Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorNajand, Nikooen
dc.date2015-02-25 16:04:14.86
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-26T14:29:34Z
dc.date.available2015-02-26T14:29:34Z
dc.date.issued2015-02-26
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/12764
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2015-02-25 16:04:14.86en
dc.description.abstractGiven the increasing variety of non-traditional family arrangements, together with reproductive technologies and adoption practices, assumptions about what constitutes a family and what constitutes a parent have been called into question. By using adoption as a paradigm example, my thesis examines different concepts of parenthood, what it means to be a parent, and how parental obligations are incurred. I support a pluralist concept of parenthood, according to which genetics, gestation, or intent to raise a child may each be sufficient to capture who is considered to be a parent in a variety of cases including adoption, contract pregnancy, or gamete donation. Using a pluralist concept of parenthood, I then consider how parental obligations are generated. While some have argued for a causal account of parental obligation (i.e., parents incur obligations by bringing a child into existence), I favor a voluntarist account. A voluntarist account argues that parental obligations are best understood as generated through consensually and voluntarily taking on the role of parent with the intent, rights, and obligations of raising a child. I argue that causal accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of the source of obligations because a) causation is not sufficient and not always necessary to ground obligation, b) causal accounts lead to troubling restrictions on women’s reproductive autonomy, c) causal accounts cannot justify why other factors such as intent are irrelevant, and d) causal accounts have difficulty non-arbitrarily limiting the number of people involved in a causal chain in the creation of a child. Moreover, I explain why, on the whole, a voluntarist account is preferable. Voluntarism with regard to parental obligations has the following advantages: a) making sense of different meanings of the term “parent”, b) avoiding the pitfalls of causal accounts, and c) explaining the significance of the parent-child relationship. Using a voluntarist framework, I then examine the ethical implications for women and men, and for children who are placed for adoption.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.subjectParental Obligationsen
dc.subjectVoluntarismen
dc.subjectAdoptionen
dc.titleVoluntarism and Adoption: Understanding Parental Obligationsen
dc.typethesisen
dc.description.degreePhDen
dc.contributor.supervisorOverall, Christineen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.degree.grantorQueen's University at Kingstonen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record