The New Local Governance of Immigration in Canada:
Local Immigration Partnerships and their role in Immigrant Settlement and Integration in
Small- and Medium-sized Ontarian Cities

By

Rebecca Pamela Pero

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Abstract
This research undertakes a policy analysis of the Local Immigration Partnership (LIP) program. Initiated in Ontario in 2008, this national policy takes a local approach to the settlement and integration of immigrants. An objective of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement, the LIP is a community-built, multi-stakeholder strategy to attract and retain greater numbers of immigrants in small- to medium-sized municipal and regional areas in Ontario, and across Canada. The program serves to understand immigrant needs in these communities and to coordinate settlement service supports. Drawing on governmentality literatures, I seek to understand the process of policy localization as well as how this process and the enactment of policy in and through the local sphere governs immigrant settlement and integration. Between 2013 and 2015, I undertook a strategic analysis of existing federal-level immigration policies, federal-provincial agreements, provincial strategies, and LIP documents, and conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants such as government officials, political leaders, LIP coordinators and council members, and community stakeholders in Guelph-Wellington, Kingston, and Peterborough. Findings indicate a neoliberal reorganization of immigration management to control immigration, economic markets, and the outcomes of immigrants. Responsibility for aspects of settlement and integration are increasingly decentralized, but without an equal transfer of authority, leaving actors in the LIP organizations limited in their ability to make decisions and advocate for change. Federal funding and established measurements for project outcomes add layers of uncertainly for program success and sustainability. This research contributes to governmentality literatures as well as policy debates by offering new links between immigration policy and practice under advanced liberalism in Canada.
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<td>Association of Municipalities of Ontario</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRCP</td>
<td>Annual Performance Report for Community Partnerships</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Constant Comparison Method</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada</td>
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<td>CISSA</td>
<td>Canadian Immigrant Settlement Service Alliance</td>
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<td>COIA</td>
<td>Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement</td>
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<td>GREB</td>
<td>General Research Ethics Board</td>
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<td>GWLIP</td>
<td>Guelph Wellington Local Immigration Partnership</td>
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<td>IRPA</td>
<td><em>Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27)</em></td>
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<td>ISGW</td>
<td>Immigrant Services Guelph-Wellington</td>
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<td>ISKA</td>
<td>Immigrant Services Kingston and Area</td>
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<td>KDIS</td>
<td>Kingston and District Immigrant Services</td>
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<td>KEDCO</td>
<td>Kingston Economic Development Corporation</td>
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<td>Kingston Immigration Partnership</td>
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<td>LIP</td>
<td>Local Immigration Partnership</td>
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<td>MCI</td>
<td>Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade</td>
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<td>MIC</td>
<td>Municipal Immigration Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Agreement of Understanding on Immigration and Settlement</td>
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<td>P2P</td>
<td>Pathways to Prosperity</td>
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<td>PCISA</td>
<td><em>Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (S.C. 2012, c. 17)</em></td>
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<td>RIF</td>
<td>Réseaux en immigration francophone</td>
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<td>SCCA</td>
<td><em>Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (S.C. 2014, c. 22)</em></td>
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<td>SPO</td>
<td>Settlement Service Provider Organization</td>
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<td>SWOLIP</td>
<td>Southwestern Ontario Local Immigration Partnership</td>
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<td>WCI</td>
<td>Welcoming Communities Initiative</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Research Questions

This thesis analyses the increasing localization of immigration policy in Canada through an examination of the Local Immigration Partnership (LIP) program in the Province of Ontario. Drawing on governmentality literatures, I seek to understand the process of policy localization as well as how this process and the enactment of policy in and through the local sphere governs immigrant settlement and integration. The results help to elucidate the immigration policy landscape in Ontario by moving “beyond state policies to their enactment across diverse social and political geographies” (Desbiens et al. 2004, 242).

LIPs were introduced in 2008 under Stephen Harper’s Conservative government; concerns for national security and the management of risk shape the political climate at the time, particularly with regard to immigration policy and practices. LIPs coordinate the efforts of service providers, immigrant associations and community stakeholders in small- and medium-sized municipal and regional areas to attract and retain a greater number of immigrants in these areas (Burr 2010; LIP Handbook 2013). These Partnerships do not provide direct settlement and integration services. LIPs are expected to leverage funds and to build capacity by “engag[ing] groups that will coordinate and enhance the current settlement and integration service delivery network” and service uptake (LIP Handbook 2013, 7). Awareness-raising and education activities encourage capacity-building, but more importantly for key informants, serve as positive outcomes of LIP work. CIC indicates that LIPs must report regularly on all project outcomes. My assumption is that those involved in the on-the-ground settlement and integration of immigrants have a good understanding of immigrant needs and experiences compared to federal- and
provincial-level decision- and policy-makers. Individuals with knowledge of immigrant needs are important actors in related policy debates. I argue that meaningful interactions between those working to support immigrants at all levels would contribute to more successful settlement and integration strategies. I also attempt to understand how LIPs determine successful outcomes, and whether current measurements of Partnership actions and activities are consistent and effective.

The questions this research set out to address are:

1. What are the perspectives of LIP coordinators, immigrant-serving agencies, political parties, and key informants involved in shaping immigration policy regarding the Local Immigration Partnership program?

2. How do Local Immigration Partnerships measure success and optimal outcomes for immigrants?

Motivating the development of these questions is the desire to assess the localization of immigration policy in a manner that considers a wide range of perspectives. This research does not study the key informants. The perspectives of individuals who provide direct, or indirect in this case, services to immigrants and have first-hand knowledge of immigrant needs and experiences are used to analyze the program and by implication a set of policies. The goal of obtaining and discussing multiple perspectives is to balance the dominant perspectives that tend to construct policy. Documentary sources of information were strategically analysed to gather insight into governmental views of immigration and policy. In addition, in light of the fact that the LIP model is formally touted as a promising practice for immigrant attraction and retention, this research aims to develop a sense of the degree to which the LIP program can achieve the stated objectives, in support of immigrant settlement and integration.

I employed a multi-method qualitative approach; I strategically analyze documents such as the Government of Canada’s *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27* (IRPA
2002), in order to uncover modes of representation and meaning in policy. I conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants (LIP coordinators and council members) in the identified research sites of Kingston, Peterborough, and Guelph, Ontario. I also organized interviews in the City of Toronto where particular government administrators, political parties, and immigrant-focused organizations are located, as well as one interview in Ottawa, Ontario with an employee of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The selected research sites are home to similar numbers of immigrants and are outside of the greater area of the City of Toronto. The incorporation of key informant perspectives ensures that my research integrated a wide range of opinions, expectations, and policy effects.

1.2 Context and Geographies of Localization

Immigration is foundational to Canada’s identity and has shaped the national landscape. The movement of peoples across borders has real socio-economic impacts (Bowen 2004). Historically, the process of nation building has been heavily managed by the state, and has always reflected the interests of those in positions of power (Castles 2000; Hennebry 2010; Simmons 2010). For example, pre-1960s nation building did not include immigrants from non-European states, and forms of exclusion built directly into the immigration system controlled the types of immigrants allowed to enter Canada (Simmons 2010). In addition, immigrant settlement and integration is affected by the practice of policy and “the state’s views about the likelihood and desirability of incorporating migrants … [with regard to] admission and selection” (Leitner and Preston 2012; 6; see also Freeman 2004; Massey 1999). Such decisions shaped the country as it exists today, and will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four: “Immigration and Canada.”

Canada’s contemporary immigration landscape is in constant flux. In the last twenty years, changes to Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s management priorities and identification by provinces of immigration “as a central resource for provincial society and economy,” has shifted
the design and delivery of immigration policy in the local sphere (Paquet 2014, 541). Section 95 of the *Constitution Act*, formally the British North American Act (1867-1975), defines immigration selection and settlement as a shared federal-provincial jurisdiction (Vineberg 2015). However, in the case of LIPs, the provincial government is made irrelevant and interactions occur primarily between federal and local-level agents. Provincial governments were not involved in processes of immigration until the federal government struck an agreement with Quebec in 1971. In the case of Quebec, the federal-provincial relationship is different, in that immigration in Quebec is used to maintain the Province’s linguistic integrity. In Ontario, there was little interest in working with the federal government to jointly coordinate immigration, in large part due to the number of arrivals of immigrants in the Province. According to Helga Leitner and Valerie Preston (2012, 3), the increase in policy localization relates to “complex forces,” including:

first and foremost, neo-liberal restructuring [that] has resulted in a downscaling of central/federal state authority to lower tiers of the state. Second, neo-conservative tendencies [that] have reinforced and promoted the drive to devolve state authority over immigration policies.

These complex forces work simultaneously to support the decentralization of administrative responsibility for immigrant management. Localization in Canada has primarily occurred at the provincial level, and Leitner and Preston (2012, 7) argue that “processes of localization are path dependent, reflecting the long and complex history of struggle over jurisdictional power and authority between different tiers of government.” Since the 1970s provincial governments have expressed an interest in becoming involved in the governance of immigrant settlement and integration, which led to the majority of provinces and territories signing formal agreements with the federal government to deliver services (Vineberg 1987; Seidle 2010; *LIP Handbook* 2013). Tolley et al. (2012) call the greater interest in immigration on the part of provinces and territories the “regionalization” of immigration.
In 2008 the initial call for proposals for a partnership project with a specialized aim to “support local communities in serving and integrating immigrants, through the creation of a community-built strategic plan and a collaborative local council representing multiple stakeholders” was presented (*LIP Handbook* 2013). The LIP model requires regionally- and municipally-bound communities to take more responsibility for the supports and services that were once provided by the federal and provincial governments. Furthermore, the “mutual obligation” of citizens to support the settlement and integration of newcomers, an objective of the LIP program, is also identified in the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.24, IRPA* (2002), the now obsolete *Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement* (2005), and *A New Direction: Ontario’s Immigration Strategy* (2012). As Leitner and Preston (2012, 6) acknowledge, immigration policies are “multi-faceted” and interconnected.

The LIP innovation is formally touted as a way to promote equitable access to opportunities; the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration acknowledged its support for the LIP project (as a best practice in settlement), and encouraged the project’s expansion in Ontario and beyond (Seidle 2010; Tilson 2010; Tolley et al. 2012). Project promotion and expansion occurred in advance of the measurement of the project’s overall performance (although the Pathways to Prosperity¹ research consortium addresses the topic of measurement). Beyond the federal government’s institution of the Annual Performance Report for Community Partnerships (APRCP) there has been little to no systematic record of what constitutes success and optimal outcomes for these partnerships (Esses et al. 2014). The APRCP connects “partnership activities to community impacts,” which is noted as a reporting challenge (Kurfurst, Simms, and Filteau 2015, 8).

¹ Pathways to Prosperity, [http://p2pcanada.ca/](http://p2pcanada.ca/)
Partnerships exist primarily in Ontario, with thirty-five LIPs in total (see Figure One). There are also three LIPs in the Atlantic region (Fredericton, Halifax, and St. John’s), six in the Prairie provinces (Bow Valley, Brooks, Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, and Winnipeg), and nineteen in British Columbia (Pathways to Prosperity 2016). The LIP program is not being used in Quebec. The institution of LIPs in Ontario is significant given that the Province settles approximately 120,000 of the nearly 250,000 permanent residents that Canada receives annually, a larger number than any other province (Burr 2010; Statistics Canada 2016). Canada receives another 300,000 temporary residents each year. These figures represent a significant contrast with the nation’s humble beginnings of 42,000 immigrants in the early 1900s (Boyd et al. 2000).

Tolley et al. (2012) note that Ontario’s demographics make the province a particular site of interest to investigators of immigration policies and practices. Immigration is a focus in many political, governmental and public spheres. Immigrants are defined by the Province’s economic need in formal provincial-level acts and strategies, including the Canada-Ontario Immigration Act (which expired in 2011), A New Direction: Ontario’s Immigration Strategy (2012), and the Ontario Immigration Act (S.O. 2015, c. 8) (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2014). The Province’s immigration act received royal assent in 2015. Quebec is the only other province with an immigration act (OCASI interview 2015). The function of Ontario’s immigration strategy and act, and the interaction of these documents with pre-existing immigration policies and practices will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Four.
My objective is to inform the direction of immigration policy, including control and incorporation policies, by providing a space for those working with and for immigrants to respond meaningfully to local-level policies that manage immigrant existence (Leitner and Preston 2012). In the next fifteen years, Statistics Canada estimates that 28% of Canadians will be foreign-born, a statistic that is indicative of the consideration researchers and policy makers will need to assume when making decisions about immigrant settlement and integration (Statistics Canada 2010).
1.3 Argument and Outline

The thesis commences from Nikolas Rose’s adaptation of Foucault’s theory of governmentality, in particular the concept of “responsibilization,” the requirement that citizens, and in this case, non-citizens, take a more “active” role in performing governance and government functions (Rose 1996; Rose 2000; see also Foucault 1991). Responsibilization is not empowerment or greater democracy: local communities, organizations and individuals are obliged to act without being able to determine the necessity or content of those actions (Coaffee et al. 2009). In this case, the “community” (i.e., the local) is “a new spatialization of government” (Rose 1996, 327).

In the context of LIPs, contemporary government policy and rhetoric asserts that everyone is responsible for the integration and regulation of new immigrants in Canadian societies (Mayer 2007). Likewise, Mat Coleman and Angela Stuesse (2014, 53) argue that “immigration control is also about policing what immigrants do (in the interior), and how.” The objective to manage immigrants, in increasingly more local spheres, requires the responsibilization of community members whom lack power to influence processes of immigration because the federal government continues to select immigrants and fund services (Dirks 1995). This lack of power is exacerbated under a political agenda that operates with neoliberal goals in mind. A hybrid structure of governance, where the nation-state dictates goals that local-level stakeholders must adopt, disciplines marginal bodies through increasingly informal techniques and technologies of rule (Isin et al. 1998). This form of governance, involving municipal, provincial, and federal networks, is officially called “multi-sectoral” (LIP Handbook 2013).

In an era of austerity measures, the LIP model, while potentially educating communities on immigrant issues, does not necessarily provide municipal actors and immigrants with a meaningful ability to inform policy or advocate for immigrant needs. There is a sense that the institution of LIPs allows the federal government to continually and more formally manage
municipal engagement and interaction with immigrants, and to direct the practices and actions moving forward—recognizing that the creation of policy occurs within a larger set of historically, geographically and culturally specific discourses (Hyndman and Mountz 2008). This is not to suggest, however, that discussions about immigration and immigrant matters (often started and encouraged by LIPs) do not have real and important effects in small- to medium-sized municipal and regional areas. The practical impact of LIPs in broad transformations of governance, without a formal and consistent evaluation of the LIP project and its mandate, is unclear. For example, is the level of community engagement an accurate measure of program success? One can reasonably question how local organizations and governments account for individual and overall project achievement without a thoughtful plan for program monitoring.

This research examines the new geography of immigrant governance in Canada. Immigration to Canada has always been a significant aspect of the Canadian identity; however, shifts in immigration law and policy, including selection, entrance, and integration policies that indicate changes in governmental priorities, influence beliefs about immigration and immigrants and the operationalization of related law and policy. The new local governance of immigration in Canada redirects attention to the municipal sphere, and has real impacts on the everyday lives of individuals. This dissertation will investigate the Local Immigration Partnership model as a “litmus test example of the political rationalities and governmental techniques” that creates subjects and economize migrants (Larner 2007, 333, see also Kuznetsov 2005). Ultimately, this research seeks to further the immigration debate in Canada.

The dissertation opens with a review in Chapters Two and Three of the relevant scholarly literature to contextualize the research, and a discussion of the research design and methodologies employed. Chapters Four and Five provide an account of the historical and contemporary immigration landscapes in Canada, including a strategic review of national-level immigration
policies, as well as a brief overview of the history of the Local Immigration Partnership program. Chapter Five will review immigration in Guelph, Kingston, and Peterborough, Ontario. Chapter Six reviews and analyses LIP implementation and the content of key informant interview responses. Finally, Chapter Seven offers a discussion of the research results and offers final remarks, identifying areas for future research.
2 Literature Review

This chapter theoretically grounds and informs the empirical observations of the research. As noted in Chapter One, the LIP project exists within the larger history of immigration policy and practice, and a review of governance, governmentality, and neoliberalism literatures can help to elucidate contemporary practices, particularly as they relate to the localization of policy. Conceptualizations of spatial scales can help to situate the localization of policy within broader sociopolitical processes, and simultaneously acknowledges the nuances of policy in practice and of experiences of policy.

2.1 Governance, Governmentality, and Neoliberalism

The concept of governance supplements the formal notion of state-based government with the recognition of a variety of other methods by which societies are governed, and thus helps to flesh out the relationships between actors and their exercise of power, and emphasize the informal collaborations that work together with formal government. Governance can be defined as a “plurality of coexisting networks and partnerships that interact as overlapping webs of relationships at diverse spatial scales” (Martin, McCann, and Purcell 2003). Gordon MacLeod and Mark Goodwin (1999, 515) point to the direct shaping of “‘informal’ networks of association” by political elites. That is, those in positions of power indirectly influence actions and categories that are not directly mandated or organized by the state. It is important to recognize that “the state is not a unitary object but is, rather, a set of practices enacted through relationships between people, places, and institutions” (Desbiens et al. 2004, 242). The interactions between actors, therefore, can effectively alter decisions, reconstitute relationships, change social orders, and shape lives (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999). A goal of this study is to
understand how stakeholder interactions specifically shape immigrant lives and influence immigration policy.

Scholars make many distinctions around the concept of governance. The interaction of networks and partnerships on multiple spatial scales is often termed “multi-level” governance. Bob Jessop (2004, 57) defines multi-level governance as “the institutionalization of reflexive self-organization among multiple stakeholders across several scales of state territorial organization.” For Jessop (2004), this form of governance demonstrates intricate interconnections within and between hierarchical organizations. The term “local governance” can be defined as a “wide range of other actors, institutional and individual, private and voluntary and public sector, who are involved in regulating a local economy and society” (Imrie and Raco 1999; 45, see also Johnston and Pattie 1996, 672). Local signifies a distinct geographic area (municipally or regionally defined); however, the concept of local governance is too often conflated with the neoliberal policy goals to reduce central government and budgets, and implies less bureaucratic involvement, which hides the continued significance of interactions with other levels of government. Kevin Ward (2000, 171) defines local governance as the “broadening of those institutions around local government that were charged with the design and implementation of different types of economic and social policy” (Imrie et al. 1999). As a component of local governance, local government is “that part of the state apparatus which is democratically accountable to a subnational electorate, but which operates within the constitutional and legal constraints set by a sovereign central state” (Johnston and Pattie 1996, 672). Ward’s definition highlights a change in the philosophical and operational structures of institutions around local government, from a focus on “design” and “implementation” to management. In the case of the LIP project, complex interactions and organization at and within the national and sub-national levels govern immigrant lives. To fine-tune Ward’s definition, LIPs operate in the local sphere
and represent a broadening of those institutions in this sphere; however, the project is largely regulated at the national level and forms around federal policy.

Like Rob Imrie and Mike Raco (1999), Ward (2000) recognizes that actors may include individual agents as well as the private and third sectors. These “other” actors (Imrie et al. 1999, 45) interact at “different levels, at different stages and with different degrees of responsibility in the design of local regeneration initiatives” (Ward 2000, 171). Once again, the localization of polices that manage immigrants in Ontario incorporates a level of federal control and various actors in various spheres with various degrees of administrative responsibility.

A key point of controversy in governance studies has been around the relationship between local government and local governance (Jessop 1994, 1995; Imrie et al. 1999; Ward 2000). Imrie et al. (1999) argue that aspects of local government remain in local governance, a position that Ward (2000) addresses. For Ward (2000), the analyses of these scholars do not allow for enough differentiation between the qualitative variations of the two forms, nor do they adequately engage with the political realities and shifting complexities of interactions between governance and government in the local sphere. In this case, I argue that local government and local governance are not mutually exclusive, and that local governance incorporates aspects of local government and vice versa. This research employs a multi-scalar approach in an effort to recognize the influence of wider political, economic, and social practices and processes on and through the local, and the reverse. According to Ward (2000, 182), this approach allows one to “nest” strategies “in terms of the geographies and histories of local governance.”

Italian legal philosopher, Giorgio Agamben provides a challenge to the understanding of government and governance outlined so far. For Agamben (2009), government and acts of governance are synchronized, as these two entities work together to manage lives through formal and informal networks of associations as well as the formation of individual wants and needs.
(Miller and Rose 2008). Agamben (2009, 2) uses the Foucauldian term “apparatus,” “dispositif” in Foucault, to describe a “set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge” to discuss the relationship between government, governance, and subjects. Agamben (2009, 19–20) notes that “apparatuses aim to create—through a series of practices, discourses, and bodies of knowledge … apparatus, then, is first of all a machine that produces subjectifications, and only as such is it also a machine of governance.” The apparatus is the system of technologies and techniques that shapes and governs human behaviour, a key aspect of the act of governance. Via the LIP program, the state is able to produce particular ways of being, and to control immigrant lives.

Agamben’s consideration of the apparatus of governance is founded in an interpretation of Michel Foucault’s work on subjectification. Foucault’s concept of “governmentality,” however, also provides us with key theoretical insights. Foucault argues that governmentality solidifies the ways in which government incorporates power to manage and direct populations and human beings. Governmentality is the “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, which allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault 1979, 20). Built on “pagan and Christian notions of the conduct of the self, of children, and of the family, through the flock,” modern governmentality characterizes the experience of power through different systems of influence (Elden 2016, 99; see also Foucault 2007). It is important to note that power is a process, is plural, and is located in specific histories and geographies (Elden and Crampton 2007, see also Foucault 2006). Studies in governmentality explore “the techniques and procedures for directing human behavior,” and provide a framework for understanding how rules, procedures, and conventions work together to shape everyday activities and lives (Mullings 2012, 408, see also Foucault 1979, 20). For instance, the powerful employ discourse, a “practical, social and cultural phenomenon,” to create
and control the social world (Foucault 1975, Van Dijk 1997). Language, in this regard, is an “instrumental governing technology because it has had the effect of rendering reality amenable to only certain kinds of action” (Mullings 2012, 417, see also Miller and Rose 1990).

Governmentality and governance both speak to formal, state-based systems of control, as well as to the informal arrangements that guide human behaviour. I use a neo-Foucauldian lens to examine the overt and covert applications, and (un)intended outcomes, of power that aims through the LIP model to control particular populations of people.

In light of the fact that Foucault’s work was in constant formation during his career, there are many approaches to Foucauldian studies, some of which were established before much of his later work on governmentality was fully translated into the English language. There are, therefore, conflicting explanations about the meaning and application of the concept of governmentality. I attempt to navigate through some of these explanations in my own analysis.

Governmentality connects acts of governing (government in action) with “modes of thought,” or mentalities, to express political rationality and power through a multitude of technologies of rule (Lemke 2001, 191). Government tries to “conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them” (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006, 83, see also Foucault 1997, 68). The role of government is to manage behaviour. Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana Valverde (2006, 95) note that “governmentality was intended to describe not merely how government worked and what it sought to make of its subjects, but also what the implications would be for how life is to be led.” This statement highlights how Foucault conceives of both government and its subjects. In other words, “the level of reflection [in/on] the practice of government,” not government in practice, was of concern to Foucault (Elden 2016, 103, see also Foucault 2007). The term government, in its more historical meaning, connects relations of power and
“subjectification,” as Agamben (2009) notes, and refers to the management of both the state and the self (Lemke 2001, 191). In this sense, Foucault also uses the term “the conduct of conduct” when describing government (ibid.).

In the same vein, Isin (2000, 149; see also Dean 1999) regards government as:

A more or less calculated and rationalized activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, which seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of both those who govern and those who are governed.

Similarly, government is also defined as “a domain of strategies, techniques and procedures through which different forces seek to render programs operable, and by means of which a multitude of connections are established between the aspirations of authorities and the activities of individuals and groups” (Miller et al. 2008, 63). Government is a “historically constituted matrix” that oversees and shapes the beliefs of and relationships between people and programs “in desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their environment” (ibid. 54). A key aspect in the establishment and maintenance of LIPs is government. The object of study is not government itself, but rather the practice of power to govern the everyday existence of individuals and groups through the partnership institution.

The concept of governmentality can be used to examine prescriptions for behaviour and the possibilities for action, and helps, as Wendy Larner (2007, 343) argues, to “‘denaturalise’ the taken-for-granted and encourages a sceptical approach.” The notion of governmentality also describes how “particular governmental initiatives come together, the rationales deployed, the techniques mobilised and the institutional forms that emerge.” In this sense, the concept of governmentality allows researchers to unpack the knowable existence and strategies of relations of power. In this research, the technologies of power employed and the interactions of different
institutions and groups of people are examined to understand the underlying motivations of the state and other organizations in the management of immigrant populations (Rose et al. 2006).

The work of Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, who develop Foucault’s ideas further with a particular focus on political power, is key to this discussion. Miller and Rose (2008, 53) argue that “political power is exercised today through a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life and individual conduct.” Political power is not implemented strictly through state-based government; the state may be a means to organize and institutionalize the political, but political power can be exercised beyond the institution of government and in traditionally non-political spheres (ibid. 54). Government authorities exercise political power through the LIP program, and LIP stakeholders reinforce political power and agenda through their actions and practices.

Foucault notes, “one never governs a state, never governs a territory, never governs political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals or groups” (Elden 2016, 94; see also Foucault 2007). The object of political oversight is the management of populations. Rose argues that in order to govern human beings those who govern must think of the governed as free (1999). If the state can presuppose the autonomy of immigrants, then they are able to manage immigrant lives through the implementation of practices, instituted at the local-level, that serve to constrain this presumed autonomy. These practices of management inform conduct and future conduct, and align with government goals for citizens who best fulfill government objectives (Isin 2000; Rose 1999). The management of immigrant lives also coincides with the desire to shape the actions and activities around the process of immigration. Mechanisms and strategies of governance are important to understand, in order to reveal how immigrant populations are in fact governed by interacting formal and informal systems of power, including LIPs, and to recognize the fluidity of processes of governing.
Nikolas Rose argues that the contemporary advanced or neoliberal capitalist era is characterised by a growing retreat by central government from the social functions citizens had come to expect from it during the previous era of welfare capitalism. In its place, the concept of “responsibilization” refers to the push for citizens to replace the state in carrying out those government functions, in other words a kind of individualized governance: people are held to be responsible for themselves and their communities (Rose 2000, see also Foucault 1991; Larner 2007). Larner (2007, 13) connects this obligation to the state’s promotion of individualistic views, where people are “active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well being,” that support the strength of the state and its power over a population (Rose et al. 2006; 84, see also Foucault 1997, 67). It is important to note that although in political pronouncements it is often presented this way, responsibilization is synonymous neither with empowerment nor with enhanced democratic control. Responsibilized individuals and communities are required to act without being able to determine the necessity or content of those actions (Coaffee et al. 2009). The active subject is a key input in neoliberal environments, an issue that will be discussed more thoroughly in a moment. In the context of this research, contemporary government policy and rhetoric assert that everyone is responsible for the integration and regulation of new immigrants in Canadian societies; however, responsibilization tends to leave individuals and community groups without the power to influence immigration processes meaningfully, given the role the federal government continues to play in selection and funding (Canada 2001; Mayer 2007). This process of responsibilization and subsequent lack of power is observed in the LIP operation, and is exacerbated under a political agenda that promotes neoliberal principles of governance. The hybrid structure of governance, where the nation-state dictates goals that local-level stakeholders must take up, disciplines marginal, immigrant bodies through increasingly informal techniques and technologies of rule (Isin et al. 1998).
Neoliberalism can be defined as a recent form of governmentality, a rationality of contemporary capitalist government (Foucault 1997), with political and economic dimensions that “is as much an ambition as an achievement” (Ley 2010, 7-8; see also Dobrowolsky 2012; Larner 2000). Neoliberalism is a “global project, accepted by elites and mainstream political parties in varying forms almost everywhere in the world, and implemented at scales ranging from municipal to supranational authorities” (Leitner et al. 2007, 3). Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002, 381) define the process as one that “combines a commitment to the extension of markets and logics of competitiveness with a profound antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies ... [which] is married with aggressive forms of state downsizing, austerity financing, and public-service ‘reform’” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 381). With regard to state downsizing in Canada, Helga Leitner and Valerie Preston (2012, 7) argue that “neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism are associated with increasing decentralization of administrative responsibilities.” The state demands the decentralization of administrative (and financial) responsibility and simultaneously encourages and maintains a mobility that stabilizes the national market. The goal is to increase national competitiveness in the global market at no extra cost to the state. Accordingly, “political technologies associated with marketization” are the basis of “advanced liberal” rule (Larner 2007, 13; see also Rose 1999).

Peck and Tickell (2002) are well known for their development of the terms “roll-out” and “roll-back” to discuss two permutations of neoliberalism common in Western nations. These terms exemplify the conditions of building and breaking down that occur in neoliberal regimes. The roll-out environment displays new instances of “institution-building and governmental intervention,” while the roll-back environment seeks the decentralization of state-based responsibility and an increase in privatization (Peck and Tickell 2002, 389). Roll-out and roll-back activities and policies are not independent and work in conjunction to facilitate political and
economic goals. The conditions of these permutations manifest through the work of individuals, the private and third sectors, and local-level governments. Beverley Mullings (2012, 408) argues that “since the 1990s neoliberalizing states have sought to incorporate private sector, non-governmental organizations and community-based groups into strategies to advance national competitiveness.” In Canada, Local Immigration Partnerships have been designed to coordinate and build capacity among community-based organizations that either directly or indirectly serve immigrants, to attract and retain immigrants in small- to medium-sized municipalities, an objective for which everyone is deemed responsible.

A neoliberal organization of the state longs for less government and a redeployment of resources (Leitner and Preston 2012). Classical liberalism is similarly “an art of governing that arises as a critique of excessive government” (Rose et al. 2006, 84; see also Foucault 1997). Foucault argues that liberalism is a form of rationality that expresses the limit of government, the search for where the limitation is located, and the calculation of its effects (Elden 2016; see also Foucault 1979). Interestingly, less government is not a criterion of a neoliberal regime; neoliberal strategies often involve a reorganization of government that allows for new, less traditional forms of oversight and involvement. Leitner and Preston (2012) note that activities of program implementation and delivery may be performed by sub-national levels of government (under direct oversight by state government). Engin Isin uses Foucault’s ideas to examine neoliberal practice and reason, and states that governments “develop a programmatic character by adopting deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought that continuously reform their practices” (2000, 149; see also Dean 1999). Larner (2000, 12) uses the term “market governance” to describe similar aspects of neoliberalism and argues that, “on the one hand neo-liberalism problematizes the state and is concerned to specify its limits through the invocation of individual choice, on the other hand it involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and
individuals to conform to the norms of the market.” For Larner, neoliberalism is a mechanism that prescribes and guides conduct in support of economic markets. In the case of this dissertation, the localization of immigration policy in Canada serves to responsibilize stakeholders to the market-orientated goals of the nation-state and enables new apparatuses of control. To manage the market is to rationalize the market, which is the “process of rendering the various elements internally consistent” (Rose et al. 2006, 98). Rebecca Pero and Harrison Smith (2014) argue that the economization of migration serves to enhance control over economic markets by stabilizing uncertainties and making markets knowable and governable (Mullings 2012; see also Rose et al. 2006; Valverde 2003). Market failures continue to occur in liberal economies, however, and need to be maintained because the “rationality of market remains an important technology of power” (Mullings 2012, 408; Callon 1998). The contemporary objective to manage international migration in the local sphere, then, is to make the nation-state globally competitive; immigration is no longer a nation-building activity (Good 2009). The LIP project supports this objective because it “aims to extend and embed the rationality of the market into everyday social relations and institutions,” to control and profit from economic markets (Mullings 2012, 407).

