neoliberal institutionalists, principles are “beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice” (Krasner 1983: 2). The neo- prefix denotes the continuation of the liberal internationalist tradition of early post-World War II theorizing, especially with regard to the Bretton Woods institutions and the slow process of European integration. Neoliberal institutionalism expands the analytical scope of its predecessor beyond formal institutions to include systemic (anarchy) and ideational dimensions (principles, norms, rules, procedures, expectations) of international cooperation. This revamped paradigm aimed to explain complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977) within the context of structural anarchy, the durability of institutions and the declining power of the United States at the time.

The intellectual environment in which neoliberal institutionalism developed, particularly in the United States, is also crucial to understanding its emergence. Importantly, neoliberal institutionalism’s elaboration took place during the so-called “neo-neo” debates with its theoretical, though genetically similar, rival neorealism (Baldwin 1993; Keohane 1986; Keohane
1984; Waltz 1979). The two share the commitment to statism, utilitarianism, structuralism and positivism identified in neorealism by Richard Ashley (1986), though to differing degrees. During the period of the neo-neo debates, theoretical convergences reinforced and naturalized each other’s ontological and epistemological assumptions. As leading theorists published in leading journals, the recursive assumptions became embedded in the core of the discipline. Neoliberal institutionalism also developed within the broader methodological debates about the reintegration of institutions into political analysis that aimed to interpose human rules and organizations between structural and societal levels of analysis (Hall and Taylor 1996; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1979). Krasner’s sentiment about the causal significance of institutions is emblematic of the place of international institutions in the analysis of world politics. He argues that regimes and institutions are “not merely epiphenomenal,” but rather they are “independent variables standing between basic causal variables…and outcomes and behaviours” (1983: 6). In this sense, neoliberal institutionalism reflects the broader intellectual currents of its times, namely institutionalist forms of positivism.

The paradigm is premised on three suppositions: that states are the central actors in world politics; that the international system is anarchic; and that regimes and institutions are significant factors that mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on state-state cooperation. Neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists agree on the first point, differ on the meaning of anarchy, and diverge on the third point. Neoliberal institutionalists criticize neorealism’s static approach to interests in an anarchic world system. They reject the notion that the prime interest of states is survival and suggest that the interests of the particular units evolve in light of the costs and benefits of cooperation. This leads to the third point about the significance of international institutions and the crucial claim of the paradigm itself. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that institutions,
regimes and conventions can intervene in a state’s decision-making calculation, thereby changing both actions and outcomes even within the structurally given distribution of material capabilities. This marks the crucial break with neorealism which “assigns everything except the distribution of capabilities to the unit level,” at least in its Waltzian formulation (Nye 1988: 243). It is on these points of divergence that neoliberal institutionalist theory generates its explanatory power and its theoretical richness regarding the nature of state goals, state intentions, opportunity and transaction costs, likelihood of cooperation and the “mutual adjustment” of interests (Baldwin 1993; Keohane 1984: 12).

The “liberalism” part is trickier to establish since it is deeply embedded in the foundations of western civilization. Arthur A. Stein (2008: 202) observes that “those who use [neoliberal institutionalism] never address whether the “liberal” qualification means that there is an “illiberal institutionalism,” or whether it is possible to talk of institutions and not be a liberal.” Liberalism’s place in neoliberal institutionalism is less about social contract theory, rights and the autonomous individual, than it is about with a faith in progress and reason in social life. As Keohane puts it,

[Liberalism serves as a set of guiding principles for contemporary social science. As a guide to social scientific thought, it stresses the role of human-created institutions in affecting how aggregations of individuals make collective decisions. It emphasizes the importance of changeable political processes rather than simply immutable structures, and it rests on a belief in at least the possibility of cumulative progress in human affairs...Institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in expectations and processes that result can exert profound effects on state behaviour (1989: 10).

Liberalism, in the sense of the possibility of human progress, finds its IR roots in the post-World War I settlement which aimed at an idealistic restructuring of world politics. Woodrow Wilson’s program for a post-war order sought to mediate the anarchy of interstate relations through institutions and rules. This “idealism” serves as the immediate predecessor to the adoption of “liberalism” as a paradigm in the study of IR, at least according to the
discipline’s own mythology (Carvalho, Leira and Hobson 2011). Neoliberal institutionalism is rooted in the liberalism of reason and cooperation in a state of nature, as opposed to the survivalist pessimism of realism and neorealism.

Epistemologically, neoliberal institutionalism is positivistic, taking its assumptions about the behaviour of its units of analysis from rational choice and game theoretical models. Like neorealism, it is interested in explaining international politics in a scientific manner. The primary method of this explanation is deductive reasoning derived from the structure of the international system which is premised upon an epistemology of rationalism and methodological individualism. Neoliberal institutionalists take states as unitary actors that are capable of autonomous action. They respond to incentives provided to them within the context of anarchy, of institutional constraints, and for some, identities and values (March and Olsen 1998). By studying both structural and institutional variables, neoliberal institutionalists view their units of analysis under the rubric of bounded rationality. This leads away from “strictly power-based, game-theoretic analysis toward the study of international regimes” (Keohane 1984: 29). Indeed, Keohane takes care to point out the limits of strict rational choice models and the importance of assimilating normative and ideational considerations into an explanation of actor behaviour (1984: chapter 7). But, while the limitations of rationalism are well-known, “it is valuable as a simplifying assumption with which to build theory, since it provides a baseline premised on a relatively uncomplicated situation characterized by purely self-interested and rational behaviour. That is, rational choice theory provides us with a set of hypothetical expectations that we can then test against experience” (1984: 70). In summation, neoliberal institutionalism fits very much within the so-called “mainstream” or “problem solving” approach to International Relations scholarship, looking to science to explain the world as it is (Cox 1981).
Neoliberalism in International Political Economy

Neoliberal institutionalism in IR stands in stark contrast to the more heterodox and critical conceptions of economic neoliberalism as understood in IPE. It is also much more difficult to capture in a concise formulation since it is used so differently across social science disciplines (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). Economic neoliberalism is a doctrine of market primacy; a syndrome of behaviours, beliefs and practices of state and non-state actors alike that are instrumentally oriented towards maximizing profit in the global economy, including the restructuring of the global economy itself towards those ends. Of course, the exact manifestations, effects and contingencies are a matter of deep debate because neoliberal policy convergence is frustrated by the idiosyncrasies of social and political relations in different places and time. Generally in this context, economic neoliberalism is seen as a globalizing political doctrine that affects state and non-state actors unevenly and at multiple levels of analysis, cutting across the inside-outside distinctions (Cerny 2008). Much like “globalization,” neoliberalism as a concept in IPE is large and contains multitudes.

Observers have not been shy in expressing frustration over the multitudes. It is referred to by scholars as a “rascal concept...inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a). Andrew Gamble (2001) calls it “hydra-headed”; to Susan Watkins (2010) it is “a dismal epithet.” Ward and England (2007) note the inverse trend in the literature between the volume of scholarship produced, and agreement over its meaning. In IPE literature, neoliberalism has been used as a short form to describe neoclassical economic policies of deregulation, privatization, marketization and monetarism that supplanted the Keynesian post-war paradigm. Scholarly convention traces the political origins of the neoliberal era to sometime in the late 1970s with the ascent of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and
Deng Xiaoping to their respective leadership positions, though the clock need not start there. While these policy orientations and political figures are a part of the neoliberal story, they are one-dimensional and analytically limited. Not only do the policy goals contain multiple strategies and tactics, they all fit within a much broader normative logic and philosophical parentage (Cerny 2008). This much is well recognized and literature on economic neoliberalism has yielded a heterogeneous body of research in IPE and in the fields of anthropology, geography and sociology. But with theoretical heterogeneity comes incoherence. Thus, “neoliberalism” as a social and economic phenomenon has spawned multiple, divergent research programs.

Ontologically, identifying “neoliberalism” as the relevant subject matter is to situate an ideational factor at the core of the research program. Many scholars take the idea as a determinant but seek to understand its influence within an integrated political economic approach. This precludes the kinds of studies that rely upon parsimonious theorizing and well-defined causal variables to render their assessments. In the critical literature, the political project of neoliberalism has been thoroughly dissected. As a class project neoliberalism is posited as a “political project aimed to restore capitalist class power in the aftermath of the economic and social crises of the 1970s…Such a project, or comprehensive concept of control is characterized by (1) a specific and relatively coherent set of ideas on how to organize the accumulation of capital and the maintenance of social order, and (2) a specific configuration of social forces that succeed in presenting their factional interests as the general interest (Apeldoorn and Overbeek 2012: 4). Put another way, neoliberalism was a “political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites…[t]he theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has…primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever is needed to achieve this goal” (Harvey 2005: 19). Even more bluntly,
neoliberalism is posited by some Marxian analysts as “the expression of the new hegemony of finance” (Duménil and Lévy 2001: 601).

More benignly, neoliberalism has been explored through a reconstruction of its intellectual history and by way of a genealogy of the idea itself. Research programs in this tradition trace the germination of neoliberalism to its genesis among the contrarian intellectuals and economists of the interwar and early post-World War II era. Here the narrative tells of an eclectic and dispersed network of Austrian philosophers, German ordoliberal and Chicago economists united by their marginal status during the period of Keynesian ascendancy (Burgin 2012; Jones 2012; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Turner 2008; Peck 2008). These intellectual histories tell the prehistory of neoliberalism’s political emergence in the 1970s. Jamie Peck takes the tale further by identifying more contemporary proponents of neoliberal ideas, namely, the think tanks and public intellectuals that fit in the “loose historical sequence from the early twentieth century to the first decade of the twenty-first…” (2010: xvii). Similarly, the political history draws much attention from scholars looking at national and transnational patterns of its emergence, as well as its effects. Much of this is rooted in Polanyian analysis of the embeddedness of markets in social contexts (Robson 2006; Munck 2005; Blyth 2002; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002).

To a lesser degree, the normative philosophical underpinnings of neoliberalism receives its share of scrutiny (Plant 2009; Slaughter 2005), as does its broad sociological implications (Comoroff and Comoroff 2000) and particular ethnographic dimensions (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Burawoy et al. 2000). The empirical effects and implications of neoliberalism, however, have drawn much more scholarly attention. These approaches largely fit under the broad “varieties of neoliberalism” school. The predominant form of analysis here is generally
institutionalist and focused on how neoliberal capitalism operates within the framework of a
given state (Crouch 2011; Roberts 2010; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Crouch 1999; Hall 1993)
though it extends to neoliberalism and international institutions (Babb 2013; Harmes 2006), and
importantly, state-level analyses of neoliberal structural adjustment in the developing world
(Woods 2006). Many analyses subsume these broader ontological preoccupations within a
schematic analysis of neoliberalism that seeks to integrate the ideological project with the
political, economic and intellectual fields of practice (Mudge 2008). Save for some of the
institutional approaches to neoliberal transformation (Campbell and Pedersen 2001), the
epistemological predilections of critical neoliberalism research are pluralistic but avowedly anti-
positivist.

So far this section has only pointed towards some of the currents in the academic
literature on economic neoliberalism without engaging in much depth. The discussion now turns
to a breakdown of the three major schools of neoliberal research as schematized by Brenner,
Peck and Theodore (2010a): the varieties of neoliberalism school, the historical materialist
tradition, and the governmentality school. What unites the three is a shared ontological
assumption that neoliberalism is a process and that neoliberalization embodies a complex profile
of policies and behaviours in constant flux and renegotiation with social context. The three have
their own epistemological and ontological suppositions, strengths and blind spots, and are worth
additional consideration in this review.

i. Varieties of Capitalism/Neoliberalism

This first type conceptualizes neoliberalism within the logic and intellectual lineage of
the varieties of capitalism school. The national varieties of capitalism literature developed during
the 1990s as an approach to the study of competing models of capitalism within and among
advanced states (Deeg and Jackson 2007; Coates 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001; literature reviews in Peck and Theodore 2007). Generally positioning liberal market economies versus coordinated market economies, this literature contrasted American hegemonic and globalizing capitalist pressures with archetypal states like Germany and Japan that maintained strong, internal regulatory regimes to mediate between internal priorities and external pressures. The “varieties of neoliberalism” literature follows in this tradition, seeking to explain particular state-regulatory approaches within a structural context of neoliberal globalization. The “varieties” literature is founded on a statist ontology which has the virtue of permitting a wide ranging comparative analysis of state systems of capitalism. However, its state-regime assumptions and focus on institutional patterns of differentiation obscure the implications of incremental adjustment on systemic considerations.

Initially, the varieties of capitalism literature posited an analytical dyad between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. Over two decades of scholarship, the binary has been disrupted but “national states are still viewed as the natural institutional containers within which macro-regulatory integrity is both accomplished historically and comprehended theoretically” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 187). They identify three problems with this methodological nationalism. First, the systemic character of institutional variety is assumed, taking the particular character of variety to be a matter of interest and not the reasons for variation itself. Second, liberal market economies are presumed to be relatively flat and evenly neoliberalized, juxtaposed with the diversity of capitalist variants in coordinated market economies. Third, coordinated market economies denote a large and heterogeneous universe of cases connected only by the analytical construct of “coordination.” Together, the varieties approach hinges upon statist, territorial and binary suppositions in order to pursue this
research program. Brenner, Peck and Theodore suggest that the varieties of neoliberalism analytic is not equipped to decipher regulatory changes that crosscut and interconnect state systems. Instead of seeing convergence as the result of contingent actors that are contextual and worthy of deeper theorization, it is viewed within the framework of “institutions as equilibrium” (Deeg and Jackson 2007) and is explained weakly as the result of external influences followed by idiosyncratic adjustment. The hybridity of free markets and particular state-regulatory regimes is crucial to the reproduction of neoliberalism, and the co-constitution of the two logics at multiple levels of sub-state analysis is overlooked by the varieties literature.

In essence, the varieties school draws its strength from its state institutional focus which permits comparative analysis and a rich explanatory output on difference. But it is limited by its inability to explain particular institutional changes within state regimes that result in systemic changes that “may undermine the coherence of inherited regulatory arrangements” at multiple spatial scales (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 191). Included in the varieties of neoliberalism is the regulationist approach of macro-level transformation theorized by Bob Jessop (2002) and the competition state theory developed by Philip Cerny (2010a; 2010b). These are both important theories of neoliberal political economy that fit within the varieties analytic and require careful attention to reconstruct. For now, they will be set aside until section II of this chapter where they will be explored in greater depth as part of a broader theoretical synthesis.

**ii. Historical Materialism and Disciplinary Neoliberalism**

The second major current in neoliberalism scholarship that Brenner, Peck and Theodore identify is what they call the “historical materialist-IPE” variant. Here, neoliberalism is an inextricable part of the spread of the capitalist logic of accumulation, expedited by political and technological changes in the late twentieth century. Specifically, the collapse of the Soviet bloc
eliminated the most formidable alternative to western capitalism; new technologies accelerated
capital transactions and communication; and, a pattern of global coordination among state actors
facilitated the convergence of economic objectives around shared assumptions about growth. In
other words, this approach views neoliberalism as the latest iteration of material relations in a
traversable global space and vastly accelerated time scale. Scholars within this ambit suggest that
neoliberalism represents an integrated project aimed at the market-enabling reconfiguration of
the global political economy.

The historical materialist-IPE approach takes philosophical root in a synthesis of
Gramscian and Foucauldian concepts, developed primarily by Stephen Gill (1998; 1995a;
1995b). Hegemonic historical blocs in the Gramscian analytic manifest themselves in a pattern of
“new constitutionalism” which binds states to transnational economic agreements. Disciplinary
neoliberalism is the outcome of internalized values of the global market. According to Gill, “it
combines the structural power of capital with “capillary power” and “panopticism” which exerts
behaviour modifying power upon actors in the public and private spheres of political life (1995a:
411). Discipline is a global and local dimension of power integral to the broader project of
reformulating human rationality towards market objectives.

Analytically, historical materialist-IPE emphasizes global and supranational parameters
of neoliberalization. This regime of new constitutionalism is initiated by an historical bloc of
international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) as well as informal institutions like the
G7/8. Gill (1995a: 412) identifies new constitutionalism as a political project attempting to make
transnational liberalism and liberal democratic capitalism the sole model for future development
and, ultimately, to forge a market civilization. The constitutionalism element embodies the
institutional elements of the global project. International economic coordination agreements
between states are constitutive of a broader regime oriented towards the internationalization of capital and the creation of ideal market conditions for transnational capital (Gill 1998). In the process, the new constitutional measures taken by state actors at the international level limit the discretionary power of states to shape spatial dimensions of their domestic political economy. The effects are policy convergence and economic integration within the space of the global market. Neoliberalism affirms and extends the power of global finance and transnational corporations while maintaining flexible regulatory arrangements, quite unlike the system that prevailed under the Bretton Woods regime. Moreover, new constitutionalism maneuvers states into a position where market priorities of government credibility, policy consistency and investor confidence take precedence over other non-market dimensions of social life (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 194).

Though Gill is not alone in the application of disciplinarity to global neoliberalism (Wacquant 2012; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001; Bourdieu 1998), this element of his historical materialist perspective is a novel contribution to the understanding of neoliberalism. It complements the Gramscian notion of hegemony by giving theoretical depth to the consensual elements of power. Disciplinarity accounts for reformulation of rationality and interests at localized levels of analysis by suggesting that it is the product of the opportunity structure of the global economy. Once supranational constitutional agreements are enacted, they constrain state institutions within the parameters of a global logic of accumulation. State-institutional iterations of regulatory reform are thus the product of structurally imposed imperatives that have pervasive effects within national and subnational polities.

The weakness of historical materialist-IPE is the inverse of the varieties of neoliberalism approach. Where the latter is bound by methodological nationalism, the former is committed to
methodological globalism (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a). This top-down perspective obscures the differential effects of neoliberalization upon national and subnational spaces, or treats them as empirically idiosyncratic. It posits a unidirectional logic emanating from the highest level of analysis, over and above other currents of neoliberalization. This includes upward and horizontal circuits of institutional reregulation as well as *ad hoc* approaches that cannot be reduced to a single direction. Much like other structural explanations for the development of capitalism, the market-disciplinary perspective is deterministic and negates the agency of state and sub-state actors as meaningful players in the process of reregulation.

Neoliberalization triggers dislocations and resistances to its universalizing market logic. These conflicts have the potential to be significantly destabilizing to the regime as a whole. However, the dialectic of discipline and resistance obscures the contextualized ways in which this takes place, the different time scales in which neoliberalization occurs, and the constitutive reformulation of the spaces of resistance over time.

This last criticism is crucial. While it is difficult to deny that neoliberalism exerts disciplinary leverage or that something resembling an historic bloc exists, the singularity of these forces are overstated. The phenomenon theorized by Gill is subject to objections on the basis of its relatively homogenous view of the space of global neoliberalism. Neoliberal reregulation always passes through institutional circumstances, all of which have path dependent effects and trajectories that are particular to context and space. By generalizing the process of neoliberalization to a combination of hegemonic new constitutionalism-plus-disciplinarity, Gill renders “a relatively undifferentiated depiction of neoliberalization processes,” when in fact, the particular dynamics of spatial scales makes a considerable difference (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 197). The particularities of these dynamics are manifested at multiple levels of
analysis, over time, in discrete sectors, issue areas and spaces. The result is an uneven neoliberalization process that may be illustrated in case study application of historical materialist theory, but underdeveloped in the abstract form. In essence, the weakness of historical materialist-IPE is the strength of the varieties of neoliberalism approach and the governmentality school.

iii. Governmentality

If the varieties of neoliberalism and the historical materialist accounts turn on institutional and structural modes of analysis, then the governmentality approach is characterized by its rejection of these ontological foundations. Rather than viewing neoliberalization as a product of a deterministic, homogenizing force or as a unitary form encased in state jurisdictions, governmentality is seen as a “logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (Ong 2006: 2). This perspective focuses its analysis of neoliberalism at the level of individuals and “assemblages,” largely without reference to the formal dimensions of power. Philosophically, it is rooted in Foucault’s theorizations of discipline, biopolitics and power “without the king” (Foucault 2008; Foucault 1980; Foucault 1978). Sociologically, the application of these neo-Foucauldian concepts facilitates political analyses of phenomena that are not easily observed through institutional or structural analysis. Quite the opposite, the governmentality approach is interested in the drawn out processes by which the rationality of the ruled is synchronized with that of the rulers. This phenomenon of isomorphic rationality is important because it amounts to the reconstitution of political subjects and has considerable implications for theories of power and practice in the global economy.
In this approach, neoliberalism is considered a technology of governing in such a way as to spread and inculcate the imperatives of market rationality in people irrespective of social context. Neoliberal governmentality is a protracted historical process of shaping subjects and exerting control with differential outcomes (Ong 2006: 3). To gain a sense of the historical trajectory of governmentality, it is worth returning to Foucault’s interpretation of the historical development of *homo economicus*. In his lectures on biopolitics, Foucault (2008) talks about how the development of this figure is the development of an individual with self-regarding interests. A marketplace made up of many interests responds systematically to one another. Though it is not stated explicitly, interventions in the interests of people that constitute the marketplace amount to a particularly subtle form of control, exercise of power, and normalization of behaviours. By controlling the stimulants of economic desire, power can then govern by way of the consensual interests of individuals. As he puts it:

*homo economicus*, that is to say, the person who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. Homo economicus is someone who is eminently governable. From being the intangible partner of laissez faire, homo economicus now becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables (Foucault 2008: 270-271).

Indeed, the governmentality literature overlaps somewhat with the historical materialist-IPE literature with regard to the disciplinary components of neoliberalism. Ontologically, however, the governmentality approach is less interested in the materialist basis of institutional and structural analysis. Rather it is oriented towards “assemblages” in which governmentality is manifest. In the historical materialist approach, the principal units of analyses are historical blocs and their constituent institutional forms. Situating these actors at the centre of analysis more or less provides a clear conceptual identification of where power resides. When power is exercised, the directional effects can be identified along its circuits through to the point where it is
ultimately applied. In the governmentality approach, the notion of power residing in any location is anathema. The exertion of power is less about its sources and systematic forms of application, than it is about the circuitry of power and the particular points of application that reformulates individual and collective rationality.

Methodologically, eschewing traditional agents of political inquiry entails reframing the primary unit of analysis. Hence, the concept of “assemblages” is deployed as a way of circumventing arbitrary scales of analysis such as the state or regional economies. As a concept, it captures the fluidity with which governmental power operates within contingent and unstable fields of practice. They are neither local nor global things, but forms that imply heterogeneity, contingency, instability, partiality and situatedness (Collier and Ong 2005: 12; Larner 2000). Governmentality is thus the array of knowledge and techniques that are concerned with the systematic and pragmatic guidance and regulation of everyday conduct within these assemblages. In its neoliberal iteration, governmentality is the outcome of the assimilation of common sense market rationality in the public and private life. In this regard, governmentality is about the creation of neoliberal subjects who need no yoking or coercive incentives to behave as market actors; they will arrive at these conclusions on their own.

Avoiding the language of multiple scales of inquiry is intended to sidestep the trap of reifying the abstract conceptual frameworks used by academic analysts. Aihwa Ong’s solution is to see the spaces of governmentality as emergent and unbound by prior political frontiers. Instead, an ontology of assemblages emphasizes the demarcations of human activity as defined by market rationality and behaviours, not pre-existing administrative units. She emphasizes this point by suggesting that there is a danger attendant to using the language of scales because it projects “a conceptual architecture that is at risk of taking itself too literally” (Ong 2006: 19).
Absolved of this kind of conceptual architecture, empirical governmentality analyses focus on activities of daily life and the ways in which neoliberalism interacts with situated actors and practices (Ong 2007). More concretely, it entails rich ethnographic and anthropological analyses of actually-existing neoliberal governmentality so as to uncover its highly contextualized forms at the level of daily life (Ong 2006; Ferguson and Gupta 2002).

The primary limitation of the governmentality approach is the consequence of the perspective’s commitment to context-specificity. Ong’s statement about taking a conceptual architecture too seriously demonstrates an unresolved tension with more conventional institutional and structural forms of analysis. Whether or not a scholar thinks that “scales” are reified, there are good reasons to accept these pre-existing administrative units and intellectual tools. Chief among them is the fact that neoliberal ideas pass through, and are given form by institutional actors. The results are manifestations of actually-existing neoliberalism, observable in institutionalized form, bounded by durable administrative parameters, and initiating path dependent processes that effect social assemblages. This theoretical blind spot is a significant shortcoming even though it occurs very much by design. Seeking “power without the king” in the neo-Foucauldian sense, entails bypassing “not only the abstracted hierarchy of structures and orders, but also the limits of stand-alone micro-analysis” (Ong 2007: 7). Methodologically this makes sense: in order to analyze the lived experiences of neoliberal governmentality, one must find a route around the conventional foci of social scientific analysis. But this passage comes at a cost. Governmentality approaches obscure or ignore durable power relations, institutionalized circuits of power, the effects of path dependency and broad structural patterns that have long been recognized as parts of neoliberalization since the 1970s (Brenner, Peck and Theodore
Thus it is not well suited to the systematic analysis of institutional iterations of neoliberalism and neoliberalization.

This section reviews a considerable sample of neoliberal theorization and covers a great deal of terrain. Particular attention is paid to the varieties, historical materialist and governmentality approaches because of their theoretical depth and analytical propitiousness. But can the three be reconciled? Or, if not reconciled, how can they be integrated to develop a unified theory of neoliberalism? This is no easy task since theory does not employ interchangeable parts. Brenner, Peck and Theodore are correct when they note that none of the three theories deserve monopoly status in the literature, or that triangulating among the theories will produce an effective “omnibus theory of neoliberalization” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 207). After all, the theories have divergent, sometimes irreconcilable ontological and epistemological components that must be reconciled before proceeding with a synthesis. The next section begins the process of synthesis. It takes the varieties of capitalism/neoliberalism school discussed above and synchronizes it with a theoretical understanding of neoliberalism premised upon its variegated effects.

II. The Nested Framework of Neoliberal Theory: Varieties and Variegation

This section builds upon the literature critique issued by Brenner, Peck and Theodore and takes on their proposed alternative to existing models of neoliberalization. It has two purposes. First, it reconstructs the theory of variegated neoliberalism and, second, it finds compatibilities with two theoretical contributions to the varieties school that Brenner, Peck and Theodore do not address. The compatibilities are synthesized into a framework that can account for the historical patterns of neoliberalization as a macro-economic phenomenon and explain neoliberalism’s
constitutive unevenness. Brenner and his collaborators are, for the most part correct in their assessments of the varieties of capitalism, historical materialist and governmentality schools. However, when presenting their alternative, the variegation approach, there is a subtext of incommensurability that is unwarranted. They overlook important affinities between their own variegation approach and the varieties school which make them compatible as theories of neoliberalism.

The two approaches can be synthesized into an integral theory of neoliberalization that is effective at macro- and micro-levels of analysis, while remaining analytically sensitive to the constitutively inconsistent nature of neoliberalization. The compatibility lies in the agreement between the schools about neoliberalization’s path dependent character. The variegation approach theorizes and documents the pathways of regulatory restructuring, all while assuming the path dependent trajectory. It does so largely by under theorizing the antecedent factors or contingent moments that constitute the prior institutional conditions from which paths emanate. This leaves the path dependent trajectory of variegation unmoored from an institutional basis for the claim of path dependence. It is important because the institutional basis for path dependence gives the varieties approach its methodological grounding.

It is worth pausing for a moment to explain what is meant here by path dependency. As political scientists have explored in great depth, path dependency is a useful tool in the historical study of changing institutional forms (Pierson 2004; 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; Mahoney 2000; Thelen 1999). As an approach to the study of historical change, path dependency views the unfolding of events such that they are more than idiographic phenomena, but rather systematic occurrences that can provide explanatory leverage over historical outcomes. Generally, the theory maintains that contingent events set into motion “institutional patterns or event chains that
have deterministic properties” (Mahoney 2000: 507). The deterministic properties of event chains can be discerned by tracing historical processes that make certain pathways more efficient (and more likely to occur) and by foreclosing on alternative courses of action. According to James Mahoney, there are at least three defining features of path dependency analysis. First, it involves the study of causal processes that are sensitive to events that occur early in the unfolding of an historical sequence. Second, early events are contingent happenings and could not have been predicted to occur at the time. Third, once historical progressions are set in motion, it is increasingly difficult to reverse the effects of the initial event that set off the chain (2000: 510-511). Mahoney argues that there are two major strands of path dependency analysis, self-reinforcing sequences and reactive sequencing. Reactive sequencing processes play a particularly important role in the evolution of military neoliberalism as articulated in chapter six.

Path dependency is especially suited for analysis of agent-initiated constraints on human behaviour, namely in institutional analysis. Institutions can be defined as the organizational manifestations of formal or informal rules, conventions or practices (Parsons 2007). Examples of institutions are legion but for present purposes, states and governmental departments (like the military) are fertile grounds for path dependent analysis since they are all human constructs and generally products of conscious human action. The decisions that are made by agents at specific points in time come to define the parameters of those institutions. Over time they yield patterns of behaviour that become locked into place. The results are constraints upon the behaviours that strongly condition the direction of agent behaviour. Thus, it becomes more efficient to remain on pre-existing courses of action than it is to reject earlier practices and start anew. By identifying the historical moments where certain factors changed the formal and/or informal rules that constitute an institution, it is possible to track and explain subsequent outcomes. This is most
significant to the analysis of military neoliberalization during the post-September 11 wars
whereby regulatory incursions into the market for military services were heavily conditioned by
prior institutional practices in that sector.

With that said, path dependency is a valuable tool for institutionalist scholars who tend to
inhabit the varieties of capitalism/neoliberalism approach. The argument here is that the path
dependency claims made by proponents of the variegation approach can be well served by
adopting the institutionalist proclivities of the varieties approach. The latter does a better job at
identifying the institutional preconditions that are necessary for a complete empirical
understanding of variegated neoliberalization. Nesting the analytical benefits of the variegation
school within the institutional framework of the varieties school permits an ontologically
consistent and methodologically sound approach to the study of neoliberalization. Importantly,
assimilating institutional analysis into a variegation account of neoliberalism is theoretically
consistent – institutions are necessary elements of the neoliberal geo-spatial landscape.

Within the ambit of the relatively new variegation approach, there is a conceptualization
of roll-back and roll-out neoliberalization. This pair of concepts provides useful tools for
identifying macro-level phenomena that denote multiple currents of path dependent processes. In
chapter six, roll-back and roll-out neoliberalization will be used to conceptualize and periodize
military neoliberalization and needs its own theoretical elaboration. But before doing so, those
concepts and the institutionalist path dependent methods they entail must be grounded in the
theoretical hybrid of the variegation and varieties schools. The following subsections contain a
theoretical reconstruction, discussion and integration of the two approaches.
Variegated Neoliberalism

Variegated neoliberalization is an analytical theory of the uneven development of neoliberalism between the 1970s and early 2000s and the uneven construction of regulatory protocols over that same time span. In this time, “neoliberalization processes are temporally discontinuous and spatially heterogeneous; and they produce (always mutating) macro institutional frameworks that simultaneously intensify and exploit this constitutive spatio-temporal unevenness” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 208). Thus, neoliberalization is not a smooth or balanced development and resembles anything but an elegant master plan. Instead, it is a patchwork of market enabling rules and protocols, stitched into the pre-existing fabric of institutional regulation and cultural practices that are unique to specific areas. Writ large, the result is a seemingly ad hoc landscape of market-enabling regulation that contains current regulatory functions amidst the remnants of prior systems. It forms not a coherent whole but a variegated landscape that is uneven in both its practices of accumulation and the regulatory systems.

To be sure, the unevenness of capitalist development is a fundamental concept in neo-Marxist theory (Harvey 1982; Frank 1966). Its importance to any analysis of capitalism or neoliberalism cannot be overstated because neoliberalism must be understood as a process and not a static institutional-ideational configuration. Thus, neoliberalization entails a theoretical foundation that can account for its own historical trajectory. Accordingly, the conceptualization of variegated neoliberalization begins from the assumption that neoliberalism is a process, akin to other major processes in political science like “industrialization,” “democratization,” or “modernization.” Though attaching an -ization suffix to an already fuzzy concept may seem like unnecessary jargon-making, it does serve a purpose. Neoliberalization establishes that
neoliberalism is a phenomenon with a complex internal profile that ought to be theorized along an historical time scale. Thus, to speak of neoliberalism is to speak of neoliberalization.

The effects of neoliberalization are observable in state and international regulatory frameworks. While neoliberalism is often shorthand for institutionalized forms of privatization, deregulation and monetarism, this does not begin to scratch the surface (Frieden 2006: 398-400). The actions of first generation neoliberal politicians in the 1980s are more accurately portrayed as partial deregulation and capital liberalization. They could not roll back the state entirely as a result of social and political resistances particular to spatial contexts. The particular resistances resulted in an uneven application of neoliberal policies in different countries, regions and sectors, and a transformation of the state’s purpose into an enabler of the free market. Empirically, observing the institutional paths of neoliberalization can lead to generalizations about the “‘rule regimes’ within which regulatory differentiation unfold” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010a: 207). These rule regimes were both domestic (union-busting) and transnational applications (NAFTA, WTO). In the 1990s, the pro-market paradigm was globalized thereby reworking the “macro spatial frameworks and interspatial circulatory systems” of the global political economic space (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 207). Of course, institutional transformations occurred unevenly at different times and in different places. Hence, clusters of wealth and zones of poverty that can be superimposed upon any political map of the world. These clusters do indeed cleave to the institutional strictures of state boundaries, but they are also conditioned by cultural practices, natural resource distribution, and regional modes of accumulation at urban, state and supranational levels. The 1990s and 2000s witnessed the emergence of an increasing volume of pro-market re-regulatory protocols designed as bulwarks against unanticipated failures of the deregulated market, which also developed unevenly.
The core analytical arguments of variegated neoliberalization encompass two aspects of regulatory transformation. First, neoliberalization processes develop unevenly across political and social space, contingent upon local dynamics and political practices. Second, the institutional frameworks and rule regimes that are constructed as a form of reregulation also develop in an uneven manner. This is the uneven development of neoliberalization, and the neoliberalization of regulatory uneven development (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 207). These two propositions provide a theoretical basis for empirical analyses of jurisdictionally specific path dependent processes of neoliberalization of political economic transformation since the 1980s.

The uneven development of neoliberalization

As the historiography of neoliberalism’s intellectual gestation makes clear, its philosophical and economic infrastructure was formulated within a network of geographically dispersed scholars in the US and Europe between the 1930s and 1970s. The North American and European crises of Keynesianism in the 1970s provoked changes in the mode of political economic governance that had been in place since the end of the Second World War. However, ruptures with the previous regime were not uniform. Neoliberal upstarts sought to exploit the strategic vulnerabilities of Keynesianism by deploying a ready-made alternative “policy paradigm” to the destabilized incumbent (Hall 1993). During the early stages of transformation to a post-Keynesian political economy, the liberalization projects reflected the idiosyncrasies of the particular crises to which neoliberal ideas were applied. In other words, Margaret Thatcher’s defeat of striking miners in 1985 differed from Reagan’s crushing of the air traffic control unions in 1981, which differed from the assimilation of market values into the programme of the
Swedish Social Democratic Party, which differed from Chilean market reforms and so on (Blyth 2002).

Neoliberal counter reactions to the Keynesian crises were patterned on the basis of existing institutional compositions and the context-specific manifestations of crises. As Brenner, Peck and Theodore suggest “the institutional landscapes over which these practices diffused were anything but randomly patterned; they were deeply structured by the contours of the Keynesian state, which established the founding rationales, ideological targets, fields of opportunity, and spaces of realization for the first rounds of neoliberalization” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 213). The implication of differential starting points and trajectories is that any talk of a “neoliberal revolution” is a gross oversimplification. While something significant did take place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, post-Keynesian political economies undertook contingent transformations yielding an institutional landscape that was highly uneven, hybrid and drew selectively from abstract principles of neoliberalism. In a loose sense, the early reforms of neoliberalization converged around some principles and shared tactics, though there was no uniform plan. Together, though, these reforms amounted cumulatively to a surging current of institutional transformation that washed over the existing landscape unevenly and with uneven downstream effects.

The neoliberalization of regulatory uneven development

What predominates now, three decades after neoliberal restructuring projects began, is a regime of uneven regulatory development. The patchwork of regulation that buttresses a global free market is the result of “successive rounds of distinctively patterned, market-oriented regulatory restructuring, each of which is predicated upon, but also partially transformative of,
inherited institutional landscapes at various spatial scales” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 209). It is an architecture built into an existing framework, which yield peculiar hybrid forms. Perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon is the transformation of the World Bank and IMF. The two institutions’ original mandates were to be mediators of international financial and economic cooperation and have since become champions of globalization and free-market restructuring. The transition of the Bretton Woods institutions to market-oriented geo-institutional rule regimes is emblematic of the assimilation of neoliberal imperatives into an existing institutional landscape. Take, as another example, the enduring salience of nationalist and security imperatives that interact with globalizing pressures and produce differentially liberalized market economies (Helleiner and Pickel 2005). Or, in Harvey’s (2005) succinct formulation, there is capitalism “with Chinese characteristics,” but one can apply this premise to any polity on Earth. In these scenarios, market-oriented policy experimentation mixed with entrenched institutional and/or social practices to produce hybridized forms of pro-market governance or rule regimes. Within states, neoliberalization becomes manifest in market-enabling regulations; transnationally, formal and informal rule regimes (akin to Gill’s new constitutionalism) are constructed, globalizing the uneven regulatory neoliberalization.

The irony, as plenty of observers have noted, is that the ideological foundations of neoliberalism are anti-statist while neoliberalization has required a torrent of state enacted governance. Moreover, neoliberalization involves the participation of non-state actors in the governance and surveillance of the global economy. Manifestations of governance range from regularized patterns of governance, such as the G8 summits, to ad hoc and decentralized forms, like industry self-regulation. Generally, the regulatory architecture of the global economy, across multiple spatial scales of analysis, follows no template or blueprint. Their improvised
emergences, institutional backstories and constant renegotiations defy isomorphism despite the motivational convergence on market priorities. Thus, the variegated regulatory landscape of neoliberalization is a systematic feature of decades of pro-market restructuring. For empirical researchers, the task is to explain particular instances of neoliberalization within the spatio-temporal context in which relevant institutions are embedded as well as the broader macro-spatial rule regimes.

Variegated neoliberalization, as it has been reconstructed here, has a number of analytical advantages for empirical research that emanate from its theoretical construction. Four in particular are highlighted here relating to its flexibility, approach to unevenness, time scale and spatial imagination:

(1) Analytical flexibility: The most general strength of the variegation approach is its analytical flexibility. Unlike the varieties, historical materialist and governmentality approaches, variegation’s ontological preoccupation with space and unevenness opens theoretical possibilities that are not otherwise available. Variegation’s spatial ontology frees it of methodological statism while acknowledging the durable institutional landscapes of the global economy. It avoids the nominal agency ascribed to states in methodological globalism as well as the erasure of systematic institutional patterns attendant to governmentality’s hyper-contextualism. In the language of debates in International Relations, the focus on “space” as its ontological organizing principle sidesteps analytical problems attendant to the Westphalian inside-outside assumptions about world politics (Walker 1993). Chief among those is that the juridical space circumscribed by state borders is ontologically prior and superordinate to other spatial scales. There is no doubt that the inside-outside distinction is an analytically useful assumption to make, and provides the basis of “scales of analysis” thinking, but it is theoretically
difficult to sustain in the twenty-first century. Globalization scholars have certainly made strides in accounting for changes in patterns of authority, capitalism and power in the global market (Mittelman 2010). But in other cases, accounts of globalization founder on definitions of power that are inextricably tied to state capacities (Nye 2011) or understand authority as self-contained spheres until they overlap (Rosenau 2002). In contrast, the geographical ontology of the variegation approach takes the institutional form of the state as part of a complex geo-institutional landscape without ascribing it ontological primacy or undifferentiated parity with other actors. Taking such an approach recognizes and captures the dynamism of regulatory restructuring in a way that eschews structural homogenization or regulatory convergence explanations. By being able to traverse analytical borders without effacing their significance, the variegation approach offers a theoretically inventive foundation without bracketing and setting aside durable realities of the real world. However, there is a problem with the degree to which institutional analysis is muted (but not silenced) in exchange for flexibility. This will be addressed momentarily.

(2) Variegation is systematic rather than anomalous: This approach accepts unevenness within enduring spatial contexts, like the state, as constitutive of the phenomenon and not as an aberration. As shorthand definitions of neoliberalism have it, one would expect to see privatization, deregulation, financialization and other policies taking effect at a relatively even rate. But this is not necessarily the case since the pathways of neoliberalization depend on actors and conditions attendant to particular scales of analysis. Neoliberalism has a systematic tendency to look different in different contexts, primarily because of resistances from socially and institutionally entrenched actors. This makes theorizing neoliberalism at the general level particularly difficult in heterodox political economy. To be sure, a phenomenon that is labelled in
a singular way despite appearing different every time calls the cohesiveness of the master concept into question. Consistent inconsistency casts doubt upon the explanatory utility of the master concept. But, by treating unevenness as constitutive, this approach identifies variegation as an intrinsic feature of neoliberalization that needs both conceptual and empirical elaboration. This yields a research program aimed at uncovering, explaining and mapping the constitutively different pathways of neoliberalism in different institutions and at multiple scales and geographies of analysis.

