POPULATION CONTROL AND SMALL WARS

By

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Abstract

This thesis argues that while there are various contending notions of how a government can improve its chances of success in a small war, few strategies will be effective without the application of a comprehensive program of population control measures. For this study, small wars are conflicts in which a government uses limited means to secure national objectives against an adversary who uses primarily the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Population control measures are defined as those restrictions imposed on movement, on choice of residence, and on the availability of food that protect the population from the insurgents while simultaneously denying the insurgents access to critical resources.

This work examines the vital importance of population control measures in overcoming guerrilla forces lacking external sponsors in small wars during the period 1870 to 1960. Five examples are used to determine their importance: the treatment of prairie Amerindians in the Canadian West (1870 – 1890); the guerrilla phase of the Philippine-American War (1898 – 1902); the guerrilla phase of the South African War (1899 – 1902); the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960); and the Kenyan Emergency (1952 – 1960). Within the broad strategies used to prosecute these campaigns, population control measures were a consistent feature and were instrumental in contributing to the termination of the conflicts. Despite their importance, these measures are typically overlooked or only treated superficially when discussed by historians. Therefore, to understand more fully the outcome of small wars, greater attention needs to be applied to the study of these measures.
In small wars the primary contest between the belligerents is for control of the people. For the government, the strategic value of population control measures is in how they separate the population from the guerrillas. This denies a wide range of critical resources to the guerrillas and additionally allows the government to both prosecute its campaign more effectively and protect the population better. Population control measures need to be a key component of a government’s strategy in a small war as their proper application may be the tipping-point between success and failure.
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It bears mentioning those who have helped push me along in this endeavour. My long suffering wife will be happy to no longer have piles of books and papers cluttering her kitchen. Many individuals willingly gave their time to read versions of my chapters and provide useful comments. In particular, I must extend my thanks to David Langlois, Caroline Vavro and Sydney Smee. I think David Soule was the individual who first encouraged me to embark on this endeavour. Thanks, Dave.
Statement of Originality

I hereby certify that all of the work described within this thesis is the original work of the author. Any published (or unpublished) ideas and/or techniques from other works of other are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices.

Richard Clarke Roy

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<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>Malayan Communist Party</td>
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<td>Massed Executive</td>
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<td>MPAJA</td>
<td>Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army</td>
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<td>Malay Race Liberation Army</td>
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<td>NWMP</td>
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<td>Surrendered Enemy Personnel</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The study of the use of population control measures in small wars is important. This chapter will outline that importance. It will start with a short comparison between conventional and small wars and then describe the key mechanisms that help resolve small wars. Then the aim of this dissertation will be given and the key terms to be used will be defined. Why the study of small wars and population control measures is so important will then be highlighted. Finally, the details of how this study is organized will be set out including the thematic approach and the structure.

While each war is unique, wars can be broadly grouped into two categories, conventional and small. The Oxford Concise dictionary starts its definition of war rather blandly with, “strife usually between nations conducted by force.” ¹ This is the standard view of large-scale conventional war involving a clash between nations with mirror-imaged military forces. It harkens back to the major confrontations of the last century such as World War I and World War II. Since 1914, many wars have taken on a “total” character; they involve the extensive mobilization and commitment of resources by the societies involved in these struggles. The very survival of the nations involved can be in question in conflicts of this type, but, fortunately, large-scale conventional wars are rare. The other type of conflict, the more common, is small wars. These are contests between unequal opponents struggling for supremacy often within a state. The insurgent, usually the weaker contestant, tries to overthrow the existing regime using a combination of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and other techniques. The government, marshalling all the instruments of the state, tries to preserve its hold on power by countering the insurgents’

efforts. Within the contested state, the opponents, much like the belligerents in large-scale conventional wars, may view their commitment to the struggle as a total one. Small wars are notoriously difficult to resolve and demand different approaches than those used in conventional conflicts.

Karl von Clausewitz, a pre-eminent military theorist, noted that violence is a means to an end in war, for violence or the threat thereof underpins all the actions that seek to persuade or coerce an opponent. Violence in conventional wars is used to erode the opponent’s fighting power whether through the destruction of military forces or through the disruption of the supplies necessary to sustain those forces. Civilian populations are incidental to the conflict and no direct relationship exists between a combatant and the civil population of their opponent. Violence has a role in small wars too, but more moderate and sophisticated instruments are also required because these contests are battles for control over the population internal to a state. It therefore becomes the norm in these types of conflicts for the government to try to extend its control and presence amongst the contested population. As for conventional wars, cutting off supplies of the opponent will play an important role, and the government, the counterinsurgent, will first certainly strive to deny the insurgents external sources of supplies. Depending on the success of these efforts, which can be greatly affected by whether the insurgents have any dedicated external supporters, the supplies the insurgents can obtain from the population may become vital to their ability to continue the struggle. For the government, limiting and otherwise restricting the insurgents’ access to the population can deliver a crippling blow to their supply chain. Given the importance of local supplies, it is questionable whether a small war is winnable without them being
denied to the insurgents. Control of the population, therefore, can be critical to giving a government a chance at success in a small war.

In war a government must bring to bear a variety of control mechanisms to achieve its purposes. It uses internal control mechanisms to weld government organizations into a collective whole capable of sustaining and prosecuting the campaign. For security forces, control is manifested in the more stringent rules, regulations and orders that govern and direct their conduct. The chain of command, aided by special staffs such as the provost corps (military police), manages and enforces the internal organizational controls which enable security forces to fight and to keep on fighting as long as required. Control measures are critical enablers that allow the government to mobilize national resources in support of the war effort. For example, in both World Wars - reflective of Charles Tilly’s argument that war leads to bureaucratic centralization - the scope and extent of the intrusion of the state into manufacturing, agriculture, transportation and other areas was extensive. Typically, control measures developed during wars are retained in bureaucratic practices afterwards. During conflicts, comprehensive control structures permit a wider and more efficient mobilization of resources and thus a fuller application of state power to the struggle. Mobilization can be constrained by manpower, commonly the scarcest resource, so success in war can be linked to the careful mobilization, allocation and management of it. The population is even more vitally important in small wars. Both opponents must actively cultivate it to secure legitimacy, support and resources; that is, they must mobilize the population in their favour. Government control of the population in a small war aids in garnering their

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support for the government and in de-linking them from the insurgents’ cause. Control measures allow the concentration, containment and protection of a contested population and can thereby be an important factor in the failure or success of the government’s efforts. It is this variety of control measures, those that separate the population from the guerrilla, that are of interest in this study.

This thesis argues that while there are various contending notions of how a government can improve its chances of success in a small war, few strategies will be effective without the application of a comprehensive program of population control measures. This examines the critical importance of population control measures in overcoming guerrilla forces lacking external sponsors in small wars during the period 1870 to 1960. Five examples will be used to determine their importance: the treatment of prairie Amerindians in the Canadian West (1870 – 1890); the guerrilla phase of the Philippine-American War (1898 – 1902); the guerrilla phase of the South African War (1899 – 1902); the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960); and the Kenyan Emergency (1952 – 1960). Within the broad strategies used to prosecute these campaigns, population control measures were a consistent feature and were instrumental in contributing to the termination of the conflicts. Despite their importance and much like small wars themselves, these measures are typically overlooked or only treated superficially when discussed. Greater attention needs to be applied to both the studies of the utility of these measures and of small wars in their own right.

This study will restrict itself to the examination of how population control measures were used by governments in the specified campaigns. All the various measures have their own long, individual histories unique to the use each country has made of
them. For instance, labour conditions were the genesis for identity registration measures in Kenya. Similarly, the preparation of detailed censuses of prairie Amerindians was closely tied to the requirement of the Canadian Government to make annual treaty payments. At some point, government forces adopted and adapted existing techniques for their utility in fighting small wars, but these campaign-specific usages may have had little ultimate effect on subsequent civil or military use.

The five small wars studied in this paper conform to the definition proposed below. They include conflicts from the eras of national expansion, colonial expansion and de-colonization. In all cases, there was a conflict between unequal, differently-organized opponents in which the element seeking to preserve or establish order, a government (normally a Western power), was required to make a long term, massive commitment to the provision of security, and a significant commitment of blood and treasure to overcome the guerrillas. Only examples where the guerrillas received no external support were examined because in these cases the value of the population control measures to success was more obvious.

This study is organized thematically around the comparison of the use of population control measures in the five conflicts. The details behind their selection are discussed in Chapter 3. In general, they were selected because government forces were successful in all of them and the population control measures played a notable role in that success. Overall success though is not sufficient to validate the importance of these measures in any particular campaign, nor does it imply that these actions alone

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4 The first detailed annual census of the prairie Amerindians was contained in the annual report of the Canadian Department of the Interior for the year ending 30 June 1876.
terminated those conflicts. The analysis of the measures included examining the opinions of senior commanders and politicians as to their utility, determining their influence on the opposition’s decision to cease fighting, and considering the extent to which they were carried forward into post conflict doctrines, practices and procedures.

While this study focuses on the victor’s use of population control measures, a variety of sources was examined. All the narratives of these conflicts are informed by the biases and opinions of their authors and are frequently crafted for political instead of historical purposes. Often the main narrative after a conflict was dominated by a mix of patriotic journalistic or military works that broadly recounted the conduct of the campaign but with limited depth or analysis. At the same time, the contrarian voices of those who opposed the conflict, like Mark Twain and other American anti-imperialists or the pro-Boers in England, provided another, but equally skewed, point of view. The story of the opponents, the guerrillas, was more difficult to capture as some societies were not given to the written record – for instance, the prairie Amerindians and the Kikuyu – and their accounts have only been constructed long after the event through oral history programs. Therefore, to fully explore the use and effectiveness of population control measures the use of multiple, competing narratives was required. More of these issues will be discussed in Chapter 2.

What is a Small War?

Clarifying what constitutes a small war is an important starting point for this dissertation as the term is often fraught with confusion. Many complex concepts are notoriously difficult to define. For instance, despite enormous efforts to develop a single
definition of what constitutes terrorism numerous and diverse ones remain in common usage. This lack of precision arises in defining something when a description is sought that is specific yet general enough to cover the numerous occurrences of a phenomenon under various conditions and factors. Each small war, for instance, has been fought between opponents possessing different levels of technology, organizational structures and institutional cultures. Establishing broad guiding principles and practices that can categorize them together is therefore difficult. Late in the nineteenth century, C.E. Callwell may have been the first to use the term small war, but since then the same type of war has been called counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, limited, irregular, unconventional, stability operations, and, most recently, small wars again. Besides this re-labelling, many diverse military operations other than war – peacekeeping, non-combatant operations and so forth – are often included under the small wars rubric. The difficulties in closely defining what constitutes a small war can be seen in the dependence of the current wave of writing on the subject, inspired by the multi-national operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, on again using the definitions of Callwell and the U.S. Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual*.6

For the purposes of this study small wars will be characterized from a Western point of view so that a clearer definition can be obtained. Callwell in his *Small Wars* defined them as, “all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of

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5 There is the canard that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. The UN continues to struggle with defining what constitutes terrorism. See Jane Boulden and Thomas Weiss, “Whither Terrorism in the United Nation?” in *Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11*, eds. Jane Boulden and Thomas Weiss, 3-26 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

regular troops.” 7 The Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* defined them as, “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, or inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.” 8 Callwell and the Marine Corps have provided a starting point but their definitions need further development. By contrasting small wars with large-scale ones many of their attributes are revealed. First, the survival of the Western power is not at stake, and, despite the rhetoric, a small war does not initially have a great bearing on their national interests. Second, the Western power conducts only a limited mobilization and commitment of resources to the small war as it is not regarded as a total war. The restraint in resource commitment is often matched by a limitation in the military means used - not every weapon or reserve is committed to the conflict. Further characteristics of small wars, much as in Callwell’s definition, can be established by comparing opponents. The insurgent will employ the tactics of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The insurgents will strike at weak points, evade the government forces and generally fight only at the time and place of their choosing. Government forces tend to start such conflicts disposed towards conducting operations in large formations and towards employing all the complex tactics and techniques suitable to fighting a mirror-image opponent. This conventional disposition usually yields few results for the security forces and eventual success, easier when from an adaptable military culture, only comes with the counterinsurgents adjusting to a more flexible, mobile form that will allow them to both protect the population and pursue the

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guerrillas. In addition, a significant mobilization of basic security forces, especially police and infantry units, will be required to respond to the threat. From a Western perspective then, small wars are conflicts in which limited means are used to secure national objectives against an adversary who uses primarily the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

What is a Guerrilla?

The importance of knowing one’s enemy is well emphasized in security literature. Clausewitz indicated that combat is a contest between two opponents seeking an advantage. Knowing an opponent well often reveals a weakness at which to strike, but identifying and defining the guerrilla tends to be problematic in most conflicts. First, the normal Western lack of situational and cultural awareness in a contested area inhibits the ability to plan a campaign that will truly quickly quell a rebellion. Second, a multitude of labels are assigned to guerrillas including insurgents, irregulars, rebels, bandits, landrones, but this often only serves political purposes, which greatly confuses their cause and purpose, i.e., are they merely robbers or do they have political objectives? The guerrilla or insurgent, terms that will be used interchangeably in this paper, may be best categorized by the tactics they use. The word guerrilla means small war, the diminutive of the Spanish term guerra (war), and it is at this lower tactical level that guerrilla forces operate. They tend to be lightly armed, to be organized into small groups, to possess

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10 These definitions will be more formally developed in the dissertation. The best handling of the issue that I have found to date is in Roger Beaumont, “Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions,” The Annals of the American Academy 541 (September 1995): 20 – 35.
good local knowledge and intelligence, and to be highly mobile for the terrain conditions. Operationally, they employ irregular tactics: small raids, ambushes and surprise attacks. They strike rapidly and then vanish before their opponents can react.\textsuperscript{12} For supplies, guerrillas draw the majority of their requirements from the population or even their opponents. Strategically, while avoiding large engagements, the guerrillas’ aim is to so raise the costs of continuing the conflict to their opponents through attrition that they quit the conflict. For their conventionally organized opponent, the elusiveness of the guerrilla and the inability to secure retribution for the casualties suffered, the inability to come to grips with the guerrilla, greatly dampens morale. For the purposes of this dissertation, guerrillas are defined as organized forces using irregular tactics in order to overthrow the power of existing authorities.

**What is Population Control?**

The concerns about population that permeate all aspects of the Western security dialogue complicate defining population control. There are several immediate problems such as population control being simply equated with birth control, and equally the substantial literature on the implications for international security of the Malthusian-oriented threat of over-population.\textsuperscript{13} The influence of Malthusian arguments, despite

\textsuperscript{12} This ability to escape, especially when it involves fading into the local population, is the cause of much frustration for the intervening force. Enormous debate as to the belligerent status of guerrillas stretches from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War (the first major war where they were operationally significant) to the present day.

their unproven assumptions, carry great weight in certain security constructs.\textsuperscript{14} Further to this view that the depletion of resources leads to conflict, there is another quantitative approach that envisions greater population numbers as a key strategic enabler, a measurable mobilization capacity.\textsuperscript{15} Complementing this approach, another strategic construct links the capacity to maintain fighting power, the ability to suffer casualties but replace them, with the ability to sustain a conflict.\textsuperscript{16} Given the central place of these constructs in security dialogues, it is difficult to separate out the immediate importance to the belligerents of winning the support of the population in small wars. For the government it is crucial to success, but how to best win this allegiance is widely debated. The use of overwhelming brute force against the population, encouraging their compliance by being more fearsome than the guerrillas, is rarely sufficient or appropriate. Development programs that seek to satisfy basic grievances with widespread land reform packages or to integrate the disaffected back into the national political discussion, both pillars of the hearts and minds formula, also have their weaknesses. In combination with the necessary persuasive and coercive measure, the allegiance of the population is best won by the government through the systematic application of population control measures.

Population control is achieved by imposing a variety of restrictions on the contested population: movement control – the restriction of freedom of movement by population registration, the issuance of identification cards, and the use of checkpoints

\textsuperscript{14} The basic argument remains that the expansion of the population will overtake the carrying capacity of the earth and therefore leads to intense resource competition and conflict.\textsuperscript{15} For examples of these arguments see Lawrence Freedman and John Saunders, eds., \textit{Population Change and European Security} (New York: Brassey’s, 1991). \textsuperscript{16} Frank L. Klingberg, “Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses,” \textit{The Journal of Conflict Resolution} 10, no.2 (June 1966): 129-171.
and physical barriers; resettlement - the physical removal of a select population into
defensible villages or camps which are protected by guards and that denies the insurgents
easy physical access to them; and, food control – the restriction of access to food through
strict distribution and movement regimes which include the rigid monitoring of all food
sold in stores, and the destruction of food stockpiles that cannot be secured or removed.
For the purposes of this study, population control measures are those restrictions imposed
on movement, on choice of residence, and on food that protect the population from the
insurgents while simultaneously denying the insurgents access to critical resources.

The Importance of Studying Small Wars

Small wars merit greater study for a number of reasons. First and foremost is that
they remain conflicts that may demand the complete attention of the threatened
government. Though security forces play an important role, especially in the enforcement
of regulations, it is the government in all its aspects and capacities that must organize,
plan, and prosecute the campaign against the insurgents. The use of any tool, like
population control measures, is a matter of government choice and policy particularly
when the employment of these programs will have long-term ramifications for the state.
The other reasons for studying small wars include their frequency of occurrence, their
place as notable markers in the evolution of empires, their use as examples to inform
strategy in subsequent conflicts, and their contribution to the evolution of international
norms.

Small wars deserve greater study as they occur more frequently than conventional
ones and have a broader influence than routinely supposed. While in the West national
narratives remain infused with the sacrifice and heroics of large-scale conventional war and Western military forces are primarily organized and trained to fight them, small wars, as Robert Asprey’s massive tome *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* reveals, are more common. Even so, the interest in small wars is highly cyclical and they are usually characterized as forgotten or ignored until they reclaim attention when an excellent exposé is published, such as Max Boot’s *The Savage Wars of Peace*, or when they are considered relevant to a current campaign.\(^\text{17}\) However, these conflicts have particular importance. First, they have had a significant influence on the formation of some national identities, as in South Africa, even when only short episodes in a long-term, persistent, localized conflict. Second, they have had a more serious influence on the development of national military cultures than may seem evident because of the regularity with which military forces are committed to them and their subsequent duration. They have shaped how particular militaries envision what will resolve such conflicts and what will constitute appropriate conduct during them. Their frequency and influence are the first consideration in their relative importance as a subject for research.

Small wars also merit greater study as they are key boundary points in the rise and fall of empires and provide substance to opposing narratives of conflict. To some degree, small wars are an escalation of the normal dialectic dynamics of oppression and resistance constant within imperialism, empire and colonialism. In retrospect, they can be seen as boundary markers of these processes: the Philippine-American War the starting

point of American overseas empire; the South African War the high-water mark of
British imperialism; and the Malayan and Kenyan Emergencies marking the twilight of
British colonialism. Given this significance, the constructed post-conflict histories of
these wars need to be continually re-examined to establish greater balance as military-
centric narratives are often juxtaposed with grievance-centric ones. For instance, the
modern historiography of the South African War touches only lightly, if at all, on the
extensive British reconstruction efforts, but, instead, focuses mainly on overstatements of
British victimization of the Boers. Similarly, the British mantra that their
counterinsurgency campaigns were always conducted purely within the rule of law is
frequently challenged in works such as those by Caroline Elkins and Huw Bennett. 18
This last debate keys on many of the fundamental differences between human rights law,
the law of armed conflict, military law, martial law, and emergency regulations and has
yet to be resolved. The need for clear, factual and less emotive accounts is important, as
many of the small wars of the past remain significant cornerstones of national narratives.

Small wars also have importance because they are held as models for future
conflicts. Nations, particularly their militaries, closely study past conflicts to inform their
current practices, but the utility of any potential lesson is conditional on the ability of a
military to learn and adapt. Isabel Hull, for one, sees military practice as constant,
immutable, set prior to a conflict and always given to an escalatory dynamic regardless of
context. 19 If military actions are deterministic then these studies are unnecessary. There
is certainly continuity between a military’s past and current practices. For instance, for


the U.S. Army the decades of fighting Amerindians in the West conditioned its initial approach in the Philippine-American War and the conventional force mindset brought forward from World War II and the Korean War influenced its performance in Vietnam in the 1960s. The ability of militaries to adjust and adapt is important to their success in any war. Without constant adaptation, Lieutenant General Horatio Herbert Kitchener would not have worn down the Boers nor would General Sir Gerald Templer have exhausted the Communist insurgents in Malaya. Understandably, care must be exercised in generalizing lessons where context and structural factors have not been thoroughly analysed and where the analogies, therefore, may be weak at best. Detailed study of small wars, assuming that they are not so atypical that there is value in examining them, is important to ensure that casual generalizations do not distort future government policies and commitments and that the correct lessons can be drawn from them.

Additionally, more attention is due to these conflicts as the best practices of former small wars, once re-discovered, often underpin the strategies used in subsequent ones. These protracted wars have been particularly problematic for Western powers, in part due to the difficulty of clearly determining the effects of one’s own actions in the midst of conflict. There are three broad approaches to resolving small wars that will be expanded upon in Chapter 3. One of these strategies advocates a hard-handed approach

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21 Often vignettes used in doctrine manuals use analogies inappropriately and over-reach in their examples. In the current US Army Counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24, Dec 2006) a vignette comparing 1st Marine Division activities with those in the Philippine-American War (see pg 4-7) is very much an overstatement. Eliot A. Cohen further elaborates upon these ideas. See Eliot A. Cohen, “The Historical Mind and Military Strategy,” *Orbis* 49, no.4 (Fall 2005): 575-588.

(based on the assumption that the war will be short and therefore supposedly more humane) is built on the total war concept developed by General William T. Sherman of U.S. Civil War fame. Combined with the law of war of the day – including considerations of the common usages of war and actions made permissible under the concept of military necessity – Sherman’s broad practices were carried forward into both the Philippine-American War and the South African War. So perceived successful practices from past and, occasionally, concurrent campaigns, for many of the practices in Kenya were substantially modeled on Malayan ones, are typically re-used. Even when considering past successful practices though the fundamentally attritional nature of small wars must be kept well in view.

A final reason for according greater attention to small wars is their influence on international norms and laws, particularly the law of armed conflict (LOAC). This trend started with the publication during the U.S. Civil War of the Lieber Code, the main predecessor of modern LOAC. Known as General Order 100, it outlined the permissible conduct of conventional forces when dealing with guerrillas. There is evidence that the Code had some bearing on German conduct during the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and was applied extensively by the U.S. Army in the Philippines. The Code permitted various acts under the rubric of military necessity. This general concept of military necessity further evolved in the follow-on Hague and Geneva Conventions and in subsequent conflicts where there were high levels of participation by guerrilla forces.

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25 For the genesis of this concept see Burrus M. Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity,” *The American Journal of International Law* 92 (April 1998): 213 – 231. Lieber is certainly the second most important Prussian to have had an enormous
This work will not discuss this evolution in detail but will touch on, where required, how these evolving trends influenced the selection of population control measures in specific campaigns.

This work aims to make a significant contribution to the study of small wars. First, the use of population control measures in small wars is a topic that has received only minor attention within military and academic circles despite their importance to success and their potential to ferment long term disharmony between nations. Second, given how they are used as models, it is important that more detailed structural analysis of what leads to success in small wars be made available. This has added significance as occasionally war-initiated practices are subsequently used in the civil environment, particularly resettlement practices. Third, generalized perceptions of how success was achieved in small wars need to be more fully informed by all the systemic activities required, not just narratives of battle heroics. Finally, while the means employed have remained relatively constant, the specific techniques governments can apply in small wars have evolved and usually evolved into more restrictive forms; therefore, understanding the history of this evolution is important in the modern security environment. Vital to success in small wars, population control during conflict is a topic that merits greater attention, study and debate.

influence on American military thought. He set the baseline for modern LOAC and his concepts are influential in both martial law and the law of occupation.

26 The post-South African War animosity over British concentration camp practices and the contested legacy of the British detention camps from the Kenyan Emergency are manifestations of the enduring nature of improperly implemented and overly harsh methods.

Considerations in the Study of Population Control Measures

Within the wider strategies applied in small wars, there are actions that shorten them and improve a state’s prospects of success. While harrying, harassing and defeating the guerrilla forces is a necessary strategy, most important theorists give equal or greater weight to actions amongst the population. Geographic objectives have little relevance compared to the importance attached to the government’s exchange of security and control for the support of the mass of the population. Security forces, of all types, when conducting operations amongst the people must have tight restrictions on the use of force. Indiscriminate beatings, bullets, or bombs, free fire zones or the imposition of collective punishments does little to encourage perceptions of legitimacy of the government amongst the local population. The first step to re-establishing a relationship with a disaffected population involves establishing sufficient control measures over them so as to secure their conditional support for the state. These measures impose restrictions and limitations on the activities of the population to separate them from the regime’s opponents and thereby deny the opponents access to critical resources: recruits, funds, food and weapons.

There are several important considerations for a government when employing population control measures. First, simply implementing the measures does not directly dismantle the insurgent infrastructure, a notoriously difficult task, and the insurgents may retain influence amongst the population. So, besides protecting the population physically,

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28 In general, the population in a conflict situation can be divided into those dedicated to the state’s downfall, those taking a neutral position to the parties to the conflict (willing to support the side they perceive to be winning), and those dedicated to supporting the state. The aim of population control measures is to protect the friend of the state and to sway the neutrals (or fence-sitters) to the government’s side.
the measures must separate them psychologically from the influence of the insurgents. By limiting the ability of the insurgents to persuade and coerce, the government gains an opportunity to sway the neutrals in the population to its side. Second, their use must be carefully planned to ensure their effectiveness. The measures must be rigorously enforced, normally by the security forces, so that they will discourage wavering individuals from supporting the hardcore fighters and convince neutral individuals to side with the government. The measures will only have a limited influence though if poorly planned, clumsily implemented, or ill conceived for local economic conditions and necessities. Given their inter-related nature, they may only be of limited consequence unless combined in a layered fashion. Third, despite their immediate pragmatic value, they may be considered to be counter-productive in terms of reconciliation and reconstruction especially if unnecessary deaths were perceived as attributable to the implementation of a specific measure, as was the case during the South African War. Finally, their contribution may seem ephemeral and perhaps overly harsh which can lead to disenchantment within the in-country population that the government is trying to win over and, in the case of colonial regimes, within the home country audiences.

There are three important temporal dimensions to consider when studying these measures. First, the majority of these measures were applied late in the wars examined here and usually long after the interest in the contemporary reporting of the campaigns had faded. For instance, works on the Spanish-American War cover Cuba more than the Philippines and for the Philippines interest waned after Admiral George Dewey took
Manila. Similarly, the bulk of many works on the South African War conclude with the fall of Pretoria that occurred just before the guerrilla phase truly commenced. Thus, information in contemporary and secondary accounts is sparse. Second, the visibility of population control measures is also moderated by trends in historical research. Narrative approaches shift with academic and political interest but without necessarily improving historical accuracy. For instance, Mau Mau fighters rationalized and overemphasized their contribution to decolonization in a bid for place and power in post-independence Kenya. Third, there is a durable yet evolutionary nature to all the measures over time. Similar techniques were used on the Canadian prairies, on the South Africa veldt, and on the Kikuyu reserves in Kenya. The use of population control measures, like other international norms, has matured and what was acceptable in the 1880s was no longer appropriate by the 1960s. To identify a measure’s utility over time therefore begs a clear understanding of how it was employed in a particular conflict and how its usage subsequently evolved.

It should be expected that population control measures would continue to be practiced in the aftermath of a conflict if they had a proven utility during it. It is difficult to determine this directly as many of the measures used pre-dated the specific conflicts studied here, but their use and refinement during the conflicts is obvious. Careful evaluation is required to identify the extent to which these processes were transformed and then carried forward into subsequent practice. For instance, a multitude of measures developed during the World Wars like rationing and identity cards were perpetuated afterwards, but it is less evident why some measures from small wars were carried

29 Though allegedly a forgotten war, the Philippine-American War was a topic of major concern in its day. The Library of Congress published several versions of its List of Works Relating to the American Occupation of the Philippine Islands, 1898-1903 with the 1905 version stretching to 97 pages.
forward and others not.\textsuperscript{30} For example, it is apparent that the New Villages remained a fixture in Malaya long after the conflict, but why the similar protective villages used in Kenya were subsequently demolished is harder to uncover.\textsuperscript{31} Obviously, some measures such as food control, curfews and strict movement control, which now remain part of the repertoire of government practice when the state is threatened, can only be used in peacetime with the greatest caution. The continuity of some measures is likely attributable to how well they helped extinguish the grievances that led to the rebellion, or, more generally, their bureaucratic utility to state control, but it is their utility in helping end insurrections that population control measures have the greatest value to the state.

There is an important relationship between ideology and the effectiveness of population control measures. On one level, building on Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, there are norms and practices that join social groups, that let them identify themselves as part of a greater whole.\textsuperscript{32} Exclusion from a dominant community and the resultant powerlessness and lack of benefits can be a fundamental cause of some small wars. Ideologies, such as nationalism or colonialism, can form this group boundary whether the filter grouping is actually a nation, state or race. The intensity and depth of an imagined collective can mitigate the influence of population control measures. The grouping can be a pre-existing strongly held view, the Boer \textit{volk} for instance, or a mobilized more inclusive yet differentiated construct, such as the collective belonging

\textsuperscript{30} For the perpetuation of practice from World War II see the short account of the development of identity cards in Britain in Philip Thomas, “Identity Cards,” \textit{The Modern Law Review} 58, no.5 (September 1995): 702-713.

\textsuperscript{31} There are a variety of reasons why this occurred including that the villages dislocated the Kikuyu from their normal dispersed settlement pattern on their home ridges, and that village life was no guarantee of access to land. More on this will be given in Chapter 5.

offered by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) or by Kikuyu oathing. To counter these ideologies, approaches underpinned by counterpoised offers for inclusion into groups perceived to be of more potential benefit are essential – most often the granting of full state citizenship. This approach was enormously beneficial in Malaya, but the same technique could not be implemented in Kenya to diffuse the Kikuyu grievances as it ran contrary to the white settlers’ self-perception and interests. The interplay of contending ideologies, a mobilization-demobilization dynamic, has great importance to the effectiveness of the population control measures applied.

The contribution of population control measures to the success of a particular campaign can be difficult to uncover. First, a military’s perceptions of the best methods to fight are embedded in its doctrine, practices and norms as conditioned by its experience and composition (regular or volunteer force). Officers, particularly experienced senior ones, are the main agents who carried forward and disseminated the appropriate fighting methodologies and institutional norms. The view of senior officers has an immense influence on what is regarded as acceptable and appropriate conduct as revealed by what they praise and what they condemn. Whether senior officers recognize the value of population control measures and then use them can significantly influence how a small war unfolds. Second, the mass of military history is fixed on narratives of glorious heroic actions, forlorn hopes, or desperate battles and not on the examination of the rather mundane administrative and bureaucratic procedures that make the application of military force possible and effective. Likewise, the important function of other elements of the government’s response, like the crucial role played by police forces in

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small wars, is often overwhelmed in the flood of military literature. Third, where narratives do touch on population control measures their value is often misconstrued. For example, resettlement in Malaya and reconcentration in the Philippines were key factors to success but not the only ones, and their contribution can be overstated, which has led to these techniques being misapplied in other campaigns.\textsuperscript{34} Finally, the changes in the behaviour of the opposition attributed to a particular measure may be actually caused by other factors. A pause in Communist activities in Malaya was a deliberate MCP decision and not as a result of any specific British imposed measure. In both these last two points, while the use of these measures may be closely tied to how the government perceived it achieved victory, this may be divorced from the actual contribution of the population control measures to the campaign. Therefore, uncovering the value of population control measures is difficult due to their lack of visibility in the historiography.

While the solutions to conflict may seem evident in hindsight, they are rarely clear in the midst of them. Small wars are notoriously difficult to resolve and as Napoleon’s struggles with his “Spanish ulcer” demonstrate they are often intractable. Each conflict is atypical, possessing unique context, geography and a complex adaptive opponent and its successful resolution will require a unique solution and government forces that can adapt and improvise as the struggle progresses.\textsuperscript{35} The advice of military commanders in the early days of most small wars is usually heavily biased to conventional operations. After conventional style operations fail to suppress the guerrilla, there is typically a turn to the use of other measures like population control. There may

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\item[\textsuperscript{35}] For a summary of the typical differentiated elements see Bard E. O’Neill, \textit{Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare} (Toronto: Brassey’s (US), 1990), 53-69.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
be hints as to their usefulness in the military’s doctrine but written doctrine, if it exists, must be translated into pragmatic application.\textsuperscript{36} The decision to use these measures is conditioned by views of their past utility and perceived usefulness even where they may not have been applied to best effect or their influence was improperly gauged.\textsuperscript{37} Once the government becomes seized with the idea of their utility, they tend to be applied in a layered and escalatory fashion - the measures complement each other and become harsher as the campaign progresses. This increasing harshness can be problematic, again using Anderson’s concepts, for if the opponent is not even partially imagined to be part of one’s own community it makes maltreatment easier to justify. So while population control measure can form a key component of a government’s strategy, their implementation still requires careful consideration.

**Organization of This Study**

This work is organized into eight chapters. This introductory chapter highlighted the major issues to be considered. It outlined the key definitions critical for the study: What are guerrillas? What is a small war? and, What is population control? These definitions will be used to limit and constrain the scope of the argument. This chapter has set the context for the study by articulating the importance of population control measures to success in small war. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature relevant to the individual population control measures and the case studies. It reveals the scale and

\textsuperscript{36} Additionally, post conflict doctrine may be fixated on other issues. For instance, for the British Army post-South African War the focus was more on large-scale conventional operations in Europe. In the 1950s, the focus was again Europe but with a fight in a nuclear environment.

\textsuperscript{37} Wunyabari O. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 81. Maloba like many others infers great lessons from the South African War were brought forward but there seems to be only weak linkage at best.
scope of the sources that had to be examined to develop a comprehensive perspective on
the use of population control measures in small wars.

Chapter 3 covers the methodology to be used in the dissertation including the
selection of the key examples that will be used. While small wars have been a persistent
phenomenon and militaries have been extensively involved in them, their resolution is
never easy. There are two nigh-opposite visions on how to achieve victory: coercion and
hearts and minds. Beyond these general approaches, a military conducts itself during a
small war guided by its institutional culture, its tactical and operational procedures, and
its view of the legitimacy of its actions. These visions of victory will be examined to see
how they affected the selection and implementation of population control measures. Even
given that there are few direct similarities between any two conflicts – due to differences
in geography, cultures, contestants and such - the comparative method will be heavily
employed in this dissertation. Comparisons are important to determine whether the
lessons learned in the past have improved the conduct and use of population control
measures in subsequent campaigns. The case studies were selected for the following
reasons: they are substantial campaigns that can be compared with contemporary
operations elsewhere; a variety of population control measures were employed in them;
and the campaigns remain contentious but poorly understood today. The case studies to
be used are as follows: Canadian Amerindian policy in the West between 1870 and 1890
– to demonstrate the use of reserves to isolate and separate the prairie tribes and the
extensive and continual use of food control measures to effect Amerindian policy; the
Philippine-American War and the South African War (early 1900s) – to show the similar
population concentration methodologies and the extensive scorched earth tactics
employed in this era; and the Malayan Emergency and the Kenyan Emergency (1950s) –
to show what may well be the best model for effective population control, the Malayan
Emergency, but how similar tactics used in Kenya went awry when implemented in a
more brutal fashion. This chapter will set the use of population control measures used
within the context of the particular vision of victory held and against the military
practices of the day.

Chapter 4 covers all aspects of movement control. It will start by further refining
the definition of movement control for the purposes of the study, including population
identification procedures and the use of physical barriers. The procedures used to identify
and monitor populations within a conflict area will be reviewed. This will include the use
of pass systems in all the conflicts including the national registration program established
in Malaya and the passbooks used in Kenya. In addition the practice of area designation
will be examined. The general use of barriers will be discussed both where they serve
merely to form a psychological “separation” gap and where they are used as more
substantial physical obstacles. In this latter case, for instance, the enormous ditch dug to
separate the Aberdare Mountains and Mount Kenya from the Kikuyu reserves, as well as
blockhouse lines used in the South African War will be examined. This chapter will
establish the importance of movement control measures to both limit and restrict the
movement of the enemy and the civil population but also how they subsequently form the
basis of intelligence work.

Chapter 5 covers the various resettlement techniques that have been used in small
wars. It will include considerations of why it was considered that resettlement would
contribute to victory. It will also look at when the decision to use resettlement was taken
and determine whether it made other population control measures more effective. Comment will also be made on whether resettlement by itself would have been sufficient to end the conflict. How the use of resettlement varied between the conflicts will be studied: from the land and agricultural focus of the Amerindian reserves, to the holding camp nature in the Philippines and South Africa, to the establishment of idealized villages as practiced in Malaya and Kenya. The mechanisms used to enforce resettlement, whether it was voluntary or coerced, will be evaluated in all the examples. This chapter will establish when and why resettlement contributed effectively to the resolution of small wars.

Chapter 6 starts with a general overview of food control in wars and outline the importance of denying food resources to the insurgent. The relevance of food control in all the case studies will be discussed. For the North-West Rebellion, the long-term practice of providing rations to the Amerindians will be reviewed and the Canadian government’s use of food to support its campaign during the conflict. The highly coercive scorched earth policies practiced during the Philippine-American War and the South African War will be discussed. Finally, the tightly restrictive food programs, non-destructive for the most part, employed in Malaya and Kenya will be examined. The development of specialized targeted military food denial operations in Malaya will be reviewed. This chapter will demonstrate the importance and utility of denying food to insurgent forces and how this is the ultimate control measure.

Chapter 7 will assess the importance of population control to success in small wars, and whether these wars can be won without their use. It will evaluate whether population control measures are equally necessary in all the various approaches militaries
used to seek victory. Using information from the examples, the effectiveness of specific measures in select circumstances will be evaluated. Similarly, the best procedures to implement certain population control measures will be explored. This chapter will confirm the importance of population control measures in small wars and highlight best practices in implementing them.

Chapter 8 will review and synthesize the findings from the other chapters. It confirms the necessity of the government deciding on the use of movement control, resettlement, and food control to restrict the access of the guerrilla to the population and to deny the guerrilla local supplies. It confirms the strategic value of population control measures in exhausting the guerrilla forces and encouraging their surrender. This chapter affirms the importance of population control measures to government success in small wars.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

In this chapter the historiography used in this study will be described. Given the five case studies used and the functional diversity of the measures, the historiography for this study is complex. This chapter will start with a brief review of some general issues within the literature then this will be followed by comments on some of the issues arising in the literature concerning each separate population control measure. The sources surveyed for each of the five case studies will then be considered.

General

There are some broad concerns when considering sources for this study. There are no works that cover individual national approaches to the use of population control measures over multiple campaigns or that cover national approaches on a comparative basis. While military forces tend to be in the fore in the implementation of these measures, the literature on small wars tends to pass lightly over the actual techniques they employed. Military doctrine manuals are often more prescriptive but often only vaguely detail how to implement the measures. Perhaps the pervasive and routine nature of these tasks in small wars makes them less interesting in post-conflict narrative than battles and bravery. Civilian studies tend to focus on the perceived violated entitlements of those subjected to the control measures and accord little relevance to their importance as security measures. Descriptive studies do exist for individual campaigns but they rarely cover why the measures were used, why they were considered appropriate and whether the measures employed contributed to the success or failure of the campaign.
There are several more specific issues when considering sources. First, some care must be taken in not focussing solely on military history sources in determining the importance of these measures since other historical approaches such as peasant studies and development literature cover aspects of population control. Second, each campaign, the conditions that led to it and how it was fought and resolved are temporally, geographically and contextually unique. Therefore, care must be exercised in a comparative work not to superimpose modern prejudices on what were acceptable military practices in the period or to over generalize between the campaigns.1 Third, the shadow of torture and, more often, the cries of genocide often colour much of the reporting on the use of population control measures. The charge of genocide has been used to brand several resettlement and concentration operations of the past, regardless of whether or not the deaths incurred were a matter of policy or neglect.2 While those who level these charges may be indifferent to the initial purpose of applying concentration and resettlement policies, sifting through the often emotive narratives and data should reveal the utilitarian nature of these efforts to these campaigns.

Due to its scale and diversity, the historiography for this dissertation has been challenging. First, the codified techniques of how militaries fought small wars had to be explored. This required examining the classic literature on small wars as well as the extant doctrine manuals and regulations that existed during each particular campaign. As

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1 Acceptable practices can be seen in their relationship to the law of armed conflict of the day and in national reactions to reports of military practices.

2 There is frequently an inference of “evil” intent ascribed to military commanders who conducted particularly harsh campaigns. General Sir Ian Hamilton’s account of General Kitchener and him crawling around the floor of their office reviewing morning reports during the South African War deflate somewhat the vision that there was something ultimately evil in their motivation. See General Sir Ian Hamilton, The Commander (London: Hollis & Carter, 1957), 101. For this general trend see works like Vinay Lal, “The Concentration Camp and Development: The Past and Future of Genocide,” Patterns of Prejudice 39, no. 2 (2005): 220-243.
the techniques were often only evident in practice, the tactics, operations and strategies of each campaign had to be explored in detail. Second, each case studied required a familiarity with the conditions of the pre- and post-conflict environments to determine how population control measures were used before the specific conflict and whether they endured afterwards. Understandably, the structure and organization of the societies involved, including their military forces, was important in determining what measures would be employed and their likelihood of success. Finally, the information on population control measures within various sources was typically sparse. Many references on the case studies cover this issue only tangentially as they are more focused on military, political or economic aspects of the conflict. In addition, the subcomponents of population control are rarely dealt with thematically. This required the casting of an extraordinarily broad net in order search out useful references and documents.

This diversity of sources created its own concern in ensuring that each type was properly handled. The sources used include government reports, histories (official and popular), memoirs, travelogues, pamphlets, pictures, journal and newspaper articles, and more. This was not a one-sided study as the views of both of the contestants in each of the case studies being considered were addressed. Because they did not often leave a written record and where they did it was not in English, the views of the insurgents have been more difficult to recover than those of the counterinsurgents. Contemporary accounts were used in the analysis where valuable, while ensuring that their biases and exaggerations were fully considered. Even today, some issues from particular case studies remain highly contentious. This is amply demonstrated by the troubles around placing commemorative plaques for the North-West Rebellion and the never-ending
debate over concentration camps of the South African War. Modern scholarship in many instances has re-balanced and corrected some of the original studies, and the experience of other participants, such as women and “natives,” has received greater consideration too. Where they could contribute, these recent trends in scholarship have been included. Even so, caution remains necessary as just because a work is recent does not mean it provides a balanced interpretation of events. This need for vigilance is pointed to by the flaws in the work of Caroline Elkins on Kenya as well as the overt assumptions of the accuracy of oral history contained in Neal McLeod’s small volume on Cree narrative memory.

Little is written without some degree of bias as every particular work is meant to serve some purpose. How an individual perceives the world is reflected in their reporting of it. But there may be the deliberate crafting of a message, truthful or not, to advance a particular agenda which when repeated often enough becomes “common knowledge.” This is the realm of propaganda. There has always been propaganda in war and it has become much more sophisticated since World War I. To a degree, all construction of nationalist narratives and even the development of war memorialisation use similar techniques. Propaganda has a bearing on this study given its evident presence in a substantial amount of the literature of the case studies. The use of propaganda by the

Boers and pro-Boers during the South African War has been well recorded. Similarly, the British version of the causes of the Kenyan Emergency and their characterization of the Mau Mau, a propaganda coup, held the centre place in the historiography of that conflict for a long time. Granted that any author’s selection of facts is based on cultural preferences, care was required in treating many sources to ensure accurate facts were being reported instead of political crafted messages.

The views of both civil and military senior officials, critical to this study, are revealed in a number of sources. Biographical works of variable quality are generally available on many of these key decision makers, and their opinions were reflected in their own reports and papers. The views of senior officials are important for a number of reasons. For instance, senior British military personnel commonly brought operational and tactical practices with them as they moved from one campaign to another or otherwise recorded their experiences in articles and books which served the British army as an experience-based, portable and informal doctrine. Therefore, the works of senior officials involved in multiple campaigns, like Frank Kitson and Sir Robert Thompson, were reviewed to draw out relevant points. Much data was also mined from their official reports and despatches from the operational theatres. Additionally, a wide variety of commissions reported extensively on the activities and conduct of these campaigns, and

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their reports served as valuable resources too. Besides the opinion of the counterinsurgent, the views of the insurgent are equally important. These were more difficult to uncover but some have been retrieved.  

This study benefited from the lesson-seeking behaviour of militaries and nations. There is a continual re-examination of the practices of past campaigns by numerous individuals to determine their merit and relevance as models for current ones. This practice was as common during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as it was for past ones. The scope of this lesson-seeking can be quite extensive. For instance, parliamentarians in South Africa looked to the 1837 Rebellion in Lower Canada for lessons on how to treat rebels. The regime in Kenya borrowed heavily from the concurrent campaign being fought in Malaya. The U.S. advisor mission to Vietnam looked to Malaya for lessons on how to implement a national registration program and the RAND Corporation conducted detailed studies of the strategies used there to inform planning in Vietnam. Besides general techniques, key advisors and experts were employed on subsequent missions. For instance, Malayan veterans contributed to many subsequent campaigns: Sir Robert Thompson advised American forces in Vietnam; and

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10 See Keith Surridge, “An Example to be Followed or a Warning to be Avoided? The British, Boers, and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1902,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no.4-5 (2012): 608-626.

11 Austin Long, On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2006).

Sir Arthur Young attempted to re-organize the Kenyan police services. These lesson-seeking writings provided useful insights into which techniques were considered key to success in particular campaigns.

This study employed a comparative approach and has benefitted from where it has been applied elsewhere. In the lesson-seeking behaviour discussed above, a common technique is to use the comparative approach. Thus, other authors in comparing their use in past campaigns have exposed many of the population control techniques examined here. For instance, as the United States expanded its mission in Vietnam, it both sponsored not only general studies of insurgency and guerrilla warfare but also very specific ones such as the series on national registration programs. Perhaps the study of resettlement has seen the fullest employment of this technique with efforts ranging from attempts to discover the origin of the use of camps, to cross comparisons of contemporary campaigns, to detailed analyses of the success and failures of particular programs. But none of these works address population control measures in great scale and scope. There is a cautionary note necessary when considering comparative studies. The value of a particular measure in one campaign does not mean its lessons are transferable to a different theatre of war as its success is obtained under the specific conditions of unique

16 For an example of the comparative approach for resettlement see Maynard Weston Dow, Nation Building in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Pruett Press, 1966).
geography, contestants, and conflict dynamics. This is probably the most common lesson that is ignored.

There are important sources that address security force aspects of the various campaigns. First, many studies have now been conducted into how particular militaries prefer to fight small wars. These studies, in a somewhat “way of war” context, spell out the longitudinal perspective of the best methods to solve these conflicts. Consideration must be given to the fact that though skewed by presenting military practices in the best light possible, they can provide a sound grounding for examining the utility of population control measures amongst the broader techniques that are used to settle these conflicts. Today there is a basic liturgy of works on small wars that inform most of the rest. In addition, there are a series of works that expound on the long term practices of nations in


small wars.\textsuperscript{21} These works were reviewed in detail to provide context for this dissertation. Second, given the complementary nature of the police forces and their key role in many of these campaigns literature on their contribution was also reviewed. This included studies that applied to policing in general in the colonial environment and to accounts by individual policemen who were involved in these operations.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Aspects of Individual Population Control Measures}

There is not a great amount of literature on movement control as a phenomenon or on its sub-components described in this study. The use of fortifications for movement control though is a common practice in military campaigns and sufficient information


was available on their use for the purposes of this study. Contrarily, while the designation of special areas is common, its practical application is not normally discussed. Surprisingly, establishing how identity systems contributed to movement control was also difficult. While identity systems are covered at length in modern surveillance studies, there are few works that trace the evolution of and interrelation between identity documents and movement control, especially during conflicts. Consequently, a more narrow approach was used here to establish how documents were used to restrict movement within an organization or within a state, and how passes were used in the normal civil environment to provide context for their utility for control during a conflict. Establishing the pre-conflict purpose of identity systems pointed to their subsequent adaptability and value during the conflict. Broadly speaking, a wide variety of sources were used to examine the movement control issues presented here, as there are few substantial works on them.23

The literature on resettlement can be highly charged and it is a topic that remains frequently and heatedly debated. While the establishment of reserves on the Canadian prairies was uncontentious at the time, the use of resettlement in the other case studies was not. Its description ranges from either a cauldron of brutality to a beacon of modernity and development. Material on the use of concentration camps in both the Philippine-American War and the South African War is characteristically biased. At the time and since, anti-imperialist, pro-Boers and others who continue to promote a

narrative of grievance for political ends have dominated the literature. This has made it extremely difficult to compare and ensure that post-event narratives actually match what occurred on the ground. For instance, a variety of circumstances contributed to the tragedy of the concentration camps in South Africa, and the use of reconcentration camps in the Philippines remains at best only partially understood. Elsewhere, the literature on the New Villages in Malaya is comprehensive. It is consistent in promoting the benefit acquired by the Chinese squatters in being resettled, and, despite some difficulties in the initial implementation, there seems to be little dissent from this view.\textsuperscript{25} Considering the number of Kikuyu relocated into protective villages during Mau Mau, over one million, this topic remains largely a blank slate. Most often mentioned only in passing, villagisation in Kenya has yet to be fully explored. Even so, because of recent works, like that of Elkins, that casually infer that the villages were concentration camps in the modern sense, future research and comment in this area could well become as contentious as that which revolves around the South African camps.

The literature on food is more straightforward. Amelia Paget, for example, wrote, “One cannot write of the Indians of the prairies without mentioning the buffalo.”\textsuperscript{26} This intimate link between the people and their primary food source exists in all cultures.


\textsuperscript{26} Amelia M. Paget, \textit{The People of the Plains} (Toronto: William Briggs, 1909), 70-71.
There is an equally intricate link between a military force and its requirement to be fed. During war the ability of a force to sustain itself is closely correlated with its access to the necessary supplies. In small wars the source of supplies is typically the people. For the purposes of this study, the details of the types of food, how it was obtained, and how it was prepared were important to examine to determine whether the food control measures imposed could have been effective. Generally, most works on food control cover those programs that were organized during the major wars of the last century. However, how food was controlled in small wars has been rarely addressed in depth. In both the South African War and the Philippine-American War scorched earth policies were employed. The few works that address the scorched earth strategies used during these campaigns are focussed on a narrative of grievance and are not concerned with a fuller examination of their strategic intent, their pragmatic implementation, and their overall influence on ending the conflict.  

27 Food was strictly controlled in lieu of just being destroyed in the counterinsurgency campaigns in the 1950s. While the use of food control measures was well recorded for the operations in Malaya, the use of similar measures during Mau Mau were commented on but not in great detail. To more fully understand the dynamics of food control, it was important in this study to establish the normal carrying capacity of the land, the typical use and availability of food in the local area, and how the measures undertaken by security forces affected this supply.

Besides examining the sources available on the techniques of population control, it was also important to review the historiography of each of the case studies in detail.

North-West Rebellion

The number of studies on the prairie region and the North-West Rebellion continues to increase. The historiography of the Canadian West is a mixture of accounts of exploration, buffalo herds, the fur trade, the Métis, settlement, the Amerindians, and the rebellions in 1870 and 1885. The events of the 1885 Rebellion are our main concern here. In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, most works on the North-West were tales of the personal experiences of the participants, reports on the operations of the various military units and formation, or general accounts of the campaign.28 The first full academic treatment of the Rebellion was G.F.G. Stanley’s *The Birth of Western Canada* that only appeared in 1936. Up to this point and well into the 1980s, the main accounts of the Rebellion closely followed the Canadian government’s version of how it had unfolded. Much of the re-interpretation over the last few decades has focused on redefining the role of Louis Riel.29 More importantly for this study has been the development of “native studies.” Writing in 1994, J.R. Miller noted the “field of Native history and the history of Native and non-Native relations have grown dramatically in recent years. In fact, when an earlier edition of this Guide [*Canadian History: A Reader’s Guide*] was published a decade ago, it was not considered essential to include a section of


work on these themes.”

Since 1994, “Native History,” particularly in consideration of the role and perception of the Amerindian participation in the Rebellion, has grown considerably. A much broader perspective on the importance and role of all participants in the Rebellion is now available. In examining this case study, three main groups of sources were used. First, contemporary accounts were used where available and applicable. Second, extensive use was made of sources that highlighted the perspectives of Amerindians. Finally, a thorough re-examination was given to the reports of government agents and departments.

The treatment of contemporary accounts was approached in two ways. First, general works were examined to place the campaign in context. Then contemporary accounts and histories were balanced against modern treatments. Second, as one of the objectives of this study was to determine the perspective of key actors as to the use and value of population control measures, many personal accounts were examined. In using these personal accounts, the plain reporting of facts was considered important. As early explorers could report on the number of buffalo observed, long-time residents in the west were more than able to record and report on the action and habits of the Amerindians they encountered. While these reporters’ interpretations will be somewhat skewed by their own cultural norms, the cultural practices of others are not as opaque to observers as

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modern interpreters would have us believe. There were four main sources of personal narratives: military, police, Indian agents, and civilians. Comments on the use of population control measures in military accounts of the campaign were sparse so they were only of limited value to this study.\(^{32}\) The individual narratives of North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) personnel were of better value given that many of them passed long years of service in the west and that many were present at the key encounters leading up to and during the Rebellion.\(^{33}\) The biography of the Indian Commissioner, Edgar Dewdney, was indispensable for establishing the government's perspective. As there are few other direct or indirect accounts by Indian agents, the record of the Department of Indian Affairs and its annual reports were used to gain insight into their views. Narratives by civilians were informative - whether captives, priests or residents.\(^{34}\)

As Miller noted, more works expounding the Amerindian perspective have now been published. This has been especially true with regards to their experiences in the Canadian West (note that the experiences of Amerindians in British Columbia are so


singularly different that they have not been considered here). Following the practice of David Mandelbaum, accounts of the early explorers of the region were read to obtain a perspective on life in the prairie regions. The texts and negotiations of the numbered treaties were reviewed using the works of the treaty commissioner and accounts of other individuals who were present. This served to establish exactly what was agreed and, therefore, what a prairie band could expect for “taking treaty.” Use was made of articles and biographies of the key chiefs of the prairie bands. Additionally, narrative works of Cree individuals and elders were considered. Neal McLeod’s work on Cree narrative memory was examined to ensure these accounts were handled appropriately. In the last decades, many works have appeared that have recounted the views and experience of the Amerindians in the Rebellion, and they have been used in this study. Use has also been made of the works of many authors who specialize in works on the prairie regions: some like J.R. Miller are prolific writers on Amerindian issues; some like H.R. Hildebrandt more generally cover the region and the era; and others who cover specific aspects of the

35 For example see Robin Fisher, Contact & Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987).
37 See Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians (1880; repr., Toronto: Prospero, 2000) and Peter Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights (Calgary: Fifth House, 1999). Other works on treaties were also examined including Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders. From 1680 to 1890 – in Two Volumes (Ottawa: Brown Chamberlain, 1891).
38 See also Derek Whitehouse-Strong, “‘Everything Promised has been Included in the Writing’ Indian Reserve Farming and the Spirit and Intent of Treaty Six Reconsidered,” Great Plains Quarterly. Paper 1537 (2007), http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/1537.
39 For instance, the works of Hugh Dempsey including Big Bear: The End of Freedom (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1984); Crowfoot: Chief of the Blackfeet (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1972); and Red Crow: Warrior Chief (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980).
41 The use of Amerindian oral histories does involve many difficulties. For some of the debate on their use see Sheldon Kirk Krasowski, “Mediating the Numbered Treaties: Eyewitness Accounts of Treaties Between the Crown and Indigenous People, 1871-1876,” (diss., University of Regina, 2011), 3-6.
relationship between the government and the prairie tribes – for instance, Sarah Carter and Helen Buckley on agriculture. 42

Every historical work is skewed to an extent by the biases and cultural perspectives of the author. Many of the contemporary accounts of the Rebellion have a negative and somewhat distorted view of the conduct of the Amerindians. Modern “Native Studies” have corrected this view but they themselves demonstrate their own biases and mis-perceptions. It seems apparent that all the various actors poorly interpreted the actions and intent of other groups during the Rebellion. The Métis were the instigators, organisers and leaders of the Rebellion. The Amerindian role was less significant than supposed at the time, but it was not as innocent as is now regularly portrayed. While the main chiefs sought negotiations to improve the conditions of their adherents, murder, marauding, arson, and wanton looting and destruction did occur as many sources reveal. Some bands had justifiable grievances, but it is evident that for some bands their troubles were self-induced. Big Bear, for instance, can be seen as a noble figure as he struggled to mobilize the Plains Cree to renegotiate Treaty 6 and later tried to contain the violence at Frog Lake. Unfortunately, the destitute condition of his immediate followers and their bitterness is directly attributable to his long intransigence in “taking treaty” and refusal to select a reserve. Several modern authors, like Hildebrandt, all but excuse the Frog Lake murders based on Big Bear’s bands’ regime of

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While Amerindians have gained greater voice, the government side of the story has fallen silent. Narratives of victimization have now become predominant in this literature with many authors pointing all the blame for all Amerindian troubles to faceless bureaucrats of the Department of Indian Affairs. This approach presumes that Amerindians were neutral actors: individuals who were acted upon but bore no responsibility for acting themselves. This view is a disservice to the many bands that struggled to farm and were successful in converting to an agricultural way of life. Despite these flaws, the Amerindian perspectives of their part in the Rebellion enrich the overall view of the event.

To re-discover the voice of those involved in the administration of the Amerindian programs wide use was made of government reports, particularly the annual reports of the various departments as captured in parliamentary sessional papers. The reports of the Commissioner of the NWMP and histories of the Force were used extensively. As the first large government organization in the West, their detailed accounts reflect much of the day-to-day encounters they had with the prairie bands. Despite their often negative representation in modern “Native Studies,” the NWMP’s early days on the prairies, besides suppressing the whiskey trade, consisted largely of providing supplies to starving Amerindians, managing Sitting Bull, discouraging horse stealing, and protecting annuity payments. The plain reporting of the Department of Indian Affairs brings to light other interesting points. For instance, the difficulties

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45 The main history used was John Peter Turner’s, The North-West Mounted Police, 2 vols. (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1950) due to it scale and scope. More recent histories were also examined.
experienced in trying to pay the annuities fairly, and the troubles found in ensuring the provision of adequate rations. The reports reveal the scale and scope of the budget dedicated to supporting Amerindians in the West, a clear record of the money disbursed for completing the annual annuity payments, for hosting the payment gatherings, and for feeding the destitute (besides funds spent on shot and shell, twine and other sundries). The reports outline the many problems in the management of the Amerindian agricultural program – weak instructors, poor specifications for implements, inadequate inspection of goods received from contractors, and the steps taken to remedy many of these faults. The intent of department officials to encourage Amerindian self-sufficiency is evident in all these reports. Hayter Reed’s anguish over the wanton destruction of farm implements during the Rebellion encapsulates the desire of department official to see progress within this program. In combination with the other sources used, these first-hand reports help to explain the relative importance of population control measures during this period in the Canadian West.

