A Prisoners’ Project in Emergent Ethics

By

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A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Cultural Studies
in conformity with the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts

Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Final Submission January 2015

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Abstract

The central questions proposed for investigation in this project are (a) What might be the relationship between emergent, intersubjective ethical processes, such as might be claimed to exist in interpersonal relationships among prisoners, and moral systems, such as the rehabilitationist philosophy of the criminal justice system? and (b) In what ways might these ethical and moral systems and processes find expression in the lived experiences of prisoners? To explore these questions a working group was formed with myself and four research collaborators who had spent some time in prison.

We worked collaboratively following a radical pedagogy approach to research, responding to these questions and testing this philosophical model against our lived experiences of prison and beyond. While we did not pretend to reach any specific conclusions on these highly philosophical questions, we were not at a loss to locate examples of our deliberations within our experiences of prison, as well as within the project itself building meaning across philosophy and practice. Thus at the very least we may advance that a framework of emergent, intersubjective ethics can have bearing on experiences of prison and may through further development present critiques and alternatives to the demoralizing spectrum of carceral control and rehabilitation. Further, we may hold that those with experience of incarceration are best prepared and most capable of offering this analysis.

We contributed to the fields of intersubjective, deconstructivist ethics and convict criminology and affirmed ourselves as ethical subjects.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is an example and reminder that creativity is a collective process and that accomplishments are the results of community effort and care. I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my research collaborators John, Billy, Roy and Broken for joining me in this project and making it your own. Thank you for your hard work and dedication. Thank you for challenging my perspectives and for being patient. Thank you for sharing your insights, creativity, laughter and friendship.

Thank you to Richard Day my supervisor for providing a theoretical lens to my desire for something other than the confines of moral certainty. Thank you for never tiring of answering questions. Thank you for giving me direction and allowing me space to find my own. Thank you for determinedly supporting the purpose and passion behind this project.

Thank you to Kim Renders for inspiring creativity in the method of this project. Thank you for helping me focus on what matters and for teaching me how to meet barriers with courage and a fiery will.

Thank you to Laura Murray for helping me build connections and for bringing focus and clarity along the way. Thank you for teaching me to look for potential even in failure and supporting me in taking worthy risks.

Thank you to the organizations involved in helping former prisoners reintegrate into the community in Kingston, namely the Kingston Community Chaplaincy, Kingston Harbour Light, and the John Howard Society for the important work you do.

Thank you to all the women and men I have worked with in the Alternatives to Violence Project for sharing moments with me and for inspiring me.
Thank you to my family and friends for your ongoing support. You are always there to listen and provide a safe place for ideas to grow. Thank you for helping me focus, for giving me respite, and for laughing in unison.

Thank you to my partner Nick for walking with me every step of the way with unwavering support. Thank you for keeping track of the little things and being steady and confident when the little things seemed big. Thank you for encouraging me, and when I wouldn’t listen thank you for putting it in rhyme.

Thank you to my number one editorial team, and wonderful parents Mary and Don. You showed me what unconditional love looks like. You proved to me that transformative change is possible. You taught me that punishment gets in the way of justice. You continue to inspire me and give me hope in the future as I watch you work for change in your communities. My part in this work is dedicated to you on your 50th Anniversary.

This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
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Section 1: Introduction and Methodologies

Chapter 1: Introduction

Research Question:

The central questions motivating this project are (a) What might be the relationship between emergent, intersubjective ethical processes, such as might be claimed to exist in interpersonal relationships among prisoners, and moral systems, such as the rehabilitationist philosophy of the criminal justice system? and (b) In what ways might these ethical and moral systems and processes find expression in the lived experiences of prisoners? To explore these questions I formed a working group with four former prisoners in Kingston, ON. I presented the following philosophical model as a starting point for those involved in the workshops (here I provide this model in academic language, in Chapter Five I describe this model as it was presented to the group, in conversational language): Ethics arise as a pre-discursive impulse or sense of obligation in response to the face of the unknowable other, and are experienced as a moment of contingency or deliberation within the full discourse-laden context of our lives. Moral frameworks are motivated by this ethical impulse, and take the form of discourses which attempt to respond to the insecurity of the unknown, with totalizing effects. Again the ethical impulse arises and interrupts the certainty and domination of moral discourses – even whilst moral discourses respond to ease the uncertainty of the ethical impulse – as tensions carry through a web.

It is my hope that in responding to these questions and testing this philosophical model against our lived experiences we may contribute to the field of intersubjective, deconstructivist ethics and affirm ourselves as ethical subjects.

Philosophical Grounding:

In order to pursue this line of inquiry it was necessary to differentiate what is meant by ‘ethics’ versus ‘morality.’ Ethics, here, following a Lévinasian inclination, is a spontaneous
sense of obligation which arises through intersubjective engagement with the ‘other’. In addition, following the poststructuralist school of thought, ethics concerns a moment of deliberation of a subject within a specific context - an intricate web of cultural, sociopolitical, economic, and emotional correlates within which the subject’s dilemma has meaning (Critchley, Day, Foucault, Guattari). In this study ethics will be distinguished as a process which is context dependent and intersubjective, emergent and spontaneous, and prediscursively motivated whilst realizable only within the discourse from which it arises. Morality, in contrast, refers to a system of rules or preset doctrine governing what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’.

I refer to discourse in a Lévinasian (2012) sense: an arrangement of knowledge through which meaning becomes possible, which is predicated on the first relation with the transcendent other—the self enters into a world that belongs to the other. The presentation of the face of the other is not a representation but represents the world to the self (96); “The world is offered in the language of the Other” (92). Thus the desire for the other motivates discourse; the first discourse.

The philosophical problematic which I seek to explore may be expanded as follows: Taking a Lévinasian standpoint, I suggest that an ethical impulse precedes discourse and all discourse is predicated on such an impulse, as the presentation of the face of the Other is the invitation to speak (Lévinas). However, this impulse cannot be accessed apart from the discourse and context in which it arises; therefore it is experienced as moment of contingency or deliberation. Moral frameworks, in this model, can be considered discourses which seek to resolve this moment of contingency with a codified system. Morality thus seeks to arrest the ethical moment. However, I wish to acknowledge the impossibility of a pre-discursive vacuum, free of moral systems, from which a pure ethical impulse may emerge. Thus, the ethical impulse
arises within the full context of our lives, imbued with discourse, affect and practice – a moment awaiting ethical responsiveness or moral resolution.

I would suggest (along with Lévinas, Critchley, Guattari, Foucault, Day) that the above model is politically significant due to the universalizing stance of morality, which aims to, but cannot fully account for the complexity and potency of the ethical impulse. It is in the attempt to know the ‘Other’ (the transcendent, the unknowable, and the one to whom we are obliged) that we commit violence (Lévinas). Moral certainty which arrests the undecidability of the ethical moment, in that it reduces the unknowable to the knowable, the other to the same, is violent. Lévinas condemns this violence, which he recognized in its most exaggerated form in Nazism. It is the same violence that is distilled in racism, ageism, ableism, patriarchy, homophobia, transphobia, the hatred of the poor, cruelty to animals, environmental destruction, and so on. Punitive incarceration may be included in this list. Still, I would like to reaffirm the impossibility that any moral system may conclusively resolve the movement toward the other which drives the ethical impulse (Lévinas). Instead our lives are rich with ethical appeals and interwoven with moral discourses.

Recognizing the interrelationship between ethics and morality, I do not propose a rigid disavowal of moral codes, but rather that we pay greater attention to emergent ethics in philosophy and practice. In affirming the ethical impulse we may build opportunities for non-universalizing responsiveness to the vast complexity of our ethical obligations. It is also thus that we may question moral certainties where they arrest an ethical appeal. Finally, by realizing that an ethical impulse precedes moral discourses we may affirm that one does not need to be taught ethics but, that context, awareness, and practice may help us develop ethical subjectivities which engage responsively with the other.
Prison Philosophy:
Those involved in the group set out to explore the spaces between ethics and morality to give substance to our field of inquiry and as a means to articulate a critique of prison philosophy. Throughout their two-century long history, prison philosophies and practices in the West have oscillated between the poles of a more humane rehabilitationism based on moral instruction and more severe forms of punishment. Wherever mainstream prison philosophy and practice might be located on this spectrum, however, they have operated to the exclusion of a space for subjects to navigate context-derived ethical engagement. Therefore one element of this inquiry is to discuss potential ways in which prisoners may have experienced context-derived ethical engagement despite the limitations of the prison environment. Thus this inquiry may inspire group members to reflect on the formation of their own ethical subjectivities and relationships within prescriptive moral systems. Such critical awareness is significant for a population for whom moral rehabilitation is a means of control because, despite the regimentation of their lives, prisoners are continuously presented with choices and conflict situations which range from potentially life threatening to potentially healing.

Delimitation of the goals:
The project is not intended as an analysis of prison norms or codes of behaviour, or as a claim that prison norms contrast with norms of other communities outside of prison. Neither does it attempt to contribute to literature on recidivism or desistance, or to impact the behaviour of prisoners in relation to these incarceratory standards. Such inquiries into norms and behaviours of prisoners are congruent with traditional moral philosophy from which this study attempts to depart. Furthermore, this study is not intended as a means to offer an improvement to the prison model. Rather than seek any measure of prison reform I hope this project may prove to be of use in affirming ethical agency of and with prisoners who are subjected to a system which
strips them of their agency by means of their punishment and their remediation. The specific ways in which the application of this theoretical lens may prove useful or politically significant will be drawn from the needs, politics and interests of the group.

Significance of the goals:
This project is urgent considering the dramatic changes underway in Canada’s prison system under Bill C10, which prescribes a sharp swing of the pendulum of prison philosophy toward a heightening of the punitive techniques of the prison and diminishing of the moral rehabilitative techniques. Instead of recommending a return to more moral emphases in rehabilitation, I attempt to depart from the cyclical logic of prison reform. This exploration of ethics, which leaves behind both punitive and proscriptive moralities, could be informative to other institutions including public schools and universities under the current context of heightening ‘security’ and diminishing social provisions (Giroux). For example, it could also lend itself to supporting experiments in transformative justice which step outside the logic of punishment and rehabilitation. In the broadest sense, grounding and affirming ethics (as first philosophy) in lived experience offers a means of evaluating any moral system, as each moral system arises out of the ethical impulse available to every being able to recognize the ‘face of the other’ (Lévinas).

Chapter Outline and Theoretical Overview
In the chapters to follow I will explain the basis of the chosen methodology: an emergent workshop series in ethical philosophies informed by radical and critical pedagogies and incorporating experiential components. I will describe how the workshops unfolded and I will discuss some of the challenges along the way. I will reflect on the content of our discussions including explorations of Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity and Moral Rehabilitationism in
Chapter Four, and Lévinas, Subjectivity and Emergent Ethics in Chapter Five. Finally, I will discuss the practical and political outcomes of the project and the project’s met and unmet goals.

Throughout these chapters I will visit and revisit the theoretical paradigms which inform the basis for the project as they pertain to methodological choices or the content of our discussions. While in preparation for this project I explored a few areas of literature including what I will call emergent ethics (Lévinasian metaphysics, poststructuralist ethics following Guattari, and Foucault’s later works), psychoanalysis and critique of psychoanalysis (Freud, Laing, Silverman, Deleuze and Guattari), moral philosophy (Kant), cultural criminology, and critical and radical pedagogies. It was my aim that the project would be grounded in our conversations rather than prior privileged theorization. I did not, therefore, proceed with an agenda of successive theoretical paradigms to cover, but introduced a model of “emergent” ethics followed by brainstorming and letting the discussions evolve, reintroducing pertinent theory to our discussions in response to my colleagues’ insightful questions and reflections.

In keeping with that approach, rather than foregrounding my colleagues’ explorations with an analytical overture I will fold these theoretical writings into the course of these pages, in much the same way as they arose for us in our discussions. This structure is intended to embody the understanding that we are all theorists of our own circumstances. It is also in response to the privileged role of the “researcher” as interpreter of “participants’” lives and circumstances. This is not to dismiss or overlook the degree of interpretive privilege that I have and will exercise herein, but to respond to it. I attempted to engage research differently by inviting the volunteers to join me in the analytical activity of research, and prioritizing the flow of interpretations in this writing. In the task of writing, I also have an ethical obligation to my colleagues to let their voices activate these pages.
Introducing the Research Collaborators

Before proceeding further, I would like to introduce the men who joined with me in this research project. I will introduce them according to the pseudonyms they chose for themselves, as Billy, Roy, John, and Broken. These four men gave up their time each week to come together share ideas, to learn with one another and co-create a way of sharing the outcomes of our discussions with our broader communities. While it is my role to convey our project’s story in academic writing, the project was co-owned and collaborative. My colleagues’ absence in this piece of writing is palpable. Any attempt to represent them herein would be a guaranteed failure and an act of symbolic violence; Billy, John, Roy and Broken do indeed transcend any idea I might have of them (Lévinas). They have challenged the limitations of my judgments and I am changed. Yet, I cannot avoid this violence and still achieve the task of before me.

As Roy explained in one of our later discussions, Lévinasian ethics, which advocates the transcendence of the other over our comprehension, is relevant to the interpretive practice of representation in research amongst other contexts:

KAREN: But not only in this example of Nazism, but also you could say that in the example of traditional research. If I were going to decide that I could write a summary that could represent you…

ROY: It’s that I'm giving you a name. I'm telling you who you are. So, I’m practicing being god ‘cause I'm telling you who you are: if you're good, if you're bad. I've made my choice about you.

At times throughout these pages you will find added analysis to the voices of my collaborators. This was unavoidable considering the limited time available to us to discuss and become familiar with the many practical and theoretical topics we encountered. Billy described the sense of unbounded inquiry available for discussion: “I don't know how big your funding is
for this, but we could probably do this for like a year, just on different areas. We’ve done this, ok, now let’s take this further. Ok, we’ve accomplished that, and we've done the white board thing on this…” There will also be times in which I represent my colleagues, as some conversations were simply too long to include verbatim. As much as possible, I have attempted to leave their spoken words in the forms in which they were uttered, altering their oral grammatical structure occasionally for ease of reading. I hope you will find their voices, self-possessed, at certain points herein.

All in all, I would like to draw attention to the exercise of power that is research writing and to reflect more specifically on the ways in which prison writings are used in general: either as analytical texts with which to engage (ethically), or as primary sources or objects of analysis. This choice of how to engage prison writings is a vital consideration for me in this project, a non-prisoner academic concerned with how to be a supporter of the field of convict criminology. Convict criminology is a field of study led by former prisoner academics who provide grounded critiques of the prison system and mainstream criminology as well as working towards preferable alternatives to the carceral hold. As non-prisoner academics, by engaging with prisoner’s writings as peers, space might be cut out in the academy for critiques by prisoners within our own writing; not by mere representation of them, but by being questioned by them. Both will be found in these pages and I will entrust to the reader this awareness. In Lévinasian terms we may consider the concept of the trace, the ethical appeal of the other who refuses to be bound by the negating violence of history as only an effect in their absence. In the trace the other calls out; unpresentable, an ethical appeal, a question, questioning our knowing, even in the objectified body of the work that has already been given (Lévinas 2006, 41-43; 2011c, 19).
Therefore, it is my hope that within these pages you will find a trace of Billy, who is keen and enthusiastic and happily takes on responsibilities. He is organized and on the ball and always ready with a helpful suggestion. Throughout the project Billy was our scribe, our time keeper, and our Google dictionary. Billy has a great sense of humour and loves to joke. He is a social convener and puts energy into sustaining relationships.

I hope you find a trace of John, who is deeply empathic and always looking to help those in need. He loves dogs for their loyalty and their authenticity: values which he holds dear. John is a great judge of character and a devoted friend. He speaks out against injustice. He has learned to smile in the face of adversity and always seeks to see the silver lining.

I hope you find a trace of Roy, who listens without judgement and seeks to learn from everyone he meets. Roy encourages others to see the best in themselves. He has a remarkable intellect, able to grapple with complex ideas, and an inquisitive mind, always challenging us with thought provoking questions. He is always looking for ways to grow as a person but perhaps does not give himself credit for the person he already is.

I hope you find a trace of Broken, who is gregarious, and at times unnervingly direct and honest. He has a way of telling stories by which he communicates the complexities of emotional, social, and physical survival of life inside prison, interrupts your assumptions of the nature of reality, and makes you laugh, all at once. Upon selecting his pseudonym Broken explained that the name holds a positive connotation for him. Still, out of concern that he was taking on a self-deprecating title, the group questioned him about the name selection. Broken assured us that despite the usual meaning, for him this word relates to a sense of achievement in his life.

Certain demographic information may seem to be missing here. In a study with participants one would expect to gain an understanding of the set of criteria according to which
the “sample” is to be understood. The lack of information regarding their length of incarceration, their charges, their ages, their years since release, marital status, employments, and so on is intentional. These men are not participants in the usual sense. They have been asked to engage with me in the process of research not as subjects but as researchers.

**Note on Voice and Audience**

Though I have mentioned a desire to contribute to a field of convict criminology, and I have identified my former prisoner collaborators as research colleagues, the reader might have observed that the voice and tone herein is directed towards an obviously free and mainstream academic audience. There are certain requirements and expectations for a master’s thesis and a somewhat limited and predictable audience for whom I write.

Furthermore, this thesis was also an attempt to traverse discourses, moving between familiar spoken language and less familiar language of “high theory”. A key goal of the project was demonstrating that the less familiar abstract ideas of Lévinasian ethics can be accessible, and can have relevance to lived experiences. I differentiate between the more and the less familiar abstract ideas rather than making distinctions such as “higher” and “lower” levels of abstraction in recognition that we all contend with highly abstracted ideas on a daily basis (i.e. money, justice, punishment, borders, and so on.). However, throughout the project I found myself stumbling through the task of translation between forms of language, and in writing this thesis stumbling again to sustain meaning across discourses. The reader may observe an inadequacy in accomplishing this task—a dual voice: one withdrawn and pedantic, the other subjective and affected.

However, this thesis is not the only way by which the ideas of the group have been shared. As will be described in Chapter Six, as a group we set out to engage audiences both outside and inside of the academe. We found ways of presenting our ideas at two conferences,
one highly academic and the other more activist oriented, and we created a white board sketch video to be uploaded on YouTube for public viewing. These outreach activities will be described in Chapter Six, *Project Outcomes*.
Chapter 2: Anticipated Methodology

Overview

This project was designed as an attempt to achieve methodological consistency with its philosophical impulse. The proposed method along with the content were emergent, but grounded in the philosophical framework discussed above and the experiential knowledge of the group. To that end I suggested formats to lead our discussion, which included a reading group of primary or secondary sources beginning but not necessarily ending with our original topic, experientially designed exercises which will attempt to elicit discussion topics related to the original topic, watching films or reading fiction with themes of the topic, or a facilitated discussion beginning with selected topics. The outcomes of the project were to be selected by the group members with suggestions including publishing a paper for the Journal of Prisoners on Prisons, disseminating their ideas amongst their communities by means of an art project, dramatic presentations or experiential workshop, or an idea emerging from the group.

Experiential Format of Project

It was my hope that the group members would be able to relate to and/or to contest the philosophical framework we started with on the basis of examples from their own lives. For example, they might have related to the experience of an intersubjective ethical impulse when caring for an ailing cellmate, helping him with his daily physical needs, or acting as an advocate for him to receive proper medical care. They might also have experienced such an impulse in response to the emotional and financial needs of their families outside of prison. These ethical obligations, presented as insatiable demands, might have come into conflict with the moral rehabilitationism of the prison when being responsive to the demand contradicts the regulation in their correctional plan. This could have taken the form of a change in their cell-accommodations in the case of the care-giver or a cut in pay (such as the recent thirty percent pay cut) in the case of the family provider (Brosnahan 2013).
Recognizing that I would be asking the group members to undergo a challenging exercise – to grapple with highly abstract ideas and relate these ideas to their experiences – my volunteer experience in prisons nonetheless taught me that many incarcerated people are accustomed to thinking at such levels of abstraction. Many who are not accustomed to this exercise take to it readily when the abstract concepts are relevant to their lives. It was expected that the experiential and emergent methodology of the study would help provide such a correspondence.

Borrowing first from my own experience facilitating experiential conflict resolution workshops in prison which have been informed heavily by Paulo Freire (2003), I sought ways to integrate an experiential approach which prioritizes the group members’ living knowledge as the basis for learning (27). As a pedagogical tool, this framework may be highly orchestrated or planned, in that the facilitator will attempt to invoke a shared experience or the memory of certain lived experiences relating to the questions or learning objectives at hand. Avoiding creating contrived exercises was a paramount concern for me in the planning of the project. I relied heavily on the frank and reflexive feedback of the group members on the activities and exercises throughout the course of the project being sure to ask for group input on the process as well as the content of our activities and discussions. Still, as one potential process available for the group to explore the chosen content of this study, I hoped an experiential approach would function as a guide to help to translate the philosophical questions into a more accessible framework. Further, I saw this approach a way to help balance the power dynamics associated with the traditional valuation of academic knowledge over experiential knowledge that this project seeks to reject.

Starting with the acknowledgement that the practical/experiential, the political, the theoretical, and the ethical are inextricably linked and embedded within all of our actions and
expressions, I borrowed methodological inspiration from Agusto Boal’s (2002) Games for Actors and Non-Actors. Boal gives an open invitation to all to make use of the exercises offered in this text, as he insists “we all are theatre” (17). Having said this I did not adopt Boal’s exercises directly, but used my understanding of his work, and my previous experience with similarly designed experiential activities, to design my own, which I hoped would promote reflection and discussion of certain of the project’s central themes and concepts.

One purpose of the games and exercises Boal (2002) introduces in his text is to help the “actor” extend beyond their usual patterns of movement, sense and expression. For example, within the series of exercises on walking (70-74), Boal acknowledges how the movements we make become mechanized through repetition, and by exploring new patterns of movement, i.e. walking differently, we can become aware of these patterns as well as free ourselves to discover new possibilities of movement. Movement and expression are inseparable for Boal (48), and theatre for Boal is self-awareness or “the art of looking at ourselves” (15). Therefore, by becoming aware of the patterns and limitations of our physical movements and exploring the outer limits of this performativity we may gain awareness our interactions with this world and open possibilities for change.

