Abstract

This dissertation examines a process of indigenous accumulation among Tonga farmers in Zambia’s Southern Province. In the 1970s multiple authors concluded that capitalist farmers had emerged among Tonga agro-pastoralists, predominantly within private titled holdings. Relying on archival research, newspapers, secondary sources and extensive oral testimony this thesis fills a 35-year gap on the topic, providing insights into the social and environmental impacts of neoliberal policy among African peasants and capitalist farmers. In contrast to dominant narratives of the post-independence period, this study argues that Zambia did experience a developmental process post-independence, which saw significant achievements made in the agricultural sector, including the doubling of national cattle stocks. The data reveals a painful process of disarticulation beginning in the late 1980s. Following neoliberal adjustment, we observe significant heterogeneity in production systems, some regional specialization, and processes of migration. Most importantly, the thesis uncovers processes of overwhelming ecosystemic change that contributed to livestock epidemics of severe scale and scope. Amazingly, this went largely undocumented because of the simultaneous crisis of the state, which left the national statistics office and other state bodies incapable of functioning from the late 1980s into the 2000s. In response, the Zambian state has introduced a number of neodevelopmental initiatives in the sector, yet the lack of animal traction remained up to 2008 and agricultural production declined, while more capitalized farmers (largely white, and/or with foreign direct investment) have become more significant players in the country. This thesis provides compelling evidence to challenge dominant economic thinking of the Washington institutions as well as many of the common Marxian formulations.
Acknowledgements

By far the most memorable experiences in my life have been in Africa. My knowledge and appreciation of the continent were cultivated during my undergraduate degree. This was largely thanks to the courses of David Black, Jane Parpart, Timorthy Shaw and Phil Zachurnuck, who gave me the opportunity to study alongside many graduate students from across Africa. My focus on Zambia also began then, almost by accident as I was seeking a case study to examine the processes of democratic and economic liberalizations taking place across the continent in the 1990s. It was a fortuitous turn for me because Jane and Tim both had produced some of their seminal works on the country, thus providing an inspiring foundation to launch from. I would never have ended up in the PhD if I had not had the inspiring mentorship of them, along with the life-changing opportunity to study in the Master’s degree with John S. Saul. He is a prolific, rigorous and inspiring ‘activist-scholar’ who showed me it was possible to write in solidarity with those in Africa struggling for a better world.

I faced many barriers bringing this thesis to completion. Had I known it would take more than a decade to complete, I am not sure I would have ever taken it on. Life, however, works out in ways we cannot always predict. Some of my detours came out of difficult challenges and others fortunately came from joyous events.

My participation in this degree has depended upon the support of a variety of medical personnel. I was very fortunate to have had the care of a progressive general practitioner, Dr. Meredith Mackenzie. I am also indebted to all the administrative staff at Queens’ health facility and am particularly grateful to their former employee and my friend, Deborah Tracy, who made my times in the waiting room much friendlier. I felt extremely grateful to have had the care of Dr. Stephanie Baxter at the Hotel Dieu Ophthalmology clinic as she ensured my frustrating eyes were in the best shape possible. Not only is she an exceptionally knowledgeable and talented doctor, but she was also available for email consultations from Zambia. Lastly, I was also supported during the last phase of my degree by Dr. Mariam Deria, and others at the Ottawa Civic Hospital.

I owe thanks to the School of Graduate Studies and the Department of History at Queen’s for supporting this study and stretching policies to make accommodations. I am particularly grateful to Sandra Den Otter for her supportive role, first as Graduate Chair in the Department of History and then as Associate Dean in the School of Graduate Studies. I am also grateful to Monica Corbett for all the administrative frustrations she helped me through. Most importantly, I valued the essential Queen’s Graduate Award funding I received. This included the additions of the Dorothy Warne Chambers Memorial Fellowship, the Keppel-Jones Award from the former Southern Africa Research Centre, and the Arts and Science Graduate Growth Funding.

I may never have ended up at Queen’s if I had not followed Karen Cocq to Kingston for her Master’s degree. In fact, she is also partly responsible for bringing Zambia back into my life in the midst of my protracted Masters’ degree at York University. I am grateful for having shared some wonderful periods of my life with her as we fought the good fight.

In addition to John S. Saul, I owe thanks to Dick Bryan and Bob Shenton for their help in getting me into the program. The PhD drastically changed the ways I think about development and human history. It was the greatest privilege to read classics of political economy in Bob Shenton’s Idea of Development seminar. This included the entirety of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations! My political economy analysis was also greatly enriched by the various development studies courses I worked in as a Teaching Assistantship for Marcus Taylor. In fact, the Global
Development Studies program always provided a secondary home for me, as I worked there and in the Department of History before I even started the PhD. I am thankful to David McDonald, Paritosh Kumar and others who integrated me into the dynamic and enriching space. I am grateful to have maintained lasting friendships with a number of former students who have gone on to have exciting careers. I am also fortunate to have gained some academic mileage from the Research Assistant work I conducted for David McDonald.

By far the most enriching aspect of the PhD came from my coursework on global environmental and agrarian history with Colin Duncan. In fact, I would say that if there are any moments of brilliance in this thesis they are inspired by his guidance and the insights I derived from the materials he presented in his seminars and the undergraduate course I worked in as a Teaching Assistant. Colin is a powerful, original thinker who reads with more breadth than anyone I have known. He is also intellectually generous, has a deep respect for his students, and opens up innumerable opportunities for their growth. Like Bob Shenton, he does not offer answers, but poses the questions, presents the complications and pushes students to find answers themselves. In turn, he always provided elaborate and useful feedback in a timely manner. I am fortunate to be able to consider Colin my friend.

I began teaching as a course instructor in the second-year of my PhD. It was likely not a good career decision, but it was enriching and it helped me explore various topics dealt with in this thesis. I would eventually teach in four different universities, with many overlaps between them. One year I taught at the University of Toronto, Scarborough campus, Queens and Trent all in the same time. In total, I wrote 14 separate syllabi over the course of completing this degree. Obviously, there were large stretches of time where little of the thesis was getting done and a lot of course preparation was taking place. Administrators know they can pay us less as contract faculty, in part because the teaching process is most often very enjoyable. It is a very privileged form of work, even when we, as a teaching underclass are systematically mistreated by the institutions we work within. Despite the insufficient remuneration and lack of professional development opportunities that is the lot of so many contract academic staff, teaching was a source of huge growth for me. I met many inspiring students over the years and was particularly fortunate to be able to keep up distance education courses at Queen’s while living in Dakar, Senegal, where a good portion of my writing took place.

I am proud of the role I played in the movement to build a union of Teaching Assistants and Teaching Fellows at Queen’s and have the deepest respect for all those who took part in the process. Tiffany Jones, Rosa Barker, Dave Thomas, Christopher Churchill, Athena Elafros, Christopher Canning, Enda Borphy, Emily Van der Meulen, Ivan Stoiljkovik, Jonathan Sears, Martin French and Simon Kiss were among the first group of comrades I worked with in this protracted struggle. It, however, took three rounds, and the 2008 financial crisis, to get it right. Fortunately, there were so many additional and very capable unionists that were to take up the task, finally culminating in a victory with the Public Service Alliance of Canada. As someone striving to be an organic intellectual I always felt that, in addition to study, it was essential to simultaneously take part in collective processes of trying to change the world.

Of all the teaching I have taken on I was never happier than to be working for the Institute of African Studies at Carleton University. I am so appreciative of being given a new, if temporary, home among a wonderful group of professors there. Most importantly, I have had the privilege of teaching many fiercely intelligent students from Africa and first-generation Canadians of African ancestry. I learned so much from them and feel confident in their capacities to positively alter the course of Africa’s relations with the rest of the world. There are also an increasing number of non-African students interested in playing an active role in processes of
decolonization. They are coming to reject paternalistic discourses about the continent. This is a fantastic context to be teaching in. At Carleton I am particularly thankful to Blair Rutherford for being a mentor and roll model over a number of years and for introducing me to Kate Crehan’s *Fractured Communities* early on in my PhD process.

Historians would be without a profession if it were not for librarians and archivists. I have great admiration for their selflessness and level of respect for documentation. Mulugeta Gebru at Carleton University made trips to the library in these last few years both cheaper and more enjoyable. I am very appreciative of all the people who supported me at various holdings in Canada, the Public Records Office at Kew, The Rhodes house collection of the Bodleian library at Oxford, The Special Collections at the University of Zambia, The Institute of Economic Research at UNZA, the Zambian National Archives and the Archives of the Zambian National Farmers’ Union.

The PhD process allowed me to realize a life goal I had set for myself at a young age. That goal was to spend time in Africa in a way that did not replicate colonial forms of observation or tutelage. I did not want to be an outsider assuming I knew how to ‘help’ Africans. I wanted to learn. For this reason, I obtained research affiliation at the University of Zambia and lived in the Marshlands residence on campus. I was formally under the supervision of the Chair of the Department of History, the late Dr. Bennet Siamwisa. His untimely departure sadly adds to a significant list of great UNZA academics that were lost too soon. At UNZA, I was also fortunate to have been generously aided by Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, Dr. Judith Lungu, Dr. Thomson Haamutete Kalinda and Dr. Fabian Miambo.

I am extremely grateful for the research assistance, translation and ongoing friendships provided by Khama Han’gombe, Carrington Siatontola, Johannes Nell, and Anastasia Mwale. I have sadly lost contact with Arthur Simiti, but my moments with him were wonderful and are a testament to the research value of socializing at football matches. Khama and Johannes were extremely generous in bringing me into their homes and sharing in the intimacies of daily life. Khama is now in the midst of his PhD in linguistics at the University of Zimbabwe. Nana Clemenson also very generously shared some key interviews with me.

I also was so fortunate to have enjoyed some accommodation and logistical support from the late and great, Dr. Elizabeth Colson. It was the greatest privilege to have been able to spend multiple evenings informally interviewing her about her career and all the changes she has witnessed in Zambia’s Southern Province over the more than 60 years she had been studying there. It saddens me I did not complete this in time for her to see it, but she offered gracious feedback on some of my related publications. Serendipitously, some of my time with Elizabeth overlapped with Maiju Tamminen, who quickly became a lovely friend. She provided a wonderful model for how to be both an insider and outsider simultaneously. I learned from her calm demeanour and admired the insights she obtained through her anthropologist’s skills of observation. It feels like we shared a portal, or node in time after which we would each return to drastically different lives, far apart, though with significant similarities of experience.

Sections of the thesis were greatly enhanced by my being generously hosted at the Tonga Timeline Seminar Workshop, at the University of Zambia in June of 2008 and the CART II conference at the, African Studies Centre, Leiden University in September of that year. It was also a great pleasure to have had feedback from Mac Dixon-Fyle, whose research from the 1970s remains important and inspired my own inquiry many years later.
I owe a great deal of thanks to Marc Epprecht who read through innumerable drafts written in an eclectic style, that was originally more than double the size of what I submit here. He was a trooper and continued to be supportive in spite of our battles. Most importantly, he’s a first-rate historian and activist-author and it was a privilege to have his guidance. Any weaknesses herein have remained in spite of his warning.

Some of the very best moments over the years of the degree came from the Soul Shakedown parties that were put on by our rotating collective. In addition to raising thousands of dollars for local community groups, these events allowed many of us to shake off our troubles and dance in the face of defeat – and to beats from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Cuba and so many other parts of the world. I am so grateful to Ekta Singh for sharing the vision with me and ushering it through its various incarnations.

A number of other good friends have provided inspiration, comradery and belief in me at various points over the years and made the times I was not in the office much better. These include Dana Olwan, Reena Usha Rungu, Gord Dueck, David Thompson, Wangui Kimari, Daniel Tubb, Rosa Barker, Earl Badour, Sulaimon Adebowale, Uyilawa Usuanlele, Susan Pereverzoff, Allassane Djigo and Tanuja Kulkarni and. Anastasia Mwale has been a close friend who has taught me so much about Zambia and made it clear to me that so many Zambian women could be feminists without even knowing the term.

John Pringle, Laurie Gashinski and Matthew Crosgrove became my adopted family throughout various stages of the degree and I am so much richer for it. They provided shelter from the storm when needed. We celebrated in victory and in battle. Laurie remains the only person for whom I’ve celebrated a “farewell to the Kidney” party. The world is a much better place for all three of them being in it. They all inspire, lift more than their share, maintain humour and know how to have a great time, even in some of the worst moments life can offer.

It is impossible to summarize all the ways my four parents have made this degree possible. I owe Valerie Saunders, Adam Saunders, David Moorsom and Kathleen Brooks the deepest gratitude for the innumerable ways they have supported me over the years and for the opportunities with which they have provided me. I am grateful to Claire Moorsom for being an exceptional scholarly role model and introducing to me to the concept of “classic” novels at a young age. She helped generate my thirst for reading. I am grateful to Ben and Rod Moorsom and their respective families for hosting me in transit and ushering me to and from the airport on so many trips to Africa over the years. Their friendship and belief in me has helped hold me up.

This project truly could not have come to completion without the loving support of Karine Girard. She generously read through many drafts and provided insightful feedback. She is herself an intellectual who has challenged, inspired and cared for me. She made many hours in the office possible and also gave me the best reasons ever to put things on hold, before Rowan and After. The birth of our son Rowan remains one of the most magical experiences of my life, which is only surpassed by the beauty of watching him grow up. Together we have experienced so much joy from his presence.
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# Glossary of Abbreviations

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<td>AFIF</td>
<td>African Farming Improvement Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Agricultural Finance Company</td>
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<td>ARMB</td>
<td>Agricultural Rural Marketing Board, established 1964 out of MCB</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress. A Northern Rhodesian political party that led the independence struggle until the formation of UNIP in 1959. The majority left to join UNIP, but the ANC maintained significant support in Southern Province and some in Western Province. The party was banned in 1972.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Agriculture Support Programme (SIDA funded, promotes commercialization of smallscale farmers)</td>
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<td>BIC</td>
<td>Brethren in Christ church</td>
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<td>BSAC</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<td>CFB</td>
<td>Commercial Farmers’ Bureau. Prior to 1964 it was called the Rhodesian National Farmers’ Union. In 1992 its name was changed to the Zambia National Farmers’ Union</td>
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<td>COZ</td>
<td>Credit Organization of Zambia</td>
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<td>DPB</td>
<td>Dairy Produce Board</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (sometimes referred to as UNFAO in sourced documents).</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FISP</td>
<td>Fertilizer Input Support Program</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
<td>Food Reserve Agency</td>
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<td>GART</td>
<td>Golden Valley Agricultural Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDECO</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Improved Farmers Scheme (some authors use AIFS for “African”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSRP</td>
<td>Food Security Research Project</td>
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<td>LAB</td>
<td>Land and Agricultural Bank</td>
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<td>MACO</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives</td>
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<td>MAWD</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Development</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
<td>Maize Control Board, 1937-1964</td>
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<td>NAMBoard</td>
<td>National Agricultural Marketing Board</td>
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<td>OFP</td>
<td>Operation Food Production, 10-year plan launched in 1980</td>
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<td>NAPSSFZ</td>
<td>National Association of Peasant and Small Scale Farmers of Zambia, est. 1989</td>
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<td>SAPS</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Policies</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist church</td>
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<td>SNDP</td>
<td>Second National Development Plan, 1972-1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNNDP</td>
<td>Third National Development Plan, 1978-84 However, it was abandoned before completion and replaced with a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), based on an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (IMF/WB)</td>
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<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party, formed in 1959, winning the first majority-rule election in 1964 and governing until 1991 under the leadership of Kenneth David Kaunda</td>
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<td>UPP</td>
<td>United Progressive Party, 1971-72, then banned. Led by VP, Simon Kapwepwe, held significant support among trade unionists and small business owners in Copperbelt, Lusaka and Northern Province</td>
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<td>ZANC</td>
<td>Zambian African National Congress, formed in 1958 and banned by the Northern</td>
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Rhodesian government in 1959, with its leader, Kenneth Kaunda being jailed until 1960, when he then joined UNIP

ZAWA – Zambian Wildlife Authority
ZIMCO – Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation, Limited
Introduction

Foreign investment, private investment, entrepreneurship. In the past quarter-century these terms have been almost gospel for international development. These are the things poor countries are told they need in order to flourish in the global economy. But the terms involved have not been transparently used. For Paul Collier, Oxford Professor of Economics and Public Policy, “[the] economies of the bottom billion are short of capital… Africa has twice as much public capital as private capital. What it, and other economies of the bottom billion, really lack is private investment” (Collier: 2007). In the most common economistic formulations, public capital is presented as dead weight on a society, bogging it down and serving to obstruct the benevolent powers of private wealth creation. For the last 25 years prescriptions for national economic development have hailed the power of an accumulating middle class, conflating and re-imagining the role such a class has played in the historical emergence of capitalist economies throughout the world. For Dambiso Moyo, PhD, former banker, and popular Zambian author:

“Africa needs a middle class: a middle class that has vested economic interests; a middle class in which individuals trust each other (and have a court to go to if the trust breaks down) and that respects and defends the rule of law; a middle class that has a stake in seeing its country run smoothly and under a transparent legal framework; a middle class (along with the rest of the population) that can hold its government accountable. Above all, a middle class needs a government that will let it get ahead.” (Moyo, 2009: 57)

For Calestous Juma, Professor of the Practice of International Development and Director of Science, Technology, Globalization, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of government, farmers in particular can be a modernizing group of entrepreneurs at the forefront of economic development on the African continent.

“… sustaining African economic prosperity will require significant efforts to modernize the continent’s economy through the application of science and technology in agriculture. In other words, agriculture needs to be viewed as a knowledge-based entrepreneurial activity…” (Juma, The New Harvest, 2011, xiv)
The above cited authors agree that development is something brought by the private sector. By ‘private sector’, they mean people who have wealth, which they wish to expand – ‘to get ahead’ in Moyo’s terms. The private sector is, therefore, inherently competitive. For Moyo, the state is seen in opposition to the activities of the private sector, though it can potentially be beneficial if “middle-class” (private) interests can discipline it. Juma, however, presents the state as a potentially supportive instrument, especially when it is controlled by what he sees as a new breed of technocratic, business-minded political leaders.

Juma and Collier differ on which sections of the private sector deserve the most support from the state. In agriculture, Juma believes small and large agriculturalists can produce larger surpluses for market if they are supported by state policy. Collier has argued that state efforts should target larger producers, whom he believes have greater relative efficiency in production. Thus, he states: “…the world needs more commercial agriculture, not less. The Brazilian model of high-productivity large farms could readily be extended to areas where land is underused” (2010). For all three of the above authors, markets are liberating institutions, so far as the state allows them to flourish. Markets enable human freedom by rationalizing the allocation of goods in society, unleashing human ingenuity and promoting individual liberty. This view of markets draws from a long tradition of liberal economic thought in which the boundaries of the “economy” are neatly separated from other spheres of human activity, particularly those related to social reproduction.

This dissertation examines these precepts by considering the historic role of indigenous property-owning farmers in Southern Zambia. In particular, I look at the changing relationship between a commercializing agricultural class and the state across time. Liberal and Marxian economists generally agree that where they have arisen, bourgeoisies have played historically revolutionary roles. However, they generally do not agree on how to interpret their significance. Currently the overwhelmingly dominant economic policies toward
Africa assume a bourgeoisie exists, or will come into being by virtue of the innovative economic activity of people described as “entrepreneurs”. This is certainly the case with policy advocacy toward agriculture – advocacy that has also been reflected in a recent World Bank publication on the subject.¹

Terms such as “farmer”, “middle-class”, “entrepreneur” and “private sector” are often employed with little specificity of meaning. In recent years, various international aid agencies, financial institutions, multi-national corporations and farming associations have promoted policy around the mantra of “farming as a business” (Wegner and Zwart, 2011, Juma, 2011, Sitko, 2010).² Recently the World Bank has used the wide term, “agribusiness” to describe such a wide range of activities that it risks losing discursive value. As explained in a 2013 report:

Agribusiness denotes organized firms — from small and medium enterprises to multinational corporations — involved in input supply or in downstream transformation. It includes commercial agriculture that involves some transformation activities (even if they are basic). It includes smallholders and micro-enterprises in food processing and retail to the extent that they are market oriented — indeed these producers and enterprises make up the bulk of agribusiness activity in Africa today (WB, 2013).

This definition relies on a number of rather slippery categories. Concepts of the “firm”, “enterprise” “micro-enterprise”, and “smallholder” may have formal institutional status in various places, but they are by no means universally accepted structures of socio-economic organization. For example, although data has been collected on “smallholders” in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia across seven decades, how they were defined has been subject to change to the point that they cannot always be compared across particular time periods. A larger problem is that the various categories of producers are vastly unequal participants in the economy. Moreover, the terms used variously involve broader issues about the nature of class

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¹ WB, (2013) Growing Africa: Unlocking the Potential of Agribusiness
² Nikolas Sitko’s PhD Dissertation argues that this policy agenda has reproduced power imbalances and exacerbated poverty in Southern Province in the name of efficiency (2009)
structure and property ownership in society. Historians know that these categories are not fixed across time.

In fact, scholarship on Zambia has tended to be impressed by how rapidly new social categories have emerged and challenged many preconceptions about Africa (Powdermaker, 1962, Parpart, 1983, Moore and Vaughan, 1994, Crehan, 1997, Ferguson, 1999). The country was annexed by the British South Africa Company very late in the colonial period, in the 1890s, following the mineral revolution in South Africa. By 1911 the British took control of what then became Northern Rhodesia and in 1925 large quantities of copper sulfide ores were discovered north of Ndola in an area that would come to be known as the Copperbelt (Phiri, 2006: 9-12). This set off a process of technological transformation that would see the country become the most urbanized on the continent. As well, categories of gender, ethnicity, urban-rural and generational groupings have been subject to change amidst ongoing contestation. And all this occurs amidst massive changes in geopolitical context, from a colonial era, to one of independence in 1964, the introduction of a single-party system in 1972 and then a reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 1991 alongside economic liberalization as prescribed by the International Monetary Fund. The first government of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was not simply interested in ‘farming as a business’, but was concerned about its national character; having goals of generating Zambian owners and achieving self-sufficiency in food production. It also saw agriculture as serving a role in moving the economy onto a higher stage of economic modernization, and as a means of curbing the processes of rapid urbanization. When the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) won elections in 1991 it ended centralized national planning and left farmers to fend for themselves. Added to this, rural producers have had to navigate complex ecological conditions.

To find and discuss the kind of “middle class” imagined by the authors cited above it is helpful to consider some basics. A capitalist generally must own something and employ labour
to transform it. In the agricultural sector this often includes the labour of the farm owner, as well as the purchasing of the labour of others. Yet many farmers rely heavily upon unpaid family labour or the non-waged labour of dependents. At the same time, forms of capitalist relations can potentially come into being on land that is not legally owned. The combination of relationships in which labour is employed upon the means of production is subject to variation across time and space, making it difficult to discern its characteristics at any one point in time.

In this dissertation, I examine a particular group of predominantly Tonga farmers in Southern Zambia who were the target of early colonial efforts to build a “middle-class”. Some of this population eventually came to be described as “capitalist farmers” who had purchased private-titled land originally cleared for intended occupation by a white settler population. In this way, they became Black settlers of a sort. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of researchers claimed at least some by then constituted an indigenous agricultural capitalist class (Baylies, 1979, Chipungu, 1988, Momba, 1982, Vickery, 1978, 1986,). Yet when I visited Southern Province in 2007 and 2008 many of these same farmers had experienced years of decline and were negatively impacted by a financial crisis, cattle epidemics, an HIV/AIDS public health crisis and widespread ecological change.

The general research question in this thesis concerns how the introduction of neoliberal economic policies impacted those indigenous commercial farmers, but sub-questions abound. How had the state contributed to the earlier formation of the indigenous

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3 The term “settler” can have derogatory connotations that are inseparable from histories of white racism and white supremacy. In choosing to use it here I do not intend to conflate these histories with the particular experiences of those who are the subject of this study. The Black Africans detailed in this thesis are, however, ‘settlers’ insofar as they acquired private-titled land in a country where the vast majority of land is held in forms of common ownership that arose out of British administrative processes of indirect rule. In the late-colonial and post-independence periods there has been a gradual process of extending private titled land into new parts of the country with the intention of making it available to commercializing African farmers; thus rendering them settlers of a new variety. The first of them might be termed ‘re-settlers’ in that they have come to re-occupy land that had been previously cleared for white immigrants. Thus, they were re-settling back onto land the Tonga had once lost. Some even bought farms very close to the areas their parents had once farmed prior to their forced relocation. Yet, since then, many other African farmers have begun to settle and gain private title in areas that have opened up through the relocation of local populations (both coordinated by the state and independently arranged through customary chiefs). The term ‘African Settlers’, however, could be deceiving as it might easily conjure images of various white African settlers on the continent. The term ‘Tonga Settlers’ is also insufficient as some came from Zimbabwe, Tanzania and elsewhere to take part in new settlements in which Tonga people were predominant.
commercial farmer class and how had that relationship changed with political and economic transitions? Does the depletion of cattle herds in Southern Province illustrate the impact of neoliberal economic policies on indigenous commercial farmers? Furthermore, how has the relationship between the state and the biophysical environment in the country altered over time? How does that history cast doubt on the assumptions and claims about human motives, the Tonga farmers, and African peasants that are embedded in the neoliberal models? Did these farms represent capitalist enterprises and did neoliberal policy open new opportunities for them to succeed? Did the Tonga commercializing farmers re-invest surpluses in a manner that expanded the local economy and contributed toward the development of tertiary industries? Based on the answers to these questions we can perhaps draw some lessons for future policy formation concerning resource management and responses to processes of ecological change.

Who are the Tonga Commercial Farmers?

The Tonga are an amorphous group originating in the Southern Province of Zambia between the Kafue and Zambezi rivers. Archeological evidence suggests they are one of the few social groupings in the country whose ancestors’ presence in the territory extends back to the early Iron age. The earliest known Tonga people lived along the floodwaters of the Kafue river where nutrient-rich alluvial deposits extend as deep as 250 feet (ibid, Fagan, 1966: 91-92). They are one of the largest ethnic groups in Zambia, and while there are significant regional variations, they are linked by a common language structure and material culture initially based on shifting cultivation. Their social systems are highly decentralized and chiefs were without political powers before the coming of the British. In the colonial era the greatest variation existed between those living on the Plateau and those living in the Gwembe Valley, alongside the Zambezi River.
The Tonga living on the Plateau were a somewhat privileged group in the colonial process largely because they became early targets of energetic missionaries intent on supporting the development of a peasantry. Early in the century, Tonga people living within 30 kilometres of the railway line between the towns of Livingstone and Lusaka were displaced to make way for white settlers. In turn, the colonial government initiated development schemes to placate portions of the population and introduce some of their members into the new economy on a privileged basis. It was, in a sense, a class-collaborationist strategy that differed significantly from processes taking place in Southern Rhodesia where the settler population was much larger and acquired land from populations that had been more thoroughly dispossessed. Southern Rhodesian settler farms were much larger (often four or more times so) and were more intent on maintaining racial segregation.4

The land from which Tonga people were forcibly removed was deemed “crown land” and subject to 100-year leaseholds that were sold to white settlers, in some cases given as part of a retirement bonus for decommissioned military officers from the United Kingdom. ‘Crown land’ could be bought and sold (see figure 1). At the same time, most Tonga people were relegated to ‘reserves’, which were subject to laws of the “Native Authority”, an imposed chieftaincy system, as established under the policy of indirect rule. In the case of the Tonga, this coincided with the creation of political powers for chiefs that had not previously existed. Not all cleared land was in fact taken up by settlers, as was hoped, and this led to resentment and contestation among the Tonga people living in the vicinity. Resentment was partly due to the fact that the reserve land was subject to significant population pressure and contained land inferior for cultivation. As a result, resettlement schemes were initiated by the colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s. At independence, crown land became ‘state land’ but leaseholds from the colonial era carried over. At the same time, efforts were made to

help black Africans purchase some of the plots that lay vacant or were placed for sale by their white owners.

A significant aspect of Zambia’s history is that tensions between white settlers and Zambians were not nearly as pronounced as in other parts of the continent. This relationship has important aspects.⁵ Late in the colonial period, some of the earlier white settlers had already decided to leave – many heading to Southern Rhodesia where it was evident white dominance would be maintained longer. Many of those who arrived as settlers had fled persecution and challenging conditions in their homeland. As a result, many had sympathies with Africans facing discrimination. In Southern Province, productive inter-racial alliances formed, making it a very different case from Zimbabwe and South Africa, which faced greater levels of institutionalized racism (or at least, had larger white populations to impose their racist social designs). As a result, among the Tonga, there was less animosity held toward white neighbours except when disagreements related to hunting rights in traditional lands. In the case of hunting, Tonga people tended to resent wildlife conservation regulations and see them as being driven by white Zambians against the interests of the majority. None of this is to say that Zambia is free of racial animosities; far from it. Yet the most racist of the white settler population left at independence and in turn vacated state land that would come to be purchased and settled by black Zambians.

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⁵ For a rich account of the political implications of this fact see Bizeck Phiri’s *A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic*, Asmara: Africa World Press, especially chapters 2 and 4
Figure 1, Farming Regions in Zambia

Figure 2. Map of Zambia, Relief. 2001

Map courtesy of the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency
In the colonial era Tonga agriculturalists seen as more ‘progressive’ in their methods of production were also explicitly seen as subjects who would be amenable to an experiment in trying to create an indigenous capitalist class.\textsuperscript{6} This was the case, in part because the Tonga had early exposure to tilling technologies introduced by Jesuit and Seventh Day Adventist missionaries (Vickery, 1978, Snelson, 1974, Peters, 1976). Moreover, the Tonga were perceived to have a culture of ‘independence’ and individualism, considered necessary for replacing kin-based land tenure patterns and modes of tribute and reciprocity. The process of

\textsuperscript{6} ‘Experiment’ is actually the word used by colonial officials, S. Gore-Browne, L.W.G. Eccles and S.J. Moffat in 1946, *Report of the Native Land Tenure Committee, Mazabuka District*, p.5
reallocating land then provided a model, adopted by the post-independence government, which continued with various resettlement schemes into the 1970s and was again re-adopted in the 1990s as part of the MMD’s privatization agenda. The settlement schemes initially focused on providing to market-oriented agricultural producers finance, infrastructure such as depots, education, marketing and extension services. Many of the schemes were coordinated by a state-managed, but privately funded development organization incorporated under the name ‘Family Farms’.

After independence, official policy was informed by the vague philosophy of ‘humanism’ espoused by the first president, Kenneth Kaunda. While this philosophy drew, at times, on the rhetoric of “African Socialism”, the broader policy setting in the first 30 years of independence also supported the provision of financial and infrastructural support toward emerging capitalist farmers.⁷ There have been four main points of justification for these policies. First, it was assumed that large-scale farmers would be more capable of utilizing capital intensive technologies to improve production and, in doing so, increase overall food supply in the country. Secondly, it was felt they would also venture into new export markets that would bring greater foreign currency into the country and as a result allow the country to buy greater quantities of food imports to make up for shortfalls. Third, it was believed that by utilizing new technologies these farmers would be introducing techniques that would then be adopted by the broader majority of peasant farmers. Thus, they would play a role in technology transfer between wealthy capitalist agricultural countries and lesser developed regions. An added justification behind this was that African farmers had been kept out of markets through unfair institutional structures such as marketing boards that were constructed to protect and enrich white farmers during the colonial period. Thus, allowing black Africans to occupy wealthy social strata in agribusiness was justified as a reformist measure countering

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⁷ socialist organizations and socialist propaganda were in fact outlawed from 1965, “Zambia Bans Red Publications” New York Times, Feb 13, 1965, p. 50
unequal structures left by colonial society. In the colonial era, the creation of a Tonga capitalist agricultural class had been a means of managing the ‘respectable african middle class’ already searching for land close to towns. Some believed, these arrangements would also provide an opportunity for insulating the farms of whites from the “lesser men” within the reserves.\(^8\)

Both the relationship of Tonga agriculturalists to the colonial administration and the subsequent policy direction of the post-colonial state provided the basis for the emergence of the farmers identified by Allan, Gluckman, Peters, Trapnell (1948) Colson (1958, 1959), Dixon-Fyle (1977, 1978, 1985). Many were seen as specifically ‘capitalist’ farmers (Vickery, 1978, 1986, Baylies, 1979, Momba, 1982, Chipungu, 1988). Little has been written, however, about the role eventually played by this class in food production and in the regional economy. Nor has there been any documentation of the experiences of this ‘emerging’ class throughout the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Moreover, if such a class existed, there has been little investigation of the relationship between this emerging capitalist farming class and a wider indigenous business class whose early stages of formation were documented by Gertzel, Szefelt and Baylies (1984). Furthermore, nobody has examined the role Tonga ‘emerging’ farmers played in the return to multi-party elections in 1991 and whether they held material interests in the transition and how they fared in the following process of liberalization and privatization.

**A Unique Physical Setting**

The ecological conditions surrounding the Kafue Flats created particularly favourable conditions for rapid accumulation among members of the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church, who then were able to capitalize at a greater rate than their peers. Following

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annexation of Northern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company (BSAC)\textsuperscript{9}, families on the plateau that were previously forced to live in fortified housing could then take their cattle out to the flats with a much greater sense of security from raiding. In 1980 Colson described it as providing “magnificent pasturage for cattle and herds of game” (Colson, 1980: 602). This is also likely the reason it holds some of the oldest archeological sites in the region, displaying a past society with significant levels of settlement and artistic material culture. The ample access to green grass allowed cattle to grow healthy and produce rich milk. Those not yet pregnant were in perfect condition to become so, at the very same time that bulls could not be easily penned into a corral to keep them apart from the females.\textsuperscript{10} Lactation is difficult when there is little water and adequate nutrition for the cattle to drink. In response the cows stop ovulating. Those herders with access to the flats benefited from a natural rhythm to breeding around which to arrange other tasks of husbandry. Birthing, inoculation, dehorning (if done at all), and culling/marketing would be more likely to take place in unison, rationalizing the use of seasonal labour. Moreover, the cycle would have been in the opposite seasonal cycle to those without access to the flats, whose cattle instead suffered throughout the dry season. In years of poorer rainfall, Tonga as far south as Mapanza and as far east as Mwanza and Siajalika took part in the transhumance migration (Vickery, 1986: 155).

Bweengwa lies at the Southern side of the Kafue River in a central portion of the Kafue flats that is a point of confluence of three Tonga subgroups. Colson claims that in the colonial era it was nearly impossible to determine fixed boundaries between these groupings (Colson 1959; 33, 1948). Today, on the North Side of the river lies territory of the Sala and Lenje people while the Ila-Tonga are mostly further to the East, though there is significant fluidity between all groups. Some informants from Bweengwa do claim to be half Ila (The Tonga

\textsuperscript{9} This was a gradual process, beginning with the Barotse concession to Cecil Rhodes in 1890, a formal agreement with the Lozi King, Lewenika in 1898, but without having much much impact on the Tonga Plateau until after 1904 (Phiri, 2006: 9, Tindall, 1968:190-191, Wills, 1967: 166, 193-223).

\textsuperscript{10} I never heard of any farmers/ranchers in ‘traditional’ lands that separated bulls, though many told me that the cows come back healthy and pregnant.
language has been divided into as many as 12 separate groupings though the distinctions are difficult to define). In 1930 a Catholic missionary, J. Torrend, at Chikuni Mission categorized the languages of the Tonga, Ila and Lenje as “Bantu-Batotwe”. This categorization informed an emerging nationalist mythology in which the three groups are seen to be the first “true” Zambians (Macola, 2010:87). This discourse became associated with the first party mobilizing for independence, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), which was then banned in 1971. Thus, authoritarian tendencies within UNIP were directed into anti-Tonga sentiments (Macola, 2010: 116-17). These sentiments continue to be mobilized in new ways in the new millennium, even though based on a highly partial and problematic historiography that occludes the complex histories of many groups living in the vicinity of the Kafue river.

The Tonga made a shift toward petty commodity production very early and rapidly in the colonial experience. In fact, it was possibly one of the most rapid agricultural transformations in human history. Chipungu notes that in this process:

> the combination of technology and topography appears to have played a critical role in the generation and perpetuation of differentiation within the peasantry by the 1930s. The wealthy, middle and poor peasants became remarkably discrete economic categories responding differently to pressures of the colonial market (Chipungu, 1988: 48)

While differentiation was evident, Chipungu describes common features, such as their “transitional” position in the economy insofar as they had “not completely broken away from pre-capitalist agricultural system and its related norms, values and practices”. Land tenure had not altered and they still relied on family labour. Moreover, the colonial administration was using the village unit, rather than individual plot as its smallest unit in planning agricultural change. Thus, differentiation did not immediately result in separate residential areas for the larger peasants. In the 1930s they built brick houses, but stayed within the same villages as their poorer neighbours (Chipungu, 1988: 49). By the 1940s Allan finds them building apart, a point echoed in Colson and Scudder (Allan et al, 1948, Scudder, 1980). Topography was such a significant feature in determining the prosperity of the peasants that the Tonga term
*kumalundu* (mountainous area) came to have derogatory connotations of backwardness (Chipungu, 1988: 48). If topography was a factor in determining differentiation then Bweengwa had the advantage of being on the edge of the flattest area in Tonga territory.

**Figure 4. Map, Tribal and Linguistic groups of Zambia**

![Map of Zambia showing tribal and linguistic groups](image)

Source: photo taken by author from government document at Choma Museum.

The Kafue Flats are an extensive area of wetlands and floodplains along the Kafue River covering around 6,500 km². The land, as the name implies, is extremely flat, with a slope of less than 5 cm/km (Schelle and Pittock, 2005). In many places, for much of the year, it appears like a bare sports field carrying on to the horizon in all directions, broken up only by the periodic lonesome tree, usually there to mark a family’s customary claim to the area during the dry season. During the rainy season the river breaks its bank and disperses to form a wide lake. The lake is fed by a catchment area covering 152,000 km², beginning in the highlands on the border with the Congo where rainfall averages around 1100mm per year, dropping to between 600-900mm annually in Southern Province. All the rains arrive within a four-month
period between December and April. To place it in comparison, rainfall is about equal in volume annually to that of a temperate city like Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, which has its precipitation dispersed throughout the entire year. The volume of water that flows into this area, before joining the Zambezi, is often enormous, washing away roads and bridges in the process. Yet these averages represent dramatic fluctuations from year to year with a close relationship between the Southern oscillations of surface air temperatures in the Indian Ocean that roughly fluctuates between cold and hot over a 5-year period. In years of El Nino (warming) there is drought while the opposite occurs in years of La Nina (Yatagai, 2010).

Table 1. Annual Precipitation Cycles, Choma, Lusaka and Livingston, 1978-2006

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Choma</th>
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Source: Yatagai, 2010

In the dry season the water gradually retreats from the Kafue Flats, depositing renewed nutrients that fertilize green grasses that last until the next rains arrive. The flats are recognized as a major wetland resource with rare and endemic species such as Kafue Lechwe, *Kobus leche kafuensis*, and Wattled Crane, *Bugeranus carunculatus* (ibid). In 1971 and 1978 two hydroelectric dams were constructed, down and up stream respectively, which
altered the timing of the seasonal flow as well as the surface area of the floodplain having a number of consequences for the people whose livelihood is dependent upon it.

**Figure 5. Map, Kafue Flats**

Bweengwa is on the South Side near the downward protruding dendritic portion to the East of “Lochinvar Park”. Note that this photo includes the location of the dams, constructed in the 1970s. Source: World Wildlife Fund.
Figure 6. Map, Kafue Flats with Linguistic Groups

Source: Haller and Merton, 2008: 702, (C. Furrer, based on S. Merton)

Figure 7. Photograph, Kafue Lechwe on the flats

Red lechwe crossing a hippo creek on the flats in July 2008, with fishing canoes and a wattled crane in the background. As the water retreats, the area in the foreground will turn into lush grassland. Fishing access to the river is maintained.
by hippo traffic that digs creeks through the mud. This indicates the close economic relationship between humans and wildlife - certainly frustrating when hippos are also the deadliest animals in the country, having a tendency to tip boats and randomly attack humans. Photo by author, 2008

As with other areas surrounding the flats, Bwengwa at the turn of the century was mostly free of tsetse flies, the vector for trypanosomiasis. However, ongoing raids from the Lozi peoples to the West, and the Makololo and Ndebele from the South throughout the 19th century left few cattle in the area (Colson, 1949: 4). People lived in round mud thatch huts in small-dispersed stockaded villages to protect themselves from the raids, which continued until the Ndebele were forcibly subdued (if not conquered) by the British near the end of the 19th century. The last decade of the 19th century was also disastrous ecologically, with locust attacks, droughts and rinderpest. As a result, cattle had been extremely rare, leading people to pay bride wealth in hoes, goats, sheep or bead (ibid, Dixon-Fyle, 1983). A significant portion of the Tonga population went into migrancy in search of work in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (Vickery, 1986: 54) We know that following the conquest, however, people built up their herds within a decade because they were found with them when missionaries arrived in the area in the first decade of the 20th century. By 1913 cattle lending was taking place and “by 1916 two beast were commonly included as part of the bridewealth, and the number rose to four, five and more in the rest of the colonial period” (ibid: 153).
Figure 8. Map, Southern Province Chieftaincies

Source: Dixon-Fyle, 1977
Methodology

This study seeks to assess the changing relationship between Tonga commercial farmers and the state in Southern Province of Zambia. This is related to the changing relations between humans and the land on the portions of the Tonga Plateau that now comprise state land. In this way the study is influenced by environmental histories that have sought to understand the ways human institutions evolve amidst various environmental constraints, opportunities, ideological contexts and geo-political realities. To these ends I have adopted three methods of historical research. First, I have reviewed the extensive secondary literature. Secondly, I undertook archival research on primary documents from colonial and post-colonial collections. Lastly, I conducted semi-structured interviews and farm tours with farmers and their families, agricultural officers, traders and business people, politicians, and farm employees. Much of the data was gathered in 2007 and 2008 during two separate research trips. In 2007, I spent three months examining archival documents at the Zambian National Archives, the Special Collections at the University of Zambia and the records of the Zambian National Farmer’s Union (ZNFU). I also spent a week in Monze where I met with local representatives of the ZNFU, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, local farmers and headmen. When I returned in 2008 I undertook a survey of farmers, politicians, state employees and industry representatives throughout Choma, Monze and in Central Province. In total I gathered evidence from 166 formal, semi-structured interviews of varying length. In some cases I spent many hours on people’s farms and/or stayed overnight. In other cases I stayed for only an hour and a half, or I arranged to meet them at an urban location.

11 See Appendix Items 1-3 for evidence of ethics approval and sample of questionnaire. The latter was translated into chiTonga for instances where it was necessary and there were separate versions for Male title-holders, Male workers, Female title-holders, workers and for those who had moved out of Southern Province. They were in any case, only rough guides and in most instances discussion strayed beyond the topics of the questionnaire. Queen’s University approval from the General Research Ethics Board. Romeo # 6003641.
I have already shown that “progressive”, “emerging” or commercializing plateau Tonga farmers have been the subjects of multiple academic studies. Allan et al. (1948), Baylies (1978), Colson (1951, 1952, 1953), Chipungu (1988), Dixon-Fyle (1977, 1983), Hellen (1968), Momba (1982) and Vickery (1986) detail significant aspects of plateau Tonga agricultural history. Baylies and Momba provide fascinating class analysis that utilizes impressive efforts at gathering quantitative data on Tonga material life. Colson’s studies are anthropological and based on Tonga people in ‘traditional’ or reserve lands. Chipungu, Hellen, and Vickery all look at early processes of modernization of Tonga agriculture, as people are increasingly brought within the sphere of a global capitalist imperial system. These latter studies are particularly strong in their use of archival evidence. Vickery and, to a lesser extent, Dixon-Fyle, Momba and Baylies rely on qualitative methods based on extensive oral testimony. Yet, it is remarkable that in this literature the direct testimony of farmers themselves is rarely presented in any form beyond the length of a sentence.

When reading the above works it is often challenging to imagine people’s daily life and the meanings they ascribe to their economic activities. Colson offers wonderful detail on material practices as she found them in some villages in the 1950s, and yet so few voices of people actually filter through. This is the case largely because her method was to not take notes while conducting interviews, but instead she would write out everything she remembered when she returned home at the end of the day (her books and articles are largely without citations). Voices of women and workers are even more difficult to find in these studies. Moreover, one cannot sufficiently discern differences among those farming on state land versus those in the reserves. On top of these absences there is a large window of time in

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12 This is based on a personal, informal communication during one of the times I stayed with her in Monze. There are significant problems in adopting this method, yet, Colson garners enormous respect both among Tonga people and among faculty at the University of Zambia. She has, without reservation, been accepted as the most authoritative figure on Tonga history and culture. This methodology allowed her to focus her attention on interpersonal communication and develop rapport with informants that provided her with an extremely intimate perspective. Her most recent work, *Tonga Religious Life in the Twentieth Century* provides clear evidence of an unmatched depth of comprehension of the subject.
which no studies examined the plight of the Tonga farmers who were the recipients of earlier
development initiatives. Yet this period was without doubt one of significant change as the
country experienced a protracted global recession and nearly two decades of neoliberal
structural adjustment policies (SAPs).

The realities of the period under study are difficult to gauge from the most easily
accessible sources. There are, for example, numerous reasons to question the validity of
statistics produced since independence. Zambia’s Central Statistics Office (CSO) is staffed by
many professional and capable statisticians, yet there are cases where the data they rely on
has been simply made up rather than collected. This has occurred historically when
departments were lacking the resources to collect the data demanded of them. It has also
occurred because funds have been personally appropriated. I have witnessed contract staff of
international organizations make enormous departures from established methods in gathering
the actual data to be compiled and analyzed. People working private contracts are sometimes
lecturers at the University of Zambia and dodge their teaching duties to undertake contract
their time waiting for missing professors of this sort. Morten Jerven (2013) details a variety of
problems in data collection among African countries, with Zambia forming one of the core
cases in his study. Most concerning are the problems with baseline data estimates that then
are used to judge changes over time. There are inconsistencies in the ways GDP is
aggregated over time, and differing currency measurements are often not corrected for. There
are no price benchmark studies. As Jerven explains: “Statistics on African economies are
widely known to be inaccurate, but the extent and nature of these inaccuracies and their
implications for the users of the data have not been rigorously assessed” (2013, 20-30).
Yet regardless of the quality of the data collected, they can support reductionist conceptions of class relations that simply differentiate between grades of peasantry and farmer, worker, petty-bourgeoisie and capitalist enterprise. A growing body of literature on Zambia shows that social relations are extraordinarily complex and display significant variation. I found this to be the case among agro-pastoralists on state land. According to plans devised in the late colonial era, they were supposed to be moving toward a clear pattern of household production increasingly capitalized and supported by waged labour. However, this has not been borne out. The household cannot be turned into an easily legible unit. Variation and flux are the norm. That is to say, many come and go from the property from different relationship avenues. Overlapping economic activities are taking place. Gender, generational and neighbourhood fractures exist. Sibling and family rivalries can be deadly, especially around inheritance. These are difficult things to capture in figures.

Oral history can be an excellent source to augment or challenge existing data. There are many concerns about the use of oral testimony in the discipline of history. Nevertheless, there are some very compelling reasons to make use of it here. The most significant is that, for a great deal of the post-independence period, there are few reliable sources with respect to Tonga farmers. Record-keeping has been generally very poor. This is not to dismiss the important work that has been done in preserving some archives in Zambia. Yet often the records that could support a study as specific as this were unavailable. For example, I would have greatly appreciated court records relating to issues of land squatting, cattle theft and property claims. In many cases, sufficient records were not kept. When they were, they had not been maintained with sufficient organization. Government buildings were often lacking sufficient space to store old records and as a result many were often stacked up in hallways and even in bathrooms. Added to this, the number of government employees had greatly

14 The creation of the UNIP archive has been very significant, even though its access is highly restricted (and should be brought into the National Archives). I made use of an archive at the Zambia National Farmer’s Union as well as the National Archives of Zambia.
decreased due to retrenchments in the 1990s while many also died (often very young). After numerous visits to Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives offices, Offices of the Land Board and Municipal offices I eventually gave up and spent my time in the field.

The first generation of Tonga farmers that settled back onto state land is a historical resource we are gradually losing. Many who were still alive in 2008 were often older than 80 and for this reason my priority was to gather testimony from them. Historians making use of oral history put themselves in a complex situation. Everyone who tells their story has hidden motivations influencing their narratives. The present circumstance of informants also has an enormous bearing on the ways they reconstruct the past. Memory is a complex topic in its own right, sufficiently so to deserve academic journals specifically addressing that topic alone. The past is literally alive in the present. Yet for that reason, walks on the property, examining photos and old machinery, the types of trees planted and evidence of their age all helps to calibrate testimony. The houses of former settlers could usually be found on a landscape by searching for the tall eucalyptus, or ‘gum’ trees that were so popular with the British. An orchard filled with failing citrus trees with sour fruit can reveal a time when there were aspirations for better irrigation facilities and more access to fertilizers. Most prominently, there are the old red-brick tobacco furnaces decaying throughout the area between Monze and Kalomo. The landscape itself tells stories if we look for them.

The most striking part of oral history gathering in this instance however, was the fact that I was speaking to people in a moment of decline. Nostalgia is, in part, the sentiment of the past having been better than the present. Emotions associated with nostalgia make people prone to romanticize the past as something it wasn’t. There are many very good reasons for capitalist-oriented farmers in Southern Province to hold fond memories of the past. Very significant achievements were made and most people have personal stories of hardship during the colonial period as well as stories of sacrifice in the struggle for independence. Following independence the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government made efforts to
establish or extend state infrastructure that would benefit all Zambians. It was a moment of pride, self-respect and optimism. However, the problem nostalgia poses is that people do not remember the numerous concerns they had once complained of (and they have a difficult time thinking negatively of Kenneth Kaunda, even though many of the same informants were in constant opposition). From the late 1970s people became extremely frustrated with the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard) (Good, 1996, Klepper, 1979). They were constantly frustrated by the poor timing in distribution of seed and other inputs, and with late payments for produce sold. They hated not having enough products to purchase and they disliked queuing to purchase commodities. Many became frustrated with the costs that the wars with Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and South Africa were placing on their economy. Most importantly, within Southern Province there was a perception that the political interests of farmers were constantly sidelined in national priorities.

Oral testimonies can also be rife with inaccuracy. Andrew Roberts, for example, found it impossible to find consistent evidence in support of popular origin and migration stories among the Bemba. In this instance, however, Roberts was addressing oral traditions and not recent history. Nevertheless, as Vansina notes, “eyewitness accounts are always a personal experience as well and involve not only perception, but also emotions” (Vansina, 5). Witnesses are also often participants in the events, while their understanding of what happened is based on their own interpretation of limited data. “Perceptions must be organized into a coherent whole and the logic of the situation supplies missing pieces of observation” (ibid). Moreover, memory and emotional state further shape an account, mediating one’s perception and over time memory proves to be quite malleable and subject to distortion. A growing literature in cognitive science provides increasing evidence of the particular types of memory distortions

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15 Andrew Roberts (1973) A History of the Bemba: Political Growth and Change in North-Eastern Zambia Before 1900
16 as Vansina (1985) notes, “The expression ‘oral tradition’ applies both to a process and to its products. The products are oral messages based on previous oral messages, at least a generation old.” Oral Tradition as History, University of Wisconsin Press, 3
and suggests they may play important adaptive functions by allowing us to insert new, helpful information into memories of past events - perhaps in order to aid us in moments where recall is necessary (Strange and Takarangi, 2015, Schacter, Guerin and St. Jaques, 2011). It would be a mistake, therefore, to suggest data of this sort is without value. If perceptions of the world are mediated and structured through language then stories can become as much a part of historical experience as more material bases of reality.

As Luise White has shown in Zimbabwe and Kenya (1997, 2000), rumors and historical fictions can also provide important insights into lived realities and popular sentiments at the time. Sometimes even seemingly wild rumors can be rooted in rational thought while the outsider lacks sufficient local knowledge of the context they emerge within. Johnson found this to be the case when he examined a case of non-cooperation with government veterinary programs among Mbeza cattle-owners in the midst of an outbreak of cattle disease on the Kafue Flats in 1957-58. Rumors had spread that government vaccinations were actually intended to poison cattle and in the process would help the white settlers appropriate more Tonga land. At the time government considered them to be a result of “evil-minded” superstition. Johnson shows that this suspicion was not only a product of anti-government resentment leading into the independence struggle, but also based on a previous case of vaccinations against foot and mouth actually killing cattle in Mazabuka in 1934, years earlier. Moreover, the government was unaware of local cattle-rearing practices that had until then helped keep their animals largely free of disease. Without knowledge of these things the government allowed the incident to reinforce inaccurate perceptions of Tonga pastoralists as ignorant. As Johnson argues, the rumor turned out to be quite logical within particular parameters (Johnson, 1995).

In Uganda, Justin Willis (1996) found inconsistencies in the testimonies of his informants who had altered their statements about their ethnic identity over time. He eventually came to believe the alterations themselves offered significant insight on the society more
broadly, which before colonial time never held rigid notions of ethnicity. Thus, one’s identity could itself maintain fluidity between respective groups, depending on context (325). In the present, there is a sense that social categories are more rigid, yet when people talk about the past, they give details that suggest more historical fluidity. People can struggle to fit details of the past into contemporary language and constructs. Therefore, dissonance can reveal social tensions and change across time.

There are various reasons informants may lie or at least rely on hearsay from questionable sources. Tonga people claim to be understated and are therefore less likely to exaggerate. I can think of many instances where this belief does not hold, for example, when men boast (truthfully or not) that they are promiscuous “Tonga Bulls”. Nevertheless, information pertaining to personal hardship is often kept quiet and surfaces only after a level of comfort is established and the informant is specifically pressed on the matter. For example, Tonga customs mean people are reluctant or slow to volunteer information about deaths in the family or financial misfortune. People are also likely to hide wealth. While people obtain status and security from their cattle, they also do not necessarily wish to distinguish themselves from others. It can make them appear greedy and relatives might interpret the farm owner as lapsing on obligations while many others go hungry. More worrisome is the sense they could become a target of witchcraft or murder as jealous members of their family or wider community may seek to benefit from inheritance of wealth, office, or simply authority within the family or broader community. As Colson writes:

homestead and village, under human control, are also the hotbed of such human emotions as envy, jealousy, malice and ambition which turn its inhabitants into the witches who prey upon their kin and other close associates in a desire for revenge or a willingness to use other people to their own ends. Divinations attribute most misfortunes to the ambitions and rivalries of those who live together. Again and again through the years I have been told by close friends, “You don’t understand. You think we are good, but we have envy (munyuno). We kill each other.” (Colson, 2006: 108)
Cattle-owners seek a careful balance in this political economy and these tensions no doubt play out in the ways people think of their past and talk about their family members, neighbours, politicians and acquaintances of all kinds.

Due to the nature of the interviews and their circumstances, the resulting data is incomplete in many categories. In my interviews I sought to establish friendly relationships with the respondents and wanted stories to emerge with little prodding. In this way I often gained interesting insights I may have otherwise missed, yet it also means that sometimes their narratives did not resolve all my questions or produce answers that are easy to quantify.

Testimonies inevitably reflect aspects of power relations. A male farm owner will obviously perceive things differently than a son, wife or worker. I was particularly interested in the ways power relations are reflected in the ideas of respondents. Keeping in mind the limitations of oral history, my primary goal in the following chapters is simply to allow more voices of Tonga people to be given prominence in a written history. I make efforts to substantiate or evaluate claims of respondents with additional sources, but regardless of the relativity of truth, I am interested in the ways people structure their worlds, how their opinions are ideologically driven and how these ideologies perpetuate contradictory social relations. That being said, I only use individual cases when they reflect an issue of broader relevance and seem representative.

For clues into Tonga life I am not simply interested in potential truth claims of informants, but in the types of statements that get repeated, such that they indicate an ideological framework in which people operate. It is these statements that give insights into people’s ‘common sense’ understanding of the world. ‘Common sense’ in the Gramscian understanding of the term is bound to occlude pieces and to be rife with internal contradictions (Harvey, 2006: 84). It is clear that many of my informants remember the past selectively, but the reasons they do so are not so easily dismissed as the work of liars – though they certainly may be. These narratives also communicate some important things about the present.
Ideological and epistemological questions can muddy the waters even further. Claims of witchcraft may reveal alternate claims to reality, attempts to comprehend the world with the tools people have available to them, or they may serve to obfuscate much more material and observable causes for the phenomenon they refer to. In this way, they can reflect underlying tensions over power imbalances within household, village and society. Likewise I am also interested in the ways memory and emotion play into people’s experience. In 2008 nostalgia was a prominent influence in people’s sense of the past. It allowed them to remember selectively, but this was also a reflection of the present and the changes that had taken place over the past decades.

In addition to these complexities there can be many questions about how my own class, gender and racial position factor into the interview process. These are not things that can be wished away and they clearly in some instances place limits on the kinds of information I can obtain, while in others offer license. I took these things into account in both the ways I designed the study and the ways interviews and information gathering took place. My interviews were primarily among the prominent individuals that obtained private titled land after independence. This cannot, therefore, be considered a truly popular history as it focuses on the most privileged Black Africans in Zambia’s Southern Province. Although these informants are privileged, they are so in a geographic area and economic sector that has in many ways been politically and economically neglected within the post-colonial state, in a country that is very peripheral in the global economy.

The fact my informants were privileged, however, eliminates many of the possible power-dynamics involved because they were, in general, much wealthier than I am. Certainly

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18 For an example of the latter; Tonga would be more willing to reveal negative attitudes about other ethnic groups to me than they would to another non-Tonga Zambian.

19 Elizabeth Colson explained to me that the same was true for her when she started doing research in the area “When I came here in 1946 people there were richer than I was. I had a few books stored with my parents...a
they may have felt they had something to gain from my presence. In most cases informants were quite pleased to spend time talking with me. I found the only times people hesitated was when there was significant reason for me to believe they could have been implicated in theft of public funds. Most of the people I spoke to claimed those who stole were the anomaly and not “the real farmers” or “not really Tonga”. Aside from a couple of people that dodged me, most were very keen to tell their stories, feeling their history had been largely and unjustifiably absent from the world stage. Surely they were interested in glorifying their successes, but people tended also to be very reasonable in assessing their mistakes. The eldest often looked on their lives stoically, trying to account for the achievements and the very obvious shortfalls. Most informants really seemed to want their grandchildren to succeed in ways they had not.

I also sought various ways to obtain information about life on Tonga farms from other sources. I had permission to bring research assistants onto farms in order for them to also interview staff and other family members. I interviewed neighbors, family members, politicians and government agricultural officers as well. I often had the chance to talk with senior wives and female heads of households who provided some of the most fascinating perspectives on changes over the past 60 years or more. For a variety of reasons the most difficult people to obtain interviews with were the poorest and youngest women. This is the greatest weakness of my data, though it is not completely void of information from these sources.

My position as a white academic from a Canadian university would of course have an impact on the ways farmers perceived me, and therefore also the types of responses I would receive. The colonial experience in Southern Africa is inseparable from ideologies of white supremacy. It was viciously degrading and must be understood as one of the most horrendous events in human history, especially when one considers the longer legacy of the slave trade.

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typewriter. I never felt superior to them. They were better off than I was. Students said we were looking down on them. You certainly weren’t in the 1940s… on the other hand, they thought we had contacts that they could use.” Colson (2008) Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 11, Monze
The British attempted to distance themselves from these processes after 1830, and repositioned themselves as supposed liberators who enforced the demise of the institution on the continent. The reality, however, was that following the decline of the Atlantic slave trade they reinstituted slavery within their colonies in a number of ways. If not enslaved, many faced dispossession and racial domination in every aspect of life (Rodney, 1972, 92-113, 205-238). I cannot escape the baggage I arrive with and it indelibly impacts the ways people engage with me.

That being said, I would suggest that my whiteness had a smaller bearing on the data than the historical realities deserve. As far as colonial experiences go, the Tonga in particular do not hold the same levels of animosity toward white settlers found in other parts of the continent. While there was anger at the whites having taken their land and benefiting from much more wealth and social power, their arrival in Zambia also brought the end of warfare and raiding from the Lozi and Ndebele. This allowed the Tonga to continue with their farming in relative ‘independence’. The amount of land taken by the state was also very limited in comparison with colonial Kenya or Southern Rhodesia. The Tonga hated the discrimination they experienced in shops and in the agricultural market during the colonial years, but that was partly because they wanted the same things as the whites: access to markets and quality manufactured goods. They saw certain affinities and to a limited degree people appreciate the whites that stayed while also feeling that the most blatantly racist among them chose to leave.

With so many interconnected and often hidden factors complicating access to meaningful knowledge it can be intimidating for one to simply try to be descriptive, in part because circumstances are actually so complex they are difficult to unify with theory. It is in fact extremely difficult to figure out where to start. I worry that any standpoint will inherently do an injustice to all the other possible experiences one could examine, relegating them to secondary status at best. Here Kate Crehan’s *The Fractured Community: Landscapes of Power and Gender in Rural Zambia* comes to mind as a study that reveals the dialectics of
daily life as it is fractured by people’s ongoing performance of gender, generational, class and regional cleavages (Crehan, 1997). The various fractures described by Crehan are particularly dramatic in the neoliberal era within which she observed populations in North-Western Zambia, however, it’s very unlikely they are something new. The colonial experience ushered in a number of contradictory processes that define the modern experience in Africa. The very unevenness of colonial influence is itself a product of modernity. The dramatic arrival of an ‘industrial revolution’ in Northern Rhodesia, as described by Ferguson (1999), coincided with a corresponding process of re-constructing the realm of the ‘traditional’. Tonga people themselves reveal simultaneous tendencies toward ‘conservativism’ while also embracing enormous and very rapid change. Ideological processes, and the limits of memory, allow for the erasure of history so that new circumstances can then become defined as ‘tradition’.

These are not the only ways that contradictions of capitalism structured people’s lives. In oral testimonies people often described their experience over the last 20 years as being “like we are going backwards”. Perhaps this is because new processes of accumulation take place at the expense of the dispossession of others. Yet I will argue that there is also a Polanyian-style ‘double-movement’ of sorts, in which the expansion of market forces has had such harmful effects on people’s lives that new institutions are being constructed to fend off their most harmful effects (Polanyi, 2001: 3,42, 136-137, 156). Following ten painful years under Chiluba’s neoliberal assault, the MMD government of Levi Mwanawasa with the aid of World Bank advisors was grappling to try and rebuild new marketing structures. In 2011 the government of Rupia Banda even launched a 6th national development plan, suggesting the cycle continues.

20 Mutoloki, Chilala (2008) Interview with Toby Moorsom, 20/05/08 Mr. Mutoloki was mid-to-late 40s, perhaps in his 50s. Interview took place on the 594 hectare farm belonging to the father. The operation fell into disrepair when rains were bad, the father had become ill and more than 400 cattle died of Corridor disease. The roof of the old colonial house had recently fallen in. His household was living in a structure designed for housing workers, which was common on TBZ land near Kalomo. It consists of a half-pipe shelter made from asbestos roofing. His family was one of 7 households living on the farm. Herbert Mwansa, uses the same phrase. Born in 1954, in the UNIP days he worked for the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, though in 2008 worked for the foreign aid supported, Agricultural Services Project. Interview with Toby Moorsom, 08/06/11
This study is concerned with power and the ways it becomes structured into ecology in ways that harm some and privilege others. For this reason, I consider this to be an examination in political ecology in the way that Peet and Watts have described as “a confluence between ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy” (1996: 6). Yet it is further, an attempt “to understand the complex relations between nature and society through a careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control over resources and their implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods” (Watts, 2000: 257, see also Robbins, 2012: 16-17).21

Ultimately I will engage with theory that brings some coherence to the testimonies and I will show how amidst these testimonies there are very meaningful truths. In fact I would argue that within these testimonies there are truths that are world-historical in their significance, even though they are lived out in the micro-politics of everyday life. The seemingly esoteric factors of interest-rates, currency valuations, commodity prices, fertilizer access and carbon consumption are determined half a world away and yet their impact on people in the center of Africa is world-altering. There are, no doubt, many versions of history, which are partly structured by the class, race, gender and generational circumstances one lives amidst. Yet, in spite of people’s varying perceptions of the past there are also major trends that carry through in people’s testimonies as they are determined by ecological, national and international factors. At the same time, the social organization of production on the Tonga plateau over the last 100 years has undergone rapid changes. As a result, there is enormous variation in the ways people have responded. Vagaries of markets and variation in ecologies and climate

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among farms mean that people have resorted to significant experimentation, even if decisions around maize production have tended to be conservative.22

Numerous factors combine to determine one’s relative success, but one particular factor alone can determine failure. In the following chapters I refer to examples that will help us draw out both trends and variation among the farmers I interviewed. I sought out people based on the number of years they farmed on state land, their relationships to government, industry, the independence struggle, and on people’s recommendations about who had significant stories to tell or important farms to visit. Often chance played a role as I simply followed the roads on 35-year-old maps of farm plots. Tracking down the more affluent farmers and politicians could be extremely challenging, as they were also more likely to be off the farm. Cellular phone coverage was limited for the area so while it helped enormously; many visits took three attempts before I succeeded. These were not villages I was trying to get to, but dispersed farms, often many kilometers apart so transport was an additional challenge in a context of having a very constrained budget in a time of extremely high fuel prices.

These challenges were not unique to me because of my status as a foreigner. In fact, in 1983 two Zambian researchers in a joint study by the National Commission for Development Planning and the University of Zambia faced them equally. Katilungu and Zeko (1983) set out to evaluate agricultural marketing and pricing policies for maize and tobacco as part of a broader catchment for Agricultural Baseline Data for Planning. They had challenges reaching farmers scattered across the landscape, whether they were commercial or in the reserves. They had challenges with language interpretation and were obstructed by the limited accounting methods on the farms. They also had difficulties getting the necessary data from

22 It is somewhat ironic that we can write of ‘conservative’ decision-making around a crop that is historically so new to the region. As Chipungu (1988) has shown, Tonga have in the past tended to be very ‘progressive’ in adopting new technologies. Yet the overwhelming dominance of maize, and the fact it is the only significant staple crop the government will provide guaranteed purchase of, made it a predictable and reliable cash crop in spite of the fact that it is highly susceptible to drought. The other factor that leads people to favour maize is the fact its husk protects the grain from birds, whereas in sorghum and millet the grain is exposed. For this reason, labour had to be allocated to its protection (with children sitting in perches with catapults).
the Tobacco Board of Zambia, the Planning unit of the department of agriculture (presumably who they were contracted by) and the Commercial Farmers’ Bureau. In the end, they relied on data from only 10 “improved” farmers and 5 peasant farmers. In comparison my sample was far larger and more representative of that captured by Baylies (1978).

I faced challenges with respect to research assistants and interpreters. I found some UNZA graduates were not familiar with local colloquialisms and class barriers between them and interviewees could inhibit free communication. While recent university graduates could be seen as snobby by informants, the alternative of relying on local youth meant that they sometimes had relationships with the informants that could also alter our reception. Some farmers felt I had brought untrustworthy riff-raff, however, I found some local unemployed youth extremely helpful as assistants because they were more aware of local dynamics and they had greater ability to interact with labourers working on the farms. On some occasions farmers I had befriended helped me translate. This too brings in dynamics that can alter the testimonies of informants. In these instances I had to consider not only the relationship between the informant, and myself but also the ways informants might alter their testimony based on their relations with my assistant. In some cases these dynamics were fairly obvious, even alluded to. Other times they were not. In some instances simply spending time around people over the course of my two visits allowed me to develop better judgment about the information I received.

Interviews were usually recorded both in audio and in notebooks and then transcribed afterwards. After having two recorders stolen I eventually was forced to take verbatim notes during interviews. As I expected, I found the most interesting information would come after I also participated in some informal participant observation activities, walking around farms, observing management processes, joining farmers on their milk-run or eating a meal with them. I was not as concerned with the quantitative data. I was attentive to all activities on the farms and to the social settings I sometimes met farmers in, but in hindsight I might have tried
harder to get more specifics on cultivation and production figures. Yet apart from the complex social relations on the farms, this is a group of people whose language does not distinguish numbers beyond “one” and “many”. Thus, I paid attention to relations with staff, neighbours, and household members. I was most interested in the qualitative data, the narratives and discourses people used.

In the end, what I found most useful about the interviews was the ways they directed me to factors in other disciplinary areas, such as in veterinary sciences and grassland biology (history is, after all, about everything). Thus, the process of oral history gathering in some ways pushed me to use their stories less than I would have expected and instead to seek out different forms of data.

Oral history gives the researcher enormous privileges. Numerous individuals entrusted me with taking down details of their lives and presenting them in a way that does some justice to the ways they wanted to be remembered. We also hear about long-term grudges, deeply personal fears and challenges. The histories I gathered revealed fascinating lives lived by people who navigated a very bizarre society – of foreign, white-minority rule - that, historically speaking, was very young and brief. The hardest part about structuring a story from the data I received is that one wants to do credit to all of the testimonies.

Overview of the Study

The first of the two main arguments of this thesis is that farmers in Zambia’s Southern Province in the latter 20th century experienced a number of challenges related to changes in social relationships between humans and nature. It is in fact impossible to write any serious historical account of post-colonial indigenous commercial farming in Southern Province without addressing the impact of cattle diseases and perceptions of climate change. Yet it is striking that no single academic discipline has been able to fully comprehend the dynamics of change that resulted in a protracted cattle epidemic. Furthermore, existing institutional arrangements
appear to be grossly incapable of re-establishing human control over the delicate relationship between humans, cattle, wild fauna, diseases and their insect vectors. This is the case because of fundamental contradictions of the inherited colonial political economy.\textsuperscript{23}

Following independence Zambians adopted agricultural policies that set the attainment of food self-sufficiency as the first priority (‘food security’ was not a term used then). In the period between 1965 and 1985, large grain surpluses were generated on the farms of commercializing Tonga farmers. Significant wage-labour was employed and cattle-stocks grew rapidly as farmers were engaged in a unique, developmental, economic context significantly defined by tasks of building a nation. This political-economic context fell into a crisis of multiple dimensions, such that it might be considered a generalized crisis in the mode of production. Policies of economic liberalization began in 1986, but intensified after 1991 with the return to multi-party elections and the victory of Frederick Chiluba and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). These policies were met with a protracted period of widespread decline in production levels, which by 2008 were still far below 1980 levels. It is unclear if one could describe the period of crisis as having ended by 2008, though there were some measurable improvements in many peoples’ lives when compared to earlier years. Yet by 2012 rural poverty rates had barely dropped over the previous decade, “stuck at over 77 percent” (Chapoto, 2012, Mofya-Mukuka, 2013, Kalinda, 2014). In one calculation, poverty rates actually increased despite recent growth in grain production (Sitko, 2012: 26). FAO statistics on food security in Zambia show the proportion of population that is undernourished in 2014 is more than 15 per cent higher than 1990 levels. It now sits at 48%, after having peaked at above 50% in the 2000s. The percentage increase in food insecurity in Zambia since 1990 has only been beaten out by Tanzania and Iraq (FAO, 2014).

\textsuperscript{23} Use of the term “colonial” may seem anachronistic, yet it seems the only appropriate way to describe the ongoing bifurcated legal structure of land-holding systems in the country, which were established in the colonial era and never abolished. The term “capitalist” is also somewhat problematic in that it cannot adequately define local conditions of production unless it is in reference to a global capitalist system. One might say that Zambia suffers from a lot of capitalism, without many capitalists.
Table 2. Prevalence of Undernourishment in Zambia by date

![Graph showing prevalence of undernourishment in Zambia by date from 1992 to 2014.](image)

Source: FAO, STAT, 2014

The second argument this thesis advances is that the forms of crisis alluded to above resulted in a period of disarticulation among a rising, indigenous agrarian capitalist class on the Tonga Plateau. That is to say that the farms in question once displayed more characteristics of capitalist production than they did by 2008 (or at the very least, greater investment, production and employment). This is partly related to wide-scale losses of accumulated capital (broadly defined) but it also relates to factors impacting the reproduction of labour. Over the period covered, labour has increasingly been subject to greater commodification of life, yet this has not necessarily been met with an increase in waged employment. Indigenous farmers in Southern Province have tended toward forms of production requiring fewer labour hours, with areas of regional specialization emerging in the country. Southern province had become increasingly specialized in cattle ranching, itself subject to specialized value-chain compartmentalization. A few Tonga farmers have become part of a national elite, yet in most instances, their success has been achieved through participation in other sectors of the economy and often, though not always, in close association with the upper-echelons of the state apparatus.
A period of disarticulation for some is also an opportunity for consolidation for others. It also enables foreign takeovers as farmers who suffered great losses tended to partition land to sell portions. In the current economic context where African governments are being encouraged to seek growth through foreign direct investment, this is one of the things we see happening in many parts of the continent (Hall, 2011). Here, however, we come up against limitations in the data because I was not able to seek out sufficient material on farms other than those held by indigenous farmers. Anecdotal evidence, farm visits, interviews and media reports show there are large differences between the capital available to foreign entrants and to local players. One clear pattern in 2007-2008 was the influx of Zimbabwean white farmers into the area. They came with enormous advantages in access to credit and relationships in foreign markets. In the “buffalo lands” area of Choma, a British company, Hever Investments, bought seven farms in the 3000 hectare range, leaving only 2.5 African owners in the area (one was bought by a white Scottish settler who married an Eastern (Zulu) woman who now is head of the household). We do not know who had previously occupied the seven plots but certainly some of them had black ownership. One reporter for Der Spiegel claimed in 2004 there were already 300 Zimbabweans that have moved to Zambia, settling on 150 farms.24 Another writer for Farmer’s Weekly, a South African publication, claimed in 2013 that in Choma there were then 35 commercial farmers, 20 of them were Zimbabwean.25 It is also clear that many white South Africans have been, in a sense, recolonizing in this period and are gaining increasingly large holdings (Hall, 2011b).

