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dc.contributor.authorJamieson, Lesleyen
dc.date2014-09-28 11:50:36.026
dc.date2014-09-30 11:43:34.489
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-30T18:31:27Z
dc.date.available2014-09-30T18:31:27Z
dc.date.issued2014-09-30
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/12524
dc.descriptionThesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2014-09-30 11:43:34.489en
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, there has been a renewed interest in Perceptual Intuitionism. A significant portion of the literature on the topic has focused on the ethical perception defense, the supposition seeming to be that one must defend Perceptual Intuitionism by showing that one can have ethical experiences which immediately and non-inferentially justify one’s beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. This thesis rejects this thought by proposing an alternative defense of Perceptual Intuitionism which employs the Wittgensteinian concept of criteria and an understanding of principles of prima facie duties as “grammatical propositions”.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.subjectIntuitionismen
dc.subjectMetaethicsen
dc.subjectMcDowellen
dc.subjectEthicsen
dc.subjectParticularismen
dc.titlePerceptual Intuitionism Without Ethical Perceptionen
dc.typethesisen
dc.description.degreeM.A.en
dc.contributor.supervisorBakhurst, Daviden
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.degree.grantorQueen's University at Kingstonen


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