Neoliberal processes are “complex, contested, and contextualized,” and I discuss variations that appear in Canada (Dobrowolsky 2012, 201; see also Brodie 2009, 148). Neoliberalism’s emergence in Canada in the 1980s was a strategy to engage in processes of economic globalization by decreasing inflation and unemployment rates as well as by supporting free-market principles (McBride 2005). The neoliberal movement began “eroding” social policies under Prime Minister Mulroney’s Conservative government and was actively “accelerated” by the Liberals in the 1990s (ibid., 109; Mahon and Macdonald 2009). McBride (2005, 110) states that at this time the “primacy of deficit reduction over maintenance of the social safety net”
points to the end of support for the Keynes-based welfare state. In essence, the trend toward neoliberal politics in Canada translated into the downsizing of public services across the nation, and a subsequent reduction in taxes, particularly in urban areas (Clark 2002). In the late 1990s, Mike Harris’ Progressive Conservative government cut funding in Ontario for social service programs by 2020% as part of their “Common-Sense Revolution” (ibid.; 2002, 231). Services were divested onto municipal governments, which were also facing amalgamation and downsizing (ibid., 786; Tolley et al. 2012). Ongoing trends indicate the continued existence and implementation of neoliberal ideologies (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009). For instance, voluntary and non-profit organizations tend to deliver public support and services but do not possess the capacities to do so adequately (Chouinard and Crooks 2008). A number of changes affect the sector’s ability to provide exceptional service support, including (ibid., 173):

increases in demand that outpace funding available from government and other sources, increased competition for funding with the private for-profit sector as a result of state policies favouring market-based modes of service delivery, difficulties acquiring and adapting their operations to high-cost new technology, and the challenge of retaining skilled staff as wage levels and working conditions deteriorate.

The LIP model is required to support immigrant settlement and integration, but LIPs are indirect service providers, and are unable to access the necessary resources and do not inform policy.

In contemporary Western societies, austerity politics and policies that encourage limited government and free economic markets are ever more pervasive (McBride 2005; Braedley and Luxton 2010). The proliferation of neoliberal processes encourages shifts at different geographic scales and restructuring that reinforces these processes. Neoliberalization also promotes a rise in particular styles of management that result in neoliberal ideals finding a way into urban politics and policies (Martin et al. 2003). Arguably, neoliberal processes do not always follow the “free economy–minimal state” model, but enable strategies that encourage and support this model (MacLeod et al. 1999; Brenner and Theodore 2002). According to Leitner and Preston (2012, 5),
“the rise of neo-liberalism as a policy regime and form of governmentality has been instrumental in shaping immigration and citizenship policies.” In the case of Local Immigration Partnerships, the localization of policies allows the state to (re)concentrate its power in a way that increases the access to and regulation of immigrants in local spheres, reorganizes formal, central government, and responsibilizes local organizations.

This research examines the practices and effects of the Local Immigration Partnership project. Leitner and Preston (2012, 7) note that “lower tiers of government are charged with implementing and delivering policy and programs subject to regulation and oversight by the central government.” LIPs also require the involvement of both public and private organizations. I use the case of LIPs to understand the recent form of governance, its realities, and its implications. The LIP program is based in particular histories, geographies, and politics, and its formation is in constant process, “producing unintended outcomes and unexpected alignments” (Larner 2007, 16; Larner and Le Heron 2005). Scholars who use governmentality approaches also tend to focus on the unique and flexible aspects of neoliberalism (Dobrowolsky 2012). This analysis calls for a consideration of scale, an analytic tool used to distinguish between units of study, alongside the use of a governmentality approach, enabling one to “encompass more diverse subjects, their rationales, remit, and political struggles, as well as to engage, more comprehensively, with the challenges of structure and agency” (Dobrowolsky 2012, 201).

2.2 Spatial Scale

The concept of scale is an analytical lens used to examine spatial organization (Kuus 2009; see also Coleman 2005; Gilbert 2007; Kuus and Agnew 2008). The use of spatial scale, more specifically, highlights state processes and endeavours to decenter state power (ibid.). Prior to the 1980s, when the concept began to be heavily debated, scale was used to denote “organizational
order” and was thought to represent real differences in the “territorial organization” of societies (Collinge 2006, 244; Herod 2003, 230).²

A response to Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) concept of the production of space, the view that scale is a social construction considers it to be “a political process endemic to capitalism, the outcome of which is always potentially open to further transformation” (Marston 2000, 221). Conceptions of scale are shifting, and are closely linked to the processes of globalization. Erik Swyngedouw (2000, 63) argues that the rise in scalar studies corresponds to discourses of globalization that reflect “the organisation of society and the position of the citizen therein.” Marston (2000, 222) points out that the construction of various scales, and the “structural transformations that have effected a capital political economy” are of import in scalar studies.

A number of scholars have critiqued geographic scale (Taylor 1981, 1982; Smith 1984; Swyngedouw 1997, 2000; Brenner 1997a, 1997b, 2001; Cox 1998; Marston 2000; Marston and Smith 2001; Marston et al. 2005). Theories of scale frequently position the concept as definite and hierarchical, and scholars call for recognition of the dynamism of the concept, and a consideration of interacting forces and political consequences (ibid.). For Swyngedouw (1997, 140), scale is not “ontologically given,” an “a priori definable geographical territory,” or a “politically neutral discursive strategy,” but, rather, the concept “in its metaphorical use and material construction, is highly fluid and dynamic, and both processes and effects can easily move from scale to scale and affect different people in different ways.” Marston (2000, 220) also argues that scale is not a “preordained hierarchical framework for ordering the world.” Smith (1992, 66) links the concept of scale to social interactions, and states that “scale both contains

² Sallie Marston (2000) notes the works of Peter Taylor (1982; 1981) and Neil Smith (1984), the first scholars to question whether scale was a set of “material social products” or solely a “mental device” (Herod 2003, 230).
social activity, and at the same time provides an already partitioned geography within which
social activity takes place.” In other words, the differentiation of scales is directly related to “the
geographical structure of social interactions” (ibid., 73). Another key aspect of Smith’s work is
the emphasis on the associations between scale and the “discontinuous and contradictory
character of capital” (Marston et al. 2005, 417; see also Smith 1984). Neil Brenner (2001, 604)
contends that studies of scale must consider broader sociospatial processes and “the rich
multidimensionality of capitalist spatiality.” For Brenner (2001, 600), a “plural connotation of
scale” clarifies the “shifting organizational, strategic, discursive, and symbolic relationships
between a range of intertwined geographical scales.” The work of these scholars calls for a
broadening of the conceptualizations of spatial scale, and indicates that a careful and critical
consideration of the relevant context(s) must be completed alongside the concept’s use.

Borrowing from several of the definitions above, I contend that spatial scale is a social
construction (Marston 2000; Marston and Smith 2001). My research employs an operational
definition of the concept of scale, as the “level at which relevant processes operate” (Lam and
Quattrochi 1992). I also consider relations between levels. Spatial scale is therefore an organizing
concept, a useful empirical and analytic tool to investigate political and social processes, and
most importantly, the effects of these processes (Dobrowolsky 2012). The tool of geographic
scale highlights changes in structures of governance and reveals the social impacts of
immigration politics and policies (Marston and Smith 2001). The government has the power to
construct scales, and construction is used to structure federal-provincial relations. In Canada, the
state operates a federalist system, where the formal power to govern is distributed between
national and provincial governments, which allows and prohibits the existence of particular
structures (Seidle 2010, 6). Scale is a useful concept in organizing “socio-territorial
configurations,” and as Brenner (2001) recommends, I clearly indicate the network of political
scales where immigration policy is enacted, including the local/regional, provincial, and national levels (Marston et al. 2005, 419). Invoking particular scales and the mechanisms that constitute them allows interpretation of how the local- and/or regional-level(s) are involved in state strategy, and vice versa, and of the level of authority assumed at each level (Born and Purcell 2006). Accordingly, “any move toward localization … advocates a new relationship between the local scale and larger ones as power devolves to local areas” (ibid., 198). Conceptions of scale contribute to the construction of immigration policy and vice versa.

The goal of this study is to discuss the Local Immigration Partnership program in small- to medium-sized cities in Ontario, but it is important to note that the literature highlights differences with regard to immigrant settlement programming, service access, and fulfilment of needs amongst smaller and larger urban centres in Ontario. According to Erin Tolley et al. (2012, 14), demographics greatly affect the ways in which municipalities attend to integration and inclusion; “smaller centres tend to focus on attracting (and possibly retaining) newcomers, while larger cities tend to have more elaborate frameworks to address a variety of integration and inclusion needs,” due to enhanced arrivals. Differences in program offerings in large versus medium and small cities reflect the types of immigrants settling in these cities and the ability of different regions to meet immigrant needs. For instance, in response to the Making Ontario Home survey (2012), immigrants identify the ease with which they are able to obtain employment in smaller towns, and note the greater distance to service locations in larger cities. The second point may lead one to question whether the location of services is based on accurate records of settlement patterns. In her study on services in the North York region of Toronto, Ontario, Lucia Lo (2011) argues that government perspectives of where needs exist geographically are not necessarily reflective of active settlement patterns. For example, with regard to language training programs, despite recent and increased immigration to the Toronto suburb of North York, there are still a
greater number of services concentrated in Toronto’s Census Metropolitan Area (ibid.).

Shuguang Wang and Marie Truelove (2003) similarly note that Toronto has not been able to give adequate attention and support to immigrants living in suburbia, and highlight that generally, the geographical distribution of and funding allocations for the CIC-provided Immigrant Settlement Adaption Program and the Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada program match settlement patterns throughout the Province. Although neither study specifically details the possible experience of such challenges in small-to-medium sized cities in Ontario, the contemporary landscape of immigration suggests that governance activities may not be evidence-based, and have not necessarily kept up with immigrant settlement patterns and needs in larger centres.

In Chapter Two, I conducted a review the governmentality literature to argue for a recent neoliberal spatiality of government that devolves administrative responsibility for immigrant settlement and integration to service providers and individuals living in LIP communities. Spatial scale is an organizational concept used to analyse the interactions between different geographical levels and to support an understanding of socio-political processes, including decentred state power. The approach allows for a practical analysis and critique of the neoliberal inner-workings of LIPs. Chapter Three outlines the research design and process, and the research methodology.
3 Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Particular Cases

Canada has a long history of policy development around immigration that contributes to contemporary policy and practice (Vineberg 2011). Policy decisions, for example, affect the geographic placement of immigrant bodies. For a variety of reasons, the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta settle the majority of recent immigrants (Statistics Canada 2016). In 2011, of a total of 6,775,800 persons born outside of Canada (20.6% of the total population), Ontario was home to approximately 3,611,400 (53.3%), British Colombia, 1,191,900 (17.6%), Quebec, 974,900 (14.4%), and Alberta, 644,100 (9.5%) (ibid.). These statistics signify a need to plan around and support immigrants in the places they tend to settle. According to Kristin Good (2009, xiii) “immigrants to Canada concentrate overwhelmingly in urban and sub-urban communities in only a handful of city-regions.” In fact, it is more likely for immigrants to “live in the nation’s largest urban centres than people born in Canada” (Statistics Canada 2016). Roughly 63.4% of persons born outside Canada live in Toronto, Vancouver, or Montréal; these cities are home to 62.5% of the nation’s recent arrivals. Ontario receives the greatest number of immigrants (Toronto received approximately 2,537,400 immigrants in 2011), and therefore the more even distribution of immigrant settlement was identified by government officials (CIC 2001) as an objective that was formally stated in the 2005 Canada–Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) and operationalized through the COIA-founded Municipal Immigration Committee (MIC) (Burr 2011). The MIC, composed of individuals from CIC, the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, the City of Toronto, and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, gathered together to discuss immigrant outcomes, focusing on a priority to attract and retain greater numbers of immigrants to small- and medium-sized cities and regions. The LIP initiative developed in this context (Burr 2011; Tolley and Young 2011). The “rescaling” (from federal and
provincial to large and then small- to medium-sized urban centres) of political governance over immigration signifies the need to continue studying municipal-level immigration policies and practices (should these policies and practices exist) (Ray 2003; Good 2009, xiii). At the outset of this research, in 2011, the Partnership model was situated in the province of Ontario only; however, discussions around Partnership expansion were already in progress, and versions of LIPs were soon established in British Colombia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia (Burr 2011).

The focus on municipalities in this research is important because, as Tolley et al. (2012, 10) note, “immigrants do not integrate into a province or a nation . . . rather, they interact with neighbours and co-workers, familiarize themselves with the library, school systems, and medical facilities, and get to know the streets, parks, and places of worship.” It is in municipal spaces that immigrants settle, integrate, and live. The cities of Guelph, Kingston, and Peterborough were chosen for this study because they are outside of the Greater Toronto Area, receive comparable numbers of immigrants each year, and are similar in terms of population (See Table One). The challenges these sites experience in attracting and retaining immigrants are contextual (see Chapter Five). In 2011, approximately 27,515 immigrants (0.4% of the total population) lived in Guelph, 18,085 immigrants (0.3%) resided in Kingston, and 9,495 (0.1%) in Peterborough (Statistics Canada 2016). Between 2006 and 2011, the numbers of immigrants received were 3,025 (0.3%), 1,740 (0.1%) and 535 (0.0%) respectively. For the same time period, the overall population counts are 141,097, 159,561, and 118,975 respectively. In comparison, Toronto received approximately 381,745 immigrants between 2006 and 2011 (Statistics Canada 2016).
Table 3.1: Demographic Information for Sites of Investigation, 2011 (Statistics Canada 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMAs and CAs</th>
<th>Guelph</th>
<th>Kingston</th>
<th>Peterborough</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born outside Canada</td>
<td>27,515</td>
<td>18,085</td>
<td>9,495</td>
<td>3,611,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Immigrants (2006-2011)</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>501,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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3.2 Research Methodology

3.2.1 Qualitative Research and Constant Comparison

This section addresses the research methodology I employ and how this particular methodology answers my research questions. I address my position as a researcher, the benefits and challenges of using a qualitative research design, and the methods that I apply.

As a young, white, female scholar who speaks English, I experience the world in particular ways and these experiences shape my position in the world. A researcher’s “positionality” can also be defined as a “perspective shaped by his/her unique mix of race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality and other identifiers” (Mullings 1999, 337). In Kingston, the city I call home, my interpersonal connections with immigrant populations shape the proposed research (Kobayashi 2001, 62; Mohammad 2001, 101). As Luis Sánchez-Ayala (2012, 117) argues, “a failure to [consider one’s own positionality] can lead to misrepresentation of the potential results of the research.” I acknowledge that my position shapes the outcomes of this research.

According to John-David Dewsbury (2010, 324), “every methodological choice we make has an implication for the management of meaning that we are making.” This study employs a multi-method qualitative research design that is flexible and encourages collaborative participation and creation of meaning (McMillan and Schumacher 2010). This design will “illuminate the taken-for-granted” and “access and valorize previously neglected knowledges and provide more nuanced understandings of complex social phenomena” (Kesby 2000, 423; DeLyser et al. 2010;
McMillan and Schumacher 2010). The objective is to reflect on different perspectives and realities of socio-political occurrences. I gathered rich and descriptive data on the practices of policy in small- to medium-sized Ontarian cities.

Qualitative frameworks for research have been criticized for the use of narratives and for their inability to replicate studies and generalize results; however, qualitative methods allow the researcher to observe unique social phenomena and therefore benefit from the use of narratives (DeLyser et al. 2010; Iosifides 2011). In addition, qualitative research results do not necessarily require replication and generalization. The use of multiple methods is a research practice that helps to validate research by providing additional depth (Bloor et al. 2001). Moreover, Mike Kesby (2000) argues that qualitative methods reflect a critical, situated, and action-oriented methodology that involves the participant in the production of knowledge (Jensen and Glasmeier 2010). As Audrey Kobayashi states, the use of a critical qualitative framework focuses on “challenging dominant ways of understanding, and exploring the contradictions that give rise to social inequities and patterns of marginalization” (2001, 56). This challenge is a particular goal of the proposed research.

The multi-method research design that I employed combines primary source data, including policy documents and semi-structured key informant interviews. I considered Government of Canada documents, including the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27* (IRPA), the Multiculturalism Act, and related Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) documents (i.e., the Annual Performance Report for Community Partnerships). I also considered provincial- and municipal-level documents produced by the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade (MCI), municipal-level planning documents, and Local Immigration Partnership strategic action plans. I reviewed documents and research about and by Local Immigration Partnerships. These documents were reviewed with the goal of revealing
meaning and motivation with regard to immigration policy and practice. I also conducted semi-structured interviews with LIP practitioners and key stakeholders. I completed eighteen interviews with leaders of large-scale immigrant service organization, political parties, and other key informants to obtain perspectives about the LIP program. The small number of interviews used reflects the identification of key individuals with information relevant to this research.

I analyzed data using the constant comparison method (CCM) which allows for the systematic generation of theory through the simultaneous and continuous coding and analysis of data (Glaser and Strauss 2012). As Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (2012, 103) describe, this method “is designed to allow, with discipline, for some of the vagueness and flexibility that aid the creative generation of theory,” and is not compelled to ensure identical results from identical data. Coding data allows the researcher to develop understanding in a systematic manner. Glaser and Strauss (2012) instruct researchers to compare incidents across different groups through categories. Comparisons and categories are then integrated together in order to delineate theory about what the results say (ibid.). CCM is preferred over first coding and then analyzing data, and over reviewing uncoded data, because the first method is designed to test hypotheses, while the latter approach lacks order. Following Glaser and Strauss’ recommendation, I concurrently coded and analyzed the data.

3.2.2 Government Documents

This research examines documents generated by governments and organizations, or “information that has already been collected for another purpose but which is available for others to use” (White 2010, 61). The consideration of government documents allows for an investigation of how meaning around immigration and immigrants is generated. An examination of these documents also connects the immediate (LIP program located in a municipality) and larger
contexts (strategies for immigration/immigrant management), to provide an understanding of the immigration landscape and perceptions of this landscape, particularly from dominant viewpoints, in Canada, Ontario and Ontarian cities.

3.2.3 *Semi-structured Interviews*

Interviews can be defined as a “verbal interchange where one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information from another person by asking questions” (Longhurst 2010, 103). I used semi-structured interviews to gather information from key informants (i.e., government officials, community members, Local Immigration Partnership staff, service providers, etcetera), who within the realm of their paid and/or volunteer positions can provide some first-hand insight into the LIP program and into immigration policies and practices (please see the interview questions below). A challenge with conducting interview-based research is that it relies on the interest and availability of those from whom one requests interviews with. I was able to conduct eighteen interviews; eleven via the telephone and seven in-person.

Through the use of these methods, I hope to develop an understanding of the localization of immigration policies. More importantly, as a researcher I value the opinions and perspectives of my informants and I want to learn from their views and concerns. I attempt to provide the space and/or conditions for advocacy if desired, while recognizing that this was not a study of advocacy itself, nor or the informants’ participation in advocacy actions. As Kobayashi (1994, 73) argues “the political is not only personal, it is a commitment to deconstruct the barrier between the academy and the lives of the people it professes to represent” (see also Ward 2007).
3.3 The Research Process and Analysis

I conducted research in Guelph, Kingston, and Peterborough. I organized interviews in mutually agreed upon places, i.e., a designated office or available public/community space or via the telephone, in each of the three research sites. Post interview, I followed up as needed. Informants included individuals who are part of the geographic area and willing to be involved in the research process. I also interviewed a staff member from Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Community Connections team, which coordinates the LIP project, and a Policy Branch employee at the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade (MCI). I also interviewed members in each LIP catchment area, such as the project manager and individuals who sit on the LIP Council. In interviews with immigrant service organizations and political party representatives, I followed leads from practitioner interviews and contacted the offices of local political parties, until I was successful in obtaining informants. Interviews with practitioners ensure that my research integrates a wide range of opinions, expectations, and therefore policy effects.

I used purposive sampling to find key informants, which allowed for the identification of participants through networks (Bedford and Burgess 2001). Emphasis was on finding people who hold key information about how the LIPs work, rather than on finding a representative sample of people affected by LIP policies. Front desk staff, committee chairs, etc. (gatekeepers) helped to facilitate the information gathering process. Initial connections led to additional interviews, and eventually the information provided by key informants began to coincide. Each interview took approximately one hour from start to finish, and was audio-recorded. I made observational notes on my personal laptop during interview sessions to complement the audio recordings (provided the action seemed appropriate in the setting). I used these notes to identify when certain issues were discussed. I saved documents using participant pseudonyms and the interview date. I
prepared additional field notes immediately following each session, and simultaneously transcribed each interview verbatim in a separate document and coded the result using a combination of colours and numbers. I did not employ qualitative data analysis. I coded the transcripts using colours and numbers to identify different codes and themes. I reviewed each interview transcript twice; first, I used colours to highlight codes and assigned numbers to identify sub-codes; second, I made additional notes on the corresponding coding document (see Appendix One). Bedford and Burgess (2001) recommend listening to recordings immediately after each session, while the event is still easy to remember, to enhance the coding process. I attempted to employ this practice whenever possible. I did not ask participants to provide their names while audio recording. I stored recordings and encrypted all research data on my personal computer, which is only accessible with a password key. Audio recordings were removed from my recorder as soon as possible after sessions. My audio recorder was kept in a locked drawer in my student office, and I held the only key. Informants were privy to materials and analyses at all phases of the research process.

I requested the LIP strategy documents, which guide and inform day-to-day activities, from each of the three research sites. I reviewed the municipal plan from each site as well, to determine municipal perceptions of immigrant attraction and retention. Government of Canada and provincial immigration documents, including IRPA, the Multiculturalism Act, COIA, the Ontario Immigration Strategy, Ontario’s Immigration Strategy Progress Report, and the Ontario Immigration Act (S.O. 2015, c. 8), are available in their entirety on the Internet. The words used and practices implicated in these documents were examined with thoughts of the goals of the LIP program in mind. I reviewed Canada’s IRPA, the Multiculturalism Act, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, and Strengthening Canadian Citizen Act because these acts manage immigration processes and philosophies about immigrant governance. I also analyzed the LIP
Handbook, published by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The Express Entry system was also reviewed, to address the operationalization of immigration program priorities in Ontario. OCASI’s Making Ontario Home survey (2012) was examined to bring to light immigrant settlement needs in Ontario. That is a total of sixteen documents that took one to two days each to review.

Coding is a method of organizing text and establishing meaning from the data presented in the text (Cope 2010). The goal is to identify information from sources that is “recurrent” and demonstrates “important insights” (Cope 2010, 444). According to Cope (2010), the process of coding requires one to:

1. Evaluate the sources;
2. Build and refine the coding structure;
3. Build codes; and
4. Loop codes back to the research question.

Strauss (1987) identifies four categories of codes, including: conditions, interactions among actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences. This research includes categories similar to all four of Strauss’ code categories. Because the research process influences the codes used and analyzed, codes emerged from both theoretical considerations and empirical data. Strauss (1987) identifies this technique as “open coding,” when codes change during the research process, with the goal of producing “concepts that seem to fit the data” (Cope 2010, 445; see also Strauss 1987). Meghan Cope (2010, 448) states that “the important thing to realize about theme building is that it is an ongoing process throughout the qualitative research project: themes may be identified before, during or after the data collection and analysis stages.” The codes utilized include (please see Chapter Six for a detailed breakdown of the code meanings): scale; resources; success; challenge; LIP; future; and immigrant.
I conducted interviews from January 2013 through December 2014. I spent approximately five days at each research site. I analyzed primary source data during the entirety of the data collection process, which allowed for a simultaneous analysis of data, developing a sense of the themes and connections through the research (Cope 2010). The data collection and transcription processes continually informed the analysis process, and vice versa (Charmaz 2011). The exact number of observations was not pre-determined, led by participants and based on the development of common themes.

According to Peter Jackson (2001), the transcription of a one-hour interview requires six to seven additional research hours, although I completed transcriptions of one-hour interviews in approximately five hours. In addition to the transcription process, each interview required several hours of extra note taking. I required approximately 150 hours to transcribe and analyze the interview data (approximately four weeks).

I asked the following questions during interviews with key informants (government officials):

1. What is the LIP model?
2. What has been the extent of your involvement with LIPs? What LIP projects have you facilitated?
3. What is the level of interaction with municipal, provincial and federal governments?
4. In your opinion, what successes has this project encountered? (What is success?)
5. In your opinion, what barriers has this project encountered? (What is a barrier?)
6. In your opinion, what is the future of LIPs?

I devised the following questions for local-level service providers and LIP coordinators:

1. What is the LIP model?
2. What do you perceive to be LIPs goal/role in the community?
3. How is that goal/role achieved?
4. What is the level of interaction with municipal, provincial and federal governments?
5. What does success mean? How do you measure LIP success?
6. What are immigrant perspectives of LIP?

During analysis, I made constant comparisons between transcribed documents and looked for common and contrasting meanings and understandings. I kept notes about the above items during the coding process. In light of the fact that this study does not engage in quantitative or survey analyses, the frequency of word or idea use was not recorded. Additionally, the number of times a word or idea came up is not significant because the frequency relates to such things as how interview questions were asked and the amount of time the interview took. I conceptually analyzed codes during the coding process. The analysis phase occurred simultaneously with other phases of research and transformed through all aspects of the research and writing stages.

I acknowledge that the process of coding, and of categorizing verbal and non-verbal patterns provides me with a level of interpretative power. Mike Crang (2001, 215), however, argues that the interpretation process is both creative and works to “fabricate plausible stories,” and “is not a process of testing, breaking down accounts into their constituent parts or cutting away layers to get down to the truth.” The goal of the interpretative process is to synthesize and communicate conceptual themes that emerge from the research.

Interviews are designated in-text using a capital “I,” to identify the use of material from an interview, a number that represents a chronological ordering of the interviews in this study, and the year the interview took place. For example, “(I1 2013).” Additional information is not provided so as to protect the identities of the participants. The system of reference is primarily of use to the author to cross-reference between the ideas communicated and the original text of the interview. Interview citations cannot be found in the reference section of the dissertation.
This research responds to the need for an understanding of organizational and policy strategies that occur at the local-level. Ultimately, I hope to add to the debate on immigration, and will situate the voices of those intimately involved in immigration policy and practice in the debate.

3.4 Ethical Concerns

In response to research of the day, one of the first professional associations to develop and implement a set of guidelines (in the early 1970s) to govern ethics for research with human subjects was The American Psychological Association (Palys 1997). Included in the guidelines were ten principles to govern the research process. Some of these principles include: fully disclose to participants all aspects of the research; allow participants to decline their involvement outright or at any time during the course of the study; make participants aware of and attempt to minimize any potential harms or discomforts elicited by the research; and maintain the confidentiality of participants (ibid.). Shortly thereafter, other associations, such as the American Sociological Association and the Canadian Psychological Association, developed their own sets of guidelines. The shift from researcher- to participant-based ethics was significant to the future of social science research.

The methodology provides an opportunity for key informants to participate in an open and participant-driven process. Each key informant was provided with a written description of the study in advance of participating where potential harmful effects were identified, and was empowered to halt the interview process at any time. Participants were assured that their information and responses would be kept confidential and secure. Throughout the process, I answered any questions about the research process and goals.

My research is also governed by institutional procedures; through Queen’s University, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada, I undertook the required Course on Research Ethics and my research
plan and design were reviewed and approved by the Queen’s University General Research Ethics Board (GREB), which governs all aspects of human participant-based research at the university-level (General Research Ethics Board 2016; please see Appendix Two). GREB follows the *Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans* (Panel on Research Ethics 2015).

The process of immigration often presents “new social and cultural setting[s]” where migrants “could perceive themselves as being in a disadvantageous and vulnerable position” (Sánchez-Ayala 2012, 123). Although this research did not involve immigrants directly, the approach I undertook was sensitive to immigrant experiences as well as to the ways in which studied policies and practices affect immigrant lives.

I conducted a qualitative policy analysis informed by eighteen key informant interviews and sixteen government documents. I used the constant comparison method to simultaneously review and analyse data. Acknowledging my outsider position, I approached the study with a level of sensitivity to the effects of policies and practices on immigrant lives. Chapter Four addresses the historical and contemporary immigration landscapes in Canada, and includes a strategic review of relevant national and provincial level immigration policies.
4 Immigration and Canada

4.1 History

Immigration shapes contemporary Canada, and is foundational to the nation’s identity. Canada is a settler-colonial state, whose original residents were and are, indigenous peoples, i.e., the “First Nations” (Abu-Laban 1998). Immigration begins as a settler-colonial project to construct a “Canada” based on particular hierarchies of race, ethnicity, and gender “expressed through laws, political institutions, [and] immigration and settlement policies” (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995, 96). Immigration supplemented the limited numbers, power, ideas, and trading interests of British and French military rule, with numbers that translated on the ground to generate a large population (Barker 2009). Thus, the interests of the nation will always be primarily defined by the colonial state, and will contrast the interests of the dispossessed indigenous population (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995). Through this negotiation of interests, one can also identify the concern to maintain a white Canada. Immigrants, or generally those non-white, often female, immigrants of lower social status, are likely to identify not with the colonial state but with indigenous populations, as indeed is happening now with alliances of non-white immigrant and First Nations’ populations.

The process of immigration has been heavily managed by the state, and reflects the interests of those in positions of power (Hawkins 1988; Castles 2000; Hennebry 2010; Simmons 2010). Pre-1960s, for example, the act of nation building did not include Asian or Black immigrants, or immigrants from non-European states, an exclusion that was built directly into the immigration system (Simmons 2010; Vineberg 2011, 2012). Past policy decisions shape contemporary immigration trends and experiences. A review of immigration policies and practices in post-Confederation Canada, as well as a discussion of the more recent decentralization of policies and practices to subnational governments and individuals, will elucidate the significance of the
nation’s immigration program (see Appendix Three). With a focus on the activities of the Province of Ontario, I will examine the federal-provincial agreement, the provincial immigration strategy, and key findings from OCASI’s *Making Ontario Home* study, as they relate to immigrant and refugee perspectives of and needs for settlement services in the province.