Looking at small-scale producers in Northern and Luapula province, Gould (2010) suggests neoliberal adjustment caused them to be “left behind’ in processes of development. In Southern Province, formerly successful agriculturalists had the experience of decline, which

sent them, in the words of some farmers, ‘backwards’. This particular statement was not exceptional in the many interviews I conducted among farmers in Southern Province. I heard various versions of it numerous times over, but these particular words have continued to draw my attention for the rich meanings that are wrapped up in them. To “go backwards” implies that time was to unfold in a desirable and expected direction – perhaps what Ferguson refers to as “Expectations of Modernity” (1999). In another sense, ‘going backwards' may also be an indication of particular processes of proletarianization, or more likely, pushing people into forms of serfdom and precarity (or even lumpenization?).

Yet, if some are going backwards while the population is increasing and agricultural production is growing, it begs the question of who is actually moving forward? This is where processes of consolidation, innovation and foreign investment, need to be examined. At the same time, we have seen the expansion of small-scale production ever outward as land tenure patterns and economic conditions fail to meet the needs of the next generation. In some places, such as Eastern Province, productivity has increased with the gradual introduction of draft animals as tsetse flies are driven out of the area.

One implication of the two arguments being advanced here is that a complete understanding of the economic situation of the indigenous farmers on state land must be considered in relation to the non-indigenous, settler farmers who are on average much larger producers, have greater access to credit and have managed to have a greater political capacity to determine the agricultural policy direction of the government in the post UNIP era. With this, one also needs to consider the ways international commercial interests impact the industry – often in contradictory ways. These interests include seed, agro-chemical and feed companies, commercial banks, grain millers, veterinary medicine producers and suppliers, aid organizations, and international industry interests (such as north American and European dairy producers). Thus, I argue, one needs to engage with theories of class, capitalism, crisis and imperialism. At the same time, we need to be cautious of past tendencies of studies in “radical
political economy” to examine African agriculture “at a rather high level of generalization and abstraction”, as Paul Richards has warned (1983: 2).

Outline of Chapters

The first chapter situates the case of Tonga agriculture within the broader literature on Zambia and environmental history of agriculture in Africa. A prominent theme addressed by this literature is a dualistic policy orientation, commencing in the colonial era, which seeks to promote commercialization and the expansion of capitalist development. This is met with a simultaneous interest in pushing others back into re-created ‘traditional’ kinship systems in order to manage the instabilities and social fragmentation that come with capitalist development. In other words, the notion of the ‘traditional’ economy described by Arthur Lewis (1954), and the modernization school more broadly, did not exist in conspicuous form, but as Arrighi (1969) argued in the case of Southern Rhodesia, had to be imposed. What this shows is that categories of commercial farmers were not naturally existing, but instead were constructed through historical processes of dispossession, followed by state subsidization. We see that the categories of the ‘traditional’, modern and spaces of ‘wilderness’ were not natural evolutionary processes, but ones directly associated with the creation of the state and a corresponding property regime.

Chapter Two argues that in the final years of the UNIP government, agriculture had actually remained buoyant and maintained the economy, despite stagnation in the copper sector. Many commentators over the years have created a perception of the agricultural sector as being fraught with politicized loan schemes in which farmers regularly defaulted, participated in forms of fraud and failed to make productive investments with the proceeds (Bates, 1982: 57, 98-99, Klepper, 1979: 141, Good, 1986). It is true that the agricultural sector was subject to an array of financial problems – as is well documented by the above-mentioned authors. Yet claims about levels of corruption risk being overstated insofar as they
relate to day-to-day agricultural marketing. While graft existed in many forms, it did not entirely define what took place in rural areas in Southern Province in the UNIP years. While recognizing the politicized nature of agricultural lending, it is important nevertheless to recognize that loan defaults have complex causes that include rapidly escalating interest-rates. There were in fact many social gains realized, along with a variety of other achievements. I look at trends in cropping and animal husbandry to highlight some of the successes and also downplay the significance and scope of loan recovery rates. This occurred even while the economy suffered from many other limitations, including the loss of copper revenues among other aspects of economic decline. Most importantly, farmers responded to national appeals to “feed the nation”. They were encouraged to adopt new crops, increase and ‘improve’ livestock holdings, venture into milk production, and adopt new technologies in all these processes. They were also encouraged to take on loans, though this remained limited to a small portion of the peasantry and the (largely white) commercial farmers. The implication is that the rural sector was not moribund and completely defined by forms of graft. Rather, they were often productive sites of accumulation, especially when one considers the impact of savings in cattle herds.

Chapter Three details the creation of what I call the national cattle complex in the post-independence era. The term ‘cattle complex’ derives from a 1926 article by Melville J. Herskovits’ on the Turkana of Kenya suggesting pastoralists had an irrational tendency to keep more cattle than the available forage would provide for and they had need for (Herskovits, 1926). It is a condescending term informed by an out-dated understanding of ecological systems, an ill-informed understanding of the pastoral society and an ideological blindness to the historical colonial context (Scoones, 1996:39, Brockington and Homewood, 1986: 94, Anderson, 1984). I do not use the term in the same manner. Instead, I use it to refer to the post-independence context in which the Zambian state assumed some level of trusteeship over the stock maintained within its borders. It instead refers to the entirety of
social relations within which the national cattle stock increased at an extraordinary rate.

Following independence, the government of Zambia set a goal of obtaining food self-sufficiency, which in turn led to a series of initiatives to support the growth of the cattle industry. Parallel with plans to expand the reach of agricultural marketing boards, administrative and physical infrastructure was extended to include a broader area of the country. In the process, the state bolstered the industry by using public funds to monitor veterinary diseases, provide veterinary extension services, apply cattle-movement bans when necessary, ensure availability of vaccines and maintain regulatory authority over the importation of veterinary medicine, among other state interventions. I describe this period of growth as a national cattle complex whereby the state accepted some level of trusteeship over the national herds. This occurred at the same time as the number of Tonga people with formal employment grew substantially, with many obtaining some of the newly available positions in branches of the government and parastatal companies.

UNIP government policy was premised on increasing the number of livestock held in “improved” conditions in which farmers would cull herds based on market incentives. To this end it was willing to accept a level of trusteeship over the national herd. The chapter shows that state support to farmers in the first twenty years of independence led to the doubling of national cattle stocks as farmers and urban workers stored their savings in their herds. To the frustration of many in government agencies, increasing sales did not necessarily take place, leading us to examine the intimate meanings of cattle rearing as a form of capital accumulation among the Tonga in addition to their productive power as capital. Here one can identify marked tensions between customary forms of cattle ownership versus cattle rearing based on capitalist imperatives of profit-making. At the same time, these point to more structural issues in the economy as the National Agriculture Marketing Board (NAMBoard) was paying farmers lower prices than at the private abattoirs, which gradually came to dominate the market in wholesale beef purchases. The essential point here is to recognize the rational value that
cattle held for farmers while also finding more complete means of measuring positive economic growth, which do not necessarily register in systems of national accounting.

Chapter Four examines the impact of oil shocks and geopolitics on the political and economic transition. In this context, liberalization can be seen as a means of displacing a protracted financial crisis that has been widely identified as an extended period of over-production on a world scale.26 The chapter then looks at debates on Kaunda’s fall from power in 1991 and explores the impact of structural adjustment policies on a national level. The experiences of neoliberalism are painful ones and were followed with some forms of reregulation within the agricultural sector, despite the otherwise continued commitment to the liberalization regime. To some, the continued government intervention in maize marketing and fertilizer subsidies represent a continuation of a political spoils system by which some segments of the domestic bourgeoisie profit from market interventions that otherwise obstruct growth and efficiency. Yet the context of re-regulation is dominated by forms of public-private partnership that see government funds dispersed to private companies which provide the services. I conclude this chapter, with a re-assessment of the academic debates on maize marketing and its impact in the early years of liberalization. A few points should be drawn from this chapter. Zambia faced a protracted economic crisis, emerging in the 1970s which undermined import-substitution policies. Yet the major crisis in maize marketing must in fact be attributed to the commencement of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs, rather than to the functioning of the maize marketing boards. Most importantly, the simultaneous process of currency auctioning sent the costs of essential imports of fertilizer and fuel soaring, further entrenching the economic crisis already faced by the Zambian State.

Chapter Five shows that the processes of economic liberalization coincided with

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multiple forms of crisis that had very negative impacts on farmers in Southern Province. I show that as much as half of the national cattle stock fell victim to epidemics that ran rampant following the withdrawal of state investments. The chapter looks specifically at the impact of a devastating cattle virus in Southern Province that has come to be known locally as ‘Corridor’ (or ‘denkati’, which means ‘just drop’ in chiTonga), although it has also been known in the region as “East Coast fever” (they are in fact slightly different strains of the same protozoon). Corridor, along with diseases like foot and mouth, provide a very significant practical challenge to economic theory that sees a minimalist role for the state. The chapter begins with an attempt to quantify the number of cattle affected and then seeks to explain the reasons for the epidemic. In doing so I turn to a variety of archival sources from the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control along with files from other branches of the Agricultural department. These are supplemented by more recent scientific studies. Finally, I provide an analysis that examines domesticity and agrarian practices in the broader context of the life world in which it is embedded. It argues that a complete understanding of the bovine epidemic requires an analysis at the ecosystemic level. That is to say one cannot see the rise of bovine diseases in Southern Province apart from processes impacting the broader ecosystem the cattle live within. This includes accounting for industrial processes taking place far upstream, along with the corresponding damming of the river for hydroelectric power. It also requires a consideration of the impact of diverting river flow for irrigation and consumption in the capital city.

Neoliberal economic policy forced a retreat of the limited state that had been constructed in the early post-independence days. This chapter shows it was not followed by a freeing of productive, creative energies in the commercializing class of African farmers. In fact, the opposite occurred. They could not maintain their herds in the face of widespread ecological catastrophe. Many of the sources of disarticulation in the agricultural economy find their origins well before the neoliberal era. The Zambian state would have been challenged to
deal with them under any circumstances. Yet it is without doubt that managing these disparate and generalized crisis was not resolved by unleashing private profit motives. Many dimensions of the crisis had roots in the neoliberal era; the extension into market gardening was a response to the need for increasing levels of cash flow to pay for basic public services. The market in counterfeit and inadequate products emerged with neoliberalism, while the state lost its capacity to monitor and contain diseases. The private sector has also not stepped in to produce necessary vaccines. Yet, in another sense, we can see that neoliberalism saw the loss of market share among smaller, indigenous farmers, while the white settler farmers tended to fare better. We can therefore say that neoliberalism enabled a transfer of market share from African producers to the larger, white settler farmers as well as those new entrants arriving with foreign direct investment.

The sixth and final chapter looks at an aspect of Tonga history that has not previously been the subject of academic study. That is, a process of gradual migration into new farming areas of the country. First, I examine the reasons migrants left Southern Province and came to Central Province. Within this, I look at family dynamics of the migrants and the relations they have forged with local populations. Secondly, I look at the advantages gained in the migration and any perceivable changes in methods of production among Tonga migrants. Lastly, the chapter examines broader political processes relating to the migration. Here we can note some areas of continuity amidst these processes of change. Lastly, I examine the evolving meaning of Tonga identity, as well as the implications of that identity in national politics. The processes of migration identified here are partly a response to economic and ecological decline in Southern Province. Moreover, they show processes in which a reformation of ethnic identities is taking place. Although Tonga people move into new territory and adopt new livelihood strategies and new cultural practices there is no corresponding weakening of ethnic affiliation. In fact, evidence suggest there are processes taking place that could be understood as forms of what critical geographer, David Harvey has described as
aestheticization (Harvey, 1990: 109-110, 207-210). In brief, drawing upon Marx, Harvey suggests this is a process in which people unable to control space turn to romantized notions of place. Space is geographically rigid, while place must be understood as an ideological process. The point is that notions of Tonga can take on stronger meanings even in the process of migration. This is concerning insofar as it gets negatively mobilized in national political discourse.

It is my contention that the processes and events described in this thesis can best be understood as a form of Polanyian “double-movement”. The concept of a double-movement needs some explanation. It arrived in Karl Polanyi’s classic 1944 text in which he argued that human relationships with market activity have not been constant across time. Polanyi argues that as a general rule in human societies prior to the 17th century, markets had only ever been peripheral and effectively embedded within forms of social regulation that also valued redistribution, reciprocity and household units of production. For Polanyi, the powerful modern states of Europe imposed market logic upon humanity and brought about the kind of structured, utility-maximizing decision-making, individualist behavior that was described in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. For Polanyi, the creation of the self-regulating market, however, came at the expense of social dislocation (enclosures) and imposes a false institutional separation between economic and political spheres (42). Society was run as an adjunct to the market, rather than being embedded in social relations as it had been up to that point (60). Society had to be shaped in a manner that allows the market system to function according to its own laws; the ‘laissez-faire was planned’ (147). During the industrial revolution, Polanyi argues that a “blind faith in spontaneous progress had taken hold of people, and with all the fanaticism of sectarians the most enlightened pressed forward for boundless and unregulated change in society (78)”. The human impact of this was ‘awful beyond description’ and he suggests that human society would have been annihilated but for the protective counter-moves which blunted the self-destructive mechanism of the market
(78). For Polanyi, the primary fallacy of the Nineteenth century capitalist market system is that it is based upon trade in commodities that are in essence fictitious; land, labour and currency. If human labour and nature were to be trucked around as mere appendages of the market, Polanyi claims the results would ultimately be the annihilation of humanity. 19th century capitalism expanded only because it was regulated and re-embedded into society. Yet this regulation was gradually stripped away again in the interests of high finance, which resulted in the calamities of world war and Fascism.

Extending Polanyi’s argument, one could describe the Bretton Woods agreement, and Keynesian economics more broadly as an effort to re-regulate national economies. The Bretton Woods agreement resulted in globally agreed-upon rules of fixed exchange rates, regulated bond and stock markets. Countries encouraged national industries and regulated their economies to those ends. These institutional mechanisms, however, were gradually eroded and the rise of neoliberalism as a doctrine in the late 1970s can be seen as an attempt to re-impose the logic of the market as the central governing logic for humanity (Toussaint, 2005: 89). Drawing on the ideas of Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman, neoliberalism is a theory and set of political and economic policy prescriptions that proposes that human well-being can be best advanced by “liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey, 2005:2). According to neoliberal theory the role of the state is to create and preserve the institutional framework appropriate to such practices. While state social services are reduced to a minimum, the military, police, and legal structures of the state are required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, the functioning of markets. “Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture” (Harvey, 2005: 2).
It was according to this neoliberal logic that structural adjustment programs were designed and imposed upon African countries as a response to the debt crisis and short-term balance of payments problems by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as the institutions sought repayment on loans (Toussaint, 2005: 222). If Keynesianism was the regulatory response to the challenges leading to the World Wars, neoliberalism was the market’s counter-offensive (ibid: 263). In Zambia, from 1986 onward, the gradual extension of the market into new areas, and the process of allowing market mechanisms to have greater control over social policy had catastrophic consequences, which ultimately led to forms of reregulation and a return to government developmental practices. Those who advocated neoliberal “shock therapy” in the 1980s and 1990s argued all along that they would result in short-term pain before the market could re-establish itself in a new set of circumstances that would eventually lead to renewed growth. They argued, for example, that new investments would take time to be made and people’s attitude of entitlement, built up in the Keynesian era, would have to be broken down. Yet the catastrophes described here did not have market solutions and they still do not in 2016 when I write these words.

The advocates of neoliberalism were correct to assume it would take time for businesses to adjust to the removal of the Zambian National Marketing Board. Certainly there were eventually some improvements to be felt on this front, but that cannot be extended to areas of banking that impact farmers. It cannot be extended to suggest that the market encouraged pharmaceutical companies to find solutions to cattle diseases. The same can be said of the management of HIV/AIDS, and processes of climate change. Nor have markets resolved basic needs of sanitation, transportation, healthcare and education; progress in these spheres since 1990 has only been made as a result of public and philanthropic initiatives. In the absence of state interventions, the ‘public’ response has been heavily dependent upon international NGOs and donor funding, rather than democratically elected governments, but they have still been public insofar as they have not been achieved strictly
through the profit motive. Still, they have remained horribly inadequate and the standard of living for the majority of Zambians has not improved.

A second argument follows, that the Tonga commercial farmers who succeeded in the early post-independence days cannot be understood as a clearly articulated capitalist class. There were previous processes of growth that saw greater levels of commercialization in agriculture. Yet the units of production can best be understood as hybrid forms of agrarian capitalism (Banaji, 2011). Furthermore, a previous moment of growth was intimately tied to the activities of the state. This growth was closely tied to a rapid increase in national cattle stocks, which then fell victim to diseases that re-emerged in Southern Africa alongside the introduction of structural adjustment programs. The broader impact of the neoliberal policy on Tonga farmers saw protracted decline and disarticulation among the Tonga commercial farmers. This era was even worse for those not on state land. By all appearances, those in traditional holdings have since faced stagnation and the slow violence of poverty. New areas of growth are emerging and are concentrated within state land holdings further north, outside of Southern Province. There are many Tonga commercial farmers among those producing in new farm blocks being opened up in other parts of the country and there are a few Tonga farmers still succeeding on state land in Southern Province. Yet they do not represent a majority and there is nothing particularly ‘African’ about the forms of growth that have occurred on farming units that replaced those Tonga who left. Moreover, laws re-written in the logic of neoliberalism have allowed surpluses accumulated on these lands to exit state borders freely.

The six chapters provided here only amount to an introduction to a large subject matter. The oral history methodology is perhaps most fruitful insofar as it pointed me in the right direction for supplementary archival data. Yet in the end there is much this thesis leaves out. In particular, it begs for better quantitative data to build on our understanding of processes of deforestation, soil acidification and salinization, and to make maps of
underground aquifers and their depletion over time. Details about the lives of farm labourers are also insufficiently examined in this thesis, even though some evidence was collected and has in places been discussed. Likewise, the complex dimensions of gender in Southern Province have been largely left aside in this analysis. This is not because these topics are unimportant, but they are beyond what can be accomplished at this time. That being said, the impacts of poverty are felt disproportionately by women, who conduct the majority of household (productive and reproductive) labour in the province and the country more broadly. The impact of foreign investment and recent ‘land-grabbing’ is also only touched upon here, and is in need of much further study. In 2007 and 2008, when I visited Southern Province, this kind of activity was limited and very new. Lastly, much more time could be spent discussing the complex nature of reregulation in the agricultural sector. In particular, there is a need to examine the role international aid agencies have played in this process, particularly as they relate to seed development, vaccinations and irrigation technologies.

A few other PhD studies have helped bring greater understanding to agricultural production in Zambia in recent years. Caryn Abrahms (2010), Nicolas Sitko (2010), and Robert Smith (2005) stand out as important contributors. My hope is that together we are slowly working to re-open discussion on these issues and are serving to provide some historical documentation for others to consider. The study here works with data that has many limitations. On one hand, there is a challenge of it being the product of a PhD student with limited funding. On the other hand, there is an issue of how one treats the data. I have considered ethical, epistemological and ontological factors in the ways I engage with the data and present it in a narrative form.
Chapter 1

Literature Review
The purpose of this chapter is to review and analyze key academic literature on Zambian history relevant to the study of the Tonga. It varies greatly in theme as well as over time. Early Zambianist literature focused on matters of improvement and decline amidst a general level of anxiety over processes of degeneration and social dislocation. Another literature addresses levels of articulation of peasant and working classes along with their concomitant political effects. The most recent literature adds in ecology and environmental history.

Early scholarly works on the Tonga address the issue of where they have lived. Although a simple question, an answer is subject to contestation - particularly over the degree to which they are an amorphous or a unified people. The Tonga have historically been highly decentralized, with a relative absence of central authority figures in the political sphere. In the past, women maintained a comparatively strong role in society. In the colonial era we see the Tonga become subject to processes of containment and paternalistic trusteeship. The colonial administration also enforced processes of agricultural change guided by highly ideological ideas about ecology. Alongside this, the Tonga were rapidly brought within a cash nexus that saw them adopt cash crop farming. There have been arguments claiming there is a history of mercantilist trade among the Tonga, however, the weight of historical evidence suggests the introduction of cash trade was relatively new and tended to be conducted by outsiders. Within these processes of change women appeared to become increasingly subordinate, even if they have continually resisted such changes.

Missionary and colonial interactions with the Tonga were often conditioned by the belief they, as a people, were particularly culturally amenable, suited or preconditioned toward liberal individualist profit maximization. Thus missionaries and colonial governments supported their interests in farming and saw them as eventually being suitable for the introduction of private land title (a feature that was otherwise discouraged amidst policies of indirect rule). At the same time, for most of the colonial era the government sought to disrupt Tonga
participation in maize cropping for cash sales. This was driven by white farmers, who wished to dominate the market. Tonga were, however, targeted as early entrants to the civil service in part because they had been exposed to English language education by the early presence of missionaries on the Tonga plateau. Therefore, as a group, their relationship to the state has been ambivalent. On one hand they sought ‘freedom’ from the state (by resisting village relocations and the appointing of chiefs under the native authority. At the same time, they oriented toward it, by seeking government jobs to finance their future ‘freedom’ as farmers. Thus it is an open question as to whether the state helped or hindered Tonga agricultural success at any point in time.

By the 1940s there were strong indications of peasant differentiation among the Tonga and by 1947 it was clear that some larger farmers were expanding cash crops into previously unutilized land. By the 1970s there was near unanimous agreement that this differentiation had led to the rise of a capitalist class among the Tonga farmers. Amidst this agreement there were differing opinions of the degree of class articulation, or in other words, over precisely how capitalist they were. The debate is important because it relates to the forms of labour mobilization taking place on the farms: Who were the ‘workers’ and how many of them found their labour to be commodified on the farms? This in turn relates to processes of labour migration that were historically much more tempered among the Tonga than in other parts of the country. One of the central lines of inquiry in this thesis is to consider the political implications of the fluidity of class relations in Southern Province. Moreover, how does it change over time? Ultimately this determines whether Tonga farmers can be seen as conservative or rebellious; traditional or modern. I would argue they can be both and that differing traits arrive in response to particular historical circumstances.

Another line of inquiry considers the achievements of independence for the Tonga? What did they seek from independence and what have they managed to secure out of it? Like many struggles for independence in Africa people generally sought material benefits such as
clean water, schooling, housing, health facilities, an end to hunger and an end to the demeaning discrimination they faced daily. They aspired for development at a standard similar to that enjoyed elsewhere, and they wanted decent jobs, improved agricultural markets and fair access to land (Cooper, 2002: 91, UNIP, 1964). Given that these were the goals of the independence struggle in Zambia, it is worth asking today whether it has become a deracialized society and weather Zambians have obtained the material benefits they sought? If an assessment today cannot provide an affirmative answer to this question then it is also worth asking if Zambians were ever closer to achieving them in an earlier period?

Ironically this question echoes themes in the literature of the colonial era which was fixated on “improvement” and the prevention of perceived social disintegration. In this period there was a shift in Tonga agriculture whereby those in the Gwembe Valley experienced declining productivity as they were relocated for the development of a hydroelectric dam completed in 1957, while those on the Plateau experienced rising productivity and increased differentiation. Most of the studies of this period were conducted by researchers at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) and continued on in the post-independence years at the Institute for African Studies (IAS) at the University of Zambia. After the RLI and IAS studies, research loses its focus on “improvement”, yet there is a continued fixation with perceived processes of decline, generally focusing on the perceived inadequacies of peasant production methods. At the same time, there is a drift from the attention paid to ‘disintegration’ and social collapse to that of fragmentation and change. Many of these studies follow on earlier work conducted on urbanization and migrant labour by RLI and government researchers. A number of studies from the 1970s onward focus on the relationships between the ‘working class’ and the ‘peasantry’. These studies are not chronologically or thematically entirely distinct from those dealing with migration and urbanization. What they tend to add, however, is a heightened level of attention to political consciousness and the role of workers and peasants in the national independence struggle and as an oppositional force in society more broadly.
Some studies of this period do draw attention to a process of peasant differentiation taking place in rural areas – and in particular in Lusaka and Southern Province. A body of literature from the 1990s onward assesses the social composition of the movement against the one-party state, which successfully advocated a return to multi-party elections by 1991. This literature arguably over-states the role of an urban ‘working class’ in this movement, while avoiding sufficient analysis of the relationship between peasant differentiation and political transition. In other words, it avoids an examination of the ways this transition, and the related neo-liberal reforms following the transition, are rooted locally and/or impact a process of indigenous accumulation. Lastly, there is a recent, though limited body of literature examining the impacts of neoliberal economic policy on agricultural industry and peasant production more broadly.

In this study I sought to avoid replicating the narratives of fracture, collapse, decay and failed modernity that have defined some of the most striking Zambianist works in recent decades (Moore and Vaughan, 1994, Crehan, 1996, Ferguson, 1999, Gould, 2010, Sitko, 2010). I wanted, instead to focus on processes of consolidation and indigenous accumulation. I tried to avoid the trope of things falling apart to look instead, as Achebe seemed to encourage, at things that held people together. It was a methodological decision I set out with because I felt that if we looked only at processes of disintegration we would be missing the parts of the story that could help us understand the direction of change. I did not want to be one more Afropessimist and I truly believed from afar that the Tonga would have benefitted from the liberalizations, especially when Tongas played a prominent role in the transition of 1991. Yet the result now, many years later, is another piece of academic work that addresses a significant process of decline.

Despite the fact this study echoes these near-tropes of Zambianist academic literature, it also looks in different directions. Although I find that Tonga commercial farmers have experienced a generalized period of crisis and disarticulation, there are other ways in which
new forms of convergence and consolidation are taking place. The very notion of Tonga identity in fact likely has more political currency in the present than it has ever had previously. This is partly due to the fact that chiefs are increasingly vying for more social and political power in society (Gould, 2010: 97-136). It is also, however, related to the fact that many Tonga are on the move. Instead of migration coinciding with social disintegration this migration is largely intra-rural and sees the re-formation of Tonga ethnicity in new areas. The Tonga were never a significant factor in the earlier migrations to urban areas which had such a massive impact on the Bemba of Northern and Luapula provinces (Moore and Vaughan, 1994). Those migrations pulled people selectively from society, yet the current migrations of Tonga are expansionary, in which the majority or entirety of a productive unit is transplanted.

Tonga migrations, however, emanate from an area that has suffered a great deal of change. In some respects it can be understood as decay, especially when it relates to climate change and toxic pollutants in water. Yet much of it could better be understood simply as unplanned change. Although the ecosystem is less hospitable for human habitation it is by no means dead. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Tonga territories in Southern Province are subject to competing demands for human uses of the ecosystem. A truly holistic analysis would see processes of fragmentation and reformation in Southern Province in relationship to ongoing processes of accumulation further upstream. In particular, the mining economy must be seen in the same view, as part of the overall process taking place in Southern Province, where much of the beef and maize consumed by miners has been grown over the decades.

**Colonial Literature 1938-1964**

The studies of this period were conducted either out of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI, est. 1938) or from within the colonial administration (Allan 1947:54-9). Though the institute was partnered with the Anthropology Department at the University of Manchester, it cannot be accurately thought of as independent of the colonial administration. There was
significant mutual support between them, the sources of funding were not entirely separate and researchers often shared the same intellectual space, some even accepting contracts that saw them moving between them. Any material produced by these authors should therefore be placed within the context of an analysis of the institute itself as a number of studies have worked to do (van Donge, 1989, Moore and Vaughan, 1994, Ferguson, 1999, Schumaker, 2001, Macola 2003, Gewald, 2007, Tembo, 2014). Moore and Vaughan’s study, though detailing agricultural change among the Bemba of Northern Province, is primarily on the production of knowledge within the RLI.

Allan, Gluckman, Peters and Trapnell completed the first RLI study of Southern province, which was the result of an extensive collaborative effort between the RLI and agricultural officers of the Northern Rhodesian Government (1948). The massive investigation involved 17,000 Tonga families living on 887.2 square miles of the Batoka Plateau in Mazabuka District of the Tonga Reservation in Northern Rhodesia. The impetus behind the study was that there appeared to be a ‘land shortage’ brought about by multiple factors. First, there was a reduction in the amount of available land by alienation for European farms and reservation as Crown Land. Second, there was not much naturally fertile land suitable for maize production. Third, population increased both by ‘natural increase’ and migration into the reservation (some clearly coming from the Gwembe Valley). Fourth, there were significant increases in the number of cattle being raised. And fifth, there was perceived soil degeneration resulting from what was considered ‘improper land use’ (Allen et al., 1948). The study reveals that the Tonga were pushed into the rocky escarpment while Europeans took over the more fertile flatlands. The colonial settlers, however, claimed there was actually sufficient acreage and that the economic hardships of the Tonga were brought about by "wasteful methods of cultivation," the acceptance of a "low standard of living," and the adherence to "kinship obligations" which purportedly allowed many to wander from village to village subsisting on the efforts of their relatives. This perpetuated an attitude of white superiority and righteousness.
The settlers’ notions of achievement related to methods of agricultural ‘improvement’: enclosure processes and production for markets.

The investigators classified the Tonga population into three categories. They describe the Tonga as originally shifting hoe cultivators growing ‘kaffir corn’ as their main crop. With the opening of the copper mines in 1926 a market for maize appeared. Through relationships with settler farmers the plow, wheeled transport, and cattle were introduced and some Africans became commercial agriculturalists. ‘Farmers’ (0.4%) were those who sold 100 or more 90kg bags of maize per year. ‘Smallholders’ (14.3%) sold from 10 to 99 bags while the rest selling less than 10 bags or none at all were described as ‘subsistence farmers’. In 1928 Tonga holdings were arranged as four reservations with consequent losses of land and crowding into less fertile areas. In the following year a set of papers was compiled by the Assistant Director of Agriculture and published by the RLI. These admit that in the 1920s, when Native Reserves were being demarcated, the Agricultural Department hardly existed and was in any case not concerned with the subsistence agriculture of the African population. The estimates available for the land requirements of Africans were guesses and not based on any study of actual farming and foraging practices. As Allan reveals, they generally proved to be underestimates, and the movement of people into the Reserves led to shortages of garden land. He does not refer to losses in foraging and hunting activities, though a later, extensive RLI study of the Gwembe Tonga conducted by Scudder (1962) reveals numerous problems related to the imposition of fines for the killing of wild game without a permit. One justification for the creation of reserve lands was that the state would then be better placed to promote ‘improvements’ in the agricultural methods and assist in providing infrastructure such as improved access to water. Allan notes that neither happened, and by 1940 a contrary process had begun, in which people were moved back from the Reserves into adjacent areas where they were required to adopt soil conservation methods and other alterations in agricultural techniques. These issues
of supposed ‘overpopulation’ and resettlement occupied the department of agriculture until independence.

More effort was taken in planning this second movement of population and involved an enlarged Agricultural Department. A general survey of the whole country had been begun a few years earlier by a government ecologist, and this was followed by detailed studies of the more congested areas. Some details are given in Allan’s article “African Land Usage”. What is clear, is that Allan was personally responsible for overseeing the relocation process. The papers discuss techniques employed in introducing changes in agricultural methods and detail land conditions in two areas of central Northern Rhodesia. Allan explains the ways the colonial administration determined that the percentage of potentially arable land in Northern Rhodesia was very low given existing techniques. He also explains that earlier attempts to assess African land requirements were inaccurate because the cultivable percentage was always taken to be higher than it really was. The author was primarily concerned with productivity per square mile and per ‘manyear’ suggesting that he was rather unaware of the role female labour played in production. As Colson points out in 1959, no census had yet been taken. Moreover, as, Isaacman and Vansina (1976) reveal, the Tonga had a reputation for repeatedly fleeing the area when colonial officials approached. As a result, estimates about land use and population rates were bound to be highly inaccurate.

Chipungu (1988) defined other documents from the colonial period as fixated on the topic of ‘improvement’. For Hellen, (1969) Johnson (1956) and Kay (1967), the “peasants became ‘modernized’ or ‘civilized’ as they engaged in market production, acquired new technologies and responded favourably to government-sponsored agricultural schemes”. Likewise in 1963 White suggested improved farming had been noticed among the Tonga for

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27 RLI Papers, 3 June 1945, pp. 13-20
28 I have not gained personal access to these papers so am relying on Barnes’ reading for the time being. J. A. Barnes (1950) Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 20, No. 2. p. 164.
29 Documents available in archives in Zambia and England, though not yet seen by the author.
over twenty years, consisting of manuring (some of it commercialized), the adoption of soil conservation measures, crop rotation and contour ridging as pressed for by the agricultural department. Once adopted, these measures justified the payment of acreage-based bonuses to registered “Improved Farmers”. He also noted the existence of population pressure and competition for arable and grazing lands. With little clarity in land allocation, he claims there was “a tendency for farmers to open up larger and larger acreages for arable purposes, and thus to make inroads into the amount of land available for grazing”. Most importantly, he noted that the Tonga lend and give land, “and in an increasing number of cases transfer it for a cash consideration, for land has both a scarcity and an economic value”. Nevertheless, in his assessment, sales of land possessed “certain undeveloped features” (White, 1963:367). “Development” for colonial authorities was clearly associated with the degree to which the commodity form presented itself.

Dixon-Fyle (1983) has suggested that agriculturalists on the Tonga Plateau, unlike other groups in the colonial period, responded successfully to colonial penetration. This position is certainly different than Muntemba’s description of the Kabwe, who are described as being ‘underdeveloped’ throughout the colonial era as they were subordinated to settler and mining interests (1977). She also described underdevelopment taking place on the railway belt more broadly (1982). Mwalukanga details much the same thing in Lusaka province 1905-53. Thus, the Tonga saw forms of ‘development’ while the trend elsewhere was the opposite.

The Institute For African Studies

In the late colonial years, researchers Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder produced more rigorous documentation of the Tonga, both on the Plateau and in the Valley. Much of this literature focuses on issues of famine, social organization, relocation and relations between peasants, the state and ecology. The first in-depth studies of Tonga society took the position that the Tonga were in many ways not a coherent group. In fact for most authors there does
not seem to be any single feature that the Tonga can be defined by as all apparent
generalities have significant exceptions. The word ‘Tonga’ is generally used to discuss a group
in South-Western Northern Rhodesia, crossing into the Zambezi into Southern Rhodesia. They
share a common language, but have various localized dialects. In 1958 Colson described
Tonga society

as a loose alliance between households or homesteads held together by the
ties based on matrilineal descent which exist between the men who head them.
But the wives and the children who form the households belong to other
descent groups which are assumed to hold their primary loyalties. (60)

Elsewhere she suggested “it is probably false to regard the Tonga as a definite group or real
unit which is set off by definite criteria from other peoples.” (1959: 95)

From her vantage point in the late 1940s and mid-1950s Colson suggested that the
Tonga appeared to have always lacked devices to form them into a common society, such as
formal (or informal) trading associations, tribal-wide age-grade sets or regiments. All Tonga
women, at the time, shared a practice of knocking out six upper front teeth. However the Ila
also held this practice and a general decline in the custom took place throughout the post-
colonial period. In 1959 the Plateau Tonga existed within one political unit, the “Plateau Tonga
Native Authority”, but this was of recent origin and derived from circumstances beyond their
control. The colonial government placed them in the bounds of a single administrative district
and organized them into the following chieftaincies: Moya, Siamuandu, Ufwenuka, Chona,
Mwansa, Sianjalika, Naluama, Mweenda, Mwanacingwala, Chongo, Simuyobe, Monze,
Mapanza, Macha, Singani, and Siabunkululu (95-96). In practice, however, there was
significant overlapping of groups.

Colson’s portrayal of the Tonga as a highly amorphous society is challenged by
O’Brien (1983), who argues that the Tonga were a much more cohesive group than earlier
literature suggests. In particular, he claims they were united by an acceptance of a shared
religious authority/prophet, Monze, and were in the process of uniting and gaining a greater
sense of ethnic identity when the British South Africa Company (BSAC) came into the area in 1904 (Phiri, 2006:11, Wills, 1967: 220-223). In contrast to the BSAC’s strategy with Lewanika, a Lozi king or paramount chief (Litunga), they divided the Tonga up into numerous smaller chieftaincies for administrative purposes. Chief Lewanika made alliances with the BSAC because he believed a united Tonga would weaken his power and threaten his own territory. For O’Brien then, the colonial system weakened a more unified people, whereas for Colson the Native Authority gave structure to a group that had not previously had any.

Social Change in the Colonial Era

Cash cropping has existed among the Tonga from very early on in the colonial experience, likely commencing in the 1920s, but clearly evident by the 1930s (Chipungu, 1988: 8, Dixon-Fyle, 1983: 428). The emergence of cash-cropping disrupted the old rotational, shifting agricultural system and thus created the basis for the introduction of outside chemical inputs. Once raiding was reduced and lion populations were depleted, investments in cattle increased rapidly. It seems the Tonga population has increased rapidly since the arrival of Europeans, though by the 1950s no census had been taken (Scudder: 99). In 1913 land extending five kilometers either side of the rail line was cleared for European farms. As a result, the Plateau Tonga lost land, yet they remained within 30 kilometers of the rail line and therefore had greater access to markets than most other African agriculturalists (Colson, 1959: 101). Though there was some migration southward in pre-colonial days, there has been a much lower labour migration rate from the rest of Northern Rhodesia and Zambia, largely because of the economic opportunities within their area and the fact settlers had hoped to draw many to their farms as labour. In fact, the Plateau has received significant numbers of migrants from the Gwembe Valley and the nearby escarpment. The poorest migrants, getting
the lowest wages are the Lozi (no doubt due to more intense neo-feudalism in Western Province)\textsuperscript{30}.

**Administration**

When the British took over from the Chartered Company they forced Tonga into new ‘villages’ (Colson, 1959: 102) compelling people to live within half a mile of the newly created ‘headman’. At the same time, a new concept of chieftaincy was created which merged juridical and legislative powers (1959: 102-103). In the 1950s these chiefs were referred to by Tonga peoples as ‘government chiefs’, or ‘box chiefs’, indicating that their authority came from the colonial administration rather than from any pre-existing indigenous order. While Tonga lived in villages in pre-European days, it was only since the colonial administration was established that these became grouped into a wider political organization. Previously, villages were independent units that did not recognize any superior, centralized authority. Colson did not see headmen living in any larger, special huts or showing any signs of conspicuous wealth above anyone else. Some villages had central huts and/or squares, others did not. While most could claim some relationship to a headman, others could not as a result of the fact that people were free to settle wherever they wished (1959: 112). The Tonga tended to be patrilocal, from matrilineal clan groups, though there were many exceptions. People tended to live in clusters which were subject to change continually, with each household moving to a newly built hut every five to six years. As Colson suggested, many of the modern villages may have represented “a Government-imposed alliance of independent local groups whose allegiance is to some leader within the cluster and not the official headman” (1959: 115).

**Division of Labour**

\textsuperscript{30} The Lozi remain semi-autonomous from Zambia as the British, for strategic reasons, recognized the ‘Royal Family’ as a means of capturing all of Northern Rhodesia. As a result, land holding by Lozi is more consolidated than in any other part of the country. Yet, large portions of the labour force are unwaged, petty traders and unemployed. This brings the average wage down for all Lozi youth in the region.
Colson (1959) saw craft divisions of labour between men and women, somewhat like a caste system, though no higher status was offered to craftspeople, nor were such positions inheritable along biological descent. They were, rather, seen as a gift granted by the spirits of the ancestors. These crafts were practiced only in addition to agricultural work so there was no division of labour between those who worked in fields and those who did not. There was little obligation to work for others and likewise, one could generally command little additional labour from others. Work-parties would take place, but seemed entirely non-hierarchical. Yet in the 1950s hired labour began to supplant work parties because it prevented people from having to return favours and also because it gave the buyer greater control over labour, while reducing the obligation to provide food and drink. Men participated in some collective activity, for example, forming ‘companies’ to pool farm equipment.

**Gender and Social Organization**

Since colonial intrusion there has been a move toward a more rigidly patriarchal society. This coincides with an increase in the occurrence of the polygynous nuclear family as paternal power increasingly won out over matrilineal claims within the Native Authority system of justice (Wright: 1983). Colson noted that in the past: “There are numerous instances of villages having been founded by women who were the headmen, even in the immediate past. Today, most, if not all, headmen are men” (1959: 116). Villages were given the name of the headmen, but as new headmen were determined, their common village name changed. The rank was not necessarily hereditary. Divergences at times arose between official names of villages and those in popular use (1959:117). Headmen received certain status and privileges, but these were limited. They did not appear to perform any rituals nor were they entitled to tribute or labour from their people. In the 1950s, there were increased demands upon the headman to exert authority over the people to make them carry out Administration or Native
Authority orders, thus the position became more and more onerous and headmen were made to assume duties not previously inherent in their status (1959: 118).

The significant value placed on self-sufficiency among the Tonga seems to have supported processes of individuation within an increasingly market-oriented society. The maintenance of matrilineal units appeared to be weakening at the expense of the nuclear family. Colson noted that “theoretically membership rests on actual descent through females from a common ancestress” though exact genealogical ties tended to be unimportant with many people. In fact, there were many instances of slaves being incorporated into the lineage. Matrilineal groups were therefore bound together by ties that were “purely temporal and tied to the life-span of particular individuals” (1980: 16). Colonial Agricultural Officer White noted that village “residents may be linked by kinship matrilaterally, patrilaterally or affinally or by vague and untraceable genealogical links and by mere acquaintanceship” (White: 1963). White felt that matrilineal kinship operates in certain fields of Tonga life such as inheritance or funerals, but that it does not determine the pattern of residence or of land holding. Matrilineages themselves could be ill defined and as a result of the shallow genealogical depth among the Tonga, matrilineally linked kinship groups and matrilineal clanship, were often blurred. Thus feuds and vengeance in Tonga society could operate within neighbourhoods in complex ways, cutting across clearly defined family lines (White, 1963).

Perhaps the most important insight made by the RLI/Institute for African Studies researchers for the period of the present study is that made by Colson in 1980:

In the new clash between the family unit based on marriage and the matrilineal kinship units based on descent, it is the family which is winning. Geographical mobility, the diffused character of the kinship system, and the emphasis upon individual independence, have always favoured the strengthening of the family unit. The new conditions of life only further the trend. (63)

The fact that wealthier Tonga peasants had to compete with the mines for wage labour meant accumulation was heavily dependent on family labour because the costs of waged labour were higher than the returns one could expect from sales of produce in the market. One
solution for the enterprising male farmer was to take in more wives. In this way, the British administration gave much greater life to the system of polygyny than it ever had in pre-colonial times (Wright, 1983). In turn, we see a seemingly contradictory process in which the more ‘modern’, commercializing farmers simultaneously resort to what were supposedly more ‘traditional’ institutions as a means of mobilizing labour.

The Valley Tonga

The Valley Tonga have linguistic and cultural ties that link them to the Ila-Tonga speakers of the Northern Rhodesian Plateau, however, their forms of agriculture vary significantly. Scudder and Colson devoted the bulk of their careers to the documentation of Gwembe agroecology and society before and throughout their relocation to make way for the Kariba dam. The Tonga were not the only inhabitants of the valley, though the most common and oldest agriculturalists. Some Ngoni and Ndebele immigrants came as refugees during the 19th century. (Scudder, 1962: 25) Their complex agricultural practices were very different than those on the Plateau largely because of the unique circumstances caused by the periodic flooding of the alluvial deposits on the banks of the Zambezi. They were growing three cereals; millet, sorghum and maize. Bulrush millet had replaced sorghum as the principal crop. Sorghum was common before 1937 (Trapnell and Clothier, 1937). Millet was grown in the rainy season on sandy loam, sorghum in heavy clay soil of alluvium II, although it is also interplanted with inzembwe, and maize (mapopwe) is planted during both the rainy and dry seasons. Planting dates, soil and water requirements of the three vary, therefore by planting all three cultivators lessens risks (1962: 30). Scudder describes complex land-holding patterns in which a household would till small parcels dispersed among numerous different soil and garden types (32). The labour of both men and women was essential for the rainy season harvest. Pioneer clearing and constructing fences were entirely men’s jobs. The plow was increasingly used, but still far from common.
Surprisingly, many available technologies were not utilized. There was no practice of irrigating of food crops, even when the maize was dying in the dry season and the Zambezi was nearby. Furthermore, Scudder noticed significant famine recorded over the previous 50 years, and yet for most of this time Temwe gardens (further away from the banks into the brush) were not cleared. When their use was introduced (or re-introduced) they were cited as a significant factor ending famine. A question that could not be answered was why they were not cleared earlier. It seems highly likely this was at least partially related to the enormous number of pest animals in the area, which seemed to have experienced a rapid growth in population after the British imposed fines for hunting wild animals. There were many poisonous snakes, including mambas, cobras, puff adders, boomslangs, sand snakes and pythons (22). Elephants and Hippopotamuses were described as a “constant menace to gardens, as are certain types of ungulates. These included buffalo, zebra, waterbuck, bushbuck, and duiker. Other species which were still hunted for food were kudu, sable, impala, eland, Sharpe’s steinbuck and klipspringer.” (23) Baboons were cited as probably causing more damage year in and year out than any other species. Vervet monkeys also caused damage, as did bush pigs. There were also lions, leopards, honey badgers and hyenas. (23) Informants identified many of these as a daily nuisance. There was no adequate fencing to keep animals out and fencing would not even be feasible on gardens of varying size, interspersed among other people’s crops. Moreover, because soils lose fertility quickly they are abandoned after only a few years.

Contrary to conditions on the Plateau, land was seen as the most important form of property and social status and access to land was largely dependent upon social position within the kinship system (61). Scudder mentions that the Tonga were unwilling to cultivate cash crops in lieu of subsistence crops (93) as most did not have enough land and would rather have used any extra to grow millet for beer rather than grow for a market.
Causes of recurrent famine were identified as being those of land pressure, irregular rainfall (223), Zambezi floods and recession (224), animal and plant pests (229-31), degradation of alluvial holdings (231), intertribal and inter-neighbourhood raiding. Illness was touched on, but not considered a significant factor (239-40). As a result there was a tendency to maintain relations with others in the clan and a practice of craft making for barter. The Valley Tonga had a reputation among outsiders as beggars (244). It is also important to note that by far the most important aspect of their diet came from gathering activities (201). Thus, it can be presumed the banning of hunting to preserve nearby game park populations was one cause of the constant state of hunger.

A major difference between the circumstances of the Valley Tonga and those on the Plateau was that when the latter took positions in the civil service or entered business they did so as a springboard from which to take up farming. On the Plateau “from the 1920s to the 1950s at least, the elite were the big farmers” (171). Plateau Tonga men that were educated in mission schools were then recruited as schoolteachers. Few remained as teachers for long, however, and instead used their savings to invest in equipment that allowed them to begin cash cropping. As Chipungu also notes, they learned techniques and bought equipment from European farmers so that by the 1930s there was a “small class of large-scale farmers who usually built apart from the villages” (ibid). They generally saw a future in farming, but were especially concerned about the restrictions placed on them by the colonial regime that favoured European farmers. The prospects of commercial farming, however, were rather unique to the Tonga Plateau, whereas in other areas “men clung to paid employment and thought of themselves as an elite group” (172).

In Gwembe District during the period when the big farmers dominated Plateau society, there was no such opportunity for the big farmers to emerge, given lack of transport for cash crops and the prevalence of the tsetse fly which made plough agriculture impossible in much of the district. Even so, in the 1950s schoolteachers were not the models for the young over much of the district. Instead they hoped to emulate their seniors in acquiring alluvial land, small
stock, and other rural wealth. They went out to work to gain funds which would help to establish them in the rural area (Chipungu: 173).

And in the 1970s many that had been successful in securing urban employment had actually returned home to flee high inflation and scarcity of commodities (173).

The RLI studies conducted in other parts of the country tended to be rather ahistorical and were concerned particularly with the perceived ‘breakdown’ of ‘traditional’ societies and their values. They allied with goals of the colonial government so far as they sought to determine the degree of out-migration of male labour that could be sustainable without impeding possibilities for reproduction of labour and disturbing ‘tribal cohesion’. Scudder, among others, saw a ‘degenerative cycle’ whereby rising population densities led to ‘imbalances’ and strain on agroecological systems. While there is likely a great deal of truth in these positions, the RLI institute members did not therefore argue against the reserve system.\(^{31}\) Rather, in line with colonial attitudes, they advocated the promotion of new, more ‘sustainable’, ‘improved’ agricultural methods; a pattern also seen in other British colonies (Beinart, 1995, Anderson, 2002, Rajan, 2002). Researchers need to consider the degree to which Malthusianism is part of a broader ideological reflex rather than something informed by biological and physical processes. As Cliffe suggests of this literature,

> the concern it expressed was literally ‘reactionary’ in the bleak view of the future it expressed, with a faint touch of that paternalism that preferred the ‘bush native’ to the upstart townee: ‘for the more distant future, one can see only a degraded people on a degraded soil, a race of “hangers on” inhabiting the midden of the mines, hawkers of minor produce, vice/virtue of their women, such as it is (sic).’ Objectively their perspective was basically that of the colonial state. Charged as it was with managing the contradictions generated by the demands of mining capital which wanted to extract cheap labour power from the reserves but wanted them to remain capable of re-absorbing it.” (Cliffe, 1979: 156, Allan cited within quotations).

Implicit in the constant evocation of degeneration is the justification for a trustee to step in to halt the decline and promote improvement. The sense of hopelessness in Allan’s statement

\(^{31}\) Although Max Gluckman was apparently prevented from returning to Rhodesia after he openly sided with the Independence movement.
above, however, gives the impression that all one can do is try and contain the inevitable. In this way it is entirely Malthusian.

**Environment and Ecology**

The environment has been a prominent topic of African history for as long as the discipline of environmental history has self-consciously existed. Explorer narratives of course played an enormous role in the processes of colonial conquest. Exaggerations of teeming, uncontrollable jungles, savage people and desert wastelands were the norm in 19th century accounts of the continent in Europe. These were displaced by Malthusian and social Darwinian fears of overpopulation and soil degradation, which have continued to animate depictions of the African peasant. There are three ways in which environmental literatures are relevant to this present study. Firstly, we can widen our perspective on colonial conquest by recognizing the entirety of social and ecological dimensions of imperialism. Secondly, we can examine the ways in which wilderness was socially constructed as part of a broader system of property relations. Thirdly, we can establish the basis of “New Ecology” approaches that see levels of agency in nature, and recognize the limits and perhaps impossibility of human ‘management’ of ecosystems (Scoones, 1999: 487, 490).

The notion of “Portmanteau Biota”, was introduced by environmental historian, Alfred Crosby in explaining the consequences of European conquest of the Americas (Crosby, 1986). In processes of colonial exploration and conquest Crosby paid particular attention to the “fellow life forms, their extended family of plants, animals and microlife” that came with the invading humans and helped them (mostly inadvertently). Much of it had descended from the domesticated species or ones that had first adapted to living with humans in the heartlands of the Old World civilizations (Crosby, 2004: 89). This concept can be usefully understood as something still in process, when applied to processes of agricultural settlement coinciding with the production of commodities for markets. In Central and Southern Africa, European abilities
to transform the landscape had been much lower (Crosby:147, 166). Crosby suggests the African continent had been much more resilient than the “neo-Europes” of North America, Australia and New Zealand in part because of the many millennia of “Old world” interactions in Africa (270-293). Nevertheless, following Crosby, Beinart suggests that with the expansion of colonialism in Southern Africa, “the ‘biological ancient regime’ was often shattered as new forms of production were introduced”. Moreover, where “neo-Europes” were introduced, pre-colonial ecological relationships were displaced, while new ecological relationships were established (1989: 147). This process was uneven, and fragmented settler societies held varying levels of authority within the regions they claimed to control. Yet, particular approaches to nature arose in the late-colonial period as regimes attempted to understand and dominate the new environments they found themselves in (Beinart, 1984, Grove, 1996). Tonga people did not experience the changing relationships to nature brought on by the rise of capitalism in the same way settlers had, even if the experiences of the latter varied significantly. Thus the conflict over land was more broadly a contest over nature and its social meaning. Consider, for example, a statement made by one of the most successful settler farmers in the Choma area.

Here Mike Beckett explains the transformation initiated by his father:

> In 1928 he bought this farm, with help from my grandfather - in England and started from scratch, this was just virgin bush; virgin Africa. There was one road to the farm and that was it... (today). Everything else as you see is cleared and artificial...and planted with special grasses.\(^{32}\)

> Sowing seeds seems rather benign and yet as with the English equivalent, the construction of the romantic pastoral landscape on the Beckett’s farm was a violent process to both people and the land.\(^{33}\) In this case, it involved steam tractors and bulldozers tearing up

\(^{32}\) Mike Beckett, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 3, 2008

\(^{33}\) The fact it is sexualized, as being ‘virgin’, highlights the inherently masculinst dimensions of colonial conquest.
the land, beginning in the 1920s. It is ironic, therefore, that settlers then step in to impose a conservationist agenda.

The creation of land title was not simply a legal demarcation, but a gradual and continuous social process of transforming the landscape for a new geography of production. It was contested not just by people living in its vicinity, but also by nature itself. It was an ideological process in which “lies of the land” are constructed about local populations to ultimately assert control and justify dispossession (Leach and Mearns, 1996).

It is generally accepted that the earliest processes of land alienation in Northern Rhodesia were organized and enforced along the lines of explicit conquest with the goals of taxation and social control. Taxation was not intended to enforce the creation of a peasantry, but rather to induce wage labour (Gann, 1958: 76-126, Momba, 1982: 99). The process was also undertaken with little knowledge of pre-colonial land-use, and little knowledge of the productive potential of the land (Gann: 1964: 225, Allan, 1967: 25-27, 54-59). What is unique about the enclosure processes in Rhodesia, and in Southern Province in the post-war period is that the supporting ideology merged with an increasingly global language of conservation, which developed significant force following the dustbowl years in the United States. This also corresponded with significant investment of public funds into infrastructure as a result of the popularity of Keynesianism and the rise of development economics. In examining this ideology in the Northern Rhodesian case it becomes difficult to separate matters of social welfare, ecology, land tenure and economic development because in the 1940s and 50s they had all been intertwined in the thinking of those in the colonial office. This enclosure process also took place alongside the popularization of the automobile among settlers, which allowed nature to also be consumed passively as spectacle. Human relationships to nature were changing in

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34 Grazyna Zaucha (undated research notes), “The Development of Agriculture in the Southern Province”, Choma Museum. Machines were necessary because settlers had a hard time getting Tonga people to work for them.
powerful ways. Specifically, nature can become valued and experienced as something more distant from human beings, but it can also be purposefully and/or inadvertently constructed.

This racialized class project was advanced in a moment particular to the post-war period in which discourses of ecology were intertwined with developmental projects of social engineering. Robin has described this as a “science of Empire” (1997: 63). Judgments about damage to soils caused by farming practices may have been in some ways accurate, yet as Anderson (1985) has noted, elsewhere they became justification for “meddling in African agriculture” (321). This was also the case in Northern Rhodesia and in the case of the Tonga the colonial government was trying to address a new category of middling peasant, or “emerging farmer” that was perceived to be disrupting the racialized social geography of the colonial order. Furthermore, concerns about agricultural techniques were not extended to include any comparable examination of the impact of the new Europeans’ farming systems, which at the time were transforming the landscape through widespread construction of dams, deforestation, fencing, and the importation of new grasses and animal species. At the same time, they were enclosing other portions of the countryside to exclude domesticated species and protect wild fauna.

While settlers and the expansion of capitalism brought with them portmanteau biota with which they began to transform the landscape we must also recognize the limited capacity they had on the frontier of the British Empire. For the first 40 years of colonial occupation there was very little interest in turning Northern Rhodesia into a settler society. Instead, it was seen strictly as a labour reserve to be tapped by the white settler economies to the south. There was also little interest in creating a peasantry that could produce export commodities. Interest in agricultural change was mainly associated with ensuring that male labour could be extracted from farming systems without causing famine (Moore and Vaughan: 1994).

The creation of reserves would contribute to a number of problems in the years ahead, not only because of the resentment among those relocated, but also because insufficient
consideration was paid to the geology, environment and land use practices, and population factors. In 1945, Allan assessed the “Critical population density” surveys that informed the creation of reserves in Southern Province (1947: 25). The data were collected in 1939, well after relocations were already in process, and based on photographic surveys, which unfortunately “covered a very limited range of types”. The scale of the photographs was “approximate” (due to variations in altitude of the aircraft relative to landmass) (25). For Allan, these, and other attempts to assess cultivability “gave, at best, uncertain results of poor reliability, and this uncertainty may well have resulted in material errors in estimation of Critical Population Densities” (ibid: 28). The attempts to understand the percentage of cultivated land were further limited by the fact that “human groups associated with specific garden areas are often complex and they may change fairly frequently either temporarily or permanently…” (ibid: 57). In efforts to supplement aerial photographs, field visits were selectively undertaken. Yet, according to Gann: “there was little scientific basis for the resultant apportionment, for [the colonial officers] possessed no soil maps, no vegetation or water surveys to help” them (Gann, 1963: 225).

Environmental aspects of land use were politically charged elsewhere in the region. Beinart shows that, in South Africa there was: “a preoccupation amongst officials with soil erosion, the necessity of combating it, and the preservation of natural resources. The welfare of the soil often emerges as the cutting edge for intervening in peasant agriculture” (1984, 53). Beinart sees this is a more generalized phenomenon across Southern and Eastern Africa, yet Phimister (1986) suggests that in the case of Southern Rhodesia, Beinart’s claims are overstated. He reveals that while conservationist rhetoric existed in Southern Rhodesia by the early 1930s, the policies requiring changes in production were generally ignored by government throughout the depression. Secondly, he claims that while the discourse of

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35 Gann makes particular reference to a “Macdonell”, a high court judge appointed in 1924 to head the Reserves Commission – and later knighted for his service
conservation was drawn on in the post-war period, intervention in peasant agriculture around resettlement was motivated more by the desire to further solidify practices of segregation. For Phimester, therefore, conservation was only one among a number of factors altering the social geography of Southern Africa at the time and by no means the most important.

Dixon-Fyle (1977) argues that conservation schemes did not have much of an impact on farming patterns of Tonga people. They did, however, find themselves at the centre of struggle between Africans and settlers and were part of the ideological arsenal in the processes of further dispossession in Northern Rhodesia’s rural landscape. This was something that occurred elsewhere in the British Empire, as Rajan argues:

An important aspect of the conservationist ideology perpetrated at this time, therefore, was a concern to effect what might be termed as technocratic closure, to restrict and control access of local populations to natural resources under the guise of ecological improvement. (1998: 226, and citing E.O. Shebbeare)

Those notions of ‘improvement’ were intertwined with the creation of new masculinities, technologies, codes, and discourses of control (MacKenzie, 16). As such, they were also the basis of new forms of contestation that surrounded conservation. More broadly, throughout the British Empire, ideas about conservation were intertwined with those of development, welfare and gender (Moore and Vaughan, 125, MacKenzie, 1998: 11, 16, Showers, 1989: 280).

In Southern Africa ideas about rangeland management throughout the colonial and most of the post-colonial era have been firmly entrenched in equilibrium models of evolution that see ecologies as having a predetermined movement toward ‘climax’ vegetation types. Thus, without human interference, biological communities of plants, fauna and fungi were seen as having natural processes of ecological succession that would develop a state of stability with species most adapted to the particular conditions. This notion of equilibrium has in turn been linked to modernization models, fears of environmental degradation and worries about potential social unrest (particularly in South African and Rhodesian experiences in which land allocation was much more grossly unequal than in Northern Rhodesia). This resulted in a
range of livestock rangeland policies that were tied to management of perceived social chaos. Peasant herders needed to manage their rangelands to avoid disrupting ecological balance to in turn prevent the risk of famine and uncontrolled migration toward urban areas.

The failure of Africans to adopt methods deemed essential for formal beef market participation were interpreted as stubborn dimensions of local ‘culture’ such as traditions around the supposed prestige and status provided by cattle (Scoones, 1996: 40). This discourse was perhaps most explicitly revealed in Herskovits’ notion of the ‘cattle complex’. As Scoones notes “the abhorrence of disorder and the apparent chaos of traditional farming systems severely upset officials who were obsessed with the aesthetics of neat and tidy straight lines (45). Such policy recommendations and interventions into African agropastoralism were, often derived from temperate zones of Europe and North America and emphasized concepts of carrying capacity, stable grass species composition and mixed farming (Scoones, 1996: 47, Bassett and Crummey, 2003: 3). Similar fears of social chaos informed policies toward forestry, deforestation and desertification in the late colonial period (Bassett and Crummey, 2003: 11).

Since the beginning of the 20th century there had been perceptions of deterioration in communal rangelands brought about by perceived overstocking and unproductive methods of husbandry. The assumptions derive from perceptions of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ model in which individual decisions go against the greater interests of the whole (Hardin, 1968). In turn, it was believed that increasing human population pressures encroach on rangelands, leading to degradation, vegetation change and loss of cover while traditional management structures supposedly collapse under the pressures (Vetter, 2003: 5). According to this model, the density of livestock will in turn suffer and losses will be incurred. Interventions derived from equilibrium models tend to focus on controlling and limiting activities and the herd sizes of pastoralists per unit area. Herskovits’ (1926) “cattle complex” was particularly influential in

propagating a view of the irrational pastoralists that would keep cattle for status to the point they would strain the vegetative base they depended upon. This in turn fit Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons” argument in support of privatization to alleviate tendencies toward perceived imbalances. These ideas about rangeland management led to significant debate in the 1980s (Ellis and Swift, 1988, Scoones, 1996, Vetter, 2003).

Ellis and Swift (1988) argue that in regions of variable rainfall it can be very difficult, if not impossible to determine factors of change that are dependent upon stocking rates, versus innumerable other possible causes of change. While some pastoral ecosystems can move toward population stability (in areas of highly predictable rainfall), the notion of a supposed homeostatic state is more an ideological construction than a scientific one (Ellis and Swift, 1988: 452). In non-equilibrium systems, factors external to the animal-forage relationship have greater determining force on herd sizes, while pastoralists never reach the nominal carrying capacity of the vegetation. “While density has a role, it is small compared to the role of environmental uncertainty” (ibid: 455). In the case of Turkana, Kenya, they argue a, “strong negative feedback relationship between plants and herbivores never develops (456). While equilibrium models stress the importance of biotic feedback, debate has increasingly pointed to the function of stochastic abiotic factors, making notions of carrying capacity largely irrelevant.

Furthermore, Ellis and Swift point out that interventions based on models of equilibrium have had no measurable benefits and that pastoralists themselves find various stabilizing strategies to deal with periods of perturbation, often by resorting to resources outside of the spatial scale of routine exploitation (such as importing food, temporarily leaving the ecosystem, staying mobile) (457). Development interventions such as destocking (and privatizing) are in themselves destabilizing to the ecosystem.
Creating Wilderness

Nature and landscape encountered in the form of parkland is remarkably culturally specific and culturally produced. Environmental historian, Stephen Pyne (1998) explains how piecemeal discoveries of the natural and physical sciences combined with artistic and literary cultural production over many decades to drastically alter people’s perceptions of their physical environment. In Europe and the United States, this process largely took place in a context where people were first separated from land and then approached it at their leisure.

Wolmer (2007) notes the dual lineage of notions of wilderness in Judaeo-Christian thought (13). It is either associated with negative connotations or the sublime. It could be the forbidden wasteland (usually mountainous) “in a realm over which God’s sway did not extend”: alien, uncontrolled, hostile, chaotic and uncivilised. Alternately, It was awe-inspiring and a place to connect with god; an ‘edenic paradise’, a ‘place to retreat into contemplation and purification’ (ibid). This lineage has increasingly been counter-posed as an alternative, a nostalgic refuge to the lavish and destructive city. ‘The wilderness premise is that nature, if it is to be truly ‘natural’, must be pristine and by definition entirely outside the realm of the human’ (ibid, 14).

Cosgrove (1987) explains ways the notion of wilderness derives from gradual changes taking place in Europe that allowed the concept of landscape to be redefined, beginning as an urban idea imposed on the countryside and one that would come to have strong religious associations (185). For Cosgrove, “landscape represents an historically specific way of experiencing the world developed by, and meaningful to, certain social groups.” It is, in fact an ideological concept which “represents a way in which certain classes of people have signified themselves and their world through their imagined relationship with nature, and through which they have underlined and communicated their own social role and that of others with respect to external nature.” (15) Landscape is premised on there being an outside observer, from
which standpoint nature can be an object to be designed and manipulated. In this way, Neumann argues that “wilderness is a critical component of the landscape of modernity” (Neumann, 2001, 643). Its relationship to modernity also means notions of ‘wilderness’ have close association with the rise of the Atlantic economy and the conquest of America. It held particular association with the closing of the American ‘frontier’ (185). By the mid-twentieth century the social relation to natural wonders was still in transition.

The “politicization of ecology” that was taking place in the early 20th century in the US then brought about the creation and administration of “wilderness” spaces (Pyne, 1998, 144-58). In the 1920s, Aldo Leopold managed to establish the first national forest-wilderness park and later created the Wilderness Society, which was devoted to protecting public lands in America. Ironically, the automobile would come to play a significant role in the formalization of wilderness areas. The 1930s and 1950s saw movements to direct the US National Park Service to building roads and service infrastructure in national parks to allow popular access (Kuzmiak, 1991: 270). However, ongoing policy changes took place amidst public debate about the definition and meaning of wilderness that continue as our impact on nature grows exponentially.

It is understandable then, that the meaning of wilderness for Africans throughout Northern Rhodesia was unclear and they certainly had not shared the experiences that led to conservation ecology in the US and Europe. We cannot know precisely how earlier generations of Africans established meaning over things like mountains and expansive nature. As McGregor notes (2005), anthropologists have revealed drastically different ideas of the wild and the tame across Africa and the literature on the relationships between African religions and understandings of nature is vast.

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It suggests complex ideas about features of the environment and animals (wild and domestic) that are difficult to translate, and transgress the commonsense meanings and boundaries of western categories. Anthropologists have also debated how best to understand features of the landscape that are regarded as ‘places of power’ and associated with powerful spiritual forces, particularly pools, forests, particular trees, hills and caves. These sacred sites are prominent features of the geographical imagery developed in oral histories and myth (as well as in the personal biographies of spirit mediums and traditional healers), in which symbolic river crossings, magical interactions with snakes or immersions in pools (both strongly associated with ancestors) or experiences on mountain tops are often central (McGregor: 212)

We know that when rain failed to come, Tonga people would take long treks to various shrines that could have been represented by a tree, a rock face, pool or simply a place where an ancestor was buried (Colson, 2006: 67). Colson notes that in the past the “the bush was a key metaphor, with multiple complex associations signifying danger, uncertainty, and illicit activities, as well as profitable new opportunities, standing in direct contrast to that other key metaphor, homestead/village/ neighbourhood” (2006: 105-106). For those on the Plateau this notion of bush could not have been equivalent to the European concept of wilderness because while it was undomesticated or untamed, it was not without human inhabitation. In fact, shifting agricultural practices meant people were actually in a constant state of taming such land, which they may have occupied only a few years earlier. Aside from the distinctions between bush and domesticity, what is very clear is that Tonga people were well aware that land outside of their own domesticity and chiefdom was subject to its own dynamics that could not be understood by an outsider who had not first visited with someone from the area. If the visit were for hunting purposes an offering might even be given to the local spirits or ancestors (101).

Colonial assumptions about the cultures of land use feed into the ideas of ‘improvement’ which underpinned the establishment of property rights in conquest, particularly as John Locke served to justify claims to land in North America. In coming to America, the British assumed that people had no claim to land because it was not settled and cultivated in ways that were obvious to them. The settlers then made claim to land by enclosing it and
rendering it productive as they saw it. This was the basis of ‘improvement’. As Ellen Wood notes, the corollary was that:

Unimproved Land is waste, so that a man who takes it out of common ownership and appropriates it to himself – he who removed land from the common and encloses it – in order to improve it has given something to humanity, not taken away (Wood, 1997:131).

Of course, Locke suffered too much imperialist bigotry and lacked key insights from environmental historians to be aware of the fact that the North American landscape was in fact a managed one, largely through the human use of fire (Pyne, 1997: 83). The coevolution of human beings and fire means that it had been used in a variety of cultural ways, thus becoming a tool to manage landscape. The fact that humans evolved on the African continent meant that there was virtually no part of it that was without human intervention. If humans have altered every aspect of the earth, then the notion of something being ‘wild’ is perhaps only possible if one is denying or erasing the history of the people who lived there for centuries before.

This is not to deny that many other organisms place constraints on human uses of the ecosystem. But humans, as part of ecosystems, are constantly intervening in nature and Pyne’s work shows that very small technologies can have far flung impacts.

**Succession and Degradation**

If people are always moving in and out of an area then a decision to permanently remove human activity is, in a sense, farming. It is a decision that selects for things that do not grow when humans are present. Management does not mean one maintains complete control – and any cultivator is aware that much is dependent on factors far beyond human control. When Tonga left an area to fallow, they did not necessarily lose their claim to it. They also saw

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it as important space for game, which could be drawn on in times of hunger. Human relationships to environment are determined by a broader mode of production that is beyond the control of any one agent. When the mode of production changes, so does the impact on the ecosystem. The adoption of agriculture, and the transition to capitalism much later, were transitions that have had world-historical impacts.

The Christian missionary influences in Africa of course involved complex changes to, and interactions with ideas of landscape. McGregor refers to:

a large literature on the ways in which Europeans responded to the landscape in terms of their own geographical background - be it the mountains of Switzerland or the rivers of Scotland - to make sense of the southern African environment. Their ideas about wilderness and the taming of the wild were crucial to the notion of a civilizing mission and processes of Christian conversion and entry into the modern world (2005: 221).

Colson suggests numerous ambiguities in the changes to this type of symbolic ordering among Tonga people since the 1940s. In one sense, the inner world was once seen as the site of order and domesticity, while the outer world of the ‘bush’ was seen as disorder – but disorder that one would depend on for livelihood. It might be the source of additional food in times of drought and it would be the land to venture into when soils became depleted (Colson, 2006: 107).

Attitudes about ecology and conservation in the post-war period in Northern Rhodesia are evident in the fact that a 1949 ordinance set up, for the first time, a “Department of Conservation”. Northern Rhodesia lagged behind the other British colonies in joining a global movement, strongly influenced by the experiences of the US Dustbowl years (Anderson, 1984, Beinart, 1984). In 1949 three ‘Intensive Conservation Areas’ (ICA) were created in Southern Province in Mazabuka, Monze/Pemba and Choma. In each of the areas committees were organized entirely comprised of settlers to attempt to address ecological issues seen to be a threat to farming. The boards were under the ministry of lands and managed to have the legislative committee devote a fund to projects undertaken in the name of conservation. Most
of the funds were spent on fencing, dam construction and boreholes. In the minutes of these meetings farmers are particularly concerned with losses of soil due to erosion, weeds, diseases and squatters. The language they adopt displays a perceived emergency with the existing state of things. They also had direct access to the legislative assembly members and were even able to take their issues into the legislature on a number of occasions. The farmers in the ICA Committees generally felt erosion was being caused by poor animal husbandry in the native areas which seemed to be referring to a perceived ‘over-grazing’ or ‘over-stocking’ of cattle on the reserve lands. They also speak of ‘wasteful’ and damaging methods of cultivation, but there is rarely evidence to explain what the settlers disapproved of or how their own forms of cultivation tended to be more ecologically sound. In fact, the scientific evidence on the subject was still very limited and subject to change (Beinart, 1984). Its application to Southern and East Africa also had to contend with highly varying territories and ecosystems.

