Getting Things Done in the Federation: Do We Need New Rules for an Old Game?
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Authors
Brown, Douglas M.
Date
2003
Type
working paper
Language
en
Keyword
Special Series on the Council of the Federation 2003
Alternative Title
Abstract
Intergovernmental relations arise naturally from the logic and design of federal systems of government. The genius of federal constitutions is that they allow for unity across a large territory and among diverse societies, by dividing governance between the union and its regional political communities –what we in Canada call our federal and provincial (and territorial) governments. The provinces take care of more local concerns or those more specifically tailored to their local society, and are fully sovereign in legislative and executive terms within the confines of their constitutional jurisdiction. The federal government is also fully sovereign in its legislative and executive functions as defined by the constitution. Democracy is thus compound, with a certain amount of creative competition and redundancy to be expected and encouraged among provinces and between them and the federal government.1
But at the heart of all federal systems is the paradox that federalism is designed, as the late Daniel Elazar put it, for both “self-rule and shared rule”.2 The self-rule consists of the separate and independent spheres of jurisdiction. The shared rule consists of the participation and representation of the regions or provinces in the federal or national government such as in the upper house or Senate of the federal parliament. It is also seen in some powers being essentially shared between the federal and provincial governments. The shared rule aspect of the federal principle is weakly developed in Canada but strong in most other federations.
Description
© IIGR, Queen's University; IRPP, Montreal
Citation
Publisher
Queen's University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations