Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSadeghnia, Mastourehen
dc.date2016-03-29 22:08:13.093
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-30T18:16:10Z
dc.date.issued2016-03-30
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/14162
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2016-03-29 22:08:13.093en
dc.description.abstractThough our everyday life is made up of contacts with the world through conscious experiences, our understanding of this basic fact is limited. Consciousness and the “hard problem” have been one of the most controversial subjects in contemporary philosophy of mind. This thesis argues for a physicalist approach to conscious experience, accepting the idea, widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, that phenomenal consciousness and its qualitative aspects resist functionalization. They are not explainable and knowable merely through functional explanation, giving rise to an explanatory and epistemic gap between phenomenal and scientific knowledge. While affirming the existence of an epistemic gap, this thesis attempts to explain it and to deny its presumed ontological implications. I discuss here two major physicalist theories (the Phenomenal Concept Strategy and Higher-Order Theories), as well as two main anti-physicalists arguments (Jackson’s knowledge argument and Chalmers’ zombie argument). I argue that the consciousness property, being an emergent as opposed to a supervenient property, is an ontologically physical property. I also argue that the unique feature of consciousness, i.e. its subjectivity, is an epistemological relation between a subject, as an experiencer, and her own physical phenomenal properties. I show how the subjectivity of consciousness is compatible with physicalism.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsQueen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canadaen
dc.rightsProQuest PhD and Master's Theses International Dissemination Agreementen
dc.rightsIntellectual Property Guidelines at Queen's Universityen
dc.rightsCopying and Preserving Your Thesisen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.subjectPhysicalismen
dc.subjectSubjectivity of Consciousnessen
dc.subjectConsciousnessen
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Minden
dc.titleConsciousness: How its Subjectivity is Compatible with Physicalismen
dc.typethesisen
dc.description.restricted-thesisI need to protect rights for publication.en
dc.description.degreePhDen
dc.contributor.supervisorMercier, Adeleen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.embargo.terms1825en
dc.embargo.liftdate2021-03-29
dc.degree.grantorQueen's University at Kingstonen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record