(3) Temporal horizons of analysis are necessarily long: Variegation accounts for changes that occur over time by avoiding analysis of an ideational-institutional field at a single point in time. The protracted time scales are constitutive parts of the theory which exists in order to make sense of the processes of neoliberalization and generate theoretical propositions about its cumulative effects. This is not to suggest that it prioritizes processes over empirical statics in its analysis. Without question, it is necessary to “stop” history in order to assess what is taking place at a given point in time. Doing so entails detailed analysis of particular and/or coordinated regulatory restructuring experiments at different scales of analysis. Specific empirical analyses, though, must be situated within the rolling historical context of neoliberalization that begins with a series of contextually bounded projects of market-oriented restructuring (“disarticulation”) and is followed by the regulatory consolidation of market-principles layered on top of prior victories (“deepening”) (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a: 211). The methodological benefit is that variegation permits, even requires, attention to the temporal ordering of events. The utility of this principle will become evident in chapter six which addresses the shifting regulatory framework relating to military privatization in the United States between the 1980s and the post-September 11 wars.
(4) Variegation can be extended to institutional and sectoral analysis: Much of the geographical literature on neoliberalization is concerned with the physical spaces of political analysis. States are bounded by borders, economic zones are bounded by the parameters defined in various agreements, and regions are bounded by physical features. This is an inherently topographical reading of space. Brenner, Peck and Theodore follow a similar lead suggesting that disarticulated neoliberalization in the 1970s and early 1980s took place across places, territories, regions, scales and crisis-riven institutional contexts. Deepening neoliberalization consolidated these gains by way of geo-institutional thickening and intensification (2010a: 211). This is not in dispute. Rather, it is crucial to underscore the theoretical significance of neoliberalization taking place within and across sectors of government. This is to say, different sectors take their own paths to and through neoliberalism. Health care, education, aviation and, as is the case here, military sectors, are influenced by the pro-market priorities of neoliberalism differently. Processes of neoliberalization in each sector are conditioned by their respective political, social and institutional compositions as well as external considerations like the type and availability of private sector alternatives (Donahue 1989). Recent research has extended analysis of military privatization beyond the US to European cases where a comparative approach uncovers unique national approaches and characteristics (Leander 2013). If this is the case, then sectors and even institutions can be neoliberalized.

This last point is one that is only implicit in variegation theory but has significant implications for the broader argument about military neoliberalization and the theory of neoliberal variegation itself. Intuitively, economic geography entails a programme of mapping economic differentiation across geo-physical spaces. Remove the border lines from a Mercator map and use various visual methods of representing differentiated economic and other trends.
This approach is grounded in two and three dimensional understandings of space that can be physically occupied and represented in the abstract. But this should not be the only way that spatial differentiation is considered. Thinking about space beyond its Euclidian properties posits an analytical distinction between the dimensions of physical space and the conceptual coordinates of metaphorical space. This allows us to think about entities that do not manifest themselves in physical form as places where spatial considerations, unevenness and variegation may be observable. For example, there is a “separation of powers” in government, church and state must be kept “separate,” budget “gaps” need to be narrowed, management and the union are “far apart” in collective bargaining, there is “distance” in the degree of neoliberalization between two agencies within one department of the federal government. In this sense, the internal composition of institutions like the Pentagon or military-industrial complex can be understood as a “space” in which uneven neoliberalization takes place. Though sectors and institutions do not occupy physical space beyond nominal brick, mortar and real estate, the configuration of their institutional practices can be disaggregated, articulated and “mapped” in non-Euclidian space. In chapter six, the uneven neoliberalization of the US Armed Forces will be discussed along with the rolling reregulation of private sector participation in the later years of the post-September 11 wars.

These four virtues of the variegation approach point to its theoretical possibilities within the heterodox programme of neoliberal political economy. However, variegation suffers from conceptual shortcomings in three interrelated areas: its approach to macro-level shifts in political economy, its dismissive methodological disposition towards the institutionalism of the varieties school, and the subsequent implications for the importance of path dependency to the variegation approach. Each one is discussed in turn:
Does not explain or account for macro-level shifts: The first problem is that variegation is weak on conceptualizing the macro-level shifts in political economic reorganization. For the most part, the proponents of the variegation approach are predominantly interested in mapping the geography of uneven neoliberalization, and not especially interested in theorizing the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism itself. The variegation approach begins its historical analysis after the general shift in the global political economy to the neoliberal paradigm, locating the big bang of the neoliberal era sometime during the 1970s global economic crisis. The end of the Gold Standard, the oil shocks and the ascent of Thatcher and Reagan, sometimes Deng Xiaoping or Pinochet to national stewardship, are often identified as pivot points between the Keynesian and neoliberal paradigms (Harvey 2005). It is, in essence, the conventional story of neoliberalism that occupies an expected place in opening paragraphs of academic books and articles. While it is not wrong in of itself, it is a convenient place to start the historical timeline of neoliberalization in order to model everything that came after. Some scholars like Jamie Peck, whose work figures prominently in the variegation school, trace the pre-history of neoliberalism through its intellectual gestation period in the early and mid-twentieth century (Peck 2008). The variegation school has difficulty conceptualizing the macro-level shifts in the global political economy and explaining why these occurred. Principally, this is because variegation is only interested in the effects (uneven geographical development) than the theoretical causes or origins.

Aversion to methodological statism has unintended consequences: One of the variegation approach’s predominant themes is the rejection of the varieties school’s fixation on states. This criticism is rightly concerned about the ontological primacy afforded to the state as a unit of analysis. Quite convincingly, variegation proponents criticize methodological statism for
sequestering political economic analysis to a pre-assigned institutional unit. Like other state-centric approaches in the study of world politics and political economy, this approach yields a propitious research programme – but at the cost of analytical narrowness. The perils of state-centric analysis have been voiced for decades in the IPE literature and need no exposition here (classic statements are made by Strange 1996; Agnew 1994; Walker 1993; Strange 1988). But while the analytical rupture of statist ontology is a breakthrough worth following, it is not viable to treat the state as merely another institution on a landscape of many. To be sure, globalizing trends have and will continue to reconfigure state behaviours, barring a dramatic reversal of historical trends. But while multiple political actors and nodes of political action have proliferated over the past few decades, the state as an actor remains a coherent locus of power, authority, identity, capital accumulation and responsibility (Cerny 2010a: 85-87). Thus, the institutional basis of state agency should not be diminished without extreme caution.

To its detriment, the variegation approach underplays the institutional foundations of neoliberalism’s uneven geographical development in its desire to move away from methodological statism. In doing so, the ontological and methodological benefits of analysis at the institutional level of political action are diminished. One could parry this criticism with the claim that seeking to reinstate institutional argumentation, or any other logic of argumentation, is a matter of analytical preference. But this is not simply an issue of preferred approaches. Giving institutional analysis a lower profile undermines a crucial claim made by the variegation approach, namely, that uneven geographical development is a path dependent process. The variegation school positions path dependency as a central property of neoliberalization and as an essential factor in the explanation of uneven geographical development. This point is not disputed. Quite the opposite, path dependent development is an essential part of explaining
variegated development, but the proponents of variegation deploy the concept without much (or any) theoretical or methodological grounding. This amounts to the second shortcoming of the variegation approach.

Path dependent nature of uneven development is under-theorized: The variegation approach characterizes uneven neoliberalization according to a series of analytical stipulations that reinforce the contextuality of the phenomenon. For example, neoliberalization is portrayed as multi-centric, cumulative, mottled and striated, generating sedimented patternings on the uneven institutional landscapes of world capitalism (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010: 184). Listed among these properties is neoliberalization’s path dependent development, included in the litany of features in a matter-of-fact way. Proponents of the variegation approach are not shy about proclaiming the path dependent character of uneven geographical development. For them, path dependency is an essential part of the complex and differentiated profile of neoliberalization across political spaces. According to variegation’s proponents, neoliberalization processes of regulatory restructuring are inherently path dependent in that the processes “necessarily collide with regulatory landscapes inherited from earlier rounds of political contestation” (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2012: 269). Since neoliberalization takes place in institutionally and culturally specific contexts, the forms in which neoliberalization manifests itself will differ, resulting in the variegation that this school situates at the centre of analysis. Thus, neoliberalization develops according to the contingencies of context, yielding self-reinforcing patterns of institutional behaviour that set successive waves of regulatory restructuring on path dependent trajectories (Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2012: 273; Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a; 217; Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010b). Again, this is not in itself disputable but the methodological implications of path dependency require deeper theorization than they are given
in the variegation literature. If path dependent processes are intrinsic to understanding neoliberalization, then the variegation approach must assimilate the logic of path dependency into its theoretical account of uneven neoliberalization. Taking the state as a vital institutional setting for path dependent analysis permits the application of a methodologically sound form of path dependent analysis. In chapter six, the path dependent effects of early outsourcing decisions made by US policy-makers are used to explain the composition of the post-September 11 military in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Opportunities for synthesis**

The problems outlined here do not undercut the variegation approach. To the contrary, as a relatively new theoretical development, its parameters are still quite malleable. While its relative neglect of the historical origins of neoliberalism and the institutional basis of path dependent neoliberalization are oversights, they can be remedied with some creative cross pollination and a robust research agenda. The institutionalist and historical properties of the varieties school can be imported into the variegation school with favourable results. Two opportunities for synthesis are especially propitious.

First, by borrowing varieties’ macro-level theorization of paradigmatic shifts from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, variegation theory can address its own limitations spelled out above. Regarding epochal change, opening the scene with the standard neoliberal origins story is insufficient. What is needed is a way of accounting for the macro-level shifts associated with the liminal period between the general end of Keynesianism and the emergence of neoliberalism. Situating variegation analysis in the institutional shifts that are associated more broadly with this historical transition change provides a firmer historical grounding for the onset of neoliberalization. It thereby provides firmer historical institutionalist grounding for the empirical
studies in neoliberal economic geography. This macro-periodization comes into play in chapters four and six, where, as will be discussed, the American shift away from a statist and paternalistic draft regime to an All-Volunteer Force coincides with the broader shifts from two paradigms of political economic organization.

Two examples from the broadly defined varieties school illustrate the macro-level conceptualizations of change and the institutionalist possibilities for analysis. In *The Future of the Capitalist State* (2002), Bob Jessop explains the macro-level shifts in late-twentieth century capitalism through the lens of state analysis. The broad changes in the capitalist world and the political economies of specific states are expressed in a shift from the “Keynesian Welfare National State” to the “Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime.” For Jessop, this entails four major general shifts denoted by each of the terms in the two macro-concepts. His concepts are intended to be generalizations that signal broad trends in advanced capitalist states, and importantly, he is careful to note that the transition embodied in each concept is mediated through a wide profile of contextual forms.

The first trend is a general transition of priorities from full employment associated with the Keynesian-era towards conditions of international competitiveness at the expense of domestic employment. To Jessop, this is a specifically “Schumpeterian” version of the competition state. Under the Keynesian paradigm, broad policy objectives directed state action towards full male employment, demand management and the public funding of mass infrastructure. Under the Schumpeterian paradigm, the capitalist state refocuses its priorities on innovation and fostering competitive conditions of accumulation for its domestic firms so that they may better compete across free market economies. This entails the sacrifice of full
employment in exchange for efficiency and flexibility, a turn to supply side economics and the development of the knowledge economy.

The second trend is a general shift from the welfare model of social reproduction involving expanded welfare rights, collective bargaining and state assistance to generalize norms of mass consumption, towards a mode based on the subordination of social policy, including standard wages and welfare access, to the putative competitive needs of capital in a global market. Third, in terms of scale, there is a broad shift from the relative primacy of the state’s juridical spaces as the locus of economic and social policy, towards a post-national relativization of scale. This means that the state promotes competition in a global market while retaining the right to intervene in the domestic economy on an *ad hoc* basis.

The fourth trend relates to the state’s posture towards creating conditions for capital accumulation. The distinction between the two phases boils down to the difference between government and governance. Under the former, the state plays a formal and primary role intervening in the economy to compensate for market failures. Under the “regime” analytic, the state emphasizes self-organizing modes of governance, public-private partnerships in service delivery and maintains a general posture of “metagovernance.” Here the state does not recede but rather it organizes the conditions for governance in collaboration with other state and market actors to create market-enabling terms of competition.

A second example of macro-shifts that are well conceptualized by the varieties school is Philip Cerny’s notion of the competition state. Under this conceptualization, the state undertakes a set of priorities in response to the globalized market pressures and the inadequacies of the Bretton Woods regime. To arrive at the competition state, Cerny envisions an historical transition similar to Jessop whereby a paradigmatic shift from the post war national industrial
welfare state (IWS) to neoliberal competition state occurs. The industrial welfare state entailed an ideological-institutional configuration whereby key elements of economic life were insulated from market forces and other elements of social life were deliberately shielded from the logic of the market. At the same time, the state promoted, regulated and organized certain sectors of the national economy (Cerny 2006). During the stagflation crises of the 1970s and the decreasing capability to perform the same kind of economic sheltering roles, the industrial welfare state gave way to the competition state. Rather than acting as a decommodifying agent – that is, removing certain activities from the market – the state acts instead as a promoter of its domestic economic firms and sectors, facilitating their competitiveness in international markets. In this regard, the state is drawn into promoting the marketization of its own activities and structures within a global marketplace (Cerny 1997). The shift from industrial welfare state to competition state entailed four types of policy change: a shift from macro-economic to micro-economic interventionism; a shift from maintaining basic economic activities to providing the conditions for flexibility in an evolving global marketplace; monetarism and inflation control; and the general promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in the public and private sector (Cerny 1997: 260).

This sketch does not do justice to the richness of Jessop and Cerny’s contributions to the field and the finer points of each theory can indeed be disputed. What is important for present purposes is to recognize the institutional bases for making claims about shifts in the ideational orientation of advanced capitalist states. The master concepts, Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational State and the competition state, are similar in general purpose. They both articulate a systemic break with the previous post-World War II political economy paradigm in the capitalist world, and both denote a series of properties attendant to the new paradigm. The
properties manifest themselves in institutional rules and behaviours whose origins can be traced to key moments in major political economic shifts. Neither Jessop nor Cerny suggests that these macro-shifts entail dramatic ruptures. Rather, each transition is a process mediated by the peculiarities of state and sectoral context. The benefit they bring to the variegation approach is a means of connecting variegation’s concern with longitudinal analysis of uneven development with the major historical transitions that took place in the 1970s without treating these events as a narrative prelude. Combined with Jessop’s and Cerny’s varieties of capitalism approaches, variegation analysis can locate its theory in institutional analyses of political transition.

The second opportunity for synthesis is found by combining this institutionalist analysis with variegation’s insistence on the path dependent properties of neoliberalization itself. It is an important remedy to the variegation approach because it adds a causal dimension to the theory of uneven neoliberalization. As it is presently constituted, the variegation school’s strength lies in its descriptive accounts of uneven development from which general propositions about neoliberalization are derived. The determinants of uneven development, though, are left to underspecified path dependent mechanisms. This criticism is particularly important because of the stance that variegation proponents take against the paucity of strict causal analysis in varieties school analysis. In a detailed review of varieties of capitalism literature, Peck and Theodore (2007) criticize the body of work for yielding more taxonomical insight into national capitalism than causal analysis. By importing the institutional ontology of varieties into the variegation approach, researchers can bridge this gap. Locating the institutional flashpoints of broader ideational change gives the variegation approach the analytical ability to account for crucial contingent events that set uneven neoliberalization off on its path dependent trajectories. Taking advantage of this mechanism provides the grounding for the path dependent claims of
variegation theory, which have already been noted as being undeveloped. By grounding path
dependent studies of uneven neoliberalization in the institutional histories of specific institutional
forms, variegation can produce causal explanations of the origins of unevenness along with
theoretically grounded accounts of unevenness over a long time scale. They would then able to
plot the path dependent historical development of uneven development and contribute important
causal substance to the variegation approach. This is an important and progressive synthesis of
two approaches that provides a finer theoretical understanding of neoliberalization.

The opportunities for synthesis discussed here only address two possibilities and there
may very well be more affinities between the schools yet to be elucidated. For now, these two
theoretical developments should provide a firm theoretical foundation for the construction of
empirical tools of analysis. Most conventional is path dependency, a well-established method in
comparative political science that serves as a systematic way of looking at the historical
determinants of a particular phenomenon. Less conventional is the conceptual language of roll-
back and roll-out neoliberalism, terms that are less precise but useful ways of denoting a profile
of independent though similar path dependent trends. It is to these features that the discussion
turns.

III. Path dependency, Roll-back and Roll-out neoliberalism

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, neoliberalism is intended to do double duty in
this theoretical framework. In its first capacity, neoliberalism is used as a key determinant that
explains the difference in the scale and scope of military contracting in the Vietnam War and the
post-September 11 wars. Doing so permits a longitudinal analysis of the trajectory of military
neoliberalization that can account for the historical shifts in troop to contractor ratios. In its
second capacity, neoliberalization it is a generalized programmatic frame for the path dependent processes that led to uneven incorporation of the private sector into US military operations. As will be discussed at length, the specific pathways of military neoliberalization in the US were decidedly uneven. This constitutive unevenness is particularly pronounced once the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began and the most intensive use of a mixed public and private deployment in the neoliberal era was initiated.

*Neoliberalism: Before and After*

Neoliberalism in the first sense serves to answer the major determining question. The overall argument, as laid out in chapter one, is that the institutional assimilation of neoliberal economic practices into the military was a crucial determinant of the increase in private sector participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is identified here as a necessary condition of the expansion and deepening of military contracting. Although it is necessary, it is not sufficient to explain the characteristics of US military contracting during the post-September 11 wars. In this study, Economic neoliberalism is joined by a shift to the All-Volunteer Force as a second necessary but also insufficient condition of contemporary military contracting. Aided by a military demand for technical capabilities that are not otherwise available, these conditions are sufficient to explain the difference in magnitude between contractor participation in the Vietnam War and the post-September 11 wars. Arguing this point takes neoliberalism as a determining factor and requires a comparative study of both wartime eras and their respective political economic paradigms. These two explanatory conditions explain in general the differences in private sector participation between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars based on a before-after analysis (George and Bennett 2005). The before-after research design is a way of dividing a single case study into two viable comparative sub-cases. The methodological difficulty with this
approach is that more than a single variable changes between the eras of the Vietnam War and post-September 11 wars. In this sense, the significant increase in contractors deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is overdetermined, a problem that is addressed in chapter five. Since more than one variable changes between the two cases, it is important to conduct a process-tracing analysis to account for the multiple interacting factors. The broadening and deepening of private sector participation in US wars is also influenced by other changes like the professionalization of the military and the technological Revolution in Military Affairs (Wulf 2005). Thus, it is important to undertake a process-tracing account of the wars in both eras in order to account for the institutional changes effected by neoliberalism and by the All-Volunteer Force. These will be undertaken in chapters four and six.

**Neoliberalism: As path dependent analytical framework**

Solving the puzzle about changes in scale and scope is important but not enough to account for the significant qualitative differences in the use of contractors. Neoliberalism provides a broad historical answer but further questions about the evolution of military contracting in the post-September 11 era require a more precise conceptualization. In other words, neoliberalism in the after part of the before-after analysis must be explained according to the path dependent properties of variegated neoliberalization. Here, neoliberalism must be understood as a phenomenon with shifting priorities and strategies that can explain why military contracting developed differently within its different sub-sectors. The onset of the neoliberal paradigm in the US military initiated a path dependent process that led policy makers to find private sector solutions to military staffing and procurement needs. According to the logic of path dependency discussed above, organizational decisions, initially formulated along neoliberal
lines, constrained future staffing and procurement practices thereby locking-in the effects of prior decisions.

In this sense, the neoliberal ideas that inspired deeper military privatization in the mid-1980s became institutionally entrenched leading to deeper experiments with private sector participation in US military engagements. Along the way, the contingent twists of history accelerated the process of military neoliberalization. This refers, in particular, to the advent of the War on Terror, where the might of the US Armed Forces was mobilized across two wars in the largest and longest military operations since the Vietnam War. Moreover, within the complex dynamics of contractor participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the market for different subsectors of military contracting were subjected to differential forms of reregulation, most often as a result of unanticipated events that brought military contractors into conflict with US priorities. Path dependency explains why certain sub-sectors of military contracting, like armed security services, have been subject to more (market-enabling) regulation than others. For example, well publicized events involving armed security guards like the killing of seventeen Iraqi civilians in 2007 account for the intensification of regulation in this sub-sector (Cockayne 2008; Broder and Risen 2007). Other sub-sectors, such as intelligence consulting or base custodial staffing remain far less regulated because of the absence of contingencies that give rise to support for reregulation. However, this inquiry is not about a single sub-sector of military contracting and is intended to explain the broader patterns of neoliberalization in the US military. Path dependency is a useful tool for accounting for specific pathways of neoliberalization but this analysis aims at identifying broader patterns. This requires a conceptualization that denotes the aggregate and systematic patterns of path dependent neoliberalization.
As has been thoroughly discussed above, the various incarnations of neoliberalism in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, and those of the latter years of the post-September 11 wars are of a different kind. Thus it is useful to adopt the concepts of “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism as useful ways of articulating the evolution of wartime contracting prior to and during the post-September 11 wars. These concepts denote two general phases of neoliberalization and a series of path dependent institutional and ideological behaviours associated with each (Tickell and Peck 2003; Peck and Tickell 2002). The roll-back phase of neoliberalism began in the 1980s with a general wave of effort to delink the state from direct involvement in market activities. These reforms were active sets of state-initiated, though by no means uniform, programs associated with attacks on organized labour, planning agencies, and bureaucracies by way of funding cuts, downsizing and privatization (Peck 2010).

Neoliberalism’s roll-back ideal-type minimal state quickly met its practical limitations as the unintended consequences of market-centric reform became evident. Despite the exigencies of the roll-back phase, the neoliberal paradigm did not collapse. Rather, it evolved to reconcile the social and political tensions that arose in its wake. It should also be noted that the roll-back phase does not necessarily entail dramatic and confrontational application of neoliberal programs as was the case with Margaret Thatcher and striking miners or Ronald Reagan and air traffic controllers. The roll-back phase is also commensurate with more pragmatic reforms depending on the country and context (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Feigenbaum, Henig and Hamnett 1999). As will be discussed in chapter six, the origins of military outsourcing as policy in the US military are innocuous and pragmatic attempts that came from within the Army bureaucracy.
By the end of the 1980s, roll-back neoliberalism evolved to incorporate technocratic, strategic and market-oriented state interventions into the free market. In essence, roll-out neoliberalism halted and reversed the dismantling of the state with a deliberate series of state interventions and re-regulations. This phase is characterized by the proliferation of “market conforming regulatory incursions” including networked forms of governance, multilateral economic surveillance, technocratic management, public-private partnerships and market-complementing forms of regulation (Peck 2010: 23-26). It was, and remains a syndrome of institutionally and politically mediated responses to the failures of the neoliberal programs brought forth by its early political proponents. Roll-out neoliberalism amounts to an admission of the limitations of the first phase of neoliberalization and a way to reproduce the ethos of market primacy (Peck and Tickell 2002). In practice, roll-out neoliberalism is associated with a rash of proactive market-enabling state strategies.

What the roll-back and roll-out concepts entail is a conceptualization of neoliberalism that encapsulates a broad series of state programs and strategies beyond static policies like privatization, marketization and deregulation. They are, in essence, ongoing interventions and improvisations on the part of the state with the objective of creating a profitable environment for the private sector. Rolled out neoliberalism allows for the primacy of market freedom, while strategically allowing formal and informal governance mechanisms to take the place of formal restrictions. An important caveat is in order: there is no tipping point where roll-back became roll-out, and the practices that characterize both phases are not uniform. In practice, roll-out measures were incorporated unevenly across and within jurisdictions, at different and overlapping points in time. Though they share the same objective of market-competitive facilitation, these measures represent generalized adaptations to different crises and periodize
two broad trends of neoliberalization. Military neoliberalization as a general phenomenon fits into the broad analytical framework of roll-out and roll-back, while the particular “roll-outs” of regulatory intervention are contingent and path dependent processes. As will be detailed in chapter six, the roll-back phase of military neoliberalization begins in the mid-1980 and reaches its apogee at the beginning of the post-September 11 wars, while the roll-out phase is inextricably linked to the unexpected consequences of a military footprint that is over fifty-percent contractor.

Conclusion

This chapter covers a great deal of theoretical terrain. Along the way, it encounters an eclectic array of meanings ascribed to neoliberalism by interrogating the term across disciplines and ontological proclivities. Ultimately, it arrives at a theoretically grounded operationalization of neoliberalism as a way to analyze private sector participation in US wars. The exploration may be ponderous, but accounting for military neoliberalization requires a well-defined theoretical exposition of the master concept. Here, “economic neoliberalism” is the capsule answer to the puzzle about shifts in the way contractors are deployed in US military operations. But this workhorse concept is indeed large and polymorphous. Therefore it is important to disaggregate the various meanings that comprise this concept in the study of world politics. Part I introduced the polysemy neoliberalism as the core concept and proceeded to disentangle its many threads of its use in the study of world politics. First, it outlined the way the fields of IR and IPE use the term and then explored the multiple ways it has been conceptualized and operationalized in IPE literature. It then embarked on a reconstruction and theoretical synthesis of the varieties of capitalism and variegated/uneven development approaches to the study of
neoliberalism. This established the theoretical foundations for path dependency and roll-back/roll-out conceptual and methodological tools. The brief third section discussed these tools and their functions. Methodologically, path dependency is a specific mechanism for investigating the particular neoliberal changes within particular sub-sectors of the US military. Conceptually, the multiple path dependent processes within the US military can be articulated using the denotative concepts of roll-out and roll-back neoliberalism. This theoretical framework will bear heavily on the analysis of the differences between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars to be discussed in chapters four and six.

With the theoretical dimensions of neoliberalism settled, it is now possible to begin the empirical analysis of the two cases studies in earnest. Chapter three compares the empirical features of contracting in the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars using the classification framework outlined in the introduction. It uncovers important differences in the scale and scope of wartime contracting whose historical determinants are then explored in chapters four, five and six.
Chapter 3
Military Contracting in the Vietnam and post-September 11 Wars Compared

Historically, the antecedents to military contracting in the post-September 11 wars can be found in the US military engagement in Vietnam. Between the mid-1950s and early 1970s, in the jungles and cities of Southeast Asia, the US turned to the private sector to carry out functions that were critical to the prosecution of the war. Decades later, many of these tasks would be reprised in the deserts and cities of Iraq and Afghanistan, often by the same companies.

This chapter draws an empirical picture of military contracting in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It makes two major points, one conceptual and one related to the question of historical causation. Conceptually, the discussion develops an important new terminology with which to discuss military contracting in the two cases. It abjures the “private military/security firm” construct in favour of the labour-centric framework established in chapter one. Doing so has two immediate benefits. It provides a vocabulary for historical comparison that does not project the anachronistic “private military/security firm” onto the past, and it provides a more precise language with which to discuss military contracting. With this new language it is possible to identify how different dimensions of US military operations have been carried out by the private sector — that is to say, how the military institution has been unevenly neoliberalized.

Analytically, the chapter establishes an important historical determinant of contracting in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Namely, that military demand for technical services is a necessary condition of contracting as such. As will be detailed, during the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars, the absence of certain in-house capabilities prompted the military to rely on market actors in the private sector to supplement the public armed forces. It is a rather benign point to make but one that is important in disentangling the historical currents that determine
military contracting. Simply stated, military demand is needed before supply can be provided and in this sense, technical necessity is always a condition of military contracting. However, the endogeneity of this relationship limits the analytical leverage as an explanation of historical outcomes. Indeed, technical necessity is a necessary condition of contracting in both the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. But, technical necessity does not have independent explanatory leverage over the question of historical change in the scale and scope of contracting. This will become more important in chapters four and six which address the historical determinants of military contracting in the two cases. For now, though, it is important to recognize the necessary relationship between technical need and contracting without ascribing undue historical significance.

The present chapter unfolds in two major sections that detail the qualitative features of contracting in the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. A table of similarities and differences summarizes the findings at the conclusion of the chapter. With that said, it is now possible to turn to a descriptive exposition of military contracting in the two cases.

I. Pyramids in the Jungle: Military Contracting in Vietnam

The kind of military contracting that has characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan took embryonic form during the Vietnam War. On the surface, this may appear rather counterintuitive. After all, US troops in Vietnam numbered in the hundreds of thousands and there was a Selective Service regime in place to fill the ranks with soldiers that volunteerism could not. Indeed, between 1965 and 1973, approximately 648,000 men would be drafted to serve in Vietnam (Clodfelter 1995; Clodfelter 1992). So why would the military seek out additional labour on the market when so much draft-eligible manpower was available? The
Vietnam-as-antecedent assertion also seems puzzling given the proportion of troops to contractors. Statistically, US military contracting in Vietnam was radically different from the post-September 11 wars. In Vietnam, the quantitative story was quite different. Total US military personnel reached its height at 542,400 in January 1969 while the number of contractors is considerably smaller. Based on figures from the two most prominent contractor firms and estimations of smaller firm contingents, the peak figure of contractors reached approximately 70,000 in 1966 (Traas 2010; Tregaskis 1975; Heiser 1974). Top levels of both contingents suggest troops outnumbering contractors was nearly 8 to 1. On average, between 1963 and 1971 contractors constituted about 10 percent of the US total force.

Figure 2.1 source: Traas 2010; Tregaskis 1975
Clearly uniformed troops in Vietnam far outnumbered contractors; an approximation of which is illustrated in figure 2.1 above. Given the difficulty of properly accounting for these numbers, the totals for military contractors are inevitably imprecise and ought to be taken with a degree of skepticism. Although reasonably reliable figures do exist for Raymond-Morrison Knudson, Brown, Root and Jones (RMK-BRJ) across the Vietnam War period, this is the exception. Figures for the second largest contractor, Pacific Architects & Engineers, are only available in intermittent snapshots between 1963 and 1971. The difficulty in establishing a full contracting count has a number of possible explanations. One is that the firms did not have to keep track of the sheer number of employees and so they simply did not. The speed with which contracts were let and work was expected probably did not lend itself well to accurate accounting. This problem has afflicted quantitative measures of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan as well. Figures for RMK-BRJ are much more reliable because of the consortium’s own internal record keeping, which has proven to be an outlier among firms in Vietnam. The second explanation is that so many of the employees were local Vietnamese, hired in unsystematic or informal ways. Thus, contracting firms only offer workforce estimates that have subsequently been uncovered by historians. The figures here are the best approximations of the workforce though certainly subject to historical reappraisal.

The troop-to-contractor ratio suggests that private sector participation was limited, perhaps only an historical aside in a conflict with much more dramatic social, geopolitical and moral implications. But quantitative measures alone cannot sustain an objection to the claim that Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan share important similarities. If the antecedent to private sector participation in Iraq and Afghanistan can be found in Vietnam, then it is important to look beyond statistical comparisons. When analyzed qualitatively, the picture of military contracting
reveals striking similarities in kind, if not in magnitude. Measured across the six classes of labour discussed in chapter one, the similarities between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars emerge and provide helpful insights into the historical trajectory of private sector participation in US wars.

A descriptive comparison of contracting in these two conflicts uncovers a great deal about the similarities and differences between the two periods of conflict. Parallels are especially striking in the construction and operations and maintenance classes though this is not entirely surprising. The Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars involve garrisoning large numbers of US troops in countries with very limited infrastructure for nearly a decade, which required significant logistical support. Similarities are also notable in the role of privately sourced advisory and technical functions, especially within the field of advanced communications technologies. In this domain, the US military’s reliance on private sector telecommunications operators and trainers in Vietnam anticipates the military’s reliance on commercial firms to provide net-centric and satellite communication technologies decades later. What is more, the purposes of turning to the private sector are not only based on technical necessity but also a desire to minimize troop deployment in order to avoid the political consequences at home.

The following sections will also address the embryonic advisory and supply tasks provided by the private sector in Vietnam. And, importantly, it will address tasks that were not undertaken by the private sector but would be during the post-September 11 wars. These include certain specialized production roles (beyond ordinary military procurement cycles), and executive security functions like mine removal and armed paramilitary security.
i. Construction

The most pronounced similarities between Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan relate to the role the private sector played in the rapid (re)construction of the three countries. During World War II and the Korean War, construction was almost entirely carried out by military engineers. Vietnam marked a significant break in the way ancillary supporting tasks were delivered for overseas contingency operations. For the first time, civilian construction companies were used in an active combat zone in order to accommodate the enormous infrastructure needs of US forces. Prior to the American arrival, southern Vietnam had limited or non-existent port facilities, warehouses, transportation or communication networks required to sustain a modern military buildup. As Heiser (1974: 5) notes, “all necessary supplies, equipment, and skills to support military operations had to be imported, and all necessary facilities had to be built.” For most of the war, it was civilian contractor forces that did the majority of the building (Tregaskis 1975).

Pre-1965 buildup

Though the US troop buildup began in earnest in the spring of 1965, privately sourced construction had been underway in the years prior. US engineers and construction teams had been working on modernizing the physical infrastructure of South Vietnam and Thailand since the late 1950s as part of efforts to supplement waning French rule in Indochina. For the most part, these projects were upgrades to civilian infrastructure like modernizing canals, roads, bridges, hospitals, port facilities and airfields. American and local firms were involved in these efforts. Construction on seaports for the Royal Thai Navy was undertaken by the American construction firm Vinnell Corporation as part of a consortium with other Thai companies, paid for by the US Department of Defense (Tregaskis 1975: 16). Other large construction consortiums
undertook massive projects in Southeast Asia. Dillingham, Zachary and Kaiser carried out major construction projects in Thailand while other smaller engineering and construction firms carried out projects throughout Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made the decision to limit the number of US military engineer personnel dedicated to construction projects in southern Vietnam. This signaled the US’s intention of using contracted construction to undertake the bulk of infrastructure development. Relying on contractors served two purposes for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. US forces already deployed in the western Pacific would not have to be rotated out of Korea, Japan and other stations, thereby avoiding the possibility of over-extending existing units (Traas 2010: 4-5). Turning to the private sector served domestic political imperatives as well. Politically, it kept Congressional and public attention off of the deepening American involvement in Vietnam. Though there were no formal troop limitations imposed by Congress, the need for legislative authorization and funding to escalate the war was vigorously debated in the Johnson cabinet (Berman 1982). Maintaining low troop commitments would avoid having to make formal requests to Congress for money and legal authorization which would draw unwanted legislative attention to US operations. Similarly, keeping US troop levels low would limit the risks of drawing the American public’s attention. Prior to 1965, the US commitment was still quite small and public awareness was minimal. But concern about public reactions to increased US troops in Vietnam was a major preoccupation for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Even after the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the escalation of the war in 1965, Lyndon Johnson continued to tread lightly when considering the effects of manpower commitments to his approval ratings on the home front. This will be discussed further in chapter four.
By late 1965, a handful of contracts had been let to different companies to develop critical infrastructure. The firm Thomas B. Bourne Associates carried out the first large-scale design-build contract for the Navy to build the first jet-capable airfield in southern Vietnam at Tan Son Nhut (Tregaskis 1975: 23). A joint venture between Tudor Engineering Company and Pacific Architects & Engineers designed air control and warning stations (Traas 2010: 5). Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall provided engineering support for a new canal system. Television Associates of Indiana did advisory work on the construction of a regional telecommunications network; between 1955 and 1962 Capitol Engineering Corporation, and Johnson, Drake and Piper took part in large-scale highway and bridge engineering projects (Carter 2008: 88-89). But it was in 1962 that a major player emerged that would dominate construction in South Vietnam. That year, general Navy and Army construction tasks were turned over to a joint venture made up of Raymond International of New York and Morrison-Knudsen Asia Inc. based in Boise, Idaho. The original contract was for $15 million but its responsibilities would increase tenfold prior to the 1965 troop buildup (Carter 2004: 45) and eventually into an eleven year, billion dollar expenditure.

Post-1965 buildup

The Gulf of Tonkin incident and the subsequent Congressional resolution was the contingent event on which American involvement in Vietnam turned. Prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson’s Vietnam policy had to strike a balance between Congress’ role in granting him the legal authority to escalate the war, its support for his domestic policy programs, and public opinion as the presidential election loomed. In August 1964, after the supposed attacks on US ships off the coast of North Vietnam, Congress authorized the president to take “all necessary
measures” to repel attacks against the United States (Herring 1986: 122). With this new and broadly worded legal authority, Lyndon Johnson authorized a massive troop buildup which began in earnest in mid-1965. By the end of that year there were over 180,000 US military personnel in country placing a logistical burden on existing facilities that were unable to accommodate the influx. Once in Vietnam, a support network of roads, bases, supply lines, equipment maintenance, living quarters, sewage systems, electricity and communications was needed. Much of this infrastructure was either nonexistent or dilapidated relics from the French colonial era.

Also in 1965, the administration made the decision to rely on a combination of contractor and engineer troop labour to meet new building demands. Prior to the influx of US troops, the only American construction capabilities in Vietnam were ad hoc civilian forces working for the US Navy (Dunn 1972). One of those firms, Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, under contract to the US military since 1962, combined with Brown & Root, and J.A. Jones Construction to form the largest construction consortium in US history. The consortium would undertake most construction tasks in Vietnam for the remainder of the war. Johnson authorized the newly minted RMK-BRJ group to create the kind of physical infrastructure that would make the massive troop buildup possible (Carter 2004). Though the consortium worked in tandem with the Army, the Navy’s Construction Battalions (“Seabees”) and the Air Force’s Base Engineering Emergency Forces, RMK-BRJ would account for 90 percent of the total construction work in the early years of the contract (Carter 2008: 159). Building plans between 1965 and 1967 called for the development of “an immense grid complex of airfields, bases, ports, canals, ammunition depots, military hospitals, dumps, warehouses, and light industry for military production, all woven together to form a kind of military matrix” (Carter 2004: 48; also see Neel 1973).
The development of airfield capacity was a major infrastructural obstacle to overcome. In all, construction contractors, primarily RMK-BRJ but also firms like Walter Kidde Constructors, and Pacific Architects & Engineers, constructed five major jet airbases and over 100 airfields dispersed across the country for local support transport (Dunn 1972: 63). Contractors were used to develop major permanent airfields and in more secure areas while Army engineers constructed forward airstrips in more dangerous zones (Ploger 1974: 109).

Port construction was a similar story. In 1966, a Congressional fact-finding mission team explained the importance of the port situation concluding that Vietnamese port capacity was the primary factor restricting the amount of military and economic assistance that the US could physically provide to Vietnam (Carter 2004: 45). This was no understatement. Ninety percent of all military supplies arrived in Vietnam by way of deep-draft cargo vessels and, prior to the buildup, there were only two harbours in the country capable of docking deep-draft vessels (Dunn 1972: 50). In November 1965, less than a year after the initial troop buildup, 122 cargo ships were idled in Saigon harbour without anywhere to dock and unload. Military planners needed a systematic reconstruction of harbours at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and Qui Nhon as well as other minor ports in order to accommodate the buildup (Carter 2004: 47). Most work to construct modern port facilities was carried out by the RMK-BRJ consortium.

One fascinating adaptation to the port difficulties was the employment of the De Long Company to provide prefabricated floating piers. Essentially, these were 90x300 foot barges supported by 150 foot long caissons that could be built in the US, towed across the Pacific and assembled on site. The De Long piers expanded the deep-draft ports and berths at five harbours and quickly alleviated the shipping backlog that had developed. Four months after the first piers
arrived in August 1965, Robert McNamara approved contract negotiation for the delivery and installation of eight more (Ploger 1974: 53).

The construction of bases and troop housing facilities were crucial to accommodate increasing numbers of US military personnel. For the most part, development in more secure areas was assigned principally to RMK-BRJ contractors, whereas construction in forward areas was undertaken by military personnel. Between 1965 and 1968, construction efforts permitted the US to deploy and garrison a military force of over half a million troops in an underdeveloped country with unprecedented military living standards (Heiser 1974).

By 1965 and 1966, the functional needs of a modern military force far exceeded expectations of planners. It also created a demand for electricity that existing Vietnamese capacity could not support. The influx of troops and the construction of bases, airfield, sea ports, and other infrastructure, not to mention the widespread use of frozen foods, fresh foods, dairy products, cold storage and air conditioning, far exceeded the expectation of military planners. One area where need outstripped capacity was in the provision of electricity. The existing Vietnamese electricity grid could not support the demands of the military buildup, thus solutions were sought in the private sector. In March 1966, with total US military forces nearing a quarter million, Army Material Command awarded a contract to Vinnell Corporation to provide electrical power at major bases across the country. The lack of existing power plants in South Vietnam was overcome by the conversion of sea tankers into floating electrical power plants. At multiple seaports and bases across South Vietnam, Vinnell converted tankers into floating electrical power-generating barges that would supply power for military installations and other coastal facilities. Vinnell was also authorized to develop land-based electrical generation and distribution systems (Traas 2010: 109). Development of power plants involved construction,
operation, maintenance, as well as design which was subcontracted to second- and third-tier companies.

The story of construction efforts in Vietnam could be elaborated at length and in tremendous detail. For present purposes, a single line articulates the significance of construction to the Vietnam War. Reflecting on the massive transformation of South Vietnam at war’s end, the general manager of Morrison-Knudsen said “there are no more pyramids to build. We have just about completed the largest construction effort in history” (quoted in Carter 2008: 248).

ii. Operations and maintenance

Those “pyramids” in the jungle, however, were only one dimension of private sector participation in South Vietnam. Once constructed, contractors were retained to operate and maintain the facilities. The California-based firm Pacific Architects & Engineers (PA&E) performed most of the operations and maintenance work on facilities, along with smaller firms like Philco-Ford were also contracted. But operations and maintenance extends beyond “base operations” – managing, staffing and maintaining facilities. It also included the installation and operation of military communications infrastructure, done primarily by Page Communications Engineers. The use of contractor expertise in this domain anticipates the role of contractors in sustaining twenty-first century integrated satellite and internet networks.

Facilities engineering and management

Facilities engineering or base operations refers to the operations undertaken at a facility after it has been built. It incorporates an array of tasks normally associated with general upkeep, maintenance, repairs and, in some cases, management of bases and other installations. For the
most part, these are unskilled and labour intensive tasks that are certainly not core competencies of the US military. Hence, the turn to the private sector in this area of labour. Without contractors, US military personnel would have had to fill these roles, which, as discussed above, came at political costs to the Johnson administration. Turning to contract labour and allocating troops already in-country to more pressing construction projects helped minimize the political costs of manpower decisions. This was especially true in 1965 when the President decided to increase draft calls of young men in order to spare National Guard troops who tended to be older and more likely to have families. Mobilizing the National Guard for the sake of performing unskilled labour in Vietnam would have been costly in terms of public support for the war which, in 1965, was still generally favourable.