**Philippine-American War**

The Philippine-American War is often characterized as a forgotten war. This generalization is shared among military, American and Filipino historians. Writing in 1984 on the American literature of war, David Lundberg pointedly omits any mention of the conflict. For military historians there are a variety of reasons for the long neglect of this war. Amongst them is certainly the enduring perception “that army conduct towards

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46 These problems are also highlighted in studies on the Indian policy of Canada. See Douglas Leighton, “The Development of Federal Indian Policy, 1840-1890” (PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 1975), 384-387.  
the Filipinos had been uniformly brutal and atrocious,” during the war that led to the narrative of the war being dominated by “lurid accounts of the ‘howling wilderness’ and the ‘water cure.’”\(^\text{48}\) The reduction of the war to merely brutal colonialism, which continues to perpetuate an anti-imperialist agenda, is often propagated uncritically even in detailed studies of the law of armed conflict current during the conflict.\(^\text{49}\) Forgetfulness of this period is also a condition of Philippine scholars. As late as the mid-1970s and even when celebrating the centennial of the liberation from Spanish rule in 1998, many of the works by Filipino authors were still informed by the perspective of “the benevolence of the colonial master” (the Americans).\(^\text{50}\) This makes the recovery of the hard facts of the Filipino experience during the conflict problematic. As discussed further below, while information on the general conduct of the campaign is now available, the Filipino perspectives on the conflict are still incomplete.

Filipino historiography is said to consist of “a careful fabric of purposeful oversight and selective remembrance.”\(^\text{51}\) Whereas this may not differ greatly from many national narratives, the Spanish and the subsequent American colonial regimes have long overshadowed Filipino history and identity. Much of the period of the war and its immediate aftermath is considered by leading Filipino academics to remain “imperfectly

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\(^{48}\) Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 17-18. Linn, an accomplished historian on the conflict, is using the characteristic buzz-phrases used by the anti-imperialist lobby. On Samar, Brig Gen Smith tasked his troops to reduce the island to a “howling wilderness.” The “water cure,” known in modern parlance as water boarding, was a form of torture involving forcing water down a suspect’s throat and then forcing him to expel it which created a sensation close to drowning.

\(^{49}\) John Fabian Witt, *Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History* (Toronto: Free Press, 2012), 353-365. I am not disputing here Witt’s point that torture is not allowed under the laws of war so much as the casual repetition about the received but incorrect wisdom concerning the concentration camps and supposed systemic brutality.


understood” and with the “munificence of American rule” still the common orthodoxy. Given the American control of the education system immediately after the war and that most of the histories of the conflict written at the time were composed by colonial officials, this original orthodoxy is perhaps understandable. The role of various Filipino groups in the war remains unclear: how committed to the revolution each group was and how it mobilized, supported, and fought in the war have yet to be recorded. This has made querying Filipino works on the conflict problematic. Some perspectives on the Filipino aspects of the campaign were gleaned from John R.M. Taylor’s Insurgent Records but this five volume set only represents a fraction of the records captured. Works written from the perspectives of the Filipinos were used here where retrievable. Because of the paucity of detailed accounts, other sources had to be examined to gather the perspective on how population control measures affected the Filipino fighting forces.

Renato Constantino wrote, “There is no source, no matter how biased, that does not yield a bit of historical truth.” Elsewhere, when discussing the anti-friar propagandists Antonio Regidor and Isabelo de Loyos Reyes, John Schumacher noted, “neither of them (were) known for their care for the facts.” These points apply equally

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in considering many of the works of the anti-imperialist lobby that developed in the United States during this period. Truth, at times, was a variable commodity for them and they deployed many political and propagandist techniques to support their position against the U.S. retention of the Islands and the conduct of the war. Much of their rhetoric is repeated uncritically today. A typical passage was couched in terms like the following:

The horrible methods of ‘reconcentration’ which continued up to a period so late as the summer of 1906, the expulsion of men, women and children from their homes, herded together under rigid surveillance, exposed to all weathers and without proper food, have been described. These Weyler methods, which contributed so largely to arouse the fiery indignation felt against Spanish Rule in Cuba, are enumerated in great detail in the League’s publications.  

This is not to infer that their position was a web of falsehoods, but although frequently accusing the administration of misrepresenting the facts, the anti-imperialists were as deft at concealing the truth. Their material has to be handled with caution but there are kernels of facts in their pamphlets and publications. For example, the incisive criticisms by Mark Twain and other anti-imperialist writers have provided important alternative perceptions of the events in the Philippines. Much has been written by and on the anti-imperialists by those trying to determine whether they were isolationists, moralists or merely racists. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the anti-imperialists for historians though was how their agitations led to Senate hearings into affairs in the Philippines. These hearings

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57 The methods are immediate “horrible,” the methods are “Weyler:” the author uses loaded word to provoke a particular image and over-generalization instead of stating facts. See Erving Winslow, The Anti-imperialist League: Apologia Pro Vita Sua (Boston: Anti-Imperialist League, 1909), 8.
provided an additional and useful window onto the population control measures employed during the campaign.  

Relevant secondary sources on the military aspects of the campaign from the earliest days to the present were used including those that focussed purely on the military aspects and those that promoted other agendas. There have been several popular histories written on this conflict recently and they were reviewed for background information. Biographies of key commanders, some very dated, were reviewed. The standard academic works on the campaign were examined including those of John Gates, Brian McAllister Linn and Glen Anthony May. The more recent monographs of William Ramsey III writing for the SSI Long War Paper Series have complemented their efforts. Earlier accounts of the American experience in the Philippines were read especially those by James Le Roy and David Barrows. A number of histories by authors who were less enamoured by the American intervention were used including works by Stanley Karnow, Stuart Creighton Millar, Moorfield Storey, and Leon Wolff. All these works, while

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60 For instance see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Philippines, Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. no. 331, Part 1, 10 April 1902.
62 Henry F. Graff, ed., American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines-1902 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986); Russell Roth, Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines, 1899-1935 (Hanover: Christopher Publishing House, 1981); Moorfield Storey, The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925 (New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1926); Claude E. Welch Jr., Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill:
confirming how the campaign devolved into specific localized struggles, only broadly or incidentally refer to the population control measures employed. They all had value in contextualizing the war but not the fidelity necessary to clearly set off the influence and importance of population control measures.

To examine the specifics of the population control measures employed, use was made of the bulky annual reports of the War Department, unit histories, personal accounts, and newspaper reporting. The annual reports of the generals who commanded in the Philippines – Elwell Otis, then Arthur MacArthur, then Adna Chaffee – were reviewed in detail. They contain extensive reporting on field operations as well as reports by the key staff officers responsible for important functions such as policing, supply and medical. Other diverse official documents were reviewed including those prepared by the Philippine Commission and those by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. Besides these sources, unit histories and personal accounts were examined to see if they contained any comments on the use of population control measures, but they provided only meagre results. Newspaper accounts were therefore used to both find more data and add colour to the campaign. For instance, newspaper accounts supplied additional details on the campaign in the Batangas and showed that Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith’s campaign in Samar was not as one-sided (i.e., an easy and brutal victory for American troops) as is


commonly assumed. Thus a broad variety of sources were used in this case study to clarify how population control measures were used.

**South African War**

There are a large number of works on the South African War. Even as early as mid-1900, it was recorded that “The flood of war literature shows no sign of abating. Books on the campaign are being issued by the score. The reader who wishes to have an authentic record of the Transvaal War may well be appalled at the vast number of volumes from which he is invited to make his selection.” This flood has not abated and sources include not only books for as Edward Spiers indicated, “the volume of correspondence from British soldiers was enormous.” The South African War was a unique experience for the British Army. As H.W. Wilson related:

…in South Africa the conditions were and are peculiar. The enemy wore no uniform, and thereby were given an immense advantage ... Further, many of the Boers had been captured, had taken a solemn oath not to bear arms further in the war, had been liberated, and had taken up arms – but stealthily, - living for days and weeks on their farms, and then going out for a few hours’ sniping, or railway breaking, or convoy looting. Finally, their methods were those of the guerrilla, and guerrilla war cannot be conducted without the aid and support of the non-combatant population and cannot be suppressed without the exercise of great severity.

These were the conditions that led to the pouring forth of books, accounts and letters. But the British side of the ledger and their interest in the war faded soon after it ended and the tale of the conflict would become taken over by those encouraging Afrikaner nationalism.

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It cannot be said that many of the works originally produced by South African historians have been unbiased (of course, neither have works that promote the British Empire perspective) but this situation has been improving. The South African War, as it is now known, remains one of the founding events of Afrikaner nationalism. 67 It is said to be, “part of the bedrock of Afrikaner self-identity.” Early South African historiography propagated a selective memory of a small nation that was, “hound ed almost to death by the British Empire but had survived and was now in the process of triumphantly rising from the ashes in response to its vocation and in order to achieve its divinely preordained destiny.”68 The academic works of Afrikaners became “less partisan and less crusading” between the late 1960s and the 1980s for a variety of reasons.69 More quality and evenness appeared around the centennial of the war. In recent years, more works have become available in English and that has permitted a fuller understanding of what happened out “on commando,” and provided more perspective on the Boer view of the conflict.70 For some periods, 1902-1910 for instance, information is still scarce and this impedes interpretation of the immediate aftermath of the war. Even so, many of the works that appear in English merely perpetuate a narrative of grievance. This is particularly so with respect to descriptions of the experiences of the Boer women.

A recent article on the concentration camps of the South African War characterizes their continued prominence in discussions of the conflict as “a debate without end.”71 It is unambiguous that the mortality rate in the Boer and black camps

71 Pretorius, “The White Concentration Camps of the Anglo-Boer War.”
was inordinately high and predominately attributable to contagious disease. Fewer individuals would likely have died if the British had improved conditions in the camps earlier, but conditions in the camps were caused by the actions and inactions of both sides. The Boer women subsequently moulded their suffering and loss into a narrative of grievance to support the political objectives of Afrikaner nationalism. Besides this, the conditions in the camps were exploited for propaganda purpose by the Boers in Europe and by the pro-Boers in England. Naturally, the British military and administration had their own version of events. In examining the phenomena of concentration camps in the South African War, therefore, great care must be exercised in the use of all sources. For example, the works and letters of Emily Hobhouse prepared in the immediacy of the war where she had a clear humanitarian intent were used instead of those prepared afterwards that served a different objective.\(^72\) All relevant British Parliamentary Command Papers covering the camps were studied. Many other newspaper stories, pamphlets, articles, reports and accounts were also considered. This breadth was necessary to winnow out sufficient facts to analyze the use of the camps in detail and to evaluate how they contributed to the Boer surrender. The camps had a great influence on the Boers but also conditioned the response of the “natives” to the war.\(^73\)

The participation of “natives” in the war is receiving greater attention. For decades, the war was portrayed as a conflict solely between white races. But in contemporary accounts, the Boers bemoaned the extent to which the British employed “natives” in any capacity and they regularly shot them out-of-hand when they captured


\(^{73}\) For a recent and excellent discussion of the camps see Elizabeth Van Heyningen, *The Concentration Camps of the Anglo-Boer War: A Social History* (South Africa: Jacana Media, 2013).
them acting as scouts or spies. The “natives” played an important role for both sides. After the war, Afrikaners tried to co-opt the “native” story into one of “equal suffering” with them under the oppression of the British. More recently the critical importance of the “native” retainers to the effectiveness of the Boer commandos in the field has been brought into view. On the British side, the first steps towards a greater awareness of the “native” participation came with the publication of the diaries of Sol Plaatje from the siege of Mafeking. Fuller studies have now been conducted into the role and function of “natives” in support of the British forces and their experiences as labourers and in their concentration camps. For our purposes, the value of the re-discovered “native” voice is to see how the population control measures used on them reflect a continuance of pre-war practices but also that these mirrored those practiced between Boer and Briton.

There is a vast wealth of material on the British conduct of the war. This ranges from official histories, to an abundance of general histories, to a mass of personal

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accounts and memoirs, to numerous regimental histories, and, as noted above, an extensive series of Command Papers and reports of royal commissions. A great deal of these works concentrate on the early period of the war – before the struggle became primarily a guerrilla one – but useful information is available on the later period too.

This wealth is fortunate for if actions speak louder than words the many actions described reveal the scope of population control measures employed. For instance, the requirement to obtain the proper passes was lamented in numerous personal accounts of the campaign. Likewise, aspects of the blockhouse lines are widely captured in histories, journals and in the photographic record. The mere evidence of a measure though does not reveal what its intended strategic purpose was or its ultimate strategic effect. So the detailed review was required of a multitude of works to determine the pragmatic implementation of the population control measures and their eventual results. For instance, Royal Engineer papers detail the specifications of the blockhouses, regimental histories detail the dull routine of manning them, while Boer accounts speak to the difficulties in forcing the lines

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once they were constructed. It was in the broad review of multiple sources that the system of British population control measures was fully exposed.

**Malayan Emergency**

There is ample evidence of the employment of population control measures in the historiography of the Malayan Emergency. Overall, the historiography of the Malayan Emergency is less contested than those of the other case studies. For the most part, it continues to reflect the official version of how and why the Emergency was won. Given the importance that population control measures played, they have been recorded in most official histories, reports and accounts. Besides this they are visible for two other reasons. First, the police forces played a significant role in combating the Communist Terrorists (CTs); therefore their role is well recounted and demonstrates the day-to-day

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implementation and execution of population control measures. Complementing but occasionally overwhelming these police narratives is an extensive body of works on the military aspects of the campaign. Prosecuting the campaign effectively required a close and interlinked partnership between these two forces, but it is military cultural norms of seeking lessons in past campaigns that further expose the population control measures used in Malaya.

Militaries typically examine past campaigns for lessons that can be applied in subsequent ones. The Malayan Emergency has been studied continuously and in great depth from almost the moment it began. Lessons learned in Malaya were immediately applied in Kenya. The United States looked urgently towards Malaya for lessons once it became more involved in Vietnam. All aspects of the Emergency were studied from the national registration system to the resettlement program. Thus began the extensive recording of the population control measures used in the campaign and the analysis of their effectiveness. This reaching-back to Malaya for lessons has never really stopped with more re-visiting occurring with the advent of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Resettlement drew special interest both because of its perceived uniqueness and because of its perceived centrality to the British success.

What debate there is in the historiography of the Emergency is concerned more with which measure contributed most to the eventual victory of the government forces.

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83 See footnote 21 above. The term Communist Terrorist will be generally used throughout this study. The insurgents were commonly called bandits in the early days of the Emergency but in 1952 they were officially labelled by the British as “Communist Terrorist” to de-legitimize them and separate them from the Chinese population.

This is not an uncommon argument after any conflict. On the one side of the debate is Karl Hack who contends that it was population control measures that “turned the tide” in Malaya before the arrival of General Templer and were the key to victory.\(^8\) On the other side of the debate are those, and this informs much of the original historiography of the conflict, that considered it was the presence and energy of Templer that turned the conflict. Kumar Ramakrishna emphasises that it was more the psychological boost that Templer provided that won the day.\(^9\) He considers that Templer gave the Malayans, the Malays and the Chinese, the confidence to have a common vision for the nation and that he drove the administration to deliver services to its citizens. Admittedly, Templer could not have accomplished this without the groundwork of population control measures established by his predecessors. Certainly, the pride of place given to “hearts and minds” aspects of the campaign is misplaced as suggested by Karl Hack and to be discussed in later chapters.\(^8\)

There is precious little written on the Malayan Emergency from the perspective of the Malayan Communist Party. Fortunately, in the last decades the leader of the MCP, Chin Peng, has collaborated in telling parts of its story.\(^8\) Though not extensive or comprehensive, these works provide some perspective as to the influence of population control measures on the MCP’s lack of success.

Kenyan Emergency

What was the Mau Mau rebellion and how is it seen today? This is a surprisingly difficult question to answer. The modern over-generalization is that it was campaign of wanton destruction, repression and brutality on the part of the British forces, but this is a narrow self-serving interpretation. In the six decades since the rebellion, its historiography has transitioned through four phases. Much was written in each of the phases, but their contrarian perspectives have added less to a fuller understood common narrative than to make it more contested. O.W. Furley categorizes the first period as the “official” version of the colonial government or as Robert Buijtenhuijs labels it, the European myth.\textsuperscript{89} The myth was common during the emergency. It was challenged ten years later and then supplanted by the African myth. This was succeeded by a combination of these two to form what Buijtenhuijs has called the “Euro-African” myth.\textsuperscript{90} These approaches faded from view in 2005 as from that date works on the conflict seemed more fixated on establishing the overall brutality of the conflict in aid of those seeking damages from the British Crown. This last approach is more political than historical. Aspects of population control can be discovered in works from each phase and the useful references are discussed below.


The “official” version of events was propagated almost as soon as the emergency was declared. It reflected the attempts of the settlers and the administration to understand and rationalize why Mau Mau had occurred. The “official” version denied that the root causes of the conflict were the lack of land, and of political and economic opportunity (though it was). In this view, Mau Mau was attributable to an unbalanced mental state in the Kikuyu: they naturally reverted to savagery; they could not deal with modernization; or other aberrations.\footnote{For the shattering of the “official” myth see Dane Kennedy, “Constructing the Colonial Myth of Mau Mau,” \textit{International Journal of African Historical Studies} 25, no.2 (1992): 241-260.} Rehabilitation thus played a large role in the administration’s approach to resolving the conflict both in the detention camps and in the protective villages.\footnote{For a contemporary view see Mary Shannon, “Rehabilitating the Kikuyu,” \textit{African Affairs} 54, no. 215 (April 1955): 129-137.} But this was not the only underlying philosophy. Those members of the administration who dealt with “native” affairs or were part of the provincial administration that was responsible for the Kikuyu Reserves displayed strong paternalistic tendencies towards their charges. Their attitudes informed policies on villagisation and land consolidation. Thus, both these attitudes have to be kept fully in view when reviewing reports and documents produced by the government of Kenya or its supporters. These accounts remain important to the study as they reveal the purpose and
plans behind the various population control measures that were implemented. The “official” view predominated until Kenya was granted independence in 1963.

The African myth was constructed in the 1960s as a limited number of personal accounts and the first analysis of the conflict from the forest fighters’ point of view were published. Of these personal accounts, some are very uneven and other are focussed on other issues, like life in the detention camps. All told, there are very few first-hand accounts of what occurred in the forests and the villages during this conflict. Buijtenhuijs attributes this to the casualties amongst the leaders in the forest that left only a large mass of illiterate fighters who could not articulate their struggles. Equally important, there was a general suppression of the memories of the war, as discussed below, and the political marginalization of the forest fighters after 1963 discouraged them from telling their side of the story. For the purposes of this study, most of these accounts were examined to gain an impression of the effects the British measures had on members of the Land and Freedom Army (the Mau Mau fighters’ name for themselves).

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The “Euro-African” myth developed shortly after Kenyan independence. The general suppression of the study of Mau Mau is encapsulated in Jomo Kenyatta’s, the first Kenyan president after independence, blunt expression, “Mau Mau was a disease which had been eradicated, and must never be remembered again.” Kenyatta sought to promote national unity after independence. He did so by pursuing an inclusive vision of Kenya that extended to all tribes (the notion that Mau Mau had not been simply a civil war between the Kikuyu) and “all had fought for Uhuru” (so the nation could forgive and forget the loyalists). Kenyatta regarded it as important to remain on good terms with the British given the importance of farm revenues to economic development of the country so the more strident demands of the forest fighters had to be suppressed. Thus a period of collective amnesia concerning the conflict set in and for a long period most substantial works on Kenya provided only an incidental glimpse of the Mau Mau years. There have, nevertheless, been important works in this drought – on political economy, on gender issues and on land reform – all of which have provided important context to this research.

The conflict has regained a central place in Kenyan historiography over the last decade. In part this occurred with the lifting of the ban on Mau Mau in 2003, and the publications of Caroline Elkins’ flawed work in 2005. Much of the present historiography consists of charge and counter-argument over the scale and scope of the brutality of the British counterinsurgency campaign. Elkins’ position is that


96 Quoted in Buijtenhuijs, *Mau Mau: Twenty Years After*, 47.


98 See fn 2 for discussion of the problems in Elkins’ work.
fundamentally brutality and human rights violations were all that it was about. Her over-generalizations display little nuance but have been further publicized in current British Court cases. This “violation” perspective also colours Huw Bennett’s recent account of the campaign. For each anti-administration work, there are rebuttals from both original participants in the conflict and from more moderate scholars. Given the contentious nature of this debate most modern works have to be dealt with carefully and with a full understanding of the political agendas that underpin them. A further difficulty is ensuring that works that reference or borrow from these works are treated with caution too.

Conclusion

A great variety of sources were used in this study. Extensive use was made of government records. These were supplemented by official and general histories of the

100 Huw Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counterinsurgency in the Kenya Emergency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Like Elkins’ work there are strengths and weaknesses in this effort. The weaknesses include his interpretation of the Boer War (95-96), the completeness of his arguments concerning the ideology on the use of minimum force (83-107), and in the end the lack of proof that the British Army itself was brutal so much as the temporary forces called into being during the emergency (home guard, Kenya Regiment, King’s African Rifles, police elements, etc.). A clearer overview of the minimum use of force can be seen in Rod Thornton, “The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 15, no.1 (Spring 2004): 83-106.
101 For instance see Terence Gavaghan, Of Lions and Dung Beetles: A Man in the Middle of the Colonial Administration in Kenya (Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1999); Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau: Creating Kenya: Counter-Insurgency, Civil War and Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); David Lovatt Smith, Kenya, the Kikuyu and Mau Mau (Eastbourne: Anthony Rowe, 2005)
102 As Hughes explains, “The coming out of Mau Mau since 2003 and the information subsequently produced masquerades as knowledge, excavated from a repressed subaltern past. But in privileging a narrow set of histories/memories over many others it remains one-sided and deeply unsatisfactory.” See Hughes, “‘Truth be Told,’ ‘Truth be Told,’ 196.
103 For instance, Anderson, publishing at the same time as Elkins, borrows from her work. See David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War and the End of Empire (London: Phoenix, 2006), 294. Note I am not arguing here that the Kenyan campaign was not particularly brutal. This is more than evident but the more that is written on the campaign the less the interpretation of it seems to be being refined. For a snapshot of the brutality see David Anderson, “British Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counter-insurgency, 1952-1960,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no.4-5 (2012): 700-719.
campaigns and unit histories and memoirs and personal accounts. Accounts from the 
oppositions’ perspective were used to gain a fuller perception of the influence of the 
population control measures employed. Even then, details on the use of population 
control measures were often incidental to the primary narrative. Thus, contemporary 
newspapers and journals were used to add to the context. The historiography on some of 
the population control measures is quite contentious and this problem helped reinforce 
the necessity of treating all sources with caution.
Chapter 3
Methodology

The methodology to be applied to the analysis of the contribution made by population control measures to success of government forces in small wars and the rationale behind it is the topic of this chapter. The chapter is structured as follows. First, there is a brief review of how militaries can become the primary regulatory and enforcement mechanism of the state in small wars. Second, there is a discussion of the factors that influence the use of population control measures. These factors include legal constructs and a number of the key characteristics of military institutions including their preferred way of war, their vision of how they will achieve victory, and their ability to learn. The third and final factor to be considered will be the generally accepted strategies for success in small wars. Next, the backgrounds of the five conflicts used in this study are outlined. Finally, the case studies are tested for commensurability.

The three chapters following this one are organized around specific population control measures: movement control, resettlement, and food control. This functional structure reveals long-term historical patterns in the use of population control measures. While it is evident that such measures evolved incrementally within modern western state bureaucracies, it is less obvious how such practices came to be employed by militaries. The functional organization of the following chapters is used to reveal how a measure contributed to immediate control in an operational area, what measures were considered appropriate and legitimate in a particular era, and which ones were sufficient to persuade or coerce the target population. This chapter will outline the structural aspects that
influence a security force’s use of specific population control measures that will be considered in the following three chapters.

The analysis of population control measures will occur in three stages. First, why a particular measure was selected by the military within the context of a specific conflict from amongst potential alternatives will be examined. Second, once selected, how specific population control measures were implemented will be assessed. If they were regarded as crucial to success there should be evidence of their importance in plans and orders. It also needs to be determined how comprehensive were the range of measures initially employed and what additional ones were added as the campaign progressed. To see whether the measures formed part of a comprehensive strategy, it will be necessary to determine how well coordinated and monitored they were and if they served immediate or long-term objectives. Third, the actual influence a measure exerted over the target population must also be evaluated. Attention will be devoted to determining the causal links between the measures imposed and the results obtained. Were the results achieved predicted or unforeseen? What importance did the opposing forces attribute to the measure both during and after the conflict? By analysing population control measures across these three stages a more substantial view of their value can be constructed.

The Military Role in Regulation

The modern western nation state evolved over centuries. As it developed, it became a boundary mechanism; the state decided who rightfully belonged, perhaps a particular ethnic group or an imagined collective, and who did not. In this process, states adopted both internal and external regulatory functions as they sought to establish control
of their population. Regulatory frameworks, including legal codes, were built upon pre-existing norms and customs from within the enclosed society. States established regulations and codified diverse standards such as those for money, weights and measures, cadastral surveys, building codes, labour codes, and the numerous measures needed to record and register the important data of a society.\(^1\) Development of these frameworks is a dynamic process; there is a continual negotiation between society and state as to what should be regulated and codified.\(^2\)

The mere existence of regulations is insufficient to establish control as they have little value if they are not enforced. Non-compliance with regulations occurs for different reasons, but it happens especially if they are regarded as trivial, intrusive, exploitative or unjust. Enforcement is essential or the regulatory regime will lack legitimacy. States have numerous institutions, such as departments that monitor different functions and multiple layers of police and security services, which conduct the surveillance and enforcement that allow a state to function.

Enforcement mechanisms are important in both peace and in war. In the later instance, the military may be called upon to implement and enforce necessary regulations. A state rarely has an institution other than its military that has the mass, reach and skills to impose control under violent conditions. Militaries maintain their internal discipline in strict fashion, and, understandably, these embedded practices can be mirrored when imposing control on external actors whether opponents or non-combatants. Thus wherever and however used, militaries are blunt instruments of control. Comprehensive, detailed control simplifies the security challenge facing a military force;

\(^1\) For the struggles to establish standards see Scott, *Seeing Like a State.*
\(^2\) Much of this section is derived from Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
however, preference for this exacting control can appear excessive even to the societies from which the militaries themselves are drawn.

In the employment of military force bluntness has a utilitarian purpose. The underlying value of a military is its ability to coerce individuals, groups and peoples to comply with its demands and objectives. A military must be perceived as a threat with an ability to do actual harm and a demonstrable intent to do so when its demands are not met. Military leaders typically expect absolute compliance with their direction and have little regard for nuance and discretion in the implementation of their instructions. Military dictates serve a deterrent function when non-compliance is believed to bring prompt and frequently forceful correction.

Military professionals study the use of force, both physical and psychological. Courage and skills in battle are regarded as cornerstones of successful military careers and not the minutiae of regulations and control. Yet in the midst of many conflicts, the regulation of the population in a military’s area of operations assumes supreme importance. Whether control measures are borrowed from standing civil practices or from a military’s internal disciplinary practices, military commanders seek immediate, demonstrable and positive compliance to their orders and directives from the target populations. Measures have to be enforced for a military force to retain its legitimacy and authority. A broad host of measures will be established to encourage acceptable and dissuade unacceptable behaviour. Stronger measures that will compel compliance and tightly control civilian activities are imperative if the initial less stringent ones prove
insufficient.\(^3\) This typology of the utility of population control measures will be important in considering the evolution of their military use.

**FACTORS**

There are certain factors that limit the use of military force. Some of these factors will be considered below; in particular, those that are considered when population control measures are applied. These factors include the following: the legal constructs under which a military force operates, the intrinsic organizational culture of the military in question, and, as a sub-component of that culture, the general strategy a military will seek to employ to defeat an insurgency.

**Legal Structures**

Militaries conduct operations under a combination of legal structures that influence how they will prosecute a campaign. More generally, legal frameworks influence the selection, application and legitimacy of specific population control measures. Therefore understanding the implications of these different legal regimes is critical to this study. As outlined below, they include military law, the law of armed conflict (and how it is bounded by military necessity), martial law, and the more recent codification and legislation of emergency regulations.

Military law is that law which applies to the internal discipline of military forces. Separate laws and disciplinary measures that are set apart from civil practices have a long legacy in militaries. Military law is harsher than its civil counterpart but it is what enables

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the institution to function by assuring that the orders of the chain of command will be obeyed regardless of the risks hazarded. It encodes what is allowed and not allowed for the troops. For instance, military law establishes how much leave an individual is allowed, designates who is authorized to grant the leave, and even details the type of pass that must be carried by an individual proceeding on leave. Military law is administered by an internal justice system with individuals and organizations at different levels having jurisdiction according to the nature and severity of a particular offence. Military law rests in the hands of commanders, provost marshals, summary trials, courts-martial and military commissions. Military law is highly coercive and demonstrative as it is not meant to be rehabilitative but about setting examples “pour encourager les autres.”\(^4\) This underlying purpose can have important implications when a military is the primary enforcer of regulations in other contexts.

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and military necessity are intertwined concepts that need to be considered together when examining their application to population control measures. The LOAC, commonly known as the Geneva Conventions, proscribes specific practices and equipment in warfare. For instance, it regulates the treatment of the wounded and prisoners of war and forbids the use of dum-dum bullets and poisonous gases.\(^5\) It is said that the LOAC is honoured more in its breach than in its observation.\(^6\) The arguments for the applicability of the Conventions in small wars are particularly confused: Do they apply to the “savage races”? Do they aid in the


identification of the guerrilla? Will both sides be held equally accountable? Are they absolute or discretionary?7

Within the general framework of the LOAC, there is the overriding concept of military necessity. Military necessity recognizes the judgment of a responsible military authority to determine that certain acts are justifiable and allowable to achieve required military ends with the critical caveat that military necessity cannot be used as an argument to condone extravagant violations of the norms of armed conflict.8

Aspects of military law and the LOAC become especially important if martial law is declared. Martial law is a system of restrictions and permissions that constrain civilian activities that may challenge the military’s authority and only permits other activities under close supervision. The scope of martial law can range from ordering curfews at night to requiring travel permits to preventative detention. The restrictions and regulations of martial law are constituted by the military itself; it sets the rules and enforces them. Provost marshals are key actors in martial law having both a civil and military disciplinary role in this context.9

7 These questions are debated at length in the literature on the LOAC. Certainly the Lieber Code was developed partially in response to the problems of how to treat guerrillas in the U.S. Civil War. This Code informed operations both in the Franco-Prussian War (1870) and the Philippine-American War. Modifications to the LOAC after World War II gave more right to the guerrillas (perhaps reflecting their wide use in that war). Treatment of guerrillas was often covered within national “emergency regulations” throughout the 1950s and 60s. The dividing line between the guerrillas, their supporters and non-combatants remains very contentious. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (BasicBooks, 1992), 176-196.


9 Provost marshals in many instances are only temporary appointments so the records available on their extensive duties are sparse. For a broad description see War Department, Regulations for the Government of the Bureau of the Provost Marshal General of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863).
Martial law is most frequently imposed where there is no functioning or acceptable civil authority in a territory being occupied. Jurists who try to grapple with responsibilities under martial law often find distasteful the degree of authority delegated to the military under this construct as they presume its application simply devolves to the will or willfulness of individual commanders. Given that the normal severity of military discipline is applied equally to civilians under martial law, practically whenever it has been imposed, all activities under it have been typically closely monitored and challenged by those outside the military. Often the population control measures selected under martial law reflect this equality of exposure to a harsher disciplinary regime.\(^{10}\)

The use of emergency regulations is a more recent practice. Legal means have a lengthy history of being the cornerstone of suppression.\(^{11}\) The modern use of emergency regulations emerged from the British efforts to quell the Irish Rebellion of 1918-21.\(^{12}\) These wide ranging regulations imposed severe penalties for a multitude of otherwise minor violations. They were enacted repeatedly during the turbulent winding down of the British Empire. In both Malaya and Kenya, they formed the core of the legal mechanisms used to suppress those rebellions. Though modified since their introduction in Ireland, the regulations used later retained much of their original harshness. Colonial authorities enacted them and then could claim they continued to operate within the rule of law. Like

\(^{10}\) This does not mean that the declaration of martial law has a coercive effect on the opposition. The Boers in the field ignored most proclamations issued by the British in South Africa. See Diplomaticus, “A Comedy of Proclamations,” *Fortnightly Review* 70, no.419 (November 1901): 873-883.

\(^{11}\) British history is replete with examples. For instance, the Black Acts of the seventeenth century and the Penal Laws used against the Irish. See E.P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975). The Catholics in Ireland were said to be “ground to dust by the penal laws.” Instituted shortly after the surrender of Limerick in 1690 when Protestant forces remained vulnerable, they were used to suppress the Irish long into the nineteenth century. See Henry Parnell, *A History of the Penal Laws Against the Irish Catholics* (London, 1822) and J.R. Willington, *Dark Pages of English History* (London: Art and Book Company, 1902). Memories of the Penal Laws were used to encourage recruitment into the Irish Brigade during the South African War. See Donal P. McCraken, *MacBríde’s Brigade: Irish Commandos in the Anglo-Boer War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1999), 73.

military law, LOAC and martial law, the application and appropriateness of emergency regulations must be considered when judging how a military applied population control measures.

Institutional Aspects

Three main institutional characteristics influence how a military will select and employ population control measures in a small war. These three characteristics are its preferred way of war, its vision of how to achieve victory, and its capacity to learn and adapt. All organizations, whether formal or informal, large or small, have a functional purpose and have an institutional culture. This culture, heavily influenced by societal norms, has a bearing on the strategic and tactical choices made to achieve that purpose.\textsuperscript{13} Culture informs all aspects of organizational choices and this includes a nation’s preferred method of conducting wars. There is an abundance of modern works that describe national approaches to warfare such as those of Russell Weigley, Isabel Hull, and Robert M. Cassidy.\textsuperscript{14}

National preferences also influence the choice and implementation of population control measures in small wars. The untried Canadian militia in the North-West Rebellion did not stray far from imitating the practices of British regular forces. American practices in the Philippines were definitely influenced by the experience of senior military commanders like Generals Otis, MacArthur and Chaffee, all of whom had


fought Amerindians in the American West.  

British Army practices have been conditioned by its colonial campaigning heritage. The pre-1900 practices of the British were well captured in Col. C.E. Callwell's 1906 book *Small Wars*, a pragmatic exposition on the best tactical methods to be used against “savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers.” His book was a prescriptive guide for the punitive expeditions of the day. While the preferences of a generation of senior British officers were conditioned by their experiences in World War II, the British Army never truly shed its small war roots. After World War II, the British had to re-examine their pre-war campaigns to inform their post-war efforts. Small war procedures were slowly rediscovered as British forces were committed to operations in the Greek Civil War, in Palestine, and then afterwards in Kenya and Malaya, where the British techniques largely crystallized.

Militaries customarily have a vision of how best to achieve victory in a conflict but most often their opponents refuse to conform to these preferred expectations. This vision is related to two different perceptions. The first is mirror-imaging the opponent:

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17 Timothy Liewellyn Jones, “The Development of British Counterinsurgency Policies and Doctrine, 1945-52” (PhD diss., King’s College, University of London, 1991), 39-40. As Jones notes, Callwell’s book did not really change how the British military conducted war but captured how they did it. Many of the lessons from the South African War with respect to population control were subsequently ignored.


expecting a similar reaction to threats and expecting similar goals, objectives and
techniques. The second is the perception of their opponent’s tactical competence
combined with the military’s categorization of the “otherness” of the opponent. Tactical
competence is quickly revealed on the battlefield. The view of the “otherness” is
constructed and its influence will be related to how intensely differences are construed.
Typically erroneous, the image of the opponent may be cultivated prior to or in the midst
of a conflict or a military might intervene in a context where there already exist strong
inter-group differentiation and boundaries. Both perceptions, particularly where the
opponent does not conform to expectations, bear on what are considered fair and
effective measures to be taken against insurgents and their adherents.

In war determining what is actually contributing to the achievement of one’s
objectives is important as victory is rarely obtained by repeating unsuccessful actions.
How or if progress is being made in a war must be measured. The measures may seem
obvious: fewer encounters with enemy forces, less violence in the area of operations, or a
local population that is increasingly cooperative. However, establishing the causal links
between military activity and an improving security situation can be difficult. It may take
some time to prove which activities are contributing the most results. How any particular
technique contributes must be carefully monitored and successful ones adjusted and

21 See Larry Cable, *The Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the
22 This perception of the “others” is well covered by works like Sherry Smith’s *The View from Officers
Row: Army Perception of Western Indians* (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1990), John W. Dower’s
*War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) and
elsewhere. It is also reflected in works like Elspeth Huxley’s *Red Strangers* (London: Penguin Books,
2006) and even in Charles E. Russell’s *Outlook for the Philippines* (New York: Century Book, 1922). From
a strict perspective of the context in a settler colony see Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
23 Jones, “Development of British Counterinsurgency,” 123. It is here that preconceived notions can cause
the greatest harm. For instance the Chief of the General Staff in 1946, Field Marshal Montgomery,
advocated harsh measures to suppress the troubles in Palestine based on his pre-World War II experience.
As the object condition had changed, this harsh policy had little utility.
adapted as conditions change. For example, the British continually modified their counter-guerrilla techniques in South Africa,\textsuperscript{24} and the Americans did likewise in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{25}

Successful militaries display a capability to learn and adapt.\textsuperscript{26} The willingness to accept and act upon a lesson differs across the structural levels of a military. At the organizational level, the highest level, lessons tend to be incorporated when they affect the survivability of the institution and its general ability to perform its mission.\textsuperscript{27} Otherwise, they are often ignored or discarded. Changes at the operational and tactical levels, the levels of the forces fighting in the field, are another thing entirely.\textsuperscript{28} There is an immediacy and urgency to lessons at these levels as the harshest ones a military force learns result from direct contact with the enemy.\textsuperscript{29} Experienced officers normally carry these hard-won lessons forward to subsequent campaigns.\textsuperscript{30} So, while the importance of


\textsuperscript{26} To borrow from Maurice Tugwell, commanders must be prepared to “adapt or perish.” See David A. Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds., \textit{Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis} (Toronto: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989), 1.

\textsuperscript{27} Scott Sigmund Gartner and Marissa Edson Myers, “Body Counts and ‘Success’ in the Vietnam and Korean Wars,” \textit{Journal of Interdisciplinary History} 25 (Winter 1995): 377-395. The authors discuss both how militaries general select tasks that will achieve their preferred outcomes but also their requirement to learn.

\textsuperscript{28} For my purposes the tactical level is the level that small military units operate at which includes the actions of platoons, companies, battalions and even brigades. The operational level consists of the activities to coordinate the actions and efforts of formations (brigades, divisions, corps, armies) that consist of those units to achieve the overall objectives in a theatre of war.

\textsuperscript{29} Sir Herbert Maxwell, \textit{A Century of Empire, 1801-1900}, vol. 3 (London: Edward Arnold, 1911), 303. One of the first thing British officers learned in the South African War was the shooting prowess of their opponent. Deliberately targeted, they had to strip themselves of distinctive marks and accoutrement to increase their chances of survival.

\textsuperscript{30} Randall W. Heather, “Of Men and Plans: The Kenyan Campaign as Part of British Counterinsurgency Experience,” \textit{Conflict Quarterly} (Winter 1993): 22-24. This cross-pollination of men is described between the Malayan and the Kenyan Emergencies. Specialist functions from colonial encounters were carried forward by their practitioners, like Frank Kitson from Kenya with his pseudo-gangs and Sir Robert Thompson from Malaya.
population control measures may be recognized and retained at lower levels, they may be forgotten or overlooked at high levels once a conflict concludes.

Institutional characteristics greatly influence choices made in war. They thus have a bearing on the population control measures that will be selected and how they will be applied.

**General Strategies**

Most militaries have implicit assumptions about how small wars should be conducted. These assumptions are important, as they constitute the organization’s view of what is sufficient violence to subdue an opponent and of what is appropriate conduct towards their opponent’s civilian supporters. For example, in nineteenth century warfare in Africa, fair play was demanded in conflicts between “whites,” whereas brute force was the standard response against black Africans, as it was believed that it was all they could understand. Within the three broad strategic approaches to small wars the underlying implicit assumptions condition the degree of violence considered appropriate.

The first strategy is the hard-handed approach that demands the use of harsh measures throughout the war. U.S. Civil War General Sherman, famous for his “March to the Sea,” was one of the original apostles of total war. For Sherman, the hard hand of war had to fall on all participants, both combatants and their supporters, exposing all to the loss and destruction wrought in war to coerce and persuade them to abandon it. He considered all components of his opponent’s system as equally liable to attack. By threatening them all and making the threat immediate, Sherman expected them to respond
by saving themselves and preserving their own self-interests. A humanitarian sentiment subtly informed this approach. A hard war would be a short one, would generate far less casualties and suffering, and was, therefore, seen as more humane. If this hard-handedness is the military approach from the first instance, it conditions all the measures selected for population control.

The second strategy is the hearts and minds approach. Some considered it the war winner in Malaya, and it is a technique that has been repeated numerous times. Hearts and minds is about national identity; it is about giving individuals a stake in the polity of the nation. In Malaya, it was about according a political voice to the disenfranchised amongst the population and bringing them into a non-violent political process with fair and distinct representation. To be successful, a hearts and minds approach must be supported by extensive population control measures. Co-opting the population to support the government requires at times bringing services to individuals who were previously denied them or could not readily obtain them. Such economic and developmental concessions can make population control measures more palatable. Even so, for this strategy to work, the guerrillas still need to be subjected to harassment and attrition.

A third strategy is a cost-benefit approach, which is fundamentally a strategy of resource control. All warfare has aspects of attrition. The ability to keep fighting a war can be reduced to an input-output equation: sufficient inputs (resources) are needed that can be converted to outputs (fighting capabilities). Denied inputs, an organization will

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32 For previous examples see William D Boyce, *The Philippine Islands* (New York: Rand McNally, 1914), 30 and 33. Boyce gives an extensive list of improvements the Americans undertook in the Philippines in order to convince Filipinos of the benefits of American governance. Similar works were undertaken in Cuba. Lord Milner’s work in South Africa at the end of the South African War proceeded in a similar fashion.
collapse and not be able to continue the struggle. In small wars how do you deny the insurgents resources when they do not possess the trappings of conventional forces? Guerrillas typically have no lines of communications, armouries, or supply dumps, but obtain their resources mostly from the local population. Therefore, the military must concentrate on protecting the population and thereby deny the guerrilla access to them. In this strategy, population control measures are crucial mechanisms to separate the insurgents from their all important sources of supply.

All three methodologies may be practiced, sometimes even concurrently, during a small war. Early on in a conflict, it is quite common for the immediate reaction by security forces to be hard handed. It may then be tempered by the other two strategies, but may then be followed by a reversion to even harsher practices. Most often small wars are brought to a successful conclusion by slowly choking off the guerrillas from the resources necessary to support their fighting.

CASE STUDIES

Five case studies have been used. To provide context, a general outline of each one is provided below. The detailed examination of the employment of specific population control measures is discussed in the next three chapters.

The North-West Rebellion

The relationships between Amerindians and whites varied during the centuries-long, westward expansion of Canada. Early on in the East, the relationship was nation-to-nation as tribes granted local privileges to newly arrived Europeans or provided crucial

\[33 \text{ I have generally used the term Amerindians in this study after the practice of Olive Patricia Dickason in } \textit{Canada’s First Nations} \text{ (1992; repr., Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993).} \]
assistance, often food. In the East military alliances were common until the 1820s, but westwards, beyond Lake Superior, the lengthy relationship remained a one of economic convenience.  

This economic interaction centred on the fur trade. The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), across the northern arc of its operations, from Lake Winnipeg to Lesser Slave Lake to Fort Edmonton, relied upon Cree middlemen to support the fur trade. The Cree, however, as they became more immersed in plains horse culture, were not motivated by the presumed economic incentives of the trade. Prior to 1870 in the Canadian North-West, there were little overt hostilities between the Amerindians and the few whites present - travel adventurers, missionaries, and fur traders – as they were not at cross purposes or competing for scarce resources. The North-West Rebellion in the spring of 1885 would be the first and last major confrontation in the region in which the Amerindians participated in a rebellion against the Canadian government.

The interest of Canadian government in the North-West increased after 1870. The region was seen as the natural outlet for Eastern Canada and the vital middle link to British Columbia. There was some urgency to assert Canadian interest as the government wished to thwart any American attempts at northwards expansion. Canada needed not just stated possession but demonstrable physical occupation, and this required settlement. Canada secured the rights to Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1870, but its failure to consult and advise the existing population of the Red River settlement as to its intentions before it took formal possession of these territories inspired the first Riel

36 Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide*, 122. The Cree did not prove to be the ‘economic-man’ that the HBC hoped for.
37 Ibid., 34.
Once this rebellion was settled, Canada began preparing the territory for development: surveys were conducted, railways were planned, and treaties were negotiated. The clear purpose of the treaties was the alienation of Amerindian lands to permit settlement to proceed. Settlement would serve a dual purpose: it would fill the prairies, thus securing possession, and it would help fund the construction of the railways. Unfortunately, all the new developments spawned grievances as they dislocated pre-existing ways of life: surveys threatened Métis land claims, railways threatened the carting trade, and the Amerindian reserves system demanded a complete transformation of their way of life.

As it sought to strengthen its claim on the West, the Canadian government established two key institutions to deal directly with the Amerindians. In 1873 the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) was established so that the Canadian government could extend law into the prairie regions and protect Canadian Amerindians from American gun and whiskey traders. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, such protection was a key government instrument for controlling Amerindian activities. Police duties ranged from monitoring and constraining the fugitive Sitting Bull, to enforcing civil law, to distributing rations in time of need. The extension of the Department of Indian Affairs into the region was also important. Many band chiefs recognized the need to develop alternate food sources and wished to take up agriculture. The farm instructors of the Department of Indian Affairs were vital to achieving this aim. Unfortunately, some of the farm instructors were ill-suited to the task, and, at points the promised farming implements and seeds were not provided. The impediments of the Department of Indian Affairs...

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38 See George R. Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada* (1936; repr., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), Ch 3-5.
Affairs stalled the efforts of some bands of Amerindians to establish themselves on their new reserves but oft times the bands were less than devoted to the new requirements of farming.\textsuperscript{39} Beside these difficulties, the government’s restrictive policy on issuing rations – they were given to the needy but the able-bodied were required to work for them - was a constant source of tension.

After 1870, the more extensive encounters between Amerindians and whites on the prairies led to mounting grievances. Some of the downward spiral in this relationship was caused by the disappearance of the buffalo from the prairie grasslands. For the Cree, their primary source of sustenance had devolved to a single source, the buffalo. In the days of the massive, thundering herds this may not have been a failing, but as the buffalo vanished the Plains Cree had few viable alternative food sources.\textsuperscript{40} By 1883 only small herds were located far to the southwest of the Canadian plains across the United States border.\textsuperscript{41} As the herds diminished, the Canadian government was repeatedly obliged to feed starving bands.\textsuperscript{42} The government used food as a lever to both pressure Sitting Bull into returning to the United States and to coax the Cree bands posted along the border awaiting the return of the buffalo to disperse to reservations along the North Saskatchewan River.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{39} Carter, \textit{Aboriginal}, 12.
\textsuperscript{40} Carter, \textit{Aboriginal}, 24-27. Carter points to the diverse nature of the food types exploited by the prairie Amerindians but these sources were in no way as easy to gather or as readily available as the buffalo. John S. Milloy, \textit{The Plains Cree: Trade, Diplomacy and War, 1790 to 1870} (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1998), 104. Milloy highlights the great importance of buffalo as the primary source of sustenance.
\textsuperscript{41} Carter, \textit{Aboriginal}, 95-100.
\textsuperscript{42} Stanley, \textit{Western Canada}, 224-227.
\textsuperscript{43} Carter, \textit{Aboriginal}, 146-149 and Stanley, \textit{Western Canada}, 232.
The Canadian government’s bureaucratic practices contributed to the eruption of the North-West Rebellion. Its dilatory response to Métis land grievances prompted them to seek other means by which to have their complaints addressed much as they had in 1870. The government policies concerning the development of agriculture and the distribution of needed rations, both miserly at best, caused discontent amongst some Amerindian bands. Their discontent was regularly voiced but not acted on. Food supplies more than land was the main grievance that led a limited number of Amerindian

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bands to throw their lot in with the Métis in the North-West Rebellion.\textsuperscript{45} Once the Rebellion was suppressed, authority was re-asserted in the North-West Territories. In order to prevent future uprisings that could jeopardize settlement plans, the prairie bands would be subjected to harsher and stricter controls than the much more culpable Métis community.\textsuperscript{46}

This case study focuses on the Amerindians not the Métis. After 1870 the Canadian government was more worried about a potential Amerindian uprising than further Métis disturbances. Further, government intrusion and control over the Amerindians was much more extensive than that exercised over the Métis. Once the Rebellion erupted, the Métis largely pursued a conventional strategy both at the battle of Fish Creek and in the defence of Batoche. Unlike the Amerindians, they did not pursue a guerrilla strategy. Given these difference, the case study has concentrated solely on the interactions between the government and the Amerindians.

\textbf{Philippine-American War}

The American foray into the Philippines must be understood as a sub-component of its brief war with Spain that erupted in 1898 over events in Cuba.\textsuperscript{47} The Philippines were a Spanish possession but an ocean away from the seat of the Cuban revolt, so why then was a major commitment launched into the Philippines when at the start of the war

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{45} Miller, \textit{Skyscrapers Hide}, 173-176. The Indians were seeking to re-open treaty negotiations in the years leading up to the Rebellion. They had also been subjected to the ‘no work, no rations’ policy which was an attempt to force them into agriculture but had also be ill-served by a retrenchment in Canadian policy which saw them receiving few of the farm supplies they required.
    \item \textsuperscript{46} Lt Col George T. Denison, \textit{Soldiering in Canada} (Toronto: George N. Morang, 1900), 314-316. As Denison outlines, many of the bands that supported Riel were coerced to do so and through careful management many of other bands remained quietly on their reserves.
    \item \textsuperscript{47} Lieutenant E. Hannaford, \textit{The Handy War Book} (New York: Mast, Crowell & Kirkpatrick, 1898), 28 and 29. One of the main reasons for the American declaration of war was the Spanish reconcentrado system. More on this will be given in Chapter 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
few Americans could locate them on a map? The motivation behind this intervention was the American Navy’s Mahanian vision: during war the destruction of the enemy's fleet was deemed necessary wherever it was in the world. In this case, a portion of the Spanish fleet was off Manila, and with the declaration of hostilities Admiral George Dewey was dispatched to confront it. Dewey steamed into Manila Bay on the 1 May 1898 and soundly trounced the weak Spanish fleet anchored there. Then Dewey in close cooperation with the Filipino land forces besieged the Spanish forces in Manila. Whether the Philippine Islands were to be retained at the end of hostilities was debated heatedly in America. Some viewed the retention as the natural expansion and continued extension of a new American empire. This view was supported by those who considered the Filipinos ill-equipped to rule themselves and feared that an American withdrawal would simply open the door for the islands to be seized by another foreign power. Others were utterly opposed to maintaining any possession whatsoever. Eventually, the United States would pay $20 million to Spain in compensation for the archipelago, and a grand colonial experiment commenced. Fighting with the Spanish was ending, but conflict with the Filipinos was just commencing.

The American intervention ended centuries of Spanish rule although the Filipino nationalists had seriously eroded Spanish authority over the previous two years during the Philippine Revolution. The initial and typical Spanish pacification strategy, which stressed repression alone, had failed during the Revolution, and then under the new leadership of Spanish Governor General Fernando Primo de Rivera reconciliation with

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48 As the American satirist Finley Dunne’s Mr. Dooley said, “tis not more thin two months since ye larned whether they were islands or canned goods.” See Finley Dunne, Mr. Dooley In War and in Peace (Boston: Small, Maynard & Company, 1899), 43.
key Filipino leaders was attempted. The erstwhile leader of the Filipinos was Emilio Aguinaldo, a young educated nationalist. As the fortunes of the rebels waned, Aguinaldo with a number of associates accepted the offer of 800,000 Mexican dollars to quit the Philippines in late December 1897. Having barely established himself in Hong Kong, Aguinaldo returned immediately upon the American intervention and reconstituted the Filipino forces. Prior to the arrival of American troops, it was the Filipinos alone who pinned the Spanish forces in their garrisons in Manila and elsewhere. The realization of national liberation, so tantalizingly close during the period of the Philippine Revolution, now appeared at hand. Merely switching colonial masters was not a Filipino aspiration.

There seemed to be bright prospects in the initial interaction between the Americans and the Filipinos. Dewey’s fleet dominated the sea approaches to Manila and the Filipino forces the landward ones. Friendly assistance and accommodation was the norm when the American troops despatched to secure Dewey’s victory first arrived. In fact, Filipino forces were displaced to allow American troops a place in the southwest corner of the siege works surrounding Manila, and the procurement of local supplies was facilitated through the Filipino command structure. Relations soon soured, however. As more of their forces arrived, the Americans became progressively more wary of the Filipino role in the future liberation of Manila; Filipino support for the Americans wavered as they became suspicious of the Americans’ overall intent. The American taking of Manila was comic theatre: the opposing American and Spanish commanders agreeing to the minimum resemblance of resistance by the Spanish to permit dignified

50 Charles E. Russell, *Outlook Philippines* (New York: Century Book, 1922), 66-68. As Edward notes, “Perhaps, at last, the Spanish became sensible of this; perhaps their government began to feel the futility of the thumbscrew as a breeder of love and loyalty.”
51 Helen S. Wright, *Our United States Army* (New York: Robert J. Shores, 1917), 234. This period lasted approximately three and a half months.
surrender; and, this was followed by the American forces immediately barring the Filipino troops from entering the city. Denied what they considered their rightful prize,

the Filipinos remained in their siege lines around the city awaiting developments.

Tensions ran high but each side tried to minimize serious outbreaks of violence. All this came to naught on the evening of 4 February 1899. A chance encounter in the dark between two opposing patrols drew deadly fire from the American side. At dawn the Americans launched an attack to capture the Manila waterworks and to push back the besieging Filipino forces. These were the opening strokes of the Philippine-American War.

Neither the bulk of the Filipino forces nor the mass of American volunteers had extensive combat experience, but the Americans proved more effective in combat. Seasoned senior leaders, organizational capability and a distinct advantage in weapon handling skills enabled the US forces to rapidly overcome Filipino defences. The U.S. troops advanced both to the north and south of Manila. Their progress northwards quickly threatened Aguinaldo's alternative capital at Malolos. Though bravely contesting the American advance, the Filipino forces were constantly forced to withdraw. The inability of his forces to hold the Americans in conventional battle was evident to Aguinaldo and his generals. In late 1899, they decided to change tactics and thereafter pursued a guerrilla strategy. Over the next two years, as they gradually pacified the

53 Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit: A Study of our War with Spain* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 393 and 397. Millis notes for the long period between the taking of Manila and the eruption of hostilities, “We held nothing save the city of Manila.” General Otis, the commander of the US forces, estimated that there were a large number of insurgents scattered throughout Luzon and some 6,000 besieging Manila alone.


55 Glenn A. May, “Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902,” *The Pacific Historical Review* 52 (November 1983): 357-359. May notes that while they did not have an edge with respect to rifles that the American artillery was superior to that of the Filipinos.

archipelago, the Americans suffered all the typical difficulties of waging a campaign against guerrilla forces: the limited availability of intelligence, the inability to easily recognize enemy combatants, the dispersion of forces, the constant strain of the threat of immediate attack, and a frustratingly elusive enemy. Two key events contributed to the dissipation of the Filipino resistance: first, the re-election of McKinley in 1900 shattered the insurgents’ hopes for a change in U.S. government policy; and second, the capture of Aguinaldo in March 1901 by Colonel Frederick Funston effectively decapitated the movement. The remaining fragmented resistance was overcome as the American forces applied the harsher measures allowed under General Order 100 and made progress in winning local support. President Theodore Roosevelt declared the long fought pacification of the main Philippine islands complete on 4 July 1902.
The South African War

The South African War was the culmination of an enduring contest between Boer and Briton in South Africa. It has been described as the high tide mark of British imperialism. If so, it was a tide that had risen gradually over the century of the British
presence in South Africa. Seized in 1806 during the Napoleonic Wars by the British to protect their sea lanes to India, conflict in southern Africa was endemic. First, there were recurrent conflicts with the “natives” – Hottentots, Zulus and others. Second, there was a constant simmering feud between Briton and Boer, usually related to sovereignty issues or to the Boer treatment of the “natives.” The response of the fiercely independent Boers to British intrusions was to migrate northward to ungoverned spaces away from British control, a process called trekking. In the new northern republics created by the Boer trekkers a major confrontation occurred between December 1880 and March 1881, the First Anglo-Boer War. Famously marked by the Boer victory at Majuba Hill, it was a sufficient embarrassment to British arms that no medal would be issued for the campaign. It was a harbinger for the conflict that would erupt nearly 20 years later, but few of its lessons were properly learnt.

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58 John Noble, *Descriptive Handbook of the Cape Colony: Its Conditions and Resources* (Cape Town: J.C. Juta, 1875), 23-24. These wars were said to have greatly retarded the development of the country. For instance in the 1834 war the Hottentots carried off 111,418 head of cattle, 156,878 sheep and goats, 5,428 horses, and 58 wagons and burnt 456 farm-houses and pillaged 300 houses.
59 General Sir A.T. Cunynghame, *My Command in South Africa, 1874-1878* (London: Macmillan, 1880), ix – x. Cunynghame relates, “The Boers rebelled in 1815, and it was necessary to shoot some of them.” And, “The question of slavery has been a sore one with the Dutch. They are so attached to it that they will not readily live in any country where it is abolished; and it is the desire of the Boers each to ‘whop his own nigger’ in peace …”
From the British perspective, the immediate cause of the South African War was the treatment of the predominantly British uitlanders (outsiders) in the two Boer Republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Discontent had been developing amongst the uitlanders in the Republics for several years. They were denied political rights, suffered many restrictions and bore the majority of the tax burden. In response to

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63 Maxwell, *Century of Empire*, 295.
this continual poor treatment, British colonial subjects from Rhodesia and Bechuanaland launched the ill-conceived Jameson Raid in early 1896 in an attempt to aid the *uitlanders* to seize power in the Transvaal. Easily repulsed, it inspired the Boers to begin serious preparations for a future conflict. They purchased and stockpiled ammunition, rifles and artillery. Conversely, the British did little to prepare and overconfidently predicted an easy victory in any future conflict despite the failings of 1881. Recognizing the degree of investment of the *uitlanders* in the wealth and economy of the Republics but also believing in the legitimacy of their grievances, Britain began pressing for their rights. Both sides began a degree of military mobilization while negotiations on these issues were ongoing. On 9 October 1899, the Transvaal government of Paul Kruger issued an ultimatum to the British demanding they cease their military preparations. The British government was unwilling to bend to such threats and when the ultimatum expired on 11 October 1899 conflict became inevitable.