I consider several key aspects of Canada’s extensive immigration history. Policy reforms, political ruptures, and economic activities, among other things, affect rates of immigration (Boyd and Vickers 2000). The interest in immigration as a tool to develop the nation was first formally documented in the *Immigration Act* of 1869, which concentrated on the travel conditions and arrival safety of immigrants, namely European farmers (Vineberg 1987). Governments actively competed to recruit and settle immigrants, with goals to increase the number of immigrants and workers. As of 1906, a new immigration act came into force that “introduced a more restrictive immigration policy, expanding the categories of prohibited immigrants, formalizing a deportation process and assigning the government enhanced powers to make arbitrary judgements on admission” (Gagnon et al. 2016a). Decisions considered an immigrant’s cultural and ethnic heritage, health, and morality, over their potential economic worth. Immigrants from non-preferred countries (e.g., Italy and Russia) were admitted to meet demands for labour.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, there was a large increase in immigrant arrivals from 42,000 to 400,000 (by 1913), which was the result of the “building of the transcontinental railway [completed in 1887], the settlement of the prairies and expanding industrial production [that] intensified demand for labour” (Boyd et al. 2000, 3; Vineberg 2012). During this same period, immigration resulted in a 44% growth of the population (Boyd et al. 2000). The increase in immigration allowed the nation to set a “higher bar” and institute conditions, with a goal to ease the “burden” on taxpayers, to exclude certain immigrants (Vineberg 2012, 12; 1987). Despite the increase in and need for immigrants, further exclusions were built in the *Immigration*
Act of 1910—the categories for prohibition increased, including immigrants sponsored by charitable organizations), as did the power of the governor-in-council (Gagnon et al. 2016b). Immigrants could be refused admission on the basis that they were “unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada” (ibid.). At this time, permanent residency was introduced and could be granted after a three-year residence period.

In 1919, amendments were made to the 1910 Immigration Act, in an effort to exclude wartime enemies (Simmons 2010). At this time, particular cultural-religious groups, Doukhobors, Mennonites, and Hutterites, were also excluded due to their “way of living,” because these groups were unlikely “to become readily assimilated … Canadian citizens within a reasonable time after their entry” (ibid., 56). Immigrants, even those from Europe, were “subjected to assimilation policies designed to turn them into citizens who shared the dominant culture-namely that of Britain, the imperial mother country” (Boyd et al. 2000, 18; Castles et al. 2009; Parent 2009; Simmons 2010). New immigrants were expected to adapt to the ideals and landscape of the New Dominion. The nation’s desire to attract capable agricultural and domestic workers was simultaneously influenced by political motivations and fear of and/or disregard for certain groups of people deemed dangerous and undesirable.

Post-World War I and prior to the Great Depression, immigration levels increased from a historical low of 7,000 to approximately 27,000 arrivals, however, the foreign-born population was just 18.18% of the entire population at this time (Boyd et al. 2000; Simmons 2010). During the 1930s, immigrants were thought to create job scarcity for Canadians, and immigrants without jobs were deported; 28,000 deportations occurred by 1935 (Simmons 2010). Deportation often coincided with one’s alleged involvement in union- or communist-based activities, a result of post-Soviet revolution paranoia and internal labour activism. The interaction between economic activity and rates of immigration, among other factors, is evident.
Anti-Semitism also surged prior to and during World War II, and only 5,000 Jewish immigrants were granted approval to enter Canada between 1920–1945 (Simmons 2010). During this time putative concerns for national security also saw the internment of many Canadian citizens and residents thought to be connected to World War II Axis enemies, a policy which was clearly racialized, as it differentiated between those of Japanese heritage, all of whom were interned and dispossessed of lands and businesses, regardless of citizenship, gender, and age. In addition, male Italian or German nationals were detained.

Nevertheless, a policy decision was made in 1947 to increase the number of immigrants accepted, although criteria for admission continued to consider the immigrant’s country of origin, ethnicity, and religion, among other characteristics (Hawkins 1988). In the same year Prime Minister Mackenzie King published a statement on immigration policy that recognized the significance of immigration to population and economic growth, and declared the importance of family reunification and humanitarian arrivals (Boyd et al. 2000; Vineberg 2011). King’s priorities reflect several outcomes of World War II—the consequences of the Holocaust, the establishment of transnational families; a change in the national economy, from agrarian to industrial; and the displacement of numerous groups of people (Vineberg 2011). Prime Minister King’s endorsement of a contextual immigration program served to address some of the consequences of the war and shaped future iterations of the country’s immigration policy.

During the 1950s, immigrants came from “Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, and the U.S.S.R.” (Vineberg 2012). In 1956, 37,000 Hungarian people landed in Canada after Hungary was attacked by the Soviet Union, and nearly 109,000 British citizens found refuge in Canada following the Suez Crisis (Hawkins 1988; Boyd et al. 2000; Vineberg 2012). Immigrant arrivals peaked in 1957 at 282,000 (Boyd et al. 2000). A precursor to the development of security policy in Canada, wartime motivations and actions greatly influenced perceptions toward immigrants,
and shaped policy directives and immigration trends. Alan Simmons (2010, 58) argues that the “combination of significant societal events and prejudices directed toward ethnic groups has the potential to ‘mobilize hostility toward minorities,’” which can manifest in attitudes toward immigration and immigrants that are enacted through law. According to Keith Banting (2010), public opinion surrounding national solidarity and diversity, a complex and pervasive dichotomy in the Canadian imagination, serve to shape both social and political thought on immigration. Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock (1998, 314) state that, “from 1946 to 1958, more than 29,000 prospective immigrants were rejected as ‘security risks,’ and … there were a total of 8,572 deportations over the period.” Tensions exist around Canadian goals for immigration and preconceptions about prospective immigrants.

Although the 1952 Immigration Act was the first new immigration act since 1910, the Act did not diverge greatly from its predecessor (Gagnon et al. 2016c). The Act did provide additional authority and discretionary power to the governor-in-council and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration with regard to decisions of admission and deportation (ibid.). “Homosexuals, drug addicts and drug traffickers” were among those who were added to the list of prohibited to enter, and conditions were set around the “arrest, detention and deportation of prospective immigrants and the process of examination, inquiry and appeal” (ibid., np). Immigration appeal boards were established at that time. At the height of the Cold War, fears of Soviet infiltration once again affected immigration; those immigrants suspected of backing communist ideals were either removed or not permitted (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998).

Post-1950 the changes to Canada’s “political, economic, and administrative climate” and “the [level of] departmental output of new policies in immigration” continued to shape immigration trends (Hawkins 1988, 347). During this period immigration rates did not exceed domestic birth rates (Boyd et al. 2000). According to Vineberg (2012, 22), “as Canada entered
the 1960s, a fairly sophisticated immigrant settlement system was being developed. However, the budgets were very small, by modern standards and, therefore, the reach of the programs was somewhat limited.”

A policy amendment in 1962, to encourage the acceptance of “non-white” immigrants further altered immigration trends, and the official inclusion of immigrants from non-traditional (non-European) countries increased national diversity (Simmons 2010, 63). The release of the *White Paper on Immigration Policy* in 1966 led to the institution of the *Immigration Regulations* in 1967; this document stresses the importance of setting specific criteria for selection, particularly with the aim of acquiring skilled labour and continuing to reduce barriers for the entry of non-dangerous peoples, including “homosexuals and chronic alcoholics” (Vineberg 2012; Gagnon et al. 2016d, np).

In 1967, the points system was designed to consider applicants for admission “under the same standards, [that are] applied on a universal basis”; more specifically, immigrants were admitted based on their “job skills, education, and official language abilities” (Aiken 2007, 9; Simmons 2010, 73). Sharryn J. Aiken (2007) argues, however, that selection criteria tend to favour particular skills over others. Accordingly, the regulations under the contemporary *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27)* continue to be used discretionarily to disregard applications from racial minorities. As Aiken describes (2007, 68):

An immigrant’s admission to Canada as a ‘skilled worker’ depends on how many points she or he receives on a scale that attempts to gauge her or his economic potential in terms of six selection factors: education, language ability (English or French), skills, work experience, age, and adaptability. Additional points are allocated for prospective immigrants with arranged employment. Although the discretionary category of ‘personal suitability’ was eliminated with recent reforms, immigration officers are still permitted to override the points system altogether to either accept or refuse an applicant on the basis that the rating does not reflect the immigrant’s chances of becoming successfully established.
The freedom of officers to determine the suitability of an applicant and override the system reproduces the cycle of racism. Furthermore, how one becomes “successfully established” is not made clear.

The Canadian Multiculturalism Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. 24) of 1971 is another essential component of the nation’s immigration program. It changed immigration trends through the decision to solidify the acceptance of immigrants from non-traditional source countries. The first of its kind in the world, the Multiculturalism Act celebrates ethnic and racial diversity as a “national asset” (CIC 2008d). The Canadian Multiculturalism Act not only recognizes the reality of pluralism in Canada, but also attempts to reverse earlier attempts to assimilate immigrants (Parent 2009). This policy also encourages Canadians to accept cultural diversity and to embrace the full and equal participation of racial and ethnic minorities in all realms of Canadian society. For immigrants, the Multiculturalism Act defined a space for the creation of a unique mosaic of citizenry that acknowledged the role of “other” cultures in building Canadian identity. Many scholars argue that multicultural policies have “failed,” in that these policies have not fulfilled their claims and do not promote social solidarity (Kobayashi 2007; Banting 2010; Vineberg 2012). Wood and Gilbert (2005, 684) note that multiculturalism “was never a goal of Canada's domestic policies, nor its immigration policy. It was never a democratic goal of the population as a whole, nor was it a popular movement.” Perceptions of multiculturalism do, however, affect the manifestations of policy goals. Keith Banting (2010, 797) identifies the “disenchantment” with the policy as being “driven by fears about economic costs, perceived threats to liberal values, challenges to historic cultures, anxieties about Islam and fears about security.” Disenchantment disrupts any value that racial and ethnic diversity adds to Canadian societies, and harks back to the prejudicial lines of reasoning that drove immigration policies in earlier decades.
The 1976 Immigration Act, implemented in 1978, marked the “first time, [that] Canada’s immigration legislation contained specific policy objectives,” including government goals for population and economic growth, as well as the prioritization of humanitarian aid and family reunification (Vineberg 2011, 212). The previous Immigration Act, dating from 1952, aims to minimize entries whereas the 1976 act encouraged selection requirements and procedures. The refugee class of immigrant was also acknowledged at this time as a specific class (Gagnon et al. 2016e). This act reflects Canada’s involvement in and commitment to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention (CIC 2006). The formal decision to involve provincial governments in decision-making and management occurred at this time, a step in the process to decentralize immigration processes. The particular history of devolution will be discussed in a section to follow.

Settlement Destinations

Much immigration during the twentieth century had immigrants settling in Canada’s largest cities, Montréal, Toronto, and Vancouver. The result of economic opportunities, the availability of ethnically-based services and associations, and the presence of family and friends, nearly 85% of all immigrants lived in a census metropolitan area in the 1990s (compared to 57% of Canadians). In 1996, “42% of Toronto’s population, 35% of Vancouver’s and 18% of Montréal’s were foreign-born,” and the Province of Ontario settled 55% of the nation’s immigrants (ibid., 10). Immigrant settlement in cities began post-World War I, even with the state continuing to encourage the settlement of farmland (Boyd et al. 2000; Vineberg 2012). The perceived overcrowding of cities, thought to be the result of “unchecked” immigration, also persuaded the government to continue to promote rural areas for settlement (Vineberg 2012, 13). Nevertheless, “the largest CMAs have a higher concentration of immigrants than the national average of just over 17%” (Boyd et al. 2000, 10).
4.2 The Decentralization of Immigration Policy

In 1868, a meeting of the new Dominion and the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick to discuss immigration resulted in the establishment of the first *Immigration Act* (Vineberg 1987). The Dominion and provinces agreed to institute an immigration office in London, England and an agency in Europe, to fund the operating costs of the existing quarantine stations as well as the nine inland immigration offices, and to meet annually. In the 1870s, however, a rivalry developed between the Dominion and the provinces, when the provinces began sending agents abroad to recruit settlers, an activity the state had already undertaken. In this instance, the Dominion requested that the provinces contribute financial and human resources to their own offices abroad. As a first step in co-coordinating immigration, the competition for newcomers was the primary concern.

Moving forward to World War I, there was a mutual interest in the return of service men and a desire to return immigration to pre-war levels (Vineberg 1987). Following this period, throughout the Depression and World War II years, immigration was limited and relations between the federal government and the provinces were poor. There was another resurgence in immigration post-World War II, and the provinces requested a restriction on the arrival of Jewish refugees. In 1950, the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration was established (formerly known as the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources), and immigration was considered a national responsibility (ibid.). Provinces were not consulted on matters of immigration, although several “reopened European offices and all devoted attention to the settlement and adaptation of immigrants” (ibid., 305). The Canadian Cabinet instructed the government to fix agreements that set parameters for settlement activities with the provinces and other organizations.
In 1966, Ontario, Quebec, and three of the prairie provinces founded subnational immigration divisions, with an aim to connect immigrant arrivals to labour market needs (Vineberg 1987). Federal-provincial collaborations were not formally acknowledged until the implementation of the 1976 Immigration Act (ibid.; Gagnon et al. 2016e). The minister was required to consult with the provinces, after which there would be “an announcement in Parliament regarding the number of immigrants it proposed to admit within a specific period of time” (Gagnon et al. 2016e np). Since that time, there has been more formal cooperation between levels of government, and coordination of rates of immigration as well as settlement and integration.

Consistent with the nation’s neoliberal reforms, the 1990s saw the federal government negotiating “settlement renewal agreements with individual provinces, downloading the administration of newcomer services to the provinces” (Abu Laban and Gabriel 2002; Stasiulis et al. 2011, 76; Tolley et al. 2012). Decisions to realign program and fund activities shifted responsibility from national to subnational governments, as well as third sector organizations, citizens, and immigrants. This realignment and increased responsibility occurred without a similar transfer of resources to match the increased responsibilities. In this environment, neoliberal ideals value the “free market, the individual, and competitiveness,” and with regard to immigration, state enforced “self-sufficiency” (Abu Laban and Gabriel 2002, 175, 67). Yasmeen Abu Laban and Christina Gabriel (2002, 67) note that “state power—in terms of increased regulation, scrutiny, and punitive measures—was being used in this case [in the 1990s] to enforce the apparent privatization of integration costs away from the state and onto immigrants themselves.” The “right to landing fee” and further filing fees were introduced at this time (ibid.). This period also included the realignment of social service responsibilities to municipalities via the Local Service Realignment program. The immigration sector in Ontario was affected by
“replacing the Ontario Settlement and Integration Program with the Newcomer Settlement Program and slashing its funding in half, while cutting the core funding of some settlement programs and switching others to less stable project-based funding” (Tolley et al. 2012, 5; see also Simich 2000). The reduction in funds led to precarious service provision.

CIC published a strategic policy report entitled *Towards a More Balanced Geographic Distribution Of Immigrants* in 2001, in an effort to modernize the government’s approach to immigration. The report examines the influence of governments in immigrant destination decisions and how choices relate to regional economic development. This report recommends that the federal government address immigration flows and settlement in a way that would support positive economic development in cities and regions (CIC 2001). CIC recommends that Canada “target second-tier cities and other metropolitan areas rather than rural and small-town areas,” where employment opportunities are available for independent immigrants and refugees (2001, iv). A lack of immigration to places other than the largest cities correlates with low rates of population growth in those places. Immigration is an economic good that should be shared more equally, regardless, in some instances, of market logic and human autonomy. The document identifies the need for provincial involvement in immigration processes, to support and increase participation in labour markets. Jenna Hennebry (2008, 343) notes, with regard to the nation’s use of immigration to support labour markets, that in Canada:

> there has been an increasing emphasis on the recruitment of temporary migrant workers … with a notable shift toward prioritizing the ‘flexibility’ and ‘labour force responsiveness’ of Canadian immigration policy, and an increased emphasis on the recruitment of noncitizen, temporary workers.

A study by Jennifer Hyndman, Nadine Schuurman, and Rob Fiedler (2006) examines the degree to which five cities in British Columbia are thought to be attractive to new immigrants. These authors contend that attractiveness correlates to a city’s size as well as the presence of
family, friends, and other immigrants in the city in question, with “higher retention rates in larger cities” (19). The authors argue that governments need to take a “proactive policy stance that enumerates and communicates the appeal of less prominent communities,” in order to “spread the wealth” when it comes to immigration and immigrant labour (Hyndman et al. 2006, 20). The degree to which small- and medium-sized cities in Canada desire to attract new immigrants and to retain them is reflective of municipal competitiveness. Municipalities’ abilities to extract additional federal transfer funds in order to accomplish this task is not well-discussed.

Canada’s Provincial Nominee Program and the Local Immigration Partnership initiative are two examples that align with CIC aims to regionalize immigration through the devolution of immigration practices and procedures to subnational authorities. These programs invite immigrants to settle in particular locations and provide subnational governments (as well as employers) with increased flexibility in the immigration process (Seidle 2010; Pero and Smith 2014).

In 2008, the same year as their first call for LIP proposals (in Ontario), CIC established a “modernized approach to settlement programming,” to augment settlement outcomes for immigrants through “greater flexibility, results-oriented programming with improved accountability, and better planning and coordination” (Seidle 2010, 5; CIC 2009, np). Under this approach, CIC’s Settlement Program and Community Connections stream oversees the development and maintenance of the LIP projects as an integral component of CIC’s contemporary approach to settlement. The consolidation of settlement programs (from separate programs to one) and a clear emphasis on responding to newcomer needs are the key objectives of this approach. CIC states that the approach is “activity- and outcome-based to make sure settlement programming is responsive and flexible to meet clients’ needs” (CIC 2009). When requesting funding, service providers must indicate the activities and intended results of the
activities they would like to implement. Several aims have been prioritized through this stream of programming, including immigrant orientation, language skills, access to appropriate labour opportunities, welcoming communities, and policy and program development (ibid.). To achieve the five outcomes listed above, CIC lists six activities: “needs assessment and referrals, information and awareness services, language learning and skills development, employment-related services, community connections and support services” (Seidle 2010, 20). Ultimately, CIC intends to increase program flexibility and effectiveness through their updated strategic framework.

The changes in programming are neoliberal in character and aim to improve organizational efficiencies and to redistribute responsibility from the state to groups and individuals (McBride 2005; Luxton 2010). According to Beverley Mullings (2012, 410), “decentralization and public-private partnerships are viewed as important institutional mechanisms that facilitate good governance because they provide civil society with new opportunities to influence how economic and political decisions are made.” The decentralization of immigration policy and procedures in Canada, through investment in new, subnational methods to facilitate immigrant settlement and integration, is highly encouraged and lauded. The associated costs, however, which were once incurred by the welfare state, have become a local responsibility, and do not correspond with an increase in government spending (Armstrong 2010). The localization of policy extends government control and governs the conduct of individuals. Subnational groups and individuals do not gain any additional power beyond taking on administrative responsibility.

Current reforms reflect the neoliberal ideologies that promote market outcomes in advance of other goals (Abu Laban and Gabriel 2002). There is an additional focus on the ability of census metropolitan areas, particularly those outside traditional immigrant destination points (i.e., Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal), to attract and retain new immigrants. Canadians citizens and
the third sector are also formally obliged to support the immigrant integration process, often without corresponding financial supports (CIC 2011).

4.2.1 Federal-provincial Agreements

Although the first federal-provincial agreement was signed in 1868, the federal government continued to manage immigration as a national program for another century (Seidle 2010; see also Vineberg). The Government of Canada and the Province of Quebec negotiated and signed the Lang-Cloutier Agreement in 1971, the first modern-era federal-provincial agreement, however, formal legislation regarding provincial involvement was not adopted until the 1976 Immigration Act took effect (Seidle 2010; Vineberg 1987, 2011). The Lang-Cloutier Agreement allowed Quebec to select immigrants and refugees autonomously and to coordinate settlement and integration services for the region (Seidle 2010; Stasiulis et al. 2011). To implement the 1976 Immigration Act, and to “promote the image of cooperative federalism across the country,” Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan were encouraged by the federal government to enter into agreements in 1978 (Vineberg 1987, 315; Seidle 2010). By February 1979, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island had also signed immigration agreements (Vineberg 1987). The latter five agreements allowed the provinces to consult on policy; however, provisions to select immigrants were not granted. Alberta signed an immigration agreement in 1985. Ontario did not similarly appeal for autonomy at the time. In 1994 the federal government proposed, in order to reduce the deficit, to withdraw spending on settlement and integration services in Ontario (Vineberg 1987; Seidle 2010). The Conservative government simply “was not interested” in engaging in immigration management (Seidle 2010, 9). In 1996 and 1998 respectively, the governments of Manitoba and British Columbia developed programs to attract and retain new immigrants and signed their first agreements, specifically through the Provincial Nominee Program (Siemiatycki
et al. 2010). These provinces exercise a greater role in the design, coordination, and delivery of settlement services than does the Government of Canada; however, programs must conform to and reach CIC determined goals and outcomes (ibid.). The election of Dalton McGuinty’s Liberal government in 2003, and concern regarding the province receiving its “fair share” of inputs as well as declining outcomes for new immigrants, led to the signing of an agreement between the Province of Ontario and the federal government in 2005 (see below). Interestingly, in 2012 CIC announced it would cancel the settlement agreements with British Columbia and Manitoba, and according to the Canadian Council for Refugees (2012), these decisions were made “behind closed doors” and without consultation. Vineberg (1987, 316) argues that “the attitude of individual ministers to the role of the provinces can be a key factor in determining the priority assigned to provincial involvement,” which may have contributed to program cancelations. CIC tightly controls the parameters around which devolution of aspects of immigration procedures and programs occurs.

4.3 Contemporary Policy and Strategic Document Review

4.3.1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27)

Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) governs the overall creation, implementation, and maintenance of immigration laws and policies, a role that the Canadian government has performed in some form since Confederation (CIC 2010a; Simmons 2010). The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Canada 2001) currently governs immigrant selection, admission, settlement, and integration. IRPA (2001) also identifies immigrant integration experience as a mutual obligation of citizen and immigrant, stipulates goals for provincial involvement and responsibility, and notes the vulnerability of specific groups of immigrants. Assented in 2001, this Act asserts the importance of family reunification and the protection of
refugees, and maintains that the acceptance of immigrants should preserve the “federal and bilingual character of Canada” and “enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric” of Canadian society (Vineberg 1987, 310; IRPA 2001).

IRPA contains several aspects of interest regarding immigrant admission, integration, and residency. The document discusses the desire “to protect public health and safety and to maintain the security of Canadian society” (IRPA 2001, see section 3(1)(h)). Accordingly, the admission of both immigrants and refugees should “promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks”. What constitutes criminality and risk is not well defined, which allows officials to apply these terms in a flexible manner. Another admission objective indicated in this act is to advance both the English and French linguistic communities. IRPA describes integration as the mutual obligation of immigrants and Canadian society (ibid.; CIC 2011). As a “two-way street,” the process of immigration should help “immigrants learn about Canadian values and [help] Canadians understand the diverse backgrounds of newcomers” (CIC 2011). Furthermore, the application section of IRPA (2001) notes the importance of “cooperation between the Government of Canada, provincial governments, foreign states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations” (see section 3(3)(d)). Although the document points to who is responsible, IRPA does not elaborate on the actors or the activities necessary to facilitate cooperation and successful integration. Arguably, an extension of the aim to devolve administrative responsibility to provinces, which the Immigration Act of 1976 outlines, the mutual obligation requires the unpaid efforts of global and subnational groups and individuals. One of the roles of the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship is to enact collaborative agreements between the federal and provincial governments, which may occur without provincial consultation provided the agreements align with the tenets of IRPA (section
The possibility of no consultation around agreements signals the lack of power held by these government and non-government actors. Finally, immigrants identified by particular statuses are vulnerable; section 24(1) indicates that temporary residencies may be revoked at any time, based on the “opinion of an officer,” and grants immigration officers and the Minister power in this regard (see section 22(1)). These allowances enable individual officers to shape immigrant lives in real, and possibly detrimental, ways.

4.3.2 Related Acts and Programs

Several other documents and programs are of particular significance. All of these were introduced by the Progressive Conservative government of Stephen Harper, in the context of the post-9/11 security environment and the “war on terror” instigated by the Bush administration in response to that attack. These include Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012, c. 17 (Canada 2012), Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, S.C. 2014, c. 22 (Canada 2014), and the Express Entry program (CIC 2016b). The Harper government maintained that the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012, c. 17 (PCISA) enabled the state to defend itself against immigrants and refugee claimants seeking entry under false pretences (Canada 2012). Some of the provisions of this Act allow the Minister to determine “safe” countries, without consultation, from which to receive immigrants and refugees, to deport immigrants and refugees at any stage of the immigration process, and to prohibit a refugee claimant the right to appeal Immigration and Refugee Board decisions. The collection of biometric information was also implemented for additional categories of immigrants (ibid.). These provisions provide additional power to the Minister and immigration officials and remove an immigrant or refugee’s ability to negotiate the system fairly, which leads to more precarious lives. The state did not openly reveal underlying motivations during the consultation phase.
Despite widespread discontent, changes to the *Citizenship Act* were accepted into law in 2014. The *Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, S.C. 2014, c. 22* (SCCA) expands prohibitions against residents and permits the state to bestow and revoke citizenship more easily (Canada 2014). National security, with regard to criminal acts and those actions deemed “contrary to the national interest of Canada,” continues to present as a key concern and motivation for legislative change (ibid., see “Summary” section). Accordingly, the Harper government stated that the Act allowed for system efficiencies; however, the document solidifies the provisions established in the PCISA (CTV News 2015). In essence, both Acts make claims regarding system inefficiencies and unwanted outsiders with a goal to strengthen the state’s ability to govern immigrant lives and reinforce existing vulnerabilities. These documents deny the ability of those holding responsibility any meaningful input into decisions made. These challenges are written into law and shape the parameters within which small- to medium-sized communities can effectively operate and support integration and settlement success.

The Express Entry system more rigorously determines the category and quantity of immigrants entering small- to medium-sized communities (CIC 2016b) by promoting provincial involvement in the selection of immigrants for employment opportunities and gaps. This program ties directly to the federal government’s economic immigration programs and provides immigrants with a route to permanent residency through available employment. Immigrants apply electronically, upon invitation, and applications are often processed within six months. The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants has raised concerns about the program’s selection bias and the simultaneous weakening of the family class category (Douglas 2015).
4.3.3 Provincial Approaches to Immigration Integration

There has been a discernible movement in Ontario’s immigrant-receiving centres from government to multilevel, multisectoral governance in the policy of immigrant settlement. (Stasiulis et al. 2011, 74)

The Government of Canada, through the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, sets goals and priorities for the nation’s immigration program, controlling the selection and admission of immigrants and refugees and the funds, through bi-lateral or co-management agreements, that provinces and territories receive for settlement and integration programming (Vineberg 1987; Seidle 2010; Stasiulis et al. 2011). Immigration is considered a joint federal-provincial jurisdiction, as per the Constitution Act (1867). Programs range from near complete devolution of settlement and integration responsibilities to partial responsibility, or co-operative agreements such as the Provincial Nominee Program (Seidle 2010). Governments with devolution agreements are able to administer funds, allowing them more control over programming. The provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba fit this description, whereas the Ontario agreement offers less responsibility. The Province of Quebec selects its own immigrants; however, the federal government can override any selections on perceived threats to national security or concerns over the migrant’s medical history. The interactions between federal, provincial, and territorial governments are important to consider to get a sense of the motivations for devolution and to understand the ways in which the agreements between governments have developed and changed, as precursors to the LIP program.

The Province of Ontario historically received, and continues to receive, the majority of new immigrants to Canada, however, the provincial government has not always taken an active role in settlement and integration (Stasiulis et al. 2011; Tolley et al. 2012). The level of involvement has changed over time; in the 1950s, Ontario worked to promote the province to potential European emigrants, particularly those available to work in industrial jobs (Vineberg 1987). The seeming
lack of interest exhibited by the province in the recent past may reflect the knowledge that extensive family supports are often available for new immigrants settling in the province, and/or the fact that the federal government tends to prioritize Ontario in its immigration planning (Stasiulis et al. 2011). The federal government is less likely to offer additional autonomy; as Seidle (2010, 2) contends “a Quebec-style agreement . . . would significantly reduce the role of the federal government in nation-building through immigration.” Quebec is the second highest immigrant receiving province, accepting nearly 54,000 permanent residents in 2010 (CIC 2010b). The Province of Ontario was asked to sign a devolution agreement in the 1990s; however, the government did not accept the agreement at that time (Stasiulis et al. 2011). With one of the nation’s two largest provinces coordinating their own immigration services, it seemed that the state preferred to continue managing the programs and flows in Ontario. The province’s interest in immigrant management changes over time and is contingent on numerous interacting factors.

4.3.4 Ontario-Specific Agreements, Strategies and Landscapes

a. COIA

Signed in 2005, the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) was an agreement made between the federal and provincial governments, particularly Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade (MCI) in Ontario. COIA was designed to establish partnerships between all levels of government and community groups and individuals, to support immigrant and refugee outcomes in the processes of settlement and integration and to improve the economic opportunities associated with immigration (CIC 2005; Siemiatycki et al. 2010; Burr 2011; Tolley et al. 2012). In addition, the agreement provided the Province as well as municipal governments with an opportunity to participate more formally in federal-level decision-making (Seidle 2010). The emphasis on “place-based policy-making”
and “multilevel governance and partnerships” results from a provincial fiscal imbalance and the initiation of Prime Minister Paul Martin’s “New Deal for Cities and Communities” in 2005, which proposed an increase engagement with Ontario municipalities (ibid.; Tolley et al. 2012).

The goals of the COIA include (Seidle 2010, 3): “enhanced funding for settlement and integration services, expanded programming, co-funding of Ontario Bridge Training projects, increased professionalization of the settlement sector, and the successful inclusion of the municipal sector.” The introduction of the LIP program was one of the key features of the agreement (Tolley et al. 2012). COIA also offered opportunities to pilot programs such as the Provincial Nominee Program and allowed for widespread governance enhanced by stakeholder participation (ibid.). Positive developments under COIA included: an increase in provincial funds for immigrant services (a total of $920 million over a five-year period); additional programming (i.e., in the areas of language and training); a more robust settlement sector; and, as previously mentioned, greater involvement from municipalities (i.e., the development of an MOU with the City of Toronto, and the LIP initiative) (Seidle 2010; Stasiulis et al. 2011).