The Eccles Report of 1946 notes “the knowledge at the time was in some respects inadequate, especially as regards the scientific basis of native agriculture and the capacity of the land” (5). Anderson (2010) claims the same was true in the case of cattle-stocking and land use policies in Kenya, which until 1948 had relied on “anecdote and observation” alongside stereotypical notions of native cattle management practices (249-255). According to Dixon-fyle the Northern Rhodesian government had actually been aware of other significant factors that played into crop output and showed the agricultural system promoted by colonial authorities may not have offered the benefits they were attaching to it (1977: 584). Moreover, as Dixon-Fyle notes, the perception of over-cropping among colonial officials must have been exaggerated or else the ability of African farmers to improve their methods was underrated because African agricultural output was to show a substantial increase during the 1940s and

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30 ML1/17/25, Mazabuka Intensive Conservation Area, ML1/2 File 4135 Monze/Pemba Intensive Conservation Area – Minutes of Board Meetings
1950s. Due to the fact there are no reliable production statistics from the Tonga farmers during this period, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which grain output was affected by land ‘misuse’. Dixon-Fyle suggests that any problems of over-cultivation that did exist were limited to a small group of farmers. (585) Even then, because it was clear different soils responded in different ways to continuous cropping it would be very hard to tell where such activity was taking place.

Aside from the issue of whether or not Tonga agriculturalists were using harmful methods of agriculture, the historical evidence does not suggest the settlers were performing any better in this regard. Phimister (1986) shows that at the very same time in Southern Rhodesia by the early 1940s they had lost their agricultural self-sufficiency while settler farmers continued to shun conservation advice (266). Moreover, in the 1940s white farmers continued to grow tobacco at levels deemed unsustainable by the conservationists (268). The value of tobacco then inflated the relative cost of labour to the point that farmers were unable or unwilling to spend more on the labour-intensive conservation methods being recommended.

**Labour Migration and Fragmentation**

If improvement and social degeneration were themes of the colonial and RLI literature, another that permeates many decades of research in Zambia is that of labour migration. With this we continue to see a great deal of attention paid to fracture, collapse and decline. This is understandable given the county’s mining history - and certainly some of the best studies on Zambia would fall into this description. Nevertheless, it risks becoming a trope with implicit political weight that functions, in part, by omitting important aspects of the story. At their best, studies of this sort have revealed the extraordinary complexities of Zambian society and show that there are very different political dynamics taking place over time and across space within the country. Yet, they also tend to be fixated on issues of migration and urbanization, particularly as they relate to the Copperbelt. Given that Southern province was generally an
exception to these processes, the literature is of limited value here, yet it relates to a broader debate about the political agency and the ideological basis of oppositional politics in Zambia. With the exception of Momba’s 1982 study, there has been a general lack of analysis of the role farmers in Southern Province have played on the national political stage.

While the language of decline tends to be applied to the situation of African cultivators, Palmer (1983) reveals it was also invoked in the political project of securing white settlers in colonial Northern Rhodesia. He argues that the ‘chronic uncertainty’ of growing and marketing conditions, where “everything seemed to be in a constant state of flux, inhibiting long-term planning” was just as much a part of the colonial experience and tended to be a justification for state assistance. Among the problems faced by settler farmers was the fact African growers, and the Tonga in particular, tended to outperform them and had the effect of lowering their potential profits (Palmer: 96, Wood and Shula, 1987: 279). Moreover, the depression of the 1920s caused the mines to be shut down, thus eliminating the market that had attracted settler farmers in the first place.

The 1936 Maize Control Board (MCB) gave Europeans domination of the market by, on average, offering Africans only 70 percent of the price that Europeans received for maize (Vickery, 1985). Other mechanisms of supporting agricultural production disproportionately benefited settler farmers, but the significance of the MCB was also that it served to establish maize as the dominant surplus crop, at the expense of older indigenous varieties. More importantly, it established a state bureaucracy that monopolized purchasing and was responsible for ensuring a stable internal market that guaranteed prices (Wood and Shula, 281). These prices could be kept lower for all peasants and then sold at market price as a means of subsidizing industrial development. Maize becomes important in the 1930s for a second reason in that peasants tend to produce it as a cash crop despite its having lower prices than other commodities. This is the case because it provides some security in the event of a poor harvest. Even though it requires more rainfall than other crops, if little is reaped the
owners can still feed themselves with it, whereas they could not with a crop such as cotton. This also promoted a shift in diets among the Tonga, who had adopted the plow in the 1930s.

The reasoning was first that it was necessary to make the cost of the plow worthwhile as an investment (Chipungu, 1988: 36). That ruled out the more traditionally preferred sorghum, as it did not have a market.

The theme of fragmentation tends to be associated both with labour migrancy and with the reserve system. This is the case because Northern Rhodesia had a long history of being a “labour reserve”, initially to supply labour to mines to the south and from the 1920s onward to those on the Copperbelt. The opening of the copper mines led to the creation of a highly uneven economy that combined or recreated the ‘traditional’ alongside industrial development. Profits from the mines tended to support infrastructure in Southern Rhodesia, which had a far larger white settler population. White miners who worked on the Copperbelt were doing short stints of highly profitable work away from their homes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Thus at the time of independence Northern Rhodesia was largely without schools, roads, hospitals, and a significant manufacturing industry as raw materials were processed after export. The small number of consumer items that did exist were largely produced by local subsidiaries of large multinational corporations (Burdette, 1988: 77, Hall, 1965).

Any state services that did exist in these years tended to be located along the rail line extending to the Copperbelt, and existed almost exclusively for European miners and the small number of white capitalist farmers who owned vast tracts of land along the same line. Missionaries generally operated the few existing services in rural areas. At independence, most of Zambia remained rural hinterland farmed by small peasants who still accounted for as much as 80 percent of the population. It was a society with marked contradictions that was experiencing rapid changes related to the creation of an industrial proletariat.

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40 Between 1953 and 1963 Zambia was part of a federation with Malawi and Southern Rhodesia that was created by the colonial administration to help control labour and natural resources. It was also used as a tool to obstruct independence movements (Hall, 1965 and 1969).
The highly divided economy has for the most part continued throughout the post-colonial period. In 1979 Klepper wrote that there had been some small successes since independence: “In most years the country has been largely self-sufficient in maize. The government established a successful sugar plantation in cooperation with a multinational firm that made the nation self-sufficient in sugar by the mid 1970s” (1979:139). Unfortunately, “the areas in which the nation falls short of its goals of self-sufficiency and the expansion of agricultural exports are far larger in number” (ibid). And while the country had hoped to finance increased industrialization through the expansion of exports, Klepper notes that these had “remained virtually unchanged in the post-colonial period” (ibid). This is a point that will be examined further in the next section, because while there was little growth in exports during these decades, significant changes were taking place in Southern Province which may have altered this trend in the coming decades.

Klepper identifies some key contradictions that run through agricultural policy in the post-colonial years. The first is a general conflict between urban and rural pressures. “On Balance”, he suggests, the former dominate (140). We can add to this an overall concern of both the colonial and post-colonial government that these divisions be maintained as part of a broader strategy of managing the populations. Secondly, he notes the choice between concentrating government efforts on capitalist or ‘emerging farmers’ versus the much larger peasantry. The ongoing trend was, and continues to be, one of favouring farmers that are already better off (ibid). Finally, there is a conflict between pursuing a capitalist or socialist policy orientation. While much rhetoric is suggestive of the latter, the former has always won out both through actual funding devoted toward increasing outputs and also through general neglect of any attempted schemes to move toward a socialist society.

In 1965 a producer cooperative scheme was devised in an attempt to bring “hundreds of thousands of peasant households into the cash economy producing marketable surpluses…for export” (ibid). The cooperative structure allowed any 10 or more people to
apply for group loans for a variety of enterprises “including building fishing and marketing”, however, in practice most of it went toward agriculture (141). By 1969 these cooperatives had failed and loans largely went unpaid. Stephen Quick argues the producer cooperatives failed in part because they “were premised on the assumption that the traditional village was a kind of natural cooperative unit which could be transformed into a modern communal production unit with the addition of modern agricultural technology” (Quick, 1975, Klepper: 141). No further attempts were made to introduce cooperative projects until the first Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda made inconsistent efforts to seek strategies for avoiding the harshest neo-liberal structural adjustment measures being forced on the country in the late 1980s (these efforts could be described as paternalistic and dictatorial while being highly detached from the lived experiences of people in rural areas). Since the failure of cooperatives, government policy has focused on individual farmers and tended to support capitalist and ‘emergent’ farmers above the more than 600 000 peasants. Thus, as Klepper has noted, in reality, the organization of peasant agriculture could be “more accurately characterized as capitalist or pre-capitalist than socialist” (1979: 142).

The ongoing neglect of rural areas in Zambian government policy is no doubt related to the fact that Zambian peasants, as Cliffe writes, “were drawn into the world economy as labour migrants” and that “the rural areas are given over more to the reproduction of labour than to the production of commodities” (149). In this process, Cliffe correctly points out that any attempt to understand Zambian society must grapple with a “whole ‘set’ of social relationships embracing ‘temporary proletarian’ and ‘partial peasant status’”. Studies by Bates (1976), Moore and Vaughan (1994), Pottier (1988) Crehan (1997) and Watson (1958), make agriculture and labour migration in peripheral rural villages the subject of their studies, while Wilson (1941), Powdmermaker (1962) Parpart (1986a, 1986b, 1988) and Ferguson (1999) investigate the impact of urbanization on various African traditional systems and later on class politics. For the RLI scholars, the Copperbelt tended to produce "detribalization," a concept
that, Chipungu notes, “became associated with everything from the rise of prostitution, to the acquisition of Western mode of dress and language, to the adoption of Christianity, and even to the engagement in labour struggles against capital” (1996: 305). In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of scholars examined the rise of nationalism on the Copperbelt. Their emphasis was on the rise and successes of the pro-nationalist associations and the cleavages that existed between nationalist parties and the mine-based labour movement.

Moore and Vaughan’s, *Cutting Down Trees: Gender Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia* (1994) is a sophisticated study that reveals an extraordinary number of contradictions in colonial agricultural policy in Northern Province throughout the 1940s and 1950s. During these years the colonial government needed labour in the mines and in building infrastructure; however they also had an interest in that same labour returning to rural areas where it could be controlled under the Native Authority. Colonial policy promoted the return to agricultural production and therefore did not want Bemba agriculturalists to relinquish their identity associations with farming – which was essential for the reproduction of their labour. Paradoxically, the government also criticized them for sticking too closely to traditional methods of agriculture. Peasant farming schemes were therefore devised with the intention of creating “progressive farmers”, yet they also required participants to be part of a co-operative in order to prevent individuation and ensure that access to resources would be tied to ethnicity and “community”. Colonial officials believed that labour migration was fragmenting society and felt that this policy would help counter the tendency and cement it back together (116). These schemes were intended to draw young migrant labour back into rural areas under terms that seemed to be more controllable than the traditional ‘citemene’ system that dispersed producers throughout the countryside in a logic that was difficult for colonial administrators to render legible and prevented the commodification of land.
In practice, these schemes tended to appeal to an older population that was able to retire from urban labouring with seed capital to invest on the farm. Moreover, the majority who applied for assistance under these schemes tended to be the more highly educated and/or prominent members of society, including chiefs. Rather than as a realistic source of income, most saw becoming a farmer as an indication of wealth and status that could only be assumed if one had another source of income. Another significant factor restricting younger men from becoming progressive farmers was the fact they did not have much command over labour, which was usually arranged through the chief and required a certain degree of seniority. This also related to the level of suspicion chiefs tended to hold toward progressive farmers as they were often not members of the community and were given plots of land outside of the chiefs’ control (118, 127).

While the government offered loans for these schemes, they placed restrictions on the size of plots. As Provincial Commissioner G. Howe stated to the district commissioner for Mporokoso in 1948; the “government (has) no intention of assisting in the creation of a large land-holding class of Africans” (quoted in Moore and Vaughan:117). While Howe suggested plots would not exceed 40 acres, they eventually restricted plots to only half that size (125). Even though many of the loans distributed under this scheme were about twice the average annual income in the area, they produced very poor returns. The reasons for failure were numerous, but of significance was the fact farmers had difficulties finding labour, especially at peak times (124). This was not only due to their poor relations with local chiefs, but also because of the absence of young men as a result of labour migration (a problem not faced in Southern Province) (127). Moreover, there seemed to be significant limitations in the market for cash crops. As a result, the district commissioner for Kasama felt the development of such a market would have to be internal to the community through a “dietary revolution” that would require residents of Northern Province to change their consumption patterns along with changes in crops that would be better suited to methods of “progressive farming” (128). Thus
we see that rather than being a natural element of society, the market, if it were to exist, had to be created.

The barriers that prevented the development of “progressive farmers” throughout this period significantly influenced the terms of anti-colonial struggle. As is clear from Moore and Vaughan’s study, improved farming schemes drew interest from a group of people that saw it as part of a wider political strategy (112). According to Moore and Vaughan, “many participants genuinely identified with, and saw their interests lying within, the colonial government’s postwar development strategy, but the way in which they saw that strategy working was quite different from the way it was perceived by colonial officials and chiefs” (113). The officials tended to be more interested in containing disaffected miners because they threatened to undermine their authority (though the colonial government also wanted to put an end to “backward” methods of farming). The chiefs, however, were more interested in “challenging the government on its own terms, and in using whatever resources were available to improve local conditions” (ibid). They essentially wanted to find ways into a modern society, which they saw as restricted on the basis of race and tied to what they saw as unfair ‘laissez-faire’ economic policies of the day. As the authors note:

these were men with class interests to promote; frustrated by the poverty and backwardness of their home areas, by the lack of opportunities for advancement, and the lack of any substantial government investment to promote it. These African spokesmen argued strongly for more, rather than less, government intervention, for a social as well as an economic transformation, and, crucially, for more money to be spent on themselves, the “improved” Africans. (Moore and Vaughan: 129)

For them, “the question of how government should plan development in Northern Province was inseparable from issues of freedom, justice and the advancement of an African middle class” (130). Meanwhile, some members of the colonial administration saw development as a way of buying the loyalty of large numbers of rural dwellers who might otherwise be tempted by the language of “freedom and justice” employed by the educated elite (ibid). Spending in rural areas, and especially in agriculture, was therefore a strategy to keep the people on their
side, stabilize village life, as well as assist in the planning of other aspects of colonial administration (131).

The experience of the various agricultural development schemes over the course of the next ten years, however, served to re-ignite anti-colonial sentiment which increasingly saw these schemes for what they were: attempts “to exercise control over people’s movements and residence” (135). Thus it created a basis for collaboration between the wealthier “progressive farmers” and the rest of the peasantry that was reacting to colonial restrictions. In their campaign for independence UNIP politicians therefore:

reactivated a long history of evasion and resistance to external control over settlement patterns and mobility. In the construction of nationalist feeling, the experience of labor migration and the urban color-bar were of course central, but UNIP was also successful in mobilizing the support of these migrants once they were back in their rural homes, and this they did through their reconstruction of the Bemba identity (136).

Thus, as Mamdani has noted, the category of ethnicity that was the basis of colonial administration can also become the (limiting) basis of resistance (Mamdani, 1996, Moore and Vaughan: 109). This is also evident in Bratton’s study of politics among the Bemba (1980:193). Not surprisingly, however, Moore and Vaughan note that many colonial era policies were eventually mimicked by the first post-independence government (Government of National Unity) strategy of “village regrouping” (136). At the same time, it is important to note that throughout the colonial period a discourse of masculinity became tied to “modern”, market-based forms of agriculture while the “traditional”, for local consumption, was feminized.

Watson’s 1958 study, argued that patrilinity and patriarchy were essential aspects of maintaining a migrant labour system between Northern Province and the Copperbelt, allowing the Mambwe to keep economic and social structures intact and even flourishing despite their migrancy. This contrasted sharply with the analysis of Wilson and Richards, who saw migration as a burden on African societies. Watson felt the key to the Mambwe’s success was that unlike their Bemba neighbors, they were not "organized round a core of women" (Watson,
Twenty years later Pottier returned to the area where he found migration had virtually stopped, and with it, regular infusions of cash (1988). In this context, food production and trade had become the key to survival. Unlike Watson, Pottier did not see patriarchal structures as responsible for Mambwe survival strategies. Instead, returned female migrants played a pivotal role as they used their links with neighboring Mambwe in Tanzania to establish cross-border trade in food and scarce commodities. It seemed, therefore, that the Mambwe were neither cohesive nor purely patrilineal. Instead, organization based on women’s networks has proved essential for survival. This is similar to the Bemba insofar as women’s labour proves to be more significant for survival, but in the case of the Mambwe they seem to be able to maintain significantly more power in the relationship.

Crehan’s *The Fractured Community* (1997) is based on secondary research on the Kaonde of Kibala and Bukama in North-Western Province from the 1970s and six months of fieldwork in 1988. The areas studied are dominated by hoe-based shifting cultivation in a Tsetse infected area where very little is produced for sale on a market. Though she bases her study in this context, it is largely a theoretical reflection on global capitalism and social sciences in which she tries to show “that, however unlikely it might seem, the vantage point of this neglected corner of North-Western Province can throw an unexpected light on some of the concrete realities of "capitalism" in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa” (2). In doing this she draws from ideas of space as developed by Marxist geographers such as David Harvey, those of hegemony as set out by Gramsci, commodification as theorized by Marx, and the production of knowledge as understood by Bakhtin and Volosinov. Though one could argue that all these authors would have little to offer an analysis of rural Zambia, Crehan argues that “What is useful for the Africanist in Gramsci is above all the practical example Gramsci's work offers us of how to approach such fragmented wholes and how to trace out the complex power relations structuring them.” (8) Thus, as one reviewer suggests we get a multi-dimensional sense of “the processes that comprise hegemony and an empirical story that describes how
hegemony is experienced on the ground” (Tranberg Hansen, 1998). Age, gender, and to some degree class issues affect the locally differentiating relationships that are conceptualized as fractures.

Crehan identifies a conflict between the authority structure stemming from matrilineal kinship, that embeds political power in social organization, and the authority structure that emanates from the state, separating family and kin from the realm of public politics. In a chapter on kinship she discusses the hierarchical relations between older and younger people, and between men and women which structure social life across much of rural Zambia through learned assumptions about reciprocity and obligation. In contrast to Pottier’s findings, Crehan describes women as being completely subordinate to men and having no explicit alternative female account of their world to challenge the dominant male hegemony (133). While the state apparatus serves to construct hegemony through politicians and bureaucrats, Crehan argues, it is impossible to tear individuals out of the kinship fabric to turn them into autonomous citizens whose rights transcend their gender and kinship location (136). Crehan juxtaposes the highly gendered organization of goods and services through market principles to those of reciprocal obligations (229).

In spite of the general rural poverty in North-Western Province, there were, nevertheless very significant differences between, and within, households; everyone was poor but some were decidedly poorer than others.

Rather than seeing Kibala and Bukama as two distinct communities, it may be better to think of the people of Kibala and Bukama as caught up in a whole range of different but entangled collectivities or communities, all of which were themselves socially differentiated, and which impacted on one another in complicated ways. These superimposed communities could be seen as forming something like a complex paisley design within which spiraled a multitude of smaller patterns” each pattern weaving people together into a different community, all of which were overlain one on the other so as ultimately to make up a single design. The character of these different ‘communities’ varied enormously, however (1997:10).
Most important in *Fractured Community* is Crehan’s argument that exchange-value comes to "dominate production to its whole depth and extent" through the thread of gender. She argues that exploring the nature of the particular relationship in different times and places, between those human wants that are met through the production of commodities and those that are not, can help us understand the specific ways women and men are located in particular societies. She suggests that everywhere the process of commodification advances, there tends to be, a broad division of labor that disproportionately “allots the primary responsibility for the uncommodified part of production—particularly that whole loose bundle of so-called domestic labor—to women rather than men” and that in fact, capitalism depends on particular social needs being met outside the market (20).

Though Crehan’s case is far removed from Southern Province, Momba notes (1982: 5, 225) that non-waged labour is an essential aspect in determining patterns of peasant differentiation (reiterated by Muntemba, 1982a, 1982b). Moreover, if gendered labour is an aspect of peasant differentiation it no doubt affects the dimensions of political discourse and practice as they make their way into the national arena. Beyond this, Crehan’s focus on the processes of commodification relate to key discrepancies within the literature on peasant differentiation and agricultural markets. In particular, we see a rather drastic difference between Rotberg’s depiction of the generation of markets in Northern Rhodesia as peasants apparently responded to opportunities of gaining commodities in exchange for surpluses of grain (1980: 583, which is a similar argument to Dixon-Fyle’s) and Cliffe’s, somewhat vague suggestion that peasants were pulled into a “cash nexus” (1979:151). Marx, Luxemburg, Thompson and Polanyi, however, belabour the point that peasants enter the market through the gradual annihilation of their ability to produce for their own consumption. Thus it requires the gradual divorcing of the peasant from the means of production. Certainly these processes take place in different ways at different periods of time and once the commodity form begins to take hold then it has the potential to unleash a whole secondary dynamic. The issue here is
that there is insufficient evidence and theoretical clarity on these matters and two rather
different bodies of thought on market activity rest upon them.\textsuperscript{41} Cliffe provides a little more
clarity when he suggests that instituting labour migration required both waged and unwaged
labour to ensure "long-term reproduction of the labour force (read: female non-waged labour)."
This movement required the penetration of the ‘pre-capitalist’ social formation and yet,

\begin{quote}
the continuation of this pattern typically required further conditions. It required
mechanisms, political and/or economic (the poll tax was the favourite), to force
certain members of the family to enter the cash economy but at the same time
had to limit possibilities for acquiring cash through independent commodity
production (Cliffe, 1979: 151).
\end{quote}
The issue here is one of compulsion versus opportunity, but also varying measures were
utilized in attempt to slow down the proletarianization of the labour force.

**Agricultural Performance and Peasant Differentiation**

In spite of the stagnation and neglect of agricultural production, Burdette notes, the
sector nevertheless played an important role in the post-independence years. In a very broad
study of Zambian political economy since independence Burdette examines the goals and
outcomes of all economic periods leading up to the later years of the UNIP regime. Among the
numerous reasons she cites as responsible for the continuing failures of economic policy are:
vagaries of ideological direction and their contradiction in practice, the unexpected lack of
interest of expatriate and foreign capital in reinvesting their profits in the economy, the
governments’ continued overdependence on the mining sector without diversifying and
localizing related industries such as parts manufacturing plants (as a result, the industry was
highly dependent on imports that became increasingly more expensive as terms of trade
eroded), the fall in copper prices and rise in oil costs after 1973 and the loss of transport
routes due to war with the south. These patterns were both complicated by, and partly a
reflection of, rising conflict between regional and class fractions that manifested themselves

\textsuperscript{41} I am referring, broadly, to the difference between liberal, Smithian inspired ‘economics’ versus Marxist political
economy.
between parties and later within UNIP. Economic policy was also limited by patronage and growing corruption within the party, state and bureaucracy as a result of increasing competition for spoils amidst declining state revenues. In virtually every period the development of the mining and manufacturing sectors was increasingly prioritized at the expense of agriculture even though in rhetoric and official policy the needs of the latter were continually accounted for - if not strongly romanticized.

A key feature underlying all early UNIP policies toward agriculture is a heavy reliance on maize production. The National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard) made some attempts to broaden the kinds of crops purchased and encouraged farmers to grow new crops such as cotton, sunflower and rice. It also undertook a brief, disastrous foray into the marketing of fresh vegetables (Chibwe, 1979: 336). Yet, in spite of these attempts, maize increasingly came to dominate agricultural policy, and the adoption of hybrid varieties has been seen as the main way of progressing from subsistence to semi-commercial levels of production (Wood and Shula: 289). According to Wood and Shula the research branch of government continued to function in the manner it had during colonial years, focusing on the needs of large-scale commercial farmers and developing crop varieties needing high levels of inputs and modern management practices. Research “tended to be directed to raising yields per unit area rather than in relation to labour which is the scarce factor of production in most rural areas:” (291). In turn, they depended upon chemical inputs that largely had to be imported and bought with the limited foreign exchange and then transported to remote areas. Maize is also susceptible to drought and not capable of being grown successfully in all parts of the country (Wood and Shula: 292). Chipungu (1988) notes that in the colonial period “Only Maize had the potential of becoming a vehicle for differentiation” because a market existed within the country and peasants produced it primarily as a food source for themselves (10). It was, however only adopted as a cash crop in a few parts of Southern, Central and Eastern Province. Productivity in maize was negatively impacted by labour migration in Northern,
Luapula, Eastern and North-Western Provinces being (Baylies, 1978: 494). Though Gould (2010) has shown government efforts did result in the expansion of maize production into remote areas such as Luapula in the late 1970s and 1980s. The fact peasants tended to stick with maize as a crop to protect themselves from failure in venturing into new crops is suggestive of a dynamic like that identified in Burma and Vietnam by James Scott (1976) whereby peasants are generally conservative, prioritizing security and group subsistence not profit maximizing. But we also see in the literature a practice of the government keeping the prices of maize down below import parity (Muntemba, 1978, Cowie and Momba, 1982: 249) in order to finance state expenditure while copper prices were at historic lows.

The degree to which peasants were preyed upon politically is also evident in the experience with the African Farming Improvement Fund. Although the fund was generated from peasant surpluses with the intention of providing loans to peasants attempting to emerge as market producers, in practice large portions of it were distributed among government employees, politicians and their clients (Szeftel, 1982). Many of these bureaucrats purchased farms in Lusaka and Southern Provinces along the rail line and no doubt some were among those I interviewed. As Thandika Mkandawire notes however, for purposes of capitalist growth there is nothing inherently negative about graft, if it can potentially satisfy needs of primary accumulation and is reinvested to productive ends (2001: 299). Some farmers were more noble and honest, but there is no evidence that makes anyone a better capitalist.

There was, nevertheless, a growing commercial farming class. As Burdette notes:

these black capitalist farmers were few, but a trend had begun. In remote rural areas the people who benefited from access to credit or extension services tended to be party or government people or those with friends in high places (Burdette: 95).

In fact, in the late 1970s and early '80s large-scale commercial producers increased their maize production from about 30 percent of market share to 60 percent (Wood and Shula: 307).
By the 1980s, as prices of Maize were being reduced – especially in the initial structural adjustment programs - the large commercial farmers had reduced their dependence on it and moved into wheat and soya complemented by livestock (Kydd, 1988:137, 1989).

In 1988 Chipungu wrote that “the work on peasant differentiation in Zambia is disappointingly scanty at the time when much is known about this subject for other parts of Africa.” This statement would hold true to this day, although there has been at least one important new contribution (Sitko, 2010, 2010b). The most important agricultural province of Zambia up to the mid 1970s was Southern Province and yet to date there are really only a few existing studies on the subject. These include Jotham Momba’s PhD thesis from 1982, Samuel Chipungu’s 1988 publication on the role of the state and technology in peasant differentiation in Southern Province Dixon-Fyle (1976, 1977, 1983) also addresses this topic to a limited degree in a broader study of peasant protest in response to relocations and conservation schemes.

Momba argues that the pattern of rural class formation he identified in Southern Province was largely a product of forces set in motion by the incursion of capitalism into pre-capitalist social formations, particularly after the establishment of colonialism in the country (2). Once peasantization took place it was followed by differentiation, which then leads to the establishment of distinct rural classes. He suggests that a rural bourgeoisie was emerging via three common routes. First, he saw peasant differentiation creating rich peasants who constitute “the dominant fraction of the peasantry and who are evolving into a rural bourgeoisie.” Secondly, he saw some rich peasants establishing themselves, with financial assistance from the state, on large-scale farms on land cleared and then vacated by European settler farmers. Thus they “join a growing number of former and current top state officials who have purchased such farms, and European farmers who chose to stay at the end of colonial rule” (Momba: 4). Third, he saw that some peasants had left their villages to acquire medium-scale farms on the state-funded settlement schemes, where they were closely supervised by
officials from the Department of Agriculture (ibid). By the late 1970s these latter farmers were rapidly expanding their agricultural enterprises.

Politically he saw that the three forms of rich farmers held increasingly common interests in that they wanted cheap agricultural labour and were heavily dependent on the marketing board and state financial aid. Yet important differences did exist. They differed in the extent to which they require hired labour and in their levels of participation in the market. The large-scale farmers were understandably the most dependent on hired labour, with the settlement scheme farmers following and rich peasants were the least. Momba saw two potential reasons for this. First, although rapid rural class formation was taking place it was not at a stage where distinct classes had emerged. Exploitative relations between the various peasant fractions were not generalized, and in the isolated cases where they existed, they were very weak, and played a peripheral role in the economic activities of the exploited peasants. Poor peasants did not have to sell their labour power to the rich peasants to secure their subsistence. The rich peasants were very dependent on the family labour of large numbers of extended family. Therefore, whatever relationships the peasants have between themselves were subordinated by external exploitative relationships – to capitalist farmers on state land, settled farmers and the urban industrial sector. As a result of this, Momba argued that although differentiation was taking place, the economic divisions being created were not then expressed politically:

(R)ather, peasant political activities are directed towards the activities of the state and the party in matters of rural development, with the rich peasants constituting the bulk of the leaders of the various peasant communities. These rich peasants speak for the whole of the peasantry in making demands on such matters as better prices for their crops, and provision of marketing and social services (6).

Consequently, although they constitute part of a dominated class in society in general, the rich peasants exercised ideological hegemony over the rest of the peasants in their village communities.
Momba also noted important differences in levels of class struggle expressed among farm-workers. Farmers on state land needed to employ more labour and could access cash and loans more easily than other categories of farmers because of the collateral offered by their title. While the use of labour on settlement farms was increasingly needed, it tended to be too expensive. Consequently, he argued, “class struggle in the form of tensions between employees and workers is very developed and overtly manifested among the large-scale farming enterprises, while it is only beginning to emerge on the settlement schemes.” (6)

Moreover, those working for rich peasants tend to have land allocations, whereas those working for settlement scheme farmers tend not to (7).

Momba also shows that the Zambian state played a crucial role in rural class formation, through its rural development programmes which gave financial and technical assistance to rich peasants in the villages, set up settlement schemes, and encouraged and assisted the occupation farms vacated by Europeans. These actions were justified in what Momba describes as a “petty-bourgeois ideology” which puts emphasis on the need to correct the discriminatory tendencies of the colonial administration. The emphasis and inherent bias of the state toward capitalist-oriented rural development programmes ensured the success of programs that led to rural class formation and the failure of socialist-oriented ones (8).

Elsewhere, Cowie and Momba cite a general “passivity” among peasantry in a “time of political turmoil” (240), and see a “decline of peasantry as a political force” (247). This fits with Bratton’s findings (1980), but it is not necessarily the case following the economic liberalizations. As Momba in fact notes in his PhD. thesis, the peasantry find their political voice in the hegemony of the large capitalist farmers. In the 1991 election of the MMD the party received its greatest level of support from southern province (Ihonvbere: 180) and yet there have been no studies that link the economic conditions of peasants and farmers in Southern province with this political process. One other limitation of Momba’s study from 1982 is that he did not assess gendered dimensions of farm labour and social reproduction. All
interviews of ‘farmers’ had insufficient interrogation of the ownership and production unit, beyond registering the presence or absence of waged labour. This is clearly problematic when one considers Crehan’s suggestion that age and gender comprised the dominant fractures in households in North-Western Province. Moreover, Momba would have had access to Muntumba’s important studies that reveal the strategy of mid-level farmers taking greater numbers of wives to increase their labour force (1982a, 1982b).

Chipungu’s study (1988) is formed as a response to scholars such as Bryceson (1980) who have argued that productive forces have hardly changed in rural Africa since the precolonial days in spite of the integration of peasants into capitalist production (6). Bryceson’s argument on the dominance of the hoe in Tanzania is, according to Chipungu, flawed in several respects. While Chipungu accepts her position that the hoe remained the dominant instrument in the post-colonial setting, he suggests the make, size and quality of hoe has changed. Larger and more durable British ones became available which allowed farmers to dig deeper into the soil, promoting better crop growth. The author claims that by the 1930s, “the British had succeeded in suppressing local production of hoes in east and central Africa thereby making peasants dependent on British imports…” (7). During WWII there were shortages that caused devastating impacts. So while the hoe may seem to be a ‘pre-capitalist tool’, its production, use and exchange cannot accurately be considered ‘pre-capitalist’. He also finds her thesis overlooks or understates peasant initiatives in adopting new production techniques such as soil conservation and crop management that peasants had adopted much earlier than she suggests.

In Zambia’s Southern Province, Chipungu finds that the technological aspects of productive forces had been changing since the early years of colonialism. He notes that general statements about this change have been recorded by a number of scholars. Kay (1969), for example sees peasants in the Southern, Central and Eastern Provinces of Zambia eager to abandon what he calls ‘indigenous systems of production’ in preference for colonial
technology. For Kay, an indigenous agricultural system can be fairly described as “primitive…characterized by a very low level of capitalist inputs, by the use of no power other than human muscles and fire, productive process and modern aids thereto.” (8).

Chipungu classified the most significant changes in farm technologies into four periods. In the 1930s there was a shift from the use of hoes to the adoption of the ox-drawn implements. To purchase hoes peasants participated in various activities, including seasonal wage-labour, sale of crops and livestock and establishing rapport with Europeans who sold them older equipment. New techniques were also adopted, mainly through experience working as labourers on settler farms, on mission stations and in school. Africans then shared this knowledge through family ties. The Department of Agriculture only played a minor role in transmitting techniques because it supported the policy of ‘land alienation’ and creation of ‘african reserves’. The Department was set up mainly to serve the interests of white settlers dealing with pests (e.g., poisoning locusts) and trying to maintain the health of livestock. As well it did research into settler-grown crops at the Mazabuka research station. It also held annual agricultural shows and funded a credit scheme, giving settlers below market rates (Chipungu, 1988: 10).

The World War II period was characterized by problems in acquiring technology and thus peasants learned ways of fixing that which had become obsolete on their own land. The state became less hostile to peasants during this period and encouraged them to increase crop production for the “war effort”. For example, in 1945 the government initiated a 10 years plan “encouraging peasants to use manure, ploughs and to adopt weed destruction strategies; and that conservation of natural resources should be encouraged. The Plan also recommended that peasant agricultural schemes be established” (1988: 11).

Between 1946 and 1964 peasants increasingly purchased new forms of mechanical technologies “and systematically adopted new techniques of production” (Chipungu, 1988: 9). The colonial state had also become more involved in peasant production through extension
services and loans to select peasants, but this affected few peasants directly. They did, however, expand knowledge overall through their demonstration effect. By then agricultural shows had also become annual events in most districts.

After independence in 1964 the state made “rural development” one of its priorities for four given reasons. Politicians realized the majority of citizens lived in rural areas. They believed that rural development would help solve the problem of migration to urban areas in search of employment. They also wished to “prevent urban unrest”. And lastly, they hoped rural citizens could produce exportable crops and sufficient food, thereby saving foreign exchange. In all “national development plans” the government generally saw technology as the vehicle for agricultural development. Between 1964-1986 the post-colonial state expanded extension services through the establishment of camps and training centres.

Yet in the ten years before 1986 state rhetoric and objectives had largely become “empty shells” as mounting economic problems narrowed the choices available to the post-colonial state. Ultimately, Chipungu argues, “Zambia fell into the orbit of neo-colonialism with critical policy decisions coming from the western hemisphere through foreign loans” (1988: 13). Nevertheless, parastatals continued to establish state farms and ranches and new peasant settlement schemes (1988: 205).

As far as the present study is concerned the most significant finding is that Chipungu, like Szefel (1982), finds:

irrefutable evidence that the political class has since the late 1970s increasingly acquired large farms. The rush for farms has been unprecedented among political leaders, bureaucrats and professionals since the beginning of the economic crisis. It is on such farms that a set of “new” fruits like peaches, strawberries and some apples are being grown (particularly around Lusaka) largely for the foreign market using private transport systems. Here, therefore, private enterprise is geared towards non-staple food crops, which the country desperately needs in abundance and cheaply. The growers of strawberries, apples and peaches have often been praised in the local mass media, and their endeavours largely encouraged by the Zambian state in the name of earning foreign exchange. (206-207)
Over the same period, roughly between 1975 and 1985, Chipungu noted that the peasantry had become a crucial factor in the Zambian agricultural sector, ironically at the time when the traditional role of the Department of Agriculture as custodian of rural technology through extension services has been curtailed by the economic crisis. All the major crops appeared to be under effective peasant cultivation: more than 90 percent of cotton, about 60 percent of maize, and the bulk of groundnuts and sunflower. Thus in terms of national demand, “it appears that peasants have brought Zambia closer to meeting levels of national sufficiency than have the agricultural bourgeoisie…” (210).

Yet, overall, Chipungu finds that the middle and rich peasants benefited while the poorest declined further. Moreover, the poorest are hardest hit by drought because they are most dependent on rain-fed Maize, a crop that is more susceptible than many others (218-219) – the prices of which were kept ‘artificially’ low in order to subsidize industry by keeping labour costs down (Cowie and Momba: 249).

Transition and ‘Civil Society’ Literature

Between the 1980s and the turn of the century almost no academic studies of agriculture in Southern Province were published. There were certainly none specifically on Southern Province. Until recently there had been a significant reduction in social research on Zambia. In the 1990s, there was a brief focus on the social forces behind the transition to Multi-Party Democracy. The analysis arguably overstates the role of the labour movement in the process. This is the case to varying degrees with Bratton(1994 and 1995), Hamalengwa (1992), Ihonvbere (1996), Larmer (2002), Panter-Brick (1994) and Rakner (1992). In 2002 Larmer writes “There is no doubt about the centrality of the ZCTU (Zambian Congress of Trades Unions) in achieving political change in Zambia in 1991 (111).

42 As Sitko notes of the post-liberalization era, there is continued evidence to suggest small-scale producers with less than two hectares of land are in fact more efficient producers than the large-scale farmers in the country (2012: 15).

Hamalengwa argues that from the 1970s Zambian trade unions began a campaign against official corruption, wanton embourgeoisement, and the indifference of the government toward the plight of workers. Rejecting the labour aristocracy argument, he presents the militant industrial working class as the prime political agent of change. The contributions of churches, students and the rural poor are overlooked, while “intellectuals” are presented as having largely sold out for material gain (130). Ihonvbere (1996) is much more restrained, suggesting that though the ZCTU played a pivotal role in the process he notes that:

Contrary to some claims as to the ideological disposition of Zambia’s labor movement and of Frederick Chiluba, which both are seen as leftist in persuasion, the reality is that, just like the ZCTU, Chiluba is a conservative liberal or, at most, a social democrat who believes very firmly in the procedural elements of liberal democracy and of the so-called free market (115).

Moreover, he notes the strong relations between the MMD and the Chamber of Commerce and its expressed intention of “vigorously” pursuing privatizations and other neo-liberal reforms (111). More recently, Larmer has convincingly shown that until 1990, Chiluba was in fact an ardent critic of neoliberalism and had gained a following based on his consistent opposition to neoliberal economic policy (2005, 2006c). His betrayal once in office is a puzzle.

Beyond the mineworkers, it seems that the MMD was not a coalition formed out of grass roots “civil society” or union activism as some authors contend. Bartlett (2000) found that any grass roots activism that did exist was severed from official leaders through top-level negotiations orchestrated by the heads of three prominent churches. As a consequence, the three groups cited above were able to form a coalition with some veneer of popularity (Bartlett, 2000). This would certainly be consistent with the fact that the new Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government used its initial popular support to introduce the most drastic reforms that had been demanded by the IFIs, though continually resisted by Kaunda. As Burdette notes:

These actions included the removal of 90 percent of the maize subsidies, increase in fuel prices and the devaluation of the kwacha (the local currency) by
30 percent without a corresponding rise in salaries. Also on the agenda is an aggressive privatization program and the cutback of 10,000 jobs in the civil service (ibid:10).

The privatization process continued throughout the ‘90s (Craig, 2000) while one study reveals clear plans for the sale of public services such as water in a context of a severely defeated labour movement in almost complete retreat (Cocq, 2006). Bates and Collier (2003, 2008) argue that a crucial moment in the rising opposition to Kaunda occurred when the urban wealthy joined in response to the exchange-rate auctioning, which was increasing the costs of luxury imports. This was to benefit only those who had savings in foreign exchange (technically illegal, though widespread among the elite), while those with savings in Kwacha would lose.

The privatization processes saw a certain amount of opposition; however, rather than being rooted in a popular movement it predominantly stems from fractions of the Zambian elite outside of the MMD who were competing for state spoils.44 In elections of 2006 we saw the emergence of a populist, xenophobic rhetoric from Michael Sata, of the Patriotic Front who was then the most popular opposition candidate and went on to become president from 2011 to his death in 2014.

What the civil society literature generally lacks are assessments of changes in the religious composition of the country at a time when there is very prominent evidence of an influx of evangelical US based protestant churches such as the Church of God, the Church of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah’s Witness and the Nigerian-based, TB Joshua’s Church of all Nations. Gordon has offered one fascinating approach to this subject matter, though it only has one chapter on the Chiluba era (Gordon: 2012). Historically, the Watchtower Movement, a local variant of the US-Based Jehovah’s Witness which took root in the early 1900s, had according to many accounts fueled a reformist movement, which would later play a significant

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44 This position rests on the author’s first-hand observations of opposition demonstrations and political activity in Lusaka, Chipata and Livingston in 2001 and 2002, though it is also evident, for example, in The Zambian Post editorial, Nov.28th, 2002.
role in the independence struggle (Hall, 1965, Assimeng, 1970, Issacman and Vansina: 186-193). That was at a time, however, when the most common churches in Zambia were the Catholic and Anglican churches. Frederick Chiluba was a self-identified born again Christian and one of his first moves in office was to officially declare the country a “Christian Nation” by parliamentary decree. Given that colonial attitudes toward agricultural ‘improvement’ were so heavily influenced by religious thought, changes in the religious composition of agriculturalists in Southern Province is of interest, although beyond what I will be able to make any definitive statements about in this dissertation. There also do not seem to be any studies on agricultural workers in any part of the country in spite of the fact there is anecdotal evidence of a migrant agricultural proletariat organized under labour brokers.45

The central question I sought to answer through field research was whether or not African commercial farmers in Zambia’s Southern Province benefited or had been harmed by neo-liberal structural adjustment policies. Furthermore I sought to discover who supported the transition financially and ideologically. What role, for example, did leaders from Southern Province play in the formation of the MMD and did they benefit from the period of MMD rule?

I argue that critiques of import-substitution policies and graft associated with the NAMBoard by people like Bates (1981) and Collier obscure the fact that many significant achievements had been made in the agricultural sector in the post-independence years. They were highly uneven, but Carolyn Baylies (1976), Samual Chipungu (1988), Jotham Momba (1982) and more recently, Jeremy Gould (2010), show there was growth and expansion of the market, with significant accumulation, re-investment and employment (along with differentiation) taking place in the sector. This is consistent with Thandika Mkandawire’s (2001) argument about the history of the developmental state in Africa that is contrary to the positions taken in the Berg report (1981) and many other places since. Rarely have studies considered the functions of the national veterinary infrastructures, challenges involved in

45 Herbert Mwansa, Agricultural Services Project, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 11, 2008
regulating veterinary pharmaceuticals, and vaccines, and making them available. Only rarely have studies considered the particularities of Zambia’s fertilizer production, the standardization of grades and general regulation of the industry. Furthermore, for agriculture, 25 years after the 1990 financial liberalization, the largest issue still appears to be the inability to deliver accessible seasonal loans and insurance products.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to review and assess existing literature on Zambia that relates to peasant production. We see that, throughout much of the country agriculture displayed a variety of forms with mixed levels of success. Secondly, in the literature of the colonial era there is a general fixation with “improvement” and the prevention of what was perceived as social disintegration. Most of the studies of this period are conducted by researchers at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and continue on in the post-independence years at the Institute for African Studies. Third, following the RLI and IAS studies research loses its focus on “improvement”, yet there is a continued fixation on perceived processes of decline. At the same time, there is a drift from the attention paid to ‘disintegration’ and social collapse to fragmentation and change. Fourth, a number of studies from the 1970s onward focus on the relationships between the ‘working class’ and the ‘peasantry’ with a heightened level of attention paid to political consciousness and the role of workers and peasants in the national independence struggle. Fifth, there is body of literature from the 1990s onward that assesses the social composition of the movement against the one-party state, which successfully advocated a return to multi-party elections by 1991. But it avoids an examination of the ways this transition, and the related neo-liberal reforms following the transition, are rooted locally and/or impact a process of indigenous accumulation. More recently, there has been a move to

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47 Chulu, K. “Realign agricultural loan repayments”, September, 14, 2015 [https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=43681](https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=43681), accessed, September 16, 2015
construct a ‘post-nationalist’ history, which attempts to examine complexities of Zambian society that remained largely unexamined as a result of the political context of increasing authoritarianism after 1971.48

Chapter 2

Feeding the Nation, 1964-1986
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the dominant agricultural policy, market circumstances and state structures that framed the lived experience of farmers in Southern Province over what are roughly the first 25 years of independence, from 1964-1986. The periodization is rough because the policy shift from central planning to neoliberalism is a gradual one that commences in the 1980s, but moves in spurts until the dramatic changes of 1991. Adrian Wood suggests the move to liberalization in the economy began in 1980 with the removal of price controls on non-essential commodities (Wood et al, 1990:52). I adopt 1986 as a more forceful break: when cattle numbers begin to decline, food riots break out in various part of the country and Kaunda breaks conditions of the first IMF Structural Adjustment Policy (McPherson, 2004: 161).

The first section of this chapter examines the political context of independence, in which agricultural policy is formed. It argues that despite popular impressions, Southern Province was not marginal within UNIP. Although the African National Congress (ANC)\(^49\) continued to be a political force, the single-party system managed to bring Southern Province into the national project, at least for a period of time. The second section examines agricultural policy formation over these years. During this time the peasantry was incorporated into the national economy on punishingly exploitative terms and their interests were repeatedly sidelined in favour of the mining industry and urban consumers. Nevertheless, the large farmers continued to receive state support. This chapter also goes on to examine agricultural performance. Although it was generally poor, I bring attention to important achievements and the emergence of regional variation.

Many studies have rightly pointed out the various ways the Zambian state failed to meet the expectations of agricultural producers, but too often they downplayed or overlooked

\(^{49}\) Not to be confused with the South African political party of the same name.
important achievements of the UNIP era. Samuel Chipungu (1988) was more attentive to these achievements as he looks at the historic dynamism of Southern Province as many farmers avidly adopted new technologies within their grasp. Thus it was not surprising they quickly took to the technological farming practices instituted by the UNIP government. The model for farming in the post-war era was based on a variety of relatively new technological innovations that combined hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilizers, petroleum-powered mechanization, along with the expansion of electrification, transport and storage abilities in conjunction with a new relationship to finance capital made available by the brokering of the UNIP state. They were designed to further implicate rural producers into a cash economy and create markets where they had previously not existed (Gould: 2010).

It would be an error to see Zambian farmers in this period as independent market participants - as entrepreneurs venturing into new terrain. They were targets of state policy and propaganda, whose rhetoric encouraged them to help ‘do their part’ in building a nation. Their activities were tied to nationalist sentiments and they were encouraged to help Zambia achieve food self-sufficiency. In the pursuit of that goal, farmers were motivated to take loans, raise more cattle, adopt new breeds, protect and fertilize crops with synthetic chemical compounds, and take on labour-intensive crops that could bring in foreign capital and provide jobs. Cold storage capacities were increased, and grain and fertilizer storage sheds were built throughout the country. By the late 1970s people in urban employment were encouraged to go “back to the land” for the sake of the nation, and state infrastructure was there to support them. Campaigns were conducted, and 4H clubs were established to encourage children to

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take up farming. Agriculture was deemed a modern activity rather than a parochial pastime. Not only were farmers feeding themselves and the nation when they planted their seeds, they were also supporting the fight against the racist, white-minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. This is what Kaunda and government representatives told them and it is what many believed.

Although Zambians have nursed a lot of hope in the brief history of the nation, there have not been many years that have been easy. Nevertheless, this chapter will show that for farmers in Southern Province, the first 20 years of independence were their golden years – or at least the closest they came to experiencing such a thing. This was a sentiment held throughout many parts of the African continent in the era of modernist nation-building. That metanarrative was also contested in varying ways. As an emerging historiography reveals, it overshadowed the lived realities of so many who had very negative experiences in the UNIP era. Likewise, for the majority of people, the large private-titled farms were without doubt places of systemic violence structured to manipulate surpluses out of people who would rather have been working their own land. Although there are a number of existing studies detailing agricultural performance over these years, none of them adequately capture either the rise or the fall of this economy.

**Post-Independence Political Context**

Expanding on the work of Goran Hyden, Crawford Young has periodized post-colonial African history into six phases fluctuating between periods of optimism and pessimism (Young, 2012: 10). The sequences he proposes roughly capture the circumstances faced by Zambians in Southern Province. Post-independence was met with a period of optimism that has been characterized as one where a number of social and economic achievements were made to improve the lives of the majority (Tordoff, 1974, Turok, 1979). That optimism soon wore off,

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51 This is most notably evident in the contributions within Gewald, Henfelarr and Macola (eds) (2008) *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*. Brill: Leiden
sooner for some than others. Politicians quickly found themselves having to manage state bureaucracies with insufficient personnel, while also attempting to massively broaden the scope of the services they were to provide. Moreover, this was in a context of Southern Rhodesian settlers making a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, which led Zambia to apply sanctions, impacting road and rail transport of basic commodities (Burdette: 64-70, Ollawa, 1979:179). The housing of regional independence guerrilla forces also made Zambia a target of sabotage and military incursions by white-minority regimes to the south. These factors led to further shortages and frustration for some constituencies, particularly business owners.\footnote{For studies on Zambian businesses see: Baylies and Szeftel, M (1982) “The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s” Journal of Southern African Studies, 8 (2), 187-213, A.A. Beveridge, (1973) Converts of Capitalism: The Emergence of African Entrepreneurs in Lusaka, Zambia, PhD, Yale. A.A. Beveridge and Obershall, A (1979) African Businessmen and Development in Zambia. Princeton: Princeton University Press,}

Making use of UNIP archives, Miles Larmer (2006a) has convincingly shown that political discontent with UNIP’s performance was expressed in various parts of the country continually across the first decades of independence. There were widespread complaints that things promised by UNIP were not arriving. Wealth was not being redistributed. UNIP politicians were suspected of varying forms of corruption and graft, and of generally betraying the struggle. Many felt there was insufficient respect shown for the sacrifices they had made in the struggles for independence. People wanted a government that would be responsive to their needs and instead they saw the rapid rise of a bureaucratic aristocracy (Larmer, 2006a: 49-65).

In the early years of independence, the political elite in Southern Province was severely fractious (Momba, 1989: 352-356). The level of conflict stayed well short of civil war, but a number of informants reported violent party rivalry. Giacomo Macola’s unauthorized biography of the ANC’s Harry Nkumbula (2010) has helped create a more accurate picture of Southern Province politics in the post-independence period. It is a picture in which elites are...
not nearly as unified in their support of the ANC as previous studies suggest. Chipungu was aware of this when he wrote that:

Southern Province was not some political monolith dominated by rich peasants, as some historians would like us to believe, but a region with varying peasant groups responding differently to nationalist politics and, at the same time, all peasant groups seeing some hope for change through nationalism (Chipungu, 1988: 114).

Bates and Collier have claimed, that at the time of the political transition in 1991, African commercial farmers “lay outside of the core constituency of the Party” (Bates and Collier, 1993: 395). Yet following independence Southern Province farmers were not marginalized in the first UNIP governments. Prominent politicians from the province sat in the party Central Committee and had posts in core offices of the state. Many of them had farms of their own and/or came from prominent farming families. One issue, however, is partly that rural politics varied even within provinces and districts. A secondary issue has to do with the meaning of representation; positions of leadership do not inherently imply mass support. Formal political representatives do not necessarily act in the interests of their constituents. Many Tonga would agree with the 85 year old Martha Mweena as she explained, the word “Politician is equated with cheating people.”

The literature is divided over the class nature of peasant politics in Southern Province. In describing processes of ‘peasant differentiation’ Jotham Momba argues that the political function of the large peasants is to act in their own interests, but that over the first decades of

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54 Elijah Mudenda was the first minister of Agriculture, Vernan Mwanga, his cousin, Mianza Chona was the Minister of Justice, then Home Affairs.

55 Interview with Toby Moorsom, 05/05/2008, this is a fascinating statement in part because I undertook the interview on the farm property of her son, Professor Benjamin Mweene – purportedly the first doctorate in math in Zambia, 1970. Benjamin was Secretary to the Treasury in the Ministry of Finance during the presidency of Dr Chiluba between 30 May 1996 and 29 June 1999. On May 25, 2010 he was convicted of corruption offences under section 29(1) of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act No 42 of 1996 and served jail time for misappropriation of state funds to build the very cottage she was living in, and which we sat outside of as I conducted the interview. http://www.lusakatimes.com/2010/05/28/katele-appeal-sentences/ http://mg.co.za/article/2004-08-14-zambias-former-finance-minister-arrest both accessed, January 20, 2012\
independence their interests were increasingly seen to be synonymous with those of the entire peasantry (Momba, 1982). Chipungu, however, argues that Momba errs in including a rural bourgeoisie in his definition of the ‘peasantry’. Following Baylies, he suggests that at independence a rural bourgeoisie breaks itself off from the rest of the peasantry when they buy large private-titled plots. At this point, he claims they ‘severed their peasant formation’ and became part of a rural agricultural bourgeoisie’ (1988: 159). To be fair, Momba describes them as, a ‘fraction of the peasantry who are evolving into a rural bourgeoisie’ and there is something quite significant in that; it points to a hybridity of class forms (Momba, 1988: 159). Elsewhere he calls them “Kulaks” (1989: 342).

The Tonga have been unique compared to many other ethno-linguistic groups in Southern Africa in the colonial and post-colonial eras, in that migrant labour only played a marginal role in their society (Colson, 1980:611-13, Vickery, 1986 ). People were more likely to stay put and place their labour into farming. There is in fact a Tonga folk-wisdom, evident in popular songs and heard continually in interviews, in which the town is seen as a place that pulls people only in one direction. It is often presented as a place of licentiousness and moral decay. In contrast, farming in Tonga traditions can be seen as what makes people fully human (Colson, 2006: 95, 113). The noun that is today understood to mean ‘work’ is the literal word “to cultivate” or “to hoe” (ku-lima). To abandon farming, therefore can be understood as a form of alienation, of abandonment of ones’ connection to the resident group (cisi) that one is in turn seen to be dependent upon (ibid). As ideas, these principles are subject to change and they have increasingly mingled with the dogmas of the various religious groups on the plateau along with the influences of the neoliberal policy driven by capitalist logic that is increasingly subsuming social life in Southern Province (Colson, 2006: 111, 227). To be sure, many of the larger farmers were only able to enter cash cropping after they had spent some time in urban employment. Many of the large farmers are also very strategic in supporting their children through college and university programs in hoping their adult financial success will advance
the farming operation. Overall Tonga culture is to a significant degree based in suspicion of those who move to the town (ibid: 243). The search for a quick fortune can be seen as dishonest (even sinister), while in contrast farming is godly work. Common sentiments toward politicians are often expressed in similar terms: they have abandoned their people and natural occupation.

Before independence the ANC had been the prominent party in Southern Province, but its support had actually dwindled significantly throughout the 1960s until it experienced a resurgence in Southern and Western Province in the 1968 elections. This brought with it the threat of the ANC potentially merging with the United Progressive Party (UPP). Led by Simon Kapwepwe, a UNIP defector, the UPP was gaining significant support among students, trade unionists and small business owners in the Copperbelt, Lusaka and Northern Province. In many instances these political struggles erupted in clashes between UNIP and their members (Larmer, 2006a: 70, Burdette, 1988: 74). In my interviews, those figures who had been close to Kaunda explained - paternalistically and perhaps apologetically - that the violence between the ANC and UNIP was one of the reasons for the adoption of the single-party system in December of 1972.

The establishment of the single-party system was relatively successful in bringing conflicts between elites within the sphere of the party – and often resolved with the help of varying forms of patronage. Momba suggests that, “Perhaps the most important event that affected peasant politics in Mazabuka and Monze was the introduction of single-party “participatory democracy” (Momba, 1982: 360). Key was the Choma declaration of June 27th, 1973. It was then that an agreement was made between UNIP and ANC leaders in which ANC leaders agreed to the new political system and voluntarily joined UNIP as a block. A concession made by UNIP was that ANC members would automatically qualify as candidates in the general election later that year. In areas of ANC dominance, existing ANC branches would be formally accepted as UNIP branches. Yet, as UNIP came to dominate, the level of
political activity at the local level was minimal. There occurred a general abandonment of support within Southern Province for the party machinery while political issues were taken more to the ward development committees and the co-operative societies that were seen as independent from UNIP (Momba, 1982: 367). Momba argues that prominent political figures were successful as candidates, because their own interests were seen as synonymous with those of the broader community, even if they were clearly benefitting much more than the majority of their constituents. At the same time, the disparate forms of opposition that had briefly been channeled through the UPP were, to use Larmer’s phrasing “stifled (but not extinguished) by state repression” (2006b: 157). Harry Nkumbula, leader of the ANC, who agreed to the Choma declaration on behalf of his party, was rumoured to have been bought-off by Kaunda by being granted an emerald mining concession (Larmer, 2006a: 71).  

**Agricultural Policy**

As has been explained in previous chapters, the impetus for transforming and modernizing Zambian agriculture emerged in the late-colonial era. This was part of a much larger imperial agenda, yet there were also immediate material justifications behind it. In particular, it was a response to the fact that the agricultural production levels were not sufficient for the needs of the colony, making it dependent upon imports. A government committee addressing the matter in 1946 noted, for example, that “[at] present territorial production only accounts, in wheat for approximately 40 per cent of the internal demand, in meat products for approximately 60 percent of the internal demand.” The committee further argued that it was unwise for the colony to be too “dependent” on the mining industry, especially when there appeared to be greater potential in tobacco, dairying and pork, alongside a recommended strategy of mixed-farming. To increase production it was felt that alienated land should be occupied in a new round of settlement, while a series of government interventions would allow

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56 Larmer actually attributes this information to Giacomo Macola, the author of a masterful biography of Nkumbula.
57 NR Committee to Enquire into the Development of the European Farming Industry (1946) GOV ZAM/02/1946/12
for supportive research and infrastructure. The position was that “under free market conditions low and unstable agricultural prices and small farm incomes are the rule rather than the exception”. Thus the colonial government called for the creation of “a coordinated system of internal price stabilization of farm produce based on long-term estimates of supply and demand, the control of marketing, and the provision of financial assistance in whatever directions this is found to be needed”. This represented the common sense within government on the cusp of independence. In practice, the policy would eventually lead in 1952-53 to the building of the first maize depots in communities further off the rail line. However, the distribution of these was restricted only to parts of Central, Eastern and Southern Province. Aside from this measure, assistance continued to be directed at farmers already distinguished by cash production and affected less then 5 per cent of the African producers in the three main farming provinces (little over 1 per cent of African households (Smith and Wood, 1984: 409).  

The most significant change to the agricultural sector in the first two years of independence was the de-racialization of maize marketing (Chipungu, 1988: 135, UN/ECA/FAO, 1964: 56). Although this was an historic accomplishment, it initially only impacted a small segment of the rural population who were within the very limited reach of existing infrastructure. Aside from this, government policy continued with the priorities set by the colonial Department of Agriculture, which involved a three-part plan to attain food self-sufficiency, encourage new cash crops where possible and support conservation (Mwenechanya, 2009).  

The First National Development Plan (FNDP), launched in 1964, was based on the recommendations of a group of international consultants from the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Africa and the Food and Agriculture Organization, at

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58 Similarly, the African Improved Farmers Scheme (1946) and the Peasant Farming Programme (1948), the two major colonial development schemes for African farmers, were limited to Central, Eastern and Southern Province.

59 While making a similar point, Mwenechanya (2009) notes that “the colonial government’s main aim was to extract wealth and hence it had no desire to incur the cost of feeding the colonies. This forced the colonial government to ironically adopt a policy of self-sufficiency while actually promoting cash crops that undermined food self-sufficiency.”
the request of the Zambian Government. The general goals of the FNDP were to increase employment, raise living standards and forge equality between rural and urban, and white and black Zambians. Agriculture was to provide raw materials for import-substitution diversification, and raise rural purchasing power by creating waged employment, and thereby expand the consumer market for industrial goods (Chipungu, 1988: 136, Elliot, 1971:10, UN/ECA/FAO, 1964). This plan established the basis for a formal policy orientation that would be extended in the following Second National Development Plan in 1972 (SNDP) and the Third National Development Plan in 1978, until it was brought to a halt with the signing of a World Bank and IMF designed Structural Adjustment Program in 1983.

It is striking today to read in the language of the UN/ECA/FAO 1964 report (which became known as the “Seers Report” after its lead author) an attitude of disciplinary paternalism toward agriculturalists as a means of inducing changes deemed necessary to promote modernization. The “European farmers” were seen as national resources that “could contribute greatly to the future of development because they possess immense amount of skill and experience, especially in the production of Virginia Tobacco, maize and beef”. Thus, they provided a “valuable index” of what was perceived to be possible among African farmers. This included their perceived ability to train “selected Africans to become large-scale commercial farmers” (UN/ECA/FAO: 54). Thus, we see a continuation of the colonial strategy of seeking out class-collaborators from the African population, while the rest of the farming population is treated as passive, backward and in need of inducement to push them into action. Furthermore, the African rural sector was seen to have a “quite different function in the national economy, its main role being at present the provision of a large low-wage labour force for the rest of the economy”. Once successfully targeted by planners, however; “when

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modernized and operating at higher productivity”, it was hoped that Africans would then “represent a substantial market for both agricultural inputs and consumer goods” (ibid).

It is likely that rural populations saw their own lives as having significantly more meaning than as a mere ‘low-wage labour force’ otherwise incapable of mustering the independent gumption, entrepreneurial spirit, and technological ingenuity to produce large surpluses. Elliot noted in 1971 that what was commonly perceived as “idleness” within the subsistence sector was often in fact farmers fulfilling other social obligations in the community (Elliot, 1971: 294).⁶¹ Seen from another perspective, the reluctance among rural producers to participate in market production on a significant scale can be an indication of their ability to meet their basic needs within the existing constraints of the economy. The market had not penetrated their society to the point that they had no other choice but to sell their labour. Reciprocity and redistribution were some of the other mechanisms that functioned toward survival.

The stereotyping of African producers was in fact also matched by an inaccurate perception of the achievements made by the settler farmers. Siddle (1981) examined the initial plans for agricultural settlement that were set out by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and later adopted and adapted by the colonial government. These plans were predicated on the assumption that an agricultural system imitating British high farming could be spatially reproduced in Northern Rhodesia, with an ideal type management unit consisting of an extensive 3000-acre plot with:

500 heads of cattle, on the three-herd-four-paddock system at a stocking intensity of 1:8; a mixed enterprise unit with perhaps 40 acres of tobacco, rotated 2:5 with 100 acres of maize and alfalfa or green maize as a supplementary dry-season feed. (236)

Despite these grand plans, Siddle notes that the reality at independence was very different:

⁶¹ A similar point is made by Arrighi in reference to Southern Rhodesia (1969)
Free enterprise and substantial government grants for land improvement were clearly not sufficient to generate such a growth profile. Aerial photographs support a general impression from survey reports that despite this investment in time, administrative energy and money, on many holdings management levels were appalling. Over-grazing and over-cropping led to pasture degradation and soil-erosion on an impressive scale and only heavy inputs of artificial fertilizer allowed maize yield to rise to respectable levels by the mid-1960s (ibid).

Thus, he argues, at independence, instead of strongly developed systems of well-managed capital-intensive farms, the new government “inherited a degraded region of semi-extensive mixed farms.” Worse still, the “specialized production of vegetables, fruit, dairy, pig and poultry products played an insignificant part in the economy”.

Consequently, the rapidly-growing urban population (by then over one million) faced “frequent deficits, even in basic foodstuffs and permanent shortfalls in other items of farm produce” (Ibid).

As has been noted at many points in this dissertation, African producers were not as incapable as policy makers have tended to suggest. They were certainly not as idle as the depictions in the Seers report infer.\(^{62}\) Chipungu has shown that Tonga in Southern Province had been eager to adopt new technologies, when there was clear evidence they worked (and they had the money and relationships with white farmers that allowed them to buy old equipment) (Chipungu, 1988). He argued they were not as conservative as often portrayed.

Yet, the Seers Report makes it clear there is a significant degree of compulsion involved in getting peasants to increase their output. Their “integration” of Africans into the national economy involved a number of compulsory measures that included being “induced” to sell “scrub stock” – meaning cattle beyond optimum breeding age (63). Moreover, the Report recommended farmers be encouraged onto leaseholds, so lease termination could be wielded as a “strong weapon” to promote the implementation of new land-use policy. Furthermore, subsidies would be manipulated so that:

Fertilizer would go only to the farmers who seeded early and at the approved rate, and it is important that they be supervised in its application. Given the inducement of profit, local authorities could become the best promoters of the sale of fertilizer to farmers and the best supervisors of its application (68).

The document noted that government investments were needed to increase the fertilizer supply, but price should also be subsidized because “to the non-commercial African farmer the difference between the cost and additional input and the income from the increased output probably has to be several times what would induce a commercial farmer to buy fertilizer” (ibid). Likewise, problems of "squatter control" continued to be identified in the FNDP. An important point we can draw from this is that people were mostly functioning outside the cash economy.

Many of the negative perceptions of African agricultural performance expressed in the Seers Report did have some basis. It is certainly the case, for example, that producers often had little idea how to use fertilizers. Yet the issue is that attitudes toward rural life were disrespectful, condescending, and uninformed by testimonies from farmers themselves. This no doubt contributed to a perception among the rural population of the state as distant and often in conflict with their interests. It is difficult to discern whether or not this was a factor contributing to the disappointing results of the policy interventions of the First National Development Plan (FNDP).

Even if the FNDP could be proven a failure, would it be fair to place the blame on Zambian politicians and bureaucrats who had only just come into power? If so, their fault may have been simply that they accepted the economic advice supplied to them by the United Nations Development Program. Wood and Shula are also correct in pointing out that the poor performance of policies in the first 15 years after independence was mostly due to the broader economic and political circumstances of an economy defined by combined and uneven

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63 NAZ ML1/17/97 “Back to the land booklet, Land Settlement and resettlement”
development (1987: 293). Kenneth Good chastises similar defensive statements made by Wood, suggesting that a major portion of Wood’s academic work, produced in close collaboration with civil servants in the Department of Agriculture, deflects attention from “the state’s sustained neglect of agriculture and from domestic mismanagement in general” (Good, 1993: 602).

Regardless of where responsibility lay, by the early 1970s wide segments of the country were disappointed by the lack of social change on a number of fronts. Initially, agricultural production declined as a result of the exodus of a number of the white farmers who feared black majority rule. The country faced an acute drought in 1970, which necessitated the state-led importation of more than 2 million bags of maize (Chipungu, 1988:139). As with other industries in Zambia, agricultural development remained highly uneven. Most marketed production had come from 4 of 10 provinces. Crop and weather patterns played a significant role in these problems, along with the focus on Maize at the expense of other traditional grains, namely millet and sorghum. Maize production was highly erratic “with exports in excess of 50,000 tons in 1965, 1967, 1973 and 1976, with imports in excess of this in 1971 and 1972” (Wood and Shula: 294). With the impact of the oil crisis the costs of production were rising steeply from 1975 onward. At the same time, the commodity prices were being held down, leading to a growing divergence in terms of trade between rural and urban areas. There was a serious decline overall in agriculture in the first 20 years of independence – with imports purportedly doubling from 20-40% of the country’s food. In fact, agriculture was still the “weakest sector (and)… lagged far behind the rest of the economy, expanding less rapidly than expected (3.3 percent as opposed to the plan target of 9 percent)”. Only 76 percent of the

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64 As a result, the remaining white farmers were to some degree revered for their fortitude and the fact they were apparently less racist than those who fled South.

65 This figure is from Good (1986: 240) comparing statistics cited by Elliot (1971: 9) against Ghai and Radwan (1983: 161). Both statistics were provided by the UN, however, I have not been able to establish whether the methodology and baseline data were reasonably comparable.
allocated budget for agriculture was actually spent, suggesting that “agriculture continued to be overlooked and overshadowed by events in urban areas” (Burdette: 91).

**Uneven Growth**

The Second National Development Plan (1972-1977) did not represent a break from the policies of the FNDP. Agricultural policy in the period between 1964 and 1986 was caught between two competing policy orientations: equity versus efficiency. This was further complicated by policies to keep maize prices down for urban workers, who were capable of significant economic disruption when protesting rising prices. At the same time, costs of inputs for farmers were rising. By 1983, Elliot could note that at its core, NAMBoard’s ongoing struggle between criteria of efficiency and equity by then appeared to have been resolved in favour of the latter. The equity agenda “faced bitter hostility from international donors” such as the World Bank (Elliot, 1983: 174). If NAMBoard were to be dismantled, it was recognized that spatial comparative advantages would be re-asserted, with farmers closest to major infrastructure getting better prices for their produce.

The strategy of seeking equity in agricultural expenditures was not, however, necessarily a progressive one, especially given that the sector as a whole was continually under-funded (rarely receiving even the amounts allotted by development planners). Thus, in a broad assessment, Gould notes “millions of economically disenfranchised men and women” remained “trapped in stagnating rural communities”, and continued to have negligible currency in political life and economic policy (Gould, 2010: 5). He further suggests “persistent agrarian stagnation might be better understood as an unintended consequence of a structural logic of social exclusion that divides Zambian society with ruthless consistency.” (137) For Gould, writing in 2010, this rural development strategy has “failed consistently to produce tangible results since its inception more than 40 years ago!” (136). Thus, if it failed to actually enable any significant transformation of productive technique and management, but was instead
rooted in further mobilization of existing forms of surplus extraction, then its effect could simply be to lock up populations in the countryside under varying forms of production that relied heavily upon non-waged labour.\textsuperscript{66} Although NAMBoard broadened its scope in the first 15 years of independence, state services were still disproportionately directed toward the most affluent farmers.

Early efforts at cooperative farms also failed rapidly (Dodge, 1977, Kydd, 1988). They never had sufficient support within UNIP, but were rather a paternalistic preoccupation of Kaunda (Klepper, 1977). They lacked sufficient administrative support, while the Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ) and Land and Agricultural Bank (LAB) obstructed the release of loans and financial support. They experienced a number of additional bureaucratic failures and fell apart amidst internal disputes and attrition (ibid: 383-6). Between 1968 and 1972, the Department of Cooperatives completely re-organized the co-operative movement from the top downwards and imposed managers. They sought to abolish local societies, abandon collective agricultural production, and to encourage individuals to farm privately. By 1972, the original network of small-scale, member-run co-operatives had become a few large farm mechanization unions “managed in an authoritarian fashion by appointees of the Government” (Klepper: 391). While production cooperatives failed, it is important to note that cooperative marketing, on the other hand, had many benefits and became a regular fixture (though graft and spoils politics present another aspect of the story).

The early years of independence thus saw greater differentiation in the sector without any major increase in production. Between 1971 and 1976, the average annual rate of increase for the commercial sector was an extraordinary 9.5 percent, while that for the subsistence sector was only 1.1 per cent, generating an overall, average increase in GNP of

3.6 per cent (Smith and Wood, 410). The contribution of traditional agriculture to GNP decreased from 11.1 to 8.7 percent, while that of commercial agriculture rose from 2.6 to 5.5 per cent. As Burdette notes, “In general…most rural areas remained underdeveloped and underproductive” (94). Between 1963 and 1980 rural-urban terms of trade amounted to a 65 percent decline in the price of agricultural goods relative to urban consumer goods (Wood and Shula, 1987: 293). The percentage of the population who were subsistence producers fell 13 percent over those years, but nevertheless, still accounted for 62 percent of the population.

The first decades of independence also saw a large increase in rural to urban migration while rural incomes declined in relation to urban incomes (Kydd, 1988: 111). “Consequently, despite attempts to reduce the gap between rural and urban incomes”, it had grown. Average household income in urban areas was more than four times that in rural areas (Ibid: 411). Despite the higher wages of the cities, unemployment was significant and expanding (Ollawa, 1979:181). The agricultural sector did not seem to be maintaining its workforce, which was relatively small, given that the industry comprises the largest sector of the national economy. In 1971 there were purportedly 38,740 employed.67 According to Wood et al (1990:17) this was lower than in pre-independence days when there were 45,000 workers (Wood, et al, 1990:17). This was in part because large-scale commercial farmers were reducing their maize production in response to the low prices and rising costs (Wood et al, 1990: 25). Tobacco production also lagged, largely because the high capital requirements made the sector susceptible amidst declining terms of trade (Katilungu and Zeko: 222). This resulted in a general practice of the government buying tobacco from farmers above world market prices (ibid: 242). Even then, farmers often defaulted on loans while they produced inferior products in a fickle market.