Using their unique commando system to quickly mobilize, the Boers invaded Natal and quickly laid siege to Ladysmith and on the western flanks of the Boer republics to the key towns of Mafeking and Kimberly. These thrusts caught the British unprepared and forced the newly arrived British Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. Sir

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64 Ibid., 293, 297.
65 H. Rider Haggard, *A History of the Transvaal* (Toronto: George J. McLeod, 1900), xix - xxv. Haggard give a good impression of the mood of superiority evident in the British preparations: “And now, in due season, the war comes; an inevitable war which cannot be escaped, and must be fought out to the end. There is only room for one paramount power in Southern Africa!”
66 Maxwell, *Century of Empire*, 298-299.
67 Ibid., 75. Most Boers were raised on isolated farms and taught to ride and shoot from a very young age, ideal soldier skills. The republics were divided into districts within which all male inhabitants were part of a designated commando under a locally elected field cornet. These commandos were very fluid organizations and possessed detailed and important local knowledge. The Boers were a true nation in arms, a true citizen army.
Redvers Buller, to revise his initial deployment plans. On the defensive everywhere, the British forces limped from disaster to disaster. This weak showing culminated in Black Week, a series of heavy losses and defeats between 10 and 17 December 1899. From that point forward, Britain mustered all possible resources from across its Empire to assist in putting down the Boers.

After his litany of disasters, Buller was replaced by Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts, and Maj. Gen. Lord Kitchener, who had recently crushed the dervishes at Omdurman, was sent out as Roberts’ chief of staff. British strategy was quickly revised by Roberts and soon the British pressed forward on the western fringes of the Orange Free State to liberate Kimberly and then to trap and defeat Boer General Piet Cronje at Paardeburg in December 1899. Subsequently, Roberts pushed his columns onwards towards Bloemfontein and then onwards to Pretoria, securing the two capitals of the Republics. With the capture of the Pretoria, Roberts declared the war over. Shortly thereafter, he and many others would return to England.

Unfortunately for the British, it was not over. Having been given a short but sufficient respite after the fall of Pretoria, the Boer forces re-launched themselves with new vigour into a guerrilla campaign. They did not have to substantially change their tactics or organization to do so. Recognizing the importance of mobility they dispensed with any and all items that would hamper them whether artillery piece, wagon or vrouw (wife). Unlike the Boers, the British were required to continually adapt their methodologies and practices as they sought to pacify the Republics. Normal measures from past campaigns like reprisals, amnesties, and destruction were applied. Newfound

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methods were also trialed: coordinated mounted columns, blockhouse lines strung along the railways and then across the veldt, massive linear shoulder-to-shoulder sweeps, and the concentration camps.

For the British, the campaign was substantially different from any earlier one. They faced a competent guerrilla opponent who was not easily coerced. The British were therefore challenged to develop new techniques that would wear their opponents down and induce them to surrender.\(^{71}\) Even this was a double-edged sword. As individuals dropped out of the fight, only the most extreme and most ardent ones, the “bitter-enders,” remained in the field.\(^{72}\) In the end, the British war effort was reduced to the continual pursuit of elusive commandos, the monotony of sentry duty in the blockhouse lines, and the destruction or removal of livestock and all other foodstuffs that might be used by the Boer commandos. The heated debate amongst the Boer delegations leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging points to the ultimate success of this British strategy of attrition.

**The Malayan Emergency**

British influence in Malaya was decidedly undermined by the successful Japanese invasion during World War II. The Japanese attack on Malaya caught the British by surprise, and their rapid success against the less than courageous British defence including the early surrender of Singapore compounded this overall disaster to British

\(^{71}\) Pakenham, *The Boer War*, 515, 568-569. Besides changing how the Army conducted sweeps, Kitchener had to eventually adopt the progressive clearing policy proposed by Milner in the early days of the guerrilla phase.

\(^{72}\) And of course, these harsh measures often prompted even fiercer resistance. See Denys Reitz, *Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War*, 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1953), 147.
A plain and definitive triumph of Asian over Westerner, the Japanese conquest eroded the moral authority and credibility of British rule. Nevertheless, the Japanese occupation, despite allusion to brotherhood and racial equality, was not a happy period for most Malayans. Pragmatically, a difficult and severe master replaced the light guiding hand of the British. The demands of the new masters were unyielding and exploitative; their rule was hard and harsh. With supporting their own war effort as their prime concern, the Japanese did their utmost to strip Malaya of resources. They employed divide-and-rule techniques that caused splits and divisions both between and amongst the various components of Malayan society. Reflective of Japanese operations in China, the occupation was especially difficult for the Chinese in Malaya. Many were driven or fled into the jungles, the inaccessibility of which provided some security and refuge.

The response to the Japanese occupation varied across the main segments of Malayan society. The Malays themselves largely remained neutral and did little to oppose the Japanese. The Indians, predominantly Tamils, continued working on the plantations and estates. It was the British and Chinese who combined to contest the Japanese presence. Spurred by the struggles in China, the Chinese resistance in Malaya was Communist-led. For over two years, a British liaison group, Force 136, helped organize, train and arm the guerrilla forces, which was originally named the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Operating behind Japanese lines, the role of the MPAJA was to disrupt the Japanese supply lines. An economy of force mission, it was hoped their attacks would draw off Japanese forces from the front lines and thereby contribute to the

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76 Ibid., 73.
broad British strategy for retaking Malaya. Though a large organization, over 4,000 guerrillas and 6,000 supporting personnel by the end of the war, it is uncertain whether the MPAJA ever vigorously engaged Japanese troops. As the only resistance element in the field though, it garnered accolades as if it had, a useful propaganda tool. Whether it had seriously contested the Japanese presence or not the MPAJA made the most of the myth of its contribution to the liberation struggle.

When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the MPAJA under its MCP leadership emerged from the jungle and seized power before the British could return. Its repressive and retributive actions won few converts, however, and the British quickly re-established themselves. The MCP then sought other avenues to power, mostly by infiltrating trade unions both in Singapore and Malaya. Given the MCP’s overt Communist purpose, the British moved to eliminate its leadership of the unions. The alternative avenues open to the MCP thus became extremely limited. When it had left the jungle at the end of World War II, the MPAJA had disarmed and demobilized, at least symbolically. Weapons that were rusted, bent and broken and no longer useable, the worst part of its arsenal, had been turned in. The best weapons were buried in case of future need. Although the MPAJA was officially disbanded, the MCP maintained a large, closely controlled organization of its veterans, and it continued to train, recruit and organize. Blocked from achieving its objectives by other avenues, the MCP returned to

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77 The military principle of economy of force means, “employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary effect.” In this context the British were planning to use a small guerrilla force to disrupt the Japanese supply lines in hopes that the Japanese would have to commit substantial resources then to securing them.


the jungle in 1948 and re-armed. This was the starting point of the Emergency. Now calling themselves the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the guerrillas continually tried to expand their base of support, but remained primarily a Communist-led, Chinese entity throughout the conflict. The British quickly categorized their opponents as Communist Terrorists (CTs).

Figure 5 - The Federation of Malaysia
Source: British Information Services, The Federation of Malaya (London: Cox & Sharland, 1963), 7. U.K. Government Copyright is reserved.
The British were unprepared for this new threat in Malaya. The initial response of the security forces was harsh and repressive and did achieve some immediate but inconsequential successes. Two factors hampered the initial response. First, there was a lack of both military and political intelligence. The scale and scope of the insurgency was not evident, and, therefore it was not clear how best to respond. Having less than a full picture of the threat made it difficult to convince Malayan leaders at the state and national levels to undertake the necessary mobilization measures. Nor was detailed intelligence available to properly target the CT in their jungle haunts. Second, even if detailed information had been available, British forces, most of whom were conscript national servicemen, were ill trained and poorly equipped for jungle fighting. Eventually, changes and improvements did come. They included, amongst many, greater skill at jungle warfare, greater employment of special forces, and greater use of air power. Two other elements served as key tipping points that aided in the eventual defeat of the insurgency. The first was the implementation of the Briggs’ Plan, an effort to resettle the bulk of the Chinese squatters. Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations in Malaya, developed this scheme to separate and protect the population from the CT. The second was the ambush and death of High Commissioner Henry Gurnsey in October 1951. General Templer, his carefully selected replacement, had a substantial influence on the final British success.

Templer energized the campaign and drove it forward to a successful conclusion. His greatest influence was in three crucial areas. First, mirroring techniques from elsewhere, Templer struck combined planning committees at all levels in Malaya to unify

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82 Allen, Malaysia, 95.
and coordinate all actions against the CT. As collective planning and execution mechanisms, they ensured a unified approach to the threat at the district, regional, state and national level. Many critical functions, especially intelligence, were centralized, unified and streamlined to better support operational and strategic planning. Second, Templer ensured that hearts and minds issues remained a priority throughout the campaign and went beyond just satisfying the simple needs of the squatters. Finally, and equally as important as hunting down individual terrorists, Templer gave due attention to the expansion and proper imposition of population control measures throughout the peninsula.

The Kenyan Emergency

In the early twentieth century the British administration in Kenya was guided by the policy of paramountcy: the concerns and well being of the “natives” were supposed to be their primary consideration. The policy was a statement of priority, but the observable practice was that the government in Kenya bent to the purposes of the white settlers. Policy and practice provided for the white settlers: Africans were restricted from producing cash crops for export; Africans could only own land within the “native” reserves and could only squat in the White Highland; and Africans were subjected to an elaborate tax and pass system to ensure the labour necessary for the success of the white

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84 Crozier, The Rebels, 208-209. Templer knew that military toughness needed to be combined with political and social progress. He was charged with leading the country as rapidly as possible to self-government while at the same time fighting the insurrection. Vernon Bartlett, Report from Malaya (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), 11. As Bartlett notes about Templer, “He has talked himself to the verge of a nervous breakdown in his desire to make them understand the obligations and benefits of democracy.”

farmers was available. Export based agriculture was deemed fundamental to the colony’s survival. The Kenyan economy did not need to be dominated by the white settlers, but it was. Even given these advantages, many white settlers did not have an easy time establishing themselves. Often under-capitalized and subject to local and global economic booms and busts, many endured years of financial hardship. A majority finally achieved a solid footing only after World War II. Whatever their hardships, they paled in comparison with those of their black fellow countrymen.

The life of the Kikuyu, the main tribal group affected by white settlement, changed after the arrival of the “red strangers” \textsuperscript{86}: the conduct of cattle raids was no longer permitted, the practice of female circumcision was discouraged, and the position of chiefs, newly created and installed by the British, contravened their own traditional self-governance practices. \textsuperscript{87} Three items became the core of Kikuyu discontent. First, there was a distinct lack of opportunities for an African to advance. Pervasive white control denied them advancement whether in church, employment, agriculture or education. \textsuperscript{88} Second, the tax-induced labour regime with its accompanying identification system, the kipande, caused discontent. The colony’s tax system, skewed in the favour of the white settlers, included a hut tax on Africans. They were forced onto the labour market to obtain the cash necessary to pay it, the underlying purpose of the tax. The kipande, which working male Africans had to keep on them at all times, was a combined identification document and record of employment. Its use was subject to much abuse by white

\textsuperscript{86} As Elspeth Huxley termed the white-settler in her book of that title.
\textsuperscript{87} Huxley, \textit{Red Stranger}, Book I – Muthengi. Though fiction, Huxley’s book outlines the structure of Kikuyu society before the arrival of the white man. It was a not a society dominated by paramount chiefs but one control by committees of elders on their respective ridges. It took the British imposition of the Dual Mandate system of Lord Lugard to force a chieftainship system onto the Kikuyu with mixed results.
employers, and it severely limited and restricted labour mobility. More details on this system are given in Chapter 4.\textsuperscript{89} Third, the greatest and most long-standing grievance concerned land.\textsuperscript{90} Each tribe had been allocated a land reserve in 1905. When they were established little forethought was given to the potential future size of the Kikuyu population. The British had eliminated the previous checks on population such as intertribal conflicts and disease, and thus the Kikuyu population began to swell. Prior to the arrival of the British, amongst the Kikuyu territorial expansion had served as a release for population pressures, but this option had been sealed off by the boundaries of the reserves. In consequence, over time the expanding population in the reserves reduced many residents to subsistence farming, land holdings became highly fragmented, and a mass of squatters migrated to white farms where they exchanged their labour for a livelihood.\textsuperscript{91} These three grievances formed the basis of the Mau Mau revolt.\textsuperscript{92}

Any stirrings to revolt grew unhurriedly in Kenya, only gaining momentum after World War II. With the return of Jomo Kenyatta from England, the Kenyan African Union (KAU) began organizing itself for a political struggle. For this nascent political entity, the key mechanism used to mobilize adherents was oathing. The significance and binding nature of an oath had deep roots in Kikuyu culture.\textsuperscript{93} Numerous large rallies were held across the Kikuyu lands to induct members into KAU. Although it was eventually

\textsuperscript{90} For an outline see St.Clair Drake, “Some Observations on Interethnic Conflict as One Type of Intergroup Conflict,” \textit{Conflict Resolution} 1 (June 1957): 155-178.
\textsuperscript{91} A fact that was more than obvious to commentators of the period. See Farson, \textit{Last Chance in Africa}, 28-29, 33,106-112.
\textsuperscript{92} Intense debate continues as to the origin of the term “Mau Mau” for the Kikuyu revolt. The participants in the revolt remained largely confined to the members of that tribe, a fact that belies argument that it was truly a nationalist movement. The centrality of the tribe to the environs of Nairobi influenced the importance of that tribe to the well being of the white settlers in Kenya.
\textsuperscript{93} Much is made of the alleged extraordinariness of the oathing but as Alport notes in “Kenya’s Answer,” “The use of an oath is nothing new in Africa and nothing new in the Kikuyu tribe.”
banned, this organization continued its recruitment. Within it there were individuals who used strong-arm tactics to ensure recruitment, and others who agitated in favour of the greater use of violence to further its overall ends. Subsequently, across the reserves the incidence of beatings, fires, thefts, and murders increased markedly in the early 1950s. Though generally aware of these rallies and a rising crime rate, the colonial administration did little to counteract them. By late September 1952, the troubles caused by a new Kikuyu organization, now labelled Mau Mau, drew increasing attention from the government. Upon his arrival as the new governor in early October, Lord Evelyn Baring conducted a rapid tour of the most troubled areas and quickly determined a more vigorous response was required. Then, on the 9 October 1952, a stalwart of the regime, Chief Waruhui, was gunned down in his car in broad daylight.

Up to this point, the administration's reaction to the heightened levels of criminal activity had been tentative and very much a “business as usual” approach. The murder served to galvanize the response. Baring declared a state of emergency on 24 October 1952. Military forces were mobilized: a British infantry battalion was flown into Nairobi, battalions of the King's African Rifles were deployed, and the Kenya Regiment was activated. The police services were rapidly expanded, and in a short time, amongst the loyal chiefs and isolated Christian elements in the reserves, home guards were formed. The British in Kenya borrowed heavily from the technique being used in Malaya, and

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96 Ibid., 226. It had included curfews, collective fines and more police but these had not curbed the violence.
97 The King's African Rifles was a multi-battalion British colonial regiment recruited in British possessions in East Africa. The KAR fought in several campaigns in World War II. Afterwards, three battalions (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd) saw service in Malaya and all of the battalions, seven in total, operated in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising. The Kenya Regiment was a territorial force unit formed in 1937 and composed mainly of European settlers. It operated in its own right but also provided officers to KAR battalions and provided support and advisors to other security forces during Mau Mau.
many individuals and units served in both theatres.\textsuperscript{98} White settlers volunteered en masse to oppose the Mau Mau. Their linguistic abilities and detailed local knowledge made them valuable in security operation. Their constructed view of the role and place of the

“natives” in Kenyan life and how they should be treated was obvious in their actions and typically casual disregard for African life.\textsuperscript{99} The Emergency ran from late October 1952 to 1960, but the fighting was mostly over by 1955. Population control measures figured heavily in the campaign, but like so many other things in Kenya the perspective of the white settlers conditioned their use.\textsuperscript{100}

\textbf{Commensurability}

The five case studies were chosen for a number of reasons. In the first instance, they were selected because population control measures made an important and evident contribution to the government’s success in the campaigns. Recognizing their importance in the denial of local resources to the guerrillas, examples were selected where massive external support was not afforded to the guerrillas. The effective use of population control measures by the government, therefore, had great relevance to how these campaigns unfolded. In the second instance, they were selected as they were sufficiently comparable and yet sufficiently different to test the thesis being examined.

There are important differences among the cases. Each struggle was constrained by factors that limited the conflict: the intensity of the conflicting interests, the uniqueness of the country’s geography, the inherent capacity and capability to mobilize resources of the societal structure, the accessibility of resources, and even the simple


\textsuperscript{100} John Gunther, \textit{Inside Africa} (London: The Reprint Society Ltd., 1957), 371. There was a clear recognition from the earliest days that military force alone was not the answer in Kenya. As Gunther sums up, “Bullets alone can not solve the Mau Mau problem. No less a person than General Sir George Erskine, who was the British Commander-in-chief, said, ‘There is no military answer to Mau Mau; It is purely a political problem of how Europeans, Africans and Asians can live in harmony.’”
carrying capacity of the land itself. Geography alone greatly influenced how the campaigns were fought. What was effective on the vast open spaces of the South Africa veldt was characteristically impractical in the confining jungles of Malaya and Kenya. Operations differed too depending on the degree to which the societies involved were acculturated to fighting, had access to weapons and supplies, and were competent at tactics, operations and strategy. Some groups like the Cree and the Mau Mau were weapons poor, tactically competent but strategically inept. These differences affected how each individual campaign unfolded.

There are other differences. For instance, the insurgents fought for different purposes: the Cree to obtain their treaty rights; the Boers to preserve their independence; and, the Filipinos, Chinese, and Kikuyu to place themselves at the head of the existing system of government. Additionally, how elements other than the military contributed to the campaigns varied enormously. In the North-West Rebellion, complete authority was never passed over to the military commander. In the Philippines and South Africa, the zones of operations were the exclusive preserve of the military commanders; civilians had advice to offer but little influence. In both Kenya and Malaya, the military was closely integrated with all other elements of the security forces and with the colonial administration in combating the insurgents.

The cases are similar in that an established, conventionally orientated force was required to adapt to combat an elusive guerrilla opponent. The scale and scope of adaptation demanded varied with the duration of the conflict; the longer a conflict endured, the greater the number of new techniques and strategies that were employed. In the short North-West Rebellion, the Canadian militia did not have to venture far from
conventional drill. In the Philippines and South Africa, greater adjustments were necessary. Both in the Kenyan and Malayan Emergencies, fighting in dissimilar jungles required comparable but locally refined adaptations. In each case, the military force had to continuously adapt.

Further, the cases are similar in that the degree, extent, and detail of the ability of the insurgents to mobilize the population affected the depth of the required military response. Grievances that lead to revolt and rebellion evolve over time and are often couched in a narrative of perceived wrongs and disadvantage. This narrative alone or combined with ideologies can be a powerful tool to mobilize individuals and groups to take action. The depth and breadth of the mobilizing construct of the insurgent had a direct influence on how detailed and sophisticated a response was required to dismantle it. The Boers, fundamentally organized as a nation in arms, required an empire-wide response from the British. In the Philippines, the Americans were challenged by a multitude of geographically dispersed, differentiated tribes each of which required different policies to pacify. In Kenya and Malaya distinct ethnic groups were for all practical purposes the sole participants in the rebellions. In the North-West Rebellion, the Cree were at the other extreme with only a few individual bands playing an active role in the Métis-initiated conflict. In all five cases, grievances contributed to the mobilization of the insurgents and the degree of mobilization conditioned the necessary counter-response.

As well, the cases are similar in how the military campaign unfolded. Brief periods of conventional operations were followed by the employment of harsher and harder methods. There was a common escalatory dynamic. Initial warnings and their attendant consequences, regular military practices, were used to attempt to sway the
uncommitted to the side of the counterinsurgent. If these devices did not achieve the
desired coercive effect on the rebels and their supporters, inevitably, harsher ones were
attempted. A challenge for the counterinsurgent in each of these conflicts was balancing
the necessary harder measures that separated the hard-core fighters from the population
with those sufficient to protect and co-opt the population.

A final similarity is the commonality of the population control measures used in
each case. Movement control, resettlement, and food control are evident in all of these
case studies. The techniques used in one era frequently re-appeared in the next. For
example, the measures used in the early 1900s and in the 1950s mirror those used in
Canada in 1885, but, of course, modified to suit the particular campaign. Many of the
population control measures were derived from long standing bureaucratic practices.
However, in each conflict the measures had to be re-discovered, modified, and translated
into effective tools for the campaign being fought. Militaries normally borrowed
techniques from other militaries and from past or ongoing campaigns. This routine of
borrowing, still common today, was practiced intensely in the frequent interchanges
between the administrations of Malaya and Kenya during the 1950s emergencies. The use
of control measures has been, therefore, typically begun based on former practices and
then refreshed and adapted as a campaign progresses.

The case studies, therefore, have sufficient similarities as well as sufficient
differences to provide a reasonable dataset of experience in the use of population control
measures to be of value in determining their overall value in small wars.
Conclusion

This chapter outlined the methodology that will be used in this study and provided the context of the case studies selected. To recap, the general methodology is comparative. The use of population control measures in each case study was queried in detail to establish their overall use, contribution and importance to the success of the military forces. The numerous factors that were considered in contextualizing the use of these measures were described. These factors included legal structures, national ways of war, perceptions of how victory was to be achieved, the potential to learn and adapt, and the general strategies pursued to resolve small wars. The five case studies were described in outline: the 1885 Canadian North-West Rebellion, the 1898-1902 Philippine-American War, the 1899-1902 South African War, the 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency, and the 1952-1960 Kenyan Emergency. Lastly, the five case studies were demonstrated to be suitable for this evaluation.

Based on this framework, the relevance of population control measures to success in small wars was examined in this dissertation to determine the strength of the causal link between their use and victory. The scale, scope and appropriateness of population control measures will have a direct bearing on the counterinsurgent’s success. The measures themselves when complemented by other security force actions contribute to the persuasive and coercive mechanisms necessary to sway a population to support the government. To be effective the measures need to be enforceable and enforced, a role that frequently falls to the military. Even then, harsher measures and tools may still be required within this construct. Population control measures are therefore a crucial
element in a military’s arsenal in a small war. The following three chapters will examine the detailed application of the individual control measures in the case studies.
Chapter 4

Movement Control in Small Wars

Mobility and elusiveness are crucial sources of power and strength for insurgents. They often possess superior mobility to the counterinsurgent because of their better knowledge of the local area and their better adaptation to the local terrain whether it is jungle, mountain or open plain. Their elusiveness is based on other factors. Difficult terrain in the urban and rural environment affords great hiding places. Their intelligence network may provide early warning that may allow them to easily evade the security forces. Additionally, the insurgents can often blend in with the local population allowing them to hide in plain sight. To be successful in a small war security forces must be able to both restrict the mobility of the insurgents and to deny them concealment of any nature. This is accomplished though the use of movement control measures which restrict the insurgents’ ability to move freely and which clearly identify them and separate them from the innocent and non-combatants. This chapter will discuss the use of movement control measures in small wars.

Movement control practices exist beyond war. It has been argued that they have been a fundamental part of the formation of the modern state.1 Today, in many states even ordinary citizens are required to possess some form of identity document. These control practices have slowly evolved over centuries, but their large-scale implementation has tended to be associated with catastrophic events. For instance, as Magdalena Krajewska points out, national identity card programs were only imposed in Britain

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during the World Wars. This chapter will concentrate on the use of movement control measures in small wars. Most often, the administration and the security forces in these types of conflicts modified pre-existing mechanisms to restrict movement. The application of three main techniques will be examined: the identification card including the use of passes/permits, the designation of special areas, and the construction of physical barriers. Blends of these techniques and others, like curfews, combine to underpin the effective implementation of the more intensive population control measures discussed in subsequent chapters.

The cornerstone of movement control is identity documents. Governments have long sought to identify their citizens and make them more legible to the state. Censuses, passports, and identification cards all form part of the mechanisms used by the state to identify its resources and who is and is not entitled to a share of them. Both passes and identification cards (ID cards) normally become ubiquitous in small wars. Passes granted by security force organizations are not truly identity documents so much as authorization forms. That is, passes are issued to authorize an individual to perform some act – travel by rail, reside in a location, sell goods and services. They do not necessarily form a basis for identification but do restrict movement. The primary purpose of ID cards is to establish the identity of the bearer. They come in a variety of forms and are constructed with varying degrees of sophistication in order to defeat forgery. For instance, cards in Britain in World War II were eventually colour coded to reflect an individual’s security

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risk, and the cards issued in Malaya bore both a photograph and a thumbprint. Security forces can routinely and systematically spot-check all individuals and thereby control movement once ID cards are issued. Security forces conduct these spot-checks at fixed or mobile checkpoints and at other times by randomly stopping individuals. Eventually, it becomes the norm for everyone to carry and value their ID cards. In addition, the central bureaucracy fundamental to an effective ID cards system – where the individual is intimately linked with their file – vastly improves the ability of intelligence staffs to winnow out and identify insurgents and their supporters. Passes and ID cards restrict the ability of the insurgents to move about freely and make other control measures more effective.

The designation of special areas is a less sophisticated system of movement control. Designated areas are usually combined with other geographic bounding techniques such as concentration zones and resettlement villages (see Chapter 5) and build on the architecture of issued ID cards and passes. Areas are categorized depending on the insurgent threat and the stance of the population, that is, their degree of loyalty to the regime. Once an area is graded, specific regulations for using deadly force (the permission to open fire) are closely linked to the designated category. For instance, in low threat areas security forces may be restricted from opening fire unless an individual flees when challenged. In high threat areas all entry into the area is usually prohibited so

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5 Larry Hannant, *The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Canada’s Citizens* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 4-6. To borrow from Hannant, screening during wartime tends to focus on establishing who is a threat to the state. The state needs visibility over the individuals within its boundaries. In small wars the ID card is often the first step to establish this legibility.
6 David Wood and Kirstie Ball, ed., *A Report on the Surveillance Society: Full Report* (Surveillance Studies Network, September 2006), 4. Wood outlines a number of factors to the success of an identification system: its attention must be purposeful; it becomes routine, it is systematic; and it is focussed. These factors are important in determining how effectively a system can be applied.
security forces may be permitted to shoot individuals on sight. While the checking of ID cards can be seen as a relatively routine administrative practice, the designation of an area allows the security forces to adopt a more proactive and coercive posture. In general, special areas are used to confine non-combatants within limited areas, to contain them and even put them behind wire to protect them from immediate threat from the insurgents.

Any large-scale sophisticated obstacle complexes constructed during a small war constitutes a bounding mechanism. Obstacle complexes consist of both physical barriers amongst which barbed wire will typically be used extensively, and the defence works such as trenches and blockhouses necessary to cover the obstacles by observation and fire. In conventional warfare obstacle complexes are used to disrupt and canalize enemy formations. In small wars they are used to block guerrilla movement in general and to separate the guerrilla from the population. The movement of the guerrillas is revealed by the trip-wire function the obstacle serves. In attempting to force a crossing of the obstacle, the guerrillas alert the security forces to their presence, and then the security forces can deploy to attack and pursue the exposed guerrilla forces. By separating the guerrillas from the population, the obstacle zones force into the open guerrillas’ attempts to re-supply themselves and make these activities even more hazardous than normal. Obstacle complexes are affected by technology employed by the opposing forces and the cost of their construction. They are not an effective counter if the guerrilla forces possess sufficient firepower to quickly force them. Similarly, they may not be feasible if the cost in personnel and materiel is excessive. In general, obstacle complexes always have a degree of linearity but their careful employment can yield great strategic results as a
conflict progresses. They may be first established to protect a narrow band of territory along a counterinsurgent’s lines of communications and then be re-roled into other uses later. Obstacle complexes can be used to separate guerrillas from their main source of supply, the population. When employed in this fashion, they are normally constructed as a wide continuous zone that insurgents are forced to cross to seek supplies, thereby greatly increasing their risk of discovery by the security forces. In this last case, the obstacle complex is usually also a designated area.

The historiography on movement control measures is sparse. The majority of literature on movement control and identity documents relates to rationing systems in the World Wars, the development of the passport, or the rise of the modern surveillance society and national identity systems.\(^7\) Material on the use of movement control measures in small wars is similarly limited. For example, the use of passes barely bears a mention in most works of military history though it is ubiquitous within and essential to the operation of a military force. Though important to the ultimate success, many ID systems used by militaries in these types of conflicts build on pre-conflict civil systems. These systems were designed for different purposes. Those in South Africa and Kenya, for example, were labour control devices.\(^8\) Where these systems are studied, it is in their

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primary civil uses instead of how the security forces employed them. While many considered the use of the ID cards system in Malaya as an important baseline, its use there has not been greatly explored either. Likewise, the use of area designations and the construction of obstacle complexes in small wars have been neglected. Perhaps it is the regularity and monotony of these necessary but plain actions that has limited their exploration.

These case studies are expected to reveal the importance of movement control measures to the counterinsurgents’ success. It is expected that individual control documents, whether passes or ID cards, will be important both for security in general and to assure the proper allocation and apportionment of resources to those entitled to receive them. Once their importance for travelling and for obtaining other commodities, like food, is realized, the general population will both value and then protect these documents. Provided that sufficient organization and bureaucratic mass is applied to the administration of an identity system it should be able to support the development of effective intelligence on the insurgents.9 Area designation, which in some instances effectively established free fire zones, complemented the documentary system and served notice as to where government supporters were safe and where opponents of the regime were in danger. The ability for the security forces to be selectively more coercive in certain areas helped wear down the guerrilla fighting forces. As to the physical barriers, these aided in containing and disrupting the insurgents’ ability to move freely and helped deny them easy access to the supplies necessary for them to sustain their struggle. Movement control measures were thus an important first step in containing the insurgent threat.

9 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 7.
North-West Rebellion

There was little or no control of the movement of Amerindians on the Canadian prairies prior to the North-West Rebellion. They went where they pleased and when they pleased much to the frustration of the Indian agents trying to establish the farming program described later in this study. This free roaming and a number of other factors prevented government officers from knowing exactly how many Amerindians were under their charge. The first post-Confederation census of Canada, conducted in 1871, outlined several of the difficulties in establishing their numbers. Initial estimates were based on the best guesses of missionaries and the data provided by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) that proved afterwards to be understated. The Government of Canada placed more effort into establishing more precise figures after it acquired title to the region after 1870. This desire to quantify became more intense because of the annuity payments affiliated with the treaties that had been negotiated. Both Treaties 4 and 6 included clauses requiring a census to establish the population baseline in order to estimate, allocate and pay the annual annuities. Every annual report of the Indian Commissioner

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10 They could wander wherever they liked “saving and excepting such tracts as may from time to time be required or taken up for settlement, mining, lumbering or other purposes by Her said Government of the Dominion of Canada.”

11 See Statistics of Canada, Censuses of Canada, 1665-1871, vol. 4 (Ottawa: I.B. Taylor, 1876), Introduction. In the introduction to this volume many of the difficulties in ascertaining the number of aboriginals in Canada are discussed. The Amerindian population was very carefully counted after the Rebellion. See Census of the Three Provisional Districts of the North-West Territories, 1884-5 (Ottawa: Maclean, Roger and Co., 1886).

12 Noel Dyck, “The Administration of Federal Indian Aid in the North-West Territories, 1879-1885” (master’s thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1970). 4. In 1872 the Hudson’s Bay Company provided an estimate that up to 9,700 Amerindians were in the North-West. Subsequently, the Department of Indian Affairs estimate for 1881 was 26,000.

13 Copy of Treaty No. 6 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Plain and Wood Cree Indians and other Tribes of Indians at Fort Carlton, Fort Pitt and Battle River with Adhesions (Ottawa: Roger Duhamel, 1964), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028710 accessed 19 Aug 2012. The Treaty 6 clause states, “that Her Majesty's Commissioners shall, as soon as possible after the execution of this treaty, cause to be taken an accurate census of all the Indians inhabiting the tract above described.” St. Germain
of the North-West Territories detailed the number of Amerindians in the western treaty areas (4, 6, and 7).

Knowing the numbers that were required to be paid did not constitute a movement control practice but did generate an identification system. When a band chief first “took treaty” he was given a medal to signify his adhesion and his followers were issued numbered metal disks that were meant to be presented at payment and matched to the number on the government pay lists. These disks were frequently lost. Concerns soon arose that overpayments were occurring and that Amerindians who were not taking their payments in their designated agencies were claiming extra entitlements and rations. Edgar Dewdney, the Indian Commissioner from 1879 - 1888, himself experienced the difficulties of paying the annuities fairly when he discovered that the money being paid out by him to the Sacree in 1879 was well over the amount required for the actual number of individuals present. Joseph Dion, unapologetically, confirms this practice, emphasizing the Amerindian habit of exploiting the system to the fullest by seeking numerous undeserved payments, blind to how this eroded trust. Dewdney subsequently developed a ticket system to prevent such overpayments. The head of each family was issued a ticket recording the size of his family, and he would not be paid if he could not considered that any census “was almost a hopeless endeavour while the Crees were still spread across the Prairies.” See Jill St. Germain, Broken Treaties: United States and Canadian Relations with the Lakotas and the Plains Cree, 1868-1885 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 113.

14 Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1878, Paper No. 10, “Annual Report of the Department of the Interior for the Year ending 31st December 1877,” xxxiii. (Hereafter Sessional Papers – if not otherwise noted Sessional Papers are the annual reports of the Department of the Interior or after 1880 the Department of Indian Affairs). See the report from Inspector J.M. Walsh after payment at Fort Walsh in 1877 for the typical problems with the payment system. See also Brian Titley, The Frontier World of Edgar Dewdney (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999), 50.

15 Sessional Papers, 1880, Paper No.4, 92-93.

16 Joseph Dion, My Tribe the Crees (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 1979), 78.
produce his ticket. The ticket system was put into effect by 1880 and in the view of
government officers allowed the annuity payments to be carried out more effectively and
with less loss to the government. The ticket system was the first form of identification
for the Amerindians on the prairies but was not used to restrict movement.

A pass system to control movement was imposed on Amerindians only after the
North-West Rebellion. Prior to the rebellion there was some minor debate concerning the
control of Amerindian movements, but this came to naught. The pass system was part
of the proposals forwarded in late June 1885 by Hayter Reed, the Assistant Indian
Commissioner, for the future management of the Amerindians post-Rebellion. The
Prime Minister only formally approved the use of passes in late October 1885, though
Reed started using a pass system almost immediately in the Battleford area. The Deputy
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Lawrence Vankoughnet, in approving the
system noted that passes should be mandatory for those Amerindians who had been
disloyal but only encouraged upon those who had been loyal. Both Macdonald and
Vankoughnet recognized that the pass system had no legal basis but felt that it could be

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19 NWMP Commissioner Irvine in his annual report for 1884 discourages the imposition of the permit
system that was proposed by Vankoughnet. Vankoughnet was primarily concerned with “the indiscriminate
camping of Indians in the vicinity of towns and villages.” See page 6 of the 1884 Annual Report in Settlers
and Rebels: Being the Official Reports to Parliament of the Activities of the Royal North-West Mounted
Police from 1882-1885 (1882-1885, reprint, Toronto: Cole’s Publishing Co., 1973). There was little other
debate on passes and permits prior to the Rebellion. See also Keith Douglas Smith, “‘An Indian is almost as
Free as any Other Person’: Exclusionary Liberalism, Surveillance and Indigenous Resistance in Southern
Alberta and the British Columbia Interior, 1877 to 1927” (PhD diss., University of Calgary, 2007), 136-
142.
20 Robert James Nestor, “Hayter Reed, Severalty, and the Subdivision of Indian Reserves on the Prairies”
(master’s thesis, University of Regina, 1998), 29-30. Given Reed’s long experience in the military his
suggestions for a pass system may have been merely an extension of his service experience. He had served
as brigade-major to LCol Irvine’s force in Prince Albert during the rebellion. Passes during the rebellion,
of course, were issued within the military forces. See Copy of Official Diary of Lieut-Col Irvine at
applied to the disloyal as they had violated the terms of their treaties by rebelling.\textsuperscript{21} In addition to this pass system Vankoughnet emphasized the need to limit Amerindian presence in to towns and villages. This he believed could be accomplished under the terms of the treaties and the Vagrancy Act.\textsuperscript{22}

The pass system had a limited effect on controlling movement. Its general objectives were to keep the Amerindians on their reserves farming, to control loafing about towns and villages, and to reduce horse stealing. In achieving these aims it was only modestly successful. While the pass system was applied restrictively around Fort Pitt, a centre point of the Rebellion, those Amerindians who had been loyal, such as those in the Treaty 7 area, paid the system little heed.\textsuperscript{23} Even Indian Department administrators were not greatly concerned with the implementation of a formal pass system. The program was approved in late October 1885, but it was only in late May 1886 that a draft pass was submitted to Ottawa for consideration.\textsuperscript{24} The draft was approved on the 4 June, but, even then, passbooks were only finally distributed in early September.\textsuperscript{25} While the pass system is condemned as a tool in the subjugation of the Plains Cree, it had far less influence than has been commonly inferred.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{21} St. Germain, \textit{Broken Treaties}, 337.
\textsuperscript{22} Smith, ““An Indian is almost as Free as any Other Person,”” 139. The use of the Vagrancy Act for these purposes preceded the rebellion. For the substance of the approval given and the dual system of pass and permit see letter Vankoughnet to Dewdney 28 Oct 1885 NAC, RG10, Vol. 3584, File 1130 Pt. 1B.
\textsuperscript{23} Around Fort Pitt Superintendent Sam Steele noted, “No Indians were seen off their reserves without a pass.” \textit{Law and Order: Being the Official Reports to Parliament of the Activities of the Royal North-West Mounted Police from 1886-1887} (1886-1887; repr., Toronto: Cole’s Publishing Co., 1973) , NWMP Commissioner’s Annual Report for 1886, Appendix F, Annual Report of Superintendent Steele, 45. Whereas in the Treaty 7 area, it was felt that the Indians were allowed of their reserves “practically when they please.”See \textit{Law and Order}, NWMP Commissioner’s Annual Report for 1887, 9
\textsuperscript{24} Reed to Vankoughnet, 21 May 1886. NAC, RG10, Vol. 3584, File 1130 Pt. 1B
\textsuperscript{25} Department of Indian Affairs, Internal Memorandum. RG10, Vol 3710, File 19,550-3.
\textsuperscript{26} This is not to dispute that the pass system was not used. Native studies literature is divided on the issue of the passes’ effectiveness. One side bemoans its contribution to the subjugation of the prairie tribes while the other side extols how easily it was evaded. For discussion see F. Laurie Barron, “the Indian Pass System in the Canadian West,” \textit{Prairie Forum} 13, no.1 (Spring 1988): 25-42. More damaging to the
During the North-West Rebellion the government used an area control mechanism to limit Amerindian movement, the existing reserves. Maj. Gen. Frederick D. Middleton, the commander of the Canadian troops, requested on 6 May 1885, that Dewdney restrict the Amerindians to their reserves for the duration of the conflict. Dewdney issued a notice later that afternoon putting such a policy into effect. He cautioned that “all good and loyal Indians should remain quietly on their Reserves where they will be perfectly safe and receive the protection of the soldiers; and that any Indian being off his Reserve without special permission in writing from some authorized person, is liable to be

prospects of establishing agricultural independence for the Amerindians was the permit system (where they could only sell items with written approval of the Indian agent) and Hayter Reed’s attempts to establish severalty and a peasant farming template for agriculture on reserves.
arrested on suspicion of being a rebel and punished as such.”

The objectives of this policy were threefold. First, Middleton hoped that by keeping the Amerindians on their reserves that their participation in the contest would be limited. Second, the rebellious Métis were constantly sending runners to spread their message of dissent amongst the bands and to urge their participation in the revolt. By keeping loyal Amerindians on their reserves, those spotted off them could be arrested and prosecuted as Riel’s runners.

Third, it was taken as a test of a band’s loyalty to remain calm on their reserves. Thus, the reserves were used as designated areas to restrict the movement of the bands.

Movement control played generally an insignificant part in the North-West Rebellion. Amerindians remained free to roam in most locations while whites barricaded themselves in forts. The designation of safe areas, the reserves, was used as a form of movement control. While it may have prevented interaction between Amerindians and potentially trigger-happy troops in some locations, many of the loyal bands had already either removed themselves far from the scenes of conflict or had already decided to remain quietly on their reserves. This policy therefore did not have far reaching effects. Movement control played a role after the Rebellion as Indian Department administrators sought to restrict the movement of those Amerindians who were perceived as disloyal and to place farming programs on a solid footing.

**Philippine-American War**

The necessity of movement control became increasingly important as the Philippine-American War progressed. Movement within the American army itself was

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always tightly controlled as the tally of disciplinary tribunals for “absence without leave” attests.\textsuperscript{29} The ability of the Americans to impose similar strictures on their opponent was less effective. When the Americans first landed before Manila they cooperated closely with the Filipino forces entrenched there. Once the Americans seized Manila from the Spanish and barred Aguinaldo and his troops from entry, tensions escalated between the two armies. From this point and throughout the entire conventional phase of the conflict the traditional trappings of a conventional fight, that is, reasonably defined front lines, bounded the movements of the opposing forces. Once the Filipino forces transitioned to guerrilla warfare in late 1899, the ability of the American troops to control the movement of the insurrectos and their supporters greatly diminished. The insurrectos exploited the benefits of language, organization, local supporters and geography to remain elusive. American troops commonly complained how quickly the insurrectos could disappear and believed that they often simply and quickly switched clothing to re-appear as amigos. The ability to clearly identify their opponents in the field became a pressing concern for the American forces.\textsuperscript{30}

Though the available evidence is limited, various types of passes were issued to control the movement of Filipino civilians.\textsuperscript{31} This practice is indicated both by reports of forged passes being discovered as well as instances where passes were issued for specific

\textsuperscript{29} For instance, see Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, \textit{Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines}, vol. 1 (Manila, P.I., 1901), 96.


\textsuperscript{31} See Brig Gen George Davis, \textit{Report on the Military Government of the City of Manila, P.I., from 1898-1901} (Manila: Headquarters Division of the Philippines, 1901). In this lengthy report there is no data on pass control measures. A census was conducted by the Department of Health but in support of sanitary measures. There is extensive discussion on licensing issues, an important source of revenue, but nothing on identity or pass requirements.
purposes like attempting to negotiate the surrender of intransigent insurrecto leaders.\textsuperscript{32}

For the most part, the Americans did not introduce a new elaborate pass system but used the existing long-standing Philippine one, the cedula.\textsuperscript{33} The cedula was a tax certificate that indicated an individual’s designated town of residence. When Manila merchants sought to re-establish trade links with the provinces, it was the cedula that was used to secure passage through American lines.\textsuperscript{34} It was used elsewhere too. On Cebu the Americans used it to expel suspected insurrectos from the barrios as they believed that the insurrectos were coming into the barrios to rest and secure supplies. All men without a cedula or one that indicated residence elsewhere were placed outside American lines.\textsuperscript{35} Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes would also employ this process in Panay.\textsuperscript{36} Though a pass system was being used it did not by itself effectively control insurrecto movement.

The ineffectiveness of the cedula system in controlling movement was due to other American policies and practices. For instance, in the first year of the insurrection the Americans followed a policy of conciliation. Its underlying assumption was that the Filipinos would recognize the benevolence and benefits of American rule and be reconciled to it, perhaps discounting the intensive desire of Filipinos for independence after centuries of Spanish repression. Conciliation included social programs to improve

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{32} For forged passes see War Department, \textit{Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, June 30, 1900}, Part 5. See Appendix N, Report Headquarters Department of Northern Luzon, June 6, 1901, 55. For instance, Maj Gen Chaffee granted over 37 passes to individuals to convey messages to the Filipino resistance leader Malvar in Batangas. See Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, \textit{Annual Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, U.S. Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines}, vol. 2 (Manila, P.I., 1901), 190.


\bibitem{34} War Department, \textit{Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, June 30, 1900}, Part 5. 117. See Circular No.1, Office of the US Military Governor of the Philippines, February 1, 1900.

\bibitem{35} Resil Mojares, \textit{Resistance and Collaboration in Cebu, 1899-1906: The War Against the Americans} (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 100.

\bibitem{36} Brian McAllister Linn, \textit{The Philippine War, 1899-1902} (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 170.
\end{thebibliography}
education and health, and it included releasing *insurrectos* shortly after they were captured and disarmed. Only those captured bearing arms were imprisoned and their release could be easily obtained by turning in weapons.\(^{37}\) There was no capability to track those released to ensure they did not rejoin the fight. By far the greatest hindrance to movement control during this period though was the policy of establishing local government. This made the Filipino civil administration in the towns and barrios responsible to monitor the arrival and activities of strangers.\(^{38}\) As most officials were part of the *insurrectos’* shadow government these regulations were not rigidly enforced.\(^ {39}\)

The requirement for sterner methods was recognized by late 1900, and Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, the American commander, would impose tougher restrictions after the U.S. presidential election of that year.\(^ {40}\) Even then, without a detailed and well-structured intelligence system, passes could only check movement to a limited extent.\(^ {41}\) Other control measures were required to more thoroughly restrict movement.

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\(^{38}\) Linn, *The Philippine War*, 206.

\(^{39}\) Brian Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 49-52. A multitude of movement control measures were supposed to be imposed on all males in the districts of Ilocos and La Union in the 1st District of Northern Luzon as early as May 1900. Though it was clear what the military and the presidents of the pueblos were responsible for difficulties continued in the region for another year.

\(^{40}\) *Report on the Military Government of the City of Manila*, 118. The details of MacArthur’s proclamation are at Enclosure 33. Interestingly in Article II of the proclamation it states “Persons residing within an occupied place, who do things inimical to the interests of the occupying army, are known as war rebels, or war traitors…” This begs the question as to what credentials were viewed as necessary to establish residence besides mere presence.

\(^{41}\) Brian McAllister Linn, “Intelligence and Low-intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,” *Intelligence and National Security* 6, no.1 (January 1991): 100-102. In March 1901 the Americans began an ‘identity cards’ project. Post commanders filled out cards on guerrilla officers, priests, municipal officials and all important people in the community. While this aided in establishing the guerrilla infrastructure it was not use to impose movement restrictions on them. Later in Batangas, Brig Gen Bell
The Americans obtained greater success in pacification once a combination of movement control measures was vigorously applied. This combination included curfews, stricter pass requirements where they could be enforced, and, eventually, the concentration of civilians (to be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5). A curfew was imposed in Manila immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, and it was slowly reduced in the number of hours of enforcement until it was completely withdrawn in February 1901. Curfews were not widely employed afterwards until one was imposed in the spring of 1901 in the 1st District of Northern Luzon. Here the population had been concentrated in the towns and all movement was restricted. Anyone moving at night was presumed to be an *insurrecto* and garrison commanders in Ilocos Sur were ordered to “shoot all persons (natives) who may be found on the road between dark and daybreak.” These restrictions reduced the supplies reaching the gangs still hiding in the mountains and thereby encouraged more of them to surrender. Restricting supplies was also the purpose behind movement control measures imposed on the waterways between the islands of Leyte and Samar in late 1901 by General Smith. Merchants and supporters on Leyte had long supplied the *insurrectos* on Samar even after the September 1901 Balingiga “massacre,” and Smith, planning to quash this trade, directed that all boats would appoint provost marshals to each town to systematically investigate and discover the local guerrilla collection system.

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42 War Department, *Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, June 30, 1900, Part 5* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), 80. The curfew started 23 February 1900. Initially all people had to be in their homes at 7 p.m., this was then extended to 8:30 p.m. and finally, much later, to 11 p.m.


44 Linn, *The Philippine War*, 262.

45 The Balingiga “massacre” occurred on the morning of 28 September 1901. The 74 members of C Company U.S. 9th Infantry were surprised at breakfast by a combination of *insurrectos* and supposedly friendly villagers. In the attack, 36 Americans were killed, 4 went missing in action, and 22 were wounded. Eight subsequently died of their wounds. The attack was considered to have been the worst reversal to
plying the coast off Samar for trade or fishing “to be painted red and to display certain
signals by night and by day.”\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, all vessel captains were required to bear a
pass from the local military commander.\textsuperscript{47} These measures were only imposed between 6
November and 7 December, but even after that period it was directed that “any steam or
sailing vessel, boat or 
baroto
found therein on the Samar side without a pass will be
confiscated or destroyed.”\textsuperscript{48} These strictures were eased as resistance on Samar waned.
Local movement control measures thus contributed to restricting the insurrectos’ access
to supplies but a more thorough region-wide method remained necessary to completely
and truly dismantle the local guerrilla organization.

Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell’s December 1901 to April 1902 campaign in
Batangas province employed this more thorough movement control system. Critical to
the success of his campaign was the concentration of the population in zones of
protection around garrisoned towns, referred to as reconcentration in the Philippines. All
the population of Batangas was encouraged to move into the nearest zone, and this
movement had been largely completed by 25 December 1901. The population, other than
able-bodied males, was only allowed to leave the zones for a few specific reasons.
Typically, permission was only granted to collect food and provisions from known
stockpiles or to harvest crops that had ripened in the fields.\textsuperscript{49} Anyone desiring to leave a
zone of protection had to acquire a pass from the local military commander and carry it

\textsuperscript{46} Report of Maj.Gen Adna R. Chaffee, 224. For details see Field Order No.1 of October 21, 1901.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 211. See Circular No.7 of December 27, 1901, for the details of the pass structure.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 188 and 207-208. Part of the reason for the easing of the stricture was poorly informed political
meddling by staff from Manila who had a poor grasp of the insurrecto supply chain on the islands.
\textsuperscript{49} May, Battle for Batangas, 250.
with him.\textsuperscript{50} The pass authorized where an individual could go and how long he was permitted to be absent. Restricting movement in the area outside of the zones turned them into quasi “free-fire zones.”\textsuperscript{51} Those moving after curfew or outside of the zones without due authorization were deemed to be insurrectos and treated as such with Bell instructing that, “Any able bodied male found by patrols and scouting detachments outside of the protected zones without passes will be arrested and confined, or shot if he runs away.”\textsuperscript{52} Bell employed the full spectrum of tested movement control measures to aid in the suppression of the last remnants of resistance on Luzon.

Movement control increased in importance as the campaign progressed in the Philippines. Initially the Americans did not enforce an unduly harsh system of movement control on the Filipinos as they hoped to convince them of the benefits of American rule. Where possible they used existing systems. Many of the American’s initial policies and procedures hindered their efforts to pacify the archipelago. In the towns and barrios and in the countryside, the American’s lack of capability to control the movement of civilians and insurrectos was a major weak point in their campaign. In combination with other necessary techniques, the Americans began to see the value in stricter movement control measures. Curfews proved their worth in the 1st Department of Northern Luzon, and stricter regulation disrupted the supply chain of the Filipino forces holding out on Samar. The continuing ability of insurrectos and their supporters to evade the American’s grasp

\textsuperscript{50} James H. Blount, \textit{The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912} (New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1913), 389.
\textsuperscript{51} Kenneth Ray Young, \textit{The General’s General: The Life and Time of Arthur MacArthur} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 265. The desire to have free-fire zones was muted by Bell when still Provost Marshal of Manila.
\textsuperscript{52} Capt M.F. Davis, \textit{Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating Campaign Against Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstruction after Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippine Islands} (Batangas: Headquarters Third Separate Brigade, 1902), 13. The bulk of these instructions are contained in the Telegraphic Circular No.14 of 21 December 1901.
led to harsher measures being imposed in 1901 which culminated in their wide employment in Bell’s campaign in Batangas. Bell masterfully intermixed measures that controlled individuals and the area outside of the protected zones forcing his opponents to concede. The pacification of the Philippines was completed with the use of effective movement control measures.

South African War

The war is at an end. To any reasonable person there can be no doubt as to the cause of its ending. The blockhouse system, of which Lord Kitchener was the author, did it. The Boers were driven from pillar to post. Their ammunition was exhausted, their horses were worn out, their supplies of food had been cut off; they had nowhere to go, nothing to hope for, and they gave in.

Edward Dicey

The use of passes has a long history in South Africa, but pass laws were applied primarily to Africans to control both their movement and labour. The Boers had an extensive system of registration and pass control during the South African War.

Registration was important for the Boers themselves because within their system of mobilization all individuals within a landrost (administrative unit) were assigned to

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54 There is an unfortunate and unsubstantiated theme in the discussion of the Indian pass system in Canada that it can be linked to the establishment of the apartheid regime in South Africa. For instance see F. Laurie Barron, “The Indian Pass System in Canadian West, 1882-1935,” Prairie Forum 13, no.1 (1988): 25-42. This idea dismisses the decades of experience with pass laws that exist in South Africa. A sampling of the duration of the pass issue within South Africa is contained in the following references: Papers Relative to the Conditions and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa, within the Colony of Cape of Good Hope, or Beyond the Frontier of that Colony, Cd. 50 (1853); Cape of Good Hope, Parliament, Report on the Select Committee on the Pass Laws of the Colony (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1883); and Union of South Africa, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Native Pass Laws, 1920 (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1922). Similarly, no mention of the system is made in the exhaustive reports of the agricultural delegation that actually visited Canada. See Transvaal Agricultural Department, Agriculture Within the Empire: Report of the Boer Delegates on the Agriculture and Stock Farming of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Pretoria: Government Printing and Stationary Office, 1905).
specific field cornets and commando. While on operations though, the presence of individuals was not tightly controlled and many commandos suffered continually from absenteeism.\footnote{Alan Hiley and John Hassell, \textit{The Mobile Boer: Being the Record of the Observations of Two Burgher Officers} (New York: The Grafton Press, 1902), 55. After Elandslaagte the Red Cross had organized the issue of identification cards for the Boer. The Burghers “accepted the cards but seldom kept them.”} The restrictions imposed on civilians, especially those of British nationality, within Boer controlled zones, were more severe. The experiences of Lady Sarah Wilson were typical. Having left Mafeking just before the siege she took up residence in Vryberg. There “strict regulation respecting the comings and goings of the inhabitants and visitors were being made.”\footnote{Lady Sarah Wilson, \textit{South African Memories: Social, War and Sports} (London: Earl Arnold, 1909), 106.} Later, she had to run a gauntlet of pass control checkpoints as she tried to make her way back into Mafeking.\footnote{Ibid., 108-109, 125.} Restrictions on movement were also applied in the towns and cities of the Boer republics.\footnote{For a fuller description of how passes and commandeering were used by the Boers see Cape of Good Hope, \textit{Magisterial Reports Having Reference to the Occupation of the Enemy of, and the Attitude of the Population in, the Districts Now or Recently under Martial Law} (Cape Town: Cape Time Limited, 1900).} Once the Boers lost control of the urban centres and switched to a guerrilla strategy such control measures lost their importance to them.

The British army throughout the conflict sought complete control over the movement of all individuals within the areas occupied by their troops, a common military practice. Their pass system was meant both to identify individuals moving about the operational area and to control passage on the limited transport available.\footnote{The “area of operations” was “defined as districts in which operations were in progress against the enemy, or which were within striking distance of the enemy’s commandos.” See \textit{Papers Relating to the Administration of Martial Law in South Africa}, Cd. 1423 (1903), 5.} The pass system, of course, could not be imposed on enemy commandos, but the fighting Boer was easy enough to recognize early in the war. To identify him elsewhere was not really necessary as J.F.C. Fuller relates, “outside hunting down the enemy in the field …we
seldom met him.” It was, however, important for the British to identify those whom they could control, and ensure they had proper military authorization to be where they were. Thus there were no exceptions to securing a pass; one was necessary whether a war correspondent, an upper class Briton, or even a military officer. Where martial law was imposed the regulations could be particularly strict. As Lady Briggs noted, “In Pretoria, as nowhere else, one felt one lived under martial law. A special pass was required for everything … one felt one had to go to the military governor to breathe.” Besides its use in support of military governance, the pass system controlled who was authorized to use rail transport, a critical asset that had to be tightly controlled given the limited space available. As Briggs outlines, “the chief of staff issues orders as to what was required … and no one or anything else was permitted to pass.” For the British, the control of individual movement retained its importance throughout the war.

Control extended to the Africans too not just the Boers and Britons. The pre-war pass laws were maintained during the conflict. This included the use of travelling passes that permitted individuals to seek employment and district passes that authorized them to stay in a location once work was secured. The military was strict on loafers, those

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60 Maj Gen J.F.C Fuller, *The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars* (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 43.
62 For details of the travel restrictions and other passes required see *Papers Relating to the Administration of Martial Law in South Africa*, Cd. 981 (1902), 91-92.
64 Ibid., 125.
65 Without a doubt martial law could be oppressive. When she was denied further work on the refugee camps Emily Hobhouse attempted to return to South Africa to challenge the use of martial law. This was an area that was well beyond her limited understanding of the necessities of warfare. See Diane Kaminski, *The Radicalization of a Ministering Angel: A Biography of Emily Hobhouse, 1860-1926* (PhD diss., University of Connecticut, 1977), Ch 8.
Africans without masters or fixed employment, usually removing them to depots where they were sheltered and fed until suitable employment was found for them. The military authorities retained the pre-existing pass system so as “to secure identification of the ‘natives’ and to minimize desertion from service.” Elsewhere they were subject to other restrictions such as curfews. For instance, during the siege of Kimberly “natives” were removed from the city to the racetrack. They were not allowed within the city without a pass and had to leave it by sundown in order to prevent their nightly forays of begging at citizens’ doors. The British made great use of African labour during the war, and continuing the pass laws gave the military administration the means to effectively manage this important source of labour.

