The Logically Perfect Language on Words without Objects

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Authors

Chin, King

Date

Type

thesis

Language

eng

Keyword

Ideal Language , Logically Perfect Language , Stuffs

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Journal Issue

Alternative Title

Abstract

Bertrand Russell’s logical atomism holds that the world is made up of a body of structured facts composed of simple objects. A Logically Perfect Language (LPL) is constructed to reflect this hierarchy of facts—every sentence in a LPL corresponds to a fact, and how these sentences are related accurately reflects how their corresponding facts are related. This paper is divided into four parts. I will first explain Russell’s conception and construction of a LPL. Then, I will explain Henry Laycock’s modified account of a singular-general dichotomy; propositions about multiple objects and stuffs need to be taken into account. In the third part, I will focus on the difficulty of integrating propositions about the non-discrete liquid-stuff in an objectual language. In the fourth part, I will examine two problems, namely, the semantics-syntax discrepancy in a LPL and the problem of collective predication. Finally, after characterizing the individuation condition for liquid-stuffs, I will motivate individuating them as discrete portions for the purposes of particular predication. I will develop a new conception of what constitute a single instance of liquid-stuff, and use this new conception to characterize the preliminary works before the construction of a LPL for liquid-stuffs.

Description

Citation

Publisher

License

Queen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canada
ProQuest PhD and Master's Theses International Dissemination Agreement
Intellectual Property Guidelines at Queen's University
Copying and Preserving Your Thesis
This publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.

Journal

Volume

Issue

PubMed ID

External DOI

ISSN

EISSN