The implementation of COIA presented a number of challenges, such as a reduction and under-spending of the additional funds promised (Seidle 2010). According to Seidle (2010), broad-based consultations with multiple stakeholders on programs, staffing considerations for CIC, and additional financial restrictions by the federal government under the 2006 Accountability Act, all served to influence the under-spending of dollars promised. CIC also provides funding for services for permanent residents only, not temporary residents or new Canadian citizens; this is not the case with the Ontario government (ibid.). CIC’s laborious administrative processes also presented a challenge to the effective operation of COIA. Following the agreement’s expiration in 2010, the COIA was extended until March 2011 and has remained unsigned since (MCI 2009).
Stasiulis et al. argue that COIA and similar agreements are “governmental catalysts to encourage municipalities to invest in multisectoral forms of governance” (2011, 82). Although the MCI maintains a co-operative agreement with the Government of Canada, the action to further decentralize immigrant management can be seen in the development of municipal- and regional-level LIPs. The establishment of the Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Agreement of Understanding on Immigration and Settlement (MOU) in 2006 ascertains such a change. According to Stasiulis et al. (2011, 74), “these agreements … commit upper-level governments to work with municipal governments, and in the case of the COIA, with community and private-sector stakeholders as well, to develop policies, programs, and infrastructure for immigrant integration so that municipalities can better realize the benefits of immigration.” It is difficult to determine whether the COIA had any real and lasting effects.

Do new governance schemes “lead to meaningful decentralization and democratization in policy-making,” or does the more “intensified involvement” of government and non-government actors confirm trends of urban neoliberalism (Keil 2002; Stasiulis et al. 2011, 75)? Certainly Stasiulis, Hughes and Amery (2011, 82) argue that these relationships are:

markedly in conformity with a number of trends, [which] include the paradigmatic shift in local governance in Western liberal democracies to neoliberal welfare regimes, the embrace of New Public Management, and the development of multisectoral networks, alliances, and local partnerships.

New Public Management refers to the use of for-profit sector management practices in what is traditionally known as the public sector (Armstrong 2010). The LIP program is part of a larger public management regime that maintains control through the responsibilization of stakeholders.

Municipalities are at the forefront of immigrant settlement and integration, and have always been involved in processes of attraction and retention, but are often independent of any form of formal support from national or provincial governments. According to Stasiulis et al. (2011, 79),
“immigration policy … is constitutionally outside their jurisdiction and largely cordoned off from their field of influence”; however, the COIA called for the involvement of municipalities across all spheres (Seidle 2010). Therefore, it is with the development and implementation of activities, such as the LIP model, under COIA’s annexes, that the formal engagement of municipalities has occurred. Smaller urban centres are often unable to meet immigrant needs due to “more fragmented and less robust organizational structures,” whereas larger centres are able to leverage the capacity of non-governmental organizations that use “purchase-of-service” agreements (Stasiulis et al. 2011, 74). Building capacity among the third sector in smaller centres is a particular requirement of the LIP program.

With regard to the shift in discourse around municipal involvement in immigration (Tolley et al. 2012, 6, see also Siegel 2009):

traditionally, Ontario has seen municipalities as vehicles for decentralized provincial service delivery. … This has changed recently with the recognition of the importance of large cities as the anchors of global city-regions and as the main drivers of economic development’ … Indeed, we can trace the roots of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) to the provincial government’s policy choices, which created a fiscal imbalance and provided a rallying point for the City of Toronto-and eventually other municipalities-to demand a ‘New Deal for Cities.’ This shifted discourse toward place-based policy-making, and multilevel governance and partnerships, which are cornerstones of COIA.

Similarly, Kristin Good (2009, xiii) notes that:

municipalities’ role in supporting a vibrant and socially sustainable multicultural citizenship in Canada is one piece of a more fundamental story about the emerging importance of municipal governments in the Canadian intergovernmental system. The role of municipalities in managing international migration is one manifestation of the ‘rescaling’ (i.e., the simultaneous globalization and decentralization) of political authority to large urban centres in Canada.

The role delegated to municipalities relating to service delivery is evidence of the manner in which municipalities have been, and are currently, involved in immigrant settlement and integration. Arguably, the shifted discourse that Tolley et al. (2012) and Good (2009) discuss
reflects governmental strategy to institute reforms that follow market principles and desire to further manage immigrant lives. For municipalities, there is a draw in adopting these reforms; “municipalities are acting upon a perceived priority to attract skilled immigrants for the purpose of better positioning themselves in the globalized competition among cities and mixed urban-rural-suburban regions for talent and investment” (Stasiulis et al. 2011, 74). Municipal goals to increase attraction and retention rates of particular kinds of immigrants, however, seem to filter through state strategy and national/global politics, versus rising from an independent interest to manage diversity (Ray 2003).

b. Settlement Service Funding

An important piece of the immigration landscape in Ontario is funding for settlement service provision. The connection between service cuts and the development and implementation of the LIP project is a significant one. In December 2010 the federal government announced cuts of $53 million to service supports that help immigrants and refugees settle in Canadian communities (Keung 2010; Pagliaro et al. 2010; OCASI 2016). The Province of Ontario experienced a nearly $44 million reduction, approximately 2020% of core funding per immigrant service organization (CIC 2010b; Keung 2010; Siemiatycki et al. 2010). The cuts were delivered equally to all settlement service agencies, while auxiliary organizations were asked to renegotiate their contracts with CIC for continued support (Keung 2010). At the same time, the institution of the LIPs between 2008 and 2010 cost $9.2 million, a fraction of the funds cut from settlement service organizations (CIC 2012). According to Liberal Member of Parliament Gerard Kennedy, the reduction in financial supports to immigrant services was done without a robust plan to transition vulnerable people (Keung 2010).

The reduction to settlement service funding is not a new phenomenon; in the mid-1990s, the Province of Ontario decentralized responsibilities to municipal governments under the Local
Service Realignment program (Tolley et al. 2012). With regard immigration, the Newcomer Settlement Program replaced the Ontario Settlement and Integration Program, and funds for the new program were decreased by half. Other settlement programs experienced either cuts to core funding or were moved to project-based funding (ibid.). Municipalities were required to offset the changes, although not all municipalities chose to. Kristin Good (2009) argues that Toronto experienced the changes in policy more significantly due the number of immigrant arrivals the City receives.

The tool of language was used in post-cut discussions, when then Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Jason Kenney argued that immigration rates had decreased; although immigration rates have decreased in Ontario since 2005, the Minister misreported the number of permanent residents, citing the numbers received in 2009 (Keung 2010; Pagliaro et al. 2010; Kenney 2011; CIC 2015a): approximately 11,257 fewer than the 118,000 permanent residents recorded for 2010 (ibid.). Kenney also reported that the provinces receive disproportionate amounts of funding, similarly misquoting rates of immigration per province, and argued that Ontario has received increased funding since 2006 (Keung 2010; Pagliaro et al. 2010; Kenney 2011). Kenney failed to mention that some of this funding had been transferred to related projects, such as LIPs, which do not directly provide services to new immigrants, as well as to the transaction costs associated with moving federal money into different programs. The Harper government’s 2006 budget announced an increase of $307 million over two years for CIC’s settlement and integration budget; however, approximately one-third of the funds were not spent in the years from 2005 to 2009 (Seidle 2010). Arguably, Kenney’s comments do not provide an accurate account of the immigration landscape, where Ontario continues to gain the greatest number of immigrants per year (see Table Two). Moreover, Kenney, in a position of power and privilege, is able to speak publically and “expertly” about the subject matter. The calculations
cited are not reflective of the number of temporary residents and refugee claimants who are supported by these same services.

Table 4.1: Permanent residents by province/territory (CIC 2015a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province or territory</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>2,581</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>1,929</td>
<td>2,586</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td>2,342</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>2,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>2,213</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>2,837</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>43,315</td>
<td>44,681</td>
<td>45,200</td>
<td>45,217</td>
<td>49,488</td>
<td>53,983</td>
<td>51,745</td>
<td>55,065</td>
<td>51,986</td>
<td>50,294</td>
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<td>Ontario</td>
<td>140,525</td>
<td>125,891</td>
<td>111,316</td>
<td>110,876</td>
<td>106,858</td>
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<td>99,460</td>
<td>99,153</td>
<td>103,552</td>
<td>95,814</td>
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<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>8,096</td>
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<td>10,954</td>
<td>11,218</td>
<td>13,521</td>
<td>15,808</td>
<td>13,312</td>
<td>13,103</td>
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<td>Saskatchewan</td>
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<td>3,516</td>
<td>4,835</td>
<td>6,890</td>
<td>7,615</td>
<td>8,955</td>
<td>11,179</td>
<td>10,680</td>
<td>11,823</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>19,405</td>
<td>20,716</td>
<td>20,860</td>
<td>24,201</td>
<td>27,017</td>
<td>32,650</td>
<td>30,961</td>
<td>36,096</td>
<td>36,639</td>
<td>45,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>44,770</td>
<td>42,084</td>
<td>38,961</td>
<td>43,992</td>
<td>41,439</td>
<td>44,187</td>
<td>34,786</td>
<td>36,242</td>
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<td>174</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>279</td>
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<td>305</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunavut</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>262,242</td>
<td>251,640</td>
<td>236,753</td>
<td>247,244</td>
<td>252,170</td>
<td>280,687</td>
<td>248,747</td>
<td>257,903</td>
<td>259,023</td>
<td>260,404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Service providers across the nation continued to experience funding cuts, a cumulative $85 million between 2012 and 2015 ($29.8 million in 2012–13, $35.2 million in 2013–14, and $20 million in 201415) (OCASI 2012a). Although these funding cuts represent 33% of the federal budget, a reduction in funding changes the ability of service providers to deliver meaningful and inclusive services that complement CIC’s welcoming communities mission (ibid.). The initial cutbacks were particularly challenging given the lack of transition time, to allow service agencies to realign their management strategies and services. Underfunding also affects smaller immigrant service agencies for specific ethnic groups that rely on larger multiservice organizations for resources, as smaller organizations are unable to compete for government funding contracts (Lo 2011). Severe cuts to funding often force an environment where survival versus meeting needs becomes the main priority. Provisions for other social services such as education and health care
have similarly been reduced, which jeopardizes the successful integration of new immigrants in all spheres and the ability of Canadians to support the integration process (Keung 2011). Arguably, a more individualized approach to funding cuts, one that attends to different needs, would be beneficial (Castles et al. 2009). The federal government maintained that funding cuts would “help achieve positive settlement outcomes for newcomers and meet the needs of Canada” (CIC 2010c). In 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s new Liberal government promised $56 million over a three-year period (2016-2019) to support the processing of permanent resident documents and the operation of settlement programs (GC 2016). Organizations that provide indirect services to immigrants, such as the Local Immigration Partnerships obtain a small portion of the funds direct service providers receive, approximately 1010% of the available Settlement Program funds (CIC 2015b).

c. A New Direction: Ontario’s Immigration Strategy and Bill 49

Published in 2012, A New Direction: Ontario’s Immigration Strategy (OIS) identifies the need for a provincial immigration strategy, contextualizes the purpose of the report, and outlines three strategy objectives to pursue moving forward. More specifically, the Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade (MCI) envisions “a new direction for immigration in Ontario – attracting highly skilled workers and their families, supporting diverse communities and growing a globally-connected economy” (2012, ii). The report emphasizes the importance of the attraction, retention and welcoming of skilled workers and their families to the province. The MCI (2012, 2) asks the question: “Why does Ontario need an immigration strategy?” Several objectives are indicated, including the need for skilled immigrants to fill skilled, paid work positions, challenges with federal-level policies, and the need for increased newcomer supports (ibid.). The province desires economic immigrants who can enter skilled jobs directly and wants to remove “barriers to meaningful employment” (2012, 4). Charles Sousa, then Ontario Minister
of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade notes that, “our population is getting older, birth rates are low, workers are retiring and forecasts say there will not be enough new workers to meet the demand” (2012, iii). The provincial government also problematizes the federal government’s restriction on numbers of immigrants entering Ontario. The OIS goes on to advocate for a partnership with the federal government in order to fulfill the province’s “new direction.” The OIS consists of four areas of consultation: The Expert Roundtable on Immigration and the committee’s Expanding Our Routes to Success report; consultations with stakeholders, including municipalities and other provincial Ministries; and labour market forecasts. The three objectives outlined in the strategy are to attract skilled immigrant workers to contribute to economic growth, to support new immigrants and their families, and to encourage a “globally-connected economy” (ibid.). Fourteen targets are identified, such as raising economic immigrant levels from 5252% to 70%. The majority of targets relate to the need and support for skilled workers, however, there are several targets that specifically discuss the importance of non-skilled workers (temporary foreign workers, international students, and non-economic immigrants) and their improved outcomes (ibid.). A number of targets encourage immigrant employment in fields that fit experience (including the provision of licenses in licensed-based professions), and attempt to improve the unemployment rates of new immigrants.

A progress report entitled Our Future, Together: Forging Ahead, Ontario’s Immigration Strategy was released in 2015. The report reiterates the goals detailed above and notes the Royal Assent given to the Ontario Immigration Act (see below) as well as the five-year agreement made.
between the provincial and federal governments with regard to Provincial Nominee quotas. Progress objectives relate primarily to the attraction and retention of skilled, economic migrants.³

There is little substance to this report. It includes actionable targets; however, it is not clear where progress has been made in several of the initial goals. Arguably, the foundation for the OIS is insignificant, and the strategy only serves to further categorize the worth of immigrant lives (e.g., the use of immigration to alleviate demographic concerns and possible economic failures). Certainly the desire of the provincial government to guide federal-level decision-making, with regard to the selection of economic immigrants, is identified. That is, skilled immigrants are valuable economic units. In addition, while the federal government has reduced the number of immigrants entering Ontario, the Province continues to receive the greatest number of immigrants (over 95,000 in 2014) when compared to the other provinces and territories (CIC 2015a). Ontario’s lack of interest in facilitating the LIP program may reflect the number of immigrant arrivals, as well as the Province’s aims to attract particular types of migrants (as outlined in the OIS).

In formal recognition of the Province’s long history of immigration and the immigration strategy, Bill 49, the Ontario Immigration Act (S.O. 2015, c. 8), the first act of its kind in Ontario, received Royal Assent in 2015. The Ontario Immigration Act outlines the Province’s aims for and engagement around immigration. The document identifies collaboration with the federal and subnational governments and non-governmental agencies as key components of the Province’s vision for immigration (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2015). Bill 49 includes sections on selection, settlement and integration programs, as well as “inspections, investigations and

³ The report identifies an earlier progress report, released in 2014; however, I was unable to locate this document.
enforcements” (ibid.). The document stipulates that the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade may, for example, “set target levels for the number of individuals selected under [federal] selection programs” (see Part 1, 2. (e)). The Minister’s responsibilities and powers are relatively insignificant, solely regarding activities around the organization of immigration. The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (2015) approves of the Ontario Immigration Act, acknowledging the document’s provisions for family and humanitarian supports, the recognition of the not-for-profit sector’s role in immigration, and for protections for migrant workers. The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants was established in 1978 with the goal of increasing collaboration amongst immigrant serving agencies in the Province (Tolley et al. 2012). The organization also notes that the bill adequately “affirms the importance of immigrants to Ontario and the role they play in shaping the economy as well as Ontario communities and society” (ibid.). To strengthen the document, OCASI identifies six recommendations, including: prioritizing permanent immigration; expanding the Provincial Nominee Program; requiring employers and immigration consultants to participate in registries; implementing a licensing system with a financial bond for employers and recruiters of migrant workers; holding employers and recruiters of migrant workers financially responsible for labour protection violations; and ensuring that immediate inspection and investigation functions with maintained by the Ministry of Labour (versus the MCI). Additional recommendations revolve around emulating Manitoba’s model for migrant worker protections. In light of the Act’s recent provenance, it is difficult to determine the effects of the Bill’s implementation.

d. OCASI and the MOH Survey

In July 2012, the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) released a report, entitled Making Ontario Home (MOH), outlining the results of survey data collected from over 2,500 newcomers. The purpose of this study was to capture information about the use of
settlement and integration services by immigrants and refugees in Ontario, and to understand the needs and challenges of this same population (OCASI 2012b). Data were collected from immigrants of all statuses via an online survey and interviews using a targeted outreach strategy, and is not a representative sample of immigrants and refugees in Ontario. In particular, vulnerable groups of immigrants were actively sought to participate in focus groups (e.g., immigrants without legal status and those from the Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender-Intersex communities) to determine any specificities with regard to settlement and integration needs (ibid.). Service providers also participated in focus groups and interviews. The survey captured demographic and migration history information and well as perceptions of settlement and integration services in Ontario. One hundred fifty-eight countries are represented in the survey. Arrival rates varied, in that one-third of respondents arrived between 2000 and 2005, while the other two-thirds arrived in Canada between 2006 and 2010. A higher percentage of women responded to the call for participants; 68.68% of women compared to 32.32% of men responded (ibid.; report available at: http://www.ocasi.org/MOH).

The study identifies ten key findings, including:

1. Employment is a high concern for immigrants and refugees;
2. High satisfaction with language training programs, but difficulties with settlement due to language abilities;
3. Settlement service providers most often provide necessary counselling and advice supports;
4. More than 80.80% of respondents had used one or more of the services provided by a settlement organization;
5. In general, there was a high degree of satisfaction with settlement service provision;
6. A correlation was noted between time of arrival and the use of service provision;
7. The use of service supports was not dependent on education levels;
8. Non-use of service provision related often to a lack of knowledge about the availability
of these supports;
9. Availability of transportation and distance to services were most often cited as limiting access to services; and
10. Services for immigrants and refugees living with disabilities need better organization.

OCASI believes that this information will inform policy decisions and build capacity within the service provision sector, a key goal of the LIP program. The ability of settlement service providers to better serve immigrants increases a community’s ability to welcome immigrants and enables attraction and retention goals. The coordination and support of multiple stakeholders is important in this regard. This report also points to the significant of federal-provincial funding and involvement.

e. The Third Sector

The third sector (non-governmental organizations) is an important aspect of the decentralization of settlement service support in Canada. Non-governmental organizations began receiving funds to deliver formal settlement programs post-1950, following the establishment of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration; however, the third sector had long been acknowledged for its support (Tolley et al. 2012; Vineberg 2012, 2014). At the forefront, organizations such as the Red Cross and the YWCA provided services for immigrants at major port and rail arrival points (Vineberg 2012). The immigrant service sector began to grow and expand post-World War II, to support both displaced and new immigrants. In 1978 a federal Cabinet decision identified the federal departments that would continue to take charge of the different aspects of settlement, while maintaining the importance of the voluntary sector “as a means of fulfilling their respective mandates instead of increasing the numbers of departmental staff” (Tolley et al. 2012; Vineberg 2012, 28). In Ontario, funds were distributed to volunteer organizations, some of which eventually became formal service agencies, through both the Ministry of Culture and Recreation
and the Settlement and Integration Program (Tolley et al. 2012, see also Amin 1987). Part of the neoliberal agenda to shift governance responsibility away from formal government, the state deems the third sector as an efficient provider of immigrant settlement and integration support, and individual social well-being is now managed in this sphere. This objective is made particularly evident through the implementation of initiatives like the LIP program.

In this chapter, I interrogated historical immigration trends to comprehend contemporary shifts in immigration policies and practices. The examination of federal and provincial policies elucidates governmental rationales for immigrant management and identifies larger structures and philosophies of governance. A discussion of the MOH survey and the involvement of the third sector highlights immigrant behaviour and need in Ontario and the promotion of neoliberal volunteerism with regard to service provision. Chapter Five provides an overview of the history, mandate and operation of the LIP program, and addresses the particulars of each of the study sites, including the Kingston, Peterborough, and Guelph-Wellington LIPs. The LIP strategic plans are examined to understand the particular program philosophies and outcomes.
5 Local Immigration Partnerships

5.1 The Local Immigration Partnership Model

There has long been an interest in involving subnational actors in settlement and integration processes; in the 1950s, a temporary innovation, known as Joint Coordinating Committees, was developed and implemented in communities across Canada (Vineberg 2012). Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) began to encourage multiple local stakeholder participation in policy in the 1990s (CIC 2013). One of CIC’s Settlement Program management priorities, called “Community Connections,” encompasses a multi-level governance strategy to serve clients from within settlement communities and promote a “two-way street” of engagement (in line with directives in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 and the Multiculturalism Act) at the community-level (Burr 2011; CIC 2013). The “two-way street” is denoted as an “obligation,” as per the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), of both immigrants and Canadian society, and intends to foster mutual “respect and tolerance” (CIC 2011). This language enables related projects such as the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC). TRIEC, which, while comparable to the LIP program, focuses specifically on employment. The project gathers stakeholders from Toronto and area to discuss issues around immigrant employment (II3). TRIEC, and other similar immigrant-specific employment councils, has been replicated across the nation (Stasiulis et al. 2011).

In 2008, the federal\textsuperscript{4} and Ontario governments, in consultation with the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) and the City of Toronto, funded a joint call for proposals\textsuperscript{5} for a partnership project with a specialized aim to “support local communities in serving and

\textsuperscript{4} Under Stephen Harper’s federal government.

\textsuperscript{5} Please see original CFP: atwork.settlement.org/downloads/atwork/CIC_MCI_CFP_LIP.pdf
integrating immigrants, through the creation of a community-built strategic plan and a collaborative local council representing multiple stakeholders” (KIP 2010, 8; Bradford 2010; CIC 2013; AMO 2008). The partnership-based program encourages “cross-sectoral collaboration and input” and expects to “support newcomers to become fully engaged in the economic, social, political and cultural life of Canada” (Stasiulis et al. 2011, 113; CIC 2013, 4).

A second call for proposals was circulated in 2010, and a third in 2012 (CIC 2013). In 2010, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration acknowledged its support for the LIP project as a “key to the future of settlement services in Canada” and encouraged the project’s expansion in Ontario and beyond (Tilson 2010; Tolley et al. 2012, 7). Then Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Jason Kenney noted that CIC “[tries] to get better coordination so, instead of dozens of little micro-organizations providing services in their own little silos, [CIC is] trying to have a more rational approach to services in a particular region” (2011). Since the initiation of this CIC “innovation,” political-institutional support has been strong (CIC 2013).

As of 2011, forty-five LIPs existed in Ontario, with fifteen LIPs (one city-wide and fourteen neighbourhood-based) in Toronto and an additional thirty community-wide LIPs across the Province (CIC 2013). In 2013, the Toronto LIPs were reorganized into one citywide LIP and four quadrant LIPs (North, South, East, and West), changing the total number of LIPs to thirty-six (ibid.; I5 2014; see Appendix Four). In addition, at this time CIC provided funds for one LIP each in Alberta, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, and plans were announced to develop the project further. Further calls for proposals (one each in British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan) took place in 2013, and successful applicants obtained funds by April 2014.

Funded in part by CIC and the MCI, the approximate cost to establish the Toronto-based LIPs was four million dollars, while those throughout the rest of Ontario cost roughly 5.2 million
dollars (CIC 2012). The availability of funds encouraged municipal interest in the project (Andrew and Hima 2011). During the development stage, the average cost per LIP was approximately $226,000, which included the “initial creation of the partnerships, needs assessment/asset mapping, consultations and research” (CIC 2013b, 23). According to CIC, the partnership maintenance costs range from $59,500 a year to $553,600 a year (CIC 2013a). The differences relate to the community’s size, needs, and activities (CIC 2013b). CIC intends to provide a maximum of $200,000 per year per LIP, outside of program start-up costs; however, CIC notes that “funding for the implementation of the strategy and the action plans is not provided through the LIPs contribution agreement: LIP partners are expected to access funding through other calls for proposals (CIC or non-CIC)” (CIC 2013a, see Appendix Five; CIC 2013b, 23). This amount may vary depending on changing research needs and immigrant influxes. I will discuss the metrics used to determine LIP funding schemes, as determined by the national government, later in this chapter.

The categories for LIP start-up spending include staff (55%), research and consultation (19%) and administration and overhead (10%) (CIC 2013a). Additional costs consist of knowledge transfer and community outreach (8%), partnership council meetings (3%), translation and interpretation (2%), and travel (1%). Maintenance costs are expected to support staff and meeting expenses only, and CIC will approve of additional needs assessment and asset mapping expenditures (ibid.). According to CIC (2013a, 17), “long term viability of the LIPs is dependent upon cost-sharing, ideally with the province/territory and municipality or other government departments;” however, the Province of Ontario does not financially support the LIPs and many municipalities are not signatories on the LIP agreements. The difference in cost reflects the reduced staff and limited scope of LIPs. Although the LIP model is intended to augment settlement and integration activities that already exist in the host communities, it is important to
understand how cuts to settlement service funds might maintain, facilitate and/or harm the vision for and development of similar projects at the local-level.

5.1.1 Mandate

The purpose of the Local Immigration Partnership model is to attract and retain immigrants to/in small- and medium-sized municipalities (away from the larger municipalities of Toronto and Ottawa). LIPs do not serve immigrants in municipalities and regions, but rather coordinate existing services and build capacity (between settlement service provider organizations, or SPOs, and other mainstream organizations) in these areas, to create “welcoming communities” for new immigrants (CIC 2013a). A “welcoming community” exists where there is a desire “to receive newcomers and where everyone works to create an environment within which newcomers feel at home” (ibid., 4). Neil Bradford (2010) uses the term “social incubators” to describe LIPs because they nurture and enhance pre-existing settlement and integration supports, particularly raising the level of communication and interaction between these supports. The model necessarily requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders, at all levels of government and community (e.g. police services, professional associations, faith-based organizations, ethno-cultural groups, school boards, and public libraries, among others).

LIP objectives then are set not only to “mandate representation, set goals, build capacity, [and] supply incentives,” but also to share accountability with community members and groups (Bradford 2010). According to CIC, the LIP (CIC 2013a, 3):

innovation is a means to systematize local engagement in settlement with resources available to hire individuals to coordinate the activities of the LIP, to build on existing local initiatives, to contribute to the enhanced planning envisioned in the 2008 modernized approach to settlement and to augment engagement of “host” populations in the two-way street model of integration.

Ultimately, CIC believes that the LIP model will help local-level organizations and
municipalities consider immigrant needs as regular and necessary parts of planning processes, which will enable municipal actors to more readily and accurately strategize and act around immigration (CIC 2013a). The implementation of LIPs also prescribes and requires local-level energy to gather resources for immigrant settlement and integration, passing responsibility to provide for immigrants to local-level actors. This represents a clear and formal shift in the immigrant integration process at the local-level.

Signatories of the original Contribution Agreements often include the municipality, the local immigrant settlement service and other service providers, such as not-for-profits organizations in the community. The combination of signatories is community-based and needs specific.

5.1.2 Operation

Although locally determined, CIC recommends that several steps occur in the LIP development phase, including but not limited to (CIC 2013a, 7; Burr 2011; see Appendix Six):

1. The institution of a partnership council;
2. The creation of partnership terms of reference;
3. The completion of research and development of a three-year integration strategy;
4. The implementation of an annual action plan, that meets local priorities; and
5. Annual reporting on the execution of action items.

The development of the Local Immigration Partnership Council, which is made up of LIP staff members, signatories and other community service groups/interested stakeholders who interact with immigrants on a regular basis, requires the creation of council terms of reference and the setting of consistent meetings. Partnership councils help to determine priority items and may delegate work to sub-committees or smaller working groups, with the goal of realizing specific ideas, issues, and/or questions (for example, focused attention on immigrant health and
wellness). The LIP Council facilitates the establishment and updating of the LIP strategy document.

Council research activities and community consultations help with the establishment of a three-year settlement and integration strategy that meets local needs (CIC 2013a). Each council develops a set of specific action plans and an implementation strategy. LIP actors review and revise the strategy document at least once a year.

In addition to these five core activities, LIP activities also often involve:

1. Regular meetings of the partnership council to update/relay information, and to strategize about steps forward;
2. Regular reporting to CIC and to the community-at-large on partnership activities;
3. Continued meetings with community groups/members to build capacity and achieve partnership objectives;
4. Meetings with CIC and other LIPs to discuss funding objectives, priorities and activities; and
5. Continuous research and education.

As discussed in Chapter Two, this type of partnership has been described as a “hybrid” institutional structure and/or a form of meta-governance, where parameters are set based on national goals, but program designs are unique to the local and regional areas (Bradford 2010).

5.1.3 Measures of Success

Although an important aim of LIPs is to develop and coordinate local solutions for more meaningful immigrant integration, CIC identifies six initial indicators of project success in the LIP Handbook; these indicators include (CIC 2014; CIC 2013a, 9, see Appendix Seven; Tolley et al. 2012):
1. Strengthen awareness and capacity;

2. Establish partnerships and enhance participation;

3. Improve access to and augment the uptake and coordination of services that are responsive to immigrant needs;

4. Advance immigrant access to labour market opportunities;

5. Increase mechanisms of reporting; and

6. Leverage funding from other, non-CIC sources.

Coordinating and enhancing available services and organizational supports are key priorities for CIC (I3 2013). These priorities allow CIC to ensure, or at the very least strongly encourage, the increased accessibility of and engagement with services and economic markets, and the more effective (synchronized) operation of settlement services. The support for the partnership model is strongly noted in all CIC materials, with goals to broaden and strengthen local awareness, support more successful integration, and to encourage the formation of networks among multiple stakeholders (place-based actors and groups, and subnational governments) (CIC 2013a; Qayyum and Burstein 2012; Burr 2011; Bradford 2010). The stated objectives are particularly neoliberal, with a goal to decentralize responsibility and funds (but not necessarily authority) and centralize the management of mobility in subnational spaces.

In addition to CIC, the Pathways to Prosperity (P2P) network, formerly the Welcoming Communities Initiative (WCI), identifies key indicators of success in their research and at national conferences (see Esses et al. This network consists of academics, practitioners, and consultants and is funded by CIC to investigate the state of immigration in Canada and to understand place-based expressions of immigration policy. P2P members regularly research partnership inputs, outputs, and operations. In March 2012, for example, an analysis of twenty-seven LIP strategy documents was completed (Kobayashi et al. 2012). P2P researchers
“undertook a search of the Canadian and international literatures covering the 2005–2011 time-period to identify promising practices associated with the top five priorities confirmed by the LIPs” in each of the seven identified domains (ibid. ii). Promising practices have been defined as (Qayyum and Burstein 2012, 1):

the use of particular inputs and processes that are likely to generate better strategic plans. A better strategic plan is one that is more likely to create desired outcomes. The assumption is that better LIP strategic plans, if implemented well, will improve the attraction and retention of immigrants, a core LIP objective.

The seven identified domains are: attraction and retention of workers and entrepreneurs; children and youth; community civic resources and initiatives; education and education policy; health and healthcare; optimizing social, cultural and political inclusion; and workplace integration (ibid.). More specifically, priorities from the “attraction and retention of workers and entrepreneurs” domain are: newcomer attraction; branding strategies; mentoring programs and internships; enhanced language training programs; and employment and business information services. Under newcomer attraction, the report also describes a program where newcomer investors are matched to businesses for sale in Northern Ontario. According to this report, the Business Immigration Attraction Plan ensures access to both newcomers and Canadian business owners and the program is said to experience great success.