Freedom of movement was further restricted in South Africa with the construction of the blockhouse lines. Blockhouses came into general use to protect the vitally important rail lines of communications that the Boers so frequently cut. At first they were set at junctions and bridges, but then as their numbers were increased they were often spaced at no more than 1,000 yards apart. Initially, they were quite expensive to build, and it was only once Major S.R. Rice of the Royal Engineers created a much cheaper design in February 1901 that the blockhouse would become a useful strategic tool. Rice’s design consisted of two circular skins of corrugated iron. The diameter of the outer circle skin was 13 feet 6 inches with the inner circle twelve inches less. The six-inch gap between the pieces was filled with shingle or rocks that formed an effective

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68 “Natives” were tightly controlled through the conflict. See *Papers Relating to Legislation Affecting Natives in the Transvaal*, Cd. 904 (1902).
barrier to rifle fire (the Boers lacked artillery at this point in the war so this was sufficient protection). A blockhouse was completed by being topped off with a simple roof, by a fire trench being dug, by a high wire entanglement being staked down, and by a water tank being installed. With Rice’s standardized design blockhouses could be constructed in a matter of hours. The blockhouse lines became an important tool in diminishing the mobility and elusiveness of the Boer commandos.

Blockhouses began to be thrown across the veldt in June 1901. The aim of Lt. Gen. Kitchener, the British Commander-in-Chief, was to enclose a section of a district with blockhouses and then sweep it clear of all supplies and enemies. Blockhouses were constructed so that adjoining ones could cover the ground between them with effective rifle fire and were thus normally 500 to 3,000 yards apart depending on the terrain. Fencing, hung with alarms, was strung between the blockhouses to hinder the passage of the commandos. The system as it developed served several purposes. First, in manning the blockhouse line Kitchener put observers across the veldt, which improved the British army’s awareness of where commandos were operating. Second, as more blockhouses were sited and density of fencing and other obstacles was increased, it became more and more difficult for the commandos to cross the lines “unobserved and without suffering loss.” As the lines were strengthened Boer mobility was equally degraded. Third,

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73 A.H.C. Kearsey, *War Record of the York & Lancaster Regiment, 1900-1902* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1903), 182. Kearsey discusses digging trenches to make dead ground impassable and also placing tell-tale wires on the barricades (a wire that when cut would drop a large stone onto some metal and alert the garrison). For details on wiring see Maurice and Grant, *History of the War in South Africa*, 571.
74 “Boers are Badly Handicapped Now,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 2, 1901.
Kitchener used the blockhouse lines as stops for his great drives. The lines formed artificial obstacles that bounded the area of operation within which the troops denuded the countryside of supplies and tried to kill, capture or disperse the bitter-enders. Once an area was cleared Kitchener would start the construction of the subsequent line for the next designated area. Finally, the lines were, “standing evidence that Britain is in the Boer territories ‘for good’ and that her conquests are to be held and consolidated.”

In all, over 8,000 blockhouses covering a total distance of about 3,700 miles would be constructed. With a minimum of seven men required per blockhouse, this was an enormous demand on British manpower. Eventually, “native” guards would be used to assist in holding the lines especially at night.

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Figure 8 - British Blockhouse Lines in Late 1901

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76 Maurice and Grant, History of the War in South Africa, 570.
77 Fuller, The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars, 114-117.
The Boers were originally contemptuous of this attempt to contain them. As the system matured though, they had to use greater care in selecting where and how to cross a line. Sometimes they used diversionary tactics when crossing such as attacking one blockhouse or two simultaneously while the wire was being breached. At times, they drove a herd of cattle in front of them to force the wire, and where this tactic became common the British constructed reinforced wire fences.\(^78\) Elsewhere between blockhouses trenches were dug to prevent the passage of wagons.\(^79\) Even experienced fighters like Deneys Reitz had their share of difficulties in trying to force a crossing through a well-defended area.\(^80\) In the spring of 1902 as the Boers debated the peace offering, the influence of the blockhouse lines was evident. While some commandos had sufficient food, others were cut off from their necessary supplies of mealie by the blockhouses.\(^81\) For others, they could not easily bring their cattle with them when forcing a crossing.\(^82\) The blockhouse complex thus eroded the Boers’ capacity to sustain their war effort.

Movement control measures were ubiquitous in the South African War. Both the Boers and British had elaborate systems of passes and permits. Where and when martial law was imposed very restrictive movement control measures were included. For the Africans the extant pass laws were continued. These measures allowed the British to

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\(^{78}\) Lt Col F.E. Whitton, *The History of the Prince of Wales’s Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1924), 426. For reinforcing the wire see “To Stop the Boer Cattle Rushes,” *New York Times*, April 24, 1902.


\(^{82}\) Ibid., 81. The blockhouse system also enabled the British to move cattle out of the operational area more efficiently and thereby deny them to the commandos.
control the movement of civilians in the operational area and exploit African labour but did not have a great bearing on the general progress of the war. The blockhouse system did. In the last year of the war there were great expectations that it would be the key to undoing the Boer resistance. Ultimately, it did hamper their mobility and limit their access to supplies thereby contributing to their decision to capitulate.

**Malayan Emergency**

Strict control over the movement of people and supplies should be enforced.

- Sir Robert Thompson

A national registration program was initiated in Malaya shortly after the declaration of the Emergency in July 1948. Everyone over twelve years old (the MCP made use of children as couriers and spies) was required to register with their local police and be issued with an identification card (ID card). These ID cards included the bearer’s photograph and thumbprint as well as details on their registration number, sex, age, race, language, birth place, occupation, permanent address, father’s occupation, and ration card number (where applicable). As Robert Thompson elaborates, for movement control to be effective, “the first requirement is an identity card system throughout the country.” The necessity of such a system was recognized early on, but the details of the program were only agreed upon in September. By the end of 1948 registration had only been completed

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83 Of course its effects took time to be realised. A typical view in late 1901 was, “The future of the present war, so far as the military aspect is concerned, depends on the success or failure of the system of blockhouse.” See “Blockhouse. I,” *The Speaker: The Liberal Review* 5, no.114 (Dec 7, 1901): 273. As early as February 1902 some saw it as a failure. See Our Military Correspondent, “The Last Failure,” *The Speaker: The Liberal Review* 5, no.124 (Feb 15, 1902): 554-556.


85 Ibid., 144.
in two locations: amongst the Chinese in a sealed twenty-mile wide belt along the border with Siam; and everyone in the settlement of Penang. The program was driven forward with more vigour after the arrival of Sir Henry Gurney as the new High Commissioner. A National Registration Department was established in October 1948, and some form of identity card had been issued to everyone registered, some 3,200,000 persons, by March 1949. Originally each state and settlement had its own registration form but then in January 1950 a uniform ID card for the Federation was decided upon. An identification document was only one part of the necessary system.

The registration system had to be enforced by the police services with support from the army. Enforcement turned on two aspects: individuals valuing and taking care of their cards; and the constant checking and verification of the identity of individual. ID card systems are only effective if the cards are cared for. The number of cards lost, damaged or stolen in Malaya was enormous with 1,865,805 replacement cards being issued between 1950 and 1956. Cardholders only truly started taking care of them once real incentives were attached to them. The government made them valuable to the holder by making them necessary to secure goods and services like space in a resettlement village, building grants, travel passes, medical services, and other items. Early on, in some areas, the ID card was necessary to obtain rations, and later on it was required to

90 Ibid., 34.
purchase supplies from shopkeepers during food denial operations. The power in the system though was in the ability it conferred on the security forces to spot check the identity of any and all individuals. Security forces would surround a village before dawn and then screen all individuals found and detain those whose presence was unusual.\textsuperscript{91} Village leaders could conduct head counts after curfew and report any strange visitors or unexplained absentees. Further, the security forces benefited by the screening process at permanent checkpoints (like at the village gates) and snap checkpoints (temporary, surprise ones). Here ID cards, passenger manifests and cargoes were verified before travelers were allowed to proceed.\textsuperscript{92} The national registration system enabled the security forces to “separate the insurgent from the population.”

The MCP recognized the threat posed by the system and tried to disrupt it by “terror, forgery and the destruction of ID cards.”\textsuperscript{93} The MCP discouraged their use by stopping people and tearing them up and at times raided villages just to destroy cards.\textsuperscript{94} They seized and destroyed over 151,450 cards in 1950 and 1951. For most CT responses though, the British had a counter. When the CTs destroyed the cards of timber workers, the British collected their cards at the village gates and issued them tallies instead.\textsuperscript{95} When the CTs targeted registration parties, the British provided armed escorts. When the CTs attempted to assassinate photographers, the British provided military ones.\textsuperscript{96} A battle raged over ID cards but the system was not without its limitations. First, even when the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Komer, \textit{The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect}, 34.
\item Clutterbuck, \textit{The Long, Long War}, 37.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
police knew every CT by name and their general location it remained difficult to “put their hands on them” in the jungle.\(^9^7\) Second, while armed guerrillas could not live amongst the villagers, the Communist supporters, the Min Yuen, consisting of farmers, shopkeepers, artisans and labourers, could and did. They were “all apparently peaceful citizens with identity cards.”\(^9^8\) The registration program did have, however, a dramatic influence on the MCP’s effectiveness despite its shortcomings.

Richard Komer, who in the future headed the U.S. pacification program in Vietnam, called the Malayan national registration program, “perhaps the most important among the special laws.” It was so for a number of reasons. When it was introduced MCP members were understandably reluctant to participate in the program. This gave the police an early indication of who were the Communist sympathizers in their midst. More importantly, fearing arrest, the bulk of the MCP leadership and military organization fled into the jungle.\(^9^9\) From there, divorced from the masses, they could not carry on the necessary political mobilization that could have sustained their movement in the long-term.\(^1^0^0\) The ID card system prevented MCP members from moving freely about outside the villages, whether disguised or not, and ensured that armed members could not live in the villages. As Richard Clutterbuck concedes, “the guerrilla would have been harder to defeat if they had been able to live, with arms at hand, among the villagers.”\(^1^0^1\) The system ensured that those stopped at police checkpoints that were outside their normal neighbourhoods without a convincing explanation were either arrested on the spot or

\(^1^0^0\) Gene Henrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954), 66.
\(^1^0^1\) Clutterbuck, “Communist Defeat in Malaya,” 66.
marked for special attention by the special branch, the intelligence arm of the police, in
the future. The ID card system not only separated foe from friend, but moreover
reduced the MCP’s political influence, restricted their freedom of movement, and
provided warnings and indications into the intelligence network.

The British also employed an area designation system to aid in movement control
in Malaya. The lead minister in a state could designate an area as a controlled area. This
included designating specific residential zones in which all people in the controlled area
were required to live. The residential area was usually designated a food-restricted zone
while the area outside it was designated a food-prohibited area. Then all specific and
relevant food control measures, especially the movement control ones, were applied
within these zones. Typically, complete curfews were applied in the food-prohibited zone
and more limited ones in the residential areas. Tenant registration was introduced within
the residential areas. This program, developed during the planning of resettlement,
required every householder to maintain a list of all occupants of his house and report any
arrivals and departures to the authorities without delay. The British also designated
“protected areas” around key installations and “danger areas,” where only security forces
were allowed to be present - normally along the jungle fringes.

The final area mechanism used was the designation of localities as “white areas.”
Black areas were those in which the MCP held sway, and white areas were those that had
been sufficiently cleansed of CT influence for the emergency regulations to be eased.

104 Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963* (London: Faber and
Faber, 1973), 176.
106 Short, *Communist Insurrection in Malaya*, 378.
General Templer felt that the long-suffering population would not want restrictions to be re-imposed and would therefore not abide the return of the CTs in their areas. Many individuals were sceptical of the process when it was first introduced, but no area that was designated white ever had to be reverted.\(^\text{107}\) The first area to be declared white was Malacca in September 1953. Over a third of all people in Malaya were living in white areas by mid-1955.\(^\text{108}\) General Briggs, the first Director of Operations, had initially proposed to roll the terrorists up in Malaya from south to north, but in the end the process occurred by the progressive establishment of white areas across the centre of the country. The country was white from coast to coast by Independence Day in 1957, and the peninsula was later whitened outwards from there.\(^\text{109}\)

The establishment of the national registration program contributed to the defeat of the CTs. The program moreover served as a form of national census revealing the location and composition of the population, infrastructure and resources. This information proved useful for planning later in the Emergency. The government in conducting the registration both demonstrated its first true interest to the Chinese squatters and made itself aware of the scale and scope of the population for which it was responsible. The ID card system underpinned most subsequent population control measures. Implementation of the program separated the guerrilla from the population and greatly limited the MCP’s ability to mobilize the masses, to move about undetected and


to obtain supplies. Movement control proved crucial, therefore, to the eventual resolution of the Malayan Emergency.

**Kenyan Emergency**

As you know, today these Kikuyu have to have a poker hand of passes of one kind or another. If one of them is missing I have to prosecute him if I catch him.

Inspector B to Peter Evans

Kenya, unlike many other countries, for decades had an identity system applicable to the “native,” the kipande. The kipande was a labour contract that Africans were required to keep on their persons at all times when they were off their designated reserves. It was meant to keep Africans on their reserves if not directly employed and limit their presence in the White Highlands. Attempts had been made before World War I to introduce a pass system, but it was because of the labour shortages during that war that one was formally adopted. The kipande was heartily disliked by the Africans and the main source of their political agitation for decades. The reasons for their dislike were many. The contract was carried in a small metal container around the neck which many Africans protested bore resemblance to the license tag of the settlers’ dogs. How strictly the kipande was applied varied depending on the background of white settler (whether Boer, Briton or other) and what agricultural practices were undertaken as different crops affected the quantity and quality of labour needed. In addition, the system was subject to abuse: a settler could adjust the labour demanded or the rations provided

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111 Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 29, 83, 92, and 125. Pass laws were discussed as early as 1904. The kipande system began when pay issues were passed to the Military Labour Bureau in July 1916. Legislation was passed after the war to establish the system. A domestic pass system also existed for the registration of household servants.
112 Ibid., 133.
on the contract with the worker having little recourse to challenge the changes; a settler
could refuse to sign off a kipande or enter derogatory remarks on it and thereby limit an
individual’s ability to gain employment elsewhere; and a settler could limit the wages of
new employees as their former pay rate was indicated on their kipandes. The kipande
thus limited an individual’s labour mobility and opportunity.\textsuperscript{114} After decades of agitation
the system was abolished in 1950.

The Kenyan administration tried to introduce a new registration system in 1950. It
was meant to provide an identity card for Africans, whites and Asians. Labour certificates
were a secondary document and became voluntary. Everyone in Kenya was to be issued a
registration card that would have their photograph and fingerprints on it. Once the white
settlers realized that the system would equally apply to them, they began to contest its
implementation.\textsuperscript{115} While strongly in favour of it being applied to the Africans, they did
not see the system as relevant to themselves.

Movement control measures were initiated as soon as the Emergency was
declared. Curfews were imposed across the country.\textsuperscript{116} The government sought to
reintroduce the kipande system for those Kikuyu living off the reserves but the program
ran into difficulties as most of them did not want to be photographed. In January 1953 the
government declared that members of the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru tribes were to carry a
passbook with them at all times.\textsuperscript{117} Trying to completely control movement the
government further declared that “no adult Kikuyu, Embu or Meru shall: leave his district
of origin; be or remain within any district of the Central Province other than his own;

\textsuperscript{114} Clayton and Savage, \textit{Government and Labour}, 132.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 295.
\textsuperscript{116} Landislav Venys, \textit{A History of the Mau Mau Movement in Kenya} (Prague: Charles University, 1970), 34
and 38.
\textsuperscript{117} Abour, \textit{White Highlands No More}, 121.
travel; or be employed on a farm or within the forest without a permit.” While these measures sought to hamper Mau Mau operations, they actually had little effect.

For the British, identifying who was part of Mau Mau was difficult throughout the Emergency. It was particularly troublesome in the early days and therefore easy just to assume every Kikuyu was involved either as a fighter or supporter. This weakness existed because prior to the Emergency the tribal reserves were administered primarily through the local chiefs and headmen in accordance with the legacies of indirect rule. A local chief would have known all members of his *mbari* (a communal land holding) and perhaps even most individuals on the adjoining ridges. He may have been reluctant to turn suspects over to security forces though depending on his own support for Mau Mau or to the extent to which he had been intimidated. When repatriated squatters flooded back into the reserves in early 1953 this further complicated local identification issues as these individuals were largely unknown to the chiefs. The chiefs’ participation was important as frequently the police and the troops “could not tell residents from strangers.” As the number of loyal chiefs and their home guard forces grew their métis concerning Mau Mau – their local knowledge of the identity of the fighters and supporters - was more fully exploited. This informal system of identification would be used to monitor the presence of Mau Mau in the local area, to winnow out suspects in the screening processes, to determine whether individuals were ready to move down the detention camp pipeline, and to determine when individuals were ready for release from

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120 For the concept of métis as local knowledge see Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 311-319.
repatriation camps.\textsuperscript{121} Lacking detailed information on the individuals and structure of the Mau Mau organization in the first year of the conflict, the security forces carried out mass arrests and then screened those they had detained. General Sir George Erskine, having recognized that a political solution was necessary to the conflict, supported mass detention to remove the troublesome from the contested areas. Given the continual troubles in Nairobi throughout 1953, a more formal system of movement control was required for the city.

The actual number of “natives” resident in Nairobi was rarely correctly estimated. When rationing had been introduced in World War II it was found that there were more Africans in the city than “thought possible.”\textsuperscript{122} Clearing the city of Mau Mau supporters and then controlling their access to Nairobi became a priority in 1954 after Erskine realized its centrality to the Mau Mau supply network.\textsuperscript{123} The clearance of Nairobi, Operation ANVIL, was conducted during April and May 1954. It involved rounding up all members of the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru tribes and subjecting them to screening. Suspected Mau Mau adherents were sent to detention camps, and others were either repatriated to the reserves or allowed to return to the city (no Kikuyu were in this latter group). A passbook system was established in combination with this clearance operation. It consisted of a “forgery proof” identification card, but it took until the end of October to implement and included a few trials before it reached its final form. The pass was meant to ensure there was no unauthorized entry into the city.\textsuperscript{124} Security force patrols “pepper-

\textsuperscript{121} For chiefs’ participation in screening and rehabilitation see Frank Furedi, \textit{The Mau Mau War in Perspective} (London: James Currey, 1989), 156.
\textsuperscript{122} Clayton and Savage, \textit{Government and Labour}, 242 and 253. Labour was registered prior to the start of rationing in March 1943. Individual registrations were affixed to the backside of the kipandes.
potted” their way about Nairobi checking identity documents which the Africans were required to produce on demand. Those whose documents were not in order were summarily arrested.\footnote{For instance, during Operation Broom in August 1954 nearly 500 Kikuyu without the necessary passes were apprehended. See Henry Swanzy, “Quarterly Notes,” \textit{African Affairs} 52, no.213 (October 1954): 271-302.} Between Operation ANVIL and the identity card system, the Mau Mau command and supply structure in Nairobi was irreparably damaged.\footnote{Edgerton, \textit{Mau Mau}, 93. To qualify for a passbook an African had to be vouched for by a European employer. To prevent forgery it carried a stamped photo of the bearer.} Once Nairobi was successfully secured these practices were pushed out to other towns and into the reserves.

The projection of greater movement control practices into the reserves took various forms. Many chiefs, now comfortable in their stockades and with sufficient and trained home guards, had established control in their own locations. This control was enhanced by the 1954 decision to undertake villagisation.\footnote{Maloba, \textit{Mau Mau and Kenya}, 90. See also Edgerton, \textit{Mau Mau}, 95.} Besides containing the population, villagisation greatly restricted movement by improving the ability of security forces to enforce curfews, to conduct roll calls and to organize communal labour. As the government moved to establish “closer administration” in the reserves, movement control became a mixture of the previous informal system and more formal procedures. The informal procedures continued to be used to buttress the local authority of the chiefs. Formal processes were used to limit travel into and about the reserves. For instance, the reserves were declared a prohibited area in 1953 and a pass was necessary to travel into them.\footnote{“Make Mau Mau Land ‘Closed Area’: Kikuyus Sealed off from Rest of Kenya,” \textit{The Chicago Defender}, June 13, 1953 (national edition), 6.}
Area control measures and physical obstacles were also used during the Emergency. The principal method was to designate an area as either special or prohibited. In *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations* these areas are defined as follows:

*Prohibited Area.* Most of the forest and certain other areas have been declared prohibited. A member of the Security Forces is authorized to shoot on sight any person found in, or seen entering, a prohibited area.

*Special Areas.* Virtually the entire area of operations in Kenya has been declared a Special Area. A member of the Security Forces may use lethal weapons in order to stop and submit to search any person who fails to stop when challenged in a Special Area.\(^{129}\)

All three reserves and Nairobi were declared Special Areas and this allowed security forces to respond promptly when individuals tried to evade them. British troops operated primarily in the Prohibited Areas of the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests. The opening fire criteria in these areas made identification important only after the kill or capture of sighted individuals.\(^{130}\) As to physical obstacles, a mile-wide barrier stretching over fifty miles was constructed between the forests and the reserves to impede the access of Mau Mau gangs to food supplies. It was built with communal labour and contained a “monumental ditch, wire and mines.”\(^ {131}\) The barrier was backstopped by mutually supporting police posts, army camps and patrols. The area system and the barrier helped isolate the remaining Mau Mau fighters in the forest.\(^ {132}\)

\(^{132}\) Kitson noted that the strip had a limited utility. He noted that it was cleared at great expense “with the idea that any terrorist within that strip could be readily spotted and shot,” but “Within a year, instead of former primal forest, which was not totally impassable, the area had become dense secondary jungle, and only the rebels benefited.” By this time though, villagisation and other techniques had come to the fore. See
Movement control in Kenya involved multiple systems. In the reserves the métis of the chiefs and headmen was crucial in determining friend and foe and in the establishment of local control. Though an identification document based on the kipande was quickly reintroduced with the declaration of the Emergency, it did little to contain the guerrillas. Only once Nairobi was cleared were effective identity documents introduced which assisted in the restriction of movement. This success was subsequently expanded into the reserves. The security forces also used area designations and barriers to control movement. Given the elusiveness of the forest gangs, the permission to shoot-on-sight in Prohibited Areas improved tactical efficiency. The various control measures in the reserves increasingly restricted the ability of the Mau Mau to move about freely and to easily gather supplies, and soon they could only go about in the dead of night. The breadth of movement control measures applied across Kenya thus contributed to eventual suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion.

Conclusion

An identity system consisting of passes, permits or ID cards is important to the establishment of movement control. An identity system always serves specific purposes. In small wars its primary function is to support security operations by allowing the counterinsurgent to exert control over who is authorized to be in select areas and

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133 Caroline Elkins, *Detention and Rehabilitation during the Mau Mau Emergency: The Crisis of Late Colonial Kenya* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2001), 48. The Emergency Regulation (Kikuyu History of Employment), 1953 required all Kikuyu obtain a new kipande and have their photo taken. Little or no explanation was given to the Kikuyu why this was initiated. Those who refused to be photographed were presumed to be Mau Mau. See also Furedi, *Mau Mau in Perspective*, 121.

134 Erskine Papers, *The Kenya Emergency June 1953 – May 1955*, 4. Erskine endorsed the concept of the prohibited areas as there “troops were able to operate on a straightforward war basis knowing that anybody they met must be an enemy.”
locations. There is a duality to this system. It forms social boundaries by defining who is allowed in and who is to be kept out. Though no formal pass system was used in the North-West Rebellion one was initiated shortly thereafter. In the Philippines the pre-war Spanish-originated *cedula* tax certificate was used as an aid in movement control. In the South African War, especially where martial law was in operation, the use of military passes was ubiquitous. In both Kenya and Malaya, more formal systems were constructed. In Malaya every individual over 12 years of age was issued an identity card within a year of the outbreak of the emergency. It became a core element in the defeat of the CTs. In Kenya the system integrated elements of the *kipande* and the failed national registration program. The passbooks distributed were fundamental to ensuring that once Nairobi was cleared in early 1954 that it remained free of Mau Mau agitators. Identity documents proved their value in beginning the process of defeating an insurgency.

The designation of special areas has been used in a variety of manners to great effect. The use of reserves and resettlement zones/ villages constitutes a use of an area system as within these geographic locations special controls were established (for more details see the next chapter). For instance, in the North-West Rebellion, the prairie bands were encouraged to remain quietly on their reserves in order to avoid potential misunderstandings with the Canadian troops. In the Philippines, General Bell used reconcentration zones with areas outside their perimeters, the boondocks, effectively becoming free-fire zones. The designation of special zones was more extensive in Malaya and Kenya. In Malaya, besides designating areas by security consideration, General Templer denoted them as either black (Communist controlled) or white. In white areas the emergency regulations were relaxed. This designation had to be earned, and the
population had to prove its loyalty to the government and ensure that terrorist activity did not re-emerge. In Kenya, the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests were declared prohibited areas. Any African encountered within them was automatically presumed to be a Mau Mau gang member and therefore hostile and could be fired upon. Area designation clarified the segregation of the degree of persuasion and coercion that would be applied. As a further control on movement, it assisted in psychologically wearing down the insurgent and served as an inducement to support the government with hearts and minds campaigns.

Extensive physical barrier systems were used in only two of the case studies, the South African War and the Kenyan Emergency. In these conflicts the nature of the terrain and the tactical weakness of the guerrillas made the use of complex obstacles practical. In the South African War the blockhouse system was initially constructed to protect the highly vulnerable railway lines. Blockhouse lines were slowly and constantly pushed across the veldt once a cheap method of construction was discovered. Boer mobility was greatly impeded and supplies became exceedingly difficult to secure as these lines increasingly segmented the veldt. This vast web of lines was important to the final decision of the Boers to surrender. Though less elaborate, a massive barrier was constructed in Kenya consisting of a mile-wide cleared strip at the base of the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests. It separated the forest gangs from their supply base in the reserves and greatly compromised the ability of the forest fighters to secure food (see Chapter 6 for a fuller description). In these particular case studies barriers played an important role in impeding the guerrillas’ mobility and denying them access to supplies.
Effective movement control measures are the cornerstone of many of the other population control measures. They set the stage for them by starting the process of separating the insurgent from the population by constraining the insurgents’ mobility and by limiting their access to supplies. They let the counterinsurgent secure the population systematically, routinely and thoroughly. They permit the counterinsurgent to ensure that resources and benefits are given to those who are already government supporters or those whom they are trying to entice to be so. Area designation and obstacles place even more pressure upon the insurgents who are already harried by the introduction of identity documentation systems. To be effective, movement control must be enforceable. Sufficient security forces and administrative staff have to be mobilized and organized to ensure enforcement becomes regularized and pervasive. Resettlement and food control, more complex population control measures, must be built on this base of strict movement control.
Chapter 5
Resettlement in Small Wars

Generalities and isolated instances aside, the real crux of the matter of warfare between civilized and uncivilized peoples almost invariably turns out to be the difference in fact as well as a difference in law. In fact, among savages, war includes everyone. There is no distinction between combatants and non-combatants.¹

War can have a dramatic effect on non-combatants. Most often, when the opportunity presents itself, they remove themselves from the fighting by fleeing the front lines. In conventional force-on-force conflicts they are incidental to the military contest though displacing civilian population may feature prominently in the overall war strategy. However, in contests with insurgents the battle is for control of the population. The clear distinction between combatant and non-combatant presumed in conventional warfare becomes obscured. When the insurgents can conceal themselves amongst a supportive population, the determination of whether an individual is friend or foe becomes exceedingly difficult. Non-combatants, through coercion or desire, may be the main source of supply for the insurgents making the insurgency a form of total war.² Given these considerations, concentrating, containing and protecting a contested population can be an important factor in the success or failure of the counterinsurgent. This chapter will discuss the use of resettlement as one such control mechanism in small wars.

¹ Elbridge Colby, “How to Fight Savage Tribes,” The American Journal of International Law 21 (April 1927): 281. Colby highlights the difficulties in the easy separation and clear bounding of combatant as distinct from non-combatants in small wars.
² In total war a belligerent completely mobilizes the resources and population available to them. In insurgencies often the insurgent operates under a total war framework while the counterinsurgent is often not.
To begin, resettlement is not uniquely a military practice as it has long civil precedents.\(^3\) Every colonial venture includes the dual aspect of resettlement: removal from one area - groups leaving their homelands and resettling in another - newly formed communities pushing the frontiers outwards in new lands. The tradition of establishing settlements of ex-soldiers to secure colonial frontiers is a more deliberate manifestation of this practice. Elsewhere, regimes have used immense resettlement programs, many of which have failed, to undertake massive social engineering programs on their rural masses. Both Soviet collectivization in the 1930s and the Tanzanian *ujamma* system of the 1960s are examples of such programs.\(^4\) Resettlement usually carries overtones of furthering progress, development, or nation-building to rationalize its use. This rationale is recited for modern dam construction projects, and formerly it was used to justify elaborate campaigns such as the eradication of the Tse Tse fly in Africa.\(^5\) The limited success of many of these projects indicates the difficulty in establishing and implementing such programs even in periods of peace.

Measures of collectivization are used during crises too. Relief camps were established during the Irish Potato Famine (1845-49) as well as during the major famines in India in the latter half of the nineteenth century (1876-78 and 1896-1902). Within the Indian Famine Codes, instructions for the British administration on how to respond to

\(^3\) Whether the intent of authorities is to create communities or simply disperse less privileged populations is another matter. See Joseph Schechla, “Ideological Roots of Population Transfers,” *Third World Quarterly* 14, no.2 (1993): 239-275.


such calamities, the use of camps figured heavily. These types of measures are also undertaken because of security concerns. Here, they take many different forms: internment camps have been well used by many countries domestically during both World Wars; preventative detention camps have been used to hold, identify and then banish or expel undesirable individuals from a country or remove them from circulation within the general population as an unchecked threat; and, perhaps the most common, prisoner of war camps have been used to hold enemy combatants for centuries. The fate of prisoners of war from the Napoleonic Wars, to the U.S. Civil War, to the modern age has rarely been pleasant. All of these practices influenced when and how military forces would use resettlement.

Because there are so many types of control measures where individuals are placed into collective groups, plainly defining resettlement can be problematic. For the purposes of this study resettlement is defined by its important characteristics. First, it involves actions taken upon a community not individuals. Second, some degree of coercion is attached to the establishment of the new localities, whether they are settlements or camps, even though individuals may voluntarily submit themselves to their confinement regime. Third, there is a security necessity behind resettlement, that is, a perceived security benefit for the counterinsurgent is derived from its use. Fourth, resettlement does not occur in isolation but is part of a systematic approach to quelling an insurgency. Finally, the counterinsurgent assumes responsibility for the continued well-being of the resettled.

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Before the case studies are considered, a number of issues in the historiography must be addressed. They are the fixation on mortality rates, the easy slide from that fixation into accusations of genocide, the difficulties in handling highly propagandized documents, and the contextual narrowing of past examples that distorts their lessons.

Much of the writing on military resettlement schemes fixates on only one by-product, the death rate. Undeniably, in certain cases it was high. However, the utility of identifying precisely the number of deaths suffers from two difficulties. The first is that exact numbers are unattainable. Even when extensive records were kept, as they were by the British in South Africa, the actual totals remain speculative and only near approximations at best. The debate over the exact numbers often rests on incomplete and fragmentary records, untested assumptions and frequently questionable mathematical models.\(^8\) Setting a higher or lower total of deaths or casualties today does not affect how decisions concerning resettlement were made during the campaign. Building off the mortality rates, the second problem is banal accusations of genocide. Genocide by definition implies intent, and these accusations are thus misguided for the intent to carry out such an act in these case studies was lacking. The primary cause of the bulk of the deaths was disease. Much of this “accusatory” writing is deficient in understanding how diseases and epidemics spread as well as the cultural context within which the conflict occurred.\(^9\) This lack of perception in regard to disease vectors extends to a simple formulation of “camp equals death and disease.” Sources must therefore be treated

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\(^8\) For some of problems at gauging population start points and subsequent mortality see David Henige, “If Pigs could Fly: Timucuan Population and Native American Historical Demography,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 16, no.4 (Spring 1986): 701-720. For both South Africa and the Philippines baseline census data was not available from which to establish the overall decline in the populations caused by the conflict.

\(^9\) For instance, in many of the works on Lord Milner the reduction in deaths in the Boer refugee camps is attributed to inferred improvements that were made under his supervision whereas most of the epidemics had run their course by the time Milner assumed responsibility for the camps.
carefully to confirm that their examination of mortality rates and their consequences are not distorted.

Much of the writing on military resettlement programs is highly charged. Sources published during the heat of the conflict or immediately thereafter are frequently highly biased, either strongly for or against the administration/counterinsurgent. The anti-war position, whether that of the American anti-imperialist of the Philippine-American War or the British pro-Boer of the South African War, has been more enduring and remains somewhat evangelical. This does not make it factual. Even then, much of the early anti-war writings are simplistically recited with little substantive reflection on their accuracy by subsequent authors who extol this stance. The anti-war position’s purposeful use in constructing post-event political narratives is one of the main reasons for its continued dominance. For instance, the Boer women’s suffering in the British concentration camps was the cornerstone of Afrikaner nationalism and the subsequent policy of apartheid. Later, throughout the 1930s the Nazis continually circulated material on the Boer concentration camps as a foil to deflect attention from their own camps. More balance is now appearing in current works, but earlier sources must be treated with caution because of their typically skewed nature.

Two other factors narrow the historical perspective. The victors write the history that tends to predominate, at least in the immediate aftermath of a campaign. Time grinds away at these first interpretations as new studies and methodologies are applied.

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11 See Paul Moore, “‘And What Concentration Camps Those Were!’: Foreign Concentration Camps in Nazi Propaganda, 1933-9,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no.3 (July 2010): 649-674 and *Papers Concerning the Treatment of German Nationals in Germany*, Germany No.2, Cmd. 6120 (1939).
Unfortunately, because of the charged nature of some of these events revision and re-examination do not mean more balanced interpretations are achieved. For instance, in G.F.G. Stanley’s *The Birth of Western Canada* (1936) the Amerindians are in the wrong in the North-West Rebellion, but more recently in Blair Stonechild and Bill Waiser’s *Loyal Until Death: Indians in the North-West Rebellion* (1997) the non-natives are completely at fault.\(^{12}\) One-sided presentations limit the understanding of the complete dynamic that occurred. Another factor that has narrowed interpretations is the mining of lessons from previous conflicts for potential solutions to ongoing ones – a frequent occurrence for the case studies used here. Unfortunately many studies are too tightly time-bound in their analysis with the long-term causes of the conflict and its cultural context poorly addressed. For example, in his consideration of the applicability of the Malayan resettlement program to Vietnam Bernard Fall noted, “any comparison between the British victories in Malaya and the situation in Viet-Nam in the 1960’s is nothing but a dangerous self delusion.”\(^{13}\) Fall is but one of many who have pointed out the dangers of the over simplistic re-application of techniques from past campaigns.\(^{14}\) To prevent this narrowing of view, a more thorough examination of the causes and circumstances of each conflict is required.

The final issue is determining how exactly camp systems originated and how they passed into common military use. The birth of camp systems can be attributed to events

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\(^{12}\) For a corrective to both sides see Jill St. Germain, *Broken Treaties: United States and Canadian Relations with the Lakotas and the Plain Cree, 1868-1885* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), xxi – xxiii.


in Cuba, but there are other possible origins as alluded to earlier. Authors like Jonathan Hyslop, borrowing from the work of Isabel Hull, consider that the usage of such camps emerged with the development of military professionalism in the late nineteenth century. It is likely simpler than that. Military campaigns involve mass and mass means manpower. To be successful commanders must know how to effectively apply mass against an opponent’s system. To acquire this mass an army needs to recruit, train, and, importantly, encamp its troops. From before the Romans to the modern day, the camp has long been central to all military campaigns. On the first page of his Field Service in War U.S. Civil War veteran Brig. Gen. Francis Lippitt states, “In every campaign, an army must perform MARCHES; must pitch CAMPS, and sometimes occupy more permanent quarters, or CANTONMENTS (sic).” The requirements and specifications for camps are listed in practically every field service regulation published and even the great Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz devoted attention to this issue.

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17 Francis J. Lippitt, Field Service in War: Comprising Marches, Camps and Cantonment, Outpost, Convoys, Reconnaissance, Foraging, and Notes on Logistics (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1869), 1. Lippitt lists six rules for the choice of a camp ground:
   (1). The camp should be near good water; if possible a running stream, for drinking, washing, bathing and general cleanliness.
   (2). It should be near to woods; for the supply of fuel, for shelters, for repair material, and for works of defence.
   (3). The site should be healthy, and the ground dry and commodious; which, in this view, should slope more or less.
   (4). It should be near good roads, or other communications for the transport of supplies.
   (5). It should be favourably situated for the defence; not exposed to be enfiladed or commanded from any point within long cannon range; but, if possible, it should itself command all the neighbouring ground.
   (6). The communications in rear should offer an easy retreat, but no facilities to the enemy to attack on that side.
18 Most militaries have field service regulations and/or staff officer handbooks. These regulations generally specify aspect of campaigns in the field other than aspects of operations (attack, defence, etc.). For
Camps of all natures are required for military operations. Large military forces cannot be maintained in the field without a complex interlinked camp system. To a degree, therefore, encamping civilians can be viewed as an alternative application of this routine military practice.

The case studies will reveal a number of commonalities in resettlement programs. First, in all the cases examined here these programs were permissible under the legal regimes in place at the time – martial law, the U.S. General Order 100, and emergency regulations. Second, most were initiated for security reasons and played an important role in denying resources to insurgent forces. As such, resettlement was not an isolated measure but one that was escalatory (i.e., implemented after the failure of less stringent approaches) and complementary to other measures imposed. Third, these resettlement programs contributed to the insurgents eventually laying down their arms. In part, this occurred as those who were more neutral in the conflict availed themselves of the benefits and protection of resettlement to limit their commitment to the guerrillas, and, additionally, as others surrendered when the scope and scale of resource denial became pervasive and persistent. Many who became regime supporters were convinced to do so because of the additional services provided by the government that made life in the camps more bearable. Finally, the sophistication of the camps in both design and management was closely tied to their projected temporal necessity. If they were meant to serve as part of a long-term social engineering project, they were more sophisticated than where they were expected to be merely short term holding facilities in a war considered to be ending soon.

North-West Rebellion

And her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside Reserves for farming lands ... and other Reserves for the benefit of the said Indians ... provided all such Reserves shall not exceeded in all one square mile for each family of five, or in that portion for larger or smaller families ... the Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs shall depute and send a suitable person to determine and set apart the reserves for each band after consulting with the Indians thereof as to the locality which may be found to be most suitable for them.  

The creation of reserves for Amerindians in the Canadian West was rooted in long standing practices. Reserves had not existed in Canada under the French regime as the French did not recognize aboriginal title to the land, but they began to appear as a formal construct after the British conquest. Once Canada had secured possession of the prairie west in 1870, as D. Aidan McQuillan relates, “Governmental Indian policy in western Canada was an extension of well-tried methods that developed in eastern parts of Canada during the previous century.” The immediate precedent and model for the numbered treaties that would be negotiated on the prairies was the Robinson Treaty. This 1850s treaty, which established reserves along the north shore of Lake Superior, contained most of the clauses and conditions that would be subsequently re-used across the western grasslands.

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The advantages of the reserve system to many in the West were considered to be as follows:

The reservations do not arrest the march of settlement in any one direction, and consequently do not to any great extent excite the cupidity of settlers. The Indians when congregated in small numbers, clinging less tenaciously to their habits, customs and modes of thought, and are in every way more amenable to the influences of civilization. They have less opportunity for devising mischief, and lack the combination necessary to carry it into operation. The danger of quarrels among hereditary enemies is avoided. The game which contributes towards the Indian’s maintenance does not disappear with such rapidity as in the presence of large numbers of hunters. The Indians find a market for produce and for labour when distributed through various settled districts, and settlers in turn share equally in any advantage to be gained through furnishing such supplies as beef and flour, which can be purchased locally.²³

More broadly, the primary objective behind the establishment of the reserves was the alienation of Amerindian land to permit settlement.²⁴ A secondary objective was a binary economic one. Reserves were meant to serve as a final transition point in the economic evolution and adaptation of Plains Cree life: from the fur trade – to buffalo hides – to buffalo bones – to agriculture. The hope of the Canadian administration was that through agriculture the Amerindians would become self-sufficient and the burden of supporting them would thereby be reduced.²⁵ Shortly after the Amerindians began selecting the sites for their reserves security concerns became more important.

²³ The Work of a Few Years Among the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, Canada (Middle Church, Manitoba: Rupert’s land Indian Industrial School, 1893), 5-6.
²⁴ McQuillan, “Creation of the Indian Reserves,” 381.
²⁵ Ibid., 389. The aspects of the economic life of the Amerindians are rarely fully considered in the literature. Many aspects of this for plains life are covered in Andrew Isenberg’s The Destruction of the Bison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). One of the main faults of the Canadian Government’s agricultural plan for the reserve was that it was not based on the complete system necessary to make agriculture successful. Grist mills and other important devices to make use of agricultural surpluses had not been included in the treaties. After 1880 the administration did take steps to address these some of these shortfalls. The hide trade was not restricted just to “whites” as even Big Bear brought in buffalo hides to trade, see Hugh Dempsey, Big Bear: The End of Freedom (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1984), 92.
Besides the long worry of an Amerindian uprising in the West, security concerns arose for three main reasons. First, the prairie tribes became increasingly dissatisfied throughout the late 1870s and early 1880s, as the Canadian government was perceived to be only meagrely carrying out its treaty promises. Second, the government became increasingly concerned with how to handle large concentrations of bands. Third, regardless of any positive attribute of any government action, there remained those who were dogmatic in their non-adherence to the terms of any treaty. This combination of factors contributed to the reactions on both sides when the North-West Rebellion erupted.

That government officials in this era still feared a possible Amerindian uprising was not unreasonable. The defeat of Custer at Little Big Horn was a recent event and the victor of that contest, Sitting Bull, remained in Canadian territory up to 1882. Many observers found it surprising that the conflicts so common south of the border had not been repeated in Canada. The durability of Amerindian cultural norms with the younger warriors, especially the one of taking whatever they could whether that was cash, rations, cattle or horses, to establish themselves as warriors made many officials believe an uprising could yet occur in Canada. 26 Further, much of Amerindian warfare, besides tales of individual bravery, consisted of the binary effect of mass and intimidation. Long-time masters of mustering overwhelming numbers against weaker opponents, various bands tried these same techniques with varying degrees of success against the outposts of the North-West Mounted Police, the Indian agent or the Hudson’s Bay Company. 27

26 For the willingness to falsify treaty payments see Joseph F. Dion, My Tribe the Crees (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 1993), 78; for the continuation of cattle theft Sam Steele, Forty Years in Canada (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1915), 176; for the continuation of horse stealing see John P. Turner, The North-West Mounted Police, vol. 2 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1950), 23.
27 Turner, The North-West Mounted Police. A few of the typical incidents were as follows: Big Bear’s obstruction of surveys in 1878 (vol. 1, 415-416); Big Bear’s demand for provisions at Fort Walsh in
Whenever and wherever large gatherings of Amerindians occurred, a confrontation of some nature was practically guaranteed. Preventing these incidents from exploding proved enormously difficult. Because of these occurrences, many perceived the West as a tinderbox.

The Amerindians in the Treaty 6 area, as well as those in 4 and 7 for that matter, were dissatisfied with the slowness with which they were able to take up reserves. To establish a reserve required a combination of wise choice of location, a detailed survey, and the receipt of the tools and instruction necessary to take up agriculture. Band chiefs were qualified to select some sites, such as traditional fishing grounds, but had little expertise for selecting sites where sustainable agriculture could be established. Besides agricultural land, reserves benefited where valuable woodlands and hay fields were included within their boundaries. The treaties had not specified where a chief had to select his reserve, but later the administration restricted this choice as discussed below. Reserves were not confirmed until surveyors had pounded in the necessary iron posts to mark their corners. The lack of surveyors, some being assigned to other tasks such as laying out settlements, was one of the reasons for delay in the establishment of some of the reserves. The size of a reserve was based on the number of members in each individual band, but often band members remained out hunting on the prairies. So many bands did not press for the completion of their surveys as they did not wish to forfeit the

1882 (vol. 1, 651); Piapot’s disruption of construction of the CPR in 1883 (vol. 2, 5); and the trouble at the thirst dance on Poundmaker’s reserve in 1884 (vol. 2, 59-67).
28 Dempsey, Big Bear, 124-132.
29 McQuillan, “Creation of the Indian Reserves,” 386.
30 Privy Council, Description and Plans of Certain Indian Reserves in the Province of Manitoba and in the North-West Territories, 1889 (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs, 1889), 7.
31 McQuillan, “Creation of the Indian Reserves,” 384. See also Jill St. Germain, Broken Treaties, 212. In the 1881 census, out of a Treaty 6 population of over 8,233 Amerindians over 5,227 were absent from their reserves.
square miles of land of those who were absent.\textsuperscript{32} The final and principal cause of grievance was the inadequate measures taken to support the development of agriculture. There were a multitude of problems: the government experiment with supply farms failed; some of the implements initially provided were shoddy and fewer than promised; several of the patronage-appointed farm instructors were inexperienced farmers and thus poor advisors; and some of the animals originally provided were either unbroken or in poor condition.\textsuperscript{33} These factors combined with reserves regularly being selected late in the growing season and compounded by the vagaries of nature placed the Amerindians in desperate straits.

The Amerindians in the western treaty areas constantly raised these issues to the administration, hoping for redress. Poundmaker was one of the first chiefs to attempt to become successful at agriculture. After encountering various difficulties he tried to win greater support from the administration but garnered little from his efforts. Big Bear, one of the most significant Cree chiefs, had not adhered to Treaty 6 in 1876 when it was first offered to him. Between then and 1885 he constantly sought to mobilize the prairie tribes to unify in order to renegotiate and seek better terms under the treaties. The thirst dance, a Plains Cree religious ceremony, on Poundmaker’s reserve in 1884 and the subsequent council of chiefs at Duck Lake were part of this political mobilization process. The general temper at Duck Lake is revealed in a report of the proceedings that included the statement, “... requests for the redress of their grievances have been again and again

\textsuperscript{32} Jill St. Germain, \textit{Broken Treaties}, 387.  
\textsuperscript{33} Brian Titley, \textit{The Frontier World of Edgar Dewdney} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999), 45, 53.
made without effect.” Having considered various alternatives, the chiefs decided to wait until 1885 to see whether the Canadian government would consider their concerns seriously. From the administration’s point of view these congregations kept the Amerindians in a constantly agitated mood. It as a rule tried to prevent these meetings and stern control measures would be forthcoming after the rebellion to do so.

Figure 9 - Example of a Surveyed Reserve - Poundmaker’s Reserve
Source: Privy Council, Description and Plans of Certain Indian Reserves in the Province of Manitoba and in the North-West Territories, 1889

35 Dempsey, Big Bear, 136-139.
A final security concern was the fear of the concentration of too many Amerindians in any one geographic location. As late as 1882, thousands remained camped around Fort Walsh. Many had made the journey south, as did Métis hunters, to pursue the last few remaining buffalo located across the border in the United States, but in 1882 the Americans had finally expelled all Canadian Amerindians. Moreover bands were camped in the Cypress Hills.


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near Fort Walsh as they had wanted their reserves to be established there. The
administration soon realized that this would form a massive block of land where the
limited forces of law and order in the west would have difficulty maintaining control.

With a view to the American sensitivities and to break up this concentration, Dewdney
directed that reserves were to be granted only along the North Saskatchewan River and
near Qu’Appelle.\(^{37}\) This did not resolve the security concerns but merely transferred them
as the new reserves were closely grouped into agencies for ease of administration.\(^{38}\)

Resetting bands from Fort Walsh put concentrations of nearly 2,000 or more
Amerindians near Fort Pitt, Battleford and Qu’Appelle.\(^{39}\) When the rebellion broke out
many settlers considered themselves to be surrounded by armed “savages.”\(^{40}\)

The final thorn in the side of the government was Big Bear’s band. As John
Tobias relates, “Because so many of Big Bear’s original followers either joined Lucky
Man, Thunderchild, or Little Pine’s bands, Big Bear by the end of 1884 was left with
only the most recalcitrant opponents of the treaty.”\(^{41}\) Big Bear’s years of political
manoeuvring had cost his band dearly with few evident results and his authority had as a
result dissipated amongst them.\(^{42}\) Once he adhered to Treaty 6, he made his way north to

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\(^{37}\) Titley, *Edgar Dewdney*, 46-47, 51. Besides sending the bands away from the Cypress Hills, Crowfoot’s
suggestion for a combined reserve for the Blackfeet, Bloods, and Sarcees was not taken up. As E.B.
Osborn suggest, “the Canadian system of band-reserves was an application of the imperial maxim, *divide et
impera.*” See Hughes A. Dempsey, *Crowfoot: Chief of the Blackfeet* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1972), 104; and

\(^{38}\) McQuillan, “Creation of the Indian Reserves,” 386.

for the Year ended 31\(^{st}\) December, 1884,” 205-207.

\(^{40}\) See Telegram S. Caruthers, Chairman Municipality of Qu’Appelle, to Minister of Militia, 25 March
1885, in Desmond Morton and Reginald H. Roy, ed., *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign* (Toronto:
Champlain Society, 1972), 57.

\(^{41}\) John L. Tobias, “Canada’s Subjugation of the Plains Cree, 1879-1885,” in *Sweet Promises: A Reader on

\(^{42}\) Dempsey, *Big Bear*, 110, 141-144. See also Norman Fergus Black, *History of Saskatchewan and the Old
North West* (Regina: North West Historical Company, 1913), 352. After the Frog Lake massacre Mr.
Halpin complained to Big Bear that some things had been stolen from him, but Big Bear admitted a blanket
Fort Pitt only late in 1883 but then refused to take a reserve once there. He continued to
stall in making his selection throughout the hard winter of 1884 and this exacerbated
tension between his band and the local Indian agent. After another difficult winter it is
unsurprising that the band’s war chief, Wandering Spirit, would willingly support the
rebellion.\textsuperscript{43} There is little noble in what Wandering Spirit did at Frog Lake. It falls well
outside the norms and narrative of noble Amerindian warriors bravely counting coup.
Despite modern apologists, the killings at Frog Lake are well characterized by the
aboriginal author Joseph Dion as what they plainly were, “murders.”\textsuperscript{44}

By 1885 there were over 50 reserves in the Treaty 6 area, a number that would
remain constant over the years to come, and when the North-West Rebellion erupted the
reserves system would be immediately used as a control measure for both troublesome
and loyal bands.\textsuperscript{45} It was when bands were off their reserves that tensions escalated and
misunderstandings multiplied. Some Amerindians stayed off their reserves to exact
revenge for past grievances, and Big Bear’s band, who has never really selected a
reserve, were eager enough participants in the rebellion but were not wed to the Métis’
cause. Numerous missteps occurred nearby Battleford when Amerindians left their
reserves including Poundmaker’s ill-timed trip to confirm to Indian Agent Rae his

\textsuperscript{43} Though this is often laid at the feet of Thomas Quinn, the Indian agent, it is more than obvious in
reviewing the historical record that Wandering Spirit had an intense dislike for the intruding whites in
general. See Dempsey, \textit{Big Bear}, 89, 103,153. Dempsey quotes Wandering Spirit as having said the night
before the massacre, “Tomorrow I am going to eat two-legged meat [i.e kill someone].” So, more
premeditation to the shooting was likely than is often noted.

\textsuperscript{44} Dion, \textit{My Tribe the Crees}, 102.

\textsuperscript{45} See \textit{Sessional Papers, 1885}, “Report Department of Indian Affairs 1884,” 205-207 and Dominion of
Canada, \textit{Schedule of Indian Reserves in the Dominion: Supplement to the Annual Report of the Department
of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended June 30 1902} (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, 1902), 17-19.
loyalty, and Lieutenant Colonel William D. Otter’s subsequent misguided venture to Cut Knife Hill to punish the bands for pillaging the town. Nearer Batoche, the seat of the rebellion, the Métis coerced some bands into leaving their reserves and participating in the rebellion with White Cap’s being brought into the Métis capital at gunpoint.

Dewdney pursued a policy of encouraging the bands to declare their loyalty to the government and to remain quiet on their reserves. The presence of large bodies of police and troops in the West was the first evidence to many Amerindians of the government’s capacity and willingness to respond to open rebellion. This overt presence made bands feel uneasy and threatened. Keeping the bands quiet and settled required careful management throughout the rebellion.

The reserves proved their general security worth during the rebellion. They provided the bands with a sanctuary so long as they remained within their established bounds. They separated nervous Amerindians from police and soldiers while the Indian Departments agents acted as intermediaries between these parties. Assisted by the reserve construct, many bands professed their loyalty and thereafter demonstrated it by non-involvement. Eventually, Hayter Reed, the Assistant Indian Commissioner, would compile a list of those bands that were considered to have remained loyal during the rebellion. Those who had remained loyal were rewarded; troublesome bands were treated less well, and Big Bear’s band was dispersed.

46 Jill St. Germain, Broken Treaties, 323 and 327.
47 Black, History of Saskatchewan, 308 – 315.
48 Ibid., 355.
50 Ibid., 214-219 and Appendix Four.
The use of the reserves as a resettlement technique in the North-West was a mixed success. There were implementation problems with the reserve system due to faults inherent in Canadian government management. These faults included a fixation on economy (or parsimony) that had a direct influence on the uneven rationing policy to be discussed in the next chapter. However, the underlying benefit of the reserve system for security purposes was evident. Besides dispersing the bands for easier control, the reserves served as a sanctuary for the Amerindians not only from settlers but also from the police and soldiers during the rebellion. Moreover, the reserves provided a measure of protection for personal property that was seemingly lacking elsewhere. From the perspective of the Canadian government, the reserve system served as a useful mechanism in helping to contain the rebellion.

**Philippine-American War**

I authorized the policy and fully approved of the methods by which the insurrection in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas was ended. The humane code of the laws of war, as published during the administration of President Lincoln, was followed in all operations against semi-civilized insurgents, who habitually violated every law of war known to civilized nations, and who treated their own people with every barbarity inflicted upon the helpless.

Major General Loyd Wheaton

The American military did not have either consistent policies or practices to guide them in countering the Filipino guerrilla, the *insurrectos*. The overall American policy to

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51 Steele, *Forty Years*, 258. The boundaries proved useful after the rebellion as the NWMP patrol the perimeters of the reserves at night.


deal with the *insurrectos* ranged from the encouragement of “benevolent assimilation” to harsh and coercive measures – fire and the sword. Underneath these overarching policies a wide assortment of counterinsurgency techniques was employed: patrolling constantly, imposing curfews, destroying supplies, and the dismantling of the insurgent infrastructure, amongst others. As the *insurrectos* were regionally based, bounded by local cultural norms and geography, U.S. commanders had to tailor their efforts to these regional differences when selecting from the various techniques available to them.\(^{54}\) However, in all cases, the pueblos and barrios, the primary units in the municipal structure of the Philippines, played a central role.\(^{55}\) They were centres of recruitment, supply and intelligence for the *insurrectos*. Their mayors and administrators often served the Americans by day and the *insurrectos* by night; hence, pacification in the Philippines depended on establishing secure control of the pueblos and the barrios.\(^{56}\)

The eventual use of resettlement in the Philippines was influenced by a number of factors. Though a large number of the serving senior officers, from MacArthur to Chaffee to Bell, had fought Amerindians in the American West, this experience does not seem to have directly influenced how resettlement was used in the Philippines. Their experience did, however, make them more amenable to the concept of “doing whatever necessary to win” and to be willing implementers of General Order 100. Perhaps the most significant factor in the eventual use of resettlement was the failure of the policy of attraction to achieve pacification. Under MacArthur’s command the military began adopting sterner

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measures but by late 1901 there remained many pockets of resistance in Luzon. The behaviour of the Filipinos contributed to this imposition of harsher measures. The ability of the Filipinos to be *insurrectos* one moment and amigos the next and the Americans’ view of the municipal leadership in many of the barrios and towns as inherently duplicitous lent merit to the imposition of harsher restrictions.57 Finally, when Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee relieved MacArthur in June 1901 he was under pressure to quickly complete the suppression of the insurrection.58 The 28 September 1901, surprise attack and “massacre” of over 40 of the 74 members of C Company, 9th U.S. Infantry Regiment, at Balangiga, Samar, assured that severe measures would be taken against the last recalcitrant centres of the resistance, the province of Batangas on Luzon and the island Samar.59

Prior to the end of 1901, resettlement, termed reconcentration in this campaign, had been used only sparingly in the Philippines. Though mishandled by the Spanish General Valeriano Weyler in Cuba, the technique was generally recognized as being

57 Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, *Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines*, vol. 1 (Manila, P.I., 1901), pg 14 of Bell’s report on the First Division of the Department of Northern Luzon. Bell summed up a general attitude held by many senior American officers. “I have been in Indian campaigns where it took over one hundred soldiers to capture each Indian, but the problem here is more difficult on account of the inbred treachery of these people, their great numbers, and the impossibility of recognizing the actively bad from the only passively so.”

58 Linn, “War in Luzon,” 313.

59 Gates, “Benevolent Pacification,” 321-328. Gates discusses the immediate aftermath of Balangiga and outlines the pressure to deal quickly with both provinces. Balangiga was not the last major assault on the American forces. Part of the problem was caused by the small size of the U.S. garrisons; sometimes they had contained no more than eight men. On October 18, 1901, over 500 bolomen rushed forty-six men of Company E, Ninth Infantry and desperate fighting ensured. In late December, Company E was again ambushed and lost seven were killed and seven wounded out of nineteen. The fighting on Samar was not as one-sided as the subsequent controversy over General Smith’s measures would indicate. See “Campaign in Samar,” *The Hartford Courant*, October 23, 1901, 14; “Samar Rebel Kill 10, Wound 6,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 19, 1901, 4; and “Bolomen Kill Seven Ninth Infantrymen,” *New York Times*, December 29, 1901, 3.
effective but was only used in the later stages of the campaign in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{60} In part, this was because the diverse, regional nature of the insurrection called for localized, pragmatic solutions, and in many regions resettlement was unnecessary.\textsuperscript{61} Where it was planned, resettlement was meant to intensify the pressure on the \textit{insurrectos}. The threatened use of resettlement contributed to the final pacification of the 1st Military District in April 1901. Only limited resettlement occurred in the 4th Military District in Southern Luzon, and there it was only used after more conciliatory methods had proven futile. Resettlement saw its fullest and final application in the subjugation of the continually troublesome province of Batangas in southern Luzon. Batangas had been only lightly touched by the war before the Americans finally invaded it, and it had been a guerrilla stronghold from the earliest days of rebellion against the Spanish. Early in the war the U.S. forces had focussed on pacifying northern Luzon and Batangas had remained so weakly garrisoned that the \textit{insurrectos} could not be effectively contained.\textsuperscript{62}

After Balingiga, Chaffee re-organized his forces and prepared to complete the pacification of Luzon.

During the Philippine campaign, the use of reconcentration was closely tied to the assignments of General Bell. He arrived in the Philippines as a captain in 1898, and his valour and drive led to his promotion to brigadier general by mid-1901. Bell commanded the 1st Military District in the spring of 1901 when resettlement techniques were muted

\textsuperscript{60} For a view on Weyler’s camps see Stephen Bonsal, \textit{The Real Conditions in Cuba To-Day} (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1897), 98-156. Bonsal would later pen many articles on the Philippine campaign.