Social Gains in the Early Years

Gains made in the agricultural sector in the first decades of independence were highly uneven, while the sector was still only allocated 5 or 6 per cent of the national budget. Nevertheless, their significance should not be underestimated. Nation-wide, 121,000 jobs were created in the first 4 years of independence. Between 1964 and 1971 wage employment increased from 267,000 to 365,550. This was short of the target of 407,000 set in the FNDP, but it was not insignificant (Ollawa: 181). While few jobs were specifically agricultural, many were in a variety of supportive sectors that promised much better terms of work including greater opportunities for skills development. Certainly one could argue this amounted to government largess, yet at the time it was a significant process of social mobilization in which copper profits were used to build essential infrastructure and support personnel in a former colony that had been desperately underdeveloped. The scope of some of the changes was extraordinary and their impact should be recognized.

First, consider the state that outgoing white settlers were leaving the land in, despite the fact that the new ministry of agriculture even encouraged white settlers to stay in the country out of concern their departure would create food shortages and reduce employment. Siddle (1981) claims that between 1964 and 1980 the number of European settler farmers dropped from 1200 to about 250. Moreover, rather than leaving ‘improved’ productive mixed farming operations as was the expectation of colonial era planners, the white settlers left little positive legacy. As noted earlier, the model brought by the BSAC and the later colonial government was that of British high farming. This is the context the plans for extending maize production were formed within.

The challenges of expanding production in maize were multi-faceted and the state led initiatives in all aspects. Greater investment was needed in seed development as well as fertilizer and insecticide acquisition, production and standardization. This is on top of establishing the infrastructure for delivery, pick-up, storage and sales. The crucial lubricant was capital. The provisions for credit were also one of the greatest challenges for a variety of
reasons. All of these things hinged on having a farming population educated sufficiently for the
tasks demanded of them. Chipungu is correct to have said that, “the most remarkable
development in terms of infrastructure was the reorganization, resuscitation and expansion of
the agricultural extension services in the country” (Chipungu, 1988: 145). This was achieved
through a massive expansion of educational facilities. Criticism has been made of the
reportedly poorly qualified and insufficiently motivated employees of the Agricultural
department as well as the regional disparities in service delivery (ibid: 146, Wood and Shula,
1987: 291). Chipungu counters both these arguments with a compelling account of the
efforts undertaken. Without addressing them all, I point out some here.

At independence, entrance requirements for agricultural college programs were raised
from Standard VI to Form II (roughly from grade 6 up to grade 8 in the US system). By 1969
this was raised again to Form III (Challens, 1974: 28). Course offerings and the length of the
programs were increased while the best students could take on an additional two-year
program at the Zambia College of Agriculture in Monze. Moreover, in Southern Province many
of the students came through primary school programs with mandatory agricultural training
(especially those associated with the SDA and the Catholic Church). Graduates would then be
posted as agricultural extension officers in one of the 542 Agricultural Camps opened between
1965 and 1972 (Chipungu, 1988: 145). Alternately, they would work at one of the Farm
Institutes (FI) or Farmer Training Centres (FTC). At least one Farm Institute was established in
each province while Farmer Training Centres existed in each district. These were specifically
intended to provide a variety of educational opportunities for practicing farmers from field-days
to one-week courses. They were also available for adult literacy courses (ibid: 175) and, from
my own observations in 2007 and 2008 it is clear they have continued to be important spaces
for a variety of public educational activities.

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68 B. Challens, a Zambia College of Agriculture Training Officer admitted to some of the difficulties ensuring quality
control among student learning experiences, Farming in Zambia, July 1974, 29.
By 1969, 437 agricultural-related Farm Radio Forums were also being run by the Department of Agriculture and Community Development as well as some independently organized by peasant cooperative efforts (Ibid: 151). The ensuing “Golden Age” of Farm Radio coincided with a number of music and cultural initiatives that served to forge a sense of national unity in a new nation of disparate peoples who in the colonial years were often drawn into sectarian and ‘tribalist’ tensions. Significant achievements were also made toward greater inclusion of women in farmers training programs. Even if women tended to be ushered toward “home economics” courses and were initially excluded from specializing in animal health and disease control some had nevertheless, begun making their way into the highest ranks of the profession (Challens: 28). Moreover, one of the initial intentions of establishing extension services was to be able to teach women to grow more varied foods. Interestingly, they leaned toward cash cropping when their husbands passed on the knowledge they had gained via training courses. Household divisions of labour at this time were such that households could cope more easily with the absence of male labour, yet wives expected to also gain from the time away (Chipungu: 155).

This all took place in a broader context of massive social mobilization in support of education and social welfare. Between 1964 and 1976 “primary school enrollment increased by over 50 per cent; while the number of primary schools rose by 44 per cent” (Ollawa: 185). Over the same timeframe the number of secondary schools increased from 72 to 115 with enrollment increasing by over 450 per cent. By 1977, 770 post-secondary diplomas and 2,204 bachelors degrees and 16 Master’s degrees had been granted (ibid). The number of health institutions had increased by over 300 percent, and services were provided free of charge (ibid: 188).

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69 I had the pleasure of undertaking an interview with UNZA’s Professor Judith Lungu PhD, who in 1970 was the first woman accepted into the agriculture program at the University of Zambia.
Settlements and State Farms

Four settlement schemes were established in Southern Province between 1964 and 1970 with at least one more commencing each year up to 1975. By 1981, 862 plots were being settled on approximately 70,000 hectares, ranging from 60 to 100 hectares, with plots in one Monze settlement averaging more than 190 hectares (Good, 1986b: 247). The intention was for government to provide a greater level of services in these blocks, such as road access, dams and electrification, yet in most cases little was ever accomplished beyond initial surveying and administrative oversight. Most importantly, however, the schemes did allow title-holders greater access to loans. The loans, however, often proved to be more a curse than a blessing, at least for those targeted by the schemes of the Tobacco Board of Zambia parastatal. This was because production costs were increasing and prices were stagnant, if not declining (Katilungu and Zeko, 1983: 243-253).

State Farms for tobacco were attempted briefly in the early 1980s. They were not as dynamic as the large-scale commercial units and overall accounted for less than 5 percent of total marketed production (Wood and Shula: 294). It is worth, however, considering why. Massive initial capital costs were incurred when tobacco prices began declining (Katilungu and Zeko, 1983: 248). This was bizarre as white settlers had foreseen the potential drop in tobacco prices from at least 1946 and had strategized diversification. Moreover, the schemes were designed to be supported by foreign investments, yet those did not arrive. Katilungu and Zeko show that in the TBZ schemes, family producers tending only 1 hectare of land outperformed much larger farmers in terms of quality of product and quantity per-hectare, and were more reliable in paying back loans (Katilungu and Zeko, 1983: 230-246). This is unsurprising given

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70 Good suggests these were ‘households’ and infers that they were already settled. This overly simplifies the process. The rules of the schemes set guidelines for gaining full title and most holders took many years to muster the capital necessary to meet them. From my personal observations it was common for owners to have relatives or workers live on the plots, in expectation that the owner would eventually relocate when sufficient infrastructure was laid. Often this was a plan for retirement.

71 Mwansa, Herbert, Interview with Toby Moorsom, 2008-06-11

72 NR Committee to Enquire into the Development of the European Farming Industry (1946) GOV ZAM/02/1946/12
that the smaller farmers relied on family and unwaged labour, whereas the larger operations had to mobilize wage labour in a very labour, capital and energy-intensive crop.

**Other Cash Cropping**

The initial response to government initiatives and the broadening of agricultural markets was impressive. Wood and Shula note that between 1969 and 1980 “small and medium-scale semi-commercial producers did increase in importance, from 23 to 36 percent of rural households, and they increased their share of marketed maize production from around 40 percent to over 60 percent” (Wood and Shula, 1987: 294). The national crop literally rocketed up in the early days and rapid achievement of self-sufficiency in the staple (a primary goal of the FNDP) led to large maize exports in 1973, 1974, and 1978. The end of the decade was met with a severe drought, which, according to Kydd “even the best conceived agricultural policies could not have withstood (Kydd, 1988b: 233). Still, what we see is a significant initial rise in maize production and sunflower. The latter was a planned import-substitution crop to support the development of a processing plant factory. According to Chipungu, between 1973 and 1975 “sunflower moved from the position of insignificance to one of the most promising cash crops in the country, with Central and Southern Provinces emerging as the most important producers (1988:152). He further suggests its uptake was “meteoric and it is certainly not an exaggeration to state that never before had a cash crop achieved such sudden success in the history of Zambia” (ibid).

In the early years of independence we also see Central Province permanently overtaking the earlier agricultural powerhouse of Southern Province. This is clearly visible in the maize market (Table. 4) but it extends to a variety of other areas of production that will be discussed. Southern Province continued to be an area of significant production, but for a variety of reasons most large farmers increasingly devoted their energies toward ranching. We can gain a sense of the numbers of commercial farmers and their labour forces from one of
the few years such statistics were gathered. In 1972, ‘Commercial Farmers’ held 1057 holdings. 585 of those were in Central Province, 409 in Southern, and there were 63 in ‘Copperbelt and others’.\textsuperscript{73} Some owners may have held title to more than one farm, even though at the time there were laws against multiple holdings.\textsuperscript{74} In total they produced on 2,901,300 acres, with 1,555,500 of those being in Southern Province. 1,239,000 of those Southern Province plots were 5000 acres or larger (more land was being operated than was claimed as owned – so likely large farmers were renting additional land). Kabwe and Mkushi were the most rapidly growing districts in that year, predominantly from new land being opened up. Kabwe increased in acreage farmed by large-scale farmers by 30.1 percent, Mkushi by 39.7 percent. Copperbelt and others followed with an increase of 14.7 percent while the rest were fairly insignificant – however Monze grew by 9.1 percent and Choma grew by 4.6 and Mazabuka by 2.5 percent. It is likely that most of this growth in land under production was by Africans, as a significant number of white farmers had still been considering leaving the country fearing the political and economic climate was insecure.\textsuperscript{75}

Table 3. Southern Province Stateland Farm Ownership by size, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farm (acres)</th>
<th>African owned</th>
<th>Non-African owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male-headed</td>
<td>Female-headed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-199</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-499</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1999</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-4999</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000+</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The salaried employees on these farms totaled 720 Africans and 18 non-Africans in the 200 to 4999 acres category and 450 African and 220 non-African employees in the 5000 acres and over group. Their wage earners and piece-rated workers totaled 4,900 males and 650

\textsuperscript{73} These and the following statistics are drawn from GRZ, \textit{Agricultural and Pastoral Production, Commercial Farms, 1972-1976}, Lusaka: Central Statistics Office.

\textsuperscript{74} 1973 membership records of the Mazabuka Farmer’s Association reveal holdings among the same families.

\textsuperscript{75} Commercial Farmers’ Bureau, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting, April 17, 1973.
females in the African group, 190 males and no reported female wage-earners in the non-African group. In addition, there were reported unpaid family workers totaling 600 males (concentrated heavily in the smaller farms – e.g. 330 on 0-199 acres) and 630 females, with 400 being in the 0-199 group. This trend is described in Momba (1988) and Muntemba (1982). Smaller commercial operations are more likely to use unpaid female labour.

In 1960 the largest single producer of crops became a sugar plantation based in Mazabuka. This was developed in co-operation with Tate & Lyle (of the UK), and by the 1980s it had an exportable surplus over domestic requirements. It should be noted that domestic consumption had increased by nearly 500 percent between 1963 and 1971, from annual consumption per capita of 6.5 lbs. to 25 lbs. (Lombard and Tweedie, 1974: 31). If independence was anything for Zambians, it was sweet. In addition to the plantation in Mazabuka, the industry required the development of a refinery, which was initially placed in Ndola, but eventually moved South to Mazabuka. Sugar cane is slow to mature and requires continuous moisture far beyond the four-month period offered by Zambia’s climate. For this reason, the location of the plantation largely depended upon the capacity to establish an irrigation scheme drawing water from the Kafue. In 1974 Lombard and Tweedie note it provided 3000 permanent and 700 seasonal jobs, supporting an estimated population of between 10,000 and 16,000 in the immediate area. This was not insignificant, given that it amounted to nearly half the number of formal employees on the 1057 other commercial farms in the country in 1974. The plantation’s expansion, however, generated a number of unforeseen consequences that will be discussed in the following pages. The plantation eventually overtook what was once a game management area for a rare population of Red Lechwe (described in Chapter 5). By 1980 the expanding population of workers and their families living on the plantation amounted to 45,000 and it was suspected many took part in poaching in the nearby national parks that continued to protect those species. The water demands of the plantation were not initially accounted for in the development of the Itezhi-
Itezhi dam until after its construction was already underway. Thus, it necessitated the raising of the dam another 1 metre in order to allow for the needs of the Sugar Estate.\textsuperscript{76} The consequences of both the plantation and the dam would have far reaching impacts, which we will return to in the chapter on the cattle epidemic. It is also worth noting that as the plantation expanded output, it increasingly resorted to mechanization, resulting in a reduction of its labour force.\textsuperscript{77}

**Table 4. Marketed Maize by Province 1964-1975**

![Graph showing marketed maize by province 1964-1975](image)

Source: extracted by author from CSO post-harvest surveys

It should be noted that these figures for marketed maize likely obscure a significant portion of production, as illicit cross-border markets existed in competition with NAMBoard (Abrahams, 2010: 128, Good, 1986: 250). Prices were much higher in the Congo, reportedly in 1984 three times those within Zambia. Evidence suggests UNIP officials were deeply involved in this illicit trade (Good, ibid). This adds to a broader picture that is emerging whereby


\textsuperscript{77} The company would eventually become state-owned, Zambia Sugar and in 2001 the operation was acquired by the South African Company, Illovo, which in 2006 became 51% owned by British Foods. In 2015 its website reported 1 873 permanent employees and 4 171 seasonal agricultural workers at peak periods
transportation becomes a focal route through which African businesses emerge and accumulate in ways that are difficult to track.

Dairy

The subsidized Federal Dairy Marketing Board was also taken over by the newly established Dairy Produce Board, with the intention of increasing sales to lower income groups.\(^7\) One year later the direct subsidy was eliminated and between 1964 and 1967 sales of milk had nearly doubled. Cheaper milk and rapid urbanization led to an increase in sales and consequently, demand outstripped local supply.\(^7\) Thus, it was supplemented with milk reconstituted from imported powder (local supply remained stable, probably largely because the majority of expatriate farmers had not yet departed, as about two thirds of them were eventually to do).\(^8\) The interest of improving nutrition became aligned with the drive to extend handling facilities along with the popularization of dairy farming among African producers. The task had surprising technical and social challenges to overcome, not the least of which was the fact that the importation of cheap milk powder, brought down the market price for local fresh milk. Thus, it was eventually stopped by decree in 1984.

Many of the farmers close to the rail-line ventured into milk production after independence. This required significant government investments in cold storage dependent upon transportation. Such facilities were established for the white farmers in Mazabuka in the 1950s but hadn’t been extended to Monze and Choma. In 1965 milk production in Southern Province brought 2,401,068 gallons to market according to the Central Statistics Office (CSO). By 1966 it had declined somewhat, to 2,099,640, likely partly a result of many of the white farmers leaving – a production trend that would have already been underway and continued for a few years in all agricultural commodities. The transition also obviously created temporary

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\(^7\) The primary structural difference was that the DPB included ‘producer-retailers’ in its management.


\(^8\) Chipungu notes that their departure had not been expected when the First National Development Plan was formulated (1988:139)
shortfalls in trained personnel and capital. Throughout this time, Southern Province was the largest producer, with double the production of Central Province. Copperbelt and Eastern barely registered any, mostly because the area was still inhabited by tsetse flies. In the years between 1973 and 1976 very large surpluses in milk were being produced by only 24 of the largest farms.  

The dairy industry stagnated for much of the next two decades (Kenny and Mather, 2008), but 1987 production saw Southern Province bring 10,896,468 gallons to market based on CSO figures. What is more interesting than the five-fold increase is that the other provinces had increased production enormously. By 1987, Lusaka Province was nearly on par with Southern. Countrywide, 39,079,691 gallons were marketed. This suggests that new entrants were at least in some senses developmental, even if many of them were gaining access to land and financing through forms of graft, as clearly revealed by Szeftel (1982). The increase coincided with the gradual introduction of exotic species and their cross-breeding with local breeds which saw greater lactation yields. Virtually all marketed production in Zambia has reportedly come from crosses or exotic breeds (Mwenya, 1992, Mubita, 1992).

**Fowl**

Lombard and Tweedie claim the hybrid poultry industry was the “most outstanding success story” in Zambia’s agricultural sector, in part because of its dependence on national technological innovation (1974: 42, also cited in Abrahams, 2010). In the first decade of independence the production of poultry increased more than ten times. By 1972 we also see Central Province totally dominating in the production of day-old chicks, which continued to expand throughout the following decades. In Central there were 16,503,500 marketed from 585 large-scale producers compared to 235,500 sold from 380 producers in Southern

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82 Cruickshank, Hatakawi and Njobu, (1976) *Increasing Milk and Beef Production with Friesian-Cross-Indigenous Cows* *Farming in Zambia*, January
Province. The same occurred with Broilers, with 1,472,100 from 585 farms in Central versus 34,000 from 380 farms in Southern.\textsuperscript{84} The obvious advantages for Central Province farmers in these segments of the market was their close proximity to urban consumers as well as their greater access to the power grid, relative to Southern Province which still remains much more thinly serviced. Abrahams cites a number of studies to show that the poultry industry in Zambia is directly connected to the Maize market, with commodity prices often mirroring each other (2010: 58). Along with dairy production, these industries have grown alongside processes of urbanization.

Livestock

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of post-independence life in Southern Province is the enormous growth in cattle stocks, which doubled in a 20-year period between 1965 and 1985. As a result, I devote a separate chapter addressing this topic. What is of further interest is the fact that beginning in the mid-1980s these stocks were subject to repeated attack from a variety of diseases. To a significant degree the same has been true for pigs, goats and sheep. The fact that the first two decades of independence were largely free of major disease outbreaks, is indicative of some functions of the state that are often not considered when authors point out the multiple failures and few achievements of the UNIP government. While I will address details of these epidemics in a later chapter, I will here simply bring attention to some state-led efforts that seem to have supported this growth. It is also worth commenting on the reasons for the growth in stock keeping.

Tonga cattle holders are often blamed for being irrational and sentimental in their herd management. Yet, the reality is multiple factors played into decisions to keep such large herds, some dealt with below in chapter 3. First, there is the matter of animal traction, another form of unwaged labour. Also market prices under UNIP tended to be low. Banks were a relatively

\textsuperscript{84} GRZ, Agricultural and Pastoral Production, Commercial Farms, 1972-1976, Lusaka: Central Statistics Office
new institution, and not necessarily trustworthy. A certain amount of stock was built up by off-farm labourers, particularly among those working in the civil service. According to the first agricultural minister in Southern Province, maize had quickly become less profitable than cattle due to higher output per acre relative to investment of energy by the farmer. Africans on state-owned farms often did not have the capital and the managerial capacities to do well in crops that required more input and labour mobilization. At the same time, the prices of labour-intensive crops such as tobacco tended to be too low to be worth the risk and challenges involved (Katilungu and Zeku, 1983). While crops continued to be purchased below global market prices, petroleum prices were rocketing. Premium petroleum prices rose by 550 percent between 1973-1981. Regular petrol rose by 538% while diesel went up by 349 percent in the same period (ibid: 252). Animal traction thus remained very important for all aspects of agricultural production. Half the work oxen in the country were in Southern Province. Four provinces (Central, Eastern, Western and Southern) together accounted for 97% of the oxen in the country (ibid: 258).

The state was very active in encouraging the growth in stock keeping as part of the strategy for food self-sufficiency. It also, somewhat paradoxically for the Tonga, encouraged people to place savings in banks in order to finance further development. The growth of cattle stocks was supported by a variety of veterinary services, by extension officers and by the day schools described above. By 1985 the Department of Veterinary Services had 1,027 staff. Most were “Veterinary Assistants”, and “Senior Veterinary Assistants”. They had 65 Livestock officers and 20 Veterinary officers. The Central Research Station in Mazabuka spearheaded

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85 Although it is not a topic I discussed with many Tonga people, money has an aura; its value is not always tangible for obtaining the things that people desire, whereas cattle continue to be. They exist and they multiply.
88 Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Annual Report of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse control services for the year 1985
research to increase the productivity of cattle breeds. It was then moved to the Mochipapa/Harmony Farm Research Station north of Choma (Cruickshank, Hatakwati and Njobvu, 1976). The state also subsidized the Cold Storage Board and financed the Zambia Cattle Development Corporation as a means of supporting loans for stocking and infrastructure development (Halset, 1976: 37)

All of these efforts, however, would have been useless if the state had not been playing a major role in disease management efforts. Foremost was the monitoring and controlling of the tsetse fly population. This took a number of small innovations to accomplish and the population is not static. If one area is cleared, the fly may end up emerging in other places where it had not previously existed. In the 1970s, for example, following its apparent eradication on the eastern side of the Kafue national park, it then emerged further south, in Kalomo, where it had not been previously documented. In this instance, the unit of the Ministry of Rural Development specifically dedicated to tsetse fly eradication oversaw mass areal spraying between Namwala and Kalomo.

The Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Services also had to monitor other disease outbreaks and oversee various vaccination campaigns. The procurement alone of the vaccine was a challenge, let alone the logistics of transporting, distributing and administering them. Archival records across the 1970s suggest these initiatives never received levels of financing and institutional support sufficient for the tasks. Yet the scale and scope of some efforts is impressive. In June 1973, for example, foot and mouth disease (SAT1 virus) broke out in Mumbwa district, in the Central Province part of the Kafue Flats. Given the distance travelled by transhumance herders, it then spread to Namwala, Monze and Mazabuka, in Southern Province. In response, the Veterinary and Wildlife Research Station diagnosed the strain arriving from local buffalo, procured the correct vaccine and proceeded to undertake two

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89 GRZ (1982) *Overview of Zambian Agriculture*, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, prepared by P. Maleka, sectoral and policy analysis section, MAWD Planning Division
90 GRZ, Annual Report of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services, 1978
rounds of vaccination (as a booster was required). A few sentences from their report give a sense of the challenges involved:

Staff were drawn from all parts of the country to assist in the vaccination campaigns. They worked under great difficulties as no crushes are available for handling the cattle on the seasonally flooded flats. Handling facilities had, therefore, to be constructed in many places in order that the work of vaccination could proceed. Many of the herds of cattle were in remote, inaccessible parts of the flats where lagoons and marches prevented our staff from reaching them in Land Rovers. Many herds could only be reached on foot or by boat.91

Both rounds were given on the flats to about 250,000 animals.

This foot and mouth outbreak was undoubtedly related to the fact that national park lands maintain vast stocks of wildlife alongside human populations that keep cattle. There is a prevalent discourse of blaming cattle owners for inadequate husbandry, yet few acknowledge the impact of wildlife reserves on the local populations. Many diseases affecting domestic stocks are endemic in wildlife. The National Parks and Wildlife Service under the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources undertook ongoing maintenance of fence lines and monitored boundaries and the health of wildlife stocks continually. They were unfortunately far more concerned with poaching than with the health and wellbeing of surrounding populations, yet they did try to reduce the negative impacts of domestic-wildlife interface. This task became much more serious in 1977 when foot and mouth first appeared in Eastern and Northern Provinces.92 In response, the government began installing new dipping tanks to treat the cattle for ticks, which act as a disease vector. Dip tanks are essentially large vats filled with a pesticide solution for the animals to jump into and walk though.

Interestingly, there seems at that point to have been some confusion on the actual meaning and diagnosis of particular diseases, because the same year, the Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services describe also finding “Corridor disease” or “buffalo disease” in

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91 GRZ (1973) Annual Report of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse control services for the year, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
92 This is the earliest record of its presence I have found. Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Annual Report of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse control services for the year 1977
Southern Province. These terms have since been interchangeable to describe the same disease, although there are multiple strains. The same year, Southern Province also saw the outbreak of haemorrhagic septicaemia (pasteurellosis). The immediate response was to place the entire province under quarantine restrictions. By 1985 the government had built 132 dip tanks in Southern Province. They worked for a time, but their efficacy broke down along with various other aspects of the economy. A 1990 Economic Report presented to the National Assembly described the circumstances:

Livestock Production was similarly adversely affected by the unfavourable weather conditions. Cattle in many dry parts for example did not have sufficient forage for feeding. In addition diseases such as Foot and Mouth, Corridor, East Coast Fever etc. also affected this class of livestock production. Unfortunately, the outbreak of these diseases occurred at a time when the animal dipping fees were increased resulting in a drastic reduction in the number of animals dipped.... Lack of transport also affected control measures.

Thus the social, economic and ecological basis of the accumulated wealth in beef cattle broke down in the late 1980s. The pig industry seemed to fare better throughout the economic transition, though I will exclude discussion of it, partly because of its relative insignificance in Southern Province.

**Modernization and Technological Packages**

It should not be surprising that the greatest difficulty in establishing settled agriculture was transportation, at least so far as agricultural production depends upon fertilizers and chemical insecticides. Transportation would also be the greatest challenge in establishing a national food industry. In the past, people throughout the territory of Zambia mostly moved their agricultural systems to sites of nutrients. For the Tonga, this meant relocating one’s residence every five to ten years. In some cases, entire villages moved or branched off from a

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93 GRZ, (1985) Annual Report of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse control services for the year 1985 Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
previous grouping (Colson, 1959). With settlement, the first issue was one of bringing the
nutrients in. This was necessary in part because Zambia’s tropical soils are not “well suited for
permanent cultivation”, while only about 10 to 20 percent was sufficient for maize cultivation
given the technological constraints in the first decades of independence (Wood et al, 1990: 29,
87). Furthermore, those areas that had been heavily cropped in the colonial years had been
heavily depleted. Depletion is not simply related to leaching of nutrients. Soil structure alters
and erodes with cultivation (ibid: 87). Yet fertilizer use in turn acidifies soil, which can be
countered with large quantities of liming agents and the use of manure or the application of
wood ash (one reason slash and burn techniques had been so common in the region). Even
many of the larger farmers were unaware of processes of acidification and instead resorted to
increased fertilizer use. Wood writes that by 1981 Zambia had “one of the highest rates of
fertilizer use per head in Africa”, yet crop yields have not risen in proportion (88).

It is important to recognize that chemical fertilizers were one part of a technology
package seen as integral to the modernization effort. Other crops, even the local maize
varieties, could and still do grow well with only the limited available organic fertilizers such as
cow manure. It is the hybrid maize varieties that need supplementation and the return is a
higher-yielding crop with more, and larger cobs per plant. Nitrogen, phosphorous and
potassium are the essential components of modern green-revolution fertilizers. They were to
be combined with mechanization, such as diesel tractors and the whole was expected to draw
producers increasingly into market production through reliance on the currency and banking
system. Hybrid maize made larger yields a possibility, but it also had drawbacks of not simply
requiring fertilizer, but being more susceptible to disease and pests. This then made additional
chemical inputs necessary. Success was not guaranteed, even for the most capitalized and

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There is an enormous literature on this topic from various disciplinary angles. Some excellent starting points are
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commercially driven farmers. Members of the government were aware of this early on. In 1969, for example, top politicians and bureaucrats were discussing the fact that ZamAnglo, the largest commercial farming operation in the country, had “been sustaining heavy losses from their farming operation”. They, and others, were finding out the limits of “their highly mechanized system of production” and hybrid seeds that left them “badly affected by the fusarium disease problem”. As a result, in 1969 they were planning to lay off 150 employees.

Fertilizer is a transport problem for a number of reasons. First, most is imported. From its earliest use it was subsidized to encourage modern, high-yield farming practices. As more African farmers entered into the market the subsidies increased. By early years of independence it was subsidized by nearly 75% (Wood et al, 1990: 92). The subsidy was lowered throughout the 1970s, but still accounted for about 50% of its cost – costs that, according to the Commercial Farmers’ Bureau were, in 1984, ‘the highests in the world’ and represented 30% of the costs of production.

It would be hard for anyone to fathom the quantities of fertilizer that were necessary, their weight and the challenges involved in procuring them. For example, in 1972:

Farmers having holdings with sizes less than 200 acres on the average used a combined fertilizer quantity of 10,700lbs whereas these having holdings with sizes in the 5000+ acreage range used an average of 891,800 lbs. of fertilizers per holding. However, looking at the intensity of the application, not much difference exists between them as they respectively registered 364 lbs. per acre and 1216 lbs per acre. An average commercial farmer uses about 211,000 lbs fertilizers giving an intensity application rate of 1029 lbs./acre. (CSO, 1972, Post-Harvest Survey)

More recent data from a 30-year period suggests 400kgs, (8x50kg bags) per hectare is ideal, though the response rate is highly dependent upon geographic variations and particular crops. Countrywide, its use expanded from between 30 and 40 thousand metric tonnes a

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96 MRD1/8/38 Ministry of Rural Development
97 CBF "Maize Pricing Policy 1984"
year at independence, to 150,000 in 1976, and 250,000 tonnes by 1984 (Wood et al, 1990: 92-3).

In spite of the large quantities used, there has been limited local production of fertilizers (Wood et al: 87). In the colonial years some cooperation between the Commercial Farmers Bureau and the colonial government led to the establishment of lime mining operations (Rhodesia Lime Company, est 1931). After independence an ammonia-based nitrogenous fertilizer plant was established, but it failed to produce below world market prices. By the mid-1980s, 76 percent of the country’s stock was imported, amounting to 8 percent of national imports. Not surprisingly, the sourcing of these quantities and their transport into and throughout the country placed enormous strain on NAMBoard and government resources more broadly. Throughout the 1970s the war with Rhodesia and the honouring of sanctions added further burdens. With the decline in global copper prices and simultaneous increase in those of petroleum, NAMBoard had sourcing and delivery problems on every level, even before one accounts for the political logic behind the subsidy regime.

Following procurement, fertilizers needed to be combined and much work was put into establishing standardized grades for compounds – getting it wrong could ruin a crop. If fertilizers were procured pre-mixed, standard grades and inspection of imports were necessary. Lime would become particularly important due to fertilizers’ tendency to acidify the tropical soils. Acidification and liming became a topic of discussion in the CFB Annual General Meetings in 1973. By 1975 there were reports of some of the largest farmers experimenting with its application, while a search was underway for economically feasible local deposits. The quantities needed were enormous. Fertilizer and lime supplements both needed to be transported to the field. This required both roads and large vehicles capable of hauling many tons. Instead of production and consumption taking place in the same location, industrial farms

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99 CFB Minutes of the Annual General Meeting, Friday, February 15, 1974, CFB, Minutes of Annual General Meeting, Intercontinental Hotel, Tuesday, March 25, 1975
were to be inserted into a production chain that brought inputs from outside and exported outputs. This is an essential aspect of the world-historical rupture that came about with the creation of the settler colonies and a global market in agricultural products (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989, Duncan, 1996).

The transportation of fertilizer and maize was further complicated by the fact it was, and still is, overwhelmingly moved in bags, while in late-capitalist countries grains had been transported much like a liquid, removing the need for the labour of baggers. 100 The reliance on bags added to the logistical problems, already complicated by sanctions. In the 1970s the country faced many shortages. Farmers were unable to market their grain, but also lacked storage capacities (Burdette, 1988: 120). 101 In addition, in 1975 there was still no standardized grading of maize. Also some depots were purportedly without scales, meaning there was no reliable means of calculating stocks and preventing fraud. 102 Production levels were repeatedly limited by late delivery of fertilizers (ibid). 103 Maintaining transport fleets was without doubt the most limiting factor. This statement from MAWD in 1981 is repeated in various ways throughout all vehicle dependent branches of the government for much of the 1970s and 1980s:

“in spite of increased fleet, there were a lot of vehicles that were lying in various mechanical service departments as non-runners due to critical shortage of spare parts…. While there was an increase in the number of vehicles, there was also an increase in the cost of fuel and scarcity of funds.” 104

In his study of Zambian marketing boards for his PhD Dissertation at Carleton University, Chibwe (1979) concluded that “the performance of post-independence food crop marketing boards on the whole is such that the aims of agricultural development,… are not being

100 Hand written note appearing from M. Choma, 7/8/73 which goes into detail on how maize is bagged by farmers, then taken out of the sack and then re-bagged. MRD1/8/38 Ministry of Rural Development
101 for example, National Archives: SP1/3/61 Southern Province Index
102 CFB, Minutes of Annual General Meeting, Intercontinental Hotel, Tuesday, March 25, 1975
103 Parliamentary Debates of the National Assembly, 16th Jan-17th March, 1976, No 41pg 147
104 Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development Department of Marketing and Cooperatives, Annual Report for the year ended 31st December, 1981
realized”. The white commercial farmers were as dependent on state transport as the rest of the population.105

In response to these challenges government resorted to issuing tenders for private transport services from at least 1973 (Burdette: 120).106 This is one of the most significant avenues for private accumulation that emerged in the UNIP years, though it has largely evaded academic study. The increasing reliance on private haulers late in the UNIP years was a practice that was challenged by some on the basis of equity. Wood and Shula (1987) argued, for example, that:

If private crop collection and input supply does develop it seems likely that this will take the more profitable areas away from NAMBoard, and so reduce the potential for that organization to cross subsidize from its profitable operations (Wood and Shula, 1987: 308).

Furthermore, to maintain an import-parity price of Maize for urban consumers, the fertilizer subsidy was expanding. At the same time the subsidy was partly financed by the taxation of farmers on the purchase price of their maize. As previous authors have noted, this amounts to a regressive tax upon the farmers who use the least amount of fertilizer (1983: 176-178, Jansen, 1990: 210). This, along with the rampant graft from the African Farming Improvement Fund described by Szeftel (1982) and the depressed farm-gate prices relative to import-parity, exemplifying the systematic predation against the largest portion of rural producers in the UNIP years (Jansen ibid, Kydd, 1988).

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105 CFB, Minutes of the Annual General Meeting, Ridgeway Hotel, April 17, 1973, Tuesday, April 17, 1973
106 I found NAMBoard private tender advertisements in the Zambian Times from at least as far back as 1973.
Figure 9. Shell-BP advertisement in *Farming in Zambia* 1974

![Shell-BP advertisement](image)

Source: *Farming in Zambia*, 1974

Figure 10. 1974 Namboard Chemicals advertisement

![Namboard Chemicals advertisement](image)

Source: Ibid.
Figure 11. 1974 full Page Barkcays Bank Advertisement
Loans

Much has been written on the use of agricultural loans in Zambia. Bates’ work on the political uses of input subsidies has perhaps been the most influential in creating a general perception of inputs and privileges and access to resources being offered in exchange for political support. At the same time, office holders can use their position to extract value in a variety of ways that prevents it from recirculating into productive investments. Bates describes this as “administratively generated rent” (2005:98). Access to loans in the first decades of independence is often associated with political processes of this sort (Kllepper, 1979). Szeftel (1982) earlier adopted the word ‘graft ‘to describe the appropriation of public funds by individuals in public office. More recently, ‘Szeftel has used the term ‘clientelism’ (2000a, 2000b). ‘Rent’, on the other hand, is not necessarily something illegal, but could simply result from sharing information about particular program funding only with those you trust to repay in political support. There is much value in Bates’ analysis, however it does not sufficiently describe the situation in Zambia’s Southern Province. Nor does it help us in seeing changes in behavior across time.

Those who argue that internal factors are the most significant cause of the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s create a perception of a country that created banks and credit schemes, which then gave out loans for patronage and neglected recovery. While this is clearly true to some extent, it describes only a small portion of the politics of spoils that had been taking place. First, the most explicit experience with politicized loans was in the early years of independence and gradually declined in the following years (Cowie and Momba, 1984: 256-264). Clearly, however, there were cases of loans going to senior party officials who saw easy credit as a political reward and took it without any expectation of repaying (Scott:

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1977: 323). Furthermore, these loans were linked to the creation of agricultural cooperatives, and were concentrated in UNIP strongholds. This occurred in “some areas” of the country, but not in all, nor to the same degree. The Credit Organization of Zambia that made the loans and the cooperatives that received them soon failed (ibid: 324). Of these loans, made between 1964 and 1968, only 10 percent were recovered, three quarters of which came from Southern Province (Ibid, 325). Farmers in the Family Farms settlement schemes in Southern Province had access to loans from Barclays bank and in the first two seasons 100 percent of the loans were recovered (Chipungu, 1988: 167).

Secondly, a huge portion of loans post 1973 came from private banks (possibly the largest amount, though I have not uncovered sufficient data to determine). Throughout the 1970s the majority of agricultural loans were short-term loans for inputs, and all of those went through commercial banks.108 Moreover, those loans continued to increase throughout that period, after it was clearly evident there was no end to the economic crisis in sight. These banks also had enough information by then to be aware of the risks involved, given that there was such a limited banking culture in the country. It is important to consider the degree to which banks were participating in predatory behavior, especially considering the fact that longer term loans were guaranteed by the government (McPherson, 2004b:153).109 There were other avenues for farmers to get loans, but conditions were stringent and heavily geared toward the wealthy farmers (Cowie and Momba, 1984, Momba, 1989: 337-341).

Third, the World Bank and the IMF exacerbated the situation. McPherson rightly wonders why it is that those institutions, along with other donor agencies, continued “lending so lavishly to a country that, as early as 1975, could not fund its external debt” (McPherson: 2004a: 31). Zambia drew on IMF finance every year between 1971 and 1986, with the

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109 for global context of interest rates see Eric Toussaint Your Money or Your Life: The Tyranny of Global Finance, Chicago: Haymarket 144-147
exception of 1974 and 1985, and had entered formal adjustment plans with them in 1978, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1986, until the crucial 1991 terms following the return of multi-party elections. It is also important to recognize that these loans from multi-lateral organizations were also used to prop up all commercial farmers. The almost entirely white membership of the CFB had been courting the World Bank from at least as early as 1970 and continued to maintain privileged relations with them over the course of the following decades.\textsuperscript{110} Understandably, people might have the impression that third world debt went to the poor, but in fact it most often ended up supporting the elites. Many of these elite were storing their wealth in British Pounds (often relying on the black market to do so) and thus causing a further undermining of the Zambian economy (McPherson, 2004b: 153).

Anyone who argued that the white farmers were at odds with the UNIP government would do well to examine some of the ZNFU archives. In 1975, the Chairman, A.B. Loggie noted union members were quite pleased with the removal of restrictions on borrowing that they were lobbying for:

\begin{quote}
We should take note that virtually without exception our proposals on taxation have been sympathetically and favourably acknowledged. The Bank of Zambia now allows the externalization of pension funds, and expatriate farmers are not only able to borrow without restriction, but they are able to externalize 10\% of their profits.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

Moreover, for an organization that later would become the most ardent advocate of economic liberalization (and removal of capital controls) it is quite fascinating they had no problem supporting the fertilizer subsidy that was one of the heaviest drains on finances in the ensuing years, along with the maize subsidies. Thus Chairman Loggie, in the same meeting, offered the CFB’s “grateful appreciation to the Government for its decision to continue the fertilizer subsidy, which is vital to ensure that costs of production are not inflated any more than

\textsuperscript{110} CFB minutes from AGM Friday June 5\textsuperscript{th}, 1970, Friday August 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1972, Tuesday, April 17, 1973
\textsuperscript{111} CFB, Minutes of Annual General Meeting, Intercontinental Hotel, Tuesday, March 25, 1975
necessary (ibid). It is clear the white farmers were also taking part in the forms of “prebendal”, “clientalist”, patronage systems that are often presumed the norm for the African population.

I am fortunate to have found a decade’s worth of data on debt that was collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD) in annual surveys between 1970 and 1981. The surveys were sent out to 130 financial institutions. In 1980 it had a response rate of 73%, in 1981 it was 93.3%, though I am unaware of the rates from previous years.\(^\text{112}\) The broader context of these loans was summed up by a MAWD study noting:

> the existing farm credit system is heavily oriented towards the needs of commercial farmers. It has been estimated that, in the 1975-79 period, only 3.5 percent of all farm families in Zambia received any type of farm loan. Recovery rates, on the part of the public-sector institutions are poor.\(^\text{113}\)

The number of successful applicants in 1975 was 26,243, which rose to 33,965 the following year and then came down slightly in 1977, 1978 and 1979. Yet the amounts issued increased massively. Most of it went to short-term seasonal loans, predominantly for crop inputs, though some was for cattle, infrastructure, machinery and others. The overwhelming majority went to farmers in Central/Lusaka and Southern. In 1975-78 in Lusaka the amounts were massive in comparison (these are likely the politicians and civil servants described by Szeftel, 1982). In general, “the majority” of seasonal credit at the time was supplied by the commercial banks while the majority of development credit (for fixed or more permanent investments) came from the Agricultural Finance Company and the Development Bank of Zambia.\(^\text{114}\)

There are a few important points to take from this. First, loans continued to be issued, even as the economic crisis was evident. Moreover, most of it went to a small portion of the producers in the country. Though Southern Province may have been marginalized in UNIP (which is still not clear) the prevailing economic conditions did ensure loans and inputs got to

\(^{112}\) GRZ (1979) Survey of Agricultural Loans Issued by Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions during the years 1975-79

\(^{113}\) GRZ/p. Maleka, Sectoral and policy analysis section, MAWD planning division (1982) Overview of Zambian Agriculture

\(^{114}\) GRZ (1982) Overview of Zambian Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, prepared by P. Maleka, sectoral and policy analysis section, MAWD Planning Division
them (something that has not happened to any significant degree in the post-liberalization era). The majority of loans in turn went to the purchasing of inputs – predominantly fertilizer (with Shell/BP possibly being the most significant beneficiary).

Furthermore, the donor community supported this process in a number of ways. For example, the Maleka study in 1982 cited above noted that;

“NAMBoard will receive a loan of K8.2 millions in 1982, financed mainly by CIDA, to enable it to invest in new fertilizer and grain storage sheds in all provinces. In addition, K3.76 millions have been budgeted for capital expenditures under the Grain Storage Programme drawing partly on funds provided via the Czechoslovak (sic) loan and a Saudi Arabian Grant…(8)”

Amidst a crisis of fertilizer production USAID was involved in supporting the CFB in its efforts to bring in competition from private producers. They were in discussion with Premier, for example, yet the company complained that the import duty was too much for them to be able to produce at parity with government prices. This was one of the many reasons CFB began pushing for liberalization, even though they had been well aware of the benefits economic protections had been providing them in the previous decades (including the subsidization of fertilizer). Wood suggests the move to liberalization in the economy began in 1980 with the removal of price controls on non-essential commodities (Wood et al, 1990:52). He further suggests that ideological pressures for liberalization came from the donor community throughout the 1980s, but it was not until 1987 that the IMF finally pushes Structural Adjustment Programs. These facts certainly beg the question of whether the loans were in fact intended to extend the markets for the national industries of donor countries (while also finding high returns for international capital invested under IMF and World Bank protection). My point here is not to deny the internal political conditions that drove pricing policies and enabled graft. It is, rather, to also point out the external factors that contributed and served to benefit in a variety of ways from Zambia’s indebtedness, especially once the effects of the Volcker shock caused interest rates to soar (Fernholz, 2004: 265).

\[115\] ZNFU archive: RC/B Location: CFB3/ii/
Zambia also cannot be solely blamed for the failure of agricultural initiatives that drained resources with little returns. The attempts to create State Farms on alienated private titled plots, for example, were foreign run and foreign supported. They were not something simply cooked up within a logic of naïve socialist state-planning. Such projects had many precedents and counterparts. They arose out of late colonial high-modernist planning and usually included joint investment by multinational corporations that were in turn protected by international aid financing. Tanzania's peanut scheme is a quintessential example (Scott: 1998: 225-261). The archival evidence suggests one of the primary reasons for abandoning them in Zambia was because pledged foreign investments did not arrive. This was in the context of a global financial crisis, which by 1982 had caused the Mexican government to default on debt payments.

Zambian economic reports in 1983 noted that prices of agricultural inputs had risen 100% over the 4 years between 1979-1983 (ibid). The inflation was 20 percent. Fertilizers were 5 times the global market average. Cooperative marketing structures that worked in alliance with NAMBoard were also not getting necessary credit to be able to maintain seasonal loans for inputs. Private bank lending was also drying up, in part because of farmers defaulting, but also because of the poor liquidity due to the crushing national debt. Consumer demand was plummeting, while some agricultural products were in a state of overproduction – pork being one example.

Another fact to consider is that, the lack of repayments on loans was not simply a political issue, but also an ecological one. Repeated drought and rain inundation was affecting the large commercial white farmers as well. Those loans that CFB members were advocating for ended up having quite a sting for them and farmers of all levels just a few years

\[116\] CFB minutes from UNIP CFB meeting, October, 25 1983
\[117\] CFB meeting with UNIP October 1983, AGRI Finance Company exchange, 7\textsuperscript{th}, Jan, 1985
later. In 1983 while complaining to government about the low purchase price for maize a Mr.
Staal, explained:

The biggest constraints to farmers at the moment were the soaring debts with
the Banks, caused mainly by the poor crop of the last two years, and the rise in
the prices of most agricultural inputs, as well as the failure by the Co-operative
Marketing Unions to pay for the produce on time.\textsuperscript{118}

These challenges would then be compounded by a third year of drought.\textsuperscript{119} The ZNFU had
received confirmation of this from a P.M Simpengba of the Agricultural Finance Company in a
letter explaining the cause of declined loan applications:

It is most regrettable indeed that our very poor liquidity position has made it
utterly impossible for us at this time of the season to respond favourably to
numerous requests for loans from us made by our customers, a lot of whom
are very good clients in the category of (name withheld). This has been due to
very poor loan repayments made by the farmers due to the severe drought
which devastated crops of most of them under the ended season of 1983/4.\textsuperscript{120}

These are some of the reasons Tonga farmers actually tended to be quite conservative toward
bank loans. Still, many of them would lose out as a result of unpredictable weather patterns. It
became far worse, when interest rates skyrocketed to above 300% in 1990/1991.

For all of the reasons cited above it is disingenuous to lambast Zambian farmers for
failing to pay back loans. It exaggerates the reality of what took place and in turn serves to
justify the dismantling of meaningful state initiatives. This is in a context where agriculture only
ever received about 6 percent of the national budget. Yet there is another dimension to the
loan issue that gets swept aside and that is the facts of colonial history. Given the realities of
Zambia’s colonial history it is reasonable to ask whether international financial institutions
should really be able to claim moral authority over people who were consciously taking loans
without regard to how they would be paid back? In the span of one lifetime land was
disingenuously and systematically stolen from under their feet. The treaties that secured the
land for the Chartered company were obtained through dishonest, manipulative means and

\textsuperscript{118} ibid
\textsuperscript{119} CFB, “Maize Pricing Policy 1984” briefing note
\textsuperscript{120} CFB, letter from Agricultural Finance Company, P.M. Simpengba, ref AFC/LP/3/2, January 7, 1985
contained terms that the signatories could never have comprehended, nor would they have had the moral and legal authority from within their communities to support them. Following this, Zambians were relocated and ushered into an undemocratic and manipulative Native Authority system of apartheid, subject to forced labour and systematic impoverishment while being denied the possible benefits of modernity such as clinics, sanitation and other potentially liberating public services. Can we really blame someone who then mistakenly believed UNIP was providing some initial form of reparations? Paul Hamanega was born in 1935, and I believe this was what he was driving at when he explained:

what we knew was just to farm. Along the rail line we had farms. Now the colonial people shifted us from good land to land that was not very good. They gave land to white soldiers – for nearly free. In some areas land was sold for 3 pence per hectare. People were shifted too far. That is how our agriculture became disturbed. When we came out of that nonsense we came back, some bought land... when we were given loans we didn’t understand... we didn’t pay back.\textsuperscript{121}

It is so easy, with the discourse around loans, to turn it into an issue of individual character, while stripping it of its social character.

\textbf{Corruption}

Many authors have argued that post-independence government institutions allowed for significant levels of corruption, with officials generally not committed to nationalist and socialist oriented policies (Burdette, 95, Baylies and Szeftel, 1982, Good, 1986, Kydd, 1988: 124,161-2, Scott, 1978, Szeftel, 1982, 2000b). Yet as Bates and Collier noted in 1993, Zambia was: “not a kleptocracy on the model of, say, neighbouring Zaire. Rather, standards of public service remained strong, in spite of the financial hardships resulting from the erosion of the value of salaries in the public service” (1993: 438). Based on Allan’s (1995) criteria the single-party era could be understood as a “bureaucratic centralist” regime. As Szeftel suggests, “the centre took over the job of managing and rationing patronage” (2000b: 213). By the end of the 1980s,

\textsuperscript{121} Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 7, 2008
however, there was no remaining surplus available for private appropriation. According to a 1986 Report of the Committee on Public Accounts, presented at the National Assembly on January 22, 1986, misappropriation of funds was taking place in virtually every government office, and the Assembly was made well aware of it. It was even in foreign missions, public schools, ministries, public health.\textsuperscript{122} It consisted of “accounting irregularities”, “poor control of overtime payments”, “weaknesses in accounting for wages”. The committee was “concerned that despite previous directives, no positive steps have been taken to correct the situation”. And they believed the problem could not be resolved by “increased training but in very rigid discipline and close supervision of accounting staff” (3). The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and National Commission for Development Planning further

submitted that whereas the costs of goods and services have increased by leaps and bounds and Government ministries and departments are facing hardships to maintain their services to a satisfactory level and while the cost of maintaining essential services has multiplied tremendously, the increases in voted allocations have not kept pace with the increased cost of providing the services… (5)

Yet far and away the largest expenditures – and largest over-budget were those going to “headquarters”. Although it is not clear in the document, it is possible this was the sum being used for the construction of a new, monstrous, UNIP national headquarters, which ironically was only completed once the party had been swept from power by the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy.

The failures of monetary control were perhaps most grave in the maize and fertilizer subsidies, with continual budgetary overruns, which were financed by additional bank credit. As Kydd noted, the government had weak control over the level of subsidy because of political pressure to keep the consumer price down, yet it had little capacity to manage the costs of the marketing system. Thus, he suggests

\textsuperscript{122} GOZ 1986 \textit{Report of the Committee on Public Accounts}, GOZ: Lusaka
the Government and the marketing agencies have played a game of brinkmanship. As a gambit to put downward pressure on the costs of the marketing system the budgeted subsidy has been set unrealistically low in relation to actual costs. Thus marketing agencies tend to run out of liquidity in the middle of a purchasing season, thereby precipitating a crisis which can only be resolved by the injection of more finance. The political imperative is to get the harvest into safe storage before the next rainy season. A further problem is that the atmosphere of continuing financial crisis vitiates actions designed to improve the management of marketing, and provides fertile ground for corruption. (Kydd, 1988)

According to Jayne et al (2007) by the late 1980s, NAMBoard's operating losses were amounting to 17 percent of government budget. Yet those budgetary over-runs that were due to processes of graft are not the same as those caused by widening terms of trade between imports and exports. The latter are an inherent drain on an economy while the former can still potentially have developmental effect if they lead to class formation into productive spheres of the economy. It seems to be the case that the funds being transferred into agricultural holdings near the capital were resulting in increased production, even if they were being managed by those who had blatantly appropriated state resources.

Conclusion

It has been argued that despite popular impressions, Southern Province was not a marginal force within UNIP in the first 20 years of independence. Although the ANC continued to be a political force, the single-party system managed to bring Southern Province into the national project for a period of time. Southern Province farmers saw themselves as important players in the project of nation building. Secondly I have shown that in contrast to the experiences of the majority of the peasantry, large farmers received significant state support throughout the first 20 years of independence. Thirdly, although agricultural performance in this period was generally poor, it is important to recognize many achievements that were made in the interests of establishing a national food system and promoting levels of economic self-sufficiency. Southern Province farmers were ideologically committed to the national project
and responded by expanding their production. Thus, the rural sector was not moribund and defined by forms of graft. Farms were often productive sites of accumulation. The implication is that import-substitution policies were in fact working.
Chapter: 3

The National Cattle Complex: 1964-1990
The first 20 years of independence saw a massive expansion of national cattle stocks while the government of the United National Independence Party accepted some responsibility for expanding and maintaining the national herd. In this chapter I show how a doubling of stocks in a two decade period must be understood as a major historical achievement of the post-colonial government. Southern Province held the largest numbers of cattle as it came to increasingly specialize in beef cattle ranching. This growth can accurately be understood as a form of saving and capital accumulation. Many of these cattle functioned as forms of savings by those educated Tonga who had obtained formal employment and stored their wealth in family holdings. This wealth also supported the purchase of state land by a number of Tonga people. After detailing the statistical rise of the national cattle complex the chapter examines some of the complex functions cattle play in Tonga society. The purpose is to describe some of the tensions between ‘traditional’ and ‘improved’ systems of cattle rearing that help explain some of the reasons Tonga farmers did not market their cattle as readily as the UNIP government would have liked. Thirdly, I contrast the logic of ‘traditional’ cattle holdings in Tonga society with those of capitalist cattle holdings so that we can better understand the hybrid nature of the systems of production on the properties of commercializing Tonga farmers and ranchers. The intention is to gain a sense of the state of cattle holdings in Southern Province prior to the introduction of neoliberal structural adjustment so that we can assess its impact.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to accurately determine the size of the overall cattle stock in Zambia in the post-independence period, despite the fact that a variety of sources are available. This is partly due to the fact that figures for the herds of “commercial farmers” were only collected in some years. It is complicated further by the fact that official categories of farm type altered over these years. Different state offices were also collecting conflicting data and there is often little transparency in methods of collection. Jayne et al (2007) have noted that in the 1970s and 1980s crop forecast data was often produced from estimates made by
extension officers. This is understandable given that throughout the 1970s and 1980s reports from the Agriculture department along with other government offices, are replete with complaints about lack of vehicle spare parts and fuel needed to collect data. Transport, overall, is the most commonly cited challenge in nearly all government departments since independence.

In Southern Province there would have also been social and physical obstructions to gathering such data as herd owners face incentives to disguise their wealth, while grazing lands have variable topography and vegetation. Haller and Merton suggest figures from the 1980s are unavailable (at least for Namwala and the Kafue Flats), while those of other years from the veterinary department are thought to be subject to “double-counting” (2010: 334). My own attempts to compile data via available Zambian government sources on agriculture leave large gaps, from the late 1980s through the entire 1990s (from head office and holdings from a variety of libraries and archives). This is partly reflective of the very significant state of crisis the country found itself in, with virtually all government departments becoming financially crippled, and losing many employees in retrenchments and as a result of very high mortality rates.\(^{123}\) The 1980s is the ‘lost-decade’ of development in many respects.

In spite of the limitations of the data, there are a number of sources that are instructive, especially when compared with each other. The easiest place to start is with the statistics held by the FAO (table 6.). These are supposed to be collated from the statistics provided directly from the Government of Zambia (GRZ). Yet the FAO numbers are much lower than those published in the Agricultural and Pastoral Production annual reports of the CSO. In most years prior to 2000 these statistics did not include the “Commercial Sector’, which would have

\(^{123}\) In 1994, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) director David Diangamo appealed to the government for money and to help address their “critical” staffing situation. The latter was claimed to be delaying the output of gathered material, and to be leaving existing staff “largely overworked because of the lack of qualified staff”. “Central Statistics Office appeals for funds for its general operations”, Chilombo Mwondela, The Post, Friday July 22, page 2, 1994. Veterinary offices were also facing similar challenges: “Cash-Strapped Offices Grind to a halt”, Weekly Post, No 95, May 14-20 p3.
encompassed most of the cattle of the farmers on state land. Furthermore, statistics from the ‘Commercial Sector’ would not have allowed any comparison between the holdings of black commercial farmers versus the white settler farmers. Nevertheless, a general sense of proportion of the two sectors can be garnered from other sources. For example, in July 1974 then minister of state for Rural Development, M. Joseph Lumina, cites stock numbers that coincide with the FAO in that year, with beef herds amounting to “nearly 1.7 million”. Of those, he claims:

only about 183,000 of these cattle are under improved systems of management the remaining number, nearly 1.5 million, represent a great under-utilised resource and do not at present make a contribution to production in proportion to their numbers. (ibid)

Presumably by ‘improved systems’, Lumina is referring to those in the ‘Commercial Sector”, although it may also include those in settlement schemes on state land, but not above the 20 hectare farm size needed to place in the category of Commercial Farmer. It is worth noting again that the 20-hectare criterion lumps together farmers of drastically different levels of capitalization and does not reflect popular understanding of the term.

Table 5. Zambia Beef Cattle Stocks (head), 1961-2011

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Incomplete statistics from the Veterinary Department (Table 7 and Table 8) for cattle held in ‘traditional’ holdings tend to be about one fifth less than the FAO numbers, giving some indication of the size of the ‘commercial sector’ farmers. These figures do not distinguish between beef and dairy herds, however they do provide a breakdown of stock between the three most prominent cattle-holding provinces (until 1973, Lusaka province was included in Central). The value of these statistics is that they suggest that in the first 20 years of independence there was nearly a doubling of cattle stocks in Southern Province, while the other major cattle-holding provinces saw their stocks grow by roughly a third.

Table 6. Cattle Stocks in Traditional Land, by Province and Country Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Western/B Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>475466</td>
<td>115758</td>
<td>283655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>488724</td>
<td>128891</td>
<td>300912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>517464</td>
<td>138544</td>
<td>329026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>498881</td>
<td>146469</td>
<td>328346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>557880</td>
<td>152637</td>
<td>349271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>580626</td>
<td>165643</td>
<td>357311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>607321</td>
<td>168345</td>
<td>358646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>616232</td>
<td>186574</td>
<td>372588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>635084</td>
<td>197677</td>
<td>373582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>673381</td>
<td>197904</td>
<td>1523410</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>681868</td>
<td>222921</td>
<td>1587983</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>694619</td>
<td>193369</td>
<td>382027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>720757</td>
<td>199139</td>
<td>386351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>742851</td>
<td>195871</td>
<td>390762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>802399</td>
<td>198990</td>
<td>378216</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>753546</td>
<td>166269</td>
<td>388518</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>825999</td>
<td>265541</td>
<td>403693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>852912</td>
<td>272198</td>
<td>440861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>899296</td>
<td>250897</td>
<td>471019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>890839</td>
<td>258367</td>
<td>486782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1985  |         |         | 2075736

Source: GRZ, Veterinary Department
Both sets of statistics show a progressively rising stock of cattle throughout the post-independence period with a peak, according to the FAO, in 1991 of 3 million head, after which a drop of about 800,000 animals over five years. If commercial dairy herds were included they would inflate these figures by about 200,000 in the upper years, based on other government sources reported below (Mwenya, 1992).

This suggests that the national cattle management regime held up throughout the post-independence era, maintaining growth in herds and fending off disease and economic decline. Such information could be offset against the annual culling rates to determine its contribution to the economy insofar as consumption is concerned. This would not provide any measure of the use-value of draft animals included in the figures or the other social functions they play (particularly in labour mobilization). The FAO data does show one small decline in the early
1980s, which could be explained by drought and cattle disease.\textsuperscript{125} The quick recovery, however, suggests the Zambian government and the country’s pastoralists were able to fairly quickly gain control of the situation and restore growth.

There are, however, reasons to suspect that the FAO figures, and the narrative above are inaccurate or at least insufficient. In table 8 (below) I have compiled the very limited data I have been able to collect from the CSO and from the Department of Agriculture Extension Branch from the 1970s and 1980s. I have included the breakdown of figures for the three prominent cattle producing provinces. They deal with only those cattle held in the reserves, or ‘traditional’ lands. The numbers from the Department of Agriculture are shaded in grey. These are likely also inaccurate, however, they capture some dynamics that offer insight into the conditions of herd management. In particular, they suggest that in ‘traditional’ holdings many more cattle were dying than were being sold. The opposite appears to be the case on “commercial” farms (table. 9).

\textbf{Table 8. Cattle Numbers by province, non-commercial, 1971-1986}\textsuperscript{126}

![Table 8](image)

\textsuperscript{125} Some farmers claimed that at this time in Southern Province a number of cattle were being imported from Botswana and that they had arrived with disease.

\textsuperscript{126} The outlaying figure in Southern Province, 1973/74 is almost certainly inaccurate and has been reported differently in another index.
Although the same office collected the two sets of data, the figures are wildly inconsistent. For example, in table 10, following the 1973/4 season, Southern Province saw a drop in herd size by nearly one half. This could be explained partly by the very high numbers of deaths and losses in that year in addition to a significant rise in sales (possibly related to a higher than average market price). Yet combined this would only account for about a third of the losses recorded in the overall stock. It is likely a significant error was made in the collection of data. However, oral accounts and records of land transactions suggest that many of these cattle were being relocated either onto state land, or into Central Province (which likely received the highest number). For example, in 1971-1972, CSO records show that 276,700

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Country Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973/4</td>
<td>168600</td>
<td>37100</td>
<td>47900</td>
<td>278500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/5</td>
<td>81400</td>
<td>36400</td>
<td>62700</td>
<td>243300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/6</td>
<td>65200</td>
<td>32800</td>
<td>74300</td>
<td>234800</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976/7</td>
<td>49100</td>
<td>29200</td>
<td>50300</td>
<td>158000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Country Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>182774</td>
<td>12391</td>
<td>37103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO, Agriculture and Pastoral Production, Traditional Sector, Annual reports
acres\textsuperscript{127} of additional land holdings were added, with a 19 percent increase from 1,241,600 acres, to 1,477,500 of operated, private-titled farmland. Although Southern Province at that time maintained a greater portion of private-titled land, it only grew by 70,300 (a third of the rate) in the same period to 1,573,700. While the figures on land transactions are suggestive, they too have a number of inconsistencies that suggest they may be highly inaccurate. Yet the postulate that cattle had been relocated onto state land could also account for the significant jump in cattle stocks in Central Province noted in (table 8) in the 1974/75 year.\textsuperscript{128}

Another curious aspect of the figures in (table 8 and table 9) is that they show significant fluctuation in herd sizes not otherwise evident in the FAO data until after 1991. This supports testimony reporting a great deal of cattle losses. Most importantly, these losses often were consecutive, meaning that some individuals lost cattle even year after year so herds could not re-establish. The FAO figures show only two dips in the countrywide cattle population - in 1979 and 1983. These figures suggest a general pattern throughout the 1970s in which more cattle were dying than were being sold. If this were the case, it certainly would provide one more reason for pastoralists to be reluctant to sell their animals. If one was unsure how many would die in a given year then it’s not worth taking the risk of selling some and then finding oneself without a herd of sufficient size to maintain itself. Chibwe (1979: 205-235) has also argued that Africans producers were discriminated against in the system of grading and pricing cattle in both the colonial era and the post-independence period. In the 1970s farmers were chastised for not selling their animals, and the Cold Storage Board was defending the

\textsuperscript{127} These figures calculated in acres deviate from statistics throughout the rest of the 1970s, which are recorded in hectares rather than acres.  
\textsuperscript{128} These statistics refer only to ‘traditional’ holdings, yet oral testimonies have suggested that a number of Tonga farmers were moving north and moving onto traditional land based on agreements (and possibly transactions) made with local, non-Tonga chiefs. Thus they would show similar patterns. We are unable to test this hypothesis as there is no available data on cattle in commercial holdings for those years.
rates it paid in response to farmer criticisms, even though no farmers were interviewed except for those in the CFB.129

The only available data on stocks on commercial holdings is presented in (table 10) below. They tell us that in the 1970s and the 1980s commercial farmers held about 350,000 head. They also show that as with their counterparts in 'traditional' lands, commercial farmers in Southern Province held the largest numbers of beef cattle. However, given that the year 1978 is not represented we have no way to understand how figures a year later show a drop of more than a third in only a 2-year period, then a rebound again the following year. It suggests inaccurate reporting, although could be explained by disease and a cattle re-stocking effort. Table 11 is interesting in that it shows that commercial farmers sold far more cattle than had died or been stolen: an apparent inverse of the situation on traditional lands in the same period.

Table 10. Beef and Dairy Cattle on Commercial Farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Central Beef</th>
<th>Lusaka Dairy</th>
<th>Southern Beef</th>
<th>Dairy</th>
<th>National Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7880</td>
<td>5550</td>
<td>340450</td>
<td>19220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7320</td>
<td>49690</td>
<td>184610</td>
<td>19190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6866</td>
<td>129241</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>25947</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>46234</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>51837</td>
<td>8698</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO, Agriculture and Pastoral Production, Commercial Sector

On commercial farms other trends were evident. While far fewer statistics are available for this category of farmer, some data from the 1970s are available. While we cannot make firm claims based on them, they show there were two-times the rate of beef cattle sales from Central/Lusaka in 1973-74 as in Southern Province. Deaths and losses on “commercial farms” are far less than in the ‘traditional’ sector - so it appears they were not being hit by major losses up to 1985. Central Province also had large milk sales among commercial farms. Large commercial farms near Lusaka were specializing in dairy and beef. Southern Province comes to focus mainly on beef. Yet there is a progressive and significant decline in sales of milk to the Dairy Produce Board throughout the 1970s (some could have been sold in private dairies, in the same way private butchers were gaining market share from the Cold Storage Board of Zambia (CSBZ). State farms did maintain their production levels better than one would have imagined, but they did not make up for the huge losses from the commercial sector.

Trends from beef cattle slaughters show the state-owned CSBZ also taking in a declining number of beef sales while private abattoirs were increasing their intake almost precisely in proportion to those being lost to the state sector. In 1964, the CSBZ took in 45,323 cattle compared to 25,633 heading to private butchers. Their figures gradually reversed over a

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CSO, Agri-pastoral production, commercial farms 1972-6.
20-year period. By 1980 the CSBZ took in only 15,873 while the private butchers handled 76,485.\textsuperscript{131} Thus private butchers were taking market share, in part because the CSBZ was not paying farmers much in an effort to keep producer prices low (Chibwe, 1979: 232-233). Yet, what we can also see is a trend between 1964 and 1980 in which far greater numbers of animals are being slaughtered in Lusaka/Central and Copperbelt process. This may in part be an indication that cattle sales from Southern Province were declining, but oral testimonies suggest the more significant reason is that cattle were being transported north, where prices were higher. Details on the number of people taking part in this would be of interest because of its potential for clarifying processes of class formation, yet its informal nature means it would be impossible to determine the scope of such activity. Transport is a focal point of private accumulation, while government, increasingly relied on tenders for hiring private haulers to take cattle from Southern Province to Lusaka and the Copper Belt (Chikulo, 2000:162-165).\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131}“Cold Storage Board Domestic Cattle Slaughterings by Province, 1964-1981”, in Agricultural and Pastoral Production, 1983/84, CSO, GRZ

\textsuperscript{132}“Maize marketing policy is a truck of trouble”, The Weekly Post, September 17-23, 1993
While Central Province was expanding in beef and dairy, it was also overtaking in cropping. The two are no doubt related, given the dominance of ox-traction (dairy requires breeding, while both oxen and dairy cattle were being sold for beef). Thus we see in the same years nearly two times the amount of white maize produced and sold in Central. Southern Province had far greater portions of their farms left uncropped. This gave an impression to outside observers that the land was ‘under-utilized’, but it was not necessarily unproductive if one factors in the products of the forests that regenerate rapidly. There was a move in Southern Province toward specialization in beef cattle that was evident from as early as 1969.\footnote{Understood at the highest levels of the department of Rural Development and the Central Committee (Zambian National Archives, MRD1/8/38 Ministry of Rural Development)}

Figures cited above suggest there were very high cattle mortality rates in Southern Province in the 1970s. Unfortunately, the mortality rates on traditional holdings continued to worsen over the course of the following decades. During the 1984/85 agricultural year an estimated 107,470 rural households reported raising cattle, totaling 1,772,800 head. 399,700 of them were from births, 32,500 were from purchases, 20,400 from gifts. Yet the stock also

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\footnote{Understood at the highest levels of the department of Rural Development and the Central Committee (Zambian National Archives, MRD1/8/38 Ministry of Rural Development)
depleted by 369,800 – nearly as many as were being born. 66,200 of those were sold alive, 11,300 slaughtered for sale and 18,300 slaughtered for home consumption. 374,000 were also lost to death, theft and losses, which is rather staggering given that it means the herd sizes were barely being maintained.\textsuperscript{134} Data beyond 1985 is extremely limited, and some of the challenges facing the Central Statistics Office at the time are evident in the fact that the figures from 1985 were not published until 1989. We do know, however, that in 1988 in Southern Province the Veterinary Department had taken over dip tank management from local authorities and was undertaking an immunization campaign. It was also imposing a movement ban.\textsuperscript{135} Nevertheless, cattle diseases did not appear to be considered in any of the plans for liberalization. This is not really surprising when at the very same time, HIV/AIDS was just emerging as a national health crisis and yet seemed to have no bearing on the ways in which liberalization was implemented.

The overall points to be taken from this section are that, first, despite the existence of various figures, we do not actually know with certainty how many cattle existed in the country at any point in time. The statistics are just too inaccurate. Nevertheless, they strongly suggest a very high level of growth in the herds, which ultimately amounted to a doubling of national stock over a 20 year period. Other figures, however, are somewhat contradictory because they suggest deaths and losses in traditional lands are higher than growth rates. We they do strongly suggest, however, is that cattle owners were constantly facing some risk of loss due to disease. Disease was therefore always present as a historical force to be reckoned with.

**Cattle rearing as capital accumulation versus capitalist cattle rearing**

One of the challenges we face in trying to assess whether or not such a group of “emergent” capitalist farmers exists or has ever existed among the Tonga, is that the question is premised on the assumption that there are somehow pure examples of both capitalist

\textsuperscript{134} CSO Agricultural and Pastoral production, Non-Commercial sector, 1985-86 published November 1989

\textsuperscript{135} 1988 Commercial Farmers Bureau AGM council meeting
farmers and Tonga agriculturalists. The problem is not only that enormous variations exist in both categories, but also that the categories are also dialectically related and therefore change. The category of Tonga ethnicity, as it exists today, only came into being through processes of colonialism as a market for agricultural products was created alongside the creation of waged mine-labour on the Copperbelt. Kenneth Vickery therefore writes that; “it is useful to retain a certain duality in the treatment” in which, there is a resulting articulation between what he calls:

the indigenous economy and the imperial economy… whereby the two economies overlapped; each was ‘incorporated’ to some degree into the other. The indigenous economy was not destroyed, but transformed – and the Tonga had a great deal to do with the transformation. (1986: 9)

Yet in abstract terms we might be able to identify something as capitalist based on the degree to which land, labour and money function as commodities that mediate human relations. For Polanyi (2001) these are the fictions and abstractions that drive capitalism and “are separated from the broader logic that would derive from social and ecological processes taken as a whole. This leads to a host of potentially destructive consequences within the broader web of life, particularly for the environment and for labor” (Polanyi, 2001). When combined, the functions of land, labour and money can be roughly equated with forces we call the market. Given that markets have not existed for eternity, as partial readings of Adam Smith might suggest, they are in every society mediated by a logic of production that preceded. Despite variation, in Tonga territory one can identify two quite distinctly different forms of cattle-rearing based on the existence or absence of fencing.

In Tonga country the ability to fence is based on an institutional-legal claim of private title, though some with private title do not necessarily utilize fencing in their cattle management beyond the enclosure of the kraal. Tonga cattle-rearing that takes place without fencing has some relative distance from capitalist demands as cattle serve a variety of functions in the web of social life. In the early part of the 20th century they began to be used as a means to provide
draft power. In this way cattle act as fixed capital does, allowing one to expand production beyond what could be done with human labour alone. It also provides insurance, wealth and status, but the ability to provide draft-power is key to being able to command labour. If one has sufficient cattle then some can be trained as oxen. As long as one has oxen and a plow one can plant crops without relying on the oxen of others. The fact that not everyone has cattle means that those without must borrow from those who do. In exchange they must work for the owner at planting time. The sooner the owner has completed planting the faster the borrower is able to get to planting a crop too. Thus there is an incentive for the off-farm labour to work quickly. Yet the person who borrows is at a significant disadvantage as they need to wait for the owner of the oxen to plant first. As a result, borrowers’ crops may be put in too late in the season. If they are not early enough in planting then the crops will not be large enough to stand up to the heavy rains and/or they will be too young when the dry season sets in. The key is for the maize to be past its ‘milking’ stage by the time the dry season sets in, after which point it will begin converting its energy into producing the seed cobs.