On a theoretical level we may at first consider the practice of expanding performative possibilities within Boal’s games and exercises to be applicable to Deleuze and Guattari’s (2008) deterritorialization of subjectivities. As a practice of reaching beyond solidified patterns of performance and unravelling our subjective assignments, the goal of image theatre may be reminiscent of the negative task of schizoanalysis (381-382), “The movement of the theater of cruelty; for it is the only theater of production, there where the flows cross the threshold of deterritorialization and produce the new land—not at all a hope, but a simple ‘finding’, a
‘finished design,’ where the person who escapes causes other escapes, and marks out the land while deterritorializing himself” (322).

Yet, at the point where the creative propagation of subjective expressions may be used as an ethical response to oppression, as for Boal, we must perhaps break from Deleuze and Guattari’s (2008) processes of deterritorialization, which impractically advance in all directions: capitalist and revolutionary (378). This is not to say that deterritorialization has no ethical bearing; as for Guattari (2006), “The new aesthetic paradigm has ethico-political implications because to speak of creation is to speak of the responsibility of the creative instance with regard to the thing created;” yet such an ethical bearing is deeply situated and “itself caught up in the movement of processual creation” (107).

Nonetheless we may look to Boal (2002) for instruction in a project with former prisoners who have lived a direct and most definitive form of oppression and on Lévinasian ethics, a response to oppression. I saw “the art of looking at ourselves” as instrumental in this project (15), in relation to the goal of affirming our ethical agency. The experiential model allowed for the opportunity to draw attention to our bodies and senses and to explore the difference between thinking and feeling. The experiential design allowed opportunities to invoke responses to objects and other people and to draw out the relationship between our experience (being in the world) and who we are (subjectivity), and thus to help lead up to a discussion of the ethical moment and the non-phenomenality of the face of the other (Lévinas).

Critical/Radical Pedagogy

On pedagogy, Boal (2002) writes, “One learns by teaching others. Pedagogy is transitive. Or it isn’t pedagogy” (266); this is a fitting introduction to the purpose and the difficulty of attempting to incorporate a radical pedagogy as methodology in this research project. I will now
consider what it might mean to come together to teach and learn from one another in the name of research.

**Critical Pedagogy**

A thorough grounding in Freire’s (2003) work, based on the principles that education must start with the living knowledge and experience of the people, and that education has an emancipatory potential, is central to the methodology of the current study. While in this project I seek to follow a radical pedagogical approach, based on the principle which rejects compulsory learning in preference to an approach to learning which is integrated with life (Illich; Prakash and Esteva), it is important to explore the differences between these approaches. Further, the experiential workshops which I co-facilitate in prisons were heavily influenced and modeled after Freire’s work. Thus, I hope to enrich the current study by drawing from Freire and also by drawing out the critiques of Freire’s concept of conscientization or critical consciousness (Illich, Prakash and Esteva).

Freire was not oblivious to the limits of his approach and insisted that he did not intend to design a model for others to follow. His literacy and political education projects were designed in the context of Brazilian workers struggle and not meant for replication. Thus, deploying a critique of conscientization without dismissing it outright will offer a more fruitful awareness to inform the current study while I set out to affirm that each of us have the capacity to theorize and act in our own sociopolitical contexts.

What of Freire’s emancipatory pedagogy might be incorporated in this project and what needs to be pushed away? Is the idea of emancipation a cruel joke when working with a population whose daily life is under constant control and surveillance, whose right to emancipation has been categorically denied by society? Perhaps the concept of emancipation may be applied in various ways. On one hand an idealistic and exaggerated goal minimizing the
more grounded goals that might emerge within the project. On the other hand, the concept may point to the potential for situated goals to emerge in the interest of increasing the freedoms of those involved.

With regard to conscientization, questions regarding agency apply again. Who needs to be conscientized and by whom? Who decides? In what substantive ways does this education, which aims to illuminate and emancipate, which sees people as lacking or needing to be changed, differ from the moral education of rehabilitationism from which this project seeks to depart?

*Radical Pedagogy*

In an attempt to address some of these concerns I sought a radical-pedagogy approach to organizing our discussion (Day, Freire, Hern, Illich, Prakash and Esteva). Primarily this means recognizing that each of us has the capacity to be theorists of our own condition and has no need of teaching, but that when we so choose we may gain much from learning together.

Notwithstanding this beautiful sentiment, radical pedagogy also means being ever vigilant of modes of authority and unequal power dynamics between us, to name them and to work to minimize their harmful expressions. The obvious examples of these are my privileged position as a researcher, an educated and free individual which may mark my voice as valid and authoritative. In contrast, as a woman, my voice is gendered as less authoritative. I will expand on some of the anticipated power dynamics under **Power Dynamics and Positionality**.

Prakash and Esteva (2008) offer an important contribution to the field of radical pedagogy including a critique of conscientization. They oppose the promotion of education as a human right due to the deployment of education as a tool of colonialism, and for the underlying presumption that people need to be taught to understand, think and act within their own sociopolitical circumstances (96). This study prefers the more radical approach of Prakash and
Esteva, following Illich, which rejects the requirement of compulsory education and education as a tool of “empowerment,” and instead supports communities, individuals and groups who choose to learn together and practice the full integration of learning and living. Still, as Prakash and Esteva acknowledge, their approach may not be applicable for those who have been thoroughly institutionalized, which likely excludes most settlers in a western capitalist context. As they assert, “Deschooling does not and cannot make any sense to the schooled imagination” (94).

Recognizing the many barriers to a “living as learning,” radical pedagogy approach in western capitalist societies, I will uphold a radical pedagogy ideal but also consider when and how the concept of conscientization may be useful or potentially damaging. To give a personal example, I have benefited greatly by being given access to concepts of patriarchy and feminist theories which have been applicable to my relationships and self-knowledge. I would not have absorbed these concepts without conscientious feminist educators and influences. This is not to minimize the differences between what I have called critical pedagogy (Freire) and radical pedagogy (Illich, Prakash and Esteva), but to fully appreciate each in their own right in order to navigate a suitable way forward for this study.

De-Schooling

Illich’s (2010) unabashed critique of required learning and the institutionalisation of education as the groundwork of capitalist society is a foundational text informing the theoretical underpinning and the methodological approach of the present study. Firstly, Illich emphasizes the growing dependency of schooled societies on institutionalised and professionalized skills and intellectual and material resources. He claims that this dependency diminishes our creative capacities of living and learning, and conceals the inherent connection between politics, economics, and education. From Illich’s (2010) insistence that “learning happens casually, and
even the most intentional learning is not the result of programmed instruction” (12), I take for the current study a theoretical parallel and a methodological instruction.

The theoretical parallel begins with the simple but radical assertion by Illich that people do not need to be taught, but instead need places, peers, and resources to direct their own learning. Likewise, I am proposing to explore in this study a de-institutionalized, de-schooled view of ethics which may develop through a similar nurturing context, through free social engagement, and may be stifled under systematic moral instruction. Further, Illich (2010) shows how school not only asserts a prerequisite of learning practical skills and intellectual prowess but also insists on the need for moral instruction: “(t)he distinctions between morality, legality and personal worth are blurred and eventually eliminated” (32).

The methodological suggestion presented by Illich (2010) describes an emergent method of learning; that people who wish “should be able to meet around a problem chosen and defined by their own initiative” (19). Coming from a university to invite a group of former prisoners to join me in a pedagogical project and, as a researcher with a painstakingly “planned” research proposal, I cannot claim that this project lives up to the framework presented by Illich. However, I attempted to plan into the project room for emergence. That is to say that the outcome of the project was not decided in advance and the project was framed as a request for engagement from the group who elected to be involved in such a way as to change the very shape of the project. In this way, I positioned myself, while recognizing the privilege that allows me to take this position, as a person proposing and initiating such a meeting around a problem for “creative exploratory learning” described by Illich (2010, 19).

Institutional Realities

While affirming the potential pedagogical value of a thoughtful inquiry into the implications of theories of emergent ethics to our lived experiences (as we navigate our
institutionalized realities of prison, family, school, economy and so on), it is vital to recognizing
the parallels between traditional schooling and prison rehabilitationism, as well as what has been
named the ‘school to prison pipelines’ (Giroux 2013, 54). As Roy and Billy so aptly point out,
there is a risk of reconstructing the rehabilitative project even while attempting to depart from it:
ROY: I think we have a very good group. ‘Cause this could've really gone bad right? You could
have got a whole bunch of people that just wanted to be here that didn't want to be
involved that thought they had to be involved right? And then that way everything goes
bad because they really don't want to be here
BILLY: Then it's like a mandated program.

It was imperative for me to create a substantive rather than merely rhetorical difference
between this project and institutional schooling and prison programming.

Considering these institutional realities, and the limitations of radical pedagogy to the
“schooled imagination” laid out by Prakash and Esteva (2008, 94), I will draw in part from
Giroux (2013). While Giroux does not take the radical approach that this study keeps within its
lens, he contributes by considering the breadth of neoliberal-style capitalist pedagogy which
extends into multiple aspects of our lives. For example, we may consider the multiple ways in
which the media suggest for us our moral subjectivities – as proper economically productive
citizens.

Giroux (2013) links the political and the ethical to the educational environment, insisting
that there is no place – least of all schools – free of ethics and politics. He paints schools as
contested places for the emergence of democratic practices (172). The same may be said for
other highly regulated and hierarchical institutions such as prison environments. Far from the
ideal of “complete and austere institutions” (Foucault 1995, 235), prisons are complex and
variegated places filled with political and ethical practices. Within the walls of the prison people
live their lives. They make decisions and build relationships – with all the care and conflict this entails; they act within and come to understandings of the sociopolitical contexts of the prison and beyond. As Giroux asserts there is no place free of politics or of the potential of ethical engagement, and despite all their restrictive measures prisons are no exception.

**Radical Utopianism**

With the warnings offered by Freire, Prakash and Esteva, and other theorists and practitioners of critical and radical pedagogy against the replication of their initiatives as a model to follow, and the limitations of working in the shadow of neoliberal, colonial, capitalist pedagogies, new experiments in radical pedagogy must be creative and utopian. It is with gratitude and hope that I recognize that a tradition of such experiments has long since begun (Hern 2008; Coté, Day, and De Peuter 2007). *Utopian Pedagogy: Creating Radical Alternatives in the Neoliberal Age* is a collection of such uniquely situated experiments, and while not attempting to emulate any one practice, I think that much can be gained by examining many diverse approaches. Together, they distill a version of utopia which “is both a critical attitude towards the present and a political commitment to experiment in transfiguring the coordinates of our historical moment” (Coté, Day, and De Peuter 2007, 13). This radical utopia which knows itself as a part of history deeply embedded in the present, partial and contested, but which still dares to theorize and to act, departs from prescribed and inert utopian visions which seek to overcome the present by pointing toward a future disassociated from history (Freire 2003, 91).

Adopting a radical utopian vision will help us avoid the traps of regarding prison or parole life as stagnant, politically and ethically inert, and set apart from an imagined future life of freedom which may or may not be attainable. This project seeks to take hold of the here and now, politically and ethically, in the midst of whatever barriers exist.
I would be remiss not to recognize at this point that this utopian vision is for me the groundwork of my abolitionist politics. While there is enough abolitionist work to be done in the carceral state for the multiplicity of expressions of abolitionism, the abolitionism to which I would like to contribute, herein and elsewhere, is utopian. It is an abolitionism which seeks to begin to make prisons and the conglomerate of associated institutions redundant. It looks to create spaces and practices which increase the freedom and capabilities of people and communities to address their conflicts and their needs without relying on the institutions which all too often exacerbate the harms they claim to address. It is thus that I would like to position this project and the goal of affirming the ethical agency of those involved as an invitation to work towards building freedoms.

This positioning of utopian abolitionism within the project is not to say that the other members of the project share my politics or that the project takes up these or other abolitionist goals. Further, one should not assume that those who have spent time incarcerated adopt an abolitionist politics; their politics are at least as varied as those of free individuals, or more so. In fact, the group reflected multiple times on our differing politics and the relationship of our politics to the range of past experiences among us. While the awareness that my own politics were the most radical among us led me to look at my abolitionism itself as a form of privilege, it was agreed that the differences among us should be regarded as a strength informing our discussions. I will reflect further on the role of my abolitionist politics and the diversity of the group’s politics in the project in Chapter Six.

*Prison Pedagogy: Why is a Radical Pedagogy Important?*

I have given a brief and partial introduction to the traditions of critical and radical pedagogy that this study intends to follow, but have yet to illustrate the role for these traditions in critiquing the carceral state. I will give two brief examples, while recognizing that many other
initiatives exist, along with an inexhaustible amount of prison writing, art and other forms of critique by prisoners.

There is a growing field of convict criminology which insists on the priority of prisoner analyses of the carceral system. Convict criminology “reflects research illustrating the experiences of prisoners and ex-cons, and attempts to combat the misrepresentation by scholars, the media and government” (Richards et al. 2008, 43). It is centered on the belief that those who have direct experience living within the system are uniquely situated to combine their experiences with academic analysis. Convict criminology is also taking pedagogical form with, for example, courses being offered for free to prisoners at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh in a joint project between the university and a medium security institution (Richards et al. 2008, 43-44).

The Journal of Prisoners on Prisons follows parallel goals: to elevate the research and analytic contributions of those whose voices have been systematically silenced yet have the most to contribute.

While these initiatives inhabit the traditional university, the university is deployed in a manner that can be congruent with radical pedagogy and utopian abolitionism, procuring space within the academic world for those who had previously been excluded and using the legitimacies of that world to elevate critical voices which had previously been silenced. It is thus that I have chosen to engage in this inquiry as a philosophical and pedagogical project, and to ask the volunteers to join me as researchers in this project. I will reflect of the ways the group has contributed to the field of convict criminology in Chapter Six, Project Outcomes.

Power Dynamics and Positionality

In the following section I will discuss some issues and dynamics pertinent to working between the institutions of the university and the prison. These include messianic pedagogies and
colonialism, intersectionality, positionality, gender dynamics, and meanings of solidarity with
prisoners’ struggles. In some cases I draw from my volunteer experience on the inside as a guide
to inform potential dynamics and responses within this project.

Messianic Pedagogies
Returning momentarily to the critique of conscientization mentioned earlier, I would like
address the potential for messianism and hidden agendas. Though inadequately according to
Prakash and Esteva (2008), Freire (2003) himself was wary of the potential messianism of
educators seeking to conscientize their students and he insisted on the mutuality of the
pedagogical relationship (79). He denounced the primacy of academic knowledge and insisted on
the need of educators to be conscientized by their students (79). Meanwhile, Prakash and Esteva
(2008) insist on the unavoidability of messianism within attempts at conscientization. Instead
they highlight “institutional inversions” experiments in “living as learning” by “those already de-
institutionalized or damaged by the institutions of industrial societies: the dropouts, the
unemployed and many others either excluded or no longer clamoring for their re-
institutionalization” (110).

As this project draws on a particularly opaque and academically lofty set of literature
with people who may have been marginalized by the traditional schooling system, a great deal of
care is required in dealing with the ways in which knowledges are evaluated. Proceeding
carelessly may risk reinforcing experiences of exclusion and internalized self-doubts. Thus, it
was necessary to build space within the project for opportunities to critique the exclusionary
nature of the traditional valuation of knowledges and to appreciate the mutual exchange of
knowledges amongst the group. The most evident example here concerns paying attention to the
choice of language in our discussions. This meant avoiding unnecessary academic jargon,
defining useful, but less familiar terms, and asking for clarification in interest of broadening our shared knowledge when others used terms specific to certain communities or institutions.

**Colonialism**

The most insidious form of pedagogical messianism is the role of education in colonial oppression. Canadian educational and carceral institutions have been and continue to be mutually entangled in the violence of colonial oppression of aboriginal peoples. The following few sentences will not begin to communicate the violence of the systemic criminalization of aboriginal peoples in colonial Canada. Yet, as a settler, working in a sense at the intersection of two key institutions responsible for colonial violence, I cannot proceed with this project without first decrying this violence and second attempting to find ways to stop its perpetuation at least within this project. There are easily available statistics which demonstrate the racism inherent within the hyper criminalization of aboriginal people, and the institutional sieve under the guise of education and rights responsible for siphoning children from their communities to grow up as prisoners. For example, the 2014 *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples*, states that,

> although indigenous people comprise around 4 per cent of the Canadian population, they make up 25 per cent of the prison population. This proportion appears to be increasing. Aboriginal women, at 33 per cent of the total female inmate population, are even more disproportionately incarcerated than indigenous individuals generally and have been the fastest growing population in federal prisons (Anaya 2014, 10).

Amanda Gebhard (2013) pushes to explore three forms of institutionalized racism which feed the “the school-to-prison nexus for Aboriginal youth: systemic Whiteness within Canadian education, the disciplinary culture of schools, and lastly, the overuse of paradigms of cultural differences to explain Aboriginal under-education” (under Introduction).
Those who enter, and have the privilege to leave prison walls, to hear the stories of prisoners and to see their faces, have the privilege of bearing witness to the extreme injustice of colonial criminalization and the resultant harm and trauma. We also witness the remarkable resilience, compassion, and hope of criminalized aboriginal peoples and communities.

I would like to recognize that the philosophical tradition that this project follows is overwhelmingly western and white – another problematic element and possible limitation for an anti-colonial politics to develop within this project. Further, no specific measures were taken to include aboriginal people within this project. This can be considered a weakness of the project. Given more time and perhaps a wider geographic region it would have been possible to make efforts to extend the invitation to those members of aboriginal communities who have been criminalized. Further, it may have been possible to consult those interested on the forms the project might have taken and the sources of knowledge which might have been included, or other recommendations. These are considerations for future projects. With regard to the work at hand it was my hope that the emergent process combined with a readiness to engage with issues of colonialism would leave the project open to addressing certain expressions of colonialism within the carceral system or beyond should there be a desire to do so.

Intersectionality

A note about identity and prison in the context of a project on anti-oppressive ethics and politics: what prisoners have in common is their living accommodations – the fact of being incarcerated. Yet once a person is criminalized, the label of “criminal” or any of its synonyms or slangs engulfs and overwhelms the diversity of subject positions, expressions and identities to which it is attached. Meanwhile, minorities and marginalized groups are by far the most criminalized. Thus, incarceratory oppression compounds prior forms of oppression. In explorative conversations with anti-prison activists/family members of incarcerated men,
Gilmore (2007) highlights the difficulty of isolating racism as a ‘factor’ of criminalization as it is often compounded with poverty and the individualizing mechanism of criminalization render such patterns invisible (224-225). While racism is an active filter for exclusion and criminalization, once criminalized, men and women are placed within a new category which has been suggestively coined “the convict race” (244). In turn, those populations who are most marginalized (and racialized) under capitalism are filtered into the prison mix (26).

Gender must enter our discussion here, as prisons are heavily patriarchal institutions. Women and transgendered people are too often criminalized for not complying with the gender norms expected of them, or for acting out against the gender and sexual violence allowed to perpetuate in patriarchal and misogynistic societies—violence which only worsens once they are criminalized.

Gender and sexual violence is not only a women’s experience of the patriarchal prison, but also widely prevalent in male institutions. This violence is not of a different beast than the patriarchy and misogyny rife within society in general. The same systems of belief and relations of power which allow for violence and sexual abuse of women at societal levels allow the perpetuation of sexual violence in male prisons. I do not need to deconstruct the expression “be someone’s bitch” to establish this connection.

The experience of incarceration and associated repressions and surveillances are the main forms of oppression that we engaged with, but we shared the intention of cracking open the identifier of “prisoner”, “con”, “inmate” etc. in its homogenizing tendency, of overflowing it with the multiplicity and proliferation of subject experiences and identities, and of unsettling the moral rigidity of these identifiers with the ethical uncertainty evoked by the face of the other.
That said, the word prisoner is used throughout these pages instead of other potential descriptors as, first, it focuses on the fact of incarceration. A prisoner is someone who is imprisoned. It bears fewer moral overtones than words such as “convict”, “con”, or worse “criminal,” as it is not a label for a person based on what they may have done. It describes a temporary situation. While the other labels mentioned can follow a person throughout their lives, “prisoner” is a description of the person’s current living situation while incarcerated. Finally, it does not soften the reality of prison as does the word “inmate.” An inmate might be an inmate of a hospital, a boarding school, a monastery, and so on (Goffman 1961, 5-7). “Inmate” is an example of institutional language which serves to rhetorically humanize the prison to the public and “denies prisoners the reality of their own existence” (Culhane 1991, 20).

In a sense, the use of the phrase “former prisoner” used in throughout these pages could operate in the same vein as expressions such as “ex-con,” as a label which sticks long after a person has been released from prison. Such labels can contribute to the psychological and social limitations to “re-entry.” Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to the volunteers who joined me in this project for their courage and willingness to temporarily bear the label of “former prisoner” in order to highlight their experiences of prison as a means to critique the system.

**Positionality**

As a prison volunteer I have become familiar with the tendency for volunteers to proselytize as well as the strong reactions against proselytism by prisoners. When living within an institution of moral rehabilitation, it is logical to question what moralizing agendas those few who elect to keep your company may hold on your behalf. On the other hand, I cannot claim neutrality in any sense. My motivations for this project are politically minded, as previously mentioned, as an abolitionist, to increase in some manner the freedoms of those involved, and to
co-contribute with them to the body of literature in the field critical/convict criminology. I can neither end there nor would I hope to complete this section. My political and moral convictions are numerous and giving an account of them would be as hopeless as it would be conceited. Still, particularly given my position of relative authority as a researcher it is important to be responsible towards how my own politics may impact the group.