Prior to the 1965 buildup, facility maintenance support for the small US advisory contingent was undertaken by the Navy’s in-house management structure that was patterned after base management operations in the United States. By 1962, military planners sought to subcontract these tasks and in May 1963 the first contract was let to Pacific Architects & Engineers (Ploger 1974: 27). In addition to RMK-BRJ, PA&E was the prime contractor charged with base and facilities construction, as well as post-construction facilities engineering (Dunn 1972). As Heiser reports, the Army relied “almost entirely” on PA&E for facilities engineering in the four logistical zones of South Vietnam. PA&E was not alone in this contracting arrangement. In 1966, Philco-Ford was contracted to provide skilled personnel to perform base maintenance support at Da Nang in I Corps, the northernmost logistical zone in South Vietnam (Traas 2010: 109).

Certain dimensions of port operations were also outsourced. As the 1965 buildup progressed, it became clear that port congestion had to be alleviated. In mid-1966, the US Army
Procurement Agency awarded ten major contracts for trucking and maintenance services at the major ports in South Vietnam. One of those firms was the Vinnell Corporation which provided stevedore support, port clearance and vessel maintenance support (Heisler 1974: 163). In mid-1968, PA&E fielded 24,750 employees, mostly Vietnamese nationals, who operated major power plants, 137 water treatment facilities, six sewage treatment plants, and performed refrigeration and air conditioning maintenance and garbage collection (Traas 2010: 380).

Other quotidian tasks first outsourced during the Vietnam War now feature prominently in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was only in 1968 that laundry and related services were outsourced to the private sector (Heiser 1974: 207). PA&E also undertook potable water and ice supply services, sanitation, fire protection, and general grounds repair. For the first time, pest control was outsourced on a broad scale to a civilian contractor in a combat zone. PA&E and Philco-Ford were the prime “entomology services” contractors that worked in close cooperation with field sanitation teams and preventive medicine units undertaking pest control at major installations and base camps throughout the country. Quite unlike today, cooking and mess hall operations was largely the responsibility of the military. By late 1972, nearly all facilities engineering was consolidated under PA&E.

**Communications**

Like the general state of infrastructure in Southeast Asia, communications networks were underdeveloped and entirely incapable of supporting a modern military operation. US needs were wide-ranging, from the development of wireless communications infrastructure to the establishment of a telephone network. Prior to World War II, a French telecommunications firm, Postes, Telegraphes, et Telephones, had developed a wire telegraph network throughout the region. However, the French had not developed a radio network largely because of the technical
difficulty of building wireless communication infrastructure in the mountainous terrain and tropical climate of Vietnam (Bergen 1986: 3). Even before the French withdrawal in 1954, US agencies were funding projects to modernize communications systems in the region. The major technical need for the US advisory contingents in Vietnam in the early 1960s was to develop a wireless network that could operate securely in the challenging topography of Southeast Asia.

The answer came in the form of troposcatter radio communication, pioneered by Page Communications engineers based in Washington. It could operate in the mountainous terrain that had previously blocked radio signals, and overcome the tendency for the jungle to absorb wireless signals. Page was contracted to develop a multichannel radio network using tropospheric scatter propagation in 1962. Backporch, as it was called, would link major cities in South Vietnam and Thailand (Bergen 1986: 488). Once the major infrastructural components of a country wide communications system were in place, the Army faced an unexpected problem. Their Signal Corps had little experience operating and maintaining commercial communications technology which meant that training and operating commercial equipment in the field required private sector help. Moreover, the one-year long tour of duty meant that soldiers did not have sufficient time to learn, operate and train their successors. Without sufficient in-house expertise to train its operators, the military relied on representatives of the firms themselves. Collins Radio Company and Page were the only firms in Vietnam capable of training operators though the task soon fell primarily to Page. By 1963, US-contractor relations had established a trend that would continue for the rest of the war. Civilian contractors were used as instructors, repairmen and day-to-day technical operators, much to the consternation of military planners. Even by the end of 1967, operating stations were largely staffed by Page Communications and Philco-Ford personnel (Rienzi 1972: 98). At the same time, the US was developing a telephone network from
the ground up. In 1966, the Army expedited transportable telephone exchanges to South Vietnam in order to provide conventional dial services. US-based Stomberg Carleson supplied the machinery needed for connecting calls while its subcontractors, Gustav Hirsch Company, had the first dial exchange running in January 1967 (Bergen 1986: 293).

As the war progressed, the Backporch system of wireless communications proved to be insufficient for military needs. The patchwork of communication infrastructure needed to be integrated into a cohesive whole. Plans to upgrade the existing network were conceived in 1964 in the form of the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS). Like Backporch, the development and installation of the IWCS required a combination of Signals engineers and contracted expertise. The Pentagon awarded sole-sourced contracts to Page Communications and Philco-Ford for construction of portions of the network in South Vietnam and Thailand (Bergen 1986: 320). Start-up was slow and faced unforeseen problems including logistics, security, and climate, and even getting adequate Department of Defense funding (Bergen 1986: 325-343). As different phases of the program were activated, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation did testing on completed systems (Bergen 1986: 328). The final phase of IWCS came online on the last day of 1967 and was crucial for US responses to the Tet Offensive in the first few months of 1968.

During the post-1968 Vietnamization period of the war, contractors remained essential to the operation of US communications systems. In late 1970, Military Assistance Command aimed to turn over control of communications infrastructure to the Vietnamese and train them on the job. However, planners were concerned that the Army could not dismantle equipment, operate remaining equipment and train new technicians while meeting withdrawal quotas. So the Army, as well as other agencies contracted firms like Page, and Federal Electric Corporation to train, advise, operate and maintain equipment at sites being turned over to the South Vietnamese Army
Contractors from Federal Electric and Page continued operating in South Vietnam even after the US withdrawal but in decreasing numbers. By September 1974, twenty-eight communications engineering contractors remained to assist the South Vietnamese Army. However, the contract with Federal Electric called for future communications engineering maintenance and supply support in Vietnam.

The case of contractor communications technicians in Vietnam provides a fascinating example of early integration of public and private sectors in US wars. It is a feature of the Vietnam War that distinguished it from previous twentieth century wars. Contract workers not only took on communications engineering tasks in secure zones installing radios on aircraft or manning telephone switchboards. As Rienzi puts it, “[t]he presence of civilian communications controllers, maintenance technicians, and operators in a war zone, often in outlying and exposed locations, was something new in Army communications experience” (1972: 98). In this case the turn to contractors came in response to a capabilities deficit within the military itself. Moreover, turning to telecommunications firms like Page, Philco-Ford and Federal Electric foreshadowed the increasing dependence of the US military on privately sourced expertise on advanced communications technology.

**Related maintenance activities**

Operations and maintenance is not limited to base operations and telecommunications operators. It is a broader category encapsulating a wider range of tasks required during the life cycle of military equipment. For example, aircraft maintenance was a particularly critical area where contract labour played a role. Here civilian contractors were used to supplement military capabilities in specific areas like sheet metal production and structural repairs (Heiser 1974: 355-359).
139). In May 1969, Dynalectron Corporation based in Fort Worth, Texas had twenty six shop locations in South Vietnam undertaking small repair parts. Vinnell Corporation also provided backup engineer equipment and automotive maintenance at Cam Ranh Bay. In 1970, a contract was awarded to Dynalectron to provide maintenance and repair parts support for the US Army Mobility Equipment Command (Traas 2010: 419).

Shipping was contracted early in the war to augment naval transportation capacity. By the end of 1965, a contract was signed with Alaska Barge and Transport Company which began operations in early 1966. Alaska Barge and Transport, along with the Luzon Stevedoring Company were critical in the transport of crushed rock from a quarry near Saigon, needed for general construction, into the Mekong Delta (Heiser 1974: 170). Three major trucking contractors used in Saigon were Equipment Inc., Philco-Ford and Do Thi Nuong. The Han Jin Company of Korea was used for trucking and stevedore services in Qui Nhon (Heiser 1974: 163).

iii. Advisory

The advisory role played by private sector firms in the Vietnam War, like the role of contractors more generally, anticipated what would come forty years later. Though they were not present on the same scale as they would be in Iraq and Afghanistan, military contractors played a significant role advising and training Vietnamese and US service personnel alike on a variety of issues like communications and construction. While military and civilian agencies of the US government assisted in the stabilization of Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel, they also enlisted private sector personnel. During the 1960s, the role of private contractors as advisors
and trainers increased as a result of a growing need for expertise that was outside the core competencies of the military.

During the 1950s, US involvement in Vietnam was by definition an advisory engagement and the State Department sought expertise on state building within the US academy. The prime actor in this regard was the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, formed in 1955 to provide technical advice on public administration, police enforcement, economic management and other forms of governance, previously the domain of French colonial administrators (Carter 2008: 49; Ernst 1998). Now, the specifics of professional academics’ direct involvement in the Vietnam War is not as important as what it represents: tight working relationships between the ivory tower and the American foreign policy community. Indeed, the close working relationships between the Department of Defense and the academic community would become a stated policy goal decades later during the post-September 11 wars (Ettinger 2011: 747-748).

More common in Vietnam was the presence of civilian contractors as trainers in the massive construction projects of the 1960s. The single largest infrastructure program during the war was highway and road construction. In 1954, there was approximately 20,000 kilometers of roads in southern Vietnam, much of which had been damaged by the war against the French. Moreover, large segments of the remaining road network were unusable for military purposes. By 1970, American and Vietnamese engineers combined to complete 2,297 kilometers of road in various highway restoration projects, 31 percent of which was undertaken by contractors (Dunn 1970: 111-112). While Army engineers completed a little over half the roadwork, they came to rely heavily on civilian consulting firms for engineering expertise as well as oversight and quality control. The firm Quinton-Budlong Company was contracted by the US Army Engineer Construction Agency to design bridges, review road and bridge designs, and to advise on
equipment issues. Other firms like Leo A. Daly Company performed architecture and engineering tasks, while others like Technical Services Corporation supplied road paving equipment experts. Late in the war, the consulting firm Booz Allen was hired to undertake a performance review of the highway advisory operations in Vietnam and make recommendations to increase capacity (Traas 2010: 413-414).

Similar to construction, the development of a modern telecommunications network required expertise that could not otherwise be found within the ranks of Army Signal Corps. Communications troops came to rely heavily on the very firms that designed and installed the equipment for training and even daily operations. As discussed above, communications infrastructure in South Vietnam was a patchwork of technologies that was slowly integrated over the course of the war. The troposcatter systems, microwave radios, fixed plant carriers and dial telephone systems all needed trained operators, staffing and regular maintenance. In Vietnam, civilian contractors taught courses in basic, intermediate and advanced electronics to operators of these systems (Collins 1975: 111). By 1966, the two prime communications contractors, Page and Philco-Ford, began developing training schools in the US to enable adequate predeployment training. Schools run by both contractors were opened in late 1967 and early 1968. In 1970, contractors operated a signal training school in Vietnam, training upwards of 320 students at a time in both English language and technical operations. New equipment sent into the field required training not always available through signal schools and much of it was the latest commercial technology which was unfamiliar to most military technicians. In these cases, manufacturers’ representatives would “train the trainers” who would then give field training throughout the country to technicians on site (Bergen 1986: 466).
Aircraft upkeep entailed expertise that was largely outside of the Air Force’s core competencies. New equipment arriving for refurbishing and repair work required skilled mechanics as well field service representatives and training teams. Technological progress outstripped the military’s in-house expertise and the military rotational base in the US was not adequate to draw upon. Thus, firms like Lockheed, Lear Siegler and Dynalectron contributed to the training of Air Force mechanics and technicians stationed in in South Vietnam (Heiser 1974: 139).

All of the bases and facilities that had to be constructed also had to be staffed. The military had already established that military deployment had to be maintained at the lowest levels possible. Thus, it was important to turn over non-essential base operations tasks to local nationals. In 1966, PA&E had established a training department in Saigon to develop skills necessary for Vietnamese nationals to assume non-military facilities engineering responsibilities. Between 1965 and 1970, PA&E trained approximately 28,000 Vietnamese in different elements of facilities engineering that ranged from boiler plant maintenance, to firefighting to stock clerks. There was also a need to develop middle management assets in the South Vietnamese military. In late 1970, a contract was awarded to Booz Allen Applied Research Inc., to develop a middle management training program for officer groups within the South Vietnamese military. From the outset, this training program was to serve two purposes. First it was to develop into a Vietnamese run operation as part of the broader Vietnamization paradigm, and second, it was to serve as a prototype for future training programs in Vietnam and other culturally similar societies (Carter 2008: 110).

Similarities between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars in the area of advisory work are striking. In both cases, private firms played a significant role as sources of technical
information that were indispensable parts of meeting major infrastructure objectives and non-essential staffing levels like facilities engineering. The major difference between Vietnam and the post-September 11 wars in the advisory field, however, is the absence of private sector sourcing of inherently military and law enforcement expertise. In Iraq and Afghanistan, private sector consultants are hired to provide advice on issues like doctrine and intelligence, as well as training on weapons, tactics and other core competencies of military and civilian law enforcement agencies (Spearin 2008). This was not the case in Vietnam. But what becomes apparent is the early symbiosis of public and private training programs built in to the reconstruction dimension of the broader military operation.

iv. Supply

The supply class of labour can include a wide range of material needed to sustain a force of half a million troops. For the most part, the military supplied the bulk of its own material for prosecuting the war. It had established a variety of automatic supply and resupply methods based on anticipated consumption, drawn from existing stock (Heiser 1974: 37-105). This is a marked difference with the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts where supply and supply chain management is, in large part, outsourced to the private sector. Here, the analysis is limited to some of the more peculiar supply issues attendant to the Vietnam War.

While it is a part of the normal supply needs, fuels, oils and lubricants are materials that any mechanized military in any conflict cannot do without. At the beginning of 1965, prior to the troop buildup, the US had very limited logistical support in Southeast Asia. There were no refineries in Vietnam and the military relied on Shell, Esso and Caltex for in-country fuel shipping and storage. For the most part, the pre-1965 US contingent could meet its needs through
existing commercial facilities. However, the commercially available stores of fuel were inadequate to keep up with the consumption needs of the 1965 troop buildup. So, the military turned to external sources for fuel, storage and transport. The Army and Navy had to construct 1.6 million barrels of fixed storage facilities across the country while 90 percent of the commercial storage was located nine miles south of Saigon (Heiser 1974: 72). Fuel delivery to outlying areas was the responsibility of contractors, who made all deliveries, including to remote areas. The limited number of fuel supply firms, and the haste with which fuel was needed, effectively eliminated market competition which resulted in numerous contracting abuses like double-billing, improper pricing guides and insufficient contractor oversight (Heiser 1974: 74-75).

Beyond fuel, the military needed nearly all materials for construction and facilities development to be supplied from outside Southeast Asia. For construction contractors and military units, this was a significant challenge. Ordinarily, the contractor is responsible for supplies which could then be billed to the principal. However in Vietnam, the supply needs for construction firms were integrated into the Army’s supply system which put enormous strain on available resources (Heiser 1974: 84). As the war progressed, the Army supply chain could not support the increase in construction material requests resulting in significant inefficiencies and delays.

Production capacity and shortage of materials for the Integrated Wideband Communications System mentioned above proved to be a tricky supply chain puzzle. Unlike construction, telecommunications equipment was not standard military material and could only be sourced outside the military supply chain. This did not mean that material flowed efficiently though. While there were only two major communications engineering firms, Page
Communications and Philco-Ford, they were supplied by upwards of 150 subcontractors for functions in Vietnam and 100 for functions in Thailand. Despite their better efforts to avoid direct competition among their suppliers, Page and Philco-Ford’s supply chains became entangled at the second, third and fourth tier subcontractors (Rienzi 1972: 80). This proved to be both a costly and time-consuming problem. The General Accounting Office found that Page and Philco should not have subcontracted from their own procurement networks. It found that the government could have procured about 89 percent of the $60.3 million worth of equipment that had been purchased by Page and Philco on their own (Rienzi 1986: 330)

v. Production

Similar to supply, the production class includes tasks that are part of the broader military procurement cycle like the production of weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and so on. However, this would entail a more expansive discussion about regular procurement cycles of military-industrial production in the United States. Therefore, this discussion is more limited. It compares the role of specialized items that exemplify differences between private sector production of major equipment in the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. In both cases, land transportation was subject to ambush and mine attacks making the transit of troops and cargo across unsecured highways a perilous undertaking. In Vietnam, US troops adjusted to these hazards through ad hoc alterations to their vehicles whereas the threat of roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan has given rise to a niche industry producing mine resistant ambush (MRAP) protected vehicles. The emergence of this technology in Iraq and Afghanistan is an instructive example that reveals important differences in the production of specialized equipment despite tactical similarities on the ground.
During the first few years after the 1965 troop buildup, most trucking took place in major port areas. But as the war progressed, highway transportation units increased and transportation lines extended deeper into less secure inland areas. Facing shortages of armoured vehicles and without assurances of receiving armed escorts, military transportation units were left to improvise their own solutions. Cargo vehicles were reinforced along the floor and sides with armour plating and sandbags. Armored personnel carriers were available but constantly in short supply. The constant shortage was characteristic of the military supply system in Vietnam which saw lags between need and assets throughout the course of the war. Between 1967 and 1969, the demand for armored personnel carriers increased 124 percent as a result of troop increases and new uses for the vehicles (Heiser 1974: 42). The military’s response was to withdraw these vehicles from lower priority units around the world. In early 1967, Army Material Command began developing belly armour for personnel carriers in the form of mine protection kits that that to be installed by the troop units themselves. These were fully tested and ready for deployment by March 1969 (Heiser 1974: 41-42).

What is significant here is that the military’s solution to vehicle vulnerability was to develop alterations that could be produced in-house and installed by troops in Vietnam. Contrast this with the emergence of the MRAP, a deliberately engineered and produced troop transport vehicle designed in response to the high casualties inflicted upon US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by roadside bombs.

Perhaps the most significant dimension of military production during the Vietnam War was the private manufacture of the M-16 infantry rifle. In 1957, after twelve years spent developing a replacement for the M1 rifle, the Army unveiled its replacement, the M-14. However, the M-14 was roundly criticized and unfavourably compared with the AK-47. That
same year, an alternative to the M-14 was presented by Armalite Corporation, a division of Fairchild Engine and Airplane. The AR-15 had been designed in less than a year by a lone employee who produced a weapon with all the attributes that the designers of the M-14 failed to achieve. Colt Firearms swiftly purchased the production rights and began a campaign against the M-14 claiming that the only problem with the upstart rifle was “that it hadn’t been invented by Army arsenal personnel” (Friedberg 2000: 278). By the end of 1965 after the first of the massive troop buildup in Vietnam, the Army was buying the AR-15 (now M-16) and issuing it to US troops in Europe and Southeast Asia. By the end of the 1960s, the US Army was equipping its troops with a standard issue rifle that had been developed and manufactured entirely within the private sector. The switch to the M-16 rifle also marked a transition from government-dominated small arms production to private sector dominated research, development and manufacturing. Until around 1950, there was no private munitions industry in the United States, with the exception of shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing (Koistinen 2012). After the M-16 episode, the US shifted to a production system whereby the government relied entirely on the private sector for design, manufacture and supply of the infantry soldier’s basic tool (Friedberg 2000).

vi. Executive

The final class of military labour, then, relates to armed security functions and otherwise uniquely hazardous tasks that private sector firms would play in Iraq and Afghanistan but was virtually non-existent in Vietnam. It is in the executive class of military labour that the most marked change in private sector participation is observable. Of course, it is difficult to discuss the non-existence of a particular phenomenon but it is useful to contrast the conflicts in order to illustrate circumstances in which the absence of private contracting affected military operations.
Vietnam and the post-September 11 wars are both characterized by similarities in the physical layout of the conflict. The presence of an insurgency in a battlespace without clear front or rear lines (south of the seventeenth parallel) caused significant security problems in both conflicts. Thus, it is helpful to observe the presence or absence of privately sourced security in tactical environments that are quite similar. The following discusses three issue areas that remain particularly salient in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and have been addressed in large part through private contracting: mine clearance, convoy security and fixed site security. In Vietnam, these tasks were undertaken by US and South Vietnamese troops or, in some cases, not performed at all.

Mine clearing: A major difference is the outsourcing of minesweeping operations from the public military to private firms. In Iraq and Afghanistan, mine clearance, or “counter IED,” has become a niche industry for firms under contract to the US military – and with good cause. It is a dangerous undertaking and can be outsourced to private firms without the public relations risk of increasing the number of troops deployed or the official casualty rate. During the Vietnam War, minesweeping was entirely the responsibility of US Army Engineers (Ploger 1974: 91). In less secure areas adjacent to base camps, as well as long stretches of highway, minesweeping was a daily exercise for uniformed troop. Often these operations were undertaken by engineers traveling on foot, though over time, troops improvised vehicle-mounted detection rigs. These engineers, all US forces troops, were integrated into the organic structure of divisional and smaller units to perform demining as needed.

Munitions Handling: Similar to minesweeping, munitions handling and disposal has been outsourced to the private sector in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Vietnam, however, the handling and disposal of ordinance began as a civilian function but was later taken over by the military. Prior
to the Vietnam War, military personnel trained in munitions handling carried out minesweeping operations. By 1966, it was apparent that ammunition battalions required detachments of skilled munitions handlers. In early 1967, each battalion had its own improvised unit capable of limited munitions handling and maintenance. Disposing of condemned ammunition required highly skilled and trained explosive ordinance disposal units. But unlike in the post-September 11 conflicts, these units were comprised of uniformed soldiers, not private contractors. They were drawn from a peacetime training base of engineers and worked under the 1st Logistical Command in Saigon, and eventually under Headquarters US Army, Vietnam (Heiser 1974: 132).

**Armed Security** One of the characteristic features of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is the presence of large numbers of armed security personnel performing convoy escort, fixed site security and body guard duties, among other things. But similar armed security contracting did not occur in Vietnam. With a combat contingent numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and with no (modern) precedent for the use of private sector security personnel, the US relied on its own military and military police to undertake security functions in Vietnam. Looking back it is easy to identify the areas where private security forces would have been deployed had the option been available. For example, physical security at remote communications installations was left to the signal corpsmen themselves which put strain on the units’ capabilities (Rienzi 1972: 161). More significantly, convoy security preoccupied logistics planners in both the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. In both cases, land transport was subject to ambushes and mines which disrupted supply lines and inflicting significant casualties. In Vietnam, military police escorts provided by both US and Vietnamese Army units were provided but only when priorities permitted and when forces were available. Ideally, convoys would have integrated armored personnel into transportation units but this was not always the case (Heiser 1974: 162). An
entirely different scenario is observable in Iraq and Afghanistan. Convoys, particularly cargo and fuel transport vehicles were vulnerable to ambush and many firms provide convoy security as part of a suite of services.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis highlights two important features about contracting during the Vietnam War. First, it suggests that military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan find an important historical antecedent in the Vietnam War. Despite the numerical differences, there are striking similarities and suggest that contracting in Vietnam set a precedent for private sector participation in war that finds its fullest iteration in the post-September 11 wars. Second, it demonstrates the utility of a labour-centric analysis of military contracting contra the firm-centric unit of analysis used in most scholarly work on the subject. By dispensing with the notion of the “private military/security firm, it is possible to undertake historical analysis that does not project that anachronistic form onto the past. The question then becomes a causal one. What accounts for the change in the proportion of troops to contractors from 8 to 1 in Vietnam, to near parity in Iraq and Afghanistan? This question will be addressed in chapters four and six.

II. Castles in the Sand: Military Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan

When US forces entered Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, no one in the Bush administration anticipated a decade and more of occupation or the expenditures associated with rebuilding these countries. Reconstruction and development were always a part of US plans to reintegrate the two into the global economy after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. But it would be wrong to treat the magnitude of underdevelopment in Iraq and Afghanistan as being of a singular kind. Indeed, both countries and their respective peoples experienced
underdevelopment differently. But in 2001, the US entered one country, riven by civil war in the 1990s which was followed by five years of Taliban rule. In 2003, the US encountered a country that had experienced nearly twenty consecutive years of war and crippling sanctions, and the severe economic distortions of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Stabilizing and rebuilding these two countries would entail massive expenditures that drew heavily from the private sector in a pattern that was similar to Vietnam.

Existing records do not provide a clear picture of how much the US spent on contracting during the Vietnam War. For scholars of the post-September 11 wars, there is no such problem. Existing documents provide multidimensional insights into the nature of contracting over the decade-long US engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. To put the extent of contractor participation into perspective, through 2011, the US spent a total of $1.283 trillion on the three operations initiated since 2001 (Belasco 2011). By the end of 2011, the costs of US contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan reached an estimated $206 billion, about 16 percent of the total cost of those wars. Moreover, between $31 and $60 billion is estimated to have been lost to waste and fraud (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 68).

Those were the financial costs. The number of contractors is much more difficult to assess. Similar to the contracting circumstances in Vietnam, the US military needed a great deal of private sector labour and needed it quickly. Moreover, there were no requirements for contractors to provide head counts of their employees. It was only in 2008 that contractors were mandated by Congress to account for their employees so all figures prior to 2008 are largely estimates. To complicate the matter, the number of contractors was constantly in flux. Therefore, it is difficult for analysts to arrive at an accurate figure of how many contractors are operating in

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1 The operations are Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan and other counter terrorism operations; Operation Noble Eagle, which is dedicated to enhancing security at US military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
the theatres at any given time. The quantitative features of military contracting during the post-September 11 wars do reveal important features of military contracting. Between 2001 and 2012, the total number of individual contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan reached levels as high as 262,000 (O’Hanlon and Livingston 2013; O’Hanlon and Livingston 2012). For the years that data are available, there has been at least one contractor for each soldier, effectively doubling the American military footprint in the two countries, but not counting towards official troop totals or casualty lists.

Figure 2.2 source: US CENTCOM (2013); O’Hanlon and Livingston (2013)
Lest there be any doubt about contractors working in dangerous conflict zones, the US Department of Labor offers a glimpse at the hazards that face civilian contractors operating overseas. Between September 1, 2001 and June 30, 2013, there were 3,357 contractor deaths registered and at least 46,312 injuries resulting in missing days of work (US Department of Labor 2013). These figures are the best publicly available casualty statistics. They are not necessarily indicative of casualties suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan, nor are they a complete list of contractor casualties.

These figures represent casualties that have been reported to the US Department of Labor by eligible companies. But in all likelihood, the vast majority of these casualties came about as a direct result of activities in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflict zones. It is also indicative of the fact that contractors, armed or not, end up in war zones and are exposed to similar hazards as US
and coalition soldiers. The figures above offer a comparative approximation of contractors and troop levels available through publicly available sources. Of course, throughout this eleven-year period, contractor activities have shifted based on tactical necessity and client need, a phenomenon that firm-centric analysis might obscure. The labour-type framework helps make sense of the diverse and dynamic internal composition of military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

i. Operations and maintenance

In Iraq and Afghanistan, operational and maintenance tasks have been, by far, the most expensive contracting outlays. Logistics support services accounts for $46.5 billion or 25 percent of all contracted expenditures encompassing an enormous range of activities needed to sustain military and civilian operations. Among them, the most common subcategory contains functions related to base life support, which, in 2009, amounted to 60 percent of the entire contractor force in Iraq (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 204). The single most notable company to perform these functions is Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), once a part of the RMK-BRJ consortium in Vietnam, and from 1962 to 2007 a subsidiary of the construction giant Halliburton. Perhaps more so than any other company, KBR exemplifies the revolving door between US defence policy and the private sector and no example is more prominent than Dick Cheney. As is well-known, Cheney, who served as vice president between 2001 and 2008, was the CEO of Halliburton between 1995 and 2000. He had also been the Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993 under George H.W. Bush (Chaterjee 2009).

But for all the military-industrial complex literature on weapons production, it is actually the benign services provided by companies like KBR that are truly indispensable to the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without them, it is doubtful the US would have been able to
sustain an extended presence in Iraq or Afghanistan without the political hazards of raising troop levels. To give an example of the scale of KBR operations, it is worth looking at a single work site. In 2005, Camp Anaconda north of Baghdad, the largest Halliburton/KBR base operation in Iraq, the firm served upwards of 28,000 soldiers and 8,000 civilian contractors, a small city. It delivers services that one would expect in a small city including movie theatres, fast food courts, recreation facilities and four meals per day. To give a sense of scale, at Camp Anaconda, Halliburton/KBR supplied 105,000 meals per day, processed 80,000 bags of laundry per month, produced 1.3 million gallons of water daily and ran over 1,000 electricity generators (Gavirila and Smith 2005).

Though there are many other firms that fulfill similar contracts (Bechtel, IAP Worldwide, Fluor Daniel), KBR has been contracted for over $40 billion worth of operations and administration tasks. The same report indicates that one vendor, most likely KBR,\(^1\) accounts for 79 percent of all logistics support services obligations (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 209-211). But beyond just base operations, this category also includes a wide range of outsourced project management functions necessary for both civilian and military operations. These include the administration and operation of bases, air and sea ports, supply chains, general inventories, drinking and wastewater, fuel supply and distribution, construction, ammunition, barracks, motor pools, electricity, oil sector programs, refrigeration facilities and other resources.

Vehicle maintenance is another regular but irreplaceable function performed by contractors. This includes repairs and servicing, field team staffing, vehicle retrofitting, refurbishing and custom modifications. This applies both to land and air vehicles. Analysts have

\(^1\) The Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011), from which this figure is derived, does not identify the particular firm. However, KBR is the leading contractor among all firms in Iraq and Afghanistan, having billed $40.8 billion between 2002 and the second quarter of 2011. The next highest billing total attributable to a single firm is $8.9 billion. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that KBR is the provider in question.
pointed to this area of labour as a telltale indicator of the direction armed forces are moving. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) put new and increasingly sophisticated machinery at the disposal of armed forces but the expertise needed to maintain these products originate with the manufacturers in the private sector. Thus, firms supply the labour needed to keep weapons like Predator drones and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in operation.

Historically, life-cycle and other technical maintenance of vehicles could be managed by Army mechanics, as was the case in most US wars in the twentieth century including Vietnam. The technological leaps of the RMA advanced beyond what the US military could feasibly teach its maintenance troops. Thus, much of these responsibilities have been devolved to contractor representatives trained on specialized equipment exposed to all the risks of the conflict zone.

Intimately related to the RMA is the integration of advanced computer technologies into military operations. Thus, high-tech maintenance functions bear heavily on tasks performed within this labour-type. In the same way that militaries cannot necessarily maintain expertise in the upkeep of sophisticated weapons systems, technology firms are superior repositories of IT expertise. This is particularly salient with regard to the maintenance of communications network infrastructure (satellite systems, net security, network integration, etc.) and biometric security systems. Similarly, many facilities are outfitted with security systems that are administered and maintained by private sector firms like Ideal Innovations Inc., Harding Security Associates and Olive Group.

This category also includes transportation functions performed by firms like DynCorp, Triple Canopy, ANHAM Joint Venture, Sallyport, OSSI-Safenet, Pacific Architects & Engineers, AEGIS, and Remote Project Services Group. Transportation includes land, sea and air delivery of troops and materiel. In many categories of labour, functions associated with overland
shipping are particularly hazardous. Many firms that specialize in armed protection duties also have expertise in secure convoy delivery functions. Air and sea transportation is less hazardous given the US supremacy over air and sea routes. Yet they are crucial to sustain an occupation force that numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Observers suggest that the US military contracts with dozens of private airlines to transport troops and war materials around the world (Reed 2013).

**ii. Advisory and training**

Over the past decade, privatized knowledge transfer has been a major part of the Iraq and Afghan wars. Private sources have provided training, analysis and intelligence to both military and civilian clients. The wars and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan have necessitated large-scale knowledge transfers, not only between western states and nascent Iraq and Afghan institutions, but also between firms, and between firms and western states. The result is a diverse class of labour that touches many aspects of military and civilian life in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Foremost is the influence that advice and training has on the physical security dimensions of life in Iraq and Afghanistan. Popular press have given a great deal of attention to the role that contractors play in training Iraq and Afghan security forces, including the military and law enforcement. Such efforts extend to weapons and vehicle training, counter insurgency training, curriculum and doctrine development, law enforcement training, hazardous materials and demining training, and so on. To give one example, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority established a training team to rebuild the Iraqi armed forces. The Vinnell Corporation won a one-year $48 million contract and subcontracted to MPRI and SAIC to raise a body of new recruits (Kinsey 2009). Beyond training in the execution of physical
security, the private sector provides security, intelligence and risk analysis for military and non-military clients. In many cases, firms that provide physical security services offer threat assessment intelligence as part of their profile of services. An example of these firms include GardaWorld, Britam Defense, Unity Resources, Diligence LLC, Group 4 Securicor, NEK Advance Securities Group, Erinys, OSSI-Safenet. Military and security consulting is not limited to training Iraqi and Afghan security forces. It also includes training US forces in logistics techniques and logistical systems modernization. Moreover, private firms also provide US forces with intelligence, analysis and, in some cases like Avenge Aviation, target acquisition. Elsewhere, firms offer expertise in data collection, intelligence gathering and analysis, (FedSys, Inc., Trinity Tech Group, Harding Security Associates, Inc. SOS International) as well as tasks like topographical surveying and atmospherics (Symbion Power).

Another prominent type of advisory function includes services that bridge linguistic and cultural divides. The long-term occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan exposed US forces to profoundly unfamiliar cultural environments. Thus, firms have evolved to specialize in translation, interpretation and transcription, as well as cultural subject matter expertise. Similarly, the US government and other firms have sought public relations expertise to communicate with local populations on cultural, religious, political and economic issues. This manifests itself in relatively familiar practices like focus groups and polling (Leonie Industries) but it also emerges in more curious forms. In one instance, a Florida-based firm was hired out to undertake a counter-ideology campaign that sounds more like a propaganda campaign. JBM Management was subcontracted by another firm to “provide planning and analysis support to the effort to counter violent extremist ideology by developing and implementing comprehensive,
self-sustaining, long-term…campaigns that degrades popular support for violent extremist organizations” (JBM Management Inc. 2012).

The process of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan entails a considerable amount of expertise transfer to nascent institutions in the public and private sector. Reconstructing governmental institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan requires specialized expertise. More than others, non-profit organizations as well as private for-profit firms undertake tasks in this sector. This extends beyond military and law enforcement to include technical advice on health care, education, judicial systems, democratization, business training, community development, agricultural development, news media training, and anti-corruption training. Firms operating in this sector include International Relief and Development, Abt Associates Inc., International Resources Group, Creative Associates International Incorporated, and Management Systems International. At the individual level, firms are also involved in civilian mentoring and job training. A sector has developed around facilitating people seeking to take advantage of investment opportunities, particularly in Iraq. This includes various services that facilitate new business investments, industry specific analyses (particularly in the oil sector), business management consulting, background checking and due diligence services, business risk analysis, micro-finance program management, investment feasibility studies, financial analysis and market entry strategies.

In the technology and communications sector, there is considerable demand for expertise needed to support both civilian and military IT infrastructure. Militarily, the demand comes from sophisticated developments in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance and Internet (C4SI) programs and protocol. Generally, the capacity to design and maintain the hardware and software has been outsourced to firms that are better situated to keep pace with
technological innovations. This extends to software training and development, system modernization and monitoring, information storage and data security.

**iii. Executive**

Executive functions are associated with armed security guarding functions of personnel, convoys, buildings and other fixed installations. But, while force application is entirely the province of the public military, the distribution of functions in Iraq reveals the extent to which executive security functions have been privatized. Between 2008 and 2013, physical security contractors under contract to the US constituted an average of about 15.3 percent of the overall contractor presence in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the figure is 17.39 percent. These numbers do not include sub-contracting or contracts tendered by private firms which would, in all likelihood, increase the percentages. Overall, guard services do not account for much of the total cost of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2011, guard services have only amounted to 2 percent ($3.8 billion) of the total goods or services purchased by the federal government (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 210).

There is little doubt this area of contracting is by far the most controversial and novel part of the private sector’s participation in the post-September 11 wars. The presence of militarized individuals, contractually authorized to shoot and kill, is the closest the military has come to privatizing force application itself in the tradition of Executive Outcomes (EO). EO was as paramilitary company formed in 1989 from demobilized Special Forces members of the South African Defence Forces. In the 1990s, the company was hired by Angola and Sierra Leone to combat rebel forces alongside national military forces and did so with highly effective land and air power (Singer 2003; Howe 1998). For the most part though, private executive security functions occur without incident. But it is the moments when these functions take centre stage in
the public’s consciousness that the problematic nature of this kind of contracting reveals itself. The prime case of this is the Nisour Square killings in September 2007. Blackwater guards shot and killed seventeen Iraqi civilians when they misinterpreted a perceived security threat (Broder and Risen 2007). The Abu Ghraib prisoner torture scandals, which involved private sector interrogators and translators from CACI and Titan, had a similar effect on the western public’s understand of what wartime contracting entails. Of course, Iraqis and Afghans have lived with the often reckless behaviour of armed security contractors from the beginning of each war, but it is only when it makes news in the US that moral outrage results in legislative action. This will be discussed in chapter six.

So who is actually carrying out armed security? It is often difficult to get a picture of the individuals involved in executive security protection. This is largely because of the secretive nature of firms in this subsector and their sensitivity towards negative media attention. Thus, studies on the individuals associated with armed security contracting tend to be idiographic, biographical or rely on limited survey information (Higate 2012a; Higate 2012b; Pelton 2010; Franke and von Boemcken 2010; Pelton 2006). What often goes unremarked in the literature on this type of military contracting is the simple ethnic composition of contractors in this line of work. The popular stereotype is of white American men in urban commando paramilitary gear, but statistics suggest that Americans are the minority of executive security providers. The graphs on the following page suggest that US security contractors numbered only in the few hundreds between 2008 and 2012. For the most part, security guarding was undertaken predominantly by local nationals (as in Afghanistan), or by third-country nationals (as in Iraq).
Figure 2.4 source: USCENTCOM. Figures include most subcontractors and service contractors hired by prime contractors under Department of Defense. They include both armed and unarmed security contractors.

Figure 2.5 source: USCENTCOM. Figures include most subcontractors and service contractors hired by prime contractors under Department of Defense. They include both armed and unarmed security contractors.
It is important to note, however, that data on armed contractors are not subdivided any further than these broad categories. In other words, it is not known which countries are the most prominent providers of third-country armed security. Nor is it known how Iraqi and Afghan security companies break down along ethnic and sectarian lines. This, no doubt, has profound implications for the security and stability of the two countries. The Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish composition of armed contractors in Iraq feeds directly into the existential crisis of the post-Saddam civil war, both as de facto extensions of the occupying force, and as armed political factions that complicate the post-US political landscape. These concerns go a long way in explaining why there are so many third-country nationals and so few Iraqis working in private security. In Afghanistan, the plurality Pashtun that dominate the south, and the northern ethnic groups, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara, have long histories of mistrust, and arming local nationals for the purposes of commercial security has significant risks. Among other things, it risks militarizing pre-existing ethnic and sub-ethnic factions which may very well contribute to the destabilization of the highly fractious political culture. The irony is that post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction usually entails disarming non-state groups. In these cases, it actually means arming ethnic and sectarian factions, with uncertain outcomes.

Executive functions extend beyond the tasks of armed security. These are the most iconic and infamous figures associated with private military contracting in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Some firms undertake investigation, surveillance and counter-surveillance (Blackwater, Aegis, Triple Canopy, SOC-SMG, Avenge Aviation, Raytheon, Stanley Associates Inc.). These can be undertaken on the ground in the form of “spies” or private investigators in civilian parlance. Moreover, these tasks can also be undertaken from the air. Avenge Aviation provided aerial surveillance to its customers using its own air fleet. Surveillance is classed in this category
because it takes place within and among the general population. It is one where direct contact is often made with the population and the risks associated with these functions are generally quite high. Interrogation functions are also included in this category. Though there is no direct contact with the general population as such, the direct contact with prisoners makes this function quite unique to this category. The most notable instance of privatized interrogation emerged out of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in 2004. Virginia based CACI International was contracted to perform interrogation and translation duties at the prison and two of its employees were implicated in the scandal though never criminally charged (Zagorin 2007).

The executive category also includes tasks that do not necessarily involve direct contact with the host population but are extremely dangerous nonetheless. In particular, this includes mine and unexploded ordinance (UXO) clearance operations. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have been characterized by deadly mine attacks on troop and supply convoys at low risk to insurgents, giving rise to the neologism Improvised Explosive Device (VSE Corporation, ArmorGroup, Ronco). Some firms have developed competencies in UXO clearance and travel route maintenance. This relieves uniformed soldiers of responsibilities for clearing mines though IEDs remain highly effective insurgent weapons. Similar to UXO, this class also includes the handling, disposal and treatment of hazardous materials like chemicals, biochemicals, munitions, human remains and other environmental hazards (Sallyport Global; Environmental Chemical Corporation).

iv. Supply

There is a considerable variety of tasks and items that fall into this next category, in fact, too many to account. What is more, the clientele is both the US government and other private
companies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of them are banal and include ordinary products like air conditioners, office supplies and miscellaneous equipment. Others are more dramatic. They are the big-ticket items like construction materials, vehicles, power generators and even weapons. Drinking water is a significant imported product for US troops garrisoned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sources are not necessarily reliable or sufficient to sustain large operations and the US military as well as many private firms import water supplies. Fuel is a major supply issue for US forces. Even a decade after the invasion, the Iraqi oil sector cannot keep up with demands placed by the large military and civilian reconstruction presence. Thus, imported fuels, usually trucked in from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey in the case of Iraq, and Pakistan in the case of Afghanistan, constitute a significant supply issue faced by US personnel. In fact, the supply of fuels is the third highest expense for a single category of product in Iraq and Afghanistan, amounting to $16.6 billion or 9 percent of all obligations (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 211). Overland fuel supply is itself a significant locus of outsourcing. Drivers are often hired from neighboring countries to make the treacherous journey through the highway system of Iraq and Afghanistan. This supply chain is highly vulnerable to insurgent ambushes and necessitates its own form of convoy security which is invariably provided by private firms (Chaterjee 2009).