A second document entitled Organizational Best Practices of Local Immigration Partnerships also reviews twenty-seven LIP plans and indicates several activities that LIPs may choose to undertake to enhance successful outcomes (Qayyum and Burstein 2012). Indicators of LIP success included “having a broadly based and inclusive LIP council; ensuring active municipal involvement throughout the planning process; and establishing municipal leadership in the form of the city being a signatory to the LIP plan” (ibid. 1). The document also identifies additional indicators of future LIP success.
It is evident that the federal and subnational governments, researchers, LIP organizations, and community stakeholders have all taken time to consider what success for this program entails. As the research indicates, the idea of success and the ability to achieve successful outcomes varies slightly by stakeholder group. In light of the fact that the partnership model is meant to incorporate the unique needs of each community, to what degree should larger scale (national) parameters be enforced? Decisions around criteria for success are particularly problematic because CIC controls the majority of funding available for LIP operations and research. Please see Chapter Seven for further discussion on this topic.

In the next section, I explore the immigration histories and contemporary climates of Guelph, Kingston, and Peterborough, Ontario, and investigate the integration strategies of each of the three LIPs. The LIPs include the Guelph Wellington Local Immigration Partnership (GWLIP), the Kingston Immigration Partnership (KIP), and the Peterborough Partnership Council on Immigrant Integration (PPCII). I shall briefly describe the mandate, structure, and activities of each LIP in order to delineate the specificities and similarities of these Partnerships.

5.2 Sites of Investigation

5.2.1 Guelph Wellington Local Immigration Partnership (GWLIP) in Guelph, Ontario

History:
John Galt established the City of Guelph in 1827 on behalf of the Canada Company, a British development firm (Lusis and Bauder 2012). Early immigrants were European; from 1827 until 1900, Scottish and Irish immigrants were the primary settlers in Guelph (ibid.). The Scottish immigrants “were the wealthiest group in the city, and owned the key mill sites and prime real estate” (ibid. 280; see also Nash-Chambers 1981, 1988). As for the Irish immigrants, there was a divide between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Roman Catholic Irish were labourers and
resided in the City’s poorer areas or the northwest side, whereas the Protestant Irish did not tend to work as labourers and established themselves downtown (Lusis and Bauder 2012). Lusis and Baudar (2012) also note that a small group of residents (0.7% of the City’s population) was comprised of Black individuals, who were former slaves from the United States and other parts of Ontario. English immigrants were by far the largest group, settling in Guelph “at a ratio of two to one, and represented 46.7% of the city’s population” (Lusis and Bauder 2012, 280; see also Nash-Chambers 1981). This group consisted of farmers, followed by semi-skilled industrial workers.

From 1900 to the 1970s, immigration from Europe was still customary, with people arriving from “France, Poland, Holland, Germany, and Hungary” (Lusis and Bauder 2012, 281). For these immigrants, jobs in the manufacturing industries tended to be the norm. Italian immigrants were also common at this time, “settling in St. Patrick’s Ward, the poorest area of the city,” and initially holding factory positions and then working as stonemasons, carpenters, and more (ibid. 281). Since the 1970s, the City of Guelph has had more immigrants arriving from “Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean,” and from the countries of “India, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines” specifically (ibid. 281–282).

Of the 127,009 inhabitants in Guelph, one in five was born outside Canada (as of 2006), and the foreign-born composition largely follows Guelph’s early patterns of settlement, in that residents are primarily from Europe, especially the British Isles (Lusis and Bauder 2012). The City also has a large population of racialized minorities, most prominently South Asians (2.8% of the population) and Chinese (2.3%). 2,830 residents of Guelph also identify as having Aboriginal heritage. The majority of residents are either practicing Protestants (38.8%) or Catholics (31.3%), and many speak English at work (greater than 99%) and at home (90%).
Although dispersed throughout the City, most immigrants live in Guelph’s western and southwestern areas.

Current Climate:
A number of organizations support the attraction and retention of immigrants to Guelph and area, including the municipalities, service providers, non-governmental groups, and the University of Guelph. The City of Guelph leads the LIP, and received $437,464 from CIC to initiate it (Lusis and Bauder 2012). The County of Wellington employs both a sensitivity consultant and translators to provide effective services to newcomers. Wellington is also the first municipal government in the Province to enter into an agreement with CIC to provide settlement and integration services, and in 2009 the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Services organization was formed. Both Guelph and Wellington County sit on the Guelph Inclusiveness Alliance, a community partnership that works to “make Guelph an inclusive community for immigrants,” and has “arguably been the organization most responsible for raising awareness of immigrant and settlement issues in Guelph” (ibid., 288, 292). Interestingly, neither the City of Guelph’s (2014) nor Wellington County’s (2016) official plans mention immigration or immigrants. Additional organizations that foster positive relationships with immigrants, through various programs, include the Guelph Police Services, the Guelph Public Library, and the Wellington Catholic District School Board. Immigrant Services Guelph-Wellington (ISGW) is the main service provider in the area and supports immigrants, with funds provided by CIC and MCI, through three major programs that coordinate immigrant settlement and integration, and language instruction.

The Guelph Inclusiveness Alliance is comprised of twenty-five organizations that work to enhance immigrant outcomes through networking and sharing information (Lusis and Bauder 2012). This organization, which was started in 2006 by four agencies, hosts a list-serve and runs
monthly meetings. Several other groups also support and encourage immigrant communities, including Onward Willow, Guelph-Wellington Women in Crisis, the Lutherwood Adult Employment Services, the United Way of Guelph-Wellington Social Planning Department, and the Guelph Chamber of Commerce. Onward Willow provides various settlement supports to immigrant clients, particularly to those living in the Willow Road area of Guelph, which is a “high-risk, low-income” community (ibid. 292). The United Way, along with the Guelph Inclusiveness Alliance, developed a report entitled *New Canadians in Guelph and Wellington* and identified issues in the areas of “employment, education, housing, transportation, and language programs” (ibid. 290–291).

The University of Guelph contributes significantly to the immigration landscape in the Guelph-Wellington area. Lusis and Bauder (2012, 294) observe that the university’s “Office of Intercultural Affairs fosters cultural competence and promotes diversity on campus, hosts an Aboriginal Resource Centre, employs an international student advisor, offers diversity leadership and intercultural programming, and pairs incoming international students with established university students,” among other activities. The university also works to credential practicing veterinarians, organizes annual, community-based workshops, and produces research with an immigrant focus.

Although there is much support for immigrant populations, Guelph and area need to continue to both “include immigrants in a shared community identity” and “raise the profile of immigration and minority communities in the city” (Lusis and Bauder 2012, 295). Lusis and Bauder (2012) recommend several activities to accomplish the above, such as providing additional information to newcomers via the city’s website, reconsidering the city’s built and ethnic infrastructure, strengthening stakeholder collaborations, and promoting continued research in the area. Importantly, these authors argue that CIC’s current funding formula is problematic.
(and service providers agree), and that “the cost-recovery model becomes a barrier to the implementation of innovative initiatives because many smaller agencies lack the initial funds to start a new program” (2012, 297).

5.2.2 Kingston Immigration Partnership (KIP) in Kingston, Ontario

History:
Kingston was originally a Mississauga First Nation settlement. Between 1669 and 1783, the settlement saw arrivals from French immigrants and then British Loyalists (Kobayashi 2012). The city received a population of approximately 850 due to circumstances around the War of 1812. Then a known military base, Kingston also served at the Dominion’s first capital from 1841–1844. Upper Canada’s largest settlement, the city was a major site for industrial ship and later locomotive construction. During this time, and continuing to present day, Kingston was the site of prominent prisons, health care, military, and higher education institutions.

By 1851, census data determined that the “population numbered 11,585, of whom more than half were foreign born, over a third from Ireland, 16% from England, Scotland, and Wales, and less than 5% from other countries, mainly the United States” (Kobayashi 2012, 110). The mid-1800s saw an influx of Irish immigrants; approximately 2,500 weekly came through Kingston, due to the famine in Ireland. More diverse European populations also began immigrating at this time, including populations from Italy; however, Kingston was known as “a large English village” due to the “dominant cultural and religious institutions, the concentration of those of British background among the economic and political elite and, not least, the limestone architecture” (ibid., 110; see also Osborne and Swainson 1998, 148).

Contemporarily, immigration makes up less than 0.5% of the city’s annual population growth (between 1996 and 2006), rising to 18,505 in 2006 from 17,840 in 1996 (Kobayashi...
2012, 111). This figure is lower than the overall average population increase (1.4% in Kingston and 4.8% in Ontario between 2001 and 2006), resulting in a low population growth and a high median age. According to Audrey Kobayashi (2012, 115), European countries and the United States continue to dominate immigrant numbers; however, similar to other cities in Ontario, Kingston has received a greater number of Chinese and South Asian immigrants, and migrants from “African, Caribbean, South American, and Asian” countries, all visible minorities, in recent years.

In the past, patterns of settlement revolved around labour, which saw quarry workers in Portsmouth Village, west of the city’s downtown core, industrial labourers in the north end, and university employees in neighbourhoods (the Sydenham Ward) east of Queen’s campus. More recently, immigrants have tended to settle in (Kobayashi 2012, 118):

(a) neighbourhoods close to Queen’s, whose residents include both faculty recruited abroad and international students (although the areas of residence for faculty and students tend to be segregated on a small spatial scale); (b) north of the downtown, which is established as an area of lower income; and (c) the northwest area of the city, a middle income suburban district.

Current Climate:
Kobayashi notes that Kingston is “one of the least diverse cities in Ontario, with one of the lowest rates of immigration,” (2012, 127), which is likely due to the lack of employment opportunities and ethnocultural and institutional supports for immigrants. The city’s economy continues to thrive through the institutions noted above as well as several large manufacturing industries, including Invista. There is a number of active individuals and organizations, which include Immigrant Services Kingston and Area (ISKA), coordinated through the Kingston Community Health Centres (KCHC), the Kingston Economic Development Corporation (KEDCO), KEYS Job Centre and, of course, the LIP, known in Kingston as KIP (Kingston Immigration partnership). The immigrant service organization, then Kingston and District
Immigrant Services (KDIS) was established in 1978. According to Kobayashi (2012, 122), “KDIS was established by the Newcomer Settlement Services Program of the Social Planning Council, and received most of its funding from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the (then) Ministry of Citizenship, Culture and Recreation.” In 2006, following the closing of KDIS, KCHC began operation of ISKA, and both organizations offer(ed) a wide variety of supports and services for newcomers to Kingston. In addition to the organizations mentioned above, there are also several ethnocultural associations that provide informal services to immigrants in the Kingston area. Historically, the municipality has shown little interest in immigrant issues, but in recent years has seemingly, through the encouragement of the KIP, demonstrated a desire to participate in the attraction and retention of immigrant populations. Beyond its participation in a web portal for newcomers, an effort to communicate (perceived) pertinent and up-to-date, area- and Canadian-specific information, the city has expressed the intention to draw up a municipal immigration strategy document. The City of Kingston’s Official Plan (2015) does not mention immigration. Kobayashi states that Kingston is unlikely to be a “major immigrant destination” for some time in light of the lack of newcomers to Kingston, the lack of general awareness around newcomer needs, and federal-level cuts to settlement service funding in 2011 (2012, 128).

5.2.3 Peterborough Partnership Council on Immigration Integration (PPCII)

History:

As described by Bhandar and Ma (2012, 185), “Peterborough is located in central-eastern Ontario about 130 kilometers northeast of the City of Toronto. Situated on the Trent-Severn Waterway, which extends from Georgian Bay to Lake Ontario, the area is popularly known as the Kawarthas or the Kawartha Lakes.” In the 1800s settlers from Britain and Ireland recognized Peterborough
as Mississauga First Nation territory (Bhandar and Ma 2012). By 1825, approximately 2,000 immigrants lived in the area. Scottish immigrants were also sought in the establishment of Peterborough, which was incorporated in 1905 (see also Chen 2004, 71). Bhandar and Ma (2012) note the importance of less prominent immigrant groups in Peterborough’s settlement scheme, including the 1892 arrival of Chinese immigrants, their integration in the City and the systemic racism these migrants experienced.

Peterborough’s contemporary population is approximately 120,650, including “10,795 immigrants, and 6,040 individuals of Aboriginal ancestry” (Bhandar and Ma 2012, 185). Primarily, immigrants in Peterborough originate from the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Recent immigrants tend to come from the “United States (1,110), Netherlands (765), and Germany (730)” (ibid., 187). The rate of immigrant growth in Peterborough is slow, in that the City’s “visible minority population is 2 percent, compared to Canada’s 16.2 percent and Ontario’s 22.8 percent” (ibid., 187; see also Statistics Canada 2006). According to Bhandar and Ma (2012, 187) “the social and cultural landscape of Peterborough reflects the stagnant nature of the demographic profile and the lack of ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity.” In addition, “Peterborough has a declining birth rate, a population growth below the national and provincial averages [4.8% vs. 5.4% and 6.6% respectively], the oldest senior population among Ontario’s 1515 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), and Canada’s highest proportion of seniors, with 18.2% of Peterborough residents 65 years and over” (ibid., 188). English, French, and German are the major languages spoken in Peterborough.

Current Climate:
The New Canadians Centre (NCC) is the main provider of settlement services in the Peterborough, Cobourg, Lindsay, Lakefield, and Norwood areas. NCC receives funds from private donations, membership fees, the federal and provincial governments (via CIC and the
Ministries of Training, Colleges and Universities and Tourism, Culture and Recreation), the United Way, and the City of Peterborough. The organization provides resettlement programs, education, and satellite services, and encourages bridging programs and partnerships. One affiliation of note is Peterborough’s LIP, formally known as the Peterborough Partnership Council on Immigrant Integration (PPCII). The NCC and the Community and Race Relations Committee hold a contribution agreement with CIC that governs the PPCII. The Trent Centre for Community-Based Education and the Workforce Development Board supported the initial planning and development phases (PPCII 2016).

Several other organizations provide services and supports in Peterborough. They include the local police unit, the education sector (e.g., the Kawartha School Board employs an equity and diversity officer, and both Trent University and Sir Sanford Fleming College offer English-language training for international and domestic students and immigrants), and the public library (ibid.). The Greater Peterborough Economic Development Corporation, the Workforce Development Board, and the Chamber of Commerce all provide assistance to employers and foreign-trained workers, whereas refugees tend to receive service from Casa Maria. The MCI also provides resources in support of immigrant settlement and integration, specifically through Peterborough’s Community Opportunity and Innovation Network and the City of Peterborough. These two organizations developed the community’s local immigration portal. The City of Peterborough’s Official Plan identifies the importance of immigration, as a means to increase population growth, in one instance (2015). MCI also funds the NCC to provide the Newcomer Settlement Program and the ESL programs noted above.

According to Bhandar and Ma (2012), there is a lack of sustained (non-European) immigration to Peterborough, and a general lack of awareness of immigrant issues by City staff.
and service providers (ibid.). Bhandar and Ma (2012) argue the need for a greater level of communication between the province, the municipality, and other relevant stakeholders.

5.3 LIP Strategy Document Review

5.3.1 GWLIP

Published in November 2010 by the LIP Council, the GWLIP Settlement Strategy is a 193-page document that includes the organization’s plan for immigrant settlement and integration, the GWLIP’s terms of reference, a literature review, an environmental scan, and other reports. The document details the process the GWLIP took to develop their strategy (i.e., research and consultations), and the immigrant and service profiles and gaps in the Guelph-Wellington area. Implementation and action phases are also identified. The strategy involved “more that 400 people in discussions, one-on-one meetings, 2 community dialogues on inclusion and in 4 open-invitation, community consultation sessions hosted in the City and County” (GWLIP 2010, 6).

The LIP Council is comprised of approximately sixteen individuals and organizations that represent “newcomers/immigrants, youth, [the] immigrant serving sector, business, education, health, social services, and government” (GWLIP 2010, 11). The entire process, from the preliminary planning to the implementation phases, occurred over the course of an eleven-month period in 2010. The LIP Council identifies four major themes for the GWLIP to focus on. These areas include Employment, English Language Training, Community Services/Programs (e.g., health and education), and Community Integration/Inclusion (e.g., encouraging workplace diversity and outreach) (GWLIP 2010). Under each theme, a gap/need is indicated along with one or more strategic directions and action strategies. For example, under employment, services that are alert to both the needs of employers and immigrants are identified as needed. The strategic direction determines that “employment service providers are fully informed and funded to match
changing immigrant/newcomer skills/education/experience with changing employment realities” (ibid., 7). Finally, the action strategy calls for an increased competency with regard to immigrant education and experience in the Guelph-Wellington area. The objective of the strategy document is to promote a “caring, equitable community where everyone thrives” (ibid., 10). The GWLIP strategy formally (and strategically) notes CIC-based deliverables including the formation of a partnership council and the development of an organizational strategy. The authors identify a need for this type of strategy in the Guelph-Wellington region, due in part to the increase in immigrant arrivals (that is, more than 800 between 2006 to 2009) in the area.

Statistics Canada data show that the City of Guelph and Wellington County receive immigrants from countries in Asia and the Middle East (63%), including “China, India, the Philippines and Vietnam” (GWLIP 2010, 14). Immigrants also continue to arrive from European countries. The GWLIP strategy is transparent, in that it includes the organization’s terms of reference, literature review, environmental scan, among other documents, which facilitate a thorough understanding of the LIP’s knowledge and intentions. This comprehensive document is more formal and professional, in language and style, when compared to the KIP document, and incorporates immigrant narratives. Communication and outreach are key aspects of all strategies, as well as the continued (effective) use of available resources and monitoring of strategic plans and actions. All strategies involve research and community consultations.

Following the delivery of an organizational progress report in 2013, of the first implementation phase (2011-2013) of the strategy, the GWLIP took time to review and update the organization’s priorities for the following two-year period (2014–2016). The progress report (GWLIP 2013) indicates need in four target areas, including employment, English language training, programs and services, and community inclusion, and notes what was accomplished in these areas between 2011-2013. For instance, under employment, the GWLIP states that over 100
immigrants attended networking events with local employers. The GWLIP identified eight priorities (two priorities per theme) within the partnership’s four themes, now entitled: Meaningful Employment; Entrepreneurship and Business; Service Coordination and Access; and Awareness and Inclusion (2013, see Appendix Eight). The priorities regard the accessibility of meaningful employment opportunities and service supports, immigrant incorporation into economic development schemes, and the improvement of education and research around immigrant needs and gaps. For example, under the Meaningful Employment theme, one of the two priorities states “create the conditions that allow immigrants to obtain meaningful employment by: a) Marketing the business case for hiring immigrants to employers and the broader community.” Six partnership committees are identified to deliver on these updated priorities. One change of note is that language training has been subsumed under the theme of employment; overall, however, the priorities have been refurbished but not significantly changed.

Similar to the strategy plans in the other communities, the GWLIP notes the importance of “community-wide” support to accomplish the updated partnership priorities (GWLIP 2013). This priority is particularly evident under the Service Coordination and Access theme. The stated expectation of community support aligns with CIC principles, and the GWLIP does not identify this requirement, with any urgency, further. The progress review denotes the metrics used by the organization; the reporting structure indicates organizational change and quantifies activities. This is parallel to how other partnerships report, as required by CIC.

5.3.2 KIP

The Kingston Immigration Partnership is described as a “multi-sector group representing the diversity of organizations and businesses in Kingston” (KIP 2010, 5). In November 2010, the KIP published a twenty-eight-page strategic action plan following nearly two years of research
and community consultations. The KIP Council was developed simultaneously and guided the process. The contents of the strategy include information about the organization, its operation and accomplishments, the consultation process, and the action and implementation plans.

Representatives from across the City, including twenty local groups, were consulted in the creation of this strategy; accordingly, “based on the feedback from the first assembly and findings from the focus groups and interviews, the KIP generated a list of 32 common needs and challenges that newcomers face in Kingston. At the second assembly participants were asked to group these needs into common themes and generate ideas on how to address these challenges” (KIP 2010, 9). There are eight areas of investigation, including employment, education and training, information, orientation and welcoming, racism and discrimination, language, social supports and community connections, health and wellness, and housing, transportation, and family services.

Within each theme, the KIP set a minimum of two goals that contain both strategy and related action points. The theme of language, for instance, identifies two goals including that “language program providers coordinate their services to improve and diversify the learning options available to newcomers,” and “occupation-specific language training is available as bridging for newcomers” (ibid., 18). These themes were based on ten guiding principles that include: settlement by all; building on our strengths; attraction by reputation; waste not, want not; growing our social capital; including-by-doing; coordinate, then innovate; learn from the best; tearing down barriers; and sharing and celebrating diversity (ibid., 11). Essentially, these principles outline the manner in which those involved envision immigrants, the settlement and integration processes, and the outcomes. For example, the “waste not, want not” principle asserts the desire to match immigrant expertise with suitable employment. With this objective in mind, more specific goals (and actions) were developed. In the case of employment, one strategy
dictates the importance of Canadian job experience, and specifies three actions, including using Employment Ontario to secure jobs.

The authors of the strategy problematize the issue of immigrant retention in the City of Kingston and identify the need to support immigrants in an effort to ensure that Kingston is economically viable. They note the primary goals of the organization, including the desire to increase immigration levels, better understand needs and “promote a welcoming and inclusive atmosphere” (2010, 2).

The KIP Council draws on the rhetoric that immigrant settlement and integration is everyone’s responsibility. The strategy explicitly states that (2010, 5):

making Kingston home to the next generation of newcomers is the business of the Kingston Immigration Partnership. Built around the simple idea that making immigrants a part of our community is everybody’s responsibility, this Partnership is connecting and coordinating efforts – both big and small – to attract, welcome, and integrate immigrants to our community.

The language around responsibility and the word newcomer are CIC-based. Another example of the phraseology includes (ibid., 5):

this document is designed so that the whole Kingston community – newcomers, long-term residents, businesses, social services, government, and community groups – can learn about and contribute to making Kingston a welcoming and inclusive place for new Canadians, informed by conversations and research with the diverse range of people and organizations in our city.

Everyone must take an active role in the process of immigration. Accordingly, the success of the plan relies on “the support of the full community” (2010, 5). In this sense, the federal government can justify a reduction in funding (a neoliberal technique) to settlement service organizations and replace those resources with support from community-based volunteers (Ilcan and Basok 2004). Furthermore, the KIP authors add, “as you read through this document, think about what your role – as friend, neighbor, colleague, manager, teacher, healer, service provider, etc. – will be in this effort” (2010, 5).
Using data from Statistics Canada, the strategy authors locate the contemporary and future immigration landscapes in Kingston, and in major urban areas (and immigrant destinations) such as Toronto and the nation. They argue that although there will be no significant increase in immigrant numbers that there will be a change in the ethnic composition of arriving immigrants (from European to Asian, African, or the Americas). KIP defines immigrant attraction to Kingston as an issue in comparison to Canada’s other larger immigrant-receiving cities. This issue can only be resolved should the collective whole come together to support immigrant attraction (and retention). Examining patterns of immigration is important to the discussion of supports and services (even though the KIP does not provide services) to new immigrants. The effort to call the community to action is evident: “do we sit back and follow that path set out for us, or start now so as to make sure that Kingston is a part of this cultural shift – as a prosperous, vibrant and diverse city” (2010, 6). Certainly, the desire to enact a prescribed change is clear, but the sentiment expressed in this passage also parallels federal-level policy and the Ontario government’s own strategy document. Interestingly, it is noted in the strategy document that while Kingston has seen negligible growth in rates of immigrant settlement since 2000, both Guelph and Peterborough have experienced “high growth in their immigrant populations over the past decade” (ibid., 6). In 2011, however, fewer immigrants lived in Peterborough (9,495) than in Kingston (18,085) or Guelph (27,515) (Statistics Canada 2016). Similarly, the number of immigrants received was fewer in Peterborough than in Kingston or Guelph (see Chapter Three).

The strategy document also outlines the supports that are currently in place for immigrants to further the coordination of necessary services, and denotes the number of consultations in this community-driven process. In addition, the plan describes the partnership as a best practice (2010, 8). Most notably, the authors of the KIP strategy problematize immigration as an issue, organize community involvement and responsibility as necessary, and make an urgent call to
action. There is an emphasis on the incorporation of community members in the planning process, as per the philosophy behind the partnership program. The KIP Strategic Action Plan sketches a vast number of priorities, goals, strategies, and actions with which individuals and groups must engage in order to facilitate the greater attraction and retention of immigrants and a more welcoming community in general. In principle, these priorities are admirable; however, the resource-based challenges experienced by the KIP ensure that accomplishing the objectives outlined will be difficult (see Chapter Six).

In 2013, the partnership council underwent a structural shift and members were required to be more accountable and responsible in their roles. Members report at every monthly meeting, and they can also serve for more than two years. The membership has opened up, which has nearly doubled the number of councillors. The council is not a decision-making body. Since 2012, the KIP has produced an annual report card. These reports review key strategy priorities and detail organizational achievements. In March 2016, the KIP released a review of the “journey so far,” which presented the voices and reactions of those closest to the project (KIP 2016). Community members discussed the organization’s successes in particular events (e.g., the multicultural festival) and the KIP’s role in coordinating other organizations (i.e., ethnic associations and school boards). Individuals noted the important move of KIP’s host organization, Kingston Community Health Centres, to a new location in Kingston, on Weller Avenue. The goal of this move is to improve service to the individuals that use the organization’s services and facilities. The authors of the report also identified the importance of opportunities to promote Kingston as an immigrant destination at trade shows outside of the city. In 2015, the city released a Workforce and In-Migration Strategy that addresses the importance of immigration to enhance labour shortages (City of Kingston 2015a). Although Kingston perceives that it is moving in the right direction on many issues (cultural competency in employment, healthcare and
food options), many immigrants still experience racism and discrimination. Again, the objective
to educate people about immigrant issues is associated with the desire to make everyone
responsible for immigrant settlement and integration. Future projects include further involving
immigrant associations and celebrating (by communicating) immigrant and organizational
successes. There was no succinct review of the eight areas of investigation. Finally, the KIP
presented a revised mandate that reads: “to provide leadership to the Kingston community in its
efforts to attract, welcome, include and integrate immigrants.”

5.3.3  PPCII

Peterborough was one of the first communities in Ontario to answer CIC’s call for proposals for
the LIP initiative. In the spring of 2008, service providers, organizations, and individuals
gathered to consult on and discuss the idea (Peterborough Partnership Council on Immigration
Integration (PPCII) 2016). With widespread support the initial four coordinating organizations,
including the New Canadians Centre (NCC), the Community and Race Relations Committee, the
Trent Centre for Community-Based Education, and the Workforce Development Board,
alongside the partnership council, developed a comprehensive five-year (2010–2015) integration
strategy. The City of Peterborough endorses the strategy and City staff members regularly attend
PPCII’s committee meetings. The Peterborough Immigration Partnership involves more than 60
local organizations and 140 community members. The partnership council governs the
organization through four active committees and the Talking about Canada Group. These
committees include: the Executive Committee; the Integration Strategy Committee; the Capacity-
Building and Outreach Committee; and the Resource Development Committee. During the
reorganization of the PPCII (2015–2016), the Executive Committee was the only committee that
met regularly, to coordinate and implement the new strategy. The NCC oversees the PPCII’s financial and human resources operations.

In 2010, the PPCII developed a four-pronged integration strategy that addressed the sectors: Economic Development; Health, Social Services, and Voluntary Housing; Transportation; and Education (PPCII 2010). Each sector identifies five themes: capacity building; access to services; opportunities for participation; attraction and retention; and, research and development. Each sector also identifies five priorities and five objectives that align with themes. For example, under the sector of economic development and theme of capacity building, the objective to “develop resources, initiatives and partnerships that support employers in attracting, retaining and integrating immigrants in the workplace” is listed. Each objective involves a series of actions, such as “give information on wage expectations and credential assessment to immigrant services in other countries” in the case of the above objective. The strategy is outlined in a two-page document that displays the organization’s plan in table format, while the action list is a comprehensive six-page document.

The PPCII (now known as the Peterborough Immigration Partnership) released a 2016–2021 community integration plan as a follow up to their initial 2010–2015 strategy document (2016, see Appendix 9). The partnership engaged in additional community and stakeholder consultations and research, and a comprehensive review of their 2010–2015 strategy document, in order to develop their most recent strategy. This three-page document outlines the organization’s values, goals, and plans. The PPCII’s mission is to create a community where the “meaningful economic, social and cultural integration of newcomers ensures a prosperous and inclusive community for all” (PPCII 2016, 3). This statement is not far off from their tag line “together we prosper.” Furthermore, the partnership aims to provide “community leadership to ensure meaningful integration in a welcoming community,” and is “committed to creating a community that reflects
our anti-oppressive and anti-racist values” (ibid.). Similar to the GWLIP and the KIP strategy documents, the PPCII identifies the need for the “community to take action” in order to realize set objectives. Goals relate to economic success and social inclusion, and call for better labour market outcomes and support for international students, and an increased sense of belonging and cross-cultural understanding in integration processes. The strategies through which the PPCII intends to accomplish these goals include education and outreach, policy engagement, and outcome measurement and reporting. In comparison to the first integration strategy, the 2016–2021 strategy is far more focused on particular gaps, but is simultaneously more general in terms of action items.

The PPCII encourages a mutual responsibility for immigration, but not with the same sense of urgency that the KIP does. The authors of the strategy document emphasize an active approach that integrates meaningful inputs with the aim to create a welcoming and inclusive community for immigrant newcomers. The partnership carefully constructs immigration as a mutual benefit through which all prosper, and the organization leads stakeholders in this goal. The organization’s goals and strategies are direct and manageable, and organizational structures are well organized. It is likely that the entrenchment of the NCC in the community has supported the PPCII’s development, and has helped the PPCII to earn the respect of community members quickly. The PPCII appears more coordinated in its involvement and successful with outcomes.

Chapter Five provided an overview of the LIP program and sites of study, and examined the LIP strategic documents. It was shown that the stated goals of the LIPs were to identify immigrant needs, to fill gaps, and to raise awareness for the betterment of Guelph, Kingston, and Peterborough. It is clear that achievement of these goals is the shared responsibility of all community members. In the next chapter, an exploration of interview responses reveals key themes and deeper concerns with immigration policy and practice.
Chapter Six: Analysis of LIP Implementation

6.1 Analysis

This chapter reviews data from semi-structured interviews to comprehend how key informants, particularly those with knowledge about immigration and the LIP program, understand immigration-related practices and policies. Results also address how LIPs measure success and outcomes for immigrants, to highlight policy impacts. The interactions between the federal and subnational governments and LIPs will be made explicit here. Interviews were conducted between August 2013 and February 2015, and reflect the information available and key informant knowledge at the time of interaction. Eighteen interviews were completed.