Those who have cattle will therefore have larger surpluses of maize which they can either sell on the market or distribute to neighbours and family members who will then be obliged to return the ‘favour’ in the coming year’s planting. Those with more maize will also often take in the children of relatives who do not have enough to feed the entire family. The children then become part of the work crew of the household of the patron. Most likely, boys will become herders and start desiring cattle of their own. If the children lack options for mobility for a number of years, they may calculate that their best option is to help a cattle owner. If the patron cannot produce sufficient returns the youngsters will eventually seek work elsewhere. The primary obligation of the head of the household is to ensure that all people living on the entitlement (in the broad, loosely defined ‘household’) are fed. While many wish to

136 Sally Falk Moore has written of comparable practices among the Chagga in Tanzania: “The relations of cattle lenders to cattle borrowers were considered to be those of superiors to inferiors” (1986, 67-70).
sell in the market, this can never be the primary goal. They must first produce for their own consumption. As Ntambo observed in an unpublished manuscript in 1968:

“if a man uses his wealth to raise his household’s standard of living, he is accused of ‘eating’ the wealth which formally belongs to his bisumukowa [kin]. On the other hand, his wife and children see the husband’s wealth as largely the product of their labour. They approve of investments which will increase their standard of living…” (99)

Thus the sale of cattle is a decision that is rarely left to one individual seller. As Ntambo also notes: “ownership is best considered not as an absolutely exclusive title, but as a complex of competing rights.” (22).

Market gardening increasingly serves to bring in a little income during the dry season, so long as enough water can be found to sustain the crops. Market gardening has been a feature of Tonga commercial activity that has only come into being during the lifetime of my informants. Men and women both take part in market-gardening, though I was often told they maintained demarcations of which crops belonged to whom, even when family members aided each other in their tending. Women often hold greater control over this sphere of production. In the past girls did at times take part in herding though today most of their activity is around the household and in the gardens.137

Having decent cattle therefore allows one to accumulate at a greater rate and obtain a variety of forms of status and power within the community. Primary among these forms of status is the ability to use cattle as bridewealth and therefore to obtain more wives. However, not all Tonga people share the same interest in polygyny. Aside from bridewealth, having many cattle establishes the basis for significant fluidity in the composition of the household in such a way that the occupants of a farm will vary from year to year. Larger farmers will take on distant relatives as paid or unpaid labour. Sometimes this is seen as a means of helping a family member who has run into some kind of trouble in another village, perhaps as a

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137 Discussed, for example, by Martha Mweene, 1924, interview with Toby Moorsom, 05/05/08. Also by Catherine Naambo, (birth cert. 1952, though she thinks she was born 5-6 years earlier), interview with Toby Moorsom, 07/08/08
consequence of idleness due to lack of land, an outstanding debt, an affair or some claims of witchcraft being made against them. It is therefore often a form of unfree or bonded labour.\textsuperscript{138} If the farmer does not have sufficient capital to pay them, but does have land then they may offer them a portion of it for them to cultivate for their own sustenance and maize. I am not very knowledgeable about the ways this relationship plays out in traditional lands, though will discuss this process on state land in later sections.

Cattle can function as capital in Tonga society, but their function does not integrate smoothly into capitalist relations of cattle rearing. Some owners who are more integrated into capitalist market relations will actually call themselves ‘ranchers’. I believe this role is in fact a relatively new form of market specialization that has emerged from Tonga society on the plateau in Zambia’s Southern Province. Generally, ‘in the village’ as one might say, Tonga cattle that appear to be owned by one person may in fact be bonded to many people. In any particular social organization of cattle-rearing a herd will almost always be an amalgamation of obligations, as well as a wealth accumulator and preservation strategy. A husband and a wife will often own cattle separately, although she may store some with a relative so there is no confusion in the event of the husband’s death.\textsuperscript{139} A relative working in the town or on the farm of a settler, or a niece or nephew may also be storing some in a herd, saving towards establishing their own herd. Some of the herd will be lent to poorer neighbours for draft power. Cattle in one person’s kraal may in fact belong to another family member but are on loan or stored elsewhere. This can act as both a means of assisting the person caring for them and for increasing the grazing space for the owner. It also allows for hiding some from other jealous or hungry family members.\textsuperscript{140} Vickery suggests in the past this likely dispersed risk in the event of Ndebele raids (1986: 24). Ntembo (1968) writes:

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\footnotesize Tom Brass (1999) provides an excellent comparative analysis of unfree labour and its treatment in neoclassical and Marxist theory. See \textit{Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labour}, London: Frank Cass
\item\footnotesize This is was a practice noted by Colson (1959: 125).
\item\footnotesize Sharon E. Hutchinson describes similar arrangements among the Nuer, (1996) \textit{Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State}, Berkeley: University of California Press, drawing on Evans Pritchard (1940) \textit{Political}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
cattle herding system “enables men living in distant areas to maintain bonds of friendship”, hides wealth from kin and creditors, pay fines to the community. Dispersing them used to provide protection in cattle raids, protection against drought and disease. (Ntembo, 1968:230 – 76)

In these instances the recipient of the loan has to keep the cattle in good health, but the reward is that they will likely be able to keep some or all offspring that arrive during the tenancy. Many larger owners lend oxen out to surrounding neighbours in exchange for various obligations to work and as a means of maintaining the integrity of a fenced boundary. If cattle break through then herd boys can be called from varying places to round them up and will be sent to help on days of dipping.\textsuperscript{141}

It becomes obvious that people and animals in Tonga society are not individuated beings whose relationships are mediated by market transactions. Many years ago Colson wrote that: “The Tonga prefer a minimum of organization and emphasize the rights of the individual to plan his own life with relatively few constraints upon him” (1958: 61)\textsuperscript{142}. Elsewhere she writes that trade was only ever a marginal activity (1980: 607). Yet in spite of the informality, they are part of a bio-social complex that ensures its own reproduction. Numerous tensions exist amidst this complex that might be described in Kate Crehan’s terms as fractures within the community (1997). These fractures do not always have a clearly defined basis to them, but the categories of gender, age and entitlement provide some structure to them. In Tonga society the role of cross-cutting ties of kinship, peer pressure and joking relationships have been a prominent means of resolving disputes and maintaining cohesion. For example, a male child will have a joking relationship with a grandmother and then when he marries he will

\textit{Institutions of a Nilotic People}, Oxford: Clarendon
\textsuperscript{141} Cattle are weekly herded into large basins of a water-pesticide solution that kills ticks and fleas which act as vectors for a variety of fatal diseases. People without sufficient access to water and capital will usually spray instead.
\textsuperscript{142} This is not to deny the clear sense of personhood that exists, both for men and women, although the power vested in the person is derived from the \textit{muzimo}, or spirit, that exists in their death. It is that \textit{muzimo} that can bring vengeance to others and therefore must be recognized as fundamentally equal (Colson, 2006: 40)
also share that form of relationship with the grandmother of his wife.\textsuperscript{143} This relationship is less formal and allows a male to vent his worries, while the senior is able to maintain a stoic distance and guide the youth in their best interests. The elder woman also helps ensure the male does what is necessary to please the granddaughter sexually – apparently feeling free to discuss issues that would embarrass the parents.

For the reasons discussed above, and no doubt many more not mentioned here, it is not easy for a Tonga pastoralist to sell cattle based on market signals or other profit motives. That is, at least not as profit as defined in cash form. Moreover currency in a country like Zambia has not really been a reliable means of storing wealth as banks have failed and inflation has at times reached extraordinary levels.\textsuperscript{144} There are some similarities in the complex ways cattle integrate in the economy in Lesotho and among the Tonga, though what Ferguson (1990) has described as a “Bovine Mystique” does not capture the dynamic among the Tonga in Southern Zambia in the last half-century. The ‘Bovine Mystique’ refers to the particular economic rules held about cattle, that establish a one-way barrier between livestock and cash (148). In Tonga society the barrier has not been as rigidly restrictive, so that cattle can be strategically planned around, as a means of storing wealth that can be converted into cash a little more easily than in Lesotho.

Cutshall studied legal complications that arose from cattle rustling among the Ila, a sub-group of the broader Tonga people. Many of the farmers on state land are Ila, part Ila or came from a chieftaincy that borders on Ila territory. If Tonga identity is associated with cattle then in some ways the Ila could be considered quintessentially “Tonga” insofar as they have had the largest herds over the longest period of time, when those Tonga in the South were unable to own them due to tsetse, presence of wild animals and greater victimhood from

\textsuperscript{143} These insights, and much of this discussion is informed by Colson (1967) \textit{Marriage and the Family Among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia}, Berkeley UC press.

\textsuperscript{144} The Tonga are clearly not the first to have structured a society in this way. The word “pecuniary” derives from the latin word; \textit{pecunia} for “money”, deriving from \textit{pecu} for “cattle”. Capital, also derives from \textit{Cappa}, or \textit{capitalis} being “head”.

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Ndebele and Lozi raiding. The second common feature of Ila people is that they are more likely to practice transhumance cattle maneuvering as they relocate to the Kafue Flats in the dry season. As Cutshall explains;

The Ila state quite frankly, "Cattle are our bank." The Ila, however, do not intend to simply possess the largest bank account possible, for indeed, greedy individuals are viewed with great disfavor. Conspicuous acquisition of cattle is intended more as an investment account, targeted for distribution and conversion in transactional networks which yield direct profits or indirect social credits" (1982: 4).

Cattle, of course, reproduce. Keeping healthy cattle therefore ensures that returns on investment are higher.\textsuperscript{145} It also may reduce the length of time to maturity (production time), in turn, bringing production time in closer alliance with labour time in production and possibly making it more attractive to penetration by capital (Mann and Dickinson, 1979: 473).

It may not only be very difficult for a male head of household to sell his cattle, most of the time there are no good reasons to sell them. For one, they are sentient beings that are capable of building complex emotional relationships with humans who tend them closely.\textsuperscript{146} Thus severing these relationships can cause emotional pain, for both the cattle and those who care for them. This is often difficult for people who do not raise cattle to understand. Yet even if one is skeptical of the relationships between cattle and their owners, there are innumerable cultural reasons influencing decisions to sell. Among the Tonga, cattle tend only to be eaten at funerals and weddings. One’s status is partly determined by how many cattle one can give to a celebration, with relatives travelling from far and often staying for days until the food has been depleted. In this way it provides social cohesion as well, allowing distant people to discuss political relations and concerns of the family and other villages. They are also often given as

\textsuperscript{145} Bolnick calculates that in 1992 anyone holding bank savings in Kwatcha “faced the prospect of losing 41.5 percent per annum compared to the alternative of holding a dollar deposit abroad earning the equivalent of LIBOR or better. “The Sequencing of Financial Market Liberalization, 1992-94”, In Hill and McPherson (eds) 2004, pp 218

\textsuperscript{146} An early and influential scientific definition of domestication comes from Francis Galton, who wrote a groundbreaking essay (1865) in the years immediately following Darwin’s \textit{Origins of the Species}. In “The First Steps Toward the Domestication of Animals” he identifies 6 characteristics that are essential for domestication. The second characteristic cited is “a fondness for man… it must cling to man notwithstanding hard usage and neglect. If the animal had no natural attachment to our species it would fret itself to death and escape to wilderness” in, \textit{Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London}, Vol 3. 1865, 122-138
gifts for a local school or church that is fundraising. Such a donation then confers esteem and popularity upon the owner.

One might sell cattle if money is needed to send a family member to school, to access healthcare or to carry one’s family through a year of drought where grain may have to be purchased from elsewhere. In this form it becomes a source of insurance to be drawn on during difficult periods. For the more traditional agro-pastoralist some may also need to be slaughtered during these times as a sacrifice to the spirits of rain or a dead ancestor whose relationship with the living world is perceived to have been harmed (for example, if a tree believed to be embodying their spirit was cut down). Cattle are also ‘gifted’ to children, nieces, nephews and even distant relatives for a variety of reasons. Alongside gifting exists the importance of cattle naming in a manner that allows the social group to mark time (Ntembo, 1968: 215).

Gifting of cattle does not necessarily involve transferring the animal to another location. Instead they are there to draw on when the youth are ready to move out on their own, much like a trust fund. Thus;

Ownership in each chieftaincy is a variable mixture of individual and corporate claims of control. Junior males, women, and children, like shareholders in a corporation, assert varying degrees of discretion in the distribution and utilization of cattle resources (Cutshall, 1982: 4)

Redistribution and political maneuvering in these processes tends also to be a very public activity among households and villages. At one funeral I attended, prominent members of the community spoke in front of a crowd of probably 200 or more people and made bold comments about a dispute between brothers over the inheritance. As with experiences in the ‘traditional courts’ of the Native Authority, if people do not manage these affairs delicately their dirty laundry will be aired for all to see and judge.

Creating Capitalist Cattle
The resettlement schemes examined in this dissertation were to establish a capitalist class on land titled as private property. The demands of capitalist husbandry, upon cattle-rearing are different from those defined above. The socially bound nature of Tonga cattle not only can prevent selling but also is claimed to obstruct the implementation of herd management techniques advocated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and other bodies with interests in the industry. Theoretically, integrating cattle rearing into capitalist relations requires the removal of all possible transaction costs, which disrupt the smooth flow of commodities. When one looks at a cow one should see a clear price and not all the additional costs of breaking it away from the social ensemble of production (i.e., the loss of power to command labour outside of capitalist wage-relations). A domestic species by definition requires human management. The labour demands on this management can be rationally organized to ensure that labour-intensive tasks across the cattle’s life take place at the same time. For example, birthing, separating steers, vaccinating, de-horning, fattening and sending to market. These tasks are done more or less based on how commercially oriented the process of rearing is and are also facilitated by the introduction of fencing into population management. They are aided by the increasing commodification of labour so that obligations have a clear contract that allows for hiring and firing based around needs of the production cycle.

Gaining access to waged labour requires a previous process of what Marx described as the “so-called primitive accumulation”. This means a group of property-less labourers must be extracted from the non-capitalist world of production, or from a declining capitalist enterprise, consolidated by a group of owners. This requires also that a sense of individualism be established, which in turn requires a breaking of the complex bonds of obligation and redistribution that are wrapped up in cattle. As David McNally writes; “the monetized logic of capital thus ruptures the human sensorium, substituting quantitative relations (monetary

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147 such as the Zambia National Farmers’ Union and the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust
values) for qualitative ones based on the unique sensible features of goods” (2011:150).

Capitalist production requires the owners do not see individual personalities and traits in their animals nor the various social meanings and relationships attached to them (time measurement, family narratives and bonds, potential future labour, and multiple forms of security) but instead see standard measurements of weight, fertility and lactation quantities if they are being used in dairy production. It also requires that they not be necessary for traction functions.

Benson Han’gombe was an octogenarian in 2008, living just outside of stateland near the town of Mbabala. He certainly did not think of himself as being separate from his cattle. When I visited, the herd boys were having some difficulty getting a stubborn cow to enter the kraal for the evening. In the process of trying to guide them one of the boys hit it with a thin switch. Upon seeing this Benson cringed and then shouted at the boy to tell him not to hit the cattle. His son, Khama, brought the matter to my attention a little while later and explained “it’s almost as if they are part of his body, like an arm. Thus it was like it was hurting him personally.” A statement taken from an Ila cattle owner some years earlier by Thomas Johnson is comparable. When explaining the impact of cattle diseases one owner stated: “You should have seen me when I had my cattle. Then I was a man!” (Johnson, 1999). We can see then that one’s sense of adulthood, masculinity, and social standing can become tied to cattle.

Cattle are not, however, inanimate objects upon which labour is applied in abstract fashion. While they are more predictable than humans, they actually have their own identities, personalities and preferences that create a need to deal with them somewhat individually. Some are ornery and stubborn; others cooperate and act as leaders. Old breeds of Tonga cattle are a local variant of the Sanga (humpless taurine /B. taurus x humped Zebu /B. indicus) and like other Zambian indigenous breeds are well adapted to harsh conditions (Zulu, 2008). They are also attentive to human hierarchy and behave differently depending on the person
managing them. Cattle have more capabilities than people who do not live amidst them would know. I heard many fascinating stories about the things cattle could do. For example, they can find their way back to their kraal without guidance at the end of the day. If a child takes an ox cart somewhere in the morning, when it is time to return they can nap on the return as the oxen will follow the exact route they took in the earlier part of the day. Owners often told me they do not like to be present when animals are loaded onto trucks to go to market. They will select the animals to go, but get others to do the loading and selling. They part with them readily for things that they know are important – such as a child’s education, but they do this in a sense of sacrifice. At the same time, children develop loving bonds to the animals as they grow with them. In fact, the very basis of people’s history is bound up with the herd as animals are named based on life events that take place when they are born. In a non-written culture they are the calendars, intimately connected to all social events, both universal and particular.

The circumstances of cattle rearing described here do not easily align with the basic theoretical principles of free-market economics. Free market theory presumes that humans are self-interested, rational individuals who can obtain perfect information about market conditions and then enter into mutually beneficial transactions. As Simon Clarke writes about the neoliberal theory of society: “on the one hand, Smith’s ideal society was one of isolated individuals, each pursuing his own self-interest”. And, as Milton Friedman states: “both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed” (1963: 55). These conceptions of the market seem void of food producers that are intimately tied to the natural content of rural life. Thus Polanyi argued:

Labour is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored, mobilized; land is only another name for nature, which is not produced by man…” (2001: 75)

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148 Published on University of Warwick website: https://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~syrbe/pubs/Neoliberalism.pdf
Cattle are, in some senses, mediating vehicles that allow humans to live on landscapes they might otherwise be incapable of. They store grasses for future consumption, but they are also intimately tied to the life world humans occupy. When farmers protect their cattle they are protecting themselves. That is why, as Khama says of Benson, that to hit the cattle is almost like hitting his arm. This is seemingly contradicted when some cattle owners neglect to vaccinate and dip or spray their cattle to protect them from tick bites. There are, however, many reasons cattle owners might neglect or avoid doing this.

The lack of consistently organized bulling practices among Tonga cattle owners has some advantages and some drawbacks. Benson Han’gombe did not own a bull in 2008. Fortunately his cattle were still able to provide offspring because others who do own bulls keep them with their herd when they are grazed on common land. This is positive in that it keeps the sexuality of the animals within the commons, allowing all to benefit, but it does not allow for selective breeding and the organization of rearing processes around the planned life of the offspring. Owners motivated by profit will take efforts to keep bulls separated from cows and make efforts to coordinate processes of reproduction. A regular source of conflict in the colonial era occurred when villagers would allow the cows to enter the paddocks of settler farmers in hopes a hybrid bull would inseminate them. State land farmers I spoke to were regularly bothered by their fences being broken, seemingly intentionally, by outsiders.

The history of African animal husbandry makes it very clear that fence lines are not merely material objects, but represent complex and abstract social relations. In the case of Zambia, if not in all instances, their introduction required the construction of a state that could establish a legal definition and enforce it through the threat of violence. Even then, the institution of fencing is still limited even within the 6 percent of Zambian land where it has been legally allowed for many decades. In much of Tonga society on the plateau, however, the ownership of cattle plays a central function in the community and the very establishment of Tonga identity. They are essential to its reproduction and are somewhat like a glue that binds
intricate conglomerations of people together into something we might call a society – or at the very least, a sectional group that plays an important function in the larger ensemble of social relations in a more generalized mode of production.

If cattle are essential, then so is access to water for them to drink. Given the dry savannah climate in which rains are absent for eight months of the year, accessing water requires taking the cattle to water. In the cattle heartland of Tonga territory this requires transhumance (migration of the entire herd and much of the household unit) for some months of the year. Villages in fact coordinate the migration and come to enjoy it as almost a vacation of sorts. People live in makeshift straw shelters on flats of fresh green grass and wide-open vistas. In turn, the milk flows easily while people also have access to plentiful fresh fish. It is a period of plenty. In such a society there are deep customs against fencing.

An irony however, is that those who were to become most successful as ‘emergent’ capitalist farmers on state land emanated from the villages closer to the Kafue river whose herds undertake these migrations. Access to the plains is tightly controlled. The rare spot where a tree exists is precious; usually it is planted and indicates temporary settlement rights. Those villages that have land near the flats of the Kafue River benefit from aspects of nature that promote the coordinated timing of cattle-management. They also benefit from a greater level of fertility among their herds for the same reason. However, as Johnson notes,

[the] region is hardly a paradise, though, since direct rainfall is variable and unreliable. Drought created famine conditions all too often in the past, and high-flood years crowded people and their herds between the water and tsetse fly-infested bush on the northern, western and southern margins of the plain. But with economic activities timed to the rhythm of the seasons, in most years seasonal transhumance offered a viable livelihood. (Johnson, 1999)

And yet, the ability to manage through difficult years certainly has provided people with some skills that can be positively transferred to strategies of capital accumulation, in part because people are conservative with wealth. People from tribes in the North and the East of the country would say this makes Tonga people ‘stingy’. The broader point, however, is that
something clearly non-human, something we generally call ‘nature’ played some role in the process.\textsuperscript{149} A further issue is whether nature’s contribution toward capital accumulation can be considered an element of ‘primary accumulation’.

To create cattle fit for capitalism there must be a market for them. Not only are markets limited by challenges of transport, restrictions are also often placed on cattle movements throughout the country in hopes of containing diseases. Moreover, if the number of cattle that entered the market were to increase, prices would go down. Markets for Tonga cattle are quite limited and foreign markets are very restrictive. The quality of meat provided by Tonga cattle is considered by many to be excellent in many respects. It is organic and not caged, and so could seemingly find a niche market, even if it is tougher than grain-fed meat. However, their potential for carrying diseases provides the justification for keeping them out of European markets.

Finally, commercial cattle rearing relies on feeding with grain, at least in the final stages of fattening. This therefore renders the farmer susceptible to agri-business. One therefore becomes further locked into market relations, rather than freed from them. In turn, it creates an interest in price predictability. In the past, this predictability was provided by NAMBoard. In its absence there are increasing moves toward the development of a futures market and insurance products.\textsuperscript{150}

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the first 20 years of independence saw the rise of a national cattle complex, whereby the government of the United National Independence Party accepted some levels of responsibility for expanding and maintaining national cattle stocks. This led to a doubling of stocks in a 20-year period, which must be understood as a major

\textsuperscript{149} For a review of those claiming that nature can be a significant historical actor see I. Scoones (1999) “New Ecology and the Social Sciences: What prospect for a Fruitfull Engagement?”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 28, pg. 490
\textsuperscript{150} L. Brockman and N. Samukonga, “Is a Futures Market the Future of Marketing”, The Weekly Post, Dec. 10-16, 1993
historical achievement of the post-colonial government. Southern Province held the largest numbers of cattle as it came to increasingly specialize in beef cattle ranching. This growth can accurately be understood as a form of saving and capital accumulation. Many of these cattle functioned as forms of savings by those educated Tonga who had obtained formal employment and stored wealth in family holdings. This wealth also supported the purchase of state land by a number of Tonga people. After detailing the statistical rise of the national cattle complex the chapter examined some of the complex functions cattle play in Tonga society in order to describe some of the tensions between ‘traditional’ and ‘improved’ systems of cattle rearing that help explain some of the reasons Tonga farmers did not market their cattle as readily as the UNIP government would have liked. This chapter also contrasted the logic of ‘traditional’ cattle holdings in Tonga society with those of capitalist cattle holdings so that we can better understand the hybrid nature of the systems of production on the properties of commercializing Tonga farmers and ranchers. Furthermore, I have tried to provide the necessary background to the agricultural economy in Southern Province before the introduction of neoliberal structural adjustment policies. Chapter 4 will examine the immediate effects of structural adjustment. Chapter 5 examines the impacts of structural adjustment on the cattle economy in Southern Province.
Chapter 4

Neo-liberal Shock
In a broad study of the experiencing of neoliberal economic policy in South Africa, Hein Marais argues that neoliberalism cannot be understood as a homogenous phenomenon. He challenges David Harvey’s analysis that portrays neoliberalism as a systematic use of state power to recompose the rule of capital in economic and social life. For Harvey, it is a globally integrated project. Yet Marais argues that; “neoliberal practice is considerably more variable, adaptive and supple than is often portrayed (Marais, 2011: 134).” In some respects, the differences are a matter of whether one looks at the national, societal or the global level. Moreover, these debates to some degree mirror recent debates about the history of empires that maintained significant particularities of place as upcountry interpretations of policy were subject to local contexts. If neoliberalism is a global class project, then it is going to be subject to various levels of support and resistance in a particular society based on variable class forces. In Zambia the project was introduced amidst highly divergent, yet weakly articulated class fractions. A history of the period therefore evades tidy description.

This chapter contains many sections. First, I examine the geopolitical context of the neoliberal turn. I go on to argue that in the final years of the UNIP government, agriculture had remained buoyant and provided for the economy, despite stagnation in the copper sector. As the previous chapter shows, the sector was fraught with problems; however, claims about levels of corruption may be overstated. While graft existed in many forms, it did not necessarily define what took place in rural areas. I also provide a basic recounting of the experiences of neoliberalism in Zambia as they can be pieced together through a variety of sources. I re-examine debates on Kaunda’s fall from power in 1991. The most important point to take away from this chapter is that the National Agricultural Marketing Board, NAMBoard, cannot

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151 Here Marais cites a phrase from Ferguson (2007) to describe a ‘tired “neoliberalism versus welfare state” frame’, as if Harvey would actually adhere to that perspective. A fair reading of Harvey, however, could never associate him with such a coarse analysis.

shoulder the burden of responsibility for economic crisis. The major crisis in maize marketing must in fact be attributed to the commencement of neoliberal structural adjustment programs, which undermined the functioning of the marketing board. Most importantly, the simultaneous process of currency auctioning sent the costs of essential imports of fertilizer and fuel soaring, furthering the economic crisis of the state. The revolt against Kaunda was largely a revolt against neoliberal policy. This is the reason people felt so betrayed by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. They voted for change, but instead, they got an intensification of the policies that were causing such hardship in the later years of the UNIP era. This is not to deny the fact that the UNIP state was increasingly authoritarian and kleptocratic. Yet, those features of the state remained under MMD, despite the fact the population despised them and had hoped for change.

Before going further it is worth reminding readers that any reckoning concerning the years of neoliberal economic reform is challenged by the conditions in which statistical data have been produced. As Morten Jerven has pointed out:

For statistical offices, structural adjustment meant having to account for more with less: informal and unrecorded markets were growing, while public spending was curtailed. As a result, our knowledge about the economic effects of structural adjustment is limited. More generally, the economic growth time series, or the cumulative record of annual growth between 1960 and today, for African economies does not appropriately capture changes in economic development. (Jervin, 2013b)\textsuperscript{153}

For this reason we have to maintain a level of skepticism and avoid making overly confident claims based on such data. One of the ways I have accounted for these challenges has been to resort to data from United Nations and World Bank studies. These are likely to be more accurate, though they are in no way free from the problems that have plagued the Zambian

\textsuperscript{153} Jerven’s work on the production of African statistics has received some condemnation from statisticians in some of the countries whose data he relies upon. Based on the response from the Zambian it appears Jerven may have allayed some of the negative responses if he had obtained visiting scholar status at the University of Zambia. His claim that senior employees of the CSO did not return emails is consistent with my own attempts to obtain assistance from the office and is a reflection of a broader attitude toward email among many higher offices in the country. In 2008 I often had to make multiple visits to offices of senior office holders to obtain a meeting and even then I was stood up. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/bc-professor-ruffles-feathers-by-spotlighting-africas-data-problems/article15434240/
Central Statistics Office in the post-liberalization era. Claims based on this data are also supported or contextualized with first-hand accounts from interviews conducted by the author.

After the Oil Shocks: Geopolitics of Zambia’s Liberalization

The protracted economic crisis that began in the early ‘70s can in many respects be understood as a loss of commodifiable space within a historically specific mode of production. Symptomatic of this loss of space is a crisis of the imagination that, among other things, prevented people from being able to comprehend alternatives or possible solutions to the collapsing current economic and political order. Lacking markets and alternative configurations of capital that would ensure continued profit, global ruling classes found themselves facing increasing competition and as a result, implemented an offensive strategy to break down post-War welfare-state regimes and open up spaces to be invaded by the profit motive. Not only did this offensive have huge implications for the Zambian ruling class, it was also in certain respects replicated within the country itself. Or, to be more accurate, this crisis extended into Zambia and was at the same time partially rooted within it.

The effects of this historic moment were most obvious in the gradual collapse of copper prices in the mid 1970s to 1987 that placed severe limits on the spoils that could be extracted from the state (Young and Loxley: 1990:4). Factional fighting increased and ignited regional and ethnic-based, or “sectional” identities (Szefiel, 2000b, 1982). The war of destabilization being fought by Southern Rhodesian, South African and US proxy forces created a climate of fear within UNIP that bred increased opposition that the party leadership was unable to control. In 1972, for example, just before the transition was made to a one-party state, a number of treason and espionage trials took place as some Zambians were purportedly conspiring with the white south.

Declining terms of trade ate into profits from the production that continued to increase until 1976. The country was essentially continuing to produce copper at similar levels, but profits nevertheless declined. The Prebish-Singer thesis, which suggested primary commodities would decline relative to manufactured, was proving to be correct (Cohn, 2012: 108, 172). This placed limits on capacities for reinvestment in the mines while the government was also unsuccessful in diversifying the economy. As a result, the industry remained dependent on imports while transport costs increased, due in large part to the war and rising fuel prices. Yet, even then a “calamitous drop in imports was determined largely by declining copper prices. In value terms, real imports fell from US$1722 million in 1976 to US$700 million by 1985” (ibid:6).

Gertzel, Baylies and Szeftel show that by the early 1980s a small but significant indigenous petty bourgeoisie opposed the somewhat socialist oriented policies that emanated from the increasingly isolated old guard politicians on the UNIP central committee (1984). As coffers ran dry the government extended and then amalgamated its involvement in the parastatal sector, allowing this class to attack the basic fabric of the state as officials plundered resources (Szeftel, 2000b, 2014). Opposition was mounting from a growing petty bourgeoisie that included a layer of managerial and bureaucratic staff within the parastatal corporations and marketing boards. Burdette writes that, “After 1975 the drive for money and power by the local governing class became more naked, accompanied by growing corruption and inefficiency at all levels of government” (95). Yet this class was internally fragmented as its formation was intertwined with the maintenance of clientelist networks (Szeftel, 2000b). Thus opposition forces did not emerge as a cohesive group. On the other hand, as a policy response, neoliberalism did not have indigenous roots. It came rather, as an external force – a package that was adopted in a context void of alternatives. The international financial institutions (IFIs) were able to capture the ideological terrain because of the depravity of indigenous politics defined by sectional patronage interests that dominated underneath the
ever-thinning veneer of economic nationalism.

In some respects, an assault of global proportions had been launched against the very idea that a nation could pursue a more radical degree of independence along with goals of social justice and poverty alleviation. I noted earlier that throughout the 1970s Zambia was housing regional liberation armies and some of the left were working to build pan-African anti-imperialist cooperation through organizations such as the Organisation of African Unity and Southern African Development Coordination Conference in support of self-determination and an end to racism in all Southern African countries (Burdette, 1988, Hall, 1969, Shivji, 2009, 2010). The country’s strategic significance was evident in the fact that it shares borders with eight countries in the region; it was once described as an arrowhead piercing into the white controlled Southern part of the continent (Hall, 1969). Even though the UNIP regime was paternalistic, top-down, repressive of the left and vicious at times, it nevertheless had a relatively progressive and defiant position when compared with most other African nations at the time. It worked with other nations at the UN to establish the non-aligned movement and attempted to build the New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Fraser, 2010).156 In spite of the inherent contradictions, the regime had been able to maintain a significant degree of independence in economic policy and foreign relations – at least until 1974 - based on the profits of copper being sold in large part to Britain and the US (still entirely through the London Metals Exchange).

It was impossible to consider economic independence in Zambia without addressing the ownership structure of the copper industry and international markets it served. On this basis, Zambia remained intimately tied to England and to a lesser extent the US. In the 1960s it was the third largest producer after the US and Chile. The threat of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia sent British industrial interests into an urgent

156 Independent Socialist organizations were banned in 1964
scramble to limit copper use, seek alternatives and resort to recycling old appliances. The establishment of sanctions against the Southern white minority states had dramatic effects, causing copper prices on the London Metals Exchange (then the sole market) to shoot up in May of 1966, from 336 GBP to 636 GBP. This was in part due to the challenges expected on exports once UN sanctions came into effect in the following year, but also because Roan Selection Trust and the Anglo-American Corporation began stockpiling. In late November of the same year Kenneth Kaunda visited Chile (with British spies on his trail), becoming the second African head of state to visit Latin America after Senghor in 1964. In 1967 Chile and Zambia were joined by Peru in Congo/Zaire where they established the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Nations (CIPEC). They hoped to build a cartel that functioned similarly to OPEC, though barriers would prevent it from obtaining sufficient control of the industry (Fraser, 2010). Between 1969 and 1971 the UNIP government had appropriated 51% ownership of the minerals in the ground and the companies bringing it out. The two mining companies were eventually turned into the conglomerated Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines under a broader parastatal structure, the Mining Development Corporation (Burdette, 1988: 88). Fraser has accurately described the resulting arrangement as “state-capitalist” in which the state worked in conjunction with international capital while it attempted to keep labour subservient within corporatist union structures (2010: 8).

Following the election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1971 the vast majority of the world’s copper supplies at the time came under the control of governments intent on nationalizing industries and finding ways of insulating their economies from imperialist processes. Together Zambia and Chile were the largest global producers of copper and gave greater weight to the project of forming a cartel. The practical reality, however, is that it


“did not represent the introduction of a qualitatively different economic system” (Larmer, 2010: 37). The Chilean coup in 1973 came only weeks after US owned mines had been appropriated by the Allende regime. Some authors consider the economic policies introduced by General Pinochet as the first experiment with neoliberal structural adjustment that would in time be imposed upon the rest of the world (Harvey, 2005, Klein, 2007, Taylor, 2006).

The oil price hikes of the 1970s coincided with a protracted decline in copper prices. In response the Zambian government resorted to borrowing from both private banks and foreign donors (Fraser, 2010: 9). Throughout the following decades mining production levels gradually declined while no investments were made in re-tooling and expansion. Following the Volcker shocks of 1979-81, interest rates on those loans were crippling.

The Third National Development Plan (TNDP) in 1980 had to account for these overwhelming trends, which had in turn given new impetus to the needs of the agricultural sector. Theoretically the sector could have absorbed those displaced from the mining economy. Included in the TNDP was Operation Food Production (OFP), a ten-year plan launched by Kaunda with allocated funds of US$500 million. The programme sought food self-sufficiency (the still elusive policy objective since 1964) while also, not surprisingly, encouraging urban Zambians to return to farming as unemployment was increasing (ibid). Since 1975 the country had seldom met its food requirements through internal production and therefore significant quantities needed to be imported. Yet, as Burdette continues, “the picture is not all bad. Seed cotton, sunflowers, and sugar have better growth rates and are feeding raw materials to INDECO (Industrial Development Corporation) companies such as Kafue Textiles, ROP (Refined Oil Products) and Zamsugar (119).”

While copper prices were declining, agriculture had in fact been performing relatively well. In the late 1970s and early 1980s large-scale commercial producers increased their maize production from about 30 percent of market share to 60 percent (Wood and Shula, 307). Burdette notes, however, that “despite assertions that the TNDP would emphasize agriculture, the budgetary projections for 1983 indicated a reduction by 34 percent of the revenue available to the two key ministries that dealt with agriculture: the Ministry of Cooperatives and the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (Burdette, 1988:114). What is more:

Lacking political muscle, the Planning Commission was subverted by a coterie of private individuals and public officials…Rather than designing a well-integrated industrial and agricultural plan, the party and its government permitted various parts of the economy greater autonomy (ibid).

By 1980 the mining sector was falling apart and had been operating at a loss for much of the previous year, solely for maintaining the precious flow of foreign exchange. So, from 1981 through 1985, of all sectors of the economy "only agriculture", according to Burdette, “held its own in production terms, albeit tenuously because of a drought and the dependence of commercial agriculture on imported inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery (117)”. Once again, Burdette notes that:

The picture of agriculture by late 1985 is complex and slightly less depressing than manufacturing. This is fortunate because agriculture may be Zambia’s economic mainstay for the future. Despite serious droughts in 1979, 1980 and 1982, marketing of crops continued to be adequate. Maize began to recover from a slump in 1979/80 in an apparent response by peasant and commercial farmers to the 100 percent increase in the producer price from 1980 to 1984. (1988: 119)

The relative success of the sector throughout these years may be partially due to the OFP. Throughout the 1980s maize production levels continued to be strong.\(^{160}\)

On paper, Operation Food Production may have been the most explicitly socialist oriented set of policies that UNIP had ever come up with, but how it was actually implemented is another matter. OFP policies prioritized the expansion of the state-farming sector and

\(^{160}\) GRZ (1991) *An Evaluation of the Agricultural Credit System in Zambia*, Agricultural Credit Study Team, October
revealed a renewed interest in the establishment of farming co-operatives. In the end these top-down attempts could not stand up to IMF pressures, nor did they have local support or means of financing. Farmers resented the coops and tended to be more interested in individualist strategies. The policy was also weakened by the fact state coffers were being robbed in virtually every branch. Following the 1981 Berg report the World Bank had exerted pressure to end the practice of centralized crop pricing along with the state marketing and crop collection programmes (Sano, 1988, Wood and Shula, 308).

The 1980s were widely considered “the lost decade” for underdeveloped countries as they became mired in debt and spent most of their budget servicing loans. This was connected to a broader initiative launched by the US ruling class to “systematically discipline the third world” and find markets for financial institutions that had exhausted lending opportunities in the North (McNally 2002, 163). Between 1971 and 1980 Third world external debt grew from $70 billion to $560 billion. As Bracking and Harrison note:

Negative real interest rates prevailed through most of the 1970s, until the second oil shock of 1979, encouraging both excessive borrowing and lending. However, 1979 also marked a radical change in global economic policy, inaugurated with the ‘Volcker Shock’ (so called after the then chairman of the US Federal Reserve) when America suddenly and dramatically raised interest rates. The sudden change of interest rate policy increased the cost of African debt dramatically, since a majority of debt stock was held in dollars. The majority of the newly independent states had been effectively delivered into twenty years of indentured labour. From that point access to finance became a key policing mechanism of African populations (2003: 6)

In the early 1980s the government of Zambia went into debt with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. While these loans came with conditions to impose trade liberalization and austerity measures such as increasing prices and devaluing the currency, Kaunda continually reneged on their implementation because of unmanageable popular reactions (Burdette 1992: 7) and, as Sano (1988) notes, fundamental contradictions in

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161 Some attempts were made toward the latter in the early ‘70s with disgraceful results. Commercial farmers were given the least amount of attention and were really only considered for the technical knowledge they could provide to the other sectors (Wood and Shula, 301).

the policy recommendations of the IFIs. Petrol prices in Zambia rose between 1973 and 1981 over 500% (Katilungu and Zeko, 1983).

There is no denying that amidst these trends, Zambian elites were also becoming increasingly rapacious. Szeftel argues that these processes were impossible to gain control of because of the ways in which “clientelism and class formation were bound up with each other”. As a result, “attempts to punish corruption by prominent individuals risked alienating their clients and provoking the political defection of their factions” (Szeftel, 2000b: 212). Yet this then served to justify increases in aid funds toward non-profit sectors, which have tended to step in to take on tasks once reserved for the state. McPherson suggests that from the 1970s onward the state lost billions through various forms of capital flight (McPherson: 43). He cites World Bank sources suggesting between $180-$400 million was being lost annually solely from the smuggling of gems.

The Consequences of Liberalization

In the late ‘80s and early ‘90s drastic increases in food prices as a result of Structural Adjustment Programmes sparked a series of food riots and looting that particularly targeted the Asian population. At the end of 1986, debt was estimated by the World Bank to be $5709 million, which was one of the highest debt loads relative to GDP in the world. at four times the estimated 1986 GDP, it was “higher than that of the major Third World debtors and higher than that of almost all other African debt-distressed nations.” (Young and Loxley, 1990: 12). According to Young and Loxley, in 1986 debt servicing represented 150 percent of export earnings, though the government of Zambia has claimed that in 1989 Zambia’s debt servicing, “excluding payment of arrears, represented 58 percent of the value of exports of goods and services” (GRZ, Demographic Health Survey, 1996: 2). Regardless of its relative value to

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163 In Zambia this word is used for people of South Asian origin. Most are Muslim and many are from families that arrived independently in the early 20th century.
exports, between 1971 and 1991 the total “long-term” debt rose from $60 million US dollars to $7.3 billion, “representing an increase in per capita indebtedness from $160 to $900” (ibid). This figure amounts to nearly three times as much as the average annual income for 1999 and more than 200 percent of GDP (Fernholz, 2004: 263, WB Atlas, 2001). These processes led to the end of an era as Kaunda bowed to international pressure and accepted a return to multi-party elections in 1991 (Burdette, 1992: 8).

As is widely documented, Kaunda lost to a broad coalition that galvanized the previous year in the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). Former president of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, Fredrick Chiluba emerged as the leader and would hold an absolute majority in the Zambian parliament between 1991-2001. Unionized workers were also suffering under UNIP as their workplaces lacked necessary reinvestments in maintenance and new technologies while inflation had eaten away at their salaries (Potts, 1995, Sano, 1988, Larmer, 2006). As a trade unionist in the 1980s Chiluba had provided the most vocal challenges to the IMF imposed monetarist policies. In 1989 he was also the first major proponent to come out in support of the re-introduction of multi-party elections. Yet once in office, with unflinching determination, he rapidly ushered in those very policy prescriptions he once railed against, thus, Zambia’s political transition to multi-party democracy was one of the many ‘dual transitions’ on the continent in the 1990s that simultaneously saw its political and economic liberalization (Pletcher: 1999, Young, 2010: 194-224). Chiluba introduced massive retrenchments that were to impoverish urban workers even further (Larmer, 2010: 47, Fraser: 11). This is not to suggest he was without broad support from unionists in 1991, but that his about-face was apparently immediate.

The new Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government used its initial popular support to introduce the most drastic reforms that had been demanded by the IFIs, though continually resisted by Kaunda. As Burdette notes,
These actions included the removal of 90 percent of the maize subsidies, increase in fuel prices and the devaluation of the kwacha (the local currency) by 30 percent without a corresponding rise in salaries. Also on the agenda is an aggressive privatization program and the cutback of 10,000 jobs in the civil service (1992: 10).

The privatization process continued throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium (Craig, 2000). The major programs were the 1991 Economic Reform Credit, the 1992-1995 Rights Accumulation Programme, the 1994 Economic and Structural Adjustment Credit, the 1995 Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the 1999 Structural Adjustment Fund and ESAF, and the 2000 Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative.

Within 18 months in office, the MMD coalition was fracturing. There were widespread allegations of corruption, a number of cabinet ministers being implicated in an international drug smuggling ring. A number of donors withheld funds and new parties were formed, the first emerging in Southern Province. The details continued to haunt the government in the following years as details were drawn out in the Challa Commission of inquiry. With large numbers of people losing their jobs, people turned to a variety of livelihood strategies. The most common involved cutting forests for charcoal and building planks, fishing, and petty trade, increasingly fueled by imports of low-cost consumer goods. The streets, newly crowded with petty traders selling all varieties of imports, were then targeted by police and governments to the point that riots erupted among vendors in self-defense, some of the most prominent on March 18, 1993. Bizarrely, Chiluba was able to capitalize on the sentiment by offering populist rhetoric in support. Following a feeble coup attempt Chiluba implemented a state of emergency that drew widespread anger among the population who tended to see it as a return

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164 "Nakatindi Wina linked to drug mandrax scandal." The Post, No 99, May 28-June 3, P1, “Chiluyba Ditched: Resignations plunge MMD into crisis, political heavy weights to form new party”, The Post, August 13-19, Amazingly, most of the politicians implicated would continue to have careers as prominent politicians, serving within various political parties.
166 “You were the Servants of Vernon Mwaanga”, April 5, 1994, “You haven’t heard the last of me!” C. Chitonga.
167 Weekly Post, March 23-April 1
to the old UNIP ways. There were also maize riots in Southern and Northern provinces (ibid: 5). Fraud and corruption allegations surfaced at the highest levels of government, over the operations of parastatals.

Figure 12. Cartoon, The Weekly Post, June 1993

Satirical cartoon from June 1993 addressing the various allegations of rampant corruption within the MMD. The figure in the center discussing pork pies and swine fever is Simon Zukas, who was Minister of Agriculture at the time. The swine fever epidemic he makes reference to was otherwise largely absent from public records.

By far the worst and immediate problems for farmers were the rising interest rates and crop marketing fiascos that coincided with multiple years of drought. One editorial in the Weekly Post (the only independent newspaper at the time) grasped the relationship between finance and farming well in the headline “Monetarist Madness Fuels Farming Fiasco”. It paints a bleak picture as “the full effects of the monetarist economic policies being forced upon

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169 *Weekly Post*, No 95, May 14-20,
Zambia by the International Monetary Fund, and which have so far been difficult for the average person to see, are now beginning to rear their ugly head.” They go on to note the loss of manufacturing companies, tens of thousands of job losses, and the withdrawal from farming by Lonrho, one of the largest companies in the country. Of the policy formulation process they had this to say:

Young, overpaid, inexperienced whizz kid economists from America and Europe, with a string of degrees but with little understanding of what it means to be poor in a Third World Country, are running the show.

It might be interesting for them to experiment on Zambia – to do what they could not do in their own countries. But they won’t have to face the consequences. We will.

The problem is that we never stopped being a colony.170

This is harsh nationalist rhetoric that no doubt reflects the bias of losing fractions of the national bourgeoisie. Yet the image is not too far from the truth insofar as the policy was drawn from economic models dependent upon a highly fictive set of assumptions.171 It also captures the perception of current-day colonialism. They believed, quite rightly, that the country had been trapped.

The relationship between agriculture and finance is much larger than many would assume. This is because the annual crop must be bought and stored if it is to survive the rain season. Its prices are prone to cycles and there had to be enough currency liquidity in the country at the time the largest amounts were being bought. Further complicating it was the fact that most of the buyers did not have the finances themselves. In the 1993 season, there were only four accredited buying agents: Lima Bank, Zambia Cooperative Federation (ZCF) Financial Services, Southern Province Cooperative and Marketing Union (SPCMU), and Credit Unions and Savings Association (CUSA). Yet they relied on approved sub-contractors to bring the crop in. There were agents that were borrowing from the bank to bet on the price of

170 Weekly Post, November 12, 1993, P 6
maize. At the same time, the Central Bank was in the process of devaluing the currency while simultaneously trying to prevent hyperinflation. Thus the government was avoiding printing money and attempting to spend only from current accounts and selling treasury bills.

The lack of currency in the system was partly the reason interest rates climbed above 300 percent. It was further depressed because the wealthy were storing their wealth in foreign currencies (McPherson, 2004 A/B: 43, 157). With interest rates soaring in the 1993 buying season it was too risky for maize traders to buy, as they were unlikely to sell in time to make a profit above the costs of servicing the loan. The combination was disastrous and compounding. By late August, “Only about 2 million bags had been collected, out of expected 18 million (90 kg bags), the buyers simply “didn’t have the cash to buy it, rates were too low” The president of the Zambian National Farmer’s Union at the time, Ben Kapita explained to the Weekly Post “that the principal buying agents were only favouring the farmers who got loans from them so that they could recover the monies”. He also claimed that, “In Southern Province, those who were unlucky lost all their maize to tricksters and conmen posing as buying agents”. This is consistent with other reports that reveal the consequences of speculation. The “Southern Province Cooperative Marketing Union had actually asked farmers who had delivered to them to come forward and retrieve their maize because the union had no money to pay them.” The principal buying agents also did not have the facilities to store the maize when collected.

One must understand that much of the so-called ‘private sector’ had come into being virtually overnight “through purchasing second hand vehicles from parastatal companies

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174 “Small farmers complain in Southern Province”, The Weekly Post, July 30th – August 5th, 1993
175 “Maize Sales Increase”, The Weekly Post, pg. 8, 1993
considered as write-offs”. In 1993 it purportedly controlled “90 percent of the fleet strength of more than 2000 units in the country (ibid).” Charles Madondo, chairman of the Truckers Association of Zambia put the blame on millers who were supposedly without sufficient liquidity. The millers were also blamed for importing from neighboring countries and thus leaving buying agents with a stockpile. Without sufficient liquidity, the government allowed the use of promissory notes in exchange for maize. As the season followed a year of drought many farmers had gone into debt for seasonal loans. With barely a market and excessive interest rates it is understandable the recovery rate was low. The Weekly post of December, 14,1993 cited a report from the Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries:

   only about 40 percent of the loans disbursed during the last planting season had been recovered by the end of November.

   Though this year’s marketing arrangement was designed to facilitate high loan recoveries by the lending institutions, the scheme has been hampered by inadequate financing for maize purchases.

On the same day interest rates were advertised as follows: Lima Bank – 94%, CUSA – 80%, ZCF – 48%. The circumstances were made worse by the fact that millers had imported maize, despite there being a bumper crop. The principal buying agents had been buying the maize on money loaned from the Central bank, but then had no market to pass it on to. Thus, by August they had “bought 460,000 bags and had only sold 50,000 bags to millers”. These circumstances would go on to force the collapse of LIMA bank and the Southern Province Cooperative Marketing Union. They also left farmers in Southern Province without a market. The only upside was that rural organizations emerged to purchase hammer mills that enabled the processing of maize without transport costs.

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177 “maize marketing policy is a truck of trouble”, The Weekly Post, September 17-23”. These findings are consistent with testimony from Zoomern Mbewe, of the Choma District Cooperative and Marketing Union, interview with Toby Moorsom, 05/30,2008
178 “Maize agents stranded with 4.5 million bags” The Post, March 8, 1994 p 13
180 “Lack of Cash to back policy”, The Weekly Post, August 27-Sept. 7, p 10
Many, including farmers, the ZNFU, as well as Oxfam International and the ZCTU expressed major opposition to SAPs. Some described the free trade agenda as a new form of colonialism. Yet, sensationalist headlines about farmers tend to be based on ZNFU claims or anecdotal evidence from one or two sampled farmers. The ZNFU did not represent even the majority of Black commercial farmers, let alone the 600,000 other peasant and small-scale farmers in the country. The experiences of large-scale farmers, however, are instructive. When they face problems, one can be sure things were much harder for the smaller-scale farmers. A news report from October 1993, largely drawing from ZNFU sources, elaborates on the situation of large-scale farmers. It claims in Mazabuka farming block, the most advantaged farmers were “spending sleepless nights as they contemplate the loss of land their families have worked over the last 50 or more years”. It goes on to claim:

Prohibitive interest rates, muddled agricultural marketing policy, lack of financing, government failure to implement announced policies and ‘open-door’ trade, in the absence of a real free market have left the farmers in a financial stupor.

Banks are calling in the loans the farmers have been unable to pay because of the unattractive maize price the government has offered as well as delayed payment for those who have actually managed to sell the crop.

As a result, farmers were stuck with their yields while buying agents were speculating in currency and investing in treasury bills. The ZNFU blamed government for withholding money for maize purchases, in line with the cash budget policy. They claimed the previous year’s drought “depleted the savings most farmers had accumulated over the years and most of them were forced to borrow at 60 percent interest. These rates meant many paid back as much as 324 percent. As ZNFU’s Nang’amba claimed “‘this can mean that farmers have to hand over their farms to the banks….”. Furthermore, they were hit by “a massive shock” of ZESCO electricity tariffs increasing by 700 per cent.

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183 P11 “What the SAP Really Means is Stop Agricultural Production”, October 8-14, 1993
This was particularly hard for wheat farmers, who used electricity to irrigate while American wheat imports seemed to have entered the country illegally.\(^\text{184}\)

Some of the early impacts of structural adjustment on the agricultural sector were documented elsewhere by the ZNFU and are worth quoting at length here because they offer valuable insights into the complexities of markets that do not fit into simplistic supply and demand models. It is important to clarify that despite the fact the ZNFU was critical of the government and the existing economic conditions, they did not oppose the adjustment policy. Instead, they merely complained “it was implemented without safeguards”. They continue, in this specific case, discussing the impact on the pesticide market:

Farmers financial position has been crippled to an extent where their capacity to control pests effectively has drastically reduced. They have either reduced hectarage of crops grown to reduce amount of inputs used or they have resorted to cheaper inputs. Using what might be termed as cheaper pesticide is posing a danger because in most cases there isn’t adequate knowledge about the chemical.

Established Agro-chemical companies have always attached education on chemical usage to the sale of their products and this might be lost if the situation is not corrected.

Farmers cannot be blamed, all they need is a massive education campaign. They have no choice by to try anything cheaper because this is probably their “survival tactic”.\(^\text{185}\)

The broader context was a flooding of unregulated chemical inputs of various types.\(^\text{186}\) Thus outbreaks could not be systematically managed. As maize stocks never made it to market, Southern Province then had an outbreak of grain borer, a pest that could thrive on the stockpiles. This was in turn linked to a rise in poverty, which led to increased charcoal burning. Along with the return to Chitemene, forests were being cut for new fertile grounds that could produce without additional fertilizer. The grain borer naturally resides in forests, but as forest

\(^{184}\) *Weekly Post*, P11 “What the SAP Really Means is Stop Agricultural Production”, October 8-14, 1993

\(^{185}\) CFB/ZNFU “Crop Protection Challenges in Zambia’s Liberalised Economy, 1994”.

\(^{186}\) Satwant Singh, former Veterinary Officer for Southern Province, Interview with Toby Moorsom, November 9, 2009, “Public Risks taking ‘bad’ food, drugs” *Weekly Post*, Page 3, March 23-April 1,
territory gets encroached upon, the insects are released into the domestic sphere where they found perfect conditions to flourish. One senior agricultural officer explained that this was how grain disappeared from NAMBoard silos in Monze.\textsuperscript{187}

The period saw a generalized ecological crisis with multiple dimensions that will be discussed in the following chapter. For now, however, the same ZNFU document has more valuable excerpts that can be drawn out:

Firstly, Farmers all over the country were plunged into massive losses during the 1993. This arose partly from the abrupt decontrol of interest rates early in the year, in the middle of the 1992/93 rain fed crop growing season. Almost overnight, farmers who had borrowed seasonal finance from commercial banks at about 60\% found that the rate had gone up to nearly 150\% - or just below 300\% on a compound basis. Not even the most efficient farmers could absorb such an increase. They soon fell into arrears, and had to sell cattle and equipment to satisfy the banks. Their problems were worsened by a chaotic marketing season last year. Contrary to official assurances, there was interference with exports, announcement of a floor price which became the official price, yellow maize imported the previous year was left on the market, seriously depressing the local price, and adequate finance was not available for the purchase of the crop. Payment is long delayed, while interest changes piled up steadily. Promisary notes were issued, backed by official assurances that they would be paid with the interest on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of February, 1994.

This nightmare situation was then aggravated by the serious drought early in 1994 – the second in three years.

An influx of farm produce due to the trade liberalization has made matters even worse. Many of the imports are not only subsidised, but have also evaded customs duty and sales tax. Local farmers cannot compete with them... as a result of these factors, farmers are now struggling to survive and will try any cheap chemical or method for pest control whether detrimental or not.\textsuperscript{188}

Many lost their farms, though there were no attempts to determine the numbers that defaulted.

The circumstances for the smaller producers were equally horrible, according to the National Union of Peasant Farmers, an organization that had only been created in 1995, in part in response to the liberalizations. In 1996, Rakner quoted them as saying:

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\textsuperscript{187} Joseph Kembo, Senior Agricultural Officer, Ministry of Cooperatives and Agriculture, Monze, Interview with Toby Moorsom, June 6, 2007
\textsuperscript{188} I personally interviewed farmers who told me they faced a 300\% rate, and in some instances, rates of nearly 400\% have been cited.
The liberalized agricultural production and marketing had enormous side effects on the peasants. It has been like a sudden heavy storm crushing the productive sectors of agriculture. Suddenly they stopped agricultural credit which incapacitated the peasants and made them even poorer. As agricultural credit finance was put into private hands, the cost of production rose beyond the reach of the poor. Peasant farmers could not afford to pay for inputs like seeds and fertilizer and they have gone without any crop for the past -3 seasons (Rakner, 89).

This no doubt had implications on levels of hunger within the country.

**Figure 13. Cartoon, The Weekly Post, June 1993**

The cartoon depicts on the right a speculator leaving the country on a South African Airlines flight with profits made from treasury bills paid out by the Bank of Zambia at massive rates of interest, while on the left farmers are offered promissory notes for their maize, to be honored in 1994.

The liberalizations were crushing for farmers and they were also very difficult for the industries servicing them. The same ZNFU memorandum cited from above, elaborates on their impact on companies selling agrochemical inputs:

Established local Agricultural industries are also feeling the pinch of the effects of liberalization. Some reasons are similar to the situation in which farmers are like high bank interest rates, unfair competition and so on. This has led to a
situation where they are unable to compete favourably on the market… trade liberalization has led to an increase in the so-called “brief case traders”. Brief case traders have been able to get in touch with the farmers and sold their products at favourable terms because they have less overheads. This might force the established companies to become more efficient but care has to be taken on what type of chemicals are being sold to farmers.

In most cases, brief case traders have been unable to provide the technical expertise to farmers which the established companies are able to offer. This implies that there will be an indiscriminate use of chemicals… recently there have been complaints from farmers that certain chemicals are not controlling pests. They have to incur double cost for one purpose… New chemicals coming in are not undergoing any tests to study their effect on pests…

This is only one example of the ways the industry was impacted by liberalizations. “Brief case traders” also re-emerged in crop purchasing and were often accused of predatory behaviour. In free-market conditions these traders are functioning as entrepreneurs, filling an essential function in the economy. Multiple single agents acting in their own self-interest, however, do not have the capacity or incentive to account for broad ecological factors in their business operations. It is understandable then, that issues like this led to an adjustment in the economic theory being espoused by the World Bank, and other proponents of neoliberal policy. Thus, in 2002, the World Bank released the “World Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets”. At the time, Zambia, and its Southern African neighbours also within the orbit of World Bank policy prescriptions faced conditions of famine, with nearly 20% of the population needing food aid. According to a Guardian reporter, Southern Province, once the grain-basket of the country was “the worst-affected, with 60% of the population needing food aid”.

Regardless of the politics of those commenting on Zambia’s economic and political crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there is no denying Zambians suffered heavily from economic liberalizations. By 1994 the country was one of the poorest in the world and there was no recovery for the rest of the decade. By 2002 Zambia’s per capita income was only

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189 CFB/ZNFU “Crop Protection Challenges in Zambia’s Liberalised Economy, 1994”.

about 60 percent of what it was in the 1960s in real terms (Maveneka, 2006). The disaster was evident even to one reviewer who largely relied on World Bank documents. Based on their data, Maveneka notes that; “almost all indicators of social and poverty conditionality deteriorated during the 1990s”. In formal manufacturing, employee numbers declined from 75,400 in 1991 to 43,000 in 1998. In agriculture the number of paid employees fell by nearly half. Over the period 1995-2000 growth rates were 2.1 percent, which did not keep up with population growth of 3.1 percent. Despite this, agricultural exports had increased by 10 and 20 percent in 1996 and 1999. The 2003 Human Development Report placed Zambia as the 4th worst performing economy in Africa, with a negative growth rate of 1.7 percent. Copper prices rose dramatically in the late 2000s and the mines were revitalized by foreign investment, although proceeds to the state had been minimal because during the privatization process companies managed to negotiate the most liberal tax exemptions. The protracted battle to exact more from the companies underscored national political debates from 2008 to 2012. Real GDP had seen slight increases, though the economy was still smaller than it was, in real terms, at independence.

The effects of the structural adjustment programs on agriculture and rural society no doubt vary across region and sector though four particular documents are instructive of the general trends throughout the 1990s. The first is the Government of Zambia (GRZ) Central Statistics Office Demographic Health Survey for 1996. The second document that will be examined is the GRZ Economic Report 2000 (ER), produced by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The third is the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) for Zambia for the years 1999/2000. Finally, we will briefly look at the GRZ, Central Statistics Office report on Living Conditions in Zambia, 1998 (LCZ).

The 1996 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) helps provide a broader snapshot of the economic situation as it pertains to agriculture after the first four years of the MMD government. At the time, Zambian agriculture contributed about 15 percent of GDP and
employed 75 percent of the labour force. Ninety percent of the farming population consisted of small-scale farmers, while less than 10 percent were medium-scale producers. Less than 3 percent were large-scale commercial producers. Maize was the country’s staple as well as a major cash crop, accounting for 75 percent of land cropped and 85 percent of crop output. In 1995 the government introduced “the Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (ASIP) aimed at boosting agricultural production and streamlining the marketing of agricultural inputs and produce”. At the time, only about 2 percent of cultivated land was irrigated, leaving most farmers highly dependent upon weather patterns. Among other statistics related to the growing debt it states that in 1996 approximately 70 percent of the total external finance flow to Zambia was allocated to debt service (DHS, 1996).

The Economic Report of 2000 offers data for the years between 1996 and 2000, though the report focuses its analysis on the 1999/2000 fiscal year. During this time, it states that:

Government policy in the agricultural sector continued to be that of facilitating and supporting the development of a sustainable and competitive agricultural sector that assures food security at the national level and maximizes the sector’s contribution to GDP. Liberalization and promoting private sector participation in marketing and input supply continued to be the main policy thrust (52).

These policies have meant that a number of companies have taken over the supplies of chemical inputs. Throughout the period reviewed the government did, however, play a role in the marketing of fertilizer “on a loan basis to small-scale farmers and out grower schemes” (ibid). ASIP II was initiated which, according to the document, would “reinforce the progress made in ASIP I” by “developing further public-private sector partnerships and (the) decentralizing of support to small-scale farmers organized in groups at local-levels” (ibid).

It is difficult to get an idea from this document just what is meant by the apparent “success” of ASIP I. However, it is obvious it has nothing to do with the living conditions or production levels of small-scale farmers. In fact, in the very same document it is evident the
entire industry did not make very significant gains. It states that: “production and productivity in the sector continued to be low”, and that “this was mainly attributed to difficulties in the availability of inputs, poor infrastructure and inadequate credit to small-scale farmers, among others” (52). The entire sector, including forestry and fishing, had growth rates of only 1.8 percent, most of which were attributed to the “favourable performance in the forestry sub-sector, which registered a growth of 4.0 percent” (ibid). This reiterates the point that laid-off workers were cutting down trees as a survival strategy. While there was a slight increase in agricultural production it was far from what was necessary to keep up with the growth in population.

In the Human Development Report, agriculture represents a higher percentage of the GDP, registering at 18.2 percent in 1999 compared with 12.7 percent in 1990. This gain was not made in a pattern of progressive increments each year, but rather the figures fluctuate a fair bit throughout the decade. Overall, however, it is clear that most of the gain in the industry came at the expense of the mining sector and not as a result of a significant increase in production (HDR: 27). Further analysis shows that the growth that did occur was largely due to non-traditional crops, with the largest segment coming from floriculture (HDR: 69). This gives us some indication of the kinds of people benefiting from these trends because floriculture farming is very capital-intensive. It requires green houses, a drilled bore hole, irrigation systems, access to electricity and significant chemical inputs. Furthermore, growth in floriculture does nothing to improve food security. According to the Economic Report of 2000, non-traditional exports, including floriculture, declined for three years in a row. This relatively new industry has since been subject to significant fluctuations, suggesting it has limited developmental potential.

191 In 2002 I toured a typical floriculture farm in Lusaka Province owned by a former UNIP minister who, like many of his former colleagues and now neighbouring farmers, retired into farming. 6 years later, the operation had ceased as the export company who marketed the crops dissolved, the investor fleeing.
Not only was the growth in the agricultural sector not keeping up with that of the population, there was in fact an overall loss of jobs (ER: 41). The HDR notes that throughout the 1990s “the liberalization of agricultural marketing saw farmers outside the rail line lose guaranteed markets for their products leading to a fall in net farm incomes” (33). On top of this, people were feeling the effects of the loss of food subsidies, and the cash budget system adopted in 1993 which “made the funding of all sector ministries erratic, including that for the social sector, a factor that reduced the population’s access to education, health, clean water and sanitation, etc.” (ibid).

It can come as no surprise then that the most common coping mechanism people adopted for dealing with the effects of this decline was to reduce the number of meals they ate in a day (LCZ: 1988). A full 64 percent of the population identified this as the most common coping mechanism, with a concentration of 66 percent in the rural areas adopting this practice. These trends amount to the unavoidable fact that people’s standard of living declined, leading to a significant drop in the country’s standing on the Human Development Index (33). Of all countries in the region Zambia was the only one that had a HDI level lower than in 1975 (interestingly, Zambia’s HDI rating peaked in 1985) (32). The percentage of the population living in absolute poverty was no less than 70 percent, with 5 of the 9 provinces having rates at or above 80 percent (37). The highest levels of poverty occur in rural areas (LCZ: 61, 121). These trends amount to an even more drastic decline in life expectancy, to the point that in 2002 Zambia had the lowest life expectancy in the world next to war-torn Sierra Leone (WB atlas).

For the vast majority of the population, the level of income from one’s own produce had gone down (HDR: 33, LCZ: 118). There was, however, a substantial increase in the percentage of income coming from non-food crops relative to food crops. What this means is that people were going hungry while non-food crops like cotton are grown for sale on markets (HDR: 54, LCZ: 1). In order to make ends meet, Central Statistics Office figures show that a
significant number of people resorted to informal borrowing (LCZ: 67). In fact, next to reducing the number of meals or other household items consumed the most common coping strategy utilized was “asking from friends”. “Informal borrowing” lay just below doing “piecework” labour for others (ibid). Twenty-nine percent of people relied upon “informal loans”, while 5 percent relied on “formal loans” as a coping strategy. In interviews with workers on farms it seemed that forms of debt bondage were taking place.

The Experiences of Tonga “Entrepreneurial” Commercial Farmers

Even the wealthiest farmers, with the greatest ability to take advantage of the liberalization process, claim the reforms were disastrous. This confirms Craig’s (2000) findings that show Zambians were largely incapable of benefitting from privatizations. Ben Kapita was the President of the Zambian National Farmer’s Union when it supported liberalization and then came to be the Minister of Agriculture under the Mwanawasa government. As he explains:

> here we did not have the money to enable Zambians to buy into some of these companies. That is what I would have preferred personally. So I have no quarrel with the policy of liberalization or privatization but I’ve got a lot of quarrel with the way it was done from 1992-2001.\(^{192}\)

The ZNFU used to boast that they were the first to support liberalizations, however, their new ‘go slow’ position has been a revision forced by the tragic experiences faced by millions as a result.

Costain Chilala was the head of the Zambian Food Reserve Agency and by his own account the largest independent farmer in the country. He emerged from the successful class of farmers on the Plateau. His success is partly attributed to the fact he, like a number of Tonga people, purchased land in Central Province in 1973 when the government was opening up new areas of private title alongside the TAZARA railway. Central Province has had greater rainfall and Chilala was able to move into new rust-resistant, tropic-hardy wheat crops made

\(^{192}\) Interview, July 19\(^{th}\), 2007
possible by a multi-year breeding program funding in part by Canadian aid money. However, even Chilala admits that, in the area he emerged from, “farms went down, either because sons did not have the know-how in farming, or because of the liberalizations”.  

George Cornhill, octogenarian and a Tonga man from a white settler father, has been a prominent independence leader, rancher and businessman. Out of 150 interviews he is the only significant example of an agriculturalist that has been able to consolidate properties in the aftermath of the liberalizations, now owning a good portion of the buildings in Monze. Even though he had benefitted in recent years he believed the liberalization process was disastrous locally, with the government abandoning important roles it had played – even if to an unsatisfactory degree. As he states of the process:

that was very bad because, all our people here, the Tonga in particular; they were big maize producers. And the collapse of NAMBOARD* destroyed the whole agriculture economy… the diseases that came and the government did nothing. They let the cattle die. Like, Monze district had the highest cattle concentration in the country and then foot and mouth wiped it out completely.  

Even though Cornhill was a prominent supporter of the MMD coming to power, he was still aware of the important role the state was playing in the economy and society more broadly. As a student in South Africa he came to know many of the independence leaders in the region. He knew that when colonial governments were withdrawing they were leaving a society largely absent of local wealth and thus the state had a role to play in creating the conditions for it – regardless of the class relations that would be created and distributed within. As he states:

all of the infrastructure we see now was built by Kaunda; universities, hospitals, clinics, roads. You know, he had that vision, but when Chiluba came, he built nothing... people who came (with the MMD), they just went into buildings already found which were built by Kaunda. So Chiluba really did nothing.

This was a universal sentiment in Southern Province.

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193 Interview, July 27, 2008
194 Interview in Monze, July 25, 2008

* National Agricultural Marketing Board
Jeremiah Munan’gandu was born in 1924 in Bweengwa, Hamusonde, where many of the prominent farmers came from. His family were early recipients of the colonial Department of Agriculture “Improved Farmer’s Scheme” and then at independence he was the second African farmer to purchase private property on what is titled as “state land”. Even though Munan’gandu was among the most prominent and business-savvy farmers, like others, he did not understand the privatization process when they voted for the MMD and feels people were cheated. As he states;

I think some of the people who had economic knowledge could have seen it, but we others, we couldn’t see it… we thought these things would go the way it was presented to us. It was always on TV. How they were describing the privatization we thought it was going to work well… when it came it did not benefit everybody. It was meant for top politicians, those that were in authority. Those were the beneficiaries. If we tried to buy one of those companies we couldn’t get through.\(^\text{195}\)

The liberalizations coincided with the removal of state veterinary services and as a result Tonga farmers lost huge portions of their herds to the outbreaks of foot and mouth and to Corridor disease that swept across the country every two years or so. Those who managed to survive this, were likely to be hit hard by interest rates that by many accounts rose as high as 300 percent. In undertaking this research I assumed some Tonga farmers might have used their prominent positions in the civil service and accumulated wealth to be able to purchase many of the parastatals. However, when I interviewed prominent farmers the response was always the same. Everyone agreed with the statement by Jeremiah Mutelo (mentioned above) that by the time the privatization process took place “there weren’t any established Tonga agriculturalists at that time… all the farmers that were high went down…people ran away from the loans”.\(^\text{196}\) Instead people tend to feel it is “the thieves” who benefitted. A very small number of farmers survived this culling so long as they were without loans in the season before the liberalizations. Almost all, however, drastically cut the acreage they farmed because they

\(^{195}\) Interview at his home, July 26, 2008  
\(^{196}\) Interview, July 23, 2008
could not access sufficient inputs. Government statistics show the percentage of the population in Southern Province classified as employers fell from 1.5 percent in 1990 to 0.4 percent in 2000.\(^\text{197}\) Despite the pain induced in the name of debt-relief, “by the end of the 1990s, the debt had returned to over $7 billion” (Fernholz: 263).

There is a perception implicit in social engineering approaches to development that Africans lack a “culture of modern entrepreneurship” (Wild, 1997: xxi). In examining capitalists in Zimbabwe, Wild argues that Africans had not gained familiarity with processes “of working with financial institutions, and of using capital and learning economic procedures…” (ibid). Yet Tonga farmers did not feel it was a lack of ability that prevented them from producing greater surpluses and hiring labourers. Instead they felt limited by factors such as the lack of loans at interest rates low enough to justify the risks, insufficient transport, limited access to markets, drastically fluctuating commodity prices and extremely expensive inputs. Moreover, they claim there is insufficient access to water, cattle diseases, inappropriate breeds and insufficient veterinary services, and that their soils were leached of fertility by white settlers before them.

The UNIP\(^*\) government took actions to address these issues and paid particular attention to the needs of those who managed to acquire privately owned land, but since 1991 most farmers abandoned ambitious plans for cash cropping. This eventually contributed to massive food shortages to the point that in the 2001/2 season, the price of maize meal increased 500 percent\(^\text{198}\) while 4 million people (out of a population of at most 12 million) were at risk of starvation.\(^\text{199}\) In January of 2002 people were lining up in the hundreds, sometimes for days at a time waiting to purchase the limited maize meal available. Shipments of maize meal to stores were often protected by soldiers to prevent stealing, and fighting in the lines.


\(^*\) United National Independence Party

\(^{198}\) By some accounts these shortages were partly due to inadequacies in marketing infrastructure while crops rotted on farms.

The saddest part of the experiences with neoliberalism is that the retrenchment of the state took place as the HIV pandemic took hold. School access declined, health clinics were closed down and/or were out of medications just as the influx of HIV began. Dambisa Moyo claims that the fact the number of people on the continent living in poverty nearly doubled between 1981 and 2002 “has its roots in aid” (7), but it is more to the point that it had its roots in neoliberalism and the debt crisis. Until then Zambia’s poverty rate had actually halved from its pre-independence days. The practical reality of this for the farmers I spoke with is that all of them had lost many of their children – and therefore a large portion of their workforce.