The supply category also includes labour procurement firms who can assemble teams of workers for projects in the construction and overland shipping sector. Labour procurement is also a source of some controversy. Allegations of human trafficking have been made towards major firms like KBR. In many instances, third-party nationals serve as cheap labour for large-scale projects. They are brought to Iraq or Afghanistan, sometimes by way of con men and human smugglers, from other countries in the Middle East like Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where
cheap labour is abundant. Often, unskilled labour is imported from farther afield including India, Nepal, Thailand, Bangladesh and Fiji. Workers are typically to work in hazardous situations in conflict zones with little security and virtually no labour protections from their employers (Stillman 2011; Chaterjee 2009).

v. Production

Major aviation firms producing military aircraft for use in Iraq and Afghanistan include L-3, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Other firms of similar size include General Electric, producers of engine systems for heavy vehicles and tanks. However, the nature of land travel in Iraq and Afghanistan has given rise to firms like Navistar, VSE Corp, ITT Corporation, that produce Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles. The MRAP is a deliberately engineered and produced troop transport vehicle designed in response to the high casualties inflicted upon US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by roadside bombs. Though the technology was first invented in South Africa in the 1980s, MRAP technology did not become integrated into the US land force until the Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies made the effects of IEDs apparent. At the end of 2012, 39.2 percent of US casualties had come as a result of IEDs in Iraq and 41 percent in Afghanistan (O’Hanlon and Livingston 2013). These figures are even more pronounced when analyzing particular periods in the two conflicts. In response, the Department of Defense initiated a tailored approach to the acquisition of MRAP vehicles in 2007. By 2009, $22.7 billion has been appropriated for the production of 16,204 vehicles from nine different firms such as BAE Systems, Dyncorp and General Dynamics Land Systems (Government Accountability Office 2009a).
Similarly, advancements in GPS technology have led to a proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles which have been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. These UAVs – drones in common parlance – have gone from a peripheral and even resented weapon of war to an essential tool for the US military. Like the UH-1 (Huey) helicopter in Vietnam, the Predator and Reaper drones have become the emblematic technology of the post-September 11 wars. To give a sense of the exponential growth in drone usage, at the outset of the war in Afghanistan, the military had a small fleet of aerial drones. By 2013 the US has over 8,000 aerial drones and more than 12,000 ground based robots (Singer 2013). In 2003, the US invasion force entering Iraq had no robot systems on the ground. By 2012, there were 12,000 ground-based robots in operation (Singer 2009). The Department of Defense acquired its drone fleet working in collaboration with the private sector. What is interesting here is that smaller manufacturers are at the forefront of military robotics, largely because they have fewer components to manufacture, and require much less logistical support to operate. For example, the Reaper drone, manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, costs about $10.5 million per craft, whereas the F-22 Raptor costs $150 million per unit (Wan and Finn 2011). Traditional aerospace weapons manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed Martin focus on high-end manned aircraft like the F-35 Lightning II fighter jet. Though the major aerospace companies do work in collaboration with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). In either case, the private sector is intimately involved in the production of this kind of weaponry. Elsewhere, the US has come to rely on the private sector to develop and produce other high-tech equipment and systems. This includes sophisticated communications technology, software infrastructure, surveillance and tracking equipment, biometric security and training simulators.
vi. Construction and Reconstruction

The final category is construction and reconstruction – that is building and upgrading installations for the host-country and US forces. These are activities associated with building and maintaining physical structures for military clients, and rebuilding physical installations for the broader population. Between Iraq and Afghanistan, expenditures toward construction of miscellaneous buildings amount to $10.4 billion or 6 percent of all obligations (Commission on Wartime Contracting 2011: 210). Related tasks like the construction of office buildings and maintenance amount to over $6.5 billion. Engineering, architecture, and construction are relatively straightforward functions to grasp. Major US firms like Kellogg, Brown and Root, Perini, Parsons Corporation as well as a number of Turkish firms hold many contracts for base construction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though not restricted to base camps, construction extends to airport, prison, water plant, power plant and other public utilities construction projects. There are also plenty of maintenance contracts for renovations, upgrades and repairs to existing infrastructure like seaports, airports, particularly electrical lines and substations. Another major area is the reconstruction and extension of road networks. And, as one would expect, construction, reconstruction and investment in the oil sector also generates a great deal of attention from the private sector.

It is important to this discussion to avoid leaving faulty impressions about the distribution of tasks across the contractor population in Iraq and Afghanistan. The contractor footprint surpassed a quarter million at its 2010 peak and much of the literature has a tendency to overlook the relative levels of the different types of labour undertaken. The chart below tracks personnel under contract to the Department of Defense by function in Iraq between 2008 and 2011.
It appears as if the most ordinary tasks, classified by the Pentagon as base operations and construction (operations and maintenance in the terminology used here) account for 60 to 75 percent of all contractors in the years where data is available. Executive security accounts for a sizable sum, 5 and 10 percent at any given time, while the rest rely on remarkably low proportion of individual contractors. By the same token, the number of dollars obligated to different types of contract labour illustrates the relative expense of these functions. By far, the largest contracted expenditures were allocated to maintenance and operations functions like logistical services, and to the supply of materials to support the occupation force.

The point of this is not to insinuate a vast conspiracy of profiteering and corruption. In fact, there is no conspiracy at all. Corruption and profiteering are rampant, widely recognized

Figure 2.6 source: Commission on Wartime Contracting (2010)
and documented. In fact, lawmakers as early as 2003 expressed concern about the “Iraqi gold rush” and the near absence of contracting oversight (Weismann and Reddy 2003). The 2011 Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting made it plain that criminality and fraud was rampant in the post-September 11 contracting culture. Rather, the analytical point is that contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan is (and continues to be) a massive and diverse phenomenon that will no doubt become more clear with the passage of time. For observers of contracting in these wars and military privatization more broadly, it is important to remain sensitive to the sophisticated distribution of labour within the industry and the proportional role of the sub-sectors. Overwhelming focus on one sub-sector distorts the image of the whole and scholars should be cautious to take note of this reality. Moreover, as this chapter indicates, military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan need not be seen as a singular phenomenon in the history of US wars. By observing the type of labour undertaken by the private sector, connections can be made to historical precedents and thus, scholars can develop a more historically grounded understanding of the present.

**Conclusion**

Private sector participation in Iraq and Afghanistan is wide and deep. While *sui generis* in its breadth and depth, the use of military contractors in a war zone is not unique in the history of US contingency operations. Comparison with contracting in the Vietnam War reveals important differences and some unexpected similarities, a summary of which is provided in the table at the end of this chapter. The preceding analysis makes two points about contracting during the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. Historically, it suggests that military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan find an important antecedent in a conflict four and five
decades earlier. Despite the quantitative differences, there are striking similarities and suggest that contracting in Vietnam set a precedent for private sector participation in war that finds its fullest iteration in the post-September 11 wars. Among the historical similarities is the simple fact that a simple lack of in-house capabilities led the US military to source certain technical functions in the private sector. Conceptually, it demonstrates the use of a labour-centric analysis of military contracting *contra* the firm-centric unit of analysis used in most scholarly work on the subject. By dispensing with the notion of the “private military/security firm, it is possible to undertake historical analysis that does not project an anachronism onto the past.

One note of caution is in order. The labour-type approach proposed here stretches the conceptual boundaries of private military firm beyond its original meaning. But shifting the boundaries is important to fully account for and compare the nature of private sector participation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. Doing so provides analytical leverage over activities and phenomena that are otherwise obscured by a firm-centric approach. And with this new conceptual vocabulary, it becomes possible to analyze private sector participation in war prior to the era of the “private military and security firm” without the artificial strictures imposed by a firm-centric perspective.

With the empirical picture of contracting established, it is necessary to move on to the historical question that is at the core of this inquiry. If there were similarities in the scope of wartime contracting, why was post-September 11 wartime contracting so much greater in scale and scope? It is to this question that the inquiry turns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Type</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Post-September 11 Wars</th>
<th>Summary of Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction and Reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>High levels of contractor involvement. Large scale modernization effort Mostly Vietnamese labour with US supervision</td>
<td>High levels of contractor involvement Large-scale reconstruction (Iraq) and modernization (Afghanistan) Mostly local and third party nationals</td>
<td>Very similar. Resource exploitation significant in Iraq occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations and Maintenance</strong></td>
<td>Base operations Some vehicle life-cycle maintenance Wireless and radio telecommunications development and support</td>
<td>Base operations Vehicle life-cycle maintenance IT and satellite communications support</td>
<td>Similar High tech sector participating in greater numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advisory</strong></td>
<td>Training in civilian non-security areas of public administration, construction, and management</td>
<td>Training in civilian non-security areas (governance, administration, community development)</td>
<td>Significant increase in scope and depth of private sector participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply</strong></td>
<td>Procurement based on military anticipated consumption calculations. Material drawn from existing stockpiles except commercial technology equipment</td>
<td>Supply and supply chain management largely outsourced</td>
<td>Major shift to outsourced supply and supply chain management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production</strong></td>
<td>Ordinary military production</td>
<td>Ordinary military production plus specialized vehicles (MRAP, drones)</td>
<td>More specialized equipment production in post-September 11 wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Personnel security, convoy security, site security; UXO handling</td>
<td>Privatized security functions are without precedent in post-9/11 wars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 Contracting in the Vietnam and the Post-September 11 Wars compared
Chapter 4

The American war in Vietnam was, until recently surpassed by Afghanistan, the longest conflict in US history. Embedded in its complex and contradictory strategy was a thoroughly rationalized plan of destruction, perfectly expressed in a *New York Times* report of one soldier’s proposition that “it became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it” (Arnett 1968). This irony was preceded by another. Before destruction became the means of salvation, something had to be built. This is what historian James Carter (2008) refers to as the “paradox of construction”: rapid construction and development of South Vietnam were the necessary first steps before the destructive force of the US military could be brought to bear on the countryside. For the most part, the creation was undertaken by a civilian force of contractors. As chapter three made clear, contractors were used in Vietnam in substantial numbers, at least in the absolute sense, numbering as high as 70,000 in 1966 and remaining relatively stable throughout the peak years of the war. As a proportion of the total US footprint (which reached its fullest strength in 1969), this contractor contingent amounted to only one tenth of the US total force. For a conflict that bears similar features to the post-September 11 wars, these proportions are strikingly different. Chapter three demonstrated that the scope of Vietnam War contracting was overwhelmingy concentrated in construction and, to a lesser extent in the areas of communication and facilities engineering. In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors are used across more areas of military labour and with much greater depth. So to restate the animating question of this inquiry: what accounts for the substantial differences in the scale and scope of contracting in the Vietnam War compared with the post-September 11 wars? This chapter begins to address
this question in earnest by establishing the determinants of US military contracting in the
Vietnam War.

The answer is not especially straightforward. As is typical of the Vietnam War, a series
of confounding issues arise that make clear historical claims difficult to establish. For one, there
is the issue of why contractors were even necessary in the first place. Despite the half-million
strong US troop presence, the Army of South Vietnam troops in tow, and the supplementary
presence of allied support troops, contractors were still employed to carry out the overall US
mission. Moreover, throughout the period of major American involvement (1964-1973),
contractor levels remained relatively stable despite sharp fluctuations in the level of uniformed
troops. There are two ways of addressing this puzzle. The first is to ask why contractors were
used during the Vietnam War in the first place. The second question is why were their numbers
so low compared to the post-September 11 wars? Responding to the first question entails an
exploration of the range of possible reasons for the deployment of a contractor force. At best, this
can draw attention to relevant correlates of contractor usage at the time. Responding to the
second question gets at the causal crux. It introduces the important mechanisms that kept
contractor levels both low and stable, relative to US troop fluctuations. Moreover, it provides
clues to as to which correlates of contracting are most influential.

The general argument here is that two crucial conditions determine the scale and scope of
wartime contracting: the ideational dimensions of American political economy and the
institutional system of raising military manpower. Here, these determinants are explored in the
context of the Vietnam War. This chapter argues that there were three necessary and related
conditions that contributed to the particular scale and scope of US military contracting in
Vietnam. More specifically, they are (1) the Selective Service draft as a form of raising
manpower during the war, (2) the political economic context in which it was embedded, and (3) the technical need for contractor services. It is the draft however, that is the more important determinant in this case.

As will be discussed at length, the draft acted as a non-market mechanism for drawing resources needed to prosecute the war that the military could not raise through volunteerism. Its effect on contracting was to depress the total number of private sector participants needed in the conflict zone. In this way, the Selective Service was the necessary institutional condition of Vietnam contracting. But the draft, like all other institutions, was embedded in its political economic context, which is a critical part of the historical connection among the determinants. Alone, the Selective Service System is not sufficient to explain the scale and scope of military contracting in Vietnam. The national form of political economy played an intrinsic role in the historical dynamics of war, manpower, and politics. Here the general political economy of the era is conceptualized using Bob Jessop’s (2002) notion of the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS). This chapter argues that the national political economy, in which the Selective Service regime was situated, was a necessary condition for the draft regime itself. Technical necessity presents an interesting problem. While it was also a necessary condition of contracting, it does not have any independent explanatory leverage in resolving the differences between contracting in Vietnam and in the post-September 11 wars. Since technical necessity is also a condition of contracting in the post-September 11 wars, its presence in both cases significantly diminishes it as an explanation for discrepancies in the scale and scope of contracting. However, it does help establish why certain types of contracting occurred when they did in the historical unfolding of the war.
So, the draft, the national form of political economy, and technical necessity are the necessary conditions of contracting. But is it possible to determine the relative significance of these three necessary conditions? After all, American involvement in Vietnam lasted nearly twenty years and spanned four presidencies. In that time, diplomatic, political and military strategies changed considerably. Just as it is essential to view the Vietnam War in its proper temporal context, it is equally important to provide historical context and ordering to the three necessary determinants of contracting.

I. The Logic of Historical Sequencing

This section explains how the factors in this historical sequence work and briefly sketches the empirical contours of the argument. The sections that follow undertake a fuller historical exposition of these processes. There are three arguments to be made here. First, the draft form of raising an army was a necessary but individually insufficient explanation for the scale and scope of contracting during the Vietnam War. Second, the political economic paradigm of the era in the United States was itself a necessary condition of the military draft and thus a critical contextualizing factor. Together these two necessary conditions constitute the key determinants of the scale and scope military contracting during the Vietnam War. However, identifying these two conditions as such does not help establish their relative significance. So, the third important argument is that one of the two determinants has a more direct influence on the scale and scope of contracting. This chapter argues that the presence of the draft was the more significant determinant of military contracting in the Vietnam War. Using the method of historical sequence elaboration, these factors can be assigned their relative historical significance.
But how does this argument work? Or, more precisely, as Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu (2009: 116) put it, “if multiple causes are linked together in a historical sequence, how would we know when an intervening causal factor is more important than the initial causal factor that launches the sequence itself?” In response, they develop a system of studying historical causation that demonstrates how different factors influence initial explanations. This approach allows a historical researcher to assess the relative importance of historical causes located at different points in time. Mahoney and his collaborators identify three benefits of sequence elaboration that accrue to historically minded research. First, sequence elaboration can contextualize original relationships by showing alternative pathways to an outcome. Second, the introduction of a new condition can diminish, but not obviate, the significance of initial relationships. Third, it can expose impossible relationships among historical conditions of an outcome. With this method, researchers can introduce antecedent or intervening factors that alter the initial relationship between one factor and its outcome.

So how do these determinants interact in the case of military contracting in Vietnam? Take the draft as the initial necessary condition for the scale and scope of contracting in the Vietnam War. More simply put, the presence of the draft in the United States meant that the number of contractors needed to carry out US objectives was minimized. Given the limitations of military statistics from Vietnam, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of draftees that served in the Vietnam War, but best estimates suggest that between 25 and 30 percent of troops serving in Vietnam were draftees (Clodfelter 1995; Flynn 1993; author’s own calculation). Data comparing draft inductions and contractor deployment show a loosely synchronous relationship. This is probably the result of a need to support the influx of draftees to Southeast Asia prior to 1967. However, without this contractor force, which was predominantly used for construction
and operations and maintenance, it is likely that uniformed troops would have picked up the slack. Given the domestic resistance to the draft during the Vietnam War, especially after the Tet Offensive in January 1968, replacing contractors with uniformed labour would be difficult to achieve. In this circumstance the draft is a necessary but insufficient cause of the limited scale of contracting in the Vietnam War.

The next necessary condition that must be addressed is the role of the political economy of the era. This chapter argues that the political economy in which the draft was situated plays a crucial contextualizing role. As will be discussed at length, the Selective Service System, in effect almost continuously since 1940, fit comfortably within the paradigm of the post-World War II era whereby the state had a strong interventionist role in the political and economic life of American society. This paradigm is more closely associated with Keynesian macroeconomic regulation but it must be applied more broadly. In this time, the Selective Service System justified itself in more than just military terms. As will be discussed below, its supporters claimed that the draft would serve important socio-economic as well as military ends (Drea 2011; Flynn 1993; Segal 1989). The thinking was that young men, particularly black men, could be imbued with certain civic virtues and moral vitality, all while receiving valuable job training that would suit them well upon returning to civilian life. Objectives like poverty alleviation and civic training were part of the wider social-engineering projects of post-World War II presidents, particularly Kennedy and Johnson. Whether or not the plan worked, which it did not, could only be assessed with the passage of time.

By the 1960s, the Selective Service System’s self-justifications fit into the paradigm of the paternalistic state, which sought to create a more virtuous citizenry and just distribution of social opportunity through military service. In this sense, the Selective Service was a function of
social engineering that was part of the political logic of the era. Indeed, while social engineering is not “Keynesian” in the economic sense, it an important dimension of Fordist state-centricity which characterized the post-World War II political economy. The New Deal-Great Society paradigms viewed military labour in a way that was anathema to the competitive military labour market that would emerge in the late 1970. Analytically, then, the statist political economy of the period can be positioned as a necessary condition for the draft form of raising a military to occur.

A word is in order about the relative placement of these historical determinants. As mentioned, the military draft is the primary factor in the relationships among the historical determinants of contracting and is contextualized by the political economy of the era. This relationship can also be phrased in a temporal sense. The statist political economy of the period can be dated to sometime around the end of the Second World War, developed in the 1950s and remained predominant in the US during the Vietnam War. The Selective Service as it is relevant to the Vietnam War can be dated to 1965 (though it was reinstated in 1948) when the administration of Lyndon Johnson chose to deploy draftees to Southeast Asia, rather than the reserves as part of the precipitous buildup in that year. Thus, the Keynesian Welfare National State-type political economy, as an historical determinant, is temporally prior to the draft and, when viewed in historical sequence, contextualizes the primary relationship between the draft and contracting in the Vietnam War. Since the draft is the more proximate necessary condition of contracting it can be ascribed greater significance in the historical pattern. The type of political economy as a contextualizing factor is less significant because it has a less direct relationship with the scale and scope of military contracting in Vietnam. Of course, technical necessity does have a necessary relationship with the scale and scope of contracting. But, as mentioned, its presence in both cases significantly diminishes its independent explanatory leverage.
With the logic of historical sequencing sketched, it is now possible to explain the historical dynamics that constitute these abstract variables. The next three sections engage these determinants by tracing the ways they interacted with one another. Section two addresses the matter of technical necessity and adds historical context to the claim. The final two sections engage the key determinants in depth. Section three discusses how the draft influenced the scale and scope of contracting in Vietnam while section four elucidates the significance of the KWNS political economy of the era. These final two discussions are particularly important because they serve as the major points of comparison with contracting during the post-September 11 wars.

II. Technical Need and Historical Timing

Technical considerations forced the US to turn to the private sector, particularly in the early years of major US involvement. In both the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars, the use of military contractors tended to track with US military objectives. The type of labour undertaken was contingent upon the changing priorities and demands of US political and military operations. Thus, the types of tasks undertaken by contractors can be located in time and pegged to the priorities of the US military. This is not a particularly surprising observation but it is important nonetheless. Contractors had skills that were not available within the structure of the Armed Forces or could not be deployed quickly enough. In the cases of some firms, the activities were highly specialized, as in the case of radio operators. Specialized manpower needed for certain functions that could not be drafted, and did not exist in-house, was raised through contracting. By the same token, low or unskilled labour, especially for construction, was more cheaply acquired through local contracting. (The alternative was using soldiers to perform low skilled tasks that were far removed from their military training). But in other circumstances, such
as engineering, the US did have in-house expertise in which case uniformed troops often worked alongside contractors. So what accounts for the dynamics of this public-private partnership? Throughout the war, the use of contractors reflected the technical needs required to carry out American policy and can be divided into four general periods.

1954-1960

The first period begins shortly after the collapse of French rule in Indochina. The 1954 Geneva Accords partitioned Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel and had provisions for the demilitarization of partition zones. While the Accords were met with mixed reaction from the Eisenhower administration, American support for the agreement, coupled with the overarching foreign policy of Communist containment, essentially committed the US to the fledgling regime in the South (Berman 1982). In a fit of pique and a harbinger of future policy, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy said in 1956, “[South Vietnam] is our offspring, we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs” (quoted in Herring 1986: 43).

After the Geneva Accords, the US commitment was limited; the Military Assistance Advisory Group numbered only about 300 individuals. The number of MAAG personnel, however, did not reflect the size of its ambition. Politically, the US sought to bolster the credibility of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in the South through massive investment and aid. This entailed a program of state building which included initiatives to strengthen the agricultural and industrial base of its fledgling ward with targeted interventions, currency manipulation and economic assistance through the commercial-import program (Dacy 1986). Moreover, the US sought to resettle migratory populations that were uprooted by the terms of the Geneva agreement. Contracting in this time was limited to targeted construction projects, developing a
modern telecommunications network in Southeast Asia and consultation. As elaborated in chapter three, most of the work was contracted to a handful of American and Thai construction companies.

Advisory work also played a significant part of early American involvement. Training in this time was largely undertaken by public servants both military and civilian. However, a major component of private sector advisory work was the contributions of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG), formally subsumed under US Operations Mission. MSUG, comprised of academics specializing in political science and public administration, acted as consultants to the Diem regime on a wide range of governance issues (Ernst 1998). Chief among them was bolstering the regime’s credibility by suppression of nascent rebellions that were taking form in the countryside. As Spector (1985) notes, the most important organization in this regard was the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. The Self-Defense Corps was a part-time militia, intended for village protection, while the Civil Guard, modelled after the Texas Rangers, was a full-time, armed and uniformed force undertaking police and intelligence duties. The increasingly autocratic Diem viewed the latter as an auxiliary to the Armed Forces of Vietnam. By 1957, MSUG had helped train 14,000 Civil Guardsmen. The working relationship between MSUG and the regime eroded as Diem’s creeping authoritarianism grated against the American scholars’ more democratic predispositions. It finally collapsed in 1960 after MSUG scholars published critical accounts of the regime in the New Republic decrying Diem’s tactics. In response, Diem dissolved the relationship with MSUG and expelled its participants from the country (Oren 2003). For the most part though, US policy in the five years after the Geneva Accords had been successful. The communist threat to the South had been blunted, infrastructural and economic improvements had bolstered the regime, dissent was stifled, a
constitution drafted and an assembly selected. According to Berman (1982: 16), the situation inherited by Kennedy in 1960 was “rich in rhetoric and momentum.”

1960-1963

The next period roughly corresponds with the truncated Kennedy administration. This period was characterized by the supersession of MAAG by the unified command Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in early 1962, a growing insurgency in the South, the fall of Diem and the considerable expansion of the American commitment. However, US-abetted consolidation of Diem’s regime did not extend very far beyond the city limits of major urban centres. In the countryside, the insurgency was palpable and the National Liberation Front had gained control over much of the rural population and territory. In 1961, NLF infiltration into the South had doubled to nearly 4,000 fighters and in September had captured a provincial capital fifty-five miles from Saigon. Instability outside of the major cities was met with a shift in US policy towards South Vietnam as a whole. The initial focus on development and modernization transitioned to pacification and counter insurgency strategy, which was popular among policy makers in Washington but met considerable resistance within the military (Avant 1993).

By October 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council considered the introduction of an American combat contingent (Herring 1986). National Security Memorandum 111 contains Kennedy’s decision to move from the limited advisory function to a more active guarantor of a non-Communist South Vietnam. The Memorandum articulated a desire to continue its support for the South while simultaneously limiting US risk. “The US Government,” it read, “is prepared to join the Vietnam Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam.” However, its stated
preferences were hedged with the conclusion that “the objective of our policy is to do all possible to accomplish our purpose without use of US combat forces” (quoted in Berman 1982: 23). The instinct to delimit combat forces did not prevent the US from increasing its presence exponentially. At the end of 1961, there were 3,200 American military personnel, called “advisors” at this point, in Vietnam, and by the end of 1962 the number had increased three and a half times to 11,300 (Herring 1986: 80).

The swelling insurgency and the larger American presence it provoked entailed a concomitant building program in order to accommodate the influx of troops. In 1962 and 1963, South Vietnam was entirely incapable of supporting the direct military assistance making its way into the country despite the infrastructural development assistance from the US over the previous eight years. The construction requirements to sustain a modern military force were enormous and would increase considerably after 1965. Details of the construction program are discussed at length in chapter three, but what has gone unremarked is that construction programs were now geared towards the broader counter insurgency strategy. As Carter (2008: 140) explains, administration officials no longer spoke of development aid and assistance but rather, they spoke of the “war” in Vietnam. All road expansion, sea and airport development, telecommunications infrastructure and construction of strategic hamlets were viewed through the rubric of war. Throughout this period, private sector contracting and engineering firms were hired to undertake many of these projects. The firms, of course, were happy to deliver services in support of the new American priorities, particularly RMK-BRJ which formed its massive construction consortium in 1962.

As the Kennedy administration raised the stakes of US involvement between 1961 and 1963, the contractor force remained quite low. The administration was generally optimistic about
the prospects of success and there was little internal dissent that risked any shift in overall strategy towards South Vietnam. After the assassinations of Diem and Kennedy, 9,000 miles and twenty days apart in November 1963, President Lyndon Johnson took the same posture as his predecessor. The Americanization phase between 1964 and 1968 marked the shift from limited counter insurgency to a rapidly expanded ground war and bombing campaign. Pacification and counter insurgency under Kennedy gradually morphed into a general buildup under Lyndon Johnson. By 1965 US troops were engaged in a ground war with the Vietcong and an air war with the North.

1964-1968

Between Johnson’s assumption of the presidency and the Tonkin Gulf crisis, the administration’s policy was to continue the programs initiated under Kennedy. Johnson and the advisors he had largely inherited from Kennedy, maintained confidence in existing programs of economic and military assistance to South Vietnam. Johnson was reluctant to compromise his domestic social programs or be seen to do anything drastic in an election year. Therefore, his strategy was to “do more of the same and do it more efficiently” (Herring 1986: 116). For a while, Johnson was able to maintain a relatively steady course, with incremental increases in material support for the post-Diem governments. Despite domestic social unrest in the South, the Johnson administration thought it had a better political partner in the Military Revolutionary Council than Diem. With the autocrat now gone, they felt that they could achieve more efficient results with the new Saigon junta. Johnson and company quickly transferred their faith to General Nguyen Khanh after his own coup ousted the junta in January 1964. Recognizing full well that further instability would compromise US objectives, Washington publicly supported
Khanh while expanding economic assistance by $50 million increasing the number of US advisor personnel from 16,300 to 23,300 by the end of that year (Herring 1986: 116).

As is well known, the Tonkin Gulf crisis was the watershed event in the unfolding of American policy in Vietnam. A confused nighttime engagement between US destroyers and North Vietnamese torpedo boats on August 1, 1964, prompted an aggressive response from the Johnson administration. Within days, on the recommendation of McNamara and his military advisers, Johnson ordered air strikes on North Vietnamese targets. More significantly, he sought Congressional authorization to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” (Herring 1986: 122). Expedited through Congress, the Tonkin Gulf resolution signaled to North Vietnam Johnson’s legislative mandate to continue military pressure, and to domestic audiences his fortitude and restraint. By responding with air strikes and not ground troops, Johnson upheld a commitment not to widen the war though he did breach a long-standing practice of not directly engaging targets in the North. The show of force effectively secured his foreign policy credentials during the election year and his victory over Barry Goldwater in November gave him sufficient domestic support to pursue a more aggressive military options against the Viet Cong insurgency in the South and military targets in the North.

Nearly a year passed between the Tonkin Gulf resolution and the actual decision to expand the ground commitment in Vietnam. Despite the seeming reprieve from bellicosity, the decision making process within the administration was contentious. But, it is clear that the Johnson cabinet and his key advisors regarded the Vietnam issue strictly through a military lens (Berman 1982). Between August 1964 and July 1965 a series of events challenged US prestige in the region that the administration could not ignore. In this period, China detonated a nuclear
bomb; a civilian government in Saigon was replaced by a military directorate; the Vietcong had scored major victories against a rapidly deteriorating South Vietnamese Army and had executed a provocative attack on US barracks in the highlands region of Pleiku in February 1965. In response to Pleiku, the administration initiated the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign that would continue for the remainder of the war. However, the final straw was a recommendation from McNamara upon his return from Saigon in July 1965 to deploy 100,000 US combat forces. Johnson decided in July to commit 125,000 additional troops with additional forces coming as necessary, thereby crossing the threshold he had been so reluctant to violate. By the end of 1965, there were nearly 200,000 US troops stationed in South Vietnam. Thus, as Leslie Gelb (1979) suggests, the pattern of Americanization was set. Troop levels increased exponentially through the reallocation of global forces, volunteers and draftees. Importantly, Johnson refused to impose any initial war tax (until 1968) or mobilize the reserves, a decision that would force him to draft manpower from the civilian population in subsequent years. Johnson’s own priority was to minimize the political risk to his signature domestic policies: Civil Rights legislation and the Great Society programs (Komer 1986: 159).

In South Vietnam, the influx of troops was a tremendous strain on the minimal infrastructure in place. Sustaining a force of this size entailed massive construction as described in the chapter three. As James M. Carter notes, once US forces landed they needed a support network of bases, lines of communication, power plants, water treatment, supply lines and so on. The Johnson administration, he says, “could only escalate the war in Vietnam as fast as an infrastructure that could receive the influx could be built” (Carter 2008: 160). To give another example of the scale of technical need, the 184,000 US troops in Vietnam in 1965 needed 138,000 tons of supplies per month. Adding to this total was supplies for Vietnamese forces. The
result was a quantity of goods entering the country that exceeded the entire port capacity of South Vietnam. For private sector firms like RMK-BRJ, PA&E and Page, shifting US policies were highly advantageous. Expanding material commitments necessitated a similarly expanded contractor force to facilitate the new realities on the ground. Contractors became an indispensable force that made it possible for the United States to carry out its military policy in South Vietnam (Carter 2008).

As the contracting presence reached its peak in 1966, the amount of work-in-place grew multiple times over. Between January 1966 and April 1967, contractors put $670 million worth of construction projects in place; this compared to $130 million work-in-place over the past four years combined. Construction contractors had, in this time, established a permanent place in the overall US war effort, yielding the contradiction noted at the outset of this chapter. Further to the destruction that construction facilitated was the corruption that wartime contracting entailed. The construction contract was negotiated between the US government and the RMK-BRJ consortium for $900 million worth of work. In a twist of historical irony, and a distant echo of criticisms that would be levelled four decades later, Republican Representative from Illinois Donald H. Rumsfeld complained about the dearth of contracting oversight. About the sole sourced contract with RMK-BRJ he mused “why this huge contract has not been and is not now being adequately audited is beyond me. The potential for waste and profiteering under such a contract is substantial” (quoted in Carter 2008: 239).

1968-1973

The final era of US involvement began in January 1968 and ended with the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 which permitted the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam. In this
period, the war would reach its fullest intensity before troops began to withdraw as the policy of Vietnamization was rolled out. The cautious optimism maintained by successive administrations between 1962 and 1967 was rudely punctuated by the Tet offensive that began at the end of January 1968. The offensive had the contradictory effect of escalating the tensions while at the same precipitating the beginning of the end of US involvement. After 1968, military victory was no longer plausible and the political agenda shifted towards extraction, but not before US troop levels reached 542,000 in 1969. Over the next three years, the US would dramatically withdraw its forces as it became clear that the war was a losing proposition. The contractor presence, however, remained relatively steady until the middle of 1971. By the end of 1967, the combat phase of the war was well underway. Over one million Americans had been issued draft notices and the war’s proponents still maintained a positive impression of the situation. Though the war had grown increasingly distressing to the Johnson administration, the public face remained optimistic. Even Robert McNamara, whose private views on the viability of US military success had dimmed considerably, would not acknowledge the existence of a military stalemate. Late in 1967, General Westmoreland visited the United States to tout the progress being made, even hinting that the US might begin troop withdrawals within two years (Herring 1986). Tet suggested otherwise.

On January 30, 1968, as many as 70,000 North Vietnamese soldiers and Vietcong guerrillas launched simultaneous attacks on urban and rural targets across South Vietnam. Over 100 cities, six of 44 provincial capitals, 64 of 242 district towns and other small villages came under attack (Carter 2008: 240). The psychological effect of the massive offensive was transformative. It indicated to all observers that the US had failed to consolidate full control over any portion of South Vietnam. Nowhere was this vulnerability symbolized more profoundly than
the assault on the US embassy in Saigon where firefights between US forces and Vietcong guerrillas in the hallways of the US embassy portended the coming political failure.

In response, General William Westmoreland, commander of MACV, requested 206,000 more troops which would have brought the overall forces to 732,000 (Herring 1986: 201). Lyndon Johnson’s reaction to Tet and MACV’s troop request was as important as the precipitating events themselves. In a televised speech in March, he signaled the end of the full military commitment to South Vietnam. Johnson advanced a plan for limited increase in troop strength far less than the one requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Westmoreland. Furthermore, he articulated a plan to turn over the US military responsibilities to the South Vietnamese Army and announced a halt to bombing in the North above the twentieth parallel. Most memorable was the announcement that he would not seek re-election that year. Johnson’s moderate military response to Tet was a public signal that military victory was no longer seen as essential to political victory. While the war only intensified over the next eighteen months, “US withdrawal from Vietnam began at that moment, even though it took several more years to physically complete the task” (McNamara et al. 1999: 366).

After his election, Richard Nixon continued this policy of gradual disengagement through “Vietnamization,” a plan whereby South Vietnam took over military responsibilities from the US. This program allowed US troop levels to be reduced swiftly while peace negotiations unfolded. Of course, this did not mean that the violence abated; the air war was intensified and expanded to Cambodia and over 285,000 draft calls were made in 1969 alone. Politically, the definition of success also changed. With victory in the jungles less probable with every passing week, focus shifted to the bargaining table in Paris where the US engaged the North in peace
talks. Peace with honour replaced peace with victory (McNamara et al. 1999). The Paris Peace Accords were finalized in 1973 and the US military engagement ended.

By 1968, the military infrastructure needed to support the influx of forces was mostly in place. Remaining contractors working for the RMK-BRJ group stood at half the strength in this period as they had in 1966. The consortium’s work force had stabilized at about 15,000 in 1967 and 1968 after a budget-driven drawdown of construction efforts beginning in late 1966. By 1966, it had become apparent to Pentagon planners that the limited funding envelope for construction contracting was running low and that it was necessary to cut back on construction spending. Thus, the Department of Defense initiated the Level of Viable Effort program which saw the contracting force dip considerably (Tregaskis 1975). The gradual drawdown of contractors was quickly halted with the adoption of new construction priorities in the post-Tet security environment. In addition to maintaining work already in place, facilities construction and road development accelerated. As US personnel moved northward, there was a renewed need for troop housing, particularly in the northernmost I Corps logistical zone and around major battle sites like besieged Khe Sanh where Marines were, even in 1968, still living in tents (Tregaskis 1975).

The post-Tet security situation also required a redoubled effort on road construction. In 1969, the Pentagon committed half a billion dollars to the lines of communication program, which, ironically, was crucial to sustaining a military operation no longer viewed as winnable. Most of this road work was concentrated on transportation networks in and around Saigon, service roads into the Mekong Delta in the south and coastal routes leading north. By 1970, emphasis was placed on road networks in the highlands and on the coast. In the final phase of construction in 1971-1972, the focus turned to inland road construction and the transfer of
equipment to ARVN engineers. In response to the post-Tet construction orders, RMK-BRJ increased its workforce to 25,000 (Tregaskis 1975: 424). The base engineering firm PA&E maintained an employee force of 21,000 to 24,000 during this period. Work orders remained consistent through to 1971, even as combat forces were being rapidly withdrawn. By that time, the US military presence had dropped below 100,000, the lowest level since 1965. With the end of the US engagement a foregone conclusion, construction contracts were closed and equipment was turned over to South Vietnam.

What this brief summary of the Vietnam War suggests is that technical need on the part of US forces plays an important role in explaining the resort to contractors. The logic is simple: the military needed certain technical capabilities it did not possess so it was raised from the private sector. In this sense, private contracting and military demand go hand-in-hand. But while this line of inquiry has some prospects, it does not explain the discrepancy between Vietnam-era contracting and post-September 11 contracting. In both cases, the reliance on contractors explains why they were used, but not why they were used to such different degrees. Indeed, technical considerations would be an independent variable that is observable in both cases, but in the presence of other independent variables that do vary, it loses explanatory force. Thus, technical considerations may explain the type and timing of contracting but not the differences in scale and scope between the cases. With that said, it is now possible to address the second major proximate cause of the scale and scope of contracting in the Vietnam War: the draft.

III. The Draft

Among the many controversies of the Vietnam War during the era, the draft was one of the most potent. Statistical analyses of draft politics (Fligstein 1980; Fligstein 1976) focus on
how equitably the burden of service was distributed in American society, or as one government study asked “who serves when not all serve” (Marshall Commission 1968)? What has gone unexplored is the relationship between the draft system and contractors. This section explores the link between the two and argues that the presence of the draft in the United States depressed the number of contractors needed to prosecute the war in Vietnam.

Between 1948 and 1973, the US raised a force by way of a combination of draftees and volunteers. During the Americanization period of the Vietnam War, draft calls increased significantly, altering the composition of the force and provoking anti-war responses on the home front. This was especially pronounced in 1965 when Johnson elected to increase draft calls, rather than mobilize the Army Reserves, in order to support the precipitous troop buildup in that year. Draft calls continued throughout the balance of the war with the last call-up issued in 1973. But for all the loaded symbolism of the draft and its effect on American politics in the 1960s, there are surprisingly few statistics relating to the number of draftees that actually served in Vietnam. Based on calculations of how many troops served in Vietnam and Southeast Asia more broadly, anywhere between 25 and 30 percent of all troops serving in the Vietnam theatre were draftees (Clodfelter 1995; Flynn 1993). What is more, the very presence of the draft exerted a steering effect on young American men. Aware of their eligibility, many draft-age men who could not otherwise secure deferments, volunteered for less risky assignments. Thus, the phenomenon of draft-induced volunteerism ought to be considered as part of the broader effect of the Selective Service regime on military manpower.

These draftees and draft-induced volunteers had an important effect on military contracting during the war. The ability of the US to raise 25 to 30 percent of manpower through coercion meant that roles that would otherwise be contracted out could be filled more cheaply
with uniformed troops. As discussed above, contracting was largely undertaken as a result of technical need, but unlike technical necessity which determined the scope of contracting, the draft played a crucial role in limiting the scale. The argument here is that the draft enabled the United States to expand the pool of labour from which it could draw military personnel to carry out critical labour functions in South Vietnam. Enlarging the public labour pool through the draft diminished the levels to which contractors served as a proportion of the total force. By resorting to draftees and draft-induced volunteerism to raise a military force, the US depressed the number of contractors necessary to prosecute the war in Vietnam.

It may be remarked that the presence of both a draft and contracting is puzzling. If there was a draft and the US could raise a military labour force through coercion, why then was it necessary to rely on a contractor force in the first place? One effect of the Selective Service was not to render contracting unnecessary, but rather to keep the US from deploying more contractors to South Vietnam. This is important to remember for the question at hand is not what caused contracting as such, but rather, what determined the scale and scope of contracting.

*The Selective Service 1948-1973*

Until 1948, the draft in America had always been imposed under conditions of national emergency. It was first used in the Civil War and reintroduced in 1917. Between 1919 and the outset of World War II, a period of isolationism, the US relied upon an all-volunteer military. In August 1940 President Franklin Roosevelt federalized the National Guard and, one month later, Congress passed the Selective Service Act. This legislation required all men between the ages of 21 and 35 to register with local draft boards, a system that proved highly effective during the period of national mobilization 1941-1945. One week after VE day, the Selective Service Act
expired but, in response to Army requests, the registration regime was extended by one year in order to maintain a “force-in-being” (Segal 1989). The Act was extended once again in response to the Soviet Union’s refusal to relinquish Iranian territory captured during the war. This second renewal expired in 1947. Between 1946 and 1947, President Harry Truman attempted to institute a regime of universal military training but was met with resistance in Congress. Postwar force reductions were looked upon with deep reservation by the Armed Forces and those who recognized the new American role in world politics could no longer be isolationist. The new peace forced a compromise between the need for a well-staffed military and the American wariness of centralized government (Friedberg 2000; Chambers 1987). Thus, Congress established the Office of Selective Service Records, headed by General Lewis Hershey who would serve until 1970.

The Selective Service was treated as a stand-by mechanism in the event that rapid mobilization was once again necessary. Between 1947 and 1948, the US forces were staffed by volunteers until twin crises in 1948 reanimated feelings of national emergency and insecurity. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the beginning of the Soviet blockade of Berlin roused the US from its peacetime posture. Truman called again for universal military training but had to settle for the selective system that had been employed during World Wars. The reinstitution of the Selective Service system was influenced by both strategic and political imperatives. Politically, the imposition of a peacetime draft ran contrary to its historical usage only in times of national emergency. Therefore, it was adopted by Congress as a temporary measure, renewable at four year intervals. Moreover, Truman was moved by strong economic incentives. Draftees and draft-induced volunteers were much less expensive to maintain than volunteers who had to be enticed by increased pay and benefits (Flynn 1993: 110). And, as its
name suggests, the Selective Service’s intake was premised upon selection criteria that distinguished between viable recruits and those that should otherwise be rejected or deferred.

During the Vietnam War, a confluence of factors – deferral mechanisms, an oversupply of eligible candidates, and the resultant uneven social distribution of draft exposure – undermined the credibility of the draft in the eyes of the public (Prados 2009; Griffith 1997; Cohen 1985; Gerhardt 1971). But during the early Cold War era, the burdens of the draft were relatively minimal and the Selective Service regime was accepted by the public as a necessary aspect of political life.