Being responsible towards others and one’s own politics does not mean denying one’s values but being upfront about goals and biases when they are relevant. It means being aware of the layers of invisible authority you may hold and choosing sometimes to be silent rather than allow your voice to dominate others no matter the strength of your conviction. It means naming power dynamics when they do occur.

**Gender dynamics in the group**

When it came to recruitment, all genders were invited to participate though preference would be given to women and transgendered volunteers; men would be invited to participate only after receiving expressed consent of these volunteers to work with men. This might have limited the group size substantially, even to one collaborator. However, I did not follow through with this plan as only men volunteered for the project. This study does not seek to be representative, so this is not a project-stopping problem. Furthermore, considering that in a patriarchal culture gender politics saturate all ethical relations, no doubt gender was a major factor influencing the discussions and activities of the group. While I will not elaborate much on gender throughout the body of this work, I will expand on the potential for a feminist development of this work in Chapter Six, under **Contributions to Research and Further Research**.

As previously mentioned, prisons are highly patriarchal institutions. The typical archetypes for women of saint or slut can seem thicker than the walls to women entering male
institutions. In my experience as a woman entering male institutions the volunteer training given by CSC included instructions to avoid expressions of femininity; most importantly, we were told, do not giggle, or the men will get the wrong idea. Women are also instructed to avoid tight clothing, shorts or short skirts and advised that “(w)hen determining what you’re going to wear when you work with an offender, whether in the institution or in the community, ask yourself, “Am I setting myself up for a conversation I don’t want to have?” (CSC 2005, 2). This policing of women’s behaviour, not to mention their clothing, does nothing to address the patriarchal culture within and outside prison walls. I will also point out that this culture is by no means insuperable. It is recreated daily in our actions, behaviours, and through avoiding important conversations. Thus gender dynamics in this project will be named and discussed as we have the strength and insight to do so. As the only woman in the group I will insistently share this responsibility.

Attempting Solidarity

Reflecting on my experience as a prison volunteer I am aware that it can mean many things to attempt to foster a sense of solidarity with prisoners, and in this project former prisoners. How to contend with your privilege, when the most basic assumptions, your freedom, is now a privilege. When your ability to communicate with your loved ones, to use a full length pencil, to have a private conversation, to choose what to have for dinner, to wear a shirt with buttons, to work, to choose to sit quietly by yourself, and so on, are all put into question, and are all expressions of your privilege. I will not offer up answers here. This is a matter of internal reflection and the slow learnings that come through the development of relationships, including the errors along the way. Lessons are unique to each relationship and need to be continually learned and re-learned. One cannot simply level the field by making such affirmations of equality. It takes work to recognize and address layers of assumptions about authority and
privilege in our thoughts, behaviours and group dynamics – to identify our hidden goals and agendas and render them transparent.

A commonly perceived limitation to building relationships of solidarity with prisoners surrounds the perception of a universalized moral difference between the incarcerated person and the free individual. This perception is reinforced by the misconception that prison volunteers manifest some inherently benevolent quality – the assumption that it takes a special kind of person to do that work. In their training with CSC volunteers are told that they are “essential to offenders’ quality of life” due to the conditions of the “isolated institution” (CSC 2005, 1); thus the enforced deficit of social contact for the prisoner sets the volunteer on a pedestal. The constructs of the guilty and the giver draws a line between two people which their experiences of each other and their knowledge of themselves contradict, yet is difficult to dismantle. The construct of the bleeding heart is a fitting example: the image of the saintly woman whose life fulfilment is to wallow in the suffering of others. This image is powerful, especially in its gendered overtones, perfectly suited to overwrite the lucidity of reasoning for supporting prisoners’ struggles.

The notion that one must come to terms with prisoners’ guilt in order to seek solidarity with their struggles, or that showing solidarity with prisoners’ struggles is condoning harm are fallacies used to undermine the legitimacy of prisoners’ struggles and maintain the social divisions necessary to support the construction of criminality. Upholding personal boundaries and values does not weaken or contradict efforts in solidarity. Working towards solidarity with prisoners’ struggles does not necessitate knowing, understanding or coming to terms with the extreme diversity of details contained in prisoners’ files. Separating the person from their past behaviour is not equivalent to advocating potential harms they have committed. Admonishing
the violence of carceral institutions is not a position in support of other forms of violence, both interpersonal and systemic.

There is a much more complicated dynamic to consider when fostering relationships of solidarity with prisoners. Many prisoners have experienced years of trauma and social exclusion as a result of their incarceration and/or prior to incarceration. Many are coping with complex social and personal challenges on a daily basis. As a result they often have greater social and emotional support needs than most free individuals. Furthermore, prisoners and former prisoners often find themselves with a very limited social network, perhaps as small as one or two close friends or family members. Their exacerbated needs are a direct result of the oppression and social exclusions of the carceral experience. They need to be respected. It can be overwhelming to develop relationships with people who have such high emotional and social needs and such a small support network as no one person is capable of providing the support equivalent of a missing community.

What does it mean to be responsible towards prisoner or former prisoner colleagues and friends given the imbalance of need and capacity? I do not have any definitive answers here. This is a relational learning process. I will offer a few suggestions. First, we can recognize that we do not take on each other’s struggles when we stand with them. Second, we can attempt to maintain our own boundaries and to be clear about these boundaries, including the ethical responsibilities of working in a research capacity. This also means concern for one’s own trauma load. Be clear about what you can and cannot do. Do not make promises you cannot keep. Third, we can listen, when able, and honour the gift of trust in personal sharing. Fourth, we can ask if we can help and how, rather than assuming that help is needed or wanted.
No doubt the relationship is no less complex for former prisoners attempting solidarity with prisoners’ struggles. Thus freedom and respect must be allowed in this project for the varying degrees to which each of us may or may not feel compelled to express solidarity with current prisoners’ struggles.
Chapter 3: Actual Methodology

Recruitment

Recruitment Criteria

The recruitment criteria were inclusive to anyone within the local geographical region (i.e. able to find transportation to weekly meetings in downtown Kingston), who has been incarcerated in a federal or provincial prison at some point in their lives. I had originally planned to limit the criteria to those who had spent some time in federal prison, as provincial prisons tend to have less rehabilitative programing. However, as the recruitment process took longer than expected, I extended the criteria to those who had spent time in provincial institutions. This was of great benefit to the project. Including a wider range of experiences lead to rich discussion about the differences between institutions.

Group Size

I looked to form a group of up to six members. As this project was intended as a collaborative and creative process in which the group was asked to engage as theorists and researchers taking as our common object of study the tensions and relations between prison rehabilitation and philosophies of emergent ethics, a group of six or fewer people was ideal for a number of reasons. First, as has already been stated, the project was not intended to be representative. It was not a study of former prisoners but a study with former prisoners. Second, as the project was designed as a facilitated group process it was important that the group size be manageable and productive.

Furthermore, community building is easier and quicker with a relatively small group size. Building a sense of community and trust in a group is particularly important when working with a population who have become accustomed for various reasons to regard each other with a certain level of suspicion and where the group members’ identities and personal information may be sensitive and put them at risk if shared. A small group size lessens the risk that any personal
information gets repeated outside the group. I will discuss the process of trust building in this project in further detail later in this section.

A small group size is more manageable in terms of addressing power dynamics, especially as I was the sole facilitator in the group. The decision not include other facilitators was made prior to the group’s formation in order to avoid a top-heavy power dynamic and to encourage the group members to gradually take on the roles of facilitation as they felt comfortable doing so, and to allow them more ownership of the process.

The small group size was also selected to help foster a sense of ownership of the content of the project by the group members and to help ensure everyone found time and space to contribute to the degree that they wished, leading to a richer and fuller discussion. Further, when attempting to make some, if not all, decisions by consensus I hoped that a smaller group size would expedite this potentially lengthy process, which was important as we were on a limited timeline.

Reruitment Process

The recruitment process took significantly longer than anticipated, with the project start date postponed from January 2014 to April 2014. The recruitment process included posting, a series of one-on-one meetings, emails and phone calls with fourteen organizations and five independent individuals involved in prison volunteerism, activism, rehabilitation and community reintegration initiatives. My previous community involvement in this area and established relationships were major assets to this process.

Out of these activities five initial interviews were arranged and conducted, and five agreements were signed. These interviews were conducted in coffee shops and lasted from one to two hours. At these interviews I provided a brief overview of the project and some background information about myself including what motivated me to do the project and my abolitionist
politics. I explained that the project was intended to be emergent and outlined the difference between ethnographic research and collaborative research. The volunteers were asked to consider any motivations they had for joining the project, any questions they had relating to theory or process, and any topics or activities they would like to include. We discussed meeting times and locations including convenience and transportation options. We read the letter of information and consent form together and discussed them. We discussed privacy and confidentiality and I asked each person to think of a pseudonym for themselves to be used throughout the project. We also went over the ground rules. I solicited concerns they had about the project thus far. I let them know that I would be available to discuss concerns one-on-one throughout the project.

Despite the relatively public setting, the prospective volunteers were forthcoming about their interests in the project, some of their concerns about the project, and certain personal details. Some of the motivations they expressed in taking part in the project included: something to do to keep busy; to use their experience of prison to contribute to their communities in some way; to make use of their experience of prison in a research capacity (to contribute to a body of knowledge and/or find a forum for their voices); curiosity relating to the project in general and to the subject of ethics and rehabilitation more specifically; to meet people; to establish a support system for themselves; and to learn how to fit in outside of prison. Each of these motivations was validated and while I could envision the possibility of at least partially addressing each of these within the project I made it clear that I could not guarantee fulfilling these goals.

I invited each person to express any concerns they might have about the project. John was refreshingly direct, inquiring, “Yeah. Who do you work for?” I appreciated the frankness of this question and though I was somewhat sensitive to the conditions of surveillance which necessitated his suspicion at the onset of the project, I became more appreciative of the daily
context which precipitated this initial question as the project progressed. When one’s life is dominated by the collection and application of personal information, suspicion of those in a role to gather such information is prudent.

It is important to note that prisoners and former prisoners are one of the most studied populations, and as a vulnerable population, at the mercy of the state, this multiple collection of information, which may be and often is at the behest of their captors in order to find new technologies of incarceration and control, can have the magnified impact of an added loss of a sense of identity and control (Thompkins 2010, 590; Ferrell, Hayward, and Young 2008, 29, 37). The collection of personal information, be it in a research, surveillance, or “rehabilitative” capacity, without the individual being in control of the application or interpretation of this information, is an act of violence in which the individual is silenced and disempowered. Prisoners and former prisoners are a population who have experienced this violence repeatedly as a matter of course through their incarceration.

Therefore, suspicion of my motivations and intentions for the project was an appropriate and understandable reaction which warranted a direct and honest response. Further, ongoing responsibility and sensitivity to the handling of any personal information that may be shared was vitally important. Explaining my motivations for the project, my politics, and my affiliations as well as the project’s collaborative style helped address the initial suspicion and quickly shifted the dynamics of our conversation.

Finding a space

The initial criteria for a meeting space were: a non-institutional space which is welcoming, wheelchair accessible, has adequate space for seated or interactive group activities for up to seven people, has audio/visual technology available, and allows for food and drinks to be served. The meeting room needed to be private so that confidentiality could be upheld.
Location was also important. The meeting place needed to be somewhere central and accessible via public transit and have adequate parking available, preferably for free. Cost for renting the space was also a consideration as I was working with a limited budget.

The meeting space was important to set the tone of the sessions. It was my strong preference to avoid an institutional setting that could be reminiscent of prison programs. Furthermore, an institutional classroom setting would reinforce the sense of the usual power dynamics existent in formal schooling that this project hoped to work against. The atmosphere of the meeting room also sends a message of intentionality for the project and respect for the group members. Therefore it should be clean, in good repair, comfortable and welcoming.

A central consideration in choosing a meeting location related to the opportunity for the project to be a bridge to claiming or re-claiming access to public spaces. For example, more than one volunteer expressed a strong feeling of social discomfort in public spaces since his release due to the sense of stigma of having a criminal record. Broken described how this feeling is compounded by years of institutionalized living, to the degree that even to walk down the street he felt like he did not belong. Holding meetings with people who are at a juncture in their lives where public spaces may be opened or closed to them in very real ways through either legal or social sanctions calls for a careful and intentional attempt to build access, familiarity and comfort in community spaces.

Given my knowledge of a number of relatively liberal and radical community spaces in Kingston I was surprised at the difficulty of finding a suitable space. Before the project began I gained greater awareness of the social stigmas former prisoners confront which contribute to a sense of social isolation. I was surprised to encounter barriers in liberal and radical spaces. I will not give the names of the organizations that I approached. Of the four organizations contacted,
two were open to having us without restriction. However, of these one was not wheel chair accessible and the other did not have daytime bookings available. Of the remaining two organizations, one inquired what “type” of former prisoners would be involved in the project and the other had “safety” stipulations – to protect me, the public, and their property – before the space would be rented to us for the project.

While I sympathize with the genuine sentiments and concerns for safety underlying these organizations’ requests, I do have to name the prejudice at work and the impacts of that prejudice. People ought not to be categorized according to “type,” whether they have a CSC file or not. An attempt to do so is prejudice. We can consider this desire to typify former prisoners using labelling theory. Labelling theory has exposed a mechanism of primary exclusion, the tendency of social control institutions to create ‘deviance’ through labelling, yet mechanisms of secondary exclusion can be seen at work here associated with the phenomenon of the revolving door (Ferrell, Hayward, and Young 2008, 29, 37). The phenomenon of the revolving door is the expression of the impacts of returning to the “community” where the “community” is no more than a reflection of the processes through which one has been denied citizenship. As we see in this example, the labels applied in prison follow the individual into the community, reinforcing old social barriers and creating new ones until re-integration scathes. Richards et al. (2008) call former prisoners “invisible minorities” referring to how exclusion prior to incarceration becomes compounded and officialized post-incarceration (47). While it may seem legitimate to ask “what type,” doing so is a manner of contributing to the revolving door by closing the doors to real community organizations, real relationships and real community integration.

The response of the second organization, though similar in its impacts of sending a message of suspicion and judgment, has the added impact of the diffusion of surveillance and
regulation to minor aspects of a person’s life. This exemplifies Foucault’s (1995) concept of discipline which refers to a power relation so diffused throughout a population that it takes on the functions of regulation, bringing “the effects of power to the most minute and distant element” (216).

Looking at these two responses in tandem, first of labelling, then regulating, we can borrow again from Foucault (1995) his analyses of delinquency, “with the generalized policing that it authorizes, constitutes a means of perpetual surveillance of the population: an apparatus that makes it possible to supervise, through the delinquents themselves, the whole social field” (281). The assumptions of the need for labelling and “security” can be seen as extensions of state power into personal and community relationships, and in the process an evacuation of those relationships. In a study of the role of family members in the surveillance of parolees Silverstein (2001) reiterates the diffusion of power throughout the personal relationships of parolees:

Further analysis underscores how others among the inmate’s social network also become actively involved in managing an inmate’s risk. While the family has become a central instrument for governing troublesome populations, the government nonetheless still calls on employers and religious or cultural supporters to assist in managing an individual’s community risk (415).

Thus, it is crucial to examine the exercises of power within our relationships with those attempting reintegration after prison. It was important that I could ensure that participation in this project would not be an extension of surveillance and control.

I discovered that concerns surrounding the risk of community rejection and further stigmatization, as well as the potential for compounded regulation and surveillance, needed to be addressed first, in order to use the meeting location as a means to build access to community
spaces. Attempting to enter an unwelcoming space could lead to psychological and emotional harm and reinforce feelings of a lack of belonging which had been expressed in the interviews. Further, there is a need for re-education and discussion amongst community organizations in order to address prejudices, misconceptions and fears which are closed doors to community spaces for former prisoners. My colleagues were neither passive, nor ignorant of the prejudices they face in re-entry nor did they shirk at the task of attempting to rebuild relationships or begin community outreach. Despite significant apprehension of being met with further rejection, stigmatization and exclusion in doing so, the group clearly set forth a community outreach goal for the project; at the very least to offer a wider view about prison life and attempt to interrupt the various labels of con or criminal with a human face.

BILLY: Yeah! We want the public to know that this is what happens in the prisons. They might see stories oh this guy shot a guard or there was a big riot ‘cause they didn't have yard for five days, or…

ROY: …and that's true they always see the bad things.

Keeping this in mind, in choosing a meeting location it was also important to take into account any number of potential restrictions that a parolee may have so that access was possible for all potential volunteers without them having to ask for accommodation or come forward with their restrictions. I consulted with each volunteer individually regarding their preference and suitability of a meeting location prior to selecting one.

That said, I neglected to share with the group the difficulties I encountered in finding a meeting space. My reasons aside—some conscious and some lacking reflection—Roy brought to my attention after the project had concluded that withholding this information might have impacted the group members’ overall comfort and their expectations of the barriers we might
meet throughout the course of the project. With Roy’s feedback I realized that by withholding this information I departed from the principle set forth in this project of sharing power and responsibility amongst the group. This was an important lesson for me that I will remember in future projects and other group work—in order to share power effectively, what happens behind the scenes or prior to the project needs to be available for consideration by the group.

We ultimately found a room at Queen’s University. Despite the desire to avoid an institutional space and concerns around reinforcing the dynamics of traditional schooling by using a classroom space, the benefits of accessibility, privacy, no added measures of surveillance and control (though occasionally a security person passed through the hallway), convenience for transportation and an available booking schedule made it a preferable choice. Lack of free parking was a drawback. Choosing Queen’s as a meeting location also fulfilled the goal of building access to community spaces, as the university setting can be intimidating and exclusive. The project allowed for a sense of legitimacy and belonging within the University space the value of which Roy emphasized: “As I say, you know, all my life I never picture myself well, the closest to coming to Queen’s is pedalling my bicycle through it. So being involved in this just on its own is really something.”

What it means to do research together

Despite some initial insecurity surrounding his own potential positionality and contributions to the group, Broken enthusiastically encapsulated our emergent and collaborative approach in the beginning of the first session. “I like the idea of being able to think about things and what ways we could do something that’s better. (As long as we) do it the right way. Between all of us we might be able to achieve something”. Khasnabish and Haiven (2012) outline this collaborative and creative impulse as a research methodology, “We tentatively imagine that ‘prefigurative research’ might name a potential strategy that understands research methods and
ethics as vehicles for bringing that future into being by creating something that would not otherwise exist: a moment or possibility that allows for the difficult cultivation of new solidarities” (413).

Granted Khasanabish and Haiven (2012) refer here to a form of solidaristic, social movement research that falls outside of our scope. I have previously mentioned the complications of building solidarity with prisoners’ and former prisoners’ struggles from the perspective of a non-prisoner, but it must be noted here that there was no pre-existent struggle per se before the formation of the group, and prior to my request, no group at all. When asked whether as a group we associate ourselves with broader social movements involved in prisoner’s struggles the group responded by pointing to and affirming the various affinities for different causes and actions among them but not seeking to resolve or minimize these differences. As Roy put it:

With us we each have our own opinion. We've each had our own little sections of jail time. We've dealt with different things, so you get a wider band. You know, the ethics that I’ve seen in prison is different than the ethics that he's seen in prison, is different than the ethics that he's seen in prison. So different situations give you so much more research and so much more of an open mind.

Meanwhile Billy pointed out that the greater awareness of each other’s experiences and struggle helped promote a sense of affinity within the group.

What we wished to achieve, which Broken knowingly left undefined, was allowed to grow, fade, and shift throughout the course of the project as new ideas and ambitions came forward, as well as unforeseen barriers and the less visible walls of the ancillary institutions of
post-incarceratory life. We may borrow Khasnabish and Haiven’s (2012) conception of the radical imagination to reiterate the pre-eminence of the collaboration to the creative process.

We do not “have” a radical imagination, no matter how dearly we wish for revolution or how unpopular our ideas might be. The radical imagination is something we do, and something we do together. Imagination, our capacity to project into the present and the future, is constantly in the dialogic process of reweaving itself in both explicit and subtle relation to those people, institutions, and forms of power that surround us. For this reason, the radical imagination is never one thing and is always changing. We cannot grasp it or measure it or define it. But we can convoke it. That is, we can call it into being as part of collaborative praxis (411).

During our reflections mid-way through the project, Roy pointed out the intersubjective nature of the co-creative impulse within the project noting that in the process of learning together we are not only developing new ideas, we are also developing new subjectivities which we derive from one another. I will expand on the theme of intersubjectivity in Chapter Five.

**Planning for emergence**

I proceeded tentatively in setting goals and planning activities for the project in the attempt to allow enough openness to the direction of the group while providing enough structure from which ideas might flow. When I raised the question midway through the project whether we had achieved an emergent approach, it was met with friendly laughter. Roy exclaimed, “Planned and structured!? Is anything planned and structured?” Billy added, “Well we need to have some guidance” and continued by pointing out that we often didn’t get to complete all of the activities which we had set out to do in a given meeting. At a later point Billy reiterated some frustration with getting off topic and suggested that we could increase our timeframe to
accommodate. Roy suggested that while conversations did often shift focus “sometimes this brings us new ideas.”

Indeed, conversations were “lightly” facilitated and were allowed to flow and diverge from the themes we set out before us. Yet, this flexibility in our agenda and facilitation style also allowed for conversations of practical and emotional support for each other’s daily challenges to arise. As many of the group members had expressed one of their goals for the project being finding a support network, I felt this was an appropriate and helpful use of our sessions. As Roy put it, “I find for me this is a support group. You're getting stuff out of me but I'm getting stuff that I knew I needed after I got out that I couldn't find.” My role in some of these conversations was merely to provide a space for them to occur; as John joked, “Just leave the snacks!”

As parolees are commonly restricted from associating with other people with criminal records, and given the stigmas and prejudices mentioned earlier which create barriers to entering non-criminalized communities, it can be difficult to develop a support network. Further, it was evident in the group discussion that there is an important role for former prisoners to support one another as they navigate the ancillary post-incarceratory organizations and build their lives on the outside. They have knowledge, and experiences of success and failure that can benefit one another. Of course, this engagement with one another can also be problematic. For example, there is a risk that relationships founded on the common identity of “former prisoner” could reinforce and instil that sense of identity and create a barrier to moving forward. This is not an insurmountable problem, however, and reflection on these risks may be enough to avoid them.

Dedication of Research Collaborators

There was a remarkable level of dedication to the project by each of the group members from the outset. Of the people who expressed interest in the project all signed agreements at their initial interviews. Billy waited for nearly two months from the time of his initial interview for the
project to begin. Billy, John, and Roy maintained full involvement with the project from the time of their initial interviews to the project’s completion over the course of four months, often arriving a half an hour or more early for meetings, helping set up before and clean up after meetings, communicating during the week by sharing pertinent thoughts, articles, and events, planning future activities, preparing statements for conferences, and writing reports following the two conferences.

One prospective volunteer, Mr. D, was unable to participate in the project due to transportation issues and scheduling conflicts – he had a full schedule of volunteer engagements. Mr. D contributed significantly to the project during the planning phase through consultation over the phone and email. I offer my most sincere thanks for his generosity of his time and input in the development of the project. I also offer my regrets that I was unable to coordinate the project sessions in a way that would have allowed him to participate.

**Building Trust and Sharing Responsibilities**

I had prepared some community-building activities for our first session to help us get to know one another. However, as I was the last to arrive (even thirty minutes before the start time) and as the group used this time to chat casually and make their own connections by the time we came to the community-building activities it was decided that they were unnecessary. A sense of rapport developed quickly within the first session without any encouragement.

As previously mentioned, due to the small group size and in an attempt to limit the facilitator-participant power dynamic, I decided not to include a second facilitator. Instead, I looked to the group to share the responsibilities of facilitating. We developed some ground rules and I asked for help maintaining them. I looked to the group members to share other facilitation tasks as they arose. Roles were shared in an informal way, no one was formally assigned a role, and all participation was voluntary. However, my colleagues readily took on responsibilities
including helping coordinate our meeting schedule, scribing notes, arriving early to help set up and staying late to help clean up the room, looking for resources to further our discussions throughout the week including news articles, upcoming events, videos, images, definitions, and so on, preparing discussion questions, addressing group dynamics, encouraging one another, keeping discussions on track, time-keeping, guiding and sharing decision-making power, preparing and making presentations at two conferences, writing reports about these conferences, having extra work sessions to complete our white board sketch video, and more.

**Documentation**

With the consent of each group member the sessions were audio recorded. The group was informed that they could stop the recording at any time. Individual meetings and conference activities including travel to and from conferences, meals and breaks between sessions were not recorded. The session recordings were useful throughout the project, freeing us from note-taking, and allowing me, on the request of the group, to bring summary notes of discussions from the previous session to each successive meeting. Following the project I transcribed and open coded the recordings.

**Broken’s Departure**

Broken had to leave the project between the time of his initial interview and the completion of the project. His departure related to the conditions of his status under CSC. No one left the project on their own accord.

Broken was re-incarcerated midway through the project, between week four and week five, on the basis of a parole breach. This resulted in a major interruption in the project and a feeling of loss amongst the group. I followed up individually with each person over the phone or by email and in person on the conditions surrounding his departure, their feelings and how it may affect the group. Due to unrelated scheduling conflicts, week five was postponed by one week,
allowing time for these meetings to occur. We discussed Broken’s departure as a group at our fifth meeting. The group expressed sadness for the loss of this member and appreciation for his open, eager, and insightful contributions. Over the course of the upcoming sessions we all frequently referred back to insights Broken had shared while he was with us. Thus, our knowledge continued to grow out of his early contributions as they were remembered anew in different contexts despite his absence.

The contrast between Broken’s enthusiastic and reflexive participation in the project and the seemingly fixed and depersonalized official reaction to a predictable behaviour which was categorized as a breach of parole was striking. His reincarceration at this time seemed completely unresponsive to the emotional, social, and psychological conditions which precipitated this behaviour, and reinforced for me the claims of re-entry literature which state that, “from the start, reentry’s focus on the individual was not meant to evaluate the specific needs and capacities of individuals but rather to reconstitute the ‘individual in reentry,’ as one in need of therapeutic management and control” (Thompkins 2010, 591). I will not go into detail about the nature of Broken’s parole breach as it is not relevant to the agreed upon process or goals of the project. However, it is appropriate and relevant to discuss the net widening nature of the system of comprehensive parole conditions which compound the barriers to reintegration, a discussion will be pursued in the next section. I will start here by expanding on the difficulties of losing Broken midway through the project in terms of my inability to contact him for approximately four months, and the uncertainty of how to proceed in during that period.

Losing Broken without warning presented challenges to the research process. As I have mentioned, one of these challenges involved responding to the group’s reactions, which included sadness and disappointment, but also uneasiness and worry. They contrasted his abrupt departure
to the momentum of the project toward imagining what an emergent intersubjective ethics might mean in the context of the dual dynamic of moral rehabilitation and carceral control. Roy pointed out the irony of the conditions surrounding Broken’s reincarceration given his constructive engagement in the project, “Especially when you are talking about rehabilitation and then the next thing he's gone right?”

The group also made comparisons to their own situations and insistently pointed out differences which would, with any luck, ensure their ongoing freedom. Much of these conversations centered on their own attitudes, behaviours and sense of commitment to “success” and personal development, while the main worry was that these positive personal attributes and achievements might go unnoticed if ever they unwittingly made a “mistake” or were caught on a technical violation. The over-emphasis on the individual discussed earlier is here adopted in personal narratives on what it takes to “succeed.” Yet the reality that the vast majority of incidents of reincarceration are based on technical violations (Munn and Bruckert 2013, 11; Thompkins 2010, 592) creates a strong dissonance with these narratives of self-discipline. Former prisoners face a choice between reinforcing these narratives to gain a sense of agency and control over their future, or becoming bitter and cynical – an attitude which in itself is a recipe for “failure” (Goffman 1961, 36). Munn and Bruckert (2013) provide a Foucauldian framework to the difficult balancing act demanded of prisoners who were bent on getting out and staying out; that of navigating, “two concurrent processes: technologies-of-the-self (working on themselves physically, mentally, and psychologically) and technologies-of-domination (navigating the state-imposed preparation process)” (55).

Another challenge to the research process was the considerable uncertainty involved in attempting to contact Broken. While I did make provisions in our preliminary agreement in the
event that if someone left the project without warning any contributions made up until their point of departure could be used in the project, I was still left with questions. I wanted to ensure that he would be satisfied with how he was represented in these pages and how he would like to have this story, the story of his departure, told. Further, I owed him an expression of gratitude and appreciation for all he contributed to the project.

I have observed with amazement the flow of information within and between prisons regarding prisoner’s movements, from inside to outside, and vice-versa or from one institution to another. This flow of information travels through networked relationships inside and outside of the institutions despite the many barriers to communication – through letters or visits or passing word to one another as prisoners are transferred to another institution. Yet, when you are outside of this network, people can simply disappear. This discussion, of how to find a colleague, friend or loved one in the Canadian prison system warrants a thorough analysis, one that is too expansive to be included in these pages. For my part, I was fortunate to be connected somewhat to this network, through my associations with the participants and other volunteers. I wrote him at the institution I thought most likely to be holding him. I was wrong. He received my letter one week before he was released and months after the completion of the project. After over four months of uneasiness surrounding his whereabouts and safety I was finally able to thank him for his part in the project, update him on the projects final stages, and have important conversations with him about how to proceed with his story in writing. During our conversation Broken intuitively understood how disconcerting it was for the group to suddenly lose contact with him: “just – swoosh – and I’m gone. Just like that,” as he put it. Broken also expressed his own difficulty in contacting the group prior to receiving my letter: “It’s not like ‘Ethics Project’ is in the (phone) book!” Thus, I learned an important lesson for future projects. It would have been
wise to provide the group members with a clear and easy way to contact me, for example recommending that they memorize a phone number, in case they were unexpectedly “picked up.”

Finally, losing Broken midway through the project left me with a sense of sobriety regarding the fragility of my colleagues’ freedom. This impacted future decision making, leading me to act more cautiously and compliantly in my correspondence with another group member’s parole officer. Could participating in this project, in any of our activities, or the simple act of discussing the system of rehabilitation in relation to ethical philosophy, leave my colleagues open to heavier surveillance? Roy reiterated my concern: “Yeah, but we can also talk about how all of a sudden we gotta worry about what we're doing. Is it (the project) affecting us?”

Meanwhile, there was a general agreement that the project “ought” to be interpreted in a positive light with regard to its “reintegration” value: noting the educative value, reflexive practice, community involvement, skill building (including public speaking, writing, reading, computer literacy, consensus decision making, group facilitation and analytical skills). Again, as Roy stated, “You’d think you would get credit for this ‘cause this is the type of thing that most, don't get me wrong, but most prisoners or cons would commit to and then not show up right?”

Working with People on Parole

While the vast majority of former prisoners successfully complete their release conditions and never return to prison, most of those who do not make it on the outside are reincarcerated “for technical violations (for example, breach of conditions), and less than 2.5 percent are for new Criminal code offences” (Munn and Bruckert 2013, 11). Similarly, in the US, Thompkins (2010) identifies how conditions of parole designed to facilitate reintegration in effect expand the rates of recidivism: “the rate of return for violating a condition of release versus being convicted of a new offense is 2.7–1” (592). He expands delineating the re-entry phase (the period of supervision) and the reintegration phase (period of establishing one’s rights and opportunities
offered to all citizens) and indicates that the conditions of the re-entry phase often create barriers to moving on to reintegration (591). The distinction between “re-entry” and “reintegration” was reflected in our group discussions.

My colleagues discussed the difficulty of putting various aspects of their lives on hold while on probation or parole or during the re-entry phase. Such aspects included finding independent housing, pursuing certain work opportunities, re-establishing relationships with friends and family, establishing new friendships, and pursuing leisure activities. My colleagues considered these aspects of “normal” free living as positive steps towards their reintegration. I would like to reiterate that all of these aspects were legal, and allowable under their conditions of release, but that due to the surveillance they were under they felt that pursuing these activities would have resulted in undue stress, and an overall increased risk for technical violation.

For example, the group explained to me the vulnerability of parolees or former prisoners to exploitative work conditions. Roy illustrated the potential power dynamics:

See, that [work] is part of the “rehabilitation.” See, they put you in the workforce and then they put these people over you who have power. I've met a few people. I know of one [employer] that takes advantage of guys that are out on parole. He pays them like three dollars an hour to do work and stuff under the table and holds it over their heads that if you don't do this then I'll go tell your probation officer that you're doing this or doing that, right? So you're already labelled as a lowlife and they're using you as it right?

John reiterated the degrading impacts of work environments during the re-entry phase: “you pretty much are a low life anyways until you're off parole ‘cause that’s just the way they treat you: like dirt.” Roy responded with sarcastic emphasis, “and it's supposed to be rehabilitating!”
Indeed, as Deena Rymhs (2009) points out in her analysis of prison work in Canada, there is a clear discrepancy between the testimonies of CORCAN (the manufacturing, textiles, construction, and services company, combined with rehabilitative/vocational training program which operates within CSC) and those of the prisoner workers CORCAN employs. While CORCAN promotes itself as being simultaneously rehabilitating and “an excellent return on an investment” (322), their employee prisoners describe degrading, monotonous and dehumanizing work. The rehabilitative claims of CORCAN, as Billy pointed out, refer to the replication of “normal” work conditions (Rymhs 2009, 323), yet their offering of menial work under heavy surveillance and exceptionally low pay puts this into a questionable light.

Rymhs (2009) quotes John Rives, a poet and former prisoner, describing the increasing securitization of CORCAN. She writes: “the working environment of some of CORCAN’s sites has become [Rives:] ‘overwhelmed by a security mentality’ that draws a sharp demarcation between non-imprisoned and imprisoned staff. The experience of not being treated like a prisoner, Rives points out, was one of the strengths of the program. That environment has now changed and migrated back to the paramilitary environment of the prison” (317). Likewise, John and Billy explored the dynamic of surveillance for parolees working at CORCAN:

JOHN: I have a guaranteed job at Corcan anyways but I'm not taking it. I've already been promised I have a guaranteed job. If I was going to go there and give just a bit of a shitty attitude or anything, well that's it for me! So I'm not doing that.

BILLY: A lot of people who have gone to Corcan end up going back inside.

JOHN: I know. I wouldn't be able to make it there for sure. I know I wouldn't ‘cause there would be a boss there that'd just be riding, riding, riding and I wouldn't be able to take that. I’m not going to put myself in that situation at all.
At this point in our discussion I brought forward Goffman’s (1961) concept of “looping,” a form of control characteristic of total institutions (36). They immediately expressed familiarity with the concept and Roy offered the following definition: “The average Joe mumbles and grumbles about work and no one even considers it, but if you're incarcerated and you mumble and grumble you're not doing what you're supposed to.” This was followed by a lengthy discussion regarding the need to manage one’s attitude as well as one’s behaviour, and the psychological “trick” this can entail. As Roy put it, “You do what you're told but you mumble and grumble about it; but you don't let them know so they don't take your power. Just smile and take it, and at the same time you don't want to make yourself feel demoralized.”

Perhaps less obvious examples of re-entry’s barriers to reintegration relate to generalized parole conditions such as geographic boundaries, or curfews which necessitate special permission from a parole officer in order to partake in reintegration activities, thus increasing the discretion and scrutiny of the parole officer over the life and activities of the parolee. For example, after changing parole officers John’s permission to continue with an evening support group was revoked, even though it had been mandated by his conditions of parole and which he found helpful. The new parole officer decided that he should attend a different, and according to her equivalent group during the day, and she would not grant an exception to his curfew to attend the evening group. Meanwhile, as John explained, he preferred the evening group because there was an established sense of trust among members and dedication to one another. He felt a sense of commitment to the group as they provided mentorship to one another. In contrast to the daytime group, which he found disingenuous and disruptive, he felt the members of the evening group were sincere regarding their reasons for attending and supportive of one another. For John
the value of the group came from the group dynamics and quality of relationships rather than the content (with which he was already familiar).

The contrast identified here by John between a program’s standardized content and the relational engagement parallels the model of the moral framework (content) and the emergent ethical potential (relational) central to this project. This contrast between interpersonal engagement and the standardized content of rehabilitative programing was a recurring theme throughout the project and will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Five. For the moment I would like to highlight the degree of discretionary power parole officers have over the lives of parolees.

On October 31, 2014 the Parole Board of Canada (PBC) released a Second Edition of the *Decision Making Policy Manual for Board Members*. Prior to that date the policy manual, stated in section 1.2 number 3C that “Restrictions on the freedom of the offender in the community must be limited to those necessary and reasonable to protect society and to facilitate reintegration.” This statement has been removed from the new edition, which instead includes caveats throughout the document which leave it to the parole board member to justify what reasonable ground they find for imposing restrictions. For example, pertaining to victim’s statements, “…Board members will impose any conditions on the parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence of the offender that they consider reasonable and necessary in order to protect the victim” (PBC). This shift in language exemplifies the increasing discretion of the PO. Further, as Silverstein (2001) points out there has been a move in the “new penology” of the past decades toward policies heavier on the side of risk assessment and population control rather than an individualized focus throughout the parole process; “The caseworker, then, becomes a case manager concerned not with individual inmates but with a whole population of
inmates. Instead of providing individual counseling and services, the case manager has morphed into a risk assessor whose expertise is assessing inmates’ risk to the community by referring to actuarial scales” (415).

While parole officers are tasked with both facilitating rehabilitative activities for the former prisoner and responsible for security and surveillance of that individual, the group expressed strong ambivalence towards the practice of these conflicting roles especially at a time when security and surveillance are being prioritized.

Billy described his observations of the variation between parole officer’s practices:

At [name of institution] we had five different PO's. One never showed up. He came in like once a week and didn't do anything and people would write stuff like, ‘I need a weekend pass’ and he wouldn’t do anything ‘till like the last minute. Then there was one who was awesome and great. And, the rest, it's like, people just don't care. But sure they have all this power to control your life, but some of them don't really care that you're supposed to be out on the street.

More than once Roy questioned the value of the system of probation or parole to facilitate reintegration. First, he cited the social stigma of being labeled criminal:

I've also heard of prisons where after you do your time they open the door let you out there's no probation there's no restrictions they just let you go and get on with your life again. And that's another one they say that isn't too bad because you get to go back to your life right? The labelling is gone right? You did your time you paid your penalty and get on with your life. You know they keep saying you're not your crime but when you have probation you are you know? You did this you're still being punished for what you did.
Second, he cited the excessive parole restrictions and stress of being caught on a technical violation:

Another way I was looking at it is it really didn't make much sense [to try to get parole]. It's just like being still in jail but being outside 'cause you had all these restrictions and all you had to do is make one mistake and you're back in and then you end up doing the full time. You do it all so you might as well do it to your expiry.

**Working between the University and the Prison**

While in one conversation the group imagined what the project would have been like if it had taken place inside rather than outside prison walls and the group pointed out many limitations the project might have faced, we met different limitations working in the community. The most significant of these was of course the limitations of the group members who were under conditions of probation or parole and thus at risk of re-incarceration. All group members had discussed their participation in the project with their POs prior to the beginning of the project and their POs had approved their participation. While there is no official requirement to get permission to participate in research, as the project involved group work with other people with criminal records they found it prudent to be upfront. Further, as previously mentioned, there was a unanimous assumption, myself included, that the project would “look good” in their files. Indeed Billy and Roy found this to be more or less true, as their POs were relatively supportive of their participation, adding no further restrictions than those under their specific conditions and asking for no further information about the project than publicly available (via the poster or our public activities).

John, who had a change of parole officers between the initial interview and the start of the project, found otherwise. He found himself under increasing levels of surveillance over the course of the project, and as the change of PO’s corresponded so closely with the start of the
project I began to question whether the project played a part in this increased suspicion of his
activities.

John commented on the greater than usual amount of attention he was receiving from his
parole officer, who concerned herself with all of his communications (phone, text, email etc.),
his relationships, and his activities. He also reported being stopped more than once by a police
officer while out walking, questioned, and then allowed to continue. His PO took interest in the
project as well, starting with a request that I confirm his participation, then asking for a meeting
schedule including date, time, and location and the purpose of the study. Apparently unsatisfied
with my responses, she asked each question more than once in a slightly different manner. I
provided information which she had already attained from either John, or public information
from the call for participation poster.

On week five the group began planning to attend two conferences, first the Society of
Socialist Studies at Congress at Brock University and then the International Conference of Penal
Abolition at Ottawa University, to present our reflections. As these conferences were out of town
John required his parole officer to grant him a travel permit to attend. John suggested that it
would be best if I present, via email, a request to his PO that he attend the conferences as he felt
that his own request would be received as less credible. Thus I found myself in the position to
attempt to leverage any authority I could muster as a researcher, in order to legitimize the project
– now engaging power structures of the university we had previously rejected. My attempts were
unsuccessful and the PO eventually denied his request for a travel permit, citing that according to
her the conferences did not warrant travel permits. However, she did not refuse before using the
opportunity to inquire about confidential information about the project including the identities of
the other participants; she was of course denied this information. In the same conversation she


made two arguments to undermine the integrity of John’s voice in this research in an effort to deny the value of his presence at the conferences. First she insinuated that John was confused about his role in the conference and the subject matter that we were discussing more broadly; this was proven to her by his unwillingness to share the details of the group’s confidential discussions: the logic was that if he would not explain it to her, he did not understand. Second, she inferred that I was manipulating the group and telling them what to say, and furthermore that she knows “how this (research) works.” I responded passively to these remarks, making note of her power to silence my colleague through discrediting him, but also aware that she had already made her decision and any resistance from me could count against him.

The group had many frank discussions about John’s exclusion from the conferences. They reflected that the decision to deny the travel permit related to concerns regarding what he might say or learn rather than safety. They pointed to the low level of risk involved:

ROY: And it was almost like a supervised trip anyway right?

JOHN: It is supervised. Like, I'm in a secure spot and in a secure vehicle. When I get there I'm very secure because all of you are there.

ROY: Everything’s planned; where you're going to be.

Then they expressed frustration surrounding finding a forum for their voices, only to be silenced again:

ROY: But it flips back on our argument about trying to improve the system and then being told you're not allowed to talk about it. I'm on probation; I have rules but I still have my freedom of speech right?

JOHN: You're supposed to have your freedom of speech.

BILLY: Yeah as long as we don't do anything to put you at risk or put ourselves at risk then we're
all good to go. Yeah. There's nothing on my probation papers that say that I can't leave
the city, I can't sit at a conference and can't give my opinion about my time that I spent in
jail.
JOHN: It doesn't say on mine either!!

I raised the question of whether participating in the project was having a negative impact
on John. He replied, “I don't think so ‘cause she said I could follow through with it gave me
permission to. She said, ‘I'm not going to stop you from going to anymore sessions you can
finish it out, but you're not going.’” Still concerned, I asked if it would have been better to have
avoided drawing extra attention to him and the project, and not attempting to go to the
conferences. His response surprised me:
JOHN: No. I’m glad we did actually ‘cause now I really know where I stand with her. Like I kind
of already knew, but now I really know. So now, I just really gotta watch myself now.
KAREN: Interesting, ‘cause I was looking at it the other way. My feeling was scared that in
asking the question that opened up an opportunity for her to get more information when
she already had her opinion, but I guess it works both ways.
JOHN: Yeah it sure did. Did a light bulb go off there?