\textsuperscript{61} Gates, “Benevolent Pacification,” 341 fn 1. Gates takes pains to differentiate Bell’s camps from those of Weyler inferring they were well run and administered. See also Charles Ballentine, \textit{As it is in the Philippines} (New York: Lewis Scribner, 1902), 89.

\textsuperscript{62} For the regional context for Batangas see Glenn Anthony May, \textit{Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). For aspects of the reconcentration program see Chapter 9.
there. Chaffee appointed him as commander of the 3rd Separate Brigade as of 1 December 1901 with orders to quell the insurrection in Batangas. Bell would make reconcentrating the population the centrepiece of his campaign. He was not averse to implementing harsh measures as in his opinion, “A short and severe war creates in the aggregate less loss and suffering than benevolent war indefinitely prolonged.” In summarizing his methods historian Glenn A. May wrote, “Ultimately, Bell’s harsh measures proved successful in quashing resistance in the Batangas.” Both of his immediate superiors, Major General Loyd Wheaton and the Commander of the Division of the Philippines, General Chaffee, approved of his techniques, at the time and afterwards.

Before Bell designed his campaign, he studied the situation in Batangas and reported upon it to his superiors. In that report Bell outlined the requirements for the upcoming operations. Recognizing the need to dismantle the insurgent infrastructure maintained by the influence of the *illustrados*, the Philippine elite class, in the province, Bell proposed to arrest and to detain all *illustrados* who did not physically demonstrate

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63 *Annual Report MacArthur*, page 20 of Bell’s report on the First Division of the Department of Northern Luzon. Bell was set to establish a series of detachments in order to capture the insurgent. If the detachment did not work he planned that, “within a month after the system is in operation I shall consider the matter of concentration of the people with supplies at points held, and starve the insurgents out, destroying entirely everything on which they could subsist, if necessary.” Bell benefited from the policies of his predecessor, Brig Gen Robert Hughes, who would later apply similar techniques for pacification on islands of the Visayan chain. Interestingly, one author hints that some of Bell’s techniques were borrowed from Brig Gen H. Smith. See Orlino A. Ochosoa, *The Tino Brigade: Anti-American Resistance in the Ilocos Provinces, 1899-1901* (Quezon City: New Day, 1989), 204.


their support for the Americans. Recognizing the importance of being able to harry and harass the insurrectos continuously, Bell proposed to organize his field forces to be able to patrol continually and to search “each ravine, valley and mountain peak.” Recognizing the importance of denying supplies to the insurrectos, Bell proposed to concentrate the rural population in the barrios as he considered this the best approach to provide protection to those “who really desired to be peaceful.” Thereafter, except for food that U.S. forces would attempt to bring back to provide for those in the zones, all supplies outside the concentration zones would be destroyed. Bell issued detailed orders to his command, a set of circulars, to both initiate the campaign and tightly control it.

In Circular 2 of 8 December 1901 Bell directed that all the population in Batangas be concentrated at designated sites by 25 December. For Bell, this movement was voluntary. People on their own volition could remain outside the camps but would not be afforded American protection from the ravages of the insurrectos or any other hazards of war. Eventually, over 300,000 people were concentrated. Military station commanders set the limits for the protected zone by selecting deadlines beyond which anyone proceeding without authorization would be regarded as a hostile. In addition station commanders were expected to secure food supplies, establish security and ensure that

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67 Ramsey III, “Counterguerrilla Warfare,” 36, 37, 39. Bell considered zones could only be established where the town or barrio was garrisoned and protection could be extended.

68 Ibid., 21-116. Ramsey reproduces the package of telegraphic circulars and general orders as re-issued for information purposes by General Bell in December 1902. The main circulars dealing with population concentration are No. 2 for the overall program itself and then a number addressing food issues within the protected zones (No’s 7, 10, 15, 17, 27, 30, 31, 35, and 37).

69 Linn, “War in Luzon,” 301.

70 Bell, Third Separate Brigade, Bell noted, “It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones, but merely to offer them the opportunity and permit them to decide for themselves whether they would cast their lot with us or with the enemy.”

71 A practice from US Civil War prison camps, if a prisoner crossed the ‘dead-line’ he could be shot dead.
adequate measures for hygiene were followed.\textsuperscript{72} Most of the population of the province had been concentrated by 20 December, and then the Americans began intensively patrolling and destroying supplies found outside the zones.\textsuperscript{73}

Various measures were taken to improve the lot of the occupants of the zones. Besides providing basic medical services, a vaccination program was initiated and over 300,000 persons were inoculated.\textsuperscript{74} As to food, the population was encouraged to bring in as many supplies as possible with them. Plans were in place to recover food from discovered caches and hides to the reconcentration zones where practical though this seems to have been carried out inconsistently.\textsuperscript{75} Bell initially hoped that the campaign would be concluded in time for the people to return to their lands for spring planting. Bell had supplies shipped in from Manila at army expense when food shortages arose in some localities with these supplies being sold at cost to the needy and the army covering the price of transport.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, Bell continually sought to make life for those in the zones more tolerable.\textsuperscript{77}

Modern interpretations as to the pragmatic benefits of Bell’s camps are difficult to reconcile for two reasons. First, the anti-imperialist bias dominates modern teaching on

\textsuperscript{72} Gates, “Benevolent Pacification,” 340.
\textsuperscript{73} Linn, “War in Luzon,” 301
\textsuperscript{74} Ken De Bevoise, \textit{Agents of the Apocalypse: Epidemic Disease in the Colonial Philippines} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 117, 243 fn38. With some anti-imperialist leaning, De Bevoise argues this was merely to prevent an outbreak of small pox amongst the American troops.
\textsuperscript{76} Bell regarded providing this food as a military necessity. Its provision caused numerous problems with more hide-bounded thinkers within the military and civil establishment. At one point August 1902 he was still feeding over 250,000 people. See “General Miles Report on the Philippine Army,” \textit{New York Times}, April 28, 1903; “Libellous Charges Against Gen. Bell,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, October 31, 1902; and “Still Feeding Natives,” \textit{Washington Post}, August 9, 1902.
\textsuperscript{77} For an overall summary of Bell’s opinion of the success of the campaign see “That ‘Concentration.’ From General Bell’s Report to Wheaton,” \textit{The Hartford Courant}, June 30, 1902, 14.
the Philippine-American War. Anti-imperialists were no-less virulent propagandists than the supporter of the U.S. administration, making use of misinformed reports like that of Major Cornelius Gardener and drawing on false images like those of swirling clouds of vampire bats. Anti-imperialist U.S. senators savaged loyal military servants of the nation comfortable that they themselves would never be so critically judged nor held responsible for their inaccuracies. A second difficulty arises as the historiography of the camps is often focused on the number of deaths both immediate and subsequent that can be attributed to them. This debate continues to rage with figures totalling from 600,000 to much lower and more realistic figures. Much of this effort is speculative with few detailed or accurate records available to prove the assertions. The rarely challenged anti-imperialist propaganda and the fixation on casualties dilute any appreciation for many of the measures Bell undertook to improve the lot of the Filipinos in the reconcentration zones.

If anti-imperialists could not recognize the operational value of Bell’s camps, others could. His opponent, the long elusive General Miguel Malvar, definitely did. Malvar, testifying shortly after his surrender, attested to how reconcentration had served

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78 Linn, “War in Luzon,” 3 and 17 fn2. Filipino historian Samuel K Tan only read Circular No.7 selectively, wanting to point out how it was like Weyler’s plan in Cuba but perhaps without digesting the meaning of the whole message. See Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino-American War, 1899-1913 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2002), 86.
79 “The Tabayas Report,” The Hartford Courant, April 9, 1902. The Senate made much of this report. In it Maj Gardener the civil governor of Tabayas complained about the influence of military activities in his province. In the short term and well before it was so used by the Senate, it was proven that Gardener had little true understanding of the nature of the insurgency in his province. See Bell, Third Separate Brigade, 274.
80 Blout, American Occupation, 393 and 395. Blout explains Senator Bacon’s misuse of the imagery.
to starve him of the supplies necessary to sustain his campaign. Bell’s superiors, as noted above, fully appreciated how these techniques had contributed to his ultimate success. Once Malvar surrendered the camps were rapidly dismantled. Afterwards Bell continued to watch over the welfare of the Batangans. He ensured they received food aid to dampen the consequences of a famine that had developed and provided medical assistance when epidemics broke out.

The U.S. Army regarded Bell’s campaign as a masterpiece at the time, and some of his techniques were immediately applied in Samar. In June 1903, a law was passed in the Philippines permitting civil authorities to continue the practice of reconcentration, and it was applied repeatedly. Bell himself was later earmarked to lead the 1906 U.S. intervention in Cuba as conditions there were assumed to be similar to those he had overcome in Batangas. Later his circular orders would be published in pamphlet form to help U.S. planners prepare for the 1910 intervention in Mexico. Bell’s practices were therefore seen as crucial to the final resolution of the insurrection in the Batangas and a worthwhile model to emulate in future operations.

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South African War

At this time vast and growing numbers of surrendered Boers with their families were being cared for, fed, attended and even entertained in protected encampments at the expense of the British Government. There was scarcely a base town, or even a considerable post on the lines of communication which had not in close and often dangerous proximity to its defences a camp of refugees living under the protection of British rifles and upon British rations. That nation is fortunate which, doomed to defeat, suffers it at the hands of an opponent who has the wealth proportionate to his humanity, and looking beyond the military need of the moment, deliberately adopts means which are dissonant with every principle of warfare in order to preserve his victims.

- General Sir Frederick Maurice

In the massive four-volume tomes of the British official history of the War in South Africa, a work which is understandably supportive of the British view of the war, General Maurice only lightly touches on aspects of the refugee camps with only 11 slim pages within the 2,000 overall devoted to them. The topic is relegated to a distant appendix in the last volume of the series. By the time it was published in 1910 the best lesson the authors provided concerned disease control. While the authors, Sir Frederick Maurice and Captain Maurice Grant, took pains to highlight the benefits of the camps and touched on the underlying causes of the “higher than normal” death-rate amongst the

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88 There are a lot of polemics surrounding what exactly the camps should be called. One sees everything from burgher, refugee and concentration camps to death camps. The best explanation may come from UK House of Commons, First, Second and Third Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts; Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix, (152,207, and 288), Reports of Committees (1904), 232. In a response to a question Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson answers, “‘Concentration camp’ is the term for all camps in which people were concentrated. It applies equally to a Burgher Camp, in which there are whites, and to the Native Refugee Camps in which there were only blacks. I do not mean that the two were necessarily always together; but the term ‘Concentration Camp’ would apply either to a Burgher Camp or a Native Refugee Camp. It was generally used as a term denoting both.”
89 Maurice and Grant, War in South Africa, 666. They recommended and rightly so that, “Under similar circumstances in the future, some system of quarantine camps where suspected incomers could be kept under observation before being given free pratique to the permanent camp would be advisable.”
children, they never indicated the scale of the losses that occurred in the camp system and their bearing on the campaign. Even the statistics provided, limited to the period of January to May 1902, only partially reveal the mortality in the camps. Diseases were the main killers with measles, dysentery and others extracting an enormous toll in both the white and black camps. The final tally was grim: in the white camps 26,927 women and children and 1,676 men died and in the black camps over 14,148 died.  

War always involves choices. Key choices include whether to start a war in the first instance and whether to keep on fighting. There were tough negotiations between Britons and Boers in 1899, but Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner for Southern Africa, preferred war and the Boers chose to start one by invading Natal. Later, at several points the British had high expectations that the Boers were ready to sue for peace but each time they were sorely disappointed. After the fall of Pretoria in June 1900, Lord Roberts thought the war was all but over, yet the Boers regrouped and launched a guerrilla campaign. The reconciliation efforts of the Burgher Peace Committee in early 1901 failed and the ensuing talks between Lord Kitchener and General Louis Botha at Middleburg between February and April also came to naught. Each choice of the Boers to continue fighting brought the imposition of harsher measures from the British. It is within this dynamic – refusal and further repression – that the use of camps in the South African War must be understood.

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91 Sir Alfred Milner was the governor of Cape Colony, 5 May 1897 to 6 March 1901, and then the administrator and subsequently the governor of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, 4 January 1901 – 1 April 1905. He was the High Commissioner for Southern Africa throughout this period.
The eventual use of concentration camps in South Africa is less remarkable than is sometimes supposed. Though the Cuban reconcentrado system was never far from the mind of critics and advocates, the local response to civilian refugees occurred well before Kitchener developed a formal system. The *uitlanders* who fled into the Cape Colony in 1899 were sheltered by various means and thereafter largely ignored even by lofty humanitarians.92 Elsewhere in the Cape Colony in late 1899 Lt. Gen. William Gatarce ordered all males over 12 years of age residing outside of villages into camps.93 Once the British invaded the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, refugees became a greater issue as they began to collect in urban centres. In July 1900, worried about limited supplies and intelligence leaks, Lord Roberts tried to expel over 2,500 refugees back into Boer lines “in order to throw their care upon their own commandos.”94 This initiative failed for, as Arthur Conan Doyle relates, “the Boer army broke into scattered bands and had no longer any definitive front lines.”95 The refugee problem therefore remained in British hands and on 22 September 1900 Maj. Gen. John G. Maxwell, the military governor of Pretoria, issued orders for the establishment of refugee camps at Pretoria and Bloemfontein. They were to serve three purposes: a protected area for oath takers, a feeding area for the destitute, and a detention area for others.96 A more complex system would soon follow.

When Kitchener took command in South Africa in late 1900 he faced two main challenges. First, he needed to reduce Boer supplies. The role of farms as supply points

95 Doyle, *The War*, 81.
96 Le May, *British Supremacy*, 91.
was clear and he continued Roberts’ policy of farm burning but considerably expanded the scale and scope of the devastation on the veldt. 97 This practice will be discussed in the following chapter. Second, he needed to protect surrendered Boers. Richard Deane concluded Volume 1 of Cassell’s History of the Boer War outlining how, “After the capture of Bloemfontein by Lord Roberts, the Free State Boers were so disheartened that they came in by the thousands and submitted. Had Lord Roberts been able to protect these men on their farms they would have remained passive. But he was not able to protect them, and, in consequence, they were soon compelled to take up arms again and go on commando.” 98 As Roberts before him, Kitchener ignored suggestions from Milner and Chamberlain to develop protected areas and then to expand pacification outwards from them. 99 Kitchener’s penchant for massive organizations and intricate control demanded another solution and in late December 1900 he would develop one.

In addition to protection Kitchener “realised that something more than the pursuit by brave troops of a brave enemy was necessary to bring guerrilla warfare to a close” and what he added to his attritional approach was forced resettlement. 100 The suggestion for the establishment of camps came from the Burgher Peace Committee who judged that their use would encourage those remaining on commando to surrender. 101 After consulting them, Kitchener telegraphed the Secretary of State for War on the 27 December 1900:

As I consider some steps are necessary to induce Boers in the field to surrender voluntarily, I am issuing instructions that all who do so will be allowed to live

100 Nasson, The War in South Africa, 222.
101 Le May, British Supremacy, 96.
with their families, property, and live-stock in laagers, under our protection, near railways in their districts. Those who took the oath of neutrality will also be allowed this privilege, unless it is proved that they went out on commando again without coercion. At present, Boers who surrender are removed from their districts, making others afraid to come in. Boer families will be brought into these laagers in their districts, and notices posted up that burghers still out are free to join them until the country is safe for them to return to their farms.

Over 46 camps would eventually be established with sites in the Cape Colony, the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal, and Natal. The population within the camps swelled as Kitchener’s drives denuded the veldt of both whites and blacks and as the approach of winter encouraged others to enter them voluntarily.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transvaal</th>
<th>ORC</th>
<th>Natal</th>
<th>Cape Colony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Pop</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>21,105</td>
<td>11,563</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>23,812</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>37,939</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>45,659</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1477</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
<td>52,571</td>
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<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>47,150</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>39,948</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Population in Burgher Refugee Camps (adapted from Hobhouse and Cd. 939, 942, 1161 (1902), Statistics on the Refugee Camps in South Africa)

102 For a good overview of the individual camps and a bibliography see http://www.lib.uct.ac.za/mss/bced
103 Leopold Scholtz, Why the Boers Lost the War (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 247. Entry into the camps may have expanded so rapidly once Kitchener’s more detailed instructions concerning the implementation of the scorched earth policy were issued to his troops in March 1901.
104 Figures for the Transvaal included those in Black Labour camps after July 1901. Some of the shift in numbers in 1902 reflects the transfer of problem individuals and other from the Transvaal to Natal and from the Orange River Colony to the Cape Colony.
Camp administration was heavily influenced by the military considerations. For instance, camps were initially sited for security purposes not comfort, and those for the blacks were organized as labour camps.\(^{105}\) Initially under military administration, in February 1901 the camps passed to civil control under the established military governments. Hamilton Goold-Adams supervised them in the Orange River Colony and General Maxwell in the Transvaal. Eventually, Milner, after his long absence in England in 1901, took a more direct role in the management of the camps.\(^{106}\) He soon pleaded for additional assistance, perhaps being worried about the influence of camp administration on his reputation or being genuinely overworked, and experts from India familiar with the working of famine camps there were sent to aid him.\(^{107}\) The military continued to provide supplies and services to the camps and retained control of the all important railway system. Even Milner struggled with the prioritization of limited supplies available.\(^{108}\)

The administration of the camps was repeatedly challenged.\(^{109}\) From Emily Hobhouse to Millicent Fawcett’s Ladies Commission, these challengers served a useful

\(^{105}\) G.B. Beak, The Aftermath of War: An Account of the Repatriation of Boers and Natives in the Orange River Colony, 1902-1904 (London: Edward Arnold, 1906), 25-29. Beak indicates how the black camps were meant to be self-sufficient and were run at a fraction of the cost of the white camps. He also outlines how they were used as a labour resource.

\(^{106}\) Headlam, Milner Papers, 230 and 273. Milner arrived back in Africa in early September 1901 and would later inform Chamberlain, “the anxiety about these camps has taken first place in my many cares.”

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 197. In February 1901 Milner thought the camps a poor substitute for whole district defence yet indicated “as far as it goes, it is a good measure ...” Later when he himself was responsible for them and the mortality rates did not seem to be subsiding he tried to distance himself from them. See G.B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa 1902-10 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 247.

\(^{108}\) Millicent Fawcett managed to get one additional rail car a day allocated to the camp by securing a personal interview with Kitchener. Overall 30 trucks (rail cars) per day were allocated to the food supply for the whole Free State: 16 went to the camps and 14 to other civilians. Fawcett had the total increased to 31. See Millicent Fawcett, What I Remember (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), 171.

\(^{109}\) Headlam, Milner Papers, 298.
They drew greater attention to the problems plaguing the camps and thereby heightened the efforts to resolve them in the resource-constrained theatre of war. Many necessary proposed reforms in water, sanitation and rations, especially those put forward by the Ladies Commission, were swiftly acted upon. Control, management and the conditions in the camps improved, too slowly for some, as the campaign progressed.

Disease, the handmaiden of war, ravaged the camps but it was not just the condition within them that caused the epidemics. The Ladies Commission wrote of three factors that had contributed to the spread of disease: the unsanitary condition of the country; causes within the control of the inmates of the camps; and causes within the control of the administration. Under the second factor, the Commission noted that contamination in the camps contributed to the spread of disease. The Boer inmates themselves and some of the camps were sanitarily unsound. Most camps used the pail system in their latrines, a common practice in urban South Africa but unfamiliar to the rural Boer. Some of the latrine systems in certain camps were poorly conceived yet much of the fouling of the ground and environment was due to the practices of the inhabitants themselves. But as Doyle notes, the majority of diseases were not the filth-

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110 Paul M. Krebs, “‘The last of the Gentlemen’s Wars’: Women in the Boer War Concentration Camps Controversy,” *History Workshop* 33 (Spring 1992): 51. Krebs points out that despite all the in-fighting Hobhouse and Fawcett “came to virtually identical conclusions about the condition there.”

111 Regardless of how well managed an individual camps might be their enormous growth over particular months (sometimes over a 1,000 new occupants) bedevilled effective organisation. No aspect of camp administration became too small to be considered. Chamberlain himself inquired after the use as sanitary pails – see *Further Papers Related to the Working of Refugee Camps in South Africa*, Cd. 934 (1902), 88; and long debates occurred over the use of fences see Cd. 934, 90.

112 *Army Medical Department Report for the Year 1902*, Cd. 1906 (1904), 143. For a general description of the pail system see Samuel M. Gray, *Proposed Plan for a Sewerage System* (Providence: Providence Press Company, 1884), 15-21 and Plate II.

113 *Reports, &c. On the Working of the Refugee Camps in the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Cape Colony, and Natal*, Cd.819 (1902), 29. In his 7th March 1901 report to the Military Governor George Turner explains some of the problems with the Boer use of latrines at Johannesburg. Poor sanitary practices were commented on repeatedly throughout the reports on the camps. See also *Report on the Concentration Camps in South Africa by the Committee of Ladies*, Cd. 893 (1902), 15.
related ones. Measles was the great killer in the camps for a number of reasons: due to their isolated existence Boer children had not developed immunities to the virus; many arrived in camps after long treks across the veldt that left them worn down, and quarantine procedures were frequently inadequate. This combination of factors contributed to epidemics of measles constantly sweeping through the camps. Whether additional medical staff could have prevented these epidemics is moot. The British Army of that era did not grasp the importance of the management of camps and medical facilities even for their own sick and wounded as clearly obvious in enteric epidemic that broke out at Bloemfontein. After the requirements for medical staff for the British Army were satisfied, there were few other medical personnel available to remedy the situation anyways.

Food rationing is a hazard of war. The occupants of the camps were hardly the only individuals suffering hardships in rationing. The story of the food supplied in the camps remains contested with the pro-Boers easily swallowing any stories about what desperate women and children could not. Initially, ration scales were set so that those who had surrendered received a greater allotment than families whose husbands were still out on commando. This was soon changed and all occupants were given the same issue of food. Ration scales were continually increased and improved as the war progressed but

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114 Doyle, The War, 84.
115 For an overview of the influence of measles see Bruce Fetter and Stowell Kessler, “Scars from Childhood Disease: Measles in the Concentration Camps during the Boer War,” Social Science History 20, no.4 (Winter 1996): 593-611.
116 Doyle, The War, 85.
117 Byron Farwell, Mr. Kipling’s Army (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 179-188.
118 Emily Hobhouse, The Brunt of the War and Where it Fell (1902; repr., Kessing Publishing, 2007), 57, 70,72, 88, 118, 157-159,171,178,210. Hobhouse’s book is rife with complaints about food. Rarely does she investigate or substantiate the claims, but she proved a useful tool to Boer propaganda by taking their complaints purely at face value. The pro-Boer lobby generally accepted all reports on the inadequacies of the food provided at face value.
remained constrained by local conditions.\textsuperscript{119} For instance, milk had never been commonly consumed in Boer life and with the war making milch cows even scarcer, the availability of fresh milk for infants was limited.\textsuperscript{120} Similarly, the quality of meat was affected by the amount captured by the troops, the distance they had to drive it in, and the season of the year.\textsuperscript{121} Camps normally kept some food reserves on hand to deal with the interruption of supply and the uncertainty of when new admissions might appear at their gates, but reserves were kept limited in areas where commandos operated so that the camps did not become attractive targets. Within the camps themselves, the management of rations was a reflection of the administration’s competence. In some the rations were handed out quickly while in others it was laborious all day affair.\textsuperscript{122} After ration scales had been equalized, restrictions on the issuing of rations were only used as a temporary disciplinary measure.

The camps were not dismantled immediately upon the declaration of peace in May 1902. Milner and his staff knew that the Boers could not return to their farms before the end of winter.\textsuperscript{123} Consequently, the camps were employed as a holding area to re-integrate Boers with their families both those coming in from commando and those returning from overseas prisoner of war camps.\textsuperscript{124} Repatriation departments were established both in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony to oversee the process of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Further Papers relating to the Working of the Refugee Camps in South Africa}, Cd. 902 (1902), 1.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Report on the Concentration Camps in South Africa by the Committee of Ladies}, Cd. 893 (1902), 13.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Committee of Ladies}, Cd. 893, 24 and 52. The Committee recounted various ration distribution methods. They considered that at Aliwal North the worst and strongly recommended the use of the block system throughout.
\textsuperscript{123} Beak, \textit{The Aftermath}, 78.
\textsuperscript{124} Arthur M. Davey, ed., \textit{Lawrence Richardson: Selected Correspondence (1902-1903)} (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1977), 58. When Richardson interviewed Col Thompson, he stated that 9,000 burghers had come in from commandos into the camps. It was a strain but he had accumulated six weeks of supplies for such an eventuality.
\end{flushleft}
re-integration and the eventual re-establishment of the Boers on their farms.\textsuperscript{125} Each individual was sent back to his farm with seed, rations for a month and a limited number of implements.\textsuperscript{126} The lack of livestock, particularly oxen, hampered the repatriation effort and initially each farmer was only allowed to retain a team for the trip to his farm.\textsuperscript{127} In late October 1902 there still remained over 34,000 people in the white refugee camps.\textsuperscript{128} By the end of 1902 there remained less than 6,000 in white camps in both colonies and 7,000 in black camps in the Orange River Colony. All the camps were closed by March 1903.\textsuperscript{129}

The camps did contribute to the Boers suing for peace, but the extent of their influence remains unclear. They were an unpleasant business, but as Walter Jerrold, one of Kitchener’s biographers, noted about the General, though criticized by sentimentalists, “he has never failed to realise that war is a grim business which must be pursued grimly.”\textsuperscript{130} Pragmatically, Kitchener and Milner had kept the camps going despite their unsettling statistics because they had few viable alternatives by late 1901. Many Britons by this time were arguing that the camps were actually a boon for the Boers and that by unburdening them from having to care for their families the camps allowed them more operational freedom.\textsuperscript{131} Even Botha hinted at this inherent value.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{125} Progress Relating to the Progress of Administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, Cd. 1551 (1903), 1-65. See for an overview of the work of the repatriation departments.
\textsuperscript{126} Beak, The Aftermath, 142.
\textsuperscript{127} Davey, Lawrence Richardson, 61.
\textsuperscript{128} Louis Creswicke, South Africa and the Transvaal War, vol. 8, South Africa and its Future (Manchester: Kenneth MacLennan, 1902), 191.
\textsuperscript{129} Progress Relating, Cd. 1551 (1903), 64-65.
\textsuperscript{131} Brig Gen C.R. Ballard, Kitchener (London: Faber and Faber, 1930), 121. The British only complicated their task in the short term as “in the end it turned out that the removal of the woman from the veld, far from reducing the mobility of the Boers, really increased it. The farmer had no longer any inducement to remain at home. His family was provided for; the house was burnt and the cattle had gone; having nothing else to lose he joined De Wet or De la Rey.”
pronouncements during the negotiation of the Treaty of Vereeniging emphasised the plight of their families in the camps and their worries that their race was being slowly exterminated. This may have been one last broadside for their foreign supporters. In truth it seems that a late December 1901 policy reversal by Kitchener finally broke the Boers. Kitchener had decided to bring no more people into the camps. Many groups of women and children in desperate condition and short of supplies had wandered the veldt instead of submitting and now even more were to be left on the veldt to fend for themselves. With the approach of winter of 1902, the plight of so many of those out-spammed in the women’s laagers partially resigned the Boers to submission. In Bill Nasson’s view the camps were “the purest encapsulation of Britain’s war of attrition, there can be no doubt that the camp policy was a weighty contributing factor to the ending of republican resistance.” In the end, while the camps were a colossal political disaster, they did contribute to instilling in the Boers a desire to surrender.

Malayan Emergency

The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.

Mao Zedong

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132 Rayne Kruger, *Good-Bye Dolly Gray* (London: Cassell, 1959), 462. Botha is quoted as having said, “We are only too glad to know that our women and children are under British protection.”
133 Nasson, *The War in South Africa*, 223. Nasson lends great weight to the camp system influencing the Boer decision to surrender.
135 Fred R. Van Hartesveldt, *The Boer War* (Sutton Publishing, 2000), 105. It was estimated that in the Eastern Transvaal alone there were 10,000 Boer women and children at risk with less than six weeks of food supply left. See Hobhouse, *The Brunt*, 293. See also Creswicke, *South Africa*, 194. Out-spanning is the process of taking the draught animals (whether horse, ox, or other) out of the traces of the wagons during pauses in a march in order to allow the animals to rest and feed.
137 Hartesveldt, Pyrah and others profess “the bitterness of the people lingers to the present.” While true it is not a given that anything that the British could have or should have done would have changed the fundamental enmity the Boers held for the British, a hate that pre-dates the war and any activity therein.
... no amount of Emergency Regulation, threats of punitive action, or propaganda could wean the rural people, especially the Chinese, from supporting the bandits unless they were made reasonably safe at their work and in their homes.\(^{138}\)

To understand the requirement for resettlement in Malaya one must understand the squatter population there. Squatter issues were not new to Malaya. Squatting had been long practiced by the Chinese immigrant community in response to unemployment and crises with individuals seeking to take up enough land to support themselves and their families.\(^{139}\) The first wave of squatting took place during the economic turmoil of 1932. During World War II it occurred as some Chinese fled “Japanese ruthlessness” in 1942-43 and again, as they responded to the later Japanese “grow more food policy.”\(^{140}\) Due to post-war shortages, any and all types of food production were encouraged and squatting issues were ignored. As they could secure no permanent title to the land, squatters choose to settle in “remote and inaccessible areas on the jungle edge.”\(^{141}\) Their location and social composition made then a natural target for the Min Yuen, the support element of the Malayan Race Liberation Army (the armed wing of the MCP). As the squatters were beyond the reach of effective protection by the administration, the Min Yuen secured aid, money and recruits from these communities.\(^{142}\)


Initial attempts to address the perceived threat surfacing in the squatter communities fell back on the previously used devices of detention and banishment, techniques long used against the MCP. Under the Banishment Order, twenty senior members of the party had been deported in 1937. Deportation orders against 400 of the most troublesome Communist agitators had been prepared in early 1948 but Governor Gent would not sign them. Emergency Regulation 17D, which granted the powers to detain and deport, was put into force 10 January 1949. Lists of dangerous squatters had been drawn up three days prior to its issue, and it was anticipated that only about 20,000 people would be removed over a six month period. The earliest resettlement operation in Malaya involved rounding up and interning complete villages with the intent of either repatriating these individuals to China or resettling them in more secure areas. Over 6,000 individuals were rounded up in the first ten months of 1949. Police Commissioner Gray considered these operations contributed greatly to law and order and that they “could be the ultimate threat to non-cooperative areas.” Others in the administration, however, protested the use of detention and its use was curtailed after June 1949. With the fall of China to Communist forces the program stalled completely as deportees were no longer accepted by the new Chinese regime. Given the size of the squatter population it is doubtful that this method of removing the troublesome would have been successful unless the Emergency had been brought to a rapid conclusion. Alternatives were necessary.

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144 Clyde Sanger, *Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire* (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995), 293.
146 Short, *Communist Insurrection*, 193.
147 Ibid., 189-193.
148 Ibid., 201.
Greater emphasis on squatter issues became crucial, as the original attempts to grapple with it had failed. Considered the source of 95 percent of the recruits for the Communist guerrillas, many British viewed the squatters as uncommitted and still “sitting on the fence.”¹⁴⁹ To the squatters this position made eminent sense, as members of their communities were daily being intimidated and murdered across the country.¹⁵⁰ Early resettlement schemes demonstrated the government’s unpreparedness. For instance, during Operation Kukri in October 1948, detainees so overwhelmed the process that it had to be halted, and over 500 of the 10,000 resettled immediately returned to the cleared area as there was no law forbidding them from doing so.¹⁵¹ Focussing more attention on resettlement evolved only slowly. First, a Squatter Committee, chaired by the Colonial Secretary Sir Alec Newboult, was established in December 1948 and reported its findings in February 1949. Next, the utility of large military sweeps was called into question. “Jungle bashing,” direct military action against the terrorists, had produced few results as “a soldier would often spend a thousand hours plodding through the jungle for each contact with the terrorist.”¹⁵² Finally, even though they recognized the supply chain as the weak link in the terrorist organization, Malayan rulers, all of whom remained the ultimate political authority in their respective states, remained reluctant to allot the necessary land that would allow resettlement to proceed. This myriad of issues demanded a fresh perspective and a new leader to re-orientate the war effort.

¹⁵² Gullick, Malaya, 98.
General Briggs was appointed the Director of Operations in Malaya in May 1950. Briggs was given the power to coordinate civil departments that had a role to play in the conflict and more importantly, he had authority over all the security forces: army, police and air force. Shortly after his arrival he prepared what was to become known as the Briggs Plan. His intent was to exploit the weaknesses inherent in the Communist supply system by denying them access to the squatters by resettling them into new villages. Besides simply protecting the population, Briggs planned to force the Communists to leave the concealment of the jungle and to cross the exposed areas over to the new village fences in order to obtain necessary supplies. He intended to flood this zone with security forces conducting framework operations and thereby dominate it. To deny the MCP access to the population Briggs employed two basic techniques, resettlement and regroupment.

Resettlement in the Briggs Plan placed the rural population into controlled, secured villages. Up to March 1950, just before Briggs’ arrival, 11,683 squatters had been resettled in their original areas, 4,465 in other areas, and 2,396 had been regrouped on the mines and estates. Quickly launched in July 1950, the Briggs Plan almost as quickly floundered due to lack of resources and the unwillingness of state authorities to support the plan. The main elements of the plan were finally only implemented in November. By November 1951 over 331,000 people had been resettled in over 315 resettlement areas. Designated “new villages,” the majority of these settlements were completely new sites (approximately 32%), built around existing small villages (24%), or

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154 Ibid., 94-95.
formed as new suburbs near towns (16%). Eventually over 573,000 individuals, predominately Chinese, would be resettled of which 273,000 had been legitimate occupiers of land and 300,000 had been squatters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Resettled</th>
<th>Not Resettled</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>117,198</td>
<td>332,667</td>
<td>449,865</td>
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<tr>
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<td>401,698</td>
<td>81,787</td>
<td>483,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Mar 1952</td>
<td>423,462</td>
<td>96,882</td>
<td>500,284</td>
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<td>31 Dec 1952</td>
<td>461,822</td>
<td>81,439</td>
<td>543,261</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Mar 1953</td>
<td>563,028</td>
<td>94,800</td>
<td>657,828</td>
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Table 2 - Progress of Squatter Resettlement in the Federation of Malaya

Overall 480 new villages were created under the Briggs Plan. Of these, the twelve largest – two with populations larger than 10,000 and ten with populations between 5,000 and 10,000 – contained over 17 percent (approximately 100,000 individuals) of the resettled population. The majority of those resettled, 82 percent (approximately 470,000 individuals), were placed into over 454 smaller settlements which formed 94 percent of the villages established. Of this total, 164 villages held between 100 to 500 persons and contained 51,874 individuals; 116 villages held between 500 to 1,000 persons and contained 79,886 individuals; and 169 villages held between 1,000 to 5,000 persons and contained 340,710 individuals. A dozen new villages held less than 100 persons each and contained 769 individuals, less than one percent of those resettled.

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156 Ibid., 100 fn 44. The attempt to resettle an estimated 50,000 aborigines was a complete disaster. See Coates, *Suppressing Insurgence*, 92.
157 Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution*, 177, Figure 13
The implementation of the Briggs Plan was not without its difficulties. The Communists attempted to counter the program and were disappointed that the squatters had not manifested a greater resistance to it.\textsuperscript{158} Propaganda, terrorism, intimidation, murder and assassination were all undertaken and the Min Yuen infiltrated the new settlements.\textsuperscript{159} There were difficulties within the administration too. The Malayan rulers had finally been won over by Briggs and provided the necessary land that allowed the program to proceed. Land plus the social services provided to the Chinese squatters caused jealousies amongst other Malayan communities that had to be managed. Many villages were set up in haste without all the desirable amenities for which they would later become known. The scope and scale of the program made heavy demands on scarce resources: competent staff, Chinese police officers, and even the bulldozers necessary to cut road to the new communities. It was the emergency committees that were established at all levels of administration across Malaya by Briggs organized that allowed resettlement to be driven forward. Benefiting greatly from the structure Briggs had constructed, General Templer would complete the final strokes of resettlement.

Resettlement followed a standard pattern. Military involvement was overt and included participating in most of the steps of resettlement: the initial census of an area to determine requirements; the physical survey of the selected resettlement site; the cordonning off of the target population in the early morning of the day of the move; the loading and moving of the target population; the destruction of any material that could

\textsuperscript{159} O’Ballance, \textit{Communist Insurgent War}, 110. Barber, \textit{Running Dog}, 120.
not be moved to deny it to the Communists; and, the provisioning of security to the new village until this task could be handed over to other elements of the security forces.\textsuperscript{160}

Each family was encouraged to bring all its belongings to the new location and was compensated for what they had to leave behind. A subsistence allowance was given to the villagers until they could re-establish themselves.\textsuperscript{161} They were allocated a site for a new house, pig pen and garden – approximately one-sixth of an acre – and, if agriculturalists, would receive another two to three acres within two miles of the village. Crops could be grown between the perimeter wire fences but under many restrictions, and newly planted crops outside of the wire would be protected once they were ripe enough to harvest.\textsuperscript{162} Villages were primarily sited for defensive purposes.\textsuperscript{163} Initially some sat astride roads but this proved impractical and all were eventually placed beside main roads. Certain villages, the particularly difficult ones, had perimeter lights installed and eventually $4.3 million was spent on this work for 161 sites.\textsuperscript{164}

A delicate balance was required for resettlement to work. First, it had to be accepted by the new villagers and, therefore, had to be more than a simplistic promise of a better life. The over-riding enticement was title to land. As the Chinese proverb says, “A land title is the hoop that holds the barrel together.”\textsuperscript{165} Amenities such as water, schools, and medical facilities were also important and all key components of General Templer’s hearts and minds campaign. Some of these services were provided through

\textsuperscript{161} Short, \textit{Communist Insurrection}, 395.
\textsuperscript{165} Barber, \textit{Running Dog}, 125.
limited government funding\textsuperscript{166} and some through moneys from the Malaya Chinese Association and its lotteries.\textsuperscript{167} The second requirement was security. Unless a police post could be provided new villages were not established.\textsuperscript{168} To truly secure them required the addition of home guard forces. The home guard was developed through a three phase process: first, they were only armed with batons and arm bands; then, they reported to the police station and carried a shotgun while on patrol; and, finally, select individuals were trusted to keep shotguns in their houses.\textsuperscript{169} In 1951 all males between 18 and 55 were conscripted into the home guard. The home guard grew from 79,000 in July 1951 to approximately 225,000 by the end of 1953 and would reach a high of over 400,000. They were responsible for the security of 72 villages by the end of 1953 and 150 by the end of 1954.\textsuperscript{170}

Regroupment, the other major relocation technique, was the grouping of labourers on the estates, mines, factories, sawmills and timber \textit{kongsis}. Over 650,000 workers were regrouped: 71.5 percent on the estates, 21.5 percent on the tin mines, and the remainder on the other enterprises. Regrouping occurred within 1,500 places of employment. The compounds required were smaller than those required for the new villages. Regroupment became a priority after January 1951 for as resettlement became more effective and the Communists increasingly turned to the labourers on the estates and mines for supplies. Priority was given to Asian-owned estates without resident managers and to exposed European ones. Regroupment had an immediate influence on the pattern of work.

\textsuperscript{166} Harper, \textit{End of Empire}, 183. Harper notes that in 1952 only 8 percent of the $67 million spent on resettlement was on social services and amenities.
\textsuperscript{167} Barber, \textit{Running Dog}, 112.
\textsuperscript{168} Clutterbuck, \textit{Riot and Revolution}, 176.
\textsuperscript{169} Coates, \textit{ Suppressing Insurgence}, 120.
\textsuperscript{170} Coates, \textit{ Suppressing Insurgence}, 121. Short, \textit{ Communist Insurrection}, 125, 412, and 413.
Production dropped about 10-15 percent as curfews and food restrictions limited the work day. Larger labour pools accumulated on the bigger estates in part because they could provide more amenities to the regrouped workers. The cost for regroupment was borne principally by the owners and this was an ongoing source of friction between them and the government.\footnote{Coates, \textit{Suppressing Insurgency}, 91. Harper, \textit{End of Empire}, 204-205.}

Overall 650,000 individuals were regrouped of which 246,000 (38 percent) were Chinese, 274,000 (42 percent) were Indian, and 130,000 (20 percent) were Malay or other nationalities. Regroupment affected 510,000 individuals on estates, 80,000 in the mines, and 60,000 in other forms of employment. The bulk of the Indians regrouped were working on the estates where they formed over 50 percent of the workers. The Chinese formed 29 percent of the workers regrouped on the estates, 69 percent of those regrouped in the mines, and 72 percent of those regrouped in other forms of employment.\footnote{Adapted from Clutterbuck, \textit{Riot and Revolution}, 177, Figure 13.}

Was this so widely studied resettlement program a success? In the long-term, yes it was. It dramatically reconfigured the human geography of Malaya and many of the villages created remain today. In the short-term, the success was less evident. Resettlement and regroupment themselves were not sufficient alone to finish the insurgency as supplies were still reaching the Communists after 1951 which indicated the need for additional control measures.\footnote{Short, \textit{Communist Insurrection}, 292.} Edgar O’Ballance considered the Briggs Plan, “a devastating measure that did more than any other single thing to defeat the Communists in Malaya, as it completely divorced the MRLA from the people and caused it to wither away.”\footnote{O’Ballance, \textit{Communist Insurgent War}, 108.} As Victor Purcell notes, “the motive of the Briggs Plan was exclusively
military and it is from the military angle that its success must be primarily judged.” For Purcell the Plan placed the strategic initiative purely in the hands of the government.  

Herein lies the strength of resettlement in Malaya, for it established control of the population, “at the New Village and estate or mine gates where strict control was maintained.” It forced the guerrilla into the open and set the conditions for the imposition of the later measures that would complete the decimation of the Communists. 

Kenyan Emergency

There was no doubt in my mind that support from the population was the key to the whole problem for us as well as for the rebels. By “support” I mean not merely sympathy or idle approval but active participation in the struggle.

Such support is seldom spontaneous. Even when it is, it still must be directed and organized. Nor can it be imposed on the population entirely from without. It must come partly from the people, more precisely from the militant elements among the masses, from the “activists,” to use the communist term. Support is thus acquired through an organization developed within the population.

- David Galula

While collective control measures were a large undertaking in Malaya their use there pales in comparison to the scope and scale of like measures imposed in Kenya. Holding camps were first used extensively in the repatriation of squatters from the White Highlands. Subsequently, an elaborate preventative detention system was used to sweep up thousands of Mau Mau fighters, and their suspected or potential sympathizers.  

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178 David Anderson, *History of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 5. Anderson estimates over 70,000 supporters of Mau Mau were held in detention camps at the peak of the emergency with at least 150,000 or more passing through them in the course of the conflict. When Richard Catling arrived in Kenya in 1954 to take up the post of Commissioner of Police he was critical of the large number of detainees held: Kenya had 78,000, whereas Malaya only
addition villagisation (resettlement), like in Malaya but on a more substantial scale, was undertaken in Kenya. Unlike in Malaya, the formation of sizeable home guard forces preceded villagisation, and they were crucial to the effective implementation of the program. Villagisation was initiated in mid-1954, comparatively late in the campaign, and by the end of 1955 over 1,077,500 Kikuyu were resettled into 854 protective villages.

There are three main difficulties when studying the relevance of villagisation to the Kenyan campaign. First, villagisation is treated thinly, almost as an after-thought, in most studies and even in official documents. For instance, in David Anderson’s *History of the Hanged* only a page and one-half is dedicated to villagisation and in the Colonial Office’s *Report on the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya for the Year 1954*, the year the program was initiated, only one slim paragraph of five lines is devoted to it. Secondly, even when considered more thoroughly, the focus is on its punitive aspects with the program presented in an unbalanced fashion, as if villagisation was about punishment alone. Anderson considers “the most punitive measure of all was surely villagization,” and most works, especially those of Caroline Elkins and derivatives of her work, over-generalize this as its primary and only purpose. The final difficulty is that the

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villagisation program is rarely contextualized sufficiently or accurately. For instance, despite the Kenyan administration’s propensity to use the tested practices from Malaya, the social engineering of African villages had been a dream of district commissioners in Kenya since World War II. In fact, Joanna Lewis suggests that in regard to aspects of development within the counter-insurgency program that, “there was little that was new.”

Beyond security considerations, there were two contending philosophies driving villagisation: one strove for social revolution and one strove for punishment. The Kenyan Administration described resettlement in 1954 as follows:

In the Central Province a social revolution is being wrought by the establishment of village systems in place of the former scattered abodes. Services, such as education, hygiene, community centres, water – to mention but a few – can now be brought to the people in their villages.

Beyond delivering closer administration and new services, the administration in combination with villagisation embarked on a Herculean labour to rationalize Kikuyu land holding, the Swynnerton Plan. As Randall Heather notes though, “the government assessed that only a limited number of Kikuyu were likely to drawn away from Mau Mau through the provision of social services, better living conditions and a degree of physical security.”

Besides the desire to extend social engineering, there were strong punitive undertones in how the administration generally treated “native” Africans and these practices extended to villagisation. Collective punitive actions were common enough in

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the early months of the Emergency especially where information on expected attacks was not forthcoming. This desire to punish reached to the highest level in the colony, the governor. Unsurprisingly, therefore, punitive measures were applied in varying degrees to areas within the reserves which were “notorious for harbouring Mau Mau gangsters and providing them with supplies.” In the end these opposing philosophies generated two versions of resettlement sites: model or protective villages with well spaced huts, gardens, social centres and a few shops; and, punitive villages that reflected “the government’s determination to ‘make conditions of life arduous for the resident populations.’” But this categorization by itself is incomplete as new villages were either temporary or permanent. The temporary villages were hastily constructed for security reasons and were meant to only last as long as the Emergency or until they could be replaced by permanent ones. The permanent ones were carefully laid out as they were meant for continued use after the Emergency.

Villagisation in Kenya was driven by more than the simple mechanics of “separating the population from the guerrilla.” It was adapted to local conditions. David Gulala considered “resettlement a last resort measure,” but, “if the rural population is too dispersed … the counterinsurgent faces the decisions of resettling it.” Addressing the dispersed settlement pattern of the Kikuyu was one of the drivers behind resettlement. A second driver was the further over-crowding of the already densely populated Kikuyu

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reserves that occurred as the Emergency progressed. The Kikuyu response to over-
crowding before Mau Mau had been outward migration in three streams: first, to the
White Highlands as agricultural labour, the squatters; second, to other African tribal
reserves where pre-emergency resettlement schemes like that at Olenguruone had been
attempted; and, third, to Nairobi, the capital of the colony.192 The Emergency reversed
this flow. When expelled from the White Highlands, over 100,000 Kikuyu returned to the
reserves in 1953 and an additional 30,000 of them, mainly men, made their way to
Nairobi. The displaced formed a rich recruiting ground for the Mau Mau with many of
them moving straight into forest gangs.193 Finally, villagisation separated the Mau Mau
fighters from their source of supply, the Passive Wing in which women played a strong
role.194

Villagisation informally began in Kenya in 1953 when settlers were encouraged
to establish them in lieu of repatriating their squatters to the reserves.195 In early 1954, it
was trialed in Nyeri and Fort Hall, the worst districts for Mau Mau raids at the time, and
was meant to create separation between the Passive Wing and the gangs at the forest
dege.196 In responding to a question in the British House of Commons in mid-April of
that year Oliver Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary, stated,

Village life is not in accordance with the habits and customs of the Kikuyu. At
present therefore villages are only being established by voluntary action or for

security reasons where it is necessary to collect people together to enable them to be better protected, or as a penal measure in specially bad areas.\textsuperscript{197}

This disruption of Kikuyu life did not really occur until villagisation became a widespread and priority program after May 1954.\textsuperscript{198} The focus on villagisation after June 1954 intensified because of two factors. First, Operation Anvil cleared Nairobi of Mau Mau elements in April, and it was important that the Kikuyu reserves did not become a new supply centre for the movement. Second, the new War Council, organized in June, had sufficient and appropriate authority to direct the establishment of this program. Villagisation was then intensified in Nyeri and Fort Hall and then later applied in Kiambu which had been previously “comparatively unaffected by Mau Mau.”\textsuperscript{199}

The role of the Kikuyu loyalists who supported the British in the Mau Mau struggle is often ignored or trivialized. Recent works have revealed the importance of their resistance and, despite claims to the contrary, the Kenyan Emergency still largely resembles a Kikuyu civil war. The immediate response of local headmen to attacks upon them by Mau Mau gangs was to form local home guard units and establish fortified posts.\textsuperscript{200} Units of between thirty and fifty men were quickly created in Christian enclaves, albeit they were initially poorly armed.\textsuperscript{201} The numbers enrolled in the home guard rose from an initial 5,000 to 10,000 by January 1953 and to 25,000 in August 1953.\textsuperscript{202}

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\textsuperscript{197} U.K., Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, Vol. 526, 15 April 1954, 141W.
\textsuperscript{198} Elkins, despite her limited understanding of the role of resettlement in Malaya, is clear on the importance of the War Council’s June 1954 decision to implementation it. See Caroline Elkins, “Detention and Rehabilitation during the Mau Mau Emergency: The Crisis of Late Colonial Kenya” (PhD diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, 2001), 230 fn 2.
\textsuperscript{199} Gray to Rogers, 2; Kitson notes that it was only in October 1954 that villagisation had to be started in Kiambu. See Maj Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), 146.
\textsuperscript{201} David Lovatt Smith, A History of the Kikuyu Guard (Brighton: Digaprint, 2003), 8.
\textsuperscript{202} U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Insurgent Wars: Selected Case Studies (Kansas: Fort Leavenworth, 1969), 6-21.
\end{flushleft}
so, these numbers were low considering an overall Kikuyu population that was estimated to be 1,500,000. Up until October 1953 the home guard was largely on the defensive with nightly attacks on guard posts common,\textsuperscript{203} but after that as it grew the guard “were to pay off many old scores against Mau Mau.”\textsuperscript{204} The home guard was used, as David Lovatt Smith relates because, “The main thing in 1953/4 was to counter the terrorism with whatever means available ... [the guard] during its lifetime accounted for 63% of all Mau Mau killed or captured.”\textsuperscript{205} Due to abusive practices, the home guard was disbanded on 31 December 1954, and its better members were transferred into the Tribal Police. As to the home guard’s value in the villagisation effort, Erskine stated, “For security reasons it was essential to concentrate the population and the opportunity to do this came as soon as the Home Guard posts became properly established.”\textsuperscript{206}

As the home guard expanded, the necessity of protecting not only the members themselves but also their families was realized and the size of their protected compounds increased. With villagisation very much controlled by local security forces in Kenya, these posts formed the nucleus of many future villages.\textsuperscript{207} Each post controlled two or three nearby villages, usually within 500 yards, of approximately 500 people each. Planning and work on a village commenced approximately three months ahead of people being moved into it. Communal work, a common practice in Kenya, was used to prepare the village’s defences and other aspects with individuals expected to reconstruct their own dwelling within the bounds of the compound using local materials.\textsuperscript{208} Once the

\textsuperscript{204} Smith, \textit{Kikuyu Guard}, 27.
\textsuperscript{205} David Lovatt Smith, \textit{Kenya, the Kikuyu and Mau Mau} (East Sussex: Mawenzi Books, 2005), 192.
\textsuperscript{206} Erskine, “Mau Mau,” 15.
\textsuperscript{207} Elkins, “Detention,” 231.
\textsuperscript{208} There are many complaints in the literature about these two activities. The cultural norm was for a Kikuyu hut to be built in under a day (it had to be completed before dark) and communal work was also
village was ready huts outside the village were burned and people relocated inside. Home
guard posts were better appointed both due to their relative longevity when villagisation
commenced and the loyalty of their occupants. Villages for suspected Mau Mau
sympathisers were more cramped, as were temporary ones.\textsuperscript{209} Considering the limited
number of security forces available, villages were designed compactly to minimize the
perimeter that would have to be guarded as security considerations trumped the comforts
of the disloyal.\textsuperscript{210}

The villagisation program served immediate and distinctive military purposes.
The first was to provide protection to wavering individuals, an exceedingly difficult task
when the Kikuyu were dispersed in their normal settlement pattern. As J.C. Carothers
reported,

One has therefore to think in terms of personal security for all these people
(provided they are not too embroiled in \textit{Mau Mau}) whether or not they have taken
certain \textit{Mau Mau} oaths and whether or not they admit to wanting this. For they
have no chance to alter their allegiance in isolated country homes, and the writer
sees in ‘villagization’ the answer to this.\textsuperscript{211}

The Colonial Office noted in its 1954-55 report on \textit{The Colonial Territories}, “As a result
of the consolidation in the Reserves the position and life of the gangs has become more
and more precarious,” and, “it appeared by the end of 1954 that the bulk of the terrorist
had withdrawn to the forest areas in the Aberdare Mountains and on Mount Kenya.”\textsuperscript{212}

The forests became the final battleground. In simplifying the overall security tasks of the

\textsuperscript{209} For a general description of the crowding and early construction issues see Mary Shannon, “Rebuilding
the Social Life of the Kikuyu,” \textit{African Affairs} 56, no. 225 (October 1957): 280.
\textsuperscript{210} Daniel Branch, \textit{Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and
Home Guard and the Tribal Police, villagisation allowed these security forces to transition from a merely defensive role to playing a role in major offensive patrolling along the forest fringe.\(^{213}\) In turn, this allowed General Erskine to hand over security tasks in the Reserves to these forces and to concentrate the military efforts in the forests. Besides forcing an exodus to the forest, the great military benefit of villagisation was in its contribution to cutting off the supplies of the remaining groups in the forest. Until early 1954 the majority of supplies were funnelled to Mau Mau forces through Nairobi. Operation Anvil dismantled and disrupted these distribution networks. Denying the Mau Mau fighters alternative sources of supply was crucial to wearing down their resistance. Herein lies the importance of the villagisation program in the post-Operation Anvil period.

Besides extending greater administration and control into the reserve, the utmost value in villagisation for the administration was in land consolidation - the Swynnerton Plan. Instead of granting the Africans new or additional lands, the long established practice in Kenya had been to educate them on better farming practices and soil management. This last aspect led to numerous soil conservation programs, including terracing, that were recurrently subjects of great discontent.\(^{214}\) Up to 1953 the land holdings of the individual Kikuyu tended to be a patchwork of small, dispersed plots that the administration assumed could not be effectively worked. In late 1953, the deputy director of the department of agriculture was directed to develop a plan to facilitate land


consolidation in the reserves in the hope of improving agricultural prospects.\textsuperscript{215} The Swynnerton Plan’s implementation proceeded apace with villagisation. Land reform in the context of the Kenyan insurgency implied a future agricultural benefit for some individuals but did not improve the lot of the majority of the Kikuyu.\textsuperscript{216} Continued residence in the permanent villages was conditional on an individual’s land holding after consolidation. Those with less than three acres and landless workers were expected to remain in the villages.\textsuperscript{217} Though satisfying a long denied aspiration of the administration, it was not truly an effective counterinsurgency tool as consolidation largely benefited those already swayed to the administration’s side.\textsuperscript{218}

The villagisation program was rapidly implemented once authorized by the War Council. Though those districts implementing it later could benefit from the earlier trials in other districts each location had its own challenges. For instance, the population density in Kiambu made its implementation there very difficult.\textsuperscript{219} The small pilot scheme in 12 locations in Nyeri at the beginning of 1954 expanded to over 140 complete and 80 under construction of a targeted 320 villages by the end of July.\textsuperscript{220} By early 1955 over 600,000 Africans had been moved and over a million would be resettled by the end of the year. Temporary villages were rapidly constructed and then dismantled as larger

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215} While it is inferred that the plan was hastily prepared, it was based on a long standing desire within the Kenyan administration to conduct consolidation. See Comas Ochieng, “Development through Positive Deviance and its Implication for Economic Policy Making and Public Administration in Africa: The Case of Kenyan Agricultural Development, 1930-2005,” \textit{World Development} 35 (2007): 454-479.
\item \textsuperscript{216} For a description of the local process of consolidation see Elspeth Huxley, \textit{A New Earth: An Experiment in Colonialism} (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), 238-240 or Greet Kershaw, \textit{Mau Mau from Below} (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997), Appendix X.
\item \textsuperscript{217} For details of the structural layout of the acreages after consolidation see G.J.W. Pedraza, “Land Consolidation in the Kikuyu Areas of Kenya,” \textit{Journal of African Administration} 8, no.2 (April 1956), 85.
\item \textsuperscript{218} There was more than a little dissatisfaction amongst the resettled for both the harsh conditions and the violations of cultural norms in the protective villages. See Felistas Njoki Osotsi, “Interpreting Participation in Resistance: Memories of the Mau Mau War” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2011), 185-245.
\item \textsuperscript{220} U.K., \textit{Parliamentary Debates}, Commons, 5th series, Vol. 537, 23 February 1955, 151.
\end{itemize}
and more carefully planned permanent ones were built. By 1960 in Kiambu District there were 110 permanent villages against 292 temporary ones.\textsuperscript{221} The conversion of villages continued into the 1960s and the techniques of villagisation would again be used by the post-independence Kenyan regime during the Shifta Conflict later that decade.\textsuperscript{222}

The long-term strategic benefits from villagisation were partially realized. The lofty goals of improvements in social services, education, and health only accrued to a limited number of Kikuyu. While land consolidation may have satisfied loyalists, it excluded large numbers of people and not just those who were or were suspected of being associated with Mau Mau. Former squatters, the \textit{ahoi} (renters), and the dispossessed received few benefits from consolidation or villagisation. With little access to land or prospects of obtaining plots locally their land hunger remained unsatisfied. Land hunger was the long unrecognized cause of Kikuyu discontent and arguably the Mau Mau revolt itself. As security conditions improved in the late 1950s, many left the villages, re-squatted in the White Highlands and waited for Kenyan independence hoping to secure a stake in a farm then. Villagisation did contribute to the smothering of the Mau Mau insurrection but village life did not become the norm for numerous individuals. The “ideal villages” had become permanent but few of wealth and power had to live there.\textsuperscript{223}

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\textsuperscript{223} Huxley, \textit{New Earth}, 238. Huxley infers, “Some changes were irreversible: the villages for instance remained.” In 1960 this was likely an early prediction that had not yet weathered the numerous land settlement schemes that were launched in the period.
\end{flushright}
Landlessness remained a troublesome issue leading up to independence and had to be addressed through a variety of land-granting programs.\textsuperscript{224}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

In each of the five case studies presented here resettlement was legitimized by common bureaucratic practices, military legal constructs, or civil emergency regulations. The immediate care and long-term benefits for the occupants of resettlement camps were related to the imposing authorities’ immediate operational objectives and their long-term strategic post-conflict goals. The ultimate objective of the resettlement programs was to separate a designated population from others, typically the insurgents themselves.