Despite the new Cold War imperatives and the draft, American manpower did not grow. In fact, it was just the opposite. Secretary of the newly created Department of Defense Louis Johnson embarked on a plan to pare down the military in the late 1940s. During this time, the Reserves were reduced from 746,000 to 600,000 soldiers between 1948 and 1950. The regular Army itself was reduced from 677,000 in 1949 to 591,000 in 1951. At the end of 1949, each branch of the armed services stopped accepting volunteers; this despite the first Soviet nuclear tests and the “loss of China” (Flynn 1993: 109).

The 1950 to 1953 Korean War, however, reinvigorated manpower acquisition imperatives. During these years, the draft was met with considerable public assent. As a conflict originating from communist military action, the war was viewed as sufficiently threatening to American interests that the public was prepared to accept this federal intrusion into the lives of young men. Increased draft calls were accompanied by a broader mobilization strategy which included wage and price controls, taxation and war rhetoric from elected officials. Furthermore, manpower rules were modified to ensure that draftees would face short-term services and that they would be rotated through battle zones, thereby limiting exposure to deadly risk. This system
of personnel management was viewed as much more acceptable to the public during a limited and undeclared war (Chambers 1987). After the Korean War, the Selective Service System settled in as a regular and influential part of American life. It required the registration of all American males at the age of 18 and deferment mechanisms exerted significant effects on educational and career choices (Saldin 2011). For the most part, the post-Korea was accepted by both elites and the general population but only because the limited intake and the opportunities for deferment lessened the burden of the draft on society as a whole (Friedberg 2000: 179).

Between 1954 and 1964, the military inducted an average of 149,176 men every year (Selective Service System n.d.) and the highly permissive deferment rules allowed the military to manage its oversupply of potential candidates while avoiding the political pressures that would come with a less limited draft regime (Friedberg 2000).

The domestic political dimensions of the Selective Service were not lost on Lyndon Johnson. He and his cabinet were well aware of the public consensus on the draft that had formed during World War II and the early Cold War crises. Throughout the deliberations of 1964, Johnson sought to limit the effect of war policy on his domestic agenda (Berman 1982). Once the build-up of 1965 was underway, he took pains to limit the burden of the war on the general population. Among Johnson’s important early decisions was his refusal to mobilize the Reserves as a way of staffing the buildup in South Vietnam. This undermined planning assumptions about available manpower within the military, and hit Army and Navy units involved in construction and logistics particularly hard. All major planning policies for expanded US activity in Southeast Asia had been premised on the assumption that a “significant proportion of the necessary manpower would come from the Reserve components, the stage was set for shortages not only of units but also of men with technical training and managerial ability”
(Ploger 1974: 6). This policy decision accounts for the notable increase in contractor levels during the Americanization phase of the war: instead of using the Reserves to fill the ranks, the Johnson administration turned to draftees; and in place of skilled labour available in the Reserves, the military had to turn to the private sector. Thus, the decision to rely on the draft created skilled labour shortages in crucial areas which required the military to turn to alternative sources of manpower.

Like Truman fifteen years earlier, Johnson saw the draft as a cost-effective and politically safe solution to manpower problems. In the short term, draftees and draft-induced volunteers allowed the Johnson administration to avoid the political repercussions of mobilizing the Reserves. Older men, who were predominant in the Reserves, were more likely to be married and have children, thus, inducting younger men inflicted less familial hardship (and therefore came at a lower political cost). Moreover, drafting young men plucked fewer experienced workers from the economy permitting Reserve and National Guard personnel to remain in their civilian jobs. In any event, younger draft-age men had higher levels of unemployment and, the administration believed, would be well-served by a stint in the military. Thus, the draft allowed Johnson to shield himself from the political repercussions of pressing civilians into military service (Flynn 1993). By 1966 and 1967, growing opposition to the war and the perception of the draft’s inequalities ended the domestic short term gains associated with the Selective Service System. By 1968, the domestic bargain over Selective Service had unravelled and the legitimacy of the draft was now an open public policy question. Opposition to the draft was primarily a matter of reform rather than abolition. Reformers wanted to keep the general structure of the Selective Service System with reforms to make it politically acceptable (Chambers 1987: 257). In 1970, a draft lottery replaced Selective Service and by 1973 the draft was abolished entirely.
When dealing with the Vietnam War, it is important to remember that the quality and reliability of statistical measures are dubious, though it is not for a lack of effort. Without question, data emanating from the US war in South Vietnam is plentiful; Michael Clodfelter’s *Vietnam in Military Statistics* (1995) stands out as a particularly useful resource. But in many areas of the conflict, data is patchy. It is ironic that for all the money and manpower committed to the war, there was no integrated or systematic data reporting system between South Vietnam and Washington (Thayer 1985). This affected measurements of wartime progress and post-war evaluation. Statistical studies of manpower use after the war were more inclined to pursue questions about the social and racial distribution of risk (Fligstein 1980; Fligstein 1976), than to establish a full empirical picture of who served and where.

Regarding the Selective Service regime, data is no less opaque so a degree of caution is in order when dealing with the service of draftees. It is not entirely clear how many draftees actually served in Vietnam or what percentage of the US total force they constituted. Part of the problem was that the Selective Service System, the agency charged with raising and vetting inductees, was not equipped to monitor these trends. It was a highly decentralized organization, comprised of many thousands of draft boards (4,080 in 1966), spread around the country and staffed by volunteers (typically well-connected members of the community). The first priority was not necessarily rigorous data collection but rather, to meet quotas handed down by the Department of Defense (Flynn 1993).

So, what is known about the number of active duty soldiers and draftees that served in Vietnam during the intensive years of American involvement? Beginning with the broadest figures, there were 26.8 million American men in the Vietnam generation (draft eligible between
of whom 10.93 million served in the military somewhere in the world. Of this 10.93 million, 8.7 million enlisted voluntarily and 2.215 million were drafted (Schulzinger 1997: 216). About 3.4 million US military personnel were deployed to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era and it is estimated that 2.7 million Americans served within the borders of South Vietnam from 1964 to 1973 (Selective Service System n.d.). During this time frame, about 1,843,640 men were inducted into the military through the Selective Service System. Between 1966 and 1969, the peak years of US force strength, approximately 300,000 men per year were drafted in the United States. At its peak, draftees accounted for 49 percent of non-commissioned personnel (Saldin 2011).

This still does not say anything about draftees actually serving inside Vietnam. Best estimates suggest that between 1955 and 1975, the approximate period of US involvement in Southeast Asia, about 648,000 draftees served in Vietnam, most of whom were deployed after 1964 (Clodfelter 1995; Clodfelter 1992). Based on the limited statistics available, draftees accounted for about 40 percent of the total accessions of enlisted personnel to the military and only about 25 to 30 percent served in Vietnam. In the Army, these figures are much higher. For example, in 1967, between 47 and 49 percent of the Army were draftees (Flynn 1993: 161). The most precise figures for draftees actually serving in South Vietnam suggest that between one third and one half of all Army personnel were raised through the Selective Service. In June 1966, of about 133,000 Army personnel, 44,654 (33.5 percent) were draftees. In June 1967, the proportion had increased to about 50.3 percent – 129,856 of 258,000 Army troops were draftees. In 1968, of approximately 310,000 Army troops, 43 percent or about 133,400 were draftees. Draftees also bore a disproportionate share of fatalities since they were more likely to be assigned to high attrition roles, in other words, front-line duty. By 1970, the proportion of
draftees serving in the Army that were killed in action reached 55 percent (Drea 2011: 270). Moreover, drafted personnel were more likely to be less educated and thus, less likely to be assigned to managerial positions away from the front lines. As George Flynn (1993: 193) remarks, “as in all wars, personnel policy put the better educated into roles where they were more useful which meant that they were usually also safer. Good management meant that those with little education usually ended up in combat roles.”

What statistical effects of the draft on contracting can be observed in Vietnam? Given the inconsistencies of data figures it is difficult to establish strong empirical connections. But the data do show some logical correspondences that suggest an effect. Figure 3.1 below shows an inverse relationship between the overall draft inductions in the US and the percentage of contractors as part of the total force in Vietnam.

![US Draftees and Contractors 1963-1971](image)

*Figure 3.1 source: Selective Service System (n.d.); Tregaskis (1975)*
As draft inductions increased, there was a concomitant decline in the proportion of contractors as part of the overall US presence in South Vietnam. Now, this is not to suggest that there were no other factors acting upon the proportion of contractors. To be sure, the decline of the contractor force is partially the result of the general troop buildup, and cannot be exclusively the result of an influx of draftees. But, given that 25 to 30 percent of the US forces in Vietnam were draftees, it is reasonable to assume that draftees made up at least a similar proportion of the troop buildup in 1965 and 1966. The effect of the draft on contracting is probably intensified when considering the presence of draft-induced volunteers. In these circumstances, men of draft age volunteered in branches of the Armed Services that were far less hazardous – the Army Reserves, the National Guard and the Navy. Throughout the 1960s, the threat of the draft induced volunteers to enlist in these sectors of the military. Though records were never kept on this phenomenon, surveys suggest that the draft was an essential tool for inducing voluntary enlistment. For example, of first-tour voluntary enlistments, 38 percent of all volunteers were motivated by the draft (Drea 2011: 265). This figure rises to 43 percent for Army and Air Force volunteers. Draft-induced volunteerism also motivated 40 percent of newly commissioned officers. As for the National Guard and Reserves, over 70 percent of initial enlistments were draft-induced (Drea 2011: 265).

Now, draftees did not directly supplant contractors. Quite the opposite, draftees were more likely to be assigned to the infantry and perform combat roles. In 1969, 16 percent of the worldwide armed forces were draftees, but they accounted for 88 percent of the infantry in Vietnam and more than half of the combat deaths (Saldin 2011). To be sure, these executive-type forms of military labour were entirely the domain of uniformed troops in the Vietnam-era. But draftees and draft-induced volunteers would have had a displacement effect on contractors.
performing other types of military labour. With the influx of draftees and draft-induced volunteers, manpower requirements could be filled with uniformed troops. Contractors would then be pushed into specialized technical roles for which there was no in-house capability, or into construction roles that would otherwise be considered an inefficient use of a uniformed troop. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that draftees and draft-induced volunteers had the effect of diminishing the contractor presence in Vietnam. Of course, there were large numbers of construction tasks assigned to uniformed American troops. US Navy Construction Battalions, Army Engineers, Air Force engineer units, and Marine Combat Engineers all undertook construction roles in Vietnam. But for the most part, “construction and service requirements were beyond the capabilities of the assigned military units” (Heiser 1974: 84). Uniformed construction battalions tended to be specialized units and worked alongside the private construction firms whose personnel numbered as many as 51,044 in September 1966 (Tregaskis 1975).

It is apparent from this analysis that the relationship between Vietnam War-era contracting and the draft is complex. Despite the difficulty of drawing strong empirical connections, extant data about contractor, draftees and draft-induced volunteers permit reasonable, if preliminary, conclusions about the effects of the draft on wartime contracting. The argument here suggests that the presence of the draft in the US had a delimiting effect on the number of contractors in Southeast Asia. Roles that could have been contracted out to private firms were instead assigned to uniformed troops, if not directly, then indirectly by alleviating manpower demands in areas of construction and facilities engineering. The result was an allocation of manpower that permitted placing draftees in high attrition roles like combat and front line duties. It is impossible to know how draft-induced personnel were allocated though it
can be reasonably assumed that they comprised a significant proportion of active forces in the Vietnam War and had a similar effect on contracting.

Counterfactuals in this case – asking what would have happened if there had been no draft or if the US had relied more heavily on contractors – could, in theory, shed light on an important dimension of draftees and contractors. But a counterfactual is largely out of the question in this particular case. Fundamentally, expansion of market-based military labour was not an option and beyond the “horizon of possibility of historical actors” at the time (Bunzl 2004). The notion of contracting out military activities even further was beyond the horizon of political economic possibility in the 1960s. Free market solutions to military manpower problems were inconsistent with the prevailing assumptions of either military, Department of Defense or White House policy makers during the Vietnam era. These actors viewed the draft as a mechanism of realizing national security, social redistribution and remediation, or both. Thus, a political economic context in which greater contracting was possible was anathema to the political economic paradigm of the era. It would take a concerted push from figures outside of mainstream policy discourse to undermine the welfarist and statist paradigm of manpower procurement in the United States. The transition from the draft to a market-based All-Volunteer Force and eventually to the programmatic outsourcing of military functions will be discussed at length in chapter six. For now, the discussion turns to the type of political economy in which the American draft was embedded and from which its assumptions and objectives were derived.

IV. Statist Political Economy as Background Context

This brings the inquiry to the antecedent condition of the draft. In a broad sense, the type of political economy that was predominant in the US between 1945 and 1973 was a necessary
condition for the Vietnam-era draft. In a causal sense, the political economy in which the Selective Service System was embedded provides indispensable context to the draft, without which the institutional scope of the Selective Service regime cannot be properly understood.

Essentially, the national political economy during the era permitted centralized, statist and highly paternalistic solutions for the delivery of public service, in this case military security. Concomitantly, market solutions for public service delivery were largely outside of the prevailing paradigm of public management. Alternatively called the Keynesian era, the period of Atlantic Fordism, even the “golden era” of capitalism, the two decades after World War II were distinctive for the role that the state played in the economic life of national polities. To a significant degree, this is also the case in the US where the prevailing political economic sentiments “enshrined the government’s role in American life and legitimized government activism” (Jones 2012: 26). Centralized and state directed delivery of public services was a norm carried over from the New Deal era in the 1930s and wartime mobilization in the 1940s. What to call this period in political economic history is problematic and largely a matter of intellectual orientation. This chapter need not be concerned with the nomenclature. What is more important is marking analytical distinctions between the political economy of this era in the US, and the neoliberal era that followed.

The political economic era in which the Vietnam War was prosecuted was characterized by the centrality of the state in delivering public service, including military security. Simply put, the statism of the period permitted the use of the draft as a non-market way of raising military labour. In the US, a statist political economy served as the ideational context and institutional configurations in which the draft was normalized. Practices of statist political economy like interventionism and more-or-less benign paternalism also provided increasingly non-military
justifications for the draft. Into the 1960s, the Selective Service evolved into something more than a mechanism for raising an armed force. It became a mechanism for carrying out social programs that were often deliberate policy initiatives emanating from the highest echelons of policy-making in the US. It was also couched in a broader philosophy of social rehabilitation in the tradition of the New Deal and, especially the Great Society vision of Lyndon Johnson. As will be discussed below, the Selective Service regime was used as an opportunity for the US to pursue additional social and economy goals including building better citizens, alleviating poverty and providing social remediation, and channeling men into preferred sectors of the economy.

The “guns and butter” imperatives of the Vietnam era, most notably during the Johnson presidency, embodied the dual role of the state. At once the state sought to secure its national interests overseas and engage in social engineering at home. In this context, the draft came to be used as a tool for doing both at the same time.

The Political Economy of the Vietnam Era

In order to make this argument it is necessary to posit a theoretical conception of the state during the era. Bob Jessop’s (2002) conception of the Keynesian Welfare Nationalist State serves as a propitious way of articulating the character of the military during post-World War II period. Typically, critical political economic analyses of the capitalist state are richly textured and part of a long intellectual dialogue and Jessop’s theory is no exception (see Jessop and Sum 2006 for an extensive review of the literature). The intention here is not to be as systematic in the analysis as Jessop’s theory would entail, nor to provide a detailed treatment as was given to neoliberalism in chapter two. In the interest of brevity, the use of KWNS is intended to be far less holistic than the Jessop intended. So for the purposes of this discussion, the “S” part is abstracted from the
other dimensions. This section will only discuss the role of the state in his formulation while recognizing the holistic complexity of his conceptualization.

In *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Jessop identifies the statism of post-war industrial economies insofar as state institutions (on different levels) were the chief complement to market forces in the Fordist accumulation regime and also had a dominant role in the institutions of civil society. Thus it was the “mixed economy” that provided the centre of gravity for economic, social and political regulation. To the extent that markets failed to deliver the expected values of economic growth, balanced regional development inside national borders, full employment, low inflation, a sustainable trade balance, and a socially just distribution of wealth and income, the state was called on to compensate for these failures and to generalize prosperity to all its citizens (Jessop 2002: 61).

There is an analogy in Phil Cerny’s conception of the mid-twentieth century industrial welfare state, discussed in chapter two. This variant “dealt with market failure by taking economic activities out of the market and replacing them with national command hierarchies oriented towards social goals and productionism, what is often called “decommodification” (Cerny 2010b). This concept should be expanded to include the economic and security realms of state activity. Under the statist conception, the state delivers public services, including military security, in a centralized way.

The point here is that the state is, among other things, an institutional framework for capitalist accumulation, a point that Marxists have long theorized (Barrow 2002; Jessop 1990). The state is also an institutional framework for providing security from external threats, a point that is central to realist and liberal theories of International Relations. Of course, the institutional configuration of capitalist accumulation and military security co-exist within the complex assemblage of the state. Analytically, what exists is an opportunity to observe the interpenetrations of market and military logic within the institutional configuration of the advanced capitalist state. Accepting that these two ideational logics are interrelated opens the
field to an analysis of how the prevailing political economy of the era influences the institutional configuration of the military sector. It is not a far-fetched claim. There is a rich literature in IR theory that seeks to explain the effects of domestic variables on the security behaviours of states (Gray 2007; Desch 1998). Accepting that military planning takes place within a cultural and institutional context, it is logical to propose that the nature of planning for war is likewise conditioned by the political economy of an era. Chapter six discusses the evolution of the US military sector as a result of influential neoliberal ideas about service delivery and institutional reformation. This section situates the Vietnam-era institutional configuration of the US military in the broader statist political economy of the age.

In place almost continuously since 1940, the Selective Service was grounded in the assumption that the state can coerce individuals into military service. It was a product of a period of national emergency (1917, 1940, and 1948) and in a basic sense it was an act of state resource extraction (Tilly 1985). Throughout the Vietnam War there was a great deal of discussion in policy circles about the iniquities manifested in the Selective Service System but until 1968, there was no serious talk about abolishing of the draft. Instead, most policy debate addressed ways of fixing the draft to make it more equitable. Some sought to make it more socially constructive through an expansion of the draft to civilian national service or to use the draft as a tool of social retraining and remediation (Chambers 1987). But for the most part, the statist imperatives of the draft were not challenged. This is symptomatic of the received wisdom of the age, where statism, national security and top-down national planning were ordinary features of political economic life (see Janowitz 1982; Mead 1982; Johnson 1975; Truman 1975; Marshall Commission 1968 for perspectives on the sociological function of the draft within the post-World War II political economy).
Building Better Citizens

During the Vietnam War, the draft was viewed as both a manpower procurement solution as well as a tool for social improvement. The idea of a military draft with social side benefits was not new and traced back to the first few years after World War I. In 1920, American military officers made the case for Universal Military Training (UMT), mandatory basic training for all qualified men. To them, UMT was more than a manpower solution. It was also “more or less universal panacea for all the social ills which beset them. According to the 1920 National Defense Act, it would strengthen national unity, promote the amalgamation of ethnic groups, and encourage democracy and tolerance. It would be physically beneficial and would virtually eliminate illiteracy in the US” (quoted in Cohen 1985: 158). After the Second World War, the United States faced the prospects of maintaining a large standing army in peacetime. To staff the post-war military, President Harry Truman made seventeen different requests to Congress to adopt a UMT regime (Friedberg 2000). Under this conception of military service, the country would be able to develop a pool of labour with basic military training as well as a more robust citizenry.

For Truman and his allies in this endeavour, mandatory service to the country was both a civic and a moral virtue. His 1947 proposal for UMT was the most substantive. For eighteen year old males, military training would provide basic training but would also emphasize “moral welfare” and “character guidance.” To its critics, however, the plan was only a partial solution to the new American mission the post-war world. To them it remained an unsatisfactory compromise between manpower needs and social improvement (Cohen 1985). Clearly not winning over the military, Truman’s justifications for universal training turned to the virtues of citizenship to make his case. In his memoirs, Truman reflected on the sentiment behind his civic
dimension of universal training. UMT, he believed, gave “young people a background in the
disciplinary approach of getting along with one another, informing them of their physical
makeup, and what it means to take care of this Temple which God gave us” (quoted in Cohen
1985: 158). He goes on to say that if these personal virtues are properly instilled, “and then instill
into them a responsibility which begins in the township, in the city ward, the first thing you
know we will have sold our Republic to the coming generations as Madison and Hamilton and
Jefferson sold it in the first place” (quoted in Friedberg 2000: 165).

One of Truman’s allies reflected this sentiment insisting that the civic virtue of military
training “brings a man into contact with his fellows solely upon the basis of fellow-citizenship.
For the time, at least, the differences of wealth, education, locality, taste, occupation and social
rank, which divide Americans as effectively as though they lived on different continents or in
different centuries, are lost sight of. Men are brought face to face with the elemental fact of
nationality” (quoted in Cohen 1985: 122). Ironically, detractors of the civic justification assailed
military training as a road to individualized debasement. Early exposure to the military, they
said, would introduce young men to drinking, gambling, prostitution and would undermine the
principles of free labour. For all the civic virtue of Truman’s claims, they saw universal military
training as decidedly un-American (Friedberg 2000: 162). Ultimately, UMT proposals were
never enacted and when the draft was reinstated in 1948, it was again modelled on the Selective
Service System. Though the social imperatives of the UMT were insufficient to sway either the
military or the general population, they were too tantalizing for politicians during the Vietnam
era to ignore.
Social Remediation

Into the 1960s, the Selective Service draft represented an opportunity to carry out broader social programs associated with the Great Society programs. Chief among these programs was social remediation. Here, the military acted as a tool of social uplift through poverty alleviation and elementary job training for men that would otherwise be rejected by the armed forces. In this way, military manpower policy was treated as an opportunity to pursue Johnson’s War on Poverty program. For much of the 1950s after the Korean War, the Selective Service was a fact of life for all American males though actual draft calls affected a small proportion of the eligible population. By 1961, the biggest problem facing the Selective Service was an overabundance of eligible men which the military could not absorb, and needed to be deferred. Before the public turned against the Vietnam War, the draft was seen more or less favourably by the general population. So to maximize the potential of an underutilized manpower mechanism with public support, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations used to draft to promote a social agenda (Flynn 1993).

In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed an idea for a program designed to enroll 20,000 otherwise unqualified men in the military. Developed alongside the president, the military – more specifically, the Army – would give disadvantaged draft-age men employment, vocational training and discipline that could serve them well in the job market once their military service ended. The Special Training and Enlistment Program (STEP) would have recruits spend six months receiving special instruction and various remedial training to overcome educational and physical deficiencies. During the fourteen weeks of basic combat training, trainees would receive four hours of general educational instruction. This was followed by eight additional weeks of advanced individual training, at which time the Army would select viable
candidates to serve out the rest of the three year enlistment period (Drea 2011). Pentagon officials snidely ridiculed McNamara’s idea for “moron camps,” and Congress was equally ungenerous. The 1966 and 1967 Defense budgets made explicit prohibitions on the funding of STEP. While some legislators rejected the program as a superfluous function of a military fighting a war, others were loath to see large numbers of African American men, mostly from the old Confederacy, receiving taxpayer-funded remedial advantages.

Unable to fund the remedial training, in 1966 McNamara turned to a program used in the Marine Corps that needed no additional dollars but could achieve the same goals. The Marine program used a regime of repetitive training and special remedial efforts to convert low aptitude men bound for rejection into viable soldiers. Thus was born McNamara’s Project 100,000; a program designed to recover thousands of men rejected by the military on physical or mental grounds and provide them with the training necessary for successful military and, later, civilian careers. The long-term benefits in civilian life figured prominently in the administration’s justification of the program. Lyndon Johnson spoke of intensive on-the-job training that would enable unqualified men to “live fuller and more productive lives” (Johnson 1975: 535).

McNamara presumed that young men rejected by the military would face the same problems in the civilian labour force. So, the military would teach marketable skills, discipline and self-confidence with the ancillary effects of lowering unemployment, increasing earning potential and making them eligible for veterans’ benefits (Segal 1989).

Beginning in 1967, the military would invite 40,000 previously disqualified men back to the armed services, and thereafter accept 100,000 men per year. Of the 246,000 “New Standards Men” to go through the program in its first three years, about 53 percent were volunteers and half of those entered the Army or Marine Corps. Approximately 41 percent of the New Standards
Men were African American, predominantly poor and with limited education, in fact, 92 percent were accepted to serve in the military because they satisfied the newly lowered mental standards. Between 1966 and 1969, the New Standards Men constituted 10.7 percent of all accessions to enlisted ranks. Indeed, the armed services chafed at the idea of spending the time and money training men with lower aptitudes on expensive equipment. Thus, 37 percent ended up in combat positions – a disproportionately high figure compared to 23 percent of all military personnel serving in combat positions (Drea 2011: 288; Flynn 1993: 209). Those that did not serve in combat, were assigned to unskilled military labour. Either way, combat training and unskilled labour experience were not particularly applicable in the civilian labour force (Segal 1989)

Salvaging these New Standards Men did not arise primarily from pressing manpower needs (Drea 2011). After all, there was no shortage of young men of draft age in the US in the 1960s, though the Selective Service boards found it increasingly difficult to meet their 35,000 per month quotas. In this sense, Project 100,000 synthesized social and military objectives into a single program. However, it was only really portrayed as a social initiative. In public statements, McNamara spoke of military service and Project 100,000 as a path to respectability in civilian life for poor, disadvantaged and delinquent young men. In one statement, the paternalism is on full display. “The poor of America,” he said, “can be given an opportunity to serve in their country’s defence and they can be given an opportunity to return to civilian life with skills and attitudes which…will reverse the downward spiral of human decay” (Flynn 1993: 209). By March 1971, the project was being phased out and despite the lofty goals, Project 100,000 was a general failure. New Standards Men were designated as military delinquents and deserters in disproportionate numbers (Segal 1989). In the mid-1980s, a small survey sample of 311 Project
100,000 veterans reported that most were no better off or were worse off than civilians who had not served in the military (Drea 2011: 271).

Channeling

Building better citizens and alleviating the distributive injustices of poverty and racism in the US made sense within the context of the Kennedy and Johnson domestic agendas. More broadly though, the draft was used quite deliberately as a way of directing American labour power into preferred sectors of the economy. Between the end of Korean War and the Americanization phase of the war in Vietnam, the biggest problem faced by the Selective Service was an increasing number of deferments made as a result of a growing pool of eligible men. More deferments meant more grounds for public grievance regarding fairness. These grievances, however, would not undermine the system until the US was deeply involved in Southeast Asia. In the meantime, the military used the process of “channeling” to guide young men into targeted professions deemed vital to the national interest. Individuals would receive deferments from military service such that service to the country would be undertaken through alternative, often non-military avenues. Paternity deferments, it was argued, strengthened the American family; student deferments incentivized young men to go to college; others were indirectly guided into scientific fields thought to have economic or military payoff. Generally, “channeling” was indifferently received by the public. Few lives were adversely disrupted and political attempts to end the peacetime draft by Adlai Stevenson in 1956 and Barry Goldwater in 1964 fizzled.

Channeling was recognized as an early strategy for developing a national labour pool of skilled workers. In 1946, amidst the debate on draft renewal, the American Council on Education argued that draft deferments could be leveraged to boost enrollments in scientific fields deemed necessary to national security and prosperity. With the reinstitution of the Selective Service, draft
deferments were used to “channel” men into specialized scientific and technical fields. As George Flynn (1993: 107) says “[m]anpower experts rejoiced at this victory of scientific management over romantic concepts of equity and individual equality.” Channeling during the Korean War proved to be an effective way of raising a labour pool of physicians, dentists and veterinarians that could then be inducted into the military. After 1953, with the immediate need for troops abating, the Selective Service occupational deferments were used to guide individuals with scientific and mathematical aptitude into areas that would be beneficial to US weapons production (Segal 1989: 33). By 1960, channeling was being used as both an economic inducement towards preferred employment, and as a way of deterring bad behaviour among registrants. Local draft boards retained and utilized the power to fast-track the induction of men labelled “delinquents” for whatever transgressions they committed as civilians. In the words of General Lewis Hershey, director of the Selective Service, channeling by declining to induce men working in certain fields is actually a form of procurement by inducement of “manpower for civilian activities which are manifestly in the national interest” (Selective Service System 1980: 474).

As the American war in Vietnam escalated, the draft became a focal point of dissent and discontentment. In addition to perceptions of the class and race-based iniquities, many reacted to the type of attitude expressed in a 1965 memorandum drafted by the Selective Service Office. Hershey provided a metaphor for the channeling system that betrayed its paternalism. “From an individual’s viewpoint,” he said, “he is standing in a room which has been made uncomfortably warm. Several doors are open, but they all lead to various forms of recognized, patriotic service to the nation. Some accept the alternatives gladly – some with reluctance. The consequence is approximately the same” (Selective Service System 1980).
Couched in the language of choice, Hershey continues with a justification of channeling that is less about individual liberty as it is about producing and reproducing desired behaviours among young American men.

It is in this atmosphere that the young man registers at age eighteen and pressure begins to force his choice. He does not have the inhibitions that a philosophy of universal service in uniform would engender. The door is open for him as a student to qualify if capable in a skill needed by his nation. He has many choices and he is prodded to make a decision.

The psychological effect of this circumstantial climate depends on the individual, his sense of good citizenship, his love of country and its way of life. He can obtain a sense of well-being and satisfaction that he is doing as a civilian what will help his country most. This process encourages him to put forth his best effort and removes to some degree the stigma that has been attached to being out of uniform.

In the less patriotic and more selfish individual, it engenders a sense of fear, uncertainty, and dissatisfaction which motivates him, nevertheless, in the same direction. He complains of the uncertainty which he must endure; he would like to be able to do as he pleases; he would appreciate a certain future with no prospect of military service or civilian contribution, but he complies with the need of the national health, safety, or interest – or he is denied deferment (Selective Service System 1980).

Take note of the terms justifying the two methods of raising an armed force. Between Hershey, McNamara, Johnson and Truman, the language of choice was steeped in state-directed engineering of both the military and society. They shared a paradigmatic view of the role of the state in political economic life whereby the state institutions are used to compensate for unjust distributions of social resources and opportunity.

When the Selective Service was due for its quadrennial review in 1967, the system faced the prospects of a contested extension. In each of the four review periods since 1948, the draft had been extended without controversy. This time, however, growing public aversion to the war and the draft led Johnson to strike a commission to investigate ways of ameliorating the iniquities arising from widespread and selective deferments. The Marshall Commission’s status quo oriented approach was symptomatic of paradigmatic thinking: assumptions associated with the existing ideational framework of the Keynesian National Welfare State were upheld and
barely questioned. The Marshall Commission recommended the continuation of a system based on selective service, rather than revert to universal or all-volunteer service. Reforms were put forward, including the consolidation of the system under centralized administration, which included limiting the discretionary powers of local boards (Marshall Commission 1968). Indeed, the twelve major recommendations were, in essence, measures to reform, rather than overhaul the military manpower procurement system.

But by 1968, piecemeal reform was increasingly untenable. The draft was under increased scrutiny and the Tet Offensive drained the last reserves of public faith in victory. Clearly, political talk of progress in Vietnam was illusory and public opinion was rapidly turning against the war. In the presidential campaign, abolition of the draft in its entirety had been adopted by Richard Nixon as part of his platform. He and other critics of the Selective Service argued that an all-volunteer force had been the norm for the majority of American history and was more consistent with the republican vision of the citizen. What is notable is that voices of radical change only emerged from outside of the established loci of authority including leftist peace activists, libertarians and University of Chicago economists. It was the arguments of the latter that ended up winning the debate. Their justifications for abolition of the draft rested upon the normative foundations of free choice, free labour and labour competition – values that reconcile the uneasy coexistence of a military in a free society. What is more, proponents of volunteerism supported their claims with liberal economic arguments about individual choice and taxes-in-kind, and dispensed entirely with the social welfare functions that had swayed presidential administrations from Truman to Johnson. It appeared that by 1970, the paternalistic intentions of using military service as a method of civic education, social remediation and labour
market engineering was coming to an end. Like the Keynesian Welfare National State paradigm itself, the draft as a military and social policy, was being eroded by its own contradictions.

**Conclusion**

This chapter makes three major interrelated arguments. First, it locates the determining role of technical need in the US to turn to contractors during the Vietnam War. It picks up on the historical exposition of chapter two and argues that the presence of contractors in Vietnam arose from the need for technical expertise that did not reside within the military, as with radio technicians, or other labour that would be inefficient uses of trained soldiers. This is an important historical determinant to acknowledge, but it is equally important to recognize that it, alone, does not have explanatory leverage over the overarching research question. So, despite a technical need for contracted labour, the chapter must account for the relatively low ratio of contractors to uniformed troops during the Vietnam War compared with the post-September 11 wars four decades later. To answer this question, the preceding discussion argued two additional points that turn on two crucial considerations: the broader political economy and the system of raising military manpower. First, it suggests that the presence of contractors was kept at a relatively low level because of the draft regime in place during the Vietnam War. Second, it argues that the Selective Service System was embedded in the wider political economic context of post-World War II America. By using the logic of historical sequencing this chapter also suggest that the draft was a more proximate determinant of the scale and scope of contracting, while the broader political economy acts as a critical contextualizing factor. These two determinants of the scale and scope of military contracting serve an important point of comparison to military contracting in the post-September 11 wars. In the next two chapters, attention will be turned to the post-draft
regime and neoliberal political economy and how they altered the conditions of military organization with profound implications on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Indeed, citizen-building and channeling policies stand in stark contrast to its successor system. The All-Volunteer Force, adopted in 1973, was a major shift for the military, upending assumptions that had been in place almost consistently since 1940. Moreover, the transition from a coercive to market-model of military labour was a crucial institutional moment which introduced the logic of the market into military manpower decisions. Over time, the market logic of military labour would gain greater currency in decision-making within the Department of Defense. The next logical steps, as chapter six discusses, would be to seek more market solutions to Defense procurement problems. Through the 1980 and 1990s, this new way of thinking was furnished with a new political economic context. A neoliberal ideational framework that gradually supplanted the Keynesian statist paradigm would come to validate the deepening integration of market logic into the national defence. By the time the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were well underway, the private sector was participating at an unprecedented rate. How and why this historical change occurred is the subject of chapters five and six.
Chapter 4
Assessing the Causes of post-September 11 Contracting: A Critique

Having compared contracting in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, and having explained the relatively low proportion of contractors to troops in Vietnam, it is now possible to address the central question: what caused the significant increase in the use of contractors as part of the US total force in Iraq and Afghanistan? Recall the graph from the opening pages of chapter one. Contractors made up an average of 10 percent of the American total force in Vietnam between 1963 and 1971. In Iraq and Afghanistan, this figure stands at about 53 percent. The discrepancy is striking, especially given the broad similarities between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. But so far in this inquiry, the question about why this happened has not yet been answered.

Fortunately, there is no shortage of possible responses, many of which are associated with the global political conditions in the 1990s. As the literature on the private military industry developed, many potential causes were put forth in order to explain the rise of this unusual sector. But there are considerable limitations to these explanations. First and foremost, explanations about the rise of the private military industry itself, which will be explored in this chapter, are woefully overdetermined. It is common to see scholars identify multiple historical events and developments interacting at once in a sort of bundle of causation. Unfortunately, there is not much distinction between the relative significance of possible causes, nor is there much discussion of spurious relationships. Within the context of the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars, overdetermination is even more confounding. Explanations of the industry’s emergence in general do not necessarily explain the post-September 11 dynamics of US military contracting in particular. This is the problem the next two chapters seek to resolve, aiming for greater empirical specificity and analytical rigour over previous explanations. The
explanations that will be posited are more rigorous because they assess causes within the logic of necessary and specific conditions, and they are more specific because they directly address causes of the historically distinct scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars.

As established in chapter three, there are notable qualitative, if not quantitative, similarities between the American uses of contracting in Vietnam and the post-September 11 wars. If these conflicts share important features as major post-World War II military operations, what accounts for the quantitative difference in the contractor footprint? The answer is twofold: military neoliberalization in the US armed forces and the transition from a mixed volunteer and draftee force to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). However these two factors did not act alone, nor do they act with equal significance. While both are necessary conditions for the outcome in question, military neoliberalization was of primary historical significance and should be regarded as such. The AVF, while necessary for the outcome in question and for military neoliberalization itself, is also necessary but its significance is of secondary importance. These factors will be explored at length in the chapter six.

The present discussion paves the way for these arguments. It takes prominent explanations of the rise of the industry in the 1990s and assesses their analytical leverage over the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars. By evaluating these determinants in a new temporal context, it is possible to discern which explanations have greater analytical leverage over the research puzzle. It finds that competing structural, institutional and ideational explanations of the private military industry’s rise offer surprisingly little insight into the scale and scope of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. But before they are jettisoned, it is important the bear in mind that these competing explanations cannot be fully precluded from a complete explanation of contracting in the post-September 11 wars. As will be discussed, some
factors act upon the outcomes tangentially, often in trivial or insignificant ways. This does not render them irrelevant but it does allow for a relative assessment of explanatory leverage. Ultimately these competing explanations should provide explanatory context to the predominant causes: military neoliberalization and the All-Volunteer Force. To arrive at this explanatory ranking, this chapter assesses the relevance of competing explanations through the logic of necessary and sufficient conditions. With this part of the question settled chapter six proceeds to drill deeper into the historical determinants of post-September 11 contracting by elucidating the sequence and processes by which they unfolded.

The Many Causes of the Private Military Industry’s Emergence

Scholarly research on the emergence of the private military industry is a prime example of overdetermination. The literature is awash in causal explanations but little to help differentiate between the causal pathways. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the private military industry became the subject of study after the dramatic exploits of Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Angola and Sierra Leone and MPRI in Croatia (Singer 2001-2002; Howe 1998; Shearer 1998; Zarate 1998). What had been largely a peripheral curiosity in the novel milieu of post-Cold War globalization was thrust to the fore by the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The result was a flurry of publications scrambling to explain the reasons for this phenomenon with reference to many competing factors that were never suitably disentangled. This is unfortunate because the causes of the industry’s emergence provide useful clues for explaining the particular dynamics of military contracting in the post-September 11 wars.

This section reconstructs commonly cited explanations of military privatization as a prelude to narrowing and parsing in the subsequent section. Now, as noted above, the claims
discussed here are well-established in the literature and should come as no surprise to close observers, nor should they be particularly counter-intuitive for readers new to the topic. The problem with the literature on the private military industry in this regard is that it has produced many plausible causal claims but no way of establishing which ones should be accorded greater weight. This is crucial to answering the question that frames this inquiry.

Many of the arguments for the rise of the private military industry explain its emergence as the result of post-Cold War structural changes. Others point to ideological or institutional factors. Some frame the causes as market supply and demand forces (which implicitly say that “the market” is the cause at a higher level of abstraction). Some explanations aim to explain the rise of the industry at a regional level, especially in Africa. Other approaches provide a list of causes without context. The multiple approaches to presenting more or less the same causal mechanisms are symptomatic of what ails the general debate: that there is no common framework in which the causes are explained. Borrowing the imagery from Craig Parsons (2007), the causes discussed here are “mapped” along the lines of structural, institutional and ideational explanations. Parsons defines these logics of explanation in specific ways and while it is not necessary to adopt his definitions wholesale, the overarching premise of each is a useful way of organizing the competing explanations of military privatization. Structural claims explain human action as a function of agents’ positions within exogenously given material structures. Institutional claims explain agent behaviour as a function of position within formal or informal organizations and rules. Ideational claims seek to explain agent behaviour as a function of cognitive and/or affective elements that organize thinking (Parsons 2007: 12). The multiple causes are summarized in a table at the end of the chapter.

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1 Parsons also includes psychological claims in his map but this form of explanation is not relevant here.
I. Structural Explanations

The end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization are the primary structural explanations for the rise of the private military industry cited by scholars. Both explanations have great currency in the literature and both have important ancillary effects.

i. The end of the Cold War

A popular trend in the literature is often point to the end of the Cold War as a key causal factor in the emergence of the private military industry (Shreier and Caparini 2005; Holmqvist 2005; Singer 2003; Mandel 2002; Nossal 2001; Aning 2001). The argument here is that the end of bipolarity altered the material threat environment in which state and non-state security actors operated, leaving room for private military firms to find a market niche. This was, of course, a profound change in the structure of world politics. The bipolar nature of the international system since the end of World War II organized the foreign policies of most states, requiring (or compelling, depending on your perspective) states to define their allegiances to the United States or the Soviet Union. Even for states that resisted – the non-aligned or otherwise peripheral states – Cold War competition between the superpowers influenced domestic political dynamics. The civil war in Angola during the 1970s or the statecraft of Egypt’s Abdel Nasser, not to mention the many proxy wars are only a few examples of the depth to which the structural conditions of the Cold War shaped political behaviour.

Change in the global threat environment after the Cold War altered the calculus of superpower intervention in foreign conflicts. When referring to the structural effects of the end of the Cold War on the private military industry, most scholars make the point that this resulted in a form of “superpower disengagement” or “Great Power reticence” According to Peter W. Singer, there was a diminishing willingness to intervene in the “released conflicts” of the post-
Cold War period characterized by weak local state capabilities and intractable ethnic conflict. The remaining superpower that had once viewed states on the periphery of the international system as a strategic battleground and intervened as patrons of these client states changed its stance. For the United States, a commitment to peripheral conflicts no longer had the same geopolitical significance. At the same time, observers anticipated that the UN would assume stabilization roles that the US and Soviet Union once performed in weak states. But, the UN experienced a considerable reduction in the number of peacekeepers in the field. From a force of 82,000 in 1993, peacekeeping force levels shrunk to 8,000 in 1995 and to 1,000 in 1999 (Singer 2003). In to this vacuum, it is argued, rushed the private sector

Statistically speaking, the end of the Cold War marks a period of increased armed conflicts. Many attribute the increase in these “released conflicts” to the loss of Soviet or US patrons as guarantors of regime stability. Threatened by their new vulnerability, weak regimes turned to the private sector to fill the spot vacated by the superpowers. Figures on the number and type of armed conflicts illustrate the market opportunity for the private military industry which found willing buyers for their services in the early 1990s. As the figure below indicates, there was a considerable spike in the number of conflicts in the early 1990s, predominantly in Africa and Asia.²

² Internal, Interstate, Internationalized and Extrasystemic conflicts have particular definitions for the data set used. Internal armed conflicts are conflicts between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states. Internationalized internal armed conflict is similar to internal conflicts except that there is intervention from other states on one or both sides. Interstate armed conflicts occur between two or more states. Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory, notably colonial and imperial war (Themnér 2012: 8).
Moreover, the types of conflict that broke out in the early post-Cold War era were predominantly internal conflicts rather than interstate conflicts. With regard to the rise of the private military industry, the explanatory logic usually unfolds as follows: there was an increase in conflicts whereby the traditional guarantors of security were no longer interested or able to intervene. This represented a market opportunity for private military service companies to fill a vacuum left by the US and Soviet Union. Moreover, where a state government was fighting an internal conflict against a revisionist insurgency, private companies were given political and legal cover by working for ostensibly “legitimate” state clients who were seeking institutional stability.
Moreover, the types of conflict that broke out in the early 1990s were predominantly internal in nature. Given the diminished UN presence and supposed reticence of the Great Powers, governments fighting insurgencies now turned to the private firms. This was the case in Angola and Sierra Leone where two of the archetypal military firms Executive Outcomes and Sandline, carried out their most famous contracts. Similar executive and advisory contracts were carried out by these firms in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia and Congo. The case of Papua New Guinea is also illustrative of this point. There, a 1997 rebellion in Bougainville prompted Prime Minister Julius Chan to turn to Australia, PNG’s traditional patron, for support. According to Chan, his requests were “consistently declined,” and so he turned to Sandline to provide material and intelligence support for the PNG Defence Forces. When the $36 million

Figure 4.2 source: Themnér and Wallensteen (2013)
contract became public knowledge in PNG, demonstrations in the capital escalated into rioting. The Chan government, which had contracted Sandline without parliamentary approval, cancelled the deal and stepped down (Singer 2003: 193-196). In short, as a cause of the industry’s emergence, weak state structures in the developing world created a demand for security services that domestic security agencies could not fulfil (Spear 2006; Schreier and Caparini 2005; Wulf 2005; Nossal 2001; Nossal 1998).


Of course, the policies driving these interventions served multiple objectives. In many cases, these operations were undertaken to protect embassies and citizens, as part of
humanitarian or policing missions but they were “engagements” nonetheless. Even post-Soviet Russia maintained a foreign interest in the early 1990s. While post-Soviet Russia no longer had the wherewithal to project its influence, military or ideological, around the world as it once did, it did maintain a particular interest in maintaining influence in its “near abroad.” The 1994-1996 war in Chechnya is perhaps the prime example of Russia asserting its power in the early post-Cold War period. What occurred after the Cold War was less a case of “superpower disengagement” but a different kind of engagement with different priorities shaped, in part, by the structural conditions of unipolarity.

The argument in the literature about post-Cold War “disengagement” holds that without the US or Soviet Union prepared to provide a security guarantee against instability, weak state leaders had to turn to the private sector to bolster their regimes. This assertion is particularly relevant in the context of sub-Saharan Africa where the most dramatic and well-publicized instances of private military operations took place. What had once been an important strategic battleground now faced the declining interest on the part of US and the disappearance of the Soviet Union (Lock 1999). This had the effect of “loosening the disciplines that the Soviet-US rivalry had imposed on local conflicts around the world, allowing other actors a deeper involvement than might have been the case during the Cold War” (Nossal 2001: 473). In essence, weak states in sub-Saharan Africa lost their patrons and turned to the private sector to fill the security vacuum (Singer 2003; Mandel 2002). The structural claim that changes after the Cold War facilitated the rise of the industry because of “disengagement” by the US is important but ultimately it is rather imprecise.

It is plausible, however, that the structural changes in the threat environment after the Cold War provided necessary conditions for the industry’s emergence. But this explanation
cannot be taken very far. Military contracting occurred during the Vietnam War, as well as the Korean War, both of which were Cold War conflicts. Similarly, contractors were deployed to the Balkans in the early post-Cold War era between 1995 and 2000 as part of the US participation in the NATO missions in Bosnia. This suggests that the presence or absence of the Cold War threat environment did not have an effect on the presence or absence of military contracting as part of US overseas operations. Thus, structural conditions of the Cold War threat environment are not necessary conditions of military contracting as part of the US force deployments. There also does not appear to be any necessary relationship between the post-Cold War threat environment and military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, this is not to suggest that the end of the Cold War had no effect at all. There are important implications, discussed momentarily, of the early post-Cold War era that influenced the private military industry but their relationship to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan is dubious.

By the start of the new millennium, the US had long since settled into the structural conditions of unipolarity. If anything, the threat environment precipitated by the War on Terrorism created structural conditions for US adventurism that are more relevant for an explanation of military contracting. By extension, the so-called Great Power disengagement of the early post-Cold War era is *prima facie* not a condition of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Quite the contrary, the post-September 11 wars are stark cases of Great Power engagement which turns the argument about the industry in the 1990s on its head. In a sense, it was the redoubling of American engagement with the world brought on by the new War on Terrorism that created favourable market conditions for industry growth.
ii. Globalization

The second structural condition that facilitated the rise of the private military industry was the pace and depth of global interactions. Of course, globalization is a widely contested concept whose definitions range from “the convergence of interest rates and stock market prices… [to]…a qualitatively new stage in the development of human society…” (Cerny 2010a: 25). For the private military industry, the effect of globalization and the concomitant technological advancements and new geopolitical openness precluded by the Cold War, was to ease the movement of goods, finances and people (Singer 2003; Aning 2001; Lock 1999; Nossal 1998). Globalization’s economic openness saw the increasing reach and commercial power of transnational corporations. This is particularly true of the extractive industry, which figured heavily in the early emergence of military firms in the 1990s. Globalization in this period enabled the accelerated penetration of transnational corporations into the political economies of developing countries through foreign direct investment (which was further enabled by neoliberal economic policies).

The archetypal military companies, Executive Outcomes and Sandline, demonstrate the extensive interrelationships between transnational extractive corporations and the private military industry. EO itself was officially a subsidiary of Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC), a South African holding company and venture capital firm. SRC itself had a close relationship with the London-based Branch-Heritage Group which had significant stake in mining and oil development around the world, including areas like Angola, where EO operated. Similarly, the military firm Sandline International, famous for its intervention in Sierra Leone, was legally incorporated in 1996 and held under the same SRC holding group (Singer 2003: ch. 7). This is not to point out a conspiracy to militarize the extractive industry, but rather to identify the
symbiotic relationship between the nascent military firms and transnational mining interests in the 1990s. In short, the globalization of the world economy permitted broader and deeper penetration of economic investment into developing countries which included firms with militarized subsidiaries. These trends have not abated and suggest that the symbiotic relationship between the extraction industry and the security industry will continue into the foreseeable future (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011).

Now, does the onset of post-Cold War globalization explain the nature of contracting in the post-September 11 wars? It does in the sense that globalization influences nearly all aspects of political and economic life. Indeed, there is little doubt that the effects of globalization had a pronounced effect on the rise of the industry in the early 1990s. But beyond the permissive structural influence, globalization provides little explanatory leverage over the scope and scale of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since it is both an outcome and process it is difficult to assess its independent effects on the nature of military contracting in the post-September 11 period. At best, it is possible to argue that globalization is probably a necessary condition of post-September 11 contracting in that the contractor workforce, corporate interests, financial flows and the sheer movement of goods associated with reconstruction in both countries are transnational in character. These are, no doubt, important dimensions of the post-September 11 wars but are rather banal, and in any event, were also present during the Vietnam War era. In the 1960s, the US moved millions of its citizens around the world to take on massive development projects in Southeast Asia, facilitated foreign direct investment, all through the movement of people, goods and finances. This does not suggest that “globalization” in the 1960s is the same as “globalization” in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but there are similar features. If globalization narrowly defined in terms of the movement of goods, people and money, then these
features are present in both cases thereby negating the explanatory leverage of globalization as an cause of post-September 11 contracting.

**iii. Ancillary effects of structural change: demobilization of troops and weapons**

Many scholars have identified two downstream effects of the structural changes that followed the end of the Cold War and globalization in the 1990s: the sudden supply of demobilized troops and weapons. Both effects stem from massive military downsizing in western armies which fell by 40 percent between 1985 and 1995 (Markusen 1999). First, the militaries of western states that had been sustained at high levels for decades were significantly reduced. The argument here is that, in a short period of time, skilled military personnel found themselves without employers in the public sector but with willing buyers in the private sector. Second, military downsizing rendered excess weapons stocks redundant and were subsequently sold on the global arms market. In the case of the former Soviet republics, the collapse of state militaries led to a flood of weapons available through unofficial channels. In either case, excess weaponry became widely available at relatively cheap prices, and access to them was facilitated by the new openness of the globalized economy. Demobilization of troops and weapons released a flood of skilled labour and materiel onto the market. This, in turn, provided a rich source of talent and tools from which private military firms could draw their capabilities (Krahmann 2010; Sheehy, Maogoto and Newell 2009; Spear 2006; Schreier and Caparini 2005; Holmqvist 2005; Singer 2003; Nossal 2001; Aning 2001; Lock 1999; Nossal 1998).

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, its arms stocks flooded the global marketplace through legal and illegal channels (Schmidele 2012; Fisk 2006: ch. 19). Former Soviet satellite states like Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, alongside organized crime syndicates, corrupt
military personnel and savvy arms dealers quickly acquired military stocks after the collapse of the Soviet bureaucracy. These arms were then trafficked in the billion-dollar global black market for military hardware. To give a sense of the scale of the post-Soviet arms bonanza, a Ukrainian parliamentary commission found that $32 billion worth of military weaponry had been stolen from that country alone between 1992 and 1998 (Musah 2002). East Germany was a particularly rich source of hardware in the early years of reunification. It was “essentially a huge yard sale of weaponry, where nearly every weapon in the East German arsenal was sold, most of it to private bidders at cut-rate prices” (Sheehy, Maogoto and Newell 2009: 15). These arms, it is important to remember, were not limited to light infantry weapons like assault rifles and rocket launchers. The new market could supply weaponry that would have otherwise been entirely unavailable during the Cold War like helicopter gunships, tanks and fighter aircraft (Singer 2003). Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to trace the lineage of this weaponry, the availability of aerial assault capability like the kind demonstrated by Sandline in Sierra Leone was likely sourced from post-Soviet arsenals. Less dramatically, the availability of demilitarized troop transport aircraft, and the personnel trained to operate this equipment made accessing remote conflict zones easier thereby expanding the market reach of private military firms (Lock 1999).

But how does the claim about a link between post-Cold War demobilization and the rise of the private military industry stand up? The claim that demobilization produced a large pool of labour for the private military industry is, indeed, plausible in the early post-Cold War context. But a closer look reveals some significant improbabilities. First and foremost, the size of the demobilization – as many as seven million ex-soldiers (Sheehy, Maogoto and Newell 2009) – does not align with the proportion to which the private military industry grew. The mere presence of seven million ex-soldiers on the market does not necessarily mean that they all
sought employment in the private military sector. In this sense, the figure of seven million trained and unemployed soldiers greatly overstates the case. Other estimates of demobilization are much smaller. Though it is impossible to measure the quantitative increase in private military personnel, the incidence of private military force being used in the 1990s is relatively small. And in the key cases – EO and Sandline in Angola and Sierra Leone – the industry’s major emergence coincides, not with worldwide demobilization, but with the demobilization of the South African Defence Forces. South Africa’s armed forces shrunk from 100,000 in 1989 to 75,000 in 1993. Executive Outcomes began its operations in the Angolan civil war. But it would be erroneous to draw causal conclusions from this particular correlation. After the formal end of Apartheid in 1994, the armed forces actually increased to 276,900 in 1995 and remained above 200,000 until the 1999 when it was reduced again to 1993 levels (International Institute for Security Studies 2010). This indicates that during the particular period when EO and Sandline operated (approximately 1993 to 2000), the South African military actually grew which calls into question the direct correlation between demobilization and the industry’s rise.

A brief survey of the composition of Executive Outcomes’ forces supports this more nuanced claim. EO’s Angola operations took place between 1993 and 1995 which began at the nadir of SADF troop strength. However, EO’s operations continued throughout the buildup of the South African military. EO continued to fight in Sierra Leone when the South African military numbered well over 200,000. The point here is that the general size of the SADF had little bearing on the activities of EO and suggests that the importance of demobilization is overstated. A more accurate claim is that the industry’s rise coincided with the disbanding of elite Apartheid-era units. These newly unemployed troops provided the manpower for Executive Outcomes. Ex-Special Forces troops from the South African Defense Forces ended up
constituting the officer corps of these military firms. The officer corps of EO and Sandline was drawn from the Apartheid-era units 32 Battalion, the South African Air Force, the SADF’s Reconnaissance Commandos, the elite 44 Parachute Brigade, and the South West Africa Police Counter Insurgency Unit (Fitzsimmons 2013a).

Further to the point that elite units comprised the fighting contingents of EO, there simply were not many individuals involved. In fact, the private fighting forces rarely exceeded a few hundred individuals. For instance, the contact between Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes (negotiated by Branch Energy) obligated EO to provide 150 to 200 soldiers, equipped with helicopter capabilities, to train and support the Sierra Leonean forces (Avant 2005). The contingent fielded by Executive Outcomes in Angola between 1993 and 1995 numbered only five hundred and fifty individuals. In 1997, only two hundred members of the White Legion fought, and lost, in the First Congo War (Fitzsimmons 2013a). Similarly, the other archetypal case, MPRI, was started by a handful of retired US generals that had occupied very high

Figure 4.3 source: International Institute for Security Studies (2010)
command positions (Zarate 1998: 104). The point here is that the mass of soldiers that supposedly flooded the market mostly reintegrated into civilian life and did not flock to the private military sector. The labour pool from which military firms drew their personnel were influenced less by the general demobilization and more by the disbanding of elite units (as was the case with the SADF) or by retiring high-ranking officers (as with MPRI). To his credit, in 1999, Peter Lock predicted that the private security industry could probably not absorb more than a small proportion of the worldwide oversupply of military professionals. With over a decade of hindsight, he appears to be correct.

But does the demobilization of militaries in the early 1990s have an effect on contractor contingents in the post-September 11 wars? No, and the first objection to such a claim is the simple passage of time. Iraq and Afghanistan did not occur until a decade after the end of post-Cold War demobilization, meaning that most of the demobilized would be past their prime and not necessarily suited to executive security tasks. Demobilized troops, particularly from disbanded elite units contributed to the pool of private military labour in the 1990s. But the bulk of armed security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are not drawn from the ranks of aging ex-military personnel in the West. In these cases, security guards are either local nationals or third country nationals, meaning that paramilitary firms are not drawing upon troops demobilized in the 1990s. Figures from Iraq and Afghanistan bear out this assertion. In Afghanistan, between 2007 and 2012, over 95 percent of all security contractors were local nationals, trained from the existing population, which means that they could not have been members of the demobilized cohort of the early 1990s (US CENTCOM 2013; Schwartz 2011).

Iraq tells a more complex story with regard to contractors performing executive security functions. There, third-country nationals comprise the vast majority of security contractors
(USCENTCOM 2012; Schwartz 2011). This is probably a function of concerns about insurgents attaining positions in the coalition security apparatus. Though there are no statistics indicating the precise national origins of third-country nationals, it is highly unlikely that they are members of the post-Cold War demobilized cohort; an improbability that increases over the life of the conflicts. In Iraq and Afghanistan US citizens make up a tiny contingent of security contractors in this time period numbering in the hundreds. These contractors are more likely to be drawn from the ranks of retired law enforcement officers or ex-soldiers than from the ranks of former Cold War soldiers finding new employment opportunities. Indeed, some may fit into this category but, again, it is highly improbable. Even under the assumption that these contractors were members of the demobilized cohort, their numbers are insignificant, numbering in the hundreds compared with the hundreds of thousands of total contractors working in these the two countries. In short, demobilized troops are, to a degree, important elements of the industry’s rise in the 1990s, but highly unlikely to be part of the post-September 11 contractor ranks.

II. Institutional Explanations

The second type of explanation relates to the institutional composition of western, and particularly the US armed forces. Two interrelated considerations are addressed here. The first is the elimination of the draft in the US. This required militaries to adapt to personnel challenges through the adoption of new operational doctrines. The second is the technological advancements of the Revolution in Military Affairs which required expertise that is well outside of the core competencies of the military. These two institutional changes have bearings on the way military contractors are incorporated into force structures and personnel decisions.
i. Professionalization

Post-Cold War downsizing was followed by professionalization of the armed forces (Schreier and Caparini 2005). During this time period, militaries faced demands from their civilian leaders to reduce costs and streamline bureaucratic structures. This meant that volunteer forces, particularly the US armed forces which had done away with the draft in 1973, faced pressures to reduce the absolute number of personnel in the ranks, but also to reorient doctrine towards risk management. Shifting in this direction entailed the development of lean, efficient and flexible force structures (Schreier and Caparini 2005: 3-4). With militaries paring down their sizes and operations – focusing on core competencies – private firms boasting military expertise provided governments in Europe and North America with an outsourcing opportunity that could sustain capabilities without increasing the size of the forces. There are at least two related consequences. The first, relating to the focus on core competencies, was a concomitant reticence to engage in low-intensity civil wars in far flung areas that were not well understood. For political decision-makers and western armies, whose core competencies were in fighting conventional interstate war, the ambiguities of the “new wars” were not particularly attractive (Shearer 1999). The second was growth in military demand for technical expertise that had been lost in post-Cold War downsizing. This had particular significance given the technological revolutions in the way western militaries operated.

The early post-Cold War era witnessed the successful professionalization of the military industry as well. Doing so was crucial to presenting themselves as viable and respectable security options to prospective clients and not as “corporate mercenaries.” Historically, this was not the first time freelance soldiers attempted to incorporate themselves into respectable business entities. In 1967, David Sterling, who established the Special Air Services (SAS) of the British
Army, founded a company called Watchguard (International) Inc. The company aimed to provide services to states in the Persian Gulf with former SAS officers. In the 1970s, John Banks founded Security Advisory Services with a not-so-subtle acronym to telegraph the pedigree of his employees to potential clients (Aning 2001). While these attempts at corporatizing the otherwise freelance soldier-of-fortune business failed, they are notable as early examples of attempts at mainstreaming a clandestine enterprise. For the new military firms of the 1990s, many seek global legitimacy and acceptance alongside profit; “[t]hey generally contract only with legitimate, recognized regimes, have largely restricted their activities to training national militaries, and have even engaged in low pay humanitarian work alongside foreign governments” (Mandel 2002: 62).

Is industry professionalization relevant to the increase in contracting during the post-September 11 wars? To be more precise it is important to note that this argument only applies to paramilitary firms that undertake executive security functions. While it is true that executive paramilitary firms “professionalized” themselves in the 1990s, there were also highly professional firms operating in Vietnam as discussed in chapter three. Perhaps the corporate structure of firms like Blackwater or Raytheon aided in the process of applying for large defence contracts. But there is little other evidence that suggests a direct effect on the increase in contracting between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. In any event, the professionalized armed paramilitary sub-sector of the industry constitutes a small fraction of the total contractor population. The sub-sector that contributes the most to the quantitative increase in contracting is in construction and base engineering, areas where professionalization was present during the Vietnam War. Thus, the necessity of industry professionalization within the executive paramilitary sector is trivial at best.
There is an important dimension of professionalization within the military that is, in fact, a necessary condition of the uptick in contracting. The shift away from a mixed volunteer and draftee military by the US in 1973 had a significant effect on the way its large scale overseas operations could be mobilized. Eliminating the draft also eliminated a way of raising military labour. The new All-Volunteer Force influenced the way large contingency forces could be staffed largely because the military could no longer rely on compelled service to provide additional labour power. This limitation was, and remains, particularly salient in large scale deployments where troop-levels are politically sensitive issues. Moreover, contractors came to be used in place of uniformed troops to perform the non-core functions that have since been outsourced to the private sector. The significance of the US transition to an All-Volunteer Force is addressed in greater detail later in the next chapter.

**ii. Revolution in Military Affairs**

The next factor that scholars suggest facilitated the rise of the private military industry is the technological transformation of the military in the 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the implications of new information and communications technologies were being realized by military planners. As the information revolution of the 1990s accelerated, so too did the possibilities for military application. The transformation called the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), denotes wholesale changes in the way military theory, planning, operations and national security doctrine were conceived as part the exponential technological changes of the 1990s (Schwab 2009). Developments in information technology permeated military structures yielding exponential leaps in conventional military capabilities. The theory was that technological superiority would provide exponential advantages in all aspects of combat such
that a war could be won swiftly and with minimal casualties. Of course, the RMA requires specialists with skills in logistics, training, maintenance and management of complex weapons systems. It also demands software specialists and skilled operators to maintain and update sophisticated network infrastructure – areas where expertise naturally resides in the civilian economy (Wulf 2005; Freedman 1998).

For a period in the 1990s, it appeared as if the new technological paradigm was bearing out its promise. The RMA was on display most prominently in the first Gulf War, the air campaigns over the former Yugoslavia and the initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These conflicts were brutally swift and relied on vastly superior US weapons and information technology to overwhelm and destroy the enemy in very short order. Much of the violence was projected from a distance which minimized the risk of casualties for US forces. The same could not be said for militaries and civilians on the receiving end of these new technologies, for which the attendant violence was even more pronounced.

Scholars claim that the RMA facilitated the rise of the private military industry because militaries did not have the in-house expertise to sustain the new technologies. Thus there was a heightened demand for expertise from the private sector. This trend came about in large part because the technologies of the RMA, and, just as important, the relevant skills to operate these technologies, resided predominantly from the private sector. Since it is difficult to develop, train and retain such specialized expertise in the institutional bounds of the military, the shift to high-tech warfare resulted in an increased demand for specialists in the commercial sector (Schreier and Caparini 2005). These specialists differ from armed paramilitary firms like Blackwater, EO, Sandline and others. For the most part, the communications and IT specialists performed
(seemingly more) benign tasks from computers, far from the combat zone, though with dramatic effects on military efficacy.

The Revolution in Military Affairs is notable in its prospective causal significance to the role of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Historically, it is unique to the post-Cold War time period and the technological advancements are variables that are independent of the Vietnam War era. Indeed, it would be incorrect to suggest that the RMA had no effect on the way contracting is done in the post-September 11 wars because it is self-evidently not true as discussed in chapter three: technical expertise unavailable in the military needs to be sourced in the private sector. However, the degree to which the RMA is a necessary condition should depend on the degree to which contractors specializing in advanced technological fields are present in the post-September 11 conflicts. A breakdown of actual distribution of contractor personnel by function actually suggests that contracting in the field of advanced technology is actually quite minimal.

Recall the chart in the closing pages of chapter three. The figures indicate that the types of functions performed by contractors that would fall within the high-tech scope of the RMA are relatively few in Iraq (equivalent figures are not available for Afghanistan). Functions like communications support, training and even logistics only make up less than 5 percent of the Department of Defense contractor workforce between 2008 and 2011. If the unspecified “other” category consists entirely of high-tech contractors, at most this is only an additional 10 percent of the contractor workforce. This certainly demonstrates the relevance of advanced technology contractors but the figures dampen claims about the causal relationship between the RMA and increased contracting. The majority of contractors, between 60 percent and 75 percent for the years given, were employed in the relatively unskilled or semi-skilled areas of base support and
construction which are also the most labour intensive functions. The top-to-bottom significance of the RMA, it seems, is not reflected in the distribution of contractor functions. Thus, it is reasonable to attribute very little causal necessity to the Revolution in Military Affairs as a determining condition of the sheer volume of contracting in the post-September 11 wars.

III. Ideational Explanations

i. Neoliberalism

The ascent of the private military industry was facilitated by the normative context of neoliberalism that had become entrenched in the early 1990s. Many scholars point to this ideational cause as a key determinant of the industry’s rise (Sheehy, Maogoto and Newell 2009; Spear 2006; Holmqvist 2005; Wulf 2005; Singer 2003; Aning 2001; Nossal 2001; Lock 1999). Enough has already been said about neoliberalism as an ideational framework in chapter one and it does not need much more in the way of theoretical content. It will suffice to say that policy trends in privatization, outsourcing and market-solutions to questions of public policy were crucial enablers of the industry’s ascent. The newfound preferences for private sector solutions lent legitimacy to the activities of private military firms which, in the past, would have been labelled mercenaries. Though anti-mercenary sentiment remains strong (Percy 2007) and the private military sector has not evaded it entirely, it does not appear to have harmed the bottom line.

But when neoliberalism is discussed it is crucial to remember that the post-Cold War free market model of the state had different meanings in highly developed western states and in the developing world. The difference depended on the strength and functionality of the state’s institutions. As Holmqvist (2005) argues, in states with weak institutional compositions, the

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3 Elke Krahmann (2010) goes even further to suggest that the ideational transformation of the state to a neoliberal mode changed not only the political economy of the military but also the philosophical relationship between soldiers, civilians and the state.
“privatization” of security is a misnomer. Since publicly provided security was spotty at best, there was little to privatize. In this sense, privatized security is a function of a service lacuna vacated by an inefficient state.

While Sandline and Executive Outcomes draw attention for their military significance, the privatization of domestic civilian security in Africa makes it the largest market for these services in the world. A combination of low-capacity state security apparatuses, abundant labour and weak regulation has led to an explosion of private security and policing across sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is the largest private security market with over 6,000 firms employing 375,000 officers. Kenya represents an interesting case of security privatization. Its approximately 2000 firms employ 48,000 people in a market that is both completely unregulated and has an antagonistic relationship with public police forces (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006). Group4Securicor (G4S) is estimated to be the largest single private sector employer on the continent with a roster of 106,605 employees working in twenty-nine countries (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011). This kind of privatization is the product of decades of liberalization policies often imposed by international financial institutions. Military functions and security services are the logical ends of such policies, particularly in states with fragile security institutions in the first place (Lock 1999). The experience with military privatization in the developing world stands in contrast with stronger and more efficient states. In these cases, security privatization has been used as a way to supplement already highly functional state institutions (Holmqvist 2005). This is the case in both the civilian security sector as well as the military. The privatization trend did not stop at the Department of Defense or even the sensitive inner workings of the intelligence community (Chesterman 2008). As Herbert Wulf (2005) notes, the co-operation of private military companies alongside state military hierarchies is viewed as an effective market solution
to meeting military demands in a context of scarce expertise (particularly in high tech functions) and an emphasis on core competencies.

Neoliberalism is crucial to this analysis. It is regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition of the increase in military contracting during the post-September 11 wars. Long-term institutional changes in the Department of Defense were initiated in the 1980s to make the American military more streamlined. These efforts were organised around separating core-competencies and inherently governmental functions from peripheral activities that could be outsourced or privatized without detrimental effect on overall military capabilities. It is necessary because the neoliberalization of the military was an important dimension of military restructuring for nearly two decades prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results of this institutional reformation directly affected the composition of the US total forces and thus the ability of the US to prosecute these wars. In addition, neoliberalism is an ideational factor that was not present in the case of the Vietnam War (though proto-neoliberal ideas influenced the decision to end the draft), making it an important distinguishing feature in the comparison of two otherwise similar cases. However, it is not a sufficient condition to explain the increase in contractors because of antecedent conditions, namely, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force, that contextualize neoliberalism and place it within a historical sequence alongside this other necessary condition. The AVF and the neoliberalization of the military are elaborated in greater detail later in the next chapter.

ii. Casualty Aversion

Casualty aversion has also been identified as a possible cause of the military industry’s emergence (Wulf 2005; Mandel 2002). The assumption is that public aversion (or perceived
aversion\(^4\) to personnel losses means that the public will not tolerate mounting casualties in overseas operations for very long. Under these conditions, the private military industry can step in to replace soldiers in missions when public sentiment would abhor taking casualties. But the supposed allergy of democratic polities to casualties is more often presumed than demonstrated empirically. Based on studies of US public opinion, casualty aversion has little effect on the decision to go to war or even troop levels. And, counterfactually, even if casualty aversion is assumed to be influential on decisions to wage war, there is no evidence to suggest that contractor substitution factored in to the pre-war considerations of troop levels in Iraq.

The deductive logic of the casualty aversion argument has a certain intuitive appeal: the public gets upset when soldiers suffer casualties, especially when those casualties are widely reported; contractors can substitute for soldiers without much public knowledge; therefore the public will not get upset when those invisible contractors suffer casualties. So, as a causal factor that can account for the scale and scope of post-September 11 contracting, casualty aversion suggests that the American public would not respond negatively (or at all) to contractor casualties because they receive very little attention. Therefore, contractors are used as a way of preempting casualties that may harm public support for the mission. Consider the actual numbers of troop casualties versus contractor casualties within the US total force. As of June 2013, there have been 3,357 contractor deaths, almost half the number of US soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan (US Department of Labor 2013).\(^5\) These figures go largely unreported and, by extension, do not factor into public opinion about the wars. Casualty aversion, then, is a plausible

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\(^4\) Here, casualty aversion is meant to encompass the range of sentiments identified in the literature including “phobia,” “sensitivity” and “intolerance.” Casualty is meant to encompass US soldiers killed and wounded as part of the overall operation. Both categories can have broader implications but for the purposes here they are meant to denote disapproval of sustaining military deaths and injuries as part of a military operation.

\(^5\) 4,487 US troops have been killed in Iraq as of December 31, 2011. 2,160 US troops have been killed in Afghanistan as of December 12, 2012 (O’Hanlon and Livingston 2013; O’Hanlon and Livingston 2012).
explanation for the proportion of contractors in the US total force given the perceived sensitivity of the US population to flag draped coffins. But the “Dover effect” is not necessarily as powerful as often assumed. Public opinion of troop deployment is more closely correlated with other variables such as the likelihood of success, which is significant in the cases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which both enjoyed substantial levels of public support in their early years (Becker 2009; Foyle 2004).

There is no doubt that the correlation between public support and casualties has been a prevailing assumption about the use of military force since the Vietnam War (Mueller 1973; for a survey of these opinions see Feaver and Gelpi 2005: 102-105). In subsequent decades, the losses sustain by the United States in Southeast Asia (58,000 killed, 303,000 wounded, and 1,900 missing) loomed large in public opinion (Prados 2009). Ever since, scholars, politicians and the public have presumed that American political culture is wary of high casualty rates and will not support a war under these circumstances. Post-Vietnam US military doctrines were clearly oriented towards minimizing casualties. For instance, in 1984 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger set out six conditions that must be met before the US would commit forces abroad, including the presence of popular support and continued adjustment of force levels based on changing conditions (Haass 1999). In the 1990s, doctrines articulated by General Colin Powell and Bill Clinton emphasized low-risk operations when national interests were not at stake and decisive overwhelming force when they were. The purposes of these doctrines were partially motivated by the spectre of domestic antipathy towards high death tolls (Smith 2005). Richard C. Eichenberg argues that this prevailing assumption is significant for two major reasons. First, some American policy makers have made decisions about war based on assumptions of how public opinion would react to military casualties. Second, policy makers outside the US have
based their calculations of US credibility on the assumption of America’s low tolerance for military losses. Such was the presumption of Saddam Hussein in 1990 (Eichenberg 2005).

The casualty aversion hypothesis, however, has been refuted by numerous studies into US public opinion and war (Klarevas 2002; Larson 1996; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Jentleson 1992; Russett and Nincic 1976). These empirical inquiries have found that it is not necessarily the case that casualty aversion figures heavily in public support for war, and by extension, the latitude that policy makers have in carrying its prosecution. Feaver and Gelpi put it quite succinctly: “[t]he public is defeat phobic, not casualty phobic” (2005: 97). Bruce Jentleson’s study of US public opinion and the use military force in the 1980s shows that casualties and citizen support do not correlate (except for the 1983 bombing of the Marines barracks in Beirut). He points to examples from the 1983 invasion of Granada, the 1989 invasion of Panama, and the 1991 Gulf War, each of which had high levels of domestic support despite some casualties. By contrast, military support for Contras in Nicaragua and the government of El Salvador in the 1980s garnered little public support despite very few US casualties. Jentleson suggests that the success of the Panama, Granada and Gulf War operations garnered public support because they were winning operations, while Nicaragua and El Salvador were losing propositions (Jentleson 1992). Eichenberg extends this conclusion in his survey of US public opinion and the use of military force between 1981 and 2005. He finds that the principal policy objective, risk of losing and degree of multilateralism operate alongside casualty aversion as conditions of public support for US operations.

The conclusion to be drawn here is that using contractors as substitutes for US troops because of the fear of sustaining casualties is unconvincing. Empirical studies show that Americans react favourably towards military engagements under certain circumstances such as
the likelihood of victory, even when there is a risk of sustaining casualties. In Eichenberg’s survey of public opinion polls, the average level of support for the US use of force in the War on Terror (79 percent favourable) and the war phase of the Iraq invasion (72 percent favourable) was considerably high (Eichenberg 2005: 157). The converse is also true; Americans react with hostility towards engagements where no victory can be ascertained, irrespective of the risk of casualties, at least initially. In the latter case, mounting casualties will exacerbate negative opinions but will not determine the level of support in the first place. Thus, the argument that contractors will prevent the erosion of public support by diminishing the number of (visible) casualties among the military is not convincing.

A counterargument could be made that decision-makers in the US mobilized contractors in anticipation of high casualties, but there is no evidence to support his counter claim. To the contrary, in the months leading up to the Iraq war, there were indications from the Bush administration that decision makers believed that the public’s casualty aversion was exaggerated (Eichenberg 2005: 151-152). This would indicate that the possibility of using contractors as substitutes for uniformed troops in order to deflect blowback from the inevitable casualties was not part of the military calculus in 2001 or 2003. Of course, there was significant concern about troop levels, particularly in the months prior to the Iraq invasion. But none of the concern placed much emphasis on public aversion to the inevitable deaths and injuries that soldiers would suffer. In fact, the original invasion plan called for a force of 400,000 troops, far more than the 150,000 that eventually landed in March 2003. CENTCOM’s original projection was made on the assumption that the invasion would be followed by a ten-year occupation and had little to do with minimizing exposure of soldiers to harm. As is now well known, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld continually pushed for a leaner invasion force but not because of concern
about public casualty aversion. His claim was that a 400,000 strong invasion force would require a long four-month build-up period which would constrain US diplomatic flexibility with its allies and at the UN, and signal the inevitability of the invasion. Rumsfeld was also under the sway of the RMA’s promise of a swift and technologically abetted victory (Gordon and Trainor 2007). The invasion of Iraq may very well have been inevitable as some argue, but the size of the invasion force was established based on factors other than public casualty aversion.

Another argument maintains that the war in Iraq would not have been possible in the absence of contractors. Military contractors, according to this line of thinking, enabled the Iraq war to proceed by keeping the number of deployed troops to a politically palatable limit, irrespective of casualties (Singer 2007; Avant 2004). In a deductive sense, this claim is entirely plausible. Increasing the number of post-invasion troops to levels higher than 150,000 insisted upon by Rumsfeld would have been to admit a significant error in the planning stages. As was well documented at the time, troop levels became a matter of public dispute among generals and Pentagon officials, and further controversy would come with costs to the administration’s credibility (Schmitt 2003). Furthermore, and in an echo of Lyndon Johnson’s thinking, calling up reserves to fight would have imposed a greater burden on American society than the Bush Administration wanted, while asking allies to supply the rest was unrealistic given the unpopularity of the war in the rest of the world.

The record of this period remains contested and Rumsfeld himself denies that there was disagreement about troop levels despite reports to the contrary (Rumsfeld 2011: 438; Gordon and Trainor 2007). But whether troop levels were determined by diplomatic, political or technological considerations, there is no evidence to suggest that the size of the Iraq invasion force was diminished in favour of contractor substitutes. As the next chapter argues, there were
much longer and slower moving historical processes at play that influenced these decisions. Evidence over four decades of military transformation point to factors that long predates decisions to go to war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military neoliberalization and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force are of primary importance to account for why the contractor work force was such a large part of American footprint in the post-September 11 wars.

One final cause of the rise of the industry is important to mention and that is the demand created by the post-September 11 wars. Schreier and Caparini argue that the growth of the national security community after September 11 “led to both the emergence and rapid growth of the private military and security industry” (2005: 4). Indeed, it is difficult to argue to the contrary. The post-September 11 wars created a bubble of military contracting and certainly accounts for the absolute growth of the private military industry in the early 2000s, but it does not account for the relative proportions of contractors to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The analytical question here is about the increase in contracting during the post-September 11 wars compared with the Vietnam War? Suggesting it was the demand created by post-September 11 wars does not address the comparative question. To answer it properly, it is necessary to consider the decades-long effects of the transition to the All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s and the neoliberal transformation that began in the 1980s.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis takes an important step closer towards answering the question at the centre of this inquiry. In applying explanations of the rise of the private military industry in general, to the case of military contracting in the post-September 11 wars in particular, it is possible to assess the relative explanatory strength of each. What emerges is a much clearer image of the different determinants. The causes of the industry’s rise – overdetermined in the
first place – provide only limited explanatory leverage over the problem. Some remain relevant, such as the Revolution in Military Affairs, but with muted significance. The table below summarizes the findings. With these factors assessed for their relevance to the question, it is now possible to set aside the unnecessary or trivial conditions. The focus can shift to an analysis of the two necessary conditions that are the primary determinants of the significant increase in the use of contractors as part of the US total force in Iraq and Afghanistan.

### Structural Explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End of the Cold War</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>The presence or absence of the Cold War threat environment does not have an effect on the presence or absence of military contracting as part of US overseas operations. Military contracting existed in conflicts during the Cold War, particularly the Vietnam War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sufficient</td>
<td>Threat environment of post-September 11 era created structural conditions for US adventurism that are more relevant for an explanation of military contracting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Disengagement</td>
<td>Prima facie not the case</td>
<td>Contractors were part of US operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. These are clear cases of great power engagement. This fact turns the argument about the industry in the 1990s on its head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War demobilization</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>Demobilized troops contributed primarily to the pool of military labour in the 1990s, not the 2000. Composition of armed security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are largely TCNs or LNs, meaning that they are not drawing on demobilized troops. Some may fit this category but it is highly unlikely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sufficient</td>
<td>This was more significant in the development of post-Cold War private arsenals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Military Hardware</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>Globalization narrowly defined as the accelerated movement of goods, people and finances, is present in both the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. Thus, it cannot account for changes in the size and scope of contracting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sufficient</td>
<td></td>
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### Institutional Explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry Professionalization</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>Armed contractors professionalized in the 1990s. This is certainly important for EO and Sandline, as well as armed paramilitary groups in the post-September 11 wars. But there is no direct effect on the scale of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The RMA depends on personnel with high-tech expertise. This should be relevant to the degree that high-tech operators are present in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The empirical evidence suggests that their presence is a small proportion of overall defence contractors.

In January 1973, the US ended the draft and transitioned to an All-Volunteer Force. The end of the draft and subsequent professionalization of the military changed the way the US Armed Forces constituted itself.

It is necessary because the military’s transition to a professional All-Volunteer Force eliminated conscription as a way of raising military labour. The AVF doctrine influences the composition of the military. It takes the conscription option off the table leaving the use of contractors as an important component of the total force.

It is not sufficient because contractors were still used under conscription during the Vietnam War. Conscription, no doubt, minimized the number of contractors needed during the Vietnam War.

This is relevant to the rise of the industry in the 1990s. Similarly, it is relevant to the emergence of the domestic security industry, especially in Africa. But in Iraq and Afghanistan, the primary purchaser of private military services is the US, the world’s strongest state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revolution in Military Affairs</th>
<th>Marginal necessity</th>
<th>Not sufficient</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Professionalization</td>
<td>Necessary</td>
<td>Not sufficient</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak State Structures</td>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>Not sufficient</td>
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**Table 5.1** The many causes of US military contracting compared
Chapter 6
The Determinants of US Military Contracting in the post-September 11 Wars

This study now arrives at its crux. To this point, it should be clear what military contractors are and what they have done in US foreign conflicts. It should also be clear that there are many explanations for their proliferation in the post-Cold War era. But it has yet to be established why they appear in such large numbers, and perform such a diverse range of tasks in the post-September 11 wars. As chapter five establishes, there is no shortage of explanations for the rise of the private military industry and that these explanations have limited use as explanations of the particular dynamics of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. In short, the overdetermined rise of the industry in general obscures determinants of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. The task now is to address the determinants of military contracting in the post-September 11 wars directly and find out why the scale and scope of contracting is so different than it was four decades prior.

This final chapter argues that the differences in military contracting between the post-September 11 wars and the Vietnam War are attributable to two particular determinants: military neoliberalization and the absence of a military draft in the US. Both are necessary conditions that account for the scale and scope features of contracting in the post-September 11 wars and how it differs from contracting in Vietnam. But the claim that these two determinants account for the particular outcome is not enough. Thus far, in this study, the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and military neoliberalization have been held up as the crucial differences between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars, and in a strict comparative sense, these are historically significant claims. But it is possible to go deeper and establish the relative ordering of significance. Accordingly, the present chapter explains the specific historical sequencing logic that supports
the relative significance of military neoliberalization and the transition to an All-Volunteer Force in the United States.

To pursue this line of thinking, the narrative returns to the late 1960s and from there, charts the decades-long transformation of the US military from a mixed volunteer-draftee force to a public-private partnership. This is done in three sections. Section one rearticulates the method of historical sequence elaboration first introduced in chapter four. Here it is used to explain the primary necessity of military neoliberalization to the post-September 11 dynamics of contracting, and the necessary contextualizing role played by the transition to the AVF. With the significance of these historical determinants established, the next two sections undertake a process tracing account of both determinants.