John teased me for not recognizing the complexity of the power dynamics at play even
after we had been discussing different forms or power and knowledge over the past few weeks.
This was no small oversight that at the same time as he was being silenced I had overlooked his
agency in his relationship with his PO. John was willing to spell out some of his less conspicuous
forms of resistance even while pointing out that I was unaccustomed to seeing them; this was
reminiscent of James C. Scott’s (1990) “hidden transcripts,” a term to describe the forms of
resistance of the oppressed which are unregistered by official lines of power. He gave the example of his response to realizing he was being followed by the police:

JOHN: My friend told me as soon as I went by him one copper came down that way, one copper went the other way and the other one went in behind him. So they followed me all that day. So yesterday boy did I take them on a tour. Oh yeah. Everywhere. Like there’s so many back alleys there's so many back streets. I walked for about seven hours. Just taking them everywhere. So, I don't know why I'm being followed I don't know what they think I up to.

Still, John’s prohibition from the conferences was a disappointment which created an exclusionary dynamic within our group which needed to be managed for the project’s duration. We revisited this conversation many times and each time John, with the support of the group, would insist upon the importance of witnessing his ongoing surveillance as part of our research process as a response to its silencing impacts, “And what you wrote, I would like you to present that to somebody about my PO and, yeah to anybody.” Billy made an optimistic look to the future: “If you perceive this a couple years from now, then you already have this information, then you can probably change how the system works.”

My colleagues’ ability and readiness to work through the limitations we faced; their analyses of power and resistance, through minor acts, or through witnessing in research; their support for one another including giving each other a forum to be heard, even while other forums were closed; and their willingness to imagine a different future brought to mind the question posed by Khasnabish and Haiven (2012), “What would research look like in the world we want to create and how can a vision of research-to-come animate a radical research strategy in the here
and now? We do not believe that the world we can create will be some sort of magical utopia in which all social divisions, oppressions, exploitations, and inequalities will evaporate” (413).

I hope to have provided in this chapter some indication of the unfolding form of the project as well as the contexts and dynamics in which we were embedded. The struggles and barriers we met became part of our content of study. While I had invited the group to reflect on their previous experiences of the prison system, we found our analytical minds being put to work on shared experiences in the process. In the following chapter I will elaborate on our theoretical exploits. To this end I will convey our conversations on subjectivity, the moral subject, and the dual experience of carceral control, alongside the exercises of moral rehabilitation.
Section 2: Analytical Reflections on Our discussions
Chapter 4: Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity and Moral Rehabilitationism

Seeking an understanding of Rehabilitation

While the group’s chosen object of study was prison rehabilitation, throughout our ten weeks of conversations we grasped for an understanding of the meaning of rehabilitation. John suggested it would be fitting to adopt the depiction of rehabilitation provided by Red in the iconic prison movie *The Shawshank Redemption* (1994):

RED: Rehabilitated? Well, now let me see. You know, I don't have any idea what that means.

1967 Parole Hearings Man: Well, it means that you're ready to rejoin society...

RED: I know what you think it means, sonny. To me, it's just a made up word. A politician's word, so young fellas like yourself can wear a suit and a tie, and have a job. What do you really want to know? Am I sorry for what I did?

Like Red, John insisted that the concept of rehabilitation was at best an empty promise: “There is no rehabilitation. It doesn’t exist. I don't think so.” Underlying his contention is the understanding, in the good company of Foucault (1995), and Gilmore (2007), that rehabilitation is one side of the prison coin, without which the other the punitive and control aspects of prison would be unpalatably inhumane to public perception—an awareness that was noted when we watched a video on the Stanford Prison Experiment (2011) and the group noted the intense moral indignation of the public against a form of authoritarian power which was “everyday” to them. As such, rehabilitation can be seen as an effort to sugar coat an institution of control based on threat of violence in a humanitarian guise.

Ruth Gilmore (2007) outlines three other concepts—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—which along with rehabilitation form the basis for prison philosophies. These concepts interrelate “as reforms—not as steps away from brutality or inconsistencies, but as
attempts to make prisons produce social stability through applying some mix of care, indifference, compulsory training, and cruelty to people in cages” (14). The apportionment of the “mix” of these reforms is continually adaptable to the sociopolitical climate of the time. For example, as was noted in our sessions pointing to the ramifications of the Tough on Crime bills and reforms to the prisons system that have been passed in recent years, in Canada’s current climate rehabilitation has taken a backseat to retribution and incapacitation. As a group we discussed prisoner pay cuts, decreasing rehabilitative and trades programing, the closure of the prison farms, prison expansion, overcrowding and double bunking, increased security measures, and greater challenges toward achieving parole, amongst other ramifications from the recent changes.

CSC Mission Statement

Noting the shift away from rehabilitation, Broken pointed out that the CSC mission statement had been changed in 2009 to accommodate the rhetoric of “public safety” in post 9/11 Canada and in the midst of CSC’s “Transformation Agenda” (CSC 2013). The current mission statement reads: “The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), as part of the criminal justice system and respecting the rule of law, contributes to public safety by actively encouraging and assisting offenders to become law-abiding citizens, while exercising reasonable, safe, secure and humane control” (CSC 2013, “Renewal of the CSC Mission”). The shift from the 1996\(^1\) wording “contributes to the protection of society” amid the “Transformation Agenda,” can be understood using Cohen’s (2007) analysis language of social control where incremental shifts in language are aimed at giving the impression of progress and the impression that institutions of social control are able to address intractable social problems (Jackson 2002, 34; Cohen 2007, 157-158).

\(^{1}\) The 1996 mission statement had been changed in response to the Arbour Report following the incidences at the former Prison for Women to include “Rule of Law” (Jackson 2002, 36)
Such a minor change in language would be hardly notable, if it weren’t that the adoption of the “public safety” rhetoric dramatically situates the banality of the criminological exercise within the context of the post-9/11 “war on terror,” opening the way for surrogate “wars” on crime, on drugs etc. Of course the connection between these “wars” is not merely rhetorical; CSC acknowledges that operating under the policy banner of the Department of Public Safety which formed in 2003 to confront “a wide range of threats—everything from crime and natural disasters to terrorism… sharpened focus on public safety [and] created a new operating context for CSC in the first decade of the 2000s” (CSC 2014, “The Priority of Public Safety”).

Before sounding the call for revitalized rehabilitation particularly at this time of seemingly bare-toothed punishment, it is significant to note the reliance on continual amendments in language and in policy of CSC, “even if nothing new is happening” with regard to the “conundrum” of crime (Cohen 2007, 158). Despite the recent amalgam of policy changes pursued by the Harper government, the basic aspects of penal philosophy remain the same. A shift to one end of the spectrum is allowable only by the placeholder at the other which provides the built-in alternative and the scope of the spectrum itself. The humanitarian ideal of rehabilitation holds the inhumanity of harsher punishment at bay while it offers “prison as rehabilitation” as the only critique to “prison as punishment” (Foucault 1995, 235). My colleagues protested this marriage between punishment and whatever “ideal” of rehabilitation might be offered, noting repeatedly the demoralizing impact of carceral control and the incompatibility of such demoralization with a rehabilitative ideal. This contradiction stood out most significantly to them as Billy read the mission statement:

JOHN: Wow!

ROY: Humane control! That word makes it sound like you're not a real person. Humane control!
Like being humane to a dog.

Broken suggested a more literal wording: “When would you see rehabilitation and demoralization at that same time? That's what CSC should have on their slogan ‘rehabilitation and demoralization.’”

Still, the group did not entirely reject the potential for a rehabilitative ideal. At times in our discussion rehabilitation was invoked as a generalized concept which was regarded positively in reference to one’s capacity to change, develop skills, and grow in new directions. While it was recognized that some CSC programing offered helpful information and opportunities for skills development, primarily this positively-connoting rehabilitation was characterized by *exceptionality* to the context of the prison, and in reference to the agency of the individual to “rehabilitate” oneself. I will expand on the group’s discussions of rehabilitation-as-change in the next chapter looking at themes of freedom, choice, power and ethics, and in the process leaving behind the term rehabilitation.

**The Subject of Rehabilitation**

While affirming the agency of the individual to change despite the institution, we may consider the formation of the subject within prison rehabilitation. Anna Neill (2006) points out that prisons rehabilitate a particular type of subject, the subject born in modernity, whose characteristic interiority is amenable to the rehabilitative technique:

Although the term “rehabilitation” describes directly coercive methods of correction as well as non-coercive, it broadly assumes that, given the right environmental conditions, the human psyche can be re-molded and that this inner transformation will manifest itself in the development of appropriate social behavior. This in turn presupposes that human beings, with all their human interiority, can be the objects of scientific management, since
environmental factors and psychological reactions to them together with their social outcomes are all observable and measurable phenomena (289)

As such, for the prisoner-subject the only forum for change is framed through the intra-subjective technique which involves both bearing forth a knowable interiority and surrendering said interiority to rehabilitative aims. Roy describes the dilemma whereby the avenues to change are limited due to the rehabilitation’s reliance on the interiority of the “criminal” subject: “If they’re labeling you then you're not changeable. So why are they trying to rehabilitate?” Again from Roy: “It's like going into a class and they say they’re gonna rehabilitate you and then they turn around and say you’re a bunch of criminals and you're never going to change.”

Roy’s dilemma was shared by the students in Anthony DiMatteo’s (1992) prison literature project in which prisoners responded to Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and Freud’s management of the tale in his Oedipus complex. As mentioned, rehabilitationist prison philosophy flowed out of the enlightenment period which included a shift in the understanding of human nature—namely that the individual was rational and impressionable to moral rectification (Smith 2004, 213-214). Credited as the father of psychology, Freud made immense contributions to the rationalist philosophy of moral reform in his enlightenment study of the human mind (DiMatteo 1992, 52). The prisoner-students of DiMatteo’s classroom drew connections between themselves and Sophocles’ Oedipus in his multifaceted dilemmas between choice, circumstance and guilt (DiMatteo 1992, 52). However, their reactions to Freud were stronger; they questioned the implications for self improvement in a psychological theory in which the individual is doomed to relive a primordial drama (52). They drew direct correlations between Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis and their experiences of the remedial prison programming (52-53). For Freud, psychoanalysis provides an education for the self which “succeeds when it redeems humanity
from Nature’s incestuous and criminal doom. The path from darkness to light is through suffering, a program of discipline and reform that brings self-knowledge” (DiMatteo 1992, 52). The connections between Freud’s prescription of self remediation and that of the corrective ambitions of the prison were all too obvious for the prisoners, connecting the rehabilitative incarceratory philosophy with Freud’s model in which the interiority of the individual is the focus of specialized treatment (Foucault 1995, 232). Similarly to the critiques advanced in the present project, the students of DiMatteo’s classroom who held hopes for themselves in the rehabilitative project began to question the source of their agency in a Freudian arrangement which directed them toward an unrecognizable interior (52).

The preoccupation with the interiority of the subject as morally reformable coerces prisoners into a set of intra-subjective calisthenics. Let us follow Guattari (2006) in “decenter(ing) the question of the subject to the question of subjectivity” (22) and consider the simultaneous management and movement between various other subjectivities within the rehabilitative ambit. In a passionate statement Broken describes the difficulty of managing one’s subjectivities within the intra-subjective exercise of rehabilitation:

Well, that's where CSC, they're trying to use the word rehabilitation, but what they're doing is they're saying “ok we're going to rehabilitate these guys” and they're using demoralization to rehabilitate and drive you down, drive you down. Which is just causing hatred and distrust and just depress you. So if you went with their theory you'd just be a ball of – screw balling, totally screw balling. You know what I mean? You'd be a mess. Where, you have to be strong and stay as a person and ponder through, and snowball off them, but still understand what they're saying so you can be coherent to what they want.
Right? And pick what you want to be strong at so you can still have a grasp of who you are.

Here Broken narrows in on the distinction between the rehabilitative exercise and his sense of self – a contrast which is premised on the incalculability of his subjectivities. As he puts it, “But they are both in conflict who we are, and what they say we are. Total opposite. Who cares what they say we are? You gotta lose that to become who you are.”

With an understanding of de-centered, incalculable subjectivities, the rehabilitative technique intended for a prisoner subject with a knowable interiority narrows in, as an attempt at reterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 2008). Broken has developed strategies of resistance:

Prison actually, the way the system runs is they try so, so hard to demoralize you. And they do it continuously, and continuously. And they won't quit, they just won't quit. And that's why everybody thinks I'm nuts. They try to depress you and then push you more and more and more. And like I was telling you, if they see me they go he's crazy, and you may all think I'm crazy, ‘cause I don't let it get me down. Where, the person they made CSC's afraid of. Where, the person I am is me. The person I held onto. And it's because I'm always laughing. I don't take nothing to heart. I don't take nothing. I'm smart. I'm intelligent, and I know what the fuck's goin' on. It's just I don't have any concerns. Like, it seems like I don't have a care; but I already know what's going on. But I don't get stressed over it ‘cause I don't give a shit; but I do. You know what I mean? But I'm not going to sit here and say “what about tomorrow?” Screw tomorrow.

Here Broken tactically re-positions himself in lateral moves in multiple directions, including adopting a guise of madness, “reduced to testifying all alone for deterritorialization as a universal process” (Deleuze and Guattari 2008, 321). He attempts to set himself apart from the properly
rehabilitatable: Broken does not situate himself as mentally ill, but as crazy, scary, intelligent, lighthearted, with-it, and at once undefinable—“the person I am is me.” Broken employs a technique of fluctuating subjectivities to cope with the encroachment of the rehabilitative technique, “inasmuch as it includes the reterritorializations that permit it to subsist only as the state of a particular flow, a flow of madness that is defined thus because it is charged with representing whatever escapes the axiomatic and the application of reterritorialization in other flows” (Deleuze and Guattari 2008, 320).

In the next chapter I will contrast the emphasis on interiority with the exteriority of intersubjective ethical engagement and look to this outwardly oriented emergent ethics as a way out of the demoralizing trap of the inward gaze (the claim that change may come out of the scrutiny of the same). For the moment I will look more specifically at the ways in which prison rehabilitation, in its interior orientation, was described as demoralizing as it was exercised within prison programming.

Demoralizing Characteristics of Rehabilitative Programing

The group identified four characteristics which contribute to the demoralization of prisoners within prison programing, creating further distance from the idea of rehabilitation: repetition, standardization/universalism, reliance on a set of knowledge of the individual, and discretionary power. These characteristics were described in addition to the system of control and punishment generally accepted as demoralizing, and are components of the humanitarian side of prison.

Each characteristic will be discussed individually, but before doing so I would like to reiterate the distinction made in our sessions between the content of rehabilitative programing and the interpersonal engagement which was mentioned in Chapter Three, either of which had the potential to be received as helpful or demoralizing. The potential for emergent ethics within
the interpersonal engagement of prison programming will be discussed in the next chapter. Detailed discussion of the content of programs is beyond the scope of this study; however, I will highlight from our discussions a single precondition to the reception of content, that is, voluntary learning.

The concept of voluntary learning in a coercive environment is conflicted at best. Yet the group was unanimously in support of the idea that the content of programs was only helpful when there was interest or willingness to engage it, or as John put it, “Only you can change. Nobody can change you.” Recognizing that the rhetoric of change and moral development is a dominant discourse which prisoners may strategically adopt as a means of “playing the game” in hope that it will bring them closer to release (Scott xii), on the level that John’s claim promotes taking responsibility for one’s own moral development his statement does not depart from this dominant discourse. However, this claim can also be taken as a form of resistance to the coercive nature of prison rehabilitation and an affirmation of agency in spite of it. In a discussion about what it means to “beat the system,” John explained, “But I've found there are different ways of doing it now instead. You know like I stayed out for four years and did it all on my own right? So I know I can do it ‘cause I want to do it. I want to prove to the system that you don’t have me no more.”

Despite the limited choices surrounding managing one’s own participation in rehabilitative programming, including the degree to which to engage with program material, the group affirmed their agency within this limited arrangement. Their affirmation can be aligned with an assertion of voluntary learning despite a coercive environment, reminiscent of the radical pedagogy approach to this project.
The work that radical pedagogy has offered, which denounces the imposition of any learning goals outside of the context of living and engaged curiosity, suggests a distinction between the rehabilitative ideal (our affirmation of change and choice) and imposed goals of moral rehabilitationism, grounded in any and every context including the confines of prison. As learning within a coercive environment maintains a complexity of power relations and an element of freedom, it can be understood as occurring despite the prison environment; likewise for ethics. As such, the following discussion is not intended to be taken as an effort to identify amenable aspects of prison rehabilitation, nor to contribute to efforts of reform (though by no means do I stand against efforts to decrease the cruelty of prisons); instead this discussion is meant to highlight that even the softer side of prison, rehabilitation, is received as demoralizing.

**Repetition**

One of the key frustrations with rehabilitative programming laid out by the group was the repetition of the same material in various programs and across different institutions throughout their sentences.

BILLY: Like, I've done two core programs and four maintenance programs. It's the same B.S. that I learned in federal they are trying to jam down my throat now.

JOHN: Yeah, I know. I'm in one right now. I'm in a maintenance program. It's exactly the same as all the other programs.

“Maintenance programs” are mandated “refresher” programs to be completed while on parole based on programs taken during one’s incarceration. Roy framed this repetition as part of a behaviourist approach to rehabilitation which he criticized for its patronizing impacts.

ROY: We talked a bit today about how treatment demoralizes you. Right? It makes you feel like a criminal instead of making you feel like a better person.

BROKEN: Well it’s repetitious.
ROY: It's like Pavlov’s dog trying to get you. Just repeating it over and over and over like you don't understand.

For the group the repetition of program material also pointed to the coercive side of rehabilitative programing which, as Roy implied above, downplays their intelligence, curiosity, agency and creative potential.

The merry-go-round of program material continues even after they are released, irrespective of its dizzying impacts, and discounting their potential to be agents of change, even while claiming to be rehabilitative.

JOHN: It means nothing! It means nothing!! It's not rehabilitation; it's program, program, program, program. Well, if that's what they think is rehabilitation well, they can just throw that right out the window ‘cause these programs repeat each other. Like, every program is a program for program like you mentioned right? Maintenance. Every program's got a maintenance program.

In the *Forum on Corrections Research* on “The Community Maintenance Program: A new strategy for providing treatment follow-up in the community,” Reyhan Yazar (2013) identifies the issue of over-burdening parolees with maintenance programs:

The proliferation of maintenance programs has had some unforeseen consequences. For instance, there are now a multitude of follow-up programs which offenders must attend upon release to the community. Depending on prior program participation, an offender may be mandated to take several maintenance programs. This has proven to be problematic because motivation to take programs in the community is often low, and the motivation to take multiple programs is almost absent (“Strategy for Providing Maintenance”).
This means that the more programs taken during one’s prison time, generally regarded as a means of demonstrating one’s readiness for release, the more maintenance programs are required. Yet Yazar (2013) ends the discussion at this point to promote “availability and access” to maintenance programs instead, and does not suggest any recourse (“Strategy for Providing Maintenance”).

*Standardization/Universalism*

Expanding on the experience of being unrecognized as agents within rehabilitation, the group critiqued the unresponsiveness of programs to the feedback of their recipients. Referring to Reasoning and Rehabilitation (R&R), the longest running and most widely administered cognitive-behavioural program in prisons across Canada, Roy observed that standardization, which is promoted by CSC as a strength of R & R amongst other CSC programs (Yazar 2013; Ross, R. R., Fabiano, and Ross, R. R., n.d.) is also experienced as a form of demoralization: “Well the R&R one is a program that was created by a university and I guess it's used throughout North America (and internationally). I thought it was funny ’cause when they read it out there you have to follow the way they did it. You can't change it. This is the way program has got to be run. Copy-right laws and all this.” As participants of R & R and other programs, the group was critical of their disenfranchisement. In such evidence-based programing prisoners are evaluated and quantified into data for program development, yet as Roy mentioned, their subjective engagement and feedback within such programs is ignored in its universalized application.

The categories of repetition and universalism both reveal programming’s reliance on behaviourist methods which (beyond being tired and outdated even within psychoanalytical fields) presuppose the modern subject with an interiority measurable and adaptive according to proper technique.
Reliance on a set of knowledge of the individual

As a way to reflect on rehabilitative programing from an abstract perspective I invited the group to take part in an activity in which they were asked to come up with a rehabilitative plan for me – playing the role of an “offender.” I read them a detailed “case history” example, but did not provide further instructions. The open-ended instructions prompted responses which oscillated between an imagined ideal and descriptions of what could be considered typical based on their personal experiences. However, their responses often landed somewhere in the middle and described potential alternatives within the constraints of existing institutions.

While I presented the case history the group interjected questions looking for more information, but as soon as I finished, the real interrogations began. They mimicked the collection of information typical of their experiences of assessments and evaluations within CSC. Their questions were so detailed and thorough I quickly started to feel I was losing control of my story (even though I had the luxury of preparing a story ahead of time). I stopped more than once to say, “Wait, would CSC actually ask for that information?” I resisted providing even the staged information I had prepared in response to a feeling of being put under the magnifying glass. Billy related my experience in this exercise to the collection of case history information within the rehabilitative project, often extending back to childhood: “Once you start opening up to them you'll go deeper back into your background. You’ll be two years old by the time you’re done.”

My own reaction reminded me of Broken’s earlier description of the challenge of managing one’s subjectivities against the assimilation of knowledge of the interiority of the self in rehabilitation.

We moved on from “evaluation” to “prognosis” and the first response to the challenge of creating a rehabilitative plan for “me” came from John, “Programs! [laughs] Joking!” Other suggestions focused on efforts to build my self-esteem. A suggestion from Roy was to help “me”
find meaningful employment. Billy suggested doing community service to make restitution to the community, and added that these activities might lead to employment and other community connections down the road. Broken offered practical advice: “You need to start eating and sleeping proper and that way you won’t get so much distress on the self and then you'll make better decisions.” It was agreed that whatever activities were recommended they would have to be voluntary and affirmed that I could not be forced to change.

Relating to the production of knowledge of the individual, during the rehabilitation exercise suggestions for counselling were used in two ways. One was voluntary and considered a helpful intervention, while the other, more cynically, described a mandatory part of a system of control which collects information to be used against you and demoralizes by focusing on the past. Later in our sessions anecdotes were offered regarding how counselling services were used in prison to collect more information and could result in further charges, or heighten security. Roy summarized this phenomenon and the resultant lack of trust: “Absolutely, when they say ‘be open and honest’ and ‘this is a safe place for you,’ and then you're open and honest and then the next thing you know they're using it against you.”

