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dc.contributor.authorCote-Boudreau, Fredericen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T17:36:21Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T17:36:21Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/26240
dc.description.abstractPersons with cognitive disabilities and nonhuman animals are denied the right to make personal choices because it is claimed that they are not autonomous, for autonomy requires the capacity to revise one’s preferences and to have second-order desires. In this thesis, I argue first that this account of autonomy (that I call ‘rational autonomy’) does not provide a satisfying foundation to the right to make personal choices and to the interest in liberty, even for the paradigmatic cases of humans deemed rational agents; second, I propose and develop a new conception, named ‘inclusive autonomy’, that is intended to do justice to rational agents, persons with cognitive abilities, and nonhuman animals. This enquiry involves multiple steps. First, I criticize the way rational autonomy intends to support a right to make personal choices, by arguing it is empirically inaccurate, that it could be perfectionist or elitist if it is deemed as a requirement rather than a value to promote, and that it generally fails to explain why choices that have not been rationally revised cannot be protected by the right in question. Second, I argue that persons with cognitive disabilities and nonhuman animals also possess an interest in liberty, and especially an objective interest in non-domination, and for the same reasons as rational agents. Third, after assessing a few notable alternatives to rational autonomy, I identify four desiderata for a satisfying conception: the balance between the right to take risks and paternalism, the antidomination requirement, the anti-ableist requirement, and the social support requirement. Inclusive autonomy, defined as the ability to form subjectively defined goods, is equipped to address these desiderata if it is further supplied by an account of preference formation and a theory of paternalism. For these reasons, I explain how the structuring of opportunities and the interest in non-domination can help individuals to develop authentic preferences, even when they are unable to revise their desires; and I discuss three provisos—the competence threshold, the social support principle, and the limited intervention requirement—that impose conditions for paternalistic interventions while enabling agents to enjoy autonomy to the greatest extent possible.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsQueen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canadaen
dc.rightsProQuest PhD and Master's Theses International Dissemination Agreementen
dc.rightsIntellectual Property Guidelines at Queen's Universityen
dc.rightsCopying and Preserving Your Thesisen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.subjectautonomyen
dc.subjectlibertyen
dc.subjectrightsen
dc.subjectinterestsen
dc.subjectanimalsen
dc.subjectcognitive disabilityen
dc.subjectdominationen
dc.subjectpaternalismen
dc.subjectadaptive preferencesen
dc.subjectrelational autonomyen
dc.subjectableismen
dc.subjectspeciesismen
dc.titleInclusive Autonomy: A Theory of Freedom for Everyoneen
dc.typethesisen
dc.description.degreePhDen
dc.contributor.supervisorKymlicka, Willen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.degree.grantorQueen's University at Kingstonen


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