Seven codes were developed during the research process and used to examine transcriptions of interviews (see Appendix One). These seven codes include Scale, Resources, Success, Challenge, LIP, Sustainability, and Immigrant. Sub-codes are used in four of the seven codes to comprehend the nuances of key informant responses. These four codes are Scale, Success, Challenge, and LIP. The theme of Scale is further defined as it relates to the Federal, Provincial, Regional, Municipal, and Local (community partner) domains, which tend to be understood as distinctive spheres by policymakers, LIP facilitators, and those involved with the program. The Success field sub-codes included Uniqueness, Impact, Collaboration, and Other. Policy, Funding and Other challenges were more specifically addressed under the Challenge heading. Finally, the LIP field included a particular focus on LIP Definition, Structure and Implementation, Outcomes, and Other. Responses are discussed below within the realm of these codes and sub-codes. The codes were used as a tool to describe and map the interview data. Each theme was identified in-text using a colour, and a number where a sub-code was present; coding software was not employed. For example, the colour yellow was used to identify the theme of Scale in transcriptions, and the number one written in brackets beside the highlighted text (1) noted the
sub-code of Scale Federal more specifically. In total, there are nineteen codes including the sub-codes. There is no code hierarchy.

In this section, I break down how I use and understand the codes. The theme of Scale, which includes five sub-codes, refers to the level at which the policy is thought to occur and/or where it is experienced in practice. Scale indicates the mention of a level at which policy may transpire, but also participant comments regarding interactions, activities, and/or decision-making at these levels. For example, Scale Regional is evoked when a regional interaction between LIPs is mentioned. Scale Municipal is noted when discussing the city in question’s level of participation with the area LIP. The code Resources reflects a discussion of funds as it relates to governmental and non-governmental funding and in-kind community effort and support. In this regard, the challenges with funding were often noted. Success indicates how LIPs are perceived as successful (as useful, necessary, and/or important). How is LIP success defined? Is it related to an organization’s individuality, effectiveness, or ability to motivate capacity? The sub-code Success Other points to resulting research and/or strategic accomplishments and organizational measures. The field of Challenge concerns how policy and funding (both sub-codes) potentially infringe on a LIPs ability to complete tasks and therefore have a desired effect. The sub-theme of Challenge Other identifies other difficulties such as the lack of a clear governmental direction for the Partnership model and uncertain futures, and immigrant challenges, which will be discussed further below. The theme, LIP Definition describes the LIP project structurally and considers whether LIP presentations vary from one organization to the next, if at all. LIP Structure and Implementation considers an organization’s overarching activities and administrative duties. The code LIP Outcomes refers to programs and activities initiated by LIPs as well as the revision of priorities. LIP Other discusses the degree to which Partnerships are involved in policy decisions as well as interactions with other LIPs. Future (Sustainability) addresses project continuation or
completion, and finally, *Immigrant (Newcomer)* notes instances where participants addressed “the immigrant” or immigration.

Although this analysis is not quantitative, Appendix Ten indicates the overall frequency with which each code occurs. I note code occurrences to get a sense of whether the discussion is proportionate to the number of times a theme occurs. For example, are challenges with partnership funding more likely to be discussed than are LIP successes, how are they discussed, and in what context(s)? Knowledge of code occurrences does not replace the qualitative significance of what was discussed around each code. Statements were analyzed to determine the instances and manners in which codes were evoked, specifically, how participants made associations between ideas and how and when data were willingly, or perhaps reluctantly, provided. Interestingly, the *Resources* theme had the greatest number of references at 103, which reflects the significance of inputs, financial and in-kind, in the day-to-day and future operations of the organization. *Scale Federal* (77), *Challenge Other* (75), and *Newcomer (Immigrant)* (69) closely followed the *Resources* theme in frequency of occurrence. *Scale Federal* points to the level at which local-level practice is constructed, construed and governed, *Challenge Other* references difficulties in measuring partnership and model success, and *Newcomer (Immigrant)*, instances of the word newcomer or immigrant. On the opposite end of code occurrences, *Scale Regional* (14) and *Success Uniqueness* (12) appear. Both are interesting results in light of the facts that LIPs are touted for their ability to serve local-level needs most effectively, and the federal-level desire to promote information sharing across regions and among non-governmental agencies.

Codes were selected prior to conducting interviews to reflect the research questions and to expose information shared by informants. The themes of governance and governmentality underlie the development of these codes. Some codes served their predetermined purpose better
than did others. For instance, an additional sub-code relating to challenges surrounding the measurement of project outcomes would have been useful and likely could have been added to the Challenge section. I coded measurement-related challenges under Challenge Other. Each code will be explicitly discussed in the sections that follow.

6.1.1 Scale

Scale reflects the particular ways in which immigration is governed and controlled at different levels of government. The interactions between different governments and groups (who interacts, when they interact, etc.) are important to consider because these interactions affect the ways in which immigrant integration and settlement occur, are understood, and are measured. Interactions and activities among stakeholders as well as perceptions of scale shape everyday outcomes. This theme displays the ability of federal bureaucrats to construct policy and shape social realities as part of governing practices. Federal government “consultations” with the local-level occur through standardized reporting structures; however, beyond an annual performance report, LIPs are unable to provide meaningful feedback to decision-makers. Despite the claim that the program offers a “two-way street” to immigrant integration, the integration continues to be one-way, with the federal government determining modes of conduct to program coordinators and other stakeholders.

The Scale sub-codes Federal and Municipal are evoked (77 and 63 times respectively) at a greater frequency than the remaining sub-codes, which points to the levels at which LIP policy is created and executed. The Provincial code occurs 48 times, the Community code, 37 times, and the Regional code, 14 times. The Provincial code is identified when participants discussed the Province’s initial involvement in LIP discussions, and current manifestations of the program are not reflective provincial level participation. The Community sub-code appears around discussions
of local-level stakeholder engagement with the project. It is difficult, however, for LIP coordinators to engage stakeholders in significant ways, due to a policy shift in early 2014 that ended a LIP’s ability to use funds distributed by CIC to implement activities (II 2014). Program directors were most likely to identify this shift.

In a neoliberal environment, insufficient time and resources inhibit stakeholder ability to participate fully in LIP activities. The Regional sub-code was implemented for the purpose of discussing LIPs that form across a larger geographical region (versus being municipal-only). Such as the Guelph-Wellington LIP that incorporates the City of Guelph and Wellington County. Any mention of joint LIP work is also identified using this code (e.g., discussion of the Southwestern Ontario LIP working group).

This section examines the immigration context in Ontario and beyond, and the interactions between levels of government and non-government. I discuss some additional and important information about specific policies and policy shifts here. Provincially, where immigration is concerned, there is a “context of uncertainty” due to frequent shifts in policy (I13 2015). In January 2015, for instance, the Express Entry system was implemented in Ontario, which allows employers to take a more active role in the selection of immigrants, and it is unclear how this policy will interact with existing systems of immigration. It is argued that established programs such as the Provincial Nominee Program are not well used by the province to reach immigrants, which is likely due to the sheer number of immigrants to Ontario and federal-level cuts to settlement service funding and targets (I8 2014). In addition, the Provincial Nominee and similar programs privilege economic class immigrants who can work in resource industries, which does not promote settlement in Ontario’s more knowledge-based economy (I7 2014; I8 2014; I10 2014). A shift in targets also presents a considerable challenge because a decrease in the number of immigrants settling in Ontario, due to the government’s aim to “reduce backlog,” justifies a
decrease in provincial funding levels for settlement and integration support, which coincides with the prioritization of settlement in provinces other than Ontario. Finally, it is important to note that as of June 2014 the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration became the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade, to reflect the government’s enhanced role in attracting immigrants that further the Province’s and the nation’s goals for economic prosperity and growth. This change reflects a larger global shift that encourages international competition for skilled workers, which shifts provincial aims and interest (Pero and Smith 2014). The federal government urges settlement outside of the province (e.g., to Alberta) and shifts the province’s mandate to augment the involvement of municipal governments and local-level stakeholders in immigration.

The LIP model is an Ontario-based idea (coordinated by the federal and provincial governments, the City of Toronto as members of the Municipal Immigration Committee, and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario) that reflects the desire to strategize around settlement destinations in the Province. The implementation of the Partnership project (which does not provide direct services) follows a period of significant funding cuts to settlement services, those that coordinate the day-to-day immigrant supports. If the federal government’s focus is to attract skilled workers, then it may eventually be the case that settlement service support will not be necessary (or will at least be less significant and expensive) because skilled immigrants are thought to have a shorter integration period (I10 2014). It is important to note that immigrants with higher levels of education are just as likely to use settlement service support than are immigrants with lower levels of education (OCASI 2012b). There is a sense that Ontario wants a more focused approach to immigrant recruitment and settlement, in a Province that historically has not appealed aggressively to the federal government (I15 2015; I10 2014). Following the expiry of the COIA in 2011, the development of the 2012 Ontario Immigration Strategy, and Bill
49, the *Ontario Immigration Act (S.O. 2015, c. 8)* receiving Royal Assent in 2015, Ontario is attempting to inform national-level policy in a way that reflects provincial needs (I8 2014; I9 2014). The province’s participation in immigration is a strategy to admit more economic immigrants.

*a. Interaction: federal and local*

To what degree are decisions about immigrant settlement and integration community-based and led? The federal government provides the funds for LIP operations, and with access to power through funds shapes project outcomes. The federal government can also direct sudden shifts in policy; one informant noted that “that one for us was kind of a shock because that came at the end of February and we had already been talking about what priorities to set, but that’s the new policy and she’s not going to budge on it so that is what we have to work with” (I1 2014). It seems that local-level priorities are not taken into consideration, and that federal-level officials dictate project priorities. Moreover, it was noted that funding interactions occur between the LIPs and provincial settlement officers, while policy related decisions are made at the federal-level (I4 2014). The “two-way street” to settlement and integration that CIC encourages is in fact only two ways when it comes to local-level providers assuming responsibilities. It would appear that obligations for settlement and integration have been further decentralized, but without an equal provision of power to make place-specific decisions; “we wanted to develop, and we did, a local immigration strategy, but we weren’t given the authority or power to carry it out” (I3 2014). LIPs are governed through resources, policy control, and tools for measurement, and the community has a limited capacity to inform policy-makers.

*b. Interaction: federal and provincial*

There is minimal interaction between the federal and provincial governments. Initial discussions involved the Province, via Toronto’s Municipal Immigration Committee (MIC), but the
provincial government is disengaged from the project and provides little-to-no resource support. Key informants noted that the MIC had no formal role in the development, implementation or sustainability of LIPs. The provincial government’s disengagement may be the result of strained relationships and/or political differences (I15). The province has spent considerable time working on its immigration strategy (2012) and legislation (originally introduced in February 2014), to inform federal policy from a provincial perspective (MCI 2014). In contrast to the federally funded *Quebec Immigration Act*, “the *Ontario Immigration Act* is really an aspirational effort by the government of Ontario to chart their own path of immigration without the attachment of any additional dollars” (I13 2015). Implementing an act would ensure a greater accountability from the federal government. The COIA, which expired in 2011, defined some of these working relationships; “and following the end of COIA … [the province] seemed a little less engaged on a number of fronts” (I4 2014). Perhaps the expiration of COIA did not occur in good faith. One informant noted that “more constructive positive relationships [need to occur] between all three levels of government on a regular, constant basis” (I3 2014). Relationships between governments present a key challenge in the realization of objectives and permit feelings of disengagement for SPOs and non-service providers, such as LIPs. The provincial government does not govern LIPs in any significant way.

*c. Interaction: provincial and municipal*

The province is involved with the LIP project in other ways. Some LIP councils have provincial representation; key informants noted out of 35 LIPs, 27 have a provincial government representative on the council, and 33 have municipal or regional government sitting on council. Approximately 17 of 35 LIPs are housed in municipal government, while the remainder are housed within community service organizations. In addition, the on-line immigration portal, a community-based resource for new immigrants, often involves collaboration between the
province, the LIP and the municipality, as it did in both Kingston and Peterborough (Kobayashi 2012; Bhandar and Ma 2012). A number of communities, Peterborough for example, receive multi-year Trillium grants, which are applied to LIP operations. Distributed funds aim to support community-based projects that promote healthy and vibrant communities, and cannot be allocated to municipal governments directly (I2 2014). It is possible that greater collaboration with the province would support a greater interest and understanding of regional patterns of immigration (I15 2015). Finally, the MCI notes that the MIC continues to meet on a quarterly basis and guides policy processes, which indicates that the MCI participates in and informs the Toronto-based LIPs (I4 2014; MCI 2014).

d. Municipal involvement

A number of municipalities are either directly or indirectly involved with the LIP in their city or region (see the numbers above). If not a signatory on the original contribution agreement then municipalities are often members of the partnership council, and are involved in other partnership activities. For example, in Kingston the municipality participates in the annual DiversityWorks conference hosted by the KEYS Job Centre. The partnership project has also sparked municipal interest in developing place-specific strategies that would further support the goal of immigrant attraction and retention, as is the case of Kingston’s Workforce and In-Migration Strategy (City of Kingston 2015a). Of course, the majority of municipalities do not intend to fund the project in its entirety, which may in part be due to the fact that municipalities are under provincial jurisdiction and the province has not expressed interest in the project (I3 2014). Of note, the importance of municipal involvement and intergovernmental interactions appear in the COIA, which guided the project’s initial implementation. In addition, the Organizational Best Practices of Local Immigration Partnerships report indicates that municipal involvement, particularly where the municipality is an agreement signatory, is a promising practice for the project.
(Qayyum and Burstein 2012). Municipalities seem keen to consider immigration and contribute to measures that increase and/or support immigration and integration, in an effort to encourage population growth and to stimulate the economy. The PPCII notes that “the City of Peterborough is definitely a champion and even ourselves we are caught out of surprise at the level of support we are receiving from them” (2014). One participant did remark that the municipality was initially nervous about the manner in which the project seems to decentralize immigrant settlement supports (I1 2014). The municipal government does not govern the LIP program, nor do municipalities express interest in directly managing the program.

e. Interaction between LIPs

There is minimal organized interaction, or opportunity for interaction, between LIPs. LIPs connect at regional and national conferences (one per year) that are initiated either by the LIPs themselves or through CIC and the Pathways to Prosperity network (formerly the Welcoming Communities Initiative) (I16 2013). LIPs also interact more informally via email and other means of communication (ibid.). The Pathways to Prosperity (P2P) network, with funding from CIC, hosts a promising practices video series for LIPs and features the videos on their website. At one time, under the direction of Mary Barr, former CIC LIP Director, a provincial working group existed to assemble LIP representatives at regular intervals; this group is now defunct (I1 2014; I16 2013). Interestingly enough, CIC notes the sharing of best practices among LIPs is a key LIP priority (2014). Guelph is a member of a larger Southwestern Ontario LIP (SWOLIP), a group comprised of approximately fourteen LIPs within this area of the province (2014). The SWOLIP meets several times a year to provide updates and discuss best practices (they are not permitted to advocate).
f. Stakeholder involvement

According to CIC, stakeholder engagement and activity are key priorities, and LIP facilitators understand the importance of building capacity (2014). Beyond noting the significance of building capacity, this theme was not thoroughly discussed by participants, receiving 37 mentions in total. The degree to which the federal-level is involved seemed to be the more pressing topic of conversation. Depending on their level of interest, various stakeholders are differently involved in the program; LIP program coordinators are more invested in program goals than are external stakeholders, including community individuals and groups, service organizations, and members of political parties. In general, there is hope that the program will result in meaningful outcomes for immigrants, but for different reasons. For example, political parties tend to be more interested in economic outcomes versus feelings of inclusion.

Although there are numerous community partners and individuals that support the project, there are others who seem to regard the project with skepticism. For example (I1 2014):

I would talk to organizations that were working front lines with clients in the social service sector and you would think they would be the most open to immigration. What we found was the opposite, they couldn’t care less about immigration. They really couldn’t. And the reaction that I got all the time was “well how many immigrants are here? We don’t see any of those.”

In this instance, communicating particular program goals more prominently allowed the partnership to gather the necessary support; “the only way that we can talk about immigration … is if it’s connected with economic development and we’ve actually made some significant in-roads to raise immigration issues with folks …, which is huge” (I1 2014).

The project has also been positively received; “I think the members of the partnership council themselves were very excited and thought this is a fantastic model, a fantastic concept and there was tremendous enthusiasm on the part of everybody” (I3 2014). Enthusiasm for project outcomes motivates stakeholder engagement and activity (I2 2014). In addition, the
project encourages discussions about immigrant issues that were previously nonexistent, which is an important method by which to enhance immigrant experiences (I5 2013). Unfortunately, limits in time and resources can inhibit stakeholder involvement, particularly the involvement of those in support service roles. Stakeholder involvement is also discussed under the theme Success Collaboration.

The CIC-funded P2P consortium conducts research on all aspects of the LIP program; research is presented in a positive light. CIC identified P2P as a project resource (2014). Although this network is not examined specifically in the scope of this research, it would be interesting to consider the interaction between P2P and CIC.

6.1.2 Resources

The resources code examines discussions around funding and finances, staff time and inputs, and in-kind supports from community partners, as they relate to the partnership project. The topic of resources was frequently addressed, particularly in relation to the financial support that CIC provides and the challenges LIPs experience with this model of funding (which are referenced under Scale_Federal and Challenges_Funding respectively). In other words, project coordinators discussed the financial support from CIC positively, but found the funding model and its requirements difficult to operate under. This theme was identified on 103 occasions (26 more times than Scale_Federal and 28 more times than Challenges_Other), occurring with more frequency than all other codes. CIC provides one-year, renewable funding, and offers more financial support in the first than in subsequent years, to facilitate initial research and the development of the LIP strategy document (I2 2014; I4 2014). According to CIC, the federal government contributed approximately $8.5 million to the LIP project in 2012-13, and LIPs leveraged more than half of that amount from other sources, mostly from community partners.
Although CIC funds in three-year terms, LIPs must request the renewal of program funds each year, an application that coincides with the federal budget cycle. One participant communicated that the short time frame of the federal budget cycle infringes on the consultative process (I5 2013). Funding decisions are made by CIC’s regional offices and are based on a predetermined formula as well as partnerships’ ability to negotiate for funds (CIC 2014). LIPs spend funds on LIP operations (i.e., overhead and staff), but not on the implementation of activities, and they invoice CIC as needed (I1 2014; I2 2014). Several participants noted the challenges of being unable to utilize funds according to their own needs (on programming), because of a policy decision made by CIC with insufficient discussion and notice. Provincially based Trillium funding, secured by communities where the municipality is not a member of the LIP agreement, provides additional, more long-term support. Municipalities are restricted financially, but tend to provide in-kind support, which may mean that a city employee sits on the partnership’s council and/or works alongside LIP representatives to develop the provincially-funded online immigration portal tool (I3 2014; I2 2014). In the research sites, community groups and organizations do not provide LIPs with substantial financial support, and partners often support particular activities through a financial and/or in-kind contribution (I1 2014).

The province does not fund the LIP project; however, the MCI does consider how partnership strategies relate to governmental activities and decisions (2014). The province also funds municipalities to complete the online immigration portals, and some of these funds are directed to LIP budget lines (Bhandar and Ma 2012).

LIPs are expected to diversify sources of financial support. This can be problematic because seeking financial support is energy- and time-consuming and disrupts an organization’s ability to focus more directly on project aims (I2 2014). In Peterborough, the perceived instability of CIC funding led the PPCII to introduce a resource committee as one of the partnership’s core groups.
The resource committee implemented an organizational fee structure, which the partnership uses in ways it determines beneficial (2014). Organizational fee structures may act as barriers to organizational access. In addition, the implementation of such structures downloads financial responsibility onto interested and invested parties. Finally, the lack of consistent financial support affects member motivation to engage in LIP activities, and creates an environment where a survival mentality is the norm (I1 2014; I2 2014). When the federal government suspends funding, it tests the degree to which local communities can (and are willing to) fund and support these partnerships in the short- and long-terms. Municipalities are limited financially and it is unlikely that they will fund these organizations in their entirety (I3 2014). Similarly, it is unlikely that the province would consider taking on the role of funder. The unwillingness of various levels of government to provide funding demonstrates the way that neoliberal governmentality operates by diverting potentially radical energy away from substantive change towards chasing funding and other administrative tasks.

6.1.3 Success

My sense is that now [that] the project has been scaled up and been running in other parts of the country, it’s getting real buy in because people are seeing that it is making a difference. The truth is that the sector has always convened these kinds of spaces. Right now it has formal recognition, there’s some funding for convening from the federal government through Citizenship Immigration Canada. (I8 2014)

Overall, seems to be a good thing to do (I13 2015).

The theme of Success was coded a total of 87 times via the sub-codes Uniqueness (12), Impact (29), Collaboration (29), and Other (17). The Success theme serves to examine aspects of the project’s perceived local distinctiveness, how the measurement of strategy outcomes occurs and is understood, as well as participant thoughts about collaboration, among other considerations. The sub-codes were selected on the basis of how informants discussed formal documents spoke
to the actual and/or perceived benefits of the LIP structure. This section will examine *Uniqueness* and *Impact* more closely.

*a. Uniqueness*

This sub-code received 12 of 87 mentions during interviews. LIPs are formally known as context-specific initiatives that coordinate support for the needs within a community (CIC 2014; Burr 2011). Informants at each site expressly articulated their difference from other sites, but this research did not reveal any major geographic differences between the LIP projects in the chosen sites (see Chapter Seven for additional explanation). For example, both Kingston and Peterborough emphasized the difference of their partnership’s governance structure from other sites (based on the fact that the municipality had not signed the initial contribution agreement); however, both sites have multiple community signatories and no formal municipal one.

Arguably, geographical differences do not present due to key organizational objectives, as dictated by CIC, and existing program challenges (see below). Although there are no major geographic differences in terms of the manifestation of the LIP program in the sites researched, those interviewed from larger cities (i.e., Toronto) perceive that smaller sites have an enhanced capacity to coordinate services more effectively on the basis of their size (I4 2014; I5 2014). This perception neglects any possible complications that may result from regional differences, of immigration patterns for example, and the need for some communities to focus on raising awareness around immigrant needs and issues (I1 2014; I2 2014). In addition, the similarity in responses from the three study sites indicates that there may be fewer differences between small-to medium-sized cities in comparison to larger, more urban ones, a possibility that would require additional research. In this study, different LIPs present differently, but their differences tend to be a result of the vision, goals, and needs of those around the table versus place-based specifics.
This result leads one to question the usefulness of place-based models in small-to-medium sized cities in Ontario.

CIC does not actively discuss program similarities or differences. Despite program challenges (noted below), the perception by key informants of a community’s uniqueness likely motivates the continued pursuance of CIC’s cause and objectives, in that key informants believe in CIC’s vision of community difference and operate with that assumption. Finally, Kingston noted that at times they choose to consult with LIP cities in the north because they feel that there are more commonalities between these locations than among LIPs located in their region in Southeastern Ontario (2013).

b. Measurement and Reporting

What we’re still not able to do is to show more objectively and more systematically how the LIPS have changed the communities in which they evolve… (CIC 2014).

It’s a pretty good return on investment (I6 2013).

You could probably very simply define success as making solid advances on the action plan (I16 2013).

So what you’re seeing is CIC over time slowly, but surely, is creating more structure, right, for these LIPs. If you look at the funding agreements between KCHC and CIC, for the LIP it probably looks exactly the same as all the other LIPs, like the deliverables are very short and sweet. You have to create a community action plan, which we’ve already done, have a Council, which we’ve already done, and you have to meet at least six times a year, and that’s it. And that’s literally it. If you look at the ISKA service agreement, there’s this whole long list of all these various service targets that we have to meet, right. You have to have this number of new clients and this number of this type of service and this number of group sessions, etcetera, etcetera. So, slowly but surely, CIC is creating structure, so the fiscal year work plan is an example (2013).

In 29 (of 87) instances the theme Impact was coded. A number of LIPs have independently organized their own community-based surveys and reports to track institutional progress and to determine any impacts of LIP activities on immigrant settlement experiences. Kingston, for example, designed and completed a report card in 2012 where they collected responses from 100
immigrants and supplemented these responses with data published by Statistics Canada and OCASI’s *Making Ontario Home* survey (2013). The organization completed a follow-up survey in 2015. The achievement of goals identified in the LIP strategy document are often recorded as indicators of partnership success; however, these achievements do not necessarily indicate greater community change (although the aspects of community that LIPs are trying to “change,” and degree to which change occurs, are not well-defined). Oftentimes, internal methods of reporting do not reflect specific targets, but rather general improvements in strategy-related tasks such as a greater awareness of immigrant needs in the community. One participant stated that the goal is to determine whether “we do what we said we would do … [because] for us it’s whether it actually had an impact or not because if it hasn’t that means we need to do something different” (I1 2014).

In this instance, it is not clear to what the word “impact” refers; however, according to key informants, overall indicators of success seem to include raising awareness about immigrant needs and issues in the community, engaging (the “right”) community, government, and immigrant stakeholders, as well as the improving community-based services for immigrants (I11 2014). Another goal is to enhance economic development, which often refers to an increase in the availability of more meaningful jobs for immigrants (I2 2014).

To complicate the process, LIP strategy documents, written with a five-year time period in mind, are fluid and are constantly revisited and revised. The strategy documents enable one to track partnership progress, but not to assess and evaluate longer-term goals and priorities in a more systematic way. Another informal tool used to support LIP sustainability is the telling of immigrant stories (see below, v. LIPs). The use of anecdotes is a useful method of eliciting interest and understanding from potential stakeholders and community members who might otherwise be hesitant to work on behalf of immigrants or to engage stakeholders to achieve stated goals. As one participant noted (I16 2015):
the true measure of success for the LIPs in small towns will be whether or not more immigrants came, and in the big cities it’s gonna be more around did they coordinate and streamline services and then that sort of focus, but in the small towns, it’s really about attraction. But I think that’s a pretty long game.

Certainly, a formal project aim is to increase attraction in a more prescribed manner; however, how is the level of attraction recorded, and how does this relate to retention? Beyond program coordinators, stakeholders did not identify concerns with program impact reports, and overall the program was viewed as being successful.

LIPs report to CIC via the Annual Performance Report for Community Partnerships (see Appendix Eleven) on a number of CIC-determined measures; CIC first requested this document in the 2012–13 fiscal year (I6 2014; I16 2013). The measures recorded by LIPs for CIC consist of partnership inputs, capacity and strategy developments, implementation and community impact, CIC settlement program outcomes, and successes and challenges, partners’ feedback, and conclusions and continued learning. Esses et al. (2014) argue that the document requires additional fields to reflect important LIP and Réseaux outcomes. The indicators of success that CIC has identified via the settlement program’s Logic Model include: greater engagement in immigrant issues; enhanced collaboration among multiple stakeholders; better and more coordinated assessment of needs; an increased ability to welcome newcomers; improved responsiveness to needs; greater coordination and use of services; sustaining partnerships; and better immigrant outcomes (CIC 2015b, see Appendix Twelve). The first four are short-term while the latter four are long-term goals. An example of how the government governs through LIPs, the performance parameters set by CIC for LIPs govern partnership objectives and abilities, and CIC oversight may obscure potential partnership benefits. For CIC, it seems that the better coordination of services, including more efficient referrals, and a greater degree of conversation about immigration and immigrant issues is the goal of LIPs situated in small- to medium-sized
cities to encourage the development of more welcoming communities (I3 2014; Burr 2011). CIC expected to conduct a LIP program evaluation sometime in 2015, although it is unclear whether an evaluation has occurred (CIC 2014). CIC initially requested that LIPs set a general priority for the year and any additional information would be considered supplementary. CIC’s request of LIPs to submit the Annual Performance Report for Community Partnerships is more in line with documents required of settlement service organizations, in their annual reporting framework. The argument here is that CIC intends to structure the organizational behaviour of LIPs, in a fashion similar to that of settlement service providers. The influence of structuring on the ability of LIPs to have a meaningful impact, whether in the CIC-determined areas or the LIP-specific ones, is indeterminable.

The Pathways to Prosperity research group recently produced a document for CIC entitled *Local Immigration Partnerships and the Réseaux en immigration francophone: Strategies for Increasing Alignment and Collaboration and for Developing Performance Measurement Tools.* The goal is to draw connections between the LIPs and Réseaux structures and activities, to encourage alignment and collaboration, and to offer recommendations on useful performance measurement strategies (Esses et al. 2014). In regard to performance measurement and planning, Esses et al. (2014, 10) argue that “while the range and creativity demonstrated [by LIPs] in developing and analyzing these measures is laudable, it is not necessarily efficient, cost effective, or optimal for tracking progress over time and for making comparisons across LIPs.” Current methods do not “optimize comparisons, collaborations across partnerships, learning from other partnerships, nor the accumulation of evidence to support knowledge of the outcomes potentially attributable to the LIPs and RIFs, which is essential for CIC’s efforts to assess progress and success” (ibid., 10). These authors recommend a core number of measures for LIPs to complete on a regular basis as well as a set of discretionary tools. Examples of core measures include
keeping records regarding partnerships, accomplishments of the strategic plan (as well as those
goals that remain unaccomplished), activities that engage the community with the aim of
increasing awareness, and leveraging resources. Additional P2P documents, including the CIC
commissioned *Organizational Best Practices of Local Immigration Partnerships* (2012) examine
indicators of LIP success and likely contribute to CIC prescribed and P2P recommended
measures.

Local determinants of success vary and therefore organizational success is, to a degree,
contextual. Participants, as indicated above, have different perceptions about what is good and
useful with the project and what is not; however, the difference among perceptions are not
necessarily place-based. The determinants outlined by CIC are more rigid and calculating, and
success is understood in a very particular fashion. Arguably, the starting point for measurement
needs to occur at the LIP level (I5 2014). If, for example, LIP goals include increasing
meaningful experiences and settlement outcomes for immigrants, but the ability of communities
to make significant progress in this goal is influenced by CIC’s management of the program, then
it is challenging to adequately determine impact. Moreover, it is difficult to capture how the LIP
specifically affects immigrant experiences (of which there is a wide array), if it does at all,
particularly in light of the fact that partnerships do not provide direct services. This fact points to
CIC’s desire to enhance community-based support and coordination, to leverage resources in the
area of immigrant settlement and integration, and help to explain decisions to reduce settlement
service funding.

In speaking to the benefits of decentralizing immigration control, one informant stated that
the “regional approach … gives voice to the specifics of the setting in question and in turn it
allows the individuals who are experiencing whatever phenomenon it is, in this case immigration,
to articulate the realities” (I15 2015). In the case of LIPs, the on-the-ground realities can never be
fully fed back to the federal government, and therefore the project cannot effectively inform
settlement and integration policy in any meaningful way. It is possible that the process of being
accountable, particularly in the case of LIPs where the availability of resources is minimal, may
actually immobilize the partnership and make it less effective, as it becomes subject to
bureaucratic procedures and attempts to source funds. In this case, measures of success depend
on who is asking, what information is being asked for, and why. For example, an informant from
one organization indicated that the ability of LIPs to inform policy is important, whereas for
others the focus is on the development of a strategy document and partnership council (I12 2014;
I4 2014). Another participant noted that policy advocacy around immigrant need is a “no-no” (I1
2014). The constraint of LIP activities and interests is a technology of rule. Understanding project
success is a large and difficult task, and requires further research.

6.1.4 Challenges

Although LIPs report experiencing a number of challenges, the main ones, which will be
discussed in this section, relate to Policy (19) and Funding (16) concerns. Of the 110 responses
recorded under this theme, 75 items were recorded under the sub-code Other, which refers most
often to the measurement of outcomes.

a. Policy

Nineteen responses refer to challenges that LIPs have experienced with federal-level policy,
which affects their ability to perform. Policy changes made early in 2014 disabled partnership
capacity to spend on the implementation of activities; for many LIPs, this policy shift presents a
challenge because partnerships are not able to execute activities themselves, and are forced to
rely on others to do so (I1 2014). Activities support a LIP’s ability to effectively gather, engage
and motivate partners and other supports. LIPs now require partners to buy-in financially and in-
kind, to support the implementation of partnership programs. One participant noted, “so it’s kind of like we’re working hard to make progress around creating inclusive communities and immigration and then policy direction comes in that makes our job harder or gives us new work to do” (I1 2014). This issue is compounded by the fact that LIPs do not provide direct services, and are therefore known only through their involvement in community activities and programs. Related to this issue, CIC has been known to control LIP activities including local media relations (I3 2014).

Federal-level policies, most recently the implementation in January 2015 of the Express Entry system, also affect existing practices of immigration. The operationalization of the Express Entry system is likely to influence the type of immigrants the province receives, in terms of skill and source country, and in all likelihood the needs to be met will also change. In addition, it is unclear whether the public sector will have the capacity to support these needs (I13 2015). Ultimately, frequent and ambiguous policy shifts affect the ability of the LIP project to accomplish its goals.

b. Funding

For a number of LIPs, finances present a challenge because the federal government’s year-to-year funding model adds a degree of insecurity and makes it difficult to plan for the long-term. One informant asserts, “I think it doesn’t do good for the financial health of an organization in terms of building those capacities, human capacities, human resources, financial capacity” (I2 2014). Peterborough’s PPCII, for example, established a resources committee to ameliorate the “financial limbo” they felt they were in; the organization chose to develop a finance committee and implement a membership fee (2014). This means that “we have full ownership of that money and how we want to spend it and where we want to put that” (Peterborough 2014). Another notes that (I1 2014):
It’s going to be a challenge to build new partnerships to be seen as a partner actually on immigration rather than just someone telling you what to do. If you go to someone and say here are the big immigration issues in the community and we need you to do these things, that’s a different conversation then here are the emergent issues in the community, we have the resources that are dedicated to support this and we want your voice at the table to help make this change.

Dependable and consistent funding is important for coordinators to facilitate LIP activities and progress, to achieve the accomplishment of goals in a way that successfully welcomes new immigrants and encourages seamless transitions in Canadian environments.

There is a perception that CIC’s underlying motivation is to make the existing settlement service system more effective, with less input from federal funds. One informant comments that (I3 2014):

But it was that sort of rapid slow process of feeling curtailed by CIC’s notion of what they were funding. And really it was sort of reduced to this rather self-serving, we want you to make sure that the other funded programs are more effective and more efficient rather than this broader community role. So I think this whole notion of partnership councils was undercut by the funder itself by in a way disempowering it.

The belief that CIC desires to support and solidify settlement service organizations does little to stimulate interest in LIP ideals and aims. Arguably, this perception weakens the effectiveness of partnership practices.

Beyond funding, additional resources are required for LIP operations including staff inputs. LIP staff are integral parts of the project, and facilitate the processes of motivating the community, building awareness, and maintaining momentum, which are key LIP priorities (I11 2014; I1 2014; I6 2013). According to CIC (2014), staff member salaries tend to make up 50% of CIC’s funding allocations.

c. Measurement

They want to measure success and how do you measure success when your role is really an advisory role and the [LIP] isn’t funded to provide direct service and therefore all I can do is advise. (I5 2013)
The processes of building capacity and offering advice are difficult to measure, and success in these areas is not well defined. The LIPs state that measurement, whether it is defining what to measure more specifically and/or finding the time and resources to measure outcomes, is an organizational challenge (I1 2014; I2 2014; I3 2014; I16 2013). One participant notes that “the Feds are quite concerned about measuring results … they sometimes measure the wrong results” (I6 2013). There is a disparity between what the federal government and what LIPs deem important with regard to outcomes. The disparity speaks to who has the power to make decisions around what is and is not important to measure, how these measures are recorded and reported, and ultimately, how/which outcomes inform policy. The inability to assess outcomes meaningfully does not lend itself to the “two-way street” for immigrant settlement and integration purported by CIC, and points to the state’s ability to govern the process. Moreover, according to CIC, “what we’re still not able to do is to show more objectively and more systematically how the LIPs have changed the communities in which they evolve” (2014). Requesting results seems problematic then, should CIC be unclear as to how to assess the intended outcomes. The effort required by LIPs to record and report results also takes time, energy, and focus away from partnership aims.

The LIP strategy document is arguably the “cornerstone to achieving goals, but how are goals achieved and measured?” (I2 2014). The lack of clarity around measuring outcomes serves to negate the significance that one might glean from performance records. Moreover, the fact that LIPs record results differently only serves to further complicate the process.

d. Other

The LIPs are hosted by community-based organizations, in the sites of investigation, not by regional and/or municipal government(s). This structure can affect an organization’s development in different ways (I2 2014). For instance, being established alongside a reputable community
organization may allow a LIP to take advantage of readily available organizational tools and supports. Conversely, it may be difficult to separate the LIP and its mandate from an organization that is already well recognized in its community. Potential stakeholders may be reticent to engage initially in the project, should the perception be that the LIP is not well established and/or well managed. The LIP coordinator in Kingston felt that (2013):

… another complicating factor is that our settlement agency itself is young. When the KIP started ISKA had only been around for two—three years, maybe two and a half years. It wasn’t very well known at the time and you know there was another settlement provider, KDIN for twenty-five years before that. I’m always amazed at how few people I run into had ever even heard of them. And you compare us to Peterborough and the NCC, it’s probably pretty well known, and I don’t know if their LIP [would have] had such a boost if they already had that long track record.

People often do not want to participate in a program until it is considered to be “successful” (I10 2014). Furthermore, hesitations about a project’s sustainability can serve to decrease stakeholder support (I13 2015). CIC anticipates that municipal governments and/or community organizations (and/or provincial governments) will take on the financial responsibilities of LIPs; while most municipalities are committed to the project, many do not intend to fund these partnerships full-time (CIC 2014). Community organizations often operate on limited funds, however, and the provincial government has shown little interest in the project.

CIC discussed challenges related to the (non-CIC) stakeholders involved in the program, and to limited funding from non-CIC sources, but would not elaborate on the difficulties addressed by LIP coordinators and other key informants, such as the federal government’s funding structure.

6.1.5 LIPs

This code addresses issues around the function and structure of the LIPs, what activities and outcomes have emerged, and any other element related to LIP interactions and policy, as well as stakeholders define the LIP project and the various structures of the LIPs. This theme was
identified on 121 occasions. Sub-codes included Definition (33), Structure and Implementation (34), Outcomes (23), and Other (31). Three of the four categories are referenced a similar number of times. There are slight differences in the timing of each organization’s initiation and how LIPs operationalize particular goals (often depending on the signatories and stakeholder groups involved), but these differences are marginal and do not appear to be place-based.

a. Definition

It’s a formal way of bringing various stakeholders to the table to ensure that…any planning that is happening at the local-level includes an immigrant and refugee lens. (I8 2014)

… to customize settlement services, to tailor local approaches, and enable innovation through flexibility. (I12 2014)

When asked to define the LIP model, all participants responded similarly noting the function of the LIP is to assemble community-based supports around immigration. Many key informants remarked that LIPs are based in and led by community organizations, and that they work to identify and prioritize immigrant needs in the community (I1 2014; I2 2014; I16 2013). The purpose of LIPs is to encourage communities to “welcome” immigrants, to consider and respond to immigrant needs and issues at the local-level, and to create equitable results for immigrants (I11 2014). A number of participants used the words “convenor” or “bridge” to describe the LIP’s role in building community capacity (I1 2014; I2 2014; I10 2014; I11 2014). The goal to engage new immigrants in meaningful ways was also discussed, especially with regard to “economic integration, social, cultural, [and] integration in the education system” (I2 2014). Few participants mentioned the desire to increase the number of new immigrant arrivals, one of the CIC-prescribed LIP mandates, and even fewer mentioned visible and linguistic minority communities. Although LIPs do not provide direct services, the perspective that “we work for [immigrants],” especially among program coordinators, was common (I2 2014). The importance of municipal leadership (versus solely the involvement of community-based organizations) and
encouraging municipal leadership was also addressed under this heading (I2 2014; I5 2014; I10 2014; I12 2014). It is not clear why municipal leadership is perceived as important to LIP governance.

According to CIC, the purpose of LIPs is to contribute to and to improve newcomer outcomes through sustained action and indirect service, as well as through the improved coordination of and access to services that facilitate settlement and integration (CIC 2014). CIC states that the partnership program is a “two-way approach” to settlement and integration, an approach that reflects an aim to incorporate local realities into policy. The CIC definition, however, is not reflective of local experiences and understandings of LIP program goals. The AMO, for example, notes that one of the project’s initial goals was to influence CIC and MCI-based policies; however, stakeholders tend to agree, “…one thing this is not is participating in immigration policy” (2014; I3 2014). Another participant states that “LIPs are seen, unfortunately, as service spaces as opposed to policy spaces” (I8 2014). It is not clear whether one of CIC’s main aims for the project is to provide better coordination of settlement services at the local-level. Few participants directly discussed this as a primary objective of CIC’s; nevertheless, as was noted earlier in the dissertation, there have been recent (since 2010) and significant financial cuts made to the settlement service sector, which may point to CIC’s motivations for decentralization. As the MCI (2014) states, “LIPs were intended to develop strategic settlement strategies” that would improve post-migration settlement and integration. Furthermore, one key informant indicates that “they [CIC] wanted us to focus solely on improving settlement services,” and continues this line of thought by saying “I thought that their whole notion of trying to develop appropriate evaluation criteria for LIPS seemed to be tied directly into the outputs of their other settlement funding programs” (I3 2014). CIC requires LIPs to fill out an annual reporting document similar to the one used by settlement service
organizations. If LIPs do not provide direct services, but rather serve to build community capacity, does building capacity include coordinating the settlement service industry, and who is expected to fund this industry? The desire to increase flow and flexibility through greater and more precise coordination is laudable, but in light of the fact that local communities have been settling and integrating immigrants for many years, it would seem that CIC is attempting to gain insight and control of immigrant programming under the veil of inviting community input.

Provincial stakeholders, and those associated with Toronto-based organizations, understand that the program outside of Toronto is and should be different compared to Toronto programs (I5 2014):

… emerging medium size cities that might have a fair amount of immigrants coming but then they don’t have that long history of a lot of social infrastructure for settlement or even a lot of federal funding and then you have the Toronto region that does have the fund history and all sorts of non-profit and all sorts of ethnicity and ethnic approaches and all that kind of stuff …

The idea for LIPs, a program that was first discussed in Toronto, was to encourage the development of a system of immigrant supports that was based on local collaboration, customization, and funds; however, cities like Peterborough, where the New Canadians Centre has been in existence since 1979, already had established settlement programs. Immigrants in large urban and small-to-medium-sized communities have different experiences with regard to access to and engagement with services, and the differences in experience are often misunderstood by large municipalities such as Toronto.

b. Programs/activities/actions of

LIPs often begin by implementing a partnership council composed of a variety of key stakeholders (any governmental and non-governmental agency involved or who may want to be involved with immigrant populations in the community) and set about any investigations necessary to gather information about immigrant needs and issues. These activities are followed
by the development of a strategy document that tends to address priorities such as immigrant employment, health, and education. The LIP takes direct action on these priorities, with the support of community partners, revising the actions and priorities as often as needed. With regard to research and strategic planning, one informant states that the purpose is to “understand what the local needs are, what the gaps are and how we can come up with local solutions to address these” (I4 2014).

There is a sense among key informants that reporting to CIC and to the community are important priorities; CIC identifies reporting as well as “strengthening awareness and capacity” as key indicators of LIP success. Key informants recognize awareness-raising and education as positive outcomes of the LIP program. Activities include the sharing of pertinent information, evidence-based research and immigrant stories with committee members, municipals officials, service organizations, and the community-at-large. Not only do awareness-raising and education activities enhance knowledge about immigrant experiences, but these activities also create capacity and raise the profile of LIPs, which invite feelings of togetherness and success.

Receivers of LIP information gain knowledge about the realities of immigrant processes, and feel included and empowered to augment the capacity-building process and to advocate on the behalf of immigrants. Awareness-raising and education activities designed for receivers benefit immigrants, program coordinators and CIC because increased numbers of people are familiar with immigrant vulnerabilities and needs, and multiple stakeholders contribute to work that is consistently under-funded.

From the government perspective, awareness-raising and education lever financial, human and in-kind resources. In other words, key CIC goals are met through the creation of a two-way dialogue, between LIPs and community members, because awareness activities leverage funds and encourage community member engagement and buy-in. Awareness activities also coincide
with CIC goals to enhance settlement service coordination and uptake because activity promotes interactions and builds support and capacity. The importance of building local solutions to local problems is regularly emphasized by CIC.

Education works well within individual LIP communities, but there is a limited interchange of ideas between LIPs. A mechanism through which LIPs could exchange information, expand the pool of users and share lessons learned would be highly beneficial. In practice, there is a lack of dialogue between LIPs for various reasons; for one, organizations are competitive, protect resources and tend not share best practices. LIP actors are also “productively” engaged in make-work projects, which inhibits their ability to perform low-priority tasks, or tasks determined to slow their daily work flow. Lastly, there is no mechanism through which to share information. An Ontario-wide LIP group was developed to convene LIP representatives (see page 112) but was cancelled in 2012, possibly due to fears of the advocacy function this group could generate. Since this time, inter-LIP interactions have been greatly reduced. According to CIC, they wish to encourage the sharing of information among LIPs via the creation of a virtual platform. An investigation of the usefulness of reconvening the LIP working group would be beneficial.

Awareness-raising and education are challenging and time-consuming tasks, but I speculate that those involved with LIPs perceive these tasks positively because awareness-raising and education promote the alignment of understandings and priorities. In an environment where advocacy is discouraged, awareness activities encourage the communal support of immigrants and propel LIP work forward (Cullen 2009). The ability of LIP coordinators and committee members to discuss and advise on immigrant needs and issues with community organizations and individuals is an important component of LIP activity and policy, and key informants considered these actions to be positive parts of their LIP roles.
LIPs are not permitted to advocate on behalf of immigrants; “advocacy is an absolute no-no” (I3 2014). For different stakeholders, program coordinators specifically, the ability to advocate is more important. Although advocacy is a “no-no,” there is still a belief that partnerships are important policy-informing vehicles (I5 2014). Policy influence is a key priority for Peterborough’s partnership (PPCII 2016). In addition, LIPs do not provide direct services to immigrants, nor are funds allocated for LIPs to implement programs and/or activities. One thing that LIPs can do, however, is to educate community individuals and groups about immigrant needs, and coordinate with other organizations, such as OCASI, to inform policy.

6.1.6 Sustainability
This theme addresses the future of the partnership project and the ways in which stakeholders discussed project sustainability. This theme was identified 19 times. A current goal for LIPs is to maintain project momentum (I1 2014; I2 2014; I16 2013). In addition, CIC wishes to promote the sharing of information among LIPs so as to use LIP knowledge more effectively (2014).

CIC expects that community partners (specifically the municipality) will commit funds to the project moving forward; however, this intent does not appear to be a strategy for most municipalities. There are several LIPs, Peterborough for example, that have set their own fee structure for membership and that employ cost-recovery measures for particular activities. LIP stakeholders often note their feelings around the precariousness of project funding (and the nature of the funding structure) because funding presents a challenge for strategizing around future activities. There is a sense that a cessation of funds from CIC is a likely outcome and that this occurrence would promptly disable the ability of LIPs to continue with their mandates (I11 2014). In terms of continued CIC intervention, one federal official indicates that (2014):

…for governments in general there is a way we can be much more engaged with the LIPs. So we are trying to work on defining how we can do that and moving in that direction
without becoming to, without creating a box right, because the beauty of the LIPs model is that it has evolved based on local circumstances and to respond to local needs and contexts so it’s important to leave it that way but it’s constantly trying to understand how we can play without being too aggressive I guess, in terms of what we want and what we need to be able to play.

Although there is a clear intention by CIC to manage LIPs actively, CIC acknowledges the importance of the local delivery. There was some question by LIP stakeholders about what role CIC should hold beyond “funding the convening of these spaces” (I8 2014). MCI did not reveal an intention to involve itself and support the LIP project in any definable way in the future (2014). The AMO notes that it continues to advocate for sustained funding for the project and partnership expansion (2014). By design, the LIP program is not an example of inter-governmental interaction and oversight.

In discussing the future of LIPs, CIC identifies their commitment to sustaining the partnership project. The program has been expanded across the nation. LIP stakeholders noted the expansion of the LIP program to the Western provinces and were concerned about LIP expansion without any formal assessment or evaluation of the program; “they’ve kind of made the judgment call that this thing is working so they’ve taken it elsewhere” (I13 2015; I10 2014; I12 2014).

6.1.7 Immigrants

The purpose of the LIP model is to understand, support and educate about immigrant needs at the local-level, and therefore, the theme of immigrants (or Newcomer) was used (and identified on 69 occasions) to describe immigrant involvement in the project as well as perspectives on their involvement. The aim for this theme was to determine when and how immigrants were discussed and described, what roles immigrants play, and how they are generally assisted.

Immigrants were mentioned in relation to their (perceived) needs, and rarely in terms of those individuals directly involved in and intimately familiar with the processes of settlement and
integration. Although the LIP project is structured around immigrant needs in principle, it appears that they are not important organizational players. Although it is clear that LIP coordinators do not intend to exclude immigrants, it may be the case that organizational structures do not allow for their more active contribution, in light of the fact that LIPs are not service organizations. In addition, new immigrants are less likely than are established immigrants to involve themselves in LIPLIP programming (see below). Ultimately, it is difficult to determine whether an organization that is meant to welcome and support immigrants is able to do so in a way that incorporates immigrant voices.

Interestingly, one LIP stakeholder took the time to define the word immigrant stating that (I2 2014):

sometimes using the newcomer role as immigrants or refugees, people coming from other provinces, people who are coming from a diverse or have a diverse background. Canadian born but maybe raised in a different culture. So, all of that.

A definition of the word immigrant may address some of the complexity around the ability (or inability) of stakeholders to decide whom to include in immigrant groupings, and how these individuals may, or may not, be accounted for by the LIP.

With regard to LIP interaction with immigrants, one LIP stakeholder noted that once the partnership council was formed there was far less interaction with immigrants, while another indicated that it tends to be more established immigrants who participate in the LIP post-initial set-up (I2 2014; I6 2013). Immigrants may be involved in committee work and/or may act as examples of the type of work the LIP is attempting to accomplish, via promotional materials and meetings, etc. For CIC, the level of immigrant participation in the LIP process seems to be either assumed and/or not a concern (2014). It seems that immigrants were incorporated in the LIP process as needed (during the initial consultation phase), and without any level of consistency.
The research data stimulate further substantive procedural and philosophical questions. For instance, when is a LIP’s work complete? Will LIPs continue under the current federal bureaucracy and federal-level policies? In addition, according to CIC, one project goal is to share resources and knowledges and to speak more collectively on immigrant issues and concerns. I argue that collaboration and education facilitate a greater role for the local to advocate on behalf of immigrants. The LIP, working as the convening body, would be in a position to support this end; however, advocacy is not written into the LIP mandate. Moreover, LIP knowledges do not appear to be well received, in any noteworthy way, by CIC. The LIP program may not be a “two-way approach” to immigration after all. It is important to note that the CIC-directed LIP working group held this function (to examine common policy concerns), but it was dismantled in 2012; this working group has not been restored, which leads one to question to what degree LIPs are given the authority and power to carry out partnership strategy and project goals. What are CIC’s underlying motivations for this dismantlement, and does decentralization, in this form, provide any social benefits? While LIPs have experienced some success in connecting communities and raising awareness about immigrant needs, with no ability to inform and contribute meaningfully to policy, the LIPs have minimal effect.

A well-planned and executed assessment and evaluation of the partnership project, which was expected to occur in 2015, would likely be beneficial before further implementation (I4 2014). For example, does bringing people together to discuss local settlement fulfill the LIP mandate (I13 2015)? Also, has there been any indication that the settlement process has been made more meaningful (I13 2015)? These complex questions require consideration and research.

The project appears to be Toronto-centric. Beyond the federal and provincial governments, and the AMO, the City of Toronto was a key stakeholder in the dialogue about the project and informed the project’s guiding principles. If a project aim was to enable small- to medium-sized
cities to provide for immigrants in a fashion similar to Toronto-based organizations, then it is unlikely that the project will succeed in this format. Toronto has a long history of settling and integrating immigrants, which is not necessarily the same for other communities. This fact may or may not support LIP goals in small- to medium-sized cities in Ontario. This would be another important area of study. Again, among the cities studied in this research, there were no major place-based differences. There are also perceptions among the small- to medium-sized cities of LIP differences that affect how LIPs interact. Kingston for example felt that aligning with eastern localities such as Ottawa would mean that their views and concerns would be “swallowed up,” and the KIP prefers to work alongside more regionally- and northern Ontario-based LIPs such as the LIP in Sudbury (2013).

Stakeholders hold different views of the LIP initiative. Program coordinators and those who have been involved locally, for example, tend to view the LIP program similarly (e.g., support for immigrant integration through the joint promotion of inclusivity). Service providers and academics identify the importance of larger structures and processes of immigration and goals. Political parties note the economic benefits of immigration. The responses from CIC and provincial government participants reflect different levels of investment, interests, and motivations. These responses often do not align with the responses of those working on the ground. CIC, for instance, encourages regional and local efforts, but supports only particular manifestations of these efforts. As noted above, CIC’s enforcement of particular ways of behaving ensures relatively few differences among the municipalities in question. Interview responses inform the analysis of the LIP policy, providing insight into the practice of policy in Guelph, Kingston, and Peterborough. A number of challenges include the inability to inform policy and obtain funds. According to informants, one positive outcome of the program is the provision of a formal objective to convene community groups and individuals and raise
awareness around immigrant needs and issues. Key informants discuss program challenges more frequently than successes, but generally were positive about proposed LIP outcomes. The investigation highlights the main topics of discussion and characterizes the actualities of neoliberal techniques of governance. I will address these techniques in the next chapter, and will discuss the results of the research, provide conclusions and make recommendations for future areas of research.
7 Discussion and Conclusions

7.1 Discussion

This research explored the new local governance of immigration in small- to medium-sized municipal and regional areas in Ontario, Canada. This chapter addresses how the research advances an understanding of the neoliberal state. The discussion will focus on immigrant governance, politics of scale, and the localization of policy in order to elucidate contemporary practices in the immigration landscape in Canada. The chapter ends with some concluding thoughts and points to areas for future research.

In the case of Local Immigration Partnerships, geographies of localization do not denote a transfer of state authority to subnational levels, but rather a reorganization of administrative responsibility around immigrant settlement and integration (Leitner and Preston 2012). Rose (1996, 327) refers to this reorganization in the local-level as a “new spatialization of government.” Leitner and Preston (2012) argue that the national government continues to manage the implementation of and sub-national interactions with policies. The federal government interacts with the local immigration partnership (not provincial and municipal governments) and third sector organizations directly. The increase in “multi-sectoral” governance and partnerships indicates that individuals and groups are increasingly required to take on roles once held by the welfare state and/or other state actors. The shift in responsibility does not limit the role of government, but rather limits opportunities for on-the-ground advocacy and support of immigrant needs (Paquet 2014). Geographies of localization enhance national options for management and encourage the production of certain types of communities and citizens. In essence, the program shapes “governable domains” and persons, through the implementation of new forms of power (Rose et al. 2006, 101). Although the state emphasizes the project’s geographical uniqueness, the
government aims to create spheres of influence within geographical areas, not to redistribute immigrant settlement patterns in Ontario.

The LIP program presents a number of contradictions. LIPs lack an ability to influence local-level stakeholders, but they are tasked to amplify service coordination capacities in entire communities. The inability of LIPs to inform policy decisions does not match the responsibility delegated to LIPs to achieve particular outcomes. LIPs are not formally monitored beyond a yearly report, but they are expected to align with program products. Contradictions such as these make the LIP program a difficult “object” of study, and call into question national policies, programs, and expectations for immigration and for the responsibilities of those addressing immigrant needs in all geographical spheres.

Although there are slightly different LIP manifestations, when one considers immigration history and patterns, individual and group objectives, and immigrant needs in each of the three study sites, this research did not observe any major geographical differences between study sites. I contend that the lack of geographical difference speaks to the degree to which the federal government oversees and interacts with the LIP program and administrators. The CIC objectives for the program are clear and are routinely communicated through documents such as the CIC’s annual organizational report. A reorganization of priorities would suggest that small- to medium-sized cities have some level of control over immigration policies and practices, when in essence communities are expected to adhere to rigid program parameters without consideration of their locally specific characteristics, histories, and needs.

The availability of and access to funding is an important factor. As Tolley et al. (2012, 15) note:

There are also institutional legacies that constrain local responses to immigration, such as downloading of responsibilities to local governments, cuts to service-providing agencies,
and federal decisions about immigration levels and composition of flow. These policies structure outputs and outcomes now and into the future.

A perceived difference between larger and smaller cities in Ontario with regard to meeting immigrant needs and access to services is also an issue (see Chapter Two). This difference appears to be related to the federal government’s understanding of immigrant settlement patterns, although one could question whether government perceptions are accurate in the implementation and maintenance of the LIP program and the effects of inaccurate information.

There were also no major differences among the perspectives of key informants between the research sites. I argue that the lack of difference is the result of comparable organizational structures and experiences of challenges; the main LIP parameters are fundamentally determined by CIC and the challenges experienced with funding, measurement capacities, etc., are similar. Despite program challenges, however, coordinators were positive about the realization of objectives, particularly that of awareness-raising and education. In terms of policy formation, the absence of difference reinforces the existing policy, in that no difference consolidates the practice of power and agenda through policy because the policy is viewed as being effective.

The perspectives of key informants outside of the research sites varied slightly depending on organizational missions and political beliefs. For instance, employment organizations focus on employment needs, which shaped how provincial-level service providers communicated information. Political party representatives spoke more specifically to the importance of immigration as a fix to population decline or labour shortages, referencing national goals for immigration more broadly. As they are less connected to the day-to-day operations of the program, these key informants presented a less intimate knowledge of the program’s inner workings. Overall, key informants were generally on the side of programs that provide additional
on-the-ground support for immigrants and maintain national goals for immigration, a factor that also encourages a continuation of the present policy.

Despite an increased interest from provinces, territories, and municipalities in decision-making around immigration, the federal government continues to exercise power through the provision of funds and decision-making around immigrant selection and arrivals that are reflected through policy. The federal government’s investment in local-level support services is not a ground-up initiative; rather, this top-down, interventionist approach serves to increase awareness of local-level settlement and integration activities through the partnership, but at the same time to reduce available funds.

Although immigration is a shared federal-provincial jurisdiction, the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade (MCI) is uninvolved in LIP oversight and operation. In the case of LIPs, the provincial government has been made irrelevant, and interactions occur between federal and local-level governments, organizations and individuals.

The Province has developed a subnational immigration strategy (OIS) and a provincial immigration act, to guide federal decision makers. Municipalities are involved either as signatories on the LIP contribution agreement and/or through partnership activities, but support is often in-kind, versus in monetary form, and there is little interest in operating LIPs in full.

While this research did not directly study immigrants, the lack of meaningful engagement and communication, particularly from the state to subnational levels of government, continues to exacerbate existing challenges and to affect immigrant lives. For example, an industry that operates in a pressurized funding environment cannot offer adequate services to vulnerable populations. In addition, the immigrant perspective is often not invited, well understood, and/or incorporated. The “mutual obligation” style of governance does not encourage evidence-based and positive change because meaningful measures to understand on-the-ground experiences and
first-hand knowledge are not implemented and do not inform immigrant settlement and integration policies and practices. Fruitless interactions (e.g., a lack of significant and wide-ranging consultation) between government, service providers, immigrants, and other stakeholders, is a technique of neoliberal rule that organizes conduct, increases service costs for Canadian societies, and fails to appropriately and equitably service immigrants.

This research did not reveal any new presentations of political scale, and the interactions between different levels of government represent a mundane politics of scale. Everyday governmental operations occur based on pre-constructed categories that allow for certain activities and ways of thinking and prohibit others. The concept of scale remains an important aspect of the analysis because scalar categories and philosophies shape how the LIP project manifests, in terms of what is available in the local sphere, and delineate what one can and cannot accomplish through the program (Desbiens et al. 2004). In other words, existing scalar arrangements encourage a particular presentation of the LIP project, despite the claim that these organizations are geographically unique. This presentation coincides with federal-level motivations and national goals for immigration. The use of scale as an analytical tool also enhances an understanding of complex and shifting neoliberal processes, and contributes to the enactments of immigration policy. The existence of federal-level policy in subnational spheres should allow for the creation of meaningful systems of feedback; however, LIPs report that they are unable to perform activities, such as advocacy work, that would enable these organizations to alter national understandings of immigrant needs, and possibly also national goals for immigration. In the case of this research, direct interaction between the federal and local/regional levels permits the federal government to know and govern these spaces, and to guide behaviours (of LIP coordinators) in ways that ensure particular outcomes, including regular reporting and seeking programmatic funds.
A multiscalar approach drew out the particularities of interactions among multiple scales, and revealed a formal federal arrangement in the local sphere. The structure and manifestation of LIPs are deliberate arrangements of the nation-state. Although immigrants are affected in multiple spheres of governance (immigrants live in and are governed by municipal, provincial/territorial, and federal policies and practices), federal-level agents continue to control decision-making processes (e.g., with regard to funding) that affect immigrant lives through policy and practice. The involvement of different levels of government (federal, provincial, and municipal), however, and of different individuals and groups in each geographical area, also represents a broadening of local institutions and government (Ward 2000).

According to the majority of informants, LIP attempts to coordinate local-level organizations and their interactions with immigrants (as per CIC directives) are positive outcomes of the program. Specifically, LIPs tend to encourage a level of education around immigrant lives that serves to strengthen pre-existing networks. Awareness-raising is fundamental to LIP staff roles and provides a sense of purpose and effect. There is no mechanism through which LIPs across the Province can interact to exchange ideas. I would recommend an investigation into the possible benefits of (re)initiating an Ontario-wide LIP working group. This tool could provide a space for LIP actors to work through challenges and communicate successes, and enhance LIP outcomes.