It is essential to know that the vastly more capitalized white farmers were not nearly as badly affected. The question then, is why did the children of African producers die? On a farm, by farm basis the reasons vary, but are heavily dependent upon some aspect of technique, management and levels of enclosure. The African stateland farmers did not have the capital
and the conditions of management that white farmers had gained through an imperial order that gave them racially-privileged access to markets, English bank accounts, and dozens of forms of subsidization, including the use of prison labour gangs – and a racist managerial discourse of paternalism. One here cannot underestimate the challenges Africans faced in trying to enclose a farm and manage labour under the most desperate conditions of generalized societal poverty. People stole fences, cattle, cattle dip, power lines, crops and anything else. Moreover, the liberalizations allowed the proliferation of counterfeit, expired and inappropriate veterinary pharmaceuticals. There was also a lack of treatment capacities and veterinary assistance – quarantine, diagnosis and, most importantly, refrigerated storage and transport, and quality vaccines.

While processes of commercialization and commodification are evident on Zambian-owned, state-land farms, they do not necessarily represent capitalist enterprises. Previously identified processes of differentiation have not resulted in significant levels of class cohesion among indigenous commercial farmers, or class antagonisms between themselves and surrounding peasant producers. Without a doubt, stateland farmers are afforded greater levels of security than peasant farmers, largely through household diversification strategies rather than preferential access to credit and state benefits. Yet the particular conditions of the last 40 years have seen processes of what Shanin (1972) describes as “multi-directional” and “cyclical mobility” that have limited the political expression of the commercializing farmers as a definitive class. These trends have been partly related to the highly experimental and ecologically dynamic conditions of farming in Southern Province. Ownership and production units are highly diverse, but also precarious, despite their significant size (cyclical mobility). Various ecological and social constraints pose significant barriers to capital formation. The broader, global economic context was also pivotal in creating a period of destruction in order
to displace a protracted financial crisis, or what has been widely identified as an extended period of over-production.\textsuperscript{200}

Previous studies of Zambia’s indigenous commercial farmers, though excellent in other ways, have neglected to examine intimate ecological dimensions of changes in rural livelihoods over time. Such studies of agrarian class differentiation and class formation may thus miss significant dimensions of contestation between capitalist and so-called ‘pre-capitalist’ formations.\textsuperscript{201} This risks creating a reductive conception of class that fails to account for ideological and cultural dimensions of capitalism and its dynamics. This has an impact on how we understand economic “crisis”. That is, if we avoid examining the ecological processes we fail to see where class is created in the first instance: on the land.

Profit maximization is not necessarily a primary motivation of the farm owners and waged labour is only a partial feature of their operations. At the same time, their enjoyment of the land, its bounty and profits, exists alongside massive inequality and increasing commodification of their life world. State-land farmers face the issue of having to secure their wealth in this context. Crops, livestock, aquaculture, wild fauna and various other forms of property must be protected from theft and other avenues of loss. When the state is incapable of enforcing a “rule of law” and maintaining a functioning market and banking system, farmers have invoked various ‘pre-capitalist’, cultural-economic relationships of obligation (the white settler farmers also adopt some of these measure). Other strategies invoke witchcraft. Some sell peripheral plots to insulate against those from the “reserves”. Some use guard dogs, heavier fencing and patrol staff.


\textsuperscript{201} the term “pre-capitalist” is problematic in part because it gives the impression that extra-economic forms of surplus extraction are somehow pristine and not altered by interactions with the capitalist world. There is of course also no necessarily linear trajectory of stages societies pass through. They come together and fall apart or regroup depending on varying historical dynamics.
Class is under construction on these farms, but its enemies are also in nature: ecological drying which reduces water access, animal and crop diseases, insects, invasive ‘weed’ species, erosional processes, and forest decline, and more. Many aspects of nature can and will come under domination by capitalist logic. Seasonality comes under some control as production times, higher yield varieties, breed-changes and the like make for regular patterns of activity. The point is that forms of ecological imperialism, of the kind Crosby (1986) describes have faced greater barriers than the current historiography can account for.

Classic definitions by Lenin and Bukharin of capitalist development clearly fail to grasp current realities, yet I use them quite specifically to describe the expansionary, organizing tendencies of capital in a manner captured well by Ellen Wood’s term “Empire of Capital” (2003). This logic continues to penetrate social and material life in rural Zambia but it does so in ways that are “diverse and historically-constituted”, “not derivative of a form of ‘metropolitan’ capitalism, no matter how strongly they might be influenced by the latter” (Bracking and Harrison, 2003: 7). As Frederick Cooper suggests; it is uneven, “filled with lumps, places where capital coalesces, surrounded by those where it does not, places where social relations become dense amid others that are diffuse” (Cooper, 2005: 91-92).

This is a more complicated scenario than the one assumed in older debates about there being ‘too much, or too little’ capitalism (Vaughan, 1987: 11). The case of Southern Zambia suggests that the unevenness of capital accumulation and of the grip of capitalist social relations is influenced by a number of factors. Prime among them are ecological conditions; climate, proximity to water, soil deposits, wildlife (including disease organisms), flood regimes and industrial pollutants among others. These factors had significant agency in creating advantages in the colonial economy. They also had the capacity to create many losers. This is now very obvious given what we now know about the rinderpest epidemic in East Africa in the 1890s (Kjekshus, 1977: 126). Rinderpest was then followed by smallpox
epidemics, sand-flea (jiggers) plague and sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis); “One tragedy reinforced the effects of the other”, devastating populations within a few years (ibid: 132).

**Reregulation?**

A certain amount of opposition emerged against the privatization process, yet no independent popular movement has been able to articulate a politics that challenges neoliberalism. The social cleavages that existed within UNIP also presented themselves within the MMD, eventually leading to new poles of political power around the United Party of National Development (UPND) and the Patriotic Front (PF). This was the case, in part, because while the party initially drew in a wide variety of dissent, it was not unified around any particular programme or set of policies outside of IMF and WB structural adjustment programs (which Chiluba had previously voiced strong opposition to). The popular expression in 1991 was that the people just wanted change. “They didn’t really care who took over. Even a dog could have run against Kaunda and won” (Mwiinga, 1994: 59). Almost identical statements were made by virtually everyone I interviewed in Southern Province. As a result, it was evident even in 1992 that the MMD coalition was prone to fragmentation (Burdette, 1992: 10). In fact, by 1994 there were already 32 new parties that were comprised mostly of the old governing elite (Mwiinga, 1994). By 2001 competition had been reduced to 11 serious contending parties that had to varying degrees established bases in different regions of the country.\(^{202}\)

National politics in the new millennium increasingly came to be dominated by a cynicism toward elites over perceived corruption. Popular frustrations were expressed again in widespread protests when Frederick Chiluba attempted to alter the constitution to allow a third presidential term in office. When popular opinion prevailed, Zambia was led into a significant period of re-regulation under the government of Levy Mwanawasa. In the 2002/3 season – under famine conditions - the government of Zambia re-established fertilizer subsidies with the

\(^{202}\) *The Monitor*, Jan, 25-28, 2001
Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP). The program pays 40-50% of the cost of the fertilizers for the amount of 1 hectare, while the farmers must pay the rest (the amount varied across the years). In 2009 the program was renamed, the Fertilizer Input Support Programme (FISP), and amounts for fertilizer were increased while 50% contributions were also made for Maize. The government also expanded the role of the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), making it a *de facto* marketing board” or “buyer of last resort”, which effectively sets the floor price for maize (GRZ, NAIP, 2014: 25, Mason, Jayne and Myers, 2014). This has coincided with a re-establishment of cooperatives as a means of administering peasants.

According to Mason, Jayne and Mofya-Mukuka (2013), between 2004 and 2011, spending on the FISP programme accounted for an average of 30 percent of total GRZ agricultural sector spending, and 47 percent of GRZ agricultural sector Poverty Reduction Programme spending” (Mason et al, 2013). This is in a context in which agriculture receives between 11-16 percent of the annual budget – despite the fact 70 percent of the population depend upon rural production. Their data show that the majority of beneficiaries of these programs have been those farmers with plots larger than two hectares, while poverty is concentrated among smallholders who are less likely to gain access. After the first decade of these programs poverty rates have remained at close to 80 percent. Mason and Tembo claim that while the program increases incomes of participants, they “do not translate into substantial reduction in poverty”, likely because little of it gets to the poorest, smallholders, or the amount is not sufficient to lift them out of poverty (Mason and Tembo, 2015).

According to the government, between 2001 and 2011 Zambia’s economy grew at an annual average of 6 percent as a result of high global copper prices, investments in sectors such as telecommunication, construction, retail and manufacturing (GRZ, NAIP, 2014: 9). Yet, despite these positive signs, poverty rates remained persistently high at more than 60 percent across the decade. The situation with rural poverty has been worse with rates stuck at 77 percent for the past decade, thereby negatively affecting the majority of the country’s
During this period the agricultural sector saw renewed growth, yet only in the context of high volatility from year to year with 2005 and 2007 registering negative growth as a result of poor rainfall. When population growth is factored in the overall number of people living in poverty increased from 6 million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010 (ibid). Furthermore, in 2007 it was estimated that 14.3 percent of adults between the ages of 15 and 49 were living with HIV/AIDS while the number of HIV infected was increasing due to expanding population (Zambia Demographic and Health Survey, 2007, UNDP, 2013).

With the support of the United Nations’s International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the FAO, the Government of Zambia also initiated a number of programs and public education campaigns to encourage better marketing of produce by farmers. In 2003, the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) launched the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). CAADP is an initiative that aims to accelerate agriculture development in African countries through a minimum annual agricultural sector growth of 6 percent. This would be realized through the allocation of at least 10 percent of the national budget to the agricultural sector with the specific aim of reducing poverty and hunger by 50 percent by 2015. Zambia signed onto the CAADP in 2006, and an additional compact on December 9, 2009, as a framework to accelerate the country’s development, in conjunction with the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) and the Patriotic Front (PF) Manifesto.

The primary avenue for promoting development under these programmes has been a broad commercialization agenda that seeks to encourage Foreign Direct Investment and Public Private Partnerships, alongside “the passing and implementation of a market-based legislation including the Agriculture Marketing Bill and the Agriculture Credit Act”. It seeks an

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203 Zambian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 

increased private sector role in agriculture, “that would allow the value chain efficiency enhancement for priority commodities” and the “implementation of a well-structured and prioritized investment framework” (GRZ, NAIP, 2014: 11). Such initiatives have occurred in confluence with a broad set of policy initiatives under the banner of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. The New Alliance was launched at the G8 Summit in 2012 by GROW Africa, a World Economic Forum public-private platform for investing in the continent. Under its wing are programs like the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa supported by the African Union and premised on scaling-up agriculture in select sub-Saharan African countries by investment from global private capital – with a vision of transforming smallholders into entrepreneurs. The model is based on public private partnerships (PPPs), whereby countries that sign on issue contracts with the private sector, for example, to build fertilizer plants or distribution centers for patented seeds or to lease agricultural land to establish plantations.

Maize Markets and the Fall of UNIP, revisited

Many years later, there is still debate about the processes that took place leading up to the 1991 transition as they related to the gradual introduction of neoliberal reforms. Perhaps it is an exaggeration to call it a ‘debate’, rather than a divided literature, because in many instances it seems authors are not reading each other’s work nor are they speaking to opposing positions. This might also be understood as a divide between the political science versus political economy literature. The former hold a set of normative assumptions about market and state forms and focus on the technocratic political processes deemed necessary to bring them about. This is most typified by the broad work of Collier (1997), Bates (1981, 1993) and Thomas Jayne, from Michigan State University. These authors generally hold a view that unimpeded markets are liberating for agricultural producers and that what is needed is a greater separation between the political and the economic spheres of human activity. Bates’ larger body of work, including the 1981 States and Markets, was influential in forming the

The heterodox political economy literature, however, broadly represents an alternate school of thinking that examines processes of differentiation and class formation. The creation of inequalities arising out of market participation gives some figures greater power within the market and that transfers into political power. This approach is represented in the work of Baylies (1984, 1988), Gertzel, et al. (1984), Momba (1982, 1988) and Szeftel (1982, 1998, 2000a, 2000b) among others. These are not strictly dichotomous positions and to be fair, Jayne, Bates and Collier, are rightly concerned about the impact of dominant political figures on the functioning of markets. For example, Jayne is concerned about the ways the milling industry and the large commercial farmers serve to negatively influence policy at the expense of small producers (Jayne et al, 2002, 2014).

My contention here takes seriously concerns raised by Thandika Mkandawire (2001). Mkandawire argues that the construction of caricatures of the African state, and political processes within them, serves to obscure developmental processes that had been underway prior to the imposition of neoliberal reforms. He challenges the array of Weberian influenced political science literature that has coined terms to describe supposed affective relations that had come to dominate the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats in Africa; prebendalism, clientelism, neopatrimonialism, politics of the belly. In the literatures, according to Mkandawire, they have ultimately been used as an “ideological weapon” to explain everything ‘wrong’ with African states, in support of an anti-state agenda. Yet in doing so, these terms in fact explain nothing, and merely signify that ‘purely’ capitalist relations do not exist in Africa (299). They lump together a variety of different social processes as if they are equal. There is, however, nothing surprising about that, and as the Asian experience shows, these behaviors do not foreclose the possibility of economic growth. Likewise, Mkandawire finds Bates’ use of “rent-seeking” very limiting. As he suggests; “while the concept points to something real in most
economies, it has been made to carry more than it can bear” (300). According to Mkandawire, most policies attributed to rent-seeking in Africa in fact “preceded and indeed spawned the social groups to whom the policies have been attributed” (ibid). He argues that contrary to arguments of Bates and others, these groups never actually captured the state. The term then obfuscates and serves to create a “bogeyman” that can be blamed in support of the justification for policy changes.

Jayne et al. (2012) suggest the literature on market reform in Africa actually “ranks among the most divided and inconsistent within the field of economic development”. Yet they see the divide entirely within the terms of a neoliberal framework, with one side branching into the “institutions for markets” perspective that tries to explain failures of earlier structural adjustment:

While some scholars find that market reform has generally supported agricultural growth and food security, a growing literature has explained the poor record of reform in terms of inadequate attention to the institutional foundations of markets and weak infrastructure, all of which lead to growth impeding market failures (2012: 1968)

This is, however, a false dichotomy because both positions accept the fundamental premise that market reforms should lead to growth. Likewise, Jayne et al. go on to argue that market reforms have not taken place to the degree necessary. For them, the “institutions”, the “rules of the game”, have not yet changed (Chapoto, 2011: 1969). In citing Collier (1997) they argue that one of the problems is that, “Aid conditionality has been shown to be fundamentally incompatible with genuine partnership and local ownership of policy reform”. Elites did not sufficiently understand and were not adequately convinced of the need for reforms. In Gramscian terms, it would appear the hegemony of the IMF and World Bank was not sufficiently deep. Reading Mkandawire (2001) one gets a sense that the local capitalist class also did not gain sufficient control over the state. The state seems to have functioned as a sphere of contestation between international economic interests and internal economic interests, large parts of which were merged with bureaucratic interests. Yet for the latter, only
some fractions of the bourgeoisie ever gained control and they were not the developmental industrialists that Arthur Lewis (1956) would have liked.

Much of the problem with the Collier and Bates strain of argument lies in the fact the authors rely too heavily on supporting theory with selective evidence. Politicians and state officials are constructed as too self-interested and unwilling to give up rentier capacities within fertilizer distribution programs, while at the same time, too susceptible to the “perceived interests” of their constituents, who may kick them out of office if liberalization is followed according to dictates of donor agencies (1979). Likewise, Pletcher relies on a highly abstract notion of “rent-seekers”, who threaten to obstruct reform in several ways. Citing Bates, he too claims Zambia is an example of a rentier state in which “governments do not rest upon mass parties or strong bureaucracies; they rest upon markets and industries that have turned into political organizations” (Bates, 1994, p. 24). “Rentierism”, for Pletcher, “made economic reform difficult since rent seekers and government officials dependent upon rents had good reason to oppose liberalization.” Pletcher then argues that “maize output markets were liberalized more quickly and thoroughly than maize input markets”. This, he believes, occurred for five reasons. First, the “perceived risks of maize market liberalization were lower than those for maize input markets”. Second, Pletcher argues that portions of the Zambian private sector stood to gain from maize market liberalization, while rent-seeking persisted in maize input markets. Third, “agricultural business associations supported maize market liberalization, but similar support from civil society for input market liberalization has not been generated”. Fourth, maize market reform enjoyed a higher level of public-private cooperation than was found in maize input market reform. Lastly, Pletcher notes that maize market reforms faced no effective opposition while there was widespread resistance to the withdrawal of government interventions in maize input markets (Pletcher, 2000).

There is no doubt significant truth in the claim that the UNIP bureaucracy grafted itself onto the marketing institutions. The problem, however, is that the rest of these claims remain
largely unproven by evidence. Pletcher creates the perception that on one hand, farmers were ready to jump on the opportunity to sell their maize independently, while fertilizer companies were being held off by a rent-seeking political class that had established itself around the control over access to inputs. For Pletcher, therefore, “The governments’ political survival depended in part on market interventions which were used to subsidize consumers and state-owned parastatals at the expense of farmers and private marketers.”

Pletcher further suggests it was the “rentiers” who would lose out in the liberalizations – in favour of some apparently more honest, industrious business people who would step in and serve the markets more efficiently than state-financed bodies. There are many problems with this logic, and the overwhelmingly dominant perception among Tonga farmers about this period, is that in the dual transition it was the honest and meritorious people that lost out, while the ‘thieves’ came to power. In support of their argument, they can cite the most basic fact that Kenneth Kaunda was not found to have stolen from the country, and since leaving office has lived relatively modestly. On the other hand, Frederick Chiluba lived in luxury, had a wardrobe of “stupendous proportions”, was convicted of the misappropriation of $46 million in a UK court and dispersed millions to his supporters (he was believed to have stolen far more, though his influence within the country allowed him to avoid a separate Zambian trial over additional allegations).205 Others from the MMD have been sentenced with jail time for their actions under his government. These are large logical leaps, but they serve to support a common narrative that has political purchase insofar as Tonga have continued to overwhelmingly support the United Party of National Development in opposition which narrowly lost in two elections amidst widespread allegations of fraud. Thus, they feel to an extent that the leadership has been stolen from them. (In 2015 UPND once again lost very narrowly, though the results were supported by international observers from the Southern African Development Community).

Another possible narrative of the transition would suggest that through his last decade in power Kenneth Kaunda used increasingly centralized powers of the office of the president and the UNIP central committee to try and hold off those “rentiers” who were stealing from the state and hoping to benefit from the privatization process. He was also rather vicious in his suppression of political opposition, which was rightly challenged. Kaunda relied on a vague and contradictory ‘philosophy of humanism’ to obfuscate actual relations of power in the country. The ideology lacked material backing, not only because it was vague, contradictory and highly paternalistic, but also because it existed in a context of few political freedoms for those who challenged it or did not benefit from it (Larmer, 2006, 2008). This included deporting those without jobs from cities to rural areas (Larmer, 2006: 162).

The reality is surely more complex. Elsewhere I have argued that the supposed meritorious Zambian ‘capitalist class’ that was to step in and provide rational and efficient alternatives to the state marketing boards simply did not exist (Moorsom, 2010). This fact was also noted briefly by McPherson (2004: 327). International capital had limited interest in serving Zambian agricultural market. Interests were constrained by the highly challenging conditions that included limited transportation infrastructure. Zambian planners had been well aware of these limitations and knew that, left to its own, the market would exacerbate existing inequalities throughout the country and re-assert regional disparities.

Between 1984 and 1987 the CFB was examining the fertilizer issue and consulting with a broad group of international aid organizations. What they found was that international corporations were not capable of providing fertilizers at a cost that allowed their application to remain feasible. For this reason the most logical avenue for addressing existing shortfalls was to help Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia to (NCZ) address its production constraints, which seemed to largely relate to the fact there was insufficient foreign exchange to purchase inputs.

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206 To be fair, this perspective could be garnered from Bates and Collier (in Bates, 1995; 126) It was also a problem he helped create as he managed sectional tensions by brokering access to the state (Szeftel, 2000b).
On at least one occasion the World Bank made a loan available specifically for the purchase of fertilizer inputs. At the same time, the Mount Makulu research station was working on improving standardization and grading of fertilizers.\textsuperscript{207}

The picture often presented to me in interviews is that those who were tired of Kaunda’s political repression were taken advantage of by donor interests, which sought to impose liberalization via the popular protest. Or worse, people felt it was the local, Zambian ‘thieves’ that took advantage of them. It is true that many people were cheating the system under UNIP, and farmers were aware of it. However, the vast majority of farmers in Southern Province were not cheaters and they worked hard in response to the state’s call to grow crops for national development. Tonga farmers quickly adopted the settled agricultural practices the British demanded of them. They formed new village arrangements when they were imposed. They responded quickly to the demand for maize surpluses. Even when the economy was gradually tanking, between 1974 and 1989, maize production was growing at 8.5 percent, most coming from ‘emergent’ farmers (World Bank, 1992: 26-28, Copestake, 1998: 6). In fact, according to a 1991 report, there had “been considerable growth in maize production during the 1980s, but that growth was sharply curtailed by the very poor crop of the 1989/90 season … caused largely by drought, combined with a sharp drop in area planted, mainly as a result of policy factors”.\textsuperscript{208} Many feel they did what they were asked to do in the national project (i.e. feed the nation) and yet they feel they were punished by the reforms. This is not to suggest the post-independence agricultural system, so heavily dependent on maize, was without flaws.

Pletcher is correct when he says that: “Inasmuch as farmers are the beneficiaries of reform [or could be beneficiaries], they are dispersed, difficult to mobilize, and in many cases constrained by the lack of infrastructure from responding to liberalizations opportunities”. This

\textsuperscript{207} File: RC/B Location: CFB3/ii/l, Fertilizer Advisory Committee, April 1982-Dec. 1987

\textsuperscript{208} GRZ (1991) \textit{An Evaluation of the Agricultural Credit System in Zambia}, Agricultural Credit Study Team, October
is reiterated by Bates and Collier (1993), and Rakner (2003: 90). Pletcher is also correct when he says that: “civil society in Zambia is weak, and a broadly based coalition of support for liberalization has yet to be constructed”. It is also true that “price control and subsidies kept maize producer prices well below international prices so maize meal prices would remain low”, and that therefore, “the system discouraged production”. Zambians were getting a lower price than if they were exporting it. However, it was predominantly the large-scale white farmers who had an interest in exporting, whereas the Tonga farmers I spoke with were interested in having their maize marketing board function more fairly and efficiently. Most were in fact so disappointed in the market conditions post-liberalization that they struggled to remember how frustrated they were with NAMBoard.

As they recollect, farmers in Southern Province were aware of the benefits NAMBoard brought them. Many of them recalled the unfair, segregated pricing of the colonial era. From as far back as the 1940s Tonga farmers were eager to join the Maize Marketing Board, which was then racially stratified. They were eager to join it because they wanted to get rid of the “briefcase businessmen” who were otherwise offering extremely low prices for their maize (Colson, 2008, Vickery 1986). Likewise, after 1991, when the state completely removed itself from the purchasing of maize, the price dropped so low that farmers stopped producing. It also saw the return of “briefcase businessmen”. These speculators preyed upon the poorest farmers, buying stocks for the lowest prices at harvest time which could then be stored privately (by those with money), and sold during the dry season as stocks declined and price rose.

A frustrating aspect of these types of arguments is that they seem to ignore the very painful lived experiences of millions. Although NAMBoard had numerous problems, it often gave prices that were above what would have been obtainable on international markets, but only for part of the year (Sano, 1988). This was to account for the fact that the vast majority of

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209 1988 CFB AGM minutes
producers did not have significant storage capacities and needed cash at the time maize was harvested. Under free-market conditions millers pushed the price down to the point that sellers could no longer cover production costs. People knew they could benefit from collectivized storage costs, to dampen wild swings in prices and prevent seasonal flooding of markets by small participants. It is certainly the case that higher prices could often be obtained by selling across the border in places like Mufilira in Zaire (now DR Congo) because the market conditions were far worse, given the extreme incapacity of government there. Such logic, however, could also have severe negative impacts on Zambia if South Africa or Zimbabwe had been able to sell in the Zambian market, as their farmers were far more capitalized. (For example, opening up the Day-Old Chick Market to South African producers could have decimated the Zambian Market). The real interest in selling maize in international markets has always been driven by the most capitalized, predominantly white farmers within the Commercial Farmers Bureau (ZNFU from 1992). The dilemmas facing peasant and emergent farmers were partly due to the limited size of the national market and this was a generalized weakness of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model.

Even the largest farmers argued in support of fertilizer subsidies in a context in which Zambian fertilizer prices were the “highest in the world”. They also knew that the state played a number of important functions within the agricultural sector and that private interests had no incentive to perform them. These included education and extension services, standardization, regulation, and disease and pest management on a national level. Before the collapse of Lima bank and other state-run lending institution there were arguments against their privatization because people were aware they expanded the market into rural areas where it never previously existed. In 1993 Moses Banda was the vice-chairman of the Economic Association of Zambia. At the time he argued that:

210 CFB, Maize Pricing Policy, communiqué 1984* 01/02/84
if all agricultural lending institutions were privatized, even those few small scale farmers who got credit in the past would lose out. We would create a plantation economy with a pauperized population with its attendant socio-economic problems.  

The author certainly captures a logic that increasingly defines Zambian society in the 2010s.

Pletcher, and Jayne, et al. made use of a study published by Kydd in 1988, that was also dependent upon highly abstract assumptions. Kydd says, for example: “The maize subsidy is at the root of massive inefficiency within the food system. One major distortion is the bias so created against on-farm storage and localised trade in maize”. He suggests one of the inefficiencies was with transporting unprocessed maize out of rural areas and then trucking it back again for sale. Perhaps such a claim could be true of Northern Province, but it was not the reality in Southern Province, which has historically been the largest producer. The first goals of most farmers in Southern Province, regardless of size, are to meet their household requirements. They only sell after their own needs have been met. In fact, most grow unmarketable flint maize for their home consumption because they find the taste better and the last thing they want to do is eat maize that has sat in a warehouse or a silo for more than a year, being sprayed with pesticide monthly. Evidence has existed for years showing Southern Province farmers moved away from maize as a market strategy. They would part with it when people came to them for it, and they would disperse it to neighbours in years of need, but they did not consider it a vital part of their business strategy. UNIP policy was trying to prevent this from taking place because the country was often facing grain shortages, having to import in years of shortfall.

Sano helps clarify some matters pertaining to maize marketing prior to 1987, when Kenneth Kaunda broke with the IMF conditions. He argues that Kaunda’s actions make sense when one recognizes the IMF was pushing policies that were counter-acting each other. In

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211 Moses Banda, The Zambian Post “Privatization – the biggest blow to farmers’ financial future”, Dec 10, p.7
particular, the removal of maize marketing subsidies was being undermined by the weekly Kwatcha auction, which led to rapid devaluations of the currency. The devaluation of the currency was desirable for international interests because it would lead to lower copper prices against global currencies, but for Zambia it meant rapidly declining terms of trade. It also resulted in bank insolvency and the “collapse of the credit system” because inflation greatly exceeded the already high interest rates on loans. Worse still, currency devaluations coincided with multiple years of drought, which meant many farmers could not even pay the principal, which was by then reduced because of runaway inflation.212

Table 13, Interest Rates and Inflation Rates, 1980-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CENTRAL BANK RATE - %</th>
<th>INFLATION RATE - %</th>
<th>REAL INTEREST RATE - %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>13.54</td>
<td>-6.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>-5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>19.36</td>
<td>-9.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>20.12</td>
<td>-8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>36.83</td>
<td>-19.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>52.51</td>
<td>-27.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>44.48</td>
<td>-29.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>54.23</td>
<td>-39.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>122.41</td>
<td>-103.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>109.60</td>
<td>-80.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Column 1 and column 2. Bank of Zambia; column 3 equals column 2 less column 1.

Source: GRZ (1991) An Evaluation of the Agricultural Credit System in Zambia, Agricultural Credit Study Team

Sano does not argue against the need for currency devaluation in the 1980s or for the removal of maize subsidies, but he does show that before the Kwatcha auctioning the consumer and producer subsidies had been decreasing very significantly (with only transport

212 GRZ (1991) An Evaluation of the Agricultural Credit System in Zambia, Agricultural Credit Study Team, October, pp. 2-4
subsidies remaining). It is worth noting here that significant government efforts had gone into creating fertilizer production in Zambia, in part because its peripheral position in the global economy did not provide farmers with prices that made maize production feasible. Fertilizer and liming agents are very heavy to transport so it was a priority to source it locally. In 1984 it represented 30% of the cost of maize production (Landless, 1984, Hanjira and Culas, 2011). The CFB would soon become a major proponent of liberalization, yet in 1984 they were calling for a “reduction in fertilizer price”, noting that “Zambian fertilizer prices are probably the highest in the world and most peasant farmers just do not have the cash available to purchase their full requirements.”

In the 1980s maize subsidies were increasing because of the devaluation of the Kwacha, which was sending the prices of inputs skyrocketing, as is evident in the following figures. In the figure below (Table 16.), the costs of transport and fertilizer are represented in column 6. Column 2 shows the maize consumer subsidy, and column 3 represents that which goes to producers. Columns 4 and 5 are for NAMBoard fertilizer and handling costs, but column 6 is given to cooperative unions for fertilizer and maize transportation, which the government had employed for this task since 1980. The significant increases in price have to do with rising petrol costs and costs of maintenance, which are dependent upon imports. Those imports were rendered vastly more expensive because of the currency devaluations. Even before the devaluations they were struggling – prior to 1980 this was partly due to the sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. Sano’s table only covers to 1986, but the trends he identified went out of control in the 1989-1991 seasons, after the government had taken a loan of K1.5 billion from commercial banks to then pass on to marketing unions for crop purchases in the 1989 season. That season drought caused a failed harvest. The devaluations caused by the

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213 Bruce Landless, quoted in CFB Maize Pricing Policy briefing note, 1984
214 GRZ (1991) An Evaluation of the Agricultural Credit System in Zambia, Agricultural Credit Study Team, October, pp, 2-4, 9
currency auction rendered the subsidies unviable because it caused the costs of fertilizers and petrol to become exorbitant.

Table 16. Subsidies to Namboard and Cooperatives 1975-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>56.64</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>28.10</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>0.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>54.10</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>14.88</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>59.70</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>10.03</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>35.65</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>18.04</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>95.29</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>12.04</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>71.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>182.59</td>
<td>66.28</td>
<td>36.22</td>
<td>30.94</td>
<td>13.82</td>
<td>11.53</td>
<td>23.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>103.68</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>24.91</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>140.90</td>
<td>14.54</td>
<td>31.61</td>
<td>17.76</td>
<td>18.69</td>
<td>44.79</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>67.29</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>36.76</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>58.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985*</td>
<td>191.00</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>31.30</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>332.00</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Mr. Hamalega (who is now chief Hamusonde) was the chief administrator of the National Import and Export Corporation (NIEC) between 1976 and 1983. He was proud to say that he had never joined a political party, nor "ever taken even the smallest root in politics." 215

At the NIEC, he would have benefitted from the most lavish salary and benefits of all public servants and it is possible he had some responsibility for budgetary losses, though his wealth can be accounted for honestly. He relied on a private loan from a white settler family to purchase his farm, along with a short-term loan from the African Development Bank that was used to purchase a tractor.216 He also maintained a herd in Bweengwa throughout his career and claims that he could have never made it as a farmer if NAMBoard had not been there during his years as a maize farmer (in his first year cropping he produced 11,000 bags of

215 Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 25, 2008
216 I made confirmation of this with the family in question.
ninety kg). Hamalega is also a prominent member of the Seventh-day Adventist church. This is certainly not a guarantee he would keep his hand out of the till, but the SDA differs from the charismatic churches in that it promotes humility and opposes conspicuous consumption. The point is that he does not really represent the constructed image of the rentier party man. In his description of the period: “the country was just struggling for essential commodities. I want to give due respect to the first president…. We were blocked, completely blocked”.  

Farmers’ poor rates of loan repayment in this period have also been inserted into “rentier state” and “patronage” models (Jayne, 2002: 202, Copestake, 1998). Here one needs to be careful in thinking farmers were running from loans as if they were simply dishonest. Most of the Southern Province farmers I spoke to would admit that some were cheating, but many were crippled by compounding debt from seasonal loans that were taken in years of disastrous environmental circumstances (as noted above, the limited data available reveals that Southern Province had the highest repayment rates). This included the fact that their cattle were dying at a rapid pace, in turn, reducing the acreage they could cultivate. Many explained to me that they really did not grow up with a strong understanding of loans (and those who had them in 1991 were totally shocked by 300 percent compounded interest rates). These were new concepts, but so too were the conditions they were farming in – conditions that have been far from predictable. While this might seem a weak excuse, one has to see it in the context in which people were not even used to their labour being calculated by the hour and for a wage (Ntambo, 1968). Furthermore, one has to consider the responsibilities of the lenders. Despite characterizations of Africans living high on borrowed money in the post-independence years, in Zambia the majority of international lending actually took place after 1974, at which point economic decline had been firmly established. Moreover, while much of it

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217 Interview with Toby Moorsom, June 25, 2008
was channeled to farmers via the Agricultural Finance Company, throughout the 1970s it increasingly arrived via private banks.\textsuperscript{218}

Over and above these factors, one also needs to consider that in the mid-1980s the country had been experiencing maize shortfalls due to a three-year drought as well as complicated ecological challenges. This is one further reason the government had gotten so deeply involved in maize marketing in the first place, because they were charged with maintaining stocks to counter fluctuations related to natural causes. As Bruce Landless, chairman of the Grains Committee at the Commercial Farmer’s bureau noted in an official policy statement:

Maize plantings in the 1983/4 season were down approximately 30% on the previous years and it appears that harvest will be down considerably. As a result maize stocks will probably be falling to dangerously low levels. Importation from neighbouring countries is going to be nigh impossible as most of the Southern African (sic) has been affected to a greater or lesser degree by the past three seasons drought. Although world maize stock levels are relatively high, prices of over K200 F.O.B North American ports are predicted. And of course any further imports will be a severe drain on our foreign exchange reserves.\textsuperscript{219}

There were clearly reasons to go to extraordinary ends to ensure a crop could be brought in during these years. People were facing famine. Furthermore, one of the mechanisms the CFB was suggesting would assist in 1984 would be the incentive of an “early announced attractive producer price”. There were clearly fears the prices would be too low for farmers to sell early on if NAMBoard did not take the step of ensuring it was going to be given. In this way, it was an attempt to adjust for an \textit{irrationality} of the market that arrives because of the inequalities among producers: that the larger and more capitalized are able to benefit from hoarding/stockpiling. That is, an irrationality in which farmers who sell first get the lowest price, while those who have the ability to hold off selling can get a better price. This is irrationality in a

\textsuperscript{218} GRZ (1979) Survay of Agricultural Loans issued by Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions During the 1975-78 Financial Years, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development: Lusaka.

\textsuperscript{219} CFB, “Maize Pricing Policy 1984” briefing note
context where 70 percent of the population is highly dependent on getting something back from those early sales.

Bates, Collier, and Pletcher have argued that subsidies in Zambia have created an urban bias, in which rural producers have been underpaid to keep consumer prices low (Bates, 1995, Pletcher, 2000). Sano (1988) challenges this perception, suggesting that such an analysis can only be relevant for the 1970s. He joins others in arguing rather, that urban populations had been the primary victims of the declining copper economy. Various dimensions of this fact have been documented over the years (Pottier, 1988, Potts, 1995, Ferguson, 1999, Larmer, 2010). They were facing rising unemployment when maize prices doubled many times over. Simultaneously, Sano claims, liberalizations had the effect of pushing large-scale producers out of maize production as subsidies were removed. Maize production then became dominated by smallholders in peripheral provinces, who are less sensitive to import costs – as they were not relying as much on fertilizer. This finding is supported by Culas and Hanjra, who point to a fall in maize production, increased food insecurity, and no significant change in levels of efficiency in maize production after liberalization (2011). They also show that liberalizations led to an increase in chitemene (slash and burn) production as access to fertilizers declined (559). This would have knock-on effects on riverine ecosystems we will discuss below. Sano argues that smallholders were entering the market, while large-holders move to crops that are less price-sensitive (irrigated wheat becoming a major windfall for the elite). In Southern Province, many simply reduced production and focused on cattle, with those close to the rail line, and wealthier, moving into dairy.

Jayne and his colleagues at the Food Security Research Project (FSRP) were quick to adopt the World Bank’s discourse. The FSRP is a research and policy advocacy and outreach body launched in 1999 and funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and more recently the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation. It is formally “a collaborative partnership” between Zambian organizations in the Agricultural Consultative Forum (ACF), the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO), and Michigan State University’s Department of Agricultural Economics (MSU). Primary investigators are Thom Jayne and David Tschirley from MSU, who have mentored a wide array of researchers over the years and ‘strengthened’ the capacities of MACO and the Central Statistics office. The project led to the emergence of the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute, which has a broader mandate, though it maintains the same sources of funding and institutional linkages with Michigan State University, which remains involved in its “capacity building team”.\textsuperscript{220} Over the years, the FSRP has produced a large body of high-quality empirical research mostly related to the position of smallholders in the economy. Its broader ideological impact, however, would be deserving of a study that framed the project in an analysis of power and international relations of the state and capital. For example, it is worth considering what are the implications of having an organization funded by a foreign ‘donor’ state and its single largest capitalist interest effectively integrated into the state ministry of the recipient? Can such an organization really function objectively on policy advocacy around issues of patented seed technologies, for example?

The underlying assumption beneath the work conducted by the FSRP is that markets aid smallholder producers. This assumption has been shared by an array of international organizations, including the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (one of the primary funders of FSRP and IAPRI) and the New Partnership for African Development. A 2006 paper from the FSRP articulates the position found in a variety of its documents:

\begin{quote}

The potential of agriculture to generate a more pro-poor growth process depends on the creation of new market opportunities for smallholders. Market access must consider various agents such as smallholders, rural and urban consumers, processor, distributors, wholesalers and rural–urban market linkages as well as interlinkages with international markets and macroeconomic
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{220} See: http://www.iapri.org.zm
policies. Despite trade liberalization opening up new markets for agriculture, the implementation of appropriate policies and the provision of an institutional infrastructure have proven equally difficult in Zambia (Jayne et al., 2006: 561).

FSRP researchers have rightly expressed concerns about the impact of dominant political figures and commercial interests on national policy. For example, the FSRP have often been critical of the impact of the positions of the ZNFU and the political power held by grain millers. The concern is that the political function of these actors will lead to distortions in the market, which in turn limit the potential for markets to serve as a liberating institution for smallholders. They have also argued that ‘brief case traders’, or what they call ‘assembly traders’ have come to serve farmers well and that farmers chose to use assembly traders over other options for grain marketing, because the traders take care of transport, pay cash and purchase early in the season (Chapoto, 2012, Kuteya and Jayne, 2012).

There are ways in which one can discern a dimension of petty bourgeois politics in the policy advocacy of the FSRP and the IAPRI. In fact, it bares some resemblance to that of the late-colonial administration, which sought to create middling capitalist farmers among African populations. This is in relation to the fact that with all the talk about value of connecting smallholders to self-equilibrating markets, there is no mention of the broader implications of such a policy. The authors rely on a reading of a previous Asian green revolution in which the rising productivity levels of millions of smallholders generated greater food security. This inclusive agricultural growth can be contrasted with Latin America, which experienced exclusive growth, exacerbating the already high levels of social inequality. The question is weather the livelihoods of smallholders and their ecosystems can really be protected by markets?221 This is a highly contested claim.222

The essential fact of capitalist agriculture is that it generates inequalities as some win out in the tragedies of neighbours. This is especially so with expansive agriculture that in a

221 It is as if they have not read any of the Brenner debates on the rise of agrarian capitalism in England and its comparison with France.
222 See, for example, Bernstein (2016), and Mazoyer and Roudart (2006:17).
market context tends toward declining rates of return on investment. That is to say that farmers are continually compelled to keep up with the average prices, despite the fact they may not have the most recent technologies. This ultimately leads to more powerful players who can then create ‘distortions’ in the market as they use their surpluses to gain advantages over others. The proponent of free-markets will argue that this is a positive consequence of competition – that it is allowing the most capable to succeed and in turn extend the efficiency of their system of production (and, there can be a left argument in support of such a process, as it produces the working class, which can in turn, theoretically, appropriate the now centralized and rationalized means of production). Yet, a truly free market would be void of hills and distance and there would be perfect knowledge and mobility of all factors of production. Such a world does not exist.

The assumption that markets aid smallholders seems to be rooted in a vision of a mythical society comprised of predominantly petty-commodity producers. It is as if they want to unleash the creative impetus of capitalism while simultaneously curtailing its destructive dimensions. Yet Jayne and Sitko are also concerned that African land tenure policies are potentially foreclosing the possibility of “smallholder led development” as an urban professional population is currently in the process of buying up much of the arable land in medium-scale holdings (Jayne et al, 2014a). This leads to a seemingly contradictory position in which the authors wish to connect smallholders to international markets, but wish to prevent the process of commodifying customary land via land titling (Jayne et al, 2014a, Sitko et al, 2014a) which would in turn tend to maintain chiefly authority. Thus, apparently they would like to see an embedded capitalism, which continued to foreclose land concentration in order to keep people occupied in the rural areas, rather than flooding to cities with insufficient job availability. It is worth scrutinizing how this differs from previous “agricultural doctrines of development” described by Cowen and Shenton (1998a, 1998b). It is a reasonable position in many ways, especially when there are historically rigorous claims of self-determination. Yet,
the Native Authority chiefs in Tongaland were a fabrication based on policies of indirect rule. In these ways, the extension of land titles, protected by the constitution, has a liberatory dimension to it – in that it smashes such neo-feudal systems. That said, there are many instances whereby chiefs have held popular support and become means for challenging what are seen to be oppressive, or insufficiently distributive government policies (Baldwin, 2010, 2013 Dixon-Fyle, 1977). There are, therefore, ways in which hierarchical ethnicity can become a protective shield against the forces of global capitalism (Vickery, 1986).

Although the FSRP and IAPRI intend to produce scientifically objective data, there may in fact be a level of arrogance in assuming the enlightened researchers can then stand as neutral arbitrators of class interests, in cooperation with a similarly neutral state. This is especially the case when there is in fact wide historical debate about the routes through which societies have achieved social transformations of the countryside. – and whether or not such transformations have led to greater food security. Nicos Poulantzas has argued that it is a particular characteristic of the petty-bourgeois to see the state as neutral. This:

 neutrality it supposes to be akin to its own, since it sees itself as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and therefore a pillar of the State -- 'its' State. It aspires to be the 'arbiter' of society, because, as Marx says, it would like the whole of society to become petty-bourgeois. (Poulantzas, 1974: 241).

The contradictory nature of the petty-bourgeois is that ultimately it desires entrance into the bourgeoisie, or at least admires it, and therefore looks to it as a beacon, yet simultaneously an enemy for obstructing its entrance. Prime among the contradictions is the desire to avoid class conflict and to seek social peace, regardless of the existence of exploitative and oppressive social relations (Sharzer, 2012: 90).

Conclusion

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223 The emergence of the concept of food security has been very recent
224 Greg Sharzer (2012) provides a very helpful explanation of petty bourgeoisie and its political tendencies.
This chapter has reviewed the prominent literature on the dual transition. It also discusses the material realities as experienced by Zambians on a national level. We have seen that a focal point in the post-UNIP Zambian political science/political economy literature has been the ways maize and fertilizer are structured into the economy. The crop is very dependent on fertilizer imports and simultaneously very susceptible to global markets (USA could flood its markets without noticing). The strategic importance of maize is such that it justifies forms of protection and public storage for years of drought. The irony is that the crop is increasingly attracting investment from international seed and fertilizer companies that obtain patents over the genetic content (Moorsom, 2015).

I have tried to point out a number of problems in the academic portrayal of the crisis that neoliberalism was intended to address, and the consequences of its imposition. There is no doubt that the UNIP government was wracked with challenges that included widespread theft of public revenues. Yet while some people were thieves, there are still many vagaries about the forms of theft that took place. More importantly, it is a cynical erasure of history to assume there was widespread popular involvement. It was, rather, something that took place among a small coterie of public servants. More broadly, people were not as disingenuous as the rent-seeking literatures suggests. In Southern Province, farmers felt they were contributing to a righteous national cause. The vast majority of Zambians, whether rural or urban, benefited very little from the agricultural marketing system. The peasantry was systematically robbed by the elite. Even so, there is nothing about theft of public resources that inherently prevents growth. In following chapters evidence will show that the farms in Central Province were sites of rising productivity. That is the case, even though significant graft led to the purchasing of land under privileged conditions and often using money misappropriated from the Peasant Improvement Fund (Szeftel, 1982).

The most important point to take away from this chapter is that the National Agricultural Marketing Board, NAMBoard, cannot shoulder the burden of responsibility for economic crisis.
The major crisis in maize marketing must in fact be attributed to the commencement of neoliberal structural adjustment programs, which undermined the functioning of the marketing board. Most importantly, the simultaneous process of currency auctioning sent the costs of essential imports of fertilizer and fuel soaring, further entrenching the economic crisis of the state. The revolt against Kaunda was largely a revolt against neoliberal policy. This is the reason people felt so betrayed by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. They voted for change, but instead, they got an intensification of the policies that were causing such hardship in the later years of the UNIP era. This is not to deny the fact that the UNIP state was increasingly authoritarian and kleptocratic. Yet, those features of the state remained under MMD, despite the fact the population despised them and had hoped for change.

While this chapter has examined the impact of neoliberal policy on a national level, the following chapter will then focus on the impact these policies had on the cattle economy that had been so dynamic for the first 2 decades following independence. It has already been argued that the growth in cattle stocks represented an important achievement of the post-independence era. These stocks represented important forms of accumulation that allowed the commercializing farmers to mobilize labour in the so-called traditional economy. More importantly, they allowed these farmers to acquire the private-titled land and become a fledgling black settler force within the economy. For this reason, we must examine the links between neoliberal policy, the emergence of devastating cattle diseases and their impacts on the herds of the emerging class of black settler farmers.
Chapter 5

Why Did the Cattle Die? The Political Ecology of Ecosystemic Change
Konabula mukowa (it is better you do not have relatives)
konabula mukowa ng’ombe kokwete (It is better you do not have relatives but have cattle)
(...)
Mfwulumende tulalila (Government we are crying.)
Amutupe musamu (Give us medicine [to treat our cattle])
Amutupe musa lubono lwamana (Give us medicine our wealth [cattle] has finished.)
(...)
Bulimi ngomusemo wacisi (Farming is the foundation of the country)
Zambia mpoijatilide (on which Zambia depends)
(...)
Amutupe musamu, amutupe musamu Zambia yadilika (Give us medicine, give us medicine Zambia has gone down [the economy of Zambia has been affected due to Foot and mouth disease])

Mashombe Blue Jeans, popular music group from Southern Province in the 1990s-2000s

In this chapter I seek to explain the causes of the bovine epidemic in Zambia’s Southern Province following economic liberalization. It begins by trying to answer the simple question of whether or not there was in fact a cattle epidemic and if so, what was its scope and scale. What, for example, were the differences in the experiences of the black settlers in comparison to those in traditional lands? This leads to further questions, like why it is the white farmers did not experience anywhere near the same levels of loss. Given that the diseases in question are endemic in wildlife, it is also well worth exploring the links between the domesticated herds and herds of wild ungulates. Was it possible, for example, that the wild herds were increasing in size and/or in turn facing ecological stresses that saw them become ill and/or leave park and reserve lands to come into closer proximity with the domestic cattle?

In exploring the broader ecology of the Kafue Flats we come to see that there are far more complex processes taking place. Doing so, however, allows us to take Akram-Lodhi’s advice (2014) and consider the totality of land-based social relations engendered by the land use changes being driven by agro-food capital. This is also consistent with an agroecological approach. “Agroecology regards farms as ecosystems embedded in broader landscapes and
Lastly, considering the data presented, I will draw some conclusions about the concepts of economic growth and dispossession in light of the complexities of the agroecological system of the Southern Plateau and its relationship with the Kafue River.

An Ecosystemic Approach

When speaking of stateland farms in Southern Province in the post-colonial era, the reasons any particular herd contracted Corridor disease vary, but are heavily dependent upon some combination of the specific following factors. First, the concentration of insecticidal dip or spray used to treat the animals may have been insufficient. This can be due to specific failures in management (miscalculation, skimping), or theft, or possible counterfeit products that had proliferated in the 1990s following economic liberalization.226 Secondly, the integrity of fencing and farm location could make some farms more susceptible than others.227 If the farm was in close proximity to urban areas it was more likely to face theft of fencing, and in turn cattle mingling with other herds. Alternately, if the farm was adjacent to reserve land it may also have been subject to fence theft and/or breaching of fence-lines in the process of stock theft. In both cases, cattle were prone to mixing with neighbouring herds. Variability in access to treatment capacities and veterinary assistance to ensure diagnosis and quarantine, and most importantly, vagaries in the refrigerated storage of quality vaccines could be determining influences.228 Another factor was the quality of paddock food sources relative to the number and type of animals, and/or failure to supplement when existing green sources in paddocks were low. This, in turn relates to how long and severe the dry season was and the relative success of the growing season. If farmers were planning on using their own silage sources, 


228 Dr. E. Chileshe, Veterinary officer, Interview with Toby Moorsom, 08-08-01
but crops struggled, then they may not have been sufficiently prepared to buy supplementary meal in the dry season. A farmer could also be affected by the importation and traffic of diseased stock. Theoretically, a farmer could visit an infected area and bring the disease vector back onto the farm. It would be difficult, even for epizoologists, to determine with any precision when and how such events occurred. The above issues do not, however, explain the reasons for the disease epidemic but rather could help explain why any particular farm became infected.

Many of these factors have to do with farm management and levels of capitalization, rather than societal factors external to the farm. Farms are more likely to have faced challenges in any or all aspects of these management issues if households ran into any additional problems. Debt and illness among primary decision-makers or title-holders were the most common challenges noted in interviews (in addition to drought). Illness or a death in the family could impose a number of additional expenses on a farming unit, thereby leading to neglect of farm requirements. Any of these possible causes, however would only provide a very partial explanation because they cannot explain why it was occurring all over the territory, in other provinces and in other countries throughout the region.229

A more deeply historical examination shows the ways micro-causalities creep forth with ultimately massive consequences. One can see historical parallels in the rinderpest epidemic in East Africa in the 1890s. As Helge Kjekshus (1977) argues of this disease in neighbouring Tanganyika:

It broke the economic backbone of many of the most prosperous and advanced communities, undermined established authority and status structures, and altered the political contacts between the peoples. It initiated the breakdown of a long-established ecological balance and placed nature again at an advantage (126).

In recent years the presumption of there having been a “long-established ecological balance” has quite rightly come into question. Nevertheless, the point I am making is that in processes of ecosystemic change clear causality is often impossible to determine. Kjekshus suggests the outbreak of sleeping sickness in Tanzania resulted from a change in the relationship between the five populations involved (humans, livestock, wild fauna, trypanosomes and the tsetse). The changes were brought on by colonial intrusion (166). Circumstances would become worse still as Germans fought for control of the economy – leading to a series of famines over the following decade (ibid: 137-153).

The Zambian government has had a goal of achieving self-sufficiency in beef production for more than half a century, yet it still falls far short. A report commissioned by the International Institute for Sustainable Development lists the reasons for the ongoing production shortfalls as disease outbreaks, poor funding to the sector, lack of technical knowledge, poor infrastructure and lack of government commitment to restocking programs (Mulemba, 2009). The author goes further to suggest that disease outbreaks are closely related to a lack of private-sector incentives to provide vaccines. While these findings provide practical policy suggestions and identify insufficient market mechanisms, they still fail to provide an explanation for why it was occurring then and not in the 1960s and 1970s. The IMF suggests: “traditional communal grazing has, in part, been blamed for the frequent outbreaks of cattle diseases in many rural areas” (2007). This has historically tended to be the attitude of Zambian state agricultural and veterinary officers, as well as the large commercial farmers and their representative bodies, though often in much more condescending and righteous terms. These explanations place the burden of responsibility upon the small-scale pastoralist without examining the broader social, environmental and historical context. They are also rarely made in reference to actual evidence that the farmers were not dipping or spraying (the latter

practice is more common, given its lower overhead costs, though it is not as effective). In one of the few media reports on the disease outbreak, one livestock officer in Central Province explains that his department was finding it difficult to completely check the disease because of transport problems that make "it impossible to quickly deal with reported cases". The existence of the disease cannot in itself provide confirmation the farmers were not dipping or making some form of intervention to prevent its spread. This is not to suggest treatment regimes were being widely applied, but that there is no data that can tell us what percentage of animals were being treated, or where, or what products were used, at what times of year and how often. Yet, these specifics are crucial to gaining control of the disease.

It is, alternatively, of analytical value to start by exploring what the farmers themselves say about the epidemic, how they explain it and whether or not they made any interventions in their herds. After all, there is a historical record of cattle disease management among the Tonga stemming back 150 years (Livingstone, 1866: 250-252). A broad and deeply historical examination of the disease outbreaks in Southern Province, allows us to see that causality has to lie ultimately on an ecosystemic level while many contributing factors themselves come about through particular and unexpected combinations of events. Many of these circumstances were unforeseen consequences of decisions made far away from the herds.

231 “Corridor Disease leaves farmers without cattle”, Mkumbu Phiri, The Post, July 6, 1994, p 5
that became infected. In the era of Keynesian influenced policy and in the particular post-colonial context of Zambia, the expectation was that the state would manage these aspects of the industry. This was not simply an expectation created by farmers themselves. It was, rather, an expectation bolstered by a government that encouraged people to increase cattle production and was accepting wide-ranging responsibilities to that end.233

Within the British Empire, in the 1930s cattle management came to be seen as an issue of national security (Wood, 2010: 59). As Britain experienced food shortages, milk began to be considered an ‘essential food’ while approaches to veterinary diseases became a national concern. (There was even concern that cattle diseases could be unleashed as an act of warfare.) This was met with greater standardization of the veterinary profession and its entrance into the farm economy to which it was previously only marginal. Extension services and farm inspections became mandated by government order. After the war, concerns of a global food shortage placed greater emphasis on increasing productivity of agricultural output, while other regulatory functions were established around prices. The 1947 Agriculture Act maintained the wartime system of fixed prices, set in consultation with the (British) National Farmers Union (Hughes, 2010).234

It is therefore not surprising that the post-independence Zambian government became tasked with managing veterinary diseases. In the case of Corridor disease, the capacities of the government were limited by the complexity of the problem and the limited scientific means of comprehending it. It was also limited by the material capacities of state agencies, and by the fact that branches of the state were often working at odds with each other. The most obvious

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233 See, for example, a lengthy statement by the Minister for Rural Development, Josuah Lumina published in Zambian Farmer, July 1974: “The livestock industry in Zambia is therefore under enormous and increasing pressure to expand production… It is also necessary to stress that the Cold Storage Board is a parastatal organization, controlled by Government for the Nation, and as such it has a responsibility as far as possible, to buy cattle from any farmer who wishes to sell. This means that the Board must conduct its operation in remote areas into which a private commercial body would not venture.”. See also, FAO, (1999) The Effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes on Veterinary Service Delivery in Africa, Animal Production and Health Division, Rome, Italy.

234 Although the UNIP government is often described as having been socialist, NAMBoard’s system of fixed prices was a continuation of the system already established by the British.
divergent interests were those between demands of the urban mining industry, and those of the rural agricultural sector. Yet, even within the Department of Agriculture and Department of Rural Development, the state continued to treat privileged segments of the industry as distinct from the vast mass of peasant and subsistence producers. Wild fauna were managed by a separate Ministry (Wildlife, Fisheries and Natural Resources) and the Agriculture Department itself was divided between Agriculture, Veterinary services and Rural Development. The position advanced here is that to better understand the dynamics of the cattle disease in Zambia we need to develop an ecosystemic analysis of what I describe as a national cattle complex. Such an analysis would require pulling together knowledge from a variety of sectors that impact the broader economy in all its biological, chemical and physical dimensions. At the same time, this study is concerned with power and the ways it becomes structured into ecology in ways that harm some and privilege others. For this reason, I consider this to be an examination in political ecology in the way Peet and Watts have described as “a confluence between ecologically rooted social science and the principles of political economy” (1996:6). Yet it is further, an attempt “to understand the complex relations between nature and society through a careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control over resources and their implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods” (Watts, 2000: 257, see also Robbins, 2012: 16-17). 

Liberalization and the Collapse of the National Cattle Complex

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235 for most of the post-independence period it has been under Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Development or Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO), and
Based on the limited data cited above we can observe what appears to have been a doubling of the national cattle stock in a 20 year period, between 1965 and 1985. Regardless of its relative accuracy, it does correspond to one claim made in virtually every testimony I gathered. That is simply the fact that herds grew and Tonga people as a whole became wealthier than they had ever been in historical record. I describe the growth as a national cattle complex because it was only made possible by the creation of the Zambian state and the fact it asserted some level of trusteeship over the national stock. The context of post-war Keynesianism, Malthusian fears of shortages in global food supply, and the professionalization of the veterinary profession supported national planning within the sector. Desires for greater food production also added to the demand for more ox-drawn traction. Import Substitution Industrialization plans and notions of national food security also supported policy that promoted increases in cattle holdings. This policy was acted upon, but not necessarily in the manner planners expected. In Southern Province, cattle numbers increased, but they were not immediately integrated into a commercialization model. This was partly because a significant portion of the accumulation was among urban workers planning for retirement (with some resemblance to what Ferguson found in Lesotho, 1990). The equally significant reason was that the growth in cattle was largely within ‘traditional’ holdings, in which the animals were ‘bound’ within various forms of social obligation. Perhaps more to the point, society was built up around the cattle, with the cattle providing integrative bonds among the population. The cattle themselves provided some of the basic dimensions of Keynesian economics: savings, insurance, occupations, and even stable identity.\(^{237}\) Amidst the ‘shock therapy’ of liberalization, this world came crashing down. We cannot rely on the statistical data alone to prove this, and that is one of the reasons we must take the oral testimonies seriously.

\(^{237}\) By identity, I refer to that which in capitalist states is attributed to the nation; what Negri calls “the mystified notion of the social interest, the public good”, in “Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State”, Hardt and Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State Form, 1994:37.
The first decade of liberalization saw negative economic growth, amidst extraordinary social hardship, as revealed in the previous chapter. A few signs of cattle disease emerge in the press, though there are remarkably few. For example, in 1994 we learn from The Post that Corridor disease was present in Chongwe, in Central Province. It had apparently killed over 3,000 cattle according to The Post:

Villagers, interviewed in Chongwe recently, said the disease had killed most of their cattle leaving them poorer than they were before the tick-borne disease broke out two years ago. Headman Sheleni said most of the cattle in his village ‘have been wiped out because the government has failed to help us contain the disease’.  

The same article also cites a district livestock officer who claims the disease came up from Southern Province via illegal livestock movements. The officer also claims his department was having difficulties containing it because of lack of transport and other resources. Despite these claims no effort was made on the part of the paper to establish the extent of the disease anywhere other than Chongwe. It is as if the gravity of the disease and its potential impact were lost to them entirely.

Johnson (1995), an historian working in Namwala and Mbeza at the time, wrote that: “From a late-1970s peak of about 225,000, the cattle population declined to around 150,000 in 1994…1992 was an especially catastrophic year”. One of the reasons he cites is that: “Local cattle owners came to depend on the Veterinary Department for inoculations, but the current government, economizing on its budget, has greatly reduced these services”. Yet Theileriosis - whether it was called East Coast fever or Corridor disease - as both terms have been used interchangeably, did not at the time have a vaccine. The World Bank had been funding a multi-year development project to train veterinary extension officers, and fix and facilitate the operation of dip tanks in the province, with the goals of increasing the crop and livestock

238 “Corridor Disease leaves farmers without cattle” The Post, Mkumba Phiri, July 6, 1994, p5
production. Only about 29% of the project funds had been dispersed and it was “suspended in May 1987 when Zambia’s withdrawal rights were suspended due to arrears on Bank loans”. Prior to that point the project implementation was hampered in a variety of ways that included bureaucratic delays, “lack of effective linkages between extension and research services which reduced the impact of extension staff”, rivalry between project staff and veterinary officers and delayed introduction of “user charges, which were conditions of disbursement for the renovation and construction of dip tanks, resulting in poor operation and maintenance of the available dip tanks” (World Bank, 1990 iv). Farmers clearly objected to the introduction of user fees. One reason for this is that dipping occurs during the planting season when farmers also must purchase crop inputs (IFAD, 2014: 37). These were additional expenses even as seasonal loans for inputs were disappearing.

In 1994 the International Fund for Agricultural Development had provided a donation to help the Zambian Government fund a vaccine program. Early results appeared rather modest (Minjauw et al, 1997). Vaccines were generally cost-effective when performed at the beginning of the decade (Mukhebi, et al, 1992), yet the barriers to widespread vaccination were significant. Not only were there barriers based on the economics of obtaining the vaccine, the infrastructure for widespread application did not exist. More importantly, there was no sufficient understanding of the epidemiology of the disease in Southern Province, which was showing a particular evolution in the tick species that saw infections taking place in the larval stage (Mulumba et al, 2000: 304). It was eventually determined that Corridor disease in Southern Province was transmitted via a different tick species than East Coast Fever, which was more prevalent in Eastern and Northern Provinces (Makala et al, 2003). Southern Province appeared to have been the epicenter of Corridor disease, which hit Tonga farmers

239 World Bank, Project Completion Report Zambia Southern Province Agricultural Development Project (Credit 1193-Za), December 3, 1990
particularly hard.\textsuperscript{241} Many farmers told me stories similar to Jeremiah Munang’andu who claimed they could not control the disease in their own herds until “the village cattle all around (...) were completely washed out, with no cattle”.\textsuperscript{242}

It seems there are two primary reasons there was so little about the presence of the vaccine in the media. The first is that in The Post, (the only independent paper at the time and the only one available for this period in this study) relied almost entirely on the press releases of the Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) for information on the sector. The ZNFU, however, was nowhere close to being representative of all farmers, but was rather, predominantly the voice of white farming interests in the country. Its membership was almost exclusively within the most accessible parts of the country. Although a small-scale farmers’ association existed it did not have the political clout to influence media, and was also experiencing a period of crisis. The ZNFU position was that the liberalization proceeded too rapidly.\textsuperscript{243} Between 1992 and 1995, the height of the pandemic, the CFB/ZNFU Dairy Committee was preoccupied with strategizing the privatization of the Dairy Produce Board and had nothing to say about diseases.\textsuperscript{244}

A CSO Census from 2000 claims that within Southern Province from 1996 until the end of the decade “the number of cattle decreased by 46.3 percent, sheep by 49.6, goats by 46.5 percent and pigs by 47 percent”, and that “animal diseases contributing to the decrease include Corridor, East Coast Fever and Foot and Mouth” (GRZ, CSO 2004). A World Bank study (Deininger, 2000) further concluded that a major reason for declining productivity in the agricultural sector was the loss of animal traction, blamed solely on drought (which weakens cattle and makes them more susceptible to disease). The World Bank study concluded that

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\item \textsuperscript{241} “Corridor Disease leaves farmers without cattle” Mkumba Phiri, \textit{The Post}, July 6, 1994, p5. “(District livestock officer Yusuto) Chisulo said the disease, which came from Southern Province through illegal livestock movement was almost under control.”
\item \textsuperscript{242} Jeremiah Munang’andu, Interview with Toby Moorsom, 2008-07-18
\item \textsuperscript{243} Ben Kapita, ZNFU president's address to Annual Congress, 1994, Ben Kapita, Interview with Toby Moorsom, 07-07-19
\item \textsuperscript{244} CFB Dairy Committee minutes 1992-95
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the liberalizations themselves were not the problem, but that government intervention continued. There was some truth to this insofar as the maize markets had not been fully liberalized, in part because the collection of maize and distribution of fertilizer offered so much potential for graft and also because there was insufficient liquidity in the country. Nor were there any traders wealthy enough to purchase the stocks. Yet it is gravely simplistic to reduce the challenges in the agricultural sector to the loss of animal traction; and the suggestion that what was needed was more liberalization is perverse. The Deininger study is meaningful, however, because it is one of the few moments the loss of cattle and the economic burden of that loss are acknowledged as factors negatively impacting the entire economy. It is a small piece of the limited public record acknowledging (if indirectly) there was in fact a major cattle epidemic. We still, however, need to establish its scope and scale.

The first national census of agriculture had been conducted in 1970/71 but was never carried out as planned in 82/83 due to lack of resources. It was then conducted again in 1990/91. The most fascinating aspect of the 1990/91 census is that it was published in two stages, giving two drastically different pictures of the state of the agricultural economy. It was not published until 1994, which is also an indication of the challenges facing the department at the time. The CSO usually conducts pre-harvest “Crop Forecast Survey” (CFS) estimates for planning purposes and then follows up with post-harvest surveys (PHS), as is explained by Jayne et al. (2000). Yet, in this case, Part 1 is based on the 1990/91 Season, while Part 2 includes 1992. Total cattle population 1,695,435 with largest numbers in Southern Province.

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Table 14. Number of cattle by province, 1991, Volume 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>170,083</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>13,511</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>275,463</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>5,860</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>46,062</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>87,815</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-western</td>
<td>46,627</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>650,012</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>western</td>
<td>400,002</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,695,435</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cattle</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cows and heifers</td>
<td>778,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulls</td>
<td>79,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>304,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxen</td>
<td>382,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tollies/steers</td>
<td>150,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained oxen/tollies/steers</td>
<td>39,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO, 1994

In Volume 2 of the Cattle Census (Table 14) the estimated number of cattle was about 1,047,167, which was much lower than reported in Volume 1. What we do not know is whether there was a pre-drought estimate, which had to be revised given the scale of cattle losses at the time of conducting the survey. Or, alternately, was there a gross error in Volume 1 of the report that justified re-doing it? Unfortunately these are not questions that I was able to receive answers to from the Department of Agriculture, despite multiple efforts.

Table 15. Number of cattle by province 1991, Volume 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>149,271</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>4,156</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>211,519</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>8,328</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>46,283</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>57,095</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-western</td>
<td>25,891</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>384,109</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of cattle that was held at the beginning of the 1991/92 season was 1,362,669. Of that, 224,313 calves were born; 48,800 cattle were purchased; 18,781 were received as gifts; 93,949 were sold/bartered; 14,123 slaughtered for sale; 11,681 heads of cattle were slaughtered for home consumption; 21,117 given as gifts and 438,779 lost through death or theft. Even in this much lower measurement, 40 per cent of the herds were lost in one year.

A decade later, in CSO figures from 2001-2002 the picture did not look much different. The herds of the small, medium and large-scale cattle holders were all being hammered by disease. The data is broken up into different categories for analysis, based on the scale of producer and then in types of cattle management. Some general trends are that Southern Province dominates in cattle stock in both Large Scale holdings as well as in small and medium size holdings. Cattle losses were clearly concentrated in Southern Province, which adds to evidence suggesting the province was the epicenter of the epidemic (fig. 13). While cattle were being lost in large numbers among all cattle holders, the smaller producers were, unsurprisingly, far worse off. Overall the herds of small and medium scale producers were decreasing in size, while those among large scale producers were increasing despite the high losses due to disease and theft. Among all levels of producers three times the number of cattle were dying due to disease than were being sold for slaughter. Dairy cattle in large-scale

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246 “Corridor Disease leaves farmers without cattle” The Post, Mkumba Phiri, July 6, 1994, p5
holdings were better off, given that they are maintained in smaller paddocks and more intensively cared for. Nevertheless, nearly as many died or were stolen as were sold for slaughter.

Among small and medium scale farmers some interesting trends emerged by 2001-2002 season. These are the clear majority of farmers. The most obvious historical change is that Eastern province emerges as the new ‘grain basket’ of the country. This is the status that Southern Province used to hold in colonial days. When looking at smallholdings, Eastern Province was by far the largest producer of maize, groundnuts, sunflower, soy, cotton and burley tobacco. Maize is also far more productive relative to area planted than in Southern – where fields are ‘worn out’ (12). This is partly related to the fact that Eastern also increased in cattle holdings, something only possible because of efforts at eradicating tsetse. They also dominate in pigs and sheep, though there are almost no pigs on large-scale holdings in Eastern. Among small and medium scale producers, Western dominates in rice, which is consistent with the fact they have the most holdings in floodplains particularly suited to rice. Southern has again come to be a significant producer of Virginia tobacco as well as of goats and sheep (Southern white populations moving up). Northern and Luapula are leaders in beans. Sunflower production is concentrated in Southern, Central and Eastern. Sweet Potato is more evenly distributed as it is increasingly grown among the poor because of its capacity to withstand unpredictable weather.

Among large-scale holdings we see greater regional specialization. Eastern comes to dominate seed maize, growing 52% of it. Wheat is concentrated in Lusaka and Central (among the most commercialized holdings with large investments in irrigation infrastructure). Groundnuts are almost entirely produced from Central, with large scale producers growing 88% of the production, though the crop is also widely grown among small and medium scale producers. Soy is concentrated almost entirely in Lusaka province (90%). Sunflower is split between Central (50%) and Eastern (33%). Goats are in Southern and Central almost
exclusively. Almost all intensive sheep production is in Southern. Poultry is only present in Lusaka and Copperbelt (the former is overwhelmingly the place for their slaughter – over 11 million head). Among large scale producers, Southern is clearly focused on beef, dairy, virginia tobacco, goats, sheep.

Although large-scale producers in Southern Province were losing cattle to disease at a crippling rate, the number of animals on large-scale farms continued to increase. From the oral testimonies, its clear there was more likely to be intense outbreaks on particular farms, rather than deaths occurring equally across the board, with all farmers being affected to the same degree. The increasing numbers were therefore likely held by a small portion of farmers, while some lost to a devastating degree. There is one surprising anomaly in that there are some cattle in large-scale holdings that are managed according to a classification of ‘traditional cattle’. From the data it is impossible to determine if these are cattle in reserves, among farmers who are nevertheless considered among ‘large scale’ producers, or if these are cattle held on stateland, but treated as ‘traditional’ cattle. Nevertheless, their rates of loss were actually lower than those of the commercial holdings (People regularly told me that some large ranchers in the traditional lands had hardy, healthy herds that withstood disease better than those on stateland. I never visited them, but did see a couple in town driving expensive SUVs).

Table 16. Beef Cattle held on Large Scale Farms By Province, 2001-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Beef cattle held on 1st October, 2001</th>
<th></th>
<th>Beef cattle held on 30th September, 2002</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>70,339</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>85,869</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>33,385</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>36,672</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3,561</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>62,428</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>72,318</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5,196</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Western</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>168,052</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>227,055</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>337,582</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td><strong>431,850</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO, Agriculture and Pastoral Production, 2001-2002 Post-Harvest Report for Large-Scale Farmers 2002
While the number of cattle deaths was much greater among small and medium scale farmers, it looks even worse when one examines the situation two years in a row. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to examine these trends continuously across the decade of the 1990s, but the available data reveals that the conditions, in the midst of a regional famine, were exacerbated by drought. It was also an intense period of Corridor and Foot and Mouth disease. Based on data for small and medium holders, the cattle population at the end of the 2002/03 agriculture season was estimated at 1,088,744 compared to 1,393,335 at the end of the previous season. This represents a 21.8 percent cattle decline in one year. This was amidst consecutive years of loss. At the beginning of the 2001 season there were 1,625,514. By the end of 2002, Western province had overtaken Southern as a percentage of cattle held. The 2002/03 agricultural season, recorded a total of 250,611 cattle losses in the country due to disease (within small and medium holdings). Western Province recorded the largest number of cattle at 27.0 percent among small and medium scale farmers, followed by Eastern and

Source: CSO
Southern provinces at 25.3 and 23.1 percent, respectively. Western did, however, experience the largest numbers of losses as well. These figures show Western Province as having greater numbers than Southern Province, even though the year prior, Southern Province held over 30% while Western had only 23%. If we were to include large-scale and commercial farmers, Southern may have still had more, though Post Harvest Survey data from that same year is not available. It does, however, suggest that Southern experienced greater rates of loss due to disease (this is supported by numerous testimonies from agricultural and veterinary officers). The data for small and medium producers also tells us that there was a reduction in the number of households raising cattle in Western and Southern provinces (i.e. dispossession).

The 2002/03 Post Harvest Survey also contains data on cattle ownership by gender of owner. The estimated total number of cattle owned by household members was 1,006,618 representing 92 percent of the total cattle raised. Non-household members whose cattle were raised on their behalf by household members owned the remaining 8 percent. Of the total cattle owned countrywide, 83.9 percent belonged to male members of the households. At the provincial level, the highest proportion of cattle owned by female members was reported in Luapula Province with 36.7 percent, followed by Western Province with 20.7 percent.