Though primarily concerned with resource denial, resettlement served other purposes. In the end, resettlement was an aid to ending each of the conflicts considered.

Resettlement in each of the case studies presented here was legitimized under particular legal constructs and practices. In western Canada the alienation of Amerindian land and the formation of reserves drew on precedents from eastern Canada. In the Philippines the re-assertion of General Order 100 included the authority to concentrate the population. The Boer refugee camps in the South Africa War were formed due to military necessity under the construct of martial law. In both Malaya and Kenya, resettlement was conducted under the sweeping authority of the emergency regulations.

The permanence of the camps was related to the long-term objectives of the counterinsurgent. In Canada, Amerindian reserves continue to exist to this day though

many mis-steps occurred in the transitioning of the prairie tribes to an agricultural way of life. In the Philippines the camps were closed immediately upon the termination of the campaign though reconcentration remained a common practice of the civil authorities. In South Africa the camps were meant to be only short term holding facilities and were kept open for approximately a year after the cessation of hostilities to aid in the repatriation of the surrendered Boers. In both Malaya and Kenya the new villages were expected to contribute to a reconfigured national life. In Malaya many of the New Villages remain today, but in Kenya many disappeared as land-hunger drew the occupants elsewhere.

Resettlement served as a separating device. Resettlement for the prairie tribes sought to achieve several objectives: to disperse and separate bands for better control and security; to establish a focal point for individual bands to adopt agriculture; and to protect Amerindians from the intrusion of unscrupulous whites. Similar social goods were planned elsewhere too. These ranged from the education programs in the Boer refugee camps, to the general provision of social services in Kenya and Malaya, to the integration of the Chinese squatters into the Malayan polity through the mechanism of the New Villages. Other than the Canadian case, the ultimate objective of resettlement was to deny resources to the insurgent as part of a general strategy of attrition.

Resettlement first became a tentative response to complex insurgencies in the late Nineteenth Century and then became a standard response of bureaucracies, both civil and military, after World War II. This technique was applied once other attempts to subdue an insurgency had faltered or proven insufficient. Resettlement was an escalatory measure that usually reflected a turn towards harsher and more repressive measures. To effectively contribute to the systematic defeat of the insurgent, resettlement had to
combined with other measures. Resettlement was underpinned by the movement control processes described in the previous chapter and provided the structure that enabled the use of food control measures that are described in the following chapter.
Chapter 6

Food Control in Small Wars

An army marches on its stomach.

- Napoleon

It is an incontrovertible fact that the success of a campaign depends almost entirely upon the feeding of the soldier during the operations of war, the conservation of his health, his condition, and his ability to march long distances and to bear fatigue without deterioration.

- Nathaniel Yorke-Davies

Armed forces cannot exist without food. There is therefore a dual aspect to food and fighting. An armed force must secure enough food to feed itself while at the same time it must deny this necessity to its opponent. With a secure food supply a military force can concentrate on its prime missions. Military histories and memoirs are replete with tales of rations: their purchase and procurement; their quantity and quality; and their texture and taste. Adequate food supply depends on a functioning supply chain that stretches from producers through a transportation and distribution network to the final consumer, the soldiers. Denying food by disrupting an opponent’s supply chain is important in war. Starving an opponent into submission, whether through blockade or siege, is an ancient practice. Warfare is not solely about food, but for insurgents their supply chain may be an enormous weakness that can become key to their defeat. This chapter examines the importance of food control mechanisms in determining the outcome of small wars.

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Denying food to guerrilla forces may seem simple, but it is a complex task closely related to the overall local availability of food. Availability is affected by a number of factors including agricultural practices (the nature, intensity and type of farming practiced), the carrying capacity of the land (the size of the crop that can be produced), the normal use of any surpluses that are created, and the vagaries of the environment (temperature fluctuations, rainfall, duration and number of growing seasons). Access to food for the guerrilla is thus directly linked to what is immediately and locally available, but what is available through internal and external distribution networks also plays a role. Availability is affected by the sophistication of these networks and, more importantly, by who controls them.\(^2\) The use of food may also be constrained by local cultural dynamics. What food is grown and harvested depends on how a particular society functions and its cultural norms with respect to eating. Taboos may restrict food usages beyond those imposed by the counterinsurgent.\(^3\) Societies may have traditional coping mechanisms for addressing famine that will be activated when the counterinsurgent imposes food restrictions. Thus denying food supplies to a guerrilla opponent requires careful planning and application combined with a good understanding of the relative cultural dynamics.

What exactly constitutes food control? For the purposes of this study it is those deliberate measures taken by authorities to systematically regulate access to food for their own forces and to deny the same to their opponents. Food control for one’s own forces involves the regulation and control of the stockpiling, movement, and distribution of food

\(^2\) For a brief overview of the food structure see George Gumerman IV, “Food and Complex Societies,” *Journal of Archaeological Method and Research* 4, no.2 (June 1997): 105-139.

to ensure that one’s troops are adequately supplied. Food control within the civil domain ensures that there is fair and equitable access and sharing of the food resources available to those whom authorities feel responsible to feed. Pragmatically, the quantity of food available may be limited to ensure that opponents cannot exploit any unintended surpluses. The removal or destruction of food supplies, particularly in harsh environments, has been a staple of counter-guerrilla operations for centuries. Food denial strategies extend from generally blunt scorched earth techniques to the much more sophisticated control techniques practiced in the counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950s. Most food denial strategies hinge on a cost benefit model that supposes that in denying the guerrillas resources their ability to fight is constrained and thereby diminished. This study focuses primarily on the denial aspect of food control measures.

Food denial measures have the greatest effect when applied comprehensively. These techniques become a major factor in campaigns only when systematized on a large scale or intensely applied in a controlled region. There are two main approaches. The first, long practiced, is highly coercive. Scorched earth is a military strategy where anything useful to an enemy is destroyed. It was used by the Romans against Carthage, by the Spanish and Russians against Napoleon, and by General Sherman in the American Civil War during his March to the Sea. In this strategy the torch is applied widely, liberally, and thoroughly. The second approach employs more sophisticated food control measures usually combining a mixture of coercive and persuasive techniques in a systemic fashion. Borrowing from the wide experience with ration control regimes in World War II, it appeared in many of the counterinsurgency campaigns in the 1950s. It

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4 For the baseline study of this approach see Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970).
included government combined planning committees that integrated the efforts of all forces and agencies within an operational theatre to deny food to their guerrilla opponents. Food control measures include techniques as diverse as communal cooking, strict rationing, movement restrictions, and checkpoint inspections.

There are two issues that merit close attention when considering the historiography of food control. First, there is very little written specifically about food control and its ultimate effect. When armies lived off the land, perhaps countering their advance with a scorched earth strategy was so obvious that it was rarely written about. For armies that are self-supporting and, especially, for guerrilla forces, the practices that are useful in denying them food supplies have rarely been elaborated. A number of works have appeared on specific commodities in the last few years and even some on hunger in general, but they are not narrow enough to assist in the analysis of the case studies presented here. Volumes on food control were published after both World Wars. They, however, focus either on the procurement or distribution of food supplies by the western allies or on the blockade of Germany. Neither category explores the intricacies of food denial in counterinsurgency. There are obscure references that address the suitability and composition of rations for fighting armies. They provided some background as to how troops were fed and what civilians could expect to be allotted, but, again, they do not address the utility or power of food denial measures in small wars.


The second issue of concern in the historiography relates to a perception of an entitlement to food. The feeding requirement for soldiers was often examined, yet the daily ration provided stayed relatively constant throughout most of the nineteenth century. Only in the early twentieth century was the nutritional content of the rations considered. Rationing spurred more heated discussion where the authorities assumed the responsibility to provide subsistence to select groups other than the fighting men. Some of this debate is couched in modern perspectives of entitlement and often assumes a perfection in the availability and distribution of supplies that did not exist at the time.\(^7\) This distortion of entitlement and presumed availability is especially evident in works on the Plains Cree and the concentration camps of the South African War.\(^8\) Often the narratives contain a sense of offence that individuals were not freely fed without consideration of the extant conditions and discounting the agency available to the same individuals; that is, they were not simply acted upon, they could act themselves. The interplay of entitlement and food control plays a different but important role in the 1950s case studies. Arguably, one must feed those considered politically significant, but there are notable variances in the policies and programs between Malaya and Kenya. This

\(^7\) Report of the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police, 1876, in Opening up the West: Being the Official Reports to Parliament of the Activities of the Royal North-West Mounted Police Force from 1874-1881 (1874 to 1881; repr., Toronto: Coles Publishing Co., 1973), 23. Frederick White reported, “In consequence of the demands of the United States cavalry in the Territories of Montana, and the ravages of the grasshopper, the larger portion of the oats required in the past year for the Mounted Police had to be transported from 1,500 to 2,000 miles to police posts in the North-West.” Food was not always as easily or readily available as some modern scholars contend.

\(^8\) See Theresa Gowanlock and Theresa Delaney, Two Months in the Camp of Big Bear (Parkdale: Times Office, 1885), 100. The authors note, “Many an English, Scotch or Irish farmer, when he comes poor to Canada and strives to take a little farm for himself, if he had only one half of the advantages that the government affords the Indians, he would consider his fortune made. They need never want for food. Their rations are regularly dealt out to them and they are paid to cultivate and clear their own land. They work for themselves and are, moreover, paid to do so – and should a crop fail they are certain of food, anyway. I ask if a man could reasonably expect more?”
undercurrent of perceived entitlement must be kept fully in view when examining the case studies.

The case studies reveal several key features of food control. First, given the elusiveness of the guerrilla, food control is the ultimate technique for suppressing an insurgency. A guerrilla force can be forced to capitulate if denied sufficient food over time. Even so, food control must be used in combination with other measures and not in isolation. Second, food control must be detailed and systematic to be effective. Guerrillas will have coping mechanisms to address food shortages, and there will always be some food leakages in the system that may be sufficient to sustain them. Food control measures must be applied extensively and strictly at the micro level (the individual and the community) to achieve strategic effect. Third, food control measures are both persuasive and coercive. They can encourage fence-sitters and the threatened to turn to the government’s side while at the same time starving holdouts into submission. Finally, food control measures have matured over time. By the 1950s, bluntly applied scorched earth techniques were replaced by carefully planned, integrated and executed food control measures. This refinement in method could only be undertaken with more sophisticated command and control structures.

**North-West Rebellion**

Securing food in the North-West was troublesome in the 1870s and the 1880s. When the buffalo had thundered across the plains, there had been a convenient larder to hand. As their numbers dwindled other sources of food became increasingly important to the Amerindians, but the natural alternatives in the North-West, whether fish, game or
plant, were insufficient substitutes.\textsuperscript{9} Farming had yet to be extensively developed within the region.\textsuperscript{10} What farming there was suffered from the multiple hazards of nature that included locusts, late and early frosts, and frequent hailstorms amongst others. While local gardens were often maintained, there was little agricultural surplus to be shared. These difficulties were complicated because the transportation network was immature. Métis freighters in their Red River carts plied the lengthy trails from Winnipeg westwards to Edmonton and elsewhere, but this was a slow and limited supply chain.\textsuperscript{11} The Canadian Pacific Railway was being pushed across the prairies but as late as 1885 was not fully complete. Extra food supplies, thus, could not be readily or quickly obtained. Food remained very much a hand-to-mouth affair for most if not all of the inhabitants of the North-West.

Amerindian cultures on the prairies, especially those of the Blackfeet and the Plains Cree, were centred on the buffalo. They used most parts of the buffalo for some purpose: bones served as scrapers and knives; sinew served as rope; and hides served as clothing, shelter and an article of trade. The plains tribes drew the majority of their sustenance from the buffalo. They hunted the buffalo by a variety of methods including the jump, pounds, and the dangerous but simple mounted chase across the open prairie. The buffalo herds concentrated in the summer and then dispersed into river bottoms and

\textsuperscript{9} Noel Dyck, “The Administration of Federal Indian Aid in the North-West Territories, 1879 -1885” (master’s thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1970), 124. When the tribes concentrated on other food sources they rapidly depleted them. Dyck relates that in 1879 the Blackfeet for “the first time have hunted antelope and nearly killed them all off.”


\textsuperscript{11} As R.C. Russell describes them, “The Red River cart ...was a two-wheeled vehicle of wood. No metal was used in its construction ...The cart had a pair of shafts between which to place the ox or pony that was to haul it, and rectangular rack with a floor of planking was balanced on the axle.” The axle was greased to easy the rotation of the wheels but the squeaking of the carts could be heard at great distance. For details on the Metis carting practices along the prairie trails see R.C. Russell, \textit{The Carlton Trail} (Saskatoon: Prairie Books, 1971).
tree lines in the winter and the hunting patterns varied with these seasonal migrations.¹² Hunters chose their targets selectively, their preference being the fattest animals that were typically the cows in the early fall.¹³ A fair degree of organization and discipline were required to control a hunt. Following any successful hunt, the carcasses were butchered and then there was an immediate feast. The bulk of the meat would be preserved by cutting it into strips and drying it. This made it easier to transport and to convert into pemmican.¹⁴ The Amerindians, through their actions and cultural preferences, played a part in the eventual decimation of the buffalo.

The journals of the early explorers of the West describe herds of buffalo covering the plains but by the 1870s their numbers were already diminishing. The primary catalyst of this ecological disaster, this killing-off, was the unregulated trade in buffalo hides that developed in the American west.¹⁵ This hide-rush was encouraged by the U.S. Army to assist in subduing their western tribes.¹⁶ The Amerindians participated in the hide trade and their preference for the fatter cows harmed the species’ capability to regenerate

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¹² For the Cree use of the buffalo and other food sources see David G. Mandelbaum, *The Plains Cree: An Ethnographic, Historical, and Comparative Study* (1979; repr., Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2001), 51–60 and 68–79.

¹³ For an overview see Jack W. Brink, *Imaginaing Head-Smashed-In: Aboriginal Buffalo Hunting on the Northern Plains* (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2008), 27–70.

¹⁴ Ibid., 168-178.

¹⁵ Hugh A. Dempsey, *Big Bear: The End of Freedom* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 64. Dempsey estimates that over 160,000 buffalo a year were being slaughtered on the Canadian plains. He asserts, “neither the government in Ottawa nor the North-West Territories Council was prepared to implement and enforce hunting restrictions. The North-West Territories Council did impose a hunting ban for buffalo in 1877 but it was subsequently repealed the following year based on petitions from Métis hunters. See Government of the North-West Territories, *Journals of the Council of the North-West Territories of Canada. Session of 1877, 6; and Session of 1878, 6 and 27. Ordinance No. 5 of 1877 initiated “An ordinance for the protection of the Buffalo,” was repealed by No. 3 of 1878 passed on 2nd August 1878. See also Alexander Morris, *The Treaties of Canada with the Indians* (1880; repr., Toronto: Prospero, 2000), 194-195. Dempsey is somewhat mistaken.

¹⁶ John R. Crook, *The Border and the Buffalo: An Untold Story of the Southwest Plains* (Topeka: Crane, 1907), 113. General Phil Sheridan considered the buffalo hunters were destroying the Indians commissary. He expounded, “let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffalo are exterminated.”
itself. The Canadian plains tribes were forced to shift their hunting territories as the herds became more elusive. Any herd spotted heading north prompted bands to rapidly decamp to intercept it. After the Battle of Little Big Horn, a large number of the Sioux fled into Canada. Their large encampments in the Cypress Hills blocked the movement of the remaining buffalo herds into Canadian territory. The closest buffalo to Canada were those found along the Milk River across the border from Fort Walsh and Fort Macleod. Many of the Plains Cree and other bands wintered on the Milk River and summered in the Cypress Hills near Fort Walsh in these final years of buffalo hunting. When the U.S. Army evicted all Canadian Amerindians and Métis in the spring of 1882, this option was closed to them. The prospects for securing food for the future were bleak for these last bands that had remained wedded to their old ways of life.

The Canadian government recognized that it had to address the disappearance of the buffalo during the negotiation of Treaties 4, 6, and 7. Three basic policies were pursued. First, up until 1882 the government encouraged the continuation of the hunt. There was no altruistic motive behind this other than that self-sufficient Amerindians meant fewer mouths to feed. Second, reservations were established. On the reserves the

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17 For the Canadian Amerindians part in the hunt see William Dobak, “Killing the Canadian Buffalo, 1821 – 1881,” The Western Historical Quarterly 27, no.1 (Spring 1996): 33-52. For a more general overview of the destruction of the buffalo see Andrew C. Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For the hunting preferences see Brink, Imagining Head-Smashed-In.
19 Report of the Commissioner North-West Mounted Police 1880, in Opening up the West, 30. See report of Superintendent Crozier on his experiences at Fort Walsh. It was the norm for the NWMP to be issuing rations to over 500 Amerindians. When others returned starving from the Milk River area at one point the NWMP were feeding over 5,000.
21 Ibid., 44-45.
Amerindians would be taught how to farm and were expected to become self-sufficient in a few years.\textsuperscript{22} The new economic way of life envisioned for the tribes was to be sedentary agriculture. Third, the government realized the necessity of feeding the needy or destitute when the other options failed.\textsuperscript{23}

Farming developed only slowly amongst the Amerindians before 1885. Many of the Amerindians’ difficulties on the reserves were described in the previous chapter. After Edgar Dewdney was appointed as Indian Commissioner in 1880, he moved quickly to resolve most of the initial missteps: farm instructors were provided; the quantity and quality of livestock was improved; better implements were provided; and grist mills were established. Several of the problems in establishing their farms though were of the Amerindians’ own making. For instance, some chiefs only accepted their reserves late in the year, and that left the ground ill-prepared for spring planting. Similarly, bands were frequently absent from their reserves during the crucial spring planting season.\textsuperscript{24}

Elsewhere, crops were initially inadequately fenced and subsequently destroyed by

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{22} Morris, \textit{The Treaties of Canada}, 178. During the treaty negotiation the food question did arise. It “was disposed of by a promise, that in the event of a National famine or pestilence such aid as the Crown saw fit would be extended to them, and that for three years after they settled on reserves provisions to the extent of $1,000 per annum would be granted them at seed-time.” Note that this money was only “for the use of such of the bands as are actually settled on the reserves and engaged in cultivating the soil.”
\item\textsuperscript{23} Robert Talbot, “Alexander Morris: His Intellectual and Political Life and the Numbered Treaties” (master’s thesis, University of Ottawa, 2007), 214 and 218. Alexander Morris who negotiated most of the numbered treaties saw giving support to the Amerindians as they strove for self-sufficiency as important. The Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Lawrence Vankoughnet, was much less enthusiastic, especially with the famine clause in Treaty 6. Morris, \textit{The Treaties of Canada}, 227. At Carleton Morris reiterated the general approach when he told the assembled chiefs, “I will speak to you in regards to food as I have spoken to other Indians; we cannot support or feed the Indians every day, further than to help them find the means of doing it themselves by cultivating the soil. If you were to be regularly fed some of you would do nothing at all for your own support; in this matter we will do as we have agreed with other Indians, and no more.”
\item\textsuperscript{24} This could include poorly choosing the time to make treaty payments. See \textit{Sessional Papers, 1880}, Paper No. 4, “Annual Report for the Department of the Interior for the Year ending 30th June, 1879.” 83. See also \textit{Sessional Papers, 1882}, Paper No. 6, 38. Poundmaker and other chief left their reserves in the early spring of 1881 but the Indian Agent, Hayter Reed, had their field planted by those that had remained behind. Dewdney reported, “when those who had left dissatisfied in the spring returned after having travelled as far as Fort Walsh, suffering great misery on the road, they found to their joy that they were the possessors of good fields of grain and vegetables.”
\end{enumerate}
wandering cattle. Agricultural efforts also suffered when groups returning from the plains discouraged those who had tried their hands at farming. Those who were truly committed to the new life style made progress but weather played a significant and fickle role in annually determining success or failure. For example, an early frost in the fall of 1884 destroyed much of that year’s crop, but Dewdney and his staff having seen the immense preparation and efforts undertaken by so many bands during 1884 predicted that 1885 would be a year full of promise.

Prior to the Rebellion the Canadian government supplied food to the Amerindians in three circumstances. First, rations were provided during annuity payments. These events became a new social gathering on the plains, and the Amerindians were fed while present and provided provisions for their homeward journeys. Elsewhere, the bands concentrated near Fort Walsh and begged “for food to take them to the buffalo” so they could set off for their fall hunts. While it would have been better to pay the annuities on the reserve to avoid having to feed the recipients and removing them from the reserves during the harvest period, this did not become the general policy until after the Rebellion. Second, rations were distributed to those taking up agriculture, a key provision of Treaty 6. The hope that this requirement would only last for two to three years proved unrealistic as Amerindian farming only progressed slowly. Finally, rations were provided to the destitute. In part, Dewdney’s appointment was based on the government’s concern with starvation amongst the western tribes. Even so, rations were

26 Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 303. The per diem allowance was said to be 13.5 oz (383 grams) of flour, 3.5 oz (99 grams) of bacon, and 6 oz (170 gram) of beef according to Dickason.
only provided to those who it could be verified had “taken treaty.” Destitution arose due to the failure of the hunt, failure of the crops and other unforeseen circumstances. Feeding the destitute remained a considerable expense throughout this period.\textsuperscript{28}

The government distributed food based on its cultural perceptions of who should be entitled to food and how it should be consumed. For the Amerindians, as Dewdney noted, “it is a peculiarity of their race …to care little for the morrow if the day satisfies their wants.”\textsuperscript{29} They lived for the day with either feast or famine their common condition. When food was available it was consumed prodigiously as there was always an expectation that more would soon be available.\textsuperscript{30} Those immediately involved with feeding the Amerindians recount two common occurrence: food for multiple days would be consumed in much shorter intervals; and then despite this over-consumption the Amerindians would just simply ask for more.\textsuperscript{31} As a consequence, rations were normally issued only on a daily basis. Similarly, the police patrols that accompanied the bands departing Fort Walsh for their northern reserves in 1882 were there less for general security then to protect the ration wagon.\textsuperscript{32} While accepting the responsibility of feeding

\textsuperscript{28} Sessional Papers, 1880, Paper No. 4, 100. Dewdney noted, “No one can at once force an Indian to take hold of the plough and keep steady at work.” For the winter of 1879 the Indian Department had 700 tons of provisions on hand but Dewdney estimated if it was necessary to feed “three-fourths of our Indians, this would not have lasted a month.” He concluded, “the necessity is that by some means or other very large supplies must be raised in the interior of the North-West, and thus prevent the complications that inevitably follow, either starvation or Indian wars, or such an expenditure for Indian supplies as would cripple our Government.”

\textsuperscript{29} Sessional Papers, 1886, Paper No. 4, 141.

\textsuperscript{30} Sessional Papers, 1881, Paper No. 14, 79. For instance Dewdney reported that Indians could not store seed as, “Heretofore they had no means of storing it except in their lodges, and when it was constantly in sight they could not refrain from giving it away or eating it.”

\textsuperscript{31} Sessional Papers, 1886, Paper No. 4, 145. Dewdney concludes his annual report as Indian Commissioner by elaborating the ration policy. He considers the $454,000 required in 1885 as well spent and estimates it could have been as high as $1,329,507. Concluding Dewdney states, “even if the above were carried out our Indians would not be satisfied, but would constantly be demanding more food, clothing, tea and tobacco.”

\textsuperscript{32} See Sam Steele, Forty Years in Canada (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1915), 154. Many chiefs were notorious for promising to carry out actions in return for rations and then going back on their promises – false compliance in some of the Orwellian language of the literature. Big Bear commonly did this as did
those considered wards of the state, the government did not wish to provide rations for free to the able-bodied. It was part of a widespread Victorian-era belief that this would merely promote laziness and bad practices. So, on the reserves the able-bodied had to work for their food and on many reserves this encouraged the breaking of more acreage, the taking of freighting jobs, and the cutting of firewood and fence rails. 33 Where agriculture progressed rations were provided. The young, sick and the elderly were exempt from this provision but in at least one instance, the government intervened where a chief was not distributing rations equitably. 34 Rations for work and the crops raised through their own farming pursuits presented food alternatives to prairie tribes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1882</th>
<th>1883</th>
<th>1884</th>
<th>1885</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Annuitities</td>
<td>$164,984</td>
<td>$123,060</td>
<td>$115,167</td>
<td>$169,406</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total in North-West</td>
<td>$222,097</td>
<td>$184,169</td>
<td>$170,749</td>
<td>$162,013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annuity Provision</td>
<td>$34,775</td>
<td>$40,265</td>
<td>$36,768</td>
<td>$16,201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total in North-West</td>
<td>$44,814</td>
<td>$50,817</td>
<td>$48,269</td>
<td>$26,216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funds for Destitute</td>
<td>$558,927</td>
<td>$479,377</td>
<td>$498,066</td>
<td>$443,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in North-West</td>
<td>$563,151</td>
<td>$480,163</td>
<td>$499,325</td>
<td>$478,038</td>
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<tr>
<td>North-West Amerindian Budget</td>
<td>$1,099,796</td>
<td>$1,027,216</td>
<td>$1,045,847</td>
<td>$1,008,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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% Spent on Provision in Treaty 4, 6 and 7

Table 3 - Some of the Funds Spent in Treaty Areas 4, 6 and 7
Source: Department of Indian Affairs Annual Reports in Canadian Sessional Papers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Treaty 4</th>
<th>Treaty 6</th>
<th>Treaty 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>$11,027</td>
<td>$167,438</td>
<td>$16,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>$27,302</td>
<td>$89,205</td>
<td>$11,046</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>$7,372</td>
<td>$79,722</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>$4,038</td>
<td>$58,473</td>
<td>$10,166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 - Treaties and Funding for Provisions and Destitution
Source: Department of Indian Affairs Annual Reports in Canadian Sessional Papers.

Piapot. See Dempsey, Big Bear, 115 and 118. See also Sessional Papers, 1884, Paper No. 4, 98. Dewdney laments, “The large sum expended last year in assisting Indians to remove to their reserves was, to a great extent, thrown away, the greater number of them having returned to Fort Walsh, where they had become accustomed to be fed without work, and where they had been bribed by the traders to remain and receive their payments.”

33 Sessional Papers, 1881, Paper No.14, 101 and 104. This policy was used as early as the winter of 1879.

34 Sessional Papers, 1885, Paper No. 3, ix. See the incident at Crooked Lakes Reserve where, “the aged Indians received but a comparatively small share of the supplies.”
When the Rebellion erupted the government immediately responded with food control measures. The Department of Indian Affairs was well practiced in reducing and limiting access to food as restricting the availability of rations had been used to push Sitting Bull into returning to the United States and to coax Canadian bands out of the Cypress Hills.  

This technique was not used in the spring of 1885. “Feed them or fight them” had long informed government practice, and the government chose feeding. There was a considerable loosening of the ration regime in order to retain the loyalty of the tribes with bands being fed with little or no restrictions. This mirrored the policy adopted for Big Bear’s band over the winter of 1884 where the Indian agent at Frog Lake had been given instructions to issue them whatever they needed. When the Rebellion began Dewdney extended this policy across the West as he tried to prevent the Amerindians, particularly the Blackfeet in the Treaty 7 area, from joining the uprising due to a lack of food.

The Rebellion, surprisingly, did not have an adverse influence on the access to food by Amerindians either in the short or medium term. In the short term the Amerindians harmed their own supplies. Spring planting did not occur because bands participated in the conflict or fled their reserves for safety. A large number of farm implements were destroyed and their replacement took time and money, a fact bemoaned by the administration. Many bands only resumed agriculture late in the growing season

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35 Lamour, “Edgar Dewdney, Indian Commissioner,” 16. Dewdney had also used the denial of rations in 1879 to get the Blackfeet and Cree to leave the Calgary area due to the expense of beef there.
37 Dempsey, Big Bear, 141.
38 W.A. Griesbach, I Remember (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1946), 82-83.
39 Sessional Papers, 1886. Paper No. 4, 70. The expenses are mentioned in Indian Agent J.M Rae’s report on the Battleford Agency.
which restricted the potential yield of their crops. In the medium term, the government chose to pursue a policy that it hoped would minimize bitterness in the aftermath of the conflict and feeding for those undertaking agriculture and for the destitute was continued.\(^{40}\) The Indian Department was well placed to respond to such demands as it had stockpiled food for the winter of 1884 when frost had ruined much of the harvest.\(^{41}\) Shortly after the start of the Rebellion, it had moved to secure additional food supplies as it recognized the harm the Rebellion would have on the agricultural season. Finally, the Department of Indian Affairs supplemented its reserves by acquiring the supplies left behind by the North-West Field Force.\(^{42}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Amerindians</th>
<th>Destitute Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,913</td>
<td>$ 58,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,539</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6,495</td>
<td>$ 384,473</td>
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<td>1887</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>$ 48,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,738</td>
<td>$175,380</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5,222</td>
<td>$259,136</td>
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<td>1888</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>$ 53,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>$105,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td>$200,617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - Annuities Withheld in the Treaty 6 Area after the Rebellion
Source: Department of Indian Affairs Annual Reports in Canadian Sessional Papers.

Table 6 - Distribution of Funds for the Destitute after the Rebellion
Source: Department of Indian Affairs Annual Reports in Canadian Sessional Papers.

\(^{40}\) See Table 5.4 below and Jean Larmour, “Edgar Dewdney and the Aftermath of the Rebellion,” Saskatchewan History 23, no.3 (Autumn 1970): 109.

\(^{41}\) Sessional Papers, 1886, Paper No. 4, xi.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 139 – 143. The Indian Department made extensive efforts to ensure it was no longer made to accept “inferior staple supplies in remote districts,” and “to guard against the starvation of Indians or a cessation of their work.”
Many of the policies that existed before the Rebellion were continued afterwards. The administration pursued its all-consuming goal of making the Amerindians self-sufficient in agriculture. The annual reports of the Department of Indian Affairs throughout the late 1880s and early 1890s track the progress of agriculture on each individual reserve in minute detail. The restrictions placed on the Amerindians in the aftermath of the Rebellion were not terribly severe. Though annuity payments were withheld in the Treaty 6 area for a number of years to pay for losses during the Rebellion, rations continued to be supplied to those who were farming and those who were destitute. Food was used during the Rebellion to assure loyalty. Afterwards the government continued to seek ways to increase its availability.

**Philippine-American War**

It is an inevitable consequence of war that the innocent must generally suffer with the guilty. Military necessity frequently precludes the possibility of making discriminations. It is necessary to end the war for the good of all, and therefore impossible to wage war efficiently and at the same time do abstract justice.

Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell

In much of the modern literature on the Philippine-American War there are inferences that scorched earth techniques were liberally applied, but this is overstatement.

43 Count de Bouthillier-Chavigny, *Our Land of Promise: A Run Through the Canadian North-West* (Montreal: The Gazette Printing Company, 1893), 74. Chavigny considered the policy as success as, “In 1881, the 20,900 Indians scattered through Manitoba and the Territories cultivated hardly 3,000 acres of land; they possessed about 5,000 head of cattle and employed about 12,000 agricultural implements. In 1889, in the same regions, the Indian population had risen to 24,522 souls. It had cultivated 12,067 acres of land, possessed a little more than 13,000 animals and employed 33,516 agricultural implements.”

44 The expenses for the Department of Indian Affairs were never well understood. The opposition in many case considered the expenditures on the Amerindians as excessive. See Canada, Parliament, *Debates of the Senate*, 5th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 2, (1885), 791-810. For a detailed study into food availability in the North-West see Canada, Parliament, Senate, *Report and Minutes of Evidence of the Select Committee of the Senate on the Existing Natural Food Products of the North-West, and the Best Means of Conserving and Increasing Them* (Ottawa: MacLean, Rogers and Co., 1887).

and does not reflect the actual preferences of the U.S. military. Given the choice between fire and sword, the military most often chose the sword and even more frequently conciliation. For most of the first two years of the conflict, plainly recognizing the hazards of simply using coercion to govern, the U.S. military sought to carry out the policy of attraction, President McKinley’s benevolent assimilation policy. The military established schools, improved hygienic conditions in urban areas, constructed a functional transportation network, and organized municipal governments.\(^46\) Purely military action focussed on recovering weapons and scouting (patrolling). The Americans sought the capture or surrender of all of the estimated 40,000 firearms that were in Filipino hands at the start of the conflict.\(^47\) The first American thrusts of the campaign, northward from Manila in 1899, were directed towards where the bulk of Filipino armaments were expected to be.\(^48\) Military operational reports and summaries were punctuated with the totals of arms captured and surrendered.\(^49\) Eventually, to encourage further surrenders the Americans promised either a thirty peso reward or the release of up to two prisoners when a working rifle was turned in to the military.\(^50\)


\(^{47}\) James H. Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912* (New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1913), 142. An estimate from 29 August 1898 placed the number of guns in the hands of the Filipinos at 40,000: 12,500 – captured from the Spanish militia, 2,500 – from the Cavite arsenal, 2,000 – from American merchants, 8,000 – captured from the Spanish in battle, and 15,000 – originally in the hands of the Filipinos prior to 1 May 1898.

\(^{48}\) James A. LeRoi, *The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation with an Introductory Account of Spanish Rule* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), 121. Of the 35,000 rifles estimated to be in Filipino hands in November 1899 more than 25,000 were thought to be in Luzon north of the Pasig River.

\(^{49}\) This ranges from General Wheaton’s report on the status of the Department of Northern Luzon contained in General MacArthur’s Annual Report for 1901 – total rifles captured and surrendered of 6,253; to estimates of the state of pacification by the number of rifles assumed to have been removed from Filipino hands - 23,000 by June 1901; to General Chaffee’s orders to Smith to recover the arms lost to the *insurrectos* at Balangiga.

\(^{50}\) War Department, *Annual Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, 30 June, 1900*, Part 6, Enclosure 34. Headquarters Division of the Philippines Memorandum March 1, 1901.
From the first shots of the conflict, aggressive patrolling was a constant feature of American operations. This was a highly effective tactic to “allow the guerrillas no rest or sanctuary” given the difficulty the American forces had in engaging the guerrilla due to their ability to fade into the local population, the nature of the terrain, and the *insurrectos’* warning system.\(^{51}\) Vigorous patrolling laid the sound operational framework for success in the many regional sub-campaigns of the conflict. Despite these two preferences, fires did burn through the islands as the campaign progressed and certainly during the conventional phase “smoke from burning huts marked the line of the American advance.”\(^{52}\)

After the war one observer questioned which army, Philippine or U.S., had caused more damage with fire. The Philippine Army used fire from the earliest moments. For example, as they were pushed out of Manila in late February 1899, they tried to burn the city. General Antonio Luna, the Philippine commander, exercised a scorched earth policy as his forces withdrew northwards with towns, warehouses, stockpiles, and bridges burnt to deny them to the closely following Americans.\(^{53}\) Fire was also used by the *insurrectos* during the later guerrilla phase. Here, it was most frequently employed in attempts to burn out the isolated garrisons and outposts of American troops. Nevertheless, the Philippine forces did not use burning in a systematic fashion other than in the withdrawal from Manila.

The initial use of the torch by the Americans was not systematic either. They applied it for specific reasons during their conventional offensive but haphazardly. Like

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the Filipinos, the Americans burned some buildings during the February 1899 fighting in Manila, especially those used by snipers. As the American troops pushed northwards this practiced continued with an occasional church or barrio burnt to prevent firing upon the rear of the advancing Americans. As they advanced, the Americans captured the stores and supplies of the retreating Philippine army. Here, the first destruction of large stockpiles of rice, the main food of the Filipino forces, began. This was not food control in a strict sense but principally resource denial, a common military practice of denying one’s opponents any and all supplies possible. Captured rice was not necessarily burned. At Bustos and Balinag the captured rice, amounting to over 100,000 bushels, was distributed to the needy – soon to be a common American practice. Where rice was discovered and could not be safely brought-in, like in the mountains about Bustos, it was destroyed. Otherwise, during the conventional campaign most American soldiers’ only experience with rice was in trudging across the paddy fields. Given its importance as the staple of the Filipino diets, rice soon became a centrepiece of many of the subsequent operations.

The capture and destruction of rice eventually became the focal point of food control measures in the Philippines. Rice was not an attractive item for consumption for

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54 Ibid., 9 fn 3. This burning of barrios during the advance mimicked the practices by the Spanish who would burn them as they passed to ensure they were not fired on from behind. It would be interesting to know whether there were actually shots heard in such cases or were the sounds heard merely the bursting of bamboo poles from the heat of the fires. See Edith Moses, Unofficial Letters of an Official’s Wife (New York: D. Appleton, 1908), 216. The churches in the barrios, as part of a long standing Spanish colonial practice, were designed to be the strongpoint in the defence of the local area,

55 Karl Irving Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines (San Francisco: Hicks-Judd, 1899), 217 and 218. Several hundred natives returned to the towns and immediately began begging for food. The granary of the tax collector was opened and, “its 30,000 bushels distributed, each native, man or woman, who asked, receiving as muck pilai, or unhulled rice, as he or she could carry.”

56 LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, 42 fn 2. In scouting in the hills around Bustos over 100,000 tons of rice were burned.

the American troops. Unlike the British in South Africa, the U.S. soldiers cared little for local produce. They did occasionally augment their diet with it but mostly preferred the frozen meat and canned goods provided them by their own commissary.\(^{58}\) When they stumbled on rice stockpiles in barrios or in cuartels (barracks) they either seized or destroyed them. This was not always easy as weapons or ammunition hidden within could explode from the heat of the fire, and the piles could burn for days.\(^{59}\) To sustain their operations, the Filipino forces were highly dependent on locally available resources that they obtained by heavily taxing the locals. Luckily for the insurrectos, the needs of the Filipino soldiers were simple and in the bountiful land of the Philippine Islands palay (un-husked rice which stored better) was readily available. The local guerrilla bands, therefore, did not have long or sophisticated supply lines. As Brig. Gen James F. Wade commented, “The forces of the insurrection are not kept in the field ... The majority live at home, even in and about the towns we occupy. When wanted they are warned through a system of signals and runners, and gather at night at some designated place.”\(^{60}\) Food was cached near towns and barrios to support operations. After nearly two years of fighting, the Americans began to recognize the importance of choking off the supplies from the barrios.\(^{61}\)

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 196. For comments on the U.S. subsistence department see Faust, Campaigning, 303-304 and Report of the Chief Surgeon, HQ Division of the Philippines in Military Governor in the Philippine Islands, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, U.S. Army, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, vol. 1 (Manila, 1901), 123.

\(^{59}\) John Bowe, With the 13th Minnesota in the Philippines (Minneapolis: A.B. Parnham, 1905), 124 and 127.


\(^{61}\) Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur for 1900. 61 and 63. In his annual report MacArthur noted, "Whenever, throughout the archipelago, there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact, beyond dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other word, the town, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are actual bases for insurgent military activities." MacArthur saw them as locations of supplies and refuge. He saw, “‘The skulking bands of guerrillas’...as a mere expression of the loyalty of the towns. They could not exist for a month without urban support.”
General MacArthur, father of the famous General Douglas MacArthur, may have realized the necessity for harsher measures to suppress the insurrection shortly after he took over command of the forces in the Philippines from General Otis. Though long a supporter of the practice of conciliation, it became evident to him that this practice was having little effect in ending the insurrection. Conciliation measures did not guarantee support from the population: for instance, released insurrectos re-appeared in the front lines, and municipal governments normally contained shadow structures that executed guerrilla directions.\textsuperscript{62} The failure of the policy of attraction was revealed in the months leading up to the November 1900 U.S. presidential election with the insurrectos launching numerous raids and attacks hoping to make Americans weary of their ownership of the Islands and to thereby influence the election. The implementation of any harsher measures had been deferred until after the election as it was hoped that the presidential election “would show the insurgents that their cause was hopeless, but this reasonable anticipation was not fulfilled.” Though attacks slackened and the surrender of men and arms increased after McKinley’s re-election, MacArthur worried that “conditions would become chronic” and prepared to launch a re-invigorated campaign.\textsuperscript{63} Making use of the provisions of the U.S. Civil War vintage General Order 100, MacArthur issued a proclamation on 20 December 1900 aimed squarely at disrupting supplies from the barrios to the insurrectos. MacArthur emphasized, “The practice of sending supplies to insurgent troops from places occupied by the United States, as is now


the case, must cease. If contumacious or faint-hearted persons continue to engage in this traffic, they must be prepared to answer for their actions under the penalties declared in this article.”

MacArthur imposed martial law across the Islands and explained what the citizens’ responsibilities were to the occupying power and what active civilian supporters of the insurrectos hazarded. In early 1901 the pacification of the complete archipelago began to be more vigorously pursued.

Harsher measures and denying food to the *insurrectos* characterized all ensuing regional campaigns. Barrios were burned more often with this action being justified for reasons as diverse as the discovery of caches of weapons or food, the prevention of their use by *insurrectos* as *cuartels* (barracks), or the telegraph wires had been cut nearby. Some barrios were garrisoned and then the surrounding areas constantly patrolled to harry and harass the *insurrectos*. Reconcentration was practiced (as described in the previous chapter) and intelligence networks developed to uncover the *insurrecto* infrastructure. Rice was removed or destroyed wherever it was found. From northern Luzon to the islands of Cebu, Bohol and Samar, to the provinces of Albany and Batangas in southern Luzon, the same pattern was applied. The constant attrition of the guerrillas and their resources, often combined with a great willingness of the American

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67 Scott, *Ilocano Response*, 141-144. With the control of the November 1900 rice harvest and the subsequent seizure in the first three months of substantial rice supplies combined with threats of reconcentration the northern provinces of Ilocos Sud, Ilocos Norte, La Union and Abra and were effectively pacified. See also Brian M. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District of Northern Luzon,” *Military Affairs* 51, no.2 (April 1987): 62-66.
commanders to negotiate an end to hostilities, led many *insurrectos* to abandon the struggle.

These methods were all used on Samar, an island that the Spanish had never truly conquered and with which the Americans had equal difficulty. Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young, when in command there, employed many of the same measures he had so successfully used in northern Luzon and by September 1901 considered that he had made good progress in pacifying the island. Balangiga proved Young wrong and General Smith was then sent to pacify Samar. He would become infamous for his order to turn the interior of the island into a “howling wilderness,” but Smith’s operations differed little from those used elsewhere in the Philippines at this date. He used reconcentration to bring the population back to the coastal town from whence the *insurrectos* had driven them.  

He encouraged his troops to lay waste to all things outside the protected zones: hemp stocks were destroyed (so they could not be sold for funds), carabaos, the water buffalo so critical to Filipino rice cultivation, were killed, and hundreds of houses and tons of rice burned. After two months Smith realized that the insurgent leader, Lucban, was receiving assistance from supporters on the Island of Leyte just across the narrow San Juanico Straits. He therefore imposed movement restrictions that succeeded in reducing the flow of supplies, especially rice, across the straits despite the strident and naïve opposition of administration officials both on Leyte and in Manila. Smith’s

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69 Hemp had long been sold to fund *insurrecto* activities. See War Department, *Correspondence Related to the War with Spain from April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902*, vol. 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 1244 MacArthur to Adjutant-General January 9, 1901; and 1334 – Chaffee to Adjutant-General May 2, 1902. Both generals noted the close link between hemp sales and insurgent activity.
combination of population control measures worked as by late February Lucban was captured and by April the few remaining *insurrectos* in the field surrendered.\(^{70}\)

Food denial measures were intensively applied during the late 1901 pacification of Batangas too. The province of Batangas had long been a hot-bed of resistance to the colonial rule of both the Spanish and the Americans. For years after their occupation of the province American rule had extended no further than “about as far as a Krag will throw a bullet.”\(^{71}\) The province remained so unsettled that convoys of between “four and sixty” soldiers were required to assure safety from attack.\(^{72}\) Early efforts at pacification suffered from insufficient troops and weak commanders, but rice was destroyed when discovered. The tide only turned in Batangas with the appointment of General Bell as commander of 3rd Separate Brigade on 1 December 1901. American troops destroyed over 1,025,000 tons of rice in the two months before Bell formally launched his operation, but an even more intensive stripping of food supplies soon commenced.\(^{73}\)

Food control was a major component of General Bell’s pacification plan and was directly linked to the reconcentration of the population into protective zones. Those Filipinos coming in from outlying barrios and districts were expected to bring all their

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\(^{70}\) Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun*, 275.


\(^{72}\) General Bell himself conceded that before he arrived in Batangas that the situation had been unsafe. Stephen Bonsal outlines the troublesome conditions too. “Of the twelve officers forming the mess at Lipa during the five months preceding my visit in November [1901], five had been killed – all shot in the back from ambush – and three had died of fevers resulting from active campaigning in the rainy season.” Bonsal also noted, “the general impression that peace prevails in the other provinces is entirely erroneous. Hardly a day passes without a fight in Tabayas or in Laguna.” See Stephen Bonsal, “The Philippines: After an Earthquake,” *The North American Review* 174, no.544 (March 1902): 409-421. The Americans at times gauged the progress of pacification by the size of column necessary to travel safely: i.e., could an individual American travel safely alone or were groups of 40-50 men necessary.

\(^{73}\) Brian McAllister Linn, “The War in Luzon: U.S. Army Regional Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1900-1902” (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 1985), 304-305. At least 50,000 pounds of palay were destroyed in two days in November and Colonel Wells destroyed over 1,000,000 tons of rice and palay in December 1901.
moveable food supplies such as rice, palay, chickens and other livestock which would otherwise be liable to confiscation and destruction. Most of Bell’s circulars (orders) directing the campaign contained detailed instructions concerning food control. For example, Circular No. 7 of 15 December 1901 included the following instructions: “Every proper effort will be made at all times to deprive those in arms in the mountains of food supplies, but in order that those assembled in the town may not be reduced to want it is absolutely necessary to confiscate and transport and save for future contingencies, whenever possible, every particle of food supplies that may be found concealed in the mountains for insurgents or abandoned at a distance from towns;” and “no rice or food will be destroyed except where absolutely impracticable to get it into towns.” Bell also made provisions to ensure that captured rice was stored, guarded and then distributed, as necessary, to those truly in need. Bell’s columns swept the countryside outside the towns of all supplies, and if food could not be brought in it was “burned or otherwise destroyed.” The insurrectos were constantly pursued across the rugged Batangas terrain, their caches destroyed and their supply chains shattered. Malvar’s forces surrendered within a matter of months.

To what extent did the lack of food cause the insurrectos to give up? There were other causes for the food shortages that existed. The carabao stock, the main draught animal in rural areas, was ravaged by rinderpest during these years. Fewer carabaos

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74 Bell’s telegraphic circulars quoted in Herbert A. White, “Pacification of Batangas,” *International Quarterly* 7 (1903): 431-444.
meant few acres of rice padi ploughed and thus a smaller rice crop.\textsuperscript{76} This unforeseen catastrophe combined with the deliberate American scorched earth policy greatly reduced the supplies available to the guerrillas. Insurrectos surrendering in northern Luzon in April 1901 stated, “it was difficult for them to get food and very dangerous, all towns being occupied and no food left in the barrios.”\textsuperscript{77} On Samar 1,200 bolomen surrendered during the first two weeks of December 1901 because, “a famine existed in the mountains, and ... they were unable to obtain food.”\textsuperscript{78} In late April 1902, General Malvar, the commander of Filipino forces in the Batangas, indicated that the primary reason behind his surrender had been “lack of supplies.”\textsuperscript{79} Thus the Filipino resistance was slowly starved into submission as the American scorched earth policy in the last year and one half of the conflict effectively denuded the countryside of supplies and left the insurrectos few options other than surrender.

Food control measures did not end for the American with the official announcement of the end of the war on 4 July 1902. Throughout the conflict the Americans had repeatedly provided rice to the destitute. This began with Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton’s seizure of rice stockpiles at Bant in May 1899. Rice had also been provided in Negros and General Bell had rice shipped to Batangas after May 1902 to

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\textsuperscript{76} Moorfield Storey, The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925 (New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1926), 215.
\textsuperscript{77} Quoted in Robert D. Ramsey III, “Savage Wars of Peace,” 62.
\textsuperscript{78} “Lively in the Philippines,” The Washington Post, February 17, 1902. The bolo was the common weapon of the insurrecto. It was a heavy machete used in agricultural work. It was generally estimated that in the Filipino forces there were 10 men armed with bolos for every one armed with a gun.
prevent a famine in that province. Large quantities of rice continued to be provided to the destitute in Batangas and Laguna provinces until 1 October 1902. With the conclusion of the campaign, serious attention was devoted to the re-establishment of agriculture. Initially, progress was hampered by three factors: the general devastation that had occurred in the countryside; the decimation of the carabao stock; and the continuation of onerous usury rates by agricultural lenders. Food was therefore a key issue during the campaign and long afterwards.

**South African War**

The great mistake they are making here, as far as I can see, is that they leave all the farms and small tenure standing. The result of this is that the Boers have always means of getting fresh supplies. I would burn all the farms in the disaffected parts, and also all the towns which we are not occupying, sending the women and children out to the nearest commando. This would hamper them in their movements, stop the supplies, and in all probability end the war. However, I suppose that Roberts is afraid of people at home kicking up a row.

- *A Captain in the Gordons*

Being a member of the British military forces in South Africa was no guarantee of being properly fed. Ration scales for the Tommy Atkins (a nickname for the British soldier) were monotonous and had varied little for decades; the primary fare was hardtack (biscuits) and bully beef. Soldiers’ letters and memoirs are replete with comments on

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80 Assuring adequate food supplies for the Filipinos was not an isolated act by Bell. Other American officers also looked to the well being of the locals under their control. See James Parker, *The Old Army: Memoires, 1872-1918* (1929; repr., Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003), 337.

81 War Department, *Annual Report of Major General George W. Davis, Commanding Division of the Philippines* (Manila, P.I., 1903), 100. The subsistence department furnished 4,601,437 lbs. Of rice in July, August and September 1902, at a cost of $67,515.13 and was reimbursed for this amount.


83 Army and Militia, *Pamphlet showing the Conditions of Service in the Army and Militia Respectively*, Cd.81 (23 February 1898), 9. The daily ration in garrison was 3/4 lb. of meat and 1 lb. of bread with vegetables and groceries having to be bought. As the pamphlet explains, “On active service a fuller ration, including groceries and vegetables, is issued free.” Fuller described the standard rations as follows, “though food was seldom scarce it was exceedingly simple, the staple diet being ration biscuit (which looks like a
food shortages with the scale of supplies often described as low, scanty, far from plentiful, and, most frequently, half. Shortages were not constant as an enormous effort was dedicated to ensuring adequate supplies reached the soldier.\textsuperscript{84} Tommies spent whatever ready funds they had to make purchases from local stores, passing farms, and the field force canteens where they were established. Like soldiers across the ages, they looted opportunistically to add fresh fruit, vegetables, chickens or pigs to the pot.\textsuperscript{85} When far-flung British columns found themselves in desperate straits and too distant to be aided from the commissariat or supply depots, unpleasant field expedients such as boiled leathers and other equally unpalatable stomach-fillers would be consumed. Feeding soldiers in South Africa was a difficult challenge even for the mighty British Army.

The British had difficulties for three main reasons. First, the geographic expanse of the theatre of operations was not offset by a well developed railway. The supplies that were moved by rail from Cape Town to Bloemfontein had to pass over a single track for the last 90 miles. With only eight trains a day capable of being put through, it took Lord Roberts over three months to stockpile the necessary supplies at Bloemfontein to

small dog biscuit and is nearly as hard as a slab of concrete), bully beef, tinned stew and alum-settled dam water.” Fuller’s most disliked meal was ‘Knock-me-down’ tinned stew that he considered, “the nearest approach to a dog’s vomit that can be imagined.” J.F.C. Fuller, The Last Gentlemen’s War: A Subaltern’s Journal of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (London: Faber and Faber, 1937), 43-44.\textsuperscript{84} See Frederick Maurice and Maurice Grant, History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902, vol. 4 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1910), 584-597 for an overview of British supply operations. By 1902 a general reserve of 120 days worth of supplies for men and animals was maintained. In the depots within the districts, 30 days worth of supplies was maintained.\textsuperscript{85} H.F. MacKern, Side-Lights on the March: The Experiences of an American Journalist in South Africa (London: John Murray, 1901), 161. Some looters had it easier than others. As Major Lewis notes, “the best of the chance lie with the mounted. When delicacies are to be got at a farm-house, the mounted man is an easy first. Tommy cannot so much as plan a raid on a henroost with success; the mounted man will have been there before him.” See Maj R.C. Lewis, On the Veldt: A Plain Narrative of Service Afield in South Africa (Hobart, Tasmani: Walch, 1902), 117.
commence his advance on Pretoria. These precarious lines of communication would be repeatedly attacked and broken during the guerrilla phase of the war. Second, Boer guerrilla tactics hampered British re-supply. Supply columns were attractive targets to the commandos and therefore had to be heavily protected. The difficulty in the re-provisioning of isolated garrisons led Kitchener to withdraw many of them in mid-1901. Columns pursuing the commandos had their own supply problems. They had to travel light to be effective and could only be replenished once they returned to a supply depot. Finally, the number of individuals the British assumed the responsibility to feed was enormous. There were over 200,000 members of the British Army in the field at any one time and there were tens of thousands of civilians. A Department of Civil Supplies was “called into existence” to ensure food was available for the “civilian populations of captured South African towns” and to secure grain for the thousands of individuals in the refugee camps. As the war continued British commanders tried to force similar supply difficulties onto the Boer bitter-enders who remained in the field.

Denying supplies to the Boers was not easy given the natural richness of the Republics in agricultural products and livestock. The Boers had their own problems at first. Their supply system was initially haphazard and only improved after a Director of Supplies was organized in Pretoria in early November 1899. The system was never efficient as there was no prioritization other than first-come first-served. Those nearest

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86See Rayne Kruger, Good-bye Dolly Gray (London: Cassel, 1959), 271. Besides the limitations on the railways, congestion at the port restricted the amount of supplies that could be forwarded. See Army, Appropriation Account, 1902-1903, Cd. 53 (1904), 227.

87Memorandum of the Secretary of State Relating to the Army Estimates for 1900-1901, Cd.76 (1900), 6. Besides rations for the Army “nearly 30,000 civilians employed as drivers of transport wagons, labourers, & c.” were fed.

88Maurice and Grant, History, vol. 4, 593. See also S.B. Spies, Methods of Barbarism? Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics, January 1900 – May 1902 (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1977), 87. Supplies for civilians had to be closely watched so they did not end up reaching the Boer commandos.
the railheads and commanders’ favourites secured the bulk of supplies regardless of operational necessities. While they could deny access to the ports and use of the railways, the British could not influence Boer supplies behind the front lines during the conventional phase of the conflict. In the guerrilla phase the individual commandos looked after their own requirements and used various techniques to keep themselves supplied: crops were planted in remote locations; British columns and depots were attacked and looted; “native” kraals in their immediate vicinity or across nearby borders were raided; and provisions were commandeered wherever they passed.\(^9\) This diversity of sources limited the British capability to deny supplies. A final and complicating difficulty was the simplicity of a Boer’s needs. H.F. MacKern said of the mounted Boer campaigner “some biltong (dried beef) in one pocket, and mealie cakes in the other, enable him to exist for several days.”\(^10\) Because of the variety of food sources available to them and their minimal needs, only a severe and thorough denuding of the veldt could be expected to limit Boer supplies.

The farm was central to Boer society and the linchpin of their food supply. \textit{Utilanders} may have dominated the mines, the towns and the cities but the Boers dominated the countryside. The pastoral nature of Boer agriculture dictated large farms,

\(^9\) For details of general supply issues for the Boers see Fransjohan Pretorius, \textit{Life on Commando During the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902} (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1999), 25-59. For examples of the cross border efforts see \textit{Colonial Reports – Annual, No. 380 Basutoland, Report for 1901-1902}, Cd. 1388 (1903), 8. As Menpes relates, “Many of the Free State farmers complained bitterly to me of the Boers; for although they are behind in most things ... they understand commandeering to perfection. The farmers say the Boers commandeering everything – they commandeer your sheep and oxen, and in the end commandeer yourself.” Mortimer Menpes, \textit{War Impressions: Being a Record in Colour} (London: Adam Charles Black, 1903), 218.

\(^10\) MacKern, \textit{Side-Lights on the March}, 150. Other agreed with McKern’ assessment that with a few pieces of biltong, the traditional South African dried meat, rusk, an unsalted biscuit, and mealies and little else a Boer was able to ride miles for an extended period of time. See Yorke-Davies, “The Feeding of the Soldier,” 602-603.
a fact that often impressed British observers.\textsuperscript{91} In selecting his farm the typical Boer, “will not if he can help it even gaze upon his neighbour’s house.”\textsuperscript{92} Boer farms were therefore widely dispersed isolated outposts on the veldt. Self-sufficiency was an objective of most Boer farmers: his \textit{vrouw} (wife) made the family’s clothes; he grew his own grain and vegetables; he raised cattle and other livestock for his own purposes; and he augmented his table with game where he could find it. His provisions were stored in the immediate environs of the farmhouse whether in its rafters or in nearby out buildings. The farms were undeniably supply points for the Boers serving as a source of food, other supplies, and intelligence.\textsuperscript{93} Initially Boer laagers moved with enough stock and wagons that supplies from farms may have been merely welcomed additions. Later, as mobility became all important to them, the commandos dispensed with cattle, oxen and transport making the ability to resupply from farms increasingly important.\textsuperscript{94} The centrality of the farm in rural Boer society - it was all a burgher possessed - and its growing importance to the Boers’ campaign made it a focal point of British efforts to end the war.