Out of these discussions I would like to highlight that, despite the thoroughness of their collection of information about “me,” the plans that they selected were, for the most part, not aimed at reshaping a damaged interior; instead they were relational and pragmatic.

_Discretionary Power_

Within the purview of CSC’s rehabilitative measures, the knowledge of the history and interiority of the “criminal” subject may be invoked at any point as a form of discretionary power for the adaptable application of rehabilitative undertakings. “The legal punishment bears upon an act; the punitive technique on a life; it falls to this punitive technique, therefore, to reconstitute all the sordid detail of a life in the form of knowledge, to fill in the gaps of that knowledge and to
act upon it by a practice of compulsion” (Foucault 1995, 252). Roy and Billy describe the exercise of this discretionary power within their program requirements while on parole:

ROY: See that's what I'm surprised about my probation is I'm just doing the one program, but on my probation it says any programs that they…

BILLY: …deem necessary!

ROY: And they could throw anything at me. They could throw anger management at me, and I don't have anger management problems, but they could make me sit through an anger management program if they wanted to.

BILLY: Mine's the same: “whatever they deem necessary.”

ROY: It’s up to the probation officer whether she decides you know, “we think that…” They could even do that as a test for me, “Let’s see how willing he is. We’ll put him in to some programs he really doesn’t need and we’ll see if he can sit through them.”

In the following section I will consider the group’s discussions of the prisoner’s file. Making connections to Freudian and Lévinasian approaches, I will look to how the file consolidates and commemorates the history and interiority of the prisoner-subject.

**The File**

In our discussions the group outlined three qualities of the file which they had experienced as demoralizing: its power of representation, its capacity to translate subjective material into objective data, and its power to create a living archive – continually documenting the prisoner’s life as history and memorializing the prisoner’s history within their lives. Further, when the group considered the file from the perspective of a Lévinasian ethics it was framed as an exercise of symbolic violence.

The file is a powerfully symbolic document in its representational capacity. From a psychoanalytic, or Freudian perspective, the file may be a rigorous, scientific and therapeutic
document which, in its power of representation, outlines the progress of the prisoner through their therapy from neurosis to health in which the patterns between the prisoner’s behaviours, their childhood and their inherited primordial complex may be laid out for analysis. Yet, in the process, as Roy put it, the file stands in for the prisoner subject, such that having a file is like, “being a number instead of a name.”

For Freud, the file exists for the benefit of the prisoner/patient but is recorded and acted upon by the professional psychotherapist or prison staff. Broken was the first to criticize the act of translating the subjective opinion of staff to the objective document of the file: “The thing that really used to get me was ‘in this writer’s opinion’. Hold up! Where do you get an opinion? Right? You’re not allowed to have an opinion. You're CSC. It’s either fact or no facts. No opinion. You're not paid for an opinion. That's biased.” Likewise, quoting Foucault, Munn and Bukert (2013) describe the file as part of a “subjectively mediated ‘objective’ process” which, through mechanisms of power, produce the file as a “textual truth” (63).

This theme was reiterated later in the workshop by Roy and Billy in response to a discussion about how Lévinas’ concepts of history, the sign and the trace of the other might pertain to the file. To appreciate Roy’s response—“cause you're not getting the full picture of who the person is,”—we need to understand the sense in which Lévinas (2012) posits the violence of history based on the privileged place of the other.

In Levinasian (2012) metaphysics, prior to ontology is the relationship with the other, a relationship defined as ethics (47-48). The world which is knowable and changeable to the subject is initially drawn into question by the presence of the other who eclipses every attempt of being summated or comprehended (43, 47). The other for Lévinas (2012) is exteriority; the other is a manifestation which, due to exceeding the ability to be known as other objects are known,
due to responding in their own right rather than succumbing to being acted upon, and due to their capacity of continual change, invokes in the self a sense of obligation and desire. As Roy put it, “I would almost say your soul, if you have a soul, you know? I believe every living thing has some kind of soul, and you don't have to do the religion part of it, but you don't fall in love with a suitcase, and you don't care about a chair right?” Lévinas (2012) describes this relationship as that of height (215). While I may reach and manipulate objects which exist in the horizontal plane of my understanding, the other resides above me outside my grasp (191-193). Therefore, I am simultaneously compelled toward the ‘other,’ and while understanding my lack, I am obliged to the other (196). Lévinas (2012) names the presentation of the unknowable ‘other’ as the ‘face’ (50). It was from this understanding of the ‘other’ as unknowable that Roy criticized the file in charge of representation; he did so with the understanding that the “full picture” was impossible to illustrate. I will expand further on the exteriority of the other, the unknowability of the other, and sense of obligation to the other as they related to our discussions in Chapter Five.

However, Lévinas (2012) does not deny the violence and brutality which people inflict on one another. He writes of the primacy and perpetuity of the ethical relation, but does so to delineate the potential denial of responsibility. Transcending my understanding of myself and my world, the other presents a challenge to me. Yet I may not recognize the face of the other even while they present their self to me. I may instead reject the call of ethics and define the other within my own terms and consistent with my own cosmology (43-46). The next chapter will begin with Broken’s descriptions of learning to “turn off” one’s ethics. For Lévinas (2012), this denial of ethics has been the norm throughout the history of Western thought (43); however, “When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from history” (50).
History, for Lévinas (2012), is violence as the other is no longer present and history measures only their work without their ability to respond: “The verdict of history is pronounced by the survivor who no longer speaks to the being he judges, and to whom the will appears and offers itself as a result and as a work” (240). The inversion of an effect for the other – in their selfhood – is the denial of ethics against which Lévinas warns. Such is the violence that Broken first, and later Billy recognized in the objectivizing process of recording the file. Billy reiterated Broken’s earlier critique: “It’s like, when we get the progress reports, or the program completion and it's like, ‘the writers opinion’” he pointed to the act of violence, whereby the staff person, who has seen their faces, turns away, and “no longer speaks to the being he judges” (emphasis added, 240). As such, from a Lévinasian perspective the file is the mutation of the presence of a subject into a sign or a record, which can be acted upon in the absence of their ethical appeal, and is thus an inherently violent act.

Let us consider more thoroughly the file as a record of the history of the prisoner-subject, looking again to Freudian psychoanalysis and rehabilitationism which together focus on the history and interiority of the subject, while Lévinas directs us toward the future and exteriority. Both theorists may converge at a generalized definition of the present: “the core belief that all time is accessed through the present or ‘each successive now’” (Moran 2012, 310). They may further concur that the present consists of an accumulation of historical remnants. For Freud (1984) these remnants are archaic memories embedded in the psyche from which the subject has no retreat other than their repression or management (358-359, 364). To Lévinas (2012) the cumulative remnants of history, which allow for the continuity of the self in a familiar world, are also the violence of reducing the other to one’s own substantiation (227-228). Lévinas is critical of this constitutive present due to its totalizing nature and offence to the present’s past:
...Lévinas conceives time before representation on the model of an “anarchic” dispersion, and memory—as a way to gather this dispersion “by retention and protention” into a coherent system of “temporal phases”. The privileged time of the totality is the present, precisely, due to its dependence on the re-presentation of events in the consciousness of the subject. History is always now, in the present that never ends and never ceases to represent events to itself (Marder 2005, emphasis in original 422).

Thus we may consider the file, as this selective memory, a gathering together of events in a historical record to be retrieved in the “present that never ends” (Marder 2005, emphasis added 422).

John and Broken express frustration at their seeming powerlessness to respond to their historical representation in the file.

JOHN: And even when they do all their paperwork and stuff it just repeats itself and repeats itself just degrading you. And bringing up your past and other charges when you are there for charge and that charge only. Why does that have anything to do with this?

BROKEN: It's a waste of trees!

And again, from Broken:

There is no way they can call that rehabilitation, because they'll tell you one thing and then next week they'll tell you another thing, and the whole time they're picking on you for shit that was twenty years ago, or thirty years ago, and they'll never forget that. But yet you did something two weeks ago that was total awesome, but they'll never bring up that.

Considering the file as a psychoanalytic document—a history of the prisoner subject—we may look to the varied meanings of such a case history for Freud and for Lévinas so as to bring
forth a potential alternative: ethical engagement with the other. In short the difference between
Freud and Lévinas in regards to history and the nature of the present is that for Freud there is no
way to escape the history embedded within the psyche of the present, but only to repress or to
manage it by looking inward; a process which was repeatedly denounced as demoralizing by the
group. For Lévinas the history embedded in the present is the “continuity of self” which
inasmuch as it is reductive is violent (Marder 2005, 423). This violence, however, can be
destabilized by the presence of the other in ethical engagement (Levinas 2012, 243). I will
expand on this in Chapter Five. For now I will leave the discussion of the metaphysics of the file
with a description from Roy during our final planning phase for the white board sketch video: “I
like that because that's part of the ‘face to face’ thing. ‘Cause you have the file, and then you
could say ‘is this me’? You could have the file and then a picture of a prisoner and you say ‘am I
the file or am a living person?’ That’s back to the labeling right? Do I exist because of my file?
Have I become a file?”
Chapter 5: Lévinas, Subjectivity and Emergent Ethics
Introduction to an Ethics First Philosophy

In our first meeting, upon initial consideration of the difference between what, in the introduction to this thesis, has been delineated as morality versus ethics, the group responded, not as I might have expected in citing proof of an inherently benevolent humanity, but in contrast bringing forward examples of instances of violence, or alternatively put, the denial of the face of the other. In responding with examples of instances of violence the group took up the task presented by Lévinas (2012) of attempting to understand our capacity to ignore the ethical appeal: “We must explicate the power that beings placed in relation have of absolving themselves from the relation” (220).

I presented the following as an initial model:

1.) Does ethics happen in the face to face interaction we have with another person?
2.) Or does it involve our knowledge of right and wrong?

In (1) we are all ethical. Ethics is about the situation/context.

In (2) we have to be taught to be ethical. Right and wrong are standard.

Broken responded in support of the first example, which I hoped to use to develop an understanding of Lévinasian ethics. First, he described the feeling of “butterflies” in his stomach when “you know damn well you’re not doing right,” but he then explained that over time he had taught himself to ignore the “butterflies.” He provided this example in order to emphasize that for him ethics does not need to be taught. Alternatively, Broken described ethics as innate yet something that one can learn to ignore:

In the long term it turned out that when I got out of prison, I had a female who accused me of not feeling things, because I had shut off the switch. Cause I taught myself to go “broop!” So I think it [ethics] would be natural, or genetic for right and wrong. You’re
born that way but you can unlearn it by teaching yourself and retraining yourself. And I think I still have some weirdness about it but I think eventually maybe over more time and freedom it will get better. But I'm opening it up just little bits at a time.

The universalist categories of “right” and “wrong” apply to morality rather than to Lévinasian ethics. Nor would the question of genetics necessarily interest Lévinas, whose philosophy was a metaphysical cosmology of the face to face encounter, considering questions of “origin”, for example, from philosophical and non-empirical perspectives and arguing that the other is transcendent i.e. escapes empirical sense. These were distinctions which had yet to be made in the preliminary explanation I had provided and sadly Broken was not present in the later sessions when we discussed these finer points to weigh in on them and/or defend the place of moral categories or genetics in our discussions. Still, Broken introduces us to the capacity within Lévinas’ humanist ethical philosophy to ignore the face of the other and commit violence.

Further, the descriptors which Broken uses, the metaphors of “butterflies” and “the switch,” and the use of an onomatopoeia—“Broop!”—to describe his experience, both point to the ethical moment or a moment of contingency in the temporality of Lévinasian ethics. Finally, Broken connects ethics, not to the need to re-train himself, but to time, freedom and, “opening.”

Examples of the potential for physical violence are useful as they may exemplify the passing from the ethical moment of engagement with the other to the reduction of the other to the knowledge of the same. This resolution of the ethical moment with violence (physical) is the also the form of systemic and oppressive violence. As has been laid out by Broken, in this chapter I will consider the capacity for violence; look to the ethical moment and in so doing reposition the subject from the inwardly oriented subject of the previous chapter to one who is outwardly oriented and obligated to the other; discuss power expressions involved in Lévinasian
metaphysics and forms of resistance; and finally, looking to Foucault as well as Lévinas, draw connections between freedom and ethics.

**Ignoring the Ethical Moment**

I will begin with the question of ignoring the ethical, for three reasons. First, it is the problem which prisons and moral rehabilitation are supposed to remedy, even if in so doing they respond to violence with greater violence. Second, this is in keeping with the flow of our conversations – the group first invoked the question of violence as evidence of the primacy of the ethical. Third, Lévinas began writing his ethical philosophy in the context of and in response to a most extreme form of violence, in a prisoner of war camp in Nazi Germany (Levinas 2001, x). This is not to conflate the different forms and examples of violence mentioned, but to propose, in keeping with Lévinas (2012), that violence itself presupposes the ethical, “violence can aim only at a face” (225).

In our second session Roy returned to the question of ignoring the face of the other:

One of the ones that really popped to my mind was the desensitization of military. How they teach how to take a life face to face, and the morals and stuff to be gone. And I was thinking do they teach prison guards to do that? They seem to have the same, you know, “you’re not a person” thing. They look at you, face to face, and you're not a human being to them, right? Where are they learning this? Who's teaching them this? Is it part of their social group or is it part of their schooling? How do you turn off your emotions to people like that?

In response to the idea that ethics sits in our relation to the other, Roy looked first to the objectifying process in the institutionalized violence of war and prison. For Lévinas (2012) this is the thematization which flows from the ontological assumption, where “‘I think’ comes down to ‘I can’” (46). The ontological assumption, when premised before the call to ethics, is
tyrannical. “Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power. It issues in the State and in the non-violence of the totality, without securing itself against the violence from which this non-violence lives and which appears in the tyranny of the State” (46).

Broken responded to Roy’s questions first citing the same oppressive context of the prison, then providing more intimate examples:

It's easy. It's actually easy, but there are two philosophies about that. The guards in the tower, they are not population guards. They are kept away from inmates so if there is ever a dispute they've never met you. So when they are aiming they can't go “Ah shit. That's not a bad guy”. They're kept outside of the institution, so they've never been face to face. But the guards inside they get personal with you, but it's still easy. And why I say that is ‘cause I'm an inmate, and it’s like [provided an example of an act he considers a form of violence]. You can turn your emotions off, and I know that for a fact. And it's a mistake ‘cause once you do, you do. And it's hard to get it back. But even, [provided another example], it's the same issue. You shut yourself down. I know, but that’s all I can say about it. But it's a fact. And they must do the same thing. [I have removed the examples in his statement to avoid the assumption that Broken was claiming ownership of these acts, something he did not attest to here or elsewhere.]

As in the previous statement by Broken, here he identifies a moment of turning away or shutting down. He recognizes that to proceed with an aim of violence one must “shut down.” This is not merely shielding one’s eyes. Neither vision nor comprehension are in question, as these both refer to the objective world (Lévinas 2012, 95). Ignoring the other requires something more. The other who faces you has already called you into question, has already invoked to you “against all good sense the impossibility of murder” (47).
Billy related this “turning away”, or “shutting down” to the pressure between prisoners and guards to dehumanize the other. He described his experience, “In a previous life I had a friend who was a guard and then when I got in to [names institution] and I said, ‘Hey, do I acknowledge that I know him or not?’ It's hard especially in Kingston if you go into prison nine times out of ten you're going meet someone that you know. ‘Sorry I can't talk to you I want to talk to you but…’” John acknowledged the extremity of such situations, “Before if you ever talked to a guard you were pretty much dead.”

Thus, in these discussions we see both the objectifying oppression against which Lévinas (2012) extends his philosophy, and the expression of obligation which precedes it: “Violence bears upon a being both graspable and escaping every hold. Without this living contraction in the being that undergoes violence the deployment of violent force would reduce itself to a labor” (223). Yet we can consider that this reduction to labor is what is at stake in Roy’s question regarding institutional violence, where the military and prison staff “seem to have the same ‘you’re not a person’ thing.” It is the possibility that “across the gold that buys him or the steel that kills him the Other is not approach face to face; even though they traverse the interval of a transcendence commerce aims at the anonymous market, war is waged against a mass” (228).

While it may be named humanitarian, Lévinas’ (2012) ethics as first philosophy was not intended for a world free of violence: “Murder at the origin of death reveals a cruel world, but one to the scale of human relations” (236). Instead, it locates, beneath the violence aimed at the other, ethics. Further it finds, within the totalizing moral response, the violence of oppression. This oppression may be exemplified within Roy’s evaluation of the reactions to The Stanford Prison Experiment (2011) in contrast to public reactions to the same conditions within prisons: “Now the funny part of that is that they look at it as inhumane because they [Zimbardo’s
‘prisoners’] were volunteers. If you asked a whole bunch of people in society now, and you showed a film like that in [names a prison] they'd say, ‘Well that's the way they should be treated, they’re prisoners!’”

A philosophy which places ethics before morality provides no guarantees; none of the security that might be sought in the promises of punishment and moral rehabilitation enter into this non-deterministic ethics. In his early work, Lévinas (2006) claims that ethics precedes culture, not, in order to determine a universalized normative, but that all such norms are secondary to the ethical pull of the other, “who is at the same time the birth of morality” (38). For Lévinas (2012) we enter a world that first belonged to the other: “The relationship between the same and the other, my welcoming of the other, is the ultimate fact, and in it the things figure not as what one builds but as what one gives” (77). Here Lévinas argues that the purpose of language is the impulse to speak to the other, a primarily ethical impulse, and thus our relation with the material world is mediated through the awareness of the needs of the other. At the same time as the other presents their self to me from great height, astonishing my sensibility of the world, they also present in need, “The being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being able to be deaf to the appeal” (200). Thus, the obligation to the other overwhelms the self as it is for the other that the material world primarily required a meaning.

Thus, as mentioned in relation to the use of an onomatopoeia to signify what cannot be spoken, ethics is pre-discursive; ethics subtends discourse (Lévinas 2012, 195). In another example offered by Broken, he shared a story from years ago, about a potential altercation between himself and another prisoner. As is common with prison altercations, the conflict was premised on exchange of disrespect. An example of Lévinas’ insistent reversals is perhaps
relevant here: “But disrespect presupposes the face” (262). The reversal is appropriate as Broken did not share this story in order to maintain his position in opposition to the other person, but to point out the pause: “the two seconds.” He measured the moment in which the outcome was undecided, the moment which allowed acknowledgement of the other, and perhaps even within this moment the desire for prolongation. As Broken emphasized, “you don't have to warn a person in prison you can just kick his face in—but give or take, it is right, but it isn't.”

As in every context, in the context of prison, despite the extensive regulation and moral conditioning, ethical engagements remain unavoidable and undeterminable. Richard Day (2001) refers to the necessity of making ethico-political choices, and the moment of contingency therein, which cannot be contained by reason (26). Where Broken emphasizes the extension of the time of indecision in a potential physical altercation; in an albeit irreducibly different context, Day finds in Derridean deconstruction a method of “increasing undecidability” as increasing the space within the ethico-political choice such as to increase overall potential choices (28).

Notwithstanding the incommensurable difference between ethics within academic discourse versus ethics within a confrontation between embodied persons, we can note a shared emphasis of extending space and time for the call to responsibility, prior to the moral conclusiveness of the choice: “Such a distention in the tension of the instant can only come from an infinite dimension which separates me from the other, both present and still to come, a dimension opened by the face of the Other. War can be produced only when a being postponing its death is exposed to violence. It can be produced only where discourse was possible: discourse subtends war itself” (Levinas 2012, 225).

Difference, Desire and Obligation

Lévinas (2012) asks, “How could separated beings maintain any relation, even violence? It is that the refusal of totality in war does not refuse relationship—since in war the adversaries
seek out one another” (223). Thus, for Lévinas, even in conflict, the relation of the self to the other is primarily defined by desire. Lévinasian desire, as with obligation, is insatiable as the other fully and completely exceeds the self (63). For Lévinas the self is drawn to know the other in their difference: in their transitory nature, their subjectivity, their unpredictability (62). The other is unknowable; mystery amplifies desire.

Following up on the activity on rehabilitation in which the group was tasked to rehabilitate “me,” described in Chapter Four, I asked the group: Can we know another person? They responded as follows:

ROY: Never completely, especially if you’re not being honest

JOHN: Not completely. No.

BILLY: No one can.

JOHN: Nobody really brings out everything.

BROKEN: It keeps changing. Who would ever want to know anybody totally anyways? It'd be boring.

The group returned to this point various times, for example later, Billy reiterated, “But like you said, we don't truly know somebody. Unless you grew up with that one person your whole entire life and even then you don't really know them.” Thus the other transcends our ability to know them.

When I introduced the concept of obligation for the other, Roy related it to a sense of empathy reminiscent of the description provided in the previous section, of obligation as the recognition of the other in need: “You almost need a sympathy condition where you are feeling sorry, or empathy for that person.” Broken resisted the concept of obligation, insisting on the separation of the self and the other: “If you are feeling sympathy for me then I don't want that
‘cause then you’re going to turn into a puppet.” Broken continues, passionate about the importance of individuation he fears gets lost in a condition of sympathy, “I don't want them to own me, but I want them to respect me as me. I wanna respect them as them. I don't wanna tell them they can't, because I'm not God.” Lévinas also insists on the separation between the self and the other. For Lévinas (2012), obligation and desire are not a means of reducing difference, but sustain difference in an asymmetrical relationship between the self and the other: “Speech is not instituted in a homogeneous or abstract medium, but in a world where it is necessary to aid and to give. It presupposes an I, an existence separated in its enjoyment, which does not welcome empty-handed the face and its voice coming from another shore” (216). I remain uncertain as to whether Lévinas’ asymmetrical obligation would have satisfied Broken who connected the concept of obligation to that of fellow feeling, which he whole heartedly rejected: “Why would you worry about what I've been though? [Silence.] Who cares what I've been through? You go through you. I go through me. People get lost tying themselves up in people. No! It's a misconstruction! I don't wanna control you. I like you ‘cause you got nice eyes, and I have to look at the rest of you from there. And it interests me. I don't wanna own you.”