It is important to note that the disease epidemics were not limited to cattle. Adding to the level of despair, loss and hunger experienced by many was the fact they were losing other animals as well. The 2002/03 Post Harvest Survey reported a total of 497,318 pigs at the beginning of the season compared to 512,819 in the previous season. During the season the population of pigs reduced to 373,262 representing a 24.9 percent decline countrywide. The year before they had also lost 179,353, predominantly in Eastern Province. Yet among large

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scale producers, the population of pigs increased from 251,618 to 261,163, with losses of only 31,255 – not marginal, yet nothing in comparison to what smallholders were experiencing.

Goats were also lost, nationally 189,739 goats out of about 1,083,162 due to disease during the 2002/03 Agricultural Season (The latter is the number documented at the end of 2001/02 season so is only approximate). Of total losses due to disease, Southern Province recorded the highest number with 39.0 percent, followed by Northern Province with 17.8 percent. Again, this was in the context of the numbers increasing among large-scale holdings, although they do not maintain them at anywhere near the same rate, with a population of only 53,141 at the end of the 2001/02 season. Generally, households rearing sheep declined countrywide. Sheep rearing was reported by 6,782 households during the 2002/03 Agriculture Season compared to 9,096 households in the previous season, representing a 25.4 percent decline. The previous year (2001/02) 40% of the sheep in small and medium scale holdings were lost, with the national herd dropping from 47,929 to 35,426. Again, losses were consecutive across years. Large scale farmers also faced slight losses in sheep (2.2 percent), but maintained a population of 26,840, with nearly 70% being held in Southern Province. Thus, large farmers clearly dominated the market.

In all of this it was the poorest that faced the worst consequences of the disease – making life in the traditional lands extremely challenging, amidst what was increased class differentiation. Class differentiation in a context of widespread economic decline can be particularly nasty, exacerbating fractures within households, families and communities (Crehan, 1997, Gould, 2010, Sitko, 2010). The Tonga farmers on stateland were almost universally victims of Corridor, though to varying degrees. It is difficult to determine the degree to which the white farmers experienced it. I learned of only one who did, claiming that his close proximity to Choma left him susceptible to fence theft, in turn allowing animals to mingle.248 Monze and Choma may have been the hardest hit areas in the country and it is likely the

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largest, mostly white, farmers in Mazabuka fared the best because of the greater levels of enclosure, access to electricity, levels of education and far greater capitalization.

Corridor disease has received much more attention from scientists than it has from social sciences and anyone involved in policy creation. Nevertheless, there have been no serious efforts at quantitative assessments of its impact in the country. Estimates of its impact in East and Central Africa in 1989 alone placed the number of deaths in the region at about 1.1 million animals, though data was generally problematic (Mukhebi et al, 1992). My findings, however, are consistent with the observations made by Haller, who conducted research on the Kafue Flats:

the outbreak of a cattle disease called Corridor or denkete locally (East Coast Fever (Theileria parva), has reduced the herds of the Ila considerably. This disease struck most intensely between 1989 and 1992, and the cattle herds of many households have not recovered since (2007).

In another article, Haller and Merten explain:

Our informants stated that the immediate loss between 1989 and 1992 was 80%. Our own data on five villages shows that in 2002, households had nearly 60% less cattle compared to the pre-Corridor time. (2010)

A 2007 census conducted in Namwala district by a team from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock found a 78% mortality over 5-years. The testimony of Jeremiah Munan’gandu is consistent with the position that there had been no recovery in the reserves by 2008. His farm bordered on traditional lands, which made him very susceptible to Corridor. As he notes, his own herd did not regenerate “until the village cattle all around me were completely washed out, with no cattle. Up to this time there are very few behind my place”.

From all of the data cited above we can say that a number of diseases have been endemic since the onset of liberalization. This is likely exacerbated by the fact animals are often poorly nourished and farmers have limited access to veterinary services. We can also

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250 Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 18, 2008
see that the impacts of the disease were worst in Southern and among small and medium holders, while larger farmers continued to increase the number of cattle held in that category. Another way of looking at it is that there has been a transfer of market share from the small and medium scale producers to the large scale. This, I argue, represents a form of dispossession.

Conservation and the Wilderness-Domesticity Interface

Some informants had suggested to me that villagers had different narratives of the reasons behind the increase in Corridor disease. Many suspected that something had changed in the ecosystem, which made the disease more prevalent. The topic came up on numerous occasions of unrecorded casual conversation with ZNFU members in Monze, staff at the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust and among people I met on a tour of the Kafue Flats with John Choongo, son of Chief Choongo, and my Research Assistant, Khama Han’gombe. Some, for example, felt there were a greater number of ticks because of changes in the river flooding, which they say was not rising as far as it had in the past. Thus, they believed the floodwater was not killing off the tick population that had increased throughout the dry season, nor were the cattle able to bathe as long and as deeply.251 These were also findings of Haller and Merten (2008: 17-19). The ticks, however, only act as the vector while the disease itself is endemic within buffalo. It therefore seems important to examine the wild ungulate populations to see if there had perhaps been an increase in their numbers or changes in their health or environment that could be contributing to the severity of the epidemic. This led me to examine documents of the government department responsible for wildlife and natural resources. The name of the ministry and department it fell within changed throughout the 1970s and 1980s as it became increasingly focused on parks and tourism. In 1970, it existed as the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and National Parks within the Ministry

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251 Catherine Tembo, Interview with Toby Moorsom, June 12, 2008
of Lands and Natural Resources. By 1980 it was Ministry of Lands, Department of Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service. I also garnered significant information from the records of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services and relied on archives of the Natural Resources Board, within the Department of Lands. Below I provide an overview of relevant knowledge and policy initiatives as they unfolded. I supplement these with academic secondary sources in epizootiology and veterinary epidemiology. Following this I will examine the impact of changes in the park and game management lands upon pastoralists within their vicinity.

Theileria parva, the protozoon that causes Corridor disease is endemic, although generally asymptomatic, in African buffalo.252 The buffalo that live on the Kafue flats and the immediate vicinity have unfortunately not attracted a lot of research. The much more populous Red Lechwe (or Kafue Lechwe, Kobus Leche Kafuensis), however, have been afforded a great deal of attention. Most interest comes from conservationists, government departments, scientists and white settlers who value the Lechwe for its meat and its rarity. At the same time, the species and the Kafue Flats more broadly are not of enormous interest to international tourists, who are more likely to visit the larger Kafue and South Luangwa national parks. Both species are ungulates. They share the same ecosystem, except the buffalo are more dependent upon the wooded areas while the Lechwe are more likely to occupy the open grasslands. In the 1990s and 2000s, wooded territories and grasslands were both in flux due to changing and expanding social uses of the ecosystem (it is possible that buffalo territory was growing as unused fields turn to woodlands, while lechwe grasslands depleted). Accounts of attempts to manage the Red Lechwe also offers us insights into the social and

252 In Southern Province, East Coast Fever, Corridor and Denkete have been used interchangeably, though technically T. parva parva causes East coast fever (Chigodola) and is spread through the vector R. appendiculatus while T. parva lawrencei causes Corridor disease (Denkete) and is spread via the vector R. zambeziensis (Makala et al, 2003:31)
environmental context that management efforts were trying to respond to. At the same time, bits and pieces of information on the buffalo emerge.

One of the challenges and controversies in studying the species is simply figuring out how many there are at any point in time. It is a matter of political controversy because local populations have tended to contest the narratives coming from the government and conservationists. In 1970 an aerial population census was conducted, providing figures considered by the department to be “the most accurate that it has ever been possible to get.” The census was conducted in October, late in the dry season when the majority of the herd was most likely to be congregated on the flats. It came up with the figure to the nearest 100, of a mean population of 94,000 +/- 11,600 with 95 per cent confidence limits (i.e. the population was between 82,400 and 105,000). In addition, the resulting report made two conclusions about the conservation of the species that would be ignored in policy formation. They noted that there did not seem to have been any alteration of population distribution and numbers since 1954. What this meant was that resource management by government had no positive effect (thus, the term ‘management’ is itself deceptive). As they note in the department’s annual report:

The density [of the species] in the Muwezwa area, where up to 1970 the Department had not operated, was found to be as high as on Lochinvar and Blue Lagoon, where considerable attention has been paid to anti-poaching. The clear implication seems to be that the virtually uncontrolled poaching in Muwezwa’s has, up to now, done no more than take off the surplus – virtually sustained yield cropping.

Another possibility is that the local communities were in fact managing the species through their customary hunting regulations. Local people were not actually ‘poaching’ until efforts were made to prevent them from hunting (contemporary claims are that the

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hunt was coordinated in an annual ceremonial event called the ‘Cila’). This anti-poaching stance of the department would, nevertheless, continue in force.

The second suggestion based on research conducted alongside the 1970 census was that, rather than focusing on poaching, conservation of the species should take into consideration the broader ecological context. As they state; “if there is any short-term threat to the future of the Kafue lechwe it will be from the change in the flood plain regime rather than human predation.” The irony of this finding is that by 1972 tenders were publicized for the construction of the Itezhi-Tezhi hydroelectric dam to provide power for Lusaka and the Copperbelt (at this time the name was being written as ‘Iteshiteshi’). The dam was planned for the Kafue River on the western, upstream side of the flats.

The most recent research at the time had also uncovered new findings about the health of the species and its ecology. In general, they found the population appeared “to be stable”, though a study examined their rates of tuberculosis. From a sample of 125 animals they found that 45 had some form of tuberculosis lesions, with females having higher infection at an overall rate of 33.3 percent. Prior to the study it was known that tuberculosis had been endemic for many years in cattle grazing the Kafue flood plains with the Lechwe, but the incidence was thought to be as low as 2.5 per cent. They concluded: “The position, therefore, appears to be that tuberculosis maintains itself as a low-grade endemic condition in cattle and in epidemic form in the Lechwe.” It therefore drew a direct link between the health of the wild and domestic animals, with the Lechwe acting as a reservoir for organisms that could, and did, infect the domestic herds. The low rates of infection among cattle could suggest the

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255 Nkhata and Breen (2010: p.298), Haller and Merten (2008)
256 To be sure, the forms of harvest altered over time as non-Tonga people increasingly came to occupy the area as they sought out new forms of livelihood amidst economic decline.
257 GRZ, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and National Parks Annual report for the year 1972
258 ibid, p.13
259 My thinking about the concept of biotic reservoirs is greatly influenced by Mark McMenamin and Diana McMenamin (1994) Hypersea: Life on Land, New York, Columbia University Press
possibility of developed immunity among the domestic herds, as the Ila-Tonga have long believed possible (Johnson, 1995).

Again in 1972 an ongoing study by W. Rees from the Department of Agriculture was also reported on. The study was examining plant communities on the flats and that year Rees recognized ten plant communities and described their topography, soil, species composition and relative abundance. The significance is that although the flats appeared to be relatively uniform, there was in fact significant complexity in grass species, indicating the existence of ecological niches. It also reveals an absence of knowledge, within state institutions, of the links between these complex grass communities and the ungulates that live upon them. When the department determined park boundaries, areas to fence, decisions about the policing of poachers and factors affecting the broader wilderness-domesticity interface, they could in fact have been artificially cutting the Lechwe off from grass communities that had particular importance to them at particular periods of the year. There could, therefore, have been natural pressures on the Lechwe to leave the park and game management areas (GMA). More importantly, the decision to dam the river led to loss of these grasslands and also caused forced relocation of populations into the GMA.

The same year, 1972, similar pressures appeared to affect the buffalo populations, while they also proved to be significant disease reservoirs. The Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services reported that Foot and mouth disease (due to the SAT1 virus), “broke out in early June on the Kafue Flats, in the Mumbwa district of the Central Province. It later spread to parts of the Namwala, Monze and Mazabuka districts in the Southern Province”. The disease had not been identified in Zambia since 1955. Control of the disease proved challenging at first because of a worldwide shortage of the vaccine, which in the end had to be produced specifically for the outbreak. It was then discovered that two doses were necessary.

GRZ, Ministry of Rural Development, “Annual Report of The Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services, for the year, 1973”
to develop immunity. Significant public resources were mobilized to contain the disease. A cattle movement ban was imposed. It is worth quoting the above-mentioned report at some length as it provides fascinating insights into the social and ecological context of the flats, and the role played by government:

Staff were drawn from all parts of the country to assist in the vaccination campaigns. They worked under great difficulties as no crushes are available for handling the cattle on the seasonally-flooded Flats. Handling facilities had, therefore to be constructed in many places in order that the work of vaccination could proceed. Many of the herds of cattle were in remote, inaccessible parts of the Flats where lagoons and marches prevented our staff from reaching them in Land Rovers. Many herds could only be reached on foot or by boat.

The work of vaccinating all the cattle on the Flats twice was, however, completed by late November. The number being around 250,000. (ibid 1973: 3)

Available National Parks and Wildlife service reports do not make much mention of the state of buffalo herds in the northern area of the flats again until 1979 where they were found “in abundance” in the Namwala Game Management area, along with Elephants, Lions, and Leopards. This was in a context of many very significant changes to the ecology in the area, with grazing areas for wild and domestic animals shifting massively in the interim.

**Anti-Poaching and Fire Suppression Enforcement**

Despite the existence of data showing that poaching had no negative impact on the Lechwe population, it remained a primary priority of the department. In 1974, however, directives were given to place top priority on the enforcement of new fire suppression measures. A detailed fire use and control programme was prepared, together with a trial monitoring system. The department divided the park into eighty-four administrative blocks, each of which was bounded by roads, rivers and firebreaks. Conservation officers believed the burning of grasses caused harm to the soil and they also obviously created an element of danger when they came close to stateland farms containing permanent infrastructure such as

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261 GRZ, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Department of Parks and Wildlife Services, Annual Report 1979
fencing. Beyond this, however, there was no clear justification for the policy other than that the conservation units believed it could make the soil susceptible to greater wear that, along with baking by the sun, made it more susceptible to erosion. In 1968 policy documents were suggesting early burning could prevent larger grass fires later.\footnote{Natural resources Board, MLI/17/105, Dept. of Ag, ML8/7/36}

The Tonga had a long history of burning grass and bush. In the pre-colonial days it was an integral part of their agricultural system. The ash served to neutralize acidity and fertilize the soil. Many also believed it helped the grass rejuvenate and regenerate faster, while also killing off the harder vegetation inedible to ungulates. Late in the dry season herders are under greater pressures to find fresh forage for their animals. At the same time, people claim many fires start spontaneously. This is theoretically possible in dry savanna grassland conditions.\footnote{T.T. Kozlowski Fire and Ecosystems, New York: Academic Press (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 1974: 144, 148-156; Philip Stot, “Combustion in tropical biomass fires: a critical review”, Progress in Physical Geography 24,3 (2000) p. 361} In addition, it is worth pointing out that these complex grass communities in fact evolved over the past 2000-5000 years in concert with human induced fires and perhaps the grass ecology needed it.\footnote{The broad work of Stephen J. Pyne has completely altered our historical understanding of grasslands and their genetic relationship to fire. Pyne, Stephen J. 1997. Vestal fire: An environmental history, told through fire, of europe and europe’s encounter with the world. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Pyne, Stephen J. 1995. World fire: The culture of fire on earth. 1st ed. New York: Holt; Pyne, Stephen J. 2009, The human geography of fire: A research agenda. Progress in Human Geography 33 (4): 443-6.} There was no ‘virgin’ state of nature outside of human interventions. That being said, people can have different motives behind decisions to ignite a fire. Farmers on the periphery of stateland can be suspicious when fires burn near their fence lines as they believe rustlers do this to entice cattle into jumping the fence in pursuit of fresher grass. Once the cattle are outside their fences the issue can be judged as neglect on behalf of the farm owner, because customary rules determine that cattle owners must compensate when their animals graze on another person’s crops.

The irony of the fire suppression directives is that the department simultaneously acknowledged there was some efficacy in the practice of burning. The issue was more about
what they considered to be priorities. On that basis, the logic of the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries was based on aesthetic concerns of potential tourists:

The program called for early burning to be reduced to a bare minimum... and where it was considered desirable the reasons given were to concentrate animals for viewing, improve visibility or to afford protection for blocks which were to be completely protected. An administrative framework was drawn up to deal with the programme. It was strongly emphasized to the stage that fire control is the most important facet of range management with which they have to cope and which should be afforded a higher priority than anti-poaching.”

Interestingly, despite the fire suppression initiative being given the highest priority within the department, according to their own report: “the end results for 1974 were only marginally better than the previous year... Between 80 and 90 percent of the park was subjected to unwanted fires.” Thus a year of their efforts was focused on one priority that proved useless in curbing fire and changing the culture around it.

In fact, the department had not even been able to get their own guards to support their initiative. As is stated in the report:

unwanted fires are deliberately or negligently started by members of the public, by members of other Government departments working in the areas concerned, and worst of all, by wildlife officers. On four occasions in 1974 Guards were disciplined for starting fires without authority, contrary to the park fire programme (ibid).

It is unfortunate there was no reporting on the stated rationale of the guards in question as such information could prove interesting. Perhaps management never thought to ask. Perhaps the guards were actually following their prior directives and thinking the burning would be positive for the Lechwe viewing by tourists. The tone is notably accusatory and righteous, in the manner of so much of the conservation discourse from the time - and of the previous 30 or so years. Nowhere does the author mention the possibility of spontaneous combustion.

The point here is that the two primary policy directives over the course of four years received the majority of the departments’ attention and resources. Those were fire

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265 GRZ, Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service, Annual Report, 1974
suppression and anti-poaching. Yet both proved to be ineffective in achieving the desired goals. "Management" was therefore more about regulating behavior of local populations based on ideological ideas about how nature and ‘wildlife’ should be structured into society. The Department was not responding to the science being developed in the ministry of agriculture, the ministry of lands (the very ministry they were within), or even the science produced within their own department (often in coordination with international academics and visiting researchers).

I suggest that what is expressed in these ideologically driven policy initiatives is a systemic frustration with ‘disorder’ on the part of the bureaucrats. In conserving nature, they were trying to impose an external sense of order onto a space that has enormous social, environmental and historical complexity (in a context where few resources were devoted to such a daunting task). This mentality ultimately results in the imposition of fences – or attempts to that end. Thus the same year,

it was also considered that game fences themselves were inadequately maintained, to the extent that large and small animals could pass freely from the park, in which they were protected, into the game elimination area where they were killed.²⁶⁶

They did make some progress in plans to fence in the Kafue flats:

a start was made on constructing a fence around the northern side of Blue Lagoon National Park. This is partly needed to dissuade certain wild animals, especially roan antelope, kudu and eland from moving out of the park seasonally. Those that do quickly find themselves in populated areas. It is also needed as a barrier to prevent cattle moving into the park. The work was undertaken by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia, aided by a donation from the Zoological Society of Frankfurt.

Concerns about the animals leaving the park were in part due to worries about ‘poaching’ (disease susceptibility is never mentioned in reference to fencing). I place the word ‘poaching’ in quotations because straying animals were also likely to be shot by villagers trying to protect their gardens (Manspeizer, 2004: 165). Moreover, I am not

²⁶⁶ GRZ, Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service, Annual Report, 1974
sure the word is accurate. Manspeizer’s PhD thesis (2004) found that virtually everyone in the populations surrounding Kafue park were regularly eating wild game and had been doing so as long as anyone can recall. This is not to deny the existence of militarized poaching gangs (ibid, 2004: 201-207). Yet it is important to acknowledge the social basis of conservation initiatives in which conservation is externally imposed and synonymous with the interests of white tourists and game hunters, which in turn overlook the complexity of rural livelihoods that depend upon hunting for a multitude of reasons (ibid: 180).

Not only was the local harvesting of game customary on the Kafue Flats, evidence suggests it was actually serving to maintain the overall health of the population. The ongoing Lechwe study started in 1971 had by 1974:

established that the lechwe in Lochinvar National Park are in poorer condition than those in the more heavily poached population of Muwezwa. There is a lack of predators, a relatively high incidence of pulmonary tuberculosis and some degree of over-population caused by compression factors.267

In trying to prevent local people from having hunting access to the herds, the Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service were actually contributing to the declining health of the population. Meanwhile, severe (often extrajudicial) punishments were given for those caught harvesting (Manspeizer, 2004: 208-212).268

**Narrowing Wilderness-Domesticity Interface**

It is worth questioning whether attempts to further segregate and enforce the domesticity-wilderness interface could have simultaneously weakened the local cattle over time. It is widely understood that the indigenous Tonga cattle were harder than imported

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267 GRZ, Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service, Annual Report, 1974

268 In all cases, it has been rural peasants who have paid with their lives; rarely were “hard-core” poachers killed as they were too well armed (...) In fact, I would argue, that when the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) is enforcing hunting restrictions, they enforce them more strongly against “local” residents than against foreigners” (Manspeizer: 212). Farmers have told me the enforcement got vastly more severe in 1990 when ZAWA was established. Another irony is that the park rangers were paid so little, they were enticed into poaching and smuggling rings. The ZAWA administration was dissolved in 2015 in part to try to rid it of corruption.
breeds. It is theoretically possible that a prior decrease in the interface between species (imposed by the creation of parklands) obstructs the capacities of local domestic animals to develop the necessary anti-bodies to the disease reservoir they had until then evolved or adapted alongside. Perry notes that there is varying innate susceptibility of hosts and varying susceptibility of different tick stocks and stages of insect growth that lead to infection (1991: 261). Alternately, if the issue is that the wild ungulates are leaving the park, perhaps it places local cattle populations at greater risk of coming into contact with animals with higher counts of bacteria, fungus and viruses in their predatory stage (i.e. not naturally dormant). Whatever the possible relationships may be, the important point is that the domesticity-wildlife interface was not static and slow changes over time can have consequences on populations dependent upon the complex (and in this case strained) ecosystem.

Amidst this slowly unfolding drama, the work on Itezhitezhi (new spelling in 1974) dam began. The annual report expressed no worries about its impact on the Lechwe population, despite having been advised that it could have negative consequences. The following year, 1975, another aerial survey of Lechwe led members of the department to believe the population showed a decline, to a figure of 80,700. The evidence was not very reliable, because a second count planned to verify the numbers “was not carried out due to the unavailability of an aircraft.” Surely it was possible at least a few thousand animals could have been missed if they were foraging within areas of bush, thus it was possible the population had not actually dropped, if one accepted the lower threshold of the earlier count (82,400). Yet despite not having sufficiently rigorous data to prove a decline had taken place they wrote that: “the decline was apparently caused by increased poaching in this area rather than by all the other causes put together.” No further details were offered to suggest how such

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a conclusion had been reached. This is not to deny that poaching may have led to a decline, but to suggest that other factors could have also caused the perceived change.

1975 also brought new scientific findings from the Lechwe study. The results of the previous year’s research on tuberculosis (TB) “showed that the lechwe TB organisms were Mycobacterium tuberculosis var bovis which was the same type as that (sic) affecting cattle in the same area”. This offers clear evidence that the Lechwe acted as the reservoir. The same year, ongoing research on rumen content by D. Handlos, W.L. Handlos and G.W. Howard led to the discovery “that thirty-six species of grasses and two species of dicotyledonous plants could have been identified as having been eaten by the Lechwe” 270; far more than previous study uncovered. Moreover, they found that “grazing by Kafue Lechwe was not confined to the floodplain plants, but varied seasonally”. They also learned that lechwe breeding occurred in particular territorial breeding grounds called “leks”. Males would compete for these breeding grounds, while only a few would find success. This shows how little was known about lechwe territory needs when park and game management boundaries were established, and that fencing may obstruct natural patterns. Moreover, it suggests there were not clearly defined areas of wild and domestic species, but that they likely had a longer history of interacting.

Not surprisingly, the establishment of the hydroelectricity dam at Itezhitezhi brought with it a number of new issues for conservation officers to address. By 1978 the Northern part of Lochinvar park, where the dam was located, was declared “insecure”. There were insufficient personnel for patrolling and it was believed significant poaching was occurring. The Southern sector, on the other hand “continued to enjoy better protection from both bush fires as well as from poaching”. 271 The park was facing added pressure from immigration into the fishing industry in part because of the slowing of the mining industry. Laid off workers and their

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dependents were coming down from the Copperbelt in search of new opportunities. Thus, the 1978 annual report argues that:

The main problems affecting this park were human population pressure on its perimeter, fishermen violating some national parks regulations and destruction of a newly erected fence by villagers in order to allow their cattle to graze in the park and poaching which was on the increase.272

Villagers were repeatedly destroying the fences because they had never actually accepted the legitimacy of the park. There had been earlier contestation concerning a massive settler ranch that had been granted without local approval. The area of Lochinvar park has enormous cultural significance to people in the area.273 Most importantly, they rely on crossing it with their herds in the annual transhumance migration.

The lack of local support for the park was acknowledged in the 1978 report and specific measures were taken to try and generate local ownership of the conservation measures. The approach, however, adopted both the methods of the carrot and the stick, without including any measures for democratic input on the part of the local communities. In response to the problems faced in the park, the newly constituted National Parks Board visited the park for an appraisal and came up with recommendations detailed in abridged form below:

a) That the reason for the disrespect for the park and the park regulations by the people around the park was due to the fact that the local people did not see any direct value of the existence of the park. It was, therefore recommended that the revenue obtained from the park should be used to develop the social and economic facilities of the people around the park;

b) That political and conservation education should be carried out in the area. This was suggested because the Board felt convinced that some of the reasons for the disrespect of the park were due to the lack of awareness of wildlife conservation by the local people;

c) That a percentage of herds of cattle straying into the park should be confiscated. This recommendation was made because the Board felt disappointed with the lenient sentences passed by the courts for cattle trespassing into the park;

d) That the cattle fence around the park was physically weak and inadequate. It was therefore, recommended that an adequate barrier in the form of a trench


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along the most trespassed parts of the park should be dug to effectively keep the cattle out. In recommending this, the board was fully aware of the great expenses this proposal would involve.\footnote{274 Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, \textit{National Parks and Wildlife Service}, Annual Report: 1978}

In prioritizing an education campaign the National Park Board interpreted the issue as one in which local populations were lacking ecological awareness. Yet the reality was that the local population had a different type of knowledge about the park and its history. The issue was partly one of contestation, more than ignorance (Haller and Merton, 2010). The position of educator and learner was treated as one-directional. The irony of this is that from what we have already seen, the conservation staff actually had very limited knowledge of the local ecosystem and the intimate relationships that had existed between humans and wildlife for as long as anyone could remember.

One cannot deny, however, the new and very real pressures posed by the immigration of Northerners. The building of the dam brought with it a workforce of 2000 and greater road access to the north end of the park. Thus, in 1974, “Poaching in the Namwala Game Management Area (of Kafue) was heavy particularly in the areas close to the Itezhi-itezhi Damn”.\footnote{275 Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, \textit{National Parks and Wildlife Service}, Annual Report: 1974} Significant changes were also underway in the Kafue Flats Game Management Areas, where, according to the 1974 annual report:

\begin{quote}
for the second year running, there was no noticeable change in the Kafue Flats animal population except that the water level on the Kafue Flats rose two months ahead of time, forcing the lechwe to graze from unfavourable areas earlier than usual.
\end{quote}

Fortunately, at least for the sake of our records, a biologist, O. Hedberg, was posted to Lochinvar for the purpose of monitoring the effects of the Itezhi-Tezhi hydro-electric development on the ecology of the Flats. The results of his study were released in 1976 and among his recommendations were that the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Service
be encouraged to continue their study on the ecology of the flood plain and to monitor ecological changes resulting from the water regulation upstream.

The challenges of the 1970s forced staff within the Ministry of Lands to make some major leaps in their thinking on natural resource management. Most significantly, they were frustrated with the fact that the research being produced in various departments was not having an impact on political decision-making. The 1980 annual report notes, in particular, that;

The needs for an integrated resource utilization are well known by most technical departments involved in the management of natural resources in the world today. In the developing countries, it is not enough for the technicians only to know these problems. The political decision makers must also be made aware of these problems. Unfortunately, this fact has yet to be established... 276

Of immediate concern was the fact that projects impacting the Kafue river were approved despite conflicting demands for water use. These included the Kafue Gorge Dam and the Nakambala Sugar Estate, as well as the Kafue Textiles and Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) factories. Water was to be extracted for the city of Lusaka (5). A yeast factory and a tannery were also known to deposit waste into the river (6). This is in addition to the fact that villages were relocated onto lands that were formerly grazing areas for game. In spite of these changes, the recommendations of the 1976 Hedburg study had “not been implemented because no one appears to have funds for it” (ibid).

In 1979 another study suggested the impact in changes to “the water balance of the Kafue Flats system are potentially severe”, leading to a situation in which there would be a change in grass species such that “a replacement of sweet grasses by sour grasses, and consequently a loss in feeding value and palatability of the grassland in that area that is no longer flooded.” 277 The department was aware this would lead to increased competition between wild and domestic species and greater pressure on the remaining grasslands.

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277 Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service, Annual Report 1980, pg 8
Amazingly, they also point out that the Iteshi-tezhi dam construction had begun without ever accounting for the water to be drawn by the sugar plantation. Thus it had to be raised another meter after-the-fact. It also took the land of the Mazabuka Game Management area, estimated to have once carried close to 30,000 lechwe. The sugar estate also brought in a workforce of 45,000, which the department worried “provided a ready market for the poached game meat, (ibid).

As the irrigation of the sugar plantation led to additional water within Mazabuka district it brought with it a “heavy mosquito infestation”. At the same time, the nitrates and phosphates making their way into the river from the factories were causing excessive algae growth to obstruct the hydro-electric tunnels. One possible upside to the changes in water was that for a brief period the oxygen content seemed to rise which in turn increased the capacities of the fishery. The river had already been “one of the richest fisheries in Zambia”, though later studies actually showed decline, significantly greater after 1990 (Chabwela and Haller, 2008, 2010, Jeffrey and Chooye, 1991). The plantation and the fishery did in fact draw in new populations that were feeling the impact of the economic decline that was by then gripping the country. In fact, evidence of the economic decline was present in the reduction of content in the annual reports of the early 1980s and their disappearance from the records in 1984. Growing unemployment from the mines would come to have much greater impact on the river than was known in 1980.

In 1983, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference recognized the strategic importance of the Zambian wetlands and called for the introduction of community-based development (CBD) in addressing the impoverishment of communities surrounding the Kafue Flats. Shortly after, a World Wildlife Fund initiative launched the WWF-Zambia Wetlands Project in 1986. The aims of the WWF-Zambia Wetland Projects (which included the

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278 Related problems would continue to plague dam management: “Government Contracts SGS to deal with the Weed” The Post, Mwansa Pintu, Feb 18. 1994”, “Kafue Weed a threat to City Power”, C. Mwondela, The Post, Friday April 8, 1994
Bangwelu marsh in Northern and Luapula Provinces) were to conserve wetland natural resources and enhance their natural productivity. “Commensurate with these aims is the objective of improving the standards of living of the wetlands local communities through the sustainable utilization of natural resources” (Jeffrey and Chooye, 1991: 74). This was with a budget of only half a million Swiss francs per year, along with revenues from sales of hunting rights. It was a four-year program aimed at reducing dependence on foreign aid in managing the flats with revenues becoming self-sustaining. The project established community development units within the chiefdoms, based on the structures established under the colonial era Native Authority. By 1988 it appeared there had been some success as the Lechwe herd had apparently increased about 10%, to a population of 65,000 (ibid).

Nkhata and Breen (2009) have since revealed a number of failures in the project and with the broader concept of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) as it had been applied in the Southern African region more broadly. They note that in the communities surrounding the flats antagonisms remain between the government and funding agencies and the locals. They suggest the efforts were largely unsuccessful because of the “limited devolution of decision making and benefit-distribution processes to the communities”, leading to the apparent poor performance of the CBNRM scheme in the Kafue Flats (2009: 297). Despite the existence of Community Development Units, “ultimately government administrators were expected to make all the decisions for the Project and they were to facilitate the establishment and dissolution of the Wetland Management Authority and CDUs”. Furthermore, they reported and were ultimately accountable to the directorate of the Department of Natural Resources and Wildlife Services, and not to the local communities. One example Nkhata and Breen offer is the relationship with the CDU based in Choongo, which made numerous requests, along with Chief Choongo to hunt two wild Kafue lechwe per year for their use during traditional ceremonies recreating aspects of the traditional ‘Cila’ hunt. On all occasions the Minister responsible under the Wildlife Act (who held the sole responsibility
for issuing special licenses) denied Choongo’s applications. Moreover, reasons for objection were never provided. This, they suggest is one of the ways local communities were left with little or no say over the wetlands. Manspeizer has also criticized the implementation of CBNRM practices as being responsive to donor demands rather than local needs (Manspeizer, 2003: 214-35).

In addition, Nkhata and Breen note there was uneven distribution of proceeds from the sale of hunting licences that allocated 82% of the funds to government departments far removed from the site. In addition, they note that most of the ongoing conservation projects had collapsed as they suffered from various problems, including inadequate recapitalization, malpractice, and poor organizational and management skills of local community members. There were also instances of CDU funds being diverted for personal uses (Nkhata and Breen, 2009:299). Efforts to recover the embezzled funds were reportedly futile owing to fear and close relationships amongst the local community members.

In addition to the problems cited above it is worth noting the ways the broader turn toward community-based development served to localize the issues and placed the burden on the communities victimized by industrial processes taking place elsewhere and benefitting others. In turn, by design they share similarities with the practices of ‘ring fencing’ within the privatization discourse that coincides with neoliberalism. By isolating a segment of state management and expecting it to develop financial self-sufficiency, it makes it more readily available as a commodity to sell on the market. Yet, the ecological reality is that the Flats are impacted by everything that takes place upstream – and even further. In fact, the water even supported the city of Lusaka (Jeffrey and Chooye: 1991).279

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In the new millennium there has been a resurgence of research on the Kafue flats that reveals a picture of ever-greater complexity. One study looked specifically at the case of buffalo, and for the first time confirmed the presence of Thieleria Parva antibodies in both the Buffalo and cattle populations (Munang’andu et al. 2009). It also showed regional variations in the buffalo antibodies, with some areas of the country potentially having a genetic resistance (though other factors could explain the differences such as the size of tick populations). Another study saw regional variation in the tick species and recognized different dynamics in the period of tick life-cycle that influenced the likelihood of infection (Mulumba, et al., 2000). Thus it was likely that dipping or spraying interventions that worked in one part of the country were inadequate in the case of Southern province. They conclude, therefore, that:

contrary to widespread belief, larva-to-nymph transmission of theileriosis is more important than nymph-to-adult transmission in the Southern Province of Zambia and reinforce our hypothesis that climate is the major driving force of the whole process. (Mulumba, et al., 2000: 312)

The authors also speculate that changes in the cattle breeds can have some impact on susceptibility, though no studies have yet examined this issue. The authors’ findings about the impact of climate are supported by Olwoch, et al., who note that increasing levels of dryness can lead to:

an increase in tick numbers, as well as shifts in the timing and duration of each generation time may overwhelm areas that may become more suitable for tick infestations. This would increase the absolute amount of production loss of cattle. Thus strategic dipping may not be a sufficient strategy in such an environment (2009).

In such circumstances it is easier to understand why villagers were skeptical of the relative benefits of dipping as it may not have been producing the desired protection, to justify the increasing, indeed, for some, prohibitive costs (Johnson, 1995). It appears, therefore, that due to climate change the tick species was evolving and transmitting the disease at an unpredicted time and life-cycle stage. It is also known
that climate and vegetation factors are the most important variables determining population and distribution of ticks (Perry, 1991: 261).

Interesting findings have also suggested the situation with the Lechwe herd was more complex than previously believed. Munyeme et al., (2010) examined the parasite load carried by lechwe in relation to overall health of the individual animals. Remarkably:

These findings suggest that at present, parasitic infections might not play a pivotal role to lechwe debilitation and consequently to population reduction on the Kafue basin. This is contrary to observation made by Gallagher et al [9], who reported that worm infestation was estimated to kill about 14% of the Kafue lechwe in the Kafue basin and suggested that worm infections were likely to be the major cause of the population reduction observed in the Kafue lechwe antelopes. However, age was shown to have a significant effect, as animals older than 15 years were one and half times more likely to carry parasites than those aged between 1 and 5 years (odds ratio = 1.5, 95% CI: 1.1-2.4). (ibid)

If parasite load does not appear to have a significant impact on the health and condition of lechwe, the authors suggest, “factors other than parasites should be considered in future investigations designed to evaluate factors most important to the maintenance of a viable lechwe population in the Kafue basin”. This too supports the claims of the villagers who argue that yearly culling of the herd was important as the aging population proved to be worse off. This was known in the 1970s yet it did not lead to any change of policy within the department that held the information.

There are at least two other ways that factors far upstream have negatively impacted the ecosystem of the Kafue Flats. Potentially the most serious is the effects of effluent run-off from the mines on the Copperbelt, which the Kafue passes through. Syakalima et al. (2001) found the Kafue to be “highly polluted with heavy metals from the mining waste upstream” with concentrations of copper, zinc, manganese, and iron at harmful levels in water, fish, grasses and lechwe. The authors note these can potentially have serious health effects on the animals as well as to all organisms in the food chain. It is, however, difficult to single out any adverse effects that can exclusively point to heavy metals as the sole etiology. However the high concentration of some of these
metals suggest the possibility of subclinical conditions existing in these animals that may be masked by interactions between these metals (318).

Worse still, “the study further raises the possibility of similar health risks on other dependents of the Kafue Flats including livestock and humans that are exposed”. These have the potential to exacerbate changes in the tick populations alongside changes in grass composition in response to the different chemical composition of the water flow. Thus the tick populations in Southern Province display highly localized variations compared to other parts of the country and continent (Olwoch et al., 2008, Maritim et al., 1992). In this broader context it appears the peasants who are blamed for causing a cattle epidemic are only one agent in a much larger set of historical events. In addition, this is a context in which smallholders have been encouraged to utilize foreign and hybrid cattle species that do not have the same resilience to tick-born infections (Perry and Young, 1995: 113).

The impact of the mining industry on the Kafue wildlife and surrounding communities goes further. The broadest study of the social impacts of the ecology to date consists of a series of articles by Haller and Merton. They note that the region experienced a growth in population up to 1980 that “resulted from immigration but between 1980 and 2000, due to a collapse of livestock production after a Theileriosis epidemic, more people were moving out of the area to urban centres.” (Haller and Merten, 2008c: 703). Furthermore,

In the Kafue Flats, livelihoods have come under pressure over the last two decades because of drought and an epidemic affecting cattle culminating in a large-scale food crisis during the lean season of 2002-2003. During this crisis, the fisheries attracted people from other urban and rural areas of Zambia, where loss of jobs due to the economic crisis as well as crop failure and increasing maize prices, drove them to seek alternative income-generating activities. Large fishing camps of seasonal commercial fishermen emerged in the Flats. (ibid, 704)

They explain that during “the food crisis, the fishing camps in the Kafue Flats and along the tributaries grew well beyond their former sizes (former sizes not going higher than 50 to 60 households)” (ibid 708). In 2002, they counted over 900 households (often single males) in one such camp. Under these circumstances, the customary legal systems and the systems of
customary resource management were incapable of addressing the changes taking place. This was partly because the immigrants were not subject to local authorities at the same time and this situation was exacerbated by the fact that the central government had sidelined local authorities in the management of fisheries and wildlife (Haller and Merten, 2010: 303). At the same time, resources did not support monitoring. Thus endogenous communities have lost out at the expense of newcomers. The majority of those benefiting from the fishing industry are among the poorest in the country, which is partly why they are motivated by only short-term gain in seasonal work and are not easily won over to conservation practices. The dynamics have aggravated tensions between ethnic groups, with the majority of fishers being from Bemba, Lala and other socio-linguistic groups originating in the north of the country. Those who have suffered the greatest economic consequences have actually been the far less numerous, but locally indigenous Batwa, who historically have practiced the most sustainable means of resource extraction, living primarily by self-sufficiency rather than seeking profits through markets. (Chabwela and Haller, 2010: 642, Haller and Merton, 2008: 702).

Along with pollution entering the river, heavy and rapid deforestation was influencing river flows and contributing to local (and global) climate change, with droughts and floods occurring more frequently over the last 20 years (Kalinda, 2014:56, Vinya et al, 2011:18). The National Parks and Wildlife Service had recognized by 1980 that deforestation on the Copperbelt had “apparently contributed to a 50 percent increase in water yield on the upper Kafue river through increased run-off”\(^{280}\) (Chidumayo and Chidumayo, 1984, Sharma, 1983). Deforestation was being caused in part by increased Chitemene (slash and burn), as well as the increased demand for charcoal for cooking in urban areas.\(^{281}\) Economic decline led to greater participation in farming and forestry as well as urban expansion (Vinya et al., 2011). These, along with livestock grazing are considered the ultimate drivers of deforestation (ibid).

\(^{280}\) Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism, National Parks and Wildlife Service, Annual Report 1980
\(^{281}\) Nov 5\(^{th}\), 1993 “Shifting Cultivation major cause of Deforestation in Zambia” The Post, p. 9, T. Banda
The underlying drivers, however, “are high poverty levels, low employment opportunities, brick-making, tobacco curing, insecure tenure rights, low institutional capacity (poor funding, low staffing levels in state agencies, lack of reliable transport for monitoring) and lack of synergy among policies and legislation (Vinya et al., 2011:18). For Vinya et al., “this corresponds to the structural adjustment programme era, during which the country’s mines made substantial cuts in their workforce” (12). The authors also use satellite imagery to determine that deforestation hotspots “are mainly located along the highly urbanized rail link running from Southern to Copperbelt provinces”. These problems are so grave that a number of studies rank Zambia as one of the countries with the highest rates of deforestation in the world. Vinya et al. show that “In 1996, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), indicated the average annual deforestation rate for Zambia to be 250 000 hectares (ha) per annum”, while “Chidumayo (1999), reported an even higher deforestation rate of 300 000 ha per annum”, suggesting that the pace of deforestation was rising across the decade (Vinya et al., 2011:10).

Deforestation in turn has led to both greater climate variation and irregularity in seasonal flows. The changes in flow patterns, industrial run-off (nitrates and phosphates) in turn contributed to further alterations in the biological content of the water. Further still, the river was subject to competing industrial uses (especially by Nakambula Sugar – now Zambia Sugar). The combined changes in the flood regime and chemical structure of the water favoured grasses inedible to ungulates. In some instances they were invasive foreign species such as Mimosa Pigra (Chomba et al, 2015). The key point to take from this is that the ecosystem was increasingly subject to multiple factors of change with potentially unpredictable consequences.

Furthermore, to understand the changes in the flood regime of the Kafue Flats one needs to consider the relationship between the two dams. Kafue Gorge Dam was the first to be constructed in 1971 by The Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO). Its storage capacity of 1000 square kilometers proved insufficient (it would run dry). Therefore a second dam was constructed at Itezhi-tezhi in 1978 with a capacity of 400 square kilometers so that flow could be released as needed in order to maintain a constant flow. Thus the previously distinct flooding pattern under natural conditions was disrupted (Schelle and Pitoch, 2005). The impact was seen in lower levels of seasonal inundation on the Flats. The impact on the Kafue Lechwe was immediate. The most recent contemporary and historical estimates of Kafue Lechwe population show that “The first significant decline was recorded after the construction of the Itezhi-Tezhi dam in 1979, which saw a halving of their population from the previous estimate six years earlier (Chomba et al., 2015: 157-8).

An additional factor to consider is the loss of grasslands due to the proliferation of irrigated gardens on tributaries of the river, in addition to the expanding and increasingly populated fishing camps (Haller and Merten, 2008a: 19, 2008c: 703). The issue is not necessarily about the size of the gardens being planted, but their encroachment upon areas of particular importance for the ecosystem. Furthermore, much of the encroachment occurs within Game Management Areas (GMAs), initially by populations that relocated during the construction of the Itezhi-Tezhi dam. More research is needed to determine the species most severely impacted by encroachments of this sort, but historical analogies can be instructive. Meaningful comparisons could be made with past processes of ecological change in colonial Tanganyika (Kjekshus, Helge,1977) and South Africa (Beinart, 2003, 2008), and, perhaps surprisingly with the settlement of the Central plains of the United States. This is not the first time such comparisons have been made (Beinart and Coates, 1995, Beinart and Hughes, 2007: 59).
Based on a reading of Elliot West’s award-winning book, *The Way to the West: Essays on the Central Plains*, the challenges faced by the Kafue Red Lechwe appear to compare meaningfully with the decline of the bison on the central plains in the mid-19th century (West, 1995). The easy narrative of the bison’s decline would put the blame for their loss upon the harvesting by the incoming settlers and the rising population of native groups (53-71). West rejects this because the potential added attrition could not account for the rapidity of the decline of the species. Instead, he suggests the “full explanation must lie in some combination of factors, some especially dangerous interaction of events” (72). Of these, he cites new diseases, but these were only a small part of much more encompassing forms of change: “whatever else was killing them, the bison were also dying because their world was changing” (73). The unique ecological role of the bison in the highly variable grassland system was based in a “series of microenvironments with unique ecologies” that held important functions at particular periods of time, based on nutritional content of grasses and forage at particular stages of growth. (73-75). In the summer months when the plains could be crossed, settlers camped with their animals in the parts of the ecosystem the Bison relied upon in the winter: the riverine valleys of tributaries. Thus, when the Bison returned, the forage had largely been stripped (78).

On the Kafue Flats, these particular parts of the ecosystem are occupied increasingly by gardens and fishing camps. I am not claiming to know what particular role these tributary microenvironments play for ungulates of the Kafue Flats, but we can be sure they are important – if only as a source of water. From an outsiders’ perspective the Flats, much like the US Central Plains, can appear to be a highly uniform environment. The reality is that it exhibits (to those who look) significant variation in space and time and that has been essential to the non-domesticated ungulates. Some of the changes that have occurred in these microenvironments have taken place with the encouragement of government and aid agencies. Gardens have been promoted in
part as a means of adjusting to the more regular demands of the cash economy brought in with liberalization. Previously, under NAMBoR, maize was a more reliable source of income even if farmers were being underpaid. Schools and clinics were also free. Upon liberalization, farmers moved out of maize (beyond home consumption) because of the lack of markets. At the same time, people were increasingly forced to pay cash for basic services like schools and hospitals. The loss of cash returns from the maize economy led people to seek out alternate means (Kalinda, 2014: 56, Vinya et al., 2011). Growing vegetables for sale in market gardens helped fill the gap and these were located along tributaries. The cumulative result amounted to the loss of grazing land and in turn, the shrinking of the domestic-wilderness interface. Furthermore, the new crops demand more water, which further draws from the already shrinking river flow, again leading to loss of valuable, annually fertilized natural grasses. Gardens and deforestation particularly impacted buffalo territory because those animals are more dependent upon wooded areas. With less territory the buffalo were both more likely to be physically stressed and then come into contact with domestic herds.

In 2015 a new aerial census of the Lechwe population was conducted, which also gave a rough estimate of the cattle population on the Kafue Flats (Chomba et al., 2015). They found that the Lechwe population had continued to decline to a figure of 28,660. At the same time, while cattle numbers on the flats were recorded at 18,841 in 2005, by 2015 the herds had rebounded, increasing by more than 300% to a figure of 92,242. This was partially due to a new vaccination campaign supported by IFAD Smallholder Livestock Investment Programme aimed at restocking with supporting cattle-dipping services. In addition, the International Livestock Research Institute efforts began producing a vaccine in Kenya and Malawi, supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and USAID. While the regeneration of cattle numbers is certainly a dramatic and important increase, it is still only a fraction of the

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250,000 cattle recorded on the Flats in the 1973 Foot and Mouth vaccination effort cited above.

Chomba et al. (2015) blamed the period of liberalizations in the 1990s for having “a severe impact on the lechwe population”, as a result of staff retrenchment and the reduction of funding for field operations, a reduction of law enforcement operations on the Flats which “accentuated illegal human settlements”, and “increased poaching levels and loss of lechwe habitat” (ibid: 162). They further argue for a:

> review of the carrying capacity of the Kafue flats as it appears that the estimated population’s carrying capacity of 100,000 might have declined over time due to among other factors; increased human encroachment, expansion of the invasive alien weed, *Mimosa pigra*, which is now estimated to cover 29 km² (this was reduced through mechanical control) and bush encroachment on the former open plains due to disrupted flooding regime (...), increased herds of cattle and many more.”

They estimated that seven Lechwe were dying daily. One could be attributed to a legal hunt while the others were due to poaching and other causes. When we take into account industrial impacts on the flats and the complexities of the fishing economy its clear this is a highly contested ecosystem area facing complicated changes. It is obvious there was a shifting in the wilderness-wildlife interface, though there is no evidence to suggest the wild side was responsible. Instead, changes in the interface resulted from a reduction in the river flood waters, invasive grass species and increasing encroachment by pastoralists and fishermen and women.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that liberalization met with a series of disasters in the agricultural sector that precipitated the collapse of the national cattle complex. This was followed by a series of farm animal epidemics that continued for over 20 years. There can be no single narrative or explanation of the processes of decline. Instead, we must understand the epidemics as resulting from multiple covariant factors influencing change in unpredictable...
ways. Southern Province appeared to have been the epicenter of Corridor disease. The African stateland farmers only began to recover after the traditional herds were largely killed off. The experience caused significant disarticulation among the newly emerging capitalist farmers. Those who survived the culling were forced to make adjustment in their production systems, which ultimately served to deepen the still partial enclosure of their farms. Many of the factors that led to the epidemics have still not been addressed on a national level, though clearly there has been a retreat from the simplistic anti-state positions typical of the early days of structural adjustment.

Lastly, in examining the historical etiology of Corridor disease in Southern Province I have attempted to show that a more complete understanding of the disease epidemic must adopt an ecosystem-level analysis. It is impossible to understand cattle diseases in Zambia without also taking into consideration the state of ‘wild’ herds. The term ‘wild’ is placed in quotations because a broad analysis of the conditions of wild animals in Southern province shows they in fact live in a form of ‘second nature’, as Cronon suggested in a different context (1991). That is to say, human agents of change have impacted their entire ecology. Attempts to manage the wilderness in Southern Province have been highly superficial, in part because they arrive out of ideological narratives rather than on the basis of science. At the same time, few efforts were made to gain an awareness of local forms of knowledge about diseases. Instead, Tonga pastoralists have been treated paternalistically, as though their decisions around their cattle management are entirely irrational. Herders have tended to be blamed for their losses and yet science has increasingly shown that skepticism on their part was not entirely irrational, but in fact had some basis in reality. An ecosystemic approach, examining multiple agents of change in the ecology shows that the causes are multivariate and complex. Variables cannot be neatly separated. Most importantly, we can see that factors impacting domestic animal health relate to changes in the wilderness-domesticity interface on the Kafue flats. The full extent of these changes is beyond what we can at this point fully comprehend.
We do know, however, that much of the change relates to prior decisions about development within the country. Often these decisions relate to factors seemingly far removed from the Kafue Flats. Yet the mining economy is not outside of nature. In this case, a river runs through it.

We have seen that the most significant impact on the ecosystem of the Kafue Flats and the health of the animals that live within it, relate to changes in the river flood regime. This is impacted by the creation of the Kafue Gorge hydroelectric dam downstream, to support a range of developments elsewhere – including powering the mines. The Kafue Gorge project was followed by the building of the Itezhi-Tezhi upstream. In addition, rapid deforestation on the Copperbelt led to higher seasonal flows. Along with broader processes of climate change these impacted the timing and levels of flow. In turn, we saw the loss of grasslands and the addition of industrial run-off (nitrates, phosphates and heavy metals), which lead to alterations in the biological and chemical content of water. We have also seen that competing industrial uses have not been planned for in any integrative approach that considers the impact on the river ecology.

Changes to the river flow in turn lead to changes in grassland communities. Inadvertently this has led to a growth in sourgrasses, inedible to many ungulates, in place of sweetgrasses. These correspond with changes to tick and other vector communities. Damming of the river led to relocations of populations, and inmigrations of new worker communities, in turn, leading to further agricultural and pastoral encroachment and deforestation in the surrounding area.

Furthermore, we see increased pressures on Lechwe, Buffalo and broader ungulate populations. They experience a reduction and deterioration in grasslands, reduced culling in some places due to conservation measures, and increased culling in others as a result of new harvesting (off-take) pressures. The reduced health of herds means higher infection rates. Here many links are very unclear, though the associations are glaring. Animals are more likely
to exit the park, seeking pasture near pastoralists while the health of the domestic herds was suffering. This was complicated further by the fact that those with urban employment were keeping savings in cattle, allowing herds to increase at unprecedented rates. At the same time, there were gradual changes in cattle species (promoted by government and aid agencies), which may not have developed the same levels of disease resilience.

Recall that from an earlier chapter I revealed documentation that herd owners in Namwala in 1957 believed the indigenous cattle had natural immunities, which Johnson explains as having been 'engineered' as cattle adjusted to the local disease environment. He also describes numerous practices among the Ila-Tonga that were taken to prevent disease, but explains that their efficacy decreased after foreign species were introduced and cross-bred, thus disrupting the local disease environment.

In explaining why the cattle died, one of the most significant of the multiple factors to consider is the shifting of the domestic-wilderness interface. The incomplete nature of enclosures combined with other factors of ecological change (industrial and broadly social) serve to bring cattle into closer contact with the wild animals that act as a reservoir for the diseases. This also, with the possible evolution of the disease organisms themselves made cattle-dipping regimes less effective, in part because the diseases were passing through tick vectors at differing times of year. It seems the changes in the flood regime have influenced changes in tick life cycles, and even caused new adaptations in the species.

It was the Tonga 'traditional' pastoralists and the new semi-capitalist farmers who suffered the most from Corridor disease, while the white farmers managed to mostly stay free from it because of their greater capitalization and levels of farm enclosure. With the loss of traditional cattle stocks, the largest, predominantly white settler farmers have managed to take their market share, while herds in the reserves have never had a chance to rebound. This, I would argue, is a form of accumulation through dispossession. Yet it does not sit within any tidy narrative. However, if we consider the process of primitive accumulation as one in which
overall, however caused, there is a net transfer from common ownership into private, then it seems this is precisely what has happened to the cattle stocks and market share in Zambia.

Corridor disease was historically new to the Tonga farmers. The challenges were broadly social, yet on an individual level the chances of protection in the context of liberalization had to do with technique – and fencing. Thus the greatest losses were to those in ‘traditional’ lands.\textsuperscript{284} When the cattle died, there were not as many oxen to plant with. So the cattle disease had numerous knock-on effects. This also, of course, coincided with the influx of HIV, causing a reduction in household labour. Banks stopped lending for inputs, while user-fees were introduced (World Bank 1990, Kalinda, 2014).

It is theoretically possible to continue to keep larger herds in common pastures. No doubt it will continue to be done as long as land title remains customary, rather than private. There are different challenges in keeping large herds in common pastures. Yet, transhumance pastoralists access value from nature in areas where private titled, fenced, hybrid herds are unfeasible because they are not hardy enough to manage the stresses in food, water, heat, and terrain. It is possible to manage the disease context if an effective state is present and its natural resource management structures are highly democratic. As Haller and Merton (2010) argue, one cannot just invoke the chief, as that will exclude some of the stakeholders (357). Managing the ecosystem would also require that scientific findings actually inform policy, rather than simply serve as warnings to be ignored.

At a point, choices also need to be made between the maintenance of ‘wild’ herds over domestic. Choices are made that impact those herds and choices are made to favour their health over domestic herds. Yet, even then, the industrial economy undermines conservation efforts. The ideological response is to blame the smallholder and ignore the actions of industrial and finance capital. As Thadeus Sunseri has rightly noted, the rise of neoliberalism

\textsuperscript{284} Satwant Singh, interview with Toby Moorsom, 09/09/11, Catherine Naambo also thinks the quality of water has declined when it is released after having been held in the dam. She says animals get sick in the weeks after the dam gates open. Interview with Toby Moorsom 08/07/08
has seen a process in which finance capital is clearly aligning with, and advancing the conservation agenda in highly regressive ways (2009: 164-184). It is disingenuous to claim to want to save a species when the interests represented are destroying the ecosystem it lives within.

Neoliberal economic policy forced a retreat of the limited state that had been constructed in the early post-independence days. This chapter shows it was not followed by a freeing of productive, creative energies in the commercializing class of African farmers. In fact, the opposite occurred. They could not maintain their herds in the face of widespread ecological catastrophe. Many of the sources of disarticulation in the agricultural economy find their origins well before the neoliberal era. The Zambian state would have been challenged to deal with them under any circumstances. Yet it is without doubt that managing these disparate and generalized crises was not resolved by private profit motives. Many dimensions of the crisis had their roots firmly in the neoliberal era; the extension into market gardening was a response to the need for increasing levels of cash to pay for basic public services. The market in counterfeit and inadequate products emerged with neoliberalism, while the state lost its capacity to monitor and contain diseases. The private sector was also slow to step in to produce necessary vaccines. Yet, in another sense, we can see that neoliberalism saw the loss of market share among smaller, indigenous farmers, while the white settler farmers tended to fair better. We can therefore say that neoliberalism enabled a transfer of market share from the African producers to the larger, white settler farmers as well as those new entrants arriving with sources of foreign direct investment. Other beneficiaries may have been those Tonga farmers that managed to move out of Southern Province for greener pastures in Central Province.
Chapter 6

Tonga Migrations: Ethnicity and Environmental Change Among Tonga Farmers of Zambia, A Reconnaissance
Most who study Southern Africa are at least marginally familiar with the Tonga peoples of Southern Zambia and Zimbabwe thanks to the six decades of work conducted by Elizabeth Colson. Colson’s work among the Tonga began in 1946 in what is now Zambia’s Southern Province when she was hired by the then-fledgling Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI). One year later, the RLI collaborated with the Northern Rhodesian government in conducting a broad survey of Tonga farmers on the Southern Rhodesian plateau. Since then, sources compiled in a Tonga Bibliography are upwards of 1200.\textsuperscript{285} Although Colson began her research on the Tonga Plateau, her work after 1956 largely focused on the Tonga of the Zambezi Valley, who were forcibly relocated to make way for the Zambezi hydro-electric dam. The data from this work is now part of a larger research project, representing the longest running and still current ethnographic study of any population.

While studies of the Valley Tonga have addressed the matter of migration, the issue has largely gone unexamined in relation to those living on the plateau. The one exception is a study by Cliggett (2000). With this paper I hope to extend research in this area and generate interest in further study. Using data from farmers in the Valley and on the Plateau, Cliggett focuses on the social context in which migrants decide to leave their homes. In particular, she examines how social links and local power relations effect decisions to move. One finding is that migration is often a means of escaping sour family dynamics that are prone to arise based on the particular matrilineal system of inheritance practiced among the Tonga. For these reasons, migrants are not necessarily maintaining links and providing remittances, as is often assumed about migrants.

The data presented in this chapter examines experiences of Tonga migrants into Zambia’s Central Province, confirming much of what Cliggett found about the social context in which people make decisions to leave, but extending the analysis to explore the experiences

\textsuperscript{285} A Bibliography of Published and Unpublished Work on the Tonga-Speaking People of Zambia and Zimbabwe, prepared by Elizabeth Colson and Bennett Siamwiza, 2008
migrants face in their newly acquired territory. In the process it depicts a situation in which Tonga agropastoralists are themselves becoming a settler force with significant, yet varying (and insufficienlly understood) levels of social cohesion among them. As former Minister of Finance and National Planning N’gandu Peter Magande stated, they have “moved and created villages in other parts of the country.” This can have negative consequences for the people being displaced by their settlement.

This chapter first examines the reasons migrants left Southern Province for Central. It looks at family dynamics of the migrants and the relations they have forged with local populations. The chapter also considers the advantages gained in the migration and any perceivable changes and continuities in methods of production among Tonga migrants. Finally, the chapter looks at broader political processes relating to the migration and the evolving meaning of Tonga identity. We conclude with some reflections on the possible implications of this migration process in national politics.

Context

Interest in the Plateau Tonga has tended to be in relation to the productive farming and cattle husbandry that expanded rapidly between 1905 and 1990. This production was greatly influenced by missionaries who introduced the Tonga to the ox-drawn plough. With uncommonly fertile land close to the rail line, these agro-pastoralists took advantage of the grain and beef markets that emerged as copper mining led to rapid urbanization further North. The government of Northern Rhodesia served to repeatedly undermine Tonga farming, in favour of white settlers, yet the Tonga still expanded their production significantly. In fact, a major motivation for the creation of a Maize Marketing Board was to restrict most Africans from the market because they were threatening to limit profits of the white settlers (Vickery,

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286 Parliamentary Debates For The First Session Of The Tenth Assembly, Thursday, 8th February, 2007, 1430 hours
Studies conducted by Baylies (1978), Chipungu (1988), Momba (1982, 1989), and Vickery (1978) show that an indigenous African capitalist farming class was emerging among Tonga producers in the colonial era, with class differentiation increasing significantly after independence. Since then, as we have shown in previous chapters, Zambia has experienced the debt crisis, the failure of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) development policies and the imposition of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs.

More recently, research has explored the complexities of Zambia’s agricultural markets in the post-adjustment era (Abrahams, 2010). Others have explored the decline in productivity among peasant farmers in the peripheral province of Luapula (Gould, 2010). Sitko (2008, 2010) has considered the experiences of Tonga farmers living deep in the ‘reserves’ of Southern Province.\(^\text{287}\) There he finds that despite being one of the most important agricultural regions in Zambia, “many farmers fail to meet their own basic food needs through production, while only a fraction (roughly 17% in 2000) of farmers in the region are capable of producing a marketable surplus”. At the same time, this takes place in a context in which self-serving behaviour is being valorized by government and aid agencies promoting marketization and the mantra of “farming as a business”. Sitko shows how new moral codes of the ‘privatized individual’ replace practices of gifting to those in shortfall with a situation in which friends and relatives profit from the hunger of others (2010, 167). While these and other studies provide valuable insights, there are none that examine the plight of the Tonga capitalist farmers identified in the late 1970s.

This dissertation shows that the large Tonga farmers also have not performed well in the era of liberalization. Thus, the mantra of “farming as a business” has not necessarily aided a local business class. At the same time, it was clear this class was accumulating under the

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\(^{287}\) The term ‘reserves’ was how the Northern Rhodesian administrators described them when they constructed the system of ‘Native Authority’. Most Zambians in Southern Province describe them as ‘traditional lands’, even when they are aware of the fact that their current geographic position is not where their ancestors resided before colonial era relocations took place. As Sitko notes, land management in these areas “is part of a multi-scalar politics of signification, which defines land as a particular type of property and serves to protect it in ways that often operate outside of the state” (2008, 102)
UNIP state, despite the values of ‘equity’ and ‘humanism’ being propagated by the state, in contrast to the present-day neoliberal policies purportedly positive for business. There are multiple reasons these farmers faced decline. They include: crippling interest-rates on seasonal loans as a result of the “shock therapy” liberalizations in 1991, multiple epidemics of cattle disease as state capacities of control were significantly reduced, the impact of HIV, the loss of an agricultural market with the removal of the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBoard), which in turn contributed to the loss of seed and chemical inputs. In addition, from the late 1980s, a variety of environmental issues have emerged in Southern Province. While there is little documentation of these issues, farmers and agricultural officers regularly discussed climate change, soil acidification and salinization, grain borer infestations and deforestation.288

When Colson began her research in the 1940s the Tonga were not geographically, linguistically, culturally, politically or ethnically bound and their economic activities varied significantly based on their geographic location and ecological options (Colson, 1960). Thus they conducted varying combinations of shifting cultivation and pastoralism alongside hunting and gathering. The colonial government enforced new ‘village’ settlements and then attempted to impose conservation techniques that had little proven efficacy. These programs then became a source of conflict that played into the Zambian independence struggle (Dixon-Fyle, 1977). With significant government assistance, wealthier African farmers began buying private titled land along the rail line shortly after independence.

Studies on migration and agriculture tend to focus on issues of outmigration as an escape from poverty. Some of the classic anthropological and economic studies in Southern Africa have focused on the creation of migrant labour regimes (Moore and Vaughan: 1994, Richards: 1940, Crush: 1987, 1997). Others focused on rapid urbanization (Mitchell, C: 1951,

288 e.g. Joseph Kembo, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 6, 07, Nyowana, Ellison, NAPSSFZ, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 6, 08
Potts: 1995, Powdernaker: 1962), followed by those on the process of re-ruralization in economic decline (Pottier, 1988, Ferguson, 1999) As Cliggett has noted, migration policy has often placed attention on the positive potential impact of remittances from such migrants (2000). Yet Cliggett shows that migration can actually be a form of escape from family and broader social bonds, rather than being part of a broader strategy devised by multiple households. In the case highlighted here, migration is intra-rural (as in those described by Cliggett), yet these are not migrants escaping poverty. They are also not sending remittances. I argue that they should be understood as settlers extending an agrarian system forged in the colonial order. Although their activities appear benign, as settlers, they are inherently immersed in a conflict over land-use.

**Methodology**

As Cliggett has noted (2000), research on Tonga migrant farmers is expensive, slow and challenging. There is almost no available official data, so interviews are paramount. Farms are spread apart while road access is often prohibitive. Costs of gasoline are high and public transport is non-existent. Given this context, I rely here largely upon a brief research trip to visit farming blocks in Kabwe and Serenje, Central Province. Given the limitations, I did not expect to obtain broadly representative data, but rather to undertake an initial reconnaissance that might lead to further research.

I began my interviews furthest north, in Serenje with research and translation assistance provided by Michelo, a teacher from the Zambian Agricultural College in Serenje. Michelo helped me contact 16 male farmers who gathered for a full day focus group on July 28th, 2008 at the farm of one of the participants. During this time wives were present though sadly circumstances did not allow me to interview them. Cliggett also found it

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289 Michelo is his last name, which is how he preferred to be identified here. Michelo committed to gather a broadly representative group though it no doubt will have some selection bias.

290 the farm of Siachinji, N
much more challenging to get interviews with women. I have managed to include some data obtained from female informants in Southern Province, but I failed to gather much in Central. Nevertheless, the group setting with men created an open and relaxed environment in which men’s reflections on their experiences over the years generated free-flowing discussion that provided significant insight. All but one of the farmers I spoke with in Serenje were happy to provide their full names and be identified with their statements. Nevertheless, I will treat many of the comments made in group-discussion anonymously.

Following the focus group in Serenje I travelled to Kabwe where I conducted personal interviews with 13 farmers, 3 of whom were female heads of households. Most of the Kabwe interviews were conducted on the farms, with the assistance of Kingsley Zimba, a District Agricultural Officer, who transported me to the farms on a ministry motorbike. Two interviews were conducted on buses and one Mkushi farmer was interviewed at the National agricultural fair in Lusaka. I conducted 5 interviews with Agricultural professionals in Central Province, including a veterinary officer, researchers and other agricultural support staff. These interviews were supplemented with earlier interviews with Martha Mweena and Costain Chilala, both of whom have farmed in Central Province, with the latter being the farmer with possibly the largest individually owned operation in the country.

The average farm size of participants in the focus group was 137 hectares, with the largest being 275 and the smallest 87.2 hectares. These are clearly large farms, given that most farmers in Zambia cultivate less than half a hectare. Only 25% of farmers have over 7 hectares. They are, however, small compared to the farms of 3000 hectares, that a number of Tonga had purchased in Southern Province. Once again, these farms are small

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292 A 2004 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations categorizes farmers into three groups; consisting of about “800,000 farming households (650,000 small-scale and 150,000 medium-scale) and only about 1,500 commercial farmers” (Chiwele and Sikananu, 2004, 36). The Central Statistics Office of the Government of Zambia describes medium-scale farmers as cultivating between 5-20 hectares.
compared to those in Zimbabwe where white farmers regularly held plots of 20-30,000 hectares.

Most informants in Serenje lived in the ‘Munte’ or ‘Sasa’ farming blocks, although two were farming in Chief’s land, where one had 15 acres for cropping and access to communal grazing lands, while another held 130 hectares for cropping with additional access to communal grazing land. One farmer was renting from 3 different land-owners, while staying in the township. All of them were born in chiefs’ land in Southern Province, ranging from Namwala, as far South as Kalomo, in Chief Siachitema’s territory. One was born in Bweengwa and related to Chief Hamusonde (Hamaleka) – who is his cousin. The wife of Jeremiah Munangandu is his aunt. There were two cases of father and son/s, - holding separate farms in one case. Average age of participants was 41 (with a mean DOB of 1966), with the eldest born in 1947 (See Appendix 2 for details). Only two in this group had come from wage employment into agriculture, in contrast to many who purchased in Southern, after years of waged work. They also say that in Serenje it was not common for people to try to farm from a distance by “remote control”. Most stayed on their farm.

**Reasons for Leaving Southern Province**

Elizabeth Colson recalls that in her first fieldwork placement in Zambia, in the village of Mujika, Monze, a slow process began in 1949 whereby some residents moved out of Southern Province in search of better land for farming. They were headed to Kabwe or else East of Lusaka because there was no longer any good arable land available in their villages. She also recalls that farmers from Choma were moving to Mumbwa. Yet, before that they had been moving west, until people learned land with available water sources was running out in that direction as well. Colson explains that those who left were among the wealthier in society. Looking back over the years she explains:
It has always been the people with resources, but not the greatest resources, that moved. They had to have capital in order to move. After that was independence and the thing became to educate your children and get them into government jobs. An initial advantage builds and their children were rocketed upwards. They were putting money in children who then move out. The problem with development is that people move out – take up opportunity.\textsuperscript{293}

Initially these migrations were informal, with migrants negotiating with chiefs for some land, but eventually the state got involved in facilitating the process with plans for formal farming blocks.

State involvement in creating farming blocks had begun in Southern Province, with reportedly 862 new households gaining properties varying in size, but mostly between 60-100 hectares (Good, 1986: 247).\textsuperscript{294} The establishment of similar blocks further north saw the government negotiating with chiefs to clear 30 kilometers on either side of the rail line as the settlers had done in Southern Province. Herbert Mwansa has a Master’s degree in agricultural engineering and had been working for the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Lands for 30 years. In his words, there was a “wish to replicate the farming patterns along the Tazara Corridor that was opened up by the construction of the Chinese-built railway to Dar es Salaam.”\textsuperscript{295} Ben Kapita explains that this was partly a strategy of searching for revenues in places other than copper, which had been facing a steep decline in global market prices.

so the thinking from the 1970s was “we will go into agriculture” and since the coming of... about 1980 again we began to develop farming skills; like in Mpongwe area where we had the Mpongwe Development Company and the “Commonwealth Development Corporation’, (CDC), and Munkumpo, also in the copperbelt....so farming became a very big preoccupation of the people.\textsuperscript{296}

In many respects this involved subsidizing those who were already wealthier. Yet in the \textit{Second National Development Plan} of 1972-76 the government justified the ‘imbalance of investment’ based on the ‘need to apply scarce resources to areas and lines of investment

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{293} Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 14, 2008
  \item \textsuperscript{294} I am skeptical of this figure because many plots were never actually settled, while others managed to gain multiple holdings, despite the fact there were officially stringent requirements for land use.
  \item \textsuperscript{295} Herbert Mwansa, Interview with Toby Moorsom, June 11, 2008
  \item \textsuperscript{296} Ben Kapita, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 19, 2007
\end{itemize}
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which offer the best economic returns’ (Good, 1986).\textsuperscript{297} This was matched with a budgetary increase to 24 percent of the agriculture budget, up from 16 in the previous plan.\textsuperscript{298} The thinking of the planners of these schemes was that: “to make good Zambian Farmers the beneficiaries have got to develop the inherent feeling that “what i have is mine’ and thereby cultivate a natural love for it”.\textsuperscript{299} It was expected this would be generated if they were given “a good title to their land provided this is regulated with the necessary covenants pursuant to good husbandry”, meaning they were gradual processes intended in part to prevent land speculation.\textsuperscript{300}

Although these schemes represented a disproportionate use of resources, it was still in a context in which agriculture is horribly neglected in the state budget. The sector received only 5.5 percent of the national budget in the plan, even though the majority of citizens are farmers (Good, 1986, 249). Mwansa recalls that "It had been the intention of government to provide other services, roads, dams, electrification, etcetera". “The cost was quite high” he suggests, so “it would not have been possible for the government to have provided all of the demands”. As a result, initial plans never quite materialized as expected: “even up to today some of the roads have not been provided”\textsuperscript{301}

Reasons they came

Most farmers made the decision to leave Southern Province based on the desire to seek out better land and climate conditions. As one farmer explains; “We came because of the drought in Southern Province… it disturbed farming so we decided to come here and farm in stable conditions.” A District Agricultural Officer in the Ministry of Agriculture concurs, that

\textsuperscript{297} Good makes use of a paper by Mulambe P. Mbulo, given as a History Staff Seminar at UNZA. Wright {{115 Wright, Marcia 1983; }} has also made reference to it, though I failed to locate it for direct use.\textsuperscript{298} See also, Minister of lands, 1976, meeting with CFB, AGM, discusses opening up lands in Tazara Corridor (AGM 1976) \textsuperscript{299} ML1/17/87 "Back to the land booklet, Land Settlement and resettlement" \textsuperscript{300} ML1/17/87 "Back to the land booklet, Land Settlement and resettlement" \textsuperscript{301} Interview with Toby Moorsom, June 11, 2008
“They’re running away from the harsh weather conditions in Southern Province, and the cattle diseases”. According to another “Those who came earlier, especially those who were working up here, saw the rains were better. Mr Maya for example they started in Kabwe and other places.” Some people learned of the advantages to being further north from “information on rain patterns from radio, TV and news”. People claim that those with education were more advantaged in coming up here. There was also “overcrowding of land in Southern Province, with population increasing.” Many could see that any potential inheritance in Southern would not be sufficient to ensure their own livelihood. Recent debates in the Zambian Legislative Assembly over the introduced Land Tribunal Bill brought attention to the historical and ongoing forms of displacement in Southern Province that are leading to increased migrations, as stated in the national Legislative Assembly by Major Robbie Chizhyuka, MP for Namwala:

The unending displacement started from as far back as 1904 when the Tongas on the plateau were displaced by the colonialist. It proceeded to 1956 when, for the sake of this country having electricity, the Tonga people were removed from their most fertile land on the Kariba Banks on the Zambezi Valley. In 1976, the people of Namwala were displaced so that we could have the Itezhi-tezhi Dam. In 1989, the Italians came to displace the Ila people from the Kafue flats, but they said no, over their dead bodies, they would not move. They succeeded and blocked that project which would have displaced in excess of 10,000 people. In 2005, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), working under some organisation from the United Kingdom, decided to combine Lochinvar National Park, Blue Lagoon and Mwanachingwala Conservation so that they could have a haven of animals. This was going to displace chief Mwanachingwala’s people. The eight foreign farmers, all of British origin, combined eight farms in Mazabuka to displace in excess of 10,000…

A number also left after the liberalizations. Fred Mudenda’s explanation was repeated by many: “yeah they went bankrupt, that is why they went there where the land has been there since the way that god left it. And the land there is still fresh. You cannot use fertilizers [do not need it]”.