On the other hand, Suzan Ilcan and Tanya Basok (2004, 130) note that “… governmental interventions have been largely successful in carrying out the voluntary agencies’ responsibilization efforts within the sector, and the delegation of responsibility is a strategy that is “characteristic of advanced liberalism.” From a federal perspective, providing responsibility for local-level action helps to solidify program goals. Specifically, the economization of the migrant scene supports the control of economic markets and increases national competitiveness (Mullings 2012; Pero and Smith 2014). The direct federal management of immigrants is particularly
important in urban centres in Ontario, the province that receives the highest number of immigrants annually. LIP strategies identify the importance of employment for immigrants. The use of immigrants to “enhance the Canadian labour market” is one driver of the federal government’s management strategy (Vineberg 2015, 52). Nevertheless, despite constant management, market failures abound (Fine, Pincus, and Lapavitsas 2001; Peck 2001; Ong 2007; Mullings 2012; Pero and Smith 2014).

Foucault’s concept of governmentality, or the “techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour,” draws attention to the place of power in this research (Mullings 2012, 408, see also Foucault 1979, 20). Neoliberal actions, which are discussed in the LIP context below, enhance the management of/over difficult to manage landscapes and order particular conduct. In this sense, and as Mullings (2012, 407) argues, as “an emerging governmental strategy … [neoliberalism] aims to embed and extend the rationality of the market into everyday social relations and institutions.”

Rationality refers to how the different aspects of the market are made consistent, where markets refer to “products of collective calculation and investment” (Pero and Smith 2014, 405). Therefore, the “… rationality of market remains an important technology of power …” because it normalizes what is expected by those in positions of power, negates contesting voices, and depoliticizes action (Mullings 2012, 408). For example, LIP operators continually seek funds and to report to stakeholders, but are unable to advocate for immigrant needs and concerns. The ability to manage migrant flows in ever more refined ways allows the state to respond to the market and control for uncertainties (Pero and Smith 2014, see also Callon 2007, 1998). In this sense, the partnership project is one part of a complex neoliberal strategy to rationalize economic markets.

Rose et al. (2006, 97) point out that “to describe certain techniques or even programs as neoliberal indicates their lineage and provides a point of family resemblance with other postsocial governance.” In view of this statement, the implementation and maintenance of a place-based,
market-led partnership program occurs within a history of actions and ideas about immigrants and immigrant management that were elaborated on in Chapters Four and Five. The purpose of this investigation is to map the program’s “governmental rationalities and techniques” as part of a larger system of mobility management (ibid., 99).

In Chapter Five, I discussed six indicators of LIP success that CIC requires to be monitored through an annual report to CIC. LIPs, however, are unlikely to achieve these difficult to measure indicators. For example, an increase in the uptake of immigrant services and an enhancement of access to labour market opportunities are two indicators that would be difficult to determine given that LIPs do not provide direct services. The activity of LIPs to establish nominal partnerships and raise awareness about immigrant needs and issues are items on which they report, but how do these factors indicate success? Beyond obtaining key informant opinions of policy success and failure, this research did not expressly evaluate whether LIPs were un/successful operations. Research results suggest that key informants experience and/or can identify a number of challenges that directly affect the ability of LIPs to perform effectively to achieve either CIC or LIP determined goals. With a greater capacity to inform policy and an increase in government funds, LIPs could actively and meaningfully contribute to immigrant settlement and integration policy and practice.

According to key informants, LIPs act as social conveners, but bound by program parameters that restrict on-the-ground activities to reduce gaps and support needs. No particular end point for LIPs is identified via federal objectives for the program, and incessant reporting does not identify transformational change in a LIP community. This research indicates that federal focus on objectives and the structure of relationships through reporting diminishes the ability to examine LIP content in an accurate manner. At the present time, there is no method to assess whether objectives were met or not. More clarity is required on LIP goal, whether these goals are being met and federal expectations.
Neoliberal techniques of control include predefined project parameters, the regulation of finances, regular reporting/measurement requirements, and the use of expertise. In order to obtain funds, partnerships must initially accomplish a particular set of tasks. Advocacy work is off-limits, as is the use of funds for activity and program payments. The inability to advocate obstructions the likelihood that grass-roots knowledge will inform policy. The lack of funding for programming inhibits a LIP’s chance to partner with like-minded organizations and to enhance community change through education. The main objective of LIPs is to build capacity among settlement service providers and organizations. As useful as this task is, the aim to manage relationships does not necessarily ensure that immigrant needs are met, or that communities are considered more welcoming. Nor does capacity building ensure the greater attraction and retention of immigrants, another program goal. The task for these non-service providers is an onerous one. The availability of and control over resources (i.e., the decrease in support for settlement service organizations and the redirection of funds to LIPs) is a tool to restrict the (spontaneous, non-state) actions of settlement service agencies and LIPs. On many occasions informants referenced CIC’s funding structure and feelings of insecurity related to this structure.

Financial survival tactics disable an organization’s ability to focus on the tasks at hand. The state requires Local Immigration Partnerships to report annually on organizational activities via report parameters defined by CIC; however, measures do not appear to be well-suited to these place-based initiatives. Federal-level control is further strengthened through the use of expertise and research to reinforce governmental goals for LIP development and continuation. The techniques identified do not align with CIC’s proposed “two-way approach,” and mutual obligation does not equate to mutual benefit. Instead, neoliberal techniques promote a top-down churn of ideas and activities that do not allow for feedback from the ground.

How do multilevel and local governance advance the neoliberal state? In the case of LIPs,
while the administrative governance of immigration is decentralized to the local sphere, the process of immigration continues to be heavily regulated by the state. According to Brodie (2002, 391), the “recent willingness of Canadian federal government to cede more of its power over the admission and selection of immigrants is consistent with its neo-liberal commitment to ‘build local solutions to local problems.’” Brodie’s assertion reflects federal support for provincial nominee programs that enable many provinces and territories to propose the selection of particular economic immigrants (although the state must approve of the selection). The LIP project also aligns with the neoliberal commitment to “build local solutions to local problems”; the federal government, however, retains power and lingers in new ways, overstepping the provincial level, in the local. This neoliberal churn allows the nation-state to make decisions with minimal input from other levels of government and non-government actors. The localization of policy therefore does not exclude the state, but rather serves as a means to reorganize responsibility for immigrant lives. This version of immigrant management is the new local governance of immigration in Canada, which can otherwise be understood as the state governing individual and group action through “regulated choices” (Rose 1996, 328). The federal government, though involved in settlement and integration through service provision organizations, now more directly oversees the ways in which communities welcome and include immigrants. Moreover, through the LIP program, the state ensures the increased coordination of direct settlement and support services. The municipalities included in this study participate in LIP activities but do not directly control LIP operations.

According to Mullings (2012, 410), particular practices form structures of governance that the state and other stakeholders consider “good,” including “participatory, consensus-oriented, transparent, equitable and inclusive forms of decision making and implementation that follow the rule of law.” Arguably, the LIP program includes these aspects of decision-making and
implementation. Moreover, Mullings (2012, 410) notes that “decentralization and public-private partnerships are viewed as important institutional mechanisms that facilitate good governance because they provide civil society with new opportunities to influence how economic and political decisions are made.” The LIP Handbook identifies the importance of systematizing “local engagement” and of “multi-sectoral partnerships” in order to “support a two-way process of integration” (CIC 2013a, 3 & 6). The perception is that LIPs contribute to and influence policy discussions; however, the goals of the “two-way street approach” are to enhance control and decrease financial support. The approach is closed; a neoliberal loop where federal goals are implemented through local-level partnerships. Informants directly or indirectly identify these goals. Interesting, Lo (2011, 134) argues that an “adequate and reasonable access to services” relates to the positive integration of immigrants in Canadian societies, which requires government investment in public infrastructure. In this case, the LIP Handbook clearly indicates the objective to improve the coordination of services in the local sphere; however, settlement service agencies in Ontario experienced a decrease in funding that corresponded with the introduction of LIPs.

Although devolution and partnership building provide opportunities for influence, LIPs do not meaningfully influence economic and political decisions. That is, LIPs cannot advocate for immigrant needs and easily consult with the federal government through reports with predetermined parameters. Civil society is not empowered to influence the settlement and integration process. In addition, organizations are unable to support immigrant needs due to the inflexibility of the program structure and the lack of financial security. CIC determines what success is and looks like, and the structure is touted as a promising practice. The lack of influence on the part of the LIPs advances the goals of the neoliberal state.
This investigation employed the data collection methods of semi-structured interviews and primary source document research to understand perspectives about local-level immigrant policies and practices. Additional interviews with stakeholders and interviews with immigrant participants would have been beneficial. Unfortunately, limits in time and resources did not allow for the coordination of further interviews. Moreover, immigrant populations tend to be vulnerable and in transition, which complicates capturing these perspectives. Perhaps governments experience this same challenge, if and when they attempt to consult with immigrants. Another challenge to obtaining immigration voices is that LIPs do not provide direct services and therefore getting a sense of the role LIPs play in immigrant lives is difficult. The focus on LIP administrators is a possible limitation to this study, and it would be interesting to ask similar questions of others. A number of individuals in higher-level government positions were not familiar with the LIP project, or with local-level arrangements of policy. Stakeholder unfamiliarity may be significant in identifying disconnections between policy creation and program implementation. All in all, the interview portion of the research is less robust than I had initially planned for.

I did not determine the degree to which LIPs advance immigrant attraction and retention efforts (a primary LIP goal) because there is no reliable way of knowing a LIP’s contribution to these processes. Another study investigating the complexities of immigration in LIP sites, and relevant pull/push factors, would be useful. Shifts in policy and the regular monitoring of objectives, as is the case with LIP documents, make it difficult to get an accurate snapshot of the landscape under examination. The analysis of primary source documents was important to this research because state and organizational sentiments can be interpreted through a detailed reading of historical and contemporary source material. A number of these challenges occurred during the research process and were beyond my control.
In October 2016, Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party replaced Stephen Harper and the Progressive Conservative Party. This research was conducted while the Harper government was in power. Although a change in government has manifested a shift in atmosphere around the importance of ethnic diversity and immigration in Canada, little has changed with regard to policy and practice. For instance, following U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order suspending immigration from a number of Muslim countries in late 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau openly welcomed refugees from around the world. Trudeau’s statement did not account for Canada and the U.S.’ joint Safe Third Party Agreement, which prohibits individuals from claiming refugee status in Canada (or vice versa) if they originally arrived in the neighbouring country. Anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. has not altered federal laws and policies in Canada. In an advanced neoliberal society where devolution is the norm, it is business as usual with regard to immigration policy and practice. Interestingly, the 2016 Liberal budget did supply additional funds, when compared to budgets since 2010, to settlement service organizations.

7.2 Conclusions
This research uses a neo-Foucauldian lens to analyze the localization of immigration policy and to understand the (c)overt applications and (un)intended outcomes of power. I examined actors’ understandings of localization at different geographic scales through a strategic investigation of documentary sources and semi-structured interviews. I argue that through the LIP program, administrative responsibility is reorganized. The reorganization provides the national government with control over aspects of immigration that occur in the local sphere, and supports the prioritization of goals to manage immigrant bodies, increase program efficiencies, and oversee economic markets.

This research contributes to the discipline of geography through its consideration of the enactments of neoliberalization through place-based initiatives, as well as of national goals for
immigration and citizenship. This policy analysis reveals that geographies of localization require community members to perform tasks once held by the welfare state, but without an equal access to power and resources. The parameters set in policy by the state for community-based organizations and individuals have an impact upon immigrant lives in new ways, such that support services become less accessible, and immigrants are unable to participate meaningfully in and to influence policy. Moreover, limits to scope and finances disable a LIP’s ability to contribute to policy.

Immigration is a shared federal-provincial jurisdiction, but the research reveals that LIPs in small- to medium-sized cities are directly controlled, through techniques of rule, by the federal government. The state is not constrained by the provincial government and the Province has minimal involvement with LIPs. Constitutional power is not shared and control is top-down. With regard to the legal division of power, it could be argued that the state is apprehensive of affording LIPs complete control, and hence ensures the ineffectiveness of these organizations. I did not pursue this thread of investigation. I contend, however, that the governance of immigration through the local-level is an example of technical managerial oversight. The individuals and groups who manage immigrants are controlled by federal-level policy and via responsibilizing forces, and are unable to complete any activity (e.g., providing programming) that is considered to be outside of the realm of what is deemed appropriate. LIP staff are required to undertake particular tasks (goals) for CIC, such as leveraging funds, which keeps members occupied with meaningless work. In comparison to settlement programs, LIPs are minimally funded and have difficulty obtaining funds. In essence, LIPs are ineffective place-holders, representing neoliberal managerialism at work, and constrain the ability to agents to make change. My research did not examine whether this action was a deliberate governmental strategy. The federal government’s intent to coordinate support services, and to prescribe particular
outcomes, promotes an ineffective use of resources, and does not allow for the voices of those working on the ground and those of immigrants to feed back into the management system. The inability to participate in certain spheres of Canadian society may discourage immigrants from becoming active members of these societies (i.e., full or “good” citizens), and reinforces immigrants’ “outsider” status. Formal citizenship, however, as Abu-Laban (1998) notes, does not always equate to substantive citizenship. Forms of neoliberal governance continue to promote these and similar outcomes, and an attempt by the state to organize a system that allows for critical and significant feedback, so as to support immigrant populations, would serve as a beneficial use of resources. Advocating for immigrant needs is an important part of this system, and the act of advocacy should be viewed as positive and constructive.

Although the LIP program faces many challenges, many agree that partnership communities are better informed about immigrant issues and needs because their agendas formally allocate space for the discussion of these topics. The role of LIPs in raising awareness and educating small- to medium-sized municipalities about immigrant needs, around employment, education, and health care, to name a few, is an important goal and a challenging task. Many would argue, however, that there is still work to be done in this regard. The ability to engage in education and elicit an expertise around immigration allows LIPs to oversee, to a degree, local-level spaces, but governments must also see the benefits of such programs and understand the importance of immigrant inclusion. A difference between government perceptions of the importance of LIP interactions and LIPs interactions was observed, and it may be that the inability of LIPs to interact formally is an ineffective practice. I would suggest that CIC reconsider a formalized grouping of LIPs, a mechanism that may function well for LIP cross-pollination. Without access to the appropriate supports, services, and opportunities, any improvements to the immigrant
settlement and integration process will be difficult to sustain (in any considerable way), and immigrant lives will be affected.

Governance in advanced liberal societies “should not be taken to imply a necessary or linear transformation of government nor (even more problematically) a change at the level of whole societies” (Rose et al. 2006, 98). CIC-determined goals (e.g., the promotion of the “two-way street” to integration and set objectives for the establishment of a LIP organization) shape the configuration of LIPs, with goals to enhance immigrant management, the materializations of program objectives and effects are shifting. As Leitner and Preston (2012) argue, one reason for fluctuations in governance is that neoconservative views at the federal-level are not always subsumed at sub-national levels. The on-the-ground realities of policy implementation are to some degree dependent on the philosophies and performances of the individuals involved. Contestations of neoliberal practices disrupt the intended manifestation of national goals. Acts of resistance are not discussed in this dissertation, and resistance should be examined more fully. Positive views were also not examined in any comprehensive way. The examination of varying manifestations of the LIP program, as well as acts of resistance and agreement, would add to the understanding of policy design and implementation, and the geographies of localization.

According to Jennifer Hyndman, Nadine Schuurman and Rob Fiedler (2006, 3), the federal government’s “spread the wealth” strategy requires greater communication around non-traditional destination points. Although it is clear that the government’s central objective is to capture and benefit from the expanded labour force of independent skilled immigrants across a greater geographical area, I would argue that the government must provide a proportional distribution of supports and resources, and access to power, that is comparable and consistent with the settlement and integration goals of all involved. To ensure the success of immigrant settlement and integration policies and practices in Canada, immigrants and on-the-ground
providers must be incorporated and supported.

7.3 Future Research

A wider investigation of the LIP project, in Ontario and nationally, would help to develop a thorough understanding of stakeholder motivations, inter-governmental interactions, and project effects. For example, would a similar study comparing LIPs in larger urban centres in Ontario, such as Toronto, London, and Hamilton, show similar results? Despite the implementation of comparable program parameters, larger urban centres may differ more significantly contextually, which may support different manifestations of the LIP structure. As noted earlier, the geographic size of Toronto means that the City hosts four quadrant LIPs. Research that comprehensively and meaningfully considers what constitutes project success and impact would also be beneficial. The partnership model is meant to incorporate the unique needs of each community, and therefore, a broader consideration of perspectives with regard to success and outcomes is necessary.

At the local-level, LIPs serve to recentralize federal government power, and decentralize administrative responsibility to local-level individuals and groups. Future research might consider the legal-juridical sharing of power and multi-level governance constrains or enhances the effectiveness of organizations. Perhaps an ethnography of CIC and MCI would provide additional insight into the mechanisms that construct LIP operations.

Future research should seek to understand immigrant perspectives of policy practices, such as localization, and their effects. Although some motivations for devolution are commendable, I argue that devolution is not effective without additional (and meaningful) input from those who are implementing and experiencing policy. Individuals who are on-the-ground supporting immigrant settlement and integration and the immigrants living through policy are best able to identify gaps, communicate needs, and facilitate resolutions. Additional information from those who are knowledgeable would provide important insight and could serve to increase program
efficiencies and policy effectiveness.

Federal-level policies such as PCISA and SCCA define which individuals are ideally suited for immigration and determine who is welcomed to and supported in Canada. The concept of citizenship is a key feature of such policies. The process of policy localization identifies the importance of small- to medium-sized cities in the operationalization of federal goals for immigration and citizenship. An examination of the concept of citizenship and the role of citizenship in the varied governance structures of policy localization would reveal government motivations for immigration and immigrant regionalization. Moreover, an investigation of the function of Canadian citizens in immigrant settlement and integration would contribute to governmentality literatures.

More in-depth research on the connections between the various scales where immigration policy is implemented and practiced, and how scales are mutually informing (or vice versa), is necessary. Moreover, consideration of how Canada uses immigration to compete internationally, and the benefits of this activity, would clarify internal decision-making processes. Research that highlights market rationalization would further an understanding of the nation’s migration industry. An international study, compiling data from other major immigrant-receiving nations, would facilitate a large-scale interpretation of enactments of immigration policy.

The immigration landscape is in constant flux, and discourses about immigrants continue to take shape (e.g., the immigrant as “enemy” and security threat). Policies and practices that manage immigrants frequently change. The arrival of Syrian refugees in Canada is an example of how management strategies shift to accommodate immigrants. Inclusionary policies are often “justified on the grounds that Canada is a multicultural nation built by immigrants,” whereas exclusionary policies promote fear and increase the securitization of national interests (Leitner and Preston 2012, 17; see also Abu-Laban and Abu-Laban 2007). The implementation of the
Provincial Nominee and Express Entry programs increase the ability of employers to identify “desirable” immigrants, but without an equal consideration of the unique service needs of the types of immigrants that are selected. Refugee populations, immigrants with disabilities, and immigrants from underrepresented groups, such as LGBT populations also tend to have distinctive needs. A research design that incorporates immigrant voices would help elucidate the complexity of shifts, and would direct research and policy creation.
References


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Guelph, ON. Retrieved December 12, 2016 (http://guelphwellingtonlip.ca/about-our-lip/reports-resources/).


Simmons, Alan B. 2010. Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational Perspectives. Toronto, ON: Canadian Scholar’s Inc.


### Appendices

1. Coding Template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scale_Federal [Decision-making + Activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Scale_Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Scale_Regional (/County)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Scale_Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Scale_Community (Partners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Resources [Funding + In Kind]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Success_Uniqueness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Success_Impact [Immigrant OR Other Inclusion, e.g. business + on settlement experience + “Welcoming Community,” e.g. community interest]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Success_Collaboration [e.g. LIP interaction + community partnerships]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Success_Other [Research + Strategy Accomplishments]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Challenge_Policy [infringes on LIP success]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Challenge_Funding [not consistent]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Challenge_Other [Lack of Direction]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>LIP_Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>LIP_Structure [Providing information + creating meaningful partnerships + ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>LIP_Expected Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>LIP_Other [LIP purpose is not advocacy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Future [Funding from the municipality]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Newcomer (/Immigrant) [occurrence]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Ethical compliance approval letter

General Research Ethics Board (GREB) ethical compliance approval letter obtained from Queen’s University

June 25, 2013

Ms. Rebecca Pero, Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Geography
Mackintosh-Corry Hall, Room D201
Queen’s University
Kingston, ON K7L 3N6

GREB Ref #: GGE0-152-13; Romeo # 6009794
Title: “GGE0-152-13 The New Local Governance of Immigration in Canada: Local Immigration Partnerships and Immigrant Perspectives in Small- to Medium Sized Ontario Cities”

Dear Ms. Pero:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB), by means of a delegated board review, has cleared your proposal entitled “GGE0-152-13 The New Local Governance of Immigration in Canada: Local Immigration Partnerships and Immigrant Perspectives in Small- to Medium Sized Ontario Cities” for ethical compliance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (TCPS) and Queen’s ethics policies. In accordance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (article D.1.6) and Senate Terms of Reference (article G), your project has been cleared for one year. At the end of each year, the GREB will ask if your project has been completed and if not, what changes have occurred or will occur in the next year.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB, with a copy to your unit REB, of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period (access this form at https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_research/ and click Events - GREB Adverse Event Report). An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participant or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example you must report changes to the level of risk, applicant characteristics, and implementation of new procedures. To make an amendment, access the application at https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_research/ and click Events - GREB Amendment to Approved Study Form. These changes will automatically be sent to the Ethics Coordinator, Gail Irving, at the Office of Research Services or irvingg@queensu.ca for further review and clearance by the GREB or GREB Chair.

On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

John D. Freeman
Ph.D.
Professor and Acting Chair
General Research Ethics Board

cc: Dr. David Murakami Wood and Dr. Audrey Kobayashi, Faculty Supervisors
Dr. Mark Rosenberg / Dr. Anne Godlewska, Co-Chairs, Unit REB
Joan Knox, Dept. Admin.
3. Major Events in Canadian Immigration Legislation

Taken from Gagnon et al. 2016; Vineberg 2011; Boyd et al. 2000

- 1867 – Constitution Act
- 1869 – first immigration act assented (amendments deny admittance on the basis of mental and physical health, moral grounds and financial capital)
- 1910 – second Immigration Act (requires examination of immigrants by immigration officers)
- 1919 – Post-World War I act (denies entry to and deports wartime enemies)
- 1923 – Chinese Immigration Act restricts arrivals of Chinese nationals (1885 head tax on Chinese immigrants in British Columbia)
- 1947 – Canadian Citizenship Act (policy change based on family reunification, labour market contribution and humanitarian principles, versus solely country of origin)
- 1952 – Post-war changes to Immigration Act
- 1962 – Nation of origin no longer a criterion for admission (Immigration Regulations)
- 1966 – White Paper (deliberate link made between labour and immigration)
- 1967 – Immigration Act confirms 1962 regulations and introduces points system based on age, education, language skills and labour skills
- 1971 – The Lang-Cloutier Agreement is signed (first formal agreement between Canada and Quebec)
- 1971 – The Canadian Multiculturalism Act is established
- 1974 – Green Paper
- 1976 – Immigration Act (collaboration with subnational governments identified)
- 1977 – Citizenship Act
- 1978 – Upholds 1962 Act, first outline of humanitarian admission factors
- 2001 – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act assented
- 2012 – Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act
- 2014 – Bill C-24 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act
- 2015 – Express Entry program + Ontario Immigration Act assented
4. LIPs funded as of 2013 (CIC 2014)

### LIPs funded by CIC in 2012-13

#### Ontario: LIPs outside of Toronto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of LIP</th>
<th>Lead organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chatham-Kent Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Municipality of Chatham-Kent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham Local Diversity and Immigration Partnership Council</td>
<td>Regional Municipality of Durham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Eastern Counties Local Immigration Partnership (Stormont, Dundas, Glengarry, Prescott and Russell)</td>
<td>Eastern Ontario Training Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Erie Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Workforce Planning Board of Grand Erie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Sudbury Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>City of Greater Sudbury</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guelph-Wellington Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Corporation of the City of Guelph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton Newcomer Strategy Group</td>
<td>Regional Municipality of Halton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Immigration Partnership Council</td>
<td>City of Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huron Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>County of Huron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Kingston Community Health Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds &amp; Grenville Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>United Way of Leeds &amp; Grenville</td>
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<tr>
<td>London &amp; Middlesex Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Corporation of the City of London</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niagara Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Regional Municipality of Niagara</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Bay Newcomer Network</td>
<td>North Bay &amp; District Multicultural Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northwestern Ontario Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Thunder Bay Multicultural Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ottawa Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Catholic Centre for Immigrants</td>
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<td>Peel Newcomer Strategy Group</td>
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<td>Peterborough Partnership Council on Immigrant Integration</td>
<td>New Canadians Centre</td>
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<td>Quinte Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Quinte United Immigrant Services</td>
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<td>Local Immigration Partnership Renfrew and Lanark</td>
<td>Algonquin College</td>
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<td>Sarnia-Lambton Local Immigration Partnership</td>
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<td>Simcoe County Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>County of Simcoe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smiths Falls Local Immigration Partnership</td>
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## Ontario: LIPs in Toronto

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<th>Name of LIP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto City-Wide Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>City of Toronto</td>
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<td>JVS Toronto</td>
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<td>Toronto West Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>JobStart</td>
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<td>Toronto South Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>St. Stephen’s Community House</td>
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<td>Toronto East Quadrant Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>Catholic Crosscultural Services</td>
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## Alberta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of LIP</th>
<th>Lead organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calgary Local Immigration Partnership</td>
<td>United Way of Calgary and Area</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Pilot projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of LIP</th>
<th>Lead organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halifax Local Immigration Partnership – Phase 1</td>
<td>Immigrant Settlement and Integration Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John’s Local Immigration Partnership - Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Association for New Canadians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. “Appropriate Costing” (CIC 2012)

6. “Steps in the LIP Process” (CIC 2013a)

**Steps in the LIPs Process**

1. Establish a partnership council
2. Create terms of reference for the partnership council
3. Conduct research and establish a local settlement strategy to be implemented over three years
4. Develop an annual action plan to address local priorities
5. Report on the implementation and execution of the action plan annually
What does success look like?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Where we are...</th>
<th>Where we hope to be...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newcomer needs assessed.</strong></td>
<td>No standardized approaches or tools for newcomer needs assessment, or a method to derive a baseline.</td>
<td>Universal needs assessment (UNA) with baseline data entered into iCAMs. LIPs facilitate UNA and provide further insight into specific local needs and context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expanded number and diversity of stakeholders.</strong></td>
<td>19 percent of SPOs using referrals; missing stakeholders from some partnership councils (e.g. media, police services, chambers of commerce).</td>
<td>Double the number of SPOs using referrals; augment representation on partnership councils to include media, police services and chambers of commerce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partnerships developed for planning and setting priorities.</strong></td>
<td>Limited interactions between various levels of government, mainstream organizations and community stakeholders.</td>
<td>Strengthen relationship between CIC and provincial ministries; participation by wide cross-section of departments and municipal involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Services coordinated at the community level and improved accessibility to mainstream institutions.</strong></td>
<td>Partial coordination; duplication of some services; limited mechanisms for sharing information.</td>
<td>Every community has a common front door to access settlement services (e.g. welcome centre, hub, newcomer information centre, lead SPO). Improved specialization and coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased awareness of settlement services and thereby enhanced uptake.</strong></td>
<td>Approximately 25 percent of newcomers use CIC language training services.</td>
<td>Increase uptake rate of 40 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved reporting of outcomes for newcomers.</strong></td>
<td>No standardized approaches or tools for newcomer outcomes analysis; no info on intermediate outcomes at community level.</td>
<td>Reporting on intermediate outcomes by community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. GWLIP progress report (GWLIP 2013)
9. PPCII progress report (PPCII 2016)
## 10. Code Frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODES</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Scale_Federal</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Scale_Provincial</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Scale_Regional (/County)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Scale_Municipal</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Scale_Community (Partners)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Resources</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Success_Uniqueness</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Success_Impact</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Success_Collaboration</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Success_Other</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Challenge_Policy</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Challenge_Funding</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Challenge_Other</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 LIP_Definition</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 LIP_Structure and Implementation</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 LIP_Outcomes</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 LIP_Other</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Future (Sustainability)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Newcomer (/Immigrant)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Annual Performance Report for Community Partnerships (received from KIP)

2. PARTNERSHIP'S INPUTS:

a) What human resources supported the work of the partnership during the reporting period? (i.e. the number and roles of staff, consultants and volunteers; training and professional development provided to staff and volunteers, etc. Do not include members of the committees)

b) Has the partnership benefited from in-kind contributions during the reporting period? If so, please identify their source (contributor) as well as the type and estimated value of these contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributor</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of in-kind contribution (supplies, space, etc.)</th>
<th>Total estimated value ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total of estimated value ($):

IME 5782 (01-2013) E

---

c) Has the partnership leveraged additional funding during the reporting period? If so, please identify the sources of funding and amounts leveraged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding partner</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Amounts leveraged in support of:</th>
<th>Amounts leveraged in support of:</th>
<th>Explanation Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIC - Settlement program</td>
<td>Federal government</td>
<td>Secratarial / Coordination (research, administration, analysis, planning, etc.)</td>
<td>Implementation of the strategy or action plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

d) What efforts has the partnership made to leverage additional funding from local, provincial, or federal stakeholders to support the secretarial/coordination or the implementation? What challenges were encountered and how were they addressed?
1. PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT:

1.1 Partnership structure

a) Have terms of reference for the partnership been developed or modified during this reporting period?

- Yes (Please attach the terms of reference to this form)
- No

b) Using the table(s) below, please provide us with more information about the structure of the partnership (add sections as necessary):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of committee</th>
<th>Total number of members</th>
<th>Total number of meetings held during reporting period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members represented (please indicate all applicable):

- Municipal government
- Federal government
- Schools / School boards
- Other (specify)

Remove  Add

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional government</th>
<th>Provincial government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlement service providers</td>
<td>Employer bodies / Employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals / Health units</td>
<td>Justice / Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society groups</td>
<td>Universities / Research networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francophone organizations</td>
<td>Ethnocultural / Religious organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other) LIP</td>
<td>(Other) Francophone network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cc) What specific efforts, if any, have been made to secure participation from certain individuals, organizations, or sectors? What challenges did you experience, and what strategies worked?

dd) Has the structure or membership of the partnership changed during the reporting period? If yes, in what ways? What brought about those changes? (e.g. were the changes voluntary or involuntary?)

5.2 Collaboration and commitment

a) What processes are used to assess the appropriateness of the partnership membership, and what are the results? For example: Is the seniority of the members, their knowledge of the issues at hand, their general commitment to the project, attendance, etc. satisfactory?
12. “Settlement Program - Logic Model” (CIC 2015b)