Destroying farms began early in the South African War and was practiced by both sides. Historians often trivialize the Boers’ destructive work because their leadership did not officially approve of the practice. Yet, the Boers burnt farms when they invaded

\begin{footnotes}
\item[91] Arthur Conan Doyle, \textit{The Great Boer War} (London: Smith, Elder, 1902), 5. Farms over 6,000 acres were the usual size.
\item[93] Johannes Boje, “Winburg’s War: An Appraisal of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 as it was Experienced by the People of a Free State District” (PhD diss., University of Pretoria, 2009), 267.
\item[94] It is debateable whether the commandos themselves were ever in desperate straits for food. Viljoen describes the constant availability of cattle from the three categories of “bush –lancers” (individuals who hid out in the thick bush and tried to preserve their own herds of cattle for reasons of their own). See General Ben Viljoen, \textit{My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War} (London: Hood, Douglas, & Howard, 1902), 499-500. The commandos also widely commandeered supplies from the natives. As Jackson relates destruction, “was supposed, of course, to be destroying the Boer’s food supply, which was impossible as there were Kaffirs in the country.” See Murray Cosby Jackson, \textit{A Soldier’s Diary: South Africa, 1899-1901} (London: Max Goshen, 1913), 193.
\end{footnotes}
Natal, destroyed others within the bounds of the two Republics, and fired others during
their invasions of Cape Colony. There does not appear to have been any specific
strategy in this destruction other than to punish British loyalists and those Boers who had
surrendered, the intensely disliked “hands-uppers.” After the invasion of the Orange
Free State the British too began farm burning but not as part of any particular strategy
either. At this stage, destroying farmsteads was nominally to discourage the similar
practice by Boers in Natal and elsewhere but much unauthorized burning was undertaken
by the overzealous *utilanders* making up the Colonial Division and unrestrained
“natives.” Attacks on Lord Roberts’ line of communication increased as British forces
pushed beyond Bloemfontein and into the Transvaal. Prompted by these continuing
attacks, Roberts issued proclamations announcing what reprisal would be taken in the
vicinity of the attacks. Initially only the house(s) in the immediate vicinity were
threatened with destruction but eventually every house and all supplies within a 10 mile
radius were included. This was the genesis of an official policy of destruction. Besides
protecting his communications, Roberts used farm burning to punish Boer leaders and
individuals who violated their oaths of neutrality as well as destroying farms from which
sniping occurred or where there had been a misuse of white flags. Division and column
commanders had considerable discretion over whether to burn a farm or not. The practice
of farm destruction remained localized and uncoordinated for much of 1900.

96 E.F. Knight, *South Africa after the War: A Narrative of Recent Travel* (London: Longmans, Green, 1903), 170.
99 Though excused by main pro-Boer historians the violations of the use of the white flags at farms was common. See Ada Thomson, *Memorials of Charles Dixon Kimber* (London: James Nisbet, 1902), 92.
Lord Roberts may have initiated the policy of farm burning, but it took Lord Kitchener to perfect it. Roberts had used farm burning as a punitive measure but sought to limit its use as it was a tactic incidental to his campaign. Roberts supported the conciliatory stance contained in most of his proclamations even though they were mostly crafted elsewhere. Some serving in South Africa considered that Roberts had been too gentle on the Boers. They welcomed the nomination of Kitchener as Roberts’ replacement expecting that he would soon impose sterner measures. As H. Gaskell noted, “We are at last beginning to realize that the only way to stop this war is to burn, and many farms we come to where the man is on commando, are burnt.” Nominally, farm burning in South Africa ceased, or so it was maintained in late 1900, but at this point in the war it was recognized by the British that “the fight is now mainly about supplies.” A more carefully choreographed clearing of the veldt was about to commence as “the only sure means of ending the war.”

Farm burning and crop destruction became a priority in military operations as Kitchener sought to denude the veldt of supplies. Launching this policy in late 1900, Kitchener instructed his commanders that, “Every farm was to be visited, and not only the women and children, but natives living on the farms, were to be sent in. Supplies,

101 E.W.B. Morrison, *With the Guns in South Africa* (Hamilton: Spectator Printing, 1901), 277-278. Morrison expressed the change as follows, “The country is very much like Scotland, and we moved on from valley to valley ‘lifting’ cattle and sheep, burning, looting and turning out the women and children to sit besides the ruins of their once beautiful farmsteads. It was the first touch of Kitchener’s iron hand. And we were the knuckles.”
103 G.B. Beak, *The Aftermath of War: An Account of the Repatriation of Boers and Natives in the Orange River Colony, 1902-1904* (London: Edward Arnold, 1906), 14. This was also the opinion of Lord Milner from as early as 1901.
wagons and standing crops, if they could not be used, were to be burnt."\textsuperscript{105} Those who did not pursue the policy with sufficient vigour were quickly corrected. Columns were assigned a certain number of farms to clear in a day and their progress could be marked by the columns of smoke billowing skyward.\textsuperscript{106} Clearing included turning out the families, killing or removing the animals, and burning the buildings, crops and vehicles. The widespread tactical use of the farms by the Boers contributed to the plight of those turned-out. Commonly, Boer snipers and commandos remained nearby to farmsteads poised to attack. Soldiers knew if they tarried too long a bullet could well be their reward.\textsuperscript{107} Thus removal operations were hurried and abrupt with families sent on their way as quickly as possible. Prior to the war there were an estimated 10,499 farms in the Orange Free State and 12,245 in the Transvaal.\textsuperscript{108} Early British estimates of the numbers of farms burned are understated but after the columns had burned their way back and forth across the veldt few structures were left in the colonies.\textsuperscript{109} After the war observers regularly commented on the extent of devastation. L.S. Amery noted that, “From end to end of the two colonies there was hardly a farmhouse left standing,”\textsuperscript{110} and E.F. Knight wrote, “we had left the region of deserted blockhouses and entered that of ruined homesteads. Every day we passed several of these, and of all the farmhouses that were situated near the road I could not see one that had escaped partial if not complete

\textsuperscript{106} Morrison, \textit{With the Guns}, 274 - 286.
\textsuperscript{107} Trooper A.S. Orr, \textit{Scottish Yeomanry in South Africa, 1900-1901} (Glasgow: James Hedderwick & Sons, 1901), 136. Farms long remain tactical strong points on the veldt. As Orr notes, “[the Boer] could guess, of course, which farms we would visit from a particular base, and would lie in wait along the road.” See also Linesman, \textit{Words by an Eyewitness}, 258-259. See also the techniques required to investigate a farm safely as described by Steele. See Sam Steele, \textit{Forty Years in Canada} (Toronto: McClelland, Goodchild and Stewart Ltd., 1915), 348.
\textsuperscript{108} William Harding, \textit{War in South Africa and the Dark Continent} (Chicago: H.L. Barber, 1899), 36, 41.
\textsuperscript{109} For the early estimate see Return of Buildings Burnt in each Month from June 1900 to January 1901, Cd. 524 (1901).
\textsuperscript{110} Amery, \textit{The Times History}, vol. 6, 43.
destruction.” When queried after the war as to the number of farms burnt in Transvaal and the Orange Free State the military governor in Johannesburg responded, “A very large number of houses ... has no doubt been destroyed or seriously damaged. Total of both classes may amount to as many as 30,000.”

Every day that passed fewer shelters and crops were available to the commandos but other sources of supply also had to be eliminated.

The second aspect of the scorched earth policy involved the removal of livestock. Cattle, sheep, oxen and horses played a major role in Boer agriculture. Before the war it was estimated that in the Orange Free State there were over 619,026 cattle and 6,619,952 sheep and in the Transvaal an additional 142,499 cattle, and 805,222 sheep. Removing such large numbers was a daunting and often unpleasant task. Many animals had to be killed in place due to the tactical situation. While animals could be driven into British lines, their herding seriously impeded the mobility of the columns. With the commandos becoming more elusive the measure of success of many columns became the number of animals it had “bagged.” Many histories of the conflict are punctuated with such statistics of the columns’ successes: August (1901) – “captures from and losses of the enemy ... 1332 wagons, 13,570 horses, and 65, 879 cattle”; and September (1901) – 770 wagons, 11

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111 Knight, *South Africa after the War*, 82.
112 Owen Coetzer, *Fire in the Sky: The Destruction of the Orange Free State, 1899-1902* (South Africa: Covos-Day Books, 2000), 110, and Pretorius, *Life on Commando*, 303. This figure is drawn from Coetzer’s polemic book and Pretorius also points to it. The 30,000 figure is widely used but unsubstantiated by any complete survey. The Republics did not keep statistics prior to the war and this absence makes any estimate of Boer fatalities suspect. It is at best an unverifiable generalized estimate.
113 See Harding, *War in South Africa*, 41 for the estimate for the Orange River Colony. Figures for the Transvaal come from the Repatriation Departments estimate of the numbers required to return the colony to its pre-war levels. See *Papers Relating to the Progress of Administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony*, Cd. 1551 (1903), 51.
11,000 horse, and 41,500 cattle. It was an enormous undertaking but it was aided greatly once the blockhouse system was constructed. Even then, Milner did not believe that it was possible to remove all the sheep, and then, of course, there was always wild game to be had. A great number of animals had been killed off by the end of the campaign and the lack of livestock was to hamper reconstruction for a number of years. After the war Milner estimated that there remained only 100,000 cattle and 1,000,000 sheep in the Orange River Colony and only 50,000 cattle in the Transvaal. Interestingly, the British did not fully exploit the confiscation of horses. They were removed from the northern border of the Cape Colony only after the failed first Boer invasion of 1900, and this impeded the subsequent invasion in 1901. More could have been done in this area to restrict the Boers’ mobility for as Ballard remarked, “a Boer on his own feet is no longer a fighting man.”

Carrying out a scorched earth campaign brought both difficulties and benefits to the British. Besides the difficulties in removing the women and children, clearing the veldt hampered British columns by giving them two conflicting objectives: clearing the farms and pursuing the commandos. Clearing such a large geographic area was an immense task and “was a hindrance to the attainment of the supreme objective, the defeat

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114 Louis Creswicke, *South Africa and the Transvaal War*, vol. 7 (Manchester: Kenneth MacLennan, 1902), 126, 139. These are monthly summaries but Creswicke’s work is peppered with the tallies of the column success in collection materiel off the veldt.

115 S.B. Spies, *Methods of Barbarism*, 178. Milner wrote, “if the whole army were to do nothing but sweep in sheep for months, we could never get them all in.”

116 Death amongst the driven animals made garrison duty particularly gruesome with the smell of dead animals stinking up the countryside. See Fuller, *The Last Gentlemen’s War*, 117. Animals died in great number while being brought in due to insufficient fodder being available. Because of the great number of animals imported during the war disease was rampant among stock in the post war period and seriously hampered reconstruction. See *Further Correspondence Related to Affairs in South Africa*, Cd. 1463 (1903), 21.


of the enemy.” Even recognizing the necessity of clearance operations, few troops were enamoured with this distasteful task and preferred to be nipping at the heels of a fleeing commando. Even just bringing in the livestock was no easy feat as those driving in the captured stock were frequently attacked, and, once corralled, herds were frequently raided. Nevertheless, clearing the veldt aided the British in a number of ways. The columns were instructed to live off the land to a much greater extent than previously which aided their mobility. The captured cattle and sheep were used to feed both troops and civilians including those in the concentration camps that eased the burden on the railways. Some stock was held as a reserve for reconstruction, and some animals were sold off which in a small way offset the immense cost of the war. Sections of the veldt were swept and then re-swept “until it might have been thought that no Boers could find subsistence within its limits.” In combination with other methods, some believe the scorched earth policy slowly wore down Kitchener’s opponents.

Did finely scraping clean the veldt force the Boers to surrender? Its utility was a divisive issue amongst the British. Some believed it prolonged the war, a position of the pro-Boers in the British parliament. Basil Williams suggested, “Instead of making the

120 Amery, Times History, vol. 4, 162.
122 Ibid., 203. For re-capture see H.W. Wilson, After Pretoria, 256 and 630.
123 Furse, Provisioning Armies, 275. As Furse notes, “The system of requisition favours speed; it should be resorted to not only in rapid marches to the front, but when the lines of communication have been cut by the enemy …” By living more ‘off the land’ the British reduced their own supply column and threw another hardship on the recalcitrant by no longer providing receipts for supplies commandeered.
125 Morrison, With the Guns, 281. Morrison notes that after collecting 150 head of cattle and 500 sheep that this netted the British government about £4000 to offset costs. See also Army, Appropriation Account 1901-1902, Cd.1903 (29), 191. The proceeds from selling captured stock were approximately £350, 209.
126 The early weakness in clear was the lack of combined measures that made it a comprehensive and systemic clearing. See An Englishman, “How to End the War,” The National Review 37, no.219 (May 1901): 345-356.
Boers tired of the struggle and eager to get peace, it makes them desperate. They see their wives and children carried away from their homes and their homes ruined, and they feel there is nothing left worth submitting for.” William noted that the Boers were less likely to settle down peacefully, “if they are driven to desperation by such extreme remedies as farm-burning, and have to live surrounded by the reminders of their ruin.” As the war wore on many senior officials began to consider that the destruction had both lengthened the war and raised the future cost of reconstruction. Supporters of this view rarely advanced viable alternatives and perhaps forgot that conciliatory methods had proven fruitless. The contrary view was that harsher and more coercive measures were demanded and the harder the better. This “hard measures” group had advocated farm burning shortly after the invasion of the Orange Free State to discourage similar practice by the Boers in Natal. As Colonel F.I. Maxse pointed out leading up to the occupation of Pretoria, “the back-country, agricultural Boers, the men who held the Mausers and required neither pay nor government rations, had not been properly beaten in a fight to a finish, and had rarely seen many of their dead comrades lying about as mute evidence of disaster, had not yet realised what the newspapers called the ‘horrors of war.’” Maxse considered that if a peace had been patched up as soon as Pretoria fell and before it was carried into the farmer’s home that “he would have remained in ignorance of its penalties and a standing menace to peace.” Advocates of this approach continually sought the imposition of even stricter measures. The war might have ended sooner if Kitchener had never brought


the women in off the veldt, but by the early months of 1902 the combinations of attritional methods he was using were slowly wearing the Boers down.

The lack of supplies available to the commandos was evident in the heated debates amongst the burghers as they prepared to meet the British negotiators at Vereeniging in May 1902. As late as August 1901, Kitchener considered the Boers to have an, “apparently inexhaustible supply of meat and mealies,” but as the winter of 1902 approached conditions had changed. Many portions of the veldt could no longer support the commandos and the chance of securing supplies from other districts was being rapidly eliminated. The first article in the Protest the Signatories of the Republic handed in at Vereeniging encapsulated their dilemma.

1. That the Military tactics pursued by the British Military Authorities has led to the entire ruin of the territory of both of the Republics, with the burning of farms and towns, destruction of all means of subsistence and exhaustion of all sources necessary for the support of our families, for the maintenance of our forces in the field, and for the continuation of the war.

Certainly for key Boer leaders, in particular Botha and De La Rey, the debates leading up to Vereeniging clearly indicated the desperate straits of the Boer volk and encouraged them to promote acceptance of the treaty. Thus, we can conclude that the scorched earth policy was one of the key elements that led to the Boer surrender.

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130 *The London Gazette*, August 20, 1901, 5480.
132 F.W. Reitz, “Is this Peace?” *The North American Review* 175, no.552 (November 1902): 607-612. Reitz, the bitter former Secretary of State in the South-Africa Republic, outlines both the terms of the Treaty of Vereeniging and the unpublished Protest that was submitted by the Boer delegates.
133 For some of the debates and the voting leading up to the surrender see Fransjohan Pretorius, “Confronted with the Facts: Why the Boer Delegates at Vereeniging Accepted a Humiliating Peace to End the South African War, 31 May 1902,” in *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918*, edited by Stephen M. Miller, 195-217 (London: Brill, 2009). See also Johannes Meintjes, *General Louis Botha: A Biography*
Malayan Emergency

Food smuggling in Malaya was the Communists’ most vulnerable activity ... the guerrillas had to rely on rice smuggled out of the villages.

Colonel Richard Clutterbuck\textsuperscript{135}

Complementary to patrolling and ambushing, one of the major weapons used against the terrorists is food denial. By imposing very strict food control measures in towns, villages and kamponds in certain operational areas the terrorists are forced into the open to seek food and thus become easier targets for the Security Forces.

... Home Guards were on duty every night of the year to defend their villages and kamponds on an ordered system of defence, endeavouring to frustrate terrorists’ attempts to obtain food. Were it not for these men, all villages and kamponds would be open sources of supplies for the terrorists, and there would be small prospect of real success for operations against them.

Federation of Malaya, Annual Report 1955

Obtaining food supplies from crops was not easy in Malaya during the Emergency. This, perhaps surprising, difficulty was attributable to three factors. First, the jungle itself contested any attempt at cultivation. Plant growth was explosive so domestic crops were crowded out unless carefully tended.\textsuperscript{136} Second, Malaya was a food deficit area from before World War II. Spare arable land was more profitable if mined or if a plantation was established instead of farmed.\textsuperscript{137} So, food had long been imported to feed the...
workforce instead of being grown locally. Finally, though both the Japanese during World War II and the British Military Administration after 1945 tried to expand food production, their programs only produced meagre results. Malays dominated padi farming and had little desire to expand production or participate in broader markets. In the post-war period, these food importation patterns soon re-asserted themselves. The eventual utility and effectiveness of the food control measures the British used were dependent on this underlying food deficit condition.

Initially, the MCP sought to supply itself much as it had during World War II, namely from the Chinese squatters on the jungle fringe. The MCP branches, the lowest tier of their organization below the districts and regions, were responsible for securing supplies. A typical branch of fifteen men coordinated the MCP work in the surrounding villages, usually overseeing a population of between 5,000 and 10,000, and supported an independent MRLA platoon of approximately sixty men. The Min Yuen (Mass Support) provided general support for the MCP. In the villages the Massed Executive (ME), card-carrying members of the MCP, organized the supplies that were filtered out to the jungle. The ME was responsible to obtain over 300 pounds of rice a week in order to feed the MRLA platoon. Food from the villages would be smuggled out and dropped at predetermined locations. Carriers from the jungle forces would then pick up the supplies and transport them to caches and dumps deeper in the jungle. The MCP proved adept


140 Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 119. An MCP branch would be responsible for approximately six villages that would
at obtaining supplies and shifted its collection patterns as restrictions and opportunities presented themselves. It preyed predominately on the Chinese squatters during the early days of the Emergency.

The new villages were critical to carrying the battle to the MCP. General Briggs’ objective in both resettlement and regroupment was to seal off the squatters, tappers and miners from the MCP’s agents and thereby reduce the flow of all nature of supplies into the jungle. Briggs sought to replace the random jungle bashing, which had preceded resettlement, with framework operations informed by precise intelligence gained from MCP efforts to collect supplies once their food supply networks were disrupted.  

In concert with resettlement, General Briggs initiated Operation STARVATION (stringent regulations to control the movement of food, medicines and other supplies), but it was initially ineffective due to insufficient security forces. Operation STARVATION prohibited some goods, set curfews, imposed the operational rice ration, enforced communal cooking, demanded an exacting accounting requirement for all items sold at any store, and closed many eating establishments. The utility of food denial was recognized early on, but it was only at the end of 1952, once resettlement had made

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143 The “operational rice ration” was a much reduce ration of rice imposed upon an area when a specific food denial operation was taking place.
144 Edgar O’Ballance, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 121 and Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution*, 216. Initially accounting for food supplies was lax. The harvesting or crops was not well monitored and both farmers and shopkeeper were allowed to have excess stock for wastage. This “hidden residue” easily found its way into the jungle. Thus many controls were needed to limit access.
substantial progress, that it could be effectively employed.\textsuperscript{145} The control of rice was all-important as without it the MCP could not sustain its members.\textsuperscript{146} A host of measures were combined both internal and external to the villages to deny food.\textsuperscript{147}

Sufficient security forces were required to effectively enforce food control measures within the villages. Tight and continuous control was only possible within the new villages after the police services were expanded and the home guards developed.\textsuperscript{148} The amount of food generally available for consumption within a village was limited in order to restrict potential supplies being re-directed to the MCP. Rice stocks were tightly controlled, and an even more limited operational rice ration was imposed when a food denial operation was in progress.\textsuperscript{149} Tinned goods were punctured at the point of sale, and shopkeepers had to keep detailed records of who purchased food. In some instances, communal cooking was imposed thereby taking advantage of how quickly cooked rice spoiled in the tropical heat.

While security forces regularly patrolled the perimeter of the new village fences to ensure foodstuff and other supplies were not passed through the wire, the cornerstone of control was the searches at the village gates.\textsuperscript{150} All individuals passing out of the gates

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\bibitem{146} Barber, \textit{The War of the Running Dogs}, 131. Clutterbuck, “Communist Defeat in Malaya,” 73.
\bibitem{147} Food control was also used in specific cases for punishment purposes were a settlement was uncooperative in supporting the counterinsurgency. See Riley Sunderland, \textit{Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya, 1948-1960} (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 1964), 36-39.
\bibitem{148} Anthony Short, \textit{The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960} (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), 292. As Short notes, “unless and until there was effective food control there was as many outlets from a resettlement as there were holes in a sieve.” See also J.B.P.R., “The Emergency in Malaya: Some Reflections on the First Six Years,” \textit{The World Today} 10, no.11 (November 1954): 477-487.
\bibitem{149} Short, \textit{The Communist Insurrection}, 485. The operational rice ration was said to be “just enough to keep a person in good health.” It was 3katis (men), 2 ½ katis (women) and 2 katis (child) per week – a kati was approximately one and one-third pounds.
\end{thebibliography}
were searched with women assigned to search the women villagers. Given the typical
morning rush of workers, the security forces had to carefully stagger their shifts to ensure
that the search, amounting to only about 15 seconds per individual, could be quickly
completed. Discovering smugglers was always a challenge. MCP supporters did not have
to smuggle out large amounts, and they would conceal their small contributions in their
bicycles, chamber pots and in other ingenious places.\textsuperscript{151} The benefit of these detailed
controls was that it enabled wavering supporters to refuse to attempt to supply the jungle
forces and helped expose those who still tried.\textsuperscript{152}

Control measures external to the villages were equally important. Foodstuffs
could not be transported at night, and restricted goods had to be covered by a tied-down
tarp when transported by road. Each vehicle was required to have an accurate manifest of
its cargo and was not permitted to stop other than in designated areas.\textsuperscript{153} To ensure that
the external measures were enforced the security forces conducted searches at village
gates, established checkpoints, and conducted patrols and ambushes. The air force
contributed by searching the jungle for vegetable plots. When found, the air forces would
then either guide ground forces onto them, bomb them or spray defoliant on them.\textsuperscript{154}

Between the internal and external controls great pressure was placed on the MCP supply
chain. Once food denial became the primary focus of all operations these measures were
even more closely coordinated.\textsuperscript{155}

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\textsuperscript{151} Clutterbuck, \textit{The Long, Long War}, 120.
\textsuperscript{152} Barber, \textit{The War of the Running Dogs}, 130.
\textsuperscript{153} The whole system depended on the “food stuffs movement permit.” See R.W. Komer, \textit{The Malayan
Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort} (Santa Monica: RAND
Corp., 1972), 58.
\textsuperscript{154} Edgar O’Ballance, \textit{Malaya}, 136.
\textsuperscript{155} Short, \textit{The Communist Insurrection}, 485. In 1956 an Emergency Food Denial Organization was created
“to standardize and provide overall control of the food control effort.” Food control officers were attached
to all state and district war executive committees (SWECs and DWECs). It encouraged the cooking of rice
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As the Emergency wore on food denial operations became “the dominant operational technique.” After 1953 these operations, termed federal priority operations, involved the massed coordinated effort of all available security forces over lengthy periods of time (twelve to eighteen months) in specifically selected and targeted areas. Food denial operations were conducted in three phases. In the introductory phase, the maximum amount of information and intelligence was developed on the specified area over a four to six month period. In the second phase, the initial aspects of the operation were set in motion. Troops surrounded the area of concern to prevent MCP elements from leaving the area. Then all known ME food handlers were arrested and the special branch began working on turning their replacements and secondary food handlers. This phase lasted for as long as it took for the local MCP elements to exhaust their food dumps and be forced to try and re-establish contact with their remaining supporters in the villages. The final phase involved exploiting the enemy’s loss of morale and improved intelligence to carry out selective ambushes on those CTs left in the jungle but now forced to expose themselves in search of supplies. The goal in all these operations was to completely dismantle the MCP branch infrastructure in the designated area. These operations became highly structured as the security forces refined their techniques. Even then, it still required an enormous investment of resources to cleanse the jungle of the last remaining hard core CTs. There were no great battles and like most operations in Malaya

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156 These operations had to cover all villages controlled by an MCP branch to ensure that they could not get supplies from within their area or nearby. The targeted area had to be sufficiently small to ensure its complete domination. See Clutterbuck, The Long Long War, 112-121 and Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection, 486-490.

the number of terrorists eliminated in any particular encounter was small.\textsuperscript{158} At the end of several lengthy federal priority operations the tally of terrorists eliminated often amounted to twenty or less. Once an area had been effectively cleared and if there was no resurgence in CT activity, it was declared white and the emergency regulations were eased within it. The peninsula slowly and progressively “whitened” as these operations successfully concluded (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of meaning of White Areas).\textsuperscript{159}

The MCP responded in a variety of ways to attacks on their food supply. When resettlement first commenced, they placed elements of the Min Yuen in the new villages to ensure their supply chains would be re-established. This, of course, was easier where they had strong support. Where the newly resettled were reluctant, violence and coercion were used as encouragement. Once supply from new villages became more haphazard, the MCP turned its attention to the tappers and miners.\textsuperscript{160} When they were regrouped, the MCP both tried to develop sources amongst the jungle aborigines and to grow their own food.\textsuperscript{161} Their early attempts to cultivate bore the stamp of their Chinese origins – neat rows that were easily spotted from the air, an error they soon learned to correct.\textsuperscript{162} While the MCP did prove adaptable in obtaining supplies, it never procured sufficient amounts to sustain a large-scale campaign.

\textsuperscript{158} Clutterbuck, \textit{Riot and Revolution}, 226.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 251. Clutterbuck describes how by 1957-58, “the cavalcade of federal priority operations moved northward and southward from the centre, demolishing on average two or three hardcore MCP districts every six months.” The area declared white thus slowly expanded but not in the roll up from the south to the north as originally envisioned by General Briggs.
\textsuperscript{160} Victor Purcell, \textit{Malaya: Communist or Free} (London: Victor Gollancz, 1954), 78.
\textsuperscript{161} C.N.M. Blair, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare} (London: Ministry of Defence, 1957), 171. By mid-1952 supplies from the new villages had slowed to a trickle. By the summer of 1953 jungle cultivation had become very important and “large numbers were being employed at this at expense of operations.”
\textsuperscript{162} Barber, \textit{The War of the Running Dogs}, 132.
As Victor Purcell noted, “food supply remained the key,” and the administration sought, “the rigid control of transport of every mouthful of food.” Food denial was the critical key to finally subduing the MCP by, “systematically starving them into failure.” It took some trial and error before this campaign construct was adopted, but, eventually, only federal priority operations were conducted over the last years of the Emergency. According to some estimates, the MCP spent over nine-tenths of their time involved in simply trying to sustain itself in the final years of the conflict. Surrendered enemy personnel (SEPs) often highlighted the importance of food in their decision to surrender. After the imposition of food controls in late 1950 over 24.8 percent of SEPs over the next four years noted the contribution of hunger to their motivation to surrender. The security forces succeeded in starving the MCP into submission by carefully combining food denial measures and coordinating their use in operations in detail.

Kenyan Emergency

*Kazi yako ni kuchukua chakula kwa kundi?*
Are you a food carrier? 

Food control in Kenya was never as nuanced or as all consuming for the security forces as it was in Malaya. Food control in Malaya benefited greatly from the limited supply of the primary staple food of all Malayans, rice. The diet of the Kikuyu in Kenya,

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164 Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution*, 215-220. The first attempt at detailed food denial was Operation Hive in Negri Sembilan in late 1952. The lessons from that operation were recorded by a Captain Latimer and would serve as the basis for future food denial operations. It was only 18 months later that federal priority operation would finally be effectively organized.
the tribe within which the revolt was mainly concentrated, was much more diverse and therefore more difficult to restrict. Posho, maize meal, formed the core component of the African diet but was supplemented by a great variety of vegetables and meat. Kikuyu farmers grew maize, sweet potatoes, and an enormous variety of beans. Meat was readily available with both cattle and large herds of goats clustered about most villages. Kikuyu dietary practices were tightly scripted and controlled by a multitude of taboos and cultural norms. So, while wildlife was abundant, it was rarely consumed.

The Land and Freedom Army (LFA), the armed wing of the Mau Mau, drew their food supplies from three principal areas all closely coordinated for them by members of the passive wing. Before May 1954, considerable amounts of money, ammunition, medicine and other supplies were funnelled from Nairobi out to the reserves and then out to the forests of Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains. Food was a different matter. Most of it was drawn from the Kikuyu reserves though supplies were never plentiful. The subsistence farming practiced on the reserves provided no great surplus. The forced repatriation of squatters from the White Highlands and the clearance of the mile-wide strip at the base of the forests put further pressure on this slender supply. Competition for food within the reserves became fierce because of the numerous groups trying to live off the crops being produced: home guard forces, individual farmers whether loyalists or oath-takers, the forest fighters, and the komera (outlaws who operated on the forest edge and stole from all). A second source was the settlers’ farms where the farms’ labour lines

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were raided, or cattle and sheep were stolen outright. Eventually, food sources in the bamboo jungle, ranging from honey to whatever animal that could be trapped, would be exploited.

Though borrowing lessons from Malaya, the use of food control measures in Kenya was bounded by local conditions and perceptions. The settlers, who formed a major component of the security forces, advocated the timely application of harsh measures and this was reflected in the food control practices. Many settlers felt that if harsh measures had been applied in the early days of the emergency it would have been easily suppressed. This overtly coercive approach is evident in a number of ways. First, it was demonstrated by the large number of Mau Mau and suspected terrorists shot every week, generally an uncommon occurrence in a counterinsurgency. Second, this general indifference to African life extended to a belief that an African needed much less food daily to survive than did a European, a long term feature of treatment of African labour in Kenya. This attitude is further evident in the limited attention the administration afforded to ensure those that it relocated during villagisation were properly fed. How it dealt with the maize crop amply reveals its approach. Once villagisation occurred and communal labour was enforced, individuals had very little time to tend to their fields and food availability suffered accordingly. The administration then decided that maize fields

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171 Weekly average kill rates in the forest ranged from 39 in 1953 to 66 in 1955. These seem to be very high figures given that months-long operations in Malaya only eliminated a few dozen guerrillas at a time.


173 Rawcliffe, *The Struggle for Kenya*, 102. This general indifference is also revealed by the administration allowing the base price of a bag of posho to rise from eight shillings in 1939 to over three pounds sterling by February 1953. See also Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 113 for details of famine amongst the detainees in Kiambu in June 1956.
had to be cut down so that the forest fighter could not neither hide in them nor loot them.\textsuperscript{174} Initially, an allowance was provided to offset this loss, but it was soon drastically cut to ensure funds did not trickle out to the forests.\textsuperscript{175} This policy and other similar practices placed great duress on all those trying to survive in the reserves.

The LFA held the initiative for much of the first year of the Emergency and these were times of plenty for the Mau Mau fighters. They terrorized Nairobi and controlled large parts of it, and their power was practically uncontested in the reserves. The forests were full of recruits. Most families had immediate relatives (husbands, fathers, brothers, or sons) in the forest and a customary obligation to provide food to them.\textsuperscript{176} In this early phase of the conflict supplies were quickly and easily ported out, often daily, to the forest by the passive wing.\textsuperscript{177} Women, mirroring their traditional and important role in agriculture, were the prime providers and carriers of supplies.\textsuperscript{178} The limited presence of security forces in the reserves until late 1953 made obtaining supplies from passive wing supporters relatively easy. However, the administration began to impede the flow of supplies as the home guard, police, and military force available expanded. Once the administration recognized the importance of denying supplies to the forest fighters, it seriously started trying to choke them off.

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The more determined effort began after General Erskine assumed command of all security forces in June 1953. Initially he continued the practice of large scale sweeps to exert control in the reserves. For 1954 he planned to dislocate the centre-point of the Mau Mau supply chain, Nairobi. After the failure of surrender negotiations in early 1954, Erskine launched Operation ANVIL on 24 April 1954. Five infantry battalions were employed to cordon off the city and then support the systematic searching of sub-areas. All Kikuyu, Meru and Embu tribesmen were screened and then either released, repatriated to the reserves, or deported to hastily constructed detention camps if suspected of supporting Mau Mau activities. Over 30,000 Africans would be processed with approximately 17,000 transported through the screening centre at Langata to the detention centres at MacKinnon Road and Manyani. Roughly 3,000 women and 6,000 children were repatriated to the reserves.\textsuperscript{170} ANVIL fractured the Mau Mau organization in Nairobi and subsequently poor leadership prevented it from regaining its former importance.\textsuperscript{180} Once Nairobi was secured attention was turned to the reserves.

Villagisation was imposed (as discussed in Chapter 4) to counteract the passive wing of the Mau Mau. The villages contained and controlled all those, primarily women, who grew the food that could supply the forest fighters. Unlike the village gate in Malaya where food distribution was controlled by inspection, villagisation in Kenya allowed the home guard to practice constant surveillance and supervision and, additionally, to impose

\textsuperscript{180} Maj Frank Kitson, \textit{Gangs and Counter-gangs} (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), 117. After Operation ANVIL Mwangi Toto took over control in Nairobi and formed his own gang. He appropriated to his own gang much of the supplies that were formerly sent out to the forest thus limiting their supplies.
communal labour to prevent the out-filtration of food supplies.\textsuperscript{181} ANVIL and villagisation ended the days of ease for the Mau Mau.

There were other aspects to the British food control policy. The sweeps and greater presence of the security forces drove the Mau Mau deeper into the forest making it more difficult to obtain supplies. The sweeps were complemented by mile-wide strips that were cleared between the forests and the reserves that were declared prohibited areas (see Chapter 4).\textsuperscript{182} The forest fighters as a result had to travel further and expose themselves to greater risk of discovery to meet their needs. Roads were cut into the forest so that company-sized patrol bases could be established and push the gangs even further into the recesses of the jungle. Even with these measures, within the reserves crops do not seem to have been stringently controlled and monitored. Some programs, like cutting down the maize crop, were carried out but elsewhere fields were poorly guarded.\textsuperscript{183} Livestock had to be confined each night in \textit{bomas} (pens). This denied food to the gangs but caused a dramatic decline in milk production and the attendant lost revenue so the white settlers never cared for this practice despite its obvious importance.\textsuperscript{184}

Mau Mau food raids generated counter-measures that contributed to operational success later in the Emergency. Combat tracker teams closely trailed raiding parties

\textsuperscript{181} Muriithi, \textit{War in the Forest}, 69. Though villagisation was enforced it does not appear that adequate protection was provided to the crops left in the field and those confined to the villages were not given sufficient time to harvest them. This was a boon to gangs seeking supplies. For scope of control see Edgerton, \textit{Mau Mau: An African Crucible}, 95.
\textsuperscript{182} Barnett, \textit{Mau Mau from Within}, 209.
\textsuperscript{183} Kanago, \textit{Squatters & the Roots}, 143. Besides the requirement for well-fenced bomas, food was supposed to be guarded after harvested and rations issued to labourers frequently in small quantities. Even the collection of firewood by women was severely restricted. Despite all these efforts, it is not clear that crops in the field were well guarded.
\textsuperscript{184} Rawcliffe, \textit{Struggle for Kenya}, 109. Maj Gen William R.N. Hinde, the first Director of Operations in Kenya, tried to convince the settlers to move their cattle ten miles back from the forest in May 1953 in order to deny the gangs supplies, but the settler refused. Eventually, the nightly enclosure policy was enforced and farm guards were established on settlers’ farms in 1955. See also Branch, \textit{Defeating Mau Mau}, 113. As there were too many cattle and goats for the enclosures, they were sold off glutting the market and drastically reducing the price.
returning from the reserves and attempted to either capture the burdened and fleeing food carriers or follow them to their jungle lairs. A different opportunity was provided by the continual contact between the forest fighters and their supporters in the labour lines and the villages. Pseudo-gangs, British led units of former Mau Mau, were able to make initial contacts by pretending to be real gangs searching for food. For the British, food restriction supported the broader strategic purpose of denying resources to their opponents and afforded them useful tactical advantages.

Food had a significant influence on how the forest fighters organized themselves. It affected their degree of internal discipline, their selection of operational areas, and their level of tactical security. The forest gangs were more rule-bound than is often assumed. They had detailed regulations for most activities including a good many addressing food. Food was carefully rationed and access to food stores was restricted to a limited few. Food stocks were both carefully stored and meticulously recorded and monitored. Good internal discipline helped the gangs make best use of their resources but foreshadowed the draconian measures that would be enforced once supplies became scarce. The availability of food also affected where gangs chose to operate. They were often unwilling to relocate from their customary areas into ones unknown to them where the availability of food was uncertain but conversely might choose to only move to areas “where it was easy to obtain food.” The assignment of operational areas was never well coordinated amongst the Mau Mau and this reluctance to relocate further diminished

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186 See Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs* for a discussion of pseudo-operation. See also Dennis Holman, *Bwana Drum* (London: W.H. Allen, 1964), 70, for how the pseudos gained access to labour lines.  
the operational reach of the forest fighters. Gangs also limited their own effectiveness by restricting where they would raid, especially later in the conflict, as forest leaders knew that raids in the vicinity of their camps, particularly ones against settlers, would draw the immediate ire of the security forces and could threaten their established hideouts. Thus, raiding parties at times were dispatched to distant plots and gardens so as to not cause disturbances near their own camps. Therefore the difficulties in securing food supplies degraded the operational effectiveness of the gangs later in the conflict.

The necessity to secure food also influenced other practices. The importance of food raiding meant that it was tasked to the most trusted members of the gang. Even then, if members disappeared during a raid the gang was often forced to uproot and relocate in case their camp had been compromised. Greater quantities of meat were consumed in the camps than was common in normal times. Though carcasses hung well in the chilly altitudes where the camps were established, highly perishable foods - like meat – were always consumed before other types, like beans, that could be stored away. Fresh meat supplies were important to Mau Mau, hence the importance of the bomas, but animals were typically slaughtered just inside the forest fringe so that their tracks would not betray the jungle hideouts. The forest gangs did not always make the best use of potential food sources, however. For instance, attacks on settlers’ farms were avoided at times as it displeased the few squatters allowed to remain on them and, of course,

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189 Muriithi, *War in the Forest*, 92. Muriithi states that they tried to be selective on who they took food from when they went to the reserves. He indicates that they tried not to take food from “hard-working women whose husbands had been ‘rehabilitated,’” but would ask for food from large families or those they knew could afford it.
192 Ibid., 208.
provoked the security forces.\textsuperscript{193} Similarly, wild game eventually played an increasingly important role in the diet of isolated forest fighters even though those who had initially consumed it had been considered to be cowards and in violation of cultural norms.\textsuperscript{194} Despite other options and the higher risk, the forest fighters preferred drawing their supplies from the picked-over reserves. Given the number of groups commandeering supplies and the duress caused by villagisation and communal labour, individuals in the reserves became more and more reluctant to part with their meagre stores of food.\textsuperscript{195}

Food control was not as central to the British campaign as it was in Malaya despite the various measures that were undertaken to limit it.\textsuperscript{196} Erskine’s final report on the operations in Kenya during his command only mentions food control in passing.\textsuperscript{197} He steadfastly focussed on the elimination of the terrorists themselves, hence, his fixation on forest operations. The scale and scope of British efforts there were meant to turn the gangs into “hunted men on the run, kept short of food and supplies by their pursuers, and unsure whether a former friend was one of them or had been converted to the cause of the government.”\textsuperscript{198} This constant pressure fragmented and scattered the gangs. Lieutenant General Gerald Lathbury, Erskine’s successor, determined that large-scale operations

\textsuperscript{193} Furedi, \textit{The Mau Mau War}, 123.
\textsuperscript{194} Muriithi, \textit{War in the Forest}, 103. For those living of game considered as cowards see Barnett, \textit{Mau Mau from Within}, 295.
\textsuperscript{195} Wamweya, \textit{Freedom Fighter}, 151. Early on only the property of whites and loyalists was taken but then those who had taken the oath were punished. So the gangs then decided to take property indiscriminately. “Reserve- dwellers did not appreciate the reason for this change in tactics. As a result, their sympathy for the warriors was alienated as they saw the forest people come and take what little they had left.” See also Barnett, Mau Mau \textit{from Within}, 375. This alienation started in the last half of 1954.
\textsuperscript{196} Food denial operations did occur in 1953 but more as efforts at simply ambushing food parties moving between the forest and the reserves. See Lt Col J.K. Windeatt, \textit{The Devonshire Regiment: August 1945-May 1958} (Aldershot: The Forces Press, 1980), 57. Later in mid-1955 Operation HUNGERSTRIKE was carried out in the settled areas to stop cattle thefts. They dropped from an average of 150 to 50 per week afterwards. See D.M. Condit et al., \textit{Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict}, vol.3, \textit{The Experience in Africa and Latin America} (Washington: American University, 1968), 292.
\textsuperscript{197} Imperial War Museum, Erskine Papers, 75/134/4, \textit{The Kenya Emergency June 1953 – May 1955}.
promised few results against such a dispersed enemy and refocused his forces on “small patrols, pseudo gangs or tracker combat teams,” to deal with the remnants of the Mau Mau.199

The forest fighters undoubtedly felt the bite of hunger. Dissension amongst those remaining in the forest rose, surrenders increased, and by 1955 the gangs expended most of their time in searching for supplies.200 Michael Blundell, the main spokesman for the Europeans in Kenya, noted that by 1955 over 25 percent of the surrenders could be attributed to hunger.201 For the most part, the British denied food to the Mau Mau gangs indirectly as a consequence of their other tactics and practices and not as targeted operations. However, the persistence of their measures caused attrition and demoralization amongst the forest fighters. Between clearing Nairobi, enforcing villagisation, and smothering the forest with patrols, the British slowly starved the Mau Mau into submission.202

Conclusion

The control of food played an important role in all the case studies presented here. In western Canada the government pursued a policy of increasing in lieu of restricting food availability in hopes of containing the North-West Rebellion. The government implemented this policy immediately upon the outbreak of the conflict. In the other case studies many other tactics and techniques were tried before stringent food control measures were used to augment operations. In the Philippines severe food control measures were used to augment operations. In the Philippines severe food control measures were used to augment operations.

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measures were only applied in several of the final regional campaigns where other pacification techniques had been found wanting. In the South African War many other options were exercised, including inducements to the Boers to surrender, before the British seriously began to burn and denude the veldt of supplies. In Malaya food control became the prime focus of the security forces over the last years of the campaign. Though applied unevenly, food control contributed to the dissipation of the Mau Mau threat. Food control thus played a prominent role in the resolution of the conflicts studied.

What is demonstrated in these case studies is that food control must be detailed and systematic to be successful. If there is a wide variety of food sources available to the guerrilla or if there are leakages in the counterinsurgents’ control mechanisms, it will not be effective. In both South Africa and Kenya the diversity of food sources hampered efforts to restrict access to them. In these instances many of the techniques adopted were highly coercive and destructive. Only when they were applied as part of a broader strategy did they greatly contribute to success. Of note, food control was less destructive in theatres that were either already food deficit areas or where the diet was based on a single staple. Both in the Philippines and in Malaya, the security forces benefited from the limited availability of the main staple, rice. Comprehensive tactical-level measures had to be applied to ensure there was no leakage from the protected zones in the Philippines and the new villages in Malaya. Comprehensive regional strategies combining the efforts of all security forces were also required to choke off supplies. For food control to be effective, it had to be detailed and systematic and implementation throughout the complete operational area.
Food control measures have been used in various ways for coercive and persuasive purposes and their application has matured over time. In the North-West Rebellion the freer provision of rations was undertaken to persuade bands not to join the Métis uprising. Elsewhere, food restrictions were used to persuade those upon whom they were imposed to support the administration. In the Philippines, General Bell’s instructions and efforts to keep supplied those in the reconcentration zones demonstrated to them the benefits of no longer supplying the *insurrectos* in the boondocks. Similarly, in Malaya the regulation in the new villages permitted those who were wavering to refuse to smuggle out rice to the CTs. Coercion, of course, played a substantial role. In Kenya the scarcity of food in the reserves after villagisation led many to begrudge having to supply the forest fighters. In South Africa and the Philippines the devastation of local areas contributed to the eventual decision of the guerrillas to capitulate. Food control strategies matured between the 1880s and the 1950s, as did counterinsurgency practices in general, with the practices of scorched earth being replaced by more sophisticated techniques by the 1950s.

Food and its control will always be important in war. This can be especially so when countering an insurgency. Depending on local conditions and what access to outside food sources they have, the insurgents’ food supply chain can be a critical weakness. In four of the five case studies presented here the supply chain was targeted. In all cases hunger helped to induce surrendered and to a certain extent the insurgents were starved into submission. Food control thus made a significant contribution to the success of all these campaigns.
Chapter 7

The Utility of Population Control Measures in Small Wars

Each war is decidedly unique. As a minimum, there are differences in causes, in protagonists, in tactics and techniques, in geography, and in scale and scope. The side that mobilizes sufficient resources and applies the necessary operational techniques to wear down its opponents to the point where they concede the contest often secures the victory. Conventional conflicts can appear to be entirely a quantitative exercise. There is an expectation that the side that mobilizes more extensively and delivers more mass to the battlefield will achieve success.\(^1\) While mass (quantity) is often said to “have a quality all its own,”\(^2\) it does not assure victory, nor that victory, if achieved, will be either quick or easy. Mass provides even less of a guarantee of success in small wars. The elusiveness and purpose of the guerrilla fighter is time and again underestimated.\(^3\) What was said of the Boers applies to most guerrillas, “By avoiding all decisive actions, which might be unfavourable, they have succeeded in dragging on the war in an astonishing way.”\(^4\) The early structure and training of the security forces is usually inappropriate for the small war that confronts them. The simplistic assumption that a large mass of security

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2 A quote that was at the time was attributed to Stalin but was also commonly used in the historiography of World War II when inferring why the Russians defeated the German forces.
3 Meysey-Thompson captures the essence of guerrilla strategy well. He describes it as, “instead of trying to overwhelm our forces in pitched battles and destroy or capture our troops, they [the guerrillas] are trying to exhaust the supplies of men, money, and patience …by spinning out and protracting the campaign, and by inflicting in the meantime all the losses they can upon us by capturing convoys, trains, and taking our troops at a disadvantage as often as possible.” See H.M. Meysey-Thompson, “Light-Weights to Finish the War,” *The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review* 50, no.298 (December 1901): 1056-1066.
forces will overwhelm the insurgents is normally quickly disproved. So, what exactly are the best techniques a threatened government should consider employing?

The keys to success in small wars remain a hotly debated subject. Typically, armies continually review and examine their tactics, operations and strategies as they seek the best ways to overcome their opponent. They seek to adapt and gain sufficient advantage over their adversary to end the conflict. Simply calling for “more men, more horse” rarely solves the problem presented. These adaptations are codified as lessons learned and may be implemented immediately. For example, because of the accurate long-range fire of the Boers, Lord Roberts encouraged the greater use of the spade by the British soldiers in the South African War. For the same conflict, another proposal suggested the enlistment of undersized men, below the minimum height restriction of 5’6”, to enhance the mobility of the British mounted troops. The development of small unit jungle patrol tactics in Malaya and Kenya was a sign of a similar desire. There are always debates after a conflict as to what contributed most significantly to victory. These debates, unfortunately, can devolve into fights over resource and institutional preservation in the post-conflict environment rather than in realistic attempts to improve operational and tactical effectiveness. This trend is manifest in the British debates over air policing in their colonies in the 1920s, a practice justified as being more cost-effective than garrisoning them with infantry battalions. Even today, current studies of the utility of air power in counterinsurgency, at points, well overstate its value. Fortunately, the

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5 H.M. Meysey-Thompson, “Light-Weights to Finish the War,” The Nineteenth Century and After.
6 There is a valuable role for air power in small wars. This role has been well explored especially since the start of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are many useful works on the subject including Jim Corum’s Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorist (University Press of Kansas, 2003). For an overview of air policing see Neville Parton, “Air Power and Insurgency: Early RAF Doctrine,” in Air Power, Insurgency and “War on Terror,” edited by Joel Hayward, 31-44 (Cranwell: RAF Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009). For an example of the overstatement of air powers value see Stephen Chappell, “Air
works of John Pimlott and Ian Beckett have clarified some of the fundamentals essential to success in small wars. They viewed six principles as critical: 1) the need to recognize the political nature of the conflict; 2) the need to ensure the coordination of the military and civil response; 3) the need to ensure the coordination of intelligence; 4) the requirement to separate the insurgent from their base of popular support; 5) the appropriate use of military forces against the isolated insurgents; and 6) long-term reforms that address the grievances that helped spawn the insurgency.\(^7\) The necessity of separating the insurgents from their base of support has been well noted by Pimlott and Beckett and many others. How to actually achieve this separation, however, has not been well studied or documented.

In the modern state, we exist in a sea of controls. There are rules, regulations, ordinances and cultural norms that govern and dictate most aspects of modern life. Our pockets are full of cards that denote the granted permission of the authorities to obtain services and to conduct specified activities, like driving. The completion of a bevy of forms is required to obtain government services. These control mechanisms and their underlying bureaucracy influence how people interact and explicitly reveal societal expectations of appropriate conduct. This wealth of regulations, a \textit{mentalité} of social control, has developed incrementally over the last few centuries. The development and imposition of regulations has been more dramatic and hurried during periods of conflict and war. Regulations such as population control measures are significant to the resolution

of small wars as they allow the state to drain “the sea” from which the guerrillas draw their supplies and leave the guerrillas exposed and separated from their support. Population control measures allow the government to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the people and disrupt this critical relationship. This chapter synthesizes the concepts dealt with separately in the previous three chapters and will discuss the utility of the population control measures used to separate insurgents from their supporters and how breaking this linkage contributed to ending these types of conflicts.

Three main questions were posed in Chapter 2 to guide the examination of the case studies. They were as follows: Why was a particular population control measure selected from potential alternatives? How was the measure implemented once it was selected? Did the measure produce an obvious result that aided in the suppression of the insurgency? This chapter provides a detailed examination of these questions based on the comparative functional approach that was employed. Each question is considered in turn. Then a general analysis of the importance of population control measures to other important functional aspects of counterinsurgency campaigning is given. Last, an examination of the strategic value of these measures is undertaken.

Some final considerations are necessary before proceeding. Population control measures were used in each of the case studies, and some individuals found some of the specific measures used highly disagreeable. This analysis does not make such value judgements on their application; rather it focuses on their plain utility in separating insurgents from their base of popular support. In examining this utility, the population control measures are considered very broadly such as how they contributed to securing the population, won over wavering neutrals, or facilitated hearts and minds programs.
The measures were both qualitative and quantitative. They were qualitative in the sense that they were directed against weak points in the guerrillas’ infrastructure and dislocated the guerrillas’ key centre of gravity, their access to the population. The measures removed the population from the insurgents’ control and thereby rendered the population non-participants in the contest. The measures were quantitative in the sense that they brought the gaze and intrusion of the state directly to bear on all individuals through detailed administrative procedures. At the lowest level, they served to disaggregate groups by segregating and identifying specific individuals. This disaggregation caused the guerrilla organizations to become disjointed and dissipated the intensity of their underlying motivation and threat.

Population control measures were a form of bureaucratic violence used by the state to coerce, persuade and dissuade. States used these measures in the near term to segregate the population, but the measures equally served long-term common goods (future economic development, land reform, health service, etc.). In each case study caution was exercised in their imposition. States were generally well aware that those being so burdened would form the future polity of the state and planned accordingly, an outlook that echoes across British thinking on small wars. Finally, militaries rarely viewed these measures initially as “war winners” and turned to them only reluctantly, but as the struggle continued more and more are employed as their value become apparent.

As this analysis proceeds, the operational and strategic implications of the population control measures have to be kept fully in view when assessing their ultimate value.

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8 This necessity of being cautious when applying measures against one’s own or potential future citizens is often discussed but may not be so evident in practice. See John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 36.
Why Certain Population Control Measures Were Selected

Security forces selected and implemented particular measures for a number of reasons. First, they wisely looked to civil precedence as population control is commonly practiced by the modern state and these practices can easily be replicated in a small war. Second, some measures were selected because they mirrored common practices used within the military institutions themselves. Measures of this nature are visible in the standing orders and field service regulations of armies. Third, a number of measures were selected because there were immediate, demonstrable examples of their perceived contribution to the success of other military campaigns. Fourth, measures were developed through innovation and adaptation during the campaign. Finally, besides the other considerations, militaries selected measures that were permissible within the legal construct under which they conducted their campaign.

Population control measures have been borrowed from or modelled on long standing civil procedures. States, for instance, have long used censuses to count both their population and other resources. The treaties concluded with the Amerindians in the Canadian North-West included a key clause to conduct a census. Censuses were valuable in both the Philippines in the early 1900s and in Malaya in the 1950s. In Malaya it was fundamental to the successful planning of resettlement under the Briggs Plan. Some aspects of identity documentation were borrowed from civil practice, and, in some instances, the civil custom was retained. In the Philippines, for instance, the tax-certificate, the cedula, was employed as an internal passport in the early years of the
American occupation.\textsuperscript{9} The inclusion of fingerprints on identity cards in both the Malayan and Kenyan Emergencies was borrowed from civilian practice. Notably, only two thumbprints were included on ID cards in Malaya in order to avert the impression that the nation was becoming a police state.\textsuperscript{10} While many measures have been drawn from civil practice, the development of population control practices does not just flow in one direction. Security forces borrowed from civil practice, and, just as frequently, states exploited the techniques developed by the militaries in the post-conflict period. Resettlement serves as an example of this interchange. The use of resettlement as a technique in counterinsurgency does not seem to have a civil precedent, but, since the 1950s, it has been used by many regimes, most famously perhaps Tanzania, as a nation-building technique.

Some population control measures have been drawn from common military practices and usages. This is particularly evident in the use of passes to enforce movement control. It is likely that the idea to impose passes on the prairie Amerindians after the North-West Rebellion had its genesis in Hayter Reed’s long military service. Certainly, the pass regimes enforced by both sides in South Africa had their origins in their respective military services: the Boers with their field cornets and commandeering system; and the British with their military regulations and martial law. An argument could be made that the concentration camp system established in South Africa was merely an extension of the normal camp complex system all large armies establish when

\textsuperscript{9} For the importance of registration in the Philippines see Bernadette Beredo, “Import of the Archive: American Colonial Bureaucracy in the Philippines, 1898-1916” (PhD diss., University of Hawaii, 2011), 131-132.
in the field. The influence of military practices is unmistakable in food control where it is fundamentally a system of rationing. Controlling and ensuring a fair distribution of rations was critical in many countries in both World War I and II. Britain in World War II developed a sophisticated and complex system to do so. These experiences and practices undoubtedly contributed to the design of the food control programs in Malaya. Finally, the way in which a country normally fights a small war and the breadth of its experience in such conflicts influences the methods it chooses to prosecute one. This is especially true if a large number of senior officers with experience in fighting small wars served in leadership positions in subsequent ones. How the U.S. Army fought in the Philippines was influenced to a significant degree by the experience of many of its senior commanders in the frontier conflicts with Amerindians. Similarly, British practices in small wars have been remarkably constant from the period of imperial expansion to that of decolonisation.

Another reason population control measures were selected was because of examples of their immediate and successful use elsewhere. This was apparent in the use of reconcentration in the Philippines and in the establishment of burgher camps in South Africa. Military commanders in both cases were well familiar with the reconcentrado program employed by the Spanish in Cuba. While mirroring the generalities of the Spanish program, both armies, the American and the British, endeavoured to ensure the conditions for those confined were less severe than had been the case in Cuba. The use

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11 I used here the most common name by which they became known, but, as discussed to greater extent in Chapter 5, they were known alternatively as “refugee camps,” “burgher camps,” and then concentration camps.

12 For other examples of the use of reconcentration see Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), 36-37.

of comprehensive and sophisticated ID card and food control programs in post-1945 small wars was an immediate legacy of the extensive programs established in Britain in World War II. A national ID card had been issued in Britain during the war, and attempts were made to establish a similar ID card system in Kenya in 1950. Complete national registration was conducted in Malaya shortly after the Emergency was declared. The food control measures enforced in Malaya mirrored to a considerable extent those used in Britain during the war. Successful techniques from concurrent campaigns were regularly and eagerly sought out. The Kenyan administration borrowed heavily from the Malayan campaign. It benefited not only by borrowing proven techniques like the unified command structures and resettlement but also by securing advice from seasoned administrators and operators. Population control measures with well proven tactical and operational value quickly came into common usage on subsequent campaigns.

Governments and their security forces must be adaptable to be successful. As militaries adjusted and adapted to the conditions of their current campaign they commonly included population control measures in their operations. Adaptation, occasionally, was merely the realisation that conciliatory measures would not entice the hardcore, committed insurgents to concede and that more stringent measures were required. The failure of the initial conciliatory approaches both in the Philippines and South Africa led to the imposition of sterner measures. The militaries in both these cases demonstrated adaptability as refinements were made to broader population control

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14 As mentioned earlier in this study, the call for harsher measures is frequent during these campaigns. Firth when discussing South Africa notes that the “British authorities ....have been trying to subdue and conciliate at the same moment. The failure of this policy will not be thrown away ... In the next great war, whenever that may take place, we can expect to see guerrillas ruthlessly stamped out with unsparing and indiscriminate severity.” See J.B. Firth, “The Guerrilla in History,” *Fortnightly Review* 70, no.419 (November 1901): 803-811.
programs as the campaigns progressed. Likewise, as the campaign in Malaya unfolded, food control measures became highly refined. They were intensified or relaxed depending on the threat of CT activity in an area and the nature of the operation being conducted. This scalability helped turn individuals against the MCP. Furthermore, the planning procedures for food denial operations became highly structured as the campaign progressed. Sometimes, adaptability was demonstrated when successful population control measures were discovered with a strategic re-roling of other existing techniques. This was the case in the use of blockhouses in the South African War. The use of blockhouses to secure lines of communication is an ancient military practice, but Kitchener’s employment of them to segment the veldt was novel and highly effective.\textsuperscript{15} His strategic use of blockhouse lines allowed him to deny the Boers mobility, to protect those who had surrendered, and to better denude the veldt of supplies. To maintain their utility, population control measures cannot be static. They must be continually modified as the campaign is fought in order to obtain from them the best and most consistent tactical and operational benefit possible.

A final criterion for selecting population control measures was whether they were permissible under the legal construct under which the conflict was being fought. None of the measures imposed in the case studies were in violation of the legal regimes in place at the time of the specific conflict. In general terms, the measures used satisfied the understood and accepted dictates of military necessity. This is not to contest whether atrocities occurred or that poor decisions were made in the management of a number of the programs. Some specific measures were objectionable to some individuals based on

\textsuperscript{15} There are of course individuals who claim that it this overall strategy was their ideas. See Edward H. Fry, “Who Invented the Block-House System? – The Transvaal Critic,” \textit{Pretoriana} 73 (1977): 14-23.
their cultural or political views, but this does not mean that they did not serve a useful military function or were illegal. The measures imposed in the latter part of the campaign in the Philippines were compliant with the prescriptions of how to treat guerrillas contained in U.S. General Order 100.\textsuperscript{16} Martial law, a form of military governance, was proclaimed across most of South Africa during the war. Those that chafed under it considered it to be solely based on the will of the local commanders, and, admittedly, there were some martinets among them.\textsuperscript{17} However, the application of martial law by the British military was much more sophisticated than its opponents claim and detailed instructions were issued for its management. The likelihood that martial law could be declared in British colonies had passed by the 1950s.\textsuperscript{18} In its stead, both in Malaya and Kenya, extensive use was made of the relatively new practices of legislating “emergency regulations,” and population control measures were then enforced under these gazetted emergency regulations.\textsuperscript{19} While these ordinances removed governance from the hands of military authorities, most of the regulations were equal to or harsher than those that had typically been prescribed under martial law.\textsuperscript{20} In summary, the general techniques of


\textsuperscript{17} Of course, there was a fine sense of finesse in its application at times. See G.F. MacGunn, “A Light Side of Martial Law,” \textit{Temple Bar: A Monthly Magazine for Town and Country Readers} 128, no.516 (November 1903): 589-598. Martial law applied to British subjects too. It was under its strictures that Emily Hobhouse was barred from entry into Cape Colony and individuals were also deported who had failed to comply with the minutia of control measures. See “Gloomy Days for British. Deportation of Man for Disloyalty,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, Apr 27, 1901, 4.

