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dc.contributor.authorWatson, Amanda
dc.contributor.otherQueen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))en
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-11T21:30:46Z
dc.date.available2017-09-11T21:30:46Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/22693
dc.description.abstractIn this essay, I explore the difference between Representational Theories of Content (RTC) and Embodied Enactivism, and argue that enactivist approaches of perception can account for hallucinatory experiences, a sensory phenomenon readily explained by the RTC approaches. RTC bases perceptual activity on the presence of representational features interpreted by the brain, and are defined by their relation to independently existing objects. The enactivist model uses success and failure to determine whether or not a perception is hallucinatory by appealing to the use of all of the body’s sensory modalities to navigate a perceptual error. In Chapter two I present my arguments for an enactivist theory of hallucination, first by demonstrating that illusion and hallucination, broadly thought of as being two radically different phenomena, are actually one and the same. I also demonstrate how it is that bodily experiences affect the type of hallucination a patient will have, appealing to mood, repetitive tasks, and current environmental presences. My last strategy cleaves a wedge between visual imagery and hallucination, an assumption often made by representationalist accounts of cognition. RTC arguments made to support visual imagery are used to demonstrate how hallucinations are representational, but if the two experiences are actually different, then arguments for visual imagery become less convincing. Chapter three focuses on some lingering concerns and interesting implications of the enactivist theory. Veridicality differs from successful/failed perceptions by appealing to the degree with which the agent can make sense of their perceptions. I also argue how smaller misperceptions are hallucinatory, as well as how auditory hallucinations and multi-modal halluciations are also explainable to the enactivist. Dreams pose the last challenge I address, for they exhibit some embodied characteristics all the while being impervious to the success/failure metric of perceptual activity.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 3.0 United States*
dc.rightsQueen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canadaen
dc.rightsProQuest PhD and Master's Theses International Dissemination Agreementen
dc.rightsIntellectual Property Guidelines at Queen's Universityen
dc.rightsCopying and Preserving Your Thesisen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/*
dc.subjectenactivismen_US
dc.subjectphilosophyen_US
dc.subjectMaurice Merleau-Pontyen_US
dc.subjectAlva Noeen_US
dc.subjecthallucinationsen_US
dc.subjectperceptual erroren_US
dc.subjectillusionen_US
dc.subjectperceptionen_US
dc.subjectvisionen_US
dc.titleSeeing Other People: An Enactivist Account of Hallucination as Perceptual Erroren_US
dc.typeThesisen
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
dc.contributor.supervisorSalay, Nancy
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US


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