Section two elucidates the effects that the 1973 transition to an All-Volunteer Force had on the military force planning in the United States. It argues that the elimination of the draft introduced market logic to manpower decision making which was a necessary antecedent to military contracting in the post-September 11 wars. Moreover, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force was a necessary condition of further incursions of market logic into military force planning in the 1980s which had path dependent effects on military neoliberalization. Thus, the AVF provides important background context to the primary determinant, military neoliberalization. The third and most significant section deploys the roll-out and roll-back neoliberalism concepts as defined in chapter two. It traces the processes by which military neoliberalization emerged as policy in the US armed forces and how it developed unevenly through the subsequent decades including the transformative years of the post-September 11 wars.
I. The Logic of Historical Sequencing

It is important to note that the primary explanatory factor, neoliberalism, is not terribly different from other claims made in the literature on contracting. Scholars have also explored the historical significance of military professionalization and the All-Volunteer Force to the twenty-first century American military. Therefore, the historical narrative in this chapter will be familiar to some. But this analysis draws upon these familiar histories in ways that distinguish this analysis from previous explorations of military contracting in the post-September 11 wars. The first distinction is the methodological approach used to explain the relationship between the AVF and military neoliberalization. Here, the two determinants are elaborated through the logic of historical sequencing that can distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions and assess the relative significance of each condition as part of the historical explanation. In this way, the two principal determinants are established through a methodologically rigorous form of historical explanation and presented in a way that is sensitive to the complex interactions of multiple factors. Taking this approach sets the stage for a deeper process tracing account of the transition to the All-Volunteer Force after 1973, and, more significantly, the processes of military neoliberalization in the US armed forces from 1985 to the present. The second distinction is the role of the transition to the AVF in the decades-long incursion of market forces into military manpower decision-making. Within the context of military contracting, this factor has yet to be given the depth of treatment that appears here.

This current section explains how the factors in this historical sequence work and the sections that follow undertake the historical exposition of these processes. There are three arguments to be made: (1) both military neoliberalization and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force are necessary but individually insufficient explanations of the nature of post-September 11
contracting; (2) the All-Volunteer Force is necessary for the outcome and necessary for the development of military neoliberalization; and (3) military neoliberalization is more significant than the transition to the All-Volunteer Force as a determinant of military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. These factors are assigned their relative historical significance using the method of sequence elaboration raised earlier in chapter four.

Applying this method helps explain the relationship between the two primary historical determinants and how they act upon the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11. As will be demonstrated, they interact through contextualization and diminishment. What is interesting, however, is that there are two possible ways to explore the interactions of these determinants. In one scenario military neoliberalization can be treated as an initial determining relationship. When the AVF is introduced to the historical sequence, it acts as background context for neoliberalization. In the second scenario, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force can be treated as the initial determining relationship. In this case, military neoliberalization intervenes thereby diminishing the initial relationship. Crucially, in both scenarios, the historical significance of military neoliberalization remains the same. Military neoliberalization remains the principal driver of contracting dynamics in the post-September 11 wars. It should also be recalled that technical necessity also plays a role in the particular type of contracting, as established in chapters three and four. Since this factor and its analytical limitations have already been established, the following discussion will set it aside and address the two major determinants. Here is how the formal logic works in both scenarios.

Scenario 1: Military neoliberalization as initial determining condition

In the first scenario, military neoliberalization represents the initial necessary determining condition with the changes in the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars.
More simply put, the presence of neoliberal ideas in the minds of policy makers meant more use of contract labour than when those ideas were absent. As will be discussed at length, the neoliberal transformation of the military was a central plank in military restructuring policy after 1985, particularly in the 1990s. In this scenario military neoliberalization is the necessary but insufficient cause of the type of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 1973 transition to an All-Volunteer Force is also a necessary but insufficient condition for reasons that will be discussed at length below.

At this point, we have two necessary conditions of the outcome in question. The next step in the historical sequencing is to give the two causes their appropriate temporal ordering. This is easy enough; the draft was ended in 1973, military neoliberalization began in 1985 with the introduction of an inconspicuous but transformative Army policy. So, when the transition to the All-Volunteer Force is introduced to the equation, it enters as an antecedent factor. In this scenario, the All-Volunteer Force contextualizes the initial relationship between military neoliberalization and the dynamics of contracting in the post-September 11 wars. However, neoliberalism remains more important because it has a more direct relationship and temporally proximate relationship with the outcome. Thus, military neoliberalization can be ascribed greater weight in an historical analysis.

Scenario 2: All-Volunteer Force as initial historical determinant

In the second scenario, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force is considered as the initial determining relationship with the scope and scale of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, the end of the draft and the shift to the All-Volunteer Force is a necessary condition of increased military contracting because it restricts the availability of labour to the US Armed Forces. Whereas between 1948 and 1973, the military could raise human resources by decree,
after the draft was eliminated, the military no longer had the coercive tool of the Selective Service at its disposal. The effect was to alter the labour-raising capabilities of the military; it now had to compete in the labour market for personnel like any other employer. In this way, the military faced a problem of having to staff and finance a labour-intensive organization with the kind of labour market discipline it had been able to avoid since 1948.

By the logic in scenario two, the introduction of labour market discipline to manpower decision-making is a necessary first step in an historical process that results in the wide scale contracting out of military labour. In this circumstance, the transition from the Selective Service regime to the All-Volunteer Force is a necessary, but insufficient, cause of the type of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is necessary because the expansive practice of post-September 11 contracting is a logical undertaking for a military that is exposed to the strictures of labour-market competition. Contracting on this scale could only come about in an organization that faces pressures to maximize output at minimal cost. (Indeed, contractors were used in the Vietnam War in the presence of the draft, but, as argued in chapter four, the draft served to keep the need for contractors to a minimum).

As in scenario one, the onset of military neoliberalization is also a necessary, but insufficient, condition of the contracting dynamics in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the historical sequence, military neoliberalization intervenes between the transition to an AVF and the outcome because of its sequence in history. Despite the intervention of neoliberalism, the All-Volunteer Force remains a necessary condition for the increased reliance on contractors. The effect of the intervening condition serves to diminish, but not eliminate, the importance of the transition to the AVF as a necessary historical cause. The original relationship in this scenario, the necessary effects of the end of the draft on post-September 11 contracting, is given a much
more complete explanation. Furthermore, the All-Volunteer Force has a sequencing effect on neoliberalism itself – it is not possible to neoliberalize the military without first eliminating the draft. As will be discussed, eliminating the statist coerciveness of the Selective Service is an intrinsic objective of neoliberalism as is shedding “unskilled” military labour and focusing on core competencies. Thus, it is possible to argue that the AVF is a necessary condition of neoliberalism, which is, in turn, a necessary condition of the scale and scope of post-September 11 contracting.

What is important is that the final equation in scenario one and two are the same. Whether military neoliberalization is treated as an initial cause or as an intervening cause, it has a more direct effect on the dynamics of US military contracting in the post-September 11 wars than the AVF. In scenario one, the transition to the All-Volunteer Force contextualizes military neoliberalization and has a less direct, but still necessary effect on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the second scenario, the intervention of military neoliberalization diminishes the significance of the original determining relationship between the AVF and contracting in the post-September 11 wars. As Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu (2009: 135) put it “the original relationship is not spurious but…a more complete explanation of the original relationship is made.” Thus the claim that military neoliberalization is the primary necessary condition in the historical sequence is logically validated.

A word of caution is in order first. Before claiming the mantle of parsimony, it is supremely important to remember that there are additional factors that are relevant to explaining the rise of military contracting in the post-September 11 wars. Different factors were considered in chapter five and evaluated for their explanatory necessity. Though many are broad conditions of the private military industry’s rise in the first place, most were shown to have little or no
bearing upon the scale and scope of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus they do not figure into the formal logic here. Now, this argument does not intend to write additional, contextual or supplementary causes out of the history of military contracting, nor is meant to imply that military neoliberalization and military professionalization are the sole relevant determinants of the outcome in question. But what is important to remember is that other potential explanations, as they have been encountered here, are minor or do not move this particular historical outcome to the same degree of significance as military neoliberalization and military professionalism. Hence, the claim in this chapter can be made with a high level of confidence: the transition to the All-Volunteer Force and military neoliberalization determined the change in scale and scope of contracting between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. With this argument in place, it is now possible to trace the discursive and policy processes by which these two necessary conditions acted upon the outcome.

II. From Selective Service to the All-Volunteer Force

There are two key steps this section will take to demonstrate the historical importance of the transition to the All-Volunteer Force. First, it must show how the end of the draft was a necessary condition for the dynamics of contracting in the post-September 11 wars. Second, it must show how the end of the draft and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force was a necessary condition for the emergence of military neoliberalization. An historical exposition of the final years of the Selective Service in America establishes its crucial background context for military reforms that emerged in the following decades.
The Effect of the All-Volunteer Force on Military Personnel

In 2004, the US House of Representatives voted 402 to 2 against a bill to reinstate the draft (Babington and Oldenburg 2004). As is often the case, the vote was more political theatre than a serious act of governing but it served to underscore the political unviability of a return to any form of the draft. If the bipartisan consensus in an election year was not enough, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld added his own rebuke. Rumsfeld, who had been an advocate of a volunteer force as a member of the House of Representatives during the late 1960s, was unambiguous about reintroducing the Selective Service. “We’re not going to re-implement a draft” he said, “[t]here is no need for it at all. The disadvantages of using compulsion to bring into the armed forces the men and women needed are notable…People were brought in; they were paid some fraction of what they could make in the civilian manpower market because they were without choices. Big categories were exempted…and what was left was sucked into the intake…” (quoted in Rostker 2006: 691). Clearly, in 2004, after thirty years, the All-Volunteer Force has become an institutionalized fixture of American political life. This fact is not lost on military policy-makers who recognize that altering three decades of institutional practice is exceptionally difficult.

The personnel pressures of the All-Volunteer Force were eventually brought to bear on manpower decisions as the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan lingered on. For the first time since the end of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense had to confront a prolonged and labour-intensive conflict without the kind of access to military labour that the draft had once provided. Without a draft, military personnel solutions had to fit within the framework of a volunteer force. As the invasion of Iraq became an occupation, the strains on US forces were beginning to show. In September 2003, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the active
Army, as then constituted, would be incapable of sustaining an occupation force of 120,000 beyond March 2004 under the one-year deployment cycle. By 2005 the CBO predicted, “the level of US forces in Iraq would begin to decline as units that had been deployed for a year were relieved and were not replaced on a one-to-one basis” (Congressional Budget Office 2003: 1). Clearly, the occupation of Iraq had an immediate effect of straining the US forces worldwide. Since a return to the draft was entirely out of the question, the Department of Defense had to take alternative measures to raise the personnel needed in the rapidly deteriorating Iraq theatre. The same CBO report made recommendations regarding adjustments in rotation sequencing, alternating personnel and operational tempo, shifting units from other posts around the globe and using financial incentives to help sustain the occupation. These changes were necessary to maintain sustainable and statutory troop deployment tempos set out in the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (Congressional Budget Office 2003).

The Department of Defense took a number of measures to address the need to free up personnel without increasing aggregate numbers. Among the measures was moving units stationed in other theatres around the world. The end of the US mission in Bosnia made an additional 3,000 troops available. More significantly, the US reduced its forces in North East Asia by 8,000, including two brigades from Korea and the Marine Corps battalion from Okinawa. The Department of Defense also made changes to the rotation schedules of Army and Reserve personnel, adopting a dwell-time standard of one year at home for every year deployed abroad. This increased pacing freed 45,000 military personnel for deployment to Iraq which increased the level of forces in the Iraq theatre to 168,000 (approximately the peak troop levels at the time of the 2007 surge). The CBO noted, however, that this pace of rotation would probably not be sustainable (Congressional Budget Office 2005: 5-6). Another non-intrusive option of
making more personnel available was a restructuring of reserve and active units. In 2004, the Department of Defense began rebalancing the forces by shifting personnel from low- to high-demand positions. Between 2003 and 2005, 50,000 positions were shifted as part of the restructuring effort. In the Army, instead of having all active combat units of the Army ready at all times, two thirds of the active combat units and one-sixth of the Reserve component would be available. Maintaining such a rotational base, though, is particularly expensive (Rostker 2006).

The most controversial approaches were the measures taken under the rubric of stop-loss and the reactivation of retired personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve, both distinctly unpopular methods of personnel retention. Under stop-loss, the military can keep a service member on active duty beyond the date the service member is scheduled to leave. To its detractors, it is, in essence, a violation of the contract between the individual and government and an abrogation of the principles of volunteerism. In some cases the Army kept some soldiers on active duty or in the Reserves for a year longer than originally planned. Prior to the war in Iraq, 51,000 soldiers were affected by stop-loss: in the month before to the invasion, stop-loss was authorized for active component units in support of the Operation Iraqi Freedom. In May 2003, the Army ended stop-loss for active component units but retained 16,000 in the active Army, 4,900 in the Army Reserve, 675 in the National Guard for an additional five months (Rostker 2006). The Individual Ready Reserve program goes even further. Members of the IRR are military personnel that have completed the initial period of active duty but have not yet met the eight-year military service obligation. In June 2004, the Department of Defense ordered 5,600 members of the IRR back into active service.

Between 2003 and 2009, between 100,000 and 200,000 troops were stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan at any given time (see chapter three). In a sense, it is remarkable that the US could
field a combined active occupation force in Iraq and Afghanistan under the rubric of an all-volunteer military. But it came at the cost of extreme stress on the forces. The swift victory in the first Gulf War demonstrated the success of the volunteer military and largely dispelled lingering doubts about its viability, but the post-September 11 wars are different. They represent the most stringent test of the All-Volunteer Force since the end of the draft in 1973. The internal reforms made by the Department of Defense were effective in that they maximized the use of existing human resources. But, as discussed in chapter three, the US relied on a contractor contingent that effectively doubled the US footprint. Seeking internal efficiencies through mechanisms discussed above would not have been sufficient – not even close under existing law (Congressional Budget Office 2005; Congressional Budget Office 2003).

But because return to the draft was out of the question, and with rotational adjustment options exhausted, a significant contracting force was the only option for defence policy-makers. The absence of the draft option affected the way occupation forces could be structured and forced the Department of Defense to stretch its internal resources in undesired ways. Within the logic of the argument, the end of the draft and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force was a necessary condition of the nature of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. But this condition is not sufficient to explain the scale and scope of the US contractor presence. Military neoliberalization, which began in the 1980s, had a significant influence on the military and the degree to which the private sector would comprise an essential pillar of the US Total Force. This phenomenon will be developed in detail shortly, but first it is worth explaining how the ending of the draft in the 1970s had antecedent effects on military neoliberalization itself. Transitioning to an All-Volunteer Force was a necessary stage in the eventual neoliberalization of the military. In
fact, ending the draft was informed by proto-neoliberal ideas and championed by intellectual exponents of the ideas themselves.

The Neoliberal dimension of the transition

By the late-1960s, the military draft had been a fact of life for two generations. Reintroduced in 1940 as the war in Europe threatened US isolationism, between 1941 and 1945, the Selective Service System generated much of the labour power needed for the US war effort. By war’s end, approximately ten million men were drafted through the Selective Service. After World War II, some variation of the military draft – universal service, universal military training or mixed force – was in place between 1945 and 1973 (except for a brief respite in 1947-1948). By the early 1960s, military and civilian policy-makers were taking the prospect of eliminating the draft seriously. Throughout the 1950s, it was becoming increasingly clear that the inequalities of the Selective Service were eroding the draft’s legitimacy, inequalities that were only magnified during the Vietnam War. As Friedberg writes, “the incongruity between America’s values and the functioning of its institutions of conscription could not be indefinitely sustained” (Friedberg 2000: 187). But while the Selective Service required all American males to register at the age of eighteen, actual draft calls did not affect very many lives after the Korean War. It was only after 1965 when draftees became an increasingly important part of the war effort that the unfair outcomes of the deferment mechanisms became glaringly obvious. It is ironic, then, that the Vietnam War – often seen as straw that broke the draft’s back – that had an initial effect of prolonging the Selective Service regime.

Prolongation, as is well-known, had its detractors. Into the late 1960s the draft regime encountered impassioned and very public opposition. It was, in short, a deeply unpopular and
unfair way of raising an army during a war. Though Muhammad Ali and David J. Miller\(^1\) are the avatars of draft resistance, the anti-draft movement drew criticism from across the political spectrum. In fact, the convergence of opinion from right to left is striking. Rarely has an institution been so reviled in America that Adlai Stevenson and Ayn Rand could both find common ground. This odd couple were not alone in finding themselves aligned with their political polar opposites. Opponents to the draft on the right wing included Rand, Milton Friedman, Barry Goldwater, and Richard Nixon. To the centre and left, Stevenson, George McGovern, John Kenneth Galbraith and Linus Pauling added their critical voices. However, it was conservative arguments that won the day over leftist concerns about social justice. Though anti-draft claims from the left were broader (social justice) and more provocative (draft card burning), arguments grounded in free market economics and libertarian principles – principles that underpinned American neoliberalism a few decades later – had the greatest effect on policy. Conservatives argued that the draft was entirely incongruous with the principles of individual liberty and the free market (Bailey 2009). Replacing the regime of compelled military labour with a free market for military labour would eliminate the inequities of the Selective Service that so perturbed the left, and the tax-in-kind which was the primary concern of the right.

In 1966, Milton Friedman published a case against the draft in the libertarian New Individualist Review arguing that the draft is an indirect tax that is wasteful, unfair and interferes with human freedom. He concludes saying “one of the greatest advances in human freedom was the commutation of taxes in kind to taxes in money. We have reverted to barbarous custom” (Friedman 1982: 632). His perspicuous and generally agreeable case was complemented by more technical studies by other like-minded economists such as Walter Oi who developed a fuller

\(^1\) In 1965, after Lyndon Johnson signed a bill making the destruction of a draft card a criminal offense, Miller burned his draft card in front of a New York City induction centre. He was subsequently arrested by the FBI and served two years in prison after the Supreme Court ruled against his claims to free speech in 1968 (Prados 2009).
economic accounting of the draft (Oi 1982). These anti-draft economists found an audience within the presidential campaign of Richard Nixon and some of whom served on the campaign itself (Bailey 2009). By 1967, Candidate Nixon had recognized the electoral advantage of opposing the draft and made its elimination a central plank in his presidential platform. In November of that year, Nixon endorsed a volunteer army that provides competitive salaries to its personnel (Rostker 2006). In October 1968, he took to the radio to make a case against the draft in the same terms as did Friedman. “The military services” he said,

…it are the only employers today who don’t have to compete in the job market. Supplied by the draft with manpower they want when they want it, they’ve been able to ignore the laws of supply and demand…Our servicemen are singled out for a huge hidden tax – the difference between their military pay and what they could otherwise earn. The draftee has been forced by his country not only to defend his neighbours but to subsidize them as well” (Nixon 1982: 606).

After his election, Nixon commissioned a panel to review the Selective Service regime and to develop a plan to move towards an All-Volunteer Force. The President’s Commission on the All-Volunteer Force, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates was influenced heavily by the economists in its membership and staff. Included in this block was Milton Friedman and monetarist par excellence Alan Greenspan, future chair of the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the commission’s senior staffers were dominated by anti-draft free market economists (Bailey 2007). Unsurprisingly, the Gates Commission report roundly rejected the existing Selective Service System and wholeheartedly endorsed a transition to the All-Volunteer Force. The Commission did so, not by expounding upon matters of fairness or social justice that preoccupied left wing critics, but by assailing the tax-in-kind, arguing that such taxes are inimical to the principles of freedom and liberty in the US. They deprive individuals of their freedom to pursue careers of their choosing, are often accompanied by severe imbalances in burden sharing, and they conceal taxes and government expenditures that distort the costs of
state services (Gates Commission 1970: 24). Thus, the discriminatory nature of this form of taxation is morally unjust, especially when it regressively shifts the burden onto the poor. The All-Volunteer Force, the Commission concluded, “is a system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accord with his values” (Gates Commission 1970: 6). Their report recommended ending the draft by 1971.

Department of Defense officials agreed with the conclusions but were alarmed by Nixon’s reliance on economists with firm anti-statist predispositions (Bailey 2009). Indeed, the absence of sociological input on the Commission was not lost on observers. Richard V.L. Cooper noted that there was some involvement on the part of historians, social psychologists, sociologists and political scientists – disciplines with a long history of analyzing civil-military relations. But broader social scientific contributions did not carry much weight on the Commission. This, he argues, is partly because the debate focused heavily on the financial costs of ending the draft which privileged economic expertise (Cooper 1977). In the end, the resort to free market principles had the virtue of being simple, elegant and easy to argue. It appealed to straightforward notions of liberty while dispensing with the more comprehensive concerns about social justice. The law ending the draft was signed into law in September 1971 and took effect in January 1973.

The case against the draft which had the greatest influence on policy decisions cleaved to market conceptions of the relationship between citizen and state. It was, in this regard, an early step toward introducing market-discipline to the force structure of the US military. Gone were the days when, as Nixon said, the military was supplied with manpower-on-demand. In its place was the All-Volunteer Force where the military had to compete in a labour market like any other
employer. This is a crucial antecedent to the eventual application of neoliberal planning principles in the following decades. Theoretically, outsourcing and privatization is logically incompatible with a force premised upon drafted labour. Of course, contractors and draftees both comprised US forces during the Vietnam War so it is not impossible in practice. However, US force structure in this time was a dysfunctional and unsustainable contradiction, hardly the model for a healthy military. Transitioning to the volunteer market-model entailed paying higher salaries, improving living conditions and offering better career prospects for soldiers. It was a major change for a force that had relied considerably on draftees for three decades. Once the military moved to a market model of labour, the next logical step is to consider labour that was not raised in-house. This was part of a progression away from the statist model that predominated from 1940 to 1973, towards a market model of labour procurement that came out of the Vietnam War and evolved along neoliberal lines for the next four decades.

III. Roll-Out and Roll-Back Military Neoliberalization

The elimination of the draft and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 explains, in part, the scale and scope of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also offers crucial background context for the emergence of military neoliberalism in the decade that followed. With this established it is now possible to explore in detail the primary determinant of contracting in post-September 11 wars. Military neoliberalism, however, is more complex because it entails an emergence and gradual evolution over a two decade period. Hence, military neoliberalism is referred to as military neoliberalization, a process that passes through roll-back and roll-out stages. These stages do not unfold in an orderly fashion. To the contrary, over three decades of military neoliberalization, it is evident that the roll-back and roll-out stages unfolded
in an uneven and ad hoc manner across the Department of Defense. The following section traces these processes from their inconspicuous beginnings to the improvised and reactive institutional reregulation of the industry after unforeseen externalities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Rolling back the Pentagon bureaucracy 1985-2001**

As discussed, military contractors were incorporated as part of US total forces in operations prior to the neoliberal period. Indeed, the importance of finding civilian non-military labour was not lost on policy-makers. Toward the end of the Vietnam War, the US Army codified controls on civilian contracting in a pamphlet titled Use and Administration of Locals in Foreign Areas During Hostilities. The Army document was intended to define the terms and conditions under which local national civilian personnel can be employed in support of US military operations. In the interest of conserving of military manpower and reducing logistical support burdens, the pamphlet asserts that “maximum use will be made of the services of available local national civilian personnel, consistent with operational requirements and the essential manpower needs of the local economy” (US Department of the Army 1971: 2). For the next fifteen years this document governed civilian contracting in military operations.

The first explicit foray into defence privatization corresponds with the emergence of neoliberalism as an organizing policy principle during the Reagan and Thatcher era. Politically, the origins of the current military privatization phenomenon can be traced to the mid-1980s with the reinstitution of the decades-old A-76 budget process that called for competitive bidding between public and private sectors for government contracts (Markusen 2003). In the defence community, the administrative origins can be traced to 1985 when US Army Chief-of-Staff General John A. Wickam signed an order that set out the concepts, responsibilities, policies and
procedures for using civilian contractors to replace soldiers and local labour during wartime (Isenberg 2009). In this unassuming thirteen-page document, the basic outline of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was first articulated with the stated purpose to plan for the outsourcing of selected services to civilian contractors in wartime conditions. The theory was that the use of civilian contractors in a theatre of operations would augment Army forces by releasing military units from non-core tasks. “Wartime conditions” was not clearly defined in the document, opening a wide window of opportunity to outsource in situations that could range from “heightened international tensions or states of military readiness through periods of armed conflict up to and including a congressionally declared state of war” (US Department of the Army 1985: 6).

Though the foundations of broader privatization were established with LOGCAP, the original order reflects a deep concern about the heightened risks associated with incorporating civilians into war operations. Wickam’s original program was designed to allow maximum decision-making flexibility for each Army command, permitting commanders to “balance its military and contractor mix accordingly” (US Department of the Army 1985: 3). Since civilian performance is far less predictable under wartime conditions, the document cautioned contracting agencies to be judicious about the requirements, type and administration of each contract. It warned that “[i]t is probable that deficiencies in any of these efforts will result in increased costs and may result in less than desired contractor performance levels” (US Department of the Army 1985: 7). Quite perceptively, General Wickam’s memorandum anticipated many problems that the US would face with its contracting corps two decades later in Iraq and Afghanistan.
1991 Gulf War

There was little movement in military privatization in the immediate years after the adoption of the 1985 LOGCAP protocol. Large land forces capabilities remained the organizing principle for US military personnel in anticipation of a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Central Europe. The 1991 Gulf War was the first conflict to make use of contractors under the LOGCAP provisions. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the US employed a relatively small contractor workforce, about 10,000 to support its deployed forces which constituted about three percent of the US footprint (Stanley 2012). In the seventeen months of deployment, the US turned primarily to Saudi nationals to fill shortages in its logistics capabilities. The rapid deployment of combat forces to Saudi Arabia in 1991 introduced a heavy demand for transportation, housing and food supply to support the incoming units. At its peak, the US deployed 540,000 troops to the Persian Gulf (Government Accountability Office 1991). The reasons why the contractor workforce was so small in proportion to US forces (54 to 1) can be attributed to a handful of factors, not the least of which was that the engagement was short and required no occupation or reconstruction.

After the Cold War and the overwhelming victories of US forces in the Gulf War, defence policy attention turned toward transformations as US forces looked toward the twenty-first century. Procurement for the Gulf War effort was the first major test of civilian contracting in a war under LOGCAP, and, like the rest of the operation, was regarded as a success. By 1992, LOGCAP was reorganized to provide a single worldwide planning and service contract, and was awarded to Houston-based Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR, formerly Brown and Root). KBR’s activities focused primarily on logistical support US forces in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti and East Timor and the Balkans (Sanger 2012). LOGCAP I, as it is called, ran until 1997 under
the management of the US Army Corps of Engineers at a total value of $811 million (USC Public Affairs 2010).

“A Revolution in Business Affairs to support the Revolution in Military Affairs”

With the Soviet Union now history, the need to retain its Cold War posture (in Europe, at least) disappeared. In this environment, the Department of Defense turned its attention to its own restructuring in the new global order. Concerns about doctrine and force structure were debated widely across the spectrum of military policy-making. Prominent among the concerns was how to assimilate private sector business practices into the operations of the Pentagon bureaucracy. By the mid-1990s, the neoliberalization of the Department of Defense became a top-level priority as part of bureaucratic streamlining initiatives. This was no mere pruning exercise. As discussed in chapter five, the so-called “peace dividend” saw the US reduce the size of its military by 700,000 between 1989 and 2000. Internally, the Department of Defense undertook a bureaucratic transformation modelled after private sector management practices. Top-level planning and steering documents from the mid-1990s serve to underscore how central these practices were to defence reform.

In the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Defense, Congress called for a wholesale review of the way that the Department of Defense operates. The following year, the Pentagon responded with a review immersed in the neoliberal language of new public management. In 1995 the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces made bold recommendations for the privatization and outsourcing of military functions. The report was premised on the neoliberal orthodoxy that the Department of Defense could benefit from adopting the business practices of
the private sector. It recommended that both the Pentagon and the government in general “return to the basic principle that the government should not compete with its citizens.” It continues to say that “essentially all Department of Defense ‘commercial activities’ should be outsourced, and all new needs should be channeled to the private sector from the beginning” (US Department of Defense 1995: 3-2).

January 1996 began with the passage of the next National Defense Authorization Act. With regard to military contracting, this iteration of the Act mandated an increased reliance on private sector resources for commercial products and services. Prior to the 1996 NDAA, Congress had called upon Department of Defense to work with the private sector but in specified situations enumerated in the legislation. This time the Act made a generalized call for increased reliance on private sector sources. Section 357 authorized the Secretary of Defense to seek private sector alternatives, where available, to commercial products or services that are otherwise provided by government officials (NDAA 1996). Two months later, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry took up the mantle of military neoliberalization. In the Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Perry extolled the virtues of the private sector and the need of the Pentagon to act more like commercial industry. “By focusing on core competencies,” he said, private companies “have reduced their costs by lowering overhead and improved their performance. Major opportunities exist for the Department to operate more efficiently and effectively by turning over to the private sector many non-core activities…To implement this strategy, the Department has been systematically examining opportunities for privatizing, as well as reviewing both institutional and statutory obstacles to its full utilization” (Perry 1996: 15). Perry did more than just endorse the principles of outsourcing, privatization and deregulation in the defence field as recommended by the Commission on Roles and Missions. He made it clear
that the Department of Defense would continue to make the search for privatization opportunities part of the Pentagon’s regular review processes.

As mandated in the 1996 NDAA, Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Paul Kaminski requested the Defense Science Board to make recommendations for outsourcing and privatization in the military. In August of that year, the DSB Task Force released a report that all but presented privatization and outsourcing as the nostrum to cure all that ailed the Department of Defense. As a matter of both “principle and sound policy,” the Task Force argued that by aggressively outsourcing and privatizing key functions, the Department of Defense could generate annual savings of $7 to $12 billion by the year 2002. With tremendous alacrity the report proclaimed that the Department of Defense “needs a revolution in business affairs to support the revolution in military affairs” (US Department of Defense 1996: 1), and that “outsourcing savings must be used to preserve the superiority of US military technology and force effectiveness” (US Department of Defense 1996: 3). The Task Force’s enthusiasm for outsourcing and privatization was dampened by subsequent studies that questioned its “overly optimistic” cost savings projections (Government Accountability Office 1998a). It was not all a matter of locating efficiencies in the private sector. In an otherwise, arch-neoliberal planning document, the Task Force made important restrictions on privatizing functions that are inherently governmental in nature or directly impact war fighting capability or other functions “for which no adequate private sector capability exists or can be expected to be established” (US Department of Defense 1996: 6A). Nevertheless, the Task Force’s language is striking in assimilation of business logic into the workings of the Department of Defense.

In May 1997, the Department of Defense undertook its first Quadrennial Defense Review, a comprehensive review process initiated by the US Congress in 1996 to analyze
strategic objectives and prospective threats after the end of the Cold War. The inaugural report covered a wide range of subjects that would be expected of a high-level defence planning document in such a transitional period. The role of the private sector featured prominently. In the introductory message, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen talks about fundamentally reengineering the defence infrastructure to take advantage of the Revolution in Business Affairs that had so transformed the commercial sector. “Over the past decade,” he continues,

…the American commercial sector has reorganized, restructured, and adopted revolutionary new business and management practices in order to ensure its competitive edge in the rapidly changing global marketplace. It has worked. Now the Department must adopt and adapt the lessons of the private sector if our armed forces are to maintain their competitive edge in the rapidly changing global security arena…

We are examining the best opportunities to outsource and privatize non-core activities, but many of those opportunities are restrained by regulations and practices built up during the Cold War. We need to deregulate defence just as we have deregulated many other American industries so we can reap the cost and creativity benefits of wide-open private competition. A guiding principle of the American government is that the government should not perform private sector-type functions, and this should also be true of the defence sector unless a compelling military need is demonstrated (US Department of Defense 1997, emphasis added).

In November 1997, Cohen reiterated this message in a report of the Defense Reform Initiative. In it, he marked a break with historical practices of the Department of Defense saying that antiquated support models and defence-unique cultures that do not correspond to the corporate world “cannot and will not continue” (Cohen 1997). The Secretary of Defense directed the different services to develop plans that would cut the equivalent of 150,000 active military personnel. This would save between $4 and $6 billion by 2003 (Government Accountability Office 1998b).

Against the backdrop of this neoliberal reform, the Department of Defense underwent some of the transformations mandated by policy-makers. US forces began operations in the Balkans in December 1995 with force levels reaching as high as twenty thousand troops. In this
time, the Army contracted with over one hundred firms, the largest of which was a contract with Brown and Root Services (formerly KBR). BRS performed the vast majority of operations and maintenance, and construction tasks for the US contingent worth $2.168 billion between 1995 and 2000. This included building large portions of base camps in Kosovo, including Camp Bondsteel which was erected in a matter of months and designed to accommodate five thousand individuals. Though the contract produced the infrastructure needed to fulfill mission requirements, the Balkans Support Contract faced criticisms that foreshadowed contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was criticized for a lack of oversight brought on by confusion over the government’s authority under the contract, insufficient training for contract managers, and frequent turnover in oversight personnel (Government Accountability Office 2000a). When the initial contract with BRS expired in 1997, US Army Europe elected to continue with the firm, rather than switch to DynCorp which had been awarded the Army umbrella contract LOGCAP II (Congressional Budget Office 2005). LOGCAP II ran from 1997 until December 2001 and was worth a total of $102 million (Chaterjee 2009).

In the second half of the 1990s, military neoliberalization programs continued to shed the non-core competencies of the Pentagon bureaucracy. As of the beginning of fiscal year 1996, officials estimated that Department of Defense had outsourced about 37 percent of its overall workforce connected with commercial activities. The Air Force estimated that it had outsourced 64 percent of its workforce performing commercial activities. The Army estimated that it had outsourced 32 percent of its workforce, while the Navy estimated its own efforts at about 31 percent (Government Accountability Office 1997: 5). Longer-term data is more difficult to assess. The GAO found that savings were, indeed, being made by the Department of Defense in the 1995 to 2000 period due to competitive sourcing, base closures and personnel reductions. But
the GAO noted the difficulty of calculating precise savings because of limitations in the
Pentagon’s baseline cost data (Government Accountability Office 2000a). Part of the problem
was a general lack of in-house capability to manage and oversee contracts, a problem that would
continue to undermine contracting cost control during the post-September 11 wars. The shortage
of contractor acquisition personnel illustrates the significantly diminished institutional capacity
to perform this kind of oversight. Though the Department of Defense had long experienced a
shortage of contract acquisition personnel, the drawdown of forces in the 1990s exacerbated this
problem. During this period, acquisition capabilities were considerably diminished while defence
spending increased exponentially. Between 1992 and 2006, the dollar value of Army contracts
increased by 331 percent and the number of contract actions increased by 654 percent in the
same period. But the expansion of contracting was not met with a concomitant expansion of
oversight capabilities. Between 1996 and 2004, the acquisition organization workforce actually
decreased by 25 percent (Gansler Commission 2007: 29-30). Whether or not outsourcing
actually led to savings, the overall plan was clear: the Department of Defense was to be
reorganized according to the best practices of the private sector, consistent with the prevailing
orthodoxy of new public management and roll-back neoliberalism.

Neoliberalization Under George W. Bush

Military neoliberalization, which had begun as policy in the 1980s and enthusiastically
adopted in the 1990s, continued at full speed in the early years of the first George W. Bush
administration. Early in his first term, President Bush released a management agenda with a
vision of government reform disciplined by competitive market-based principles. This, he said,
entails “actively promoting rather than stifling innovation through competition” (Bush 2002: 4).
Bush’s management agenda, of course, applied equally to the national security apparatus, whose neoliberal roll-back had accelerated under the Clinton administration. In this regard, the program articulated in the President’s Management Agenda and the initiatives brought forward by incoming Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, was a continuation of existing policy.

During Rumsfeld’s second tenure at the Pentagon (2001-2006), the United States embarked on an explicit program of roll-back outsourcing and privatization. Like his predecessor, he intended to incorporate the logic of the private sector into the operations of the Pentagon apparatus. Rumsfeld, though, did so in a characteristic style that serves to underscore the centrality of market principles to his management at the Pentagon. His September 10, 2001 speech to assembled Pentagon employees at an Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week has been widely reported but it is well worth revisiting his words for what they portend. In his remarks he draws a direct connection between neoliberal restructuring and national security. Rumsfeld begins with an introduction to a new threat to American security. “The topic today,” he says,

…is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America. This adversary is one of the world’s last bastions of central planning. It governs by dictating five-year plans. From a single capital, it attempts to impose its demands across time zones, continents, oceans and beyond. With brutal consistency, it stifles free thought and crushes new ideas. It disrupts the defense of the United States and places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk. Perhaps this adversary sounds like the former Soviet Union, but that enemy is gone: our foes are more subtle and implacable today. You may think I’m describing one of the last decrepit dictators of the world. But their day, too, is almost past, and they cannot match the strength and size of this adversary. The adversary’s closer to home. It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy…Let’s make no mistake: The modernization of the Department of Defense is a matter of some urgency. In fact, it could be said that it’s a matter of life and death, ultimately, every American’s (Rumsfeld 2001).

The ever-quotable Secretary may have taken some dramatic license with his rhetoric, but he certainly came by the principles honestly. This approach was a reflection of the approach he took as the CEO of the pharmaceutical company Searle after his first tour as Defense Secretary
in the Gerald Ford administration (1975-1977). At Searle, his rule of business was “Prune business, products, activities and people” (Rumsfeld 2011: 250). His approach worked to great success and inculcated in him an appreciation for lean operations in the private sector. Upon his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld’s plan for the Pentagon bureaucracy was an alloy of neoliberalism and national security.

Department of Defense restructuring continued to be an important element of Rumsfeld’s plan for the Pentagon, even as international terrorism overtook all other concerns. In early 2002, Rumsfeld published an article in *Foreign Affairs* laying out his vision for the transformation of the US military. Among the changes was a plan to extend defence transformation to the institutional composition of the Pentagon. Rumsfeld asserted the need to “promote a more entrepreneurial approach: one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and to behave less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be ‘validated’ but rather anticipates them before they appear and develops new capabilities to dissuade and deter them” (Rumsfeld 2002: 29). Rumsfeld’s statements read like a manifesto for the neoliberal roll-back of the largest bureaucracy in the US government. His language of entrepreneurship and venture capitalism in these early declarations would be transformed into standard operating practices over the course of the next decade.

Rumsfeld’s public statements reinforced the existing reform initiatives inherited from the Clinton years. More significantly they foreshadowed the massive outsourcing in Iraq and Afghanistan and under LOGCAP III and IV. In December 2001, LOGCAP III was the first contract program awarded during the post-September 11 era and was awarded to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root with a cumulative value of $35.7 billion.2 This contract was

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structured according to a three-tiered incentive arrangement. The first tier was an unlimited firm-fixed price whereby the Department of Defense and the contractor agree to a fixed price for services rendered, and the contractor assumes responsibility for all costs incurred. The second tier was “cost-plus-fixed-fee” where the Department of Defense provides payments for allowable incurred costs to an extent enumerated in the contract. The third tier was cost-plus-award-fee, which does not set fixed payment criteria above and beyond the initial contract value. This cost-plus award structure has been widely criticized as the source of over billing, abuse and fraud (Government Accountability Office 2006a). Though LOGCAP II, awarded in 1997, had a one-year lifespan, the Pentagon retained the right to extend it every year for a maximum of nine years, until January 31, 2012 (Chaterjee 2009). However, in July 2006, the Pentagon announced the cancellation of the LOGCAP III contract and introduced the implementation of LOGCAP’s fourth iteration. As of 2011, three companies, DynCorp, Fluor Intercontinental, and KBR carry out contracts under LOGCAP IV with a projected value of $150 billion by 2017 (Hedgepeth 2007).


The decade of military contracting was unprecedented in its size and scope, brought about by the bubble created by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Through the tumult of these conflicts, contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan became a focal point of discontent in the Pentagon and in the broader public. Reports of fraud, waste, abuse, murder and even torture brought unwelcome attention to an industry uncomfortable in the public spotlight (Scahill 2007; Zagorin 2007). Yet, the role of contractors remained indispensable in Iraq and Afghanistan, and threats to outlaw contractors, particularly armed paramilitary guards, were both unconvincing and

A shift in attitudes towards the roll-back dimensions of military neoliberalization of military functions associated can be traced through official documents outlining the strategic direction of the Department of Defense. Chief among those documents are the Quadrennial Defense Reviews of the period. Analysis of language used by the Pentagon to incorporate private military firms, and the private sector more broadly, into its operations is an effective way to track the arc of military neoliberalization over the crucial 2001 to 2010 period. What it reveals is a considerable change in Pentagon attitudes away from the 1990s enthusiasm for outsourcing to a much more cautious approach, which is especially true of the 2010 iteration.

Mostly written before the September 11 attacks, the 2001 QDR adapts existing Pentagon thinking into the new global security environment. Donald Rumsfeld’s foreword to the 2001 review reasserts existing priorities about the centrality of homeland defence and asymmetrical threat preparation. However, much of this new direction is framed by the need to revitalize the Department of Defense according to the principles of private sector efficiency standards. Continuing trends that accelerated in the 1990s, the 2001 QDR articulated a need to transform America’s military capability, as well as the internal structures of the Department of Defense, beyond strategy and force structure. More specifically, Rumsfeld was interested in bureaucratic reform that would efficiently integrate and mobilize civilian resources at the Department’s disposal.
With regard to research and development, the QDR prescribed that the Department of Defense embark on a “quiet revolution” to integrate its research and development practices with the private sector. The Pentagon, it said, will rely on the private sector to provide much of the leadership in developing new technologies into the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will “turn to private enterprise for new ways to move ideas from the laboratory to the operating forces, to draw upon the innovations of the private sector,” and to “blend government and private research where appropriate” (US Department of Defense 2001: 41). Shortly thereafter, the QDR stresses an important caveat – that “only those functions that must be performed by Department of Defense should be kept by Department of Defense. Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function… Aggressively pursuing this effort to improve productivity requires a major change in the culture of the Department” (US Department of Defense 2001: 53). Three broad categories will guide decisions about what is core and what is not: functions directly linked to war fighting and best performed by the federal government; functions indirectly linked to war fighting capability that must be shared with the private sector; and functions not linked to war fighting and best performed by the private sector. In these areas, Department of Defense would look to privatize or outsource “entire functions or define new mechanisms for partnerships with private firms or other public agencies” (US Department of Defense 2001: 54).