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302 Zimba, Kingsley, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 31, 2008
303 Daily Parliamentary Debates For The Fifth Session Of The Tenth Assembly Friday, 19th November, 2010, 0900 hours
The nature of intra-rural migration in turn reveals the fact that many are resisting proletarianization. People wanted the form of “independence” Tonga historically sought out in their systems of shifting cultivation. One claimed “we don’t want to be always dictated to by a boss. We want to start and knock-off when we want. To look for a job for someone, that person will be exploiting you.” People also sought the stability farming offered insofar as “you don’t look to where you will retire; you are there.” Yet with some degree of contradiction people also felt it was exciting to seek out “new land, new places, environment being better, the better land, better situations and new experiences”. Some said it was not easy to find labour in Southern Province because; “everybody wants to work for themselves so they cannot work for you”. In Southern, they say it is customary that “each person, when they reach a certain age, they seek their own land above the (success of the wider) family and so they don’t want to work for the parents. In contrast to Southern Province one participant says that; “labour is easy to find here, just as long as you have something to exchange, maize, clothes, it doesn’t have to be money.” In comparison “children in Southern Province are getting more education than others. It is priority number one; inheritance is now about what you have in the brain”. Many focus-group participants do also claim to have family in waged employment who are boosting the capital on their farms. They say some are teachers. As with past practices in Southern Province, children support their parents on the farm by buying animals of their own and keeping them until they are able to start at some point in the future. The herd continues to function as a savings bank. Although there are risks of disease they are not necessarily seen as any greater than the risk of losing savings to inflation or a failing bank.

Family Dynamics

Among the Tonga migrants one can discern a continuation of the contradictory tendencies between tradition and change, which have been common to many processes of
settler expansion. People want stability, but undertake significant change to bring it about. The settlers claim they want to maintain ‘traditions’ of their livelihood, but embrace significant change in the process. They have taken up finger millet to some degree, and made greater use of donkeys for traction because of their disease hardiness. They also marry local women, usually of the Lala – a sub-group of the Bemba. This has occurred alongside what they say is an increased level of polygyny in households, which had been documented in Southern province in the 1990s (see previous chapter, and Muntemba, 1982a, 1982b).

The tendency toward polygyny has economic motives, as one man says “You can’t get a girlfriend to work for you, so you marry another woman”. He says, with each new wife comes “batches of labour”, which “is also why older wives will want another to come along”. Another man says “there are even times here where we are dishing money out for labour and we think why don’t we get another wife to keep them in the household?”. Finding wives locally seems to be quite easy and people say it does not cause them to lose Tonga identity. “These days we don’t need to keep it in the tribe. Labola (bride price) here is cheap. You don’t look at cost to pay; you look at quality of the woman”. All 16 farmers in the focus group agreed that local women adapt to Tonga custom and learn Tonga, rather than the husbands taking on Lala practices, which they generally saw as primitive and inferior. “It is not them changing, the women must change”, when they marry a Tonga. This latter statement is particularly interesting, given that Tonga are historically matrilineal. That would mean their children are no longer Tonga, unless the notion of ethnicity/membership has in fact changed. Furthermore, the opinion no doubt represents the narrative of the dominant group while surely wives utilize other levels of agency.

Men say that even though the bride price is cheap, “it does not mean the marriage is stable”. For this reason people have looked for certain qualities in women. “You don’t just marry anyhow” first, “you look at the family tree”. This statement was received with approval of all the younger generation present. An older man continues, saying that traits of “discipline,
respect, dignity”, are important. Plus, they should be a “hard worker, respect family members and the husband”. People generally agree that; “Beauty is a second thing”. The economic motives of gaining additional labour are apparent.

**Relations with Locals**

Given the limited scope of my interviews it was impossible for me to get a thorough understanding of the relationships between Tonga migrants and those already living in Central Province. People in Serenje explained that when they first started farming, locals did not understand the idea of property lines. Lalas had been conducting citemene (slash and burn) forms of cultivation for numerous generations. Immigrant Tonga farmers initially found that Lalas would be trying to cultivate on land. Henry Haabowa arrived in 1993 and explains;

Their citemene system could mean they would make fields anywhere, even in my area. At first they couldn’t understand, that they couldn’t just cut trees anywhere, and they couldn’t understand when the chief said the whole place was just for me. Understandably, this could lead to tensions between the migrants and those previously living there.

Respondents generally felt they are welcome in the area, in part because they offer jobs and they have also begun lending cattle and teaching people to train oxen. People say the local Bembas still do not use them for draft power, although the Lalas are starting to incorporate them, often because Tonga immigrants loan them. Farmers say they have also formed some branches of the Seventh Day Adventist church, although I did not get a sense of whether or not people from other tribes were joining. Farming blocks are populated by people from other ethnic groups – coming from Eastern and Western parts of the country, yet some parts seem to have greater nodes of density, in which Tongas tend to group together. One participant says that about 2/3rds of the residents in his Serenje farming block of 105 farms are Tonga people. Bornwell Mulumba came to Kabwe, from Monze in 1952. He says “We mix, the Tongas, Lenjes, Lambas, Bemba. They are all there.” He then goes on to state,
however, that his son “must marry a Tonga”. Problems occur, they say, when death comes. “That is where we differ: different inheritance customs… so children could belong nowhere. Who is owner? Children could be left with no father.”

While there is mixing of ethnic groups in the farming blocks, respondents also make it clear that Tonga people are identifiable by particular farming practices and relationships with the broader population. Dr. E. Chileshe, Veterinary officer of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, says that;

Tongas really support each other. In one area (Waya) I have seen Tongas organizing a cooperative and wouldn't let others join. They thought some were too lazy... other migrants want to fish and Tongas focus on livestock.304

When asked if the assessment of Tongas being harder working was fair, Chileshe says;

It is a fair assessment I would say. The others are jealous of them. The Tongas have extra food and some are buying trucks. The others will just sit back, sell maize fast, get money and drink it and then be without. Then they will start calling the Tongas foreigners who are coming to take their land (ibid).

Chileshe is cautious to qualify his statement by suggesting that he thinks the primary differences between ethnic groups in the North and those in the South is that the “culture of tribes in Northern and Central Province was about trade and not livestock”. To be clear, these are constructed stereotypes that may not have much relationship with reality, but the narratives do indicate the presence of claims to group identity – group identities that are changing and in competition over land use.

Martha Mweena, a former teacher, moved to Kabwe in 1974 to farm and claims that many of the other farmers that bought in the farming blocks were not very productive and not necessarily skilled in farming. Many were retired workers and may not have actually been that motivated by profits or may not have been aware of the challenges involved in full-time farming. She bought her land from a retired cobbler who did not do well. She claims that in those days many:

304 Interview with Toby Moorsom, August 1, 2008
were really having difficulties. Even workers. Some of the workers would resign from other farmers and come to me… they farmers were not paying long time, they were not feeding and they had no proper timetable for working. Sometimes workers would come and the farmers would be sleeping. Now the worker is waiting for the farmer to wake up. Do you think that worker is going to like that? They must find you already up… now because of you sleeping they start late and whose fault is that?305

These characterizations of the Tonga as hard workers are supported also by Kingsley Zimba, a district Agricultural officer in Kabwe, yet he still thinks the local community is quite welcome to Tongas “as they have brought hard work and cultivation methods into the area so locals have admired them… they provide work. The Tongas have food. It’s not necessarily money that is exchanged.” In this context, one can discern a combination of both jealousy and respect toward Tonga migrants.

Just how significant and identifiable the Tonga are as a group apart from others in Central Province is unclear. Danny Munsanje, is a senior livestock officer, who used to work in Mkushi. He says that in the area most of the Tonga farmers have between 200 and 250 hectares. Costain Chilala is often noted by members of government as an example of a successful Tonga farmer in the area, though Munsanje, suggests the size of Chilala’s operations are an anomaly. Chilala owned 8 large farms in the area by 2007, yet there were no other African farmers of comparable size, aside from Hakainde Hichilema, whose farms are mostly in Southern Province. Nevertheless, it seems Tongas have gained dominance within the farming blocks. According to Munsanje, “as long as there are areas that the government is opening up, they (Tongas) are the first to rush to it”.

Although people cite many reasons Tonga migrants are welcomed and appreciated in the area, there are tensions. One particularly disturbing aspect of the migration is that some Tonga people tend to hold disturbing and contradictory opinions of the local populations. On one hand, there is a re-writing of the past that eliminates the activities of the local population and describes the area as uninhabited; “terra nullius”. Very early on in my research, Fred

305 Interview with Toby Moorsom, May 5, 2008
Mudenda (cited above) brought up the matter of migration north by some of his Tonga neighbours and relatives. He told me they left, in part, because the land in Southern Province was exhausted from overuse and partly because many ran away from the loans that had often tripled in size after liberalizations in 1991. What was interesting about this was partly the way he talked about the land to the north as being “still fresh” and not degraded from years of tobacco and maize production in the way that much land in Southern Province is. Martha Mweena also described her and her husband's process as “pioneering”, saying they “opened up land” and trained workers, who were otherwise without skills. Henry Haabowa says that compared with Southern Province “there are many trees. They are tall; the land looks virgin. There is plenty of everything”.

The notion of vacant land coincides with a contradictory discourse in which a local population is less evolved or culturally significant. One participant in the Serenje focus group says, for example that; “people were not civilized here when my father first came (in 1995). They didn’t even have bicycles so they would walk from here to town.” Haabowa provides a common assessment of the quality of the local population as a workforce. He says that casual labour is “easy to find”. He is pleased with the quality though explains they need “close supervision as it is not part of their life. They will not do what they are supposed to unless you overlook”. He also says people “steal a lot and they ask for money before they have completed work because they are hungry”. He says he has to account for losses from theft and feels it is reasonable to be patient. “The only good thing”, he explains, “is that they fear cattle. They don’t know what to do with it so it is safe, but they will steal chickens, maize, tobacco… anything”. Some, however, also suggest the locals are increasingly adopting Tonga techniques. One farmer speaking anonymously, suggested that when he came; “they (the locals) were not very advanced, but we’ve been teaching them how to farm.”

Amidst these pioneering narratives and discourse of cultural superiority there is also a sense among Tonga people that they face a level of linguistic oppression within the country
more broadly. They see how Nyenja, from Eastern Province, is now the dominant language in Lusaka province and that Bemba is spoken almost everywhere in the country. These concerns collude with the deeper mythology of the Bantu-Botatwe (Southern Tribes of the Tonga, Ila and Lenje) being the original Zambians, who are victim of tribes who steal.

There have been instances where Tongas in Central Province have attempted to form new leadership structures. Danny Munsanje says of the influx of Tonga migrants “tensions come when they come in large numbers and want their own headmen”. He tells me of a story I had heard a few times, where in 2004 in Kapiri Mposhi (Central Province) some Tonga farmers “actually declared a place (Mukonshi) as ‘New Monze’ and wanted a headman”. That apparently caused a disturbance and he says a similar process occurred in another area he is aware of (within Mukonshi). One of the farmers in the Serenje focus group also explains that; “we made a mistake last year. We wanted to elect our own chief”; which was not well received. When asked why they felt it was necessary he said “because a chief is supposed to be wealthy to rule people – but chiefs here are poor. They are beggars.” Yet another says; “chiefs are more serious here, there is more hierarchy, so we have to adjust; to accommodate”. In contrast, they say in Tongaland the notion of a chief is synonymous with the word “mwame”, which means “one who has”, yet in other respects “the chief is not above” others.

It is understandable there is significant confusion about the role of chiefs in national politics because their incorporation into the system of Native Authority (or in the case of the Tonga, their invention along with the creation of the NA) existed in place of any form of civic electoral representation. This new feudal structure continues to expand in processes of constitutional renewal. Jeremy Gould has recently drawn attention to these process in which chiefs continue to vie for more power in national politics (Gould, Jeremy: 2010). Gould argues that in attempt to fill the vacuum of representation in rural areas left by the dissolution of single

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306 Danny Munsanje, August, 1, 2008
party structures a select number of Chiefs from areas with prominent royal traditions have managed to exact significant benefits for their subjects by taking advantage of alliances with an urban political elite. At the same time, the majority of chiefs, and particularly those who are elected, are unable to navigate in the milieu of the national elite. While chiefs have increasingly bickered over succession and territory claims, they tend to do so without involvement of their subjects, meaning the rural poor continue to be excluded from decision-making processes.

This posturing for power among chiefs appears to have aided Tonga immigrants in some cases. Haabowa, for example, states that “it was almost impossible to go for title deeds in Southern (province)” as chiefs obstructed it. Although farmers have constitutional rights to gain title, many are unaware of this and “chiefs wouldn’t surrender their land and power”. Yet, according to Haabowa, “in Serenje, farming is done by locals in a very small rate and the chief is not so tough to get the land from... here there are no cattle so people do not need much”. I heard multiple variations of a land grabbing case that could not be adequately confirmed; yet the narrative offers insights into the conflicting interests involved in land-grabbing cases. The story is that a chief in Kapiri Mposhi was supposedly approached by a white investor interested in a large swath of land. Seeing potentially lucrative concessions for himself, the chief reportedly attempted to evict some Tonga farmers who had previously been given permission to farm the land (in traditional territory). In response, the farmers were said to have taken the chief to court and were successful in solidifying constitutional rights to stay on the land.307 We cannot know what dimensions of this story are correct, but they are consistent with similar land disputes that have animated discussions in the legislative assembly. In 2007,

307 I had heard this story from sources in Southern Province before heading to Central, however, the only documentation I have of it is in this one interview Michelo, July 30 2008, and the Munkombwe parliamentary intervention, Daily Parliamentary Debates For The Third Session Of The Tenth Assembly Tuesday, 24th March, 2009. Elizabeth Colson had also heard of it, though had no documented evidence of it either. One version says that the farmers were offered compensation from the white investor, but that the chief thought he was deserving of the money. The three farmers in question were arguing for the money, rather than to stay on the land.
N’gandu Peter Magande, former Minister of Finance and Planning invokes the constitution in defense of the Tonga diaspora:

because of the increase in population in Southern Province, it would seem there is not enough land for the people who are there. One of the permits of Zambian Democracy according to the constitution is that a Zambian is free to move and settle anywhere. This Government is going to make sure that anybody who wants to do that is protected under the constitution. That is why some of the people who felt they could not find enough land in Southern Province moved and created villages in other parts of the country.308

Bornwell Mulamba’s family came from Monze in 1952 and felt very welcome. He has continued to reside in chief’s land, but says at times “relations are OK, but they have (recently) been stressed. The owners of the area were trying to push us out as they were jealous of our development”.309

The testimonies here are not sufficient for us to make rigorous claims about the nature of internal colonization and/or “land-grabbing”. They do, however, suggest complex circumstances in which notions of indigeneity and civil rights are subject to negotiation. Moreover, they show us some of the confusion that exists around the role and powers of chiefs in the present moment. Furthermore, it suggests that if their actions are not scrutinized, chiefs may be willing to sell off people’s land to foreign investors, regardless of the interests of the populations they claim to have some power over. LSE professor, Catherine Boone, has provided a systematic neoinstitutionalist analysis of how these processes play out in differing ways across the continent in a context of increasing land pressure (Boone, 2015).

On March 24th, 2009 Southern Province politician, Daniel Munkombwe, was defensively responding to slurs against the Tonga in the National Legislative Assembly and he was heckled continuously throughout his rambling intervention. The issue was over resistance to the opening up of new farming blocks in other portions of the country, which has in-turn fueled a wider political backlash against the Tonga. His statement included the following:

308 Daily Parliamentary Debates For The First Session Of The Tenth Assembly Thursday, 8th February, 2007, 1430 hours
309 Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 30, 2008
Those who do not have land have settled elsewhere and have been accepted. Let us not make the lives of those who have gone to settle near Tanzania miserable because of our utterances. Can we guide ourselves because there are people who are being displaced by us. We do not want to be targeted as a tribe of invaders because that is dangerous. We are in Kaoma and elsewhere because we have a shortage of land. Therefore, if I went to Lundazi now, I would find Tonga families that have been accepted there. If I went to Mkushi, Serenje, Mpika and elsewhere, I would find Tonga families there. In fact, in some areas there are places called new Choma and new Monze.310

In the Presidential elections of 2015 the anti-Tonga sentiments in the country had risen to a level not seen before, with the governing Patriotic Front benefiting from the incitement of anti-Tonga sentiment, which may have been the reason the UPND again lost an election after having been widely considered the frontrunner.311 Within Southern Province there have been political reprisals with UPND cadres attacking prominent PF supporters.312

Advantages and Changes in Production

In spite of the challenges of moving into new territory, the immigrants were not suffering to the degree that many stateland farmers were in Southern Province. People actually really appreciate many aspects of being away from Tongaland. They say it gives them a level of security they lack in Southern Province, in large part because it keeps them away from their extended family. As one farmer explains;

If wealthy people go back, they will be considered a witch and threatened. People think we are supposed to share and if they kill us they will inherit. If you are a target of jealousy outside your own area they cannot go so far as to kill you (as would be the case with family).

310 Minutes from the Daily Parliamentary Debates For The Third Session Of The Tenth Assembly
Tuesday, 24th March, 2009
People are also less likely to be victim of “property grabbing” and cattle rustling in Central Province. Mweengu Muzuwa, for example, bought a farm in Mkushi and moved from Namwala. He claims he inherited quite a lot, but that “property grabbing was quite common” so he moved to Mkushi to prevent other family members from taking the animals. Moddy Dimuna concurs about her adopted home of Kabwe. She says “I find living in such a place is more peaceful than back there, as is evidence with the number of people there still seeking farms like this one. You are isolated and independent in your dealings here.

Farmers in Serenje, say, “here there is more land”. Most began with forested land and; “started stumping on our own”. During this phase many take up tobacco farming because the drying requires significant amounts of wood in the furnaces. On the land I conducted the focus group on the family had built four large “barns” with elaborate improvised furnaces. They have then resorted to some crops not commonly grown in Southern. They say “beans are growing here in a way they hadn’t before.” As is Millet, Sorghum, sweet potatoes, even cassava and people are appreciating the additions to their diet. Some were aware they were grown in the past in Southern, but say “they forgot it down there”.

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313 Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 31, 2008
314 Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 31, 2008
Productivity is also reportedly significantly higher further north. Chief Hamusonde, a major rancher in Southern says he is “told that in Mazabuka area you can get 8 tons of maize a hectare. In Choma it is possible in some parts. ‘Chisamba guys’ get 12-13 tons a hectare in Chisamba and Mkushi area.”³¹⁵ Farmers in Central are in some respects more commercially oriented; yet their primary interest is still to simply feed themselves. Moreover, as with farmers in Southern, people often could not be bothered to produce above their own needs of consumption. The costs of fertilizer were simply too high to justify taking the risks of possibly losing the crop. Some reportedly would cross the border into Tanzania to buy cheaper fertilizer. I was told that in 2008 a 50kg bag would sell in Tanzania for 45,000 (12USD)

³¹⁵ Hamusonde, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 25, 2008
Zambian Kwatcha, compared to 215,000 (56USD) in Zambia. This was consistent with a number of news reports of busts of smuggling operations in Tanzania and Malawi, destined for Zambia.\textsuperscript{316} This sort of activity has been evident since at least 1996.\textsuperscript{317}

Although cropping comes with high risks, some say the greater number of leguminous trees in Serenje has allowed a higher land capacity for grazing and foraging herds. Tobacco is being widely cropped because it brings returns from bush clearing, yet in Southern Province the African farmers were decreasingly interested in it because of the enormous labour costs amidst a high ratio of the kwacha to the US dollar, the currency tobacco trades in. When land is cleared for cropping and grazing the older growth could be sold for timber or made into planks for building, although many were building traditional mud dwellings and living in those.

Many respondents throughout my research were prone to making over-generalized claims about Tonga people, but Michello was quite accurate in depicting an almost universal phenomenon when he says: “Tonga will not have large houses. They think it’s a waste – a foreign concept. Wealth is around you.” As another farmer, Haabowa states:

\begin{quote}
we value cattle more than anything else – you don’t have a cow you are nothing, you have two Benz cars, but don’t have cows it means nothing… OK, these days it is changing, but in my day it was like that and parents can place pressure for you to buy them so that at least you have something to retire with.\textsuperscript{318}
\end{quote}

As with Ferguson’s findings on the case of Lesotho (1990:146) cattle are not necessarily freely convertible with cash and nor are they simply a business investment. In this case, they are clearly seen as part of a retirement plan. They may serve that function through their social uses that are not clearly connected to the functions of ‘capitalist cattle’, as described in Chapter three.

The notion of Tonga wealth being discussed by these respondents is also highly gendered. One respondent who had lost much of his herd to cattle diseases complained: “10

\begin{footnotes}
\item[316] “Zimbabwe: Police Seize 28 Tonnes Fertilizer, Driver Arrested”, \textit{The Herald} 20 DECEMBER 2007
\item[317] \url{http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC4513.pdf}, Malawi Police intercept 100 fertilizer bags enroute to Zambia, Nyasa Times, February 3, 2013,
\item[318] Henry Haabowa, Interview with Toby Moorosm, July 31, 2008
\end{footnotes}
animals is for women. It is like having nothing. We are poor. We wanted to become rich again”. Yet if they are “poor”, another word would be needed to describe the Lala who are being pushed off the land and find work on the new farms, along with charcoal burning and other means of scraping by. This is where the apparent prevalence of tobacco in Central Province is suggestive of deeper class dynamics. The “stumping” involved in clearing fields is backbreaking work and the scale is significant. Relations between labourers and owners here are bound to produce tensions – especially given the fact that tobacco prices have been declining. An added dimension of tobacco farming is that it is very hard on soil, leaching it of nutrients, and becoming thus dependent upon applications of fertilizer. Thus Tonga farmers are at risk of recreating the problems of soil leaching they faced in Southern Province.

Further research is needed into the ethnic dimensions of these tense relations, especially given that they coincide with the displacement of the local Lala population. As is evident in some of the comments above, Tonga responses to backlash make appeals to Zambian nationalist sentiments and the protection of the constitution. Such liberal responses, however, fail to recognize the power imbalances between groups, which often see the Tonga winning out at the expense of indigenous groups. Thus backlash is not simply about Tonga victimization, but a response to forms of colonization.

The Tonga immigrants said they had abandoned some practices that were still common in Southern. For example, they cited a decline in “gifting”, in which people give animals to younger people as an inheritance for when they start off on their own. They also said they do not spread their animals out as much, among various family members. They also did not participate in collective labouring, where in the past, people in Southern would go from one field to another when it was seen to be needed on someone’s land. In 2008 one informant said “we don’t do it here because of distances between farms”, which are just too large in comparison. In the past, they also say, many used to keep all their animals in one kraal, and have different markings on their ears to determine ownership. That too has not migrated with
them. Instead, they say “now we have to buy labour, or get more wives”. The significant break that has been made from the clan structures in Southern Province changes labour and cattle gifting patterns, but also protects people from jealousies that could lead to their death.

Respondents say “there is no milk up here”, and therefore no dairy coops because transport is not there for it. Yet “some roads are being worked on at this time…it is coming now, at least you can diversify here”. People also note that; “there is no fencing here. We are still called small-scale farmers.” If these farmers, with 250 hectares of land are considering themselves “small-scale”, then it suggests a very particular definition is being applied to the practice. The Lala citimene system is certainly a form of cultivation. In Tonga, the word *mulimu*, “to turn the soil” has tended to be used, but these farmers must somehow be associating it strictly with cattle-drawn plowing and/or participation in the market.

The Polanyian concept of the double-movement in capitalist societies is compelling in light of the processes observed here (1944:79). That is to suggest that as the market mechanism advances one sees a paradoxical process in which non-capitalist or pre-capitalist relations are created anew. These farms are commercialized in many dimensions of their labour and yet as with the experiences of commercializing farmers in Southern Province, there is a tendency for farmers to adopt multiple wives, far above previous, early-colonial rates as identified earlier by Muntemba (1982a, 1982b) Likewise, cropping patterns and market participation represent a mix of older, non-market practices common in Southern Province, and market-oriented practices. In some instances, farmers in Central are maintaining practices now less common among those working stateland in Southern. For example, more people reported using non-hybrid, flint varieties of maize than those on stateland in Southern (though still common among farmers on chief’s land). Moddy Dimuna says they use MRI 624, designed for the area, but “find it gets weavils despite good rains”. She says she keeps the
Gankata, always using it for food stocks because it tastes better. Beauty Mwiinga uses MRI and Seed Co, but continues with Gankata and Kamwamba (traditional varieties), which she says mature early. She says of both; “they do not need much fertilizer and Gankata is good for mealie meal”.

One study showed wide variation in seed use throughout the country with little regional uniformity and no company dominating.

**Continuity and Change**

While migration has seen changes taking place in Tonga farming practices, very key aspects of their production systems remain intact and are in some respects cause for concern. The migrations are partly a response to environmental and climate changes in Southern Province, which are in-turn impacted by Tonga production techniques. This is the case for both cropping and animal husbandry. As Chipungu so effectively revealed (Chipungu: 1988) Tongas have had a reputation for rapidly adopting new technologies. Yet, this oddly coincides with a contradictory conservativeness. As Dr Chileshe of The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) in Kapiri Mposhi considers the matter, he says Tongas tend to be too dependent on fertilizer and won’t plant more than they have. “It’s going to be a big problem with them bringing their methods North. I would have thought, having cattle, they would start into organic fertilizers, but they don’t.” In contrast, Chileshe thinks aspects of the outgoing citemene system had ecological advantages. He says;

> I think it’s a better system than what the Tongas are doing. It leaves roots, whereas the Tongas uproot all the trees and put in fertilizer. Of course, the burning kills the microbes, but because they rotate it allows it to rehabilitate.

Chileshe thinks this clear-cutting has contributed to increasing drought, floods and soil erosion.

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319 Moddy Dimuna, July 31, 2008  
320 Beauty Mwiinga, July 31, 2008  
322 Dr. E. Chileshe, August 1, 2008
Further South, in Kabwe, Kingsley Zimba of MACO has similar observations. He says, of the incoming Tonga practices;

That’s a big concern… as they have moved here that is likely to happen as the Tongas are known for cutting down trees. We are trying to teach them on ways to conserve the environment. Production can go up, but environment shouldn’t be damaged. We are working hand-in-hand with the conservation farming unit to try and influence change.\footnote{Kingsley Zimba, July 31, 2008}

The conservation farming unit agenda has been pushed by the Zambian National Farmers’ Union in conjunction with donor agencies, but it has had very little purchase among Tonga people. This is partly due to their memories of the past links between colonial oppression and the imposition of conservation practices (Dixon-Fyle, 1976). Zimba and his colleagues admitted that Tongas tend to laugh at their recommendations. Farmers almost unanimously told me the conservation methods required too much labour to adopt completely. It is perhaps ironic that Tonga people at once claim to love the land and at the same time have reputations for being so hard on it. To be fair, however, Tongas are not the only ones who are reluctant to adopt the recommended techniques. Some studies show conservation methods are being adopted in Zambia at greater rates than other countries in the region, but its expansion is limited in part by people’s limited understanding of climate and environmental change. As Nyanga et al. note, most small-holders tend to see these things as having supernatural causes (Nyanga, 2011).

Leya Chingamba moved up to Central Province in the early 1970s and initially found land in Chief Liteta’s district, but then moved onto a 300 Hectare farm in Munyama Settlement in 1981. She reports that “farming has been going on well. We still have the working implements, tractors and plows. Its only the soil fertility which has declined, making it impossible to be productive without fertilizers”. Her neighbour, Pamela Hamalambo was born to Tonga parents who had also been in Liteta, though her parents died in 1979 and in 1996. She says that while their performance has been good in the past, it has recently been “very
poor”. She says they make plans, but “lack somebody to give us money.” In her case, the death of her parents, as well as many of their cattle caused her and her siblings to lose out on opportunities for education. Without a family member in paid employment they have no source of capital, which forces them into the lower ranks of the peasantry. Yet, with 360 hectares of land the 30 family members on their farm are still wealthier than most.

In this context, complaints often revolved around changes in government efforts to provide cheaper fertilizer. People find it frustrating that the subsidized rate only supports one-hectare of land. Beauty Mwiinga says that in spite of having 258 hectares of land, they “don’t sell enough from the farm to pay for the basic needs” of the 34 family members staying on the farm. She says “continuous change derails the improvements” they have seen. They reminisce about the loan facilities that had been available in the UNIP years. Of agricultural inputs she says; “those days there was enough. These days there is not... and the supplies of fertilizer were in larger quantities in the Kaunda era.” She supported the MMD in 1991, along with everyone else she knew, but says “we didn’t get what we expected”. Nevertheless, in 2008 she said she would vote for them because they were back into giving some fertilizer “though its not enough”.

Tonga approaches to cropping are not the only areas where they might be considered stubborn. In his role as veterinary officer Dr. Chileshe struggles to try and contain various diseases in highly unsupportive conditions. Senior Livestock Officer at MACO, Danny Munsanje notes that “here you would say the Tongas are in the forefront of caring for the animals.” He says most have improved their dipping or spraying practices, saying; “the majority have lost animals and so have taken it more seriously”. Yet Dr. Chileshe says that “often farmers won’t give (the necessary) boosters six months after the vaccines.” Also,

324 Pamela Hamalambo, July 31, 2008
325 Beauty Mwiinga, July 31, 2008
326 Danny Musange, Interview, July 31, 2008
327 August 1, 2008
“people may not learn the techniques of jabbing. They were purportedly relying too much on MACO vets and did not store the vaccines properly (constant refrigeration amidst regular power cuts requires a generator. Corridor vaccines should be transported in liquid nitrogen so its actually unfeasible to expect individualized market-based solutions to emerge). As a result, people had been heavily affected by Corridor and foot and mouth disease. In 2008 he claimed more disease was reported in Kabwe, from the “nineties up to 2000, and they are still dying”. This is understandable given the greater number of cattle farmers in the area, making it harder to insulate cattle from neighbouring herds.

While Dr. Chileshe sees an unwillingness to change among Tonga farmers he also admits that the same is true of the approaches taken to address these problems by MACO. He says, within government “people haven’t sat down seriously, I think we need to change the system”. On managing Corridor disease he says “I don’t think we’ve put enough in place to manage it”. Chileshe notes that the vaccine is expensive and produced in Botswana, rather than by a local laboratory. At the same time, he says in Zambia there “is not enough equipment for diagnosis”, as a result, they often have to take samples to South Africa to be sure of the nature of the disease they are dealing with. The lag time in receiving results allows cases of infection time to spread.

In response to the cattle diseases Dr. Chileshe says they have created buffer zones where they vaccinate, but he says “those programs are not so consistent”. In addition to the lack of diagnostic equipment, there is “not enough motorized transport for our officers to patrol”. At the time he noted “Newcastle disease” was invading and having a heavy impact on the poultry. Yet “there are no storage facilities for the vaccines and a person has to travel 200 kilometers for the vaccine. Then, do they have a cooler box with ice in it to keep them in?”. He said he had been trying to get rural officers fridges, but then notes they did not have the electricity to support that. “All those structures are not there.” Chileshe says, “we have tried to

328 Hatimba Mweemba, Interview July 31, 2008
train (farmers), but when there is no transport its difficult”. As a result, MACO resorts to the same practices that have been relied upon for at least 60 years, by all governments. They “target farmers who seem to be leaders and can spread their information”. Numerous other agricultural staffers confirmed the widespread use of these strategies, including the former chief veterinary officer for Southern Province, Satwant Singh, whose salary was paid for by British aid for nearly 20 years. It is somewhat fascinating that the same strategy was used by the colonial government, and in turn, gave added support to the practice of privileging some farmers over others (e.g. via mechanisms such as the “Improved Farmer’s Scheme”). This in turn then led to some gaining access to the Land Board and the Land Bank, which was to help them buy stateland farms.

When questioned about the broader issues of climate change in Central Province Dr. Chileshe says “even us, as people who are running the system, I don’t think we are doing enough. He says the Forestry Department focuses too much on making money from forest products rather than conserving. This is a complex issue though, because it is “the poorest (who) are the ones who chop they are the middlemen and sell it and then spend the money in town”. The same can be said of charcoal burning, which in Central, is “being done by the other tribes locally” and the same is true of those fishing. This leads one to question the degree to which environmental and climate issues rest on systems of production structured around ethnolinguistic identities.

Identity, Politics, UNIP versus MMD

Every Tonga person I spoke to that had moved North felt there was still important meaning in being Tonga and they had fears the identity will not be passed to their children. As Haabowa says “they don’t quite learn [to be Tonga], and we don’t like it that way. I for one would like it if they could cope with what I am doing [presumably farming]”. When asked if they were becoming more Lala than Tonga he says; “not quite, I think I won’t allow that”.

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Costern (also known as ‘Costain’) Chilala has lived in Central Province since 1981. He explains;

I consider myself Tonga. I speak Tonga. My children speak Tonga, and we still attend Tonga ceremonies...I’m Tonga, you cannot turn away from that Culture. It is not right for anyone to turn away from where he comes from. I am Tonga, But of course occasionally if people say “what are you now”, I’m a mix of Tonga and the Lalas because those are the people living in that area where I’ve been for some time now.\(^{329}\)

As earlier noted by Colson, it has always been very challenging to actually give a clear definition of what it means to be Tonga. The desire for “independence” usually comes up in discussions, but perhaps the most consistently cited criterion defining what it means to be Tonga is willingness to take on hard work. As Bornwell Mulombo says “we Tongas are hard workers, especially as far as agriculture and animal rearing is concerned. Most of these tribes are copying from the Tongas.”\(^{330}\)

A significant difference with the Tonga in Central Province and those in Southern is that there seemed to be less allegiance to the United Party for National Development. Among the people I interviewed I found greater diversity in responses compared to Southern, in which UPND received support from an overwhelming majority. In Central, based on my small sample, it appears people will vote for all three and some are even active in politics. Mostly, however, people are very cynical about politics and there is a continued pattern of many being completely uninterested. People had all the same things to say about the UNIP days as those in Southern. They say “there was a market then. The good thing was that marketing season was better because NAMBoard bought it all. We never had people selling maize in small buckets”. Moreover, “fertilizer was coming on time, loan facilities were available”. People were “motivated by extension workers who moved to assist. Now we are crippled”. People also recall the regular field days and say “there was even a way to hire a tractor. Even clearing land, you could hire a worker to bring a caterpillar”. There were bank loans, “and

\(^{329}\)Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 28, 2007
\(^{330}\)Moddy Dimuna, Interview with Toby Moorsom, July 31, 2008
cooperatives were active”. “but when Chiluba came in… he had to frustrate the farmers to prevent Kaunda from being re-elected”. “of late, this government has tried, but marketing is still too difficult. Even fertilizer has been privatized”.

As with Southern Province, among the Tonga in Central there was a general sense that corruption permeated all aspects of society. People unanimously said it was worse than in the UNIP days, though they all admit it existed then as well, but was just not as obvious. One farmer says “It has gotten to the point that I don’t think there is anyone who is above stealing. It is everywhere.” This induces a deep sense of cynicism, which pulls on the long-standing Tonga tendency of avoiding politics. Michello claims; “Tongas will not argue, even if they know people are wrong. They think it is a waste of time. If people don’t want to learn, then leave it. This is why Tongas fail politically. They would rather give up politics and concentrate on their farming.” Moddy Dimuna, says “I don’t even participate in voting anymore. I’ve voted enough and it doesn’t make a difference”. Hatimba Mweeba takes a slightly different response; “me, I’m non-partisan. I just support anybody that comes to power. For me it’s just helpless. I vote. If my party fails me, I’m a neutral man, because to me it is helpless. I can go into parties, but I don’t get anything. It is better for me to feed my family”.

Although these examples express a deep level of cynicism, there are still many in Southern Province who hold onto the Tonga nationalist mythology, so effectively described by Macola (2010). In this narrative the Tonga themselves are seen as being the first and true Zambians. Although the “Tonga ideal of the independent individual exists”, in the past people have tended to see their labour as connected to national interests (Baylies, 1978: 788, Momba, 1982: 143). Moreover, they really want the same level of collective commitment to the nation from people from other parts of the country – others who are often perceived as “thieves” and foreigners. (Macola, 2010 :87). Perhaps this narrative does not maintain the same purchase in Central Province, given that it is in fact the Tonga who are the ‘foreigners’

331 Interviews, July 31, 2008
in this land. Yet the ideas Tongas held about the local population turns between contradictory, yet continually problematic narratives. They are either absent, while the Tonga move into “virgin land”, or they are “lazy”, or link up with the “thieving” tribes who manage to also dominate in government.

Conclusion

The data presented in this chapter is very limited, yet it offers some new insights on the Tonga Migrations. Although it is impossible to make broad claims based on the interviews reported on here, they do have value in other ways. First of all, it confirms much of what Cliggett has found about migrants escaping family dynamics. Social context of migration cannot be assumed. Yet this chapter attempts to show the ways the Zambian state influenced the social context of migration. Moreover, although people choose to migrate, in part, to escape the social context in their home territory, they are by no means the most disadvantaged in that homeland. It has tended to be the ones with resources who have left. Furthermore, the impact of structural adjustment and climate change have contributed to this process of migration, though it was not as significant a factor as land tenure and land exhaustion in Southern.

Secondly, this chapter attempts to provide some evidence of the experiences migrants face in their new homes. We can, at the very least, prove from this data that they do exist and maintain some sense of Tonga identity and maintain some degree of community in which they belong. Respondents were unanimous that their migration brought them advantages over those who remained in Southern Province. They also are making changes to the methods of production that have come to be associated with the Tonga in Southern Province. Although it is difficult to gauge many aspects of this Tonga community in Central Province, it is at least clear that pioneering narratives do exist among them and these narratives animate national debates. The bigotries that were mobilized in the National elections of 2015 did not occur in a
vacuum. There are material forces behind them. While the most obvious forces diverge on the economies of mining and agriculture, agricultural expansion plays a role in which victims of previous processes of development then become colonizers.

Lastly, it is evident from the data presented here, that tensions do exist between Tonga and endogenous residents of Central Province. It is impossible to ascertain the scope and depth of these tensions, but it does provoke a number of questions. It does not seem, for example, that the circumstances are comparable to cases such as the Kikuyu settlement farmers in Kenya. Nevertheless, although the Tonga complain about their relationship with the state, they are in fact part of a broader group of farmers that are benefitting disproportionately from the actions of the state (Sitko, 2012). Kenneth Vickery described “Tonga” identity partly as a means by which the Tonga could insulate themselves from the capitalist order. It imposed limits on capital’s domination… Yet, here in this case, Tonga identity is forging into new territory. It is pioneering. – and they get state support doing it. This contradicts the Tonga narrative of other tribes stealing, while the state does nothing for them. Although the state does very little for farmers, it is actually doing much more for the Tonga settlers than for most others in the country.

What cases like Hakainde Hichelema (Tonga farmer and UPND president) show is that investors can readily move into agriculture. Yet those capitalists ‘naturally’ (in the Smithian sense) arriving out of the local economy have not been able to enter into other sectors of the economy in any significant way on the basis of ownership. Routes to ownership most often rely on moving through the education system (usually with foreign degrees) and obtaining a professional salaried career. That secondary career can itself provide capital to inject back into the farming economy and/or become a point of departure for obtaining preferential terms of investment capital. Another route into farming exists via the transportation sector, as is seen in the case of Stainford Siatontola.
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that farmers in Zambia’s Southern Province in the later 20th century experienced a number of challenges related to changes in social relationships between humans and nature. These challenges were greatly exacerbated by the imposition of neoliberal economic policies, which were met with a period of disarticulation among a once-rising, indigenous agrarian capitalist class on the Tonga Plateau.

The first chapter situated the case of Tonga agriculture within the broader literature on Zambia and the environmental history of agriculture in Africa. A prominent theme addressed by this literature is a dualistic policy orientation that began in the colonial era and sought to promote commercialization and the progress of capitalist development but met with a simultaneous interest in pushing others back into re-created ‘traditional’ kinship systems in order to manage the instabilities and social fragmentation that come with capitalist development.

In chapter two it has been argued that during the UNIP government, agriculture had remained buoyant and maintained the economy, despite stagnation in the mineral economy, inadequate funding to the sector and insufficiencies in the functioning of the national agricultural marketing system. Moreover, despite popular impressions, Southern Province was not a marginal force within UNIP in the first 20 years of independence. Although the Southern Province based, ANC continued to be a political force, the single-party system managed to bring the province into the national project for a period of time. I also show that in contrast to the experiences of the majority of the peasantry, large farmers received significant state support throughout the first 20 years of independence. Thirdly, although agricultural performance in those years was generally poor, it is important to recognize many achievements that were made towards national food security and by promoting levels of national economic self-sufficiency. The implication is that contrary to popular perception, the rural sector was not moribund and completely defined by forms of graft. Rather, portions of
the sector were productive sites of accumulation, especially when one considers the impact of savings in cattle herds.

In chapter three I argued that the first 20 years of independence saw the expansion of national cattle stocks, whereby the government of the United National Independence Party accepted some levels of responsibility for expanding and maintaining national herd. I argue that the doubling of stocks in a two decades period must be understood as a major historical achievement of the post-colonial government. Southern Province held the largest numbers of cattle as it came to increasingly specialize in beef cattle ranching. Secondly, after detailing, as best as possible given statistical limitations, the rise of the national cattle complex I reveal some of the complex functions cattle play in Tonga society. The purpose was to describe some of the tensions between ‘traditional’ and ‘improved’ systems of cattle rearing that help explain some of the reasons Tonga farmers did not market their cattle as readily as the UNIP government would have liked. Thirdly, I contrast the logic of ‘traditional’ cattle holdings in Tonga society with those of capitalist cattle holdings so that we can better understand the hybrid nature of the systems of production on the properties of commercializing Tonga farmers and ranchers. The essential point here is to recognize the rational value that cattle held for farmers while also finding more complete means of measuring positive economic growth, which does not necessarily register in systems of national accounting. Moreover, according to neoliberal theory, these commercializing farmers should have been poised to benefit from the processes of economic liberalization introduced under pressures from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Chapter four points out a number of problems in the academic portrayal of the crisis that neoliberalism was intended to address, and the consequences of its imposition. There is no doubt that the previous UNIP government was wracked with challenges that included widespread theft of public revenues. Yet while some people were thieves, there are still many vagaries in the forms of theft that took place. More importantly, it is a cynical erasure of history
to assume there was widespread popular involvement in processes of graft. People were not as disingenuous as the rent-seeking literatures suggest. In Southern Province, farmers felt they were contributing to a righteous national cause. The vast majority of Zambians, whether rural or urban, benefited very little from the agricultural marketing system. Even so, in the final years of the UNIP government, agriculture had remained buoyant and provided for the economy, despite stagnation in the copper sector. While the sector remained buoyant into the late 1980s, it nevertheless fell victim to multiple forms of crisis that ravaged the sector.

There are a few points that should be drawn from the fourth chapter. First is that Zambia faced a protracted economic crisis, emerging in the 1970s which undermined import-substitution policies. Yet the major crisis in maize marketing must in fact be attributed to the commencement of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs, rather than to the functioning of the maize marketing boards. Most importantly, the simultaneous process of currency auctioning sent the costs of essential imports of fertilizer and fuel soaring, further entrenching the economic crisis already faced by the Zambian State.

In the fifth chapter I argue that as much as half of the national cattle stocks fell victim to cattle diseases epidemics that ran rampant following the withdrawal of state veterinary services. I argue that the rise of bovine diseases in Southern Province must be understood in relation to broader processes of change within the ecosystem the cattle depend upon. This includes accounting for industrial processes taking place far upstream, along with the corresponding damming of the river for hydroelectric power. It also requires a consideration of the impact of diverting river flow for irrigation and consumption in the capital city. Coming back to the analysis of Karl Polanyi we can see that the imposition of neoliberal policy exposed Zambian society more fully to the weight of the market on society and it had tragic consequences.

Neoliberal economic policy forced a retreat of the limited state that had been constructed in the early post-independence days. This chapter shows it was not followed by a
freeing of productive, creative energies among the commercializing class of African farmers as proponents of neoliberal policy suggested. In fact, the opposite occurred. The farmers could not maintain their herds in the face of widespread ecological catastrophe. Many of the sources of disarticulation in the agricultural economy find their origins well before the neoliberal era. The Zambian state would have been challenged to deal with them under any circumstances. Yet it is without doubt that managing these disparate and generalized crisis was not resolved by private profit motives taking root. Many dimensions of the crisis had their origins firmly in the neoliberal era; the extension into market gardening was a response to the need for increasing levels of cash to pay for basic public services. The market in counterfeit and inadequate products emerged with neoliberalism, while the state lost its capacity to monitor and contain diseases. The private sector also did not step in to produce necessary vaccines. Yet, in another sense, we can see that neoliberalism saw the loss of market share among smaller, indigenous farmers, while the white settler farmers tended to fare better. We can therefore say that neoliberalism enabled a transfer of market share from the African producers to the larger, white settler farmers as well as to those new entrants arriving with sources of foreign direct investment.

Chapter six offers a reconnaissance into Tonga agricultural migrations that confirms much of what Cliggett (2000) has found about migrants escaping family dynamics. That is, people choose to migrate, in part, to escape the social context in their home territory. It has tended to be the ones with resources who have left. Furthermore, the effects of structural adjustment and climate change have contributed to this process of migration, though they are not as significant as factors of land constraints and perceptions of land exhaustion in Southern Province. Migration then brought advantages over those who remained in Southern Province. The Tonga people who left have seen changes to their methods of production and their notion of Tonga identity. Nevertheless, it is evident from the data presented here that tensions do
exist between Tonga and endogenous residents of Central Province and that these tensions are informing new discourses of ethnicity within the country.

Overall, my research supports findings from many previous studies revealing that capitalist farmers were emerging in Zambia’s Southern Province, with support from the state and international aid. Yet, this study finds that while processes of commercialization and commodification are evident on Zambian-owned, state-land farms, they do not necessarily represent capitalist enterprises. Previously identified processes of differentiation have not resulted in significant levels of class cohesion among indigenous commercial farmers, or class antagonisms between themselves and surrounding peasant producers. Without a doubt, stateland farmers are afforded greater levels of security of position than peasant farmers, largely through household diversification strategies rather than preferential access to credit and state benefits. Yet the particular conditions of the last 40 years have seen processes of what Shanin (1972) describes as “multi-directional” and “cyclical mobility” that have limited the political expression of the commercializing farmers as a definitive class. These trends have been partly related to the highly experimental and ecologically dynamic conditions of farming in Southern Province. Ownership and production units are highly diverse, but also precarious, despite their significant size (cyclical mobility). Various ecological and social constraints pose significant barriers to capital formation. The broader, global economic context was also pivotal in creating a period of destruction in order to displace a protracted financial crisis, or what has been widely identified as an extended period of over-production.

Previous studies of Zambia’s indigenous commercial farmers, though excellent, have neglected to examine intimate ecological dimensions of changes in rural livelihoods over time. Such studies of agrarian class differentiation and class formation may miss significant dimensions of contestation between capitalist and so-called ‘pre-capitalist’ formations. This risks creating a reductive conception of class that fails to account for ideological and cultural dimensions of capitalism and its dynamics, which have an impact on how we understand
economic “crisis”. That is, if we avoid examining the ecological processes we fail to see where class is created in its first instance: on the land.

A further implication of the arguments laid out here is that the Zambian state went through a transition from a state that once supported the interests of indigenous capitalist classes to a state that instead favoured the interests of international capitalists. These are consistent with findings of Grace-Edward Galabuzi (2014:368). Neoliberal policy was largely imposed from outside. While some segments of the Zambian elite were able to benefit from the new dispensation of power, their interests were secondary to those of international capitalists (Craig, 2000). The Tonga commercial farming class that had been built up through decades of developmental interventions lost out despite the fact they had been selected for their supposed merit and business acumen.
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### Appendix 1. Interviews, Southern Province

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<td>Hamweete, Vincent</td>
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<td>Oshawa Muzembo</td>
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<td>Costain Chilala</td>
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<td>Lewindii Charlton</td>
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<td>Ishmail Ndambo</td>
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**University Researchers**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomson Haamutete Kalinda,</td>
<td>UNZA agri econ dept</td>
<td>07-06-25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Judith Lungu</td>
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<td>07-06-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Fabian Miambo</td>
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<td>Chileshe Mulenga</td>
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<td>Colson, Elizabeth</td>
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**Government**

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<td>Kapita, Ben, Min. Agric</td>
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<td>Joseph Kembo, Monze, MACO</td>
<td></td>
<td>07-07-06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chisembwe, Harry</td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satwant Singh</td>
<td></td>
<td>08-05-29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eda Nawale, Agronomist</td>
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<td>Kingsley, Zimba</td>
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<td>Chileshe, Dr. E</td>
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<td>Ephram Chongo</td>
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<td>Kainda, Lillian - Golden Valley</td>
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<td>Kasaulta, Michelo GART, Dairy tech</td>
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<td>Agricultural Director, MACO</td>
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</table>
**Industry**

Stephen Kyriazis, Tiger Feeds  
Zambia Seed  
Zambian Fertilizer  
James Kapikanya, Marketing Manager, Choma Milling

**Workers - Male**

Habayama - HH manager  
Kasaulita, Michelo, GART,  
Kasalo, Jeremiah - Monze ZNFU  
"Grain Trader" choma miling

**Workers - Female**

**Marketeers**

**Further Assistance**

Hansingo, Justina  
Dennis

### Appendix 2: Serenje Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Province farmers</th>
<th>DOB</th>
<th>location</th>
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<td>Siachinji, Richard</td>
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<td>1947</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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<td>Choma/C. Hamoudu</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>Monze/C. Chona</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Serenje</td>
<td>Choma/C. Hamoudu</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>Monze/C. Ufanuka</td>
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<td>Silocomena, D</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Serenje</td>
<td>C. Kazungulu (tonga/lozi)</td>
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<td>1969</td>
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<td>Kalyabanjama, Shipunga</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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Haabowa, Henry
Malambo, Bright
Dimuna, Moddy F
Mwiinga, Beauty F
Chingamba, Leya F
Hamalambo, Pamela F
Mulomba, Bornwell
Mweengu, Muzuwa Mkushi

Central Province
Mumba, Philis
Kingsley, Zimba EA
Mazuba, Hector EA
Chileshe, Dr. E EA
Musanje, Danny EA 01-Aug-08
Emmanuel Kashinge ASP
Peter, C. Michelo
Appendix 3. Ethics Approval
April 4, 2008

Toby L. Moorsom
PhD Candidate
Department of History
Queen’s University

GREB Ref # GHIS-024-08

Dear Toby Moorsom:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB) has given approval to your proposal titled “Neo-Liberalism, Indigenous Accumulation and Environmental Change in Zambia. A History of Emergent Farmers in Southern Province 1974 – 2005”. In accordance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (article D.1.6) and Senate Terms of Reference (article G), your project has been approved for one year. At the end of each year, GREB will ask if your project has been completed and if not, what changes have occurred or will occur in the next year.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB of any adverse event(s) that occur during this approval period (see: www.queensu.ca/vpr/greb/addforms.htm#Adverse). An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that any adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be approved by the GREB. Examples of required approvals are: changes in study procedures or implementations of new aspects into the study procedures that affect human subjects. These changes must be sent to Linda Frid at the Office of Research Services or FRIDL@queensu.ca prior to implementation. Ms. Frid will seek the approval of the GREB reviewer(s) who originally assessed your application.

On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours truly,

Steve Leighton
Professor and Chair
SL/lf General Research Ethics Board

Faculty Supervisors: Robert Shenton / Marc Epprecht
Appendix 4. UNZA Affiliation

See following page
25th May, 2007

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This letter serves to inform you that Mr. Toby Leon Moorsom is a research affiliate at the University of Zambia with the School of Humanities and Social Science in the Department of History. We would therefore appreciate any assistance that you may render to assist him carry out his research.

Yours sincerely

Felicitas N. Moyo (Ms)
ACTING RESEARCH AFFILIATIONS OFFICER
DIRECTORATE OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE STUDIES
Appendix 5. Sample Questionnaire: Male Title-Holders

Questionnaire to be administered to Males with land title who are producing for markets (keeping in mind that terms of title will vary)

Farm Number:

Name or brief anonymous description of informant:

Age:

A. Household Data

1. Name/s and Ages and levels of education of each member

   Ndinywe abni zina? ____________________________

2. Family members not present

   No. of children below 10 years -
   ____________________________

   No. of Children working on the farm  _____________

   No. of other relatives working on the farm ________

   No. of children at home,
   but not working on the farm
   ____________________________

   No. of children in wage employment
   ____________________________

3. Who makes decisions on the farm?

   Ino nguni uubamba mizeezo yabwende bwazintu ampulazi yanu?____________________

4. What kind of decisions do you make and what do others make?

   Ino mizeezo nzi njomubamba, naa zyzkucita nzi
   nzyomuyeeya? ______________________

   Ino bamwi bamukwashwi nzinzi zyakucita
   zyobayeeya? ________________________

   (e.g. siblings, aunts/uncles, parents, wife/wives, children, workers)

5. Do you pay people money to do household tasks on a regular basis such as
   laundry, cleaning, cooking, gardening (not including agricultural or seasonal staff –
   though not if there is overlap)?
6. Take number of employees, occupations and indicate days per week worked.

If answer is no move to question 12

7. If yes, do any of your household staff also do agricultural work?
Sena abalo balaunka kumuunda?______________________________

8. How did you find your household staff?
Sena mulaikkomanina milimo yabo? (take number of employees, occupation and indicate days worked per week) ________________

9. Is it difficult to find labour for the household?
Sena cilamukatazya kujna Bantu bakumubeleleka milimo? Yes________
No________
(can you elaborate)

10. Are you happy with your household staff? Yes _______ No _______
Can you elaborate?

9. Where do your employees live?
Ino babelesi benu bakkala kuli?_________________________________

10. What distance do your household employees travel to their work in your home?
Ino mulamfu buti musinzo ngobeenda babelesi banu kuboola kumilimo?__________

11. Are there any identifiable characteristics of your employees, such as ethnic group, country of origin etc?
Sena mulijisi babelesi bazwa kuzisi zimbi mbuli kwa Simwatachela nobaba babelesi batali batonga?____________________

12. Do you have any other profession besides farming?
Sena kuli milimo imbi njomucita kunze akulima kulima?____________________

13. Did you have a profession before embarking on farming?
Sena kuli milimo imbi njimwakali kubeleka kamutana talika kulima?____________________

14. if yes, why did you change professions?
Ncinzi cakapa kuti mutalike kulima?____________________

15. What were the professions of parents and grandparents?
Ino bamauso abamahaanyookulu bakali kubeleka milimo nzi?
16. Can you tell me some things about their lives?
Senka kuli nzomukonzya kundaambila kujatikizya bazyali banu amaumi aabo?

Farm Particulars

17. In what way did you or your family gain title to this land?
Senka nyika (mpulazi) eyi ykaba buti yanu?
Purchased ownership?_____________
Via resettlement scheme?__________
family lending (who?)_____________
in-laws lending____________________
other? Explain ____________________

18. If you were alive when your family gained access to the land can you tell me what you can remember about the process?
Kuti kamuli mulayeeya kabotu kabotu ciindi eyi nyika niyakaba yanu, sena inga mwandaambila mbocakacitika?

19. What is the total acreage of your farm/s? (approx. if unknown) ______________

20. Do you farm land in more than one area? Yes / No
Senka mulijisi imbi mpulazi kunze aayeeyi? __________________________________
If so, list

21. how much of your diet comes from the farm?
Ino kujatikizya cakulya ncomulya, sena ncinji buti cizwa mukulima?________

22. Has this changed over time? If so, How?

23. What types of crops have you been growing in recent years (list by estimated average acreage over a 4 year period – if acreage is not known get number for quantity of seed)?
Senka nzishangonzi nzomwalikushanga kwamyaka yoonse eyi yainda?
________________________
________________________
________________________

24. Have your crop choices varied over time? If so, what else have they grown?
aciindi?______________ Ino Nkaambo nzi?____________________________________
If yes to 29, ino nzishango nzi zimbi nzomushanga?________________________
25. Over the years have some crops become more profitable given your farming conditions? Yes / No, if yes, list them and the approximate years the change first became noticed.
Sena kuli zishango zyabaampindu kwiinda zishango zimwi kwamyaka yainda?_____
____________________________________
____________________________________
____________________________________

26. Do you rotate crops?
Sena mulacincauzya zishango nzyomushanga munyika yanu aciindi aciindi (crop rotation)

27. If yes to 17, why do they rotate them?
Ino nkaambo nzi ncobacincauzya boobu?

28. Have some crops become less profitable? Yes / No, list
____________________________________
____________________________________

29. Do you know your production levels based on bags/per/acre?
Sena mulibuzi butebuzi bwenu kwiinda mumasaka ngomujana muhekele lyomwe lyanyika yanu?______________________________

30. Has this increased or decreased over the years? ______________
Sena butebuzi obu bwaya kunzele naa bwaya ansi kwamyaka yainda?_________
(see graph below 22.)

31. If you don’t know your production levels based on bags per acre, are there any other ways you can judge the performance of your farm over time?
Sena kuti kamuli tamuzyi butebuzi bwanu mbomujana hekele ahekele, sena muzyiba buti mpualazi yanu mboyimupangila? ________________________________
32. By using the timeline below, can you create a rough visual graph of bad good years and bad?


33. What types of livestock are kept? (list with number reared in current year)
Sena muvwuba banyama nzi (List with number reared in current years)
___________________
___________________

34. Have there been changes to the numbers of livestock you have kept?
Sena mweelwe wazivwubwa zyanu wacinca kwamyaka yainda?______________

35. What is the most you’ve had, and when?
Sena mwaka nzi nimwakajisi zivwubwa zinji kwiinda alimwi zyakali zinji buti?
________

36. What was the least, and when??
Ino mwaka nzi nimwakajisi zivwubwa zinji kuceya alimwi zyakali zinji buti? ________

37. How much acreage is under production for your own livestock?
Sena zivwubwa zyanu zikkala mubusena bupati buti bwanyika yanu? __________

38. Do you purchase feed? Yes / No
Sena zivwubwa zyanu mulazyuulila cakulya?_____________________________

39. If no, what do your animals eat?
Sena zivwubwa zyanu zilya cakulya nzi?_____________________________

40. Does any of it come from off-farm?
Sena kuli cimbi cizwa aanze aampulazi yanu?____________________________

41. If yes, what and how much?
Sena ncinji buti cizwa aanze aampulazi yanu?
________________________________

42. If you do purchase feed, do you have a regular supplier and or/Brand?
Sena kuli mbunga yomwe naa muntu omwe umusambalila cakulya eeci lyoonse?___

43. Are their options of other companies and suppliers?   Yes / No
(provide detail if necessary)
Sena kuli muntu uumbi naanka mbunga iiimbi iiikonza kumusambalila cakulya eeci?_

44. How much capital goes into your farm in a year?           _________________
Sena mubelesya mali nzi mubulimi bwanu mwaka amwaka?______________

45. Do you use loans?
Sena mulabweza malooni (Zikwelete)?______________________________

46. If so, from where?
Ino Zilooni muzijana kuli?_______________________________________

47. Has access to loans affected you over time, positively or negatively? Please elaborate
Sena zillonzi zamusumpula mubulimi bwanu naa zyamutola aansi?________

48. How many people work on your farm over the course of a year (paid or unpaid)?
Ino bali bongaye Bantu baba leka ampulazi yanu mumwaka (nobabadelwa anobatabadelwi)____________________________

49. How many are paid a wage?
Sena babbadelwa mali bali bongaye?_____________________________

50. What other arrangements do people work under?
Ino bami baba leka mubapa nzi?
a) Family obligation
b) Reciprocated labour
c) Reciprocation with lending of tools or machinery
d) Reciprocation with land use?
e) Other? Please explain:

51. Do you currently use fertilizer?
Sena mulabelesya camutunzlya? ____________________________

52. Has this always been the case?
Sena mwali kubela leya camutunzlya kwamyaka yoonse yainda? _____________
53. What is your opinion of fertilizer use? (e.g. positive or negative affects, would they use more if they could or less, if they were able to?)
Sena kubelesya camutunza ncibotu naa ncibi? ____________________________

54. What kind of farming implements do you use? (hoes, plow, tractors, harvesters etc.)
Sena mubelesya zibelesyo nzi mubulimi bwanu? ____________________________

55. Which ones do you own?
Sena azibelesyo eezí kuli izyanu na? ____________________________

56. Do you borrow some of them?
Sena kuli zimwi nzomulomba buya

57. Do you hire some of them?
Sena kuli zimwi nzomubbadelela mali kuti mubelesye na?
________________________________________

58. Where do your inputs come from
Ino zyintu nzomubelesya mukulima kwanu (mbuto, zibelesyo, camutunzya) Muzijana kuli?
________________________________________

59. Has the government ever given you any financial assistance?
. Sena mfulumende kuli niyakamugwasyide kwiinda mukumupa mali mubulimi bwanu?
Very much ________ Just enough__________ A little bit ________ None ______

60. If so, in what years, how much, and for what purpose?
(a). Ino mumwaka nzi?_________
(b). Sena malinzi alimwi nkaambo nzi_________
Year ______ Amount (may be approx.) ________ For ______________
Year ______ Amount ________ For ______________

61. if the answer to 45 is none, have you ever tried to seek government financial assistance?
Sena kuli nimwakasolede kulomba lugwasho kzwa kumfulumende? ____________

62. If no, why not? (then move to question 68)
If no
Nkaambo nzi?_________

If yes, why did they not get it?
Nkaambo nzi ncoyatakamupeda mfulumende? ____________________________

64. have you ever used private loans?
Sena mwakabelesya kale zilooni kuzwa kumbunga zitalikumbatiziyi kumfulumemende?

66. for how much? If Yes, If yes, how often,
48. Ino nziindi zyongaye alimwi zilooni zyakali zipati buti? 

49. Ino ncizi cakamucitikila kujatikizya zilooni ezi?

50. Sena kuli mpindu iimbi njomucita kunze aakulima? 
If yes
Ncinzi cakapa kuti mutalike mpidu eeyi?

67. What has their experience with these loans been?

68. have you taken on any secondary lines of business since starting farming?

69. If yes, why did you move into this business?
Sena kuli mpindu iimbi njomucita kunze aakulima? 
If yes
Ncinzi cakapa kuti mutalike mpidu eeyi?

70. Has it been a positive or negative move?
Sena kuli bubotu mbumwakajana mumpindu eyi? 

71. Would you ever get out of farming all-together?
Sena mulalangilwa kulekela limwi kulima? 

72. As far as you know, will your farm be inherited by anyone if you were to die (i.e. is there someone expecting/hoping to take it over?)
Sena kuli muntu ulangilwa kwiikona mpulazi yanu naa mwafwa kuteezya tubi? (Sena kuli muntu uuinyonokela nyika yanu)?

Impact of Economic Reforms

73. how have you found changes in marketing your farm produce throughout the years of economic reforms?
Sena mukulanganya buti kucinca mubusambazi bwazishango zyanu kwalo kwakaletwa akucinca cinca mumakwebo aabuvwubi bwacisi kwamyaka yainda (mbuli kusambalwa kwamakampani)______________________________

74. would you say things are better now than before the reforms took place?
Sena inga mwaamba kuti busambazi bwanu mbubotu ino kwinda mbobwakabede kucinca ooku kakutana boola______________________________
75. how have you found changes in extension services throughout the years of reform?
Sena mulanganya buti lugwasho luzwa kubabelesi ba mfolumende (bana agilikacha) kuzwa kucinca oku nikiwakaba? 

76. would you say they are better now than before the reforms?
Sena bubelesi bwabana agilikacha buli kabotu mazuba aano kwiinda mbubwakabede kucinca oku kakutana boola?

77. what would you say the problems were before the reforms?
Ino mapenzi nzi aakaliko kucinca ooku kakakutana boola?

78. what other problems came along with the reforms?
Ino mapenzi nzi aakaboola akaambo kakucinca oku?

79. If relevant, has labour become easier to access since the economic reforms? (If relevant) Sena bubelesi tabucikatazyi nkaambo kakucinca mubuvwubi bwacisi amakwebo?

80. have you had increasing difficulties with your labour or have they improved over the years?
Sean kujana babelesi cilakatazya naape kwamyaka yoonse eeyi yainda kusikila sunu?

81. what type of problems do you face with labour? (If Relevant) Mapenzi nzi ngomujana?
Absenteeism ______ Illness ______ Desertion ______ Laziness ______

Poor attitude ______ Sloppiness ______ Unreasonable demands for higher wages ______

Political interference ______ any other (explain) ______

None at all ______

Discuss separately for family labour

82. Do you have seasonal labour?
Sena mulijisi babelesi baciindi comwe amwaka? (e. g Bamainza aalo?)

83. If yes, do you have more, or fewer problems with them?
Sena mijisi mapenzi kujatikizya babelesi aaba?
_________________________________

**Impact of Environmental Factors**

84. Have you been affected by environmental issues?  
Sena zintu zili mbuli masamu, bwizu, azimwi mbuli mvula azuba kuli mbozimnyonganya bulimi bwenu?

85. If yes, when did these problems begin?  
(a). Ino penzi eeli lyakatalika lili?

86. If yes, after the interview can you show me any evidence of the problems you are describing?  
Sena inga mwatutondezya bumboni bwapenzi eeli twamana mubandi wesu? ______

87. (a). Ino penzi eeli lyakatalika lili?f yes, what do you think are the causes of these problems?

88. Have your ideas about the environment changed over the years? If yes, how?  
Sena kuli kucinca mumizeezo yanu kujatikizya zintu zimuzingulukide mbuli meenda, masamu, bwizu azimwi? __________________________________________

If yes  
Ino nkucinca nzi?
_________________________________________________________

**Agriculturalists and the Community**

89. Have you ever been a member of farmers organizations?  
Sena kuli nimwakali mukabunga kabulimi?__________  
If yes, (a). which ones?__________ What years?__________

Year _______________________ Position _____________________

If yes, which ones? __________ What years? __________________

90. If Yes, have you held any formal positions in the organization?  
(b). Sena kuli nimwakajisi cuuno mukabunga aaka?  
Years:________________________ Position/s held: ________________

91. Do you think any of these organizations have been useful to farmers?
Sena muyeeya kuti tubunga ootu twabagwasya Bantu mukulima kwabo?
Very much ______, just enough ______, not at all ______

Whatever your answer, please elaborate:

92. Do you think any of these organizations have been useful to the country more broadly? Sena muyeeya kuti tubunga ootu twacigwasha cisi mumuzeezo walusumpuko?
Very much _____, Just enough, ______, not at all ______

93. Which political parties have you favoured over the years?
Sena njili nkamu ikanana twaambo twacisi njomuyanda kwamyaka yoonse eeyi yainda?
_____________________________________________________________________

94. Have you ever been involved in a political party?
Sena kuli nimwakasangene nkamu ikanana twaambo twacisi? ___________________

95. If yes, which one/s and when?
(a). Ninkamu nzi alimwi mumwaka nzi?____________________

96. If yes, did you take on any formal positions within the party?
(b). Sena kuli nimwakajisi cuuno munkamu eeyi?___________

97. What has your relationship to the traditional rulers been like?
Muswaangana buti abaleli banu mbuli basimabbuku abamami?________________

What is your relationship with other farmers like?
Muswaangana buti abalimi nyoko?__________________________________________

What is the relationship like between your family and white people in Southern Province?
Sena mubalanganya buti balimi bamakuwa okuno kumusanza?________________

Is your identity as a Tonga person important to you?
Why or why not?
Sena cilamukkomanisya kuba batonga?
____________________________________

(If yes or no) Nkaambo nzi? __________________________

98. Are you religious? If yes, which religion and has this changed over time?
99. Is this different from your parents?
100. Do you believe in witchcraft?
79. Sena mulakomba?________________________________________
If yes
(a). Munjila cikombelo nzi_______________________________________________
(b). Mulacinca-cinca zikombelo sena
(c). Ino bazyali banu bakali kunjila naa banjila cikombelo nzi? ______________
(d). Sena mulashoma mubulozi? _______________________________________

**Family Trajectories:**

101. Can you tell me about your siblings?
(e.g. What do they do? Where do they live? Have they done well for themselves?)
Take names
Ino bana bakwenu,
(a). Bakkala kuli? ______________
(b). Babeleka milimo nzi? ______________
(c). Sena babeleka kabotu (Sena balizwidilide mumbeleko zyabo)
102. Can you tell me about your children?

103. Do you think any of these people would be interested in contributing their thoughts to this study?
81. Can you tell me about your children?
Ino bana banu,
(a). Bakkala kuli? ______________
(b). Babeleka milimo nzi? ______________
(c). Sena kuli uunga wayanda kubuzigwa mibuzyoeeyi? ______________

**Political Ideas**

104. what do you think are the main problems facing farmers in SP at this time?
Sena mapenzi nzi mapati balimi bacuundu ngobajana kwaciindi cino?_____________________________________________________________

105. What do you think are the main problems facing Zambia?
Ino mapenzi nzi cisi ca Zambia ngocijisi?_________________________________

106. What do you think are the main problems facing the world more broadly?
Ino mapenzi nzi nyka yoonse ngoijisi? _______________________

107. What roles do you think women should play in society?
Ino bamakaintu beelede kubeleka milimo nzi mumasena mobakkala? ______________

108. Do you think they should go to school?
Sena bamakaintu baleelede kwiiya?
_________________________________________

109. If you could only send one child to school would it matter if it were a boy or a girl?
Sena kuti kamukonzya kuyiisya mwana omwe buyo aciindi, inga mwayiisya musimbi naa musankwa?

Consumption

110. Do you have any electronic devices?
Sena kuli zibelesyo zimwi nzomujisi zibeleka aamagesi?

111. If yes, what are they?
Nzibelesyo nzi?

112. Do you own any vehicles? If yes, how many?
Sena mulijisi myootokala? (if yes)
Yongaye?

113. Do you travel much? If so, where? How often?
Sena muleenda kapati? 

114. Would you say your household brings in enough money to satisfy everyone’s basic dietary needs?
Sena mumali ngomujana mulakonzya kubamba mukwashi wanu cakukutula?

115. Would you say your household has enough space to house everyone sufficiently?
Sena mukwashi wanu ulakkwana kabotu kabotu mumaanda eenu?

116. Do you have sufficient funds to send children to school?
Sena mulijisi mali aakuyiisya bana banu?

117. Is everyone in the household healthy?
Sena mumukwashi wenu nyoonse mulaabuumi bubotu?

Closing

98. Do you have any interesting documents or photographs related to the family history that they would be willing to show us?
99. Would they mind walking us around some of the property? (if it is very large, offer
to drive) – especially be aware they will likely have gardens that are not tended to by
males.
Sena inga mwatweenzeeza kutegeza tubone lubono lwanu/
_________________________