The unknowability of the other, the difference between the self and the other, allow for the concept of infinity, and for the suspension of the moment of the encounter. Perhaps Broken would have preferred Lévinas’ concept of desire. The desire for the other is ever pressing forward, and as such, desire is the means through which one comes to conceive of infinity (Lévinas 2012, 50, 62). Alternatively, Roy and Broken shared the ways in which they had conceived of infinity:

ROY: At work I have a mirror in front of me and a mirror behind me and it drives my head crazy
‘cause if you stand in the right place you get the reflection back and forth continuously.

So you see the same thing forever. That has always bothered me, mirrors like that. ‘Cause it goes for infinity. It goes on forever.

BROKEN: It’s the same thing as it when I worked at that graveyard years ago. They said, “Why are you laying in that hole?” And I said, “‘Cause I wanted to give it a test run before I’m dead.” So I’ve seen the future and now I’m never worried about dying. ‘Cause I know what it looks like. So that’s infinity. What it reminded me of is [names institution], you look out and see the sky and the tops of trees. Infinity.

JOHN: It’s all you see.

ROY: Infinity.

For Lévinas the self is situated as an event in relation to the other, and to infinity, “The infinite in the finite, the more in the less, which is accomplished by the idea of Infinity, is produced as Desire—not a Desire that the possession of the Desirable slakes, but the Desire for the perfectly disinterested—goodness” (50). No one becomes a puppet in this scenario. The “infinite in the finite” is the recognition of the surpassing nature of the other within the moment of the encounter; the experience of the infinitude of desire and obligation within a finite event (50). Lévinas (2012) differentiates “the immediate” which “is the face to face” from a mere moment within the history of the self (52). “The immediate” is more than a moment in chronological time but an event which commands and situates the self within eternity, “Though of myself I am not exterior to history, I do find in the Other a point that is absolute with regard to history—not by amalgamating with the Other, but in speaking with him” (Lévinas 2012, 52). It would be misleading to imply that desire and obligation are distinctive categories. Instead desire
is of an ethical nature and obligation flows from the infinity of desire they are intertwined in the face to face encounter.

**Power and Resistance**

As a group, we looked at power in various forms. Most frequently power was discussed as oppressive and authoritarian and contrasted with forms of power as resistance (as were discussed in the Chapter Four). We also discussed more subtle forms of power invoked in our relationships. We considered the work that is involved in recognizing and addressing these more insidious forms of power; Billy normalized this difficult task expressing that the need to work to manage power dynamics in a relationship is “just like a real relationship.”

Following a demonstration of the potential options available when we are “pushed” (literally and figuratively) Billy directed us to examine the relationship between power, choice and ethics when he asked “but what does that actually have to do with ethics?” We considered Foucault’s (1997) conception of power as the relative ability to make decisions (292). We conducted a role play activity designed to examine the dynamics of power and ethics within relationships where power is typically understood as consolidated and stagnant (in our role play a traditional teacher/student relationship). I should note that the group did not allow the power dynamics (which I had attempted to set up in order to tear down), to remain uncomplicated for an instant. Following up on this role play activity, in reference to Foucault I described, “Power is everywhere. It's a relation. Even, as in this scenario, when it is limited or uneven, it is always present to some degree. We can consider power as the freedom to make decisions, not what you decide, but the making of the choice.” In response, Roy emphasized in keeping with Foucault (1997), that power is diffused and ever present. He added the ethical quality of the freedom to choose: “In other words if you were a prisoner of war where you had no decisions at all – like worse than prison right? But you still have ethics ‘cause you're still making decisions to keep
yourself alive, right? Even if you have to do stuff that you never wanted to do, you’re doing it to keep yourself alive. So technically you still have a little bit of power.” John added, “Yeah the power to stay alive.” Likewise for Foucault, who considers “freedom” the “ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflections” (284). Further, as in the example of the prisoner of war, “if there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere. Of course, states of domination do indeed exist. In a great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom” (292).

As in our discussion of power, Lévinas uses freedom in two ways, at times freedom refers to the power of the will to reject the ethical appeal (43). Yet at other times Lévinas discusses freedom and responsibility as mutually reinforcing, “the Other—does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it” (197). Roy and John considered that short of murder or execution, there always remains some freedom and some power in life:

ROY: Makes sense, ‘cause I don't think at any point you never have freedom. There’s always some point of freedom in your life. If it's not a decision or something. Even if you're locked up in a box with no windows and stuff you still have free thoughts. No one can keep you from thinking. They can't take that away from you.

JOHN: Freedom of speech they can though. [A poignant statement from John at this time, who was speaking both theoretically and from his recent experience of being disallowed to speak with us at our upcoming conferences].

ROY: But the thoughts you're thinking about though, your memories and all that, they can't take that away from you. They can try but…

JOHN: If they give you an execution they could. Oh! I thought we were still role playing!
[laughs]

Indeed. Short of an execution, freedom and ethics continue. For Lévinas (2012), time is “the postponement of death” (232). By this he contends that prior to an understanding of the chronological passing of time, in minutes and hours, one understands time intrinsically, as the inevitable approach of death (Lévinas 2011a, 71-72). Thus, time is the time left over, “The mortal will can escape violence by driving violence and murder from the world, that is, by profiting from time to delay always further the hours of expiration” (Lévinas 2012, 242). Let us examine this statement by Lévinas further. Here again, he prolongs the ethical encounter, opening potential. We may “escape violence…by profiting from time”. The other who resists, questions, and demands of me, within this prolonged moment, increases the potential for something other than violence. Thus, for Lévinas (2012) in the moment of the ethical encounter, “The ‘resistance’ of the other does not do violence to me, does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: ethical” (197).

We looked further at this positive feedback loop of freedom (as the power to choose) and ethical engagement:

KAREN: So, like in this group, creating this space to come together and talk, relatively freely, and kind of create new ways thinking together…

ROY: Increases your ethics!

KAREN: Yeah? Does it?

ROY: Absolutely! I think my evaluation says something about that.

As such, the relationship with the other figures in to one’s freedom and ethics. Thus, the resistance of the other as in discourse, or as in the call to responsibility, has a co-creative potential of an ethical structure, “in expression the being that imposes itself does not limit but
promotes my freedom, by arousing my goodness” (Lévinas 2012, 200). In light of this positively reinforcing relationship between freedom and responsibility we can remember Broken’s earlier aspiration that with “more time and more freedom it will get better.” Broken points to a desire for non-oppressive possibilities for change which can be contrasted with the promises of a freedom earned through rehabilitation in their totalizing characteristics discussed in the previous chapter. “To think freedom as within totality is to reduce freedom to the status of an indetermination in being, and forthwith to integrate it into a totality by closing the totality over the ‘holes’ of indetermination—and seeking with psychology the laws of a free being!” (Lévinas 2012, 225)

Returning to a Model of Ethics

Though Broken was not able to be part of our later sessions, together the remaining group considered the co-creative potential of an ethics which increases freedom. As I presented a more abstracted version of the original model of ethics, the group interjected insights emphasizing an intersubjective structure of ethics:

KAREN: We can consider ethics happening in the moment. We can't think it, but it is because of it that we come to think. We become who we are because of the ethical relation with the other, and because we derive our very being from the relation to the other we have an obligation to them.

BILLY: Makes sense

ROY: You're giving me a purpose. So you're saying I wouldn't exist if you didn't exist

JOHN: No she wouldn't exist if we didn't exist

ROY: I exist because you exist and you exist because I exist

BILLY: And we all exist because Karen exists. [Laughter]

Yet I will reiterate that for Lévinas intersubjectivity does not minimize difference, amalgamate or draw beings closer to one another. The self remains distinctive. Despite being
continually drawn to the other in desire, the distance between the self and the other is never reduced, “Thus my unicity qua I contains both self-sufficiency of being and my partialness, my position before the other as a face” (Lévinas 2012, 214). While always in relation to the other, the self is still able to turn away, and reject the call to obligation. Further, for Lévinas (2012) difference and separation are not at odds with the ethical relation, but are derived from it:

These differences between the Other and me do not depend on different ‘properties’ that would be inherent in the ‘I’, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in the Other, nor on different psychological dispositions which their minds would take on from the encounter. They are due to the I-Other conjuncture, to the inevitable orientation of being ‘starting from oneself’ toward ‘the other’ (215).

The “I” we see here can be contrasted with the conception of the subject discussed in the previous chapter where the subject was defined by their interiority and amenability to rehabilitative technique. Here we have a subject, self-sufficient yet incomplete, continually drawn outward through desire and obligation in a relation of becoming; a relation which takes nothing from them, but instead increases their freedom.

KAREN: And we are always redefining ourselves so there is no beginning and no end in this scenario.

ROY: And that's why you say you can't know somebody, because it's always changing.

Here Roy interjected with precisely the next point I was about to introduce, linking the transcendence of the other over the self to a perpetual subjective becoming. As Lévinas (2012) sustained, “the will is subjective—it does not keep hold on all its being” (240); subjectivity is always in flux, without losing its containment. Roy continued, this time incorporating our previous discussions of disseminated power into the model of ethics we were bringing forward,
“And seeing as we're changing, that's why the power changes,” Again, Roy related this outwardly oriented subjective becoming to the co-creative process of learning in our project:

Well it's kinda like this project, because what we're talking about is changing me, and when it changes me I come up with different thoughts, and that changes your object, and your ideas on the project, and then that changes you, and that changes his thoughts, and that changes my thoughts, and then it just ... oh my god!

We took a moment at this point to appreciate the intellectual exertion that thinking at such a level of abstraction demands.

While I had originally hoped to draw on our past experiences, particularly those involved in the apparatuses of incarceration, we were now taking up the concurrent experience of the project itself as an object of inquiry. In turning to our common experience as an object and example of the ethical process we were working to delineate, Roy affirmed the hope that I had had prior to the start of the project: that there would be confluence between theory and method within this project. In line with Roy’s reflection about our co-learning process, Anna Neill (2006) describes a process of “ethical self fashioning” (285) that occurs amongst learners involved in critical prison education as “a realm of ethical possibility that has no instrumental end” (290).

**Revisiting the Face**

As a way to explore Lévinas’ conception of the face, not in a literal sense, but as the presentation of the incognizable other, and to ground such discussions within the context of the prison experience, John brought forward the example of the prison farms.² Though the farms are

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² The prison farm program in Canada, which consisted of six working farms (two of which were in the Kingston area), provided trades training for approximately three hundred prisoners and yielded food for the prisons and surrounding communities, was closed as part of the Conservative Administrations tough on crime policies, in August 2010 despite the widespread public resistance. The Save Our Prison Farms (2014) campaign continues to organize and advocate for the revitalization of the prison farms.
now closed, stories about the prison farms figured easily into our discussions allowing us to consider that the other, might be, for example, a cow—the ‘other’ for Lévinas (2012) being any one (or potentially anything) who challenges the consistency of the autonomous self by escaping their capacity of comprehension through their infinite subjective becoming (43). I shared a story with the group about a man who worked on one of the farms.

KAREN: And there was a cow that he had to milk every day – this one cow – and she wouldn't let him milk her. Finally he figured out that he had to go and pet the cow and give the cow some love first, and then she'd let him milk her.

JOHN: Makes sense!

ROY: We're back to the face to face! Even though it’s a cow he still has to realize that!

KAREN: And he ended up developing a relationship with this cow. And he said that this relationship with the cow taught him how to tell his kids he loved them.

JOHN: That's… that's pretty good!

KAREN: ‘Cause before then he didn't know how to express that

ROY: His feelings

KAREN: He'd go, “here's the stupid cow. I gotta milk the cow” and then the cow was like giving him a hard time. And then he figured out “no I actually have to have a relationship” and that led him to…

ROY: Yeah the cow was a thing before and then it became…

BILLY: A person

ROY: A person

JOHN: I think pretty much every cow that was in there that was getting milked had a name. Like for sure!
We see in this example that the “resistance” of the cow had “a positive structure: ethical” (Lévinas 2012, 197). Further, we see a moment of engagement where the man becomes willing to recognize the “face.”

Earlier in our sessions Roy had shared with us stories about his experience of moving from one prison to a lower security institution with a “treatment” focus. Roy contrasted his experience of relating to prison staff. In the first prison he described feeling demoralized; however, in the second institution, he described an experience of being treated “like a human being and with respect.” Still, according to Roy:

There were a few staff there that even I looked at I thought you shouldn't be here ‘cause you look at me like I’m a prisoner and you're a guard, but there were staff there that worked hard for you. They'd do things that most staff would never do for you in a prison. If you cut your finger you'd be down to the doctor’s office immediately, where in [names previous institution] you'd sit there and bleed to death.

Billy related Roy’s insight on this experience to the story about the cow, “Kinda like you said yesterday when you were in [names first institution], you were a number, but when you got to [names second institution] you became a person again and got your name back.” Roy responded, “So you can't have face to face ethics if the guy is a label and a number, he's not a person so there would be basis for ethics.” Here we can see emphasis on a willingness to recognize the face of the other no matter how it presents, and take up the ethical moment, a moment always contextually embedded yet available in every context.
Section 3: Practical and Political outcomes

Chapter 6: Project Outcomes

In this final chapter I will look at how the group related the story of the cow to a story of Lévinas and a dog named Bobby from his imprisonment in a work camp in the Second World War. I will also describe some of the practical and political outcomes of the project as identified by the group. To begin, I would like to note that the group did not attempt to reach a conclusion or a consensus to our discussions. As Roy pointed out more than once, it seemed to him that we were left with more questions at the end than at the beginning of the project. As we were working with philosophical questions contextualized by experience our discussions of the meaning of rehabilitation, or of the nature of ethics remained largely open-ended. In our last session we discussed in the form of a brainstorm what we had discovered during our discussions. The answers included:

- There is no real answer to the question of ethics – it is open ended
- People can ignore their ethics
- Everyone needs spell check
- Karen has a criminal background [referring to the activity in which they created a rehabilitative plan for “me”]
- You don’t have to have letters on the back of your name to make intelligent points

We can see from these responses an affirmation of the open-endedness of our discussions and of philosophical questions in general. For a while there was some uneasiness about not having a singular message or a conclusion to share. This uneasiness was especially evident as we planned our presentation for the conferences and made the white board sketch video. Yet, the pressure of wanting a conclusion was matched by a common understanding that our questions were not ones amenable to “answers” in the common sense. By the end of the project we were
ready to embrace this open-endedness. Also apparent in the brainstorm above, is an emerging confidence in intellectual ability, and a dismantling of the elitism of the university. This was one of the most prominently affirmed outcomes of the project, particularly by Roy.

I will discuss our engagement with the university in more detail below in conjunction with the description of our participation in the two conferences, the Congress of the Social Sciences and Humanities, and the International Conference on Penal Abolition (ICOPA). I will explore the difficulty of assessing the project’s outcomes, including recognizing the variation in our politics and goals and our varied experience of the project’s outcomes. In doing so I will consider some of our more tangible goals such as producing a white board sketch video and attending conferences as examples of community outreach and contributions to research and the field of convict criminology respectively. I will also look at some less tangible goals such as evaluating the pedagogical value of the project, the value of the project as a support group, and how the project factored in, positively or negatively, to the barriers met while returning to the community after prison time.

Variation in Experience of Goals and Outcomes

Variation in Outcomes

In a project that insists on being emergent in philosophy and method our outcomes might be as difficult to define as the goals—particularly so, as goals and outcomes vary for each group member. Many of the outcomes were personal and were experienced differently for each of us. At least in part, this variation arose out of our different past experiences and politics we brought with us to the project. The variation can also be attributed to the largely subjective nature of some of the outcomes, for example the pedagogical outcomes, and the support the group might have offered.
Variation in Goals, Interests and Politics

As previously discussed the group did not share a single politics. The variances in opinion among us were invited to remain, as differences. I have discussed how our differences were interpreted as strengths, broadening the forum of our discussions. However, our differing politics also presented us with a wider scope of goals for the project than those commonly shared in the group, or at least varying expressions of those goals. Therefore it is important to take the scope and variation of our goals into account when gauging our outcomes. For example, Billy and Roy both spoke various times about a desire to contribute to improving the prison system by making it more humane, while I was the only one in the group who expressed abolitionist politics. John and Broken were both particularly concerned with the recent changes to the prison system under the Omnibus Crime Bill C10, for example the pay cuts and cuts to trades programs:

JOHN: The thing with the prison system is at least you used to be able to come out with a trade and now there's nothing.

BROKEN: And they're taking an extra thirty percent for room and board.

JOHN: They're taking more than that.

Billy also kept himself apprised of the politics surrounding these changes in the news out of a sense of fellow feeling for those still inside, “on their behalf ‘cause I used to be one of them.” While Roy was also sympathetic, he felt distant from some of the specific concerns of the others, for example, closure of the prison farms, indicating how our past experiences can situate our affinities and politics: “… where John was all about the farm stuff …you know that doesn't affect me or in my mind it doesn’t affect me.” Yet these differences were never interpreted as conflictual or even as lacking of fellow feeling. The group was supportive and interested in each other’s opinions and politics.
These variations in politics and goals, while recognized in the spirit of interest and support within our discussions, can also be regarded as having a limiting impact on the potential for any one ambition to come to fruition as a practical outcome. This can be considered as part of a group consensus process, whereby no one person’s agenda will dominate, there is room for the expression of multiple values and affinities, and there is a willingness to set aside potential avenues for individual action on behalf of the collective potential of the group. Within this group process we recognize our ethical obligation to one another; the particular dynamics of relationality whereby the unicity of the individual is not circumscribed by the group within the consensus process is fundamental to an anti-oppressive ethics and could be explored further with regards to Lévinas’ (2011b) notions of ethics and politics and the introduction of the third party (157).

Further, the responsibility for one another this process upholds struck me as particularly prudent, if not necessary, as I began to realize the privilege I carry alongside my own abolitionist politics. I witnessed my colleagues being silenced, while I was simultaneously being accused of politicizing them, an experience that demonstrated to me that my colleagues may face risks for no more than articulating their poignant critiques. This is not to imply that those under the regulatory surveillance of the state would take on more radical beliefs had they greater freedom and privilege, but to recognize that the risks to them are higher, and are not limited to actions, but extend to the articulation of their beliefs. Given the varied levels of risk and surveillance, the varied interpretation of these risks, and the varied politics and values we held, it was essential that as a group we moderated our activities and goals to those we all shared and felt safe undertaking.
During one of our conversations about process Roy pointed out that I was affectively tied into the project, pointing out my attachments to them and that I was part of the intersubjective engagement in learning – inasmuch as my “bias” affects the research the research would affect me: “We’re not John Doe, the first session you didn't really know us but over time you’ve started to form relationships, which also changes your opinion on things.” When I asked how I should attempt to manage such a complex positioning in the project, he suggested that, given the impossibility of dividing myself into an objective observer and a subjective participant, I should turn to the group in reflexive engagement to understand and manage my positionality.

ROY: But you're a human right? So you can't eliminate your opinion. No matter what you'll have an opinion right? And your opinion will affect the outcome of your research.

KAREN: So how can I account for it?

ROY: The group!

Community Outreach

A desire was expressed to use the project as a means of reaching out to the community, namely to humanize prisoners and begin to break down negative stereotypes by building more complex understandings. The topic of emergent ethics was particularly conducive to this humanizing aim. We chose to develop a white board sketch video, as this format was achievable within a short period of time, at relatively low cost, with our given skill sets (plus some practice using the software) and fit within the comfort level of the group members. Further, this format would allow us to reach a wide audience while maintaining confidentiality. This format also allowed us to share the philosophical side of our discussions using imagery, symbolism, and narrative, making it accessible for us and for the viewer.

The two conferences that we attended and presented also allowed for a form of community outreach, this time to academic and activist communities. While the generalized
audience for whom we prepared the white board sketch made us aware of a need for confidentiality, the specialized audiences, for whom we presented at each conference, raised no such concerns. The group felt comfortable representing their own ideas, in person at the conferences (albeit under their pseudonyms). Roy explained:

I wouldn’t be going to Ottawa and standing up and doing a speech if I thought these were average Joes of the street that I have no idea about, right? These are all open minded people. That's what gives me a little bit more of relief about people searching me out. The program looks like it's going to have lots of people who have been in [prison] and we're just a drop in the bucket that's going to be there.

The forum at the International Conference on Penal Abolition allowed us to find a place and engage with a broader community of people who work critically with the prison system and affiliated institutions of control. As such it allowed the group to participate in the field of convict criminology.

The conferences allowed us to expand our public discussion to include aspects of the project including reflecting on the project as research, engaging with theory in more abstract ways, and including more specific and individualized contributions allowing for some of the personal interests of the group to be highlighted in a broader forum. I will expand on these and other details of the conferences under Approaching the University: Conferences.

**Video**

The video begins with a quick introduction to the application of Lévinasian ethics to the context of prisons. After providing a succinct overview of Lévinas’ anti-oppressive ethics of responsibility the video introduces our character: Prisoner Phil. We follow a narrative of Prisoner Phil as he enters prison and experiences the demoralizing exercises of carceral control and rehabilitation:
Now Phil was given a number, and everything there was to know about him was written in a file.

The more they seemed to know about him the less he seemed to know himself. He wondered if he was anyone at all.

He took programs and the rehabilitation experts filled his head with every single right and every single wrong that they knew. Some of it was helpful. Still there were some situations he saw in prison that none of their rights and wrongs could sort.

Messages came at him from all directions, labels, suspicions and accusations. Do it their way or no way at all. He was expected to do the right thing but not trusted to do anything at all.

