Empathy (Re) imagined: A Theory of Motivation for Moral Action

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Authors

Kumar, Jacqueline

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thesis

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eng

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empathy, moral life, Hume, Smith, cognitivism, emotivism, Prinz, Bloom, yogas.

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The use of the word “empathy” has become ubiquitous, whether it be in descriptions of someone’s personality, their daily interaction with others, or their lack thereof. The aim of this dissertation is to (re-) think the concept of empathy. The text is divided into four chapters: (1) The Against Empathy Movement; (2) Sympathy and Empathy; (3) Moral Phenomenology; (4) Empathy and Yoga. Chapter 1 sets out arguments for and against empathy. Several moral psychologists and philosophers have argued that empathy is central for the making of moral judgments. Conversely, the philosopher Jesse Prinz in “Against Empathy” (2001), and the psychologist Paul Bloom in “Against Empathy: A Case for Rational Compassion” (2016) argued that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral judgment. I challenge Prinz’s and Bloom’s narrow understanding of empathy by offering a co-constitutive definition of empathy, one that includes affectivity, cognitive perspective-taking and action-oriented disposition. Chapter 2 provides an overview of emotivism and cognitivism in moral philosophy. This chapter contributes to the larger goal by providing cognate notions of the various historical perspectives on empathy to get a sense on how this concept has traditionally been employed throughout Western thought. Chapter 3 diagnoses the connection between empathy and morality and how it fits into various existing debates on morality. Here I propose that the process of empathy considers both the cognitive components as articulated by Jonathan Dancy and John McDowell. They draw our attention to morally salient reasons and values in a given situation. I also discuss the affective components that occupy the emotivists such as David Hume. Chapter 4 looks to the Indian yogic tradition and the four yogas: bhakti (love/devotion); karma (action); jnāna (knowledge) and rāja (psychic control). An examination of the four yogas assists us in understanding that “empathy” is not just the product of Western thought. It can be argued that rather than projecting the notion of empathy onto Indian philosophy, the four yogas provide a different set of concepts and ideas that are helpful when analyzing the universal phenomenon known as “empathy.”

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