\textsuperscript{18} A.W. Brian Simpson, \textit{Human Rights at the End of Empire} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 89.

\textsuperscript{19} I infer they are new as they had only come into practice during the Irish Uprising of 1920-21 and had then been used to a certain extent in Palestine in 1946-48. Their more full-scale use really began in Malaya and Kenya.

\textsuperscript{20} For aspects of this legal transition see David French, \textit{The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 3 – The Legal Context and Counter-insurgency by Committee and 137. French states, “The British conducted their counter-insurgency campaigns within the law. But it was a law that they largely created themselves, and it was one that left them with a wide latitude to act coercively yet legally.”
population control were permissible within the legal regimes that existed during the conflicts.

This section discussed some of the reasons why the population control measures used in small wars were selected. Pre-conflict civil usages were very important at times. In other cases, standard military practices were transferred into broader population control methodologies, meaning they were given wider scope by becoming applicable to both the military and civilians. Recent or concurrent examples of the effective use of population control measures elsewhere were also highly influential in determining the ones selected. Additionally, the legality of using a particular measure was considered. Whatever measures were initially selected, they were commonly adapted and modified as the campaign progressed. Next, this adjustment process is examined further as the implementation of population control measures is discussed.

**How Population Control Measures Were Implemented**

How population control measures were implemented gives us clues to their importance. Their centrality to the campaign along with the timing and scale of their implementation demonstrated their relative importance. For example, if they were applied routinely throughout a campaign, they can be viewed as part of the standard procedures, the normal administration and bureaucracy that supported the fighting of a war. Contrarily, if they were fielded as major strategic changes or additions at key junctures, they can be viewed as critical components of the subsequent campaign. In both instances, the measures had value where they contributed to the effectiveness of the government’s campaign. This section will examine whether the measures when applied displaced other
strategies, whether they were recognized as necessary from the start, whether they were refined and adapted as the campaign progressed, and whether the various measures were combined and synchronized into a broad systematic approach.

Population control measures did displace other strategic approaches. Admittedly, some of the campaigns studied here had an initial conventional phase in which major population control strategies would have been ill placed. For example, both in the Philippines and South Africa, the guerrilla phases, where these measure could have a telling effect, were only initiated after the conventional forces of the Filipinos and the Boers had been defeated and their respective capitals seized. Counter-guerrilla procedures only became the focal point of those campaigns after it was recognized that the war had not actually ended but had transformed in nature.²¹ The British began to develop and implement more stringent controls almost immediately. On the other side of the world, the U.S. forces in the Philippines took much longer to refine their counter measures. By the end of both these campaigns, population control measures figured heavily in the strategic approaches. Some minor population control measures were applied in both Malaya and Kenya from the earliest days, but initially the main strategy in those theatres was dominated by other considerations. A conventional approach, consisting of a mix of “jungle bashing” and intimidation, predominated in the early years in Malaya. Eventually, resettlement and then food control operations became more strategically important. With the Mau Mau in Kenya holding the initiative well into early 1954, the early approach of the security forces there was a reactive one based on brutality.

²¹ In both cases, the occupying forces, British and American, had little control or influence in the countryside and only a weak recognition of how the guerrillas would fight. When considering why Pretoria did not end the South African War one author noted, “It was not their business to defend the towns; they did their fighting on the veldt and in the kopjes, and we would find that we had yet plenty of work before us.” An Imperial Yeoman, “The Free State Boer,” Macmillan’s Magazine 84, no.499 (May 1901): 49-56.
and intimidation. Once the Mau Mau stranglehold on Nairobi was broken in April 1954, population control strategies became more prominent. In each of these case studies, population control measures evolved into the centre piece of the campaigns.

The requirement in certain of the case studies for specific population control measures was identified from the start. While the need may have been acknowledged, the measures were not always implemented immediately. This lag in implementation occurred when it was presumed that standard military tactics would be sufficient to quell the uprising, and, therefore, no other actions merited priority. Often this assumption that conventional military tactics would suffice had to be tried and to fail, unfortunately, before the value of previously unknown, undiscovered, or underutilized population control measures were considered. This lag may additionally occur when the military and the administration underestimate the threat they face and are therefore reluctant to mobilize and seriously commit resources to the conflict. The early benefit that could have potentially accrued from certain population control measures did not imply the need for draconian ones, despite the recurring mantra that harsher measures would yield a quicker resolution to the conflict. The resettlement program in Malaya is an example of an obvious requirement that was recognized early but greatly delayed in implementation. The MCP were known to be preying on the Chinese squatters scattered along the jungle fringe. The necessity to relocate them was broadly recognized with both the Squatter Committee’s report in 1949 and the Briggs Plan in 1950 recommending such action. Despite this support, the rulers of the Malay states were reluctant to allocate the necessary land to Chinese squatters to make the program successful, and Briggs only finally won their concessions because fighting had continued and intensified. In cases
such as this one, population control measures, even when of obvious strategic value, have been only be implemented after the administration recognized the depth of the challenges it faced and the scale of mobilization required in response.

For population control measures to remain effective, they must be adapted and refined as the campaign progresses. This is true for individual measures and for how they are wielded collectively. For example, passes for movement control have been employed in a variety of fashions. Both in South Africa and in Kenya, it was common for individuals to have a handful of passes (some undoubtedly forged), but their movement was not truly restricted. The quality of ID cards and their use in other campaigns was steadily improved upon. ID cards in Malaya were issued at first by the Malay states and were printed on a grade of paper that deteriorated quickly in the hands of the labouring peasants. Eventually, Federation-wide passes were introduced that were designed to be long lasting and hard to forge. Forgery-proof passbooks were similarly distributed after the clearance of Nairobi to control those Africans re-admitted to the city. Adaptation and improvements occurred in many campaigns at the system level too. The first tentative step towards success in Malaya was the institution of the national registration program. This greatly hindered the ability of the CTs to move freely about the country.

Subsequently, the resettlement program more forcefully created a physical separation between the CTs and the population. Yet this was not sufficient to completely shut off the flow of resources into the jungle as the Min Yuen ensured supplies still leaked out of the villages.\(^\text{22}\) This MCP supply had to be choked off as even a small trickle of supplies

\[^{22}\text{Riley Sunderland underscored the “functional importance of the Min Yuen.” He noted, “The guerrilla could no more operate without them than the army could without its logistical base. Indeed, the basic guerrilla LOC [note line of communication] was the path taken by the food supply parties of the Min Yuen. This LOC was as vital as any in the world, and also as vulnerable, once the soldiers and police had learned}^\]
could sustain the CTs indefinitely. Food control measures were then added to further restrict the guerrillas’ access to resources. As these cases well illustrate, population control measures can remain useful throughout a campaign when they are individually and collectively constantly adapted and refined.

The Value of Combining Population Control Measure

While a population control measure can be employed in isolation and does have a utility in its own right, it will have greater strategic consequence when used in combination with other measures. This potential to have greater combined effect is revealed in each of the case studies.

Only a limited number of population control measures were applied during the North-West Rebellion. There was not an individual pass system on the prairies at the time of the Rebellion. Rebellious or not, the Amerindians roamed where they pleased, and the cooped up inhabitants of Battleford had little knowledge of the whereabouts of Poundmaker and his followers. Likewise, neither Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Strange nor General Middleton could locate and run Big Bear’s band to ground. The reserves served as a movement control device with Dewdney cautioning bands to remain quiet upon them to both prove their loyalty and to avoid trouble with militia columns in their areas. This worked in some agencies but elsewhere bands fled far afield to avoid the troubles altogether. The most important measure for Dewdney was removing all restriction on the issuing of rations. Feeding them, he felt, dissuaded the bands from joining the uprising. This was considered especially important in convincing the Blackfeet, considered the

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most war-like tribe, from rising. Crowfoot, the Blackfoot chief, had considered joining in
the uprising but determined that it was not in the best interest of his tribe.\textsuperscript{23} Further south
in Alberta, the Bloods still bore great enmity against the Cree and would not have risen in
their support in any circumstances.\textsuperscript{24} The number of Amerindians willing to join Riel
may have been reduced by encouraging them to stay on their reserves and by increasing
their rations. Though these measures had some influence, the presence of masses of
Canadian troops and the short duration of the campaign likely had an added influence on
restraining Amerindian participation.

Only a few population control measures were applied in the conventional phase of
the Philippine-American War. They were incidental in that period of the contest. Passes,
based on the \textit{cedual} system, were used and restrictive curfews were enforced.\textsuperscript{25} The
Americans expected that with the defeat of Aguinaldo’s army and the seizure of his
capital, Malolos, hostilities would end. Instead, the Filipinos re-organized themselves and
launched a guerrilla campaign. It took considerable time for the Americans, whether
military or members of the civil administration, to realize the scale and scope of
resistance to their rule. Certainly, the Philippine Commission did not really understand
how weakly pacification was holding. The Americans devoted considerable attention to
estimating local municipal governments blissfully unaware that they contained shadow
organizations that fully supported the \textit{insurrectos}.\textsuperscript{26} The Americans’ “touching belief”

\textsuperscript{24} Hugh A. Dempsey, \textit{Red Crow: Warrior Chief} (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980), 133.
\textsuperscript{25} A pass system was used within the American Army of course. It was applied across all levels and even
general were occasionally held up if they did not have the proper paperwork. See “The Faithful Sentry and
\textsuperscript{26} Linnea P. Raine, “The Philippine Insurrection, November 1899- July 1902,” in \textit{Isolating the Guerrilla:
Supporting Case Studies}, vol. 3, 77-115 (Washington: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization,
1966), 86-87.
that the Filipinos would recognize the benefits and benevolence of their rule and then
give up the struggle endured until after the U.S. presidential election of November 1900,
when “this reasonable anticipation was not fulfilled.” Population control measures up the
end of 1900 had not been particularly stern, but then General MacArthur declared martial
law across the islands in December. He outlined the exact behaviour he expected from
the Filipinos, and the harsh measures that would follow if these instructions were not
complied with.\(^\text{27}\) Subsequently, a wide range of measures was collectively applied to
suppress the continuing regional-based localized struggles.

Many of the senior American commanders in 1901 had been fighting in the
Philippines since the first shots were fired in 1899. They had gathered considerable
experience in fighting the *insurrectos* (often considered to be just landrones – bandits).
Their collective experience informed the implementation of the regional strategies where
combinations of population control measures were tailored and applied to meet the
demands of the local situations. A mixture of curfews, pass controls, concentration of the
population in the barrios, and restrictions on food stocks was first combined for good
results in the 1st District of Northern Luzon in April 1901. One of the long-serving US
commanders, General Young, had initiated these measures in Northern Luzon, and
General Bell was in command when the district was finally pacified.\(^\text{28}\) Bell employed the
practices established there later that year in the final campaign in Luzon, the pacification
of the province of Batangas. In that province, Bell successfully and energetically

\(^\text{27}\) Martial law did not immediately deny resources to the *insurrectos*. It was reported in early 1901 that the
Americans went on numerous “hikes” but “cutting off the sources of supplies continues to be an enormous
problem,” and that the *insurrectos’ “sinews of war” continue to be raised largely in Manila.” See

\(^\text{28}\) Young was long an advocate for harsher methods similar to those used by other colonial powers. For
example of concurrent Dutch practices see Emmanuel Kreike, “Genocide in the Kampongs? Dutch
Nineteenth Century Colonial Warfare in Aech, Sumatra,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 14 (September-
combined movement control restrictions, reconcentration zones, and the control and denial of food stocks. This combination of measures hastened the surrender of the remaining organized Filipino forces holding out in the province. General Smith used a similar combination of measures on Samar to force an equally intractable guerrilla leader to surrender. Brig. Gen. Robert Hughes likewise carried out comparable operations on various islands in the Visayan group - including Cebu, Panay, and Leyte. The U.S. Army had learned by the end of the Philippine-American War that skilful combinations of population control measures helped defeat irregular opponents.

Only one population control measure was immediately applied in South Africa by both opponents before the fall of Pretoria, pass control systems. The use of passes had a long history within South Africa and within the Boer Republics in particular. Before the war pass restrictions applied principally to the Africans. They had been required to carry them when traversing or entering white controlled areas from the early 1800s; not an unsurprising requirement given the long history of frontier warfare in South Africa. Passes of a different nature, primarily for labour control, were developed for the “native” in the late 1890s. Passes were also important within the Boer commandeering system. As the likelihood of war increased in late 1899, utilanders were required to possess passes too. Utilanders still in the Republics in the last months before October 1899 were required to obtain permits to stay and passes to leave. They lived under the constant threat that they and their possessions would be commandeered for service with the Boer

29 In those islands the government only issued enough rice to civilians for one meal at a time to prevent supplies from reaching the insurrectos. See “Rebels Slain by Rifle Fire of Americans,” The Atlanta Constitution, Oct 28, 1901, 1.
30 For details of some of the aspects of how passes were applied see H.R. Fox Bourne, Black and Whites in South Africa: An Account of the Past Treatment and Present Condition of South African Natives Under British and Boer Control, 2nd ed. (London: P.S. King & Son, n.d.).
field forces. The British system was equally comprehensive with passes required by any and all who wished to accompany the advancing troops or those who wished to secure passage on the rail lines. Passes were required for practically all activities once martial law was declared in the Republics and in many districts of Cape Colony. Passes, by themselves, afforded some control over one’s own forces, but little or none over the opposition. For example, Boers who came in to surrender after the fall of Pretoria were required to swear an oath of allegiance, and then they were given passes to return to their farms. Local commandos quickly forced many of them to re-take the field. Without protection, the passes provided no guarantee of good behaviour nor did they restrict movement. Other measures were required to secure the defeat of the Boers.

Kitchener ultimately combined blockhouse lines, concentration camps and scorched earth tactics to defeat the Boers. Passes by themselves had not hampered the Boer commandos’ ability to elude British forces. Blockhouse lines, first constructed in June 1901, were continually extended and in the end hemmed in the Boer commandos. However, the strategic potential of the blockhouses could not be fully exploited until the Boers no longer possessed the firepower necessary to capture them, and until an economical design was discovered to make their widespread construction affordable. Each new blockhouse line further segmented the veldt that then allowed the British to systematically clear the contained space. The Boers were initially contemptuous of the lines but soon found that they denied them access to supplies and that they were difficult to drive herds of cattle across (the herds served as the commandos’ on-the-hoof food supply). The systematic attack on the Boer food supplies, the scorched earth policy, had

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started much earlier. Farms were being burned daily and the veldt scraped clean of fodder and food by late 1900. Families found on the farms were sent in to the concentration camps. Kitchener threw blockhouse lines across the veldt, orchestrated massive sweeps, and liberally applied the torch in his coordinated campaign of resource denial. The application of these combined measures intensified after the Boers refused to come to terms in early 1901 at Middleburg. The persistent pressure of these measures wore down the resolve of the Boers over the intervening year. Kitchener decided in December 1901 not to accept any more Boer refugees into the camps. This, along with the forlorn condition of many of the commandos, impelled the Boers to capitulate in May 1902. The combined application of these broad measures is what at last forced the bitter-end to concede in South Africa.

The Malayan Emergency was fought as a small war from the start. Today it is heralded as a paradigm of how a counterinsurgency campaign should be fought. Population control measures were applied in a staged fashion as their need was discovered and their uses refined. Many of the measures were applied only after conventional strategies and tactics had been tried and found wanting. The requirements for an identification program were recognized at once. A registration program was announced within a month of the declaration of the Emergency and shortly thereafter it

33 Testifying before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa in regards to his own supplies Kitchener stated, “The local resources of South Africa proved to be very much larger than anticipated.” Herein lay the problem too with denying supplies to the commandos and the proximate requirement for the scorched earth policy. See Royal Commission on the War in South Africa. Minutes of Evidence, vol. 1, Cd.1790 (1904), 9.

34 “The Boer War Sequel: England’s Solution for Reconstruction,” New York Times, July 28, 1902, 10. The author points out the Boers’ opinion on the blockhouse lines. “It was his blockhouse system, they say, that brought them to surrender.”

35 Karl Hack categorizes the early period of the war (1948-1949) as a period of counter terror where the strategy was distinctly coercive and intimidatory. See Karl Hack, “Everyone Lived in Fear: Malaya and the British Way of Counter-insurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23 (October-December 2012): 671-699.
was decided to apply it nationwide.\textsuperscript{36} The first areas in which ID cards were issued were in the controlled zone along the border with Thailand and in the hotly contested state of Perak. The program was then expanded to include all of the Malay states. A national registration bureau was established to assure centralized control and direction of the program. The national ID cards permitted the police and military forces to directly enforce movement control. The program separated the MCP from their supporters, and later, the central registry of the national program would aid the work of the special branch, the intelligence arm of the police force. The program was highly useful in itself, but other measures were required.

The other measures used in Malaya were first resettlement and later food control. National registration formed a low barrier between the CTs and the people and then resettlement provided a sturdier wall. Resettlement and regroupment removed the squatters and labourers from the immediate grasp of the CTs. The fences and cleared areas around the New Villages and the regroupment sites provided a physical barrier to the CT bands. By removing the squatters from the jungle fringes, the CTs were forced to cross the dangerous and exposed ground between the fringe and the fences in order to seek supplies. The gates of the villages and compounds provided important checkpoints where individuals could be screened and searched every day, pragmatically on a continuous basis. But only small amounts of food needed to be smuggled out daily to ensure there was sufficient food available for the guerrillas in the jungle (each guerrilla needed about five pounds of rice per week). Supporters smuggled out food in ingenious fashions; so, detailed food control regulations were required to eliminate this trickle of supplies. Food denial operations became the primary focus of the security forces in the

\textsuperscript{36} Adkins, \textit{The National Identity Card Program}, Appendix XIII.
last years of the Malayan Emergency. These operations could be conducted because of the existence of the ID card system and the resettlement program. It was the combination of these measures that ultimately yielded success in Malaya with food control and resettlement being considered to have been “of decisive importance.”

Population control measures were not widely used in Kenya at first. The requirement for Kikuyu to be registered, based on a pass system modeled on the kipande, was imposed by emergency regulations in late September 1952, even before the formal declaration of the Emergency. The system of indirect rule limited the usefulness of this measure. The pass system was targeted at squatters in the White Highlands, and, so much like the kipande, it was meant for Kikuyu living off the reserves. The passes did not aid in the identification of friends and foes in the reserves. The bulk repatriation of squatters to the reserves in early 1953 overwhelmed the ability of the local administrators and chiefs to know who was in their locations, sub-areas, and districts. This rendered the reserves largely terra incognita to the security forces. The conduct and practices of the security forces in the early months of the Emergency also reduced the potential value of population control measures. The round up of the suspected Mau Mau leaders, a decapitation strategy, left no moderates with whom a settlement could have been negotiated. The settler-informed strategy of brute force – knock enough heads and the African will submit – underpinned many of the early operations of the security forces and

37 Under the concept of indirect rule the administration within the Kikuyu reserves had been left mainly to the appointed chiefs under the guidance of British district officers and provincial administrators. Many of the regulations and institution that operated outside the reserves were not replicated within them. For instance, the Kenyan Police did not operate within the reserves prior to the Emergency as the much more rudimentary Tribal Police patrolled these areas.

38 This is not to imply that they were not applied. There is a long list of measures that were established in late 1953 such as the extension of registration to Embu and Meru in September, the end of repatriation to the reserves in the same month, and the imposition of a curfew in Nairobi between 7 p.m. and 5.30 a.m. in early October. They were not the centrepieces of strategy though. See Henry Swanzy, “Quarterly Notes,” *African Affairs* 53, no.210 (January 1954): 4-41.
pushed aside more nuanced strategies. All Kikuyu were treated as guilty of being Mau Mau and this greatly reduced the ranks of those willing to collaborate with the security forces. Despite this hard-handed approach, the Mau Mau retained the initiative in the reserves until late in 1953 when General Erskine wrested it away. It was not until mid-1954 when substantive and substantial population control measures were put into practice that the conflict turned in favour of the government.

The major turning point in the Mau Mau rebellion occurred 1954 with the application of a comprehensive system of population control measures.\textsuperscript{39} Attempts had been made prior to 1954 to halt the flow of supplies from Nairobi into the reserves by making a pass necessary to enter the reserves, but this did not stem the flow.\textsuperscript{40} Erskine, once he recognized the importance of Nairobi to the Mau Mau supply effort, prioritized the clearance of Nairobi of Mau Mau supporters. Operation ANVIL, launched in April 1954, thousands of Kikuyu, Meru and Embu were swept off the streets of Nairobi and then processed: screened and then detained, repatriated to the reserves, or allowed to return to the city.\textsuperscript{41} Those few permitted back into the city were issued forgery proof passbooks. Villagisation was implemented in the reserves directly thereafter, and in short months over one million Kikuyu were resettled into protected villages. Villagisation

\textsuperscript{39} Population control measures were vital as they helped the security forces address several major operational deficiencies: the security forces had expanded rapidly and were inexperienced; they were operating in rugged and unknown terrain with poor communications infrastructure; there was a language barrier (few whites knew Kikuyu); and the Mau Mau “had almost complete information on British movements,” while the security forces initially had little intelligence on the Mau Mau. See D.M. Condit, “Kenya (1952-1960)” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 3, The Experience in Africa and Latin America, ed. D.M. Condit, et al (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), 292.


\textsuperscript{41} This was Operation Anvil. It was not the first large clearing operation that had occurred in Nairobi. Similar sweeps had occurred in late March 1953 (over 7,500 detained), 18 July 1953 (over 17,000 individuals screened), and 5 October 1953 (between 15,000 and 20,000 “illegal” African residents evicted). See Chronology of International Events and Documents 9, no.7 (19 –31 March 1953), 198; Chronology of International Events and Documents 9, no.14 (9 –22 July 1953), 442; and Chronology of International Events and Documents 9, no.19 (17 September – 7 October 1953), 603.
combined with the mile-wide strip cut along the base of the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests made re-supply for the forest fighters increasingly problematic.\textsuperscript{42} As collecting food from the reserves had been made more troublesome, measures were also introduced in the settler areas to limit the accessibility of food such as enclosing cattle in \textit{bombas} (a corral) every night. While small bands of fighters remained in the forest for several more years, the combination of passbooks, villagisation and food control had reduced Mau Mau by 1955 into only a “nuisance.”\textsuperscript{43}

Population control measures were used to varying degrees in all of the case studies. Their contribution to the eventual success of the campaigns was often quite significant. While they were only secondary part of the overall strategy during the North-West Rebellion, they contributed to its swift end by keeping bands from joining the Métis. Careful combinations of population control measures in the other case studies formed a major part of the strategic approach that led to the successful termination of those conflicts. The restriction on their movements, the limitations on their access to the population, and the constraints on their ability to obtain food and other supplies wore down the guerrilla opponents. Individual measures made their own useful contribution, but it was when employed in combination that the measures slowly but surely lead to the demise of these insurrections. This is not to infer that population control measures are the only mechanisms that will ensure victory. Other key strategies must be equally and concurrently pursued including the following: government forces have to be properly equipped and trained; intelligence networks have to be developed; education, health and


\textsuperscript{43} “Mau Mau held Reduced to ‘Nuisance’ in Kenya,” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor}, June 23, 1955, 10.
development initiatives have to be programmed; arms and ammunition have to be denied to the enemy; and the hardcore elements have to be contained or eliminated. Population control measures form a useful baseline for implementing these other requirements. How they contribute to these other functions is discussed below.

The Demonstrated Value of Population Control Measures

How can the contribution of population control measures to ending conflicts be measured? This question is challenging as few statistical methodologies can directly reveal the value of the application of population control measures to conflict termination. Other methods are required to validate their contribution. The testimony of the combatants points to their military utility, but care must be taken in handling information from these informants. Their message may be crafted to advance a political end or the promotion of a continuing narrative of grievance and propaganda that is not uncommon particularly in testimony from the losing side. The testimony from the victors can yield better evidence as attributing success to certain factors and then carrying these practices forward to subsequent campaigns reveals their perceived value. How external observers, those outside the operational theatre, make proposals for the use of or comment on the population control measures imposed provides an indication of their importance as well. Finally, the durability of a population control measure can demonstrate worth. The immediate value of a population control measure is in how it contributes to the resolution of the extant conflict. If it continues to be practiced in the post-conflict environment, it demonstrates a wider security or nation-building value to the society and state that

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44 For an example of this process see Liz Stanley and Helen Dampier, “Cultural Entrepreneurs, Proto-Nationalism and Woman’s Testimony Writings: From the South African War to 1940,” *Journal of South African Studies* 33, no.3 (September 2007): 501-519.
employs it. With these considerations in mind, the contribution of population control measures in helping terminate conflicts is examined below.

Insurgent testimony can indicate the influence of specific population control measures on their decision to surrender. When General Malvar surrendered in Batangas, the last Philippine province still holding out in 1902, he commented on the effectiveness of the population control measures employed by General Bell in forcing him to quit the contest. Similarly, the discussions of the Boer delegates prior to and during the negotiations for the Treaty of Vereeniging amply revealed the influence of population control measures on the conflict and on the Boer decision to concede. Kitchener’s decision in late 1901 not to accept any more Boer women and children into the concentration camps constrained the Boers’ choices, but the chief impediment to their continuing was the lack of food. Food supplies were scarce, even critically so, due to the blockhouse system and the scorched earth policy, and while some areas within the Boer Republics still had sufficient supplies to continue resistance, many did not. There was no formal surrender of organized resistance forces in either Malaya or Kenya. In both cases, many insurgents voted with their feet once population control measures had become too onerous to bear. Hunger, an indicator of the effectiveness of food control measures, drove many guerrillas into giving themselves up. From the guerrillas’ perspective then, population control measures repeatedly had a direct influence on their decisions to surrender.

How the victors describe the value of population control measures exposes their perceived significance. The North-West Rebellion ended too quickly for a broad sweep of population control measures to become necessary. Yet Dewdney considered that
keeping the Amerindians quiet on their reserves, a factor in the post-Rebellion evaluation of their loyalty, in combination with increasing their rations to have been critical to limiting their participation. General Bell’s campaign was lauded by his superiors and considered a superb model for operations of that nature. Kitchener had few qualms about enforcing draconian measures, but he did not explicitly record what he considered to be the keys to success in South Africa. British official histories of the conflict, pointing more antiseptically through statistics to the results, note the pragmatism of the scorched earth policy and the pressure maintained on the Boer commandos by a combination of the blockhouse lines and the massive drives. The worth of population control measures to the success in Malaya is frequently recounted. All of them – the ID card system, resettlement, and food control – played significant roles and have been recorded in memoirs, histories and reports. There is less discussion of their value in Kenya as tales of pseudo-gangs, special branch operations and detention camps form the bulk of the writing on that conflict. The massed application of key population control measures in 1954 demonstrated their utility by tipping the campaign in favour of the administration. Ultimately, the narrative of the victors of these conflicts confirms the use and utility of population control measures.

At times, external actors such as media commentators, politicians, and foreign militaries propose population control measures. The number of unsolicited proposals usually increases when a conflict wears on longer than expected or when an opinion forms that the military leaders have failed to recognize the nature of the conflict they are involved in (and, hence, have failed to apply the appropriate techniques). These proposals may be mere exhortations that more severe measures should be enforced without a full

examination of the impact of such actions. In South Africa, for instance, Kitchener was not only encouraged to take harsher measures, but it was recommended that he establish a camp system like the one used by General Weyler in Cuba.\textsuperscript{46} Some individuals proffered advice on the construction of blockhouse lines, perhaps forgetting that Kitchener was a Royal Engineer. Others, including Milner, suggested that the best approach to fight the guerrillas was to establish protected areas and then expand operations outwards from there.\textsuperscript{47} Sometimes, proposals from outsiders were tested then employed as commanders sought solutions to the ongoing campaigns. These suggestions demonstrate that population control measures can be perceived to have strategic significance by outside actors.

The perceived value of a population control measure can be seen in whether it is carried forward as a practice for subsequent use. This assertion needs to be qualified as each campaign is unique and what works in one conflict may be grossly misapplied in the context of a different campaign. General Bell synchronized several types of measures in his successful campaign in Batangas including reconcentration. Reconcentration was later used against landrones by the civil administration in the Philippines for years afterwards. Even later, Bell’s circular orders for the campaign were re-printed and distributed as the U.S. planned to re-intervene in Cuba in 1906. This resurfacing and re-studying of Bell’s campaign points to the perceived utility of the measures he used. Similarly, lessons from Malaya have been constantly advocated for employment in other small wars.\textsuperscript{48} Lessons


\textsuperscript{48} Leon Comber suggests many of the British practices were drawn from Japanese ones used in Malaya during World War II. Thomas Mockatais suggests that the British Army’s adaptability was more likely
about police procedures, command structures and resettlement programs were immediately applied in Kenya but were less effective there because of differences in the structure of its colonial society and the preference of some of the Kenyan security forces for heavy-handed action. A blindness to local cultural norms and societal structures also limited the value of Malayan lessons in the Vietnam conflict. Studying the Malayan registration program may have improved that Vietnamese system but attempts to carry out a similar resettlement program repeatedly failed.\footnote{Where population control measures have been identified as useful, they have been typically carried forward into subsequent operations.} A blindness to local cultural norms and societal structures also limited the value of Malayan lessons in the Vietnam conflict. Studying the Malayan registration program may have improved that Vietnamese system but attempts to carry out a similar resettlement program repeatedly failed.\footnote{As Bernard Fall noted, the “strategic hamlet” program was a, “slavish imitation of a Malayan pattern totally inapplicable to Vietnamese conditions.” See Bernard Fall, \textit{Viet-Nam Witness, 1953-66} (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), 197. For a summary of some of the problems with the program see Richard A. Hunt, \textit{Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Mind} (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 20-25 and Michael E. Latham, \textit{Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 151-207.}

A final indication of the demonstrated value of a population control measure is its durability. The military utility of a population control measure is time bounded for if they are not perceived to be helping to end the existing conflict they will be quickly discarded. Some measures, like food control regimes, are tolerated in an emergency situation but are unwelcome in normal day-to-day life. Durability extends beyond the military functionality to whether civil agencies perpetuate a measure. For instance, the Philippine Constabulary after 1902 replicated many of the control measures practiced by the U.S. Army. The registration program in Malaya served as a national census. It helped in planning resettlement, conferred a sense of citizenship on cardholders, and underpinned

development programs for the Malays after the Emergency. The resettlement program itself transformed the urban and economic landscape of Malaya, and many of the New Villages continue to exist today. Conversely, in Kenya villagisation was more dramatic and draconian but left less of a telling mark on the countryside. While the need to conduct resettlement has been hotly disputed during many conflicts, it has seen widespread and frequently unsuccessful application under peacetime conditions since 1960. This has been particularly the case in both Ethiopia and Tanzania. Population control measures have proven value to deliver both short term military objectives and long term state social goals when used appropriately.

The Contribution of Population Control Measures to Other Measures

Population control measures work best when there is coordination between the military and civil elements in small wars. This coordination is important as many population control programs must be drawn from civil administrative practices, and civil administrators must prepare for post-conflict reconstruction. In the North-West Rebellion, Dewdney at the behest of General Middleton issued his proclamation requiring the Amerindians to remain on their reserves. In the Philippines, while there was regularly a tense relationship between the civil government and the military, there was general agreement over the requirements for nation-building and over the firm measures employed by the military to secure the final capitulations. In South Africa, the military


governors oversaw the annexed Boer Republics as long as martial law was enforced, but at the same time, Milner and his staff prepared for the transfer of responsibilities to them. In Malaya, unity of control was the cornerstone of operations. This was exemplified not only by the integrated war executive committees at all levels but in the duality of civil and military responsibilities held by General Templer. This coordination was highly refined by the time comprehensive food denial operations were launched later in the Emergency. In Kenya, the establishment of a War Council in 1954 immensely improved civil-military coordination. In each of the cases, the diverse nature and potential strategic impact of population control measures required and encouraged detailed coordination between the civil and military elements.

Population control measures, especially pass control systems, are important to the development of useful and exploitable intelligence and to deny intelligence to the enemy. In the Philippines it was realized late in the campaign the importance of keeping records on the leaders in the barrios and provinces in order to track their activities and their support of the *insurrectos*. In Malaya the national registration system allowed the special branch to thoroughly investigate individuals who were suspected of supporting the MCP. In their own ways, both resettlement and food control measures contributed to the development of actionable intelligence. Monitoring the carts leaving the burgher camps in South Africa occasionally revealed those who were smuggling food to the

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commandos. Resettlement in Malaya and Kenya forced the guerrillas and their supporters into different movement patterns which once recognized could then be exploited. Resettlement afforded the further benefit of providing a sense of security to the inhabitants of protected villages. Many of them then refused to provide resources to the guerrillas arguing that it was too difficult to carry contraband past security force screening teams. Additionally, many villagers became more willing to provide information on guerrilla activities once they felt more secure from their depredations.55 Food control measures contributed to the development of intelligence in all of the conflicts presented here. For example, in Malaya hardcore, the truly committed Min Yuen, food suppliers would be arrested which led to their replacement by individuals who were less committed to the struggle. The special branch would then try and turn these less dedicated replacements. In Kenya, security forces trailed Mau Mau raiding parties back to their forest hideouts by following the tracks of the stock they had stolen, and pseudo-gangs repeatedly used the ruse of “seeking food” to gain access to supporters’ huts. In all these ways, population control measures provided good fodder for the intelligence war.

Population control measures support the attritional methods necessary to eliminate the hardcore elements amongst the guerrillas. ID cards, as noted above, helped by dividing and separating the guerrilla from the general population and clarifying the identity of all. Others worked by forcing the otherwise elusive guerrilla into the open and

thereby making them more exposed targets for security forces actions. Linear obstacles, such as the mile-wide strip in Kenya forced a physical separation upon the guerrillas. The mile-wide strip was interlaced with police and military posts that placed the forest fighters at enormous risk of discovery for if they wanted supplies they had to gingerly cross it to reach the reserves and then re-cross it burdened with whatever supplies they had managed to obtain. Similarly, the CTs in Malaya had to cross from the jungle fringe to the wire around the New Villages to secure supplies. This exposed them to the military and police frame work ambushes in the intervening ground and the home guards patrolling the perimeter fences. Zone designations were also used to increase the risk to the guerrilla as movement within these zones was either tightly controlled or forbidden completely. The security force could immediately open fire on encountering anyone in certain designated zones. Population control measures heightened the exposure and, therefore, the risk for the guerrilla and improved the ability of the security force to harry, harass and attrit them.

Population control measures have also made programs that addressed the underlying grievances of the conflict more effective. They did so in some respects by providing a captive audience for hearts and minds programs. Governments and militaries prosecuting small wars, whether in a conquered country or a colony, normally hold to the view that the greater portion of the population are or have the potential to become future loyal citizens. However, conciliatory approaches by themselves, like those initially used in the Philippines and South Africa, have rarely worked to sway the majority in favour of the administration. They contributed more effectively when reinforced by detailed control; that is, control sufficient to have strategic effect especially resettlement and to a
more limited extent food control. Characteristically, programs that delivered previously unavailable services accompanied resettlement such as education and health care. The most significant inducement was normally an offer of land. In Malaya, those who were resettled received their own individual plots of land, whereas in Kenya the existing land holdings were simply consolidated, with those already loyalists benefiting the most.56

Land grievances were well addressed in Malaya but considerably less so in Kenya. In both countries, the broader provision of government services was expected to draw support to the existing administrations. Population control measures supported the provision of government programs, goods and services where previously unavailable and thereby helped mitigate some of the underlying causes of a conflict.

A Strategic View of Population Control Measures

Small wars are a form of total war. This is particularly true for the guerrillas as they mobilize the population as completely as possible in support of their cause. To win wars of this nature, a state must devote considerable attention to counteracting the guerrillas’ efforts by controlling the population. This does not imply that repression is necessary or even useful, but it does mean that the state must extend its bureaucratic hold over the people to maintain what it perceives as the common good. There must be visible demonstrations of state power to convince the population of the state’s seriousness and intent. The state during the period of the conflict must become more intrusive, achieve

56 John Ade Otieno, “Land Politics and Class Development Among the Kikuyu in Kenya’s Central Province, 1900-1969” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 1984), 152 and 174. Land consolidation to a great degree benefited existing landholders. When the Emergency ended there was a scramble for land by those who had been either dispossessed or who possesses not land in the first place. There was little to hold people in the locations of the resettlement villages. The difference in the success of resettlement over the long-term in the two colonies is related to land tenure. In Malaya there was an individualization of land tenure for all, but in Kenya it was for the few.
better penetration into the daily lives of individuals, and employ a mixture of persuasive and coercive measures. The population must be both made to feel an equal part of the state as citizens and responsible to observe its social norms and regulations. Large conventional wars may be the continuation of policy by other means (armed force), whereas small wars are the continuation of population control by more intrusive means (administration). This intrusive extension of administration in small wars is accomplished through the use of population control measures.

One of the broad objectives of population control measures is proving to the population the implied benefit of being a citizen of the state. The state accomplishes this end by providing them services, affording them security and protection, and where practical addressing their underlying grievances. Population control measures render visible the state’s interest. The state may bind the population to itself and show them that they will not be left to their own devices, somehow apart from the conflict. At the same time, population control measures uncloak those working against the state and make them vulnerable. Population control measures can be decisive even though they are banal instruments of power. They are not military or police specific procedures but primarily bureaucratic ones. They are often drawn from existing institutional practices or the existing usages of governance in both emergencies and peace. Their application ranges from the micro to the macro level. Their application is not necessarily blunt as their intended effects can be quite precise. The sophistication with which they are applied is determined by the skill and organization of the bureaucracies implementing them.

Population control measures have an important place in the military strategies employed in small wars. The use of force, usually the cornerstone of military strategy,
can be problematic as it cannot assure a quick victory in these wars. Population control measures have the advantage of targeting the use of force only against those who have been identified as the enemy and supporting the resource denial strategies that are so important in this type of warfare. Resource denial is a qualitative approach as it strikes at the weaknesses of the guerrillas, namely their need for supplies to field and sustain combat forces. Population control measures have a quantitative aspect as they are the mass of underlying micro-control processes that make resource denial possible. Militaries need strategies for small wars that are significant and durable. At the same time, the decision to implement population control measures, given the scale and scope of many of these programs, requires major strategic commitment. Like all strategies, the expected gain from their use must be carefully weighed against the resources that will be expended to implement them. Control measures take time to put into action, and it takes time to realize their full influence on the conflict. Even considering the commitment and time required for the effects of these measures to become evident, these case studies show that population control measures have proven strategic value and durability.

Militaries benefitted through the use of population control measures beyond their contribution to resource denial. How these measures contributed to the protection of the population is significant. General Sherman may have wanted civilians “to feel the hard hand of war,” but depending on the zeal of the guerrilla supporters this was not generally a useful strategy in small wars. Population control measures segregated and distinguished foe from friend and thereby made the population contested not contestants. Pass systems, 

\[57\] The guerrilla’s operational problems appear different then those of the regular soldier but they are not – “both guerrilla and regular soldier must eat; both require ammunition; both need intelligence; both must have replacements. For the guerrilla, most of these operational requirements are met entirely or in part from local civilian support.” See *Isolating the Guerrilla*, vol. 1, 9.
areas designations and other movement control measures contributed to the separation of the guerrillas from the people. Resettlement schemes further enhanced this physical separation, and furthermore contributed to a psychological separation. First, services were made available in the new settlement that won support for the government. Second, individuals were exposed to the full view of government authorities, and the overt government presence converted weak supporters of the guerrillas and fence-sitters to the government’s side. Both movement control and resettlement restricted the choices of the population, excluding them from the conflict and rendering them truly non-participants.

How population control measures impact the choices of the insurgents and the people has great strategic importance. The choices of both are delimited by their respective self-interests and the degree of sacrifice and burden they are willing to bear to achieve their objectives. The persistence and harshness of the imposed measures influences when and why each group makes choices. For the guerrilla, their counter-responses to population control measures are often dramatic and violent when they are first imposed. However, when the government persists with their application, the viable responses available to the guerrillas significantly diminish. The continual pressure from a broad range of measures combined with military operation induces many guerrillas to quit the contest. Guerrillas are exposed to attacks, threats, coercion, cajoling and persuasion, and the same is true for the wider population. In fact, the population is caught between the demands for support from both the guerrillas and the government. If the guerrillas have easy access to the population to intimidate them, few will want to be seen as government supporters. Unprotected, the population’s choice is stark. Afforded protection, their choices become more distinct. As the government’s influence, power and
presence are extended, their choices become clearer again. This is especially true if the government is perceived as winning. A tipping point is often reached when government support has risen to such an extent that support for the guerrilla drains away. To be effective population control measures must have a direct effect on the choices available to the guerrillas and to the population.

**Conclusion**

Small wars are different from conventional conflicts and each is unique in itself. Geographic and social differences aside, they are similar in the critical relationship that links the guerrilla with the people as the population provides the bulk of necessary resources to the guerrilla organization: recruits, funds and food. The major challenge in counteracting a guerrilla opponent is determining how to apply sufficient pressure on this elusive enemy to force them to give up. Population control measures are amongst the techniques that can be used to persuade and coerce the guerrillas. The great utility of population control measures is that they separate the guerrillas from the people. A variety of these measures exist in the strategic repertoire of Western militaries. Arguably, they are part of some nations’ way of small war. Why they have become so is indicative of their effectiveness in helping end these wars.

Not all population control measures are equally useful, but there is some logic behind why certain ones are selected and applied. Often, the first measures selected are borrowed from extant civil practice and represent a measure of bureaucratic continuity. As with the borrowing of procedures in common civil usage, militaries will often impose practices that are common to their own internal economies (those standard procedures
that promote internal organizational discipline). Pass control systems and the strictures of
martial law are good examples of the replication of procedures from within a military’s
own internal practices. Some measures are selected because of their successful
employment on other, recent campaigns. Some are discovered and first practiced during
the campaign as militaries test and adapt strategies as they seek to overcome the
insurgents in the immediate conflict. Even given this wide variety of options available,
militaries usually restrict the techniques they employ to those that are permissible within
the legal regime in force at the time of the conflict.

Population control measures are not always eagerly implemented or readily
accepted as necessary by militaries. Their use normally only comes to the fore once
traditional conventional strategies have been found wanting. Even when their need has
been immediately recognized, it did not always lead to their rapid implementation.
Population control measures, once in use, were especially durable when they were refined
and adapted as the campaign progresses. Though individual population control measures
had merit in their own right, they were best used when applied in combination and in a
systematic fashion. When applied persistently in an integrated fashion they have
contributed significantly to extinguishing rebellions.

Population control measures were important to the ultimate success in all of the
five case studies considered. Their value was demonstrated in a number of ways. The
testimony of those against whom they were applied, the insurgents, may be the most
telling evidence of their effectiveness. There is ample evidence that such measures led to
many surrenders. The counterinsurgent in their narratives of victory attested to their
worth by recounting their perceived value as well. When outside commentators
encouraged the adoption of a particular measure during a campaign, or when a practice was carried forward into subsequent campaigns, it further demonstrated the evidence of their importance. Furthermore, the long-term value of a measure is revealed when its use endures after the battles are over. Population control measures were important, in addition, because they enabled other key counterinsurgency functions such as the cooperation between civil and military elements, the development of intelligence, the elimination of the hardcore elements, and the delivery of hearts and minds programs.

Population control measures had a significant effect on strategic success in the case studies. They formed a core component of the general strategy of these small wars and were a key to the grand strategy of these campaigns. These measures ensured that resource denial could be executed and that the population was afforded protection. Population control measures demonstrated the interest of the state in its population and were crafted to garner support for the state. Ultimately, by separating the guerrilla from the population, these measures had a great utility in resolving these small wars.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

War is an enduring phenomenon. Nations are well served by prudently preparing to defend themselves and to secure their interests. How ready and capable a nation is to win a war depends not only on how well it prepares but also on the type of war for which it plans. In the West, the preference of most nations and their militaries has been to organize for large-scale conventional conflicts. When they do occur, they have been cataclysmic, but, fortunately, they are rare. Small wars, contests between a conventional force and an irregular opponent, occur more frequently and are the most common type of conflict. The fundamental character of war does not change regardless of type, but the best ways to resolve a war do vary by type. Small wars are not a “kinder and gentler” version of conventional war, and, in most case, they are much more difficult and complex to resolve.¹ Though they are more frequent and more difficult to resolve, small wars have not been accorded extensive study, and the strategies that have led to success in them have not been fully examined. The purpose of this dissertation was to illuminate some of the critical elements that are key to the success of governments in small wars, population control measures.

Greater study of population control measures is merited for a number of reasons. First, their value in ending these types of conflicts in the favour of the government is typically under-rated with pride of place in the received narratives of victory being given

to other mechanisms such as “jungle bashing” or winning hearts and minds. Second, where afforded attention, their systemic value is usually not fully realized, and, where more fully considered, the lessons concerning their use tend to be over-generalized and then misapplied in subsequent campaigns. Third, more emphatic and contrary narratives that are constructed to serve political as well as propagandistic purposes often distort the strategic and operational utility of population control measures. Finally, within military institutions, lessons that have been captured on their use may afterwards be published in doctrine manuals, but, even then, this does not guarantee their proper subsequent application or that they will be afforded the attention and priority they deserve. As noted in Chapter 7, many authors have indicated the importance of population control measures amongst the myriad of strategies that must be undertaken in a small war. Yet, these measures have not, so far, received significant attention in the study of warfare by most Western militaries.

This dissertation examined the importance of population control measures to increasing a government’s likelihood of successful resolution of a small war where the guerrillas received no outside support. To test this thesis a comparative approach using five sufficiently commensurable case studies was used. The five case studies that were selected were limited to examples where the guerrillas did not receive substantial aid or assistance from external supporters. They stretched from the 1880s to the 1960s with three from the era of colonial expansion and two from the era of decolonisation. The five examples used were the treatment of prairie Amerindians in the Canadian West (1870 – 1890), the Philippine-American War (1899 – 1902), the South African War (1899 –

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Within the context of the case studies, the analysis of population control measures occurred in three stages: first, why a particular measure was selected by the military within the context of a specific conflict from amongst potential alternatives was examined; second, how specific population control measures were implemented was assessed; and, third, attention was devoted to determining the causal links between the measures imposed and the results obtained. Besides these considerations, attention was also devoted to determining whether they displaced other strategies, whether they were employed in a systematic fashion, how the guerrillas responded to their imposition, and how key leaders perceived their utility. Besides having to review the historical particulars of each case study, the overall approach in this dissertation additionally demanded a detailed review of the historical development of population control measures. The measures considered in this dissertation were movement control (e.g., ID cards, curfews, and obstacles), resettlement in all its various forms, and food control (e.g., rationing, scorched earth, and food restrictions).

A state controls its population through a combination of techniques that persuade, deter and/or coerce. While persuasive measures are emphasized in peace, in conflict states are more likely to impose measures that greatly restrict the free choices of the population and that can be highly deterrent and coercive. Population control measures, as defined in this study, are those restriction imposed on movement, on the choice of living space, and on the availability of food that protect the population from the insurgents while simultaneously denying the insurgents access to critical resources. Militaries typically seek to end wars quickly through battles of annihilation, massed manoeuvres
that seek to dislocate and destroy the troops of their opponent and in this manner force them to sue for peace. Unfortunately for all involved, most wars, and especially small wars, devolve into contests of attrition. The restrictions imposed by population control measures serve two closely-linked attritional functions. First, borrowing from the cost-benefit model of Eric Wolf, the measures limit access to critical supplies and this leads to the exhaustion of the guerrilla forces. Second, the guerrillas are forced to expose themselves to a far greater extent in order to retrieve supplies as resources become scarcer, and this makes their physical attrition easier for the security forces. Thus, population control measures play a key role in any contest with insurgents.

The purpose of movement control measures is to restrict the ability of the insurgents to move freely and to clearly identify and separate them from the innocent and non-combatants. Elusiveness is a great strength for the insurgent and is normally based on terrain that affords good hiding places, on their ability to blend in with the local population, and on the poorly developed intelligence networks of the counterinsurgent. To be successful in a small war, security forces must be able to both restrict the mobility of the insurgents and to deny them concealment. The starting point of these efforts is movement control measures. The main techniques applied include the issuing of identification cards in the form of passes and permits, the designation of special areas, and the construction of physical barriers, but there are others, like curfews. Movement control measures were used to a varying degree in all the case studies. Their utility varied in how systematically they were applied and in how enforceable they were, i.e., whether there were consequences for not abiding by them. While movement control measures

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played only a minor part in the North-West Rebellion in 1885, they formed a major component of all the other conflicts. Identity cards and passes figured heavily, and they were considered one of the fundamental keys to success in Malaya. The designation of special areas was first used extensively in the Philippines with the areas outside of the zones of concentration effectively being free fire zones. Later, in Malaya and Kenya, the designation of areas, again a fire control mechanism, improved the reaction time of security forces in their chance encounters with the guerrillas. The designation of “white” areas in Malaya was a key technique to ease emergency regulations and encourage individuals to withdraw their support from the CTs. Obstacles played an important role in Kenya and in South Africa. In Kenya the ditch separating the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests from the Kikuyu reserves made the ability of the Mau Mau gangs to resupply problematic. The extensive use of blockhouse lines in South Africa was a major strategic factor in the eventual British success there. Movement control measures were an important starting point on the road to victory, but they were not sufficient to bring the insurrections to an end on their own.

The purpose of resettlement is to set off the population from the insurgents. Resettlement takes many forms and for the purposes of this study it included any process where non-combatants, which can be loosely characterized as civilians, are grouped together, secured and controlled. Resettlement has taken various forms depending on the permanence and purpose of the new location into which the population is moved. For instance, in the Philippines and South Africa the zones and camps were merely meant as short term holding facilities, whereas in the Canadian North-West, Malaya and Kenya they were meant to be permanent agricultural-based communities. The reserves
established in the Canadian North-West were part and parcel of the alienation of Amerindian land in that region. During the Rebellion, they served as a control mechanism: the bands were encouraged to remain quietly upon them to both prove their loyalty and ensure they would not be confused with Riel’s supporters. In the Philippines the use of reconcentration zones was regionally focused and they were crucial to suppressing the final localized disturbances in 1901-1902. Camps were used across the breadth of South Africa for both Boers and blacks but made a more mixed contribution to that campaign. Given the mortality rates of the women and children in them, they were a political disaster. The black camps did provide a captured labour pool and by bringing in the Boer families the British did marginally reduce the intelligence on their movements available to their opponents. But clearing their families off the veldt removed the necessity of caring for them from the Boer commandos. This enhanced their operational manoeuvrability, an important advantage, and, in fact, only once Kitchener refused to bring in any more families did the Boer finally relent. Resettlement programs were more intensive in Malaya and Kenya: hundreds of thousands were moved; agricultural programs were attached to the relocations; and once the new communities were established the governments began delivering services. In both these cases, as resettlement evolved, it built off and complemented movement control techniques and permitted the development of more sophisticated food restrictions. In all, resettlement formed a critical step to more fully controlling the population and to protecting them from the guerrillas.

The purpose of food control is to deny sustenance to the insurgents. Food control characteristically involved actions to provide a scale of food to designated entitled
individuals while at the same time trying to physically deny any and all types of food to the insurgents. Rationing served to limit the amount of food resources the guerrillas could extract from an area; it reduced the local carrying capacity beyond that provided by just agriculture. Rations were often increased to try to defuse tense situations as they were in the Canadian North-West. In many of the other case studies, authorities ensured that those who were regrouped received a share of the rations available. Limiting the availability of rations in an area also involved placing detailed restrictions on their transport, sale and storage. The delivery of rations to contained populations occurred in the Canadian North-West, the Philippines, in South Africa, and in Malaya, but it was practiced to a much lesser extent in Kenya. Preventing food from being transported into an area was one technique of physical food denial but more generally where food was found it was destroyed, a policy usually referred to as scorched earth. This practice was applied extensively in the Philippines and equally liberally in South Africa. It was not necessary in Malaya because of the inhospitableness of the jungle, but was used extensively again in Kenya. In Malaya food control became the cornerstone of all security force operations in the later years of the Emergency. Food control was the final important piece of the puzzle that guaranteed the security of the population and the tight control of all resources that the guerrillas could potentially make use of.

The use of population control measures has often been challenged on ethical grounds, i.e., whether they were appropriate to use. Care was taken in examining contemporary accounts of those who either decried or supported the use of these measures. Great care was also taken in reviewing the current writings on the case studies to ensure they were not ahistorical - projecting modern sentiments inappropriately onto
past events. The various population control measures employed, while perhaps not common usages of war at the time, were permissible actions within the legal regimes when the conflicts took place – martial law, emergency regulations and the law of armed conflict of the day. This is not to dispute whether some atrocities and barbarities occur, but from a pure utilitarian perspective, these techniques were permissible and had a strategic and operational military value. Overall, population control measures and their permissible use have evolved enormously over time. Rudimentary surveillance and identity systems have become much more sophisticated. While resettlement techniques have been highly refined by the modern “development community,” it is unlikely that Western military forces could employ large-scale resettlement today even with the greatest caution. Likewise, a scorched earth strategy such as the one employed in South Africa would likely be both misplaced and inappropriate today. The population control measures used in each particular campaign were selected from the options available to the military commander at the time. These options have continued to evolve and, where pragmatic and permissible, such practices will continue to have military value in small wars.⁴

The strategic value of population control measures is dependent on how they were applied. While they have individual value, it is in their combination that the greatest synergy and strategic effect are achieved. For instance, in both the Philippines and Malaya pass systems proved useful but once combined with resettlement and food control severe and persistent pressure could be brought to bear on the guerrillas. Food restrictions were the final important stage in most of these control systems. Movement controls and

resettlement reduced food supplies to a trickle and then food control sealed off even this sparse flow. Besides being combined with other population control measures, these techniques were applied in concert with other strategies as they were less effective in isolation. They complemented and reinforced other important functions like intelligence and physical attrition. As part of an attritional strategy, these measures were applied over the long term. They contributed to wearing down the guerrilla but also amply demonstrated the seriousness and intent of the government to win. By proving the intent of the government to survive in the long term, the measures become tools to sway individuals to the side of the government. Population control measures were best employed in combination as part of a long-term strategy in combination with other strategies.

The proof of the strategic value of population control measures is borne out in a number of ways. First, testimonies of their effectiveness come from the guerrillas themselves. Their part in eroding the morale of the guerrilla fighters was attested to by General Miguel in the Philippines, General Botha and his associates in South Africa, and Chin Peng in Malaya. Though less directly stated, the choice and implementation of population control measures by key counterinsurgents, like General Bell in the Philippines and General Briggs in Malaya, similarly confirms their value. Second, population control measures had a recognizable value as these programs became priorities and displaced other strategies such as large-scale conventional sweeps. Third, their value was demonstrated in their subsequent use. Though lesson-seeking behaviour is

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5 As a cautionary note Eqbal Ahmad suggests that these measures can reflect a very bureaucratic orientation towards resolving an insurgency, something which may be impossible. Further, he suggests the government must be careful not to try and secure popular support solely by coercive measures. See Eqbal Ahmad, “Revolutionary War and Counter-Insurgency,” *Journal of International Affairs* 25, no.1 (1971): 35-37.
well established in most Western nations, discovering lessons and then actually using them are two different things. The perpetuation of these techniques reveals their value in small wars. There is immediacy to this demonstration; for instance, lessons from Malaya were directly applied in Kenya. Even today, these case studies are continually re-examined for useful lessons to inform modern operations. Finally, their value is demonstrated in their endurance in post-conflict practices. For instance, the civil administration in the Philippines frequently used reconcentration after 1902, and the new villages of Malaya still dot the countryside today. Forms of the identity system developed and the ration regimes employed still exist in some countries today. This cross-section of demonstrable value points to the strategic importance of these measures.

Overall, population control measures have been proven in the case studies to have important strategic utility to government forces. Their core importance, whether coercive or not, is their contribution to separating the population from the insurgents. This denies a wide range of critical resources to the guerrillas including recruits, money, medicines and food. This denial of supplies may eventually exhaust the guerrillas and force them to further expose themselves to physical attrition. Nearly equal in importance is the ability of the measures to provide the population with a sense of security both from a physical and psychological perspective. Identity checks, barbwire, and defensive posts provide the physical security that enhances the population’s perception of their own security, their ability to safely make their own choices in relation to their futures. This perception of safety encourages the population to pass more information to the security forces and to refuse to supply resources to the insurgents. The perception of security leads to the perception that the government will be triumphant and this sways more individuals to the
side of the government. A final benefit of population control measures is their scalability. In small wars, governments greatly intrude into the lives of individuals in order to more “closely administer” them. This depth of intrusion becomes a useful tool. Restrictions can be intensified or relaxed depending on the attitude of the local population and the degree to which they support the insurgents. Once the population wearies of the conflict, opportunities to return to some semblance of normalcy (with relaxed restriction) can help push the mass of the population into supporting the government. The strategic utility of these measures is constant across small wars.

Population control measures make important contributions to government success in small wars. This is not to infer that they are the sole or primary contributors as victory is rarely mono-casual nor that they have to be applied dogmatically. They are, though, an important part of the system of administrative and security measures necessary that can lead to collective success. Effective population control measures are drawn from across pre-conflict civil and military practices, are further improved and refined to suit the conditions of the conflict, and are often kept in practice by the civil administration in the post-conflict environment. Population control measures – movement control, resettlement, and food control – are most effective when applied in a layered, complementary structure. Their core value is their contribution to dislocating the capability of the insurgents to gather the resources necessary to sustain their struggle. This value hinges on their ability to separate the insurgents from the population, their

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6 Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 11. Gentile notes that there is a trend for the current U.S. Army Field Manual on population-centric counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, to be applied as if it is the only solution set to insurgencies without sufficient thinking on the extant condition encountered. Population control measures should be applied but only if the existing conditions indicate there is value in their application.
primary source of supplies. Population control measures are critical to success in small wars. Their proper application may be the tipping-point between success and failure.
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