Returning To Our Senses

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Authors

Busuioc, Octavian Alexandru

Date

2007-09-27T19:08:42Z

Type

thesis

Language

eng

Keyword

De Re Thought , Mind and World

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Abstract

The following thesis is concerned with the way we think of particular objects. More specifically, it is concerned with de re thoughts and beliefs, which are parasitic upon the objects they are about. In ascribing and expressing de re thoughts and beliefs, we employ de re expressions, such as demonstratives and names. There is a pervasive view in the philosophy of language, known as the direct-reference view, that claims that these expressions contribute to thoughts nothing over and above objects themselves. I argue that not only is this view of de re expressions untenable upon reflection on its repercussions for cognitive significance and judgement, but also that the considerations that motivate its genesis rest on a mistaken understanding of the alternative, viz a Fregean understanding of thought that employs a notion of sense. In the first chapter, I present logical difficulties that face accounts of de re belief and a quasi-Fregean response to them. In the second chapter, I focus on two exhaustive interpretations of the cognitive significance of de re expressions on the direct-reference view, and I argue that both interpretations are untenable either because they cannot account for propositional unity, or because they isolate experience from judgement. In the third chapter, I present a holistic interpretation of sense, and argue that it is neither faced by critiques presented by proponents of direct-reference, nor by the difficulties I articulate in the first two chapters.

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Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-21 10:53:33.232

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This publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.

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