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dc.contributor.authorPayumo, Marken
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-07T20:21:05Z
dc.date.available2021-01-07T20:21:05Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/28653
dc.description.abstractThe ability to reason about other’s beliefs, and in particular their false beliefs, is a fundamental part of having a theory of mind (ToM) – an understanding of the role that mental states (i.e., beliefs, desires, and intentions) play in causing behavior. Reasoning about others’ minds is difficult, particularly when others’ perspectives are different from one’s own, as is the case with false beliefs. One explanation for this phenomenon may be the anchoring-and adjustment theory, which stipulates that our first guess about other’s mental states is “anchored” to our own perspective (that is, we think that they think what we do) and then adjusted, based on what we know about the other person and their contextual circumstances. If this theory is correct, then neurocognitive processes associated with flexible thinking should be implicated when reasoning about others’ false beliefs. To investigate this possibility, the relationship between beta electroencephalographic (EEG) oscillatory activity and belief-reasoning was examined in adults. The suppression of beta EEG activity has been associated with processes such as cognitive flexibility, learning, and dopaminergic functioning; therefore, it may also be involved in the adjustment process. In this study, 39 adult participants were recruited, and EEG recordings were obtained in response to a series of false-belief and true-belief tasks. It was hypothesized that: 1) beta EEG activity will be suppressed more when reasoning about others’ false beliefs relative to their true beliefs, and that 2) beta suppression will be evident at scalp sites that are typically associated with neural regions that are important for ToM reasoning, including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Results showed significant trial effects for beta suppression at the dmPFC, but not the rTPJ. These results demonstrate that beta EEG activity may be used as an index for belief-reasoning and, in turn, may reflect aspects of the neurocognitive factors underlying the anchoring-and-adjustment process.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsQueen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canadaen
dc.rightsProQuest PhD and Master's Theses International Dissemination Agreementen
dc.rightsIntellectual Property Guidelines at Queen's Universityen
dc.rightsCopying and Preserving Your Thesisen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/*
dc.subjectTheory of Minden
dc.subjectEEGen
dc.subjectFalse Beliefen
dc.subjectBetaen
dc.titleBeta-Band EEG Activity and False-Belief Reasoning in Adultsen
dc.typethesisen
dc.description.degreeM.Sc.en
dc.contributor.supervisorSabbagh, Mark
dc.contributor.departmentPsychologyen
dc.degree.grantorQueen's University at Kingstonen


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Queen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canada
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Queen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canada