At this point Phil reflects on the story we mentioned earlier about Lévinas’ encounter with a dog while he was imprisoned during the Second World War. In contrast to the treatment Lévinas received by guards and bystanders, who, he wrote, “stripped us of our human skin,” the dog named Bobby met the prisoners of war with excitement and joy every morning and every evening: “For him, there was no doubt that we were men.” Bobby was “the last Kantian in Nazi Germany” lacking “the brain needed to universalize maxims” (Calarco 2010, 114-115). In preparing the sketch, Roy and Billy reflected on the story of Bobby:

ROY: And the dog is not judging. The dog doesn't know what is right or wrong, but the dog has ethics. No, I like that idea ‘cause, as I say, part of what we’re working on is who’s telling you what’s right and wrong. ‘Cause that’s when you get back to the morals, and the morals are taught. Where we're saying ethics is part of you, you already “know” it no matter what anybody tells you. You’re already programmed to do no harm. If you listen.

BILLY: From the voice of the dog!
In our video and in our conversations, the story of Bobby was then related to the story of the cow at the prison farms. Our character Phil, then reflects on relationships in his life and “ways of being in relationships that are bigger than right and wrong.” The video ends with Phil, as an ethical actor, still in prison, coping with the pressures that that entails, and a call to learn about Prisoners Justice Day, write to a prisoner or become involved with prisoners’ justice initiatives. The video received an enthusiastic reception when we presented a working version at ICOPA. John will be featured narrating the final version, which will then be uploaded to YouTube under the title Ethics Behind Bars.

**Pedagogical**

Even when a learning experience is shared, what we might learn or how we might incorporate what we learn into our lives is personal and influenced by our multiple subject positions, affinities, values, and contexts. Evaluating learning in a project such as this would be contradictory. Instead, I will look to how the experience of co-learning was valued. In preparation for the conferences Roy and John reflected on this learning experience:

ROY: I think mine is going to be more based on a grade 12 graduate, and then being incarcerated, and then all of a sudden having these thoughts and theories that never in your life you ever thought of right? And then you start looking back through your life and you start using these theories in your life. That: “oh yeah! I see that, and I see why that happens” and, “Oh, I wonder if there's ethics in that?”

JOHN: Life is an ethic. I'm beginning to figure that out.

We see in Roy’s comment a recognition of the continual intertwining of life and learning whereby our learning experiences and our living experiences are inseparable and reflect one another in mutually reinforcing and ever emerging ways. We see in John’s comments a
comparison between this emergence of learning and the emergence of ethics, so much so that there is no distinction: “Life is an ethic.”

Support Group

The degree to which the project would factor in as a form of collegial support in the group members’ lives was unplanned, but emerged in various ways throughout the workshop; it was at times directly articulated and at other times demonstrated through sharing resources and emotional support. As an outcome this form of comradeship is immeasurable. As we reflected on the ways in which the group had personal import Roy related back to our theoretical discussions of intersubjective becoming: “Well it goes back to if I don't exist you don't exist.”

In as much as the sense of community that developed in the group allowed for much of what we achieved, this sense of community can be stated as both a goal and an outcome. However the ways in which the experience and expression of such a community impacts our lives varies for each member of a community, throughout our lives and circumstances. As the ways in which the group provided support for one another was discussed in Chapter Three I will limit the present discussion to two points. First, the period of reintegration after prison is one in which a person has recently said goodbye to the communities they may have had within prison walls, while their links to new and old communities on the outside may be limited. Therefore, the project may have arisen during a time when the need for community was particularly strong. Second, the degree to which the project might have served as a support network might have been impacted by the temporary nature of the project. Recognizing that the end of the project could be experienced as a loss of a newly formed community, I was attentive to developing a sense of closure. Nonetheless, the degree to which relationships may have been formed and sustained amongst the participants is yet another unknowable outcome, as are the ways in which brief relationships impact our lives.
Access to Community Spaces

As was discussed in Chapter Three, building access to community spaces was a stated goal in the planning stages of the project. I considered this goal particularly important given the point at which this project intervened in the group members’ lives, during periods of “re-entry” or “reintegration.” My assumption was reinforced given the difficulty I found in sourcing a community space to host us. At the same time, since we did find a university space where we could meet, this goal may be considered at least partially achieved. On a deeper level the ways in which this access was experienced and considered meaningful varied throughout the group.

Further, as Broken left the group at the midway point and John was disallowed from participating in the conferences there was a major disparity in the group with regard to building community access. However, when John was excluded from the conferences, witnessing surveillance arose as a new goal of the project, which was expressed through group discussions in the forms of support and analysis, by publicly witnessing – presenting the reasons for John’s absence at the conferences with his consent and guidance – and including John’s analysis of the conditions of this surveillance as part of our research. I will discuss further reflections on access to community spaces in the next section Approaching the University.

Approaching the University

In many ways the project operated within a crossroads of the university and the prison. In Chapter Two I offered critiques of traditional schooling and its roles in perpetuating oppressive power structures in society from colonialism to criminalization and intersections in between. I attempted to position the project within a version of radical pedagogy. In Chapter Three I described some of the barriers the group met from the parole system and my attempts to confront these barriers by engaging forms of authority within the bounds of the traditional university.

While I was unsuccessful gaining support for John to attend the conferences, there were other
ways in which the project gained legitimacy from leveraging the university. For example, we were still able to meet as a group despite the limitation on some members preventing them from meeting with other people with criminal charges. We were also able to maintain confidentiality throughout the project despite the curious inquiries of John’s parole officer. During my interactions with John’s PO she was clear that from her perspective she was not interfering with the research process; as she stated to me the “content you require for your project is still available”. Her statement provided an indication that positioning the project as research provided it with a form of legitimacy, and albeit limited, a barrier to her authority over the group.

Thus, our engagement with the traditional university was complex, at times pushing away forms of authority the university upholds and at other times strategically adopting them. Likewise, as previously mentioned, our engagement with the university also included building access to a space previously regarded as inaccessible, elite and exclusive. As we approached the university an important challenge emerged – to avoid further glorifying this institution, reinforcing the power structures therein, while validating what the group found valuable in their new engagements with it. I will expand on this discussion presently as I share the group’s reflections on their experiences attending the conferences.

*Conferences*

Billy, Roy and I attended two conferences. First, we were part of a Panel for the Society of Socialist Studies at Congress. At this conference we reflected mainly on the project’s process as research. Leading up to the conferences we deliberated as a group on what we would like to present, I prepared a presentation based on these discussions and the group provided feedback over email on the presentation. Billy agreed to co-present with me and Roy agreed to take the lead in responding to questions. The audience was highly engaged as Billy and Roy spoke, nodding at key points and laughing at jokes; their contributions were much appreciated. Roy was
surprized by the enthusiastic reception they received: “I just find it hard to believe that people care about what our opinions are!”

Billy wrote a report for our next meeting following the conference and we reflected on the experience with John. Billy and Roy reflected on the elitism of academic language, but noted that despite the use of specialized language they were still able to follow the main points of the other panelists’ presentations. Roy appreciated the attempt to create a friendly atmosphere and avoid the expert/audience and teacher/learner dynamics by positioning the seating in a circle, “That was the other thing about yesterday, ‘cause the way you explained it we were going to sit at the front and going to have an audience, but it turned out to more of a circle discussion type thing, which I liked more. It was more comfortable right? We weren't standing out right? Like we will be in Ottawa.” As it turned out, we sat in a circle at ICOPA as well.

The overwhelming response to their experiences at Congress, however was one of affirming their own knowledge and de-romanticising the image of the “professor.”

ROY: And to be able to talk to people with more letters behind their names then I've ever met in my life and for them to treat you as an equal or listen to you like you have something to say.

KAREN: You do, you all do

ROY: I find that amazing right ‘cause in my normal life I would think yeah, ok if I meet a college or university professor somewhere and I say hi to him he would just look down on me and say, “Infidel!” You know? Like, “I got more degrees than…” right? So your thought doesn't matter.

KAREN: They're not “all that.”

ROY: But that's the perspective you get right? But they're average Joes just like anybody else.
Yesterday really proves the point with the sandals and the shorts right.

JOHN: What, was everybody else dressy?

ROY: I had a dress shirt, dress pants, shoes, and he [Billy] had a tie, and in came the professors and they were in flip flops and baggy shorts!

JOHN: Well ‘cause they can! They’re already up there.

ROY: I was waiting for them to all light up cigars, “give me a glass of wine.”

JOHN: “Where’s the scotch?!?”

I asked if they’d noticed what the women in the room were wearing and, they noted that we had been dressed “professionally”. Adding this awareness of gender to the discussion reinforced John’s analysis of privilege above, and it was noted that, even as professors, women did not experience the same exceptionality of privilege.

For the International Conference on Penal Abolition, Billy and Roy each made their own presentations while I gave an overview of the project and facilitated the discussion. Billy spoke about his critiques of the universalizing tendencies and demoralizing impact of rehabilitative programing from his experience. Roy drew out meaningful comparisons from his experience of two different rehabilitative approaches based on the primacy of the face to face ethical encounter. Had John attended the conferences he would have spoken about a number of issues that were important to him. As he and Billy discussed earlier in the workshop:

BILLY: I think your topic should be the prison farms.

JOHN: Yeah that's what I'm going to touch on. I'm going to touch on that and the prisoner justice day t-shirts ‘cause I don't think that should ever be taken away. Like we pay for it; we fund it. It goes to the committee, the money comes back to us and that buys our sports equipment and anything that we need like gym equipment.
At the time a class action lawsuit had been in the papers surrounding CSC banning the new design for the Prisoners Justice Day t-shirts (Yanagisawa 2014). It was decided that the group would discuss the PJD t-shirts at the conferences in John’s absence, but that no formal presentation by John be read to avoid exposing him to greater risks for speaking out.

The men received a very warm reception at ICOPA and their presentations were followed by a fruitful discussion. As Billy wrote in his follow up report, “It was now our turn to get all nervous and present our material. It went very well. There was a huge discussion on rehabilitation. Sorry John not too much on the farms or PJD. The white board was a huge hit.”

As Billy noted many of the questions and comments centered around our critique of rehabilitation and added complexity as comparisons were offered between the Canadian context and varying international contexts, all with different positionings along the punishment-rehabilitation spectrum (the United States on one side and Norway on the other). The audience also challenged Roy and Billy with questions pertaining to how to encourage accountability while reaching outside of even the softer side of prisons. The audience was made up of academics, authors and activists engaged in the field of Critical Criminology. During the discussion period an audience member reflected on the value of the conversations to their/our respective work intellectually and personally. This sentiment, which was evidently shared across the room, reflected a shift in the group’s involvement and an entry point into making a contribution to the field of Convict Criminology.

This engaged conversation with a broader field continued the following day as we attended other sessions. Billy and Roy reflected on the seeming lack of attendance by other people who had direct experience of incarceration, and noted that their presence was appreciated. Their engagement in the conference on the whole was appreciated not as symbolic
representatives from the inside, but as actors in an arena of conversation and collective creativity. I will not summarize the discussions and insights that evolved out of the sessions we attended, together and separately, but will note a session entitled Stories from the Inside that Billy and Roy found particularly poignant. It was given by a group of actors who come together spontaneously to create and present plays representing stories of oppression. As Billy wrote in his report, “John this would have been a group that you would have enjoyed as they hit the nail on the head during their play that they were doing on everything that happens in prison – from parole officers, to people coming back from outside visits, to the huge wage decrease.”

As in the above comment, Billy was sure to make note of topics and conversations of interest to John in his report. The group agreed they would like to attend ICOPA again and John was particularly enthusiastic as by the next conference he would be free to do so.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

In the final pages I will consider some of the ways in which this project has gestured towards potential future research projects. Although many questions arose throughout the project that could be pursued in the direction of future research I will provide only two examples, both of which have been informed by the theoretical and methodological explorations in the current project: A Feminist Project, and A Restorative Project.

I will conclude with a short summary.

Contributions to Research and Further Research

This project, though presented herein in with scrupulous detail, took little more than a lot of willingness, most notably the willingness and dedication of my collaborators. As such, similar projects informed by various topics, passions and goals could easily emerge along the lines of co-learning, co-creation and co-research with/by former prisoners. The details provided regarding of some of the challenges and barriers met by our group may be useful in understanding and managing similar challenges should such projects arise.

Pertaining to future research, Roy pointed out, “You could also talk about other topics that have spun off of what we’ve been talking about. Other researchers or whatever might be sitting there [at one of the conferences] saying, ‘there's a good topic we could probably do some research on’. They may say, ‘I wonder if anybody’s ever done any research on that?’” There were indeed many topics with which we were not able to follow through, pointing again to the open-endedness of our discussions. There are more such tangents than I have space to write herein. However, I will offer two key examples of directions in which our project might have taken had we continued. First, a feminist critique would have much to offer our discussions and would be highly amenable to future projects. Second, much of our discussion and the questions
they inspired are lendable to restorative justice approaches: another potentially fruitful avenue for future projects.

**A Feminist Project**

A similar project could be designed along the lines of feminist critiques of the prison as a patriarchal institution that perpetuates gender violence and misogyny within and beyond its walls. While I provided very little discussion of gender within these pages, had we continued the project there would have been opportunity to engage in feminist critiques of Lévinasian ethics and allow these critiques to inform further discussion of patriarchy within the prisons and society (Irigaray 1991). A direction towards a feminist critique was beginning to form within the project. As mentioned above the group noted at the conferences that privilege is not afforded to men and women equally; this was a conversation that built curiosity surrounding the varying meanings of feminism. Unfortunately, these conversations around feminism occurred informally and went unrecorded, for example, during our long drives to and from conferences, therefore I am at a loss to include them.

However, there were other times when gender entered our more formal discussions. For example, the group discussed and decried instances of gender violence perpetrated against incarcerated women, including those following the Prison for Women Riots in Kingston in 1994. As John described,

> You wanna see something really, really inhumane is the riot over at P4W back in the early 90's. If anybody can go back to that, that was just unbelievable what happened with those girls – with men there too. They had to call in police, other male guards from other institutions and all that and none of that should have gone on. Absolutely none of it. They’re still going through law suits all the males that were involved in that doing what they did and that shit. And I believe that's why that place got shut down.
In another example, Roy brought forward a critique of the versions of hyper-masculinity promoted within the prison context amongst staff members. During Roy’s time incarcerated in a lower security, treatment-focused institution, a staff member had shared with him that he feels embarrassed for working at such a low-security institution in front of prison staff from other institutions. I will reiterate that at this institution Roy felt that he was treated as a person, and his experience was less demoralizing than at the pervious institution where he had stayed. As Roy told the story:

Exactly, but it's not the tough, hard life you know? They [the staff] sit at a desk and hand up pens and pencils. And they communicate with us, they spend time with us. If you wanna go in and talk to them, you go in and talk with them, without being worried about all the others guys there going “oh look he's squealing on somebody” or something like that. But, he [a staff member] said he was in a coffee shop one day and it was funny ‘cause he said, “Oh, I work at [names institution]” and there was another pen guard there or something, and she just snuffed her nose at him and walked away. And they just looked at him totally different he said.

Tying together critiques of gender and demoralization within the system, here we see a version of hyper-masculinity promoted and upheld by social ostracization and shame, premised on the need to demoralize prisoners.

Had we continued in the direction of a feminist critique we might have taken up these and other examples, along with feminist critiques of Lévinasian ethics and feminist literature on prisons, which portends that, “the very use of prisons is a reflection of a patriarchal approach to ‘solving’ social problems, which often explicitly demands aggressive tactics” (Munn and
Bruckert 2013, 52, on Marc Maur and Meda Chesney-Lind). Much work could be done in this area.

**A Restorative Project**

As the project progressed a stream within our discussions began to emerge surrounding the themes of trust, lying, victims, and forgiveness. While I will not fully detail these conversations here, they erupted within our project out of our burgeoning understandings of an emergent, intersubjective ethics, and pointed us on a trajectory of restorative justice. The group critiqued the ways in which elements of restorative justice are employed by CSC and become distorted into forms of control. They also expressed a desire for better processes. They delineated a distinction between a lack of trust (for prison staff) and fear (of a threatening fellow prisoner) and ‘preferred’ fear, even when it referred to fear for one’s life. The lack of trust that was described to be fostered by the prison context was a connected to a denial of the authenticity of the face. What we were referring to as trust was being put forward as a sort of practice of being willing to recognize the face of the other in the ethical encounter, and lack of trust as a practice of oppression. A lack of trust (as opposed to fear) was premised as the strongest barrier to practicing ethics in prison and just as the elements of restorative justice were distorted from their desired aim within the suspicious context of prison the group questioned whether prisons could be hospitable to trust.

These conversations, rich as they were, were left at a preliminary stage. They arose out of our conversations of Lévinasian ethics and have much potential for further development in conjunction with his works. For example Lévinas’ discussion of the freedom to lie may be read alongside our discussions of trust, “But deceit and veracity already presuppose the absolute authenticity of the face—the privileged case of a presentation of being foreign to that alternative of truth and non-truth, circumventing the ambiguity of the true and the false which every truth
risks—an ambiguity, moreover, in which all values move” (Lévinas 2012, 202). Furthermore, Lévinas’ exploration of the apology (Levinas 2012, 240, 252) and the concept of infinite responsibility may inform discussions on forgiveness; as Broken put it, “Take responsibility; but its serious shit responsibility! It's so simple; but it ain’t.” While during our sessions we did not reach developed concepts of forgiveness and restorative justice, given more time an in-depth discussion might have been built around the connections we were forming. The group’s groundwork in a direction of future research within the field of restorative justice approaches was reinforced at ICOPA as the audience encouraged Roy and Billy to consider alternative forms of accountability consistent with the work we had presented.

To help develop a potential direction of future research to build on the present study by adding restorative justice approaches we may look to the work of Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2008). Gobodo-Madikizela has examined forgiveness within South African restorative frameworks from Lévinasian and psychological perspectives. While her focus is on the potential psychological benefits, in the form of processes of ‘empathic repair’ that forgiveness may offer to victims, for our purposes I would like to emphasize certain consistencies she draws out between the Lévinasian perspective and the restorative justice model.

For Gobodo-Madikizela (2008), the process toward forgiveness is that of intersubjective engagement between the victim and the offender (343). When the victim perceives true remorse on behalf of the offender there is an opening for empathy as remorse helps to build an emotional connection though the recognition of the other’s subjectivity (344). Remorse is not consistent with the cruelty of the harm therefore it allows the victim to understand the perpetrator in a new way. However, if remorse is not offered, then forgiveness will not be possible. She emphasizes
context as the fundamental variable to how and when forgiveness occurs; forgiveness can neither be a goal, nor a technique, but may emerge in context (347).

Thus, the restorative approach can be seen as the work of intersubjective potentials, where time is suspended in anticipation of an emergent ethical transformation. In contrast to rehabilitationism, these approaches are nondeterministic, future oriented and contingent on the ethical pulls exterior to the self rather than moral reformulation.

Summary

In the preceding pages I attempted to convey our practical and analytical explorations of emergent ethics within and beyond the experience of carceral control and as a critique of rehabilitationism. We began with unraveling the demoralizing tendencies of rehabilitation based on the reliance on a subject defined by their knowable and malleable interiority. We considered the intra-subjective escapades that this subject of rehabilitation endures under the auspices of the psychoanalytic rehabilitative technique and the barriers presented to freedom, creativity and change. We described four characteristics of rehabilitative programming: repetition, standardization/universalism, reliance on a set of knowledge of the individual and discretionary power. We considered the file as a symbolic document and as a therapeutic document. We then critiqued the file as a form of objectifying violence through a Lévinasian lens.

We undertook a more intimate look at Lévinasian ethics. We considered the question of violence, looking at both the ethical moment within the potentially violent encounter and the capacity to ignore the call to ethics: the violence of systemic oppression. We repositioned the subject as outwardly oriented in desire and obligation toward the other and looked to the co-creative impulse facilitated by this outward orientation. We looked at power and freedom as mutually reinforcing and tied to the co-creative impulse of intersubjective engagement.
While we did not pretend to reach any specific conclusions on these highly philosophical questions, we were not at a loss to locate examples of our deliberations within our experiences of prison, as well as within the project itself, building meaning across philosophy and practice. Thus at the very least we may advance that a framework of emergent, intersubjective ethics can have bearing on experiences of prison and may through further development present critiques and alternatives to the demoralizing spectrum of carceral control and rehabilitation, varying applications of which have overwhelmingly dominated our responses to harm since the birth of the prison. Further, we may hold that those with experience of incarceration are best prepared and most capable of offering this analysis.

While as the group concluded, “there is no real answer to the question of ethics,” we did affirm ourselves as ethical subjects and as analytical, collaborative learners and researchers.
References:


December 05, 2013

Miss Karen Raddon
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**GREB Ref #: GCUL-030-13; Romeo # 6011192**
Title: "GCUL-030-13 A Prisoners' Project in Emergent Ethics"

Dear Miss Raddon:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB), by means of a delegated board review, has cleared your proposal entitled "**GCUL-030-13 A Prisoners' Project in Emergent Ethics**" for ethical compliance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (TCPS) and Queen's ethics policies. In accordance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (article D.1.6) and Senate Terms of Reference (article G), your project has been cleared for one year. At the end of each year, the GREB will ask if your project has been completed and if not, what changes have occurred or will occur in the next year.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB, with a copy to your unit REB, of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period (access this form at [https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/](https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/) and click Events - GREB Adverse Event Report). An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example you must report changes to the level of risk, applicant characteristics, and implementation of new procedures. To make an amendment, access the application at [https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/](https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/) and click Events - GREB Amendment to Approved Study Form. These changes will automatically be sent to the Ethics Coordinator, Gail Irving, at the Office of Research Services or irvingg@queensu.ca for further review and clearance by the GREB or GREB Chair.
On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

Joan Stevenson, Ph.D.
Chair
General Research Ethics Board

c: Dr. Richard Day, Faculty Supervisor
Dr. Magda Lewis, Chair, Unit REB
Ms. Danielle Gugler, Dept. Admin.