Four years later, the Department of Defense released the first QDR that accounted for the unanticipated problems with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In keeping with its predecessor, the 2006 document reiterates the concern that the armed forces are hampered by inefficient business practices” (US Department of Defense 2006: 63). However, it goes deeper, reconceptualising the full scope of resources available to the Pentagon in a way that blends the
notions of the public and private sphere. According to the 2006 QDR, the Department’s Total Force will consist of four components: its active and reserve military components, civil servants, and its contractors, thus constituting the aggregate US war fighting capability and capacity (US Department of Defense 2006: 75). In this reconfigured Total Force, “a new balance of skills must be coupled with greater accessibility to people so that the right forces are available at the right time. Both uniformed and civilian personnel must be readily available to joint commanders” (US Department of Defense 2006). Here, in no uncertain terms, the Pentagon integrates private sector contracting into its organizational logic as a means of rolling back the “non-core” functions identified in the 2001 review.

But this firm support for roll-back reform was short lived. The period between 2006 and 2010 did a great deal to change Pentagon thinking about contractor operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Iraq war, contracting abuses had been exposed to public scrutiny. Largely unaccountable cost-plus incentive contracts led to billing scandals and calls for increased oversight (Government Accountability Office 2006a; Government Accountability Office 2006b). More significant, however, was the increasing notoriety of armed security guards operating in Iraq and especially the highly publicized killing of seventeen Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007 by Blackwater contractors (Broder and Risen 2007). Sensitive to the changing dynamics of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2010 QDR reassessed the role of private contractors and conveys the strategic need to reconfigure the way contractors are integrated into US war efforts.

Much more cautious and circumscribed, the language of the 2010 QDR calls for a more systematic approach to Defense partnerships with the private sector. Quite unlike the unalloyed calls for outsourcing and privatization of the previous reviews, the Pentagon in 2010 took a much more interventionist and managerial view of wartime contractors and contracting. In the
document, Department of Defense’s strategic direction on contracting recommended action on four issues. The first pair involves slowing the unchecked process of outsourcing that had characterized the previous two review periods. The second pair of issues involves intensifying the role of the Pentagon as a facilitator of public-private partnerships that reach deeper into the civilian institutions and networks of American society.

Chief among the stated directions was a reduction of the US military’s dependence on contracting. Between 2010 and 2015, the Department of Defense would aim to reduce the number of support service contractors from 39 percent of the current workforce to 26 percent (pre-2001 levels) and, in some cases, replace them with government employees (US Department of Defense 2010: 55). The QDR admitted that services provided by contractors are a crucial part of military strategy in conflict zones, but the military must include this sector in such a way that balances mission requirements and overall return. While maintaining the language of a “total workforce” that includes military, civilian and contractor personnel, the Department of Defense made a significant qualification to the composition of the workforce. By reducing the number of contractors, the Department of Defense will be able to more appropriately align public and private sector functions, which will result in “better value for the taxpayer” (US Department of Defense 2010: 55-56, emphasis added). The phrase “more appropriately” was left undefined in the discussion of force reduction. However, clues to its meaning are discernible in the review’s language about striking a balance among the components of the renamed “total defense workforce,” which is the second strategic recommendation. Here, the 2010 QDR called upon the Department of Defense to find the “right mix” of military, government, civilian and contractors with the right competencies. The Department of Defense must assess whether it possesses the right workforce of size and mix in order to “establish a balanced workforce that appropriately
aligns functions to the public and private sector” (US Department of Defense 2010: xii). Here again, the parameters of appropriate alignment are left undefined, but it is difficult to imagine that “finding the right mix” would involve anything other than rolling-out greater bureaucratic oversight, re-regulation and management.

Textual support for this assumption emerges in the second pair of reforms, which began by demanding a more active role for the Pentagon bureaucracy in the contracting process. Predictably but importantly, it called for improved accountability mechanisms for overseeing contracting. The QDR states that Department of Defense needs to “better align profitability with performance by linking contract fee structures with contractor performance.” This involves “rigorously examining service-based contracts to ensure that fees are properly earned, eliminating the use of no-bid contracts whenever possible, and ensuring that multiyear contracts are limited to instances in which real, substantial savings are accrued to the taxpayer” (US Department of Defense 2010: 79). This is a logical step after years of unheeded calls from the US Government Accountability Office, among others, to improve the structuring and oversight of military outsourcing.

Most profound, however, is the QDR’s recommendation that the Department of Defense extend the scope of its public-private partnership and improve the way it engages with its civilian industrial, commercial and intellectual base. Though large-scale industrial providers, like Boeing, Lockheed Martin and KBR, play a unique role as exclusive weapons suppliers, the QDR acknowledged that the US military relies on a “complex and integrated supply chain of product providers that, if strained at the second, third and even fourth tiers,” would compromise the ability of major first tier providers to continue provisioning the armed forces (US Department of Defense 2010: 82). Understanding the cascading effects of Pentagon decision-making is crucial
to ensure that all actors along the supply chain are integrated into Department of Defense procurement strategy. The QDR went on to identify a number of previously overlooked sectors crucial to the field of military contracting. At the third and fourth tiers, the Pentagon identified small, highly specialized companies that are subcontracted by major suppliers. Moreover, the QDR identified the significant role played by the financial community in the US that provides venture funding to small technology start-ups, and the debt markets that provide capital support to major long-term programs.

Elsewhere in the 2010 QDR, the Department of Defense recognized that not all technological innovations arise from specifically contracted or sub-contracted companies. The vast majority of innovative advancements come from the commercial marketplace in small defence companies or in research universities. In order to expand the scope of Pentagon resources, the QDR asserted that the Department of Defense would “work to establish requirements and pursue specific programs that take full advantage of the entire spectrum of the industrial base at our disposal: defence firms, purely commercial firms, and the increasingly important sector of those innovative and technologically advanced firms and institutions that fall somewhere in between” (US Department of Defense 2010). Though it is not explicitly stated, reaching deep into American society for assistance with defence procurement would entail significant bureaucratic involvement and the development of networked forms of governance to provide a regulatory environment that will facilitate partnerships between the US military and the industrial-commercial-academic complex.

**Rolled-out neoliberalism in the post-September 11 period**

While the 2010 QDR called for new forms of regulation, bringing nearly a decade of largely unrestrained contracting under regulatory control has proven extremely difficult.
Currently, US military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan is subject to an overlapping *ad hoc* patchwork of regulation, dispersed across multiple jurisdictions and authorities. Most of the existing regulatory framework is comprised of scattered directives issued at all levels of civilian and military decision-making authority, while more formalized approaches attempting to roll-out oversight regimes have been slow in developing. But the patchwork of law and regulation acts as a limited framework for functional and legal governance of the domestic private military industry.

There is no single governing body or statute to look to for guidance. Instead, regulation in the US is an act of multi-level governance that spreads regulatory authority across different agencies at the federal and state levels, working through military, criminal and civil law, and contractual law. Internationally, US contractors are subject to international laws (to which the US is party) and local laws in the host states where contractors carry out their work. Each regulatory level creates room for public control over contractor activity. Many of these regulations predate the post-Cold War emergence of the private military industry, and many predate its post-September 11 boom. Those that do amount to the regulatory landscape in which contracting during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars was undertaken, and the framework onto which new regulation was constructed. As Huskey and Sullivan argue, the need to create a stronger accountability regime has yielded alterations to existing civil and criminal liability laws which have yet to be fully tested (2012: 349). Reregulation has also yielded entirely new legislative requirements and restrictions that are layered atop existing regulation.

The oldest relevant statutes date back to attempts by the First Congress to combat piracy with the US Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction. This legislation allows individuals to be tried in US courts for crimes committed in international waters or at US-operated facilities
(Price 2012). In 1892, the Anti-Pinkerton Act was enacted in order to prohibit contracts for quasi-military services, usually employed as strike breakers (Elsea 2010). The primary instrument for controlling the sale of military equipment and services is the Arms Export Control Act of 1968 (AECA). It authorizes the President to “control the import and the export of defence articles and defence services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the US involved in the export and import of such articles and services” (Caparini 2007: 159). The US introduced the AECA to provide the authority to control the export of defence material and services.

In the 1980s arms brokering and the export of military services were included in the Act after the State Department discovered that firms in the US were providing training to individuals overseas contrary to US national interests (Schreier and Caparini 2005). The AECA is implemented through the International Transfer of Arms Regulation (ITAR) which governs services sold by the private sector to foreign states. Deborah Avant observes that ITAR was designed to improve functional regulatory control over private sales of military goods and services such that all transactions served US interests (Avant 2005). At the centre of the ITAR is a licensing regime that requires the State Department to notify Congress of contracts exceeding $50 million, sold to non-NATO and non-allied countries. But the ITAR has been widely criticized for being ineffectual. For example, the $50 million threshold for reporting has been criticized for being easily circumvented by breaking up larger contracts which would allow for large arms and services transfers to take place without Congressional approval (Kinsey 2005). Moreover, there is no formal oversight or reporting process, while contracts are administered in an ad hoc manner by multiple departments and agencies (Holmqvist 2005). In practice, though, oversight usually falls to US embassy officials in the contracting country.
Part of the challenge of mixing the private sector in conflict zones is the delicate nature of who gets to dispense lethal force. In US regulatory parlance, this is the essence of “inherently governmental functions.” Multiple federal regulations attempt to address this question and establish clear parameters for what military contractors can and cannot do. The Federal Acquisition Regulations System (FAR) established in 1984 established uniform policies and procedures relating to acquisitions by all executive agencies. Among other things, it codifies examples of inherently governmental functions, including the use of force, which are always supposed to be executed by government employees. It also includes requirements that contractors develop internal ethics policies and compliance programs to prevent misconduct and comport to federal law (Government Accountability Office 2009b). In 1998, “inherently governmental functions” was redefined in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act to cover activities that require discretionary or value judgements on behalf of the Federal Government that are intimately related to the public interests of the US or can “significantly affect the life, liberty or property of private persons” (Elsea 2010; Congressional Budget Office 2008). The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is the Department of Defense’s FAR implementation regulation. It regulates armed security contractors insofar as it limits the extent to which contract personnel may be hired to guard military installations and mandates contractual provisions for contractors accompanying US Armed forces deployed overseas. Contractors are considered civilians accompanying US forces and are not authorized to use deadly force except in cases of self-defence. This was altered in 2006 when the Department of Defense created an exception for private security contractors which authorized them to use deadly force when necessary to execute the missions defined in their contract (Elsea 2010).
The most significant extensions of regulatory control are legal provisions that enable the US to prosecute civilian contractors that commit offenses outside US territorial borders. Here, the two relevant pieces of legislation are the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). The UCMJ, codified in 1950, replaced the Articles of War as the US military’s legal code providing it with prosecutorial jurisdiction over military personnel. It originally applied in “times of war” to uniformed service members and civilians serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field (Price 2012). This limited the scope of jurisdiction to operations during declared wars, of which there have been none since the end of World War II.

In response to the inadequacy of the law’s coverage, the jurisdictional language of the UCMJ was expanded in a 2006 amendment to the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. Article 2(a) (10) extended jurisdiction to persons accompanying and armed force in the field during times of both war and “contingency operation.” Contingency operations are defined as military operations that are “designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are, or may become involved, in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the US or against an opposing military force” (Masterton 2009: 71). Prior to the 2006 amendment, the UCMJ was only applicable during formal states of war, the last of which was declared by the US in 1942. Clearly, the amendment to the UCMJ is a significant expansion of the scope of the law. There are, however, considerable limitations that arise from precise definitions of “in the field,” as well as the constitutionality of trying civilians in a military court (Masterton 2009; Ryngaert 2008). More problematically, the 2006 amendment only applies to Department of Defense contractors despite the sixteen other Federal agencies and departments that have supported contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Commission
on Wartime Contracting 2011: 145). In March 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued an instruction clarifying the process by which Defense would work with the Department of Justice to establish how civilian courts-martial would proceed (Gates 2008).

The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was originally passed in 2000 to extend prosecutorial jurisdiction over contractors employed by the Department of Defense who commit crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year in the United States. It was revised in 2004 to extend criminal jurisdiction to contractors “supporting the mission of the Department of Defense” and again in 2007 to extend to all contractors working in a contingency operation (Government Accountability Office 2008). Like the UCMJ, the legislation is limited to the prosecution of US civilian contractors supporting the mission of the Department of Defense, but not to those contracted with agents outside this clause. Also like the UCMJ, the Department of Defense issued regulations requiring coordination between the Pentagon and the Departments of Justice and State. Between the UCMJ and MEJA, the US exerts significant legal control over its own contractors thereby extending governance to personnel in conflict zones. The effectiveness of these legal remedies are questionable given the difficulty of investigating crimes in a war zone, but their existence nonetheless amounts to a degree of statutory reregulation that resolves the “vacuum of law” or “ungovernance” that some observers noted in the early 2000s (Singer 2004; Leander 2002).

In addition to the UCMJ and MEJA, the annual defence spending bill, National Defense Authorization Acts, have been used to mandate regulatory mechanisms to agencies employing military contractors. The 2006 and 2007 NDAAs directed the Department of Defense to develop strategic plans to assess critical competencies of its civilian workforce. In 2008, the Pentagon was directed to develop specific plans to govern civilian defence workforces as well as statutory
obligations to improve contracting oversight, reporting and accounting. The 2008 NDAA also mandated the establishment of a coordinated database for contractor information among the three largest departments (Defense, State and USAID). In 2009, the NDAA outlined whistleblower protections, ethics guidelines and importantly, prohibited contractor activities in particularly sensitive areas of military activity like prisoner interrogation. In 2010, competitive bidding processes were mandated before any civilian Department of Defense function is converted to the private sector. In 2011, specific standards and certification requirements were established for armed contractors in conflict zones. These include penalties in the award and fee processes against contractors who fail to comply with regulatory requirements; extensions of regulatory authority over “significant military operations” where only “combat regulations” were previously covered; establishing performance standards for programs like weapons training; and requirements to report on deaths inflicted on civilians (Huskey and Sullivan 2012: 346; Ettinger 2011).

Legal commenters note that the extension of law and regulation to military contractors in the US has not kept pace with the industry’s development and that the US regulatory regime is incomplete and scattered across multiple levels of legislative authority (Tonkin 2011; Schreier and Caparini 2005). Huskey and Sullivan (2012: 380) strike an optimistic note about domestic regulation of US military contractors. They suggest that advancements in oversight and accountability mechanisms are important expansions of state regulatory control over the industry and should not be dismissed lightly. In a sense, they are correct. What needs to be recognized is that there is no consideration of legislating military contractors out of the logic of military planning nor is there a serious questioning of contractors’ value to military operations within policy circles. To the contrary, the logic of neoliberal outsourcing of military tasks fits snugly
within the current paradigm of force planning. As Leander and Spearin (2013: 204) put it, “[g]overnment must catch up with commercialization; it is not expected to (re)claim commercially performed tasks.”

At the global level, market enabling regulation is also the priority of policy-makers. Currently, international law and regulation is overlain and interconnected in a “responsibility matrix” that ties together state, international and corporate social responsibility (White 2012). Here too, legal commenters remark upon the inadequacy of global accountability mechanisms (Huskey 2012). Global corporate social responsibility initiatives like the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct have sought to codify “good practices” through the soft law of voluntary industry standards (ICOC-PSP 2010; Montreux Document 2008). More stringent “hard law” advocates have aimed at developing a UN Convention to regulate corporate military firms (del Prado 2012). Beginning in 2011, a UN working group has been developing a charter though any ratification is many years away. After all, the UN Convention on mercenaries took over twenty years to come into effect (Singer 2004). At the levels of state, interstate and global corporate spheres of authority, regulation is decidedly market-enabling. There is no push to accomplish anything that would limit global market competition among firms. Rather, states and industry advocates have cooperated to create a common vernacular for the global business. More broadly, the industry has used regulation to legitimize the business, normalize the practice of military and security contracting, and secure a permissive regulatory regime in which it can operate into the future (Ostensen 2011).

Conclusion

The global mainstreaming of private military contracting is an American and neoliberal phenomenon. It is led by American firms and industry associations seeking to extend the
industry’s profitability beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As this chapter has illustrated, the process by which the global industry developed was long and driven by a particular conception of neoliberal capitalism. Neoliberalization of the Department of Defense represents an incursion of the logic of capitalism into the logic of security policy, which has now reached global proportions.

Analyzing the role of the US contractor workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is evident that the neoliberal transformation of the US military has a significant and necessary relationship with the scale and scope of contracting. Military neoliberalization created the institutional circumstances and ideological support for the kind of Armed Forces that relies so much on private sector participation. As the preceding section demonstrates, between 1985 and 2000, the US embarked on a program to affect “a revolution in business affairs” within the institutional structure of the Department of Defense. After September 11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan served to magnify the role that the private sector plays in US military organization.

Neoliberalization, as argued earlier, is a process which passes through two phases in an uneven manner. The early form was broad based in its principle as seen in the pronouncements of successive Defense Secretaries in the 1990s and 2000s. In practice, however, some functions were “more neoliberalized” than others. Or stated differently, uneven military neoliberalization affects the degree of contracting in different areas of the Department of Defense’s jurisdiction. In this way, unevenness is spread across the institutional space of the Pentagon and is observable in the way military tasks are distributed across the public and the private end of the partnership.

The table below provides a snapshot of this constitutive unevenness. Logistical functions are almost entirely outsourced but force application and command and control remain the purview of the public military. Other functions remain differentially shared between the public
and private sector. Unevenness is also evident in the rolled-out reregulation of the industry by the US. As the post-September 11 wars unfolded, piecemeal reregulation was enacted as a reaction to the unforeseen problems arising out of military neoliberalization in Iraq and Afghanistan. At each turn of re-regulation, the new requirements are nearly always market-enabling. They permit the ongoing participation of the private sector in wartime situations while attempting to stave off the negative externalities that befell the US in Iraq and Afghanistan.

![Military and Contractor Personnel by Function in Iraq Q3 2008](image)

*Figure 6.1 source: Commission on Wartime Contracting (2011)*

It appears, at this point in history, that solutions to these externalities will be sought within the neoliberal management paradigm. Since the lock-in effects it institutionalized are particularly difficult to change, reforms will likely come from within, and they already have as
discussed above. This does not preclude change, of course. Two generations of Selective Service gave way to the All-Volunteer Force but not without internal pressure and external shocks. But it does not appear as if military neoliberalization faces any challengers as the overriding economic principle of defence personnel procurement. Nor does it appear as if the post-September 11 wars have had the same traumatic effects on the military as did the Vietnam War. For the foreseeable future, roll-out military neoliberalism will most likely be the norm of US military organization. Whether or not roll-out neoliberal reforms work remains an open question.

This chapter takes a long route to making the core argument of the broader inquiry. It argues that the absence of the draft in the United States and processes of military neoliberalization are necessary conditions to explain the differences in military contracting between the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars. Arriving at this point requires a mode of analysis that allows the two key determinants to be given relative historical weighting. The exposition demonstrates that the two determinants interact in specific ways and in a particular sequence that generated the unprecedented scale and scope of military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results are twofold: first, it resolves the overdetermination problem discussed in chapter five. Second, it answers the fundamental question that frames this study. Changes in the operational political economy of the United States and the institutional manpower procurement regime account for the differences between Vietnam-era and post-September 11 contracting in the United States. More broadly it offers insights into the deep interpenetration of market forces in the institutional composition of US defence institutions and American force projection in the twenty-first century. Even more abstractly it underscores the nature of the state in this stage of advanced and globalized capitalism.
Chapter 7
The Neoliberal Way of War

The story of American contractors on the battlefield is the story of the slow and deliberate expansion of private sector participation in war. In this study, military neoliberalization is grounded in a Polanyian premise that the mutual embeddedness of economics and politics should also consider the embeddedness of war planning within its political economic context. This perspective takes a new approach to one of the most scrutinized institutions in the United States. It treats the military as a site of contestation over ideas about public service delivery, a dynamic configuration of power and practice, and a barometer of the market’s incursion into some of the most fundamental responsibilities of the modern state. It is tempting to rely upon an ideal-typical conception of the military apparatus as a public entity dispensing public goods. But this is not the case, nor has it really ever been the case. The American military did not materialize from nothing to become a fully public agency of the federal government. It evolved through periods of minimalist decentralization to the extreme centralization of total war, from coercive impressment to strict volunteerism; each fluctuation embodying its own systematic and contingent patterns. The cases presented in this study explore episodes in American history where the military experimented with different mixtures of draftees, volunteers and private actors. What they reveal is the ongoing negotiation of the military’s composition and the significance of prevailing ideas about how the public armed forces should be constituted. The very same debate occurs in every other field of public service delivery and has for some time. But American military neoliberalization has far reaching implications on the theory and practice of politics.
Before discussing those implications, it is worth reviewing where this study fits in the literature. The introduction suggested that this inquiry spans the two traditions of security studies and political economy. Its application of a critical theoretical perspective, typically found in International Political Economy literature, to a subject that is more commonly studied within the ambit of International Relations attempts to bridge a gap between two research traditions. In this sense, the major contributions of this study can be mapped onto the empirical terrain of IR and the theoretical terrain IPE.

Theoretically the study contributes a conceptual elaboration of variegated neoliberalization that is particularly salient to theorists of neoliberal capitalism. Articulating neoliberalization is a particularly difficult task because its root concept – neoliberalism – is claimed by many intellectual traditions. Therefore this study devoted a great deal of space to elaborating this core concept in order to assist in the historical exposition of the idea that moved military neoliberalization in the United States. The empirical study, then, is outfitted with a theoretically robust conception of neoliberalism supported by a philosophically sophisticated frame and a pragmatic way of operationalizing neoliberalism in time. Chapter two adds to the conceptual architecture of neoliberalism in a novel way by introducing the non-Euclidian notion of spatial development. Space does not need to have height, width and depth. Space, as is argued, can be conceptual; therefore neoliberalization can occur within the conceptual space of an institution. Applying this concept to the US Department of Defense makes it possible to observe and then explain why different parts of the military have been differently neoliberalized – because the concept of neoliberalization has diffused unevenly throughout the institution. Moreover, the uneven roll-out of neoliberalism helps to explain ongoing processes of re-regulation of the private military sector.
Empirically, the study contributes a comparative case study of military contracting in two of the most controversial and contested wars in US history. The politics of the Vietnam and post-September 11 wars will remain an open question for a long time to come and research will continue to search for answers to the big questions that will always perplex. This study adds a new dimension to an underexplored area of private sector participation in the Vietnam War. It also contributes to the protean literature on the post-September 11 wars in general, and the private military industry in particular.

The starting point for this inquiry is a relatively simple historical trend: what accounts for the five-fold increase in private sector contractors from the Vietnam War to the post-September 11 wars? The answer turns on two necessary conditions of wartime contracting that differed in the two eras. In this study, they have been defined as ideational and institutional factors. Ideationally, The Vietnam War and the post-September 11 wars, though similar in important ways, differed in their political economic context. Military manpower decision making at the Department of Defense was influenced by temporally distinct currents of economic thought. Vietnam-era decision makers were moved by a statist view of the military whereby coercive inductions were acceptable and could even be used to achieve broader social policy objectives. This stands in stark contrast with the neoliberal paradigm of military manpower. Neoliberal-era policy makers sought to introduce a revolution in business affairs to accompany the revolution in military affairs. Institutionally, the major difference between the Vietnam-era and post-September 11 era is the manpower procurement regime. Between 1948 and 1973, the military raised its forces through the Selective Service which shielded the military from the discipline of the labour market. After 1973, the new All-Volunteer Force regime required the Department of Defense to compete for military labour like any other employer in the market.
Although these two determinants are identified as necessary conditions of contracting in the post-September 11 wars, they did not influence outcomes equally. Using historical sequence elaboration, it is possible to evaluate the relative significance of these two factors on military contracting. In the post-September 11 wars, neoliberalism was the primary necessary determinant of contracting dynamics. As an approach to public service management, the neoliberal policies of privatization, outsourcing, deregulation and public-private partnership led to an organizational arrangement whereby the private sector and public military are co-dependent. It was a long and deliberate process that began in the 1980s and accelerated through the 1990s with the enthusiastic support of policy makers at the highest level of the Pentagon bureaucracy. As the neoliberal paradigm took hold in defence planning during the 1990s, the impulse to roll back the Defense Department bureaucracy grew stronger. During the five year engagement in Balkans the United States relied heavily on contractors to play supporting roles. In Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors not only supplemented the American armed forces but they played irreplaceable roles in the ground as force multipliers and as repositories of capabilities that did not reside within the military structure. With hindsight it is evident that the private sector was a necessary source of labour power for the US military. Neither the reticent allies and coalition partners, nor an increase in deployed US uniformed personnel were viable options. But these were long developing circumstances. The three decade process of military neoliberalization gave way to a situation whereby US operations in the post-September 11 were, by design, a public-private partnership. Therefore, this study argues that military neoliberalization is a necessary, though insufficient condition, of the scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars.
As transformative as neoliberalization was to the Department of Defense, it alone is not sufficient to explain the scale and scope of post-September 11 contracting. Institutional change within the Department of Defense provides crucial background context to the broader neoliberal shift in the American political economy. This is identified as the transition from the Selective Service draft to the All-Volunteer Force. After 1973, the military could no longer draw upon the population at will in order to fill its ranks. Of course, the military always had to work within a budget and could not be reckless in its draft inductions, but after 1973, it had to adopt the mindset of an employer in the workplace like any other. A direct tie binds institutional reform in the early 1970s and neoliberalization in subsequent decades. Amid the cacophony of draft critics from the political left and right, proto-neoliberal arguments invoked by anti-tax, small state proponents were most influential in affecting policy change. More importantly, however, it was the abandonment of the coercive draft regime that introduced the logic of labour market competition into the logic of manpower procurement. This acted as a necessary precondition for the emergence of neoliberalization and adds important historical context to its emergence in the 1980s and 1990s. The scale and scope of contracting in the post-September 11 wars is the result of long-developing trends in the political economy of the United States.

American neoliberalism raises the broader point about neoliberalization as an ongoing phenomenon in the advanced capitalist state. Military neoliberalization is the current iteration of the slow exposure of the US military to the strictures of the free market. What is occurring in the twenty-first century is the incorporation of the private, for-profit military sector into the operational logic and functioning of the US military at home and around the world. The new military hybridity goes back a long way and has many names: Eisenhower called it the “military-industrial complex,” others called it “iron triangles”; more recently this phenomenon finds new
theoretical expression in concepts like “state-corporate symbiosis” (O’Reilly 2010) or as a Bourdieusian field of international security (Williams 2012; Abrahamsen and Williams 2009). In the context of the post-September 11 wars, what is observable is the advanced capitalist state operating under an ideological paradigm whereby the devolution of fundamental state military functions to the market is, in Gramscian terms common sense – the received wisdom of the dominant class and its ideology. Military contracting on the scale and scope of the post-September 11 wars is, in its essence, the neoliberal way of war.

The Future of the Industry

The question then, is what comes next? The future of the private military sector is uncertain now that the bubble of Iraq and Afghanistan is deflating. Corrupt and murderous behaviours of contractors in the conflict zones have been exposed to the light of day and Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan continue to report on these transgressions. Moreover, the Great Recession that began in 2008 has confronted global and national varieties of neoliberalism with their underlying contradictions and the social ruptures are present for all to see. For an industry that grew out of the neoliberal political economic paradigm, these may be worrying signs but a number of developments suggest that the industry is by no means on its way out.

The first development is largely functional. Part of the reason for turning to the private sector is the need for capabilities that do not exist within the military structure and the case studies here bear this out. As technology progresses at a rapid rate, the military will continue to turn to the private sector for support. Take, for example, the production and supply of weapons systems. In this subsector, integration of public and private agencies is necessary if the military
wants to keep pace with technological development. This relationship is, perhaps, best exemplified in the area of drone and robotics development, and cyber security.

In the robotics subsector, advancements in global positioning technology have led to a proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles which have been used extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. These UAVs or drones have gone from a peripheral and even resented weapon of war to an essential tool for the US military. As in the past, the Pentagon acquired its drone fleet working in collaboration with the private sector. However, unlike previous aerospace developments, smaller manufacturers are at the forefront of military robotics, largely because drones have fewer components to manufacture, and need less logistical support to operate. This leaves leadership of capital and resource intensive projects like the F-35 and F-22 fighter jets to traditional aerospace weapons manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (Vucetic and Nossal 2013). Though, the big firms do work in collaboration with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). In either case, the private sector is intimately involved in the production, supply and maintenance of this kind of weaponry.

Similarly, the integration of advanced computer technologies into military operations will continue to require collaboration with the private sector. In the same way that militaries cannot necessarily retain in-house maintenance capabilities for sophisticated weapons systems, IT firms are superior repositories of programming expertise. This is particularly salient with regard to the maintenance of communications network infrastructure (satellite systems, net security, network integration, etc.) and biometric security systems. In the technology and communications sector, there is considerable demand for expertise needed to support both civilian and military IT infrastructure. Militarily, the demand comes from sophisticated developments in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance and Internet (C4SI) programs. Generally, the
capacity to design and maintain the hardware and software has been outsourced to commercial firms that are better situated to keep pace with technological innovations. This extends to software training and development, system modernization and monitoring, information storage and data security. The issue is especially pressing given the attention given to cyber espionage. Two of the most prominent affairs were the 2010 US-initiated Stuxnet virus that undermined Iranian nuclear centrifuges and the Chinese hacking program uncovered in 2013 (Sanger, Barboza and Perlroth 2013; Liff 2012). Both cases underscored the extent to which cyber espionage has become a matter of national security and relations between major states in world politics. Given the comparative efficiency of IT developments in the private sector, the Pentagon has made a point of collaborating with the private sector in order to expedite the development of computer systems (Lynn 2010). Indeed, it is no coincidence that private internet security companies uncovered both the Stuxnet and Chinese hacking operations.

The exponential increase in the sophistication of computer technology over the past decade has also been accompanied by the proliferation of users. Presently, the United States military seeks to incorporate individual computer hackers to identify weaknesses in its own cyber defences and those of competitor countries. Willing hackers and their small businesses can reap considerable rewards for cooperating with the US defence establishment (Perlroth and Sanger 2013; Kushner 2013). The prospect of this hacker-state symbiosis is an opportunity for both small tech companies and the US government that can avoid large fee contracts to major corporations. However, there are considerable risks to the partnership. One of the most significant events in the private entry into the IT security sector is the breach effected by tech contractor Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013. Snowden revealed details of National Security Agency surveillance programs that had been collecting aggregate data on foreign and
US residents without judicial authorization. News of the cyber dragnet raised pressing questions about the constitutionality of advanced data mining techniques. Snowden accessed this data in his capacity as an IT specialist for industry giant Booz Allen Hamilton which was under contract with the NSA. This arrangement is increasingly common in the post-September 11 era and is moving towards deeper public-private hybridity (Chesterman 2008). Recent figures indicate that the number of private companies contracted to the NSA has grown from 150 in 2001, to approximately 500 in 2010 (Priest 2013). Snowden’s security breach highlights the degree to which the private sector is involved in the most secretive practices of domestic surveillance and the potential damage that an individual contractor can bring to bear on the surveillance state itself.

Beyond territorial borders, the US has already turned to the private sector to help carry out its foreign policy. The Department of State is especially reliant upon contractors in its African regional command. Throughout the post-September 11 wars, the United States’ renewed interest in Africa came at a time when its ground forces were significantly limited by commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East. Even so, the sheer size and diversity of the continent would require a massive personnel presence to cover it in any meaningful way. The private sector, then, represents an option for carrying out US policy. In 2009, the US State Department let a five-year $1.5 billion contract for private sector provision of military and security training programs under what is now the AFRICOM geographical command. Presently, a handful of prominent firms including DynCorp, Military Professionals Resources Incorporated, and PAE Government Services are undertaking security sector reform projects with militaries and civilian police forces across the continent, as well as with the United Nations (De Nevers 2012; McFate 2008; Aning, Jaye and Atuobi 2008). Piracy in the Horn of
Africa has also garnered attention from private maritime security operations. In the absence of a capable Somali state, private counter piracy has emerged as a niche sector along the Somali coast and the shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden (Percy and Shortland 2013; Fitzsimmons 2013b; Spearin 2012; Kinsey, Hansen and Franklin 2009; Hansen 2008). Closer to home, for the United States, the private military sector is also looking to the US-Mexico border as a possible site of the next industry boom. Familiar firms like KBR, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and General Dynamics feature prominently in the militarization of the southern border. They have lobbied the Department of Homeland Security for construction and supply contracts whose costs run in the billions of dollars (Holland 2013; Lipton 2013).

This brief overview of the direction in which the industry is already headed belies any claim that the post-September 11 contracting bonanza is over. To be sure the enormous profits reaped by the private military industry in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot really be expected to last. While the sheer scale of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan may have been contingent up policy decisions to occupy and reconstruct those countries, the evolving scope of contractor participation suggests a systemic role for the private sector in the military and surveillance apparatus of the US. Moreover, the neoliberal model of public service delivery does not appear to be threatened by any other alternative as post-war Keynesianism was in the 1970s. Technical need, ideational justification and institutional demand remain firmly in place. For the private military services sector, the future looks lucrative.

What Comes Next?

If the industry is evolving, academic scholarship must do the same. Areas of future research abound and can take scholarship in multiple directions. For one, the historical tale of
contracting has barely begun to take shape. This study is based on the increasing use of contractors in war by the United States but only two conflicts are profiled. Further historical research could uncover a great deal more about how contractors were used throughout twentieth century conflicts. Of particular interest is the Korean War where existing research suggests that contractors were used in far greater numbers than ever before. It is an anomaly in history and well worth deeper exploration. Similarly, the research agenda could be extended to other countries undergoing military privatization, particularly in other NATO countries whose own varieties of neoliberalism may influence their own pathways to military neoliberalization. This is especially true in the wake of the 2008 recession. Militaries will be facing austerity pressures and the outsourcing of tasks will, no doubt, be an important part the post-recession restructuring. Moreover, there is already a literature on the possibilities and implications of contracting out peacekeeping and other UN functions (Ostensen 2013; Pattison 2010b; Bures 2005).

Regulation and re-regulation of the private military industry is currently underway and will remain a salient matter for states and the sector itself. In this study, the US is the sole focus of analysis, though other countries have developed differing regulatory regimes (or non-regimes) to address their own domestic industries. Accounts of regulatory reform at the international and corporate levels have gained in prominence and should continue to generate comparative investigations of national varieties of regulation (Leander 2013; Bakker and Sossai 2012). By the same token, industry-led reform deserves scrutiny. As the closing pages of chapter six suggested, re-regulation is driven by both states and industry actors. State-led regulation has been slow in developing while the industry has led initiatives to develop corporate regimes of self-regulation through codified industry standards. The Montreux Document, the International Code of Conduct, as well as the International Stability Operations Association code of conduct are
attempts at imposing self-discipline upon the industry in order to assuage skeptics that the transgressions of the past will remain in the past. Professionalizing the professional security industry is seen as a necessary mode of normalizing the business and assuring its profitability into the future. This issue area is one that will be watched closely by the industry and the effects and implications ought to be subject to both theoretical and empirical analysis (see for example Leander 2012).

Of course, regulation, deregulation and re-regulation are characteristic dynamics of multiple sectors in advanced capitalist economies. Ergo, the neoliberalization of the military contracting sector can be fruitfully compared with other sectors that have experienced similar (or different) trajectories. Notably, this includes the prison-industrial complex and space exploration, two sectors that have historically been administered and executed within the administrative structure of the state. Take the prison sector. Like the military, incarceration is traditionally held to be a core function of the state though it, too, has slowly and deliberately been privatized. Beginning with American political developments in the early 1970s, the United States became the site of the world’s largest prison-industrial complex, though unevenly concentrated in certain regions, particularly the South (Wood 2007). Over subsequent decades, states and the federal government undertook experiments with privatization with widely differing outcomes. Academic work has scrutinized the causes, dynamics, limits and uneven neoliberalization of prison privatization in the United States, as well as comparisons with sectoral development in other jurisdictions (Wood 2007; Culp 2005; Nossal and Wood 2004; Schlosser 1998; Lilly and Deflem 1996; Lilly and Knepper 1993). Future research into military neoliberalization and its long trajectory could well be compared with prison neoliberalization in the US and other countries.
The matter of public-private partnerships in the area of space flight looks very much like the military or prison industry. Piecemeal incursions of the private sector have yielded a hybrid industry composed of interlocking public and private agencies. Already the United States has seen entry of the private sector into space travel both by policy design and by entrepreneurial ambition (Chang 2012; Chang 2010). In 2013, the International Space Station received a delivery of supplies from the private firm SpaceX as part of a $1.6 billion contract with NASA to make twelve supply runs (Dunn 2013). The incursion (or is it excursion?) of private authority into space will be driven in part by profit and will extend the reach of neoliberalism beyond its terrestrial origins. Funding cutbacks to NASA and the retirement of the space shuttle programs have encouraged the gradual outsourcing of particular tasks to market actors. Beyond the atmosphere, however, a commercialized race is on to lay claim to something for which there is no vocabulary. State-centric perspectives are especially difficult beyond the atmosphere because territory – the physical foundation of global Westphalianism – is not applicable (Newlove-Eriksson and Eriksson 2013). The results of this sectoral variant of neoliberalization remain to be seen and should be closely watched.

Finally, as long as there are competing interests in this world, there is always the continuing story of the military-industrial complex in the United States. Though the term may be over half a century old, the pertinence of these iron triangles or power elites is as relevant as ever. The post-September 11 wars may be drawing to an end but the traditional production of military materials continues. Since this military-industrial complex now includes the commercial services of armed paramilitary contractors, any talk of the complex must also include these new corporate actors in the mix. Recalling Eisenhower’s famous farewell address where he spoke of the complex’s unwarranted influence and its endangerment of democratic processes, it is
incumbent upon observers to continuously monitor the effects of marketized recruitment systems on civil-military relations and the democratic control over force (Bacevich 2011; Avant 2010; Avant 2005). Again, this is particularly true in the post-2008 recession era with the promise of budget cuts, increasing private sector substitution for public functions and its political fallout. Here, too, scholarship must pay attention to trends in the industrial patterns of arms and personnel procurement which will, no doubt continue to fascinate and outrage. Beyond production and supply, the national security enterprise (George and Rishikoff 2011) is deeply co-constituted by public actors and private market interests. This labyrinthine field of practice is most certainly a rich vein of neoliberalization available to those observers who dare to enter.

More theoretically, this study raises a series of issues about the dynamics of war in the twenty-first century. One of its implications is the emergence of more complex combatant assemblages in twenty-first century conflict. Historical trends show an increase in internal conflicts involving more than just uniformed militaries. Participants in these kinds of wars are far more difficult to disentangle, leaving observers in the policy and academic fields scrambling to update their lexicon. While this inquiry dealt with the complexities of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, another recent example may help illustrate the trend: the 2011 Libyan conflict. In this case, local uprising among tribal groups escalated into a civil war in which multiple factions, including differently motivated foreign non-state combatants, fought for and against Gadhafi’s state regime (Gwin, 2012; Apps, 2011; Brunnerstron and Elgood, 2011). As the civil war raged, the international community was drawn into the fray in the form of humanitarian intervention. NATO and some of its constituent member states flew bombardment missions above Libya in support of the rebel coalition. In the Libyan case, the assemblage of combatants defied simple categorization, greatly complicating clear analysis and certainly post-conflict resolution. What is
needed is a conceptual framework in which to understand, classify and locate non-state actors participating in war within this spectrum. Opportunities for research are sorrowfully abundant.

Finally, and most far reaching, are the implications this study raises for the continuing evolution of the “state.” The neoliberal transformation of the state since the 1970s in the developed and developing world, across sectors and across space, is one of the deepest rearticulations of politics in modern times. This means that the evolution of the state, and the theorization of the state are both incomplete. There can be no question that a fundamental structural reality of world politics is that it takes place within the conceptual strictures of the state system whose constituent units are accorded special status. But despite the special status of this constructed entity, it is presumptuous to speak of a unitary state that holds true across time and space. As that fundamental feature of political life, the “state” is fluid, permeable, contingent and constantly evolving in both theory and practice. As a concept which organizes academic inquiry, the state is ascribed certain fundamental properties needed to begin any political analysis, each of which is in constant flux and renegotiation. Whatever the state might be, it is by no means static. Rather it is “a site of contention that overlays and is overlain by a multitude of complex phenomena. As an agent capable of its own action, the state maintains a certain peerless status among other actors at multiple scales of analysis” (Ettinger 2013: 380). Its destabilization as a concept has deep and far reaching effects on the intellectual foundations of political and moral thinking. More importantly, its destabilization in practice has serious effects on the lived experience of security for people around the world. That dimension cannot be forgotten.

Plenty of attempts have been made at conceptualizing the state, many of which are remarkable useful. To take one example, Christopher Clapham speaks of “degrees of statehood” in reference to Africa. He argues that the “displacement of the state by international economic
flows, domestic insurgency, NGOs, and the privatization/personalization of state power render the dyad too simplistic. Complex combinations of these phenomena affect the capacity of ‘states’ to live up to the ideal-types of political science. Thus, when speaking of African states, the sliding scale of statehood is far more analytically appropriate than absolute conditions of ‘quasi,’ ‘failed,’ ‘weak’ or ‘strong’” (Clapham 1998: 144). More recently, critical political economy and political sociology scholars have imported the Bourdiesian vernacular of fields of practice to articulate the state and other core concepts in International Relations (IPS 2011). Here, the state, rather than a “thing” that is relatively autonomous or an institution occupied by class power, is instead a field of practice that is constituted by densely layered practices and habits. In this literature, the prospects of fruitful research are enormous.

In summation, the incursion of the military industry into the defence sector contests the historical primacy of the state in dispensing coercive force. It was, as detailed in this study, abetted by the neoliberal paradigm of market primacy, institutional reform, the evolutions of technology, and the contingencies of American foreign engagements. What these historical forces have yielded is a phenomenon never before seen in American history: the parity of state and private sector participants in an extended conflict, not by accident, but as a matter of policy. This recent history serves as a reminder of the dynamic political economy of war and the role of ideas in its transformation. That was the past. And while predicting the future is hazardous, one forecast can be made with some confidence: that the future of conflict will be as complex as ever – moved by the forces of agency, ideology, institutions and the unknown.
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